Socialist parties in postwar Japan

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SOCIALIST PARTIES IN POSTWAR JAPAN

by ALLAN GEORGE CECIL

B. C O L E O. T O T T E N

H. U Y E H A R A

with a contributed chapter by R O N A LD P. DORE

N ew H aven and London, Yale U niversity Press, 1966

Copyright © 1966 by Yale University. Designed by John O. C. McCrillis, set in Baskerville type, and printed in the United States of America by Connecticut Printers, Inc., Bloomfield, Connecticut. Distributed in Canada by M cGill University Press. A ll rights reserved. T h is book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publishers. Library of Congress catalog card number: 66-21511 Published with assistance from the foundation established in memory of Henry Weldon Barnes of the Class of 1882, Yale College.

W e affectionately dedicate this volum e to our wives, M arjorie Cole, Astrid T otten , and A llie Uyehara

Preface

Since 1947-48, when Japan’s Social Democratic Party shared in two successive ruling coalitions, its activists have several times predicted the party would assume power by obtaining a majority after a few more elections. But this hope has repeatedly been dashed; the remark­ able political and social changes accompanying recent economic growth have made its attainment more difficult. Since 1958-59, elec­ toral support—reflected by the number of seats in the Diet—has reached a plateau, the “barrier of one third,” as referred to by the Socialists themselves. T h e number of votes and percentage of total votes received by the Socialists and other leftist forces have, however, steadily increased and now exceed 40 per cent of the total votes cast. W ith approximately one third of the seats in the national legislative bodies they and their allies have been, in some senses, defending as­ pects of postwar democratization, trying to promote the interests of their allied movements, seeking to strengthen Japanese neutralism in the cold war, striving to reorient Japan toward closer relations with the socialist states, and, since the autumn of 1948, generally acting as the opposition. Though these parties do not seem to be within easy reach of peri­ odic majorities and power, their role may enable them to reap advan­ tages from shifts which are not yet clearly foreseen. In any case, Japanese socialism, which somewhat unsteadily accepts representative politics, has for more than a generation expressed certain durable in­

v iii

PREFACE

terests and traditions in Japan’s industrializing society. Earlier in the process of modernization, conditions and tensions in Japan were more like those which gave Marxism some cogency and following in other industrializing, late-developing societies. In the course of time and struggles a veritable socialist ethos developed. Especially in a culture in which militancy, loyalty, sacrifice, patriarchal elitism, and social chasms are prominent, such a philosophy and movement developed persistent traditions. In some senses these are emotional traditions to which activists become devoted. Somewhat as the range of denomina­ tional sects in Western Christianity apparently conform to a spectrum of human experience and need, so in secular politics there has devel­ oped a variety of traditions, each with its momentum, each combining opportunism and principles while striving to adjust to changing reali­ ties. Paradoxically, even a revolutionary cause like Marxist socialism in time has developed a core of orthodoxy and hence its own relative conservatism. As Japanese modernization developed and matured, new social strata, or classes, emerged; some more than others organized self-con­ sciously to promote their distinct interests. We shall see that Japan’s Social Democrats have considered themselves to be the natural allies of organized labor. T he white-collar class, students, and many intel­ lectuals have been poorly paid, are highly literate, and are either un­ ionized or otherwise organized. T heir inclinations have tended to be more reformist or radical than two other groups which the Socialists have tried to attract: the rural and what some have called the “urban peasantry.’’ Since the postwar land reform, the Social Democratic Party (s d p , also called the Japan Socialist Party, j s p ) has tried to win support from farmers more on specific issues than on class and ideo­ logical grounds. Voters in the small business sector have mostly been conservative, though a fraction smaller than one third has tended to support Socialist candidates. These interests are becoming better or­ ganized and politically less apathetic, but growing prosperity and cap­ ital development have filtered to them and strengthened proprietary tendencies. Other interests, such as those of women, youth, and con­ sumers, also receive Socialist attention. We shall discuss how these noncommunist parties on the left have tried to reconcile their ideo­ logically rationalized positions with the political fact that electoral support for all major parties in Japan is cross-stratal. Especially since 1955 there has been much discussion of whether a two-main-party system is suitable for Japan. W hile true that the s d p

PREFACE

IX

is the pivot of the opposition, and that the two main conservative party lineages have been combined, it is clear that the emergence of two national parties with considerable overlap in common basic poli­ cies is unlikely soon to take shape. On the right of the spectrum is a coalition of conservative factions. Observers follow their rivalries and combinations, but the underlying distinction is between traditional conservatives, whose attitudes were mainly formed under the authori­ tarian Meiji system, and cautiously progressive elements. The three main sectors in the opposition have been the evolution­ ary, reformist right-wing Socialists, the revolutionary left-wing So­ cialists with intramural differences but, under dominant capitalism, favoring parliamentary politics, and the Communists whose principle of proletarian dictatorship is well known. One can distinguish funda­ mentally between the milder right-wing Socialists (since i960 called Democratic Socialists) and the more moderate revolutionaries in the s d p “mainstream” groups, on the one hand, and the more drastically radical intraparty opposition plus the Communists, on the other. This does not mean, however, that the two more moderate Socialist groups, or the two more revolutionary forces, are likely to form lasting combinations. T h e ebb and flow of personal, factional, organizational, and environmental conditions, as well as strategic relationships, give each of these groupings a role to play. Japan’s multiparty pattern has in some ways been simplified but in others has become more complicated since the mid-’fifties. Political movements are afoot which relate to the vast petty middle class, to un­ organized industrial workers and clerks—thus to the “floating vote”— to the opportunities for Japanese traditionalism to find channeled ex­ pression, and to the participation of those millions who have lived in poverty at the foot of the social ladder. After ten years of organization and political growth, the Soka Gakkai, a religio-political movement of Buddhist laymen and their converts, in 1964 founded the Komeito (Clean Government Party). In some ways this new force, though still somewhat obscure as to policies and main direction, may already be stronger than the socialist parties. T he leftist Social Democratic Party is in some respects an anomaly. For a party which receives such sizable support in national elections it has a very small membership and weak regional and local organiza­ tions. In these respects and in the circulation of its published organs it is weaker than the Communist Party. It is also weaker in its discipline, clarity of policies, and ability to mobilize campaigns of action. Finan­

X

PREFACE

cially and in programs of action it is seriously dependent on Sohyo, the principal left-wing federation of labor and its component unions. Moreover, the controversies which beset socialists, since capitalism in the world and in Japan is obviously not moribund, cut right across this party. T he perplexities of the “structural reformers” in the s d p , whose views we shall discuss, derive from their attempt to cope with contradictions for socialism which have recently been more trouble­ some than for regulated and resurgently dynamic capitalism. We shall see that minority socialism in Japan is making contributions toward the development of a welfare state. But the definitive doers are, and may continue to be, the governing Liberal Democrats. Inherent in this situation are socialist frustrations which can be utilized by advo­ cates of direct action in efforts to justify extraparliamentary methods for seizing power and compelling “qualitative” changes. A t present it appears that the stage is being set for great struggles over constitu­ tional revision and, in 1970, over the renewal of the military-political alliance with the United States. Foreign observers often become ex­ cessively alarmed at such demonstrations of opposition. Japan’s technology and economy are rapidly maturing to a new level capable of keeping ahead of later developing countries and com­ peting to supply many of their needs. Japan is beginning to play a more positive, nonimperialistic role in international affairs. Its pro­ ductive growth and prosperity are making possible a greater capacity to protect its own security, to provide higher incomes and social secu­ rity for its people, to shift more families from crowded agriculture into urban occupations, and to come closer to full employment. Mid­ dle strata in society are growing in size and confidence, and are attain­ ing higher cultural levels. Professional people and the army of clerical workers are receiving more adequate salaries. Farmers are joining in the consumer boom and are being more fully integrated into the body politic. Even though there has been mild inflation, discontents which tend to foster susceptibility to revolutionary appeals have subsided. Socialism’s champions, though more reluctant than their counterparts in Western and Central Europe, have been compelled to cope with the practical and theoretical implications of these changes. In writing this study of Japan’s noncommunist Social Democratic parties since their revival in 1945 to 1960-61, just after the assassina­ tion of Inejiro Asanuma, the party’s Chairman, the authors have combined the historical method with political description and anal­ ysis. T h e first two chapters provide an historical survey according to

PREFACE

XI

phases of party development. The charts depicting party splits and mergers, leadership lineages, as well as successive labor and farmer organizations provide additional guideposts. Topical chapters then can and do assume that the reader has an overview of the party’s po­ litical history; they refer only briefly to such events and can freely treat their subjects according to analytical and interpretative require­ ments. O f course, each of these topics is much more complex than we have had space to explain. We have had to select, simplify, and gen­ eralize, using a broader background in making judgments. There is, for example, need for more research on the interpretation of socialist thought; and we have had to omit treatment of cultural movements related to the Socialists. It seemed to us that, although the Socialists have most often empha­ sized and split over foreign policy issues, the competence and validity of Socialist economic proposals should also be evaluated. We enlisted the assistance of the Kokumin Keizai Kenkyu Kyokai (National Eco­ nomic Research Institute), an unofficial and nonpartisan agency, to help us outline and evaluate the policies advocated by right-wing and left-wing Socialists during successive stages of Japan’s postwar eco­ nomic development. Subtopics under foreign policies could be multi­ plied but we were obliged to select key issues on which major debates have been waged and which continue to be matters of controversy. T he chapters on party organization and leadership have also been distilled from considerably longer manuscript treatments. T he special relations between the party and labor unions in policy, finances, or­ ganization, and personnel, warranted a careful description and anal­ ysis covering both cooperation and confrontation. W e are grateful to Professor Ronald P. Dore for contributing to this volume the chapter on “T he Socialist Party and the Farmers.” T he chapter on middle and other strata attempts to find indications from opinion polls as to trends of opinion in relation to policy positions taken by the Socialist Parties. T he final chapter pulls threads together, makes some general interpretations, and scans the forward horizon. This study is Volume 2 of “Studies on Japan’s Social Democratic Parties,” Volume 1 being The Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966) by George Oakley Totten, III, which traces the origins of the movement back to the end of the nineteenth century but concentrates on the noncommunist proletarian parties of the 1920s and 1930s and their labor, agrarian, and other organized supporters. An earlier product of this same project is Leftwing Social

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PREFACE

Movements in Japan: An Annotated Bibliography (Tokyo, Japan, and Rutland, Vermont, The Charles E. T uttle Company, 1959) by Cecil H. Uyehara, in which may be found the bulk of the Japanese language primary and secondary bibliographical materials then avail­ able. T he existence of that publication and the fact that full citations have been provided in the footnotes obviate the need for a separate bibliography in this volume. Our principal consultants in this undertaking have been Professors Masamichi Royama, formerly of Tokyo University, then President of Ochanomizu Women’s University; Chitoshi Yanaga of the Depart­ ment of Political Science at Yale University; and Edwin O. Reischauer, formerly Director of the Harvard-Yenching Institute at Har­ vard University and more recently United States Ambassador to Japan. We are grateful not only to them but also to Mr. and Mrs. Michio Royama, Mr. Masao Yoshida, and Mr. Seiichi Izumi, who served as research assistants at various times. T o Mr. Hidezo Inaba and the staff of the Kokumin Keizai Kenkyu Kyokai we are indebted for their economic studies. Leading officers of the s d p , Socialist Party Diet members, the professional staff in the party’s national head­ quarters, numerous SDP-oriented labor union officials in Sohyo, Zenro, and other organizations, and very many local party and labor union executives gave most generously of their time in responding to numer­ ous queries from project members when they visited Japan and trav­ eled from Hokkaido to Kyushu. W e wish especially to thank Messrs. Shimpei Fujimaki, Masamichi Horigome, Tamio Kawakami, and Fusao Yamaguchi. We also wish to thank Miss Ruth L. Davis and Mr. David Horne of the Yale University Press for their editorial advice and other efforts. T he Ford Foundation supplied financial support during the research and early writing stages of this project. Tufts University provided a home for and administrative support to the project. T he initial encouragement and guidance by Dr. Robert B. Stewart, formerly Dean of T h e Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, in launching the project is remembered with gratitude. We deeply appreciate all the advice, suggestions, and assist­ ance provided to project members individually and to the effort as a whole, but the responsibility for factual material and interpretations appearing in this book is necessarily our own. A l l a n B. C o l e January 1966

G e o r g e O. T o t t e n C e c il H . U y e h a r a

Contents

Preface List of Tables and Charts

vii xvii

P O S T W A R P A R T Y H IS T O R Y 1

T he Socialist T aste of P ower and D ecline

Rebirth of the Japanese Socialist Party The Politics of Protest Sharing Power: The Katayama Cabinet Coalition Renewed: The Ashida Cabinet Great Debates in 1949-51 The Inamura-Morito Controversy The Peace Treaty 3

Frustrations of the R evived but C hronic O pposition

Socialist Schism Reverse Course The Peace Offensive and the Elections of 1953 The Platform Controversy The Elections of 1955 Rapprochement The New Situation The SDP Convention of 1957 Kishi’s Challenge The Election of 1958 Teachers, Police, and Foreign Affairs

3

3 g 16 23 25 26 32 37 37 38 43 45 48 50 56 59 61 63 65

CONTENTS

XIV

Elections and Renewed Schism in 1959 A “Season of Disruption,” Then Moderation

69 75

T H E O R I E S , T A C T I C S , A N D P O L IC I E S 3 Principles and T heory Background of the 1955 Unified Program Major Aims and Tasks The Character of the Party The Problem of Means Attitudes Toward Democracy and Totalitarian Systems Critiques of Capitalism

85 86 92 94 96 98 103

4

P olitical I ssues and T actics

Tactics Toward the Communists Tactics Toward the Conservatives Constitutional Issues and Tactics Defense of Civil Rights and Local Interests 5

E conomic P olicies of the Social D emocrats during R ecovery and Stabilization

Limitations of the Japanese Economy Coping with Immediate Postwar Inflation and Reconstruction The Katayama Cabinet The Ashida Cabinet Dodge-Line Disinflation The Struggle for Economic and Political Independence An Export Boom and Then Retrenchment 6

11 o 120 131 138 145 146

148 149 153 155 158 162

Socialist E conomic Planning for 1957-1961 and B eyond 164

Foreign Trade Fiscal Policies Basic Industries Social Security Unprecedented Peacetime Economic Growth and Socialist Responses Recent Socialist Plans and Proposals 7

109

Socialist F oreign P olicies

The Desire for Neutralism The Quest for Security without Alliance or Rearmament Rearmament: Blight or Necessity? Criticism of the United States and Opposition to Renewal of the Security Treaty

165 172 179 184 188 194 199 200 205 2og 214

CONTENTS

XV

Partisan Views on Relations with the Soviet Union Efforts to Restore Relations with Mainland China

221 227

O R G A N I Z A T I O N A N D L E A D E R S H IP 8

O rganization and P rocesses

Basic Tenets The Size and Composition of Membership Party Organs The National Convention The Central Executive Committee The Chairman of the Central Executive Committee and of the Party The Conference of Bureau Chiefs The Control Commission The National Headquarters The Policy Planning Board Diet Operations and the Election Policy Committee Political Education and Propaganda Prefectural and Local Organizations Party Finances 9

L eaders and Factions

The Left Wing The Suzuki Faction The Wada Faction The Nomizo Faction The Matsumoto (or Heiwa Doshikai) Faction The Kuroda Faction The Right Wing The Kawakami Faction The Nishio Faction Medial Elements in the Party Statistics on SDP Characteristics Recent Shifts in Factional Rivalry and Party Orientation

241

242 244 247 247 250 252 254 255 258 259 260 261 263 269 273

278 278 282 286 287 28g 290 291 295 299 301 306

E L E C T O R A L A N D O R G A N IZ E D S U P P O R T 10

T he A rticulation of O rganized L abor with the So c ia l is t P a r t ie s

Union-Party Tensions, Cooperation, and Labor Politicism

3*3 313

CONTENTS

XVI

During Democratization and While the Socialists Shared Power Decline, Schism, and Recovery of Labor and Socialist Organizations Labor’s Role in the Schism and Reunification of the SDP Mounting Crises, 1958-61 Functional Party-Union Relations, Left and Right Socialist Labor Policies To What Degree do Workers Support the SDP? 11

T he Socialist Party and the Farmers

The Immediate Postwar Period The Period of Land Reform and a Socialist Government From the 1949 Elections to the Major Party Split The Period of Socialist Schism Reunification Agriculture Under a Socialist Government The Recent Tactical Approach Farmer Support for the Socialists 12

Socialist Support from M iddle and O ther Strata

Professional and Technical Workers Bureaucratic Influence and the Social Democrats Cooperation with the White-Collar Salariat University Students and Other Youth Groups Women Voters and the Social Democrats Party Efforts to Attract Small and Medium Enterprisers

322 330 336 344 351 358 363 370 371 381 387 391 395 401 407 409 418 423 425 427 430 435 439

C O N C L U S IO N 13

P rospects and P roblems

451

Index

465

Tables 1. U.S.-Japanese Trade Balances in Relation to U.S. Aid and Special Procurement, 1946-1956

168

2. T he Target Composition of the General Account of the SDP Five-Year Plan Budget for 1961 Compared with the 1954 Government Budget

174

3. Socialist Factional Representation in the Diet, 1959

277

4. Factional Representation in the Central Executive Committee of the Socialist Party before and after March ig6o

277

5. Distribution of Non-Conservative Votes by Type of District, i 947-!955

410

6. Social Stratification of Occupational Classes in 1952

420

Charts 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Chronology of the Social Democratic Party in Japan Socialist Party Organization Main Socialist Leadership Factions Lineages of Japanese Labor Federations Lineages of Japanese Farmers’ Unions

39 243 274

3*4 372

Postwar Party History

1. The Socialist Taste of Power and Decline

R EBIRTH O F T H E JA PA N ESE SO CIALIST P A R T Y

When, in that fateful August of 1945, Suehiro Nishio heard in Osaka the Emperor’s broadcast call for his people to lay down their arms and “bear the unbearable,” he is said to have straightway boarded an elec­ tric train to visit another veteran right-wing socialist, Chozaburo Mizutani, in Kyoto. There he vigorously expounded the need for re­ organization of labor and farmers’ unions and for a socialist party to contribute in reconstructing the devastated country. Tw o days later, with rucksack on his back, Nishio started for Tokyo to confer with another former colleague, the veteran organizer Komakichi Matsuoka, who also favored reviving the trade union movement. Political consultations in the next few months reflected the physical and spiritual turmoil of a society still suffering from the shock of de­ feat. Conservative and socialist leaders, who would later be bitterly antagonistic, conferred about policies to meet the national crisis. Some of them had been elected to the Diet in 1942 without T o jo ’s blessing and for years had faced the scorn of the militarists in power. Men prominent in most of the prewar proletarian lineages, motivated by a combination of ambition and public responsibility, were again astir and renewing contacts. Three days after the ceremony of surrender aboard the U.S.S. Missouri, thirteen former socialist Diet members decided to form a

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

4

new party. Despite widespread privation, social and political instabil­ ity, and economic near-paralysis, more than one hundred persons from many parts of the main islands answered the call for a national conference and selected an inaugural committee of 25 members. Within two months, on November 2, 1945, these champions of the in­ terests of workers, farmers, and the petty middle strata founded Ja­ pan’s first postwar political party. Having in the past known oppres­ sion, and being uncertain about policies to be required by the Allied Occupation authorities, they chose the name Nihon Shakaito (Social­ ist Party of Japan) but also were careful to adopt as the official English translation the title Social Democratic Party of Japan ( s d p or s d p j ). It seemed safer to announce only a general program of three aims: de­ mocracy, socialism, and eternal peace. T h e convention was chaired by Matsuoka (future Speaker of the Lower House). Tetsu Katayama (who later became Socialist Prime Minister) was elected SecretaryGeneral. Suehiro Nishio, Chozaburo Mizutani, Rikizo Hirano (future Ministers of State) and the other members of the inaugural committee were installed as the party’s first Executive Committee. Amid thun­ derous applause, Masaru Nomizo (who would soon become Minister of Agriculture), read the Inaugural Declaration, proclaiming that “Japan is about to experience an historical transformation” and call­ ing on the assembled five thousand and the nation to “cooperate in carrying out this historic undertaking. T h e gates of the Social Demo­ cratic Party of Japan are freely open to all.” It was not without traditions and experience that such a large group responded with new hope to the summons of that small band of so­ cialist leaders emerging from forced hibernation. As a precursory vol­ ume1 has explained, movements of peasant protest had multiplied in the later decades of Japan’s last feudal era and during the early Meiji period. Such revolts were suppressed and for sixty years after the Im­ perial Restoration common farmers and industrial workers, without votes, were governed and usually represented by economic magnates and oligarchs or their agents. T he molders of the new Japan, though mostly risen from lower ranks of the warrior elite, developed a la­ tently authoritarian regime; the Diet was constitutionally circum1.

Chapter i is intended to serve as a bridge between this volume and George O. T o t­

ten’s T h e Social Democratic Movement in Prewar Japan (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966), which is Vol. t of “Studies on Japan’s Social Democratic Parties.”

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

5

scribed and rested on a limited and reluctantly expanded electorate. Much from the feudal emphasis on hierarchy and absolutism was transmitted into the new polity and the sharply pyramided new eco­ nomic structure. T he farmers, who had paid disproportionately for the cost of Japan’s modernization, were joined among the discon­ tented by urban workers, growing at first slowly, then rapidly, in num­ ber. In Japan’s capitalist system, the poorer farmers—though no longer serfs with feudal obligations and controls—became tenants. Workers in more modern industries were less encumbered and pro­ tected by the old institutions of guild and apprenticeship. Regulative legislation lagged, and in Japan there was an “industrial reign of terror” mitigated mainly by the paternalism of entrepreneurs. Political awareness and strategies were slow in developing among the underprivileged and powerless. T he first tenant and labor unions were organized between the turn of the century and World War I. Liberalism had been rather erratically espoused by opponents of oli­ garchic governments, especially since the early 188os, but the various schools of socialism began their precarious existence as the contempo­ raries, and soon the allies, of the early trade unions. Every modern war stimulated Japan’s industrialization, but it was notably economic expansion and inflation during and after the First World War which augmented the numbers of workers and their determination to or­ ganize. Marxian socialism had exerted slight influence in Japan since the 1890s, concentrated among a few intellectuals; it was only in the chaos following the global conflict that it established a revolutionary base in the greatest Eurasian state and became a neighboring force greatly feared by the masters of the Meiji system. Most of the determinative institutions of this conservative regime had been founded before the oligarchy yielded to demands for a con­ stitution and a parliament. Moreover, before their inauguration and before each subsequent extension of suffrage, the Peace Police or Peace Preservation Laws were tightened. Only lack of strict enforce­ ment permitted illegal labor unions to be organized. Even at the height of their interwar development, their members numbered fewer than half a million; the movement was more significant as a portent for the future of an industrialized society than for its then existing in­ fluence. However, individuals and associations—whether concerned chiefly with proletarian philosophies, economic bargaining, or strate­ gies for attaining political power—were watched and placed under

6

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

severe disabilities by agencies of law and control. By the mid-1930s the modified Meiji system had become an atavistic police state reminis­ cent (in a modern context) of the Tokugawa system and many of its component feudal regimes. This was not all foreordained, but there were certainly built-in reasons why it could happen. T he increased popularity of democracy and the growth of urban middle strata contributed to the ferment which followed the First World War. In the early 1920s, a national federation of labor and one of farmers’ unions were formed. T he Japan Communist Party (j c p ) was also founded, its components usually working through other leftwing movements. Shortly before and after enactment of the universal manhood suffrage law in 1925, the Japan Farmers’ Union, and espe­ cially leftist elements in the General Federation of Labor (Sodomei), became more politically oriented. T heir members and prospective constituents would soon be able to vote, and they would consequently have a larger stake in the parliamentary system. Many leftists really doubted that socialism could triumph over bourgeois capitalism and other conservative elements only through electoral campaigns and the Diet, but it was expedient to keep within the pale of legality by avow­ ing at least a degree of respect for this institutionalized form of struggle. Stronger political emphases in both the labor and farmers’ move­ ments caused sharper distinctions and tensions between their left and moderate wings. T h e General Federation of Labor was split at its con­ vention in 1925, the leftists forming the Council of Japanese Labor Unions (Hyogikai). Thereafter, the labor movement was plagued by competing organizations, guided by irreconcilable leaders mostly dis­ cernible in four groups: social democrats, radical leftists, Commu­ nists, and, for a time, anarchists. T he first proletarian political party was banned in 1925 as being Communist-influenced. In the following year, four parties were formed: the Labor Farmer Party (Rodo Nominto), the Japan Labor-Farmer Party (Nihon Ronoto), the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto), and the Japan Farmers’ Party (Nihon Nominto)—in order of general radicalism from left to right. T h e resulting factions of leaders have persisted to this day. A succes­ sion of Communist-dominated parties on the extreme left, though re­ peatedly suppressed by police actions, excelled in the disciplined vigor of their leaders and in electoral results. By the spring of 1929, how­ ever, such a political organization could no longer operate publicly.

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

7

More moderate left-wing groups attracted some of the splinters result­ ing from the government’s hammer blows as well as dissidents from the right-wing Social Democratic Party. W hile the legal or noncom­ munist left benefited in one way from official repression, this situation bred a kind of opportunism which made some of its leaders suscepti­ ble later to the pressures of chauvinism and national socialism. More­ over, the latitude for legal activities was repeatedly narrowed, espe­ cially during and after the Manchurian crisis. By 1931 there were only two main parties on the left: the intellectu­ ally radical National Labor-Farmer Masses’ Party (Zenkoku Rono Taishuto) and the more conservative Social Democratic Party men­ tioned above (but not to be confused with the postwar party). Height­ ened nationalism caused attrition in both these organizations and their component factions. T he latter split in part over the issue of military action in Manchuria but more fundamentally Tetsu Katayama represented those upholding social democratic principles, while Akamatsu led those who inclined toward national socialism and soon bolted the party—with some labor elements—to support military lead­ ership. T he former also split over “state socialism.” In mid-1932, the two still anti-fascist parties merged to form the Socialist Masses’ Party (Shakai Taishuto). T he two main factions in this new party were thereafter known as the “Socio-Democratic” (Shaminkei) and the “Japan-Labor” (Nichirokei) cliques, from abbreviations of the names of the parties they had originally founded. But the process of yielding to overwhelming pressures was renewed, and by the time clashes led to war in China in 1937, this harassed organization promised to help promote national unity in the face of the crisis. Earlier in that same year dissidents, led by Kanju Kato and Mosaburo Suzuki, had founded the last of Japan’s prewar leftist parties. They called it the Japan Pro­ letarian Party (Nihon Musanto) and tried to make it the vehicle for a united front. But by the end of the year the party was ordered dis­ banded and its leaders were arrested. Although the Socialist Masses’ Party had gained the third largest representation in the House of Representatives, in the elections of 1937, it had no chance for further growth. Its Japan-Laborites, led by Hisashi Aso, tried to ride the bandwagon of total mobilization, but some of the more moderate and politically principled Socio-Democrats under Isoo Abe and Tetsu Katayama left the party in 1940. Later that year the Socialist Masses’ Party outdistanced its bourgeois rivals in dissolving all political par-

8

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

ties to make way for the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (i r a a ) which some of them erroneously thought could help control the military. A small number of former proletarian party leaders, some with and others without T o jo ’s blessing, were elected to the Diet in 1942. Still others, mainly certain Japan-Laborites, served in the i r a a and the Japanese version of a “labor front’’ during the war in the Pacific. Some established small businesses and cooperated with the war effort while others quietly retired. Despite the national emergency and the dreaded “ thought police,” the i r a a never became a harmonious single party. Some former proletarian leaders, like conservative politicians, maintained liaison, survived the holocaust, and promptly emerged in September 1945 from strategic retirement. Japan’s military machine had been destroyed; civilian political au­ thority was discredited and confused. T h e Allied Powers declared that Japan would be completely disarmed and demilitarized. T he influ­ ence of chauvinistic nationalism was to be totally eliminated. A ll re­ strictions on political, civil, and religious liberties were rescinded. Democratic parties with rights of free speech and assembly were to be encouraged. In these sudden and extraordinary circumstances, it was imperative that some organized movement—perhaps a spectrum of them—fill the immediate postwar vacuum. T he Social Democratic Party hoped to benefit by the new prestige of “democracy.” Its leaders had fought a rearguard action, not without compromises, for many of the ultimate objectives proclaimed by the victorious Allies. Disillu­ sioned by the national leadership that had brought them to the brink of almost total destruction, the Japanese people seemed to have repu­ diated war and militarism and to be ready for something new. T he prewar social democrats of many hues, regrouping themselves in the Social Democratic Party, appeared to be one of the best solutions dur­ ing the critical period of reconstruction. Professional and academic observers as well as the man on the street expected much of this party. According to one prominent educator, “ Our hope for possible escape from the present ruinous chaos and for our possible revival as a nation hinges upon the future of the Party.”2 T he s d p was and still is a controversial organization, or movement, advocating a program based on socialism. In the immediate postwar months, Mitzutani declared that socialists would build a “Japanesetype democratic government in accordance with the Imperial Charter 2. Kisaburo Yokota, "Social Democratic Party,” in Digest Service, i (Sept. 8, 1946).

I,

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

g

Oath of 1868, by means of a mass party based on socialistic princi­ ples.”3 When they began laying the groundwork for a comprehensive coalition, the Socialists soon discovered that years of suppression had neither tempered their respective philosophies nor lessened their fac­ tional proclivities. T he Emperor system, wartime collaboration b) some, and the problem of selecting the supreme party leadership were the first knotty problems. T he conservative Nishio group, which was predisposed to uphold the Imperial institution, contended this to be in the interests of the party and to be a correct reflection of the popu­ lar will. This view was accepted by the newborn party. Each principal constituent from the prewar movement suggested as a prospective party Chairman some prestigious figure outside of their own mem­ bers: a prominent member of the former Japanese peerage, or a con­ servative businessman or politician. T h e compromise was a headless beginning, with Katayama serving as Secretary-General. T he ideo­ logical jumble in the party’s top leadership was aptly described by a Tokyo daily in 1945 as a heterogeneous alliance of all socialist groups . . . There are the intellectual Utopians and the religious idealists, the hardheaded laborites who have come up through the rough and tumble mill of union activities—incidentally divided among themselves be­ tween the right-wing and the left-wing factions, the opportunists who swerved from socialism during the war but who are now try­ ing to come back into the fold like repentant prodigals, and the uncompromising and unforgiving orthodox materialistic Marx­ ists who have always been single-mindedly devoted to the “ Cause.”4 TH E PO LIT IC S O F PROTEST

When the war ended in August 1945, the Japanese industrial sys­ tem had almost ground to a halt. Industrial and mineral production in 1945 and the early part of 1946 was about 10 per cent of the 193436 average. Not only had human resources been completely over­ worked during the war years; the industrial plant had also been al­ lowed to deteriorate. T he exigencies of war had concentrated all resources on military objectives; consumer goods industries had been largely squeezed out of existence. Air raids had not only demolished 3. Asahi Shimbun, Sept. 16, 1945. 4. Nippon Times, Nov. 3, 1945.

io

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

most of Japan’s industrial capacity but had cut off its overseas food supplies and had destroyed much housing. Immediate postwar cabi­ nets made no attempt to carry out a planned conversion of Japan’s remaining industrial plant to peacetime production. T h e government failed to control the distribution of the gigantic supplies of food and materials stockpiled by the Japanese armed forces. An equitable dis­ tribution of these commodities could have eased the initial impact of the acute shortages and the uncontrolled inflation after the war ended. Hoarded foods and materials slipped from one black market to another, accelerating each time the spiral of prices. Deliberately or through sheer ineptitude, the government stimulated inflation by re­ leasing enormous military funds, by making peacetime reconversion loans to industry, and by subsidizing industrial production. Barely subsisting on meager diets, sheltered in dilapidated and makeshift dwellings, the people gave vent to long pent-up discontents, thus add­ ing fuel to the crisis. By the end of 1945, just three and a half months after termination of the war, black market prices had risen 93 times above the prewar level. This desperate situation was the background for a determined bid of the regrouped Social Democratic Party for postwar leadership, a vigorous revival of the legalized Japan Communist Party, and the meteoric rise of labor unions, both numerically and politically. Com­ munist leaders just released from prison in October 1945 repeatedly called upon the s d p for the formation of “a common front of demo­ cratic forces in the new Japan.” Although the right-wing Socialists were able to dominate the party during the early postwar years, they had also to contend with a persistent and vocal left wing. T he relative unity of the Communists at this time contrasted with the divided So­ cial Democrats. In most respects, the former were more aggressive in the immediate postwar period; they held rallies to ferret out and make lists of war criminals, organized demonstrations on a variety of issues, discovered and forced the rationing of hoarded foods and mate­ rials. T h e Socialists were pressed to the wall in justifying their con­ tinued and sometimes equivocal rejection of Communist overtures. First, they declined on grounds that neither group had formed a party or drafted policies; that “going one’s own way” would be more effec­ tive than cooperation; that Socialists could not trust a secret Com­ munist Party; and lastly, the 1946 general elections were used as an excuse. Even right-wing s d p leaders recognized that objective condi-

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

11

tions were ripe for a democratic front but that their party had not been sufficiently organized to assure Socialist leadership of it. Signifi­ cantly, it was always the Communists who approached the Socialists and the latter, at times politely, at times bluntly, demurred. T he 1946 return from China of Sanzo Nozaka, the suave, softspoken Communist leader, his appeal for a “lovable” j c p , and leftwing Socialist efforts to force the hand of the s d p by forming their own Democratic People’s League (Minshu Jimmin Remmei) under the leadership of the veteran socialist, Hitoshi Yamakawa, embarrassed the party’s right wing. T h e Communists appealed to rank-and-file Socialists, especially on the local level, where they were partially suc­ cessful. The Socialist national leadership was unable to prevent lim­ ited cooperation between Socialists and Communists in outlying areas during elections. T he latter tried to coax Socialists into cooperating on specific issues, such as “Food May Day” (May 22, 1946), when in­ creased rice and other rations were demanded. After the elections of April 1946, a right-wing Socialist, Tatsuo Morito, proposed a Demo­ cratic League for National Salvation (Kyukoku Minshu Sensen Remmei), hoping thereby to reestablish s d p leadership among all democratic forces in and out of the Diet. Socialist procrastination in joining or creating its own “common front” was due to the party’s in­ ternal dissension, especially on the crucial point of participation with the j c p , and the deep suspicion of all leftists harbored by right-wing Socialists. T he latter insisted on continued rejection of Communist overtures because they expected the conservative Yoshida Cabinet to reach an impasse in its economic policies and then to call upon the Socialists to help form a national government. Democratic leagues of the Communist or right or left Socialist brands, furthermore, did not arouse public opinion or bring about a union of democratic forces. The National Salvation League was an anticlimactic termination to Socialist-Communist sparring in their bid for left-wing leadership. It was more tactical in nature than sincere in purpose. Ironically the Diet, which had been elected under the strong guid­ ance of General T ojo in 1942, was directed by the Allied Occupation to legislate many important democratizing innovations into the Japa­ nese political and electoral systems toward the end of its term in 194546. Noteworthy among these changes were the granting of woman suffrage and stronger safeguards to assure honest elections. A ll re­ strictions on free speech and association had been removed. Leftists,

12

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

who had always operated insecurely, had never experienced such an unhampered atmosphere in which to challenge the regime; but the “new forces” in Japan had not recovered from the war and were poorly organized, factious, and plagued by problems of wartime col­ laboration as well as by competing ideologies. During the long cam­ paign preceding the elections of April 1946, the s d p was initially cautious as to the number of candidates it selected. Its central slogan was simply “socialism or capitalism” with a promise of gradualism in the socialization of banking, and of the coal, iron, fertilizer, electric power, and transportation industries. On January 4, 1946, a “purge directive” was handed to the Japanese government. A ll parties except the Communists were affected, con­ servatives and right-wing Socialists in larger numbers being disquali­ fied from holding public offices. T h e problem of responsibility for aggressive war had been a source of constant irritation in Socialist ranks. Left-wing factions had repeatedly called for a purification of the party and for removal of wartime collaborators sitting in its high­ est councils. But they had not been successful. It was only through implementation of the purge that several leaders of the dominant right wing were politically barred. Its advantage was due less to or­ ganizational strength than to prewar experience and renown. While only a few Socialists were affected by the purge, Diet delegations of the conservative parties were seriously depleted. This emboldened the Socialists to increase the number of their candidates for the Diet elec­ tions in April. But the contest when it came was still far from equal: the intense indoctrination of prewar education, substitution of the henchmen of some purgees in the electoral race, and concentration of governmental authority and prestige in the old guard weighed against the Socialists. Still, the s d p emerged from the first postwar elections as a major political entity. It became the second largest party with 92 members in the House of Representatives, only 21 of whom had formerly sat in the Diet. A large proportion of the new s d p Diet delegation was com­ posed of freshmen in politics who were attracted to “socialism” as a panacea for the ills of postwar Japan but whose ideas were not based on any solid philosophical convictions. No political party received a clear mandate in this election; a coalition was unavoidable. Similari­ ties in political outlook and historical background and their com­ bined majority naturally placed the two conservative parties in a posi­ tion to form the next Cabinet. Realizing that the demands of labor—

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

13

expressed in successive labor offensives as well as through the s d p and could not be ignored, the conservatives tried to entice the rightwing Socialists into a coalition. In the post-election negotiations, and later during the peak of the labor offensive in December 1946 to Jan­ uary 1947, many of the right-wing Socialists were willing and eager bargainers for governmental posts. T he Socialist position was further strengthened by personality conflicts among conservative politicians, a legacy from prewar years. However, the Socialists themselves were divided in their attitude toward participation in a coalition govern­ ment; the left wing vehemently opposed any such dilution of socialist principles. When Shidehara finally resigned on April 22, 1946, he demanded that the next Premier and Cabinet be a “stabilizing force.” After pro­ tracted negotiations, the initiative to form a Cabinet passed from the Liberals to the s d p and back again. Shigeru Yoshida, the Liberal Party’s new president after the purge of Ichiro Hatoyama, formed a Cabinet, but it failed to provide stability. It did not raise production, was forced into modified economic planning, and antagonized labor through derogatory statements and inflationary financial policies. These chaotic conditions encouraged continued Socialist-conserva­ tive negotiations, which, though long unsuccessful, whetted rightwing s d p leaders’ thirst for ministerial posts and afforded the left wing a chance to exert more influence in party councils. The advent of the Allied Occupation had freed the labor movement of its shackles. It was soon legally recognized and actively encouraged. A basic labor union law was enacted in December 1945 and became effective in March 1946, giving workers the right to bargain collec­ tively and to strike. Prewar labor leaders, many of whom were affili­ ated with the former proletarian parties, reemerged and soon be­ came prominent. In less than a year after the surrender, almost 13,000 unions with more than 3.8 million members had come into existence, and this growth continued—usually at an accelerating rate—until March 1949. Prewar unions were reactivated, but more importantly, workers in many new industries were organized. Leaders associated with the prewar Socio-Democratic clique reestablished the General Federation of Labor (Sodomei) in August 1946. More radical prewar leaders in the same month created a competing organization along industrial lines; this Congress of Industrial Unions (Sambetsu, or the ciu) came increasingly under the dominance of the j c p . Food shortages, lack of raw materials, and inflation spurred strikes. jcp—

14

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

Managements, shaken by a breakdown in social order, acceded to most of labor’s demands. Organized workers even adopted “ production control” as a strike tactic until this was later declared to be illegal. Instances of irresponsible violence by labor and mob pressures oc­ curred. But this was only natural when the government showed itself totally unable to control prices and wages; it had no food policy and took only weak financial measures. T he depreciation of real wages progressively aggravated the already explosive situation. Soon after taking office, Premier Yoshida (in June 1946) issued a statement on the maintenance of social order, in which he said there were certain elements in Japan who, on the pretext of practicing democracy, were apt to ignore order, hold law in contempt, and indulge in inflamma­ tory speeches and actions. This comment only accelerated social un­ rest and further aroused the hostility of organized labor. In turn, the government, supported by influential capitalists, took a stronger stand and attempted large-scale personnel retrenchment without adequate unemployment insurance, tried to enact a Labor Relations Adjust­ ment Law taking away from governmental workers the right to strike, and blandly ignored the steadily deteriorating economic situation. Then even the moderate Federation of Labor could no longer stand idly by. T h e politically oriented labor offensives organized by the ciu were gathering momentum. T he first peak was reached on December 17, 1946, with a mass rally of half a million workers mobilized by the General Federation, the ciu, farmers’ unions, and independent trade unions, demanding the overthrow of the Yoshida Cabinet and the establishment of a democratic government with s d p control of key ministries. T h e rally was coordinated with a non-confidence motion presented in the House of Representatives which was, of course, de­ feated by the conservative majority. W hile members of the right-wing s d p contented themselves with this motion, left-wingers were more concerned with its being synchronized with the rally. Yoshida’s New Year greeting, containing a reference to “ those base fellows” (a mild translation), stiffened labor’s attitude. T he government workers’ un­ ions, about 2.6 million strong, thereupon called a general strike for February 1, 1947. In order to prevent the labor offensive from being totally guided by the j c p , the s d p — especially its left wing—reluctantly participated. As a party of the workers, it felt compelled to condone the general strike and to uphold all economic demands. Only a writ­ ten directive from General MacArthur as Supreme Commander for

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

15

the Allied Powers (s c a p ) prevented the “use of so deadly a social weapon in the present impoverished and emaciated condition of Ja­ pan.” A week later he wrote to Premier Yoshida requesting “another democratic expression of the people’s will.” Because the new Japanese Constitution was soon to come into ef­ fect, elections to the House of Councillors, to prefectural legislatures, and to governorships were scheduled for April 1947. T h e selection of a new House of Representatives was thus added to a multiplicity of elections. All indicators of public opinion showed growing support for the Social Democratic Party. Just before the last Imperial Diet adjourned, however, the ruling conservative parties pushed through a revision of electoral districts, changing them from large prefectural constituencies with plural balloting to medium-sized constituencies with single balloting. T he Socialists vigorously opposed this move. It was obvious that this revision would seriously hurt their candidates in the forthcoming contests, but s c a p did not raise a finger to prevent the old guard from consolidating its power through such last-minute schemes. Disillusionment with bureaucratic ineptitude, popular identifica­ tion of the conservatives with the discredited wartime regime, the at­ traction of a new force, and a feeling of desperation on the part of the people—all heaped unreasonable and naive expectations on the s d p . As a symbol of the new era, and the only party that might be trusted to guide Japan toward democratic aims, the s d p had become the chief beneficiary of the prevailing mood. The ruling conservatives had been slow in enforcing the purge—even overlooking certain cabinet min­ isters—had maintained a more than friendly relationship with the chief director of the purge, and had crippled the Economic Stabiliza­ tion Board. T he confident s d p rejected a bid from the j c p for electoral cooperation. During the campaign, Socialists emphasized the deficien­ cies of the retiring Yoshida administration and advocated govern­ mental control of coal mines and the fertilizer industry, taxation of wartime black market profiteers, and suspension of interest payments on wartime government bonds. T o their own surprise the Socialists obtained a plurality with 143 members in the House of Representatives. T he two conservative par­ ties, Liberals and Democrats (with factional rearrangements, the Pro­ gressive Party having changed its name), obtained 13a and 126, re­ spectively. T he People’s Cooperative Party had 31 members elected,

i6

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

while the j c p secured only four seats. T he extent of discontent was thus indicated. But the tenacity, skill, and determination of conserva­ tive politicians was equally apparent. SHARING PO W ER : T H E K A T A Y A M A C A B IN E T

“We shall struggle against the conservative reactionary camp and carry out a revolution through the Diet”—so spoke Tetsu Katayama, Chairman of the s d p , immediately after the elections from the balcony of the Asahi Newspaper building to crowds assembled below. It proved to be no more than a bold gesture. Should the s d p , with only a plurality in the Lower House, try to form a cabinet? Tension persisted between its left and right wings on this score. T h e left opposed participating in the government because of the difficult economic situation, the lack of an absolute majority, and slim hopes for a future Socialist government if it failed the first time. T he right wing, on the other hand, felt that the s d p should par­ ticipate in the government since the people had given the largest sup­ port to the Socialists; because the party must not seem to lack in political courage; because it should abide by parliamentary practices as the plurality party; and it was, they argued, the only party that could “save the masses” from postwar economic chaos. T he Socialist predicament was accentuated by the overwhelming conservative ma­ jority, though split as it was into competing parties and jealous fac­ tions. For a month the four main parties (the s d p , the Democrats, the Liberals, and the People’s Cooperative Party) worked toward a na­ tional unity government and a four-party policy agreement. T h e j c p was pointedly omitted. T he left-wing Socialist leaders, Mosaburo Su­ zuki and Kanju Kato—in order to placate the suspicions of the con­ servatives on account of their active role in the aforementioned labor offensives, and in a bid for possible participation in the government —made a dramatic anticommunist declaration. Instead of accepting these gestures, however, the Liberals demanded that the s d p be purged of its left wing. This the Socialists refused to do, but they agreed to exclude them from cabinet posts, to reject the extreme left and right, to prevent leakage of state secrets, and to refrain from any action conducive to social unrest. W ith more concessions from the s d p than from the conservatives, a four-party policy agreement was concluded. T he Socialists pledged not to demand a freeze of the “new

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

17

yen” or suspension of interest payments on war bonds and acceded to a diluted version of their coal nationalization policy. Socialist policies for overcoming chronic inflation were also sacrificed. At the last min­ ute, the Liberal Party declared it would not participate in the govern­ ment anyway. T he Socialists, Democrats, and People’s Cooperative Party eventually formed an administration. While they were officially bound by the four-party agreement, the Liberal Party as “friendly” opposition could not be counted on for much cooperation. T he ratio of cabinet seats was seven each for the sdp and the Democrats and two for the People’s Cooperatives. The Socialists held the portfolios of Education, Agriculture and Forestry, Justice, Commerce and Indus­ try, and in addition the directorship of the Economic Stabilization Board. Thus, for the first time in modern Japanese history, a Socialist (and incidentally a Christian), Tetsu Katayama, headed the govern­ ment. He was also the first Premier under the new Constitution. The Katayama cabinet inherited an intolerable crisis from its pred­ ecessor: the vicious wage-price spiral, the militant demands of labor, and the food problem. In retrospect, Katayama claims that there was only four days’ supply of rice in government warehouses when he took office. T he paramount mission of this cabinet was, therefore, the formulation and execution of effective economic policies. T he Pre­ mier made desperate appeals to the people to bear up under the crisis and to cooperate with the government. T h e economic measures adopted by the Socialist-led government were in line with the general requirements enumerated in a letter from General MacArthur to the previous Prime Minister, calling for strong economic controls. As a result, Hiroo Wada, Director General of the Economic Stabilization Board (esb), the chief economic planning agency, wielded consider­ able power in the cabinet. Under Wada’s direction, the esb compiled the first economic white paper in Japan and devised a wage-price sta­ bilization program pegging wages at 26.8 times those of the 1934-36 level, prices at 65 times, coal at 127 times, and iron at 220 times their levels during that same earlier period. T he government tried to en­ force the program with penal sanctions but was not successful. Passage of the bill for state control of the coal mining industry proved to be the only quasi-socialistic policy pushed through by the So­ cialist-conservative coalition government. As soon as Minister of Commerce and Industry Mizutani had announced his intention to draft such a bill, the Liberal Party had declared it would not be bound

i8

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

by the four-party agreement on the issue. In order to obtain the support of conservative members of the cabinet, the sdp made one concession after another. When the bill was debated in the Diet, it was further diluted by the conservative forces. As finally passed by the House of Representatives on November 25, 1947, perhaps only the title—T em ­ porary Law for the State Control of Coal Mining—closely resembled the original Socialist proposal. O f all the economic measures proposed by the government, this law most epitomized the basic incompatibil­ ity within the coalition. In actuality the emasculated bill signified that the obsolescent machinery in Japanese collieries would be mod­ ernized at the taxpayers’ expense and soon returned with the mines themselves to private hands. T he more positive achievements of the Katayama cabinet included various laws to implement the new Constitution. For these, the So­ cialists were assured of the backing of scap ; in fact initiative usually came from General Headquarters. These laws concerned institutional reforms of the government, procedural improvements, and strength­ ening of the social and economic foundations and procedures for building democracy. T h e Ministries of War, Navy, and Home Affairs were abolished. T he Attorney General’s office and a new Ministry of Labor were created, both headed by Socialists. Local government and the police were reorganized. T h e criminal code was revised, and sup­ port for the patriarchal family system was eliminated from the civil code. T he first group of Japanese Supreme Court justices was ap­ pointed, and a government employees law was enacted. Labor stand­ ards, anti-monopoly and economic power deconcentration laws were passed and land reform further implemented. Most of this legislation did not basically affect the size of the powerful bureaucracy in Japan. While being somewhat reduced in numbers, its personnel was usually just reassigned. Even the purges mainly affected the ministries which were to be abolished. T he “arrogant” bureaucracy proved to be the most unshatterable institution of the old, centralized system. Toward the end of 1947, the sdp showed signs of serious internal dissension. In his zealousness to attract agrarian support, the Socialist Minister of Agriculture and Forestry, Rikizo Hirano, began to upset superficial coalition tranquility. He advocated that the government pay the growers higher prices for rice they were obliged to “deliver.” If carried out, this would have disrupted not only the government’s budgetary plans but also Wada’s esb plans to curb inflation. Hirano’s

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

19

proposal, suddenly made public while he was on a stumping tour, re­ kindled irritation and dissatisfaction among sdp leaders over his pre­ war ultranationalistic activities and high-handed role in earlier coali­ tion negotiations. T he possibility of his purge was also mentioned, as it had been when the cabinet was formed. Premier Katayama and his chief lieutenant, Nishio, supported Wada against Hirano as did the sdp left wing. Soon Katayama was forced to dismiss Hirano as a “dis­ turber of the coalition peace.’’ That stormy petrel was later officially purged from political life. He had already left the party, followed by 15 of his kobun or followers. The “ Hirano incident” consolidated the Socialist left wing into a stiffer attitude toward the right wing and other governmental parties. Its spokesmen demanded unsuccessfully that a member of their group be appointed Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. This was unac­ ceptable to the Democratic and the People’s Cooperative Parties be­ cause they regarded the sdp left wing as too pro-Communist. When Kanae Hatano, a nonparty university professor with right-wing So­ cialist connections, was ultimately selected, the left wing formed the May Society (Satsuki-kai), in order to consolidate its forces, declared its opposition within the party, reserved the right to criticize the gov­ ernment, and called for the abrogation of the four-party policy agree­ ment which it regarded as a serious impediment to effective Socialist policies. T he left-wing Socialist appeal met with marked success at the party’s third national convention in January 1948, which resulted in a “ policy victory” for the left and a “ personnel victory” for the right. The latter was able to maintain its leadership only after overcoming a serious challenge. It found itself in the anomalous position of hav­ ing to carry out leftist policies. Katayama was reelected chairman of the Central Executive Committee (cec) but with many blank votes cast “against” him; abrogation of the four-party policy agreement— the basis of his own cabinet—was endorsed by the convention. In es­ sence, the party had withdrawn the props from under its own shared government. At the time the Katayama cabinet had been formed, the labor movement had supported the Socialist Party. T he conservative Fed­ eration of Labor (Sodomei) had promised the coalition government its unqualified support, while the Sambetsu (the ciu) had given ap­ proval upon condition that socialist policies should continue to be effected. Labor disputes and strikes had temporarily decreased. T he

20

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

Sodomei had proposed a rally to “ support the Katayama cabinet’’ but, at the insistence of the Sambetsu, this was changed to “ encourage the sdp.” The difference in the attitudes of these two major labor federa­ tions was significant. When the government announced its wage-price stabilization program, the Sodomei reluctantly gave its support to the government, but Sambetsu demanded the fulfillment of sdp promises and the abandonment of the four-party policy agreement. Although the government had initiated many institutional reforms in favor of labor, it was unable to curb the deteriorating economic situation. Labor became restive; disputes and strikes began to increase again. Because private employers were able to circumvent the government’s wage-price stabilization program with impunity, the real wages of government workers began to lag. Negotiations became protracted and bitter. T he Central Labor Relations Board urged the adoption of a compromise: the payment of 2.8 months of a government work­ er’s salary to overcome the inflationary deficit. T he government paid two months extra wages; only the 0.8 month’s pay remained, but this was too great a problem for the sdp and the coalition government. Since the right wing had monopolized all cabinet posts allotted to the Socialists, the left wing had sought compensation in the form of a number of important party posts and numerous Diet committee chair­ manships. T he two most important they obtained were the chairman­ ship of the Budget Committee of the House of Representatives and of the party’s Policy Planning Board, both held by Suzuki. When the government decided to raise railway and postal rates to pay for the 0.8 month’s pay, he, backed by the May Society and in this case the opposition Liberals, vehemently opposed the plan. T h e former de­ manded that the government workers’ wage increase be paid for through the sale of cotton goods in government warehouses. The right-wing Socialists and the government refused to accept this pro­ posal. Suzuki allowed a fellow left-winger to submit a motion reject­ ing the budget. It passed, and the government withdrew its budget. Suzuki resigned his chairmanships. A hue and cry was raised for the expulsion of the recalcitrant leftists, but this was no longer possible without destroying the party. A few days later, on February 10, 1948, after being in office for only a little more than eight months, the Kata­ yama coalition government resigned. It was forced out by intraparty conflict. “ Mr. Katayama and his cabinet have given the country a conscien­ tious and patriotic leadership,” declared General MacArthur when

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

21

the cabinet stepped down. That government has since been criticized as a rubber stamp of the Allied Occupation. This was, of course, stead­ fastly denied by those in the coalition; but there was undeniably at least a limited meeting of minds between Occupation officials and the government, especially the sdp, concerning numerous measures to promote democratization. Indeed, ever since the beginning of the Occupation, the sdp had often been trying to “catch up” with the Allied program of reforms. There was a naive, vague impression in Socialist circles that somehow democratization policies would im­ prove the living standards of the people. A harsh lesson was learned in this respect. Socialists had been demanding many of these reforms since before the war with little hope of their realization. Then, after national disaster, they were deluged with one reform after another. Even in such a basic document as the Constitution, the Socialists, who had been regarded as radical, lagged behind Allied policy. T he official Socialist position placed sovereignty, under the new Constitution, in the state, which included the Emperor. T h e left wing argued for hav­ ing it reside in the people, as was finally provided by the Diet at the insistence of scap. Very few Socialists had had any experience as administrators when their party first participated in this coalition. T h eir leaders had lacked adequate opportunities to draft national administrative plans and policies. They had made few preparations; they had neither re­ sources nor personnel to create long-range plans which would spark the imagination, enthusiasm, and initiative of a people suffering from manifold disaster. They had no strong, nationwide grass-roots organization to sustain them and no adequate grip on local govern­ ment, which was essentially conservative. Had the sdp not led the gov­ ernment at that time, however, democratization would not have pro­ gressed as far as it did. T he immediate results were catastrophic for the party, but it can be argued that long-range benefits accrued to Japan by the participation of the sdp in the government at that time. Unfortunately, the Katayama cabinet presided over the highest in­ flation rate yet. It faced an almost unmanageable situation. T o raise production and hold down inflation simultaneously seemed impos­ sible. In emphasizing the revival of basic industries, it gave industrial management and capital a breathing spell, and also restrained the de­ mands and pressures of trade unions. It incurred the antipathy of farmers when it ordered compulsory collection of rice quotas to ease the food situation. When prices were controlled, black markets pros-

22

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

pered. Taxes rose, unemployment spread, and scarcity prevailed. Efforts of the Socialists had the ironical effect of strengthening the entrenched bureaucracy because of necessary dependence on it for the formulation and enforcement of policies, in spite of their hopes for “socialistic planning and control.” Intertwined with these problems was the harassing experience of a coalition government with two divergent ideologies, capitalism and socialism, bound together by a vague policy statement. Socialist will­ ingness to compromise was based on the illusion that eventually, through a cumulative process, their socialist objectives would be at­ tained—an illusion that was completely shattered. This and the en­ suing experience impressed upon the sdp the undesirability of a tenu­ ous coalition with parties bent upon conserving capitalist interests. Furthermore, the sdp should not have expected to initiate a wholly socialistic program under a basically conservative, even though benev­ olently reformist, occupying power. There is no doubt that factional strife within the party and its coalition partners had its toll on the efficiency of governmental leadership; but after all the criticism has been heaped on the Katayama government and the sdp, it is more than rhetorical to ask whether this tragicomedy was not virtually in­ evitable in the circumstances, the more so once the party decided to join the coalition. Socialists have since realized that there would be less excuse in the future if history in this regard should ever be re­ peated. coalition renewed; the ashida cabinet

T he Liberal Party, as the opposition, insisted that formation of a new cabinet should be its responsibility. Its leaders continued their refusal to participate in negotiations toward a new coalition. The Democrats, weakened by defections to this conservative rival, desired a four-party coalition. Officially, the sdp did not demand the premier­ ship and declared it would support the Democrats if a policy agree­ ment could be reached; but left-wing Socialists stubbornly demanded the redesignation of Katayama as Premier. They feared the Liberals would revert to reactionary policies and call for an election which would result in Socialist defeat. Only after Katayama refused to accept their nomination did they concede and vote for Hitoshi Ashida, Pres­ ident of the Democratic Party, as new Premier. T he left wing in the sdp had expressed its disinterest in and opposi­ tion to participation in a revised coalition cabinet. In order to avert

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

23

a party crisis, Kato and Nomizo, two leading members o£ the May Society—the very faction which had brought down the Katayama cabinet—consented to join the cabinet as Minister of Labor and Min­ ister without Portfolio, respectively. This switch within the left wing severely strained its factional unity. Suzuki, foremost of the group, gave his tacit approval, but Hisao Kuroda, a doctrinaire Marxist, per­ sisted in his opposition to participation in the cabinet. In addition to the two ministerial posts already mentioned, the Socialists obtained six more: the office of Vice-Premier (going to Nishio), the Attorney Generalship, and the Ministries of Education, Agriculture and For­ estry, and Commerce and Communications. T h e Democrats held seven posts and the People’s Cooperatives two. After a month’s negotiations, the three parties concluded a policy agreement. It was more detailed than the previous one, but on such crucial matters as interest payments on war bonds it was exceedingly vague, calling for a “ termination-like disposition’’ ; more important was the growing influence of the international situation on Japan. The cold war between the Soviet Union and the United States was being intensified. T he Truman Administration had announced the inauguration of the Marshall Plan. Several missions of high-ranking governmental officials visited Japan, and Occupation policies shifted from emphasis on reform to accents on security and on speeding Jap­ anese recovery as the workshop of Asia. Premier Ashida stressed the mission of his cabinet to facilitate the introduction of foreign capital and a substantial improvement of production as the only ways to im­ prove living standards. From the outset, the Ashida cabinet was beleaguered by labor of­ fensives. T he spearhead of these disputes was again the federated gov­ ernment workers’ unions. This group had formed a council and, in concert with Sambetsu as well as the coal mining and electric power workers’ unions, participated in a March labor offensive, one ob­ jective of which was to prevent the dreaded retrogressive revision of major labor laws. T h e unions were also demanding wage increases, but the union of workers in the Ministry of Communications, the driving force behind these offensives, based its calculation on the in­ come necessary to maintain a diet of 2,400 calories per day. A truce was arranged between the government and its own labor unions in March 1948, but the lull was soon broken over formulation of the national budget, related as that was, and always is, to the wages of governmental employees.

24

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

The new labor offensive was checked only in July when the Occu­ pation authorities sent a letter to Premier Ashida recommending that the National Public Service Law be amended to deny the right of government employees to strike. This letter placed the sdp, especially Kato as Minister of Labor, in a very embarrassing position. A week later, on July 31, 1948, the government issued an ordinance imple­ menting the no-strike, no-collective-bargaining request and providing penal measures for violations. T h e next step was to submit similar legislation to the Diet. At this point the sdp equivocated, for it did not want to be party to any further restrictions on activities of the labor movement. Still, the Socialists finally decided to stay in the Cabinet— instead of calling for a dissolution of the Diet—in an attempt to limit the severity with which the rights of governmental workers would be curtailed. Dissatisfied with Socialist leadership and reacting against the restrictive Occupation policies, the unions became increasingly restive and militant. At the same time, groups within the labor move­ ment which were not in agreement with the more aggressive tactics used in the past, formed “democratization leagues” (Mindo) and be­ gan successfully to challenge radical leadership which had led the unions through the abortive strike early in 1947 and the more recent offensives with no gains. Prior to culmination of the Cabinet’s labor troubles, controversies raged again over compilation of the budget. At the same time, the alleged involvement of Nishio in large-scale illegal financial contribu­ tions was brought to light. He became an easy target for left-wing attacks and was forced to resign his vice-premiership and leave the party in order to prevent the passage of a personal non-confidence motion in the Diet. In the meantime, the sdp and the Democratic Party agreed to delay interest payments on war bonds for one year, but this resulted in another defection from the Democratic Party. When the budget was finally passed, the Kuroda faction voted against it. Like Nishio, its members were later disciplined and expelled from the sdp. T he respite from scandals, expulsions, and budget wrangling soon came to an end when the Showa Denko scandal concerning po­ litical subsidies from a fertilizer company was revealed with the arrest of the conservative director-general of the Economic Stabilization Board. Soon thereafter, Nishio was arrested for allegedly having re­ ceived a million yen to “hush up” the case. T he cabinet resigned on October 7, 1948.

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

25

The Ashida cabinet had lasted eight months. It had been unable to curb inflation or to achieve any great measure of economic recovery and had been saved from the onslaught of determined labor offensives only by the Supreme Commander’s intervention. It had been rent by policy dissensions resulting in expulsions on the left, defections on the right. The gravitation of dissident Democratic splinters toward the newly formed Democratic-Liberal Party had been disruptive. More­ over, Nishio had become vulnerable to left-wing attacks. Ignoble was the denouement. Shigeru Yoshida formed what was meant to be a caretaker govern­ ment. Fearing losses, the sdp tried to postpone the elections. The party had grown more factionally fragmented; its organization was shattered. T h e Kuroda group had revived the tradition of a WorkerFarmer Party, advocating closer cooperation with the Communists. The latter, for obvious reasons, did not propose a united front but ran their own candidates. T he elections, held on January 24, 1949, re­ sulted in the most severe electoral setback suffered by the sdp during the entire postwar period. From a plurality of 143 seats in the Lower House, it fell to 48. Many Socialist cabinet ministers, including Katayama, Kato, and Nomizo, were defeated. T h e sdp polled only 4.1 mil­ lion votes or 13 per cent of the total cast. On the other hand, the jcp elected 35 Representatives, attaining the peak of its postwar popu­ larity. In addition to all the aforementioned weaknesses and ills of the Social Democratic Party, the shifting psychology of a defeated, in­ secure people had marked effects on the first three postwar elections. Voters were more intent on surviving the difficulties and confusion of the postwar period than on absorbing the ideas of a socialist utopia. The rise of the sdp had been as dramatic as was its sudden decline. Faced with an absolute conservative majority, guided by the auto­ cratic hand of their implacable political opponent, Shigeru Yoshida, the Socialists had only one recourse: to rebuild from the shambles and for many years to fight a rearguard defense of gains made during the preceding period of democratization. GREAT DEBATES IN 1 949-5 1

There ensued a dramatic period in the evolution of the Social Dem­ ocratic Party. T he three years 1949—51 were marked by two historic controversies over the philosophical basis and proper character of the

26

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

party, and the attitude to be adopted toward the Japanese peace and security treaties. T h e former problem has never been fully resolved; the latter may be settled by the passage of time, but some of the issues raised by alliance with the United States have continued and again came to the fore in 1958-60 as revision and ratification of the security treaty were negotiated. T he Socialist Party had made a bid for power, though never really convinced that it would succeed. Its sudden prominence had inflated membership rolls and had attracted many nonsocialist Diet members whom the party had felt obliged to accept because of its paucity of effective candidates. Of the 143 sdp candidates returned to the Diet in 1947, no less than 48 have not since been reelected. Thereafter, the number of sdp Diet members who had been elected only once to the House of Representatives was never more than four in any one con­ test. It seems clear, therefore, that the 1949 election constituted a di­ viding line between the early postwar party and the organization which had to rejuvenate itself from debacle. T o be sure, the upper echelons of leadership remained intact, but a new group of secondary leaders emerged in the sdp Diet delegation and Executive Committee. This group, often working through the older leadership, exerted great influence in councils on all levels. The Inamura-Morito Controversy T he Socialist convention in 1949 was postponed until after elec­ tions in January. T o show their sense of responsibility for drastic de­ feat, the leaders, including members of the cec, resigned en masse but immediately reconstituted themselves as caretakers of the party. The convention in 1949 is generally referred to as the fourth “reconstruc­ tion” convention, though actually this was a misnomer. T he troubles of the Katayama and Ashida cabinets put right-wing Socialists on the defensive; the leftist attack was correspondingly de­ termined. T he controversy over the party name during inaugural negotiations illustrated the delicate balance of power which persisted. T he right wing advocated changing the official designation to “Shakai Minshuto” (Social Democratic Party); the left wing wanted to re­ tain the name Nihon Shakaito (Japan Socialist Party) although allow­ ing the official English translation to remain the Social Democratic Party of Japan (sdp or sdpj). T he latter was adopted by a majority of one vote. At almost every turn, such disputes have plagued the party.

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

27

In 1949 the leftist attack, which had focused on more basic philo­ sophical problems, reached a new crescendo. In accordance with the usual practice, a special committee to draft the annual action program was established. Significantly, the chairman of this committee was Suzuki, concurrently chairman of the party’s Policy Planning Board. In subsequent negotiations among the right, left, and center factions, the left wing demanded thorough self-criticism, pinpointing responsi­ bility for the existing crises, enunciation of a fundamental philosophy based upon “scientific socialism,” creation of a class party based on or­ ganized workers, utilization of competent leaders from forces outside the party, and the exclusion of wartime collaborators. T he right-wing rebuttal, vague and innocuous, called for the dissolution of factions, for the outgoing executives to decline renomination at that year’s convention as an expression of collective responsibility, and for the establishment of a theory and party posture to combat both conserva­ tism and communism. Being on the defensive, the moderates hoped to reinforce their dwindling authority by attracting the center fac­ tions with a broad and obviously acceptable statement of policy. Suzuki’s chief theoretician, a noncommunist Marxist named Junzd Inamura, drafted the committee’s version of an action program, which was immediately countered by another written by Tatsuo Morito, who relied considerably on the philosophical foundations of the Brit­ ish Labour Party. Inamura was a veteran socialist and a prominent member of the prewar noncommunist Marxist Labor-Farmer faction (the Ronoha). In contrast, Morito, though he had been on the moder­ ate fringe of the prewar social democratic movement, had recently entered politics and had become a leading right-wing theoretician when he justified the creation of the Democratic League for National Salvation in 1946. Later he had become Minister of Education in the Katayama Cabinet. T he “reconstruction” convention was to assemble in two or three days, yet the opposing factions adamantly clung to their divergent interpretations. The deadlock was broken only when Seiichi Katsumata, a newcomer to the sdp from the bureaucracy, was instructed to draft a compromise. This he accomplished in one night at the home of his political mentor, Wada, completing the task by seven the next morning. On the same day, the party ceg accepted it as its official draft. T he convention was marked by a debate between the two protago­ nists, Inamura and Morito. Though inconclusive, it revolved around

28

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

several points. T he right wing maintained that socialism would be attained gradually through effective democratic government, while the left claimed that the change from capitalism to socialism must be by revolution and that the conservatives could be expected to try all means including force to stem the tide. Such a counter-revolution would have to be met by correspondingly great force. T h e left wing wanted to give workers—principally factory employees—a preferred status in the party and in the guidance of this revolution, producing thus essentially a “class” party. T he right wing urged a broadly based party with all social classes on an equal footing—in essence a “na­ tional” party. T h e Katsumata compromise, with typical skill, fused the two conflicting theories (based, respectively, on German social democracy and British socialism) by shifting the frame of reference to the jcp , but this only blurred the real nature of the controversy. Un­ like the Communist Party and its revolutionary tactics, the compro­ mise declared that the sdp would carry out constructive policies aimed toward socialism and would also organize the masses to meet any counterattack by the conservatives. T h e sdp was not to be a vanguard party like the jcp but a “class oriented mass party.” In this way, the political “face” of both factions was preserved. The action program, as finally adopted, included several crippling riders which only meant that the final showdown was postponed another year. Although a crisis over the program of action could thus be tempo­ rarily evaded, a struggle over the selection of officers was inevitable. T h e left wing demanded the resignation of the entire right-wing lead­ ership, the election of Suzuki as Secretary General, and the reelection of Katayama as Chairman. In recognition of the role they were ex­ pected to play in reconstructing the party, labor union leaders were encouraged, especially by the left wing, to join en masse and were in­ vited to the convention as special delegates with full voting rights. This group consisted mainly of “democratization leagues” organized in the National Railway Workers Union and in Sambetsu unions in opposition to militant Communists in these bodies and to the con­ servative labor federation, Sodomei. Except for a few leaders, this group was actively wooed by, and supported, the left wing. In con­ trast, the more conservative faction, lacking the vigorous leadership of such persons as Nishio, failed to maintain liaison with this crucial group of about 65 labor delegates. In the nominating committee Inejiro Asanuma, the right-wing candidate for Secretary General, won

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

29

over Suzuki, 31 to 30, but when the full convention voted Suzuki was upheld by a wide margin: 390 to 261. After bargaining all through the night, the ratio of factional strength in the cec was set at ten each for the left and right wings, five each for the center faction and the leftist National Labor Union Congress leaders. Katayama was reelected Chairman. T h e fourth sdp convention was not constructive; only a patchwork settlement was achieved. T he relentless attack by the left wing had been successful. It had demonstrated its superior skill in convention strategy, an advantage which it repeatedly pressed. It had all but overwhelmed the right wing in policy decisions and personnel appointments. T he “mainstream” in party authority had shifted de­ cisively to the left. In preparing for the fifth national convention in 1950, there con­ tinued to be friction between the left and right wings. Both sides de­ veloped youth departments as rival avenues to party hegemony. A l­ though youthful radicals were more attracted to the left wing, the right—not to be outmaneuvered—created the Independent Youth League in July 1949. Leaders of the sdp right attended its inaugural ceremonies, exposing themselves to charges of factionalism by left­ wingers who had already obtained firm control of the party’s Youth Department. T h e left wing was further irritated by Sadachika Nabeyama, the right-wing theorist behind the Independent Youth League. He was a former Communist who had become vehemently opposed to extremism and who regarded the left wing as composed of “pseudoMarxist-Leninists.” Just before the convention in January 1950, the leftist-dominated Youth Department held a national convention at which it decided to demand the expulsion of party members who also had joined the Independent Youth League and to present to the full party convention a motion of non-confidence in Chairman Katayama. The cec tried to calm the irreconcilables. Internecine struggle be­ came more bitter by the day and hour. Except for a centrist conven­ tion president, the left wing captured all important chairmanships at the fifth convention with a greater majority vote than in 1949. Secre­ tary General Suzuki reflected this strength when he declared that those who rejected the principle of a class party would not be toler­ ated. After three days of hopeless negotiations, even a sudden threat by Katayama to decline further nomination to the chairmanship was not enough to bring about a truce in factional conflict. When, on the final day of the convention, Katayama declined nomination for re-

3°

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

election (and he was never thereafter reelected), the entire right wing walked out of the convention. Thus the postwar sdp experienced its first major schism. Its leaders in their narrow feuds for posts had lost control of them­ selves, the convention, the delegates, and the whole trend of events. T hey were thus swept toward a lasting split. A large proportion of sdp Diet members was uncommitted, however, and formed a centrist group. Through a “ Unification Discussion Group” they attempted to reconcile the warring factions. Though the right- and left-wing groups had held their own conventions, they cooperated in the Diet. T hey were impelled to unite because some labor unions, their main source of support, were in the midst of a spring wage offensive. The National Railway Workers Union even intimated that it would with­ draw its support from the sdp unless the party became more effective through unity. T he split was widely condemned as irrational and without justifiable political basis. T he ensuing House of Councillors election in June 1950, the decline of Prime Minister Yoshida’s popu­ larity, and the consequent revival of support for the sdp—indicated by journalists and public opinion polls—gradually forced a reconcilia­ tion. After three months of tedious negotiations, the three groups, left, center and right, were reunited on April 3 at the sixth special convention. T he right wing failed in its attempt to change the char­ acter of the Youth Department but the Marxist tinge in the party’s action program since 1949 was modified and accepted without debate. T he chairmanship was left vacant. Suzuki retired in favor of Asanuma as Secretary General, but the left wing gained 15 of the 30 cec seats, the right wing receiving nine and the center faction six. Between 1949 and 1951, Japanese Socialist attitudes toward the Allied (chiefly American) Occupation’s policy changed from oblique criticism to direct attack. Japan could not escape the repercussions of the colcTwar. 'Occupation policy no longer j3tifih.asiz.cd reform but rather recovery and security. T he land reform program had been vir­ tually completed, but industrial and financial deconcentration, which had also been regarded as essential to democratization of Japanese economic and political institutions, was brought to a halt; gradual, later marked, reconcentration and revision of antitrust legislation be­ came a contrary trend, sdp disillusionment with the United States was further deepened by the strict enforcement of the so-called “Dodge line,” which called for a balanced budget, severe curtailment of credit

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

31

frorn governmental banks, a single exchange rate, and retrenchment of personnertn governmental and private industries. T he Socialist Party, together with the principal labor unions and federations, grudgingly accepted these measures in principle but lamented what they called the “ one-sided” sacrifices being forced on the mass of workers and small entrepreneurs. Recognizing that they had little power to prevent enforcement of this program, the sdp and allied unions did their best to mitigate resultant sacrifices. T he right- and left-wing factions supported the unions to varying degrees in their successive offensives. While the left wing generally encouraged more militant tactics pointing toward a general strike, the right rejected any attempt to use this weapon. When the Communists scored their spectacular electoral gains in 1949, they controlled a large segment of the labor movement, but since the abortive strike intended for February 1, 1947, the challenge to their influence had been gathering momentum. This^was centered in the so-called democratization leagues, which were being established in various national unions, and the trend was accelerated by the vio­ lent resistance of Communist-dominated unions against the personnel retrenchment prescribed by the “Dodge line.” When the jcp was criti­ cized early in January 1950 by the Cominforffi for its somewhat con­ ciliatory attitude toward the Japanese government and the American Occupation, it shifted to a more “positive” policy of sabotage, vio­ lence, and militant strikes. This aroused criticism of Communist leadership in the labor unions and assisted the activities of the democrati­ zation leagues. The American Occupation authorities also took a strong stand against Communist elements in the unions and actively supported their purge. A series of directives in May and June 1950 culminated in drastic reduction of jcp influence in both the Diet and in the labor movement amid charges of grave disregard of civil liberties. On May 3, 1950, the third anniversary of the new Japanese Constitution, Gen­ eral MacArthur suggested outlawing the jcp but, for various reasons, even conservative leaders in the main preferred not to do so. On June 3 and 7, 1950, the Japanese Government at the behest of scap purged 24 members of the jcp Central Committee from public office and 17 editors from the party’s organ, Akahata (Red Flag).(On June 27, two days afterjhe Korean War startecU-thismewspaper was suspended T he nearby conflict seemed further to justify a thorough purge of Com ­ munist elements from the ranks of organized labor. From 1949 to the

32

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

end of November 1950, this expulsion—the “ Red Purge”—eliminated 11,000 workers in private industry and 1,200 in governmental service. T he Socialist Party did not actively oppose the purge, for its leaders realized that, with outside assistance, the way was being cleared for their domination of a large sector of the labor movement. W ith the blessings and active encouragement of the Occupation, the democ­ ratized labor unions began moving toward the establishment of a common organization near the end of 1949. The democratization leagues, formation of the International Confederation of Free Trade -Unions, and the labor offensive in March 1950 led to the creation of the General Council of Japanese Trade Unions (Sohyo) in July 1950. It brought together about 3,000,000 organized Japanese workers many of whom had ousted their Communist leaders. Sohy5 , born of anticommunism, did not directly oppose the purging of labor ranks; rather it regarded this measure as inevitable in the circumstances, and it joined in denouncing the destructive tactics of the jcp . A month earlier, on June 4 , l q y o , the s d p had faced its first major "national election since 1949. As previously intimated, all indications — showed Socialist popularity to be on the rise again after the serious lapse. Party morale was given a boost when a Socialist won the gover­ norship of Kyoto in April. Though barely recovered from its incipi­ ent rift earlier that year, the s d p campaigned for a comprehensive peace treaty and against the disinflationary financial policies of the Xpshida government. Virtual elimination of Communist opportuni­ ties caused the labor unions to concentrate support behind the s d p . It became the second largest party in the House of Councillors with 61 out of 250 seats. On the prefectural level, Socialist candidates polled more votes than in 1947. T he Communists declined, never to rise again during the period under consideration. Only 17 months fol­ lowing their disastrous defeat, the Socialists regained a posture of some strength. They steadily increased their Diet membership until a plateau was reached in 1958-60. But less than three weeks after their electoral rejoicing, they were faced with a serious international crisis, for, on June 25, 1950, the Korean War began. The Peace Treaty T he sdp condemned the North Koreans for using military force to reunite their country, but gave only moral support to the actions of the United Nations forces. T he Socialists were impressed by India’s limited compliance with the Security Council decision to aid South

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

33

Korea and by neutralist Sweden’s support. But they noted that, since Japan was still occupied, it was in no position freely to express its will. They admonished the conservative government to carry out the or­ ders of the Occupation authorities only insofar as the terms of sur­ render required. They were apparently not in sympathy with any zealous cooperation with the Western powers. Although its position was to change radically at a later date, Sohyo, which was being organ­ ized when the Korean War began, also pointed the finger of accusa­ tion at North Korea. Important as the Korean War was for the world, for the Japanese economy, and for Socialist thinking, it was over­ shadowed for the Socialists in 1950-51 by the decisive controversy over the nature of the expected peace treaty and related security ar­ rangements. T he Korean War hastened the conclusion of a peace settlement with Japan. Official termination of the state of war and of the Occupation had been delayed mainly by Soviet-American differences. American policy toward Japan had become less restrictive, and Chinese Communist victories had forced reconsideration of the whole problem of non­ communist security in Asia. Negotiations, when renewed, bogged down between the Departments of Defense and State on touchy prob­ lems of national security and foreign relations. On April 6, 1950, John Foster Dulles was appointed consultant to Dean Acheson, who was then Secretary of State, to make a determined effort to negotiate a peace treaty between Japan and its recent enemies. The Socialists reacted to each change in Allied policy. T he Katayama government, for instance, had made a weak bid to represent the Japanese people at a peace conference; but food, inflation, and other economic matters were then far more pressing both on the Cabinet and on the people. While the United States government was endeav­ oring to unify its own policies, the sdp began formulating its views regarding a settlement. It had early decided that Japan should (1) coilv elude one peace treaty with al! i ts dormer enemies, (2) maintain neu­ trality, and (3) neither conclude military pacts with any one country, nor give military bases in Japan to any foreign country. It asked-that special consideration be given to Japan because of its constitutional . prohibition preventing participation in any sanctions against an ag­ gressor. It is significant that these policies, generally referred to as the “ three principles of peace,” were initially accepted by both wings of the party. However, as the provisions of the expected treaty gradually became

34

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

sharper issues both in Japanese national politics and in the sdp itself, the attitude the party should adopt became intimately linked to the question of party control. T h e seventh convention in 1951 not only reaffirmed the previously formulated three principles of peace but, at the insistence of the left wing, added a fourth opposing the rearma'ment of Japan. This faction believed that the United States was con­ sidering the peace treaty as only a preliminary step to a security treaty which would require Japan to rearm. They were emotionally, theo­ retically, and strategically opposed to any rearmament proposals. The right wing, however, forced the left mfcTa lengthy debate on the mer­ its of a separate peace and self-defense treaty. T he former’s position was, no doubt, strengthened in 1951 by General MacArthur’s New Year statement to the Japanese people in which he referred to the inherent right of self-defense. A proposition to endorse that right suf­ fered an overwhelming defeat, however, and was followed by the elec­ tion of Suzuki as party Chairmari, although right-wingers were elected Secretary-General and Treasurer. T h e cec was divided into fifteen members for the left wing, ten for the right, and five for the center. T he left-wing position was massively reinforced by its labor union supporters. Sohyo, the Teacher’s Union, the National Railway Work­ ers Union, and others in convention all supported leftist policies. Religious leaders of several faiths, together with Sohyo and other ma­ jor national labor unions, formed a National Conference for Further­ ing the Peace. Initially, it excluded Communists but later was ex­ tensively infiltrated by them. T he labor union front was by no means unanimous, since the Sddomei and moderate factions in certain other unions rather ineffectually opposed the movement’s left wing. T he Sodomei regarded a separate or partial peace treaty as inevitable but was relatively inactive in pressing its case. In tenaciously sustaining its four principles of peace, the left sdp was conscious of compromises in the name of expediency at the time of the Manchurian Incident twenty years previously. Its leaders felt conscience-bound not to surrender to “reaction,” this time in the form of the Western “ imperialist” camp. They believed, furthermore, that peaceful coexistence was possible between the opposing Com­ munist and free world blocs and that only through general peace could they achieve their program of socialism in Japan. Outright alignment with the West would only jeopardize their position of neu­ trality. A rearmed nation, they reasoned, would not only offer a pre-

SOCIALIST TASTE OF POWER AND DECLINE

35

text for aggression against Japan but could easily involve Japan in highly undesirable foreign wars. Such an armed force would not be a national army but merely a mercenary one which might be used in the suppression of the Japanese working class—a fear not wholly with­ out grounds in the light of historical experience. Left-wing Socialists aimed at achieving “positive” rather than “passive” neutrality, at cre­ ating a “ third force” in world affairs. They further based their stand on postwar pacifist tendencies among the Japanese people, their revul­ sion against ultranationalism, and their fear of war in the nuclear age. — The right wing, on the other hand, viewed such policies as ideal­ istic and claimed that, realistically—in the world of power politics— a separate peace was inevitable. So long as Japan sided with the West, strict neutrality was impossible. Communist aggression, direct or in­ direct, must be countered by some sort of self-defense. T he right-wing position was bolstered by the definition of “democratic socialism” adopted by the Socialist International in 1951, by its rejection of dog­ matic Marxism, and by its condemnation of the Communist camp as the main source of world tension and the cause for top priority being given to Western military preparedness. The differences between the left- and right-wing Socialists may be simply stated by reverting for a moment to observations made by the Socialists in 1945 on the unresolved contradictions between dictator­ ship and democracy and between socialism and capitalism. As viewed by left-wingers, the basic contradiction was between socialism and capitalism; right-wingers, however, observed that the fundamental choice was between democracy and dictatorship. Apart from any the­ orizing, these choices were colored by definite mental predispositions long nurtured by leaders of the various factions. Notwithstanding their differences, the Socialists did represent a brand of left-wing na­ tionalism aimed at achieving '“true national independence.” Unable to agree among themselves, they repeatedly procrastinated. In a speech on March 31, 1951, John Foster Dulles revealed the gen­ eral contents of the proposed peace treaty. On August 15, the final draft was announced. On September 4, the treaty was signed in San Francisco. It had been negotiated, hotly debated in and outside Japan, and then signed, but the Socialists still could not agree on their atti­ tude. From spring into the fall of 1951, when the treaty was ratified by the Diet, they inched painfully toward a decision. Only the highlights

36

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

of the intricate maneuvering which led up to the eighth special con­ vention can be recounted here. The right-wing Socialists demanded a reevaluation of policy at every opportune moment. T he relatively poor showing made by the Socialists in the 1951 local elections was blamed on their unrealistic attitudes toward the peace treaty. But the left wing was unmoved. T he cec met frequently; subcommittees were formed and dissolved; groups of three and four discussed the irreconcilable positions; the right wing initially accepted the peace and security treaties but the left wing rejected both. Chairman Suzuki agreed to attend the com­ mittee of the Socialist International Conference and possibly to re­ study the four principles of peace. But he abstained from voting on the resolution concerning peace and military preparedness presented to that conference, returned to Japan, and reported that he saw no necessity for any reconsideration of party policy. During his absence, the right wing had tried unsuccessfully to change this position. The left wing called for a special convention and strengthened its ties with leftist labor unions. T he rival faction countered by organizing more than half of the sdp Diet delegation into an ad hoc committee headed by Kanju Kato, who had come to be affiliated with the right wing. At last, on October 5, 1951, the cec adopted by a vote of 16 to 14 a com­ promise plan for approval by the convention; it provided for accept­ ance of the peace treaty and rejection of the security treaty. T he right wing feared a convention; the left realized it would be defeated in the two highest party committees—the cec and the Centra] Committee—where these decisions were being made. T h e apparently unavoidable eighth special convention was convened on October 23, 1951. T h e special session of the Diet called to approve the treaties was already in session. After seventeen hours of confusion, the Socialist convention split in two. T he main factions continued their separate conventions in Buddhist temples, each claiming to be the “real” party, so they both used exactly the same name. In the Diet, left-wing Socialists voted against the treaties; the right Socialists voted for the peace treaty and against the security treaty.

2. Frustrations of the Revived but Chronic Opposition

SOCIALIST SCHISM

Factionally and organizationally divided, the Socialists faced the new era of national independence in April 1952 with uncertainty. Inter­ national events and domestic politics at times deepened the gulf and intensified the competition between the two main factions and then forcibly brought them closer together. T he possibility of a conserva­ tive merger and recognition that, divided, the Socialists could never achieve a parliamentary majority slowly induced rapprochement.1 In the meantime, the most pressing problem for the Socialists was separately to regroup their forces to meet any conservative challenge. Hurriedly both Socialist parties held their conventions in January 1952, only three months after the split. Given a prominent role by the leftists in the reconstruction of their organization, Sohyo reciprocated significantly with financial subsidies and personnel. In contrast, the Right s d p received only weak support from its labor allies. T he Left Socialists at first tempered their policies, calling for a revision of the peace treaty and abrogation of the security pact; but supporting un­ ions obliged these leaders to adopt a stronger stand against the two i. Hereafter, when reference is made to either of the two Socialist parties in the con­ text of the 1951-55 schism, R ight and Left will be capitalized; when referring only to factional affiliation, they will be lower case.

3»

POSTWAR PARTY HISTORY

treaties and to champion the four principles of peace. T h e Right So­ cialists accused their rivals of being pro-Communist because their criticism of the jcp and the Cominform lacked thoroughness and con­ viction. They rejected any possibility of reunification while such basic differences persisted and instead pressed for the organization of all “democratic socialist” as distinct from “social democratic” forces. Japan, they asserted, had to rely on collective security and could not subscribe to the leftist notion of no defenses and no resistance. They did not believe, however, that Japan had wholly regained its inde­ pendence, so they advocated a revision of the peace and especially the security treaties to rectify this inadequacy. T he finality of the Social­ ist cleavage was sealed by the election of separate slates of officers. The Left sdp elected Mosaburo Suzuki as Chairman, Masaru Nomizo as Secretary-General, Hiroo Wada as chairman of the Policy Planning Board, and Hyo Hara as Treasurer. T he Right sdp left its chairman­ ship temporarily vacant and elected Inejiro Asanuma and Kyohei Shimojo as Secretary-General and Treasurer, respectively. Reverse Course The divided Socialists fought their first important legislative battle against the conservative government’s Subversive Activities Preven­ tion Bill—the first major measure proposed after the end of Occupa­ tion controls. Although the ostensible aim of the bill was to curb Communist activities, Socialists in both main factions and labor un­ ions unanimously opposed it. They were motivated not by compas­ sion for Communists but by a deep-seated distrust of a revived politi­ cal police. The left wing in Japan is not likely to forget its experiences under the notorious Peace Preservation Law, the interpretation of which had been extended to include all opposition groups. T he So­ cialists labeled the new bill a postwar edition of the former hated law, merely clothed in democratic terminology. Despite their serious nu­ merical handicap m the Diet (q^Otrt of 466 in the House of Repre­ sentatives), the Socialists carried out a vigorous and partially success­ ful campaign to embarrass the government and to force revisions of the bill. A ll left-wing elements opposed the measure, but there was considerable difference in the degree of their intensity. Possibly be­ cause more left than right Socialists had suffered under the prewar thought police, and also because the campaign against the bill served as a convenient rallying point for lukewarm Socialists, the Left sdp

CHRONOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF JAPAN NOVEMBER

1945

I

KATAYAMA CABINET

JUNE 1957

I Expulsion Expulsi o f R IKIZO HIRANO

ASHIDA CABINET

n

JANUARY 1948

MARCH 1948

Expulsion o f SUEHIRO NISH 10

r

JULY 1948

Expulsion o f HISAO K U RODA

(

JULY 1948

W O R K E R - FARMER PARTY

HIRANO FACTION

DECEMBER 1958

RECONSTRUCTION CONVENTION APRIL 1949

FIFTH

I

CONVENTION

JANUARY 1950

LEFTWING FACTION

» CENTRIS1" FACTION

RIGHTWING FACTION

1 APRIL 1950

EIGHTH SPECIAL CONVENTION OCTOBER 1951

X

LEFT SDP

RIGHT SDP •NISHIO-*— readmitted AUGUST 1952

i- .«o vt k,° kQ ^

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£ 444; postwar, 148-49; state controlled, 320; 7949-50 policies, 391-92,

economic aid, 156; export boom, 162;

444; and agricultural income, 391-92

economic growth, 188-90

Infure Shori Keizai Kiki T o p p a Taisaku Yoko (An Outline of an Emergency Economic Policy for Dealing with Infla­ tion), 149 n.

trade with U.S., 165-66, 167-68, 171; Japan Broadcasting Workers, 338 n. Japan-China Friendship Association, 227,

356 Japan Communist Party, 43; founding, 6;

Inoki, Masamichi, 299

postwar revival, 10; relations with

Inomata, Kozo, 140, 288 n.

10-11, 15, 60, n o -16 ; and ciu, 13; and

Inomata, Tsunao, 281

general strike, 14, 113; in election of

sd p,

Inoue, Ryoji, 299

7947, 16; in election of 7949, 25, 31; in

Institute on the [Segregated] Community

Inamura-Morito controversy, 28; “ Red

Problem, 142

purge,” 31-32, 114-15, 156, 291, 330-36,

Intellectuals, 422, 424, 451, 458; prejudice of peasants against, 370

345, 349-50; in Socialist schism, 38; 7972 election, 41; 7977 election, 44; support

International Confederation of Free Trade Unions ( i c f t u ) , 32, 52, 210 n., 332, 334;

for Shigemitsu, 45; 1958 election, 65; police revision bill, 67; security treaty,

and Nishio faction, 296; and left-right

69, 219, 221, 348; 7959 election, 70; in

tendencies, 335; criticism of, 337; Zenr5

unions, 72, 78, 265, 267, 316, 323, 328,

and Domei Kaigi, 339, 348; union

333, 355; structural reform, 91-92, 102;

orientation toward, 343; vs.

sd p

w ftu

, 344

International Labor Organization Conven­ tion No. 87, 362

tactics toward, 110-20; popular front,

111-13; Left and R ight s d p positions during schism, 115-17; and Constitution,

International Trade and Industry, Ministry of ( m i t i ) , 443

War, 201; on nuclear testing, 212-13;

Investment Planning Committee, 177-78

means of attaining socialism, 218;

Iron and steel industry, socialization of,

membership, 246 n.; infiltration of

180, 196

Ishibashi, MasatsUgu, 284 n.

131 n.; and civil rights, 141; and Korean

Sohyo, 317-18; attempt at “people’s government" (7947-4S), 321; influence in

INDEX

472 Japan Communist Party (cont.) Sambetsu, 324, 326; and power through parliamentary system, 324; and joint struggle committees, 325; in wage dis­

Japan Socialist Review, The, 263 Japan Socialist Youth Alliance (Nihon Shakaishugi Seinen Domei), 435 Japan Sociological Association, 367

putes, 328; shift to moderate line, 340,

Japan-Soviet Friendship Association, 356

342, 376, 390, 397, 398; blocked by

Japan Student Peace Conference, 433

reunification of

Japan Teachers’ Union. See Teachers’

sd p,

341; democratic

government as transitional stage to revolution, 342 n.; and National Council

Union, Japan

against the Security Treaty, 348; and

Japan Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation, 181

tenants, 371; and farmer-leader factions,

Japanese American Committee on Security,

376, 385; and agriculture, 376, 383, 385;

217

policies of 7950-55, 397; and students,

Japanese National Railways, 181

431, 433; and New M en’s Society, 434;

Japanese Trade Union Congress. See Zenro

and Zengakuren, 434; future of, 451 Japan Confederation of Labor. See Domei Kaigi

Kaigi J c p . See Japan Communist Party

Jiji News Agency, 438 n.

Japan Council Against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs (Gensuikyo), 115, 119,

Jimmu boom, 147, 162, 188 Jishu Kempo Kisei Domei (League for an Independent Constitution), 136. See also

212-13 Japan Council of National and Local

National Federation for Preservation of

Government Worker’s Unions (Nihon

the Constitution

Kankocho Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai, or

Johnston Report, 154

Kankoro), 172, 426, 429; Local, 411

Joint Diet Struggle Committee, of Sohyo

Japan Democratic Education Political League, 352 n.

and

sd p,

333, 353-54

Joint Diet Struggles Council, 344

Japan D em ocratic Party (N ihon M inshuto) of 7954 (not earlier D em ocratic Party), 49-50. See also Conservatives; Progressive P arty of 7952 Japan Express W orkers’ U nion, 305 Japan Farm ers’ P arty (N ihon Nom into) of 7926, 6

Joint Struggle for Wages. See Chingin

Japan-Labor Clique (Nichirokei), 7, 8,

Kagawa, Toyohiko, 291, 295

274~75> 276 n., 280, 287, 291, 299, 300, 371. See also Japan Labor-Farmer Party; Kawakami faction

Kyoto Joto Nomin Kumiai (Joto Farmers’ Union), 373. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan; Farmers’ Unions Kagata, Susumu, 284 n. Kaji, Wataru, 140 Kakushin Domei (Progressive Alliance), 282

Japan Labor-Farmer Party (Nihon

Kambayashi, Yoichiro, 286 n., 287

R 5 noto) of 7926, 6. See also Japan-

Kameda, Tokuji, 286 n.

Labor Clique

Kamiyama, Shigeo, 111 n.

Japan Labor Union Congress. See Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi

Kanda, Daisaku, 293 n., 298 n. Kankoro (Nihon Kankocho Rodo Kumiai

Japan Monopoly Corporation, 181

Kyogikai, or Japan Council of Govern­

Japan Productivity Center, 344

ment Workers Unions), 172, 426, 429

Japan Proletarian Party (Nihon Musanto), Japan Socialist Newspaper (Nihon Shakai Japan Socialist Party. See Social Demo­ (Nihon Shakaito)

Katayama, Mrs., 439 Katayama, Sen, 281

Shimbun), 262-63 cratic Party of Japan ( s d p or

Kasuga, Ikk 5 , 294 n., 298 n., 443 Katashima, Minato, 284 n.

7

sd pj)

Katayama, Tetsu, 4, 69, 123 n., 124, 301 n., 3 2 7 - 3 5 5 ; PartY sPl;t in * 93 i> 7 ; and Socio-Democrats, 7; Secretary-General of

IN D E X

473 Kawakami faction (cont.)

Katayama, Tetsu (cont.) postwar

sd p,

9 ; 1947 coalition cabinet,

support, 81; anti-security treaty cam­

1 6 - 2 2 ; refusal of second premiership, 2 2 ;

paign, 219, 220; forming of

defeat in 1949, 2 5 ; at fourth and fifth

farmers, 274-75; alliance with Nishio

d sp,

273; and

conventions, 2 9 ; and Constitution, 1 3 5 ,

faction, 276; "mainstream,” 74, 276, 307;

3 0 1 ; and Peking-Moscow-Warsaw Mis­

origins of, 276 n.; representation in Diet,

sion, 2 2 6 , 2 3 0 ; Chairman of

277, 278; tactics, 290; and Labor, 290-91,

sd p,

2 5 3 ; and

Nishio faction, 2 9 8 n. See also Katayama cabinet Katayama “ anti-mainstream” faction, 278 Katayama cabinet, 16-22, 149-53; economic

295; and Japan-Labor clique, 2gi; and R ed Purge, 291; strength, 293-94; compromise formula of 1977, 348. See also Kawakami, Jotaro Kawakami, Tam io, 89 n., 292 n.

problems, 17, 21-22, 149-53, i55- 383“ 84; achievements, 18; internal dissension,

Kawamata, Seion, 294 n„ 374

18-19; labor and, 19-20, 153; resignation,

Kawashima, Kinji, 300 n.

20, 153; analysis of, 21-22, 122; and Peace Treaty, 33; priority production

Keizai Jissd Hokokusho (Report on

system, 150; nationalization of coal

Kempo Chosakai (Constitutional Research

industry, 150-52; price and wage freeze, 152-53; inflation, 152-53; agrarian leaders and, 385; students and, 432; women voters and, 438; socialists in, 460.

Economic Conditions), 149 n. Committee), 138 Kempo Yogo Kokumin Rengo. See N a­ tional Federation for Preservation of the Constitution Kensetsusha Domei (Founders’ Federa­

See also Katayama, Tetsu Kato, Kanju, 36, 326, 329, 383; and Japan Proletarian Party, 7; anti-Communist

tion), 292, 434 Khrushchev, Nikita, 226-27, 342 n., 345

declaration of 1947, 16, 113; in Ashida

Kihara, Tsuyoshi, 288 n.

Cabinet, 23, 24; defeat in 1949, 25; on

Kikuchi, Yonosuke, 293 n., 374

Control Commission, 256; and Kawa-

Kikukawa, Mrs. Kimiko, 294 n., 298 n.

kami faction, 294 n.; and centrists,

Kikukawa, Tadao, 332

300 n., 301 n.

Kimura, Kihachiro, 290 n.

Kato, Nobuyuki, 271 n.

Kinoshita, Gengo, 288 n.

Kato, Ryozo, 298 n.

Kinoshita, Iku, 413

Katsumata, Seiichi, 231 n., 463; in

Kinoshita, Tetsu, 294 n., 298 n., 413

Inamura-Morito controversy, 27, 28,

Kishi, Nobusuke, 126, 171, 232, 355; first

87 n., 88; on small constituency bill, 58;

cabinet, 61-63, and unions, 62, economic

1978 Convention, 60; on annuities, 185;

policies, 63; 1978 election, 63; second

reunification of

sd p,

89 n.; on military

cabinet, 66; police revision bill, 67, 139,

power, 202; and Narita, 280; and Wada

346; revised security treaty, 75, 217 n.,

faction, 282; early career, 284-85

220, 345; resignation, 76, 78, 221; knifed,

Katsuzawa, Yoshio, 284 n.

79; and military pensions, 187; on

Kautsky, Karl, influence on New M en’s

nuclear weapons, 212; on conventional forces, 214; debate with

Society, 434 Kawakami, Jotaro, 41, 48; on Constitu­ tional revision, 57; 1959

sd p

split, 74-75,

292, 300; stabbed, 79; Sohyo support, 81; Chairman of

sd p,

sd p

Chairman

Suzuki, 233. See also Kishi government

Kawaii, Eijiro, 295

253-54; influence on

Kishi-Eisenhower talks, 217 Kishi government, 231, 347. See also Kishi, Nobusuke Kitayama, Airo, 284 n., 288 n.

s d p , 255; career, 291-93; and Asanuma, 292, 293, 301; as compromise candidate,

Kobayashi, Susumu, 294 n.

350. See also Kawakami faction

Kokkai Nippo (Diet Daily), 260

Kawakami, Sueko, 292 n. Kawakami faction, 291-95, 453; Sohyo

Kodaira, Tadashi, 231 n., 298 n. Kokuro. See National Railway Workers’ Union

INDEX

474 Kokutetsu. See National Railway Workers’ Union

Labor-Farmer faction (cont.) Suzuki, 278, 281; and Eda-Narita group,

Komaki, Tsuguo, 294 n„ 298 n.

279; inspires Shimizu platform, 318 n.;

Komatsu, Kan, 284 n.

pre-7940 national union movement, 323;

Komatsu, Shintaro, 294 n., 298 n.

in Diet, 1947, 326; withdrawal from

Komeito (Clean Government Party), 460

coalition, 329; extremists, 347; militant

Kono, Mitsu, 53, 86 n., 89 n., 228 n.; and

leftism, 350; leftist, and tenants, 371;

Hungarian revolt debate, 225, 226; and Tom im i Narita, 280; purged, 291 n.; and Kawakami faction, 293 n., 294 n.; and

sdp

split, 300

prewar, in Socialist Society, 425 Labor Farmer Party (Rodo Nominto) of 1926, 6 Labor federations: right-wing gains in

Kono faction, 224

early ’fifties, 319;

Konoe cabinets, 283 n.

unification of, 342; cooperation of, 346;

Korean War, 32-33, 43; and Sohyo, 33, 333;

representation on Diet struggle commit­

and Japanese economy, 155, 157, 158, jcp

, 2 0 1 ; after-

math, 2 0 1 ; and “security risks,” 3 3 1

Labor laws, retrogressive revision of, 335 Labor Liaison Committee, 353

Koryo, Kenkyukai (Platform Study Group), 28 8

Labor Relations Adjustment Law, 14, 360, 3 6* Labor Relations Commission, National,

Koyama, Ryoji, 341 n. Kozaha (Monographs faction), 278

35° Labor Relations Law, Public Corporation,

Kubota, Yutaka, 290 n., 400

361

Kuribayashi, Saburo, 286 n. Kurihara, Toshio, 286 n.

Labor Standards Act, 327, 360, 361, 440

Kuroda, Hisao, 289-90; opposition to

Labor Standards Offices, 362

Ashida cabinet, 23; and Worker Farmer Party, 53, 114, 400; expulsion from

tees, 354; distribution of right and left,

365

3 3 4 , 3 6 1 , 3 9 2 , 4 4 4 ; Socialist attitude

toward, 2 0 0 - 0 2 , 3 3 5 ; and

infiltration, 333;

jcp

sd p,

53, 114, 257, 384; and Japan Farmers’

Labor Union Federation. See Sodomei Labor Union Law, revision of, 360 Labor unions: and schools of socialism, 5;

Union, 287, 289; and Mosaburo Suzuki, 289; and Ikuo Oyama, 289-90; and

postwar rise, 10, 13; uses of power, 14;

Labor-Farmer faction, 374; and farmers’

cabinet, 23-24; influence on

sd p

unity,

unions, 376, 379; and Unity Discussion

30; and Dodge line, 31; and

jcp

, 31-32,

Group, 385

72; and peace treaty issue, 34; during

Kuroda faction, 24, 276, 289-90, 319; and farmers’ unions, 274-75; support for, 289; and

jcp

and Socialists in 1947, 19-20; and Ashida

, 290

Kyodoto (Cooperative Party) of July 7952, 275. See Hirano faction Kyukoku Minshu Sensen Remmei. See Democratic League for National Salvation

sd p

schism, 37-38, 44; importance to

challenges to

ld p,

6 6 ; police revision

bill, 67; “second unions,” 72, 297, 316 n., 338 n., 349, 350; and

d sp,

77; and

jcp

, 78;

Miike strike, 78; general strike, 14, 113; and Katayama cabinet, 153; rate of growth, igo; in

sd p

contributions to Labor; and Ashida cabinet, 23-24, 326-27;

sd p,

61; conservative attacks on, 61-62;

organization, 267;

sd p,

271; and Wada

faction, 284; demand for social justice,

united front, 323, 328, 337; economic

313; lineages of, 313, 314-15; politicism

concessions to, 325; crises, 344-51; rela­

of, 313-22; principles of union-party

tions with management, 363; shortage of

relations, 313, 316; and

skilled, 363; loss of influence in national

leaders, 316, 317, 321-22, 334, 343, 356,

community, 458 Labor-Farmer faction or Labor-Farmerites

sd p,

313-69;

360; centralized industrial, 316, 366 n .; local councils and

sd p,

316 n ., 317;

(Ronoha), 27, 93, 99, 103, 111, 220, 334,

united front, 316, 343; tensions with

341, 344, 348, 374; and Mosaburo

sd p,

317-22; membership, 323-24, 332 n .;

INDEX

475

Leveling Movement (Suihei Undo), 141-

Labor unions (cont.) organization, 324, 361; joint struggle

42, 288. See also Matsumoto, Jiichiro

committees, 325, 331, 335, 354; offensives, 325, 336; power distribution, 328; union-

Liaison Council for a Democratic Labor

busting movement, 331; principle of

Liaison Council for the Protection of

autonomy, 334; conservatives and Sohyo

Democracy, 216 Liberal-Democratic Party (Jigu Minshuto

left, 338; backing of

sd p

candidates, 352,

Movement. See Minroren

422; campaign activities, 353; joint

or Jiminto): founding, 55; majority

committees with

party, 56; on revision of Constitution,

sd p,

353; electioneering

in, 353 n.; and Domei Kaigi, 356; elec­

57; small constituency principle, 57-58;

toral support, 357; joint action with

school board bill, 57, 58-59; attacks on

farmers, 400; as background for candi­

Teachers’ Union, 58, 62, 66; 1956 elec­

dates, 411; importance in mobilizing

tion, 59; Kishi cabinet, 61-63; legislation,

farmers’ Socialist votes, 413-14; and

62-63; increasing opposition to

bureaucrats, 426; joint action with small

65-69; police revision bill, 66-67;

business, 443; changes confronting, 457;

security treaty, 69, 217, 220; restrictive

as source of leaders, 457. See also Con­

measures, 77; i960 election, 80; and

gress of Industrial Unions; Kankoro;

Constitution, 132 n., 136, 138; and

Kokutetsu Sodomei; Sohyo; Teachers’

Political Violence Prevention Bills, 139;

Union; Zenro Kaigi

and Anti-Prostitution Bill, 140; and segregation, 143; and social security, 185;

Labor University, 262, 356

ten-year economic plan, 190, 192; and

Land, socialization of, 389 Land reform: 371, 386, 392, 398; and

sd p,

scap,

doubling national income, 190-91,

375; criticism of by farmers’ union, 377;

194 n., 403; and growth of medium-sized

revised, 379; and socialist government,

enterprises, 191; on

381-87; struggle to enforce, 382; third,

235; national organization, 264; success

sd p

China policy,

in villages, 416; supported by white-

384, 389, 406, 407 Land requisitioning for military bases, 394

collar workers, 429; factionalism in, 454;

Landlords, bonus payment to, 380; revival

machine, 457, 460; and Minimum Wage

of organizations, 394 Law to Assist Small and Medium Businessmen, 61 Law Concerning Maintenance of Order in Mass Demonstrations, 360

Law, 362. See also Conservatives; Japan Democratic Party; Liberal Party Liberal Party: and first postwar cabinets, 13, 111; and Katayama cabinet, 16-17, 20 ; le ft - w in g sd p o p p o s it io n to , 22;

L d p . See Liberal-Democratic Party

e l e c t i o n o f 1952, 4 1 ; “ r e v e r s e c o u r s e , ”

Leadership factions, 274-75. See also

41; cooperation with socialists, 43; elec­

Factions; Social Democratic Party of

tion of 1995, 44; and Strike Control Bill,

Japan

45; 7957 scandals, 48; 7955 election, 50;

League for Democratic Socialism (Minshu Shakaishugi Remmei), 54, 425 League for the Establishment of Inde­ pendence, 385 League for an Independent Constitution. See Jishu Kempo Kisei Domei League for Promotion of Trade with China, 68 League for Revivifying the Japan Farmers’ Union. See Nichino Sasshin Domei Left

sd p

or Left Socialists (Saha Shakaito).

See Social Democratic Party of Japan

and Constitution, 131, 132. See also Conservatives; Democratic Party; Japan Democratic Party; Liberal Democratic Party Lineages: of main Socialist leadership factions, 274-75; °£ Japanese labor federations, 574-75; of Japanese farmers’ unions, 572-75 Local Government Workers’ Union, candidates from, 411 Long-Term Political and Economic Plan, > 9 4 -9 7 .4 4 6

“ Let the Executive Establish the Inde­ pendence of the Party,” 72

M acA rthur, Douglas,

325, 330;

and general

INDEX

476 Minabe, Yoshizo, 127, 284 n.

MacArthur, Douglas (cont.) strike, 1 4 - 1 5 ; and economic controls, 1 7 ,

Mindo (Democratization Leagues or

1 5 6 ; on Katayama Cabinet, 2 0 ; on j c p ,

Minshuka Domei), 326, 328, 332-33 n.;

31; on rearmament, 34; and police force,

Left, 319; acceleration of movement,

132; and Security Treaty, 217; attacked,

331; disagreements in unions, 335; anti­

221; and Public Service Law, 329. See also s c a p

communist emphasis, 336; regenerated leadership, 338; pressed to left, 347, 349

Maeda, Tamon, 263

Minimum Wage Law, 362

Malenkov, Georgi, 43

Ministry of International Trade and Industry ( m i t i ) , 443

Manhood Suffrage Law, 6 Mao Tse-tung, 68, 208, 229, 230, 232 Marxism, 5, 85, 87, 321; in

sd p

reunifica­

tion, 341; shedding of, 454

Minroken (Democratic Labor Movement Study Group), 337, 338 Minroren (Minshushugi Rodo Undo

Masaki, Kiyoshi, 301 n.

Renraku Kyogikai, or Liaison Council

Masutani, Hidetsugu, 58

for a Democratic Labor Movement), 5/5,

Matsudaira, Tadahisa, 228 n., 294 n. Matsui, Masakichi, 294 n. Matsumae, Shigeyoshi, 294 n. Matsumoto, Jiichiro, 281 n., 350; and Leveling Movement, 142, 288; influence on

sd p,

255; and discrimination, 287-88

Matsumoto, Shichiro, 284 n., 288 n. Matsumoto faction (Heiwa Doshikai or Peace Comrades), 73, 90, 225, 276, 287-89, 319; and

sd p

reunification, 53, 289; and

farmers’ unions, 274-75; candidate for Diet, 278; interchange of adherents, 284; and Takano faction of Sohyo, 288, 289; and “ peace force,” 288-89. See also Heiwa Doshikai; Matsumoto, Jiichiro Matsumura, Seiichi, 228 n., 298 n. Matsunaga, Yoshio, 374

338- 34i Minsha Shimbun (Democratic Socialist Newspaper), 263 Minsharen (Minshu Shakaishugi Remmei, or Democratic Socialist League), 54, 425 Minshato. See Democratic Socialist Party Minshu Jimmin Remmei (Democratic People’s League), 11, 111, 112 Minshu Rodo Undo Kenkyukai (Demo­ cratic Labor Movement Study Group),

337-38 Minshu Shakaishugi (Democratic Social­ ism), 425 Minshu Shakaishugi Remmei. See Minsharen Minshu Shakaito. See Democratic Socialist Party

Matsuo, Mrs. Toshiko, 298 n.

Minshuka Domei. See Mindo

Matsuoka, Komakichi, 3, 4, 123 n„ 297, 332

Minshushugi Rodo Undo Renraku

Matsuzawa, Kanendo, 89 n.

Kyogikai. See Minroren

Matsuzawa, Kenjin, 294 n., 300, 301 n.

Mitsuhashi, Hachijiro, 286 n.

M ay Day riots (19;2), 336, 398, 433

Mitsuhashi, Masao, 140

M ay Society (Satsuki-kai), 19-20, 23, 123 n.

Miwa, Juso, 58, 291 n., 290, 294 n., 300 n.

M eiji system, 4-6, 85, 104 n., 183, 461

Miwa, T eiji, 286 n.

Middle class or strata: candidates from,

Miyake, Shoichi, 291 n., 293 n., 294 n., 300,

411-12; support for Socialists, 418-47;

374

percentage of population, 418; stabiliz­

Miyamoto, Kenji, 342 n.

ing role of voters, 419; white-collar

Mizutani, Chozaburo, 3-4, 89 n., 298 n.,

workers as "new,” 427; rural voting

443 n.; in Katayama cabinet, 17; and

preferences, 421; support from organiza­

jcp

tions, 422; defined, 446; advances of, 460

industry, 151; on nonaggression treaties,

Miike coal miners’ strike, 78, 90, 96, 220, 306, 3 4 9 - 5 ° M ilitary bases, U.S. See Security Treaty, J apanese-American

, 110; and nationalization of coal

222; and centrists, 300 n. Moji, Ryo, 294 n., 298 n. Molotov, Vyacheslav, 222 Monographs faction (Kozaha), 278

INDEX

477

Mori, Mikiji, 301 n.

National Federation for Preservation of

Morito, Tatsuo, 11, 27-28, 87, 112

the Constitution or National League for

Motoi, Masashichi, 298 n.

Protection of the Peace Constitution

Motojima, Mrs. Yuriko, 294 n., 298 n. Mukai, Nagatoshi, 298 n.

(Kempo Yogo Kokumin Rengo or Goken Rengo), tig, 124, 135-37, 2 3 °. 3 4 L 3 5 5 National Federation of T extile Industry

Muto, Takeo, 298 n., 336 Mutual Security Aid, 159-60, 161, 355. See also Security Treaty, Japanese-American

Workers’ Unions (Zensen Domei), 332 n., 338 n. National General Mobilization Act of

Nabeyama, Sadachika, 2g Nagai, Junichiro, 300 n.

1938, 291 National Labor-Farmer Congress, 400

Nagai, Katsujiro, 284 n.

National Labor-Farmer Masses’ Party (Zenkoku Rono Taishuto), 7

Nagasue, Eiichi, 298 n. Nagy government (Hungary), 225

National Labor Relations Commission, 78,

Nakada, Yoshio, 228 n.

35° National Labor Union Congress, Prepara­

Nakahara, Kenji, 290 n.

tory Committee for (Zenkoku Rodo

Nakai, Eitaro, 294 n. Nakai, Tokujiro, 294 n.

Kumiai Kaigi Jumbikai, or Zenrokaigi)

Nakamura, Hideo, 294 n.

of 1949, 29 National Labor Union Formation Prepara­

Nakamura, Masao, 298 n. Nakamura, Takaichi, 291 n., 293 n., 294 n., Nakamura, Tokio, 294 n., 298 n. Nakazaki, Satoshi or Toshi (Bin), 294 n.,

National Labor Union Liaison Council (Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Renraku Kyogikai or Zenroren), 314, 326

298 n. Narita, Tomomi: structural reform, 81, 100, 216; leader of Suzuki faction, 280; Secretary-General of

tory Committee (Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Kessei Jumbikai), 314

374

sd p,

351. See also

Eda-Narita group National Conference for Furthering Peace, 34

National Conference for the Restoration of Relations with Communist China, or People’s Council for Restoration of Relations with R ed China and Russia, or National Council for Resumption of Diplomatic Relations with Soviet Russia and Communist China, 222 National Congress of Industrial Unions. See Sambetsu National Council of Government and Public Workers’ Unions. See Zenkanko National Council against the Security Treaty. See People’s Council for Block­ ing the Security Treaty National Cultural Congress, 356 National Economic Research Institute, 425 National Farmers’ Federation (Zenkoku

National Leveling Society. See Zenkoku Suiheisha National Liaison Council of Independent Unions (Churitsu Roren), 78 National Liaison Council for Socialist Party Members in Sohyo, 316 National Movement Liaison Board for Solution of the Okinawa Problem ( s d p ), 355

National Movie and Theater Workers’ Union, 338 n.

National Police Reserve Force, 132, 133 National Public Opinion Research Insti­ tute, 419 . 43L 435 National Public Safety Investigation Agency, 246 n. National Public Service Law, 24, 327, 330, 361 National Railway Workers’ Union (Kokutetsu Rodo Kumiai, abbreviated as Kokutetsu or Kokuro), 279, 305, 324, 334, 352 n., 368 n.; democratization leagues,

Nomin Domei), 373. See also Farmers’

28; and s d p reunification, 30, 50-51; support of left-wing s d p , 34; 1957 labor

Union, Japan

offensive, 62; dispute over personnel

INDEX

47 8 National Railway Workers’ Union (cont.) dismissed, 344; candidates from, 41 x

Nihon Kyoshoduin Kumiai. See Teachers’ Union

National Safety Force, 132

Nihon Musantd (Japan Proletarian Party),

Nationalism, labor, growth of, 368 Nationalization: by Katayama government,

Nihon Nomin Kumiai (Japan Farmers’

150-51; of key industries, 179-80; and socialization, 180; of forests, 404; and

7

Union). See Farmers’ Union Nihon Nomin Kumiai Kessei Kondankai

dislike of socialism, 440; of enterprises,

(Discussion Committee for the Forma­

460; gradual, 462. See also Socialization

tion of the Japan Farmers’ Union), 772.

Neutralism: in foreign relations, 33-35, 46-47, 54, 200-05, 340-41, 455; political, 337; and small businessmen, 441. See also Security Treaty New Life Movements, 389 New Line of the SDP, 1961 (Shakaito no Shin Rosen), 261 n. New M en’s Society (Shinjinkai), 434 New Village Construction Group of the Japan Farmers’ Union (Nichino Shin

See also Farmers’ Union, Japan Nihon Nomin Kumiai Sodomei (General Federation of Japanese Farmers’ Unions), 777, 394. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan; Farmers’ Unions Nihon Nomin Kumiai Zenkoku Rengokai (Nichino Zenkokuren, or National Federation of the Japan Farmers’ Union), 777. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan; Farmers’ Unions

Noson Kensetsuha), 777, 391, 394, 397,

Nihon Nominto (Japan Farmers’ Party), 6

399

Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (Nichiro Kaigi

Newspaper Public Opinion Research Federation (Shimbun Yoron Chosa Remmei), 432, 437 n. Newspaper Union, 353 n.

N h k (Broadcasting Corporation of Japan), 181 Nichino. See Farmers’ Union, Japan Nichino Kessei Zenkoku Kakudai Jumbi Iinkai (National Enlarged Preparatory Committee for the Formation of the

or Japan Labor Union Congress) of 1946, 314, 323, 333 n. Nihon Ronoto. See Japan-Labor clique; Japan Labor-Farmer Party Nihon Shakai Shimbun (Japan Socialist Newspaper), 262-63 Nihon Shakaishugi Seinen Domei (Japan Socialist Youth Alliance), 435 Nihon Shakaito. See Social Democratic Party of Japan (s d p j or

sdp)

Japan Farmers’ Union), 772. See also

Nikkyoso. See Teachers’ Union, Japan

Farmers’ Union, Japan

Nishimura, Eiichi, 89 n., 298 n., 299

Nichino Sasshin Domei (League for R eviv­ ifying the Japan Farmers’ Union), 382. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan Nichino Shin Noson Kensetsuha. See New

Nishimura, Rikiya, 288 n. Nishio, Suehiro, 3, 4, 9, 48, 122, 123 n., 225; and Katayama, 19, 297; in Ashida cabi­ net, 24, 25, 297; and reunification of

sd p,

Village Construction Group of the Japan

53; reunification program revision, 90,

Farmers’ Union

96; and jcp, 60, 111 n., 118; and i960

Nichino Shutaiseiha (Independence Fac­ tion of the Japan Farmers’ Union), 772. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan Nichino Toitsuha (Unity Faction of the

sd p

schism, 72-73; 1959 attacks on, 73-74,

118, 257-58, 297, 349; new party, 74-75, 296-97; on bourgeoisie, 106; and America, 134; and Constitution, 135; and

Japan Farmers’ Union), 772. See also

Showa Denk 5 scandal, 154, 256-57; and

Farmers’ Union, Japan

Hungarian revolt debate, 226; and

Nichiren Buddhists. See Soka Gakkai.

Nationalist China, 230, 296; influence on

Nichiro Kaigi (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi,

sd p,

or Japan Labor Union Congress), 314, 3 2 3 n-» 3 3 3 nNichirokei. See Japan-Labor clique

255, on

d sp

organization, 268 n.;

and Wada, 283, 307; and Zenro, 297; career, 297-99; and Sone, 297-98; posi­ tion of, 348. See also Nishio faction

IN D E X

479

Nishio faction, 295-99, 3471 anti-security treaty campaign, 220; on China, 235, 296; s e c e s s io n f r o m

sd p,

273; a n d f a r m e r s ,

Okinawa issue, 59, 60, 117, 215-16 Onishi, Masamichi, 294 n. Onishi, Toshio, 381

277-75; p r o m i n e n c e o f , 276; o r i g i n s o f ,

Ono, Koichi, 294 n., 298 n.

276 n . ; c a n d i d a t e s o f

Onuki, Daihachi, 294 n„ 298 n. Opinion polls, 366, 367,419, 431, 435; and

d sp,

278; t a c t i c s ,

290, 295; and labor, 295; police power bills, 296; anticommunism of, 296; prob­

farm votes, 410; and voting preferences,

lems, 299; electoral strength, 298-99;

419; and voting of professional classes,

i960 schism, 355, 357, 401; and Diet

424; of white-collar workers, 428; and

strategy, 453. See also Nishio, Suehiro Nohara, Kaku, 284 n.

university students, 430, 432; and women, 436-38; and small business,

Nomin Doshikai. See Nomizo faction

441. See also National Public Opinion

Nomin Kumiai Soshiki Sewaninkai

Research Institute

(Farmers’ Union Organization Sponsor­ Nomin Rodoto (Farmer Labor Party), 292 Nomin Sensen Toitsu Sokushin Zenkoku Daihyosha Kaigi (Zendai Kaigi, or National Representatives Congress to Promote a Farmers’ United Front), 777. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan; Farmers’ Unions Nomizo, Masaru (Katsu), 257, 374, 376, 379; Inaugural Declaration, 4; in Ashida Cabinet, 23, 287; defeat in 1949, 25; and Left

sd p,

Organization Bureau ( s d p ) , 248, 269; Farmers’ Section (Right

ing Committee), 572

38, 287; revision of reunifica­

tion program, go; career, 286-87; and Japan Farmers’ Union, 287; and Minoro Takano, 287; expulsion of, 384. See also Nomizo faction Nomizo faction (Nomin Doshikai or

sd p),

391, 395

Organization Committee, Farmers’ Sec­ tion, 390 Orthodox Diet Members’ Group (Seitoha Giindan), 277-75. See also Kuroda faction; Social Democratic Party of _ Japan Ota, Kaoru, 101, 284; and "peace force” theory, 46; defeated by Takano, 47, 52-53, 337; Sohyo Chairman, 347; and united labor front, 348; and structural reform, 351 Ota-Iwai main-current group, 282, 308, 338, 341; leadership of Mindo, 345; and j c p , 348; leadership of Sohyo, 350, 439 Ouchi, Hyoe, 185 n., 285 n.

Outline of an Emergency Policy for

Farmers’ Comrades), 225, 276, 286-87;

Dealing with Inflation (Infure Shori

and farmers’ unions, 277-75; Diet repre­

Keizai Kiki T oppa Taisaku Yoko),

sentation, 277, 278; agricultural interests, 286; role, 287

149 n. Oya, Shoz5 , 294 n., 298 n.

Nozaka, Sanzo, 11, 117 n., 376, 398

Oyama, Ikuo, 289-90

Nuclear submarines, U.S., 355

Ozawa, Sadataka, 298 n.

Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty, 213 Nuclear testing, 212-13, 451

Pancha Shila, 202 Party-Labor Union Cooperation Confer­

Occupation Forces. See

scap

ence (s d p ) , 279

Ochiai, Eiichi, 333 n.

Party Preparatory Committee ( s d p ) , 1949,

Ogawa, Homei, 284 n. Ohara, Toru, 288 n. Ohashi, Takeo, 127

Payroll Commission, 327

Oka, Ryoichi, 293-94 n-> 301 n.

375

Peace, Japan-U.S.S.R. Declaration of, 224 n.

Oka, Saburo, 286 n. Okada, Haruo, 290 n.

Peace and Democracy (Heiwa to Minshushugi), 135

Okada, Soji, 89 n., 278 n,, 374, 381

Peace Comrades. See Heiwa Doshikai; Matsumoto faction

Okayama federation ( s d p ) , 257

480 Peace offensive. See Communist peace offensive Peace preservation force, 42, 45, 47, 116 n.,

IN D E X

Policy Planning Board (cont.) Committee; Research and Planning Bureau

318- 3 3 7 Peace Preservation Laws, 5, 38, 281

Political central schools, 261-62

Peace Treaty, Japanese-American, 33-36,

Political Study Group (Seiji Kenkyukai),

158 Peaceful Land Construction Corps (Heiwa Kokudo Kensetsu-tai), 179 Peasants: conservatism of, 370: “industrial and commercial,” 440. See also

Political Funds Control Law, 271 n. 292 Political Violence Prevention Bills, 139 Popular front, 111-13 Popular Front incident (1937), 279, 281, 289, 307

Farmer-owners; Farmers; Farmers'

Postal services, democratization of, 187

Unions; Rural areas; Villages

Postal Workers’ Union, 352 n., 411

Pensions, military, 187 n.

Press, freedom of, 140

People’s Cooperative Party (Kokumin

Private Railway Workers’ Union (Nihon

Kyodoto) of March 1947, 15, m ;

Shitetsu Rodo Kumiai Sorengokai, or

election of 1947, 15; in Katayama

Shitetsu Soren), 305. See also National

cabinet, 16-17, 19 > *n Ashida cabinet, 23, 153. See also Conservatives People’s Council for Blocking the Security Treaty, 69, 120, 139, 218, 295, 348, 434 People’s Council to Oppose the Revised Police Duties Law, 67, 218 People’s Council for Protection of Democracy, 348 People’s Council for Restoration of Relations with Red China and Russia, 222, 227, 356 People’s Finance Corporation, 181

Railway Workers Union Progressive Alliance (Kakushin Domei) in Sohyo, 282 Progressive Party (Kaishinto) of 1932: founding, 40; 1932 election, 41; coopera­ tion with Socialists, 43; end of, 45; 1933 election, 44; formation of Japan Democratic Party, 49; and Constitution, 131, 132. See also Conservatives; Liberal Democratic Party Propaganda and Education Bureau ( s d p ) , 261

People’s Relief Association, 144 n.

Public Corporation Workers’ Union, 305

“ Plan for Reform of Party Structure," 242

Public Corporations Labor Relations Law,

Planning Board (s d p ) . See Policy Planning Board Planning Board incident (1938), 282-83, 285 Planning Bureau ( s d p ) . See Policy Planning Board Platform Study Group (Koryo Kenkyukai) 288 Police Duties Bill, g6, 118, 126, 127 n„ 139, 217; general opposition to, 66-67,

361 Public Election Law, 353 n. Public Law 480, 405 Purge directive, 12 Purges,

scap,

274-75

Quarles, Donald A., 214 Railway Workers’ Union. See National Railway Workers’ Union Rearmament, 34, 205-14, 335, 368, 429;

346; and Nishio faction, 296; withdrawal

resolution opposing, 209-10; and

of, 347; violation of constitutional

360; student opinion on, 431, 432; and

scap,

rights, 360-61; demonstrations of white-

women voters, 435, 436, 437. See also

collar workers, 429, 434

Defense; Neutralism; Peace Treaty,

Police powers. See Police Duties Bill; Subversive Activities Prevention Laws Policy Planning Board ( s d p ) , 172, 185, 353; and Korean War, 200; organization and membership, 245, 248, 250, 259-60; and Nomizo faction, 286; small businessmen as members, 442. See also Diet Policy

Japanese-American Recessions, "saucer,” 344 Reconstruction Finance Bank, 150 Red Flag. See Akahata "R ed Purge,” 31-32, 114-15, 156, 291, 330-

3i Reformed Living Campaigns, rural, 389

481

IN D E X

Regenerated Democratic League (Shinsei Mindo), 338 n. See also Mindo Report on Economic Conditions (Keizai

261-63. See also Policy Planning Board Research Society on Japanese Social Structure, 428 n. sd p,

sd p

schism, 72-73; 1952 Left

sd p

program,

88; on character of party, 95, 96; on means of attaining socialism, 100; on

Jisso Hokokusho), 149 n. Research and Planning Bureau (s d p ) ,

Reunification program of

Sakisaka, Itsuro, 53, 55, 78, 90, 350; i960

54-55,

89-90, 92-93, 95, 96, 100; neutralism, 204;

structural reform, 102; on defense force, 209; and W ada faction, 285 n. Sakisaka clique, 220 Sakurai, Keio, 284 n. Salariat. See Workers, white-collar Sambetsu (Zenkoku Sangyo-betsu Kumiai

rearmament, 211-12; dependence on

Kaigi, or National Congress of Industrial

U.S., 211; U.S. economic pressures,

Unions), 13-14, 28, 112, 314-15, 323; support of s d p , 19-20, 114; democratiza­

211-12; China, 229 “ Reverse course of

l d p ,"

41-42, 62, 125, 322,

336, 43 m ., 454 Revisionism: trends, 345; Suzuki-Sasaki group and, 351; conservative, 360 Rhee, Syngman, 201, 215 Rice: price of, 392, 394; abolition of controls, and cooperatives, 406

tion (Mindo) movement, 279, 328; and jcp

, 324, 326; membership, 324, 331; and

Socialist leaders, 325; Mindo faction, 332, 333 n. See also Shin (New) Sambetsu Sampo (Industrial Patriotic Association), 322 San Francisco Peace Treaty, 33-36, 158

Rice Price Deliberation Commission, 393

Sanekawa, Kiyoyuki, 286 n.

Ridgway, General Matthew, 41

Sangyo Hokokukai (Industrial Patriotic

R ight

sd p

or R ight Socialists (Uha

Shakaito). See Social Democratic Party of Japan R inji Sekitan K 5 gyo Kanri Ho (Emer­ gency Coal Industry Control Law), 151

Association), 322 Sano, Kenji, 284 n. Sasaki, Kozo, 47, 228 n., 253; rivalry with Eda, 235; and Suzuki faction, 254, 276, 278, 280, 282

Rodo Nominto. See Labor Farmer Party

Sasaki, Ryosaku, 231 n., 294 n., 298 n.

Rodosha Doshikai (Worker Comrade

Sata, Tadataka, 89 n., 228 n., 282, 285, 306

Society), 337, 347 Rodosha Nominto. See Worker Farmer Party

Satake, Haruki, 299 Satake, Shinichi, 301 n. Sato, Eisaku, government of, 138

Romu Hokokukai (Labor Patriotic Association), 314

Sato, Kanjiro, 284 n., 301 n. Satsuki-kai. See M ay Society

Ronoha. See Labor-Farmer faction

Scalapino, Robert A., 56 n.

Ronoto. See Worker Farmer Party

scap

Royama, Masamichi, 138, 299

(Supreme Commander, Allied

Powers), 21, 123; democratization, 11,

Royama, Michio, 299

322-30, 444; socialist attitudes toward,

Rural areas: protest in, 371; change in

30; and

jcp

, 31, 112, 114, 330, 383; rulings

situation, 374; support of Socialists, 378;

against strikes, 113, 325, 333, 432; and

voters, 381-82; employment, 392; types

economic problems, 149, 150, 156, 330;

of Socialist candidates, 410-11; floating

Dodge line, 155; abolition of repressive

votes, 416; economic determinism flouted

state agencies, 323; and anti-Communist

by

union forces, 326; and strikes by civil

sd p,

417

Russia. See Union of Soviet Socialist

servants, 329, 428; union-busting

Republics Ryokufukai. See Green Breeze Society

movement, 331; bolstering conserva­

Ryukyus, 215-16

tives, 334-35; nationalist reactions to, 335; termination and Constitutional revision, 355; and rearmament, 360; land

Saha Shakaito (Left Socialists). See Social Democratic Party of Japan of 1945 Sakamoto, Taira, 288 n.

reform measure, 375; behavior of personnel, 431 n.; critized by students, 432. See also MacArthur, Douglas

482

IN D E X

School District Bill, 57-59, 127-28. See also

Shidehara, Kijuro, 13, 152

Teachers; Teachers’ Union S d p , s d p j . See Social Democratic Party

Shigakuren, founding of, 433

Shidehara cabinet, 325, 375 Shigemitsu, Mamoru, 40, 45, 222, 224

of Japan of 194; Seamen's Union, 48, 338 n„ 356 n., 368 n.

Shigemori, Toshiharu, 278 n.

Second unions, 72, 297, 316 n., 338 n., 349,

Shima, Kiyoshi, 298 n.

85° Security Treaty, Japanese-American, 34-36,

Shimagami, Zengoro, 278 n., 328

218-21, 335, 345, 347;

sd p

opposition,

Shimaguchi, Jujiro, 294 n. Shimbun Yoron Chosa Remmei (Newpaper

34-36, 41, 68, 70, 75-76, 200, 202, 218-21;

Public Opinion Research Federation),

and U.S. military bases, 42-43, 62, 211,

432, 437 n.

318 n„ 343, 355, 368, 394, 432; revised,

Shimizu, Shinzo, 47, 101

73, 75, 76, 217; student opposition,

Shimizu platform, 318

75-76, 2 1 8 ; broad opposition, 1 1 8 ; and

Shimojo, Kyohei, 38, 300

jcp

, 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 ; Sohyo opposition, 2 1 9 - 2 0 ,

348. 35°. 355; opposition strategy, 220-21; Shin Sambetsu opposition,

Shimura, Shigeharu, 284 n. Shin (New) Sambetsu (Zenkoku Sangyobetsu Rodo Kumiai Rengo, or National

339-40. See also Neutralism; Rearma­

Federation of Industrial Labor Unions),

ment

218, 333 n„ 337, 341, 342. See also

Seiji Kenkyukai (Political Study Group), 292 Seitoha Giindan (Orthodox Diet Members’ Group), 274-75. See also Kuroda faction; Social Democratic Party of Japan

Sambetsu Shin Noson Doshikai (New Village Comrades’ Society), 572 Shinsei Mindo (Regenerated Democratic League), 338 n. See also Mindo

Seki, Yoshihiko, 90, 299

Shoup, Dr. Carl S., 156

Self-Defense Force, 132, 212

Showa Denko scandal, 24, 74, 154, 256-57.

Shakai Minshuto. See Social Democratic Party of 1926; Socio-Democratic clique Shakai Shicho (Socialist Trends), 87 n. Shakai Shimpo (Socialist News Report), 101 n., 260, 262 Shakai Taimuzu (Socialist Times), 86 n., 262-63, 356 Shakai Taishuto. See Socialist Masses’ Party Shakai Tsushin (Socialist Communica­ tion), 262

See also Nishio, Suehiro Shutaiseiha (in Japan Farmers’ Union), 388, 390, 394, 396 ff. Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance, 208, 222 Small and Medium Enterprises Bureau ( m i t i ) , 443

Small and Medium Enterprises Organiza­ tion Law (/957), 444, 445 Small Business Finance Corporation, 177 Small constituency bill, 57-58, 126

Shakaishugi (Socialism), 72, 425

Small Enterprise Loan Corporation, 181

Shakaishugi Bungaku (Socialist Litera­

Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto)

ture), 262 Shakaishugi Kyokai. See Socialist Society. Shakaishugi Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo (Socialist Institute of Political Economy), 149 n - 2 7 9 Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyukai (Socialist Policy Study Group), 300 Shakaito. See Social Democratic Party of Japan. Shaminkei. See Social Democratic Party of 1927; Socio-Democratic clique Shepilov, D. T ., 224

of 1926, 6-7. See also Socio-Democratic clique Social Democratic Party of Japan of 1949 ( s d p j or s d p ) (Nihon Shakaito, sometimes

referred to as the Socialist Party or the Socialists, and from 1951-55 as R ight and Left

sd p;

see chronological chart, 39),

8-16, 25-26; founding, 3-4, 8; traditions, 4-8; factionalism in, 9; bid for power, 10-11; relations with

jcp

, 10-11, 15; in

1946 election, 12; purge directive, 12; relations with conservatives, 13; and

IN D E X

483

o f 194; (cont.) general strike, 14; grow ing support for, 15; in election of 1947, 15-16; K atayam a C abinet, 16-22, 122, 149-55, 326-27,

sd pj

381; Ashida cabinet, 22-25, 123 - 153-55, 460; 1949 election, 25; 1949 Convention,

sd pj

of 7945 (cont.) renewed, schism (1959-

), 69-82;

7959 election, 69-71; causes of schism, 71-72; issues, 72-73; 7959 convention, 73; new party, 74-75; 7960 convention,

26-29; controversy over party name, 26;

74-75, 220, 350; security treaty approval, 76; i960 election, 77, 79-81; reevalu­

Inamura-Morito controversy, 27-28, 87;

ation of tactics, 82

election of officers, 28-2g; 1950 Conven­ tion, 29-30; 7950 split and reconciliation,

principles and theory, 85-108, 214;

32; and Korean War, 32-33; and Peace

three-point program , 86-87; Inam uraM orito controversy, 87-88; 7952 L eft program , 88; 7959 R ig h t position paper, 89; reunification program , 54-55, 89-90,

Treaty, 33-36; 795/ Convention, 34,

92-

209-10; 7957 elections, 36; 1951 special

achievement of socialism, 93; on

convention, 36

neutralism, 93; means of attaining so­

30; disillusionment with U.S., 30-31; and “ Red Purge,” 32, 114; 1950 election,

1951-55 schism, 36-56, 300, 301; 7952

separate conventions, 37-38, 342; a n ti­ subversive law , 38-40, 138-39; 7952 election, 41; opposition to governm ent, 42-43; on A m erican bases, 42-43; foreign policy, 43; p artial cooperation betw een factions, 43; 7957 election, 44; election of Prem ier, 44-45; platform controversy, 45-48, 52; reaction to H atoyam a, 49;

93; structural reform, 91-92; on

cialism, 93, 96-98; on security treaty, 93, 96; on international socialist solidarity, 93-

94; character of the party, 94-96, 454;

on democracy and totalitarianism, 98-102; relations with

jcp

, 102; on

capitalism, 103-07; basic difference between left and right, 107-08 policies and positions, 109-44; on

jcp

,

10-11, 15, 110-20; "R ed Purge,” 32, 114;

7955 election, 50; three factions, 336-37;

defense of democratization, 109-10, 125;

labor, 336-40

popular front, 111-13; general strike,

7955 reunification, 316, 395-401; rapprochem ent, 50-55; pledge to reunite, 53; steps tow ard reunification, 54,

bill, 118; and conservatives, 121-31;

113; security treaty, 118; police revision Left and R ight tactical cooperation,

125-26, 163; platform, 54-55, 89-90,

123-25; anti-Yoshida agitation, 124-25;

92-93, 96, 100, 204, 211-12, 229; Asanuma

violence, 126-28; emperor, 131-33;

and, 155; labor in, 317, 340-44, 357; de­

Constitution, 131-38; rearmament, 132,

mand for, 340; Marxist leadership in,

133; and Constitutional Research

341; adjustment of R ight and Left,

Committee, 138; and civil rights, 138-44;

357; national elections and, 452

freedom of the press, 140; Hiroshima

opposition party, 452-53, 455; and

death march, 140-41; special com­

Communist China, 46, 49, 64, 68, 222,

munities, 142-43; tactics, 144; labor

227-36; second Hatoyama cabinet, 55,

policies, 358-63; agricultural policies,

56; opposition to

390, 401-07;

ld p,

56-57; on revision

of C on stitution, 57; and sm all constitu­ ency prin cip le, 57-58, 126; school board b ill, 57, 58-59, 127-28; 7956 election,

of interest, 147-48, 172; during re­

59; 7957 Convention, 59-61, 401; and

developed policies, 149 n.; nationali­

jcp

, 60; and Kishi, 61-63; anti-military

economic policies, 145-98; conflicts covery, 149-63; first systematically zation of coal industry, 150-52; Dodge

base policy, 62; 7955 election, 63-65, 408;

Line, 156, 359; shifting attitude toward

differences with

Occupation economic policies, 156-57; Economic Four-Year Plan, 157-58; Left

opposition to

ld p,

ldp,

63-64; increasing

65-69; police revision

tralism, 68-69; decline of support,

and R ight policies, 158-62; “ Five-Year Plan for Economic Reconstruction,”

217-18

158-59; ’’Economic Policy to Conquer

bill, 67, 1/18, 139; independent neu­

484 sd pj

IN D E X

of 1945 (cont.)

sd pj

the Recession,” 159; Five-Year Plan for

of 194} (cont.)

security, 211; on nuclear testing, 212-13;

the Construction of a Peace Economy,

futility of self-defense, 213-14; criticism

159-60; 15-year economic program,

of U.S., 214-21; Soviet expansionism, 215;

163-64; basic five-year plan, 163-65, 171,

on Ryukyus, 215-16; Communist peace

184-

offensive, 216; repayment of American

85, 443, 445-46; small enterprises,

165; expanding foreign trade, 165-72,

economic assistance, 217; Japan-Soviet

192-93; U.S. m ilitary purchasing, 165-66;

peace treaty attempts, 222, 224, 226;

trade with China, 167, 168-71; trade

missions to China, 226, 231-32, 234; and

with Southeast Asia, 171-72; fiscal

agriculture, 404-05

policies, 172-79; alternative budgets, 172-73; tax policies, 173-77, 195; govern­

organization, 241-72; post-reunifica­ tion plan, 241-42; democratic centralism,

ment-administered funds, 177-78;

242-43; uniform table of organization,

consequences of reduced defense costs,

244-44; identity of party, 244; mem­

178-79; critiques of

bership, 244-47; party organs, 247-63;

sd p

economic

planning, 179, 182-83, 187-88, 197-98;

national convention, 247-50; Control

nationalization of industries, 179-80;

Commission, 242, 247, 249, 250, 255-58;

socialization of industries, 180-83;

Central Committee, 247;

welfare and social security, 184-88;

249-50, 250-55; Policy Planning Board,

cec,

247, 248,

health insurance, 184-85; annuities,

245, 248, 250, 259-60; Organization

185-

Bureau, 248, 269; Finance Committee,

87; military pensions, 187; response

to economic growth, 189-93; economic

249, 250, 269; Diet Policy Committee,

growth from the top, 191-92; on urban-

250, 260; Election Policy Committee,

rural disparities, 192; trade with U.S.,

250, 260-61; Bureau Chiefs Conference,

192-93; Long-Term Political and

254-55; national headquarters, 258-59;

Economic Plan, 194-97; labor

Propaganda and Education Bureau,

participation in management, 195;

261; Research and Planning Bureau,

development of economic policies,

261-63; educational programs, 261-62;

195-96

publications, 262-63; local organizations,

foreign policies, 199-237; American

263-69; local branches, 264-66; branch

rearmament of Japan, 199; neutralism,

conferences, 266-67; federations of

200-05; anti-military bases, 200, 202, 211;

branches, 267-68; weaknesses of local

opposition to rearmament, 200, 202,

organizations, 263-64, 268; national

209-14; attitude toward Korean War,

organizers, 268-69; party finances,

200-

02; on democracy vs. totalitarianism,

269-72

201-

02; on U.N., 201, 202, 204, 205,

207-08, 210, 212; five principles of

factions, 273-309; Nishio, 220, 235, 273, 276, 290, 295-99; Kawakami, 219,

coexistence, 202, 208, 228; peace treaty,

220, 273, 276, 278, 290, 291-95, 299;

202, 205-06; security treaty, 202, 205-06,

Suzuki, 220, 225, 273, 276, 278-82;

207 n., 210, 211, 217-21; four principles

chart, 274-75; R ight

of peace, 202; “ third force” position,

stream,” 276; Wada, 276, 278, 282-86;

202-

Nomizo, 275 ff., 286-87; Matsumoto,

03, 318; Left and R ight attitudes

sd p,

276; “main­

toward neutralism, 202-04; and China,

225, 276, 278, 287-89; Kuroda, 276,

204, 226, 227-36; Taiw an 204, 227 ff.,

289-

231 n.; Suez crisis, 205; and U.S.S.R.,

34, 60, 220, 277-78; Eda-Narita, 278-79,

205, 215, 221-27; Soviet intervention in

282; left wing, 278-90; right wing,

90; in Diet, 276-78; in

cec,

29-30,

Hungary, 205, 225; administrative agree­

290-

ment with U.S., 206-07, 210, 211;

301-06; labor, 304, 305; rural support,

99; centrists, 299-301; statistics,

alternative security proposals, 207-12; nonaggression pacts, 208-09; Left and

305; shifts in rivalry, 306-og and labor, 313-69; Sambetsu, 19-20,

R ight views of threats to national

114; cooperation with unions, 313-17,

IN D E X

sd pj

485 Social Security System Investigation Board,

of 1945 (cont.)

322, 3 5 » -5 2 . 3 5 4 -5 6 . 359; w o r k e r s ’ p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n , 313; u n i o n i z e d s h o p s ,

184, 186 Socialism: means of attaining, 27-28, 93,

316, 341 n.; Sohyo, 316-20, 333;

96-98, 100, 218; and democracy, 89;

r e u n i f i c a t i o n , 316-17, 340-44, 357; a n d

structural reform of, 363; appeal to

jcp

, 318; p o l i t i c a l v e h i c l e f o r w o r k i n g

c la s s , 319; n a t i o n a l u n i o n m o v e m e n t ,

323; weak assistance to federations, 324;

farmer, 387; future of, 453; non-Communist blocs in, 454; reconciliation of policies, 455

democratic people’s front, 325; joint

Socialism (Shakaishugi), 72

struggle committees, 325, 353-54; Communist labor groups, 326; revision

Socialist Communication (Shakai

of National Public Service Law, 329-30;

Socialist Institute of Political Economy

Mindo leaders, 331; during schism, 336-40; central force, 340; Zenro Kaigi,

Tsushin), 262 (Shakaishugi Seiji Keizai Kenkyujo), 149 n„ 279

343; bipartisan group, 343; 1958-61

Socialist International of 1951, 425

crises, 344-51; class party, 346; mod­

Socialist International Committee, 36,

eration since i960, 350; mining decision,

210 n.

350; radical elements, 351; party-union

Socialist Lawyers’ Association, 425

relations, left and right, 351-58; labor

Socialist Literature (Shakaishugi Bungaku),

policies, 358-63; twin movements, 363; salariat, 366; vote in cities, 367

262 Socialist Masses’ Party (Shakai Taishuto),

on agriculture, 375, 401, 406; farmers’

7-8, 216, 291 Socialist Monthly. See Gekkan Shakaito

union, 376, 385, 394; national and

Socialist News Report (Shakai Shimpo),

and farmers, 370-417;

sd p

thinking

sectional economic interest, 381; rural vote, 382, 416-17; rural defections to Communism, 385; agrarian leaders of sd p,

387, 391; agricultural policies, 390,

401-07; during schism, 391-95; prag­ matic approach to agriculture’s prob­ lems, 401; five-year plan, 402; foreign policy and promises to agriculture, 404-05; statement of policy, 405; and farmer-owners, 406; tactics for gaining

101 n., 260, 262 Socialist Party of Japan. See Social Democratic Party of Japan of 1945 Socialist Policy Study Group (Shakaishugi Seisaku Kenkyukai), 300 Socialist Society (Shakaishugi Kyokai), 88, 209 n„ 285, 347, 425 Socialist Times (Shakai Taimusu), 86 n., 262-63, 356 Socialization: of key industries, 180-83,

support, 407-09; plans for agriculture,

195, 196; of land, 389. See also

4 °9

Nationalization

and middle strata, 418—47; women,

Society to Protect Human Rights, 144 n.

422, 435-39; tradition of intellectualism,

Society for the Study of Women’s Prob­

424; professionals, 424; civil servants,

lems, 439 Socio-Democratic clique (Shaminkei), 7,

425-28; students, 431-34; Shigakuren, 433; Zengakuren, 433-35; small business,

274-75, 276 n„ 286, 295, 331; leaders,

441-46

371; and Japan Labor clique, 374.

prospects and problems, 451-63; Left’s scorn for compromise, 452; fundamental

See also Social Democratic Party of 1927 Sodbmei (Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai

nature of party, 454; grievances of

Sodomei, or All-Japan General Federa­

Right, 455; need for stronger organi­

tion of Labor Unions), 6, 14, 28, 323-28,

zation, 456-57; changes in leadership,

333; reactivation of, 13; support of

457; future of Right, 458-59; rethink­

Socialists, 19-20, 326, 364; on Peace

ing of position, 459-61; attainment of

Treaty, 34; and Zenro Kaigi, 52, 77; and

power, 461-63

d s p

Social security, 184-88, 359

, 96, 279; and popular front, 112; lineage, 514-15; opposing Sohyo’s radical

486

IN D E X

Sohyo (cont.)

Sodomei (cont.) wing, 318, 357; membership, 324; and

convention, 345; and police bill, 346;

struggle committees, 325; and Socialist

Group to Strengthen the Socialist Party,

right, 327; and democratization, 328;

347, 349; 7959 convention, 348; split of

leftists, 331-32; “ New Sodomei,” 332;

moderate minorities, 349; representation

schism in, 333 n.; and reverse course,

in Diet, 353-54; Political Department,

336; hampering All-Japan Trade Union

354; Conference to Safeguard the Peace

Congress, 338-39; launching Minroken,

Constitution, 355; “ cultured men,” 424;

Minroren and Zenro Kaigi, 338 n.;

and Socialist Society, 425; Youth Section,

reunification, 342; union tactics, 356;

433; Housewives’ Association, 439; and

contribution to R ight and Left Socialist campaigns, 356 n.; and Nishio, 357

survival of small enterprises, 442 Soka Gakkai (Value Creating Study

Sohyo (Nihon Rodo Kumiai Sohyogakai, or General Council of Japanese Trade

Society), 71, 129, 130-31, 144, 265, 447, 460

Unions), 34, 333-49; creation of, 32; and

Soma, Sukeharu, 298 n., 300 n.

Korean War, 33, 333; and Left Socialists,

Sone, Eki, 224, 228 n.; and Socio-Demo-

37, 41, 45, 336, 357; and anti-subversive

cratic clique, 48; and reunification, 89 n.;

law, 40; changing political orientation,

and prevention of preemptive war,

46-47, 52-53, 60-61; 7956 election, 59;

210 n., 222; and Nishio faction, 297-98,

7957 spring labor offensive, 61-62;

sdp

299

contributions, 70, 271, 364, 365, 454; left­

Sorge spy case, 283 n.

ward shift, 72, 90, 334, 336, 348;

Southeast Asia, Japanese trade with, 171-72

sdp

7959 convention, 73, 74; competition

Special Committee for Formulating

with Zenro Kaigi, 74, 77; M iike strike,

Policies for Small and Medium

78; and

Enterprises, 443

sdp

s t r u c t u r a l r e f o r m , 92, 96,

102, 105-06; on U.S., 93, 355; influence on

sd p,

96, 248; and Constitution, 119;

and People’s Council, 120; and

sdp

Special Committee on Sino-Japanese R e­ lations, 230,231n. “Special Community” people, 141-43

economic policies, 160, 458; and peace

Sp j . See Socialist Party of Japan

force, 203; and U.S. bases, 207, 214-15;

Stalinism, 201-02

and nuclear weapons, 212, 213; on

Steffens, Lincoln, 462

Okinawa, 215; increasing radicalism, 218;

Strike Control Bill, 45

and

Strike Prohibition Law, 336

jcp

, 218, 317-18; anti-security

treaty campaign, 219-21, 348, 350, 355;

Strikes: threat of general, 14-15; rulings

on Hungarian revolt, 225; affected by

against, 113, 325, 333, 432; loss of

Left-Right-SDP debates, 276; and Suzuki

rights, 321, 328; breaking, use of goon

faction, 279; and Wada faction, 282, 284;

squads, 350; ban on communications,

lineage, 774-75; National Liaison

328-29; waves of, 7952, 336; coal and

Council for Socialist Party members in,

electric, 338; restricted in public

316; and unionized shops, 316; 7957

corporations, 360; of farmers, 393.

convention, 318, 336, 337; and united

See also Miike strike

front, 318 n.; potent pressure group, *955~58- 319; 7955 convention, 319, 341; mainstream faction, 319, 453; and Sodomei-Zenr5 , 319-20; and govern­ mental workers, 321, 426, 429; effect on Sambetsu membership, 331; strength of,

Structural reform, 91-92, 97, 101-02, 319, 351, 447, 461, 463; Eda and, 8t, 92 n., 307; Narita and, 81, 100, 216; and farm support, 406-07 Students, 430-35; and

sd p,

324, 366, 430-35;

and laborers and poor farmers, 431;

333-34; initial moderate tendencies, 334,

factors influencing, 431 n.; federations,

338; neutrality of central organization,

432. See also Shigakuren; Zengakuren

335; 7957 convention, 335; Four Prin­

Subcontractors Payment Adjustment Law,

ciples of Peace, 335; and Peace

162 Subversive Activities Prevention Bill:

Comrades, 338; and Kishi, 345; 795S

487

IN D E X

Subversive Activities Prevention Bill (cont.)

38-40, 67, 121, 138-39, 360; Sohyo opposition to, 40, 336, 425; uses of, 139; j c p opposition to, 296; and Katayama-Nishio faction, 2g6; strikes against, 338, 354; student opposition to, sdp opposition to,

432

Suzuki faction (cont.) rise of, 278-79; economic planning, 279; and reunification, 279-80; 795S election, 280; leaders, 280, and labor, 337, 338,

348

Suez Canal crisis, 205, 224-25

Tabata, Kanemitsu, 298 n.

Sugiyama, Motojiro, 228, 294 n., 301 n., 374

Tagami, Matsue, 298 n.

Suihei Undo (Leveling Movement), 141-42

Tagaya, Shinnen, 284 n.

Summit failure (i960), 345

Tahara, Haruji, 291 n., 294 n.

Sunaga, Ko, 379

Taiwan. See China, Nationalist

Supreme Commander for the Allied

Takada, Naoko, 288 n.

Powers. See MacArthur, Douglas;

Takada, Tom iyuki, 284 n.

Ridgway, Matthew;

Takahashi, Masao, 285 n.

scap

Supreme Court; U.S. Forces, 68, 134;

Takano, Minoru, 351, 353 n.; and Yoshida

National Police Reserve Force, 133;

government, 45; and peace force, 46, 284;

status of decisions, 135; appointments to,

reunification of

136

279, 328; and Sohyo, 337; and

Suzuki, Flajime, 298 n. Suzuki, Mosaburo, 278 n., 359, 3gg; and Japan Proletarian Party, 7, 281; and jcp

, 16, 110, 113, 383; in Katayama

cabinet, 20; and Ashida cabinet, 23, 327; and Inamura-Morito controversy, 27-28;

sd p,

53; and Sodomei, sdp

schism, 340 Takano faction, 439; and Sohy5 , 60, 72, 318, 341, 347 ff., 355; and united front, 319; and Sodomei, 332; in

sdp

split, 337;

and market basket wage formula, 338 Takatsu, Masamichi (Seido), 374

Secretary-General, 28-29, 281; and 7950

Takeya, Gen taro, 298 n.

convention, 29; retirement of, 30; and

Taku, Yoshitaka, 284 n.

7957 convention, 34; and Peace Treaty,

Taman, Flirofumi, 294 n., 298 n.

36; and Left

Tanahashi, Kotora, 298 n.

sd p,

of

sd p,

38, 281; Chairman of

47, 55, 253, 254; call for reunification

sd p,

51; and small constituency bill,

58; and Law to Assist Small and Medium

Tanaka, Hajime, 300 n., 301 n. Tanaka, Ikusaburo, 294 n., 298 n. Tanaka, KotarS, 134

Businessmen, 61; compromise with Kishi

Tanaka, Orinoshin, 288 n.

on unions, 62; police revision hill, 67;

Tanaka, Takeo, 284 n., 443

7959

Tanaka, Toshio, 288 n.

sd p

split, 74-75; relaxation of

leadership, 81; three-point program,

Tariff structure, and job security, 320

86 n.; revision of reunification program,

Tate, Shunzo, 290 n.

90 n.; and Police Reserve Force, 133; on

Taxes: reduction of, 359; farmers’ struggle

neutralism, 204; on nuclear testing,

against, 382; demonstrations against, 386;

212 n.; and U.S.S.R., 226; visits China,

reforms, 392; commodity, 444; corpora­

228 n.; on China, 230, 233, 235-36; leader of faction, 280-82; early career,

tion, 444; income, 452 Teachers: right to engage in political

280-81; tension with W ada faction, 284;

activities, 335; struggle against efficiency

and Kuroda, 289; and Kawakami, 293;

rating system, 346; restrictions on, 361;

and labor, 326, 348; definition of socialist

influence in villages, 4:4; status of, 423.

revolution, 343. See also Suzuki faction

See also School District Bill

Suzuki, Yoshio, 301 n. Suzuki faction, 220, 225, 278-82, 307-08;

Teachers’ Union (Nihon Kyoshokuin Kumiai or Nikkyoso), 324, 334; support for left

sd p,

34, 352 n.;

attack on, 42;

rift in, 273, 282; and farmers, 274-7;; mainstream of s d p , 276, 319, 347; Diet

School Districts Bill, 58, 62, 66, 127; and

representation, 277, 278; origins, 278;

Wada faction, 284; influence on workers,

Eda-Narita group, 278, 279, 306, 351;

352; candidates from, 411; and Cultured

ldp

488

IN D E X

Teachers’ Union (cont.)

U.S.S.R. (cont.)

M en’s Council, 425; radical tendencies,

rights, 222, 223; student opinion on

429; student organizations, 432-33

relations with, 432; lessening of influ­ ence, 458

Temporary Law for the State Control of Coal Mining, 18

Union of T extile Industry Workers’

Tenants: unions, 5; protest against land­ lords, 371; and

jcp

, 371; amelioration of

position, 375, 378; tenancy disputes, 379;

Unions, 344 n. Unions. See Labor Unions

and landlords, as classes, 388; tenancy

United front: rejected by Socialists, 32526; opposition to, 339

regulations, 406; loyalty to radical past,

United labor front, 323, 328, 337

412-13

United Nations, Japanese views of, 201,

T extile Workers, Federation of, 332 n., 338 n. See also Union of T extile Industry Workers’ Unions

202, 204-05, 207-08, 210, 212 United States: economic aid to Japan, 156, 405; trade with Japan, 165-68, 171, ig 2 -

Theory and Practice for Peace, 200

93; support of authoritarian regimes,

Togano, Satoko, 294 n.

201, 215;

Togliatti, Palmiro, 81, 92 n., 101

also

Toitsuha (in Japan Farmers’ Union), 385,

sdp

scap;

criticism of, 214-15. See

Security Pact, Japanese-

American United States Counterpart Fund for Japan, 156

397 **■ T ojo, Hideki, 3, 11, 293, 413 Tokuda, Kyuichi, 43, 384

Unity Group (in Japan Farmers’ Union),

Tomiyoshi, Eiji, 374

385 . 397 ff-

Tosan Iincho Kaigi (Affiliated Trade Union Chairmen), 351

Ushimura, Seiji, 288 n. U.S.S.R. See Union of Soviet Socialist

Trade Union Law (December 1945), 323 Trade unions. See Labor unions

Republics Utsumi, Kiyoshi, 298 n.

Transportation, socialization of, 180, 196 Trotskyites, in Zengakuren, 434 Trum an Doctrine, 383

Value Creating Study Society. See Soka

Tsubaki, Shigeo, 306

Gakkai

Tsujihara, Hiroichi, 284 n.

Villages: prewar, 371; democratization,

Tsukamoto, Saburo, 298 n.

377; economic improvement, 392; status

Tsutsumi, Kojiro, 127

of middle-income farmers, 408; motives

Tsutsumi, Mrs. Tsuruyo, 294 n., 298 n.

for Socialist support, 416. See also Rural

Tuberculosis, 185

areas

Two-main-party system, 35-56, 418, 440,

447. 454 Wada, Haruo, 364-65 Wada, Hiroo, 27, 60, 90, 257, 279, 463; and Uha Shakaito (Right

s d p ).

See Social

Economic Stabilization Board, 17, 18,

Democratic Party of Japan

159, 283; and RikizS Hirano, 18-19,

Ukai, Nobushige, 136

283; and Left

Ukeda, Shinkichi, 294 n., 298 n.

controversy, 46, 47; on small constitu­

Unemployment, and

ency bill, 58; zp59

sd p

urging of public

38, 88; and platform sd p

convention, 73;

Five-Year Plan for the Construction

works, 358 U n e s c o , research on student support of

of a Peace Economy, 159-60; on China, 236; early career, 282-84; in Yoshida

leftist parties, 431

cabinet, 283; in Katayama cabinet, 283;

Unification Discussion Group, 30 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

sd p,

sd p

attitude toward, 205, 215, 221-27; in Hungary, 205, 225; Japanese fishing

and Nishio, 283. See also Wada faction Wada, Toshiaki, 114 W ada faction, 220, 225, 276, 282-86, 337,

489

IN D E X

Yamada, Choji, 374

Wada faction (cont.) 347; and farmers, 274-75; representation

Yamada, Setsuo, 298 n.

in Diet, 277, 278; leaders, 282-85; rise in

Yamaguchi, Shizue, 293 n.

sd p,

283-84; tension with Suzuki faction,

284, 351; electoral strength, 284; and

sd p

reunification, 285 n.; and left wing, 28586; structural reform, 307 Wages: wage-price formula, 327; stabiliza­

Yamaguchi Prefectural Labor Federation, slogan of, 414 Yamahana, Hideo, 231 n., 288 n. Yamakawa, Hitoshi, 11, 99, m , 285 n., 387 Yamamoto, Koichi, 286 n.

tion of, 330; offensives, 333, 344; “market

Yamanaka, Hiroshi, 284 n.

basket” formula, 338; minimum, 344,

Yamashita, Eiji, 293 n., 294 n., 298 n.,

359,403, 440; adjustment, 354; rises, 358-59; organized efforts, 363

301 n. Yamashita, Yoshinobu, 301 n.

Watanabe, Sozo, 301 n.

Yamazaki, Motoo, 284 n.

Welfare, Japanese, 184-88

Yanagida, Hidekazu, 284 n.

Welfare state concepts, 460 W hite Plum Society, 439

Yao, Kisaburo, 294 n„ 300-01 n.

Wholesale markets, public, 404

Yasuhira, Shikaichi, 278 n., 301 n.

“W hy We Demand an All-Around Peace,” 201 Women: and

Yaoita, Tadashi, 89 n., 286 n. Yokomichi, Setsuo, 284 n. Yokoyama, Toshiaki, 284 n.

sd p,

422,435-39; professional

Yomiuri Shimbun, 281

status, 423; as white-collar workers, 427;

Yonekubo, Mitsusuke, 327

employed and voting, 436; response to communication media, 436; opinion

Yoshida, Shigeru, 123, 355; first cabinet,

Yoshida, Hosei, 231 n., 288 n.

polls, 436-38; and Ashida cabinet, 438;

11, 13-14, 15, 111, 114, 122, 149; second

in Diet, 439

“ caretaker” cabinet, 25; election of 1949,

Worker Comrades Society (Rodosha Doshikai), 337, 347

25; decline of popularity, 30, 124; dis­ solves Diet, 40, 44; and "reverse course,”

Worker-Farmer Party (Rodosha Nominto or Ronoto), 53-54, 114, 123-24, 135, 274-75, 289, 290, 3 ! 9 . 372- 73>4 ° ° Workers: political action of, 313, 322; moderated temper of, 320-21; minority

41; deteriorating position, 48; resigna­ tion, 49, 125; and Constitution, 132 Yoshida government, 283, 392; first cabinet, 11, 13-14, 15, 111, 114, 122, 149; second “caretaker” cabinet, 25; and Dodge Line,

of electorate, 322; traditional attitudes

155-56; and Korean War, 201; fall of,

of, 352-53; conferences, 353 n.; tempo­

334; 1974 decline in popularity, 423

rary, 360 n.; older competing with

Yoshida Liberals, decline of, 438

younger, 362 n.; and middle-class living,

Yoshikawa, Kanemitsu, 294 n.

363; support for

Yoshino, Sakuzo, 295

sd p,

363-69, 423-25;

support for conservatives, 367; support

Youth Department (s d p ) , 29, 30

for reformist parties, 367; industrial,

Youth groups, supporting

368, 441 n.; white-collar, 416, 422, 427-

Yuaikai (Friendly Society), 297

sd p,

430-35

30, 447; decline of militancy, 423 n.; technical, 423-25; professional, 423-25; clerical, 426; politicism of, 455; changes

Zaibatsu combines, 149

in orientation of, 458. See also Labor;

Zen Nichino. See Zen Nihon Nomin

Labor Unions World Congress against Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs, 115, 119, 212-13 World Federation of Trade Unions ( w f t u ), 335

Kumiai Zen Nichiro. See Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Remmei Zen Nihon Chusho Kigyo Rodo Kumiai Sorengo (All-Japan Federation of Labor Unions in Small and Medium Enter­

Yagi, Noboru, 284 n.

prises), 442

49« Zen Nihon Nomin Domei (All-Japan Farmers’ Federation), 401 Zen-Nihon Nomin Kumiai (Zen Nichino), 3 7 3 . 3 82 . 3 9 4 . 3 9 7 - 3 9 9 - See also Farmers’

Union, Japan; Farmers’ Unions Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi (All-Japan Trade Union Congress). See Zenro Kaigi Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Remmei (Zen Nichiro), 333 n. Zen Nihon Rodo Sodomei Kumiai Kaigi (Domei Kaigi, or All-Japan General Federation of Labor Unions Congress, or Japan Confederation of Labor). See Domei Kaigi Zen Nihon Seinen Fujin Kyogikai (AllJapan Youth and Womens’ Council), 433 Zengakuren (Zen Nihon Gakusei Jichikai Sorengo, or All-Japan Federation of Student Self-Government Associations), 80 n., 118, 218, 221,433-35 Zenkanko (Zenkoku Kanko Shokuin Rodo Kumiai Kyogikai, or National Council of Government and Public Workers’ Unions, or Council of National and Local Government Workers’ Unions), 3 2 9 . 3 39. 354

Zenkoku Nomin Domei (National Farmers’ Federation), 373 Zenkoku Nomin Kumiai (Zennd, or National Farmers’ Union). See Zenno Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Kaigi Jumbikai (National Labor Union Congress Pre­ paratory Committee) of 1949, 29, 314 Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Kessei Jumbikai (National Labor Union Formation Pre­ paratory Committee), 314

IN D E X

Zenkoku Rodo Kumiai Renraku Kyogikai (Zenroren, or National Labor Union Liaison Council), 326 Zenkoku Rono Taishuto. See National Labor-Farmer Masses’ Party Zenkoku Sangyo-betsu Kumiai Kaigi. See Sambetsu Zenkoku Suiheisha (National Leveling Society), 288. See also Leveling Move­ ment Zenno, 372-77. See also Farmers’ Union, Japan Zenro Jumbikai (Preparatory Committee for Zenro) of 7953, 3/3 Zenro Kaigi (Zen Nihon Rodo Kumiai Kaigi, or All-Japan Trade Union Con­ gress, or Japanese Trade Union Congress) of 1954, 48, 69, 341, 357; creation of, 52-53, 338; 1956 election, 59; police bill, 67; support for

sd p,

70, 248,

364, 365; “second unions,” 72, 297; and d sp,

74, 77, 81, 96, 248, 349; splits in

leftist unions, 119, 190; nuclear weapons, 213; growth in radicalism, 218; security treaty, 220; on Hungarian revolt, 225; and Nishio faction, 295, 453; principles of, 339; and

sd p

reunification, 342, 343;

and Japan Productivity Center, 344 n.; Zenro-Sodomei unions, 347, 349; reunifi­ cation with Sohyo, 347-48; and

jcp

, 348;

and union tactics, 356 Zenro Kaigi of 1949. See National Labor Union Congress Zenroren, 326. See also National Labor Union Liaison Council Zenshin (Forward), 425