Society, Spirituality, and the Sacred: A Social Scientific Introduction, Second Edition [2 ed.] 9781442603486

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Societ y, S p ir i t ua lit y, and the Sacr e d

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Donald S. Swenson

Societ y, S p ir i t ua lit y, and the Sacr e d • A Social Scientific Introduction second edition

University of Toronto Press

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Copyright © University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2009 All rights reserved. The use of any part of this publication reproduced, transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, or stored in a retrieval system, without prior written consent of the publisher—or in the case of photocopying, a licence from Access Copyright (Canadian Copyright Licensing Agency), One Yonge Street, Suite 1900, Toronto, Ontario m5e 1e5—is an infringement of the copyright law. Originally published by Broadview Press 2005. library and archives canada cataloguing in publication Swenson, Donald Society, spirituality, and the sacred : a social scientific introduction / by Donald S. Swenson.—2nd ed. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-8020-9680-7

1. Religion and sociology—Textbooks. I. Title.

BL60.S94 2008

306.6

C2008-906599-9

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Ta bl e of C on t e n t s

Chapter one

The Definitional and Theoretical Bases of the Social Scientific Study of Religion

Chapter TWO

Religious Experience

Chapter THREE

Religious Experience and Social Institutions

1 29 59

Chapter FOUR

The Dilemma of Interpretation—Religion as a World View: The Study of Mythologies

Chapter FIVE

The Dilemma of Mixed Motivation: The Study of Sacred Leadership

81 108

Chapter SIX

The Dilemmas of Interpretation and Mixed Motivation: The Study of Women as Leaders

Chapter SEVEN

The Symbolic Dilemma: The Study of Ritual

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137 164

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v i | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D

Chapter EIGHT

The Dilemma of Administrative Order: The Rise of Sacred Organizations

Chapter NINE

The Dilemma of Delimitation: The Study of Ethos

Chapter TEN

The Dilemma of Power: The Relationship Between Religion and Politics Part One: Caesaropapism and Hierocracy

Chapter ELEVEN

The Dilemma of Power: The Relationship Between Religion and Politics Part Two: Alternative Links

Chapter TWELVE

Religion and the Economy

Chapter THIRTEEN

The Encounter With Culture: Secularization and Postmodernism

Chapter FOURTEEN

188 228 257 289 319 343

Conclusions

375

GLOSSARY

381

REFERENCES

403

index

431

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C h a p t e r on e

T h e De f i n i t ion a l a n d T h e or e t ic a l B a s e s of t h e S o c i a l S c i e n t i f ic S t u dy of R e l ig ion

Orientation Imagine yourself on a quest to grasp the meaning of religion and its

substantial basis, the sacred. You begin your journey in a library and read several anthropological studies of religion in hunting and gathering or settled societies. There you are struck that much of the discussion is not about “god” or deities but about some kind of soul, a force, or, what South Pacific peoples call, mana. Your curiosity is enticed, and you begin to read archaeological texts on myths of ancient Mesopotamia and are introduced to religions of many deities such as Ea, Marduk, Tiamat, or Zarpanitu. Your third set of books leads you to ancient Egypt, and you read from the Book of the Dead about such deities as Ammet, Anubis, Babai, Horus, Osiris, Seth, and Thoth. You may begin to be confused as you learn now that religion varies so much with history and culture. Coming west, you encounter Hinduism and detect, again, many deities, both male and female, but with an underlying or primary deity, Brahman. Your journey further west takes you to the Middle East with religions that are monotheistic: Jews call their god Yahweh; Christians say Father or Trinity; and Muslims pray to Allah. What are you to make of this? How can you define the sacred or religion given such a variation? This will be our first task in this chapter—to present definitions of the sacred and religion that capture all of this variation. Next, I will present several ways that social scientists define religion and examine the theoretical position that will structure this whole text: what I am calling a Weberian-O’Dean theoretical perspective (Weberian, from Max Weber and O’Dean from Thomas O’Dea, the American sociologist). This will then be followed by an overview of the text.

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The Definitional Base of Religion The Conceptualization of the Sacred From the illustration of you, the reader, on this universal tour, one might ask the question what characteristic of religion, in spite of its being so varied, is commonly accepted as being at its heart or soul? I take the position that it is the phenomenon of the sacred, also called the holy or the numen. This element of religion is what makes the social phenomenon distinctly different from other human realities. Several scholars acknowledge that the sacred is a central or fundamental characteristic of religion: Leuba (1913), Durkheim (1915/1968), Nottingham (1971), Bailey (1998) and Bowker, (2000). Yet there is still variation in the literature as to how the term sacred is used. Evans (2003) illustrates this well. Relying on a wide variety of sources, he considers the sacred to be defined in three different ways: the religious (concerning the supernatural), the set-apart (any object that is evaluated beyond utility), and the transcendent (indicating that which takes people out of themselves and puts an individual in contact with fundamental forces of the universe). My selection of the dimension of the sacred that is best applied to the definition of religion is the last meaning: the transcendent. The first definition restricts religion to relationships of the supernatural, which would disqualify nature religion common in folk religions.1 The set-apart image is too broad. Many people “set-apart” persons or objects such as photos or mementos that would not necessarily be religious. The term the transcendent sacred seems to capture the heart of the sacred and to be equally applicable to folk, archaic,2 oriental,3 and occidental religions.4 Two pioneers in the social scientific study and comparative study of religion were Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Rudolph Otto (1869–1937). Durkheim (1906/1974) is noted for his defining the sacred as set-apart but is also remembered for his two-fold distinction of the term. Otto (1923/1958), whose work has carried much of the interest in the concept, focuses on the same distinction. As depicted in Figure 1:1, there are two dimensions of the sacred: mysterium tremendum and fasciandus. As a believer approaches the sacred, two kinds of experiences are elicited. The first one is awe and distance. The religious person is in touch Figure 1:1 The Sacred or the Numen

Mysterium Tremendum

Fasciandus

Awe

Hunger

August

The Sacred

Desire

Wonder

Exaltation

Wholly Other Than

Fascination

Fear and Dread

Love and Mercy

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Figure 1:2 The continuum of the Numen

The Numen

Dread

Fear

Energy

Wholly Other Than

Being Wonder Filled

Mercy and Love

with a power, a force that is illustrated by terms such as august, a shuddering, dread, fear, being overpowered, and a sense of being a creature and of relating to the sacred as being wholly other. The second option is fascination, which includes a desire to be close to the sacred, to experience exaltation, love, and mercy. Note that there is an implicit tension or dialectic within the experience of the sacred. One may consider religious experience flowing along an implicit continuum within the sacred. Figure 1:2 expresses this continuum. The Judeo-Christian tradition presents explicit examples of both dimensions of the sacred. Examples of the mysterium tremendum and fasciandus that refer to deity include texts from Ezekiel and Revelation:5 Table 1:1 Texts from the Judeo-Christian Tradition of the Numen Mysterium tremendum

Fasciandus (from Exodus Isaiah, and I John)

brilliant light (Ezek. 1:27–28)

Yahweh a God of tenderness and compassion (Ex. 34:6)

brilliance like that of amber (Ezek. 1:4)

slow to anger (Ex. 34:6)

fire with brilliant light (Ezek. 1:27)

rich in kindness and faithfulness (Ex. 34:6)

flashing of lightening (Ezek. 1:13)

He is like a shepherd feeding his flock, gathering the lambs in his arms, holding them close to his cheek and leading to their rest the mother ewes (Isa. 40:11)

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Table 1:1 Texts from the Judeo-Christian Tradition of the Numen Mysterium tremendum

Fasciandus (from Exodus Isaiah, and I John)

glittering like chrysolite (Ezek. 1:22)

God is love (1 John 4:8)

a throne of sapphire (Ezek. 1:26)

since God has loved us so much we too should love one another (1 John 4:11)

radiance of encircling light (Ezek. 1:28)

God is love and anyone who lives in love lives in God and God in that person (1 John 4:16)

A son of man dressed in a long robe tied with a belt of gold (Rev. 1:13) head and hair white with the whiteness of wool like snow (Rev. 1:14) his face like the sun shining in all its brilliance and his eyes like a burning flame (Rev. 1:14) his feet like burnished bronze (Rev. 1:15) from his mouth the word of God sounding like the roar of the ocean (Rev. 1:15) SOURCE: Jerusalem Bible (1966). The experience of the sacred, then, has various affects. If I experience the sacred as “dreadful,” I am likely to have personal experiences of dread or fear. If I experience the sacred as love, mercy, and compassion, I am more likely to experience being loved, accepted, and cared for. Here is a question you may be asking as a reader: Is the sacred “true” or “real”? This is not a social scientific question. The social scientist depends on the external behaviors of people and on interpretations of these behaviors. So the social scientist cannot know whether the sacred is based on an external reality or is wholly a personal or social construction. What the social scientist can do is to study the manifestations of the sacred and then theorize regarding whether these manifestations are personally or socially constructed. When social scientists engage in research, the analysis of the sacred is important because the subjects say it is important (the methodology of the Weberian verstehen)—worthy of scientific investigation. It should be pointed out, however, that the sacred, of itself, is not subject to social scientific investigation. It belongs to the arena of what the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724– 1804) calls the noumena. Kant (1929) contended that reality is both phenomena (subject to laws of nature and open to scientific investigation) and noumena (that which is

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assumed to exist but is beyond scientific analysis). In defining the sacred as a concept that can be used in the social science of religion, social scientists may be said to employ the methods used to investigate phenomena that are assumed by the subjects (who in this case are believers) to be real, in other words, to investigate noumena. Such a paradoxical approach has social scientists walking a tightrope between the total reduction of the sacred to the laws of science, on the one hand, and the abandonment of a scientific study of the seemingly unapproachable sacred, on the other. The challenge facing social science is to balance its investigation of religion between the horns of the noumena-phenomena dilemma, that is, to use the scientific method to study a topic that, in its final essence, may be beyond the realm of science.

The Conceptualization of Religion Two extremes appear to be represented in any definition of religion: (1) essentialisticuniversalist and (2) fatalistic or denying the possibility of defining the phenomenon. The essentialistic-universalist position is used by scholars to argue that there is an underlying essence in religion that has cross-cultural and cross-historical significance. An example of this is from a seventeenth century Enlightenment thinker by the name of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583–1648). He defined religion as a belief in and pious adoration of a supreme power, a mechanism for the expiation of sin, and a means to receive, in the afterlife, rewards and punishments given for human action (Bowker, 2000). The anthropologist Mircea Eliade (1959) updates this position and states that religion is a unique phenomenon beyond its numerous variations and differences in history and across cultures and societies. The fatalistic position is represented by Beckford (2003) who argues that it is impossible to construct a universal definition of religion. He writes, “It is better, in my view, to recognize that an all purpose, universally, acceptable definition of religion is unattainable” (2003, p. 20). After reviewing further ways that religion can be defined, I shall attempt to construct a centralist position between these two extremes. As indicated above, the problem of defining religion is significant. With such a variety of what people consider to be religion, both cross-culturally and cross-historically, it does appear to be a daunting task. Consider not only radical differences between the world religions6 (Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) but also the many variations within each of these (for example, in Buddhism, Theravada or Mahayana; in Christianity, Catholic or Orthodox or Protestant; and, in Islam, Sunni or Shiite). In spite of this inter- and intra-differentiation, there are many examples of how scholars have defined religion to capture the wide variation among and within sacred traditions. The concepts represented in Box 1.1 illustrate some of the most significant overarching definitions of religion. I contend that, if any social phenomenon has the presence of the sacred (defined as the transcendent sacred), then one meets religion in its variety of forms. If this sacred is not present, then religion is absent. The question arises, then, why such a variety of religious expression across the wide expanse of the human world both cross-historically and cross-culturally? I argue it is because of the wide variety within the expression of the sacred, a variety present both in the past and

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Substantive

Box 1:1 DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION

Religion is experiential encounter with the holy and the responsive action of the human being influenced by the holy. Gustav Mensching (1964, p. 36) (paraphrased) ... the heart of religion consists in the manifestation of the sacred to people. Mircea Eliade (1959, p. 11) [T]he haunting realization of the ultimate powerlessness in an inscrutable world, and the unquestioning and thoroughly irrational conviction of the possibility of gaining mystic security by somehow identifying oneself with what can never be known. Edward Sapir (1960, pp. 122–123)

Functional A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden—beliefs and practices which unite into a single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them. Emile Durkheim (1915/1968, p. 62) Religion, then, can be defined as a system of beliefs and practices by means of which a group of people struggles with these ultimate problems of human life. Milton Yinger (1970, p. 7) A religion we will define as a set of beliefs, practices, and institutions which men have evolved in various societies, as far as they can be understood, as responses to those aspects of their life and situation which are believed not in the empirical-instrumental sense to be rationally understandable and/or controllable, and to which they attach a significance which includes some kind of reference to the relevant actions and events to man’s conception of the existence of the “supernatural” order which is conceived and felt to have a fundamental bearing on man’s position in the universe and the values which give meaning to his fate as an individual and his relation to his fellows. Talcott Parsons (1951, p. 2) Man makes religion, religion does not make man. In other words, religion is the selfconscious and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again.... Religion is the general theory of that world (the world of capitalism) ... its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, ... its universal ground for consolation and justification.... It is the opium of the people. Karl Marx (1844/1964, p. 41)

Formal Religion is (1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in [people] by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic. Clifford Geertz (1966, p. 4)

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the present. For example, the world religions mentioned above all have something to do with the sacred. In addition, folk and archaic religion also share this commonality. A term that is useful in our understanding of these expressions of the sacred comes from the Latin for sacred, the numen. Arnold Toynbee (1946) offers to us the construct numeniferous to capture how the sacred is manifested in the empirical world. The sacred or the numen does not stand alone. It necessarily needs to be “incarnated” in human realities. Humans construct stories, rituals, ethics, and social configurations in their daily lives. Through these carriers or human expressions of the sacred, it becomes real in experience. In regard to religion, then, these stories, rituals, ethics, and social configurations become vehicles or carriers of the sacred. It is these “carriers” that social scientists can observe and compare in an endeavor to analyze them. However, the actual presence of the sacred is not amenable to direct observation. It is the believers themselves who claim the sacred. The investigator needs to honor these people and try to study the expressions of the sacred (numeniferous). But does engaging in a ritual constitute experience of the sacred? It depends. Many people engage in ritual and have little or no experience of the sacred. This is where a social scientific study of religion is useful to distinguish people who use the ritual as a front to achieve an instrumental end from those who engage in it for the purpose of experiencing the sacred. A further way scholars have clarified the concept of religion emerges from three major positions: the substantive, functional, and formal. A substantive definition of religion focuses on the essence or nature of religion. Those who employ substantive definitions tend to emphasize affect or feelings. Religion is an “experiential encounter” (Mensching), a “manifestation of the sacred” (Eliade), or a “haunting realization of ultimate powerlessness” (Sapir). Substantive definitions of religion, much like substantive definitions of myth, are difficult to establish cross-culturally. Boundaries between the sacred and secular or the divine and the human are much clearer in Western than in oriental mythology, yet definitions of religion tend to assume this demarcation. Anthropologist Edward Sapir, still working from a substantive perspective, attempts to avoid defining religion in terms of Western thinking by emphasizing a sense of “ultimate powerlessness” and an impossibility of knowing, but this definition reflects other biases. Functional definitions emphasize the effects of religion on people and on the social order. They may define religion in positively functional terms with religion providing meaning (Yinger and Parsons), social legitimation (Parsons), social cohesion and integration (Durkheim and Parsons), or a source of morality (Durkheim). Functional definitions see religion as being a product of human activity, which in turn acts on members of a society in ways that contribute to the maintenance of the social order. Religion is regarded as an important agent of socialization and guardian of societal values. Other functional definitions conceive of religion as playing a less positive societal role. Marx’s secular social and political philosophy was in direct competition with the organized religion of his day, and Marx’s definition of religion reflects this tension (Johnstone, 1992, p. 110). Marx stressed the dysfunctions of religion, emphasizing how religion is used by the dominant and powerful in society to encourage acceptance of one’s lot in life. Marx called religion the “opium of the people,” meaning that it served as a kind of narcotic drug, administered by the elites of a society to the less privileged.

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8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Functional definitions of religion can stress religion’s positive functions in maintaining social control or its dysfunctions in promoting a status quo that exploits a group of people. Non-Marxists tend to describe the functions of religion in more positive terms while Marxists are critical of the role religion has played in perpetuating unjust social situations. Some contemporary Marxists, however, use Marx’s framework to describe religious protests that have brought about social change.7 Anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s formal definition is actually a blend of substantive and functional approaches to religion. He provides a more detailed description of what religion is and how it operates. He considers symbols—things that represent or remind us of something else—to be at the heart of any religion. Symbols have a decided impact on human sentiment, which in turn prompts people into action. They are catalysts that elicit “long-lasting moods and motivations.” They provide a sense of the “general order of existence”—conceptions that seem very real (Geertz, 1966). Geertz’s entire definition is long and quite elaborate, running in its entirety some 46 pages of text. It identifies the general properties of religion, depicting religion as a world view that performs specific functions in society. From this wide variety of sources and clarifying distinctions, I present a substantive definition of religion as “the individual and social experience of the sacred that is manifested in mythologies, rituals, and ethos and integrated into a collective such as a community or an organization.” These elements are all different dimensions of religion and are numeniferous or vehicles of the sacred. The experiential dimension is envisioned as the sacred being carried by individuals and groups (small groups to whole societies). Mythologies are structured belief systems while rituals are the way believers remember their myths by frequent symbolic repetitions. Ethos indicates the moral dimension of religion (as the ten commandments of Judaism or the five precepts of Theravada Buddhism) whereas the collective is structured human interaction resulting in such manifestations as temples, mosques, churches, or, in the case of folk religions (which tend to be coextensive with the social boundary), a society. Gleaning from these authors, I present this as a substantive definition of religion: Religion is the individual and social experience of the sacred that is manifested in mythologies, rituals, and ethos and integrated into a collective, such as a community or an organization.

The Theoretical Base of Religion The importance of theory in the development of both natural and social science is vital to the academic enterprise because theory provides a way of organizing experience and ideas. However, if one previews many texts in the sociology of religion, one discovers a terse, cursory description of primary theories in the social science of religion but then it is as if these theories carry no further value or use. These theories often do not inform the rest of the text. What one typically finds is an outline of the key concepts used by social scientists to study religion socially and scientifically but little or no attempt to tie ideas together into a theoretical whole. This current text provides an alternative approach. After reviewing the key theories,

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I shall present one that I am calling the Weberian-O’Dean theoretical framework that will structure an introduction to the social science of religion.

The Meaning of Theory Two sociologists will be the source of outlining what is meant by a sociological theory. Ritzer, a well known sociological theorist, states that “a theory is a set of interrelated propositions that allow for the systematization of knowledge, explanation, and prediction of social life and the generation of new research hypotheses” (1996, p. 4). Merton, a functional theorist, adds, “It is only when such concepts (such as social action, social structure, a social role and the like) are interrelated in the form of a scheme that theory begins to emerge ... when propositions are logically interrelated, a theory has been instituted (1957, p.89). Figure 1:3 The LOGIC OF THEORY AND A CASE STUDY Propositions arranged in a logical manner Abstract Cause or Factor

Abstract Effect

Abstract Prediction

X (childhood experiences)

Y (images of God)

Z (socio-political events)

x

y

z

Hypotheses which can be tested

Common to these conceptualizations is the notion of theoretical development as the nexus between empirical knowledge (derived through observation and experience) and theoretical ideas. In addition, the concepts are constructed to become propositions about what the sociologist considers to be a relationship. When these relationships are ordered, one has a theory. Figure 1.3 depicts these relationships. The logic of this figure can be explained using the Freudian theory developed by Erikson (1962) in his case study of Martin Luther, the sixteenth century reformer. The abstract concepts are Luther’s childhood experiences, his images of God, and the socio‑political effects that he generated. X refers to an abstract definition of childhood experiences while Y is images of God. Z is the predicted outcome that is social and political. The lower case letters (x, y, and z) are indicators or measures of the more abstract concepts (X, Y, and Z). It is at the

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10 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D level where these abstract concepts are measured and then the hypotheses concerning their relationship are tested that one has a theory that has been or can be empirically tested. A nother important term that buttresses the theoretical base of this text is theoretical framework. Klein and White (1996, p. 9) describe the term as having at its core a set of theoretical assumptions and propositions that are sufficiently general to give rise to a number of theoretical variants. The propositions, linked together into a coherent whole, are concatenated to the empirical world. These types of theories accumulate and organize research findings, provide precision in what concepts mean, guide researchers to develop and test hypotheses, connect concepts together in other theories, and describe, predict, and explain phenomena (1996, 18–21). I shall use theory in this sense and construct a theoretical framework to link the wide variety of theories and socio-religious phenomena.

The Classical Foundation Classical theory forms a substantial basis to this text. Karl Marx (1818–1883) informs the discussion on religion and the economy, and Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) is a frequent source in the text, especially in the analysis of the sacred and the functions of ritual and ethos. William James (1842–1910) is the primary scholar underlying this text’s analysis of individual religious experience. However, the classical scholar who is central to the whole text is Max Weber (1864–1920), especially in his use of the terms charisma and the routinization of charisma. O’Toole (2001) assists us in appreciating the importance of these authors to our understanding of the phenomenon of religion in the past and the present. He accents their vitality: ▶▶

The classic theories are social facts whose importance is matched by their symbolic, mythological, and functional relevance.

▶▶

Classic theories emerge not only as distant fountainheads of current approaches but as resources with immediate and topical relevance.

▶▶

These authors are noted not only for their methods and their theories but also for their questions, which are of wide scope, concern whole societies, and consider how societies have been transformed and the varieties of men and women who inhabit them.

▶▶

In the language of C. Wright Mills (1916–1962), the classical founders of the social sciences were “soaked in history” and their analyzes interweave individuals’ private troubles with public issues.

A striking feature of these authors is that all of them had an interest in religion. In fact, one of their theoretical contributions to sociology is that they include religion in their construction of ways to understand modernity and how this modernity has emerged from past societies. I agree with O’Toole, who writes, “ ... many practitioners of the sociology of religion view the classic texts as the charter documents of their enterprise, hold them in the highest esteem, incorporate their ideas into current scholarship, and continue to find inspiration in their myriad meanings” (2001, p. 149).

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However, I am not so anchored in this past as to disregard the present analysis of religious phenomena. It is important to build on what these scholars have given to us and introduce more current ideas of how religion is related to the individual, to society, and to culture.

Current and Major Theoretical Frameworks Before I outline the contours of a Weberian-O’Dean framework, it is useful to present the major alternatives: the functionalist, conflict, and rational choice theoretical frameworks.8 After each framework, I will provide examples from Islam.

Functionalism The functionalist framework flows out of the functional definition of religion, in other words, out of a definition that focuses on what function religion accomplishes, both for individuals and society. According to Roberts (1995), functionalism sought to explain social organization or behavior in terms of how a particular religious behavior or belief satisfied the individual or social needs of humans. Bronislaw Malinowski (1884–1942) argued that religion meets individual needs such as how to respond to evil, misfortune, helplessness, anxiety, personal organization, and death. On the other hand, Reginald Radcliffe-Brown’s (1881–1955) focus was on societal needs such as stability, integration, and social order. Parsons (1960) considers the core function of religion to be the regulation of the balance of the motivational commitment of the individual to the values of the society. Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and Parsons give us an elementary insight into functionalism and religion. It is O’Dea (1966) who gives an extensive insight into this theoretical framework. His analysis is structured about three themes: (1) the kinds of questions asked; (2) how religion functions to meet fundamental problematic characteristics of human existence; and (3) the specific functions religion performs. Adapting his outline from the work of Parsons (1951), O’Dea argues that religion functions to respond to questions about four main areas of human life. ▶▶

The social system: What are the functions of religious institutions in maintaining the equilibrium of the social system as a whole?

▶▶

The cultural system: What is the contribution of religion to culture as a system?

▶▶

The personality system: What is the function of religion with respect to the ongoing equilibrium of personality?

▶▶

Adaptive and expressive needs:9 What is the significance of religion in terms of these adaptive and expressive needs?

Some fundamental problems characteristic of human life are that we live in circles of uncertainty and contingency, that we are, in many ways, powerless over many of our circumstances,

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1 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D and that we live in scarce environments. Most of time, we do not experience these deprivations, but, when we do, we reach a breaking point. What do we do, and where do we go? Religion, by its reference to a transcendent sacred, supplies us with a super-empirical view and helps us make sense of the human condition. In other words, as O’Dea notes, “Religion answers the problem of meaning” (1966, p. 6). As to the specific functions of religion, O’Dea presents six: it provides support, consolation, and reconciliation; gives security and identity; sacralizes the norms and values of a society to enable its proper functioning; provides people with standards of value in terms of which institutionalized norms may be examined critically and found wanting (he calls this the prophetic function); and, last, religion provides for growth and maturation of the individual throughout his or her life course. What is missing in the functional framework is the conflict, power, contradiction, and hurt or violence committed in the name of religion. Thus, functionalism assists us in understanding something of religion but not all of it. The first example of a functional approach to the study of the Islamic religion is a case using functional language to understand the Islamic expansion into the Byzantine state that included Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. From the genesis of Islam, Christians and Jews were called the “People of the Book.” They were treated as minorities (dhimmis) under Muslim protection. This system of protection was exemplified in the creation and early development of Baghdad. The first stage of the growth of Islam involved Muslim military expansion. Jerusalem was conquered in 638 at the beginning of this expansion, which continued to the establishment of Baghdad in 762. It was in the ninth century that natural science grew significantly and that advances were made in medicine, astronomy, mathematical geography, cartography, algebra, optics, engineering, botany, and pharmacology (Dallal, 1999). The late historian Brown (2003) argues that the genesis of these scientific advances can be attributed to the Christian scholars who brought the ancient sciences from Greece to Baghdad. In functionalist language, it was to the advantage of the new Muslim ruling class not to have these Christians convert to Islam and to be protected under the tradition of dhimmis. These Christians brought with them translations into the Syriac language of the Greek philosophical and scientific documents. Dallal (1999) adds that Muslim scholars translated these documents into Arabic and not only synthesized this literature but created and discovered new scientific knowledge. One may say that it is due to this expansion that Western Europe benefited significantly.

The Conflict Theoretical Framework The origins of this framework are, fundamentally, from Karl Marx (1818–1883). His theory will be presented in the chapter on the economy and religion. For the present, Roberts (1995) outlines several features of the framework that includes conflict as a source of social disruption, integration and social change. I shall focus on social disruption, which is founded on a perspective that society comprises interest groups each of which endeavors to achieve its own self-interest. These interest groups initiate conflict, coercion, and the use of power, one over the other.

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The historical example given is the conflictual relationship between Latin Christianity and Islam in Spain from about the early tenth century to the middle of the thirteenth. The early tradition in Spain (seventh and eighth centuries) was an expression of Muslim tolerance for and integration with Christians, who were honored as dhimmis. The earliest form of Muslim conflict with Western Latin Christianity began with the spread of Muslim armies across northern Africa, into the Iberian Peninsula (711), and then north into Gaul—unhindered until 732 by the Frankish King, Charles Martel (690–741). Along the way, the armies sacked and pillaged cities and abbeys (Smith, 1999). After the initial period of conquest was over, Muslim tolerance of the Christians was high, and the principle of dhimmis was practiced. Smith notes, however, that, in the late tenth century, things began to change with the rule of Abu Amir al-Mansur (914–1002), who commenced a series of ruthless campaigns against Christians. The reason for these campaigns, according to Smith, was that, even though the Christians enjoyed the dhimmis status, they were still considered infidels. Kennedy (1999) provides us with some background to his policy. By deceit and intrigue, al-Mansur became the caliph of al-Andalus in 981 and consolidated power for twenty years. Kennedy notes that Muslim Spain reached its apogee in terms of territorial security and internal peace and prosperity during the reign of al-Mansur. He imposed a rigorous Islam and took strong measures against any sign of heterodoxy, purging a great library of any texts that might object to orthodox opinion. The most important part of his populist convictions was his systematic use of jihad against the Christians. He engaged in about fifty raids against Christians and sacked several cities that were Christian strongholds. In the northern part of the peninsula, he conducted many raids against the Christians, and this continuous destruction caused large scale fear. In this environment of fear, Muslims would require the submission of Christians to them during daily social intercourse, and proscriptions were established against building new churches, holding public processions, exhibiting crosses in public places, and any form of public prayer. If a Muslim converted to Christianity, he or she was condemned to death. On the side of the Christians, however, things were not much more positive. As Christian princes began to take back territories, they themselves persecuted and expelled Muslims from the Andalusian region of Spain. It appears that the conflict was, indeed, inspired by religious belief and practice.

The Rational Choice Theoretical Framework Stark and Bainbridge (1985) are among the first sociologists of religion to introduce a rational choice model into the social scientific interpretation of religion. They assume that religious behavior is similar to all other kinds of social action—that the individual chooses various means to achieve a goal that maximizes returns. Religious behavior results in a different kind of reward that they call a compensator. They mean the belief that, if one engages in sacred activity (like prayer, submission to certain doctrine, attendance at religious services), one will be rewarded in the future. With this in mind, they define religious organizations as “human organizations primarily engaged in providing general compensators based upon supernatural assumptions” (1985, p. 8).

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1 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D In addition to the term compensator, they use the term rewards, and, in rational choice theory, this term is defined as religious activity that results in tangible benefits such as social status, earning a living, leisure, and human companionship. They argue that the wealthy and privileged religionists are more likely to receive rewards whereas the marginalised and poor are more likely to receive compensators. In their theory of sect and cult, sects are likely to emerge when churches become too secularized or more focussed on receiving rewards. Some participants become dissatisfied with this secular focus and seek compensators or supernatural rewards. They form sects, in part, to receive these compensators. Bibby (1987), in his research on religion in Canada, uses a similar model called the market model. He notes that Canadians tend not to disaffiliate from their churches but they do choose elements from the churches or “fragments” which serve their own desires. Examples of this include the desire and the action to have access to “rites of passage”: baptism, marriage, and a funeral. From the vantage of the organizations, the denominations compete for consumers just as economic institutions do. Churches offer a wide range of ministries and services to attract members such as bible study and prayer groups, day-care services, and numerous interest groups. Why is this the case, Bibby asks? Congruous with Stark and Bainbridge, Bibby argues that these fragments are chosen because they work within people’s lives and because they lead to such rewards as role consistency,10 well being, and success. Compensators are selected because they provide for people a sense of meaning that goes beyond the temporal. The problem with religion being seen as a market commodity or a reward and compensator is that, if religion becomes nothing more than a consumer item, the consumer is in charge, and religion is reduced to an á la carte role that has little to say about everyday life (Bibby, 1987, p. 149). Warner (1993) considers rational choice to be a new paradigm in the social scientific study of religion. It is his impression that the old paradigm, which focuses on religion as providing meaning to life, has led to many inclusive results, particularly in understanding secularization. This old paradigm seems workable only in a society that has one major religious organization such as that of medieval Europe or present-day Iran. In a country like the United States (and, I would argue, Canada), where religious pluralism is the mode, this paradigm is not adequate in explaining religious organizations, participation, world views, and ethics. In his article, Warner reviews a wide range of research that lends credibility to the new paradigm. The baseline for the paradigm is an historical one: the disestablishment of religion in the United States with the founding of the independent American state in the late eighteenth century. American society, he argues, is an economically free market that is also integrated with a religious free market: no one denomination or church has dominance or a privileged position, as did various religious institutions in much of Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In this free market, there has been a long history of mobilization of religious human capital11 to compete for scarce resources, one of which is organizational membership. Warner indicates that the “Christianization of the United States was neither a residue of Puritan hegemony nor a transplantation of a European sacred canopy but an accomplishment of nineteenth century activists” (1993, p. 1055). There are several critiques of the framework. Bruce (1995) challenges the empirical findings of many researchers devoted to the paradigm. His position is similar to mine in that we

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both think the model does not take seriously the question of culture and is reductionist in nature. He writes, “The validity of the rational choice models is not a small methodological quarrel but goes to the heart of the nature of religious belief. If one considers what sort of society it would be in which economic models of religious behavior worked well, the answer would be one in which religion no longer matters at all” (1995, p. 354). Another sociologist of religion, Sharot (2002), argues that rational choice is more applicable to Christianity in the West and much less relevant to the Eastern religions such as Buddhism and Taoism because they are not built on rational ways of living as is the case with Christianity. Their emphasis is more on a value based rationality 12 that rational choice theory does not address. Further, the theory is linked to the congregational-based religion of the West. Buddhism and Taoism do not have this base. The rational choice paradigm is definitely a challenge to the overall thesis of this text: that the sacred is a unique phenomenon, that world views are critical in analysing religion, and that religious experience (and attending routinization processes) makes a difference in people’s lives. My model, to be presented in the next section of this chapter, fits much more closely to the old paradigm and takes more of a global view by trying to understand religion from a cross-cultural perspective. Why? In addition to its other limitations, the rational choice framework is reductionist in nature in that only the manifestations of the sacred inform the model. Finally, the theory in general and in its particular application to the study of religion is flawed in that it is unidimensional. Social action is defined only in rational terms and not in non-rational ones such as affective or charismatic circumstances, for example (see below under Weber). I would argue that it is to the paradigm’s credit that it can explain many of the manifestations of religion linked to other social and psychological phenomena. However, it does not go far in explicating the experiential dimension of religion or in focussing on the sacred element of religion. In other words, this new paradigm’s strength is in measuring the external manifestations of the sacred and of mythologies, but it does not attempt to consider the sacred and mythologies as factors in social change. The last section of this introduction to the social science of religion presents the core theoretical framework of the text: a Weberian-O’Dean perspective. I will outline the Weberian approach and then tie it to the work of O’Dea. The example of the Islamization of Syria and Mesopotamia given above provides us with a way to see how the rational choice theoretical framework can be used. As noted, Christians were not forced to become Muslim. However, they were required to pay a higher tax than their Muslim neighbors.13 After the seventh century expansion of Islamic Empire (called the Umayyads from 661–750 AD), there was prosperity for the ordinary people, Christian and Muslim alike. However, with the collapse of this regime, northern Mesopotamia became a corridor through which warring armies passed. P. Brown (2003) documents that the local Muslims suffered as much as the Christians and competed for local resources with the Christians. In about 770, the Muslims took advantage of the situation to demand higher taxes from the Christians. Rather than pay the taxes (as a cost in the rational choice theory), they choose Islam. Brown quotes a chronicle from a monastery at that time: “The Christians turned to Islam faster than sheep rushing to water ... they would boast and look down on us (the remaining Christians) saying, ‘You are the godless, and holding as it were on to spiders’ webs’” (2003, p. 315). It appears that the Christians became Muslim for a short-term benefit—economic well-being.

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16 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D

The Weberian Heritage The significance of Weber’s contribution to sociology is amply demonstrated in the following quotation, taken from a compilation of essays published to commemorate the centenary of his classic and salient work The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: One of the seldom-mentioned coincidences in the early years of the twentieth century is that 1905 offered up at least two significant revolutions in the way moderns thought about their worlds—Einstein’s physics and Weber’s sociology. It may not be incidental that both set forth their ideas in a series of imperfectly linked papers. In 1905, Einstein published the three papers that laid the foundation of a theory of the physical universe as, if not exactly foundationless, an indefinite space in time without a stable physical structure—as, in effect, a space vulnerable to time’s warping speed ... Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, also a weak collection of strong papers written when Einstein was working on his, has had much the same—if not exactly the same—effect on the human sciences as Einstein’s had on modern physics. (Lambert, 2005, p. ix)

It is because of Weber’s genius that I use Weberian sociological theory as a foundation for much of the discussion in this text. The approach relies on both the classical theoretical foundation (as indicated above) and the social scientific basis established by Durkheim, Weber, and Marx. All three classic founders agree that the study of social phenomena follows the path of natural science, which is dedicated to objectivity. Weber (1894/1978) calls this “valuefree sociology.” Durkheim (1895/1938) refers to it as the task of considering social facts as things, and Marx argues for the necessity of searching for the basic fact of the economy: the “commodity,” which is empirical. Weber’s sociology in general, and his sociology of religion in particular, structures this text. Weber defines sociology as “a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social action and thereby with a causal explanation of its course and consequences” (1894/1978, p. 4). There are two key terms in this definition, which warrant discussion and explanation: interpretative understanding and social action. I shall add three concepts vital to this text: the ideal type, and charisma and the routinization of charisma. Their addition is important as these concepts will structure the main thesis.

Interpretative Understanding Both formal and informal approaches to describe the social world include objective description and subjective interpretation. Subjective interpretation emerges from a person’s world view. An example from a teacher in management skills, Cory (1989), may help us. He recalls that on a Sunday afternoon in New York, he was taking the subway when a man and his children entered the car. While the man, seated next to him, was self-absorbed, his children were behaving in the most inappropriate manner according to the decorum of subway travel. Cory asked the man to take some control of his children. The man apologized and explained that he and his children were just returning from a hospital where the children’s mother had just died. Cory said that he immediately changed his world view from one of “children should

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behave well in public” to compassion and understanding for the father and his children. Two world views interpreted the same phenomenon in quite different ways. Weberian interpretative sociology or verstehen focuses on these differing interpretations of reality rather than merely on objective conditions. Weber’s own writings in the sociology of religion provide a model for blending the study of objective facts with consideration of the subjective interpretations given to these facts by social actors. In one of his major works, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Weber (1904–1905/1958) discusses at length how the religious beliefs of the English Puritans and Methodists were an important factor in the rise of the Western capitalistic system. In other words, the subjective interpretations of reality presented by Protestantism had an objective impact on the economic system. These interpretations are often referred to as sacred world views, but the term that will be used in the study of belief systems is mythologies. Through interpretative understanding, sociologists can explain the development of social phenomena. In the light of his understanding of value-free social science, Weber did not believe that social scientists (acting as social scientists) had a right to make value judgments, but rather that social scientists must take into account the values of those under study. The social scientist is interested in human action, the particular qualities of human actors, and the meaning they ascribe to their actions. Her or his goal is to search for patterns delineating how people think as expressed in their social action.

Social Action Weber (1894/1978, p. 4) speaks of social action insofar as individuals attach subjective meanings to their behavior. Weber maintains that there are three primary types of social action that are reflected in human behavior: traditional, rational, and affective. Traditional social action is guided by set patterns that have developed over time together with a sense that things must “always be that way.” It is a commitment to believing and acting in ways that seem to have always been there. Backers of tradition often use religious myth to support preferred behavior and to resist change. During the recent debate on same-sex marriage in Canada14 and the United States, Maclean’s indicated that 59 per cent of Americans oppose gay marriage in contrast to just under 50 per cent of Canadians (Gatehouse, 2004). These percentages indicate wide support for a traditional understanding of marriage (i.e., marriage between a man and a woman). The author of the article also noted a strong religious factor behind this opposition to gay marriage; in this case, religion was being used to promote traditional social behaviors and actions and even to advance political causes and campaigns. One of the reasons evangelicals have supported the Republican Party in the United States is that the party opposes same-sex marriage. The evangelical association Focus on the Family, located in Langley, garnered $750,000 to launch an ad campaign against same-sex marriage. A lthough tradition has g uided human action for much of histor y, Weber felt it had lost ground to what he called r ational social action.15 Legal or instrumental rational action is determined by the expected responses of others as “‘conditions’ or ‘means’ for the attainment of the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends” (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 25). In other words, actors anticipate potential responses to their

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1 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D behavior and act in such ways as to bring about things they desire. Such action may be demonstrated by changes that have occurred in granting marital rights to gay and lesbian couples in Canada. As of July 2005, all provinces and territories in Canada now have legislation to permit marriage between adults regardless of sexual orientation. It has been an issue that has divided Canada in what may be called a “seismic fracture in morality.” With few exceptions, the dividing line is religious: conservatives in Christian, Muslim, Sikh, and Hindu traditions are on the side of traditional social action and non-affiliates and liberal believers support the legislation, which is a reflection of rights-based rational social action. Affective social action is emotional rather than means or ends oriented. Its driving force is a specific affect or feeling state. Weber (1894/1978, p. 25) notes that action is affective if it satisfies a need for revenge, sensual gratification, devotion, contemplative bliss, or for working off emotional tensions. Weber (1916/1995) continues by saying that religious states, to some degree, have been sought for the sake of the emotional value they offer to the devout. As I shall demonstrate throughout this text, affective action, having this emotional component, is at the core of religion. It is also at the heart of many religious myths, which express a range of feelings, including love, hate, fear, and awe. As the late humanistic psychologist Maslow (1970) has noted, myth often embodies the intense experiences (peak experiences) of the founders of great religions. From Abraham’s calling through the experience of Moses on Mount Sinai, from the baptism of Jesus through Paul’s conversion, Judeo-Christian religious myth is rife with accounts of affective action.16 Similarly, Buddha’s response to poverty and disease is reflected in his compassion while in Islam, Sufism speaks of God’s love and the devotee as the beloved. Weberian sociology recognizes that shifts have occurred in these three types of social action. Human behavior was once largely traditional in nature, guided by beliefs and values that seemed ingrained and by patterns of social action that were stable and repetitive. People followed traditions and were very resistant to changing their long-established ways of living. These traditions were often sanctified with religious myths. In contemporary societies, men and women are now more likely to behave in accord with legal-rational behavior, guided particularly by scientific knowledge. The Weberian model of societal transition depicts a move from traditional societies, in which religious thought is the pre-eminent world view, to modern legal-rational societies, in which scientific knowledge is a dominant theme. In the process, religion has lost the prominent place it once held in the public sphere, being relegated largely to a private world. In modern societies, individuals make personal choices about whether or not to be religious and about their respective religious paths. The writings of Max Weber have been utilized by members of diverse schools of thought, including functionalism, structuralism, interactionism, and conflict theory, thus providing a social scientific perspective of much depth and breadth.

Ideal Types The methodology I employ is Weberian in that it uses ideal types whenever possible. An ideal type may be described as an analytical construct that serves as a measuring rod to determine similarities and differences in concrete cases. It usually does not exist in its pure form, but it is of heuristic value for discussing the real world. For example, Weber created an

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ideal type of authority that is basic to his theory. Traditional authority rests in long-standing practices and institutions (e.g., a monarchy or the Catholic papacy). Legal-rational authority is rooted in rules and procedures (such as the possession of necessary qualification by leaders to carry out well-defined responsibilities or the Charter of Rights and Freedoms). Charismatic leaders appeal to people’s emotions and lead on the basis of personality (e.g., Martin Luther King, Jr. or the Dalai Lama). It is evident that, although most leaders in modern society are examples of legal-rational authority, tradition (e.g., a well-known family name) and especially charisma (e.g., television appeal) also enter the picture. The use of ideal types permits comparisons between and among different sorts of religious leaders as well as between and among different religions. This text uses examples from folk societies, archaic (classical) societies, medieval Christianity and Islam, and the modern societies. Anthropology will provide us with data on folk societies, archaeology and classical studies on the archaic worlds, mainstream and social history on the medieval world, and the social sciences on the modern world. Using ideal types from these societies and eras will assist us in taking a comparative approach to the understanding of religion. Finally, the Weberian approach to sociology—especially in the hands of modern sociologists of religion such as Peter Berger and Thomas O’Dea—is a dynamic one that includes social change. It allows for the tensions that arise when old meanings are confronted with new interpretations, when modern rational thought clashes with traditional values and beliefs, when old priests struggle against new prophets. The tensions between individuals and the collectivity, between older and newer religious perspectives, and between religious and secular institutions are sources of energy that propel social change.

Historical Sociology All the classical founders of sociology were steeped in history. One might categorize Weber as being significantly immersed in it. Much of his sociology has links to history. As we shall see in Chapter 12, one of the most famous of his works is The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, which was first published in 1904–1905. Nielsen (2005) notes that the text is viewed as a pioneering study of historical sociology, a study that covers the fields of sociology and history with equal weight being given to both genres or disciplines. This text, as well as others, outlines ideal types, historical individuals as types, affinities between social phenomena, and instances of causality and uses these delineations to make comparisons among nations, sacred groups, social strata, and individual actors. Weber had the genius of synthesizing massive amount of historical data from ancient Rome, early Christianity, medieval Europe, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism. Nielsen (2005) uses the term a “Grand Narrative” to describe Weber’s depiction of how modernity emerged from the Atlantic North and not in the rest of Europe, Eastern Europe, or the regions of Islam and the Orient. This text is also a sociology of religion that relies on the Weberian heritage and is substantially linked to history, wherein data arises from folk societies, ancient civilizations, the medieval world, the domains of Islam, and modern societies.

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Charisma and the Routinization of Charisma It is in context of religion being a source of social change that another set of Weberian concepts will be used in a central way in this text; those concepts are charisma and the routinization of charisma (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1111–1148). Weber restricts their usage to religious leaders who are initiators (e.g., founders of religion like Abraham or Zoroaster), innovators (e.g., Joseph Smith of Mormonism), renewers (e.g., Benedict of Nursia, who renewed monastic life through the establishment of the Benedictines), or reformers (e.g., Martin Luther). He situates the charismatic stage during the era when these kinds of leaders flourish; routinization occurs during the era of successors (and followers) who, in many cases, effectively lose the charisma and routinize the sacred. In light of other data on religion, I shall extend this approach to include communities and organizations (as well as leaders), which encase charisma, the routinization of it, or combinations thereof. O’Dea’s work on the institutionalization of religion will provide the framework for this extension. A Weberian theoretical framework also makes room for a multidimensional view of society 17 that includes social agency and social order, the social actor and the institution, subjective and objective facets of society, social stability and social change, and micro and macro levels of analyzes. It is from his genius and the contributions of contemporary theorists who have built upon it that I draw my sociological inspiration. I have attempted to avoid many of the “dualisms” (to use the concept of British theorist Giddens) inherent in sociology. Two primary sources of dualism have been the debates over, first, whether sociology should focus primarily on human actors (the “micro” level of analysis) or on social structures (the “macro” level of analysis) and, second, whether the subject matter of sociology is subjective reality as perceived by the actors in society or objective reality described in the terms of social norms, institutions, and structures. Inspired by two sociological theorists, Giddens (1976a) and Alexander (1982), I prefer to adhere to a multidimensional approach to sociology that acknowledges that both social action and social order are necessary pre-suppositional concepts in interpreting the various dimensions of human society. Social action assists us in understanding that people are active in shaping their social world while simultaneously

Figure 1:4 Multidimensional Social Life SOCIAL ACTION Rational

SOCIAL ORDER Collectivist

SOCIAL ORDER Individualistic

SOCIAL ACTION Non-Rational

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being shaped by, but not passively determined by, social institutions, norms, and history. The symbolic interactionist Herbert Blumer says it well: Social organization is a framework inside of which acting units develop their actions. Structural features, such as “culture,” “social systems,” “social stratification,” or “social roles,” set conditions for their action but do not determine their action. (1962/1996, p. 365)

To further illustrate multidimensionality, Alexander (1982) provides insights from which Figure 1:4 was constructed. The figure attempts to capture the idea that social life and institutions are understood both to be created by individuals (from the individualistic end of the social order) and to be a result of collective activity and thought (from the collectivist pole of the social order). The figure also intends to convey that social action is both rational and nonrational. Religion, in its social action and social order dimensions, consists of both rational and non-rational elements, as well as being created by both individuals and communities and used as a source of both the constraint and the enablement of individuals.

O’Dea and Swenson: Expanding the Concepts of Charisma and the Routinization of Charisma Thomas O’Dea has used Weber’s theoretical framework and concepts from the work of Parsons on the processes of institutionalization to outline some of the well-known dilemmas in the institutionalization of religion (Karlenzig, 1998). The various dimensions of these dilemmas are rooted in what he calls the fundamental dilemma between religion and society (1966, p.114–ff). O’Dea argues that the religious person and religious institutions are constantly in a precarious situation because secular society is in significant contrast to the sacred order. While religion concerns itself with limit-situations and the question of meaning, society’s focus is on less-than-ultimate matters such as the production, exchange, and consumption of goods; the reproduction and socialization of children in family configurations; or the ordering of social relationships through politics and education. Because religion is interested in the transcendent sacred, it stands apart from the profane (everyday) concerns of the secular order. Finally, religion is based on faith wherein its object is supra-empirical while societal concerns are with the empirical and the observable.18 The sacred and the profane belong to heterogeneous spheres. Conflict is inevitable. This heterogeneity of the sacred and the profane renders charisma unstable and makes institutionalization of religion necessary for the survival of religion itself. However, institutionalization involves routinization, as Weber describes this concept. With this routinization, charisma is attenuated and ordinary, profane life erodes its vitality, power, vivacity, and awe. The dilemma is how to sustain the power of the original charisma in a routinely organized institution. This problem forms the basis of what O’Dea terms the five dilemmas of institutionalization of religion. Rather than regarding charismatic manifestations and institutionalization of religion as polar opposites, O’Dea understands them to be in a dynamic and dialectical relationship. He writes,

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2 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Since the religious experience is spontaneous and creative and since institutionalization means precisely reducing these unpredictable elements to established and routine forms, the dilemma is one of great significance for the religious movement. (1966, p. 242)

O’Dea (1966, 1970) specifies five dilemmas, each offering a somewhat different approach to the antimony between charisma and institution. These five dilemmas are (1) the dilemma of mixed motivation (useful in the study of sacred leadership), (2) the symbolic dilemma (useful in the study of ritual), (3) the dilemma of administrative order (important in any investigation of sacred organizations), (4) the dilemma of delimitation (useful in considering ethos or morality), and (5) the dilemma of power (helpful in eliciting the relationship between religion and politics). To give an empirical example of these five dilemmas, I will use Poloma’s (1989) work on the Assemblies of God Pentecostal denomination.

The Dilemma of Mixed Motivation When charisma is at its peak during the early years of a religious movement, followers appear to be motivated by a single-hearted devotion to the goals and ideals of the leader. With institutionalization, however, arises a system of status and roles that can generate other motivating factors, including prestige, power, and security. As the original vision becomes more obscure, members often become lukewarm and lethargic—less willing to make the great sacrifices made by their forbearers. A tension comes to exist, therefore, between the vision of the charismatic seer and the institutional practices that develop to promote the vision. Poloma’s (1989, p. 104–ff) reference to a prominent prophetic woman pastor, Marie Burgess Brown, provides evidence for this dilemma. In the early years of the Pentecostal movement, Mrs. Burgess Brown was a key leader who had the charisma of leadership as well as institutional acceptance as a pastor (she was a pastor for 64 years). However, during these years and later, there emerged in the denomination increasing pressure not to continue the “female-pastor charisma,” and, to the present, even though women can be officially ordained, “the Mrs. Browns in the Assemblies ... are few and far between” (Poloma, 1989, p. 105).

The Symbolic Dilemma: Objectification versus Alienation The primary mechanism for keeping alive the vision and religious fervour is religious ritual. If, however, the routinization of ritual is allowed to run its course, the symbol may become a substitute for the religious experience. The routinized symbol loses its effectiveness to affect the attitudes and elicit the emotions of followers. Therein lies the paradox: while objectification or imposing order on ritual is necessary for continuity, it finally leads to alienation when it fails to provide the nexus between symbols and subjective attitudes. Throughout history, there have been examples of responses to the empty reification of symbols. The Protestant reformers of Europe removed statues and whitewashed religious murals; and, centuries later after the Second Vatican Council, many Roman Catholic churches simplified their church decor. Quakers moved away from seemingly empty ritual, encouraging complete silence during their meetings to allow worshipers to encounter God; yet the silent meetings became a new ritual. Pentecostals have eschewed publishing an order of service, allegedly

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allowing the Spirit freedom to move; but this practice has provided new ritual forms rather than fresh experiences. Changes in the Sunday rituals of the Assemblies of God illustrate this dilemma. Poloma quotes an observer of the denomination as saying The spontaneity of worship is not as obvious in many congregations as it once was. As the churches have become larger and more urbane, there has been increased demand for a professional clergy, a robed choir, and sophistication in the sanctuary. (1989, p. 187)

The Dilemma of Administrative Order: Elaboration versus Effectiveness This dilemma, if out of control, leads to the tendency of a structure to over-elaborate—to become an unwieldy bureaucratic machine. Clearly, organization is necessary for the vision of the founder to continue. The organization, however, can lose sight of the original vision and become primarily concerned with its own development and growth. Not only can an organization grow to become unmanageable, but structures that were set in place at an earlier time may refuse to bend to change. As O’Dea and O’Dea (1983, p. 60) observe, “Structures which emerge in one set of conditions and in response to one set of problems may turn out later to be unwieldy instruments for handling new problems under new conditions.” Whether the problem is characterized by an over-elaborate organization or a structure that cannot respond to present-day needs, the result is a potential alienation of officeholders from the rank-and-file members of the religious organization. In the early years of the Assemblies of God, Poloma (1989, p. 122–ff) notes that, both in theory and in practice, charisma was diffused both among the leaders and the adherents and was structured in a “loosely cooperative fellowship” that tried to retain this charisma. However, as the denomination grew, the church necessarily became more of a bureaucracy. It should be noted, however, that the leaders still try to maintain a charismatic dimension to their leadership structure.

The Dilemma of Delimitation: Concrete Definition versus Substitution of Letter for Spirit O’Dea (1966, p. 83) observes that, in the process of applying the religious ideal to “the prosaic and concrete, the content of the message may itself appear to take on a prosaic quality and lose those charismatic elements that originally moved men.” There is a pit on either side of the narrow charismatic road: one waters down the original message and the other offers a rigid position that kills the spirit. The dangers of distortion of the faith require the formulation of dogma, but, once established, these authoritative definitions of tenets themselves pose the possibility of another distortion. According to O’Dea and O’Dea (1983, p. 61), the definitions become “a vast intellectual structure which serves not to guide the faith of untrained specialists but rather to burden it.” Jesus, for example, repeatedly repudiated the Judaism of his day for its empty legalism, yet Christians repeatedly have developed their own Pharisaic practices. The comparative study of religion provides countless examples of petrified

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2 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D doctrine and moral proscriptions, which, in time, believers may challenge. In the course of challenged dogma, however, reformers are always in danger of abandoning a core message offered by the prophet. The struggle to maintain the “spirit of the law” and keep distant from the “letter of the law” has been met with only partial success in the Assemblies of God, Poloma (1989, p. 162–ff) contends. Central teachings of the church such as “Baptism of the Holy Spirit” and speaking in “tongues” had, originally, a special charismatic flavor. As challenges to these teaching have emerged, these authorized practices of the church have tended to become more like legal norms void of “the spirit of the law.”

The Dilemma of Power: Conversion versus Coercion As a religious movement matures, O’Dea observes, it is likely to become intertwined gradually with the public, non-religious culture. This gives rise to the dilemma of power: powerful religious leaders may seek ways either to convert or to coerce others to join the movement. Constantine’s edict to Christianize the Roman Empire offers a prime example of coercion, as do contemporary efforts by Islamists (rather than fundamentalist Islamic leaders) to restore conservative Islam. Most religions in the West do not have this power to coerce, so they must rely on the voluntary conversion of prospective followers. This horn of the dilemma of power has attendant problems. In order to become attractive to new members and to retain the old, a religion must often accommodate to the secular culture. The charismatic spirit may be eclipsed in the process of providing a growing (or at least stable) membership for a sound organizational base. Charisma, if it is to endure over time in modern society, will be bureaucratized in some form. This process may lead to a bureaucracy that subserves the original spirit (in which case charisma is fostered by the organization), or it may lead to an organization that uses charisma to further the organization (in which case charisma is overpowered by rationality and efficiency). As Stark (1964) notes, In judging a church, the question cannot be whether it has connected with a certain apparatus of bureaucrats, but whether this bureaucratic apparatus has completely overlaid and stifled the life which it was supposed to assist and to preserve. Only where the latter contingency has become a reality can we speak of the routinization of charisma. (p. 206)

Using survey data (from 1,275 respondents of the Assemblies of God), Poloma (1989, p. 140–ff) tests several theses of cultural accommodation. The results are mixed. On one side, there has been accommodation on such original teachings as the rejection of physicians and medicine and prohibitions against public swimming, professional sports, beauty parlours, and the use of jewellery. A more subtle accommodation that Poloma (1989, p. 145) suggests is the lure of narcissistic pleasure and success. However, there continues to be counsel against non-marital sex and the use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs, and these prescriptions present a picture of non-accommodation and help retain the identity of the Assemblies as “a peculiar people, a people set apart.”

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The Dilemma of Interpretation: Interpretation versus Dogmatism I propose to add a sixth dilemma to O’Dea’s five. The key problem that I find in the fourth dilemma is that, in his 1966 description of it, O’Dea attempted to include two dimensions of religion that are, essentially, distinct: ethos and mythology. In the original publication of 1961,19 O’Dea’s focus is only on ethos, morality, and religious behavioral codes. In the 1961 edition, there was no mention of mythology or belief systems. By including mythology in the 1966 definition of the fourth dilemma, he confuses matters because he makes this dilemma address two dimensions of religion: ethos and mythology. We need a sixth dilemma, one that acknowledges mythology or beliefs systems specifically. The dilemma may be understood in the following way. Whether religion begins within the individual or amongst a collective, its genesis involves the experience of the sacred. As the individual endeavors to understand this experience, a pristine interpretation emerges that is expressed in stories, fables, folklore, or mythologies. For the sake of understanding and communicating this experience of the sacred, these stories, these mythologies are necessary. However, a dilemma, the sixth dilemma, emerges with the expansion of these interpretations of the sacred because mythology leads easily to dogmatic statements and rigid doctrines that abort the possibility of the message of the sacred experience being communicated O’Dea (1966) did grasp the importance of mythology but did not construct its development as a unique dilemma. He sees myth as a primordial form of the intellectual content of religion, a dramatic expression of human life, a “sympathy of the whole of life,” and a presentation of some past event redolent with power (1966, p. 41–43). However, myth, like religious experience, is precarious and unstable. In the quest to understand the myth, there is a tendency to rationalize or to move from mythos to logos. O’Dea writes, “Human thought has become progressively rationalized, both in a formal sense, with respect to its consistency and its systematic character, and substantively, in the elimination of fantasy and mythic elements” (1966, p. 44). Historically, O’Dea contends, this occurred in occidental Christianity when medieval Christian scholars attempted to interpret the Christian message in the categories of Ionic philosophy (both Platonic and Aristotelian), and Calvinist Protestants sought to “disenchant” the same message of its mystery, its accent on divine immanentist world views, and to substitute rationality, calculation, and instrumentality. The concern is, then, that there is a functional need for an interpretation of the sacred so that the individual or the group may have some understanding of the mystery that will lead to a continued experience of the sacred. One may say that mythology is necessary to cradle the sacred experience and to be authentically numeniferous or a carrier of the transcendent sacred. The frequent danger, however, is that the experience of the sacred is lost, and all that is left is the form or external structure of mythology, which tends not to free participants but to enslave them.

Summary This chapter has laid the foundation of a particular approach to the social scientific study of religion. I began by presenting the meaning of the sacred and by claiming that the sacred is at the very heart of religion. Thereafter, I reviewed some of the more salient theoretical

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2 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D frameworks related to the study of religion and contrasted these to a Weberian-O’Dean perspective. This perspective will inform the whole text, with a particular focus on it evident in the second part of the book. Again, the overall thesis of the work is that the sacred is a unique phenomenon, that world views are critical in analyzing religion, and that religious experiences (and the attending routinization processes) make a difference in people’s lives. After presenting a discussion on the nature of religious experience (the genesis of religion), which I refer to, primarily, as the sacred within, I continue to look at various extensions of this experience in the carriers of mythology (the dilemma of interpretation and the sacred of symbolic structures); sacred leadership (the dilemma of mixed motivation); ritual (the symbolic dilemma or the sacred between); organizations (the dilemma of administrative order or the sacred among); ethos (the dilemma of delimitation or the sacred of the ought to be); and, the study of religion and politics (the dilemma of power).

Notes 1 Many anthropologists used to call folk societies “primitive.” Current usage considers this term to be offensive and alternative names are used. Some of them include “traditional,” “folk,” or “simple.” “Traditional” is too extensive and is used, typically, in classical sociology as pre-modern. “Simple” may also be offensive. The term used here will be “folk” referring to hunting-gathering and agrarian-pastoral societies. 2

The term refers to the religions of ancient societies such as the Egyptians, the Mayans, the Aztecs, or the Romans.

3

The ancient religions of the East, typically, Buddhism, Hinduism, Shintoism, and Taoism, are called oriental.

4

The religions of the West, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, are called occidental.

5

All scriptural references are taken from the Jerusalem Bible (1966).

6

Sharot (2001), in the tradition of Weber, notes these as world religions because they are systems of life-regulation that have known how to gather multitudes and confessors about them.

7

Karl Marx had surprisingly little to say about the protest function of religion. His collaborator Friedrich Engels, more than Marx, elaborated on the nature of religious protest (Marx & Engels, 1964).

8

Chalfant, Beckley, and Palmer (1994) add symbolic interactionism as another theoretical framework candidate and provide one research example that reflects the perspective. After doing a content analysis for the past four years of three key journals in the social science of religion (Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, the Review of Religious Research, and the Sociology of Religion), I have found no article that uses key concepts and propositions from this framework. Consequently, I deleted the discussion of symbolic interactionism. Feminism is a viable option and will be discussed in the chapter on religion and women.

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9

The adaptive needs of humans arise out of the impulse to survive; humans need to act within or upon the natural environment, either to adjust to it or to master it in order to survive physically. Expressive needs are given meaning in the way people express feelings, act out affective needs, and relate to others in non-utilitarian ways.

10 Role consistency is the sense a person has that his or her many roles have consistency among them because of what is selected from the religious commodity. 11

The term human capital refers to all the skills and talents that a person has, which are used for the production of commodities.

12 The kind of rationality that is present in rational choice theory is instrumental in nature— a reward is given for a specific social action. Value based rationality is based on ethics or ideals. It is this kind of rationality that is common in Buddhism and Taoism. 13

Part of the original practice of dhimmis was to have “People of the Book” pay a higher tax than Muslims.

14 As of July 2005, same-sex marriage in Canada is now legal. 15

Weber identified two forms of rational action, legal rational and value rational, although most of his writings on rationality refer to legal rational action. Value rational action is characterized by its adherence to some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other principles, independent of its prospects of success. Weber (1894/1978, p. 25) provides as examples of value rational action those persons who act according to their convictions, whether these are duty, honor, the pursuit of beauty, a religious vocation, personal loyalty, or some sense of calling. The successful engineer who leaves her profession to become a missionary to Africa is acting in a value rational way. She is behaving on the basis of conviction, probably sensing a religious call to spread her religious faith.



Although this distinction has some heuristic value and seems very relevant for the sociology of religion, Weber made little use of it. Whimster and Lash (1987, p. 17) suggest that Weber did not identify any authority type as stemming from value rational action because it is of little sociological consequence in the modern world. I would further suggest that action that is initially classified as “value rational” may, on closer analysis, be reclassified as “instrumental rational” or “affective.”

16 Although this form of action is important for an interpretative understanding of religious behavior, Weber saw it as a residual category and did not explore it in any great detail. Later social scientists, following Weber, have also tended to downplay the importance of affective social action in modern society. It is only within the past ten years that some social psychologists working in the newly developed field of the “sociology of emotions” have begun to demonstrate how important affective action is for understanding human behavior. 17 Alexander (1983) cites such sociologists as Talcott Parsons and Robert Bellah, who share this view of multidimensionality. However, Alexander disagrees with them. He considers Weber’s later work to have moved away from social action and interpretative sociology to emphasize rational-legal authority in the modern world, authority that increasingly held men and women in an “iron cage” that left little room for charisma, change, and innovation. I side with this earlier interpretation of multidimensionality.

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2 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D 18 In an earlier work, O’Dea (1958) gives an empirical example of this basic dilemma. In this text, he traces the dilemma faced by American Catholic intellectuals who try to who try to reconcile their faith with the canons of reason. The primary dilemma here is between faith and reason. 19 Again, O’Dea’s outline of these dilemmas was reprinted several times, e.g., in the 1970 Sociology and the Study of Religion.

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C h a p t e r T WO

R e l ig ious E x pe r i e nc e

Orientation Imagine yourself talking to someone you recently met at college,

university, or your place of employment. He comes to you and asks, “Are you born again?” or “Have you had a religious experience?” You do not know what to say and are wondering where this person is coming from. If you were brash enough, you might have responded by asking him a question: “What do you mean?” You engage in a long conversation, and he tells you the story of his religious experience. This is the topic of this chapter. We will cover the terrain of the experience of the sacred that is both personal and social in nature. From the perspective of social science, history, and religious studies, people, both individually and socially, are the initial carriers of the sacred, and their experiences are the genesis of religion. One cannot have mythologies, rituals, ethics, or sacred organizations unless there has first been an experience of the sacred. Further, there would be no link between religion and other institutions, such as the economy or the family, without this starting point. The initial focus of this chapter is to present a case for the personal and social construction of religion that flows from the first two dimensions in the definition of religion used in this text (see Chapter 1). Thereafter, the personal experiences of the sacred or the sacred within will be outlined. This sacred within moves our journey into the realm of the psychology of religion, wherein the question will be asked as to the importance of this kind of experience in the study of religion. Subsequently, we will consider various researchers’ responses to the question of whether spirituality has a biological basis. And, finally, the chapter reviews the salient studies and perspectives in the psychology of religion and outlines the varieties of religious experience and the meaning of conversion.

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3 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Under the rubric of the varieties of personal religious experience is the study of psychic experiences. In addition to looking at historical and empirical studies of psychic experiences, the discussion of these kinds of experience will be structured from a wider framework of magic. I will present there the literature that distinguishes magic from religion.

The Psychological-Personal Construction of Religion Images of the sacred are influenced by earlier personal experiences, especially those in familial settings. Human life may be compared to a palimpsest of forces or events in one’s life course, to a manuscript that is continually written over in such a way that the old words can be read beneath the new. The words on the bottom layers are constructed in early childhood experience, and continued layers are added in personal life that may influence a variety of adult outcomes. Two sources capture this perspective: the writings of psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) and the more updated interpretation of Freud constructed by the architects of object relations theory. Three themes emerge from Freud: (1) that religion is psychology projected into the external world, (2) that religion is thought to exist to control the unconscious with its antisocial instincts, and (3) that the psychological function of religion is to meet the individual’s need for being rescued from danger (Wulff, 1997; Pruyser, 1973). The first idea—that religion is psychology projected into the external world—arises out of early childhood experiences. A child, by nature, is helpless and in need of care from adults, normally the father and the mother. Ordinarily, children seek security when they perceive themselves to be in danger from a stranger, when a parent is absent, or because of another threat to their safety. Adults are like children. They also feel helpless within the forces of life, such as illness, death, war, the ravages of nature, and the like. The adult, then, projects into the heavens a divine parent (Freud uses the term father figure) who will provide her or him with security and safety. An adult has “lost” the biological father and seeks to restore this lost relationship by being obedient to the omnipotent father. This lost father is what Freud calls the ego-ideal. To put it simply, religious people are immature adults who have not grown out of their need for a parent. A nuance of this theme leads to the second—that religion controls the unconscious. Individuals find nature and culture to be both nurturing and threatening, as are parents. In response, individuals tend to both submit to and rebel against parents, culture, and nature. Rebellion is an effect of the unconscious mind and could lead to both individual and collective violence and even death. What is needed, according to Freud, is the creation of folklore, fairy tales, legends, and religious mythologies to control the anti-social instincts so that human social life can be somewhat peaceful and ordered. A function of these myths is to legitimate morality and social authority, which serve to control people. However, the primary function of religion, as Freud sees it, is to provide a “remedy” for or “rescue operation” from a person’s reaction to his or her feeling of impotence in the face of the universe, so much of which is unknown and induces fear. The immediate response of fear is mitigated or is replaced with some more acceptable response such as joy, hope, or a sense

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of mastering life or of its having meaning. However, the substitution is never complete; thus the individual lives a life of constant internal conflict with no complete resolution. As outlined by Wulff (1997), object relations theory is an update of Freudian psychoanalysis. This update has moved in two directions: (1) to focus less on unconscious drives of eroticism and aggression and more on personal relations (thus “object relations”) and (2) to accent the importance of the presence of the mother in providing emotional care and love. Nevertheless, the relationship between the individual child or adult and the object of his or her love and obedience (human or divine) is still central to this theory’s conception of religion and its genesis. The case study that follows focuses on the importance to religion of the parental figure (from Freud, the father) or the “object” in the language of object relations theory. The presence of the mother is not discussed, except tangentially, in the case study. Pruyser (1973) reviews a number of studies on religion that have been generated using Freud’s image of the personal construction of religion. Since his publication, there have not been significant numbers of scholarly work. An earlier important work, however, is a case study of Martin Luther (1483–1546) who is the reform prophet of Lutheranism. He will be discussed in the chapter on religious leaders, but, for the present, I shall outline Erikson’s (1962) study to give evidence for the theory.

Young Man Luther Erikson presents a fascinating story of the inner life, both human and sacred, of the Protestant reformer, Martin Luther. These experiences are linked to the genesis of early modern Europe with its social, political, and economic extensions. Erikson relies on Freud’s theory of how early childhood experiences shape adult life, especially in regards to the creation of mythologies. Luther was born to a man who worked as a proletarian miner but rose to a status of a middle-class partial owner of a mining enterprise. This rank gave him the means to support his son, Martin, in receiving an education in order for the son to become a lawyer and a future member of the emerging managerial class. The father presented two sides of a complex personality. To the social world outside of the home, he was a person of integrity, honesty, and justice. On the other hand, in the home, he was prone to violence, alcoholism, and, at times, cruelty. To drive anger and temper out of his children, he frequently used a cane to punish them. Moreover, Martin’s mother reinforced this disciplinary action by “caning” Martin as well. This practice of discipline was augmented in the boarding school he went to. Thus, from both parents and schoolmasters, his will was shaped by violent discipline. The child Luther suffered from this. He responded with anxiety, melancholy, troubled sleep, fear, and total submission to any authority figure. He constantly thought harm was close to him. The more important effect, which illustrates the personal construction of images of god consistent with Freud and object relations theory, was his notion of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit as avenger, as fierce, wrathful judge, as the terrifying Trinity. Erikson (1962) quotes Luther: “He gorges us, with great eagerness and wrath ... He is avaricious, a gluttonous fire” (1962, p. 121); “Christ becomes more formidable a tyrant and a judge than was Moses” (1962, p. 195).

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3 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D There appear to be two major conversions in the life of the Martin Luther. The first happened when he was at a university in Erfurt about the time he received a master’s degree. He had gone home for a visit, and, on his return, a lightening bolt nearly killed him. His immediate response was to attribute this to God, and he felt called to enter a monastery. In 1505, he did so, took vows, was ordained a priest, and continued consistent obedience to those in authority. He later was summed by authorities to Wittenberg, which was to become his home until his death. During this time, he studied in depth the New Testament and the book of Psalms and had another conversion experience when he was thirty years of age. This time, it was an internal one, a gradual one because it arose out of his study of the Christian scriptures over a long period of time. This conversion changed his life but not his religious affiliation. It is termed internal because he did not “change” religion but did change interiorly. (See the section on conversion in this chapter, especially the discussion of William James’s study of conversion). In Luther’s search to be just before God, he discovered from the “matrix of the Bible” that its source is faith. The Christian experiences God, becomes holy, and is given eternal life through faith alone and not through merit. With this “revelation” in hand, he nailed on the door of the Castle Church in Wittenberg the famous ninety-five theses (written in 1517) against the Roman Catholic practice of indulgences.1 This event, along with his subsequent publication of many pamphlets that received wide distribution because of the printing press, sparked a revolution that became the Protestant Reformation, which has had significant results in Western history.2 For a time, Luther was exiled and suffered duress until he returned to Wittenberg, married, and made a living as a professor in theology and a pastor. It appears, though, that his second conversion was not profound. He was noted to have doubted his personal appropriation of his teaching of the justification by faith. He engaged in “black and white” thinking by demonizing the papacy, Jews, and peasants. He encouraged the responsive violence of the secular leaders to recusant peasants. Further, long periods of depression and melancholy still plagued him. In summary, it would appear that Luther never really recovered from such negative childhood experiences. The first thirty years of his life were spent in absolute submission and were reflected in images of a cruel and judgmental God. His image of God did change with his conversion. The years of submission were followed by years of rebellion against the emperor and the Catholic Church. Erikson asked the question: “Could this adult rebellion be the long felt need to rebel and say no to his father?” This application of Freudian and object relations theory is intriguing. Luther did not have positive experiences as a child and may have, at least unconsciously, sought for a deity who would perform like a loving parent. However, he seemed to have found the opposite— a deity who was very much like his parents. Also, his rebellion against his image of God, and against the church that reinforced it, came to the foreground in his later youth. Moreover, as Erikson documents, Luther continued to have internal conflict. This may be explained by his contradictory experience of the divine being, whom he saw as being loving and kind as well as harsh and cruel. It seems that Luther never did have a peaceful resolution. Yet Erikson is not without his critics. Wulff (1997) reviews some studies that show Erikson did not have any other data on Luther’s childhood than Luther himself in later life.

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He cites some Reformation scholars who attest that Luther’s parents were caring and loving. However, these critics are meet with a comment by Bellah (1997), a well-known sociologist of religion: “What Erikson has given us is an interpretation of Luther, an interpretation which has been compelling for many students of religion in general and of the Reformation in particular, because of the coherence of the pattern he has discerned” (p. 29 and quoted in Wulff, 1997, p. 409).

An Empirical Update A more recent interpretation, in what may be termed a Freudian approach, comes from the scholarship of Bierman (2005).3 In doing a literature review on the relationship between child abuse and adult religiosity, he found that those who were victims of abuse in childhood tended to have negative views of God, were less likely to believe in God, and were less likely to be involved in organized religion as adults. He interprets these findings with caution, as he did not control for potential factors beyond abuse. Using a national sample of 3, 032 persons (the 1996 National Survey of Midlife Development in the United States), he attempted to test the validity of these earlier findings and to present some testable propositions related to the link between abuse and specific orientations to God and religion. Three dimensions of religion were measured: ritual (attendance at sacred services), religious self-concept (“How religious are you?” and “How important is religion in your life?”), and spiritual self-concept (“How spiritual are you?” and “How important is spirituality in your life?”). Several items on emotional and physical abuse that were merged into a scale were used and several control variables (age, education, gender, socio-economic status, race, and family structure background) were included in the analysis. His findings both contrasted with and confirmed previous studies. In contrast to earlier research, if a person (man or woman) was abused by his or her mother, this did not affect ritual, religious self-concept, or spiritual self-concept. However, in confirmation of earlier studies, if people, men or women, experienced paternal abuse, they were less likely to practice regular ritual and had lower levels of religious and spiritual self-concept. In the light of Freudian theory, it could be that, because Christianity’s image of the divine is primarily paternal, those men and women who were abused by harsh, capricious fathers formed a sacred image that was also as harsh, capricious, and distant. This view of the deity could be why they did not attend religious services and had lower levels of religious and spiritual self-concept. Bierman (2005) concludes, In closing, this study represents the first time that a national probability sample has been used to examine the effects of physical and emotional forms of child maltreatment on adult religiosity and spirituality. This has been a relatively understudied topic, but there do appear to be effects of physical and emotional child maltreatment on adult religiosity and spirituality. (pp. 357–358)

Essentially, what Erikson observed in his historical case study of Luther, who lived during the early modern era in northern Europe, is reinforced by this recent study: the link between paternal abuse and negative images of the divine is a consistent finding that is as relevant in the twentieth century as it was in the sixteenth.

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The Social Construction of Religion Recall that the first dimension of religion is the experience of the sacred and that this experience has two elements: personal and social. Often, the social experience of the sacred is expressed as the social construction of religion. Many scholars have contributed to this perspective: the philosopher Ludwig Feuerbach (1804–1872), Friedrich Engels (1820–1895) and Karl Marx (1818–1883), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917), and, more recently, Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann. The sociological interpretation of religious experience is best outlined by Durkheim and Berger and Luckmann. I shall present their theoretical frameworks and, following that, three empirical examples of the social construction of religion: one from folk and archaic religions, a second from pre-medieval Catholic Christianity, and a third from early America, the mythology of the Mormons.

Durkheim’s Model Durkheim begins his study of folk religion with the analysis of totemism. According to Durkheim, each tribe of the Australian mainland had an emblem that was the totem of the tribe. 4 This totem (most frequently symbolic of an animal or a plant) represented both the local, central deity of the tribe as well as the tribe itself. This totem was not inert but had a spiritual power that was believed to have real effects in the lives of the clan members. Figure 2.1 gives a graphic illustration of Durkheim’s analysis. Figure 2:1 The Totem

The Deity or the Sacred The Totem The Clan SOURCE: Adapted from Durkheim (1915).

Further, this totem discloses not only the two-fold symbolic dimension but also that the deity and the clan are one. As Durkheim (1915) notes, The god of the clan, the totemic principle, can therefore be nothing else than the clan itself, personified and represented to the imagination under the visible form of the animal or vegetable which serves as totem. (p. 206)

The heart of Durkheim’s model is that he believes that the clan participants are actually worshipping their clan in worshipping their deity through ritual.

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We already saw that Durkheim considers belief and ritual within a community to be at the heart of religion (see Chapter 1, Box 1.1). Why do the believers actually believe that the deity is real? They do so because of ritual and a common social religious experience. It is when folk believers gather together in a ritual, a religious ceremony, that they are carried beyond themselves into another world. It is in this group ritual that they experience ecstasy, enthusiasm, effervescence, joy, interior peace, serenity, and a sense of being “transported into another world.” Durkheim implies that, because of the group experience, which is not open to an individual, the believers adhere to a conviction that the deity, filled with energy and power, is real and present to them. Also, this presence is felt as a locus of moral control. However, it really is not the deity that is the source of the religious experience but, rather, the clan, the social group itself. In addition, it is from these collective ritual experiences that the collective consciousness and the mythology emerge and are socially constructed. Indeed, for Durkheim, all of religion is socially constructed through ritual: the sacred or the deity, religious individuals, mythology, ethos, and the sacred organizational features. Figure 2.2 is an illustration of this: Figure 2:2 Durkheim’s Social Constructionist Model of Religion Individuals Ritual as the fundamental source of:

The sacred

Leaders

The numeniferous extensions

Mythologies

Ethos

Institutions

Berger and Luckmann’s Model Berger and Luckmann (1966) create a similar social constructionist model with a variety of nuances and an accent on one major dimension of religion, mythology. The heart of the model is social action that begins, both currently and historically, in face-to-face relationships. As is most common in the social experience of humanity, when this action is done repeatedly, habits of social action are created, which the authors call habitualization. Further, these habitualizations may be categorized into types of habits or typifications. When these typifications are reciprocal between persons and these persons also become types of social actors, institutionalization is the product. An example may help. In our study of religious experiences and their link to institutions, we will encounter Joseph Smith, Jr., the prophet of Mormonism. Smith had many experiences of the deity in his youth. As these experiences were repeated, they became habits in his religious consciousness (habitualization). From these habits, there were constructed types,

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3 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D patterns of what he thought God was like (typification). Then, these typifications led to the legitimation of Smith’s initial experiences of the sacred in the construction of the institution of the Mormon Church, in its infant stage (institutionalization). These institutions 5 have “power” over individuals, they appear as real, and they are external to the consciousness of individuals. They have resilience and are the means of the socialization of new generations of people. Berger and Luckmann (1966) write, “The institutions are there, external to him, persistent in their reality, whether he likes it or not. He cannot wish them away. They resist his attempts to change or evade them” (p. 60). Social institutions include the family, religion, polity, the economy, and education. Something more is needed, however, in this social construction of religion and that is legitimation or the justification of these habitualized relationships and institutions. Berger and Luckmann (1966) theorize that the human need to legitimize is why we have systems of knowledge and of beliefs or, what they call, symbolic universes. They define the symbolic universe as “... the matrix of all socially objectivated and subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe” (p. 96). Symbolic universes are necessary for human social life for they function to provide order to people’s lives and to present to them an identity. Social life is precarious (with death, illness, violence, tragedy, and isolation always possible) and, to assist people in coming to grips with this precarious situation, these symbolic universes also function as sheltering canopies, as protective systems providing meaning in the face of tragedy. Of particular interest in the sociology of religion is the place of mythologies as a special sort of symbolic universe. They provide continuity between the human world and the world of the sacred, and believers, in the light of these universes, solicit assistance from the sacred to make sense of the frequent breaking points of everyday life. Berger and Luckmann (1966) summarize the heart of their view of the social construction of all reality, religion included, in this way: “What remains sociologically essential is the recognition that all symbolic universes and all legitimations are human products; their existence has its base in the lives of concrete individuals, and has no empirical status apart from these lives” (p. 128). Figure 2.3 presents an outline Berger and Luckmann’s theory. Three examples will demonstrate these theories, models, or perspectives. They include examples from folk and archaic societies, from pre-medieval society, and from early modern America.

Folk and Archaic Societies An empirical study of folk and archaic societies is available to us to test the social construction thesis. Swanson (1966) asks this question: From what experiences do the ideas of the supernatural and its myriad forms arise? From an anthropological sample of 556 societies, Swanson selected 50 that represented folk and archaic societies reasonably well. All but 4 are folk societies: the ancient Egyptians (the Middle Kingdom), the Romans during the time of Augustus, the Israelites in the era of the Judges, and the Aztecs of Mexico.6 He chose seven topics in the anthropology of religion: monotheism, polytheism, ancestral spirits, reincarnation, the immanence of the soul, witchcraft, and codes related to the dead or the immortal.

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Figure 2:3 Berger and Luckmann’s Social Constructionist Model of Mythology The legitimation of institutions via symbolic universes or mythologies

Social action

Habitualization

Typifications

Institutionalization resulting in institutions

Using a cross tabulation analysis, he investigated the relationship between each of these topics and various social factors. Table 2.1 summarizes his findings. Table 2:1 The Relationship of Various Sacred Phenomena to Social Factors Monotheism or the presence of a high god Of the 50 societies, 19 give clear evidence that there is a high god. Some examples include the Aztecs, the Egyptians, the Iroquois, the Israelites, and the Blackfoot of the Canadian plains. Polytheism The ancient societies of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Rome are only some examples of the presence of polytheism. Some names from Ancient Egypt to be explained in Chapter 4 include: Maat, Anubis, Osiris, Horus, Thoth, and Ammet. Ancestral spirits (involving the ritual of talking to, invoking, and seeking the help of ancestors) An example of this kind of belief is from the Nandi, a farming tribe in the western highlands of Kenya. These sprits return to trick and play games with living relatives.

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Most likely to appear in societies that have a stable food supply. Positively related to the presence of a hierarchy of three or more sovereign political groups. The number of deities is positively related to the number of economic and social specialities in these societies. Societies with social classes are more likely than others to possess a belief in many gods, with certain gods being superior to other gods. There is a positive relationship between the presence of sovereign kinship groups (extended families who have political power) and a belief that ancestral spirits are active in human life.

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Table 2:1 The Relationship of Various Sacred Phenomena to Social Factors Reincarnation A minority group in Myanmar, the Karen, do not believe in an immortal life and posit a belief that, when their people die, they become a vegetative fluid and empower the rice to be abundant. Immanence of the soul The Iroquois peoples of eastern Canada and the north-eastern United States have the most evidence of belief in the immanence of the soul out of all the societies studied.

Those societies with small, scattered and nomadic bands were more likely to have beliefs in reincarnation than those that were more centralized.

A number of social factors are related to a belief in the soul. Those societies with sovereign groups with unlegitimated contacts, a large number of units of settlements, and the presence of sovereign kinship groups were more likely to believe in the soul.

Witchcraft (the ritual of invoking spirits to harm another person) The Navaho are the most populous of all aboriginal groups in the United States, scattered throughout north-western New Mexico, Arizona, and south-eastern Utah. Many practice witchcraft to attain wealth, women, destruction of enemies, and access to supernatural powers Supernatural sanctions for interpersonal relations In a large number of folk societies, incest, which jeopardizes familial relationships, is nevertheless common and is punished by some supernatural agency.

Witchcraft tends to be prevalent when people must interact with one another on important matters without legitimated social controls.

Supernatural sanctions for interpersonal relations are most likely to appear in societies in which there are interpersonal differences to wealth.

SOURCE: Adapted from Swanson (1966). Swanson’s scholarship on the links between the common social experiences of people and sacred phenomena appears to be substantial. By way of conclusion, Swanson (1966) writes,

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Our findings reaffirm the persistent sociological judgement that participants in a society experience and formulate significant aspects of that society’s total structure, that participants are not limited to experiencing and formulating only those aspects of their society with which they, personally, are in intimate touch ... or ... to which they give ultimate meaning (pp. 191–192).

Swanson’s work illustrates the social construction theme. Although he uses a correlational statistical analysis, his theory is that the various dimensions of religion are constructed from a variety of social hierarchies, social arrangements, and economic structures. It is further argued that these sacred elements are preceded by these social, political, and economic factors.

Pre-Medieval Society Brown (2003) notes that Christianity, during the time of the Roman Empire, had come to Britain (termed Britannia by the Romans) but that very little is known about the religion at that time. It is from the remnants of this early faith that the young man Patricus came. Patricus, later known as St. Patrick (c. 410–461 AD), was the son of a deacon. Captured and enslaved by Irish raiders, Patricus spent lonely years in seclusion in Ireland, escaped to Britain, joined the clergy, and returned to the island as a missionary of the Catholic faith. From his success, ascetic monasteries7 emerged in many parts of Ireland. He was a sapien— the kind of person who became a “hero or heroine of the faith” —a wise person who had mastered rustic Latin and learned the Christian Bible well. Many of these sapiens went to Britain, which had lost much of its vitality because of the invasion of the German Saxons. A major contribution that these men left as a legacy to the Catholic Church was the ritual of confession and the code of Penitentials. The Penitentials were used by priests to evaluate the kind of penance (fasting, prayer, doing good works) one was to be given in correspondence to the sin committed by the penitent. The gravity of the sin varied, as well, according to the person who was offended by the action. More serious sin (along with more grave penance) was seen if an offense was committed against a person of high rank (a bishop, an abbot, a local official) rather than against a person of lower rank (a parish priest, a peasant, a common person). While examining the Penitentials in the context of the social construction of religion (in this case, in the context of ritual and ethos), P. Brown (2003) writes something very interesting: “Behind the crabbed Latin of these texts, we can also sense the living texture of the Celtic societies8 in which they were first elaborated” (p. 244). In this tribal and “stateless society,” peace was maintained through a rough equality of status and lived out through honor. If one broke this code of honor and offended a neighbor or a senior, one needed to offer some sort of compensation. Offenses against those having power or status often required more serious compensation. The sapiens, then, constructed the Penitentials based on or derived from this social base. Thus, the sacred ethos, the need for compensation through penance, was founded on the honor arrangements of the social system of the lands of the Britons, giving us substantial evidence for the social construction of this one dimension of religion.

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Early Modern America Much has been written by historians on the social, political, and economic links to religion in colonial America. In post-revolutionary America, with the creation of a democratic state separate from any religious hegemony, something new was happening. The sociologists Stark and Bainsbridge (1985) call it religious competition that provides the opportunities for a wide variety of religious textures to be developed without the fear of state coercion. In this environment, during the first part of the nineteenth century in the United States, a new religious movement was created and matured. This movement came to be known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. In the light of the social construction of religion, it is arguable that the primary mythology of Mormonism was constructed using earlier religious traditions. By describing the primary belief tenets of Mormonism, linking them to earlier traditions, and presenting how Joseph Smith, Jr. (1805–1844), the revolutionary prophet of the church, could have accessed these traditions, I will support this argument. According to Weberian interpretive sociology, it is important to garnish data by outlining them from primary and inside or faith-based sources. The writings of Parley Parker Pratt (1855/1979) and the teachings of Joseph Smith, Jr. are excellent sources for this purpose. Pratt was one of the earliest Mormon theologians to present the central Mormon tenets of belief. He became a convert to the faith in 1830 and was an original member of the twelve apostles. It is acknowledged from inside sources that, from 1855 until the present, his summary of church doctrine has remained authoritative. The following table (Table 2.2)9 outlines these key tenets. Table 2:2 The Central Tenets of Mormonism Images of Deity ▶▶ God the Father possess a physical body that has all the attributes, organs, senses, and affections of a perfect man (Pratt, p.20) ▶▶ Jesus is a separate person from the Father just as two humans are two different persons (Pratt, p.21) ▶▶ Jesus and the Father are subject to all general laws of nature such being able to occupy only one space at a time ▶▶“It is, therefore, impossible for God the Father, or Jesus Christ to be everywhere personally present” (Pratt, p. 23) ▶▶ The Holy Spirit is the controlling element of the Father and the Son (indeed, all the cosmos) and is omnipresent (Pratt, p.24) ▶▶ God himself was once as we are now, and is an exalted Man, and sits enthroned in yonder heavens (Smith, p. 388) ▶▶ The mind or intelligence that man possesses is coequal with that of God himself (Smith, p. 392)

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Table 2:2 The Central Tenets of Mormonism The Creation of the Cosmos ▶▶ God was not God from eternity (Smith, p. 390) ▶▶ The head of the Gods called a council of the Gods; and they came together and concocted a plan to create the world and people it (Smith, p. 391) ▶▶ All the elements of the cosmos are eternal, uncreated, and self-existing (Pratt, p. 26) Image of Humans ▶▶ Humans are made in the image of God and possesses every organ, attribute, sense, sympathy, and affection that is possessed by God himself (Pratt, p. 61) ▶▶ God and humans are of the same species (Pratt, p. 21) ▶▶ People are the physical offspring of deity (Pratt, p. 30) ▶▶ Members of the church will continually evolve, here on earth and in the heavens, in a progressive growth towards deity (Pratt, p. 96) Images of Marriage and Family ▶▶ Marriage (in a Mormon Temple) is an eternal union for the purposes of procreation (Pratt, p. 107) SOURCE: These tenets are paraphrased from Pratt (1855/1979) and Smith (1844/1999) From whence do these teachings come? For the believing Mormon, they come from divine revelation. For the social historian, there appear to be links to precedent religious and sociological circumstances. Brooke (1996) offers some interesting insights. Brooke’s central thesis is that Mormon mythology is rooted in the magical tradition of hermeticism and in radical streams of Christianity. The origins of hermeticism go back to Greco-Roman Egypt, and its corpus was passed to twelfth-century medieval Europe through Muslim sources. Essentially, the teaching involves two ideas: (1) the earth is an organic being linked to spiritual entities and (2) experimenters (alchemists) can accelerate a process of transformation of metals into gold and of people into a higher sate of humanity, the androgynous Adam. The energy to do this is the Holy Spirit, an idea taken, in part, from traditional Christian mythology (Brooke, 1996). The key teachings of hermeticism are outlined in Table 2.3.

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Table 2:3 The Key Teachings of Hermeticism There are three heavens (from the Cabala or medieval Jewish mysticism) The mutuality of the material and the spiritual (the latter not essentially different from the former) Pre-created intelligences A divine Adam is the “father of all, prince of all, that ancient of days” A sinless Fall of Man and no such thing as original sin The religious efficacy of marriage and sexuality Divine power is given to man as a Magus and is the human means to divinity SOURCE: Paraphrased from Brooke (1996, p. 11–12). Much of the language of hermeticism and Mormon teaching is Christian. Some of this language emerges from radical Christian movements that included tenets of belief from magical and millennialist doctrines.10 Brooke outlines many of these beliefs, only some of which have implications for understanding Mormon mythology. Among those characteristics that do connect to Mormonism are the restoration of first-century Christianity and of the Paradise of Adam; a communal economy; polygyny; a theocratic society; warrior-saints; the concept that spirit and matter are the same; the deification of the human soul; the idea that God has body parts; the belief that there are two seeds of humanity, one good and another evil; and the view that creation was not out of nothing (as in traditional Christianity) but from some sort of eternal matter. Brooke (1996) concludes his first chapter by writing “Recoverable trials of popular experience and enduring, revitalized texts suggest that the hermetic dispensationalism of important elements in the Radical Reformation was not merely analogous with but antecedent to the theology framed by Joseph Smith, Jr. centuries later on a distant frontier” (p. 29). The links between Mormon theology and hermetic and radical Christian teachings are embodied in the following comparisons. Hermetic polygyny was practiced by Joseph Smith, Jr. and Brigham Young, and many early leaders had several wives. The Mormon communities of Kirkland, Ohio and Nuavoo, Illinois lived out a communal economy, and Joseph Smith, Jr., being an example of a theocratic leader, was not only a religious leader but also a political one. Smith set up a military cadre that approximates the hermetic “warrior-saints.” Mormons believe that all faithful believers will evolve into some sort of deity. Smith’s first religious experience was followed by the belief that the Father deity had a body just as Jesus did. As noted from Pratt, just as in hermeticism, Mormonism holds that all the elements of the universe are eternal and uncreated. Brooke is aware that the commonality between Mormon mythology and these earlier traditions is not evidence in itself to argue for an historical link between them, so he considers

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how Joseph Smith, Jr. might have come across hermetic and radical Christian practices and beliefs. He devotes a whole chapter to tell this part of the story. The historian documents that Joseph’s parents and grandparents, on both sides of the family tree, were suspicious of evangelical Christianity and that his father was involved in divining for treasure. Joseph’s brothers joined a universalist church that had hermetic leanings. The grandfather of Joseph on his father’s side (Asael) exhibited a religious style with hermetic tenets. William Cowdrey, a close companion to Smith who helped translate the Book of Mormon, also came from families that were linked to the hermetic culture of the frontier of New England. Of course, Brooke does not prove that Mormon mythology is founded on these earlier traditions. How, then, can one claim that this is an example of the social construction of religion? I aver that this claim moves forward on several fronts. First of all, the gnostic-hermetic belief systems precede Mormonism by centuries. Second, historians of early American religion, as documented by Brooke (1996, p. 60) note that these gnostic-hermetic traditions were relatively common even in the frontier of upper New York. Last, the social construction theme is best illustrated by Brooke’s documentation of the links that Smith had, through his family and paternal and maternal ancestors, to earlier hermetic traditions. Brooke also records that the main players in early Mormonism had links to these traditions as well. In essence, scholars contend that personal and social experiences of the sacred enable individuals and societies to form religions, that our personal and collective religious views are psychologically and socially constructed. Consequently, individual religious experience, as expressed in spirituality and in various religions, is of central significance to the social scientific study of the sacred.

Individual Religious Experience Various definitions are useful in understanding the nature of the sacred within. Recall that the definition of religion used throughout this text is “the individual and social experience of the sacred that is manifested in mythologies, rituals, and ethos and integrated into a collective, such as a community or organization.” The individual experience of the sacred is what concerns us here. Swatos (1998) uses religiousness as a synonym of religiosity. To present the idea that the sacred within has a unique meaning apart from the sacred between and the sacred among, I am proposing to use the term spirituality (hence the title of the text) in a specific way in this chapter and in this text. Spirituality, henceforth, refers to those aspects of religion and religiosity or religiousness that have an internal presence to the individual. It includes such elements as feelings, moods, attitudes, beliefs, attributions, and the like. This definition is similar to that of James (1920): In the more personal branch of religion it is on the contrary the inner dispositions of man himself which form the center of interest, his conscience, his deserts, his helplessness, and his incompleteness. (p. 29)

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4 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Several other authors have made a similar case. Zinnbauer and his colleagues (1997) consider religiousness to include personal beliefs, such as belief in God or in a higher power, and organizational beliefs and practices, for example, church membership, church attendance, and commitment to the belief system of an organized religion. Spirituality is defined in only personal or experiential terms (not institutional or organizational), such as believing in God or a higher power or having a relationship with God or a higher power (Zinnbauer et al., 1997, p. 561). Yamane (1998) says essentially the same thing. Spirituality is most generally understood as a quality of a person whose internal life is orientated toward God, the supernatural, or the sacred. Again, the central point is that it is internal—within the individual. The understanding that spirituality is essentially internal is what distinguishes it from religious experience. The latter could include extensions beyond the internal, such as rituals and behaviors. Finally, Hamer (2004), a behavioral geneticist, sums up the distinction by arguing that spirituality is essentially internal because it resides in the brain, whereas religion is external, subsisting in institutions.

How Important is the Social Scientific Study of Religious Experience? One approach to the study of religion has been to follow William James in taking experience as the core of religion. Although this tradition has been criticized for being too individualistic and subjectivistic—for not taking into account the social dimension of religious experience—it has provided an important foundation from which to explore the origins and renewed fervour of religious groups. Taylor (2002), in an update on James, provides evidence that many Americans have done just what James considers to be at the heart of religion: uncoupled spirituality from institutions, the political sphere,11 and contemporary society. He writes, “The spiritual as such is no longer intrinsically related to society” (Taylor, 2002, p. 102). The comparative religion scholar Rudolf Otto (1958) valorizes experience above all dimensions of religion. He writes, “Spiritual experiences are the basic factor and the basic impulse underlying the entire process of religious evolution” (Otto, 1958, p. 15 as quoted in Laubach, 2004). In addition, many social scientists do recognize that the experiential dimension is an important, albeit often neglected, part of the phenomenon we call religion (see Glock & Stark, 1965; Stark & Bainbridge, 1985). The priest-sociologist Andrew M. Greeley (1995) writes, “I feel that sociologists of religion have ignored for too long the experiential aspect of religion” (p. ix). The need for social scientists to investigate religious experience is also presented by Roof and Taylor (1995), who argue that, within contemporary culture, there is a renewed interest in religious experience as expressed in new religious movements such as New Age spirituality, goddess worship, neo-paganism, eco-spirituality, and “Gen-X” raves. Religious experience, then, is increasingly being recognized as an important focus of social scientific investigation. In the field of the psychology of religion, for example, some scientific studies of religious experience have established two forms of spirituality: intrinsiccommitted and extrinsic-consensual.

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Psychological Types of Spirituality Hood (1998) distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic spirituality.12 Intrinsic spirituality refers to an individual viewing trust as supreme, being oriented toward a unification of existence, honoring universal brotherhood (and, by implication, sisterhood), and striving to overcome self-centeredness. Extrinsic spirituality is utilitarian and is sought after for external reasons, such as social status and safety from a hostile world.13 Spilka and others (1985) argue that the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions are motivational (referring to them as providing any impetus to act). These authors combine Allport’s (1950) intrinsic-extrinsic religiosity scale with Allen and Spilka’s (1967) distinction between consensual and committed religion, which incorporates a cognitive aspect, and they create categories called intrinsic-committed and extrinsic-consensual. Intrinsic-committed spirituality is described as the kind of faith that is open, candid, personally relevant, abstract, relational, discerning, and differentiated. Extrinsic-consensual spirituality tends to lack a knowledge base, is restrictive, detached, irrelevant to everyday life, concrete, and simplistic. What Spilka et al. (1985) do is to combine the two dimensions to include both motivational and cognitive aspects of spirituality. Table 2.4 is a reproduction of this combination. Spilka and his colleagues use these dimensions as measurements of spirituality, build on them to construct a model of the phenomenon, and review a range of topics to substantiate the validity and reliability of the measures. In this chapter, you have been introduced to a study of the youth of Martin Luther, the reformer of Roman Catholicism in the sixteenth century. One may argue that, up until his internal conversion in the monastery while reading the Scriptures, his kind of spirituality was extrinsic-consensual. After this conversion, it appears that he adopted an intrinsiccommitted spirituality. However, as noted by Erikson, in Luther’s later life, he moved back to an extrinsic-consensual type. Is there a link between these types of spirituality and other aspects of the sacred or of the individual’s social and psychological life? Several empirical studies confirm a positive response. Wulff (1997) reviews a number of studies that indicate correlations between certain behaviors or attitudes and either extrinsic or intrinsic spirituality. Among other things, there is a relationship between extrinsic spiritual and prejudice against blacks (Feagin, 1964); prejudice in general (Allport & Ross, 1967); dogmatism (Hoge & Carroll, 1973); authoritarianism (Kahoe, 1975), and ethnocentrism (Dicker, 1977). Poloma and Gallup (1991), in a nationally representative study of prayer in the United States, found that the extrinsically spiritual do not tend to prayer meditatively and are less likely to claim an experience of God. If there are effects of spirituality, are there causes of it? Some researchers claim that spirituality is the consequence of biology.

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TABLE 2:4 CHARACTERISTICS OF INTRINSIC-COMMITTED AND EXTRINSIC-CONSENSUAL SPIRITUALITY INTRINSIC-COMMITTED

EXTRINSIC-CONSENSUAL

Devout, strong personal commitment

“Follows the rules,” convenient, called on in a crisis

Universalistic, strongly ethical, holds to brotherhood/sisterhood ideals, stresses love of one’s neighbor

Exclusionist, ethnocentric, restricted to in-group, chauvinistic, provincial

Unselfish, transcends self-centered needs, altruistic, humanitarian

Selfish, self-serving, defensive, protective

A guide to living, a general framework for daily life

Expedient, used when needed, not integrated into daily life

Faith is of primary importance and accepted without reservations; creed is fully followed

Faith and belief are superficial; beliefs are selectively held

Faith is of ultimate importance, a final good, supreme value, the ultimate answer

Faith is utilitarian, a means to other ends; it is in the service of other personal wants and desires

Sees people as individuals; high self-esteem; views God as loving, forgiving, and positive

Views people in terms of social categories, e.g., sex, age, status; low self-esteem; views God as stern and vindictive

Open to intense religious experiences; views death positively; associated with feelings of power, competence, and internal control

Tends to be closed to religious experience; views death negatively; ties to powerlessness and feelings of external control

Uses abstract principles and sees relationships among things

Concrete and literal in outlook and judgement

Discerning, orderly, exact in meaning, clear

Vague, mechanical, gives routine answers, uses clichés, obscure in meaning

Complex, differentiated, uses multiple categories and ideas, sees things as on a continuum

Uses few categories, polarized in thinking (black and white on issues), simple ideas

Open, flexible, creative in thinking, thoughtful, tolerant of different ideas and positions

Closed, restrictive, intolerant of different viewpoints, rigid, mechanical in thought

SOURCE: Spilka et al. (1985) p. 19.

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Box 2:1 DEFINITIONS OF RELIGION ...the need for God may be a crucial trait stamped deeper and deeper into our genome with every passing generation.... Nowhere has that idea received a more intriguing goingover than in the recently published book The God Gene: How Faith is Hardwired into Our Genes, by molecular biologist Dean Hamer. Chief of gene structure at the [U.S.] National Cancer Institute, Hamer not only claims that human spirituality is an adaptive trait, but he also says he has located one of the genes responsible, a gene that just happens to also code for production of the neurotransmitters that regulate our moods. Source: “Is God in our Genes?.” Time, October 25, 2004, p 45-52

Is there a Biological Basis to Spirituality? The 25 October 2004 edition of Time magazine has on its front cover a woman in a prayerful mood with the caption “The God Gene.” Substantial parts of the article are devoted to a review of the book The God Gene by behavioral geneticist Dean Hamer. Hamer’s primary thesis is that there is a unique gene in the brain that is a basis for the human need for the divine or the sacred. He discovered that this gene, VMAT2 or vesicular monoamine14 transporter, happens also to be a code for the production of neurotransmitters15 that regulate our moods. He provides evidence that this gene is linked to self-transcendence, a dimension of spirituality. In a sample of 1,000 men and women, he found a statistically significant relationship between variations of the gene and scores on self-transcendence. To present a further case for a biological basis of spirituality, Hamer references a large study of 25,000 identical (they have the same DNA) and fraternal twins (Kirk, Eaves, & Martin, 1999). This study found that there was a strong correlation between self-transcendence scores and being identical twins. This is significantly important because there appears to be genetic relationship to self-transcendence. To summarize all Hamer’s text is beyond the nature of this text. What can be said, though, is that there is substantial plausibility that spirituality does have a biological base.

VARIETIES OF SPIRITUALITY AND RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES There are many varieties of spirituality and religious experiences. I will focus on only three types: psychic experiences, mysticism, and conversion. When appropriate, I shall outline evidence of the impact of these kinds of spiritual and religious experiences on other areas of people’s lives.

Psychic Experiences The social historian of religion, Keith Thomas (1971) has argued that, as modernity emerged in the Western world, religion did not decline but magic did. However, some literature sug-

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4 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D gests that psychic experiences and paranormal beliefs, which can be seen as being part of magic, have not declined and are still part of the landscape of religion. Before the topic of these experiences is reviewed and located in the person, it is well to understand what magic is. There is a long scholarly history of defining magic by contrasting it to religion—scholarship that comes from anthropologists, sociologists, and historians. From anthropology, Malinowski (1954) describes magic as the use of rituals to harness supernatural power for human ends. 16 Frazer (1922/1999) describes religion as a propitiation (or conciliation) of powers superior to humans, powers that are believed to direct and control the course of nature and human life. In contrast, magic manipulates and controls these powers with appropriate rituals. An example of magic comes from Thomas (1971). The idea that an amulet of the Agnus Dei (a small, wax cake bearing the image of the lamb [Jesus] and a flag), if worn, would automatically be a defense against the assaults of the devil and a preservative against thunder, lightening, fire, drowning, or death in childbirth, suggests a magical orientation even though the symbols used are Christian. The sociologist Durkheim (1915) argues that magic does not have a religious collective but a clientele. He writes that “There is no Church of magic” and reasons that the social dimension of religion is essential in distinguishing it from magic, which has no collective consciousness and is only for the individual (p. 44). He further argues that the social relationship between a magician and people is of a master-client type. It is rare that the magician’s clients have a relationship with one another that would constitute a community. Another sociologist, Wach (1967), notes that the primary difference between religion and magic involves the attitude of the believer toward the transcendent. The religious perspective emphasizes the intrinsic need for worship, recognizing the object of worship as being worthy of such homage. Magic, on the other hand, involves attempts to manipulate the supernatural forces that are believed to control human destiny. These supernatural forces are not necessarily something with which a relationship is established, but rather they are more likely to represent laws of the universe, which must not be violated. The religious way leads to adoration; magic sets out to conquer and to manipulate. Kieckhefer (1989), another social historian of religion, provides us with an example of magic’s coercive nature. A German adjuration against a cyst a person was suffering from reads as follows: May you be consumed as coal upon the earth. May you shrink as dung upon a wall. And may you dry up as water in a pail. May you become as small as a linseed grain, and much smaller than the hipbone of an itch-mite, and may you become so small that you become nothing. (Kieckhefer, 1989, p.71)

Finally, some historians also note that, in effect, magic’s purpose is to control the supernatural while religion’s is to worship the divine. Flint (1991), in a study of magic in early medieval Europe, argues that religion requires reverence, trust, and being open to pleasing the deity and to being pleased by the same. In contrast, magic is practiced to subordinate, command, and influence a deity. Thomas (1971) extends the discussion by presenting the following contrasts: in sixteenth and seventeenth century England, the prayers of the religionist had no certainty of success but the rites of the magician were said to work automatically; a prayer was a supplication whereas a magical spell was a mechanical means of manipulation learned

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by the practitioner to control the supernatural. Thomas notes that, in the early modern period, the distinction between magic and religion became blurred in the minds of the common folk. For example, the original meaning of the Bible is to inspire believers to live a Christian life, so they should regularly attend to the Scriptures; however, in the early sixteenth century, this religious dictum (to listen to the word of God) was transformed into the magical idea that, if Catholics crossed themselves when a priest read a passage from the Gospel according to St. John, no tragedy or trouble would come to them that day (Thomas, 1971, p. 36). Subsets of magic, psychic experiences are thought to be outside what is considered physically possible, based on scientific assumptions (McClenon, 1998a). They consist of such phenomena as ESP (extrasensory perception); PK (psychokinesis or paranormal action in which one’s mind can influence a physical object); clairvoyance (seeing events in the future or beyond normal sensory contact), and déjà vu (the feeling that one has been in a place before). Greeley (1975), utilizing data collected at the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), assessed how many people reported experiences that could be considered psychic, including déjà vu, ESP, clairvoyance, and contact with the dead. He noted with some surprise that “almost a fifth of the American population reports frequent paranormal experiences” (p. 5). Only 38 per cent had never experienced déjà vu, and forty per cent had never experienced extrasensory perception (“feeling they were in touch with someone when they were far away”).17 Other studies reveal how common is the experience of or belief in psychic phenomena. Table 2.5 indicates this: Table 2:5 Data on belief in or experiences of psychic phenomena Contact with the spirit world

Source

Déjà vu

ESP

Clairvoyance

Contact with the dead

US: Greeley (1975)

20%

20%

20%

20%

–

US: Laubach (2004 from GSS in 1988)

–

64%

27%

–

40%

US: Rice (2003)

70%

60%

–

–

40%

Canada: Bibby (1987)

General belief in psychic phenomena: 63%

Canada: Bibby (2002)

–

59%

–

23%

40%

Canada: Bethune (2006) from Bibby data

–

57%

55%*

33%

–

* Here, the belief was in “having psychic powers.”

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5 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 2:4 Factors and Effects of Paranormal and Psychic Experiences and Beliefs

Paranormal and psychic beliefs More likely to experience

(Rice)

Higher education White

Experience contradictory feelings at the same time (Greeley)

Women Higher income

Sensitive

Paranormal and psychic experiences

Happier Less depression More sense of meaning More satisfied with life (Poloma & Pendleton)

Several empirical studies help us to understand psychic beliefs or experiences and the effects these have (see Figure 2.4). Rice (2003) investigates the reasons that some Americans are more open to beliefs in the paranormal and others are not. Using data from a 1998 national survey, he found that measures of the paranormal that consisted of astrology, ESP, extraterrestrial beings, ghosts, psychic healing, reincarnation, déjà vu, and the power of the mind to heal the body yielded the following correlations. By far, women are more likely to believe in these measures of the paranormal (six of eight), but people with higher education (three of eight), with higher incomes (three of eight), and who are Caucasian (two of eight) also believed more readily. These findings were contrary to his deprivation theory, which claims that those people who are marginal to a society are more likely to believe in the paranormal than those who are not marginalized. What he found was that it is not African Americans, those who live in rural areas, and those with lower incomes (examples of those more marginalized and thus deprived) who were more likely to adhere to psychic beliefs but, rather, Caucasians, higher income earners, and urban dwellers. The only factor that was consistent with the theory of deprivation was that women (who tend to be more marginalized than men) were the most likely to believe in the paranormal. Do psychic experiences affect people’s lives? Yes, they seem to (see the outcome or endogenous variables from Figure 2.4). In analyzing the data he had collected on psychic experiences, Greeley (1975) found that psychics appear to be more sensitive “in the sense of having higher and stronger feeling levels” (p. 31). They appeared to be more likely to experience the seemingly contradictory feelings of marital tension and positive affect (e.g., feelings

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of happiness) than non-psychics—a finding Greeley attributes to the more affective or feeling state of psychics. Building on Greeley’s study of psychic experiences, Poloma and Pendleton (1991) used the four different types of spirituality (peak, psychic, prayer, and occult) in their research on subjective perceptions of well-being. They sought to determine whether these mystical experiences had an effect on how satisfied people were with their lives, on their sense of life’s meaning and purpose, on happiness scores, and on negative affect (depression, sadness, loneliness, tenseness, and fear). They report that respondents who had peak and/ or prayer experiences were more likely to be satisfied with their lives, to feel that life had a meaning and purpose, and to report being happier than those who did not have such experiences. On the other hand, psychics were less satisfied with their lives than non-psychics, and occultists had a less developed sense of life’s meaning and were more likely to score higher on negative affect measures. It appears that both prayer and peak experiences have a positive impact while the occult and psychic experiences have a negative impact on subjective perceptions of well-being.18 These findings reveal that there is a significant difference between those who have prayer or peak experiences and those who have psychic or occult experiences. The former appear to have positive images of life and the latter, negative. Another term for the peak experiences described by Poloma and Pendleton is mysticism. This is the second type of religious experience to be discussed.

Mysticism Mysticism can be defined both as a construct and as a measurable variable. As a construct, it is defined as “an oceanic experience” (Freud, 1952), a “cosmic emotion” and “union with the divine” (James, 1902, p. 78), or “sudden raptures of the divine presence” (James, 1902, p. 391). McClenon describes it as a “doctrine that special mental states or events allow an understanding of ultimate truths” (1998b, p. 316). Being abstract, these definitions are not susceptible to measurement. However, measuring mystical experiences was made possible through the work, cited by Spilka et al. (1985), of Stace (1960) and Hood (1975). Stace (1960) considered mysticism to be noetic (a valid source of knowledge), ineffable, holy, positive in effect, and paradoxical in that it defies logic. He went on to describe two forms of mysticism, extravertive and introvertive. Extravertive mysticism is reflected in such experiences that are spontaneous and in which a person perceives an ultimate unity in the multiplicity of perceived phenomena. Introvertive is a form of mystical experience in which the usual number of externally perceived objects vanishes leaving a void that is experienced as the “One” or the “Absolute.” Hood (1975) constructed 108 descriptors that could be used to measure Stace’s criteria for mysticism, subsequently reducing this number to 38. They tap into such experiences as feeling, holy, peaceful, unified into a single whole, and united with all things. Do common people have mystical experiences, or are they restricted to such special people as Jesus, Muhammad, St. Benedict, or St. Hildegard of Bingen? Several studies from the United States, England, and Canada provide evidence that significant numbers of individuals have had mystical experiences. ▶▶

The United States: (1) National data samples from 1962, 1966, and 1967 indicate that 31% have had a mystical experience (Hood, 1975). (2) A 1972 national study

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5 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D indicated that 40% reported affirmatively to a question on mysticism (Greeley, 1974). (3) A 1988 GSS found that 34% of Americans had some mystical experiences (Laubach, 2004). (3) In an Akron, Ohio representative study, over two-thirds experienced a strong sense of God’s peace and presence, divine leadings, and inspirations and had specific prayer requests answered (Poloma & Pendleton, 1991, 1992). ▶▶

England: 33% of respondents answered positively to the question asking whether they had been aware of or influenced by a presence or power different from everyday life (Hardy, 1970, cited in McClenon, 1998b).

▶▶

Canada: From a 1975 representative sample of Canadians, Bibby (1987) found that 44% claimed these kinds of experiences. In one of his most recent updates, Bibby (2002) finds that Canadians who claim they have had an experience of God number about 50%. He notes that, far from declining since 1975, mysticism continues its importance.

What are the sources or potential causes of mystical experiences? Several theories exist. Psychologists, who use the individual as a unit of analysis, have often sought to explain religious experiences using physiological or other material causes, sometimes reducing their explanations to neurological or chemical responses to physical stimuli (Greeley, 1974; Hamer, 2004). Some research in social psychology suggests that drug use, meditation, reading sacred texts, and music are facilitators of religious experience (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993; Hamer, 2004). Sociologists, whose basic unit of analysis is the collectivity or group, have sought explanations within the realm of observable social factors, including demographic factors such as age, gender, socio-economic status, race, and ethnicity (Poloma, 1995). Some writers, including James (1920), Greeley (1974, 1975), and Poloma and Pendleton (1991, 1992) accept as real the mystical experiences reported by respondents. In other words, they are reluctant to reduce these experiences to other material or social factors. Other researchers are more likely to seek the essence of mystical experiences within the natural realm (including chemical and neurological disorders), with research conclusions that have the tendency to “explain away” the very experience they seek to study.19 I argue that the most fruitful theorizing and research has been done by those who acknowledge the impossibility of determining the essence of mystical experiences scientifically (or the claim that a deity or deities exist), who proceed to accept the definition of the situation offered by research subjects, and who then seek to determine the impact of such experiences on people. Some of the most useful sociological approaches to the origins of mysticism consider the social and cultural contexts of these kinds of experiences. One example of this comes from psychological observations about the labelling used by sociologists who work outside the laboratory and inside the natural world. They tend to emphasize that reactions to stimuli are framed by the language and culture of persons who experience them. Yamane and Polzer (1992), using what they call a cultural-linguistic approach, shift the focus from inward experiences to providing evidence on how religious institutions promote mysticism. Using NORC data, they found support for their basic thesis. The more people are immersed in their religious traditions, the more likely they are to have mystical experiences.20 A second example of

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the cultural-linguistic approach, which focuses on social learning and the role that religious institutions play in promoting mystical experiences, is from a qualitative study of religious experience. The historian Tilley (1994) argues that narratives of religious experience provide evidence that the institutional factor is vital in personal religious experience. Whether mystical experiences are innate responses of the person to non-material or spiritual phenomena or whether they are the product of physical and social forces, for the present, remains an underlying and untested (although often unspoken) question in social scientific writings. Regardless of whether mystical experiences are approached at face value or whether underlying material causes are the primary research focus, the different forms of mysticism warrant more attention than they have received to date. To conclude, consider again Hamer’s (2004) work on the biological basis of spirituality and, in this case, mysticism. Clearly, Hamer’s “self-transcendence” measure can be seen as a part of mysticism. According to Harmer, self-transcendence is correlated to the gene VMAT2. His theory includes other research on consciousness. Relying on the work of Edelman (1992), he posits that humans have two levels of consciousness, core and higher. Core consciousness is the ability to construct scenes from sensory data. A higher consciousness integrates the self into our view of the world. Hamer argues that the core and higher consciousness is integrated by the gene VMAT2 triggering the flow of the monoamines. Those persons who are measured to have experienced this integration are those who have mystical experiences. What is the event or the process of people transferring from normal, everyday life to the claim of having mystical experiences? Psychologists of religion respond and call this conversion–the last topic to be presented in this outline of religious experience.

Conversion James (1902, pp. 193–203) defines conversion as a change from one aim in life to another, a journey from a divided self to a united self, a new perception of life, and an emotional transformation. For a person to be converted means “that religious ideas, peripheral in his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual center of his energy” (1902, p. 196). Paloutzian offers a formal definition; it is “conversion to an organized set of beliefs that provide a superordinate framework for the individual’s life” (1996, p. 145). Another insight understands conversion to be changes involving cognitive, emotional, and belief dimensions (Richardson, 1998). All three authors subdivide conversion into basically two types. James calls these types volitional and self-surrender. Paloutzian (1996; Spilka et al., 1985) terms them gradual and sudden.21 Richardson moves away from these authors and, in light of the recent controversy surrounding conversions to new religious movements, he calls one type of conversion pathological and the second volitional. Pathological indicates that the person converting is “brainwashed”22 and joins a new religious movement while denying her or his free will. The second type, volitional conversion, acknowledges the convert as one who freely chooses the new group. Sudden conversion has three elements: being passive, sensing a strong “otherness,” and feeling guilty and unworthy (Spilka et al., 1985). Passivity refers to the convert’s sense of being controlled by “something” other than self, often in a moment of crisis. The “otherness” is the sacred, the object of religious worship. Last, the sense of guilt, which might have triggered

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5 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the conversion, is taken away as a consequence of conversion. In the Christian tradition, St. Paul’s conversion is a good example (Acts 9:1–19). Gradual conversion is just that—it takes place over a period of time. It still results in a change to a new identity of the self. Martin Luther’s conversion, described earlier, provides an illustration of this type. Through his reading of the Bible, he experienced a gradual transformation from Roman Catholicism to being the initiator of the Protestant movement. TABLE 2:6 SUDDEN AND GRADUAL CONVERSIONS SUDDEN CONVERSIONS

GRADUAL CONVERSIONS

sudden awareness of the other

gradual and increasing search for meaning or purpose

predominance of negative emotions and feelings of sin and guilt

absence of emotions, especially intense feelings of sin and quilt

passive act of surrendering to a faith perspective

active assent to a faith perspective

SOURCE: Adapted from Spilka et al. (1985), p. 206. In a study of college students, which was designed to test the validity of the classification outlined in Table 2.6, it was found that there were no significant differences between those students who had sudden conversions and those who had gradual conversions. Differences were found, however, between students who had a conversion and those who did not (Zinnbauer et al., 1998). A theoretical model of conversion that includes both psychological and sociological factors comes from the work of Lofland and Stark (1965) and Stark (1996). Conversion to a new, deviant religious group occurs when, other things being equal, individuals have or develop stronger attachments to members of the group than they have to non-members (Stark, 1996, p.18). Stark uses this gradual approach to explain how Romans converted to Christianity. These illustrations of gradual conversion from the work of Lof land and Stark have become a model of conversion. Richardson (1998) calls it the “World-Savior” model. Both he and Paloutzian make use of the model of gradual conversion illustrated in Figure 2.5. First, the individual needs to experience enduring, acutely felt tensions. Second, the potential convert must adopt a sacred strategy rather than a profane or secular one to address these tensions. When this strategy is selected, his or her current commitment to conventional religion is experienced as not life giving. A fourth step consists of a potential convert sensing a turning point in her or his life and, at that time, meeting someone who represents an alternative religious group. After an initial commitment is made, the new convert creates strong bonds to members of the new group and tends to sever bonds with people outside the group.

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Figure 2:5 The “World-Savior” Model 1. Sense of loss or tension

7. Total identity with the new group

2. Adopts a sacred strategy

6. Severs bonds with old group

3. Current commitment is not life giving

5. Begins to form bonds with new group

4. Meets someone from a new group

The seventh and final step occurs when the convert becomes a “total convert” and identifies completely with the new association. An alternative model of conversion emerges from rational choice theory (see Chapter 1). One student of this model, Iannaccone (1990), uses working concepts from a household production approach utilized within the tradition of household economics. The concept refers to the production of commodities within a household unit, commodities that are not made for exchange or distribution (as in market production) but directly for consumption. This production includes many of those things produced within our homes: food, clean clothes to wear, or an ordered home to live in. The term human capital indicates the skills needed for the production of these commodities. Examples of these include cooking, cleaning the house, and driving a vehicle in order to provide goods and services consumed by family members. Iannaccone translates these terms for use in the study of religion, calling the first religious production and the second religious human capital. He acknowledges that religious products are difficult to measure, unlike the inputs to religious production. These inputs include such elements as the skills, talents, and training necessary to produce religious products. The religious products themselves include familiarity with religious doctrine, rituals, traditions, and members. In addition, religious capital is also a product of religious activity, such as religious services, which are conducted to inspire, instruct, and prepare participants for service. In this model, he offers an explanation for conversion. He argues that the more similar the groups, the greater the likelihood of conversion from one religious group to another because children receive their religious human capital from their parents and will, therefore, be more likely to move to another group whose members received similar training in religious human capital. He cites several studies to confirm this hypothesis. For example, Iannaccone (1990) concludes, ... the human capital approach to religious participation illustrates the threefold contribution of economic theory to the scientific study of religion: integrating numerous predictions within a single conceptual framework; providing theoretical explanations of observed empirical regularities; and generating new hypotheses to guide future empirical research. (p. 313)

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5 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D

SUMMARY Perhaps a third of the North American population has had some kind of religious experience, be it mystical or psychic. This alone makes spirituality an important focus for analysis. Geneticists and psychologists have made significant contributions to the understanding of these phenomena. From the sociological perspective, it is also essential to see spirituality and belief within social contexts. A landmark study of an individual’s spiritual journey was Erikson’s Young Man Luther, which considered Martin Luther’s early life and its relation to his religious rebellion and conversion within psychological, social, and historical contexts. Luther was a man of his historical era, influenced by both personal and institutional factors. Indeed, the sacred within is socially constructed, legitimated, and transformed.

Notes 1

In 1343, the pope of the Roman Catholic Church decreed that Christians gained merit that was “stored in heaven.” This merit was useful for the sake of freeing people from purgatory. Also, the storehouse of merit could be drawn on for the remission of the earthly punishment of sins that had been confessed and for which a person had received absolution. These “indulgences” were granted by the church and gradually replaced the severe penances of early Christianity. The issue that really troubled Luther was that these indulgences were commercialized and sold.

2

The economic effects of the Reformation, as described by Max Weber, will be discussed in the chapter linking religion and the economy.

3

It should be noted that Bierman does not interpret his study in Freudian terms. I have linked his work to Freud and Erikson’s.

4

Rivers (1968) adds to Durkheim’s use of these people as typical of folk religions by noting that totemism is central to other folk religions as well as to those found in Australia.

5 Most sociologists and anthropologists agree that there are five primary institutions: the family, the economy, the polity, education (not necessarily schools but any mechanism of socialization beyond the family), and religion. 6

Refer to Swanson (1966, p. 35–36) for a list of all the societies he investigated.

7

Ascetic refers to choosing an austere life or some rigor to the body for a spiritual end. It often consists of fasting, sleep deprivation, sexual abstinence, and, sometimes, isolation in wilderness areas.

8

Celtic refers to both an ethnic and language group of Western Europe in Roman and preRoman times in Britannia, Ireland, and Normandy.

9

There are many more beliefs, such as in the kinds of the heavens, the existence of a “MotherGod” who, with the Father-God, procreates all spirit children, and polygyny. The beliefs presented in Table 2.2 are selected as illustrations.

10 Millennialism and dispensationalism have similar meanings. The former term captures many religious traditions that look for a new heaven and a new earth. Dispensationalism

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has the connotation of stages: periods of growth and change throughout human history until the culmination of a new heavens and a new earth. 11

We will revisit this when we investigate the relationships between religion and politics.

12 The author uses the term religiosity or religiousness. 13

Hood (1998) traces the history of the contrast between intrinsic and extrinsic spirituality to Allport (1960, 1966); he notes that, in spite of criticism of the intrinsic-extrinsic continuum (for example from Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993), its use in the measurement of spirituality has dominated much of the empirical study of spirituality.

14 Monoamines are the biological mediators of emotions and values. They are what make us feel. Within them are such chemicals as serotonin (the feel “bad” one) and dopamine (the feel “good”). See Hamer (2004, p. 103–105). 15

A neurotransmitter transmits nerve impulses across a synapse between brain cells or neurons.

16 An opposing view from another anthropologist, Brown (1997), makes a case that the distinction is not as clear as one might think. This position is also taken by the sociologist Sharot (2001), who sees little difference between religion and magic, especially in Chinese Taoism. 17 Bibby (1993) notes that evidence from two national surveys (one in 1980 and the other in 1990) reveals that 47% of Canadians have precognitions and 59% have had ESP experiences. In addition, 63%of Canadians surveyed in the mid-1980s believed “that some people have psychic powers, enabling them to predict events,” and 61% affirmed their belief in ESP (Bibby, 1987). 18 Unlike Greeley, who focused on psychic experiences, Poloma and Pendleton’s multivariate analysis employed all four forms of mystical experience in the same model. Poloma and Pendleton did not find support for Greeley’s report that psychics were higher in affective action. They did find that both psychics and occultists tended to be somewhat younger while those having prayer and peak experiences tended to be older than their respective comparison groups. Age was held constant in the multivariate analysis testing for the impact of mystical experiences on well-being measures. 19 Reducing a phenomenon to social or psychological factors is common in social science. Reducing religious beliefs and rituals to social factors in sociology goes back to Émile Durkheim’s classic work in which he defines the essence of religion as the worship of society. I concur with Raymond Aron (1970), a well-reputed commentator on sociological theory, who critically states, “To suggest that the object of the religious feelings is society transfigured is not to save but to degrade that human reality which sociology seeks to understand.” 20 This finding fits well with an earlier one based on a study of college students by psychologist Ralph Hood (1970). Hood reported a general relationship between mysticism and church participation, suggesting that “mystical experiences may play a dual motivating role among the religiously committed, serving to maintain an active church orientation while producing dissatisfaction with a particular church membership.”

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5 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D 21 He adds a third called “socialization.” Many would not agree with his categorization, as it seems to lack the basic element of change from one state to another. 22 The term “brainwashed” should be used with caution. Members of many New Religious Movements (NRM) who have been accused of brainwashing converts have been exonerated by some scholars who have found no evidence for that. For example, Hexham and Poewe (1986) note that, in studies of ex-NRM converts as well as their family members, most deny being coerced into becoming members. In the research on members, social scientists have found that they become members because of a long search for meanings and not because they were forced.

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Chapter THR EE

R e l ig ious E x pe r i e nc e a n d S o c i a l I ns t i t u t ion s

Orientation Have you ever wondered about the origins of religious institutions?

Have you asked what mechanisms were common to these origins? These are some of the questions that this chapter addresses. Answers are taken from both historical and comparative religious studies. These studies provide important evidence of the connection between the origins of religious institutions and the when and the how of the religious experiences of some of the major figures in the universe of established religions. The individual experience of the sacred and social institutions are intimately interconnected, and the relationship between the two has long been recognized to be one of tension. According to James and Weber, religious experience is what gives the impetus to religious organization. These social theorists would concur, however, with Berger (1979), who observes, “Whatever else it is, religious experience is dangerous. Its dangers are reduced and routinized by means of institutionalization” (p. 46). Although religious experience may be “domesticated” (to use Berger’s term) by institutionalization, there is an underlying tension between religious experience and religious organization. For James (1920), it was religious experience or personal contact with the divine that gave the original impetus to a religious organization. The “innocent beginning” is often lost as the “politics and lust of dogmatic rule” take over (p. 262). If the organization is totally successful, the day of inwardness is over, the spring is dry, and church members, who live a second-hand religion, “stone the prophets in their stead” (p. 262). Taylor (2002) adds to James’s observation. The real locus of religion, according to Taylor, is in individual experience not in corporate life. He then reviews how important individual experience has been in

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6 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Christian history from the Late Middle Ages1 to the present: The Brethren of the Common Life; the Lateran Council of the Latin Church in 1215, which encouraged confession and the reception of communion; the rise of the Franciscans and Dominicans in the thirteenth century; and the Reformation, with its strong accent on experience of the divine through faith and grace. I would add the rise of Methodism in the eighteenth century, which led to the “Great Awakening” in the British colonies and the United States (and the creation of modern evangelicalism and Pentecostalism) and, more recently, the emergence of the “Charismatic Renewal” in denominational Christianity from 1965 to about 1980. Taylor also discusses the rise of Sufism in Islam (see also Chapter 8 on religious organizations in this book). I would add that the cabbala in Judaism is an important locus of Jewish religious experience (see Cooper, 1997). Weber is no less pessimistic than James about the fragility of religious experience, but his approach is somewhat different. Weber’s level of analysis shifts from the individual to the social. His focus is on the relationship between charisma, the affective action of religious leaders, and social organization. Weber’s charisma appears to be an attribute that is at the extreme end of any mysticism scale. This “gift of grace” is not the mysticism we have been discussing thus far but rather rests on only a few spiritual elites or virtuosos.2 The free-flowing charisma of the spiritual elite becomes the basis for either traditional or legal rational forms of organization that are more institutionally stable than charisma. Religious institutions, like other social institutions, tend to rely on traditional and rational forms of action. Sharot (2002), in his comparative sociology of world religions (which extends the Weberian framework), also assists us in understanding the dynamic interchange between sacred experience and sacred institutions. A great advantage of his work is that it moves beyond a frequent bias in the social science of religion—the heavy emphasis on Latin and Protestant Christianity. Sharot presents an analysis of the relationship between two kinds of sacred elites, the virtuosos and the clerics, which gives us insight into the experience-institution dilemma. Clerics are those who hold authoritative positions in sacred organizations and who seek to monopolize the distribution of religious benefits to the people. Virtuosos tend to have links to organizations in more exemplary ways and serve as illustrations of outstanding goodness (e.g., the monks in medieval European society or in Buddhism) whereas the clerics’ bond is to formally organized sacred institutions (e.g., the imams in Islam or priests in Catholicism). Yet there is still much overlap. According to Sharot (2001), Weber considered the relationship between the religious elite and the common people “mainly in terms of the relative influence of the virtuosos over the masses” (p.57). The influence of the virtuosos was smaller in oriental religions (Hindu, Buddhist, Confucian, and Taoist) than in the religions of the West or the Middle East (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) because the oriental virtuosos other-worldly, contemplative mysticism separated them from the masses whose sacred ethics revolved about magical traditions. In the West and Middle East, for example, in the monasticism of Latin Christianity and the Sufism of Islam, the virtuosos were more linked to the everyday life of the people. A second observation is that the carriers of the sacred, numeniferous persons, came from the intelligentsia in the East but from the urban and bourgeoisie class in the West. The final note is that religious organizations in the East were restricted to the monasteries, whereas, in the West, various religious gatherings became numeniferous (or carriers of the

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sacred): the church or the sect, in the case of Christianity; the synagogue, in Judaism; and the mosque, in Islam. There is a need, as sociologist Eisenstadt (1968) stresses, to consider how charisma and institution “are continuously interrelated in the fabric of social life and in the processes of social change” (p. ix). In other words, charisma plays a role in the development and transformation of institutions. This, indeed, is the substantial dilemma of the dynamism between experience and organization, between mysticism and bureaucracy, and between charisma and its institutional transformations in routinized carriers. This chapter will review the characteristics and experiences of three religious leaders or virtuosos who have been significant in the construction of three sacred organizations: Mother Ann Lee and the Shakers, Joseph Smith, Jr. and the Mormons, and Muhammad and Islam. The goal is to see how the personal characteristics of these persons, especially their sacred experiences, have patterned the sacred institutions subsequent to them.

Charisma in the Burned-Over District The “burned-over district,” a section of western New York state, was so named because of the passionate religious zeal exhibited in tent revivals commonly held in the area (Cross, 1950). Although a number of theories have been advanced to account for this region’s becoming a hotbed of religious activity, a commonly accepted explanation focuses on the socioeconomic milieu. The construction and opening of the Erie Canal in 1825, connecting the Great Lakes with the eastern seacoast, opened up new markets for commerce and began an unprecedented expansion of the western area of New York state. (See Map 3:1.) For example, between 1820 and 1830, the five counties surrounding the western half of the canal increased 135 per cent as commerce flourished. This rapid growth brought economic prosperity to the area but also a weakening of old community bonds. The milieu created by the flourishing economy of early nineteenth century New York is familiar to those who study new religious movements. The weakening of community ties occasioned by rapid economic and demographic change is frequently accompanied by a greater individualism that deprives many people of their social moorings and leaves them open to new beliefs and connections. Those migrating into a new area often leave behind family, friends, and community, only to find themselves without meaningful social ties and feeling somewhat estranged from their new world. This social disruption, leaving many without adequate social support or social control, creates conditions that are favorable for religious experimentation and innovation (Foster, 1981). It was within this social context that Ann Lee and Joseph Smith, Jr. introduced their experiences and innovative religions to prospective disciples. Despite the great differences between the two religious movements, they share certain commonalities (Foster, 1981). Each had its beginning in the religious experience of its charismatic leader. The leaders, viewing the world as corrupt and on the brink of destruction, were pessimistic about the future. Both felt that the answer to the problems confronting the world was to restore Christianity to its pristine form (although each had a different conception of what model this “original Christian church” should take). Each virtuoso and founder had a unique vision for establishing the kingdom of God on earth.

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6 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Erie Canal, 3.8702” wide x 2.6566” high

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Ann Lee was born in Lancaster, England in 1736, the illiterate daughter of a blacksmith. At the age of 23, she joined an enthusiastic religious group known as the “Shaking Quakers.”4 (The Shaking Quakers, so named because, during worship services, the members would fall into trances in which they would quiver and shake, experienced persecution for their departure from mainstream Anglicanism.) While Ann Lee was in prison in 1770 for having participated in worship that was considered indecent and blasphemous, she experienced a vision. In the vision she witnessed the “original sin,” which led her to believe that the sexual act was the cause of all evil and suffering in the world. Ann Lee had always felt guilty about engaging in sex with her husband, especially after each of the four children born to her died in early infancy. She was convinced that their deaths were a divine punishment for her concupiscence. During this vision, a light shone about her, and she claimed that the Lord Jesus spoke to her, becoming one with her in mind and spirit. A few months after her release from prison, Mother Ann Lee (as she was called by her followers) had a divine revelation in which she was directed to America—a place, she was assured, in which the Believers would prosper and grow. Mother Ann, together with eight faithful followers (including her husband), moved to New York in 1774 (Morse, 1980; Kephart, 1987). Ann Lee had the makings and markings of a charismatic leader, a virtuoso, one that could elicit from her followers a commitment to a communal celibate life. Her religious experiences, including speaking in tongues, visions, and revelations, as well as her talents, such as the ability to heal, left her convinced that she was the second coming of Jesus Christ in female form. Through her charisma and countenance, she was able to convince others that her experiences were more than illusion. An early convert in the United States spoke of Mother Ann as follows:

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Her countenance appeared bright and shining, like an angel of glory. The graceful motions of her hands, the beautiful appearance of her countenance, and the heavenly melody of her voice, made her seem like a glorious inhabitant of the heavenly world, singing praises to God. (Morse, 1980, p. 23)

As Kephart (1987, p. 190) has astutely noted, the fact that Ann Lee was able to gain any followers in the eighteenth century for a religion in which a woman claimed to be a reincarnation of Christ and which demanded sexual celibacy testifies to her spiritual and charismatic powers. Mother Ann died in 1784, at the age of 48: “Thus ended the short but very remarkable career of a very remarkable person. Through the quiet force of her own personality, she was able to transform a tiny band of ineffectual ecstatics into a respected and rapidly growing religious body” (Kephart, 1987, p.191). According to Weberian theory, the loss of a charismatic leader is often a fatal blow to a new religious movement. What is needed is the emergence of another leader—one who can systematize, organize, and set the stage for expansion. One of Ann Lee’s earliest converts, Joseph Meachem (a former Baptist minister), proved to be the right person for the job following Ann Lee’s death. Father Joseph was a brilliant organizer, and one of his first acts was to appoint Lucy Wright to the headship of the “female line.” For the next ten years, Father Joseph and Mother Lucy provided the necessary stable leadership for the Shakers, a leadership that nurtured the work begun by Mother Ann Lee. At the time of Father Joseph’s death in 1796, there were Shaker communities in 11 locations, with membership totalling over 10,000 persons. Mother Lucy continued in the top position for another 25 years, during which time 5 more societies were established and thousands more people added to Shaker numbers. During its heyday, 75 years after Ann Lee’s death, the United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Coming (also known as the Shakers) had established 19 societies in 8 states. Of significance for this chapter is the attraction to Shaker life offered by revivalistic activities. Foster (1981) describes some of these activities as follows: Among the types of behavior described in Shaker sources were shaking and trembling, shouting, leaping, singing, dancing, speaking in strange tongues, whirling, stamping, rolling on the floor, crying out against sin and carnal nature, and trance.... Many of these activities seemed to be clearly beyond any conscious human agency, and thus were seen as manifestations of the supernatural . . . Believers saw them as a sign of God’s continuing workings in human history and the existence of an authority going beyond the purely man-made. (p. 29)

Religious ritual provided a break from the serious, rigid, and demanding life of a Shaker. The Shakers were also among the forerunners of modern spiritualism; they believed that the living could communicate with the dead. Communication with the spirit world was particularly prevalent in the 1830s and the 1840s, when Mother Ann Lee (now deceased for some 50 years) would come to visit her followers or when Alexander the Great, Napoleon, George Washington, or Benjamin Franklin would be their guests (Kephart, 1987, p. 212–213). Ecstatic religious communal experiences and vibrant worship accompanied the organization and growth of the Shakers, but charismatic dance increasingly became routine ritual,

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6 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D and spiritualism died down after 1850. The routinization of religious practices described by Desroche was one factor in the demise of the religion: The characteristic Shaker dance rituals were slowly modified and eventually abandoned. Instrumental music and more conservative songs displaced the early chants and folk spirituals. The forces of religious ardor, holding compact the life of the sect, were wearing themselves out. (quoted in Kephart, 1987, p. 215)

Granted, there were many other socio-economic factors contributing to the decline of the United Society of Believers—factors we will discuss in other chapters of this text. There can be no doubt, however, that this highly successful religious community was marked by charisma from its founding through its early decades of growth. The gradual and then rapid decline of the Shakers after the Civil War coincides with the demise of affective ritual practices. Religious experiences were the highpoint of a very demanding and austere communal celibate life, and they were certainly a drawing card for those attracted to the movement. As the twentieth-first century entered its first decade, there was but one tiny community left (in Sabbathday Lake, Maine), made up of a handful of women Believers. After lasting over 200 years in America, the Shakers may well be coming to an end.

Joseph Smith, Jr. and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints Joseph Smith, Jr. was born on December 23, 1805 in Vermont, to parents who were both “God-fearing Christians.” After frequent moves in search of a better life, the Smiths settled in Palmyra, New York, in the “burned-over” district, when Joseph was a teenager. Kephart (1987) describes some of the religious groups in the area as follows: The Millerites proclaimed that the world was coming to an end. Emanuel Swedenborg announced that he had communicated directly with God. Ann Lee’s Shakers renounced sex and marriage, and formed a nearby settlement. Jemima Wilkinson, ruling by revelation, built her colony of Jerusalem. John Humphrey Noyes started the Oneida Community. The Fox sisters, claiming to have communicated with the dead, founded the modern spiritualist movement. All of this occurred in Western New York between, roughly, 1825 and 1850. Even the older denominations—Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians—were torn by schism and dissent. (p. 220)

Joseph Smith, Jr. (1851/1957) reported being disturbed by this “war of words and the tumult of opinions.” One day in 1820, the teenage Smith “retired to the woods” asking God to show him who was right, and there he had an intense experience of God: I was seized upon by some power which entirely overcame me, and had such an astonishing influence over me as to bind my tongue so that I could not speak. Thick darkness gathered about me and it seemed to me for a time as if I were doomed to sudden destruction. (p. 40)

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He then envisioned a pillar of light and saw two personages: one God the Father and the other, the Son. He was told by the former to listen to the Son and not to join any of the religious sects, for “all their creeds were an abomination in his sight” (Smith, 1851/1957, p. 48). Smith did not have another visitation for three years. This second visitation was the most noteworthy of all his religious experiences because it informed him of the plates or tablets that are the very foundation of Mormonism. Smith (1851/1957) recounts this visitation as follows: After I had retired to my bed for the night, a personage appeared at my bedside, standing in the air, for his feet did not touch the floor. He had on a loose robe of the most exquisite whiteness. He called me by name, and said that he was a messenger from the presence of God, and that his name was Moroni; that God had work for me to do. He said that there was a book deposited, written upon gold plates. He said that the fullness of the everlasting Gospel was contained in it. Also, that there were two stones in silver bows—and these stones, fastened to a breastplate, constituted what is called the Urim and Thummim, and that God had prepared them for the purpose of translating the book. (p. 49)

Eventually, Joseph Smith, Jr. removed the plates from the hill and, with the help of the Urim and the Thummim, translated them with relative ease. (The angel Moroni is said to have come back to take the original plates together with the Urim and the Thummim.) The translation stayed on earth and became known as the Book of Mormon. Joseph Smith, Jr. had other visitations. In 1827, he returned to the woods together with Oliver Cowdery (an early disciple), and John the Baptist reportedly appeared. After John the Baptist conferred upon both men the Aaronic priesthood and the priesthood of Melchizedek, they had an intense religious experience: “We were filled with the Holy Ghost and rejoiced in the God of our salvation” (Smith, 1851/1957, p. 56). In 1830, when Joseph Smith, Jr. was 25 years old, he gathered with five other young men, who had seen the golden plates, for the purpose of founding a church. Joseph Smith, Jr. announced that he had received a revelation from God that said, “Behold there should be a record kept among you: and in it thou shalt be called a seer, a translator, a prophet, an apostle of Jesus Christ, an elder of the church through the will of God” (Kephart, 1987, p. 226). The church attracted a thousand members in less than a year, but it also attracted vicious persecution. To escape harassment, Smith and his followers moved westward—to Ohio, Missouri, and Illinois—with persecution following them each step of the way. There can never be authentic reasons for persecution, but the social scientist can present some reasons or conditions why there is. In the case of Mormonism, two internal revolutionary practices may have sparked persecution: the introduction of polygyny and the production of currency. The thesis is that these two innovations were so much in contrast to the external social environment that they resulted in violent opposition. According to Brooke (1996), Smith’s initial revelation on polygyny came in 1831 while he was about translating chapters of the Old Testament of the Christian Bible in Kirkland, Ohio. Testimony dating to 1843 notes that Smith saw himself as subject to no human law but only to divine law that was revealed to him (Winchester, 1889 from Brooke, 1996). It is interesting that the sacred text, the Book of Mormon, condemned polygyny: “Behold, David and Solomon truly had many wives and concubines, which thing was abominable before me, Saith the Lord

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6 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D ... Hearken to the word of the Lord: For there shall not any man among you have save it be one wife; and concubines he shall have none” (Jacob 2:24, 27 in the Book of Mormon). In 1841, Smith secretly married two women. These would be the first of about 33 wives. At least Ostling and Ostling (1999), surveying evidence on the number of wives that Smith had and relying on the research of Compton (1997), think that he had 33. In addition to polygyny, polyandry was present. Smith had 11 wives who were married to other men. Why so many wives? Some contend that it was because there were more women than men in the frontier and that the women were beyond marriageable age. Yet, as Ostling and Ostling document, there was a shortage of women in the frontier, and, of Smith’s 33 wives, only 3 were older than him. Some were as young as 14 years of age. It is interesting, however, that there are few references to Smith’s polygyny in his letters and diary. Faulring (1989) compiled a number of the prophet’s records, diaries, and journals. A record in a diary in 1843 gives evidence that he married two women. An irony exists, however. In the same year (October 6), Smith writes, “Walked up and down street with scribe and gave instructions to try those who were preaching, teaching, or practicing the doctrine of the plurality of wives on this Law. Joseph forbids it and the practice thereof. No man shall have but one wife” (Faulring, 1989, p. 417). A second reason that Mormons may have been persecuted was that they produced currency in Kirkland and, later, in Nuavoo. The community was suffering from high rates of unemployment and had few funds to support its members. In 1837, Smith and his companions created a bank with divine legitimacy but without state approval. Shortly after, currency was being produced, and Smith and others were charged with “making spurious money.” Thereafter, the bank failed and the community in Kirkland collapsed because of internal dissent and external persecution (Brooke, 1996). Those loyal to Smith moved to Missouri and then to Nuavoo, Illinois. There was a short reprieve from persecution, but it emerged again. The reprieve came in the form of Illinois State legitimation. Nuavoo was declared a city free from many of the laws governing the rest of the state. Brooke (1996) writes, “Nauvoo was firmly regulated by a web of civil, military, and religious ordinances woven by the Mormon leadership” (p. 241). However, the reprieve was short lived. In 1843, under the duress of economic stress and amidst mounting external opposition to Mormonism because of renewed suspicions that the community was engaging in counterfeiting, polygyny, and polyandry, persecutions emerged again. In 1844, several events and accusations against Smith occurred. In May of that year, he was indicted by marshals on two charges: one for false swearing and one for polygyny. On June 10, under the order of Smith, the Nuavoo Expositor, which published articles accusing him of nefarious activities, was destroyed. Smith and others were charged, and they submitted to the state authorities. Shortly after, in nearby Carthage, he and his brothers were murdered when a mob stormed the jail on June 27, 1844 (Faulring, 1989). In interpreting the effects of Smith’s death, the spirit of Weberian sociology is useful again. This fledgling church faced an acute leadership crisis with the death of its young, charismatic founder. The crisis led to further schisms, with several different men taking charge of break-away groups. A second charismatic leader, Brigham Young, emerged to guide the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (the official name for the Mormon Church or LDS) into stability and organization. Charisma began to be domesticated through “containment” of its fervour even before the death of Joseph Smith. O’Dea (1957, p. 158) reports that there was a significant amount of

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shared charisma within the community in Kirkland, Ohio. At times, however, some members claimed prophetic inspiration that challenged the leadership of Joseph Smith. Smith consolidated his leadership by claiming that he alone was the “prophet, seer, and revelator” and by making himself president of the High Priesthood, a move that successfully overshadowed opposition to his leadership. Prophecies of followers were permitted, but they were greatly contained and limited. After Smith’s death, Brigham Young gradually took on his master’s mantle. It was not until Young began the Western Trek that he was able to proclaim himself “prophet, seer, and revelator.” This move paved the way for the further containment and institutionalization of charisma, relegating prophecy to the presidency of the church. O’Dea 1957) writes, Charisma had been successfully contained within the organized structure of the Church and was identified with the functions of the Church office. (p. 160)

Although individual Mormons remain free to receive revelations for their own private lives, it is the Church President who bears the title of “prophet, seer, and revelator,” a title that, in practice, rarely seems to be used. The early charismatic manifestations, including speaking in tongues and prophecy, seem to be things of the past. What started off with a heavy accent on religious experiences ended with a strong bureaucracy. O’Dea’s astute observations about the institutional development of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints provided him with evidence to expand the Weberian theory of the routinizing of charisma. Today, Mormonism exists as one of the fastest growing of America’s religions (with Mormons numbering about 11 million worldwide), but it is also a religion that has few of the charismatic manifestations of its founders.

Sixth and Seventh Century Arabia: Muhammad and the Genesis of Islam As previously stated, any social scientific study of religion should go beyond the usual emphasis on the study of Christianity. For this reason and because of the recent controversy associated with Islam (fed by reports of al-Qaeda operatives and from the war in Iraq), it is vital that the student of the science of religion understands Islam. We shall meet this religion at several junctures in this text: in the chapter on religious leaders, in the discussion on religious organizations (wherein the Assassins and Sufi will be explicated), and in the chapter focusing on the link between religion and politics. Here, the focus is on the religious experiences of Muhammad (570–632 AD), the prophet of Islam, and on the connection between these experiences and the institution of the religion. But first it is necessary to outline the social and political context of sixth and seventh century Arabia and address the question of the veracity of early sources. Only then can a comprehensive picture be presented of the prophet’s early childhood experiences, of his experiences of the sacred, and, then, of the social-political effects of these experiences. This approach is not new. What is new, however, is to present a theoretical perspective, from attachment theory and research, to account for Muhammad’s particular experiences of the sacred and his charismatic leadership. Figure 3.1 is an illustration of this model.

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6 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 3:1 A Model of the Religious Experience of Muhammad and its Social and Political Effects Muhammad’s sudden conversion The social, political, and religious context of pre-Islamic Arabia

Muhammad’s early childhood experiences

Social and political effects

Muhammad’s images of the sacred

The Pre-Islamic Social, Political and Religious ContexT To better grasp why Islam emerged as such a vital social, political, and religious force in the seventh century, social scientists must have some insights regarding the nature of the society in Arabia at that time. Hodgson (1974), an acclaimed scholar of Islam, provides us with some details. Islam is a specific inheritor of the integrated, international society that emerged during the Axial Age in the region that the Greeks called the oikoumene. The Axial Age is considered to be a special period in the development of human societies from 800 BC to 200 BC.5 The term oikoumene means inhabited space and indicates the area ranging from China in the east to the Atlantic in the west. The north to south range covered the inhabited region from southern, present-day Germany to the north of the sub-Saharan desert in Africa. Of particular interest was the region between the Oxus River and the River Nile that contextualized the Middle East, the birthplace of Islam. Map 3.2 shows pre-Islamic Arabia during the period of Muhammad’s life. Central features characterize this time and space. In various sites and throughout the period, written languages emerged, coinage was invented, major religions and philosophies developed, such as Confucianism in China, Hinduism and Buddhism in India, Zoroastrianism in Persia, and Judaism in Israel. Further, in Egypt, Ancient Greece, and Persia, the elements of natural science, astronomy, and mathematics were created. Although all of the civilizations that emerged during this time were what Hodgson calls agrarianate citied societies, which are those whose central focus is a city that is surrounded by pastures and cultivated land, a key group of people were the traders or the merchants with connections to other city-based societies. These civilizations were not isolated. They were intricately linked through land and sea trade routes. With the rise of the merchants, there also evolved a culture of mercantilism that included such values as egalitarian justice, individual rights before the law, and populism. These values were especially linked to Judaism in Israel and Zoroastrianism in Persia.

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map 3:2 pre-islamic ARABIA Black Sea

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Of special interest to the creation of Islam is the city of Makka (in English, Mecca). A r a b i a n as being Orientalist scholar Watt (1991) describes the city before the time of Muhammad Sea advantageous for trade and mercantilism. It was a link to the north-west—to Syria (and the Mediterranean)—and to the north-east was Iraq, to the south was Yemen, and to the west was the Red Sea, which opened trade to the Far East and to Abyssinia in Africa. Trade items transported in caravans included leather, gold, silver, perfumes, spices, cotton, linen, silk, military arms, cereals, and oil. Not only was Mecca important to trade but it was also a financial center. Watt (1991) writes, “By about 600 AD, the leading men (and some women of whom Khadidj, Muhammad’s first wife was one) were skilled in the manipulation of credit and interested in the possibilities of investment along the routes they traveled” (p. 145). India n Ocea n In addition to being an important and vital commercial center, Mecca had been a sacred site from ancient times. It was a harem, a sacred place wherein the Kaaba, a sacred, large stone, had special significance. Commerce and religion were linked. Peoples of Arabia frequented the city as pilgrims to engage in rites, such as walking around the Kaaba seven times to invoke the blessings of the deities thought to inhabit the sacred space. The majority of the Makkans were polytheists with a nuance of henotheism.6 The “high-god” was called Allah or just “The God.” In addition, there is evidence that there were Christians and Jews scattered among the citizens of Mecca. Gulf of Aden

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The Reliability of the Muslim Sources An issue that concerns historians is the difference between the tendentious shaping of the historical phenomena surrounding Muhammad and the actual history of the man (Watt, 1953). Rogerson (2003) terms the problem the difference between the “symbolic Muhammad” and the “historical Muhammad.” Rubin (1998), in an extensive analysis of the source materials for early Islam, offers standards for assessing historical authenticity. First, one

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7 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D needs to focus on the acts or the behaviors of the early Muslims and not on their religious motives. Second, if there is a wide range of agreement on the historical events, there is more chance of veracity. He does make a point, however, that the source materials relevant for Muhammad’s Makkan period are less reliable than those for his Medinian period. This poses a problem for documenting his childhood and youth, but this difficulty is balanced by the relative consensus of the early writers. The original sources consist of the siras or the manner of life of Muhammad; the Qur’an; the Hadith; and biographies composed by Ibn Ishaq (c 768), Ibn Hisham (c 833), At-Tabari (c 922), and Ibn Saad (c 845). The one original biography used in this section is the earliest, the one written by Ibn Ishaq. Rogerson (2003) suggests that the best most recent biographies are from Watt (1953), Lings (1983), and Armstrong (1991). These three, besides Rogerson, are also used in this outline. Is there external evidence for this documentation? In specific ways, no, but in more general ways, yes. Hillenbrand (2005), a medieval scholar, mentions three external sources: numismatics, papyri, archaeology, and an historian who lived during the early years of Islam until 806 AD. Numismatics, the study of coins, indicates that, by the seventh century, provincial Muslim governors in Iran and Iraq had their names on coins. Papyri (written about 643) give evidence that the Hijrah (Muhammad’s flight to Medina, then known as Yathrib) did occur in 622. In the approximate year that the documents were written, there are military records that give proof of Muslim military expansion. Archaeological remnants indicate that the Qur’an was a well-known document by 692 because the interior of the Dome of the Rock is decorated with 240 meters of text from the Qur’an. The Christian historian Theophanes the Confessor (815/1997) is believed to have been a monk in the late ninth and early tenth century in the Byzantine Empire. His history is a chronology of the main religious and political leaders of the Arab caliphs, the Byzantine emperors and bishops, the popes of Rome, and the patriarchs of Constantinople, Jerusalem, Alexandria, and Antioch. He presented a short history of the life of Muhammad and the dates he gave correspond reasonably well with Muslim sources. He likely is the one who claimed that Muhammad was afflicted with epilepsy (815/1997, p. 464). This tradition continued through to modern times when it was discredited. Theophanes goes on to document the names and the years of the first caliphs in Damascus through to the early years of the Abbasids’ reign (750–1258). These data points from non-Muslim sources indicate that the early Muslim scholars can be trusted. As Hillenbrand (2005) writes, These events ... [in the early Muslim era] do not obey the laws of “ordinary” history; they operate on a different level altogether. But that they do also enshrine actual historical events need not be doubted—and should not be doubted “on principle” simply because they are presented in a religious guise. (pp. 325–326)

Thus equipped with historical evidence that is verifiable, I turn to Muhammad’s early childhood experiences.

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Muhammad’s Early Years Buhl (1993) notes what is commonly known about Muhammad the theologian: that he was considered the “Messenger of God” and the proclaimer of belief in the unity of God. However, his interest, and mine, is not so much on the theology of the Prophet but on his historical existence. The exact date of Muhammad’s birth is unknown. What is better known is the period of time he was in Medina: from the time of the Hijrah (the first year of the Muslim calendar, which marks the date of his flight from Mecca to Medina in622 AD) to his death in 632. Tradition has it that he was about forty when he received his revelations, which puts his birth at about 570 AD. Ibn Ishaq (c 768/2004) presents a chronology of Muhammad’s birth and early childhood. In general, this chronology is substantiated by Watt, Lings, and Armstrong. The approximate date of Muhammad’s birth is 570 AD, as noted, and Muhammad was the first child of Aminah and Abdullah. During Aminah’s pregnancy, his father died on a caravan trip in Syria. He thus began life in a single-parent household. Haykal (1964/1976) adds that, shortly after his birth, he was given to a woman named Thuwaybl, a servant of Muhammad’s uncle Abn Lahab. However, she died. Later, he was offered to a Bedouin woman named Halima al Sa’diyyah to be wet-nursed. Other women did not want to do this because his father was deceased. He stayed with her for two years and was then weaned. As was the custom among the tribe, he was brought back to this mother, but, when Halima begged to keep him, Aminah agreed. However, a religious-symbolic story is told that the boy Muhammad was attacked by two men who “tore out his heart, cleaned it, and put it back again.” Halima was terrified and brought the boy back to his mother in Mecca. Before he was returned to her, however, when he was five years of age, Halima lost him for a short time in a market in Mecca (Haykal, 1964/1976). When he was six years of age, his mother died. He was given to his grandfather (AbdulMattalib), the father of his own father, to be cared for. However, at eight, the grandfather died as well. Haykal (1964/1976) records “he cried continuously at his death” (p. 50). Muhammad was then given to his uncle, Abu Talib, his father’s brother. It was Talib who cared for the boy into his adulthood. The future prophet of Islam learned the skills of a camel manager, a caravan leader, and a warrior. Also, during his childhood, he had his first experience of the sacred: “some Being whom I did not see struck me a fearful blow” (Ibn Ishaq, 768/2004, p. 25). Muhammad was being told to put his loincloth back on; he had taken it off as had some other boys.

The Major Religious Experiences of Muhammad Both Muslim believers and academic scholars believe that Muhammad had some kind of sacred experience that transformed his whole consciousness and led him with a spiritual strength that not only decided his own personal course of life but also changed human history and prompted the creation of the second largest religion in the world (Buhl, 1993). Just what kind of experiences did he have? The biography from Ibn Ishaq and a passage from the Hadith tell a similar story. Haykal (1964/1976), relying on Ibn Ishaq’s account, says that Muhammad was about forty years of age (c 610) when he experienced his first revelation:

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7 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D He came while I was asleep, with a cloth of brocade whereon there was writing, and he said: “Read,” I replied, “I cannot read it.” Then he pressed the cloth on me till I thought I was dying. Then he loosed his hold of me and said, “Read.” I replied, “I cannot read it.” Once more he pressed me and said “Read.” Then I asked, “What shall I read?” And I said this because I feared he would press me again. Then he said, “Read in the name of the Lord thy creator; who created man from a drop of blood.” (Ibn Ishaq, c768/2004, p.36)

Another version, from the Hadith, reads as follows: The angel came to him and asked him to read. The Prophet replied, “I do not know how to read.” The Prophet added, “The angel caught me (forcefully) and pressed me so hard that I could not bear it any more. Then he released me and again asked me to read and I replied, “I do not know how to read.” Thereupon he caught me again and pressed me a second time till I could not bear it any more. He released me again and asked me to read, but again I replied, “I do not know how to read (or what shall I read?)” Thereupon he caught me for the third time and pressed me and then released me and said, “Read in the name of your Lord, who has created (all that exists) and has created man from a clot. Read! And your Lord is the Most Generous.” (quoted in Sahih Bukhari)

Haykal (1964/1976)7 comments that Muhammad was struck with fear and stood there trembling. As he left the cave where he had slept, according to Haykal, Muhammad saw a vision of Gabriel, who appeared as a human giant, and wherever Muhammad went during the vision, the being was there. Haykal adds that he experienced the mysterium tremendum. Going home to his wife Khadija, Muhammad was afraid; his heart was beating severely, and it is said that he asked her to cover him because he was so filled with fear and dread. Other sources say that she supported him. His legitimacy as a prophet was reinforced when Khadija took him to her cousin Waraqa bin Nawful, a recent convert to Ebionite Christianity, who affirmed that it was Allah who spoke to him—the same Allah who had spoken to Abraham and Moses. This experience was the genesis of a series of encounters, some visions and some interior locutions. (An interior locution is distinct from a vision in that, although an individual receives divine revelation, no supernatural entity is seen to be present.) Every time these encounters occurred, Muhammad was filled with dread, fear, and anxiety. He was so distressed that it is said he attempted suicide. He was stopped by another locution. It seems that he never did experience comfort or mercy from these encounters. His wife Khadija comforted him, encouraged him, and supported his belief that he was called to be a prophet. Armstrong (1991, p. 83) notes that all the sources and traditions emphasize his fear, his dread, and his anxiety. Indeed, it appears that the image of the sacred that he received was of a distant, controlling, and fearful divine being.

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Hierocracy in Medina and Islam’s Political Aspects In order to understand both Muhammad’s religious experiences and the initial and continuing connection between Islam and politics, one must investigate the social, economic, and political context of Medina during Muhammad’s time (and Islam’s genesis). A salient feature of Medina in the sixth and seventh century was that it was, in socio-political form, a hierocracy. The term hierocracy or hagiocracy comes from Weber (1978, pp. 1159–1160) who defines it as the leadership of sacred leaders who have official influence on secular society in general and on political sectors in particular. Hodgson (1974), Esposito (1984), and Buhl (1993) offer several insights regarding the hierocratic nature of Medina’s governance at this time, as well as about other social, economic, and political aspects of early Islam. At the heart of religion is an important link—between the sacred and the social— which is common in Islam as well as in other religions. Humans, in their species dimension, are social. We need to live together in spite of much conflict. The isolated person and believer is an oxymoron. Thus, in a deep way, religion is sociological. For Muslims (those who submit), this social aspect of religion is expressed in the ummah or the community of the faithful. To live in this community, believers must follow the commands of Allah, which are detailed in permanent written forms in the Qur’an (the sacred text of Islam) and the Hadith (the reports of the sayings and doings of Muhammad, second only in importance to the sacred text). The ulama (teachers and authoritative lawgivers) have constructed the Shari’ah based on the Qur’an and the Hadith, and the Shari’ah, in principle, covers every possible contingency of social and individual life. Together, the Qur’an, the Hadith, and the Shari’ah form a unified and comprehensive guide for believers, one that affects not only sacred matters but also intimate and familial relationships, education, literacy, science, art, high culture, architecture, and politics. Hodgson (1974) notes this unusual unified totality of Islam, as well as its pervasive effects: In principle, any religious allegiance might make demands on every aspect of life to such a degree that a religious body could constitute a complete society, its way of life a self-sufficient culture. But Islam especially has tended to make this kind of total demand on life. In many spheres, not only public worship but such spheres as civil law, historical teaching, or social etiquette, Muslims succeeded quite early in establishing distinctive patterns identifiable with Islam as religion. (p. 89)

Indeed, one might argue that this unity of belief predisposed at least some Muslims to attempt to unify people politically as well as within a religion. From the time of Muhammad to the present, Muslims have made frequent attempts to unite various tribes, races, and ethnic groups under a single supreme authority. Sometimes, this authority was a caliph (literally, the legitimated successor of the Prophet), who would lead their worship (the salat) as well as their whole society and their wars. This is the pattern in Sunni Islam, but, in Shi’ite Islam, the imam is the preferred leader (see Chapter 7). Other scholars note that, even at its origins, Islam was more than a set of religious beliefs and behaviors. Esposito (1984) writes that not only did Muhammad crystallize a faith in Medina (from his time there, 622–632 AD) but also a socio-political system. It was through

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74 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the Prophet’s military and diplomatic acumen that a religious hegemony was established throughout all the Arabian Peninsula. Scholars of Islam have long known of the two primary periods of Muhammad’s life: the Mecca period and, subsequently, the Medina period. Buhl (1993) notes that, during the Makkan period, Muhammad was a religious reformer, a “warner” of divine judgement upon the people. Rogerson (2003) notes that “The imminence of divine wrath never left Muhammad” (p. 58). So the Prophet called on all to believe in one God, to appeal to him for forgiveness of sins, to offer prayers frequently, to assist the less fortunate, to stop the practice of exposing unwanted babies to the elements, and to be free of greed, unchastity, and cheating. Yet, some of his teachings had political implications particularly to the Makkans. When he proclaimed that the Kaaba belonged to Allah, the true God (not just the high-god), the political and economic leaders felt threatened, and years of suffering and persecution ensued. Political phenomena emerged from the negative reaction that Muhammad received from the Jewish tribes in Medina, who had significant economic and political power. Initially, though, there was a time of negotiation and amnesty between the Prophet and the Jews. Muslims were even directed to pray bowing towards Jerusalem. After the rejection of Muhammad by the Jews, the followers of the Prophet were encouraged to face Mecca in their times of prayer. The political-military effects were twofold: the expulsion and the massacre of Jews in Medina and the military expeditions against the Makkans. Many expeditions followed,8 but the most famous one was the Battle of Badr (624 AD). A small force of Muslims (numbering only 300) defeated the Quraysh tribe’s army of 1000 men (600 wearing shields), 100 horses, and 700 camels; the Quraysh also had luxurious provisions to last for several days. Muhammad’s legitimacy was established as not only a prophet but also a hierocratic presence. Shortly after this battle, residents of Medina witnessed the expulsion of the Kaynuka and the Banu ‘l-Nadir Jewish tribes. Buhl notes that these tribes were said to have been committed many crimes, but their actual offenses are difficult to know. The Qur’an says that they defied God and his Messenger and thus suffered for it. The fate of a third tribe (the Banu Qurayza) was not so favorable. Shortly after the Battle of the Ditch (627), during which a Quraysh-led army from Mecca besieged Muhammad’s forces in Medina, the Qurayza tribe was accused of conspiracy in that, although allied with Muhammad, it refused to fight. At the command of Muhammad, an estimated six to nine hundred men were beheaded, the women and children were sold into slavery, and the tribe’s property was divided among the Muslims. The massacre is described by Ishaq (768/2004): The apostle of Allah imprisoned the Qurayza in Medina while trenches were dug in the market place. Then he sent for the men and had their heads struck off so that they fell in the trenches. They were brought out in groups, and among them was Kab, the chief of the tribe. In number, they amounted to six or seven hundred, although some state it to have been eight or nine hundred. All were executed. (p. 129)

Was there divine legitimation for the killing? It seems so, according to Ishaq and the Qur’an. After his successful defense of Medina at the Battle of the Ditch, Muhammad had put away his weapons. However, Ishaq (768/2004) reports that the angel Gabriel came to the apostle and said,

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“Hast thou put away thy arms, apostle of Allah?” He replied, “Yes,” and Gabriel said, “But the angels have not yet put away theirs. I have come here to call the people to follow the command of Allah and march against the Banu Qurayza.” (p. 126)

Comparable verses from the Qur’an read as follows: And those of the people of the Book who aided them, Allah took them down from their strongholds and cast terror into their hearts so that some you slew, and some you made prisoners. And He made you heirs of their lands, their houses, and their goods, and of a land which you had not frequented before. And Allah has power over all things. (Surah 33: 26–27).

After either exiling or massacring the Jews, Muhammad moved forward in his vision to have a complete unity of religion, politics, economics, and social life in Medina. It was there that he became an accomplished statesman as well as a prophet. One might ask why force, in the form of violence, was not far removed from the contours of Islam. Weber has argued that force in the state is a legitimate characteristic element of its institution and is based, primarily, on legal norms or on tradition. In Islam, force has a further foundation, which is found in Ishaq’s biography of Muhammad and in the Qur’an and the Hadith. In the year of the Hijrah (622), Ishaq recounts an alliance between men from Yathrib, some local Makkan followers of Muhammad, and the uncle of the Prophet, Al-Abbas. In this alliance or covenant, there is an agreement to stand together and fight those who oppress them. The text reads as follows: Allah therefore permitted Muhammad to fight and to aid his followers against those who tyrannized over them ... Fight against them until there be no more temptation— until Believers shall no more be tempted to abandon their religion—and until the religion be Allah’s, that is, until Allah alone shall be worshipped and none else besides him. (Ishaq, 768/2004, pp. 65–66)

The call to fight appears to be both defensive and offensive. Believers should fight defensively to protect the Muslim faith against tyranny and offensively to achieve a time when there will be no other religion but that of Allah. A second source is from the Qur’an: Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you, but do no transgress limits; for Allah does not love transgressors. And slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; ... And fight them on until there is no more tumult or oppression, and there prevail justice and faith in Allah; but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression (Surah 2: 190–191, 193).

Both defensive and offensive force or violence also seem to be implied by this text. Further, the verses are interpreted by a Muslim scholar who also quotes from the Hadith (Vol. 4, Bk. 52, No. 41):

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7 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Al-Jihad in Allah’s cause (with full force of numbers and weaponry) is given the utmost importance in Islam and is one of the pillars (on which it stands). By Jihad Islam is established, Allah’s word is made superior, (his word being La ilaha ill Allah which means none has the right to be worshipped except Allah), and his religion (Islam) is propagated. By abandoning Jihad (may Allah protect us from that) Islam is destroyed and the Muslims fall into an inferior position; their honor is lost, their lands stolen, their rule and authority vanish. Jihad is an obligatory duty in Islam on every Muslim, and he who tries to escape from this duty, or does not in his inner-most heart wish to fulfill this duty, dies with one of the qualities of a hypocrite. Narrated Abdullah bin Masud: I asked Allah’s Messenger. “O Allah’s Messenger! What is the best deed?” He replied, “To offer the prayers at their early fixed stated times.” I asked “What is next in goodness?” He replied, “To be good and dutiful to your parents.” I further asked, “What is next in goodness?” He replied, “To participate in Jihad in Allah’s cause.” (Taqi-ud-Din Al-Hilali & Muhsin Khan, 1996, p.50)

There is evidence, then, of the sword being linked to divine approval and of politics being a factor in the genesis of Islam.

A Theory of Links between Images of the Divine and Politics The historical facts reviewed above are common in Islamic scholarship. As noted, what has not been attempted previously is to give a psychological/sociological account of the links between Muhammad’s childhood experiences, his image of the divine, and the extension of the Muslim religion into the social and political sphere as well as its forceful (sometimes violent) propagation by political and military means. The construction of a theoretical perspective useful in this attempt emerges from attachment theory, a subset of child development research in psychology, and from the work of the psychologist Kirkpatrick (2005). The psychology of religion has not been linked well to psychology in general, but Kirkpatrick addresses this lacuna and outlines attachment theory as the fundamental way to better understand the psychology of religion. He links attachment theory to the creation of images of the divine and to conversion. T he heart of attachment theory revolves about five major themes: (1) the infant/child seeking and maintaining proximity to the caregiver; (2) the caregiver being known as a haven of safety; (3) the caregiver being a secure base; (4) the child having a sense of security, which enables the child to initiate the exploration of his or her social and physical environment; and (5) the creation of internal working models and attachment styles that affect relationships. Beginning with British psychoanalyst John Bowlby, researchers have been able to establish evidence for the presence of these themes in child development and of their interconnection. The infant is genetically programmed to seek proximity to the caregiver (normally the mother), and, if the caregiver is sensitive to the infant, that baby begins to feel loved and accepted and considers the caregiver to be a haven of safety (from danger or strangers) and a secure base. From this secure base, the child initiates the exploration necessary for his or her social and intellectual development. The child who is loved develops internal working

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models (or systems of ideas), and these models confirm that the developing child is a good person because he or she is loved and cared for. But not all infants and children are so blessed. Many seek proximity to a caregiver who may not be interested in the child, who gives inconsistent care or, even worse, who is an abuser. These children experience insecure attachments. Kirkpatrick (2005, pp. 35, 42) outlines research on the personality effects of various kinds of insecure attachments (avoidant, ambivalent, and disorganized/disorientated). A child who has insecure attachments, and whose caregiver is cold and rejecting, is suspicious of human motives, believes that others are not trustworthy, doubts the honesty and the integrity of parents and others, lacks confidence in social relationships, and is not interpersonally orientated. When children are ambivalent or resistant in their attachments (because a parent is inconsistent in care), they are insecure, and they tend to be fretful, do not engage in exploration, are distressed, desire extreme intimacy, fear rejection, display heightened distress and anger, and are solicitous and compliant to gain acceptance. Children who are abused suffer the most, and their kind of insecure attachment is reflected in them lacking goal orientation, having incomplete movements, freezing, being confused, fearing the parent, and experiencing disorientation. Kirkpatrick continues by linking attachment theory to the relationship of believers to the divine. He notes that believers tend to want to seek and to maintain proximity to God; they see the divine as a haven of safety, as a secure base, and they construct images of God as internal working models of relation (those models of life, laid down in early childhood, which indicate that the external world is good and a safe place to be or, on the other hand, dangerous and a loci of fear).9 The psychologist then presents both a theory and empirical evidence to connect the different kinds of secure or insecure attachments people have in childhood and early adult life to the sorts of images they have of the divine in later adult life. Kirkpatrick (2005) uses what he calls the correspondence hypothesis. He writes, Individual differences in attachment styles should parallel, in important respects, individual differences in beliefs about God and related aspects of religious belief. For example, people characterized by a secure attachment style would be expected to view God, like their human relationship partners, as an available and responsive attachment figure who loves and cares for them, whereas avoidant persons should be more likely to see God as remote and inaccessible, or cold and rejecting, or simply nonexistent. (p. 102)

Next, Kirkpatrick creates a model that reflects the impact of the general internal working models that emerge over the early life of a person—working models that, eventually, result in a person’s images of the divine. People construct their views of relationships (internal working models or IWMs) from their histories of attachment behaviors—from their parents, their intimate partners, and their friends. The kinds of IWMs they construct predict the kinds of IWMs they tend to have of God. Figure 3.2 illustrates this. Thereafter, Kirkpatrick summarizes a range of literature that reflects this model, and he makes, generally, the following observations. Those adults who have had a secure attachment history (reporting strong connections to their parents, their spouses, and their friends)

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7 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 3:2 A Model of IWMs

General IWMs

Parental IWMs

Peer IWMs

Sacred IWMs

Mother and Father

Spouse or Friend

God

SOURCE: Adapted from Kirkpatrick (2005), p. 103. tend to view God as loving, caring, benevolent, compassionate, available, and warm-hearted. However, those who have had insecure attachments tend to see God as controlling, powerful, demanding, wrathful, and punishing. 10 These different images of God have political as well as religious implications. Beliefs that God is powerful and controlling are consistent with a conceptualization of God as a “big chief ” or the ultimate king. Making reference to the work of the historian Burkert (1996), Kirkpatrick points out that many of the ancient religions generally accepted a system of rank—implying dependence, subordination, and submission to divine figures. It could very well be, then, that the construction of an image of the divine as controlling and all powerful is linked to insecure attachments. The implications of this analysis for the social scientific study of Muhammad’s life and the genesis of Islam are striking. As reviewed above, the Prophet experienced inconsistent childhood attachments. These figures were, in turn, his mother, Thuwaybl, Halimah, his mother again, then Halimah, his mother, his grandfather (whose death led him to cry for a long time), and then his uncle. Muhammad’s image of the divine, as expressed after his encounter in the cave outside of Mecca, has all the markings of an image created by someone who has experienced insecure attachments; god is seen as controlling, all powerful, and a political figure. The correspondence hypothesis applied to this situation would suggest that Muhammad’s severe lack of early attachment meant that he had an image of the deity as being so awesome that he experienced fear and dread. His relationship with the deity seems similar to that of a servant in contact with a master or a subject in relation to a leader. This image of the deity as an all-powerful master fits well with one meaning of the term Islam—submission. This idea of total submission to an all-controlling deity engenders, it can be argued, the image of authoritarian power as being central to politics. This analysis of Muhammad’s life does not claim there was no mercy in Muhammad’s image of the deity. Surah 93: 6–7 states that Allah is said to have cared for Muhammad during his early years. Later traditions add such descriptions as merciful, peace-giver, fashioner, and

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form-giver (see Haykal, 1964/1976, pp. 280–281). Rogerson (2003), writing a contemporary biography of Muhammad, lists the ninety-nine names given to Allah. Of these, about five refer to the compassion of Allah, with names such as merciful, forgiving, forbearing, all forgiving, and loving. Yet, mercy seems to be conditional. When mercy is related to ethical behavior, Haykal (1964/1976) writes, “Kindness is not kindness without justice” (p. 183). Further, Allah’s compassion is only offered to those who submit and not to those who do not.

Conclusions The primary goal of this chapter has been to see how the religious experiences of virtuosos is linked to the kind of organizational features of particular religions. In addition, it has been shown that, after an initial charismatic stage, which was evident especially in the construction of the religion of the Shakers and the Mormons, there emerges religion as an institution with all its bureaucracy and its organizational dilemmas. Sometimes, the formative nature and institutional characteristics of a religion are linked to politics; Muhammad’s life and the development of Islam provide a good example. Additionally, the discussion of the genesis of Islam theorized as to how the early childhood experiences of the Prophet not only affected his adult images of God but also had future political and military consequences.

Notes 1

The medieval scholars Ditchburn, MacLean, and MacKay (2007) categorize the whole breadth of the Middle Ages into the following: the Early Middle Ages (395–1050, the Central Middle Ages (1100–1300), and the Late Middle Ages (1300–1500).

2

Sharot (2001) describes virtuosos as those religious elites who are recognized as having obtained the highest values of the religion.

3

The official term is the United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing.

4

It is significant that, in 1759, England—much like western New York in the early nineteenth century—was experiencing a time of social change and upheaval characterized by a movement from an agrarian society to a proto-industrial society, and this change spawned a number of religious movements (Levine, 1984). As with those in the burned-over district of New York, many in pre-industrial England became religious through the work of John Wesley (1703–1791), the evangelist and reform prophet of Methodism.

5

Some scholars (Sharot, 2002) extend the Axial Age to Islam in the seventh century. However, if you consider Christianity and Islam to be successors of Judaism, the original period is the preferred one.

6

Henotheism is a variation of polytheism that acknowledges a “high-god” who does not displace the other deities but has higher power or authority. See the chapter on mythology.

7

This biography has an official status. It was published with the approval of the Minister of Higher Education of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

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The English Enlightenment historian Gibbon (1789/1952, p. 238) notes that Muhammad fought in nine battles or sieges and that either he or his lieutenants engaged in fifty enterprises of war. Rogerson (2003) puts it at sixty.

9

Although Kirkpatrick sees that Christianity is the best example of this kind of attachment process, there is evidence in Hinduism and Islam for comparable themes. However, Swenson (2004) provides evidence that ancient Judaism and Christianity have the best fit to God as an attachment figure.

10 Can one apply this theory developed in the twentieth century to a man in the sixth and seventh century? Two sources assist us in making the claim that the fundamentals of attachment theory are rooted in the human species, irrespective of history or time, Siegel (1999) and Kirpatrick (2005). Siegel is a medical doctor and a clinical scholar of psychiatry. His central thesis is that attachment relationships function to provide the infant with protection from many threats. It is these attachment experiences that organize subsequent experiences and crucial in the ongoing neuronal growth of the developing brain. These emotional relationships directly affect the development of mental functions such as memory, narrative, emotion, representations, and states of the mind. Attachment bonds may serve to create the fundamental basis of how the mind develops. What is the evidence that early childhood attachments predict adult attachments? Siegel garnishes a significant amount of research that early childhood attachments predict how, in later life, attachments are classified as secure or insecure. In both cases, it appears that there is a “natural” connection between early experiences and later adult outcomes in relation to attachment bonds, the development of the brain, and relationships. Kirkpatrick approaches the biological-evolutionary base somewhat differently. The human infant is helpless at birth and needs significant care. Intimate care is essential for the infant’s survival. If it is true that a significant amount of parental investment is necessary in child development, then it is also true that this investment assists the child in learning about his or her environment and the vehicles of social development leading to the human capacity to learn and work. One might say that the infant and or child acquires human capital that enables him or her to carry on the natural and social reproduction of the human species as adults.

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C h a p t e r FOU R

T h e Di l e m m a of I n t e r pr e tat ion—R e l ig ion a s a Wor l d V i e w: T h e S t u dy of M y t hol o g i e s

Orientation Often in social discourse, religion is referred to as belief. This is only

partially true as belief is only one dimension of the sacred. You might consider in your conversations with your friends or companions what belief really is. Is it an adherence to the unobservable? Is it a conviction that something is true? Or are beliefs only for the illiterate and children? These questions lead us into another domain or dimension of religion, one that envisions it as a system of belief. There are several vantage points from which belief systems may be viewed. Our everyday, taken-for-granted reality may be constructed in a secular mode that negates or downplays sacred world views or in a sacred mode that elevates the supernatural. Either of the informal approaches (secular and sacred) may be supplemented by more formal investigation, including humanistic approaches (as in the history or the comparative study of religion) or various social scientific perspectives. Belief systems may be regarded as a particular perspective through which other facets of reality may be interpreted or as an object that may be formally studied using different academic approaches. The focus in this chapter is on how belief systems or mythologies function as lenses for interpreting the social world. Mythologies are different yet similar to beliefs. Beliefs are elements of mythologies, or mythologies can be considered a system of beliefs. Both topics will be covered in this chapter. This chapter is a natural progression of the Weberian perspective presented in the introductory chapter. Religious world views, which can be defined as mythologies, are central to Weber’s sociology of religion. In his work on the social psychology of the world religions, Weber (1916/1995) argues that, even though it is true that material and ideal interests do affect

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82 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D social action, world views frame human behavior and act like “switchmen” in determining which type of religious social action one will choose: … very frequently, the world images [namely, world views] that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. “From what” and “for what” one wished to be redeemed and, let us not forget, “could be” redeemed, depended upon one’s image of the world. (p. 26)

The importance that Weber assigns to world views is substantiated by scholarship summarized by Whimster and Lash (1987).1 They argue that the Calvinistic-Christian world view, which was especially rationalistic, is considered by Weber to be a necessary (yet not sufficient) condition for the development of modernity.2 Weber makes his case by an extensive analysis of the world views of Confucianism, Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism, and early and medieval Christianity. He uses changes in world views, among other factors such as the kind of medieval feudalism and the existence of autonomous cities in Western Europe, to understand the West’s creation of the modern social institutions of capitalist economies and state democracies. Bendix (1962), in his important portrait of Weber, notes that he saw the study of belief systems (i.e., sacred world views) in terms of how relevant they were for collective actions. In addition, Bendix writes, Weber considers how and if these world views were concentrated in the inspirations of a few that eventually became the convictions of many. The discussion of mythologies is framed in what has been termed the sixth dilemma in the institutionalization of religion—the dilemma of interpretation. (See also Chapter 1.) This dilemma can be understood in the following way. As persons come into contact with the sacred, they may, either individually or collectively, have an experience of the sacred. As the individual endeavors to understand this experience, a pristine interpretation emerges that is expressed in stories, fables, folklore, or mythologies. For the sake of understanding and communicating this experience of the sacred, these stories, these mythologies are necessary. However, these mythologies create a dilemma because expansion of any interpretation of the sacred experience easily leads to dogmatic statements and rigid doctrine that abort the possibility of the message of the sacred experience being communicated. Using the dilemma of interpretation to understand mythologies has some limitations. It is more applicable to those world views that have emerged from historical charismatic persons, as in the case of Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam. The dilemma is less useful in grasping the meaning of the world views that have been constructed within folk religions, Hinduism, Taoism, archaic religions, and the New Age movement of the late twentieth century. The purpose of this chapter, however, is not to illustrate the efficacy or limitations of using the dilemma of interpretation to understand mythologies or systems of belief. Rather, the chapter presents a description of what is meant by mythology, an outline of the substantive or descriptive understandings of myth, a study of the factors or explanations that account for the origins of myths (the why of mythology), and, last, an account of the functions of myths or of their effects in peoples’ lives. A morphology of the various kinds of myths concludes the chapter.

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Mythologies, Religion, and World Views Human experience is the substance out of which religious world views are constructed and through which they are maintained. Thus, human experience, both individually and collectively, is numeniferous or a carrier of the sacred. Myths, explanations whose factuality usually cannot be determined, traditionally have been basic elements in a more general world view. They are the stories that help people account for the origins, history, and purpose of life. They serve to interpret the cosmos, to explain suffering and death, and to provide meaning for daily life events. Social science can neither prove nor disprove myths; rather, its task is to present theories as to their origins and to study the impact they have on people and society. It is important to emphasize that, when we are using the term myth, we do not wish to imply that such beliefs are false or fictitious. Nor is myth intended as a synonym for fairy tales or folk narratives (Roberts, 1990, p. 77). Myths are accounts or stories that undergird peoples’ interpretation of life. Their truth or falsity is not the concern of social science. In outlining Weber’s commitment to a verstehen sociology, Turner (1974) adds that, although sociology must take the actor’s claims (in this case, his or her mythology) seriously, it does not have to accept the actor’s world view as true. Myths once provided the paramount definition of reality for people in pre-modern societies (folk, archaic, or medieval), and all people in these kinds of societies shared the conviction that the spirits had an impact on life. The primacy of this mythical world view was challenged first by philosophers and later by scientists. Although religious world views continue to occupy an important place in some parts of the world, they have lost their position of dominance in the public life of modern industrial and post-industrial countries. Rulers in modern nations do not invoke the deities as the source of their right to rule, judges do not claim to make legal decisions based on divine law, and meteorologists do not use spiritual forces to account for the weather. Box 4:1 The controversy over “intelligent design”

Intelligent design: The assertion that some features of living things are best explained as the work of a designer rather than as the result of a random process such as natural selection. A number of Christian scientists are claiming that there are “holes in Darwin” and that higher species of life are “irreducibly complex” to be explained by natural selection and gradual evolution from small beginnings. Critics claim that these advocates are hiding religious belief and claiming scientific evidence for a creator who has designed and made the universe. In a Harris poll in June of 2005, 54% of American adults did not believe humans had developed from an earlier species. The debate has moved to the political realm. Former President Bush favors teaching the intelligent design theory alongside of Darwin’s perspective on evolution. Twenty states now are considering legislation to allow for the teaching in public schools. Source: Wallis (2005).

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8 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The myth or “story of the deities” has given way to the tenets of science in parts of Asia; in much of Australia, Europe, and North America; and among the educated in other parts of the world as well. This erosion of the power of religious myth is most evident in the public sphere, but myth continues to function in private lives. We see this in the United States where 95 per cent of the population believes in the existence of God, with 84 per cent believing that God is a “heavenly father who can be reached by prayers” (Gallup & Jones, 1989, p. 4). The vast majority of Americans accept accounts that God did play an active role in creating human beings, with 44 per cent subscribing to a creationist mythology that depicts God as having “created man pretty much in his present form at one time within the last 10,000 years.”3 A plurality of survey respondents accepted accounts of biblical miracles and either completely agreed (51 per cent) or mostly agreed (29 per cent) with the statement “Even today miracles are performed by the power of God” (Gallup & Jones, 1989, p. 10).4 One of the primary functions of myth is to provide a sense of meaning and purpose, even in the face of tragedy. Medical science can furnish a detailed and technical account of how and why a young child died of cancer, but such an explanation does little to comfort the bereaved parents. Religious accounts appear to be widely and successfully used by millions of North Americans in constructing a sense of life’s meaning and purpose. Although religious myths appear to be used less in modern public life than they once were, they continue to function widely in the private sphere.

Substantive, Explanatory, and Functional Effects of Myths This section follows the scientific methodology of describing a phenomenon, presenting explanatory factors for it, and then outlining its effects. In this particular case, research on describing, explaining, and evaluating the effects of mythologies or beliefs will be presented. (See Figure 4.1.) Figure 4:1 A Scientific-Sociological Model of the Analysis of Social Phenomena Z

X (Factor)

Y (Phenomenon)

(Effect)

Factors of a social phenomenon

A social phenomenon

The effect of a social phenomenon

Factors of mythologies or beliefs

Mythologies or beliefs

The effect of mythologies or beliefs

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The inspiration for this approach to mythology comes, in part, from the classical period of sociology and the scholarship of Émile Durkheim. Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method (1895/1938) presents a methodology of doing sociological research that focuses on describing a social fact, explaining it, and looking for its functions or effects. In Figure 4.1, which is derived from Durkheim’s methodology, “Y” refers to the phenomenon itself; “X” to its factor or, more than likely, factors; and “Z” is indicative of the functions of “Y” or its effects. The description of mythology or beliefs, in other words, definitions of the essential nature of the phenomenon of myth and of its factors, can be referred to as substantive mythology, while the effects of mythologies relate to the functional aspects of this phenomenon.

Substantive Mythology or Beliefs The substantive approach attempts to define what myth is in itself. The research methodology in the study of religion that is most useful in this regard is the phenomenology of religion. This approach is best represented by the Dutch theologian and historian Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890–1950). His approach is close to Weber’s interpretive or verstehen perspective on social phenomena. Van der Leeuw (1933/1986) notes that the researcher needs to penetrate the meaning of a phenomenon (in this case mythology), engage its subject, and place herself or himself in the person of the believer. The scholar contends that the meaning within the object “manifests” itself and discloses itself to the observer. Mircea Eliade (1973), an anthropologist who wrote extensively about religion, provides a concise description of the nature of myth: In short, myths describe breakthroughs of the sacred (or the supernatural) into the world. It is this sudden breakthrough of the sacred that really establishes [italics in the original] the world and makes it what it is today. Furthermore, it is a result of the intervention of supernatural beings that man himself is what he is today, a mortal, sexed, and cultural being. (p. 70)

Eliade contends that myth presents a sacred history, a story of what took place in primordial time. It informs the believer of how, through the deeds of supermundanes, the cosmos came into being. It represents a break through—or, more accurately, a “break into”—the mundane world of the common place by non-terrestrial beings. Another scholar of world myths, the comparative religion scholar Joseph Campbell (1904–1987), presents a detailed and deep phenomenological description of belief through what he calls the “mystical function” of myth. (In fact, this “function” probes deeper into describing experience recounted in myth.) According to Campbell (1964/1987), the mystical—standing in awe of the sacred—is at the heart of myth. It is an experience that defies definition. In folk mythology, it is expressed as demonic dread; in oriental and occidental religions, as mystical rapture. Those who have such encounters are the seers, the poets, or, to use Weber’s term, virtuosos. They are the ones who are able to formulate the story that captures the religious imagination of others. Campbell contends that all those who wish to live a full life must be willing to go on spiritual journeys not unlike those of the great mystics. For Campbell, these journeys represent going inward to explore the unconscious—a venture that is both inviting and simultaneously fearsome.

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8 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 4:2 Images of God

Vengeful

Human roles

Regulating

Mysterious

Powerful

Inspirational

Benevolent

SOURCE: Kunkel, Cook, Meshel, Daughrty, and Hauenstein (1999). Another substantive interpretation of myth uses an empirical approach and asks a sample of people what they envision myth to be. One such approach questions subjects on what may be called a dimension of mythology: images or concepts of God. One of the first instruments created to measure concepts of God comes from the psychometric work of Spilka, Armatas, and Nussbaum (1964). Their measurement of conceptualizations of God includes six dimensions: as vindictive, as a stern father, as a supreme ruler, as distant, as a kindly father, and as god-like (omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent). A grounded theory approach comes from a sample of 20 university students from a southwestern university in the United States. Kunkel and his colleagues (1999) asked a simple question: “What is God like?” Their respondents offered 85 God images. Then, through statistical analysis, the authors created a map of seven clusters of images that describe God in a variety of ways (See Figure 4.2.). The “vengeful” cluster includes images of God as punishing or capricious; the “human,” God as man, woman, father, mother, or brother; the “regulating,” God as teacher, ruler, judge, and lawmaker; the “powerful,” God as life-giving or strong; the “mysterious,” God as mystical, silent, or relentless; the “inspirational,” God as amazing, charming, or energizing; and the “benevolent,” God as peaceful, loving, beautiful, gentle, or forgiving. Many of these images of God reflect previous research5 and augur a complex perception of the divine. Kunkel and his colleagues (1999) did reduce this complexity to a concept of the sacred that is similar to the one presented by Durkheim and Otto (see Figure 1.1). Table 4.1 illustrates the common patterns in perceptions of the divine. There is further variation in how God is conceived. Piazza and Glock (1979) used a survey instrument to determine whether subjects describe God as personally and socially influencing their lives, as personally influential only, as socially influential only, or as being remote and with no influence on their lives. Larson et al. (1994), in their study of evangelical ministers in Canada, used an instrument to measure descriptions of God in terms of various dichotomies: judge-redeemer, protector-observer, sovereign-servant, intimacyauthority, master-friend, mother-father, God “out there”-God “with us,” and transcendentimmanent.

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Table 4:1 Two Dimensions of the Sacred and Images of God Awe and Fear

Love and Desire

Vengeful

Having human roles such as father, mother, or brother

Mysterious

Inspirational

Powerful

Benevolent

Regulating

Explanatory Mythology and Beliefs An explanatory approach to mythology seeks to explain the elements of or the factors influencing mythologies or belief systems. These factors are represented by the “X” box in Figure 4.1 and constitute a statistical notation. In the case of beliefs, the “X” refers to those factors that have been documented to influence beliefs. So what factors are assumed to influence different images of God or belief in God? One such factor, outlined in Chapter 3, is that those adults who have had a secure attachment history to their parents, spouses, and friends tend to view God as loving, caring, benevolent, compassionate, available, and warm hearted (Kirkpatrick, 2005). However, those who have had insecure attachments tend to see God as controlling, powerful, demanding, wrathful, and punishing. Noffke and McFadden (2001) review research that shows that women, as compared with men, view God as more relevant and less punitive. Men, also, are more likely than women to see God as controlling. Further, research refers to Benson and Spilka (1973) who found evidence that self-esteem was positively correlated to a loving-accepting God but negatively to a God who is viewed as rejecting. In their own research, Noffke and McFadden were interested in how denominational and age differences predicted divine images. Using an instrument from Spilka, Armatas, and Nussbaum (1964), they tested 250 participants from east central Wisconsin whose ages ranged from 16 to over 55 and who were Methodists, Roman Catholics, or General Baptists. They found that age did not make any significant difference in how the participants viewed God. They did discover, however, that denominational differences made a difference. General Baptists rated God as significantly more vindictive and more frequently as a stern father figure and a supreme ruler than both Methodists and Roman Catholics. Methodists more than Roman Catholics and General Baptists saw God as distant. Further, the General Baptists saw God as a kindly father and omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent more than did the Methodists. The authors offer some explanations for these differences. They contend that the General Baptists are more conservative in theological positioning than either Roman Catholics or Methodists. This may account for why they view God as vindictive, a stern father, and a

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8 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D supreme ruler. Yet, they also see God in kindly terms. This may be because they place a lot of emphasis on a personal relationship with Jesus Christ, their embodiment of love, mercy, and forgiveness.

Functional Effects of Myths or Beliefs Before looking at the scientific model of the effects of mythologies, it may be useful to present a functional definition of myth. Leick (1998), an archaeologist who has special expertise in Assyriology, presents us with this functional definition: Myths, very broadly defined as narratives featuring divine or heroic protagonists, have a paradigmatic function. They establish connections between the known and the unknown; the past and the present; the world of the gods and the world of men. The more successful a myth, the more levels of “meaning” it is able to allude to ... myths also constitute a language. This language of myths extends its web of associations to all areas of literary culture; from royal inscriptions and historical annals to hymns, incantations, rituals, and astronomical observations. (p. xi)

Note how this definition is linked intricately to ordinary and public life. In the West, we no longer use myths to document history or issue state proclamations, but they are still used in astrology, and they find a place in current religious practices. Also, recent empirical studies on some of the functions or effects of myth present evidence that religious beliefs still make a difference in people’s lives, that, as a social phenomenon (“Y” in Figure 4.1), belief has an effect (“Z” in Figure 4.1). Three of these studies document the effects of concepts of God and the functions of religious beliefs in general.

The Effects of the Concepts of God A question one may ask is, does an individual’s concept of God enable a person to cope with losses or tragedies? Maynard, Gorsuch, and Bjorck (2001) present some data to answer that question. Earlier research had established four kinds of religious coping styles when people are confronted with loss or tragedy: (a) self-directing, wherein individuals solve their own problems without any divine referent; (b) the differing style, wherein persons defer problem solving to God; (c) the collaborative style, wherein individuals collaborate with God; and (d) surrender, wherein individuals work with God while valuing divine direction rather than their own. Maynard, Gorsuch, and Bjorck (2001) used this research to investigate whether particular religious coping styles were associated with certain perceptions of God. A sample of 129 undergraduate university students in Christian colleges were asked to choose from among descriptions of God those portrayals that matched their own concepts. These included the idea of God as benevolent, wrathful, omnipresent, guiding, false, stable, deistic, worthless, powerful, condemning, and caring. Results indicated positive correlations between God as benevolent, omnipresent, guiding, stable, powerful, and caring with coping styles that were collaborative, deferring, and surrendering. When God was seen as false, deistic, and worthless, there was a significant positive correlation with self-directing styles of coping.

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In discussing these results, the authors comment that those students who envision God as benevolent, omnipresent, guiding, and stable feel comfortable in yielding control to God, who loves and cares for them. On the other hand, those who understand God to be false, deistic, and worthless prefer to take matters into their own hands and solve their own problems.

Functions of Beliefs Several studies provide evidence that belief in God makes a difference in people’s lives. Stark (2001), using data from the World Values Survey of 1990–1991 that includes people from a wide variety of religions and countries, conducted an analysis of the correlation between ethics (buying something you knew was stolen, failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked car, and smoking marijuana) and belief (the importance of God in your life). Strong correlations were found between belief and morality in the United States, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, Turkey (Muslims), and India (Hindu) but not in Japan and China. One would not expect a correlation in the case of Buddhists in Japan because it is part of Theravada not to believe in God (or gods). A similar expectation would be logical for China (some of which is Buddhist) because, there, the image of God is but an image of the sacred as a kind of inactive, non-conscious essence (termed Tao). The divine is not believed to be conscious of or active in human affairs. In a nationally representative sample in Australia, Francis and Kaldor (2002) found that there were correlations between belief and psychological well-being. Belief was measured by responses to the following prompts: there is a personal God; there is some sort of spirit or life force; I don’t know what to think; and I don’t think there is any sort of spirit, God, or life force. Controlling for both age and gender, the researchers found that those Australians who did believe in a personal God were more likely to experience psychological well-being than those who did not.

Summary This section has been devoted to describing the, substantive, explanatory, and functional approaches to analysing beliefs. The substantive approach used a phenomenological as well as an empirical methodology to understand beliefs from both comparative religious studies and social science. Beliefs were further examined under the topic of the various conceptualizations of divine images. There appears to be evidence that various factors influence people’s beliefs and that these beliefs have effects in the lives of religious people.

A Morphology of Myths Religious world views or myths may be categorized according to four general types: folk,6 archaic, oriental, and occidental. Given the centrality of myth for religion, noting the primary differences among these four types will alert us to the diversity of religious beliefs. These

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9 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 4:3 The Morphology of Myths Folk

Archaic

Occidental

Oriental

Animistic

Poly-Theistic

Mono-Theistic

Pan-Theistic

No gods

Large pantheon

God as ethical

All is sacred

Gods and goddesses are like humans

God as creator

God and creation are one

Religion and society are one Little choice

Theurgy

God involved in human affairs

Salvation is eternal oneness with God Ethical

basic differences, variations that are not easily reconciled, reflect the difficulty scholars have in defining religion. Figure 4.3 provides a brief summary of these four generic types of myths.

Folk Mythology Elementary supernaturalism and animism are common in folk mythology. Elementary supernaturalism does not recognize specific gods or spirits but does assume that supernatural forces have an impact on human life. Animism, on the other hand, recognizes active, animate spirits operating in the world. Although these spirits are not gods and are not worshiped, they are regarded as forces that may be benevolent or evil. People must take these spirits into account and might try to influence them. Animistic religions have been common among tribes of Africa and the Americas. Some forms of animism persist in the modern world in rituals associated with spiritualism and exorcism and in some forms of the occult.7 Although vestiges of magic exist in other forms of religion, magic is more characteristic of animism and elementary supernaturalism than of Eastern or Western religions. What magic is and how it is different from religion has been presented in Chapter 2 under the topic of religious experience. Sociologist Robert Bellah has observed how folk myths, whether they are religious or magical, provide a unified common world view specific to the tribal group. This world view is all encompassing, touching nearly every practical area of life. Bellah (1970) describes the unidimensional perspective of folk religions as follows: Primitive religions are, on the whole, oriented to a single cosmos; they know nothing of a wholly different world relative to which the actual world is utterly devoid of value. They are concerned with the maintenance of personal, social, and cosmic harmony and with attaining specific goods—rain, harvest, children, health—as men have always been. (p. 23)

A case example of a folk religion comes from an anthropological study of Canadian aboriginal religion by Jenness (1955/1976). Although there were many tribes spread throughout pre-

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European contact Canada, there was a remarkable uniformity of belief and practice. The most fundamental belief was in the kinship between humans and nature. To the Native Canadian, there was no distinction between animate and inanimate nature, and all things, ranging from the smallest pebble or insect to the stars of the heavens, were endowed with different forms but were all alike and had personalities similar to the Native people themselves. Everything in the cosmos glowed with a spiritual power or force that might be either friendly or hostile. Just as there was a hierarchy in the tribe, so also was there a hierarchy in nature. Every species of plant, inanimate object, or animal had a leader—the highest of all was some sort of Supreme Being or ruler. Yet this Supreme Being was remote from the life of the Native person, so he or she resorted to his or her own thoughts or to rituals directed to lesser powers that seemed to exert a more immediate influence on daily life. These powers were invoked for success in a hunt and protection from tragedy. However, they were not evoked for moral ends. The whole character of aboriginal mythology belies its ethical intention, and there is no effort to use myths to elevate justice above injustice, to encourage the strong to protect the weak, or to suggest that an evil-doer will meet with just punishment or the doer of the good, a just reward.

Archaic Mythology The term archaic mythology is applied to the kind of religion that was common among ck Sea the major earlyB l acivilizations of Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and Italy. During the time of 3400–500 BC, there were significant centers of civilization in Mesopotamia, Palestine, Phoenicia, Syria, and Anatolia (present day Turkey). The first cites, which appeared in Sumer and Babylon, were a result of a concerted effort to build canals to channel and preserve water. Cities also developed near rivers because the surrounding soil was a rich silt that allowed for

4.1539” wide x 2.6566” high

map 4:1 Ancient Sumer Caspian Sea Tig ris

tes

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Mediterranean Sea

hra

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Eup

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Persian Gulf Red Sea EGYPTSmith (1999a) SOURCE:

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9 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D agriculture to flourish, which lead to significant surpluses and allowed an elite to emerge to devote itself to full time politics, priestly ministry, education, and the creation of writing. Because there were few other natural resources, territories were expanded to allow for movement of wood and metals (see Freeman, 1996). The sample case of archaic mythology is from ancient Mesopotamia. Mesopotamia refers to a region and not a civilization, a region covering, roughly, present day Iraq, Kuwait, and parts of Syria. The ancient civilizations present in this region between 3400 and 323 BC were the Sumians, the Akkadians, the Old Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Hittites, the Neo-Babylonians, and the Persians. Maps 4.1 and 4.2 illustrate the region of these ancient societies, and Table 4.2 presents a timeline of Mesopotamian history from the scholarship of Van De Mieroop (2007). Archaeological sources provide us with the following information on these civilizations from the work of McCall (1990). The people of Mesopotamia tended to live in cities that were, typically, divided into three parts: a walled inner region that contained a temple dedicated to a local deity, a palace, and homes of official and citizens; a suburb that was comprised of farms, fields, orchards, and date groves; and a labouring area that was the center of commercial activity. The status system consisted of elites and non-elites: those few who benefitted from royalty and the temple and the lower class consisting of peasants, craftsmen, slaves, and merchants. However, within this non-elite class was a status group of great importance: the scribes, who become vital in the writing and preservation of the ancient texts from which we learn about the social life of the people and the famous myths.

Black Sea

map 4:2 Ancient babylon 3.5093” WIDE X 2.6448 HIGH

Tig

Caspian Sea

ris Riv

Mediterranean Sea

er

Eup

hra

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MESOPOTA MI A Babylon Kish

S U M E R Nippur Uruk

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Gulf of Oman

Arabian Sea

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Table 4:2 A Timeline of Ancient Mesopotamia (Dates are approximate) Period

Peoples and General Characteristics

3400 BC to 2350 BC

Sumerians: Series of city states

2350 to 2000 BC

Akkadians: Creation of a state beyond the city state through aggressive warfare

2100 to 1950 BC

Neo-Sumerians: Back to the city state. Home of the famous ziggurat of Ur. Likely home of Abraham, the founder of Judaism

1950 to 1750 BC

Old Babylonians: Genesis of a small empire by the conquest of other city states. Period of Hammurabi (1792–1750) who had codified famous laws know as the Code of Hammurabi

1750 to 1590 BC

Assyrians: Centered in NW Mesopotamia

1590 to 1350 BC

Hurrians and Kassites: From the west of Babylon and Assyria

1350 to 1250 BC

Emergence of the Hittites

1250 to 612 BC

Reconstruction of the Assyrians known as the Neo-Assyrians

612 to 539 BC

The era of the Neo-Babylonians

539 to 323 BC

Persians: Conquered by the Greeks in 323 BC

Among the people of Mesopotamia, labour was divided extensively, a fact that runs contrary to an observation by Durkheim (1911/1933), who thought there was little or no division of labour before modern times. Peasants produced barley (the staple grain), tended herds of sheep and goats, milked cows, and raised poultry. Craftsmen worked in clothing production, tanning, pottery, carpentry, and metal work. Slaves were common and were, typically, prisoners of war. The cities of Mesopotamia were far from being isolated. Major trade routes linked cities and regions from the Mediterranean through to Anatolia and down to the Persian Gulf. This sense of internationalism is important in understanding archaic mythology, for the myths reveal a wide variety of influence and cross-pollination.

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9 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The archaeological findings related to these areas are extensive. Part of the reason for this is that there were many tablets written that were housed in libraries,8 private homes, and in the court. That many tablets have been discovered does mean, however, that there were probably a significant number of persons engaged in literary activity, even though only a few authors’ names of the stories, epics, and myths have been preserved. Evidence is present that the authorship of most documents was a collaborative endeavor, arising from generations of storytellers9 and scribes. McCall (1990) presents us with a number of patterns common in the Mesopotamian myths. They portray cosmic forces in a personified way, such as the submission of chaos to nomos (or order) in the universe and in the life of humans. They sometimes reflect historical events, for example, military victories or the founding of cities. Some may serve purely cultic (public worship) purposes, such as the ritual recitation at the New Year’s Festival of the Epic of Creation, which tells of the world’s creation and the foundation of the city of Babylon. All the myths recorded exhibit a multitude of deities and may be characterized as polytheistic. Gods, goddesses, and humans interact within a pace of action that is stately and slow. The movements of the gods, goddesses, and humans from one geographical region to another also reflect the movement of the myth’s hero in these geographical regions. The plot of the myth or the epic occurs in various ways: by dreams of future events, through communication between the main protagonists, or by gods giving instructions and advice. Sometimes, there is a heightened dramatic tension. An example is found in the Epic of Creation when two gods are sent to overcome Tiamat, a primeval goddess who is the mother of the first generation of gods and epitomizes chaos. Marduk, the patron god of Babylon and an agricultural deity also named “bull-calf of the Sun,” succeeds, and the cosmos is born. Some examples may help. In the longest of the Mesopotamian myths, the Epic of Gilgamesh, the hero Gilgamesh is the semi-divine king of Uruk (in present day Iraq), who goes in search of eternal life. In the meantime, the gods are angry with the people and decide to punish their sin with a flood. However, a “good” god, Ea (water god, creator, god of wisdom, supreme master of magic, and protector of craftsmen and artisans) feels compassion and tells Gilgamesh to build an ark wherein he will be saved with his household along with “cattle of the field and beasts of the field.” Heidel (1949) documents that the epic was fixed at about 2000 BC among the Assyrians but that parts of it reflect earlier versions linked to the Babylonians and the Sumerians. The corollaries to the Hebrew Bible’s story of Noah (Genesis 6:13–8:22) are quite striking. Heidel lists the common themes in both accounts: a hero of the flood, an announcement of its coming, the presence of an ark into which all sorts of animals and seeds are loaded, the physical causes of the flood, its duration, the ark’s resting on a mountain, the sending of birds out to look for dry land, and the final disembarkation of the occupants, who “spread throughout the whole world.” The uniqueness of the Genesis account is that only one god (the one God of the Universe, Yahweh, or Elohim), not multiple gods, engaged in the process. These myths sound strange and out of touch in our modern world. However, their continued legacy attests to the fact that deities were believed to affect human affairs. We have different myths and sacred stories. And we now know empirically that these myths do make a difference in people’s lives.

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Occidental Mythology The dominant religious myths that emerged in the West are contained in what is known as the Levantine tradition. Levantine refers to the cultures bordering the eastern Mediterranean that gave rise to Judaism, Islam, and Christianity. These three monotheistic world religions replaced the earlier polytheistic mythology of ancient Greece and Rome, with Christianity coming to dominate civilization for centuries. Local beliefs and local magic gave way little by little to the gradual acceptance of a Christian world view dominated by Greek Christianity. Christianity is but one of the major world religions in the Levantine tradition. Several general characteristics may be found in all three mythological systems that contrast with oriental mythologies (Campbell, 1968; Bellah, 1970). First, all three religions tend toward dualism. God is transcendent and separate from the world in a fundamental way. Second, all are based on special revelations that go beyond nature. The giving of the Decalogue to Moses in Judaism, the incarnation of God in Jesus taught in Christianity, and the role of Muhammed as the Prophet of Islam are all illustrations of supernatural manifestations of God. Third, in contrast to the acceptance and tolerance of Eastern religions, all three Levantine religious mythologies hold a stance of exclusivity. Each believes itself to be the sole carrier of special revelations. Fourth, the dualism of the Levantine traditions is manifest in their focus on the need for people to be saved from the secular, from evil, from that in the world which binds them. Fifth, unlike folk or oriental mythologies that exist without a time reference, Levantine mythologies are historic. These myths focus not upon a time beyond history but on specific historic events. For Judaism, a focus is on the Exodus, marking the flight from the slavery of Egypt; for Christianity, the nucleus is crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus; the heart of Islam is the revelation of the Qur’an to Muhammad. Sixth, all three Levantine mythologies depict a masculine-like deity. Women do not have as special a role in the functioning of myths as they do in oriental thought. As noted in the introduction, part of the purpose of this text is to offer to the reader an interpretative understanding of Islam. Consequently, this investigation of occidental mythology now turns to a case study of the mythology of Islam. Watt (1969) outlines the five central beliefs of Islam: 1.

God is all-powerful and good

2.

Humans will appear before God on the Last Day to be judged and assigned to heaven or hell according to their deeds

3.

People ought to be grateful to God and worship him

4. Humans should be generous with their wealth and be upright 5.

Muhammad has been sent as a warner to bring this message from God to his fellows (pp. 44–45)

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9 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D A variation of this set of beliefs, called the Six Pillars of Faith, is given by Cornell (1999):10 1.

To believe in Allah

2. To believe in Allah’s angels 3.

To believe in Allah’s revealed books, which include the Qur’an, the New Testament, also known as the Evangel, the Psalms of David, the Torah, and the Pages of Abraham

4. To believe in Allah’s messengers, which include many of the prophets of the Hebrew Bible as well as Jesus, John the Baptist, and such previous Arab prophets as Hud and Salih 5.

To believe in the Last Day. Islamic eschatology is close to that of Christianity and even includes an intercessory role for Jesus. Many Muslims also believe in a quasi-prophetic figure call Mahdi (Guided One), who will come after Jesus and usher in a period of peace and justice that will last until the Day of Judgment. This figure does not appear in the Qur’an but is a later addition to the Hadith. Significantly, the Mahdi’s first appearance in the Hadith is found, like the Hadith of Gabriel, in Shi’ite Islam

6. To believe in Allah’s determination of affairs, whether good or bad. This is a reaffirmation of the concepts of divine foreknowledge and fate (p. 88) Farah (1994), a Muslim scholar, fleshes these statements out in more detail. The most basic statement of faith is “There is no god but God (Allah) and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” This is the famous Shahadah, the profession of faith that forms the first pillar of Islam. Farah notes that to proclaim the first part of the Shahadah is to become a “muslim” or submitter to God, but, when one pronounces the second part, one becomes Muslim, an adherent to the religion of Islam. Farah divides his outline of the primary beliefs into the following categories: the doctrine of Allah, cosmology, eschatology, and predetermination versus free will.

The Doctrine of Allah The conception of Allah may be summarized by the following: God is one; he has no partners; he is singular, without any like him, and uniform, having no contrary; he is separate, having no equal, ancient, eternal, everlasting, ever existing, perpetual and constant, supreme in greatness, alpha and omega, manifest, hidden, and real (Farah, 1994, p. 106). Further, the role of God as creator and as omniscience is heavily emphasized: his attributes distinguish him from his creatures, and he is one who rewards and punishes and is merciful and compassionate to the repentant sinner. The unity of God is one of the most critical contrasts to Christianity with its belief in the Trinity (the oneness of three persons—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit).

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The Muslim denial of belief in the Trinity is expressed in the Qur’an: “Do not say ‘Trinity.’ Desist, it will be better for you. For Allah is One God, glory be to Him for far exalted is He above having a son” (Surah 4:171). At least ten texts in the Qur’an indicate that God has no son and that expressing belief in the Trinity is dangerous: “He may warn those who say, ‘Allah has begotten a son.’ They do not have any knowledge of such a thing, nor had their fathers. It is a grievous thing that issues from their mouths as a saying. What they say is nothing but falsehood.” (Surah 18: 4–5).

The Cosmology Allah created the cosmos in six days. Besides himself, there are only two other uncreated beings: the prototype of the Qur’an and the divine throne. The belief that the Qur’an is uncreated or eternal is the position held by Farah. However, there is a dispute in Islam as to the veracity of this statement of faith. Both von Grunebaum (1953) and Glasse (2001) present some of the history of this controversy. The high honor and noble status given to the Qur’an is presented in the text itself: Verily, it is a Qur’an noble In a book treasured, Touched only by the purified A down-send from the Lord of the Worlds. (Surah 56: 76–70)

The high honor afforded the Qur’an came to mean, over the first centuries of Islam, that the text was uncreated or eternal. By at least 738 AD, the belief was so fundamental in Damascus that the caliph Hisham (724–743) had Ja’d B. Dirham put to death for advancing the doctrine that the Qur’an was created. An extension of this controversy continued into the later eighth century in Baghdad, which was ruled at that time by the Abbasids. Scholars called the Mutazilis (abstainers) championed reason as judge of matters of belief that came from the Christian scholars, who were well versed in Hellenistic philosophy and were invited to come to Baghdad. Brown (2003) records that there is considerable evidence that, in the court of the caliph Harun alRashid (who ruled from 786–809), there were many Eastern Christian administrators, theologians, astrologers, and doctors. Brown (2003) writes, “ ... at the Muslim court of Baghdad, a perennial Greek wisdom was patiently put together, in Arabic ... ” (p. 317). The Mutazilis made elaborate arguments, based on Hellenistic logic, that the text could not be eternal. According to von Grunebaum, the debate spilled over into the streets of Baghdad, and every stratum of society took up the theological discussion. By 827, the teaching of the created Qur’an gained in ascendency to the extent that the caliph al-Mu’mun instituted a decree in 833 and an inquisition to require that all qadi, divines, and traditionalists were to adhere to the teaching. However, a later caliph, al-Mutawakkil (who reigned from 847 until 861), reversed the policy and aligned himself with the traditionalists (who believed that the Qur’an was uncreated). Glasse (2001) avers that belief in the uncreated Qur’an has not been challenged since in the Sunni world. Further, the Kharijites, a Muslim sect discussed further in Chapter 8, and the Shi’ites both claim that the Qur’an was uncreated.

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9 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D In the Muslim cosmology, created beings are ranked below Allah and any uncreated entities. Farah (1994) notes that about the divine throne are the highest created beings. These are angels, pure sexless beings, some of whom worship God while others are sent as messengers to the earth. A few of these messengers are sent to assist the believers in their fight against unbelievers (in dar al-harb, the territory where Islam is not dominant). Others are guardian angels, who watch over everyone’s deeds and keep a record thereof to be produced on the day of judgment. Allah continues to be the creator: each new human life comes to be by a divine breath, which becomes a human soul.

The Eschatology Like Christians, Muslims believe in the resurrection, the last judgment, paradise, and hell. At death, the body again turns to earth while the soul moves to a state of sleep and unconsciousness. At a future time, on the day of judgment, all will rise from the dead and will, eventually, be judged on their merits. Those who have done good will be rewarded while those who engage in evil will receive punishment. Farah (1994) writes, A balance will be present to weigh the deeds of all, and sentence will be passed depending on how the scales are tipped. He whose balance is laden with good works will be saved; he whose balance is light will be condemned. (p. 113)

However, Muslims believe that, even if their good deeds are lacking, they will be delivered to paradise after they have spent a term in hell and been punished for their sins. The rewards of heaven and the punishments of hell vary in degree depending on merits or demerits. As paradise is most glorious, hell is most horrible. Those who are admitted into the presence of Allah will feast on fruit, recline on soft coaches, imbibe excellent wine, and be served by bashful, dark-eyed virgins or handsome youth (Surah 37: 43–48; Surah 76: 12–17). Beyond these pleasures, however, will be a vision of Allah and an experience of felicity that surpasses all the pleasures of the body (Farah, 1994, p.116). On the other hand, for those who engage in evil deeds, punishment will be commensurate to their wickedness. Darkness, fire, and ignominy will be their lot (Surah 10: 27).

Predetermination and Free Will A common struggle for Jewish, Christian, and Muslim scholars is how to reconcile two seemingly contradictory beliefs: that God is all knowing and has predestined creation and that God has given to humans freedom of will. Farah refers to the Qur’an to provide evidence for both teachings. Muslim theologians have attempted to negate the problem by pointing to the believer’s lack of knowledge about Allah’s plan and the future. The lack of knowledge of predestination allows a believer to have personal choice. The Muslim is free to make an intelligent choice using his or her own knowledge and following Allah’s laws, both gained through access to the Qur’an. Farah (1994) summarizes, “In obeying the laws enjoined by the Creator, the believer is better equipped to carry out his duties and attain the right path to him. God, however, does not compel him to do so” (p. 122).

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Faith as Knowledge One may ask a further question about the belief system in Islam: what is the goal of faith in these propositions? In Christianity, it is for a transformed life; the aim is to be like Jesus in his relationship to the Father-God and to live a life of love. In Islam, the function or goal of faith is, especially, practice and knowledge. The concept of practice is twofold: ritual and ethos. Both of these will be addressed in later chapters. The discussion here will focus on knowledge as a primary goal of the Islamic faith. “The essence of faith is knowledge” (Cornell, 1999, p.72). For a Muslim, what does this mean? During what is known as the Islamic Middle Period (from the ninth to the fifteenth centuries), philosophers, mystics, theologians, and jurists offered some answers. Relying on the Qur’an and the Hadith, they elicited three types of knowledge: (1) the knowledge of certainty, (2) the eye of certainty, and (3) the truth of certainty. The knowledge of certainty is open to all human beings. It is rational and discursive and is based on an acknowledgment that the signs of Allah are present in nature and that his existence can be argued. This is a very similar position to Aristotle’s and to that of the scholastic theologians of the Christian Central Middle Ages, especially as represented by the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (1224–1274). The knowledge of certainty can be transformed into a higher form of knowledge that is known in the Qur’an as the eye of certainty. Before attaining this type of knowledge, a kind of vision, the believer must be opened to Islam. Once opened, the believer receives this kind of knowledge as a type of “divine light.” In contrast to the first kind of knowledge, which is based on rationality and discourse, this kind of knowledge is theophanic or a kind of divine illumination that strips away the veil of worldly phenomena to reveal the divine reality within. It is a self-transcendence to the divine. The third and highest type of knowledge builds on the transcendent nature of knowledge itself. This “truth of certainty” is the form of knowledge that participates directly in the divine reality, and it transcends both rationality and vision. It is a consciousness of truth that is both immediate and participatory, for it is knowledge based on direct inspiration. This knowledge, however, is restricted to the prophets and the messengers. I would add that it is also the kind of knowledge common in Sufism, which will be a topic in the chapter on religious organizations (Chapter 8). This discussion is incomplete. Cornell (1999), representing the core of Islam, sees knowledge as only part of a much wider whole. He quotes a Sufi master as saying, “Knowledge without practice is like a tree without fruit” (p. 63). Belief, knowledge, ritual, and ethos are one organism in Islam. And all of these dimensions of Islam are addressed in this text.

Oriental Mythology A major difference in tolerance exists between religions of the East and the West, and this difference has affected their respective relations to folk and archaic religions. Occidental religions are much more likely to regard themselves as “the only true religion” than are oriental religions (including Hinduism and Buddhism). While exclusivity prevailed in the West, in much of the East, it was widely held that the more religion there was the better. Bryan Wilson (1982) describes this contrast:

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10 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The Gautama Buddha did not condemn the worship of deities, even though he was pointing to a higher path, and the majority of Theravadin Buddhists worship deities and placate spirits in practice, even though the teachings of their religion counsel quite different activities. The symbiosis of Taoism, Buddhism and Confucianism in China, and of Shinto and Buddhism in Japan, are no less social realities, whatever vicissitudes occurred in governmental sponsorship of one faith or another. In contrast, Jews and Christians were taught to anathematize alien gods, and to regard their worship as false and even demonic. The Jewish god was, of course, originally a tribal deity, but eventually he came to be conceived as a universal spirit: initially superior to other deities, subsequently he was proclaimed as the only true god. Christians (and in considerable measure, Muslims) inherited this orientation, and there can be no doubt of its powerful influence on western culture. (p. 56)

Aspects of folk mythologies were more likely to be absorbed into the more tolerant Eastern religions while attempts were made to purge elementary supernatural and animistic beliefs from the more exclusive Western religions. Weber, too, contrasts occidental and oriental beliefs when he explains the differences between Christianity and Indian religions (Hinduism and Buddhism). He argues that, whereas Christianity buttressed an attitude of the growth of the self and the world by dominating them through social action, the Indian religions encouraged an attitude of selfdeification and world rejection through contemplation (see Schluchter, 1987). Despite their tolerance and diversity, oriental mythologies do possess some central elements. Campbell (1968) identifies five commonalities. First, the ultimate mystery, the sacred, is transcendent or above all of the cosmos. At the same time, it is mysteriously immanent—it dwells within all things. Second, the purpose of the Eastern mythologies is to bring people into an awareness of their own identities. Paradoxically, identity is actually non-identity, for it is grounded in the spiritual, which alone is real; self and the cosmos are one. Third, Eastern mythologies give pre-eminence to the order of natural law, which is everlasting, wondrous, blissful, and divine. There is no special revelation and no special theology. According to Campbell, this natural law is manifested in the universe (the macrocosm), the individual heart (the microcosm), and the hieratic order of the state with its symbolic arts and rites (the mesocosm). Fourth, there is more use of the feminine image in the mythologies of the East, particularly in Hinduism. For example, maya (non-empirical reality, which alone is “really real”) is personified as a woman within the Hindu world view. Finally, unlike Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, there is no one unique divine manifestation. All personifications, forms, acts, and experiences make manifest in some way the transcendent universal mystery. In sum, Eastern religions tend to be monistic. The heart of the Eastern world view is spiritual, with all that is material being regarded, ultimately, as illusion. The function of religion is to move people beyond illusion into ultimate reality. Although the sacred texts of oriental religions tend to include both transcendentalist and immanentist teaching, the everyday lived oriental religions tend to emphasize indwelling or immanentist religiosity (the inherent religiosity of the world). A profane world separated from a distant holy god is embodied more in transcendental Christian, Jewish, and Islamic teachings than in immanent oriental thought.

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Although there are a number of points of contrast between Eastern and Western mythologies, the basic difference is found in their respective perceptions of what is real. The world view of the spiritualistic Eastern tradition stands at the opposite pole from the Western materialistic tradition. In many oriental religions, the physical world, including human emotions such as love, hate, pity, anxiety, compassion, jealousy, and envy, is illusion. The eternal alone is real; the individual personality is maya and must be transcended. The Western world view, in contrast, regards the physical and spiritual realms as being interrelated. Both are regarded as real and valuable. Since emotions, if properly understood, can push us toward the center of meaning, love (which may be regarded as illusion in Buddhist traditions) is often esteemed in Western religions as the motivating and creative core of the universe. The centrality of love in many Western religions may be illustrated through the mystical traditions of Christianity, Sufism (Islam), and the cabbala (Judaism), in which a primary goal is becoming one with divine love or a divine lover (Kelsey, 1983, p. 23). These contrasts are summarized in Table 4.3. Table 4:3 Occidental and Oriental Myths Occidental

Oriental

the creator is distinct from the creation

the creator is not distinct from the creation and Self=Cosmos=Divine

prominence given to revelation

prominence given to nature

eternal life consists of continued, personal existence

eternal life consists of the absorption into the divine

masculine images of the divine are common

both masculine and feminine images of the divine are common

there is a unique revelation beyond nature

there is no unique revelation beyond nature

tend toward exclusivity

tend toward inclusivity

Levantine

non-Levantine

Historical

non-historical (Buddhism and Sikhism are exceptions)

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Table 4:3 Occidental and Oriental Myths Occidental

Oriental

tend to begin civilizations

tend to be absorbed into already existent civilizations

tend to control the environment

tend to submit to the environment

Myths of Human Ascent and of Divine Descent An additional dichotomy will assist us in comparing and understanding various mythologies. It is possible to categorize one set of myths as involving “human ascent and divine response” in contrast to another set, which involves “divine descent and human response.” “Human ascent and divine response” myths present a sacred world view that sees the human condition as one of struggle and hard work or the human quest as striving to ascend to the divine realm by one’s own efforts (be they good works, proper sacrifices, well-performed rituals, or following moral codes). The hope is that the divine figure will look with kindness on these efforts and reward the seeker with eternal life, riches, blessings, and good things. The human subject may be called the seeker. Empirical evidence of the existence of this kind of myth comes from Weber’s summary of Asiatic religion (Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, and Taoism). He argues that all the philosophies and soteriologies (doctrines of salvation) of Asia had a common presupposition, which was that knowledge, gnosis (having the Figure 4:4 Myths of Human Ascent and Divine Response The Sacred The Divine Response

The Human Ascent

Humans as Seekers In all myths except in ancient Judaism and Christianity

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Figure 4:5 Avy’s Judgement in the Book of the Dead

© The Trustees of the British Museum right knowledge), was the absolute path to holiness (Weber, 1958b, p. 330). In addition, the myths of Mesopotamia, as presented earlier in the chapter, reflect this human ascent imagery. Figure 4.4 depicts this kind of myth. Two images capture the mythology of human ascent. The first is of a seeker at the bottom of a mountain, who begins a long ascent to the top where the sacred dwells. The hope is that, once the top is reached, justice and rewards will be forthcoming. Another image of human ascent comes from a common theme in myths: light and darkness. Most human ascent myths see people living in darkness and groping for the light. However, there is, typically, a large chasm that separates the two eternal regions, and the seeker needs to build a bridge to cross over through his or her own effort. A paradigmatic model of this set of myths may be presented from excerpts of the Egyptian Book of the Dead (Andrews, 1985). The Book of the Dead is the name given to sheets of papyrus that contain magical texts and illustrations termed vignettes; the ancient Egyptians put these with their dead to help them pass through the dangers of the underworld and come to the afterlife called the “Field of Reeds” or heaven. The earliest edition can be traced to the middle of the fifteenth century BC, but some ritual utterances and incantations have a history dating a thousand years earlier. For the wealthy deceased, Egyptians customarily recited the spells on a regular basis, for it was believed that, as long as one’s name was recited, the “spirit” in the mummified body would remain in the body. Figure 4.5 depicts the judgment scene of a man, Ani, who has just died. He comes to be judged with his wife Tutu. Both Ani and his wife Tutu watch as his heart (a heart with a human head on it) is weighed on a scale with an ostrich feather, which represents Maat (a goddess of truth, justice, and cosmic order). Anubis (a jackal-god of embalming closely associated with Osiris) and Horus (a falcon god) help with the weighing. Thoth (a god of wisdom and learning) waits to write down the results of the weighing. If Ani’s heart is pure and without sin (e.g., he has never killed, stolen, committed adultery, had sex with a boy, insulted a king,

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10 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D damaged a measure, or harmed a neighbor’s land), his heart will be lighter than the feather. If, however, his heart is not pure and is sinful, the monster Ammet will devour it, and Ani will be non-existent. At the top of the picture are number of gods (42) who form the “Hall of Justice” and sit in judgment of mortals. Here is how one deceased person makes his claim of innocence in front of these judges: Hail to you, O you who are in the Hall of Justice, who have no lies in your bodies, who live on truth and gulp down truth in the presence of Horus. Save me from Babai, who lives on the entrails of the old ones on that day of the great reckoning. Behold, I have come to you without falsehood of mine, without crime of mine, without evil of mine, and no sin—no one testifies against me, for I have done nothing against him. I live on truth, I gulp down truth, I have done what men say and with which the gods are pleased. I have propitiated God with desire; I have given bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked and a boat to him who was boat-less, I have given god’s offering to the gods and invocation-offering to the spirits. (from Spell 125, quoted in Andrews, 1985, p. 32)

This quotation illustrates well, along with the story of Ani, that it is in doing, in gaining merit though good action, that one enters into the favor of the gods and gains access to the Field of Reeds. Note that the list of good deeds presented by the supplicant includes living in truth, caring for the marginalized, and performing required religious rituals. Other spells testify that the believer has vindicated the god Osiris and has not made conjuration against the king. A more recent example of a myth of human ascent comes from Islam and is outlined in Surah 70 in the Qur’an. Allah’s appellation here is “Lord of the Ways of the Ascent.” All unbelievers and those who do wrong (e.g., killing or stealing) will not ascend to the heavens but receive a penalty. However, those who hold to the truth of the day of judgment, remain steadfast in prayer, give to the poor, stay chaste, stand firm on their testimonies, and perform other virtuous acts will ascend to paradise. The second set of myths, those involving “divine descent and human response,” portrays the divine descending to the human condition and inviting a response from a human subject (here called the “one who trusts”). The mountain image is again useful: the sacred, manifested as a conscious person, descends down from the mountain and offers to take the one who trusts up to the top. All the human subject has to do is to respond with trust and be carried (although this trust is also expressed in behaviors that reflect the sacred). In terms of the movement from darkness to the light, the image consistent with this set of myths involves the divine constructing a bridge from the realm of light, walking across it to the region of darkness, and carrying the one who trusts back to the light. Figure 4.6 illustrates this genre of myth. The mythologies that express the first circumstance, human ascent and divine response, are the archaic mythologies as well as those of the East, folk societies, and Islam.11 Only Biblical Judaism and Christianity reflect the second situation, that of divine descent and human response. The divine descent myth is at the core of Biblical Judaism in that the deity loves people and creates a group so that salvation can be given to all humankind.

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Figure 4:6 Myths of Divine Descent and Human Response Divine imitation of the God who loves

Human response in faith

Humans as sought after The myths in ancient Judaism and Christianity Several texts from the Hebrew bible illustrate divine descent. The God of Israel is described as one who is “a God of tenderness and compassion, slow to anger, rich in graciousness, relenting from evil” (Jonah 4: 2). This deity is seen to act on behalf of the people, as both the deliverer and law giver, a fact that is illustrated in a dialogue between Yahweh and Moses: “I have seen the miserable state of my people in Egypt, I have heard their appeal to be free of their slave drivers. Yes, I am well aware of their sufferings. I mean to deliver them out of the hands of the Egyptians and bring them up out of that land to a land rich and broad, a land where milk and honey flow” (Exodus 3: 8). Another text explicates the sacred descent: “He let you hear his voice out of heaven for your instruction; on earth he let you see his great fire, and from the heart of the fire you heard his word. Because he loved your fathers and chose their descendants after them, he brought you out of Egypt, openly showing his presence and his great power ... and brought you into their land to give it to you for your heritage (Deuteronomy 4: 35–38). After the rescue, the people were required to be obedient to a covenant established by God in the Sinai desert (Exodus 20), and, if they were faithful, they would continue to experience this intimate care. Christianity goes a step further in its divine descent mythology: the sacred actually becomes human in the person of Jesus and bids people to come to him and thus enter into a divine life. It is in this latter mythology that God is defined as love and is intimately involved in the human condition. An early Christian writer says it in this way: Out of his loving-kindness for us he came to us, and we see this in the way he revealed himself openly to us. Taking pity on mankind’s weakness, and moved by our corruption, he could not stand aside and see death have the mastery over us; he did not want creation to perish and his Father’s work in fashioning man to be in vain. He therefore took to himself a body, no different from our own, for he did not wish simply to be in a body or only to be seen ... In death the Word made a spotless sacrifice and oblation

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10 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D of the body he had taken. By dying for others, he immediately banished death for all mankind. (St. Athanasius, 318–323/1976, p. 1808)

However, the human response necessary for salvation in Christian mythology was not only trust but also to take on the character of Jesus, who forgave those who hurt him, loved the marginalized, and showed mercy to the forsaken. Morality becomes a goal not of reaching the sacred but of living out the myth in everyday life.

Summary This chapter has presented an investigation of mythology that uses archaeological, anthropological, psychological, and sociological languages and methodologies. The importance of Weber’s theory that mythologies both undergird social institutions and are instrumental in their change has been acknowledged. Then, using a scientific method, mythologies and beliefs were defined substantively and explained using contextual, non-sacred factors. A small number of examples of the many functions and functional outcomes of myths were then summarized. The chapter continued with an analysis of the various forms of myth as these are expressed in folk, archaic, oriental, and occidental societies. A further morphological distinction was made between the human ascent/divine response verses the divine descent/human response mythologies.

Notes 1

An alternative view is provided by Turner (1974) in his study of Weber and Islam. He writes, “Weber is far more concerned with the analysis of the military, political, and economic circumstances of Oriental society than he is with the “world images” which arise under these circumstances (p. 20).

2

It is important to realize that Weber is an astute sociologist who was not satisfied with monocausal interpretations of social phenomena. The Calvinistic-Christian world view was only one factor in the construction of the modern world, according to him. In addition, these world views do not stand by themselves. To be effective, they need to be linked to status groups who act as carriers of the world views. In the case of the development of capitalism, it was, especially, the Puritan business-status groups that acted as carriers.

3

Another 38% professed to believe in an evolutionary development of humankind with God guiding creation (Gallup & Jones, 1989, p. 100). (Of the remaining 18%, 9% had no opinion, and 9% claimed to believe in a Godless evolution.)

4

The United States, it should be noted, is the most religious of the world’s industrialized nations (Warner, 1993). Statistics for all European countries (with the exception of Ireland and Poland), Japan, and Australia all show a much lower level of religious belief than do US statistics. Canadians are more religious than residents of most other industrialized

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countries, but are significantly less religious than Americans. For example, 83% of Canadians say they believe in God (in contrast to 95% of Americans). These figures range from a high of 93% for the Atlantic Provinces to a low of 73% in British Columbia (Bibby, 1987, p. 73). 5

Noffke and McFadden (2001) use a similar categorization in their study of divine concepts, denominations, and age.

6

Significant numbers of both Americans and Canadians were found to use astrological predictions to guide decision making. Bibby (1987, p. 74) reports that 9% of Canadians believe in the power of astrology. Poloma and Pendleton (1991), using a somewhat different question, found that 8% of their sample of Americans either “sometimes” or “often” used a horoscope to guide decision making. (Another 9% admitted to having done so “once or twice”).

7

One monumental Mesopotamian library, which documented Akkadian civilization around 1600 BC, was discovered and excavated in 1968 by an Italian archaeologist. Over 2,000 documents were recovered, and these recorded the great exploits of the rulers of Ebla (near Aleppo, Turkey), referred to the biblical Sodom and Gomorrah, and presented an extensive collection of literature, magical spells, ritual texts, and economic transactions. The documents reveal a busy, prosperous kingdom in which sheep rearing and textile production prevailed (Bienkowski & Millard, 2000, p. 98–99).

8

Leick (1998) argues that the link between an oral tradition and a literary tradition cannot be made easily. The only evidence is for a literary tradition because oral traditions not recorded have been lost in the mist of time.

9

These six pillars originated in the Hadith of Gabriel. Cornell (1999) quotes from this Hadith: “A man [later thought to be Gabriel] asked Muhammad: ‘Tell me about faith.’ The Prophet said: ‘It is to believe in Allah, His angels, His books, His messengers, and the Last Day, and to believe in Allah’s determination of affairs, whether good comes of it or bad’” (p. 75–76).

10 Weber (1978) substantiates this theory by noting the following: “But Islam was never really a religion of salvation; the ethical concept of salvation was actually alien to Islam. The god it taught was a lord of unlimited power, although merciful, the fulfilment of whose commandments was not beyond human power” (p. 625).

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Chapter FIVE

T h e Di l e m m a of M i x e d Mo t i vat ion: T h e S t u dy of S ac r e d L e a de r s h i p

Orientation Most of us have experienced the complexity of life because we, with

few exceptions, live in social arrangements that are challenging. We are born as individuals with unique features and somewhat independent, so how is it possible to be sociable and to relate to others so as to produce and maintain a state of order? This has been a fundamental question from the time of the foundation of sociology in the early part of the nineteenth century. In the case of religion, a third dimension is added beyond the individual and the social—the transcendent. How can all three domains of human life engage to have positive results? A way that we as humans have socially created this order is through leadership—the topic of this chapter. I invite you to journey, again, into the worlds of folk, archaic, oriental, occidental, and modern societies to understand the social phenomenon of leadership through the lens of sacred leaders. Chapter 4 focussed on the religious experiences of leaders of religious movements and on the resultant social institutions that flowed from these experiences. This chapter, which also focuses on religious leaders, emphasizes the tension or dilemma that these leaders experience: the dilemma of mixed motivation. Recall from Chapter 1 the importance of a charismatic stage in the life of a prophet, a virtuoso, or a sacred leader. At this stage, the leader is energized, vivacious, has a singleminded devotion to the sacred, and is dedicated to its fundamental elements and its extensions. However, the charismatic stage passes; the original leader eventually dies, leaving followers with only a memory, and, without the leader to induce and insist on single-minded devotion, institutionalization processes occur. Successive leaders frequently have mixed

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motivations or motivations that diverge from the original heart or élan of the religion. In speaking of the institutionalization of Christianity and of the effects of this process on the church’s religious leaders, O’Dea (1966) writes, When a professional clergy emerges in the church, there comes into existence a body of men for whom the clerical life offers not simply the “religious” satisfactions of the earlier charismatic period, but also prestige and respectability, power and influence, in both the church and society, and satisfactions derived from the use of talents in teaching, leadership, etc. Moreover, the maintenance of the situation in which these rewards are forthcoming tends to become an element in the motivation of the group. (p. 91)

Clearly, that religious leaders develop or have mixed motivations is a significant factor to consider in the social scientific study of religion because the change from the goal of singleminded religious devotion to goals that involve secular prestige and influence appears to be central to the process of religious institutionalization. To investigate further the dilemma of the mixed motivations of religious leaders, I will present some historical examples of this dilemma, which will be followed by descriptions of religious leaders that typify the religious leadership of folk and archaic societies. Thereafter, in the language of Weber, both the virtuoso-cleric and prophet-priest continua will be presented to capture the wide range of different types of sacred leaders.

Historical Case Example One: Muhammad, the Caliphate, and Islam In Chapter 3, the religious characteristics of Muhammad during his charismatic phase were outlined. Muhammad’s charisma continued throughout his life in Medina, where, it is said, he continued to be inspired and to receive the divine messages that resulted in the Qur’an. His charisma was very evident. It flowed from its religious base to him, empowering him to be both a statesmen and a military leader. This charisma, especially expressed in militaristic terms, continued through the second charismatic phase of Islam, which Muslims call the period of the “the rightly guided caliphs”; These caliphs led from 632 AD (the death of the Prophet) until 660 AD, the death of Ali, and they were Abu Bakr (reigned 632–634), Umar ibn al-Khattab (reigned 634–644), Uthman ibn Affan (reigned 644–656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (656–660). During their tenures, Islam and the Muslim state expanded significantly to include all of Arabia, Syria, Palestine, the Susanians of Iraq, Armenia, eastern Iran, and Egypt. Donner (1999) comments that the conquests were momentous. These caliphs established a large new empire in the Near East, destroying the Susanian Empire and capturing large parts of the Byzantine Empire as well. The caliphs were committed to a new religious mythology that, in part, created new economic structures and redistributed property and wealth. Most important, Donner notes, the newly emergent state provided the political framework wherein the beliefs of the caliphs could gradually spread among the conquered peoples. The last of the “rightly guided caliphs” was Ali who was not only the cousin of the prophet but also his son-in-law, married to Fatima. His acclamation of the caliphate was opposed by many Muslims—especially

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1 10 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Uthman’s kinsmen of the Umayyad clan, led by Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan. Before there was resolution, Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite while praying in a mosque in 660. Ali and Fatima’s son, Hasan ibn Ali (d. 669), became the fifth caliph. However, he was forced by Muawiyah to abdicate the role of caliph in his favor. Muawiyah was acclaimed as the new caliph, and the dynasty of the Umayyads begins in 661. From the time of the “rightly guided caliphs” until the fall of the Abbasids (1258), the term caliph was applied to the head of Islam as well as to the head of the Muslim Empire, which stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to the borders of China. Its meaning varied throughout early Islamic history, but it came to be understood by the eleventh century in the following way. The primary function of the caliph was to celebrate the main rituals of Islam, to defend it, and to administer the religion. In addition, he was to be an arbitrator in times of legal dispute, protect the territory of Islam, punish evil-doers, provide troops for the guarding of Muslim territory, wage jihad against those who refused to accept Islam or submit to Muslim rule, collect taxes, pay salaries, administer public funds, and appoint officials in the operation of the vast empire. In summary, the caliph was “to defend religion and administer the state” (Arnold, 1924/2000). Arnold comments on an influential thinker, Ibn Khaldūn (1332–1406), who adds the following to the description of the position. The caliphate provides a solid religious base to an empire, and the caliph gives guidance on practical matters, guards the Shari’ah, is a vice-regent of God on earth, must be of the Quraysh tribe of Arabia, and must be of good character. During the time of the Ottomans (1300–1922), when the sultans appropriated to themselves the title, the position is described as “the chosen Khalifah of the Creator,” “the shadow of God on earth,” “shadow of the mercy of God,” “warrior of the path of God,” and “fighter for God’s word.” However, during this period of Muslim history, a major change happened: a movement from hierocracy to caesaropapism. During the Ottoman Empire, the sultan was primarily a head of state and only secondarily a religious leader. It appears that the title caliph was used to offer more legitimacy to the position of sultan. Nevertheless, Arnold provides an abundance of historical evidence that reveals a close link between the religious and political leadership of the Islamic world, first in the form of a hierocracy (the caliphate and politics) and then in the form of caesaropapism (the sultanate and religion). The blend of religious and political roles that is evident in the caliph’s position begs investigation of the caliphate as a leadership facing the dilemma of mixed motivation. Donner (1999) comments that the empire (with the Umayyads setting up their capital in Damascus and the Abbasids in Baghdad, Iraq) continued to expand significantly. The armies went west to conquer North African and Hispania only being stopped by the Frankish King Charles Martel, in 732 near Tours. To the east, they went as far as Eastern Iran, Uzbekistan (near the Indus River valley), and Pakistan. It may be claimed that these caliphs continued the same charismatic leadership as Muhammad and the righty guided caliphs)—that their actions were similar and that there is no evidence of the later caliphs being motivated by mixed goals. The primary evidence against this interpretation is that, as the Muslim movement expanded beyond being a sacred tribe to being an empire, motives and goals became more mixed, and caliphs were increasingly desirous of the wealth and fame accruing because of their many military successes, as opposed to being motivated by sacred devotion. Further, in contrast to Muhammad and the

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“rightly guided caliphs,” these leaders accumulated for themselves much wealth and social prestige: they owned many properties, palaces, harems, and servants, which garnered them status and respect. Most scholars acknowledge the mixed motives and mixed religious and political roles of the caliphs. Some social scientists studying Islam even consider the early segmentation of the Muslim faith as different attempts to come to terms with the death of a charismatic leader and the three branches of Islam as “different expressions that the charismatic authority of Muhammad assumed in its process of institutionalization” (Dabashi, 1992, p. 13). Although the process of religious institutionalization and its concomitant dilemma of mixed emotions seem quite evident when one considers religions such as Christianity and Islam, which both arose in response to a charismatic “messenger,” these sociological developments are less obvious in the context of folk and archaic faiths. Still, an examination of religious authority within these societies will enable discussion of the dilemma of mixed motivations across the various types of religious leadership.

A Typology of Religious Leadership The dilemma of mixed motivation is best applied to occidental religions and to Buddhism, to religions whose origins can be traced back to a charismatic leader. The dilemma is less applicable to folk and archaic religions. Nevertheless, an outline of the religious leadership emerging from folk and archaic religions will be useful in our examination of the dilemma across the continuum between the virtuoso and the cleric, as observed by Weber (1978), and between the prophet and the priest, as discussed by Sharot (2001), whose ideas were informed by Weber’s.

Folk Religions and the Shaman The shaman is the central sacred leader in folk societies. Townsend (1997) provides us with a description: the shaman communicates with spirits, controls them, enters into altered states of consciousness (abbreviated as SSC, shamanic-altered states of consciousness, or ASC, altered states of consciousness), can be possessed by the spirits, and has the ability to separate the soul from the body and to “fly” into the regions of the spirits. The term spirits is generic in nature and includes deities, pure spirits, spirits of the dead, and spirits of animals, plants, and inanimate objects. Townsend estimates that the origins of this religious leader go back about 25,000 years and that shamanism was mostly concentrated in hunting and gathering societies. Of the many aspects of the shaman, two deserve extra description: shamanic states of consciousness and, a subset of these states, possession by spirits. Shamans can enter into a state of consciousness that is an alternative to mundane consciousness. It is in this consciousness that shamans communicate with the spirits. This altered consciousness needs to be induced by drumming, dancing, chanting, fasting, and meditation. Evidence that the shaman is in this state is that she or he senses a “hot state.” A shaman of the Tungus people of Nepal reported that, when the spirits came to dwell inside of him, he felt hot and experienced a loud noise and was unable to recall what the spirits said to him. This altered state of consciousness,

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1 1 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the entry of spirits into the person of the shaman, is called possession. The journey to this state is similar to that toward more general altered states of consciousness: drumming, chanting, and soul journeys. Once the spirits are allowed to enter, they speak through the mouth of the shaman. Townsend illustrates this possession from the Cree, Ojibwa, and Arapaho Canadian first nations. Their shamans enter a spirit lodge, are bound up in a darkened room, and open themselves up to the spirits of the dead. The foundation of the shaman’s leadership and authority is the culture’s mythology. The central elements of this mythology include a pervasive presence of the spiritual in all of the cosmos with a distinction between three kinds of realities. The upper world is the domain of the deities and the spirits. The middle cosmos is the juncture of the material and the spiritual, the natural and the supernatural. The lower cosmos is a dark, negative, malevolent place. Humans, who live in the middle cosmos, have both a visible body and an invisible soul, and the universe is ordered in balance and reciprocity. The shaman is linked to this mythology in several ways. He or she is the only one who can enter the upper world while alive. All other members of a tribe or community can only enter into it through death. There is also a belief in an axis mundi (a cosmic center) that links all three worlds together. This axis mundi is typically characterized as a world tree and is traversed by the shaman in frequent “soul journeys.” Shamans can be either men or women, and they have a high status in the society because of their ability to deal with supernatural powers. This status usually exists within a hierarchy or a range of status. Further, they perform frequent rituals to protect the community, have special dreams, use heat and fire as symbols of supernatural power, use words and sounds in communicating with the spirit world, and use animal blood sacrifice to the spirits either to induce them to act or to thank them for previous interventions. The functions of the shaman are manifold, and she or he is thought to be a necessary and important person in society. Shamans placate plants, water, animals, and the earth to facilitate abundance and growth. They heal people of illnesses and injuries. They perform rites against witches, who are thought to bring harm to tribal members, and shamans escort the dead into a peaceful afterlife. How does one become a shaman? The belief is that the spirits call one to be a shaman. How is this call heard? Several signs are important, for example, recovering from a serious illness or injury, special dreams and visions, exhibiting erratic behavior, inheriting shamanic powers from ancestors, or undergoing a strange event such as being struck by lightening. It is also possible to purchase or stealing the power of a shaman. Subsequent to these initial signs of being called, a person is recognized as a shaman by being controlled by a spirit, being identified with the possessing spirit, having acquired the necessary ritual paraphernalia, being tutored by a spirit and a real-life teacher, and experiencing ASC. Townsend illustrates the process from the several tribes of Nepal. Shamans experience an involuntary possession during which they either mentally or physically withdraw from the community. During this exit, they gain control of the spirits and enter into and out of the ASC at will. A Hindu in Nepal received his call from his dead father, who had also been a shaman. As a child, he ran away to a forest and later learned how to use the drum to achieve a trance. After coming out of the trance, he sought to be taught by a local shaman.

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Many of the images of the shaman continue through to the present. Townsend (1997) writes, “If nothing else, changes in Western attitudes, partly influenced by core and neoshamanism and some parts of New Age, may moderate the severe materialist approach being exported and might be one potential benefit of Western spiritual experimentation” (p. 460). Jenkins (2004) expands on this. In a workshop conducted in Minneapolis-Saint Paul in 2003, participants were initiated into a shamanic journey that was aided by drumming and dancing to induce them into an SSC. Jenkins notes that up to 5,000 clients come each year to this workshop. Also, a woman, Loren Cruden, worked for many years with a Potawatomie medicine man to learn the art of the shaman and now leads shamanic workshops in the Pacific Northwest. However, Jenkins also notes that much of the New Age use of shamanism is not linked to Native spirituality but to Western occultism, theosophy, spiritualism, and mesmerism.

Archaic Religious Leaders To illustrate patterns of archaic religious leadership, we will turn once again to the ancient societies of Mesopotamia, whose mythology was described in Chapter 4. Oppenheim (1964) documents that there were two critical organizations during the three millennia of Mesopotamian history: the community of persons of equal status bound together by a consciousness of belonging and the center of the whole system—the temple and the palace. The income for the center of the system (the temple and the palace) came from agricultural holdings, taxes, and sacred offerings to the administrators of the temple. In both cases, significant amounts of wealth were dedicated to adorning the palace and the temple in splendour and luxury. The temple functioned to link the city to the deity by providing a permanent divine dwelling place, to secure prosperity for the city and happiness for the people, and to support the legitimacy of the king. Religious leadership was divided into three categories: the king as high priest, the clerical administrators of the temple, and the diviners. Kingship was understood to be of divine origin, and the incumbent king appeared in a sacred-like, “awe inspiring luminosity,” evoking a sense of the tremendum. In the case of Assyria, the name of both the capital city and the god was Assur. The special relationship between the king and his god was said to materialize in the successes of the ruler in war and in prosperity in peace. To the extent that this did not happen, there was thought to be a disjuncture between the king and the god. To assure that there would be success in war and prosperity in peacetime, the temple priests and the diviners were necessary. Clearly, there was an essential link between the palace and the temple. The king was the official priest whose responsibilities were both the building and the constant maintenance of the sanctuary. However, he delegated the daily activities to the priests. The primary and only function of the priests was to “care for the deity.” Together with craftsmen, they made the image of the deity out of expensive wood decorated with gold. After the image was constructed, the priests engaged in an all-night ritual to “bring life into the image” for it was thought that the deity dwelled within the image itself. Very similar to the palace family, the divine family lived in the temple and was served in courtly fashion by the priests, as officials in the palace served the king, his family, and his harem

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1 1 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D of concubines. The priests were responsible for lifting the image up high on a pedestal to reflect awe and wonder. The most important ritual the priests performed was to provide elaborate meals for the god and his family. These meals were served two times a day in a very royal manner. Several courses were offered behind a curtain that screened the image—to give the deity and his family privacy. After a short time, the food was distributed in the following manner. The bulk of the food was taken to the king and his family, most of the rest was given to the priests, and, finally, the leftovers were distributed among other attendants, such as craftsmen. This partaking of the food offered to the deity is very important. Oppenheim argues that this ritual is at the heart and hub of the entire social system, for, in eating, one participated in the power and energy of the deity. The third category of religious leader was the diviner. He interpreted omens, which were necessary for civil, religious, and political life; in Oppenheim’s (1964) words, “Civilized existence, as epitomized in a king’s way of life, relied on omens” (p. 227). The ritual the diviners engaged in is termed divination. It represents a technique of communication with the supernatural forces that are supposed to shape the history of the individual as well as of the group or the whole society. The archaeologist categorizes divination into two parts: operational and magical. In the case of operational divination, the diviner “offers” the deity the opportunity of directly affecting an object activated by the diviner through such activities as casting lots, pouring oil on water (leconomancy), or observing smoke as it rises from incense (libanomancy). Magical divination consists in the interpretation of the changes a deity produces in natural phenomena, such as the wind, thunder, or the movement of the stars. Another type of magic is called extispicy, which is the prediction of an outcome in the future from deformations in the viscera of animals. The operational kind of divination follows a pattern of protasis—the diviner stating the problem or a case to be solved—followed by an apodosis—the response from the deity containing the prognostication. A common ritual of the diviner was to take a bowl of water on his lap, pour oil on the water, state the case to the deity, and ask for an answer. The answer was supposed to be given according to how the oil spread over the water, which was thought to reveal the will of the deity with regard to the state or the individual. The extant Mesopotamian texts that deal with extispicy surpass the number of texts on all other kinds of omens. It was thought that the deformation of the internal intestines presented an arcane message that had to be deciphered by the diviner. The practice was important in helping generals and the king discern whether a potential war or military campaign would be auspicious or not. The most common type of divination that the Mesopotamian peoples are known for is from the “Royal Art of Astrology.” It has a long history, and evidence for it is found in Old Babylonia. Oppenheim acknowledges that the bulk of the texts on astrology come from the library of a king of Assyria named Ashurbanipal, who reigned between 668 and 627 BC. Diviners thought that the sun, the planets (they distinguished stars from planets), the stars, the moon’s cycles, eclipses, and other meteorological phenomena, such as thunder, rain, hail, and earthquakes, all had ominous validity in the matters of the state—that these things predicted the outcome of wars, peace, harvests, and floods. The existence of horoscopes is late in Mesopotamian history, around 410 BC. These were more individual in nature and had

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less to do with official state matters. From a person’s date of birth and date of conception, diviners were said to predict an individual’s future. In conclusion, it can be seen from this analysis of the various kinds of religious leadership in folk and archaic societies that there was an intricate link between the state and the mythology, ritual, and leadership of religions. The nexus is solid. One cannot understand religion without its societal and political links, and, on the other hand, the individual, the social group, the class system, the priests, the diviners, and the king were part of a larger system imbued with the sacred.

The Virtuoso-Cleric Continuum One can reasonably apply the dilemma of mixed motivation to Weber’s distinction between the virtuoso and the cleric. The religious elites within Buddhism provide us with an illustrative example of the contrast between the virtuoso and the cleric. First, however, it is well to define what a religious elite is. Sharot (2001) notes that religious elites are composed of those who occupy the highest position of a religious social organization that has an internal authority structure. Weber (1916/1995) makes a distinction between two types of religious elite: the virtuoso and the cleric. The virtuoso is the closest to being charismatic while the cleric is an elite member who is “religiously unmusical” and more part of an “official elite.” The cleric is more likely to have a stake in a position that has more to do with self-interest than service to the faithful. This distinction is similar to the contrast O’Dea (1966) makes between religious leaders who are purely motivated and those who have mixed motivations. The virtuoso is intensively religious and is recognized by faithful followers as having a special estate or as being pneumatic, meaning connected to the spiritual. Frequently, the clerics fight against the virtuosos. Weber provides us with some examples to clarify the struggle. According to Gethin (1998), virtuoso ascetics of the brahmanical tradition threatened the supremacy of the brahman priests by offering rival visions of society and the world. In the time of the Ottomans, the ulama, the clerical elite of Islam, fought against the Sufi religious order and thought its members to be heretical and subversive. Early Christian bishops opposed ascetical charismatic persons, and the Lutheran and Anglican clerics, too, were distrustful of ascetics. Sharot (2001) elaborates on the differences between the virtuoso and the cleric. The virtuoso has reached the highest level of spiritual growth while the cleric has achieved the highest level of the organizational strata. However, Sharot (2001) then argues that both virtuosos and clerics have a common goal and that is to call the faithful back to the central tradition of a particular religion. Both also seek to maintain or increase the distinction between themselves and the faithful, and they use material, political, and organizational or mythological interests to monopolize and control the distribution of religious benefits to the faithful. In some ways, they are the gatekeepers of sacred goods. A further function they perform is to try to keep the tradition pure. All the major religions have evolved from previous traditions with roots in folk and archaic religious expressions. Many of these folk and archaic traditions are infused with magic. Thus, a function of the elites is to challenge the faithful to renounce magic for the sake of the “higher” sacred tradition.

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1 16 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Another distinction between virtuosos and clerics, according to Sharot, is how separate or integrated each group is within the economic and political structure. Frequently, the dominant economic-political elite seeks to incorporate clerics (e.g., the clergy) into its hegemonic strategy. The powerful in a society offer economic, political, and familial links to the higher-ranking clerics and bestow privileges and property upon them that is termed prebendal. In the eyes of the clerics, the effects are a sense of indebtedness and dependence. Using Sharot’s analysis of Buddhism, I shall outline some of these theoretical ideas. Buddhist studies commonly portray Theravada Buddhism as a non-theistic philosophy practiced by monks and intellectuals and the Buddhism of the faithful as being immersed in animistic and magical religion. Some scholars, Sharot notes, considered that Buddhism as a religion of the people was nothing more than a veneer superimposed on animism and magic. Recent studies have challenged these ideas. What has usually been understood as the “true” religion of Buddhism, Theravada Buddhism, was never a reality. There is no evidence that the early Buddhist elites disbelieved in supramundane beings. Their sacred texts contain many references to deities, demons, and miraculous events. Gethin (1998) provides us with more details about Buddhism’s variety. The Theravada tradition or the “southern” tradition is a religion to more than 100 million people in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos. It is the tradition that is closest to the ancient Buddhism of the early centuries in India. The Mahayana alternative, or the East Asian tradition, is common in China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam. It is very diverse and has co-existed with Confucianism, Taoism, and Shintoism. A third, the Tibetan or tantric tradition, is predominate in Tibet, Mongolia, Nepal, and Himalayan India. This special path arose within Mahayana Buddhism and is based on treatises known as tantras, and, while generally embracing the same aims as other forms of Buddhism, it claimed to provide a rapid means to accomplish the goal of enlightenment by way of its distinctive techniques. It is Theravada Buddhism that Sharot considers in his interpretation of sacred elites from the patterns of religious leadership evident in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand. The meanings of several terms are vital to enable a better understanding of these religious elites. Dharma reflects the truth of the Buddha that is to be passed on; it is the great tradition of Buddhism. Arhat is the enlightened virtuoso while sangha is the gathering, the community of the monks. Nirvana is a state of release from all suffering, the destruction of all desire, and eternal freedom from rebirth. The sum of all good and evil deeds that form either merit or demerit is karma. Virtuoso elites or arhats and clerical monks all belong to a sangha. The arhats keep to themselves within their sangha and do not associate with the faithful outside of their community, whereas the clerical monks go out from the sangha to perform various functions. The arhats are characterized further as meditating to attain nirvana, renouncing normal social life, not marrying, having little support from the deities or the supermundanes, having restricted physical mobility, being expected to follow 227 rules of conduct, praying to the Buddha not for help but rather to remember him, and trying as best they can to imitate the Buddha. They are completely supported by the faithful who think that the monks gain merit for them and hope to be protected from illness and evil and to enjoy a good, mundane life because of their support. The primary functions of the clerical monk are to study and then teach, perform rituals, and pastor the faithful. Some secondary functions include being a counsellor, community leader, doctor, and astrologer. They call upon the deities to assist them in transferring

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merit to the people. The monks chant; use amulets and charms; and propitiate deities for good harvests, health, longevity, and employment. They are also instrumental in bringing order to the community. The faithful are more than willing to support the clerical monks economically because this support brings people merit, better karma, and secular benefits such as health, wealth, and happiness. There is no expectation for these monks to meditate, and they are not encouraged to strive to reach nirvana, for this state is considered beyond them. Their hope is also to increase good karma and then, after death, to be reborn into a better social and economic situation. Functional distinctions do exist, then, between the arhats (virtuosos) and the clerical monks of Buddhism. But what are the links between Buddhism’s religious elites and political figures? In Buddhism, it was relatively common for kings to espouse Buddhism and offer credibility to the monks by building temples and protecting the Buddhist faith. In some cases, kings became deities, and deities became kings. The supramundane image of the heavens and the earth is isomorphic to the image of a royal state. As a deity is the supreme ruler of a particular territory so also is the king the supreme ruler of a specific domain. As the king is far removed from the people so also is the deity far removed from the faithful. Both are accessed by the people through the clerical monk and Buddhist statues, arhat relics, and prayers to lower deities. The prayers are very pragmatic, in that, if the supplicants honor the deities, the deities are expected to give them health, happiness, financial security, and longevity. Both religious elites, the virtuosos and the clerics, are necessary for the growth and continuity of Buddhism, as well as for the health of other sacred traditions. And, the more integrated with the economic and political structure a religious elite becomes, the more its members appear to leave charismatic, single-minded devotion and experience the dilemma of mixed emotions. Next, we will focus on this dilemma as it appears within the contrast between a prophet and a priest, a comparison that emerges from a Weberian sociology of religion.

The Prophet-Priest Continuum In Chapter 3, we investigated the centrality of religious experience as the genesis of religious collectivities. Part of the argument was that, from a leader’s religious experience emerged a world view or a myth. Weber (1894/1978) adds to this by noting that, for the prophet, there needs to be a “unified view of the world derived from a consciously interpreted meaningful attitude towards life” (p. 450). Both the religious experience and the world view characterize the leader, whom followers call the prophet. Even at this stage, however, there exists a conflict between the empirical reality and the sacred conception of the world as a meaningful totality, and this conflict produces tensions in the prophet’s inner life as well as in his or her external relations to the world (Weber 1894/1978, p. 451). In contrast to the prophet is the priest, who is more concerned with status and prestige than with charisma. Weber (1894/1978, p. 452) argues that the priest is a product of routinization. The focus of the priest 1 is to secure some permanency of the message of the prophet, to insure the economic existence of the enterprise, and to control the authority of the collective. When we look at historical and contemporary instances of prophets, we will see how the institution of the priesthood is related to the charisma of the prophet (See Table 5.1.).

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Table 5:1 The Prophet and the Priest Characteristics

The Prophet

The Priest

Authority

A personal call

From tradition

The Source of Authority

From a personal revelation

From an official office

Social Origins

Outside of a priestly class

Likely from priestly class

Remuneration

Little or none

Is paid for services

Education

Little or none

Likely with theological training

Source of Revelation

First-hand account

Second-hand account

SOURCE: Adapted from Weber (1894/1978), pp. 439–442. Weber further illustrates this contrast between prophet and priest: “Prophets systemized religion with a view to unifying the relationship of man to the world, by reference to an ultimate and integrated value position. On the other hand, priests systematized the content of prophecy or of the sacred traditions by supplying them with a casuistical, rationalistic framework of analysis, and by adapting them to the customs [italics added] of life and thought of their own stratum and of the laity whom they controlled” (1894/1978, p. 460). In short, then, the prophet, as a type of religious leader, has a purer motivation, and the priest tends to have mixed motivations.

A Typology of the Prophet From Weber, several types of prophets can be identified: the founding prophet, the lawgiver, the teacher, the mystagogue (one who performs sacraments or magical actions), the ethical prophet, the exemplary prophet, and the renewer prophet. Beyond that, two other types can also be identified from the histories of religions: the reforming and the revolutionary prophet. Founding prophets claim to bring completely new messages and revelations. Abraham, the founder of Judaism, provides an example of this kind of prophet. Moses of Israel exemplifies the lawgiver while the mystagogue is typified by Taoist sacred elites. An ethical prophet is one who believes he or she has some sort of mission to teach ethics and call forth obedience. Weber calls both Muhammad and Zoroaster (630–553 BC) ethical prophets. The exemplary prophet, by his or her personal example, demonstrates to disciples the way to liberation. The Buddha embodies this type and is especially designated as “the great Teacher.”

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Renewer prophets preach an older revelation anew with no radical changes (Weber 1894/1978, p. 439). These prophets take an original tradition and attempt to renew it from within without changing the existing collectivity in any radical way. The tradition is considered to be valid and is the basic source of renewal. The routinized religious collectivity is perceived as needing to be renewed not by something “new” but by a “revolution of tradition” (Hill, 1973). Reforming prophets accept as given some elements of a previous tradition but reform this tradition according to a new revelation. The revolutionary prophet begins with an established religious tradition but changes it radically according to a new revelation; the result is a “new religious movement” or group. Giving extended examples of all of these prophetic types may overwhelm the reader. I shall restrict my outline to the following: an ethical-exemplary prophet, Gautama Siddhartha Buddha (c.563–c.483 BC), a founding prophet, Abraham (c. 2000–1650 BC), a reforming prophet John Calvin (1509–1564 AD), a Renewer Prophet, Benedict of Nursia (c.480–c.547 AD), and two revolutionary prophets, Jesus of Nazareth (c. 6 BC–c.30 AD), and Muhammad (c.570–c.632 AD).

An Exemplary Prophet: Buddha According to Weber (1978), an exemplary prophet models the path toward spiritual goodness: The preaching of this type of prophet says nothing about a divine mission or an ethical duty of obedience, but rather directs itself to the self interest of those who crave salvation, recommending to them the same path as he himself traversed. (pp. 447–448)

A portrait of Prince Gautama Siddhartha (later called Buddha or “the enlightened”) will demonstrate why he should be considered an exemplary prophet. This portrait will be based on the work of Gethin (1998), who provides a summary of the literature on the historical Buddha and on why he is considered the embodiment of sacred perfection. The historical sociologist, however, faces the same problem with the Buddha as he or she does with Muhammad: it is only possible to analyze what is known of this prophet from historical sources and to outline his legendary or symbolic tradition. The actual dates of Buddha’s life are only estimates. It is argued that he was twenty-nine when he commenced his spiritual quest and that, after his “awakening” six years later, he reached, taught, and guided disciples for forty-five years, before dying at the age of eighty. The Buddha, whose family name was Gautama, was part of the Sakya peoples in northeastern India. He was the son of a local chieftain and was given the name Siddhartha, which means “one whose purpose is accomplished.” His birth gave him a relatively privileged lifestyle, and he enjoyed a comfortable upbringing. At some point in his youth, he became dissatisfied with his life, even though he was married and had a son himself. He left the domain of comfort and started to search for the truth of the universe. This search led him to be trained by various teachers—to no avail. He then became a radical “renouncer” and followed an exceptionally rigid and ascetic style of life. It is said that, after several years, he left this life and sat beside a tree in unwavering commitment not to leave until he “found the truth.”

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1 2 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D According to Buddhists, he did and became the “enlightened one” or the “awakened one.” Thereafter, he spent a life of teaching the dharma, the way of truth. Whatever can be said of this historical man, it is true that Buddhism would not have originated without this charismatic and strong leader towards of truth. There are many legendary traditions about the life of Gautama Siddhartha. One such common tradition, which comes from Tibet, structures his life around “Twelve Acts.” The first action of Buddha was his pre-existence in Tusita. A Buddhist tradition is that many Bodhisattvas (those becoming Buddhas) exist in this heaven of gods and men, and they come to earth only when the dharma has been lost. The second act is his descent from Tusita, for he had attained a Buddha’s perfection before his birth as Siddhartha. His conception is the third act, and it was surrounded by divine beings accomplishing the special conception. His birth, the fourth act, was also redolent with miracles. It is said that, after birth, he stood up, walked seven steps to the north, and said, “I am chief in the world, I am best in the world, I am first in the world. This is my last birth. There will be no further rebirth” (Gethin, 1998, p. 19). Act five is an act of pleasure and sensuality. But as he reflected on this inanity, he became disenchanted—and becoming disenchanted was the sixth act. The seventh act is the first turning point, the first conversion. It is said that “the Buddha goes forth” to commence his six years of unwavering search for the truth. During this “act,” he meets “holy men” who teach him many things to no avail. Act eight leads him into severe austerity but this act, also, does not bring him to the truth.

Box 5:1 America’s Fascination with Buddhism Many Americans are embracing this Eastern religion with gusto. Evidence for its salience includes ▶▶

In Amazon.com, there are approximately 1,500 titles on the subject

▶▶

There are some 100,000 American-born Buddhists

▶▶

There are 1,062 Buddhist teaching centers—up from 429 in 1988

▶▶

Celebrities like Steven Seagal, Adam Yauch, Tina Turner, Richard Gere, Martin Scorsese, and Phil Jackson have embraced the religion.

▶▶

The films Seven Years in Tibet and Kundun have been highly successful.

▶▶

The Dalai Lama received the 1989 Nobel Peace prize.

▶▶

Zen Buddhists in San Francisco have organized an AIDS hospice.

Source: Van Biema (1997)

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His ninth act is a turning point. He now commits himself to sit under a Bodhi tree until he finds the truth and experiences an “awakening.” Gods are about him in eager anticipation of his success. Act ten is facing a challenge. The demon Mara comes to tempt him in order to deter his quest. Mara offers Buddha sexual pleasure and other worldly gifts. He refuses and defeats Mara and Mara’s army of gods (the other gods around Siddhartha flee in fear). Thereafter, Siddhartha becomes the Buddha, a fully enlightened one. It is said that the mighty Lord Brahma commends him and encourages him in his achievement. For a short period of time, the story goes, Buddha enjoyed this enlightenment so much that he wanted to keep it to himself. The eleventh act is the act of compassion. He senses a “call” to teach the way of the dharma. Soon, six of his companions join him, and they, in turn, became arhats. The last great act was his passing from change, corruptibility, and time to an eternal awakening. He thus dies and becomes the everlasting and most perfect Buddha. Evidence that Gautama Siddhartha should be considered an exemplary prophet is that neither he nor Buddhists claim that he had any divine revelation or “word from God” to guide him; there was no direction given to him from above. His is a self-liberation through enlightenment—what he provides for his followers is an exemplary life that guides the follower. A Buddhist is one who follows the example of Gautama Siddhartha and strives to do what he did: to follow a path of the renunciation of pleasure, to free oneself of affections, and to contemplate nature, which holds the key to enlightenment. From this one man, the world religion of Buddhism originated, and it has survived for 2,500 years. Approximately 600 to 750 million people adhere to this faith tradition. According to Statistics Canada, in 2001, about 300,345 or 1 per cent of Canadians claimed affiliation (Statistics Canada, 2005). Contemporary estimates from the United States are that from .2 to .6 per cent of Americans are Buddhist, as measured in 2000. This would mean that there are about 2.3 million American Buddhists (Smith, 2002). It is no small matter that so many people in the world continue to follow this ancient teacher, this ancient ethical-exemplary prophet.

A Founding Prophet: Abraham Abraham, the founder of Judaism, is an excellent historical example of a founding prophet, one who brings a new teaching and revelation.2 Abraham is not only the father of the Jewish faith but also the original founder of both Christianity and Islam. From the foundational vision of this prophet emerged, in time, these three significant traditions. The story of Abraham, as recorded in Jewish and Christian sacred texts, begins with him living in the city of Ur (see Map 5.1) during the nineteenth century BC. It is recorded (Genesis 11: 31–31) that the father of Abraham, Terah, took Abraham, his wife, and his grandson Lot to Haran, a semi-barren caravan center on the extreme northern edge of the Arabian Desert (Noss & Noss, 1984). Once there, Abraham is said to have had his first religious experience. The social conditions of the time were precarious. Noss and Noss (1984, p. 354) note that inhabitants of this region were in constant peril of being attacked by the Akkadian people to the east and the Hurrians to the north. They further document that some of these peoples actually did immigrate to Palestine, where Abraham was eventually to go. Abraham’s first religious encounter was in the form of a directive: Yahweh said to Abram (the name Abraham was born with), “Leave your country, your family, and your father’s house,

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1 2 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D for the land I will show you. I will make you a great nation; I will bless you and make your name so famous that it will be used as a blessing. I will bless those who bless you; I will curse those who slight you. All the tribes of the earth shall bless themselves by you” (Genesis 12: 1–3). Several other experiences followed: a promise of a covenant and the possession of a new land (Genesis 17); the promise of a son even in the old age of Abraham and his wife Sarah (Genesis 17); his dialogue with Yahweh over the matter of the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah (Genesis 19); and the original prescription and subsequent withdrawal of the sacrifice of Abraham’s son, Isaac (Genesis 22). All of these religious experiences focused on this man as a founder of what was to become Israel. These simple beginnings have had no small effect because over three billion people follow Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Cahill (1998) comments how on important was the simple yes to the call that Abraham received: So, “wayyelekh Avram” (“Avram went”)—two of the boldest words in all literature. They signal a complete departure from everything that has gone before in the long evolution of culture and sensibility. Out of Sumer, civilized repository of the predictable, comes a man who does not know where he is going but goes forth into the unknown wilderness under the prompting of his god. Out of Mesopotamia, home of canny, self-serving merchants who use their gods to ensure prosperity and favor, comes a wealthy caravan with no material goal. Out of ancient humanity, which from the dim beginnings of its consciousness has read its eternal verities in the stars, comes a party traveling by no known compass. Out of the human race, which knows in its bones that all its striving must end in death, comes a leader who says he has been given an impossible promise. Out of mortal imagination comes a dream of something new, something better, something yet to happen, something—in the future. (p. 63)

Why is Abraham a founding prophet? It is because he was the first in known history to have received a personal call to break from the polytheistic religion of Sumer and to found a monotheistic tradition. Further, he is called the father of the faiths of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Last, it is from the seed of Abraham that the Judeo-Christian tradition finds its origins, through his son Isaac, and to which Islam traces its roots, through his other son Ishmael. Cahill (1998) offers these reasons for conceiving of Abraham as the founding prophet of Judaism: ▶▶

Abraham responded to a divine call to go on a journey. The Israelites were also called to journey from Egypt to their new land Israel.

▶▶

The founding prophet had a relationship with a personal, familial deity that was to be a paradigm in Judaism.

▶▶

The simple statement “Abraham went” came to be a response to an invitation that is not only shared by Jews but also by Christians and Muslims.

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▶▶ “He went” is also a sign of trust. Abraham likely had no idea of where he was going, but he did go in trust. Jews, but especially Christians, are noted for “going in trust in the deity who loves them.” Thus, we can claim that Abraham, although his life story is not well documented outside of sacred textual evidence, is the founder of the occidental religion Judaism.

A Reforming Prophet: John Calvin The early church appeared to expand the charisma of Jesus to most of the followers.This collective grew significantly (from one person to an estimated 33 million by 380 AD, according to Stark [1996]), until it, in turn, took on more routinized characteristics. The leaders moved from being prophetic followers of Jesus to becoming more like priests who were invested in prestige and status. Then, during the Late Middle Ages, a particular historical moment when the church was highly routinized, two reforming prophets emerged to charismatically offer “new life” to the institutionalized church: Martin Luther (1483–1546) and John Calvin (1509–1564). As we shall see in Chapter 12 on religion and the economy, the ideas of both of these reformers were instrumental in the construction of early modern Europe and, according to Weber (1904–1905/1958), formed the sacred base of capitalism. In Chapter 2, we were introduced to Erikson’s work on Martin Luther. In a similar way, McGrath (1990) presents A Life of John Calvin: A study in the shaping of Western culture. Note the subtitle. Both authors illustrate the relationship between biography and history, helping to reveal, in the words of sociologist C. W. Mills (1959), “the intricate connection between the patterns of [our] own lives and the course of world history” (p. 4). McGrath sees Calvin both as a man of his times and, more important, as a man beyond his times, one who will become a major figure not only in the development of Protestantism but also in the shaping of the Western world. He lived at a time (during the calamitous sixteenth century) that had already been in a ferment of major changes in religion. The Roman Catholic Church, indifferent to new economic and political alignments, was experiencing a crisis of leadership, the questionable morality of its clergy, a lack of spiritual authority, and a movement away from the New Testament’s adherence to the myth of divine descent and human response and towards a mythology of human ascent and divine response, wherein salvation depended on merit. It was also a time of major shifts in the social, political, and economic arena. A growing middle class that had access to the printed word through the technological presence of the printing press was emerging. Many Catholics adhered to nonschismatic evangelicalism that accented personal religious experience over institutional allegiance and that was rooted in reading the Bible. John Calvin was French. He grew up and received his education in liberal arts, civil law, and theology in Paris and Orléans. He became a competent philologist and historian during his years of studying and interpreting the Bible. While he was in Orléans, he had an interior conversion wherein he saw himself as passive and God as active; thereafter, he believed in justification through faith (from Luther), and, what was quite striking, had an interest in reforming the Catholic Church and not dividing it. He became accused of being a recusant and was forced to flee. He sojourned in different places and resided mostly in Geneva.

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1 2 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D By the time he was in Geneva, however, he was committed to a form of Protestantism initiated by Ulrich Zwingli (1484–1531). In 1537, it was expected that all citizens of Geneva adhere to the 21 articles of Protestant faith outlined by Calvin. Yet it was several more years (after 1555) before he had enough sacred-political legitimacy to make a difference in the city. However, from 1555 until his death (1564), his influence increased dramatically, and Calvinists were well on the road to continue a reformation that went to France, to Scotland, and, eventually, to most parts of Western Europe. Calvin was known as a gifted orator, a genius of organization, and an astute scholar and writer. His most famous text, the Institutes of the Christian Religion, originally written in Latin, was translated into French, Italian, English, German, and Dutch and was enormously influential throughout Europe. His focus was to “return to the sources or ad fontes”—to the Bible. From his reading of this sacred text, he argued that (1) humankind was totally depraved, (2) all were predestined for salvation or not (a doctrine of double predestination), (3) there was limited atonement from Jesus only to those chosen for salvation, (4) the chosen experience the irresistible grace of God, and (5) those elected would never be able to defect or lose their salvation. It is from this ethos and this mythology that Weber (1904–1905/ 1959) weaves his story of the emergence of capitalism, sparked by what he calls the Protestant ethic. We will return to this theme in Chapter 12. McGrath (1990) offers an apt conclusion in the following summary of the impact of this reforming prophet: The full history of the impact of Calvinism upon western culture has yet to be written; the points noted above are merely a tentative indicator to its extent and potential importance. Nevertheless, the modest findings … [of this work] allow a significant conclusion to be drawn: to study Calvin is not merely to study the past—it is also to gain a deeper understanding of the present. Modern western culture continues to be shaped by memories of the past. Although Calvin lies buried in an unmarked grave somewhere in Geneva, his ideas and influence live on in the outlooks of the culture he helped to create. (p. 261)

A Renewer Prophet: Benedict of Nursia To understand the impact of Benedict, some of the historical and social context of the Roman Empire needs to be presented. Constantine (c.274–337 AD) was the Roman emperor from 312 to 337 AD (see also Chapter 10 on the relationship between religion and politics).3 He is especially remembered because he became a Christian (312 AD), suspended the persecution of Christians, and announced that, thereafter, many varieties of religion, not only the state religion of the Roman Empire, would be free from coercion and persecution. Stark (1996) does not consider Constantine to be heroic at all. He presents evidence that, by 305 AD, the emperor Galerius (emperor from 305 to 311 AD) had acknowledged that Christianity had become so widely received by Romans that a successful persecution was futile. Constantine merely continued state policy. The Edict of Milan (313 AD), giving civil rights to Christians throughout the empire, had mixed blessings. Christians were no longer outcasts and were protected from blatant

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hostility from the Romans and persecution. However, as O’Dea and O’Dea (1983) note, “born Christians” rather than converts made up the membership of the church, and laxness of observance was common (p. 52–53). In addition, because the official religion was now Christianity, many people became members not for religious reasons but for reasons of status and position. In this context, some Christians were disheartened by the laxity of ritual observation. The original fervour and commitment were waning (an example of mixed motivation), and, increasingly, the church became much more institutionalized and routine. In response, Benedict (called Benedict of Nursia, in reference to his birthplace in Italy) “brought” the monastic ideal from the North African desert and worked for ecclesial renewal in Europe. From a source written by Pope Gregory the Great (c. 540–604 AD), we know that Benedict came to Rome as a young man for a classical education. Dissatisfied with this, he became a hermit. Over a period of time, he had mystical religious experiences in which he sensed a personal and intimate relationship with the sacred. Several men began to come to him, and, subsequently, he began a small community. He later moved to Monte Casino (in central Italy) were he founded the first and one of the most famous Western monasteries (Ferguson, 1990). Benedict became noted for his famous Rule of St. Benedict that was the basis for much of Western monasticism. In this text (published by Pope Gregory), St. Benedict outlined a return to gospel-like simplicity and encouraged prayer (to be done seven times a day), hard work, and living in harmony with other members. Monks, especially, were to live their lives in the context of an “eternal vision of God” and a “loving identification with Christ.” Marty (1959) documented that a keynote of Benedict’s system was to create a family-like community that emphasized service and sanctity. Van Doren (1991) adds that he built a monastery on compassion, humility, and moderate spirituality—balancing prayer, work, and study— and that Benedict’s vision has become a spiritual treasure of Catholicism. The abbot (the elected leader) was to be a spiritual father and not a rigid authority figure. In addition to this, the monks were to be obedient to the orthodox faith (Ferguson 1990). The impact of the Benedictines on Western civilization was significant. Van Doren (1991) acknowledges that they organized, sorted, classified, and copied classical texts passed on from the Greek and Roman past. In addition, it was the Benedictine monks who carried Christianity (and with it, civilization) to Britain, northern Germany, and western Spain. It was not long, however, before routinization processes affected the Benedictine monastic movement. Van Doren (1991) notes that the monasteries, like the Roman Catholic Church itself, grew rich and that, by the twelfth century, many of them had corrupted the gospel and the simplicity and humility of Benedict.

Revolutionary Prophets: Jesus of Nazareth and Muhammad The revolutionary prophet emerges when a charismatic leader faces a highly institutionalized religion and is concerned not so much about reforming it but about changing it. This prophet is called revolutionary because he or she begins with an established religious tradition and changes it radically according to a new revelation that he or she claims to have received. Two historical figures, Jesus of Nazareth and Muhammad, can be categorized as revolutionary prophets, although there is some debate in the literature concerning whether Jesus was a reforming prophet or a revolutionary one. Stark (1996) argues for the latter position.

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1 2 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D His rationale is that, when the early Christians believed that Jesus rose from the dead, this myth went beyond the reformation of Jewish doctrine and actually changed it. One could also consider the tradition within early Christianity that Jesus was believed in not only as a prophet (like Isaiah or Jeremiah in Judaism) but also as the Son of God or, in effect, as divine. This belief would have been a revolutionary (indeed a blasphemous) teaching and would thus qualify Jesus as a revolutionary prophet. Two millennia after Abraham (c. 10–6 BC), in a time when Judaism was highly routinized, Jesus of Nazareth entered the historical scene. This man provides us with an illustrative case of the revolutionary prophet: one who accepts as given some elements of a previous tradition (in this case Judaism) and changes it according to a new revelation. Jesus comes at a time in Western history when Rome was the imperial center of Western civilization. The Roman Empire stretched from India in the east to Spain in the west and Britain and France in the north to northern Africa in the south. The empire’s political, economic, and social situation became vital for the eventual expansion of Christianity throughout the known world. Palestine (consisting of Judea, Samaria, Idumea, Galilee, Perea, and Bashan) had come under the control of the Romans in 60 BC. It was governed by a procurator (a representative of the emperor in Rome) and three tetrarchs of the family of Herod the Great. (Their rule began at about the time of the beginning of the Common Era or at a date close to the birth of Jesus.) Significant antagonism, conflict, and bitterness existed between the Jews and the Romans. This antagonism led to frequent revolts by a group called the Zealots. One of the more noteworthy revolts was led by a man named Judas who conquered a city in Galilee. This revolt was bitterly crushed by two Roman legions, which crucified several thousand of the Zealots (Noss & Noss, 1984, pp. 415–416). The Jewish religious climate was also problematic. The religious leaders were, to all intents and purposes, like the institutional priests described by Weber (1894/1978). They were interested in maintaining the status quo and in negotiating with the Romans to achieve as much religious autonomy as possible in the face of the Roman policy of religious intolerance. Two key groups were leaders. The Sadducees, by profession legal experts, had control of the high priesthood and were rich, conservative, linked by complex family alliances, and legalistic. They did not believe in angels, life after death, or divine intervention (Johnson, 1976, p. 15). As somewhat of a contrast, the Pharisees were a lay group who dated back to the time of the Maccabees (c. 167 BC) and who lead a successful revolt against the Greeks. Johnson (quoting early Jewish historian Josephus, c. 37–100 AD) describes them as seeming more religious than the others and more aware of the minutiae of the law. They used tradition to interpret the sacred texts and, without their leadership, the Judaic system could not be made to work at all. It was against the Pharisees and the Sadducees that the charismatic prophet Jesus levelled his fiercest attack. Matthew (23: 13–21) records the words of Jesus: Alas for you, scribes and Pharisees, you hypocrites! You who shut up the kingdom of heaven in men’s faces, neither going in yourselves nor allowing others to go in who want to. Alas for you, blind guides! You who say, “If a man swears by the Temple, it has no force; but if a man swears by the gold of the Temple, he is bound.” Fools and blind! For which is of greater worth, the gold or the Temple that makes the gold sacred?

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The eventual result of this kind of confrontation was the crucifixion and death of Jesus. However, the early followers of Jesus believed that he rose from the dead and that he expected them to carry on his work of reforming Judaism and of spreading this message to the Gentile world. These early disciples soon came into confrontation with the Jewish religious powers and were eventually expelled from participating in the synagogue. It was during this time that Christianity became a new religious movement. Box 5:2 The Da vinci Code The book and the movie have taken readers and moviegoers by storm. Over 60.5 million copies of Dan Brown’s (2003) book have been sold, and the opening day of the movie drew more crowds than any other movie. Central to these productions is the presentation of another kind of Jesus and an alternate history of Christianity: ▶▶

Leonardo da Vinci was a keeper of the secret of the Holy Grail.

▶▶

The Bible is a product of man not God.

▶▶

Nothing in Christianity is original.

▶▶

Jesus is not the Son of God.

▶▶

All that has been taught about Christ from the tradition of Christianity is false.

▶▶

Mary Magdalene married Jesus, he did not die on the cross, and they had children.

▶▶

Jesus gave directions to Mary, not to Peter, to found the church.

▶▶

The descendants of Mary and Jesus formed a royal bloodline, which runs through the French Merovingian dynasty.

▶▶

The bloodline continues to the present.

▶▶

The sexual union of male and female is a sacred ritual leading to true knowledge.

▶▶

The New Testament is false testimony.

▶▶

The Catholic Church has a conspiracy to suppress all this alternate history.

Source: Brown (2003).

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1 2 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Muhammad can also be considered a revolutionary prophet. As indicated in Chapter 2, many think of Muhammad as the last and greatest prophet after Jesus and the prophets of Judaism. He is called a revolutionary prophet because he broke from the mythological traditions of both Judaism and Christianity on several fronts. Using Watt’s (1956) analysis of the life of Muhammad, I will present these pivots of change from traditional Judaism and Christianity. Both Jewish and Christian tribes were relatively common throughout Arabia. In particular, there were three well-established Jewish clans in Yathrib whose source of wealth depended on land used to grow dates, on the market for trade goods, and on crafts. In coming to Yathrib under the invitation of the “Helpers,” Muhammad had high hopes that the Jews would accept his claim of being the last and greatest prophet in the line of the ancient prophets of Israel. In other words, Muhammad presented himself as a prophet within Jewish tradition. Further, Abraham (in Arabic, Ibrahim) is as important to Muslims as he is to Jews. He was the “first Muslim” because he submitted to God. The Qur’an records that the bloodline from Abraham to later Muslims was through Hagar, Abraham’s concubine who gave birth to Ishmael. It is said that Hagar and Ishmael journeyed to Mecca and, that later, Ibrahim joined them to denounce sin and idolatry and to construct the Kaaba. Thus, it was thought that Abraham was the ancestor not only of Jews and Christians but also of Arabs. In addition, both Jews and Christians are called “People of the Book” in the Qur’an (Surah 4: 171), and, later in Muslim history, they become dhimmis or protected ones. In part, Muhammad tried to win the Jews to his faith (or at least to accept his political authority) by encouraging prayer facing Jerusalem. He might have introduced fasting as a Box 5:3 Some Responses to the Da vinci Code A whole industry surrounding the Brown novel and movie has been created. Many have been the responses and critiques. One such response was published in Maclean’s: ▶▶

Brown suffers from significant historical illiteracy.

▶▶

The church did not claim that Jesus was the Son of God in the fourth century—this claim was well established from the genesis of the faith.

▶▶

The novel is badly written, error-strewn, and historically inaccurate.

▶▶

There were not 80 gnostic gospels. The New Testament gospels see Jesus as very much a human

▶▶

There is no evidence of a bloodline stemming from Jesus.

▶▶

Art historians deny any hidden message in Leonardo da Vinci’s famous painting The Last Supper.

Source: Bethune, B. (2004)

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ritual he borrowed from them as well. All this was to no avail. It is claimed that in 624 AD, after a divine revelation, he proclaimed prayers facing Mecca and that the fast (known as Ramadan) would have no reference to Jewish rituals and would begin to commemorate his arrival in Yathrib. From this time on, significant divergences continued. Muhammad thought that both the Jewish and Christian bibles were corrupt and that they imperfectly represented the ancient faith of Ibrahim. The Jews, he argued, claim that they are the chosen people but their consistence disobedience reveals that they are not. From this divergence of faith, there followed the physical attacks against the Jews that were reviewed earlier in Chapter 2. During the life of Muhammad, there were no direct physical attacks against the Christians, but Islam makes a substantial denial of the fundamental faith of Christians. In the Qur’an, at least ten texts claim that Jesus is not God’s son—in Christianity, Jesus being the “Son of God” is a foundational tenet. Some examples are illustrative: O People of the Book! [i.e., Christians] commit no excesses in your religion: nor say of Allah anything but the truth. Christ Jesus the son of Mary was [no more than] a Messenger of Allah and His Word, which He bestowed on Mary and a Spirit proceeding from Him: so believe in Allah and His messengers. Do no say “Trinity”: desist: it will be better for you; for Allah is One God: glory be to Him: [far Exalted is He] above having a Son. (Surah 4: 171).

and That He may warn those who say, “Allah has begotten a son.” They do not have any knowledge of such a thing, nor had their fathers. It is a grievous thing that issues from their mouths as a saying. What they say is nothing but falsehood (Surah 18: 4–5).

Another pillar of Christian faith is that Jesus was crucified and died on a cross on the outskirts of Jerusalem. There is a denial of this also recorded in the Qur’an: They [Jews] that say [in boast], “we have killed Christ Jesus the son of Mary, the Messenger of Allah”; but they did not kill him, nor crucified him, but so it was made to appear to them, and those who differ therein are full of doubts, with no [certain] knowledge but only conjecture to follow, for of a surety they did not kill him. Nay, Allah raised him up unto Himself; and Allah is Exalted in Power, Wise. And there is none of the People of the Book but must believe in Him before his death; on the Day of Judgement He will be a witness against them (Surah 4: 156–159).

There is considerable evidence, then, that Muhammad is a revolutionary prophet and that his life is the genesis of another new religious movement—Islam, just as the life of Jesus was the origins of Christianity.

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Prophets, Priests, and Religious Organizations A special feature of these kinds of prophets is that their uniqueness results in special types of religious organization, types that reflect the distinctiveness of the prophets. As we will see in our discussion of the third dilemma, that of administrative order, there occurs the need to continue the charisma of the prophet through a social structure that frequently becomes routinized. Thus, the religious leader who is a prophet or a virtuoso gives way to the priest or cleric. Yet the direction need not be one way. Priest and clerics may, in turn, become prophets or virtuosos in an attempt, for example, to renew a religious tradition that has lost its charisma. My thesis in this section is that the reforming prophet initiates the sect, the revolutionary prophet the new religious movement, the renewer prophet a movement of renewal, and the priest, who may be a successor of any one of these kinds of prophets, reflects the kind of leadership common in the church-type organizational structure. We will first define and provide the sociological basis for these kinds of religious organizations and then see how they are connected to the priest and the various prophetic types. A detailed description of various religious organizations will have to wait until Chapter 8, but here are the essential features of the some of the most common: the church, the sect, the new religious movement, and the movement of renewal. The church, as an organization, is in low tension with the external secular environment and is linked to the priest type of religious leader. The sect is an outgrowth of protest over the accommodation to secular society of the church type of religious organization, and the sect is in high tension with the non-religious social-cultural environment. The sect separates itself from the church and is sparked by a reforming prophet. The new religious movement is also in high tension with the external environment and splits from the church type of religious organization. In addition, its mythological system is in contrast to that of the church. The type of prophet to establish a new religious movement is the revolutionary prophet. Last, the movement of renewal is very similar in organization to both the sect and the new religious movement, but it does not separate from the church nor does it change the church’s mythology. Its function is to renew the tradition of the church, bringing the church closer to its original ideals. The prophet of renewal is engaged in this task. Religious organization and religious leadership, then, both reflect and affect one another—the complacent integration of the church with secular society may spark a reforming or a revolutionary prophet, for example, who becomes, in turn, the origin of new sects or religious movements (i.e., new types of religious organization). And, when these new religious organizations become routinized, their prophets give way to priests, and their organizational structures become more church-like. Because the priest as leader and the church as organization seem to comprise a recurring stage within the cycle of religious renewal and routinization, further study is warranted.

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Mixed Motivation: Studies of the Priest Weber (1978) developed another typology of the prophet and the priest. It involves a continuum, which is illustrated in Table 5.2: Table 5:2 The Prophet and the Priest Continuum Prophet... The Lawgiver... The Preacher... The Pastor... The Teacher... Priest SOURCE: Adapted from Weber (1978), pp. 442–451 A case can be made in light of this continuum that there are examples of these kinds of sacred leaders within contemporary religions or, at least, that contemporary religious leaders play these leadership roles. As we look especially at such topics as role strain among contemporary religious leaders, this Weberian typology becomes useful. The difference is, however, that, for Weber, there were different persons for different roles whereas the modern cleric has to fulfil a multiplicity of roles. This typology is also useful, especially when applied to clergy who have many roles, to help us to understand O’Dea’s theory of the dilemma of mixed motivation. We will look at the role tension and the dilemmas of motivation that clerics experience and then address these issues in relation to two kinds of leader: the social action prophetic activist and the clerical and lay leaders within modern Christianity. Witham (2005) will be the primary source for American clergy, and Larson et al. (1994) will inform us on Canadian evangelicals along with Swenson et al. (1994), who will also offer insights on a sample of Canadian Roman Catholic priests.

General Descriptions of Modern North American Clergy Witham estimates that nearly 600,000 persons have some kind of clergy status. Around 60 per cent lead local congregations, and there are 40 per cent of them who are teachers, missionaries, counsellors, administrators, freelancers, or retired. Of these, 22 per cent are from mainstream4 Protestant circles, 21 per cent are Pentecostal, 15 per cent are Southern Baptist, and 11 per cent are Roman Catholics. The others (28 percent) are independent evangelicals, Adventists, Mormons, sectarians, or orthodox Protestants. Carroll (1992) calls these contemporary religious leaders the theotokoi, or bearers of the sacred, and says that they have a sacred aura. Witham outlines their general characteristics: they are older, more and more are women (14 per cent), they are paid modestly (many have second jobs to supplement their incomes), and most new recruits are older people who have had a first career. Earlier researchers (Reilly, 1975) observed that the clergy engaged in a multiplicity of roles such as administration, counselling, preaching, administering the sacraments, and leading the liturgy. A source of tension and role ambiguity was presented by a study of evangelical Canadian clergy (Larson et al. 1994). These researchers indicated that 32 per cent of the married ministers were very happy with their ministry, but a majority (63 per cent) believed that ministry

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13 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D makes marriage more difficult for their spouses. About 80 per cent of both ministers and their spouses agreed with this statement: “Being a minister is something like being married to both the church and my spouse.” This tension results in stress: clergy indicated that they believe that being a minister conflicts with their responsibilities as spouses and parents.

The Roman Catholic Priesthood Hoge, Shields, and Soroka (1993), in an empirical study of Catholic clergy, document that they have unusual stressors because they must take a vow of lifetime commitment, permanent celibacy, and obedience to their bishops. Further, they live where they work and are expected to be available to parishioners at any time. They write, “The job of a priest is usually unbounded and sometimes ill-defined” (Hoge, Shields, & Soroka, 1993, p. 3). They also found that the central sources of stress for these clergy included overload, excessive responsibility, and organizational problems (having little control over decisions, no connection between responsibilities and rewards, and lacking clear directives in ministry). In a study of Catholic clergy in Canada, Swenson et al. (1994) found that 39 per cent of priests reported a struggle with a sense of inadequacy in the typical pastorate. Although 44 per cent of priests said that they had never experienced ministry burnout, 37 per cent of them said that they grapple with it occasionally or often. The Catholic clergy shortage is a major concern for the contemporary Catholic Church. Witham notes that, in 1980, there were 60,000 priests. By 2005, this had declined to 46,000. This decline has translated to priestless parishes, as there are 12 per cent of the 19,179 American parishes without a resident priest. The decline is for two reasons: the aging clergy are not replaced by newly ordained ones, as there are few seminarians, and many priests are leaving their roles. Why do they leave? Witham cites a study that says 30 to 40 per cent become disillusioned, 20 to 30 per cent fall in love and leave to marry, and a smaller percentage are gay and leave so they can freely express their sexual preferences.5 Most of the current priests prefer to have a “servant-like” image of their roles. However, the younger priests see themselves a leaders of the liturgy and tend to be much more conservative. Another feature of contemporary Catholic leadership is that many dioceses have introduced a deaconate program that allows a man to remain married and to serve as a deacon who assists the priest in some of his functions. Approximately 13,000 men are currently deacons. Further, about 30,000 lay leaders are employed either full or part time by parishes throughout the United States. A striking feature of this is that 80 per cent of lay leaders are women. The question of celibacy has been a major issue in Catholicism for centuries. Why does the Catholic Church continue to demand it of the clergy? Swenson (1998) addresses some of these concerns. He reviews church history on the emergence of celibacy in the Western Catholic Church and finds that support for and against it has varied throughout the nearly 2,000-year history of the institution. Typical reasons presented for celibacy (e.g., more time for parishioners, more spirituality, and a deeper devotion to Christ) have not been tested empirically. Using data from 80 Roman Catholic priests and 1,294 evangelical, married clergy, he found no significant difference on measures of religiosity and commitment to parishioners. There appears to be little evidence in support of continuing the requirement of celibacy.

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Private Troubles and Public Issues A foundational insight in sociology is that our private lives are intricately linked to public issues. This is no less true for clergy, and the link may be even stronger for them because, by nature of their role, they are public figures. Two private troubles face the contemporary clergy: homosexuality and the malfeasance of Protestant and Catholic members. Witham (2005) contextualizes these two private troubles beyond their specifics to the symbols of Christian life—the order of creation, the nature of the family, the validity of doctrine, Biblical authority, and the legitimacy of the clergy members themselves. There has been and continues to be much discussion among ecclesial authorities on the ordination of practising homosexuals and the celebration of gay marriages by the clergy. After years of debate, the Presbyterian Church in the United States upheld, in a general assembly in 2003, the traditional ethic that homosexuality is a sin. However, this decision was nuanced by a court of the church saying that the ordination of gay people is permissible if they do not publically acknowledge their sexual orientation. The Episcopal Church has gone through a similar struggle. The House of Bishops of the church, first in 1977 and then at the general convention in 1979, forbade the ordination of practicing homosexuals. This ruling was later overturned in 1990 because of test cases in which bishops ordained openly gay and lesbian seminarians; an ecclesial court declared that “The court finds that there is no core doctrine prohibiting the ordination of a non-celibate homosexual person living in a faithful and committed sexual relationship” (Witham, 2005, p. 163). In a similar way, the United Church of Christ allows for the ordination of homosexuals and freely marries same-sex couples. The one major exception to this trend among mainstream Protestant churches is the United Methodist Church, which, at its 2004 general conference passed a resolution to uphold the traditional ban on ordaining homosexuals. Ecclesial variations that do not allow for the ordination of homosexuals include Roman Catholics, Southern Baptists, Mormons, Evangelical Lutherans, and Orthodox Jews (Turner, 2005). In Canada, the United Church and the Anglican Church permit homosexuals to be ordained and also perform same-sex marriages, which became legal throughout Canada in 2005. In regards to the blessing of same-sex marriages, churches, on the whole, that ordain homosexuals also perform same-sex marital ceremonies, even where these are not recognized by the state. The fault line, the term used by Witham, is the liberal-conservative split both in Canada and in the United States. On the whole, liberal denominations are open to the ordination of homosexuals, allow them to continue to be members even with an explicit declaration that they are gay, and bless same-sex marriages. On the other hand, conservative Christians and Jews behave in the opposite way. Even though there is an official policy in the Roman Catholic Church against ordaining homosexual men, there is evidence that many priests are gay. Witham cites studies to indicate that 25 to 40 per cent of priests are gay. This high percentage has created what some have called a “gay subculture” within the Catholic Church in America. The Vatican has responded to both the phenomenon of abuse of male youth and the prevalence of homosexuality in the priesthood. In a document published by the Vatican in late fall of 2005, ecclesial officials, under the mandate of Pope Benedict XVI, write, “The church cannot ordain men who are active homosexuals, who have ‘deeply rooted’ homosexual tendencies or who support the ‘gay culture.’ Those who have overcome ‘transitory’ homosexual

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13 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D tendencies, however, could be ordained” (Thavis, 2005). In an extension of the document, Thavis adds that, in spite of some confusion, the bottom line is that homosexual men should not be accepted into seminaries or ordained to the priesthood. The text intimates that homosexuality is not a permanent identity and can be overcome. Nor are “celibate” gays allowed to be ordained. The Vatican is not, as Thavis notes, taking a “don’t ask, don’t tell” attitude, and bishops and seminary officials are vigilant in applying the norms. The specific mandate is consistent with the ty, which notes, “Basing itself on Sacred Scripture, which presents homosexual acts as acts of grave depravity, tradition has always declared that ‘homosexual acts are intrinsically disordered.’ They are contrary to the natural law. They close the sexual act to the gift of life. They do no proceed from a genuine affective and sexual complementary. Under no circumstances can they be approved” (Holy See, 1995, p. 2357). The next salient concern among the clergy is another private trouble (to use a sociological term from Mills): the abuse of children, youth, and women. In a representative sample of the Dallas–Fort Worth area, one researcher cited by Witham found that 7 per cent of the sample “had intimate knowledge from friends’, co-workers’, or relatives’ reports or from their own experiences of some sort of clerical abuse” (2005, p. 171). The abuse could be sexual, physical, financial, or authoritarian. Personal experiences accounted for 3 per cent. With no references to abuse, in the Larson et al. (1994) study of the Canadian Evangelical clergy, 30 per cent indicated that they had struggled with pornography, 40 per cent indicated they had improper attractions to the opposite sex at least once or twice, and 6 percent struggled with attraction to the same sex. The tension between the personal, and in this case psychologically deviant, motives of the clergy and the spiritual aims of Christian leadership is perhaps most startlingly revealed in the Catholic clergy’s abuse of youth and children, which has recently occasioned a fullscale public inquiry. Beginning in 2002, the sexual abuse scandal of the Boston Archdiocese rippled throughout the United States to virtually all regions where the Catholic Church has a presence. Two years later, 700 priests and deacons accused of abuse had been removed from ministry. Researchers of a study organized by the American Catholic bishops documented that 4 per cent or 4,392 priests serving from 1950 to 2002 had faced similar allegations, which were brought forward by 10,677 claimants, including both women and men. These abuses have resulted in the closure of 65 parishes in the Boston Diocese, huge recompense suits against several dioceses, and, the worst effect, the pain and suffering that the victims experienced. Most of the victims have been teen-age boys according to a Vatican statement (Vatican City, 2005). Canadian youth have also been affected. Bibby (2002), in his latest study of Canadian religion, estimated that some 6,000 lawsuits and several class actions have been levelled against the clergy, both Catholic and Protestant. A small sample of Canadian Catholic priests reveals that many struggle to suppress personal desires: 30 per cent with using pornography, 5 per cent with fondling of children, 30 per cent with desiring to have sex, 25 per cent with wanting to make sexual advances, 5 per cent with being attracted to the same sex, and 25 per cent with being attracted to women (Swenson et al., 1994). To put some of this into perspective, accounts of abuse are higher in education (11 per cent), among public officials (24 per cent), and in corporations (65 per cent). This comparison does not excuse the clergy, yet the fact of this abuse among religious leaders does reveal high

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levels of the routinization of charisma within the church. A sacred leader motivated only by single-minded devotion to God would not let these personal motives hold sway. What are some of the major challenges facing the current clergy? Whitman cites several. Most believe in their call to ministry and want to communicate the message of Christianity to an unbelieving world. Recruitment (especially for the Catholic Church) is an issue, as all clergy members are getting older, and there are few young people to replace them (the exception is in the more evangelical and charismatic churches). Many face unresolved conflicts within the church, as is the case in the Southern Baptist Church wherein about 10 per cent of the clergy suffers from depression, and many are overweight. Finally, role ambiguity is just as present among contemporary clergy members as it was during earlier periods. Witham (2005) ends his summary in the following way: Yet for all ministers, just as ministry begins with the call, it must keep some semblance of that divine connection (I would add to the original charisma), search, or faith throughout. Without this, clergy agree, ministry itself loses its integrity, and ministers lose the power to be examples. Spiritual integrity is a normal requirement of ministers of God, but not easy to achieve. (p. 205)

Conclusions This chapter has offered an overview of religious leadership, taking examples from folk religions, Mesopotamia, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and contemporary America (with an accent on the Christian clergy). Reflections from Carroll (1992) and Nason-Clark (1993) on the presence of the dilemma of mixed motivation within modern religious organizations and on the continuing tension and struggles experienced by contemporary religious leaders provide a good chapter summary. Carroll (1992) uses Wuthnow’s (1988a) restructuring thesis, which is that American Christianity is being restructured in liberal and conservative streams. Carroll considers three processes: (1) the redefinition of the clergy not only as clergy man but also as clergy woman, (2) the blurring of the distinction between the clergy and the laity (the decline of clericalism), and (3) a reinterpretation of truth and faith in light of the postmodern world consciousness. We will look at Carroll’s first reflection in the next chapter on women and religion. His second reflection, that clericalism is on the decline, relates directly to the idea of the concrescence of religious leadership and religious organization. When the distinction between the clergy and the laity is blurred, which is a partial consequence of the declining numbers of available priests in Roman Catholic parishes (see also Nason-Clark 1993, p. 231), the church is conceived of as a congregation of the “People of God” rather than as a hierarchy, teams of leaders emerge in churches (including laity), and people grow intolerant of unchecked power not only in religious institutions but also in any sphere in contemporary society (NasonClark, 1993, p.232). The dilemma seems to be that of a contrast between a hierarchical structure and an egalitarian, democratic one. If one retains only a hierarchical structure, one runs the risk of continued clericalism; however, if one emphasizes only the democratic or egalitarian model, one meets the problem of what de Tocqueville (1945) called the tyranny of the majority and the consequent movement toward mediocrity.

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13 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The third reflection concerns the clergy’s role as interpreters of truth and the faith, and it is also directly related to the dilemmas of religious leadership. In the light of postmodern thinking, one finds that certainty is undermined, doubt is institutionalized, and everything seems open to revision. Nason-Clark adds that the modern cleric is not the only professional able to meet the spiritual needs of members: family therapists, psychologists, and social workers compete with the minister. These other professionals challenge the cleric’s authority as the only or the best interpreter of the human condition. The role of postmodern clerics, Carroll maintains, is to refer people back to the spiritual, to act according to what Giddens (1991) calls reflexivity. Clerics should be open to interpreting the religious tradition by using a variety of sources: the sacred text itself, theological commentaries, their own and others’ experiences, and modern science. As Carroll (1992) writes, “Reflective leaders are attempting to restructure their interpretive role to bring religious faith to bear meaningfully on the complex issues of living in this time of high modernity” (p. 301). A dilemma is involved here as well. If religious leaders interpret the sacred tradition as a sealed tradition and clothe themselves in the authority of the theotokoi, then they run the risk of becoming alienated from their congregations. On the other hand, if the leader is open to too many sources, the risk is that the tradition loses its essence and “the baby is thrown out with the bath-water.” I conclude our chapter where we began. Both historically and contemporarily, the role of the religious leader is one that involves the dilemma of mixed motivation. Sacred traditions call for leaders who are single-hearted in devotion—pure in mind, spirit, and body—and who model the tradition for the followers. Only occasionally is this role fulfilled in reality. The challenge, however, continues to be set before these leaders: to be for present-day believers what the original founders were in the beginning.

NOTES 1

The term priest is a sociological term, an ideal type not a profession, as is the case for Roman Catholic priests.

2

The originality of the teaching is that he saw the deity in a personal way, that this deity called to him and his descendants as a unique people who were bound together as a community, and that this deity made a covenant, a promise to them that would last for many years.

3

Constantine’s empire is an example of caesaropapism.

4

In the United States, mainstream Protestantism includes the Reformed Church, the Disciples of Christ, the Episcopal (Anglican) Church, Presbyterians, the United Church, and the United Methodists. In Canada, the term refers to those who belong to the United Church of Canada and to Anglicans, Lutherans, and Presbyterians. Another term used to describe these Protestant sects is the seven sisters. In addition to these churches, the American Baptist Church is also included (see Witham, 2005, p.26).

5

Another major issue in the Catholic priesthood is the nefarious story of sexual abuse. The topic will be covered in the sub-section entitled “Private troubles and public issues.”

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Chapter SIX

T h e Di l e m m a s of I n t e r pr e tat ion a n d M i x e d Mo t i vat ion: T h e S t u dy of Wom e n a s L e a de r s

Orientation More than any century in the history of humanity, the twentieth-

century is likely to be recalled by our grandchildren and great-grandchildren as the century of women. During that century, women received the right to vote, were admitted into maledominated places of higher learning, received equal pay for equal work, were encouraged to be active in the paid labour force, were counselled to have fewer children, and became political leaders. This story of growing opportunity for women is redolent with real-life issues and problems, such as the increasing number of single-parent families, women living alone or receiving inadequate salaries, men and women experiencing difficulties in balancing commitments to work and the family, and the struggle of women to have an identity defined not by others but by women themselves.These struggles and dilemmas, which are common in education, the family, and public labour, also create similar tensions in religion. Two dilemmas focus this chapter’s discussion of the relationship between women and religion. The first, the dilemma of interpretation (see Chapter 4), will be a special asset in discussing women in the first 500 years of Western Christianity and in the early years of Islam. The second dilemma, the dilemma of mixed motivation (see Chapter 5), aids us in considering women as religious leaders, just as this dilemma was useful in unpacking the challenges facing sacred leaders more generally. The chapter will proceed similarly to previous chapters. The first section will focus on the theoretical aspects of the two dilemmas, and subsequent sections will consider women as religious leaders in folk societies, in the archaic society of Mesopotamia, in the first 500 years of Western Christianity, in Islam, and in modern and postmodern Canada and the United States. The dilemma of interpretation can be

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13 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D applied especially to women in folk societies and during the first 500 years of Western Christianity, and the mixed motivation dilemma is better applied to women in modern societies.

A Weberian Addition to the Two Dilemmas Weber (1922/1963) supplements his consideration of the dilemma of interpretation and the dilemma of mixed motivation by arguing that, in the religion of underprivileged classes, there is a tendency to give equality to women (p. 104). In addition, the role of the woman as a prophet is common in the early stages of the religions that grew from Buddha, Christ, and Pythagoras. However, Weber (1963) observes, after the initial charismatic stage is passed and routinization occurs, “a reaction takes place against pneumatic manifestations among women, which come to be regarded as dishonorable and morbid” (p. 104). Weber seems to suggest that, as both the leadership and the community of followers experience routinization, which is a consequence of the need to interpret (i.e., the dilemma of interpretation), mixed motivations result, as well as what I am calling a process of masculinization. In this light, masculinization is a form of the routinization of charisma. This process sets the stage for our discussion of women as religious leaders.

Women and Religion in Folk Societies Shamans, as we learned in Chapter 4, were significant religious leaders in many folk societies, and anthropologists have tended to present these leaders as male. But were there women shamans? Tedlock (2005) argues that there has been a blindness among many male anthropologists who have not recognized the vital role that women as shamans have played in folk societies. What is some of the evidence that women were as likely as men to be shamans? From a variety of sources from archaeology and anthropology, Tedlock presents a cogent argument that this is the case. In the cave drawings of prehistoric Europe (1700–1300 BC), women are depicted as healers and dancers in a similar way as men were. Caves in Mongolia and South Africa reveal pictorial representations of women leading men in rituals to evoke spiritual forces to generate rain. The shamans of Siberia were frequently women who were known as being very powerful in their spiritual life in these northern cultures. The evidence for this comes from modern forensic science; DNA samples of the remains of buried persons (being preserved because of the cold climate) have indicated that many of the shamans were female. In many graves of the prehistoric peoples of Europe, there were discovered an abundance of Venus figurines, which were small female figures with exaggerated breasts and buttocks that illustrate the vitality of the feminine. Archaeologists have documented patterns of incidence and use for these figurines: they were used to illustrate the female life cycle, as territorial markers or charms, and functionally, for example, to teach children. Another theme was the link between the feminine and nature. In many folk societies, animals were thought to share their spiritual essence with humans. Women, because of their

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closeness to the natural world, were considered excellent supplicants of these animal spirits. Again, evidence comes from the paintings of prehistoric peoples, in which women were depicted as conducting rituals to enable the tribe to be successful in a hunt that was linked to survival in an important way. A further pattern that anthropologists and archaeologists have discovered is the nexus between the female and the male. In many societies with a male shaman, it was common that his wife was also a shaman. Tedlock supplies evidence for this from Korea, Japan, Burma, and Vietnam. A feature of these wedded shamans is that the dress of both the female and male shaman was modelled after female dress, illustrating a level of female ascendancy. An example that Tedlock gives is that, in the dual-sex dress of the shaman, hair was woven into the garment that was symbolic of the vulva, which, in turn, symbolized the generative nature of the female body. The male-female relationship, however, was not all harmonious. A myth from the Huichol people of northern Mexico illustrates not only the vitality of the feminine but also the conflict that ensues between mythological representations of the feminine and the masculine and the subjugation of the female to the male in at least one folk society’s mythology: Takutsi was a powerful woman shaman who created the world with her magical staff and medicine basket. Long ago she taught my ancestors how to sing and dance and make ceremonies to communicate with the gods and heal the sick. One day the men became jealous of her and decided to steal her magic. They got her drunk and shot her healing wands and tobacco gourds with arrows. Then they shot her through the chest, but she didn’t die—she just fell to the ground, laughing. But when they shot her bamboo staff, where she kept her heart, they finally killed her. They removed her heart from her staff and planted it in a field, where corn of many colors sprouted. Then they made special shamans’ chairs and became the first male shamans. (Tedlock, 2005, p. 57)

This story is a classic story of how the mythology of women as shamans was changed. As in the first millennium of Christianity, in the Huichol shamanic tradition, the salience of women was evident at early stages of religious development. As male-orientated images emerged, there occurred an attenuation of women as shamans. This illustrates well the dilemma of interpretation: there is a movement from an initial understanding of the sacred, which is inclusive of women, to an androcentric dogmatism that excluded women. Why is it that much of the research on shamanism has focussed only on male shamans? Could it be that early folk religions were much more amenable to the vitality of the feminine than later folk societies? It does appear that there is evidence for Weber’s theory of the early presence of the feminine in religion, a presence that later became marginalized both in religious organization and in mythology, as shown in the quoted myth. This masculinization also provides evidence of the increasingly mixed motivation of religious leaders as a faith becomes routinized. However, it is difficult to discern whether religious authority in folk societies was significantly masculinized over time, as a religion became routinized, or whether anthropologists with androcentric views have ignored the female religious leaders of folk societies. Some evidence suggests that anthropologists have neglected feminine religious authority. For example,

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1 4 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D among the Altayen nomads of Siberia, women were the only shamans from the fourth to the fifth centuries AD. Also, among the Turkic and Mongolian peoples of the sixteenth century, shamans were both male and female. But these facts have received scant attention from anthropologists until recently. Possibly why female shamans have been “stricken” from anthropological literature is that one of the most famous studies of shamans, by the noted Eliade (1964), makes only limited reference to female shamans. Recent anthropological evidence may provide an answer. Anthropologists have commonly understood there to be a gender division of labour among folk societies; men were thought to have hunted while women gathered fruit. Recent studies from Siberia, Alaska, Paraguay, Brazil, Nepal, and Hungary, however, have found that women also hunted large game. Could it be that anthropologists have marginalized the role of women shamans in the same way as they have obviously marginalized the role of female hunters? To explain why anthropological literature has been biased, Tedlock argues that Eliade was a student of Freud. For Eliade, the essential feature of a shaman was soul flying, which had a phallic symbol. He considered that women, on the other hand, experienced the sacred through spirit possession, which, for him, was not a mark of a shaman. If these conclusions were true, then women, by nature, would have been excluded from shamanism. Current research indicates, however, that women also claimed “soul flying” and that spirit possession was considered a sign of being a shaman. Tedlock does not make this conclusion, but this neglect of the significance of the female shaman in folk societies could be a case of “androcentric social scientific research,” to use the words of Canadian sociologist Eichler (1988). Thus we have two possible explanations for the marginalization of female shamans: the masculinalization of religious authority in folk societies (evinced by the myths of male “takeovers” from female shamans that support the dilemma of interpretation) and the androcentric research of male anthropologists.

Women and Religion in Ancient Mesopotamia From the abundance of Mesopotamian clay cuneiform tablets discovered by archaeologists, we know a lot about women in this ancient world. Two authors, Stol (1995) and Rollin (1983), are useful in the following presentation of the general role of women in the religions of ancient Mesopotamian society. I shall begin with Stol as he presents a wider image of women in Assyria while Rolling focuses on witchcraft in the same civilization. Stol’s main sources are family archives and letters as well as collections of laws written in Akkadian. The physical image of women was positive, and there was no evidence that women were veiled. The primary erotic gift of the woman was her hair and her genitals. In marriage, a woman was given value in that she carried with her a bride price. She was expected to be a virgin and the bearer of her husband’s children. For most part, marriages were monogamous with a provision that, if a woman did not bear a child after three years, the man could take a “second wife.” Divorce was an option, and women could file for a divorce, yet she was not equal to her husband. Adultery was serious. Both men and women were punished but women more than men.

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Much folklore has been presented about middle-eastern royal courts—that they were elaborate, grand, wealthy, and had harems. The evidence is that the courts were very splendid and that large harems were common. One estimate is that some of these harems contained from 44 to 232 women. Most were in slavery and came as booty to conquering armies. The sacred permeated the whole society, yet there were some special places for women. Kings frequently appointed their daughters as high priestesses, and women served in funeral rites. An interesting belief was that, when the people prayed to a male deity, his female consort brought these requests to him, and she served as their advocate. Further, some women joined celibate cloisters that prefigured the women’s monasteries (nunneries) of medieval Europe. A frequent bias in the modern literature on gender is to too quickly generalize that women in ancient society were totally subsumed under a harsh patriarchy. It is true that Assyria was a patriarchal society, but this does not mean that Assyrian women had no agency at all. Rollin (1983) takes up another story about the relationship between women and religion. The period she considers is what historians call the “Neo-Assyrian” era from about 900–600 BC. As with Stol’s research, her data come both from Akkadian cuneiform documents as well as from legal codes. Throughout Assyrian history, there was a constant belief that humans could harm others by supernatural means. The term to describe this is witchcraft or sorcery. Most witchcraft was an illegitimate means to do harm to others. A legitimate use of witchcraft was practiced by those having state power, who would evoke supernatural powers to stop illegitimate witchcraft. Who were witches? Rollin describes five kinds: demons or ghosts, foreigners, and three kinds of enemies internal to the city state or the empire. Demons or ghosts were either male or female and lived in mountains or uninhabited lands that were in antithesis to a civilized Assyrian society. Frequently, priests recited an elaborate ritual to ward of evil from those who were not members of Assyrian society. This gives the impression that many Assyrians feared foreigners. Rollin notes that most of these foreigners were women. Two internal enemies of minor note include a sufferer who has been cursed by a rival as well as a victim who has had a close companion turn on him or her. Another type of internal enemy deserves more attention because this enemy is, more often than not, a woman. This type of internal enemy is characterized as being an actor or actress, male or female, and a snake charmer or a pedlar. These kinds of persons would be more likely to be transient and not have a permanent home, and thus they would not be networked with other residents. Other enemies of this sort might include wet nurses, unmarried women, and women who could not bear children. Women were much more likely to be classified as this sort of feared person. Why is this the case? Rollin theorizes that women were much less involved in the political arena, had few social positions of respect, and suffered from a general social disadvantage. Further, their persons were defined in male terms, and they were suspect when they did not live up to these patriarchal expectations. One text elaborates on this theme: Do not marry a prostitute whose husbands are legion, An Istaritu1 who is dedicated to a god, A kulmasitu whose favors are many. In your trouble she will not support you, In your dispute she will be a mocker, There is no reverence or submissiveness with her.

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1 4 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Even if she dominate your house, get her out, For she has directed her attention elsewhere. (Rollin, 1983, p. 39)

In contrast to the infamous witch hunts of the late medieval period, there appears to be no explicit mechanism in ancient Assyrian society to search out and destroy or eliminate these women. There are several texts that outline how to prove an accusation against one of their kind, but not in an extensive way. It is striking that many of the studies of late medieval witchcraft (see Thomas, 1971) converge in detail with studies of this ancient period. Among other things, it is interesting that both societies target witches—women or those who have marginal positions in the social order.

Early and Late Classical Western Christianity Socio-historical and historical data on the role of women in the early and late classical period of Western Christianity (from the time of Christ to the sixth century AD), usefully illustrate the dilemma of interpretation in religious organization. Heine (1987), in her study of women and early Christianity, documents that the praxis of Jesus was in radical contrast to both the Roman and Judaic host cultures in that Jesus came to serve and not be served. Women were partners in his enterprise, and many were his personal friends. His motif was “inclusiveness and not exclusiveness as the criteria” (Heine, 1987, p. 63). Individuals were not judged by their ethnicity, political leanings, social status, or gender but by how much they believed. In his mythology, all people are equally in need of salvation, men no less or more than women. Indeed, women first witnessed the resurrection epiphany and not the male disciples. It has been suggested by some that women’s roles and voices in early Christianity begin to be attenuated during the first century through the work of Paul the apostle. Reference is usually given to the first letter of Paul to Timothy wherein Paul counsels women to dress modestly, be quiet and respectful, not to teach, and to focus on matter for which they are best suited—domestic responsibilities (I Timothy 2: 9–15). According to Heine (1987), to use this text to represent the total mind of Paul on women is to use Paul as a scapegoat. She goes on to cite evidence that women, under his ministry, become the first converts, are active collaborators with him (she estimates that about 25 per cent of them were women), serve as apostles, missionaries, and deacons. Stark (1996), in his sociological study of the rise of Christianity, concurs with the Weberian view that, early in the religious tradition, women had a special place. He points out that the early Christian church was especially attractive to women, who enjoyed far higher status within it than did women in the Greco-Roman world. He offers several pieces of evidence. First, because female infanticide was practiced in ancient Roman society, with men having almost life-and-death power over women and children, there was a disproportionate number of men to women (an estimate is 131 to 100). The Greco-Roman world was not a safe place for women, for they were likely to be killed in infancy, to be divorced, or to be victims of incest, marital infidelity, and polygyny. The Christian value system rejected the double standard, cohabitation (which left women vulnerable), divorce, and female infanticide

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(indeed any infanticide). In addition, widowhood in the Greco-Roman society meant speedy remarriage, as the widow was required to remarry so as to pass on her former husband’s estate to a new man. In Christianity, widowed women were honored and cared for financially by the church if they had not alternate means. In addition, Christian women were not encouraged to marry until they were in their twenties when they were better able to make adult decisions. In the Roman world, women were three times more likely to marry before the age of 13 than were Christian women. Finally, Stark reviews early literature that accords leadership roles to women in the early days of Christianity, which is in contrast to the situation within the late medieval church. The theologian Frend (1993) presents examples of two courageous women, Blandina and Perpetua, who faced fear and hatred with prowess and strength in martyrdom. They dared to challenge the patriarchal ideology of the pater familias (father of the family) and forfeited their lives. Frend (1993) writes that “Christianity provided scope for the human need of achievement and daring for a cause” (p. 95) and the equality practiced by the Christians offered fulfilment to many women. Further, as Christians, women formed and joined societies of worshippers without social and gender distinction, congregations that the GrecoRoman society could not offer. In a major social history of Catholic nuns, McNamara (1996) notes that the ideal of syneisactism (or of platonic male and female relationships for work, friendship, or companionship) was a common feature of the social life of early Christianity. She writes, “Syneisactism was more than a convenient practical arrangement. It was an ideology that challenged its practitioners to transcend the limits of the physical gendered world” (McNamara, 1996, p. 55). In the fourth century, monasticism both for men and women became a special feature of Latin Christianity in Northern Africa. McNamara (1996) documents a legend about Pachomius who, in about 323, is said to have been given a bronze tablet by an angel upon which was engraved a monastic rule that chartered the shift from eremitic solitude to communal life that combined shared living and eating arrangements with manual labour, prayer, silence, and contemplation. Near his monastery along the Nile River, his sister Mary offered the same religious community to women. Here was created the “double-monastery” 2 of abbots and abbesses, who pastored lay monks and nuns and who had no need of priests because their spirituality was based on the Bible rather than on the sacraments. The men and women of these monasteries engaged in household tasks, had cottage industries, made clothes, studied the Christian scriptures, meditated, practiced hospitality, and cared for the poor. McNamara (1996, p. 80) documents that, on one occasion, the women from a religious community sent a ship full of grain to Rome, which was under the attack of barbarians. In a work on independent virgins, Salisbury (1991) comments that, when holy women renounced their sexuality, they no longer had to obey the old Roman traditions of gender. Chastity allowed women to control their lives in the face of Roman expectations regarding what was the appropriate behavior and role for women. She tells of Constantina, the daughter of Constantine the Great, and of Mary of Egypt, a reformed prostitute, who renounced their social privilege to become ascetics. She further writes of women named Egeria and Melania the Younger who travelled alone without male escort to the Holy Land. Pelagia, a beautiful prostitute, left her wealth and lived in cell on the Mount of Olives. Finally, Castissima, the daughter of a wealthy family of Alexandria, was trained to read the scriptures by her father,

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1 4 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D left the socially distinctive lifestyle into which she was born, and became known as a saintly and learned woman near the city. What about more official roles or ministries for women in the church? According to Torjesen (1993) and Eisen (2000), women had an active role and performed many functions. Eisen’s (2000) thesis is that, in early Christianity, women appear as independent subjects, demonstrably active in important Christian positions. Torjesen (1993) adds that they were preachers, pastors, priests, prophets, and patrons. Evidence for this does not come from official ecclesial sources but is rather epigraphical (to do with inscriptions on stone, buildings, coins, and statues) and papyrological (to do with papyrus manuscripts), forms of documentation that were commonly used by the Egyptians, the Greeks, and the Romans. Surveying churches in Philippi, Corinth, and Rome during New Testament times, Torjesen (1993) writes that women, such as Lydia, Priscilla, Phoebe, Jania, Mary, Tryphaena, Trypohosa, and Peris, served as leaders of house-churches and were prophetesses and even apostles. An important ministry of widowhood was central to the life of the early church, and these women were commissioned to the ministry of praying and of receiving revelations. Further, because early Christianity was a private religion, working underground because Christians were persecuted, women were authorized to teach, discipline, and administer material resources. Eisen’s (2000) work is more specific. She examines epigraphs (most of which were on tombs) from Anatolia, Egypt, Syria, and Palestine. Her review reveals that women were active as apostles (Junia, Thecia, and Nino); prophets (Nanus and Anmia of Philadelphia); teachers of theology (Kyria, the desert mothers Theodora and Syncletica, Hypatia, Theodora of Rome, Marcella of Rome, Proba, Melania the Elder, Melania the Younger, Theodora the Didaskalos, and Maciona); priests or presbyters (Ammion the Presbytera, Epikto, Artemidora, Kale, Leta, Flavia Vitalia);3 enrolled widows (Flavia Arcas and Regina); deaconesses (Sophia, Maria, Agalliasis, and Agrippiane); bishops (e.g., Episcopa Theodora, the mother of Pope Paschal I),4 and stewards (such as Irene of Asia Minor) whose role was to manage the goods for the poor and who were commissioned to do so. Evidence from these authors revealed that women preached the gospel, spoke in tongues, went on missions, prayed, presided over Eucharists, baptized, taught and created theology, cared for the poor and the sick, and administered burial places. Congruent with the thesis of Weber, data from this review presents evidence of the vital and charismatic presence of women in early Christianity. Why, then, did this not continue? Why were countless doors closed to women? In Weberian language, routinization processes emerged, and there began the subtle transformation of a mythology that honored women to one that deprecated them. In place of a mythology that supported women’s being, their voices, and their vital roles, there arose an alternative mythology that introduced dogma and codes that were, indeed, less than positive to women. What is the source of this change? I argue that the church fathers introduced a theology about women that was foreign to the early Christian tradition—a theology related to Greco-Roman philosophy about women. This thesis is given credibility by Torjesen (1993), who notes “the enormous extent to which the Christian Church allowed Greco-Roman social dogma to pervade its teaching” (p. 114). Part of the changed image of women consisted of fears of feminine sexuality and of an emphasis on female shame: “woman” was made to feel that she was the source of sin and evil in the world. Torjesen (1993) writes,

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Although these notions about female shame and women’s sexuality have their roots in the social order of ancient Greece, they have had a profound effect on the Christian understanding of women, sexuality, and sin throughout the history of the Church— they are foundational to the Western doctrine of sin, the church’s theology on sexuality, and the Christian concepts of self and even of God. (p. 7)

Materials from the church fathers also express these notions about women. Ide (1984) and Cole (1993) quote from some of the original writings of these early theologians: ▶▶

Clement of Alexandria (150–215): “His characteristic is action; hers, passivity ... the mature, then the immature” (Ide, 1984, p. 65).

▶▶

Origen (185–254): “What is seen with the eyes of the creator is masculine and not feminine, for God does not stoop to look upon what is feminine and of the flesh” (Ide, 1984, p. 67).

▶▶

Epiphanius, Bishop of Cyprus and Salamis (315–403): “… the female sex is easily seduced, weak, and without much understanding. The Devil seeks to vomit out this disorder through women” (Ide, 1984, p. 68).

▶▶

Tertullian (160–220): “You [women] are the devil’s gateway; you are the unsealer of that forbidden fruit; you are the first deserter of the divine law; you are she who persuaded him whom the devil was not valiant enough to attack. You destroyed so easily God’s image, man. On account of your desert—that is, death—even the Son of God had to die” (Ide, 1984, p.77).5

▶▶

Ireneus (130–200) goes beyond mythology and gives directions to women that they must be pure, refrain from all social intercourse with men, be meek and mild, submissive to their husbands, and not take part in any church function (Ide, 1984, p. 80).

▶▶

Ambrosiaster (4th century) and John Chrysostom (347–407) both taught that man, not woman, was made in the image of God (Cole, 1993, pp. 121, 162).

This is but a small sample of some of the theological reflections that these church fathers had about women. Still, this evidence is at the level of the abstract and the mythological. Salisbury (1993) theorizes, however, that this changed view of women seen in mythology, whose advocates, among them church fathers, argued for the control of holy women in the third and the fourth centuries, began to affect religious practice and was evident in religious legislation by the fifth to the sixth century. The dilemma of interpretation—the need to interpret, structure, and communicate the original sacred revelation—resulted in a movement from direct understanding of the faith, which was often in opposition to prevailing societal norms, toward rigid dogma, which was influenced by the cultural and social hierarchy. The movement has been from the salience of

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1 4 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the feminine to the dominance of the masculine. The effect of this process is that people in general, and women in particular, become constrained and encased and alienated.

Women and Islam: Historical and Contemporary Issues The theoretical framework of the dilemmas of interpretation and mixed motivations can be applied to Islam as well, but not in such a clear way as is possible when studying the first five hundred years of Western Christianity. The first part of this section will focus on the Qur’an and the Hadith literature. In these documents, there is evidence that early Islam did offer more rights to woman than it offered subsequently. Women had an honored place in the Qur’an, and traditional roles, such as being an honored wife of the prophet or the role that A’isha played, extended respect and some power. Also, Muhammad prohibited female infanticide and cared for numerous women who were not his wives. However, the bulk of the evidence points to continued patriarchal constructions of women and to the fact that women, as will be argued, lost some of the status they enjoyed in pre-Islamic Arabia. Mixed motivation and dogmatism informed the main features of early and modern Islam in relation to women. In the spirit of Weber, I will combine relevant historical research on women in Islam with more recent sociological studies to provide evidence for the dilemmas of interpretation and mixed motivation. There is, however, a massive literature on women and Islam, one stretching from the religion’s early beginnings to the modern era. Space in this text limits my study to early and modern Islam’s orientation toward women, so I will focus mainly on material drawn from social scientific studies of the late twentieth century and, specifically, on those about modern Turkey. The dilemmas of interpretation and mixed motivation seem less applicable here because it appears that images of women in Islam have not changed through its history. The changes occur in the late modern era in countries like Turkey (originally the center of the Ottoman Empire) when occidental ideas about gender equality were introduced in the early part of the twentieth century.

The Qur’an There appear to be two main conceptualizations of women in the Qur’an, something that is also acknowledged by Bellah (1970, p. 154) in his study of Islam. On one hand, the Qur’an states that woman was created by Allah with man (Surah 4:1; 49:13); that she, along with man, will enter paradise as long as she does deeds of righteousness (Surah 4:124; 33:35; 40:40); that she is to be treated, as is a man, with justice because she has similar rights (Surah 2:228; 4:32); and that she is equally a protector of men as men are of women (Surah 9:71). The Qur’an counsels men to treat women with kindness (Surah 30:21) and says that women are to be seen as blessings to men (Surah 3:14). On the other hand, even though women have rights similar to those of men, they are inferior in status (Surah 2:228); men have authority over women because God made the one superior to the other and because men spend their wealth on women (Surah 4:34); men have the prerogative of divorce (Surah 2:228–232); one male witness is equal to two female ones (Surah 2:282); women are given one-half of the inheritance given to men (Surah 4:11);

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and men are allowed to have several wives, especially if widows with children are being considered for marriage (Surah 4:1), as well as concubines, particularly those captured in war. Surah 70 (verses 29–31) reads, “They keep their chastity. (They have relations) only with their spouses, or what is legally theirs—anyone who transgresses these limits is a sinner.” Several verses in the Qur’an refer to veiling, at least indirectly: When you ask his [Muhammad’s] ladies for anything you want, ask them from before a screen: that makes for greater purity for your hearts and theirs. (Surah 33:53) It shall be offense for old spinsters who have no hope of marriage to discard their cloaks without revealing their adornments. Better if they do not discard them. (Surah 24:60)

Of the many verses referring to women, Surah 4 is most striking: As to those women on whose part you fear disloyalty and ill conduct, admonish them (first); (next), refuse to share their beds, (and last) beat them (lightly). If they return to obedience, do not seek against them means of annoyance. (verse 34)

In contrast to this verse, Ibn Saad (c. 840/1904, p. 147) writes that the prophet never hit any woman, and he never liked to hear of any woman being abused. An alternate interpretation of how women are portrayed in the Qur’an is presented by Wadud (1999) who challenges the dualistic view. A convert to Islam and an African American, she encourages the reader to look not at individual verses but at the “spirit of the Qur’an,” the underlying ethos or world view, which, she argues, paints a picture of gender equality and neutrality. She writes, I propose that the way to believe in “the whole of the book” (Surah 3:119) is to recognize that “spirit” of the book and accept its world view, vision, and ultimate intent. In examining the Qur’an, we need “to accurately determine the rationales behind its statements, comments and injunctions.” Even when the reason for a certain command is not explicitly stated, it is not difficult to guess it. Thus to arrive at that ultimate intent requires the same level of pure commitment, devotion, and intellectual striving as the members of the earliest community. However, in the context of a technologically advanced world, such a commitment will require a broader, global perspective activated in, but not limited to, one’s local context. (Wadud 1999, p. 81–82)

In general, Wadud agrees that the sacred book makes positive statements about women, such as the statements listed above. She also addresses several gender-laden issues in the Qur’an: paradise, patriarchy, polygyny, witness, inheritance, and child care. The image that paradise is a heaven for men wherein they will receive pleasure from youthful, virginal, dark-eyed, white-skinned females, says Wadud, made its way into the Qur’an because Muhammad was appealing to the patriarchal Makkans; the text was composed during his time in Mecca. It does not have universal relevance as does Surah 101, verses 6 to 11, in which the entrance into paradise is equally provided to men and women. In this

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1 4 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D passage, a scale is presented wherein the good deeds are weighed against ones’ bad deeds. The criteria are equal for both women and men: “Ultimately in the Qur’an, the reward for good is good” (Wadud, 1999, p. 59). To explain the patriarchal nature of some parts of the Qur’an, Wadud applies her theory of interpretation, which attenuates the specific wording of a verse to ameliorate the global meaning of the Qur’an, a meaning that is beyond gender. Or, another way to interpret the text is to localize it in seventh-century Arabia where patriarchy was the norm. She believes that the texts that reveal equality outweigh those that speak of patriarchy. A correlate to patriarchy is male leadership. Wadud presents a perspective that challenges the reading of the Qur’an as advocating male authority: the general image of leadership in the Qur’an is gender neutral, she argues, in that the one placed in authority is the bestsuited person, which happened to be a male figure in seventh-century Arabia. Qur’anic polygyny is rooted in justice according to Wadud. She argues (using Surah 4:3) that the reason for the Qur’an allowing a man to have up to four wives was so the society could care for women who, without husbands, would not have male financial support. She also notes that the ideal is monogamy because the Qur’an reads, “You are never able to be just and fair between women...” (Surah 4:129). As noted above, in the Qur’an, one male witness is equal to two females (Surah 2:282). Wadud explains that the verse does not refer to two female witnesses but to two females, one female witness and a corroborator. She applauds the Qur’anic teaching that a woman alone would have more difficulty in giving witness in a male-dominated society if she did not have a corroborator. Referring to female inheritance, Wadud points out that all the relevant verses (Surah 4:11–12) should be read. The two to one distribution is only one of the possibilities. If there is one female child, her share is a full half. There are a significant number of other variations that Wadud relates. Her interpretation is that the typical male-female distribution of an inheritance is not the privileged one but only one of the possibilities offered by the Qur’an. The last issue of gender that Wadud outlines refers to the care of children. She notes that the Qur’an gives rights to both parents in the care of children. Further, the text allows for a mother to have another woman suckle her child. The Muslim scholar offers an interpretation of child care that is flexible, integrated, and dynamic. In regard to the difficult text that advocates the beating of wives who are not obedient (Surah 4:33), she offers these observations. The word for disobedience in Arabic is nushuz, which means recalcitrance or disruption of marital harmony. The responses to this are threefold: (1) to arrive at a solution through verbal discussion between the couple or with help from others; if this does not work, (2) to separate the wife from her husband temporarily; and, as a last resort, (3) to scourge the wife. Wadud goes onto argue that the term “scourge” is a translation of the Arabic daraba, which could mean “to leave” or “to give an example.” If “to scourge” does mean violence, it does not mean violence to hurt a woman (as in marital violence or domestic abuse) but to create harmony in marriage. These observations are challenges to this chapter’s claim that the Qur’an presents a dual image of women. I would offer some observations. If Wadud’s view of the Qur’an is correct, why is it that, after Muhammad and early Islam, the image of women in Arabian society was still dualistic? If Wadud can say that the references to gender inequality in the

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Qur’an are there because the text was created within a certain time and space, or that there are different meanings to the text’s particular terms, or that the negative and subservient portrayal of women is against the “spirit” of the text, then one could also argue the same for the positive images of women in the text. The same criteria in interpreting the negative images of women in the text should also be applied to the positive images. Wadud does not do that. Further, the subtitle of her book is “Rereading the sacred text from a women’s perspective.” This is what I would call an interpretation using the ideologically based emancipatory theory of gender. She acknowledges a “women’s perspective,” which, by nature, is tendentious. An alternative kind of feminism is explanatory feminism, which is based upon the social sciences. This approach aims to be value-free, and scholars use this method to describe the differences between men and women, to try to account for these differences, and to search for the effects of these differences on the lives of women and men (Chafetz, 1997, 1999). In the light of explanatory feminism, one should allow for a text to “speak for itself ” and not let the lens of emancipatory feminism cloud the text. Wadud (1999) acknowledges that the Qur’an is a moral history that is “extra-historical and transcendent in nature” (p. 29). Although there is a debate as to the uncreated nature of the Qur’an, which was addressed in Chapter 4, the present teaching in Sunni Islam is that it is uncreated, as Glasse (2001) argues. If the text is uncreated and eternal, how can it be changed or affected by historical and contextual circumstances as argued by Wadud? Another scholar, Minai (2005), also focuses only on the positive image of women in the Qur’an and in early Islam. She writes, “It was a religion that concerned itself heavily with women’s rights, in a surprisingly contemporary manner” (p. 746). Included in the positive images are that, upon marriage, a man had to pay his bride a dowry, which was to be insurance in the case of divorce and widowhood; that a woman was allowed to choose her own spouse; that both men and women could be punished with 100 public lashes if they committed adultery or fornication; that heaven was at the feet of mothers; that, later in Muslim history, a few of the learned women acted as imams; that some women were honored poets; and that many women became famous as warriors and were seen to have had as much courage as males. However, like Wadud, she rarely refers to the negative images of women in the Qur’an and does not address the questionable activities of Muhammad in his relationships with women.

The Hadith and Select Biographies of Muhammad The intimate life of Muhammad is reflected in his relationships with his wives, his concubines, those he divorced, and those to whom he was engaged to be married during the ten years from the time he arrived in Medina in 622 AD to his death in 632 AD. The literature varies as to the number of wives Muhammad had. Esposito (2003), relying on ninth century biographer Ibn Hisham (d. 834), records thirteen matches in addition to two concubines. Ibn Saad (c. 840/1904) mentions a variety of traditions and estimates that Muhammad had from at least twelve to fifteen wives (p. 158). Glasse (2001) documents eleven in addition to Muhammad’s first wife, Khadijah, who died in Mecca before the Hijrah. Stowasser (1994),6 relying on the Hadith documents, notes that the majority of traditions put the number at fourteen of which nine were alive at Muhammad’s death.

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15 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Ibn Saad (c. 840/1904: p. 100-107) records that Muhammad married five women whom he divorced before these marriages were consummated. These women include Alkalabiya, Asma (bint al-Nu’man), Qutayla (bint Qays), Mulayka (bint Ka’b), and bint Jadab. Ibn Saad adds that Muhammad was engaged to be married to nine other women but never had sexual relations with them. He also writes that these women offered themselves to Muhammad. Stowasser (1994) documents that there were two concubines. However, Ibn Saad only records one, Mariyah. It was to her that a son was born, but he died in early childhood. From Ibn Saad’s list, the women that Muhammad had some marital or close relationships with number 27. Ibn Saad also presents information about the number of women who were in the care of the prophet. He records 295. Most of these women were married to other men, and it appears that his interest was altruistic in that he cared for them and their families financially. Ibn Saad mentions that some he went to visit, others he stayed with, and a few were nannies. One woman, Fatima (bint Al-Aswad), stole some jewellery and Muhammad cut her hand. The youngest of Muhammad’s wives was A’isha, who was six years old when she became betrothed and the daughter of his first military lieutenant, Abu Bakr, who would later become the first successor of the Prophet. The marriage was consummated when she was nine. In the Hadith of al-Bukhari, it is noted that A’isha said that she was married to the prophet when she was six years old and the marriage was consummated when she was nine years old (Awde, 2005, p.66). Stowasser (1994) claims that some of the early documents indicate she still played with her dolls after the marriage. Contrary to the family-law tradition of Islam, which argues for equality between wives, A’isha was his favorite and chief wife (Watt, 1961). One marriage was quite controversial. Muhammad married his cousin Zaynab bint Jahsh, the divorced wife of his adopted son Zayd.7 Glasse argues that only this marriage was one of affection and personal affinity. Ibn Saad adds to the list of intimates of Muhammad a large number of women whom he personally cared for financially and who thought of him as sovereign and their leader. Ibn Saad (c. 840/1904: p. 141-345) documents them by name and number At his death in 632, the Prophet left behind nine wives and a consort, Mariyah the Copt, a Christian slave who was a gift from Muqawqis, the Byzantine-viceroy ruling the Copts in Egypt. In the Qur’an the wives of the Prophet are called “Mothers of the Faithful” and forbidden in marriage to other men after the Prophet’s death. Esposito (2003) notes that they are regarded as moral exemplars for Muslim women. In particular, A’isha and Umm Salama (a widow of Abu Salamah who had died in one of the many military campaigns of the Prophet) are reported in numerous Hadiths from Muhammad and thus played a decisive role in the shaping of the Sunna. To try to understand from the perspective of social science why he had so many relationships (if you add to the number of his wives the five women he divorced as well as his two concubines, the sum is over twenty), we return to the attachment theory and the research literature introduced in Chapter 3 on Muhammad’s religious experiences. The general theory concerns how early childhood experiences affect adult attachments in dating and marriage. Feeney (1999) theorizes about and provides evidence for the linkage. In general, she theorizes that secure attachments from childhood are linked to higher levels of trust, commitment, satisfaction, and interdependence. On the other hand, insecure attachments, both avoidant and ambivalent, were negatively linked to trust, satisfaction, commitment, and interdependence.

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Just as the internal working models developed as a consequence of childhood attachments (or lack of them) provide the mechanism for the link between early childhood experiences and images of the divine, so also are they the mechanisms in the nexus between early childhood attachments and later adult intimate attachments. The internal working model or how a person views the world is substantially laid down in early childhood experiences. If a child has experienced secure attachments, an internal working model emerges so that the kind of relationship one searches for in adult life is isomorphic to these early experiences. Securely attached children tend to bond with other securely attached adults in their own adult years. In contrast, insecurely attached children use a working model that propels them to connect with other insecurely attached adults. Further, researchers studying marriage record that spouses with secure working models report higher level of interpersonal satisfaction than those with insecure models. Another set of studies documented by Feeney links secure working models, care-giving behaviors, and sexuality. Theoretically and empirically, persons with secure early childhood attachments are bonded to their partners in levels of high proximity, sensitivity, and care giving. On the other hand, those with histories of insecure attachment exhibit distancing from their partners, insensitivity, and a lack of caring for each other. There is also support in the research literature that insecure individuals have more accepting attitudes toward the idea of having multiple sex partners. In contrast, securely attached persons were less likely to have multiple partners and more likely to be involved in mutually initiated sex and to enjoy physical contact. Evidence from the Hadith and the biographies seems to indicate that many of the elements of Muhammad’s adult bonds are linked to his early insecure attachments: some of these elements include being distant from his partners, insensitivity, and having multiple sex partners. That he had multiple sex partners is evident from the literature. Evidence about him being distant from his wives is illustrated in that he was close to only a few (A’isha and Zaynab bint Jahsh). Thus the others likely experienced his distance from them. Insensitivity is illustrated in his marriage to Zaynab, who was originally married to his son-in-law, and in his having sexual relations with Mariyah in a wife’s house (Hafsa’s) on the day that he was appointed to be with A’isha. These multiple relationships included many marital troubles that were of major proportion. Stowasser (1994, p. 96) documents them: ▶▶

The Prophet’s wives, in the manner of the Ansar women of Medina, had become argumentative and given to insubordination and backtalk against their husband

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They made material demands that the Prophet could not fulfil because of poverty

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The Prophet had sexual relations with his concubine Mariyah in Hafsa’s house on A’isha’s “day” or on Hafsa’s “day”; when confronted, he made an oath that Mariyah would henceforth be haram (forbidden to him for sexual contact) if Hafsa kept this information secret, but she betrayed it to A’isha

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Hafsa was not satisfied with her share of presents (or, meat) distributed by the Prophet among his wives; she sent the gift back several times to bargain for more, until A’isha blamed the Prophet that he had “lost face” in these dealings, an accusation that is said to have angered him

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Hafsa was jealous of A’isha’s beauty and the Prophet’s love for her (or she was jealous of A’isha’s favored position and Zaynab’s beauty)

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The Prophet’s wives bragged about the unequalled value of their dowers

Muhammad’s response was one of becoming distant to them all by segregating himself from all of them and threatening divorce unless they chose God and his Prophet and renounced the world and its adornment. It is said that they all made that commitment. This commitment to obedience becomes a paradigm of a woman’s role within Islam. The special place that is given to the wives of the prophets is a place of honor and respect. They, and other Muslim women, are counselled to live in segregation and quiet domesticity, exhibit modest comportment, be invisible through the veil (the hijab), witness ascetic fragility, and be obedient to God, the Prophet, and their husbands (Stowasser, 1994, p.118). This paradigm will form a basis for the discussion of women from the time of the Prophet until modern times. There are other explanations that may account for the relationships that Muhammad had with women, and these tend to be more historically specific. Although there is debate in family studies that affective and romantic images of marital relationships are an invention of the modern world (see, for example, Aries, 1962; Shorter, 1975; and Stone, 1979), it can be averred that marriage in pre-Islamic society was more likely to be for political and economic reasons than for romantic ones. Further, one could argue that the reason Muhammad was not close and intimate with women is that he had so many of them in his relational orbit, and the historical record does say that many of his marriages were not for romantic reasons. In contrast to explaining Muhammad’s relations with women using the theory of attachment, then, one could argue that he was not close to these woman because of the culture in which he lived and not because of his early childhood experiences.

Modern Turkey and Western Europe since 1945 The modern world has brought on many changes in the roles of Muslim women. Two such examples are presented here: one from Turkey, documented by Arat (2003), and another from Western Europe, presented by Cesari (2003). Arat, considering the work of several scholars who have looked at the history of women during the Ottoman Empire and into the modern world, presents several patterns. One scholar justified the new reforms that were being initiated by Mustafa Atatürk (1881–1938), the father of the modern Republic of Turkey that was born in 1923, by considering the role of women in pre-Islamic Turkey and noting that they experienced significant equality with men. Along with Atatürk’s social reforms related to gender, women themselves were active in politics that brought women’s problems to public attention. Arat also notes that changes in gender equity have their primary roots in the modernist paradigm

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Box 6:1 Multiple meanings of the Hijab The hijab is part of the fabric of Muslim society, which has a richly woven history. For some Muslim women, it may be linked to patriarchal pressure, while, for others, it is a symbol of emancipation in a patriarchal society. To some Canadians, women who wear it are typified as “the other,” and this view is part of a complex history of Western hostility to the Muslim veil. In England, a woman in an Anglican school was dismissed for wearing the niqab, and the decision was upheld by Britain’s Prime Minister, Tony Blair. The debate is so polarized that it could trigger race riots in Britain....The tradition of women being veiled is wider than Islam; both Christian and Jewish women in medieval times wore an equivalent to the veil ... Indeed, the hijab has more to do with culture than religion. Source: Ghafour (2006).

and not in Islam. To link this to Weber’s theory, one might say that women’s salience was high in pre-Islamic times then was attenuated in the Muslim era only to arise with secular, modernist ideologies. The story is more varied in Western Europe with a starting point of 1945 as outlined by Cesari (2003). She embeds the discussion of gender within the context of three waves of immigration and Western Europe’s latent suspicion of and overt racism towards Muslims. The first wave of immigration was of men from 1945 to 1970 in response to a labour shortage in the wake of two devastating world wars. This was followed by a second wave when family members joined men who had already immigrated. The third wave was comprised of refugees and asylum seekers. Most Muslim women in Western Europe experience at least some disjunction when they juxtapose work and home because the later is at least modestly affected by or adorned with Islamic beliefs and rituals. The hijab8 carries with it a rich cultural-sacred tradition. The West’s view of the veil is that it represents male dominance and female subordination. If we try to understand its meaning from the viewpoint of Muslim women (using Weberian interpretative sociology), other symbols emerge. As noted previously, the hijab was meant originally to symbolize modesty, privacy, and morality. In these modern times of conflictual encounters in ideology and mythology, the veil has taken on political meanings such associated with nationalism and culture. Further, the veil has become the symbol of cultural resistance to the values of modernity. Some Muslim feminists use the veil to symbolize their Muslim beliefs, identity, national pride, and ethnicity. Cesari (2003) says it well: Muslims in general, and women in particular, have not only adjusted to post modernity, urbanity, and globalization in the European context, but they have also adapted to a “culture of separateness,” which presupposes autonomy and independence in even the religious realm. Consequently, identities that are integrated in Muslim countries are automatically broken down into religious, social, and ethnic components in the West. (p. 302)

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15 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Williams and Vashi (2006) add to the discussion on veiling in their study of Muslim women students attending university in Chicago who choose to wear the hijab. These women claim that the veil does not symbolize inequality or submission but that its use is a claim of equality with men. Further, they wear it as a statement against the American secular values of blatant eroticism, valorizing work over the family, and individualism. These women believe that men cannot control their sexual passions, and the use of the veil functions to control these passions.

Contemporary Issues of Women and Islam The literature is too vast to do full justice to the subject of women and Islam in the contemporary world. Nevertheless, here are a few of the more salient issues that face Muslim women today. One researcher, Moaddel (1998), argues that, in India and Egypt, where Islam has experienced modernization resulting in what he terms “Islamic modernism,” adherents have encouraged women’s education and their involvement in social affairs and have spoken out against polygyny and the exclusion of women from the public sphere. He theorizes that they have created an Islamic discourse that is rooted in the Enlightenment and is channelled through unique historical and social structures in Egypt and India. On the other hand, Iran, after the revolution of 1979, denounced all the provisions for female equality that were common under the leadership of the Pahlavi dynasty (pre-Khomeini). Women increasingly lived under the shadow Ayatollah Khomeini’s fundamentalist, hierarchical regime, which eventually required the veiling of women in public, and all the reforms granted by the Pahlavi rulers that benefited women were reversed. In a survey done in Kuwait in 1994, Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali (1998) found support for their hypothesis that Islamic orthodoxy is a predictor of allowing women to vote but Islamic religiosity is not. Islamic orthodoxy is a composite constructed of several elements that reflect this orthodoxy.9 In contrast, Islamic religiosity is identified by another set of measures that ascertain religiosity.10 Meyer, Rizzo, and Ali (1998) point out that is not just religion that predicts extending the franchise to women. Other factors include being Sunni and having a high social status and social embeddedness between and within the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. If citizens adhered to a school of thought derived from the Shi’ites of Iran, they would be less likely to support the enfranchisement of women. On the other hand, if citizens had links to the Sunnis of Egypt, they would be more likely to support the extension of political rights to women. The authors conclude that it is important to specify what it is in Islam that is either supportive or unsupportive of women’s rights: “In short, Islamic beliefs and positive views toward increasing women’s political rights, in general, and towards the democratization process in particular, operate within structures of group life and stratification systems of nations, such as Kuwait” (Meyer, Rizzo, & Ali, 1998, p. 143).

Summary Statements In an introductory text such as this, it is difficult to do proper justice to such a vast and important part of Muslim life and history. I do believe, however, that attachment theory does help

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Box 6:2 Women in Modern Iraq Some educated, professional young women in Iraq tell their story of moving from one prison under Saddam to the new Iraq, another prison for them. One woman spoke, “There is no woman among those in the government … This is a male-dominated country. The majority of those elected are more concerned about how to gain more power and territory.” Many are filled with fear: ▶▶

Families fear that their daughters will be kidnapped or murdered

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Islamic parties threaten women who do not veil themselves

▶▶

Many women veil themselves out of fear of reprisal

Years of war (with Iran, with the United States and its allies during the Gulf war and now during the war in Iraq) have had a devastating effect on the sex ratio. Currently, the population is 60 per cent female and 40 per cent male. This leaves many women outside of the marriage market and displaced, as there is a high expectation in Iraq for women to marry. Source: Pazira (2005).

to explain, in part, Muhammad’s relationships to so many women, although these relationships may also have been a consequence of his being socialized into a culture of patriarchy to begin with rather than a result of his early childhood experiences alone. Further, the features of the first and sixth dilemmas are not strong in this outline. However, I do contend that the bulk of the literature does support the idea that Islamic attitudes toward women display the mixed motivations of religious authorities, motivations derived from both religious and secular sources, and that, as the Muslim faith developed, these attitudes became more legalistic and dogmatic, as opposed to being interpretive, wherein the image of women is more akin to feminine agency rather than to women being controlled.

Contemporary Discussion of Female Clergy: Women as Prophets and Priests11 Returning to the two dilemmas that introduce this chapter, I aver that the literature on the female clergy offers a mixed story of not either/or but of both/and. By this I mean that the women to be profiled next can be seen to act as men do: they are motivated by mixed intent as well as pure intent and can be understood as living a ministry of textual interpretation as well as being dogmatic—especially as many are committed to a strong political feminism. Beginning in the early part of the twentieth century, more and more women have joined the ranks of the clergy. For example, Noll (1992), referred to by Chaves (1996), notes that the Association of Women Ministers was formed in 1919 to secure equal opportunity for

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15 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D women and was influential in changing rules in several churches. Hole and Levine (1971) add that, around the start of the second wave of feminism,12 the National Organization for Women established an Ecumenical Task Force on Women and Religion that sought equal opportunity of access to clergy positions. Carroll (1992) notes that the ordination of women has increased at a rapid pace since 1970. According to Chaves (1996), there were 21,000 ordained women clergy in the United States in 1986, a three-fold increase since 1970. Witham (2005) updates this to 2005 when women comprised 14 per cent of the American clergy. Another estimate is from the United States census (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2003) elevating the number to 15 per cent. In Canada, there is also evidence of this increase. The first woman to be ordained was in 1936, and, in 1993, 25 per cent of ordained United Church ministers were women. Ten per cent of Anglicans priests are women. However, the Roman and Ukrainian Catholic churches, the Eastern Orthodox Church, and the Church of Jesus Christ of Later-day Saints (because of the ban on ordaining women) do not have women priests or ministers, and there are few in Baptist, Holiness Pentecostal, and Pentecostal churches (Nason-Clark, 1993). Of the churches that allow for female ordination, few actually do it. Witham documents the following percentages of female clergy in Protestant churches in the United States historically black denominations, 3 per cent; white conservative congregations, 1 per cent; and mainline Protestant churches, 20 per cent. Why is it that some churches ordain women and others do not? Using a database of 92 American churches, Chaves (1996) performs what is called an “event-history analysis,” which tests the likelihood of either an event occurring or “changes of state.” What is measured is a “hazard rate,” which is the rate of movement from one state to another—in this case, the rate at which a church allows ordination for women. The results reveal that both what was happening in the external and internal environment influenced the likelihood that the church ordained or did not ordain women. Externally, both first-wave and second-wave feminism had an effect on the likelihood of ordination. Internal factors affecting the likelihood of

Box 6:3 A New Face of the Feminine: Many Protestants embrace Mary, the mother of Jesus Many circles within Protestantism have come a long way. Although a statue of Mary was burned in Walsingham, England in 1538 and other statues were beheaded or chopped up for firewood, American Protestants are today taking a second look at the mother of Jesus. Evangelical, Methodist, Baptist, and Presbyterian pastors and theologians are preaching about and writing about Mary. Their primary referent is the New Testament wherein many texts speak of basic Christian attributes that were embodied in her: submission to the divine will, obeying Jesus, humility, prayer, faith, love, and long suffering with the crucified Christ. A Southern Baptist theologian writes, “Insofar as Evangelicals may have marginalized Mary’s presentation in the Bible, it needs to be recovered.” Source: Van Biema (2005).

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female ordination include the following, according to Chaves (1996): women are more likely to be ordained in those churches that were recently founded (because these churches have no long history of male-only ordination); in those which were non-sacramentalist (because the more sacramentalist a church is, the more it is tied to a masculine image of ordination), in those which were not literalist in biblical interpretation (because the more fundamentalist a church is, the more likely it is to take verbatim the biblical imagery of the subordination of women to men); and in those churches that allow more independent authority to women in leadership positions within congregations. Summing up his article, Chaves offers some informative insights. In the early period (from 1850 to 1917), conflicts over the ordination of women emerged because small numbers of women wanted to speak and take leadership within the churches. This is also substantiated by Warner’s review. In the period between 1920 until 1970, the source of conflict was a top down “mandated” decision to ordain women. From 1970 to the present, however, it is female seminarians and theological students who have been forming organizations, mobilizing constituencies, and disrupting normal organizational processes that continue to refuse the full recognition of women as clergy. Chaves adds that the ordination of women is part of the Western cultural account with its accent on individual rights. It is interesting that what he is saying here is that the ordination of women is rooted in the modern, secular world and not within the mythology, the ethos, and the ritual of the sacred. One might say that the process of recapturing the charisma of women is accomplished not by a return to the charismatic Christian past (the one described previously in the case study of women in the first millennium of Christianity) but by assimilating to the modern agenda of gender equality. In these churches, what, according to Witham, are some of the characteristics of the female pastor and of her congregation? The congregations are more likely to have more women than men and are usually in urban regions. The women pastors are characterized as having modest incomes (much less than their male counterparts), as experiencing the “glass-ceiling” phenomenon, as being in a second career, and as presenting a relationally based, inclusive, and democratic style of leadership. Other researchers (Ice, 1987 and Wallace, 1992) have found a similar pattern. Perl (2002) updates these gender differences both in a review of the literature on the topic as well as by doing his own research. After a review of the literature, he concludes that female pastors are more likely than male pastors to be “people orientated.” Men were more likely than women to prefer work in large, suburban areas whereas women were more likely

Box 6:4 Pastors’ wives have changed with the times Some themes and facts: The divorce rate among ministers and their wives is 50 per cent; 70 per cent of pastors’ wives work outside of the home and most in some professional capacity; 84 per cent of wives had no idea of how to be a pastor’s wife before marriage; loneliness is a running theme among them, and they do not go to parishioners for support or help; some find help by linking online to a number of electronic support networks designed for them. Source: Cullen (2007).

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15 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D to aspire to being a pastor in small, rural areas and to be more involved in prison, hospital, youth, elderly, and minority ministries, as well as ministering to the ill. Using data from a 1994 survey of ordained men and women from eight Protestant denominations, Perl (2002) tested some of these findings using a measure of how much time was spent on the typical pastoral-administrative activities of these pastors. For all pastors, male and female, work appeared to be categorized into two domains: administration and personal pastoral ministry. Gender differences were discovered that reveal that women spend a significantly lower proportion of their working days than men in two activities: administration/supervision and visitation. They also spend more time than men in such tasks as worship preparation, denominational meetings, facilitating small groups, teaching, church meetings, and pastoral counselling. This gives evidence for Perl’s first hypothesis that women spend more time than men in personal, one-to-one ministry. His second hypothesis, that men spend a greater proportion of time than women in administrative tasks was not confirmed. Further, he found no evidence to show that there were gender differences in leadership styles, as previous researchers had argued. One anomaly Perl comments on is that men were more likely to engage in visitation than women. He explains this not as an intrinsic difference in the desire of men and women for parochial visitation but as a consequence of the modern “double shift” expectation that women have to include care responsibilities from the home more than men. A qualitative analysis of a Dutch community in the east of Holland tells a contrasting story. Anthropologist Watling (2002) documents that women in Protestant, Catholic, and Orthodox settings are sensing empowerment from their sense of a “calling.” This calling enables them to demonstrate their beliefs through pastoral work, through their human qualities, and by encouraging rather than leading others. Is there evidence here for the validity of Weber’s theory regarding the significance of the feminine during a religion’s early stages and for the idea that masculinization occurs with routinization? Among some churches, yes. Witham notes that, in the middle of the nineteenth century, more than half of women clergy served in the Holiness and Pentecostal denominations. This growth was reversed, and the reversal has continued to the present. Recent evidence comes from the scholarship of Poloma (1989) in her study of the largest Pentecostal church, the Assemblies of God. Women such as Aimee Semple McPherson, a founder of the Four Square Gospel Church, and Marie Burgess, a pastor of an Assemblies of God Church in Chicago for forty years, were vital leaders in the early years of these churches. However, as the years passed, fewer women were ordained, and, in 1999, they comprised only 16.2 per cent of the total Assemblies of God clergy, according to Witham. Poloma argues that the Assemblies have bowed to pressure from conservative, evangelical churches under the influence of biblical literalism and have restricted ordination to men. There are nuances within the topic of female leadership in the Catholic Church. Even though women are not allowed to be ordained, they are incumbents of decision-making positions. Witham records that, in 2004, according to the United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, nearly 50 per cent of all administrators in the dioceses of the nation were women. This figure compares favorably with the percentage of women in managerial leadership in the US workforce. In addition, many women are involved on the local congregational level in Catholic lay ministry. Witham notes that, of the 30 thousand lay ministers in the United States, the vast majority are women. Chang (1997) cites a survey that found that 85 per cent of full- or

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part-time lay workers were women. This fact may be, in part, why the Vatican is considering reviving the ancient tradition in Christianity of ordaining women to become deacons. Non-ordained female pastors in Catholic parishes were studied by Wallace (1992). She found that they did virtually everything and were recognized as legitimate pastors by the local bishop. She acknowledges that this is quite remarkable given the patriarchal structure of this church and the conservative stand of Rome in not giving women access to the priesthood. Wallace offers several reasons for allowing Catholic women to have such significant leadership roles. First, Vatican II (1962–1965) gave official recognition that the medieval institution needed to be updated. Second, major demographic transitions have presented a very practical need for lay leadership: there is a severe shortage of priests.13 The third reason she offers is the contemporary women’s movement. First, she presents national data showing that over 50 per cent of the American Catholic population are in favor of granting ordination to women. Second, women’s groups within the church have lobbied for pastoral letters from bishops that condemn sexism and order gender-neutral documents. Her research was on 20 women of the 80 who were either then in pastoral roles or who had been in the recent past. All had to have been appointed by their bishops for inclusion in the study. There was an equal distribution between laywomen and nuns. These women endeavored to do the work of a caring pastor: knowing people’s names, showing affection, visiting parishioners, showing personal warmth, being willing to work in collaborative rather than authoritarian leadership, and empowering members to be more active in the life of the parish. The appointment by the local bishop was authentic. Shortly after each woman was appointed, her pastor conducted an initiation ceremony that legitimated her role. However, in spite of the parochial and diocesan support, these women leaders experienced constraints, conflicts, and tensions. The primary source of conflict was at the institutional level. Even though they did most of the pastoral work, they were not allowed to baptize, marry, conduct funerals, or, especially, be the celebrant at the Eucharistic celebration. When the Sunday liturgy was conducted, a priest had to come in for that function. They experienced tension in this role: on the one hand, they were given significant authority, but, on the other hand, their authority was subordinate to that of the ordained priest who, being the Eucharistic leader, had more “power” than they did. In Canada, one would expect that evangelical clergy would be quite conservative in their support of the ordination of women. However, Larson and his colleagues (1994) found that 59 per cent of evangelical clergy support female ordination. (Yet a similar story could be told for evangelical ministers in Canada as for Assembly of God members in the United States: they verbally support ordination but, in fact, very few women are ministers. Only 3 per cent of ministers in the sample were women.) Canadian support is somewhat higher for the ordination of female Roman Catholic priests (62 per cent) but not significantly (Swenson et al. 1994). Another issue that ordained clergywomen face is how they combine the responsibilities of work and family. Cody-Rydzewski (2007) addresses this issue. Her base-line theory is that, as women achieved more education, higher valued occupations, and more pay, they received more resources to negotiate more power in decision making in marriages. (This theory is termed the resource hypothesis and was created by Blood and Wolfe [1960]). According to this hypothesis, because ordained clergy have a high status and are vested with a great deal

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16 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D of authority, ordained women have more power and authority than women who are not ordained clergy. Interviewing 33 highly educated ordained women, she asked whether having ordination as a valued resource increased their power to negotiate more egalitarian roles in marriage and in the home? According to the resource hypothesis, because these women were highly educated, ministered in liberal churches (whose ideology prevented members from interpreting the roles of men and women in literalist terms), held a high prestige occupation in society and had higher than average incomes, they would enjoy an egalitarian marriage, and their husbands would reduce the double-shift burden of their wives. Not so, Cody-Rydzewski explains. Contrary to the resource hypothesis, the clergywomen responded as follows: ▶▶

The transition to become an ordained minister resulted in an excess of responsibilities and less time for the women themselves, their husbands, and their children

▶▶

Husbands did not help their wives in care for the children and in housework

▶▶

Church members expected that these women would not only be responsible for them as parishioners but also teach Sunday school, cook, and care for their children

▶▶

These women felt ambiguity and uncertainty in their authority in the home even though, after ordination, they experienced increased public adulation

▶▶

Some of these ordained clergywomen experienced resentment from their husbands because they had less time. The wives responded by being more diligent in caring for family work

These results reveal that there is an “invisible wall” between work and home and that what happened in work did not necessarily translate into the home. Cody-Rydzewski (2007) concludes, The findings of this and other similar studies speak not only to husbands’ resistance to women’s success in male-dominated occupations, but also to the resistance of the church. Like most other social institutions, the church has not altered its gendered expectations to accommodate the rising number of women and mothers entering ministry. Unfortunately, compared to other employed women, clergywomen face a prejudice of greater intensity, since churches model and promote gender differentiation both as a matter of practice and policy. Although these women belonged to denominations which are open to women’s leadership, the church has done little to modify its expectations for how the work of the ministry, or the work of family, is performed. (p. 287-289)

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Some conclusions are in order concerning female ordination and the dilemma of mixed motivation. It appears that there has been a significant move among male clerics and denominational authorities to include women in their ranks. This may be a sign of movement away from mixed motivation to single-minded motivation. What may matter more, however, is whether the women themselves are being moved by mixed motives or single-hearted commitment. From this review, mixed motivation seems to be dominant. Female ordination appears to be driven by as many practical as revelatory factors, such as the paucity of priests and the disjunction between societal norms and traditional religious views regarding the role of women. Also, women are drawn to seek ministry within established churches, in part, to increase their personal status and to further the status of women generally. A real sign of a movement towards single-minded motivation would be the revitalization and renewal of current Christianity in Canada and the Untied States. By way of a conclusion that reviews the research done on Christians, clergy, and gender, Nason-Clark (1993) offers us some thoughts: What would a church look like if it took the responsibilities of Christian men and women to be equal as partners in sharing their faith and in leadership? The gender breakdown of the local church board or governing council would not differ from the nursery roster; the proportion of women on the platform would approximate the proportion of women in the pew; the language and liturgy of worship and instruction would be inclusive of the diversity amongst believers; the full expanse of the church’s ministry would have men and women serving as partners, on the basis of talent, willingness to serve and spiritual maturity; and the programs offered to the congregation and the local community would represent the full range of needs and experiences of ordinary women and men, boys and girls alike. The full inclusion of men and women in active lay service can only be accomplished by rethinking the power and prestige conferred by ordination. (p. 230)

CONCLUSIONS The journey tracing the salience and the silencing of women in religion has been long and involved. Under the canopy of two dilemmas, that of interpretation and of mixed motivation, I have followed this story from pre-historic times to the present. There appears to be evidence for the dilemma of interpretation in the example of female shamans but little among the ancient Assyrians. During the first 500 years of Christianity, the story does give credibility to the same dilemma. Looking at a small portion of the long history of Islam, we noted both the legalistic interpretation of Muslim texts related to women and the tendency toward mixed motivations in considerations of the sacred role of Muslim women. The narratives of both the salience of women and their exclusion appear throughout this history, although, from the genesis of this religion, exclusion predominates. The modern period gives abundant evidence of the salience of women in Christianity and Islam (see the above discussion on women in Turkey). However, these changes, these improvements in the status of women within the two religions appear to have been initiated from a secular world view and not a sacred one that is internal to either Islam or Christianity. The one piece of modern evidence related to

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16 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D a change in the religious authority of women that resulted from an altered internal sacred world view comes from the Holiness and Pentecostal churches, which acknowledged the vitality of the feminine in their early histories but later excluded women from authority. This story tends to support the idea that masculinisation accompanies routinization. However, Poloma’s insight that these churches accepting a fundamentalist world view may account for these changes, which give evidence for the dilemma of interpretation.

NOTES 1

These terms refer to different kinds of sorceresses who, in some way, were linked to the sacred rites.

2

An example of this type of monastery is the double monastery of Wimborne in Dorset. St. Boniface (c. 680–754), the famous English missionary to Germany, summoned nuns from Wimborne to help him in his German mission, and one, St. Lioba became the abbess at Boniface’s nunnery in Bischofsheim, Germany (See Deanesly, 1991, p. 53.).

3 Eisen (2000) writes, “on the basis of epigraphic evidence we can suppose that until the 4th century women were active presbyters in the communities of Asia Minor, Greece and Egypt” (p. 127). 4 Eisen (2000, p. 200–202) uses this designation with some caution. The inscription appears as “Episcopa Theodora” on a mosaic dating from the time of Pope Paschal I (Pope from 817–824). This could mean that she was married to a bishop and not a bishop herself. 5

It should be recognized that this theologian is more extreme and that he departed from the Catholic Church to join a sect called the Montanists, an encratitic group.

6

Some claim that this author is biased and does not represent the true meaning of the Qur’an. One of the most well known authors of Islam, John Esposito writes on the back cover of the text: “An excellent study of women in Islamic scriptures and commentary. A significant contribution to the scholarship. There is no comparable study in terms of either focus or approach, despite the fact that the topic and materials are so fundamental.” Stowasser’s work was named an outstanding academic book for 1995. Stowasser’s primary source for this evidence is from Muhammad Ibn Saad (d. 844), author of one of the earliest biographies of Muhammad and the compiler of the earliest known biographical dictionary, Kitab al-tabaqat al-kabir (The great book of generations). He systematized and organized the collection and presentation of biographical materials. His biography of Muhammad became an archetype in structure, content, and source materials for later literature addressing Muhammad’s life, virtues, merits, and proofs of his prophethood (Esposito, 2003). Another story is presented by Madani (1982). At the time Muhammad was master of the large part of the Arabian peninsula, a verse was revealed laying down that the wives of the prophet can neither be divorced nor can they be remarried after his death. This refers to his wives after his death but does not refer to them before his death. Logic would assume that, if he could have more than the four wives allocated to other Muslims, he could divorce

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them. As noted above, during his trouble with his wives, he threatened to divorce them if they did not obey him (Surah 66:5). Further, Surah 33 verse 51 reads, “We grant you this privilege so that none may blame you. God is forgiving and merciful. You may put off any of your wives you please and take to your bed any of them you please.” 7

Glasse (2001) notes that there was a justification in the Qur’an for his action.

8

The hijab is one form of veiling. The others include the burka, the niqab, and the chador.

9

These items include the following beliefs: it is a duty to help those confused about religion, it is important to help people become enlightened about religion, the world would be a better place if more people held my religious views, the world’s problems are aggravated by the fact that so many people are misguided about religion, all Muslims must work together to face the Western challenge against Islam, and Islam does not separate politics and religion (Meyer et al. 1998, p. 135).

10 The construct was measured by adherence to the following ideas: families should insist that women wear veils, men should have beards, Western clothing is more practical than traditional clothing, divorce is okay if two married people cannot get along, and people should choose political candidates for their political experience, not their religious sect (Meyer et al. 1998, p. 136). 11

It is important to note that this term does not refer to priests in the Roman Catholic, Anglican, or some of the Greco-Roman religions but to the construct as outlined by Weber.

12 There is some debate as to how many “waves” or different stages of the women’s movement have existed in the United States and Canada. Chaves considers the “first wave” to be the early twentieth-century suffrage movement whereas the “second wave” is the more recent movement, which has broader goals such as equal pay, equity in the family, equal protection for the rights of women, equal access to higher education, and more egalitarian policies for access to professions. 13

For data, see the section about tension in the priestly role.

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Chapter SEVEN

T h e S y m b ol ic Di l e m m a : T h e S t u dy of R i t ua l

Orientation You and I are products of ritual. The order of society requires that we

learn patterns of social action that mandate repetition. Consider, for example, a common day for most of us in North America, Europe, Australia, or New Zealand. Our days are ever more structured—from our rising, our eating, our going to school, our many hours of work, and then our times with our respective families. These are our common, everyday rituals. We can apply these quotidian rituals to religion. Many anthropologists have recognized the significance of habits of behavior and have defined religion as belief and ritual. The added dimension beyond our human relationships is the relationship to the sacred. This “third party” in human life, our link to the sacred, is expressed in the substance of repeated, ordered social actions that are called rituals. This chapter offers a look at ritual. In his study of the five dilemmas of religious institutionalization, O’Dea refers to ritual as the symbolic dilemma. In summary form, we can explain this dilemma as follows. In the genesis of a religion, virtuosos hope to continue the experience of the sacred in their own lives as well as in the lives of their followers. In doing so, they create collective symbols, and the religion becomes objectivized for the sake of continuity. However, in the process, it tends to lose its effectiveness, which results in alienation. Therein lies the paradox: while it is necessary for a symbol to become objectified in ritual so a religion can achieve continuity of the symbol across time and space, the ritual may lead to alienation when a religion fails to provide the nexus between symbols and subjective attitudes. This process, however, is not necessarily linear: there may be reverses to regain the charisma of the symbol sometime after there is alienation. Figure 7.1 illustrates this:

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Figure 7:1 The Symbolic Dilemma Ritual at the charismatic moment or a space or time to enable the experience of the sacred

To accomplish this, objectivation is necessary

Danger: an ossification of ritual that leads to ritualism and alienation

May be attempts to de-routinize the ritualism

Keeping the nature of the symbolic dilemma in mind, this chapter will accomplish the following. First, it will analyze ritual with a focus on defining the phenomenon, and, carrying on the tradition of this book, it will present this definition from both a substantive and a functional viewpoint. It is theorized that a substantive interpretation of ritual will tend to see objectification as leading participants toward an experience of the sacred while a functional perspective will tend to focus on ritual as curtailing sacred experience. Following this, I will illustrate the symbolic dilemma (the routinization process) by interpreting it in the light of the substantive and functional definitions of ritual. Case studies from folk societies, ancient Mesopotamia, Islam, and Christianity will flesh out this study of the functional extensions of ritual.

An Analysis of Ritual: Contrasting the substantive and the functional In Chapter 1, I provided both substantive and functional definitions of religion. Again, a substantive definition of religion focuses on what religion is in itself—on its substance. Those who employ substantive definitions tend to emphasize affect or feelings. Religion is an “experiential encounter,” a “manifestation of the sacred,” or a “haunting realization of ultimate powerlessness.” Functional definitions emphasize the effects of religion on the participants and on society as a whole. People may define religion in positively functional terms with religion providing meaning, social legitimation, social cohesion and integration, and a source of morality. Marxist and conflict theorists define religion in dysfunctional forms, pointing to such things as how dominant groups use religion to legitimate their positions of power and exploit other groups of people. A substantive understanding of ritual is more likely to see ritual as a door to sacred experiences and a functional interpretation as more likely to see how ritual affects the participants in more instrumental ways. Because one aim of this text is to outline the many dimensions and meanings within Islam, I shall place a special emphasis on illustrations of ritual in that tradition. Both substantive and functional definitions of ritual will be examined through examples taken from

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16 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the rituals surrounding visiting the burial places of deceased imams in Shi’ite Islam and the dhikr ritual in Sufism. However, before one is introduced to these rituals, it is wise to have some historical background concerning the reason for the Shi’ite visitations and the Sufi dhikr. Sunni and Shi’ite divisions within Islam began in the first generation of leaders after Muhammad. According to some scholars (for example, Donnar, 1999; Hodgson, 1974; Madelung, 1997), Sunnis recognize four “rightly guided caliphs”: Abu Bakr al-Siddiq (died in 634 or two years after Muhammad); Umar ibn al-Khattab (who was the caliph from 634 to 644), Uthman ibn Affan (served as a caliph from 644 to 656), and Ali ibn Abi Talib (caliph from 656 to 661). It was during the lifetime of Ali that the Shi’ite sector of Islam had its genesis. Troubles began during the last six years of the reign of the third caliph, Uthman. According to Kennedy (2004), among other things, he was accused of favoring his relatives and members of the Quraysh tribe with political appointments. Rebellion occurred both in Kufa (in Iraq) and in Egypt in 656. In that year, Uthman was assassinated because he continued to assert the control of the Quraysh elite even if doing so meant the denial of the rights and privileges of Muslims from other tribes and peoples. Ali, cousin to Muhammad and husband to Muhammad’s daughter Fatima, became the fourth caliph, but his time was rife with political crisis and civil strife. The favorite wife of Muhammad, A’isha, along with al-Zubayr and Talha of the Quraysh tribe, were discontented with Ali’s leadership and left Medina to seek support for a rebellion against him in Basra. Ali followed them and defeated them in 656. In the following year, Muawiyah, the governor of Syria, led his army against Ali and his supporters. Rather than a battle, an arbitration occurred. This arbitration weakened Ali’s position and his support suffered in Basra. Later, a break-away group called the Kharijis took advantage of his weakened position, and fought against Ali. Ali responded by killing most of them, but, he, in turn, was assassinated by a Kharijite as he prayed in a mosque in 661. Ali had settled in Kufa, and, after his death, his followers (known thereafter as “Followers of Ali” or Shi’ite) gathered there to proclaim that Ali’s son, al-Hasan, was the next caliph. He was forced to resign by Muawiyah, who became the next caliph and the founder of the Umayyad dynasty. Al-Husayn, the brother of al-Hasan, was invited by the Shi’ites to be their own caliph (thereafter called an imam). He and the Shi’ites led a rebellion against the local governor, Yazid (son of Muawiyah). In 680, Yazid’s armies decimated al-Husayn and his family at Karbala. This act of martyrdom marks the official beginning of the separation of the Shi’ites and the Sunnis. Further, these historical events—the deaths of both Ali and al-Husayn—are marked by the special devotion that Shi’ites have given to both men as deceased imams and by the ritual visitations to their tombs, which provide evidence for both the substantive and functional dimensions of ritual. Another sector of Islam (called a new religious movement and discussed in Chapter 8) is Sufism. J. Peter (1987) documents that its origins occur about the middle of the eighth century when the Umayyads had increased in wealth and glorious power. Sufism is a challenge to that type of Islam and denounced wealth and worldliness. Hodgson (1974) adds that its adherents practiced asceticism and were committed to high moral standards and that some were celibate. Peter notes that the earliest recorded Sufis were Ibrahim ibn Adham (d. 780) and a woman, Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya al-Qaysiyya (717–801) who focussed on mystical love. These leaders and a number of others were loosely connected before the twelfth century.

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By the middle of that century, however, tariqah or Sufi orders became established. Followers became disciples linked to a spiritual master called a pir, and they lived mystical and spiritual lives. The most famous ritual is called a dhikr and is celebrated about the tomb of a deceased pir, as well as in other devotional forms. The dhikr, as well as the Shi’ite ritual visitations to imams’ tombs, will be analyzed according to the substantive and functional dimensions of ritual. Because both rituals are celebrated about the tombs of famous religious virtuosos (either imams or Sufi masters), it may be important to see how the two virtuosos differ. The major contrast is between the image of the imam in Shi’itism and the image of the pir in Sufism. Table 7.1, constructed from the work of Takim (2005, p.199), presents this contrast: Table 7:1 Contrasting Images of the shi’ite Imam and the sufi Pir The Shi’ite Imam

The Sufi Pir

Has a divine light, extraordinary knowledge, and is born holy

Has divine light that is achieved through asceticism

Given esoteric knowledge and can perform miracles

Has esoteric knowledge Can perform miracles

Divinely appointed

Is active in social life

Charisma is passed through descent

Has saint-like qualities

Free from corruption

Focuses on self-realization and becoming divine

An additional way to structure the discussion on the ritual in Islam is to use the distinction that Sharot (2001), relying on Weber, makes between the religion of the elites and the religion of the masses. Two types of elites are recognized: the virtuoso and the cleric (see Chapter 5). In the analysis that follows, the religious elite is linked to the masses. Another term for the sacred within the masses is popular religion or the religion of the ordinary people. In Sufism, the virtuoso is the pir and the devotees to the tombs of the pirs are the masses. In Shi’ism, the imam is categorized as the virtuoso while the masses are the pilgrims to the tombs of the imams. Table 7.2 provides a categorization of these types:

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Table 7:2 The Imam and Followers and the Pir and his Devotees The Shi’ite Imam

The Sufi Pir

The pilgrims visit the tombs of the imams

It is the devotees who visit the tombs of the deceased pirs

Other imams (the descendents of al-Husayn) came to be honored as well

The pir is linked to a religious order called a tariqah

The Substantive Dimension of Ritual Several sociologists and anthropologists present various substantive definitions of ritual. The anthropologist Geertz (1966, p. 28) describes ritual as consecrated behavior in some sort of ceremonial form. This form may be simply a recitation of a myth, the consultation of an oracle, or the decoration of a grave. Human expressions of ritual activity consist in particular moods and motivations. In ritual, the “world is lived and is imagined.” The sociologist Davis (1948–1949) outlines religious ritual as being highly circumscribed to time and place, expressive of internal attitude, symbolic of unseen powers. It can include any kind of behavior known, such as the wearing of special clothing, the recitation of certain formulas, and the immersion in certain waters; it can include singing, dancing, weeping, bowing, crawling, starving, feasting, reading etc. (534)

Hargrove (1989) is more concise: “ritual is repeated symbolic behavior,” a behavior in which the religious participant meets his or her mythical hero (p. 49). Durkheim (1915, p. 226) and Smith (1956, p. 265) present a similar outline of the substantive meaning of ritual and note that, within ritual, a bond of friendship, communion, and unity connects the ritual observer with his or her god. Durkheim (1915) adds that rites are rules of conduct that order participants to have a special comportment in the presence of the sacred (p. 43) and that rites help people to forget the real world and transport them into a transcendent world (p. 380). One may add that, according to the substantive definition of ritual, the participant in ritual is led to an individual experience of the sacred, or, if engaging in a social ritual, all the participants come to have a social sacred experience. In the light of these contributions, I offer the following as a substantive definition of ritual: Ritual is repeated consecrated (sacred) behavior that is a symbolic expression of the moods and motivations of religious participants and unseen powers. Ritual forms a

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bond of friendship, community, and unity with the believer and her or his god. Ritual further enables the participant to have an experience of the sacred.

Substantive Ritual I shall illustrate this dimension of religion using various types of religion: folk, archaic, Islamic, and Christian. Again, the substantive basis of ritual is to enable the participant to have direct access to an experience of the sacred.

Folk Religion A substantive interpretation of ritual can be found in Turner’s 1967 case study of the Ndembu of Northern Rhodesia. In 1965, these people numbered about 17,000 people and lived in the North-Western Province of Northern Rhodesia. They are subsistence farmers who augment their labour and livelihood through hunting. Turner notes that a symbol, the mudyi tree, is found in more than half a dozen different kinds of ritual. Its sacred element is that it is considered to be the place of all mothers, the ancestress of both men and women, and the place where all ancestors have slept. One rite celebrated about the tree is a puberty rite for girls. A feature of the tree is the color of its sap—white. When a girl child is initiated, she leaves her mother to become a mother herself. The milk of the tree is symbolic of the breast—a source of food and nurture and the bond between a child and the mother. The girl becomes a woman in the same way her ancestors did and, in so doing, become pure. Part of the ritual is to pass on the necessary knowledge to the female child to equip her for work and motherhood. The substantive element of this ritual is that it links the girl becoming a woman to the sacred women ancestors, who were also initiated and are pure.

Archaic The example presented here is from ancient Mesopotamia, from the scholarship of Buccellati (1995), which describes a supplicant praying on the roof of a temple during the night. He is there to sacrifice a lamb whose entrails are to be interpreted as a sign giving insight into the truth of things. The fire on the temple roof and the far stars are the only light visible. It is through the fire burning the lamb that the supplicant evokes the gods to reveal to him things hidden from human senses. These material objects are sacred and act as a sacrament, an avenue into the sacred realm. The prayer is directed to the deities because they are the windows through which one sees the ultimate level of being and power. In a word, the goal of the ritual is to partake of the same knowledge and power that the deities are purported to have.

Islam As noted above, two Islamic rituals, both involving rites performed at the tombs of religious masters, exemplify the substantive dimension of ritual. The ritual from Shi’ism is the popular

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17 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D visit to the tombs of the imams, including Ali and his son al-Husayn. This is a pilgrimage and second in importance only to the hajj or the journey to Mecca, one of the pillars of Islam. Takim (2005) describes the proper etiquette of the visit: having a ritual bath, being humble, weeping for the tragedy of the deaths of the imams, praising Allah while sending greetings to the Prophet Muhammad, cursing the ones who killed Ali and al-Husayn, giving money to charity, and, later, visiting those in need. While in the tomb’s precinct, the pilgrim is to recite an official prayer book, the ziyara. Extensions of the ritual consist of drama, passion plays, the reading of poetry, flagellations, and weeping. The focal point of the whole ritual is to congregate at the shrines to hear repeated affirmation of the injustices endured by the progeny of the Prophet. The passion plays relive the events that happened centuries ago in Kerbala (where al-Husayn was killed) and confront the martyrdom, intercession, and pivotal role of the imams. Flags and biers accompany the play to recall the suffering of these saints. A horse is part of the play and symbolizes the horse that al-Husayn rode on before his death. At the very appearance of the horse, the pilgrims weep and mourn for al-Husayn’s death. Some take swords and cut their heads, arms, and chests to symbolize the physical suffering of the imams. Another ritual that occurs outside of the visitation itself takes on the form of “the corpse traffic.” Relatives of deceased kin exhume the bodies of their deceased loved ones and carry them to be buried again near the tomb-shrine. The primary substantive meaning of the ritual consists of experiencing the presence of the holy man and, through him, coming into direct contact with Allah. At the very heart of the ritual is connecting with the divine or the sacred. According to Takim (2005), the contact is tangible, and the pilgrims claim, upon finishing the ritual, that they have been immersed in the divine presence. Those who participate in the dhikr ritual of Sufism and who recite the Qur’an also move to an ecstatic state of being one with the deity. These rituals reflect the very heart of Sufi mysticism or unity with the divine. To come to the tomb of a saint or a pir is to participate in the baraka or the blessings of the pir, which present the adherent with experiential knowledge, a love of God’s beauty, and a deep communion. Hodgson (1974) acknowledges that the more famous Sufi masters, such as Suhrawardi (d. 1191), focus on the divine light shining in the believer. Rumi (d. 1273) encourages the use of poetry, dancing, and ecstasy. His mystical theology led him to write, “All is God—the ocean is God, the pir is God, the wine is God, and the wine-drinker—all truth is to know just this” (quoted in Hodgson, 1974, vol. 2, p. 248). Trimingham (1971) adds another Sufi saint, Ibn al-‘Arabi (d. 1240), who was called “the greatest shaykh” (another word for pir) who lived in Spain. Al-‘Arabi writes, “I am the Light of God and all things are from light … I am the First who existed” (quoted in Trimingham, 1971, p. 163). Striking is the evidence that, in both diverse traditions within Islam, the ritual accentuates unity with the divine, living in the divine light, experiencing ecstasy, and being transported to another realm. Of relevance to these observations is the discussion in Chapter 8 as to the type of religious organization that Sufism is.

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Christianity Watts’s (1954) study of myth and ritual within pre–Vatican II Catholicism is a useful beginning point for the examination of Christian ritual from the substantive perspective. In pre– Vatican II Catholicism, the historical myth-event of Christ takes on an eternal dimension that is not restricted to two thousand years ago but is something perennial, both in all time and beyond all time. The Catholic Church follows an annual cycle called the Church Calendar, which begins with Advent, a period of preparation for Christmas symbolizing one’s personal death and the permanent coming of Christ’s kingdom, and continues with Lent, which prepares the participants for the death/resurrection myth of the Christ. The third period is the post-Easter period wherein church members are reminded of the “mysteries” that they just experienced ritually. The final period is a post-Pentecost time wherein the participant reflects upon the long period of history when the church has existed in this world under the “power of the Holy Spirit.” The cycle begins again, repeating the previous periods. The rituals of each stage of the annual cycle are repeated over and over again and carry with them a sacred character. In Advent, for example, the believers are encouraged to be in touch with moods and motivations conducive to that period: to remember their mortality and to prepare for eventual death. The rituals also serve to put the believer in touch with the “Christ” in whom bonds of friendship, unity, and communion are strengthened. Last, because reliving past historical events is not of this world but rather, in Watts’s (1954) words, “time itself is delivered from mere inanity by being lived sub specie aeternitatis” (or under the aspect of eternity), the ritual observer is transported into another world while still living in this world (p. 2).

Functional Ritual A functional definition of ritual, similar to a functional definition of religion and myth, emphasizes what ritual does—its function both for the individual and for the social group or society of which the believer is a part. These functions tend to accent the ritualistic aspect of the dimension of religion (namely, ritual that tends toward the alienation in contrast to the objectification end of O’Dea’s alienation–objectification continuum. Eight functions of ritual can be identified from the literature: (1) remembering, (2) social bonding, (3) regulating the moral behavior of members, (4) socializing members and acknowledging changes in social status, (5) psychological development or identity creation, (6) bonding to nature (the ecological function), (7) being empowered, and (8) evoking the nefarious. Ritual has a remembering function—it recalls to the believer that which tends to be easily forgotten: the mythologies of the past. Ritual also induces social bonding; the ritual observer is bonded to her or his god and, therefore, also to other members of the social group or the society. Another function of ritual is the regulation of behavior. Both anthropologists and sociologists have long understood that, for social life to be possible, there needs to be some sort of common base, some sort of common value or moral foundation that integrates individuals. A number of authors argue that, because ritual activity is repeated activity and because it is a

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17 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D “moral force,” it acts as a socially controlling agent on individual persons. Ritual also serves to help the individual to develop psychologically and to create an identity. Another sociological function of ritual is present when individuals are in the process of being socialized into being active members of a society or are changing status within that society. The literature on ritual calls these socializing customs and acknowledgements rites of passage, and they include the rituals that surround birth, puberty, marriage, and death. The ecological function of ritual is not common. For participants in some religions, however, rituals put them in touch with nature, with the natural ecology. Rituals function to form some kind of communion with the earth, the fields, waters, the trees, or some other natural element. Another function of ritual is empowerment. The argument here is that, when participants gather together, they experience something they do not when they are alone: empowerment and a sense of having received a supernatural power. Only one function of ritual is negative; ritual can function to invoke the nefarious. Just as religion can be dysfunctional (see the discussion of conflict theory in Chapter 1) both for individuals and groups (societies as well), so also can ritual. The functions of ritual can be understood best when they are examined within the context of specific sacred traditions. Consequently, the following section will use examples of rituals drawn from folk, archaic, Christian, and Muslim traditions to illustrate each of the functions of ritual described previously. Archaeological scholarship on the Assyrians, anthropological literature concerning folk religions, and historical and sociological data on the sacred in medieval and modern societies inform the following discussion.

Ritual as Remembering Ritual functions to remind both individuals and social groups what their heritage is and what their past was. It serves to remind the participants of the myths, stories, and past events that affect the present reality. Davis (1948–1949) writes, “Ritual helps to remind the individual of the holy realm, to revivify and strengthen his faith in this religion” (p. 534). Berger (1969) begins his functional definition of ritual by arguing that people tend to fear the prospect of chaos: both cosmological and social. Ritual serves to remind them that, in the light of religious myths, chaos is pushed back every time it is enacted. In short, ritual “makes present the past” (Berger, 1969, p. 26). Watts (1954), Wallace (1966), Durkheim (1915), and Eliade (1959) present a common view of ritual as remembering. Watts (1954) describes Christianity as a ritual reliving of the Christ story through the seasonal cycle of the ecclesiastical year. For Wallace (1966), ritual connects the myth of the past with the reality of the present and helps participants recall a major cosmological theme: a theory of the origins of the universe and the pantheon (the divine population of the heavens). Durkheim (1915) says it well: “The rite consists solely in recollecting the past and, in a way, makes it present by means of a veritable dramatic representation” (p. 372). Eliade (1959) adds that it is by way of ritual that the believer constructs a sacred space that reproduces the work of the gods. An example from folk religion (the Lakota’s) illustrates this function. The Lakota (nineteenth-century plains people of Midwestern America) developed a ritual that was intended to

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“put things back as they were” before the arrival of the Europeans. DeMaille (1982) provides us with a description of this ritual—the “Ghost Dance.” He quotes a missionary observer: They all looked at the sun as they danced. They stopped going round now and then, and all faced the sun, with uplifted faces and outstretched arms, standing in straight lines and moaning a most horrible sound. Then they raised themselves on the toes, and then lowered themselves, raising and lowering their bodies in this way and groaning dismally, then joined hands with heads strained backwards, watching the sun and praying to it until, with dizziness and weariness, one after another fell down, some of them wallowing and rolling on the ground and frothing at the mouth, others throwing their arms and running around and whooping like mad men, and all the time, as much as possible, still gazing sunward. They have not yet cut themselves, as in the old sun dance, but yesterday I heard this talk: some said, “If one cuts himself, he is more “wakan” 1 and can see and talk with the Messiah.” (p. 264)

The dance is similar to a more ancient dance, the sun dance. It became a common ritual among the Lakota towards the end of the nineteenth century. The historical context of the dance is the near destruction of the buffalo, the people’s confinement to the reservation, their having received some basic instruction in the Christian religion, and the dictatorial leadership of the agents who, along with the missionaries, forced the death of traditional Lakota beliefs and rites. This particular ritual is both a remembering ritual and a restorative one. A cornerstone of the Lakota religion, as recorded by DeMaille, was that both humankind and the buffalo had originated within the earth before they emerged on the surface. When the animals became scarce, it was believed that they went back under the earth because they had been offended by either the Lakota or the Europeans. The mythology associated with the Ghost Dance included the story of a holy man or shaman of the tribe who had foretold during the mid-nineteenth century that “the four-leggeds were going back to the earth” but, also, that they would return. A part of the ritual of the Ghost Dance was the promise of a new earth, well stocked with buffalo, the cessation of Euro-American domination, and the resurrection of the Lakota culture and lifestyle. A comparable version of the mythological basis of this ritual was given by a Lakota chief, Short Bull (1982): “The Father had commanded all the world to dance, and we gave the dance to the people as we had been bidden. When they danced, they fell dead and went to the spiritcamp and saw those who had died, those whom they had loved” (p. 262). Remembering and restorative themes are present in this version as well: the Great Father has given all to the white man and to the Indian nothing. In the future, the Indian shall have all that the white man has and the white man will have nothing. Wisdom and power will be given to the Lakota, and the white man will be helpless. As so many other customs, the Ghost Dance has ceased. DeMaille (1982) comments: The importance of the Ghost Dance is not to be measured in the simple number of participants or in the unhappiness or despair that it reflected, but rather as part of the religious history of the Lakota people. For a time it held out such hope to the Lakotas that its ultimate failure, symbolized by the tragic deaths of the believers at Wounded

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174 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Knee, generated a renewed religious crisis that forced a final realization that the old ways, with the hunting of the buffalo, were actually gone forever. (p. 269)

Ritual as Social Bonding Central to the sociology and anthropology of religion is the social dimension of religion. The study of ritual reinforces this perception. Ritual functions to bond persons together, to increase levels of social cohesion, and to augment social solidarity. Smith (1956) agrees: “in renewing by a solemn act of worship the bond that united him [the participant] with his god, he also renewed the bonds of family, social, and national obligation” (p. 263). Smith (1956), discussing the sacrificial ritual common in Semitic religion, where members ate and drank together as part of the ritual, writes the following: By admitting man to his table the god admits him to his friendship; but this favor is extended as one of a community, to eat and drink along with his fellows, and in the same measure as the act of worship cements the bond between him and his god, it cements also the bond between him and his brethren in the common faith. (265)

Durkheim (1915) extends this analysis of the social bonding function of ritual beyond the eating and drinking dimension to other kinds of social interaction. He notes, Rites are something more than movements without importance and gestures without efficacy—the apparent function is to strengthen the bonds attaching the believer to his god—they at the same time really strengthen the bonds attaching the individual to the society of which he is a member. (p. 226)

Levi-Strauss (1966) offers a further nuance. In the case of two groups that are at odds with one another or that are initially very separate, ritual joins them together. The following example of the social bonding function of ritual is taken from a study of archaic religion. Wiggermann (1995, p. 1858) provides us with this example, taken from the archaic religion of Mesopotamia, and describes a system of religious acts of worship that include prayers, processions, sacrifices, adoration of sacred images, gestures, and genuflections, which were usually performed in sacred public places such as temples, shrines, and venues of pilgrimage. These rituals were intrinsically linked to Mesopotamian theology. This scholar presents a picture of Mesopotamian theology that defines the deities as rulers, human as their servants, and nature as a multitude of objects to be managed for the profit of both. Human social action was closely monitored by these gods and goddesses and was guided through punishment and reward. Beyond the state, there was inconsistency in how these deities governed. Beyond the civilized regions of the ancient domain were hungry demons, feral monsters, untamed mountains, dreadful seas, and lawless barbarians ready to wreak havoc on the civilized Mesopotamians. Wiggermann (1995) further argues that a striking dimension of Mesopotamian theology is political and that this theology achieved lasting success as a mythology of rulership and legitimated power or authority, to use Weber’s language. These deities of supernatural

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power created the world for their own benefit, and humans were created to serve them. This is the core theology that is reinforced by the multifarious rituals that ring out in the temple services and the sacred spaces. The social bonding function of ritual is reflected in the construction of a unity between the deities of the cities of Sumeria (Kish, Nippur, Umma, Urak, Lagash, and Ur), the cities’ kings, and their subjects. This bond can be described as a paradigm linking religion, politics, and society, and it consisted of a belief in the city deity or in a major national deity (along with his female consorts and divine “concubines”), the rituals necessary to honor this deity, and the proper actions that were pleasing to the deity or deities. The link was tenuous. If there were a breach in belief, an improper celebration of ritual, a dishonoring of the king, or any sort of lawlessness, the gods and goddesses may be angered, and suffering, plagues, or even military defeat might be a consequence.

Ritual as Regulating Moral Behavior Durkheim (1938) has argued that a unique feature of social groups, of societies, is the presence of social facts. These facts are considered to be every way of acting that is capable of exercising an external constraint on the individual person. Human behavior, then, is affected by these facts, which are coercive in nature and tend to regulate the behavior of societal members. Religion in general and religious ritual in particular function in this way, being kinds of social facts that act as external constraints upon the believer. As Durkheim (1915) states, “The true justification of religious practices does not lie in the apparent ends which they pursue, but rather in the invisible action which they exercise over the mind and in the way in which they affect our mental status” (p. 359). He adds that rites “serve to remake individuals and groups morally”(p. 370). More recently, Wuthnow (1987), using a cultural analytical approach,2 concludes that the central function of ritual is to reduce uncertainty by expressing and maintaining moral order. Ritual is that which maintains moral order or “regulates and defines social relations” (p. 107) and “a symbolic expressive aspect of behavior that communicates something about social relations, often in a dramatic or formal manner” (p. 109). In the tradition of Durkheim, then, the moral function of ritual is to put order into human relationships, to provide a code whereby men and women can live and interact together. An example from Islam will give evidence of the moral function of ritual. Ethics and morality are important not only among the Sufis and the Shi’ites but in Islam in general. One of the Five Pillars of Islam is giving alms to others. Takim (2005) notes that a pilgrim giving alms during a visit to the tomb of Ali (called the “Commander of the Faith”) will gain the merit of 100,000 good deeds and have 100,000 evil deeds removed. Further, if one continues to perform the ritual, there will be a restoration of the social-political rights forfeited to the Sunnis over the centuries of conflict. The Sufi ideal is that the pir and the disciples never lie, never break a promise, do no harm to anything, do not judge others, and are humble (Hodgson, 1974). Even ascetic practices, such as living humbly or wearing the rough woollen robe of the Sufi, have a moral dimension in Islam. Just as political jihad is part of the Muslim tradition, the “invisible jihad” is central to Sufism. Holy war begins in the soul—one becomes pure and righteous by “fighting” against lust, passions, and pride

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17 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D inside of one’s self. For mystics like Suhrawardi, Ibn-al-‘Arabi, and Rumi, the love that links the soul to God also is linked to fellow Muslims and, indeed, to all humans.

Ritual as Socialization and Changes in Social Status Some of the earliest work done on ritual by anthropologists was on rites of passage. Van Gennep (1960) argued that all cultures have a class of rituals that celebrate the transition of an individual from one social status to another. He notes that there are three stages of this passage: separation, transition, and incorporation. Wallace (1966) explains them: “In separation, the individual is taken from a place or group or status; in transition, he is sacred and is subjected to procedures of transformation; and in incorporation, he is formally installed in the new place or group or status” (p. 105). I will present several studies from Christianity to illustrate this function of ritual. A good example of a rite of passage or socialization is the coronation of a monarch in the medieval (and Catholic) world. A significant paradigm of the relationship between religion and the state, between the crown (a medieval symbol of the head of a state) and the cross (the symbol of Christianity), was the coronation of Charles the Great or Charlemagne (747–814) as the Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo III (c. 750–816) on Christmas Day, 800. This was the genesis of the Holy Roman Empire that existed, although in fragmented form and within various borders, until 1806. Hodgkin (1899/2003) provides us with some vital details of this monumental, paradigmatic event. By the time Charles had gone to Rome, he was already king of the Franks, as the heir of his father, Pepin the Short (c. 715–768). Hodgkin recounts how both Charles and Leo III processed into a huge basilica measuring 320 by 226 feet; as the two walked under canopies of velvet drapes, they were surrounded by 96 pillars; 1, 370 candles; dozens of icons of Jesus, Mary, and saints; and numerous cardinals of the Episcopal Order (cardinal bishops). Charles knelt in a prayerful mood and then, upon rising, the pope approached him, poured oil over his head, and crowned him emperor with these words, which were echoed by the congregation: “To Carolus Augustus, crowned by God, mighty and pacific emperor, be life and victory” (Hodgkin, 1899/2003, p. 149). Then the people, the pope, and the cardinal bishops sang, and loud series of laudes (praise invocations) to Christ, the angels, apostles, martyrs, and virgins ensued, as the congregation asked heaven to grant to the newly crowned emperor divine aid to conquer all his foes. To flesh this coronation out beyond an event in the history of the West, Buc (2001) provides us with how this ritual was constructed and its import for subsequent European history. The legitimation of early European royalty by the church did not come easily. Bishop Gregory of Tours (c. 538–594) was unwilling to hallow his kings. However, during the life of Gregory, early medieval Europe was changing. A new mixed nobility of primarily Frankish heritage arose in Gaul. The bishops of Gaul, during the fifth century, were upholders of morality and leaders in the wake of the collapse of the western part of the Roman Empire. With the stabilization of Gaul at the hands of the Franks, the local aristocrats needed these bishops to support their authority. Brown (2003) notes that these same bishops began to take on the veneer of aristocracy, and many of them became very rich. Their wealth, however, was a wealth distributed among the people. These bishops visited hospitals, gave alms generously, attended to the clergy, and provided an open house for many visitors.

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This charitable activity was a social precondition for the legitimation of future kings by the bishops, who were of a similar social class. Buc (2001) notes that it was after the death of Charlemagne that rituals were created to construct a closer unity between church and state. This coming together was especially important in the coronation ritual where anointing by oil and crowning with a royal crown constituted royal power. The crown, especially, became the sign par excellence of the monarch and was associated with Christian kingship. After the coronation by the local bishop (or the pope, as in the case of Charlemagne or other emperors of the Holy Roman Empire), the king walked hand in hand with the bishop in procession from the church. Another custom that flowed from this ritual of the unity of the cross and the crown was that the king was frequently a senior member of church councils. Although this custom was accentuated after the era of the Frankish coronations, Bede (1272/1994), in his ecclesiastical history of the English peoples, notes that King Oswiu, the king of Northumbria in the latter part of the sixth century, called a special church council in Whitby (the Synod of Whitby) to arrange for the church in England to follow the Roman church’s method of calculating when to celebrate Easter.

Ritual as Psychological Development O’Dea and O’Dea (1983) provide us with the theory that religion is a response to people’s experiences of “limit situations” or to their feelings of contingency, powerlessness, and scarcity. Ritual practices can, as noted by Smith (1956), Kluckhohn (1972), and Hargrove (1989), reduce the anxiety produced by these feelings. Kluckhohn argues that rites remind believers of how the ancients survived these feelings. These ancients (he uses the example of the Navaho people) met similar “limit situations” and conquered them. If the rites are performed properly, the participants can also reduce anxiety and be at peace.

Figure 7:2 The Spiritual Journey of A Sufi Devotee Souls are part of this emanation

Creation emanates from God All creation is fundamentally one: change is illusionary

Need a pir to assist in the journey…one comes from God (into darkness) and returns to God (back to light)

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They are caught in darkness and their life journey is to ascend back to the light: souls are moments in God’s love of His own self-fulfillment

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17 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 7:3 The Centrality of the Pir

The Order of the Cosmos God Pir Devotee Ordinary People: Sufism as a popular religion where people journey to tombs to seek blessings

Folk Religion Durkheim furnishes us not only with an understanding of ritual’s function in society (social bonding and moral regulation) but also with the theory that ritual has a psychological function—to promote well-being. He notes that, when the Australian aboriginal repeats rites over and over again, the result is not only a material good but also a sense of well-being. He writes that, after performing the rite, “they take away with them a feeling of well being, whose causes they cannot clearly see, but which is well founded. They feel that the ceremony is good for them; and, as a matter of fact, they reforge their moral nature in it” (Durkheim, 1915, p. 359). The psychological function of ritual is evident in Islam–particularly in Sufism. Personal or psychological development is important not only for Sufi devotees but also for the pilgrims to the shrines of the imams. As mysticism is central to Sufism, a central part of mysticism is movement or journeying to oneness with the divine. Many rituals surround this journey: the recitation of sacred texts (especially the Qur’an), chanting, proper breathing, modest posture, discipline, and obedience to the pir. Unlike the scholars of Sunni Islam (the ulama) who analyze the sacred text, Sufi devotees search for hidden, esoteric meanings to apply to their lives. For the more famous Sufi masters noted above (Suhrawardi, Ibn-al-‘Arabi, and Rumi), the end of the journey was to be enveloped in light, to be enraptured with love for Allah, to experience the soul “... as only a moment in God’s love of his own self-fulfilment (Hodgson, 1974, p. 239). Figure 7.2 illustrates this personal pilgrimage through life. Trimingham (1971) notes that the pir is essential for the spiritual progression of the devotee. Each pir is seen as an axis mundi about whom the world revolves. Of special importance is the greatest of pirs, Muhammad the Prophet, who is the image of God, who existed before creation as a cosmic Muhammad. Figure 7.3 is a visual depiction of the link to the divine that the pir provides for pilgrims who come to the tombs of the deceased pirs. Personal development and growth is also important to the Shi’ite pilgrim. There is believed to be baraka on the tomb of an imam, in any cloth thread of the tomb and in the

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sand about the tomb. To touch any of these objects is to receive cures, blessings, bounty, and happiness in the psychic order. Pilgrims often take sand home with them to remind them of the baraka (Takim, 2005). Also, the many rituals surrounding the pilgrimage, such as recitation of the ziyara, participation in passion plays, reading poetry, weeping, and flagellations, increase the merit of the participant and aid in personal growth and well-being.

Ritual as Bonding to Nature: The Ecological Function of Ritual This function is not commonly recognized in the research literature. The only example presented here is from folk religion, as few other religious traditions emphasize this function— connecting people with the natural world. The example from folk religion is from First Nation Americans and Canadians. As is well known from native studies, the aboriginal peoples of America and Canada have a profound respect for the natural environment. Paper (1989) describes the ecological and cosmological meaning of the sacred pipe ritual. The bowl of the pipe (made of stone) is a miniature cosmos that is female. The tobacco is put into the bowl in minute pieces that symbolize bringing the entire cosmos into the bowl itself. The stem of the pipe (made of wood) is male in nature and is symbolic of the trees and the sky. When the sacred pipe is smoked in a formal ceremony, there is signified a connection of the self (the participant) not only to the world of social relations (fellow participants, family, clan, and nation) but also to animals, who are extensions of social relations (nature is depicted in personal, familial terms), to the earth, to the sky, and to the whole of the cosmos. In effect, then, this ritual is understood to integrate people with nature, for all things are “relatives.” Although the religions of the First Nations people of North America provide the best examples of this function of ritual, other religious traditions also have rituals that connect people with nature, e.g., the blessing of the animals in the Anglican tradition, the Harvest Ritual in ancient Rome, and the various New Age earth masses.

Ritual as Empowerment Durkheim (1915) writes that a central function of ritual is empowerment: believers … feel that the real function of religion is not to make us think, to enrich our knowledge, nor to add to the conceptions which we owe to science others of another origin and another character, but rather, it is to make us act, to aid us to live. The believer who has communicated with his god is not merely a man who sees new truths of which the unbeliever is ignorant; he is a man who is stronger. He feels within him more force, either to endure the trials of existence, or to conquer them. It is as though he were raised above his condition as a mere man; he believes that he is saved from evil, under whatever form he may conceive this evil. (p. 416)

Durkheim focuses here on a central feature of religion in general and ritual in particular— empowerment through acts of communication with the divine. Islam provides us with an example of this function. For Shi’ite pilgrims, to visit the tombs of their beloved imams is to receive an abundance of baraka, merit for the forgiveness of sins, cures from illnesses, prosperity, and life in paradise. This is illustrated within the last

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1 8 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D rite of the visit, the farewell ziyara. Here is from a farewell ziyara text dedicated to al-Abbas who was also killed at Karbala with al-Husayn: I bid farewell to you and I send my greetings to you, believing in Allah, His Prophet, the book and in what has come from Allah. O Allah, record for us among those who have witnessed, do not make this my last visitation to the grave of the son of the brother of your Prophet, peace be on him and his family. Grant me a chance to visit him for as long as I am alive. Gather me with him and his ancestors in the gardens. Bring me closer to him, Your Prophet and friends. (Takim, 2005, p. 193)

The pilgrim now returns to ordinary life and is reintegrated into society redolent with and empowered by the baraka of the imam. He returns having just experienced the power of salvation and, maybe, the curative blessing of the imam. The empowerment of the Sufi disciple and the pilgrim to a deceased pir is intimately connected to the baraka and the power of the pir. As a disciple, the Sufi is taught to gain empowerment through song, dance, and the recitation and singing of the Qur’an. His pir encourages him not to be deceived by external manifestations but to search for an interior empowerment to bring him to unity with the divine. The devotee to the pirs’ tombs is no religious virtuoso. He is married, likely with children, and has a secular job. His hope for the power to live out, on a daily basis, the teachings of the Qur’an is to bathe before the tomb, to touch material articles, and to recite and sing the dhikr with instruments, sound, and voice. In short, these rituals are vehicles of empowerment: assisting the participants in feeling stronger, less alienated, and more ready to serve others. It should be stressed that, in both cases, empowerment, although it is personal, is directed to the social group—the whole group (or church) becomes empowered as well as the individual.

Ritual as Evoking the Nefarious The symbolic dilemma presents the possibility that some of the rituals and objects necessary to symbolize a religion’s original transcendent experience may become alienated from the believer; when rituals function to evoke the nefarious, a different form of alienation is present. These rituals function to bring harm, hurt, and even death to others, often people alienated from society, who are considered enemies or evil. Curses and witchcraft are common examples. Sociologically, one may see these kinds of rituals as creating boundaries between the immediate social group and the “outsiders.” Here are some examples from the folk and Christian traditions.

Folk Religion The classic and seminal study of witchcraft among folk societies is by Evans-Pritchard (1937/1976). In an introduction to its text, Gillies (1976) provides us with the background of the Azande peoples, who lived in what is now Sudan and Zaire. These people lived in a sparsely wooded savannah and made their living by cultivating vegetables, hunting, fishing, and rearing fowl. This subsistence agricultural economy was supplemented by trade in a variety of crafts, including selling the wares of smiths, potters, and basket weavers. Evans-

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Figure 7:4a The Identification of a Witch Through an Oracle Witchcraft beliefs

The kin of the victim seeks answers through a poison oracle.

A witch is a person who has a witchcraft substance.

The witch hates another or is angry with another.

The victim suffers an illness or dies.

The witch bewitches this other person.

If a witch is identified, then he or she has to pay some recompense.

Pritchard did his field studies in the 1920s when the people were not, as yet, integrated into the larger market being established by British and French colonialists. Scattered, small farms were spread about the savannah, and neighbors were linked by marriage and kin. For some, polygyny was a common practice. The political structure was involved and hierarchical, with a clan by the name of the Avongara ruling the Azande peoples. They held their subjects in contempt and resented the encroachment of the British and the French colonialists. Graphic and visual representations of Azande beliefs and rites concerning witchcraft (Figure 7.4a and 7.4b) will help our understanding. Evans-Pritchard clarifies some of the elements of Azande belief and the meanings of terms that the Azande use. A witch can be either a woman or a man, and the older she or he is the more potent is her or his power. Witchcraft is ubiquitous in that it is integrated into the ordinary social, economic, and political life of the people. Sorcery is the use of a ritual or a spell to harm others, but a witch is a person who has the “substance” of the craft within her or him. Witchcraft is actually part of the person’s body (termed mangu). The substance and role of being a witch is inherited from ancestors and thus can be part of a whole kin network. This substance is “cool” in that, most of the time, it is inactive. However, it becomes “hot” when the witch sends it as a kind of psychic-physical substance to a person who is to be harmed. This is the activity of “bewitching.” Witchcraft beliefs assign any tragedy (loss of a crop, poor yields of the fields, curtailed game in a hunt, the lack of fertility of a woman, the impotency of a man, illness, and, especially, death) to the fact of the victim being bewitched. A witch bewitches another because of a broken relationship, anger against a neighbor, a shattered promise, or jealousy. The witch bewitches one against whom he or she has a grudge. In all cases but illness and death, the victim tends to “bear” the tragedy or the problem. However, in the case of illness or death, it is imperative that the victim or the victim’s representative takes action to identify the witch who did this and to seek revenge. In the first example of discovery (Figure 7.4a), the victim

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1 82 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 7:4B The Identification of a Witch Through the witch doctors’ dance Witchcraft beliefs

The witch doctors dance, and their “prophecy” identifies the witch.

A witch is a person who has a witchcraft substance.

The witch hates another or is angry with another.

The victim suffers an illness or dies.

The witch bewitches this other person.

If a witch is identified, then he or she has to pay some recompense.

(or representative) engages in a ritual of poisoning a chicken. Suspected tribal members’ names are presented before a chicken. The chicken is given a mild poison—if it lives, the person so named is not guilty, but, if the chicken dies, then he or she is guilty. A representative takes a wing of the chicken to the guilty party. In most cases, the witch admits wrongdoing and asks for mercy. Except in the case of death, no recompense is asked, and peaceful relationships are constructed again. The second ritual is more complex. It occurs in the case of serious illness and death. Figure 7.4b illustrates this ritual. At the home of the ill person or his or her previous home, a witchdoctor comes (sometimes with other trainees). He (only he as there are no female witchdoctors) comes dressed in an elaborate costume that is covered with bells, charms that make noise. After talking to the ill person (or the kin of a deceased person), he begins to dance. Neighbors arrive and a long dance ritual occurs. During the dance, the witchdoctor calls upon magic to fight against the power of bewitching. Also, he reflects on a number of names—people who are suspected of doing the bewitching. After long periods of dancing, he moves into a trance. Here an oracle is said to have occurred. A particular name stands out, and he utters it. A messenger goes to the accused witch and, in cases when the victim has died, the witch has to pay something in recompense. In contrast to the European view of witches in late medieval times, the Azande consider the witch to be a normal member of the society. He or she is married, has children, engages in economically productive work, and is a good neighbor. If he or she does bewitch, there are rituals to deal with it. However, the witch is not hurt, exiled, or punished in any major way. Witches are told that they must give restitution for their wrongdoing.

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Figure 7:5 Twofold Nature of Witchcraft (15th–18th century Europe) Witchcraft

Against religion A heresy

Harm to others

Christianity The essential meaning of witchcraft in the late medieval and early modern period in Europe (mid–fifteenth to mid-eighteenth century) is similar to that found in Babylon, Assyria and among the Azandes. Both Thomas (1971) and Morton and Dahms (2005) describe the essence of witchcraft as doing harm to others—those who did the harm were called witches or maleficarum (doers of evil). The difference between the Azande witches studied by Evans-Pritchard (1937/1976) and those of the other past cultures mentioned is that, for the latter, a supernatural source is the origin of witchcraft’s harm. In ancient Babylon, a demon-goddess was the source (Rollin 1983). In the European example, the demon is identified as Satan, the archenemy of God or of Christ. Also, the witch was thought to have been in covenant with Satan. The unique addition from Europe is that not only does witchcraft cause harm and have Satan as its source but also, most important, it is a heresy against the Christian tradition, both Catholic and Protestant. As time progressed, however, according to Morton and Dahms (2005), the “doing of harm” takes on a minor note, and the “true crime” becomes heresy, abandoning the faith, and being in league with the devil. Figure 7.5 illustrates this distinction. There has been much debate over the last two decades as to how many women were executed because of been found guilty of being a witch. Monter (2002) did an extensive review of sources and comes up with the number of about 50,000 women. Numbers, small or large, do little to portray the horror and dishonor inflicted on these women. This treatment provides such a contrast to the respect given to women during the era of early Christianity and in early Europe, as documented in Chapter 6. Further, how many people were accused and then executed? Thomas (1971) gives us some sense. In Essex, England, from 1559–1736, there were 513 persons accused under witchcraft legislation of whom just over 200 were convicted and 105 were hanged. A full 13 per cent of all crimes were associated with witchcraft. How can we explain why this happened from a sociological perspective? A possible explanation is to consider the nature of medieval society. As will be discussed in Chapter 10, at various times and places, the medieval world was a hierocratic society. This domination led to the use of coercion and violence to induce people to conform. Those who did not conform were sought out, tried, prosecuted, and, as in the case of witch hunts, killed. Women were considered in many ways to be non-conformist. Because the medieval world was as patriarchal as it was hierocratic, they were more likely to be victims than men.

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1 8 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Using data from the research of Morton and Dahms (2005) and Thomas (1971), one may construct a sociological model to assist us in understanding the phenomenon. As with most social phenomena, witchcraft, including all its elements (witches, trials, and the eventual execution of witches) is created about two factors: (1) the social construction of the phenomenon by the people directly engaged (the theme of social construction) and (2) the secular and sacred authorities (the social control theme). Figure 7.6 depicts the model. Thomas (1971) makes the case that the typical trial and execution of a witch begins with the allegation that a curse was made by a person of lower status against one of higher status. As in the case of the Azandes, the use of witchcraft can be traced to broken relationships. Thomas notes that the efficacy of cursing others lay not in theology but in popular sentiment. The more justified a curser’s anger, the more likely the imprecation would be effective. They were violent. In Wales, church records contain rituals that ask God to shorten the lives of enemies, burn their houses, kill their children, destroy their goods, and blast their descendants. In time, these curses were combined with magical rituals and, consequently, were interpreted as being witchcraft. Who was more likely to be accused as a witch? A person who was a woman and was poor. She was thought to have cursed people in authority or those of superior classes. Thomas (1971) writes,

Figure 7:6 The Social Construction and Social Control of Witchcraft (15th–18th century Europe) Witchcraft

Social construction

Social control

The Witch

The Witch Hunt

Woman

Establishment of power to judge and punish heresy

Outsider Enemy Heretic Devil’s consort Part of demonological conspiracy

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Reinforcement of patriarchy Suppression of ancient knowledge Control of those outside power structures

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Although the witch might expect to gain some benefits from her diabolical compact, these were subordinate to her main desire, to avenge herself upon her neighbors ... lowliness of condition was the first ingredient in the making of a witch. (p. 522)

If tragedies happened in people’s lives, it was often assumed that they were the result of a curse by a suspected witch. Some include the illnesses of people and animals, a fire, broken hedges, trodden-down corn or grain, failed crops, the infertility of women and animals, or butter that would not set. The accused women were objects of hatred by their neighbors, and a witch’s conviction at the assizes (the courts) usually had the full support of the people. Another theme in the social construction of witchcraft comes from the research of Morton and Dahms (2005). Witches were believed to travel at night to rituals, called sabbaths, where they met the devil. They were thought to engage in orgies of blasphemy, immoral rites, the eating of infants, and the mocking of Christian rituals. People imagined that Satan forced sex on them, that the witches kissed his backside, and, more dramatically, that they made a compact with him. People imagined that, if this happened, Satan placed a secret sign on the woman’s body. In later trials, the persecutors looked for these signs. Thomas comments that there is no evidence at all that these sabbaths were ever celebrated. This covers the central elements of the social construction theme. Those women who did not go to court were still punished by local neighbors, which caused the accused witches much harm, anguish, and pain. Others, however, were punished by the courts, and many lost their lives. How did this happen? It emerged from the social control exerted by those in power and authority, who were also engaged in their own social construction of reality. The teaching that witchcraft was rooted in the devil began in a series of edicts that resulted in the papal bull Summis desiderantes affectibus of Innocent VIII in 1484. This was followed by the Malleus Maleficarum of 1486, published by two Dominican friars, Heinrich Kramer and Jacob Sprenger. It was well distributed: in Germany, it was released 16 times and, in France, 11 times before 1700. In a work by Robbins (1959), the idea that this new concept of witchcraft was created and propagated as a means of social control is clearly outlined: “the theological concept of witchcraft was never of the people but was imposed from above by the late medieval papacy” (quoted by Thomas, 1971, p. 456). The players of the Inquisition made a trade of witch hunting and used torture and leading questions (along with examining women’s bodes in search of the “mark of the devil”) to extract confessions. A precedent to the witch trials that had both sacred and religious legitimacy was the creation of the Inquisition as part of the bureaucracy of the medieval church. In 1231, Gregory IX presented a bull that institutionalized the prosecution of heretics. The responsibility of staffing the papal inquisition was given mainly to Dominican friars. The papal inquisition was not, however, a full institution but, rather, a series of inquiries into the beliefs and actions of suspected recusants or those who diverted from the faith (Morris, 1990). Ecclesiastical courts were constructed to engage in these investigations. In the case of witchcraft, the actual executions of the accused were carried out by the civil courts. Morton and Dahms (2005) present us with an example. During the times of the witch trials, Germany was part of the Holy Roman Empire, and its laws included an imperial criminal code called the Carolina that was intended to provide order to the state. The principal parts of the code were that judgements should be based on the testimony of reliable witnesses and interrogation of the accused. One such code refers

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1 8 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D to those accused of witchcraft. The accused, after witnesses were presented, was tortured to induce confession. If confessed and “shown” to be guilty, then she was sentenced, in many cases, to death. A true case history that fleshes out the themes of social construction and social control comes from the work of Morton and Dahms (2005). They discovered records of a witchcraft trial that occurred in Brunswick, Germany in 1663. The woman accused was Tempel Anneke (whose real name was Anna Roleffes). Morton and Dahms edited and translated the trial records and reproduced them in their 2005 publication. Tempel Anneke was accused of numerous crimes and heresies that help the modern reader understand the social construction of witchcraft. After a long trial and torture, she confessed to those things of which she was accused. She said that she committed heresy in renouncing Jesus, received a mark of Satan on her person, learned sorcery, visited the Devil’s dance, fornicated with him, stole from neighbors, and caused a disease in a man’s leg and the death of horses and cows. Via the social control dimension of the authorities, on December 28, 1663, she was beheaded with a sword and burned. This period of Christian history is a dark time in the religion’s tradition. The intent of ritual in the charismatic stage of Christianity was to offer a loving, caring relationship with Christ. These routinized versions of ritual indicate how far removed a ritual can be from its original genesis.

CONCLUSIONS The substantive and primary intent of ritual is to put the participant in touch with the sacred. Several case examples were used to illustrate this. Thereafter, examples from folk, archaic, Islamic, and Christian traditions were presented. There appears to be evidence for the substantive view of ritual, which defines ritual as putting one in contact with the sacred. Ritual can also be defined in functional terms. Rituals function to encourage people to remember what they so frequently forget about their religious heritage: their myths. And ritual tends to create bonding and communion between members and the social group thus constructed. Conversely, ritual is also a source of social control, a mechanism of socialization, a means to acquire a new status, and a regulator of moral behavior. For the individual person, ritual practices create well-being and offer a vehicle of emotional release. However, they also tend to channel and to regulate emotion. Rituals, especially among folk peoples and the First Nations of the Americas, integrate participants with organic life, the earth, the land, the water, and the sky. A sixth function of ritual is empowerment. The spiritual is understood by most religious adherents as being redolent of energy or power. Through ritual, this power is captured by the participants, and they feel a sense of empowerment. The functions of ritual often become more important as a religion becomes institutionalized and charisma is routinized. Also, ritual, in its most routinzed form, has a dark side. Even though it may function positively in establishing group boundaries, ritual also produces harm and destruction to individuals who are considered outsiders and who may become targets of ritual.

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NOTES 1

Among various American Indian groups, wakan is a potentially great spiritual power of supernatural origin belonging to some natural objects. Wakan may be conceived of as a weak or strong power; the weak powers can be ignored, but the strong ones must be placated. Poisonous plants and reptiles can contain wakan, as can intoxicating drinks. Wakan beings are the immortal supernatural powers who bestow wakan; they, too, may be weak or strong, but all are believed to enjoy music and pipe smoke. Wakan has no essential characteristics in itself; rather, it is a kind of holiness or wonderfulness inherent in some objects.

2

See Chapter 1.

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C h a p t e r E IG H T

T h e Di l e m m a of A dm i n i s t r at i v e Or de r : T h e R i s e of S ac r e d Or g a n i z at ion s

Orientation Most of us who have had any contact with organized religion have

had this contact through some sort of experience with a specific church, mosque, temple, or synagogue. If we received a positive experience, then we may have been encouraged to return. If our contact did not make any impression on us, and we sensed nothing but routine and “dry bones,” there was likely little to encourage us to return. This is the topic of this chapter: the religious organization as life giving or as enervating. A subsequent question is how to maintain order within collectivities without that order inhibiting freedom, effectiveness, and, in the case of religious groups, the possibility of participants continuing to be in contact with the sacred. The dilemma that structures this chapter is the dilemma of administrative order. Coined by O’Dea and O’Dea (1983), the phrase the “dilemma of administrative order” has as a subtitle “elaboration versus effectiveness.” In simple terms, the dilemma describes the necessity of developing a system of administrative order and the danger that, if this development gets out of control, the organization’s structure will become too elaborate—an unwieldy bureaucratic machine. Clearly organization is necessary for the vision of the prophet to continue. The organization, however, can lose sight of the original vision and become primarily concerned with its own development and growth. Not only can an organization grow to become unmanageable, but structures that were set in place at an earlier time may refuse to bend to change. As O’Dea and O’Dea observe, “Structures which emerge in one set of conditions and in response to one set of problems may turn out later to be unwieldy instruments for handling new problems under new conditions.” Whether the problem is characterized

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by an over-elaborate organization or a structure that cannot respond to present-day needs, the result is a potential alienation of officeholders from the rank-and-file members of the religious organization. Initially, this chapter will introduce the reader to the meaning of religious organization. Next, it will elaborate various kinds of religious organizations: those from folk societies, temples (an example from ancient Mesopotamia), churches, sects, new religious movements, movements of renewal, and denominations (with examples from Christianity and Islam where appropriate). Subsequently, a review of the research on people who switch from one religious tradition to another or who disaffiliate completely will be presented. Last, the chapter examines whether charisma can be maintained within organizations.

The Elements of an Organization Chapter 1 outlines Weber’s categorization of social action and notes that the third type, affective social action, is at the core of religion. Affective social action is the locus of charisma, and the routinization of charisma is the way affective social action is transformed into either traditional or rational/legal social action. This transformation is the heart of the process of organization or the construction of religious institutions. When charismatic or affective social action becomes regular and consistent, norms, roles, and ranks emerge. I may, then, give a simple definition of a religious organization as a routinized form of charismatic social interaction. A more developed definition of a religious organization, however, considers the phenomena from both substantive and functional perspectives. Substantively, a religious organization is the construction of charismatic social action that enables a participant to be in touch with the sacred. A functional definition consists of the functions a religious community or organization performs for the participants. These may be belonging; being accepted; creating a positive self-image; and providing social solidarity, integration, global well-being, and meaning. In a routinized form of religious organization, participants can also be controlled and used by the organization.

The Emergence of Various Kinds of Sacred Organizations Archaeologists, anthropologists, and sociologists of religion have categorized and defined sacred organizations in a number of ways. One might argue that religion becomes formalized between the need to have an elaboration of roles and institutionalized procedures on one hand, and to maintain the charismatic element on the other hand. The literature provides us with several ways that sacred organizations emerge: the whole society, the temple, the church, the sect, the new religious movement, the movement of renewal, and the denomination. They appear to be constructed according to two patterns (Pattern One and Pattern Two below). The two patterns vary according to how each kind of organization began. Figures 8.1 and 8.2 illustrate these two patterns.

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19 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 8:1 Pattern One

Ritual

From The Sacred Between

The Society as a Whole

Folk Societies

The Temple

Ancient Societies

Experience of the Sacred

To The Sacred Within

Then to The Sacred Among

Figure 8:2 Pattern TWo The Church The Sect

Individual experience of the Sacred

Ritual

The New Religious Movement The Movement of Renewal The Denomination

From The Sacred Within

To The Sacred Between

Islam and Christianity

Christianity

Then to The Sacred Among

The first pattern of creation commences with ritual that leads people to have an experience of the sacred. This experience becomes contextualized within the whole society, which becomes the structural carrier of the sacred phenomena. This is the pattern in folk societies. Also, the ritual (that leads to experiences of the sacred) may result in the construction (both symbolically and materially) of the temple, which is the type of sacred organization prevalent in ancient societies. In the second pattern, an historical person can be identified, one who has had an individual experience of the sacred that is then recalled in ritual. This ritualized experience

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becomes expressed in various types of sacred organizations: the church, the sect, the new religious movement, the renewal movement, or the denomination.

The Folk Society Durkheim (1915/1968) provides us not only with a summary of anthropological research on religion in folk societies but also with a theory of the origins of religion. He contends that, among the peoples of Australia and North America, the clan (in Latin gens) is the fundamental social base or carapace of the sacred. It has two major characteristics. First, it is a bond of kinship in the wide sense of the term. It is not that all members are related by blood but rather that they are united by a common name, such as the Dieri, Urabunna, and Wotjobaluk of Australia or the Tlinkit and Haida of North America. The practice of marriage among these peoples is exogamy, wherein the new wife leaves her clan and lives in the clan of her husband. The clan can be as large as a phratry, which is a group of clans united to each other by bonds of fraternity. The common name of the clan is a totem, and a person’s social identity is that he or she has the “surname” of this totem. In the vast majority of cases, this totem is the name of an animal or a plant. Durkheim emphasizes the social and generic nature of the totem: it does not refer to an individual animal or plant but to a species or to the kangaroo or the crow in general. Frequently, the totem animal or plant is engraved or painted on the individual. Yet the animal or plant species is symbolic and points to something beyond—to a sacred object. Durkheim (1968) writes, These totemic decorations enable us to see that the totem is not merely a name and an emblem. It is in the course of the religious ceremonies that they are employed; they are part of the liturgy; so while the totem is a collective label, it also has a religious character. In fact, it is in connection with it that things are classified as sacred and profane. It is the very type of a sacred thing. (p. 119)

The “set apart” imagery of the sacred is central (See Chapter 1 on how the sacred is defined). Among five tribes of central Australia, Durkheim documents, special instruments are used in the liturgy: pieces of wood or polished stone (called a churinga) upon which is carved the design representing the totem of a particular clan. In the ceremonies, they are whirled rapidly to produce a humming sound unlike any sound found in the profane world. After the rite, the churinga are hidden in a special place known only to a few of the select male ceremonial leaders. They are not be touched by anyone who has not proven himself (women are forbidden) through some sort of trial or rite of passage. Sociologically, then, what Durkheim describes is the intimate and essential link of the sacred to the clan, to the cultural-social group. From this basis, he constructs his theory of the origins of the sacred, arguing that ritual, in celebrating not only the mythology of the sacred but also the social group, forms the foundation of religion. His theory, essentially, is that religion is a social construct, as was discussed in Chapter 2.

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The Temple In the most simple of terms, the temple is the “house” or “dwelling” of a deity. Four architectural elements seem to be present cross-historically and cross-culturally: the inner sanctuary (the cella), an altar in front of the cella, a large hall and portico, and a colonnaded porch or entry. The cella, the heart of the temple, housed the image of a deity, which was placed on a high pedestal to symbolize how removed the deity was from the people. The altar was the place of sacrifice, and the hall was a large area for worshippers to come. The cella was a forbidden space for ordinary people, and only priests, especially purified with special robes fit to serve a king were allowed within (“Temple,” 2006). Two scholars inform our discussion of the temple in ancient Mesopotamia, Oppenheim (1964) and Wiggermann (1995). They provide evidence to the effect that the temple is one of the two great organizations in Mesopotamia, the other being the palace. The social organization of the institution is threefold: the King was the overall head of the temple and performed major, state-wide festival services; those directly linked to the temple, such as priests, diviners, exorcists, the book keeper, and the scribes, held the second highest status; and the many employees both within and without the temple precincts were of third rank. The king had two major responsibilities: the performance of the cult (religious ritual) in times of national importance and the maintenance of the structure. Performing religious ritual was an imperative obligation during the early Assyrian period (1300 to 640 BC). Second, the king was to ensure the physical maintenance of the whole temple. To accomplish this, he was expected to share some of the most valuable elements from booty as well as to use prisoners to serve as labourers. The second status level included priests, diviners, exorcists, bookkeepers, and scribes. We covered the functions of the priests, diviners, and exorcists in Chapter 6 in the discussion on sacred leadership. The bookkeepers and scribes were important workers. The bookkeeper managed the employees, kept track of income and expenditures, and made sure that all the supplies for the care of the gods and goddesses were present. The scribes were responsible for the sacred texts, especially the ritual texts, making sure they were available to the priests and the king. The third class of people was comprised of all the many workers of the temple. These people performed a wide variety of labour: farmers to till the fields, shepherds to care for the Figure 8:3 The Temple’s Responsibility to the Community The Temple’s Role

Social Responsibilities

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herds, millers, bakers, weavers, wood and metal workers, stone cutters, architects, cleaners, courtroom sweepers, and doormen. Below all of these people were the everyday citizens. What was the collective role of the temple to the city, the state, and the community? Figure 8.3 illustrates that it was twofold: social and cultic. Social responsibilities consisted of correcting grievances from the economically underprivileged by creating standards of weights, setting limits on interest, and constructing just standards. Sometimes, loans were given without interest to those whose need was the greatest. Finally, children who had been orphaned became oblates in the temple. As already noted, the temple was a central institution in ancient Mesopotamia. One of its main functions was to link the city to the deity and to provide a house or dwelling place for the deity, as he or she was the guardian of the city. Ordinary people came to the temple have disputes resolved that involved oaths and, in some cases, ordeals. Further, the temple was the conduit between the deity, the king, and the citizens of the city.

The Church In light of Weber’s theory of the routinization process, which is outlined above, one may argue that the church, as a type of formal religious organization, is further removed from the charismatic moment than other organizational types.1 Weber (1906/1946) describes the church as an institution whose membership is composed of those who may not experience a conversion but who are baptized, usually as infants. The charisma of the leader is not a personal one but rather a charisma associated with the office. The leaders are priests or ministers who are professionally trained, and the organization tends to be ranked according to a hierarchical structure. Troeltsch (1931) characterizes the church as being conservative in doctrinal matters, dominating the members, and, to a certain extent, accepting of the secular order. Demerath III (1965) adds to this the following elements. This kind of religious organization has a professional leadership, a relatively impersonal fellowship, and has lax criteria for membership. Ritual is important. The church accommodates itself to the secular order with a posture of adaptive compromise, which leads to organizational stability and a large following. Coleman (1968) applies the term organizational precariousness to the church that has a built-in tension between 1) its aim to remain true to its original charismatic faith and 2) its organizational bureaucracy or “weight,” a tension that leads to dissatisfaction and encourages organizational breakdown. Considering all of these authors, I define the church in the following way: The leaders of the church are professionally trained and do not hold a personal charisma but the charisma of office. Authority is “top-down” in a series of hierarchical rankings. There tends to be a liaison between the religious and the secular leaders. Members are mostly members from birth and have an ascribed status. Ritual is more important than spontaneity, and the fellowships lean toward a kind of collectivity. Last, a church accommodates itself to the external environment.

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19 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Table 8.1 illustrates this definition. Table 8:1 Elements of the Church Kind of Leadership

Kind of Membership

Relationship to the Social Environment

priests

from birth

low tension

they are professionally trained

ascribed status

accommodates the environment

in a hierarchical order

more likely to be controlled by leaders

organizationally “over weight”

they are in liaison with secular authorities

ritual is more important than spontaneity

tends not to be indifferent to the social environment

conservative in traditional times but liberal in modern times

tends to be part of impersonal social groups

Two examples will be used to illustrate this organizational type: from Islam, Sunni and Shi’ite religious institutions and, from Christianity, the parish of St. Denis, Quebec.

Islam Islam is the second largest religious body in the world today, surpassed only by Christianity. To know this religion is vitally important for the social scientist of religion and that is why many dimensions of it have been and will continue to be covered in this text. Here, two kinds of sacred organizations within Islam, those of the Sunni and the Shi’ite, will be described.

Sunni Islam Sunni Islam is by far the largest branch or church-like type of Muslim religious organization, consisting of about 85 per cent of all Islamic believers. Hodgson (1974a) describes the term sunni to be an abbreviation of “Men of the Sunna and the Jamaah” (Islamic society or community). Donner (1999) argues that the term emerged during the first civil war in Islam, which arose between the Muslim establishment in Medina and the followers of Ali, a civil war wherein the relationship of these two factions was also complicated by the challenge of the Kharijites (see below under the discussion of this sect). Sunnis followed the early traditions of Islam and were guided by the Sunna. Esposito (2003) adds the following to the list of Sunni beliefs: acceptance of the legitimacy of the four “rightly guided caliphs” (Abu Bakr, ‘Umar, Uthman, and Ali); adherence to a consensus of jurisprudence created by the

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Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali legal schools; and a belief that other Muslims (such as the Shi’ites, the Kharijites, the Sufi, and others) have departed from the essentials of the faith. It eventually became the faith position of the Umayyad, Abbasid, Seljuk, and Ottoman empires. The Sunni sacred organization seems to approximate the ideal type of the church. The leaders (the imams) are professionally trained; the people are born into the tradition, are given an ascribed status, and are part of an impersonal collective. The organization accommodates to the environment (the ideal is the unity of the Muslim “church” and Muslim society) and is in low tension to that environment. Elements inconsistent to the ideal type of the church include the possibility of not having a hierarchical order; Muslim believers are to go to Allah via the Qur’an for guidance.

Shi’ites The religious organization of the Shi’ites (or the Shi’a) provides a contrasting Islamic churchlike organizational type. Unlike the emergence of variants of the church type in Christianity, the Shi’ite experience was created in violence and conflict. This was detailed in the discussion of rituals common among the Shi’ites (Chapter 7). In the first half of the eighth century, the son of al-Husayn (or the great-grandson of Muhammad), al-Bakir, became a founder of a systematic Shi’a sacred law and constructed the belief that he (and the subsequent leaders, now called imams) had a special religious authority. These leaders were called muhaddith or, alternatively, Mahdi, meaning “spoken” to by an angel (See Table 7.1 in Chapter 7). Al-Bakir argued and, later, the Shi’a believed that one could not add to the Qur’an but could (and indeed had to) have a special revelation throughout time to interpret properly the message of the Prophet Muhammad as recorded in the sacred book. Other teachings from him include the call to prayer, ritual ablution, and the permission to have a temporary marriage or mutah.2 The already privileged position of the imam was further enhanced in the middle of the eighth century by the belief that the imam was immune from error and sin. The Shi’a came to accept as common knowledge that this divinely given gift of interpretation through revelation was passed from father to son through subsequent generations. It was incumbent upon every believer, then, to obey these imams. Since that time, there have been many sectarian Shi’a movements of which three are the main branches today: the Zaydis, the Ismailis, and the Ithna Asharis. Space does not permit us to detail these sects. By way of summary, however, the Shi’a, considered as a whole, are reasonable candidates for being a church type of religious organization. How can Shi’ite Islam be considered a church-like organization? Comparing Shi’ite Islam to the outline of the elements of a church presented in Table 8.1, one can observe similarities: members are born into the religious organization, imams are professionally trained, Shi’ism is very much linked to the social environment (for example, that of modern Iran), and members tend to have impersonal relationships to other members because of the size of the organization. Unlike Sunni Islam, Shi’ite Islam has a strong hierarchy—the imam is considered to have been given power and authority over the members.

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Christianity Before a Canadian example of the Christian church type of religious organization is presented, it may be useful to know how important this organizational type has been to the development of Canada as a whole. O’Toole (1996), in an essay on religion in Canada, makes a cogent argument that the evolution of Canadian religion has followed the European model rather than the American one. In the spirit of revolution, the United States has been dominated by the sect as the most common kind of religious organization. In contrast, religion Canadian style has had strong roots in the social establishment common in the church type of organization. Canadian religion, especially historically, has had strong links to commanding political, business, and cultural elites. This connection has had a continued impact, O’Toole argues. About two-thirds of Canadians consider themselves to be members of the Roman Catholic, Anglican, or United Church. This statistic has not changed substantially over the 100 years since the latter part of the nineteenth century, even with the introduction of nonChristian religions as well as with the growth of secularization. Bibby (2002) presents evidence that Roman Catholics constitute 42 per cent of Canadians; mainstream Protestants (Anglican, Lutheran, United, Presbyterian), 19 per cent; conservatives, 8 per cent; and those of other faiths (Jews, Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, and Sikhs), 6 per cent. St. Denis, a rural parish community about 80 miles downstream from Quebec City, provides a good example of the church type of religious organization in Canada. Miner’s (1939) ethnographic analysis of this community is useful here. Although the history of the community goes back to 1695, it was formally established as a parish in 1833. The economic base was entirely agricultural, with the center of the social life of the community being the parish itself. Because the civic boundaries of the community are co-extensive with the parish, we can rightly call St. Denis a universal church. The parish was the “first point of reference” of the people into which was enmeshed the family. Within the family, primogeniture was the custom, and inheritance passed to the first son. All of the other children (usually ranging in number from 5 to 7) were to leave the farm. One was to become a priest, another a nun, and the rest professionals or emigrants to the north-eastern part of the United States to work in the textile industry. When Miner was writing, the role of religion was very powerful. Sacred beliefs supported the time-tested, successful right behavior. The Sunday ritual, the mass, was the key ritual attended by virtually every person in the parish. In this setting, the priest (called the curé) presented directives for a righteous life. This ritual functioned to create solidarity and cohesiveness within the group of believers. This ritual was augmented by sacred feasts, which brought further integration. One such example is a celebration in the autumn called All Souls’ Day. In this ritual, families were integrated with their ancestors in a series of prayers for the deceased. This kind of religious organization permeates the daily life of its members, is present as a powerful means of social control, and creates social solidarity and cohesiveness among a people. However, it is out of step with modernity, which emphasizes individual choice and personal freedom.3 Since the time that Miner completed his work, St. Denis has not changed much but Roman Catholicism beyond the village has changed dramatically. O’Toole (1996) informs us that the church has moved from a triumphalist position to a position of exile or abdication; it is now far from the center of Canadian francophone life. It has been displaced by the state

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in education and health care, has experienced a drastic decline in the clergy, and an increasingly large number of its members do not frequent religious services. In addition, many francophone Catholics dissent from official church teachings on matters of birth control, legalized abortion, and premarital sexual activity. On the other side, however, a full 86 per cent of Quebeckers identify themselves as Roman Catholics. The organization itself has also changed to include liturgical flexibility, ecumenical dialogue, and a compassionate concern for social justice. The more central institution than the church in the lives of francophones is the Catholic-parochial school. Even though the adults do not go to church on Sunday, they send their children to schools that are still under the directorship of the Catholic Church. Citing Lemieux (1990), O’Toole (1996) writes, Raymond Lemieux suggests that, in contemporary life, it [Quebec Catholicism] has acquired a multi-faceted character. It has become a diffuse, churchless faith which simultaneously supports a vague, almost subliminal civil religion of reassuring familiarity and a privatized popular religiosity whose discrete spiritual quests evoke and involve “religious effervescence, emotional communion, affirmation of universal values and explosion of imaginary.” (p. 123)

Even today, the authority of the religious leaders of St. Denis (which is reinforced by their educational role) the significance of ritual in the parish (even though many rituals have been secularized) and the abiding connections between Quebec society and the religious organizations of Catholicism mean that the church type of religious institution plays a strong role in the community, giving it tradition, unity, and stability. But how is the church different from the sect? And how does the sect, a more revolutionary type of organization, emerge out of the church?

The Sect There is a long tradition in the sociology of religion of defining what a sect is. Weber (1894/1978, p. 1121-ff.) argues that the first moment in the routinization of charisma is the formalization of a small group of followers around a charismatic leader. He notes that the pure type of charismatic rulership is unstable, and there is a desire, especially by the followers, to transform charisma and charismatic blessing from a unique, transitory gift of extraordinary times and persons into a permanent possession of everyday life. He writes, The turning point is always reached when charismatic followers and disciples become privileged table companions, as did the trustis of the Frankish king, and subsequently fief-holders, priests, state officials, party officials, officers, secretaries, editors and publishers, all of whom want to live off the charismatic movement, or when they become employees, teachers and other with a vested occupational interest, or holders of benefices and of patrimonial offices. (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1122)

The sect appears to be the kind of formal organization that is “closest” to the charismatic moment of a religion. In another place, Weber (1906/1946) outlines the sect as admitting

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19 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D only members who are true believers (those who are the converted), having a leader whose authority is based on charisma and not on holding an office, being comprised of predominantly lay members, and tending to be democratic or egalitarian. In another publication (Weber, 1894/1978), he adds another criteria: a sect is not political in nature as it is prone to keep to itself. Troeltsch (1931, p. 331) describes the sect as a small group, whose members emphasize personal, inward perfection; aim at personal fellowship; renounce the idea of dominating the world, have an attitude of indifference, toleration, or hostility to the outside society; are connected with lower classes; are detached from the world; appeal to a particular religious typology or interpretation (for example, the Sermon on the Mount) as the spiritual ideal; and are fundamentally democratic. Demerath III (1965, p. 37–39) adds to this definition the following elements. The leadership of the sect is charismatic and non-professional as well as being perceived as somewhat eccentric by non-members. The standards of the sect are stringent and include conversion and signs of salvation. The fellowship is intimate and forms an exclusive moral community. Ritual is less important than spontaneity, and the personal testimony more vital than any sacrament. The sect stands in a non-accommodative relationship with the external society. It is animated by a distinctive doctrine and is unwilling and incapable of capitulation. A further characteristic of the sect is its relationship to the church. Wach (1967) uses the term protest to define this relationship—the sect is a protest against the laxity and “overaccommodative” nature of the church. The result is a separate religious organization that distances itself from the church. However, this separation is meant to reform the church as a religious organization but not to change the essential mythology of the church. Figure 8.4 illustrates this process: Stark and Bainbridge (1985) endeavor to move this typology of religious organization to a theory. This is an important difference, and these scholars utilize the church-sect-cult typology to present a theory of the secularization and counter-secularization processes. During this century, studies have presented arguments for and against their thesis. In their theory, Stark and Bainbridge (1985) took into account both secularization and sacralization processes, calling sacralization the self-limiting process of secularization. In our terminology, sacralization could be called the attempt to regain lost charisma and to reduce the formalization processes inherent within religious organizations. Stark and Bainbridge (1985) maintained Figure 8:4 A Recognized Pattern of the Formation of the Sect Separates from From Church

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Does not change mythology

The Social Environment

The Sect

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that secularization is a fact in modern society; however, it is self-limiting. They argued that, as secularization and rationalization increase, there is a concomitant movement to recognize the limitation of these processes, especially in regard to issues of meaning. Consequently, sacralization processes develop in churches, and these processes challenge and mitigate the overall thrust of the secularization process. As in the case of sect formation, protest movements emerge from within established churches. According to this theory, in the beginning stages of secularization, members protest, break away, and search for a more otherworldly form of religious commitment. One of these break-away groups is called the sect. A summary definition of the sect seems to encompass three domains: membership, leadership, and the relationship to the environment. A sect is A religious organization that includes members of a primary group of dedicated adherers to doctrine and morality, who tend to opt for spontaneity rather than for formalized ritual and who form an egalitarian moral community. The lay non-professional leaders protest against the “over-accommodative” nature of the church type of religious organization. The sect stands in a high-tension relationship to the environment and is organizationally precarious.

Table 8.2 illustrates the characteristics of the sect:

Table 8:2 Elements of a Sect Kind of Leadership

Kind of Membership

Relationship to the Social Environment

lay

claim to be converted

high tension and apolitical

charismatic protestors

tend to follow stringent rules

non-accommodative to the environment

non-professional

form primary groups

organizationally precarious

tend to be spontaneous

indifferent to and intolerant of the environment

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The Sect in Islam Many of the constructs in the sociology of religion have emerged out of the social scientific study of Christianity. It is good to ask whether these constructs are relevant to other religious traditions. We have seen, through the eyes of Weber, that many of these constructs (and subsequent theories) are applicable to a wide variety of sacred affiliations. Cook (1999) asks another very good question: Are the ideal types of the sect and the church applicable to Islam? With some qualifications, his answer is yes. Cook considers the Kharijites (alternatively, the Kharidjites) to be an Islamic sect, and his view is supported by two scholars of Islam, Della Vida (1978) and Esposito (2003). The Kharijites formed a short-lived religious group, a section of which has continued into modern time under the name of the al-Ibadiyya. We will examine the socio-historical context of Kharijism before we consider whether or not the Kharijites comprised an Islamic sect. Weber (1894/1978) observes that, with the death of a charismatic leader, there immediately arises the question of succession. For the first Muslims, this question arose when Muhammad died in 632 AD, although he did give some guidance as to the sort of person who should replace him. A Hadith attributed to Muhammad reads, “The Prophet stated that the most appropriate person to be a Caliph was one who was not keen on it but whom the people considered for the high office” (Narayan, 1978 p. 160). However, if there are several factions within a faith, which faction is going to discern the true successor? This has been a significant issue for Islam and has resulted in major conflict, especially between the Sunni and Shi’ite Muslims. The emergence of the Kharijites occurs after the homicide of the third of the four “rightly guided caliphs”—Uthman (caliph from 644 to his murder in 656). Kennedy (2004) notes that many of his policies resulted in the creation of religious factions in Medina. Although it was unclear who assassinated Uthman, many stories spread. Still, Ali (caliph from 656 to 661) was elected the fourth caliph, but he had a major opponent in the Syrian governor, Muawiyah, a cousin of Uthman. To protect himself, Ali went to Basra in Iraq. A’isha, the widow of Muhammad, led an army against Ali, to retaliate against the murder of Uthman. A battle ensued, and Narayan (1978) claims that 10,000 men died and that Ali was victorious. Ali was disturbed by this battle. He thought that Muslim fighting against Muslim was wrong and that diplomatic gestures were more important. Although he later led an army of 10,000 soldiers against Muawiyah in Syria, only a few skirmishes and no battles resulted. A diplomatic agreement between the two leaders was reached, and they entered into arbitration about the future of the caliphate. It is at this juncture that the Kharijites are created. A group of warriors from the tribe of Tamin vigorously protested against setting up a human tribunal of arbitration above the Qur’an. Their name is rooted in an Arabic term kharadja, meaning “to go out,” and this group did go out, leaving the followers of Ali and the city of Kufa, where most of them lived. As noted in Chapter 7, shortly after that, they engaged in many attacks against the followers not only of Ali but also of the Syrian general, Muawiyah. Ali responded by defeating them in their camp. This success was costly to Ali, and he himself was assassinated by one of the Kharijites. Right after Ali’s death, Muawiyah gained the caliphate and began the Umayyad dynasty of rulers (661–750), a dynasty located in Damascus, Syria. During the dynasty, the Kharijites

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continued their terrorist activities and caused serious damage to the unity of the Muslim Empire under the Umayyads. They engaged fellow Muslims near Iraq and Arabia. However, their extremism was their downfall. They nearly became extinct by the time of the Abbasid dynasty (750–1258). Besides being more militaristic than other Muslims, what made them distinct? Like the Shi’ites, they disagreed with the Umayyads as to the proper method of choosing a caliph, and they also believed that a caliph who did not live up to the demands of Muslim leadership could be deposed. Another characteristic is their moral strictness and rigidity. If any Muslim committed a mortal sin, he was to be forever ostracized by the community and considered an apostate. They used a man’s apostasy to justify his murder and that of his wife and children as well. In regard to worship, every person had to be absolutely pure before he could engage in a public prayer. It is likely due to this extreme Puritanism and militaristic spirit that the group did not continue in the same form. The Kharijite sect did, however, continue in various sub-groups in Iraq, Arabia, and Africa, going by the name of the al-Ibadiyya or the Ibadi. The scholar Schacht (1979) will inform us of this sacred tradition within Islam. In the first part of the eighth century, the reform prophets known as Djabir and Abu Ubayda are attributed as being the founders of the Ibadi sect. They are distinctively different from their Kharijite predecessors in being less militaristic, more tolerant of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, willing to intermarry with other Muslims, and close to the Sunnis in their interpretation of the Qur’an. However, once their imams were selected, they were leaders in war, as well as judges and theologians. They reigned as absolute rulers, and those who rebelled against them were considered to be heretics. Part of their mythology was to capture all Muslims into their way of thinking and to construct a worldwide caliphate. They frequently carried on militaristic campaigns against the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Fatamids (the Shi’ite caliphate in Egypt from 969–1171) and each other. They expanded to central Arabia from Basra and Kufa in Iraq, conquering Mecca and Medina in the middle of the eighth century. The Umayyads, however, led armies against them in both cities and defeated them. The Ibadi continued to expand to Yemen, Oman, Persia, Egypt, North Africa, western and central Sudan, and even to Spain and Sicily. In many of the cases of expansion, the local imams opposed the larger Islamic Empire and frequently fought against each other for sacred-political leadership. According to Esposito (2003), there are about one million adherents today. From what we know now of the Kharijites and the Ibadi, can we categorize both as being sects in Islam? The founders can be described as reform prophets while their subsequent leaders (imams) are selected as ordinary lay people from the ummah (the Muslim community). The adherents claim to have knowledge of a deeper truth not known to other Muslims, but members of these two groups share much in common with the Sunnis. They follow stringent rules and are in high tension with the social and cultural environment. The only element that is inconsistent with Weber’s definition of a sect is that both the Kharijites and the Ibadi are political units as well as sacred communities. The warrior-sacred leader originally created by Muhammad lives on in these groups.

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The Sect in Christianity A clear example of the Christian sect is presented by Weber when he outlines his theory of the rise of capitalism as a consequence of the Lutheran/Calvinistic reformation. Two sources will provide evidence about this sect, the historian Haller (1938) and Weber himself (1904–1905/1958). Haller (1938) provides the reader with an extensive outline of the rise of Puritanism in England from the time of Elizabeth I (1533–1603) to the eve of the English Great Rebellion (1640). There were two paths that Puritanism took: one was to reform the official Church of England, and the other was to separate from the same. The first path can be described as a movement of renewal and the second as a journey towards the creation of a sect. I shall outline the general features of the movement and then focus more closely on the formation of a separatist sect. The historical background to the rise of Puritanism was the understanding that the monarch saw the church as an instrument of royal authority over the English people, as a caesaropapist political organization. The origins of the movement revolve around a preacher by the name of Thomas Cartwright, a reform prophet who called for the establishment of Calvinism not only in the Church of England but in the state as well. He was expelled from his post as a preacher in Cambridge, but his ideas of reform spread like a wave to countless other clerics and laity. These ideas became reflected in religious experience, a range of ethics (termed the Puritan Code), the attenuation of ritual, Calvinistic beliefs from Calvin, and the social construction of a spiritual brotherhood and the sect. Table 8.3 analyzes Puritanism according to the five dimensions of religion, which were presented in Chapter 1: Table 8.3: Various Puritan Dimensions Individual Experience

Ethos: The Puritan Code

Ritual

an inner freedom

struggle with the “Seven Deadly Sins”4

Mythology

Social Organization

living an honest life with integrity

many rituals inherited from the Catholic and Anglican church were attenuated

maintenance of the essential Christian message

most of Puritanism was a movement of renewal for the state church and English society

faith had to be lived out in ethos

only essential rituals were repentance, confession, and baptism

the centrality of the word of God or the Bible

creation of a spiritual brotherhood of preachers

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Table 8.3: Various Puritan Dimensions (continued) Individual Experience

having emotional excitement

accent on self-expression, self-confidence, and selfexertion

being anxious about the assurance of one’s salvation

Ethos: The Puritan Code

not being idle and using time to the fullest

Ritual

the sermon, based on the Christian scripture, was central

Mythology

the church must be independent of the state

not to shun prosperity but not to be attracted to it

all people are equal before God

call to live out the Ten commandments

for the Baptists and the other separatists, the Church of England was not to be considered Christian at all

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Social Organization high accent on individualism; this same individualism leads to the construction of the sect for the separatists, the Church of England and (especially) the Catholic Church was not Christian church at all

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Table 8.3: Various Puritan Dimensions (continued) Individual Experience

having an honest calling in life

Ethos: The Puritan Code

use your talents, work hard and practice “Godly-thrift”

live an active life in the world

Ritual

Mythology

Social Organization

contrasts: sin/grace Satan/Christ hell/heaven Adam-Eve/ Christ emphasizes: Book of Romans in the New Testament

acceptance of the Calvinistic double predestination processes: election, vocation, justification, sanctification, and glorification

The Baptist sect, described by Weber, was constructed at the hands of a John Smyth in the early part of the seventeenth century. Smyth called for a complete separation from the Church of England. He believed that the baptism that members of the Church of England received was invalid and that they must be re-baptised; thereafter, new converts needed to be baptized in their youth. They, and the other Puritan separatist groups, believed that the Church of England was sold to the “Anti-Christ,” that they were the “true church of the believers,” and that only those who could prove they were elected were allowed to join them. Members from these types of sects immigrated to New England. Weber (1904–1905/1958) and Haller (1938) describe the Baptist sect as well. The Baptists reject any kind of church authority and accept only the authority of the Bible. It is through

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reflection on the Bible that the Baptist believer receives revelation about how to live in the world. He or she would have nothing to do with the state but, on the other hand, would be intensely interested in economic occupations that were to be done with utmost integrity and honesty. One needs to work in the world, not avoid it, be ruthless in a radical rejection of worldliness, and grow in the gift of salvation given freely from God. The sect itself is the invisible church of the spirit; it accepts only those who are regenerated, imitates the apostolic or early Christian community, baptizes only those who experience salvation through faith, and is totally separate from the Church of England. How, then, can we legitimately consider Puritanism to be a sect? As presented in Chapter 5, the Puritans began in response to a reform prophet, John Calvin. He himself was not a cleric but a layperson. Members are those who have claimed some kind of conversion, and the sectarian groups are in high tension with the environment (especially in their origins in England wherein they were in high tension not only with the state church but also with the monarchal system. The groups were known to follow stringent rules and tended, at least in the beginning, to be spontaneous (in contrast to the highly ritualized services of the Church of England). Last, there was an intent to be small and thus form into primary groups and also to be organizationally precarious. A glance at the Christianity that came from the Calvinistic reformation shows us how many Puritan factions have created a multitude of other sects.

The New Religious Movement There is a debate in the current literature of the sociology of religion as to what term should be used to describe this kind of sacred organization: a cult or a new religious movement. Hexham and Poewe (1986) suggest that the term cult is too heavily laden with negative connotations and that the term new religious movement should be utilized. Although the term cult is still widely used (for example by Dawson, 2006), I will follow Hexham and Poewe’s lead and use the term new religious movement. Some would object to part of the term— new—because the word is historically specific. For example, we may consider cults of the twentieth century as new, but Christianity, in the first century, was also new in comparison to Judaism. Further, Islam, in the seventh century, was new, in contrast to both Judaism and Christianity. Mann (1955), Westley (1983), Stark and Bainbridge (1979, 1985) and Johnstone (1992) have all outlined the characteristics of new religious movements. Mann (1955) contrasts sects with new religious movements: whereas sects emphasize the recovery of primitive, initial mythology, new religious movements blend alien religious or psychological notions with traditional doctrine with a view to achieving a more adequate or modern form of faith. It is this blending or syncretic feature that distinguishes the new religious movement from the sect, according to Mann. Members defend this kind of independent existence by choosing different elements of, for example, the Christian religion and blending these with nonChristian beliefs. A sect is indifferent or opposed to many secular goals such as worldly prestige, popularity, and wealth, but a new religious movement accepts such values. The ultimate goal of the new religious movement is individualistic in nature, and it emphasizes harmony, happiness, and success. Westley (1983) describes modern new religious movements as having the following characteristics: a rationalized economic structure (fee for service), an emphasis on individual

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2 0 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D development, a partial involvement of members, and a transient community life. The belief structure corresponds to these sociological characteristics: an emphasis on science and technology, a concern with contamination and purity, and a belief that one’s personality is a composite of many past personalities. Stark and Bainbridge (1985) argue that the new religious movement is like the sect in that it is in a high-tension relationship with the environment. It differs from the sect, however, because the new religious movement’s protest against the church turns to a non-conventional belief system or to a deviant religious tradition (deviant to the society under investigation). Robertson (1992) extends the deviant element in his definition of a new religious movement. He notes that the new religious movement emphasizes the new—a new revelation or insight believed to be inspired by a supernatural agent. There is an attempt on the part of new religious movement members to contrast themselves with the more traditional and orthodox religious groups (either churches or sects). He also notes the presence of a heightened level of individualism. New religious movements diverge from churches and sects in that they tend not to develop a strong organizational structure and are informal and small.5 Using these authors, one can identify that several elements converge to form three domains that are particular to new religious movements: deviant beliefs, a focus on the individual, and a high-tension relationship with the environment: A new religious movement is a belief system that is deviant from the traditional religious doctrines of the host society and is syncretic. There is a special focus on the individual who becomes almost sacred. This emphasis on the individual leaves the association thus formed in a loose, informal, organizational structure. Finally, the new religious movement stands in a high-tension relationship with the external environment. Table 8.4 illustrates this definition: Table 8:4 Elements of the New Religious Movement Deviant Beliefs

Kind of Membership

Relationship to the Social Environment

tend to be deviant from the religious doctrine of the host society

through conversion

high tension

syncretic

achieved status

high and low accommodation to the environment

beliefs are selected from several sources

the individual is the sacred

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With this background in mind, I will illustrate the new religious movement as a type of religious organization using two examples from Islam, the Assassins and the Sufi. Following this, I will look at new religious movements in Montreal, Canada.

New Religious Movements in Islam Two new religious movements within Islam will be presented in this section: Sufism and the Order of the Assassins. After presenting the characteristics of each, I will make a case regarding why each should be considered a new religious movement.

Sufism Three sources are used to present an interpretation of Sufism: Hodgson (1974b), Trimingham (1971), and Peter (1987). The movement originated in the late eighth century under the guidance of Ibrahim ibn Adham who died c. 770 AD. Sufism later flourished in three major centers: Basra, Kufa and Baghdad. The term suf is Aramaic and means “coarse wool.” Common knowledge at that time called these ascetics Sufi or “those who wore coarse wool.” For the leaders (called pirs), the term meant “the way of perfection,” and another view is that that name Sufi originated from the Arabic word for purity—safā. Further, the movement emerged out of Sunni and not Shi’ite Islam (For a comparison of the pir of the Sunnis and the imam of the Shi’ites, see the discussion under ritual in Chapter 7.). Consistent with using the five dimensions of religion to define religious phenomena, I will organize the materials on Sufism according to the individual experience of the sacred, sacred leadership, mythology, ritual, ethos, and organization. Within Sufism, there is a strong focus on mysticism, interior spirituality, the “internal jihad or the war against the interior sins,” and experiential knowledge. The soul is understood to be a multitude of lights that are trapped in the human body and long for liberation. The early mystics had a hatred of wealth, power, and glory, and they challenged the Muslim statesmen who delighted in enjoying a multitude of women, revelled in wealth, and took great pride in their magnificent palaces and mosques. Human life was nothing but a spiritual journey to the divine presence wherein the soul, as the beloved, could revel in the arms of his or her loved one, Allah. The key to sacred leadership among the Sufi is the virtuoso, the pir. Pirs were revered as perfect humans, cosmic axes, and leaders of all the saints, and they were said to be filled with divine light and without sin. The Sufis believe that Muhammad was the perfect Sufi who was pre-existent to the historical figure, and he is said to have announced, “I am the Light of God and all things are from the Light” and “I am the First who existed” (Trimingham, 1971,p. 163). Several important pirs stand out from the rest. One of the earliest pirs, Abu Yazid al-Bistami, saw himself as divine: he thought it was “Glory be to me” and felt intoxicated with the divine presence. Jalal ad-Din Rumi (1207–1273), focussing on the love of God, wrote, “All is God— the ocean is God, the pir is God, the wine is God, and the wine-drinker—all truth is to know just this” (Hodgson, 1974b, p. 248). Sufism is known to attenuate mythology and to ameliorate ritual. However, there are certain recognizable mythological patterns. Beliefs arise out of the esoteric or mystical meaning of the Qur’an that only the spiritual elite can decipher. The mythology is, essentially,

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2 0 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D heterodox and rooted in Hellenistic, Semitic, and Iranian Gnosticism. Iblis (Satan) is not evil, he did not tempt Adam and Eve (Allah did), and he will return to the bosom of God after rebelling. Creation is, essentially, one with Allah and is an emanation from God of the same being and substance. Individual souls are monads of God’s love of his own self-fulfilment. All things have pre-existed as ideas in God, and humans (as well as all things) emanate from and, eventually, return to God. Figure 8.6 illustrates some of Sufism’s core beliefs. As noted in the previous paragraph, Sufism ameliorates ritual and centralizes it into its life. The individual devotee is to control breath, move with the body, chant, and recite a text so that a spiritual spark can be ignited in the individual believer. The most important ritual is termed the dhikr wherein the participants sing, dance, recite texts, chant, and are moved to ecstasy. It is part of the larger ritual of self-purification so that one can be a receptor of baraka or a blessing. Of special interest to the Sufi is ethics. A core value is love—the love of Allah and the love of others. Some more specific codes consist of not swearing to God, never lying, never breaking a promise, doing harm to none, and not encouraging others to infidelity. Al-Ghazali (1058–1111), one of the most famous of Muslim theologians, attempted to integrate Sufism into standardized Sunni orthodoxy. However, according to Peter (1987), he also argued that certain actions are permissible even though they are contrary to religious law and go beyond the five pillars of Islam. Finally, the organizational features of the movement will be outlined. Sufism has two organizational elements: the creation of the Sufi or the tariqah orders and Sufism as a populist movement. The orders were constructed about the relationship between a pir and a number of devotees. Each tariqah (or school of Sufism) has a guide or spiritual leader (or pir), and these groups or schools are usually named after their founding pirs. Tariqahs began early in the development of Sufism—about the latter part of the eighth century. They were relatively fluid but became more organized by the thirteenth century. The devotee promised absolute obedience to the pir who was considered to be a spokesperson from God. In fact, he or she (and all people) necessarily needed a pir to achieve any kind of spiritual maturity. Figure 8.7 illustrates this relationship. The link between the virtuoso and the populace, as opposed to that between him and his devotees, is not during the life of the Sufi pir but after his death. The pir tomb becomes a Figure 8:6 Some Central Beliefs of Sufism Creation emanates from God. All creation is fundamentally one: change is illusionary.

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One needs a pir to assist in the soul’s journey: one comes | from God (into darkness) and returns to God (back to light).

Souls are part of God’s emanation. They are caught in darkness, but life’s journey is to ascend back to the light. Souls are moments in God’s love of His own self-fulfillment.

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sacred space of pilgrimage, prayer, solicitation, singing, and petition. People believe that, if they touch the tomb or its immediate precincts, they will receive baraka as well as merit to cancel the debt of sin. This pilgrimage is, in some way, a substitute for the annual pilgrimage to Mecca for those who are not able to make the long journey or are not able to pay for it. The tombs of the pirs, which are in Pakistan, are under the auspices of the state and part of the money donated to the caretakers of the tombs is transferred to the government. The donation of money is also seen as a way to receive baraka as well as merit. To update research on the Sufi pir, the Muslim scholar Aslam (2005) provides us with fresh insights that examine the darker side of this sacred leader, at least in modern times in Khaipur, Sindh, Pakistan. Aslam engaged in a qualitative study of four villages and four Sufi shrines within these villages. The total number of respondents interviewed was 94 (66 men and 38 women). Her research reveals the movement from the charismatic stage (the pir as virtuoso during the genesis of Sufism) to the routinized stage (the pir as cleric in contemporary Pakistan). Islam came to this region of Pakistan in the early part of the tenth century not by the sword (as in the West) but by the preaching and example of Sufi masters. Many devotees recall the miraculous gifts that some of these masters had: by a beetle nut, hard water became drinkable; the dead were raised to life; and people were healed of their illnesses. The current Pakistani social structure of the shrine consists of the pir, his envoys (called Khalifas), treasurers of the funds donated by the people, guards to protect the shrine and the pir, the actual tomb of an ancient Sufi saint, and a large courtyard. One shrine is guarded with armed security guards who prevent the people from conversing with the pir. A responsibility of the envoys is to convey concerns and problems of the pilgrims to the pir. Aslam (2005) observes that “The whole environment oozes of power and rule” (p. 22). The irony, she writes, is that the people hold the pir in highest honor, sometimes in fear, and are not recusants. They continue to come, give offerings, bow in prostration before the shrine, and kiss the tomb and enclosure. Figure 8:7 The Centrality of the Pir

The Order of the Cosmos God Pir Devotee Ordinary People: Sufism as a popular religion where people journey to tombs to seek blessings

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2 10 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Aslam presents us with images of the current pirs in the various shrines: the pirs are like royal figures clothed in silk, driving expensive vehicles, carrying automatic weaponry, laughing at the ignorance of the ordinary people, holding massive amounts of land (one pir owned 33,125 acres), and offering luxurious lifestyles to the envoys. There are frequent rivalries between the pirs, and between the pirs and the imams of local Sunni mosques. She quotes one respondent who “saw through them”: Firstly they go for election. Then they grab land. Then they hire terrorists and harass noble, non-violent people. Then they attack mediocre people and grab their plots through fraud. Additionally it is very common for them to take money from the people and announce a wrong decision. Bribery is common. And one comes across many examples. (quoted in Aslam, 2005, p. 29)

Is Sufism a new religious movement? Many features of the ideal type, the movement of renewal, apply to Sufism. There are fundamental differences in the Sufi structure of mythology—divergences from both Sunni and Shi’ite Islam: the Sufis claim almost divine status for their pirs, who are pillars of the earth; they deny the evil of Iblis; have beliefs rooted in Gnosticism; and argue that Muhammad pre-existed as a divine-like being and that God is all and all is God. On one hand, the ethical basis is admirable (built on love, compassion, and forgiveness), but, on the other hand, they claim esoteric knowledge for their pirs and state that they can go beyond and even contradict the five pillars of the faith.

The Order of Assassins Al-Qaeda continues to be in the news as well as being salient in the consciousness not only of Muslims but also of the West. One of the group’s strategies is to attack, do harm, maim, and kill victims through suicide perpetrators. A legitimate question to ask is whether al-Qaeda operatives have precedents. Yes, they do: the Hashishin or Hashishiyyin (in English, the Assassins). This section will outline this group of Muslims and make a case regarding why it should also be considered a new religious movement and not, as Lewis (2001) claims, a sect. The work of both Lewis (2001) and Franzius (1969) informs the study of this religious group. The Assassins emerged from the same historical trends that gave birth to the Kharijites and the Shi’ites. As noted previously, the Shi’ites concentrated their hopes on overthrowing the Umayyad dynasty and setting up what they believed to be the true Imam, who came from the bloodline of Muhammad through Ali and Fatima to their sons Hasan and Husayn. Lewis (2001) notes that, during the first generations of the imams, while they were moderate and resolute, many violent groups aiming to overthrow the Umayyads continued to rise and fall among the Shi’a. The moderates took their cue from the sixth imam after Ali, Ja’far al-Sadiq (died 765) who had a son Isma’il. But Isma’il was either disinherited or hidden for his own protection or died before his father did. His brother, Musa al-Kazim, was eventually selected as the imam. It is from this son that the line continued through to the twelfth imam, Hujjat al-Mahdī, who, according to believers, disappeared in about 873 and will return from hiding to complete his mission. From this “hidden Imam” was created Twelver Shi’ism, which is, to the present, the official religion of Iran.

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However, a minority of Shi’ite Muslims believe that Isma’il was the true successor of Ja’far al-Sadiq and that Isma’il had descendants who should have inherited. This group, which emerged in the eighth century, became known as Ismailis. The Assassins were an offshoot of the Ismailis. As described in Chapter 7, the imams from the bloodline of Muhammad are considered to be divinely inspired and infallible. In some circles, they are considered to be divine because the imam (like the pir in Sufism) is the microcosm, the personification of the metaphysical soul of the universe. He is the fountainhead of knowledge and authority, and complete obedience is to be given to him. The story of how the Assassins emerged from the Ismailis centers on a revolutionary prophet named Hasan-i Sabbah. Born in Qumm in the late eleventh century, Hasan was a seeker of truth who discovered some of the teachings of the Ismailis, converted to their beliefs, and went to Cairo (an Ismailis center) to become more initiated into this branch of the Shi’a faith. Later, he went to the northern part of Persia and Iraq where he gathered disciples in hopes of carrying on the earlier Ismailis tradition of war against the caliphs, who were then also the sultans of the Seljuk Empire. He eventually was able to acquire a large castle named Alamut in northern Iraq. From there, he and his followers captured local land. Gathered about him were fidais (devotees) whom he initiated into the esoteric knowledge of the Ismailis, offering them rigorous training and strong character formation and inspiring them to attack the Sunni Muslim leaders. The successors of Hasan were known as the dais, and they created a strict sacred-warrior order whose members were promised that they would partake of divinity according to the level of their obedience. Many of the dais considered themselves to be divine spokespersons to the extent of believing that they were divine, sovereign masters of creation and truth. Other dais felt that they could overturn the five pillars of Islam, turn away from Mecca at the time of prayer, not fast, and drink alcohol. These men became the suicide assassins whose primary object was to kill and supplant the Abbasid caliphs or the Seljuk sultans and to put in their place an Ismailis imam and construct a “true Imamate.” They engaged in terror and killed countless Sunni and Seljuk leaders, grand viziers, Sunni scholars, Sunni religious leaders, municipal authorities, and many other Sunni authorities. The ritual of commissioning was nefarious. One of these fidais was selected to carry out an assassination against a particular leader who was carefully selected. He was sent and gradually became integrated into the circle of trusted officials of that particular leader. When he could get close enough to the leader, he killed him and stood his ground, so the assassin was, in turn, killed. Over many years (the active dates of the order were from its founding in 1090 to its demise in 1270, when it was destroyed by the Mongols), the order expanded significantly to centers like Aleppo, Afamiya, Ulayqa, Tripoli, and Banyas in Syria and Palestine. From these centers, trained assassins were sent out on missions that brought fear and terror to Muslim leaders. Regicides and tyrannicides are not new to humanity—both occurred before the Assassins and thereafter. What was new about them and their founder, Hasan-i Sabbah, was that the murders were not only an act of piety but also a ritual, an almost sacramental act. Lewis (2001) adds that the Assassins introduced terrorism—the long-term use of terror as a political weapon—and the idea of a nefarious sacred end to pursue the task of overthrowing the Abbasid caliphate and the Seljuk system. Hasan knew he did not have an army to attack the

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2 1 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D hegemony of the Muslim state, but he did find a new way whereby a small, disciplined, and devoted group of men could strike effectively against a much superior force. How striking is this in its similarity to the current strategy of al-Qaeda. Lewis (2001, p. 139) concludes his discussion on the Assassins by commenting on their place in Muslim history. First, the new religious movement was a profound threat to the then existing socio-political order. Second, it was one of many previous and subsequent movements that have emerged within Islam arising from deep-seated anxieties and erupting into revolutionary violence. Third, Hasan-i Sabbah and his successors formed from a range of discontents, which had once been nothing more than an unfocussed collective rage, a mythology and an organization of discipline, order, cohesion, and purposive violence. Last, they failed. Could it be that al-Qaeda faces a similar future? One last point: In even a cursory review of the Assassins, it should be clear that they are a new religious movement within Islam. They had a variant mythology, were antinomian, radically changed the Sunni-Shi’ite rituals, and justified terror in the name of divinity.

New Religious Movements in Montreal Westley (1983) researched six groups in Montreal that are categorized as being new religious movements:6 Scientology, Psychosynthesis, Arica, Est, Shakti, and Silva Mind Control. It is beyond the scope of this presentation to detail the unique elements of these religions. Instead, I will present their common characteristics, such as beliefs and organizational features. Using several authors, Westley presents the following common characteristics of these groups. They come from the encounter group/therapy tradition; have the idea of pre- and post-existence in a spiritual state; believe in a plurality of worlds, each with its own spirits and angels; adopt the Renaissance notion that divine consciousness is continuous with humans; accept the intimate connection between the body and the mind; see bodily conditions as direct reflections of mental states; and are part of the human potential movement, which emphasizes individual changes from an intense group encounter. In short, these groups, which represent the new religious movement of humankind, are ... a mixture of the late stages of the human potential movement, the positive-thought movement, and the new religious movement traditions. The point of agreement of all six of these is that it is the human individual who is seen as sacred, as all powerful. This sacred power is seen as located deep within the individual personality. Actions in the outer world become significant, not in themselves, but only in terms of their impact on this inner self. (Westley, 1983, p. 38)

There are several distinguishing organizational features that these six groups share. To participate in group activities, people pay fees for services. Rather than attend regular teachings on certain themes, as is common in churches and sects, participants register in, pay for, and attend a course on a certain topic. Membership transience is another feature of these groups. In fact, as long as the individual grows or develops, the continued presence of the group is not necessary. Partial commitment or involvement is also common. One can come and go at will; no one will be asked, “Why did you miss the gathering last week?” (Westley, 1983, p. 39–58).

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The belief system corresponds to this informal, loose kind of organization. Faith (such as trust in a supernatural power or person or adherence to basic doctrines) is replaced by learning scientific or spiritual technology (one is reminded of the nineteenth century new religious movement Christian Science). Rather than focussing on healing that would integrate one into a community (as is the case with members of the Catholic Charismatic movement), members of these groups find purification from polluting ideas, especially negative ones, more important. In this way, these particular groups are gnostic7 in a fundamental manner.

The Movement of Renewal The movement of renewal is a protest from within an existing church, a protest that does not involve secession or a schism but rather a desire and mobilization to change the tone, the emptiness, or the routinized charisma of the church through a renewal of tradition. The members of a renewal movement strive hard to maintain connections with the authorities of the church. The main sources on this type of religious organization are Wach (1967) and Hill (1973). When the church becomes routinized and a leadership arises that protests against this routinization and accommodation, there may emerge not a sect or a cult but, rather, what Wach (1967) calls a church within the church. He identifies three subtypes, one of which is the most useful for our discussion here: the monastic order. Members of this kind of collectivity desire to live a common life of religious devotion in closer association in closer association to one another and to the sacred than is possible in everyday life. Membership in the monastic order is exclusive and includes permanent loyalty, obedience, fixed residence, particular dress codes, meals in common, special devotions, and common labour. In addition, members are asked to renounce personal possessions, to embrace celibacy, and to practice asceticism. An additional characteristic of the movement of renewal is provided by Hill (1973, p. 85–103). He developed the concept of revolution by tradition to account for the “innovative nature of tradition.” Table 8.5 outlines the characteristics of a movement of renewal (MOR). Table 8:5 Elements of the MOR Leadership

Membership

Relationship to the Social Environment

lay

through conversion

high tension

not professionally trained

achieved status

low accommodation to the environment

in strong relationship with the church

joins small primary groups

non-schismatic in relationship to the church

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Table 8:5 Elements of the MOR (continued) Leadership

Membership

a renewal of tradition or a revivification of a sacred past

desires a strong relationship with the church

Relationship to the Social Environment

the organization tends to be informal

The Movement of Renewal in Islam The example from Islam to illustrate a movement of renewal is Islamism. First, the meaning of the term is presented through the work of Van Nieuwenhuijze (1995); then, the example of Egyptian Islamism is considered using the scholarship of Berman (2003). This section concludes with the case for considering Islamism as a movement of renewal. Islamism is a polysemic term so it is difficult to give a simple definition. Van Nieuwenhuijze’s research assists us in understanding that the primary elements of Islamism are the commitment to apply a literalist interpretation of the Qur’an and of Shari’ah law to all aspects of a Muslim’s life and to “make present” the sacred past of the Medina period of early Islam from the time of the Hijrah of Muhammad in 622 to the death of the last “rightly guided” caliph, Ali, in 661. This sacred past, however, has more to do with an idealization of this period and is not reflected in its actual historicity. Elaborating on the literalism of this religious movement, Van Nieuwenhuijze (1995) writes, “Islamism is meant to be the reassertion of Islam for purposes of improving the quality of life whilst dispensing with, indeed forcibly rejecting, any un-Islamic deviations of alien origin” (p. 16). The movement has two different epochs, called by Van Nieuwenhuijze Pre-Western Islamism and Post-Colonial Islamism. (See Figure 8.8 and 8.9.) Pre-Western Islamism arose during various periods when Islam was dominant and was little influenced by the Western world. In Islam as in any religion, followers may observe their faith with pure or mixed motivation, and they may be committed or lax. Laxity has been part of the faith for centuries, and, to meet this challenge, there have been frequent revitalization movements to call believers back to the “true” or the “authentic” Islam. Figure 8.8 outlines the elements comprising these pre-Western Islamic revitalization movements (which were not necessarily called Islamism, as this is a nineteenth-century term coined in the West). There are three essential components: the public (the ummah), the political leader (such as the caliph or the sultan), and the clerics, usually educated jurists or Muslim scholars called the ulama. What surrounds these components, providing their immediate ecological niche, is the Muslim state wherein the political leadership is Muslim and most of the people are also Muslim.

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Figure 8:8 Pre-Western Islamism A state that is predominantly Muslim

Public

A state that is predominantly Muslim

Islamism as an ideological movement Political Leader

Cleric

Figure 8:9 Post-Colonial Islamism A Westernized and secular Muslim state

Public

A Westernized and secular Muslim state

Islamism as an ideological movement Political Leader

Cleric

The primary targets of these Islamists are members of the Muslim elite. These Islamists believe that the political and clerical elites are not living up to the standards of Islam and that they are called upon to reform the elites. If reform does not happen, then a violent revolt against the elites may be necessary, and new elites, from among the Islamists, will take on the leadership role. Another feature of this type of Islamism is the accentuation of orthopraxy—belief that “right” Islamic practice is paramount to living the life of a “true believer”—over orthodoxy—belief in accepted doctrine. Along with this, the future, for an Islamist, is not apocalyptic (as is the case of Shi’ism in modern Iran) but is what Van Nieuwenhuijze calls “a defiant utopianism.” The best current example of this type of Islamism is Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia. (See Chapter 10 for more on Wahhabism and on Shi’ism in modern Iran.)

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2 16 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The second type of Islamism was defined by the recent historical past, during the period after Western or European states colonized many parts of northern Africa and the Middle East. A consequence of this colonization was that many Muslim states became secularized according to Western standards of science, polity, and philosophy. The targets of Post-Colonial Islamism, therefore, expanded to include not only Westernized political leaders and clerics who do not oppose these new political elites but also any agents of external, secular, and Western societies. This is a major movement in the modern world. As Van Nieuwenhuijze (1995) writes, Over less than half a century, the image of Islamism has changed dramatically. From being seen—and experienced by its adherents—as marginal to mainstream Islam and subversive in terms of public affairs, it has come to feature as one of Islam’s conspicuous expressions, a revolutionary force by its promoters’ own reckoning, a menace to both mainstream Islam and the public order ... and ... the phenomenon of Islamism has since 1928, the foundation of the Muslim Brethren in Cairo, spread like brushfire over the length and width of the Islamic world, jumping from one locale to another (p. 9-10 and 14).

In his article, Van Nieuwenhuijze (1995) also presents a profile of an Islamist. The Islamist may be a leader or a follower, a propounder or enactor but all Islamists share common characteristics—being discontent and resentful. These passions are directed against lax political and clerical leaders and representatives of those alien to the faith: those of the West. Their strength is ameliorated through networks, and they work very hard to ingratiate themselves with people of influence in the public sphere. Van Nieuwenhuijze presents examples of the links among ordinary believers and a wide range of professionals in Egypt. Of interest, however, is that the movement is comprised primary of laypersons who are not trained theologically and who are amateur politicians. The strength of Berman’s (2003) article is that it fleshes out in concrete ways what Van Nieuwenhuijze has presented in a more analytical or theoretical form. Berman’s case study is Egypt, and she presents her findings by asking why the Islamist movement has been so successful in that country. She uses the theorist of revolutionary movements, Skocpol (1994), to interpret the rise of Islamism in the state of Egypt. Citing Skocpol, Berman avers that revolutions emerge out of historical precedents— the crisis or the breakdown of the administrative and coercive powers of the old system. Skocpol argues that revolutions have happened only in countries that are disadvantaged within international spaces and, in particular, that show economic and military weakness. These precedents may be followed by the rise of a revolutionary movement if there are actors present who take advantage of the ennui. In the case of Egypt, beginning in the 1950s and 1960s, a series of events weakened the state: promises of economic wealth to the populace that never happened, the failure of Egypt’s attempt to lead the League of Arab States, the defeat by the Israelis in 1967, the rising fertility rate that crippled the state’s resources, and a vast number of university graduates who could not get employment. This is the historical context, Berman states, of the rise of Islamism in Egypt.

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As Van Nieuwenhuijze has indicated, networking is critical to the success of the Islamist movement. In the wake of the troubles of the secular state, the Islamists connected to others through local mosques and common ties. In poorer areas, they provided social goods such as health care, housing, education, and employment. One of Berman’s sources claimed that the Islamists were better equipped than the state officials and were much more professional in their support. A major earthquake shook Egypt in 1992, and the Islamists were there immediately to offer tents, food, blankets, and alternate housing. They also created strong liaisons with the middle-class professionals. Through fair and free elections, they (specifically, the Muslim Brotherhood) gained control of syndicates of doctors, engineers, scientists, pharmacists, and lawyers. As Berman (2003) writes, “Indeed, Islamists have been so successful in running these organizations and using them to provide services and a voice to their members that some scholars have argued that under their influence, professional syndicates became perhaps the most vibrant institutions of Egyptian civil society” (p. 261). The effects are visible. In many ways, the goal of Islamism has been reached to a large extent in Egypt: the lives of the people are informed by Muslim ideals, values, and beliefs. There has been a widespread censorship of media and academic information wherein some secular intellectuals have been branded as heretics and have faced harassment and even violent attacks. Women are required to wear the hijab, at least, and the secular state has introduced Shari’ah law as the law of the state. Islam is very salient: four thousand new mosques have been built in the recent past, Qur’anic and religious studies have increased, and businesses have to close during times of prayer. Berman (2003) offers the following as an observation: In short, while the Islamist movement has not been able to topple the Egyptian state, it has contributed to isolating it still further from its people and transforming the country’s society and culture to such a degree that some scholars refer to what has occurred as the “Islamization of society” or “cultural revolution.” Indeed, the changes in Egypt have been so striking that some have even argued that the country is already well on its way to becoming a near-Islamic state and may indeed be more genuinely Islamized than Iran. A nation long considered an outpost of democracy and secularism in the Arab world is quietly being transformed into an Islamic order. (p. 263)

Islamism, then, has all the features of a movement of renewal that were outlined in the definition and in Table 8.5. Islamists have protested against the laxity of Muslim leaders and clerics. They are laypersons and not professionally trained, they have a strong link to mainstream Islam, they are not schismatic, and they attempt to make present or to renew the sacred past or the tradition of the mythic Medina years of Islam. Further, members become “converted” to the cause through networks (see the Lofland-Stark thesis in Chapter 2). There appears to be status achievement wherein members believe they are living the ideals of Islam, and they approximate the standards dictated by their leaders. Finally, Islamism has always had, at its emergence, a highly tense relationship to the external environment, whether that environment consisted of lax or secularized Islam or of the West and its influence.

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The Movement of Renewal in Christianity An example of a late twentieth-century Christian movement of renewal is the Catholic Charismatic Renewal movement. Swenson and Thompson (1986) did a content analysis of the key texts and magazines of this movement from 1967 to 1976. Using Wach (1967), Hill (1973), and O’Dea and O’Dea (1983) as a theoretical base, they then reviewed the writings of Catholic Charismatic spokespersons active in the movement. All of these spokespersons write of the need for members of the movement to remain loyal to the Roman Catholic Church, particularly to its leadership and its core beliefs. In their analysis of these writings, Swenson and Thompson (1986) also observe that, to legitimate the charismatic dimension of this movement in the eyes of both followers and the church hierarchy, spokespersons take great pain in locating the charismatic dimension in the traditions or “sacred pasts” of the Catholic Church. Such “sacred pasts” consist of the New Testament, the early church, the monastic movement, and the mystical saints of the medieval period. A recent past was the Vatican II council in the early 1960s. Relying on the documents of Vatican II (Abbot 1966), these leaders of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal movement make a case that the highest authority in the Catholic Church, the gathering of all the bishops and the pope, approved of the vitality of the charismatic gifts. This completes our investigation into new religious movements and movements of renewal. The last religious organization common in modern societies is the denomination. I will outline its main features and then present a case history of one such denomination: the United Church of Canada.

The Denomination The term denomination was introduced into the sociology of religion by Niebuhr (1957). It is seen as one type of organization generated by the routinization of charisma—a type that represents an accommodation to the class divisions within a society. Niebuhr (1957) argues that a sect exists only for the period of time of the reformer. Soon after the death of the reformer, the sect begins to accommodate itself to the host society and the denomination emerges. The denomination, then, is a routinized sect that reflects the class, ethnic, and racial divisions in a society. Martin (1962) updates this definition. He notes that sects do not necessarily become denominations but may continue for many generations as established sects, for example. What is unique about the denomination is that it has some features that are common to the church and to the sect, as well as having characteristics unique to itself. Martin provides us with a way to distinguish the denomination from both the church and the sect. Table 8.6 presents this distinction and has been taken substantially from Martin, although I have added the concept of the various dilemmas facing these organizations, which I consider implicit within Martin’s typology.

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Table 8:6 A Typology of the Denomination, the Church and the Sect Characteristics

Church

Denomination

Sect

salvation dilemma

one way

several ways

one way

unity dilemma

through institutional means

through experiential means

through right doctrine

order dilemma

achieved separate from as well as linked to the social environment

achieved through a pragmatic relationship with the social environment

achieved separate from the social environment

sacramental dilemma

sacred within symbols

sacred among the people

sacred in the text

marital dilemma

marriage is a sacrament

marriage is not a sacrament

marriage is a contract

eschatological dilemma

individual

individual

only for the converted

individual dilemma

collective choice

individual choice

individual choice

moral dilemma

through works

through faith and works

through faith

Source: Adapted from Martin (1962), p. 4–10.

As can be seen from this table, the church and the sect represent polar extremes when it comes to resolving these various dilemmas. The denomination, however, tends to try to balance these extremes (except that it sometimes accepts the extreme of either the church or the sect). This overview of the denomination illustrates the core thesis of the whole text, which concerns tension, as this tension is presented within the dilemmas of the institutionalization of religion. Here the tension is about organizational choices that result in the various configurations of these organizational types. One might argue that the denominational alternative is an endeavor to capture something of the sacred of the sect while avoiding the weight of the bureaucracy of the church. Rather than presenting my usual summary definition here, as I have done for the other types of religious organizations, I choose to offer Martin’s definition of the denomination:8

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2 2 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D [it] ... does not claim that its institutional borders constitute the one ark of salvation, its concept of unity is a unity of experience and its historical sense is likewise a unity of experience rather than an institutional succession. Its attitude to organization and to new religious movements and forms tends to be pragmatic and instrumental, while its sacramental conceptions are subjective. This subjectivity is related to a fundamental individualism. In the field of eschatology, its conceptions are traditional, and, in the field of moral theory, its conception of the relation of faith and works is dynamic but balanced. (Martin, 1962, p. 11)

With this definition as a background, I will illustrate the denominational type of religious organization using the United Church of Canada. It came to be on June 10, 1925, as a unification of three churches (the Presbyterian, Methodist, and Congregational) and one small amalgam (the General Council of Local Union Churches). Grant (1967) argues that the union was not so much a result of ecumenism (which had not yet been born) but, rather, one of exigency and practicality. Canada was still an expanding country at this time. Vast lands with small populations left rural areas with many churches in competition with one another and each with few members. Union, then, made a lot of pragmatic sense. The Basis of Union (the document that forms the foundation of the union of the various churches) presents a presbyterian polity 9 wherein each congregation and pastoral charge has a representation and a voice in one of 98 presbyteries. (There were 4,200 congregations in 1990 and 2,400 pastoral charges in which one or more congregations were under a minister.). Each presbytery, in turn, has its own elected representatives to the regional conference (a union of thirteen local presbyteries). Finally, each conference elects representatives to the national church, the General Council, wherein major decisions are made (Grant, Chambers, Forrest, Greene, Lee, & White, 1990). One of the ways the early founders found consensus is that each church agreed not to develop its own “brand” of Christianity. In other words, there were to be no “Wesleyans” or “Calvinists.” A consequence of this meant a lessened emphasis on “ours” and “theirs” (Grant et al., 1967, p. 101). Morrow (1923) outlines a history of the discussions within each of the churches that eventually led to the union. The Basis of Union (Morrow 1923, p. 322–327) established both the doctrinal and political basis of the new church. All representatives agreed that the union was to be based upon the faith given by the apostles and prophets of the New Testament with Jesus Christ as the “corner stone.” The Bible was understood to be the primary source and ultimate standard of the faith. In addition, the representatives gave allegiance to the early creeds and the teaching of the reformers. The document goes on to detail the common beliefs regarding God, revelation, the divine purpose, creation, the sin of man, the grace of God, the divine-human nature of Jesus, the Holy Spirit, the need for regeneration, faith, repentance, sanctification, and prayer. The doctrines of the law of God, the meaning of the church, the sacraments, the ministry, fellowship, and the teachings of eschatology all follow basic reformation theology. A significant contrast to the original faith of the denomination is found in the (unofficial) currently accepted “doctrines of faith.” Grant et al. (1990) present the United Church’s creed in the following words:

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We are not alone; we live in God’s world. We believe in God who has created and is creating, who has come in Jesus, the Word made flesh, to reconcile and make new, who works in us and others by the Spirit. We trust in God. We are called to be church: to celebrate God’s presence, to love and serve others, to seek justice and resist evil, to proclaim Jesus, crucified and risen, our judge and our hope. In life, in death, in life beyond death, God is with us. We are not alone. Thanks be to God. (p. 160)

From this creedal document, one is able to see how the leaders of the United Church take a middle-ground approach that is quite indicative of the denominational type of organization. The United Church sees itself as only one way among many to salvation, its orientation is pragmatic, it sees the divine presence in others, it emphasizes personal choice, and it combines both faith and works as duties leading to salvation. The routinization of the sect to create a denomination is also evident in the history of this church. The United Church moved from a sect-type of doctrinal stance, which was common during the beginning of the church, to a much wider basis of faith in the 1990s; this development shows how much the church has adapted itself to new external religious movements. O’Toole’s (1996) reflections on the United Church add further credence to this interpretation. Even though 11.6 per cent of Canadians affiliate with this church, this figure is a decline from 20 per cent in previous times. In addition, only 16 percent attend religious services on a regular basis. Mythologically, the church exhibits a moderate progressivism that tries to steer between extreme liberal and conservative belief systems. This has become, indeed, its most crucial challenge. On one hand, conservative members are concerned about the maintenance of orthodox doctrine and sexual morality while the liberals are committed to social justice, equity, and inclusiveness. The importance of inclusiveness brought the church to near crisis in the late 1980s when professed homosexuals were given freedom to be ordained as ministers. Although a full-scale schism did not occur, there continues to be a high level of tension between the church authorities and the conservatives, who are becoming more marginalised. Here is a good question: Did this liberalization or secularization process begin only in the United Church in the twentieth century? The social historian of religion in Canada, Marshall (1992), says no. I will return to his work in the discussion on secularization in Chapter 13. Closer to the latter part of the twentieth century, the United Church had become more and more liberal and secular in its orientation. Rev. Bill Phipps, a recent moderator of the denomination, challenges orthodox United Church teachings. In contrast to a New Testament text that says, “In his body [Jesus Christ] lives the fullness of divinity”(Colossians 2:9), Phipps says, “I believe that God is more than Jesus. God is huge, mysterious, wholly beyond our comprehension and beyond our total understanding. Jesus does not represent or embody all of God, but embodies as much of God as can be in a person.” The resurrection, according to Phipps, should not be taken literally; rather, “it is the belief in transforming energy that calls us into the world to follow Jesus who, we say, gives life over death.” And, finally, “heaven and hell are what we create on earth” (Driedger, 1997, p. 43). An additional important question to ask about religious organizations relates to people who “switch” or move from one kind of religious organization to another (for example, from a church to a sect) or from one religion to another (for example, from Catholicism to Protestantism or Judaism or Islam or to one of the new religious movements). Why do these

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2 2 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D people “switch”? Beyond that, why do some leave the religious organization into which they were socialized and claim no religious affiliation at all?

Switching and Disaffiliation Since a landmark study done in the 1960s by Stark and Glock (1968), there has been a significant amount of research on the topic of switching and disaffiliation. I shall review a selection of this research that documents both the patterns and the complexities of these social phenomena. The review will conclude with some reflections on seeing these patterns and complexities through the lens of Weber’s theories of charisma and routinization of charisma. Stock and Glock (1968), using a sample drawn in California, discovered that about 40 per cent of their sample switched and that the following patterns were occurring. Men and women moved from more conservative churches and sects to more liberal and upwardly mobile denominations, such as the Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and Congregationalists. Those groups that lost membership included Methodists, Lutherans, non-Christians, and those with no affiliation. The reason people gave for switching, as noted by Roof and Hadaway (1979), was theological. Believers moved because the destination denominations were more liberal and had demythologized belief systems that were more conducive to modernity. In Calgary, Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1973) found little evidence of switching but documented increased growth within conservative evangelical sects. Their research was sparked by a position stated by Kelly (1972), who presented evidence that conservative churches were growing at the expense of the liberal ones. They explain that this growth occurred not because people were leaving mainstream Canadian churches (particularly the Roman Catholic, Anglican [Episcopalian], and United churches) or coming from the disaffiliated populace, but because these conservative evangelical congregations were able to socialize their youth well, and members were moving from one evangelical sect to another. To describe this movement, they use the phrase the circulation of the saints. Hadaway (1978) argues, from several General Social Surveys conducted between 1973 and 1977, that, even though there was a general pattern of movement from liberal to conservative affiliations (Roof & Hadaway, 1979), the patterns are more complex. Baptist and Lutherans were more stable than other mainstream churches, but, at the extreme of the conservative continuum within the liberal churches, many members were switching to the conservative denominations. Hadaway offers some explanation for these new patterns. It could be that the Lutheran and Baptist stability is realized because these religious groups tend to concentrate geographically: the Baptists in the south and the Lutherans in the Midwest. With such a high concentration of adherents to a particular religious organization, there would be fewer alternatives and people would be more likely to marry endogamously (thus precluding switching because of one’s spouse being of another group). Roof and Hadaway’s (1979) research is similar to Kelly’s. Using General Social Surveys from 1973 to 1976, they found that, in contrast to the thesis of Stark and Glock (1968), the mainstream churches or the more liberal ones were losing members to sects and that more and more were disaffiliating themselves entirely from organized religion. Those who lost members include the United Methodists, the United Presbyterians, and the United Church

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of Christ. The Southern Baptists, Mormons, Jehovah’s Witnesses, and various Pentecostal and other sects gained members. Why the discrepancy? Wuthnow (1976 and cited in Sherkat 1991) believes that the 1960s stand out in contrast to earlier and later decades because, in that decade, the new religious movements of the counterculture were born and new religious groups were emerging. This may explain, in part, why many religious nones became affiliated, but it does not seem to give an account of why liberal churches were growing. A better explanation may be that Stark and Glock’s study was regional while Roof and Hadaway used a national sample. Something may have been present in northern California that was not common in other parts of the United States. Newport (1979), using national studies from 1975 to 1976, adds to the discussion. His research gives further reasons for the phenomenon of switching. First of all, he discovered that switching was substantial. Between 25 to 32 percent of Americans report current membership in a religious group different from the one in which they were raised. Of that percentage, 37.8 percent of all switching is to no affiliation. The most common reason cited for switching was changing from one’s affiliation to that of one’s spouse (religious exogamy). Newport noted that 40 per cent of all those who switched did so for this reason. When examining switching to different groups or denominations, Newport found that Baptists, Roman Catholics, and Methodists lost members while Episcopalians, Presbyterians, and sects gained. This evidence confirms data from Stark and Glock (1968) as well as from Roof and Hadaway (1979). Movement is not consistently from liberal to conservative or vice versa. A later article by Hadaway (1980) adds a further reason for switching. Using a 1978 Gallup Poll, his analysis included measurements of religiosity or religiousness (measured by ritual participation and religious experience) that discriminated between the switchers and the stayers (those who did not change). The switchers were more religious than the stayers. In fact, 60 per cent of the switchers were religious seekers and were more likely to be evangelicals. Roof (1989) then asked how many times switchers usually switch. In his analysis of the 1988 General Social Survey, he found that 30 per cent of those who switched had switched more than once. The reason the respondents gave for their mobility was either religious exogamy (they changed because of their spouses) or that they changed to accommodate other family members or friends. This confirms a network theory of conversion first presented by Lofland and Stark (1965). In reviewing the literature on switching from the 1960s until the 1980s, Sherkat (1991) synthesized the research and found that there had been five sets of theories used to explain the phenomenon: status theories (upward or downward mobility to higher or lower status denominations); family structure theories (switching because of marriage or to achieve the socialization of children); network theory (from Lofland and Stark [1965] on the tendency to convert because of family and friendship social networks); theories about denominational characteristics (switching because a denomination is liberal, moderate, or conservative); and theories involving generational characteristics (age differences). He used the same database as Roof (1989) and found evidence to support all five theories. People switched to increase status, because of the faith commitment of their spouses, due to friends and relatives, because they were attracted either to the liberal or moderate or conservative teachings of another affiliation, and because they were young. Of all, the strongest predictor was religious exogamy.

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2 2 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Hadaway and Marler (1993) asked the opposite question on switching: why do adherents not switch, or why are they stable? Using a range of data from the General Social Surveys between 1973 and 1990, they confirmed the earlier finding of Hadaway (1980) that the switchers are more religious than the stayers. They read the Bible more, pray more frequently, attend church more often, give more money to the church, and are more likely to say that they are “born again.” Other reasons are given for those who stay. They are more likely to be socialized into their denomination from early childhood and are more likely to marry someone with the same affiliation. The switchers had marginalised church affiliation when they were young, had parents who married exogamously, and had irregular contact with relatives. Bibby and Brinkerhoff (1994) returned to their study of the 1970s (1973) to see if their original findings held true. They used comparative data acquired by revisiting 16 of the original 20 congregations that they surveyed in 1970. They found few differences. Re-affiliates (those from other evangelical churches) made up 70 per cent of the congregations, birth was down somewhat to 17 per cent, and proselytism was up modestly to 13 per cent. However, they offered some new reflections on their original thesis of the circulation of the saints. Even though the circulation thesis is accurate, the conservative Protestants (using evidence from the Calgary study and national studies) are demonstrating impressive vitality in managing to maintain 10 per cent of the national religious market. They do this by continuing to hold their youth and through modest increases in evangelism. Mainstream Christianity (Anglicans, Roman Catholics, and the United Church) is not even doing that, and its churches are losing ground in membership and commitment. Sherkat and Wilson (1995) update the research on social status theory by using rational choice theory (see Chapter 1). They argue that high-status parents socialize their children into high-status denominations (of the church organizational type) and that those who have “been left behind” by an upwardly mobile group tend to switch to a sect that is more conservative. Also, they find that those who seek out and want a strict religion choose conservative denominations. The authors note that it is the change in social status that prompts changes in affiliation. The original discovery by Hadaway (1980), that those who switch are more religious, is confirmed in a study of Presbyterian youths by Hoge, Johnson, and Luidens (1995). Reasons given for those youths changing to affiliations close to the Presbyterian tradition include religious exogamy (again, changing to the religion of their spouses) and moving to a new city. Those who switch to traditions further removed from Presbyterianism do so because they are dissatisfied with the church’s teaching. Those who move outside of the church are also more religious than those who switch to a church that is doctrinally close to their original affiliation. In a more recent publication, Sherkat (2002) examines evidence that African Americans are switching from the church type to the sect type of religious organization, a category of change that was first investigated by Kelly (1972). Using a data sample from the General Social Surveys conducted between 1973 and 1998, Sherkat presents a number of important patterns. Consistent with much of the research cited above about Americans switching from more liberal to more conservative Christian denominations is the finding that African Americans have switched significantly from Methodist, Baptist, and Catholic denominations (the church type of organization) to both conservative sects and non-denominational Christian groups. This is truer of a younger cohort (those born between 1944–1980 rather than those born pre-1943).

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Further, for both cohorts, these mainline churches lost most of their members because they became disaffiliated rather than because they switched to another denomination. Banerjee (2008), using data from the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life (www. pewforum.org), found that 44 percent of Americans have switched religious affiliations. Of all the denominations, the Roman Catholic Church has lost the most. More than 33 percent of those raised Catholic have left the denomination. The “group” that has grown the most are those who have no affiliation, accounting for 16 percent of Americans. Additional findings show that immigration is a factor of change as well. Most immigrants are Christians and nearly one half are Catholic. Muslims and Mormons have the most children and Hindus are the best educated and among the richest of all religious groups. Bibby (2002) presents a different story for Canada and argues that very few Canadians switch from one denomination to another. Some of his evidence follows: 80 per cent of Catholics in Quebec and 10 per cent of Catholics in the rest of Canada identify with the religion of their parents; 80 per cent of those in mainline Protestant churches (Anglican, United, Presbyterian, and Lutheran) have not switched; and, last, 70 per cent of conservative Christians stayed with their denominations as did similar percentages of those from other faith groups (Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh). Yes, many have become disaffiliated, but Bibby notes that, if you follow those who have becomes nones, many return to their religious origins later in life (especially after marriage and childbirth). Much has been learned about the phenomenon of switching from the thirty or so years of research. We know more about the rates of, the directions of, and the reasons for switching. One finding stands out that gives credibility to the theory of the routinization of charisma. It has been found that switchers tend to be more religious than non-switchers. One could argue that the switchers are closer to the charisma of Christianity and the stayers to its more routinized form. It may also be reasoned (although not measured in these studies) that the switchers are more intrinsic-committed, while the stayers are extrinsic-consensual.

Conclusions: The Question of the Maintenance of Charisma This chapter has focussed on O’Dea and O’Dea’s (1983) third dilemma of institutionalization. A central issue is the dilemma that, in order for a religious organization to be effective, it needs some sort of organizational structure. Thus, some level of routinization is necessary. However, if the routinization processes increase, the original religious charisma is lost and what is left is an over-elaborate organization or bureaucracy that tends to be self-perpetuating. The key seems to be achieving some sort of balance. The object is to have enough routine to make the religious organization effective but also to maintain a certain element of the charisma as well. This chapter has illustrated how different religious organizations formulate this balance. Religious organizations seem to be only partially successful in walking the line between developing efficient structures and maintaining charisma. There appears to be a tendency either to extremes of instability (as in the case of the sect and the new religious movement) or of over-elaboration (as in the case of the church). Two attempts have been made to construct a balance: the movement of renewal and the denomination. Even here, however, success

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2 2 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D has been only partial. I would contend that these dynamics will likely not cease in the near future and that religious organizations will continue to have to struggle with this dilemma, searching for more ways to maintain charisma while being organizationally effective.

NOTES 1

This interpretation is substantiated by Berger’s (1995) reading of Weber’s (1894/1978) comparison of the church and the sect.

2

A mutah is a private and verbal marriage contract between a man and an unmarried woman for a specified period of time: a temporary marriage. This pre-Islamic tradition still has legal sanction among Twelver Shi’ites, predominantly in Iran. The length of the contract and the amount of consideration must be specified. The minimum duration of the contract was hotly debated. Some required a three-day minimum; others required three months or one year. The object of mutah is sexual enjoyment and not procreation. After dissolution of the mutah, the wife must undergo a period of sexual abstinence (iddah); in case of pregnancy, iddah serves to identify a child’s legitimate father. Sunni jurists reject the validity of this type of marriage

3

Ten years later, Miner returned to the parish. Already by this time modern values and technology were invading the tight community.

4

A medieval list of the major sins of the unredeemed person, called the “Seven Deadly Sins,” challenge the Christian all his or her life: pride, avarice, lust, greed, gluttony, anger, and sloth.

5

There are some exceptions to this. The Jonestown group and the recent Branch Davidians of Waco, Texas are examples of new religious movements that had closely integrated members enmeshed in a strong hierarchical political structure.

6

Although new religious movements are numerous and varied, Wilson (1976) provides us with a general definition. Members of these movements believe that salvation is gained by becoming acquainted with a special, perhaps secret, knowledge from a mystic source; that ultimate salvation and knowledge comes from the liberation of powers within the self; [and] that real salvation is attained by belonging to a saved community, whose life-style and concerns are utterly divergent from those of worldly people. (p. 63)

7

The term is from the Greek, gnosis, a word that simply means knowledge. The mythology that extends the meaning of the term is Gnosticism. Its origins go back to Egyptian religion, which had a central tenet, “He who knows himself, knows the All.” Other important features include the concept of the Divine Man (a man who is both human and divine); Sophia or the feminine manifestation of the divine essence similar to the Divine Mother; having special knowledge available only to a few; making a strong distinction between the spiritual and the material; and, last, belief in a symbolic reading of canonical texts from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Eliade, 1995).

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8 McGuire (2002) and others have done some more recent work on defining this type of religious organization. However, these more recent references do no add anything substantially different to the definition of the denomination presented by Niebuhr and Martin. 9

This is the kind of organization that emerges from the Calvinistic Reformation. In a nation state, the church is divided into geographical units called presbyteries. Congregations subsist within these presbyteries.

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Chapter NINE

T h e Di l e m m a of De l i m i tat ion: T h e S t u dy of E t ho s

Orientation Many of us likely experienced dictates from our parents as to what to

do and what not to do. On occasion, we may have been punished for infractions of familial rules and order. At other times, we may have been rewarded for “good” or proper behavior. Not only is this sort of experience part of our own family lives, but also it has been part of human social history. Archaeologists and anthropologists have observed that, in addition to these ethics implying punishment or reward, there is also an added element: divine punishment or reward. This is the “stuff” of this chapter—the ethical nature of nearly all religions of the world. This chapter charts another path into the domain of religion: the study of ethos in general and religious morality in particular. Other numeniferous paths were considered in previous chapters: the sacred through religious experience, myth, ritual, and organizations. The theory and review of the scientific study of religion has led this author to argue that the genesis of religion is in religious experience, both social and personal, which is followed by the construction of a mythology to explain that experience. Rituals are created to continue that experience through one’s life-course and to pass it on to succeeding generations. Thereafter, religious organizations emerge for the maintenance, framing, and housing of religious experiences, myths, and rituals—these organizations form a carapace (or protective covering) over the religious experiences and their successors. Within these religious organizations, however, is another numeniferous path, which Geertz (1973) calls ethos. One may see this as a cluster of behavioral codes including values, norms, morals, and laws. Anthropologists and sociologists have referred to values as

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providing a general orientation to life while norms outline more specific kinds of behavior. Another way to look at norms is to consider them as “the rules or standards that govern interaction.” A particular species of a norm is what Sumner (1906), a founder of American sociology, terms the more. Mores, or moral codes, carry more weight than norms and have the authority of established facts or customs. They also channel human behavior according to effects: rewards for conformity and punishments for disobedience. Laws are specific norms and mores that are codified by some state or societal authority. The cultural analyst Robert Wuthnow (1987) adds another important element to an understanding of morality: one of its functions is the provision of social order in a society. This concept recalls the work of Durkheim, who also saw morality as a basis of social solidarity. In religious circles, these mores have even more of an impact because they carry with them some sort of sacred approbation and legitimacy. A popular term to describe them is ethics, and a collection of ethics would be called an ethical system. For example, the Ten Commandments of Judaism constitute an ethical system, and conformity to this system means long life and prosperity while disobedience connotes suffering, a shortened life, and poverty (see Deuteronomy 28). As with myth, ritual, and religious organization, the purpose of the ethical or moral system is to keep believers close to the original religious experience, the pristine charismatic moment. This moment we may call the spirit of the law. To enable a moral code to be operative in people’s lives, a process of delimitation is necessary. Delimitation refers to a provision of limits to a fluid and illusive religious experience, a limiting that functions to specify human behavior and to channel it as closely as possible to religious experience. In the process of delimitation, however, elaboration of the ethical system created from religious experience may mean the death of the “spirit of the law”—the loss of the charismatic moment of inspiration to do what is right. This is the dilemma of delimitation. O’Dea and O’Dea (1983) explain delimitation in the following way. In the process of applying the religious ideal to “the prosaic and concrete, the content of the message may itself appear to take on a prosaic quality and lose those charismatic elements that originally moved men.” There is a pit on either side of the narrow charismatic road: one waters down the original message, and the other offers a rigid position that kills the spirit. The danger of distorting the faith requires the formulation of dogma, but, once established, the doctrinal definitions themselves pose the possibility of another distortion. The O’Deas (1983) write that definitions become “a vast intellectual structure which serves not to guide the faith of untrained specialists but rather to burden it” (p. 61). Jesus, for example, repeatedly repudiated the Judaism of his day because of its empty legalism, yet Christians have developed their own Pharisaic practices. The history of religions provides countless examples of petrified doctrine and moral proscriptions, which in time may be challenged. In mounting these challenges, however, people face the danger of abandoning a core message offered by the prophet. Figure 9.1 depicts this dilemma. The dilemma of delimitation, then, is another quandary inherent in religion. Using this dilemma as a framework, I will outline the intricate connection between myth, ritual, and ethos. Anthropological and sociological research will illustrate this connection. Thereafter, I will provide a morphology of morality—a morphology constructed by reviewing literature from archaeology, religious studies, anthropology, and sociology. If appropriate, data will emerge from folk religions, the religions of Mesopotamia, Islam, and Christianity.

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23 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 9:1 The Dilemma of Delimitation Delimitation Spirit of the law

Religious Experience

Delimitation

Fluid

Spirit of the law

Illusive

Function: freedom and guidance Elaboration Letter of the law Function: to lay burdens on people … to control them

Then, research on Buddhism in Myanmar, Roman Catholicism in medieval Christendom, and recent new religious movements in California will provide the empirical basis for the dilemma of delimitation and will enable us to understand the vital place of ethos in religion. Last, using Wuthnow’s 1988 work on the restructuring of American religion, we will see how different religious world views elicit various ethical systems.

The Connection Between Myth, Ritual, and Ethos There appears to be general consensus among anthropologists and sociologists of religion that the moral or ethical dimension is central to the understanding of religion. Dissenting voices to this include the nineteenth century anthropologist Edward Tyler and the functionalist anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski. Tyler (1929), in his study of folk religions and animism, argued that ethical laws stood independent of animistic beliefs and rites. He was joined by Malinowski (1932) who saw religion as practically divorced from the functional aspects of everyday life because it dealt with the ultimate purposes of lives of the Argonaut peoples. The anthropologist Edward Norbeck (1961) found some evidence supportive of Tyler and Malinowski’s position. For example, he found that, among the Inuit, morality is relatively removed from religious myths and to break a moral code is not to entail after-life punishment. However, in contrast to Tyler and Malinowski, Norbeck discovered that, for the Manus peoples of Melanesia, morality is intricately tied to religion. Strict moral codes govern sexuality: for example, one is guilty of sexual transgression even if one inadvertently sees the private parts of a member of the opposite sex. Laziness, theft, and disobedience to elders incur illness as a punishment from the ancestral spirit. He writes, “Any moral transgression is thus the concern of everyone and the compulsion to follow the code is strong. Public accusations of guilt, confession, and expiation also bring shame and loss of social prestige and serve to strengthen the supernatural sanctions” (Norbeck, 1961, p. 184).

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The bulk of the evidence does reveal that there is a substantial interconnection between myth, ritual, and morality in religion. Inspired by Geertz (1973), Figure 9.2 illustrates this connection. I begin with the heart of religion, the sacred that is interactively linked to myth, ritual and ethos. Geertz (1973, p. 126–ff) explains the connection between myth, ritual, and ethos in the following way. Religion consists of a myth, a ritual, and a code. Myths provide believers with what “is”—with the factual or a view of reality. The ethos is the “ought” (or the sacred or the ought to be) that flows from the myth: A people’s ethos is the tone, character, and quality of their life, its moral and aesthetic style and mood; it is the underlying attitude toward themselves and their world that life reflects. Their world view [in my terms, myth] is their picture of the way things in sheer actuality are, their concept of nature, of self, of society. It contains their most comprehensive ideas of order ... the ethos is made intellectually reasonable by being shown to represent a way of life implied by the actual state of affairs which the world view describes, and the world view is made emotionally acceptable by being presented as an image of an actual state of affairs of which a way of life is an authentic expression. (Geertz, 1973, p. 127)

These world views, however, are not merely in the ideal realm. They are represented in symbols such as the Buffalo totem of the Sioux peoples of the American Great Plains, the cross of Western Christianity, the icon of Eastern Christianity, the serene Buddha statue in Myanmar, or the crescent of Islam of Saudi Arabia. As we saw in Chapter 7, rituals dramatize, make present, and express the myth through ceremonies. Ritual’s purpose is to enable the practitioners to have a religious experience. Thus, the connections between myth, ritual, and the ethos are profound. In other words, myth makes meaning of the cosmos, ritual enacts the myth, and ethos provides the quotidian channel to live out the myth. Again, one comes full circle. Ideally, if believers know the myth in an experiential way, enact it through ceremonies, and live it out in daily life, they increasingly come in contact with the sacred. What I propose to do in this section is to provide empirical evidence for these connections. My thesis is that myth and ethos mutually reinforce one another and that ritual Figure 9:2 Links Between Myth, Ritual, and Ethos Myth

The Sacred Ritual

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Ethos

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23 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D reinforces ethos. I will provide evidence from archaeological studies of ancient Mesopotamia, from anthropological research on folk religions and on Buddhism in Myanmar, from research on Islam, and from recent surveys of a variety of religious affiliations in North America.

Connections in Folk Religions Goode (1951) reviewed research on four folk peoples and outlined their religious systems: the Dahomey of Africa, the Tikopia of Polynesia, the Zuni of New Mexico, and the Murngin of Australia. Goode explains what this review taught him about the connection between myth and ethos. The social character of religion is not only horizontal (implying the ethical or moral) but also vertical: between the believers and their deities. Social values are, at the same time, ultimate values—linking the person to the sacred. He notes that folk gods have the same notion of what is good and evil as does the tribe, for “as long as the group is living according to precept, the general action of the spiritual entities is expected to be beneficial, not inimical” (Goode, 1951, p. 44). The precept that is closest to the sacred is to protect the holy from the profane, and one must dishonor the sacred by providing this protection. The Tikopia honor the holy in this way during a sacred ceremony; the people are forbidden to talk about mundane matters. One may argue that one of the most basic precepts in religion is this: “You shall not let the profane intrude upon the sacred.” I argue that this is the substantive meaning of ethos. Among the Dahomey of Africa, the ancestral spirit called Sir Ghost guards the family and supervises the morals of the kin. If, for example, there is a sexual offense (e.g., adultery), Sir Ghost will send an illness to the offending party. Confession and some sacrifice to the deity need to be offered to compensate for the offense. The basis of morality among the Zuni of New Mexico is honor: honor to the elders expresses honor to the deities. In both cases, the connections between myth, ritual, kinship, and morality are multifaceted: myth and morality are linked to belief in the deity, as ritualistic confessions of immoral behavior and sacrifices of atonement are directed to the deity. Also, moral, honorable conduct towards elders honors the deity as well the family.

Figure 9:3 Durkheim’s View of Links Between the Social, Myth, Ritual, and Ethos Myth

The Social The Totem The Sacred Ritual

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Ethos

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The most extensive analysis of the connection between myth, ritual, and ethos in folk religion is from Durkheim (1915/1968), which he provides in his secondary analysis of the tribal peoples of Australia. His interpretation can be illustrated by an extension of Figure 9.2, shown below as Figure 9.3. For Durkheim, even more so than for Geertz, ethos is central to religion. Recall that the totem is the focal religious symbol for Durkheim. The totem is the symbol of the sacred par excellence in that it signifies the animal or the vegetable holy to the tribe. The tribe is named after the totem and the most basic taboo of each tribe is that members should not eat of the totem, for doing so is an intrusion of the profane into the sacred. The totem can be identified with the social group; thus, worship of the deity in the totem is really the worship of the group. A special feature of the totem is the presence of a moral force that is believed to reside within the totem. To impart this moral force to the believer, it is necessary to celebrate a ritual. In this ritual, members of the tribe frequently gather, recall their ancient myths, and are empowered in a kind of sacred effervescence. In this environ, the individual receives the power to obey the moral order of the tribe, which is believed to be enacted by the sacred. In fact, when the believer obeys the codes, he or she feels empowered and full of confidence, courage, and boldness in action. Thus, there is a profound connection between belief in the totem (the myth), the ritual of a common celebration (to enact the myth), and an empowerment from the totem to obey the moral codes, which, in turn, provide the believer with more power. As was agued in Chapter 2, Durkheim conceives of this deity as none other than the society itself, which is the source of social control that “acts” upon the individual to enforce conformity. He writes, As long as scientific analysis does not come to teach it to them, men know well that they are acted upon, but they do not know by whom. So they must invent by themselves the idea of these powers with which they feel themselves a connection and from that, we are able to catch a glimpse of the way by which they were led to represent them under forms that are really foreign to their nature and to transfigure them by thought. (Durkheim, 1915/1968, p. 209)

Finally, the presence of a moral force is so salient in Durkheim’s anthropology and sociology of religion that he calls the religious gathering a “moral community” in his definition of religion (see Chapter 1). The subsequent sections on Eastern religions will offer two contrasting positions: one describes the intensification of the link between ritual and ethos using Buddhism in Myanmar as a case in point and the other describes the attenuation of this link by presenting evidence from the empirical work of Stark (2001).

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Connections in Eastern Religions The Case of Buddhism in Myanmar Buddhism has an ancient history and preceded the emergence of both Christianity and Islam. In Chapter 5, the revolutionary prophet Gautama Buddha was introduced to the reader, as were two of the main schools of Buddhism: Theravada and Mahayana. The Theravada school predominates in Sri Lanka, Thailand, Myanmar, and Indo-China. The Mahayana alternative is the Buddhism of northern Asia—China, Korea, Japan, and the Himalayas (Noss & Noss, 1984; Florida, 1994). The anthropologist Spiro (1982) illustrates the linkage between myth and morality that he discovered through his fieldwork among the Theravada Buddhists of Myanmar. In his work, Spiro identifies four types of Buddhism: nibbanic, kammatic, apotropaic, and esoteric. Each provides evidence of the vital link between myth and ethos. Morality is at the very heart of Buddhism for it is one of the three stages of salvation: sila (morality), samadhi (meditation), and prajna (wisdom). However, salvation from the world of suffering (in the hope of reaching the “land of no suffering or nirvana”) is mainly achieved through meditation in the original teaching of Gautama. Through meditation, one becomes detached from all things: both internal desires and external troubles. In the state of detachment, then, one practices the great precepts of Buddha, especially compassion toward all creatures. Buddhism received the mythology of karma and of the process of rebirth from Hinduism. Salvation consists of being freed from the karma that would reduce one’s social status in the next life. For example, through meditation and following the precepts, one can achieve a better state in another life. Eventually, one is freed completely from karma to enter nirvana or eternal peace, calm, and the total cessation of suffering and further reincarnations. Spiro argues that, for the various kinds of Theravada Buddhism in Myanmar, this process and its goal are quite different. Nibbanic Buddhism (after nibbana or nirvana) is the closest version approximating the path of the Gautama. It is the Buddhism of the monks who meditate for long hours each day. They obey the five precepts (actually, in some cases eight or ten) as a means to achieve nirvana. One of these precepts is sila or morality: “morality is primarily a form of spiritual discipline; it is a means to the attainment of a certain psychological state which is the first condition for the achievement of nirvana” (Spiro, 1982, p. 47). Kammatic Buddhism (after kamma or one’s karma) is a routinized form of Buddhism that focuses not on achieving nirvana but, rather, on improving one’s karma. These adherents strive not so much to renounce desire and pleasure in order to achieve nirvana and eliminate rebirth but to follow Buddha’s teachings in order to have a better rebirth. The central process is not meditation, as in the case of nibbanic Buddhism but, rather, following the precepts. In this form of Buddhism, the linkage between myth and morality takes the form of “salvation by works.” Doing good works and not transgressing the precepts ensure a better karma in the next life. The most positive “good works” are giving to others and protecting living things from death. Spiro (1982) documents some interesting local customs that connect morality and karma. For example, if a man commits adultery (breaking the third precept),

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he will be reborn with a small penis, whereas, if a woman does the same, she will be reborn a prostitute. Apotropaic Buddhism (from Greek and meaning a ritual designed to avert evil) moves Buddhism away from other-worldly mysticism to inner-worldly asceticism, to use the Weberian terms. The focus is on this world, the everyday and the mundane. Both morality and ritual are designed to ward off evil and to protect the faithful against calamity and illness. Unlike nibbanic and kammatic Buddhism, which do not emphasize ritual, apotropaic Buddhism acknowledges the presence of evil spirits from which one needs to be protected. Falling just short of believing that Gautama Buddha is a deity there to save them from evil, followers have faith that the Buddha has “infused” protective power in his statues, in various rites, and in obeying the precepts. Here, then, we see the unity and the interconnectedness of myth, ritual, and morality. The myth states that the world is suffused with evil spirits and that there is power in the Buddha statues, the monastery, the Buddhist teachings, and the precepts. By adhering to various rituals, such as reciting prayers and making offerings to the Buddha images or to the relics of the Buddha and reciting the beads (repeating, for example, texts from the sacred canon), and by obeying the five precepts, one is protected from evil in this life. Spiro calls the fourth Buddhist form in Myanmar esoteric or chiliastic 1 Buddhism (1982:162). Esoteric Buddhism could be called a new religious movement (see Chapter 8) in that it is a syncretism of traditional Buddhist beliefs, local animistic practices, and quasisecretive sects. Even though the Buddha is not a deity, his return is expected. (Theologians of nibbanic Buddhism see Gautama Buddha as the fourth incarnation of the Buddha and believe that the fifth Buddha will bring on the eternal kingdom of the Buddha.) However, there is also a belief in a mythical magician or weikza who has enormous supernatural powers. For esoteric Buddhists, morality is secondary while the practice of magical rites to invoke the weikza is primary. In this case, morality is connected less to myth than it is to ritual

The Attenuation of Links in the Orient Stark (2001) begins his article by directly challenging the theory that there are intricate links between myth, ritual, and ethos. Further, he questions the proposition that religion functions to sustain the moral order. Stark uses the 1990–1991 World Values Survey to test the relationship between ritual (both public and private) and morality. Morality was measured according to responses to the following three actions, which were judged as unjustifiable by a substantial majority in each nation surveyed: (1) buying something you knew was stolen; (2) failing to report damage you’ve done accidentally to a parked car; and (3) taking the drug marijuana or hashish. Although Stark presented quantitative results for 427 societies, I will give his results for Japan and China because these countries have substantial elements of Buddhism within their national borders. In the case of Japan, Stark reported that there was no significant correlation between morality, as measured above, and ritual, either public ritual (visiting the temples) or private (prayer or meditation). In China, public participation in ritual is rare (and, in many cases, illegal), so the only adequate measure of ritual was private prayer or meditation. Stark did discover a link between private ritual and morality, but it was a negative link. In other

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23 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D words, the more people prayed the more likely they were to be immoral, according to the measurement used! Stark offers an explanation from authorities on the subject of religion in China. Meditation and prayer, in China, do not appear to be occasioned by a long-standing, deeply felt relationship with a god but are petitions for pragmatic, worldly favors from a variety of deities. Prayer to the Chinese is a self-centered and self-serving ritual. Indeed, Stark does challenge the literature that supports the existence of a vital link between ritual and ethos. I contend, however, that one has to link morality with mythology as well as with ritual to garner a better picture. Also, I would question Stark’s measure of ethos or morality. Most sacred traditions refer to morality that has to do with ordinary familial and communitarian relationships in addition to sexual codes of behavior. It would be interesting to know whether Stark would still have discovered a lack of connection between ritual and morality had he selected other measures of morality.

Connections in Ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt linking Myth, Ritual, and Ethos Stark (1996) makes a claim that the deities of ancient Rome were radically immoral and acted, in many ways, like depraved humans. His underlying message, then, was that there was a disjuncture between myth and ethos, and we might assume, consequently, that this disconnect was common in other archaic societies. This is not true, as the documentation on ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt will attest. Buccellati (1995), whose evidence on ritual in ancient Mesopotamia we considered in Chapter 7, describes the connections between religious experience, ethos, ritual, and mythology. He offers specific meanings for the terms ethics and piety, defining ethics as the identification of absolute values that condition human social action and piety as the personal, individual response in humans caused by their understanding of the divine. He argues that there is an intricate link between the two. Both are linked to an underlying shared body of sacred forms. The unity is a unity of a common substance—a divine presence. Further, the sacred culture blends with ethics, which are the shared values within a community and order human existence under the weight of a commanding, divine presence. Although the mythology is polytheistic, the various deities are windows to the absolute essence of being. The connection of ethics to ritual is evident in the ceremonies used to discover what is expected of the believer. One such ritual in Ancient Mesopotamia as described by Buccellati (1995) is when the diviner examines the entrails of a lamb to have access to the “truth of things” or to learn what is expected of him in his daily life (quotidian ethics). Thus, we have evidence of the amalgamation of ethics and religious experience, mythology, ritual, ethics, and sacred organizations. This evidence is consistent with that presented by Durkheim (1893/1933), who also considers these elements to have a common, unified, and solid base. (See the next section about Islam.) Another dimension of the ancient religion that Buccellati discusses is the uncanny commonality between many of the ethics of the Akkadians (the Babylonians) and those presented in the ethical and sacred texts of Judaism and Christianity. His theory is that both polytheism and monotheism have a common root: the monotheistic deity of Israel is believed to be

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the absolute in the cosmos whereas the various gods and goddesses are like a window and mirror this absolute. From a Mesopotamian-Akkadian text called the Surpu (which means burning), Buccellati documents these ethics. The actual statements are proscriptions preceded by an incantation aimed at purifying the sinner. An appropriate translation may be “woe to one … ” ▶▶

who has eaten what is taboo to his god

▶▶

who scorned his god or despised his goddess

▶▶

who has oppressed a weak woman

▶▶

who is full of contempt towards his father or mother

▶▶

who gave with small measure and received with big measure

▶▶

who entered his neighbor’s house and approached his neighbor’s wife

Other codes are prescriptive in nature and promise rewards: ▶▶

if his heart is troubled, it will rejoice

▶▶

if he is just and things do not go well for him, later on things will go better

▶▶

if he speaks according to justice, he will have a good recompense

▶▶

if he loves what is good, only goodness will follow him

Buccellati asks what the function is of following these ethics and what the effects are if one does not follow them. Because the Mesopotamian experience is one of unity between mythology and ethos, values are coterminous with the perception of the divine. Violation of them produces a breach that affects the order, peace, and harmony in the cosmos and threatens the underlying unity and nature of all things. Virtue functions in the opposite way: to be a virtuous person is to contribute to the harmonic order of the cosmos. How can one make recompense for the disharmony? This is the link to ritual. By offering sacrifice to the deities and by performing correct rites of incantation, one can dissolve the strain and effect of evil and regenerate the harmony lost. In ancient Egypt as in ancient Mesopotamia, moral conduct was linked to myth and ritual. Codes of behavior in the form of moral dictums or directions were common in ancient Egypt. As was noted in Chapter 4, the Egyptian Book of the Dead (Andrews, 1985), which depicts the judgement scene of Ani, shows him as being allowed to enter the Sea of Reeds if his heart is lighter than a feather. The weight of Ani’s heart depended on how many evil deeds had accumulated in his person and how many good deeds. If the good deeds outweighed the evil, he entered into the Egyptian paradise. If, however, his evil deeds were heavier than the good, he was judged by the 42 gods and devoured by the monster Ammet. Some of the

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23 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D deeds that counted include that he had not stolen, committed adultery, had sex with another man or a boy, insulted the king, damaged a measure, nor harmed a neighbor’s land. Ani also makes the following personal claims in his negative testimony: he has lived his life without falsehood, crime, and evil. In addition, he testifies that he gave bread to the hungry, water to the thirsty, clothes to the naked, and a boat to the boatless! Lesko (1995) records other types of moral behavior important to these ancient peoples: doing no harm against another person and not consuming another’s property. In documents of papyrus, a man speaks to his deceased wife and claims that he did not divorce or vex her, was an honest and patent husband, did not lord it over her, and was sexually faithful to her. The moral content of the religion of the ancient Egyptians seems to be especially linked to the rituals of the dead, as outlined above. The scene of Ani’s judgement is very much a sacred scene that includes a range of deities who have a variety of functions. What is weighed (illustrating good versus bad deeds), the recorder deity (Thoth), the 42 divine judges, and the devouring beast (Ammet, a demon) all indicate connections between morality and mythology. An additional link was to the official priesthood whose primary responsibility was to care for the gods but whose members were also called on to pray for the dead. After the entombment of the deceased, priests frequented the tomb to pray and perform special rites for the welfare of the dead and their continued existence.

Connections in Islam Linking Myth, Ritual, and Ethos The location of ethos in Islam is involved and complex. It has various dimensions, which are depicted in Figure 9.4. A brief outline of the values, customs, and morality of Islam will be presented; this outline will be followed by a more extensive discussion of the place of the law in the Islamic religious tradition. A common theme throughout the subsequent discourse is the fundamental linkage in Islam between belief, ritual and ethos. A paradigm within the faith is that all aspects of life (the polity, the economy, the family, intimacy, education, and social life in general) should be impregnated with the believer’s relationship to Allah and to fellow believers. The Muslim scholar Hashim Kamali (1999) writes, “Religion is inseparable from politics, morality, and economics, just as the human personality cannot be compartmentalized into religious, political, and economic segments” (p. 147). As noted previously, values are general orientations to life. The most central values in Islam, according to Farah (1994), are duty before right and justice to others. Hashim Kamali Figure 9:4 Essential Dimensions of Ethos in Islam Ethos in Islam

Values

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Morality

Custom

Law

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(1999) adds to this that the dignity of the human person is a central value as well. The same author makes a distinction between values and the law, both of which are outlined in the Shari’ah (the sacred behavioral code of Islam). He states that, out of the five categories of behavior considered in the Shari’ah (obligatory, desirable, neutral, reprehensible, and forbidden), only the two extremes (obligatory and forbidden) are of a legal nature. The middle three relate to values. Flowing from these values are a multitude of mores such as being kind and considerate towards the destitute, the orphan, and distressed. Men are called to be honest, true to their commitments, loyal, and humble, while women are encouraged to be chaste and constrained. Both women and men are to avoid ostentation, usury, consumption of alcohol, and vulgar display. Customs also have a special place in Islam and in moral behavior. Esposito (2003) notes that the terms urf or adat are Arabic for the term custom. They refer to unwritten customary law, in contrast to written Islamic law codes or other legal canons. Urf often refers to three different categories of customary practice: (1) the way common people maintain order, engage in social interactions, or conduct business locally, for example, in the marketplace or in wedding ceremonies; (2) the legal decisions made by a ruler and his representatives; and (3) the practices of local courts. The Qur’an directs Muslims to use socially accepted practices in organizing details pertaining to a variety of legal issues (for example, dowries or settling certain financial obligations). While, generally, scholars insisted that customs were not a fundamental source of jurisprudence, fiqh (to be discussed under law) relied heavily on adat/urf to formulate cultural rules (e.g., dress, mannerisms). In time, many pre-Islamic beliefs and worship practices were also adopted without reference to primary sources. The bulk of this discussion of ethos and Islam will focus on law. Its use in the religion is elaborate and complex. Even though Hashim Kamali (1999) claims that less than 3 per cent of the Qur’an deals with legal matters, Huff (1999), in a book entitled Max Weber and Islam, acknowledges the following: It cannot be too strongly stressed that the central structure of Islamic thought is based on jurisprudence. Law in the Islamic world is the sustaining source providing the believer with guidance for every aspect of daily life. Consequently, it is to law not theology that Muslims are expected to turn in times of doubt. (p. 4)

Further, it is extremely important for a Muslim to know the law so he or she can obey it. Obedience to the law is a source of merit: the more one obeys the law, the more merit one gains for life in paradise. As was noted in Chapter 4, Islam emphasizes the human ascent and divine response mythology. This is illustrated in the way that Islam requires a believer to obey the law in order to be approved of by Allah. The need for the Muslim to climb towards Allah and paradise through belief and proper actions makes moral behavior, as codified in sacred law, of great significance. To understand the importance of the law in Islam, we will first investigate the meaning of some of its critical terms, and then we will consider, briefly, how Islamic law has evolved from the time of Muhammad to the present, focussing particularly on how Muslims in modern, post-colonial states have sought to link the Shari’ah with Western jurisprudence and state constitutions. Although some Muslim scholars disagree, most have come to understand the Shari’ah as a codex of the Qur’an and the Sunna. Linked to the Sunna is the Hadith. Juynboll (1997)

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2 4 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 9:5 The Principal Sources of the Shari’ah Qur’an

Hadith/Sunna

Shari’ah

and Burton (1994) claim that the Hadith refers to the oral and written registration of the revered practice of Muhammad and his Companions (those who lived with, interacted with, or were seen with Muhammad and were considered immune from major sin and beyond criticism). The provenance of the documents that form the Hadith is thought to be attested to by a list that names the people responsible for their contents. These persons are seen as a chain of guarantors who passed down the written text from generation to generation, and, taken together, this chain is known as the isnad or the support on which the text rests. Although the terms Hadith and Sunna are frequently used interchangeably, there is some evidence for a distinction between these two sources of Islamic law. The Hadith is comprised of written texts. The Sunna indicates the specific actions to be taken, the good example and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad himself. One might say that the Sunna provides the core elements of the written text, the Hadith. The Shari’ah designates the rules and regulations governing the lives of Muslims and is derived, at least in principle, from the Qur’an and the Hadith and Sunna. Figure 9.5 illustrates the sources of the Shari’ah. A further distinction between the Hadith and the Sunna was made in the formative years of Islam. Frequently, the law was not clear in the Shari’ah, and some sort of interpretation was needed (Calder, 1997). Consequently, Allah’s revelation was explained and elaborated by an interpretative activity of scholars using fiqh. Fiqh is jurisprudence and comes close to the actual Islamic laws themselves. Shari’ah encompasses fiqh but refers more to the process or principles that include the laws themselves as derived and interpreted by the ulama, the legal scholars. The fuqaha, the plural of faqih, are jurists, and this term tends to be used more to refer to the leading scholars of Shi’ite Islam. Shari’ah, which means path or the way (parallel to yoga or marqa in Hinduism), is like the Judaic Torah, an ongoing process that includes revealed text, oral tradition, written tradition, and ongoing effort (jihad) by the believers. Another term similar to fiqh is ijtihad. Its connotation is more pious and sacred than is the case for the word fiqh. Calder (1997) defines ijtihad as the supreme and pious effort and exertion of a trained jurist to take into account all the relevant texts and principles of interpretation to construct a law for a particular human condition. The ijtihad, then, is used to resolve original problems, for example, a disputed source or principle or fiqh or judicial understanding, but, generally and historically, ijtihad is subordinate to the Qur’an, Hadith, qiyas (analogical reasoning), and jima (consensus of the people or the scholars). Islamic legal history is simultaneously a history of Shari’ah and fiqh, of the principles or framework and the product of that effort. In more recent times, since the Western colonization of Muslim lands, a third element has been introduced: Western jurisprudence and

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legal systems. Hashim Kamali (1999) outlines for us a short history of Islamic law, which he divides into six periods: (1) the prophetic era (610–632 AD); (2) the era of Muhammad’s Companions (632–661); (3) the period of the Umayyads (661–750); (4) the era of independent reasoning (750–950); (5) the institutionalization of the dominant legal schools (950–1900); and (6) Islamic law in confrontation with the laws of the West (from the turn of the twentieth century to the present). The development of the Shari’ah had a very short history from the time of Muhammad to the death of the last of his Companions two decades after the death of the founder of the faith. The prophetic period was a time of simplicity because, if a legal matter emerged, Muhammad would have an immediate response to it. The second period saw the genesis of the fiqh method, and the Companions began the isnad chains attesting to Muhammad’s sayings and actions. During the period of the Umayyads, there arose two major types of scholars: traditionalists and rationalists. The former kept close to the sacred texts and doubted the use of reason. The rationalists, on the other hand, used a more liberal and sometimes reformist approach in interpreting these texts, one that acknowledged the place of logic and independent reasoning. In Sunni Islam, the fourth era is marked by the creation of the four major schools of legal thought in Islam: the Hanafi, the Maliki, the Shafi’i, and the Hanbali. Space does not permit us to detail them. They tended to have a following in various parts of the Muslim Empire and unique places on a liberal–traditional continuum. During the fifth stage, these four schools became more and more institutionalized, and they emphasized a reliance on the past and the vital role of precedence in legal matters rather than encouraging new developments. The last stage, the current one, is a witness to many movements to re-integrate Shari’ah law into modern Muslim states, which have reacted to Western dominance in constitutional and legal matters. Yazbeck-Haddad and Freyer-Stowasser (2004) inform us of the dilemma that many Muslims face in the modern and postmodern eras. With successive sacred and secular crusades against the Ottoman Empire (primarily), Europeans, mainly the British and the French, colonized Northern Africa and the Middle East. The genesis of this colonization was, in a modest way, the first major defeat of Ottoman naval power, which occurred at the Battle of Lepanto (1571), during which Western forces called the Holy League (a union of the Catholic papacy, Venice, and Spain) routed Ali Pasha’s forces. Given the Muslim principle or paradigm of the unity between sacred law and political, economic, and social life, the central issue in modern and postmodern times is how to either centralize or integrate the Shari’ah into the life of an Islamic state. Yazbeck Haddad and Freyer-Stowasser (2004) trace three ideal and practical alternatives: ▶▶

Fully centralize the Shari’ah into the political, economic, and social life of a people

▶▶

Integrate it into state legislations that balance Western law and the Shari’ah

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Leave Muslim societies as they are—as inheritors of Western law

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2 4 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Any one of these options is very difficult to engender. Even though many Muslim societies are predominantly Muslim, there are many religious minorities who have a voice and who do not want to be held accountable to Islamic Shari’ah law. The dilemma of applying Shari’ah law, which is considered eternal and immutable, to the conditions of life, which are so infused with temporal flux and constant change, however, is not new. The four major legal schools mentioned above struggled with integrating daily life and the sacred law (embedded within the Shari’ah) or the way of the faqih. The current dilemma’s resolution seems to range between these two poles: the secularist and the traditionalist. A middle position is to use the tradition of the fiqh to develop laws that take into account the current modern and postmodern culture but to still use the Shari’ah as the yardstick of the law. Muslim scholars and statesmen who represent the first position are those who believe that the Shari’ah has lost its normative power and is no longer applicable. For example, they argue that the Shari’ah laws related to slavery, business, and the economy are outdated. Some of the codes, particularly as they relate to women, are largely contrary to international human rights and laws pertaining to individual liberty. However, as was noted in the discussion of Islamism (Chapter 8), there is a vital and global movement to re-introduce Shari’ah law into mainstream Muslim society. When, in Chapter 10, we look at another version of Islamism, we will discover that this kind of legal movement is central to Wahhabism. Some proponents of the middle position have arrived at new formulations of the social and political rights of Muslim women by the way of the fiqh. The innovators go beyond the jurists, however. Using new media, especially the Internet, to communicate their ideas, nonspecialist Muslims, as they read and reflect on the Qur’an, are constructing sacred-based individual opinions on legal issues. As we noted in Chapter 8, those at the traditionalist end of the spectrum are called Islamists. They consider the Shari’ah to be normative and believe it should be applied in essentialist ways. This means that, when the Shari’ah law diverges from social practice, the Shari’ah is valid and social relationships must conform to it. They argue that the less society conforms to Allah’s law, the more urgent is the demand for change and purification. The Muslim Brothers of Egypt, also mentioned in Chapter 8, provide a good example of the traditionalist perspective on the place of Islamic law in the social, political, and economic life of a Muslim nation. They maintain that the true framework of law and authority is the sovereignty of Allah and the sovereignty of the Shari’ah. In addition, they do not recognize the authority of received fiqh tradition as generally represented by the four schools of law. They want to go back and start with the Qur’an and the Sunna only, treating the rest of Shari’ah’s tradition as non-normative. Yazbeck-Haddad and Frey-Stowasser (2004) consider the work of several authors who make claims for the selection of one of the alternatives (or a mixture of several). The primary focus of these two authors is on the role of women in the modern Muslim state, and, consequently, they consider the laws related to marriage, divorce, and inheritance. A major dilemma, then, is whether to use modern codes of behavior and laws regarding women and families or to search for relevant codes in the Shari’ah and in the legal precedents of Muslim history. I do not conclude this discussion, as the question of how to achieve an integration of Islamic law and contemporary Muslim culture continues to foment, with changes and

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transformations continually occurring in a variety of Muslim states. As long as Islam remains a major sacred tradition, this question will continue to provoke discussion. Box 9.1 considers the issue of Shari’ah law in Canada. In sum, the links between Islamic mythology, rituals, and ethics are evident, especially in the centrality of proper behavior and practice to the faithful. So important are these correct actions that they have been codified and authorized as sacred law. Even though the Muslim religion is multi-dimensional, in most cases, its dimensions overlap and tend to be mutually supportive. It appears that the organization of religion is what binds believers together to create a social whole. Box 9:1 Ban on Shari’ah Right Decision On May 26, 2005, the Quebec National Assembly rejected the establishment of Shari’ah tribunals in Quebec. Mahfooz Kanwar, a Canadian Muslim and sociologist, applauds this decision and claims that Shari’ah would introduce gender inequality for Muslim women in Canada and that this inequality cannot be accepted in this country: “we cannot have different laws for different people ... If this law was allowed in Canada, Muslim women would be in a much worse situation than they are now in.” Source: Kanwar (2004).

Connections in the West: Recent Research Linking Myth, Ritual, and Ethos Survey research documents a reasonably long tradition of linking myth, ritual, and morality. Gerhard Lenski (1963), in the late 1950s in Detroit, conducted research with 656 Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews. He found that devotionalism (as measured by personal communication to God through prayer and meditation) was associated with an ethic of helping or humanitarianism. Allport (1966), in his study of religion and prejudice, found that, even though religious affiliates were more prejudiced than non-affiliates, members who were most active in their churches were least prejudiced. Later research is consistent with these studies of the 1960s. In a 1973 survey of San Francisco Bay area residents, Piazza and Glock (1979) found linkages between morality and myth (measured by images of the divine), ritual, church attendance, and daily prayer. Morality was measured as a willingness to perform compassionate acts. Those who had what the researchers called a “personal view of God” or a belief that God was active in their lives were more likely to attend church and pray and more likely to lend money to a co-worker without interest or give money to a stranger for bus fare. In a national study conducted by the Gallup organization reveals similar results. (See Chapter 7.) Poloma and Gallup (1991) extend the measure of prayer beyond mere frequency to types of prayer: ritual prayer; reading from a prayer book or reciting memorized prayers; and conversational prayer, talking to God in one’s own words. Two other types include petitionary prayer, asking God for favors, and meditative prayer, offered by those who spend time thinking about God, feel a divine presence, worship God, and try to listen to God speaking. A bivariate analysis2 reveals that those who pray meditatively are more likely to

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2 4 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D forgive others who have hurt them and are less likely to nurture resentments than are those who use the other forms of prayer. More recent studies offer further evidence of linkages between religion and ethics. A group of Netherland researchers (Scheepers, Te Grotenhuis, & Van der Slik, 2002) have investigated how various dimensions of religion predict a range of moral attitudes. Besides having individual measures related to personal mythology, religious affiliation, and performance of ritual, they also included contextual measures.3 Moral attitudes were measured with a score4 —a composite of levels of agreement on the acceptability of extramarital sexual relationships, premarital sex, homosexual relationships, and abortion (if the unborn baby had serious defects or if the family were poor). Ritual was measured by attendance of the parents at religious services and the respondents’ attendance; mythology (what the authors referred to as a religious world view) was assessed by people’s responses to statements about God’s personal involvement with every person and on the positive meaning of life because of the existence of God. The data the investigators used were those from the International Social Survey Program, which surveys a large number of respondents from a sizable number of nations.5 The finding was that all the individual measures of religion make a difference in people’s views of morality: those who had parents who were affiliates, those who attended religious services, and individuals with strong religious beliefs were more likely to disagree with liberal moral attitudes than those who were not members of denominations, did not attend services regularly, and had weak beliefs. This challenges Stark’s research in regard to ritual but confirms his results in regard to beliefs. Which country people lived in also made a difference. The authors found that individual measures of affiliation, ritual, and sacred beliefs were more strongly correlated to moral attitudes in countries that were more religious than in the more secular of these nations. These findings enhance our understanding of secularization, which can be defined as a process wherein the sacred and its institutional extensions are either marginalised, in sociological or psychological ways, or diminished by the secular. The attenuation of the link between moral attitudes and religion in countries that are more secular may suggest that a marginalization of morality accompanies secularization. An additional extension of the social role of religion in people’s lives is exemplified by studies of how morality is affected by an individual’s membership in small groups or involvement in social networks. Robert Wuthnow, one of the most celebrated scholars of American religion, has lately been interested in the role of small support groups in the lives of Americans. Using a national survey that included 1,000 respondents involved in small groups and 900 who were not (as well as data from in-depth interviews with a smaller number), Wuthnow (1996) concretizes the concept of the small group and its importance in late twentiethcentury American society. From these data, he estimates that about 40 per cent of all Americans belong to a small group that meets on a regular basis. The groups are varied: Sunday school classes, Bible study groups, Alcoholics Anonymous and other twelve-step groups, youth groups, singles groups, book discussion groups, sports and hobby groups, and political or civic groups (Wuthnow, 1996, p. 4). This translates into hundreds of thousands of small groups, not a small number. The majority of these groups are religious: two-thirds of all have some connection to churches or synagogues.

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In one of his latest surveys, Wuthnow (2000) was interested in whether membership in these small, religiously based support groups enabled members to forgive hurts done to them, assisted them in healing relationships, and helped them to work on broken relationships. His results indicate that 61 per cent of the respondents said that their group helped them to forgive someone, 71 per cent had experienced healing of relationships, and 43 per cent said that they had worked on improving a broken relationship. Further, those who participated more often were more likely to offer forgiveness than those who participated less. In statistical terms, the weekly attenders were 5.7 times as likely to say their group helped them to forgive than those who were less active. Another interesting finding is that those who had actually experienced divorce, conflict with spouse or partner, falling out with a friend or neighbor, or guilt about something indicated that they were helped to forgive by others in the group. However, it was not just being a group member that enabled forgiveness: the kind of activity that members engaged in was predictive of forgiveness. Those who prayed together or studied the Bible were more likely to forgive than those who just socialized together by dining or discussing books or politics.

Summary of the Myth, Ritual, and Ethos Connections Considerable support exists for the thesis that there is a substantial linkage within religion between myth, ritual, and morality. Utilizing anthropological literature, Goode (1951), Geertz (1973), and Durkheim (1915/1968, 1893/1933) provide evidence of this linkage. Durkheim, as we saw, goes further and regards this link to be the very basis of a community. As was noted, Theravada Buddhism is a classic example of the intricate link between these three dimensions of religion. Several authors gave us evidence that the link is also salient in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, as well as in Islam. Recent quantitative data from the United States give a final cap to the strong evidence of a fundamental link in religion between myth, ritual, and morality.

A Morphology of Morality As I researched the many studies of morality and religion, I detected an interesting pattern that illustrates the O’Dea and O’Dea delimitation dilemma. In the first and second parts of this text, I have given both substantive and functional definitions of religion, myth, and ritual. In a morphology or typology of morality, we also discover both substantive and functional elements. A substantive understanding of morality is one that defines morality as a precept or moral code that is proximate to the sacred. The example given from folk societies is from Goode (1951), who uses Durkheim’s distinction between the sacred and the profane, which is at the core of this text. Almost universally among folk peoples, Durkheim (1915/1968) and Goode (1951) observe that the profane must not intrude into the sacred. More particularly, we learn from Durkheim (1915/1968, p. 43) that there is a whole range of interdictions that protect and isolate the sacred from the profane. One might construct a moral code that would reflect this reality: “You shall not let the profane intrude into the sacred.” 6 A functional definition of morality focuses on what morality is to do, is to accomplish. Within this definition, seven different functions of morality appear: empowerment, bonding, ecology, social integration, worldly success, social control, and alienation. Next, we

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2 4 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D will investigate these seven functions by considering empirical examples from folk religion, Buddhism, and Christianity, examples that are representative of each function.

The Function of Empowerment Durkheim’s work focuses on morality as a means of social control. Not only do moral codes come from the gods to induce conformity, they also empower the conformists. To be an effective member of a society, Durkheim (1915/1968) argues, one must conform not only externally but also internally. In the process of internal conformity or socialization, one becomes elevated and magnified. In addition, these moral codes become “moral powers” within us, and we develop a moral conscience. By conforming to the codes, one senses a protection from the deities, and one has confidence to meet the challenges of everyday life.7 In other words, morality functions to empower the individual. A case study of American Pentecostals further illustrates this function. In a non-representative sample of Pentecostals, Gerlach and Hine (1970) gathered data from 230 respondents, all of whom acknowledged being empowered with “the Holy Spirit.” The respondents believed that this personal empowerment enabled them to commit to other Pentecostals and that this commitment gave them further power, establishing a “pool of power” available to the church.

The Function of Social Bonding Goode’s (1951) analysis of the Murngin of Australia illustrates the social bonding function of morality. These people consist of a large clan of about 40, 000–50,000 members who live in a geographical region comprising 360 square miles. The religious and social center of the clan is a large water hole, which is believed to house the unborn children. It is necessary that parents obey the codes of their clan in order to free the spirits of the children to become incarnated. After birth, a child must follow the age-graded codes of behavior for his or her gender. In doing so, the child becomes bonded to his or her group. As an adult, a man grows into spiritual manhood and, in so doing, increasingly bonds with his fellows. Thus, by following the moral codes, he builds a bond with the spiritual world and with the world of his clan. Empirical evidence of social bonding and how it affects morality is also provided in the Detroit study of Lenski (1963). He found that there was a correlation between the variable called “communal involvement,” as measured by how many of one’s close friends and relatives are members of the same religious group, or by a measure of social bonding, and “associational involvement,” as measured by attendance at religious services.

The Ecological and Cosmological Function of Morality Morality can also function to connect people to nature and to the cosmos. As obedience to moral precepts bonds people to brothers and sisters, so does obedience bond them to the earth, the water, the sky, the animals, and the stars. For example, Eliade (1959) argues that, when members of folk societies follow the codes of sexual intimacy, they become bonded to the heavens, for the heavens are to the earth as the male is to the female in their mythology. Or, when one lives out a married life, one represents the divine wedded to the whole universe.

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The clearest example of this function is from aboriginal peoples. Before European contact, there were an estimated 4–12 million people in North America who spoke 550 different languages. Even though there was a wide ethnic variation, they all shared some fundamental myths, rituals, and ethical codes. The social historian of American religion, Albanese (1981, 1990), describes this commonality as a form of “nature religion.” Its central concept is a mythology of connectedness: the world and the cosmos are redolent with power, vivacity, unity, and purpose. The view is fundamentally a relational one that connects individuals, societies, nature, and the universe into a sacred tapestry. Unlike in the apotropaic Buddhism of Myanmar, which sees nature as dangerous, in a “nature religion,” the material world is a sacred world, a safe world, a world “peopled” with mysterious persons. The fundamental value and explicit moral code for all these people is, according to Albanese (1990), “the harmony ethic” (p. 26). In pragmatic terms, one is to respect and honor everything: animals, plants, the earth, water, and fellow humans. The well-being of all persons depends fundamentally upon how well one lives out this basic precept. Not to honor nature (to kill more than one can eat, cut down more trees than necessary, fish beyond the dietary needs of one’s group) is to cause disharmony with one’s fellow brothers and sisters. Another specific code common among the first inhabitants of North America is to apologize to an animal if one has to kill it in order to live. The complementary ethic to this harmony ethic is what Albanese (1990) calls the “ethic of reciprocity” (p. 27). If you follow the harmony ethic, you will, in turn, be treated well by your fellow humans and by nature; indeed, the whole cosmos will be gracious to you.

The Function of Social Integration Another function of morality is social integration. It is argued that, as members of a social group, a tribe, or a religious organization honor the moral codes that are common for all the members, they will integrate more and more into the whole of the community. For the Inuit of the North, it is very important to avoid breaking the religious taboos. If one does, the spirits will be angered and will take their anger out on all the members of the group (Norbeck 1961, p. 177). Another example of morality influencing social solidarity is found among the kammatic Buddhists of Myanmar, whom we met previously. In what is called a Buddhist lent, people go on a pilgrimage throughout local villages to collect articles and money to give to the monasteries. The manifest function of the practice is to gain merit for one’s better-future karma, but the latent function (to use Merton’s famous term) is the creation of village solidarity. In fact, Spiro (1982) notes that being a Buddhist adds to the solidarity of the whole Burmese society, for to be Burmese is to be Buddhist.

The Function of Worldly Success A further function of morality is reflected in religion’s tendency to affect change in people’s mundane world. Religion is pragmatic and is effective, at least sometimes, in providing believers with a better place in life—with wealth, for example, or worldly success. Weber’s (1904–1905/1958) study of Protestantism and the genesis of capitalism is a classic expression of this function. He argues that the Protestant ethic (as represented by the Calvinistic

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2 4 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D ethic of the hard work and diligence that would bring eternal rewards) has a latent function: to empower people to succeed in wealth and status. It is too simplistic to think that if one adheres to this ethic, one will prosper financially. However, the ethic becomes a moral force, a power to work hard, to be honest, to save, and not to steal. An offshoot of this behavior is success in the world. Weber goes to great lengths to present credible evidence to substantiate the thesis, and his work has been replicated in many research projects since his time. I shall detail the thesis in Chapter 12.

The Function of Social Control As Weber’s work best illustrates the function of worldly success, so does Durkheim’s research illustrate morality as social control. In fact, as we have seen, the idea that morality operates as a means of social control is at the very heart of his theory of religion. He conceives of society as a moral force coercing members to conform. It is in this conformity that society is made possible. Norbeck (1961) portrays the social control function of morality well in his analysis of the Manus people of Melanesia. The Manus, as we saw before in this chapter, are very strict in regard to sexual mores. Each family has a guardian spirit who keeps a close eye on the actions of the family members. If members are obedient to the precepts (Norbeck identifies sixteen), they will have wealth and a long life. If they transgress, they will become ill, live a short life, and be poor. Norbeck (1961) writes of the power of social control among the Manus: Any moral transgression is thus the concern of everyone else and the compulsion to follow the code is strong. Public accusation of guilt, confession, and expiation also bring shame and loss of social prestige and serve to strengthen the supernatural sanctions. (p. 184)

The Function of Alienation The last function of morality that we identified is really a dysfunction: alienation. The idea here is that religion or adherence to a particular moral code results in negative outcomes both for individuals and the social groups or institutions in which they reside. Berger (1967) explains it in the following way. Religion and religious ethics are products of social construction that occur in conversations between persons, groups, and institutions. In the process of this construction, however, some projections can become so reified as to appear objective and not dependent at all on social creation. The actor does not act but is acted upon and is but a passive receptor in the process. If this involves codes of behavior, these codes become “alien” to the person and are dysfunctional to him or her. The fifteenth century canonical text called Malleus Maleficarum is a good illustration of his negative use of ethics (See the section on witchcraft in Chapter 7). Historians of the Occident consider the era during which the Malleus Maleficarum was constructed to be the twilight of the medieval period and the dawn of early modern Europe. But even earlier than the fifteenth century, the Roman Catholic Church and its doctrinal documents were becoming increasingly legalistic. The historian Toynbee (1946) notes that, after Hildebrand (1020–1085) assumed the papal office and became Gregory VII, the leadership of the church

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was also substantially linked to law. Many of the high and late medieval popes were less spiritual and more legal than their predecessors. They were trained as jurists—legal experts on what is know as the canon law of the Roman Catholic Church. By the time the Malleus Maleficarum was written, the legal nature of the bureaucracy of the medieval Latin-Catholic Church was firmly in place. It seems that the heart of the institution was a legal entity and that only a small number of saints in monastic settings reflected the original nature of Christianity. In other words, the legalistic codes and practices of the church were becoming increasingly alienated from the sacred roots of the religion—and from the moral precepts derived from these roots. Because of these developments, the Malleus Maleficarum provides and excellent example of a moral code that seems alien to those upon which it is enacted. Summers (1928/1948/1971) is not only a translator of the Malleus Maleficarum but also an ecclesial historian. He traces the history of the development of laws against witchcraft and provides a study of the phenomenon itself. According to Summers, the harsh sentence, death to convicted witches (or male wizards), has a basis in one biblical verse from the book of Exodus: “You shall not allow a sorceress to live” (Exodus 22:17). It should be noted that the New Testament of the Christian church does not replicate this text from Exodus. It does mention witchcraft or sorcery as a sin but does not present it as a crime (Galatians 5:19). In the fifth century BC, Levy records that it was a capital offense for anyone to blight crops and vineyards or to spread disease among flocks by means of witchcraft. In Rome, from 319–367 AD, several emperors decreed against and had crusades against magicians, soothsayers, and the like. After the fall of the Western Roman Empire around 475 AD, and subsequent to the Visigoths establishing themselves in Italy, laws were passed in 578 to punish witches. One such person was accused of using her craft to contrive the death of a Visigoth prince. In Europe, Louis the Pious, a son of Charlemagne, took active measures in 814 against sorcerers and necromancers. The date 829 is an important one in the development of the law against witchcraft in Europe. A council of the bishops of Paris appealed to the secular courts to carry out the sentences that the bishops pronounced when they convicted witches. In many cases, the sentence was death. In England in 925 and Scotland in 850, anyone convicted of witchcraft was sentenced to death. Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II (1194–1250) not only created a legal code for Germany and Italy but also established punishment for heresy throughout his jurisdiction and argued that witchcraft and heresy were inextricably commingled. These precedents were followed by several pronouncements against witchcraft by popes in 1258, 1330, and 1482. As part of the process of implementing procedures against witches, inquisitors were set up. As noted in Chapter 7, the original office of the Inquisition was created in 1231 by Pope Gregory IX to prosecute heretics. In what might be called a “witch craze,” the Inquisition was used to inquire about persons who had been accused of witchcraft. Summer writes that the inquisitors were like ecclesial judges—men drawn, primarily, from two religious orders: the Dominicans and the Franciscans. One aspect of the craze includes the imagery that witches were a vast political movement, an organized society that was anti-social, anarchist, and a danger to civilization. Misogyny was rampant, and women were much more likely to be accused of being witches involved in this societal conspiracy than were men. In addition, it was a social construct that witches

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2 5 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D were intent on killing and causing harm to political leaders, popes, bishops, and priests. Fear was endemic. In this setting, the Malleus Maleficarum was constructed. From its publication in 1487 up to the year 1669, 30 editions were produced. As Summers (1928/1971), who gives the text the highest praise, comments, “The Malleus Maleficarum is one of the world’s few books written sub species aeternitatis [having eternal significance]”(p. viii). The specific occasion for the text’s production was the assignment of Heinrich Kramer (1430–1500) and Jacob Sprenger (1450–1494), from the Dominican Order, to the position of Grand Inquisitors for all of Germany by Pope Innocent VIII (1432–1492) in 1484. Immediately, these men commenced prosecutions against witches and wrote the book that was published in 1487. Both were highly respected theologians who had extensive publications on a variety of theological matters. What legitimacy did the text have in the social system of the day? Significant. The authors’ peers, the pope, and the University of Cologne not only praised the publication but also gave it official status in the legal systems of Germany, France, and Italy. It seems to have had less impact on England and Scotland. It was not well known there and was not translated into English until about 1700 (Thomas, 1971). What are the contents of the text? Contrary to what some think of as common knowledge, it is not only a collection of laws and procedures against witchcraft but also a theological treatise on the subject of the occult and magic in general. It has three parts: (1) on the link between witchcraft, the devil, and the witch; (2) on the various techniques of witches and how to annul them; and, at the heart of the legal core of the text, (3) the juridical procedures in both ecclesial and civil courts covering how to adjudicate witchcraft and how to prosecute it. The first part reviews the various kinds of magic—the existence of witches, astrology, that witchcraft is linked to the devil, and the phenomena of incubi and succubi—and it presents a misogynist image of women. Kramer and Sprenger (1487/1971, pp. 43–48) make the case that women, more than men, engage in witchcraft, and so are more frequently prosecuted in the witch trials. The authors characterize women as chiefly addicted to evil superstitions, fragile, knowing no moderation in vice, and encompassing wickedness in all its forms in contrast to men. Further, women were said to have a slippery tongue, so “perfidy is more often found in women than in men”; to be intellectually like children; more carnal than men; and to have weak memories (Kramer & Sprenger, 1487/1971, p.44). Women were also thought to be subject to the vices of infidelity, ambition, and lust more than were men. To substantiate their claims, Kramer and Sprenger (1487/1971) quote Greek and Latin authors who saw women as more bitter than death, as a hunter’s snare (or as more perilous than a snare), and with hearts made like a net (see Chapter 6). They only praise women who are modest, obedient to their husbands, and virtuous. But many of these humble women, they say, have brought beatitude to men and have saved nations. Still, according to the Malleus Maleficarum, women are generally evil inf luences. Following the statement that nearly all kingdoms of the world have been overthrown by women, its authors write, “For truly, without the wickedness of women, to say nothing of witchcraft, the world would still remain proof against innumerable dangers” (Kramer & Sprenger, 1487/1971, p. 46). The second part of the work is dedicated to explaining how women become linked to devils, their involvement in covens, their use of rites of the church to engage in evil acts,

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and their various powers: their ability to remove men’s penises, to cause infertility among women, to transmute people into animals, to cause injury to others or loss of property and health, to kill newborn children and cause abortions, and to injure crops, cattle, and flocks (see Chapter 7). The authors proceed by presenting remedies to those who have been harmed by witches: go on a pilgrimage to a holy place, confess one’s sins, ask the church for an exorcism, look intently on the Eucharist bread, wear sacred words (from the Bible) around one’s neck and use holy water and salt. The last part is the most significant section of the document—the procedures for the investigation and sentencing of accused witches and wizards. From this section, it is obvious that, when it came to witchcraft trials, there was a division of jurisdiction between ecclesial and civil courts. The church was concerned because it believed that witchcraft was a heresy of the faith or a departure from it (apostasy). The civil courts were involved in identifying witches because they brought great harm to society. In great detail, Kramer and Sprenger (1487/1971) provide procedures for sentencing according to the various kinds of heresies and witchcraft. For all cases, there had to be at least three witnesses who claimed that the accused engaged in heresy or the art of the craft. The defendant could call on witnesses to advocate for her or him. If the person did not admit to the crime or was defiant, she or he was tortured until there was a confession. Sentences ranged from wearing a cloak for one to two years or standing in front of a church with a candle in bare feet (for a person accused of heresy who is repentant) to jail for a period of time or excommunication (for those who were accused of heresy but did not repent). Of the fifteen situations outlined, two refer specifically to witchcraft. The fourteenth chapter outlines various sentences given to those who remedied the effects of witchcraft using witchcraft itself, to witch midwives and archer-wizards. These archer-wizards are the only men implicated in the craft. They were thought to use the power of the devil to shoot arrows at the crucifix, arrows that were aimed against a personal target, who, ordinarily could not be harmed but was harmed as “the devil guides the arrow to its personal target.” If these sorts of witches or wizards were found guilty and confessed, they were given penalties similar to the ones given to repentant heretics. If they were accused and, after due process, found guilty, but they did not repentant or abjure their actions, they were to be excommunicated and handed over to the civil court for judgement (usually death). The fifteenth chapter outlines the procedures of appeal. The accused had the right to appeal the decision of the “Inquisitor Judge.” If there were valid reasons for the appeal, it was taken to “The Most Holy Lord the Pope” and the Holy See for a final judgement. As is now evident, the Malleus Maleficarum exemplifies a harmful code of ethics, one that damaged not only those accused of witchcraft but also their accusers and defenders, medieval society, and Christianity itself. The document, a creation of two Dominican priests, was very much external to the people called upon to live by its precepts; it was an “alien” construction in that it was created from within the scholarly and increasingly legalistic traditions of the Roman Catholic Church, traditions that abrogated not only the power that women had achieved in the early Christian church but also the radical morality of unconditional love outlined in the New Testament. In other words, it illustrates not only how alienation can be a function of morality but also how such a foreign and nefarious ethos is constructed and applied. Although the Malleus Maleficarum means little to us today, for over two hundred years it spread the darkness and shadow of hurt, pain, persecution, and

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2 5 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D death to tens of thousands of women and was a major force in one of the darkest periods in the history of the Christian church.

A Summary of the Functions of Morality Morality takes on many different forms within religion. In this review, we saw that these forms vary between the extremes of delimitation and elaboration. Our argument was that a substantive interpretation of morality centers it in the sacred. As morality moves more and more away from delimitation towards elaboration, it becomes a dysfunction to persons and societies.

The Restructuring of American Religion: The Case of Morality I bring this chapter to a close by looking at clusters of morality that seem to center on what Wuthnow (1988a) terms “cultural structures.” He argues that American religion is no longer characterized by denominational boundaries because of what he terms the declining significance of denominationalism. In regards to both personal and social morality in the late 1970s, he found little evidence to support the theory that denominational differences affect personal and social moral choices. For example, he notes that, on the question of abortion, the proportion of approval to disapproval is the same for members of all major denominations. With the decline of denominationalism comes a whole new set of boundaries that he calls the restructuring of American religion. This restructuring crosses denominational lines and is marked by a new alignment of liberalism and conservatism. Liberalism is characterized as religion adapting itself to the cultural environment whereas conservatism distances itself from this environment. In effect, then, the cultural boundaries are between these two cultural alignments, with liberalism having symbolic boundaries that are permeable to the new American religious culture and conservatism having boundaries that are tighter and more impermeable. A way to test this restructuring hypothesis is to see whether Christian morality is clustered around the patterns of cultural alignment. Theoretically, one would think that more conservative ethics would cluster around the conservative structure and more liberal ethical positions would cluster around the liberal structure. This theory seems to have an empirical base. For example, Roof and McKinney (1987) compare a range of moral issues not only along denominational lines but also along a continuum of liberalism to conservatism. Figure 9.6 was constructed from Roof and McKinney’s analysis of morality and denominations. Their data come from eleven different General Social Surveys (GSS) conducted between1972 and 1978, and in 1980, 1982, and 1984. This figure uses only two categories: liberal Protestants and conservative Protestants. Their categories are more expansive and include moderate Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and smaller groups, such as the Mormons and Jehovah’s Witnesses. In this figure, “Women Work” means “in favor of a woman working even if her husband can support her,” “Abortion” refers to “favoring abortion for any reason,” “Extra Marital” indicates that extra-marital sex is not always wrong, “Pre Marital” means “premarital sex is

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Figure 9:6 Morality and Religious Restructuring in the United States 70 60 50

Level of support for

40

Women Work

30

Abortion Extra Marital

20

Pre Marital

10 0

Gay Sex

Liberal Protestants

Conservative Protestants

Source: Roof and McKinney (1987) not always wrong,” and “Gay Sex” means “homosexuality is not always wrong.” The authors add more to their tables. They conclude that there is a significant difference between the liberals and conservatives in terms of moral values. However, their data do not quite fit Wuthnow’s bilateral restructuring thesis. Roof and McKinney find that Roman Catholics and moderate Protestants form a “middle” group that seem distinct from the liberal and conservative extremes. The general nature of this research has been updated through the work of Jensen (1998). She compared fundamentalist Christians and progressive Christians in the United States as well as members of orthodox and progressive religions in India. The concern here is with the American sample. The results of her analysis reveal that fundamentalist Christians were more likely than progressives to consider suicide in general, suicide in the case of terminal illness, and divorce to be morally wrong. In Canada, we find a similar story. However, there is less variation on moral issues between the major denominations, and most Canadian Christians belong to what Bibby (1987) calls “The Big Four”: the Roman Catholic Church, the Anglican Church, the United Church, or various conservative churches (those churches that are either evangelical or charismatic). He has also correlated attitudes to a number of moral and social issues with denominational affiliation, using data that he has been gathering for about twenty years across Canada. Figure 9.7 presents these data. So that there can be a comparison between items cross-nationally, I used the same variable names in Figure 9.7 as in Figure 9.6. Also, for the sake of comparison, I collapsed two Canadian affiliations, Anglican and United, into liberal. In addition, because there are significant differences between Roman Catholics in Quebec and those outside Quebec, Roman Catholics within Quebec appear in Figure 9.7 as a distinct group. Last, the Canadian data had no comparable item about women in the public sphere, and thus this item was not included.

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2 5 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 9:7 Morality and Restructuring in Canada 80 70 60 50

Abortion

40

Extra Marital

30

Pre Marital

20

Gay Sex

10 0

Liberal

Conservative

RC Quebec

% Disagree Source: Bibby (1987) Evidently, there are similar restructuring patterns in Canada as in the United States: a clustering of liberal attitudes with liberal churches and conservative attitudes with conservative churches. Similar to the Roof and McKinney data from the United States, the Canadian data also suggests a middle ground between liberalism and conservatism. Not shown in this figure but evident in Bibby’s data is that, in Canada, this middle ground is composed of Roman Catholics outside of Quebec, Lutherans, and Presbyterians. A feature not in the United States, however, is the difference ethnicity makes to the moral attitudes of Roman Catholics. The Roman Catholics in Quebec are just as liberal as Canadian Anglicans and United Church members. One might argue that a new form of religious restructuring is taking place in Canada, one that has an ethnic dimension in contrast to the mainly ideological dimensions evident in religious restructuring in the United States. In summary, there is partial evidence from these data, both in Canada and in the United States, for the bilateral restructuring thesis of Wuthnow. In both countries there is a middle ground. In the United States, it is among the moderate Protestants and the Roman Catholics. In Canada, the middle ground is held by Roman Catholics outside of Quebec and by Lutherans and Presbyterians. Unlike in the United States, however, at least when it comes to morality, in Canada, Quebec Roman Catholics stand in close union with Canadian Christian liberalism.

Summary and Conclusions We have come full circle in our investigation of ethos in general and morality in particular. It has been discovered that there exists an intricate linkage between myth, ritual, and morality. We have also seen that, on the continuum between delimitation and elaboration, there are both substantive and functional dimensions of morality. Recent studies illustrate that, in

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modern Canada and the United States, morality seems to be clustered around two poles: liberal and conservative. In Chapter 10 and 11, I investigate the final dilemma of religion that O’Dea and O’Dea described: the dilemma of power or coercion versus conversion. This dilemma will enable us to understand the connections between religion and politics. Box 9:2 The Restructuring of Canadian Religion Canadian Liberal and Conservative Differences An Angus Reid poll conducted in 1993 finds evidence for a conservative-liberal split. As United Church leaders accommodated to liberal values like speaking out on social issues and accepting homosexual clergy, rank and file members rebelled, and 20 per cent of the United Church membership felt that the Church was too liberal. As the general population becomes more liberal on social issues, it is the most uncompromising conservative churches that are flourishing. Although they make up only 8 per cent of the Canadian population, conservative Christians are much more active supporters of their churches. Their views are frequently much more homogeneous than those found in more liberal churches. For example, 75 per cent of conservative Christians believe that homosexual behavior is morally unacceptable (compared to only 40 per cent of Roman Catholics). They are the only group of Christians in which the majority disapproves of premarital sex, and they are the strongest opponents of abortion—41 per cent say that it should be permitted only when the mother’s life is in danger. Source: Nemeth (1993).

NOTES 1

The term refers to millennialism or religious belief that focuses on the coming of the divine kingdom, the future order, or the future heaven on earth.

2

This type of analysis investigates to see whether there is a significant relationship between two variables.

3

The term refers to group-wide characteristics (for example, a family, a community, a city or a nation). The context of this study is a nation.

4

This is a methodological term to describe a variable that is composed of a number of other variables that are correlated with each other to measure a common feature present in all of them.

5

The number of respondents was 16,604 from Australia, Austria, the former East Germany, Hungary, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, New Zealand, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Russia, the United States, and the former West Germany. It should be noted that Canada was not part of this study.

6

Another example of the substantive meaning of morality is from the Decalogue of Judaism. Of the Ten Commandments, the first three are ordinances specifically related to honoring Yahweh or the central sacred element of the religion.

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This is reflected in the sacred text of Christians, the New Testament. It is told that, after Jesus rose from the dead, he sent his Holy Spirit to his disciples. If they obeyed his precepts, they would be empowered from “on high” to continue his mission upon earth.

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Chapter TEN

T h e Di l e m m a of P ow e r : T h e R e l at ion s h i p Be t w e e n R e l ig ion a n d P ol i t ic s

Part One: Caesaropapism and Hierocracy Orientation Part of our identity as citizens of the modern world is political. We

talk politics; we hear it on radio and observe it on television. In many ways, it seems to be pivotal to our way of life. We depend upon the political system for citizenship, legal protection, many freedoms, and, in the case of trouble, some sort of assistance. But what is the relationship between religion and politics? Our experience, at least in Canada, is that there is a disjuncture between the two institutions. However, this has not always been the case. In fact, as we shall observe, it is only within recent historical memory that societies, especially in the West, have constructed this division. How did this happen? What role has religion played on the political terrain of the more distant past? These questions that be discussed in Chapter 10 as well as in Chapter 11. We will continue to use the O’Deas’ theory of the various dilemmas experienced by religious organizations in our investigation of the linkages between religion and politics. In this chapter, the dilemma of power will frame our discussion, and I will outline the connections between religious and political institutions under the rubric of caesaropapism and hierocracy. Chapter 11 is a follow up chapter that will discuss alternate ways in which religion and politics are linked. To understand the dilemma of power, let us recall the interpretation given by the O’Deas. As a religious movement matures, it is likely to become intertwined gradually with the public,

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2 5 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D non-religious culture. As a religion becomes more closely aligned with secular power, its leaders may be tempted to use this power to coerce others to join the ranks of the faithful, so the intermingling of religious and secular culture gives rise to the dilemma of power: whether to convert or to coerce others to join the religious movement. Prince Vladimir of Russia (died 1015 AD), who ordered the mass baptism of the people, is a prime example of the use of coercion, as are contemporary efforts by fundamentalist Islamic leaders to restore conservative Islam, for example, in Iran. Most religions in the West do not have this power to coerce, so they must rely on the voluntary conversion of prospective followers. But relying on either conversion or coercion presents problems. In order to become attractive to new members and to retain the old, the religion must often accommodate to the secular culture. The charismatic spirit may be eclipsed in the process of providing a growing (or at least stable) membership for a sound organizational base. To regain the charisma, sectarian or new religious movements frequently emerge. On the other hand, charisma, if it is to endure over time in modern society, will be bureaucratized in some form. This process may lead to a bureaucracy that subverts the original spirit (in which case charisma is diminished by the organization), or it may lead to an organization that uses charisma to further the organization, but, in doing so, the charismatic nature of the sacred movement is also attenuated, to be replaced by rationality and efficiency. As Stark (1964) notes, In judging a church, the question cannot be whether it has connected with a certain apparatus of bureaucrats, but whether this bureaucratic apparatus has completely overlaid and stifled the life which it was supposed to assist and to preserve. Only where the latter contingency has become a reality can we speak of the routinization of charisma. (p. 206)

As we saw in Chapter 5, Christianity began with the revolutionary prophet Jesus. After several centuries, this new religious movement began to become like a church, which we defined as a type of religious organization that accommodates itself to the social environment. I shall outline two kinds of responses to this accommodation. In the first case, I shall look at caesaropapism (Weber, 1894/1978; Marty, 1959), which involves the subordination of religious power to that of the state. Another response was also an accommodation on the part of the Christian church, wherein the religious collective used the state to achieve its own end. This was a hierocratic response (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1161),1 which could involve the rule or government by priests or religious leaders and which can also be referred to as the hierocratic paradigm. Table 10.1 illustrates these alternative responses: Table 10.1 Two Responses to Accommodation Names of Responses

Meaning of the Responses

The Caesaropapist Paradigm

The State’s Use of Religion

The Hierocratic Paradigm

A Religion’s Use of the State

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This chapter does not look at folk religions or the modern world except in the case of Islam and hierocracy in Iran. I shall initially detail the meaning of the terms caesaropapism and hierocracy and explain how they reflect historical phenomena. Again, the inspiration comes from Weber who was “soaked in history” (see Chapter 1). This will not be a chapter of history that traces facts; it will, however, use the historical record to search for patterns and themes, as Weber did in his many studies of ancient Rome, medieval and early modern Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism.

Caesaropapism Weber (1894/1978), in his many studies of the relationship between religion and society, documents a long history of tension and antagonism between political and sacred authorities. This tension commences, especially, at the stage of permanent settlements. He reflects that the city god or patron saint is indispensable for the beginning and continuation of every political community. In war, the triumph of one’s own god is the definite confirmation of the ruler’s victory and an effective guarantee of the obedience of one’s subjects. As will be outlined below, tension seem to be endemic to the relationship between political and religious leaders, and, in historical times, patterns of this tension can be identified. But first, let us expand our understanding of the term caesaropapism. There are several definitions of this term that will assist us in discerning patterns of tension within the religious-political relationship. Livingstone (2000a) defines caesaropapism as, The system whereby an absolute monarch has supreme control over the Church within his dominions and exercises it even in matters (e.g., doctrine) normally reserved to ecclesiastical authority. The term is most generally used of the authority exercised by the Byzantine emperors over the Eastern patriarchates. (p. 218)

Weber (1894/1978) offers a simple definition: “the complete subordination of priestly to secular power” (p. 1161). Ware (1990), a theologian of the Byzantine Church, adds, “Caesar, the civil ruler, was also pope, supreme governor of the church” (p. 135). Caesaropapism has an early history. Weber (1894/1978) acknowledges that it was found in occidental antiquity, in the oriental states, and in the Byzantine Empire. Its application in the Occident and in Christianity comes from two sources. First, the kings who led jurisdictions in Ireland, Hispania, England, Scotland, and Wales were inspired by folk religions in those areas to construct a caesaropapist paradigm. Second, kings and emperors of the Frankish tradition, for example, Charlemagne as well as emperors of the Holy Roman Empire and the Byzantine kings of the eastern Roman Empire, received their models of legitimation from kings in ancient Israel, Mesopotamia, Egypt, and Rome. I shall outline the link between Christianity and the political aspects of folk societies (in this case, settled ones) and follow by examining the nexus between religion and the Christian kings and emperors from ancient societies. Thereafter, I will illustrate the caesaropapist paradigm in occidental Christianity, in Islam under the Ottomans, and in modern Arabia during the rule of the Saudi royal family.

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Sources in Western European Folk Religions In the light of Durkheim’s (1895/1933) theory that early societies exhibited limited differentiation of societal institutions, we can see that the political structure encompassing the royals and their subjects reveals an intricate relationship of power that connects political authority with sacred authority. Jones (1990) indicates that the Anglo-Saxon kings saw themselves as descendants of the ancient Nordic deity Woden, depicted as a war-god who protected heroes and rewarded the fallen in the afterlife. The aura about a monarch, then, was sacred. A clear example of this comes from a work inspired by King Alfred the Great (849–899) called the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, which contains a number of genealogies that trace royal lineage back through heroes to the god Woden. Barber (2008) quotes a sample passage: “Woden begot Casser, begot Tytmon, begot Trygils, begot Rothmand … begot Aethelric” (p.19). This sacred aura or divine potency of rulers continued through to early modern times. Thomas (1971) outlines a special gift the English monarch had—the ability to cure the King’s Evil by touching a victim. This evil was scrofula or a tubercular inflammation of the neck. Thomas (1971) writes, “Most people thus regarded the power to cure the Evil as an intrinsic quality pertaining to the sacred person of the monarch” (p. 195).

Sources in the Ancient Middle Eastern and Western Religions As we saw in Chapter 5 in the section on leaders in ancient Mesopotamia, the image of the King as priest is central to our understanding of the political nature of those societies. Oppenheim (1964) and Wiggermann (1995) present an image of divinity wherein the gods created the world for their own benefit and created humans to serve them. In order to coordinate the rulership of the deities, “kingship was lowered from heaven” and invested in a sovereign who was luminous with a kind of divine radiance or light. The king, then, was the divine representative on earth who was to see that there would be one king, one god, and one state. Further, political authorities were installed by the gods to insure that rebellious subjects would not depart from their directives. A yearly national spring ritual was celebrated by the monarch wherein gifts were offered to the national deity who would recognize the monarch’s performance, reaffirm him in office, and decree another year of abundance to the people. The deity would also be a warrior god who would grant success to the king as the principal general. However, if the deity were not pleased with the king and his subjects, he or she would not grant prosperity or success in war. The hierarchical nature of the deities and the state are outlined in Figure 10.1. Cantor (1993) considers the sacred-political hierarchy of ancient Egypt, a hierarchy that, eventually, formed the basis of the sacred-political philosophy of Rome. He uses the term solar theology or theocratic monarchy to describe this religious-political structure. Goelet (2008) presents as a classical concept of Egyptian religion that the god (especially the god Re, the sun-god) acts, and the king reacts to his activity. Kings are divine agents on earth who are to carry out several commands: to judge subjects, to protect the weak from the strong, to satisfy the gods, and to maintain the order of the society, which is pre-existent to the origins of Egypt. Further, the king was to be a “defender of the faith” and lord and master of all foreign peoples as well. As in ancient Mesopotamia, in Egypt, military campaigns were

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Figure 10:1 The Sacred-Societal Hierarchy

The Heavens

The Earth

{ {

The High and Higher Deities

The Lower and Minor Deities

The King

The Subjects

commissioned and blessed by the state deity. After a successful campaign, some of the booty gathered was presented to the deity as repayment for guaranteeing Egyptian victory. The solar theology of ancient Egypt adds to the model of the ruler as divine representative on earth the ideas that the king is to be the defender of the faith and is an agent of the god who commissions and guides military expansions. As a summary, here are some of the features of this early form of caesaropapism: ▶▶

Kingship was created and ordered by the deities

▶▶

Subjects, both of the king and the deity, were there to serve both

▶▶

A sacred hierocracy was constructed on earth that resembled the hierocracy of heaven (lesser gods and goddesses served higher deities)

▶▶

A divine aura or light surrounded the king instilling fear in the king’s subjects, just as the deity was feared

▶▶

The unity of the state was reflected by one god (a high god of the nation) and one king

▶▶

The deity provided abundance in times of peace and success in periods of war to the level that the king pleased the deity

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Obedience to the king was seen as obedience to the deity

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The king was considered a defender of the faith

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The deity commissions and protects military expansion while the king carries out this demand

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Christianity and Caesaropapism The fourth century is pivotal in creating a Christian version of the ancient caesaropapist model in the person of Constantine (274–337 AD). He was the first Christian emperor of Rome, and he established the pattern of the Christian emperor that was followed until the last Roman emperor of the West, Romulus Augustulus, was deposed in 476 by Odovacar (433–493), a German commander of the imperial guard in Rome (Gerberding, 2005). Some claim that his conversion occurred in 312 AD, when he was reported to have seen a vision in the heavens of a Christian cross that gave him encouragement to fight and win against a usurper to the throne, Maxentius. Thereafter, he treated Christianity as a favored religion. Many were his “intrusions” and excursions into the Western Catholic and the Eastern Christian Church: he instituted Sunday as a holiday, established December 25 as the celebrated day of Christ’s birth, forbade bloody gladiatorial combats, built churches, and prohibited the building of new pagan temples (Todd, 1979; Latourette, 1975). Several legacies stand out as central to our discussion. First, he allowed the Christian clergy to use donations given to the state, which put them on par with the Greco-Roman religious priests. Many laymen became priests thereafter, which suggests that the priesthood during this period was affected by the dilemma of mixed motivation. Nonetheless, this expansion of the religious leadership does indicate a growing accommodation of Christianity in the empire. Further, Constantine published an edict of toleration, the Edict of Milan (313), wherein all religions were proclaimed as free to function without fear of reprisal. He later relocated the central authority of the Roman Empire to the east, specifically, moving it to the city Byzantium, which he renamed Constantinople in 330. During his life there, he was significantly involved in the business of the church. It was Constantine who ordered the gathering of the Council of Nicaea (325 AD), presided over the first session, and introduced the term homoousios (of one essence) to describe the personhood of Jesus (Todd, 1979). His successors (except for Julian who was not a Christian) continued to be very active in the life of the Church. An example of extreme caesaropapism occurred during the reign of Gratian, who shared the position of emperor of the West with two others from 375–378 AD. When a strict Christian sect in Spain was accused of heresy and immorality, the local secular authority responded. The leader of the sect (Priscillian, bishop of Ávila) was tried in civil court and then executed with six of his followers (Todd, 1979). Although the church often reacted to the state’s forays into the prosecution of heresy, this dual action of the church and state against dissenters became a model during the medieval period. The caesaropapist paradigm is well illustrated in the Eastern Church,2 as seen, for example, by the fact that the emperor in the eighth century claimed that he was “God’s representative” on earth (McKitterick, 2004, p. 72). The model is further illustrated in Russia. In 860 AD, the Moravian Prince Rastislav asked the Byzantine emperor to send missionaries to the Slavs. The emperor obliged, and, after a short period of missionary activity, two monks, Cyril and Methodius, earned great success. A state church was instituted, and the practice of creating state churches became very common in the East. In 988, Vladimir I of Kiev sent envoys to various nations to investigate which religion (Islam, Latin Christianity, Judaism, or Eastern Christianity) would best suit his purposes for a national religion. He chose Eastern Christianity, and he ordered the mass baptism of all Russians. This is a classic example of the

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use of power not to persuade people to convert but to coerce them. Between 1451 and 1452, Constantinople fell to the Ottoman Muslims, and the primary seat of Eastern Christianity was evacuated. Moscow then came to be known as the “Third Rome”: the center of the Russian state as well the spiritual center of the East (Steeves, 1979). From this time until the fall of the Czarist regime in 1917, Orthodox Christianity was the state religion of Russia. Marty (1959) provides further evidence that Orthodox Christianity and the Russian polity fit the caesaropapist paradigm. Peter the Great of Russia (1672–1725), who was czar from 1682–1725, set up a style of religious-political linkage that continued through to the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. He was heard to say, “I am your patriarch.” He reorganized monasteries and schools, reformed parish life, and infused religious instruction with a polite and subtle rationalism. The revenues of the church were under state control, and the clergy were not much more than vassals of the state. He even went so far as to abolish the Patriarchate of Moscow in 1721, and he established a synod of bishops under the watchful eye of a layman, who came to be known as “The Czar’s Eye.” The caesaropapist paradigm exemplified by Peter the Great’s relationship with the Orthodox Church illustrates an extreme of the dilemma of power. As the sacred institution adapts to the secular society, the secular world enters into the very life of the sacred. In this case, the charismatic role of the religious institution is replaced by the political power of the state, and the latter leads or tries to rule the former. In relationship to the O’Dean theory of the dilemma of power discussed here, the caesaropapist paradigm is a clear illustration of the use of power for conversion. By far the most illustrious example in medieval Christianity of a caesaropapist relationship between religion and state is the Holy Roman Empire. The empire began when Charlemagne was crowned “August Emperor” in 800 by Pope Leo III (pope from 795 to 816). To illustrate this coronation as a rite of passage, I outlined the ceremony in Chapter 7. Here, the focus will be to present themes of caesaropapism from Charlemagne to the last ruler of

Box 10:1 The Wedding of Religion and Politics in Russia Continues Church bolsters Russian nationalism. On a wide range of foreign and domestic issues—including nuclear disarmament, the political union of Russia and Belarus, and the eastward expansion of NATO—the Orthodox church is reinforcing the increasingly nationalist slant of Russian politicians ... In domestic affairs, the church has bolstered the chauvinistic mood of Russian politics by pushing for restrictions on foreign missionaries and smaller religious sects.... Critics say the church today is continuing its tradition of cozy links with the Kremlin. The patriarch often appears side by side with President Boris Yeltsin at key political events.... As a reward for its loyalty, the church has been allowed to participate in lucrative stateauthorized financial schemes.... The church owns 40 per cent of the shares in the oilexport industry.... The church’s conservative and authoritarian tendencies are linked to its rejection of the fundamental reforms that were introduced in Western religions. Source: York (1997).

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2 6 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D the Holy Roman Empire, Leopold II (emperor from 1790 to 1792). The primary authorities for this summary are Hodgkin (2003) and Heer (1968). At its height in 815, the Frankish Empire of Charles the Great (Charlemagne) covered all of present day France and the historical territories of Frisia, Saxonia, Austrasia, Bavaria, and Northern Italy. The empire never became a fully developed bureaucratic state but relied on the charisma of Charles himself. After his death, the territory was divided among three of his sons. Charlemagne, as we noted, legitimized his authority by appealing to the Christian traditions that suited him. Christ is no longer the suffering servant of the New Testament but a king of nobles, king of the Franks, and a warrior God. Brown (2003) notes that shortly after the death of Charlemagne, a German document called the Heliand (The Savior) portrayed Jesus as a lord and the apostles as his war band. The king is a protector of Western Christianity who is to be the one emperor over one state under one religion. Rather then the emperor submitting to the pope, the pope submits to Charles in such language as “your cause is ours and ours is yours.” To create unity among all the peoples of his domain, Charlemagne published an act of uniformity in 782 to subdue the Saxons who were causing him trouble. Over four thousand Saxons were beheaded for insubordination and being recalcitrant. Charlemagne issued many other edicts and took many other actions that influenced church teaching and practice. For example, he spoke jeremiads against lax priests; appointed abbots to monasteries; counselled Pope Leo III on the need to be virtuous; commissioned church officials (bishops and priests) to administer the Kingdom of the Franks (later known as the Holy Roman Empire); sent a bishop to be his ambassador to Constantinople, the center of the Byzantine Empire; personally sought out those he thought to be heretics or those who challenged the Catholic Church; saw it as his business to uphold “corrected” Christian order in his territory; and engaged in war to protect not only his own kingdom but also the church. Brown (2003) adds that he made Christian law the law of the land or the true, universal law of the whole empire. One of the most important legacies he left was in church reform and education. Hodgkin (2003) notes that Charlemagne himself was an educated man who read and spoke Latin, understood Greek, read in his native language (Frankish) the ancient stories of his ancestors, and saw to the education of his sons and daughters. A literary birth occurred during his reign that Hodgkin considers to be as important to the West as was the Renaissance of the fifteenth century. The Carolingian Renaissance, as it was called, was made possible through the person of Alcuin (735–804), a Benedictine monk from Northumbria in the Briton island. Around Alcuin, Charles gathered a number of learned men proficient in Greek and Latin letters, Christian theology, and the Bible. Of special interest was Alcuin’s creation of a new, uniform script of Latin that used lower case letters and came to be known as the “Caroline minuscule” (Brown, 2003, p. 444). Brown (2003) notes that this action had major ramifications in the education of clerics, monks, lay elite, and administrators. It brought Latin back as a spoken and readable language, and, subsequently, Latin was used up to modern times in law, medicine, science, and communication channels from states to states. It was during Alcuin’s tenure that vernacular French was given a higher status: all priests were told that, along with reading the Bible in Latin, they were also to read rustic Latin (the genesis of Italian), German, and French. The carapaces of these texts were schools in monasteries and in court residences, and these schools became the basis of the medieval university of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.

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According to Heer (1968), after Charles the Great, the empire was divided among his sons into territories that later became, essentially, Germany, France, and Italy. The Holy Roman Empire was not lost, however. It took shape through the Ottonian dynasty (962–1024), which was founded by Otto I (912–973). Otto was crowned as emperor in 962 by two archbishops of Germany, and he expressed in his life the caesaropapist paradigm. Heer uses the term imperial church to describe what Otto I and his successors created: an ecclesial system wherein bishops (also called “imperial bishops”) became like “petite princes,” were called lord, and dressed in royal regalia. The Ottonian Emperor was considered a representative of the high priest, Christ, who was portrayed as the priest-king who succeeded Israelite kings such as David, Solomon, and Hezekiah. One of the emperor’s major responsibilities was to lead the church to war and victory. Otto I did, indeed, live out this duty in his wars against Slavs, during which “utmost brutalities” were committed in the name of the Christian God. Heer reviews the subsequent dynasties of the Holy Roman Empire to its penultimate emperor, Leopold II. All were wedded to the idea that they were anointed by God, that they had a kind of sacred insignia within them, that they had a responsibility to uphold the Christian church, and that they had a say in the internal matters of the church. However, towards the end of the twelfth century, this one-way street was challenged. With the meeting of Pope Gregory VII (1020–1085) and Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106), a new model of religious-political interaction emerges: hierocracy. This story is pivotal in the development of the medieval world and will be told in the next section of the chapter. Before leaving this discussion of the Christian caesaropapist model, however, the story of the Hapsburg dynasty should be told because it adds further elements to the paradigm. Wheatcroft (2004) reveals some of this story. He focuses on the Hapsburg dynasty between the reign of Albert II, who assumed the title of Holy Roman Emperor in 1438, and Maximilian I, who died in 1519. Sacred images are redolent in depictions of these emperors and their families. The emperor is Christus Domini, the Lord’s anointed, the vicar of Christ. The emperors and their families were thought to be “touched by God.” They were described as the chosen ones, as divine agents on earth who were doing God’s work in their domain, and it was believed that they were personally selected to fulfil the divine will on earth. As with previous emperors, their violent use of power was legitimated in the light of Christian mythology and was considered honorable. If they were successful, God was on their side but, if not, God had lifted his grace from them because they, or the people, had done something wrong. The Hapsburgs were believed (at least by them) to be the founders, supporters, and protectors of Christendom. It was this family (in the person of Charles V, 1500–1558) that encouraged Pope Clement VII (pope from 1523–1534) to call the Council of Trent (1545–1563) to address the Protestant Reformation. Heer (1968) presents a summary of the duties and powers of the Holy Roman Emperor and the relationship of this office to the papacy: The Emperor is the supreme bishop, is bishop and overseer of the church in its outward aspect and as such has a duty to defend and regulate the church. It falls on the Emperor to call councils and synods, to confirm ecclesiastical laws and ordinances and to amend religious observances. It is the Emperor’s duty to suppress superstitious and idolatrous misuses, to oversee the moral conduct of the clergy, to punish clerics who fall short, to appoint and remove the church’s servant. The Pope is bishop as

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2 6 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D regard the internal affaires of the church, and in these matters the Emperor is subject to the Pope; but in the external affairs of the church the Pope ought to be subject to the Emperor. (p. 201)

A remarkable affinity exists between the image of caesaropapism in ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt (see above) and the icon of the Holy Roman Emperor. The major change is in mythology—from polytheism to monotheism. However, the ethos is consistent. As with the ancient kings, the medieval emperor was created and ordered by God, is obeyed and honored by subjects, is subservient to the Christ who has servant saints, and is anointed with a kind of sacred aura. The unity of state, ruler, and God forms a substantial basis of medieval society. The emperor is the defender of the faith and, in the name of Christ, engages in both offensive and defensive war. As outlined above, religio-political organizations structured according to the caesaropapist model respond to what O’Dea calls the fifth dilemma—the dilemma of power—by using coercive rather than persuasive power to further their goals and gain membership.

Islam and the Caesaropapist Paradigm: The Ottoman Empire and Modern Arabia The Ottoman Empire may be seen as the last of the great empires of the last two millennia; it was preceded, in turn, by the Islamic empire of the Umayyads and the Abbasids (c. 660–1258), the Persian Empire (founded c. 550 BC), and the Roman Empire (27 BC–476 AD). Its existence was long lasting—from 1299 to 1923—and, at its height, it stretched from the Atlantic Ocean in the west to India in the east. Vienna was nearly taken by the Ottomans in 1529 and again in 1683. In the north-west, then, the empire touched the eastern regions of Western Europe, capturing all of Eastern Europe except Russia. In the south, it reached through Egypt to Abyssinia during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1494–1566). Lord Kinross (2003) has offered an extensive analysis of this empire, and, in what follows, I shall use his work to illustrate caesaropapism and its themes within the historical context of the Ottoman Empire. It has been claimed that Osman (1259–1326) once passed the night in the home of a pious Muslim wherein his host gave him a copy of the Qur’an, which Osman read throughout the night. In the early hours of the next morning, he heard “Since thou hast read my eternal word with so great respect, thy children and the children of thy children shall be honored from generation to generation.” Later, he had a vision of a tree growing from his loins and covering the whole world with the shadow of green and branches. The leaves then became swords and, as the wind blew, they pointed to Constantinople. On waking, and through the counsel of an elder, he came to believe that he had a destiny to unite with other Turkomans to become a community of Ghazis (Muslim warriors) to carry on a cause against the infidel Christians. As we will see, military campaigns were also frequently led against the Shi’ites of Iraq and Persia. Caesaropapist features, then, are evident in the mythology surrounding the origins of the Ottoman Empire—in Osman’s dream of a Muslim military organization fighting against Christianity and spreading Islam. Indeed, the Ottoman Empire began as an expansionist system in a way similar to Islam’s genesis. The substantial rationale was economic and militaristic.

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The expansion resulted in a significant transfer of resources, both in material and personnel benefits. Much booty was garnished in the initial stages of the expansion and thereafter, benefits and taxes were gathered from formerly Christian territories (primarily from Byzantium, Greece, the Balkans, Abyssinia, and Hungary) as well as from already established Muslim regions such as Egypt, Northern Africa, Arabia, Iraq, and Persia. In previously Christian states, Jews and Christians were allowed to maintain their religions but were also required to pay higher taxes, were not allowed to own property, and could not join the armies. The other benefit to Muslims of the expanding empire was the requirement that all Christian peoples give some of their sons and daughters as slaves (in Muslim tradition, no Muslim could enslave another Muslim). Murad I, who ruled from 1359 to 1389 and who was considered to be the first of the great sultans, initiated a process of male slavery that was to continue for many centuries. Boys, first of all from the Balkans, were selected for military service from among non-Muslim captives and slaves; these fighters would become one of the most highly trained and elite military troops of all empires, the Janissaries. These men were required to become Muslim and to be completely loyal and answerable only to the Sultan. They were highly trained and educated, dedicated to the expansion of Islam, celibate, not required to work, highly disciplined, and given lucrative benefits. Kinross (2003) quotes the historian Gibbon, who describes the Janissaries as fighting “with the zeal of proselytes against their idolatrous countrymen” (p. 52). They were always in the forefront of military expansion and continued as an elite corps until 1826 when they revolted and were killed or exiled by the supporters of Mahmud II (who was emperor from 1808 to 1839). The sacred supporters of the Janissaries were the Sufi dervishes, who lead them into battle. Christian personnel were also recruited to be scientists, jurists, and members of the educated elite class. These Christians were the original agents of the construction of two major institutions of the empire: the Grand Mufti (called the “aristocracy of the brain”), who cared for the sacred element of the state and maintained Shari’ah law as the basis of society, and the Grand Vizier, the “prime minister of the sultan,” who was to care for the secular elements of the empire. The Grand Vizier had enormous powers, and the position was highly coveted by many elite in the empire. Young women were also enslaved, many of whom became concubines of the sultans and the Ottoman elite. For example, after Hungary was conquered by Suleiman I in 1521, the titular monarch was required to give one-tenth of his population, both men and women, to the sultan in Istanbul. The empire kept expanding in the West until 1529, when Suleiman’s siege of Vienna was not successful, and he had to return to Istanbul. Expansionist programmes continued under Suleiman’s successor until halted briefly by another military defeat near Lepanto, Greece, in 1571, when the naval fleet of the Holy League (a triple alliance of the pope, Spain, and Venice) defeated the Ottoman navy. It was not until 100 years later (at the end of the seventeenth century) that the Ottoman Empire ceased to expand. Many are the images of the caesaropapist paradigm throughout the long spread of this Muslim and militaristic empire. The Ottoman sultan was called “the Lord of lords.” After the conquest of Constantinople in 1453 by one of the youngest sultans, Mehmed II (reigned 1451–1481), the sultan “took the seat of Caesar” and was thereafter called the Khan (the name of the Far Eastern king), the Ghazi (a Muslim warrior), and Caesar (a name of the Byzantine Emperor). Other titles given to him include “sacred majesty of the East” and “princely

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2 6 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D magnificence of the West.” After the conquest of Arabia and the fall of the last ruler of the Mamluk sultanate in 1517, the emperor of the Ottomans began to be known as the “sultancaliph” and as a leader in Islam; he was “God’s representative on earth” and “God’s ambassador on earth.” In classic caesaropapist language, he was the “defender of the faith of Islam” and “commander of the faithful.” The unity of religious and political authority and the totality of allegiance expected to this authority were also evident. Even though Christians and Jews were considered dhimmis or protected peoples, the subtle message was that they were inferior: they had to pay a higher tax, and, eventually, to become Muslim to rise out of this state of marginalization. This move toward Islam as a unified totality was also expressed in the suppression and execution of Shi’ite Muslims, who were thought to be heretics of the faith. For example, 40,000 followers of Ismail were killed in Anatolia in 1514. The totalization process occurred within a divinely based programme of jihad. For this reason, Kinross calls the Ottoman Empire a military theocracy. Although he uses the term theocracy and I use the term caesaropapism, the reality behind the two terms is similar. Examples of jihads against Christians are many: the killing of 10,000 men in Nicopolis in 1396 by Sultan Bayezid (reigned 1389–1402); the massacre of all men, women, and children in 1453 during the siege of Constantinople, to the accompaniment of the battle cry “There is no God but God and Muhammad is his Prophet”; in 1480 in Oranto, Italy, the killing of 800 people who refused to convert to Islam; and the suppression of a revolt in Bulgaria in 1876, which resulted in the burning of villages, the indiscriminate massacre of 12, 000 people, slaughter, rape and the burning of a church that held 5,000 Christians. By far, the most extensive massacres occurred on several occasions in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth century when the empire had lost most of its eastern and western territories and was in the midst of a modernization and reform process. In fact, these atrocities took place after a period of substantial religious tolerance; what became known as the Magna Carta of the Ottoman Empire was created by the Tanzimat (or reorganization) of that empire, which began in 1839 and extended the rights of Ottoman citizenship to all people regardless of religious affiliation. These affronts occurred during two periods: 1895–1896 and 1915. The first involved the Armenians, who had been Christians since 314 when the peoples of Eastern Anatolia converted through the missionary activity of Gregory the Illuminator. They had been given the protection of the Muslim tradition of dhimmis. Between1895 and 1896, however, several Armenians posted seditious placards in their towns calling on Muslims to revolt against Sultan Abdul Hamid II (reigned 1876–1909). The sultan demanded that the Armenians pay an even higher tax. They refused, and the armies of the sultan were sent. They indiscriminately killed Armenian men, women, and children. The attacks were surrounded by religious rituals, which occurred during Friday prayers in the mosques. An estimated 50,000 to 100,000 persons lost their lives in the purge. The next major massacre occurred in 1915 when the Ottoman authorities ordered the killing or the deportation of the remaining Armenians in Eastern Anatolia. Kinross estimates that one million Armenians were affected and that about one half of them lost their lives. For centuries the Ottoman Empire had been in decline. It had reached a zenith in the sixteenth century under Suleiman the Magnificent and continued to its nadir towards the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century. It had all the characteristics of a major empire. It was a Turkish state, an Islamic state as well as a universalistic one.

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Conquests continued for two and a half centuries, and it became an imperial power of high stature. Its decline lasted for nearly four centuries. In the end, the state became a democratic republic with the ascendency of Atatürk (1881–1938), the founder of the Republic of Turkey. From that time to the present, Turkey has been one of the most Westernized nations of the Middle East, and it has instituted, essentially, a separation of the state from religion. There is no example from modern Christianity that we can examine to update the caesaropapist paradigm, but there is still a salient one from Islam: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. As noted in Chapter 8, Islamism plays an essential role in the understanding of this state. I shall rely on the scholarship of Esposito (1991) and update his work with Wynbrandt’s (2004). Esposito claims that Saudi Arabia is an example of a modern, self-proclaimed Islamic state. However, in contrast to Iran, the head of the state is not a cleric but a royal figure from the bloodline of a local tribal leader in the latter part of the eighteenth century. It can be considered a caesaropapist state as it is closely linked to Islam both in history and in the current world. In 1802, a local tribal leader, Muhammad ibn Saud, and an Islamist revivalist, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, created an alliance and united all the disparate tribes of the peninsula, just as the Prophet Muhammad had done in the seventh century. In fact, they used the Medinan experience as a sacred past to construct the then current union. Saud was the secular leader and al-Wahhab the clerical religious one. After their ascent to power, armies were sent out to destroy Shi’ite and Sufi shrines, saints’ tombs, sacred temples, and anything that did not reflect a very puritanical and rigid version of Islam. They enforced strict observance of prayer and used the Qur’an to enact punishment for deviants. The union was short lived because it was undercut by Shi’ite rebellions and Ottoman armies. However, at the turn of the twentieth century, a Saud descendent, Abdul Aziz ibn Saud, gathered enough support and, with an amassed army, regained control of the land again. The state was officially established in 1932. King Saud used the model constructed by his predecessors–especially al-Wahhab. The sacred-political system came to be known as Wahhabism, and it is an example of Islamism. Some of the elements showing the union of Islam and the state are as follows: ▶▶

Wahhabism is the state religion

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Jihad was allowed against fellow Muslims because they dissented from the faith

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The society was to be based on the Medinan model

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Islamic symbols were to be used to unite the tribes

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Brotherhood communities were created that included 30,000 warriors

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The state was committed to spread Islam throughout the world

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If you die in battle, you will inherit paradise, and, if you are successful in war, you are free to take booty and plunder

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27 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D In practical life, much more direction was needed regarding the application of this combined religious and political authority. The Saudis created Shari’ah courts to deal with religious matters and other courts of justice to address commerce, business, and crime. The legal system was built on the Hanbali school of law (see the Chapter 9 on ethos) and introduced religious police, who are still present today in the country. The tradition of policing religious practices came from the Abbasid caliphate, and Saudi Arabia’s religious were to enforce the Ramadan fast, the closing of business for daily prayers, abstinence from alcohol, and strict, gender-specific dress codes. Several kings followed in the line of the Saudi dynasty. From 1964 to 1980, the state rulers gave significant support to Islam: creating the Muslim World League and supporting the PLO in Palestine so that Jerusalem could be again in Muslim hands. Yet this was not enough for many believers. Several revolts occurred in Mecca and in the Shi’ite-dominated eastern part of the nation. Protests led to the creation of a consultative assembly in 1980 and new, stricter codes of behavior were introduced: women could not work by themselves or with men; dress codes were enforced more rigorously, and the royal family could no longer goon vacation during Ramadan. Wynbrandt (2004) updates us on more recent events that illustrate the secular-sacred link in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis gave military and physical aid to the Bosnian Muslims in Slovakia and were called upon to meet the challenge of Osama bin Laden, a returning Saudi hero of the jihad in Afghanistan that pitted Muslims against the Soviet Union. Bin Laden, the son of a princely family, became a supporter of the institution of Shar’iah law and considered Afghanistan under the Taliban to be a model Islamic country—one combining religious and political rule. Once home in Saudi Arabia, he strove to increase the connection between Islam and political governance, and he spoke against the state when it accepted the stationing of non-Muslim soldiers on what he considered holy Islamic lands. He became more and more implicated in local and worldwide terrorism. The first members of the al-Qaeda, which bin Laden founded, were from Saudi Arabia, and fifteen of the hijackers implicated in the 9/11 attacks were also citizens. Because the al-Qaeda began threatening the Saudi nation, the state has made significant attempts to curtail and stop its own homegrown terrorism. Still, the connection between religious and political authority is evident in the recent history of Saudi Arabia. Much more can be said of this nation. The purpose of this discussion, however, was to offer a modern day illustration of caesaropapism in Muslim clothes. Esposito (1991) offers a perspective: “From the inception of the state, the House of Saud effectively employed Islam to assert its traditional political and moral authority” (p. 112). It is from this genesis that the state is intricately and officially linked to Islam to this day.

The Hierocratic Paradigm As with caesaropapism, hierocracy (hagiocracy, from Geertz [1968], or theocracy) has several meanings. Weber (1894/1978) describes it as “a system wherein a high priest is also king” (p. 1159). A more comprehensive definition is given by Canning (1996): “the term … is derived from the Greek words for priest (hiereus) and power (kratos) and describes a model of papal monarchy ... The pope being responsible before God for the Christian community has

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the right to judge, depose and concede power to secular rulers” (p. 94). Canning’s definition restricts hierocracy to Catholicism, but the term may be applied to other sacred traditions as well. At heart, the term designates a political system wherein priests, virtuosos, or clerics have power and authority over secular authorities and non-sacred social and cultural systems. Two examples will be used to illustrate the hierocratic paradigm: one from medieval Christianity and the other from Islam.

Medieval Christianity Although hierocratic authority was not actually established until the medieval period, the hierocratic model of power was born in the fifth century, was salient from the later part of the eleventh century, and continued through to the beginning of the fourteenth century. Two events occasioned the construction of the political-theological theory that fashioned the paradigm. Todd (1979) notes that Theodosius (emperor from 378 to 395 AD) objected to the persecution of Jews in Rome and commanded that the bishop responsible should restore a burned synagogue. Ambrose (340–397 AD), bishop of Milan, forced Theodosius to capitulate to him, and the Jews were not recompensed. A second instance was more dramatic. In 390 AD, the people of Thessalonika murdered a military commander, so Theodosius executed 7,000 of the region’s citizens. Ambrose excommunicated Theodosius, who was not reinstated into the church until he publicly repented. As a consequence of these events, Pope Gelasius I (pope from 492–496) constructed the Christian hierocratic model, arguing that there were two institutions of authority in society: the clerics who exercised sacred power and the kings and emperors holding royal power. Sacred power was thought to be above royal power, so the church was the superior power. Gelasius’s intent was to keep the emperor out of church affairs. Cantor (1994) cites Ambrose as saying that the clerics must interfere with the king if the state violated the morality of the church.3 However, until the eleventh century, there was not much bite to this teaching. Royal and elite families, especially in Italy, influenced church affairs by electing or appointing their own to positions of higher clerical authority. The issue of church versus state authority does come to a head, however, precisely because of the continued practice of lay investiture (the practice of a lay or secular leader choosing a priest, bishop, or pope). It was not until a reform movement within the monasteries that the direction of control began to change to favor the church. The Cluniac order, founded in France in 910 AD, reformed the reporting hierarchy of monastic communities so that each monastery reported directly to the pope rather than to a local lord. Another priest who increased the independence of the church, Clouse (1979) writes, was Hildebrand (1020–1085), who became Pope Gregory VII. He outlined the hierocratic paradigm in 1075 in a document entitled the Dictatus Papae (the dictates of the pope), which forbade lay investiture, stated that the pope was superior to the secular rulers, and declared that papal power was absolute. These dictates resulted from an event long since remembered as a focal point of the change from a caesaropapist model to a hierocratic one—the meeting of Pope Gregory VII and Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV at Canossa, Italy in 1076–1077. The medievalist, Whitton (1990), recalls the story. Henry IV (1050–1106) was intent on appointing his own men to critical bishoprics. He selected three bishops in Northern Italy, which already had

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27 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D three that had been selected by Gregory. Henry gathered his bishops at Worms in Germany and declared, along with the bishops, a withdrawal of obedience, calling Gregory a false pope. Gregory responded by excommunicating Henry and declaring that another German prince was emperor. Henry repented, stood for three days in the cold, and eventually met Gregory outside of a castle in Canossa. Gregory accepted this penance, and Henry was re-instated as emperor, only to send his armies later against Gregory, who died in exile. The effect, at least officially, was the death of caesaropapism and of the king’s power to dispense ecclesiastical offices. By the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, according to McKitterick (2004), the pope became the effective leader of Christendom and, in some circles, was called a “papal monarch.” He became the center of an effective bureaucracy wherein councils, legates, and papal letters and edicts spread to most parts of Latin Christianity, establishing codes that affected marriage and politics. The height of the church’s power occurred during the papal reign of Innocent III (1161– 1216), and hierocratic elements are evident in the Canons of the Fourth Council of the Lateran of 1215, which established the mastery of the papacy over nearly every feature of Latin or Roman Christianity. Although Alcuin, the Anglo-Saxon scholar of Charlemagne’s time, had argued that the pope was spiritually superior to the Holy Roman Emperor, Innocent III, 300 years later, provided a mythological-theological foundation to the notion of papal supremacy. He did this by presenting, in a papal letter of 1198, a poetic analogy reflective of the hierocratic paradigm. In the heavens, he writes, there are two luminaries: the sun and the moon. On earth, there are also two luminaries: the pontifical authority and the secular ruler. The moon symbolizes the secular ruler while the sun is symbolic of the pope: “the royal power derives its dignity from the pontifical authority: and the more closely it cleaves to the sphere of that authority the less is the light with which it is adorned; the further it is removed, the more it increases in splendour” (Innocent III in Sicut universitatis conditor, October 1198, quoted in Clouse, 1979, p. 256). The zenith of the hierocratic model was during the time of the Avignon papacy from 1309 to 1370. According to the medieval scholar McKitterick (2004), Pope Clement V (1260–1314) established his court in Avignon, France in 1309. His successors, over the next sixty years, constructed the “papal monarchy” that became the hub of Europe and the church’s most efficient bureaucracy. The paradigm was further reinforced through the theological thinking of the most famous scholastic cleric, Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). He argues that the secular power does not depend on the spiritual power and that kings are not vassals of the pope (in contrast to Innocent III) but rather that the Church is still the higher power and kings must be subject to priests, bishops, and popes. In addition, it is the duty of the state to put heretics to death (Aquinas, 1272/1952). The hierocratic paradigm, as the dominant sacred-political model of authority, was not long lasting—continuing from 1077 to 1303. Vale (1990) notes that, by 1500, the secular power exerted a greater control of the church than in had in the thirteenth century. The beginning of the change occurred between 1294 and 1303, during the time of Pope Boniface VIII (pope from 1294–1303) and Philip the Fair (1268–1314), king of France. Philip and his predecessors (as well as some monarchs in England) taxed the clergy and thought they had the right to do so. Boniface VIII responded with a papal bull rejecting this right. Philip reacted by attacking

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the pope’s universal sovereignty, doctrinal orthodoxy, and his lack of capacity to carry out inquiries into heresy. The king went to Rome and assaulted the papal palace, and the pope died in duress shortly after this attack. After Boniface’s humiliation, no pope would again seriously challenge the power of kings or emperors. In fact, towards the end of the fourteenth century, the French kings had carried the caesaropapist model higher than the Holy Roman emperors. Charles V (king of France from 1364–1380) was presented as quasi-sacerdotal figure, in direct descent of Charlemagne, and endowed with thaumaturgic power to heal diseases like scrofula (a throat disease). The rest of this section will be devoted to providing more evidence for the hierocratic paradigm, and it will be divided into four headings: general instances of the paradigm; the emergence of the many crusades against Jews, Muslims, and deviants from mainstream Catholicism (called heretics); and the legitimation of the Monks of War, military religious orders dedicated to carrying out the directions of the higher clergy.

General Instances of the Hierocratic Paradigm Shifts from caesaropapism to hierocracy had already commenced in France in the tenth century, according to Whitton (1990). Clerics expressed new views about the ordering of society into categories that were called the three orders: the workers, those who prayed, and those who fought. Fighting was to be limited to the defense of the church and the weak. Part of this directive (given in several councils) was the truce of God, which meant not fighting on certain days. Those who broke this truce were excommunicated or had to do penance. The church also claimed that it had the right to launch war and that those who were obedient could receive merit and their souls would be benefited. These claims form some of the theological legitimation for the crusades, which will be discussed shortly. The Ottonians of the Holy Roman Empire (see above) came to realize that their secular decisions could not be easily enacted without ecclesial approval. Popes and bishops had the right to quash an election if they suspected simony (the buying or selling of privileges or offices) or irregularities. Popes or their delegates were known to leave Rome and travel to give direction on secular matters. Bishops were also given powers to influence state officials.

The Crusades Clerical leaders, during the eleventh century, thought that they had authority not only to curtail war but also to start it. The wars they did start, the crusades, may be called a Christian version of holy war. One often thinks of the crusades as only those to the Muslims in the Outremer (the region about Jerusalem). However there were many more, which I have grouped into five categories.4 Figure 10.2 illustrates these. Crusades began early in Christian history. By the eleventh century, however, the crusades would be better named as a movement—as one of the most important components characteristic of late medieval culture. The first were against Jews. This was followed later by several against Muslims, the Byzantines, religious deviants, and women. Although historians have not named the witch hunts as crusades against women, if you look at their effects (the execution of tens of thousands of women), I believe the term is appropriate. We have already discussed campaigns against women when we discussed the witch hunts and the

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274 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 10:2 Various Kinds of Crusades Crusades

Against Jews

Against Muslims

Against the Byzantines

Against Religious Deviants

Against Women

support of them by the medieval church as an example of a dysfunctional product of the connection between ritual and ethos (Chapter 9), so we will not consider these crusades here. It should also be noted that a form of crusade occurred after the medieval period. In the modern era, additional military excursions continued into Muslim lands beginning in the early part of the nineteenth century through the French expansion under the aegis of Napoleon (1769–1821). The relationship between Jews and the early medieval world (500–1000) was complex. Toch (2005) informs us that many had been in the West from the time of the Romans, and, over this period, were scattered throughout Iberia, Gaul, Italy, and Germany. They originally migrated from the eastern part of the Roman Empire and then, later, from Byzantium. In Iberia, they came to be known as the Sepharads and, in the north, as the Ashkenaz. Contrary to stereotypes that they were slave traders and moneylenders, they occupied a wide variety of positions in society; for example, they were merchants, craftsmen, farmers, and entrepreneurs in textiles. Toch (2005) asks whether the Jews wielded a mercantile hegemony or even a monopoly. His response was no. He further writes that “... three interrelated myths should be laid to rest: of Jewish ubiquity, of commercial hegemony, and of the slave trade” (Toch, 2005, p. 561). In our discussion of the role of women in early Christianity and early medieval society, a case was made that images or a mythology that portrayed women as dangerous and evil preceded the construction of codes that marginalized them. A similar story is told here. Augustine (354–430), one the four fathers of the Latin Christian Church, speaks of the Jew as one who is a recalcitrant unbeliever as well as a potential Christian. This dual discourse permeated much of medieval theology to the extent that, “by the onset of the Middle Ages the vocabulary, grammar and syntax of this ambiguous discourse were already in place” (Toch, 2005, p. 562). One strong voice that honored Jews came from the mouth of Pope Gregory the Great (540–604) who argued for their conversion but not by force. He spoke against unlawful hostility and mob violence towards them. His voice seems to have been muted, however, and codes that marginalised the Jews included prohibitions against intermarriage and social discourse with Christians. Macro factors were also at work in this marginalization: urbanization, economic growth, the puissant church, religious unification and centralization, and the growth of an increasingly monolithic society.

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Several other instances of crusades and local mob violence against Jews occurred: the persecution of Jews in Rome towards the end of the fourth century (Todd, 1979); their forcible conversion in Gaul in 576 (Markus, 1990); and a fierce persecution against the numerous and prosperous Jews in Andalusia in 612 (Previte-Orton, 1952). Chazan (2004) extends to the twelfth century the discussion of the Jewish presence in the medieval era. Economic activities continued to be multi-faced ranging from unskilled workers to bankers and medical professionals. The Sepharads of the south were more likely to experience acceptance from both Muslims and Christians while, in the north, the Ashkenaz were more likely to be faced with hostility and animosity. Chazan (2004) asks why this was the case. The Ashkenaz, he answers, were newcomers and were thought to be interlopers. Also, many became moneylenders in alliance with local political authorities. By far the strongest factor encouraging anti-Semitism, however, was the stereotypical-prejudicial feeling that the Jews were responsible for the crucifixion of Jesus. Further, ungrounded rumors abounded that Christian youths were victims of ritual violence enacted by the Jewish people. Several campaigns resulted. Even though the crusading enterprise of the church and the state was not directly against them during the First Crusade of 1096, many Jews lost their lives in the Rhineland at the hands of the crusading armies, which thought it legitimate to persecute any who deviated from the standard faith. During the twelfth century, however, increased antipathy towards the Jews grew, and the state and the church codified restrictions against them. In 1150, French royalty ordered the burning of thirty Jews, and, two decades later, more the eighty lost their lives through burnings. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, deleterious shifts occurred between the state and church officials. A growing number of people espoused popular anti-Jewish canards, the church instigated the limitation of Jewish behavior, Jewish goods were unjustly expropriated on a massive scale, and Jews suffered their precedent-setting expulsion from the French domain of King Philip II Augustus (1165–1223). Chazan (2004) offers a good summary of this period: Change and creativity, innovation and imagination have the potential for both positive and negative results, for producing both good and evil. The innovative and creative eleventh and twelfth centuries brought in their wake, for the Jews of the Mediterranean and European worlds, a complex combination of both ... A vigorous and creative two centuries left a mixed legacy for the subsequent history of the Jews. (p. 656–657)

Some historians have numbered the crusades but Lloyd (2002) declares that this is anachronistic. It is useful, however, to group crusades into historical periods. Livingstone (2000b) provides us with three periods of crusades against Muslims: 1) 1095–1204, 2) 1204–1291, and 3) after 1291. One may add a fourth, as indicated above, the secular campaigns at the beginning of the modern era. Riley-Smith (2002) informs us that, during the first stage begun in 1095 under the campaign of Pope Urban II (1042–1099), kings, princes, and soldiers embarked on a “holy war” to free the Holy Land from the power of the Muslims. During the first period, the crusading movement was confined to the Levant. During the second crusading period, which started in 1204, a crusade was directed against the Byzantines in Constantinople, and crusaders

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27 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D followed by attacking them in Greece (However, in 1231 and beyond, other crusades were called on to support those defending against the continued Muslim attack on Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire.) The focus of the movement against the Muslims was in Egypt, Morocco, and Andalusia. Crusades achieved little permanent success in Egypt and Morocco but more in Andalusia. It was also during this period that internal crusades were levelled against religious deviants, especially the Albigensians (or Cathars) in southern France and the Wends (non-Christians) in Ösel, one of a series of islands north of Estonia and in the Baltic Sea. Other crusades to fight dissidents were directed against the Stedingers of Germany on 1232 and Bosnian recusants in 1227 and 1234. The third period of the crusades, after 1291, marks the virtual end of a Christian political presence in the Levant. After 1291, many crusades continued against internal religious deviants and Muslims in Andalusia and in the East when the Ottoman Empire rose to significant power and conquered much of Eastern Europe (see above). The focus of this discussion will be dedicated to the first period of the crusades (1095– 1204) when the movement was focussed against the Muslims in the Levant. Our purpose is to consider these crusades as a social and historical phenomenon by using a model developed by Weber. This model allows us to investigate the patterns of an historical phenomenon, the reasons for its occurrence, and, when applicable, its effects. See Figure 10.3. The scholarship of Lloyd (2002), Bull (2002) and Cantor (1993) will inform our discussion of the crusades. I begin by presenting the patterns or generic descriptions of the movement. Riley-Smith (2002) theorizes that the idea of a crusade was not new during the first crusading period. For several generations, the Seljuk Turkish Muslims had been encroaching on Byzantine land, and the Eastern Roman Emperor had frequently called for help from the Western Church. The First Crusade (1096–1102) was a military success, which was shortly dimmed with the defeat of other crusaders two years later by the Turkish Muslims. According to Riley-Smith (2002), the first crusade was sparked in 1095 at the end of a church council meeting in Clermont, France. In an open field, the pope preached a sermon wherein he called upon the Frankish knights to vow to march to the Levant to free Christians Figure 10:3 Description, Factors, and Effects of the Crusades X (Factor)

Y (Phenomenon)

Z (Effect)

Factors of a Social Phenomenon

A Social Phenomenon

The Effect of a Social Phenomenon

Factors of the Crusades

Descriptions of the Crusades

The Effects of the Crusades

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under Muslim rule and to liberate the holy sites of Christianity—especially the tomb of Christ. The response was immediate: Deus vult or “God wills it”! Not only did Urban II proclaim the First Crusade in Clermont, but he travelled throughout other parts of France preaching on the call to join the movement. The call was mostly to the military class in general and to the knights (professional cavalry) in particular. However, many beyond this class joined the movement, especially in its early years. The People’s Crusade in 1096 was a tragedy and a failure with significant loss of life at the hands of Turkish Muslims in Anatolia. The First Crusade (1096-1099) was not only the first but the only one that was successful militaristically, leaving a legacy of Latin states in the Levant. In some ways, the subsequent waves were to consolidate and protect these original Outremer outposts. The first four crusades were conducted overland through Eastern Europe and Anatolia. The subsequent ones in the thirteenth century were focussed on Egypt and involved marine transportation. Lloyd makes a strong point that the crusades were, indeed, a movement, which involved both directly and indirectly the all the peoples of Western Europe. He writes, “the crusading movement would emerge to become one of the most important components, and defining characteristics, of late medieval western culture” (Lloyd, 2002, p. 37). In a period of medieval history wherein long distances were an obstacle to communication, the message of the crusading movement was spread far and wide in France, England, and the Holy Roman Empire. Several means were utilized. The original pattern of communication was set by Urban II, who travelled to several locations proclaiming the message. This practice was continued throughout subsequent papacies. Popes also issued bulls or official decrees that were sent to bishops, to the local priests, and, thus, to the laity. Who were the crusaders? They were many. The primary recruits were professional warriors, the knights (equivalent to a cavalry). Contracts were set up between the volunteers and the papacy (and its delegates) in the form of a vow. Many others joined the knights: crossbowmen, siege engineers, kings, royalty, cooks, clergy, and many more. Financing these war efforts was very expensive. An estimate from 1248–1254 in France was that the First Crusade of Louis IX cost about twelve times the annual revenue of the king. Other sources of income included family donations, money from the sale of land by nobles, revenue from the monasteries, and both ecclesiastical and secular taxes. In 1199, 1/40 of the revenue of the churches was used for the campaigns. Many pragmatic issues faced the crusaders. Authority had to be established, supplies had to be present, and a systemic economy that converged massive amounts of food, drink, military resources, horses, and ships into the cause had to be established. Bull (2002) argues that the violence evident at the foundation of medieval society in the tenth and eleventh century can be seen as a precedent of or a factor resulting in the crusading movement. Violence was endemic to the social-cultural system of early medieval Europe. Few legal and juridical structures were present from the collapse of the Carolingian Empire to the rise of the Holy Roman Empire. One might say that violence expressed within a social order was transferred to violence without. However, the external threat of Islam was real. From the time of the “rightly guided caliphs” of Islam (632–661), Muslim armies had conquered major parts of Byzantium in the Levant and parts of Anatolia and Egypt, moving all the way across Northern Africa through to Andalusia; all these areas had been formerly the domains of Latin or Roman Christianity.

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27 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D According to Riley-Smith (2002), Urban II finally heard a consistent cry from the Byzantine Emperor and responded. What were some of the other societal factors enabling the crusading movement? Bull (2002) offers four. The first precedent was the presence of a knightly elite called milites who fought on horseback. These were professional cavalry at the service of their kings or princely nobles. Closely linked to this elite was a wide system of financial, social, and cultural support. Likely the most important factor, and one that illustrates hierocracy so well, was the reform movement begun by Gregory VII in the eleventh century. It addressed clergy sexual deviance, lay investiture, the illiteracy of the clerics, and ineffective liturgies. Cultural-religious factors contributed to the crusader ethos as well. By the eleventh century, what scholars have called the myth of human ascent and human response reached a climax (see Chapter 4). Lay people struggled to live saintly lives, but very often they failed. Further, this failure (termed sin) was problematic to the cohesion of the small-world communities. The way to deal with sin and its consequences was through penance, which was intended to “clean the slate of a believer.” One especially important means of penance was to visit a shrine of a saint (very similar to Shi’ite Islam). By doing so, one would be freed of guilt and from punishment. To go on a crusade was a militaristic version of a pilgrimage, and those who went or those who supported the movement would be granted freedom, in the form of indulgences, from the negative effects of sin. Bull (2002) writes, “The crusade message cut the Gordian Knot. Here at last was a spiritually effective activity designed specifically for lay people, in particular the warrior elites whose sins were considered among the most numerous and notorious” (p. 33). What were some of the effects of the crusades? Both Lloyd (2002) and Cantor (1993) provide us with some. The most explicit effect of the First Crusade was death—death to thousands of Jews and Muslims in Jerusalem in 1099. This effect has been immortalized in a document written by William of Tyre (1187/1994), who lived between 1130 and 1185: The duke [Duke Godfrey, the Jerusalem commander] and those who were with him then united their forces and, protected by their shields and helmets, swept hither and thither through the streets and squares of the city with drawn swords. Regardless of age and condition, they laid low, without distinction, every enemy encountered. Everywhere was frightful carnage, everywhere lay heaps of severed heads, so that soon it was impossible to pass or to go from place to place to another except over the bodies of the slain. (p. 94)

The crusading movement had effects beyond those caused by this carnage. In Western Europe, these were almost limitless. On the stage of world history, the movement redrew the political and cultural map resulting in Latin states in Andalusia, north-eastern Europe, and the Levant. Further, papal power reached its zenith and was able to challenge the Holy Roman emperors. French power, prestige, and influence were enhanced while solid lines were drawn between Islam and Christianity that resulted in a xenophobic streak in Western society (expressed in continued crusades against Jews, dissidents, and women from the fifteenth to the seventeenth century). One effect of the crusades had an impact on the development of capitalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: wealth was created among the Italian maritime republics that expanded trading routes unchartered before. These trading routes were a result of the

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crusaders taking control of the Mediterranean, which was formally under Muslim dominion. A further effect was more long lasting. After its reconquest by the Muslims, the trading route through the Suez was curtailed, which encouraged explorers to traverse or circumnavigate the southern part of Africa and opened up further trade with and exploration and colonization of Africa and the Far East.

The Monks of War Evidence concerning the “monks of war,” an extreme example of Christian hierocracy, comes from the work of Seward (2000). Religious military orders are an oxymoron if one takes the standard Jesus offered in his Sermon on the Mount, wherein his followers are called to love their enemies and do good to those who hurt them. Yet, the mythological basis of these fighting monks is situated in the Hebrew experience as well as in a selective reading of the Christian tradition. They constitute the first time in the history of the Christian church that a religious order would also become a military order. The monks of war originated in the eleventh century during the very first crusades to the Outremer, and they existed, in essential forms, until the end of the fifteenth century. They were the “crack troops” of the papacy, and members were subject only to the pope, just as the Janissaries in Islam were subject only to the Ottoman sultan. Some of their ideals consisted of “killing for Christ,” and to “fight and pray.” Long before the crusades, Leo IV (pope from 847 to 855) and John VIII5 (pope from 872 to 882) had taught that warriors pure in heart who died fighting for the church would go to heaven and would be considered martyrs. How very close to this teaching is the Muslim ideal. In the main, these monks of war were affiliated with the following religious-military orders: the Teutonic Order of Germany, the French Templars and Hospitallers, and the Order of St. John in Jerusalem. They were very much like ordinary monks: they took vows of celibacy, lived communally, prayed on a regular basis, went to Eucharist every day, kept silence as they marched into battle, and, in Andalusia, supported themselves by farming and holding lands. In the Outremer, they led the other crusaders and were considered to be the elite, as were the Janissaries among the Ottomans. However, in spite of their discipline, military skill, and bravery, the Muslims regained control of Jerusalem in 1243. The military fortress in Acre lasted longer but, in 1291, it also fell. After they left the Outremer, some, for example, located in Rhodes and Naples. Others went to Northern Europe to serve in attacks against the Wends of the Baltic states or to Hungary as the new threat of Islam emerged under the Ottomans. The orders were, however, most successful in Andalusia, where new ones were created. Along with the Spanish princes, they engaged in victorious military campaigns against the Muslims of Spain. As Seward (2000) comments, Much of Iberian history cannot be understood without some knowledge of the brethren. They became the Reconquista itself, and the ideals which inspired them, religion, soldiering, and “purity from infidel blood”–shaped the peninsular mentality for centuries. Their tradition would play a vital role in creating the Spanish and Portuguese empires. (p. 149)

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2 8 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D One of the orders, however, neither found a new place in which to flourish nor did it just slide out of history—the Order of the Knights Templar was eliminated. The Templars became very powerful, achieving a membership of around 20,000 over the lifetime of the order. They were, especially, blamed for the fall of the Outremer and were thought to have gained some esoteric knowledge from the Muslims. King Philip IV of France (1268–1314) organized a whole crusade against them that gave a model for later witch hunts against women. They were accused of denying Christ, of worshipping idols, of homosexuality, and of dishonoring the crucifix. Most confessed under torture and, throughout Europe, hundreds were convicted and ended their lives by being burned at the stake both in France and England. In 1312, under political pressure, Pope Clement V (pope from 1305–1314) declared the order dissolved. Much more can be said about the monks of war. Many of these religious military orders continued as male fraternities into the twenty-first century. In the medieval world, though, they were part of the wider crusader movement and had strong links to the ecclesiastical and secular powers of the Central Middle Ages. As a classic example of hierocracy, they leave a legacy in Christianity that was radically removed from the vision of Jesus the Nazarene, who was a servant and who renounced violence in all its forms.

Islam The hierocratic image within Islam has its genesis in the very birth of the religion. Esposito (1991) comments: “Islam was not simply a spiritual community. Rather, it also became a state, an empire. Islam developed as a religio-political movement in which religion was integral to state and society”(p. 3). It is already evident that this special feature of the religion had its genesis in the person of Muhammad, who was not only a prophet but a statesman and a military leader (see Chapter 5). Further, it was argued in Chapter 3 that, because of the kind of religious experiences that Muhammad had, he viewed the deity as all powerful and distant, like a supreme emperor or king. In Chapter 5, the “four rightly guided caliphs” were also shown to be intricately involved in politics. In this section, I shall provide evidence that hierocratic authority prevailed under the Umayyads (661 to 750) and the Abbasids (750 to 1258).6 Although the caliphate continued after 1258, the caliph’s authority was subsumed under that of the sultan in the Ottoman Empire, which changed the hierocratic model to a caesaropapist one. Hierocratic authority was, however, resurrected in modern times in Iran, and a discussion of this case will conclude our outline of the connection between religion and politics in its caesaropapist and hierocratic patterns. In Chapter 2, I argued that Islam is one of the Western religions that belongs to the Levantine cultures that border on the eastern side of the Mediterranean Sea. Born in the seventh century through the prophecy and evangelism of Muhammad (c. 570–632 AD), Islam grew from a small following of dedicated disciples to number in the hundreds of millions in the twentieth century. Two major traditions emerged during this growth: Sunni and Shi’ite Islam (see Chapter 8 for the meaning of the two traditions). The Sunni tradition is represented in the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties and will be the focus of discussion here. The primary source is the work of Esposito (1991). When we look at modern Iran, the core discourse will involve Shi’ite Islam.

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The Umayyads This dynasty lasted from 661 to 750 and began with the ascension of Muawiyah (c. 602–680), the governor of Syria, to the caliphate. The capital was moved from Medina to Damascus, Syria, from a hinterland to a cosmopolitan center. Several features characterise the dynasty. This was the first empire of Islam, stretching from Andalusia in the west to the borders of China in the east. The world became defined in Muslim terms as dar al-Islam (the territory of Islam) and dar al-harb (the land of the non-Muslim or of war). As was discussed in Chapter 8, it was during this time that Shi’ism emerged. For the Umayyads, unity and stability were established within an empire that was governed by both an Arab autocracy and a warrior aristocracy. The Arabs were privileged and paid a lower tax than non-Arab Muslims. The caliph soon created a huge bureaucracy, which emerged out of the wealth and booty gathered from the conquered lands of the Byzantines and the Sasanians. The bureaucracy was divided into the institutions of the market inspector and the judge or the qudi. The market inspector cared for the secular world of the inhabitants and was a supervisor of public morals. The qudi relied on the Shari’ah to implement state decrees and to settle disputes in a Shari’ah court. From 720 to 750, opposition to this system of rule emerged on many fronts. Non-Arab Muslims resented their second-class status within the system, Kharijites and Shi’ites continued to revolt, and the luxurious lifestyle of the caliphs and the elite was an affront to pious Muslims. There came a call to return to the Medinan ideal of Muhammad and the “rightly guided caliphs.” In 747, Abu Muslim, a freed slave of Ibrahim and descendent of the Prophet’s uncle al-Abbas, led a successful revolt. In 750, the Umayyads fell and Abu al-Abbas, the brother of Ibrahim, was proclaimed caliph. Thus commences the Abbasid dynasty that lasted until 1258. Hodgson (1974) presents more detail about the revolt. The revolution’s success was, in part, due to the support of the Shi’ites and the Kharijites. However, after Abul al-Abbas was given control, he and his elite turned their backs on the more pious Shi’ites, had Abu Muslim killed, and massacred all remnants of the Umayyad family.

The Abbasids The ideology that undergirded the early years of the dynasty was to restore Islam to its “purer form” and to take care that the new government would lead in the name of Islam and that it would promote the faith as part of public policy. One might say that the Abbasid agenda was closer to the hierocratic ideal than the Umayyad one. The intent of these rulers was to take a lot more care of the Muslim faith than their predecessors. They were patrons of Islamic institutions, supported disciplines (orders for Muslims to live up to their faith), built mosques, and established Muslim scholarship in schools. Yet, they seemed to have reverted shortly after their ascendency to power, luxury, and pomp. Taking a cue from the emperors of the Sasanians, the caliph became known as “the Deputy of God” or the “Shadow of God on Earth.” Magnificent palaces were constructed, and the whole office received a royal mould. Subjects were now required to bow before the caliph, kiss the ground, and submit to him as one holding absolute power and autocratic rule. His word, in effect, became law.

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2 82 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Still the caliph was also the supreme sacred leader. He was called the “commander of the faithful.” He lead Friday prayer, celebrated community prayer, and insured that the rule of the land was the rule of Islamic law. The grand vizier was created during the time of the dynasty. He was to be the prime minister and to take care of all the many secular responsibilities inherent is such a vast empire. Provincial jurisdictions were set up with a governor in each. The greatest contribution that the dynasty gave to Islam (and to the West) was cultural. Arabic became the official language of discourse, government, and literature. It was during this period that the vast array of Islamic laws were codified, summarized, and classified. This task was primarily in the hands of the four major schools that became the standard branches of the faith in subsequent Muslim history (see Chapter 9). These schools took on a sacred aura as “the divinely revealed blueprint for the Muslim society.” The era of interpretation had ceased by the tenth century, and all the judges could do thereafter was to implement the law. Essentially, two juridical systems emerged: 1) Shari’ah courts that concerned themselves with private matters and the family and 2) the Muzalim courts that were dedicated to administer public law involving matters such as crime, land issues, taxation, and commerce. What has been termed the Golden Age of Islam occurred during this time. According to Brown (2003), the caliphs of Baghdad invited Christian scholars from Byzantium to teach students the arts and sciences of ancient Greece. Brown (2001) comments: Learned Christians were essential to the new Muslim ruling class as doctors and as astrologers. Altogether, they were human artesian wells. Only learned Christians who had retained the knowledge of Syriac, and who enjoyed intermittent contacts with Greek-speaking fellow-Christians, could tap the vast subterranean reservoir of medical, scientific, and philosophical knowledge which had slowly seeped into the Syriac churches, which were now subject to the Islamic empire. (p. 316–317)

From this, Muslim scholars created, refined, and extended the baseline scholarship that led to the development of medicine, optics, philosophy, art, architecture, astronomy, and other natural sciences. The university prototypes were established in many parts of the empire: Andalusia, Iraq, Egypt, Persia, and Sicily. In fact, European Christians discovered the idea of the university in Muslim controlled Cordoba, and this discovery led, in part, to the construction of the university system in medieval Europe in the twelfth century. However, empires rise and fall. After 950, the political unity of the Abbasid Empire began to crumble. The Kharijites and Shi’ites of Iraq rebelled, and local governors in Morocco, Tunisia, Syria, and Iran took on complete local authority. Also, Egypt was taken over by Shi’ite Fatimids from 909–1171, and Baghdad itself was conquered by the Shi’ite Buyids and the Turkish Seljuks. The caliphs still contained some spiritual power but had little political presence anymore. The empire and dynasty collapsed under the horror of the Moguls from the east in 1258. Esposito (1991) offers this description of part of the Abbasid Empire’s legacy: The world was divided into Islamic and non-Islamic territory. All Muslims were to strive to extend Islamic rule wherever possible. Thus, merchants, traders, and soldiers were the early missionaries of Islam. Islam was part and parcel of the state’s

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institutions: caliphate, judiciary, taxation, education and social welfare system ... Islamic identity and ideology were basic to politics .... The political and social institutions, especially Islamic law, which represented an ideological synthesis of the Islamic way of life, would continue to constitute the essentials of Islamic government for future generations. (p. 25)

Modern Iran We have been introduced to the question of leadership among the Shi’ites on several occasions already, for example, in the discussion on ritual (Chapter 7) and the one on religious organization (Chapter 8). As noted, the Shi’ites argue that the proper interpretation of the Qur’an is accessible to those who are in the lineage of Muhammad’s son-in-law Ali. Three major traditions or branches emerged within Shi’ism, but the one that became most popular was called the Imamis or the Twelver Shi’ites. From Ali, they trace a divine lineage through him and his twelve decedents, whom they revere as imams (in contrast to the caliphs in Sunni Islam). The last descendent was Muhammad al-Muntazar (the twelfth Imam) who is said to have disappeared in 874. His name means Muhammad the awaited. He is the Mahdi considered to be the Lord of the Age, held in hiding, undying, till the end of the world when he will return and bring victory to his loyal partisans and justice and truth will prevail in the world. To fast forward to modern times, the Twelver Shi’ite branch of Islam is the official religion of Iran, and that country’s connected religious and political system of governance provides a good example of the hierocratic paradigm. Esposito (1991, 2003) and Arjomand (1988) inform us of the historical setting to its emergence. Shi’ite Islam was established as the state religion in Iran from the foundation of the Islamic Safavid Empire dating from 1511. These Safavid leaders, early in their period, imported Shi’ite ulama (class of religious and legal scholars and leaders) because they could not find any in their conquered territory. The ulama did have influence but did not lead the state. Arjomand (1988) notes that when the empire collapsed in 1722, the Shi’ite leaders were forced to subsist on their own and only be concerned about sacred matters. Under the Qajars (1794–1925), there was no claim of a linkage to the twelfth imam, as was the case during the time of the Pahlavi shahs (1925–1979). These latter shahs were committed to the modernization and secularization of the state. These processes culminated in what was known as the White Revolution or the Revolution of the Shah and his People of 1963. Even though the shah was a religious figure (the King of Islam), the Pahlavi shahs disengaged the Islamic clerics from secular policies, did not engage in caesaropapist politics, sold resources to foreigners (considered against the Islamic policy of selling property to infidels), gave the franchise to women, and handed over educational functions to the state. Further, they established Zoroastrianism as the state religion, replaced Shari’ah law with Western legal codes, and sought to control the ulama. The influence of the British during the period of the Pahlavis was preponderant, so it was not until after World War II that the United States “colonized” the land in the hope of controlling its rich oil resources. In the 1970s, Muhammad Reza, the shah, became more and more linked to the United States, repressed dissidents, did not privilege Islam, and continued to support foreign investments. It was in this situation that vociferous voices rose in protest. Among those protesting were Ali Shariati (died in 1977) and Ruhollah Khomeini (died 1989). According to Esposito

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2 8 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D (2003), Shariati, a scholar educated in the West, taught that the Qur’an needed to be adapted to the historical period of his time and argued that a revolutionary system needed to be created to bring about social justice for the people. He exhorted the masses to follow the example of al-Husayn (the third Imam and son of Ali) who sacrificed his life on behalf of the political and social liberation of his followers in his fight against the followers of Muawiyah, the first caliph of the Umayyad dynasty. It was Khomeini, however, who became the symbol and the architect of the new Iran. He spoke against the poison of the West, saying that the Occident was an enemy of Islam and that the Iranian shahs were an affront to Islam. He promised a new government of religious elites, arguing that Islam and politics had always been inseparable and that the Shari’ah law was the only true guide to living an Islamic life. A multitude of enemies, imperialist, shahs, Jews, and Christians were distorting the truth of Islam, according to his view. It is interesting that Khomeini did not personally lead the revolution. It emerged as the social construction of a wide variety of Iranians. In the late 1970s, students, workers, merchants, and others held a series of demonstrations. The climatic day was Thursday, September 7, 1978, when 500,000 demonstrated. Because of the size of this demonstration, martial law and a curfew were imposed in Tehran and in other large cities, which led directly to the incident known as “Black Friday” when 75,000 people demonstrating the next day in violation of curfew regulations were attacked by the army. The traditional Muslim battle cry was shouted out: “God is most Great.” Two million people called for the death of the Shah, who then resigned. Khomeini then took hold of power as an Imam and created a clerical Islamic government. Why was Khomeini such an important figure who was able lead millions into a new Muslim state? According to Arjomand (1988), the Ayatollah was so influential partly because he was a charismatic leader who was thought to be the true follower of Muhammad in the person of the Twelver, the hidden “Imam of the Age.” After the revolution, Khomeini became the ruler of Iran on behalf of this hidden imam, established an Islamic theocracy, and eradicated all traces of occidentalism in Iran, positing the West as an enemy not only of the people of Iran but also of the Islamic faith. Esposito adds that a whole series of radical changes occurred as a consequence of Iran’s Islamic revolution: ▶▶

the denial of rights to women

▶▶

the oppression of political, intellectual, and religious opponents

▶▶

purges of political bureaucracies, the military, the judiciary, and universities

▶▶

the disallowance of alternate ways of thinking

▶▶

the reintroduction of a Muslim dress code, especially for women

▶▶

instatement of the promotion and spread of Islam as a primary foreign policy

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▶▶

the summons to all Muslims of the Gulf and throughout the whole world to rise up against their governments

In light of what we have learned thus far about secularization and various responses to it, Khomeini represents a charismatic leader in general and a renewer prophet in particular, and the revolution a revolution by tradition (see Chapter 8). The Iranian revolution is a good illustration of how religion can respond to secularization by establishing a hierocratic authority linking the secular (the state) and the sacred (Islam). It also illustrates the use of power and control in conversion rather than free acquiescence. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini died in 1989 and was replaced by the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who is the nation’s supreme Muslim ruler. He has been a more moderate leader than was his predecessor. He still has a final say in all government decisions. As his public face has declined, his president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has come to the forefront of Iranian power. The president carries on the black versus white imagery that depicts the West and Israel as evil and Islam and Iran as holy—an imagery that was part of the Khomeini regime.

Box 10:2 A Date with a Dangerous Man Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is seen as an enigma. He has said many startling things, such as that the Holocaust is a myth, Israel should be “wiped away,” and the Jewish state is a “stain of disgrace.” He has accelerated work on Iran’s nuclear program, which the west sees as a movement towards developing the nuclear bomb. He and his regime have threatened to retaliate against every US interest in any part of the world if the US attacks Iran. On the other hand, in his visit to the United States, he sees that the people are good— they are also seeking peace, love, friendship, and justice. He aspires to unite Muslim opinion and make Iran the dominant player in the Middle East, restoring the country to its ancient imperial glory. Here are a few of his responses to questions posed to him by Scott MacLeod of Time magazine: ▶▶

Are you ready to negotiate with the United States: Yes

▶▶

Is it your right to have nuclear weapons? We are opposed to nuclear weapons

▶▶

Should Israel exist? Israel took over the land of the Palestinians. It is not the land of Israel.

▶▶

Do you deny the Holocaust? I am free to make up my own mind on that matter in independent research.

Source: MacLeod (2006).

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2 8 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Ahmadinejad declares that Israel should be eliminated and that the Holocaust never did happen. Further, he suppresses dissent and gives the impression of a hard-line cleric intent on carrying out the plan of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Two sociologists, Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) ask important questions about the secular and hierocratic social system in Iran: ▶▶

with the processes of secularization growing in pre-revolutionary Iran, were ordinary Iranians less religious?

▶▶

after the Khomeini revolution when Iran became a hierocratic state, did Iranians become more religious?

These questions are important as they reveal the links between collective phenomena and personal beliefs and behavior. To answer these questions, the authors utilized two nationally representative surveys, one conducted in 1975 and a second in 2001. Their results are illustrated in Table 10.2: Table 10:2 Religious Beliefs and Rituals in Iran Year

Frequency of Daily Prayer

Frequency of Public Prayer

The Influence of Religion in the Future

1975

83% always

26% always

26% more

2001

82% always

6% always

16% more

In the authors’ discussion, they offer some reflections. Contrary to the secularization theory (See Chapter 13), when secularization processes were growing in pre-revolutionary Iran, 83 per cent of the people always engaged in personal prayer, 26 per cent of them were active in public rituals, and 26 per cent felt that religion influenced their views of the future. The evidence is, then, that the people were not affected by the collective changes within the religion. Kazemipur and Rezaei (2003) offer an explanation based on rational choice theory. During the shah’s reign, religion was a scarce resource for ordinary life. People reacted to this and sought out religion as a cultural resource for life. On the other hand, in post-revolutionary Iran, religion was imposed on the population using a hierocratic program. As a result, Iranians turned to alternative narratives of social or political identity and began shifting away from formal Islam. Further, they may have been disillusioned by the use of the sacred for mundane and political ends by the Khomeini government. Something quite fascinating happens. As secularization processes grow, people either increase or search out sacred answers. However, when the opposite happens or when sacralization processes emerge, people are less likely to adhere to the sacred traditions. The authors do not say, but Stark and Iannaccone (1994) and Finke, Guest, and Stark (1996) found a similar thing. In pre-industrial England when the Church of England imposed a

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caesaropapist authority on the people, few practiced public religious rituals, according to Stark and Iannoccone. The same thing happened in New England. During the colonial period, sacred images were presented as expected belief and behavior. Again, public ritual was much lower during this time than in later periods.

Conclusions This chapter has reviewed the literature and the research on the linkages between religion and politics by positioning these connections in relation to the fifth and final religion-society dilemma outlined by the O’Deas—the dilemma of power. The central thesis is that, as a religious movement becomes more accommodated to the social environment, it takes on more of the values and ways of acting that are common in the political and economic spheres. On the other hand, it may react against this accommodation and choose a different path. I argued that, in the early Christian church, the response to accommodation was the increasing alignment of the church and the state and the use of coercive power in religio-political leadership. This coalition or association resulted in two forms of authority: caesaropapism and hierocracy. Caesaropapism, in which the state uses the sacred for its own ends, continued to be the most common paradigm in Eastern Europe and Russia for many centuries. It was resurrected in the early years of the Reformation when Protestant princes used coercive force to elicit conformity to Protestantism. The hierocratic paradigm was evident during the mature years of the medieval era and declined in the later years. I outlined a twentieth century version of the paradigm in modern day Iran and fundamentalist Islam. What of the future of the connection between religion and politics? Given the many different kinds of social responses in the past, there will likely be a continuation of these in the future. One thing is probable: even though there is a strong move to personal privatization, I would agree with Wuthnow (1993) that there will likely continue to be a salient linkage between the two institutions.

NOTES 1

Weber (1894/1978, p. 1161) uses the term hierocratic to mean a form of caesaropapism. However, this is incorrect; as was seen above, caesaropapism is the subordination of priestly to secular powers.

2 Early in Christian history, two models of Catholicism evolved, a Western and an Eastern tradition. The West tended to follow the Latin culture, and the East, the Hellenistic. The Latin version tended to be more scholastic (taking a cue from Aristotelian philosophy) and legal (following after Roman law), whereas the East tended to be more ascetic and mystical, in the tradition of Plato. 3

An additional complication to the sacred-political relationship during the medieval period was a document called the Donation of Constantine. It was purported to be given by the Emperor Constantine to Pope Sylvester I (pope from 314–335) and his successors, and to

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2 8 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D confer on them various privileges and possessions. These included papal primacy over the central church jurisdictions of Antioch, Alexandria, Constantinople, Jerusalem, and Rome. Further, the Pope was to have all authority over the clergy as well as secular dominion over all the provinces of the West. Constantine was also represented as offering the imperial crown to Sylvester, who declined to wear it but agreed to the transfer of the imperial government from Rome to Constantinople. Deanesly (1991), a medieval historian, adds that a later pope, Pope Nicolas V (pope from 1447–1455), exposed the document as a forgery, saying that there was no historical evidence of it having been written in the eighth century. 4 Even this five-fold distinction is too simplistic. Lloyd (2002) adds that similar crusades were levelled against non-Christians in the Nordic north and also against the Mongolian hordes who began to threaten Europe in 1241. Another aspect of the movement was the proclamation of crusades against papal opponents, as was the case when Innocent II (pope from 1130–1143) announced a campaign against Roger I (1031–1101), the Norman king of Sicily in 1135. 5

During his time, the urgent need was to defend Italy from the Muslim attacks and the papal state against the destructive raids of the Saracens, based in southern Italy. Not content with appeals to others for help, John personally took charge of military operations, building a defensive wall around St. Paul’s Basilica and commanding a small papal fleet, which he founded.

6

A case can be made that the hierocratic paradigm can be seen in its ideal form during early Islam (from 622–661) when Medina and surrounding areas were administered by Muhammad and the four “rightly guided caliphs.” I contend that it can also be used for the Umayyad and the Abbasid dynasties because the caliphs saw themselves, primarily, as successors of Muhammad and also because they had final authority not only on secular matters but also on sacred.

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Chapter ELEVEN

T h e Di l e m m a of P ow e r : T h e R e l at ion s h i p Be t w e e n R e l ig ion a n d P ol i t ic s

Part Two: Alternative Links Orientation Have you ever wondered just how many various connections there are

between religion and politics? What is your personal experience, if any, of the links between religion and politics and of how these affect the way our society operates? You are about to be exposed to some of the many ways social scientists (especially political scientists and social scientists of religion) have identified some of the most salient of links between the two institutions. As was the case in Chapter 10, this chapter uses the O’Dean theory of the dilemma of power to investigate the connections between politics and religion. However, by remembering that sacred traditions emerge and exist in various secular worlds (see Chapter 1), we can extend our investigation to consider how the way in which believers interact with their socio-cultural contexts affects the relationship between religion and politics. This perspective sees all religions as part of an interpretive framework of multi-level or contextual analysis and enables us to focus on the political context and how believers accommodate themselves to this context. I present several ways that this accommodation occurs: communal withdrawal, personal withdrawal, political activism, the division paradigm, and civil religion. I shall proceed by explaining the meaning of these responses and then present case studies as evidence for the distinctions between them.

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Table 11:1 Several Types of Accommodation Names of Response

Meaning of the Response

Communal Withdrawal

No political involvement

Privatization

Personal withdrawal

Political Activism

Engaging in the political sphere

The Division Paradigm

Separation of the church and the state

Civil Religion

Religious mythology and ritual that supports the state

Communal Withdrawal Several sacred traditions have responded to the political context by distancing themselves from it and having nothing or little to do with it. Many consider the political world to be corrupt and too secular, so they reject any kind of association with it. The Anabaptists, radical Protestant reformers of the sixteenth century, often formed religious groups that rejected the secular world in this way. Two such groups are the Mennonites and the Hutterites. The Mennonite sect was founded by Menno Simons (1496–1561), a major leader in the Anabaptist Reformation and a “reforming prophet” (see Chapter 5). Menno Simons was the prophetic reformer of the third arm of the protest against Catholicism: the Anabaptist movement. (Lutheranism and Calvinism comprised the first arm and the establishment of the Church of England was the second.) Although Simons did not start the movement, he became one of its most outstanding leaders and the one whose name gives us the word Mennonite. Simons, a former Catholic priest, emphasized an experiential relationship with Christ. By this, Simons meant something similar Luther’s idea of having a relationship to the Christ that was personal. Simons sought to pass this personal experience of Christ on to followers by encouraging them to be true disciples who used the Sermon on the Mount as their guide and who were open to the inward enlightenment of the Holy Spirit through the baptism of the spirit and reading the Bible (Wenger, 1956; Estep, 1963). The followers of Simons and the other Anabaptists stood in contrast not only to the Catholic Church but also to Lutheranism and Calvinism. In fact, they were not only persecuted by Roman Catholics but also by the Lutherans and the Calvinists. Their point of departure from these other Protestant reformers was that Anabaptists believed that the true church must consist only of the true believers (Bainton, 1958). They rejected infant baptism because, if it were allowed, the whole populace would be considered Christian, which would be false (Hershberger, 1957). They did not think they were called to work through the existent church and state institutions because God was able to work through them, through true

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believers, and not through these institutions. Further characteristics included a focus on an ascetic way of life, not taking oaths, and communal living (Bainton, 1958). Yoder and Kreider (1979) argue that the core of the movement was its opposition to the intrusion of the state into the life of the Christian church. Anabaptists thought they were called to offer a whole new alternative to existing Christian and secular structures: to restore original Christianity in what they called its pristine form without its developed linkages to secular authorities. Further characteristics included an emphasis on an ascetic way of living, the repudiation of the taking of oaths (which merited much persecution from the state), abstention from any force, dedication to a life of suffering, communal living, and a general indifference to the political world (Bainton, 1958). There were many different versions of the movement in the early centuries. However, the ones that have existed through to the present are named in Figure 11.1. Kraybill and Bowman (2001) inform us that, by far, the largest of all the Anabaptist sects are the Mennonites, who are from both Swiss and Dutch heritages and who take their name from Menno Simons. Their immigration to North America was early—1683. In the nineteenth century, a major schism led to the creation of the Old Order Mennonites and the progressives. The former maintain life in rural regions and are less inclined to use modern technology. In urban settings, they tend to resemble evangelical Christians and are noted to be very socially aware of poverty in the Third World. The Amish came to America in 1693 and later to Canada. They are the most conservative of all the Anabaptists, live exclusively in rural areas and either farm or engage in small businesses, shun any kind of modern technology, provide only basic education to their children, and worship as families in their homes. The fourth group, the Brethren, do not originate in the sixteenth century but were founded in 1708 in Germany. They are called Anabaptist because of their similarity to the other Anabaptist sects and because they accept the primary tenets of the movement: adult baptism, separation of church and state, pacifism, and church discipline. The Brethren immigrated to the American colonies in 1719 and later divided into three groups ranging from one that was similar to the Old Order Mennonites to one characterized by local congregations in urban settings. All three groups are more integrated into their local social environment than are, for example, the Hutterites and the Old Order Mennonites. The first group, the Hutterites, will be my main focus. Three sources will be used: Hostetler and Huntington (1980), Peter (1987), and Kraybill and Bowman (2001).

Figure 11:1 Various Anabaptist Groups Anabaptists

Hutterites

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Mennonites

Amish

Brethren

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2 9 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Envisioned as a “colony of heaven” or “Noah’s ark,” the Hutterites have a longevity unmatched by other utopian attempts at social life. Hostetler and Huntington note that, of the one hundred and thirty utopian groups begun in the United States, only four lasted one century and all the others disintegrated within ten years of existence. They share several unique characteristics: an economy of human effort, the elimination of the poor and the rich, a distribution system that minimizes personal privilege, motivation without private gain, security for all individuals, and social control without a police force. They have been extremely resilient to oppressive external economic and socio-political institutions and have survived medieval hierarchy, the caesaropapist Holy Roman Empire, the Muslim Ottomans, Eastern European nationalism, the industrial revolution and, currently, the post-industrial global capitalistic system. Their origins can be traced to 1529 when a group of believers shared their goods in Austerlitz, Moravia. Shortly after, Jacob Hutter (d.1536)—from whence the Hutterites receive their name—joined and gave the group a solid foundation. In the beginning, they were very successful, numbering 80 colonies and 20,000 people. Part of their success was a result of their literacy; their expertise in farming, trades, nursing, and midwifery; and their education. However, prosperity brought envy, and both the Holy Roman and Ottoman empires waged war upon them through execution, plundering, and torture. Subsequently, they moved in waves to Slovakia, Wallachia (Hungary), Russia, and, from 1874–1877, the United States. The sword of persecution was always behind them until their arrival in America and Canada. Yet, even in America, a number of the men, who refused to be conscripted in 1918, were imprisoned in Alcatraz, tortured, and eventually died. The mythology of the people is dichotomous and presents a black and white world view. Table 11.2 illustrates this: Table 11:2 The Dichotomous Hutterian Mythology God

Satan

God

Human

Eternal

Temporal

Spiritual

Carnal

Righteous

Wicked

Men

Women

Colony

World

Good

Evil

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The Hutterites are a classic example of a sect (see Chapter 8). The Hutterite sect had its genesis in a reforming prophet (Jacob Hutter), maintained the essential teaching of the mother church, but reformed and accented certain elements of that wider tradition. Further, as do other sects, the Hutterites separated from a church type of religious organization, in this case, Roman Catholicism. Hutterite beliefs are similar to Catholicism in some aspects. They believe that all people have sinned and are prone to sin. They see the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as the remedy for this flaw and think that human life should be limited or lived out in a tight social order to reduce the potential to sin. Heaven, in its eternal form, will come to those who follow the Hutterian way of life. The Hutterites live by three unique mythological-social standards: ▶▶

sharing goods as a community of faith

▶▶

subordinating self-will to the collective will

▶▶

separation from an evil world that includes a withdrawal from political life

Peter (1987) presents an interesting theory about the origins of the special feature of communal ownership, as this concept has only a minor note in the Christian New Testament. He argues that the Hutterian experiment was an attempt to maintain what the peasants of medieval times had as a right: access to unsettled public land for hunting, fishing, pasturing livestock, or collecting lumber and food. The feudal system and the decline of communal pastures because of the growing commercialization of the city states, according to Peter, led to a reaction from the peasants (and were major causes of the peasant revolts of the sixteenth century). The social order is rooted in a divine and natural order (see Figure 11.2). All aspects of the life of the people fit into a divinely legitimated social order wherein men direct women, adults direct children, and the preacher (both the religious and secular head of the colony) and the elected council direct the community. There is no need for a police force as there is much social pressure to conform to the codes of behavior. Hostetler and Huntington (1980) quote a Hutterite member who is appreciative of this pressure: “We observe and watch over each other—it is good to live in community for there is always one hundred eyes watching you” (p. 57). Transgressions are punished by a Figure 11:2 The Divine, Natural, and Human Order God

Preacher

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2 9 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D form of shunning—the guilty party is to remain within the community but is not allowed to interact socially for a period of time. One view of the Hutterites is that they form a static society and have successfully planted a medieval village into the modern world. Yes, the medieval village has been transplanted but not without many changes. Part of the success of the people has resulted from their awareness of the need to adapt to the various social, economic, and political environments that have surrounded them at different times. Throughout history, they have been able to adapt to a wide variety of political systems. The current challenge is to adapt to the postmodern, post-industrial global capitalistic system. And they seem to be successful. Peter (1987) and Kraybill and Bowman (2001) describe the recent changes within the Hutterite communities of North America. Birth rates have declined from 45.9 per 1,000 persons in 1950 to 35.2 per 1,000 in 1990. This decline has been facilitated by later marriages and the use of contraceptives such as tubal ligations, birth control pills, and condoms. The elders consider these measures to be technological innovations that do not contradict essential beliefs. The number of colonies has grown exponentially from 3 in 1875 to 425 in 2000. However, this expansion has now been slowed due to the lack of availability of large tracts of land (each colony needs several thousand acres), the high price of the land, and state restrictions on the amount of produce or grain that can be produced. As can be surmised from the discussion on social order and mythology, the colony is a patriarchal system. However, the roles and power of women are changing. God, according to the Hutterites, should be worshipped and approached by the Hutterite community acting as a collective. Yet some women are coming to have personal sacred experiences that lead them to see the deity as individual and personal. This gives them some power in Box 11:1 Hutterites oppose same sex marriage Arm River Hutterite Colony, Sask.—Canada’s Hutterite community has taken an unprecedented political stand, writing the prime minister to warn that the country could become the next Sodom and Gomorrah if same-sex marriage is legalized. Hutterian Brethren Church of Canada, which represents about 50,000 Hutterites in British Columbia and the Prairies, urged Paul Martin not to adopt the proposed legislation. “We will be classed as traitors in God’s eyes, and we will live the darkest day in all of Canada’s history,” says the letter. Never before have the intensely private Hutterites taken such a public, and political, stand. The religious sect tries to maintain political neutrality and its members do not usually vote in elections. “Two men living together is not right: we are totally against that,” Paul Hofer, an elder at the Arm River Hutterite Colony in Saskatchewan, told CBC news. “There’s only going to one judge over that one ... and that’s our dear Lord up in heaven.” Joseph Wollman, who lives in Hillcrest Hutterite Colony near Saskatoon and was one of the authors of the letter, said the Bible forbids same-sex relationships. “It is a terrible sin. If all the people on the earth would turn that way, the people in the world would die out,” Wollman told CBC. Source: “Hutterites take rare political stand” (2005).

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interpersonal negotiations with men. Women have more say in their selection of a marital partner, and some women never do marry. Further, husbands do not have unquestioned sexual access to their wives—wives negotiate and offer themselves on the condition that men behave acceptably. Why have these changes occurred? Some would say that the source of these changes is a revitalization of the sacred (as a movement of renewal). Peter (1987) argues against this theory, observing that Hutterite mythology and rituals are very much routinized. He offers other reasons that are primarily the economic or that involve technological adaptation to the external world. Currently, according to Peter (1987), the general economic pattern for most Hutterites is not mixed farming (e.g., grain growing, livestock and poultry production for exchange) but rather specialization in one area such as only grain, potatoes, sugar beets, beef, or pork. With this specialization comes the need to be efficient, which necessitates a significant use of sophisticated machinery, computer technology, telecommunications, and the like. And the use of technology has led to the need for fewer workers and to less employment for both men and women. Agricultural specialization also involves more use of professional accountants and encourages higher levels of education among young men, so they can learn the technology behind the new machinery. Thus, there is more independent thinking within the Hutterite community, as many members now work in solo positions outside of traditional and communal agricultural production. Women have also taken advantage of new baking and cooking technologies, which gives them more time to be with their children. The experiment of the Hutterites is remarkable and their genius is vibrant. Their resilience and growth have been evident in their longevity, their ability to adopt technology while maintaining their key sacred culture, and their capacity to maintain an approximation of a utopian community in a wide variety of social, economic, and political settings.

Privatization or Personal Withdrawal One response to the need to accommodate religion to society is to try to reduce the tension between the sacred and the secular worlds by “keeping religion to yourself ” and not engaging in any public manifestation of belief. Musing on this, Berger (1967) argues that religion in the modern United States is a private institution that is not linked to the public sphere. He contends that a significant consequence of modernization is the creation of the private sphere or a domain of personal life that is separated from the major political and economic institutions. This private sphere is represented especially by the family. In this sphere, the individual is expected to fulfil himself or herself in a number of voluntary relationships (Berger, 1967, p. 369–ff). Religion has gone through a similar process in that accommodation has “driven” religious institutions and symbols out of the public social areas. Berger adds that this process has several implications. First, religion is no longer able to challenge the autonomy of the state, which has become a rigid, powerful, and highly structured institution. Second, the economy is also effectively divorced from religious influence. Third, religion is most relevant in “leisure-time activities” in which the individual is able to have a significant amount of

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2 9 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D choice. Fourth, religion has found a social proximity to the family in the private sphere, reflected in the ideology of familialism (or conservative “family values”). Are Berger’s reflections supported empirically in recent research? Yes, according to the several sets of literature that will be reviewed later. Another way religion accommodates the secular world is to allow the individual believer a significant latitude of belief. This loosening of central religious authority is illustrated by what Roof and McKinney (1987) call a new voluntarism. They expand to say that the following elements characterize religion in America: the quest for self, the inner life of impulse and subjectivity, the emphasis on a highly individualistic ethos favoring greater religious subjectivity and personal choice, and the disestablishment of the institution of religion. Also, according to Roof and McKinney (1987), “Commitment to Self has grown at the expense of community, disrupting especially loyalties to traditional religious institutions” (p. 33). They say that, to understand what is happening today on the religious scene, one has to be aware of the implications of greater individualism and voluntarism (p. 9). In Canada, a similar process is described by Bibby (1987), as believers tend to select to believe in and practice only personally relevant aspects of their religion, which results in the fragmentation of a religion’s belief system. Hervieu-Léger (2000) updates research on this kind of religious individualism and offers an explanation as to its origins. She calls this kind of sacred individualism the mysticalesoteric, saying that it has the following characteristics: primacy is accorded to personal experience, which leads each along his or her own path; there is no truth beyond the self, for all truth is a personal truth; there is no authority beyond the self, and none can impose it on the individual; and the aim of life is self perfection that does not include any kind of moral perfection but rather the access of the individual to a superior state of being. This kind of spirituality, she argues, fit well with modernity, which values personal health, well-being, vitality, beauty, and youth. It confronts any and all kinds of dualistic thinking, such as the divine-human or the natural-supernatural dichotomies. The author moves from these descriptions of the mystical-esoteric to its historical origins. Figure 11.3 illustrates the original sources. Hervieu-Léger, focussing on the intra-personal dimension of religion (Chapter 2), outlines the growth of both Roman Catholic and Protestant pietism during the sixteenth century

Figure 11:3 Historical Precedents of Modern Mystical/Esoteric Individualism Sixteenth Century Christian Pietism Modern Mystical/ Esoteric Individualism Seventeenth Century Enlightenment

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in the West. There emerged in France a strong emotional piety that favored emotional proximity to God rather than a relationship to a deity approachable only through a rigorous and relentless self-denying asceticism. This emotional piety was characterized by a devout humanism, a gentle and humane spirituality, a peaceful contemplation of Christ, and the perception of the deity and the Christ as a friend or as one “close to the heart.” This approach in France was akin to the pietistic movement that was created in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Germany. Such terms as “communities of the awakened” or “friends of Jesus” were commonly used to describe groups within this movement. The Enlightenment, whose philosophers offered an opposite view of God than the one outlined by members of the pietistic movement, was, nevertheless, a precedent of the modern kind of mystical-esoteric spirituality, according to Hervieu-Léger. The central figure of the Enlightenment is Voltaire (1694–1778), who has been called “the embodiment of the Enlightenment.” While the pietistic movement of France and Germany sought to bring the divine close to the individual, the Enlightenment attempted the opposite: to push deity into the outer regions of the universe far removed from the workings of humans. Voltaire wanted to construct a “religion without a church” that was to overcome specific, historical revelation (as from Jesus or Muhammad) by a natural one common to all of humanity. Voltaire offers several images of God: the power and unity of the universe, the one who reigns through nature and the natural order, and the great geometrician who has arranged everything in order but who never intervenes at all in human life. The last idea, that God created the world but does not interfere in it, describes deism, which became common in both France and Great Britain. It is Hervieu-Léger’s opinion that the two movements, pietism and deism, were inseparable from one another—two sides of the relationship between the individual and the divine, which shaped the creation of the modern mystical-esoteric movement. The two images of God’s relationship to humans—divine proximity and distance—and the tension created by their being in opposition fashioned the transition from religious individualism to modern individualism. In this modern form of spirituality, the divine is not only distant but is, essentially, non-existent outside of the parameters of nature and the self. The mystical aspect of this spirituality is the notion of the sacred within; all authority and power is intra-psychic.

Box 11:2 Continued Individual Spirituality in 2005 Martin Marty suggests that Americans are following three religious paths in the first part of the third millennium: (1) most people pursue their search in traditional sanctuaries, (2) a few combine their faith with social activism, and (3) millions speak of their being spiritual and not religious (meaning, spirituality is a very personal quest). They go to hear the Tibetan Dalai Lama and are pilgrims on the paths of the never-ending, newly prospering spiritual journey, and they keep inviting more company from among their contemporaries. Source: Marty (2005).

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2 9 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Laubach (2004) offers empirical evidence that the modern era saw the creation of private religion, which supports Hervieu-Léger’s historical theory regarding the construction of mystical-esoteric spirituality. He theorizes that paranormal experiences, defined as psychism, influence the personal construction of private religion. By psychism, he means, “perceptions of psychic intrusions into the stream of consciousness that are interpreted by the actor as not originating within the self ’s normal information channels” (Laubach, 2004, p. 242). He also describes private religion as the individual having moral autonomy, non-conformity to organized religions, rejection of beliefs that reflect conformity, and having low levels of participation in communal practices. From this definition, he creates a theory that consist of the following propositions: 1.

Psychic intrusions are relatively normal occurrences (see also the many studies referred to in Chapter 2).

2. The more a person attributes reality to these psychic intrusions, the more the beliefs from these experiences take on a privileged status. 3. The more people give themselves over to these intrusions, the more likely they are to develop moral autonomy, and the less likely they are conform to organized religion and participate in the communal aspects of religion—in short, the more likely they are to construct a privatized religion. Laubach then creates this model of the intra-psychic origins of privatized religion. What Laubach is attempting here is to rule out competing theories of the origins of private religion, especially sociological ones. The model, in statistical terms, is what is called a non-recursive model wherein the dependent variable (private religion) is not only an effect of psychism but also a factor of psychism. The author uses a 1988 General Social Survey (GSS) that is representative of the mainland American people. His key finding is that psychism fosters autonomy in moral beliefs and the privatization of religious practices. This result contrasts to conformity theory, a common premise in the sociology of religion, which postulates that people construct their sacred lives from extra-personal social experiences. In general terms, Laubach’s study gives further

Figure 11:4 Intra-psychic Origins of Privatized Religion Social, cultural and demographic controls Privatized Religion Psychism

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credibility to the idea that personal religious experiences are still frequent and significant in the live of Americans.

Political Activism: Liberal and Conservative Involvement in politics Religion and politics continue to be connected in the modern world, which is, almost by nature, secular. Also, throughout the text, there has been a synthesis of evidence to argue that religion is still present in the personal and social lives of many people throughout the world. In the United States and Canada, this abiding connection between religion and politics is reflected in several political movements that are significantly informed by two forms of Christianity: liberal and conservative (See Wuthnow [1988a], who defines these terms in his study on the restructuring of American religion, which is discussed in Chapter 8 of this text). I shall use as cases one example from the liberal and one from the conservative camp. My example from the liberal Christian tradition is the social gospel movement that emerged during the first part of the twentieth century and that later became the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) Party of Saskatchewan and, still later, the federal New Democratic Party (NDP). The example from the conservative Christian tradition is the New Religious Right of the United States. I argue that these two forms of Christianity, the liberal and the conservative, respond to accommodation in two different ways. The social gospel movement reflects the liberal or church model of response (to use Weber’s [1894/1978] and Troeltsch’s [1931] categories), which can be characterized as an adjustment to the social environment that tries to build bridges between it and religion. The conservative response is to emphasize the differences between Christianity and the world, and this response lends itself to a more sectarian mode of religious organization. Both responses illustrate the dilemmas of the sacred in a profane environment.

A Liberal Response The social gospel movement is an example of a liberal Christian response to political accommodation. Beginning about the end of the nineteenth century and the first part of the twentieth century, many liberally minded Protestants recognized that the modern industrial state was not serving marginalized people. Hargrove (1989, p. 266), a sociologist of religion, notes that the social gospel developed out of a need to care for the rights and the needs of the poor and the downtrodden. She uses Bennett (1955, p. 20–21), who provided a mythological basis for this movement. Elements of the social gospel mythology include faith in God as Lord of history; recognition of the commandment of love as a call to act to improve the living conditions of others; responsiveness to a call to repentance—to transform what can be changed for one’s neighbors’ sake; a Christian understanding of sin, which recognizes that anyone will pursue personal or in-group interests and that, unless those interests are made accountable to others, no person can be trusted to run the society for the benefit of all; and a recognition of one’s neighbor as a whole person in the context of the community, so that social action will be taken in a broader frame of reference.

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3 0 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Allen (1973) traces the social gospel movement in Canada from the 1890s. He notes that proponents of the movement considered that Christianity involved a passionate commitment to social involvement and a desire to champion the disinherited. As a result, in the liberal mode of thinking, the sacred might very well be the secular, and the secular the sacred. The “Kingdom of God” was not a far-off goal but rather something present wherein adherents are challenged to harness themselves to social problems and carry the yoke of social concern (Allen, 1973, p. 17). Allen details leaders, churches, and regions in Canada to present a profile of the social gospel movement between 1914 and 1928. In his conclusion, he reflects on some of this movement’s effects. Even though it was not accepted fully in the Protestant churches (predominantly Anglican, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congregationalist), it did bring on a broad range of social reforms, such as legislation that aided the underprivileged, and it contributed to the creation of social work as a profession (Allen, 1973, p. 352). It is from this background that the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation of the province of Saskatchewan (CCF) emerged. Well-known sociologist Seymour Lipset (1959) informs us of the emergence and growth of this political party. The party (formally established in 1932 in Calgary, Alberta) has three basic roots: rural socialism, urban socialism, and the social gospel movement. Rural socialism had a long history, dating to the early part of the century. Its origins emerged in a joint effort by farmers to sell grain not to private markets but to cooperatively owned grain companies that represented the needs of the farmers and not of big business from eastern Canada. In addition, the farmers united to form an association called the United Farmers of Canada that was inherently socialist in nature. In 1929, a small group of trade unionists and teachers formed the Independent Labour Party (ILP) of Saskatchewan. To establish a strong power base, the two organizations joined forces with other socialist Canadian organizations in 1933 to become a new political party known as the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The social gospel connection comes through J. S. Woodsworth, a former Methodist minister and avid advocate of the movement. He was a prominent leader and author who, in 1918, resigned from the ministry and devoted himself to the socialist cause (Allen, 1973, p. 49). In the 1930s, he was the national leader of the CCF. It was during the late 1930s, however, that the original radical stance of the CCF in Saskatchewan was modified (Lipset, 1959, p. 111–ff). The second impact of the social gospel movement came with the 1941 election as party leader of Tommy C. Douglas (1904–1986), another former minister and a member of the Baptist Church. Douglas (1973), in an autobiographical essay, writes of his time as a pastor in Weyburn, Saskatchewan in the 1930s. He organized a food bank, a clothing depot, and an unemployment agency. The tragedy and difficulty of the depression of the 1930s gave impetus to the CCF party because many people cooperated to make a quality life for themselves. As Douglas (1973) writes, The cooperative movement grew by leaps and bounds during that period. People helped each other in a score of little ways. They rallied to each other. They came close to each other for warmth and comfort and companionship. (1973, p. 170)

Douglas was a charismatic leader and a religious prophet for social concern. While a pastor, he met a woman who was too poor to pay for health care. He promised her that if he ever

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Box 11.3 Thomas Douglas is Honored In November 2004, Canadians voted that Tommy Douglas was not only one of the ten greatest Canadians of the twentieth century, but the greatest. (Over 1.2 million votes were cast in the contest.) Born and educated in Winnipeg, he witnessed personal struggles with health and watched, as a child, the infamous Winnipeg General Strike of 1919. These two experiences led him to embrace a socialistic stance in politics and, after being a Baptist minister for several years, he entered both federal and provincial politics for the rest of his active life. Tommy Douglas’s legacy as a social policy innovator lives on. Social welfare, universal Medicare, old age pensions and mother’s allowances— Douglas helped keep these ideas, and many more, watching as more established political parties eventually came to accept these once-radical ideas as their own. Source: “Tommy Douglas greatest of them all” (2004).

came to power, he would see to it that health care would be provided for the poor and the rich alike. As we shall see shortly, he kept his promise. In 1944, Douglas and the CCF did gain power in a provincial election. Immediately, the party began to extend social services such as social security and health and education services, legislate security of lands for farmers, and increase farm commodity prices (Lipset, 1959). Of special interest was the provision of health care for residents. Lipset argues that the most important single reform of the government was socialized medicine. And, in keeping with Douglas’s promise and the CCF’s platform in 1947, a free hospitalization plan was inaugurated for all residents. It was not until 1962, and after the 1961 transformation of the federal CCF to the New Democratic Party (NDP) of Canada (the provincial party was still called the CCF), that the Saskatchewan government introduced coverage for medical care. As one can see, the impact of the social gospel movement in the political landscape of Canada is real. Indeed, Lipset (1959, p. 136) recognizes the importance of the social gospel in the CCF. He notes that, from the time of its founding to the present, the party has had a moralistic and religious emphasis: “the CCF stresses its support of Christianity and the fact that many of its leaders are religious; and it makes political capital of the fact that some churches are anticapitalist” (p. 136). Although it would be an exaggeration to say that the social gospel was the only driving force for socialized medicine in Canada, it is nonetheless true to say that it did have a definite impact on the future shape of medical care in Canada.

A Conservative Response The New Religious Right in the United States is just one “conservative” Christian response to the need for a religion to accommodate to economic and political social contexts (Wuthnow, 1988a, p. 204). However, the climate of conservative ideology and practice that it typifies is evident in many Western countries today. Even liberal parties, such as the Democratic Party in the United States and the Liberal Party of Canada, have become more right wing than left. Part of this conservative swing has religious underpinnings in the form of what has come to be known as the New Religious Right. Wilcox and Larson (2006) categorize the

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3 0 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D movement into four stages. The first occurred in the 1920s as an effect of the fundamentalist movement of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century; this stage was a response to the liberalization of Christianity then evident in some major mainline churches, such as the United Church and the Presbyterian and Episcopal churches. The movement became linked to politics with the spark of the famous Scopes trails in 1925 when, John Scopes, a teacher, went on trial in Tennessee for teaching evolution in a public school. The political part of the movement was not long lasting and was in decline during the 1930s. The second wave emerged in the 1950s with the “Red Menace” or the socially constructed threat of a communist infiltration into American politics. In addition to being against communism, these conservatives also opposed Medicare and sex education in schools. After the realization that there really was no communist threat, this conservative movement died by 1960. The third and fourth waves have had the most impact on the American political scene. The third, from 1980 to 1990, is typically called the “religious right.” A newer version of this religious conservatism, however, emerged after the 1990s, which Wilcox and Larson call “The Second Coming.”

The Christian Right of the Eighties One of the first sociological analyzes of this movement was a book edited by Robert Liebman and Robert Wuthnow (1983). In this text, several authors outline the ideology (or mythology), the organization, and the cultural environment of the movement. Himmelstein (1983, p. 15–18) presents three elements of the ideology of the movement: economic libertarianism, social traditionalism, and militant anti-communism. Economic libertarianism is classic capitalism with the assumption that, if the market is left to itself, the interaction between rationally self-interested persons will yield prosperity, social harmony, and manifest personal and social goods. Thus, the welfare state needs to be dismantled as it interferes in the economy. Social traditionalism is more focussed on religion. Its premise is that social ills have emerged in the United States with liberal support for abortion, the Equal Rights Amendment, bussing, affirmative action, sexual permissiveness, and other initiatives, such as the secular curriculum in public schools. Militant anti-communism is the third set of religious right assumptions. It is the idea, originating from the McCarthy era, that there exists a conflict between the West and communism, which is a conflict between good and evil. This ideology has become especially mobilized under the organization called the Moral Majority. Liebman (1983) adds that this ideology is combined, essentially, with American fundamentalism characterized by a large number of small denominations with strong, charismatic leaders. It is relatively successful, however, in its ability to mould disparate local activities into a national movement. The locus of this mobilization was the local church. How widespread and powerful was the Moral Majority? Did it receive support from all conservative churches and conservative political adherents? Shupe and Stacey (1983) argue that it did not. In a sample of 905 respondents in the Dallas–Fort Worth metropolitan area, they found no basis to Jerry Falwell’s contention that most conservatives support the movement (Jerry Falwell co-founded the Moral Majority in 1979). They also found that Falwell and other leaders of the New Religious Right seriously overestimate the amount

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of agreement among modest supporters on the issues the leaders hold to be important. Finally, while Falwell contends that the movement is only political and not religious, these researchers found that the grassroots people who support the movement are more likely to be sectarian and fundamentalist Christians and not moderate and conservative Protestants and Roman Catholics. Guth (1983) adds further credibility to Shupe and Stacey’s conclusions from data gathered from 453 Southern Baptist ministers, a sample drawn from the approximately 40,000 pastors of the denomination. He finds that there is little support for the Moral Majority’s campaign. He argues that the religious right draws its strength from those ministers who are less educated and are less professional. Southern Baptist ministers of this type are becoming increasingly rare, as the church becomes more and more like other denominations in the United States. These findings are more significant given that the Baptists comprise not only the largest Protestant denomination but also the most conservative Thus, even in one of the most conservative churches, there is not significant support for the Moral Majority. What sociological circumstances have given rise to the New Religious Right? Wuthnow (1993) offers some answers. He argues that the movement is similar to the rest of American Protestantism in presenting a “this-worldly orientation” (from Weber, 1894/1978). It is an orientation not toward some other world but toward an active engagement in moral reform and social service. Also, in line with the wider conservatism within American culture, the religious right, too, placed a new emphasis on values, particularly family values, according to Wuthnow (1993). And, in response to Watergate and the Roe vs. Wade decision in 1973 on women’s right to abortion, the movement has been engaged in describing the public meaning of these values and in advocating policies purported to support them. A third circumstance giving rise to the movement, a circumstance unique to America, is the willingness of people to give financial support to their churches and to causes such as the New Religious Right. There were also some organizational factors that led to the movement’s growth. Relying on his earlier work on the restructuring of American religion (see Chapter 3), Wuthnow (1988a) notes that the declining significance of denominationalism, the emergence of special interest groups and leadership networks, various sources of social strain, the growth of higher education, the growth of the welfare state, and political upheavals have all contributed to the emergence and the growth of the movement. A study of the movement by the religious studies scholar Walter Capps (1990, p. 5–14) focuses not so much on the world view or the mythology of the New Religious Right but, rather, on its instinctual basis that forms the social and psychological source of its motivational power.1 Elements of that instinct include the reassertion of patriarchy, indulging in nostalgia, a reaction to secularization, an engagement in spiritual warfare that pits “us” and “them” in polar opposition, striving to be intellectually respectable, and using television to create a positive image. This instinctual focus is combined with a certain kind of mythology that is in keeping with a fundamentalist world view. The political message is communicated via biblical symbols that are interpreted in a literalist way. This absolutist dedication to literalism (especially in reading biblical text that is apocalyptic in nature) encourages the tendency toward intolerance of others, doctrinal fanaticism, and the understanding of symbols and mythologies as facts. It is a mythology that divides the world into good and evil, darkness and light, God and Satan. Capps writes (1990):

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3 0 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Like Manichaeism of old, it is a disposition that understands the ingredients of the world to be arranged as polar opposites: something is either good or evil, represents light or darkness, embodies truth or error, for there is no middle ground. But it is also a reading on the world in which no great allowances are made for distinctions between the image and its referent, the symbol and that to which the symbol may refer, or even between empirical and imaginative portrayals. (p. 14)

Capps continues his study of the movement by presenting biographical accounts of four prominent leaders: Jerry Falwell, Francis Schaeffer (a philosopher-theologian), Jim and Tammy Bakker, and Pat Robertson, who went as far as to become a serious presidential candidate in 1988. In analysing these persons, Capps (1990, p. 186–ff) posits the following observations. First, they all agree that the nation is suffering because its spiritual vitality is weak. This suffering is variously described as a rampant drug culture, the prevalence of sexual promiscuity,2 the frequency of teenage abortions, and deviant behavior both in communities and schools. Second, all believe that the reason for this malaise is a secularism that is manifested through liberalism, secular humanism, ecumenical Christianity, and all the human potential movements. According to these leaders, this kind of secularism has reduced human dependence upon God and has failed to offer a satisfactory vision of human transcendence. The theme common in the ideology of these leaders that has the most far-reaching implication for the political sphere involves their response to the secularization processes of modern America. Secularization’s roots, according to the New Religious Right, go back to the Enlightenment, which substituted humanism for theism. Now, according to the leaders of the religious right, humanism needs to be replaced with a new theism that focuses on an apocalyptic image of America and the world. In this view, the world is coming to its end. The Messiah (Jesus Christ) is to return to bring judgement on a disobedient world. In this coming, America has been given a special role to serve the Kingdom of God. Michael Lienesch (1993) also studies the leaders of the New Religious Right, providing evidence that the movement is not as monolithic as previous accounts would assert. He argues that, rather than providing a single world view, the religious right was beset with the inability to go beyond being a collection of single-issue reactions to the secular enemy. His research focuses on values and indicates members’ beliefs regarding how important the bornagain experience is, how central the family is for maintaining spirituality, and how necessary laissez-faire capitalism is for the success of America, as well as documenting the attempt by the leaders of the movement to give back to America her place as the “New Jerusalem” of the modern world. In contrast to other researchers, Moen (1992) is struck by a new accommodation within the New Religious Right. His main thesis is that it has gradually become more politically sophisticated and, as a consequence, has shed many of its sectarian ways and structures to become more accommodating to the political realities of the 1990s (Some of this accommodation may be due to the demise of Moral Majority as an organization in 1989.) In addition, rather than choosing to fly under the banner of an organization such as the Moral Majority, it has now aligned itself more with the Republican Party. Further, because of the religious right’s grassroots approach, its membership within the party has increased substantially. A critique offered by Guth (1992) is useful, however. Moen’s data

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are not derived from “grassroots” information but rather from interviews with a limited number (33) of leaders. Although other scholars may not think that the New Religious Right has stepped away from its original goals because it has become more accommodating with regard to political realities, Kenneth Wald (1987), at least, states that, for the most part, the movement has not succeeded in achieving these goals. What future does the New Religious Right have? In his book on the future of Christianity in the twentieth century, Wuthnow (1993) attempts to answer this question. He sets up his argument as a dialectic between social forces that would present a positive future for the movement against those that could herald its demise. The movement has several resources that could be mobilized for future success. First of all, it appears to have more sympathizers, especially regarding its stance on issues, than actual committed members. He acknowledges studies that show that there is a strong and wide interest in pro-family issues, concern about sexual infidelity, and a commitment to traditional standards of honesty and integrity. A second reason for optimism is that conservative clergy are becoming increasingly more educated and have the ability to muster support for a cause at the grassroots level. A third reason pointing to a positive future for the New Religious Right is that the lack of political success of clergy such as Falwell and Robertson may indicate a change in strategy, i.e., not having clergy leaders who are handicapped because of their commitment to their own denomination. Wuthnow (1993, p. 162), relying on Hadden and Shupe’s (1988) work on TV evangelists and the “new right,” suggests that the new leaders should come from writers, counsellors, lobbyists, and business people. A fourth reason follows. Wuthnow considers that the high profile of the TV evangelists did give a lot of momentum to the movement, but it also made them very vulnerable as in the cases of the Bakkers and Jimmy Swaggart. For the movement to be successful, then, some form of powerful support from the surrounding social and political environment is important. Ronald Reagan, in the 1980s, gave this sort of support to the movement. Without this support, however, will the movement grow? Wuthnow also outlines some of the factors that might contribute to a decline of the movement. Another necessary resource is time and labour. Because of the educational achievements of many conservative Christians, women are much more likely to be in the labour market. The downside of this for the church is that these women are no longer available as voluntary agents for the movement. Another interesting factor presaging decline relates to the potential consequences of the New Religious Right achieving its objectives. If it did (for example, reversing the Roe vs. Wade decision and re-introducing prayer in the public schools) what would motivate its continued existence? And, if it lost, would it not lose its enthusiasm? A final reason the movement might weaken is that, although there is widespread support for many of the issues advanced by the movement, there is still much disagreement. For example, Falwell (a fundamentalist evangelical) did not join forces with Robertson (a charismatic evangelical) because of internal division within the evangelical community. Catholics would join with fundamentalists on issues of abortion and sexual codes but would be significantly divided from them on many others. What of the future of this third wave of the religious right movement? Wuthnow predicts that there will continue to be a strong segment of the American people firmly committed to their conservative churches and who respect traditional “family values.” These Americans will more likely be middle-class suburbanites who are well educated and have talents for mobilization. Furthermore, the majority of these conservative Christians will participate

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3 0 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D in politics because they consider it their entitlement. In the end, Wuthnow (1993) does some wishful thinking that the New Religious Right “will be less concerned with achieving its ends through politics alone but be more devoted to service, caring for the poor and disadvantaged, promoting community, reconciliation, and the transmission of values through teaching and training the young” (p. 167).

The Second Coming Evidence is strong that the third wave of the religious right has also come to an end. Where did the movement go from there? This is the question that Wilcox and Larson (2006) attempt to answer. These authors organize their discussion on five fronts: the characteristics of and the statistics related to the newest religious right movement, the demographic groups that the movement targets for membership, the major organizations of the movement, the political processes addressed, and an assessment of the movement. Several elements distinguish this movement from previous ones. All three religious right movements were restricted to fundamentalist evangelicals. Previously, all three religious right movements were restricted to fundamentalist evangelicals, but, recently, a new ecumenism has emerged that links fundamentalists to conservative Christians in the wider evangelical church, Catholics, mainline Protestants, and African Americans. The members of this new coalition also came to understand that they should use the language of the gay and women’s rights movements that accented individual rights. For example, they believed that it was a Christian child’s right to pray in a public school. Further, a language of victimization was created as they argued that conservative Christians were victims of discrimination, just as women and gays and lesbians had been. Their political agenda widened considerably to go beyond family, sexuality, and sexual orientation issues to include health care reform, taxes, crime, and education. Their numbers are significant: there may be as many as four million members nationwide with 150,000 activists who work in politics. Their social-demographic profile illustrates that they are well educated, affluent, most likely to be women, have high rates of ritual participation, and are astute in using media and computer technology. To encourage membership, the movement targets white evangelicals, conservative Catholics, mainline Protestants, and African American evangelicals. All groups share a cluster of conservative values; they are against abortion and same-sex marriage and for the maintenance of traditional male-female social roles. African American evangelicals share these values but also accent Biblical themes such as liberation, equality, social compassion, and care for the poor and the marginalised. African American members also want more state intervention and less distinction between the roles of men and women, and they are more likely to support the Democratic Party than the Republican. Although there are many religious right groups and organizations, three stand out as having the most supporters, paid employees, and extensive communication avenues. They are Focus on the Family, Family Research Council, and Concerned Women for America. I restrict my presentation to Focus on the Family, as it is the largest. Nationwide, it has a budget of $100 million and a staff of 1,300. The heart of the organization’s focus is the family, and its ideology valorizes the heterosexual, married couple with children. Its media outreach is wide, covering 3,500 radio stations, 80 TV outlets, and columns in 500 newspapers. The audience is about 200 million people in 99 countries. Its major policy issues are homosexuality,

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which is considered to be a life-style choice, and the option to be heterosexual; same-sex marriage and other socio-moral issues pertaining to intimate life; and economic, welfare, foreign, and environmental policies. The political processes followed by the membership of all the groups and organizations of the movement include influencing federal, state, and school board elections. Groups are also active in promoting their best candidates for the Republican Party and in seeking to aid in the selection of court justices. Wilcox and Larson (2006) note what others have observed: that the voter turnout among evangelicals and a mobilization in many churches helped out George Bush’s election victory over John Kerry in 2004. What of the future of this wave of the religious right? Wilcox and Larson (2006) suggest that, if the movement is to navigate through the political terrain of America, it needs to shed it dogmatic, bipolar language and its authoritarian image and practices. If it does, it can broaden the electorate in positive ways, move to enable the right of religious expression in public schools, and keep reminding Americans that moral and religious values should be used in crafting public policy. Further, Wilcox and Larson (2006) argue that the movement should come to be known as just one voice among many in such a multi-ethic, multi-sacred pluralistic society. Yet all is not growth for this newest version of the religious right; there is evidence of decline. Bates (2000) offers some observations based on the demise of one religious right organization in Oregon. He constructs a model that is sociologically astute by accenting both social action and social structure (See Figure 11.5.). The Oregon Citizens Alliance originated as a grassroots religious movement and peaked in 1994. The primary focus of the alliance was on gay rights and on the possibility that samesex marriage might become legal and sanctioned in some churches. From 1994, however, the movement declined in influence, membership, and organizational prowess. What Bates attempts to do is to understand and to theorize about why this decline occurred.

Figure 11:5 An Action-structure Model of the Demise of a Christian Right Movement MacroStructural Factors

The decline of the political opportunity structure Failed campaigns The disjuncture of two ideological frames

The demise of the Oregon Citizens Alliance

MicroSocial Action Factors

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Problems with organizational structure and strategy Problems with recruitment strategies

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3 0 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D The first structural factor in this decline is the loss of a political opportunity that occurred in 1996. The organization endeavored to curtail the State of Oregon from passing legislation offering protection against discrimination for gays, lesbians, and bisexuals in employment, housing, education, public accommodations, and other transactions. A similar bill was passed in Colorado before this. However, the Supreme Court of the United States struck this legislation down, effectively taking the wind out of the Oregon Citizens Alliance. The second structural factor was the organization’s many failed campaigns to achieve its goals. Last, a disjuncture grew within the link between the organization and the Republican Party because of two diverging ideological and cultural frames. As the Oregon Citizens Alliance was becoming more extreme and “black and white” in its thinking and practice, the Republican Party was calling for moderation. The other two factors that Bates (2000) argues contributed to the demise of the Oregon Citizens Alliance were intra-organizational and related to the actions of leaders and members. Its leaders’ strong belief in absolute truth, especially about homosexuality, became realized in an authoritarian style of leadership. Bates (2000) quotes the leader of the organization as claiming “the military model is appropriate because this is a war and you do not compromise and God does not want us to compromise” (p. 31). What in effect happened is that, because of this authoritarian structure and unwillingness to compromise, the voices of the members of the organization were curtailed, and they became disillusioned and disempowered. This, in turn, led to problems in recruiting new members and maintaining existing ones. The fate of the Oregon Citizens Alliance brings to mind Wuthnow’s comments on the dangers of both political success and failure for the religious right. In Oregon, initial successes occasioned by direct connections to the Republican Party dissipated as, in an effort to appeal to moderates and get elected, the political party turned away from the organization’s extreme political demands. On the other hand, the alliance’s strong interest in one political and legal issue as well as its militaristic, no-compromise way of pursuing its aim meant discouragement and disempowerment among members as a result of repeated failure to win the “war.” Given the insight of this notion that both success and failure are potentially dangerous to the movement, how accurately has Wuthnow (1993) predicted other aspects of the fourth wave of the religious right? Two seem to be accurate: in the 1990 and into the twenty-first century, members of the religious right continue to be strong in their commitment to fundamental values, and they are definitely politically active. However, the prediction that the movement would become more concerned about service and care for the marginalized does not seem to have come true.

The Division Paradigm This paradigm represents a fourth response to accommodation, one that is common in the modern world. The example given will be from colonial and post-revolutionary America. I shall categorize the discussion into two parts: European beginnings and the United States.

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European Beginnings The history of the medieval period in Christianity has been marked by a union of religion and the state in two modes: caesaropapism and hierocracy. Nascent signs of the division of religion and the state emerged in the Treaty of Westphalia (1648)—ending the depredation of the Thirty Years’ War. Indices of separation were focussed on the passage of ecclesiastical property to the state. The idea that flowed from this exchange was the separation of jurisdictions between the secular state and religious organizations (McGarry and Soregel, 2003). Later developments include the French Revolution of 1789 (see Marty, 1959) and the intellectual origins of the Enlightenment. Chadwick (1975), in his study of the secularization of the European mind, writes of Enlightenment philosopher John Locke (1632–1704) that he laid the intellectual groundwork for democracy or the liberal state. This groundwork implied the essential nature of the human right to freedom of conscience, freedom of choice, and freedom to create a government. This view of human rights, especially of the right to create a government, challenges both caesaropapism and hierocracy. Further, written into Locke’s political philosophy was also the need for the tolerance and acceptance of others’ religious affiliations—to enable freedom of conscience. To do so meant that the state could not privilege one religion over others, as in the case of caesaropapism and hierocracy. Thus, the Lockean image of the state, if carried to its logical end, necessitates a secular state. Chadwick (1975) writes, A secular state is a state in which government exerts no pressure in favor of one religion rather than another religion; a state in which no social or educational pressure is exerted in favor of one religion rather than another religion or no religion; a state wholly detached from religious (or irreligious) teaching or practice. (p. 27)

The last phrase of the quotation is critical: “a state wholly detached from religious teaching or practice.” It is this philosophical principle that became codified in the French Revolution. Marty (1959) refers to a turning point in the detachment of religion, in this case Catholicism, from the state: With all exceptions in mind, however, we can safely generalize that the modern trend has been toward the disestablishing of papal religion, removing from it political sanction, and forcing it to make its way on a voluntary principle among the other denominations and religions. (p. 281)

He adds that Protestantism faced a similar fate. From about 1650 to the present, there has been a gradual decrease in the official influence of Protestants in the political sphere. Frederick the Great of Prussia (1712–1786) was one of the first politicians to have broken with the caesaropapist policy, and he sought out Enlightenment thinkers, particularly Voltaire, intending to impose Enlightenment ideals on Protestantism. In England, after the Great Rebellion of 1642–1651, the Church of England as the established church lost more and more of its official status.

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The United States It was in the United States, however, that the doctrine of the separation of church and state reached its apex. Even though the Constitution did not explicitly propose the separation, a virtual pattern of division was institutionalized as a consequence of subsequent legislation.3 One such legal document was the First Amendment, ratified in 1791, which states, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exchange thereof ” (Constitution, 1952). Three sociologically related themes undergird this American phenomenon. One is the connection between modernity and societal differentiation and specialization. According to Durkheim (1893/1933), the primary mark or characteristic of the modern world is institutional separation, which he called the division of labour. The second theme is that we need to understand this “division paradigm” in the light of our lengthy discussion in Chapter 10 on caesaropapism and hierocracy. The backdrop to the creation of the American republic and the separation of religion and the state is comprised of the various pre-Revolutionary examples of American colonial caesaropapism and hierocracy. Last, a “grand daughter” of the paradigm is the privatization of religion that we just discussed. I will outline this investigation by presenting materials on the history of what is known as the establishment of religion in the colonies, explain what this means, and then reflect on the meaning of the separation of religion and the state in post-revolutionary America. McConnell (2003), a circuit judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit as well and a professor at the University of Utah, defines the establishment of religion in America as “... the promotion and inculcation of a common set of beliefs through government authority. It may be narrow (focussed on a particular set of beliefs) or broad (encompassing a certain range of opinion)” (p. 2131). I interpret it as having two dimensions: caesaropapist and hierocratic. In the case of the former, the state has the final authority in sacred matters, and, in the case of the latter, the sacred institution has control of key sectors of the state. The establishment of religion in the colonies had its origins in the years of caesaropapism in Western Europe, which was detailed in the last chapter. The legal establishment of an official religion or a state church is especially evident in the history of the United Kingdom, especially of England. In a conflict with the pope over his desire to divorce his wife Catherine of Aragon, Henry VIII (1491–1547) legislated the Act of Supremacy in 1534. This made him not only the “defender of the faith” (a title the pope had given him earlier) but the supreme head of the Church of England, and it gave him power to reform and redress the errors and heresies of the church. During his lifetime, the new parliament enacted various “articles of the faith,” and his appointee, Archbishop of Canterbury Thomas Cranmer, was instrumental in producing the first Book of Common Prayer, which was published just after Henry’s death. Later, the 1662 Act of Uniformity required all ministers to conform to these requirements that made the Church of England the sole institution of lawful public worship. Later acts of the parliament prohibited unlicenced religious meetings, presented punishments to dissenters and Catholics (a derogatory name given to them was “Papists”). Even after the English Civil War (1640–1651) and when the crown was restored in 1660, the policies excluded Catholics, Jews, Unitarians (those Christians who denied the Trinity), and other non-Protestant affiliations from privileges enjoyed by members of the official church.

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To this day, the queen is the supreme governor of the church, the archbishop of Canterbury (the clerical head) and other high prelates are chosen by the prime minister, bishops sit in the House of Lords, parliament still has control over the doctrines, structure, and liturgy of the Church of England, and the Church of England still plays a privileged ceremonial role in the life of Great Britain. It was this kind of model, with some nuances, that became inculcated in the American colonies during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This established Christianity came to the colonies in two forms: those following the exclusive Anglican established faith settled in the southern colonies, and the Puritans, most of whom refused to separate from the Church of England, settled the New England colonies, other than Rhode Island, which became the home of “Separating Puritans.” In New England, religious and political authority took the form of hierocracy under Puritan auspices (see the section on the sect in Chapter 8). The Church of England, through many legislative acts, became the established church of Virginia, North and South Carolina, Maryland, and Georgia. McConnell uses Virginia as the model that was, in general terms, replicated in the other southern colonies. Several legislative acts consisted of the following: that all colonists take the oath of supremacy, that they recognize the king or queen as the head of the Church of England, that churches and chapels be erected and maintained by public funds (in the form of taxes), and that the local colonial governor approve of the ordination of any Anglican bishop. In addition, the liturgies were t0 be celebrated only in accordance with Church of England doctrine, and all colonialists were to go to weekly services, observe Sunday as a holy day, and have a day of fast to honor King Charles I (1600–1649) who was “martyred.” Infringements of sacred codes (such as drunkenness, fornication, slandering, or swearing) were considered to be civil crimes. Monies and land were to be set aside for the education of youth to advance learning. McConnell (2003) concludes, “This was the model throughout the South, though in the Carolinas and Georgia there was much greater toleration of dissenters” (p. 2119). New England also experienced the establishment of an official religion, but in a very different way than in the South. These colonies were settled by English dissenters called pilgrims and Puritans. Although their religious beliefs varied somewhat, they were one in establishing English Protestantism as the official religion of their assorted colonies. Leder (1972), an historian, notes that Massachusetts became officially a Puritan colony in 1634 by order of the General Court. Its model of governance was a modified kind of hierocracy. Preachers were not allowed to have civil office, but the civil officers were required to act on clerical advice. This arrangement is depicted in Figure 11.6 and reflects the place of religious authority in “a colony whose raison d’être was religion” (Leder, 1972, p.57). By 1647, the power of the church (Puritanism, which became k now n as Congregationalism) grew to such a degree that those not of this kind of Christianity, such as Anabaptists, rigid separatists, Jesuits, or Catholics were banished.4 McConnell (2003) details other components of these kinds of unions between the state and religion: governmental control over the doctrines, structure, and personnel of the established church; mandatory attendance at sacred services; public support of glebes (land belonging to the official church); public taxes for the established church; the prohibition of worship in other denominations; and the use of the state church for social welfare, marriages and public records, and prosecution of moral offenses.

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3 1 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 11:6 A Model Hierocracy in Seventeenth-Century New England The Bible as the source of behavior and belief

The clerics who interpreted the sacred text

Gave direction to civic leaders

It is against this background of the power of the established religions of the colonies that one must consider the First Amendment. Hamburger (2002) takes up the historical story. He argues that the intent of Thomas Jefferson (1743–1826), who was the central architect of the First Amendment, was threefold: to protect religion and the churches from the state, to protect the state from religion, and to free people from the beliefs of religion influencing their politics. However, the actual amendment reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ” (Constitution, 1952). It seems that Jefferson, a deist, wanted more. In a letter to the Danbury Baptist Association in 1802, he adds, “... thus building a wall of separation between church and state” (quoted in Hamburger, 2003, p. 3). Hamburger continues and traces how the amendment has been interpreted down to the beginning of the twenty-first century. In more recent times, interpretations have matched Jefferson’s idea that the church and state should be separate, an idea that is in contrast to the initial intent of the dissenters (which was to discontinue the privilege of the established church). The dissenters (Presbyterians, Mennonites, Quakers, Methodists, and Baptists) sought to disestablish the official church and to be allowed to have religious freedom of worship, attendance, and affiliation. The author adds that the primary way the amendment is understood today is that those of religious persuasion should not and do not have the right to influence the state. As Hamburger (2002) writes, “The federal and state constitutional provisions designed to protect religious liberty have, ironically, come to be understood in terms of an idea that substantially reduces this freedom” (p. 14). Much more can be said of this division paradigm—this separation of religion and politics. What has been discussed is how the phenomenon, especially as it has been channelled in early America, is an alternative to the caesaropapist and hierocratic paradigms, is an example of institutional differentiation, and is a precedent to the personal privatization of religious life in modern America.

Civil Religion This term has been in common sociological usage since the publication of an article by Bellah (1970). This article claimed that Americans (and, by extension, all members of modern nations) share beliefs, symbols, and rituals that provide a religious dimension to the life of the nation—a sort of institutionalized and non-denominational collection of sacred ideas about America that are expressed symbolically in the resonant documents and speeches of

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the nation’s history. According to Cristi (2001), there has been a strong emphasis by American scholars on the functional definition of civil religion that has limited the utility of the term to uncover socio-sacred phenomena in the modern world. She offers five critiques of how it has been used in the last three decades of research on the phenomenon. First, she argues that, although Bellah refers to Rousseau’s (1762/1952) characterization of civil religion, he relies upon Durkheim’s theory of religion. Consequently, Bellah sees civil religion only in functional terms and does not envision the potentially abusive nature of civil religion or its frequent conflictual diversity. Second, she argues that this functional understanding of civil religion easily leads the reader to believe that it is rooted in human nature and is not a social construction. Third, Cristi (2001) argues that, if civil religion is assumed to provide legitimizing functions, it is common to see it as upright and morally justified, which is not always a correct view. Her fourth critique concerns the danger that the view of civil religion as a social construction deriving from a nation’s cultural base obfuscates the possibility that civil religion might be imposed on people by a government. Her fifth criticism is that Bellah and subsequent scholars have used the American expression of civil religion and, in applying it to other cultures, have lost much of the cultural distinctiveness of the phenomenon. With this in mind, she diverges from what may be called the mainstream scholarly interpretation of civil religion and presents a more multi-dimensional definition: Civil religion may be considered a belief system or, a surrogate religion, that expresses the self-identity of a collectivity. Yet, like secular ideologies of different kinds, civil religion may also attempt to force group identity and to legitimize an existing political order, by injecting a transcendental dimension or a religious gloss on the justification.5 (Cristi, 2001, p. 3)

Figure 11:7 The Two Dimensions of Civil Religion CIVIL RELIGION AS A SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION

CIVIL RELIGION AS AN IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL RESOURCE

Central Author: Durkheim

Central Author: Rousseau

Key Features: An emergent property in the life of a people in a particular culture

Key Features: Used to support an existing social order

Continued through frequent public rituals

Origins in a pre-meditated political ideology constructed by the state Members are expected to follow and obey

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3 1 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 11.7 illustrates this definition. Using Cristi’s critique as a starting point, the rest of this section considers civil religion first as a social construction and then as a means of social control (This approach is similar to the one used in Chapter 7 to study the phenomena of witchcraft.).

Civil Religion as Social Construction The social construction of civil religion is similar to the social construction of religion in general. With some nuance, the same argument outlined in Chapter 2 can be applied here as well—that civil religion is an effect of the frequent effervescent gathering of a people wherein myths, ritual, and social codes are constructed. Religion, in turn, functions for the social order of a particular society. Bellah (1970) focuses on the United States and introduces the term civil religion into the sociology of religion by arguing that there exists a religion in the United States that is inclusive enough to include all Christian denominations and exclusive enough to exclude atheism, agnosticism, and polytheism. He uses the term from Rousseau (1762/1952) but refers to him, Cristi suggests, as presenting the characteristics of the concept and not it underlying theoretical basis. Bellah (1970, p. 168–186) continues his analysis and reviews literature on the American Revolution, the American Civil War, presidential speeches, and sociological studies (by de Tocqueville [1835/1945] and Lipset [1964]) to give the following as a categorical and functional definition of American civil religion. It is a religion that includes ▶▶

the doctrines of belief in God (albeit, unitarian) and religious liberty

▶▶

biblical archetypes such as Exodus (movement from Europe), Chosen People (Americans are called to spread the message of democracy throughout the world), Promised Land and New Jerusalem (America the free and the beautiful), Sacrificial Death (the death of Lincoln) and Rebirth (emancipation of the nineteenth century and the civil rights of the twentieth)

▶▶

and rituals such as the celebration of Memorial Day and feast days, Thanksgiving Day on November 26, the Fourth of July, and presidential inaugural days. Together, these elements form a basis for social integration, cohesion and order

Bellah and his colleague Hammond (1980) reflect further on the topic and use strong functional language. They use the republican political tradition to argue that civil religion is necessary for the maintenance of democracy. A communitarian set of values undergirds the very reality of a democracy, and a religion is a necessary ingredient of this set of values. They add that the very existence of the United States depends upon some sort of “national community” that contributes to the social integration of the state. Roberts (1995), in his introduction to the sociology of religion, adds to this functional interpretation of civil religion by writing,

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Regardless of one’s personal evaluation of civil religion, the student of religion must keep in mind that it serves functions for the individual and for the society as a whole. American civil religion provides a sense of ultimate meaning to one’s citizenship. It causes people to feel good about themselves as participants in the nation. It is not likely to disappear soon from the American scene. Besides simple survival, the particular style and character of American civil religion in the future is important, for civil religion may be influential in shaping the course of the nation. (p. 387)

Is there evidence that this kind of civil religion exists in Canada? Blumstock (1993) thinks not. As noted above, Bellah and Hammond (1980) theorize that, for American society to survive, there must be a basic consensus. This basic consensus is found in American civil religion. It is different, though, for Canadians. Blumstock lists reasons for there not being a national religion that unites Canadians. Even though some Canadians sing “God Save the Queen,” there is little substance to that prayer. The value consensus is different: there is little symbolic power in Canadian values such as peace, order, and good government compared to the American values of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The United Empire Loyalists are in sharp contrast to the Sons of Liberty; Canadians have no Lincoln who became a civil and religious hero, who was sacrificed for the sake of the emancipation; and Canadians still do not have a symbol of unity that compares to the flag of the United States. Besides, the Quebec Referendum of October 1995 reflects a deep-rooted disunity that no religion, civil or denominational, seems able to solve.

Civil Religion as Social Control To identify how civil religion can be used as a means of social control, Cristi looks more deeply at Rousseau’s original conceptualization of the phenomenon. Before I present her interpretation, it is well to refer to Rousseau’s work directly. The section on civil religion is part of his text The Social Contract. This four-part treatise presents Rousseau’s prospectus on what an ideal social-political system should look like. His central theory of social-political life is revealed in one of his most famous sentences: “Man is born free; and everywhere he is in chains” (1762/1952, p. 387). In Rousseau’s view, because socio-political systems have so often taken the sacred right of freedom away from people, it is imperative that a system be constructed that maintains this natural freedom. The whole document is about how to build such a system. As he writes, The problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before. (Rousseau, 1762/1952, p. 391)

The rest of the book is devoted to presenting a practical theory of how this can be done. A central concept he uses is the general will, which he describes as a true consensus of all that people in a body politic really want (Jones, 1952). Herein, Rousseau argues, is the moral basis of society and the best means of defending and protecting the whole while maintaining personal freedom—all citizens can obey expressions of the general will in order to achieve

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3 16 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D social order and continue to be free from coercion. It is in this wider context that the meaning of civil religion is contextualized. Civil religion is presented as a necessary part of this vision of the body politic. Its backdrop is the caesaropapism and hierocracy of Rousseau’s time, which, Rousseau notes, are contrasts to his vision of civil religion. Religion in these systems is imposed on a people whether they want it or not. Civil religion is co-extensive with the state, and it matters very much to the community that each citizen should have a religion. Religion, for Rousseau, does not have supernatural links but is sacred in the sense that it is the most important element in the body politic (see the discussion on the sacred in Chapter 1). Where does Cristi get the impression from Rousseau that civil religion has a potentially coercive power? According to her, although Rousseau coined the term civil religion, he meant by that term a kind of compulsory political religion that actually exerted coercive power: “Rousseau advocates a state religion comprising a simple set of civic-religious dogmas that every citizen must subscribe to, on pain of exile or death” (2001, p. 16). The dogmas of this political or civil religion do not consist of supernatural references but of the fundamental teachings or codes of a society. If persons do not obey them, a sovereign (Rousseau considers the government or a king to be the representative of the general will) can banish him or her not because of recalcitrance but as an anti-social being, incapable of truly loving the laws and justice or of sacrificing her or his life for duty to the society. Herein is the coercive nature of civil religion. To illustrate this image of civil religion, Cristi uses the Chilean period of 1973–1989. In 1970, in a free election, Salvador Allende Gossens became the president of Chile and governed for three years. He was a Marxist and planned to construct Chile along Marxist and communist lines. However, in 1973, a violent coup d’état resulted in a military elite seizing power under the generalship of Augusto Pinochet. He and his regime lasted until 1989, when a full-scale, national protest forced him out of office. Cristi documents the coercive power of civil religion in this era. Pinochet was cast in a priestly role, portrayed as a messianic and sacred figure in a God-given position. She quotes him: “The hand of God is here to save us” (Cristi, 2001, p. 170). His “divine call” was to fight against the only true enemy in the world, communism. It was Pinochet’s mission, through his minions, to defend the faith of the “true” or “pure” Chile. The culture of Chile was patterned into opposing forces. Table 11: 3 The Dichotomous World of Pinochet Black

White

Communism

Chilean “Democracy”

Satan

God

Political heretics

Patriots

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The fight against communism was, indeed, a holy war. Pinochet was to construct Chile as a “safe” haven for democracy that was, ironically, built on a culture of fear. As “messiah,” he was to regenerate humankind by extirpating the Marxist cancer. This case study fits well into our investigation of civil religion in several ways. In Chile, civil religion was co-extensive with the Chilean state with reference to some kind of transcendent being called “God.” There was also a wide use of a sacred lexicon (God, Satan, messiah, chosen, good, evil) along with simple dogma captured in patriotism. And, in Pinochet’s world there was no in between—either you are for him (thus you are a true Chilean) or against him (a heretic). With great skill and in an atmosphere of fear and violence, Pinochet and his regime used these sacred symbols to coerce Chileans into conformity.

CONCLUSIONS Reflecting on the O’Dean fifth dilemma, which concerns the relationship between religion and secular or political power and whether religions should use that power to convert or coerce, I offer the following thoughts. The review of communal withdrawal presented above could be read as the story of the creation of enclaves of religious freedom from historically caesaropapist or hierocratic elites and from secular democracies in modern times. Here, the focus is on choice. However, there may be a nuance in that the case example of the Hutterites illustrates conformity with little opportunity for individual choice. Private withdrawal can be viewed as significantly emphasizing freedom of choice in matters of religion, especially as these relate to politics. Even when religious authorities choose to act directly in the political world, their activism may have either a persuasive or coercive character. Liberal political activism, as exemplified by the CCF, seems less coercive than the conservative political activism of the religious right. Likewise, we saw in the discussion on the separation of religion and the state how the First Amendment was conceived of as a protection of the established religions of the various American colonies—as a limitation of the federal government’s ability to use its power to enact a nationwide established religion. Religious freedom was the sacred motive behind the First Amendment, but this freedom has been variously interpreted as freedom from state coercion or regulation or freedom to establish a religion within a colony or community and enforce religious rules and conformity. Bellah’s version of civil religion appears to honor the freedom of citizens and provides a base for civil liberties and social cohesion. Cristi’s alternate version of civil religion speaks cogently about imposition and conformity. What of the future of the connection between religion and politics? Given the many different kinds of social responses in the past, there will likely be a continuation of these in the future. One thing we can be sure of, even though there is a strong move to religious privatization, I would agree with Wuthnow (1993) that there will likely continue to be a salient linkage between the two institutions. In his discussion on the future of the nexus between religion and politics, Wuthnow (1993) uses the religious right as a case study. He contends that religion will matter in a pluralistic society to the level that believers have firm convictions in a divine truth. Further, he outlines how this conviction will not so much create a religious hegemony but rather crystallize “the power of the holy” in things that matter to the majority of Americans.

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3 1 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D And we do see evidence of the effects of this sort of power: even though the religious right has not changed the abortion law and has not introduced prayers into schools, it has succeeded in bringing more moderate and even liberal thinkers into considering the question of abortion and of the place of spirituality. It has not succeeded in having legislation passed to ban all violence and sexual innuendo on TV and in the movies, but it has raised consciousness on these matters. The issue of the religious influence in the public domain is not so much one of ministers and priests in positions of political leadership but one of influencing a shift in values. The legacy of the religious right lies not in fundamentalism and sectarianism but in the creation of a public symbol, a public discourse on morality. The public role of religion is to inform the public on a range of moral issues that affect all Americans (or Canadians), not just the conservative constituency.

NOTES 1

Capps acknowledges Thomas O’Dea (1966) for this perspective.

2

Contrary to this opinion, Laumann, Gagnon, Michael, and Michaels (1994) provide evidence from an American national sample of adults that the idea of sexual promiscuity as a norm has no empirical basis. In fact, most Americans stay faithful to their spouses, have few sexual partners, do not enjoy “kinky sex,” and are heterosexual.

3

Wuthnow (1996) terms this the second restructuring of American religion.

4

This intolerant attitude grew increasingly tragic: the infamous Salem witch hunts of 1692 took place in this colony.

5

She uses the latter part of the phrase as a definition of political religion, a part of the title of her work.

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C h a p t e r T W E LV E

R e l ig ion a n d t h e E c onom y

Orientation What could be more far apart than religion and the economy? Religion

has to do with the sacred and, in some cases, the supernatural realm and paradise while the economy is so down to earth and mundane? So how can they be linked? This is the central question of this chapter, for sociologists, especially Weber, have identified many links between the two. Many theories and considerable evidence indicate that religion has influenced economies and been an agent advancing or inhibiting social change in the development of modernity. The first thesis—that religion can act to encourage social and economic change—is termed the Weberian perspective, and the latter—that religion reinforces the status quo and retards social and economic change—the Marxian. Some relevant questions: How does religion influence the economy? How is religion influenced by the economy? This chapter continues a central theme of the text—the various tensions and dilemmas that occur when the sacred and the secular worlds meet. A frequent leitmotif discovered in the history of the link between religion and the economy is that the initial appeal of religion is to the marginalized and the middle class. This has been documented, in the case of Christianity, by Troeltsch (1931) and Stark (1996). What frequently happens, however, as we shall see, is that, as these non-elite and marginalized people join or form religious groups and experience economic and social benefits, a routinization of charisma occurs. Routinization processes tend to accommodate religious adherents to the world of money, business, success, and social mobility. Therein is a dilemma. To be religious is to be in contact with economic systems. However, in this contact, there is a tendency to

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3 2 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 12.1: Religion as a Factor of the Economy Religion

The Economy

X

Y

engage in and adhere to economic values that may erode the sacred. I will illustrate how this pattern is explicated by research.

Religion as an Agent of Change and as a Factor in the Genesis of Modernity The thesis in this section on the linkage between religion and the economy is that religion is an independent variable and the economy is a dependent one. In other words, religion acts on and affects the economy. Figure 12.1 illustrates this. Further, it is argued that religion is seen to be an agent of change—particularly in the creation of the modern world. I use, in part, an article written by Nielsen (2005), who considers Weber’s scholarship on the emergence of the modern world from its genesis in medieval Europe and the Reformation to be a sub-narrative of the story of religion’s effects on the economy. This narrative can be divided into the following phases: medieval precedents, the sacred breakthroughs of Martin Luther, John Calvin’s revolt against medieval religiosity, the rise and triumph of Protestant asceticism, the person of Benjamin Franklin, the uncoupling of the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, and the decline of value-based capitalism. After describing and explaining these stages, I will present historical evidence supporting the Weberian thesis, related evidence from empirical studies done in the twentieth century, and, to conclude, an investigation of the effects of religion on global economic development.

Medieval Precedents The medieval precedents of rational capitalism take on two forms: one form lays the foundation of later capitalism, and the other inhibits it. The sources of the former are from Weber (1894/1978) and an interpreter of his, Schluchter (1999). Schluchter selects various elements from Weber’s analysis of medieval society, presented in Economy and Society (Weber, 1894/1978), to contrast them with equivalents in the history of Islam.1 Three medieval social constructs are described by both Schluchter and Weber as positive precedents encouraging the creation of capitalism in the West: occidental law, medieval feudalism, and the city. According to Landau (2004), a medievalist, the foundation of the Western legal tradition was a papacy-inspired revolution between 1075 and 1122, one personified by Pope Gregory VII,

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whom we met in Chapter 10. Because of this revolution, there existed an inherent distinction between canon (sacred) law and civil or secular law. The latter was derived from the Roman law of Justinian (482–565), which was immensely influential on the legal systems of most of Europe. Landau presents some reasons for the emergence of this distinction between canon and civil law. This “revolution in law” occurred at the same time in European history as the “commercial revolution” wherein the demand for and availability of luxury goods grew because of the growth of trade with the Islamic world, Hungary, and the Vikings. There was a need for a rational law of contract and a reliable credit system. A second factor was the reform movements in the monasteries, which necessitated the creation of written rules and regulations. The third reason was the rise of the power of the papacy, which meant that, after the decline of the Carolingian Empire, the law of the church was the only unifying system. A final reason was the continued controversy between the church and the monarchy as to who had legitimate power and jurisdiction. Legal systems were constructed on two lines: one specific to the kings and their territories and the other giving authority to the church on sacred matters, an authority that stretched beyond national boundaries. Schluchter (1999) comments that this codification of law formed a substructure of medieval society and facilitated the emergence of modernity in general and capitalism in particular. More specifically, the distinction between the sacred and secular legal systems allowed commerce and trade to emerge that was not impinged upon by the sacred or canonical law of the Catholic Church. Another precursor of rational capitalism, according to some scholars, was the “feudal revolution” that occurred around 1000 AD. Historians define this revolution as a change in societal relations caused by the disappearance of a central power able to control the localities and the consequently growing power of local authorities (for example, local lords). Although some recent scholarship, summarized by Reuter (1999), claims that the concept of the “feudal revolution” or the “feudal mutation” is highly problematic, some of the most recent historical research does suggest that the term is still generally applicable. Regardless, feudalism is an important concept to define. In various forms in the Occident, it refers to the replacement of public authority by personal ties (Reuter, 1999, p. 19; Fossier, 1999, p. 40); a contract between a lord, who protects a fief, and a vassal, who, in turn, labours for the lord (Marx, 1867/1967; Fossier, 1999, p. 28); a vassal and his lord bound together by the vassal’s fealty or fidelity to his lord; and a contractual relationship between a lord and a vassal, in which substantial safeguards of the vassal’s interest were linked to a highly personal relationship to an individual lord (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1075). There is substantial agreement among medieval historians that the origins of the feudal pattern grew out of the collapse of the Carolingian Empire (see Chapter 10) around the tenth and eleventh centuries. With this decline and the “feudal revolution” came an increase in the amount of cultivated land, the growth and acceleration of trade, the construction of mills, and the intensification of long-distance trade with the Muslims, especially of gold. What does this have to do with laying the foundations for capitalism? Schluchter (1999) writes, “Western medieval feudalism represents a special historical case that is one of the general cultural prerequisites for the rise and development of rational capitalism” (p. 94). He explains that the feudal relationship involved two characteristics that were valuable for the development of rational capitalism: the notion of freedom and decentralization.

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3 2 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D As indicated above, the vassal was a “free person” who had certain rights, in contrast to a slave who had no rights at all. These rights involved the feudal ethics of fealty and honor; a loyal vassal was considered an honorable individual, an attitude that made a specific feeling of dignity accessible to the vassal himself. Thus, elements of freedom moved outside of the noble class into the general population and formed the basis of the freedom of an entrepreneur to conduct business, which was a necessary precursor of rational capitalism. The second feature, decentralization, diffused the power and authority of the absolutist sovereign—thus allowing for more freedom in economic relationships beyond the tight grip of an emperor or monarch. The third general precedent to the rise of rational capitalism is the growth of the city. At the beginning of a long discussion on this phenomenon in his Economy and Society, Weber (1894/1978) provides us with a description of the city in late medieval Europe: a concentrated settlement of nobles or other aristocrats; of merchants buying and selling commodities, which indicated a market system; and of a number of craftsmen (who frequently formed themselves into guilds). Besides, the medieval city had an essential link to the agricultural hinterland, which provided it with food products, and it was a fortress or garrison that housed military or policing activities. The medieval historian Epstein (1999) adds features to this list that are relevant to our discussion. He is describing the medieval city of the thirteenth century, which had experienced a rapid increase in population: a number of cities reached 200,000 people (e.g., Paris), the average population of the city was 80,000, and, at the lower end, a city contained 50,000 people (e.g., London). The thirteenth-century city was clustered into neighborhoods organized around craft and professional occupations. Epstein claims that the most distinctive feature of this urban society was the large number of people who supported themselves through wage labour—casual workers, journeymen and women, and apprentices worked in small shops and even some large enterprises like shipyards. Most of these working men and women were organized into guilds, which gave them some security in time of economic trouble. However, many of the indigent and marginal peoples were offered charity by the church. Many of the cities were also places of higher education, and the city acted to contextualize the university (as in Paris, Florence, Cologne, and Oxford). Although these institutions of higher learning were all connected to the church, they increasingly provided educational services to people beyond clerical rank to equip them to join the bureaucracies of the local city and the emerging state as, for example, professional writers, lawyers, and notaries.2 Education was not, however, restricted to book learning. Ordinary folks learned skills and trades through apprenticeship training that brought them into full membership of the guilds. The kind of city that Weber was most interested in, however, was the city-commune, which has no equivalent in ancient or oriental societies. It consisted of these characteristics: a fortification; a market; its own court of law that was, at least in some respects, autonomous; an associational structure; and at least some partial autonomy and autocephaly. A special feature of this city is the presence of the burgher class, which was composed of those wellto-do members of the middle class who had certain civic rights and responsibilities associated with citizenship. Their special characteristic is that they had autonomy from external political figures, who were, more often than not, princes or kings (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1226). Schluchter (1999) adds that the burghers were a fraternity of men dedicated to business

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enterprise and that their business fraternity stood above religious allegiances, the solidarity of kin or neighbors, and external political powers. Weber considered these cities to be relatively common throughout medieval Europe. However, Epstein (1999) notes that the only cities that were virtually free of external governance were Genoa and Venice. Yet, most cities did enjoy some freedom from external control at the hands of the state and were allowed freedom in making local laws and enforcing taxes. McKitterick (2004) puts the number of relatively autonomous cities in northern and central Italy at 300 while about 100 existed in the Holy Roman Empire. She documents that the latter existed as independent units until early modern times. How is this autonomous city related to the rise of rational capitalism? Weber’s focus (as well as Schluchter’s) is on the communal-city that, with its high level of freedom from external control, enabled merchants and entrepreneurs to function with relative independence. The thirteenth century was also a time when banking systems emerged, especially in Italy. Although these communal-cities were not as common as Weber thought they were, one can make a case that these cities, as well as others, were free enough to provide a context for economic freedom. Other factors in the growth of rational capitalism, ones neglected by Weber and Schluchter but documented by Epstein, include the presence in the medieval city of wage labourers as well as the medieval citizens’ increasing levels of education. I argue that the combination of relatively free cities, the growing salience of wage labour, and increased levels of academic and apprenticeship education were precedents to the construction of rational capitalism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

Martin Luther’s Reformation Ideas In our discussion on the bases of a Weberian perspective (Chapter 1), a central concept was its focus on understanding social actors by interpreting the meaning that they attach to their social actions.3 This process is called verstehen, which Giddens (1976a) acknowledges as essential to the interpretation of human action. This framework is at the heart of how Weber links religion and the modern world, particularly Protestantism and capitalism. Kaelber (2005) alerts us to what this link is. It is not a hypothesis about Protestantism and capitalism in general. Rather, it considers the ways in which elements of the Protestant religion contributed to the emergence of a specific theme in modern culture: a methodical, calculated approach regarding how to conduct business that is rooted in a sacred ethic and in the organization of ascetic Protestant sects such as the Puritans (Chapter 8), Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers— and not in Protestantism in general. These sects became the “carriers” of the ethic of Protestantism. And at the heart of this ethic is Luther’s contribution, the notion of calling. The notion of calling was a focus of Martin Luther,4 who argued that a supreme purpose of the Christian was to respond to a divine call to work very hard in this world. Nielsen (2005) notes that not only did Luther valorize work as a calling in the world, he broke the medieval distinction between the virtuoso and the layperson by claiming that the latter could live the Christian life equally as well as the virtuoso, the cleric or the monk. In fact, he judged the monastery as a locus of egoistic withdrawal from the larger Christian church. The sociological meaning of the breakdown of this distinction is that, as a consequence, there would

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3 2 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D be a universal sacred ethic applicable to all Christians and not a separate one for Catholic virtuosos. Being universal, the ethic could be applied to all and not just a few.

John Calvin’s Break with Medieval Catholicism A brief biography and the basic teachings of Calvin have already been presented in Chapter 5. As outlined there, he was committed to reforming Catholicism by radicalizing some of the early Christian teachings. He taught that the human being is but a tool of divine action, that salvation is not found in any human effort, and that any kind of idolatry should be avoided (thus, all images of the sacred were removed from church buildings). He was also opposed to secular pleasures, such as sports or entertainments, and to any display of wealth (thus we use the term asceticism to describe his ethics). His teaching of double predestination (see Chapter 5) focussed his theology on the quest for the assurance of salvation. He argued that men and women are predestined for eternal salvation or eternal damnation. God’s grace for salvation remains central, but it is up to the individual to seek assurance that he or she is predestined for salvation. In opposition to the idea that the Roman Catholic Church could intercede with God in matters of punishment, forgiveness, and salvation, Calvin taught that the believer could not rely on the church to be an intermediary in these processes. The believer, according to Calvin, is without the priest, Mary, the saints, or the hierarchy of Catholicism as a channel of salvation. The believer is alone with his or her transcendent God. As Weber (1904–1905/1958) writes, In what was for the man of the age of the Reformation the most important thing in life, his eternal salvation, he was forced to follow his path alone to meet a destiny which had been decreed for him from eternity. No one could help him. No priest, for the chosen one can understand the work of God only in his own heart. No sacraments, for though the sacrament had been ordained by God for the increase of His glory, and must hence be scrupulously observed, they are not a means to the attainment of grace. (p. 104)

How, then, was this assurance to be achieved? The Calvinist sought it in the daily struggle of life, which involved intense worldly activity for the glory of God. A sign of this assurance, then, was wealth or personal success, and both were considered blessings from God. In sum, the notion of a calling (Luther’s idea) that entails hard work and a personal quest for the assurance of salvation links the ethic of Protestantism to the spirit of capitalism. Weber (1904–1905/1958) explains: In conformity with the Old Testament and in analogy to the ethical valuation of good works, asceticism looked upon the pursuit of wealth as an end in itself as highly reprehensible; but the attainment of it as a fruit of labour in a calling was a sign of God’s blessing. And even more important: the religious valuation of restless, continuous, systematic work in a worldly calling, as the highest means to asceticism, and at the same time the surest and most evident proof of rebirth and genuine faith, must have been the most powerful conceivable lever for the expansion of that attitude toward life which we have here called the spirit of capitalism. (p. 172)

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This attitude toward life is an illustration of what Weber calls inner-worldly asceticism. In other words, one attains salvation by denying oneself worldly pleasures, by working hard within the world, and, by doing both, glorifying God. Schluchter (1987), an interpreter of Weber, writes that “the unique character of Occidental asceticism derives from the fact that it is basically an asceticism of work—by contrast with Indian asceticism” (p. 110).

The Rise and Triumph of Protestant Asceticism Weber is well aware that ideas, even sacred beliefs, do not impact human social life unless they adhere to social carriers. Nielsen (2005) fleshes out Weber in arguing that, in the medieval world, the central ethics of many people were the monastic ethics of poverty, chastity, and obedience. Calvin saw these ethics as substantially Christian, but he made major modifications: monastic poverty became the Protestant ascetic value of the refusal to enjoy the wealth gained from work; chastity became not having sexual relations outside of marriage; and obedience was redirected from submission to ecclesial authority to submission to God alone. This new ethic became incarnate in the sects mentioned above: the Puritans, Methodists, Baptists, and Quakers. As the title of the work by Weber indicates, the dependent outcome of his analysis is the spirit of capitalism. Weber’s (1909/1976) focus is not on capitalism as an economic system but on one, albeit central, part of capitalism: its spirit. As a background to this, Kaelber (2005) assists us in understanding what Weber really means by capitalism. Figure 12.2 offers a presentation. Booty or robber capitalism is based upon unequal and even forced exchange between parties. Adventure capitalism is based on “irrational speculation,” that is, an exchange not based on rational calculation and reason. The type of capitalism Weber focussed on is rational capitalism. Kaelber (2005) offers a succinct definition: Parties are formally free to enter into market relations that are not based on forced exploitation, and the parties, headed by entrepreneurs, are systematically orientated toward making “ever-renewed” profit by methodically but peacefully exploiting market opportunities available to them. (p. 143)

Figure 12:2 Types of Economic Capitalism Economic Capitalism Modern Rational Capitalism

Booty or Robber Capitalism

Adventure Capitalism

Source: Adapted from Kaelber (2005, p. 142)

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3 2 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 12:3 Economic Motivations in Kinds of Capitalism Market Motivation in Economic Capitalism Spirit of Modern Rational Capitalism

Forced Exploitation in Booty or Robber Capitalism

Irrational Speculation of Adventure Capitalism

Source: Adapted from Kaelber (2005, p. 144) Kaelber then links the different kinds of motivations to these three kinds of capitalism. Figure 12.3 illustrates this. Of what does this spirit of capitalism consist? To answer, Weber relies on the writings of Benjamin Franklin (1706–1790), which present ideas such as that time and credit are money, that the good paymaster is lord of another’s purse, that the duty of the individual is toward the increase of capital, and that honesty is an essential value. However, the summum bonum5 of the spirit of capitalism is the earning of more and more money combined with a strict avoidance of all spontaneous enjoyment of life. The capitalistic entrepreneur avoids ostentation and unnecessary expenditure, consciously enjoys power, and is embarrassed by the outward signs of the social recognition (Weber, 1904–1905/1958, pp. 48, 71). The ethic of Protestantism is linked to this spirit of capitalism, as depicted in Figure 12.4. Weber uses the term elective affinity to make a case for the relationship. By an elective affinity he means, an “affinity of essence” in which two kinds of motivations are “drawn together” in a symbiotic relationship that is contextualized within social carriers (i.e., social characters that carry out and interpret social actions, as described above). Weber was an astute enough historian and sociologist to see that, in the case of the relation between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, there were more factors beside motivations that contributed to the rise of rational capitalism. Several of these elements from the medieval world were already outlined. To this list, Weber and Giddens (1976a) add a capitalistic activity associated with the “rational organization of formally free labour,” a disciplined labour force, and the regulated investment of capital. It is the regular reproduction of capital through investments that distinguishes capitalist economic activity from traditional versions. Further characteristics of capitalism include the systematic utilization of goods or personal services as means of acquisition, rational bookkeeping, Figure 12:4 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism

The Protestant Ethic

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The Spirit of Capitalism

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separation of business from home, and the elevated place of law and bureaucratic administration (Weber, 1904–1905/1958, pp. 18–20).

The Decline of Ethically Driven Capitalism and the Return of Adventure Capitalism A valid question one might ask is whether the link between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism continues to exist and to exert influence. Are we still experiencing rational capitalism? Some evidence will be presented shortly, but, for now, it is enough to know that Weber would be the first to say no. Interpreting Weber, Nielsen (2005) posits what he calls a three-phase view of the historical transformation of capitalism. Figure 12.5 depicts this interpretation. Again, adventure capitalism refers to the kind of capitalism that is without an ethic of honesty or respect for others—it is a form of exploitation. Weber (1904–1905/1958, p. 182–183) offers poignant descriptions of modern adventure capitalism, portraying it as the pursuit of wealth that is stripped of its sacred and ethical meaning; a culture of specialists without spirit, sensualists without heart; and a nullity that imagines that it has attained a level of civilization never before achieved. The second stage of rational capitalism is the period of Occidental history (the late sixteenth to the eighteenth century) during with the desire for profit was based on integrity, honesty, hard work, modest expenditures, and the like. Nielsen adds that modern capitalism is either in a state of stasis or grotesque overdevelopment: “Today’s capitalistic order is a monstrous cosmos!” (Nielsen, 2005, p. 69).

Figure 12:5 The Historical Transformation of Capitalism Stage One: Adventure capitalism of medieval Europe

Stage Two: Rational capitalism linked to Protestantism and a value-informed ethic

Stage Three: The return of adventure capitalism of modern time

Empirical Research and the Weberian Thesis Work by Gorski (2005), two studies by Kaelber (2005), as well as more current updates outline the generic link between Protestantism and rational capitalism.

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The Little Divergence Gorski (2005) and other historians use this term to describe the shift of economic hegemony from the Mediterranean to North Atlantic Europe. His key thesis is that the Protestant Reformation was, in part, responsible for the emergence of this economic hegemony in the northwest of Europe. The economic hegemony of this region was depicted in the dominance of the city and its regional hinterland. The hegemonic city had the following characteristics: It was able to extract taxes from trade by being an international entrepot; it had dominance within the most advanced industries, and it served as an international leader and clearing-house. The examples he gives are Genoa, Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London. These cities were dominant at different times in post-Reformation Europe in succession to one another. Gorski documents several consequences of the Reformation that were linked to the construction of rational capitalism in each of these cities. His summary theses include the following. ▶▶

because of the hostility that Calvinists and Puritans experienced in Catholicdominant areas, thousands left and immigrated to Antwerp, Amsterdam, and London. Antwerp and Amsterdam became “hotbeds” of Calvinism while the Puritans congregated in London, especially before and during the Great Rebellion of 1642–1651. All these cities, in turn, experienced economic hegemony

▶▶

a common feature of medieval society was the cessation of work during many sacred festivities and holy days. Epstein (1999) notes that about seventy or eighty days were set aside from work to devote to Catholic saints, Mary, and Jesus Christ. Not only was there no work, there was no pay. The Protestants, both Lutheran and Calvinist, changed all this. For example, in England, royal legislation eliminated virtually all saint days during the sixteenth century, which resulted in longer and more intense work as well as the increase of capital

▶▶

Brooke (2006) documents that the monastery was a central figure of medieval society. For example, in England, from 1066 to 1150, monasteries increased from 60 to nearly 600. By 1300, there were thousands of monasteries, consisting of 17 to 18 thousand men and women. Gorski adds that these religious institutions possessed enormous amounts of land. An estimate from England is that they owned 70 per cent of arable land. With the coming of Protestantism and under the reign of Henry VIII, monasteries throughout the England were decimated and a significant piece of revenue was accrued to the English state. These revenues, in turn, were invested in the English naval fleet, which, within forty years, had become the largest fleet in all of Europe. This, one might say, was the genesis of the English Empire, which resulted from Britain’s worldwide colonial expansion

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▶▶

most political scientists and economists would agree that capitalism is intricately dependent upon the state so that it has space and time to develop. Capitalism is characterized by property rights because these rights are needed to protect entrepreneurs in their production, exchange, and consumption of goods. Therefore, according to Gorski, a particular sort of political system or state is required to protect these rights. The state must not be too strong, or it will commit public predation against these rights; but it must be strong enough to protect these rights from private predation. He observes that capitalistic economic development occurred first in England and the Netherlands whose governments offered these protections. Two sorts of predation challenged the protection of property rights in the late medieval societies of Spain and France in the sixteenth century: venality and patrimonialism. Venality refers to the practice of buying and selling official offices and patrimonialism to the custom of incumbents in public positions receiving their positions from their ancestors. These were common customs in the late medieval period, both in the Catholic Church and in the public officialdom of France, Spain, and Italy. Calvinism, the prominent Christian sect in England and the Netherlands, challenged these customs and set up constitutionally based bureaucracies within the Calvinistic sect. Further, since member of the sect were also public officials (both elected and appointed), they forbade the use of venality and patrimonialism and paid officials (both clerical and public), according to qualifications and legal rights. Thus, property rights were protected and capitalistic systems were free to develop

Thus, five links between Protestantism in general and the construction of rational capitalism have been outlined: Calvinistic immigration to entrepots, the elimination of the Catholic sacred calendar allowing more time for work, the decline of the monastery resulting in monks and nuns entering the work force as well as in wealth for the English state, and the provision of a constitutional state present to protect property rights.

Ascetic Protestantism and Frontier Ohio Knowles (1997), who is cited in Kaelber (2005), presents us with an image of the link between ascetic Protestantism and entrepreneurial conduct. During the middle of the nineteenth century, many Welsh from the Calvinist Methodist, Congregationalist, and Baptist churches immigrated to the frontier of Ohio to become free landowners. Soon, however, three groups of Welsh built charcoal-iron furnaces and formed corporate organizations wherein each member became a shareholder. Two of the three industries became very successful and the owners, wealthy. How is this economic success story linked to ascetic Protestantism? Knowles responds with several theses. First of all, the corporation leaders were also elders in the chapels. Second, the rules of conduct of these businesses were very similar to the rules of conduct of the chapels. Third, the immigrants believed they were predestined (see section on Calvin’s theology of predestination) to come to Ohio and prosper. Last, the ethos of the chapel was also the ethos of the enterprises: maintain modesty even though you have wealth, be humble,

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3 3 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D and follow the letter of Calvinistic law. As Kaelber (2005) writes, “Welsh asceticism took the form of simple attire, men not parting their hair, severe restrictions on social amusement, strict Sabbatarianism, modesty, submitting controversy to community mediation, and religious piety” (p. 153).

Ryder, a Merchant Capitalist of England Jacob and Kadane (2003), cited by Kaelber (2005), claim that they discovered an historical figure, Joseph Ryder (1695-1768), who exemplified the link between rational capitalism and ascetic Protestantism. Their evidence for the link emerged from their content analysis of Ryder’s journal, which consisted of a day-by-day recollection of his life that covered 14,000 pages. Several elements of the Protestant ethic are prominent: spiritual observance of the self so as not to fall from grace, belief in being one of the predestined, diligence in pursuing a spiritual calling, and material asceticism. The spirit of capitalism is also abundantly clear: diligence in pursuing a vocational calling, making good use of one’s time, an affirmation of the value of prosperity, the acquisition of wealth, the seizure of economic opportunities so long as the goods of the world do not challenge spiritual striving, and profit maximization as a means to a more godly life. An observation may be in order. For Nielsen (2005), Ryder represents an ideal type, although he is also an historical individual; Ryder signifies the way in which rational capitalism, the second stage depicted in Figure 12.5, was rooted in ethics or “value-rational” social action at a time when the desire for profit was based on integrity, honesty, hard work, and modest expenditures.

The Scots and the Modern World It is interesting to muse on the fact that Scotland was a seed-bed of Calvinistic Presbyterianism as well as a substratum of rational and industrial capitalism, which was undergirded by that classic work of political economy, the Magna Carta of capitalism, the Wealth of Nations (1776)—also written by a Scot—economist Adam Smith. Is there a connection? A possible answer may be found in a book by Herman (2001), who makes the case that the Scots invented the modern world. Herman does not mention Weber in his text, but one may apply a Weberian interpretation to his work, which does link Protestantism to the creation of the modern world. I take this cue from Gorski (2005), who argued that Protestantism, in general, led to the rise of rational capitalism. Several patterns appear to be salient. Weber and Nielsen (2005), one of Weber’s interpreters, have already argued that a key feature at the root of the Protestant ethic was Luther’s blurring of the landscape between clerics and the laity. In sixteenth-century Scotland, John Knox (1513–1572) removed the distinction between religious virtuosos and ordinary people in a significant way by consecrating every individual. Further, from Calvin, he implemented a Presbyterian form of governance that allowed for elected laymen to be in leadership positions within congregations. Also, in 1560, Knox was responsible for creating a plan of education for all people, but it was not until 1696 that Scotland’s parliament passed a bill to establish a school in every parish in the state. The results were momentous. Herman notes that, in the mid-eighteenth

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century, about 75 per cent of all males could read. This literacy rate was later translated into middle-class students receiving a university education at the universities of Glasgow and Edinburgh. Adam Smith recognized the importance of education to capitalism, as Herman notes, and strongly urged public support for a system of schools that would benefit the nation as a whole. With the union of Wales, England, Scotland, and Ulster, Great Britain became a reality in 1707. This new state protected the property rights that allowed for entrepreneurship to develop. The eighteenth century experienced a significant increase in economic output, with tobacco manufacturing being the most lucrative industry in Scotland. Herman (2001) writes, “Glasgow’s tobacco trade offered up an image of capitalism in its purest and most dynamic form” (p. 165). Scottish Presbyterians were also on the forefront of science and technology. James Watt (1736–1819) perfected the steam engine invented earlier by two Englishmen, and it became the work engine of industrial revolution after entrepreneur Matthew Boulton (1728–1809), in partnership with Watt, began manufacturing hundreds of steam engines. These engines made possible the creation of the factory, a hallmark of early industrial capitalism. Scots continued to invent new technologies that continue to be part of the present industrial world: the locomotive in 1820, the blast iron furnace in 1827, and, closer to the twentieth century, Morse code in 1834 (invented by Samuel Morse [1791–1872]) and the telephone in 1875 (invented by Alexander Bell [1847–1922]). Herman expands his horizons to show how influential the Scots were in other parts of the world, including Canada, India, Africa, Australia, and, especially, the United States. He argues that the foundation of the Constitution of the United States was a result of the Scottish Enlightenment and the hard working, individualistic Scot, who carried with him or her to America a traditional moral discipline—the legacy of Presbyterianism. The threads maybe too weak to construct a historical continuum between the Calvinistic Protestantism of Scotland and all the events, peoples, and institutions mentioned here. However, I do believe that the general patterns and links are substantial enough to make a claim that, in generic terms, Protestantism in general, among many other precedents, is a harbinger of the modern world.

Twentieth Century Research Studies Twentieth century research on the link between rational capitalism and Protestantism yields inconsistent evidence. Some data support the thesis while other data question it. A review article by Bouma (1977) presents us with an overview of this evidence and counter-evidence. Bouma (1977) refers to several studies before 1960 that said, in effect, that there was little or no empirical evidence to substantiate the Weberian position (for example, Lipset & Bendix, 1959). However, the well-known study of religion in Detroit in the late 1950s by Gerhard Lenski (1963) provided some evidence for the thesis. Using several items that measured the Protestant ethic, Lenski concluded that Protestants have identified themselves with more individualistic and competitive patterns than Catholics. In addition, Catholics were more likely to have collectivistic values and security-orientated thinking than Protestants. Lenski argues, then, that the Protestant ethic remains linked to a capitalistic spirit. Bouma (1977), furthermore, presents two theses: ascetic Protestant beliefs and norms produce achievement motivation among Protestants that is higher than among Roman

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3 3 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Catholics and ascetic Protestant beliefs and norms predispose Protestants to make more effectual use of educational opportunities than do Roman Catholics. Regarding the first thesis, he writes that there is no reliable indication of a relationship between religion and achievement orientation. Relevant to the second thesis, the empirical evidence is inconsistent, and there is neither confirmation nor support. Bouma concludes that one of the reasons there are no appreciable differences between the two Christian religions is that there is too much variation within Catholicism and Protestantism. Given that there is inconsistency in the research, one may extend the discussion beyond the specific relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism on two fronts: (1) to consider religion as an independent factor in social change and (2) to see if religion, in general, is linked to the economy. Coleman (1968), a Catholic priest and a sociologist of religion, argues that Weber’s thesis is most useful as a method by which one can discover how religion affects social and economic change. He acknowledges that It is in the more abstract and general form that the Protestant ethic has any relevancy for an understanding of twentieth-century economic change. It is Weber’s heuristic intent and not his specific hypothesis which can serve to provide continuity of thought in sociology of religion. (p. 57)

Examples of twentieth-century research that follows this heuristic intent include work on the special place of Christianity in the development of nineteenth-century Canada and on the relationship of early Christianity to the Greco-Roman society. O’Toole (1996), citing various sources, argues that the vitality of Victorian Christianity has profoundly shaped the character and the identity of the Canadian nation. He argues that many features of modern Canadian life, such as the political party system, the welfare state, foreign policy, and a Canadian version of “law and order” have been shaped, in part, by religious myths and attitudes and the structures of nineteenth century Christian religion. The idea that religion has an independent effect on the economy of a country is addressed by an economist and a philosopher, Barro and McCleary (2003). These authors are interested in whether and how religion affects economic outcomes. They begin with Weber’s argument that religious practices and beliefs have important effects on economic development, an argument that has been at the heart of our discussion on Protestantism and capitalism. They attempt to get measures of religiosity from a wide variety of religious traditions, using the World Values Surveys, the International Social Survey Programme, and the Gallup Millennium Survey, for example, and they focus on economic development per se. Their data are world wide, taken from 41 countries and about 40,000 respondents, and the unit of analysis is the country. The religions represented include Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism. The dependent variable is economic growth while the explanatory factors are (1) ritual or monthly sacred observances and (2) belief in heaven and belief in hell. Their primary thesis is that religion affects economic development by fostering religious beliefs that influence individual traits such as thrift, honesty, a work ethic, and openness to strangers. They created a model of this thesis, which is depicted in Figure 12.6.

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Figure 12:6 A Chain Model of Religious Influence on Economic Development Ritual

Religious Beliefs

Individual Traits Individual and Country-wide Outcomes

However, they do not directly test this model and are more interested in the direct relationship between religion and economic development. Their findings include that increases in ritual tend to reduce economic growth while beliefs in heaven and hell augment economic growth. Using their theoretical model, they offer an explanation of why beliefs would increase economic growth. Beliefs in heaven and hell (beliefs in hell had a stronger effect) help individual behaviors that enhance economic productivity. On the other hand, ritual decreases productivity because people use the time for religious services that they could use for economic activity.

Conclusions This completes our discussion of a major thesis in the study of the relationship between religion and the economy: the Weberian thesis that links the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. We have extended this thesis to investigate the medieval factors that conditioned capitalism and how Protestantism, in general, has affected rational capitalism. The section concludes with an outline of how more recent studies have strengthened the original thesis, weakened it, or challenged it.

Religion as an Inhibitor of Change: The Marxian Thesis This section reverses the direction of influence. Here we look for social scientific evidence that the economy can also be viewed as influencing religion and that religion can also be Figure 12:7 The Effects of the Economy on Religion The Economy

Religion

X

Y

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3 3 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D seen as an inhibitor of change or social development. Figure 12.7 illustrates this directional change by showing the economy as the independent variable. I begin by outlining the traditional Marxian model of society and religion’s place in it, followed by Weber’s thoughts related to why modernity in general and rational capitalism in particular did not evolve in Islam. Last, several empirical studies will be presented in support of the idea that the economy affects religion or that religion retards economic and social change.

The Traditional Marxian Model Although the work of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on religion is not extensive, they do provide a classic definition of religion, which was presented in Chapter 1. The basis of irreligious criticism is: Man makes religion, religion does not make man. In other words, religion is the self-consciousness and self-feeling of man who has either not yet found himself or has already lost himself again. But man is no abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the world of man, the state, society. This state, this society, produce religion, a reversed world-consciousness because they are a reversed world. Religion is the general theory of that world, its encyclopaedic compendium, its logic in a popular form, its spiritualistic point d’honneur, its enthusiasm, its moral sanction, its solemn completion, its universal ground for consolation and justification. It is the fantastic realization of the human essence because the human essence has no true reality. The struggle against religion is therefore immediately the fight against the other world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma. Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people. (Marx and Engels, 1964, 41–42)

Figure 12:8 A Marxian Model of Society Ideologies and Mythologies Social Institutions such as the Polity, the Family, Education, and Religion Modes or Means of Production; Technologies

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{

Superstructure

{

Infrastructure

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Before I give an interpretation of this statement, it may be good to recall Marx’s theory of society. Figure 12.8 presents us with a visual image of the theory. Following his commitment to view society as rooted in the economic means of production, Marx argues that social life is a result of the interactions between people in all societies in their worlds of work—their attempt to make a living and provide for their basic physical needs. This struggle to provide what is necessary for survival is augmented with technology—from simple tools to complex computers—and the economic infrastructure forms the social base. The social institutions (politics, religion, family, and education) are part of the superstructure built on the economic base. Further, at the pinnacle of the superstructure are the ideas, the culture (that includes the ideologies and mythologies) of a people. This theory is a reductionist theory, reducing religion to social or economic sources, as well as a theory of social construction. In Marx and Engels’ theory, a significant characteristic of religion is that it inhibits economic and social change by providing consolation to the oppressed and alienated. Birnbaum (1973) argues that the negative situation of people is alienation. This alienation is due to class differentials wherein one class (or estate) has nearly all the economic and political power. This class exploits the common people (in capitalistic societies, the proletariat) for its own ends. For the proletariat or any other oppressed group, this position is a very difficult one. To try to cope, the alienated people seek some way to assuage the pain and suffering: they create religion. For example, African Americans under slavery met their suffering by hoping for a land of freedom after this life had ended. This is what Marx and Engels mean by religion being the “opium” of the people. On the other hand, religion serves the powerful as well. Here the experience is not alienation but control. Religion provides an ideology for the rich to control the marginalized people. In summary, the Marxian theory of religion is threefold: 1.

Religion is a social construction built on economic relationships.

2.

Religion acts as opium that assuages the pain of alienation experienced by the marginalized.

3.

Religion is used by political and economic elites to control the people.

Historical Studies of the Marxian Model: The Case of Islam in the Historical Sociology of Weber The example presented below of how religion has been an inhibitor of change comes not from Marx’s scholarship but rather from Weber’s. We have already considered Weber’s argument that medieval precedents laid the groundwork for the creation of rational capitalism while the Protestant ethic provided its “spark.” But what factors in Islam hindered the development of rational capitalism? For an answer, compare Figure 12.9 and 12.10 As discussed previously and outlined in Figure 12.9, the significant factors that encouraged the development of rational capitalism in Christian Europe were laws, urban structures, feudalism, and the religious ethics of Protestantism, all of which allowed for individualism

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3 3 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 12:9 Precedents and Motivations in the Creation of Rational Capitalism Occidental Medieval Law

The Medieval City

The Religious Ethic

Medieval Feudalism

Rational Capitalism

Figure 12:10 Factors Predicting no Development of Rational Capitalism Sacred-Shari’ah Law

The Oriental City

The Religious Ethic

Oriental Patrimonialism

No Development of Rational Capitalism

and a measure of personal independence. In the subsequent discourse, which will rely considerably on Turner (1974) and Schluchter (1999), we will consider how Shari’ah law, the structures of the Oriental city, patrimonialism, and Islamic ethics worked against the development of rational capitalism in Muslim societies.

Sacred or Shari’a h Law Chapter 9 already provides a description of the sacred or Shari’ah law of Islam, so here we focus on why it inhibited the development of rational capitalism. Of use is Weber’s theory regarding why modernity in general and capitalism in particular arose in the West and not in the Orient and the Middle East. Weber’s theory has been updated by Crone (1999), who focuses on the role of law in the Occident and in Islam and on why law in Muslim societies acted as an inhibitor to the development of capitalism in those societies. Crone challenges Weber on the specifics of why rational law (see Chapter 1) was a precursor to the development of capitalism in the West, especially in England. The details of that critique are not vital here; however, the general notion she presents of the contrasts between law in the Occident and law in Islam is relevant. Her argument is similar to Durkheim’s (1893/1933) theory of the division of labour. Folk societies, and to a lesser extent archaic societies, tended to conflate social institutions and functions into a unity. In these societies, the same social group would be bearers of children, producers of food, worshippers of deities, and leaders and defenders of members. The substructure of this main group (in folk societies, the clan) would have been underpinned with a homogeneous mythological system that united all together into a single whole. In this setting, change

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would have been very difficult. It is change, though, from some autonomous group that jump-started the creation of civilizations as outlined in great detail by the British historian Arnold Toynbee (1946). In contrast, modern societies have specialized. Those who rear children are now families. Those who bear arms are members of the military, and those who work (in a wide variety of loci of work) create an economy. Along with this segmentation goes the dismantling of the universal mythological system, which, over time, has been disenchanted and has developed into rational ideologies. According to Weber, the development of rationality had a very long history. It began in medieval Europe with the distinction between canon law (of the Catholic Church) and civil law, a change that corresponded with the emergence of the national state. In archaic societies (e.g., the Muslim empires of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, the Seljuks, and the Ottomans), the state was the originator of law as well as its promulgator. In Western Europe, however, the state leaders allowed for more societal entry into the matters of governance (through, for example, ties of fealty) and provided more services to the common people than, for example, was the case in the Ottoman Empire. Crone (1999) writes, “The ultimate result was that Europe was pacified and bureaucratized to a degree unheard of by a state which represented society instead of merely sitting on top of it ... the modern state is certainly a precondition for industrial capitalism” (p. 261). Turner (1974) adds the following nuance. Central to the development of rational capitalism is a state-wide legal system that is based on reason, rationality, and universality. These are especially operative in a society that makes the distinction between secular and sacred law. Capitalism is dependent upon the stability and legal security of economic transactions. If this basic stability can be threatened by a fatwa issued by a legal authority or by an arbitrary decision of a sultan (as was the case in the Ottoman Empire), then rational capitalism has difficulty developing. Schluchter (1999) offers additional arguments. Because there was no history of a legal distinction between the sacred and the secular and because Islam developed a theocratic legal system, when the sacred traditions became established in the first centuries of the religion and the charismatic stage “dried” up, there was a paralysis of the potential to change Muslim law.6 A table created from the text of Schluchter (1999, p. 110) offers some of the contrasts between the legal traditions of the Occident and of Islam: Table 12:1 Contrasting Legal Traditions—the Occident and Islam The Occident

Islam

secular law based on rational law

no such counterpart

continued updating of both sacred and secular law

no updating, as the law is understood to be eternal

sources of law in Roman and Germanic law

no precedents, as the time before Islam is considered to be a time of ignorance

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3 3 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D In more current times, modern European and Islamic law are polar opposites: European law has been dissociated from Christianity while Islamic law epitomizes and valorizes Islam. Even though there is some precedent for the distinction between Islamic sacred law (the Shari’ah) and secular law (rationality in the fiqh), the latter is still essentially linked to the former. As the Shari’ah is eternal and universal, change cannot easily happen. It is likely that, only when there is a disjuncture between the sacred and the secular legal systems, will it be possible for an autonomous group like the bourgeois to emerge. It should be noted, however, that this analysis makes generalizations that may not, in fact, be accurate. During the period of the Umayyads and the Abbasids, the caliphs were notorious in administrating “regulations” that paralleled Shari’ah but were not considered to be law. Another nuance is that Shari’ah, in some cases, was not used as arbitrarily as indicated above.

The Oriental City In the Islamic world there were no autonomous cities wherein capitalism could freely development. Either the caliphs or the sultans of the empires of Islam (the Umayyads, Abbasids, and Ottomans, for example) had indirect control of the economy of the Muslim cities. Schluchter adds that city domination was an extension of territorial domination. He quotes Weber to show that the more unified Islamic authority inhibited the development of autonomous oriental cities: “Thus, the more unified the organization of the larger political association, the less the development of the political autonomy of the cities” (Weber, 1894/1978, p. 1352; Schluchter, 1999, p. 105). Another aspect of the West was the presence of the guilds, which offered some independence to medieval artisans and workers. There were also guilds and a wide variety of merchants in Muslim cities. In fact, Turner (1974) notes that the initial origins of Islam were in a merchant town, Mecca. There is evidence that these merchants enjoyed some autonomy, subject to the tribal authorities. As the empires of Islam developed, however, the ulama extended their authority (in fact, they became state officials) and controlled these merchants and guilds.

Oriental Patrimonialism Other factors that inhibited the creation of rational capitalism in Islam were its prebendal system and the presence of patrimonialism. Weber’s thesis, as interpreted by Schluchter, is that the creation and the development of rational capitalism are inhibited in Islamic states because of the lack of the division of powers among heterogeneous units. In the formation of the Islamic state, two institutions stand out: the army of purchased slaves and military prebendalism. These slaves became “slaves on horses” and were radically tied to the rulers’ authority (either the authority of the caliph or the sultan). The soldiers became the “holy” warriors, who proved themselves as heroes through the conquest of ever-new areas and peoples. In time of peace, these slaves (for example, the Janissaries) continued to be trained and supported by the sultan himself, and they were to be loyal to him alone. This is the meaning of prebendalism as applied here: the armies were fully supported by the state (centered in the sultan), and, in turn, the armies were fiercely loyal to him and to him alone.

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Eventually, the system of payment to the army was delegated to the generals who collected taxes on behalf of the central authority. However, in time, they came to appropriate tax revenue to themselves in arbitrary ways. Both the slave system and the taxation system paralyzed the free development of the economy. Patrimonialism is also seen as an obstacle to the development of rational capitalism. As discussed, the term refers to the practice of offering offices to kin or to one’s circle of friends. This practice was common in the Muslim state as it was in most traditional empires. Qualifications for a position were less important then loyalty and blood. Turner (1974) explains that the rule of a large empire involves many and a wide range of administrative officials. In the Islamic empires, the appointment and promotion of these officials were not rule based; in other words, appointments and promotions were made not according to neutral law or rights but constituted personal, arbitrary decisions wherein the bureaucracies were staffed based on favoritism and became unpredictable. A free, rational capitalism is difficult to develop in these kinds of circumstances.

The Religious Ethic The heart of the Muslim ethic is unconditional obedience wherein the relationship of the believer to God is one of a subject to a lord—a relationship of submission and of worship from a position of radical subordination. As noted in Chapter 4, the meaning of Allah is al (the) God, and Allah is described as omnipotent and as being far distant from humans, using terms such as “the most high” or “the Majestic.” Because this deity is totally transcendent, his will is supreme and already established in the future. This future is assured if the ordinary Muslim obeys the Five Pillars of Islam. For the warrior, paradise is assured if he dies for the sake of Allah. His motivation is also tied to success in war—he can also be assured of booty from a conquered people. According to Weber, with these strong motivations, the warrior and the whole Muslim army believe in invincibility and this belief equips him and the army with world-conquering military discipline. This ethic, a “warrior ethic,”7 has affinity to robber capitalism (which relies on the booty captured after conquest)8 just as the Protestant ethic has an affinity to rational capitalism. This ethic came to be expressed in the concept of holy war or jihad and in the division of the world into dar al-Islam (the land of Islam) and dar al-harb (the land of war), which developed during the time of the Abbasids (750–1258) and was documented by Kassim (2005). Without the continued expansion of empire, however, the warrior ethic diminishes and the economy languishes. Consequently, although capitalism was present in the Muslim world, in various times and places, it did not develop beyond the booty capitalism outlined by Kaelber (2005) and depicted in Figure 12.2. Thus, in Islamic societies and states, rational capitalism was not created as it was in the West. Currently, although capitalism is very much a part of many Muslim states, it is an imported capitalism—more akin to adventure capitalism or to the form of corporate capitalism common in the modern world.

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Recent Empirical Studies of the Marxian Model More recent studies supporting the Marxist view that religion is derived from and affected by economic relationships also use Weber’s scholarship as a starting point. Beyond Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism, Weber conducted in-depth analyzes of Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism (Weber, 1916/1951, 1918/1952, 1904–1905/1958). In these studies, according to Birnbaum (1973), there is significant evidence that religious organizations and symbolic structures are developments within limits set by material factors, such as property and production relations, and their political correlates. Birnbaum (1973) further adds that colonialism and imperialism inflict alienation upon the cultures and peoples of non-Western societies and that religious control was part of that colonial expansion. The idea that religion is the opium of the alienated and exploited is also illustrated within the work of Lanternari (1965), who studied the religious movements of the oppressed. He looked at millennium movements in Africa, the United States, Central America, South America, Melanesia, Polynesia, Asia, and Indonesia. An example from the native people of the Great Plains in the United States illustrates two theses of Marx and Engels: (1) that religion is a source of alienation of the people and (2) that religion acts as a defense mechanism against this alienation and as an opiate. Lanternari (1965) supports these points by investigating the Peyote cult. The cult emerged on the heels of the domination of the plains peoples by the American state and in response to the cultural disorganization and alienation that these people experienced under the impact of European culture and religion. In the midst of oppression and despair, these plains peoples had hope— hope in a future wherein all First Nations people would be emancipated. This future would consist of a collective salvation and collective protection from tribal disintegration. In 1890, a man received visions that created a mythology wherein peyote (a drug from the peyote plant) is the comforter, the sacred spirit that enables the believer to achieve supernatural revelations and spiritual and cultural emancipation from the oppression of the white man. The mythology presented a reinterpretation of the Christian myth: Jesus, along with the Holy Spirit, is the sacred spirit of the peyote; Christian brotherhood is really Pan-Indianism. These beliefs were a synthesis of First Nation and Christian myths: use of the peyote for religious ritual and spiritual enlightenment was common among the native people of Mexico and was reported as early as the 1500s. Salvation was defined as freedom not from sin but from the domination and exploitation of the white man. Another study substantiates the thesis that religion is an “opium of the people” and also a result of economic factors: Pope’s (1942) analysis of the textile industry in Gaston County, North Carolina in the late 1930s. In this county in 1939, there were 570 plants that produced 80 per cent of the cotton yarn in the United States. The author used observational methods of research and interviews with hundreds of residents, as well as the historical records of the county, to give credibility to his argument. He documented that the working class used religion as an “opium” to soften the alienation they experienced from upper-class values and from the world at large. Poverty or lower-class status was not defined as a problem but as grace. They knew they did not live in a “fancy” house but they had “true religion,” and, by implication, the security of their true home in heaven. Pope also observed that working-class mythology viewed the world as a battleground on which God and Satan struggled for each person, and workers were taught that the “blood

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of Jesus” and Bible reading gave God the “upper hand” in the struggle. Further, concepts of alienation, as shown in Pope’s content analysis of hymns, emphasised dependency and poor self-esteem as well as a negative concept of human character and the sense that “I am a worm.” Religion and the economy were also linked in the genesis of the industries in the county. From his study of the county records, he discovered that, in the 1880s, religious institutions were active in shaping the economic affairs of the people of the county (evidence of Weber’s thesis that religion affects economic development). Yet, at the time of his research during the 1930s, the churches submitted to the economic social forces of the industries and seldom defined or introduced new social values in the county—indicative that religion played a passive role as predicted by Marx. In contrast to the idea that religion comforts and controls the oppressed, Gardell’s (1996) study of the Nation of Islam presents a clear example of religion being not an opiate but an agent of change. He notes that the central thesis of the Nation of Islam—that “the black man is God, or has the potential to evolve into the exalted state of divinity”—is a cogent religious tenet that has significant consequences for the empowerment of African Americans (Gardell, 1996, p. 333). Gardell argues that this conviction is an extreme version of positive thinking, a therapy that creates self-esteem. In real life, there is evidence that members of the Nation of Islam are, indeed, changing not only changing their own lives but also the social conditions about them. Gardell (1996) quotes Farrakhan to show the practical results of this empowerment: “You say that the buildings are all run down. Yeah, but they weren’t always.... whatever’s run down, we run ’em up. We got carpenters, brick masons, electricians, we got everything we need in the black community to rebuild the black community” (p. 347). The work of Clayton (1995) provides evidence that those in power use religion to control others. He does not use survey research but rather a combination of demographic data, texts on the African American religious experience, and news releases. From the time of slavery through to emancipation and the consequent immigration of African Americans to the north, Clayton argues that the churches have been sites of belonging, encouragement, and hope. This hope, however, was focussed on the Christian belief in the afterlife: that the sufferings of this world would be richly rewarded in the afterlife. As a result of this focus, African Americans were able to endure the injustices and “troubles” of this world—religion comforted the oppressed. According to Clayton, the response of Caucasian Christians in the South illustrates another of Marx’s thesis: that those in political and economic power use religion to further their own ends. Using studies of black histories, Clayton (1995) makes the following observation: Just as American churches tended to identify with the American culture, so Southern churches identified with the Southern culture. Practically speaking, most Southern churchgoers were traditional Southerners, expressing traditional Southern viewpoints, including the support of segregation. (p. 106)

In essence, Clayton argues that the Southern viewpoint is reinforced by the economic and political elite who did not want racial integration and who even transferred funds to support segregation, going so far as to remove the tax exempt status of those churches who chose to integrate their congregations.

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Summary of the Weberian and Marxian Models These two models and the studies that surround them are critical to our understanding of the link between religion and other social institutions. In this review, there is convincing evidence to suggest that religion functions both as an agent of social change as well as an inhibitor of it. With some qualification, both the Weberian and the Marxian models, along with the studies that have tested them, reveal that, under certain temporal, social, and economic conditions, religion can make a difference. Religion can encourage people to engage in social change, or it can inhibit social change by comforting believers and focusing their hopes for justice and benefit on the afterlife. Further, religion can both influence economic development and be an object of manipulation by economic, social, and political forces.

NOTES 1

I shall focus on why modernity did not emerge in Islam according to Weber in a subsequent section.

2 Epstein adds that, in towns like Lucca and Genoa in Italy, parish schools (linked to the church) and entrepreneurial schoolmasters provided elementary reading and arithmetic skills to the youth. However, he also notes that the records are sparse as to how many children benefited as well concerning the kind of curriculum offered. 3

See Chapter 1. It should be noted, however, that the sociological theorist Jeffrey Alexander argues that Weber kept too close to this perspective in his early writings but later focussed primarily on structural factors of the higher collective order (Alexander, 1983, vol. 3, pp. 76–127).

4

See Chapter 2 and Chapter 5 on Luther.

5

This phrase means, literally, the chief good.

6

It should be acknowledged that there is some precedent in Islamic law for the distinction between sacred and secular law. Kassim (2005) argues that, in the eighth century, a group of Muslim scholars called the Mutazilis did make a distinction between sacred and secular law. However, it does not seem that the distinction was widespread enough to make a difference to the more common view that Islamic law should govern both religious and everyday life, which scholars consider inhibited the development of modernity.

7

It should be acknowledged that this ethic was not unique to Islam and was present in archaic societies as well.

8

The link between the warrior ethic and robber capitalism is not unique to Islam and was common in other agrarian societies.

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Chapter THIRTEEN

T h e E nc ou n t e r W i t h C u lt u r e: S e c u l a r i z at ion a n d P o s t mode r n i s m

Orientation Are you aware that you live in a time and a space that surrounds you

as if you were a fish immersed in water? For just as water is necessary for the fish to survive so also is our surrounding culture necessary for social life. Culture is omnipresent—it is in the thoughts I think, the words I speak, the actions I take, the beliefs I live by, and the kinds of food I consume. Cultural anthropologists, especially, have recognized that culture is part and parcel of the human experience. And, for most of our species’ history, religion, an extension of culture into the sacred, has also been part of our story from our very genesis. This embeddedness of religion within our current culture is the topic of this chapter. The connection between religion and culture is the final linkage presented in this text. Two aspects of this connection warrant close investigation: (1) the much-debated idea that religion and culture have recently undergone a process known as secularization and (2) the various theories regarding religious responses to a major cultural position of the late twentieth century— postmodernism. It is a fundamental thesis of this text that, as the sacred is manifested in the secular, a basic tension emerges between the two phenomena. Two concepts capture this tension: secularization and sacralization. Secularization is the erosion of the sacred by the secular, and sacralization results in the ascendancy of the sacred over the secular. In the real world, neither pole exists in a pure form. For this reason, both processes are ideal types in the Weberian sense of the term. In human societies, this polarity is the basis of the dilemma between religion and other facets of social organization and expression, for example, the economy or the polity. There is a constant tension between the secular and the sacred. An important

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3 4 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D sociological question relevant to this tension is whether one or the other is ascendant and, if so or not, in what kind of socio-cultural and historical context. The first section describes secularization and sacralization in general. It includes a brief history of secularization in the Occident followed by a discussion of the phenomenon in Islam. A case study of several Victorian and early twentieth century Christian denominations will illustrate the process. The third section introduces two theories that scholars have offered to explain the processes of secularization and sacralization. In the fourth section, research examples will be offered to illustrate these two theories. The last section of the chapter considers the link between religion and postmodernism and uses the new age movement as the illustrative example.

The Concepts of Secularization and Sacralization A general definition of the first term is provided to us by Bowker (2000): From the Latin, saeculum, “age” or “world,” i.e. this world. The process whereby people, losing confidence in other-worldly or supernatural accounts of the cosmos and its destiny, abandon religious beliefs and practices, or whereby religion loses its influence on society. The term is an elusive and much-debated concept. In origin, the term referred to the alienation of Church property to the State, and thence to the loss of temporal power by the Church. It then came more loosely to refer to the transition from the religious to the non-religious world. (p. 523)

In basic terms, secularization refers to a process or a series of events occurring over a long period of time that moves a society from being informed by a sacred world view, experiences, rituals, and organizations to a “this world” perspective of human life. Berger (1969) nuances this definition, giving it both objective (structural) and subjective meanings. Structural or objective secularization refers to the process by which social institutions and culture shed the domination of religious institutions and symbols. Subjective secularization indicates the marginalization of myths and ethos within human consciousness (Berger, 1969, p. 107–108). A further gradation of meaning, one that is akin to Berger’s distinction between objective and subjective secularization, is the contrast between internal and external secularization. Internal secularization refers to the process of virtuosos, clerics, and sacred organizations adapting to the external secular context. External secularization, rather than a process of internalization, is the imposition of the secular on the sacred from without, especially by powerful states. Examples of this second form of secularization are found in eighteenth century France and in twentieth century Russia, China, and Cuba. Demerath III and Williams (1992) add to the discussion that secularization is not so much creating another enclave where religion can survive but rather, in their terms, an abridging of faith or the diminishment of the sacred in the arms of the secular: “the process by which the sacred gives way to the secular” (p. 190). Figure 13.1 and 13.2 illustrate these marginalization processes. Sacralization connotes the opposite. In the spirit of Jeffrey Hadden’s (1987) critique of the secularization thesis,1 one may describe sacralization as the process of social institutions

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Figure 13:1 Subjective secularization: Marginalization to the peripherals of one’s consciousnesS

Sacred

Figure 13:2 Objective secularization: Marginalization to the peripherals of a society

Sacred

Figure 13:3 Subjective sacralization: Moving to the center of one’s consciousness

Sacred

Figure 13:4 Objective sacralization: Moving to the center of society

Sacred

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3 4 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D becoming more and more influenced by both sacred symbols and institutions as well as the movement of the sacred from the periphery of people’s consciousness to the center. Figure 13.3 and 13.4 depict this process.

A History of the Secularization of Europe This part of the chapter traces the history of the meaning of the term secularization from medieval times through to the twentieth century and investigates various forms and historical examples of the secularization process.

Secular as a Clerical Distinction Terms vary in meaning depending on where and when they are used. The first usage of the term “secular” is from medieval times when it was used as a distinction between those clergy who were part of a monastery and those who had parishes in public spaces (called secular). To understand this, one needs to see when there was no or little distinction. According to de Jong (1995), in the eight century, the episcopal and abbatial (heads of monasteries) roles were intertwined. Bishops of dioceses assumed the functions of abbots, and abbots the functions of bishops. There appeared to be only three kinds of local clerical leadership: bishop, abbot, and those who had the two roles. Likewise, no clear distinction existed between monks and the priests who served people outside of the monastery. A clear distinction between monks and active clergy among the people was an unknown, and a hybrid of the two even emerged during the second half of the eighth century. A number of clergy called clericus canonicus or canonical priests lived outside of the monastery but still lived a communal life and cared for people as pastors. Also, many parish churches continued to function within monastic jurisdiction, and the monks not only prayed but pastored the people. It appears that it was in the tenth and early eleventh century that distinctions between monastic, canonical, and secular priests emerged. According to McKitterick (1999), although the monastery continued to serve the spiritual needs of the people, the parish church grew more and more to be the sacred social vehicle of the church. The parish church model, originating in early Christianity with the church’s use of the Roman imperial administrative units, precedes the development of the monastic system. However, the monastery was the central organization of the Christian church until the middle of the tenth century, when the parish church model was reintroduced into the larger ecclesial system. The parish was a jurisdictional unit of a diocese wherein a local bishop had the charge and care of the clergy and laity. Parish priests, called secular priests, were ordained by the local bishop and were his representatives on all ecclesiastical matters such as discipline, administration of the sacraments, pastoral care, income, or the upkeep of the church.

Secularization as Ecclesial Property being transferred to the State or the Public A further meaning of the term secularization comes from the time when, in Western Christendom, church property was “alienated” or given to the state, which meant the church’s loss of temporal power. It was considered to be profane for this to occur. The vital link between

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the church and property was outlined by Pope Gregory VII (c.1020–1085) as documented by Robinson (2004). The historical backdrop to this loss of property was the wider dilemma of investiture discussed in Chapter 10. The investiture controversy over whether religious or state authorities had the power to appoint religious officials culminated in the conflict between Gregory and Holy Roman Emperor Henry IV (1050–1106). During this time, a distinction was made between ecclesiastica (of the church) and regalia (of the world and secular). Regalia referred to the cities, duchies, marches, counties, mints, tolls, and markets that belonged to the kingdom while ecclesiastica indicated the offerings and hereditary possessions of the church that did not belong to the kingdom. Thus of the church is sacred and of the kingdom is secular. The right of the church to possess, maintain, and administer property was elucidated by Gregory VII in a document published at the beginning of the eleventh century. The sacralization of this assumed right and clerical privilege included the following elements: ▶▶

the church’s possessions were offered to God and therefore sacred and inviolable

▶▶

the emperor and any layperson were denied any right in the administration of church property

▶▶

the pope was the supreme administrator of the property of all churches

▶▶

the selling or use of church property by any layperson for private purposes was tantamount to a crime and “selling the blood of the savior”

▶▶

what was given to the church (from any layperson) belonged in perpetuity to Christ and could in no way be alienated from the possession of the church

The term “alienation of ecclesial property” leads us into the second meaning of the term secularization. The church owned papal estates, or large farms that were established in the middle of the eighth century, and this church property was considered inalienable and exploited directly by the church in Rome (see Noble, 1995). However, these papal estates had little political legitimacy within the Lombard Kingdom, which covered most of Italy. According to Delogu (1995), conflict grew out of the question of the suzerainty of Italy, as the Lombards, the Byzantines, and the Franks struggled for control. Pepin III (c.715–768), a Frank and the father of Charlemagne, challenged the king of the Lombards, Aistulf (ruled from 749–756), and, in 754, forced him into submission. Pepin III gave political legitimacy to the papal estates by officially placing them under papal authority, and thus they became a political entity called the Stato Ecclesiastico or the Papal States. The ownership and administration of these lands belonged to the pope and his successors. For centuries, conflict continued between various states and the pope, who now owned and controlled a major portion of the Italian peninsula, and this conflict was not resolved until the secularization or alienation of these lands in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Map 13.1 shows the extent of the Papal States in the middle of the nineteenth century:

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3 4 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Map 13:1 The Papal States

PA PA L

STATE S

Roma I TA LY

Source: Reprinted with permission from Reformation Online, http://www.reformation.org/garibaldi.html According to Morris and Irwin (1970), several military and political movements of Napoleon I (1769–1821) led him to become king of Italy in 1805. In 1798–1799 and in 1808–1809, the French annexed the Papal States as a consequence of Napoleon’s military victories (The states were returned to the papacy briefly between these two periods of French control). With the dismantling of the Napoleonic system, however, these lands were more permanently restored to the papacy, but, eventually, popular support led to their final inclusion in Italy. Thus, the secularization of this papal property was permanently achieved. The only remnant is Vatican City (created in 1929), a minute state in the middle of Rome.

Secularization and The Protestant Reformation In Chapter 5 we were introduced to two reforming prophets, Martin Luther and John Calvin. This was supplemented by a closer examination of Puritanism as a sect within Christianity (Chapter 8). Berger (1969) argues that the Protestant Reformation and its antecedents mark the genesis of secularization in the modern world, and he contrasts the different mythologies of medieval and Protestant Christianity to provide evidence. With Calvin, especially, Berger (1967) states, there occurred “a radical truncation, a reduction to ‘essential’ at the expense of a vast wealth of religious contents” or “an immense shrinkage in the scope of the sacred in reality” (p. 111). This shrinkage consisted of ▶▶

the near elimination of the meaning of the sacrament as vehicles of the sacred

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▶▶

the closing of the universe to miracles of healings, exorcism, and special revelations

▶▶

the jettisoning of the saints and Mary, the mother of Jesus, to the externals of Christianity

▶▶

the reduction of the sacred to only the Bible

▶▶

a challenge not to the doctrine of the incarnation but to its everyday meaning

▶▶

the reliance on only the “three solas of faith”: sola scriptura, sola fides, and sola gratia

For Berger, this essentially means that, during the period after the Reformation, these “extras” became secular and were not to be included in the sacred repertoire of Christianity. The only sacred, then, became the Bible. One might well ask what the consequences would be, in this situation, if the sacredness of Bible were to be challenged, which did happen during the latter part of the nineteenth century and in the late twentieth century. This form of secularization, this erosion of the sacred, then, is from within the Christian tradition and not imposed from without.

The “Received Tradition of Secularization”: Voices from Great Britain Two well-known British sociologists of religion, Bryan Wilson and David Martin, give us what may be termed “the received tradition of secularization.” By this is meant a baseline tradition that has resulted in a significant amount of theory and research concerning the future of religion. Here is the tradition stated in propositional form: as modernity advances, religion recedes. In setting the baseline, Wilson (1985) makes the following observations about secularization: 1.

religion is no longer a dominant institution in the economic and political sphere.

2.

the education systems of the Western world are removed from the significant influence of the churches.

3.

religion moves from the center of people’s consciousness to the periphery.

In an earlier work, Wilson (1982) argues that secularization is understood not only as a change occurring in society but also a change of society. It is but one of a number of concomitant processes (such as, industrialization, modernization, rationalization, bureaucratization and urbanization) that have contributed to fundamental changes in Western societies. He notes the following indicators of these changes:

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3 5 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Secularization relates to the diminution in the social significance of religion. Its application covers such things as, the sequestration by political powers of the property and facilities of religious agencies; the shift from religious to secular control of various of the erstwhile activities and functions of religion; the decline in the proportion of their time, energy, and resources which men devote to super-empirical concerns; the decay of religious institutions; the supplanting, in matters of behavior, of religious precepts by demands that accord with strictly technical criteria; and the gradual replacement of a specifically religious consciousness (which might range from dependence on charms, rites, spells, or prayers, to a broadly spiritually-inspired ethical concern) by an empirical, rational, instrumental orientation; the abandonment of mythical, poetic, and artistic interpretations of nature and society in favor of matter-of-fact description and, with it, the rigorous separation of evaluative and emotive dispositions from cognitive and positivistic orientations. (Wilson, 1982, p. 149)

Like Wilson, Martin (1978) sees secularization as part of the larger process of modernization. He uses the theories of Comte (1798–1857), Tönnies (1855–1936), Durkheim (1858–1917), and Spencer (1820–1903) to note the evolutionary path of modernity—from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft. Secularization is not so much a process of changes in consciousness (as with Weber) as it is a decline of the secular institutional foundations of religious systems. There are fewer and fewer support mechanisms in the culture at large to undergird a sacred world view, a mythology. More and more religious institutions have to forge their own way as a swimmer (the religious institutions) traverses upstream (the current of the river being the secular culture) in an attempt to “push the river back.” Several historical processes acted as the flow against which sacred institutions struggled; these included the industrialization occasioned by the Industrial Revolution (beginning, in Great Britain, during the second half of the eighteenth century), urbanization, and social mobility. According to Martin, these processes fostered personal anonymity, worker alienation, and the general depersonalization of society, which undermined both the horizontal and vertical relationships within society (and within the church) as well as the connection between the believer and the sacred, a connection based on the idea that the sacred deity is a transcendent being. Martin (1978) also considers the secularization occurring as a consequence of the second revolution, which he refers to as the communication revolution. The different communication technologies available after this revolution homogenized people without providing the social base of face-to-face or even direct interpersonal contact. Even those in remote areas or the socially marginalized became aware of the manners and values of the powerful— who tend to control the media. So culture itself became homogenized while, at the same time, local social groups or regional cultures broke apart, leaving people without a societal anchor that shapes, supports, and authorizes the local religious institution. For Martin, then, secularization is primarily the attenuation of the traditional cultural institutions that had given support to religious world views, and this attenuation, in turn, led to the demise of the sacred world view all together. In sum, the received tradition of secularization is that the process is linear and evolves as the modern world matures. Religion will eventually evaporate into non-significance. The anthropologist Wallace (1966) puts it well:

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the answer must be that the evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supernatural beings and in supernatural forces that affect nature without obeying nature’s laws will erode and become only an interesting historical memory. (p. 264)

Secularization of the European Mind in the Nineteenth Century Contrary to Berger, who argues that secularization occurred from within the Christian tradition, Chadwick (1975) makes the case that secularization pressures arose from outside the faith. His work also challenges the historical linearity of common secularization theory, which sees secularization as a progression from traditional, sacred society to modern, secular society. Although he does provide evidence of secularization, he demonstrates a frequent return in modern Western society back to sacred moments. This idea will become clear in this chapter’s subsequent section on rational choice theory and secularization. He uses the fate of a Parisian church to convey his thesis that the sacred had recurrent periods of ascendency in modern times. Louis XV (1710–1774) commissioned the building of a church dedicated to St. Genevieve because of a vow he made. However, the church had not yet been finished by the time of the French Revolution of 1789. The National Assembly, in distancing itself from Catholicism, turned the church into a mausoleum, called the Panthéon, honoring (and entombing) important French figures such as Voltaire and Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)—a transformation that emphasized the secular in contrast to the sacred. Rather than having a cross, a huge statue of the goddess Fame adorned the front. However, under the order of Napoleon I, in 1806, the Panthéon becomes a church again, with the goddess removed and the cross instated. Then, in 1830, another political revolution happened that was also symbolic of the secular—the cross and St. Genevieve were out again. However, in 1873, the cross was returned and remains there to this day. Chadwick (1975) writes: Here is a symbol of all our troubled intellectual history. The old world started it, a church built in fulfilment of a vow which might have been taken in the Middle Ages, but was fulfilled by modern financial jugglery. Then it became a sign of de-Christianizing revolution, national virtues instead of old virtues, La France instead of St. Genevieve; and because it became a sign, it was buffeted to and fro in accordance with the see-saw of party politics, holy and secular, until at last, like so much of Western Europe, it lay almost secularized, but with the not so old stone cross still there to make a memory and a blessing, the past of Europe still speaking to the present, and keeping guard over men once thought to be the vilest enemies of the cross, but now seen to have fought for freedoms and for truths that were necessary to the human spirit. (p. 159–160)

What, then, were the signs of this secularization from outside of the faith? Here are a few that Chadwick outlines. The initial signs happened among a small intellectual elite during the Enlightenment and among nineteenth century philosophers and sociologists such as Comte, Durkheim, Marx, and Weber. All agreed that the new order in society (that which we know now as modern) consisted of liberalism, which meant, essentially, freedom from external constraint, freedom

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3 5 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D of opinion, and freedom to meet and to express. This view of freedom included teachings on inalienable individual rights that needed to be protected from religion and the state. These freedoms, based on the philosophy that the human is inherently good (not subject to sin as in Christianity), necessarily meant democracy (and thus the dismantling of the monarchy) and secularization (the concomitant elimination of the church). On the subject of the church (and religion in general), Karl Marx goes further than other advocates of secularization, as we discussed in Chapter 12. Chadwick (1975) quotes Marx: “The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-contempt, abasement, submission, dejection, in a word, all the qualities of the canaille (proletariat); not wishing to be treated as canaille, needs its courage, its self-consciousness, its pride, and its sense of independence more than its bread” (p. 58). Not only is religion not important in the new social order (modernity via communism), it is contrary to its principles and must be undone by a social revolution. The Marxist revolutionary ethic is similar, at least in its effect on religious institutions, to the bourgeoisie French Revolution: both initiate state programs to de-establish all sacred public symbols, to dismantle religious institutions, and to confiscate church property. These events occurred in dramatic ways in the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. As a social historian, Chadwick asks whether the secular teachings of the Enlightenment and of nineteenth century philosophers secularized the working class. For secularization to be effective among ordinary people, there must be mechanisms or avenues connecting philosophies of secularization to societal attitudes and behavior at large. Chadwick saw few. What he did see, however, was a decline in ritual observance and in the commitment of time to sacred institutions in both England and France during the nineteenth century. His interpretation, however, was that the religious firms were not able to supply the spiritual needs of the workers. Another force external to Christianity that furthered secularization was the vibrant anti-clerical movement in France. Why did it emerge? Chadwick offers several reasons. First, the church stood against the French Revolution and was thought to be obscurantist. Second, members of the elite were highly critical both of hierocracy and caesaropapism. Third, during the French Revolution and the Napoleonic era, the call to the French was a nationalistic call whereas the Catholic Church was international. Finally, there was much opposition, both in France and in Italy, to the continuing existence of the Papal States. Did this criticism of the church and advocacy of the secular curtail religious activity? Not really. Chadwick notes that from 1870 to 1880, an unprecedented number of French Catholics went on pilgrimages. As a case in point, between 1871 and 1876, 50,000 people visited Lourdes. There, they heard priests and bishops call for the expiation by the state of its “republican sins,” the return of the French monarchy, and the restoration by force of the temporal power of the pope. A further source of secularization (again with many nuances) was the growth of science symbolized by the publication of Darwin’s On the Origin of Species in 1859. Science and religion were sometimes constructed as polar opposites: science standing for liberating knowledge and religion inhibiting ignorance. This spirit is described by Chadwick (1975): The universe has no purpose. It is blind, unalterable necessity of the laws of matter. Priests are deceivers or ambitious. Religious men are fanatics, No educated man can

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possibly disagree with these conclusions. Only the “ignorant layman” can believe in a personal god. (p. 171)

Indeed, this kind of philosophical thinking was found among the educated elites. They were few in number in the nineteenth century. This perspective’s challenge to religion likely did not percolate down to the people until the latter part of the twentieth century, when significant numbers of Western people had access to higher education. Chadwick has a wonderful gift of language, and he uses this gift to summarize the interplay of the sacred and the secular within the recursive secularization process. Educated Europeans in the third quarter of the nineteenth century still looked towards the altar of God, for all that evolution could say. But they stumbled. This change was not just a change for the theologian. It was a change in the religious understanding or attitude of religious men. (p. 184)

The Cultural Analytic Approach to Secularization The “received tradition of secularization” (sometimes called the secularization thesis) has already been presented and challenged. Two perspectives inform any discussion of the validity of this thesis. The cultural analytic approach provides evidence that secularization occurred during the modern era, and rational choice theory aids us in understanding the continuity of the sacred or sacralization. Cultural analysis has been present in the sociology of religion from its inception. Durkheim and Weber are the classical representatives of the model. In the post-war period, Berger is the most important figure to interpret religion through its lens. But Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil (1984), Wuthnow (1987), and Wuthnow and Witten (1988) all document the central features of the approach. One of its focal concepts is the vitality of the human symbol within cultures. Not only do human subjects give meaning to their lives through symbols, but they also construct patterns and rules from these symbols. Using the symbol as the starting point, Wuthnow (1987) defines culture as “the symbolic-expressive aspect of human behavior” (p. 4). This definition of culture informs what follows. Wuthnow’s concern is to understand moral order in a society and how it is constructed. He divides his 1987 book into four elements: the subjective, the structural, the dramaturgic, and the institutional nature of culture. The subjective approach to culture considers personal beliefs while the structural looks at a pattern of beliefs or mythology. The dramaturgic approach, which focuses on the way in which culture is dramatized, opens the door to ritual, whereas the institutional approach is concerned with organizations and social groups. Several authors will be reviewed here that substantiate both the cultural analytic perspective and secularization theory.

Berger: Plausibility Structures and Responses to Secularization Hammond (1986) presents Berger’s theory of secularization, which describes the process as operating at both the subjective and institutional levels of society. Subjective secularization,

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3 5 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D which operates at the level of human consciousness, occurs first and is reflected by the rationalization of beliefs. In this way, Berger resurrects an earlier theme developed by Weber. A secondary source of secularization is in the pluralization of world views within institutions. The effect is the relativization of myths, a crisis of credibility, and even social homelessness. A third way that secularization manifests itself is within what Berger (1969)2 calls “the problem of plausibility.” The primary reason for this predicament is the weakening of what Berger terms “plausibility structures.” Plausibility structures are social interactions within a group that serve to sacralize the shared meanings of the group. In other words, these structures make the religious world view “plausible” or believable. Given the secular nature of modern society, fewer and fewer plausibility structures are available to support religious myth. Where they are available, however, myths are viable. For example, persons who identify strongly with and associate regularly with a particular religious group are able to accept the group’s tenets, regardless of how strange the beliefs may appear to those outside the group. For myths to survive, they must be rooted in a social base that creates a sense of sacredness about the beliefs; in other words, they must be grounded in plausibility structures. In pre-modern societies, religious myths provided an important foundation for interpreting the world. Social interaction within these pre-modern groups reinforced religious myths, and these myths, in turn, provided people with a believable meaning system. In modern Box 13:1 Benedict XVI: The Deductive Leader. Pope Benedict XVI, like his predecessor, challenges the world with strong statements rooted in his orthodoxy. Of Canada, he said “your country has had to endure the folly of the redefinition of spouse, and in the name of ‘freedom of choice’ it is confronted with the daily destruction of unborn children.” Christian civic leaders must cease to yield to ephemeral social trends and the spurious demands of opinion polls.” In a visit to Spain in July of 2006, he spoke against Spanish leaders for allowing for same-sex marriage. “The family, based on the indissoluble marriage of a man and a woman, is the only proper base for society.” He also addressed European Christianity for uncoupling reason from faith, which has impoverished the faith. The Calgary-based Catholic bishop, Fred Henry, supports the Pope in regard to samesex marriage. As he said, “The homosexual lifestyle must now be treated as wholesome and legitimate, when, in reality, it is unwholesome and immoral.” Source: Bethune (2006a). More recently, Pope Benedict XVI commented on the low fertility rate in Europe: “One must unfortunately note that Europe seems to be going down a road which could lead it to take its leave from history.” Source: “Verbatim” (2007).

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pluralistic societies, several different meaning systems compete for adherents, making it difficult to regard any one as having absolute truth. One of the major lines of cleavage is between the traditionalism of religious world views and the rationality of the modern scientific world. Berger (1969) explains the challenge of secularization in another way. As pluralism advances and the economic and political systems become increasingly divorced from religious institutions, there is produced what he calls a “liberated territory” with respect to religion (p. 129). The overall effect of these processes—these polarizations between religion and the political and economic spheres —is that religion manifests itself as a public rhetoric and private virtue; in Berger’s words, the end result is the “privatization of religion.” Privatization does not necessarily leave religion totally ineffective, however. Berger objects to the linear theory of secularization presented by Wilson, Martin, and Wallace. In a text entitled The Heretical Imperative (1979), he offers contemporary possibilities of religious affirmation: the deductive, reductive, and inductive possibilities. The deductive option of religious affirmation in the face of secularization is both a reaction and a resistance. It is the reaffirmation of the religious tradition that has been challenged by non-religious processes. The example Berger (1979) uses is neo-orthodoxy, which he defines as “the reaffirmation of the objective authority of a religious tradition after a period during which that authority had been relativized and weakened” (p. 79). In addition, neo-orthodox adherents claim that the destination is the starting point and are determined to remain faithful to their own religious experiences even in the face of contrary evidence. The New Religious Right would be a more contemporary example of this option. In Roman Catholicism, referred to in Box 13.1, the pronouncements of Pope Benedict XVI reflect this reaffirmation of religious authority. A second option is what Berger entitles the reductive possibility or the modernization tradition. In essence, this possibility accepts modern science in general, and psychology and philosophy in particular, as the authority to challenge and to change religious world

Box 13:2 The Reductive Option as Applied to the Christian Belief in the Resurrection of Jesus Scholars Deny the Resurrection of Jesus German New Testament scholar Gerd Ludemann, a visiting professor at Vanderbelt Divinity School ... [notes] the Resurrection is “an empty formula” that must be rejected by anyone holding a “scientific world view.” ... Ludemann argues that Jesus’ body “rotted away” in the tomb. The Risen Christ that appeared to the Apostle Peter ... was a subjective “vision” produced by Peter’s overwhelming grief and “guilt” for having denied Jesus when he was arrested.... In short, modern psychology reduces the Risen Christ to a series of interpsychic experiences that produced in the disciples a renewed sense of missionary zeal and spiritual self-confidence.... According to this elaborate and academic protocol, the Resurrection is ruled a priori out of court because it transcends time and place. Source: Woodward (1996).

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3 5 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D views or mythologies. Adherents accomplish this in two ways: cognitive bargaining and translating. By cognitive bargaining, Berger means the attempt by Christian theologians to adapt the sacred world view to the secular world view in the hope of salvaging the necessary and important parts of the sacred world view (the mythology) and eliminating that which is offensive to the modern mind. Miracles are one such offense. Using a process termed “demythologization,” people interpret certain of these “offensive” aspects of a religious tradition as not necessary for faith (for example, the resurrection of Jesus or the virgin birth of Christ in Christianity). As well as this sort of cognitive bargaining, people engage in translation to enable their religious faith. Berger (1979) defines this process as follows: “Terms of transcendent reference in the tradition must be either eliminated [in the case of those deemed marginal] or translated into terms of immanent reference [in the case of those deemed part of the core to be preserved]” (p. 112). This process is illustrated in the transformation of religious beliefs to related ethical precepts. Religion becomes not so much a relationship with the sacred as striving for justice, being compassionate, having concern for the marginalized, and striving for world peace. Box 13.2 illustrates the reductive option. Berger’s final conception of a response to secularization that enables faith is called the inductive possibility or the movement from tradition to experience. His mentor here is the nineteenth-century German theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher takes human experience as the starting point of religious reflection and sees that revelation is understood to be every new or original disclosure of the cosmos to the innermost consciousness of the person. One begins with the widest variety of these kinds of experiences and induces from them what is common and most important. He thinks that liberal Protestantism is the result of this process of induction. Once this induction is completed (although it is never really completed), it results in the essence of religion. Where does Berger stand in relation to these options? The first option, he thinks, is too doctrinaire and backward looking in its advocacy of traditional beliefs and practices that were relevant to a time long past but that are not relevant now. The second option is too reductionist, and the sacred element is next to being eliminated. However, it is the secularization option, the last option, that serves the modern world the best. It still attempts to retain the essential nature of the sacred (which has roots in the past) but is flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances as societies evolve. In short, Berger argues, religion will not evaporate but will change to be meaningful to a succession of future generations. Berger (1992) continues his reflections on the third option by considering the importance of human-religious experience. The solitary individual, who can exist only in the modern world, is at an advantage in that she or he is able to make an independent decision without being coerced by a monopolistic religious system. This individual is able to have a personal experience of sacred reality that exists regardless of societal desires and wishes. It is this kind of religious experience that carries one through the uncertainties of a modern, secularized world. Yet Berger notes that individual religious experience cannot stand on it own. There still needs to be some institutionalization of the experience. In what he wrote about 25 years before this publication, he argues that religious institutions are necessary to provide a plausibility structure for these experiences. Something similar is still needed today.

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Hadden and the Processes of Sacralization The basic position of Hadden (1987) is that secularization should be viewed as a theory that has itself become sacred. By this he means that secularization is an ideological characterization of the modern world and not a theory that has an empirical base. He flatly denies secularization. He presents five indicators of the persistence of religion in the United States: 1.

From 1935–1985, there has never been a lower proportion than 94 per cent of Americans who have believed in God.

2.

In 1937, 73 per cent of all Americans were church members in comparison to 68 per cent in 1984.

3.

Essentially the same proportion reported attending church in 1984 as did in 1939.

4. In relationship to personal religious practices, in 1985, 87 per cent of people said they prayed on a daily basis in comparison to 90 per cent in 1948. 5.

On a per capita basis, Americans gave almost 20 per cent more to their churches in 1982 than they did in 1962.

Bibby (2002) provides further support that religion has remained strong in North America: in Canada, in 1985, 84 per cent of people believed in God and, in 2000, a full 81 per cent still believed; daily prayer was practiced by 26 per cent of Canadians in 1975 and by 28 per cent in 2000. And the number of religious believers is even growing in some parts of the world. In the twenty-first century, thousands of Chinese are becoming Christians every day, and they now constitute about 5 per cent of the population of China (Elegant, 2006). This empirical evidence suggests that the modern world is not becoming more secular. And Hadden (1987) cites other sources of evidence to challenge the secularization thesis. New religious movements have attracted many Americans. The young are the most likely to become involved in such movements, and they, in turn, are least likely to continue involvement in mainline Christianity. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a sacralization process in the lives of youth at the expense of their involvement in more established churches. Further, in 2006, many young men in the United States and Canada are embracing Islam, for they find that the religion gives them answers to life problems and offers to them a detailed moral map in a secular world. This map covers everything from friendships to protecting the environment. Islam is also a refuge for those who are downtrodden and disfranchised. Additionally, it is relatively easy to become a believer or go through the process called reversion. All one has to do is say the Shahadah, in Arabic, twice in front of another Muslim, and one is a Muslim (Farouky, 2006). Taking a global perspective, Hadden also presents evidence of the importance of religion in the current relation between religion and political authority: for example, the establishment of Israel as a religious state; Gandhi’s non-violent civil disobedience as a political

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3 5 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D strategy rooted in religious convictions; the religious elements of the political conflicts in modern-day India with its factions of Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs; the overthrow of the Shah of Iran by fundamentalist Muslims; the Roman Catholic “factor” in the overthrow of Marcos in the Philippines and Duvalier in Haiti; the explicit presence of the Anglican Church in South African politics in the person of Bishop Tutu; and the rise of liberation theology as a religious-political movement in Latin America. To further illustrate this sacralization process, Bibby (2002) cites Lester (2002) who, writing in the Atlantic Monthly, predicted that the new century might be vibrant with the growth of Christianity in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. This growth, in turn, will also affect the West as immigrants come to build their churches in Canada, North America, and Europe. “The present rate of growth of the new Christian movements and their geographical range suggest that they will become a major social and political force in the coming century” (Lester, 2002, p. 45 and quoted by Bibby, 2002, p. 237).

Wuthnow: The Restructuring of American Religion Herberg (1960) argued that, in the middle of the twentieth century, American religion was structured according to Roman Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish affiliations. Wuthnow (1988a), who analyzed religion in America from the end of World War II until the late 1980s, sees a restructuring according to other than denominational criteria. This restructuring crosses denominational lines to result in two cultural structures: liberal and conservative. Table 13.1 illustrates this religious realignment. Table 13:1 The Restructuring of American Religion Elements of Restructuring

Conservative

Liberal

mythology

Evangelical

Liberal Theology

Fundamentalist

ethos

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Focus is on a special knowledge of the Bible

Minimal knowledge of the Bible

Strong sense of orthodoxy

Tends To Be Heterodox

Intolerant

Tolerant

Morally rigid

Morally flexible

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Table 13:1 The Restructuring of American Religion Elements of Restructuring

political involvement

Conservative

Liberal

Abortion is always wrong

Abortion is optional; Women’s reproductive rights are emphasized

Contra state influence

For state influence

Critical of the welfare state

For the welfare state

Some New Religious Right involvements

Critical of the New Religious Right

For defense spending

Critical of defense spending

Source: Adapted from Wuthnow (1988a, p. 13–ff)

The liberal alignment is reflective of secularization, and the conservative, of sacralization. Wuthnow’s observation of Christianity in America is a view of concomitant sacralization and secularization—both are happening together. But why? Why is secularization so common amongst the liberals? Several sources are working in tandem: the protest against the Vietnam War; denominational mergers that resulted in dissent and controversy; the rise of new religions; and, especially, the phenomenal increase in higher education. Wuthnow notes that from 1960 to 1970, the percentage of youth who went on to college after high school increased from 22 per cent to 35 per cent while the combined budgets of institutions of higher learning increased from $2 billion in 1960 to $23 billion in 1970 to $51 in 1980 (1988a. pp. 155, 167). A correlation with this increase was the liberalization of a wide range of values, attitudes, and behaviors. He writes, “So powerful, in fact, were the effects of higher education on a wide range of values and beliefs that speculation began to emerge in the 1970s as to whether a new class had come into being” (1988a, p. 157). This observation is reinforced by survey data. Relying on a Gallup Poll, he observes that the level of education attained is the strongest determinant of social and religious attitudes and of whether one is conservative or liberal. Again, he writes, “of all the social background questions in the study, education was the factor that most clearly discriminated between religious liberals and religious conservatives” (1988a, p. 169). Wuthnow’s observations about this data give credibility to Weber’s understanding of secularization. What is presented here is a version of disenchantment or the rationalization of the beliefs of religious social actors. And the reason for this secularization is the ascendancy of the rationalism of higher education with its emphasis on empiricism and reason as the mode of thinking.

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Summary of The Cultural Analytic Approach All of the interpreters of secularization outlined here fit well into the cultural analytic perspective. Berger’s insights inform us of the subjective, structural, and institutional dimensions of secularization. The subjective and structural elements are illustrated in his discussion on rationalization and the pluralization of life worlds. The institutional aspect is revealed in his discussion of the problems that disappearing plausibility structures pose for the continuance of religious belief. He adds, however, that, in spite of the reduction of cultural and institutional supports for belief, people need to have an experience of the sacred. Hadden’s statement that secularization is not substantiated by data emerges from the subjective, dramaturgical, structural, and institutional dimensions of religion. In his discussion on the vitality of religious belief, public and private ritual, vibrant faith systems or myths, and the institutional linkage between religion and politics in nations outside of America, he gives evidence for this perspective. In summary, all authors referred to illustrate the cultural analytic view, and all agree that both secularization and sacralization processes continue in the modern world.

The Rational Choice Model In setting a framework for a new paradigm in the study of religion in the United States, Warner (1993) argues that, when scholars consider secularization, the fact that the “reigning theory [the old paradigm] does not seem to work has become an open secret” (p. 1048). Citing several authors who represent the cultural analytic paradigm (my term for the old paradigm), Warner notes that the resurgence of fundamentalism, the persistence of evangelicalism, and the continuity of liberal Protestantism are anomalies that refute the secularization thesis. The rest of the article is devoted to those who are opponents of the secularization theory and who have created the new paradigm. According to Warner, then, the new paradigm has evolved because the old paradigm does not adequately explain the determined and even resurgent presence of the sacred in the modern world. Several authors have forged new ways to address the secularization debate in light of the rational choice model. Stark (1985) and Stark and Bainbridge (1987) develop a theory of sect and cult formation, seeing secularization as a delimiting process. Bibby (1987, 1993a, 1993b), working from Canadian survey data, uses the phrase “fragmentation of the gods” as a response to secularization. Stark and Iannaccone (1994) address the phenomenon in Europe. However, the Warner article, which will be reviewed at the conclusion of this section, provides the most comprehensive view of the new paradigm’s usefulness in the secularization debate.

Stark and Bainbridge: Secularization as a “Delimiting Process” Stark (1985) frames his discussion within the church-sect dichotomy, which, he argues, should be considered a theory rather than a typology. While acknowledging that Niebuhr (1957) presented this distinction as a theory, most church-sect researchers have, indeed, used it as a typology. Yet Stark, with his colleague Bainbridge, have moved the typology to the level of a theory using a rational choice model.

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Stark and Iannoccone (1994) begin to construct their church-sect theory by positing and defining the concept of religious economy as consisting of all the religious activity going on in any society. Religious economies are like commercial economies in that they consist of a market of current and potential customers, a set of firms seeking to serve the market, and the religious “product lines” offered by the various firms. (p. 232)

An important consideration is the extent to which a market is regulated. In a society with an unregulated religious economy, pluralism will grow. In Stark’s words, “the ‘natural’ state of religious economies is one in which a variety of firms successfully cater to the special religious interests of limited market segments” (Stark, 1985, p. 143). The more dominant a religious firm is the more church-like it will be, and the more it will be in low tension with the social environment; in other words, dominant religious organizations become more and more connected to the secular world. This is the process of secularization. However, a religion adapting to the secular world to increase its “market share” of the religious economy does not necessarily lead to the demise of religion that Martin, Wilson, and Wallace would predict. It does suggest, on the other hand, the eventual failure of a specific religious organization if it becomes too secularized and divorced from the sacred. So from where do the continuity or resurrection of the sacred and the growth of other kinds of religious organizations emerge? They emerge because secularization is a self-limiting process. As the church-like organization becomes too secularized, various forms of protest occur. A religious group that is in high tension with the social environment emerges from the dust of a church that has become too secular, and this group revives the lost sense of the sacred, the charisma. If this revival is a renewal, a revitalization of the old faith, we have a sect. If, in contrast, a new sense of the sacred emerges, if a religious innovation is constructed that varies from the old faith, a new religious movement is the result (see Chapter 8).3 Figure 13.5 depicts secularization as a self-limiting process: Figure 13.5 Secularization as a delimiting process Leveling off of the process

Maximum growth of secularization; it’s reaching a limit

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Growth of Secularization

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Bibby in Canada: Fragmentation and Resilience as Responses to Secularization Like Stark, Bibby (1987, 1993a, 1993b) frames his discussion of religion in Canada in terms of a religious economy or market model that includes concepts such as firms, products, and consumers (1987, 118–ff). The four main “firms” are the Roman Catholic, Anglican, United, and “conservative” churches. Each is competing for limited resources—particularly, members, who are the consumers of religious products. And the competition is getting keener as affiliation remains stable but active participation grows weaker; there is about a 25 per cent active participation rate in organized religion the late twentieth century (Bibby, 1993b). Bibby’s interpretation of secularization begins with the same religious organization type as Stark and Bainbridge’s: the church. Unlike them, however, Bibby does not link secularization with a theory of sect and cult formation. Rather, religious organizations in Canada appear to adapt themselves to Canadian culture and “give the consumers what they want.” In addition, consumers tend to select from these organizations “consumer items” that fit their own lifestyles and life orientations. In other words, both the organizations and the members have distanced themselves from the sacred and have become increasingly secularized. To use Berger’s terms, secularization is seen to occur at the objective or structural level (in organizations) and at the subjective level (among members). Fragmentation, then, is a response to these processes. Indeed, religious or spiritual fragments are powerful because they work. Bibby (1993a) says it in the following way: Modern women and men continue to identify with established religious traditions, selectively adopt certain beliefs, practices and teaching, and occasionally turn to groups for specialized professional services—a baptism, a wedding, a funeral. Consumer-oriented as they are, many supplement the items available from their core religious traditions with fragments from other systems. They read their horoscopes, give credibility to psychic phenomena, think they might be reincarnated, don’t rule out the existence of a spirit world. They are into fragments, not systems, into consumption, rather than commitment. (p. 76–77)

It should be emphasized, however, that secularization is not the end product. Canadians do not say no to the sacred, but they do select and choose what appeals to them about the sacred. Bibby (1993b) adds that Canadians are still intrigued with mystery, search for explanations of the unknown, and seek meaning within their secular lives. Religion has not eroded in Canada, but it definitely has changed. In a more recent publication, Bibby (2002) extends the work of Stark and Bainbridge (1987) on secularization as delimiting process and adds that it may also stimulate the rejuvenation of a previous tradition. Evidence is provided by Bibby to indicate that, even if Canadian religious groups and their members are not being revitalized, they are revealing religious continuity and resilience. He provides data to indicate this resilience (See Table 13.2).

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Table 13.2: Evidence of Religious Resilience in Canada Years

1985

1990

1995

2000

Do you believe that God exists? (Yes)

84%

82%

80%

81%

Have you experienced God? (Yes)

25%

20%

20%

20%

Years

1975

Daily Prayer

26%

2000 --

--

28%

Source: Bibby (2002) The percentage of Canadians who claim that they believe in God has remained solidly constant from 1985 to 2000, which is a strong indicator of resilience and a contra-indicator of secularization. The percentage of people who said they have experienced God has declined from 1985, but has remained constant since 1990. The one dimension of religion that has shown an increase is ritual—more Canadians prayed daily in the year 2002 than in 1975. To flesh out further the meaning of these data, Bibby created cross tabs between and among these dimensions. Those people who pray on a daily basis are more likely not only to believe in God but also to think God cares for them. Those active in this daily private ritual are also more likely to experience God, to see themselves as spiritual, and to attend public sacred services on a weekly basis. Bibby (2002) offers these conclusions regarding religion in Canada at the beginning of the twenty-first century: To look at Canada in the first decade of the new millennium is to see a country characterized by religious restlessness. It’s a restlessness magnified considerably by the worldwide attention given religion by the sight of a Pope and millions of young people from around the world descending on Toronto for an 11-day “World Youth Day.” As our theistic color commentator leaves our telecast booth, he shakes his head. “The gods seem to be everywhere,” he says, “in the churches, outside the churches, confronting people directly, giving them an array of hints, forcing them to reflect on life and earth and purpose in the course of their experiencing the good and the bad of everyday living. What more could they do?” (p. 248)

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Warner: Secularization and the Social Scientific Study of Religion Warner also thinks that the old paradigm does not adequately address the problem of secularization. He presents a significant volume of research to substantiate his critique of traditional secularization theory. One specific criticism is that interpreting secularization as a linear process in the United States is inaccurate. According to Warner (1993), during colonial America, church involvement and participation rates were quite low. After the disestablishment of religion in the post-revolutionary United States (see Chapter 11), the number of people enrolled in churches grew, and this growth continued throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century. This trend has continued through to the present, even though there have been fluctuations. The reasons for this growing support of religious organizations can be explained by the rational choice paradigm: with increased pluralism and competition, sacralization is the outcome. Because no single religious group has a monopoly, a large social and religious marketplace is created in which a variety of religious groups mobilize, trying to provide a more attractive “firm” to encourage church participation. They mobilize to increase the marketability of their religious product. Some examples of such organizations include churches (synagogues, mosques, and temples as well) responding to the needs of immigrant groups, as in the case of the Irish in the nineteenth century and the Muslim and Oriental peoples in the twentieth. In addition, many Christian denominations and Jews have opened their ordination, membership, and rites of passage to women. Even gays and lesbians find some sacred social space in a denomination called the Metropolitan Community Church. For African Americans, churches were frequently empowerment centers for civil rights.4 Looking at the demand side of the market model, Warner challenges the view that the new voluntarism5 of the modern religious believer is a sign of secularization. He thinks the new voluntarism can be an instrument of change and vitality in religion. For example, when people switch denominational affiliations, research shows that they make a serious commitment to participate more religiously than before the switch.

Summary of the Rational Choice Theory All these authors offer us responses to the problems, anomalies, and critiques that have troubled the linear thesis of secularization. Stark and Bainbridge inform us that both processes, secularization and sacralization, occur at different times and in different organizational configurations. Bibby’s interpretation assists us in seeing that fragmentation and resilience are responses to the religious firms not doing well on their supply side of the market equation. Stark and Iannaccone address a concern similar to Bibby’s—secularization is a result of religious firms not marketing their religious products well. Of interest, Chadwick makes the same observation. Warner, arguing that a new paradigm is necessary to explain secularization and sacralization, presents evidence that America is more religious today than it was in colonial times. All authors in the rational choice model are united in giving us cogent evidence that the linear model of secularization has significant flaws.

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Attempts to Reconcile the Two Interpretations Examining secularization and sacralization using the cultural analytic approach places the sacred culture and the secular culture in tension. The ascendancy of the sacred over the secular depends upon changes within either the sacred or the secular culture. No other sources of change are considered, which is one problem with using this model for understanding secularization. In contrast, the significant strength of the rational choice model is that it enables searching for and discovering sources of change in the social system—namely in the economic and political systems. Also, rational choice models offer powerful explanatory strength to the data. A possible reconciliation of the two models may be in the making. One way is to use an ecological model of nesting the sacred cultural system in the center of a larger system that includes, in the following order, the secular culture and the social system. The market model argues, for example, that pluralism in the social system encourages changes within the sacred and secular cultural systems. Where there are elevated levels of pluralism, the sacred culture will be in ascendancy (sacralization). On the other hand, with low levels of pluralism, the secular cultural system will be dominant. Other researchers have established links between these various aspects of society and culture in order to understand secularization and sacralization. Hammond (1986) observed that Berger uses the market model to understand four features of modern religion: growth of the ecumenical movement, pressure to compete with better religious products, appealing to people’s desires, and marketing targeted at encouraging youth to become active. However, as Warner (1993) implies, the market framework of Berger does not become a central feature of his work. Wuthnow (1988b) also includes market model language in his sociology of religion. In his discussion on the relationship between religion and the social environment, he notes the importance of considering social resources when attempting to understand religion, especially because religious systems often engage in competition with one another for scarce resources. In addition, he views the institutional nature of religion (the fourth level of the cultural analytic approach) as represented by organizations that extract resources from the environment, then coordinate them, and finally direct them towards accomplishing a goal. He then goes on to interpret the church-sect dichotomy using these concepts. A final note. Neither model addresses the importance of religious experience.6 A way to include this phenomenon in a paradigm relevant to secularization or sacralization is to theorize that, in a pluralistic social system, there is more likelihood for the personal religious experience of the sacred to emerge. All things being equal, this experience may lead to the formation of a social group, the growth of a sect or a cult, or a movement of renewal. One practical way to test this hypothesis is to see whether there is a correlation between sacralization and both the number of religious reformers in a society and its pluralistic characteristics.

Secularization and Islam As noted in the introduction to this text, understanding Islam is important today—in the first years of the twenty-first century and the third millennium. By looking at Islam, we may

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3 6 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D be able to see whether the claim that society is experiencing secularization is valid outside of the Judaeo-Christian and Western tradition. Robinson (1999), who investigates secularization in the Islamic world of South Asia (especially during the British colonial era), provides useful evidence. She first outlines the essentials of Weber’s theory of secularization and then illustrates secularization processes within the context of South Asian Islamic struggles with, adaptations to, and rebellions against Britain. Weber, as we know from the first chapter, introduced into sociological parlance terms denoting various kinds of social action: affective, traditional, and rational. From these types emerged three kinds of authority: charismatic, traditional, and rational. The main thrust of occidental development, according to him, is the movement towards rational authority (the reasoning individual) and away from both charismatic and traditional authority. The movement, however, is not linear: the path toward rational authority and rationalization sometimes turns (and returns) toward charismatic or traditional authority. Obviously, secularization is a feature of this process of recursively moving toward rational authority, and a significant factor within this movement is the abandonment of charismatic and other non-rational experience—what Weber calls “the disenchantment of the world. Other elements include the depersonalization of social relationships, the fragmentation of social life into public and private, and the marginalization of the sacred from economic, political, and social conduct. Robinson adds Berger’s distinction of objective (or structural) and subjective secularization to Weber’s outline (see above under Berger). As mentioned, Robinson uses as a case South Asia or India during the time of the Mogul Empire (from 1526–1857). The West came to India in 1506 in Portuguese ships with the intent of trade. The British came in the early 1600s and their presence resulted in a series of battles with the French and with local peoples, as well as in the establishment of the East India Company. Eventually, Britain gained political, economic, and military control of India. The last Mogul Emperor was deposed in 1857, and the land became an official British colony in 1858. Objective or structural secularization began in 1770 with the replacement of Muslim law by British law. By 1820, the Shari’ah was applicable only to personal-familial law. Consequently, the society experienced fragmentation in that the public sphere was occidental in nature and the private, Muslim. Shortly after that, British courts replaced Muslim courts of law. Further, education in the Islamic tradition was marginalized while occidental, liberal higher education became more and more centralized. This marginalization was exemplified by the fact that there were fewer and fewer Islamic madrasas. On the other hand, the British attempted to allow for the accommodation of the Muslims to their suzerainty. From 1909–1947, a separate public Muslim identity grew as Muslims gained separate electorates, which formed the Dominion of Pakistan in 1947 after the partition of India and became a republic—the Islamic State of Pakistan—in 1956. The result of British colonial rule was a structurally dualistic society—the main institutional apparatus of the modern state inspired by the West coexisted with Islamic laws and institutions. Robinson then presents elements of a subjective secularization that occurred during the era of the British presence. This secularization manifested itself in three forms: (1) an Indian-Muslim form of Puritanism, (2) Islamic modernity, and (3) a fully secular Islam.

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In a similar way that Puritanism stripped Catholicism to its bare essentials (specifically the Bible), so also did a movement called the Ahl-i Hadith (People of the Hadith) seek to distil Indian Islam to its fundamentals. Their special attack was against the Sufis (see Chapter 8) who had developed a whole range of saints, figures, sacred symbols, pilgrimages to holy men’s tombs, and the like. The Ahl-i Hadith considered God to be a fully transcendent being who gave the believer no comfort and no guidance except through the Qur’an or the Hadith. The world became a cold, disenchanted place, so the movement placed a strong emphasis on the law. Just as Berger described Protestantism as the first moment of secularization in the West, so might we consider the People of the Hadith as the first secularization of Islam, especially in its Sufi form. This movement was very similar to the Wahhabist movement discussed in Chapter 10, and it became a strong political force in favor of creating a separate Muslim state. A second movement, the Aligarh, which can be considered a version of Islamic modernity, emerged also in Muslim India. It was similar to the Ahl-i Hadith movement in that it sought to include elements of Western knowledge, philosophy, and technology, bringing these into harmony with the teachings of Islam. Part of the goal of this movement was to make available to Muslim students the educational system of the Occident. A third response to the presence of the West in Muslim India was the Progressive Writers Movement, whose members fully accepted the Enlightenment and the modernity of the West. They supported a socialist vision of progress and considered Islam to be important only as a cultural identity and not as a religion. Both the Ahl-i Hadith and the Aligrah movements illustrate the delimiting effect of secularization. Both groups maintain that the Qur’an and the Hadith constitute the genesis of their religion. The first group holds fast to a petrified image of Islam and adapts only slightly to the modern world while the latter group practices an assimilated from of the religion. Members of the Progressive Writers Movement are comparable to secularized Christians in the West who view their sacred roots only in cultural terms and not in religious terms. These tend, also, to be similar to the “liberal” Christians that Wuthnow (1988b) outlines. Beyond these variations in how Islam links to modernity in India, it is important to note that the religion is very different from Christianity. Weber would say that Islam is a “this worldly” religion, while, for example, medieval Catholicism was an “other worldly religion.” Islam is much more a tradition of behavior than a belief. As noted, the essential belief of Islam is summarised in the Shahadah. The purpose of ritual in Islam also contrasts to its purpose in Christianity—in Islam, ritual is intended to create and support the ummah. The major rituals, prayer, fasting, giving alms, and the pilgrimage (the hajj) are there to support and enforce the Shari’ah, which is the foundation of the ummah. Muslim society is thus to support the ummah, and the terms sacred and secular have unique meanings in Islam. To follow the Shari’ah is to be sacred and not to follow it is to be secular. The return to the Shari’ah in matters of personal and family law for the Muslims of British India is an example of sacralization. The Shari’ah was made into a legal code in the Shariat Application Act of 1937 in India, and, after the act’s passage, Muslims were to live only under the Shari’ah in matters related to family law. This sacralization is a common feature in many states wherein there are significant numbers of Muslims. Other examples of sacralization include the movement to make the Sudan a Muslim state, which is very alive in 2006; the activities of the al-Qaeda, who are intent to remove “secular leaders” from office

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3 6 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D and to establish a Muslim state; and current circumstances in Iran, which are discussed in Chapter 10. What effect has secularization had on Islam worldwide? Today, there are various types of Muslims—from the active believers in the West who accept Western jurisdiction, to cultural Muslims, to those who exist in a constitutionally secular Muslim state, such as Turkey. And sacralization processes are also at work within the wider Muslim world. Islamism, as discussed in Chapter 8, seeks to unify Muslims in rejection of the cultural (and secular) influences of the West, and al-Qaeda uses violence in the hope of creating an Islamic state whose citizens follow Islamic religious practices and traditions.

Some Conclusions on Secularization As the above outline indicates, controversy exists in the social scientific and historical fields as to the salience or nadir of secularization. The evidence seems to suggest that both secularization and sacralization have to be studied within a specific regional and historical context. Both the cultural analytic and the rational choice approaches to the study of secularization provide evidence for its existence and for its attenuation. Islam in colonial India and Christianity in nineteenth century Canada also seem to have experienced both secularization and sacralization. I contend that neither the linear theory of secularization nor the rational choice theory is totally accurate. Both need to be tested in various and multiple historical and regional circumstances.

Postmodernism The conclusion of this chapter addresses the question of how religions respond to the most recent stage of occidental society: the postmodern stage. Although there is vibrant debate as to how postmodernism should be typified, there is a substantial agreement that the West, in the latter part of the twentieth century, has either become or is being defined as postmodern.7 First, of course, it is necessary to define the terms postmodern and postmodernism. Thereafter, I will summarize one religious response to the condition of the postmodern and postmodernism—the new age movement.

Definitions of the Postmodern and Postmodernism Although these terms have been and continue to be used interchangeably, they do describe two different sets of phenomena. Postmodern refers to the social, economic, and political conditions of late second and early third millennial societies. Postmodernism refers to the culture of the postmodern period—the accent here. As early as 1959, C. W. Mills reflected that the modern age was being succeeded by a postmodern period (cited in Ritzer, 1997). However, let us turn to more contemporary scholars, Albright (2007) and Ritzer (1997), for an introduction to the term’s multidimensional meaning.

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To understand what postmodern means, we need some introduction to the term modern. Modern indicates the kind of society and social organization that emerged after the Reformation, the Enlightenment, and the industrial and political revolutions of the eighteenth century.8 Special features include the creation and continuation of nation states; political systems founded on democracy and socialism; a general challenge to monarchal systems; in the twentieth century, the creation of welfare capitalism; a geometric increase in the production of material goods through capitalist or socialist industrialism; learning and knowledge expanding on the philosophic-scientific traditions of the Enlightenment philosophers and natural scientists; great hope for the future that was typed as progressive; and a goal that would offer emancipation to all peoples including all marginalized races, ethnic groups, and religions. The postmodern world is quite different. The social conditions of this world are explored in the work of Bell (1976) who uses the term post-industrial.9 Elements include the domination of the West over all the world, the global market system seducing national populations into external dependency, and the purchase of increasing numbers of material and symbolic goods and services (with the added lever of the Internet or other communication technologies increasing consumption). The cultural term that corresponds to the modern world is modernity. Its emphasis is on master narratives, positivism, the recognition of human rights, conformity through law rather than power, and the human subject who constantly lives to invent him or herself. To do justice to a definition of postmodernism would take too long, and a simplified definition would not provide the reader with enough context to understand its meaning well. However, Ritzer (1997) does offer a short definition that is useful: Postmodernism refers to cultural products (art, movies, architecture, music, video and computer games and the like) that are seen as different from modern cultural products. (p. 5)

In other words, postmodernism is a concept that helps us understand those cultural elements that are unique to postmodern society and that were not found in the previous modern era. Although Ritzer describes it as a theory, I consider that postmodernism is better conceptualized as a description of the culture of the postmodern world rather than as a theory. Some of the cultural components that form this description emerge from the work of Ritzer (1997) and Albright (2007), which reviews scholarship in the area of postmodern social theory (See the work of the authors referred to by Ritzer and Albright for more detailed information). Albright avers that postmodernism encompasses many disparate ideas and embodies a shift in the focus of life evidenced in the arts, music, and architecture. Changes include a shift from the form, structure, and substance of cultural creations to ingenuity, pastiche (an art form composed of a variety elements), and simulation. An underlying theme is to question knowledge, science, truth, and reality. A postmodern proposition could read as follows: “All of human life (culture, religion, social institutions, the world, and relationships) is but the personal and social construction of reality.” Some of the more salient constructs consist of hyperreality, humans as “desiring machines,” multiplicity, plurality, decenterdness, the archaeology of knowledge, knowledge as translated into

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3 7 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D binary codes and stored in computers, the demise of meta-narratives to be replaced by small, local, and specific narratives of life, hypermodernity, intertextuality, deconstruction, and bricolage. Some explanation of these constructs is in order. Hyperreality refers to a simulation of human life that takes a person into a fantasy land of extreme make believe wherein the subject is the center of life and has “all power” to destroy the enemy, to enjoy the ultimate of sexual experiences, and to live a life of unmitigated hedonism. This construct is similar to the idea of the human being as a “desiring machine” that craves all the pleasures of life and is directed to the self. Multiplicity and plurality indicate an endless variety of personal experiences and beliefs that bring happiness and pleasure to the human subject. Decenterdness is a concept relating to this great number of available perspectives and experiences; it means that there is no “center of the universe,” no god, no central truth, and no axis mundi. Accordingly, it seems that, if the human is defined as a desiring machine, the only center is the self. The phrase archaeology of knowledge denotes a version of the social construction of reality theory that we met in Chapter 2. Specifically, it is a method to uncover the underlying rules that are at the base of social discourses (written texts, for example), all of which are conceived of as being derived from temporal and spatial contexts. Knowledge defined as information translated into and stored in binary codes also signals a devaluing of human judgement and wisdom; the billons of “bytes of information” are equal (decentered), numerous, separate, and fragmented (multiple and plural), and each “desiring machine” holds different data. If each person or “desiring machine” in the postmodern world stores his or her own story and perspective, the significance of the meta-narrative decreases. These meta-narratives can be either a secular world view or a mythology. The meta-narrative of pre-modern societies was, typically, a mythology such as Catholicism in the medieval world or Islam during the Muslim empires of the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the Ottomans. The secular meta-narrative of modern times was comprised, especially, of positivism and faith in progress—of the idea that the use of science will lead to the betterment of society on personal, social, and political fronts. Hypermodernity is illustrated by members of a postmodern society who are hyper-consumers of goods, engaged in frequent movement from place to place, focussed on sensual pleasure, and hedonistic. Intertextuality also relates to the decentring of meaning; the idea is that no text has meaning on its own, so texts (for example, philosophic, religious, or scientific discourses) can only be understood by reading other texts relevant to them (such as an historical critique of the Christian Bible or the Muslim Qur’an). Deconstruction “aims to clear away the wreckage of a cluttered theoretical past, which clings to preconceptions that are regarded as no longer workable in the contemporary world” (Denzin, 1994, p. 185; Ritzer, 1997, p. 10). This appears to be a perception that all things of the past—all discoveries, documents, religious texts and philosophical discourses—are of no value and need to be replaced by postmodern thinking. One might wonder how this aim would be of value, for to argue for a contemporary discourse is a no win game; by the time one “says” or “writes” it, it is not useful either. Bricolage is a term referring to the work of a bricoleur — a kind of intellectual handyman who makes do with whatever happens to be available at the time during which he or she is doing research or creating some sort of religious, scientific, or philosophical discourse. A set of postmodernist terms that do not require definitions is provided by Ritzer (1997). Postmodernist thinkers tend to accent phenomena such as emotions, feelings, intuition,

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reflection, speculation, personal experience, violence, metaphysics, tradition, cosmology, magic, myth, religious sentiment, and mystical experience.

A Religious Response: The New Age Movement The New Age movement (see Chapter 8) can be seen as a response to postmodernism.10 As we will see, this movement corresponds well to the many images of postmodernism outlined above: introducing people to a “sacred” hyperreality and to a decentered perspective, viewing the person as one who “creates” his or her own sacred narrative, announcing the demise of meta-narratives (especially Christianity), accenting pleasure to the self, encouraging the deconstruction of previous sacred world views, and celebrating the self as bricoleur, who cobbles together a sacred narrative from a wide variety of religious narratives. The New Age movement can also be seen as what Durkheim calls “the cult of the individual” (see Chapter 8 under new religious movements). Using the work of Ferguson (1980), Newport (1998), and Heelas (1996), I shall outline the basic themes or beliefs of the movement and its organizational base. What Ferguson (1980) terms “New Age Spirituality” is a diminution of doctrine, an exchange of faith for experiential knowledge, and a transformation from compartmentalized cognition to unitary thinking (p. 369). This direct knowledge is considered to be a glimpse of the true nature of reality, a disassociation from the ego or the individual self, a connection with the source of all that generates the world of appearances, and a reunion with all living beings.

Mythology Although the New Age movement is associated with a wide range of diverse beliefs, beneath this heterogeneity, according to Heelas (1996), is a consistent or homogenous perspective. From the work of Newport and Heelas, these common themes emerge: life is in a state of malfunctioning; all humans are gods or goddesses in exile; and, through proper rituals, one can become whole in the processes of transformation. According to New Age philosophy, human life is problematic even though the person is good by nature. The human condition malfunctions because the ego is attached to so many things. This breakdown is especially true in the culture of postmodernism, which leads to fragmented personal and social lives. Liberation from this malfunction—or the way out of slavery to the ego and towards the creation of a whole self—requires the realization that we are all gods. Indeed, we are “gods and goddesses in exile.” New Age spirituality is “self spirituality,” which is its hallmark. The experience of the self is the experience of God, Christ, the source, the inner child, and true consciousness. Indeed, the self is divine: “You are an eternal essence of God” (Heelas, 1996, p. 20). The last theme exhibits the optimism of the believers: that one can move to transform the ego to the true self through meditation, psychotherapy, dance, magic, fire-walking, and sex. Heelas presents five other themes that describe most New Age adherents: unmediated individualism, a self-ethic, social responsibility, freedom, and perennialism. Unmediated individualism refers to accepting as true or authoritative only that which comes from your own self and your own experience. Narratives of the past are only true if you experience

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3 7 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D them as true. The only legitimate values are those that exist within yourself. The New Age religion is “a religion of the self.” Having a self-ethic means that the individual serves as his or her own source for moral guidance. However, this emphasis on self frees one to social responsibility in the form of magic. To help others, a believer should call upon his or her own spiritual force from within. One is not to blame others—parents, society, the culture. The fourth theme is freedom. This concept is vitally important to New Age mythology. The idea that a person can transform from an ego to a self entails a position that everyone is right because everyone is a god or goddess. We are to be the masters of our own destiny. Perennialism, the fifth theme, is an odd characteristic. It means that, although New Agers tend to break from tradition and refuse to adhere to the religious stories of the past, they continue to use and reflect on certain religious traditions. For example, they still draw on traditions that accentuate the spiritual self. They are prone to say, “All religion is about humankind finding a relationship with the higher self ” or “All religions are the expression of the same reality” (Heelas, 1996, p. 27). Some of these traditions include Zen, yoga, Christian mysticism, psychosynthesis, Jungian therapy, Tibetan Buddhism, transcendental meditation, and Sufism. Newport adds the religious traditions of gnosticism, Neoplatonism, hermeticism, alchemy, Celtic religion, the Renaissance, Freemasonry, Swedenborgianism, mesmerism, spiritualism, Hinduism, transcendentalism, theosophy, New Thought, and positive thinking. They also draw on some twentieth century secular phenomena: for example, the human potential movement, which includes encounter groups, gestalt awareness training, transactional analysis, sensory awareness, primal therapy, bioenergetics, massage, psycho synthesis, humanistic psychology, and psychic healing. There are other aspects of the movement that fit well with postmodernism. As noted above, the culture of the postmodern world accents the deconstruction of narratives and that there is no common, overarching narrative. New Agers “detraditionalize” all past narratives or, in postmodern terms, de-construct them. Unlike many postmodernists, however, they endeavor to reconstruct the world through the reconstruction of the self.

Organization Unlike most religions, which have become institutionalized into religious collectives or organizations, the New Age movement is what is called a “decentralized mega-network” (Christensen, 1993) or networks (Newport, 1998). Heelas (1996) suggests that only as few as 5 or 10 per cent of New Agers belong to and are faithful members of New Age organizations. There is no equivalent to Christian churches, Islamic mosques, or Sikh temples.11 However, this does not mean the movement is without institutional substance. Its institutional presence is expressed in a wide variety of gatherings (for example, at Stonehenge or Glastonbury Tor in England), seminars, books, training centers and a number of New Age–related businesses. Newport (1998) says it well: churches are developing less frequently now than are groups of people who gather around institutes, study centers, seminars, trance channellers, psychics, teachers, healers, and expositions. All of these interrelate, or “network,” with one another. (p. 15)

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Most New Agers are part of Christian churches. Bibby (1993b, 1995, 2001), using 1990, 1991, and 1995 Canadian national census survey data, notes the following: ▶▶

about 30 per cent of Canadians say they are familiar with New Age ideas (1990 data)

▶▶

11 per cent indicate they are either “somewhat interested” (8 per cent in 1990) or “highly interested” (3 per cent in both 1990 and 1995)

▶▶

3 per cent say they are involved in New Age activities, 2 per cent have joined groups, and 2 per cent are in networks (1990)

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in 1995, 3 per cent were involved in activities, 2 per cent had formed groups, and less than 1 per cent had formed networks (note an actual decline over the five-year period)

▶▶

those most interested in New Age thought in Canada were Christians (81 per cent)—53 per cent Roman Catholic and 28 per cent Protestantism (1990 data)

▶▶

5 per cent actually identify with some other kind of religion (unspecified), which could be New Age (1990 data)

▶▶

75 per cent of these core adherents indicate that they have no intention of abandoning their traditional affiliations (1990 data)

However, it should be noted that, according to 1991 Canadian census, only 1,200 persons claimed membership in the movement, and the 2001 census does not have a category for New Age adherents. In summary, the New Age movement is a religious response to the kind of world we live in today. It challenges modernity on two fronts: as a reaction against rationalization through its focus on religious experience and as a response to bureaucratization, which has resulted in the movement’s concerted effort to be organizationally fluid. It should be seen not so much as a sect (it lacks a sect’s organizational dimension) but more as an amorphous movement of relatively disconnected adherents with a syncretic mythology (including First Nation beliefs) that approximates what Durkheim has called the “cult of man.” It has much more in common with oriental mythology than with occidental (see Chapter 4). Finally, the focus is much less on mythology, ethos, and collectivity and more on religious experience (being in touch with the sacred both within and without) and ritual (particularly channelling). An established thesis of sociology is that there is a reciprocal relationship between social structure and culture. In this section, I have outlined the social-structural basis of the postmodern world and shown that postmodernism is a culture consistent with the kind of social structure that is common in the Western world toward the end of the twentieth century. Finally, I considered one sacred response to the postmodern world and its culture of postmodernism—a response that tends to “fit” with this kind of world: New Age spirituality.

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SUMMARY This chapter reviewed a range of literature to assist us in understanding religion in Canada and the United States from the point of view of social change. Here is a question frequently asked by sociologists and laypeople interested in the religious effects of social change: Is religion dead or dying? As the modern world changes to a postmodern one, is death the destiny of the sacred? To these questions, the central response of these authors has been twofold. Those who represent the cultural analytic position argue that both secularization and sacralization continue through to the present. For those authors who represent the rational choice or market model, evidence continues to mount that it is not the sacred world that is in decline but rather the secular. A sacred response to postmodernity is illustrated in that it is religion or a spiritually based movement that offers meaning, albeit a decentered and fragmented meaning, to a central tenet of postmodernity: meaninglessness.

NOTES 1

Hadden argues that secularization theory, or the idea that modern society is becoming increasingly secular, is itself a social construct emanating from a particular historical context, one that views society as “progressing” from simple to more complex forms.

2

See Chapter 3.

3

Although not part of Stark’s discussion, the theory could be used to explain the formation of the movements of renewal that I outlined in Chapter 8. As a church becomes too secularized, a protest may emerge that envisions itself as renewing the church from within. I used the monastic movement and the modern day charismatic movement as historical examples.

4

On the other hand, see the research on religion as an opium (Chapter 12).

5

See Chapter 3.

6

The exception would be Berger.

7

Giddens (1993) objects to the use of the term postmodernism and prefers to use the phrase “radicalized modernity.” He takes the position that there has not been a break with modernity but, rather, that modernity has moved to a more radical stage.

8

I refer here to the Industrial Revolution and the French and American revolutions.

9

I am using the term post-industrial to mean postmodern.

10 There is controversy regarding the view that the New Age movement is a response to postmodernism. One dissenting voice is Heelas (1996) who present five theses arguing that the link between the two is erroneous. 11

It should be recognized that there are some New Age churches. Newport (1998, p. 15) writes that they have names such as the Church of Spiritual Healing, the Church of Ageless Wisdom, the Radiant Light Interfaith Church, the Church of the Earth Nation, and the Church of Truth.

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C h a p t e r FOU R T E E N

C onc l us ion s

Consider your reading of this text as a journey—a journey into the

social scientific research on religion. You have now come to the end of the journey that the author of this text has charted. This does not mean, however, that your own journey has ended. There is so much more to the journey than what has been documented here. I trust that this conclusion is not the terminus but the genesis of your interest in understanding the complexities of religion not only the modern world but in the historical past. I have outlined the social science of religion by using, primarily, the theories of Max Weber and Thomas O’Dea to organize a vast array of archaeological, anthropological, historical, psychological, and sociological data. At the heart of this text is the sociology of religion— that sub-discipline of sociology that has a long history and a current significance as a result of the religious aspects of the ideological struggles of the twenty-first century. Borrowing from science, I have frequently arranged data in a model in order to understand, in turn, what religion is, what its factors are, and, subsequently, its effects. Figure 14.1, a variation of Figure 1.3, presents this scientific model. Religion and all of its topics, themes, and issues can be defined in the model as “Y.” This process began in Chapter 1 when religion was defined. Thereafter, throughout the text, the various subjects within the broader topic of religion, namely, religious experience, mythology, religious leadership, women and religion, ritual, sacred organizations, and ethos, were defined. Where there was appropriate evidence on each of the topics, I presented theories and factors to account for the various sacred phenomena. Also, if present, data were given to test the credibility of various theories or the effects of a specific sacred phenomenon on persons and societies.

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3 7 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Figure 14:1 A Scientific Model of Religion Propositions arranged in a logical manner Abstract Cause or Factor of Religion

Abstract Concept of Religion

Abstract Effect of Religion

X (specific factors)

Y (the topic of religion)

Z (personal and social effects)

x

y

z

Hypotheses which can be tested

Many religions exist and the variation, even within particular religious traditions, is vast, so I selected examples of sacred phenomena from only folk, archaic, oriental and occidental societies. Not all religions were represented: Hinduism, Taoism, Confucianism, Shintoism, and Judaism were not covered. Also, there was a focus on the native spirituality of North America when considering the religions of folk societies, on ancient Mesopotamian religions to represent archaic religiosity, on the Buddhism of the Orient, and on Christianity and Islam as illustrative of occidental sacred traditions. Further, all the classical writers of sociology are represented as theorists (Karl Marx, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber) as well as one classical psychologist, Sigmund Freud. However, as you have experienced, Weber’s work, which has been updated by Thomas O’Dea, is the umbrella under which information about the sacred is arranged. The text also introduces the main contemporary theories of religion, e.g., functionalism, conflict theory, and rational choice theory (for a wider selection, see Pals, 2006). Where appropriate, these theories were revisited throughout the text if the data were present to offer credibility to them. As stated in the introduction, the primary topics of religion were subsumed under the five dilemmas of the institutionalization of religion, dilemmas that O’Dea outlines. Before these were discussed, the genesis of religion—religious experience—was described as having two parts: the individual’s experience of religion and its social counterpart. The individual’s experience of religion was investigated using Freud’s insights, as interpreted by Erik Erikson; we found that the childhood experiences of Martin Luther predicted his images of the divine, which, in turn, helped launch the Protestant Reformation of the sixteenth century. In that same chapter, Durkheim’s theory of the social construction of religion was given to assist the reader in learning more about the social predictors of some sacred experiences.

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c h a p t e r f ou r t e e n | 3 7 7

The same chapter served as an introduction to the psychology of religion, and covered, in turn, spirituality, psychic experiences, mysticism, and conversion. The author devoted Chapter 3 to analyzing the link between the personal experiences of sacred leaders and social institutions. Mother Ann Lee of the Shakers and Joseph Smith, Jr. were investigated, and evidence was provided that the characteristics of sacred institutions are dependent on the original stories and personal experiences of their specific founders. Framed by attachment theory, an extensive analysis of the life of Muhammad the prophet of Islam was given to illustrate how the early childhood experiences of this man were reflected not only in his images of the divine but also in the political effects of these images and experiences. Chapter 4 through to Chapter 11 outlined O’Dea’s five dilemmas of institutionalization as well as an additional dilemma put forward by the author of this text—a sixth dilemma, the dilemma of the interpretation of mythology. In Chapter 4, it was argued that, in O’Dea’s theory, the fourth dilemma covered both the delimitation of ethos and mythology. Thus, the author sensed that a sixth dilemma should be constructed, one that addressed only one aspect of the expression of the sacred: belief systems or mythologies. A social scientific view of cause and effects was used to model various examples of belief systems. Thereafter, a morphology of beliefs that covered the full range of religion was presented, a structure relevant to folk, archaic, oriental, and occidental variations. To assist the reader to understand more about Islam, a special section of Chapter 4 was devoted to introducing the student to the mythology of Islam. This chapter concluded by explaining what the author terms the mythologies of “human ascent and divine response” and of “divine descent and human response.” Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 were devoted to sacred leadership—both religious leadership in general (Chapter 5) and women (Chapter 6). The O’Dean dilemma of mixed motivation was used to interpret sacred leadership among folk religions, the archaic tradition of ancient Mesopotamia, and the oriental religion of Buddhism. Subsequently, Weber’s classification of prophets was used to consider historical individuals who exemplified founding, reform, renewal, and revolutionary prophets. Weber’s ideal type, the priest, represents the more routinized kind of sacred leader or, in O’Dea’s language, a leader with mixed motivation. To investigate the characteristics of modern American and Canadian clerics, I used this type (the priest) to synthesize a vast array of data on these leaders. In Chapter 6, both the dilemma of mixed motivation and the dilemma of the interpretation of mythology (proposed by this author) were used to understand the role of the feminine in religion in general and in religious leadership in particular. These dilemmas were used, with varying success, as a means to understand women in folk and archaic religions, in early European Christianity, and in nascent Islam. Thereafter, following the Weberian-O’Dean model of the priest as an ideal type, current women clergy were investigated. The seventh chapter was devoted to a central and common feature of religion co–ritual. The phenomenon was given a simple “substantive” definition: “actions that tell the story.” Several examples of these sacred actions were revealed from ancient Mesopotamia, Islam, and Christianity to illustrate this substantive definition of ritual. Thereafter, the more routinized aspects of ritual were considered, and a functional definition was presented, one that described ritual as remembering, social bonding, the regulation of moral behavior, socialization, psychological development, linking humans to nature, empowerment, and evoking the nefarious.

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3 7 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Chapter 8 began with an outline of the dilemma of administration, which was used to investigate the rise of sacred organizations. Most sociology of religion texts use Christian examples to illustrate concepts regarding the definition and classification of various types of sacred institutions. I have introduced the reader to a much wider documentation of the various kinds of organizations by examining the institutionalization of the sacred in folk religion, archaic traditions, Christianity, and Islam. To illustrate the church type of sacred institution in Islam, we considered the Sunni and Shi’ites. The Muslim Kharijites typified the sect while both the Sufi and Assassins were examples of a new religious movement. The modern Islamists were categorized as a movement of renewal. Along with examples from Islam, various kinds of sacred organizations from the Christian tradition were described. The last section of the chapter was devoted to the topics of switching religions and disaffiliation. In Chapter 9, the fourth dilemma, the dilemma of delimitation, introduced the reader to the topic of ethos, which was used as a broad term to describe sacred values, norms, morals, laws, and commandments. Evidence from the study of folk religions, Buddhism, the sacred traditions of ancient Mesopotamia and Egypt, Islam, and Christianity in the United States was presented to argue that there is an intricate relationship between myth, ritual, and ethos. As with ritual, ethos has a variety of functions: empowerment, bonding, linking humans to nature, social integration, worldly success, social control, and alienation. Case examples from folk societies, Buddhism, and Christianity illustrated these functions. The chapter concluded with an analysis of how Christianity in Canada and the United States is being restructured along a conservative-liberal continuum that crystallizes in categorizing ethics along these lines as well. Chapter 10 and Chapter 11 describe the dilemma of power—whether acts of conversion or of coercion characterize a religious authority. They can also be seen as bridging chapters, connecting our investigation of the dilemmas of the institutionalization of religion with our study of how religion is linked to other institutions and culture. Two foci are evident in Chapter 10: caesaropapism and hierocracy. Weber introduced these specialized terms into sociological discourse, and this text has traced historical examples of these paradigms of religious and political authority. First, the chapter outlined caesaropapism’s emergence from the folk religions of Western Europe and from the sacred traditions of ancient Egypt and Rome, using both social and mainstream history for evidence. Next to be considered was caesaropapism in the Holy Roman Empire, in the Ottoman Empire, and in modern Saudi Arabia. Hierocracy, “the rule of the clerics,” was also prevalent in the Central Middle Ages (1100–1300) and the Late Middle Ages (1300–1500). After discussing hierocracy in medieval Christianity, the author presented a short history of the various Christian crusades (and included a social scientific model characterizing these crusades). To this was added a discussion of the vitality and importance of the monks of war, which were the military Catholic orders who were so involved in campaigns against the Muslims. Hierocratic authority in Islam had its genesis at the very birth of the religion. I documented that Muhammad was at once a religious, political, and military leader. His precedent informed our discussion of hierocracy among the Umayyads, the Abbasids, and the imams of modern Iran. Chapter 11 continues the discussion of the fifth dilemma but, in this case, several alternative responses to this dilemma, responses beyond caesaropapism and hierocracy, were considered. These responses consisted of communal and personal withdrawal, political activism,

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separating religious and secular life (or the division paradigm), and civil religion. Because there is little evidence for representations of these types of responses outside of Christianity, the chapter focused on Christian traditions, especially those of the West. Historical and contemporary data were used to outline Anabaptism in general and the Hutterites in particular as examples of communal withdrawal. Then, personal withdrawal was studied as being a result of religion and politics becoming so personal that there is a cultural norm of “political correctness” not to discuss religion in the public sphere and to keep it to oneself. An extension of that norm is the accent on choice, independent thinking, the quest for self, and the individual being the final arbitrator on sacred matters—be they beliefs or ethics. The opposite of this withdrawal is political activism—both liberal and conservative—rooted in the sacred. To illustrate liberal activism inspired by religion, the chapter used the CCF (later the NDP) while conservative religious activism was exemplified by the New Religious Right Christian movement of the United States. America was the example drawn on to present the division paradigm—the separation of the state and religion, which has become a model for the place of religion in the modern, democratic political society. Finally, the origins of civil religion in Christian and Enlightenment philosophy provided a case study of this type of response to the dilemma of power. One may be struck that religion is front and center in the US political campaigns of 2007 and 2008. Is this a sign of civil religion or of the breakdown of the division paradigm? Traces of Karl Marx were seen in this book’s introduction to the social scientific study of religion, where the reader first encountered conflict theory. His work, along with that of Engels, is revisited in Chapter 12 to enable us to understand the complexities of the relationship between religion and the economy. Two models were represented: the Weberian model (when religion is understood to be a factor that effects the economy and other social institutions) and the Marxian one (when the opposite is argued, namely, that religion is nothing but an epiphenomenon of social, economic, and political factors). The author uses both of these models to make a case for both approaches. To outline the Weberian legacy, the chapter presented an extensive analysis of a wide range of Western historical and religious factors that preceded the construction of modern capitalism. Subsequent historical evidence was elucidated to make the case that the famous Weberian thesis connecting the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism was still valid and useful. However, also presented was literature that considers Weber’s thesis to be limited and decreasing in relevance. This scholarship suggests that a heuristic interpretation is better suited for the continuation of our view of religion as a factor of social change. The reader will also have discovered that the Marxian model is another vital way for us to understand the relationship between religion and the economy. An extensive analysis of Islam led us to argue that religion was an inhibitor to social change and to the construction of a modern, capitalistic society. Last, more current evidence for the continuing relevance of the Marxian model was presented. The final chapter considered other links between sacred phenomena and social configurations—between religion and culture. The author subdivided this chapter into two important elements in the religious landscape—secularization and a sacred response to postmodernism. After defining both secularization and its antonym, sacralization, several historical documents were perused to understand that the term secular began as a clerical distinction, to investigate secularization as the transfer of ecclesial property to the state, to

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3 8 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D assess the link between secularization and the Protestant Reformation, and to discern the nineteenth interpretation of the term. Thereafter, a variety of literatures were accessed to make a case for or against the theory of secularization. Two ways of studying secularization were offered: the cultural analytic approach and rational choice theory. Because these were contrasting theories, the author attempted to reconcile the two. The chapter concluded by giving meaning to the illusive sociological term postmodernism, and that was followed by a description of a sacred response to postmodernism—the New Age movement. This has been a long journey. We have travelled by looking at the sacred within (the internal presence of the divine in persons and leaders), the sacred of the symbol (mythology), the sacred between (ritual), the sacred among (religious organizations), and the sacred of the ought to be (ethos). Beyond that, the reader has had a taste of the wide variety of connections between sacred phenomena and the polity, the economy, and culture.

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GLOSSA RY

adat: see urf affective social action: see social action agrarianate citied societies: Societies whose economy was based on agriculture in which cities emerged and were able to dominate the countryside and gain control of the agrarian surplus, using it in the interest of city dwellers.

al-Qaeda: The base. This militant organization was formed in 1986 by Osama bin Laden to channel fighters and funds for the Afghan resistance movement. It moved to become a global military struggle against governments and Western representatives in Muslim states, against America, and against other parts of the West. It is influenced by the fundamentalist world view and militant piety of seventh-century Kharijis, by eighteenth-century Wahhabism, and by contemporary Egyptian extremist movements. Transnational in identity and recruitment and global in ideology, strategy, targets, economic transactions, and network of organizations, the organization embraces extremist militant views that are rejected by mainstream Muslims.

Ahl-i Hadith: An extension of the nineteenthcentury South Asian Tariqah-i Muhammadiyyah movement. It is linked to the tradition of Shah Wali Allah and the eighteenth-century Wahhabi movement. Adherents prefer the direct use of Islamic sources (especially the Hadith) and the exercise of ijtihad (independent Albigensians: A medieval designation for the reasoning) rather than following schools of law “heretics” who lived in parts of southern France (taqlid). The group is reported to have had two during the late twelfth and early thirteenth thousand local branches and two million adher- centuries. They were a branch of the Cathars, a Christian religious sect believing in the incoments in Bangladesh in the mid-1980s. patibility of love and power. From 1165 onwards,

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3 82 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D successive councils of the Catholic Church condemned them, and Innocent III authorized a crusade against them. In 1233, the Inquisition began effective action against these heretics and, by 1300, only a few survived. alchemy: Elementary science with spiritual overtones. The practitioners tried to discover a way to transform material objects into gold and to discover the divine spark identified as the self. Alids: In early Islam, those who followed Ali, the son-in law of Muhammad, as the first rightful caliph and contended that only a member of the Prophet’s clan of Hashim (descendants of Ali) should rule. Believing that political legitimacy lay in genealogy, they fomented numerous uprisings in the last years of Umayyad rule (661–750). Aligarh: A city, located in northern India about 90 miles south-east of New Delhi and in the western part of Uttar Pradesh state, that has been associated with major Muslim educational, political, and ideological movements since the late nineteenth century. The Aligarh Scientific Society and Mohammadan Anglo-Oriental College were centered there to make contemporary European education available to a primarily Muslim public. Ammet: In Egyptian mythology, a monster (part crocodile, lion, and hippopotamus) present at the weighing of the heart, ready to eat those hearts weighed down with sin. Anabaptist movement: A generic term to describe closely related Christian groups who denied the efficacy of infant baptism; they allowed their children to be baptized only at the age of maturity.

Anasazi: A prehistoric Native American inhabitant of the canyons of northern Arizona, New Mexico, and south-western Colorado. Anubis: The god of embalming in ancient Egyptian mythology who was closely associated with Osiris. apotropaic: That which is to avert evil. arhat: In Buddhism, one who is worthy of reverence by virtue of attaining the ultimate state of perfection. Ashari: Partial name of Muslim theologian Abu-al-Hasan Ali ibn Ismail al-Ashari, who died in 935. He bridged the gap between a literal, legalistic interpretation of Islam’s sacred texts (the Qur’an and Hadith) and rationalism by arguing that the Qur’an as revelation was uncreated but that any physical copy of the Qur’an was created. He emphasized the importance of divine power over free will and rational faculties and considered that reason should be used to determine the meanings of revealed truth, to defend this truth, and to persuade others of its validity. ASC: Altered state of consciousness (see SSC). autocephaly: Being independent of external and especially patriarchal authority. Axial Age: Term coined by German philosopher Karl Jaspers to describe the period around the sixth century BCE that saw the beginnings or development of many philosophical and religious traditions, e.g., Platonism, Buddhism, Zoroastrianism, and Confucianism. axis mundi: The center of the earth or of the entire cosmos. Ayatollah: Sign of God. This honorific title in Twelver Shi’ite Islam is common in Iran, and

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G l o s s a r y | 3 83 its use in Iraq is restricted to legal scholars of Iranian origin.

arrival of the Seljuks. Under them, the caliphs became administrative figureheads.

Babai: A minor deity of Egypt, usually malevolent but also connected with the royalty of ancient Egypt. Babai was thought to guard the entrance to the lower world.

caesaropapism: The political system in which an absolute monarch has supreme control over religion within the state and exercises it even in religious matters usually reserved to ecclesiastical authority. The term is most generally used in reference to the authority exercised by the late Roman or Byzantine emperors.

baraka: Spiritual wisdom and blessing given by God to humans. The term, which is used in both Judaism and Islam, has a wide range of meanings depending on context. The act of reciting or reading the Qur’an is considered a means of receiving baraka, and uncommonly pious individuals are endowed with it. bioenergetics: The study of energy transformation in living systems. Brahman: In Hinduism, an all-inclusive being or reality that, in some cases, is a personal, primary deity but, in other cases, an impersonal entity that is a neuter “something” without motion or feelings. brahmans: Members of the highest of the four varnas, or classes, of Hindu society. The brahmans were traditionally the custodians, interpreters, and teachers of religious knowledge, and, as priests, acted as intermediaries between humans, the world, and God. breaking points: Those events in life that have tendency to “break us.” Examples include death, illness, natural disasters, or unemployment. burka: A full-body garment that leaves only a grill for seeing. While its use is not mandatory in Afghanistan any more, it is still widely used. Buyids: Also known as Buwayhids. This dynasty of mercenary soldiers from western Iran and Iraq dominated the Abbasid Empire from the midtenth to the mid-eleventh century, until the

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caliph/caliphate: Terms adopted by the dynastic rulers of the Muslim world to refer to the chief civil and religious ruler (caliph) and his office (caliphate). The caliph is considered to be the successor to the Prophet Muhammad and the supreme political-military ruler of the Muslim community. The first caliphs were chosen by the consensus of the Muslim community’s elders and were known as leaders of the believers, but, subsequently, the caliphate became hereditary. Until the conquest of Baghdad in 1258, the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties dominated the caliphate, and the caliphs had real power. Their power waned under the Mamluk sultanate, which kept members of the Abbasid family as titular caliphs in Cairo until the Ottoman conquest of Egypt in 1517. The caliph’s traditional duties are to enforce the law, defend and expand Islam, distribute wealth (in particular, the spoils of war and alms), and administer and supervise the government. cella: The body of the temple, as distinct from the portico and other external structures, dedicated to the deity. Celtic religion: The pre-Christian folk religion of the Irish, Scottish, Welsh, Cornish, and English. chador: An all-enveloping garment that leaves only the face uncovered. Originally the chador was used by upper-class Persian Christians and Hindus hundreds of years ago.

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3 8 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D charisma: Term applied by Weber to persons or groups who appeal to peoples’ extraordinary needs beyond physical or social necessity. Leaders with charisma hold no official position but receive legitimation if they are successful as warriors, holy people, or miracle workers or if they can convince others of a “higher truth.” clerics: Members of the clergy. The term derives from a Greek word meaning those who served at an altar, but, in medieval times, it was applied to anyone who had once had his hair cut in the form of a crown (a tonsure) in the presence of his bishop and who had a written verification of this. Clerics had to be legitimate, free boys or men with at least some schooling. Companions: People thought to have lived with, heard, or seen the Prophet Muhammad. In Sunni Islam, the Companions are revered as authorities on the conduct of Muhammad and are considered models of good behavior. compensator: In the sociology of religion, a reward for religious beliefs or behaviors that will be obtained in the distant future or in some other context that cannot be immediately verified. Congregationalism: In the seventeenth century in the American colonies, the pilgrims and the Puritans came to be known as Congregationalists. The church is characterized by separation from the Church of England, the maintenance of infant baptism, and the philosophy that each congregation is independent and has full authority to make decisions. Over time, the church became differentiated into two denominations but became united in 1957 under the name of the United Church of Christ. Constitution of Medina: Charter drafted by Muhammad to end the tribal fighting amidst the Muslims, Jews, and pagans of Medina. It outlined the rights and duties of all citizens and the

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relationship of the Muslim community to other communities on the basis of religious confession rather than tribal ties or ethnicity. It is considered the ideal model for an Islamic state. correspondence hypothesis: In the sociology of religion, the theory that individual differences in attachment to caregivers and romantic partners correspond to individual differences in beliefs about and images of God and to related aspects of religious faith. cult/cultic: A form of worship or reverential homage rendered to a divine being or beings. Some scholars consider cults to be more innovative or more alienated from traditional religions than other groups of believers. Cultic means anything to do with the cult. dar al-harb: Territory of war. These are the territories bordering on dar al-Islam (or the territory of Islam) and that do not have a treaty of peace or nonaggression with Muslim rulers. The people and leaders of these territories are called upon to convert to Islam or face war. Some trace the concept to Muhammad’s messages to the Persian, Abyssinian, and Byzantine emperors demanding that they choose between conversion and war. The concept has little significance today. dar al-Islam: Territory of Islam. This term denotes the region of Muslim sovereignty, where Islamic law prevails, but, according to some schools of Islamic law, territory conquered by non-believers can remain dar al-Islam as long as a judge administers Islamic laws and Muslims and non-Muslims are protected. deacon: In the Catholic and Episcopal Church, a rank in the ministry below the presbyter (priest) and bishop; in some Protestant churches, lay officers who assist the minister or pastor. According to Christian tradition, deacons were assigned to help bishops or priests with mainly

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Glossary | 385 material or secular duties, but they did read or chant scripture and guided common people in prayer. Their role in public worship diminished in 595, but, because they were still responsible for collecting and distributing alms, they remained important. An archdeacon, or the chief deacon of a particular region, was often the bishop’s principal administrative officer. deist: One who believes in a supreme being or creator but thinks that this deity does not intervene in the world or universe. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, deists in Europe argued that this supreme being could be known only through natural religion and reason rather than through revelation or religious teachings. dharma: Word used in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism to mean some variation of the essential or fundamental truth inherent in all things. In Buddhism, dharma is the truth of the Buddha that is to be passed on and is termed the great tradition of Buddha. It also reflects the underlying law of reality. dhikr: Remembering or reminding. In Islam, the dhikr is any act of devotion during which one reminds oneself of God, as is commanded in the Qur’an. In Sufi devotions, the term refers to both the regular activity of remembrance and to specific litanies and prayers involved in the act of remembering. dhimmis: Minorities under Muslim rule who were protected, especially Jews and Christians. disenchantment: A term coined by Weber meaning the eradication of mystery, emotion, tradition, and affectivity and its replacement by rational calculation. divination: The art or skill of seeing or divining the unknown (e.g., the future, the location of lost items, the identity of wrongdoers or future marriage partners) by calling on the power of

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“divinity” or the deity. It is undertaken by recognized and designated specialists who use mechanical means or manipulative techniques. Dome of the Rock: Islamic shrine in the Haram al-Sharif or Temple Mount of Jerusalem erected circa 692 by the Umayyad caliph Abd alMalik over a rock (sakhra) that is sacred to both Muslims and Jews. According to Jewish tradition, the rock is the foundation stone of creation, the place where Abraham showed himself willing to sacrifice his son to God, and the site of the final Third Temple. For Muslims, the rock is where the Prophet Muhammad left for a miraculous journey (miraj) to heaven and hell. The domed Islamic shrine was placed as a visual challenge to the nearby dome of the Church of the Holy Sepulchre. Dominicans: A Catholic religious order known as the Order of Preachers or, in England, as the Black Friars. The Dominican order was founded by St. Dominic in early thirteenth century France, but it took definite shape at the General Chapter at Bologna in 1220. Dominicans are dedicated to preaching, the salvation of souls, and to demonstrating compassion, and study has always been important. Dominicans also relinquished possessions and practiced strict poverty, both individual and corporate. The order owned only its houses and churches, and communities were supported by alms not revenue. Druze: An Islamic religious group or a member of that group, which began as an offshoot of Ismaili Shi’ism. Founded in Cairo in the early tenth century by Hamzah ibn Ali, a Persian missionary, the faith professes that truth is revealed to their teachers through revelation. Followers regard the Fatimid caliph al-Hakim ibn Amr Allah as the “awaited imam”—the one who will return as the Mahdi at the end of time, and they call themselves al-Muwahhidun (unitarians) due to their strict emphasis on monotheism.

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3 8 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Ea: A Sumerian god of fresh water, wisdom, and incantations. Its main symbols were a goat-fish and a horned crown on a shrine. ego-ideal: Freud’s term to describe an individual’s internal notion of perfection, to which the ego tries to conform. It is derived from early identification with parents and can be dysfunctional, for example, in a person who, during childhood, either did not have a father or whose father did not parent adequately. elective affinity: A term used by Weber to describe the correspondence between aspects of Protestantism and the spirit or ethos of capitalism. Without being aware, necessarily, of the connection or affinity between the two, people who hold one system of belief (Protestantism) have a tendency to build and flourish within the other system (capitalism). encratitic: A term describing characteristics related to the Encratites, early Christians who carried their ascetic practices and doctrines to extremes (e.g., no wine, no meat, no marriage), which were considered heretical in most cases. entrepot: A place to which goods are brought for redistribution to other parts of the world, for example, a strategically situated trading town or city, often a port.

self until God is all, which is the state just prior to experiencing union with God. In early Sufism, achieving fana was the reason to follow the Sufi path (tariqah). fasciandus: Related to fascination with and the desire to be close to the sacred—to experience exaltation, love, and mercy. fatwa: An authoritative legal ruling on a point of Islamic law given by a jurist or legal scholar (a mufti) in response to a question posed by an individual or a court of law. fealty: The fidelity of a vassal or feudal tenant to his lord or the obligation of such fidelity. fiqh: Islamic jurisprudence or the fallible, human attempt to understand divine law (Shari’ah). Although Muslim law or Shari’ah is immutable, all-inclusive, transcendent, and infallible, fiqh, being the human understanding of that law, is fallible and changeable. The term usul al-fiqh, meaning methods of legal interpretation and analysis, should be distinguished from the word fiqh, which refers to the total sum of human understanding of divine law.

evil eye: A glance or stare through which, it is widely believed, the eye can cause mischief or damage or cast spells.

Five Pillars of Islam: The five acts considered obligatory for all Muslims and presented in the Qur’an as necessities of worship and signs of commitment to Islam. The five pillars are the shahadah (witnessing belief in God as a single entity and in Muhammad as God’s prophet), performing salat (praying the prescribed five daily prayers), paying zakah (a tithe for the poor), observing sawm (a month-long period of fasting and abstinence during the daylight hours of Ramadan), and performing the hajj (pilgrimage during the prescribed month) at least once in a lifetime.

fana: Passing away. In Sufi Islam, the term refers to the mystical state of the obliteration of the concerns and consciousness of the human

folk religion: The religion of small, local communities or regions, which often stands apart from large religious systems or traditions.

epigr aphica l: Relating to epigraphs or inscriptions; often, in archaeology, relating to engraved inscriptions on rock or on a comparable hard substance such as a building, statue, or tomb.

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Glossary | 387 In a wider sense, folk religions synthesize popular beliefs and practices related to the experience of the sacred or appropriate religious beliefs and practices for use at a popular level.

occasion. These distinctions are evident when a citizen is “forced to be free” from his or her own self-interest by being constrained to follow the general will.

Fr anciscans: The Order of Friars Minor founded by St. Francis of Assisi in 1209 when he gave his followers their first rule, now lost. This rule was recast in 1221 and brought into its final form in 1223, when Honorius III (pope from 1216–1227) confirmed it by bull. Franciscans were known for their missions to the New World and for embracing apostolic poverty.

Gilgamesh: King of Uruk and may mean “the old man is a young man” in Sumerian. He is listed with gods in early texts. His epithet: “King of the Earth.”

Franks: Members of Germanic peoples present in Europe in the third to the ninth centuries. It is said that they originally came from Pomerania on the Black Sea and spread into the Roman Empire around the third century, gradually conquering most parts of Gaul, Germany, and Italy under the Merovingian and Carolingian dynasties. Freemasonry: An alternative gnostic spirituality adapted to the modern world. Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: From the sociology of Ferdinand Tönnies, these German terms are usually used in tandem to distinguish between traditional forms of “community” and more modern and impersonal forms of “society.” Gemeinschaft was the world of close, emotional, face-to-face ties, attachment to place, ascribed social status, and a homogeneous and regulated community. Gesellschaft has come to be linked with urbanism, industrial life, mobility, heterogeneity, and impersonality. general will: Term used by Rousseau to denote the collective will of society, which is the embodiment of its citizens’ common interest. Opposite to the general will is the will of any particular individual or group, as well as “the will of all”—by which Rousseau means the preference of members of society on this or that

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glebe: Land belonging to or yielding revenue to a parish church or ecclesiastical benefice. gnosticism: A complex of religious movements, having at least some of its roots in Jewish and pagan thought but appearing in developed form as a Christian alternative. Key elements include the distinction between a remote and supreme divinity and an inferior creator god (a demiurge or skilled artisan) responsible for the imperfect material world; the importance of knowledge to salvation and redemption, which is conceived of as a return to the divine realm; and a belief that Jesus was not only the emissary of the supreme God but a divine being who only appeared to be human. Gordian Knot: The symbol of a complicated problem that only bold action can solve. The original Gordian Knot was said to have connected the yoke of the chariot of King Gordius, founder of the Phrygian capital of Gordium, to its pole. Tradition had it that only the future ruler of Asia would be able to untie this knot, which, according to legend, Alexander the Great sliced through with his sword. The phrase “cutting the Gordian Knot” has thus come to mean solving a difficult problem by taking forceful action that others could not have conceived. Gr a nd Mufti: The leading mufti (legal scholar or jurist) who serves as an advisor on religious matters to government or as the chief legal authority of a city or state. The Ottoman

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3 8 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Empire institutionalized the position in 1433 (See mufti.).

it is proper for other groups to worship different gods.

habitualization: The process by which social acts that are repeated over and over again become habits and are acted on without conscious awareness.

hermeticism: With origins from ancient Egypt, this religious philosophy synthesized gnosticism, Neoplatonism, astrology, and various other spiritual traditions from Greece.

Hadith: An Arabic word with many meanings, including speech, report, and narrative. In Islamic tradition, it means a record of the sayings and doings of the prophet Muhammad and his Companions. To Muslims, it is seen to be a source of law, dogma, and ritual second only to the Qur’an itself.

heterodoxy: Departing from or opposed to the usual beliefs and established doctrines of a religion. Heterodoxy is the opposite of orthodoxy, and the term is often used to mean inclining toward heresy.

hagiocracy: Rule or government by religious authorities or by people considered to be holy, for example, saints or prophets. hajj: The annual pilgrimage to Mecca during the month of Dhu al-Hijjah. Approximately two million Muslims perform the hajj each year, and its performance is one of the Five Pillars of Islam. If physically and financially able, each adult Muslim should perform it at least once.

hierocratic: With the characteristics of a hierocracy, a system in which a religious leader (e.g., priest, pope, bishop, patriarch, or caliph) takes on state responsibilities or authority. Some scholars distinguish this term from theocracy, which refers to a state being ruled by a deity directly. However, most authors use the terms as synonyms.

Helpers: Two tribes that invited Muhammad to Yathrib (Medina) to settle a feud between them. They, along with the emigrants, established the first Islamic community.

hijab: The various forms of head, face, or body covering worn by some Muslim women in public, often referred to as the veil. The practice of wearing the hijab originated among the elite women of Byzantium, Greece, and Persia, and it spread among urban populations in the Muslim world after the Islamic conquest of these areas, becoming pervasive under Turkish rule as a mark of distinction and wealth. In the Islamic tradition, the hijab symbolizes modesty, privacy, and morality. Some in the West view the hijab as symbolizing the subordination and oppression of women in Islam. In recent times, it has come to symbolize Islamic consciousness; the willing participation of women in the Islamist movement; the reaffirmation of Islamic identity, morality, and nationalism; and the rejection of the materialism, commercialism, and culture of the West.

henotheism: A form of faith in which a nation, tribe, group, or family worships only one god but recognizes that other gods exist and, often, that

Hijrah: Arab word meaning migration or breaking off of relations that is used to refer to the departure of Muhammad and his Companions

Hanafi: The most widespread school of Islamic legal thought (madhhab). The Hanafi School of Law originated in eighth century Iraq and was founded by Abu Hanifah. haram: Legal term for that which is forbidden or inviolable under Islamic law. Also describes the area surrounding the three holy cities of Islam: Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem.

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Glossary | 389 from Mecca in 622 AD, the first year in the Islamic calendar. The Prophet and his disciples travelled to Medina to escape persecution, so the Hijrah is also an Islamic symbol of the willingness to suffer for the faith and to remain hopeful in the face of persecution. In modern times, it has been used to oppose colonial rule, legitimize Muslim migrations, settle Bedouin tribes, and consolidate power. It can also mean a symbolic withdrawal from Western culture. Hol i n e s s C h u r c h o r t he Hol i n e s s Movement: A predominantly American religious movement that arose in the nineteenth century among Protestants and that emphasizes a doctrine of perfectibility. Members believe that entire sanctification takes place instantaneously upon conversion. The largest churches are the Church of the Nazarene, which emerged in America in 1908, and the Church of God, which dates from 1881. Holy Roman Empire: The varying complex of lands in western and central Europe ruled over first by Frankish and then by German kings for ten centuries, from Charlemagne’s coronation in 800 until the renunciation of the imperial title in 1806. Horus: A falcon god of ancient Egypt who was a creator-god and an opponent of Seth. He was the son of Osiris and his successor to the kingship of Egypt. human capital: All the spiritual, personal, economic, and political resources that humans have. ideal type: An analytical construct that serves as a measuring rod to determine similarities and differences in concrete cases; it does not exist in its pure form, but it is of heuristic value for discussing the real world.

ijma: The consensus or agreement by which Islamic law can respond to new situations and one of the sources of Sunni law. Twelver Shi’ites do not consider the ijma to be an appropriate source of the law. An ijma is needed when the Qur’an and Sunna (the most authoritative sources of law) are silent on a particular legal matter. The process of establishing an ijma varies, and disputes arise regarding whose opinions should be considered in its formation; most agree that looking for consensus among historical texts that represent the ideas of the Companions and the family of the Prophet, as well as the people of Medina, is the best policy. Once an ijma is established, it serves as a precedent, but decisions based on ijma generally cannot override a statement of the Qur’an or the Sunna. ijtihad: Islamic term meaning a supreme and pious effort by a trained jurist to take into account all the relevant legal texts (primarily the Qur’an and Hadith) and principles of interpretation to construct a law for a particular human condition. The ijtihad is also a source of Sunni law. imam: An Arabic title meaning leader or pattern or one who stands in front. The imam is the head of a Muslim community and its spiritual and secular role model. In Sunni legal writings, the title is given to the leader of the prayers in the mosque. Among Shi’ites, the imam is an infallible intermediary between the human and the divine and a successor of Muhammad, appointed by God, who has proved himself as a leader through struggle. He is consequently able to direct all areas of human life. incubi: An evil spirit that lies on persons in their sleep and, especially, one that has sexual intercourse with women while they are sleeping (see succubi). inner-worldly asceticism: From Weber wherein he contrasts inner-worldly asceticism

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39 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D with outer-worldly asceticism. Both refer to the locus of salvation orientation of which the former is linked to concerns of the earth such as wealth (or its denial), health, happiness, and peace. The latter is the asceticism of eternity, heaven, and paradise. The focus is on the action necessary to achieve heaven. institutionalization: A process that occurs when typifications become reciprocal between persons and persons have roles that are linked together into patterns. interpretative sociology or verstehen: The capacity for a researcher of human subjects to endeavor to interpret the subjective meaning a social actor has. Ishmael/Ismail: The son of Abraham (Ibrahim) and his wife Sarah’s maid Hagar, who, according to Judeo-Christian texts, was driven away after Sarah gave birth to Isaac. According to Muslim tradition, Ismail was the son who, because of his deep faith, accepted his fate as his father’s sacrificial offering to God. Muslims also believe Ismail to have built the Kaaba with his father as a sign of God’s covenant with them, and they consider him to be the founder of the Arab nation. Today, the Isaac/Ismail conflict is often used as a paradigm for the Jewish/Arab conflict. Islamism/Islamists: A movement of Islamic renewal and its participants. Members assert that Islamic approaches to development are superior to capitalism and socialism because of their attention to spiritual and material needs and their concern for equity and social justice. Personal wealth is permitted, but such accumulation is accompanied by responsibility for the basic needs of the less fortunate. An Islamic theory of development would thus be a set of modernized ethical standards to guide the economic, social, and political development of the Muslim world.

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isnad: The list of authorities who have communicated or transmitted a particular Islamic saying or doctrine, particularly the chain of authority that verifies a Hadith. jahiliyyah: Islamic concept meaning ignorance of Allah and of divine guidance, used to refer to the pre-Islamic period of Arab history and to the contemporary condition of anyone not following Islam. jamaah: Islamic society or community. jihad: Arabic word meaning to strive, to struggle, to exert effort, or to fight. Generally, jihad means to struggle in the way of Allah, and it can involve a fight against the unholy aspects of one’s self, an effort to convert others to Islam, or a struggle for the moral betterment of society or the Muslim community. Jihad can also mean armed struggle against persecution and oppression. As jihad is the only warfare considered permissible in Islam, it is carefully defined in Islamic law and its pursuance is regulated. In recent times, wide-ranging opinions have emerged about the definition of jihad and about who has the authority to proclaim religious jihad, which is distinguished from other struggles by the addition of the word Islamic or holy. Also, the term has been used loosely and stripped of its religious connotations to mean any struggle, in a way that is similar to the contemporary Western use of the word crusade. Kaaba: Cube shaped central shrine of Islam built in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, some say by Abraham (Ibrahim) and Ishmael (Ismail), and revered by Muslims as the house of god. The Kaaba is at the center of the Great Mosque and provides the focus of the hajj pilgrimage, as well as the exact point that all Muslims face during prayer. karma: The law that actions have consequences affecting a person’s future rebirth, which is the driving force behind the cycle of reincarnation

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G l o s s a r y | 39 1 in Asian religions. It is believed that every good act will bear good fruit but every bad act will produce negative results. Kharijis/Kharijites: Followers of an early Muslim sect, neither Sunni nor Shi’ite, although they originally supported the Shi’ite leader Ali’s claim to the caliphate against Muawiyah’s. The Kharijites, who believed that the caliph should be selected on the basis of his wisdom and piety, turned against Ali when he agreed to submit his quarrel with Muawiyah to arbitration. legitimation: The process by which institutions become legitimate with reference to mythologies or ideologies. Lombard Kingdom: The Lombards were a Germanic tribe who invaded Italy in 568 and occupied Lombard (named after them) and central Italy. Beginning with Pepin III’s campaigns in the middle of the eight century, they were finally conquered by Charlemagne in 774. Maat: Egyptian goddess of truth, order, and cosmic balance or a term meaning these characteristics, which are personified in the goddess. As a goddess of the underworld, Maat assisted in the weighing of souls by placing her feather on the appropriate side of the scale. madrasa: A school of higher learning or a college that teaches Islamic sciences, law, and philosophy. During the tenth and eleventh centuries, the madrasa taught Islamic law, primarily, although other religious sciences and related subjects were taught as options. As a consequence of the Muslim world’s various experiences with and responses to Western colonialism and education, the madrasa experienced tremendous change. In some parts of the world today, the term may be used to refer to any school that offers religious study based on the Qur’an.

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Mahayana Buddhism: One of the two main forms of Buddhism, which regards itself as a reformed and more adequate expression of the dharma than that offered by earlier forms, such as what it calls Hinayana Buddhism (meaning the lesser or inferior vehicle). Mahayana Buddhism, which is prominent in Tibet, Mongolia, China, Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, emphasizes compassion for all sentient beings, and practitioners strive to manifest the Great Compassion exemplified by the bodhisattva (ideal practitioner). Mahdi: The “divinely” or “rightly guided” and prophesied spiritual and temporal leader whom Muslims believe will rule during an era of justice and true belief just before the end of time, but also an honorary title given by early Muslims to Muhammad and the first four caliphs, i.e., the rightly guided caliphs. The concept of the Mahdi as the expected restorer of Islam was developed by the Shi’ites and some Sunnis into belief in a messianic deliverer who would return to champion their cause. Both Islamic groups conceive of the Mahdi as belonging to Muhammad’s family, as appearing to a sinful and corrupt world, as spreading abundance, justice, and the Islamic faith while defeating Islam’s enemies. Ma lleus M a leficarum: Famous treatise whose title means Hammer of the Witches, published circa 1486 by Jacob Sprenger and Heinrich Kramer. It was the textbook of the day on witchcraft, setting out how to discover and punish it. mana: A word of Polynesian (e.g., Hawaiian and Maori) origin but also found in Melanesian and Micronesian cultures, meaning the power of the elemental forces of nature embodied in an object or person. Manichaeism: A major gnostic religion that was founded by the prophet Mani in Iran and that flourished between the third and the seventh centuries. Manichaeism was dualistic, conceiving

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39 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D of God (the Father of Light) as spiritual and of evil (the Prince of Darkness) as material. A cosmic struggle between these forces goes on as the light is delivered back to its original state, and humans are helped in this process by “apostles of light,” such as Mani. Mara: In Hinduism, a god of mortal disease that embodies the attraction of sensual pleasure, which makes humans reckless in what they do. In Buddhism, Mara is the opponent and tempter of the Buddha. Marduk: Patron god of Babylon and consort of Zarpanitu. He was the national god of Babylonia and, as such, was known simply as Bel, meaning Lord. He was an agricultural god, and his name may mean the Bull-calf of the Sun. market model: A concept from rational choice theory that views religion as a non-tangible product to be produced, distributed, exchanged, and consumed like other tangible products in a society. mesmerism: Named after Viennese physician Franz Mesmer (1734–1815) who taught that everything was connected to everything else and that the source of this nexus is a universal magnetic field. He treated patients by using magnets to correct “imbalances” in this field, which he believed caused their ill health. millennialist: Generally, one who believes that a coming age or messiah, usually one arriving imminently, will reward a particular group of believers. The term is used more narrowly to refer to one who believes in a future thousand-year reign of Christ, hence in a coming millennium. Mogul Empire: A Muslim empire founded in India by Babur (d. 1530), after his 1526 conquest of Dehli and Agra. Babar was descended on his father’s side from Timur-i-Lang (Tamerlane or Timur the Lame) and on his mother’s from

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Genghis Khan. At the height of its power, around 1700, the Mogul Empire controlled the entire subcontinent except the far south. In time, its power waned, and former provinces became independent states, until the British deposed the last emperor in 1857. However, over the centuries of its power, the Mogul Empire was one of the three great Islamic empires, the other two being the empire’s of the Safavids and Ottomans, and one in which some of the highest expressions of Islamic culture were achieved, particularly in architecture. moksa: Meaning release or liberation, it is the fourth and ultimate goal of Hinduism: freedom from the round of death and rebirth. mores: Customs or conventions regarded as characteristic of a community. mufti: An Islamic legal expert or jurist who can give, upon request, an authoritative although nonbinding ruling (fatwa) on a point of religious law (See Grand Mufti.). muhaddith: An Islamic title given to someone who knows and narrates the Hadith. mutah: A temporary, private, and verbal marriage between a man and an unmarried woman, the object of which is sexual pleasure not bearing and raising children. This type of marriage contract, although a pre-Islamic tradition, still has legal sanction among some followers of Islam, i.e., the Twelver Shi’ites in Iran. The Sunni reject its validity, however. The minimum duration of the contract varied from between three days to one year. After dissolution of the mutah, the woman had to undergo a period of sexual abstinence (iddah) so that, if she were pregnant, the child’s legitimate father could be determined. Mutazilis: School of thought within Islam that originated in eighth century Basra (Iraq), which believed in the absolute unity, oneness,

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G l o s s a r y | 39 3 uniqueness, and justice of God and emphasized the difficulty that human’s have in using language to conceptualize God. Followers rejected anthropomorphism, considered the Qur’an to be created rather than eternal, opposed the doctrine of predestination and maintained that humans had free will, and emphasized that human reason and revelation were important in determining the correctness of an action.

irreconcilably different, that no one person has more or less authority than the other, and that they are the ones holding the true faith.

mysterium tremendum: Latin phrase meaning great mystery and related to the awesomeness and distance of God.

Neoplatonism: A philosophical-religious movement during the early centuries of the Christian era marked by the idea that the One (the ultimate, omnipresent, and transcendental Good) is superior to and gives rise to the realm of the “nous” or the mind (intelligence), which gives rise to souls, some of whom become bodies. The world soul is co-extensive with the material world.

mythology: A system of beliefs common to a social group, an institution, or a society. It is distinguished from beliefs that are internal to the believer.

New Thought: A nineteenth century movement that emerged in the United States whose founder, Phineas Parkhurst Quimby (1802–1866), defined god as the divine mind.

Naqshbandi Tariqah: One of the largest and most active and widespread Sufi orders. It traces its spiritual lineage back to Abu Bakr, the first caliph, but the order was founded in Bukhara during the fourteenth century. Followers practice strict adherence to Islamic law, are sober in their devotional practices, and perform the silent dhikr (remembrance of God) rather than one with music or dance. The order is frequently active in politics: it resisted Russian imperialism in Dagestan in the nineteenth century, led rebellions against Chinese rule in Xinjiang, was active in the Soviet-Afghan war, and passively opposes secularism in Turkey and elsewhere today. The order has branches across the globe, from North America to Indonesia, but it is particularly influential in Turkey and among the Kurds.

niqab: A veil worn by some Muslim women that covers the face, leaving only the eyes exposed. It is sometimes worn with a long, shapeless gown called an abaya or jilbab.

Neopaganism: As part of new religious movements, the social phenomenon refers to a revival of paganism, especially of the Greco-Roman variety. It emphasizes a belief in many deities, and, especially among worshippers of female ones, nature is considered sacred and the feasts to be celebrated are seasonal ones. Neopagans contend that many religions are radically and

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nirvana: The final goal and attainment in Indian religions. Hindus see nirvana as the extinction of worldly desires and attachments so that union with God is possible. In Buddhism, there is no self or soul to attain union with God after death. Nirvana therefore represents the realization that that is so. It is the condition of the absolute cessation of entanglement or attachment, in which there is the extinction of desire and of individual consciousness. nones: Those who do not belong to any organized religion. noumena: A term especially associated with Kant denoting things as they are in themselves, in other words, things that are objects of pure reason or that are thought as opposed to things as they are for us, namely, knowable by the senses (phenomena).

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39 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D numeniferous: Having the characteristic of carrying the sacred.

Westernization of Iran and the establishment of Zoroastrianism.

oblate: A person dedicated to a religious or monastic life who has not taken vows. The term is most often used to refer to a child dedicated by his or her parents to a religious house and placed there to be brought up.

palimpsest: A piece of vellum or parchment that has been written on many times and within which traces of the earlier layers can still be discerned. Applied to the human life course, it means that adult lives are moulded from many layers of life experience that, together, result in maturity or, in many cases, dysfunctional lives.

occultism: Various beliefs and practices concerned with the knowledge and use of supernatural forces and especially with attempts to work apparent miracles not by the power of God but by the use of hidden forces beyond human control. oikoumene: Term derived from a Greek word meaning inhabited world and used in antiquity to mean the whole earth. orthodoxy: The quality, practice, or instance of being orthodox or of conforming to traditional beliefs or established doctrine. See heterodoxy. orthopraxy: Term meaning right practice and referring to the proper observance of religious rituals and actions, just as orthodoxy refers to right belief. Many religions (for example, Hinduism, Islam, and, to some extent, Judaism) emphasize the performance of religious acts and consider that people will have to account for these acts on the day of judgement. Osiris: In Egyptian mythology, he is the god of the dead and the legendary primeval king of Egypt slain by his brother Seth. outer-worldly asceticism: see inner-worldly asceticism Pahlavi dynasty: Founded by Shah Reza Pahlavi (died in 1944) that continued until its overthrow in 1979 by K homeini. The Pahlavi shahs were committed to a full-scale

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papyrological: Related to the study of papyrus manuscripts made from a tall, aquatic plant native to the Nile valley. This material on which to write was prepared from thin strips of the pith of this plant laid and pressed together, and it was used by the ancient Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans. patrimonial/patrimonialism: Related to the noun patrimony, which means a property inherited from one’s father or male ancestor or anything derived from one’s father or male ancestors. A patrimony could also be an estate or endowment belonging by ancient right to a church. Pentecostal: A word designating a group of Christians that, in the early twentieth century, experienced “Spirit baptism,” speaking in tongues, and other charismatic gifts. These Pentecost experiences were reported among various revivalist or Holiness groups in America; those occurring in Los Angeles in 1906 attracted attention. The largest Pentecostal body in the United States is the “Assemblies of God.” phenomena: Things shown, or revealed, or manifest in human experience as opposed to objects and events as they are in themselves (or noumena). pietistic movement: A reform movement within Protestantism, begun in the late seventeenth century German Lutheran church

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G l o s s a r y | 39 5 and lasting into the twentieth century. Pietists sought to revitalize Protestantism by emphasizing the spiritual rather than institutions and dogma and by concentrating on the practice of personal piety rooted in inner experience and expressed in a life of religious devotion. pir or murshid: Terms meaning old person or one who guides that refer to a Sufi master responsible for guiding and directing disciples on the various Sufi “ways” or “paths” (tariqahs) toward God. The pir must bestow the practices, liturgy, formulas, and symbols of a specific tariqah or path in the same manner in which he received them, preserving continuity in a line of pirs back to the original master. positivism: A view or system of inquiry associated with French philosopher Auguste Comte that values observable or positive facts and the relationships between them as the highest stage of knowing, above the theological and the metaphysical. The concept is often used more broadly to mean an outlook that rejects any assertion that cannot be verified scientifically or through logical or mathematical proof. postmodernism: Postmodernism refers to cultural products (art, movies, architecture, music, video and computer games, and the like) that are seen as different from modern cultural products. pr ebend, pr ebendal, or pr ebendary: Words related to the right to collect a portion of the revenues assigned to a specific institution, usually a cathedral or a church, or to the property from which this stipend was collected. Also, words related to a stipend furnished by a cathedral or collegiate church to a clergyman (as a canon) in its chapter. private troubles: A term made popular in sociological discourse by C. W. Mills (1916–1962) and used to distinguish personal problems from

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public issues. Private troubles have to do with one’s self and with those limited areas of social life of which a person is directly and personally aware, e.g., depression resulting in job loss. public issues: Issues or difficulties having to do with matters that transcend the local environments of the individual and the range of his or her inner life, e.g., the failure of market processes resulting in job loss. The term is the counter concept to the notion of private troubles, delineated in the sociology of C.W. Mills. purdah: A term meaning various ways of secluding women or of protecting them from men in traditional Muslim societies. Purdah may involve confining women to a separate space within the household or to the company of only other women and close male relatives, the separation of men and women in public places, or practices such as veiling the female form and having women adopt self-effacing mannerisms. qadi: In Islam, a judge. Qajar dynasty: Persian dynasty of Turkic descent that ruled Iran between 1796 and 1925. Agha Muhammad Khan, the founder, unified many tribes and ended eighteenth-century civil strife. After Iran’s occupation during World War I, Reza Khan (also known as Reza Shah Pahlavi) led a coup against the last ruler of the Qajar dynasty and established the Pahlavi dynasty in 1925. qiyas: A term derived from the Arabic word meaning measure and used in Islamic law to refer to the process of deducing, by using analogy, legal rulings from the Qur’an or Sunna on matters not explicitly covered by either. Quakers: A popular name for the Religious Society of Friends, a group of Christians originally called Children of the Light, Friends in (or of) the Truth, or just Friends. The Quaker

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39 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D movement was founded in seventeenth century England by George Fox, who preached a simple, personal religion that relied on the immediacy of Christ’s teaching within each person as opposed to ordained ministers, consecrated buildings, and rituals of worship. Qur’an: The sacred Islamic book or scripture (whose name means recitation) believed to be the word of God transmitted through the Prophet Muhammad. rational social action: see social action Reconquista: Military campaigns over a long period by Christian states to recapture territory in Spain and Portugal from the Muslims, who had occupied most of the Iberian Peninsula by 718 AD. Reconquista ended in 1492 with fall of Granada. It had important social consequences because it cultivated a warrior ethic among the Spaniards and emphasized the notion of a religious crusade. religion: The individual and social experience of the sacred that is manifested in mythologies, rituals, and ethos and integrated into a collective, such as a community or an organization. Religion can be defined -substantively: what religion is in itself -functionally: what religion does for a person or a society -formally: including both substantive and functional elements rewards: Defined in the sociology of religion as religious activity that results in tangible benefits, such as social status, earning a living, leisure, and human companionship. routinization of charisma: The process by which charisma is eroded but its form or structural vestige remains. Because charisma is unstable, it frequently passes into other kinds

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of authority: royal, aristocratic, democratic, or hierocratic. See also charisma. Sabbatarianism: Excessively strict observance of the sabbath (sometimes Saturday but most often Sunday) as the divinely ordained day of rest. sacred: Generally, connected with the divine or deserving veneration because holy or numinous; associated with numen (spirit or divine power) or hagios (sainthood or holiness). There are many aspects of this term: -religious: concerning the supernatural -set-apart: any object that is evaluated beyond utility -transcendent: takes a person outside of self and puts him or her in contact with the fundamental forces of the universe Safavid dynasty: Persian dynasty that ruled Iran from 1501 to 1722 and helped established its theocratic and territorial boundaries. The founder of the dynasty, Shah Ismail, claimed descent from a Shi’ite Sufism order, and, eventually, Shi’ism became the main distinguishing feature in Persian religious life, in comparison to the Sunni religion practiced by Ottomans, Uzbeks, and Moguls. A literary and philosophical renaissance occurred under the influence of this Shi’ism. salat: The ritual prayer of Muslims, performed five times daily, which forms the second pillar of Islam. sangha: Religious communities in Buddhism. The word means gathering or community or, more specifically, those who follow the teachings of the Buddha (i.e., the four groups of Buddhists: monks, nuns, laymen, and laywomen). It more usually refers to a community of monks or nuns or to the Buddhist community of a certain place.

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G l o s s a r y | 39 7 sapiens: A wise person who had mastered rustic Latin and learned the Christian Bible well.

one pronounces the second part, one becomes a Muslim.

Saracens: Initially, the name that ancient Greeks and Romans used for nomadic groups in Syria. Later, the term was applied to Arabs, and, by the time of the crusades, Christians used it to refer to all Muslims.

Shari’ah: Islamic law as expressed in the Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith and Sunna). Shari’ah is considered to be God’s eternal and unchanging will for humanity, and, as such, is binding for all believers.

secularization: Term from the Latin, saeculum, which means age or world and is used to refer to this world. In current usage, it means the (supposed) process whereby people, losing confidence in other-worldly or supernatural accounts of the cosmos and its destiny, abandon religious beliefs and practices or whereby religion loses its influence on society.

Shi’ism: The branch of Islam whose adherents (Shi’ites) follow and accept the claims of Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of Muhammad, who married Muhammad’s daughter Fatima. They differ from Sunnis in a variety of ways: the primary one being that they believe Ali rather than Abu Bakr should have succeeded Muhammad. The role of the imam is much more powerful for the Shi’ites than for the Sunnis, and there are some differences in family law.

Seljuks: Turkic nomadic tribesmen from central Asia who ruled much of the eastern Islamic world from 1038 to 1194. They succeeded in invading the Byzantine Empire and they defended the Holy Land against Christian crusaders. The Seljuk dynasty began a long period of Turkic political, military, and religious dominance in Islam and, consequently, a Sunni revival after a period in which Shi’ism had dominated. Seth: A god of storms and the desert; in ancient Egyptian mythology, the brother and murderer of Osiris. shah: The title, which means simply king in Old Persian, used by the dynastic rulers of Iran and Turko-Persia and often used in a compound form, such as padishah (emperor) or shahanshah (king of kings). Government by a shah is a version of caesaropapism. Shahadah: The profession of faith that forms the first pillar of Islam: “There is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God.” To proclaim the first part of the Shahadah is to become a muslim or submitter to God, but when

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social action: Human action intending to influence the actions or behavior of one or more people that assumes that persons are free agents who, in their relationships with others, attach subjective meanings to their behavior and to their accounts of the behavior of others. Kinds -affective social action: an action is affective if it satisfies a need for revenge, sensual gratification, devotion, contemplative bliss, or for working off emotional tensions. -rational social action: legal or instrumental rational action is determined by the expected responses of others as “conditions” or “means” for the actor’s own rationally pursued and calculated ends. -traditional social action: this form of social action is guided by set patterns that have developed over time together with a sense that things must “always be that way.”

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39 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D spiritualism: A system of beliefs and religious practices intended to establish communication with the spirits of the dead, especially through mediums. In its modern form, spiritualism began in the United States in 1848, when the American Fox family reported that it had made contact with a murdered peddler. By the 1850s, the movement had spread to England and the Continent. SSC: Shamanic state of consciousness. In general terms, these are neurophysiological states in which ordinary consciousness is suspended or replaced by other states. The states are induced in many ways, ranging from those induced by drugs to those induced by meditation practices. Controversy has arisen over whether the states so induced are identical, or whether there is a difference in those states that occur in religious contexts. sub species aeternitatis: Latin phrase meaning in the form of or with the appearance of eternity. succubi: A demon assuming female form to have sexual intercourse with men in their sleep (see incubi). Sufism: Islamic mysticism that reached its peak in the thirteenth century and that was considered to have internalized and intensified Islamic faith and practice. Sufis strive to follow a path to mystical union with God, so they strive to be constantly aware of God’s presence and stress contemplation rather than action, the spiritual rather than the legal, and solitary contemplation rather than social interaction. This form of Muslim mysticism is not connected to the Sunni/Shi’ite split, nor is it related to a particular school of Islamic law or to other social or regional demarcations, i.e., class, gender, birthplace, or family. Being associated with both popular religion and orthodox doctrine, it has

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been both opposed and supported by the state. Various Sufi orders still exist. Sunna: Term meaning trodden path or customary practice and used in Islam to indicate the traditional portion of Muslim law that is based on the specific actions, example, and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad himself. Sunni: Meaning one who adheres to the Sunna the word is used to designate the mainstream or majority branch of Islam. supermundanes: People who are superior to the earth or worldly affairs, i.e., not associated with the mundane. Swedenborgianism: Religious system named after its founder, Emanuel Swedenborg (1688– 1772) who argued that everything in the visible material world corresponds to something in the spiritual world (the theory of correspondence). syneisactism: Women and men living together chastely without regard for gender differences. tariqah: Word meaning the path or way and used to refer to a specific Sufi order or spiritual regimen passed on by a teacher or master. Nearly every tariqah is named for its founder and includes particular religious practices, recitations, and literary traditions. Sometimes, a tariqah becomes institutionalized in an organization, which can be either transitory (disappearing along with its founder) or a longer-lasting structure. tantras: In both Hinduism and Buddhism, teachings or texts that are esoteric, concerning macro-microcosmic correspondence, phonic evolution, esoteric anatomy, and yoga. ta n t r ic Bu ddh ism: A n e x ten sion of Mahayana Buddhism rather than a different philosophy, which is based on texts known as

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G l o s s a r y | 39 9 tantras and which emphasize particular tantric techniques (e.g., mantras, meditation, and yoga) thought to provide an accelerated path to enlightenment. Its teachings and practices are designed for laypersons rather than monks or nuns, and its techniques, which can seem more magical than spiritual, sometimes involve mundane goals. Its primary aim, however, is the rapid transformation of the individual into an embodiment of the divine. tao: Word meaning the way and referring, in Confucianism, to the morally correct path. In Taoism, the tao is conceived of as both the totality of all existence, which is considered a unity, and the way of letting go to achieve union with this whole. theophanic: Having the characteristics of theophany or a visible manifestation of a deity. theoretical framework: A set of theoretical assumptions and propositions that are sufficiently general to give rise to a number of theoretical variants. theosophy: From the Greek word that denotes knowledge of divine things and used, generally, to describe a number of philosophies premised on the belief that all existence is a unity, so knowledge of God can be achieved through direct perception or by intuitive or ecstatic means that develop each person’s latent powers. The word was first found in magical papyri and then used by the Neoplatonists. In the seventeenth century, it was used to refer to speculation derived from intuitive knowledge, such as that found in the Jewish Cabbala. Theravada Buddhism: One of the only early schools of Buddhism to have survived to the present and currently the dominant form in much of Southeast Asia. Theravada Buddhists are faithful to the Pli canon, the earliest complete set of Buddhists scriptures preserved intact. This form of

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Buddhism is in contrast to Mahayana Buddhism, which has dubbed early forms of Buddhism, including Theravada Buddhism, the small vehicle or Hinayana (see Mahayana Buddhism). Thirty Years War: A series of religious and political wars fought in Central Europe between 1618 and 1648. The conflicts were, predominantly, between the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II (1578–1637) and Protestants. Several wars occurred with no clear victory, and the Peace of Lübeck was concluded in 1629. Further conflict ensued when the Treaty of Prague (1635) between the emperor and most of the Protestant estates was concluded. Negotiations continued until the Peace of Westphalia (1648) reaffirmed the Peace of Augsburg (1555) and extended to Calvinist as well as Lutheran princes the right to determine the religion of their states. Thus was put into effect cuius regio, eius religio (whose rule, his religion). Thoth: A scribe of the ancient Egyptian gods who is a god of wisdom and learning represented as an ibis or a baboon. Tiamat: A Mesopotamian deity and the primeval goddess of the seas. Tiamat was represented as a she-dragon, and she was the mother of the first generation of gods in the Epic of Creation. Torah: The teachings of the Jewish faith. It can mean all the laws on a particular subject or the summation of all laws. It can also refer to the Pentateuch (the first five books of the Hebrew Bible). totemism: A system of belief in which humans are thought to have kinship with a totem or a mystical relationship is said to exist between a group or an individual and a totem. A totem is an object, such as an animal or plant, that serves as the emblem or symbol of a kinship group or a person.

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4 0 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D traditional social action: see social action Transcendentalism: Generally, a philosophy or belief related to the idea that things transcending human perception exist, e.g., God or an absolute form or concept. In nineteenth century America, New England Transcendentalism grew, in part, from the introduction of the sacred books of Hinduism, and it stressed the spiritual unity of the world, combining nature religion with Hindu nuances.

urf or adat: Custom. In the central Islamic countries, it is the common name for unwritten customary law, as opposed to written Islamic law. In Indonesia and elsewhere, the word adat is comparable in meaning. Venus figurines: Small statues of nude women, which are faceless, have downturned heads, and exaggerated breasts, hips, and buttocks. They are ancient and date from the Ice Age. verstehen: see interpretive sociology

Tusita: Buddhist heaven, home to the “contented gods,” and the domain of all enlightened people who need to reappear only once more on earth to work out the last remnants of karma. typifications: The habits of people categorized into types. ulama: A word meaning men of knowledge (singular = alim) and referring to Muslim religious scholars, jurists, learned men, judges, and Ayatollahs. They were often regarded as custodians of orthodoxy. Umayyads: Members of the Umayyad dynasty (founded by Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan) that ruled the Islamic world from the death of the fourth Sunni caliph, Ali, in 661 until 750. Muawiyah’s conf lict with Ali occasioned the split between Sunni and Shi’ite Islam, but, by the time of his death in 680, Muawiyah had stabilized the caliphate’s administration and established Damascus as its capital. ummah: The whole and united Muslim community, bound together, although its members are culturally and geographically diverse, by unbreakable ties of faith. The term expresses the essential unity and theoretical equality of all Muslims.

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virtuosos: In the field of the sociology of religion, a term (used particularly by Weber) to describe people eminently capable of seeking and devoting their lives to the sacred, e.g., monks, and to distinguish these people from both the common religious practitioner and those who hold high positions in a religious organization. Wahhabism/Wahhabist: An ultra-conservative, puritanical Muslim movement arising in Arabia in the late eighteenth century; a devotee of that movement. The founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, joined with Muhammad ibn Saud and created a union of various tribes throughout the peninsula. They believed that the Muslims of Arabia had lost their faith and had distorted the faith with innovations. It is the most common form of Islam in Saudi Arabia. wakan: Among various American First Nation groups, a great spiritual power of supernatural origin belonging to some natural objects. Wakan may be conceived of as a weak or strong power; the weak powers can be ignored, but the strong ones must be placated. Western cultural account: The widely accepted cultural and philosophical myths of the West, which include notions or rationalism, justice, progress, and individualism and from which comes the idea that individuals have a

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G l o s s a r y | 4 01 distinctive moral standing as individuals and not as members of groups, such as families, institutions, or classes. witchcraft: The belief that human affairs and features of the environment can be ordered, controlled, and changed by skilled practitioners whose powers are usually believed to be innate— and the practice of using these powers. Traditionally, the term has been applied pejoratively to those who invoke power (often considered to come from an evil source) to harm others. More recently, it is being used in more positive ways by some anthropologists and practitioners of wicca, a nature-based religion. wor ld r eligions: Commonly known as Confucianism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. According to Weber, they all share these characteristics: rationalization, transcendentalism (referring to the transcendental vision of the supernatural), and universalism (the ability of all to transcend social boundaries whether of groups, communities, nations, cultures, or states).

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yoga: Any form of spiritual discipline or technique for transforming consciousness and attaining liberation from rebirth. Through yogic practices, such as breath control, postures, and meditation, the mind can be focused and developed, so the practitioner reaches higher states of consciousness and union. Zand dynasty: A dynasty (founded by Zand tribal chief Karim Khan Zand) that ruled western and southern Iran from 1751 to 1794. By 1760, Karim Khan controlled all of Iran except Khorasan, but his descendants were overthrown by the Qajars less than twenty years after his death in 1779. Zarpanitu: A Babylonian goddess of pregnancy and the spouse of Marduk. ziyara: A special pilgrimage prayer in Islam. It refers to visiting gravesites for the purpose of praying for the dead or visiting the tombs of holy people (saints), seeking blessings.

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i n de x

A Abbasids, 70, 97, 195, 201, 266, 270, 337, 338, 339, 370; fall of, 110; hierocracy and, 280, 281–83, 288n6 abbots, 346 Abdul Hamid II, Sultan, 268 aboriginal peoples: Australia, 178, 232, 233; ecological and cosmological functions of morality, 247; Peyote cult and, 340; religion in Canada, 90–91, 112, 179; United States, 179, 187n1, 340 abortion, 197, 244, 251, 252–55, 302–6, 318, 359 Abraham, 20, 93, 126, 128; Pages of, 96; as prophet, 118–19, 121–23 Abu al-Abbas, 281 Abu Muslim, 281

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abuse: child, 33; by clergy, 133–34 Abu Ubayda, 201 Abyssinia, 69, 267 accommodation, 289–317; responses to, 258, 299–308; types of, 290 Adam, Paradise of, 42 adat, 239 administrative order, dilemma of, 23; sacred organizations and, 188–226 Adventists, 131 adventure capitalism, 325–26; return of, 327 “affinity of essence,” 326 Afghanistan, jihad in, 270 African Americans, 224, 306, 335, 341, 364 agnosticism, 314 agrarianite citied societies, 68 Ahl-i Hadith, 367 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 285–86

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43 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D A’isha, wife of Muhammad, 150–52, 166, 200 Aistulf, 347 Akkadians, 92–93, 236 al-Abbas, 180 Alaska, 140 al-Bakir, 195 Albanese, Catherine, 247 Albert II, Holy Roman Emperor, 265 Albigensians, 276 al-Bistami, Abu Yazid: see Bistami Albright, J., 368–69 alchemy, 41, 372 Alcuin, 264, 272 Alexander, Jeffrey, 20–21, 342n3 Alfred the Great, 260 al-Ghazali, 208 al-Hasan: see ibn Ali al-Husayn, 166, 170, 180, 195, 210, 284 Ali: see ibn Abi Talib al-Ibadiyya, 200 alienation, 164; church property and, 346–47; Marx/Engels and, 335, 340; morality function of, 248–52; objectification and, 22–23; worker, 350 Aligarh, 367 Ali Pasha, 241 al-Kazim, Musa: see Kazim Allah, 69, 72, 73, 75, 79, 96–97, 98, 99, 146, 170, 178, 195, 207–8, 238, 239, 339 Allen, Richard, 300 Allende Gossens, Salvador, 316 Allport, Gordon, 45, 57n13, 243 al-Mahdi, Hujjat: see Mahdi al-Mansur, Abu Amir: see Mansur al-Mu’mun, 97 al-Muntazar, Muhammad: see Muntazar al-Mutawakkil, 97 al-Qaeda, 67, 210, 212, 270, 367–68 al-Rashid, Harun: see Rashid al-Sadiq, Ja’far: see Sadiq al-Siddiq, Abu Bakr: see Siddiq Altayen nomads, 140 altered states of consciousness (ASC), 111, 112

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Ambrose, bishop of Milan, 271 Ambrosiaster, 145 America, early modern, 40–43 American Baptist Church, 136n4 American Civil War, 314 American Revolution, 314, 374n9 Amish, 291 Ammet, 1, 37, 104, 237–38 Amsterdam, 328 Anabaptism, 290–91, 311; Reformation, 290 Anatolia, 91, 144, 268, 277 ancestral spirits, 36, 37 Andalusia, 276, 277, 278, 279, 282 Anglican Church, 133, 136n4, 196, 222, 224, 225, 253, 300, 358, 362 see also Episcopal Church Anglicanism, 62 Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, 260 Anglo-Saxons, 260 Ani, 237–38 animism, 90, 100, 230 anonymity, 350 anti-clericalism, 352 anti-communism, 302 anti-Semitism, 275 Antwerp, 328 Anubis, 1, 37, 103 apodosis, 114 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 99, 272 Arabia, 109, 128, 201; modern, caesaropapism in, 266–70; sixth and seventh century, 67–79, 148 Arapaho first nation, shamanism among, 112 Arat, Yesim, 152 archaeology, 70 of knowledge, 370 archaic mythology, 90, 91–94 archaic religion, 2, 82, 115; leaders of, 113–15; substantive ritual in, 169 archaic (classical) societies, 19, 36–39, 336 archer-wizards, 251 Argentina, belief and morality in, 89 Argonaut peoples, 230 arhat, 116–17

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i n de x | 43 3 Arica, 212 Aristotle, 25, 287n2 Arjomand, Said Amir, 283–84 Armenia, 109, 268 Arnold, Thomas, 110 Aron, Raymond, 57n19 asceticism, 39, 166, 175, 213, 235, 291, 297; inner-worldly, 235, 325; Protestant, 325–27, 329–30 Ashkenaz, 274–75 Ashurbanipal, 114 Aslam, Maleeha, 209–10 Assemblies of God, 22–23, 158, 159 Association of Women Ministers, 155–56 Assur, 113 Assyria/Assyrians, 92–93, 113, 192 astrology, 50, 88, 107n6, 250 Atatürk, Mustafa, 152, 269 atheism, 314 At-Tabari, 70 attachment theory, 76–77, 80n10, 150–52, 154–55 august, 2–3 Augustine, 274 Austerlitz (Moravia), 292 Australia, 106n4; aboriginal peoples in, 178, 232, 233; belief and well-being in, 89; clans in, 191 Austrasia, 264 authoritarianism, 45 authority, 19; legal-rational, 19; social, 30; traditional, 19 autocephaly, 322 autonomy, 322 Avignon papacy, 272 Avongara clan, 181 awe, 2 Axial Age, 68, 79n5 axis mundi, 112, 178, 370 Azande peoples, 180–81, 183–84 Aztec society, 26n2, 36, 37

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B Babal, 1 Babylon, 91, 183, 236 Babylonians, Old, 92–93, 114 Badr, Battle of, 74 Bainbridge, William, 198, 205–6, 360, 362 Bakker, Jim, 304, 305 Bakker, Tammy, 304, 305 Bakr, Abu, 109, 194 Balkans, 267 Banerjee, Neela, 225 Banu ’l-Nadir tribe, 74 Banu Qurayza tribe, 74 Baptist Church, 156, 222, 223, 224, 312, 323, 325, 329 Baptist sect, 204–5 baraka, 170, 179, 180, 208, 209 Barber, Richard, 260 Barro, Robert, 332 Bates, V., 307–8 Battle of the Ditch, 74 Bavaria, 264 Bayezid, Sultan, 268 Beckford, James, 5 Bede, the Venerable, 177 beliefs: ethics and, 89; functions of, 89; in God, 33, 44, 84, 87, 89, 107, 314, 363 belief systems, 81; see also myths; mythology Bell, Alexander, 331 Bell, Daniel, 369 Bellah, Robert, 27n17, 33, 90, 146, 312–16 Bendix, Reinhard, 82 Benedict XVI, Pope, 133–34, 354–55 Benedictines, 125 Benedict of Nursia, 20; as renewer prophet, 119, 124–25 Bennett, John , 299 Benson, P., 87

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43 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Berger, Peter, 19, 34, 35–36, 37, 59, 172, 226n1, 248, 295–96, 344, 348–49, 351, 353, 362, 365, 366–67, 374n7; The Heretical Imperative, 355; plausibility structures, 353–56; responses to secularization, 353–56 Berman, Sheri, 214, 216–17 Bibby, Reginald, 14, 52, 57n17, 107n6, 134, 196, 222, 224–25, 253–54, 296, 357–58, 360, 362–63 Bierman, Alex, 33 bin Laden, Osama, 270 bioenergetics, 372 biology, spirituality and, 45, 47, 53 Birnbaum, Norman, 335, 340 bishops, 346 Bistami, Abu Yazid al-, 207 Blackfoot, 37 Blair, Tony, 153 Blandina, 143 Blumer, Herbert, 21 Bodhisattvas, 120 Bolshevik Revolution, 263 Bonaparte, Napoleon, 274, 348, 351 Boniface VIII, Pope, 272–73 bookkeepers, 192 Book of Common Prayer, 310 Book of Mormon, 65 Book of the Dead, 1, 103–4, 237 booty (robber) capitalism, 325–26, 339 Bosnia: Muslims from, 270; recusants from, 276 Boston Archdiocese, sexual abuse scandal, 134 Boulton, Matthew, 331 Bouma, Gary, 331–32 Bowker, John, 344 Bowlby, John, 76 Bowman, Carl, 291, 294 Brahma, 121 Brahman, 1 Brahmanical tradition, 115 brainwashing, 53, 58n22 Branch Davidians, 226n5 Brazil, 140; belief and morality in, 89

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breaking point, 12, 36 Brethren, 291 Brethren of the Common Life, 60 bricolage, 370, 371 Brinkerhoff, Merlin, 222, 224 Brooke, John, 41–42 Brown, Dan: The Da Vinci Code, 127; responses to, 128 Brown, Marie Burgess, 22 Brown, Peter, 15, 39, 97, 176, 264, 282 Brown, Michael, 57n16 Brunswick (Germany), 186 Buc, Philippe, 176–77 Buccellati, Giorgio, 169, 236–37 Buddha, 18, 100, 138, 231, 234–35; as prophet, 118, 119–21; Twelve Acts of, 120–21 Buddhism, 5, 15, 19, 26n3, 60, 68, 99–100, 101, 102, 119–21, 196, 225, 332; American fascination with, 120; apotropaic, 235, 247; esoteric/chiliastic, 235; kammatic, 234–35, 247; mixed motivation and, 111; monks, 116–17; in Myanmar, 234–35; nibbanic, 234, 235; religious elites in, 115–17; variety in, 116–17; Weber and, 340; world views of, 82; see also Mahayana Buddhism; Theravada Buddhism; Tibetan/tantric Buddhism; Zen Buddhism Buccellati, Giorgio, 236 Buffalo totem, 231 Bull, Marcus, 276, 277–78 bureaucracy, 67, 79, 258, 281, 339; church and, 23, 185, 188, 193, 219, 249, 272; mysticism and, 61 bureaucratization, 349, 373 Burgess, Marie, 158 burka, 163n8

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i n de x | 43 5 Burma, women shamans in, 139; see also Myanmar burned-over district, charisma in, 61–67 Burton, John, 240 Bush, George W., 307 Buyids, 282 Byzantine Church, 259 Byzantium/Byzantine Empire, 262, 264, 267, 277, 281, 347; crusade against, 275–76; Islam and, 12; Jews and, 274

C cabbala, 60, 101 caesaropapism, 110, 136n3, 259–70, 287, 287n1, 352; Christianity and, 262–66; death of, 272; hierocracy and, 110, 271–72, 280, 309, 310, 312; Islam and, 266–70 Cahill, Thomas, 122 calculation, 25 Calder, Norman, 240 caliphate, 109–11 caliphs, 73, 109–11, 214, 281–82, 338; rightly guided, 110–11, 166, 194, 277, 280, 281, 288n6 calling, notion of, 323 Calvin, John, 205, 348; break of with medieval Catholocism, 324–25; Institutes of the Christian Religion, 124; as prophet, 119, 123–24 Calvinistic-Christian world view, 82 Calvinistic Presbyterianism, 330–31 Calvinistic Reformation: see Reformation Calvinism/Calvinist Protestantism, 25, 82, 124, 202, 204, 220, 247, 290, 324, 328–30 Cambodia, Buddhism in, 116 Campbell, Joseph, 85, 100 Canada, 14, 106n4, 296, 332; aboriginal religion in, 90–91, 112, 179;

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abuse by clergy in, 134; belief and morality in, 89; Buddhism in, 121; Catholic clergy in, 132; Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 19; church as religious organization in, 196–97; civil religion in, 315; evangelical ministers in, 159; gay marriage in, 133; homosexuality in religious organizations, 133; liberal Christian response to accommodation, 299–301; mainstream Protestantism in, 136n4, 196; morality in, 253–54; mysticism and, 52, 57n17; religious restructuring in, 253–55; responses to secularization in, 362–63; Shari’ah law in, 243; strength of religion in, 357; switching and disaffiliation in, 222–25; women clergy in, 156, 159 Canning, Joseph, 270–71 Cantor, Norman, 260, 271, 276, 278 capitalism, 82, 123, 278, 302, 304, 321, 329; adventure, 325–26, 327; booty/robber, 325–26, 339; economic motivations in, 326; ethically driven, 327; as exploitation, 327; global, 292; Protestantism and, 323, 324; rational, 320–27, 329–30; spirit of, 324–26, 331–32; types of, 325–27 Capps, Walter, 303–4 Carolingian Empire, decline of, 321 Carolingian Renaissance, 264 Carroll, Jackson, 135–36 Cartwright, Thomas, 202 Castissima, 143–44 Cathars: see Albigensians Catholic Charismatic Renewal movement, 218 Catholic Church: see Roman Catholocism

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43 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D celibacy, 62–64, 132–34, 141, 213, 279 cella, 192 Celtic religion, 372 centralization, 274 Cesari, Jocelyne, 153 chador, 163n8 Chadwick, Owen, 309, 351–53 Chafetz, Janet, 149 charisma, 19, 20–21, 21–25, 60, 63, 82, 108, 138, 189, 258, 263, 285; alienation and, 164; bureaucratization of, 24, 258; in burned-over district, 61–67; domestication of, 67; Douglas and, 300; institution and, 22, 61; Jesus and, 123; Khomeini and, 285; maintenance of, 225–26; Muhammad and, 109–11; Roman Catholic Church and, 218; routinization of, 20–21, 21–25, 67, 117, 130, 135, 138, 148, 165, 189, 193, 197–98, 209, 225, 319; sects and, 198; women and, 138, 148 charismatic dance, 63 “Charismatic Renewal,” 60 Charlemagne, 176–77, 259, 263–65, 273 Charles I, 311 Charles V, 265, 273 chastity, 325 Chaves, Mark, 156–57 Chazan, Robert, 275 Cherbury, Lord Herbert of, 5 child abuse: adult religiosity and, 33; maternal vs. paternal, 33 child care, in Qur’an, 148 childhood experiences, 30, 31; Muhammad and, 151–52, 155 Chile: belief and morality in, 89; civil religion in, 316–17

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China: belief and morality in, 89; Buddhism in, 116, 234, 235–36; secularization in, 344, 352 Christ: see Jesus Christ Christianity, 1, 5, 12, 19, 25, 26n4, 39, 61, 79n5, 80n9, 95, 126, 128–29, 205, 236, 258, 359; Abraham as founder of, 121; appeal of to marginalized and middle class, 319; caesaropapism in, 259, 262–66; church in, 196–97; conflict with Islam, 13; conservative, 301–8; cross in, 231; denominational, 60; divine descent in, 104–6; Ebionite, 72; ecumenical, 304; European law and, 338; first-century, 42; fundamentalist vs. progressive, 253; goal of faith in, 99; Greco-Roman society and, 332; Greek, 95; hierocracy in, 271–80, 309; icon in, 231; image of divine, 33; Indian religions vs., 100; institutionalization of, 109; liberal, 299–301; liberalization of, 302; mainstream, 224; medieval, 271–80, 309; Mormonism and, 42–43; movement of renewal in, 218; mystical traditions of, 101; New Agers and, 373; Orthodox, 5, 263; radical streams of, 41, 43; as ritual, 172; ritual in, 176–77; Roman conversion to, 54, 124–25; sect in, 202–5;

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i n de x | 43 7 substantive ritual in, 170; Victorian, 332; vs. Islam, 367; witchcraft in, 183–86; women in, 142–46, 274; world views of, 82 Christian Right: see New Religious Right Christian Science, 213 Chrysostom, John, 145 church, 190; in Christianity, 196–97; church within a, 213; definition of, 193–94; denomination and, 218–19; elements of, 193; immigrant groups and, 364; in Islam, 194–95; monarchy and, 321; as organization, 130, 193–97; property rights of, 347; routinization of, 213; sect and, 198, 218–19, 226n1, 360–62; vs. state, 271, 291 Church of Ageless Wisdom, 374n12 Church of England, 204–5, 286, 290, 309, 310–11 Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints: see Mormonism Church of Spiritual Healing, 374n12 Church of the Earth Nation, 374n12 Church of Truth, 374n12 churinga, 191 circulation of the saints, 222, 224 cities: growth of, 322–23; oriental, 338 city-commune, 322–23 city states, commercialization of, 293 civil religion, 290, 312–17; definition of, 313; dimensions of, 313; as social construction, 314–15; as social control, 315–17 civil rights, 364 clairvoyance, 49

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clan, 191, 336; deity and, 34–35; sacred and, 191 classical foundation, 10–11 Clayton, Obie, 341 Clement V, Pope, 272, 280 Clement VII, Pope, 265 Clement of Alexandria, 145 clergy, North American, 131–32; challenges facing, 135; female, 155–61 clericalism, decline of, 135 clerics, 60, 167, 214, 271, 273, 323, 344; role of postmodern, 136 clericus canonicus, 346 Clermont (France), 276–77 Clouse, R., 271 Cluniac order, 271 Cody-Rydzewski, Susan, 159–60 coercion vs. conversion, 24 cognitive bargaining, 356 cohabitation, 142 Cole, J.K., 145 Coleman, J.A., 193, 332 collaborative style, 88 collective, 8 collective consciousness, 35 “commercial revolution,” 321 communal economy, 42 communal withdrawal, 290–95 communication revolution, 350 communism, 302, 352 communitarianism, 314 “communities of the awakened,” 297 compensators, 13–14 competition, religious, 40 Comte, Auguste, 350, 351 Concerned Women for America, 306 concrete definition vs. substitution of letter for spirit, 23–24 conflict, 21 conflict theory, 12–13 conformity theory, 298

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43 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Confucianism, 5, 19, 60, 68, 102, 116; Weber and, 340; world views of, 82 Congregational Church, 220, 222, 300, 311, 329 consciousness, 53 conservatism, religious, 87, 132, 158, 159, 193– 94, 224, 252–55, 301–8, 318, 362; Islam and, 24, 258 conservative–liberal split, 18, 133, 221, 222– 23, 252–55, 299, 317, 378, 358–59 conservative restructuring, 358–59 Constantina, 143 Constantine, 24, 124, 262; Donation of, 287n3 Constantinople, 262–63, 266 conversion, 53–55; vs. coercion, 24 Cook, Michael, 200 Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), 299–301 coping styles, 88 Cornell, V., 96 correspondence hypothesis, 77 cosmic forces, personification of, 94 cosmological function of morality, 246–47 cosmology, Islamic, 97–98 Council of Nicaea, 262 Council of Trent, 265 counter-secularization, 198 Cowdery, Oliver, 65 Cowdrey, William, 43 Cranmer, Thomas, 310 creation, evolution vs., 106n3 credit system, 321 Cree first nation, shamanism among, 112 Cristi, Marcela, 313–14, 316 Crone, Patricia, 336–37 Cruden, Loren, 113 crusades, 273–79; against Byzantines, 275–76; description, factors, and effects of, 276; against dissidents, 278; First, 275–77; against Jews, 273–75; kinds of, 274;

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against Muslims, 273, 275–77; People’s, 277; against religious deviants, 273; against women, 273–74, 278 Cuba, secularization in, 344, 352 cult, 14, 205; church, sect and, 198, 360–62; performance of, 192 cultic role of temple, 193 cultural accommodation, 24 cultural analytic approach, 353–60 cultural-linguistic approach, 52–53 cultural system, 11 culture, religion and, 343–74; approaches to, 353 currency, production of, 65–66 curses, 180 “Czar’s Eye,” 263

D Dahms, Barbara, 183–86 Dahomey peoples, 232; Sir Ghost, 232 dais, 211 Dalai Lama, 19, 120, 297 Danbury Baptist Association, 312 daraba, 148 Dar al-Harb, 98, 281, 339 Dar al-Islam, 281, 339 Darwin, Charles: On the Origin of Species, 352 Davis, Kingsley, 168, 172 Dawson, Lorne, 205 Day of Judgment, 96 deacons, 132; women as, 159 dead, codes related to, 36 Deansely, Margaret, 288n3 Decalogue, 95, 229, 255n6 decentralization, 322 decentredness, 370, 371 deconstruction, 370, 371 deism, 297, 312 deity, clan and, 34–35 déjà vu, 49–50 de Jong, Mayke, 346

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i n de x | 439 delimitation, dilemma of, 23–24; ethos and, 228–55; explanation of, 229 Della Vida, Levi, 200 Delogu, Paolo, 347 DeMaille, Raymond, 173 Demerath III, Jay, 193, 198, 344 democracy, 82, 352 demythologization, 356 denominationalism, decline of, 252, 303 denominations, 190, 218–22; definition of, 218–20; vs. church and sect, 218–19 depersonalization, 350 deprivation theory, 50 desiring machine, humans as, 370 de Tocqueville, Alexis, 135, 314 devotionalism, 243 dharma, 116, 120 dhikr ritual, 166–67, 170, 208 dhimmis, 12–13, 27n13, 268 Dieri clan, 191 differing style, 88 dilemmas, O’Dean, 21–25; administrative order, 23, 188–226; delimitation, 23–24, 228–55; interpretation, 25, 81–106, 228–55; mixed motivation, 22, 108–36, 137–62, 262; power, 24, 257–87, 289–318 symbolic, 22–23, 164–86 disaffiliation, 222–25 Disciples of Christ, 136n4 disenchantment, 366 dispensationalism, 56n10 dissenters, 312 divination, 114 divine, images of, politics and, 76–79 divine descent, human response and 104–6 divine response, human ascent and, 102–4 diviners, in Mesopotamian religion, 114 division paradigm, 290, 308–12; European beginnings of, 309; in United States, 310–12 divorce, 142

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Djabir, 201 dogma, 23–24, 229 dogmatism, 45, 146; vs. interpretation, 25 dome of the rock, 70 domestication: of charisma, 67; of religious experience, 59 Dominicans, 60, 249 Donation of Constantine, 287n3 Donner, Fred, 109, 110, 194 Douglas, Tommy, 300–301 dramaturgic approach, 353 dread, 3 drug use, religion and, 52 dualism, 95 dualisms, 20 Durkheim, Emile, 2, 6, 7, 10, 16, 57n19, 85, 86, 172, 175, 236, 260, 313, 350, 351; cult of the individual, 371; cult of man, 373; cultural analysis, 353; division of labour, 93, 309, 336; empowerment, 179; institutional separation, 309; links between the social, myth, ritual, and ethos, 232–33; magic and, 48; Rules of Sociological Method, 85; sacred and profane, 245; social bonding and, 174; social construction of religion and, 34–35; social control, 246, 248; social solidarity, 229; substantive dimension of ritual, 168; totemism, 34, 233 Duvalier, Jean-Claude, 358

E Ea, 1, 94 earth as organic being, 41 Eastern (Catholic) Church, 262–63 Eastern Orthodox Church, ordination of women, 156 East India Company, 366

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4 4 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D ecclesiastica vs. regalia, 347 ecological function: of morality, 246–47; of ritual, 172, 179 ecological model, 365 economy: religion and, 319–42; religious, 361–62 eco-spirituality, 44 ecstatic religious communal experience, 63 ecumenism, 220, 304, 306 Edelman, Gerald, 53 Edict of Milan, 124, 262 effectiveness vs. elaboration, 23 egalitarianism, hierarchy vs., 135 Egeria, 143 ego-ideal, 30 Egypt, 109, 166, 201, 267, 276–77, 282; ancient, 1, 26n2, 36, 37, 68, 144, 259, 260–61, 266; Greco-Roman, 41; Islam in, 154; Islamism in, 214, 216–17; mythology of, 91, 103–4; myth, ritual and ethos in, 236–38 Eichler, Margrit, 140 Eisen, Ute, 144 elaboration vs. effectiveness, 23 elective affinity, 326 Eliade, Mircea, 5, 6, 7, 85, 140, 172, 246 elites: Buddhist, 115–17; economic-political, 116; Muslim, 215; Taoist, 118; vs. masses, 167 empirical vs. supra-empirical, 21 empowerment: morality function of, 246; ritual as, 179–80 encounter groups, 372 encratitic groups, 162n5 Engels, Friedrich, 26n7, 34, 334–35

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England: Act of Supremacy (1534), 310; Act of Uniformity (1662), 310; capitalism, 329; Civil War, 310; crusading in, 277; division paradigm in, 309; mysticism and, 52; religious movements in, 79n4; secularization in, 352; state church in, 310–11; witchcraft in, 249, 250; see also Great Britain Enlightenment, 296–97, 304, 309, 351–52; Scottish, 331 entrepots, 328 entrepreneurial conduct, 329 Epic of Creation, 94 Epic of Gilgamesh, 94 epigraphical evidence, 144 Epiphanius, Bishop of Cyprus and Salamis, 145 Episcopal Church, 133, 136n4, 222, 223, 302 Epstein, S., 323, 328 Erikson, Erik, 9, 31–32, 33, 45, 123 eschatology, Islamic, 96, 98 Esposito, John, 149, 162n6, 194, 200, 239, 269–70, 280, 282–83 essentialism-universalism, 5 Est, 212 ethic, Protestant, 323, 324–25, 326, 330, 331–32 ethical prophet, 118 ethical system, 229; elaboration of, 229 ethics, 229, 236, 330; belief and, 89; monastic, 325; quotidian, 236; Sufism and, 208 ethnocentrism, 45 ethos, 8, 266; crusader, 278; dilemma of delimitation and, 228–55; marginalization of, 344; myth, ritual and, 230–45

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i n de x | 4 4 1 Evangel: see New Testament evangelicalism, 60, 131, 306, 360 Evangelical Lutherans, 133 Evans-Pritchard, Edward, 180–81 evolution, creation vs., 106n3 exclusivity, 95 exemplary prophet, 118; Buddha as, 119–21 existence of God, belief in, 84 Exodus, 95 exogamy, religious, 223–24 exorcism, 90 experience, religious, 29–56, 59–79, 365, 373; ecstatic, 63; fragility of, 60; human, 356; individual, 43–47, 202–4; social institutions and, 59–79; varieties of, 47–55 explanatory mythology, 87–88; age and, 87; gender and, 87 extispicy, 114 extra-sensory perception (ESP), 49–50 extraterrestrial beings, 50 extravertive mysticism, 51 extrinsic-consensual spirituality, 45–46

F fairy tales, 30 Falwell, Jerry, 302–5 Family Research Council, 306 family structure theories, 223 faqih, 240, 242 Farah, Caesar, 96–98, 238 Farrakhan, Louis, 341 fasciandus, 2–4 fascination, 3 fatalism, 5 Fatamids, 201, 282 “father figure,” 30 Fatima, 109–10, 150, 166, 210 fatwa, 337 fealty, 321–22, 337 fear, 3

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Feeney, Judy, 150–51 female pastors, characteristics of, 157–61 feminine, nature and, 138–39 feminism, 26n8, 155–56, 306; waves of, 163n12 Ferguson, Marilyn, 371 feudalism, 82, 293, 321–22; decentralization in, 322; freedom in, 321–22 Feuerbach, Ludwig, 34 fidais, 211 fiqh, 239–42, 338 First Nation beliefs, 373 Flint, Valerie, 48 Focus on the Family, 17, 306–7 folklore, 30 folk mythology, 85, 90–91, 100 folk religion, 2, 115, 230, 259; ecological function of ritual, 179; myth, ritual and ethos in, 232–33; psychological function of ritual, 178–79; shamans and, 111–13; substantive ritual in, 169; witchcraft in, 180–82 folk societies, 19, 36–39, 190, 245, 336; religious organizations in, 191; women and religion in, 138–40 formal definition, 6, 7, 8 founding prophet, 118; Abraham as, 121–23 Fourth Lateran Council, 272 France, 264, 265, 329, 348; crusading in, 277; hierocracy in, 273; piety in, 297; secularization in, 344, 352; witchcraft in, 250 Franciscans, 60, 249 Franklin, Benjamin, 326 Franks, 176, 264, 347 Franzius, Enno, 210 Frazer, J.G., 48 Frederick II, Holy Roman Emperor, 249 Frederick the Great, 309

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4 4 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D freedom, 351; in feudalism, 321–22; New Age mythology and, 372 freemasonry, 372 free will, Islamic, 97 French Revolution, 309, 351–52, 374n9 Frend, W.H.C., 143 Freud, Sigmund, 30–31, 32, 33, 140 Freyer-Stowasser, Barbara, 241, 242 friends of Jesus, 297 Frisia, 264 functional definition of religion, 6, 7, 165, 189 functional effects of myths, 88–89 functionalism, 11–12 fundamentalism, 302, 306, 360; evangelical, 306 fuqaha, 240

G Galerius, 124 Gandhi, Mahatma, 357–58 Gardell, Mattias, 341 Gaston County (North Carolina), 340–41 Gautama Buddha: see Buddha gay marriage, 133, 306–7, 354 gay rights movement, 306 gays and lesbians, churches for, 364 Geertz, Clifford, 6, 7, 8, 168, 228, 231, 233, 270 Gelasius I, Pope, 271 gemeinschaft vs. gesellschaft, 350 gender division of labour, 140 gender equality, 157; in Islam, 147–49 General Baptist Church, 87 General Council of Local Union Churches, 220 general will, 315 Genoa, 328 “Gen-X” raves, 44 Gere, Richard, 120 Gerlach, Luther, 246 Germany, 265, 276; Brethren, 291; pietistic movement in, 297; witchcraft in, 249, 250 gestalt awareness training, 372

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Gethin, Rupert, 115–16, 119 Ghazis, 266 ghosts, 50 Gibbon, Edward, 80n8, 267 Giddens, Anthony, 20, 136, 323, 326, 374n8 “gift of grace,” 61 Gillies, Eva, 180 Glasse, Cyril, 97, 149, 150 Glastonbury Tor, 372 glebes, 311 Glock, Charles, 86, 222–23, 243 gnosis, 102, 226n7 Gnosticism, 208, 213, 226n7, 372 God: belief in existence of, 33, 44, 84, 87, 89, 107, 314, 363; effects of concepts of, 88–89; images of, 86–87 goddess worship, 44 Goelet, Ogden, 260 Goode, William, 232, 245, 246 Gordian knot, 278 Gorski, Philip, 327–29, 330 gradual conversion, 53–54 Grand Mufti, 267 “Grand Narratives,” 19 Grand Vizier, 267, 282 Grant, John, 220 Gratian, 262 “Great Awakening,” 60 Great Britain, 297, 310–11, 331; secularization in, 349–51; see also England Great Rebellion, 309, 328 Greece, 267; ancient, 37, 68, 93; mythology of, 91 Greeley, Andrew M., 44, 50–51 Gregory VII, Pope, 248, 265, 271–72, 320–21, 347; Dictatus Papae, 271 Gregory IX, Pope, 185, 249 Gregory of Tours, 176 Gregory the Great, Pope, 125, 274 Gregory the Illuminator, 268

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i n de x | 4 43 guilds, 322, 338 guilt, conversion and, 53 Guth, James, 303, 304–5

H habits, 35 habitualization, 35, 37 Hadaway, C.K., 222–24 Hadden, Jeffrey, 305, 344–46, 357–58 Hadith, 70, 71–72, 73, 96, 99, 146, 239–40, 367; biographies of Muhammad and, 149–52 hagiocracy: see hierocracy Haida clan, 191 hajj, 170, 367 Haller, William, 202, 204 Hamburger, Philip, 312 Hamer, Dean, 44, 53; The God Gene, 47 Hammond, Phillip, 314–15, 353, 365 Hammurabi, 93 Hanafi legal school, 195, 241 Hanbali legal school, 195, 241, 270 Hapsburg dynasty, 265 harem, 69 Hargrove, Barbara, 168, 177, 299 “harmony ethic,” 247 Hashim Kamali, Mohammad, 238–39, 241 Hashishin (Hashishiyyin), 210 Haykal, Muhammad, 72 Hebrew bible, 105 Heelas, Paul, 371–72, 374n11 Heer, Friedrich, 264–65 hegemony: economic, 328; mercantile, 274 Heidel, Alexander, 94 Heine, Susanne, 142 Heliand, 264 henotheism, 69 Henry, Fred, 354 Henry IV, Holy Roman Emperor, 265, 271–72, 347 Henry VIII, 310, 328 heresy, 262 Herman, Arthur, 330–31

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hermeticism, 41–43, 372; polygyny and, 42 Herod the Great, 126 Hervieu-Léger, Danièle, 296–98 heterogeneity, of sacred and profane, 21 Hexham, Irving, 205 hierarchy: egalitarianism vs., 135; medieval, 292 hierocracy, 73–76, 183, 261, 270–87, 287n1, 311, 352; caesaropapism and, 110, 271–72, 280, 309, 310, 312; general instances of, 273; ideal form of, 288n6; in Iran, 283–87; in Islam, 280–83; in medieval Christianity, 271–80; in New England, 311–12; zenith of, 272 hijab, 152–54, 217; multiple meanings of, 153 Hijrah, 70, 71, 214 Hildebrand: see Gregory VII Hill, M., 213, 218 Himmelstein, Jerome, 302 Hinduism, 1, 5, 19, 26n3, 60, 68, 80n9, 99, 102, 196, 225, 234, 240, 332, 358, 372; Weber and, 340; world views of, 82 Hine, Virginia, 246 Hisham, 97 historical sociology, 19 Hittites, 92–93 Hodgkin, Thomas, 176, 264 Hodgson, Marshall, 68, 166, 170, 194, 207, 281 Hofer, Paul Hoge, Dean, 132, 224 Holiness Pentecostal Church, women clergy in, 156, 158 holy, see sacred Holy League, 241, 267 Holy Roman Empire, 176–77, 259, 263–66, 277, 292, 323 Holy Spirit, 41, 246, 290, 340 homoousios, 262

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4 4 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D homosexuality, 306–8; clergy and, 133–34, 255 Hood, Ralph, 45, 51, 57nn13,20 horoscopes, 107n6, 114 Horus, 1, 37, 103 Hospitallers, 279 Hostetler, John, 291–93 Hud, 96 Huff, Toby, 239 Huichal people, 139 human ascent, divine response and, 102–4, 278 human capital, 14; religious, 55 humanism, 297, 304; vs. theism, 304 humanistic approaches, 81 humanistic psychology, 372 humanitarianism, 243 human potential movement, 372 human response, divine descent and, 104–6, 278 human rights, 309, 369 human symbol, vitality of, 353 Hungary, 140, 267, 279, 292, 321 Huntington, Gertrude, 291–93 Hurrians, 93 Hutter, Jacob, 292–93 Hutterite Brethren Church of Canada, 294 Hutterites, 290, 291–95; mythology of, 292, 295; routinization of mythology and rituals, 295; social order, 293–95 hypermodernity, 370 hyperreality, 370, 371

I Iannaccone, Laurence, 55, 286–87, 360–61 Ibadi: see al-Ibadiyya ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Muhammad, 269 ibn Abi Sufyan, 110 ibn Abi Talib, Ali, 109, 166, 170, 175, 194, 200, 210, 214, 283 ibn Adham, Ibrahim, 166, 207 ibn Affan, Uthman, 109, 166, 194, 200 Ibn-al-‘Arabi, 170, 176, 178 ibn Ali, Hasan, 110, 166, 210

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ibn al-Khattab, Umar, 109, 166, 194 Ibn Hisham, 70, 149 Ibn Ishaq, 70, 71 Ibn Saad, Muhammad, 70, 147, 149–50, 162n6 ibn Saud, Abdul Aziz, 269 ibn Saud, Muhammad, 269 Ibrahim, 281 iddah, 226n2 Ide, Arthur, 145 ideal types, 18–19 identity, ritual and, 172 ijtihad, 240 imams, 73, 166–68, 178, 180, 195, 210–11; vs. Sufi pirs, 167–68 immanence of the soul, 36, 38 immigration, 153 immortal, codes related to, 36 “imperial church,” 265 incest, 38, 142 incubi, 250 independent virgins, 143 India: belief and morality in, 89; Buddhism in, 116; Islam in, 154; Mogul Empire of, 366; political conflicts in, 358; Shariat Application Act (1937), 367 individualism, 296–97; mystical-esoteric, 296–98; religious to modern, 297; unmediated, 371 individual religious experience, 43–47; Puritanism and, 202–4 individual rights, 157, 306, 352 inductive possibility, 356 indulgences, 32, 278 industrialization, 349–50 Industrial Revolution, 292, 331, 350, 374n9 infanticide, female, 142, 146 inheritance, in Qur’an, 148 Innocent II, Pope, 288n4 Innocent III, Pope, 272 Innocent VIII, Pope, 250; Summis desiderantes affectibus, 185

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i n de x | 4 4 5 Inquisition, 185, 249 institution, charisma and, 22, 61 institutional approach, 353 institutionalization, 21, 35–36, 37, 59, 82, 108–9, 111; of Christianity, 109; dilemmas of, 21–25 instrumentality, 25 intelligent design, 83 internal working models (IWMs), 77–78 internationalism, 93 interpretation: subjective, 16; vs. dogmatism, 25 interpretation, dilemma of, 25, 81–106; women leaders and, 137–62 interpretative sociology, 17, 40 interpretative understanding, 16–17 intertextuality, 370 intrinsic-committed spirituality, 45–46 introvertive mysticism, 51 Inuit, morality and, 230, 247 investiture, lay, 271, 278, 347 Ionic philosophy, 25 Iran, 70, 109, 110, 215, 269, 282, 368; “Black Friday,” 284; Gnosticism in, 208; hierocracy in, 282–87; Islam in, 258, 283; religious beliefs and rituals in, 286; Revolution in, 283; secularization of, 283, 286; Twelver Shi’ism, 210, 226n2, 283–84; women in, 154, 283, 284; see also Persia Iraq, 12, 67, 69, 70, 109, 155, 166, 201, 211, 266, 267, 282 Ireneus, 145 Irish immigrant groups, 364 Iroquois, 37, 38 Irwin, Graham, 348 Isaac, 122 Ishmael, 122 Islam, 1, 5, 12–13, 18, 19, 26n4, 60, 61, 95–99, 106n1, 196, 205, 225, 321, 332, 357, 358, 364, 370;

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Abraham as founder of, 121; caesaropapism in, 266–70; central beliefs of, 95; church in, 194–95; conflict with Christianity, 13; conservative, 258; cosmology of, 97–98; crescent of, 231; crusades against, 273, 275–77; customs in, 239; eschatology, 98; expansion of into Byzantine state, 12, 15; external threat of, 277, 279; faith as knowledge, 99; Five Pillars of, 175, 208, 339; gender equality in, 147–49; genesis of, 67–79; “golden age” of, 282; hierocracy in, 280–83; law in, 239–43, 335–39; legal schools of, 195, 241–42; Marxian model and, 335–39; Middle Period, 99; modernism, 154; modernity in, 366–67; movement of renewal in, 214–17; Muhammad, the caliphate and, 109–11; myth, ritual and ethos in, 238–43; new religious movements in, 207–12; orthodox, 154, 215; political aspects of, 73–76; pre-determination and free will, 98; pre-Islamic context, 68–69; prophetic era, 241; Puritanism in, 366–67; psychological function of ritual in, 178–79; racism against, 153; regulation of moral behaviour in, 175–76; reliability of sources of, 69–70; religious ethic in, 339; ritual as empowerment in, 179–80; ritual in, 165–68, 367; sect in, 200–201; secularization in, 365–68;

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4 4 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Shari’ah, 73, 110, 214, 217, 239–43, 270, 281, 282, 283, 336–38, 366–67; Six Pillars of Faith, 96; substantive ritual in, 169–70; vs. Christianity, 367; war against Christians, 266; Weberian historical sociology and, 335–39; women and, 146–55, 242; world views of, 82; see also Shi’ite Islam; Sunni Islam Islamic law, 239–43; periods of, 241 Islamism, 24, 214–17, 242, 368; in Egypt, 214, 216–17; Post-Colonial, 214–16; Pre-Western, 214–15 Ismailis, 195, 210–11 isnad, 240–41 Israel, 122, 286, 357; ancient, 36, 37, 68, 259 Italy, 264, 265, 278, 329, 342n2, 347; cities in, 323; witchcraft in, 249, 250 Ithna Asharis, 195

J Jackson, Phil, 120 Jacob, Margaret, 330 James, William, 10, 43–44, 53, 59–60 Janissaries, 267, 279 Japan, 106n4; belief and morality in, 89; Buddhism in, 116, 234, 235; women shamans in, 139 Jefferson, Thomas, 312 Jehovah’s Witnesses, 223, 252 Jenkins, Philip, 113 Jenness, Diamond, 90 Jensen, L.A., 253 Jesus Christ, 23, 51, 62, 95, 96, 138, 142, 220, 229, 256n7, 258, 262, 264, 279, 293, 297, 304, 340; charisma of, 123; crucifixion and resurrection of, 95, 275, 355–56;

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as prophet, 119, 125–27; relationship with, 88, 290; virgin birth of, 356 jihad, 13, 175, 240, 268–70, 339; in Afghanistan, 270; against Christians, 268; “invisible,” 175 jima, 240 John VIII, Pope, 279, 288n5 Johnstone, Ronald, 205 John the Baptist, 65, 96 Jones, W.T., 260 Jonestown group, 226n5 Josephus, 126 Judaism, 1, 5, 8, 12, 19, 23, 26n4, 68, 79n5, 80n9, 93, 95, 121–23, 126–28, 196, 205, 236, 252, 310; cabbala, 60; crusades against, 273–75; Decalogue (Ten Commandments), 95, 229, 255n6; divine descent in, 104–5; marginalization, 274; Orthodox, 133; synagogue, 61; Torah, 240; Weber and, 340; women and, 364; world views of, 82 Jungian therapy, 372 Justinian, 321 Juynboll, G.H.A., 239–40

K kaaba, 69 Kadane, Matthew, 330 Kaelber, Lutz, 323, 325–26, 327, 329–30, 339 Kant, Immanuel, 4 Kanwar, Mahfooz, 243 Karen, 38 karma (kamma), 116, 234 Kassim, Husain, 339, 342n6 Kassites, 93 Kaynuka tribe, 74 Kazemipur, Abdolmohammad, 286

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i n de x | 4 47 Kazim, Musa al-, 210 Kelly, Dean, 222 Kennedy, Hugh, 13, 166, 200 Kenya, 37 Kephart, William, 63 Kerry, John, 307 Khameini, Ayatollah Ali, 285 Kharijism/Kharijites (Kharidjites, Kharidjis), 97, 166, 195, 210, 281, 282; creation of, 200; as Islamic sect, 200–201 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah, 154, 283–86 Kieckhefer, Richard, 48 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 19 kingship, 260–61 Kinross, Lord, 266–68 Kirkland (Ohio), 65–67 Kirkpatrick, Lee, 76–78, 80nn9,10 Kluckhohn, Clyde, 177 Knights Templar: see Templars knowledge: archaeology of, 370; as information, 370 Knowles, Anne Kelly, 329 Knox, John, 330 Korea: Buddhism in, 116, 234; women shamans in, 139 Kramer, Heinrich, 185, 250, 251 Kraybill, Donald, 291, 294 Kreider, Alan, 291 Kundun, 120 Kunkel, Mark, 86 Kuwait, Islam in, 154

L Lakota people, 172–74; “Ghost Dance,” 173–74; sun dance, 173 Landau, P., 320–21 Lanternari, Vittorio, 340 Laos, Buddhism in, 116 Larson, Carin, 301–2, 306–7 Larson, Lyle, 131, 134, 159 Lash, Scott, 82

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Last Day, 96 Lateran Council of the Latin Church, 60 Laubach, Marty, 298 Laumann, Edward, 318n2 law, 229–30; canon (sacred) vs. civil (secular), 321, 336–38, 342n6; contract, 321; revolution in, 321; Roman, 321; Shari’ah, 73, 110, 214, 217, 239–43, 270, 281, 282, 283, 336–38, 366–67; Western, 320–21; Western vs. Islamic, 336–38, 366–67 lawgiver prophet, 118 lay investiture, 271, 278, 347 leadership, sacred, 108–36, 207; typology of, 111–15 leadership networks, 303 League of Arab States, 216 leconomancy, 114 Leder, Lawrence, 311 Lee, Mother Ann, 61, 62–64 legends, 30 legitimation, 36, 37 Leick, Gwendolyn, 88 Lemieux, Raymond, 197 Lenski, Gerhard, 243, 246, 331 Leo III, Pope, 176, 263, 264 Leo IV, Pope, 279 Leopold II, Holy Roman Emperor, 264, 265 Lepanto, Battle of, 241 Lesko, Leonard, 238 Lester, T., 358 Levantine tradition, 95 Lévi-Strauss, Claude, 174 Lewis, Bernard, 210, 212 libanomancy, 114 liberal–conservative split, 18, 133, 221, 222– 23, 252–55, 299, 317, 378, 358–59 liberalism, religious, 252–55, 299–301, 304, 351–52 liberalization, 221 Liberal Party of Canada, 301 liberal restructuring, 358–59

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4 4 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D liberation theology, 358 libertarianism, economic, 302 Liebman, Robert, 302 Lienesch, Michael, 304 limit-situations, 21 Lipset, Seymour, 300–301, 314 “little divergence,” 328–29 Livingstone, Elizabeth, 259, 275 Lloyd, Simon, 275–78, 288n4 Locke, John, 309 Lofland, John, 54, 217, 223 Lombard kingdom, 347 London, 328 Louis IX, 277 Louis XV, 351 Louis the Pious, 249 Lourdes, 352 love, 101 Luckmann, Thomas, 34, 35–36, 37 Ludemann, Gerd, 355 Luther, Martin, 9, 20, 31–33, 45, 54, 123, 290, 323–24, 330, 348–49 Lutheranism, 31, 136n4, 196, 222, 225, 254, 290; evangelical, 133

M Maat, 37, 103 Maccabees, 126 macro- vs. micro-level analysis, 20 macrocosm, 100 Madani, S.M., 162n6 madrasas, 366 magic, 47–49, 57n16, 250 magical divination, 114 Mahayana Buddhism, 5, 116, 234 Mahdi (Guided One), 96, 195, 283 Mahdi, Hujjat al-, 210 Mahmud II, 267 malfeasance, clergy and, 133 Maliki legal school, 195, 241 Malinowski, Bronislaw, 11, 48, 230 Malleus Maleficarum, 185, 248–52 Mamluk sultanate, 268 mana, 1

UTP01 Spirituality_Interior_071709.indd 448

mangu, 181 Manichaeism, 304 Mann, Williams, 205 Mansur, Abu Amir al-, 13 Manus peoples, 230, 248 Mara, 121 Marcos, Ferdinand, 358 Marduk, 1, 94 marginalization, of Jews, 274 market model, 14, 361–62, 365 market system, 322 Marler, P.L., 224 Marshall, David, 221 Martel, Charles, 13, 110 Martin, David, 218–19, 227n8, 349–50, 355, 361 Martin, Paul, 294 Marty, Martin, 263, 297, 309 Marx, Karl, 6, 7–8, 10, 16, 34; conflict theory, 12, 165; model of society, 334; religion and, 333–42; secularization and, 351–52 Marxism, 316 Mary, Protestant embracing of, 156 masculinization, 138, 139–40, 158 massage, 372 Maximilian I, Holy Roman Emperor, 265 Mayan society, 26n2 Maynard, Elizabeth, 88 McCall, Henrietta, 92 McCleary, Rachel, 332 McConnell, Michael, 310–11 McFadden, Susan, 87, 107n5 McGrath, Alister: A Life of John Calvin, 123 McGuire, Meredith, 227n8 McKinney, William, 252–54, 296 McKitterick, Rosamond, 272, 323, 346 McNamara, Jo Ann Kay, 143 McPherson, Aimee Semple, 158 Meachem, Father Joseph, 63 Mecca (Makka), 69–70, 129, 201, 270, 338 media, 350 Medina, 70, 71, 109, 201, 214, 217, 269; hierocracy in, 73–76, 281 meditation, 52, 234

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i n de x | 4 4 9 Mehmed II, 267 Melania the Younger, 143 Mennonites, 290–91, 312; Old Order, 291; progressives, 291 Mensching, Gustav, 6, 7 Merton, Robert, 9, 247 mesmerism, 113, 372 mesocosm, 100 Mesopotamia, 1, 15, 37, 174, 259; archaic religious leadership in, 113–15; caesaropapism in, 260–61, 266; kingship in, 113; mythology of, 91–94, 103; myth, ritual and ethos in, 236–38; priests in, 113–14; “Royal Art of Astrology,” 114; substantive ritual in, 169; temple in, 192–93; women and religion in, 140–42 meta-narratives, 370, 371 Methodism, 17, 60, 79n4, 87, 220, 222, 223, 224, 300, 312, 323, 325, 329 Metropolitan Community Church, 364 Mexico, 139, 340; belief and morality in, 89 Meyer, Kraig, 154 microcosm, 100 Middle Ages, 60, 99; Catholicism in, 324–25; Christianity in, 271–80, 309 hierarchy in, 292; precedents for rational capitalism in, 320–23 millennialism, 42, 56n10, 255n1 Mills, C.W., 123, 368 Minai, Naila, 149 Miner, Horace, 196, 226n3 misogyny, witchcraft and, 249–50 mixed motivation, dilemma of, 22, 262; sacred leadership and, 108–36; single-minded motivation vs., 161; women leaders and, 137–62 Moaddel, Mansoor, 154 modern, definition of, 369

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modernity, 82, 369; Islamic, 366–67; New Age movement and, 373; religion and, 349–50; via communism, 352 modernization, 295, 349–50; Berger’s tradition of, 355–56 Moen, Matthew, 304–5 Moguls, 282 monarchs, coronation of, 176–77 monasteries, 271, 328, 346; as locus of egoistic withdrawal, 323; reform movements in, 321 monasticism, 125, 213, 271, 323, 346; ethics of, 325 Mongolia, 138; Buddhism in, 116 Mongolian peoples, 140 monism, 100 “monks of war,” 279–80 monoamines, 47, 53, 57n14 monolithic society, growth of, 274 monotheism, 1, 36, 37, 95, 236, 266 Montanism, 162n5 Monte Casino, 125 Monter, William, 183 moral behaviour, ritual as regulating, 171, 175–76 moral community, 233 moral control, locus of, 35 morality, 30, 165, 176; functional definition of, 245; functions of, 245–52; morphology of, 245–52; religious, 228–55; see also ethos Moral Majority, 302–3 mores, 229

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4 5 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Mormonism (Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints), 35–36, 40–43, 61, 64–67, 131, 133, 223, 225, 252, 312; central tenets of, 40–41; Christianity and, 42–43; ordination of women in, 156; polygyny and, 65–66; production of currency, 65–66 Morocco, 276, 282 Morris, Richard, 348 Morrow, E. Lloyd, 220 Morse, Samuel, 331 Morton, Peter, 183–86 Moscow: Patriarchate of, 263; as “Third Rome,” 263 Moses, 95, 105; as prophet, 118 “Mothers of the Faithful,” 150 movement of renewal (MOR), 190, 213–18, 295, 374n4; in Christianity, 218; elements of, 213–14; in Islam, 214–17 Muawiyah, 110, 166, 200, 281, 284 muhaddith, 195 Muhammad, 51, 61, 67–79, 95, 109–11, 146, 147–49, 170, 178, 195, 210, 214, 269, 280, 281, 284, 288n6, 297; attachment theory and, 150–52, 154–55; biographies of, 149–52; Companions of, 240–41; death of, 200; early years of, 71, 151–52; manner of life of, 70; as prophet, 118, 119, 128–29; relationships of, 149–52; religious experiences of, 71–72; revelation of Qur’an to, 95; Sufism and, 207 multidimensionality, 20–21 multiplicity, 370 Muntazar, Muhammad al-, 283 Murad I, 267 Murngin peoples, 232, 246 music, religion and, 52

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Muslim Brotherhood/Muslim Brothers of Egypt, 217, 242 Muslim sources, reliability of, 69–70 Muslim World League, 270 mutah, 195, 226n2 Mutazilis, 97, 342n6 Muzalim courts, 282 Myanmar, 38, 231; Buddhism in, 116, 234–35, 247 mystagogue prophet, 118 mysterium tremendum, 2–4, 72, 113 mystical-esoteric spirituality, 296–98 mysticism, 51–53, 60, 178, 207; bureaucracy and, 61; Christian, 372; church participation and, 57n20; extravertive vs. introvertive, 51; social factors and, 52 myth, 83–84; effects of, 84–89; erosion of power of, 84; functional effects of, 88–89; marginalization of, 344; morphology of, 89–102; mystical function of, 85; primary functions of, 84; relativization of, 354; ritual, ethos and, 230–45 mythology, 8, 17, 25, 30, 31, 81–106; explanatory, 87–88; feminine in, 139; Puritanism and, 202–4; religion, world views and, 83–84; shamanism and, 112; social constructionism and, 35–37; substantive, 85–87; Sufism and, 207–8; varieties of, 89–102

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i n de x | 4 5 1

N Nandi, 37 Narayan, B.K., 200 narratives: deconstruction of, 372; grand, 19; master, 369 Nason-Clark, Nancy, 135–36, 161 nationalism, 292 National Organization for Women: Ecumenical Task Force on Women and Religion, 156 Nation of Islam, 341 natural law, 100 nature, feminine and, 138–39 nature religion, 2, 247 Navaho, 38, 177 Ndembu people, 169 necromancy, 249 needs, adaptive and expressive, 11 nefarious, ritual as evoking, 172, 180–86 Neo-Assyrians, 93, 141 Neo-Babylonians, 92–93 neo-orthodoxy, 355 neo-paganism, 44 neoplatonism, 372 Neo-Sumerians, 93 Nepal, 140; Buddhism in, 116; shamanism in, 111, 112 Netherlands, 329 network theory, 223 neurotransmitters, 47 New Age movement (“New Age Spirituality”), 44, 82, 371–73; mythology of, 371–72; organization of, 372–73; shamanism and, 113 New Democratic Party (NDP), 299, 301 New England, hierocracy in, 311–12 Newport, Frank, 223 Newport, John, 371–72

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New Religious Movements (NRM), 44, 58n22, 130, 190, 205–13, 223, 258, 357; characteristics of, 205–6; definition of, 226n6; in Islam, 207–12; in Montreal, 212–13; Order of Assassins, 210–12; Sufism, 207–10; vs. sects, 206 New Religious Right, 299, 301–8, 355; decline of, 306–8; ideology of, 302; of the 1980s, 302–6; New Testament, 96, 256n7, 264, 293 new thought, 372 new voluntarism, 296 Nicolas V, Pope, 288n3 Niebuhr, H. Richard, 218, 227n8, 360 Nielsen, Donald, 320, 323, 325, 327, 330 niqab, 163n8 nirvana (nibbana), 116, 234 Noffke, Jacqueline, 87, 107n5 nones, 223, 225 Norbeck, Edward, 230, 248 norms, 229 noumena, 4–5 Nuavoo (Illinois), 66 numen, 2–4, 7; continuum of, 3; Judeo-Christian tradition of, 3–4; see also sacred numeniferous, 7–8, 35, 60, 83, 228 numismatics, 70 nuns, 143 nushuz, 148

O obedience, 325 objectification vs. alienation, 22 objectivity vs. singularity, 20 object relations theory, 31, 32 oblates, 193 occidental mythology, 90, 95–99; vs. oriental, 100–102 occidental religion, 2

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4 5 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D occult, 90, 113 O’Dea, Janet, 177, 188, 218, 225, 229, 245, 257 O’Dea, Thomas, 1, 11–12, 19, 21–25, 109, 177, 188, 218, 225, 229, 245, 257, 318n1; alienation–objectification continuum, 171; charisma and, 21–25, 67; dilemma of administrative order, 23, 188–226; dilemma of delimitation, 23–24, 228–55; dilemma of interpretation, 25, 81–106, 228–55; dilemma of mixed motivation, 22, 108–36, 137–62, 262; dilemma of power, 24, 257–87, 289–318 functions of religion of, 12; mixed vs. pure motivation, 115; ritual and, 164; Sociology and the Study of Religion, 28n19; symbolic dilemma, 22–23, 164–86 Odovacar, 262 Ohio, ascetic Protestantism in, 329–30 oikoumene, 68 Ojibwa first nation, shamanism among, 112 Oman, 201 operational divination, 114 opiate/opium, religion as, 335, 340, 341, 374n5 Oppenheim, A. Leo, 113–14, 192, 260 oppressed, religious movements of, 340 oral vs. literary traditions, 107n8 Order of Assassins, 210–12 Order of St. John, 279 ordination: of homosexuals, 133–34, 255; of women, 156–61 Oregon Citizens Alliance, 307–8 organizational precariousness, 193 organizations: see religious organizations oriental mythology, 90, 99–102; central elements of, 100–102; feminine image in, 100; vs. occidental, 100–102 oriental religion, 2 Origen, 145 Orthodox Christianity, 5, 263 Orthodox Islam, 154, 215 Orthodox Judaism, 133 Orthodox Protestantism, 131

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orthopraxy, 215 Osiris, 1, 37, 103, 104 Osman, 266 Oswiu, King, 177 “otherness,” conversion and, 53 other-worldly orientation, 60, 235, 344, 367 O’Toole, Roger, 10, 196, 196, 221, 332 Otto, Rudolph, 2, 44, 86 Otto I, 265 Ottoman Empire, 110, 152, 195, 241, 263, 276, 279, 280, 292, 337, 338, 370; caesaropapism in, 266–70; Magna Carta of, 268 Ottonian dynasty, 265, 273 Outremer, 273, 277, 279–80

P Pachomius, 143 Pahlavi dynasty, 154, 283 Pakistan, 110, 209, 366; social structure of the shrine in, 209–10 palace, 192 Palestine, 12, 91, 109, 126, 144; PLO in, 270 palimpsest, 30 Paloutzian, Raymond, 53, 54 Pan-Indianism, 340 Panthéon, 351 papacy: see popes papal estates, 347 Papal States, 347–48, 352 Paper, Jordan, 179 “Papists,” 310 papyri, 70 papyrological evidence, 144 paradise, in Qur’an, 147–48 Paraguay, 140 paranormal beliefs, 48–50 parish church, 346 Parsons, Talcott, 6, 7, 11, 21, 27n17 Paschal I, Pope, 162n4 passivity, conversion and, 53 pathological conversion, 53 patriarchy, 141, 148, 155, 183, 294, 303 Patricus (St. Patrick), 39

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i n de x | 4 5 3 patrimonialism, 329; oriental, 338–39 Paul the apostle, 142 peasant revolts, 293 Pendleton, Brian, 51 Penitentials, 39 Pentecostalism, 22–23, 60, 131, 156, 158, 223, 246 “People of the Book,” 12 People’s Crusade, 277 Pepin III, 347 Pepin the Short, 176 perennialism, 372 Perl, P., 157–58 Perpetua, 143 Persia, 68, 201, 211, 266, 267, 282; see also Iran Persian Empire, 266 Persians, 92–93 personal construction of religion, 30–33 personality system, 11 personal withdrawal, 290, 295–99 Peter, J., 166, 207, 208 Peter, Karl, 291, 293–95 Peter the Great, 263 Peyote cult, 340 Pharisees, 126 phenomena, 4–5; scientific methodology for description of, 84–85 Philip II Augustus, 275 Philip IV, 280 Philippines, 358 Philip the Fair, 272–73 Phipps, Rev. Bill, 221 Phoenicia, 91 phratry, 191 Piazza, Thomas, 86, 243 pietism, 296–97 pietistic movement, 297 piety, 236 pilgrimages, 352 pilgrims, New England, 311–12 Pinochet, Augusto, 316–17

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pirs, 167–68, 170, 175, 180, 207–10; centrality of, 178, 209; vs. Shi’ite imams, 167–68 Plato, 25, 287n2 pluralism, religious, 14, 355, 361, 365 plurality, 370 Poewe, Karla, 205 Poland, 106n4 political activism, 290, 299–308 politics, religion and, 257–87, 289–318 Poloma, Margaret, 22–23, 51, 158, 243 polyandry, 66 polygyny, 42, 65–66, 142, 154, 181; Hermetic, 42; in Qur’an, 148 polytheism, 36, 37, 69, 79n5, 94, 236, 266, 314 Polzer, Megan, 52 Pope, Liston, 340–41 popes, 56n1, 271–72, 273, 278, 320–21, 347–48 popular religion, 167 positivism, 369, 370 possession, spirit, 111–12 Post-Colonial Islamism, 214–16 post-industrial, 369 postmodern, definition of, 368–71 postmodernism, 368–73; definition of, 368–71 poverty, 325 power, 22, 36, 165; dilemma of, 24, 257–87, 289–318; papal, 278 prajna, 234 Pratt, Parley Parker, 40 prayer, 13, 39, 45, 51, 125, 235–36, 243–44, 269, 286, 305 “Prayer to the Gods of the Night,” 236 prebendalism, 116, 338 predestination, double, 324 predetermination, Islamic, 98 pre-Islamic context, 68–69 prejudice, 45 pre-medieval society, 39

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4 5 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Presbyterianism, 133, 136n4, 220, 222, 223, 224, 254, 300, 302, 312, 330–31; Calvinistic, 330–31 presbyterian polity, 220 prestige, 22 Pre-Western Islamism, 214–15 priest: characteristics of, 118; hierocracy and, 271; in Mesopotamian religion, 113–14; prophet and, 111, 117–29, 131–35; religious organizations and, 130; studies of, 131–35; use of term, 136n1, 163n11; women as, 155–61 primal therapy, 372 Priscillian, 262 private troubles, 134 privatization, 290, 295–99, 355 privatized religion, 295–99; intra-psychic origins of, 298 production, religious, 55 profane, sacred vs., 21, 233 prognostication, 114 Progressive Writers Movement, 367 proletariat, 335, 352 prophet: characteristics of, 118; ethical, 118; exemplary, 118, 119–21; founding, 118, 121–23; lawgiver, 118; mystagogue, 118; reforming, 118, 119, 123–24, 130, 290; religious organizations and, 130; renewer, 118, 119, 124–25, 130, 285; revolutionary, 118, 119, 125–29, 130; priest and, 111, 117–29, 131–35; teacher, 118; women as, 155–61 protasis, 114 Protestant asceticism: frontier Ohio and, 329–30; rise and triumph of, 325–27 Protestant ethic, 124, 247–48, 323, 324–25, 326, 330, 331–32

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Protestantism, 5, 131, 252–53, 309, 311; Calvinist, 25, 123–24; capitalism and, 323, 324, 327–29; liberal, 356, 360; mainstream, 136n4, 196, 306; orthodox, 131; radical reformers, 290; vs. Catholicism, 332 Protestant reform, 22 Protestant Reformation, 32, 60, 202, 205, 227n8, 265, 328, 348–49 protests, 8 Pruyser, Paul, 31 Psalms of David, 96 psychic experiences, 47–51; belief in, 49–50 psychic healing, 50, 372 psychism, 298–99 psychokinesis (PK), 49 psychological construction of religion, 30–33, 76–78 psychological development, ritual as, 177–79 psychological types of spirituality, 45–46 Psychosynthesis, 212, 372 Puritan Code, 202–4 Puritanism, 17, 310, 323, 325, 328; Indian-Muslim form of, 366–67; as sect, 202–5, 348 Pythagoras, 138

Q qadi, 97 Qajars, 283 Qaysiyya, Rabi’a al-‘Adawiyya al-, 166 qiyas, 240 Quakers, 22, 312, 323, 325; Shaking, see Shakers qudi, 281 Quebec, 225, 315; church in, 196–97; morality in, 253–54; Shari’ah law in, 243 Qur’an, 104, 128, 129, 239, 242, 266, 269, 367; gender issues in, 147–49; genesis of Islam and, 70, 73, 75;

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i n de x | 4 5 5 in Iran, 283–84; male leadership in, 148; occidental mythology and, 95–97, 99; ritual and, 170, 178, 180; sacred organizations and, 195, 201, 207, 214; women in, 146–49 Quraysh tribe, 74, 166

R Radcliffe-Brown, Reginald, 11 Radiant Light Interfaith Church, 374n12 Ramadan, 129 Rashid, Harun al-, 97 Rastislav, Prince, 262 rational capitalism: Calvin and, 324–25; Luther and, 323–24; medieval precedents for, 320–23; patrimonialism as obstacle to, 339; Protestant asceticism and, 325–27, 329–30 rational choice theory, 13–15, 55, 224; secularization and, 360–64, 365 rationality, 25; traditionalism vs. rationality, 355 rationalization, 199, 349, 354; reaction to, 373 rational social action, 17–18, 27n15; instrumental, 17; legal, 17, 27n15; value, 27n15; vs. non-rational, 21 Re, 260 Reagan, Ronald, 305 rebellion, 30 reciprocity, ethic of, 247 recusants, 276 “Red Menace,” 302 reductive possibility, 355–56 reflexivity, 136 Reformation, Protestant/Calvinistic, 32, 60, 202, 205, 227n8, 265, 328, 348–49 Reformed Church, 136n4 reforming prophet, 118, 119, 130; Calvin as, 123–24; Menno Simons as, 290

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reincarnation, 36, 38, 50 religion: as agent of change, 320–33, 341; as belief, 81; civil, 290, 312–17; comparative study of, 81; conceptualization of, 5–8; definitional base of, 2–8; disestablishment of, 14; and economy, 319–42; of elites vs. masses, 167; experience as core of, 44; functions of, 12; and genesis of modernity, 320–33; as inhibitor of change, 333–41; institutionalization of, 21–25, 35–36, 37, 82; intra-personal dimension of, 296; magic and, 47–49, 57n16; Marx/Engels definition of, 334–35; Marxian thesis of, 333–41; modernity and, 349–50; mythologies, world views and, 83–84; as opium of people, 335, 340, 341, 374n5; phenomenology of, 85; politics and, 257–87, 289–318; popular, 167; privatization of, 355; as private institution, 295; psychological-personal construction of, 30–33; psychology of, 76–78; ritual as foundation of, 191; of the self, 372; social construction of, 34–43, 191, 314–15; and state, 176–77, 309–12; theoretical base of, 8–15; “without a church,” 297; as world view, 81–106 religiosity, 223; child abuse and, 33; immanentist, 100; religiousness and, 43 57n12 religious competition, 40 religious economy, 361–62 religious exogamy, 223–24

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4 5 6 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D religious experience, 29–56; ecstatic, 63; fragility of, 60; human, 356; individual, 43–47, 202–4; social institutions and, 59–79; varieties of, 47–55 religious human capital, 55 religious leadership, typology of, 111–15; see also leadership, sacred religiousness, 223; religiosity and, 43, 57n12 religious organizations, 59, 344; definition of, 189; dilemma of administrative order and, 188–226; elements of, 189; emergence of, 189–222; feminine in, 139 religious production, 55 remembering, ritual as, 171, 172–74 Renaissance, 372; Carolingian, 264 renewer prophet, 118, 119, 130; Ayatollah Khomeini as, 285; Benedict of Nursia as, 124–25 resource hypothesis, 159–60 restructuring thesis, 135, 252–54, 358–59; liberal and conservative, 358–59 Reuter, Timothy, 321 revolutionary prophet, 118, 119, 130; Jesus as, 125–27; Muhammad as, 128–29 revolution by tradition, 213, 285 rewards, 13–14 Reza, Muhammad, 283 Rezaei, Ali, 286 Rice, T., 50 Richardson, J., 53, 54 Riley-Smith, Jonathan, 275–76 rites, 168 rites of passage, 172, 176, 191

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ritual, 7–8, 22, 33, 35, 48, 63, 190, 191, 192, 228, 373; in Christianity, 176–77; church and, 193; demise of, 64; ecological function of, 172, 179; as empowerment, 172, 179–80; functional, 171–86; as invoking the nefarious, 172, 180–86; in Iran, 286; in Islam, 165–68, 367; myth, ethos and, 230–45; as psychological development, 177–79; Puritanism and, 202–4; as regulation of behaviour, 171, 175–76; as remembering, 171, 172–74; as social bonding, 171, 174–75; as socialization, 172, 176–77; substantive vs. functional, 165–68; substantive dimension of, 168–71; Sufism and, 207; symbolic dilemma and, 164–86; women and, 139 Ritzer, George, 9, 368–71 robber capitalism, 325–26, 339 Robbins, Rossell Hope, 185 Roberts, Keith, 314–15 Robertson, Pat, 304, 305 Robertson, Roland, 206 Robinson, Francis, 366 Robinson, I., 347 Roe vs. Wade decision, 303, 305 Roger I of Sicily, 288n4 Rogerson, Barnaby, 70, 80n8 role ambiguity, 135 role consistency, 14 Roleffes, Anna: see Tempel Anneke Rollin, Sue, 140–42 Roman Catholicism, 5, 22, 60, 87, 123, 125, 131, 196–97, 218, 222–25, 252–54, 264, 306, 309, 310, 321, 329, 351, 355, 358, 362, 370; Calvin and, 324–25; charisma and, 218; Church Calendar, 171;

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i n de x | 4 57 Eastern and Western, 287n2; female leadership in, 158–59; hierocracy in, 271; Hutterites and, 293; Malleus Maleficarum, 248–52; non-ordained female pastors in, 159; ordination of homosexuals, 133; ordination of women, 156; pope, 56n1, 271–72; pre-Vatican II, 171; priesthood, 132; protest against, 290; Puritanism and, 367; vs. Protestantism, 332 Roman Empire, 262, 266, 274 Rome, ancient, 19, 26n2, 36, 37, 124, 126, 236, 259, 262; Christianization of, 24, 54, 124–25; mythology of, 91 Romulus Augustulus, 262 Roof, W.C., 222–23, 252–54, 296 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 313, 315–16, 351; The Social Contract, 315 routinization: of charisma: see charisma of church, 213; of mythology and ritual, 213; of sects, 221 Rule of St. Benedict, 125 Rumi, 170, 176, 178 Rumi, Jalal ad-Din, 207 Russia, 262–63; Hutterites in, 292; religion and politics in, 263; secularization in, 344, 352 Ryder, Joseph, 330

S Sabbah, Hasan-i, 211 Sabbatarianism, 330 sacralization, 198–99, 343, 344–46, 364, 365; conservatism and, 359; reconciliation of with secularization, 365; subjective vs. objective, 345

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sacred: clan and, 191; conceptualization of, 2–5; profane vs., 21, 233; religious definition of, 2; revitalization of, 295; set-apart definition of, 2, 191; social factors and, 37–39; transcendent definition of, 2 sacred among, 26, 43, 190, 219 sacred between, 26, 43, 190 sacred elites, 60 sacred leadership, 108–36, 207 sacred organizations: see religious organizations sacred pipe ritual, 179 sacred–societal hierarchy, 261 sacred texts, 52 sacred within, 26, 29, 43, 167, 190, 219, 297 Sadducees, 126 Sadiq, Ja’far al-, 210–11 Safavid Empire, 283 St. Benedict, 51 St. Boniface, 162n2 St. Denis (Quebec), 196–97 St. Hildegard of Bingen, 51 St. Lioba, 162n2 St. Patrick, 39 St. Paul, 54 saints’ days, 328 salat, 73 Salem witch hunts, 318n4 Salih, 96 Salisbury, Joyce, 143, 145 samadhi, 234 same-sex marriage, 17–18, 133, 294, 306–7, 354 sangha, 116 sapiens, 39 Sapir, Edward, 6, 7 Saracens, 288n5 Sasanians, 281 Saskatchewan, 299–301; Independent Labour Party (ILP), 300 Saudi Arabia, 231, 269–70; Wahhabism in, 215, 269

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4 5 8 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D Saxonia, 264 Saxons, 264 Schaeffer, Francis, 304 Schleiermacher, Friedrich, 356 Schluchter, Wolfgang, 320–23, 337, 338 Scientology, 212 Scopes, John, 302 Scorsese, Martin, 120 Scotland: education in, 330–31; modern world and, 330–31; witchcraft in, 249, 250 scribes, 192 Seagal, Steven, 120 Second Vatican Council, 22 sectarianism, 131, 258 sects, 14, 61, 130, 190, 197–205, 223; charisma and, 198; in Christianity, 202–5; church and, 198, 218–19, 226n1, 360–62; definition of, 199; denominations and, 218–19; elements of, 199; formation of, 198; in Islam, 200–201; routinization of, 221; vs. new religious movements, 206 secularism, 304 secularization, 14, 198–99, 221, 244, 283, 285, 286, 303, 304, 309, 343–68; as clerical distinction, 344; cultural analytic approach to, 353–60; as delimiting process, 360–61, 362; ecclesial property and, 346–48; of European mind in nineteenth century, 351–53; history of in Europe, 346–53; internal vs. external, 344; Islam and, 365–68; liberalism and, 359; Protestant Reformation and, 348–49; rational choice model of, 360–64, 365; received tradition of, 349–51; reconciliation of with sacralization, 365; social scientific study of religion and, 364;

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structural/objective, 344–45; subjective, 344–45, 353–54 security, 22 self, reconstruction of, 372 self-concept, religious and spiritual, 33 self-directing style, 88 self-ethic, 371–72 self-surrender, 53 self-transcendence, 47, 53 Seljuks, 195, 211, 276, 282, 337 sensory awareness, 372 Sepharads, 274–75 September 11 attacks, 270 Sermon on the Mount, 279, 290 Seth, 1 “Seven Deadly Sins,” 226n4 “seven sisters,” 136n4 Seven Years in Tibet, 120 Seward, Desmond, 279–80 sexual promiscuity, 304, 318n2 Shafi’i legal school, 195, 241 shahs, Iranian, 283–84, 358 Shahadah, 96, 357, 367 Shakers (Shaking Quakers; United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing), 61, 62–64; charisma and, 63–64; demise of, 64 Shakti, 212 shamanic states of consciousness (SSC), 111, 113 shamans, folk religions and, 111–13; women as, 138–40 Shari’ah, 73, 110, 214, 217, 239–43, 270, 281, 282, 283, 366–67; principal sources of, 240; Weber and, 336–38 Shariati, Ali, 283–84 Sharot, Stephen, 57n16, 60, 79n5, 115–16, 167 Sherkat, Darren, 223, 224 Shi’ite Islam, 5, 73, 96, 97, 154, 200, 201, 210, 215, 266, 268, 269, 270, 278; church in, 195; emergence of, 280–83; ethics and morality in, 175;

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i n de x | 4 5 9 hierarchy of, 195; hierocracy and, 280–83; pilgrims, 178–80; ritual in, 166–68, 169–70; sectarian movements, 195; separation of from Sunni, 166; Twelver, 210, 226n2, 283–84 Shintoism, 26n3, 116 Short Bull, 173 Shupe, Anson, 302–3, 305 Siberia, 140; shamans in, 138 Sicily, 201, 282 Siddhartha, Prince Gautama: see Buddha Siddiq, Abu Bakr al-, 166 Siegel, Daniel, 80n10 Sikhism, 196, 225, 358 sila, 234 Silva Mind Control, 212 Simons, Menno, 290, 291 Sioux peoples, 231 siras, 70 Skocpol, Theda, 216 slavery, 341 Slovakia: Bosnian Muslims in, 270; Hutterites in, 292 Smith, Adam, 330–31; Wealth of Nations, 330 Smith, Jane, 13 Smith, Joseph, Jr., 20, 35–36, 40, 42–43, 61, 64–67 Smyth, John, 204 social action, 17–18; affective, 18, 189; rational, 17–18; rational vs. non-rational, 21; traditional, 17; “value-rational,” 330 social bonding: morality function of, 246; ritual as, 171, 174–75 social cohesion and integration, 165 social construction of religion, 34–43; civil religion as, 314–15

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social control: civil religion as, 315–17; morality function of, 248 social factors, sacred phenomena and, 37–39 social gospel, 299–301 social institutions, religious experience and, 59–79, 260 social integration, morality function of, 247 socialism, rural and urban, 300 socialization, 58n21; ritual as, 172, 176–77 social legitimation, 165 social mobility, 350 social order, 229; Hutterite, 293–95 social organization, Puritanism and, 202–4 social responsibility, 371–72 social solidarity, 229, 247 social system, 11 social traditionalism, 302 social values, 232 solar theology, 260–61 solas of faith, 349 sorcery, 249 South Africa, 138 Southern Baptist Church, 131, 133, 135, 223, 303 Soviet Union: see Russia Spain, 201, 329 special interest groups, 303 Spencer, Herbert, 350 Spilka, Bernard, 45–46, 86, 87 spirit of capitalism, 324–26, 331–32; summum bonum of, 326 spirit of the law, 229 spiritualism, 90, 113, 372; Shakers and, 63 spirituality: biology and, 45, 47, 53; definition of, 43–44; individual, 297; intrinsic vs. extrinsic, 45–46; motivational vs. cognitive aspects of, 45; mystical-esoteric, 296–98; New Age, 44; psychological types of, 45–46;

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4 6 0 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D uncoupled from society, 44; varieties of, 47–55 Spiro, Melford, 234, 247 Sprenger, Jacob, 185, 250, 251 Sri Lanka, Buddhism in, 116, 234 Stace, Walter, 51 Stacey, William, 302–3 Stark, Rodney, 54, 89, 142, 198, 205–6, 217, 222–23, 235–36, 244, 258, 286–87, 319, 360–62 Stato Ecclesiastico: see Papal States status theories, 223 Stedingers, 276 Stol, Marten, 140 Stonehenge, 372 Stowasser, Barbara Freyer, 149–51, 162n6 structural approach to culture, 353 subjective approach to culture, 353 subjective interpretation, 16 subjectivity vs. objectivity, 20 sub specie aeternitatis, 171 substantive: ritual, 168–71; vs. functional, 165–68 substantive definition of religion, 6, 7, 165, 189 substitution of letter for spirit v. concrete definition, 23–24 succubi, 250 Sudan, 201, 367 sudden conversion, 53–54 suf / sufi, 207 Sufism, 18, 60, 101, 195, 269, 367, 372; central beliefs of, 208; dervishes, 267; empowerment of disciples of, 180; “invisible jihad,” 175; as new religious movement, 207–10; pilgrimages, 209; as populist movement, 208; ritual in, 166–68, 170, 178; spiritual journey of devotee of, 177; tariqahs, 167–68, 208 Suhrawardi, 170, 176, 178 Suleiman the Magnificent, 266–68 sultans, 214

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Sumer/Sumeria, 91, 175 Sumerians, 92–93 Summers, Montague, 249–50 Sumner, William, 229 Sunna, 150, 239–40, 242 Sunni Islam, 5, 73, 97, 148, 154, 166, 178, 200, 201, 226n2, 241, 283; church in, 194–95; emergenc of, 280–83; ethics and morality in, 175; hierocracy and, 280–83; separation of from Shi’ite, 166; Sufism and, 207, 208 supermundanes, 85 supernatural, 2, 36, 48, 90, 100, 141, 174–75, 235; sanctions, 38 Surpu, 237 surrender, 88 Susanian Empire, 109 Swaggart, Jimmy, 305 Swanson, Guy, 36–39 Swatos, William, 43 Swedenborgianism, 372 Swenson, Donald, 21, 25, 80n9, 131, 132, 218 switching, 222–25 Sylvester I, Pope, 287n3 symbolic dilemma, 22–23; ritual and, 164–86 symbolic interactionism, 26n8 symbolic universes, 36, 37 symbols, 22; collective, 164; reification of, 22 synagogue, 61 syneistactism, 143 Synod of Whitby, 177 Syria, 12, 15, 69, 91, 109, 144, 200, 282

T taboo, 233 Takim, Liyakat, 167, 170 Taliban, 270 tantras, 116 tantric (Tibetan) Buddhism, 116, 372 Tanzimat, 268

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i n de x | 4 61 Tao, 89 Taoism, 15, 19, 26n3, 57n16, 60, 82, 102, 116; Weber and, 340 tariqahs, 167–68, 208 Taylor, Charles, 44, 59 teacher prophet, 118 Tedlock, Barbara, 138–40 televangelism, 305 Tempel Anneke (Anna Roleffes), 186 Templars, 279–80 temples, 190, 192–93; cultic role of, 193; responsibility of to community, 192 Ten Commandments: see Decalogue terrorism, 211 Tertullian, 145 Teutonic Order, 279 Thailand, Buddhism in, 116, 234 theism, humanism vs., 304 theocracy, 270; military, 268 theocratic monarchy, 260 Theodosius, 271 Theophanes the Confessor, 70 theophanic knowledge, 99 theoretical framework: classical, 10–11; current and major, 11–15; definition of, 10 theory, meaning of, 9–15 theosophy, 113, 372 theotokoi, 131 Theravada Buddhism, 5, 8, 89, 100, 116, 234 Thirty Years’ War, 309 this-worldly orientation, 303, 367 Thomas, Keith, 47–49, 183–85, 260 Thompson, J., 218 Thoth, 1, 37, 103, 238 three orders, 273 Tiamat, 1, 94 Tibet, Buddhism in, 116, 120 Tibetan/tantric Buddhism, 116, 372 Tikopia peoples, 232 Tilley, T., 53 Tlinkit clan, 191 Toch, Michael, 274

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Todd, R., 271 Tönnies, Ferdinand, 350 Torah, 96 Torjesen, Karen Jo, 144 totem/totemism, 34, 191, 233; Buffalo, 231 Townsend, Joan, 111–13 Toynbee, Arnold, 7, 248, 337 traditionalism vs. rationality, 355 transactional analysis, 372 transcendent, 108 transcendentalism, 100, 372 transcendental meditation, 372 translating, 356 Trimingham, J. Spencer, 170, 178, 207 Troeltsch, Ernst, 193, 198, 299, 319 Tungus people, shamanism among, 111 Tunisia, 282 Turkey, 269; belief and morality in, 89; women in, 152–54 Turkic peoples, 140 Turner, Bryan, 83, 106n1, 337, 338, 339 Turner, Tina, 120 Turner, Victor, 169 Tusita, 120 Tutu, Desmond, 358 Twelver Shi’ism, 210, 226n2, 283–84 twins, self-transcendence and, 47 Tyler, Edward, 230 typifications, 35–36, 37 tyranny of the majority, 135

U Ukrainian Catholic Church, ordination of women in, 156 ulama, 73, 178, 214, 283, 338 Umayyads, 15, 110, 166, 195, 200–201, 210, 241, 266, 337, 338, 370; hierocracy and, 280, 281, 288n6 ummah, 73, 201, 214, 367 unconscious, 30 unification, 274 Unitarians, 310

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4 6 2 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D United Church (Canada), 133, 136n4, 196, 222, 224, 225, 253, 255, 362; Basis of Union, 220; creed of, 220–21; denominations and, 220–21; women clergy in, 156 United Church (US), 136n4, 302 United Church of Christ, 133, 222–23 United Empire Loyalists, 315 United Farmers of Canada, 300 United Kingdom: see Great Britain United Methodist Church, 133, 136n4, 222 United Presbyterian Church, 222 United Society of Believers in Christ’s Second Appearing: see Shakers United States, 14, 106n4, 196; aboriginal peoples, 179, 187n1, 340; belief and morality in, 89; Buddhism in, 120, 121; burned-over district, 61–67; characteristics of religion in, 296; civil religion in, 314; Conference of Catholic Bishops, 158; Constitution, 309, 331; Democratic Party, 301, 306; division paradigm in, 309–12; establishment of religion in, 310–12; First Amendment, 309, 312; homosexuality in religious organizations, 133; Hutterites in, 292; Iran and, 283, 285; mainstream Protestantism in, 136n4; mysticism and, 51–52; New Religious Right in, 301–8; persistence of religion in, 357; religious restructuring in, 252–54; Republican Party, 17, 304, 306–8; restructuring of Christianity in, 135; restructuring of religion in, 252–54, 299; second restructuring of religion in, 318n3; Supreme Court, 308; switching and disaffiliation in, 222–25; women clergy in, 156; see also America, early modern

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Urban II, Pope, 275, 277, 278 urbanization, 274, 349–50 urf, 239 Urubunna clan, 191 Uzbekistan, 110

V Vale, Malcolm, 272 value based rationality, 15 value-free social science, 17 van de Mieroop, Marc, 92 van der Leeuw, Gerardus, 85 van Doren, Charles, 125 van Gennep, Arnold, 176 van Nieuwenhuijze, C.A.O., 214, 216–17 Vashi, Gira, 154 Vatican II, 159, 218 Vatican City, 348 venality, 329 Venus figurines, 138 verstehen, 4, 17, 83, 85 vesicular monoamine (VMAT2), 47, 53 Vietnam: Buddhism in, 116; women shamans in, 139 Vikings, 321 violence, individual and collective, 30 virtuoso–cleric continuum, 115–17 virtuosos, 60, 85, 164, 167, 180, 207, 208, 271, 323, 330, 344 Vladimir I of Kiev, 262 Vladimir of Russia, Prince, 258 volitional conversion, 53 Voltaire, 297, 309, 351 voluntarism, 364; new, 296 von Grunebaum, Gustave, 97

W Wach, Joachim, 48, 198, 213, 218 Waco (Texas), 226n5 Wadud, Amina, 147–49 Wahhab, Muhammad ibn Abd al-, 269 Wahhabism, 242, 367; in Saudi Arabia, 215, 269 Wakan, 187n1 Wald, Kenneth, 305

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i n de x | 4 6 3 Wales/Welsh, 184, 329–30 Wallace, Ruth, 159, 172, 176, 350–51, 355, 361 Wallachia, 292 Ware, Kallistos, 259 Warner, R. Stephen, 14, 157, 360, 364, 365 Watergate, 303 Watling, Tony, 158 Watt, James, 331 Watt, W. Montgomery, 69, 95, 128 Watts, Alan, 171, 172 Weber, Max, 1, 10, 59–60, 106nn1,2, 107n10, 153, 167, 174, 200, 259, 350, 351; Asiatic religion, 102–3; Baptist sect, 204–5; capitalism, 123, 124, 202, 247, 324–27, 331–32; charisma, 20–21, 63, 67, 117, 138, 144, 189, 193, 197–98; city-commune, 322–23; cultural analysis, 353–54; dilemma of interpretation, 138; dilemma of mixed motivation, 138; Economy and Society, 320, 322; emergence of modern world, 319–20; empirical research and, 327–29; feminine in religion, 139, 144, 158; heritage of, 16–21; hierocracy/hagiocracy, 73, 270, 287n1; ideal types, 18–19; inner-worldly asceticism, 235, 325; interpretative understanding, 16–17, 40, 85; and Islam, 320, 335–39; liberal response, 299; occidental vs. oriental mythologies, 100; other-worldly orientation, 60, 235, 344, 367; prophet and priest, 111, 117–19, 126, 131; Protestant ethic, 124, 247–48, 324–25, 331–32; The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, 16, 17, 19; rational capitalism, 320–42; Reformation and, 56n2; religion and economy, 319–42; sects, 201, 226n1; social action, 17–18, 189, 323, 366;

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social psychology of world religions, 81; status and prestige, 117; this-worldly orientation, 303, 367; verstehen, 4, 17, 83, 85, 323; virtuoso and cleric, 115; “warrior ethic,” 339; world views, 82 weikza, 235 welfare state, 302 Wends, 276, 279 Wesley, John, 79n4 Wesleyanism, 220 Western Trek, 67 Westley, Frances, 205, 212 Westphalia, Treaty of, 309 Wheatcroft, Andrew, 265 Whimster, Sam, 82 White Revolution, 283 Whitton, David, 271, 273 widowhood, 143–44 Wiggermann, Frans, 174, 192, 260 Wilcox, Clyde, 301–2, 306–7 William of Tyre, 278 Williams, Rhys, 154, 344 Wilson, Bryan, 99–100, 226n6, 349–50, 355, 361 Wilson, J., 224 Wimborne, monastery of, 162n2 witchcraft, 36, 38, 140–42, 180–86, 249–52; Christianity and, 183–86; in folk religion, 180–82; social construction and social control of, 184; trials, 184–85, 251, 273–74 witchdoctors, 182 witches, identification of, 181, 182 witch midwives, 251 Witham, Larry, 131, 133–34, 156, 157, 158 witness, in Qur’an, 148 Woden, 260 Wollman, Joseph, 294 women: charisma of, 157–58; in Christianity, 142–46, 274; as clergy, 155–61; crusades against, 273–74, 278; equality of, 138;

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4 6 4 | S O C I E T Y, S P I R I T UA L I T Y A N D T H E S A C R E D folk societies, 138–40; Greco-Roman philosophy about, 144; Hutterite, 294–95; image of, 140; Islam and, 146–55, 242; Judaism and, 364; leadership and, 137–62; in Mesopotamia, 140–42; Muhammad and, 149–52; nexus between men and, 139; official roles and ministries for, 144; ordination of, 156–61; as prophets, 138; as Roman Catholic lay leaders, 132, 159; as shamans, 138–40; in Turkey and Western Europe, 152–54; witchcraft and, 250–52; work/family balance, 159–60 women’s movement: see feminism Woodsworth, J.S., 300 worldly success, morality function of, 247–48 world religions, definition of, 5 “World-Savior” model, 54–55 world views, 82; mythologies, religion and, 83–84 Wotjobaluk clan, 191 Wright, Mother Lucy, 63 Wulff, David, 31, 32–33 Wuthnow, Robert, 135, 175, 223, 302–3, 305–6, 308, 318n3, 353, 365, 367; morality, 229, 353; restructuring thesis, 135, 252–54, 358–59; small support groups, 244–45 Wynbrandt, James, 269–70

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Y Yahweh, 105, 121, 122, 255n6 Yamane, David, 44, 52 Yauch, Adam, 120 Yazbeck-Haddad, Yvonne, 241, 242 Yazid, 166 Yeltsin, Boris, 263 Yemen, 69, 201 Yinger, 6, 7 Yoder, John, 291 yoga, 372 Young, Brigham, 42, 66–67

Z Zarpanitu, 1 Zaydis, 195 Zealots, 126 Zen Buddhism, 120, 372 Zinnbauer, Brian, 44 ziyara, 170, 179, 180 Zoroaster, 20; as prophet, 118 Zoroastrianism, 68, 283 Zuni peoples, 232 Zwingli, Ulrich, 124

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