Postwar Vietnam: Dilemmas in Socialist Development 9781501719394

Citation preview

David G. Marr & Christine P. White, Editors POSTWAR VIETNAM:

DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT

Sponsored by the JOINT COMMITTEE ON SOUTHEAST ASIA of the SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH COUNCIL and the AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

David G. Marr & Christine P. White, Editors

POSTWAR VIETNAM:

DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT

SEAP Southeast Asia Program 120 Uris Hall Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 1988

© 1988, Cornell Southeast Asia Program 2nd Printing 1993 ISBN 0-87727-120-8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abbreviations

ix

Introduction

1

I.

KNOWLEDGE AND SOCIETY

1)

Tertiary Education, Research, and the Information Sciences in Vietnam David G. Marr 2) Learning for Life? Glimpses from a Vietnamese School Susanne Rubin 3) Women and Family Planning Policies in Postwar Vietnam Nguyen Huyen Chau II.

15 45 61

ECONOMIC POLICY AND REFORMS

4)

Party Policies and Economic Performance: The Second and Third Five-Year Plans Examined Vo Nhan Tri 5) The Limits of Planning and the Case for Economic Reform Suzy Paine 6) Issues in Economic Unification: Overcoming the Legacy of Separation Melanie Beresford 7) State Finance in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam: The Difficult Transition from "State Bureaucratic Finance" to "Socialist Economic Accounting" Max Spoor 8) Alternative Approaches to the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture in Postwar Vietnam Christine Pelzer White 9) The Problem of the District in Vietnam's Development Policy Jayne Werner 10) Some Aspects of Cooperativization in the Mekong Delta Ngo Vinh Long

v

77 91 95

111 133 147 163

III.

INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE 11)

12)

IV.

The Regularization of Politics: Continuity and Change in the Party's Central Committee, 1951-1986 Carlyle A. Thayer The Military Construction of Socialism: Postwar Roles of the People's Army of Vietnam William S. Turley

177

195

TRENDS IN AID AND TRADE 13)

14)

Results and Limits in CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations, 1975-1985 Anna Petrasovits External Assistance in the Context of Vietnam's Development Effort Karl H. Englund

213

225

Chronology

233

Bibliography

239

List of Contributors

247

VI

LIST OF TABLES AND DIAGRAMS

Map

Postwar Vietnam

Frontispiece

Tables 2.1 Number of Instruction Hours/Week 6.1 Index of Output of Major Industrial Products 1957-1974 6.2 Growth Rates of Industrial Sectors (1970 constant prices) 7.1 State Budget SRV (1976-1984) 9.1 Model of the District Economic Structure 9.2 The Scale of Several Districts in 1977 9.3 The Structure of the Total Value of Products in a Number of Districts, 1977 11.1 Retention and Promotion Rates on the Central Committee 11.2 Sectoral Composition of the Central Committee, 1960-1986

49 102 110 125 149 153 154 182 187

Diagrams 1.1 Information Flow Chart (Nguyen Khac Vien) 1.2 Information Flow Chart (Author: David G. Marr) 2.1 One page from a Physics Textbook 11.1 Rate of Growth in the Size of Central Committee Membership by Status, 1951-1986 11.2 Composition of the Central Committee by Seniority, Promotion, and Membership Status 11.3 Generational Transition--The Passing of the 1951 Central Committee 11.4 Sectoral Composition of the 1982 Central Committee (Full Members) Plates Plate 1: A Lecture to Class 8G Plates 2 and 3: Pupils in Class 8G

40 41 53 181 182 185 186

Following page 60

VII

This page intentionally left blank

ABBREVIATIONS

ACFOA AFP BUSCSCV CIP CMEA CMPC DRV ELE ESC FBIS-APA FEER FLPH GPD IMF IRRI JPRS NCKT NEP NEZ OMPI PAVN PNVN QDND RVN SIDA SDSRV SRV SWB/FE TCCS TCHDKH TCNCKT TCQDND UNFPA

Australian Committee for Overseas Aid Agence France Presse (Paris) Bulletin of the US Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam Commercial Import Program Council for Mutual Economic Assistance Central Military Party Committee Democratic Republic of Vietnam Editions Langues Etrangeres (Hanoi) European Socialist Countries Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific (Washington) Far Eastern Economic Review Foreign Languages Publishing House (Hanoi) General Political Directorate International Monetary Fund International Rice Research Institute Joint Publications Research Service (Washington) Nghien Cuu Kinh Te [Economics Research] (Hanoi) New Economic Policy New Economic Zone Organizacion Mundial de la Propriedad Intelectual [World Intellectual Property Organization] People's Army of Vietnam Phu Nu Viet Nam [Women of Vietnam] (Hanoi) Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People's Army] (Hanoi) Republic of Vietnam Swedish International Development Authority Statistical Data of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Socialist Republic of Vietnam Summary of World Broadcasts/Far East (BBC Monitoring Service) Tap Chi Cong San [Communist Journal] (Hanoi) Tap Chi Hoat Dong Khoa Hoc [Scientific Activities Journal] Tap Chi Nghien Cuu Kinh Te [Economic Research Journal] Tap Chi Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People's Army Journal] United Nations Fund for Population Activities

ix

VCP VHNT VDRN VNA VNC VSB XHH

Vietnam Communist Party Van Hoa Nghe Thuat [Art and Culture] Vietnam Documents and Research Notes (US Embassy, pre-1975 Saigon) Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi) Viet Nam Courier (Hanoi) Vietnam State Bank Xa Hoi Hoc [Sociological Review] (Hanoi)

x

Vietnam: provincial boundaries and principal cities

Postwar Vietnam

This page intentionally left blank

INTRODUCTION David G. Marr and Christine Pelzer White

"The entire socialist world is in the midst of a theoretical crisis," Tran Bach Dang told one of the editors of this book in early 1988.1 Veteran of thirty years of fighting the French and then the Americans, since 1975 one of Vietnam's most widely read communist authors, Mr Dang clearly was troubled that the ideology which had sustained him for so long did not seem to be providing answers to current problems. He acknowledged that there was no consensus on where to turn, what to do. The implications were more serious for Vietnam than for other socialist countries, as it faced serious food shortages, rampant inflation, administrative confusion, and continuing military threats from China. Furthermore, in the absence of normal diplomatic relations with the United States and a peaceful closure to the war which ended over thirteen years earlier, the leadership remained nervous about the intentions of its former adversary and no longer even claimed that it had won that war.2 The mood among Vietnam's communist leadership had been very different in late April 1975 as the Vietnam War came to an end. The seemingly impossible task which the Communist Party had set itself of resisting American high-technology military power had been accomplished. The country was free of foreign troops and foreign exploitation for the first time in 113 years. Three decades of death, destruction, and psychological trauma had been vindicated. Now, as Ho Chi Minh had imagined before he died, a peaceful Vietnam could rebuild itself ten times more beautiful. It seemed that success on the economic front would be swift and easy in comparison with the long struggle for national liberation and reunification which had just ended. As one Central Committee member told a Western correspondent, "Now nothing more can happen. The problems we have to face now are trifles compared to those of the past."3 On Tet 1976, Party Secretary Le Duan promised each family a radio set, refrigerator, and TV set within ten years.4 It was as if he expected the economy of newly reunified Vietnam miraculously to combine the (pre-airwar) industrial development of the north 1

Interviewed by David Marr in Ho Chi Minh City, March 25,1988.

2

The SRV's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach pointed out in an interview given to an American journalist that "Both countries [i.e. Vietnam and the United States] have been victims of war. There are no losers and no winners.... It is very uncomfortable to have enemies. If you have an enemy, you sleep with only one eye shut. It is the wish of the Vietnamese to have peace and friendship with the U.S." USA Today, June 10,1988. 3

Tiziano Terzani, Giai Phong! The Fall and Liberation of Saigon (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976), p. 294.

4

Nhan Dan (Hanoi), February 2,1976.

1

2 Postwar Vietnam with the wartime American-created consumer society in the south. In December 1976 the Fourth Party Congress announced the aim of largely completing Vietnam's transformation from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production within about twenty years.5 Optimism reigned supreme. The triumphant leadership believed that these goals could be achieved via egalitarian, centrally planned socialism, bypassing the social inequalities of the capitalist development path. History did not follow this projection. The planned leap into large-scale socialist production did not materialize; instead the country staggered from one economic crisis to another. What is the explanation for this disastrous record? As of 1975, the economic infrastructure of the country had advanced little since French colonization of Vietnam in the late nineteenth century. The productive base of the economy was still agriculture. French colonial "mise en valeur" of Indochina which began at the turn of the century had developed a modest railroad network and an export-oriented plantation economy but virtually no industry. The factories which had been built in the north with socialist-bloc aid between 1954 and 1964 had been destroyed or heavily damaged during the airwar, while the industrial sector near Saigon which had mushroomed in the early 1970s amounted to little more than an assembly of imported parts. Any gains from two decades of competing socialist and capitalist development in the north and south of divided Vietnam between 1954 and 1975 had been more than offset by the negative and distorting effects of war devastation and foreign aid dependency. Not only had industrialization not taken place, but the agricultural infrastructure of the economy had been gravely damaged: thousands of hectares of agricultural land had been poisoned by Agent Orange and other chemical agents, while former "free fire zones" were a hazard to clear due to unexploded ordinance, and continued to claim lives and limbs as farmers attempted to reclaim the land. Defoliation during the war of millions of square miles of forests left the land unprotected and vulnerable to flooding.6 A hundred years earlier, the country's administrative and non-productive population, supported by taxes and rent from agriculture, had been relatively small. The power of the central government to extract a surplus from the villages through taxation had been limited and contested. The socialist government was soon to discover that these fundamentals had not changed. However, in the intervening years the number of people who had come to expect to live off the government payroll rather than to engage in manual labor hi production had mushroomed out of all proportion to the productive capacity of the country. The ideological fervor with which socialist and capitalist development respectively had been touted for two decades on either side of the seventeenth parallel, the dramatic increases in the number of educated people who expected white collar jobs, and the distorting effects of foreign aid had produced a revolution in rising expectations. The educational infrastructure of a much more developed country had been created which was out of proportion to the capacity of the economy to provide suitable jobs. No postwar government could have met popular demands and radically escalated needs without massive foreign assistance. In short, at the end of the war, the leadership not only expected to work miracles; miracles were expected of it by the population.

5

Communist Party of Viet Nam, Fourth National Congress: Documents (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1977), p. 59.

6

Postwar Vietnam's attempts to rehabilitate its natural environment are summarized in Elizabeth Kemf, "The Re-Greening of Vietnam," New Scientist, No. 1618, June 23,1988.

Introduction 3 The first rude postwar shocks came when China and the Soviet Union reduced economic aid to Vietnam, and the United States refused to provide the three billion dollars of reconstruction assistance promised by President Nixon in 1973. Meanwhile, the abrupt end of American aid to the south divested the former members of the Saigon government, military, and police of employment which had been funded by American taxpayers' money rather than the Vietnamese economy. It also deprived the southern population, particularly the large middle class, of the foreign consumer goods to which they had grown accustomed during two decades of the American Commercial Import Program (CIP).7 In the initial postwar years the leadership tended to blame development problems on the war. This argument needs to be taken seriously. According to Vietnamese statistics, in the south alone the war produced 20,000 bomb craters, 10 million refugees, 362,000 war invalids, 1 million widows, 880,000 orphans, 250,000 drug addicts, 300,000 prostitutes, and 3 million unemployed; two-thirds of the villages were destroyed and 5 million hectares of forests destroyed.8 Not a promising start for attempting to build a socialist economy, or any economy. However, the legacies of underdevelopment, foreign occupation, wartime destruction, foreign aid dependency, and high popular expectations were not the only problems facing the postwar government. Within the Communist Party itself many became increasingly aware that a large proportion of Vietnam's economic problems could not be blamed on colonialism, imperialism, or war, but were actually the result of counterproductive economic policies. Two broad tendencies emerged within the leadership. On one side were the orthodox, who wanted to consolidate the system instituted in the north since the late 1950s and expand it, barely modified, to the south. On the other side were the reformers, who felt that certain economic policies long considered the only socialist route to economic development needed to be jettisoned or changed. Core socialist policies—central planning, state price controls, priority to heavy industry, cooperativization as the vehicle for state procurement of agricultural produce, and egalitarian wage and distribution policies—were all increasingly called into question. This was due to the winds of ideological change blowing through socialist countries throughout the world, as well as the response to specific economic crises in Vietnam. Until 1979 orthodoxy prevailed: it was assumed that the entire economy would be managed from Hanoi; heavy industry would receive investment priority, and the wartime "subsidy and procurement" system of cheap rations for state sector employees, subsidized consumer goods for peasants, and low prices for the products of agricultural cooperatives would be continued. In the newly liberated south, re-education camps would transform former ARVN officers and ex-Saigon government officials into faithful citizens, reactionary culture would be stamped out, capitalist entrepreneurs eliminated, and farmers in the fertile Mekong Delta organized rapidly into cooperatives which would provide a surplus to help feed the whole country and finance development. Not only did these policies of socialist transformation not work in the south, but a crisis in food procurement developed in the north as the peasants refused to continue levels of delivery to the state at prices which often did not even cover costs of production. During the war, peasants in cooperatives in the north had given up any rice surplus to the state at low prices to feed their sons and 7

On the development and political impact of the CIP see George McT. Kahin, Intervention (New York: Knopf, 1986), pp. 85-88. 8

Vietnam Ten Years After (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1985), p.6.

4 Postwar Vietnam husbands in the army; in exchange they had benefitted from the distribution of consumer goods, especially clothing, bicycles, and thermos flasks, provided by Chinese foreign aid. This key aspect of the "subsidy and procurement" system broke down after the end of the war when wartime moral and material incentives were no longer operative and Chinese commodity aid stopped. Crop losses in 1978, followed by the brief but destructive war with China in 1979, brought Vietnam to the brink of economic disaster. In this context, the advocates of economic reform finally carried the day in top-level policy discussions. In September 1979 the historic Sixth Plenum of the Party Central Committee (Fourth Congress) opened the way for an expanded role for family-based production and economic exchange at market prices. The issue of the relative roles of "plan and market" was finally opened to discussion.9 The plenum resolution argued that socialist economic transformation must go through steps which could not be leapt over or ignored by revolutionary will. The unsuccessful attempt to control all economic decision making and transactions through central planning and state prices was attacked in terms which included an ideological challenge to the orthodox: "voluntarism is the enemy of Marxism-Leninism and of revolutionary science." The program of economic reforms was presented as based on the recognition of "objective laws" which the orthodox, in their "revolutionary ardor," preferred to ignore.10 Nonetheless, for two years these policy changes had very little practical impact, probably reflecting opposition as well as confusion within the Party at various levels. The proposed move in the direction of untying the unseen hand of the market and allowing direct producers more freedom in the disposition of the fruits of their labors threatened the role and power of lower-level cadres who spent their time communicating plan targets to peasants and workers and urging them to work hard to overfulfil! the plan. Meanwhile, living conditions were becoming even more desperate for millions of citizens. It was in this context that Nguyen Khac Vien, head of Vietnam's Foreign Languages Publishing House, wrote a letter to the National Assembly severely criticizing the Party leadership. No one accepted responsibility for obvious errors, he complained, much less taking resolute corrective measures. Instead of mindless exhortation and bureaucratic obfuscation, Vietnam needed careful, critical analysis of its many difficulties. "A political orientation which is not based on a scientific analysis of society is like a building constructed without first testing the soil."11 In 1981-1984 food output improved significantly, reflecting the hard work and long hours which farmers put into the soil, aware that any surplus could be sold on the open market. However, the authorities did not take advantage of this breathing space to expand production of crucial farm inputs (fertilizers, pesticides, fuel) and consumer goods, to reduce the dangerous government budget deficit, or to tackle continuing population growth. By 1985-1986, rampant inflation was making rational economic decision making impossible, while stories of corrupt cadre circulated everywhere. In contrast to 1975-1976, when most people expected the Party to take hold of postwar reconstruction and development in the same vigorous manner as the earlier fight against foreign invaders, in 1986 the 9

"Plan and Market" (editorial), Nhan Dan, October 22,1979.

10 11

"Objective laws and revolutionary ardor*' (editorial), Nhan Dan, October 13,1979.

Georges Boudarel, ed., La bureaucratic an Vietnam (Paris: 1'Harmattan, 1983), pp. 115-19. Dr. Vien's comments circulated widely, although the letter was not published inside Vietnam. He was not punished for his temerity, perhaps reflecting a 1981 shift of power back to the reformists.

Introduction 5 majority of citizens had lost confidence in the existing leadership. Party legitimacy could no longer be taken for granted, but would need to be proven once again. Personnel changes at the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 represented another top-level attempt to grapple with intractable reality. The new secretary general, Nguyen Van Linh, gave every sign of appreciating the seriousness of Vietnam's position and supporting economic reforms. His speeches were filled with admissions of past Party mistakes, blunt criticism of those cadre who continued to evade or ignore reform instructions, and encouragement to citizens to take matters into their own hands. He particularly encouraged greater freedom of the press, including letters from the public and critical investigative journalism. Political openness was added to the reform agenda. A major problem, he noted, was that the political system had become opaque in both directions—citizens unable to fathom the logic of higher decision making, and leaders often groping in the dark, unable to ascertain what was happening in the villages or factories. By early 1988, despite Linh's initiatives, conditions were worse than ever. Inflation soared as high as 1000 percent per annum, many farmers lost interest in maximizing production, and city folk despaired of making ends meet. Although reform laws emanated from the increasingly influential National Assembly, for example on foreign investment, export-import procedures, and property ownership, they seemed to make little dent on the way middle and lower-level cadre conducted affairs. An IMF delegation sent to Hanoi to renegotiate Vietnam's arrears in interest payments found the National Bank preoccupied with the introduction of new currency denominations. In one week prices jumped 54 percent, and the IMF team departed without an agreement. Matters came to a head when the specter of famine gripped inhabitants of a number of northern provinces in April-May 1988. Although bad weather and insects provoked the immediate crisis, the underlying causes were administrative and economic. First, province leaders provided grossly over-optimistic harvest projections; then the Politbureau failed to heed ministerial recommendations to import grain. Once the danger was grasped, prime attention focused on extracting more paddy from farmers in the Mekong Delta. If the government had publicly admitted the northern shortfall in March and appealed for southern donations on humanitarian grounds, there might not have been a crisis. Instead, all was done in secrecy, so that farmers understandably considered the "request" as just one more state tax. In early May, still facing serious food deficits in several northern provinces, Hanoi dispatched messages overseas requesting emergency assistance, and this news was broadcast back to Vietnam on the BBC and Voice of America. By the end of June the food crisis had been overcome for the moment, but pressure was increasing on the Party and government to explain the entire episode to the public. In particular, journalists were angry at having been kept in the dark for at least three months, or in some cases forbidden to print facts already in their possession. They now published interviews and descriptions deeply embarrassing to the authorities. Members of the elected National Assembly also pried information out of the bureaucracy and helped to publicize faults. While the press generally cast its criticism in terms of inept leadership, between the lines one could read ever greater doubts about hallowed institutions and ideological assumptions. Most of these postwar events in Vietnam have gone unnoticed in the West. A cynic might conclude that the vast media coverage of the Vietnam War in the decade before 1975 produced a feeling of surfeit. Ethnocentrically, Vietnam was not a "story" after the

6 Postwar Vietnam Americans left. The truth is more complicated. It must be noted that Hanoi has not made it easy for Western journalists or scholars to ascertain what is happening. Initially those reporters who managed to gain entry to Vietnam tended to harken back to epic wartime events or dwell on foreign legacies, for example American soldiers missing in action, the Amerasian children, decaying French villas in Hanoi, a few ancient Citroens and Chevrolets in the streets of Ho Chi Minh City. Meanwhile, most Western newspaper editors apparently felt that the real "Vietnam" stories were not in Vietnam at all, but among the refugees, the veterans, the old Washington policymakers, and the public figures of the former anti-war movement. Vietnam's invasion of Kampuchea in December 1978, and China's invasion of Vietnam in February 1979, served to renew Western interest in the region as a whole, if not in Vietnamese domestic developments. Those on the right who had long assumed some international communist conspiracy to overrun Southeast Asia were bewildered by such open, bitter conflict among Kampuchean, Vietnamese, and Chinese Marxist-Leninists. In America, reflecting Washington's current geopolitical analysis embodied in the Reagan Doctrine, writers tended to uphold the Chinese, to regard Vietnam as a Soviet pawn, and to ignore or downplay the moral implications of tacitly supporting Pol Pot and the Khmer Rouge. Meanwhile, those on the left who had expected anti-imperialist solidarity to persist beyond destruction of the three American client regimes in Indochina in 1975 were equally nonplussed. They tended to divide into pro-China and pro-Vietnam camps, or simply to throw up their hands in dismay. The international dimensions of the Vietnam story since 1975 are important. Washington's decision to isolate Hanoi economically as well as diplomatically profoundly colored internal affairs in Vietnam. Vietnam's 1977 attempt to attract Western investment was doomed before it started. By the same token, Hanoi's refusal in 1977 to drop its demand for American reparations became an obstacle to diplomatic normalization, and played into the hands of those in Washington who favored a decisive tilt towards Beijing. Simultaneously, growing tension with China led to policies which caused the exodus in 1978-1979 of at least 300,000 overseas Chinese, many of whom possessed valuable commercial and technical skills, and meant that Vietnam's generals could not be denied the resources and manpower they requested. Neither could military aid from the Soviet Union be reduced in favor of more economic aid. The siege mentality which had fueled the Vietnamese resistance for so long gained a new lease on life, strengthening conservative repression of public debate of domestic policy options, reinforcing the institutional status quo, and warping the initiatives of economic reformers. From 1979 to 1987 the international cleavages surrounding Indochina remained fixed, although the danger of another major Sino-Vietnamese armed conflict gradually abated. Western media attention tended to focus on skirmishes along the Thai-Kampuchea frontier, refugee camp inmates, the occasional third-party proposal for negotiations. Two book-length studies went deeper, probing the causes of dramatic strategic realignments in the region after 1975.12 However, there has been only one book-length attempt to link

12 Grant Evans and Kelvin Rowley, Red Brotherhood at Wan Indochina since the Fall of Saigon (London: Verso, 1984). Nayan Chanda, Brother Enemy: The War after the War (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 1986).

Introduction 1 strategic and domestic developments, and to examine internal economic, social, and institutional questions on their own terms.13 Today, a curious American, European, or Australian going to her local library, or even a nearby university collection, will have difficulty finding enough on domestic Vietnam since 1975 to compose a high-school essay. Consulting major on-line computer data bases is not much more rewarding. Nor can she contact an established center for Vietnam studies in the West, as none exists. In fact, among socialist states, only Albania and Outer Mongolia are likely to prove scholastically more elusive than Vietnam. And yet, by population Vietnam is the sixteenth largest country in the world and third largest socialist society. It deserves to be studied because it is there. It also offers fertile ground for comparative analysis by political scientists, economists, sociologists, and historians. Sufficient data exists to satisfy both empiricists and theoreticians. No longer is contact with Vietnamese academic institutions impractical; scholars can now travel in both directions, attend conferences, utilize library collections, even begin to talk about fieldwork projects. As in the case of China studies fifteen years ago, misunderstandings and setbacks are bound to occur, but the general trajectory is towards expanded scholarly communication. All of these factors prompted the Joint Committee on Southeast Asia of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Research Council to convene a conference on "Postwar Vietnam: Ideology and Action."14 Participation was deliberately international in scope, involving specialists from eleven different countries. We were particularly fortunate to gain the involvement of five Vietnamese scholars resident overseas (Lam Thanh Liem, Nguyen Due Nhuan, Nguyen Huu Dong, Ngo Vinh Long, and Vo Nhan Tri),15 two scholars from Eastern Europe (Anna Petrasovits from Hungary and Teresa Halik from Poland), one from Sweden (Susanne Rubin), which operates a large aid program in Vietnam, and a senior UN official (Karl Englund) possessing over eight years experience in Vietnam. We also felt we did something towards bridging the gap between Francophone and Anglophone academic traditions on Vietnam. With almost one-third of the participants more comfortable in French than English, conference proceedings moved back and forth in both languages, although we must be self-critical and admit that none of the three papers in French was translated to appear in this book. Besides choosing to emphasize domestic over external questions, we gave relatively more attention to economic policies and performance than to matters of politics, history, language, or culture. The conference theme of "ideology and action" was designed to move us away from the well-worn conceptual framework of "tradition and revolution," to

13 William Duiker, Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon (Athens: Ohio: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1985). 14 The conference brought twenty-two scholars to the Institute of Development Studies (Sussex, England) in September 1985. In addition to the contributors to this volume we would like to thank the following individuals for their valued participation in the 1985 conference: Judith Appleton, Anthony Barnett, Georges Boudarel, Nayan Chanda, Nguyen Huu Dong, Teresa Halik, Udo Janz, Lam Thanh Liem, Nguyen Due Nhuan, and David Szanton. In 1986, the editors invited two scholars not at the conference, Melanie Beresford and Nguyen Huyen Chau to contribute essays of relevance to the theme of "dilemmas in socialist development." 15 Arrangements were also made for two specialists to come from Vietnam, but at the last moment they conveyed their apologies. Fortunately, since 1985 it has become less problematical to invite participants from Vietnam to such academic gatherings.

8 Postwar Vietnam keep us from concentrating too much on immediate events, and to promote comparisons with other societies. Some of these thematic exchanges proved helpful to participants as they rewrote their papers for publication. A number of other themes surfaced in the original papers or conference deliberations, and can be seen as analytical threads weaving their way through the present book. First, as suggested above, Vietnam offers a stark historical lesson in the physical and intellectual difficulties associated with moving from war to peace. Second, major changes in the international strategic environment cannot help but have a heavy impact on a small country like Vietnam, in this case to its detriment. Third, the period since 1975 has seen the departure of a whole generation of elderly communist activists; their replacements are a far more diverse lot, which has both negative and positive implications. Fourth, it is no longer acceptable to concentrate on events in the capital; a great deal of consequence is happening in the other cities, in the provinces, at district and village levels. Finally~and this accounts for the subtitle of the book-debates both inside Vietnam and abroad are positioned increasingly within the much larger debate about what it means to be socialist, or to engage in socialist development. Clearly the center of gravity has shifted away from Stalinist or Maoist formulations dominant until the early 1970s. But towards what? Many in the West gleefully answer, "Capitalism." Not really. Although it is true that most theorists in the Soviet Union, Hungary, China, or Vietnam are prepared now to admit the dire perils and pitfalls of trying to push an impoverished feudal, colonial, or semi-colonial society directly into socialism, bypassing the capitalist stage, very few are ready to jettison Lenin entirely, to endorse even a temporary "retreat" to capitalism. Instead, they dwell on a variety of "transitional" devices leading towards socialism, or "reforms" of the existing socialist system. In practice, some of the instruments associated with state socialism since the 1920s are being dismantled or remodeled, but that does not necessarily mean that these societies are becoming capitalist. To turn the issue around, no society in the world today is "capitalist" in the pure, buccaneer sense delineated by Marx in the second half of the nineteenth century. What exists is a wide range of compromises, reflecting ever-changing economic and political realities. What are needed among analysts are some new definitions, perhaps even new terms to replace the now hoary capitalist/socialist dichotomy. In the natural sciences, when a construct becomes overloaded with intricate empirical exceptions it is time for a new theory.16 The social sciences usually do not move in such a straightforward manner; yet, given the growing conceptual confusion, is it too much to hope for a new Marx or Weber in coming decades? None of the participants in this volume aspire to such lofty heights. Instead, each offers for consideration one piece in the puzzle which is contemporary Vietnam. Since Vietnam's future development will depend primarily on human knowledge and creativity, the volume begins with a detailed account of the growth and scope of the country's higher education and research institutions and personnel, followed by an account of Vietnam's attempt to make the secondary school system more practically oriented. Marr argues that Vietnam's intellectuals have unfortunately been restricted by 16 For example, it was only when Newtonian principles of physics became so surrounded by experimental qualifications that Einstein was inspired to formulate his theory of relativity, which in turn is being subjected to the same process. See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (second edition) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).

Introduction 9 severe financial constraints, ideological straitjackets, bureaucratic interference, and the legacy of wartime secrecy based on the military principle of limiting the flow of information to those with a proven "need to know." Rubin, one of the first Western researchers to carry out extended fieldwork in postwar Vietnam, describes teaching techniques and the curriculum in a school near Hanoi in the context of a survey of educational history and policy. The legacies of the Confucian and colonial educational systems, along with the continuing importance of mastering academic subjects in order to pass exams for entrance to institutions of higher education, have combined to produce a rather traditional educational system despite attempts at reforms. While a relatively high educational level among the population is one of Vietnams primary assets for development, the country's high rate of population growth is one of the major liabilities which, unless controlled, will eat up any future gains in economic production. Chau provides an overview of Vietnam's war-distorted demographic structure and the history of official and particularly Women's Union attempts at promoting birth control. Traditional attitudes to gender roles and fertility have been identified as the primary obstacles to the implementation of family planning. The next set of articles deal with postwar economic policies, performance, and reforms. Tri provides a detailed critical summary of the record of the first postwar decade, the period of the Second and Third Five-Year Plans, focusing particularly on the negative effects of socialist transformation efforts in the south: the campaign against the Chinese compradore bourgeoisie and attempts at cooperativization and at achieving state control of the industrial sector. In the country as a whole, a drastic decline in the standard of living, including widespread malnutrition, has been a major concern for Vietnamese of all social strata. Paine launches a spirited attack, from the viewpoint of a Cambridge-school socialist economist, on the record of central planning in Third World "shortage economies" and makes a case for the "small state" which does not attempt to control all economic transactions administratively or to monopolize investment, but concentrates instead on developing the physical and social infrastructure. Her death shortly after the conference was a great loss; her contribution has been edited from the taped conference proceedings. Beresford provides a systematic overview, from a viewpoint grounded in Marxist economic theory, of the issues involved in economic unification, which include overcoming not only the legacy of two decades of north-south separation but also the tradition of village autarky, particularly in the north. She also describes important policy changes away from the postwar stress on heavy industry and large-scale cooperativization. Post-1979 reform policies have favored small industrial and handicraft production, especially of consumer and export-oriented goods, and, in agriculture, peasant households farming cooperative land on contract. Spoor analyzes the attempt, spearheaded by the economic reformers, to transform postwar Vietnam's inherited system of highly centralized planning and financing to a partially decentralized system with economic responsibility and accounting at the level of the socialist enterprise. While difficult reading for those not familiar with the vocabulary and concepts used in socialist economics, it is the most detailed available presentation of the differences between the old and reformed economic systems in Vietnam. White argues that top-level differences over postwar agricultural policy along the lines of the economic debates outlined in the chapters by Beresford and Spoor were discernable

10 Postwar Vietnam as early as 1974. The economic reforms, she argues, constitute a crucial break from the ideological straitjacket of the orthodox Marxist-Leninist and Maoist concept of the "struggle between the two roads" which, by condemning family-based petty-commodity production as "capitalist," had produced economic stagnation and political stalemate in the countryside. Neither the state nor the peasantry was able efficiently to control production and investment. While the reforms are often justified ideologically in Vietnam with reference to Lenin's NEP, the concept of harmonizing the "three interests" (state, cooperative, and family), has also been used. This opens the way to conceptualizing the reform package as an alternative strategy of socialist transformation, not a concession to capitalism. Werner analyzes attempts to strengthen the role of the district, an administrative level between the province and the village, in the context of the economic reforms since the late 1970s. Particularly in the early 1980s, the district was strongly promoted as the most appropriate level for regulating peasant-state economic transactions and for integrating agricultural and industrial development at the local level. Although originally promoted by the late Secretary General Le Duan and his now discredited proteg6 To Huu, the district must still be taken seriously when examining the effects of reforms on local administration and economic performance. Completing this section on economic policy and practice, Long provides a detailed critique of cooperativization in the south, arguing that government policies were not sufficiently attuned to local conditions. More progress could have been made if the government had increased investments in agriculture in the Mekong Delta rather than continuing to push the policy of cooperativization. The next section deals with such major political questions as: the problem of succession as the revolutionary leadership passes from the scene; the relationship between the party and the military; and the role of the military in economic development. Thayer's study of the regularization of the process of leadership change in Vietnam's leading Central Committee rejects factional analysis in favor of a theory of sectoral representation. His findings are that power has already passed to a younger generation, that provincial leaders have increasing influence in the national system, and that, despite the long war, military representation on the Central Committee has not increased. Turley examines the relationship of the military to the political system, concluding that direct conflict between the Party and Army is virtually unimaginable. In the postwar period the military has been called upon to play a role in economic development, a demand which conflicts with the tendency towards increased professionalization. With its Spartan and egalitarian tradition, as well as concern for pay, the military may well be the institution least enthusiastic about economic reforms. The concluding section examines emerging patterns in Vietnam's international economic relations. Petrasovits provides an overview of Vietnam's interaction with the CMEA as well as giving a rare insight into debates within Eastern European countries over trade with Vietnam. The dominant view in Hungary is that Vietnam's participation in the CMEA is a burden on Eastern Europe's struggling economies, especially given the fact that the bulk of Vietnam's most desired exports go to the Soviet Union. However, Petrasovits makes a case for mutual economic advantage, especially through direct agreements between Hungarian and Vietnamese enterprises, a process facilitated by the economic reforms in both countries. She makes it clear that, although an economic case can

Introduction 11 be made, at present the motivation for trade is more political than economic interest per se. From the vantage point of his former position as administrator of the UNDP development program in Hanoi, England summarizes postwar international development assistance to Vietnam and points out priority areas for future aid. He argues that> despite problems, Vietnam is capable of absorbing aid, which should be based on a practical and well-researched assessment of the country's needs. As contributors to this book demonstrate in detail, Vietnam faces daunting obstacles to development. Some are clearly linked to wartime destruction and dependency on foreign aid (both south and north of the seventeenth parallel). Others relate more to ideological assumptions. Still others are the product of structural limitations only partly appreciated by those in power, although a constant preoccupation for the other 65 million Vietnamese who must somehow make their way within the system. Finally, Vietnam shares with so many other Third World countries grinding poverty, an excessive population growth rate, environmental degradation, and continuing sharp demarcations between city and countryside. However, the essays in this volume also offer grounds for optimism. Vietnam is not a permanent basket case, although aid officials in Moscow must sometimes wonder. It possesses considerable natural resources. Also, anyone who goes to Vietnam and talks with people will sense both resiliency and great human potential. Anyone who studies Vietnam's long history knows this is the case. It is up to current generations, especially those who have come of age since the end of the thirty-year war, to get it right.

This page intentionally left blank

Knowledge and Society

This page intentionally left blank

TERTIARY EDUCATION, RESEARCH, AND THE INFORMATION SCIENCES IN VIETNAM David G. Man

Vietnamese intellectuals are periodically reminded that it was Vietnamese cleverness and creativity which beat the French, the Americans, and the Chinese, not sophisticated weaponry, and that human intelligence remains Vietnam's most precious capital in the current struggle to develop the economy.1 Having mapped out very ambitious development goals for the next few decades, Vietnam's leaders are acutely aware of the need for more scientists, social scientists, university teachers, and university educated managers and administrators. Already they can point proudly to expanded tertiary enrollments, increased staff numbers, expanded infrastructure (libraries, laboratories, computers, conferences, overseas academic exchanges), international recognition for particular Vietnamese scholars, and the solution of specific high priority problems by local research teams. Nevertheless, some leaders will acknowledge privately that the quality of tertiary education has declined in recent years, and that new problems for research seem to crop up as fast (or faster) than old ones are solved. With peacetime expansion of universities and research institutes also have come new difficulties in planning, financing, coordination, and communication. With growing doubts about the ability of the present political leadership to grapple with highly complex economic issues have come urgent calls for wider public consultation and more delegation of responsibility to specialists. Tertiary Education Vietnam's tertiary system traces its origins to imperial court-sponsored schools of classical learning (quoc tu giam), and subsequently, the colonial University of Hanoi. In 1954, most staff members moved south to provide the core of the Republic of Vietnam's (RVN) University of Saigon. The University of Hanoi, as reconstituted in 1955, came under firm control of a Worker's Party (now Communist Party) committee. Most of the forty teachers and 500 students were Viet Minh intellectuals returning from resistance zones. Priority went to training teachers and doctors. During the next five years, with substantial assistance from the Soviet Union, fourteen additional tertiary institutions were established in Hanoi, under as many different government ministries.2 One of the most remarkable ac-

1 Ha Hoc Trac, "Ve tiem luc khoa hoc cua cac truong dai hoc" [On the scientific potential of the universities], To Quoc, 1984, no. 11:16-18. 2

Nguy Nhu Kontum, "30 nam phat trien cac truong dai hoc o thu do" [30 years development of universities in the capital], To Quoc, 1984, no. 10; 12-14. 15

16

Postwar Vietnam

complishments by 1960 was the transformation of all tertiary textbooks, lectures, and classroom discussions from the French language to Vietnamese3 (a process not completed at the University of Saigon until the early 1970s). During the late 1950s and 1960s, socialist countries, including China, accepted several thousand students per year from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), while the United States and its allies did likewise for the south. Between 1965 and 1970 all tertiary schools in northern cities were forced to move to the countryside to try to avoid American bomb attacks. DRV tertiary enrollments dropped from 69,902 in 1970 to 55,701 in 1974, but this probably reflected a substantial increase in acceptance of Vietnamese students by Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries.4 In South Vietnam in 1974, 96,916 tertiary students were enrolled, 80 percent in the faculties of letters or law.5 As of 1974, about 85,000 individuals hi North Vietnam possessed tertiary degrees,6 while the south had about 70,000.7 Following the complete communist victory in April 1975, the new authorities encouraged South Vietnamese academics to remain at their posts. However, all younger male staff members were subject to call to "re-education camps," since the former RVN government, as part of universal conscription, had enrolled them as lieutenants in the Army. For the majority the experience was brief if unpleasant. Almost 1,200 other Saigon intellectuals, including older university teachers, attended a "basic political course" from December 1975 to April 1976. After those baptisms in the new way, teachers of the natural sciences, medicine, and engineering found that little had changed in their conditions of employment, except that they had to attend occasional political instruction sessions, and were expected to give special assistance to new students from revolutionary or workingclass backgrounds. On the other hand, social science and humanities teachers had to assimilate and endorse sweeping alterations in course content before being permitted to lecture again. Tenured staff who refused to teach the new curriculum might still remain on the public payroll, albeit under a cloud, without students, and with little hope of publishing their work. Not surprisingly, many joined the refugee exodus after 1978. By that time, private universities established in the south by various religious organizations (Catholic, Buddhist, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao) had been closed down or transferred to state control. In 1983, Vietnam boasted fifty-three different tertiary teaching institutions, the most recent being the Law College established in Ha Son Binh province in 1980:8

3

Nguyen KhanhToan, et al., Tieng Viet va day dai hoc bang tieng Viet [Vietnamese and university teaching in Vietnamese] (Hanoi, 1967). 4

Tran Phuong in an interview on December 31, 1974, indicated that about 10,000 students returned from overseas each year. Many of these went for only one or two years, and some were from PRO zones in the south.

5

James E. Coughlan, "Education in Southern Vietnam since Liberation: Education for Development?" unpublished paper (Canberra, ANU, 1978), p. 33. 6

Tran Dai Nghia, "30 Years of Scientific and Technical Achievements in the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam (1945-1975)," Vietnamese Studies 49 (1977): 33.

7

At the moment this figure is based on a crude extrapolation from 1959-1968 tertiary enrollments and 19621969 overseas scholarship figures, in Vien Quoc Gia Thong Ke, Nien giam thong ke Viet Nam 1970 [Vietnam Statistical Yearbook 1970] (Saigon, 1970), pp 122-23,132-33.

8 Tap Chi Hoat Dong Khoa Hoc (Scientific Activities Journal) [hereafter TCHDKH] (Hanoi), 1984, no. 1: 4546. Viet Nam Courier [hereafter VNC, 1983, no. 9: 30-31. This list does not include vocational or military schools, nor at least 136 teacher training schools lacking tertiary accreditation.

Tertiary Education 17 Comprehensive universities (Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, Hue) Medical schools Polytechnics Teacher training colleges Agricultural colleges Institutions connected with specific ministries or departments Other Total

3 5 3 9 5

24 4 53

Only sixteen of these institutions were administered by the Ministry of Higher and Vocational Education. Presumably following Soviet precedent, the Hanoi authorities had allowed a wide variety of specialized schools to crop up, most of them tied to a particular technocratic or bureaucratic constituency. Thirty-one tertiary institutions (59 percent of the total) were concentrated in the two urban centers of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, where only about 9 percent of the population resided. Hanoi alone had about 40 percent of all tertiary teachers, and 36 percent of tertiary students.9 Although policy statements indicated that the government wanted both to break down barriers between schools and to promote a degree of geographic decentralization, progress was proving very difficult. Between 1975 and 1979, tertiary student numbers rose dramatically, from 92,100 to 158,800, reflecting pent up wartime demand for education and the release of some People's Army and Liberation Army cadres into the civilian sector. This was despite the fact that tertiary enrollments in the south dropped 66 percent between 1974 and 1976.10 Somehow teacher numbers managed to keep up with the surge, rising from 9,600 in 1975 to 16,000 in 1979. In 1980, however, a drop of 10,600 students was recorded, as both government and citizenry encountered serious financial difficulties. Throughout 1975-1980, only about 12 percent of enrolled students graduated each year, reflecting the fact that some were dropping out entirely, while perhaps as many as one-third took courses parttime. Nevertheless, between 1975 and 1979 a total of 77,600 students graduated from universities and colleges, easily compensating-at least in statistical terms-for the brain drain due to refugee departures.11 In 1980, women constituted only about 17 percent of the tertiary teaching staff and 25 percent of the students.12 By 1984 those figures had risen to 27 percent and 39 percent respectively. Nonetheless, only 2.8 percent of the full professors and 4 percent of the associate professors were women.13 Overseas study continues to be very important. As of early 1985, nearly 5,000 Vietnamese students were enrolled in 150 different universities and colleges in the Soviet Union. 9

VNC, 1982, no. 10: 26.

10

Ministry of Education, p. 45. Stewart E. Fraser, "Education in Vietnam," The Education Magazine, 34, 5 (1977): 41. 11

Ministry of Education, p. 45.

12

Birgitte Sevefjord, Women in Vietnam-Women in Bai Bang (Stockholm: Swedish International Development Authority [henceforth SIDA], 1985), p. 14. 13

Vietnam News Bulletin, (Canberra, Embassy of the SRV, April 1986), pp. 6-7.

18

Postwar Vietnam

Over the past three decades the Soviet Union has helped train more than 70,000 specialists.14 Possibly another 30,000 trained in other CMEA countries, and an equivalent number studied in China during the late 1950s and 1960s. Particularly in the natural sciences, engineering, and medicine, the intellectual elite of Vietnam is now very much a part of the CMEA network. For example, the director of the Physio-Biochemistry Center at Vietnam's Institute of Sciences, Dr Nguyen Tai Luong, obtained his masters degree at Metnikov University in Odessa in 1968, with a thesis on the effects of rice on stomach action. He later co-authored a book with Dr. R. O. Feitelberg on absorption in the human digestive system. After successfully defending his PhD dissertation in 1974, Dr Luong returned to Hanoi to take responsibility for several state research projects designed to improve the quality of food intake for both humans and livestock.15 Vietnam's educational dilemmas become most evident at the graduate level. Although CMEA countries continue to provide significant numbers of graduate scholarships, Vietnamese administrators would like more.16 A small but significant number study at Western institutions, particularly in the Netherlands and France.17 Meanwhile, increasing attention has been given to developing graduate instruction inside Vietnam. Since 1976 forty-six Vietnamese institutions have been authorized by the government to enroll and train graduate students. These include fourteen universities and colleges, two military academies (for technology and medicine), and thirty research institutes.18 Standards have been set quite high, partly with an eye to obtaining CMEA equivalency recognition for any degrees awarded. Only in the discipline of mathematics is it felt that sufficient numbers of experts are available in Vietnam to insure proper preparation and defense by graduate students of a full doctoral thesis. Students in other disciplines often begin work inside the country but then complete the full doctorate in the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, "candidate doctorates" (pho tien si) can be achieved entirely at home, but the competition is intense for scarce resources.19 At Ho Chi Minh City University in 1984, although about 600 graduate students were on the books, only about one-tenth could be accommodated in existing advance research units, and no one had yet achieved a candidate doctorate.20 Can Tho College had only seven graduate students, in agronomy and microbiology.21

14

VNC, 1985, no. 3: 14. Many of these did not obtain tertiary degrees, and indeed some were enrolled in secondary or vocational schools. 15 VNC, 1982, no. 9: 23-25. Another interesting example is the young physicist Vu NangThi, whose B.Sc. studies at the University of Minsk and subsequent career are described in Viet Nam (Pictorial), 1984, no. 3: 8-9. 16 See, for example, Nguyen Canh Toan, "Nghien cuu khoa hoc trong nganh giao due 40 nam qua" [40 years of scientific research in the education field], TCHDKH, 9 (1985), no. 9: 20, where the author indicates that about twenty educational science students going overseas each year is clearly insufficient. 17 Penelope Lee, compiler, "A Report of an ACFOA Delegation to Indochina" (Canberra: Australian Committee for Overseas Aid [ACFOA] 1985). 18 TCHDKH, 1984, no. 2: 41-42. Translation available in FBIS, Vietnam Fact Book (Washington: Joint Publications Research Service [henceforth JPRS], August 1985), pp. 87-88. 19

. Interview February 29,1988 with Dr. Bui Thien Du, Ministry of Higher Education, TCHDKH, 1985,no. 8: 10-11. 20

Interview with Nguyen Huu Chi, member of the University's Governing Council, September 5,1984.

21

Interview in Ho Chi Minh City with Professor Vo Tong Xuan, September 5,1984.

Tertiary Education 19 In 1983, about 250,000 people in Vietnam possessed tertiary diplomas.22 While this represented only 0.9 percent of the working-age population of 27 million, it was certainly sufficient in theory to improve the quality of life in the country and make possible a variety of important research and development projects. Yet, the authorities refused to trust a large proportion of pre-1975 university graduates in the south, denying them state employment and sometimes even excluding them from libraries. Among more recent university graduates, reports persisted of poor preparation for job assignments, or of administrators failing to place them in positions appropriate to their skills.23 Many criticisms are leveled at the tertiary education system besides an alleged tendency to under-emphasize practical knowledge. Communist Party leaders complain about reduced political enthusiasm among both students and young staff members. Compulsory university classes in (Marxist-Leninist) political theory are said to be dry and unappealing. Young teachers do not take sufficient pride in being socialist "engineers of the soul," or in upholding the tradition of centuries of patriotic Vietnamese literati.24 Professors are bothered that too many students, having passed the tortuous entrance examinations and obtained a scholarship, then tend to coast along for the duration of university training. Students feel placidly confident of obtaining a secure public payroll job even if their tertiary performance is mediocre.25 As graduation approaches, it is said, many students maneuver feverishly for urban rather than rural postings. They do not appear especially eager to become Party members, and the campus Communist Youth organization is often weak.26 On the other hand, no one raises the specter of Vietnamese tertiary institutions serving as foci of youthful political discontent as in China in 1987. Gifted tertiary students are now tending to avoid the teaching profession, and many parents agree with their decisions. Some teachers even become upset when their own children express a wish to follow in their footsteps.27 Perhaps one reason, at least at the primary and secondary school levels, is that teaching is increasingly becoming stereotyped as "women's work." In 1980, about 64 percent of primary teachers and 42 percent of secondary teachers were female. Nor is the teaching profession a place to get ahead in the Communist Party; indeed, only 15 percent of secondary and primary schools have Party branches.28

22

Dao Van Tap, "Problems in Socialist Construction," Vietnam Social Sciences 1 (1984): 31. An additional 700^000 had achieved "secondary technical scientific level." VNC, 1982, no. 3: 5, indicates 245,000 university graduates and 529,400 holders of "secondary level" diplomas. Meanwhile, possibly 30,000 tertiary graduates had left Vietnam as refugees between 1975 and 1984. 23

See, for example, VNC, 1983, no. 9: 30-31, and Nguyen Xuan Lai, "Economic Development 1976-1985," Vietnamese Studies 71 (1983): 49.

24

Le Van Thuong, "Nguoi thay giao dai hoc" [The university teacher], To Quoc, 1984, no. 11:19-21.

25

Tran Kim Thach, "Co che moi nhat dinh thang" [The new mechanism will surely win], Doan Ket (Paris), 379 (April 1986): 31-32.

26

Le Van Thuong, "Nang cao chat luong dao tao o bac dai hoc" [Upholding the quality of training at university level], To Quoc (Hanoi), 1984, no. 4: 26-29. 27 Ha Hoc Trac, "Ve tiem luc khoa hoc cua cac truong dai hoc" [On the scientific potential of the universities], To Quoc, 1984, no. 11:18. 28

Nguyen Thi Binh, "Muoi nam xay dung va phat trien giao due pho thong cua nuoc Viet-nam thong nhat" [Ten years building and developing general education in reunified Vietnam], Tap Chi Cong San [Communist Journal] (hereafter TCCS), 1985, no. 5:41-47.

20

Postwar Vietnam

However, far more important are the financial liabilities that come with being a teacher in Vietnam today. Between 1982 and 1985 the percentages of total government expenditure devoted to education dropped from 18.2 percent to 13.2 percent.29 While inflation (estimated at 1,000 percent in 1987) is demoralizing to everyone on low, fixed salaries, teachers have far fewer opportunities to earn supplemental income than do physicians, scientists, technicians, engineers, or skilled workers. Perhaps their only advantage over those professions is their ability to improve the chances of their children entering university. When it comes to engaging in illegal practices to sustain one's family, some Party officials, government clerks, and policemen receive bribes or traffic in state property, but one very seldom hears of teachers altering examination marks for payment or trying to sell laboratory test tubes. Instead, pathetic stories circulate of teachers selling ice-cream sticks to pupils at recess time, or using their motorbikes or bicycles to carry paying passengers in the evening.30 Not being able to eliminate the deleterious effects of inflation, at least in the short term, the government has tried to boost morale among teachers by bestowing public honors. At the tertiary level in 1980, full professorships were conferred on eighty-three members of university faculties and research institutes.31 State medals have been awarded periodically to elderly academics.32 A few university teachers are elected regularly to the National Assembly. Senior academics compete vigorously for permission to attend foreign conferences, at which time it is also possible to purchase and carry home scarce consumer commodities. Considerable publicity is given to researchers who successfully defend their PhD theses at Soviet universities. Tertiary teachers can also be spurred on by the prospect of graduate study in their chosen field. Compared to demand, however, the number of graduate awards to study either overseas or at home is very small, and teachers must compete for selection with members of the many research institutes. In practice, whether one is in a university or an institute, it may be ten years or more before one is permitted to apply formally (and in some cases take an examination) for graduate training, or even secure a position in a research laboratory. Research

As one of the twenty poorest countries in the world, Vietnam simply cannot afford to devote substantial resources to research, even when it is known in principle that various research programs can help break the domestic cycle of poverty. According to one estimate, Vietnam probably spends only about 0.3 percent of its gross national product on research and the initial application of research findings.33 Nonetheless, a surprisingly 29

International Monetary Fund, "Viet Nam-Recent Economic Developments" (Washington, D.C., June 30, 1986), p. 49. The 1986 budget proposed to raise this to 16.1 percent.

30

Apparently a 1983 or 1984 government statute prohibits university teachers from engaging in all activities "incompatible with the dignity of their position." Bulledingue (Paris), July 1984, pp. 10-11. This is unlikely to reduce moonlighting significantly.

31

VNC, 1980, no. 7: 24. Another 347 received the rank of associate professor.

32

For example, see To Quoc, 1984, no. 9: 3.

33

Jon Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology. A Tentative Description of Structure and Planning (Lund, Sweden: University of Lund, 1982), p. 13. Tran Dai Nghia (in TCHDKH, 1984, no. 4: 10) revealed plans for the research budget to be 1 percent of national income by 1985, 2 percent in 1986, and 4 percent in

Tertiary Education 21 complex research infrastructure has materialized in Vietnam, currently employing about 30,000 people, of whom one-third possess undergraduate diplomas and almost 1,000 hold graduate degrees.34 As with universities and colleges, research institutes have tended to proliferate more as the result of ad hoc bureaucratic initiatives than according to any long-term plans for the development and dissemination of knowledge. Already in 1960 there were twenty-three research institutes in North Vietnam, and by 1975 the figure had risen to eighty. Nationwide by 1984 it was possible to count one hundred and forty-five research institutes and twenty independent centers, not to mention ninety universities, colleges, and higher secondary schools with research interests.35 To complicate matters further, after 1975 many Hanoi research organizations proceeded to set up their own subordinate sections in Ho Chi Minh City.36 Possibly three-quarters of the government's research budget went to research institutes controlled by twenty different specialized ministries and departments, while the remainder was divided among the universities, the State Commission for Science and Technology, and the Social Science Commission.37 In such circumstances, it should not surprise us that research bodies vary widely in size and performance. A few institutes received clear mandates upon establishment, have stuck to their jobs over the decades, and continue to enjoy firm, if necessarily modest, state support.38 Others were poorly conceived, yet have been permitted to linger on indefinitely. Still others make sense in principle, but have never acquired sufficiently qualified personnel to accomplish the task assigned to them. Institutes often prefer to entrust new research initiatives to unqualified internal staff rather than hire acknowledged experts from outside.39 About half of all research institutes are housed in temporary buildings or in space belonging to other organizations. Research equipment remains extremely scarce, yet that which does exist is only being used at 30-40 percent of capacity. Sophisticated equipment donated from overseas is sometimes damaged by the erratic electricity supply or by absence of proper temperature and humidity controls.40 Libraries often take several years to catalog foreign publications. Duplicate copies are not passed to other libraries.

1988 or 1989. This was surely wishful thinking. By way of comparison, Prof. Sigurdson estimated that China and South Korea spent 0.6 percent. In an interview, March 7,1988, Mr Tran Tri, of the State Commission for Science and Technology, admitted that formulation of such goals had proven to be a "questionable enterprise." 34

Nguyen Thanh Thinh, 'To chuc va kien toan cac co quan nghien cuu khoa hoc va trien khai ky thuat o nuoc ta" [Organizing and perfecting scientific research and technology dissemination institutions in our country], TCHDKH, 1986, no. 11: 30. On the other hand, VNC, 1985, no. 4: 26, claims nearly 20,000 researchers in Ho Chi Minh City alone. Different definitions of "researcher" are probably being employed. 35

Nguyen Thanh Thinh, 'To chuc va kien toan," p. 30.

36

See, for example, Ho Si Thoang, "10 nam xay dung truong thanh va phuc vu cua phan Vien Khoa Hoc Viet Nam tai thanh pho Ho Chi Minh" [Ten years development and service by the Ho Chi Minh City branch of the Vietnam Science Institute], TCHDKH, 1985, no. 4:18-20, 29.

37

Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology, p. 28.

38

In this category, Nguyen Thanh Thinh, 'To chuc va kien toan," p. 30, lists the following institutes: Hygiene and Epidemiology, Malaria, Entomology and Parasitology, Communications Technology, Animal Husbandry; Food Crops; and Forest Construction Planning. From the social sciences one might add the Economics Institute and Archaeology Institute. 39

Tran Kim Thach, "Co che moi nhat dinh thang," p. 32.

40

Nguyen Thanh Thinh, 'To chuc va kien toan," p. 31.

22

Postwar Vietnam

A number of institutes were established without consulting the State Commission for Science and Technology, which is supposed to formulate policy and coordinate research for all sectors of the economy. Inevitably this has led to duplication. In 1979, for example, the State Commission for Basic Construction founded four research institutes which closely paralleled ones already existing under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Construction. In other cases attempts have been made to consolidate research occurring within several different ministries or universities, but without deciding who is in charge.41 Prominent researchers are sometimes appointed to advisory councils outside their own institutions. Cross-fertilization is encouraged but remains informal, as symbolized by a 1983 published list of individuals responsible for scientific and technical matters in forty different ministries, departments, and commissions.42 In April 1981, the government resolved that research institutes and universities could sign service contracts directly with production units (factories, construction teams, cooperatives, state farms), and use the proceeds to cover running costs and supplement employee wages.43 In actual fact this legitimized a practice which had been going on "underground" for some years already. Nonetheless, more than two years later official instructions for implementation of the 1981 resolution had still not appeared, reflecting important differences of opinion over how to determine the monetary value of "research labor," what lands of contracts to permit, and who was going to control the income. Some hardline officials continued to argue that research work should be remunerated the same as factory or desk labor, that contracts should be limited to flat payment for jobs accomplished, and that all proceeds should be assimilated to a research institution's existing budget, for supervision and allocation according to standard state regulations. As might be expected, many researchers argued that the results of "creative labor" ought to be compensated at a higher level than ordinary labor, that contracts should permit research institutes to share in any producer profits resulting from innovations, and that each research institute should be able to decide how resulting income is utilized, with no interference from state functionaries.44 While these issues are not likely to be decided definitively one way or another until broader ideological questions are resolved, the trend currently is in favor of the research institutions and away from the state accountants. As of 1984, universities throughout Vietnam had signed a total of 2,171 research and development contracts valued at 273 million dong.45 Although a few institutes may now receive as much money from outside contract work as from the state budget, they seem reluctant to publicize such entrepreneurial successes.46 Some are now borrowing significant amounts from the State Bank to finance 41

Ibid., pp. 31-32.

42

TCHDKH, 1983, no. 10: 39-40.

43

The April 29,1981 Government Resolution (175 ICP) followed by nine days a verbose Politbureau resolution, on science and technology, which is translated in large part in Vietnamese Studies 67 (1981?): 7-43.

44

Vu Cao Dam, "Can nhanh chong ban hanh thong tu huong dan thuc hien Quyet dinh 175/CP" [We must quickly promulgate instructions implementing Resolution 175/CP], TCHDKH, 1983, no. 10: 25-27; 40. The author bluntly advocates the pro-researcher position and implicitly criticizes the state bureaucrats, something no one could have done in print a year or two earlier.

45

Nguyen Van Than, "Cac truong dai hoc dua tien bo khoa hoc ky thuat vao san xuat va doi song" [Universities put scientific and technological advances into production and life], TCHDKH, 1985, no. 3: 26.

46

The Ho Chi Minh City section of the Science Institute did admit to contract income worth 150 percent of state allocations. Ho Si Thoang, "10 nam xay dung truong," p. 20.

Tertiary Education 23 outside contracts.47 As of 1984, guidelines allowed at least 30 percent of contract income to go to institute employees in the form of salary bonuses.48 Local Party cells probably decide how such rewards are divided mternally~high-flying researchers being expected to share liberally with support staff. Despite these reforms, a lot of researchers, "including many of special talent, advanced education and positions of leadership," have been forced to seek additional private work to sustain themselves and their families.49 Despite such structural and financial problems, important achievements have been recorded. In this respect, probably the most impressive research body in Vietnam is the Science Institute, an umbrella organization which has grown in recent years to include at least 2,100 staff members working in nine institutes, six centers, and five sections or laboratories. Besides disciplinary-based organizations devoted to mathematics, cybernetics, mechanics, physics, chemistry, biology, earth sciences, and oceanography, the Science Institute encompasses two regional research bodies (at Ho Chi Minh City and Dalat), a tropical technology institute, and a scientific equipment plant.50 The state has set the Science Institute nine major research tasks, including detailed surveys of weather patterns and land and water resources, agro-biology applications, improving metallurgy techniques, the development of higher quality industrial products (catalysts, semi-conductors, paints, food processing chemicals, pharmaceuticals, measuring devices), and microcomputer testing and development.51 One measure of the importance attached to Science Institute projects by Party and government leaders is the large number of foreign scholars permitted to come to Vietnam at its invitation, not only from CMEA countries but Western ones as well. Most notably, the Science Institute has hosted a score or more specialists from the United States, and, with assistance from the US Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam, has sent an equivalent number in the reverse direction. Generally each specialist not only tours relevant facilities but offers lectures or seminars and perhaps attends a conference. A few joint projects have been undertaken, for example designing portable solar drying equipment,52 studying ecological damage from herbicides, and improving the nitrogen fixation capabilities of selected Vietnamese crops.53 Some of the most exciting work in Vietnam today involves application of international advances in biology to local agricultural problems. The Science Institute takes credit for

47

Nguyen Thanh Thinh, "To chuc va kien toan," p. 31.

48

Interview with Professor Nguyen Lan Dung, head of the Applied Microbiology Centre, Hanoi University, August 18,1984. 49

Vu Cao Dam, "Can nhanh chong," p. 40.

50

Nguyen Van Hieu, "Vien Khoa Hoc Viet Nam: 10 nam xay dung va phat trien" [The Vietnam Science Institute: ten years building and developing], TCHDKH, 1985, no. 8: 2-7, 28. Nguyen Van Dao, "Ten Years of Activity of the Vietnam Institute of Sciences," VNC, 1985, no. 10: 20-21, 23. Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology, pp. 28,34-35; A-l. 51

Nhan Dan, March 21, 1985, reprinted in Doan Ket 370 (May 1985): 30. TCHDKH, 1985, no. 5, 26-28. TCHDKH, 1985, no. 6: 35-37. TCHDKH, 1985, no. 8: 8-11. 52

Steve M. Slaby, "An American Engineer's Journey to Vietnam," The Princeton Engineer, September-October 1980, pp. 6-8.

53

Reports and newsletters of US Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam, 1980-1984. With the killing of the committee's chairman, Dr. Edward Cooperman, by a Vietnamese refugee in November 1984, these exchanges suffered a major setback.

24

Postwar Vietnam

improving potato, corn, soybean, and tobacco seed varieties, for developing useful bacteria cultures, and for enhancing organic fertilizers and biological pest control. Assisted by ten Soviet specialists, the Institute of Agricultural Sciences and Technology has collected and preserved some 6,000 varieties of native and imported strains of rice, each with its own biological record.54 The Center for Applied Microbiology at the University of Hanoi is analyzing the nitrogen fixation capabilities of existing plants, as well as possible genetic alterations to rice seeds that can dramatically reduce the need for fertilizers.55 General articles on genetics display an almost religious zeal, Vietnamese scientists being pictured as engaged in a lofty international quest to unlock nature's remaining secrets, manipulate genes, and thus produce incredible new benefits for mankind.56 Once again, however, a great deal of research duplication is evident. When restructuring an overall system is not possible, the normal bureaucratic response is to establish an inter-departmental committee. For example, the "Steering Committee for Biology in the Service of Agriculture" is composed of twelve members from seven different institutes and universities; it also has four subcommittees and twenty specialized teams.57 To complicate matters further, Vietnamese agro-biologists must liaise regularly with CMEA representatives who monitor technical aid in five program sectors: rice, corn, beans, cattle, and pigs.58 Bureaucratically speaking, perhaps the most intricate effort ever authorized was compilation of a National Atlas for Vietnam. Although listed as a priority project hi the 19761980 State Plan, only ten maps were drafted and a committee established during that period. When announcing the 1981-1985 plan, the Politbureau affirmed that the atlas would be completed "at an early date." Preliminary training took place in Havana, and the Geography Institute of the USSR Academy of Science provided subsequent assistance. Unfortunately, the discipline of geography has no single home in Vietnam: natural geography is the responsibility of one state organ, economic geography of another, and the teaching of specialists yet another. Each map was assigned to a particular ministry, but those responsible have often experienced difficulty in obtaining necessary data from other ministries. The engineering industries map, for example, was being compiled by the Ministry of Engineering and Metallurgy, but it also required details about factories run by the mining and coal, chemicals, transport and communications, agriculture, and forestry ministries - plus others under provincial and city jurisdictions. Certain maps could not begin before others were completed (e.g. geology had to wait for the subsoil and hydrography maps).59 At some point the Science Institute assumed responsibility for final compilation. In 1985, a "first draft" of the National Atlas was promised by the end of the year.60 The final product has not yet appeared, and when printed, it can be safely assumed that the atlas will be classified.

54

To Quoc, 1984, no. 8: 36-37. Viet Nam (Pictorial) 295 (7-1983): p. 22.

55

Nguyen Lan Dung, "Chien luoc sinh hoc" [Biology strategy], To Quoc, 1984, no. 6: 33-35. Interview notes, Hanoi, August 18,1984.

56

To Quoc, 1984, no. 1: 32-36.

57

Alan Hooper, "Biology as Applied to Agriculture in Vietnam," unpublished report, 1980, pp. 18-22.

58

TCHDKH, 1985, no. 9: 30-32.

59

VNC,1983,no. 12,19-21.

60

Nguyen Van Dao, "Ten Years of Activity," p. 21.

Tertiary Education 25 Although the 1981-1985 State Plan deliberately reversed course and emphasized agricultural over industrial development, this shift is not necessarily reflected in Vietnam's research establishment. Of course, people trained in a particular discipline cannot shift as quickly as the priorities of state planners. In December 1980, about 40 percent of the 1,836 advanced degree holders might be said to specialize in industry-related topics (energy, mining, metallurgy, geology, mechanical engineering, construction, electronics, communications, physics, chemistry, marine biology), while at most 25 percent specialized in topics related to agriculture or forestry.61 Also in 1980, of the 430 individuals promoted to the rank of professor or associate professor, approximately 45 percent were in industryrelated fields, and only 13 percent hi agriculture or forestry.62 At the prestigious Hanoi Polytechnic, which boasted 300 doctoral degree-holders, only one out of ten faculties was specifically devoted to agricultural problems.63 Since recent figures are lacking, we cannot be sure how many people have been transferred to agricultural projects. One of the dangers of advanced scientific research in a poor country like Vietnam is that a handful of experts will become more and more knowledgeable, more famous at home and overseas, while the job of translating this knowledge to the ricefield or factory floor falls further and further behind. This appears to have happened in medicine, despite the wishes of government leaders and many health scientists. Since the Resistance (19461954), a small cluster of Vietnamese physicians accredited in the late colonial period have spearheaded training of more than 10,000 doctors and 1,000 specialists at the Hanoi Faculty of Medicine. Yet, "teachers and students are now only too well aware that the heroic period has passed and that the major task of modernizing teaching requires a certain material and technical base."64 The DRV medical system of the 1950s and 1960s was far better integrated and probably more effective than the system today, which sees a small number of research and teaching hospitals trying to maintain international standards, while province and district hospitals struggle with cases referred to them from below, and thousands of village clinics are unable to deal with routine disorders for lack of basic supplies. The surgical facility established by the late Dr Ton That Tung at the Viet Due Hospital in Hanoi is possibly one of the best in the Third World.65 Vietnamese medical researchers now routinely present their finding* at international conferences and publish in specialized Russian, German, and FrencL journals.66 Ranking cadres and their families have access, when ill, to highly trained cardiac surgeons, urologists, neurologists, internists, and orthopedists, not to mention advanced drugs and medical equipment. Such facilities tend to be

61

Based on data in Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology, p. 48. The remaining 35 percent were in medicine (15.3), economics (8.3), pedagogy (5.0), social sciences (4.9), and "other" disciplines.

62

VNC, 1980, no. 7: 24. Medicine and pharmacy had a remarkable 23.7 percent, social sciences 12.8, and economics 5.3. 63

Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology, p. 46.

64

VNC, 1983, no. 1:19-20.

65 Dr. Tung's short autobiography is one of the more frank, refreshing books to appear in recent decades. Ton That Tung, Duong vao khoa hoc cua toi [My path to science] (Hanoi: Thanh Nien, 1978). Translated as Reminiscences of a Vietnamese Surgeon (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House [henceforth FLPH], 1980). 66

An Index Medicus published for the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Hanoi Faculty of Medicine, lists nearly 3,000 publications in various languages by 900 Vietnamese authors. VNC, 1983, no. 1: 19.

26

Postwar Vietnam

heavily dependent on foreign aid.67 At certain city and provincial hospitals there are said to be as many as four different wards divided according to the patient's rank.68 Meanwhile, some districts in southern Vietnam still have only one or even no resident physician, compared to as many as fifteen in northern districts. A government campaign is under way to convince more doctors and assistant doctors (y si) to move to the countryside.69 Serious health problems persist in the upland areas of northern Vietnam as well. At the Vinh Phu Pulp and Paper Mill, for example, Swedish researchers found that the three doctors and seventeen nurses had almost no medicine, and that among workers there was no prophylaxis for malaria, very little soap, and a high incidence of intestinal parasites.70 In Vietnam today it is not unusual for a hospital doctor, after diagnosing a patient, to admit that a necessary medicine, or even bandages, alcohol, plastic tubing, or syringes are lacking. This compels the patient's relatives to search frantically in the marketplace for the missing item. Although it can be argued that such shortages are temporary, other signs point to longer-term problems. In recent years there has been a modest but unmistakable resurgence of such diseases as malaria, tuberculosis, and dengue fever. Cholera and plague refuse to be eliminated. Trachoma persists. Public sanitation and personal hygiene, for several decades the strongest weapons in Vietnam's health armory, at least in the north, show signs of decline. New doctors and nurses seem less willing than ten years ago to go to rural and mountain areas. Wherever they go, miserably low state salaries leave them no option but to spend much of their time in private practice. Vietnam's health and medical system is still better than in many countries with substantially higher per capita incomes, but the aspirations expressed by Ho Chi Minh in 1945 for a healthy citizenry are still far from being realized. In the area of plant and animal genetics, the gap between research and large-scale application appears less serious. For example, Hanoi researchers obtained their first samples of IRS "miracle rice" in 1967 or 1968, and by 1971 they had already experimented with, cross-bred, and grown sufficient seed to plant 1,330,173 hectares of North Vietnamese paddy field with the new varieties.71 The high crop yields of 1972-1975 would not have been possible otherwise. Unfortunately, the government's commitment to hybrid rice strains was also one cause of low outputs in 1977-1980. Seed varieties "degenerated" after four or five years, requiring innovative replacement. Agricultural extension services failed to convey to farmers the new requirements concerning selection, treatment, and storage of

67

Malcolm Segall, "Vietnamese-Swedish Cooperation in the Health Sector Planning the Future" (Stockholm, November 1985), unpublished report, pp. 21-24. 68

Interview with N.H., Da Nang, August 21,1984.

69

Interview with Dr Truong Cong Trung, Rector of Ho Chi Minh City Medical College, September 4,1984.

70

Sevefjord, Women in Vietnam, pp. 43-47. Katarina Larsson and Lars-Erik Birgegard, Socio-Economk Study of Factors Influencing Labour Productivity in the Forestry Component of Vinh Phu Pulp and Paper Mill Project in Vietnam (Stockholm: SIDA, 1985), pp. 20-23.

71

Thanh Dam, "Nong dan Viet Nam tiep thu khoa hoc ky thuat trong qua trinh tien len chu nghia xa hoi" [Vietnamese farmers take in science and technology in the process of advancing to socialism], in Nong Dan Viet Nam Tien Len Chu Nghia Xa Hoi (Hanoi, 1979), pp. 223-24. Seed samples arrived from South Vietnam, from "cadres able to work overseas," and even from Premier Fidel Castro, who in 1968 brought twenty bags with him to Hanoi.

Tertiary Education 27 seed grain.72 Severely reduced imports of chemical fertilizers and pesticides further limited productivity. The search is now on for high-yielding rice varieties which resist local pests, require less chemical fertilizer, contain more grains per ear, and grow well in particular combinations of soil, temperature, and moisture. Due credit is given to the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the Philippines, Russian geneticists, and American microbiologists. Vietnamese specialists undoubtedly appreciate that the international exchange of seeds is simply an extension of one of the natural principles of pollination, whereby the more distant the linkage the better the chances of producing new genes and selectivity. They are also quite prepared to apply for international patents on hybrids developed in their laboratories and test plots. Indeed, the first of nine patents awarded by the OMPI (Organization Mundial de la Propriedad Intelectual-World Intellectual Property Organization) to Vietnamese inventors was for rice variety NN 75-10, created by four members of the Agricultural Sciences and Technology Institute in Hanoi.73 Other research teams are focusing on hybrid corn, potatoes, yams, sugar, pigs, and chickens, as well as the development of protein additives for human and animal consumption.74 Nonetheless, it remains questionable whether maximum advantage is being taken of such scientific innovations at the local level. Of the 30,000 agricultural engineers trained by 1983, 25,500 remained concentrated in the cities and provincial towns, with a mere 4,500 going to the district level. Only 10 percent of the chairpersons or chief accountants of the 10,000 or so cooperatives in north Vietnam had been recruited from among the 100,000 holders of higher secondary school certificates in agriculture. Only 50 out of 400 districts had their own agricultural schools. An experiment is under way to bring students from the cooperatives for four years training at the best agricultural colleges and return them directly.75 A few enterprising local farmers have sought out microbiologists to obtain new seeds and technical instruction.76 One college has adopted a case study approach to educating agricultural engineers, as distinct from the standard curriculum emphasizing general scientific knowledge.77 The agronomy teacher who initiated this case study curriculum conducted his own survey of work requirements in the countryside, from which he distilled 1,000 problem episodes likely to confront school graduates. People at all levels need reliable statistics, which are often sorely lacking in Vietnam. Undoubtedly the most ambitious data collection effort to date was the national census of October 1, 1979, praised by foreign observers for its generally careful planning and implementation. The routine vital registration system in north Vietnam is well developed, allowing statisticians to examine birth and death figures continuously according to time

72

Trinh Dat, "May y kien ve phuong huong phat trien san xuat cua cac hop tac xa o Bac bo" [Some ideas on the direction for developing production in northern cooperatives], Tap Chi Nghien Cuu Kinh Te [hereafter TCNCKT] 131 (February 1983), pp. 44-45. 73

To Quoc, 1984, no. 7: 36, 41-44; ibid., 1984, no. 9: 34-36, 41-44; TCHDKH, 1985, no. 2: 24-27.

74

TCHDKH, 1985, no. 4: 19; ibid., 1985, no. 6: 35-36; ibid., 1985, no. 8: 26.

75

VNC, 1983, no. 5:12.

76

VNC, 1986, no. 2: 20-21.

77

VNC, 1984, no. 9: 30-31.

28

Postwar Vietnam

and place.78 Morbidity statistics are somewhat less reliable, yet better than in most Third World countries. The situation in south Vietnam is slowly improving. The 1979 census shocked Vietnam's tiny corps of demographers, both in terms of the total population figures (52,741,766) and of the rate of growth (2.57 percent).79 Although the State Planning Commission proceeded to calculate the sobering economic implications, and the government launched a program to convince families to have no more than two children, births did not decline at anywhere near the rate desired. While the causes were multifold, one basic problem remained the paucity of reliable data on such things as age of marriage, birth order of children, continuation rates with various contraceptive methods, or on the age, parity, and occupational distribution of family planning acceptors. Beyond that, it was essential to survey people's attitudes about family size, receptiveness to different contraceptive methods, response to different communication techniques, and reactions to particular state policies. In the face of this need for information, there were very few individuals with graduate training in demography, and not a single population research program in a Vietnamese university or institute.80 In late 1984, the Institute of Education did conduct a poll among urban schoolteachers and higher secondary and tertiary students to ascertain levels of awareness about basic demographic and family planning information.81 Apparently resources were still lacking to poll a substantial sample in rural areas, where birth rates are higher. Soon after the 1976 Fourth Party Congress, the Social Sciences Commission was permitted to establish a Sociology Department to train cadres in this unfamiliar discipline and to conduct surveys. Guest lecturers came from the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, Belgium, and Japan. Between 1978 and 1980, department staff and students carried out a study of urban housing problems (which are severe, especially in Hanoi), interviewing 9,000 families. The Sociology Department then began to examine modes of living of various social strata in Hanoi, surely a politically delicate topic. In 1982, prime attention in the north shifted to surveys on marriage and the family, while in the south a sub-group of the department analyzed the social legacies of neo-colonialism. This research represented a promising initiative in the social sciences, yet for some reason the Sociology Department seemed to falter. In 1983, the department was said to be still weak, its results meager. Other important research topics, such as the social consequences of the production contract system, the sociology of management, juvenile misbehavior, religions, the elderly, would have to wait.82 Although sociology was promoted from department to institute status in 1984, the discipline had still not found a secure niche in Vietnam, and was devoting inordinate amounts of time to distinguishing "socialist and capitalist viewpoints" rather than mounting intensive field investigations.83 78

For example, Dr La Vinh Quyen, To Quoc, 1984, no. 1: 39^42, discusses samples of 195,789 births between 1968 and 1978, and 39,667 deaths between 1958 and 1978. One of the purposes of the article is to dispute traditional beliefs about individual fate being tied to time of birth.

79

A knowledgeable medical source in Hanoi told me in March, 1980 that the real figures were probably closer to 60 million and 3.1 percent.

80

UNFPA [United Nations Fund for Population Activities] Report, June 1981, pp. 10,13, 28-29.

81

VNC, 1985, no. 2: 25.

82

VNC, 1983, no.8: 28-29.

83

Hoai Duong, "Symposium on Sociology of Way of Life," Viet Nam Social Sciences (Hanoi), 1985, no. 1: MSISO.

Tertiary Education 29 One cannot help but wonder if part of the Sociology Institute's problem is that it cannot be effective without poaching on terrain traditionally held by the Party. From the late 1930s, Communist Party intellectuals-including several still prominent today-wrote about local socio-economic conditions. Experience as successful revolutionaries in the 1940s and 1950s gave surviving Party leaders firm confidence in their own ability to take the pulse of the masses and formulate correct policies. Only occasionally has that confidence been shaken. In 1954, despite the availability of village case studies more accurate than anything done previously, the Party's land reform organization cast aside empirical data in favor of claims that there were no limits on what mobilized peasants could create. To talk of problems was to be held guilty of defeatism, of rightist deviation. By October 1956, however, stunned by the whirlwind they themselves had unleashed, Party leaders publicly admitted to serious errors. One of the reasons given: "Because we did not do research."84 Nonetheless, the tendency persisted to set goals first and study how to achieve them later. The pseudo-scientific side of this syndrome might be called "quota-ism," characterized by regular rousing declarations from above, quantifying the achievements expected from each sector of society during the coming year (or quarter or month). This sort of government by exhortation and pressure worked remarkably well during the long struggle against the United States. Leaders pushed for ever higher production figures, ever more young recruits to go into battle; citizens often surprised themselves at how much work and sacrifice they could endure. If a particular quota was not met, that fact could be buried amidst the success stories. Published reports were invariably long on vague percentages and short on absolute numbers (a practice also justified on security grounds). In some cases, success was declared despite clear evidence to the contrary; careful examination revealed that the definition of success had changed. By the mid 1970s in north Vietnam, however, quota-ism was in trouble. Citizens wanted to negotiate production targets, not accept them automatically. They also tended to question Party policies more often, to complain more vigorously about government ineptitude and rigidity. Even more surprising, when the hierarchy refused to make concessions, people increasingly evaded or ignored standing rules and regulations. The Party had scant prior experience with this kind of "spontaneous" behavior, which was all the more worrisome because it occurred at a time of growing tension with China and Democratic Kampuchea. If the Party did consult social scientists for advice, there is little evidence that imaginative answers were forthcoming. While some economists argued for price reforms, most toed the line; historians and archaeologists reaffirmed wartime patriotic rhetoric, philosophers split Marxist-Leninist hairs, and legal scholars occupied themselves with researching a new national constitution rather than evaluating growing evidence of popular disregard for regulations.85 In the south, meanwhile, the Party was trying to bring 24 million people under the system developed north of the 17th parallel since 1954. To do this required understanding what had happened in the south during the twenty years of partition. It was no easy task. 84

Edwin E. Moise, Land Reform in China and North Vietnam: Consolidating the Revolution at the Village Level (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), p. 246.

85

Political scientists and psychologists might have been of help too. In Vietnam, however, there is no institutional home for the political science discipline (other than the Party itself), and psychology is considered a part of medicine. For some observations as of 1978, see David Marr, "The State of the Social Sciences in Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 10,4 (1978): 70-77.

30

Postwar Vietnam

So many Party faithful had been killed or maimed in the south that a decade or more would be required to rebuild a reliable network. Although non-Party members of the PRG/NLF were numerous enough in many rural areas to take over local administration, most of them lacked the political confidence to give advice frankly to higher echelons. In the cities, thousands of young intellectuals and students offered their services eagerly to the new authorities, but they were generally kept at arm's length. Included were several hundred social scientists, who obediently attended MarxistLeninist study sessions to learn the new mode of discourse, after which they might be invited to seminars on topics of immediate concern to the Party. A few were then allowed to join problem-solving teams. However, even they were almost never given regular employment and status, or trusted with independent assignments. Because the Party considered southern intellectuals as a group to have been seduced by neo-colonialist culture, and southern social scientists to have been further tainted by American bourgeois ideology, individual economists, sociologists, political scientists, and historians seeking employment commensurate with their skills were probably bound to be disappointed. By the early 1980s only a handful had gained permanent research positions. The remainder had either emigrated or shifted occupation completely, often surviving as private language teachers, merchants, or healers. Social science research carried out in the south in the late 1970s was long on MarxistLeninist theoretical assumptions and woefully short on practical analysis or insights. Often no serious investigation appears to have preceded major policy initiatives, for example when declaring "new economic zones" in the countryside and proceeding to ship hundreds of thousands of poorly prepared urbanites there. The even more important campaign to enrol all farmers in the Mekong Delta in cooperatives was well under way before the Party Central Committee ordered a survey of eight locations in mid-1978. Because doctrine insisted that capitalism must cause great economic and social differentiation, obedient researchers professed to find those results, although the statistics clearly suggested otherwise.86 Faced with widespread passive resistance, the Party eventually acknowledged that it had made major errors, due partly, it was said, to a failure to study complicated (phuc tap) reality. Nonetheless, certain dogmas had to be reaffirmed. For example, the class struggle between socialism and capitalism, between working people and the exploiting classes in the Mekong Delta, remained paramount, despite an admission that middle peasants constituted 70-80 percent of the population.87 The Party and social scientists could not accept a more plausible interpretation: the struggle was over who would benefit from surplus production, the middle peasant or the state. More recently, natural scientists and social scientists have teamed up to plan the future integrated development of Ho Chi Minh City and the Mekong Delta. Listening to several economists explain the master scheme, and viewing their map for 1990, I again had the feeling that extremely ambitious targets were being set before detailed investigation had begun.88 In an effort to tap the expertise of about 50,000 tertiary degree holders residing in 86

Nguyen Cong Binh, "Mien nam tien len hop tac hoa nong nghiep" [The south advances to agricultural cooperatives], in Nong Dan Viet Nam, pp. 426-41. VNC, 1983, no. 12: 14-17. 87

Cao Van Luong, "Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa nong nghiep o cac tinh Nam Bo" [Understanding agricultural cooperatives in the southern provinces], Nghien Cuu Lich Su 210 (May-June, 1983): 12-23. 88

Interview with Professor Ho Le and Dr Tran Anh Tuan, Ho Chi Minh City, September 5,1984. A fascinating 556-page bibliography on the Mekong Delta, compiled in 1981, did demonstrate the abundant sources available to future researchers.

Tertiary Education 31 former Saigon, the government has established a Ho Chi Minh City Union of Science and Technology Associations (Lien Hiep cac Hoi Khoa Hoc va Ky Thuat). At its inaugural meeting in January 1986, Nguyen Van Linh, then Party Secretary of the city, admitted that southern intellectuals had been poorly treated since 1975 and promised improvements.89 In the meantime, operating along different lines, about one hundred natural and social scientists have established a Technical Services Center in Ho Chi Minh City, designed to solve on a contract basis practical problems brought to them by district administrators or factory managers. Their favorite success story is Cai Lai district, in Tien Giang province, which hi 1983 upgraded its food grain output to 950 kilograms per capita per year, more than three times the national average. Elsewhere the center has been called on to deal with problems of cash crop selection, seed multiplication, plant protection, local pollution, food processing, and machine servicing.90 To a greater or lesser extent, however, Vietnam will remain a centrally planned economy. What the government sorely needs, according to one prominent academic administrator, are well founded forecasts which are neither too conservative nor premature, the latter being defined as leading to decisions not sustainable by available material means.91 Unfortunately, independent forecasting by Vietnam's economists remains the exception. The College of Economics and Planning, with 440 staff members, seems to devote an inordinate amount of research to the pet Party strategy of concentrating scarce resources at the district level.92 If Nghien Cuu Kinh Te [Economics Research], the prime publication of Vietnam's economists, is any indication, a tremendous amount of time is spent thinking about how best to justify existing (or contemplated) government policies in terms of Marxist-Leninist theory, rather than collecting reliable statistics, conducting detailed case studies, or analyzing national and international economic trends. For example, during the seventeen months from January 1983 to May 1984, Nghien Cuu Kinh Te carried: thirty-six articles advocating or explaining existing policies; eighteen on general Marxist-Leninist theory; fifteen on foreign (especially CMEA) economic experiences; three non-polemical articles backed up by statistics; and two critiques of particular existing phenomena.93 Since 1980, if not earlier, plans have been under way to establish a Vietnam Academy of Sciences, combining a large number of natural and social science institutes under one institutional umbrella. In April 1981, the Politbureau gave its seal of approval.94 Nonetheless, implementation has been postponed repeatedly, probably because senior members of existing commissions and institutes fear erosion of their authority. Postponement may also reflect personal rivalries within the Party Central Committee, since Vo Nguyen Giap 89

Doan Ket 379 (April 1986): 31-32.

90

Interview with Huynh Van Hoang, Rector of Ho Chi Minh City Polytechnic, September 5,1984. VNC, 1984, no. 1: 21. Viet Nam (Pictorial), 1984, no. 5:18-19.

91

Dao Van Tap, "Problems in Socialist Construction," p. 32. For a more general statement on scientific prediction, see To Quoc, 1984, no.10: 36,43.

92

VNC, 1983, no. 1: 8-9. Viet Nam (Pictorial), 1983, no. 11: 26-27. VNC, 1982, no. 11:13-14, indicates that 51 districts were the object of a flood of reports and masterplans by researchers at twelve different colleges between 1979 and 1981. Preoccupation with the district was already Party policy in 1974.

93

Two of the non-polemical articles are by Le Hong Tarn and deal with Vietnam's demographic dilemmas and the difficult conditions faced by women workers. Phung The Truong offers an urgent documented article on population trends and future optimum utilization of labor. The two critiques deal with use of hired labor in central Vietnam and poor management practices. 94

The April 29,1981 Government Resolution, Vietnamese Studies No. 67, p. 27 [see above n. 44].

32

Postwar Vietnam

was touted from the beginning as first head of the academy. Some Party leaders may have had second thoughts about the academy when prestigious scholars argued that the president ought to be elected from among scholarly peers, following Soviet precedent. Finally some government officials were disturbed at how aggressively the natural scientists in particular moved to sign service contracts. Since 1981, there have been ample signs of confusion and demoralization within the Social Sciences Commission. Many theories have been offered for this low morale, ranging from Party punishment for overly critical comments about particular policies, to the political decline of longstanding patrons within the Central Committee, to a Ministry of Interior backlash against growing contacts with Western social scientists. One or all of those theories may be true. However, I suspect the main reason is financial. Faced with serious inflation and government incapacity to increase the commission's budget accordingly, social scientists have tried, like the natural scientists, to obtain service contracts. Unfortunately, local economic units generally see the natural scientists as providing more value for money. Besides, social scientists are far more restricted by Party attitudes in what they can advise. Without service contracts, many of them have no option in the current economic climate but to seek individual outside employment, usually in jobs that bear little relationship to their research specialties. Information Sciences Vietnam has access to almost all means by which knowledge is communicated, although sheer poverty limits the use of some techniques, and the Party's desire to monopolize the flow of information limits others. Being mostly intellectuals, Communist Party leaders of the 1930s and 1940s were fascinated by the print media-not only the more obvious newspapers, books, and pamphlets, but also leaflets, posters, banners, and slogans painted on walls, wicker baskets, even the flanks of water buffalo. Of necessity, they also learned to rely heavily on oral transmission, particularly popular poetry, songs, theater, and easily memorized propaganda slogans (khau hieu). In August 1945, they gained control of the French radio transmitter at Bach Mai, on the outskirts of Hanoi, and quickly developed a powerful capacity for conveying both open and encrypted information by voice radio and morse code (the latter reaching as far as Saigon and Bangkok). Additional transmitters were acquired or pieced together, and all this equipment was eventually carried into the hills. By the early 1950s, the Viet Minh possessed a surprisingly sophisticated radio network. Today, the radio, tied in with local speaker systems reaching into most homes, remains the most important means for the government to reach the Vietnamese citizenry. From 1945, the Viet Minh also experimented with the visual arts, particularly woodblock prints, photography, and displays of captured enemy artifacts. During the 1950s all of these media were combined to denounce landlords and then promote cooperativization. Newsreels and feature films developed quickly in the 1960s. Museums were established, from the capital, Hanoi, to province and district levels. More recently, the government has organized increasingly ambitious public fairs. In 1982, the First National FairExhibition on Economic and Technical Achievements encompassed 158 projects and 3,000 products. The Second Fair, in 1985, grew to more than 200 projects and 4,000 products, with top priority being assigned to hybrid plants and animals, followed by water con-

Tertiary Education 33 servation schemes, processed foods, industrial machinery, electronic devices, and consumer goods.95 Printing presses were seized by the Viet Minh in 1945 and subsequently transported to the jungles and hills.96 Returning to Hanoi in 1954, the Party found that not all intellectuals were prepared in peacetime to accept its declared monopoly on the print media. Matters came to a head in 1957-1958, with the Party violently denouncing hundreds of authors and editors. An unknown number were arrested and sent to labor reform camps, the rest ostracized or converted into compliant clerks. Today the Party continues to screen carefully all book manuscripts prior to publication. Any author wishing to submit an article manuscript to a journal must first obtain permission from his unit head and append to the manuscript observations by his leadership organization.97 Occasionally there is a hiccup, as when General Tran Van Tra apparently obtained clearance from Party officials in Ho Chi Minh City to publish his outspoken memoir of 1973-1975 military and political events, only to see all copies withdrawn from bookstores a few days after release.98 Writers of novels and short stories are given relatively more leeway to criticize current realities than writers of non-fiction. For example, Nguyen Manh Tuan, in his novel Dung truoc bien [Facing the Sea], was able to expose the inability of many cadres arriving from the north or from the jungle in 1975 to administer southern enterprises (in this case a fishing company), as well as their tendency to relax morally and physically after several decades of single-minded commitment and self-sacrifice.99 The Party uses the print media to criticize institutional performance, but very seldom to attack existing policies. At most, authors can point to particular policy aspects "needing strengthening," or altered conditions that suggest a policy review. More serious criticisms must be forwarded via the established confidential chains of command. Above all, nothing is published which might challenge the Party's ideological monopoly. Nguyen Khac Vien, often considered an advocate of more open discussion of issues, perhaps unwittingly states the Party's dilemma: Having taken Marxism-Leninism as the basis for thought, we ought not to prevent cadres from thinking, acting, and struggling according to Marxist-Leninist teachings.100 Then Dr Vien proceeds to assert that Vietnam is not a conceptual desert, and that the voices of those who want change will not be lost. Conferences often provide an opportunity for Party members and non-Party researchers to communicate in a reasonably forthright manner. Although the format invariably is tightly structured, discussion from the floor can become very pointed and invigorating.

95

VNC, 1985, no. 11: 23-25.

96

A bibliography now being compiled by the National Library of Vietnam is said to list almost 10,000 titles published in DRV-controlled areas between 1945 and 1954. Discussion with the national librarian, Nguyen The Due, Sydney, July 5,1985. 97

Instructions to authors contained in 1983 issues of Tap Chi Khoa Hoc Ky Thuat, published by the Vietnam Institute of Science.

98

Tran Van Tra, Ket thuc cuoc chien tranh 30 nam [Concluding the 30 years war], (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe, 1982). Ten thousand copies were printed.

99

Nguyen Manh Tuan, Dung truoc bien [Facing the sea] (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe, 1982). Needless to say, there is a politically correct ending. 100

Interview printed in Bulledingue, April 1984, p. 11.

34

Postwar Vietnam

Occasionally the presence of foreign participants, or rather the arguments presented in their papers, are used by Vietnamese specialists to criticize prevailing positions. Conferences also cut across institutional barriers, enabling specialists to criticize findings of counterparts in other departments or ministries. Some institutions routinely convene meetings to publicize their research projects and subject findings to peer evaluation. The Hanoi Polytechnic, for example, organizes an ambitious biannual conference of this kind; the early 1984 affair encompassed 400 different topics presented in twenty-four panels.101 Unfortunately, published materials which grow out of such meetings are pale reflections indeed. Conference reports refer to "lively discussion" on particular topics, then leave the reader guessing as to why or how participants differed. For example, the report of a meeting of fifty specialists, chaired by the head of the Social Science Commission, to discuss 1982 and 1983 Party resolutions, mentioned "intense debate" about the family economy and its relationship to the state and cooperative sectors, without concrete details.102 A large proportion of articles appearing in specialized journals are reworked conference papers. However, "collective" screening often produces an article which has far less research content than the original paper and far more ideological pontification. For example, most articles in Vietnam's main economics journal, Tap Chi Nghien Cim Kinh Te, contain a higher number of footnote references to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Le Duan than they do to specialized economic reports, case studies, surveys, or statistical compendia. One cannot help but conclude that the main purpose of such a publication is to explain, justify, and legitimize existing policies, rather than communicate new research or provide a forum for informed debate. Paper is said to be very scarce in Vietnam, and certainly the quality is poor, due to the government's desire to avoid spending valuable foreign currency on imported varieties. Nonetheless, huge quantities of domestic paper are expended on official circulars, memos, and forms to be filled out in multiple copies. Ministries and departments also manage to publish ninety different journals and bulletins, many of questionable utility.103 In a mammoth effort of translation and printing, the Soviet Union and Vietnam cooperated to publish the 55-volume Le-Nin Toan Tap [Complete Works of Lenin], totaling 44,058 pages. Each volume had a print-run of 60,000 hard cover copies, the entire job consuming 3,500 tons of paper.104 Meanwhile, researchers at the History Institute in Hanoi had to wait two or three years for a government committee to release paper to print books on a title-bytitle basis. Foreign friends were sometimes asked to bring stationery as gifts to department heads, thus enabling them to avoid the embarrassment of using crude domestic paper when sending letters overseas. Publishing in Vietnam is divided along functional lines. Thus, the Party uses its Truth Publishing House to print important speeches, resolutions, and the occasional venture into political theory. The Armed Forces Publishing House is more eclectic, releasing not only speeches and training manuals, but also military histories, memoirs, and fiction and poetry 101

Tap Chi Khoa Hoc Ky Thuat, January-February 1984, p. 33.

102

TCNCKT, November-December 1983, p. 73.

103 104

A list is appended in Sigurdson, Vietnam's Science and Technology, pp. A9-A14.

Viet Nam (Pictorial), 1982, no. 4, inside front cover. The last volume came off the press in Moscow in August 1981.

Tertiary Education 35 written by members of the armed forces. The Science and Technology Publishing House has released an average of sixty titles each year since 1980, but would like to raise that to one hundred or even three hundred.105 Other constituencies serviced by separate publishing houses include university teachers, social scientists, workers, women, youth, and children. About 2,000 new titles are issued in total each year. Some of the largest print-runs occur in the two publishing houses devoted to literature, mainly fiction and poetry. Perhaps the best measure of reader demand is reprint figures. For example, Vu Ngoc Phan's sensitive 1956 study of Vietnamese folk sayings and folk poetry has been reissued at least six times, for a print total of no less than 115,000 copies. A four-volume description of Vietnamese legends has surpassed in popularity all other publications of the Social Science Publishing House, 533,942 copies being printed between 1958 and 1975.106 In 1980, Vietnam could boast of 20,000 libraries housing a total of 20-30 million titles. The vast majority of these libraries have been set up in schools, cooperatives, villages, and factories, each collection containing 300-1,000 titles. Local citizens are asked to donate at least one book each, a volunteer librarian is located, a room obtained. Groups are then formed to read books aloud to each other, to introduce new books, and to listen to outside cadres talk on scientific and cultural topics. The hardest part is soliciting financial contributions for purchasing new titles, and hopefully subscribing to several newspapers and journals.107 Also, continuity suffers if the volunteer librarian drops out. For that reason, perhaps, a substantial proportion of small libraries are locked up for months at a time, or are open for only several hours per week.108 At a less formal level, work brigades at different locations manage to swap books in fifty-title batches, with a distinct preference for novels, love stories, and poetry.109 The Ministry of Culture devotes considerable energy to establishing district-level libraries, each staffed by at least one trained and salaried librarian. The model in central Vietnam is the Phuoc Van district library, in Nghia Binh province, which began in 1977 with 9,000 books, five periodicals, and 1,500 citizens signing up for readers' cards. Its current objective is 30,000 books, twenty-four periodicals, and a network of lending arrangements with school, village, and cooperative libraries. Citizens also come to view films, discuss books, and meet authors (who apparently make the rounds of district libraries at government expense). Training classes for volunteer librarians take place at the district level as well.110 One well-established urban district library is in the Ba Dinh section of Hanoi. Readers tend to be retired public servants, technical cadres, workers preparing for promotion tests, mothers on pregnancy leave, policemen, and junior secondary pupils. Elderly volunteers help the professional staff re-shelve books and promote good titles to prospective readers. 105

TCHDKH, 1985, no. 8: 34.

106

David G. Marr, "Social Science Publishing in Vietnam," Southeast Asian Research Materials Group Newsletter no. 14 (December 1979): 11-19. 107 Van Hoa Nghe Thuat [Art and culture], [hereafter VHNT] November 1984, pp. 23; 25. VHNT, June 1981, pp. 27-28,58. 108

Larsson and Birgegard, Socio-Economic Study, p. 24. My visits to cooperatives in Dien Ban district (Quang Nam-Da Nang province), August 25,1984, and Cu Chi district (Ho Chi Minh City), September 1,1984. 109

Lisbet Bostrand, "Living and Working Conditions for Forestry Workers in Vietnam: A Follow-up Report" (Stockholm, March 1986, mimeo), p. 33. no VHNT, February-March 1984, pp. 30-31. In rural north Vietnam, the model district library is in Hai Hau.

36

Postwar Vietnam

The staff spends considerable time visiting smaller libraries in factories, handicraft cooperatives, and clubs established among the women, youth, and retired folk of the district. Each of Ba DimYs sixteen neighborhoods also contains a children's library. The head librarian even takes individual books to ranking Ba Dinh district cadres, both because they are too busy to come, and to get them to pay more attention to the library and the reading movement in general.111 Attempts to develop a truly national library network appear to break down at the provincial level, where the staff is expected not only to respond to the needs of incoming readers, but also to supervise all salaried library employees in the province, prepare and distribute cataloging and bibliographic aids, service the needs of specialized readers, and provide the key link in a future inter-library loan system. Province (and city) libraries also seem to be the lowest level at which foreign publications and books and journals of the RVN and French colonial periods can be shelved, catalogued, and made available in special reading rooms to individuals possessing proper authorization. In reality, provincelevel library officials cannot maintain up-to-date records of local activities or meet many requests from scientists and technicians for specific information. They possess no union catalog against which queries can be checked, nor are most libraries willing to loan anything of value to other libraries. As one senior librarian points out, it does little good to prepare bibliographies on specialized agricultural topics if the books and journals can only be read in Hanoi or Ho Chi Minh City.112 Upon taking over Hanoi in late 1954, DRV leaders found that the French had shipped almost all archival materials and a significant portion of existing library collections to either Saigon or the metropole. Nothing daunted, the National Library, the University of Hanoi, the Medical School, and the new research institutes soon were busy acquiring titles from private collections, from the government-controlled publishing houses, and from overseas donors, particularly the Soviet Union and China. More central libraries cropped up in the 1960s, and collapse of the RVN in 1975 meant further additions. As with universities and research institutes, libraries have tended to emerge and perpetuate themselves along bureaucratic lines of least resistance, without any unified development strategy, much less supervision. Besides the Ministry of Culture, at least four other ministries or commissions claim jurisdiction over specific major library collections in Vietnam. Theoretically, the Vietnam National Library is meant to coordinate overall library strategy. It has the advantage of being the legal depository for all books and serials published in Vietnam, which provides the basis for an annual printed bibliography of Vietnamese acquisitions.113 It receives large numbers of gift or exchange publications from overseas, especially the Soviet Union, which is the main reason its collection has grown from only 50,000 volumes in 1954 to about one million in 1984.114 However, processing of all these foreign language materials has proceeded slowly. More importantly, since no list

111

VHNT, October 1984, pp. 12-13,41.

112

Do Huu Du, "Suy nghi ve van de phoi hop va hop tac hoat dong giua cac thu vien" [Some thoughts on the problem of interaction and cooperation between libraries], VHNT, February 1981, pp. 27-29; 42-43. Professors at the University of Hue also told me how they had no option but to travel 700 kilometers to Ho Chi Minh City to read certain books essential to their research. Interview August 22,1984. 113 Nevertheless, some provincial publications do evade the National Library's net. 114 Interview with National Library administrator, December 23,1974. Helen Jarvis' report on trip to Vietnam, July 13-26,1984, as a guest of the Vietnam National Library.

Tertiary Education 37 of catalogued foreign language holdings has ever been printed and distributed, potential readers outside Hanoi have no idea of what may be of use to them. Also, the National Library generally lacks access to foreign currency to enable it to purchase important books or serials not available through gift or exchange channels. Sometimes it has even been harassed by Vietnamese customs officials for payment of duty on incoming book parcels.115 All in all, the National Library lacks political influence. It is also utilized far less by researchers than its formal status or its information potential would suggest. The Central Library of Science and Technology has a smaller collection but higher rate of use by researchers. Set up in 1960, it now possesses 250,000 books and 5,000 different serial runs. It also handles microfilms more effectively than the National Library, including the contents of 300 foreign journals. About 20,000 readers use the Science and Technology Library each year, and it has distributed some 600 specialized bibliographies to date.116 Perhaps the only effective inter-library loan system in Vietnam is run by the Armed Forces Library. For most of its thirty year existence it has been concerned primarily with getting particular books and journals to military units scattered everywhere. Starting with only 500 titles, it now has about 250,000 books and 600 serials (including a number hi English, Russian, French, Chinese, and German). A separate system handles routine distribution of millions of copies of Vietnamese publications to military unit libraries.117 The Social Science Library contains some 500,000 volumes and receives about 600 current serials.118 Since 1975, it has been incorporated within the Social Science Information Institute, with the combined staff of 170 expected to devote special attention to compiling bibliographies, abstracts, review articles, partial or complete translations, and photo-duplicates of key foreign materials. They even prepare audio tapes for ranking officials to listen to while eating.119 Their monthly journal, Thong Tin Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi [Social Science Information], printed in 5,000 copies, usually consists of bland synopses and review articles of select publications received from CMEA countries.120 There is also a Social Science Library in Ho Chi Minh City, based on the former Vien Khao Co (Archaeology Institute) collection plus tens of thousands of books brought from the north after 1975. It is attached to the Social Science Institute, the southern extension of the Social Sciences Commission in Hanoi. In 1978, only about fifteen specialists and ten graduate students were using the collection each day. The staff was devoting much of its time to weeding out titles from the pre-1975 collection to place in a "restricted" collection at another location in the city.121 By 1980, the library was also responsible for preparing

115

Interview with national librarian, Mr Trinh Giem, March 15,1980.

116

VNC, 1985, no. 4: 28.

117

VHNT, December 1984, pp. 11-12.

118

Helen Jarvis' trip report. Adrian D.S. Roberts, "An official visit to Vietnam, 26 February-12 March 1984," South East Asia Library Group Newsletter (London), 27-28 (July 1984): 15-21. 119

Interview with Nguyen Huu Buoi, deputy director of the Social Science Information Institute, Hanoi, April 10,1980. 120

Admittedly I have only seen issues prepared in 1980.

121

Visit to Social Science Library, February 1,1978.

38

Postwar Vietnam

bibliographies, synopses, and review articles in mimeograph form, for government use only.122 The second largest collection in Vietnam is housed at the General Sciences Library of Ho Chi Minh City. Formerly the RVN National Library, it contains at least 600,000 volumes, 200,000 being English-language donations from USAID between 1955 and 1975. Most pre-1975 materials can only be requested and perused in a small upstairs "restricted" reading room, which had six people in it when I visited in 1984. Next is a "Science Room," for those who have graduated from university and are engaged in officially approved research; about thirty people were reading there. Even the large "General Reading Room" is limited to twelfth year students and above (others are expected to go to the district and neighborhood libraries), who can only use books shelved in the room, not request titles from the catalog. Finally, there is a current periodicals room, where one can also take materials off the shelf to read, including publications from Western countries. About 800 serials are available in Russian, Vietnamese, English, and French, the vast majority focusing on the natural and medical sciences. At least forty people were reading there.123 The General Sciences Library receives about 20,000 new titles each year, the majority being gifts from CMEA countries. Besides cataloguing those materials and supervising the reading rooms, the staff of 100 is sorting out large stacks of old regime books that were brought to the library after the communist seizure of power in 1975. Some copies will be sent to restricted collections in the north, while others, in principle, may be offered for exchange with foreign libraries. Staff members have also prepared and duplicated specialized bibliographies on such topics as rice, coffee, cacao, and kenaf production. A much more ambitious "Mekong Delta catalog" is being compiled to complement one already completed by the Social Sciences Library. All of the major libraries discussed above possess microform cameras and readers, usually gifts from overseas. However, with the possible exceptions of the Central Library of Science and Technology and the National Library, that equipment is seldom used. Usually the most immediate problem is servicing. Spare parts and bulbs must be imported, but foreign currency is lacking. Some machines do not have devices to modulate electricity surges, which are quite common in Vietnam and particularly devastating to light bulbs. Technicians must be called in from other organizations. Beyond that, the cost of film is prohibitive. The same problems exist with photocopy machines, tape recorders, and video recorders, not only in libraries but at universities and research institutes. For some time after 1975, institutions south of the 17th parallel had ready access to photocopiers left behind by the Americans, until ink and paper ran out or major maintenance was required. All of the above difficulties, and more, face specialists when it comes to employing computers. In some ways Vietnam is well positioned to enter the computer age. From the 1950s, if not before, secondary schools have been noted for the high quality of their mathematics instruction. In recent years Vietnamese secondary students have consistently performed excellently at the International Mathematical Olympiad. The publications of sev122

Interview with Phan Gia Ben, head of the Social Science Library (South), March 24, 1980. Adrian D.S. Roberts, "Official Visit," pp. 19-20. 123

Visit to General Sciences Library and interview with deputy head, Huynh Ngoc Thu, August 30,1984. Helen Jarvis' trip report.

Tertiary Education 39 eral mathematicians have brought them worldwide recognition. One American mathematician asserts that the level of mathematics in Vietnam is "higher than any other underdeveloped country except China and India."124 During the war, specialists in the Vietnam People's Army received computer equipment and computer training from the Soviet Union.125 Much the same thing was happening in the south; indeed, American experts left behind intact some valuable IBM mainframe computers in their haste to depart in April 1975. In peacetime, however, Vietnam failed to capitalize on these resources. Four or five interested civilian institutes and departments in Hanoi tended to compete with each other for extremely scarce computer equipment and software, rather than join together. Seemingly the most appropriate coordinating body, the Institute of Computer Science, continued to focus on cybernetics and systems theories far too elaborate for Vietnamese conditions. Much time and energy was devoted to planning and hosting a conference of the International Federation of Information Processing, in January 1983, with overseas participation from the USSR, German Democratic Republic, USA, France, and Canada.126 Vietnamese specialists designed mathematical models for industry placement, water resources, and salinity intrusion, but it seems that no one possessed the appropriate software or a fund of reliable statistics to put them to use. As one senior librarian commented, "We have to provide Vietnamese food for the computers to eat or they aren't worth the trouble."127 The Foreign Trade Ministry in Hanoi did develop a data base containing the average prices of nearly 100 products over the previous thirty years, together with associated production and marketing information.128 Meanwhile, in Ho Chi Minh City, computer programers and statisticians were languishing because they had previously been part of the American-run system. Many left the country after four or five years. Although as early as 1980 the Social Science Information Institute in Hanoi proudly publicized its membership in CMEA's computerized information system (MISON), privately officials admitted that it was not being used much. In June 1984, the Central Science and Technology Institute conducted its first full-dress interrogation of a satellitelinked data base in Moscow, in the presence of General Vo Nguyen Giap and ranking Soviet visitors.129 A second ground relay station was set up near Ho Chi Minh City and was operating in time to beam American television coverage of the Vietnamese tenth anniversary celebrations of the end of the war to New York City via Moscow. Academics told me that it was not yet possible to carry on a conversation with the data base directly, only to send requests for information that would be serviced within one day.130

124

Neal Koblitz, "A Mathematical Journey: New Impressions," Bulletin of the U.S. Committee for Scientific Cooperation with Vietnam [hereafter BUSCSCV], Spring 1984, p. 7. See also, Peter Hilton, "A visit to Vietnam," Focus, 5,6 (November-December 1985): 1-2. 125 Ta Quang Buu mentions a Soviet Academician, "Dorodnitxin," who from 1960 onward has helped Vietnam establish a computer system. TCHDKH, 1984, no. 3:11. 126 BUSCSCV, Spring 1982, pp. 8-11; Fall 1982, p. 14; and Spring 1983, pp. 10-13. See also the article on new concepts in automatic control systems in Tap Chi Khoa Hoc Ky Thuat, May-June 1983, pp. 21-27. 127

Interview with Nguyen Huu Buoi, April 10,1980.

128

Thong Ke [Statistics] (Hanoi), 1985, no. 3: 28, as described in JPRS-SEA-85-100 (June 25,1985), p. 99.

129

TCHDKH, July 1984, p. 44.

130

Interview with Nguyen Huu Chi and colleagues, Ho Chi Minh City University, September 5,1984.

40

Postwar Vietnam

Aside from the financial costs of maintaining and improving computer systems, Vietnam's leaders must decide whether to continue following the Soviet precedent and tightly control access to terminals, or whether to permit a wide range of specialists and students to learn by doing. In March 1984, the Ministry of Defense convened a meeting at its mainframe computer center in Ho Chi Minh City to discuss "protection of hardware and software, and working applications of the IBM system."131 In February 1985, the Ho Chi Minh City Polytechnic organized a conference on "Microcomputers and Applied Information Sciences," with sixteen papers by Vietnamese specialists and the participation of experts on computer networking from Grenoble University in France. Some of the papers described systems already working, for example maintaining the polytechnic's student enrollment and staff personnel records, maintaining pay records for the Ho Chi Minh City Labor Bureau, automating the polytechnic's response to sudden electric power reductions, and developing a full Vietnamese font for word processing.132 In January 1987, a number of overseas Vietnamese computer experts were invited to a conference in Hanoi on "Automation of Vietnamese script. Conclusion In 1980, Nguyen Khac Vien published a thoughtful article in the Party daily, Nhan Dan, summarizing his argument for improving information flow with the following diagram:133

Diagram 1.1. Information Flow Chart (Nguyen Khac Vien)

131

TCHDKH, June 1984, p. 46.

132

Copy of February 4-5, 1985 conference program. Besides the Grenoble connection, the polytechnic has received an Apple II, an Epson printer, and various software packages from Vietnamese friends in Australia. Even at this early stage, Vietnam has computer compatibility problems. A variety of Soviet, East and West German, American, French, Japanese, and Canadian equipment can be found in universities, research institutes and libraries. 133

Nhan Dan March 16,1980.

Tertiary Education 41 This model is revealing in several ways. Predictably, it places the (Party) leadership at the center of everything. Nothing of significance ought to happen in Vietnam without Party awareness. In the text of the article, however, Dr Vien makes it clear that the Party should not meddle in the scientific community's approach to knowledge, or prevent scientists from reaching independent conclusions. Particularly interesting is the direct link he draws between scientists and the mass media. He calls for more grassroots discussion in the media of current policies and performance, including opinions contrary to official statements. Surveys conducted by social scientists which produce unpleasant results ought not to be restricted to a tiny official audience. Nonetheless, one is struck by the double circle enclosing all four elite sectors, as if the establishment must stick together when facing a profusion of complex and contradictory information coming from both inside Vietnam and overseas. The current situation might be represented as in Diagram 1.2. This includes the armed forces, whose general and field officers are definitely part of the elite, and whose researchers conduct investigations separately from the civilian establishment. It also highlights the

* includes Politbureau, Secretariat, permanent committees and Central Committee when in session. QT units in research organizations with permission to interact with foreigners, i.e. "international affairs" offices and scitech and social science information institutes. Diagram 1.2. Information Flow Chart (author)

42

Postwar Vietnam

compartmentalization which has developed in the past thirty years, not only between major sectors, but within each sector as well. And it points out how most researchers are limited to passive receipt of foreign information, not permitted to engage in two-way communication. Frustrated by state limitations on incoming information, many scholars listen extensively to BBC and Voice of America broadcasts. They also inundate with questions those overseas Vietnamese who return to visit relatives. Vietnam's leaders acknowledge the deleterious effects of compartmentalization, often ascribing it to residual peasantism or the small producer mentality. Ministries, research institutes, and university departments are constantly encouraged to pool their talents, in order to coordinate projects. It may well be true that individual researchers guard their data like peasants guard their crops, or that institute directors can be equated with village headmen operating behind thick bamboo hedges. Such attitudes are common in developed countries as well. In Vietnam, however, the entire state structure exacerbates such attitudes, whatever the stated desires of particular leaders. In the fashion typical of all security systems, unless a researcher has an authorized "need to know," he or she does not seek out information, whether it be in a restricted library collection at his/her own institution, at a different government ministry, or by daring to write a letter to a foreign colleague. It is not permissible even to engage in idle conversation with tourists as a way of improving one's foreign language competence. When higher level research managers address themselves to the compartmentalization problem they almost always call for more centralization rather than for reducing the barriers. Thus, a member of the State Science and Technology Commission urges that there be a unified administration of all foreign contacts, to aim resources according to a masterplan extending to the year 2000, and that a halt be called to inappropriate, localized, or frivolous interactions.134 The director of the Science and Technology Information Institute proposes that a single committee control whatever foreign currency the state is able to allocate for purchase of books and journals overseas.135 One can imagine that many Vietnamese scientists would regard such cures as worse than the disease itself, and would try to head them off—for scholarly reasons and not because of a small-producer mentality. The limitations of Vietnam's entire approach to knowledge show up most glaringly in studies of foreign countries. The History Institute, for example, devotes only a tiny proportion of its resources to researching anything other than Vietnamese history. The Economics Institute appears to take the outside world more seriously, most notably by scouring Soviet texts about the 1920s to see what is applicable to Vietnam today. Occasionally an article surfaces about recent innovations in the smaller Eastern European economies; Hungary has occasioned the most interest in recent years.136 Articles on capitalist economies hew so closely to the Party line as to be intellectually meaningless. This obviously hurts Vietnam's current efforts to expand exports.137 Natural scientists have been much quicker than social scientists to pick up and discuss developments overseas. Nonetheless, 134

Tran Tri, TCHDKH, 1984, no. 3:16.

135

Nguyen Nhu Kim, TCHDKH, 1984, no. 4: 16.

136

See, for example, TCNCKT, 1983, no. 3: 53-61,72; and TCNCKT, 1984, no. 4: 66-70, 77. The latter article is based on a five-year old conference paper translated into Vietnamese in April 1983. 137

For example, new technologies in steel production have reduced demand for the kind of coal produced by Vietnam, yet the government has been slow to find alternate markets for their product. Far Eastern Economic Review (hereafter PEER), November 15,1984, p. 127.

Tertiary Education 43 the vast majority of published items are brief reports of inventions, discoveries, meetings, or visits. Seldom does an article size up a field internationally or put isolated events in perspective. Only five of 172 articles published in 1983 issues of Tap Chi Hoat Dong Khoa Hoc [Scientific Activities Journal], dealt with foreign science and technology.138 Such overview articles are perhaps more common in publications aimed at non-specialists, for example To Quoc [Fatherland]. Ironically, there is a tremendous curiosity among Vietnamese concerning things foreign. This is well known among primary school teachers, who have to try to answer pupils' questions about foreign customs with only the thinnest knowledge available, or teach world geography without a globe. Foreign language study remains extremely popular, even though few individuals will have opportunities to speak with foreigners. Among "higher intellectuals" enrolled in adult education courses, 75 percent choose to take foreign languages.139 Russian and English novels are highly prized. The range and depth of non-fiction books in any language about people outside Vietnam is totally inadequate to satisfy curiosity, which means that most Vietnamese depend on oral sources of widely varying reliability. Overseas Vietnamese offer fruitful links for understanding developments in the West. Although the vast majority of these emigrants continue for political reasons to avoid contact with institutions in Vietnam, a significant and growing minority are willing to cooperate in their chosen fields.140 However, the practical and psychological obstacles can be daunting. During 1986, overseas Vietnamese associations in West Germany and Canada took the lead in gently criticizing government restrictions and proposing reforms. Ultimately Vietnam's leaders will have to decide which is more important, maximizing controls or maximizing production. In recent years, the Party has relaxed controls hi certain realms because not to have done so would have meant economic disaster. However, those are officially designated as temporary, "transitional" concessions, justified by appropriate quotations from Lenin and references to Soviet NEP experience in the 1920s, which of course was followed by Stalin's full-scale, forced "socialization" after 1928. It does not seem to occur to custodians of Party dogma hi Hanoi that the world has moved on since then, that they are faced with problems never imagined by Marx, Lenin, or Stalin. The unwillingness or inability of Vietnam's political leaders to devise new conceptual models, new analytical approaches for the conditions around them, will not necessarily prevent a younger generation from devising their own solutions on an ad hoc basis, however. The result will be inefficient controls and productivity barely exceeding population growth, in short, a muddle characteristic of many underdeveloped countries in the second half of the twentieth century. Scientists have already convinced Party leaders that certain problems deserve top priority consideration if Vietnam is to break out of its vicious cycle of poverty. These include biological innovations in agriculture, dealing with aluminous soils, halting forest degradation, harvesting more protein from the sea, and reducing population growth at a faster rate

138

About 4,000 copies of this journal are printed each month. TCHDKH, 1984, no. 5: 4.

139

Vietnam (Pictorial) 319 (7 - 1985): 9.

140

Some specialists asked to return home in 1975-1976, but were politely turned down by the government. A few natural scientists were accepted. See, for example, the revealing interview with marine biologist 'Quynh' in Bulledingue, December 1985, pp. 3-9; January 1986, pp. 14-16.

44

Postwar Vietnam

than has occurred to date. However, as many well-educated Vietnamese are coming to realize, it is relatively easy to identify particular development problems and propose solutions, but extremely difficult to accomplish changes amidst widespread institutional rigidity. The ancient Book of History warning that "To know is easy, to act is difficult," has taken on poignant new meaning.

LEARNING FOR LIFE? Glimpses from a Vietnamese School Susanne Rubin

In 1982, together with a Vietnamese-speaking colleague, Eva Lindskog, I spent five months in Vietnam on fieldwork. The Vietnamese authorities gave us this opportunityup to now almost unique-to conduct an exploratory study of their school system.1 We focused particularly on a lower secondary school in Dich Vong, a village close to Hanoi. The school itself was chosen by the Ministry of Education and was considered to be among the best schools in the country. While at Dich Vong and elsewhere, we asked questions and collected data about Vietnamese schooling in general. We especially wanted to understand how one of the government's key objectives, "to integrate theory and practice, theory and productive work, theory and society," influenced the educational system. However, we did not have the opportunity to undertake a full-scale study of Vietnamese education. Such a study would need to give far more attention to historical developments, the literacy campaigns mounted since the early 1940s, the adult education system, and the whole question of "informal education" in the family, youth organizations, and the military. What follows, then, is a case study plus a few broader observations. The Integration of Theory and Practice—Some Background Notes

After liberation from the French colonialists, there was a great demand for education among the people of Vietnam. Alexander Woodside goes so far as to argue that "Vietnam is and has always been one of the most literary civilizations on the face of the planet."2 Since feudal times education has been held in high esteem. But the French limited the educational system so that only a small elite who could be useful to the colonial regime would gain from it. A nationwide literacy campaign was started in 1945, the same year the Democratic Republic of Vietnam was founded. It was successful despite the armed struggle against France's attempts to reconquer Vietnam and general conditions of hunger and poverty. The literacy campaign was followed by, and combined with, efforts to create a modern and truly Vietnamese general education system. The French language was soon replaced by Vietnamese at all educational levels. 1 A more detailed account is available in Swedish: Susanne Rubin and Eva Lindskog, Lara for livet? En vietnamesisk skolai narbild [Learning for life? A close-up of a Vietnamese school] (Stockholm: Department of Education, University of Stockholm, 1984). 2

Alexander Woodside, Community and Revolution in Modern Vietnam (Boston: Houghton Mifflin,1976), p. 2. 45

46

Postwar Vietnam

The importance of integrating theory and practice in the school system has been a major theme in Vietnamese educational debates, especially since about 1960. Emphasis on practice was a revolutionary innovation, as the school systems during both the Confucian and the French periods were of a decidedly theoretical character. President Ho Chi Minh often reminded teachers to train students in physical labor in order to do away with the traditional contempt of the educated for manual work. In his writings Ho underlined the importance of integrating theory and practice in the schools' education programs. In 1962, he stated that if people who performed mental labor did not also perform manual labor, and people who performed manual labor did not also also perform mental labor, the result would be paralysis of one part of the body.3 The principle of combining theory and practice has been reaffirmed in postwar educational policy. In a Party resolution of 1979 introducing a major project for educational reform, the following comment was made:4 Quantitatively our socialist education has developed very quickly, but it still has many weaknesses in all areas with respect to quality. The principle that theoretical studies are to be combined with practice, education with productive labor and the school with the society has not been carried out, either with respect to content or to pedagogical method. In many areas the school has fallen behind social development as well as developments in science and technology and does not meet the demands of the socialist revolution. In fact, while Vietnamese leaders argue for the integration of theory and practice in the schools, the years of childhood are also seen as being primarily a time of study, i.e., theory. There is an apparent contradiction between intentions and the very real problems of everyday school life. The educational reforms outlined in the 1979 resolution began to come into effect during the school year 1981/82. Prior to that, the general school system in northern Vietnam consisted of a four-year primary level, a three-year lower secondary level, and a three-year upper secondary level. Before starting school, children could also attend preparatory sessions, the so-called abc classes, where the basics of reading, writing, and arithmetic were taught. In 1981/82 the abc class was converted into the first grade of the primary level, and both the curriculum and teaching methods were changed. The goal was to establish a nine-year comprehensive school for basic education, to be followed by either upper secondary school, a "half study-half labor school," or a vocational school. The 1979 resolution also called for expansion of elite schools for children who showed particular ability in such subjects as languages, science, or mathematics. Special schools were also to be constituted for children having learning problems in the ordinary school program. At present, the three levels of the general school system consist of grades 1-5, grades 68, and grades 9-11. The curriculum and pedagogical methods are being changed successively from grade to grade, one year's course at a time. In due time the general educational system will be expanded to twelve years. 3 4

Ibid., p. 269.

Nghi qyet cua bo chinh tri ve cai each giao due [Central Committee resolution on educational reform], January 11,1979.

Learning for Life? 47 Although more than a decade has passed since Vietnam was united, the differences between the school system in the north and in the south remain considerable. In the south, for example, they still have a twelve-year system dating back to French colonial times. The curriculum also differs to some extent. Educational reforms currently under way are intended to unify the two school systems. It should also be noted that the quality of education and facilities varies considerably throughout the country. Some Statistics on Education In spite of the wars that have ravaged the country and the resulting extreme poverty, the school system in Vietnam has expanded remarkably. The following statistics give some idea of this expansion, although in many cases they are only estimates. In 1955 in northern Vietnam there were only around 700,000 pupils enrolled in the general school system.5 The number increased to around 2.9 million by 1965, and in 1970 the total enrollment reached 4.7 million. In 1980, there were 11.7 million pupils attending school throughout the whole of Vietnam-7.9 million in the primary grades, 3.2 million in the lower secondary grades, and 700,000 in the upper secondary grades. The number of pupils hi the general school system decreased somewhat between 1980 and 1982.6 The numbers in the crucial primary grades began to decline in 1978, and by 1980 had dropped to 1977 levels,7 despite a population growth of more than 3 percent. This decrease is most probably related to severe economic problems in the country. Officials at the Ministry of Education stated that approximately 90 percent of all northern Vietnamese children between the ages of six and eleven attended school in 1980/81, while the figure for the south was lower, around 70 percent. Enrollments for the lower secondary level included about 60 percent of all children in that age bracket. School enrollment was unevenly divided in the country, being highest in the big cities of northern Vietnam, such as Hanoi and Haiphong. By contrast, hi the minority areas and in remote areas of the Mekong Delta, the proportion of children attending school was con siderably lower. The drop-out rate was quite high and varied considerably from region to region. According to statistics prepared by the Ministry of Education during the school year 1980/81, the overall drop-out rate at the primary level was around 10 percent, and at the lower secondary level around 16 percent. At the primary level it was 5 percent in northern Vietnam and 15 percent in the south. It was only 4 percent in the Hanoi area, but was as high as 33 percent in the mountainous northern province of Ha Tuyen, a minority area. It should be pointed out, however, that all children between the ages of six and eighteen who drop out of school have the right to return at any time. Another problem concerned those pupils who had to repeat a grade. In 1980/81, 7 percent of pupils repeated a grade at primary and lower secondary levels and about 5 percent at upper secondary level. This percentage also varied from school to school and from region to region. The age spread within a class could be quite large, four or five years 5

Ministry of Education, Education in Vietnam (Hanoi, 1982), p. 37.

6

General Statistical Office, Statistical Data of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, 1982 (Hanoi, 1983), as quoted in Le Thanh Khoi, "Le Vietnam dix ans apres I'enseignement" (Paris, 1985, unpublished paper). My thanks to Professor Khoi for making his paper available. 7

Education in Vietnam, p. 39.

48

Postwar Vietnam

being not uncommon. School classes were large. The average number of pupils in primary grade classrooms was thirty-seven in 1980/81, increasing to forty-two in the lower secondary grades, and to forty-eight in the upper secondary grades. Focusing on One School The Ministry of Education draws up general outlines which are used as a basis for supervising and inspecting every school. Each institution is then ranked as a "model," "superior," "advanced," "passable," or "below standard" school. The lower secondary school in Dich Vong is one of 405 lower secondary schools within Greater Hanoi, which includes the immediately surrounding rural areas. For the year 1980/81,104 schools had been classified as "advanced" and 8 as "superior"~among them the lower secondary school in Dich Vong. No school in this area had achieved "model" status. During a six-week period in the spring of 1982 we conducted interviews at the school, looked at pupils' test papers and schoolwork, and examined textbooks and teaching manuals. One of those weeks was devoted to making classroom observations in a particular class. We also interviewed workers on the job, members of the village (xa) council, and others. The collection of data at the school and in Dich Vong village was both exciting and time consuming. The little prior information we possessed on the Vietnamese school system, as well as the vast cultural differences between our society and that of Vietnam, posed interesting challenges. One important problem we had to deal with was getting around and beyond the "official picture." At times our questions pertaining to current reality would be answered in terms of future plans or intentions. Because of the lack of sufficient educational facilities, some pupils at Dich Vong's lower secondary school, as with almost all schools in Vietnam, must attend school in shifts. A school day may be divided into as many as four shifts. At Dich Vong there is a morning and an afternoon shift. The buildings are quite simple: classrooms have earth floors, the blackboards are scratched; pupils sit on wooden benches. Dich Vong possesses an assembly hall, which is rather uncommon. In general, however, teaching equipment is very scarce and the material standard of the school is among neither the best nor the worst in the country. Previously, all textbooks were loaned out to the pupils. Today, however, pupils buy their books from the school at low cost or through secondhand book shops. Not all pupils have their own books, so that copies are sometimes shared. The pupils come from different social environments. Some of their parents are farmers, members of the agricultural cooperative in Dich Vong. Others work in state-owned shops, in machine cooperatives, or privately owned cafes. Another category of parents consists of staff and students of the nearby residential teachers' and Party colleges that have moved out from central Hanoi. From an administrative point of view these state institutions and their accompanying living quarters are not part of the village and these people are not included on village registers. Social contacts appear quite limited. Nonetheless, children of individuals working or studying in these central-affiliated institutions do attend schools in Dich Vong and neighboring villages. In 1982, there were 1,034 pupils in twenty-five classes attending grades six, seven, and eight hi the school studied. Around half of the children came from state institutions in the area, the other half from the village, which produced significant variations in social background. The general proportions varied in any particular class; for example, in class 8G, the one we followed most closely, almost all the youngsters came from the village.

Learning for Life? 49 Among the parents of children in any one class, a few might be illiterate, while a few others were perhaps instructors at a teachers' college. The Timetable in Lower Secondary Schools Table 2.1 shows the timetable for sixth, seventh, and eighth grades, in accordance with directives published by the Ministry of Education in 1978, and still in force in the spring of 1982. Those were the directives. However, the actual timetable adopted in the lower secondary school at Dich Vong differed somewhat. Hours given to "productive labor," where pupils take part in the repair of school buildings, plant rice for the agricultural cooperative, etc., were reduced. During the spring term of 1982, the eighth grade had not done any "productive labor" at all. The reason, according to the headmaster, was to give pupils more time to study in order to improve their chances of being accepted at the upper secondary school. Also, "productive labor" in the sixth and seventh grades, as well as the eighth Table 2.1 Number of instruction hours/week [AT = autumn term, ST = spring term] 6th grade AT ST Vietnamese History Geography Moral education/Current events Politics Mathematics Physics Chemistry Hygiene Biology Agricultural techniques Handicrafts/Domestic Science Gymnastics Drawing Music Foreign languages Social life Productive labor Social activities Total

7th grade AT ST

8th grade AT ST

Total

6 1 2

6 1 2

5 2 1

5 1 2

5 1 2

5 2 1

32 8 10

1

1

1

1

6

6

6 2

5 2

1 2 2

1 2 1

1 1 5 3 2

1 1 6 3 1

2 1

2 2

2 2

2 1

6 2 34 10 3 2 12 9

2 1 1 4 2 2 2

1 2 1 1 4 2 2 2

1 2 1 1 4 2 2 2

2 1 1 4 2 3 2

2

2

3 2 3 2

3 2 3 2

2 12 4 4 22 12 15 12

35

35

35

35

36

35

211

50

Postwar Vietnam

grade during the autumn term, had been reduced from the previous two hours a week to two hours every second week. Dich Vong school also did not include "social activities" in the timetable as specified in the directives. Most social activities were organized outside of the timetable by the Young Pioneer Movement in the school. At lower secondary level pupils can study Russian, English, or French as a foreign language. Russian is most commonly taught in the north, English in the south. At Dich Vong, children studied Russian two hours a week in the sixth and seventh grades, instead of the four hours stipulated in the directives. In the eighth grade they did not study any foreign language at all. Vietnamese (including literary history, grammar, and essay writing) and mathematics are the two main subjects. Pupils in the seventh grade received one extra hour a week in mathematics, while the eighth graders had one extra hour a week in both. Only one hour a week was devoted to gymnastics, instead of the stipulated two. Handicrafts and domestic science were omitted from Dich Vong's timetable. Pupils in the eighth grade had undertaken handicrafts one hour a week during one term of the previous year, however. Almost all of the deviations from the official time-plan made education at Dich Vong School more theoretical. It should be added that loose application of the directives appeared more the rule rather than the exception. It seemed quite common for lower secondary schools not to possess any instruction in foreign languages, music, gymnastics, or drawing. According to information we received from the Ministry of Education, it was not necessary for schools at this level to organize teaching in those subjects. Vietnamese and mathematics were the most important exam topics, and emphasis on these subjects could already be found in the directives. For example, eleven of the thirtyfive hours a week during the spring term of the eighth grade were expected to be devoted to those subjects. At Dich Vong these subjects were given even more emphasis, taking up thirteen of the twenty-seven scheduled hours a week. In many schools—but not in the lower secondary school at Dich Vong-teaching was just concentrated on those subjects included in important tests, while other subjects were treated rather superficially. Included in the twenty-five classes at the Dich Vong lower secondary school were two special classes in mathematics, an arrangement in existence for only a few years. Talented pupils from the whole district were welcome to attend the special class. However, during the spring term of 1982, all pupils in those two special classes—with only one exceptionwere children of parents who worked or studied in the state institutions rather than in the village. Over and above scheduled classroom teaching, the school also organized extra teaching. Special groups were formed consisting of youngsters considered to be either poor students or successful students. The poor students were primarily engaged in repeating lessons in Vietnamese and mathematics; parents had to pay a small sum for this. Not all pupils with study difficulties participated in these classes. Successful pupils also received extra teaching in Vietnamese and mathematics, free of charge, and these pupils could take part in competitions arranged in Hanoi. Parents could also pay for private tutoring for their children, as did parents from teachers' colleges in the area. Such extra instruction had developed as a response to the in-

Learning for Life? 51 creasing difficulty of gaining acceptance to upper secondary school and university, and consisted primarily of drilling for examinations. A Short Account of Teaching Methods It must be remembered that the lower secondary school in Dich Vong was considered a "superior" school, where both staff and pupils were more motivated, and teachers better informed than in many other places. At Dich Vong, we indeed encountered a very ambitious teaching staff. The teachers we interviewed appeared professionally motivated. The lessons we observed during the one week in class 8G were well prepared and well implemented, and the teachers were well versed in their subjects. In addition, the majority of the thirty-seven pupils in 8G seemed to be very interested in their schoolwork. Discipline was good, but not absolute. Sometimes individual pupils were observed doing their mathematics homework during the lesson in Vietnamese. When the teacher's back was turned a few of the pupils threw paper wads at one another. The teaching method in Dich Vong's lower secondary school required that pupils listen silently to the teacher's presentation of the material to be learned, copy down carefully what she/he wrote on the blackboard, and be prepared to answer questions concerning the subject matter. Teachers tended to follow the textbooks very closely. Pupils were expected to spend almost as many hours doing homework as they spent in school. Assigned lessons were learned more or less by rote. During the observation week pupils did not ask any questions concerning subject matter. In general very little creativity was demanded of the pupils, even if some subjects, such as Vietnamese, gave a bit of scope for solving certain problems in a more personal manner. Pupils faced many tests during the school year. In biology alone, class 8G took five tests during the spring of 1982. A ten-point scale was used hi grading. Generally it can be said that a good deal of emphasis was put on examinations, both oral and written. Many pupils held positions of responsibility in the class. Groups of pupils supervised each other in order to maintain discipline. Most of the pupils in class 8G were divided into two-person study-groups to help each other with homework. During class time, however, everyone worked individually. A variety of competitions involving both discipline and academic performance were held in the class and between classes. Special titles were assigned to classes, to units of the Young Pioneer Movement, to pupils, and to teachers, indicating their levels of achievement. On the basis of our observations at Dich Vong and several other schools, as well as interviews and relevant printed materials, we would characterize the Vietnamese approach to teaching as traditional. To Huu, then vice-premier, seemed to share this view:8 Schools in the general school system have not prepared pupils for participation in technical work, nor given them any vocational training. Educational content is backward in comparison with the development of society and science, and in many schools educational methods still divorce study from practice and education from productive labor to a serious extent. It is still common for pupils to learn by rote and for teachers to instruct according to a "cram" method. It is still common for study 8

To Huu, TCCS, September 1979.

52

Postwar Vietnam and practice, instruction and productive labor, not to be integrated to teaching methods. The school, the family, and society are not closely united.

A short account of some physics lessons we observed in Class 8G can help to illustrate how education was conducted. The homework for the first lesson in physics that particular week was from a chapter in a textbook entitled "Electricity." The teacher asked questions about alternating current and direct current. Then she lectured on the effect and force of electric currents and went through the formulas for their calculation. After that she went on to talk about joules, amperes, volts, and watts. Some textbook exercises were solved, for example: "How much current is used by a 10 ampere, 110 volt stove in three hours?" Afterwards the pupils were given a few other textbook exercises as homework. One of these was: "One 40 watt lamp is lighted an average of five hours a day during one month. How much will the electricity cost if the price/kwh is 0.15 dong?" During the first physics lesson, the teacher asked what kinds of electric appliances could be found in the home. The pupils gave few replies to this question. It was the teacher who offered stoves and refrigerators as examples. During the second lesson in physics, the teacher asked questions based on the homework. Some of the pupils then worked out textbook exercises on the blackboard. As homework for the third lesson, pupils were given three more textbook exercises. During the third lesson the teacher quickly checked that the homework had been done, and then lectured on a chapter in the textbook concerning the transformation of electric power into heat. The teacher said: "We really ought to do some laboratory work on this, but that's impossible. Therefore I'll show you." On the blackboard she hung up an enlargement of a drawing from the textbook showing the wiring diagram for a certain experiment. Then she explained the experiment and asked some of the pupils to come to the blackboard and repeat the explanation. Afterwards she fired questions at the pupils in quick tempo. One of our encounters hinted at the school's elaborate ways of moral training and of ensuring that pupils carry out assignments. Hung, a pupil in class 8G, told us that during the lesson hi mathematics we had observed earlier the same day, the monitor had noticed that he had not done his homework and reported it to the leader of his class-unit, who in turn reported it to the best pupil in mathematics, who reported it to the mathematics teacher. Hung told us that he would be criticized for his lapse during the final period of the week, in a subject called "social life." He added, "You can also report yourself if you have not done your homework. It is worse if someone else discovers it." Unequal Opportunities The curriculum and teaching methods in the lower secondary school at Dich Vong are abstract and probably difficult for many whose family background has not prepared them to learn from books. The fact that the pupils did not ask questions during lessons, even when they failed to understand something, made it difficult to pick up any lost threads. Although teachers tried to teach at a level that most pupils would understand, those who did not could fall behind rather easily. As it was very difficult to get accepted for upper secondary school and then for a university, many youngsters in Dich Vong with educated parents worked extremely hard at their studies. One reason for this, as both the youngsters and their parents articulated to us, was that they could not think of working in, for example, an agricultural cooperative. For

Learning for Life? 53

27. NHtTlHG DVNC CV DdT N6NC BANG Df$N a) Nguyen We.

Nguoi ta dtra tren hien tirang d6ng di£n l£m nong day dan de che tao nhfrng dung cu d6t nong, nhir ban la, am, bep, 16 siroi dung dong ctten, v.v... Ta biSt rang nhiet lugng tea ra Iren day din li le (huan v6i didn tra.

Hinh 49 - Am di^n.

Hinh 50 - B&n 1^ di^n.

Do do, b6 phan chu yeu trong cac dung cu nay la mdt day dan c6 dien tra suat r^t 16n true tiep lam nong dung cu hoic lam nong nhftng vat chua tronjj dung cu (kh6i sSt cua ban l& f nu6c trong ftm dien...).

Hinh 51 - Bep di£n.

Hinh 52 - Mo ban dien.

b) l/ng dv""9.

N h u n g d u n g c u dot nong bang dien co ral nhicu ling dung trong d&i song va trong ky t h u a t : am, b^n la, bep mo Mn (xem cdc hinh 49 — 52), 16 sirai, may ap trirng, 16 hap, 16 nung, v.v...

Diagram 2.1. One page from a Physics textbook

54

Postwar Vietnam

the children of farmers the prospects were, of course, different. The fact that they often had to help their parents in agricultural work, and therefore had less time to do their homework, worked against their educational success. Of course, the staff at Dich Vong lower secondary school perceived these differences between different groups, but they lacked resources, as they saw it, to do anything to change the situation significantly. Nonetheless, some affirmative measures were taken. The Young Pioneers organized a campaign to see to it that every pupil had a corner at home where he/she could sit down and do homework. This could be seen as an attempt to support the children of parents who had little or no education and who failed to appreciate the necessity of being able to work undisturbed in order to do well in school. Although there were obvious differences in opportunity for pupils from different social groups, one could still say that this school had managed to create a positive attitude towards school achievement among the majority of its pupils, using such children as those with parents at the teachers' colleges as pace-setters. The school suffered from a shortage of educational facilities, for example laboratory equipment or basic wood-working and metal-working tools. During the observation week in class 8G, no practical experiments were carried out. Taking the school year as a whole, however, some boys (but no girls) had performed a few experiments in physics, and the teacher had demonstrated other experiments in front of the class. In chemistry, pupils did no laboratory work, but the teacher was able to carry out a few demonstrations. In the subjects of biology, "productive labor," and "agricultural techniques," pupils performed a number of practical exercises. They dissected frogs, fish, and the like. They worked with pickaxes, observed and even tested the use of insect spray. They raised vegetables, grew medicinal herbs, and looked after a dam. They also helped somewhat in the work of the agricultural cooperative, and were allowed to try out but not operate the mechanical equipment. Outside scheduled classroom hours they cleaned the school and village roads. Drawing and handicrafts were little studied at the school, and not at all in the eighth grade on which our field study concentrated. Neither could "productive labor" be found on the timetable in the spring term of this grade. Both in Dich Vong and at lower secondary schools generally, subjects such as drawing, handicrafts, gymnastics, and "productive labor" were given low priority. Visits to places of work other than the agricultural cooperatives were not arranged by the Dich Vong school. Vocational counselling was virtually non-existent. Pupils did not learn much about the requirements for productive labor, nor did they study much technical material. In only a very limited sense could it be said that productive labor had enriched theoretical studies or that theoretical studies had been used to improve the quality of productive labor. Those are ambitions, however, that are very difficult to realize in the lower grades which were the focus of our study. After Vietnamese and mathematics, moral and social training (including but not limited to "moral education" and "social life") appeared to receive most emphasis at this school. Through the Young Pioneer Movement and the Ho Chi Minh Youth Union, pupils were encouraged to adopt the morals, ideology, and working methods of the Communist Party. It is also worth noting that competitions such as those we observed at the school-among pupils, classes, and teachers-could be seen in all walks of life in Vietnam. However, despite the fact that group discussion is not an unimportant component of decision making in Vietnamese working life, there was a notable lack of classroom discussion. Nor could it be said that school life trained pupils to utilize their own creativity. Rather,

Learning for Life? 55 they were encouraged to participate in centrally organized activities of a political and social nature. In general, the educational system exerts contradictory influences on parents and others in the community. On the one hand it emphasizes communist ideology. On the other hand it stresses education as a means to individual progress. Our observations also suggest that school life bears little relationship to the local community, even though pupils in Dich Vong school did clean the roads, while parents and others did take part in building the school. Instruction closely follows textbooks which contain little reference to local conditions. However, teachers sometimes do take up issues concerning the relationship between the school and the local community. Also, questions of general relevance to contemporary Vietnamese society are treated. During the week we observed class 8G, they studied such topics as the organization of cooperatives and the circumstances surrounding formation of the Communist Party. Traditional Remnants In Today's Education

Education played a central role in traditional Vietnam. Many dreamed of achieving positions in the upper levels of the bureaucracy, although few saw their dreams fulfilled. For most, admittance to the inner circle of power and prestige was blocked by a rigid academic system that placed heavy demands on the candidates' ability to assimilate and mimic intricate literary, ethical, and ideological norms. We interviewed Nguyen Due Minh, an official at the Institute of Educational Science in Hanoi concerning those characteristics of today's schools which could be traced back to earlier epochs. He stressed that: Intellectual work was considered to be the only "fine" type of work during the Confucian period. Reading books was the only important occupation. This perpetuated a negative view of practical labor. Another aspect which survives today is encyclopedism. In the Confucian school it was very important; pupils were required to know everything. He also said that, although we now have a very negative opinion of feudalism and Confucius, those ideals somehow live on. Indeed, certain Confucian traditions are considered tunelessly beneficial, for example the emphasis on moral instruction. That schools are still "literary" was also rooted in the French schools, Minh added: There was no connection between study and practice in colonial schools either. The examination system was formalistic and demanding. Pupils studied in order to become members of the civil service. However, he believed that certain characteristics of French period pedagogy were positive, for example its strictly stipulated system of rules, with numerous regulations governing teachers, pupils, and supervisors. During the Confucian and French periods, those who worked in agriculture or other manual occupations received vocational training from their parents. Today, most of those who work in agriculture within the cooperatives still possess a relatively low educational level. Among leaders of cooperatives in 1982, only 0.2 percent had completed the upper

56

Postwar Vietnam

secondary level, and 9.5 percent had completed the lower secondary school.9 It is also interesting to note that agricultural universities attracted only about 10 percent of the country's students, although about 70 percent of the working population were farmers.10 The school at Dich Vong encouraged the youngsters to continue their studies and to apply for admission to an upper secondary school, rather than go to a vocational school or join the work force. In the spring of 1982, a questionnaire was circulated at the school. Of the 253 pupils completing the eighth grade at that time, 185 hoped to continue studies in the upper secondary level, 48 wanted to start work in a factory, 18 wanted to become members of the agricultural cooperative, and 2 wanted to be soldiers. Pupils accepted at an upper secondary school (around 70 percent of those who pass the eighth grade at Dich Vong, compared to an average of 30 percent for the whole country) can choose from among three different institutions in the neighborhood. Most of them enter a school at Yen Hoa village, 1.5 km from Dich Vong. At that upper secondary school we were told that, of around 300 pupils who finished their studies in the spring of 1981, only twenty-eight had gone on to a university, while two others had gone abroad for study or work. Most of the other 90 percent wanted to continue their studies at a university level and/or go abroad, but it was not to be. The fact that very few of the young people in the lower secondary school at Dich Vong wanted to become members of the agricultural cooperative is influenced by the fact that Dich Vong is situated very close to central Hanoi. More and more institutions are being relocated outward, and this is reducing the area of Dich Vong cooperative. This aspiration of young people to leave agriculture can also be noted in other villages which are much further away from the cities. However, Alexander Woodside has argued, this should be seen not only as an expression of the spontaneous wish of rural people to flee their villages but also as a sign of the lack of employment there for educated young people. He referred to a Vietnamese study, made in 1977, which showed that local organizations responsible for deciding village employment are often of the opinion that upper secondary graduates, by definition, are no longer part of the village's already overcrowded work force.11 The Attraction of the University Pressure on the universities is severe. According to information received from the Institute of Educational Science, it was expected that somewhat more than 200,000 pupils would complete their upper secondary school training in the spring of 1982, and that approximately half would apply for admission to a university or other tertiary educational institution. In addition, it was believed that approximately 500,000 additional young people who had earlier completed their upper secondary schooling would also apply. Only 5-10 percent of the applicants could be admitted. It was not uncommon for young people to apply to the university several times. Taking the entrance examination was an event that often involved the entire family.

9

Nhan Dan, February 16,1982.

10 11

Le Thanh Khoi, "Le Vietnam," p. 7.

Alexander Woodside, "The Triumphs and Failures of Mass Education in Vietnam," Pacific Affairs, 56, 3 (Fall 1983): 425.

Learning for Life? 57 The percentage of pupils who are admitted to a university has changed drastically since the beginning of the 1960s. At that time the majority of those who completed upper secondary level could receive a higher education. More recently, however, the number of pupils in the general school system has greatly increased. During the five-year period between 1976 and 1980, the number of pupils completing lower secondary schooling increased from 466,000 to 770,000 per annum, while students completing the upper secondary level rose from 63,700 to 164,000.12 About 70 percent of the students from lower secondary schools and 85 percent of upper secondary students had to give up their schooling-519,000 after the 1979/80 school year alone. What happens to all the pupils who do not gain admission to higher education? A1981 directive on vocational education stated that every year there are hundreds of thousands of pupils who are unable to continue their studies, yet who are inadequately prepared to take up an occupation. Vo Nguyen Giap, member of the Politbureau and vice minister of the Council of Ministers, commented:13 Many see only one way, namely to proceed from the primary school through to the university. If this is not possible they feel that the education system is not responsible to the needs of society and the young people. Attending a vocational school appeals to few of the young people. As former Vice Premier To Huu said in a 1979 speech:14 At present, when they leave lower or upper secondary schools or the university, the majority of young people have no intention of becoming workers, peasants, or employees in some national service unit. They are therefore somewhat sorrowful and depressed by life - which is not a desirable attitude. A number of young people begin to attend vocational schools against their will and are consequently not enthusiastic and lack a sense of responsibility and occupational interest. However, the system's practical attention to vocational schools is weak: there are five to six times as many places in upper secondary schools as in vocational schools. That the tendencies at Dich Vong school are not unique can also be understood from an admission hi the Party journal:15 In actual fact, the goal of the general school system is not especially clear. We have utilized a training program to evaluate the results of the training instead of employing reality's demands as a criterion. According to a well-known writer, Dr. Nguyen Khac Vien, pupils will abandon the schools if education does not become better adapted to present day realities:16 The traditional pedagogical method is designed to fit the needs of a minority in a stagnant society. To apply this pedagogical method to mil12

VNC, 1981, no. 2: 22.

13

Information-Documents [Hanoi], no. 1 (March 1982): 15.

14

Nhan Dan, October 22,1979.

13

Hoang Ngoc Di, TCCS, May 1981.

16

Interview with Dr. Vien, Hanoi, June 1982.

58

Postwar Vietnam lions of children who are no longer a minority is an impossibility. The school does not develop the skills of those who are clever at repairing machines, who sing or who love to work with animals. The result is a single-track school for the few. If you know that as a pupil you have an opportunity to become a higher civil servant, you will make an effort to be good in school. But if you know that you will not achieve your goal, there is no reason for you to try. You won't go to school. If no solutions are found now, the pupils will abandon the school. They will begin to look for work. Life will force them to.

Many villages are finding it difficult to motivate pupils for schoolwork. As a teacher at the Dich Vong school said, "There is a special tendency here. The children think it is fun to come to school. In other villages the children may not want to attend school at all." Qualify and Quantify Decisive changes have been introduced into Vietnamese schools since the revolution in 1945. Instruction in morals and politics has been revised in order to implant socialist ideology in the pupils. The Young Pioneer Movement and the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union have been given important functions in the schools. However, perhaps the most important transformation is the great expansion of the general school system itself. A radical increase took place, of course, following unification of the country in 1976; but an increase is also taking place because of population growth. Children and young people in Vietnam are steadily increasing in numbers. This, plus the ambition for all children to attend school, constitutes continuous pressure on the educational system. The authorities understand that maintenance of high quality instruction is a difficult problem. The VCP Central Committee's political report to the Fifth National Congress in 1982 acknowledged that the quality of instruction had seriously deteriorated. It also stated, "Not only has technical-scientific instruction become more and more deficient, but instruction of the younger generation in revolutionary ideals and social ethics has also deteriorated."17 Nguyen Thi Binh, the minister of education at the time, suggested various reasons for this decline in the quality of teaching, in particular the difficult economic situation faced by teachers, which forces some to find work additional to their teaching responsibilities, in order to support themselves. According to the minister, a lack of enthusiasm for the teaching profession was therefore spreading within the teaching corps, even if this did not apply to a majority of teachers.18 It would seem that Vietnamese educators are being called upon to expand the school system further when the Vietnamese economy does not yet allow for such expansion. As a result, the quality of education could be jeopardized even more. Some official documents imply that all children will have access to a twelve-year education in the not too distant future. It is the hope of the authorities that by means of guidance counselling they will be able to alleviate the problem of the hundreds of thousands of pupils who have no possibility of

17 Vietnam Communist Party, Fifth National Congress. Political Report of the Central Committee (Hanoi 1982), p. 24. 18

Nguyen Thi Binh, TCCS, August 1982.

Learning for Life? 59 continuing their education and are also inadequately prepared to take up employment. Earlier, vocational guidance had been considered a matter for the parents, not the schools. However, in a circular letter published in 1981 by the Ministry of Education, all schools were required to inform pupils what vocations were needed in the local community as well as in the country in general.19 In an interview with a representative of the Educational Service in Hanoi, we were informed of plans to bring in practicing scientists to offer three additional hours of instruction per week to those local upper secondary school pupils who were rated in the top 10-15 percent in theoretical subjects. During those hours the other pupils would be given training in a skilled occupation at which they could work after graduation. Even during school time they could get some remuneration for their work. For pupils on the outskirts of Hanoi, education in productive labor would be channeled into agriculture, while for pupils in central Hanoi it would incline towards handicrafts, mechanics, and the like. We were also told that a large number of teachers were being trained to instruct pupils in handicrafts and that UNICEF was building centers in Hanoi which would provide industrial labor training. Better integration of theory and productive labor is clearly a major aim of educational reforms now on the agenda in Vietnam. Nonetheless, by 1991, when such reforms are expected to be fully realized, only around 15 percent of total class time will be reserved for productive labor and technique.20 We had no chance to study the new curriculum which is being introduced, grade by grade, but some educators we spoke with feared that, in an effort to reach the same level as the developed countries, for example the Soviet Union, the new curriculum might be too overloaded. Nguyen Khac Vien has called it a "massive curriculum." Experimental institutions have been in existence in Vietnam for quite a number of years, among them the so-called "half study-half labor" schools. The first school of that kind was started on the initiative of the Young Communists League as early as 1958. In 1970, there was a decree from the Council of Ministers stating that the number of these schools should increase, that they should encompass the upper secondary level, and that they should provide an all-round education. These schools would also produce goods, contribute to the school's maintenance, and advance development of the local community. However, attempts to expand this type of school have not been successful. Thus, documents from the 1982 Party Congress, as well as other sources, call for renewed efforts to develop half study-half labor schools as well as vocational schools. Problems involving these schools are continually discussed. One question is whether or not they should be allowed to reduce their theoretical curriculum in comparison with other schools at the upper secondary level. The risk that these schools may develop more in the direction of a production unit than a school also causes some concern. Another question under discussion, in this case since the revolution in 1945, concerns the content and method of moral and political instruction. For example, Nguyen Thi Binh, then minister of education, emphasized the need to improve the teachers' political quality

19 Ministry of Education, "Cong tac huong nghiep trong nha truong" [Vocational guidance work in the schools] (Hanoi), November 17,1981. 20

Nguyen Truong Khoa, TCCS, August 1981.

60

Postwar Vietnam

and to establish local Party organizations in a larger number of schools.21 One way to deal with the problem of limited university facilities is to require that applicants be members of the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union. In 1984, the VCP daily paper indicated that from the 1985/86 school year, candidates, with few exceptions, would need to be in that category.22 When discussing instruction in productive labor, some Vietnamese educators prefer the various trades and handicrafts which have a long tradition in rural Vietnam, and which enable youth to begin to earn an income almost immediately. Others believe that it is better to provide youth with an educational base which will enable them to work in the more modern sectors of the economy. Either way, plans to devote more time to productive labor seem rather modest. Because of the many difficulties confronting the Vietnamese school system today-problems in maintaining educational quality, trying to ensure full obligatory school attendance, severe budget constraints, unemployment among the youth, to name a few-a more sweeping reformation of instruction is being called for in Vietnam. A lively pedagogical debate is under way there, which I found quite stimulating and productive. It is important that the school system hold open many different educational paths and not, as is the case today, place so much emphasis on mathematics and Vietnamese. If through school instruction pupils become more capable of making solid contributions to local production, then a major step in integrating "theory and practice, theory and productive labor, and theory and society" will have been achieved. However, the form and content of instruction will need to be better adapted to fit local needs. The energy and initiative of pupils could be given a more central place in the scheme of things, which is not possible if the predetermined curriculum is overloaded. It is unlikely that these ideas, fragments from current Vietnamese pedagogical debates, will be realized in the near future. In an institution such as the lower secondary school at Dich Vong, if instruction were to be more oriented toward practical activities and local conditions, this would run counter to the school's history and current curriculum. The traditional school has great powers of survival. This is true not only in Vietnam, but all over the world. 21

Nguyen Thi Binh, TCCS, May 1985.

22

Nhan Dan, June 1,1984.

Plate 1

Photograph by Susanne Rubin

A Lecture to Class 8G

Plate 2

Photograph by Susanne Rubin

Plate3

Photograph by Susanne Rubin

Pupils in Class 8G

This page intentionally left blank

WOMEN AND FAMILY PLANNING POLICIES IN POSTWAR VIETNAM Nguyen Huyen Chau

Introduction In 1972, in an article on childbirth and the protection of the mother and child in the Vietnamese women's magazine, Phu Nu Viet Nam [Women of Vietnam], Dinh Thi Can, the head of the Committee for the Protection of Mother and Child, identified excessive fertility as having a negative impact on the health of women, the happiness of the family, and labor productivity. At the very age when young women should be most productive, they were instead constantly bearing children. This had a double effect. Not only were there more mouths to feed and more young children to care for, but there were fewer women available to work in an economy which depended on their labor power. Family planning, she argued, would promote the revolution, the people, productive labor, and women's liberation. Therefore, every woman had to be made aware of the benefits of birth control.1 This chapter concerns the advocacy of family planning by the Vietnamese state and the adoption of family planning practices by Vietnamese women since the inception of a state population policy in 1963. In particular, it focuses on the problems encountered in the implementation of these policies and the role of the Vietnam Women's Union as an intermediary between the state policies and women's decisions whether or not to adopt family planning practices. The first section looks at the structure of the Vietnamese population and how population came to be perceived as a policy problem. The second section traces the development of population policies and details their organizational infrastructure, contents, and results. The third section considers the problems of implementation, the socio-cultural context, and the contradictory pressures placed on the women who are asked to embrace family planning practices.2 Population as a Policy Problem When looking at the origins of Vietnamese population policies, the central question is: what prompted the state policy makers' concerns about population? When and why did the regulation of fertility come to be defined as a "problem"? In order to throw some light

1

Phu Nu Viet Nam (hereafter PNVN), 1972, no. 3.

2

The materials presented in this chapter are derived from an earlier unpublished study by the author (Nguyen Huyen Chau, "North Vietnamese Peasant Women and Vietnamese Population Policies: Factors Affecting the Adoption of Birth Control Practices by North Vietnamese Peasant Women," MA thesis, University of Warwick, 1983) and a variety of primary and secondary sources in Vietnamese, French, and English.

61

62

Postwar Vietnam

on these questions and prepare the way for more detailed discussion of the development of population policies, a little background on the demographic structure is in order. The results of the 1979 nationwide census, the first one of its kind in modern Vietnamese history, were released in April 1980.3 Vietnam's population was approximately 53 million and growing at a rate of roughly 2.6 percent per year.4 This came as a shock because previous estimates in 1976 had ranged from 42 to 45 million. By 1985, the total population was estimated to be 60 million5 and growing at a rate of 2.3 percent per year.6 This makes Vietnam the world's thirteenth most populous nation.7 This rapid increase in population is all the more remarkable in the light of a recent history of famine, war, and a significant net migration. The structure of the population can be characterized as follows. First, it is overwhelmingly rural in nature. At least 80 percent of the population live in the countryside, with the north being less urbanized than the south. Therefore, it is a predominantly peasant population, in which 75 percent of the entire population gain their livelihood from agriculture.8 Second, in terms of ethnicity, around 15 percent of the population consists of fifty-five to sixty minority groups who live in the central mountain highlands, and in the north and northwest provinces adjacent to Laos and China.9 Third, as in many developing countries, the population has a high dependency ratio: a 1984 estimate suggests that 45 percent of the population are aged fifteen and under,10 which means that there is still much potential for future rapid population growth. Fourth, the population has an unusual balance between males and females, especially in the twenty-five to forty-five age group. This would seem to be a result of the war.11 There are 2 million more women than men in the total population.12 A recent study in the Vietnamese Sociological Review suggested that in some areas of northern Vietnam there were as many as three women to one man in the twenty to twenty-four year range.13 Fifth, in terms of relative growth rates, there is a considerable disparity between the north and the south of the country. According to 1981 estimates, the fifteen provinces which constitute northern Vietnam had a growth rate of only 2.2 percent per annum, 3

Stewart Fraser, "Vietnam Census Reveals Imbalance," People 8, 2 (1981): 24; idem., "Vietnam: Population and Education, Current Notes," La Trobe University Bulletin 13, 22 (1982): 1; J. Banister, The Population of Vietnam l(Washington: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 1985), p. 4.

4

Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 3; Viet Nam Courier (hereafter VNC), 1983, no. 10: 22.

5

VNC, 1985, no. 5; Tap Chi Cong San (hereafter TCCS), 1983, no. 9: 58.

6

Xa Hoi Hoc (hereafter XHH), 1985, no. 12: 16.

7

Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 4; VNC, 1985, no. 5: 26.

8

Stewart Fraser, "Vietnam's 1980 Census: Current Position and Future Outlook," Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, 3 (December 1981): 226; XHH, 1985, no. 12:13. 9

Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 9.

10

TCCS, 1984, no. 8: 38.

11

Nguyen Due Nhuan, "Constraintes de*mographiques et politiques de developpement au Vietnam, 19751980," Population 39, 2 (1984): 318. 12

XHH, 1985, no. 12: 17.

13

Ibid.

Women and Family Planning 63 whereas the southern twenty provinces were growing at a rate much closer to 3 percent per annum.14 It should be noted that, prior to reunification in 1975, South Vietnam had very little in the way of family planning policies. The north, on the other hand, had been experimenting with family planning programs since 1963.15 Sixth, the geographical distribution of the population has long been characterized by an imbalance. Nearly two-thirds of the population is concentrated on approximately 24 percent of the cultivable land in the delta provinces of the Red River and the Mekong.16 In the delta provinces, the density ranges from 156 to 1,686 persons per square kilometer, whereas in the mountainous provinces, the average density is only nineteen to twenty-five persons per square kilometer.17 As a result of intensive farming methods, the delta provinces have long been densely populated. Overcrowding and natural disasters have, however, led to chronic food shortages and severe famines, especially in these provinces. In particular, as many as 2 million people died of starvation in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Vietnam is now classed among the very poorest of the developing nations. Despite repeated economic reorganizations and attempts to increase agricultural production, it is still a struggle to feed the population. With population growth outstripping economic growth, Vietnamese policy makers have faced the dilemmas common to so many Third World nations. Rapid population growth has thus been defined as a problem and attempts to limit this growth have become an integral part of economic policy. Development of Population Policies Apart from attempting to increase agricultural production and promote more rapid economic development, the Vietnamese government has attempted to tackle the population problem in two ways: first, it has implemented a population resettlement policy to redistribute the population towards areas of less densely populated and uncultivated land; and, second, it has pursued a policy of attempting to lower the rate of population growth. Since this article will focus mainly on this latter dimension, the resettlement aspect of Vietnamese population policies will only be briefly mentioned here. Both the population redistribution and family planning policies were initiated during the First Five-Year Plan (1961-1966). Beginning in the early 1980s, the government attempted to persuade some people to leave the densely populated Red River Delta provinces for the sparsely populated highlands.18 New economic zones consisting of previously uncultivated land were established. This was a precursor of the post-1975 resettlement policy. With the Second Five-Year Plan (1976-1980), the government aimed to move 4 million people from the north to New Economic Zones in central and south Vietnam.19 14

Fraser, "Vietnam's 1980 Census," p. 223.

15

XHH, 1985, no. 12:28.

16

Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 6.

17

XHH, 1985, no. 12: 27; Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 6.

18

Gavin Jones and Stewart Fraser, "Population Resettlement Policies in Vietnam," in Population Resettlement Programs in Southeast Asia, ed. Jones & Richter. Development Studies Centre Monograph No. 30 (Canberra: The Australian National University, 1982), p. 115. 19

Ibid., p. 115; Jones, "Population and Education," p. 783.

64

Postwar Vietnam

Despite this ambitious target, recent figures indicate that only 1.5 million people were relocated during this period.20 The development of policies to lower the rate of population growth might be divided into three very approximate phases: first, from 1963 with the setting up of a Committee for Family Planning; second, from 1972 with a renewed effort to promote birth control; and third, from 1976 onwards, when the policies were extended to the south. The results of the 1960 census in North Vietnam showed that the population was growing at a rate of 3.4 percent per year. There seemed to have been a population explosion after the end of the war with France in 1954. During the period 1954-1960, the total rate of population growth was 4 percent. In some villages, the rate was as high as 5-6 percent.21 This led the government to formulate a population policy.22 The first family planning campaign was launched in 1963. The primary emphasis was on women's health and its link with the need for increased productivity by women to meet the war effort. This is important, since in 1966, over 65 percent of the agricultural workforce was female.23 By 1972, this proportion rose to 80 and 90 percent.24 However, due to the demands of the war, population control was low on the list of priorities.25 In this first phase, family planning was seen as related to women's health needs and possible improvements hi labor productivity. Improvements in women's health could be gained from either the limitation and spacing of births or the practice of contraception.26 It was also argued that family planning practices would improve women's opportunities to participate in the labor force and, thereby, raise their relative social status. By 1970 official publications still complained that women were giving birth to too many children too quickly and this had a bad influence on labor productivity.27 A new policy impetus was in evidence from the early 1970s. At a birth control conference for thirteen key provinces, Pham Van Dong, the prime minister, described the population situation as "serious, dangerous and urgent."28 More precise goals on a deferred age for marriage, the spacing of births, and ideal family size were espoused. For example, in 1971 a movement was launched to get 5 percent of women to use an intra-uterine device or IUD.29 This movement came about as a result of a survey conducted hi a number of localities which showed that the birth rate was invariably high, 3.5 percent in the countryside and hi some villages as high as 5.7 percent, and that often 50 percent of women workers were giving birth.30 The survey's results suggested that if 5 percent of the total number 20

Jones & Fraser, "Population Resettlement Policies," p. 121.

21

XHH, 1985, no. 12:16.

^TCCS, 1982, no. 8: 38; Fraser, "Vietnam's 1980 Census," p. 223. 23

PNVN, 1966, no. 10.

24

William Turley, "Women in the Communist Revolution in Vietnam," Asian Survey 12, 9 (1972): 793-805.

25

Banister, Population of Vietnam, p. 5.

26

PNVN, 1967, no. 5; ibid., 1969, no. 4; ibid., 1970, no. 10.

27

PNVN, 1970, no. 9.

28

VNC, 1983, no. 10:23.

29

VNC, 1981, no. 7: 21.

30

PNVN, 1971, no. 2.

Women and Family Planning 65 of women (or about 25 percent of women of child-bearing age) could be persuaded to use an IUD, the most widely used contraceptive device in Vietnam, the population growth rate could be reduced by 2 to 1.25 percent within one to two years.31 The reunification of the north and the south in 1975 led to a third phase, in which the campaign was extended to southern Vietnam. After the end of the war many couples were reunited. Anxiety at an expected increase in the birth rate was a major motivation for the New Culture Family campaign.32 This postwar campaign of the Women's Union was a guide to good conduct in the new socialist society, in which the practice of family planning was identified as a particular priority. A new Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) began-the first since the 1961-1966 plan was interrupted. In 1977, the government set ambitious targets to achieve a reduction in population growth rate to a little over 2 percent by 1980, and down to 1 percent by the year 2000.33 In other words, the government had established targets for a continuous and longterm decline in the rate of population growth, with the ultimate objective of achieving zero population growth in the twenty-first century—an extremely ambitious plan for a developing country experiencing rapid population growth. There can be little doubt that family planning had become an important element in the government's plans for the reconstruction of the country. Organization and Implementation Four organizations have been involved in family planning policies: the State Planning Committee, the Institute for the Protection of Mother and Child, the Ministry of Health, and the Vietnam Women's Union. The first two are largely concerned with drafting the policies while the latter are more closely involved with implementation. In the context of its different Five-Year Plans, the State Planning Committee sets targets for population growth, while the Institute for the Protection of Mother and Child is responsible for translating the broad targets into detailed quotas of actual family planning practices at provincial and lower levels.34 The Ministry of Health has the technical responsibility for advising and propagating methods and techniques of birth control, including the training of family planning personnel.35 The Women's Union carries out the detailed propaganda work in favor of the policies. Through its network of branches in every village, government office, factory and other workplaces, it activates the political and educational aspects of the campaigns.36 This includes persuading individual women of the benefits of practicing birth control. Given the importance of the Vietnam Women's Union as an intermediary between state population policies and women's decisions to adopt birth control practices, a subsequent section will examine in greater detail its role in the implementation of family planning policies. 31

VNC, 1981, no. 7: 21.

32

PNVN, 1976, no. 3.

33

Fraser, "Vietnam's 1980 Census," p. 224.

34

Gavin Jones, "Population Trends and Policies in Vietnam," Population and Development Review 8, 4 (1982): 796.

35

Stewart Fraser, "Notes on Population and Family Planning in Vietnam," The Journal of Family Welfare 25, 3 (1979): 72.

36

Ibid., p. 75.

66

Postwar Vietnam

The actual content of the family planning policies has, of course, evolved, but it includes the concept of an ideal family size, recommended ages for marriage and motherhood, the spacing of births, and the adoption of specific methods. On ideal family size, it is suggested that families living in the city should have a maximum of two children.37 Families living in rural areas, the great majority, are also encouraged to have just two children. Initially, if the first two children were daughters, parents were permitted to have three children.38 This now appears to have disappeared from official discourse. By 1985, the absolute maximum was expressed as two children, irrespective of whether they were daughters or sons.39 Second, delayed marriage is encouraged. The minimum legal age at marriage for girls is eighteen years, and women's average age at marriage has risen to around twenty in the cities. Women and youth committees in rural areas are committed to the official goal of delaying marriage as long as possible.40 Third, it is recommended that a mother should be at least twenty-two years of age when having her first child, and then should aim for a five-year interval before the second birth.41 As regards contraceptive methods, there seems to be an almost exclusive reliance on the intra-uterine device (IUD). Family planning targets are expressed in terms of the percentage of women of child-bearing age who have been fitted with an IUD. For reasons of economy and continuity, especially among peasant women in the countryside, the IUD appears to be the method of birth control preferred by the state. The condom is only available for cadres in the city. The oral pill is rarely used. Whereas female sterilization was formerly very rare, and male sterilization was almost non-existent recent evidence suggests that male and female sterilization have now been introduced, and that abortion is becoming an increasingly important method of birth control.42 According to as yet incomplete data, during the first six months of 1985, 512,417 lUDs were fitted, and there were 14,850 male and female sterilizations. There were also 241,815 abortions, due to such reasons as ill-health and psychological and personal circumstances.43 It has been suggested that, prior to 1984, the highest number of lUDs fitted was 500,000 in a year when there were very few sterilizations or abortions. It seems that, hitherto, compliance has not been compulsory. It has been reported that the guiding rule was "persuasion always, coercion never."44 There is, however, evidence that sanctions and incentives have been used to encourage the adoption of birth control practices, especially the fitting of the IUD, as different cooperatives attempted to fulfil their quotas. For example, women are entitled to periods of rest, money allowances, and foodstuffs when having an IUD fitted or undergoing abortion. The rewards tend to vary

37

Fraser, "Vietnam: Population and Education," p. 1.

38

Houtart and Lemercinier, Sociologie d'une commune vietnamienne (Louvain-la-Neuve: C.R.S.R. Universite Catholique de Louvaine, 1981), p. 140.

39

TCCS, 1985, no. 9: 61.

40

Jones, "Vietnam: Population and Education," p. 797.

41

TCCS, 1985, no. 9: 61.

42

On female sterilization, see Fraser, "Notes on Population," p. 76 and A. Monnier, "Donne'es recentes sur la population du Vietnam," Population 36, 3 (1981): 619. On male sterilization, see Jones, "Population Resettlement Policies," p. 800. 43

XHH, 1985, no. 12: 20.

44

Stewart Fraser, "Everybody's Business," People 5, 2 (1978): 25.

Women and Family Planning 67 according to the relative wealth of a particular cooperative or workplace. A 1984 issue of Phu Nu Viet Nam, for instance, noted that, if a couple in Hanoi registered to practice birth control, they were entitled to a week's holiday in a seaside resort, one month's salary, and early promotion.45 The Vietnamese Communist Party journal has also raised the possibility of establishing sanctions for exceeding "ideal family size." Thus, it is suggested that families with more than three children will no longer benefit from the range of social policies which support maternity and nursery care.46 This recent consideration of the possibility of greater recourse to sanctions no doubt reveals something about the mixed results of the policies to date. Although the family planning campaigns have made considerable advances, especially in north Vietnam, they also encounter significant problems both in their organization and implementation and, most significantly, in terms of resistance to the.idea of family planning by peasant men and women. Recent figures, for instance, show that women still give birth early and go on having children until they cannot have them any more.47 Another report indicates that as many as 33 percent of mothers delivered have four or more children (some as many as ten children); at least 52 percent of mothers delivered were giving birth to their third child.48 In some areas, for every hundred women who have an IUD fitted, fifty still give birth thereafter.49 Moreover, it was suggested that some of these practices were prevalent among cadres and Party members. Thus, it has been recommended that the population and family planning propaganda work should be primarily aimed at cadres, Party and youth league members, married couples of child-bearing age, old people, religious sections of the population, and school students.50 A1984 assessment of the National Population and Family Planning Commission noted that, at the current rate of progress of the birth control campaign, there would be no hope of reducing the number of children per family to two by the end of the century. To achieve such a target would involve raising the number of married couples using contraceptives from the present 30 percent to 70 percent within the next ten years.51 Thus, despite the increasing emphasis on the promotion of birth control practices by the state, the actual adoption of these practices by the population remains checkered. Certainly, this is a reality as presented in official Vietnamese language sources. For some insights into the reasons for this, the next section considers the role of the Vietnam Women's Union in the development of population policies and the position of women in the implementation of these policies. The Women's Union is, in the end, the major organization responsible for the implementation of the targets, particularly in terms of detailed propaganda work. Moreover, it is almost exclusively towards women that the policies have been directed. This can be seen in a study of the official publication of the Vietnam Women's Union, Phu Nu Viet Nam (PNVN).52 45

PVNV,1984,no.6.

^TCCS, 1982, no. 8: 42. 47

XHH, 1985, no. 12: 26.

48

VNC, 1983, no. 10: 24.

49

XHH, 1985, no. 12:14.

SD

TCCS,1985lno.9:61.

51

VNC, 1985, no. 5: 27.

52

See Nguyen Huyen Chau, "North Vietnamese Peasant Women."

68

Postwar Vietnam

Problems in the Implementation of Family Planning Policies The Women's Union, which was founded in 1930, has two main tasks: to mobilize women for the tasks which society needs them to perform, and to defend and expand women's rights.53 By 1976, the Women's Union had approximately five million members in north Vietnam, a significant proportion of all women over sixteen years of age.54 Thus, the Women's Union must be seen as an official organization which undoubtedly maintains a high degree of legitimacy and authority. PNVN, its official publication, is the major periodical produced specifically for women in Vietnam. For the researcher, it provides a unique barometer of the messages which are being directed at women from the leadership of both the Women's Union and the state. Its significance in this regard seems to be confirmed by the targeted readership. PNVN is distributed to every Women's Union branch at workplace, village, district, and provincial levels. Given the scarcity of paper and the limited resources, the small number of copies distributed at the local level suggests that it is aimed at local-level activists and leaders who will then lead discussions at collective meetings and be involved in mobilization campaigns on women's issues. Much of the subsequent discussion of the problems in the implementation in family planning policies is, therefore, drawn from the work of the Vietnam Women's Union. The Women's Union has characterized the pursuit of family planning work as a process where it has to struggle continually against ideological constraints and difficulties.55 When the Women's Union organizes a meeting of all women of child-bearing age in a particular village to explain birth control practices, for instance, it has been suggested that women seem to grasp the problem. They often respond positively. Once these women return home, however, they are more influenced by what is said there and change their minds. Some women are reported to have the IUD fitted one day and then come back the next day to have it removed. Other women, of course, simply react negatively to the idea of family planning. They note that it is they who feed and bring up their children and that they do not ask the state for help nor to do these tasks for them. Why, therefore, should they be asked to plan their families?56 Other women simply want to postpone birth control, especially if they have not yet produced a son.57 While many women perceive clear benefits in the adoption of birth control practices, particularly in terms of better health and greater control of their personal lives, virtually all Vietnamese women are caught between conflicting pressures over birth control from the state, the family, and the community. Furthermore, while the state has deployed its resources to implement the family planning campaigns, not all state policies encourage women to use contraceptive methods. Thus, women end up bearing the contradictions of state policies. Women are also influenced by the enduring appeal of the high ideological value traditionally placed on fertility and by their inferior position in gender relations.

53

A. Eisen, Women and Revolution in Vietnam (London: Zed Books, 1984), p. 119.

54

C. Molander, Women in Vietnam (Stockholm: SIDA, 1978): 27.

55

PNVN, 1978, no. 5 #18.

56

PNVN, 1978, no. 6 #23.

57

PNVN, 1980, no. 4 #14.

Women and Family Planning 69 The state's population policies are directed almost exclusively at women. It is significant, for instance, that it is the Women's Union which is charged with implementing these policies. Should women wish to adopt family planning practices, the onus is clearly on them to overcome the resistance of their husbands, parents-in-law, other relatives, and the community. The Women's Union appears conscious of these contradictory pressures and has advocated persuasion rather than coercion. In the drive to fulfil and overfulfil the target of a percentage of women on the IUD, many cooperatives and other workplaces have been denounced by the Women's Union for resorting to the "wrong" kinds of approaches, in particular the use of sanctions in order to coerce women into having an IUD fitted. Sanctions can range from cutting food rations to women who give birth outside the cooperative's plans to deducting work points for their past and future work. Since the policy relies almost uniquely on the use of the IUD, it is the women who must cope with the fear of adverse physical effects. Myths about the IUD run rampant in the villages, and information on the real risks and problems is scarce. Many women express fears about the IUD, even though they might be favorably disposed to birth control. They fear that the IUD might make them ill and that they would then be unable to work to feed their children. They also fear that, once the IUD is fitted, they will not be able to have any more children, even if it were removed. The Women's Union has requested the training of more family planning workers who would be available at the village level to explain the use of the IUD and allay the women's fears. Many of the women's fears appear wellfounded, as a major problem in the family planning campaigns is the lack of supporting health care facilities at the local level. The insertion of the IUD is generally carried out by a provincial IUD fitting team which might stay for a period of a month in any one village. Should women suffer from any side effects from the insertion of the IUD after the team has departed, it is difficult to obtain expert advice. The new economic measures designed to address the long-lasting crisis in the food supply run counter to state policies for family planning. The economic reforms place a new emphasis on the role of the family economy, encouraging greater freedom for the household organization of production through a new system of subcontracting production.58 The irony of this system from the point of view of the family planning campaign is that, while it might stimulate greater production, it might also make additional children economically more attractive. A major pressure on women in their decisions about the adoption of family planning practices is clearly the enduring importance of the traditional attitudes to fertility, especially the preference for sons. Traditional attitudes have been identified as the most important barrier that the Women's Union has to overcome in its family planning work. A 1981 Conference on Family Planning, which was held to assess the results of the family planning campaign during the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan, concluded that, although the birth rate had declined, the influence of the old ideas and ideologies still constituted the main barrier to the adoption of contraception.59 These, of course, may only be understood in relation to the role and status of women in Vietnamese society.

58

See Christine White, "Socialist Transformation of Agriculture and Gender Relations: The Vietnamese Case," IDS Bulletin 13,4 (1982): 45^7; and her chapter in this volume.

59

PNVN, 1981, no. 5 #18.

70

Postwar Vietnam

There seem to be two distinct historical phases in role and status of women in Vietnamese history. First, if Vietnam was not matriarchal in its social organization, there seems to be at least some evidence that women in prehistoric times "enjoyed equality, even power."60 For instance, popular Vietnamese legend emphasizes the relative equality of men and women, and there are a number of stories supporting the matriarchal origins of Vietnamese history. As Marr notes, Vietnamese women have never had to wear veils, nor have their feet bound. This contrasts markedly with the Confucian ideology of the Chinese who have figured so prominently in Vietnamese history, particularly during the one thousand years of direct rule to AD 939, but periodically thereafter. It is suggested that under this Chinese rule, women's lives were greatly restricted, and they lost many of the freedoms that they had previously enjoyed. In particular, women were taught that they were inferior by nature and that they should always follow and never lead. Women's worth was dramatically expressed in this most Confucian of expressions: "One hundred women are not worth a single testicle."61 Similarly, a woman's role vis-d-vis her husband was clearly outlined in the Confucian marriage manual: "Even though you sleep intimately on the same bed and use the same cover with him, you must treat your husband as if he were your king or your father."62 Confucianism, moreover, promoted marriage over celibacy and demanded fertility as the first quality of the married woman. Indeed, "happiness itself" was defined in terms of a woman's fertility.63 Despite considerable historical evidence that Vietnamese women once enjoyed an equal role and status with men, over the centuries Vietnamese ideas concerning the family and fertility became imbued with Confucian values. Pregnancy and birth have generally been seen as a divine blessing bringing prosperity and happiness. The following traditional expression seems an accurate description of these values: "Happy is the man who has a large family." Even happier was the man who had many sons. Not only were sons valued for their productive role in the family economy, but they remained within the family and ensured the continuity of the cult of ancestor worship. A daughter, on the other hand, would belong to another family upon marriage. Children of both sexes, especially boys, were valued for the economic contribution that they could make in an agricultural society. From a very young age, children have taken an active role in production. When a son gets married, moreover, he brings another laborer, his wife, into the household and, ultimately, they with their children will care for their parents in their old age. Many sons also facilitated the maintenance of a larger family land holding. There were many factors, therefore, that contributed to the aim of having as many children as possible. To this end, the normal child-bearing period lay anywhere between the ages of twenty and fifty.64 Children were a sign of prosperity and happiness, sent by "Heaven." As regards the economic prospects that awaited them, the traditional proverb, "Heaven creates elephants and it will create grass to feed them," expressed the prevailing blend of economic fatalism and fertility strategies.

60

David Marr, Vietnam Tradition on Trial, 1920-1945 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981), p. 191.

61

A. Bergman, Women of Vietnam (San Francisco: People's Press, 1975), p. 19.

62

Ibid., p. 18.

63

R. Coughlin, "Pregnancy and Birth in Vietnam," in Southeast Asian Birth Customs, ed. Rajadhon Hart and R. Coughlin (New Haven: Human Relations Area Files Press, 1965), p. 217.

64

Ibid.

Women and Family Planning 71 As suggested by Mai Thu Van, the son in Vietnamese society is like a little king: he links the different generations and seals the relationship between husband and wife.65 Since children are the chief aim of a marriage, it is possibly not surprising that there has never been any widespread support among the Vietnamese people for contraception. Even poverty is not a deterrent to fertility.66 The potential for conflict between this traditional approach to fertility by the Vietnamese and recent state policies to reduce population growth should thus be readily apparent. The pressure of traditional values is often expressed through the comments of others. If a woman wants to have an IUD fitted, the people around her will say that she does not love her husband any more or that she wants to commit adultery. Postwar reunions with the many husbands who had been absent during the war were expected to blossom in pregnancies. The quest for many sons continues to be one of the strongest motives in large family size. Recent research, for instance, indicates that a high percentage of women feel distressed and ashamed if they have not yet produced a son.67 Indeed, there are reports that polygamy, forbidden by the 1960 Law on Marriage and the Family, is widespread in the countryside among men seeking a male heir. Another, albeit exceptional, example of traditional ideologies is that of the two million Catholics in Vietnam. In common with many other Catholics, they tend to view the practice of birth control as contrary to the teachings of the Church. The Women's Union has attempted to tackle this particular problem by enlisting the support of local priests. The priest is asked to propagandize family planning in sermons and say that it is not a crime to practice family planning. Rather, it is a crime to be unable to provide adequately for the children who are being born.68 It should be noted that the key manifestation of traditional attitudes and ideologies on fertility is not confined to any particular group but, rather, within the structure of the family. As was suggested above, it is often after women return home and are subject to family pressures that they change their minds about the practice of birth control. In particular, husbands and mothers-in-law are identified as the key obstacles to the practice of family planning.69 They seem to be the hardest to convince of the merits of birth control. This applies equally to peasants, workers, cadres, and Party members.70 Decisions about family size do not rest solely with the couple. The family, neighbors, and the community all comment on family size and exercise a cultural pressure on the couple to have more children.71 Probably the most visible and telling pressure on women in considering family planning, arises in their relations with their husbands. If a woman has had an IUD fitted and

65

Mai Thu Van, Vietnam un Peuple, des Voix (Paris: Horay, 1983), p. 260.

66

Coughlin, "Pregnancy and Birth," p. 222.

67

XHH, 1985, no. 12:42-45.

68

PNVN, 1979, no. 9 #35.

69

PNVN, various issues.

70

PNVN, 1978, no. 11 #47.

71

XHH, 1985, no. 12: 34-37.

72

Postwar Vietnam

her husband objects, then she feels compelled to have it removed. PNVN, for instance, contains numerous reports of husbands who, during "home-to-home" persuasion campaigns, hide their wives or attempt to embarrass or even attack the representatives of the Women's Union. The key gender aspect of family planning decisions is the subordination of women to the wishes of their husbands in these matters. If family planning is to be practiced then the husband must be willing, for he is the dominant partner in the marriage relationship. If, on the other hand, he espouses the traditional values of fertility, especially a preference for sons, then his wife seems obliged to comply. When the infant mortality rate was much higher, women often stayed pregnant to ensure that at least some of their children would survive, especially their sons. More recently, the threat of war and the volatility of the political situation have similarly encouraged women to stay pregnant so that their husbands and husbands' families will not be devoid of descendants. Reproduction, therefore, is not just a woman's choice. The willingness to adopt birth control practices can only be understood in the context of gender relations which are themselves bearers of larger cultural and social values. As has been suggested, these are often far from supportive of the implementation of family planning campaigns. Women's family planning decisions in Vietnam are, thus, caught between conflicting pressures in the context of the overall structure of power. Women are obliged to internalize the conflicting pressures between private and public domains when, even in the public domain, not all state policies are supportive of family planning. The result is surely that many women end up feeling impassive or powerless to implement family planning. Conclusion The conclusions that can be drawn are limited by several factors. First, the lack of reliable statistical data makes firm conclusions on demographic trends and on the possible impact of population limitation virtually impossible. Second, much of the material on the experience of peasant women in this article is derived from a state-sponsored journal, PNVN. It is difficult to estimate to what degree the reality of these women is being adequately reflected in the pages of the journal. The operating assumption, given the lack of alternative data, is that it is possible to glean some notion of the experience of family planning policies from the pages of PNVN. There exists little survey research on whether peasant women and men have been convinced of the desirability of limiting family size from the economic and health points of view, or on which factors play the more important roles in the calculation of this desirability. Some exploratory studies in a recent issue of the Vietnamese Sociological Review are a notable exception and, it may be hoped, are a harbinger of further studies of this nature. Although family planning campaigns have made considerable advances, especially in the north where they have been pursued more vigorously and for a longer period, they encounter significant problems in their organization and implementation, particularly in terms of peasant resistance to the practice. Recent reports suggest that after almost twenty-five years of family planning policies, the rate of births has only dropped from six to five per family. Women continue to give birth early and continue to have children until it is biologically impossible.72 Thus, despite the important changes that have come with the development of socialism in Vietnam, the family structure and gender relations therein

72

XHH, 1984, no. 12.

Women and Family Planning 73 seem to be enduring and pervasive institutions. The Women's Union has confessed its impotence to foster change in this area through traditional emulation campaigns, because those very values which it seeks to alter are also deeply imbued in much of the Party leadership. This question of women's role and power is perhaps, therefore, the right note on which to make a final observation. It has been suggested in PNVN and by the Party leadership that the way to improved living standards is to practice family planning; but the vicious circle for so many in the developing countries is that it is rather improved living standards which encourage the practice of family planning. This raises the question of how the social organization of production mediates between living standards and fertility strategies. While changes in the social organization of production might alter calculations about the economic utility of children, they do not necessarily eradicate much deeper cultural beliefs. The social organization of production must be understood, moreover, within the context of gender relations and the often contradictory view of men and women. As portrayed in the pages of PNVN, despite the official commitment of state policy to this goal, one of the single most important barriers to the practice of fertility control by Vietnamese women is their husbands, situated of course in the context of the larger cultural, and no doubt patriarchal, universe in which male children had "always" been considered a positive value and women were generally a subordinate species. Years of socialist transformation and much propaganda work on the part of the Women's Union might have significantly altered many of these traditional views, but they have by no means eradicated them. In many important respects, and on the basis of the available evidence, it seems possible to conclude that women remain sexually subordinated-not only in relation to their husbands, but also in relation to the policies which first sought to increase female labor productivity to meet the requirements of the war effort, and then sought to control their reproductive behavior to meet national economic targets.

This page intentionally left blank

Economic Policy and Reforms

This page intentionally left blank

PARTY POLICIES AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE: THE SECOND AND THIRD FIVE-YEAR PLANS EXAMINED* Vo Nhan Tri

In 1976, the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) declared that the nation's economy had entered the period of "transition to socialism." Party philosophers subsequently refined the periodization as follows:1 a) First phase: the Second Five-Year Plan 1976-1980; b) Second phase: devoted to "socialist industrialization," and subdivided into a 19811990 stage ("the initial stage of the transitional period") and a 1991-2005 stage; c) Third phase: "perfecting" the transition between 2006 and 2010. Much attention was devoted at both the Fourth Party Congress (December 1976) and Fifth Congress (March 1982) to translating this scheme into concrete plans.2 Even before the Second Five Year Plan was launched, however, the Party signaled some of its intentions by opening campaigns in the south against the "compradore bourgeoisie" and the "feudal landholding class." Code-named "XI," the anti-compradore bourgeoisie campaign lasted from September 11,1975 to December 1976. Targets were said to be big businessmen who had colluded politically and economically with the US and Saigon governments, making fortunes through war contracting, and by establishing monopolies over certain market sectors. Subsequently, it was stated that 70 percent of this compradore bourgeoisie was ethnic Chinese, who at the end of the war controlled about three-quarters of the leading economic sectors in the south, ranging from 100 percent of domestic wholesale trade, to 80 percent of industry, 70 percent of foreign trade, and 50 percent of retail trade.3 In Ho Chi Minh City and seventeen provincial cities, 670 families were selected as campaign targets, were arrested, and had their properties confiscated. Retrospectively,

* I am grateful to the Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex, for a three-month Visiting Fellowship enabling me to continue work on this topic. I am also indebted to David G. Marr, Carlyle A. Thayer, and Christine P. White for providing useful source materials and copies of their own articles on related subjects. 1

Tap Chi Triet Hoc [Philosophy Journal] (Hanoi), December 1984, pp. 93-98.

2

Le Duan, "Political Report of the Central Committee," in Communist Party of Vietnam, Fourth National Congress: Documents (Hanoi: FLPH, 1977) (hereafter "Fourth Political Report"), and "Political Report" in Communist Party of Vietnam, Fifth National Congress (Hanoi: FLPH, 1982) (hereafter "Fifth Political Report"). 3

Viet Nam Courier (hereafter VNC), November 1978, p. 9. Nguyen Khac Vien, Contemporary Vietnam (18581980) (Hanoi: Red River, 1981), p. 267. 77

78

Postwar Vietnam

however, only 159 families, 117 of whom were ethnic Chinese, were regarded by the Party as genuine compradore bourgeois.4 The fact that most individuals arrested were Chinese meant that the Party conceived of the campaign as a struggle both against "class oppression" and "national oppression of a colonialist type."5 The new regime wanted to penetrate the Chinese community hi Cholon and break up the formidable power structure which governed it.6 Propaganda aimed against the "feudal landholding class" revealed a desire to conform rigidly to Maoist doctrinal stereotypes. In reality, the power of the landlord class in the south had already been broken as a result of previous revolutionary land reform campaigns in liberated areas, the flight of many landlords to the cities during the war, and agrarian reforms carried out by the Ngo Dinh Diem and Nguyen Van Thieu regimes. There was no need for a far-reaching land reform similar to that undertaken earlier in the north.7 While completing the above-mentioned remaining tasks of the "people's national democratic revolution" (which required assaults on the compradore bourgeoisie and feudal landlords) the Hanoi leadership started from 1976 a new phase of revolution, namely the socialist revolution. The Second Five-Year Plan 1976-1980 In December 1976, the VCP held its Fourth National Congress, which issued a report presuming to set the economic line for the entire transitional period. Vietnam would move from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production in about twenty years. Priority would be given to "rational development of heavy industry on the basis of developing agriculture and light industry."8 At this Fourth Congress the Second Five-Year Plan also was unveiled. Among basic tasks outlined for completion by 1980, the following were most important:9 a) concentrate the forces of the whole country to achieve a leap forward in agriculture; vigorously develop light industry; b) turn to full account existing heavy industry capacity and build many new heavy industrial installations, especially in machine industry, so as to support primary agriculture and light industry; c) virtually complete socialist transformation in the south. 4

Bao cao long ket danh hi san mai ban o cac tinh mien nam sau ngay giai phong [Review report on striking the compradore bourgeoisie in southern provinces after liberation], (Hanoi: VCP internal document, nd).

5

Dao Van Tap, "La politique Iconomique du Vietnam dans la lutte pour I'inde'pendence nationale et le socialisme," Sciences Sociales (Hanoi) 1 (1984): p. 30. 6

For additional information on the anti-compradore bourgeoisie campaign, see article by Nguyen Van Tran, Hoc Tap (Hanoi), September 1976; Nguyen Van Linh, Dau tranh giai cap trong chang dau thoi ky qua do [Class struggle in the opening phase of the transitional period] (Ho Chi Minh City: NXB Thanh Pho Ho Chi Minh, 1984), pp. 20 ff; VCP Central Committee, Giai cap tu san mai ban o nam Viet Nam [The compradore bourgeoisie in south Vietnam] (Hanoi: internal document, 1977). 7

Article by Chien Thang in Nhan Dan, December 1,1975. Nguyen Khac Vien, Sud Vietnam au fil des annees 1975-85 (Hanoi: FLPH, 1984), pp. 364 ff.

8 9

Le Duan, "Fourth Political Report," p. 59.

Ibid., pp. 63-64. See also Pham Van Dong's report reprinted in Nhan Dan, December 18, 1976 and December 19,1976.

Policies and Economic Performance 79 Extremely ambitious targets were set, to include increasing food production (paddy + subsidiary crops) to 21 million metric tons by 1980, and raising industrial output by 16-18 percent per annum, labor productivity by 7.5-8.0 percent per annum, and national income by 13-14 percent per annum. This overconfidence probably reflected the Hanoi leadership's assumption that economic development could be tackled with the speed and daring that characterized the final campaign of the war.10 Also, Hanoi almost surely expected to receive massive amounts of foreign aid from Western capitalist countries and international lending agencies, to be able to combine with assistance from COMECON and China. As Nguyen Khac Vien acknowledged six years later, "In the euphoria of victory... which came so unexpectedly, we have somewhat lost sight of realities. Everything seemed possible and close at hand."11 The December 1976 Party Congress gave clear intent to transform the relations of production in the southern countryside. After allocating land regained from former landlords and rich peasants to landless families, the Party would immediately develop work exchange teams and "solidarity-teams" and build pilot cooperatives. Necessary conditions would be obtained to undertake "large-scale cooperativization of agriculture in a steady, rapid way."12 The Second Plenum of the Central Committee, meeting June-July 1977, instructed each province in the south to set up some pilot cooperatives by the beginning of 1978. "Good results hi this experiment will be the basis on which to ... establish socialist relations of production throughout the southern countryside by the beginning of the '80s," the Second Plenum affirmed.13 Between August 1977 and November 1978 a series of highlevel Party directives attempted to step up the pace even further, ordering subordinate units "quickly" and "resolutely" to get southern peasants into "production collectives" (the equivalent of semi-socialist agricultural cooperatives in the north) by the end of 1979.14 The results were disastrous. Already in April 1979, Vo Chi Cong, Politbureau member and chairman of the Committee for Socialist Transformation of Agriculture, complained to a review conference in the Mekong Delta that "the cooperativization movement has not become widespread," and completion could not be envisaged by 1980 unless the situation changed. In fact, by early 1980 about 10,000 out of the 13,246 production collectives established in the south had collapsed,15 forcing the Party to back away temporarily.16 Particularly in the Mekong Delta, peasants had boycotted the collectives, refused to harvest crops 10 See, for example, Premier Pham Van Dong's statement at an April 1977 reception in Paris of the Association d'Amidee* Franco-Vietnamienne, quoted by Alain Ruscio, Vivre au Vietnam (Paris: Editions Sociales, 1981), p. 59. 11

VNC, June 1982, p. 15.

12

Le Duan, "Fourth Political Report," p. 95.

13

"Resolution of the 2nd Plenum," Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), 51 (1977): 33.

14

Vo Chi Cong, "Day manh cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi nong nghiep o cac tinh Mien Nam" [Strongly pushing socialist reorganization of agriculture in the southern provinces], TCCS, 1979, no. 2: 5. The Dat, Nen nong nghiep Viet Nam tu sau Cach Mang Thang Tarn Nam 1945 [Vietnamese agriculture since the August 1945 Revolution] (Hanoi: Nong Nghiep, 1981), p. 206. 15

Vu Oanh, Hoan thanh dieu chinh ruong dat, day manh cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi nong nghiep cac tinh Nam Bo [Complete land adjustment, strongly push socialist reorganization of agriculture in the southern provinces] (Hanoi: Su That, 1984), p. 10. 16

NCKT, 1980, no. 8: 11.

80

Postwar Vietnam

in time, abandoned land, and secretly killed livestock.17 In the face of this resolute opposition, Le Thanh Nghi, another Politbureau member, heaped blame on low-level cadres, accusing them of impetuosity and use of force, when it had been the Politbureau itself which had pushed the pace.18 After food output fell in 1977 and 1978, due primarily to forced collectivization, the Sixth Plenum of the VCP Central Committee, held in August-September 1979, decided to overhaul agricultural policy completely. Together with small-scale industry and handicrafts, agriculture was now given top priority and peasant interests were favored in a number of ways.19 By the end of the Second Five-Year Plan in 1980, Vietnam's total food production was 14.4 million tons, compared to the target of 21 million. Between 1976 and 1980 food production increased only 6.45 percent, while the population grew by 9.27 percent. Per capita food production thus decreased from 274 kg to 268 kg, forcing Vietnam to import 8-9 million tons of food during the 1976-1980 period.20 Even so, malnutrition was widely evident, especially among young children. The average yield per annum of paddy fields had also declined from 22.3 quintals per hectare to 21.0.21 As regards industry, Communist Party policy seemed ambiguous from the time of the Fourth Congress. In one section of his Fourth Political Report, Le Duan declared that during the entire transitional period lasting into the twenty-first century priority would be given to heavy industry, albeit "on the basis of developing agriculture and light industry," whatever that meant exactly. In another section, he indicated that light industry would receive attention ahead of heavy industry. To confuse matters further, Premier Pham Van Dong, in his report to the Congress on the Second Five-Year Plan, stated:22 Some cadres might be concerned that because we are concentrating our forces in 1976-80 on developing agriculture . . . we are therefore giving light attention to heavy industry. Such is not the case at all, because assembling forces for the development of agriculture primarily means assembling the forces of heavy industrial sectors to equip agriculture. In practice, the VCP tended to give priority to heavy industry, as can be seen for example in the following statistics on state investment:23

17 Lam Thanh Liem, "Collectivisation des terres et crise de 1'economie rurale dans le Delta du Mekong," Annales de Geographic (Paris), 519 (1984): 552-62. 18 Nhan Dan, November 9,1981. Le Thanh Nghi's assessment was later confirmed in a Party Secretariat directive. See Nhan Dan, March 4,1983. 19 Nhan Dan, October 9, 1979. Nguyen Huu Dong, "6e Plenum: Adoptions conjoncturelles ou relormes durables? Essais sur la politique e"conomique du socialisme," in Vietnam (Paris) 2 (April 1981): 46. 20

Tran Phuong, "Chinh sach kinh te cua Dang Cong San Viet Nam trong 5 nam qua" [The Communist Party's economic policy during the past five years], lecture delivered at the Central School of Economic Management, Ho Chi Minh City, November 27,1980 (internal document). For a slightly different figure cf. PEER, November 15,1984, p. 128. 21 Statistical Data of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1981 (Hanoi: General Statistical Office, 1982), pp. 53, 55. (Hereafter SDSRV-81.) 22

Nhan Dan, December 18 and 19,1976.

23. Statistical Data of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam 1982 (Hanoi: General Statistical Office, 1983), p. 41. (Hereafter SDSRV-82.)

Policies and Economic Performance 81

State investment in industry (as a percentage of total state investment) Heavy industry Light industry

1976

1980

31.9 21.4 10.5

41.2 29.7 11.5

By contrast, VCP statements were quite clear in their intention to transform private industry and handicrafts into state capitalism, and later into full-fledged socialist enterprises. As indicated above, the first moves involved abolishing the compradore bourgeoisie. By early 1977, however, industrialists and big businessmen in the south not labeled as compradores were also under relentless financial, administrative, and trade union pressure to "voluntarily offer" their enterprises to the state. By the time this pressure became public policy in March 1978, the remaining victims were mainly medium and small capitalists.24 Whether informal or formal, these southern anti-bourgeois campaigns were brutal, especially against capitalist traders. They were more drastic than similar campaigns in North Vietnam in 1957-1958, because private business was far more significant in the south than it had ever been in the north, and because the Hanoi leaders no longer felt any need to make concessions to the bourgeoisie now that national reunification had been accomplished. According to a Vietnamese spokesman, by early 1978 some 1,500 capitalist enterprises employing 70 percent of workers in that sector had been nationalized and converted into 650 state-owned companies employing 130,000 people.25 Although allegedly aimed against the non-compradore bourgeoisie in general, without regard to nationality or religion,26 the ethnic Chinese were most affected. By early 1979, due especially to ruthless socialist transformation efforts in the south, industrial production had fallen seriously. The Sixth Plenum then proceeded to criticize the "erroneous tendency . . . to bring all important sectors of the economy under State control and to fix unrealistic objectives. . . .M27 It also envisaged policies designed to encourage private initiative in order to boost production of consumer goods. Individuals turning out "good products" would be helped to continue operating under general state management policies, while some products currently assigned to state firms would be "boldly assigned" to private capitalists.28 Overall, industrial output (including handicrafts, which accounted for approximately half of the total) increased from 1976 to 1978, and then fell during the years 1979 and 1980 as a consequence of socialist transformation and other factors, such as poor management, lack of capital, and shortages of energy and raw materials. Over the full 1976-1980 period industrial production increased a mere 0.1 percent, and that was thanks to an 11.1 percent boost in handicraft production, whereas output from state and joint state-private enter-

24

Do Muoi, "Day manh cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi cong thuong nghiep tu ban tu doanh o mien nam" [Strongly pushing socialist reorganization of privately owned industry and commerce in the south], TCCS, 1978, no. 5: 53.

25

Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam Five Years After (Hanoi: FLPH, 1980) p. 17.

26

Radio Ho Chi Minh City (Domestic Service), March 23,1978.

27

VNC, March 1980, p. 1.

28

Nhan Dan, October 9,1979.

82

Postwar Vietnam

prises declined by 6.5 percent. Labor productivity decreased in the state sector, and many enterprises operated at only 30-50 percent of capacity.29 Comparing some of the industrial targets of the Second Five-Year Plan with actual performance by 1980, the miscalulation was all too obvious:30 Coal (million tons) Electric power (billion kwh) Cement (thousand tons) Steel (thousand tons) Fabrics (million meters) Chemical fertilizers (thousand tons) Paper (thousand tons)

Plan Target

1980 Performance

10 5 2,000 300 450 1,300 130

5.3 3.68 641.0 62.3 175.3 313.0 46.8

The Fourth Party Congress had declared that improving the people's material and spiritual life was the "cardinal task," and the "highest objective" of economic development programs. Yet the people's standard of living declined dramatically between 1976 and 1980. For example, real monthly per capita income for worker families and state employees in the north declined from an indice of 81.8 in 1976 to 57.8 in 1980.31 Almost certainly the drop was more severe in the south.32 A French correspondent in Hanoi quite sympathetic to the regime describes the situation as follows:33 The Vietnamese of 1980 are more destitute than the Vietnamese of 1976. Poverty is profound and harrowing. People live above the bearable physiological threshold, but only just. Many wage-earners are compelled to be cunning in order to survive. Shortages lead to the persistence of illicit trading and corruption. The editor of Nhan Dan, Hoang Tung, confessed in early 1980 that "the situation is particularly serious and painful for urban people and wage earners."34 First Deputy Premier To Huu told Wilfred Burchett "[the Vietnamese] will be poor and will be hungry until the end of this century."35 The general lassitude and demoralization was also reflected in published fiction of the period, above all the widely discussed novel by Nguyen Manh Tuan, titled Dung truoc bien [Standing before the sea].36

29

SDSRV-81, p. 29. For another interpretation of events in industry during the period in question, see Irene Norlund, "The Role of Industry in Vietnam's Development Strategy," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 14, 1 (1984): 98-105. 30

Le Duan, "Political Report of the Central Committee," p. 64. SDSRV-82, pp. 32-33.

31

Nien giam thong ke 1980 [Statistical Yearbook 1980] (Hanoi: Tong Cue Thong Ke, 1981), p. 379 (internal document). The cost of living base was 100 in 1960. 32

PEER, November 8,1984, p. 29; Ibid., May 2,1985, p. 32.

33

Ruscio, Vivre au Vietnam, p. 49.

34

J. P. Gallois interview, AFP April 19,1980.

35

PEER, January 9,1981, p. 42.

36

Nguyen Manh Tuan, Dung truoc bien (Ho Chi Minh City: Van Nghe, 1982). See for example pp. 15,105, 141,163, 204.

Policies and Economic Performance 83 The Third Five-Year Plan, 1981-1985 At its Fifth Congress in March 1982, the VCP gave top priority to solving problems in food production. Nonetheless, the dialectical unity of agriculture and industry was reaffirmed. Each was considered the basis for development of the other, and the long-term goal remained an industrialized economy.37 Indeed, the idea of agricultural development being part and parcel of the "socialist industrialization" process was proclaimed a "new and creative concept of industrialization,"38 hardly an accurate assertion. The Fifth Congress also reasserted the Party's intention to take agriculture a step further towards "large-scale socialist production." This meant:39 a) integrating collective and individual sectors to a general plan for intensive cultivation and crop specialization; b) stepping up the scientific and technological revolution in agriculture, particularly in water utilization, applied microbiology, fertilizer use, gradual mechanization, and enhanced storage facilities; c) completion of the socialist transformation of agriculture in the south; and d) building the district into a viable economic structure, combining agriculture, forestry, and fishery on the one hand with small-scale industry and handicrafts on the other (see the chapter by Jayne Werner in this volume). Particular emphasis was given by Le Duan to "basically completing agricultural cooperativization of the southern provinces" by the end of 1985.40 This was reiterated hi Vo Van Kiet's report to the National Assembly, which insisted that the Party "must resolutely complete cooperativization of the southern provinces in the main" by the end of the 19811985 Five-Year Plan.41 With progress in cooperativization still slow in 1983 and early 1984, the south came under renewed pressure from mid-1984. By late 1985, Hanoi claimed the existence of 622 agricultural cooperatives and 36,457 production collectives in southern provinces, incorporating 86.1 percent of peasant households and 81.3 percent of cultivated acreage. In addition, some 562 "inter-production collectives" had been established, designed to group together two or more production collectives so as to create favorable conditions for ad-

37

"Fifth Political Report," pp. 42-43,45. Nguyen Ann Bac, "Quan cong nong nghiep trong chang dau cua thoi ky qua do o nuoc ta" [Industrial-agricultural relationships in the opening phase of the transitional period in our country], NCKT, 1984,no. 6: 24. Tran Due, Tim hieu mot so van de muc tieu kinh te xa hoi cua nuoc ta [Understanding some problems regarding economic and social objectives for our country] (Hanoi: Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1984), pp. 145-46. Le Hong Tarn, "Vietnam: Building Industrial-Agricultural Complexes," in Unreal Growth: Critical Studies in Asian Development, ed. Ngo Manh Lan (Delhi: Hindustan Publishing Co., 1984), pp.527ff. 38

Sciences Sociales (Hanoi), 1984: 59.

39

Nguyen Huy, "Dua nong nghiep mot buoc len san xuat Ion xa hoi chu nghia" [Taking agriculture a step towards large-scale socialist production], NCKT, 1983, no. 4:17-28; and ibid., no. 5: 20-31. Parti Communiste du Vietnam, Ve Congrfes National (Hanoi: FLPH, 1982), pp. 59, 84. Nhan Dan, March 4, 1983.

40

41

Nhan Dan, December 27,1984.

84

Postwar Vietnam

vancing to agricultural cooperatives.42 However, it was admitted that in many of these organizations the structure remained irrational and efficiency low.43 The Fifth Party Congress gave an unambiguous stamp of approval to attempts to encourage the "family economy." Already in 1979 the Sixth Plenum had opened the door to change, stigmatizing those "weak-spirited comrades [who] are obsessed with the spectre of the spontaneous development of capitalism when any production or exchange is not organized [by the state],"44 and emphasizing the family economy's potential to produce much-needed food and handicraft consumer goods. In truth, most of the Party leadership had been "weak-spirited," convinced like other Leninists, Stalinists, or Maoists that small production begat capitalism, and hence needed to be repressed. At the Fifth Congress, the family economy was reclassified as part of the socialist relations of production, and cadres were urged to foster its development "in the right direction,"45 that is, according to plans devised at cooperative and higher levels. In 1983, the family economy reportedly supplied 50-60 percent of the peasants' total income, more than 90 percent of the pork, chicken, vegetables, and fruits consumed by the peasants, and 30-50 percent of total foodstuffs.46 However, the most important change in agricultural policy during this period involved generalization of the end-product contract, or sub-contracting system authorized by the Party Secretariat from January 1981. Peasant households signed contracts to farm collective land, especially focusing on transplanting, weeding, and harvesting, whereas plowing, irrigation, and pest control usually remained the prerogative of the cooperative, using collective labor. Each household allocated work internally and fulfilled its contract by turning over the agreed amount of produce to the cooperative. If it fell short, the deficit had to be made up the next year. Any surplus could be retained for internal consumption, for sale on the free market, or for sale to the state at "negotiated prices." This system had the effect of shifting responsibility for production to the household, and was intended to encourage more efficient use of inputs, as well as stimulate farmers to work harder in anticipation of reaping rewards directly.47 Ironically, this very same end-product contract system had been fiercely condemned in 1968 by Truong Chinh, chief Party theoretician, when it was attempted in Vinh Phu province in the north. For Truong Chinh, this was a return to individualistic ways of working

42

Radio Hanoi (Domestic Service), October 19,1985. Nhan Dan, October 22,1985. VNA (English), October 10,1985.

43

Radio Hanoi (Domestic Service), October 19,1985.

44

Nhan Dan, October 22,1979.

45

"Fifth Political Report," p. 47.

46

Nguyen Huy, "Ve moi lien he giua kinh te tap the va kinh te gia dinh xa vien" [On the relationship between collective and family economies], NCKT, 1983, no. 3: 20. Concerning the "family economy," besides Nguyen Huy, see also Thanh Toan, "Kinh te phu gia dinh duoi chu nghia xa hoi" [The secondary family economy under socialism], ibid., pp. 24 ff. Truong Son, "Kinh te gia dinh" [The family economy], TCCS, 1983, no. 7. Tran Van Ha, "L'e"conomie familiale et le systeme e*cologique VAC," Le Courtier du Vietnam, 1983, no. 12. 47

Nguyen Huy, "Dua nong nghiep," pp. 22-23. Vu Huu Ngoan, "Khoan moi va hoan thien co che khoan trong hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep" [The new contracts and systematically perfecting contracts in agricultural production cooperatives], TCCS, 1983, no. 1. Xuan Kieu, "May suy nghi ve hoan chinh co che khoan san pham trong hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep" [Some thoughts on completing end-product contracts in agricultural production cooperatives], TCCS, 1984, no. 2. TCCS Editorial, 1985, no. 6: 3-4. Nhan Dan, December 26,1983, March 16,1984, and February 19,1985.

Policies and Economic Performance 85 which "destroyed the meaning of agricultural cooperatives, turning them into mere formal structures."48 His position was adopted as the general Party line, so that for ten years subcontracting remained ideologically taboo, closely resembling the Maoist line on the same issue in China from 1961.49 In the midst of economic crisis in the late 1970s sub-contracting once again became a lively issue within the Party. Eventually the successful experience of farmers in rural districts surrounding Haiphong50 convinced the Party to ratify endproduct contracts "for a long period to come."51 However, in June 1985 the Politbureau stated that the system "continued to display many shortcomings," which caused many cooperatives not to be "appropriately consolidated." Some cooperative members suffered from the system, for example families of disabled soldiers. More attention had to be given to strengthening the district echelon in conjunction with the end-product contract system, which was to be expanded beyond food cultivation to animal husbandry, forestry, fisheries, and handicrafts.52 Clearly the Party had no intention of permitting capitalism in agriculture, but rather expected to recuperate on the basis of peasant initiative, to give new impetus to collectivization, to "further consolidate and strengthen socialist production relations in the countryside."53 How have these Party policies influenced agricultural output during the Third FiveYear Plan? On the following page are some relevant figures.54 Compared to 1980, gross agricultural production by 1984 had increased 32.3 percent in monetary terms, while food output went up by 19.5 percent. Paddy yields improved 30.9 percent. During this same period, however, the population grew by 13.8 percent. The 18.6 decline in output of subsidiary crops (e.g. corn, manioc, yams, potatoes) was blamed on a lack of official encouragement at various levels.55 Favorable climatic conditions undoubtedly helped farmers increase output in the years 1981-1983, while poor conditions in some regions in 1984 limited growth. Wastage of existing food stocks remained a serious problem. In 1984, a senior official in the Ho Chi Minh City Agricultural Service told me that at least 30 percent of nationwide production was lost each year.56 How much of this was caused by rats, weevils, or mold, and how much was due to human pilfering of state and cooperative supplies remained unclear. One

48

Hoc Tap (Hanoi), 1969, no.2: 12-13. See also the obligatory self-criticism by Vinh Phu's leader, Kim Ngoc, in Hoc Tap, 1969, no. 6.

49

A. Lefebvre, La politique rurale de la Chine: Notes et etudes documentaires (Paris: No. 4766,1984), pp. 5761. Christine White, "Recent Debates in Vietnamese Development Policy," in Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World, ed. G. White, R. Murray and C. White (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983), p. 249.

50

Nhan Dan, March 16,1984.

51

Tran Due, "Lai ban ve van de luong thuc va thuc pham" [Further discussion on the problem of food-stuffs and provisions], NCKT, 1985, no. 1: 48.

52

Nhan Dan, July 1,1985.

53

Ibid., September 13,1985.

54

SDSRV-82, p. 55. Vo Van Kiel's reports to the National Assembly, reprinted in Nhan Dan, December 22, 1983, and December 27,1984. NCKT, 1984, no. 1. NCKT, 1985, no. 1. I have also made several calculations based on figures in Vestnik Statiski (Moscow), 1985, no. 8: 61-62.

55

Nhan Dan, December 25, 1984. See also Objectif cooperation: le dossier franco-vietnamien (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1985), pp. 226-27.

56

A French agronomist also has estimated a 30 percent loss. See Objectif cooperation, p. 109.

86

Postwar Vietnam

source reported that many trucks and vessels transporting grain for the state had lost 10 percent or even 15 percent of their loads.57

1981 1) Gross agricultural production (million dong; at 1970 constant prices) 2) Total food output (million metric tons) - paddy - subsidiary crops (converted to paddy equivalent) 3) Average yield of paddy per annum (quintals/ha)

1982

1983

1984

7,867.1 8,515.6 8,744.1 9,322.7

15.07 12.55 2.52

16.59 14.17 2.42

16.90 14.74 2.16

17.288 15.08b 2.20b

22.2

24.8

26.3

27.5C

Notes: a

Although Nhan Dan February 22,1985 claimed a 1984 total of 17.86 million metric tons, a whole series of figures provided by Vo Van Kiet contradicted this, while Deputy Premier Tran Phuong told a foreign correspondent (Financial Times, April 17, 1985) that he believed the correct figure was 500,000 metric tons below the Department of Statistics estimate of 17.8 million. b

Nhan Dan, December 26, 1984 gave the 2.2 million metric tons figure for subsidiary crops in 1984, so the paddy figure is by subtraction. c

According to Le Courrier du Vietnam, 9 (1985): 24, almost surely overestimated.

In 1983, all the Vietnamese mass media banged the big drum to celebrate alleged food self-sufficiency. Although it is true that food imports were no longer essential to human survival as in previous years, the situation remained precarious. Per capita food production had grown from 273 kilograms in 1981 to 290 in 1984,58 yet this was still below the minimum human threshold of 300 kilograms. In 1984, Vietnam had to import 300,000 tons of cereals.59 In late 1985, the Minister of Agriculture admitted that the Fifth Party Congress target of 19 million metric tons per annum by the end of the Third Five-Year Plan might not be achieved.60 Nhan Dan acknowledged that food production was not yet stable, especially in the Red River Delta and north-central coastal provinces, where climatic reversals and insects frequently threatened crops. All localities were exhorted to "resolve the food problem in the last years of this decade."61 Another source was less optimistic, predicting that it would take three or four more five-year plans basically to resolve the food problem.62

57

Nhan Dan, April 27,1985. See also Nhan Dan, September 18,1985, and NCKT, 1985, no. 1: 46.

58

Radio Hanoi (Domestic Service), December 24,1984.

59

Le Monde (Paris), April 28-29,1985.

60

VNA (English), December 6,1985.

61

Nhan Dan, June 17,1985. See also Nhan Dan, September 30,1985.

62

Tran Due, "Lai ban," p. 41. NCKT, 1985, no. 2: 77, makes a similar prediction.

Policies and Economic Performance 87 The VCP continues to lay emphasis upon the development of industry, despite the attention given to agriculture. This is most obvious in selected light industries, where the leadership hopes either to satisfy pent-up consumer demand or to expand exports.63 However, the dogma of priority to heavy industry has by no means been abandoned.64 In September 1983, the late Secretary General Le Duan reemphasized that getting a "firm grip on socialist industrialization" was the principal task of the whole transitional period.65 Soviet economic aid has tended to favor large-scale projects, most notably the Da river dam and hydroelectric complex sixty kilometers southwest of Hanoi. Begun in 1979 and scheduled for completion in 1991, the Da river project will cost at least $2.4 billion, of which $1.3 billion is expected to come from the USSR. A thermal power plant at Pha Lai in the north and a hydro-power plant at Tri An in the south are also being built with Soviet assistance. Other Soviet aid projects include big open-cut mines in the Quang Ninh area northeast of Haiphong, the Bim Son cement plant, and dozens of engineering, phosphate fertilizer, construction, and food-processing enterprises. The largest Vietnamese-Soviet joint venture aims to discover and then exploit oil and gas on the southern continental shelf in the vicinity of Vung Tau, thus greatly reducing Vietnam's fuel imports, creating new industries, and, it is hoped, giving a boost to the economy as a whole. In 1984, Soviet sources boasted of over 200 economic projects in Vietnam. Enterprises built with USSR assistance produced nine-tenths of Vietnam's coal, more than one-third of its cement and tin, and one-quarter of its electricity and tea.66 Despite the Third Five-Year Plan's proclaimed intention to give light industry precedence over heavy industry, available figures suggest that the latter still received a higher proportion of state investments.67 In constant 1970 prices, industrial output allegedly grew as follows:68 Year

1981 1982 1983 1984

63

Heavy Industry Light Industry (Million dong) 4,077.1 4,229.0 4,320.9 n.a.

5,385.9 6,545.0 8,069.9 n.a. .

Total 9,463.0 10,774.0 12,390.8 13,264.8

"Fifth Political Report," p. 50. Nhan Dan, June 3,1985.

64

See Charles Fourniau, "Vietnam: Ne'cessite', originalite* et ajustements du Socialisme," Recherches Internationales (Paris), no. 14 (October-December 1984): 57, for a contrary view.

65

VNA (English), September 2,1985.

66

Radio Moscow (in Vietnamese), December 26,1984. Concerning the construction of some forty major eco nomic projects by USSR in the third Fiscal Year Plan, see Sotsialisticheskaya Industriya (Moscow), May 24, 1983.

67 68

This is definitely true for the first two years of the Plan. See SDSRV-82, p. 40.

Sources for these figures include SDSRV-82, p. 29, and my own calculations based on data in Vestnik Statistiki (Moscow), 1985, no. 8: 61. At best one can get a sense of relationships, not real industrial output, since some so-called "1970 constant prices" are in fact partly calculated at current prices, which thus exaggerates growth. Beyond that exists the problem of double or even triple counting at different stages of production.

88

Postwar Vietnam

According to these figures, total industrial production (i.e. industry and handicrafts) increased 61.4 percent between 1980 and 1984. Light industry output grew by 64.5 percent to 1983, whereas heavy industry increased only 30.3 percent. Between 1981 and 1983 light industry's share of total output rose from 56.9 percent to 65.1 percent. Nonetheless, Vietnamese industry remained beset with difficulties. In September 1985, Premier Pham Van Dong complained of low labor productivity, high production costs, and poor-quality commodities.69 Shortages of materials, fuel, energy, and spare parts caused many enterprises to operate at only one-half or one-third capacity. Management was often haphazard, training programs non-existent. Accounting procedures disguised serious inefficiencies.70 Recently establishments have been made accountable for losses as well as profits, with all subsidies to cover losses removed except on a "case-by-case and temporary basis."71 A subsequent examination of 130 state-run enterprises in Ho Chi Minh City showed that "although most of them had been commended or rewarded for fulfilling planned targets, in fact they were operating at a loss "72 Vo Van Kiet's complaint that state enterprises were managed worse than collective enterprises, and the latter worse than private enterprises, at least in terms of productivity and quality control, seemed no less true in late 1984 than when first voiced in 1983.73 The Standard of Living On the occasion of Lunar New Year (Tet) celebrations in early 1976, Le Duan promised the working people of Vietnam "a better life in five or ten years," even going so far as to predict "a radio set, a refrigerator, and a television set for each family hi ten years time."74 In 1985, such goals were still far from realization for the vast majority of Vietnamese families. Calculated according to UN methods, per capita national income had been $101 in 1976, then slid to $91 by 1980, and managed to creep back up to $99 by 1982.75 More recently, Pham Van Dong acknowledged that per capita income had "not increased much compared to what it was ten years ago."76 Malnutrition continues to hound most Vietnamese families. In 1985, Vietnam's Nutrition Institute asserted that the energy generated by eating 458 grams of food a day by an average Vietnamese did not exceed 1,940 calories, which was 16-23 percent less than required.77 The minister of health estimated that the physical condition of people had declined somewhat in recent years. Perhaps most ominously, the weights of newborn babies 69

Nhan Dan, September 20,1985. See also, Vu Huy Tu, "Gia thanh voi quan ly xi nghiep" [Cost pricing and management of enterprises], NCKT, 1985, no. 3: 21-22.

70

Nhan Dan, December 17,1984. Radio Hanoi (Domestic Service), December 17 and 18,1984.

71

Nhan Dan, June 22,1985.

72

QDND, October 22,1985.

73

Nhan Dan, August 23,1983, and ibid., December 10,1984.

74

Nhan Dan, February 2,1976.

75

SDSRV-82, p. 18. Actually, whenever expressed in US dollars Vietnam's national income or per capita national income is exaggerated, due to the official exchange rate of the dong always being overvalued.

76 77

Nhan Dan, September 20,1985.

VNA (in English), June 26, 1985. See also Le Monde, November 9, 1984; and M. Autret, La situation alimentaire et nutritionnelle au Vietnam 1983 (Bureau du Vietnam: UNICEF, 1983).

Policies and Economic Performance 89 were below average and becoming even lower.78 A Western aid official in Vietnam claimed that, "One out of every ten children dies of gastro-enteritis brought on by malnourishment."79 Living conditions remained especially precarious among Vietnamese on fixed incomes, which included workers at state enterprises, state employees, intellectuals and pensioners. Although pay raises were authorized in June 1981 and September 1984 to offset increases in the cost of living, after each raise one noticed prices of foodstuffs, clothing, and medicine going much higher. Hoang Tung, a Central Committee secretary, is alleged to have conceded that prices soared due to "governmental miscalculations in economic policy and reckless issues of banknotes."80 Dao Thien Thi, minister of labor, admitted that in recent years, "the real wages of workers and civil servants-in kind as well as in money—have been continuously falling, and cannot [even] secure reproduction of their [own] labor in a normal way."81 I can testify that by 1984 the monthly salary of a high civil servant or senior researcher covered hardly one-quarter of his or her expenditures. The other three-quarters was secured by breeding pigs and chickens, receiving gifts from family members living abroad, or engaging in illegal trading. However, among the "politocracy," the ruling stratum of the Party and government, a range of privileges in kind and in services made life much easier.82 In Vietnam, as in other socialist countries, one could paraphrase George Orwell and affirm that all cadres are equal, but a few are more equal than others. While acknowledging modest improvements since 1981 in total agricultural and industrial output, we must question whether the VCP possesses the capacity to formulate and implement sensible economic policies in the longer term. Nothing illustrates this better than the monetary and wage reforms initiated in September 1985, and subsequently admitted to be a failure.83 For the third time since 1976, the existing currency was declared worthless except when exchanged for new banknotes under specified restrictions. However, for various reasons, prices soared entirely out of control and the state was forced to restore to public employees some payments in kind which had been discontinued as a reform measure only months before. Tran Phuong, a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, was made to take responsibility for the policy fiasco and sacked.84 Although major leadership changes have occurred since then, it remains to be seen whether the Party as an institution will be able to learn from its errors and revise both theory and practice accordingly.*5 78

Radio Hanoi (Domestic Service), October 26,1985.

79

Newsweek, April 15,1985, p. 35.

80

Xinhua News Agency (in English), August 29,1985. See also, Nhan Dan, September 19,1985, for an assessment by Nguyen Duy Gia, head of the State Bank.

81

Dao Thien Thi, "Cai tien tien luong" [Improving wages), TCCS, 1985, no. 7: 34. See also, ibid., p. 19; and NCKT, 1985, no. 4: 26.

82

Lam Thanh Liem, "Collectivisation des terres," p. 564. For a discussion of communist "politocracies," see P. Kende and Z. Strmiska, Egalites et inegalites en Europe de 1'Est (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1984), Ch. 9. 83

Asiaweek (Hong Kong), April 6, 1986, pp. 31-38. The Straits Times (Singapore) February 1, 1986 and March 3,1986. 84 85

Nhan Dan, February 1,1986. Le Monde, February 7,1986.

For more details concerning the Third Five-Year Plan, see Vo Nhan Tri, "Vietnam: the Third Five Year Plan 1981-85. Performance and Limits," Indochina Report (Singapore), October-November 1985 (Special Issue), and Vo Nhan Tri, "Vietnam: Radioscopie de l'e*conomie," Sudestasie (Paris) fevrier-mars 1986, pp. 46^o.

This page intentionally left blank

THE LIMITS OF PLANNING AND THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC REFORM Suzy Paine*

I have two basic aims in this presentation. The first is to give an analytical sketch of certain problems of Vietnamese development during the last three to four decades and the second to draw some conclusions about development strategies in a low-income Communist Party state like Vietnam. In particular I would like to put forward a number of theses for discussion. The first is the proposition that, right from the outset, from the mid-1940s, Socialist Vietnam was a shortage economy and became much more so over time. When I use the term shortage economy, I do so in two senses. First, is the common-sense meaning that there are not enough resources to feed everybody. The second use of the word "shortage," which is what I am particularly concerned with in the Vietnamese case, is shortages which are actually generated by the system. In principle, it would be possible to feed everybody, but, because of the way things are organized and policies are pursued, some resources in fact get wasted. I will mainly be using the term "shortage" in the second sense where a shortage economy can actually be created and reinforced at the time. The second proposition I want to put forward is that, once a situation of chronic shortage exists, it is very difficult to reverse it, and this is what reform is all about. This is where we see the limits of authoritarian planning in their sharpest form. When we talk about planning, we have got to be very careful about what kind of planning we mean. Most of the time in discussions of planning in the Vietnamese case, people are really thinking of the old kind of Stalinist quantitative authoritarian planning. Of course, there are all sorts of other planning, for instance, the kind of planning the Labour Party in Britain has in mind for the next election. This is important. Planning means exactly what the authors intend it to mean, and planning is a political term par excellence. Actually it's about bargaining and how resources should be distributed rather than an economic form per se. When we talk about how a planning system works, we have to be very careful about what we are saying. In general, I want to put forward the proposition that, in a situation of chronic shortage, authoritarian planning is at least as bad as-I don't want to say it's necessarily better or necessarily worse, and a priori it is neither better nor worse than~the market system. I came to that conclusion very sadly and very bitterly over many years, because I started off absolutely convinced of the merits of planning, and it was only when I saw that planning could go as badly wrong as the market that I started to change my views.

* This is a transcript of the oral presentation which Suzy Paine made at the conference on postwar Vietnam.

91

92

Postwar Vietnam

On a more positive note, the third proposition that I want to put forward is that in a country like Vietnam the right land of strategy to pursue is what I call "wage goods led growth." By wage goods I mean historical subsistence goods at a particular point in time. In contemporary Vietnam these are food, clothing, and a few other consumer necessities such as housing and the like, not luxury consumer goods. But at a different stage in a different kind of economy, higher-level consumer goods might come into that category. This wage-goods-led growth needs to proceed through various forms of structural change. By this I do not mean the building of heavy industry, which is the land of structural change which receives most emphasis in the literature. I mean rather the move from lower-value, cheap consumer manufactures to slightly higher-value consumer manufactures, and especially diversification within agriculture away from lower value-added crops and products to the higher value-added products. Now a brief historical overview. Right from the onset in the mid forties to the mid fifties, the old kind of authoritarian planning and industrial priority strategy really never stood much of a chance. In fact you cannot blame the Vietnamese for that; this was a strategy handed to them. Politically mass support was for land reform, education of their children, and so on. There was not any great peasant support for rapid collectivization. As long as they got their food and clothing, peasants did not care too much about who owned and controlled industry. At the same time, at the economic level, priority to heavy industry and authoritarian planning essentially could not work because the per capita surplus was too low. The model of priority to heavy industry-the model of the Soviet Union's First FiveYear Plan, China's First Five-Year Plan, and India's Second Five-Year Plan-has certain crucial prerequisites which in the Vietnamese case distinctly were not met. First of all, there have to be micro-economic structures in which people actually want to work and want to produce. In a really poor agricultural country the risk of failure is very great and people can starve. Under war conditions collective sacrifices can and do work and this is what saved Vietnam. This first prerequisite is the right kind of micro-economic structure; the second one is that the link between the micro economy and the macro economy, which happens to be prices, must be right. If people turn up at work and work hard, put their best into production and produce good products, when they sell them they should get decent prices for them, which they can exchange for consumer goods to improve their living standards, or investment goods to help them produce better. Despite problems, the system of industrial nationalization and agricultural collectivization in Vietnam survived because of the war, during which time the system itself was applied in a very lax way. At the same time, potential physical shortages were alleviated by Chinese commodity aid. But the minute the war was over, the endemic problems of this kind of system began to show. Added to this were, first of all, the problems caused by the war itself, physical destruction, etc., and, second, the politically inevitable, but economically disastrous decision to go ahead with economic unification. In theory, one should have been better off after capturing all those shiny assets in the south. In practice, what happened was that the south actually siphoned off resources, because of the shortage of inputs. Following the departure of the Americans, southern production capacity fell drastically. To get output from those assets, they had to channel key materials from the north, which reduced the availability of consumer and investment goods in the north which, in turn, reduced the incentives for northern agriculture to develop and grow. At the same time, those incentive goods which were channeled from the north to the south were not sufficient to keep the southern

Limits of Planning 93 population's living standards at the level to which they were accustomed, and the north finished up worse off. There is a lot of detailed information in the other papers about what went on after 1975 and the kinds of problems that arose. I would like to put forward some thoughts about the reforms, which have not gone as far as I would have hoped. At the start, Vietnam was ahead of China in reforms. Yet, at the same time, even with agriculture, reforms did not get very far and in industry hardly anywhere at all. This, I think, fundamentally derives from socio-political problems rather than economic problems. The cadres who previously held the monopoly control over resources have, for perfectly comprehensible reasons, been very reluctant to go in for changes. They had been there for a long time, doing their best. One has to find some way to neutralize their reluctance to reform. In Chinese agriculture the reforms advanced essentially through buying off the cadres by giving them priority access, e.g. by enabling them to get loans, to invest in things like chicken breeding, so they could do very nicely. In Vietnam, control is really what matters and is still very much the heart of the story. However, the necessary statistical system just does not exist. The authorities do their very best to obtain accurate information from their statistics staff. They not only can not get accurate statistics, but the planning system itself does not really function. A whole range of parallel markets and chains of contacts exists which wastes a lot of time for procuring inputs and has a bad effect on productivity. Planning is really a set of cultural wishes and good intentions. This would be fine if it were not the case that there is still a belief that somehow, if only it were not for dreadful accidents (such as the weather, etc.), planning could work. Of course, we would like planning to work better, but we have got to realize its limitations, particularly in a poor country. In such a context, the highest priority must be to raise the living standards of the majority of the population as quickly as possible and to give the ordinary person more control over the working conditions of his/her life. For this reason I would put forward some final propositions. I would like to argue first of all in favor of what I call a small state, i.e., a state which does what it does properly. In Vietnam the state has got plenty to keep itself busy, particularly in terms of physical and geographical infrastructure, where it has a very major role to play in terms of investment. Instead of trying to extract large quantities of resources to invest in the more directly productive sectors of the economy, the "small state" should concentrate on physical and social infrastructure (health, education, etc.) There is the feeling that if a state can't get taxation, then you can't have investment; this is nonsense. Investment takes place just as much with voluntary funds and voluntary investment. Governments have from time immemorial found it very much easier to persuade people to invest on their own account rather than, when they are poor, to try to extract the money from them and tell them "we know better." People will only believe that the government knows better when there are goods in the shops. That is not the situation in Vietnam at present. In general, therefore, the government would do much better, since there is no big challenge to its monopoly around at the moment, to encourage the agricultural, small business, and service sectors. In fact anything that produces more output is essentially a good thing. In this way it becomes profitable to put in many more hours of labor time. You find that the number of people actually entering productive labor and the hours they put in rise very dramatically. This came out very clearly, as a result of the Chinese reform. Now if you actually measure productivity in China in many parts of the rural sector during the last few years, it looks as if it has risen enormously because it has moved to higher value products. But if you actually start measuring productivity per hour, it becomes very complicated, because it suddenly had become

94

Postwar Vietnam

so profitable as a result of the reforms to work much harder and longer hours, to earn money to save or invest, build houses, etc. There was a huge increase in the amount of labor time put in during the very first year or two of the reforms in China. People chose to work many more hours simply because they could keep the money and do what they liked with it. I would advocate that the "small state" use the agricultural sector and the small business sector, essentially families and the family sector, to get the economy moving. The market place is important since it is the only way to challenge the bureaucracy politically without going head on. One of the reasons why people claim that the market works well is because they do not want to criticize the bureaucracy. Of course, the market will, in Vietnam as everywhere else, start to cause problems. But at this stage, I think it is the only way to get the economy moving and raise living standards. I would also suggest that more accumulation from private savings rather than through direct taxation would be a good idea. There is less pressure now against reform in Vietnam than there was, partly because of Gorbachev's coming into power in the Soviet Union, and partly because of the Cambodian situation. I would like to challenge pessimism about growth being impossible in Vietnam without either foreign aid or Soviet help. It certainly will be difficult. However, if ten years ago at a conference on China someone had envisaged what has happened in China since then, it would not have been believed. A lot of changes are thinkable hi Vietnam because it has certain basic factors which, if the obstacles to growth are removed, could do reasonably well. So I would like to stop on a not too pessimistic note. I think there is hope for Vietnam.

ISSUES IN ECONOMIC UNIFICATION: OVERCOMING THE LEGACY OF SEPARATION Melanie Beresford

Introduction Formal political reunification of Vietnam took place in 1976 with the establishment of the Socialist Republic. Superficially, economic unification was carried out within a year or two of that date with the creation of a single customs entity, state budget, and banking system. It was also the stated intention to establish a system of collective farming and nationalized industry similar to that of the former DRV. The aim was to "achieve basic socialist transition in the south" by the end of the 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan.1 However, despite efforts to create a uniform set of socialist institutions for the whole country within the first five years, in practice the two systems remain largely separate. Unification is a process, not a single historical act or a sudden rupture with what went before. In the first five years of attempted unification, indifferent results both of growth policy and of political steps towards unification can be explained primarily by (a) the fact that the starting point in the south was one of negative surplus production between 1965 and 1975, plus the difficulty of finding an extra one million metric tons or more of rice and other consumer goods to replace the "free goods" represented by US aid; and (b) a weak and lopsided industrial development in the north as a result of both US bombing and the policy of priority to heavy industry; and (c) a crisis of productivity in the northern collective agriculture system. These factors produced a level of economic and social tension which undermined the goals of unification. In the second five-year period the accelerated growth policy was modified; collectivization in the south was slowed, and the new contract system in agriculture not only eased social tension, but even put more grain into the hands of the state trading organizations. These changes, amounting to an economic reform and a dramatic change of course, have created an improved context for achieving some of the goals of unification. A Framework for Analysis of the Unification Process In embarking upon the transition to socialism in April 1975, the south began a process which has proved to be much longer and more complicated than was expected by either the Vietnamese leadership or most outside commentators at the time. While some convergence toward a unified system of planning and administration has certainly taken place over the past decade, the direction is clearly different from that envisaged by the govern-

1

Communist Party of Vietnam, Fourth National Congress: Documents (Hanoi: FLPH, 1977), p. 63. 95

96

Postwar Vietnam

ment in the early postwar years. It is therefore worth asking whether the interaction of northern and southern systems (of virtually equal economic and demographic weights) has produced a new direction altogether. In fact, one could go so far as to argue that developments hi the south had ramifications for the socialist "model" which has emerged in the whole country. There are many factors which can account for the process of economic reform which began in late 1979. Clearly the Vietnamese are benefitting from an international climate very favorable to reform of centralized planning and price systems, with major changes in economic policy in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and China. But in understanding why Vietnamese reformers have been able to hold sway in the 1980s when they were defeated in the 1960s, I think it is as important to focus on domestic factors-particularly the process of reunification--as on international ones. What exactly is meant by the term "economic unification"? In Marxist terms this involves unifying both the economic system narrowly defined-the organization of production and reproduction, the accumulation of capital, generation of total economic surplus, technological change, circulation and distribution of goods-and the system of social relations which structure production, distribution, and exchange; that is, the class relations of society. Socialism, like capitalism, allows for a number of different forms of the fundamental social relationships-in capitalism, for example, forms like sharecropping can be adapted from a pre-capitalist mode of production to suit the accumulation requirements of capital. A socialist system typically contains cooperative, state, and family ownership forms, and it should not be presumed that new institutions (such as a contract system between individual families and the state) are less "socialist." Much depends upon what changes are taking place in the forces of production and on the ways in which surplus is appropriated. At one level, the defeat of the Saigon regime in April 1975 put a halt to any further systematic development of capitalist production relations in the south for the foreseeable future. However, the practices embedded in a particular set of production relations are not necessarily transformed by the change of a political regime. In this case, sections of southern society proved capable of resisting the changes which the government wished to bring about after 1975: this brought forth both a repressive response and also a series of compromises which have created new institutions and practices not hitherto part of the Vietnamese socialist system. Turning to the dimension of productive forces, it seems obvious that unification involves economic integration and the establishment of a national market-a nationwide system of production, circulation, distribution, and exchange. The north-south divide is not the only issue here; a political entity which contained a number of autarkic economic villages or regions could not be considered economically unified. For Marx, economic growth involved not only the production and accumulation of surplus, but also an increase in the social division of labor and extension of the system of exchange, especially exchange between industry and agriculture.2 The importance of a national market may appear para2

For Adam Smith (e.g., Wealth of Nations [London: Methuen, 1961], pp. 430-31), as for Marx, the division of labor between industry and agriculture formed the basis of all subsequent divisions of labor. Marx had this to say. 'The foundation of every division of labor that is well-developed, and brought about by the exchange of commodities, is the separation between town and country." (Karl Marx, Capital, 3 vols. [Moscow: Progress, n.d.], 1: 333.)

Economic Unification 97 doxical when discussing a socialist country, since the division of labor and generalization of commodity production (production specifically for the purpose of exchange) has so far reached its apogee under modern industrial capitalism. A socialist economy is not necessarily characterized by generalized commodity production, in the sense that all goods (including labor power) possess a definite exchange value in relation to all other goods.3 But in developing his ideas on socialism, Marx clearly had in mind that most goods would enter into a system of exchange in a system characterized by an increased social division of labor. In looking at the transition to socialism in Vietnam, it is important to remember that the goal of the communist leadership is to advance towards "large-scale socialist production," that is, a system in which the division of labor, and therefore the system of exchange, is highly developed. Vietnamese thinking on the question of economic unification has been dominated by the idea that a deepening of the social division of labor would be facilitated by reunification. This is at the root of the "economic complementarity" thesis: the idea that the development of exchange between the south, with its enormous agricultural and light industrial potential, and the north, with its mineral resources and heavy industry capacity,4 would promote a surge of economic growth and enable more rapid consolidation of socialist production relations. The Economic Legacy of Separate Development in the South The southern economy in 1975 was different from that of the north in 1954 in a number of fundamental ways. In the first place, a dramatic transformation of the social structure had taken place—even allowing that this was already somewhat different from that of the north during the colonial period. The changes were marked in the rural areas where, as Ngo Vinh Long has pointed out,5 considerable development towards rural capitalism had taken place. This took the form of a concentration of ownership of modern means of production in the hands of relatively few "rich peasants." However, the series of land reforms carried out by the Viet Minh (as far back as 1946) and National Liberation Front (finally given de jure status by the Thieu regime's US-financed land reform in the early 1970s) had created a situation in the Mekong Delta of widespread peasant land ownership where the vast majority of agricultural producers could be classified as "middle peasants."6

3

Other forms of exchange include gifts, barter, and administrative allocation, in which it is not possible to express the value of all goods in terms of a definite quantity of each other, via the medium of a universal equivalent (money).

4

See, for example, Le Chau, Le Vietnam socialiste: une Economic de transition (Paris: Maspero, 1966), p. 243

5

"Agrarian Differentiation in the Southern Region of Vietnam," Journal of Contemporary Asia, 14, 3 (1984). See also the response in ibid., 15,4 by Nancy Wiegersma.

6

According to a survey of eight villages in eight provinces of the Mekong Delta carried out in 1978, poor and landless peasants accounted for 22.6 percent of households and held 8 percent of the land; middle peasants (those owning no more land than could be worked by family labor) were 56.9 percent of households and had 55.8 percent of the land; upper-middle peasants and rich households (those holding land and capital in excess of the above) were 18.5 percent of households with 36.0 percent of the land. Tran Huu Quang, "Nhan dien co cau giai cap o nong thon dong bang song Cuu Long" [Identifying class structure in the rural areas of the Mekong Delta], NCKT 128 (August 1982): 32. A similar picture emerged from a survey covering the whole southern region in 1981 and cited in Long, "Agrarian Differentiation," pp. 295-%.

98

Postwar Vietnam

Mechanization and use of modern inputs led to a higher level of involvement by peasants in commodity production. The availability to peasants of gram surpluses, which they had hitherto handed over to landlords as rent, probably resulted in increased personal consumption, but it also allowed increased rural consumption of manufactured inputs and consumer goods.7 Labor shortages brought about by the disappearance of adult males into the armed forces during the war or by refugee movements into urban areas also helped the tendency to more mechanized production and higher wages.8 American aid programs were also aimed at spreading the use of high-yielding varieties, chemical fertilizers, and insecticides.9 These factors in turn stimulated increases in marketed grain surpluses,10 especially after 1969 when, with the restoration of relatively peaceful conditions in the Mekong Delta, output of most crops began to rise rapidly. One can exaggerate the extent of rural capitalist development—South Vietnam had by no means become a Taiwan or South Korea-but the process was certainly much further advanced than it had been in the north in 1954. Increased concentration of commodity grain in the hands of the vast majority of rich and middle peasants provides the possibility of demand-led industrialization, but does not necessarily lead in this direction. In South Vietnam, most manufactured goods consumed by peasants and urban dwellers alike were imported under the American-financed Commercial Import Program (CIP), or else financed by direct US expenditure in the country (for example, by US troops purchasing local currency).11 The local manufacturing sector was tiny, with a large percentage devoted to alcoholic beverages and cigarettes,12 and it suffered a severe setback when US troops withdrew (along with their spending power).13

7

C. Stuart Callison, for example, found a significant increase in investment among recipients of Land-To-TheTiller titles. "The Land-To-The-Tiller Program and Rural Resource Mobilization in the Mekong Delta of South Vietnam," Papers in International Studies, Southeast Asia Series, No. 34, Ohio University, 1974. 8

Robert L. Sansom, The Economics of Insurgency in the Mekong Delta of Vietnam (Cambridge [Mass.] and London: MIT Press, 1970), pp. 124-25. 9

Imported fertilizers, for example, rose from an annual average of 96,000 metric tons in 1955-1962 to 207,000 in 1963-1967 and 323,000 in 1968-1973 (Le Khoa et al., Tinh hinh kinh te mien nam 1955-1975 [Economic situation in the south 1955-1975] [Ho Chi Minh City. Vien Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1979], p. 189). The area sown to high-yielding rice varieties increased from 500 hectares in 1967-1968 to 835,000 ha in 1972-1973 (J. M. Burr, "Land-To-The-Tiller: Land Redistribution in South Vietnam 1970-73" [PhD dissertation, University of Oregon, 1976], p. 177). 10 This is deduced from the increase in investment and consumption of manufactured goods, but Ngo Vinh Long has also provided an estimate, based on official US data, that about half the rice produced in the Mekong Delta was marketed in 1970. Long, "Agrarian Differentiation," p. 287. We may compare this with figures from the north: in 1965 20 percent of grain output was sold to the state monopsony, but by 1974 the share had fallen to 16 percent (Statistical Service, Tinh hinh phat trien kinh te va van hoa mien bac xa hoi chu nghia Viet Nam 1960-1975 [Development of economy and culture in the socialist north, 1960-1975] [Hanoi, 1978]. 11

In the late 1960s, CIP was about half the total US aid, but after the troop withdrawal it became an even higher proportion. 12

Five industries—beverages, tobacco, food processing, textiles, and chemical products—accounted for between 70 and 90 percent of industrial output in 1970 (according to different sets of data). Beverages and tobacco accounted for 43-72 percent, depending on which set of data is chosen. Dale L. Moody, "The Manufacturing Sector in the Republic of Vietnam" (PhD dissertation, University of Florida, 1975), pp. 89-90. 13 Industry's share of GDP declined from 11 percent in 1960 to 6.5 percent in 1972 and the real value of output fell absolutely from $VN 11 billion in 1965 to $VN 8 billion in 1972 (1960 constant prices). Le Khoa, Tinh hinh kinh te, pp. 117-18.

Economic Unification 99 Moreover, industry depended very heavily on imported raw materials and spare parts.14 The value of US non-military aid averaged one third of South Vietnamese GNP between 1965 and 1969,15 and this led to the rapid growth of the commercial sector-chiefly importing agencies-to nearly 20 percent of GDP by 1972.16 Between 1965 and 1975 exports covered no more than 5 percent of the import bill on average.17 The South Vietnamese population was highly urbanized. In 1976, after many had already left the cities, urban population was reported at over 7 million (30.5 percent of the total southern population), compared with the north's 3 million (11.6 percent).18 The warrelated rapid growth of the cities from 1965 on had necessitated large imports of rice. During the war, aid imports had played an extremely important part in suppressing inflation. Since much of this urban population (about half of which was in Saigon and Da Nang) was employed unproductively under the old regime19 and the productive base of the economy was very restricted by both war and lack of investment,20 new money creation was used extensively to finance the budget deficit.21 Nevertheless official inflation rates remained high over the period.22 The vital role played by the CIP in South Vietnam's economic life is further illustrated by the fact that total non-military expenditure by its citizens amounted to an average of 114 percent of GDP for the years 1960 to 197423--the gap being made up by US grant aid. This had important implications for the growth of the South Vietnamese economy. In general, national income and expenditure can be divided into two categories: income, chiefly derived from profits, which is expended on investment, and that, chiefly derived from wages (or subsistence farming), which is expended on consumption. In the case of South Vietnam, between 1960 and 1974, expenditure on consumption alone averaged 14 Imported raw materials in the five main industries ranged from 70 percent in food processing to 95 percent in tobacco and textiles in 1968. Moody, "Manufacturing Sector," pp. 100-101. The tendency was for the share of imports to rise over the period 1962-1968. 15

Asian Development Bank, Southeast Asia's Economy in the 1970s (London: Longman, 1971), pp. 617-18.

16

Le Khoa, Tilth hinh kinh te, p. 116.

17

Ibid., p. 33. For 1956-1964 the figure was 25.4 percent.

18

Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1930-1984 [Statistical Data 1930-1984] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Thong Ke, 1985), pp. 18-19. 19 By 1974 an estimated 15 percent of the employed southern workforce were in the armed forces, 4 percent in administration, 22 percent in miscellaneous services (including transport, construction, and utilities for which there are no separate data), 56 percent in agriculture, and 3 percent in industry. In 1960 the corresponding figures had been: agriculture 88 percent, industry 2 percent, military and administration 2 percent, services 7 percent, others 1 percent. Le Khoa, Tilth hinh kinh te, p. 110 and World Bank, Current Economic Position and Prospects of the Republic of Vietnam, Report No. 315-VN, January 18,1974, p. 1. 20 Estimates of the real growth rate of the economy from 1967 to 1974 put it at 1.2 percent (well below the population growth rate). See Le Khoa, Tinh hinh kinh te, p. 114. In the combined sectors of agriculture, industry, mining, transport, construction, and utilities, the real growth rate after 1967 was -0.3 percent, compared with 4.1 percent in services. Ibid., pp. 116-18. 21 The CIP contribution to budget revenue, directly and indirectly via import duties on US-financed imports, was about 80 percent. The domestic deficit, after taking aid revenue into account, averaged 28 percent of government expenditure. This was financed either by printing money or by sales of local currency to US personnel (creating US dollar reserves). Chi Do Pham, "Inflationary Finance in Wartime South Vietnam, 1960-72" (PhD dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1976), p. 105 and Le Khoa, Tinh hinh kinh te, p. 75. 22

Chi Do Pham, "Inflationary Finance."

23

Calculated from National Bank of Vietnam figures cited in ibid., p. 29.

100 Postwar Vietnam 103.5 percent of GDP. Gross investment averaged 10.6 percent. After deducting from gross investment that portion which goes to depreciation of the existing capital stock, the amount left over for new investment is even smaller.24 What these figures suggest is that, in the economy as a whole, savings were negative. One of the consequences of the American policy of trying to win support for the South Vietnamese regime by lavish supplies of consumer goods, was that the "socially necessary" means of subsistence (i.e., the level of consumption which has become socially accepted as a minimum) rose well beyond the inherent productive capabilities of the economy. On the other hand, because of the high import content of production, even existing levels of output would have been difficult to maintain following withdrawal of American aid. Substantial investments in the production of local raw materials for industry and an increase hi export income in order to overcome the foreign exchange bottleneck would be required before production could even be restored to pre-1975 levels. The drying up of imported consumer goods and inputs would also have serious incentive effects on rural producers, encouraging them to reduce marketed surpluses, with serious consequences for the urban population. It is estimated that 400,000 metric tons of grain were shipped from the Mekong Delta to other areas of the south (chiefly the cities) in 1970.25 On top of this, 609,000 metric tons were imported.26 Although by 1973-1974 imports had fallen to around 300,000 metric tons, the ramifications of the total withdrawal of US aid and trade for the ability of urban areas to obtain sufficient food (as well as other consumer goods) were much wider than this figure would suggest. The food deficit in the southern cities would have to be resolved before much thought could be given to transferring agricultural surpluses to the north. Given the existence of negative savings in the South Vietnamese economy, and the high levels of interdependence brought about by the extensive commoditization of the southern economy, the withdrawal of the large American expenditure subsidy exerted a cumulative downward pressure on the economy as a whole. In this context, what were the policy options hi 1975? Prospects were not entirely bleak. Much of the investment in the south had been unproductive, which contributed to the slow growth rate of the economy. It would have been possible for this investment to have been utilized much more effectively to expand the productive sectors: for example, by concentrating on reorganization of labor resources and improving incentives to labor; by using low capital-intensity investments which generate quick returns at the same time as they bring about a rapid increase in the supply of consumer goods; by concentrating investment in areas which utilize the plentiful supply of labor and make use of existing resources, rather than requiring a high import content. Such measures could certainly have been used to mitigate the structural dislocation of the postwar period. There were also the resources of the north to draw upon. According to the "economic complementarity" thesis, in theory the socialist industry of the north could supply many of 24

Estimates of net investment are available for 1961-1970 only. The average share in real GDP (1960 prices) is 9 percent, although it tended to be higher than this after 1966. Estimated from data in Le Khoa, Tinh hinh kinh te, p. 114 and National Institute of Statistics, Statistical Yearbook (in Vietnamese and English) (Saigon, 1969 and 1972).

25

According to data from a US Department of Agriculture study cited in Long, "Agrarian Differentiation," p. 287. 26

Le Khoa, Tinh hinh kinh te, p. 136.

Economic Unification 101 the commodities lacking in the south-for example, steel and cement for construction, coal for energy, machine tools for manufacturing, fertilizers for agriculture, etc. In the next section we shall look at the capacity of the north to fulfil this function before returning to the question of whether economic policies mitigated or exacerbated the crisis. The Economic Legacy of Separate Development in the North During the two decades of the DRV, especially from 1961 onwards, the government shared the view, in common with most other socialist governments, that industrial selfreliance was desirable. In the Vietnamese case the existence of substantial deposits of coal and minerals tended to reinforce the view that a self-reliant strategy was a viable alternative to the pattern repeated by many Third World countries of relying on trade in one or two major primary commodities or on a comparative advantage in labor-intensive, lowwage industries for export. The government therefore embarked upon the creation of an industrial structure which, if achieved, would have essentially duplicated those in existence in the rest of the socialist bloc. In 1971 the combined productive sectors of agriculture, industry (including mining and utilities), construction, transport, and communications accounted for an estimated 81 percent of the DRV's national income. Commerce and services were 9 percent and others 10 percent. These figures compare with 1957, three years after the French departure, when the productive sectors accounted for only 66 percent.27 The share of employment in these sectors was even higher.28 However, there were a number of serious structural problems which were the legacy of war and also of the priority the DRV government gave to heavy industry. As far as industrial production is concerned, its share of employment rose from 7 percent in 1960 to 10.6 percent in 1975,29 but its output suffered an absolute decline after 1965-the year in which intensive US bombing of the north began-and was still struggling to recover hi 1970 (see Table 6.1). According to the data on which this table is based, only nine of the twenty-six industries listed in the table showed an increase in per capita output between 1965 and 1974 and eleven of them showed negative or zero growth between 1970 and 1974. From 1961 onwards, development strategy involved giving priority to investment in heavy industrial capacity. This policy is reflected in the share of industrial investment allocated to Group A (producer goods): 78 percent in 1961-1964,82 percent in 1965-1968, and 76 percent in 1969-1971.30 This resulted in a rapid rise in the share of Group A in the value

27 G. Nguyen Tien Hung, Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam 1955-1980 (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 104. These figures are not directly comparable with those given above for the south as they are based on different methods of accounting. 28

See A. Vickerman, "Industry in Vietnam's Development Strategy," Journal of Contemporary Asia 15,2 (1985): 230.

29 30

Ibid.

Industry's share of investment in these three periods was: 1961-1964, 53 percent; 1965-1968, 33 percent; 1969-197140 percent; and that of agriculture 21 percent, 14 percent, and 21 percent respectively. Hung, Economic Development, pp. 123,142.

102 Postwar Vietnam Table 6.1. Index of Output of Major Industrial Products 1957-1974 (1965 = 100)

1957

1965

1970

1974

19 26 10 29 8 40 16 -

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

94 64 32" 91 0 100 105 179 23 80' 90 126 171

162 88 25" 61 0b 119 165 76 63" 138 238 142

-

100 100

25 93

150 109

10 125 67 493 13 11 38 72

100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100

62 158 89 113 527 319 45* 131a 50*& 73 1291

82 128 96 123 532

Group A Electricity, kwh Coal, tons Apatite ore, t. Cement, t. Chrome, t. Machine tools, no Diesel motors, no. Electric rotary engines, no. Pig iron, t. Timber, m3 Car tires & tubes, sets Chemical fertilizer, t. Ploughs & harrows, no. Livestock fodder processing machines, no. Insecticide, t.

no

Group B Paper, t. Rush mats, pairs Cloth, meters Chinaware, pieces Fish sauce, liters Seasoning, t. Sugar, t. Cigarettes, packs Soap, t. Bicycles, t. Salt, t.

635 45" f64bh 75 72 107" K

Notes:* 1971;b 1973. Sources: Nguyen Tien Hung, Economic Development of Socialist Vietnam, p. 144; Vo Nhan Tri, Croissance economique de la Republique democratique du Viet Nam (Hanoi: Editions en Langues etrangeres, 1967), p. 231; Vien Kinh Te Hoc, 35 Nam Kinh Te Viet Nam 1945-1980 (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1980), p. 97.

Economic Unification 103 of industrial output from 27 percent in 1955 to 43 percent in 1965.31 Stagnation of industrial growth after that date led to a freezing of shares. Whatever the preferences of the government, the strategy was thrown into abeyance by the commencement of US bombing in 1965. Aside from the widespread destruction of industrial capacity caused by the war, many factories were physically dismantled and removed to rural areas so that concentrations of production were dispersed. Although this policy enabled much production to continue, it nevertheless involved additional transportation and other costs, as well as the necessity to construct new infrastructure in remote areas. The hitherto rapid expansion of industry ceased, and indeed output declined in many branches.32 Growth resumed once the bombing had stopped, but those areas which recovered quickest were handicraft industries which required little capital investment with very short gestation periods.33 By 1975 the rural areas of the north were, on the whole, characterized by local self-sufficiency and stagnating productivity. I have argued elsewhere that an important cause of this lay in the organization of production within the cooperatives.34 However, part of the problem also lay in the industrial sector and in the development strategy. Investment and imported goods were allocated by administrative methods, the goals of which had been largely dominated by the requirements of war production and the desire of the leadership to create a heavy industrial base. Priority had not been given to satisfying agriculture's demand for modern inputs and consumer goods-a factor which reinforced the tendency to local autarky. Rather low official purchase prices for grain were also responsible for discouraging increased commoditization of gram, since they adversely affected the returns to collective farming compared to household subsistence farming (see Christine White's chapter in this volume). To some extent there is a chicken and egg problem involved here. Agriculture's retreat into autarky made industrial recovery from the effects of the bombing more difficult, while the slowdown in industrial growth constricted both rural modernization and incentives for agricultural surplus production. It is fair to say that after 1964 the development of an "economic link" between industry and agriculture in the DRV suffered a considerable setback. Inability of the agricultural sector to supply sufficient foodgrain to feed urban populations or supply raw materials to industry meant that considerable quantities of rice had to be imported. Few industries with backward linkages to the rural sector were developed, in spite of intentions expressed in various plans.35 As a result of the "heavy industry priority" strategy, investment re31

Vickerman, "Industry in Vietnam's Strategy," p. 228.

32

Between 1959 and 1964 the annual average growth rate of real value of industrial output was (on the basis of data in 1959 constant prices reported by Hung, Economic Development, p. 140) 14.8 percent, and of modern industry, 20.9 percent. Between 1965 and 1968 the rate of industrial growth was -0.6 percent p.a. The branch most affected was Group B (consumer goods) which declined by 2.8 percent p.a., but the growth rate of Group A also fell from 19.7 percent p.a. in the earlier period to 2.4 percent. 33 From 1968 to 1973 the average annual rate of growth in the handicraft sector was 18.6 percent compared with modern industry's 7.8 percent and Group A's 6 percent. Ibid. 34

M. Beresford, "Household and Collective in Vietnamese Agriculture," Journal of Contemporary Asia 15,1 (1985).

35

This was recognized by the Vietnamese leadership in the Political Report delivered to the Fourth National Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party in December 1976 and, more trenchantly, at the Fifth Congress in 1982. See Fourth National Congress, p. 32 and Ve Congres National: Rapport Politique (Hanoi: Eds. en Langues etrangeres, 1982), pp. 25 and 45-55.

104 Postwar Vietnam sources were tied up in construction of large-scale plants with very long gestation lags which, as in the case of the Thai Nguyen steelworks,36 relied heavily on imported inputs of capital equipment and raw material. Such large projects themselves create extra demands (e.g. for wage goods) without any accompanying short-term increase in the productive capacity of the economy to meet them. Under a system of centralized resource allocation in which units at the base of the administrative pyramid are not allowed to exchange directly with each other and shortages exist, there is a well-known tendency for enterprises or ministries to try to secure their own sources of inputs. This can lead to hoarding and unnecessary duplication of productive capacity, which reduces economies of scale, wastes scarce resources, and slows down the growth rate. Moreover, the shortages are thereby reinforced, as Kornai has pointed out.37 Such problems also occurred in Vietnam, although they did not receive much public airing until the debates associated with the introduction of reforms from 1979 onwards. In order to achieve an accelerated growth rate, the strategy of "priority to heavy industry" calls for compression of the consumption share in the short term. This holds potential dangers both for labor productivity, especially if the subsistence level is below a socially accepted minimum, and for continued political support for the regime. In Vietnam, as in most other socialist countries at the outset, the division between producer goods and consumer goods sectors corresponded very largely to that between industry and agriculture. The concentration on construction of a heavy industrial base and relative neglect of the consumption goods sector therefore carried with it a strong danger of alienating the support of the Vietnamese peasantry. This danger was averted by the willingness on the part of the population to make sacrifices in their living standards during the war for the sake of the cause of national reunification and independence, and also the ability of the government to subsidize consumption levels via foreign aid (chiefly Chinese rice and manufactured consumer goods). The importance of external resources to Vietnam is brought out by figures on per capita production of basic consumer goods-for example, food and textiles. Per capita annual production of staple foodgrains actually fell from about 370 kg in 1955-1964 to about 310 kg in 1969-1973, while per capita annual cloth output also fell, from 5.17 meters in 19601964 to 3.24 meters in 1972-1973.38 These also give some idea of the narrow constraints operating on investment policy. Any growth strategy which involved reductions in per capita consumption levels would run the risk of forcing large sections of the population below minimum physical subsistence requirements and posing a severe threat to mass support for the regime. According to estimates by W. Kaye,39 actual and planned foreign aid from the socialist countries to the DRV totalled $US 911 million between 1955 and 1965, but showed a tendency to decline over this period. There was also a shift from grants towards refundable 36

Christine White, "Debates in Vietnamese Development Policy," IDS Discussion Paper, University of Sussex, 1982, p. 10.

37

Janos Kornai, Growth, Shortage and Efficiency (Oxford: Blackwell, 1982).

38

Cloth figures for 1960-1964 exclude 1961. Le Chau, Le Vietnam socialiste, pp. 217, 219; Hung, Economic Development, pp. 127, 144; Kai Carlberg and Jens-Christian Sorenson, "Landbmget i den vietnamesiske udviklingsstrategi," Den ny verden, 14,1 (1980), p. 79.

39

"A Bowl of Rice Divided: The Economy of North Vietnam" in North Vietnam Today, ed. P. J. Honey (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 115.

Economic Unification 105 aid.40 Other estimates, by Hung,41 suggest a substantial increase following escalation of the war, but there are no indications available as to its size relative to national income. There is some limited information on foreign aid's importance for the annual budgets of the DRV. For 1960 it is said to account for 18 percent of government expenditures.42 A year earlier, in 1959, taxes on industry and agriculture had supplied 61.5 percent of budget revenue.43 Thus the emphasis in this period at least was on domestic sources of revenue. No comparable data are available for later years. However, by the 1960s, industry was by far the largest contributor of revenue (via turnover tax and profit transfer) so that subsequent stagnation in this sector must have considerably reduced domestic sources of budget revenue.44 After 1965 the situation changed, but lack of data prevents any systematic analysis of that period. With the government of the SRV persisting with its "heavy industry priority" strategy during the Second Five-Year Plan of 1976-1980, in spite of the reduction in foreign aid levels and an economic crisis caused by production dislocation in the south and institutional bottlenecks in the north, trouble was inevitable. Plans for growth were unrealistic, and they were undertaken without resolving a number of problems within the industrial sector of the north, such as excessive waste of raw materials and low productivity growth rates. North Vietnamese industry in 1975 was not in a state to carry out the leading role assigned to it by the "economic complementarity" thesis and by orthodox socialist development theory. It is hard to avoid the conclusion, given the statistics on the years in which the major decline occurred, that the American bombing of the urban and industrial centers of the north was a major cause of this. However, a number of other factors combined to ensure that, once peace was restored, recovery based on the same overall development strategy would be extremely difficult. Structural Crisis: A Fetter on Economic Unification In both halves of the country, serious disruptions to the circulation of goods resulted from the war, withdrawal of aid, and development of hostilities with China. In the south, it can be argued that the dislocation which occurred soon after April 1975 was more drastic, because its effects reached further into the countryside on account of the more highly developed system of commodity exchange. Since the CIP had provided production incentives to farmers, its termination must have resulted in reduced food supplies reaching the non-farming population, exacerbating the effect of the termination of PL 480 and other food aid. In the north, the effects on the rural areas were probably less dramatic, though

40

Ibid.

41

Economic Development, p. 185. The estimates are $US 100 million per annum from China and, from the USSR, $345-360 million in 1970 and $315^50 million in 1971.

42

Le Chau, Le Vietnam socialiste, p. 246.

43

Ibid., p. 205.

44

Between 1955 and 1965, the agricultural tax, the chief means of extracting surplus from the rural sector, provided a progressively smaller proportion of revenue. Agriculture's terms of trade improved greatly between 1948 and 1959 so that it seems discriminatory pricing was an unlikely method by which surplus was extracted (Le Chau, Le Vietnam socialiste, pp. 94, 208-9).

106 Postwar Vietnam not less serious, because of the narrower margin of subsistence. The living standards of urban populations in both regions were severely affected. In this context, scarce foreign exchange reserves had to be diverted to purchase food, which further intensified the crisis in the industrial sector. As a result, the proposed postwar strategy of achieving economic complementarity by exchanging southern food surpluses for northern industrial goods could not be implemented. Although considerable assistance was provided to the south in the immediate aftermath of the victory,45 this does not seem to have formed the basis of a sustained trading pattern, nor was the southern agricultural sector able to overcome the food deficit in the southern region itself, let alone supply northern deficit areas, in the early years of unification.46 The sheer enormity of the structural crisis in the Vietnamese economy would have strained the resources of any underdeveloped country, even without a US economic blockade and growing confrontation with Kampuchea and China to contend with. However, as they have since admitted, the Vietnamese leadership was over-optimistic about its ability to cope with these adverse circumstances.47 As a result Vietnamese policy makers took few steps, if any, to slow the rate of beginning new construction projects. They certainly took insufficient account of the costs imposed on the people's consumption standards by such a strategy being carried out with a reduced contribution from foreign aid.48 Moreover, the unification process began in 1976, at precisely the time when the difficulties in 45

One year after the end of the war it was reported that the north had sent 1.6 million metric tons of goods and raw materials to the south, including rice, sugar, fuel, industrial raw material and equipment, fertilizer, medicine, 32 million meters of fabric, 1,700 tons of seed, and hundreds of thousands of livestock. In return, the south had sent 80,000 tons of local products to the north. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, Weekly Economic Report, FE/W875/A/27, April 28,1976.

46

Even in 1985, when the Mekong Delta was producing large grain surpluses, I was told by an official in Hanoi that lack of transport facilities prevented significant quantities being shipped to the north.

47

See, for example, Ve Congres National, pp. 24-25: "The depth of economic and social upheaval after a long war was poorly appraised ... we did not completely anticipate certain less favorable developments in the international situation. Consequently, we displayed subjectivism and impatience in fixing a number of overly ambitious targets ..." (my translation). 48

There is little hard data on this as far as north Vietnam is concerned. Vietnamese officials have told me that aid levels were reduced after 1975, though it is not known to what extent increased Soviet and East European aid offset the withdrawal of Chinese and US aid. Some indications of the importance of foreign aid to the unified economy are set out below. It is certainly a smaller contribution than was hitherto experienced by the south. Foreign loans and grants to the SR Percent of GDP

1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983

_

9.5 8.7 10.0 9.3 8.8 15.7 12.1

Percent of government expenditure

28.6 21.4 22.2 27.5 26.1 23.9 33.3 27.6

Source: IMF, "Socialist Republic of Vietnam-Recent Economic Developments," SM/79/126, May 1979, p. 33; SM/82/96, May 1982, p. 17; "Viet Nam-Staff Report for the 1983 Article IV Consultation," SM/83/123, June 1983, p. 4.

Economic Unification 107 the southern economy caused by the withdrawal of US aid were making their biggest impact-as imported stocks and the possibilities of recycling wasted military equipment diminished. Although Vietnamese propaganda had often stressed the political and economic dependence of the former southern regime on US aid, it appears that their planning for postwar economic unification did not take into account the extent of the structural dislocation caused by its cessation. This was probably due in part to lack of hard information: the picture of the south presented to the Fourth Party Congress, for example, took only two sentences and was couched merely in terms of the prevailing social relations, in contrast to a quite detailed account of the economic problems of the north.49 The CIA-inspired Phoenix Program had greatly depleted the stock of cadres with sufficient experience of the south. The nationalization of control over industry and the commencement of collectivization in agriculture, along approximately the same lines as been taken in the north twenty years earlier, were thought to provide the basis of economic reconstruction in the south. Ironically, this view remained dominant, despite mounting criticism within the north itself of the centralized administrative planning model, until the sheer severity of the economic and political crisis facing the country in 1978-1980 began to turn the tide in favor of those advocating reform. The structural economic crisis already inherent in the economies of the two regions at the end of the war was intensified by the policies pursued by the government in the south. In the first place, efforts by the government to replace the prevailing market relations of exchange in the south by a state-controlled system of planned resource allocation were, in a situation of acute shortages of all kinds of goods, increasingly subverted by black marketeering and speculation by both wealthier traders and corrupt cadres. A major cause was inappropriate pricing of agricultural commodities. Low official purchasing prices of grain discouraged individual farmers from selling grain to the state (a) because they could obtain much higher prices from private traders, and (b) because the state did not control a sufficient quantity of necessary consumer goods and farm inputs to satisfy farmers' demands. Farmers increasingly resorted to the free market, which had the effect of undermining both the government's equity goals (since the market allocates resources according to wealth) and its economic growth objectives (since it effectively lost control over the marketed grain surplus, leaving it in the hands of local capitalists who had already displayed a preference for commercial enterprise, hoarding gold, and speculative activities over less profitable productive investments). The speculative activities of private merchants tended to increase inflationary pressure and worsen the cost of living for urban workers on fixed salaries. The government initially attempted to control inflation by administrative and police measures. In May 1978, it moved to clamp down on private trading activities. While this may have temporarily stabilized prices, it did not remove an underlying cause, which was the failure of official prices to reflect acute disjuncture between supply and demand. The price reform carried out in late 1981 was a necessary first step in improving the government's ability to control the economic environment.

49

Fourth National Congress, p. 42. The appraisal of the northern economy is contained in pp. 31-34 of this document.

108 Postwar Vietnam In the second place, the initial collectivization drive in the south, instead of achieving peasant integration into the national economy via administrative control and state procurement of surpluses, encountered passive resistance. Prices were an important element, but organizational problems-particularly the system of incentives and imposition of a rather artificial division of labor-which were already coming under increasing criticism in the north, were also a factor.50 Although many collectives were formed on paper prior to 1979, few operated successfully. The same problems with labor mobilization and low productivity of labor on collective fields in the north also began to appear in the south. Not only did peasants concentrate most of their effort on the household economy, but paddy output began to decline.51 Given the importance of southern agriculture in the overall strategy of food self-sufficiency, this was a factor which contributed in no small way to the serious national economic crisis of 1978-1980. The Impact of Economic Reforms Since the gradual implementation of economic reforms began in 1979, the average annual growth rate of southern paddy output has been 8.3 percent, well above the population growth rate of the region. Average per capita output of food grain in the Mekong Delta area in 1984 was 511 kg per capita, compared with the national average of just over 300 kg (and an average of only 246 kg for the northern region).52 Moreover, as a result of the reforms, state procurement of food grains has increased greatly. Total domestic foodgrain procurement rose from a low point of 1.4 million metric tons (10.2 percent of output) in 1979 to 3.75 million metric tons (22.4 percent of output) in 1983.53 Thus the reforms have not only benefitted the growth rate of agricultural output, but they have helped increase the ability of the state to mobilize agricultural surpluses, hence to promote social rather than private appropriation. In the longer run, the continued growth of the economy will depend on the expansion of exchange between industry and agriculture. This means both the development of manufacturing industry catering to the domestic market and the expansion of exports to cover the costs of imports. The Chinese attack on the northern borders in February 1979 destroyed some vital industrial capacity (notably the apatite mine-the basis of the phosphate fertilizer industry), and the exodus of skilled Chinese workers during the same period further disrupted production. Indices of physical output in twenty-three major industries after 1975 show that while most of them experienced quite rapid growth during 1976, and about a third continued expanding up to 1978 or 1979, virtually all suffered a severe collapse thereafter. Some 50

See Beresford, "Household and Collective."

51

South Vietnamese paddy output averaged 6.7 million metric tons during 1971-1974, the last four years of the old regime. Yields per hectare ranged from 2.35 to 2.48 metric tons. In 1975, output fell to 5.4 million metric tons (2.17 t/ha). In 1976 it was 6.6 million metric tons (2.72 t/ha). Recovery was interrupted in 1977-1978, but output and yields rose again after 1979, reaching 9.4 million metric tons (2.94 t/ha) in 1984. 52

Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1930-84, pp. 13-14, 90-91.

53

IMF, SM/82/96 May 1982, p. 13; Statistical Service, So lieu thong kc 1979, p. 61; PEER, February 2, 1984.

Economic Unification 109 based on agricultural products (sea fish, tea, cigarettes, soap) had never really got going before this crisis.54 Recovery did not begin until 1982 in the majority of cases. In fact, industry's share of state investment fell slightly during 1976-1979, while that of agriculture rose (compared with the earlier data for the DRV). Within industry, the share of Group A also fell a little.55 Since the reforms were introduced and, more particularly, since the 1982 Party Congress which ratified the Five-Year Plan for 1981-1985, the shares both of industry and of Group A within industry have risen, while that of agriculture has fallen. These figures do not, however, necessarily reflect the actual investment situation. One of the features of the reforms has been precisely the devolution of financial decision making to regional industries and agricultural cooperatives. Beginning in 1979, enterprises were permitted to retain a higher proportion of their profits and to determine the disposition of the retained share. Investment carried out in this fashion is not reflected in state investment outlays. No figures are available on the total investment effort of state and enterprises combined. The importance accorded to the development of a heavy industrial sector was not abandoned until 1986, but it was modified to take a more realistic account of actual existing input-output relationships in the economy-to increase investment in industries providing necessary inputs to agriculture, for example-and to overcome major bottlenecks which have slowed down the growth of production and led to severe under-utilization of capacity. No less than 30 percent of industrial investment in 1984 went to construction of electric power-generating capacity.56 There has also been much greater emphasis on completing and expanding existing capacity rather than starting new plants. By the end of 1984, industrial recovery was well under way. Although many output indices had not yet risen above their late 1970s peak, growth rates were respectable, particularly in those sectors requiring small capital investments (see Table 6.2). An index of industrial labor productivity, after stagnating before 1980, had risen sharply by 19821983.57 By the end of 1984 also, industry had come much closer to realizing its 1981-1985 plan targets than during the previous Five-Year Plan.58 This can be seen as an indication that planning has become more realistic, bearing a closer relationship to the existing capacity and input-output coefficients of the economy. Although documentation is sparse, the impression I have gained from discussions in Vietnam is that much of the industrial recovery is accounted for by the growth of light industry and handicraft industries in the south, fueled by rising demand from peasants in 54

Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1979, pp. 32-33; ibid., 1982, pp. 32-33; ibid., 1930-1984, pp. 44-45.

55

Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1979, pp. 39,41,44; ibid., 1982, pp. 39, 41, 44; ibid., 1930-1984, pp. 75-76.

56

Interview with Nguyen Huu Tho, Hanoi, October 1985.

57

The index (measuring gross value of output per worker) based on constant prices of 1970 (1982 = 100) fell from 76 in 1975 to 72 in 1980, before rising again. Using 1982 constant prices (again 1982 = 100), the index for 1983 is 119 and for 1984,123. Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1979, p. 28,1982, p. 28; 1930-1984, pp. 63-68. This is the only indication available on the basis of published data. 58

Plan fulfillment in ten major products (food grain, sea fish, pigs, coal, electricity, cement, chemical fertilizer, steel, cloth, and paper) for the 1976-1980 Plan ranged from 20 percent in steel to 74 percent in electricity; in 1981-1984, with a year of the Plan still to run, the range was from 61 percent in coal to 119 percent in sea fish (no figures available for steel). Statistical Service, So lieu thong ke 1930-1984, pp. 40, 44-45, 78, 85, 87, 119; Fourth National Congress, p. 64; Pham Van Dong, "Report to VCP Congress," JPRS, Vietnam Report (1982).

110 Postwar Vietnam Table 6.2. Growth rates of industrial sectors (1970 constant prices)

Period 1975-82 1975-79 1979-82 1982-84"

Group A %

Group B %

5.7 4.7 7.2 9.0

7.8 6.3 9.8 12.3

H'craft % —

b

5.3 -

7.6C

Modern Industry %

Central %

Local %

Total %

. 0.5" 7.0C

2.6 4.4 0.2 11.2

9.8 6.7 14.2 11.0

7.0 5.7 8.9 11.1

Note:a 1982 constant prices; b 1975-1980;c 1983-1984. Source: So Lieu Thong Ke, 1930-1984, pp. 40-42. the Mekong Delta. These are industries requiring little capital which are, on the whole, able to use domestic sources of raw material to supply consumer goods to the peasants. Export industries have also expanded rapidly, and these provide foreign exchange for imported fertilizer and other agricultural inputs. The effect of the reforms in the south has been to deepen the social division of labor between industry and agriculture, setting hi motion a cumulative growth process. The internal improvement of the balance in the southern economy is an important step in laying the foundation for a feasible unification process. In the north, on the other hand, industrial investment and production remain concentrated in the heavy industrial sector, and this has meant fewer short-term opportunities for peasants to increase their level of exchange with the towns. Future growth will very much depend on peasant surpluses being matched by a better supply of manufactured goods. In the longer run, greater balance in the northern economy may itself depend on the development of exchange between the north and south. If the expansion of southern agricultural and light industrial capacity, set in motion by the reforms, continues, then the role envisaged for it in the "economic complementarity thesis" may indeed come to fruition. Similarly, the development of heavy industry in the north, provided it is based on a realistic assessment of the resources available in the country and those which it would be better to purchase abroad (at least for the time being), could become the basis for growth of these consumer industries. Economic reforms since 1979 have at least cleared away some major obstacles to the unification process.

STATE FINANCE IN THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM The difficult transition from "state bureaucratic finance" to "socialist economic accounting"* Max Spoor

Introduction

The Eighth Plenum (Fifth Congress) of the Central Committee of the Vietnamese Communist Party, held from June 10-17, 1985 announced rather far-reaching economic policy changes. The resolution of the Party Central Committee on prices, wages and money emanates from the practice and experience of our Party and State over the past years. It demonstrates a profound and vigorous change in our Party's approach and policy not only in the domain of prices and wages but also in commerce, finance, money and the mechanism of planning and economic management with a view to completely abolishing the bureaucratic system of state subsidy and making a complete switch to socialist economic accounting and business, thus creating favourable conditions for our national economy to develop to a higher level.1 The decisions taken at the plenum marked a milestone in the process of changes in economic policy in Socialist Vietnam during the past decade, a process that has involved important debates within the leadership. The object of this article is to analyze the intended (and partly already realized) transition from the system of "state bureaucratic finance" to one based on principles of "socialist economic accounting." The focus is on fiscal policy and particularly the state budget. Although the value of statistics on the Vietnamese economy is still rather problematic, estimates of the state budget (1976-1984) have been included. The "state bureaucratic" system of economic and financial management, inherited from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, had been established as that of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) after political reunification in July 1976. At the same time, this administrative supply system was already under attack, and important pleas had already been made in favor of introducing a system of "economic auditing."2 Although * In preparing the final version of this article I profited from the remarks of conference participants; furthermore I am indebted to Michael Ellman of Amsterdam University. 1 Text of the communique issued at the end of the 8th Plenum, in: Vietnam News Agency (Hanoi) (hereafter VNA) (English) June 21,1985 (SWB/FE/7984/B/7, June 22,1985). 2

Excerpts from talks on economic management by Doan Trong Truyen, in: Hanoi for N and S-Viet Nam, February 15,1976 (SWB/FE/W866/A/32-34, February 25,1976) and Hanoi for N and S-Viet Nam, February 17,1976 (SWB/FE/W867/A/20-22, March 3,1976) as examples.

Ill

112 Postwar Vietnam some policy changes were made at this time, only small modifications were in fact implemented. Major reforms had to wait until the early 1980s. Before discussing a periodization of the postwar decade intended to clarify the analysis of the system of state finance, two theoretical observations should be made. First, the concept of "transition" is used hi order to underline the fact that there is no complete dichotomy between "state bureaucratic finance" and "socialist economic accounting," but rather a much more complex problematic of transforming a largely administrative economic and financial management system into a system which, while remaining at least partly centrally planned or coordinated, retains financial independence for state enterprises, a certain freedom for market response and for operation outside the "plan," and "market management" based on "rational" pricing policies. Principles of "economic accounting" (known under the Russian term khozraschei), which date as far back as May 1921 when they were introduced with the New Economic Policy (NEP) in the Soviet Union, already played a role in the late 1950s and early 1960s in the DRV, although they never were implemented very well.3 They received renewed attention during the economic debates and reforms in the period 1969-1971 and later on in the mid-1970s. In some ways, therefore, the criticisms of the existing system of state finance and management were a repetition and a continuation of earlier ones which had emerged during several stages of the socialist development of the north. However, it may be questioned whether "abolishing" the subsidy system is really intended or even fully possible (apart from the even more important question of whether it is desirable or advisable) when state intervention, particularly in the distribution and circulation of commodities, is seen as absolutely necessary. Second, it is clear that changes in economic policy in the SRV, and the debates that accompanied them, were not solely determined by endogenous factors. The changed international environment, including the new tensions at Vietnam's borders, the US blockade, and, since June 1978, Vietnam's membership in the CMEA, all had a significant, although often immeasurable influence on the process of change in economic policy. One may even wonder whether the far-reaching Chinese economic reforms had an influence, or even whether the advice of IMF missions contributed to changing the system of state subsidies. As far as possible within the limitations of this paper, we will try to include at least some of these external influences in our discussion of the reforms of the system of state finance in the SRV. Periodization We will divide the 1976-1985 decade into three sections. The first period runs from 1976-1978, during which time the economic system of the north (DRV)-with some adaptations for the southern zone-became that of the reunified country. Only by the end of these three years was the financial system unified, with one state budget, one currency, and one banking system.4 During these first three years of the existence of the SRV an intensive drive towards socialization of the south was undertaken. 3

A detailed discussion of the origins and consequences of "economic accounting" (khozraschet) in the period of the NEP in the Soviet Union is given by E. H. Carr, The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923, 3 vols. (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 2; esp. ch. 19, pp. 280-357.

4

Money reform took place in several stages. In August 1975 an agreement was reached between the north Vietnam State Bank and the National Bank of south Vietnam on a direct exchange rate between the dong and

State Finance 113 During the second period, from 1979-1981, some reforms (the sub-contract system in the agricultural sector, reforms in wages and prices, and a devaluation of the dong) were introduced, but continuous heated debates raged inside Party circles about their necessity and value. By the year 1979, economic stagnation in the north, adverse reactions to the pace and form of socialization in the south, the destruction caused by the "Chinese lesson," and Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea followed by an even greater political isolation, all contributed to a major revision of economic policy, particularly vis-a-vis the agricultural sector. These reforms were made public after the~by now well known-Sixth Plenum (Fourth Congress) held in August 1979. The third period runs from 1982-1985, particularly from the Fifth Party Congress in March 1982 to the June 1985 Plenum. Due to debates about the reforms, the Congress had been postponed several times, but, when it was finally held, it expressed generally strong criticisms of the existing economic and financial management system and gave the green light for a fundamental change of the old bureaucratic system of state finance into a system based on principles of economic accounting and business. Tax reforms in early 1983 and the decisions taken by the important Sixth Plenum of the CC (Fifth Congress) in July 1984 on industrial management were steps in the ongoing process of economic reform, leading up to the Eighth Plenum at which "drastic changes" were announced. The Party newspaper Nhan Dan commented that the resolution of the Eighth Plenum of the CC marked "a new period of leadership and socio-economic management for our Party," but also said very realistically that: It is not the work of a short time, still less is it an easy job. What we are going to do is only the first step in an extremely difficult and complicated task.5 For all three sub-periods we will discuss the development (and changes) of the system of state finance, looking in detail at the sources of revenue and budget expenditure. 1976-1978: Bureaucratic Centralism As had been the case in the north earlier, the state budget from the very beginning was the most important instrument hi redistributing the national income according to the objectives of government policy. In the three years of this period, domestic revenue hi the state budget represented on average 35.7 percent of the national income, while budget expenditure was around 48.6 percent.6 During the first two years after the foundation of the SRV the economy still operated in two separate zones, with two budgets, two economic plans, two currencies, and—in the the piaster (1 dong = 330 piaster) for the north. In September 1975 the Provisional Revolutionary Government already had introduced "Bank notes of Vietnam" for the south in order to replace the piaster of the ancien regime by a new one (1 piaster [n] = 500 piaster [o]). A month later, a new agreement was reported between the two banks on an exchange rate, now fixed on 1 D = 0.8 P. This situation remained until the money reform in early May 1978, when the dong became the national currency. Southern piasters could be exchanged against the official exchange rate, with certain limitations-the rest to be deposited in the bank (which was since August 1976 one unified bank). Sources: Hanoi H/S (SWB/FE/W846/A/28, September 3,1975; Saigon H/S, (SWB/FE/W846/A/28, October 1,1975). See also: Duong Dinh Gi, "La monnaie vietnamienne depuis la revolution d'aout," in Courier du Vietnam, 1978, no. 73, p. 30. 5

Hanoi H/S, June 20,1985 (SWB/FE/7985/B/5-6, June 14,1985); editorial in Nhan Dan, June 21,1985.

6

Table 7.1, combined with data on national income for 1976-1978. See for example: NCKT, 1981, no. 2: 1-3.

114 Postwar Vietnam very beginning-with two central banks. A unified budget was not introduced until 1977, while the economic plans still had separate parts for the northern and southern zones. After several stages, the currencies circulating in both zones were finally unified in the dong with the money reform of May 3-6,1978, while the Vietnam State Bank (north) and the National Bank (south) had already merged into the new Vietnam State Bank (VSB) of the SRV in August 1976.7 It seems that during this early period of reunification and economic reconstruction there was a great imbalance between the northern and southern zones. On the one hand the north contributed greatly to the reconstruction of the south, both in manpower and material resources. For example, it was reported that in the first half year after liberation of the south, the north supplied the south with an amount of 1,000 million dong worth of goods and raw materials.8 High expenditure in the south for reconstruction purposes produced a flow of goods from north to south, supplemented by foreign aid. On the other hand, the south still contributed relatively little to domestic revenue in the state budget, as fiscal policies were not yet well developed and government capacity to levy taxes on the dominant private sectors in the southern economy was not very great. In the autumn of 1976 (in fact just before the important tenth month paddy harvest) the Council of Ministers promulgated tax regulations for the agricultural sector in the whole country. In comparison with the existing system in the north there was not much change. The principles of agricultural tax were still based on the yearly estimated gross output of a normal average crop.9 As earlier, the executive powers for taxing were in the hands of village committees, giving rise to widely diverging practices in different regions and districts. According to the director of the Agricultural Taxation Service, Tran Dinh Trac, in a statement broadcast in February 1976, the tax rates in the south were lower than in the north. Reacting to the rumor that in many hamlets and villages in the south tax rates would be increased, he specified that, although tax policy remained the same, tax income for the state would increase by extending and improving tax records. With regard to peasants in the newly liberated areas, who in past years did not fulfil the tax obligation or who just donated a certain amount of grain to the revolution every year, they will, from now on, have to fulfil this obligation by declaring their actual cultivated area and income so that taxes can be levied as equitably as they have been on the peasants in the old liberated areas.10 Implementation of the farm tax system in the whole country produced a sharp rise in tax income. While in 1976 tax paid in kind amounted to only 500,000 tons of paddy (4.2 percent of gross output) this rose in 1977 to 900,000 tons (8.3 percent), in spite of the sharp decrease in overall paddy output. In 1978, when the paddy harvests were at their lowest

7

Ho Chi Minh city (SWB/FE/W891/A/33, August 18,1976).

8

VNA, (SWB/FE/W853/A/29, November 19,1975).

9

Tax regulations promulgated September 25,1976 by the Council of Ministers: Ho Chi Minh city, October 30, 1976 (SWB/FE/W907/A/30-34, December 8,1976). 10

Saigon H/S, February 12,1976 (SWB/FE/W868/A/35-36, March 10,1976).

State Finance 115 point of the whole decade, farm tax still came to a level of 725,000 tons of paddy (7.2 percent).11 Apart from the farm tax, a number of other taxes existed, particularly for the private sector. There was a tax on business transactions at a rate of 2 percent (an additional tax on so-called "unreasonable profits" was operative between 1975 and early 1978, after which it was abolished), and an income tax of 12 percent for private producers and 18-20 percent for private shopkeepers. Furthermore, there was a commodity tax for certain goods varying between 15 and 50 percent (the highest rate was levied on non-essentials), a slaughter tax, and custom duties (in practice only levied on border trade and trade with capitalist countries).12 In broad lines the taxation system resembled that of the DRV, as it had developed particularly during the early and mid-1960s.13 If we look at the domestic revenue of the state budget (Table 7.1), we can state that, of the total increase from 6,322 million dong hi 1976 to 7,500 million dong in 1978, only 20 percent was provided by taxes.14 Practically all other domestic revenue came from state enterprises (industry, agriculture, transport, domestic and foreign trade-the latter virtually a state monopoly) in the form of turnover tax, profit transfers, and depreciation funds. Turnover tax, a direct transfer of part of the social product to the budget-well known from other socialist economies-varied between 15 and 50 percent of the wholesale price of a commodity. It is paid by the enterprise at regular intervals in order to provide the budget with a continuous flow of funds over the financial year. Profit transfers, equally important as a source of income for the budget, were based on average cost norms and planned profit margins and were paid monthly. At the time of the yearly "clearing of accounts" between the enterprise and the central financial authorities, refunds are made in the case of deficits, while profits in excess of targets could be retained by the enterprise for the benefit of three enterprise funds, the production development fund (with a limit of 0.41.2 percent of total fixed assets); the bonus fund; and the social welfare fund (with a maximum between 6 and 12 percent of the total wage fund). Finally, the depreciation funds which had to be transferred to the budget (as well as to be included in production costs) were based on original purchasing values, rather than current replacement costs, a reason why the contribution to domestic revenue from this item was comparatively low.15 No detailed data is available to the author concerning the origins per sector or branch of budget revenue received from state enterprises. However, a substantial portion must have come from domestic and foreign trade state companies through the use of price differentials, both in internal markets and in relation with foreign markets (domestic and foreign prices having no relationship whatsoever). The profits made were entirely transferred to the budget (while all losses were covered by budget expenditure).

11 IMF report, "Socialist Republic of Vietnam-Recent Economic Developments," May 1979, p. 21 and paddy output (published in a great number of sources). 12

IMF report (1979), p. 28.

13

For further discussion: see M. Spoor, "The Economy of North Viet Nam: The First Ten Years: 1955-1964 (A study of economic policy and performance of socialism in the Third World,)" (M. Phil thesis, I.S.S., The Hague, 1985), pp. 117-24. 14

IMF report (1979), p. 33.

15

Ibid., pp. 28-29, 33.

116 Postwar Vietnam Budget expenditure, as we can see in Table 7.1, was 9,275 million dong in 1976, remaining nearly constant in the following year, after which it rose rather sharply to an estimated level of 9,900 million dong in 1978. There are at least four items that account for this increase of budget expenditure (especially current expenditure). First, the country was struck by a number of natural disasters, including typhoons and floods, which led to greatly increased government emergency aid programs to the affected areas. Second, following the increased border tensions with China and Kampuchea, defense expenditure was increased. Third, growing subsidies were paid from the budget, in order to sustain the program of food distribution to the urban population at low fixed prices in a context of very low production of paddy, high tax evasion, and an increased portion of paddy purchased at higher prices. According to IMF estimates (based on Vietnamese data and its own calculations), these consumer subsidies grew from 97 million dong in 1976 to 279 million dong in 1978 on a cash basis; this amount would be even higher if estimated on a full evaluation basis with world market prices taken into account.16 Fourth, the government had widely expanded social programs in health, housing, education, and social security, mainly financed by the budget. Current budget expenditure therefore increased rapidly. This could partly be realized by a decrease in the capital expenditure directly financed by the budget, while increasing the share of state bank credits in the working assets of state enterprises from 30 to 50 percent. This process of change began in 1977.17 From the very beginning the state budget of the SRV was highly unbalanced, with large deficits covered nearly exclusively by foreign aid, with a small share provided by VSB credits to the state.18 The growth of current expenditure in the budget also negatively affected public savings (i.e. domestic revenue minus current expenditure). As a share of the national income-according to IMF estimates-public savings were no more than 3.4 percent in 1976. Through the increased state control over the economy in the south, this share increased to 4.4 percent, but it dropped to the low level of only 2.9 percent in 1978. Therefore public savings could provide only a small share of capital expenditure, in 1978 not more than 20.0 percent, with the rest coming from foreign aid (i.e. foreign savings).19 With large deficits in its current balance of payment account, the SRV received a substantial flow of foreign capital from both the capitalist and socialist world to finance the gap. It is interesting to note that there is a large difference between the so-called capital movements in the balance of payments and foreign aid in the budget accounts, the latter being nearly twice the amount of the former. This shows that during this period a substantial amount of foreign aid was in fact still provided in the form of non-refundable grants (which gave rise to flows of imports that were often left out of trade statistics) or other special arrangements. Nevertheless, through receipt of government aid and substantial commercial bank credits the SRV's foreign debt to the convertible currency area grew 16

Ibid., p. 32.

17

Ibid., p. 29.

18

Ibid., p. 33; PEER, November 2,1979, p. 46 (citing IMF sources): Foreign Aid State Bank

19

1976

1977

2,652.0 301.0

1,965.0 136.0

1978 (in millions of dong) 2,200.0 200.0

IMF report (1979), p. 30; PEER, November 2,1979, p. 46.

State Finance 117 substantially, amounting to 1,095 million dollars ("outstanding disbursed debt") by 1978.20 In that year debt service started to put pressure on the state's financial position, as it had already reached an estimated 130 million dollars, 27 percent of total export proceeds and 103 percent of export earnings in the convertible area.21 In 1978 it was also clear that the investment code published in early 1977 had failed to attract foreign investors.22 In general, the financial management system of the SRV was still largely administrative, although during 1977 and early 1978 some measures were taken in the direction of greater use of bank credits to finance working capital of state enterprises, and towards a stricter adherence to the principles of "economic auditing." In April 1977 a new statute for state industrial enterprise was promulgated. Well before the Fourth Party Congress (December 1976), the necessity of "economic auditing" had been emphasized by Doan Trong Truyen, a senior economist who was then vice-chairman of the economic department of the VCP's Central Committee and who has been recently promoted to the important post of secretary-general of the Council of Ministers. In one of his long statements on economic management he said: The profit and loss accounting system still lacks the necessary premises and conditions and, consequently, has failed truly to direct and promote the reckoning of economic efficiency, nor have the economic levers been applied in a sound and uniform manner during the process of drawing up and implementing plans and, as a result, their effects are still very limited.23 In another report he articulated the case for economic auditing and a critique of the current administrative system of state finance: This system [of "economic auditing"] requires that all economic units make calculations to formulate plans and carry them out with minimum expenditures in labour, materials and capital in order to produce the greatest quantities of products with the lowest costs. On this basis the basic requirement of the economic auditing system will be met: with their surplus revenue enterprises will be able to settle for themselves the expenses they have incurred during the production process and maintain their profits. Thus, the economic auditing system is completely different from the management system patterned after the administrative management of supplies, which is characterized by uncalculated expenditures and disregard for capital returns, under which the state covers all business losses and receives all profits, and all expenditures of the enterprises are charged to the state budget.24 The wish to reform was therefore present in at least part of the leadership. Why was this not implemented as early as 1976? An important reason was that state enterprises were probably not very enthusiastic about following principles of "economic auditing." The 20

IMF report (1979), p. 48.

21

Ibid., p. 41; OECD's External Debt of Developing Countries (1983), p. 213.

22

For a discussion of the investment code, see PEER, May 13,1977.

23

Hanoi for N and S-Viet Nam, February 15,1976 (SWB/FE/W866/A/33, February 25,1976).

24

Hanoi for N and S-Viet Nam (SWB/FE/W867/A/21-22, March 3,1976).

118 Postwar Vietnam safe system of state supplies, very low prices, and covering losses at all times by the budget led them—in view of the pressures caused by the plan norms-to overstocking, reselling materials on the free market, and other activities outside the plan. Reports about this were numerous; it is worth citing one example from late 1977 which said that actual spending in construction "often exceeded approved limits by 30-35 percent,'* that 30-40 percent of supplies were "damaged" and that 35 percent of the machinery was "out of order." The report concluded that "corruption, waste, loafing, falsification of production records and infringement of socialist property are quite prevalent."25 1979-1981: First Breaches in the "Old" System The Sixth Plenum of the CC of the Party, held in August/September 1979, introduced economic reforms to deal with severe problems in the agricultural sector. These reforms opened the way to the sub-contracting of land to families and individual peasants, raising purchasing prices (which had been at an extremely low level for many years) for agricultural products, and increasing the freedom to sell on the free market. Measures were also announced in the system of state finance, although they did not have as much impact as the policy changes in agriculture ("new economic policy" in the Vietnamese terminology). The financial problems were indeed serious. State budgetary revenue decreased in 1979 to the level of an estimated 7,240 million dong, which was 2.5 percent below the 1978 revenue and more than 800 million dong below the targeted figure (see Table 7.1).26 The main reason was that, particularly in the industrial sector, economic activity had been decreasing substantially since 1978. In "peacetime conditions" the malfunctioning of the state sector was rapidly becoming apparent, leading to stagnation. The "hasty" takeover of many of the southern industries worsened this situation, while a number of other factors also had negative influence: the severe floods late in the year which affected the provision of food and raw materials, the Chinese attack on the northern border zone, the outflow of tens of thousands of skilled workers of ethnic Chinese origin which had a negative effect on coal production and the functioning of Haiphong harbor; and finally, the cessation of all remaining Chinese aid hi mid-1978. This negative economic trend had direct consequences for the main source of state budget revenue, namely the income derived from the state enterprises. A further reason for the decrease of budget revenue was the very poor procurement performance of the state in the agricultural sector, particularly in the southern provinces. A report of June 1980 stated that "the state of falsifying the numbers [i.e. area] of one's land to evade tax now prevails" and that there were even land-owning cadres and Party members who had refused to pay taxes.27 The government tried to overcome some of its financial problems by further adapting and developing fiscal policies, by a system of economic and financial management, and by preparing for a major revision in the wage and price system. In the midst of 1980 several tax regulations were changed. Apart from the commercial transaction tax already in exis25

Hanoi H/S (SWB/FE/W954/A/27, November 9,1977).

26

IMF report (1979), p. 33 gives a planned budget revenue of 8,100 million dong for 1979.

27

Hanoi H/S (SWB/FE/W1090/A/30, July 9,1980) editorial in Nhan Dan, June 24, 1980.

State Finance 119 tence, a new tax "on major transactions" was introduced. This seems to have been a new step on the road toward using fiscal (instead of coercive) instruments to control the private sector, while at the same time gathering extra resources for the budget. A set of rather complicated regulations for exemption rates on income tax was introduced to stimulate greater activity by artisans and handicraftsmen (and likewise to decrease the size and activities of the private commercial sector), as well as to promote cooperative forms of work. Finally, animal husbandry by families, which had been severely restricted before 1979, was encouraged through the introduction of substantial reductions in the 10 percent slaughtering tax (based on value according to fixed state prices) if animals were raised for private consumption. The total proceeds of this tax were allowed to be retained in the local and village budgets.28 In January 1981 the Council of Ministers adopted regulations for the management of state enterprises which aimed at increasing their financial autonomy and expanding material incentives for the workers through piece-rates and bonuses. The enterprise production plan would have to consist of three parts; the state-assigned part with state-supplied assets, the part produced with self-procured assets; and the part with the production of socalled by-products. More profits from the second part could be retained by the enterprise for the social welfare fund, the bonus fund, and the production development fund than from the first part. All profits from the third part could be kept by the enterprise, and the by-products could be sold on the free market if a state agency did not want to buy them. Although implementation seems to have brought some improvements in efficiency and output, enterprises also used the "unclear delineation" between the three parts in order to calculate profits in their favor. Furthermore, there was a "failure to remit to the state the volume of products assigned under plan and a tendency to retain more products for the plant than allowed by state regulations."29 In the summer of 1981 some drastic measures in the sphere of prices and exchange rates were taken, in line with IMF "advice."30 The government raised the prices paid for forty agricultural products by 400-600 percent, while the exchange rate to the dollar was changed from just over 2 dong to just over 9 dong. Finally, as a further step in rationalization of the price structure (particularly in its link to world market prices), in the autumn of 1981 the prices of a large number of commodities and raw materials-some of them imported-rose drastically. At the same time, in compensation, wages for state enterprise workers and civil servants were doubled.31 During the two years after 1979 budget revenue indeed rose, reaching in 1981 a level of + 11.1 percent over 1979 (measured in dollars, see Table 7.1). Budget expenditure increased by 7.1 percent over the same period, but in 1979 it had already grown by 4.5 percent while revenue had decreased as we have seen above. Clearly, one important factor in the overall increase in budget expenditure was the rapid increase of (and reallocation to)

28

Hanoi H/S (SWB/FE/W1090/A/28-29, July 9,1980).

29

VNC, 1982, no. 6:19-21.

30

For a discussion of the IMF terms to receive the January credit (of only $31 million!) see Walden Bello, "The IMF and socialist construction in Vietnam" Indochina Chronicle 87 (1983), p. 12.

31

Ibid., p. 12; UN Monthly Bulletin of Statistics; and FEER Asia Yearbook (1982), p. 263.

120 Postwar Vietnam defense spending.32 Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea and the brief but large-scale war that followed the Chinese intrusion in the north had two consequences, in addition to the mobilization of troops and military equipment. First, the government had to divert resources to restore the enormous damage the Chinese army had brought over the whole length of the northern border. Second, Vietnam's presence in Kampuchea and Laos was followed by substantial amounts of "solidarity aid." For example, in the case of Kampuchea it was estimated that Vietnam provided $56 million in 1979 and $62 million in 1980, while over the period 1976-1985 a sum of $146.7 million was given as assistance to Laos.33 Rising subsidies, mainly price subsidies for food, were another factor causing an increase particularly in current expenditure. In addition, the government was buying more paddy from the peasants at the by-then much higher official purchasing prices or even prices well above that level. To give a striking example, reported by Nghien Cuii Kinh Te, it seems to have been not uncommon that a state agency would buy 1 kg of rice at an "agreed" price of 6 dong, which in the food distribution program for state workers and civil servants would then be sold in a state store at a fixed price of 0.4 dong, leaving a subsidy of 5.6 dong to be covered by the budget.34 On the other hand, apart from the negative trend in state finance, the rise in prices of imported goods sold on the domestic market in late 1981 did lessen part of the burden of budget expenditure by increasing the profits of trade companies. Because of the above factors, the government deficit during the years 1979-1981 had reached a level that was 32.7 percent higher than the average for the years 1977-1978 (see Table 7.1). Although this deficit was still largely covered by foreign aid, the year 1979 represented a watershed in the flow of foreign funds and the conditions under which they were extended. Important external influences were, of course, numerous. By mid-1978, all Chinese aid programs had been stopped, resulting in a substantial decrease in foreign aid. Vietnam's CMEA membership (which was certainly not warmly welcomed by all member states) only partially compensated for this loss of aid, although there were prospects for more aid for the new Five-Year Plan, starting in 1981. In addition, Vietnam's intervention in Kampuchea resulted in a virtual cessation of Western aid and also made it difficult to obtain commercial credit. As the gap between foreign aid and government deficit grew, the government took more and more recourse to bank credits, which in fact meant the issue of more money. This deficit financing rapidly increased the money in circulation, contributing to already high inflationary pressures on the free market. Yearly inflation had already reached an average of around 50-60 percent according to several estimates.35 It is important to note that by the end of the years 1979-1981 public savings (which had already been relatively very small in the previous years) had become negative. This can be 32

FEER Asia Yearbook (1980), p. 10, gives 47 percent for (1974-1978); FEER Asia Yearbook (1978), p. 14, gives 20 percent for (1974-1976). Both percentages seem to have only an indicative value. 33

FEER, October 6,1983, p. 50.

34

Nguyen Train Que, "Tu moi quan he gia-luong trong khu vuc quoc doanh den su can doi hang-tien tren thi truong xa hoi" [From the price-wage relation in the state sector to the goods-money balance on the state market], in: NCKT, 1983, no. 2: 32.

35

Press conference given by Vice-Premier Tran Phuong, reported in FEER, May 24, 1984, p. 81. See also: FEER Asia Yearbook (1982), p. 9.

State Finance 121 concluded from the reports presented by the Party leadership at the March 1982 Congress (hence relating to the situation in 1981), which stated that the national income did not cover national consumption, and that the economy was still unable to engage in a process of domestically financed accumulation. Current expenditure had increased over domestic revenue; capital expenditure, therefore, was totally financed through foreign aid programs.36 By 1981 these budgetary investments were (measured in constant prices) down to the level of 1977. Although this is outside the scope of this paper we should mention here that the composition of state investments had changed. Particularly the so-called "nonproductive" investments were at far lower levels than before, a development which had negative consequences for already low living standards. With increasing interest payments and amortization and decreasing willingness (particularly on the part of Western countries) to provide new aid, Vietnam's balance of payments deficit rose. In 1981 alone this deficit was already $248 million37 (basically in relation to capitalist countries), which Vietnam was only able to cover by using its very meager remaining international reserves or simply by not paying on time. According to the IMF (which in mid-1982 refused on political grounds a second credit tranche,38 despite some "IMF-like" economic policy reforms), in 1981 the debt service had reached $284 million, 77 percent of all export earnings and 218 percent of exports to the convertible area.39 By then the total foreign debt was estimated by the Far Eastern Economic Review at around 3,000 million dollars (1,400 million in convertible currencies and the rest in non-convertible currencies).40 Survival in financial terms was only possible through the increased aid to the SRV from the CMEA countries (cf. Petrasovits in this volume). According to Vice-Premier Tran Phuong, this aid included almost no grants, but was made up almost entirely of loans, albeit on soft conditions.41 Also loans were obtained from Algeria, Libya, and OPEC, basically to finance fuel imports.42 Finally, increasing transfers from overseas Vietnamese provided some financial relief. Realizing that one of the major problems in the economy had become the great imbalance between exports and imports, enterprises were in fact urged by the government to produce more goods for export. The resolution of the Sixth Plenum had introduced some measures to make production for export more attractive. Enterprises were allowed to use 10 percent of foreign currency in then- export plan and 50 percent of their above-plan profits to buy raw materials and spare parts abroad.43 In late 1981 even more generous regulations were promulgated which allowed all localities to engage directly in exports (under the guidance of the Ministry of Foreign Trade) and to retain 70-90 percent of foreign ex36

VNC, 1982, no. 5: 6.

37

PEER Asia Yearbook (1982), p. 9.

38

Walden Bello (1983), p. 11.

39

PEER Asia Yearbook (1983), p. 276; OECD External Debt of Developing Countries (1983), p. 213, estimates a debt of $2,596 million in 1981.

40

FEER Asia Yearbook (1982), p. 263.

41

PEER, May 24,1984, p. 81.

42

OECD External Debt of Developing Countries (1983), p. 213.

43

Nhan Dan, October 9, 1979, pp. 1-2; see also: Tran Ngoc Rich, "De nouvelles mesures pour relanccr 1'e'conomie vietnamienne" (Document de la Fraternite Vietnam, 1980), p. 7.

122 Postwar Vietnam change earnings for importing raw materials, machinery, and consumer goods for their own use.44 This constituted a major reform of the old management system which had, in the words of Nguyen Khac Vien: confined local production units and authorities to a narrow and rigid system of regulations which left them no leeway or room for initiative.. . . They had to plough through endless bureaucracy to obtain the required authorisations, thus wasting months and even years.45 Imports decreased during 1980-1981, partly because of the recovery of domestic food production, which lowered the imports of food grains. On the whole, during the years 1979-1981 a growing part of the leadership of Party and government moved towards important reforms and improvements of the overall system of economic and financial management. There was also a growing concern for developing a viable export sector, improving the organizational structure of foreign trade, and introducing financial incentives to produce directly for export. The results of the reforms were still far from positive in terms of the financial problems of the state, although agricultural production (1979-1981) in particular improved greatly compared to the previous years (19761978), and-after the deep depression in the two years 1979-1980--the industrial sector also recovered. The rather slow implementation of reforms in the system of state finance may partly have been caused by external factors. It was, however, also caused by a lack of clarity and unity about the way to proceed on the road to economic reform. The rather loose formulation of reforms in the system of economic and financial management, and a lack of sanctions to enforce them at the enterprise level, gave full opportunities for the enterprises to continue "old" practices and even to use "new" regulations in their favor. At the national level there were open and rather heated debates in official publications, such as the Party's daily Nhan Dan. These debates centered on important questions such as the role of the "law of value" in the state sector, the relationship between the state sector and the private sectors of the economy, and the role of the market in relation to the plan. The long expected Fifth Party Congress was postponed a number of times, apparently due to these debates. However, by the end of this "interregnum" the moderate reformers inside the Vietnamese leadership were stronger than ever before. This was indicated not only by the (re)formulation of economic policies at the March 1982 Party Congress, but also by the appointment of a number of reformers to essential positions of power in the government. 1982-1985: Drastic Changes in the Making

The third period, 1982-1985, started off with the important Fifth Party Congress, which clearly confirmed the line of economic reform and openly expressed severe criticisms of previous policies. Its final resolutions completed the shift of emphasis, which had begun with the Sixth Plenum in 1979, from the traditional priority on heavy industry-based on the so-called "law of priority development of producing the means of production"46-^ 44

PEER, January 8,1982, p. 58.

45

VNC, 1982, no. 6: 16-17.

46

See M. Spoor, "Economy of North Vietnam," pp. 76-78, for a discussion of the concept and its significance in the First Five-Year Plan. Although data is insufficient, it must be noted that in 1982 state investments in industry increased by 19.8 percent and in agriculture decreased by 43.7 percent (!), quite the opposite of policy intentions expressed at the Fifth Congress.

State Finance 123 agriculture and light industry, with particular attention to the development of exports in these sectors. The Fifth Congress also called for a major review of the system of economic and financial management. It concluded that the "managerial and planning mechanism remains heavily bureaucratic and still rests on budget subsidies" and criticized "insufficient attention to the principle of economic accounting."47 Reforming the old system of bureaucratic centralized economic management would become the main task after the congress. As Nguyen Khac Vien commented, the aim was to abolish a whole range of outdated regulations, and to institute a new system of prices, wages, norms, management mechanisms, while developing novel economic structures.48 While economic liberalization had positive effects, including the recovery of the agricultural sector and, with a timelag, the industrial sector as well, there were also important negative side effects. State control of production and circulation of goods decreased, while economic activities outside the plan and the socialized sector increased rapidly, often tapping state property and supplies for private benefit and speculation. In order to improve the financial position of the state by increasing budget revenue, in early 1983 a wide-ranging tax reform was carried out. This must equally be seen as an attempt to construct a fiscal system that would curtail the by-now rapidly expanding private commercial sector, while promoting cooperative forms of production and distribution through tax exemptions. A license tax was introduced, based on the legal obligation to obtain a license for practically any economic activity. A system of heavy fines (in case of violation and tax evasion) was installed to reinforce it. The business tax on sales profits became 3-5 percent for small industry, handicrafts, construction, transport, and the agricultural business sectors not liable for agricultural tax; 6-9 percent for service sectors and 6-10 percent for food and drink catering sectors. In practice, it seems that in some cases much higher rates were used to push people out of business. The new tax regulations gave trade and industrial cooperatives tax exemptions of 5-20 percent.49 For the agricultural sector a more fundamental change in the tax system followed. In the words of the vice-minister of finance, Nguyen Ly, there was a switch "from taxation based on the progressive income system to fixed rate taxation based on the type of land."50 The cultivated land was classified in seven categories ranging from an annual output of less than 1.5 tons/ha to more than 5.0 tons/ha of paddy. There were three different tax rates (for delta, midland, and mountain villages) for each of the seven categories of land. Taking all the tax rates together, the average official rate seems to be around 11 percent of the annual output, calculated in kg of paddy/annum.51

47

VNC, 1982, no. 5: 6-7.

48

VNC, 1982, no. 6:17.

49

Hanoi H/S (SWB/FE/7284/C/1-3, March 17, 1983), reports the regulations issued by the SRV Council of State on February 26. See also: Nguyen Quang, "Thue cong thuong nghiep va nhung dieu sua doi trong tinh hinh hien nay" (Tax on industry and commerce and modifications in the current situation], in: NCKT, 1983, no. 5: 13-19.

50

Hanoi H/S, March 7,1983 (SWB/FE/7284/C/9, March 17,1983).

51

Ibid., March 3,1983 (C/5).

124 Postwar Vietnam This new system of tax on land rather than on income was certainly an improvement, because previously: quality of land seems to have been assessed largely by village committees, a practice which led to considerable anomalies and much bad feeling.52 For privately owned land a surtax was levied (varying between 10 and 60 percent of the total tax obligations of a household). Nguyen Ly commented that: Application of the surtax is aimed at accelerating land readjustment in the localities where private production is prevalent, and where the land areas used by peasant households still differ greatly. Land readjustment, if satisfactorily carried out, encourages peasants to join agricultural cooperative and production teams.53 He noted that a correct application of the new tax law in the agricultural sector would increase the levies by 30 to 40 percent, an increase that an IMF team which visited Vietnam in April 1983 estimated to be 2.5 billion dong in absolute terms.54 However, budget expenditure in 1982 had risen far above expected values, resulting in a deficit of 19,500 million dong (new prices) which is an estimated 39 percent above the 1981 deficit (measured in dollars, see Table 7.1). Again current expenditure increased particularly rapidly. First, this was because the wages for state enterprise workers and civil servants had been doubled at the end of 1981, with substantial costs for the 1982 budget. Second, state procurement of paddy increased rapidly to 2.9 million tons in 1982 and 3.75 million tons in 1983 (including agricultural tax, quota sales at official purchasing prices, and above quota sales at "agreed" or "encouragement" prices).55 In spite of the fact that this was a major achievement and socially very important, enabling the continuation and improvement of the food distribution program in the urban areas, financially it meant an even greater burden for the budget, as the wide difference between the prices paid for paddy (even for the quota) and the official state store retail price was totally covered by budget subsidies. The policy of cutting capital expenditure financed by the budget was continued while total state investments were also drastically curtailed. According to one estimate, the accumulation rate of national income was down to 14 percent in 1982,56 while the ratio of state investments and national income, according to the author's calculations, was no more than 11.4 percent in 1982 and 11.6 percent in 1983.57

52

FEER Asia Yearbook (1984), p. 287.

53

Hanoi H/S, March 7,1983 (SWB/FE/7284/C/9-10, March 17,1983).

54

FEER Asia Yearbook (1984), p. 287. There is a problem of pricing here, because the same report speaks about a budget deficit of 4,000 million dong, which seems to be measured in old prices.

55

Vo Van Kiel's report to the National Assembly, in: FEER, February 2,1984, p. 46. The article says that about 10 percent of procurement was bought at prices well above official prices. However, these official prices varied already between 2-5 dong/kg (FEER Asia Yearbook [1983], p. 275). 56

FEER Asia Yearbook (1983), p. 7.

57

Based on CMEA Statistical Yearbook (1984), pp. 37,133.

Table 7.1 State Budget SRV (1976-1984) (in millions of US dollars ($) and Vietnamese dong (D)

Domestic Revenue Total Expenditure Deficit

$ D $ D $ D

1976

1977

1978

1979

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

3,090 6,322* (4,540) 9,275" (1,450) 2,953"

3,460 7,078" (4,490) 9,179" (1,030) 2,101"

3,670 7,500" (4,840) 9,900" (1,170) 2,400"

3,580" (7,240) 5,060b (10,230) 1,480" (2,990)

3,870° (8,080) 5,330° (11,130) 1,460° (3,050)

3,980° 13,800d 5,420° 18,800" 1,440° 5,000d-e

(4,120)° 27,000d (5,560)° 46,500d (l,440)c 19,500"

4,049f 41,300" 5,754' 58,700" 1,705' 17,400"

(4,909)f 61,400" (6,772)' 80,800" (1,863)' 19,200"

Figures between brackets are estimates. For the years 1978-1982 the exchange rate between the dong and the dollar can be taken from the Monthly Bulletin of Statistics of the UN: 2.044 D/$ (1978); 2.022 D/$ (1979); 2.088 D/$ (1980); 9.045 D/$ (1981) and 9.757 D/$ (1982). For the dollar estimates for 1976/77 the 1978 rate has been taken, although officially the 1977 exchange rate was reported as 1.754 D/$. The 1981 exchange rate is not used for the conversion in dollars, as the devaluation of the dong took place mid-1981. The dollar estimates for 1982 and 1984, which are given in brackets, are ex-ante, while the dong figures are ex-post. In May 1985 the exchange rate to the dollar changed more drastically to 1 $=100 D. Finally, the most recent money reform in September 1985 replaced the old dong with a new dong (at a rate 10:1) influencing the real exchange rate still further. Notes •IMF report, "Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Recent Economic Developments," May 1979, p. 33; FEER, November 2,1979, p. 46. b

FEER Asia Yearbook (1982), p. 11.

C

FEER Asia Yearbook (1983), p. 9

d

IMF data, privately disclosed to the author, based on budget figures as given by the Vietnamese authorities and on IMF staff estimates; FEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 267 (citing IMF sources).

c

FEER Asia Yearbook (1983), p. 276.

f

FEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 9.

126 Postwar Vietnam The improvement in the fiscal system, and the rapid growth of the agricultural and industrial sectors finally decreased the budget deficit in 1983, when it went down to 17,400 million dong (new prices).58 It was still large by any standard (29.6 percent of total expenditure), and was still covered mainly by foreign aid, VSB loans, and money issue. Inflation was estimated to be 80 percent in 1982 and somewhat tempered to 55 percent in 1983.59 It is interesting to note that in late 1983 the government introduced a new way of financing the budget deficit, namely the issue of government bonds. By December 1984, after one year, the yield would be more than 2,000 million dong, although the chairman of the Planning Board, Vo Van Kiet, later commented in the theoretical journal of the Party that the benefits of the operation did not justify the costs of issuing the bonds and the large scale of the operation.60 Exports increased rapidly over 1982 as a result of the improved material incentives. That this development was not viewed with great enthusiasm by all the Party leadership became clear from a Politbureau meeting held in Ho Chi Minh city (the center of the country's exports) in late 1982, where decisions were taken to restrain what was seen as rather uncontrolled growth of export companies and their range of operations.61 This decision had a negative impact on the growth of exports in the following year. In spite of a virtual stop in food imports, the trade balance (measured in foreign currency) scarcely improved, since imports generally tended to rise during the years 1982-1984.62 Foreign aid to cover the deficits, increasingly coming from the Soviet Union, had created by 1982 a foreign debt-using official exchange rates to the dollar, particularly for the debt in rubles~of around $3.5 billion, while by the end of 1984 it was up to around $6.0 billion.63 Even while exports had grown substantially in comparison with the years 19791981, the debt service in foreign currencies continued to be a real problem that led the government to enter into discussion with several countries and consortia of commercial banks to postpone the repayment of outstanding loans.64 The internal financial situation of the state had somewhat improved, but more longterm and fundamental reforms were necessary, particularly in the functioning of the state sector itself. The call for a new system of economic and financial management by the Fifth Party Congress, after some new adaptations introduced in September 1982, was finally concretized in the resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in July

58

PEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 268.

59

IMF estimates reported by FEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 268.

60

Vo Van Kiet, "Phan dau gianh thang loi Ion nhat cho ke hoach nha nuoc nam 1985" [Striving for the greatest achievements of the 1985 State Plan], in TCCS, 1985, no. 1: 20. 61

FEER Asia Yearbook (1984), p. 286.

62

PEER, February 10,1983, p. 66. There is strongly conflicting evidence here. FEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 9 gives sharply rising imports and, consequently, deficits on the trade balance and the current account. CMEA Statistical Yearbook (1984) reaches the opposite conclusion. An explanation for the former phenomenon could be that greater freedom to use foreign exchange leads also to freedom to import consumer goods, which can be sold with great profits in the domestic market. 63 64

FEER Asia Yearbook (1984), p. 9; FEER Asia Yearbook (1985), p. 9.

For example, an agreement was reached with Japan (twenty-six Japanese commercial creditors) in May 1985 on the rescheduling of a debt of $160 million. See: Asahi Shimbun, May 21, 1985. Negotiations were under way with Libya, India, and Algeria. (FEER Asia Yearbook [1985], p. 287).

State Finance 127 1984 and the decisions of the Council of Ministers on "national industry management" later in that year.65 The principles of "economic accounting" for state-run and joint state-private industrial enterprises included independence in production and business ("under the centralized and unified leadership of the state"), the use of enterprise income to cover production costs and to secure profits, the use of material incentives and sanctions, and central supervision through financial control. By 1985 all these enterprises were to determine their production costs by including the full wage fund, depreciation of fixed capital (which is increased, basing itself on current replacement values), and the value of materials used, whether state-supplied or self-procured. Complete regulations were still to be worked out. Enterprises were also called to "scrupulously audit actual production costs."66 As regards the use of enterprise profits, new regulations were promulgated to increase the options for financial independence. Where profit norms had been established by the state, the enterprise could use 50 percent of its profits when using state-supplied inputs and even 60-80 percent in the case of self-procured inputs (the remaining profits were to be transferred to the central or local budgets). In other cases, after deduction of taxes, turnover tax, and possible punitive payments, the full 100 percent of profits was to be for the enterprise, to be used for a production development incentive fund, for replenishing working assets, and for the welfare and workers' incentive fund (up to 30 percent of the total wage fund).67 The already widespread practice of linking salaries and bonuses to production results and profits was further widened by giving enterprise directors the right to terminate employment of workers "in order to meet the needs of production."68 If indeed generally implemented, one can imagine some consequences for the system of financial management: 1)

The financial resources for the enterprise would no longer be primarily state-supplied, but would include budget-supplied assets, production incentive funds, selfprocured assets, amortizations for worn-out machines, and bank loans. This would reduce the budget capital expenditure and create the necessity for the enterprise to enter into contract regulations with other economic units for the supply of inputs.

2)

The state budget would limit itself to providing capital assets for large-scale special projects (such as energy and heavy industry), while self-procured assets would have to be used to finance minor construction projects. However, the budget was still to cover 50 percent of the liquid funds of the enterprise, with the other 50 percent to come from bank credits and self-procured assets. Depending on the terms under which credits are extended this should increase cost accounting by the enterprise.

3)

In order to increase the profitability of state industry, room was created to react to market demand and consumption forecasts, apart from planned norms provided by

65

Nhan Dan, December 17,1984 (SWB/FE/7881/C/1-16, February 21,1985).

66

Ibid., SWB/FE/7881/C/6.

67

Ibid., C/ll.

^Ibid^C/ll

128 Postwar Vietnam higher echelons, and consequently to broaden the enterprises' right to deliver directly to consumer households.69 In general, the goal was to lessen the burden on the budget by making state enterprises more responsible for their expenditures and losses, while on the other hand giving them material incentives to increase production and profitability. This would lead to higher budget revenue in the long term. However, in spite of the above fundamental changes, the subsidized price and supply system still remained largely in force. The losses of the distribution sector, when the fixed state retail price was lower than the enterprise wholesale price, would still be compensated for by the budget. But study was under way for shifting the subsidy-based method of materials supply to the method of handling materials supply in accordance with economic accounting, and for expanding the trading of materials other than those under unified state control and distribution, in order to meet requirements for broadening the decision-making rights of establishments in production and business.70 All these developments formed the prelude to the Eighth Plenum, which announced the end of the state subsidy system. The resolution of this plenum made very clear that the previous reforms in the system of economic and financial management, as discussed above, had not in practice changed the still largely administrative character of the state economy. The Party's daily Nhan Dan commented a few days after the closure of the Plenum. In production and business, we continue to provide guidance in a centralised bureaucratic manner by implementing the duties of distribution, issuance, delivery, production and business without regard to cost under the concept that the state will take all profits and cover all losses. In distribution, we continue to maintain the system of supplying materials widely at very low prices. Wages are no longer an incentive to stimulate labour. The extent of subsidization is broad and large .. .71 The editorial concluded that: The system of subsidization, which was essential during the 30 years of continuous war, has become a habit, a pattern of thinking, a lifestyle, and a way of socioeconomic management. It has caused negative results that should be quickly overcome.72 The following day, in the stream of comments on the Eighth Plenum's decisions, Nhan Dan said: Abolition of bureaucratism and subsidization in terms of prices, wages and money has become a pressing demand. This requires that production cosis include all rational expenses, and that prices cover rational actual expenses so that the producers earn an appropriate profit and the 69

Ibid., C/4, C14.

70

Ibid., C/13.

71

Editorial in Nhan Dan, carried on Hanoi H/S, June 20,1985 (SWB/FE/7985/B/4-5, June 24,1985).

72

Ibid, (emphasis added).

State Finance 129 state is able gradually to build up its capital accumulation; and that an end be put to a situation in which the state buys and sells at low prices and subsidises irrational business losses. Actual wages must ensure that wage-earners can live chiefly on their wages and labour can be reproduced in accordance with the capabilities of the national economy. Wages must be tied closely to productivity, quality and labour efficiency. The principle of "to each according to his work" must be observed, and egalitarianism must be ruled out. All production and business activities of sectors, localities and basic units must be fully switched to the system of socialist economic accounting and business under which financial autonomy is developed. All economic establishments must be accountable for their own profits and losses, and all subsidies for irrational losses in production and business paid from the state, central and local budgets must be terminated. Subsidies for losses may be paid only on a case-by-case and temporary basis after being subjected to very stringent scrutiny. It is necessary promptly to abolish all items of expenditure earmarked liberally from the central and local budgets for subsidization purposes. Banking must perform its functions satisfactorily so as to create the best conditions for sectors, localities and basic units to carry out socialist economic accounting and business. The economic return of capital must be considered the most important criterion of the Bank's credit activities.73 The statements cited above do indicate an intention to move decisively towards the general implementation of principles of "economic accounting," which would have far-reaching consequences. In our analysis above, however, we have seen that the "drastic changes" announced by the Eighth Plenum seem to be more the logical consequence of a whole series of reforms, particularly following the Sixth Central Committee Plenum in 1979, than the complete switch indicated by official statements. One conclusion can certainly be drawn from the Eighth Plenum decisions: after the SRV's first decade of existence, with mounting problems in its state finance, the leadership has reached a point where a genuine "new economic policy" must be formulated and implemented. Conclusion 1)

73

If indeed the decisions taken by the Eighth Plenum mean the beginning of a "new period" as announced, this will depend not only on the way the new policies are formulated, but particularly on how and how far they will be implemented. Ending the administrative allocation of state supplies will in practice mean a radical departure from the existing "habit" within the state sector, in which the state receives all profits and covers all losses. Although policy intentions and formulations existed from the very beginning of the postwar decade (and also before), the system of "economic accounting" was hardly put into practice. This indicates that at lower echelons this "lifestyle" was often more attractive. Cheap state supplies and bank credits for working capital, no "hard budget constraint" to control expenses of the enterprise, and the indefinite covering of losses by the budget, gave rise to low efficiency, low

Editorial in Nhan Dan, carried on Hanoi H/S, June 21,1985 (SWB/FE/7985/B/4-5, June 24,1985).

130 Postwar Vietnam productivity, and the (mis)use of state property for private gain (which in many cases was necessary to supplement insufficient nominal wages). A fundamental change in this system would need to be accompanied by reforms in the credit policy (and the banking system) as indicated by the resolution ("the economic return of capital must be considered as the most important criterion"). Furthermore, it will be important how the horizontal links of an enterprise may develop, whether with or without knowledge (or control) of the central planning authorities. These links are absolutely necessary if self-procured assets become a major source of capital for the enterprise and "consumer demand" is allowed to influence production and distribution. It is still too early to tell how far these reforms will go. 2)

With the drastic rise in food purchasing prices in the period 1979-1981 when state store retail prices were still fixed at their old levels, the price subsidies covered by the current budget became practically unbearable. Capital expenditure—as we saw in the discussion of the budget-was squeezed more and more, and cuts were made, particularly hi the sphere of "non-productive" investments. However, for many years food price subsidies enabled the government to guarantee a basic level of daily essentials for the urban population, in particular for state enterprise workers and civil servants. If these subsidies were to be abolished overnight, as has been IMF advice all along, without adequate compensation in the monetary income of these strata, then certainly some form of social unrest would arise among those who form the backbone of the state apparatus, who have already long had the lowest living standard of the population and who are supposed to implement the new reforms. Another important consequence of abolishing the price subsidies, particularly for food products, would be an increase in the already existing differentiation in living standards between regions unless adequate measures in the distributional sphere were taken to supplement the reforms in state finance. In September 1985 a new dong was introduced by the financial authorities, replacing the old one at an exchange rate of 1:10. It formed part of the short term anti-inflationary package of the government, but drastically misfired. Wages, although "adapted" to the new situation, rapidly proved insufficient as inflation on the expanding free market got out of control, basically because supply of commodities remained insufficient.

3)

While the reforms all indicated a process of decreasing the range of control over the economy, the Eighth Plenum also launched an urgent call for increased control over the market. The day after the Plenum, Nhan Dan devoted an editorial to stepping up the "transformation of private trade." We should concentrate the source of commodities in state hands and stabilise distribution and circulation, prices, and the market. We must control, occupy and master the market, including the free market. We should limit the negative aspect of the free market while simultaneously using its positive aspect to regularise distribution and circulation and supply and demand, thus helping ensure the normal life of society and the labouring people. In order to control and transform the free market, we must know how to use it, and not subjectively reject it. We must certainly accelerate the socialist transformation of the free market and gradually reduce its area of operation, not merely through simple administrative measures but through correctly combining economic, educa-

State Finance 131 tional, administrative, legal and organisational measures, of which the economic measures are the most vital.74 In abolishing price subsidies, distribution and circulation can not just be left to market forces (as the IMF would like). Much of the success of the reform will therefore depend on which economic and organizational measures are taken hi this crucial field. 4)

What has not been analyzed (at least not openly) by the Eighth Plenum is that there has been another essential and nearly systematic feature in the system of state finance. The large budget deficits, varying between 25-30 percent of total expenditure, have been covered largely by the inflow of foreign aid (and only partly by the issue of money). This aid, that came primarily from the CMEA countries (and before 1978 also from China), contributed to the widely existing "import mentality" within the higher echelons of the Vietnamese leadership. Plans are continuously over-optimistic in terms of growth of production and accumulation. Any shortages in terms of capital goods, raw materials, and consumer goods could—in the eyes of many of the planners—always be imported under some kind of aid agreement. This situation has not only been a product of the war but has its foundations in the growing dependency that the DRV had already established during its first ten years (1955-1964),75 in spite of the then-existing ideology of self-reliance. Since the crisis years 1978-1979 it has become clear that this "tendency to import" can not continue unless some balance is reached between exports and imports. As we have seen, foreign aid from Western countries has been greatly reduced, and certainly more conditions have been attached to new long-term loans received from the CMEA countries. In spite of the rapid improvements in the export sector over the last few years, imports seem to develop in a rather uncontrolled manner, for which no adequate remedy has yet been found.

74

Editoral in Nhan Dan, carried on Hanoi H/S, June 17,1985 (SWB/FE/7983/B3, June 21,1985).

75

Spoor, "Economy of North Vietnam," ch. 4.

This page intentionally left blank

ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO THE SOCIALIST TRANSFORMATION OF AGRICULTURE IN POSTWAR VIETNAM* Christine Pelzer White Introduction The title of the conference from which this book emerged--"Postwar Vietnam: Ideology and Actions-suggests a new conceptual framework for the study of contemporary Vietnam. It therefore seems necessary to begin with a review of the main concepts which have been used in the recent past to analyze Vietnam. "Ideology" and "action" are often defined as opposites. In this view, ideology is a set of theories or a belief system adopted for its own sake with little regard for "reality," beliefs pursued without regard for the "practical" results. In this conception ideology is empty promises and blind faith or a procrustian bed into which "ideologues" try to force reality. Action, on the other hand, is, in this view, a phenomenon totally separate from ideology. Action is in the realm of empirical reality, what "is" as opposed to what "ought to be." The Oxford dictionary defines ideology as: "manner of thinking characteristic of a class or individual, ideas at the basis of some economic or political theory or system (bourgeois, Marxist, ideology)." As human beings perceive "reality" through the lens of beliefs about how reality is structured, adherents of opposing ideological systems tend to see their own set of beliefs as reflecting "reality," and their opponents' belief system as "ideological." For Marxists, Marxism is a science which is explicitly opposed to "bourgeois ideology," while non-Marxists see Marxism not as a science but as an ideology. Ten to fifteen years ago Vietnam scholars who questioned or opposed America's particular brand of ideology and action~a crusade using bombs, bullets, napalm, gas, and defoliants to attempt to root out a foreign and hostile phenomenon named communism from Vietnam-stressed the ancient and indigenous origins of revolution in Vietnam. In an intellectual tradition inaugurated by the French Orientalist Paul Mus's perception of the 1945 August Revolution in Confucian terms as a change in the "Mandate of Heaven,"1 revolution was seen not as a poisonous foreign Marxist/socialist/communist import imposed by force, but rather as a plant which had deep roots in the soil of Vietnamese history and culture. In a popularization and development of Mus's ideas, Frances Fitzgerald argued in Fire in the Lake that apparently foreign Marxist-Leninist concepts such as exploitation, equality, and communal property were in fact part of Vietnamese traditional popu-

* This article is based on research funded by a grant from ESCOR, Overseas Development Administration, U.K. The author is also grateful to Mark Blecher and Tom Lyons for editorial suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. 1

Paul Mus, Vietnam, Sociologie d'unc guerre (Paris: Seuil, 1952). 133

134 Postwar Vietnam lar culture.2 David Marr's authoritative study of Vietnamese Anticolonialism established the strong historical continuity—the passing of the torch—between anti-colonial Confucian scholars and the Western-educated intellectuals who founded the Communist Party in Vietnam.3 It is no coincidence that two important collections of articles on Vietnam which appeared in the early 1970s bore the title "tradition and revolution."4 One important theme of these works was that the Vietnamese revolution drew its strength from the richness and positive aspects of Vietnamese tradition-nationalism, people's war, the role of the scholar gentry in leading popular revolts, etc.-while rejecting the negative and stagnant elements of tradition. Throughout the world, opponents of American intervention in Vietnam saw Vietnamese nationalism as a positive force. Since the end of the war the conceptual pendulum has swung. There has been widespread international criticism of the presence of Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, despite the plausibility of the argument from a Vietnamese nationalist viewpoint that this is necessary for Vietnamese national security in the current international context. Internationally, Vietnamese nationalism tends now to be seen in offensive rather than defensive terms. In terms of internal politics, there has been a similar shift. In his wartime essay "Confucianism and Marxism," Nguyen Khac Vien presented in glowing terms the continuities between Vietnam's Confucian heritage and the Communist movement and Party.5 In recent years, however, the Confucian legacy of bureaucratism has been critically re-evaluated, both in Vietnam and abroad.6 Rigid adherence to ideological principles derived from dogmatic reading of the classic Marxist-Leninist texts has been compared to the Confucian strait-jacket on thought and the Sinicization of Vietnam in earlier times. Since reunification, the institutions and practices which had been established in the DRV in the late 1950s and 1960s have become "tradition." One key point at issue has been whether the "second generation" of postwar socialist transformation in southern Vietnam should follow the same course as that in the DRV twenty years earlier. At the same time, in the north it became increasingly apparent that many of the "traditional" Vietnamese socialist institutions needed to be revised. The process of revision has been considerably complicated by the persistent differences in institutional and ideological context in the north and south. If the south does not follow the same line as the north did previously, or if the system in the north is significantly changed, does that then constitute a defeat for socialist principles which had been defended militarily for so many years? Postwar economic problems and the reunification of Vietnam after so many years of war have constituted an unfavorable context for an open, innovative, and creative approach to experimentation with alternative routes to socialism.

2

Frances Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), pp. 286-88.

3

David Marr, Vietnamese Anticolonialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

4

Jean Chesneaux et al., eds., Tradition et Revolution au Vietnam (Paris: Anthropos, 1971) and Nguyen Khac Vien, Tradition and Revolution in Vietnam (Berkeley. Indochina Resource Center, 1974).

5 6

Nguyen Khac Vien, "Confucianism and Marxism, in Tradition and Revolution.

Georges Boudarel et al., La Bureaucratic au Vietnam (Paris: Harmattan, 1983). One Vietnamese example is an allegorical play set in the fifteenth century which opened in Hanoi in 1980. See Charles Fourniau, "Presentation de la piece de Nguyen Dinh Thi: 'Nguyen Trai £ Dong Quan"' Vietnam (Paris) no. 1, December 1980, pp. 75-90.

Transformation of Agriculture 135 Postwar Economic Debates: Ideologies v. Pragpiatists? As reflected in many of the articles in this volume, the economy has been the major internal problem of the postwar period: economic recovery, economic reunification, economic development, economic reform. The debates within the Vietnamese leadership which have been public knowledge since the Sixth Plenum in August 1979 have been predominantly characterized in the West as between "ideologues and pragmatists" or "moderates and hardliners."7 This often carries the underlying assumption that, although "ideologues" or "hardliners" struggle to keep faith with socialist orthodoxy, communist parties are eventually forced "pragmatically" to face the capitalist facts of economic reality. This approach is not limited to studies of Vietnam. In a study of economic reforms in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, J. Wilczyski has noted the polemical and ideological nature of much of the discussion of the reforms in Western Europe and North America. Many cynics have taken delight in interpreting the reforms as an admission on the part of Socialism of its defects and an acknowledgment of the superiority of Capitalism by the adoption of several features of the rival system. Some, in their naivete, have gone even further-depicting the reforms as a return to Capitalism.8 The characterization of economic reforms as capitalist or "not socialist" is of course not limited to the capitalist world: so-called ideologues within Vietnam are the first to see the economic reforms as a temporary retreat from socialist policies or a temporary concession to capitalism along the lines of Lenin's NEP. For the older revolutionary generation, the formative experience in the realm of economics was the use of political mobilization and political-administrative control through the apparatus of the Party and state to bring under control an economy controlled by hostile forces: imperialists, capitalists, gram speculators. In contrast, for a younger generation trained hi economics and economic management and formed under the socialist system, market prices could be used as "economic levers." However, there is no clear divide between older "ideologues" and younger "pragmatists." For example, Pham Van Dong, one of Vietnam's most senior revolutionary leaders, has been a consistent advocate of a slow transformation of the peasant economy via state-peasant exchange, rather than rapid large-scale collectivization. The younger generation, sometimes termed "technocrats," are well-grounded in Marxist-Leninist ideology, and are indeed likely to have a better formal education in the principles of Marxist-Leninist political economy than many less welleducated older revolutionaries. So-called "ideologues" place great stress on the importance of technology and science as the key to the solution to Vietnam's problems of economic development. In earlier writings I have suggested that the debate should be seen, not as ideologues versus pragmatists, but as being between those who define socialism as entailing maximum centralized political and administrative control of economic production and exchange by the vanguard party, versus those who feel that the economic goals of socialism, including both production and equity, can be better achieved by allowing more autonomy 7

Tan Teng Lang, Economic Debates in Vietnam (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985), pp. 27, 32. 8

J. Wilczynski, Socialist Economic Development and Reforms (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 300.

136 Postwar Vietnam in economic decision making for socialist enterprises (factories and state farms), as well as producing households and individuals.9 In terms of the financial system, the centralized version of socialism is "state bureaucratic finance," while "socialist cost accounting," allows more autonomy to producing units (see Max Spoor in this volume). What is at issue is a centralist versus a more decentralized, and potentially more democratic, version of socialism. The case for reforms and economic democracy was recently put by none other than Truong Chinh, the Party leader long seen as Vietnam's ideologue par excellence. Addressing a conference of Party cadres-those who have the most power to lose through the reforms-Truong Chinh stated: Some people have offered the idea that, between centralism and democracy, we should at present accord priority to centralism. That claim is erroneous both in theory and in practice. Democratic centralism is a principle that reflects very strict unity. Unless we promote democracy and ensure the right to autonomy of basic units, and the legitimate interests of the worker both in agriculture and industry, both in production and goods circulation, there will be no, or only very few, commodity products, and commodities will not be in normal circulation. In such a situation, can we ensure centralism? If centralism is stressed to the point that we lack commodities and goods circulation is stalemated, what is the purpose of centralism? That is the bureaucratic centralism we have been guilty of for a long time, and which the resolution of the Sixth CPV Central Committee Plenum has analyzed, criticized, and rejected.10 However, this did not imply a complete rejection of centralism. The new orthodoxy is that somehow the Party must guarantee both central control and basic unit autonomy, which is as theoretically elegant as the idea of "democratic centralism," but as difficult to put into practice. Two Positions on the Postwar Transition to Large-scale Socialist Agricultural Production Although the Sixth Plenum in 1979 is generally taken as the starting point for the public debate over economic policy in Vietnam, one can in fact date the debate over the two lines advocated for the socialist transformation of agriculture in the postwar period to the national conference on agricultural development held in Thai Binh in August 1974. The key speeches by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong given at that conference were translated and

9

Christine White, "Debates in Vietnamese Development Policy," Discussion Paper 177 (Sussex: Institute of Development Studies, 1982). Tan Teng Lang, (Economk Debates in Vietnam, p. 32) summarized this argument as identifying the two groups as "the economists" and "the vanguard party," which is not what I had in mind, as, of course, the economists in question are also members of, or advisors to, the vanguard party in question. Both positions are within the Party, but give a different role to the Party's administrative apparatus in controlling the economy. 10

Truong Chinh, speech at the July 7-10 Cadre Conference, broadcast on Hanoi Domestic Service July 261986 (FBIS-APA-86-148, August 1,1986, p. Kll).

Transformation of Agriculture 137 published in Hanoi, under the title Towards a Large-Scale Socialist Agriculture.11 It is worth examining in some detail the similarities and, especially, the differences between the positions taken by Le Duan and Pham Van Dong at this point when postwar agricultural policy was already being debated. Both agree that the aim is large-scale socialist agriculture, the complete transformation of agriculture from "small, scattered handicraft production into a large-scale, centralised and mechanised production on the pattern of industrial production." Differences between the two positions included the timing of this transition, agricultural mechanization, scale, planning, the role of the peasants' household economy, and the pricing of agricultural products. Pham Van Dong repeated an argument that had been rejected in earlier debates in the late 1950s about the timing of the introduction of cooperativization in the north: that the progress of socialist relations of production in agriculture is contingent on the availability of new forces of production in the form of agricultural machinery.12 The timing of the transition from small-scale handicraft agriculture to large-scale socialist production in Vietnam would have to be gradual and "step by step," Pham Van Dong argued. He quoted Lenin on the necessity for a long period of alliance with "the many millions of small and very small peasants," and Lenin's statement that "it will take a whole historical epoch to get the entire population into the work of the cooperatives through NEP."13 Citing Lenin's "Report on the substitution of a tax in kind for the surplus grain appropriation system," a most relevant document for the situation in Vietnam throughout the 1970s, Pham Van Dong recalled that Lenin had said: It will take generations to remould the small farmer, and recast his mentality and habits. The only way to solve this problem of the small farmer ... is through the material basis, technical equipment, the extensive use of tractors and other farm machinery and electrification on a mass scale.14 The implication of this is that the extension of the scale of the cooperatives should follow the development of a "technical revolution," in Vietnam as in Lenin's Soviet Union. Le Duan put less stress on the importance of inputs from heavy industry and emphasized Vietnam's historical uniqueness and departure from the Marxist-Leninist classics. He argued that Vietnam must "carry out agricultural cooperation immediately, even before having built a large industry."15 He acknowledged what Marx, Engels, and Lenin had to say on the subject: for example, that Marx had written "Without highly organised big industry, there can be no talk of socialism in general, much less of socialism in an agricultural country."16 However, insisted Le Duan, Vietnam is in a new situation and living in a new era.

11

Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards a Large-Scale Socialist Agricultural Production (Hanoi: FLPH, 1975). 12

Ibid., p. 71; cf. Nguyen Khac Vien, Phan Quang and Nguyen Ngoc Oanh, 'The Agricultural Co-operation Policy" in Vietnamese Studies 13 (1967): 78-79. 13

Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards a Large-Scale Socialist Agricultural Production, p. 77.

14

Ibid., p. 78.

15

Ibid., p. 25.

16

Ibid., p. 26.

138 Postwar Vietnam It seems that no country so far in history has been in a situation such as ours. We must lead the peasantry and agriculture immediately to socialism, without waiting for a developed industry, though we know very well that without the strong impact of industry, agriculture cannot achieve large-scale production and new relations of agricultural production cannot be consolidated. . . . To proceed from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production is a great problem and a new one.17 Le Duan argued that Vietnam would be able to succeed in this task because of "the most progressive factors in our time. .. . the system of socialist collective ownership, the science of labour organisation, economic management, water control, the use of fertilizers, seeds, new implements and so on."18 We ... cannot sit idly by waiting for the creation of heavy industry before establishing [proletarian dictatorship and collective ownership]. History enables and compels us to go forward to these relations immediately. What Engels felt was very difficult to realize in many countries (hence his recommendation to "wait") can be done in ours.19 Le Duan was not only ambitious in terms of timing but also in terms of scale. Large-scale socialist production is a type of production whose scope and system of division of labour go beyond the limits of a region or locality; its aim is to meet the requirements of the whole country. We should do away with the autarkic character of production. The whole country should become an immense work-site. The whole nation is a single market. Each worker is a cell in the division of social labour, each economic unit is a link in the chain of production.20 For Le Duan, the key was not mechanization but a new social division of labor.21 Cooperatives must not be autarkic but rather "organically connected, through the process of production itself, with other cooperatives and with the state economic sector" (emphasis added). In other words, national economic cooperation is not to be achieved through the medium of exchange, but through direct state involvement in the organization of production. Le Duan's vision of the entire nation as a single work-site entailed greatly enlarging the basic unit of the organization of socialist production, the cooperative, from its current small scale to that of an entire district (cf. Werner in this volume). I think that in the present conditions of mechanisation it is possible for a locality handling about ten thousand hectares of agricultural land and employing about forty thousand people, that is the scale of one district,

17

Ibid., pp. 29-30, emphasis added.

18

Ibid., p. 31. Note: "new implements": not "mechanization."

19

Ibid., p. 32, emphasis in original.

20

Ibid., p. 42, emphasis added. It is strange to read these words now, for in the postwar era, this vision of immediate transition to large-scale, centrally controlled socialism is one associated with the economic system of Pol Pot's Kampuchea rather than Le Duan's Vietnam. It is to Vietnam's credit that this program of immediate transition to communism was not implemented. 21

Ibid., p. 46.

Transformation of Agriculture 139 to carry out such a division of labour and organisation of production in a better and more rational way.22 Pham Van Dong, on the other hand, advised caution in transforming the district into a unit for the organization of production. Up to now, the district has been an administrative unit; the boundaries of a district have been defined for administrative purposes only, not for economics and production. This is irrational, but we should not make any hasty changes in this regard.23 In essence, Le Duan was arguing for immediate integration of agricultural production into a national planned economy, via the intermediary of the district administration and the cooperative management committees which would implement the aim of transforming each peasant laborer into a cell in the national social division of labor. In turn, each individual should expect that the collectivity of the nation would care for him or her: Everybody (except the disabled) must do some work to contribute to the common efforts, at the same time no one must find his material and spiritual life uncared for by society: "One for all, all for one."24 This seems to be an attempt to introduce immediately the social division of labor of a communist, rather than socialist, transitional stage of organization, along with the communist principle of distribution: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs," instead of the socialist distribution principle "to each according to his work." Whereas Le Duan stressed bringing all of agricultural production into a single unified national system, Pham Van Dong clearly specified three sectors: state farms, agricultural cooperatives, and "the sideline occupations of the coop members' family." He even argued, presaging the 1979 innovation of the doctrine of "the three interests," that: if our State, the State-managed and the cooperative economies can help [the family economy] to develop in the right direction, many a mickle will make a muckle, and a noticeable contribution can be made to the national economy, to the advance toward large-scale socialist production.25 In response to clearly articulated peasant demands for policy changes, particularly in pricing, Le Duan and Pham Van Dong again articulated clearly differentiated views. Le Duan tackled the problem at the outset of his speech, rejecting outright the case put by the assembled leading party cadres from the agricultural sector that low productivity was caused in part by the lack of price incentives.26 Instead, Le Duan instructed the rural cadres to "help our peasants understand better our Party, our State, our system" by explaining to them that the state provides the peasants with more commodities than the peasants provide the state, and that the fact that the peasants made a great contribution to the fight for national salvation should not be used "as a pretext to demand special rights and privi-

22

Ibid., p. 47. Such "conditions of mechanisation" in fact exist only in industrialized countries.

23

Ibid., p. 88.

24

Ibid., p. 42.

25

Ibid., p. 73.

26

Ibid., p. 11.

140 Postwar Vietnam leges."27 Pham Van Dong, on the other hand, quoted Lenin's article "On Cooperation" (published 1923) to the effect that: "A number of economic, financial and banking privileges must be granted to the cooperatives."28 While the debate over moral versus material incentives in socialist pricing policy is often discussed by Western scholars in terms of "ideology" versus "pragmatism," in general these categories are not very useful hi understanding Pham Van Dong and Le Duan's approaches to agricultural policy. Pham Van Dong's more "pragmatic" position is also more grounded in orthodox Marxist-Leninist texts. Furthermore, in previous attempts to label individual leaders as "ideologues" and "pragmatists," it was Le Duan who was considered the "pragmatist" in contrast to the "ideologue" Truong Chinh, who, as we have seen, by 1986 joined the ranks of advocates of reform. If in the text analyzed above Le Duan is demonstrably not an "ideologue" in the sense of referring to a body of Marxist-Leninist texts and development experiences, what is his ideology? At one level, it is nationalism, as in the case of his wartime statement "nation and socialism are one."29 In terms of agricultural development policy, in Towards a Large-Scale Socialist Agricultural Production, as demonstrated above, Le Duan goes so far as to insist on Vietnam's uniqueness and capacity to break with Marxist-Leninist precedent. In the post Vietnam war era, when a number of armed conflicts are taking place between nations and nationalist movements claiming to be socialist, this identification of nationalism and socialism appears highly problematic. Not only are socialist nations at odds, but there are a number of current definitions of socialism. This being the case, agricultural policies cannot be accepted as being socialist just because a communist party in power calls them "socialist." They need to be objectively examined both for their grounding in Marxist political economy and in terms of their results. Le Duan's version of socialism in the text analyzed above is highly centralized, managerial, and statist. There is a reference in his text to "the right of collective mastery" but no attention is devoted to how the peasantry might implement this "right." On the contrary, as we have seen, rural cadres' attempts to use the forum of the National Congress to express the collective peasantry's demand for higher state prices for their products was firmly rejected by Le Duan. Even "collective mastery" is conceived of in a top-down way: it is the task of the state, not the people, to implement collective mastery: Management by the state aims at ensuring the right of the masses to be the collective masters of the country. How then will the state manage its affairs so as to ensure this right of collective mastery?30 The answers Le Duan gives to these questions are entirely in the realm of state management: to make full use of the state's inherent important influence on social and economic management, and "to build a State apparatus composed of men and women able to

27

Ibid., pp. 11-12.

28

Ibid., p. 77, emphasis in text.

29

Le Duan and Tran Van Dinh, This Nation and Socialism are One (Chicago: Vanguard Books, 1976).

30

Le Duan and Pham Van Dong, Towards a Large-Scale Agricultural Production, p. 15.

Transformation of Agriculture 141 meet the need not only of administration but also of developing production, the economy and technology."31 Rethinking the Socialist Transformation of Agriculture

According to what has long been the orthodox communist ideology, socialist transition in agriculture entails a constant "struggle between the two roads—collective production and private production; large-scale socialist production and small scattered production." The quote, in this case, is once again from Le Duan's 1974 speech,32 but it could equally well be from Stalin, Mao Tse-tung, or Truong Chinh at an earlier date. The implication of such a statement is that the package of policies for collectivization of agriculture implemented in the DRV between 1958 and 1975, and postwar attempts to collectivize agriculture in the south, constitute the only possible "socialist" alternative to "capitalism." However, subcontracting of cooperative land to peasant households, declared illegal in 1968,33 was secretly reintroduced in a number of areas in the late 1970s and finally legalized hi 1981. For the orthodox, this constituted an NEP-type step back to capitalism, a retreat from socialism, which will be reversed as soon as possible. I would argue, however, that the product contract system should be considered as a new socialist management system, justified hi Vietnam by the theory of the "three interests," which unlike Maoism stresses the need to respect the interests of individual laborers and harmonize them with societal and collective interests.34 This is an important theoretical innovation, breaking for the first time from the ideological straitjacket of the concept of "the struggle between the two roads" which sees small-scale peasant production as the enemy of socialism. The Maoist model of collective agriculture, which had been adopted in Vietnam and a number of other Third World socialist countries, was viewed by a number of leading Western academic experts on development as the major alternative model for rural development which combined growth with social justice."35 Another view was that collectivization offered considerable advantages in terms of employment, equality, and welfare, but had disappointing results in terms of productivity.36 Recent policy changes in Vietnam and China have made it necessary to re-pose two major questions: 1) how effective is collective agriculture as a policy package for continuing growth and equity; and 2) is this traditional collective agriculture policy package the only socialist alternative to capitalist development? 31

Ibid., p. 16.

32

Ibid., p. 54.

33

Truong Chinh, "Weaknesses, Shortcomings and Mistakes in Agricultural Cooperatives," Vietnam Documents and Research Notes (henceforth VDRN), No. 63 (Saigon: US Embassy, JUSPAO, North Vietnamese Affairs Division, June 1969). 34

See "The Three Interests," excerpt from an article in the Party theoretical journal Tap Chi Cong San (March 1982), reprinted from translation in FBIS on April 30, 1982, in Southeast Asia Chronicle 93 (April 1984): 12-13.

35

Joan Robinson, Aspects of Development and Underdevelopment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); K. Griffin and J. James, The Transition to Egalitarian Development: Economic Policies for Structural Change in the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1981).

36

M. Ellman, "Agricultural Productivity under Socialism," World Development 9, 9/10 (September/October 1981): 979-89.

142 Postwar Vietnam The position argued here is that the collective agriculture model, as applied in Vietnam, has serious problems not only as a formula for development but also in terms of its "socialist" credentials, and that the recent policy changes may open the way for a less statist and more democratic and peasant-based form of socialist rural development.37 In terms of the dichotomy between centralism and grass-roots democracy, the agricultural producers' cooperative contains all the ambiguity of a democratic centralist socialist institution. It incorporates aspects of both centralized state control (for example, incorporation of cooperative production into the national plan; sale of produce to the state at prices fixed by the state) and formal economic and political democracy in the form of election and overview of the cooperative management committee by the General Assembly of cooperative members. The orthodox Marxist-Leninist package for socialist agriculture as it theoretically functioned in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s had the following four primary components: 1)

Peasant household agriculture was replaced by collective ownership of agricultural land and other means of production and control of collective labor by cooperative managerial personnel.

2)

Incorporation of the rural economy into a nationally planned and administered economy, in which economic transactions were controlled by administrators rather than taking place via market exchange. The administrative apparatus supplied available inputs (imported machines, fertilizer, etc.) to cooperatives at subsidized prices and set delivery targets. The system was centralized and hierarchical, encouraging economic transactions along the lines of administrative hierarchy and discouraging economic transactions between productive units at the same level (e.g., between cooperatives).

3)

Cooperatives were expected to be a vehicle for low cost procurement at state-controlled prices of agricultural products (food and industrial inputs) in order to provide food rations for the non-agricultural state sector (industrial workers and government personnel) and for surplus accumulation for industrialization.

4)

Five percent of cooperative land was distributed among member households as the major component of the "subsidiary household economy," in which cooperative households gained the bulk (an estimated 65 percent) of their cash income.38

This was how the system worked hi theory. However, collectivization was never fully operational. It was relatively easy to organize northern Vietnamese peasants into cooperatives since there was an existing tradition of nucleated village life and communal land ownership. However, cooperative control of the labor process was often more formal than real, with many steps in production in fact carried out by individuals, households, or small groups.39 Furthermore, the economic importance of the household economy meant that there was never a complete transformation from peasant to collective agriculture: the system worked, in effect, as a symbiosis of collective and household agriculture. To this ex37

Cf. Andrew Watson, "Agriculture Looks for 'Shoes that Fit': The Production Responsibility System and its Implications," World Development 11,8 (August 1983): 705-30.

38 39

Nguyen Xuan Lai, 'The family economy of cooperative farmers," Vietnamese Studies 13 (1967).

For further discussion of this point see Christine White, The Role of Collective Agriculture in Rural Development: The Vietnamese Case, Report (Brighton: University of Sussex, IDS, 1984) and Adam Fforde, "Problems of Agricultural Development in North Vietnam," Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University, 1982.

Transformation of Agriculture 143 tent, the change of system in 1981 to household production contracts was not as radical a change as it appeared, and in some ways regularized and developed an already existing phenomenon within collective agriculture. The "subsidy and procurement" system regulating state-cooperative exchange worked better during the initial redistributionist phases of socialist transition and during the war. In the initial period, state assistance to the poorest cooperatives and areas helped bring deficit areas up to a subsistence and even surplusproducing level. The subsidy system was economically feasible during the war period when the state was receiving a considerable amount of foreign aid (agricultural inputs, such as machinery and fertilizer, as well as consumer goods), which could be distributed at uneconomically low prices to cooperatives because the state had received them free.40 Furthermore, non-material "moral" incentives work best during a war (peasants giving the state their surplus to feed their sons in the army).41 During a short and intense period of redistribution, which Griffin and James have argued is imperative during the early stages of "transition to egalitarian development," there may be strong reasons for a highly centralized egalitarian distribution system (including rationing and price controls), such as existed in Britain and the United States during World War Two.42 However such a system usually has insufficient incentives for the expansion of surplus production, leading to criticisms that it is "overly egalitarian." The traditional Marxist-Leninist model of collectivization, with state-controlled prices and procurement, is questionable as a viable socialist strategy for development on both theoretical and empirical grounds. First, a number of the primary principles for socialist agriculture have been drawn from Marx's descriptions in Capital of the dynamics of capitalist industrialization: the superior productivity of collective work and specialized division of labor; and the advantages derived from scale, mechanization, and the separation of workplace from the home.43 This basic paradox in socialist development theory and policy is due to the fact that Marx provided no description of the principles of socialist development; Capital, therefore, became, ironically and by default, the major Marxist source for the principles of socialist economic growth, drawn on first by the Soviet Union and subsequently by China and Vietnam. It is dubious that early capitalism should provide a model for socialist development. Second, the redistributive reforms and policies, implemented by the socialist state, which contributed to peasant equality and security of access to the means of subsistence (most importantly, land reform and, after collectivization, the distribution of household plots and relatively egalitarian distribution of collectively produced food grain on the basis of both labor and need), also created a sound material basis for small-peasant production (e.g. inalienable access to a small plot of household land, guaranteed minimum food supply from the cooperative, the improvement of peasant housing which is also a base for peasant production). Third, low state prices for agricultural commodities undermined the economic viability of the primary socialist unit for production and accumulation in rural areas (the agricul40

Le Due Tho, "To improve agricultural management," Southeast Asia Chronicle 93 (April 1984), originally published in Nhan Dan, September 4,1982. 41

Christine White, "Interview with Nguyen Huu Tho," Journal of Contemporary Asia 11,1 (1981): 127-30.

42

Griffin and James, Transition to Egalitarian Development.

43

Cf. Caroline Humphrey, Karl Marx Collective: Economy, Society and Religion in a Siberian Collective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 76.

144 Postwar Vietnam tural producer cooperative), and acted as a systematic material disincentive for collective work.44 The official stress on "moral incentives" for collective work has, in effect, obscured the fact that the system provided material ^incentives for collective work, and material incentives for members to concentrate as much as possible on the household economy. Fourth, the combination of low prices for collective products and providing peasants with the basis for a household economy (household plot and a bare subsistence ration from egalitarian distribution of collective produce) worked systematically against two major aims of collectivization policy: (i) surplus production and accumulation at the cooperative level; and (ii) socialist accumulation at the state level. With systematic material disincentives for collective work, the peasantry retreated into subsistence production (e.g., leaving land fallow) and both state grain procurement and cooperative accumulation suffered. Finally, the system was stalemated, in that the household plots guaranteed peasant households a stable base for small scale production and petty accumulation, but the prohibition on peasants owning means of production, plus cooperative monopoly of most of the land, limited the extent to which these savings could be put to productive use. Peasant savings went for consumption or were invested in their "five percent land" while the 95 percent of cooperative land under collective control was starved of both labor and investment funds. In sum, the empirical result (contrary to the aim) of the traditional collectivization in Vietnam was to restrict surplus accumulation from agriculture by both the state and collectives, while systematically preventing the peasants from investing their savings either in means of production (for example, draft animals) or towards raising productivity on cooperative land. This is a formula for stalemate and stagnation, not "socialist development." The new policy package emerging in Vietnam does not constitute a return to capitalism or proof that peasant agriculture is necessarily more productive than collective agriculture. Although there are still very significant problems to solve (for example, the pronatalist effect of the return to household control of the labor process), the new policy package needs to be examined as an alternative socialist strategy for rural development. 1)

Since there has been no reprivatization of land, and usufruct of agricultural land is distributed among households on the basis of their available labor power, the ownership and distribution system is broadly socialist (distribution according to labor).

2)

Since market liberalization and higher prices for agricultural products were introduced at the same time as the return to household production, increases in production cannot be conclusively attributed to the change from collective to household control of labor. Higher prices can provide an incentive for either household or collective production.

3)

Cooperatives still exist, although with reduced functions. It is now official Party policy to encourage planning and financial autonomy by cooperatives, and that they should become viable socialist businesses operating on a cost accounting basis.

44

Cf. Maureen Mackintosh, "Economic Tactics: Commercial Policy and the Socialisation of African Agriculture," World Development 13,1 (January 1985).

Transformation of Agriculture 145 The system is a product of both peasant initiative and state policy. In the words of Le Due Tho, at the time a Party leader, the production contract system "was not something from the sky or devised by the Central Committee, it was the formulation of something the masses had created and which they quickly absorbed."45 It must be added that, if the state and Party adopted and promulgated this peasant initiative, it was because of its potential as part of a "new management system." The outcome might be in the direction of either a democratic or a statist form of socialism-either of which is more plausible than a return to capitalism. Socialist Agriculture: State Control or Peasant "Collective Mastery"? One fundamental question for re-evaluating agricultural producers' cooperatives is: whose interests do they serve? Do they serve the interests of the state, of cooperative cadres, or the cooperative members? The verdict is not clear cut. On the one hand, the government attempted to use cooperatives as a major instrument for increasing central state control over the rural economy. While cooperative cadres and peasants were, and are, constrained in many ways by state regulations, from the point of view of the state the aim of controlling the rural economy was not achieved. The short answer to the question "Who controls the cooperatives?" is that no one does completely. Cooperatives should be seen rather as a site of struggle between state cadres, cooperative cadres, and the cooperative members. The cooperative is a transitional form, and the key question is whether it is a transition to a democratic form of worker self-management, in which the peasant producers participate in discussion and decision making on crucial questions of economic and social development, or whether it is in transition to a top-down, statist, and managerial form of development in which state, cooperative, and party cadres control the sociopolitical process. The phrase used by Ho Chi Minh to express the spirit of collective ownership and selfgovernment was "the cooperative is a house and the cooperative's members are the masters." Until the recent expansion of political discussion after the Sixth Party Congress in 1986, the standard phrase institutionalized in Vietnamese writings for economic and political democracy has been "collective mastery." The acknowledged difficulty in attaining "collective mastery" and the acknowledged prevalence of cadre corruption are in fact two aspects of the same problem of democratic mechanisms for popular control of economic processes. Within the first years of cooperativization in Vietnam, it was reported that the peasants felt alienated from their land and did not feel that they were the "collective masters" of the countryside and their cooperatives. There were repeated institutional reforms to attempt to resolve this problem of peasant discontent. The fact that the peasants were supposed to be the "masters" of the cooperative, but in fact did not feel that they were, was described as "the masterless situation."46 This phrase aptly expresses the partial political vacuum existing at the core of a political stalemate: neither peasants, nor the state, nor cooperative cadres were able to "master" the rural political economy, but each had sufficient power to

45

Le Due Tho, "To improve agricultural management."

46

Nguyen Khac Vien, Phan Quang and Nguyen Ngoc Oanh, "Agricultural Co-operation Policy."

146 Postwar Vietnam check the other. Le Duan's persistent attacks on cooperative "autarky" could be seen as an indication of statist hostility to a degree of peasant mastery of their small collective economy were it not for peasant complaints about "the masterless situation." The move since early 1981 to indirect labor mobilization, via the contract system and partial decollectivization of land and labor, was a result of this alienation and of the failure of the Vietnamese cooperatives system to put the principle of "collective mastery" into practice. The government originally introduced cooperatives in part as a means to procure agricultural commodities at low prices, but cooperatives also strengthened the collective bargaining position of agricultural producers. This was because cooperatives provided peasants with a degree of economic self-government, equality, and food security. The struggle for "mastery" is closely related to the disposition of "surplus." In most discussions of socialist development, it is generally assumed that the state's share of the agricultural product is used to the benefit of national development priorities. More surplus extraction would lead to more socialist accumulation, investment in production, and accelerated development for the good of the nation as a whole. As the government's stated aims in surplus extraction are to feed workers and to develop industries, including those producing agricultural inputs and consumer goods for the peasantry, in the long term and theoretically there is no fundamental contradiction between the interests of the government and the interests of the peasantry. According to a formulation frequently used in socialist countries, it is only in the short term that there is tension between what is presented as the state's priority to surplus extraction, accumulation, and economic growth and the peasants' desire for increased present consumption. However, these conceptual categories need to be re-examined. Is it correct to call the state's share of the produce "surplus" and the peasants' share "consumption" or "subsistence"? It seems that this categorization obscures and mystifies important basic facts. It is crucial to note that people at each of the three levels-state cadres, cooperative cadres and peasant producers-have needs to meet. State and cooperative cadres, as well as peasants, are human beings who need to eat; the difference between them is that it is the peasants who are the food producers. Whatever sector controls the lion's share of the agricultural product—state, cooperative, or peasant household—has the power either to choose the selfish path of raising its own consumption or to act in the general interest of increasing the aggregate social product by investing in production. It is a mistake to name the state's share "surplus," and to see it as the major contribution to development, and to call the peasants' share "consumption." In fact the state, cooperative, and peasant households are alike in that any extra over bare subsistence needs can be either invested productively, consumed to raise the standard of living, or simply wasted. What happens when peasants voluntarily forego rice wine and rice cakes and sacrifice their consumption by selling the rice at a cheap price to the state? Can the peasants be sure that their deferred consumption will be invested productively? Changes in policy and institutional forms in agriculture have been rooted in the dynamic struggle between state and peasants over what share of the product is to go to each sector. On the ground, the struggle is still stalemated; what is needed is a breakthrough in socialist ideology and action which will lead to peasants and the state working together rather than at cross-purposes. The reforms since 1979, and especially the opening of political debate since 1986, hold out the hope that Vietnam, a country which achieved successful state-peasant alliance in national defense, will be able to find a successful formula for state-peasant alliance in socialist economic development.

THE PROBLEM OF THE DISTRICT IN VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT POLICY* Jayne Werner

The new economic policies inaugurated in the late 1970s placed a renewed emphasis on the role of the "district." As Le Duan put it in his address to the Sixth Plenum of the Party's Central Committee in mid-1984, the district has become a "basic unit" (don vi co ban) of agricultural production in addition to the agricultural cooperative. Districts are the arena in which "to bring together [production] forces from the cooperatives, perform a new division of labor, make good use of land, develop sectors and jobs, link cultivation and animal husbandry to the processing of agricultural products and combine the forces of cooperatives and the district with those coming from the provincial and central levels to create total strength to develop the economy, build a new culture and new men, consolidate national defense and ensure the people's livelihood and reproduction of production on an expanded scale."1 In recent years, and especially since 1983, state and Party leaders have seen the district as the means for solving problems of agricultural productivity, state procurement, and accumulation for local development. The province is too remote administratively to exert much control over micro-economic units (numbering 300-500 per province). One of the major reasons for strengthening the district echelon has been to develop the administrative means to distribute in a timely way agricultural inputs and consumer goods to the peasants in exchange for their agricultural products. Thus, if both the state's purchase of agricultural products and its supply of industrial goods (for both production and consumption) can be unified at the district level, this will help overcome bottlenecks in supply and be a stimulus to procurement.2

* The research on which this article is based was made possible by a post-doctoral research fellowship from the Social Science Research Council and a field trip to Vietnam in September-October 1984 under the auspices of the Vietnam Uy Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi (Social Sciences Committee). I am grateful to Professor Pham Huy Thong for his assistance and support. I wish also to acknowledge the helpful discussions and suggestions from Postwar Vietnam Conference participants. This paper relies mainly on published sources; Party documents and unpublished academic and pedagogical materials may contain additional information and data on this subject. 1 Le Duan, "Nam vung quy luat, doi moi quan ly kinh te" [Firmly adhering to laws, improving economic management], TCCS, September 9,1984, p.14. My translation. An English version of the full speech can be found in JPRS Southeast Asia 84161. 2

Le Thanh Nghi summarized the state's attitude succinctly in his address to a major conference on the district in 1978: "If we assign to the district the responsibility for organizing procurement and products for the state, it is certain procurement will be better than when it was organized by the province." Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen thanh don vi kinh te nong-cong-nghiep [Develop the districts into agricultural-industrial economic units] (Hanoi: Su That, 1979), p. 77. 147

148 Postwar Vietnam The district has also been seen as a means of reorienting production by setting priorities and establishing regional "production guidelines." Agricultural and non-agricultural specializations are to be determined on a district basis, according to principles of comparative advantage.3 The district is to combine agriculture with industry, so as to stimulate industrial development. Agriculture is to be reorganized so that forestry and fishing can be developed in appropriate districts, and animal husbandry increased.4 Plans linking agriculture to industry include transferring labor from agriculture to industry, so as to overcome surplus agricultural labor and provide labor for non-agricultural pursuits. These plans have been developed at the district level.5 District development is thus an integral element in the process of transforming agriculture from small-scale to large-scale production, overcoming the self-containment, isolation, and production for self-sufficiency that has plagued Vietnamese agriculture.6 The 1977 Second Plenum specified that the district's economic function is to link all basic units together as a "production structure" or an "agro-industrial unit."7 Table 9.1 presents a model of district development, indicating the envisioned relationship between agriculture and industry, basic units and state levels, and their relation to the economy. Although the district concept has been in existence since the 1960s, it is especially in the 1980s that the district has been considered central to the processes of agricultural production and procurement. In line with this new focus, agricultural productivity is no longer seen solely as a problem internal to agricultural cooperatives, but equal weight is now placed on the need to improve the relationship between cooperatives and the district.8 3

Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de ve to chuc san xuat va quan ly kinh te o huyen [Some problems concerning organization of production and economic administration in the districts] (Hanoi: Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981), pp. 9-26,189-213. 4

Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen, pp. 20-21. Districts have been grouped into zones. In 1984, Zone 1, the coastal region, had 91 districts; Zone 2, the lowlands, had 126 districts; the midlands, Zone 3, included 70 districts; Zone 4, the low mountains, 67 districts; and Zone 5, the high mountains, 64 districts (a total of 418). See Nguyen Ngoc Triu, minister of agriculture, in Nhan Dan, November 13,1984.

5

This is explained in Nguyen Huy, "Several Theoretical and Practical Matters Concerning Building the Districts and Strengthening the District Level," NCKT, no. 2,1979, available in English, JPRS 73851. Labor redistribution formulas included "4-2-4" (40 percent labor in agriculture, 20 percent in livestock production, 40 percent in handicrafts) and "5-2-3," depending on the district. 6

See Le Duan, "Nam vung," pp. 11-16; 16-19. Also Le Duan, Ve qua trinh tu san xuat nho len san xuat Ion xa hoi chu nghia [On the process of advancing from small-scale production to large-scale socialist production] (Hanoi: Su That, 1982).

7 The Fourth and Fifth Party Congresses developed policies for building the district, although the initial forum which ushered in the concept of the district was the Nineteenth Plenum (of the Third Party Congress) which took place in 1970. The importance of the district was stressed at an agricultural conference in Thai Binh in 1974. It was not until the Third Plenum (Fifth Party Congress) in 1982, however, that district building was approached in earnest. Every plenum since then has had a major statement on the district. Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen; Conference on the Reorganization of Agricultural Production, held in Thai Binh province, August 5-12, 1974, specifically Le Duan's address to the conference, translated into English in FBIS-APA, October 31, 1974, pp. 17-23; Editorial, "Endeavoring to Build Strong, Solid District Party Organizations," TCCS, 1984, no. 2. An English version can be found in JPRS Southeast Asia 84070; Resolution on the Seventh Plenum, Nhan Dan, December 27,1984. 8

To Huu, a major figure in district development in the 1980s, has described agriculture as the "kingpin" of the district's economic structure. He has claimed that the district will change the face of rural life, not the agriculture cooperatives. The new agricultural focus of the district appears to have shifted from an earlier emphasis on "industry." It could be that district development was originally planned to expand small-scale industry at

District in Development Policy 149 Table 9.1 Model of the District Economic Structure

Source: Mai Huu Khue (ed.), Mot so van de ve to chuc san xuat va quan ly kinh te o huyen, Hanoi: Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1981, pp.18-19.

150 Postwar Vietnam This revised view may well be linked to the decline in food production and the expansion of private commerce outside state control which followed the end of the war. In the late 1970s, state procurement and low output reached a point of crisis, in part because the state lacked the necessary producer and consumer goods to supply to the peasantry. The so-called "two-way contracts," which went into effect in the north in 1978, were meant to tie state supply of fertilizer, pesticides, cloth, and other items needed by the peasantry at fixed prices, with purchase of grain and other food products, also at fixed prices. This was done on a contractual basis between the peasants and the state, and it has taken place at the district level.9 With the institution of two-way contracts, a three-tier system of procurement was put into effect. Some grain was initially purchased by the state at obligatory prices (2.6 dong/ kg hi the north, 3 dong in the south in 1982), as per contractual arrangement and on the basis of quotas. Above-quota grain was additionally purchased at "negotiated" prices. Finally, grain was obtained through payment of taxes (8 to 9 percent of peasant household income).10 Unfortunately, procurement based on the new two-way contracts failed to meet its goals. The state proved unable to furnish agricultural inputs in the quantities and at the times needed by the peasants. As a result, the state was compelled to buy more and more agricultural products at "incentive" prices, in effect market prices. By the early 1980s the resulting inflation had driven up prices of all goods and fueled market speculation by grain traders, an illegal activity.11 The Sixth Plenum (1984) defined "exercising mastery in the market" as the most important economic problem facing the state. Concern about lack of control over the market and the consequences of inflation may well have impelled the Party to accelerate district development at this time.12 If the district could gain control of products where they were produced, on behalf of the state, this could offset the effects of the free market on the circulation of goods and on commodity prices. By controlling the flow of goods and by providing incentives for producers to hand over their products to the state, the district could play a critical role in curtailing the speculative operations of private traders and dampening severe price fluctuations. In 1983, the Council of Ministers and the Party Secretariat organized a specialized apparatus to coordinate central government, district, and provincial efforts to promote the district. "District-building committees" were established at the provincial level and in the ministries. This apparatus reviewed implementation of relevant regulations and the work of eighty-five key districts. In mid-1984, the districts were granted more autonomy: provinces were instructed to transfer to them control of agricultural support stations and agencies dealing with tractor operation, irrigation, veterinary services, vegetable production, seeds and animal species stations, as well as farm implement factories and transportation the local level. In 1970s literature on the district, one finds emphasis on the reorganization of labor, shifting labor from agriculture to industry and building material/technical bases. 9

Interview with Nguyen Huu Tho, agricultural editor of Nhan Dan, Hanoi, August 26,1982.

10

Nguyen Huu Tho interview.

11

See Tran Ho, "Mot so van dan ve phan phoi luu thong" [Some problems regarding circulation and distribution], TCCS, 1983, no. 3: 27,33. Available in English translation, JPRS Southeast Asia 83679. 12

See especially Le Duan, "Nam vung," pp. 22-26.

District in Development Policy 151 enterprises. Also, provincial-operated forest lands and some state-run enterprises were to be handed over to the district. All units were instructed to shift from internal accounting to cost accounting before transfer.13 Policy Application and Pilot Projects

In experimenting with new organizational forms, Vietnam has employed a process of identifying and developing pilot projects and then using them as models. This had been done earlier with agricultural cooperatives. Following this pattern pilot districts were selected as early as 1968, numbering ten to twenty by the late 1970s, and they were placed under close scrutiny by the center, probably receiving state aid and additional, trained cadres.14 The pilot districts were selected on the basis of demonstrated superiority in certain aspects or attributes which enabled them to be "quickly strengthened." Particularly attractive to central leaders were areas that had overcome, or could overcome, the monoculture of rice cultivation, successfully diversifying into subsidiary or industrial crops, animal husbandry, or non-agricultural pursuits. The targeted districts were those attaining high rice yields, as well as those making good use of limited mechanical means. They also selected districts which had developed consumer goods to satisfy local needs or for export (the goal was set at 100 workdays per local laborer in export production in 1983).1S For instance, Tho Xuan district in Thanh Hoa province, a pilot district since 1974, developed production guidelines for its thirty-seven cooperatives early on and achieved successful specialization in crop production. Sugar cane, subsidiary food crops, and rice became its main products.16 Hai Hau district, Ha Nam Ninh province, also a pilot district for several years, is noted for being the highest producer of rice in the north and for its cultural development. Hai Hau developed taro as feed for pigs, which in turn furnished manure enabling cooperatives to practice intensive cultivation. In 1983, Hai Hau achieved 3.1 pigs per hectare of cultivated area. Hai Hau also carried out well the center's policy of shifting labor from agriculture to industry. By 1976, 35 percent of its workers were in the handicrafts and industrial economic sector, with 65 percent remaining in agriculture. The district also controls a mobile labor force numbering 12,000 people, used for construction and emergency relief projects.17 Nam Ninh district, Ha Nam Ninh province, is noted for its consumer-goods industry, for local use as well as sales outside the district. Handicraft cooperatives in Nam Ninh produce glassware, hats, garments, and metal containers. Three cooperatives make bicycle parts and fourteen produce cloth. Nam Ninh's production guidelines have focused on subsidiary food crops and industrial crops, as well as the establishment of "rice regions" of 10 tons, 8.5 tons, and 8 tons per hectare respectively.18 13

To Huu's address to the Hanoi Conference on District Building, reprinted in Nhan Dan, October 8,1984.

14

Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen, p. 7.

15

Le Duan, "Nam vung," pp. 28-29.

16

Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, pp. 18-19; and To Huu's address.

17

To Huu's address, and Thanh Ha, [The Hai Hau style of work], JPRS Southeast Asia 71773.

18

Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, pp. 34,58-59; To Huu's address.

152 Postwar Vietnam The center also targeted Duy Tien district, Ha Nam Ninh province. This district is the largest export earner in Ha Nam Ninh, profiting from jute and other industrial crops and handicraft production. It has also concentrated on irrigation, assisting cooperatives, such as Chau Giang, with water-control problems. Chau Giang, confronted with difficult production problems in the 1960s, has clearly moved ahead to become a model cooperative in Ha Nam Ninh.19 Along with irrigation and other agricultural support services, Duy Tien has promoted the construction and use of carts to replace shoulder-pole transport, along with the development of cart-width paths among the paddy fields. Targeted mountain districts include Song Lo, Vinh Phu province, which specializes in tea, grain, and hogs, rather than rice cultivation; and Van Chau district, Hoang Lien Son province, which has specialized in tea production and tea processing.20 Dien Ban, Quang Nam province, was targeted after 1975, and developed very quickly. By 1983, industrial output equaled 26 million dong, compared to 20.1 million dong for Hai Hau and 16.6 million dong for Tho Xuan district.21 Pilot districts in the south include Cai Lay, Tien Giang province, whose per capita rice output is 940 kg, and Long Phu, Hau Giang, which has the largest number of production collectives in the south.22 A comparison of the accomplishments and characteristics of a number of targeted districts are presented in Table 9.2. Table 9.3 illustrates the structure of the output value of agriculture, forestry, and industrial products for Hai Hau, Nam Ninh, and Song Lo districts in 1977. Of 426 districts in the north, center, and south, more than one hundred were rated as "fairly good" in 1984. There appears to be a huge gap between those districts and the remaining 326, as Party leaders have admitted.23 The methods and pattern of experimentation and the selection of pilot districts appear to have changed after 1983. Experimental categories were broadened to include "nontargeted" experimental areas. These "non-experimental" districts now number 124. Experimental or pilot districts have been increased to 85, for a total of 209 districts that are being observed by the center for policy review purposes. Of these, 7 are under close state supervision. Pilot districts at all levels presumably are favored for direct state aid and assignment of cadres. Since 1983, it has been reported that twelve provinces have sent over 1,500 cadres to the districts. In addition, 705 district cadres have received advanced training, while 763 have received basic training.24

19 Interviews in Duy Tien district and Chau Gian cooperative, October 1984; especially with Nguyen Van My, a member of the People's Committee, Ha Nam Ninh province, and cooperative officials at Chau Giang. 20

To Huu's address. An interesting discussion of mountain districts can be found in Vien Mac-Lenin, Kinh te dia phuong va quan he nong-cong nghiep tren dia ban huyen [The local economy and agricultural-industrial relationships at the district level] (Hanoi: Thong Tin Ly Luan, 1983). An English translation of a discussion of Quy Hop district, Nghe-Tinh province, also a mountain district, can be found in Southeast Asia Chronicle 93 (1984). 21

To Huu's address.

22

Ibid.

23

Ibid.

24

Ibid.

Table 9.2 The Scale of Several Districts in 1977 (from Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, pp. 18-19)

Districts 1

Area Type 2

Thanh Tri (Hanoi) Dong Ann (Hanoi)

Suburban Suburban

Dong Hung (Thai Binh)

Lowland

Nam Ninh (Ha Nam Ninh) Lowland Cu Chi (Ho Chi Minh) Suburban Cai Lay (Hau Giang) Lowland

Long My (Hau Giang) Tho Xuan (Thanh Hoa)

Lowland Lowland Midland

Quynh Luu (Nghe Tinh)

Lowland Midland Coastal Midland

Song Lo (Vinh Phu) Phuoc Van (Nghia Binh) Kpong Pack (Dae Lac)

An Son (Thuan Hai)

Lowland Midland Coastal Midland

Lowland Midland Coastal

Forest Land 6

Other Land 7

4,141 11,308

-

-

125,905 158,909

26,341 60,835

22 23

20,745

15,962

-

-

217,580

96,067

47

2,820 43,730

17,800 32,513

-

-

260,285 176,400

117,395 81,310

51 16

54,570 78,381

35,655 56,231

-

-

213,139 180,466

89,274 72,712

28 12

28,597 80,300

14,133 25,986

4,496 23,093

-

158,000 199,498

67,700 82,350

37 39

71,518

34,354

21,391

-

197,879

80,959

80

119,780

15,285

25,500

-

146,540

62,940

19

242,950

33,600

196,300

-

119,216

59,843

19

270,750

18,000

183,800

-

123,500

49,400

—

Production Orientations 3

Land (ha.) 4

Food products Food products Rice Rice Hogs Hogs Food products Rice Pineapples Bananas Hogs

8,082 16,975

Grain Ind. crops Hogs Hogs Ind. crops Grain

Ag Land 5

Population Labor 8 9

Number of Cooperatives 10

Tea

Grain Forests Grain Meat Forests Coffee Cocoa Grain Forests Grain Cotton Meat, Forests

DistrcnevlopmPy15

154 Postwar Vietnam Table 9.3 The Structure of the Total Value of Products in a Number of Districts-1977 HaiHau Ha Nam Ninh*

Nam Ninh Ha Nam Ninh*

Dong Anh MaNoi

SongLo VinhPhu

1. Total Value of Product ~ Agriculture -- Forestry — Industry

100.0 71.9

100.0 52.9

100.0 80.9

28.1

47.1

19.1

100.0 78.1 5.1 16.8

2. Total Value of Industrial and Handicraft Products ~ Machines — Processing agriculture and Fish products, Salt - Processing forestry products — Building materials ~ Ceramics, Glass - Weaving — Musical Instruments - Other

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

4.3 42.0

14.5 0.3

14.5 --

9.5 10.5

~

-

-

50.0

18.0

28.4 ~ 40.4 5.8 10.6

28.4

28.9 0.8 0.3 -

33.6 0.6 1.5

— 40.4 5.8 10.9

* Nam Ninh and Hai Hau figures are for 1978 From: Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, p. 76.

The Party Central Committee established its own District Building Committee, headed by former Politbureau member To Huu, who convened a major conference on the district in October 1984. Provincial and city Party district-building committees were instructed to implement state policies vis-a-vis the districts by passing their own concrete regulations. The district peoples' committees have been reorganized and reassigned new economic and management functions. There was noticeable excitement and activity regarding "district building" in the capital and the provinces in the fall of 1984, during my trip to Vietnam. This activity coincided with the district conference held in Hanoi, one of the effects of which was to accelerate the training of cadres for district posts. In Ha Nam Ninh province, for instance, provincial-level mass organizations were organizing training courses for village-level cadres to assume district positions. Provincial organs were also in the process of identifying and selecting the best cadres from the cooperatives to be promoted to district-level functions. Where women cadres were concerned, the Women's Union was directed to help selected women with family or transportation problems so that they could assume their new posts. The increased attention to the district, however, has yet to produce all the desired results. By 1985, central and sectoral interests were dragging their feet in assisting the districts in their new functions. Districts were criticized as having failed truly to link them-

District in Development Policy 155 selves with the grass-roots level. Not enough attention had been given to subsidiary crop production, industrial crops, animal husbandry, and export farm products in local plans.25 The district control of the market through the circulation of goods and the use of state commercial outlets has also been criticized. Districts were told that they could not use surplus products for sale on the market or for exchange with other districts. Districts were mandated to be responsible for the collection and purchase of products for the state. New regulations attempted to give the district more economic leverage, by the establishment of food and commodity funds, and trade and materials corporations.26 The full implementation of the district concept inevitably faces challenges from provincial, sectoral, and cooperative interests. In order to become a viable economic and managerial unit, the district needs a level of economic and political resources not currently at its disposal. Viability appears to hinge on two key issues: an independent basis of revenue formation and the ability to unify the flow of goods through district channels for bargaining purposes with the peasantry. Two Key Issues: The District Budget and Control of Goods and Supplies Although plans for budgeting at the district level have been in existence since the 1970s, it was only in 1983 that budgets became a functioning aspect of district operations. At this time, the district was instructed to rely on its own sources of supplies, rather than provincial or central allocation. The system of financial management in place did not include budgeting at the district level, and although the district was expected to be an "economic apparatus," this was defined administratively rather than financially.27 The level of budgeting as of late 1984 was described as "contracting receipts and expenditures."28 The "four sources of supplies" (bon nguon kha nang) formula was devised to encourage districts to rely on local materials, supplies obtained through economic ties with other units, income from export commodities, as well as supplies from the center. It was up to the district to balance its sources, and decide how to increase materials. Also, following the motto "the state and the people working together," the district was authorized to mobilize labor for construction projects, such as irrigation and transport facilities.29 District budgets, based on the "four sources," were set up with the assistance of the province. Provinces were instructed to help districts balance their revenues and expenditures and to demonstrate how to reduce the need for supplemental funds from higher levels. Districts were permitted to develop resources for their budgets by setting up grain and goods reserves. Provisions were made for the creation of a grain fund to pay workers, for production purposes, for purchase of products for the state, for social welfare, and for

25

Ibid.

26

Ibid.

27

Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, pp. 71-72.

28

To Huu's address.

29

Sec "May van de dat ra sau khi phan cap quan ly cho huyen o Thanh Hoa" [Some problems arising from management decentralization at the district level in Thanh Hoa], Nhan Dan, March 6,1985.

156 Postwar Vietnam stimulating hog production. Commodity reserves could be used for trade, barter, and export activities.30 The district budget is supposed to include provincial and central units transferred down to the district. Since these units have been instructed to shift to "independent cost accounting" before they come under district management, however, it is not clear what their financial or administrative benefits to the district may be. Districts have also been authorized to retain budget surpluses, which come from standard and above-quota procurements and from economizing on disbursements. New revenue accounts have been established for the budget. The "general revenues account" is based on procurement, by which the district receives 5 percent of the value of the products procured, with a bonus of 10 percent for above-quota procurements. "Supplemental regulated revenue accounts" have rates set by the province. Strong districts are supposed to balance their budgets on the basis of their general revenues account. Other potential sources for the district budget include capital construction funds from the province and other special allocations determined by the province. Profits from state-run trade and export activities can be added to the district budget.31 Examples of district initiative in developing budgets are frequently provided in the press. In Thanh Hoa province in 1984, for example, Thieu Yen district had the largest budget surplus, totaling 53 million dong.32 These surpluses cannot be acquired through independent buying and selling. Districts are not allowed to sell products in their reserves on the market, but can use them for barter arrangements with other units. As of 1983, the district was also receiving money (at an interest rate of 20 percent) from social welfare funds of state enterprises located at the local level. Since the district was responsible for the social welfare needs of local cadres, district administrators argued that they deserved an actual share of those funds.33 It appears that the largest portion of the budget is meant to be devoted to capital construction. However, to date, the provincial level has not transferred responsibility for capital construction down to the district level, despite repeated efforts by the center to induce them to do so. Until this is done, district budgets will continue to comprise only administrative and service expenditures. Although the principle has been established that districts must balance their budgets by matching expenditures with revenues, they have yet to achieve an independent basis for budgeting. District officials are accused of being passive about financial matters.34 Nonetheless, a high rate of upper-level budgetary support continues, as well as the strong probability that districts will be bailed out in the event of crisis. For instance, the state maintains fixed prices by compensating retail commerce agencies when local budgets can-

30

To Huu's address.

31

Chu Tarn Thuc, "Thuc hien tot chc do phan cap quan ly ngan sach cho dia phuong" [Implement properly the system of assigning budget management responsibilities to the localities], TCCS, 1985, no. 3: 60. 32

Nhan Dan, March 6,1985.

33

Chu Tarn Thuc, "Thuc hien," p. 59.

34

Ibid., p. 55.

District in Development Policy 157 not pick up the shortfall. Similarly the state budget is also responsible for compensating them for goods purchased by cadres and other state employees.35 Up to the present, district expenditures have tended to dictate revenues, rather than the reverse. As districts develop new sources of income at the local level and respond to state incentives for increasing revenues, they may display greater initiative and responsibility in using their income and reducing state expenditures. In fact, the procurement incentives introduced by the state were meant, in part, to heighten districts' "sense of responsibility."36 District reforms have included assimilation of village budgets. The district budget is supposed to include disbursements to the village level at a rate determined by the district. A recent article indicates this will be "carried out gradually."37 Although the province and the center do not at present totally determine district expenditures, the long-range implication of centralized planning is pre-programmed district operations. Already the rates of revenue accumulation are fixed by higher levels, and even local revenue sources have to respond to "expenditures" determined outside the district. Thus, the district budget remains largely an administrative procedure, without much actual working capital for district officials to use at their discretion. One of the major reasons for upgrading the district is to exercise greater control over the two-way flow of goods between the peasants and the state. Theoretically, the unification of materials' allocation through the district will enable the state to use consumer and producer goods at its disposal as an incentive for increased procurement. Before the district reforms, materials allocated to the grass-roots level were divided among state and provincial organs, with the district simply an administrative funnel. But this system was plagued by persistent and widespread shortages. Moreover, production units at grassroots levels, including those with important supplies for agriculture, had to go through the provincial level to establish relationships with agricultural cooperatives. Even if they existed side by side with agricultural production units, they were not permitted direct links.38 In 1983, material supply agencies were set up at the district level to coordinate supplies previously divided among competing central and provincial agencies. In addition to increased procurement, district monopoly over supplies was meant to give the district leverage over the supervision of production in agricultural cooperatives. The district was meant to supervise the production schedules of the new contract system, and lend technical and other assistance with respect to seeds, machines, crop information, cost accounting, and inspection work. It was also meant to devote attention to improving "weak cooperatives."39

35

Ibid., p. 57.

36

Ibid., pp. 61-62.

37

Ibid., p. 61.

38

To Huu's address.

39

Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen, p. 64. Le Due Tho's assessment of the operation of the contract system makes the point that the new system (che do quan fy moi) entails greater district intervention in cooperative affairs. This evaluation is published in a major article in Nhan Dan, "Phat huy nhan to moi, hoan chinh che do quan nong nghiep" [Developing new factors, perfecting the new management system in the agricultural cooperatives], Nhan Dan, September 4,1982.

158 Postwar Vietnam The Sixth Plenum (1984) stipulated that districts would be obliged to plan flows and exchanges of goods on a yearly basis by setting their own norms and formulating their part of the provincial plan. It was through the district that agricultural cooperatives were to be incorporated into national planning.40 Leverage at the district level is meant to be enhanced not only by the coordination of goods and supplies, and planning, but by the linkage of local small industrial and commercial enterprises. Local food processing, consumer goods production, agricultural support installations, construction units, trade corporations, and export facilities are to be developed in part to improve the district's bargaining position vis-&-vis the peasantry. These micro-economic units presumably can be managed in ways that would increase the levels of goods and supplies at the disposal of the district, which, after it has met local consumption needs and its obligations to the state, would be able to use its resources for other purposes.41 The first step in this process, however, is the unification of materials allocation. The district supply agency is meant to unify planned supplies from the various central ministries. At the other end, goods from the center and province are to be coordinated by the Ministry of Supply. Assuming supplies reach the district, the people's committee is authorized to control allocation. When supplies do not arrive, the district can try to compensate by finding other sources of goods, through its ability to trade.42 Although district trade corporations have been authorized to supervise marketing and credit operations, their ability to control district trade is still in question. To Huu indicated that 396 trade corporations, 197 general supply corporations, and 83 grain corporations had been established in the districts by late 1984. Yet state commercial networks are still not entirely in district hands. District management of trade has met with determined opposition on the part of provincial trade corporations.43 More importantly, private commerce has actually expanded in recent years in the north, and now appears to have a substantially greater impact on the flow of goods than do state commercial channels. Economic integration with the south may have accelerated this trend. By 1983, it was officially reported that the state exercised weak control over consumer and producer goods being produced by its own (state-operated) enterprises.44 This being the case, the state can hardly guarantee the planned levels of allocation needed by the districts. The bargaining mechanism of supply versus procurement under the aegis of the district remains inoperable, therefore the state is forced to rely on taxes and purchasing grain at market prices in order to maintain levels of procurement. In essence, the district's control of goods, probably its most important function from the standpoint of the state, is dependent on the behavior of the free market. Recently it has been admitted that the state's management of market prices via the district is largely ineffective.

40

To Huu's address.

41

Mai Huu Khue, ed., Mot so van de, pp. 65 ff.

42

To Huu's address.

43

Ibid.

44

Tran Ho, "Mot so van de ve phan phoi luu thong," pp. 27-28.

District in Development Policy 159 Contradictions in District Development: Political versus Administrative Functions The issue of the political versus the administrative role of the district has yet to be resolved. Concerted resistance from provincial and sectoral interests to "decentralization of management" is one dimension of this problem. Provincial bureaucrats are wary of the argument advanced by Party leaders that the transfer of functions is purely an administrative matter. Not only have the bureaucrats dragged their feet in carrying out specific regulations and directives from the Council of Ministers and the Party Secretariat, but they have justified their inactivity by criticizing district mismanagement and irresponsibility.45 To lessen this opposition, the center has explained that the district will only be a coordinating body for independent and self-sufficient units, implying that these units will not really add to the power of the district. Provincial leverage will be maintained by the anticipated centralization of the planning process, whereby the activities of all lower-level units will be subject to the advance approval of the province. Yet, if the district is to be an "economic apparatus" and is to become a real "production structure," then this implies it will have more than purely administrative responsibilities. For the district to "manage" all the units under its territorial aegis requires that it have economic and political resources at its disposal. Problems over the budget reflect indecision on exactly what constitutes the district. The management function of the district vis-a-vis the smallest agro-economic units—the cooperatives-is also fraught with difficulties. Districts have been given the task of deciding what the production orientation of their areas will be. This means adjusting the production priorities of the cooperatives according to comparative advantage. Although comparative advantage is presented by state officials as a matter of objective scientific analysis this clearly is not always the case. State assistance has already given some districts production advantages over others, before the decisions concerning comparative advantage are made. Also, political criteria almost certainly come into play when some cooperatives are obliged to give up production in some commodities and not in others. The issue of measuring benefits versus losses, or compensating for loss, has not been confronted directly by district builders. Or if it has, the political aspects of designated comparative advantage are carefully concealed. If in fact specialization decisions are often political and not economic, this raises other questions. Unlike province-district relations, district-cooperative relations currently appear rather clear-cut. State and Party leaders have gone to great lengths to assure villagelevel cooperatives that their independence will not be affected by district reforms. This touchy issue obviously reflects the delicate political balance between the state and the peasantry, in which the peasantry retains the edge.46 The presentation and promotion of district reforms to agricultural cooperatives has occurred under the formula of "consolidating" the cooperatives, which are considered to be "basic," "primary," and independent production units.47

45

Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen, pp. 65-66.

46

See my article, "Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam," Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars 16,2 (1984).

47

Le Thanh Nghi, Xay dung huyen, p. 64.

160 Postwar Vietnam It can be argued that district reforms constitute an inherently "centralizing" tendency, which cooperative leaders will thus oppose by one means or another. Yet, at the moment, the center has been unwilling or unable to provide the district with political leverage vis-tivis the cooperatives. For instance, cooperatives that resist shifting their production guidelines according to district dictates may discover the district lacks the ability to enforce orders. Development of specialized production regions or the implementation of comparative advantage thus faces a tough road ahead. Without economic resources and lacking the "managerial" clout to enforce decisions, the district must rely on political exhortations and rhetorical persuasion to accomplish its objectives. This would be unnecessary if the district enjoyed the prerogatives of managerial control, which presumably would include leverage over local cooperative officials. The strengthening of the district's position depends on the center. Districts were a creation of the center to begin with, and were unable to develop on their own, even when instructed to do so. So far, resources at the disposal of the district, particularly supplies and cadres, have mostly come from the center. Developmental initiatives by the district will undoubtedly need to be confirmed by the center for some time to come. The district's dependence on the center is reflected hi reports about the "confusion" of district cadres who attend conferences as to how they are going to carry out Party resolutions. The Market versus The Plan

If the district is truly meant to control the source and supply of goods in its area, there is an inherent contradiction between the use of administrative means for such ends and the dictates of the market. If the district's use of the market is restricted, then its control over goods will be hampered. Even administratively, the district has yet to gain control of goods at the local level. Province leaders have not carried out central directives establishing goods reserves, commodity funds, export companies, and trading corporations at the district level. Existing transport, fishing, and salt companies, together with forestry operations, are still outside district hands.48 The expansion of production, business, and agricultural service units at the district level simply has not occurred. District units turn out few specialized commodities and very limited export quantities. Some districts are not even self-sufficient in rice. Handicraft production facilities are encountering numerous difficulties in obtaining raw materials and in pricing. District relations with agricultural cooperatives remain tenuous. Production guidelines, upon which all other programs are contingent, have yet to be established in many districts. Because of that lack of expertise, bargaining power, and institutional contact, the districts themselves have not yet been able to solve managerial problems in the cooperatives. The goal of increasing collective income remains unattained. Many districts have been unable to mobilize unemployed labor from the cooperatives to work on construction projects. In every province there are districts which reportedly possess a "dependency" attitude, neglecting to search for local resources or to initiate projects, but waiting instead for "models" to emerge (elsewhere).49 Although there are numerous potential sources of funds for the district, the failure of most district leaders to develop them may well be linked to the lack of goods, especially 48

Nhan Dan, March 6,1985.

49

Ibid.

District in Development Policy 161 agricultural inputs. State-supplied fertilizer cannot meet local demand, and although fertilizer can be purchased on the free market, prices are very high. Even when fertilizer is forthcoming from the state, it often arrives at the wrong time. Supplies of petroleum and pesticides are also very low.50 One of the effects of the increased grain output resulting from the contract system, has been more rice chasing fewer goods.51 Assuming that the district will soon control the trading corporations, trade on the market will likely remain heavily restricted. When used for exchange, commodity reserves at district level will be employed non-commercially. Nonetheless, inter-district trade, based on barter, could easily come into conflict with the state plan, especially if the market in effect determines value for goods. If the district's control over trade and new enterprises allows them to use the market and the resultant profits for then* own investment projects, they will obtain a significant new source of funds. At present, they can only borrow capital for purposes specified in the plan, subject to dictates from above. "Banking" at the district level remains a function of treasury administration. The inability of the district to perform its planned economic role may also in part be a result of the product contract system. By providing more incentives to grow rice, the contract system has actually slowed down product diversification. As a result, subsidiary and industrial crop production, animal husbandry, and even handicraft have declined. A late 1983 investigation of several cooperatives in Ha Nam Ninh province revealed that, while grain output increased by 50 percent or more after the adoption of the contract system, subsidiary crop, hog, and brick production had declined.52 Under present policies, the district by itself appears to have limited powers to promote industrial and subsidiary crop production, agricultural diversification, balancing agriculture with animal husbandry, or expansion of cooperative production and handicrafts production. Conclusion How the district develops will depend on many factors outside the control of district leaders~the market, center-cooperative relations, goods supply, and procurement policies. Simultaneously, the district reflects important institutional dynamics and brings their contradictions to the fore, especially at this time of economic debate and reforms. It raises questions of centralizing versus decentralizing tendencies in the overall system, autonomy versus control, the role of the market versus the plan. District development can be viewed as either centralizing or decentralizing, depending upon whether it is seen from the cooperative or the province. For the district to perform the role assigned it by the center, may well require increased autonomy. Transfer of power from the province to the district level has been a step in that direction. Problems associated with district development may in part reflect the center's proclivity for using administrative changes to try to solve fundamental economic and political problems. The "district," untried and untested, becomes the focal point for change, but change 50

Xa Luan, "Phat huyen nhan to moi, dua nong nghiep tien len theo huong dan xuat Ion xa hoi chu nghia" [Develop new factors, advance agriculture toward large-scale socialist production], TCCS, 1984, no. 4: 2.

51 52

Interview with Nguyen Huu Tho.

Xuan Kieu, "May suy nghi ve hoan chinh co che khoan san pham trong hop tac xa san xuat nong nghiep" [Some thoughts on the improvement of the product contract system in the agricultural production cooperatives], TCCS, 1984, no. 2: 37-43,48. Available in English, JPRS Southeast Asia 84070.

162 Postwar Vietnam predicated on an "organizational fix." It becomes a means to cure all problems. The bureaucratic dimension of socialist ideology in Vietnam could well underlie the district enterprise. Clearly the district has yet to become another functioning, administrative-economic level, comparable to the collective, province, or center. Nonetheless, to the degree that the shift from sectoral to territorial management does take place, the district will assume increasingly important functions. It may one day constitute the organizational focus of agricultural production, at least as far as the state is concerned. For ease of operation, it is clearly preferable to deal with the district rather than with individual agricultural cooperatives. The Party now sees the district as integrally linked to the advance of agriculture towards large-scale socialist production. To underscore this point, Party leaders claim that districts, not agricultural cooperatives, will transform the face of rural life in Vietnam.53 The coordination of production, supply, distribution, and circulation of goods and money at the local level may simply be too ambitious for people's committees at the district level to handle. The present quality of some personnel in the people's committees does little to inspire confidence in their leadership abilities. A number of these cadres are army veterans, former or present members of mass organizations such as the Fatherland Front, and have had virtually no training or experience in economic management. Wholesale replacement of membership and reformulation of the concept of people's committees may be necessary before wide-ranging changes can occur. Devolving responsibility to the district level is advantageous as far as administrative and economic efficiency is concerned, but it also may lead to local autonomy. How to encourage innovation at the local level while maintaining control, is a fundamental problem of socialist development in Vietnam. One suspects that further efforts to achieve district autonomy may be challenged by a coalition of state, central ministry, and provincial interests attempting to reassert their prerogatives. Vietnam's new economic policies and the debates over the direction of economic reform have thus not occurred within a vacuum, but contain important institutional ramifications. The problem of the district has brought to the fore dynamics of central versus local relations, sectoral versus territorial administration, control versus autonomy. With the reform process proceeding incrementally rather than by broad strokes or great leaps, new institutional forms have not yet crystallized. New price, procurement, and wage policies associated with the Eighth Plenum (1985) will undoubtedly affect these relations, and may well enhance the role of the district. However, the overriding dilemma of centralization versus autonomy remains unresolved. It is still unclear whether the center has either the intention or the power to develop the district as a viable entity, or whether a truly viable district can in fact perform all the functions that the state has assigned it. 53

To Huu's address.

SOME ASPECTS OF COOPERATIVIZATION IN THE MEKONG DELTA Ngo Vinh Long

Introduction

The Mekong Delta is 2.2 times larger than the Red River Delta in land area and includes 31 percent of the total cultivated surface and 48 percent of the paddy fields in the entire country. It is therefore not difficult to see why the delta in particular, or the southern region in general, have always figured prominently in the minds of Vietnamese policy makers and planners. For economic, social, political—and even moral—reasons, since the end of the war Vietnamese leaders have associated the transformation and development of the southern region with cooperativization. Some of these reasons have been very explicitly stated while others have only been implicit. Some of the explicit reasons were explained by Hoang Tung, a secretary to the Central Committee and editor-in-chief of Nhan Dan, in February 1978-two months before cooperativization was pushed in the southern region-as follows: First, it must be affirmed that in not cooperativizing agriculture, in not moving the peasants onto the socialist path, and in maintaining private production, new differentiation will certainly be created in the rural areas of the southern region, middle peasants and even rich peasants will further develop, poor peasants will increase in numbers. This is a certainty. Second, without timely cooperativization it is impossible to develop irrigation, impossible to dig the networks of canals and ditches such as we have now in the north. Without irrigation double cropping in rice is impossible, development of production is impossible. At present, the yield in this region is two metric tons per hectare per crop. The majority of the land here only supports one crop a year. To multiple-crop, it is definitely necessary to put in irrigation. Irrigation works cannot be performed by the individual families on individual plots of land. They must be carried out hi each region of the entire delta of the southern region [Mekong Delta] where cooperativization has been completed. This will require billions of dong, much effort and time in order to create a new development in agriculture.

163

164 Postwar Vietnam Third, without cooperativization it is impossible to eradicate capitalism. For over a hundred years now, the rural areas of the southern region have been under the influence and control of capitalism.1 Because of the potential of the Mekong Delta for surplus rice production, the government planned to concentrate investment in mechanization and irrigation in that area, as it was expected to produce more rapid results than investment elsewhere.2 Implicit in the policy makers' statements are also the hopes that, by getting the peasants into a collective framework, the government would be able to procure food more effectively in its effort to feed the burgeoning urban population and armed forces; that the peasants would then stay in the countryside so that the already excessive urbanization problem would not get out of hand; that government control of agricultural production could be achieved; and finally that political control could be maintained in the rural areas in order to ensure implementation of the above-mentioned goals. The aim of this chapter is to examine the extent to which cooperativization has been realized in the Mekong Delta and whether it has succeeded in meeting some of the goals of the Vietnamese Communist Party outlined above. Extent of Collectivization in the Mekong Delta After the Third Plenum of the Fifth Party Congress declared in early December 1982 that the cooperativization of the southern region should be "basically completed" by the end of 1985, almost every newspaper and magazine article which deals in any way with the south repeated this refrain. The question, as far as most of these articles and studies were concerned, was not when but how. Cooperativization was to be carried out "actively and firmly" through the three forms of 1) "solidarity production teams" (to doan ket san xuat)\ 2) "production collectives" (tap doan san xuaf)\ and 3) agricultural cooperatives (hop tac xa nongnghiep). According to many of these studies, the most widespread form of cooperativization in the southern region has been the "solidarity production teams," defined as a transitional form aimed at getting the "individual peasants to exchange labor, to help each other in production, to begin to produce according to the guidance of the plans of the central government and to achieve economic relations with the central government." But all efforts should be made to move the peasants to "higher forms," which are the production collectives and the agricultural cooperatives respectively. The collectives are defined as "transitional collective economic units" of from 30 to 50 hectares of cultivated surface each, where land and other means of production are cooperativized, where distribution of resources is according to labor, and where rents are still being paid for land and machine services. Hence, although it is "not really socialistic yet," it is considered the most suitable form for attracting the southern peasants, especially the middle peasants, onto the path of collective production. Ultimately, however, the peasants should be gathered into agricultural cooperatives, which are said to include about 200 to 300 hectares of land each in the delta and lowland areas. Because of their size, these cooperatives are said to be much more "capable of realizing the superiority of socialist economic production," since they 1 Hoang Tung, "Ve duong loi phat trien nong nghiep va xay dung nong thon moi" [On the policies of agricultural development and establishment of a new rural society], Hoc Tap [Study and Practice], February 1978, pp. 23-24. 2

Ibid., p. 24.

Cooperativization in Mekong Delta 165 are supposedly providing more favorable conditions for reorganizing production, for utilizing labor, and for setting up better "material and technical bases." Land rents, it is maintained, should be terminated as soon as the production collectives are "advanced into agricultural cooperatives."3 We have heard almost exactly the same words many times since the adoption of the "Second Five-Year Plan of 1976-1980."4 In the February 1985 issue of Tap Chi Cong San (TCCS), however, the following figures (complete with bar charts, pie charts, and pyramid charts!) were given: In 1980 there were 9,350 production collectives and 1,518 agricultural cooperatives; in 1983 there were 19,154 and 1,731; and in 1984 there were 27,344 and 1,925 respectively. Together these collectives and cooperatives included 24.5 percent, 24.7 percent, and 25.1 percent of the total peasant households for the years 1980,1983, and 1984 respectively. It is interesting to note that, while the number of collectives and cooperatives had increased threefold since 1980, the number of peasant households they represent had increased only by half a percentage point! In other words, the apparent increase is only a numbers game and not a "great momentum" or "forward movement," as many official and semi-official articles have claimed. There is no doubt that Vietnamese policy makers see the question of cooperativization as the linchpin to their overall rural and agricultural strategy. Agricultural Minister Nguyen Ngoc Triu, for example, stated in an interview in September 1983 that, in spite of the fact that the government had invested 80 percent of its funds for agricultural development in the southern region, agricultural production there was the most sluggish hi the country. Yields were still very low and cultivated surface had not increased significantly, especially in the Mekong Delta. Intensive agriculture and multi-cropping in the Mekong Delta were also the lowest in the country. The average yearly use of the soil was 1.6 times in the north, 1.8 times in the Red River Delta, 1.2 times in the southern region, but not yet even as high as one time in the Mekong Delta. The reason for this sorry state of affairs, the minister insists, was because socialist transformation of agriculture there was still largely unaccomplished.5 Whether cooperativization will help increase production in the Mekong Delta in the long run is a question which we will return to shortly. Since the Vietnamese policy makers are obviously bent on carrying out cooperativization to completion in the southern region and since there is no indication that they will be able to do so even at the most basic level

3

See, for example, Cao Van Luong, 'Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa nong nghiep o cac tinh Nam bo" [In order to understand agricultural cooperativization in the provinces of the southern region], Nghien Cuu Lich Su [Historical Research], May-June 1983, no. 3:12-21.

4

See NCKT, April 1977, pp. 14-17; Vo Chi Cong, "Day manh cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi nong nghiep o cac tinh mien Nam" [Push strongly the socialist transformation of agriculture in the provinces of the south], TCCS, February 1979, p. 5; The Dat, Nen nong nghiep Viet Nam tu sau each mang thang tarn nam 1945 [Vietnamese agriculture since after the August Revolution of 1945] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban nong nghiep, 1981), p. 206; Cao Van Luong, 'Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa," p. 19; Nguyen Huy, "35 nam thuc hien duong loi phat trien nong nghiep cua Dang" [Thirty five years of implementing the policies for agricultural development of the Party] in 35 nam kinh te Viet Nam, 1945-1980 [Thirty five years of Vietnamese economy, 1945-1980] (Hanoi: Vien Kinh Te Hoc, 1980), pp. 132-33. 5

Nhan Dan, September 7,1983.

166 Postwar Vietnam in the foreseeable future, it is important for us to examine some of the reasons for the failure so far. Reasons for the Failure to Collectivize According to the analyses of the Vietnamese government and most of its ideologues and researchers, there have been two main reasons inhibiting the completion of the cooperativization program (at least as of the end of 1983). First, cadres were criticized for "hesitation and tentativeness," causing slowness, as well as a tendency to "haste and simplemindedness" which, in the words of one report, "has led to the development of the production collective in such an impetuous and unprepared manner that in some areas the peasants have even been forced to join the collectives, thereby creating problems and poor results to the cooperativization movement."6 While it is true that the lower- and middle-level cadres have been guilty of the two tendencies mentioned above, it is also true that their failure has been due to the fact that most of them have tried their best to carry out the policies and directives of the Party as they have understood them. It was the Party which had at various times since 1977 set the dates for "basically completing" the cooperativization program. The second reason given by the government for not having basically completed cooperativization of the southern region is the failure to eradicate all forms of exploitation and to complete the redistribution of land, a necessary preliminary step to coopperativization.7 This explanation, however, represents a basic misreading of most studies produced by the government itself-especially the surveys of 1978 and 1981 on agrarian differentiation-which suggest that the government's methods to eradicate "all existing forms of exploitation" and to carry out the redistribution of land have been both inadequate and inappropriate.8 First of all, land redistribution alone is inadequate. This is indicated by the fact that, although the government has tried persistently since liberation to distribute land to landless peasants who do not have, or do not own enough, draft animals and farm equipment, many of them have either refused to accept land granted to them by the government or have received it only in order to resell it immediately afterwards. In July 1983 the government reported that only 272,000 hectares of land had actually been redistributed to the landless in the southern region. This represented some 30,000 hectares less than the amount which had reportedly been distributed in 1976 and 1981 respectively. In fact, the number of landless peasant households increased from 2.5 percent in 1978 to about 5 percent in 1983.9

6

Cao Van Luong, "Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa," pp. 18-20. For details on all of this also see: Le Duan, Cai tao xa hoi chu nghia o mien Nam [Socialist ransformation in the south] (Hanoi: Su That Publishing, 1980); Van kien Dai Hoi Dang Cong San Viet Nam Ian thu V [Documents of the Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party] (Hanoi: Su That Publishing House, 1982), Vol. I.

7

Cao Van Luong, 'Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa," p. 20.

8

Cf. Vo Nhan Tri's chapter in this volume, where he argues that land reform was not necessary.

9

Hoang Tan, "Mot so dac diem kinh te-xa hoi va tinh chat dac diem cua nong dan dong bang song Cuu Long" [Some special socio-economic aspects and special features of the peasants in the Mekong Delta], in Mot so van de khoa hoc xa hoi ve dong bang song Cuu Long [A number of social science questions on the Mekong Delta] (Hanoi: Nha Xuat Ban Khoa Hoc Xa Hoi, 1982), p. 209; "Hoan thanh dieu chinh ruong dat, day manh cai tao xa hoi chu nghia doi voi nong nghiep o cac tinh Nam bo" [Complete the readjustment of land, strongly push socialist transformation of agriculture in the provinces of the Southern Region], TCCS, July 1983, pp. 47-52.

Cooperativization in Mekong Delta 167 Second, it is inappropriate to use the cooperativization program to try to eradicate "all existing forms of exploitation." The 1978 and 1981 surveys show that the reason for this so-called exploitation was the continuing agrarian differentiation in the Mekong Delta which derived chiefly from commercial activities and machine services. The rich and upper-middle peasants owned most of the farm equipment, especially the tractors, and used them to increase their income. But at no time were there more than 16,000 tractors in the southern region. The government could have made a small but critical and strategic investment in tractors and other farm equipment, thus helping those peasants who needed them most and breaking the hold of the rich and upper-middle peasants on other peasants in terms of machine services. At the same time, this would have lessened the differentiation, thus creating the necessary conditions and mechanisms for getting the peasants into a cooperative framework. Instead, by trying to collectivize the machines, the government induced the peasant owners to neglect or sabotage their farm equipment. As a result, although we are told that by May 1983 the government had been successful in getting 200 "machine collectives" and 100 "machine cooperatives" established in the southern region, these collectives and cooperatives together included only 3,200 tractors, which represented 84 percent of all the tractors still in operation.10 It is clear, therefore, that, until the agrarian differentiation problem is solved, the agricultural cooperativization program will not be successfully completed. Peasants with more material and human resources will continue to regard the program as a means of equalizing income distribution at their expense, and hence they will continue to resist it in one way or another. In fact, it is not cynical to say that perhaps the cooperativization program would work only in areas where the peasants are equally poor and hence are forced to cooperate to survive. Such a situation has existed in many areas in the central and northern regions. But even in the northern region where the cooperativization program has been most developed, the basic organizational structures of the cooperatives-especially the interconnected problems of labor utilization and resource distribution—have been inherently exploitative and have therefore threatened to destroy these cooperatives from within. The various reforms since 1979, including the "new contract" system, have so far prevented these institutions from collapsing but they have not really solved the basic problems at all. Why Southern Peasants Resist Cooperatives It is clear that, even in the north where the problem of differentation had been minimal in the first place and where the peasants have had over two decades to adjust to cooperativization, the organizational structures and the management of the cooperatives still present many problems which recent reforms have not yet been able to solve. As far as the southern peasants can see, the "new contract" system represents but a very narrow reform, in which the cooperative members can enjoy the "end products" of only a small percentage of the total production. The greater part of the income of the cooperative has to be used for the various "public interest funds" to help pay for the social costs produced by the various wars (e.g., support for the disabled) and for "production costs," which include salaries to the cooperative cadres and the village Party members. In the southern 10 For details on the differentiation problem see Hong Gia, "Ve tinh hinh so huu ruong dat, may moc va co cau cac tang lop xa hoi o nong thon Nam bo" [On the situation of landownership, machines, and structures of the various social classes in the rural areas of the Southern Region], TCCS, January 1979, pp. 61-71; TCCS, December 1981, pp. 34-36; Ngo Vinh Long, "Agrarian Differentiation in the Southern Region of Vietnam," Journal of Contemporary Asia 14,3 (1984): 283-305. For details on the extent of the collectivization of farm equipment and the number of existing tractors see Cao Van Luong, 'Tim hieu ve hop tac hoa," p. 22.

168 Postwar Vietnam region at the present time, the more "successful" the hamlet or village, the more cadres there are in the various Party establishments, governmental structures, and popular organizations. Depending on the degree of "success," there may be from fifty to over 100 cadres who are either fully or partially paid by the village, not by the central government. By contrast, throughout the French colonial period there were at most around ten village officials, of whom only three were paid either fully or partially: the village chief (fy truong), the registration chief (chuong ba), and the patrol chief (truong tuan). The socialist transformation of agriculture in the south, therefore, has been used to try to increase governmental penetration into-and control of--rural areas, with the local inhabitants, especially those in the collectives and cooperatives, footing the bill. In fact, the government has stressed from the very beginning that a primary goal of collectivization is political control. For example, the 24th Plenary Session of the Party Central Committee in September 1975, which has been hailed as the most important policy meeting on economic development after the end of the war, stressed that cooperativization in the south first had to go handin-hand with the establishment and reinforcement of Party infrastructures as well as state and popular organizations.11 Since then, almost every report on the success and achievements of any village, district, or province assesses the achievement most basically in terms of political control.12 The following is an excerpt from a report of the most successful district, Long Phu, in the most successful province of the Mekong Delta, Hau Giang: Under the direct leadership of the Hau Giang provincial Party Committee ..., the Long Phu Party Committee has been able to put forth four programs of action which include: . . . Maintenance of political security, social order, and safety; consolidation and development of various Party organizations; urgent increase in the support and training of cadres, especially at the local level, so as to be able to meet the various short-term and long-term demands; consolidation and development of governmental and popular structures, and organization from the district down to the village and hamlet levels.... The district Party Committee has paid special attention to increasing both the quality and quantity of Party members for the local levels. Fourteen district Party members have been sent down to the villages to take direct control of the positions of village Party secretaries; twenty-three of the thirty-five members of the district Party Committee are in constant touch with, and are giving direct leadership to, the various local organizations. The Long Phu Party Committee has paid close attention to the task of developing the Party There is now no hamlet that does not have Party cells, Party members, and Party or-

11 12

Dao Van Tap, ed., 35 nam kinh te Viet Nam, pp. 130-32.

For examples, see: Le Phuoc Tho, "Nhin lai chang duong muoi nam cai tao va phat trien san suat nong nghiep cua Hau-giang" [Looking back at ten years of transformation and development of agricultural production in Hau Giang]; Huynh Van Niem, "Nong nghiep Tien-giang 10 nam sau giai phong" [Tien Giang's agriculture 10 years after liberation]; and Tran Van Len, "Con duong di len chu nghia xa hoi o huyen Hoa-thanh" [The road upward to socialism in Hoa Thanh district], TCCS, April 1985, pp. 51-59, 60-64, and 73-78, respectively. These are the most successful areas of cooperativization and economic development in the Mekong Delta in the eyes of the Vietnamese policy makers and hence they are given special treatment in this commemorative issue of the 10th anniversary of the liberation of the south.

Cooperativization in Mekong Delta 169 ganizations. This is a most welcome achievement of the district Party Committee of Long-phu.13 What was the peasant reaction to such developments? It should be remembered that 70 percent of the rural population in the Mekong Delta were middle peasants who owned 80 percent of the cultivated surface, 60 percent of the total farm equipment, and over 90 percent of the draft animals, and who could already produce more than enough for their own consumption by the time the government decided to ram through its collectivization program. In 1979, for example, the total amount of food staples (mostly rice) used by these peasants for their own consumption and for feed was 2,390,000 metric tons and they had a surplus of nearly 1.5 million metric tons.14 This surplus could be sold in various ways~either to the government at the subsidized and negotiated rates, or on the free market-to enable them to purchase consumer goods and necessary supplies for reproduction. Why then would they be willing to enter the collectives and cooperatives and have the surplus absorbed by all the funds and expenses mentioned above and also have the cadres breathing down their necks? It is therefore not surprising that, as of February 1985, only 25.1 percent of the peasant households in the south had joined the collectives and the cooperatives. The number of those who had not joined exceeded the number of middle peasants for the south by 15 percent and for the Mekong Delta by about 5 percent. We can therefore assume that many rural capitalists, rich peasants, and even poor peasants had not joined either. Collectivization and Food Procurement

It was primarily because of food production and food procurement that the government pushed the cooperativization program and moved against the capitalists and compradors in the first place. The repeated concern of the policy makers had been how to feed-and to provide jobs for-the 8 million unemployed people in the urban areas in the south (more than one-third of the total population) which they inherited from the former Saigon government.15 In terms of food procurement, the move against the compradors did not seem to strengthen the hand of the government. Instead, it backfired in a number of ways. First of all, since many of the compradors were ethnic Chinese, this gave China the excuse to terminate all aid and all trade by mid-1978. Trade with China had accounted for 70 percent of Vietnam's foreign trade. Much of China's aid had been consumer items, such as hot water flasks, bicycles, electric fans, canned milk, and fabrics; without these items the government had little to offer the peasants for their produce in order to encourage them to increase production. Meanwhile, the compradors-who had dispersed their goods and funds among their relatives and the tens of thousands of small traders belonging to their networks long before the final government move in March 1978-continued to compete with the government for the peasants' produce and to create obstacles to the government's effort at rural transformation. Even more important was the fact that the conflict with 13 Nguyen Kien Phuoc, "Long Phu-mot huyen manh" [Long Phu~a strong district], TCCS, April 1983, pp. 4245. 14 Le Minh Ngoc, "Ve tang lop trung nong o dong bang song Cuu Long" [On the middle-peasant class in the Mekong Delta], in Mot so van de khoa hoc xa hoi ve dong bang song Cuu Long, pp. 215-25. 15

TCCS, March 1977, p. 59; December 1975, p. 17.

170 Postwar Vietnam China necessitated the diversion of funds-especially after China's "military excursions" into Vietnam in early 1979-from agricultural projects in the Mekong Delta as well as in other parts of the country. The end result was that food production in the south stagnated in 1978 and 1979, whereas it had increased significantly in previous postwar years. In 1976 total staple production reached 7.1 million metric tons, or about 22 percent over the average prewar production of 5.2 million metric tons annually for the 1961-1965 period. In 1977, although there were many disastrous floods, food production in the south still reached 6.8 million metric tons-an increase of about 17 percent over the best prewar years. (Staple production is counted in terms of rice and rice equivalents: three kilograms of sweet potatoes or corn, for example, are equal to one kilogram of rice.) During the preescalation period of 1961-1965 the total production of corn, sweet potatoes, and manioc was 39,000,277,000, and 196,000 metric tons respectively. In 1977 the total production of these staples increased to 159,000, 775,000, and 1,400,000 metric tons respectively. These increases had been made possible largely by the movement of over a million persons from the north and from urban areas of the south to reclaim about one million hectares of land.16 This increased production did not, however, lead to an increase in government food procurement. Because of the resistance of the middle and rich peasants to government policies and programs and because of the shortage of consumer goods, farm equipment, and funds from the government, food procurement by the government amounted to only 398,800 metric tons in 1979, as compared to 950,000, 790,900, and 457,200 metric tons in 1976, 1977, and 1978 respectively. (Food procurement includes taxes and governmental purchase.) Under the agricultural tax system at the time, a peasant did not have to pay tax on produce kept for family consumption, but a graduated tax was imposed on all surplus. For example, a tax of 8 percent had to be paid on a surplus of 200 to 250 kilograms of rice. According to official surveys, most of the poor peasants did not have to pay any taxes and did not have any surplus to sell. Food procurement, therefore, largely concerned middle peasants. Procurement through taxes did not change significantly from 1976 to 1979 because food production did not decrease markedly. The drastic fall in procurement in 1978 and 1979 was largely due to the reaction of peasants to the government's purchasing policies. In 1976 the government purchased food from the peasants at prices equivalent to the free market prices. In 1978 and 1979 the government implemented its nghia vu luong thuc ("food obligations") policy, through which the peasants had to sell a certain amount of paddy rice to the government at the so-called "two-way contract" rate of 0.50 dong per kilogram, so that the government could then provide all registered inhabitants of the urban areas with a minimum rice ration of 13 kilograms per adult at the subsidized rate of 0.40 dong per kilogram-only one-tenth of the going market price. In return, the state sold the peasants an equal value of goods such as oil, gasoline, fertilizers, and fabrics at subsidized rates. But besides the fact that government goods were usually slow in coming because of shortages, pilferage, distribution, and transportation problems, many of the items pushed by the government were not necessarily what the peasants wanted to have. For example, the government wanted the Mekong Delta peasants to buy adequate amounts of urea fertilizer for their paddy fields. But few Mekong Delta peasants wanted to do so, although the application of this fertilizer to their fields was far below governmental recommendations. As a result, urea piled up in government warehouses in many southern provinces. On the other hand, there was a high demand for cement (which the peasants 16

Nguyen Huy, 35 nam thuc hien, pp. 134-35.

Cooperativization in Mekong Delta 171 wanted for resale at higher prices). The government did not have enough of such items as insecticides which the peasants would rather buy from the government at prices higher than the market rates because they were afraid of counterfeit. The effect of all the factors cited was that in 1979 in the province of Hau Giang, for example, food procurement by the government decreased four-fold. The overall food procurement situation would have been much worse if the government had not bought additional amounts of rice at market prices. To remedy this situation, in 1980 the government modified its pricing policies and was able to procure a million metric tons of rice.17 Food procurement, therefore, has more to do with market and pricing mechanisms than with collectivization and its various control mechanisms. Collectivization and Agricultural Development

As to the question of whether cooperativization has helped or will help promote agricultural development and rural development (which are not one and the same), most official reports at all levels have tended to obfuscate rather than clarify this. Take a report of the most successful province hi the Mekong Delta, for example: We are told that in 1976 the production of rice in the province totaled 800,000 metric tons, but in 1984 it reached 1.52 million metric tons, an average increase of 10 percent for the period 1980-1984. For the first time in its history, rice production reached 616 kilograms per capita and staple production equaled 10 percent of the total production of the entire country. The report also stresses that the entire population of Hau Giang is extremely happy to have been able to contribute 420,000 tons of grain to the government procurement program, or 10 percent of the entire amount of food staples procured by the government in 1984. Without actually making any connection, the report states that after many difficulties and complexities (whatever that means!), Hau Giang has completed the redistribution of land, created over 5,000 production collectives and 26 agricultural cooperatives, which together accounted for 62.27 percent of the rice surface in the province. Then the report made this complex analysis of the reasons for the achievements of the province in terms of agricultural production: The revolution in the relations of production in agriculture in Hau Giang has created the conditions for the laboring population to become the owners of the means of production, of labor, and of distribution and transportation. There is no doubt any further that among the factors promoting the development of production, agricultural transformation [sic., not socialist transformation of agriculture] has been the big factor and has played a leading role. The results in agricultural production, especially in food production, in Hau Giang have helped us confirm that the direction, techniques,and steps taken have been appropriate for the first stretch of the transitional period and precisely correct for the concrete situation and conditions in Hau Giang; this is also the result of the energetic and in-depth application of technical and technological advances into agricultural production.

...

17

Le Minh Ngoc, "Ve tang lop trung nong dan."

172 Postwar Vietnam The development of agricultural production in Hau Giang in the last ten years has been related organically to the development of local industries. ... If in 1976 the total value of industrial production was only 7 percent of the total value of agricultural-industrial production, in 1984 it increased to 33.53 percent.18 In other words, the report does not say whether it is cooperativization and socialist transformation of agriculture or capital and technological inputs which have been the leading factors in promoting agricultural production hi the province. We are not told how much of the increase in food production has been due to the combination of the above factors and how much to an increase in the cultivated surface as a result of the land reclamation program and of double cropping-both of which have been made possible by government investment in irrigation projects and the repair and building of irrigation ditches by the individual peasants. We are not sure, therefore, whether the 80 percent of all government investment in agricultural development which, according to Minister Triu, went to the southern region, has in fact helped production, because socialist transformation of agriculture there has not been completed as he claimed. All this brings us to the classic question of whether labor intensive, capital intensive, or a combination of both methods is appropriate for the Mekong Delta in particular, and for Vietnam as a whole. The answer to this question depends on many factors, among them distribution of resources and means of production, population, and land distribution, traditional local practices in agriculture, social and political consciousness. But if the government is convinced that the labor intensive method as manifested through the cooperativization program is an appropriate one for the southern region, then it will have to change drastically the organizational structures and management of the cooperatives, as well as make the necessary investments to equalize the resources in the hands of the various peasant categories first, before these peasants would be willing to join the cooperatives. Even if one were to assume-contrary to fact-that the southern peasants had basically been petty peasants like the peasants of the Red River Delta to begin with, that they had never been affected by commercialization of the rural economy and capital inputs, and that they had all agreed to enter the collectives and cooperatives gladly of their own accord, the organizational structures and the management of the present cooperatives-even in the most "advanced" areas—leave much to be desired. There has been a tremendous amount of government propaganda stating that the cooperative system as practiced in the north would be applicable to the southern region, if only the local southern cadres could somehow patiently, "actively and firmly" transplant the structures-with some creative minor modifications to suit the concrete conditions of the local areas in the south, of course. An example of this kind of propaganda is the tremendous play that the government has given to the novel Cu Lao Tran in its newspapers and magazines in recent months. But even in the north, the organizational structures and management of the cooperatives inhibited production and rural development and thereby threatened to destroy the cooperatives as an institution, especially in the postwar situation where people were no longer willing to put up with all the problems and excesses. Reform measures have so far saved the cooperatives as an institution and have helped increase production somewhat. But all these reform measures—especially the much-talked-about "new contract system" which has been widely considered to be extremely radical-have served only to maximize the utiliza-

18

TCCS, April 1985, pp. 57-58.

Cooperativization in Mekong Delta 173 tion of land and labor through a somewhat fairer distribution of resources within the cooperatives and through mutual responsibility (i.e., since each of the contractors would stand to benefit from the "end products" of the work or the land contracted, they would make sure among themselves that there would not be any free riders). But since efforts at maximizing labor and land utilization can only produce one-time results, agricultural production might have already reached a plateau by the end of 1984. Further agricultural development will have to depend on increases in capital and technological inputs, as well as on more basic changes in the organizational structures of the cooperatives. If this conclusion is correct, then the political and policy implications are indeed quite significant both in terms of further agricultural and rural development in Vietnam in general and in terms of collectivization hi the south in particular.

This page intentionally left blank

Institutional Change

This page intentionally left blank

THE REGULARIZATION OF POLITICS: CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN THE PARTY'S CENTRAL COMMITTEE, 1951-1986 CarlyleA. Thayer Introduction In March 1982 the Vietnam Communist Party (VCP) held its Fifth National Congress and elected a new Central Executive Committee1 composed of 152 members. The list which appeared in the official party newspaper Nhan Dan differed from those published following the Third and Fourth National Party Congresses.2 Previously, members of the Central Committee were divided into two groups, full (uy vien chinh thuc) and alternate (uy vien du khuyei), and listed in Vietnamese alphabetical order.3 In 1982, however, full members were sub-divided into seven categories, while alternate members were grouped into five sub-divisions. This new-style listing provided for the first time an authoritative insight into the structural composition of Vietnam's political elite. This chapter will explore the significance of these groupings by comparing changes in the composition of the Central Committee over the thirty-five year span between the Second and Sixth National Congresses.4 It will also examine the question of elite transition, as the first generation of Vietnamese Marxist revolutionaries, now aged in their late seventies, comes to an end and passes the mantle of leadership to a younger group of officials. The Second Congress of the Party, held in February 1951 in the midst of the resistance war against France, elected a Central Committee.5 This provides a starting point for ana1

Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong; termed Central Committee (CC) for convenience.

2

"Danh sach Toan Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong," [Roster of the CC] Nhan Dan, September 12,1960; and "Ban Chap Hanh Trung Uong Dang Cong San Viet Nam Khoa IV," [The fourth CC of the Vietnam Communist Party] Nhan Dan, December 23,1976. 3

In 1960 Ho Chi Minh's name came first, followed by the rest of the Central Committee. No doubt this was in deference to his position as chairman (chu tich\ sometimes translated as president) of the Party. This post should not be confused with that of first secretary (hi thu nnat), retitled general secretary (tong bi thu) in 1976.

4

The First Congress was held in Portuguese Macau in March 1935. It elected a nine-member Central Committee led by Secretary-General Le Hong Phong. 50 Years of Activities of the Communist Party of Vietnam (Hanoi: FLPH, 1980), p. 47. Because of the small numbers involved, and the historical controversy surrounding this gathering, I have decided not to include the Central Committee chosen by this congress as the starting point for my analysis. For a discussion, see Huynh Kim Khanh, Vietnamese Communism, 1925-1945 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), pp. 186-88.

5

The name of the Vietnam Communist Party (Dang Cong San Viet Nam) has changed over time. Founded in February 1930, it was renamed the Indochinese Communist Party (Dong Duong Cong San Dang) in October of that year. In November 1945 it was formally disbanded. However, the Party did maintain a covert existence, emerging in March 1951 under the name Vietnam Workers' Party (Dang Lao Dong Viet Nam). In December 1976 the name was changed to the Vietnam Communist Party, for convenience, this name will be used throughout this chapter.

177

178 Postwar Vietnam lyzing Vietnam's national leadership.6 The Third Congress, convened in September 1960, was the first congress to be held by the VCP as a Party in power. Some six years had already passed since ending of the anti-French resistance war and the partitioning of Vietnam, ample time for an underground Party to assume the tasks of running government. It was at this congress that Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan (1961-1966) was announced. The Fourth Congress was held sixteen months after the de facto reunification of Vietnam in 1975, a somewhat shorter period of time to readjust from war to peace. Nonetheless, the Fourth Congress witnessed the incorporation of the southern party organization (dang bo mien nam) into a national structure and the announcement of Vietnam's Second FiveYear Plan (1976-1980). The Fifth and Sixth Congresses, held in 1982 and 1986, marked the start of a process of regularization (discussed below). Why is a study of the changing composition of the VCP's Central Committee important to a study of contemporary Vietnamese politics? On the face of it, the answer appears obvious: members of the Central Committee represent the political elite of Vietnam. It is they who make the vital decisions on the economic and social questions which are a central topic of this volume. Other chapters discuss ongoing debates over economic policy. As it is from among the present full and alternate members of the VCP's Central Committee that Vietnam's post-revolutionary leadership generation is emerging, it is crucial to understand this group of policy makers. There is another reason why a study of Vietnam's political elite is important. Vietnam is a closed, secretive political system. Its media are carefully controlled and many important publications are generally not available outside the country. Access by foreign scholars is limited, infrequent, and also carefully controlled. A study of biographical data is not generally affected by these constraints. At the least, such data provide an empirical base upon which to construct a table of organization of central- and provincial-level Party, state, and military organizations. This is useful, because such basic information is often lacking in studies of contemporary Vietnamese politics.7 Biographical data may also be used in making generalized statements about the functioning of the Vietnamese political system over time; for example, assessing the roles and relative influence of the military, civilian technocrats, and provincial Party leaders. It can also be used to chart generational change and the rise and decline of various sectoral groups. There is a third reason why a systematic, empirically based study of Vietnam's political elite is valuable. Such an approach will enable scholars to compare Vietnam with other societies. Data on Vietnam can then be used in conjunction with analyses dealing with transition in post-revolutionary societies, as well as the study of political elites in socialist countries. Methodology This chapter presents a new qualitative and quantitative approach to the question of continuity and change in the Vietnamese leadership. It is argued that the nature, magni-

6

Truong Dang Cao Cap Nguyen Ai Quoc, Lich su dang cong san Viet Nam, 1920-1954 (Hanoi: Sach Giao Khoa Mac-Lenin, 1983), 1: 311.

7

See, for example, the disappointing study by Nguyen Van Canh (with Earle Cooper), Vietnam Under Communism 1975-1982 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983). This book is significant because none other has appeared in English on the post-1975 political system in Vietnam.

Regularization of Politics 179 tude, and frequency of changes in the composition of Party leadership posts are the result of political development and emerging organizational complexity, as the Vietnamese political system responds to input demands from its domestic environment.8 This should be considered a preliminary hypothesis, as the data base is still incomplete. In the course of quantitative analysis of the available data, the author developed a working theory of sectoral representation as the most convincing explanation of the emerging patterns. To date, the standard qualitative paradigm for analyzing Vietnamese leadership change has been the factional model popularized by P. J. Honey in the 1960s.9 Thai Quang Trung has used this concept of factions to analyze leadership change since the death of Ho Chi Minh in a recent study with a variety of serious flaws which have been discussed elsewhere.10 Such an approach may have merit if the inside sources are authoritative and knowledgeable. For example, the views of former Politbureau member Hoang Van Hoan on the workings of the Central Committee prior to 1976 would appear especially valuable, if subject to standard scholarly evaluation.11 Nevertheless, advocates of this approach, who sometimes rely on the uncorroborated evidence of non-Party officials and low-level defectors, overemphasize the notion of intra-Party factionalism in explaining leadership change. Trung's study is deficient in the manner in which he treats the periodic and quite regular reshuffling of ministerial posts. A sectoral approach to the study of leadership changes provides a different perspective, suggesting that change is due in part to political development and its concomitant, structural differentiation. It is argued here that those elected to leadership positions are elected because they have a sectoral or territorial base (e.g. a ministry or a province) rather than owing their position to the patronage of, and their support for, a particular Party "heavy" or "boss." Implicitly, the factional model assumes that there are only two or three important rival politicians (e.g. Le Duan v. Truong Chinh) connected to polarized political positions (e.g. pro-Soviet v. pro-Chinese; orthodox Marxist-Leninists v. economic reformers). The "sectoral representation" hypothesis proposed here implies that "interest group" politics is at work in Vietnam and that Central Committee members represent sectorally or regionally based constituencies rather than being straw men filling out a top leader's "faction."12

8

For a discussion of the systems approach and its applicability to Vietnam, see the author's "Political Development in Vietnam, 1975-85," in Contemporary Vietnam: Perspectives from Australia, ed. Colin Mackerras, Robert Cribb and Allan Healry (Wollongong: University of Wollongong Press, 1988). This chapter relies on Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., Comparative Politics: System, Process and Policy, 2nd ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978).

9

P. J. Honey, 'The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh," in North Vietnam Today, ed. P. J. Honey (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 47-58; and Honey, Communism in North Vietnam (Cambridge: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963), ch. 2. 10 Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An Essay on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1985). The author of this publication fails to define his central concept, factionalism; also, his evidence for the existence of factions is assertive and not based on empirical evidence. For an extended critique see: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnamese Perspectives on International Security: Three Revolutionary Currents," in Asian Perspectives on International Security, ed. Donald H. McMillen (London: Macmillan Press, 1984), pp. 57-65. 11 12

Hoan, however, has not been forthcoming in his interviews with foreign journalists.

Interest group theory has long been used in the analysis of Soviet politics. I was influenced by the work of T. H. Rigby.

180 Postwar Vietnam Leadership Change: The Central Committee As indicated above, the Central Committee of the VCP is elected by a national congress of Party delegates. Party statutes set out the frequency of these meetings; these statutes have been amended, gradually extending the stipulated time period between congresses from once every three years (1951), to once every four years (1960), to once every five years (1976). National congresses have been relatively infrequent affairs until recently, as Party statutes permit the postponement of a congress as a result of special circumstances. For example, some nine years elapsed between the Second and Third Congresses (1951-1960), while a further sixteen years passed before the convening of the Fourth Congress (December 1976). The Fifth and Sixth Party Congresses were held more or less on schedule, in March 1982 and December 1986, respectively. In the thirty-five year period between the Second and Sixth Congresses, a total of 312 persons have served on the Central Committee. This figure includes all whose names were listed in the official newspaper Nhan Dan following a Party congress, as well as those who have since been identified in the official media. Included in the latter category are a number of secret appointees to the Central Committee chosen in September 1960, as well as individuals appointed and/or coopted onto the Central Committee to fill vacancies in the time period between congresses. There is at least one case where a member was appointed to the Central Committee after a congress but died before the next congress.13 Central Committee membership represents only a tiny fraction of total Party membership, which itself is but a small proportion of the total population. The ratio of Central Committee membership to total Party membership is extraordinarily small: .004 percent (1951), .014 percent (1960), .009 percent (1976), .009 percent (1982), and .0096 percent (1986).14 In 1986, total Party membership was about 3 percent of the Vietnamese population. Membership on the Central Committee has increased nearly six-fold since the 1951 Second Congress. Total numbers (including full and alternates) have risen as follows: 29 (1951 CC), 74 (1960 CC), 133 (1976 CC), 152 (1982 CC), to 173 (1986). While there has been a tremendous growth hi absolute numbers, the rate of increase from one CC to the next, expressed as a percentage, has slowed considerably in recent years: 61 percent between the Second and Third Congresses; 44 percent between the Third and Fourth Congresses, and 12 percent between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses and also between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses. Full membership grew as follows: 59 percent between the Second and Third Congresses; 54 percent between the Third and Fourth Congresses; 13 percent between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses; and 6.5 percent between the Fifth and Sixth Congresses. The comparable figures for alternates are: 64 percent, 12 percent, 11 percent, and 26.5 percent respectively. These figures are pictured in the diagram below,

13 See the case of Truong Chi Cuong, coopted after the Third Congress as a new alternate member, but who died in March 1975 before the Fourth Congress. While the number of such cases is small, they do provide an additional complication when determining exact CC membership. 14 These percentages are calculated from the following ratio of CC membership to total party membership: 29: 766,349 (1951); 75: 525,000 (1960); 133:1,553,550 (1976); 152:1,727,784 (1982), and 173:1,800,000 (1986).

Regularization of Politics 181

Diagram 11.1. The Rate of Growth in the Size of Central Committee Membership by Status, 1951-1986

What appears to be happening is a process of regularizing leadership change in those periods when the Party has moved from armed conflict to managing the peace. Thus, the small and lean 1951 Central Committee served as a core, around which new members were added in 1960, after the Party moved from the resistance phase of struggle to economic development along socialist lines. Since 1960, the Party has had to engage in both armed struggle and socialist construction. With the end of the war in 1975 and reunification of the country, the Party has expanded its membership to cope with new tasks. It would appear that full membership was expanded to meet these demands, while a relatively small and stable group of alternates was tested for leadership potential. The figures set out below help to document this point. If 1951 is taken as starting point, continuity and change in the Central Committee as a whole may be measured by observing the pattern of promotion from one Central Committee to the next. Any Central Committee chosen after 1951 will consist of the following categories of members: full retained; full promoted (that is, former alternates who were advanced); full new; and new alternates. The residual cases represent full and alternate members not reappointed, as well as members who have died. Data at hand reveal in the period from 1951 to 1982 that no alternate members were retained in that status: they were either promoted or dropped.15 At the most recent Party congress in 1986, six alternate members were retained. Table 11.1 and Diagram 11.2 set out the composition of the four Central Committees selected since the Second Congress in 1951. The data in Table 11.1 and Diagram 11.2 indicate several trends. First, there appears to be a well-established pattern of leadership renewal, whereby full membership on the Central Committee is granted to two distinct streams of persons. One stream consists of alter15 In 1982, there was some confusion outside Vietnam when Nguyen Chan, a new alternate, was thought to be the same person who had served on the 1976 Central Committee also as an alternate. However, these were two different persons whose names had different diacritics.

182 Postwar Vietnam

Table 11.1 Retention and Promotion Rates on the Central Committee 1960 (N=75)

1976 (N= 133)

1982 (N= 152)

1986 (N= 173)

Full retained

19 (25%)

34(26%)

65 (43%)

62 (36%)

Promoted

10 (13%)

11 (8%)

21 (14%)

23 (13%)

Full new

17 (23%)

56 (42%)

30(20%)

39 (23%)

Status

Alternate retained Alternate

-

29 (39%)

-

32 (24%)

-

36 (24%)

6 (3%)

43 (25%)

The columns do not all add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

Diagram 11.2. Composition of the Central Committee by Seniority, Promotion, and Membership Status.

Regularization of Politics 183 nates who have earned promotion. The other comprises individuals appointed directly on to the Central Committee, without any period of apprenticeship on the Party's top policymaking body. Second, the trends would seem to indicate that in recent times retention rates for full and alternate members have gone up, from a stable 34-38 percent (19601976) to over 50 percent at present. Finally, it would appear that the number of alternate members has stabilized at roughly a quarter of total membership. Three questions arise from the variations in the data presented in Table 11.1 and Diagram 11.2: (1) Why were so many alternates appointed in 1960? (2) Why were so many new members appointed in 1976? and (3) Why were so many members either retained or promoted in 1982 and 1986? While definitive answers to these questions are not possible, the gap in time between one congress and the next must be taken into account. Up until 1982, congresses of the VCP were not held on schedule as dictated by Party statutes. The convocation of a national congress was a comparatively rare event. It seems reasonable to speculate that leadership changes were directly related to the goals and objectives adopted by a particular congress. It is not known why Party officials held the Third Congress in 1960 instead of earlier, say in 1958 or 1959. Perhaps scheduling of the Third Congress was initially dependent on implementation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements. With hindsight, it is clear that no such congress could have been held in 1955-1957 because of the disruption and turmoil engendered by the land reform and rectification of errors campaigns. By 1960, however, Vietnam's communist leaders clearly had accepted the fact that Vietnam was divided and unlikely to be reunited in the short-term. The Third Congress, then, was convened to set the direction for building socialism in the north, symbolized by unveiling Vietnam's First Five-Year Plan, as well as to discuss conduct of the national democratic revolution in the south. The increase in alternate Central Committee membership at this time may be related to those twin goals.16 Of the twenty-nine alternates appointed, 57 percent could be classified as central Party and state officials17 and 29 percent military. There is no data available on the remaining 14 percent (or four individuals). Leadership changes in 1976 are a matter of some controversy. The factional model of analysis provides one set of explanations. Ex-Politibureau member Hoang Van Hoan has alleged that one-third of the full members of the Central Committee, opponents of the Le Duan faction, were dropped, enabling the new Central Committee to be stacked with Le Duan loyalists.18 Other writers have discerned a "pro-China group," centered around Hoang Van Hoan and including several alternates, who were dropped at this time.19 The 16 The Vietnam People's Army was also modernized at this time. See: Carlyle A. Thayer, "Southern Vietnamese Revolutionary Organizations and the Vietnam Workers' Party: Continuity and Change, 1954-1974," in Communism in Indochina: New Perspectives, ed. Joseph J. Zasloff and MacAlister Brown (Lexington: Heath, 1975), pp. 44^6. 17 This classification includes ministers, vice ministers, members of Central Committee departments, and members of central government agencies such as the State Science Committee. 18 See the discussion in P. J. Honey, Vietnam Quarterly Report No. 74, China News Analysis, No. 1179, April 25,1980, pp. 3-4. 19

This is argued by P. J. Honey in, "The 4th Congress of the Lao Dong Party," China News Analysis, No. 1072, March 11,1977. These views are accepted uncritically by Thai Quang Trung, Collective Leadership and Factionalism, pp. 73-74. In an interview with the author, a Vietnamese official challenged elements of this interpretation, asserting, for example, that one CC member, Nguyen Trong Vinh, had been appointed ambassador to China just before the Fourth Congress, at which time it was clear his chances of retaining alternate status were unlikely. Vinh's appointment was a demonstration that the leadership's political confidence in him re-

184 Postwar Vietnam defection of Hoan to China in 1979 and the reported house arrest of Le Quang Ba and Chu Van Tan, two full members dropped in 1976, provide strong evidence that there were policy disagreements at Central Committee level.20 However, a detailed examination of 1976 leadership changes reveals that more fundamental processes were at work, apparently unrelated to the policy/personality differences experienced by Hoang Van Hoan.21 First, it must be noted that the sixteen-year time span between the Third and Fourth Congresses, which embraced the armed struggle for national reunification, constituted the longest inter-congress period under consideration here. During that extended time there was attrition in membership through natural causes. Second, in 1976 it was necessary to integrate the leadership and organization of the southern branch of the Party into a regularized national structure. Finally, there was a normal turnover in membership, first witnessed in 1960, as incompetent, ailing, and/or elderly members were replaced by officials who had performed well during the previous years. The third question to arise from Table 11.1 and Diagram 11.2, namely, why so many members were retained in 1982 and 1986 as compared with previous Central Committees, may be answered in part by noting that a relatively short interval separated each of these congresses from its predecessor. The magnitude of natural changes was less intense than previously. Second, leadership retention rates in 1982 and 1986 must take into account the expansion in size of the Central Committee in 1976. There were now comparatively more younger and technically competent individuals available for vetting and promotion. Third, the period between the Fourth and Sixth Congresses was marked by frequent redistribution of state ministerial posts, apparently a form of experimentation to fit the best individual to the best job. Related to this was a less public and much more difficult to document process of fitting the best individuals to Party posts. Nevertheless, some 27 percent (fifteen of fifty-five) of the full members appointed in 1976 were not retained in 1982. It is difficult to reconcile this figure with the view that the 1976 full new intake was selected mainly for its political loyalty to Le Duan. A second and related measure of continuity versus change is the length of time a member has served on the Central Committee. For example, the Central Committee chosen at the Fifth Congress in 1982 was composed of thirteen full members (11 percent of the total) first elected in 1951; eleven full members (10 percent) first elected in 1960; sixty-two members (53 percent) first elected in 1976, and thirty members (26 percent) first elected in 1982. In other words, 11 percent of the 1982 Central Committee had served for thirtyone years or longer, 10 percent had put in twenty-two years of service, while 53 percent had worked for only nine years. The remainder were new appointees with no prior experience on the Central Committee.

mained intact and that he was considered fit for this post. Further, the former ambassador to China (up to the end of 1969), Ngo Minh Loan, was well known for his o/i/i-Chinese views; his dismissal was related rather to his poor handling of the Ministry of Food. Finally, my source challenged the view that the Fourth Congress had taken an anti-China line and had therefore dismissed a pro-China group. He pointed out that several former ambassadors to the USSR had also been dropped. He asked rhetorically why no one argued that a proSoviet group had been dismissed. 20

Reported by Nayan Chanda, "A Massive Shock for Vietnam," Far Eastern Economic Review, August 10, 1979, p. 89.

21

These are explored in my "Development Strategies in Vietnam: The Fourth National Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party," Asian Profile [Hong Kong) 7, 3 (June 1979): 276-80.

Regularization of Politics 185 The process of leadership transition and generational change is illustrated by using data on the length of time a member has served on the Central Committee (see Diagram 11.3 below). If we term the group first elected in 1951 the original revolutionary generation, its passing from the scene can be illustrated with reference to its declining strength on the national leadership body. At the Third Congress in 1960, the revolutionary generation comprised 63 percent of all members; this figure shrank to 20 percent in 1976, fell to 11 percent at the Fifth Congress in 1982, and plummeted to 3 percent in 1986. The average age of this group in 1986 was approximately seventy-four, with a range from sixty-five (youngest) to seventy-eight (oldest). Only eight of the thirteen were currently serving on the Politbureau and they broke down into two groups: those in their seventies (Le Duan,22 Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, Le Due Tho), who retired at the Sixth Congress; and those in their mid to late sixties (Pham Hung, To Huu, Do Muoi, Van Tien Dung).

Diagram 11.3. Generational Transition-Trie Passing of the 1951 Central Committee.

Quite clearly, Vietnam is experiencing an imminent leadership transition, as one generation gives way to another. Re-examination of the data on time served on the Central Committee reveals a relatively small body of officials with between twenty and thirty years' experience at the national level. This is most noticeable if one looks at those members who joined the Central Committee in 1960: their numbers have fallen from 37 percent of total full membership in 1960, to 26 percent (1976), 10 percent (1982), to 5 percent (1986), a slightly smaller component than the 1951 group. They would appear to be of the same generation as the 1951 appointees, with an average age in 1986 of seventy-two.23 These data suggest that the transition from one generation to another is already taking place, and was a striking feature of leadership appointments at the Sixth Party Congress. Unfortu-

22

Le Duan died in July 1986.

23

Data was available on eight of the eleven members.

186 Postwar Vietnam nately, the lack of data does not permit detailed examination of age differences in the remaining two categories of leaders, the 1976 and 1982 intakes. The Central Committee: Sectoral Composition As mentioned above, following the 1982 Fifth Congress, the Party press departed from its previous practice of either listing Central Committee members in Vietnamese alphabetical order or in rank order (presumably based on balloting). This time, after first listing seventeen current and immediate past members of the Politbureau in order of Party seniority, the remaining ninety-nine members were arranged into six sub-lists by alphabetical order. Although none of the components was labeled, certain patterns would have been evident to knowledgeable readers. By going one step further and checking the Party and/or state positions of every 1982 Central Committee member, it became apparent that each sub-list represented a sectoral group, to which one can assign a descriptive label. These groupings are pictured in Diagram 11.4 below.

Diagram 11.4. Sectoral Composition of the 1982 Central Committee (Full Members).

The first group comprises the senior Party leadership, that is, eleven full members of the Politbureau24 and the six members who had not been reappointed in 1982. The remaining full members are listed in the following six categories: central Party and state officials, newly appointed central Party and state officials, secondary-level Party and state officials, newly appointed secondary-level Party and state officials, military, and new military. In a similar fashion, alternate members are grouped into five categories: senior state officials (vice ministers or equivalent), technocrats (directors of key enterprises), provincial Party officials, junior provincial Party officials (deputy secretaries), and the military.

24

Four new members of the Politbureau were not listed in the senior category. Dong Sy Nguyen (alternate), Nguyen Due Tarn, and Nguyen CoThach (alternate) were listed among the central level officials, while Le Due Anh, a general, was listed with the military.

Regularization of Politics 187

The 1982 leadership list is significant because it provides a Party view of the composition of the Central Committee. The order and numbers of persons in each category may be assumed to reflect the relative influence of sectoral groups comprising the Vietnamese political system. For purposes of comparison, I have also classified members of the 1986, 1976, and 1960 Central Committees by occupational position held at the time of selection and then grouped them into one of the seven categories above. The paucity of data on alternate members does not permit a similar comparison. The results of this exercise are summarized below in Table 11.2.25 Table 11.2 Sectoral Composition of the Central Committee, 1960-1986 Sectoral Category

1960

1976

1982

1986

SENIOR PARTY

28%

17%

15%

11%

Central Party/State New Central Party/State COMBINED CENTRAL

26% 20% 46%

22% 20% 42%

32% 10% 42%

27% 5% 32%

Secondary Party/State New Secondary Party/State COMBINED SECONDARY

11% 0% 11%

3% 23% 26%

18% 12% 30%

25% 24% 49%

Military New Military COMBINED MILITARY

2% 13% 15%

3% 13% 16%

10% 3% 13%

5% 2% 7%

The most important trend to emerge from the data in Table 11.2 is the rise of secondary-level Party officials. This development has been at the expense of senior Party and central-level officials. During this thirty-five year period, secondary-level leaders increased their representation on the Central Committee from 11 percent to 49 percent. This has mainly taken the form of increased representation of provincial Party secretaries (and in a few cases, deputy secretaries) on the Central Committee. By way of illustration, in 1960, if the Hanoi City Party Committee is included, only three provincial Party secretaries were represented on the Central Committee.26 In 1986, at least thirty provincial25. The data in this table should be taken as suggestive rather than definitive. There are still problems of missing, contradictory, or incomplete data on certain individuals which make classification difficult. Because of this problem, the category "combined total" in the three instances above is a more accurate guide to the sectoral composition of the Central Committee. 26. These were: Nguyen Lam (Hanoi), Ngo Thuyen (Thanh Hoa), and Vo Thuc Dong (Nghe An). Problems of classification are illustrated in the case of the three secret full members appointed in 1960 and assigned to the Central Committee Directorate for South Vietnam (i.e., Nguyen Van Linh, Vo Chi Cong, and Vo Van Kiet), as well as the secretary of the Viet Bac Autonomous Zone Party Committee (Chu Van Tan). These

188 Postwar Vietnam level Party officials were included on the national leadership body.27 Inexplicably ten provinces were not represented on the Central Committee by province-level officials at that time.28 A second trend to emerge from Table 11.2 is the marked decline in the military's position from 16 to 7 percent of full membership in the ten-year period since reunification. Previous studies have tended to indicate a quite dramatic drop, from 30 percent in 1976 to just over 11 percent by 1982.29 Part of the discrepancy is definitional, as many army officers are assigned to civilian posts and it is unclear whether they are on secondment or have retired from active military service. The figures presented in Table 11.2 attempt to reflect the method of classification adopted by Nhan Dan in 1982. The 1960 figures are considerably lower than other estimates.30 Gareth Porter has produced figures showing a decline in military representation from 20 percent in 1960, to 14 percent in 1975, to 11 percent in 1982.31 A third trend indicated by Table 11.2 is the decline of senior Party officials as a proportion of total Central Committee membership. This category includes mainly Politbureau members. From a high in 1960 of 28 percent, representation by senior Party officials fell to 17 percent in 1976, fell still further to 15 percent in 1982, and reached an all time low of 11 percent in 1986. This decline may be explained in part by the dramatic increase in the overall size of the Central Committee which occurred in 1976. Since then senior Party representation has averaged 14 percent of the total. It seems unlikely that this figure will shrink much further.32 A fourth trend illustrated in Table 11.2 is the decline in representation of central-level officials, from 46 percent in 1960 to 32 percent in 1986, and the steady rise to prominence of secondary-level Party officials, including many new members. Within this overall trend, a significant sub-current is at work. Incumbent central-level officials, first brought on to the Central Committee in 1976, are being retained, while the proportion of new central Party officials is diminishing over time. This group of central-level officials brought on to the Central Committee in 1976 and retained since, represents a stable group from among whom future Politbureau members can be expected to be selected.

persons are not considered strictly provincial representatives. In terms of the data in Table 11.2 they are classified as secondary-level Party officials at the time of their appointment. 27

This includes the municipalities of Hanoi, Ho Chi Minh City, and Haiphong, as well as the Vung Tau-Con Dao Special Zone. 28

According to my biographical data files, these provinces were Ben Tre, Dae Lac, Dong Thap, Ha Son Binh, Lai Chau, Quang Nam Da Nang, Quang Ninh, Song Be, Tay Ninh, and Thuan Hai. 29

Carlyle A. Thayer, "Vietnam's Two Strategic Tasks: Building Socialism and Defending the Fatherland," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1983, ed. Pushpa Thambipillai (Aldershot: Gower Publishing Company, 1983), pp. 309-12. These figures include all members, whereas, Table 11.2 discusses full members only. 30

David Elliot has estimated the military/police composition of the 1960 Central Committee at 21 percent; see; "Revolutionary Re-integration: A Comparison of the Foundation of Post-Liberation Political Systems in North Vietnam and China" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Cornell University, 1976), vol. 2: 315.

31

Gareth Porter, "Vietnamese Communism: Internal Debates Force Change," Indochina Issues, No. 31, December 1982, p. 2. Porter's figures include both full and alternate members.

32

The size of the Politbureau over the last thirty-five years has been as follows: eight (1951), thirteen (1960), seventeen (1976), fifteen (1982), and fourteen (1986).

Regularization of Politics 189 The Sixth Party Congress

For the last fifty-six years (1930-1986), Vietnam's ruling Communist Party has been dominated by men who became politically active in the 1920s and who founded the Vietnam Communist Party in 1930. This first generation of revolutionaries, comparable to Russia's Bolshevik or China's "Long March" generations, has been elected to the top Party posts on the Politbureau, Secretariat, and Central Committee at each successive national congress since 1951. In 1986, at the Sixth Party Congress, in an act not usually associated with leadership change in communist states, the founding fathers of the Vietnam Communist Party stepped aside, vacating then* positions on these bodies. Even the Party's secretary-general stepped down.33 In order to appreciate the significance of these changes, note should be taken of two underlying processes which have influenced Vietnam's peaceful leadership transition. Vietnam's Sixth National Party Congress brought to an end a protracted period of generational succession. A decade ago, coincident with reunification, Vietnam's original revolutionary generation began to pass from the scene. At Vietnam's Third National Party Congress in 1960, for example, the proportion of Central Committee members first elected in 1951 stood at 63 percent. By 1976 this figure had fallen to 20 percent; at the Fifth Congress five years later, this number had shrunk to 11 percent. In the five years since the Fifth Congress, the number of members first elected in 1951 stood at only four persons, or 3 percent of the total full membership. The process of generational succession has preoccupied Vietnamese leaders for some time. Starting at the Fourth Congress in 1976, and at each subsequent congress including the most recent, a consistent pattern of leadership turnover has emerged.34 These changes have rapidly reduced the voting power of the older generation. For example, 31 percent of the current full membership was first elected in 1986, 37 percent were first elected in 1982, and another 24 percent were first elected in 1976. Vietnamese Party officials have also given some thought to generational succession involving members of the Politbureau. In March 1982, on the eve of the Fifth Party Congress, the editor of the party's newspaper Nhan Dan spoke of the necessity to "rejuvenate the Politbureau only gradually and slowly."35 That year, in an unprecedented move, six senior members of the Politbureau stepped down. Throughout 1986, Party spokesmen made clear to visiting journalists that the past pattern would be repeated, and that some of the top officials would retire. Despite Secretary-General Le Duan's untimely death in mid-year, and possibly some second thoughts by Party officials, six full Politbureau members were retired at the Sixth Congress. Three of the most senior have been appointed special advisers to the Central Committee, while a fourth, Van Tien Dung, retains his seat on the Central Committee.

33

Contrary to much foreign press coverage, this was neither unique nor unprecedented. In 1956, two Politbureau members, including the Party's first secretary, stepped down in the wake of failures associated with land reform. In 1982, six Politbureau members retired at the Fifth Congress.

34

At each congress, approximately 45 percent of the Central Committee members are retained, 18 percent promoted from alternate status, and 37 percent newly elected. These figures are derived from data on leadership changes from the Third to Sixth Congresses (1960-1986). 35

Quoted in Thayer, "Vietnam's Two Strategic Tasks," pp. 299-324.

190 Postwar Vietnam The process of generational succession has been accompanied by a second process, which may be termed the "regularization of politics," as Vietnam's political system has moved from an operational mode dictated by the exigencies of war, to a more routine, regular pattern. As Party congresses have become regular affairs, there has been a more frequent evaluation of the national leadership and its performance by the Party's rankand-file. Further, the complexity of reintegrating the south and managing an underdeveloped economy has resulted in an expansion in the size of the Central Committee, and the admission of new sectoral groups to the policy-making arena. Membership on the Central Committee has steadily expanded, increasing sixfold between 1951 and 1986. The greatest influx occurred at the Fourth Congress in 1976 when the size of the Central Committee leapt from 74 to 133 members. It has risen at each subsequent congress to a high of 173 in 1986. Most of the new officials represent Vietnam's second generation of revolutionaries who were born after the Party was founded and who began their careers during the anti-French resistance (1945-1954).36 In the last decade they have quickly risen to the top rungs of power. For example, 50 percent of the Politbureau, and 62 percent of the Secretariat were first elected to the Central Committee in 1976. Over the last two decades, the sectoral composition of the Central Committee has been changing markedly. The main beneficiaries have been secondary Party and state officials, whose representation on the Central Committee leapt from 11 percent to 49 percent. These are mainly provincial Party secretaries, economic specialists, and technocrats. In contrast, military representation has declined slowly but steadily with each passing congress, from a high of 16 percent in 1976 to a low of 7 percent this year. The ranks of central-level Party and state officials on the Central Committee has likewise declined from 46 percent (I960) to 32 percent. The dramatic increase in the number of younger, secondary-level Party and state officials has meant a greater focus on economic issues. This was particularly evident at province-level Party discussions in the lead-up to the national congress. Here, similar patterns emerged, with the emphasis on younger, better-educated, and more technically competent leaders. In summary, the policies of the central-level economic reformers have found broad support in an emerging coalition of province-level officials, in both north and south Vietnam, now given increased voting representation on the Central Committee. These persons can be expected to benefit from economic policies which stress administrative decentralization, local autonomy, and greater initiative at the grass-roots level. The person most identified with Vietnam's new economic policies is Nguyen Van Linh, the new Party secretary-general. Linh has surrounded himself with colleagues who actively prosecuted the war in southern Vietnam in the mid- to late-1960s. These men are policy implementors and doers. Their experience has convinced them of the desirability to reach out and broaden the base of popular support for their objectives. Already Linh has spoken out, urging reconciliation between the Party and Vietnam's ethnic Chinese, Catholics, and former members of the Saigon regime. The nature of Linh's broad new coalition 36 According to the Vietnam News Agency, "their average age is 56.1; 116 members are aged from 40 to 59 (67 percent), 56 others from 60 upward (32.3 percent), and one member below 40. Twenty-one members of the new Central Committee were admitted to the Party before 1945 (12 percent); 142 in the 1945-65 period (82 percent) and 10 in the 1965-69 period (5.9 percent). Of the Party Central Committee, 75 members have got university or higher academic degrees, accounting for 43.3 percent and 56 others have graduated from senior high schools (32.3 percent)." VNA, December 25,1986 in SWB FE/8456/B/6, January 3,1987.

Regularization of Politics 191

is encapsulated in a phrase heard at the Sixth Congress: "the north won the war, the south must manage the economy."37 Conclusion

This chapter has examined the theme of continuity and change in membership of the Vietnam Communist Party's Central Committee, from the 1951 Second Congress to the 1986 Sixth Congress. Data on seniority clearly illustrate that a process of generational transition is under way. The first generation of revolutionary leaders, both those appointed to the Central Committee in 1951 and those of the same generation appointed in 1960, represent a declining proportion of total membership. At the time of the Sixth Congress in 1986, this group (8 percent of all full members) had been in service at the national level for more than twenty-six years. It will be replaced by a new group which, in 1986, had ten or fewer years of service at the national level. Data on occupational roles, classified into four major sectoral categories (senior Party, central Party/state, secondary officials, and military), provide another measure of continuity and change in Central Committee membership. One of the most striking developments over time has been the rise of local province-level leaders to membership on the national leadership body. In contrast, representation of senior Party officials has fallen, while that of the military has declined markedly. Representation of central-level Party and state officials has stabilized at about one-third of the total. The data presented in this chapter suggest that the size of the Central Committee is likely to increase at a relatively slow rate. The category of senior-level Party officials is unlikely to be enlarged. For example, any increase in the size of the Politbureau is likely to be constrained by the need to meet frequently. Also, in 1982, the category "senior officials" included the six Politbureau members dropped that year but retained on the Central Committee. In 1986, with one exception (Van Tien Dung), all dropped members of the Politbureau also lost their seats on the Central Committee.38 Military representation is also unlikely to expand. It is difficult to see what factors, short of a major war with an outside power, would contribute to an increase in the size of the military. Party officials can be expected to check any such tendency in peacetime. A marked increase in the representation of central-level Party and state officials is also unlikely. The number of Party posts and state bodies which can be filled by Central Committee members appears relatively small. The number of ministries and state commissions was reduced from thirty-six to thirty-two in 1987. At present, of the thirty-two ministries/state commissions comprising the Council of Ministers, 85 percent are already held by Central Committee members. The remainder appear to be held by specialists. Representation of secondary-level leaders might be expanded to embrace all provincial-level units; this would amount to an addition of ten more members. Yet expansion in this sector too appears unlikely.39 37

Reported to me by a Western correspondent; the phrase is not an official one, however.

^Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Due Tho were retained as advisers to the Central Committee. 39

In an interview with this author in November 1985, Bui Tin, editor of Nhan Dan, asserted that there was no "law" requiring representation of all provinces on the Central Committee.

192 Postwar Vietnam This quantitative analysis of leadership change (retention, promotion, dismissal) suggests that the process has become regularized over time. That is, as national congresses of Party delegates become a regular feature (held in accordance with Party statutes at least once every five years), so too will leadership alterations. Leadership turnover must be seen as part of the process of political development, one feature of which is structural differentiation. New structures have emerged over time as the Vietnamese political system responds to changes in domestic and external environments. For example, the central apparatus surrounding and supporting the Central Committee has grown more complex and differentiated. State structures have changed too with adoption of a new Constitution in 1980. Expansion in the size of Central Committee membership in part reflects these developments. As noted at the beginning, conclusions reached here should be regarded as suggestive. It ought to be possible to explore hi greater depth the process of leadership change in various other components of the Vietnamese political system. Several areas for further study spring immediately to mind, such as changes in central Party postings (Politbureau, Secretariat, Central Control Committee, and VCP Central Committee Departments), ministerial portfolios (with special attention to the central planning and economic ministries), membership on the State Council and Council of Ministers, and military region commands. Career patterns are also a neglected area of study; the retirement of military officers from active service and their employment in civilian posts is but one example. The approach adopted in this chapter, focusing as it does on political elites, obviously neglects other important components of Vietnamese society. A future task for scholars is to extend research outward and downward, from central to regional and provincial levels.40 The rise in importance of provincial-level leaders, as measured by their representation on the Central Committee, is a clear signal that a trend is under way which deserves to be studied. The structural approach adopted in this chapter cannot be definitive. Vietnam, like every other political system, is a place where personalities clash, where factions form, and where ideology sharpens policy differences. The methodology adopted here can only illuminate a certain portion of the workings of the Vietnamese political system. Nevertheless, it is empirically grounded. The present transfer of power in Vietnam from one generation to the next will be even more significant than the passing of Ho Chi Minh from the top leadership in 1969. A comparison with research on the Soviet Union by Seweryn Bialer41 suggests that Vietnam may experience a transformation akin to "the succession," when not only the leader (the Party secretary-general) but the top layer of the elite stratum pass from the scene. Although cross-national comparisons of this nature are risky, Bialer's comments are worth recording: The period of succession offers a high potential for disrupting the inertia characteristic of the way the business of government was conducted throughout the entire bureaucratic structure by the departed leaders, 40

Note the call by David Marr in his "Central Vietnam Rebuilds: An Eyewitness Account," Indochina Issues, No. 59, July 1985.

41

Seweryn Bialer, Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability and Change in the Soviet Union (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), especially chapters 4-6.

Regularization of Politics 193 and for changing the inertial drift of the substance of their policies. It is a period with a high potential for ferment, for greater responsiveness to pressures, real and anticipated, for broadening political participation and opening up the political process. In sum, the succession, aside from its own intrinsic importance, acts as a catalyst for pressures and tendencies which already exist within the polity and society but which previously had limited opportunity for expression and realization.42 Vietnam's succession will unfold in stages. Indeed, it is already under way with the dying off of the original revolutionary generation, and with the passing of Le Duan in 1986, the man at the Party's helm since September 1960. The essential features, and hence the stability of the Vietnamese political system, are unlikely to change during this process of generational transfer. As argued in this chapter, the reform tendency represented by Party Secretary-General Nguyen Van Linh has a solid sectoral constituency, first in the growing number of economic specialists and technocrats in the Central Committee, and perhaps more importantly in the emerging coalition of provincial-level officials who have an institutional stake in reform policies which stress administrative decentralization and local autonomy. It seems that foreign policy developments could only strengthen this tendency. Either continued dependence on the Soviet Union (which is itself experimenting with liberal economic reforms), or an opening to the West and/or China (itself pursuing the "four modernizations" policy) will tend to reinforce the position of the economic reformers within the Vietnamese political system.43 42

Ibid., p. 66.

43

Cf. the discussion in Thayer, "Political Development in Vietnam, 1975-1985."

This page intentionally left blank

THE MILITARY CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIALISM: POSTWAR ROLES OF THE PEOPLE'S ARMY OF VIETNAM William S. Turley

A band of thirty-four guerrillas at its founding in December 1944, the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) by 1975 had grown into one of the world's largest and most effective military establishments. Transformed in the course of two wars, it had become a modern, conventional, professionally-led armed force. But the new situation required different responses from those who had won the wars for national independence and reunification, and lacking massive foreign assistance, maintenance of such an army conflicted with the country's peacetime priorities. The shift from war to peace thus posed fundamental questions about the military's role and mission. Were the army's size and cost to be cut, or were its capabilities to be harnessed to the tasks of reconstruction and development? If the latter, how could military involvement in economic work be reconciled with the new defense requirements? Was direct military involvement in the "construction of socialism" consistent with the revolution's ideology and ethos, or did it undermine values held dear by the Party? Had the PAVN so thoroughly absorbed Party values that it no longer needed political supervision, or had distinctive military points of view taken root? Would (and should) the military become more deeply involved in politics, or less? Ideology bears on these questions chiefly in regard to the military's internal organization and relationship with society. According to Marxism-Leninism, armies are never "politically neutral" as "bourgeois theorists" suppose. Instruments of state, they are necessarily the instruments of the dominant class. The problem for socialist societies is to guarantee that the military always serves the interests of the proletariat (and "socialized peasantry"). This is done through class criteria in the recruitment and promotion of officers, induction of officers into the proletarian Party, a Party organization within the military, and political indoctrination. Such a military internally reflects the socialist transformation of society and must assist in the accomplishment and defense of that transformation. Ideology mandates military participation in politics, in support of Party objectives. Marx abhorred standing armies and foresaw their abolition under socialism, but Lenin and Stalin cited security requirements to justify a large army under professional officers. Deep distrust of Tsarist officers caused the Bolsheviks to place political officers alongside military commanders. All other communist parties have followed in these Soviet footsteps. Direct supervision of the military by Party committees and political officers is the technique by which communist parties universally have sought to insure that armies lived up to their political obligations.

195

196 Postwar Vietnam But practice may diverge from precept. Technological modernization, by requiring specialization and enhancing the authority of experts, encourages tendencies that are believed by some analysts to conflict with the ideological requirement of a completely politicized military.1 Such a military is not necessarily a threat to civilian authority or political stability, however. Properly socialized "communists hi uniform" may be the chief guarantors of Party rule and state stability, as in Poland.2 But chronically weak or unstable political systems invite military praetorianism,3 and the tendency of communist regimes to experience succession crises, factional struggles, and decaying legitimacy can draw the military deeper into politics.4 The combination of legitimate military participation in politics, declining revolutionary 61an, and civilian dependence on the military may drive all communist parties toward the accommodation of the military's professional interests, involvement of the military in Party factional quarrels, and toleration or abetment of spreading military values in society. Is this the future in store for Vietnam? The diversity of military roles in communist states cautions against facile extrapolation. Different foreign relations, geographic locations, security requirements, patterns of factional strife and domestic tensions, ethnic composition and inherited traditions have produced differences of style and substance in communist civil-military relations. So has the mode of coming to power. In contrast to the Soviet Union and most Eastern European countries, Vietnam is one of the states (along with China, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Laos, and Pol Pot's Cambodia) where the Party attained power in a manner that delayed emergence of distinctive "military" and "civilian" institutions, and where the relationship between these institutions lacked visible tension.5 Circumstances surrounding the climb to power have significant lasting effects.6 The military's sense of professional corporateness and actual separation from society also depend on the level of economic development. Unable to sustain a parasitic military or to leave any significant resource idle, the Vietnamese in the 1950s elevated the vague

1 See Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1967), pp. 34-35; Dale R Herspring, 'Technology and the Changing Political Officer in the Armed Forces: the Polish and East German Cases," Studies in Comparative Communism, 10, 4 (Winter 1977): 37093; Dale R. Herspring, 'Technology and Civil-Military Relations: The Polish and East German Cases," in Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems, ed. Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1978), pp. 12^43; and Harlan W. Jencks, From Muskets to Missiles: Politics and Professionalism in the Chinese Army, 1945-1981 (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982), pp. 12-13 and passim. 2

George C. Malcher, Poland's Politicized Army: Communists in Uniform (New York: Praeger, 1984), p. 235; and Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Professional Soldiers and Politics in Poland: The Experience of the 1980s." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, October 18-20,1985. 3

Samuel P. Huntingdon, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), ch. 4. 4

Roman Kollowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis," in Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 109-28; and Timothy J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders, and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp.285-86.

5

David E. Albright, "A Comparative Conceptualization of Civil-Military Relations," World Politics 32,4 (July 1980): 558-59.

6

These effects are compared in Jonathan A. Adelman, ed., Communist Armies in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982). For comparison of the Soviet and Chinese armies, see Jonathan A. Adelman, The Revolutionary Armies (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1980).

People's Army of Vietnam 197 principle of military support for socialism to an imperative for the military to participate actively in its "construction." Ideological commitment to suppression of the entrepreneurial classes added assurance that the regime would have to depend principally on its own institutions for development. Of these, the PAVN nearly monopolized construction capacity in transport, communications, irrigation, and hydropower. Compared with state and Party organs the army was more efficient, disciplined, and technologically advanced. The Party had no choice but to mobilize those assets for postwar reconstruction, which it did enthusiastically. However, prizing the military as an agent of development may instill in officers "morbidly high self-esteem" and belief in their indispensability as administrators.7 Involvement in economic work also can undermine an army's combat readiness, with divisive effects both within the officer corps and on civil-military relations, especially when the international situation is perceived as threatening. Political Role Broadly speaking, Vietnam has not experienced civil-military or Party-army frictions comparable to most other communist systems.8 This has been due largely to the circumstances in which the Vietnamese communists came to power. From its birth, the army was the creation of the Party, and the first generation of military leadership was nothing more than a segment of the Party leadership. Civilian and military leaderships were fused by origin and experience. Nor did the Vietnamese communists, unlike their Soviet or even Chinese counterparts, absorb many former enemy personnel of dubious loyalty. The youthful urban volunteers and peasants who flooded into the PAVN after the August Revolution were politically unsophisticated and needed instruction in how to wage "people's war," but their loyalty to the Party's principal goal at the time-national liberation-was not in doubt. The absence of clear-cut distinctions between military and civilian roles during lengthy guerrilla struggles, moreover, retarded the emergence of military professionalism as a source of conflict. Conflict over professionalism did surface in 1956 and again in 1964, but the split mainly divided generations of officers, not civilians and the military. The years of war that followed helped to preserve solidarity among civilian and military leaders at the top and to prolong the functional overlap. During that war, however, the PAVN, while remaining essentially a ground infantry with integral air and naval "commands," grew into a modern, conventional army under professional officers. Doctrine, while continuing to honor "people's war," increasingly stressed conventional war waged by main forces. The Soviet Union replaced China as the PAVN's chief foreign source of weapons, advanced training and technology, tactical doctrine, and organizational models. The PAVN also emerged from the war with even greater prestige than it had after Dien Bien Phu. The officer corps possessed credentials as a bulwark of the revolution and the nation perhaps more solid than the Party itself. Though the PAVN was still effectively commanded by

7 8

S. E. Finer, The Man on Horseback (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 63-70.

Evidence for this paragraph may be found in William S. Turley, "The Political Role and Development of the People's Army," in Indochina in Conflict: New Perspectives, ed. Joseph Zasloff and MacAlister Brown (Boston: Heath, 1974), pp. 24^5; William S. Turley, "Origins and Development of Communist Military Leadership in Vietnam," Armed Forces and Society, 3, 2 (Winter 1977): 219-48; and William S. Turley, "The Vietnamese Army," in Communist Armies in Politics, ed. Adelman, pp. 63-82.

198 Postwar Vietnam Party leaders in uniform (e.g., Generals Vo Nguyen Giap, Van Tien Dung, Song Hao), career officers had filled many key slots just below the top. Debate over the army's postwar role began in 1973, when the army was assigned tasks in economic reconstruction. Some Defense Ministry officials argued that demobilization combined with technological modernization would provide the best defense at least cost,9 but the decision was made to postpone demobilization so that troops could be used as shock labor in the recovery period. The Fourth Party Congress in 1976 affirmed dual economic and defense missions for the military (to which some officers objected, as we shall see), and the proportion of military members in the Central Committee declined slightly.10 From this it might seem that the military was remarkably acquiescent after decades of wartime prominence. But the Fourth Congress also announced changes in the army's political work system, the first such overhaul since 1952, to bring the relationship between military and political officers into line with the PAVN's increasingly modern professional character. The scene seemed set to accommodate the military's striving for modernization, in return for which the military would contribute in a significant way to the economy. The new system was slow to be implemented. Reluctance to introduce major organizational changes at a time when new external threats loomed may have been a factor, but internal resistance also was present. Hitherto, under "collective decision making and division of responsibility," political cadres enjoyed equal status with military ones, but the new system of "one-person command" concentrated responsibility in the highest-ranking officer, who almost invariably would be the military commander. Political cadres stood to lose authority and prestige. "A number of cadres cannot help wondering," it was remarked in Quan Doi Nhan Dan [People's Army Daily], "whether one person can fulfill the responsibility formerly shared by various commanding cadres in a unit. Some comrades also fear that... individual authority will emerge, leading to the weakening of the importance of party and political tasks, the position of political cadres and so forth."11 Though some military officers may have wished to avoid responsibility for political work, the change of duties was hardly as likely to have displeased them as much as it did political 9

Nguyen Ngoc, 'Tim hieu mot so tu tuong tien bo trong xay dung quan doi cua to tien ta" [Understanding some progressive ideas in our ancestors' army-building], TCQDND, January 1974, pp. 67-73, and Tran Sam, "Nang cao trinh do khoa hoc-ky thuat cua can bo, gop phan tang cuong sue manh chien dau cua quan doi ta" [Raise the scientific and technical level of cadres, contribute to the combat strength of our army], TCQDND, February 1974, pp. 1-18. 10

Military representation among full voting members of three past Central Committees is as follows: Committee members Military members Percent military

1960

1976

1982

43 11 25.6

101 24 23.8

116 18-22 15.5-19.0

The number of military members is always debatable, particularly so in 1982, despite functional grouping in the published list. For another count, see the chapter by Carlyle Thayer in this volume. However, it is clear both that the proportion of military members in the Vietnamese Central Committee has been moderately high by comparison with other communist systems, and that it declined in 1976 and 1982. The proportion of military members in the Soviet Central Committee has been 3 to 13 percent; in China, it has been as high as 30 percent. Military representation in the Political Bureau—usually just one member in the Soviet Union, as high as thirteen out of twenty-five in China—was three out of thirteen in Vietnam in 1960, three out of seventeen in 1976, and three out of fifteen in 1982. 11

QDND editorial, n.d., broadcast over Hanoi radio October 26,1980. Translated in FBIS-APA, October 26, 1980.

People's Army of Vietnam 199 cadres. Indoctrination to prepare for the change to "one-person command" dragged on. Actual implementation apparently did not begin until May 1979.12 Articles on precedents in the Soviet Army, where one-person command had been in continuous effect since 1942, left no doubt as to the model.13 In addition to "one-person command," Party leadership in the military was to be revised. Here again implementation was delayed. Article 12 of Party regulations, issued in 1976, reaffirmed the long-standing structure under which a Central Military Party Committee (CMPC), composed of civilian as well as military members of the Central Committee (though until 1980 Le Due Tho appears to have been the only civilian ever to serve), exercised leadership over the Party organization in the army.14 The CMPC channeled its instructions through the General Political Directorate (GPD) of the Ministry of Defense, while Party committees at lower levels assured that all Party policies were implemented. Subsequent discussion indicated that Party committees would retain the ultimate authority of "collective leadership" when one-person command went into effect. But the Fifth Congress in 1982 reduced the 550 words of Article 12 to the terse notice: "The organization of Party leadership in the People's Army of Vietnam will be determined by the Central Committee." In his report to the Congress, Le Due Tho also mentioned a need for a new organ of central Party control over the military. Not until spring 1984 was the new Party and political work system unveiled in its entirety. Commanders were to consult with their deputies in the political as well as military affairs of their units, but ultimate authority now resided with the "chief responsible cadre" alone. Political officers retained their title from regimental level on up, but below that level political cadres were to be called "deputy commanders for political affairs."15 Equality between military and political cadres and between separate military and political command structures thus came to an end. Gone, too, was "collective leadership" by Party committees, which were circumscribed to education and mobilization functions, effectively removing them from involvement in professional military matters. The changes remained controversial. In April 1984, the deputy director of the GPD, Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep, outlined a plan to abolish the hierarchy of Party echelon committees from the CMPC on down and to transfer authority over Party affairs in the army from the CMPC to the Secretariat. Under this plan the Secretariat would exercise authority directly through the GPD, "which will help the Secretariat in these tasks in the army while remaining within the Ministry of National Defense."16 If these measures were designed to preserve Party control, subsequent moves were probably concessions to the military. In fall 1985 Hiep revealed that the CMPC, "under the direct leadership of the

12

QDND, April 24,1984, cites a Central Military Party Committee directive of this date.

13

Van Trong, "Ve che do mot truong trong cac luc luong vu trang Xo-Viet [On the one-person command system in Soviet armed forces], TCQDND, August 1979, pp. 64-70. See also the translation of a Russian article: "Che do mot nguoi chi huy—nguyen tac quan trong nhat cua vice xay dung cac luc luong vu trang Xo-viet" [The one-person command system-a most important principle for building the Soviet armed forces], TCQDND, May 1981, pp. 55-67, and June 1981, pp. 51-60. 14

Military members of the CMPC as of 1983 appeared to be Van Tien Dung, Chu Huy Man, Bui Phung, Hoang Van Thai, Le Due Ann, Le Quang Dao, Le Trong Tan, and Nguyen Quyet. Le Due Tho was still a member. Le Duan took over from Vo Nguyen Giap as committee first secretary in 1980. 15

Interview with Colonel Nghiem Tuc (deputy editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan), Hanoi, April 23,1984.

16

Nhan Dan, April 23,1984.

200 Postwar Vietnam Party Political Bureau and Secretariat," would remain the "highest Party committee echelon in the army" and henceforward would be composed only of military members of the Central Committee. The 1985 reform also set up a long-promised "standing agency" [co quan thuong true] for military and national defense work" to advise the Political Bureau and to assist both the Bureau and Central Committee in formulating resolutions on military and defense affairs.17 The membership of this agency was not revealed, but its duties would seem to call for professional military experts. The effect of reform was partially to disentangle military and civilian functions, at least at high echelons of the Party. On the one hand, with military representation in the Central Committee having declined at the Fifth Congress and military seats on the Secretariat slipping from two out of nine to one out often,18 civilian dominance and Party authority were affirmed. On the other hand, the military gained greater control over its internal affairs and greater routine access to policy making. Awareness of Soviet experience may have made the Vietnamese anxious to curb any tendencies toward political independence that reform and development in the military might foster.19 The leadership advanced two reasons, each an echo of Soviet discourse, to justify these changes. The first was the military's political maturation. Since late 1945, when "the proportion of Party members in the army was very small... and the ideological level of cadres generally weak,"20 Party membership and a high level of political consciousness had become the norms for military commanders. In consequence, according to one PAVN spokesman, political officers had become "obsolete."21 That rationale was partly gloss, but the military was indeed a politically trusted institution, as indicated by a Party decision to rely heavily on it for recruiting and grooming youth for Party membership. From the Fourth Congress through 1982,59 percent of all new Party members came from the army. A complaint that, "From this figure we can see that the Party's ranks are not yet replenished in a manner that is symmetrical or rational," was not a criticism of the army's role but of inferior performance by other organizations.22 Nearly 22 percent of all discharged troops are Party members, and "most of the rest" are members of the Party's youth affiliate, the Ho Chi Minh Communist Youth Union.23 If, say, a quarter of all PAVN personnel are Party members (the proportion is about 90 percent among officers), then about one-seventh of current Party membership would be military. But while the Party has come to depend heavily on the army for new members, the number of Party committees

17 Article by Lieutenant General Dang Vu Hiep in TCQDND, November 1985, broadcast over Hanoi radio November 10,1985, in FBIS-APA, November 15,1985. 18 Lieutenant General Le Quang Dai, long-time deputy chief of the General Political Directorate. Other Secretariat members (as of mid-1983) were Le Duan, Le Due Tho, Hoang Tung, Nguyen Due Tarn, Nguyen Lam, Nguyen Thanh Binh, Tran Kien, Tran Xuan Bach, and Vo Chi Cong. 19

One-person command was long the aim of Soviet officers who wished to be rid of supervision by political "commissars" and to advance the corporate professional interests of the military. See Michael J. Deane, Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), pp. 50-53, 58-41, 98-99,116-18. 20

Editorial, TCQDND, September 1979, p. 2.

21

Nghiem Tuc interview, April 23,1984.

22

Chinh True, "Xay dung doi ngu dang vien trong sach, vung manh" [Build clean and strong ranks of Party members], TCCS, February 1982, p. 35. 23

Senior General Chu Huy Man, at PAVN's fortieth anniversary review conference, broadcast over Hanoi radio, December 4,1984; in FBIS-APA, December 12,1984.

People's Army of Vietnam 201 and cells in the army increased significantly.24 Party and army are tightly intertwined, and the PAVN is a highly politicized army of proven loyalty to the Party. The second reason given for change was that the old arrangements, however appropriate for a guerrilla army and "people's war," were an impediment to command responsibility and efficiency hi an increasingly conventional army. "Implementation of this system will eliminate the recurrence of past cases in which the commanders were dependent on the Party committee echelons or waited for one to make decisions, thus failing to fully discharge their individual responsibility. Consequently, the resolutions adopted by the Party committees and directives and orders issued by the higher echelons were not carried out promptly and effectively, especially hi time of combat or other emergency."25 In fact, during the long second war, military requirements did cause eclipse of the political apparatus, especially as maneuvers by large units with sophisticated equipment grew in importance. Reassertion of political supervision hi peacetime could not have been welcomed by combat-hardened officers who now wished to emphasize speed of command decision, coordination of multi-branch forces, and mastery of technology, not political indoctrination or liaison with the population.26 In effect, the reforms accommodated the command needs of a modern conventional army, acknowledged the primacy of specialized expertise, and increased the professional autonomy of the officer corps. Professionalism is regarded warily by the PAVN's top stratum of political generals, however. In a speech on the "new leadership mechanism" in 1984, Senior General Chu Huy Man, head of the General Political Directorate and member of the Political Bureau, admonished cadres that the army's "revolutionary character" and "modern conventional character" were "not of equal rank and cannot replace one another. To think that a high professional level and modern equipment and technical facilities ... can partly substitute for revolutionary character is a very mistaken concept which must be criticized, for it will lead to light regard for political development, which has always been our army's fundamental strength."27 Clearly, commitment to ideology and tradition is strong, but, as such remarks suggest, so are pressures to shed overt political controls and make specialized expertise the prime value. These pressures implicitly question the Party's competence to lead the military, at least with regard to matters that officers regard as professional prerogatives. In February 1985, the army monthly itself took to task those who would "mechanically" separate "state management" from Party leadership: It is necessary in the new leadership system to intensify Party leadership-especially the leadership of the Party Central Committee, with its Political Bureau being directly in charge—over the Peoples Army and over the national defense undertaking.... We must resolutely criticize the phenomena of abusing Party organizations and authority, acting ille24

Col. Vu Trong Canh, "Mot buoc tien moi trong cong tac phat trien dang cua dang bo quan doi" [A new step in the army's Party development work], TCQDND, March 1980, p. 15. 25

QDND editorial, n.d., broadcast over Hanoi radio October 26,1980; in FBIS-APA, October 28,1980.

26

For one example of interest among Hanoi's "defense intellectuals" in bringing the PAVN abreast of technical advances in other armies, and their awareness of the implications for command, see Iran Hong Tan, "Tu dong hoa chi huy trong quan doi hien dai" [Automation of command in the modern army], TCQDND, September 1980, pp. 55-63. 27

Chu Huy Man, "Thu truong chinh tri va che do chi huy quan doi cua Dang trong giai doan each mang nay" [The political director and the Party's new leadership mechanism in the army in the current phase of the revolution], TCQDND, March 1984, p. 12.

202 Postwar Vietnam gaily in the name of the Party, placing one's self above the law, disrupting the social and army discipline.28 It would be an error to read such passages as evidence of praetorian tendencies. The three military members of the Political Bureau29 are all political generals and not likely to be spokesmen for the corporate interests of professional officers. Control over military affairs has been concentrated in central Party organs that are stable, authoritative, consensual, and civilian dominated. Officers are loyal to the Party regardless of how professional they may be. Any major change hi the army's political role would more likely depend on developments outside the military institution than within it. Wariness towards professionalism is based not on fear of military interference in policy making, but on ideological hostility to the tendency of a professional military to disengage from its civic duties in "people's war," economic development, or whatever non-military undertaking the party decides could benefit from military involvement. That ideological posture, however, may be difficult to sustain in the context of evolving security requirements. The Military Mission Victory in 1975 changed the PAVN's chief mission overnight from one of reunifying the home territory to defending it against external threats. Whereas earlier the military mission had required the main forces to fight in a mobile offensive mode, the new one presented the unfamiliar need to defend territory. PAVN leaders did not really come to terms with the latter mission until Vietnam faced ground attack from across Vietnam's northern border. The response to that threat had the somewhat contradictory effect of reaffirming "people's war" and deepening the military's involvement in some "civilian" activities, on the one hand, while intensifying pressures from within the military for technical modernization and professionalism, on the other. The end of the war in 1975 encouraged PAVN commanders to assume that henceforward priority would be given to conventional defense, relieving them of responsibility for organizing local self-defense forces. Village militia (and reserves), the mainstay of "people's war," suffered neglect. Officers even viewed economic work as preferable to assignment with local forces (where opportunities for professional advancement are few). Then, in mid-1978, as relations with China worsened and preparations were made to attack Cambodia, an article in Quan Doi Nhan Dan noted that "We cannot fail to pay proper attention to local military tasks under the pretext of concentrating our efforts on economic construction." The article reminded officers of their responsibility to train militia cadres and to conduct exercises with local armed forces.30

28

Editorial, TCQDND, February 1985; in FBIS-APA, February 1,1985.

29

General Van Tien Dung, Chu Huy Man, and Le Due Ann. General Vo Nguyen Giap stepped down as defense minister and first secretary of the Central Military Party Committee in 1980 and lost his seat in the Political Bureau in 1982. There has been speculation that Giap lost his posts for failing to anticipate the Chinese attack of 1979, or that he failed to get his way on postwar issues and quit in frustration. In fact, Giap's political clout had been waning for a long time. Party First Secretary Le Duan had dominated strategic planning in the war for reunification and thus had gained dominance of the military itself, which he demonstrated by taking over from Giap as first secretary of the CMPC. Whatever the immediate circumstances of Giap's departure, they probably only supplied a pretext. 30

Broadcast over Hanoi radio, July 2,1978; in FBIS-APA, July 6,1978.

People's Army of Vietnam 203 The reminder anticipated the response to China's attack in February-March 1979, if not the attack itself. A mobilization decree, issued on March 5, ordered "All qualified male citizens 18 to 45 and female citizens 16 to 35" to "join the militia, guerrilla, and selfdefense forces." "All agencies, factories and warehouses," were to be "guarded and protected on a 24-hour basis including holidays." The following month, General Van Tien Dung told mid- and high-level cadres that Vietnam could not afford to let popular defense deteriorate. On the contrary, he said, local forces must be enlarged, upgraded, and prepared in some areas to absorb the first blows of invading columns. Noting that the threat would require a major commitment to popular defense for "many future generations," Dung called for "a drastic change first of all within the Party, . . . the people's armed forces, and public officers."31 Though many officers no doubt yearned to rush ahead with the PAVN's military modernization, Hanoi strategists felt the immediate threat from China gave them no choice but to revitalize popular defense. Debate was mainly over how to respond in the long term. General Vo Nguyen Giap, after repeating Dung's themes, stressed the need to continue modernizing the main forces: "We must prepare for and wage a war... under conditions wherein our side as well as the enemy are equipped with increasingly modern weapons. We must pay the greatest attention to our cadres' and combatants' ability to master modern weapons and technology, organize coordinated battles, and command and secure material and technical bases." Giap also cited the need to adapt main-force tactical doctrine: officers who were highly skilled in stealthy offensive operations, he said, needed retraining in static defense, for the new objective was "not only to destroy the enemy's strength and war means but to hold every inch of our territory."32 However, holding every inch of territory, given Vietnam's manpower compared with China's and its logistical dependency on the Soviet Union, required mass mobilization and a large ready reserve to complement a powerful main force. A Thomistic debate over whether offense or defense was "most basic" ended in compromise on the need to synthesize "multiform" methods.33 The "nation's economic situation and living conditions," it was argued, ruled out expensive high-technology solutions.34 Geography and resources made Vietnam highly vulnerable to large Chinese forces attacking by land, sea, or air in widely scattered locations, which the People's Army could never adequately defend without help from popular forces-in-place. Thus did the PAVN find itself drawn once again into close association with local Party and state officials to train local self-defense forces, and generally assist in all manner of security-related work, especially in security sensitive regions. As in the last war, units have helped to reorganize communities within range of possible fighting as "combat hamlets," and to develop entire districts as "military bastions." One regiment in a northern border district inhabited by the Dao minority, for example, is said to have relocated many villages, held regular exercises to practice coordination with local forces, built 162 km of roads, and organized an "orchard and fish pond" movement that resulted in the planting of 5 million

31

Broadcast over Hanoi radio, April 12,13,15,16,1979; in FBIS-APA, April 20 and 24,1979.

32

TCCS, May 1979; in FBIS-APA, May 24,1979.

33

See Q.S., "Ve cac hinh thuc tac chien" [On the forms of combat], TCQDND, May 1981, pp. 5-18, and "Phong ngu" [The defense], TCQDND, June 1981, pp. 9-17.

34

Q.S., "Local people's war campaigns," TCQDND, April 1983; translated in JPRS, Southeast Asia Report, no. 1319, JPRS no. 83-999 (July 28,1983), pp. 88-89, 93.

204 Postwar Vietnam fruit trees.35 Population redistribution and construction of new economic zones, begun in 1975 for economic reasons, have been conducted since 1979 under military supervision in mountain regions, coastal areas, and islands "to create on-the-spot national defense forces and strength in order [in the short range] to ... defeat the enemy's sabotage activities and [in the long range] to consolidate and perfect the local defensive deployment."36 In addition, the military has been called upon to assume new duties in the civilian education sector. The expansion of the ready reserve to an estimated 3 million members sharply increased demand for reserve officers, a demand that could be met only by military education in civilian tertiary institutions. A Soviet-style program, begun on an experimental basis in late 1975, was formally inaugurated by the new military service law passed in 1982.37 That year cadres of Military Region 7 trained 1,157 reserve officers among the students of Ho Chi Minh City University and Schools of Medicine and Pharmacy, while the Radar-Rocket and Air Force Staff Officers' Schools assigned thirty officers to teach 381 students in Hanoi Polytechnic College.38 In 1983, 2,000 students at Hanoi University were said to be receiving military training, up from 500 to 600 students in the past. The university contains a Military Department whose staff, a detachment from the PAVN Chemical Command, not only offers courses on military subjects but also organizes students to perform paramilitary duties in an effort to "forge the military lifestyle" and "implement militarization [quan su hoa] school."39 Cadres, assigned by the Naval Command to Haiphong Maritime College, train students for service in the navy and reserves, and also work with the student body to fashion "a civilized, modern, and industrial style of life."40 All higher institutions have such programs to "create cadres and specialized and technical personnel for the army."41 As for secondary schools, the military service law requires instruction in military subjects as part of the regular curriculum, and orders local government organs and enterprises to provide similar instruction for male youths not in 35

Senior Colonel Trinh Hong Thai, "The Mission of Main-Force Troops in Developing District Military Bastions," TCQDND, April 1983; JPRS trans., Southeast Asia Report, no. 1319, JPRS no. 83-999 (July 28, 1983), pp. 60-66.

36

Senior Colonel Nguyen Anh Bac, "Combine the Economy with National Defense in Distributing Social Labor," TCQDND, October 1983; JPRS trans., Southeast Asia Report, no. 1389, JPRS no. 84-999 (December 22,1983), pp. 148-49.

37

Training reserve officers in the civilian school system had been done for years, mainly in the form of taking graduates from technical faculties to serve in the army's engineering, communications, radar, and medical corps. Military subjects had been taught as an adjunct to the standard curriculum, not part of it, and no formal system of military departments and military lecturers for civilian schools existed. The new program sought to upgrade military instruction and more closely integrate the activities of the schools with military requirements. Hoang Xuan Tuy, "Dao tao, huan luyen si quan du bi trong truong dai hoc" [Form and train reserve officers in the universities], TCQDND, December 1979, pp. 56-61. 38

Dinh Xuan Nghiem and Le Quang Phuc, "Military Region 7~Good Training and Management of Reserve Officers; Hanoi-Polytechnic College Ends 4th Reserve Officers' Training Course," QDND, October 5, 1982; JPRS trans., Vietnam Report no. 2413, JPRS no. 82-430 (December 9,1982), pp. 7-8. Also see the article by Senior Colonel Do Hoang Mao, deputy commander of the Capital Military Region, in Dai hoc va trung hoc chuyen nghien [Universities and specialized training schools], November-December 1982; JPRS trans., South east Asia Report no. 1310, JPRS no. 83-867 (July 12,1983), pp. 13-14. 39

Nguyen Duy Quy, "Giao due quan su la mot bo phan quan trong cua giao due toan dien" [Military education, an important part of a comprehensive education], QDND, September 16,1983, p. 3.

40

Ngoc Qua, "At the Haiphong Maritime College," QDND, September 16,1983; JPRS trans., Southeast Asia Report no. 1375, JPRS no. 84-834 (November 28,1983), pp. 62-63.

41

Military Service Law, section III, article 18, in Hien Luong, Tim hieu hiat nghia vu quan su [Understanding the military service law] (Hanoi: Phap Ly, 1982), p. 79.

People's Army of Vietnam 205 school. The content of military training is determined by the Ministry of National Defense.42 Combined with economic work (see below), the post-1979 defense posture thus enhanced the PAVN's involvement in highly diverse roles, despite the army's major commitment to combat along the northern border and in Cambodia. Hanoi leaders might prefer to rely on other forms of defense. And indeed a significant increase in the volume and sophistication of Soviet assistance has helped the PAVN to surpass the conventional capability of Chinese border forces and to continue modernization. Nevertheless, constraints require a defense-in-depth based on mass mobilization and protracted PAVN involvement in organizing this defense. Vietnam has neither the material and technical endowments to be self-sufficient in military hardware, nor a location that permits it to depend exclusively on such hardware from one distant foreign supplier. An adequate conventional defense could be developed with Soviet assistance, one PAVN general acknowledged, but the resultant dependence would be a strategic liability: "Everyone must be made to realize clearly that we cannot use as much ammunition as the armies of fraternal countries with modern heavy industries, for the simple reason that our army still has to rely on international aid for weapons and ammunition. Moreover, in case of a large-scale war, supplying our forces through aid will not be easy."43 Although the PAVN can mount joint operations of infantry, armor, and artillery, and has begun to incorporate air support, geostrategic realities require that it remain overwhelmingly a force of infantry, be large relative to population, maintain large reserves, and participate in the organization of popular forces-in-place. These facts imply indefinite maintenance of a large standing army and involvement by many officers in preserving the popular defense option. The Economic Mission The PAVN's second mission is to contribute to economic recovery and development. This long-standing mission, in which the PAVN's role much more closely resembles the Chinese People's Liberation Army than the Soviet Army, is partly an attempt to resolve the contradiction between high military requirements and a low level of development. Yet very heavy diversion of military resources into economic work undermines the ability to fight. PAVN generals are no less aware than their civilian counterparts of these dilemmas.44 As noted earlier, the PAVN was slated for a postwar economic mission in 1973. This assignment was not a new one. Assisting peasants in return for recruits, intelligence, and supplies had been a key element of PAVN doctrine since its founding. Following the war with France, the PAVN was heavily involved in flood control and land reform, and it routinely contributed labor, technical assistance, and machinery to development projects in the 1950s and 1960s. The PAVN's capabilities in construction, transportation, and communications surpassed anything under state administration. These precedents, and the 42

Military Sendee Law, section III, article 17, ibid., p. 78.

43

Lieutenant General Pham Hong Son in TCQDND, June 1985, in FBIS-APA; June 25,1985.

44

For example; 'The present situation causes a contradiction between the requirements of building the economy, stabilizing and improving the people's welfare, and consolidating national defense on the one hand, and the actual condition of our nation's economic base on the other, as well as a contradiction between the requirements of concentrating forces for economic development and guaranteeing that the forces of national defense will be strong." Lieutenant General Le Quang Hoa, May van de tiet kiem trong quan doi [Problems of econo mizing in the army] (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1981), p.12.

206 Postwar Vietnam concept of the army as an integral part of society, were quite sufficient to rationalize the army's role. A PAVN spokesman also has cited the precedent of "feudalist times," when ten to fifteen thousand men could be found performing dual military and economic functions.45 Thus Vietnamese leaders perceived the PAVN's postwar economic mission as a continuation of both revolutionary and historical practice. However, the PAVN's economic duties were greatly expanded in 1975, as it seemed senseless to let the army's vast capabilities stand idle during what was hoped would be a lasting peace. The PAVN was soon rebuilding the rail spurs to Pha Lai and Quang Ninh and the rail line from Hanoi to Saigon, improving the road networks in the former Ho Chi Minh Trail complex, expanding route 613 (the logistical line built through the central highlands to supply the last offensive), constructing Hoa Binh dam and the Pha Lai thermoelectric project, and clearing land for both rice and industrial crops. Cleared lands were to be placed under management of the Agriculture Ministry as state farms worked by demobbed troops. Many other "infrastructural" projects and some factories could be added to this list. In 1976, the army reclaimed 35,000 hectares of wasteland and planted 38,000 hectares of rice, which contrasted with the total of 9,281 it cleared or planted in 1955, the first year following the anti-French war.46 A large standing army was maintained partly to assure that labor would be available for these projects and to socialize youths, particularly in rural areas, to the work habits required in an industrializing socialist society.47 Troops who had worked on a project were offered employment at their work sites upon completion of military service, thus assuring a supply of skilled, experienced workers in newly built facilities. To oversee the PAVN's economic work, an entirely new "General Directorate for Economic Development" was established in the Defense Ministry and placed in direct command of units specially assigned to "construction and production."48 A number of officers were appointed to head civilian agencies where their expertise in logistics, engineering, and management was applicable. Thus Lieutenant General Tran Sam, former head of the army's General Directorate of Rear Services, became minister of supply; Major General Dinh Due Thien, also a former head of the Rear Services Directorate, became minister for oil and natural gas; and Senior Colonel Dong Si Nguyen, an assistant to Thien in planning logistics for the 1975 spring offensive, became minister of construction. The Ministry of Transportation and Communications, a military fiefdom since 1960, remained one under General Phan Trong Tue. Readiness to rely on military personnel was further evident in the proposal made by a member of the State Planning Commission to take from the army two-thirds of the 30,000 cadres needed for training as district economic management cadres.49 This proposal appears to have been accepted, and 10,000

45

Interview with Senior Colonel Tran Cong Man, senior editor of Quan Doi Nhan Dan, Hanoi, March 28, 1983.

46

Editorial in Nhan Dan, March 18,1977; in FBIS-APA, March 28,1977. See also the article by Le Chuong in Nhan Dan, January 3,1956.

47

Pham Van Dong report on the Five-Year Plan at the Fourth Party Congress, Nhan Dan, December 18 and 19,1976; in FBIS-APA, January 24,1977.

48 49

Political Bureau resolution broadcast over Hanoi radio, October 17,1976; in FBIS-APA, October 19,1976.

Che Viet Tan, "Some Suggestions about the Five-Year Plan," Nhan Dan, December 7, 1976, as broadcast over Hanoi radio on December 8; in FBIS-APA, December 13,1976.

People's Army of Vietnam 207 officers and NCOs were specially trained for assignment to district-level administrative organs in the first nine months of 1977 alone.50 Along with construction work, the army's economic mission included reduction of the military burden on society.51 Directives enjoined units to eliminate waste and produce a larger portion of their own consumption needs. To the extent that military duties allowed, troops were to raise food crops, provide their own shelter, and build military facilities with resources at hand. These, too, were familiar tasks for the PAVN, as garrison units often had tended gardens and kept chickens. However, postwar aid reductions and economic strictures, combined with determination to maintain a large military, made it necessary to extend these practices. Though PAVN spokesmen contend that controversy over the military's economic mission was non-existent, some officers accepted the assignment reluctantly. General Vo Nguyen Giap, in his role as chief Party delegate to the military, had to argue in May 1976 that economic work was necessary before the army could become a self-sufficient, modern armed force.52 Later that year he berated unnamed officers who complained that economic work would damage the army's combat readiness, erode discipline,and retard military modernization.53 The Political Bureau also noted that, "We must overcome erroneous views still prevalent among a number of cadres and combatants to enable our armed forces to satisfactorily accomplish the new task."54 Giap himself may not have been entirely convinced, as his May statement included the reservation that economic work must not be given such high priority that it interfered with defense. At the Fourth Congress in late 1976, the matter was hardly mentioned, except hi terse affirmations that the army must continue to perform economic tasks. Chief of Staff Van Tien Dung stressed that defense had "paramount importance," but acknowledged that the army's economic and military missions "must go hand in hand."55 In all likelihood, officers just recently returned from field commands hi "the world's best infantry" were scandalized by the effects 50

Vietnam News Agency, October 10,1977; in FBIS-APA, December 13,1977.

51

Though the burden of military expenditures on the budget and national income is surely great, budgetary secrecy and unreliable data mock efforts to measure it. The Institute for Strategic Studies (London) for a long time provided no estimate of Hanoi's military expenditures in its annual publication, The Military Balance. Even if the Institute had known the SRV's military expenditures, wildly varying estimates of GNP, which ranged from US $10.0 billion to US $16.0 billion for fiscal 1985, rendered estimation of those expenditures as a percentage of national income sheer speculation. Budget figures provided to the International Monetary Fund include a line for "other expenditures" that purportedly cover defense costs and commodity aid to Laos and Cambodia. In 1984, "other expenditures" were 20.6 billion dong in a total state budget of 74.5 billion dong; that sum was 20.8 percent of state spending and 38.1 percent of internal revenues. IMF, "Socialist Republic of Viet Nam," May 18,1984, pp. 2,4. With annual foreign military assistance valued at about US $1 billion presumably an add-on to the budget, it is not inconceivable that Hanoi spends some 40 percent of domestic revenue-about 10 percent of gross domestic product-on defense. But if that is the case, much is left unsaid about government debt for aid that is no longer "nonrefundable." 52

Senior General Vo Nguyen Giap, "Xay dung nen quoc phong toan dan vung manh, bao ve to quoc Viet-nam xa hoi chu nghia" [Build a firm all people's national defense base, defend the Socialist Vietnamese Nation], Hoc Tap, May 1976, pp. 13-45.

53

Vo Nguyen Giap's speech to mid- and high-level military cadres, TCQDND, November 1976, broadcast over Hanoi radio, November 22,1976; in FBIS-APA, November 30,1976.

54 55

Political Bureau resolution, broadcast over Hanoi radio, October 17,1976; in FBIS-APA, October 25,1976.

Van Tien Dung, report on national defense at the Fourth Party Congress, broadcast over Hanoi radio, December 16,1976; in FBIS-APA, December 22,1976.

208 Postwar Vietnam of dual duty on training and discipline. Such officers may also have perceived assignment to economic work as a loss of status, and members of the high command may have seen it as a dangerous distraction from external threats. Whatever the differences on those issues, the crises of 1976-1979 permitted the army to reduce, at least temporarily, its involvement hi economic work. Figures on the number of troops engaged full-time in economic work are not available, but the time spent on military training throughout the army increased. In 1980, though the PAVN managed to clear "tens of thousands hectares of virgin land," its planting of rice fields (12,000 hectares) was less than a third what it had been in 1976.56 Nor could units on operations or a high state of alert contribute much to their self-support. The Defense Ministry's General Directorate for Economic Development was abolished.57 Efforts to maintain a high level of military preparedness and continue economic work sharpened the contradictions between training and "other pressing and important tasks such as building defense lines and combat positions, constructing barracks, stepping up the production of food to achieve selfsufficiency ...," and between "great and diversified needs for training materials and facilities and limited procurement capabilities."58 However, as the emergency subsided, economic work resumed, and, with 300,000 to 400,000 more men in uniform, the manpower available for both economic and defense missions was greater. Fifteen 3,000-man "divisions" composed of men too old for combat, and a number of engineering regiments, were allocated exclusively to economic work. Internally, too, an effort was made to increase the army's economic self-sufficiency through troops' "productive labor," despite continuing complaints that such labor was incompatible with basic training and combat readiness. Whereas projects had been organized mainly at company or battalion level, some now began to be organized by regiments and divisions and operated for a profit. In 1982, Military Region 3, comprising the Red River Delta, reported that it was cultivating rice, sugarcane, tobacco, and rushes, raising hogs and ducks, and producing sugar, salt, and nuoc mam (fish sauce). With income from sales on the market, some units were buying sewing machines, haircutting implements, even television sets, and the region claimed that over 50 percent of its units had supplied their own grain for three months or more.59 By 1983, the PAVN was meeting one-sixth of its food requirements, though the proportion varied widely between branches; many engineering units were able to supply 100 percent of their needs, while air force units supplied hardly any at all.60 It is impossible to measure precisely the PAVN's contribution to the economy, to know how much it has reduced the military burden on society, or to gauge the impact of economic work on the army itself. In theory, an army is not a particularly effective agent of 56

Editorial in Nhan Dan, January 22,1981; FBIS-APA, January 13,1981.

57

In 1978, according to Carlyle Thayer,"Regularization of Military Bureaucratic Regimes: From Symbiosis to Coalition-The Case of Vietnam." Paper presented at the 6th Biennial Conference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia, University of Sydney, May 11-16,1986, p. 13.

58

Major General Tran Van Phac in QDND, n.d., broadcast over Hanoi radio, March 1, 1981; in FBIS-APA, March 5,1981.

59

Major General Nguyen Trong Xuyen, "Military Region 3 and the Organizing of Production Within Training and Combat Readiness Units," TCQDND, June 1983; JPRS trans., Southeast Asia Report no. 1327, JPRS no. 84-158 (August 22,1983), pp. 145-53. 60

Tran Cong Man interview, March 26,1983.

People's Army of Vietnam 209 development. The PAVN tends to perform economic tasks independently of state agencies, and the morale of troops in economic construction units is admitted to be low.61 Nor is it entirely free of the corruption that has bedeviled the Party and state and soiled the reputation of civilian cadres. Though references to corruption in the military are few, officers have been known to divert unit resources into social activities, funerals, and weddings;62 curbing theft of material belonging to the armed forces has been said to require "resolute struggle";63 and "deviate and degenerate personnel" in the armed forces as well as state agencies have engaged in smuggling and speculation in league with "professional criminals."64 Nonetheless, heavy dependence on the military to perform a wide range of economic and administrative functions, more than a decade after war's end and despite a continuing threat from China and intervention in Cambodia, indicates that alternative resources for development are perceived as deficient. Whatever the army's shortcomings, therefore, it has maintained and perhaps expanded its role as bulwark of the revolution and paragon for other institutions to emulate, in peace as in war. ******

What can be foreseen about the PAVN's role in future? Clearly, this analysis suggests that no significant change is likely. The army is politically active and highly visible in nominally civilian tasks, but these are legitimate roles that reflect the circumstances of the PAVN's origins and the Party's rise to power. Though the replacement of the PAVN's uniformed Party leaders by younger, politicized professionals may lead to a clearer demarcation between military and civilian spheres, direct conflict between the Party and army is virtually unimaginable at present. The Party's remarkable record of internal unity and apparent preparation for an orderly succession are additional assurances that the military will not exceed the limits of its legitimate political participation. However, it is most improbable that Marx's antipathy to standing armies will have any more impact on the PAVN than it has had in any other communist country. Obviously the PAVN must remain large to cope with the Chinese threat; and dependence on the PAVN to perform a widening range of tasks, while it also serves as chief repository of revolutionary virtues, values, and traditions, lays the basis for an incremental increase of military influence. Likewise, prolonged reliance for defense on "people's war under modern conditions" causes the military to permeate society and state at civilian initiative. Budgetary and strategic constraints virtually force Party leaders to mingle military and civilian functions if they wish to achieve a measure of security self-reliance without jeopardizing development. Generational succession, if not orderly after all, could well place military leaders in the role of power brokers. Aside from the interesting question of whether some form of "militarized socialism" might result, a key question is which policy tendencies the military will be likely to support. These, it seems clear, will include the adjustment of development priorities to create a national defense industry, which implies a shift again in favor of heavy industry as soon as 61

Editorial in Nhan Dan, June 15,1985; in FBIS-APA, June 18,1985.

62

Le Quang Hoa, May van de tiet kiem trong quan dot, p. 44.

63

Lieutenant General Bui Phung, "Improve the Effectiveness of the Rear Services Work," TCQDND, April 1983; JPRS trans., Southeast Asia Report no. 1319, JPRS no. 83-999 (July 28,1983), p. 81.

64

Editorial in Nhan Dan, October 5,1985, broadcast over Hanoi radio, October 4,1985; in FBIS-APA, October 8,1985.

210 Postwar Vietnam conditions permit.65 The military's proud, Spartan egalitarianism, not to mention concern for status and pay, also imply antipathy to market-oriented reforms. With regard to foreign affairs, the PAVN's prestige is now staked on successful prosecution of the war in Cambodia, which requires continued close security ties to the Soviet Union, at the expense, if necessary, of improved relations with China. Should PAVN influence in decision making grow, these orientations could define the limits of policy innovation within the Party. 65

PAVN leaders have been very consistent, and somewhat at variance with civilian planners, on this point. See General Giap's speech to the National Assembly, May 28,1979; in FBIS-APA, supplement of June 5,1979. See also Lieutenant General Le Quang Hoa, Tim hieu vu xay dung nen quoc phong toan dan [Understand the task of building a basis for all people's national defense] (Hanoi: Quan Doi Nhan Dan, 1983).

1 rends in Aid and 1 rade

This page intentionally left blank

RESULTS AND LIMITS IN CMEA-ViETNAMESE TRADE RELATIONS, 1975-1935 Anna Petrasovits*

The CMEA and the World Economy It is well known that the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) is composed of non-complementary moderately developed shortage economies in which the same concept of import substitution has been promoted by each of the member countries. Shortages of capital, high technology and managerial skill, materials and energy have been aggravated, if not created, by the inadequate industrialization model and the macro management system, which has been in practice for four decades. The structure of the CMEA is radial; it is integrated on the basis of bilateral economic relations between the Soviet Union and the "small ones." However, the Soviet Union, with abundant raw material and energy deposits, as well as high technology in defense and astronautics, is not, and has never been, the only supplier of the small CMEA member countries. Imports of capital (in the form of credit), technology, raw materials, and fuels from outside the CMEA put a heavy burden on the balance of payments of the small member countries. By itself, this disequilibrium is not alarming. However, the problem is that it has not been the acceptable concomitant of a successful continuous structural adjustment to the world economy, but rather the result of a vicious circle produced by the import-substituting economic policy. As is very often the case with excessive import substitution, the ratio of self-sufficiency of CMEA has not increased. On the contrary, numerous goods, including agricultural products, raw materials, medium technology, and spare parts, which formerly were items of intra-CMEA trade, are today imported by individual CMEA countries from outside the regional integration. The member countries try to offset their growing hard-currency import bill by less and less effective exports, or, like the Soviet Union, by selling raw materials, fuels, and gold on the world market. CMEA is a passive part of the world economy, taking in capital, technology, consumer goods, and even lifestyles, without vigorous interaction between it and the rest of the world economy. Given this state of affairs, is the extension of CMEA to underdeveloped areas economically reasonable, justifiable, or useful? The formulation of the question reflects the well-known fact that the expansion of the CMEA has been spurred by political consid-

* The author's intention is to give some facts and considerations from the viewpoint of a Hungarian economist about CMEA-Vietnamese trade relations. She examines only the economic aspects of the Vietnamese mem bership in CMEA and focuses on trade relations on the basis of rather limited and fragmented material. For all statements made in the paper, responsibility lies with the author alone. 213

214 Postwar Vietnam erations on the part of both the CMEA (especially the Soviet Union) and the newly enternig developing countries. If one considers only the resources taken from the European Socialist Countries (ESC) for Vietnam in the form of commercial credits, long-term development grants, and aid, Vietnam's presence in the CMEA certainly represents a sacrifice on the part of the ESCs, since these semi-developed economies themselves suffer from grave structural problems, low factor efficiency, and institutional inefficiency. Some say that the extension of the CMEA to underdeveloped countries is like loading a ship with too much cargo. Even though this might be an over-dramatized picture of reality, one must admit that the main problems of the CMEA are not helped by the addition of Vietnam or any other underdeveloped country. Genuine economic motivations which come from internal economic conditions in developed industrialized economies, such as relative superfluity of capital and commodities, are not present. Given the existing situation, however, economists must try to come up with alternatives corresponding to the economic mechanism of each ESC in order to find mutual interests with Vietnam. Ways and means, solutions and results might differ from country to country. The prerequisite for any more organic integration of Vietnam into CMEA in the future is the gradual conversion of the one-sided resource flow to a bilateral exchange of goods and production factors between Vietnam and the individual ESCs. There are considerable difficulties, however, hi trying to put this into practice. Although fully aware of the problems of the present economic situation in Vietnam, described in other chapters in this volume, the deficiencies of the CMEA core itself in, for example, pricing, monetary, and credit mechanisms should be given appropriate emphasis here. These operating deficiencies make international economic activities within the CMEA itself, as well as between the individual CMEA members and any other country, tiresome and inefficient. Since bureaucratic requirements and low efficiency increase in proportion to the complexity of the type of economic relation (in commerce it is not as spectacular as in the international allocation of production, where institutional rigidity usually creates unbridgeable problems), it is almost "natural" that export-creating efforts by the ESCs in Vietnam meet cumulative difficulties. As a result of lack of experience, lack of managerial skill, and lack of institutional flexibility in the ESCs, it appears as if Vietnam would be and could only be a "pledged" partner, but not a needed partner from a purely economic point of view. However, there are a number of actual and potential economic interests which should be taken into consideration in surveying the relationship between the ESCs and Vietnam. These areas of economic advantage include the need on the part of the ESCs to: i. ii. iii. iv.

release hard currency balances of payments in different ways; restructure their industrial pattern; ease structural labor shortages; utilize comparative advantages.

These four economic motivations play very diverse roles in the concrete trade and investment policy of the individual ESCs. Although there may be some cases of ESC-Vietnam economic interaction in which these economic considerations are not relevant, in Hungary's case they have been important. Hungary has severe resource shortages, and therefore a strong interest in structural changes in industry; in addition the country's eco-

CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations 215 nomic institutions are not absolutely rigid. As a result, Vietnam is considered a valued partner in a well-conceptualized partnership. In practice, however, these macro-economic interests are not always fully perceived by the socialist companies, which would have to carry out the activities planned or indicated by the national economic authorities. The non-cooperation of the companies, in turn, means that ESC relations with Vietnam remain in the framework of aid rather than economic partnership. On the other hand, at least in Hungary, there have been policy discrepancies between the central government and companies handling concrete economic relations with Vietnam. There have been cases in which a company or an industrial cooperative perceived an interest in cooperating with a Vietnamese economic unit, but the limited availability of capital and the too-short period for circulating fund credit made it impossible to expand operations in Vietnam. In the present stage of the world economy, when regionalism is losing importance, a new approach of ESCs towards Vietnam can perhaps be expected, though it should not be overestimated. A new approach would be one small sign of attempts at adjustment to the rules of the game in the world economy. Some Features of Vietnamese-CMEA Trade Joining the CMEA was more than a formal act for Vietnam, even though regular economic relations had already existed for decades. Perhaps the two most important new elements were regular agreements on national plans, and a gradual stiffening of trade and credit conditions. Of course, much time is still needed before the European CMEA members can or should apply the significantly more stringent conditions in their own economic relations to Vietnam, but there is certain to be an evolution towards a gradual approximation of the standard trade and credit conditions prevailing within the CMEA. The process can develop only on the basis of equity, as in the case of Cuba or Mongolia. Economic relations between Vietnam and individual ESCs include long-term development credit, trade and commercial credit, aid, grants, and finally contract work, which involves a combination of development credit and trade transactions financed by the state and the firm involved, according to strict credit and monetary regulations. The actual structure of contract work differs considerably from country to country. VietnameseHungarian contract work will be discussed later in this chapter. At the time of unification, about 50 percent of Vietnam's foreign trade was with CMEA countries. Even in 1979 it was not more than 60 percent, and this increase was entirely due to the increase of Vietnamese imports from CMEA.1 The real break-through came in 1981 rather than in 1978-1979 as one might have expected. Parallel to the break with China and Vietnam's entrance into CMEA, grants and aid to Vietnam from CMEA countries increased, but it took some time to channel commodities into the regular trade relations. By 1981,85 percent of Vietnamese foreign trade 1

These and following statistics are from Hungarian Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics, issues for 19761986, Central Bureau of Statistics, Budapest, Hungary.

216 Postwar Vietnam was carried out with the CMEA, and 90 percent of Vietnamese imports came from the CMEA. However, the CMEA's proportion of Vietnamese exports was only around 70 percent, due to prior Vietnamese obligations for export to other countries. Since that time, the CMEA's proportion of Vietnamese imports has slightly decreased, while that of Vietnamese exports has increased. In the period 1975-1980, the total commodity trade between the CMEA and Vietnam amounted to 3.5 billion rubles. The 2.5 billion rubles' worth of CMEA exports was covered by only some one billion rubles worth of Vietnamese goods, in other words an average coverage of imports by exports of approximately 40 percent. The main importer was the Soviet Union, which received 66 percent of total CMEA imports from Vietnam, with the German Democratic Republic second with 10.5 percent. The balance was as follows: Czechoslovakia 5.3 percent, Poland 4.3 percent, Hungary 3.2 percent, Bulgaria 2.7 percent, Cuba 2 percent, Mongolia 1 percent. Although no aggregate data are available for the 1980-1985 period, these general orders of magnitude have not changed since 1981. In terms of the dynamics and geographical composition of Vietnamese foreign trade, three years are particularly worthy of note. In 1981 Vietnam's hard-currency imports dropped to 23 percent of those of 1980, and in 1982 they were still less than half the 1980 level and one third of the imports in the period 1975-1980. At the same time, imports from the CMEA grew by 60 percent from 1980 to 1981. In 1981 hard-currency exports from Vietnam decreased by only 5 percent, and rubles exports to CMEA increased by 17 percent. The coverage of rubles import by rubles export dropped sharply to 20 percent. 1982 was a year of improvement in Vietnam's foreign trade relations. Though hardcurrency exports decreased by some 10 percent, rubles' exports increased by 35 percent. At the same time, Vietnamese total imports stayed at the same level, or decreased slightly, despite the fact that hard-currency imports grew by 74 percent over the 1981 figures. Altogether in 1982-1983, the equilibrium in the Vietnamese trade balance improved, partly because of better economic achievements, including a good harvest in 1983, and partly because of favorable institutional changes, including decentralization and autonomy of southern foreign trade companies. Curtailment of this autonomy the following year was in large part responsible for Vietnam's poor achievements in foreign trade in 1984. According to foreign trade practices among CMEA countries, trade relations are regulated by long-term goods exchange agreements signed by government officials. The export-import quotas among the members are not designed to protect the importer's market, but on the contrary, to guarantee the importer that the goods agreed upon will be delivered sooner or later. As for the long-term goods exchange agreements of CMEA members with Vietnam, projections concerning ESC's quotas to Vietnam significantly exceed Vietnamese export quotas to the same countries. The projected ESC exports are calculated as a sum of projected possible commercial credit by the ESC to Vietnam, and the probable Vietnamese imports. In the case of trade between Vietnam and the Soviet Union, the projected export/import ratio was 40 percent, i.e. Vietnamese exports to the Soviet Union equal 40 percent of imports from the Soviet Union. The "little ones" demand a somewhat higher ratio: Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and East German projections are 60, 70, and 85 percent respec-

CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations 217 tively. Bulgaria had expected a positive Vietnamese trade balance for the 1980s, but the actual export/import ratio was no higher than 60 percent in any year. Actual contracts and deliveries fell short of projected quotas. Eventually after "carrying over" these targets several times, roughly 70-75 percent of the projected quotas were delivered. The rather equitable projections have proved to be far too optimistic. From unification to 1980, Vietnam covered 37 percent of its Soviet exports, and 48, 47, and 43 percent of GDR, Czechoslovakian, and Polish exports. This ratio was the lowest in the case of Hungary at only 23 percent. The Hungarian partner tolerated this with understanding. On the basis of rather inconsistent data, the author would cautiously estimate that, in the period 1980-1985 the total amount of commodities flowing from the CMEA to Vietnam in the form of commercial exports exceeded 5.5 billion rubles. My detailed research has indicated that between 1976 and 1983 mineral and agricultural raw materials (tin, rubber, marble, chrome, jute, etc.) constituted less than 2 percent of Vietnam's exports to the ESCs. Simple industrial products (taps, rubber machine parts, articles made of metal, small bicycles, spare parts, etc.) reach 5-6 percent. Tropical fruits and luxury commodities (such as coffee and tea), together with spices (mainly cinnamon), make up about 25 percent. Other foodstuffs (sweets, tinned fruit, etc.) have a share of 30 percent, and a variety of other goods (like balm, carpets, sports and household goods, woven products, etc.) exceed 35 percent. Thus the Vietnamese export structure is not an example of monoculture. It is, in fact, far too dispersed compared to the economic development of the country. It reflects the efforts of the Vietnamese leadership to meet international obligations as far as possible, even at the expense of domestic supply. The practice of enforced exports, quite well known also in the ESCs, primarily in hardcurrency account relations, is most manifest in the case of manufactured foodstuffs. In the category "other foodstuffs and commodities," which make up a total of 65 percent of all Vietnamese exports to ESCs, the receipt of some products has much more to do with international solidarity than real economic demand. This variegated group of products deserves much more attention from market researchers of the ESCs so as to select more appropriate consumer goods. These should not deprive the domestic Vietnamese market of basic necessities (like some of the processed foodstuffs), but should include needed goods which are not produced in sufficient quantities by firms in the ESCs. Vietnam's export structure is far from optimal for either Vietnam or the receiver ESCs. This structure is unlikely to permit any significant increase of export volume and this is a serious bottleneck in trade with the ESCs. The demand for a modified export structure is obvious in two groups of products: 1. Each ESC would like to increase its imports of tin, rubber, and jute from Vietnam. Vietnam tries to divide these raw materials proportionally among the importing countries. Since Vietnam gets most of the goods important for its internal market from the Soviet Union, four-fifths of the above mentioned commodities go to the Soviet Union. The remaining one fifth are divided equally among the small socialist countries. The case is similar with respect to coffee, tea, and tinned fruits.

218 Postwar Vietnam 2. The heading "other foodstuffs and commodities" includes articles with very laborintensive production, which are viable products for Vietnam to export. With changes in production structure in the ESCs, an increase in the import of this group of products can be expected. The composition of Vietnamese imports from the ESCs reflects the changing concepts and priorities of Vietnamese economic policy. In 1976 roughly 80 percent of the total socialist import was made up of investment goods, machinery, energy, and materials. Only 15-20 percent served the immediate improvement of living conditions. In the composition of credits and aid there was a similar, though much less sharp, disproportion. In the following years, the proportion of basic necessities in imports from the ESCs grew, reaching 20-25 percent. The bulk of imports from the ESCs still consists of energy and raw materials, but the proportion dropped from over 50 percent to about 40 percent, while the proportion of machinery has grown somewhat. The most important import items are oil, fertilizers, tractors, trucks, cereals, and cloth. There is a significant difference in the composition of Vietnamese imports from the Soviet Union on the one hand and from the little ESCs on the other. In Soviet exports to Vietnam, machinery and materials predominate, leaving little room for small ESCs to export investment goods. The proportion of machinery in the export of the small ESCs has dropped from around 30 percent to under 10 percent. The proportion of consumer goods, including food, has now reached some 75-85 percent, up from some 50 percent at the end of the 1970s. In the composition of long-term development credit the difference is not as sharp as in the case of the commercial flow of goods. Since the main Vietnamese trading partner for both exports and imports is the Soviet Union, it is fitting to give a short summary of Soviet-Vietnamese trade relations. Soviet commercial export to Vietnam was composed of the following articles in the period 19761980: Machines, equipment Petrochemicals Cereals, flour Cotton, fiber

791.5 million rubles 46.2 percent « 8.2 " 140.3 " « 16.6 " 284.9 " 6.4 " 110.5 " «

Source: Foreign Trade USSR 7/1985: Rubalko: USSR-SRV, 30 years of fruitful cooperation (in Russian). Even though Soviet imports from Vietnam make up less than 1 percent of its total imports, in certain goods the Vietnamese imports cover a considerable portion of Soviet domestic consumption. Thus, for instance, 96 percent of total Soviet consumption of pineapples, 60 percent of chili powder, 14 percent of bananas, 9.6 percent of cigarettes, 8.6 percent of rubber, 7.8 percent of jute, 7.3 percent of coffee, 7 percent of tea, 2 percent of cloth are imported from Vietnam. To illustrate some orders of magnitude, according to my calculations and estimates, the Vietnamese direct 100 percent of their exported fresh fruits, 75 percent of frozen fruits, 95

CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations 219 percent of cigarettes, 88 percent of rubber, 66 percent of coffee, 88 percent of tea, and 100 percent of slippers and rubber boots to the Soviet Union. In absolute terms, it is the Soviet Union which has developed the most extensive production cooperation (contract work) in Vietnam, including manufacture of shirts, woolen carpets, and work overalls. The ratio of produced to planned quantity in contract work is not very high, but it has improved somewhat in recent years. Problems occur with quality. Actually, contract work has been operating as a specific form of Soviet solidarity assistance, but recently a new concept of contract work, a certain shift towards a more economically inspired activity, is under way. Coming back to the low export capacity of the Vietnamese economy, three more points need to be made. 1. Despite the obvious bottleneck in trade relations, there are certain "sensitive" or "hard" goods,~i.e. goods with hard-currency import content-flowing inevitably from the ESCs to Vietnam. Naturally, those goods are sensitive or hard only in the framework of foreign exchange restrictions, where, in both Vietnam and the ESCs, the national balance of payments is sharply split into convertible balance and ruble balance of payments. The massive outflow of such goods with significant hard-currency import content would have a negative effect on the hard-currency balance of payments in the ESCs. Even though this conversion of hard currency to rubles or dong could be compensated for by various Vietnamese export goods presently bought by CMEA countries with hard currency, there is a certain ambiguity in this respect in the actual decision making in the ESCs. 2. From another viewpoint, however, the concern is different. The rather speculative question posed is whether the export-creating efforts by the ESCs are developing an externally oriented "socialist enclave" in the texture of the underdeveloped Vietnamese economy? There can be two answers to this question. i. empirical data and practical experience do not show the phenomena characteristic of enclaves in world economy, neither in the positive, nor in the negative sense. ii. parallel to the primary policy of import substitution, only the extension of export capacities in Vietnam can guarantee the long-term interests of the individual ESCs, and the CMEA as a whole, bearing in mind that the ESCs are defensive subjects of the world economy. The rather random and scattered inflows from the ESCs, and necessarily inefficient utilization in Vietnam, are losses for the ESCs without being benefits for Vietnam. The most desirable new philosophy of credit and loans would focus on concentration and trade in accordance with the urgent need to improve living conditions in Vietnam. 3. Despite low export capacity, it should be possible for Vietnamese exports to be created in a short period of time, in significant quantity and good quality, once economic interests have succeeded in breaking through institutional rigidities. Contract work and barter deserve special attention in this respect. To build up a successful practice of barter, each side must be aware which of its goods are most wanted by the partner. Desired items are sometimes "hard" commodities, but are usually everyday consumer goods. Vietnam sends 80-90 percent of her exports most wanted by ESCs to the Soviet Union, and so has difficulties in distributing the rest among the "little ones." Barter is the back door. While quotas are not filled up by way of clearing, considerable amounts of goods move by barter agreements. The system of barter has

220 Postwar Vietnam been successfully realized by the GDR and Hungary. The goods exchanged are rubber and cloth, medicine, and other consumer goods. Investments and reconstruction financed by credit are outside the scope of this paper, but work on contract, an important means of Vietnamese export promotions, is an integral part of trade relations. In this way the Soviet Union, GDR, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary have tried to bridge the gap between their exports and imports from Vietnam. Some potential Vietnamese capacities are not used, simply because of shortages of material, which aggravates employment problems. On the other hand, the ESCs mentioned above suffer from structural labor shortages. The ESC agrees to deliver the materials, supplementary material, and technological documentation to the Vietnamese, who, in return, pay with the wage content of the processed goods. The GDR has experience with Vietnamese manufacture of gym shoes, Czechoslovakia with electronic spare parts, Hungary with underwear, shirts, rubber products, and recently initiated mass produced commodities made of metal. Such cooperation for the promotion of Vietnamese export capacities is particularly suitable for the small CMEA countries, which are not in a position to contribute large amounts of capital. In the development of contract work, the investments involved are generally not beyond their capacity, and turnover is much quicker than it is for most investments by the Soviet Union, or even by the same ESC in the framework of long-term development assistance. However, this form of cooperation needs a great deal of initiative, flexibility, individual determination from the ESCs, virtues which are not always readily available. The Experiences of the Vietnamese-Hungarian Trade Relations Even though Vietnamese-Hungarian trade relations date back decades, Vietnam's share in Hungarian foreign trade is not significant. Between 1976 and 1980 Vietnam accounted for 0.8 percent of Hungarian non-hardcurrency export, and 0.2 percent of non-hard-currency import. Between 1980 and 1984 Vietnam's share in Hungarian non-hard-currency export decreased somewhat, while the level of imports did not change. From 1976 to 1984 Hungary accounted for 2-3 percent of Vietnamese foreign trade. Although Vietnam's share of total Hungarian imports is small, it is essential in the case of certain goods, such as cinnamon, balms, and volatiles, and is important in others, such as shirts and underwear. The peculiar problems of the Hungarian economy require a careful balancing of a number of different interests and considerations in Vietnamese-Hungarian trade relations. The basic motivation for building up economic relations with Vietnam, i.e., Hungary's political alignment, has not changed for decades, but to dynamize relations, long-term economic interests must be involved and realized on both sides. From the mass of interests and arguments for and against expanding relations, there are three principal pairs of opinions to emphasize. 1. One Hungarian viewpoint states that economic ties with Vietnam can be beneficial for the long-term equilibrium of Hungarian hard-currency balance of payments, since some imports from Vietnam may substitute for some hard-currency imports (tropical

CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations 221 products, textiles, various contract work products). This would also be in Vietnam's interest, as production experience would gradually increase the country's capacity for hardcurrency exports. Those in Hungary who oppose this viewpoint argue that the hard-currency import content of investment goods and special materials needed to build up export capacities in Vietnam would place an additional strain on Hungarian hard-currency balance of payments in the short run. Furthermore, in this view, efficient utilization of these production capacities is very doubtful. 2. One Hungarian viewpoint states that the partial transplantation of some labor-intensive products would help the industrial restructuring in the country and would ease relative, structural labor shortages. For Vietnam, such activity would also have beneficial linkage effects which would generate the manufacture of related products in the production chain, as well as of import substituting goods which require similar skills and production conditions. Those in Hungary who oppose this viewpoint argue that there is still regional underemployment in Hungary, primarily among rural women. There is still room for transplanting labor-intensive workshops within Hungary itself outside the traditional industrial agglomerations, which would entail much less organizing effort and fewer risks. Uncertainties in the economic policy, and low absorbtive capacity in Vietnam make fruitful cooperation rather dubious. 3. Depending mainly on the speed of an inevitable evolution in Vietnamese economic policy, the minimal prerequisites can be expected to emerge for Vietnamese participation in the regional division of labor. Being in the vicinity of dynamic world economic forces in Southeast Asia, this might introduce new elements in Vietnamese-Hungarian economic relations, though not in the short run. The opposing argument holds that Vietnam is too far from Hungary, and the existing conditions over there do not make it possible for Vietnam to study and follow positive experiences in nearby countries. The roughly 20 percent yearly augmentation of Vietnamese-Hungarian trade certainly indicates considerable success in finding mutual economic interests. The bulk of Hungarian exports (60-70 percent) is made up of diverse consumer goods, especially medicines and chemicals. The proportion of raw materials is around 20 percent, that of machines is the same, though because of a halt in Vietnamese investments in 1983 it dropped below 10 percent. The structure of Vietnamese exports to Hungary does not differ much from that to other CMEA countries. Thus statements made concerning the global Vietnamese export structure are also valid for Vietnamese export to Hungary. However, Hungary's share is underrepresented in the receipt of Vietnamese coffee, tea, and tinned fruit, due mainly to different standards, sanitary regulations, and customers' traditions. On the other hand, Hungary's share in Vietnamese cinnamon and pepper exports is unusually large. Among other articles, imports of industrial rubber products and hand wheels can be expected to increase. Imports of iron ware and metal products have been growing in the past two years, permitting a significant repayment of hard-currency account imports.

222 Postwar Vietnam Barter offers a good means for expanding Vietnamese-Hungarian trade. The rate of increase is faster than that of contingents.2 Barter makes up about 25 percent of total imports. The most successful barter has been the import of industrial rubber by Taurus Rubber Works and the export of textiles by Hungarotex. Contract work is an even better way of creating exports. It was, in fact, begun by individual industrial firms, such as Fekon (men's shirts and underwear), the Textile Factory of Szeged, etc. In the beginning, the business was carried out on consignment, but the producers slowly withdrew, mainly because of unsolved financial problems. Today, most contract work is carried out by foreign trade companies on their own account and at their own risk. This appears to be a serious obstacle to Hungarian firms adopting a more active transplanting policy in Vietnam. Vietnamese contract work, because of slow payment, would need centrally supported credit assistance in Hungary. By far the most important field of Vietnamese-Hungarian contract work is the manufacture of men's shirts and underwear. Hungary obtains 15-20 percent of its domestic supply of shirts and 8-10 percent of underwear in this way. The production of bicycle tires is increasing fast, and now amounts to two million per year. These products are followed by knitted underwear and baby clothes, and work overalls. The relative differences in wages, even with transport expenses, make it possible for these products made in Vietnam to fit into the Hungarian market price level, provided that credit periods do not get longer (in fact, they should be considerably shortened in the future). In this way Vietnam can ensure 35-40 percent of its exports to Hungary, since the labor cost of the products made by contract work comes to that amount. Furthermore, Vietnamese laborers and managers are significantly more disciplined and efficient than in most cases of Hungarian long-term development assistance. Finally, the author carried out interviews with two Hungarian firms involved in Vietnamese contract work. The first firm interviewed was Taurus, a rubber company listed on the world market. Before the 1980s, Taurus only carried out contingent trade through clearing.3 Taurus had delivered tires for Vietnamese rubber. At the beginning of the 1980s a small country plant unit was transplanted to Vietnam which produced bicycle tires. Experience was rather mixed. There were quality and delivery problems, but the situation is improving. Some of the wastage and delay came from Taurus's inexperience, and, having become more familiar with Vietnamese production conditions, further improvements are expected. Taurus management sees possibilities in Vietnamese rubber contract work, and thinks the negative aspects are a natural part of the learning process on both sides. In the near future a rubber glove plant is about to start operation under a contract work arrangement. Despite the additional organizational problems, Taurus is interested in the establishment of further Vietnamese contract work, and in becoming the main agent for vertical integration of Hungarian interests in rubber from plantation to export.

2

The term "contingents" in intra-CMEA trade refers to obligation for the delivery and/or the receipt of goods contracted in the framework of a goods-exchange agreement signed by foreign trade policy authorities of the countries involved. 3

Contingent trade through clearing aims at the elimination or minimalization of cash (transferable ruble) movements between the trading partners.

CMEA-Vietnamese Trade Relations 223 The second firm the author visited was a foreign trade company, Hungarotex, trading in textiles and clothing. The Vietnamese-Hungarian textile and clothing contract work is carried out by Hungarotex and one other large foreign trade company, Konsumex. These two companies represent two factories and several cooperatives working with woven material, ready made clothes, knit wear, and, recently, shoes. The importance of Vietnamese contract work is indicated by the fact that it is the Hungarian textile industry which is most seriously hit by structural labor force problems. The contract work substitutes for roughly two and a half thousand Hungarian workers, mostly women, in the textile industry. The Hungarotex experience is that the Vietnamese partners are reliable; complaints from the Hungarian side are rare. Hungarotex made agreements on technical supervision with two Hungarian cooperatives, which took responsibility for providing the permanent control of technological discipline. Hungarotex representatives are always on the spot to ensure smooth production, giving technical advice, ensuring continuous material supply, incentives, and quality control. Most of the products are categorized as good or high quality. Hungarotex is keen on further refinement of the production structure. As for the future of Vietnamese-Hungarian economic relations, the really dynamic factor would be if, in conformity with continuous economic reforms in Hungary, firms themselves would activate contract work in Vietnam with centrally supported credit. However, a number of obstacles exist. i. Competition among firms is still not strong enough to force them to cut down labor costs. ii. Hungarian manpower is still cheap compared to the risk a firm would take in transplanting selected products of its own. iii. The present principles of credit policy discourage economic activities by Hungarian firms abroad including in Vietnam. iv. The hard-currency import content of the material sent to Vietnam for processing creates a bottleneck in contract work. Thus while the similar political set-up and the potential synergy of the two economies might help to attract each other, the problems of a semi-developed, still bureaucratic economy in Hungary and underdevelopment in Vietnam result in difficulties in practice.

This page intentionally left blank

EXTERNAL ASSISTANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF VIETNAM'S DEVELOPMENT EFFORT Karl H. Englund

When considering development assistance to an underdeveloped country, one should bear in mind that in normal cases domestic resource mobilization by far exceeds external contributions to the development effort. Therefore, in order to place the impact and relevance of such assistance to any given country in its proper context, it is necessary to review economic and social developments in the recipient country, to identify potentialities and constraints and assess the relevance of external assistance. Vietnam is no exception to this rule, with the proviso that Vietnam faces the additional task of reconstruction following thirty years of almost uninterrupted warfare. The war caused suffering and destruction of gigantic proportions. North Vietnam, about the same size as the state of Texas, had to absorb three to five times the tonnage of explosives used in all theaters during the Second World War. Millions of people were killed or maimed. Bombs, defoliants, and bulldozers destroyed or damaged about five million hectares of forest land. No accounts of events or reference to gruesome statistics of death and destruction can do justice to the story of untold human suffering and devastation that was particular to Vietnam. The Vietnamese paid a very high price indeed for independence and reunification, while most other underdeveloped countries gained their independence without armed struggle and no other country came near to what Vietnam had to endure before the task of liberation and unification was accomplished. That is why the war and its consequences for the country's economy must be taken into account as a major factor influencing postwar developments. The full story of the war and its impact on Vietnam's future development prospects has yet to be told. Suffice it to say here that it will take decades for Vietnam to complete the rehabilitation phase, making up for the reduction of human and physical capacities needed to put the country on the path of sustained economic growth. However, it should also be stressed that the economic misfortunes which have befallen Vietnam since 1975 can to a considerable extent be attributed to unrealistic, rigid, and unimaginative planning, as well as mismanagement of current development activities, resulting in less than optimal allocation and husbanding of scant resources. When discussing the postwar period it is imperative to bear in mind the momentous consequences of events at the end of 1978 and beginning of 1979. Vietnamese troops invaded Kampuchea and a few weeks later the war with China began. It is no exaggeration to say that Vietnam's military involvement in Kampuchea dramatically changed its position in the world. The immense reservoir of international goodwill generated in Vietnam's favor by the successful end of a war, in which a poor and underdeveloped country prevailed in fierce battle with the most powerful war machine ever brought into action, 225

226 Postwar Vietnam was consumed in a surprisingly short time. In 1976 and 1977, much of the world looked at Vietnam with respect and admiration. A resolution of the UN General Assembly called for special assistance to Vietnam. Since 1979, however, Vietnam has been strongly criticized and viewed with suspicion in the non-communist world because of its intervention in Kampuchea. Isolation from a large part of the donor community has denied Vietnam access to important sources of financing, a most unwelcome development considering the vast needs of the country's war-torn economy. The break with China and the cancellation of Chinese aid, together with the decrease of Western and international assistance, inevitably has led to greater dependence on the USSR and the rest of the CMEA. Earlier the Chinese had provided yearly almost one billion dollars worth of aid, including 500,000 tons of rice. Such a substantial loss could only be sustained by increased contributions from other external sources, since the faltering domestic Vietnamese economy was unable to make up the shortfalls. The USSR and its CMEA partners were the only alternative. One consequence of this re-orientation of Vietnam's external relations was to reinforce previously existing domestic tendencies towards over-centralization, rigid setting of quantitative quotas, and bureaucratic inertia. Other chapters in this volume have dealt with economic and social developments since the war. In this chapter I will review postwar economic assistance and indicate what I see as the priority areas for the future. Development Needs The need for external development assistance arising from the postwar evolution of Vietnam's economy is practically unlimited. Since unlimited funds are by no means available, a strict order of priorities is an obvious necessity. Ideally, pre-investment investigations should be carried out to analyze a number of priority areas where the potential to produce goods and services have to be strengthened before sustainable growth of the economy can be accomplished. The economic infrastructure must be restored before steady progress can be accomplished. Power stations, railroads, coastal shipping, industries producing consumer goods for the population are thus easily identifiable as target areas. Agriculture warrants special attention. Vast amounts are needed to modernize agricultural production and improve productivity. A review of the agricultural sector is long overdue to establish priorities, not only between types of activities and investments but also between regions. The Mekong Delta should be selected as the main target area since it has an enormous long-term potential, estimated by some experts at 100 million metric tons of cereals per year. The importance of water control is obvious to anyone who has witnessed the destructive consequences of very unpredictable weather patterns hi Vietnam. Construction of water-storage dams and irrigation systems should rank very high on the priority list. To avoid excessive reliance on external inputs, small water-control systems, built mainly with local resources and serving limited local communities, should be considered in the first instance. Many factories and workshops use machinery and equipment which would have been written off a long time ago, if normal business practices had been observed. However, in Vietnam it is indeed necessary to keep machines going well beyond their normal write-off date due to the enormous gap between needs and means. Rehabilitation of old

Economy and External Assistance 227 industries, which might seem at first glance an uneconomical policy, may well be justified in the Vietnamese context. Nonetheless, rehabilitation of such factories can in most cases only be a stopgap measure, with a relatively short life expectancy due to obsolescence of the machinery. It will need to be studied carefully whether or not the investment is justifiable, taking into account expected returns in relation to amounts invested. An emphasis on hardware is logical, since the country's productive assets are with few exceptions old and run down. This does not mean, however, that assistance in the form of advisory services and training is not necessary. On the contrary, the Vietnamese have much to learn, more than many may think. In research, assistance ought to focus on practical, result-oriented activities as close as possible to the primary agents of production, rather than on basic research of a more academic nature. The priority sectors-agriculture, industry, forestry, and fisheries-should be the main beneficiaries. Vietnam's forests are being depleted at an alarming rate, although a reforestation drive has shown some success in the last few years.1 Consumption of fish is very low, about ten kilograms per head each year. A large part of the fishing fleet is out of commission due to engine failures and lack of fishing gear. Economic management has been a serious drawback since the end of the war. Advice and training in this field are important and urgent. A key element of such assistance should be courses and study tours in market-economy countries and relatively advanced developing countries. In general, it is a good idea to send Vietnamese on training and study tours to Western countries. It helps to break the country's isolation, exposes the visitors to developments in a part of the world hitherto fairly unknown to them, and ensures training according to Western methods. Selection of candidates must be based strictly on technical merits. Training abroad should not be over-emphasized, however. Technical middle-level training, a matter of great urgency to Vietnam, can best be done locally by means of support to existing institutions. Rapid population growth is one of the main impediments to economic progress, yet external assistance to the family-planning program is clearly insufficient. The Vietnamese government recently has set up a committee for population control and family planning. This committee, chaired by the legendary General Vo Nguyen Giap, has coopted a senior membership and shown a promising start. Vietnam has considerable long-term development potential. There are many rivers which could be harnessed for irrigation and power generation. About three million hectares of agricultural land are uncultivated. Mineral resources, which are located primarily in the north of the country, are either unutilized or underutilized; pre-investment studies would in all likelihood identify profitable investment opportunities. Development Assistance to Vietnam Information on external aid is rather sketchy as far as the CMEA countries are concerned.2 In particular, no figures on project costs or yearly allocations are available. It has been estimated that assistance for civilian purposes coming from the CMEA is worth the

1 2

See, for example, Elizabeth Kemf, The Re-greening of Vietnam," New Scientist, no. 1618, June 23,1988.

Anna Petrasovits, in her chapter in this volume, has summarized the available information on CMEA assistance.

228 Postwar Vietnam equivalent of about $1 billion yearly. The USSR is by far the largest donor; in the earlier postwar years its share was estimated at about 50 percent of the CMEA total. This share is likely to have increased because of the economic difficulties facing some of the other CMEA countries. The USSR is heavily involved in energy development, with three large power stations under construction. When completed in five to ten years, these stations will increase power-generating capacity from a 1985 level of about 1.5 billion kw to 4.5 billion kw. This does not automatically mean a threefold increase of power for the consumer, however. Heavy investments hi transmission lines and power grids will be necessary to distribute the power generated. Industrial development is another target area as far as the USSR is concerned. Machine tools, chemicals, cement, food processing, and coal and tin mining are the main beneficiaries. The USSR also has joined Vietnam in an ambitious program for expansion of rubber plantations, although the target of one million hectares seems overly optimistic. Estimates by outside observers suggest a maximum figure of 500,000 hectares under optimal conditions. A second bridge over the Red River, a project abandoned by China in 1978, is being completed with USSR assistance. All of the oil Vietnam consumes is provided by the Soviet Union. Previous deliveries from Arab countries have been stopped due to difficulties with loan repayments. Oil is the main item on the import bill, with no clear indication when domestic wells will begin to reduce this heavy burden. Programs of cooperation between Vietnam and the socialist countries in Europe place main emphasis on industrial development, expansion of industrial and subsidiary crops, technical training, forestry, and to a lesser extent transport, health, and shipping. Poland and Hungary granted Vietnam soft loans amounting to 100 million rubles each for the period 1981-1985. The corresponding amount for the German Democratic Republic was 20 million rubles. Total assistance granted by the German Democratic Republic up to 1980 has been estimated at 800 million D-marks, while Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Poland, and Hungary together contributed about 800 million rubles. The program of labor cooperation between Vietnam and the CMEA countries, including the USSR, continues as planned. The total number of Vietnamese workers in Eastern Europe is estimated at at least 20,000 yearly. A part of their wages is withheld as repayments for outstanding loans. Results of programs of cooperation between Vietnam and CMEA countries apparently have been mixed. Some projects have been considerably delayed due to lack of power and other necessary inputs. In general, donors show a preference for project aid, rather than program aid, as a means of improving control over the use of their funds. Since the end of the war Sweden has been consistently the largest non-socialist donor. In the mid-1980s, the amount of this aid declined, with its allocation for the fiscal year starting July 1,1985, for example, being reduced by about 20 percent, to 300 million Swedish Kronor (about $40 million). Operational assistance to the pulp and paper mill and two hospitals built with Swedish aid, a new primary health program, and import support are the main components of the Swedish program. Some funds will also be allocated to rehabilitate paper mills and a power station in the south of the country. Denmark is winding up its aid to Vietnam. Funds have been allocated to complete construction and commissioning of a sugar factory, a cement factory, a composting plant, and a water-supply facility. Dutch government-to-government aid to Vietnam has been

Economy and External Assistance 229 discontinued; from 1974 the Netherlands granted Vietnam assistance worth about $120 million. Both Norway and Australia had earlier ceased official assistance to Vietnam. However, Australia has resumed its aid on a modest scale through the UN system. French aid has been suspended pending a satisfactory outcome to negotiations concerning the rescheduling of Vietnam's debt to France. Advisory services, in some cases accompanied by equipment, are still financed by France in the fields of agriculture, livestock farming, and health. Belgium has agreed to supply Vietnam with locomotives, part of the funds being a grant, the remainder a soft loan. Finland has financed a ship repair yard and granted funds for improvement of Hanoi's water-supply system. The World Bank suspended its assistance to Vietnam in 1979. Its only commitment had been $60 million for a large irrigation system, which is at present being built with cofinancing of $10 million each by the Netherlands, the Kuwait Fund, and the International Fund for Agricultural Development. The Asian Development Bank has no projects being implemented in Vietnam for the time being. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have been moderately active in Vietnam. As of the end of 1983, NGO assistance granted to Vietnam for ongoing and future projects was estimated at $5.5 million. The main target areas were health, humanitarian relief, and science and technology, with the largest part of the funds coming from organizations in the Netherlands. More recently, the Australian government has begun channeling several hundred thousand dollars per year to NGOs on a matching funds basis. The UN system provides assistance to Vietnam worth between forty and fifty million dollars yearly. The main beneficiary sectors are agriculture, forestry, industry, transport, and energy through the UN Development Program, and health and child care through UNICEF and the World Health Organization. The World Food Program has granted food aid worth $24 million for four to five years, to improve nutrition among children in selected provinces. Vietnam has in fact been one of the main beneficiaries of WFP assistance since 1975. Does Vietnam have the capacity to absorb the assistance given to it? Based on experience gained so far, the answer is mixed, with positive elements probably outweighing negative ones. On the one hand, the dialogue between foreign aid representatives and Vietnamese officials is open, frank, and businesslike. Vietnamese officials do take no for an answer and accept criticism, if the reasons for the refusal or criticism are explained to them. They prepare themselves for negotiations and are good listeners. On the other hand, the administration is far from efficient. Decision making is a slow, complicated process. Cooperation between government departments is difficult to achieve. Such services as housing, transportation, and power supply are more often than not grossly inadequate. In brief, the administration has not yet fully adjusted to the requirements of peacetime development management. It is still too much the administration of a country at war. Very careful project preparation and close monitoring of ongoing activities is therefore necessary. The impact and relevance of the development assistance received by Vietnam could only be adequately assessed after a thorough review of the various joint undertakings planned or under way. Such a review has never been carried out. Nevertheless, some general observations are possible. The relatively modest share of assistance provided to the agricultural sector does not reflect needs and priorities as they have evolved since the war. Agriculture is the main sector,and the lack of food is the main problem facing the country. Furthermore, assistance ought to be provided at the level of the farmers, whose

230 Postwar Vietnam impressive performance is a safe measure of their considerable absorptive capacity. In Vietnam, as elsewhere, small-scale ventures with the direct participation of local communities are the best approach. The share of foreign assistance to light consumer goods industries seems to be growing, a satisfactory development. This trend should continue in order to increase availability of daily necessities, an urgent requirement if the living conditions of the population are to be improved. The present emphasis on energy development is amply justified by the energy crisis. However, more attention ought to be devoted to small-scale hydropower projects combined with irrigation. Vietnam has a large number of rivers and tributaries which lend themselves to such ventures. Fisheries seem to have escaped the notice of most donors, which is regrettable. Vietnam's long coastline undoubtedly offers good prospects of increased catches both of fish and crustaceans. Vietnam's fishing fleet is in a deplorable state of repair, which prevents the country from participating in deep-sea fishing in more distant waters. It is fortunate that relatively large funds have been reserved for Vietnam's railways, the backbone of the country's transport system. By the same token, it is regrettable that coastal shipping has been neglected. Vessels sailing along the coasts fulfil a vital purpose as a means of cheap mass transportation. So far, the bulk of the assistance to Vietnam has been geared to repair, replacement, and renewal of capital goods, which was probably inevitable in the initial reconstruction phase. However, a re-orientation in favor of technical training at various levels is called for in the future to be able to improve the qualifications of cadres and workers. The country's hospitals and clinics are unable to serve the population adequately, due toacute shortages of equipment, supplies, and drugs. Schools at all levels and in all specialties are in the same deplorable situation. External funds reserved for health and education cover only a fraction of the needs. Unfortunately, the same can be said for any other sector of the country's economic and social life. Conclusion To judge from what has been said on many occasions by senior Vietnamese officials, the ultimate aim of economic policy is a fully socialist society with the people as the master, the Party as the leader, and the government as the manager. Whether and when this goal can be fully reached is for the future to tell, although some questions seem relevant in this regard. In the long run, will it be possible to reconcile the economic reforms now under way with the overall aim of socialist transformation? How far will free enterprise be tolerated? To what degree will joint ventures with foreign investors be encouraged? Are the present economic reforms a temporary phenomenon in the face of current difficulties, or are they here to stay? To what extent is the bureaucracy willing and able to adjust constructively to the reforms? Are Vietnamese leaders too strongly tied to the old habits of centralized, bureaucratic management by decree, according to the Stalinist model, hence ignoring or opposing market forces? Do they still believe that it will be possible to mold a new socialist man prepared to subordinate personal interests to those of the collective? In a nutshell, who will gain the upper hand, the conservatives or the more liberally inclined elements? It would be futile to answer such questions with any pretension of accuracy in the present transitional situation.

Economy and External Assistance 231 There are many interrelated factors whose relative impact is impossible to assess at the moment. At any rate, from past experience it is clear that fundamental changes in the management of the country's economy are necessary. If not, progress at the present rate will be almost entirely offset by population growth and hence leave little or no room for much needed, long overdue improvements in the people's living conditions. The Vietnamese are poorly fed, poorly clothed, and poorly housed, and it would be unreasonable to expect them to work much harder than they are already doing. Exhortations at meetings or over loud-speakers will not do the trick. Only more food, better clothes, more decent living quarters, and, last but not least, better pay for better work, will lead to success. The people-imaginative, hardworking, resourceful, seemingly capable of absorbing unlimited amounts of hardship-are there. If given the right tools, they will do the rest and bring the country out of its present impasse. Outsiders often remark that the Vietnamese are prisoners of the past. This is by no means a dramatic discovery. Practically every town in Vietnam has a street called Hai Ba Trung, hi memory of the two sisters who, in AD 39, waged a successful war against the Chinese and established a short-lived kingdom, thereby beginning the long series of rebellions against foreign oppressors. Another valiant woman warrior, Trieu Thi Trinh, raised a small army 200 years later and led her troops in golden armor, astride an elephant. Overwhelmed by superior Chinese troops, she committed suicide rather than face the dishonor of defeat. Legend or history? Whatever the facts, that is the way the Vietnamese wish to remember their past heroes. Beginning with those female freedom fighters of ancient times, the line of patriotic warriors extends to the 1954 victor of Dien Bien Phu, General Vo Nguyen Giap, with many other leaders in between, such as General Ngo Quyen, who defeated the Chinese in AD 938 and won independence, or General Tran Hung Dao, who stopped the onslaught of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. There are a multitude of heroes of lesser consequence. All are remembered as patriotic, courageous, ready to sacrifice for the common good, which is Vietnam's freedom, independence, and separate identity, the leitmotiv of its history. No doubt there is some justification in concluding that the Vietnamese are too inclined to look backward. On the other hand, one should not be too harsh in criticism. Not much more than a decade has elapsed since the end of the war, which completely dominated the minds and bodies of the entire population. That is a short period hi the transition of an entire country from conditions of protracted all-out war to those of peaceful development. Mentalities and psychological reactions, as well as institutional patterns, need time to change and to adjust in a rapidly changing world. When assessing Vietnam's economic performance it cannot be repeated too often that thirty years of war, with immense human losses and material destruction, remains a major factor in the development process. So is the country's involvement in Kampuchea. While the expense in cash and kind may be tolerable, the political cost of Kampuchea is very high indeed. However, all things considered, there is no reason to despair about the country's economic future. The time perspective will no doubt be longer than was originally thought. If the Kampuchean problem is resolved within a reasonable period of time, and if the present economic management reforms are expanded and consolidated, there is reason for optimism in the longer term. The country is blessed with large areas of fertile land, mineral resources, considerable hydropower potential, and, above all, a people who possess in ample measure qualities needed to face the challenge of development.

This page intentionally left blank

POSTWAR VIETNAM: CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS 1975-1988*

1975

April 30

Complete liberation of Saigon, marking the end of the war; PRG flag hoisted over Independence Palace.

May

Termination of Chinese military aid to Vietnam; beginning of border disputes between Kampuchea and Vietnam.

End August

Non-aligned Conference in Lima. The DRV becomes a member of the non-aligned movement.

September 22

First currency reform; issuing of a new South Vietnam dong to replace the piastre used under the former regime.

September 10

Beginning of campaign against the "comprador-bourgeoisie" in south Vietnam.

1976

April 25

Elections held throughout Vietnam for a reunified National Assembly..

July 2

National reunification as the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, with Hanoi as the capital.

September 15

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) recognizes the membership oftheSRV.

September 20

The SRV becomes a member of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

September 23

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) recognizes the SRV as a new member.

December 14-20

Fourth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam, until then known as the Vietnam Worker's Party. Premier Pham Van Dong outlines Vietnam's Second Five- Year Plan (1976-1980); a new Central Committee is elected comprising 133 members; Le Duan is elected Secretary-general of the CPV.

* Prepared by Udo Janz and updated by Christine Pelzer White.

233

234 Postwar Vietnam

1977 January-December Border disputes escalate between Democratic Kampuchea and the SRV. April 18

A new law on private foreign investment in the SRV is announced in Hanoi.

July

CC Second Plenum: decision on collectivization of agriculture in the south.

July 18

"Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" signed between the SRV and the Lao People's Democratic Republic.

September 20

The SRV becomes the 149th member of the United Nations.

1978 Mid-February

Third Plenum of the CPV-Central Committee (Fourth Congress) convenes.

March 23

Campaign to abolish bourgeois commerce in the south.

May 3

Money reform unifying the currencies circulating in the northern and southern zone; introduction of the new dong as the only national currency.

June 29

The SRV joins the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) as a member.

June/July

CC Fourth Plenum.

July 3

Termination of all Chinese economic aid to the SRV and subsequent withdrawal of all Chinese technicians.

November 3

"Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" signed between the SRV and the USSR.

December 22

Start of a military offensive of the SRV against Democratic Kampuchea.

1979 January?

Occupation of Phnom Penh by Vietnamese troops and overthrow of the regime of Democratic Kampuchea (Pol Pot).

Feb. 17-Marchl9

Chinese invasion of SRV provinces bordering China.

February 18

"Peace, Friendship and Cooperation Treaty" signed between the SRV and the People's Republic of Kampuchea.

August

CC Sixth Plenum introduces economic reforms. Part of resolution made public in September.

Chronology 235

1980 February 3

Celebrations marking the 50th anniversary of the CPV held throughout Vietnam.

December 18

A new constitution is adopted by the National Assembly.

1981 January

Directive CT/TU/100 on production contracts between cooperatives and households.

April

A new National Assembly (the seventh since 1945) is elected. 4% deputies elected from a slate of 614 candidates.

July 4

Truong Chinh is elected Chairman of the State Council.

1982 March 27-31

Fifth National Congress of the CPV is held in Hanoi; a new Central Committee composed of 152 members is elected. Congress encourages expansion of the family economy and stresses agriculture and consumer goods production.

July 9

CC Second Plenum (Fifth Congress).

December 3

CC Third Plenum.

1983 June 18

CC Fourth Plenum.

November 29

CC Fifth Plenum.

1984 July3

CC Sixth Plenum discusses industrial and agricultural management.

December 11

CC Seventh Plenum.

1985 April 20

Major devaluation of the dong against the US$; new official exchange rate is 100 dong per US$.

June 10-17

Eighth Plenum of the CPV-Central Committee issues resolution on prices, wages, and money.

September

Price, wage, and currency reform. New dong replaces old at rate of ten to one. Food rations abolished, state sector wages raised. Disastrous inflation results.

236 Postwar Vietnam

1986 July 10

Death of Le Duan at 79; he had been the Party's Secretary-general since the Third Congress in 1960.

December 15-18

Sixth Party Congress held in Hanoi convening 1,129 official delegates representing 1.8 million Party members. Three top Politbureau leaders (Truong Chinh, Pham Van Dong, and Le Due Tho) step down but retain advisory positions. Nguyen Van Linh elected Secretary general.

December 24-29

Twelfth session of Seventh National Assembly. Draft Law on Marriage and the Family passed.

1987 January

Political Bureau directive to "renovate" National Assembly elections by increasing the number of candidates.

February

Beginning of purification campaign expelling corrupt members from the Party.

April 19

Elections for Eighth National Assembly; 496 persons elected from a slate of 829 candidates.

May 25

Secretary General Nguyen Van Linh begins press campaign against administrative corruption and inefficiency with his column in the Party newspaper Nhan Dan under the heading "Things to be done immediately."

June

First session of Eighth National Assembly elects Pham Hung as premier.

August

CC Third Plenum discusses shifting basis of operation of state-run enterprises from state subsidization to socialist economic accounting (an expansion of the Eighth Plenum, Fifth Congress of June 1985).

September 2

National Day amnesty for 6,685 prisoners including 480 military and civilian personnel of the former US-backed Saigon government.

December 5

Politbureau resolution on renovating leadership of literature, art, and culture.

December 8-17

CC Fourth Plenum assesses 1987 economic peformance.

December 23-29

Second session of Eighth National Assembly passes important laws on land use, foreign investment, and import-export taxes as well as a draft criminal code. The new foreign investment code, one of the most liberal in all Southeast Asia, allows foreign companies to establish wholly owned enterprises in Vietnam.

1988 February 7

First joint venture established: a transport and tourist company in Vung Tao involving the local tourist office and a Hong Kong firm.

Chronology 237 March 10

Premier Pham Hung dies.

March 28-29

First National Congress of the Vietnam Peasants' Union.

Aprils

Politbureau resolution on renovation of economic management in agriculture.

June

Formation of two public stock-selling companies (a Haiphong shipping company and a Hanoi insurance company). Stock may be purchased by foreigners.

June 14

CC Fifth Plenum (Sixth Congress) on Party reorganization. Nguyen Van Linh defends Sixth Congress economic reform program.

June 22

Third session of Eighth National Assembly elects Do Muoi to position of premier.

This page intentionally left blank

POSTWAR VIETNAM Selected Bibliography (Citations from 1982 onward)

Appleton, Judith. "Socialist Vietnam: Continuity and Change." In Rural Development and the State, edited by D A.M. Lea and D. P. Chaudhri, 273-300. London: Methuen, 1983. Banister, Judith. The Population of Vietnam. Washington: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Oct. 1985. 43 pp. Beresford, Melanie. "Agriculture in the Transition to Socialism: the case of South Vietnam." In The Primary Sector in Economic Development, edited by Mats Lundaht. London: Croom Helm, 1985. Beresford, Melanie. "Household and Collective in Vietnamese Agriculture." Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1985), pp. 5-36. Beresford, Melanie. "Vietnam: Northernizing the South or Southernizing the North?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 8 (March 1987). Beresford, Melanie. Vietnam: Politics, Economics and Society. London: Pinter, 1988. Bostrand, Lisbet. Living and Working Conditions for Forestry Workers in Vietnam: A Follow-up Report. Stockholm: SIDA March 13,1986. 72 pp. Boudarel, Georges. L'id£ocratie importde au Vietnam avec le Maoisme. In La Bureaucratic au Vietnam, edited by Boudarel, et al., 31-106. Paris: 1'Harmattan, 1983. [Although this essay deals mainly with the 1940s-1960s, the arguments are still relevant.] Broyles, William. Brothers in Arms: A Journey from War to Peace. New York: Knopf, 1986. Bui Dinh Thanh, et al. "Science Transition to Socialism in Vietnam: Characteristics and Periodization." Viet Nam Social Sciences (Hanoi), 1-1984, pp. 48-70. Chanda, Nayan. "Vietnam's Economy: 'Bad but not Worse'." Indochina Issues (Washington), No. 41 (October 1983). Chanda, Nayan. Brother Enemy: The War after the Wan A History of Indochina since the Fall of Saigon. San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986. Da Cunha, Derek M. "Aspects of Soviet-Vietnamese Economic Relations." Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 7, No. 4 (March 1986), pp. 306-19.

239

240 Postwar Vietnam Dao Van Tap. "Problems of Socialist Construction: the Vietnamese Economic Policy in the Struggle for National Independence and Socialism." Viet Nam Social Sciences (Hanoi) 1-1984, pp. 22-41. Dao Van Tap. "About Strategy on Foreign Economic Relations." Viet Nam Social Sciences 3/4-1986, pp. 52-65. Draguhn, Werner. "The Indochina Conflict and the Positions of the Countries Involved." Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 5, No. 1 (June 1983), pp. 95-116. Duiker, William J. "Vietnam in 1984: Between Ideology and Pragmatism," Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 1 (January 1985), pp. 97-105. Duiker, William J. Vietnam Since the Fall of Saigon. 2nd ed., rev. Athens, Ohio: Center for International Studies, 1985. Duiker, William J. "Ideology and Nationalism in Vietnamese Foreign Policy." Harvard International Review, Vol. 9, No. 2 (January 1987), pp. 16-22. Duiker, William J. "Vietnam Moves Toward Pragmatism." Current History (April 1987). Eisen, Arlene. Women and Revolution in Vietnam. London: Zed, 1984. Evans, Grant, and Kelvin Rowley. Red Brotherhood at Wan Indochina Since the Fall of Saigon. London: Verso, 1984. Fforde, Adam. "Economic Aspects of the Soviet-Vietnamese Relationship: Their Role and Importance." University of London, Birbeck College Discussion Paper No. 156, October 1984. Fforde, Adam. "Law and Socialist Agricultural Development in Vietnam: the Statute for Agricultural Producer Cooperatives." Review of Socialist Law (The Hague), No. 10 (1984), pp. 315-36. Fforde, Adam. "Problems of Agricultural Development in North Vietnam." PhD thesis, University of Cambridge, 1982. Fourniau, Charles. "Vietnam: necessit£, originalit6 et ajustements du socialisme." Recherches Internationales (Paris), No. 14 (October-December 1984). Fraser, Stewart E. "Vietnam Struggles with Exploding Population." Indochina Issues, No. 57 (May 1985). H6mery, Daniel. "Vietnam-Cambodoge-Chine: La Guerre des Frontteres." In Problemes des Frontieres dans le Tiers Monde, 94-119. Paris: 1'Harmattan, 1982. Hiebert, Murray. "Contracts in Vietnam: More Rice, New Problems." Indochina Issues (Washington), No. 48 (July 1984). Hill, R. D. "Aspects of Land Development in Vietnam." Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 5, No. 4 (March 1984), pp. 389-402. Hill, R. D. and Cheung Man Biu. "Vietnamese Agriculture: Rhetoric and Reality." Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol. 7, No. 4 (March 1986), pp. 292-305. Houtart, F., and G. Lemercinier. Sociologie d'une Commune Vietnamienne. Louvain-laNeuve: Universit6 Catholique de Louvain, 1981.

Bibliography 241 Him Thinh. "From Poverty to Plenty: The Ricefields of Dien Ban." Vietnamese Studies (Hanoi), No. 76 (1985), pp. 109-22. Jones, Gavin W. "Population Trends and Policies in Vietnam." Population and Development Review, Vol. 8, No. 4 (December 1982), pp. 783-810. Kempf, Elizabeth. "The Re-Greening of Vietnam." New Scientist, No. 1618 (June 23, 1988), pp. 53-57. Kimura Tetsusaburo. Indochina Economy: Part I: Vietnam's Economy in Perspective. Berkeley Institute of East Asian Studies, October 1984. Kimura Tetsusaburo. "Vietnam: Ten Years of Economic Struggle." Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 10 (October 1986), pp. 1039-1055. Kleinen, John. "Roots of the Sino-Vietnamese Conflict." Monthly Review, Vol. 34, No. 5 (October 1982), pp. 16-36. Lam Quang Huyen. "Ben Tre: 1975-1985." Viet Nam Social Sciences, 3-1985, pp. 24-34. Lam Thanh Liem. "Le bilan de dix ann6es d'6dification de Peconomie rurale socialiste dans le Sud Vietnam (1975-1985)." L'Information Geographique, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1985), pp. 89-94. Lam Thanh Liem. "Collectivisation des terres et crise de l'6conomic rurale dans le delta du Mekong (1976-1980). Annales de Geographic, No. 519 (September-October 1984), pp. 547-75. Lam Thanh Liem. "Nouvelles r6formes et crise persistante de P6conomic rurale dans le delta du Mekong de 1981 a 1985." Annales de Geographic, No. 524 (July-August 1985), pp. 385-410. Larsson, Katarina, and Lars-Erik Birgegard. Socio-Economic Study of Factors Influencing Labour Productivity in the Forestry Component of the Vinh Phu Pulp and Paper Mill Project in Vietnam. Stockholm: SIDA, January 1985. 115pp. Le Duan. "Get a Good Hold of the Laws and Renovate Economic Management." Viet Nam Social Sciences, 2-1984. Le Due Tho. "To Improve Agricultural Management." Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 93 (April 1984), pp. 7-14. Le Thanh Khoi. "Modele socialiste et pays en developpement: vietnamienne." Revue Tiers-Monde, No. 91 (July-September 1982).

Pexperience

McMichael, Joan. "Health Care in Vietnam: Politically Defined Priorities." Southeast Asia Chronicle, No. 84 (June 1982), pp. 23-29. Mai Thu Van. Vietnam: Un peuple, des voix. Paris: Pierre Horay, 1983. Marr, David G. "Central Vietnam: A Region on the Move." Indochina Issues (Washington), (July 1985). NgShuiMeng. "Vietnam in 1983: Plodding on Slowly." Southeast Asian Affairs 1984. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984. Ngo Vinh Long. "Agrarian Differentiation in the Southern Region of Vietnam." Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1984), pp. 283-305.

242 Postwar Vietnam Nguyen Due Nhuan. "The Contradictions of the Rationalization of Agricultural Space and Work in Vietnam." International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1983), pp. 363-79. Nguyen Due Nhuan. "Contraintes d6mographiques et politiques de developpement au Viet-Nam 1975-80." Population (Paris), March-April, 1984, pp. 313-36. Nguyen Due Nhuan, ed. Le Vietnam dix ans apres: bilan et perspectives Paris: La Documentation Francaise, March 7, 1986. 40 pp. Nguyen Due Nhuan, ed. Le Viet Nam post-revolutionnaire: population, Economic, soctetf, 1975-1985. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1987. Nguyen Huu Dong. "Collective and Family Agriculture in Socialist Economies." IDS Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 1982), pp. 23-28. Nguyen Huyen Chau. "North Vietnamese Peasant Women and Vietnamese Population Policies." MA thesis, University of Warwick, 1983. 121 pp. Nguyen Khac Vien. "South Vietnam 1983: The Two Roads." Vietnamese Studies, No. 72 (1983), pp. 125-47. Nguyen Khac Vien. "The 1980s." Vietnamese Studies, No. 71 (1983), pp. 5-21. Nguyen Khac Vien. Southern Vietnam (1975-1985). Hanoi: FLPH, 1985. Nguyen Ngoc Huy. "Vietnam Under Communist Rule." Vietnamese Studies Papers, No. 1 (May 1982). Fairfax, VA.: George Mason University. 22pp. Nguyen Van Canh. Vietnam Under Communism 1975-1982. Stanford: Hoover Institute Press, 1983. Nguyen Van Hong and Nguyen Thi Nhut. Education: The Infant School and Teaching How to Read in the First Form. Hanoi: FLPH, 1983. 56 pp. Nguyen Xuan Lai. "Economic Development 1976-1985." Vietnamese Studies, No. 71 (1983), pp. 22-64. Nguyen Van Linh. Ho Chi Minh City: Ten Years. Translated in JPRS-SEA-87-104, August 26,1987. Nguyen Xuan Lai. "Questions of Agrarian Structures and Agricultural Development in Southern Vietnam." Vietnamese Studies, No. 75 (1984), pp. 23-63. Norlund, Irene. "The Role of Industry in Vietnam's Development Strategy." Journal of Contempory Asia, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1984). Petrasovits, Anna. "On Vietnamese-Hungarian Economic Relations." Paper presented at EADI General Conference (Madrid), September 1984. 12 pp. Petrov, M.. "Vietnam's Cooperation in the CMEA Framework." Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow), 1-1983. Pike, Douglas. "American-Vietnamese Relations." Parameters, Vol. 14, No. 3 (1984). (Journal of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA). Pilger, John and Anthony Barnett. Aftermath: The Struggle of Cambodia and Vietnam. London: 1982.

Bibliography 243 Porter, Gareth. "Vietnamese Communism: Internal Debates Force Change." Indochina Issues, No. 31 (December 1982). Quinn-Judge, Paul. "The Vietnam-China Split: Old Ties Remain." Indochina Issues, No. 53 (January 1985). Quinn-Judge, Sophie. "Vietnamese Women: Neglected Promises." Indochina Issues, No. 53 (January 1983). Quinn-Judge, Sophie. "Tailoring Education to meet Vietnam's Needs." Indochina Issues, No. 61 (October 1985). Rubin, Susan, and Eva Lindskog. Learning for Life? A Close-up of a Vietnamese School. Stockholm: University of Stockholm Department of Education, September 1984. 28 pp. Ruscio, Alain. Vivre au Vietnam. Paris: Editions Sociales, 1981. Sevefjord, Birgitta. Women in Vietnam: An Evaluation of the Effects of the Bai Bang Project on the Lives of Female Workers. Stockholm: SIDA, January 1985. 90pp. Shaplen, Robert. "Return to Vietnam." The New Yorker, April 22,1985, pp. 104-25; and April 29,1985, pp. 92-115. Sigurdson, Jon. Vietnam's Science and Technology: A Tentative Description of Structure and Planning. Lund, Sweden: Research Policy Institute, 1982. Simon, Sheldon. "The Two Southeast Asias and China: Security Perspectives." Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 5 (May 1984), pp. 519-34. Spragens Jr., John. "Vietnam and the Soviets: A Tighter Alliance." Indochina Issues, No. 51 (November 1984). Stern, Lewis M. "The Scramble toward Revitalization: The Vietnamese Communist Party and the Economic Reform Program." Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 4 (April 1987), pp. 477-93. Tan Teng Lang. Economic Debates in Vietnam: Issues and Problems in Reconstruction and Development (1975-84). Singapore: ISEAS, 1985. 60pp. Taylor, Keith W. "Vietnam in 1984: Confidence Amidst Adversity." In Southeast Asian Affairs 1985, 349-63. Singapore: ISEAS, 1985. Thai Quang Trung. Collective Leadership and Factionalism: An Essay on Ho Chi Minh's Legacy. Singapore: ISEAS, 1985. 131 pp. Thayer, Carlyle. "Vietnamese Perspectives on International Security: Three Revolutionary Currents." In Asian Perspectives on International Security, edited by Donald H. McMillen, 57-76. London: Macmillan, 1984. Thayer, Carlyle. "Vietnam's Two Strategic Tasks: Building Socialism and Defending the Fatherland." In Southeast Asian Affairs 1983,299-324. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1983. Thayer, Carlyle A. "Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview." Contemporary Southeast Asia, June 1987, pp. 12-22.

244 Postwar Vietnam Thrift, Nigel, and Forbes, Dean. "Cities, Socialism and War: Hanoi, Saigon and the Vietnamese Experience of Urbanisation." Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, Vol. 3 (1985), pp. 279-308. Thrift, Nigel,and Forbes, Dean. The Price of Wan Urbanization in Vietnam 1954-1985. London: Allen and Unwin, 1986. Ton That Thien. "Vietnam's New Economic Policy." Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 4 (Winter 1983-84), pp. 691-712. Trigubenko, M. E. "CMEA and Vietnam: Assistance and Cooperation." Viet Nam Social Sciences, No. 3/4-1986, pp. 66-75. Turley, William S. "The Vietnamese Army." In Communist Armies in Politics, edited by Jonathan R. Adelman, 63-82. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982. Turley, William S. "Vietnamese Communism: Successes, Failures, and Prospects." Asian Review (Bangkok), Vol. 4, No. 3 (July-September 1983), pp. 32-58. United States Department of State. Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1984. Washington: submitted to Congress February 1985. Vietnam section pp. 891904. United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Vietnam Fact Book. Washington: JPRS, August 7,1985. 164 pp. Vietnam Communist Party. Fifth National Congress: Political Report. Hanoi: FLPH, 1982. Vietnam Communist Party. Sixth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam: Documents. Hanoi: FLPH, 1987. 207 pp. Vietnam, Socialist Republic of. Statistical Data of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, 1982. Hanoi: General Statistical Office, 1983. Vietnam Women's Union. Women of Vietnam: Statistical Data. Hanoi: Vietnam Women's Union, 1981. Vietnam Women's Union. 5th Congress of the Vietnam Women's Union. Hanoi: Vietnam Women's Union, 1982. Vo Nhan Tri. Socialist Vietnam's Economy, 1975-85: An Assessment. Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economics, January 1987. 133 pp. Vo Nhan Tri. "Vietnam: The Third Five Year Plan 1981-85." Indochina Report (Singapore), No. 4 (October-December 1985). Vo Van Kiet. "Transformation of Private Industry and Trade in South Vietnam: Some Practical Problems." Viet Nam Social Sciences, 2-1985, pp. 47-63. Vu Tuan Anh. "The Process of Industrialization and the Modification of the National Economic Structure." Viet Nam Social Sciences, 1/2-1983, pp. 61-76. Weatherbee, Donald E., ed. Southeast Asia Divided: The ASEAN-Indochina Crisis. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.

Bibliography 245 Werner, Jayne. "Beyond the Household? Dimensions of Socialist Agriculture and Household Economy in the Case of Vietnam." Paper presented at Regional Conference for Asia, on Women and the Household, New Delhi, January 1985. 28 pp. Werner, Jayne. "Socialist Development: The Political Economy of Agrarian Reform in Vietnam." Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1984), pp. 48-55. White, Christine. "Socialist Transformation of Agriculture and Gender Relations: The Vietnamese Case." IDS Bulletin, Vol. 13, No. 4 (September 1982). White, Christine. "Recent Debates in Vietnamese Development Policy." In Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World, edited by G. White, R. Murray and C. White, Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1983. White, Christine. "The Role of Collective Agriculture in Rural Development: the Vietnamese Case." IDS Research Report, December 1984. 172 pp. White, Christine Pelzer. "Women, Employment and the Family. Report on a Colloquium Comparing the Women's Movement and Governmental Legislation for Gender Equality in Britain and Vietnam." IDS Bulletin, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January 1984), pp. 57-61. White, Christine Pelzer. "Agricultural Planning, Pricing Policy and Cooperatives in Vietnam." World Development, Vol. 13, No. 1 (1985), pp. 97-114. Wiegersma, Nancy. Vietnam: Peasant Land, Peasant Revolution. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988. Williams, Michael. "Vietnam: The Slow Road to Reform." The Journal of Communist Studies, Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1987), pp. 102-12. Womack, Brantly. "The Party and the People: Revolutionary and Postrevolutionary Politics in China and Vietnam." World Politics, July 1987, pp. 479-507. Woodside, Alexander. "The Triumphs and Failures of Mass Education in Vietnam." Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Fall, 1983), pp. 401-27. Yermolayev, A. "Soviet-Vietnamese Scientific and Technical Cooperation." Far Eastern Affairs (Moscow) 1-1985, pp. 15-24.

This page intentionally left blank

CONTRIBUTORS TO POSTWAR VIETNAM: DILEMMAS IN SOCIALIST DEVELOPMENT Co-editors: David Mam Senior Fellow, Research School of Pacific Studies, Australian National University. Author of Vietnamese Anticolonialism 1885-1925 and Vietnamese Tradition on Trial 1920-1945. Christine Pelzer White: Visiting Associate Professor, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University. Coeditor Revolutionary Socialist Development in the Third World. Other contributors: Melanie Beresford: Lecturer in history at University of Wollongong, Australia, author of Vietnam: His tory, Politics and Society. Karl H. Englund: Swedish UN official for seven years (1978-1985) head of UNDP office in Hanoi, recently retired and currently writing on development issues. Ngo Vmh Long: Department of History, University of Maine at Orono; author of Before the Revolution: the Vietnamese Peasants under the French. Nguyen Huyen Chau: Independent researcher specializing in the study of Vietnamese and Chinese sociology. Suzy Paine: Economist, Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge University, England. Well known as both a scholar and consultant. Her death in November 1985 was a great loss. Anna Petrasovits: Economist, researcher at Karl Marx University of Economics, Budapest, Hungary. Susanne Rubin: Swedish specialist on education policy. Carried out five months field research in Vietnam in 1982, the results of which were published as Lara for Livet? En Vietnamesisk skola i naribild (Learning for life? A Close up of a Vietnamese school).

247

248 Postwar Vietnam Max Spoor: Agricultural Economics Department, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Nicaragua (UNAN), affiliated with Free University of Amsterdam. CarlyleA. Thayer: Senior Lecturer, Department of Government, Defence Force Academy, University of N.S.W., Canberra, Australia, co-editor of The Soviet Union as an Asian Pacific Power. William Turley: Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University. Editor of volumes on Vietnamese-ASEAN relations and expert on the Vietnamese military; author of The Second Indochina War. Vo Nhan Tri: Former Head of the World Economy Department, Institute of Economy, Hanoi (1965-1975) and Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences, Ho Chi Minh City (1975-1984). He left Vietnam in 1984, and is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Jayne S. Werner: Associate Professor, Political Science Department, Long Island University and Associate, Southern Asian Institute, Columbia University. Author of Peasant Politics and Religious Sectarianism: Peasant and Priest in the Cao Dai in Viet Nam.