Social Media and the Cultural Politics of Korean Pop Culture in East Asia [1 ed.] 9781003411208, 9781032532691, 9781032532707

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Social Media and the Cultural Politics of Korean Pop Culture in East Asia

This volume examines international engagement with Korean popular culture in East Asian online spaces, and how Asian identities are formed and perceived between nations within the region. In the context of global diversification and growing public participation in global issues, it builds up a new theoretical perspective in order to explain the emerging power of Asia in the global mediascape. With a focus on Korean media, touching upon K-pop and the phenomenon of Hallyu and antiHallyu, the author also looks at Japan, China, and Taiwan in this regional study. Combining theory with ethnographic audience studies in East Asian countries, the book elucidates East Asian media in a larger context of the changing global structure and media technology. This book will interest academics and students working on Asian popular culture and media, new media, East Asian studies, participatory media, and digital communication. Sunny Yoon is Professor in the Department of Media and Communication at Hanyang University, Korea. She has published widely on Asian media, cinema, media technology, and audience studies. She is the author of the book Global Media and Asian Identity (2020) and Communication Technology and Creative Industry (2021).

Routledge Research in Cultural and Media Studies

Drag in the Global Digital Public Sphere Queer Visibility, Online Discourse and Political Change Edited by Niall Brennan and David Gudelunas Crowds, Community and Contagion in Contemporary Britain Sarah Lowndes Global South Discourse in East Asian Media Studies Dal Yong Jin Bias, Belief, and Conviction in an Age of Fake Facts Edited by Anke Finger and Manuela Wagner Reasserting the Disney Brand in the Streaming Era A Critical Examination of Disney+ Robert Alan Brookey, Jason Phillips and Tim Pollard True Crime in American Media Edited by George S. Larke-Walsh Branding Berlin From Division to the Cultural Capital of Europe Katrina Sark Sustainable Resilience in Women’s Film and Video Organizations A Counter-Lineage in Moving Image History Rosanna Maule London as Screen Gateway Edited by Elizabeth Evans and Malini Guha Social Media and the Cultural Politics of Korean Pop Culture in East Asia Sunny Yoon

Social Media and the Cultural Politics of Korean Pop Culture in East Asia

Sunny Yoon

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Sunny Yoon The right of Sunny Yoon to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-53269-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-53270-7 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-41120-8 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208 Typeset in Sabon by codeMantra

Contents

List of Figures Acknowledgments

1

Introduction

vii ix

1

PART I

Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture

17

2

Emerging Asia and Global Communication

19

3

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media

32

4

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity

45

PART II

Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia

63

5

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS

65

6

Emerging China as Global Superpower and International Tensions in East Asia

81

7

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts between Japan and Korea

97

8

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics: Hallyu and Anti-Hallyu in Taiwan

115

9

Social Media and Cyber-Imagination of Asian Communities 133 Index

141

Figures



Acknowledgments

It’s been over a decade since I went to the field to research media receptions by audiences in different parts of the world. I had opportunities to meet diverse fans of Asian and Korean media in East Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, and the United States, as well as North Korean defectors, who shared their motivations and desires for consuming Asian/Korean media. The idea and themes of this book were first inspired by these audiences in my previous works. I like to thank all the participants in my previous studies. For this book, 100 people participated in this research. In 4 countries, 90 people participated in this research as interview subjects. This ethnographic research took a long time and much effort. The participants dedicated their time to multiple interviews and shared their opinions and daily lives during interviews. I cannot express my gratitude enough to them. Additionally, ten interpreters helped me in my study by translating the languages when I conducted research in China, Japan, and Taiwan for this book. Also, some of my colleagues and friends at universities in China, Japan, and Taiwan assisted me to solicit interview subjects and to conduct research. I especially thank my colleagues in the media department at Doshisha University in Japan and the School of Journalism at National Taiwan University who invited me as a visiting professor and helped me in my research. Friends and colleagues at Henan University and staff at Korea Cultural Center in Beijing arranged my visit and assisted me in this research. Thank you all. I would like to express my thanks to the editors and staff members at Routledge for their support and cooperation. I would like to extend my gratitude to two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Sunny Yoon Hanyang University, Seoul

1

Introduction

Social media and cultural politics of Korean pop culture in East Asia examines the role of social media in the emergence of East Asian pop culture and public participation in cultural exchanges at a global level. Although East Asia has been the site of cultural exchange, the forces of globalization coupled with technological innovations, new global media hubs, and economic development in the region have produced dynamic forms of international exchange and flows of online discourse. With the world’s highest rates of online interconnectivity and its large, diverse populations, East Asian online spaces are particularly interesting sites of global discourse that have revealed the perils and promises of new media technologies and social media. This book examines both the ways in which social media use facilitates intercultural affinity and growth alongside inter-regional media flows, and the ways in which social media use exacerbates longstanding historical tensions and produces new conflicts. The ways in which users in multiple countries navigate social media in the context of inter-regional global flows present opportunities to advance their understanding of global communication. Owing to the growing use of social media, Asian pop culture has spread world over. Social media has played an important role in disseminating Asian pop culture at the global level. K-pop is an example of global success, wherein it established a strong global fandom through social media that stretched across the world—including to places where K-pop and Korean media are not broadcasted by extant public media outlets. Japanese animation and games are the cases that are disseminated to the world through digital platforms. East Asian media and pop culture have often produced global celebrities through strong fandom by connecting through social media and digital platforms. The paradox is that growing interactions through digital media and transnational flows of cultural products through social media have not necessarily enhanced mutual understanding of the people in the world and international cooperation. Social media often mobilizes the public in disputes and leads them to become involved in conflicts. The potential of digital media in enhancing democratic participation through two-way communication has not DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-1

2 Introduction been achieved, and interactivity on digital media often mobilizes in directions that oppose the idea of democracy (Langlois 2012; Jenkins 2010). Social networking through digital media can undermine democracy and cause social conflicts and can extend to the global sphere where people get involved in conflicts and public disputes among nations because of the growing use of social media. East Asian countries are becoming competitive and getting involved in conflicts as a result of growing social networking. In addition to the longterm disagreement between Korea and Japan, and between China and Japan because of the legacy of colonial history, the clash between China and Korea has been ongoing since 2016 because of a military issue. Political disputes between China and Taiwan and China and Hong Kong have intensified as well. It may not be a coincidence that East Asian countries are simultaneously involved in international and intercultural tensions. The transformation of the global power structure and changes in the media use serve as a breeding ground for the exacerbation of current tensions in East Asia. This book elucidates Asia as an emerging power and growing contestations among Asian nations. Asian countries play a leading role of challenging global hierarchy and demanding diversifying globalization. Global challenges like terrorism, trade contests, and the disintegration of international organizations have been brought up by Asian countries while demanding for changing the global hierarchy centered on Western and modern power. Along with switching the global hierarchy and demands for a new pattern of globalization, Asian countries emerge as a new alternative having cultural and religious diversity as well as growing economic power. Moreover, global dominance has been challenged in the context of changing media environments. Appadurai (1990) called it mediascape along with other central basis of global power including ethnoscape, technoscape, ideoscape, and financescape. Like financial and technological distribution systems that exercise global influences, mediascape or the global structure of media distributions and flows dominates global communications and consolidates global power. Currently, social media platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook have replaced conventional media in promoting public participation in a diverse range of issues. Changing mediascape and new patterns of using media in the contemporary world bring up new challenges against the previous systems and the emergence of new global power. Social networking through the advancement of digital media has facilitated the demand for a new global communication and the voices of the people through social media. East Asia becomes progressively active in global communication because of the widespread use of social media. East Asian countries are technologically advanced and have the largest number of social media users. Asian countries occupy over 50% of internet access of the world and have from 70 to 100% of mobile access (Delbert et al. 2012; World Bank 2020).1 Public

Introduction  3 participation in international affairs and debates is growing along with the widespread use of digital media and social networking systems (SNS) in East Asia. Public debates among East Asian countries on social media platforms have ignited conflicts and nationalistic competitions. The current range of disputes among East Asian nations and the growing nationalist conflicts are rather eccentric as the premises of conventional theories including liberal and Marxist views have expected nationalism to wane through globalization or a socialist revolution, respectively. However, nationalism seems to be intensifying among East Asian countries, which is the main result of public disputes among nations. The changing mediascape and the growing use of social media have opened up the channel for public debates on international matters, which has exacerbated growing international tensions among the public across different nations. Growing international frictions among East Asian countries are also opposed to the conventional notion of globalization and theories of international communication, which assume the eventual assimilation and harmonization of nations. Both mainstream and critical theories of international communication have concurred with the idea that the world would eventually be assimilated by cultural diffusion or capitalist restructuring (Chomsky 1999; Bhabha 1994; Harvey 2005). However, we are facing global challenges such as the disintegration of and disharmony in the world instead of homogenization. East Asian countries experience the augmentation of international conflicts as they globalize and increase their international exchanges. Nationalism seems reinforced, and conflicts and disharmony at the global and regional levels have intensified. Growing public participation in international issues with non-institutional mediums like social media and other private channels has intensified international tensions further. Growing participation of the public through social media has transformed the patterns of global communication. Understanding this requires alternative theories to pre-existing ones on mainstream international communication. New theoretical perspectives like post-structural or post-modern theories that made epistemological turns from both mainstream and critical theories have been applied to study both international relations and changes in media use. These new theoretical perspectives have elucidated a diverse range of issues and the role of public participation in international communication in ways that conventional theories cannot. New theoretical perspectives on international communication have shifted the focus to cultural dynamics and identity issues. The cultural identity of the public is an important aspect of social networking and public participation in international and intercultural exchanges in current times. Along with challenging pre-existing global power and the changing position of Asia in the global political economy, Asian countries have tried to consolidate international cooperation among themselves in order to protect their interests. Yet,

4 Introduction political and economic cooperation among Asian countries is limited because of conflicting interests among them. As Asia is geographically enormous and socially and culturally heterogeneous, it is difficult to cooperate in a community and make a solid organization. Despite its heterogeneity, Asia shares common experiences, that is, the historical experience of colonialism. Most Asian countries have been ruled by Western imperialists in history, and Asian people share the common memory of the harsh power of colonialism and resistance to it. Critical Asian theorists seek de-Westernizing theories by highlighting the common interest in resistance against Western dominance and the desire to surmount the economic and cultural power of global hierarchy (Chen 2010; Iwabuchi 2002; Chua 2012). Although critical theorists recognize the illusionary desire of Asian people, they often refer to the notion of imagined communities (Anderson 1983), which motivated to build up a communal entity in reality like nationalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. Spirits of resistance and independence may motivate Asian people to consolidate a community. The resistance to the West and motivation to pursue de-Westernization can be common desires among Asian people. Even though linkages among Asian nations are weak because of the heterogeneous nature of Asia, resistance to Western influences and global power may serve as a cornerstone in building Asian communities. Cultural identity is the key to consolidating a community among Asian people in that it is derived from a psychological desire to resist global power and establish an independent entity. Asian people began to see Asia as an entity and defined themselves only in the course of modernization during the colonial era. Before that, Asia comprised distinct components like the Chinese, Indian, and Arab empires or regions. The consciousness of an Asian identity and motivations toward building up an Asian community come to bear based on psychological and cultural means in modern times. Current endeavors of Asian communal activities are derived from these historical memories and desires for de-Westernizing their identities. This book seeks to explain common endeavors in constructing Asian identity through a cultural perspective by examining the media use. Consuming media contents and enjoying pop culture can be a means of expressing the demand for promoting Asian values and an attempt to consolidate a kind of community among the public. This is a bottom-up approach that depicts the realistic ground of communal spirit as initiated by the people. This book conducts audience studies of Asian media in East Asian countries and highlights the search for Asian values as motivations to consume Asian pop culture. Asian media has achieved a global reach at a large scale since the turn of this century, along with the demand for cultural diversity and changing patterns in media consumption. The changing patterns in media use reshape the consumption of cultural products. Strong fandoms for Asian pop culture particularly illustrate the changing patterns in media consumption. As digital media began to replace conventional media as the ratings of public media like

Introduction  5 network TV, newspapers, and cinema began to fall, while social media began encroaching into the realm of conventional public media in East Asia, a new pattern of media use emerged. Users are strongly involved in communicative activities in the course of their media consumption and are no longer passive viewers. This motivation drives users to join strong fandoms. Korean media is an example of leading transnational flows in Asia since the turn of this century. Korean TV dramas, film, and pop music have spread throughout Asia, which was largely dominated by Western media and Hollywood films besides domestic cultural products. It was rather sudden that Korean media brought up a new pattern of foreign media consumption in Asia, and some new agencies named it Hallyu (Korean wave), the popularity of Korean media in Asia. Hallyu has drawn academic interests and brought up debates. Some theorists view it as an alternative to the global communication system, while others perceive it as a new way of forcing a global hierarchy centered on post-colonial power. Asian scholars, on the one hand, looked for a hopeful vision in Hallyu as a means to form an alternative global communication hub and a cultural community in Asian regions (Iwabuchi 2010; Cho 2005; Yoon 2009). They argue that the new form of global communication can be possibly different from the century-old world information communication order (WICO) controlled by the West, the superpower of the 20th century (Schiller 1976; Nordenstreng 1984; Hamelink 1997; Carsson 2017; Macbride 1979). Hallyu can be a threshold for counterflows of this old global communication. Hallyu stimulates regional communication in Asia by Asians without going through the old Western center of the world system. A more critical examination of Hallyu has been, on the other hand, developed. Post-colonialism theories, for example, provide another interpretation of Hallyu as cultural enforcement in the global society. Many scholars use the concept of hybridity from post-colonial theories, specifically referring to Bhahba (1994; Young 1995), to explain the success of Hallyu. In reality, Kpop and Korean media are emulating Western culture in their genre and visual styles while being played out by Korean actors and singers (Ryoo 2009; Shim 2006). This hybridity is a new way to enforce world power and to consolidate capitalism by relocating the cultural centers. In this way, Hallyu is a byproduct of the diversifying global communication and cultural power as a method of consolidating the same world power. However, Hallyu gets into another stage at the current time. Hallyu ignites competitions and conflicts among Asian countries. Anti-Hallyu sentiments have emerged from various countries in Asia, including in Japan, Taiwan, and China. Regional competition, such as anti-Hallyu movements, reflects a changing global mediascape and different patterns of using media by the users. There have been diverse analyses and policy suggestions regarding the cause of anti-Hallyu movements by pinpointing problems with South Korean media as well as political or ideological conflicts among countries

6 Introduction (Chen 2017; Leung 2008; Gries 2004). Although ideological contestations and problems with Korean media contents raise the antagonism of the global audience against the South Korean media as these theorists argue, changing structure of global communication and the use of media by the Asian audience work more importantly in the emergence of anti-Hallyu movements. As a result of the growing use of social media and public participations in international affairs, tensions and frictions increase among East Asian countries. Previous theories tend to assume that increasing use of digital platforms will enhance communal activities online (Jenkins 2003; Latour 2007). Social media, such as YouTube, Facebook, and Tweeter, functions on the basis of user-created contents so that DIY (do it yourself) spirits and collaborative works among users are necessary to run the digital platforms. For a generation, users have worked together to figure out how to collaborate with each other on the cyberspace throughout the digital history from the Internet era to the current time of social media. However, digital media and SNS do not always facilitate collaboration and accomplish their democratic potential. It often becomes a target of control and surveillance and leads to conflicts and tensions instead of cooperation and mutual understanding. The paradox of social media is partly originated from contradictions between communicative activities of users and partly from the monopolistic nature of the system. Ordinary people are no longer passive, but become active and participatory by using digital media. Digital platforms are, however, often targeted by algorithmic manipulation, fake news, and techno-populism despite the fact that they contribute to expanding networks among people and to promoting public participation. The monopolistic structure of the platform industry and the political use of digital media are the two major bases that create this paradox of social media. The growing frictions among East Asian countries in current times illustrate examples of the paradox of social media. Ethnography as Research Method This book adopts ethnography as its main methodology. The ethnographic research of media audiences demonstrates the complex aspects of cultural practices and identity formation in their daily activities and media consumption. The strength of ethnography lies in the thick descriptions of the daily lives of ordinary people, which discloses the complex issues involved in consuming media content. Asian audiences enjoy media and pop culture, which simultaneously demonstrate social issues and collective activities. Ethnography has been considered a discipline within the broader domain of anthropology. It prospered in the 19th century during colonialism when information on colonies was gathered. It was not until the early 20th century when ethnography established the principles of its use as a methodology. Earlier, missionaries and public officials, as well as anthropologists, collected all kinds of information on colonies, which they presumed were unknown

Introduction  7 lands of savage people (Stocking 1991; Jones & Watt 2010; Hamilton 2001). Malinowski, a well-known figure, founded ethnographic methodology and explored an interpretive tradition while conducting field research in New Guinea and Trobriand Islands (Malinowski 1922; Kuper 1996; Geertz 1975). Since then, ethnography has expanded to include diverse areas of research, and the Chicago School made a good deal of contributions to the domain (Becker 1999; Plummer 1997). By developing the phenomenological approach with a focus on symbolic interactions, the Chicago School produced studies set in urban environments that targeted the working class and immigrants in Chicago. These studies expanded the areas of research to study “urban others,” from erstwhile fieldwork conducted by “colonial others.” Since then, ethnography has been adopted by diverse disciplines in the social sciences and the humanities, including sociology, psychology, and communication studies. Contemporary ethnography has expanded the areas of research and has developed diverse methodologies. These methodologies often start by criticizing conventional ethnography and changing the focus of research. Feminist ethnography, for example, criticizes the view of androcentrism of the scientific methods in classical ethnography (Smith 1974). Institutional ethnography transforms the focus of ethnography on social relations and the larger context instead of merely describing ethnic relations while sharing critical points of feminist ethnography (Campbell & Gregor 2002; Rankin 2017). This examines multiple axes of power that create and mediate people’s social relations (Smith 2006). The philosophical perspective of post-structuralism has influenced the rise of contemporary ethnography. Theories of post-structuralism have deviated from the premises of both mainstream and critical conventional theories. Post-structuralist theories like those of Foucault and Derrida have changed the focus of research to the locality and have called for an examination of the microcosm of social relations from the perspective of seeking the scientific truth in mainstream theories or grand narratives, such as the mode of production and socialist revolution in Marxist critical theories. The research interests of post-structuralism fit ethnographic methods better when they are compared to other research methods. Post-structuralism addresses the importance of ethics, relativism, representation, inclusion, and subjectivity, all of which concur with the guidelines for ethnography since Malinowski’s early studies. These research guidelines oppose the scientific and positivist approach of mainstream theories and the grand narratives of Marxist theories. Clifford and Marcus (1986) called the new ethnography post-modern ethnography or interpretive anthropology, which intends to oppose extant anthropology overall and the positivist approach to ethnography, in particular. Post-modern ethnography or interpretive anthropology have both opened up the realm of ethnographic studies and transcended the discipline of anthropology to work with studies of humanities in general. It has provided an alternative research approach to conventional studies in the form

8 Introduction of the so-called modernism or structuralism, which include both mainstream and Marxist theories. The guidelines for research under the new approach align with Malinowski’s research method of classical ethnography, which emphasized on relativism, thick descriptions, immersion, contextualization, native voices, and reflexivity.2 In media studies, new ethnographic approaches with the influence of poststructuralism have been adopted since the 1970s. British cultural studies have led the ethnographic research in media studies. Since the University of Birmingham’s Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCS) founded the tradition of British cultural studies, ethnographic studies have been adopted in media studies as early as the 1970s. BCCS was established by critical sociologists who shared the view that conventional sociology and Marxism did not explain contemporary social conflicts sufficiently. By developing neoAlthusserian and neo-Gramscian approaches, BCCS sought to go beyond the static approach to explaining ideology and class relations. Ethnography was considered a new alternative to static research, and BCCS scholars explored critical interactionism. Paul Willis’ (1977) ethnographic study of workingclass high school students, for example, explained the class structure and how resistance among the youth was integrated into the existing social class through the method of critical interactionism. British cultural studies have explored ethnographic methodology after Willis and the first generation of social ethnographers. Radway’s (1984) Reading the Romance initiated audience studies, and David Morley’s Family Television (1986) and Nation-wide Audience (1980) illustrated solid ethnographic research on media audiences. A series of ethnographic studies set in the media studies context continued to be influenced by British cultural studies and reflected the research focus on class relations and cultural practices among minority groups like workingclass people, the youth, and women. Ethnography in media studies has not developed without methodological contestations. Whereas ethnographic studies have prospered in many disciplines in the humanities and social sciences, methodological debates have intensified. Media studies are particularly involved in such contestations because they employ diverse media in doing research. Media studies often employ online and/or offline ethnography in doing research. Network ethnography, for example, raises methodological questions on the connectivity between researchers and subjects, as it extends to the online domain from the offline one (Bengtsson 2014; Howard 2002). It is “the process of using ethnographic field methods on cases and field sites selected using social network analysis including active or passive observation, extended immersion, or indepth interviews” (Howard 2002, p. 562). Although it benefits researchers in overcoming the spatial barrier and getting into ethnographic research in terms of distance, it brings up methodological questions on distance and connectivity. Malinowski said that it is mandatory for a researcher to travel to the field, have a “lonely time” as a stranger, and encounter “other cultures”

Introduction  9 in order to conduct ethnography. According to Malinowski, ethnography is the work of describing the process of strangeness and understanding of other cultures in their languages. Network ethnography blurs the distance between researchers and subjects and condenses the process of describing other cultures by cutting out the spatial distance. The research stance of media ethnography and distortion of distance may interfere with reflexivity in the course of ethnographic research. Reflexivity is the key notion of ethnography and is distinct from other research methodologies. It discloses how researchers strategically use their status, capital, and the involvement of researchers’ personalities and identities in the course of conducting research (Robinson & Anderson 2020; Swidler 1986; Hine 2000). Demographic characteristics like gender, ethnicity, and profession can influence subjects of research in ethnography. Symbols, stories, rituals, and world views that researchers espouse influence the process of research and the results that ensue. Reflexivity is the process of disclosing the personal traits of researchers in the ethnographic work itself. Ethnography in media studies is strategically designed by theoretical frameworks and the stance of the school in question. Ethnographic research in BCCS focused on, for example, the working class and the resistance of minorities against mainstream ideologies. Media ethnography does not often scrutinize reflexivity while assuming certain theoretical stances. Reflexivity becomes critical especially when ethnography is conducted over a short time or at a distance (Burawoy 2003; Lichterman 2015). Media studies take a shorter research time than does classical ethnography, and they often conduct research at a distance without traveling to the field and living among local subjects. Although media and cultural studies contribute toward producing ethnographic studies on pop culture, they are involved in methodological contestations as a result of issues pertaining to time and place. This book adopts the method of post-modern ethnography to highlight the cultural practices of ordinary people in their everyday lives. Foucault and other post-structural theorists serve as starting points that examine the microcosm of ordinary practice and the dynamics of people’s lives. By reflecting methodological contestations and theoretical positions of cultural studies, ethnographic researches in the following chapters turn the focus on the use of the media by ordinary audiences to illustrate a realistic picture of the cultural practices of people. While taking advantage of thick descriptions of classical ethnography, the results of studies demonstrate social relations and cultural contexts that are similar to the tradition of BCCS and institutional ethnography. Immersion and reflexivity were emphasized in the ethnographic researches in this book. Global media audiences and their reactions to Korean media and pop culture are the focus of the research. The primary research interest is the identity issue that the audiences have while consuming media. Among many levels of identity issues that are involved in media consumption, people often speak

10 Introduction of Asian identity as their primary motivation to consume Korean media or local media. The Asian identity is a vague notion because of the loose nature of Asia as an entity and because people have had little experience identifying themselves as belonging to the collective group of Asians in history. Asian identity has hardly been consolidated because of conflicting interests and the intervention of other global powers. Nevertheless, people are easily involved in conforming to the Asian identity while consuming media. Media audiences react to their national or other Asian media more positively than to the media content of other regions, while identifying with the cultural similarity in Asia. This may be a realistic vision of building up an Asian community and enhancing the Asian identity wherein the Asian media audiences voluntarily enjoy their cultural similarity and support Asian pop culture. Ethnographic research on Asian media audiences may demonstrate the complexity of Asian identity that Anderson called “imagined community” and that Iwabuchi (2006) associated with “desiring Asia.” It may not be true that Asian media consumers speak for a singular Asian culture and unity. Rather, it may be a mere fantasy, and there may be particular desires apparent in their feelings and statements of Asian identity and cultural similarity. Even so, it is a more realistic picture of the Asian identity than that produced out of institutional necessity and by the political movements promoting it. Ethnographic studies of Asian media audiences in this book demonstrate a complex process of identity formation and cultural practices among Asian people in their everyday lives. Structure of the Book This book consists of two parts. Part 1 discusses the major concepts and theories with respect to globalizing Asian pop culture and social media. The chapter following this introduction addresses emerging Asian culture and discusses the notion of an Asian identity. As Asia achieves rapid economic and technological developments and advancements, Asian countries have attempted to build up Asian communities to protect and promote their common interests and values. However, Asian organizations like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have limits when it comes to enhancing communal spirit, because of the heterogeneous nature of Asia and the conflicting interests within the organizations themselves. Chapter 2 compares Asian organizations and the European Union (EU). The main issue that both the EU and Asian organizations face pertains to identity, although Asian organizations have greater problem with institutionalization when compared to the EU. While EU illustrates the case of fragility unless it is consolidated by the strong identity of member nations, Asian organizations demonstrate further challenges with regard to identity issues. The contestations with respect to the Asian identity originate from historical experiences and religious and cultural confrontations, as well as theoretical contestations. This book focuses on the cultural

Introduction  11 practices of ordinary people in their everyday lives while explaining the cultural identity of Asian people. Chapter 3 presents an overview of the growing use of social media in Asia and its impact on cultural politics and identity issues in Asia. Social media has changed the mediascape and has now become the hub of public participation. Asia has the largest population of social media users in the world. Social networking has become important in people’s lives. Although social media offers a channel for democratic participation, it has also given rise to problems such as public manipulation, fake news, cybercrime, and privacy issues. Social media has brought about international conflicts and intercultural disputes among people world over. It is the main channel for the globalization of Asian media and pop culture, which are largely neglected by conventional media. It functions as the main channel for Japanese animation, Chinese games, and K-pop. Owing to the changing patterns in media use, audiences for Asian media outlets actively engage in fan activities and consolidate strong fandom. As social media empowers minority groups in various societies in terms of class, age, gender, and other factors, strong networking among members of the Asian fandom can open up channels for subcultural activities and resistance to mainstream culture. The growing popularity of Asian media and the pattern of social media use demonstrate concrete cases of social change and mechanisms of cultural politics as practiced by the people, from the bottom up. Chapter 4 presents case studies on the globalization of Asian media and pop culture in the past and the present. Asian media and pop culture have attracted global attention since the mid-20th century even when international communication was strictly dominated by Western global superpowers. This is a rare case where the media and pop culture of non-Western countries attained global success under the ambit of the strict world information and communication order (WICO). Japanese films drew global attention from as early as 1951, when Rashomon was awarded the Best Film at the Venice Film Festival. Hong Kong films were a global hit, particularly the Kung Fu films and action genre since the 1960s. Japan and Hong Kong established a Hollywood-type studio system and led the globalization of national cinema and pop culture. Japanese animation and games continue to dominate the world market and have depended on this giant production system thus far. J-pop was popular across Asia in the 1980s and 1990s and has now been replaced by K-pop in Asia and the world. Despite the global success of East Asian media, the issue of cultural identity was debated since the inception of the globalization of Asian media. Critiques addressed “self-orientalism” in Japanese art films since the time of award-winning films like Rashomon and Hell Gate in the 1950s. This point of criticism continues to be raised against Japanese animation and horror films today and is applied to contestations with respect to the cultural identity of K-pop and Korean media. On the contrary, China is experimenting with another strategy while globalizing its media along with expansionism in its economic and cultural power

12 Introduction domains. China promotes nationalism and Asian traditions while maintaining the media and culture as its means of spreading national propaganda. Hong Kong films have faced Sinicization, wherein they were integrated into the Chinese film industry after the handover in 1997. This chapter discusses diverse strategies around globalizing Asian media and pop culture from the perspectives of cultural identity. Part 2 addresses cases of cultural politics of the people in East Asia through their uses of social media. East Asian countries are examined with a focus on the media consumption and cultural politics prevalent in each country. Ethnographic studies of media users in South Korea, China, Japan, and Taiwan are conducted in sequence. Reception of Korean media and pop culture in these countries are examined in order to look into transnational flows of Asian media and its impact on the cultural practices of the people in nations. K-pop fandom and reactions of people in anti-Hallyu groups are compared in the chapters as salient examples of leading cultural exchanges among East Asian countries. Chapter 5 examines BTS (short for Bangtan Sonyeondan, which means “bulletproof boys”), the Korean boy band that has established a new business model for entertainment. BTS develops unique management mainly relying on social media and new media technology. Starting out as an underground band, BTS attained top-ranking global celebrity status by continuously breaking records on the Billboard Charts and the Guinness Book of World Records. The success of BTS relies on social media and the support of a strong sense of fandom. BTS members share their lives with their fans through social media, including V Live and YouTube. Through these means, their strong fandom has been built up and the fan club (called ARMY) has become extremely organized in its support for BTS. International ARMY members gather and conduct fan activities even where BTS has not appeared on TV or other public media. Furthermore, BTS employs diverse new technologies like blockchain, metaverse, and transmedia to strengthen its social networking and to develop and produce a new form of entertainment. An ethnographic study of ARMY members in South Korea demonstrates diverse issues in using new media technologies and managing fandom culture in this chapter. Chapter 6 examines the growth of China as an emerging global power and the rise of international conflicts in the region among East Asian countries. Tensions between China and Korea since 2016, when military issues, namely, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) dispute emerged and turned into an international dispute among users of social media, are highlighted. China has been the primary importer of Korean media. Chinese fans of Korean media were very active and passionate until the dispute came up, when the importation of Korean media content to China dropped to 10% of that in the previous years. The cultural conflicts between China and Korea demonstrate the increasing role of public participation in international issues by using social media. An ethnographic research was conducted in this

Introduction  13 chapter by recruiting Hallyu fans and anti-Hallyu people in China to examine and compare the motivations of public participation in international affairs. The results of the study highlighted the complexity of cultural politics involved in public participation. People employ social media to practice their understanding of national interests and express their social desires while engaging in debates in the political and cultural arenas. Discursive practices of Hallyu and anti-hallyu movements in China demonstrate the complex motivations of the people in their uses of social media. Chapter 7 traces the variations in long-term international conflicts between Japan and Korea, which have intensified since the adoption of social media. Social media brings in a new phase wherein nationalist sentiments have been expressed by Japanese people, who had hidden their nationalist feelings after their defeat in World War II. Growing intercultural tensions between Japan and Korea and present-day nationalism have all indicated the political and social changes in both the domestic and international circumstances in Japan. Social media has played a strong role in highlighting racism and nationalism among Japanese people since the end of the 1990s, when Channel 2 opened up online debates through the Bulletin Board System (BBS). Digital media disseminated messages on techno-nationalism that mainly targeted Korean immigrants in Japan through BBS in the 1990s, which has now expanded to include diverse social media platforms. Despite the rise in techno-nationalism through social media, Korean media and K-pop have continued to draw strong fandom in Japan, which implies another level of social connotation. This chapter discusses the rise of techno-nationalism in the context of political and social change in Japan along with advancements in social media. Indepth interviews of K-pop fans and anti-Hallyu groups in Japan have been conducted to examine the reactions to the rise in ultra right-wing political orientations and nationalist movements in Japan. Complex reactions of interview subjects to international tensions and the new patterns in media consumption have provided alternative explanations for international conflicts and the vision for international communication. Chapter 8 explains the role of social media in identity politics and interAsia communications with a focus on the case of Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the few countries in Asia that has maintained a liberal democracy and has protected free trade and flows of international communication. As a leader of cultural exchange among Asian countries, Taiwan is the initiator of Hallyu and also the first-comer in anti-Hallyu movements. This ambivalent reaction to K-pop culture represents the complexity of Taiwan’s cultural orientations and identity politics. Despite its small size in terms of geography and global power, Taiwan has engaged in international and intercultural issues pertaining to many parts of the world. These issues have mainly originated from its relationship with mainland China. Taiwan has multiple ethnic groups within and promotes multiculturalism with its national policies. The historical legacy of Japanese colonization, competition with Korea, and other newly advanced

14 Introduction Asian economies, and its support for Hong Kong’s democratic movements in addition to China’s threat, have all complicated Taiwan’s cultural politics. In this chapter, ethnographic research of Taiwanese media users was conducted to examine identity politics among the Taiwanese people who are facing challenges from China and other parts of the world. Taiwanese people have positioned themselves as defenders of liberal democracy and have enhanced their national identity while encountering the growing challenges. In spite of differences, both Hallyu and anti-Hallyu movements demonstrate the struggles of the Taiwanese people in order to maintain their identity politics. As ethnographic researches in East Asian countries are shown in these four chapters, the globalizing Asian media and distinctive consumption of Asian pop culture in each nation demonstrate social change and transformation of the mediascape in the contemporary world. Although growing cultural exchanges and advancements in social media have exacerbated conflicts among Asian countries and intercultural tensions among the people of each nation, social networking through the consumption of Asian media and culture can be a ground for enhancing Asian values and commonalities. Although Asian identity is a vague notion and represents illusionary desires, the formation of cultural identity in the course of consuming Asian media may enhance communal spirits and desires of people in Asia. Active and participatory uses of social media as fans or anti- fans of Asian popular culture demonstrate a new way of cultural practices of the people. Notes 1 https:/data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET.USER.ZS 2 Young (1979) presented Malinowski’s research guidelines in the following words: – Live in the field; immersing yourself in this social world. – Learn and use the language of your field subjects. – Isolate yourself from “outside” influences. – Collect as much data as you can on everything in the field setting, from folklore stories to social rules and customs, descriptions and observations. – Take copious field notes. – Participate in field activities where possible; thus, participant observation is a key element of ethnographic research. – Keep a detailed field diary to use as a safety valve to release emotional pressures.

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16 Introduction Leung, L. (2008). Mediating nationalism and modernity: the transnationalization of Korean dramas on Chinese (satellite) TV. In B. Chua, & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp. 53–70. Lichterman, P. (2015). Interpretive reflexivity in ethnography. Ethnography, 18(1), 35–45. doi:10.1177/1466138115592418. MacBride, S. (1979). Shaping a New World Information Order. Paris: UNESCO. Malinowski, B. (1922). Argonauts of the Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of Melanesian New Guinea. London: Routledge. Morley, D. (1986). Family Television: Cultural Power and Domestic Leisure. London: Routledge. Morley, D. (1980). The Nationwide Audience. London: BFI. Nordenstreng, K. (1984). Defining the new international information order. In G. Gerbner, & M. Siefert (Eds.), World Communications. New York/London: Longman, pp. 28–36. Plummer, K. (1997) The Chicago School: Critical Assessments. London: Routledge. Radway, J. (1984). Reading the Romance: Women, Patriarchy, and Popular Literature. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Rankin, J. (2017). Conducting analysis in institutional ethnography: guidance and cautions. International Journal of Qualitative Method. doi:10.1177/ 1609406917734472. Robinson, S. & Anderson, C.W. (2020). Network ethnography in journalism studies: a mixed-method approach to studying media ecologies. Journalism Studies, 21(7), 984–1001. doi:10.1080/1461670X.2020.1720519. Ryoo, W. (2009). Globalization, or the logic of cultural hybridization: the case of the Korean wave. Asian Journal of Communication, 19(2), 137–151. Schiller, H. (1976). Communication and Cultural Domination. White Plains: International Arts and Science Press. Shim, D. (2006). Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia. Media, Culture & Society, 28(1), 25–44. Smith, D.E. (2006). Institutional ethnography as practice. Sociological Review, 68, 645–679. Smith, D. (1974). Women’s perspective as a radical critique of sociology. Sociological Inquiry. 44(1), 7–13. Stocking, G.W. (1991) Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge. London: University of Wisconsin Press. Swidler, A. (1986). Culture in action: symbols and strategies. American Sociological Review, 51(2), 273–286. Willis, P. (1977). Learning to labour: how working class kids get working class jobs. New York: Columbia University Press. World Bank (2020). World Internet use. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IT.NET. USER.ZS Yoon, S. (2009). Cultural identity of Asian community. Korean Journal of Communication & Information, 46, 37–74. Young, M. (1979) The Ethnography of Malinowski: The Trobriand Islands, 1915– 18. London: Routledge. Young, R. (1995). Colonial Desire: Hybridity in Theory, Culture and Race. London: Routledge.

Part I

Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture

2

Emerging Asia and Global Communication

Asia has emerged as a new power and as an alternative to the pre-existing global power that was centered on the West. Having encountered a range of global crises that include climate change, terror threats, ethnic conflicts, and a pandemic, people around the world have been challenging the pre-existing systems and looking for alternatives. It is believed that global crises, which exploit humans and Nature, are often considered the result of capitalism and modernization led by Western countries, as well as imperialism under the hegemony of Western powers. In light of this, Asia has emerged as an alternative because Asian countries have achieved economic development on their own while also maintaining their historical traditions and culture. Some East Asian countries have joined the lineup of global superpowers and have become a part of top global power groups like G7 and G2. These countries have maintained their social and political systems and cultural traditions and remained distinct from Western countries. Despite the emergence of Asian power in the contemporary global sphere, Asia or the Asian identity is a more contentious notion than it first appears. Besides the geographical mass of the Asian continent, Asian countries do not have much in common in terms of political, social, economic, and cultural aspects. Asia comprises countries that have huge economic gaps, including both the country with the highest gross national income (i.e. China) and the country with the lowest income (i.e. Bangladesh) in the world. It also has discrepant political systems that range from liberal democracy (i.e. Japan) to totalitarian communism (i.e. North Korea). Asia has cultural diversity and is home to different religions, traditions, and customs. It is a heterogeneous unit that comprises countries that are geographically connected to each other. Despite its heterogeneous nature, Asia often tries to establish a community to work together. Political attempts to make an Asian community have been initiated by Asian countries. International organizations like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have made efforts to consolidate Asian countries. The historical legacy of the Asian community is evident in its diverse activities and social and academic movements among individual Asian communities. DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-3

20  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture Asian Civilization and Cultural Identity Asia has a long history. Several civilizations were established in Asia since the ancient times, that is, East Asia is associated with Confucianism, the Middle East with Islam, Southeast Asia with Buddhism, and South Asia with Hinduism. These religions originated in different parts of Asia in ancient times and supported the establishment of ancient civilizations within its territory. Although religion became less important in the modern era because of the separation of religion and politics, it continues to play an important role in people’s lives in the contemporary world. Huntington (1996) said that the clash of civilizations in the 21st century would be based on religion. He considered religion one of the most important aspects of forming civilizations while categorizing seven civilizations, namely, the Western, Confucian, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic, Latin, and African ones. The current global crisis looks like a clash of civilizations based on religious conflicts. It is, however, problematic to identify cultural units in Asia with their religious backgrounds because the religious influences are very broad and hard to specify. It is easy to overgeneralize and interpret the influence of religion too loosely. For example, it is often argued that East Asian countries achieved speedy development under the influence of Confucianism (Amsden 1989; Han 2019). The development of East Asian countries like Japan in the 1970s and 1980s, and the so-called four dragons—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—in the 1980s and 1990s, and China in contemporary times is commonly considered to have taken place under the influence of Confucian culture. It is argued that loyalty to companies and respect for hierarchy in organizations that share Confucian thought and traditions are the driving force for the achievement of rapid development in East Asia. However, Confucian traditions were blamed for backwardness when countries in East Asia remained underdeveloped until the first half of the 20th century. Conservative resistance against modernization and the cultural traditions of Confucianism were considered the main barriers to the development of East Asian countries (Kang & Jang 2014; Chang 2008). That Confucianism caused both backwardness and modern development is contradictory, based on the period in question. Confucianism is still considered backward and irrational among many people in East Asian countries. Young people disregard Confucian traditions when they have generational gaps with their elders in East Asian countries. People do not learn about Confucian thoughts because it is not included in the present-day school curriculum. Although Confucian traditions remain a part of rituals and festivals, people generally do not have much interest in learning about them. It is generally an outsider’s view that East Asian countries form an integral part of Confucian culture. Western scholars and foreigners have designated Confucianism as an important aspect of East Asian countries. This outsider’s

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  21 view is not only an inadequate interpretation of East Asian societies but also a function of cultural bias and prejudice. Huntington’s thesis was criticized for being reductionist and dichotomous. Edward Said (1978/2003) pointed out that Huntington considered other cultures anti-Western by dichotomizing differences into “Islam vs. Christian (Western) civilizations,” which is a theoretical flaw and amounts to reductionism. Muller (2000) concurred with Said in that Huntington’s arguments overemphasized conflicts between different cultures. He emphasized the co-existence of cultures as opposed to the clash of civilizations. By the same token, Confucianism in East Asia can be viewed through a reductionist lens, which creates a dichotomy between Western and Confucian civilizations. This view echoes Said’s Orientalism (1978/2003), which pictured Asia as exotic and eccentric through the eyes of ethnocentrism by dichotomizing Asian and Western cultures. As Said and other critical theorists noted, all nations in the world have changed in the course of modernization. Ethnic cultures merge with each other through migration, adaptation, and cohabitation. Huntington’s categories of civilization do not reflect reality as each civilization and culture does not remain in its pure form. Confucian civilization has not remained in its pure form since the 19th century when Western imperialism entered its territory and imposed its model of modernization on it. As East Asian countries achieved rapid development, traditional values and systems were rapidly demolished, including Confucianism and other traditional religions. Nevertheless, clashes of civilization describe increasing challenges and demands from the voices of minorities or peripheries in the contemporary world. The former colonies and peripheral states in the world system in the previous centuries start to have voices by challenging the global power center and demanding for diversity (Thussu 2013). Even though Huntington’s notion does not properly explain the complexity of religious influences and diverse dimension of cultural identities, it describes changes in the ­pre-existing global system and demands for new alternatives and diversification in terms of cultural and environmental senses as well as political and economic challenges. In the context of the changing global system and growing demand for diversification, people often refer to Confucianism to describe the distinctiveness of East Asian culture. They rely on it to describe rapid economic development and the cultural influence of East Asian countries. Currently, Asian culture appeals to global audiences as seen in the case of Japanese animation and South Korean pop culture such as K-pop and Korean cinema. Many studies and news reports have analyzed the popularity of Korean pop culture and have focused on Confucianism. According to these reports, cultural commonality in countries with Confucianism is the main basis for the popularity of Korean pop culture (Shim 2006; Kim & Yang 2006). These arguments do not explain many aspects of Hallyu such as the global popularity beyond East Asia, the generic nature of K-pop and Korean films, which

22  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture are not traditional but rather very Westernized in addition to the distinctive phenomenon of fandom. Both traditional cultures and Huntington’s notion of clashes of civilizations do not explain the Asian identity properly. The Confucian civilization does not exist any longer in its pure form. East Asian countries have changed drastically in the course of modernization. Lifestyles and cultural products of East Asians are far from traditional Confucian values. It is too vague to define the cultural trends in East Asia in terms of a specific religion that originated in ancient civilizations. This view may lead to ideological and cultural prejudices. Alternative notions and theories are sought in this book to explain the dynamic aspects of Asian media and cultural identity. Asian Identity, Past and Present Many efforts have been made to enhance the Asian identity and to establish Asian communities in history. It was first initiated during the historical era of imperialism in the 19th century (Kim 2005; Kim & Yang 2007). Although Asia was involved in international relations and cultural exchanges since ancient times, as the Silk Road and the history of the Chinese Empire demonstrated, there was no sense of Asia being a whole unit in itself. The notion of Asia did not emerge until the era of discovery, and Asian people did not recognize Asia until they opened the door to the world in the course of modern history. Earlier, people had no self-recognition of Asia, but identified themselves with their national or regional associations. Although Asian countries have been actively involved in international relations since the ancient times, these activities have partially occurred under the ambit of regional power, such as the Chinese empire and the Mongolian occupation, without involving all of Asia. Efforts toward the formation of the Asian community had not been made until the modern era. The first attempt was initiated by Japan in the 19th century when it became a part of modern imperialism. While adopting Western culture and products since the Meiji Restoration in 1889, Japan tried to enhance the Asian identity as a counterforce to Western invasion. It tried to explore the distinctiveness of Asia over time. Pan-Asianism was an endeavor that Japan tried to pursue in order to build Asia up as a political and cultural entity. Japan developed Pan-Asianism in three stages (Yang 2005; Kim & Yang 2007). In the first stage, resistance to Western powers was mainly initiated by scholars and political leaders. In this stage, Japan tried to explore the notion of Asia in order to highlight the self-consciousness of Asians. Japanese scholars, for example, invented the new notion of the yellow race for Asians as opposed to White Westerners and Black Africans. Japan strived to build a coalition among yellow Asians by soliciting the participation of the Chinese and other East Asians. The second stage went beyond the idea of an alliance among Asians to military bands led by Japanese imperial power.

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  23 This  military Pan-Asianism or notorious thought named Great East Asia (DaedongA or Daitoya) turned out to be the driving force for Japanese fascism to invade many parts of Asia and carry out war crimes. Japan provoked war in Asia and occupied Korea, parts of China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and so on during this time, and expanded its military drive to wage the Pacific War (Great East Asia War or Daitoyasensho in Japanese) during World War II. This ideology aligned with Japanese Pan-Asianism. It was led by ultraright politicians and military groups. Asian movements and cooperation have been directed toward different paths in the contemporary world. Japanese scholars tried to develop a new model of Pan-Asianism. It is called the third stage of Pan-Asianism. They are trying to restore the democratic approach to Pan-Asianism from the first stage by eliminating the military aspect. Pan-Asianism currently focuses on cultural power in order to build up Asian alliances and communities. These scholars have paid attention to Asian pop culture from the perspective of whether or not it contributes toward enhancing the Asian identity, and toward building up an Asian community (Iwabuchi 2002). Although the current scholastic approach to Pan-Asianism has made academic contributions, Asian people are normally alert to any attempt of Japanese Pan-Asianism because of historical experiences during the era of imperialism. Besides Japan, many Asian countries and academics in other parts of the world have been interested in Asian movements. Miike (2019) addresses the notion of Asiancentricity named after the Afrocentricity of Asante (Miike & Asante 2013). Despite misunderstanding of the name, Miike denies any attempt of ethnocentrism in Asiancentricity unlike White supremacy and European ethnocentrism. Asiancentricity rather gears toward augmenting the autonomy of Asia by enhancing self-consciousness of Asia and placing Asian thoughts and matters at the center of inquiry. Miike and Asante made attempts of paradigmatic changes in intercultural communication by emphasizing Asian or Afrocentricity. They try to relieve from ethnocentric and essentialist perspectives of the West and put on emphasis on literary and cultural autonomy of Asia and Africa. In addition to academic and theoretical discussions, many Asian countries have tried to promote Asian movements and the Asian identity in a more practical way. Countries compete to take the lead in organizing Asian organizations and communal movements in the region. In the course of pursuing the motivations to protect their national interests, communal movements are on the rise in Asia. Asian Communities and Their Limits and Prospects Asian countries have tried to establish Asian communities in many ways. The APEC and ASEAN were specific attempts to establish transnational organizations among Asian countries. Emulating the model of the European Union (EU), Asian countries have attempted to set up these organizations to

24  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture protect their interests and channel their voices on global issues. ASEAN is an international organization that was set up by 10 nations in Southeast Asia in 1967. It comprises three pillars, namely, the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC), Economic Community (AEC), and Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), which handle the political, economic, and cultural domains, respectively. Free trade and equal opportunities among member countries are the target of ASEAN’s policies. ASEAN +3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) have held summits every year since 1997, when the Asian economic crisis occurred and Asian countries had to cope with the crisis together. ASEAN is one of the most active and comprehensive organizations in the Asian region to work toward serving common interests. The APEC comprises 21 member countries including those in North America, Oceania, and Asia. It was established in 1989 by 12 member countries. Since then, APEC has hosted annual summit meetings and has pursued the economic interests of its member countries. Economic cooperation is the main goal of this organization. Environmental and military issues among other related matters are discussed in summit meetings. These international organizations in Asia, however, demonstrate limits in leading international cooperation and consolidating solid communities. They are politically mobilized without any strong communal spirit. ASEAN, for example, cooperates only on a temporary basis for specific interests such as trade and military purposes, rather than for the creation of a constant communal entity (Henry 2007; Plummer & Click 2006). Member nations often come in conflict with each other because they have different interests. The gap in the economic and political status among members is so wide that it hinders them from cooperating consistently. The APEC has additional problems as a result of differences and conflicting interests among its member nations, because of the diversity in membership. Countries like the US and Australia have also been members of the APEC since its inception because of their stake and interests in the region. The APEC hardly plays a role in promoting an Asian community because of the intrusion of global powers. These international organizations in Asia lack internal solidarity because of the absence of commonality among members and the intrusion of particular global powers. Although Asian countries take the EU as a model of a regional community, even the EU has problems with internal solidarity and identity issues. Smith (1996) argued that the EU has encountered an identity crisis. Although it is a solid international institution based on common interests, it has not succeeded in consolidating the collective identity of all its member states. According to Smith, there are two sources of enhancing collective identity: one is relying on some institutional apparatus like policies and organizations, and the other involves building a natural entity on common memories and experiences. The EU is weak when it comes to maintaining a collective identity because it mostly relies on institutional apparatus. EU follows a top-down

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  25 approach in the form of political leadership and institutionalization instead of a bottom-up one through a collective consensus of the people of the member nations. Smith described the EU metaphorically as having a “pale face without blood circulation” (Smith 1996, p. 175). This means that the EU limits soliciting communal spirit and emotional alliances among the people of its member countries. Cultural aspects are as important as political and economic interests in cultivating the collective identity of international organizations. Smith noted that “collective oblivion” is necessary to build up the cultural identity of the international community. The people of a nation usually share collective memories from historical experience and get through difficulties together, all of which constitute collective oblivion while forgetting about their individual interests and distinctiveness. War and natural disasters give people opportunities to consolidate communal spirit and inspire collective oblivion. People suppress their individual differences to share such collective oblivion. It is seldom possible for people across national boundaries to share such collective memories and oblivion. In European countries, Christianity may seem to serve as a basis of and shape a cultural and collective identity. Smith, however, considered Christianity a weak basis for commonality among EU members because they fought each other in history despite having the same religious background. Christianity is a common element only on the surface, as religion has brought about more conflicts than peace in this region in history. Anderson (1983) argued in favor of imagination as a basis for the creation of collective identity. He used the term “imagined community” to explain nationalism in modern history. People believe in nationalism because they consider a nation a collective entity, as Anderson stated. By the same token, international organizations can consolidate their internal solidity by soliciting people’s beliefs in imagined communities. When people believe in the common destiny of their (imagined) community, they solidify the collective identity, and an international organization based on it will be unbreakable. The current situation shows the weakness of the EU. Brexit and controversies around EU policies like the refugee and environmental issues illustrate an internal cleavage among EU countries. These instances show that the collective identity of EU is in danger. When compared to the EU, other regional organizations have demonstrated more serious problems and weaknesses in a collective identity. Although Asian organizations such as ASEAN and APEC attempt to establish a solid system and institutionalize cooperation like EU, Asian communities cannot achieve their goals unless cultural aspects and identity issues are consolidated as the current cleavage of EU illustrates. Moreover, competition and conflicts among Asian countries are getting more serious now more than ever before, and international relations have become complicated. Although there have been many attempts to establish international cooperation in regional

26  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture organizations, Asian countries have not developed a permanent basis for international cooperation. In addition to political and economic gaps among Asian countries, there are major cultural distinctions. Even religion is a major ground for distinction among Asian countries, given that there are five major religions in Asia, in contrast to Europe, where Christianity dominates. Despite the differences, most Asian countries have commonly experienced colonial history. Different parts of Asia have been occupied by different imperial countries like England, France, and the Netherlands, and Japan. This has resulted in diverse systems and cultures in post-colonial Asia. Colonial history has fundamentally changed these Asian countries and continues to affect them in many ways. The experience of colonization, on the one hand, has undermined commonality among Asian countries and hindered them from building up a collective entity. On the other hand, colonial experiences motivate Asian countries to work together and resist post-colonial power. Chen (2010) developed the concept of “Asia as Method,” in his book of the same title. It is an attempt of developing alternative thoughts by Asians while breaking up with fundamental premises and methods of the mainstream Western thoughts. Chen saw the core of the Asian method as resistance. Resistance against colonialism and global power can be the primary basis of gluing Asian countries together and motivating them to build up a community. Chen argued that Asian countries’ resistance manifested in the post-colonial, post-Cold War, and post-imperial contexts. Asian countries share historical trauma that emerged from the imperialism of the 19th century and then the Cold War era after the two World Wars. Asian countries have endeavored to overcome these historical traumas and resist global power that still influences them. Collective efforts to resist Western power both in political and cultural ways can help construct Asian communities. Chen critically examined resistance movements in Asian countries and warned against the danger of the ideological power of local movements. Referring to Nandy (1983), Chen discussed the danger of nativism and revivalism in post-colonial countries that wish to go back to the original state before the colonial era. This activism often produces mirror images of colonial power and serves local power elites and practices ideological power such as patriarchy and nationalism. Asian Identity and Cultural Practices Political and economic cooperation among Asian countries and the establishment of Asian organizations demonstrate limits that emerge from conflicting interests and discrepancies among member countries. Asia lacks commonality in every aspect, be it political, social, or cultural. Asian organizations have little communal spirit to bring members together. Although resistance to postcolonialism and Western culture may motivate Asians to take up communal movements, these motivations have not yet glued Asian countries into one.

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  27 Cultural movements among Asian people, on the other hand, illustrate a possible way to construct communal spirits among Asian people. Particularly, the media use of Asian audiences and changing media environments insinuate a new vision of establishing communities among Asian people. Asian identity is a key to glue media users together and enhance communal spirits among Asian audiences in different nations. Cultural identity has been an important aspect of consuming pop culture in cultural studies and critical theories of media. Enjoying certain genres of pop music and films can represent the identity of a person. Cultural studies have extended the discussions of the identity of users to social issues and movements. Studies of youth culture in British cultural studies, and post-modern feminist studies by Fiske and Grossberg illustrate the examples of studying ideology and resistance involved in cultural practices of the people in daily lives. In contrast to the significance of identity issues in cultural studies, Fukuyama (2018) addresses the danger of identity politics in the contemporary world. Inspired by incidents of Brexit and Trump’s politics, Fukuyama views that identity politics leads to segregating people in the scheme of ethnic groups, religions, and nationalism. By defining identity as a means to recognize one as superior, he warns danger of contemporary identity politics. Fukuyama argues it as a threat against liberal democracy. As a legalist, Fukuyama suggests that a more universal value such as human dignity and humanism should come first to identity. Even though Asian identity may stimulate group segregations as Fukuyama claims, the Asian identity was first motivated by resistance to colonial power. It is not meant to recognize oneself as superior and to segregate Asians from others, but to resist against superior power of invaders. Since the colonial era, resistance to global power and Western imperialism has been a major motivation to identify Asia-ness. In fact, the notion of Asia itself was historically constructed during the colonial period. Even after independence, Asian people continue to have motivations of resistance in order to establish their autonomy and to construct a system and culture in the post-colonial era. Although resistance is important in constructing the Asian identity, resisting power demonstrates irony and ambivalence in the long run. While Asian people are motivated by resistance to Western culture, they often produce cultural products that are similar to those of Western culture. Korean pop music and Japanese animation are examples that emulate Western pop culture for the sake of global appeal. The national and Asian characteristics in K-pop and Miyasaki Hayao’s animation, for example, do not stand out, aside from the language and the actors/singers’ ethnic backgrounds. It is ironic that Asian cultures reproduce the format of Western culture while resisting it. It is noteworthy that Asian media and pop culture are unique in a sense that they have been popular among Asian people since the 1980s even when Western countries unilaterally dominated the global media arena. International communications theories called the pattern of global communication

28  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture the World Communication Order (WICO) which refers to communication flows in the world being dominated by Western countries while undermining cooperation and communal activities among global regions like Asia, Africa, and South America. The power structure of the WICO has been criticized, alternatives are pursued. This movement for alternatives is called the movement for the new world information and communication order (NWICO). UNESCO has participated in it since the 1980s. NWICO aims to enhance the autonomy of media and culture of non-Western countries, without being mediated by media in Western countries. Even in the high days of WICO in the 1980s, however, some Asian countries produced media and pop culture that appealed to people in other Asian countries. The popularity of Japanese media and pop music (J-pop) and Hong Kong films throughout East and Southeast Asia is a salient example of media items that broke through the domination of Hollywood movies and Western pop culture in the world. Some of Asia’s pop culture at the time was successful in expanding to the global market including the US and Europe, as the cases of Japanese animation and Kung Fu films show. The Korean media or Hallyu is another trend in Asian pop culture that has been successful in the global market in the post-millennium era. Such cases of popularity have drawn academic attention and politicians and ordinary audiences in light of the fact that they may stimulate a new movement of Asian communities and enhance the Asian identity. There are diverse researches to explain how Asian media and pop culture become popular globally. In addition to positive and hopeful visions of portraying the global success of Asian media, critical views are also addressed. Theories of post-colonialism are one of the critical perspectives that provide a framework of analysis to examine the global popularity of Asian culture. These theories address the importance of the cultural aspect and the identity issue in the relations between nations and cultural exchanges in the world. Unlike conventional theories in international relations, which are based on mainstream political science and economics, post-colonialism refers to theories of psychoanalysis and post-structuralism, such as Foucault and Derrida in explaining global power and international relations. Original texts like Franz Fanon’s Black Skin and White Mask and Said’s Orientalism, which address the psychological and literary traditions embedded in former colonies, affect the inauguration of theories of post-colonialism. Fanon and Said referred to Lacan’s psychoanalysis and Foucault’s theory, respectively. Postcolonial theorists have inherited these texts, and now develop concepts and methods that focus on the psychological and cultural effects of colonialism and its legacy in contemporary international relations. From the critical views of Post-colonial theorists, global popularity of Asian media and cultural movements of promoting Asian identity may be seen as the product of desire, applying Lacan’s theory of psychoanalysis. In reality, there is a lack of commonality among Asian people in terms of racial,

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  29 cultural, and social aspects since Asians are racially diverse and gaps in the political, economic, and cultural realms among Asian countries are wide. Post-colonial theorists have explained that Asian countries have emerged as a group in global politics and economic entities despite their differences because they desire Asian communities to protect their interests. These movements are derived by the historical trauma of colonialism and its legacy in contemporary times. From the post-colonial perspective, the Asian identity demonstrates the desire of former colonies resisting against dominant global power. In light of this, the popularity of the Asian media and pop culture is considered an expression of this desire and the assertion of the Asian identity. Iwabuchi (2002) argued that the popularity of Asian media content, particularly Hallyu is motivated by the idea of “desiring Asia.” He examined cases of Hallyu and other forms of Asian pop culture that have attracted Asian audiences like J-pop and Hong Kong films. Iwabuchi argues that the motivation of enjoying this Asian pop culture is to find a distinctive Asian identity as opposed to global cultural products and to resist Western culture. Iwabuchi (2010) also pointed out the negative aspect of this desire that can work for ideologies like nationalism and segregation from each other instead of fostering long-term communal spirit. Having seen the positive and negative functions, he draws a conclusion that resistance is the main driving force behind consolidating the Asian identity. It can lead Asians to gather and build up an Asian community. However, the notion of resistance and collective psychology of desires do not adequately explain the dynamics of Asian identity and multiple facets of Asian communities. It may be easier to identify motivations for resistance in building up political and economic systems in the Asian region, such as ASEAN and APEC to protect interests against other regional organizations. In contrast, it is not easy to identify specific motivations with cultural practices in the daily lives of people, such as by consuming media content and enjoying pop music. Media audiences are not unilaterally motivated by a singular purpose, but rather enjoy their cultural preferences and interpret them in diverse ways. Nevertheless, the cultural practices of ordinary people present a more realistic picture of the Asian identity than do other institutional activities. This book focuses on the cultural practices of Asian media audiences as a realistic expression of the Asian identity. Media audiences in East Asian countries and their reactions to Korean media and pop culture are the focus of the research. Cultural identity of the audiences is one of the most important aspects of consuming media pop culture. While Hallyu currently leading transnational flows of cultural products in Asia, media audiences in East Asian countries often explain cultural similarity as the main reason to prefer Korean media. Despite contestations with regard to the notion of Asian identity and the historical reality of Asia-ness, the reactions of media audiences and their cultural

30  Social Media and Globalizing Asian pop Culture preferences can demonstrate a realistic vision of building up an Asian community and enhancing the Asian identity. The Asian media consumers may not speak for a singular Asian culture and identity. Even though it may be a fantasy and imagination or psychological desires when people speak for the cultural similarity of Asia and Asian identity, cultural practices of the people in their daily illustrate a realistic picture of the Asian identity. Ethnographic studies of Asian media audiences in this book examine a complex process of identity formation and cultural practices among Asian people in their everyday lives. References Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Community. New York: Verso. Chang, H. (2008). Nepotism discourse in Korean society: it has nothing to do with Original Confucian Values. Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 15(1), 105–124. Chen, K. (2010). Asia as Method. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Fukuyama, F. (2018). Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. New York: Farrar Straus and Giroux. Han, S. (2019). Confucianism and reflexive modernity. Post-Western Social Sciences and Global Knowledge, 3, 1–12. Henry, L. (2007). The ASEAN way and community integration. European Law Journal, 13(6), 857–879. Huntington, S. (1996). The Clash of Civilization and the Remaking World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster. Iwabuchi, K. (2002). Recentering Globalisation: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Iwabuchi, K. (Ed.). (2010). East Asian Pop Culture: Analyzing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Kang, J., & Jang, W. (2014). Critique of modern western civilization by European conservatism and the Joseon Wijeongcheoksapa in the nineteenth century. Korean Journal of Political Science, 48(2), 233–250. Kim, K. (2005). Pan-Asianism and cooperation in Northeast Asia. Korean Northeast Journal, 37, 5–29. Kim, D., & Yang, I. (2007). Experience of Pan-Asianism and East Asian coalitions. Epoch and Philosophy, 18(3), 65–97. Kim, S., & Yang, E. (2006). Reception of East Asian pop culture and hybridity. Korean Journal of Journalism and Mass Communication, 50(1), 115–135. Miike, Y. (2019). Intercultural communication ethics: an Asiacentric perspective. Journal of International Communication, 25(2), 1–34. Miike, Y., & Asante, M. (2013). Paradigmatic issues in intercultural communication studies: an Afrocentric-Asiacentric dialogue. China Media Research, 9(3), 1–20. Muller, H. (2001). Coexistence of civilization. Zusammenleben der Kulturen, translated by Lee S. Seoul: Pureunsup. Nandy, A. (1983). The Intimate Enemy. Bombay: Oxford University Press. Plummer, M., & Click, R. (2006). The ASEAN economic community. ADB working paper.

Emerging Asia and Global Communication  31 Said, E. (1978/2003). Orientalism. London: Penguin. Shim, D. (2006). Hybridity and the rise of Korean popular culture in Asia. Media, Culture & Society, 28(1), 25–44. Smith, A. (1996) Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era. Oxford: Blackwell. Thussu, D. (2013). Communicating India’s Soft Power. New York: Palgrave. Yang, S. (2005). Sun Wen’s Pan-Asianism. Korean Political Science Review, 13(2), 313–353.

3

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media

The use of social media is increasing throughout the world while the use of traditional media is decreasing. It is reported that half of the global population uses social media on a daily basis, with more and more people starting to use it over the year.1 Young people, in particular, tend to use social media while avoiding traditional media such as TV and newspapers (Abbott & Wagner 2012; Wellman 2001). Social media is transforming media consumption patterns and the daily lives of people. The changing media environments influence daily lives of people. Appadurai (1990) calls it mediascape by referring to global structure of media distributions and flows which consolidates global power. By classifying five bases of global power including ethnoscape, technoscape, ideoscape, and financescape, he addresses influences of changing mediascape on lives of people in the world. Currently, social media platforms like YouTube, Twitter, and Facebook lead the changing mediascape by replacing traditional media in promoting public participation (Jin & Yoon 2016). Social media has facilitated the demand for a new communication and the voices of the people through social media. Social media has been developed with the hopeful vision of enhancing two-way communication and promoting democracy. It is expected to spark a revolution in communication by overcoming the problems of one-way communication of mass media in society. Social media indeed offers a platform for ordinary people to express their opinions on a daily basis. It seems as though direct democracy is possible through social media and people no longer need representatives to lend voice to their opinions. Although this view sounds too optimistic, no one can deny that social media has ushered in changes in many realms of people’s lives. Social media allows people to share their ideas with others on not only political matters, but also social and cultural matters. In this way, social media affects the entire spectrum of people’s lives, including their political, social, and cultural lives. However, there are concerns about the potential negative impacts of social media. Political concerns such as fake news and propaganda as well as personal concerns such as privacy issues and addiction risks have been raised with regard to social media use. The social agenda of social media is currently DOI: 10.4324/97810034112081-4

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  33 more focused on governing and mitigating the negative impacts than on developing positive and democratic visions. Two Faces of Social Media Social media is defined as web-based services that allow individuals to construct a public profile within a bounded system, articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and traverse connections within the system (Boyd & Ellison 2007). Connectivity and autonomy are the two key notions of social media. Social media sites allow users to create their own content and profiles (autonomy) and also share them with others (connectivity). Social media includes diverse platforms such as social networking sites (SNS), blogs, micro-blogging sites, and podcasts. Each platform has its own functions and works based on distinct algorithms. Facebook and MySpace, for example, emphasize the function of social networking and YouTube and TikTok focus on the creation and sharing of visual content, while Twitter and Weibo are micro-blogging sites that allow users to share information through short messages. The use of social media has increased phenomenally throughout the world. Currently, half of the global population uses social media. Additionally, social media users employ diverse platforms simultaneously. It is reported that the number of social media users in the world is currently 4.7 billion in 2021, and users have an average of 7.5 accounts.2 Individuals choose to use diverse social media platforms as each platform has a different function while sharing the common characteristics of connectivity and autonomy. The diverse social media platforms facilitate the sharing and exchange of ideas, thoughts, and information and help users connect with others via virtual networks. Social media use takes diverse forms such as informational, expressive, relational, and recreational (Skoric et al. 2016; Valenzuela 2013). Depending on the type of platform, some social media channels emphasize information while others focus on expression. Facebook, for example, is oriented toward relationship building by helping users share their profiles and customized messages, whereas YouTube allows users to express themselves through creative content and messages (Zhu & Chen 2015; Kim 2021). As users have diverse motivations for using social media, they accommodate different platforms (Kaplan & Haenlein 2010; Lamberton & Stephen 2016; Voorveld et al. 2018). As the number of people using social media grows, its economic value is also increasing drastically. Businesses are increasingly using social media to market their products or services. Accordingly, the share of social media in advertising is growing based on new media technologies and marketing strategies (Lamberton & Stephen 2016; Voorveld et al. 2018; Kim 2021). Companies are using media mix strategies integrating social media and traditional media. Additionally, they are utilizing the diverse functions of social media to maximize the marketing effects. While websites and podcasts are used to

34  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture attract users by providing detailed information, platforms like YouTube and Instagram are used to invoke emotional appeal through digital content and images. Facebook and other SNS are generally employed to develop networks and manage customers, while Twitter and other micro-blogging services are used to make announcements and publicize events (Kim & Kim 2020). The economic value of social media is important not only to industry but also to individuals. Social media allows people to accumulate new values through networking known as social capital (Nan 2001; Valenzuela et al. 2009). Like economic capital and cultural capital, social capital also creates values given that connectivity is an integral part of profitability as the business opportunities on YouTube and Facebook demonstrate. However, the components of social capital are different than those of traditional forms of capital including economic and cultural capital. Economic capital solely consists of material resources, whereas cultural capital refers to non-­material assets that affect social stratifications. Bourdieu (1994) defines that cultural capital attributes to the cultural tastes and elitist consciousness of the bourgeoisie in capitalist society. Social capital, on the contrary, is based on trust, obligations, reciprocity, and knowledge, which create social and psychological values (Lin 2008). Social capital is accumulated by making connections online, and it can produce strong bonding or bridging. In general, social bonding refers to strong connections while bridging is characterized by weak ties (Nan 2001; Wellman 2001). Research shows that the effects of connectivity vary depending on the social media platform and individual circumstances. Among these platforms, Facebook is particularly useful in developing bridging, while MySpace promotes bonding (Ellison et al. 2011; Ahn 2012). Research shows that users having strong ties on social media are victimized more often than those with weak connections (Valenzuelz et al. 2009). Thus, social capital may have negative impacts on users and drive them to disconnect from the networks. Social Media and Public Participation The development of social media holds the promises as it is expected to promote democracy and public participation. It is expected to resolve the problems present in mass media and reduce the alienation of people in a modern and capitalist society. Social media serves as a forum for mutual communication and provides a platform for the voices of the common people to be heard. This democratic vision of social media is one of the main reasons why it has attracted the interest of academia and policy-makers. In particular, civic movements in authoritarian regimes that use social media have drawn the attention of the world. The Arab Spring in Egypt and the Jasmine Revolution in China were both pro-democracy uprisings that used social media to urge the public to revolt against the authoritarian regimes. Social media platforms play a role in promoting civic participation in public affairs.

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  35 The diverse functions of social media, including informational, expressive, relational, and recreational uses, influence political participation as they have economic effects. The influence of social media on public participation and democratization differs depending on the prevailing political systems. In free democratic countries, social media encourages public participation and serves as a public sphere (Habermas 1991), whereas in authoritarian countries, social media plays a limited role in democratization. More specifically, empirical studies have demonstrated the influence of social media on civic engagement through the relationship between message types and political systems. Informational messages on social media are important in authoritarian countries because traditional media is tightly controlled by the government in such nations and cannot provide proper information (Skoric et al. 2016). Social media in these countries can serve as an alternative channel for information as it is subject to relatively less political oversight. Conversely, in free countries enjoying freedom of press, the informational role of social media is limited, while the expressive uses are more important for soliciting public participation (Valenzuela 2013). The results of studies generally concur with the point that the expressive functions of social media contribute to mobilizing public participation in free countries, whereas informational functions work better in authoritarian countries; recreational functions hardly play a role in any type of regime (Bennett & Segerberg 2012). For example, a survey of college students in the US illustrated that the expressive uses of social media tended to encourage political activities (Macafee & De Simone 2012). In Chile, by contrast, the relational and informational uses of social media contributed to mobilizing political protests whereas the expressional uses of SNS had a limited influence (Valenzuela et al. 2012). A study on social media use in Egypt showed that the use of social media has hardly promoted political participation since the Arab Spring (Tufekci & Wilson 2012). Thus, there seems to be a wide acceptance of the notion that the relationship between social media use and political activities works differently depending on the prevailing political systems. On the one hand, social media promotes democracy and public participation in political activities, but on the other, it gives rise to problems and undermines democracy due to its negative influences. The proliferation of fake news is one of the most frequently cited problems when it comes to the negative impacts of social media. Various endeavors to control the spread of fake news in media are being attempted in many societies. Technological approaches such as feature engineering, matching-based, and fact-checking methods have been developed to undermine fake news (Cha & Gao 2020). The feature engineering method identifies fake news by checking features such as time, structure, and language, while the matching-based method attempts to dig out false claims by matching them with evidence from reliable sources. The automatic fact-checking method is the most frequently used technology to track fake news by checking it against multimodal information. Despite

36  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture these efforts and technological development, fake news remains a serious problem in social media and counter technologies are still in their infancy. Moreover, social media produces negative psychological effects on individual users. Online violence and crimes are continuously increasing. A survey shows that foul language, profanity, and libel accounted for the majority of cybercrimes, followed by rumors, fake news, and privacy issues (Parris et al. 2012). Young people are often victimized by cyber criminals, with a South Korean survey showing that 50% of teenagers have experienced online violence (Kim 2020). Cyberbullying among teenagers is a growing problem on social media. Studies demonstrate the negative impacts of social media on the self-esteem and happiness of individual users. While users attempt to accumulate social capital by using social media, they also face the risk of becoming victims of cyber violence and crimes. Additionally, research shows the negative relationship between the length of time of social media use and feelings of fulfillment and happiness (Ciplak 2020; Livingstone 2008). This means that those who use social media for a longer time and have extended social networks are at a greater risk of becoming victims of verbal abuse, fake rumors, privacy violation, and other cyber-crimes. As a result, some people tend to disconnect from social media after suffering from social media fatigue. It is reported that over 60% of Facebook subscribers stop using it because of fatigue (Bright et al. 2015; Kim 2020). These users disconnect from social media because they become disinterested in the messages posted on social media and are dissatisfied with its contents. Some empirical studies show that heavy users of social media feel greater fatigue than light users (Judy 2007; Luqman et al. 2017). The studies also found that privacy concerns contribute to social media fatigue more than any other negative aspects of social media. One of the extreme cases of the negative aspects of social media is terrorism. Social media is often used by terrorist groups to promote their agendas. For example, radical terrorist groups, including the Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State, and the Abu Sayyaf Group, have adopted social media as the main channel for financing, propaganda, and recruitment (Droogan et al. 2018). Studies revealed that 76% of terrorists used the Internet and social media to research and plan their actions, while 90% of terrorist activity online is conducted through social media (Gill et al. 2017; Weimann 2016). Social media is a double-edged sword in terms of public participation and democracy. It is undeniable that social media paves the way for public participation and empowerment of social minorities. At the same time, it can also function as a forum for political manipulation and impede democracy due to its negative aspects. Currently, there are concerns that social media is being used to undermine democracy by employing more subtle means of political manipulation than harsh means such as fake news, cybercrime, and terrorism. Public figures widely use social media to mobilize public support on a daily basis. The spread of populism across the world is considered to be a serious political

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  37 problem, and the phenomenon represents an undemocratic use of social media (Gerbaudo 2018). Although it is difficult to define populism, it is generally identified with the social imaginary and viewed as a forum for public rally (Pariser 2011; Postill 2018). It is imaginary in the sense that people speak out believing that policies reflect the public will, but, in reality, policies usually reflect the will of political leaders. Populism used to be a part of the political propaganda of leftist or Marxist political regimes. Now, not only leftists but also ultra-right politicians develop populist policies to mobilize public support. Social media provides the means to these politicians and facilitates populist mobilization of the people. Ultra-right politicians and leftists as well as centrist politicians who position themselves as neutral use social media to further populist politics. Postill (2018) identified Donald Trump as an ultra-right politician who used social media for populist politics, Obama as a leftist leader who used social media for mobilizing public support for the first time in the US, and Emmanuel Macron in France as a centrist political leader who promotes populist politics using social media. Postill concludes that all these politicians use social media to drive public participation and successfully attain populist support. Although supporters have a sense of belonging and commitment by being connected to populist politicians through social media, the sense of public power is only imaginary in what is one of the bubble effects of populism (Gerbaudo 2018). Populism via social media impedes democracy and has a detrimental impact on public participation. Social Media and Democratic Movements in Asia The dissemination of social media in Asia is among the highest in the world. As large parts of Asia have a strong network infrastructure, social media is used by the majority of the people. An average of 66% of people use the Internet and social media in East Asia which is the highest in the world.3 Asia is encountering the dualistic effects of social media on democracy. Although social media plays a pro-democratic role as the Arab Spring incident demonstrates, it is also employed as a means of controlling people in authoritarian regimes and promoting populist politics in Asia. While most Asian countries are increasingly using social media to solicit public participation, the trend does not always lead to democratization. Asian countries are encountering the negative effects of social media on political developments. Asian countries are particularly vulnerable to them because the rate of social media use in the region is high. Authoritarian governments in Asia develop technologies of censorship and public control to suppress the democratic demands of the public using social media. China, for example, has the highest rate of social media users in the world, and public participation in political matters through social media is also relatively high. Yet, China continues to be the least democratic state, according to the annual reports of Freedom House.4 The use of social media and internet is controlled significantly by the government in China. The infamous online system of China

38  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture known as the “Great Fire Wall” blocks people from accessing international social media, including services such as Google, YouTube, and Facebook, and from searching for information, including certain keywords, that is forbidden by the government. Additionally, the high rate of public participation in public affairs online applies only to nationalist matters in China. There is no room for people’s voices and opinions to be heard for other matters. The Chinese people are not allowed to criticize the government or the communist party in social media. Among Southeast Asian countries, Malaysia is an example of an authoritarian regime where the increasing use of social media has contributed to public participation and democratization to a certain degree. Despite being a semi-authoritarian country, the Malaysian government employs fewer restrictions on social media compared to China. The public use of social media has contributed to enhancing democratization in Malaysia, albeit to a limited degree (Abbott 2012). In his comparison of Southeast Asian countries, Abbott (2012) found that the Philippines is an example of a country where social media has negatively influenced democratization and public participation as evident from Duterte’s use of social media for his presidential election campaign. Malaysia and Indonesia demonstrated both positive and negative effects of social media on public participation and democracy depending on the time and occasion. As social media is a platform for ordinary citizens to share, spread, and exchange messages and content within a vast virtual network, it is difficult for political authorities to control or censor it entirely. Even the Chinese government, which tightly controls the use of networks and social media, sometimes fails to block the public from using the Internet and social media. During the Xinjiang riots in 2009, Uyghur protestors in the Xinjiang region gained access to uncensored social media platforms outside of government control and to servers from the US, the UK, and Germany via virtual private networks (VPNs) (Shih 2017). These activists promoted resistance movements against the Chinese government and appealed to the international community using social media and peer-to-peer message systems. Since then, the Chinese government has developed a tighter control and monitoring system. Currently, China widely uses facial recognition systems throughout the state and restricts political messages and images on WhatsApp and WeChat in addition to employing the preeminent “Great Fire Wall” blocking system. Nevertheless, people try to find a way to get access to international networking systems, and both hacking and blocking technologies constantly emerge—the former from public users and the latter from the government. The vision of the democratic role of social media has not been promising so far while the negative effects of social media have evolved and are increasingly producing social problems. Social media seems to be creating more nuisance than benefits for democracy and individual happiness in the contemporary world. Notwithstanding the problems and negative influences, the role of social media in people’s lives cannot be denied. The new mediascape

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  39 led by social media can drive civic engagement in politics and promote democracy in multiple ways, though it may not always have a direct impact on persistent political power. Social Media and Cultural Politics of Asian Media Social media has empowered individuals and groups by opening up channels for people to make their voices heard in the public sphere. Particularly, marginal people such as the youth, the impoverished, and ethnic minorities have the means of reaching out to government and industry using social media. Although this kind of public participation can give rise to both positive and negative effects, it is significant that social media provides a communication channel for social minorities, who have largely been ignored by traditional media. Social media also contributes to the empowerment of minority cultures in the world as well as minority groups in a nation. The pre-existing flows of global communication have transformed amidst social media efforts to publicize minority cultures in the world to the global audience. Asian media and pop culture is an example of minority cultures that are being disseminated through social media and reaching global media audiences. Asian media and cultures used to be considered peripheral in the global communication system, which has largely been centered on Western cultures such as Hollywood films and Western European arts. Currently, social media is driving the transformation of the existing hierarchy of global communication, and Asian media content and pop culture have started to appeal to the global audience not only in Asia but also in Western countries. Even when Asian media content and pop culture are not usually broadcast by traditional media in the Western hemisphere, they are attracting global users mainly through social media. As Asia has established a vast digital infrastructure with high-speed Internet capabilities and is the leader in the production of IT devices, Asia becomes now at the forefront of social media use. East Asia is especially the leading user of social media in the world in terms of the number of users.5 The high density of population in Asia is also a major factor for the advancement of social media in this region. Asian countries are publicizing their media content and pop culture to attract global users by taking advantage of advanced communication technologies and social media. Asian countries achieved economic development by focusing on manufacturing and technological advancement during the second half of the 20th century. Now, these countries are turning their attention to culture power or soft power on top of economic power. Soft power has become the new catchphrase for many Asian countries and motivates them to spread their pop culture to the globe. K-pop, for example, has attracted global audiences via social media. K-pop has been able to deliver major hits in the global market by relying solely on social media given that they have never been broadcast by traditional media in many parts of the world. Singer Psy set a Guinness world record in 2012 when his Gangnam Style became the first K-pop song

40  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture to receive 100 million YouTube clicks. Currently, BTS, a K-pop boy band, is continuously rewriting world records in the Billboard charts and Guinness records. These K-pop songs were not broadcast in traditional public media in Western countries until they become popular globally. They attained global fame solely through social media. According to a survey conducted by the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) in 16 countries, 83.6% of K-pop is still consumed only over social media platforms (KOFICE 2019). BTS is a salient example for how social media can be used to achieve global fame. The fame that BTS currently enjoys and the world records that the band has set could not have been achieved without the support of fans through social media. Currently, BTS has 25 million subscribers to Bangtan TV (BTS’s YouTube channel), 20 million followers on Instagram, 23 million followers on Twitter, and 16 million subscribers to V Live. Every BTS tweet is retweeted 300,000–600,000 times and gets 100,000 replies on average.6 BTS fans dedicate enormous amounts of time and energy to ensure that BTS sets Guinness records and tops the Billboard charts. The success of BTS demonstrates a new business model for music entertainment in the changing media environments (Lee 2018). The case of BTS have drawn academic interests in terms of the role of social media and democratic participation of the people as well as the new entertainment model. Cultural studies especially address the resistant power of pop culture consumption and BTS fandom that appears to have political meanings and represent the voices of minorities. For instance, the political activism of ARMY against Donald Trump’s election campaign was highlighted by the media. In a counter campaign against Trump, some BTS ARMY members deliberately reserved seats in a 19,000-seat arena for a political rally to ensure that it was empty.7 ARMY members in the US announced that they would utilize the strategies and speed of the ARMY in social media in their counter campaign against Trump. Additionally, BTS ARMY members made significant contributions to BLM (Black Lives Matters) activities following BTS’s donation to the BLM campaign. These incidents drew the attention of news agencies and academics to the political activism of K-pop fans, who are supposedly underdogs and resistant to mainstream culture and politics in the US and European countries. However, political activism of BTS and its fandom demonstrate more complex issues than empowerment of minorities. When K-pop became famous in the world, K-pop stars started receiving invitations from politicians to participate in political activities as national representatives. The government often picks BTS to represent Korea in global events such as ceremonies of summit meetings and diplomatic affairs. BTS has made a public speech at the UN, and its members have been invited to the Blue House and to the White House by the presidents’ offices of the two countries.

Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  41 Previously, K-pop stars were not usually involved in political matters. Instead, they were often criticized as unserious young idols with no political consciousness. K-pop, as a matter of fact, is considered to be a specific genre of music (young idols’ dance music produced by big agencies), rather than a representative of Korean popular music as a whole. The K-pop genre was often a target of criticism for being commercialized music and oriented toward Western culture. K-pop music was not appreciated by many Korean people because of its apolitical and shallow musical quality. When K-pop achieved global fame and fandom, K-pop singers get to engage in political matters by receiving invitation of politicians and political organizations. While K-pop singers attain global fame and get involved in political events, they become the center of political debates. As a result of political events and fans’ political activities, BTS became the target of political attacks by some Chinese and Japanese people as well as Trump supporters. The political campaigns and activism of K-pop singers are, in fact, hardly related to their musical character or messages. Since global fans of K-pop, particularly in Western countries, are minority groups who are empowered by social media, they are mobilized by political activism. This is separate from the musical nature of K-pop. Although the increasing power of general users and the benefits of twoway communication in social media are commonly accepted, researches find contradictory outcomes. As the case of BTS fandom illustrates, people are often mobilized by political authorities and get involved in nationalist competitions and hate crimes. Asian pop artists sometimes get involved in nationalist conflicts when they are forced by their governments to engage in political activities. Chinese actors and K-pop idols are frequently involved in such nationalist agendas, sparking political debates and competition among their fans. Moreover, empowerment of the public and two-way communication through digital media is often questioned because of persistent power of the industry. Jin (2019) addresses reinforcement of media power in the changing mediascape. The power of global media is strengthened instead of weakened in the age of what he calls platform imperialism. He turns the focus on increasing power of Netflix and other OTT (over the top) which take the lead of changing mediascape (Jin et al. 2021). Platform media exercise as much as power that Western media dominated the world communication in the age of cultural imperialism. It is not only OTT or giant platform media, but also social media that are dominated by industrial power. Some studies reveal that industrial strategies overwhelm fan power even when fan networks appear to play a strong role in driving global pop culture. A study on BTS fandom found that fan messages on social media merge into industry messages (Lee & Hong 2020). The study used the method of node analysis to examine the network effects of

42  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture social media messages posted by BTS fans. The findings of the study disclose that the social networks of BTS fans merged into a specific node instead of dispersing into diverse nodes. It implies that fans mostly react to the messages of BTS members and the agency, instead of initiating their own messages on the fan site, in this case, the official BTS account on Twitter. Most tweets and retweets of fans are reactions to BTS members’ messages. This means that the industry initiates and manages the social networks of fandom using social media instead of initiation of fans. In this way, the cultural activities of ordinary people give rise to complex issues such as interference of political authorities and strategic manipulation by the industry. In the changing mediascape, the cultural activities through social media have significant implications for public participation and political democracy. As social media empowers minority groups in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and nationality, public engagement in political and economic lives is increasing. Cultural activities of the public on social media are meaningful in the sense that these activities are exerted concretely on a daily basis by the masses and consolidate empowerment of the public in diverse areas. At the same time, social media has certain downsides, such as fake news, public surveillance, and populism, which produce negative impacts on civic lives and democracy. Because of these negative influences of social media, the increasing political and economic participation of the public through social media bring up contestations. Increasing civic engagements and democratic participation of the public relying on social media are often influenced by political interests and industrial strategies. They sometimes augment international conflicts as the cases of BTS demonstrate. Fandom can be also manipulated by industrial strategies as discussed. Despite these challenges, the cultural activities of social media users demonstrate significant meanings in terms of cultural movements and desires of the public. Notes 1 https://www.statista.com/statistics/278414/number-of-worldwide-socialnetwork-users/ 2 https://datareportal.com/social-media-users. Global Web Index. https://www.gwi. com/ 3 http://www.asianbarometer.org/; http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org 4 https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores 5 https://www.oberlo.com/statistics/how-many-people-use-social-media 6 https://www.btsarmycensus.com/. See Chapter 5. 7 https://www.theguardian.com/music/2020/jun/24/how-us-k-pop-fans-became-apolitical-force-to-be-reckoned-with-blm-donald-trump

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Changes in Mediascape and Social Media  43 Ahn, J. (2012). Teenagers experiences with social network sites: relationships to bridging and bonding social capital. The Information Society, 28(2), 99–109. Appadurai, A. (1990). Disjuncture and difference in the global cultural economy. Theory, Culture & Society, 7(2), 295–310. Bennett, W.L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action. Information Communication & Society, 15, 1–30. Bourdieu, P. (1994). Distinction. New York: Routledge. Boyd, D., & Ellison, N. (2007). Social network sites: Definition, history, and scholarship. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 13, 210–230. Bright, L.F., Kleiser, S.B., & Grau, S.L. (2015). Too much Facebook? An exploratory examination of social media fatigue. Computers in Human Behavior, 44(C), 148–155. Cha, M., & Gao, C. (2020). Detecting fake news in social media. Communication of the ACM, 63(4), 68–71. Ciplak, E. (2020). Variables predicting social media addiction: narcissism, happiness, and average weekly time spent on social media. International Online Journal of Educational Sciences, 12(5), 48–58. Droogan, J., & Waldek, L., & Blackhall, R. (2018). Innovation and terror: an analysis of the use of social media by terror-related groups in the Asia Pacific. Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism, 13(2), 170–184. doi:10.1080/18335 330.2018.1476773. Ellison, N., Steinfield, C., & Lampe, C. (2011). Connection strategies: social capital implications of Facebook-enabled communication practices. New Media & Society, 13(6), 873–892. Gerbaudo, P. (2018). Social media and populism: an elective affinity? Media, Culture & Society, 40(5), 745–753. Gill, P., et al. (2017). Terrorist use of the internet by the numbers: quantifying behaviors, patterns, and processes. Criminology & Public Policy, 16(1), 99–117. Habermas, W. (1962/1991). Structural Transformation of Public Sphere. Cambridge: MIT Press. Jin, D. (2019). Globalization and Media in the Digital Platform Age. New York: Routledge. Jin, D., & Yoon, K. (2016). The social mediascape of transnational Korean pop culture: Hallyu 2.0 as spreadable media practice. New Media and Society, 18(7), 1277–1292. Jin, D., Yoon, K., & Min, W.J. (2021). Transnational Hallyu: The Globalization of Korean Digital and Popular Culture. London: Rowman & Littlefield. Judy, C.C. (2007), Online stickiness: its antecedents and effect on purchasing intention. Behavior & Information Technology, 26(6), 507–516. Kaplan, A.M., & Haenlein, M. (2010). Users of the world, unite! The challenges and opportunities of social media. Business Horizons, 53(1), 59–68. Kim, J., & Kim, K. (2020). A convergence study on the effective content marketing in social media – focused on the characteristics of content application in social media channels. The Korean Society of Science & Art, 38(5), 113–127. Kim, N. (2021). The effect of social media platform characteristics on consumers’ behaviors. Journal of Product Research, 39(2), 27–35. Kim, S. (2020). Relationships between perceived outcome of SNS use and social capital: focused on moderating effects of victim and offender experiences. Journal of the Korea Contents, 20(9), 448–460.

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4

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity

Asia has emerged as an alternative model of development in the world. Since the high tide of the global hierarchy and the umbrella of the Cold War under the two superpowers, East Asian countries have achieved tremendous economic development. Japan entered the G2 in the 1980s and has now been replaced by China. Smaller economies in East Asia, namely, the four dragons—South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore—have also achieved rapid economic growth since the 1980s. The economic success of East Asian countries is considered an alternative to the modern and capitalist development of Western societies. Along with economic development, Asian media was also well received by global audiences even when global communications were dominated by Western countries. Japanese films have attracted global attention since the 1950s, and films from Hong Kong were exported to the global market since the 1960s. Currently, Japanese animation and K-pop have become global phenomena that enjoy fandom across the world. East Asian pop culture is further spreading out throughout the world relying on social media. Social media is not only a channel of disseminating Asian pop culture but also a means to consolidating global fandom. The current stream of globalized Asian pop culture including K-pop and Japanese animation and games demonstrates the changing pattern of media consumption and a new trend of disseminating cultural products through social media and new media technologies. It is, however, debatable whether globalizing East Asian media and pop culture have promoted Asian values and Asian identity. J-pop and Hong Kong films in the 1980s and the current popularity of K-pop and Japanese games have all given rise to contestations with regard to the Asian identity. It dated back to raise criticism of self-orientalism when Japanese art films attracted world attention in the 1950s. The debates with regard to identity issues continue to be brought up whenever East Asian pop culture are successfully globalized such as J-pop, Hong Kong films as well as K-pop and Japanese animation. Currently, the debates are further intensified as Asian media contents and pop culture are widely globalizing by means of social media and other new DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-5

46  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture media technologies. The generation-old issues of cultural identity and stereotypes of Asian images pass on to contemporary East Asian pop culture spreading through digital platforms. The global success of Squid Game on Netflix and popularity of BTS and Psy on social media illustrate the examples how Asian media contents and pop culture achieve global fame through new media technologies. At the same time, these global hits bring up contestations with regard to Asian values and identity. Despite global popularity, these Korean cultural products frequently become a target of criticism such as selforientalism and stereotyping Asia. It is not a coincident that Korean production of Netflix originals create monstrous images of Asia, and K-pop bands blur Asian identity by emulating Western pop and creating hybrid culture. Instead, the issues of Asian identity and representation of Asian images have evolved since the mid-20th century when Asian media started globalizing. This chapter discusses debates on Asian identity and the evolution of Asian images in globalizing East Asian media. Japanese Pop Culture and Evolution of Asian Images in Media Japanese pop culture is a successful example of globalizing Asian media. Japanese media has attracted global audiences since the mid-20th century. Japanese cinema was the first form of media that attracted global attention in the 1950s. Soon after World War II, the Japanese film Rashomon (Akira 1950) won the Grand Prix at the Venice International Film Festival in 1951, and Hell Gate (Teinosuke 1953) won the Grand Prix at the Cannes International Film Festival in 1954. The global fame of these films influenced other forms of Asian pop culture (Figure 4.1). While Japan stepped up its modernization following the Western model, before any other country in Asia during the Meiji Restoration in 1868, it was the frontrunner in establishing the media industry among Asian countries. The first Japanese film was made in 1898, just a few years after the inauguration of the film history in 1895. The Japanese film industry emulated the Hollywood system and established a studio system in its early days. It reached its heights in the 1950s and attained success in both the domestic and international box offices. Nevertheless, art movies such as Rashomon and Hell Gate were not very popular among domestic spectators who were fond of genre movies. The Japanese people tried to explain the fame of Japanese art films when they were awarded at renowned international film festivals. Some were involved in spreading rumors that Japanese films won major awards because they were viewed with pity because of the destruction Japan faced after World War II. They did not feel good about it at first. Benedict (1946), a cultural anthropologist, pointed out the ambivalent attitudes among Japanese people by writing about the attitudes of those who zealously welcomed and cheered American occupants after the war, despite

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  47

Figure 4.1 Rashomon

the fact that they were involved in detrimental battles in Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima. Japanese people have shown ambivalence and ironic attitudes since the beginning of the modernization era in the 19th century, by believing that Japan was one of the modern advanced countries and was not different from its Western counterparts. Some Japanese people also felt insulted when they were treated as distinct by their American occupants (Richie 1972; Harootunian 1993). They saw themselves as part of the West instead of as distinctively Asian. However, the award film Rashomon gave the Japanese people an opportunity to reconsider Asian values as distinct from Western ones. The series of awards it won at major film festivals in the 1950s inspired the Japanese people to create their own media and culture as “Western others.” They tried to conform to the international standard of film aesthetics (Tezuka 2012; Song 2020). It was the time when Japanese academia addressed self-orientalism in the Japanese media by commenting on Rashomon. Critiques and academics pointed out that such award films emphasized the exoticism of Japan in order

48  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture to draw the attention of Western viewers. During this period, self-orientalism turned into a key notion in creating media aesthetics and globalizing Japanese media (Gates & Funnell 2012; Tezuka 2012). Master film directors sought to create Japanese aesthetics such as the use of oriental colors and dadami shots and tended to picture Japanese traditional figures such as the samurai and geishas in their films. While promoting globalization, the Japanese film industry tried to catch up with international standard by creating trends such as “Shoijiku nouvelle vague” in the 1960s (named after the French nouvelle vague) which later evolved to a new wave of Japanese independent movies in the 1970s and 1980s (Yun 2006; Kang 2017; Lindy Hop 1987). Whereas big studios (the big three: Toho, Toei, and Shoijiku) continued to dominate the film industry, they made a range of efforts to adjust both to domestic needs and the international standards of film aesthetics. Shoijiku nouvelle vague and Doho monster movies like Godzilla (1954) are examples of such efforts invested in developing Japanese film aesthetics. The Japanese film industry has shrunk since the 1980s, and small-scale independent films have flourished. Even major studios began to make small movies such as erotic and low-budget films during the 1980s. Film genres known as “Roman porno” and “V cinema” were small films made by big studios like Nigatz and Toei, respectively. There are debates on why Japanese film industry declined in the 1980s and 1990s when Japanese companies merged and acquired Hollywood studios and established Sony, Columbia, and Matushita Universal. Other electronic companies like JVC and Pioneer also invested in Hollywood productions (Tezuka 2012; Yoshimi 1999; Schilling 1999). In the era of globalization and the information age, these Japanese manufacturing companies sought to invest in cultural products and acquired Hollywood studios. When Japanese companies dominated the global film distribution circuit by acquiring Hollywood studios, Japan’s domestic film industry ironically declined. These Japanese electronics companies merged with Hollywood to import its movies to Japan, and domestic productions decreased as a result of it. Japanese studios tried to keep up with the globalization of Japanese cinema, but failed (Itoh 2000). Only some Japanese independent films were box office hits in the market in the 1990s. The Japanese film industry became scattered, and independent films occupied 90% of the film production for the domestic market (Che 2019). Since the mid-2000s, Japanese cinema was revived and the film industry increased its domestic market share and exports. The market share of domestic films in Japan increased to 65% in 2012 from 30% in 2000 (Kang 2017; Standish 2005). National cinema continued to dominate, and took over 50% of the market share in the 2010s, compared to previous years the Japanese film market was dominated by Hollywood movies. Japanese horror films like The Ring (1998) and The Grunge (2003) attracted global spectators, as well as domestic ones during this time, and were remade in Hollywood. Also, Japanese art films have been awarded in major film festivals, such as the

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  49 films of Koreda Hirokatz, which were awarded at the Cannes Film Festival in 2015 and 2018. The Japanese film industry has been revived and expanded its reach to the global market. It is, however, debatable whether the global success of Japanese cinema and pop culture enhances Asian and Japanese values and identity. Some have argued that Japanese economic development and globalizing Japanese pop culture are an alternative to Western modernization by promoting Asian values (Craig 2000; Higashi 1990; Allen & Sakamoto 2006). They viewed that Japanese media has enhanced Asian values by soliciting global fandom and spreading Japanese aesthetics to the world. Some others, however, have criticized the Asian images and identity in Japanese pop culture. Iwabuchi (2002), for example, pointed out that the globalizing Japanese media is based on “Oriental orientalism.” It means that the Japanese media and culture reflect Asian stereotypes as defined by Westerners. The Japanese media is affected by orientalism, which the Japanese adopted in order to adjust with Western perspectives. Self-orientalism continues in Japanese media and creates unique characters and atmospheres like grotesque figures, ghost creatures, and barren environments in order to meet the images of exotic and “shocking Asia.” The globalized versions of Japanese horror movies and high-end art films demonstrated such odd Asian characters. Overall, the rise and demise of Japanese cinema go along with globalization. It has reinforced stereotypes of Asian images in the process of globalization by creating certain genres and styles. Globalizing strategies of Japanese cinema bring up issues of Asian identity. Japanese animations demonstrate another strategy of globalization to cinema. Japanese animations have attracted global viewers by replacing Japanese cinema when it began to decline since the 1980s. Major film studios and cultural capital centers started to invest in Japanese animations at that time. As a result, box office hits in Japan were mostly animations until recently. Spirited Away (Miyajaki Hayao, 2001) was a box office hit in Japan for almost two decades. Japanese animation has developed over several stages. It began with Astro boy Atom (1963) and made progress until the Gundam series (1979), Neon  Genesis  Evangelion (1995), and Death note (2006). Although these animations have been popular among domestic viewers since the 1960s, it was not until the mid-1990s that Japanese animation began both globalizing and gaining a strong sense of fandom. These animation series were remade in movies and distributed in theaters in many parts of the world. Japanese animation became ranked second after Disney in the world animation market by occupying 10% of the global market share when compared to Disney’s 40% (Pei et al. 2018). Science fiction (SF) and robot genres of these TV series inspired subcultural activities among global fans. The global branding power of Japanese animation is estimated from diverse perspectives. Original TV series are mostly in the SF genre and the quality is not very high as it uses limited animation owing to a constrained

50  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture budget, which creates art at the expense of quality. The use of limited animation suits the SF genre and robot characters and minimizes the production cost when compared to the high visual quality of full animation adopted by Disney. This way, the Japanese animation industry developed a marketing strategy oriented toward establishing a niche market in the 1980s and 1990s in order to avoid direct competition with Disney. Japanese animation aims to reach a niche market by relying on a budget and aims to reach older age groups when compared to Disney’s target audience. The success of Japanese animation in the global market comes from the power of storytelling in addition to marketing strategies and economical production. Although the main genres in Japanese animation are SF and battles, they have developed rather humanistic stories such as those of adolescents growing up and encountering conflicts in their world views. The Astro boy Atom, for example, tells the story of a boy, who seeks to define his identity though the boy is a robot. Evangelion also focuses on social issues and individual agony by picturing wandering and resistant adolescents in the SF genre. The powerful stories and open texts in Japanese animation have both ignited debates among global fans and consolidated strong fan communities. In addition to TV animation series, Miyasaki Hayao contributed toward promoting the popularity of Japanese animation globally by upscaling animation to a form of art. His works have been awarded at major international film festivals—he won the Best Film Award at the Berlin Film Festival, and his works and Ghibli studio became a global brand. He sticks to 2D (dimension) animation believing that animation is a part of the broader field of fine arts. In addition to box office hit, cultural influences of Japanese animation have gained strength by consolidating global fandoms. It gained strong fandom and created subcultural phenomena like otaku culture and cosplay world over. The global fandom for Japanese animation spread otaku culture world over and maintains the cultural power of Japan. Young global audiences have favored Japanese animation, which has encouraged them to prefer Asian pop culture on the whole even in adulthood, and to organize subcultural activities by consolidating their inner circle and spreading otaku culture. College students often established fan clubs for Japanese animation programs in Asia, Europe, and the US to share information and opinions and to organize screenings of animation shows in the 1990s and early 2000s (Lu 2008; Liu & Lee 2019). The number of such fan clubs has decreased in the college environment because Japanese animation and pop culture are now easily available online, owing to changes in media technology and the increasing use of social media. Fandom networks have expanded and moved onto social media platforms at the global level. The strong fandom and subculture of Japanese animation continue to expand to new arenas such as games and digital media. Some critics, however, have pointed out that the globalizing strategies of Japanese animation constitute another form of self-orientalism. While

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  51

Figure 4.2 How’s Moving Castle

Japanese animations have attracted global audiences and spread otaku culture worldwide, they have not promoted Asian characters and values much. Artistic animations like Miyazaki Hayao’s works were purported to seek “universal” themes and aesthetics instead of addressing Japanese and Asian characteristics alone. Hayao developed universal themes like ecoism and humanism and presented pictures of the European countryside and employed Celtic music, as seen in Howl’s Moving Castle and Laputa (Figure 4.2). These are exported from European novels. TV animation series also have mostly eliminated Japanese characteristics by picturing “universal” figures and characters through the genres of SF and robot battles. The main characters in these TV series are blonde Westerners rather than Japanese or Asian people. Unlike Japanese cinema, Japanese animations have eliminated Japanese characteristics and identities in the course of globalization. Iwabuchi (2006) calls it as mukokuseki (無国籍 in Japanese) which involves erasing national and ethnic features and preferring a-national and a-local characters and narratives in cultural products. He pointed out that mukokuseki is one of the

52  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture main characteristics of the “cool culture” of Japan. He identified it with the self-orientalism of Japanese pop culture, which mitigates cultural differences among global fans. Japanese cool culture adds just enough of Asian and Japanese flavor to evoke exoticism and cultural curiosity and to satisfy the images of orientalism for global audiences. The rise and demise of J-pop at the end of the 20th century demonstrated both the limits and promises of Japanese global strategies of mukokuseki. Jpop was a new wave of Japanese popular music that emerged in the 1980s. It was an alternative to traditional Japanese pop music known as Enka. The Japanese music industry created a new wave by adopting the Motown type of production system that prevailed in the US. J-pop adopted American pop tunes and produced idol music in the 1980s. Big production companies called Jimusho (“office” in Japanese) dominated the process of music production (Shin 2017; Marx 2012; Mōri 2009). Major Jimusho such as Johnny & Associates (Johnnys) and Four Leaves recruited idols by holding auditions for high school students and trained them to become entertainers. Japanese idols like SMAP, Utada Hikaru, and others were created by these Jimusho according to their strict production systems. J-pop attracted Asian and Japanese fans in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Japanese idol music became popular in Asian countries including in Taiwan, Malaysia, and South Korea, among others (Ng 2004; Fung 2019; Kishimoto and Lee 2001). Idol music boomed in this period and Jimusho established a solid system of entertainment business and marketing strategies in the use of idols. Strong fandom for popular music was consolidated and systemized during this time, as a result of Jimusho’s marketing strategies. However, the popularity of J-pop did not cross beyond Asia. Even when Japanese companies dominated the global music industry as a result of which electronic companies merged global film and music industries like Sony and Universal music, J-pop remained to Asia. The popularity of J-pop in Asia began to decline gradually in the mid-1990s. K-pop replaced it and gained popularity in Asia, including in Japan. Since the end of the 1990s, most Jimusho closed down, except Johnnys, which continues to produce idol music such as ABK 48 and Arashi. There are a number of reasons for the decline of J-pop in Asia. One is the failure to innovate in the Japanese music industry, particularly Jimusho. Japanese music companies did not catch up with the digital circulation of music, and remained true to the traditional routes of music production such as records and CDs (Jin 2020; Shin 2017). As they were overly sensitive to copyright issues, they did not take to the digitalization of music even for marketing purposes. Johnnys did not have a YouTube channel until 2018 and remained hesitant to release products on digital media platforms. Whereas K-pop makes 85% of its revenues from digital media, the Japanese music industry relies on physical marketing such as record sales to date (Jin 2020). As the Japanese music industry weakened because of the lack of innovation

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  53 and strategies, K-pop frequently occupied the highest rank in terms of record sales and on the Orion Chart since the 2010s. K-pop idols have a strong influence on Japanese media and concerts. K-pop made a new wave in the Japanese pop music market when J-pop declined. Although the Japanese music industry has weakened, the influence of Jpop on Asian pop culture should not be underestimated. K-pop is a specific genre in Korean pop music and comprises music that has been produced by the “big three,” namely SM, YG, and JYP followed by BigHit (agency of the Korean group BTS) since the 2000s. The major producer SM originally benchmarked Japanese Jimusho and produced idol music for the first time. The production system and management of K-pop were almost identical to those of J-pop Jimusho at that time. The K-pop boy band, H.O.T first produced by SM was involved in a case of plagiarism of Japanese idols because SM followed exactly the same path of the Jimusho system (Jin 2020; Aoyagi 2000; Lie 2015). SM emulated not only the production system but also the musical styles and choreography. Although K-pop is growing in the global market and J-pop is on the decline, K-pop continues to create the same genre and styles of music by relying on an identical production system. K-pop is currently expanding to the global market and consolidating fandom throughout the world in a larger scale than J-pop. While adopting similar systems and musical styles, K-pop is able to explore global reach owing to social networks through new media technologies. Despite global success in current time, K-pop is facing with the same challenges that J-pop had and derived to decline. K-pop started with emulating the production system and musical styles of J-pop which have raised the issues of cultural identity. Kpop has expanded to global reach beyond the boundary of J-pop by using social media and new media technologies whereas J-pop did not accommodate to changing media environments and global strategies. K-pop adopted otaku culture and fandom communities that J-pop Jimusho had developed and expanded to the global market by actively utilizing new technologies and social media networks. While expanding global reach through social media, K-pop encounters the same issues such as cultural identity and musical creativity that J-pop previously had and did not break through. Overall, the Japanese media and pop culture are one of the successful cases among non-Western cultural products. They have attracted global audiences and have built up fandom culture. Japanese cinema has drawn the attention of global viewers since 1950s, and Japanese animations and games have successfully maintained their global market power and have spread a particular form of subculture called “otaku culture” to the world. J-pop has also attracted Asian audiences even though it is currently weakened because of the maladjustment to technological innovation and global strategies. However, Japanese media and pop culture have encountered issues in the process of globalization. Self-orientalism and mimicry are generationold criticism of Japanese media. Japanese media sometimes emulate Western

54  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture styles by covering up or twisting it with some Japanese flavor. Mukokuseki or a-national characteristics continue to be the basis of globalizing Japanese pop culture. Some other times, Japanese media exaggerate Japanese traditions and ethnic features to stimulate exoticism and cultural curiosity. Japanese visual genres and artistic styles are often considered a reflection of the Western perspective that defines the Asian identity. Since the early days of globalizing Japanese media and pop culture back in the 1950s, Japanese scholars and media critiques have pointed out the presence of self-orientalism. Japanese media illustrate Japanese features and Asian values only to some extent, in order to attract the curiosity of Westerners. Global strategies of Japanese media and pop culture spread stereotypes of Asia to the world by creating cultural products in the manner of selforientalism and cultural hybridity. The identity issues with Japanese media and pop culture have passed on to other forms of Asian pop culture, such as K-pop and Taiwanese cinema. These new Asian cultures are also emulating the Japanese global strategies of mukokuseki or cultural hybridity to attract global audiences. While Japanese media and J-pop were bounded to the domestic market in addition to the limited number of fan communities in the world because of the passive use of new media and social media, these new Asian trends expand to the global market by widely employing social media and diverse media technologies. As Asian media and pop culture expand to the global market through new media, the debates on cultural identity and criticism of stereotyping Asian images become more intensified than before. Hong Kong Noir and Asian Images Hong Kong cinema is another example of global success among Asian media in the mid-20th century. Hong Kong was a symbol of freedom in Asia. As a small nation-city, it was the hub of international trade in Asia and one of the four dragons that achieved dramatic economic development in the 1980s and 1990s. It was not only the center of a free economy, but also the hub of cultural exchange and soft power in Asia. Films from Hong Kong gained popularity in Asia since the 1960s and expanded to the global film market in the 1970s as the phenomenal success of Kung Fu films demonstrated. In its hey days during the mid-1990s, Hong Kong ranked third in the global film market in terms of the number of films produced and the revenues of film exports to the world. Despite the symbol of freedom and advancement, Hong Kong films have featured exotic images of Asia and dark sides of the society by inventing specific genres. Hong Kong had a big and strong film industry led by major studios including Golden Harvest and Shaw Brothers like Hollywood studio system. Since its inauguration, these large-scale film companies dominated the production and distribution of films. They invented genre films to attract global viewers, starting from the Chinese-speaking population and then

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  55 reaching other parts of Asia. The global fame of Bruce Lee and Jackie Chan was thanks to Golden Harvest, while the global popularity of Kung Fu films was brought about by the Shaw Brothers (Gates & Funnell 2012). Shaw Brothers also attempted to co-produce projects with Japanese film studios in the 1960s in order to expand the target of Asian spectators beyond Chinesespeaking territories. Kung Fu films especially spread around the world, attracting world viewers beyond Asia. Along with expansion to the global film market, these action and Kung Fu films influenced to make certain stereotypes of Asian images. In the 1980s and 1990s, Hong Kong film industry became inventing new genres films such as the noir and fantasy which also began to attract Asian and global audiences in addition to Kung Fu films. Hong Kong action films were particularly popular across East Asia, called “Hong Kong Noir.” An action film from Hong Kong, named A Better Tomorrow (John Woo 1986), for example, created a “syndrome” in South Korea. Korean male spectators who were fascinated with Chow Yun Fat, the male protagonist of the film, emulated his costumes and dialogues (Figure 4.3). They still identify as “the generation of hero Chow,” while making a reference to these films (Kim 2017). Action films from Hong Kong reached their zenith in the 1980s and 1990s by attracting global audiences. Hong Kong made 250 films a year, which made it the third largest film producer after India and the US. Its film exports were the second largest, after the US in 1994. Despite these successes in the global market, Hong Kong noir portrayed dark images of Asia and the backside of economic advancement in East Asia. The Hong Kong film industry declined drastically in around 1997, when Hong Kong was handed over to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) under the Sino-British Joint Declaration. Film actors and crew members from the Hong Kong film industry immigrated in large numbers to Hollywood and elsewhere along with a large pool of immigrants in the business sector and the general population around this time. The number of films from Hong Kong shrank. The market share of domestic films decreased to 20% after the handover. Only 50 films were made in 2007, as opposed to 250 in 1991 (Kim 2014). A few commercial films were box office hits like Shaolin Soccer (2001) and Infernal Affairs (2002) after the handover. While big studios were shrunk, most independent films made by small-scale production companies occupied the film market thereafter. The Hong Kong film industry is recently reviving itself and has begun to produce large-scale films as PRC has begun to invest in the film industry. Along with the drastic expansion of the Chinese film market, China sought to enhance its film industry by co-producing films with Hong Kong. In China, over 10 screens are added every day in China, and box office sales increased by 30% and the number of screens increased by 100% every year since 2010 (Yin 2013). China is interested in working with the Hong Kong film industry to adopt its advanced systems. It has employed a strong quota system to

56  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture

Figure 4.3 A Better Tomorrow

block the import of foreign films: there is a limit of 20 foreign films a year. Since the strict quota system evoked international criticism, China made a deal at the WTO in 2012 and allowed an additional quota of up to 14 films and include a few new tech films (3D, IMax etc.). Overall, only 34 films can be imported into Chinese territory each year. Even under the restrictive quota system, however, the Chinese film market has been influenced by Hollywood films to a large degree. Foreign films occupy over the half the box office revenues in China. This means that less than 10% of films take up half the revenues in China. Considering that Hollywood films constitute the lion’s share of foreign films because of the strict quota,1 a few Hollywood films (estimated 5% of the total release) have constituted half the revenues at the box office when compared to the Chinese ones. Thus, China tried to enhance its film industry by integrating the Hong Kong film industry into it. It established the Mainland and Hong Kong

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  57 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) and made a special deal with the Hong Kong film industry in 2003 (Kim 2014). Hong Kong films are considered to be domestic films under the CEPA. Although the Sino-Hong Kong relations are officially encapsulated by the idea of “one nation and two systems,” the film industry became an exception as it was integrated into its domestic product range. Owing to CEPA, Chinese companies have invested large-scale capital in Hong Kong films. As a result, the Hong Kong film industry has been revived and a new wave has emerged. Large capital has been invested into the Hong Kong film industry through joint ventures between China and Hong Kong. Famous Hong Kong actors and directors have returned from Hollywood to Hong Kong to make films because of this policy. Hong Kong cinema began to face with identity issues as it came under the “Sinicization” or “mainlandization” process (Yun 2019; Shon 2015). They have to pass strict censorship rules in China as they are considered domestic films. Independent and art films from Hong Kong cannot pass Chinese censorship easily. As a result, large Chinese film companies do not normally invest in such films. The Hong Kong film industry has thus changed, and not only art films but also genre films that were unique to Hong Kong cinema are no longer made. The main genres of Hong Kong cinema are now action and war films, much like contemporary Chinese cinema. The globally renowned Hong Kong film director Peter Chan claimed in an interview that there are no films “made in Hong Kong” any longer, but only “made by Hong Kong” (Szeto & Chen 2013). He sarcastically commented on the dependency of the Hong Kong film industry on China in contemporary times. Even though Hong Kong cinema was the target of criticism in terms of cultural identity because of creating dark images of Asia in the process of globalization, Hong Kong protected the creativity and freedom of the film industry. Now, Hong Kong cinema encounters the identity crisis on a new level because of the growing influences of Chinese power. Struggles for Asian Identity, Universality or Locality Asian media and pop culture have attracted global audiences since the early time right after World War II, and throughout the Cold War era when global superpowers dominated the world communication system. Japanese films have drawn global attention steadily since Rashomon. Hong Kong film is another example that experienced commercial success since the 1960s and produced hits in the 1970s and 1980s. J-pop also dominated the Asian pop culture scene in the 1980s and 1990s. These Asian media and pop culture have been exceptional in reaching the global market among non-Western countries since the mid-20th century. K-pop has followed suit in current times, and Japanese animation and games continue to attract global users. These East Asian pop cultures make a new tradition of fandom culture that spread world over using social media and new technologies.

58  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture However, Asian media and pop culture have been the target of criticism in terms of cultural identity. Although the Asian media has led a new wave in each stage since the mid-20th century, it has emulated Western pop culture in terms of genres and styles, particularly that of America. Both J-pop and K-pop echo the Motown production system in terms of management and musical quality. Idol music from J-pop and K-pop follow the total entertainment format of Motown in the 1960s, and musical genres comply with the dance pop tunes with choreographies involving group dance that is similar to American and British idol music. Additionally, Hong Kong films emulate the studio system of Hollywood. A few giant companies have dominated the production and distribution of Hong Kong films, targeting the global audience beyond the territorial limit of the nation city. Like Hollywood, Hong Kong also made genre films for wider global audiences. These genre films including noir, Kung Fu, and ghost fantasy featured the dark sides of the society and backward images of Asia for global viewers. East Asian media and pop culture tend to mix a pinch of Asian flavors within the universal (Western) formats in order to create a sense of exoticism and cultural curiosity, such as Kawai (cute) in J-pop and K-pop, and Kung Fu action in Hong Kong films. Yet, major styles and the business management of Asian media comply with entertainment conventions in Western societies. Cultural hybridity mixing Asian ethnic features with mainstream Western pop culture became global strategies. Cultural hybridity of East Asian pop culture has brought up discussions on self-orientalism since the early days until now with regard to cultural identity. While these notions explain the strategies behind the global success of East Asian pop culture, they distort the understanding of Asian culture and spread stereotypes of Asia to the world. China has taken another path to globalize its media and pop culture. China attempts to promote Chinese dream by featuring Chinese traditions and Asian values in media. As a socialist country, it considers media and culture an integral part of its propaganda schemes and means of ideological education. Although China has opened up its economy to the market system since its adoption of the open-door policy, its media continues to be under the tight control of the government through restrictive censorship and blocking of foreign networks. China has adopted soft power as the basis of its foreign policy and has expanded global power in cultural production under the Xi administration.2 Locality and nativism are current strategies of promoting soft power of China in the global market. China has employed aggressive strategies to merge the media and pop culture of several Asian countries in the course of pursuing soft power and globalizing its media. In addition to Hong Kong films, China attempts to integrate Taiwanese and other Asian media into its own media domain by making large investments. As China built close economic relations with Taiwan, Chinese media companies began to invest in Taiwanese films and pop music. China released the quota limit and accepted Taiwanese films as domestic ones

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  59 in 2013 (Frater 2018). Taiwanese films become an exception to the quota of foreign films in China like Hong Kong films. Taiwanese music and films are now gradually being co-produced by mainland China which is making large investments. Compared to Hong Kong film industry, Taiwan walks on a different path and goes against integration into China. Taiwan still maintains its quota against Chinese films in order to limit the Chinese influence. Taiwan attempts to pursue universalism and freedom of expression as the primary value of media content. Taiwanese filmmakers are opposed to Chinese censorship and are reluctant about being integrated into the Chinese film industry. The public demand for the national identity of Taiwan is currently growing more than ever before. They want to maintain the integrity of Taiwanese cinema and protect freedom of expression. As Taiwanese cinema is experiencing a renaissance in recent times, the pressure from China is growing. Taiwan encounters a choice between expanding co-production with China and mainlandization, and keeping up with national cinema on its own. Taiwanese media so far try to protect universal values and freedom of expression under the pressure of Chinese soft power policies. China expanded its cultural power not only to the territory it claims as its own (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), but also to other Asian countries. For example, China has invested into South Korean media. South Korean media has been particularly popular among Chinese audiences through TV shows, cinema, music, and digital games. As almost all realms of Korean pop culture have attracted Chinese people, China sought to localize Korean media products by hiring Korean crews and artists. Localization is a new strategy for China to enhance its media in the second phase of Hallyu, following the first, wherein China imported Korean TV shows on a large scale. The Chinese media industry began to restrict the importation of Korean programs and worked on producing its own remakes in the second phase by hiring Korean crews. It became a fad for Korean producers and artists to go to China to make media content. Payments in China are believed to be ten times higher than that among Korean producers. The flow of media artists as immigrants was interrupted since 2017 due to military conflicts between China and Korea. China continues to pursue localization of media content in order to promote Chinese traditions and national prides by making large investments. Along with technological advancement, China is further expanding the cultural power to the world using new media technologies and social media. China begins to make profits in digital media in the global market. Despite massive investments, on the one hand, Chinese cinema was not very successful in the global market. Although the share of Chinese films in the global market is high, its revenues mostly come from domestic consumption because of its large population and the growing scale of the film market in China. China continues to invest massive capital in making and co-producing films with Hollywood and other Asian countries, but the number of Chinese films

60  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture exported to other countries is limited. The soft power of Chinese cinema is largely restricted to its domestic market. China, on the other hand, began to achieve profitable results by exporting TV dramas and digital games to other countries unlike the case of cinema. Chinese digital games are growing and have begun to occupy a large share in the global market. Chinese games occupied 27% of the global mobile game market in 2020, according to Google Play; the game Genshin Impact ranked first in the global market in the first quarter of 2020.3 Chinese game companies continue to pursue aggressive strategies to expand the global market based on the capital power of IT companies like Tencent. Additionally, the revenues from exporting TV dramas to 200 countries constituted 70% of its total media exports.4 The One Belt and One Road Policy of Xi Jinping has helped promote Chinese cultural products to partner nations. China not only builds up construction and infrastructure but also disseminates 5G technology and Chinese platforms in partner countries based on its policy of the One Belt and One Road. Chinese TV shows have attracted audiences in the Middle East and Africa as well as central Asia relying on new technologies and soft power policies. Thus, China is expanding its soft power to the world by exporting and coproducing diverse forms of cultural products using new media technologies. The new wave in Chinese media emphasizes locality and Chinese values unlike the hybrid culture that other East Asian media have previously created. It is a new experiment of global strategies that China tries to accomplish its soft power while amplifying nationalism and Chinese traditions. Globalizing Asian media have brought up contestations in terms of cultural identity. Asian media has explored niche markets and achieved success in the global communication order that has centered on Western culture since the mid-20th century. Asian media and pop culture further expanded their market power as the world began to pursue cultural diversity in the 21st century. However, identity issues in Asian media and pop culture continue to be brought up because globalizing Asian media often strengthens the stereotypes around Asia and distorts the understanding of Asian culture. The notions of self-orientalism in Japanese films and animations and cultural hybridity of K-pop illustrate critical issues of cultural identity in Asian media. The global strategies adopted by the Chinese media and the Sinicization of East Asian media have led to contestations at another level, wherein nativism and nationalism pushed by political interests and ideological stances have created issues. Hybrid and native strategies of globalizing Asian media among East Asian countries have both evoked contestations of the Asian identity. As East Asian pop cultures are widely disseminated throughout the world by means of social media and digital platforms, two competing strategies of East Asian pop culture between universal and hybrid culture, and locality and nativism further ignite contestations and frictions among East Asian nations with regard to Asian identity.

Globalizing East Asian Media and Asian Identity  61 Notes 1 China set the quota of annual foreign films as equal to the number of domestic films made on a monthly basis. The quota of 34 films is equal to 1/12th of the 408 domestic films that the Chinese government estimates as its annual production. Yet, the number of Chinese films had grown to 745 in 2012 (Kim 2014; Yin 2013). 2 See Chapter 6. 3 https://www.chosun.com/economy/tech_it/2021/01/20/VQNBOTDQGJ AI3GWRNEFXDPKESE/ 4 http://www.nrta.gov.cn/art/2018/1/4/art_114_35585.html

References Allen, M., & Sakamoto, R. (2006). Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan. New York: Routledge. Aoyagi, H. (2000). Pop idols and the Asian identity. In T. Craig (Ed.), Japan Pop! Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture. New York: East Gate, pp. 309–326. Benedict, R. (1946). The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture Ruth Benedict. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Che, K. (2019). Film industry and independent films in Japan. Asia Film Research, 12(2), 265–296. Craig, T. (2000). Japan Pop! Inside the World of Japanese Popular Culture. New York: East Gate. Frater, P. (2018, Mar 1). Mainland China opens its door to Taiwan films. Taiwan News. Fung, A. (2019). Between dislocated and relocated Inter-Asian popular music studies: academic discourse and possibilities. Popular Music, 38(1), 121–127. Gates, P., & Funnell, L. (2012). Transnational Asian Identities in Pan-Pacific Cinemas: The Reel Asian Exchange. New York: Routledge. Harootunian, H. (1993). America’s Japan/Japan’s Japan. In Miyoshi & Harootunian (Eds.). Japan in the World. London: Duke University Press, pp. 186–221. Higashi, C. (1990). The Internationalization of Japanese Economy. Norwell: Kluwer. Itoh, M. (2000). Globalization of Japan. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Iwabuchi, K. (2002). Recentering Globalization: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Iwabuchi, K. (2006). Japanese popular culture and postcolonial desire for ‘Asia’. In M. Allen, & R. Sakamoto (Eds.). Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan. New York: Routledge, pp. 15–35. Jin, D. (2020). Comparative discourse on J-pop and K-pop: hybridity in contemporary local music. Korea Journal, 60(1), 40–70. doi:10.25024/kj.2020.60.1.40. Kang, S. (2017). The film industry in Japan and Cool Japan policy. East Asian Cultural Studies, 69, 261–281. Kim, J. (2014). Changes in the Hong Kong movie industry after its entry into the Chinese market. The Journal of Cultural Policy, 28(1), 137–154. Kim, S. (2017). The aspects of acceptance of Hong Kong cinema in South Korea in around 1990. The Journal of Korean Studies, 62, 95–136. Kishimoto, Y. & Lee, H. (2001), J-pop penetration to Korean market under Japanese culture liberalizing policy. Business Management Review, 34(1), 269–280.

62  Social Media and Globalizing Asian Pop Culture Lie, J. (2015). K-Pop: popular music, cultural amnesia, and economic innovation in South Korea. Oakland: University of California Press. Lindy Hop (1987). Alternative Movies in Japan. Tokyo: Aicusha. Liu, S., & Lee, J. (2019). Study on characteristics of culture through Otaku – focusing on cartoons and animations in Japan and China. Cartoon and Animation Studies, 2019(6), 171–192. Lu, A.S. (2008). The many faces of internationalization in Japanese Anime. Animation: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 3(2), 169–187. Marx, D. (2012). The jimusho system: understanding the production logic of the Japanese entertainment industry. In P. Galbraith & J. Karlin (Eds.). Idols and Celebrity in Japanese Media Culture. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 35–55. Mōri, Y. (2009). J-pop: from the ideology of creativity to DiY music culture. InterAsia Cultural Studies, 10(4), 474–488. Ng, W. (2004). The rise of J-Pop in Asia and its impact. Japan Spotlight, 2004(3), 24–27. Pei, Y., et al. (2018). The study on the promotion of Chinese animation industry – a comparison of Korea, China and Japan. Journal of the Korean Contents, 18(3), 456–471. Richie, D. (1972). Japanese Cinema: Film Style and National Character. London: Secker and Warburg. Schilling, M. (1999). Contemporary Japanese Film. New York: Weather Hill. Shin, S. (2017). Niche, ethnic and global operations: models of production and circulation of East Asian popular music. European Journal of East Asian Studies, 16(1), 5–35. https://www.jstor.org/stable/44630915. Shon, S. (2015). China’s film policy and globalization. China and Sinology, 26, 37–61. Song, A. (2020). Historical and political wound in East Asia and blooding bodies of men. The Journal of Korean Drama and Theatre, 67, 169–186. http://www.dbpia. co.kr/journal/articleDetail?nodeId=NODE09322823. Standish, I. (2005). A New History of Japanese Cinema. London: Continuum. Szeto, M.M., & Chen, Y.-C. (2013). To work or not to work: the dilemma of Hong Kong film labor in the age of mainlandization. Jump Cut: A Review of Contemporary Media Jump Cut, No. 55. http://ejumpcut.org/archive/jc55.2013/SzetoChenHongKong/text.html Tezuka, Y. (2012). Japanese Cinema Goes Global. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Yin, H. (2013). Globalization and development trends of Chinas film industry. Asia Review, 3(1), 31–52. Yoshimi, S. (1999). Made in Japan. Cultural politics of home electrification in postwar Japan. Media Culture & Society, 21(1), 149–171. Yun, S. (Ed.). (2006). Cultural Power of Japan. Seoul: Dong Asia. Yun, Y. (2019). Hong Kong Film Awards and New Wave in Post-1997 Hong Kong. Foreign Studies, 50, 493–522.

Part II

Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia

5

Social Media and Fandom Community The Case of BTS

BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan, loosely translated as Bulletproof Boys), a Korean boy band, has attracted global fandom. BTS has broken world records including 23 Guinness World Record titles and the first Billboard chart breaker among Asian singers and was rated the “Entertainer of the Year” in 2020 by Time magazine. When BTS releases new songs, BTS leads social media by attracting billions of views on YouTube and other social media. The legendary story of BTS demonstrates the transformation of the mediascape in the contemporary world and a new pattern of consuming media and pop culture primarily relying on social media. BTS started as a low-profile band managed by a small agency or rather a one-person business when it first debuted in 2013. The name BTS or Bulletproof Boys encapsulates the struggles of teens chasing hip-hop dreams. Success did not come overnight for BTS, but the band became popular after its release of the album Hwayangyeonhwa, or “The most beautiful moment in life,” in 2015, which earned BTS various awards at music festivals and the highest rank in the music charts on TV in Korea. People were surprised by the sudden rise of BTS at that time. BTS’s primary business strategy is the use of social media such as the V Live app, YouTube, and Twitter. BTS members release not only their music but also details of their everyday lives, including private talks between the members, their training, and social activities, on these platforms. BTS fans gather on these social media and share their life stories with their favorite idols. The reason behind BTS’s success is the global network of fans led by ARMY, which was founded in 2014 as the official fan club of BTS. The number of ARMY members is known to be close to 40 million, though there is no official report.1 In addition to ARMY members, BTS has 34 million followers on Twitter and 25 million subscribers to its YouTube channel. This chapter examines the Korean boy band, BTS, and its international fan base, ARMY, by highlighting the growing role of social media in global cultural production. BTS achieved global fame by relying on social media and has thus created a new business model in entertainment. In-depth studies of the fan activities of BTS ARMY through social media are being conducted DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-7

66  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia to shed light on changes in cultural production and new trends of fandom culture in the contemporary world. New Technology and Social Networking of BTS Fandom Even before appearing in public media in the US and Europe, BTS had become famous globally owing to fan support through social media. BTS won the “Top Social Artist” award at Billboard in 2017 when BTS had never appeared on TV and other public media in the US and Europe. Today, the US reported that BTS was the most clicked artist of the year on Twitter and CNN released a report on how BTS attracts American teens using only social media. BTS continues to be the “Top Social Artist” at the Billboard and American music awards. Additionally, BTS has been frequently ranked first in the Billboard 200 and Billboard Hot 100 charts for consecutive years since 2019. While BTS has surprised the world with these records, which are rarely accomplished by any Asian singer, news reporters and critiques have been analyzing the secret behind BTS’s success, which is believed to be largely due to the support of BTS fans. A highly organized international group named BTS ARMY literally works round the clock for their favorite idols. The ARMY mobilizes global support to ensure BTS’s success by running something similar to shift labor for 24 hours (Lee 2018; Amos et al. 2008). ARMY members are passionate about participating in events and support activities. True to its name, ARMY works with military precision and is run by managers who are also voluntary fan members. BTS has employed social media as the main channel of communication, and members share their daily lives with fans through podcasts, BTS V Live, and YouTube to entertain fans through these social media channels. BTS established a new form of labor-intensive service wherein both the artists and fans are active on social media for 24 hours. This new business model in entertainment prioritizes social networking over musical or any other activities. BTS has further expanded the realm of cultural products by soliciting the participation of fans in creating content in addition to being involved in regular fan activities and support events. BTS actively adopts new technology, which includes transmedia, metaverse, and blockchain. Blockchain technology, which is oriented toward peer-to-peer (P2P) service, allows BTS fan bases to form local networks that connect fans. While idols are connected to fans, fans are also mingling with each other in a more democratic way, rather than in a top-down fashion, using blockchain technology. Blockchain technology has attracted the attention of the music industry since Spotify, the largest online music portal site, acquired blockchain enterprise Mediachain Labs in 2017 (Dutra et al. 2018; Musicoin 2017). Although blockchain technology is mainly used to record transactions of virtual currency such as Bitcoin and Ethereum and attracts investors in financial markets, this technology can be applied to transactions in various industries,

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  67 including the music business (Marcus 2016; Yoon 2018; Rogers 2015). The music industry has long suffered from copyright problems and skewed distribution of royalties, which discouraged creators and producers. The music industry can employ the P2P system of blockchain technology to make direct connections between users and creators without intermediation by a third party. The music industry has started employing this technology and implementing the pay per play (PPP) method (Dredge 2016; Koh 2018; Sanchez 2018). Blockchain technology leads to a fair distribution of royalties for creators by making it possible to track the use of their music. It is particularly useful in music streaming services that are growing fast compared to previous forms of record sales. The P2P system of blockchain technology ensures fair compensation for creators in the music industry and enables clear use of music online. The democratic model of blockchain technology can help the music industry expand its realm from market exchange to content creation. BTS is an industry leader in terms of applying blockchain technology to cultural production (Seo et al. 2018; Yoon 2018). This technology is used to generate user-created content (UCC). When BTS members provide the initial content, fans expand on it and create new contents and share it across multiple media platforms. This is called transmedia, wherein the content is circulated across multiple platforms that go beyond the conventional forms of public media. Transmedia is first defined by Jenkins (2010) as representing “a process where integral elements of a fiction get dispersed systematically across multiple delivery channels for the purpose of creating a unified and coordinated entertainment experience.” BTS fans use social media and upload their drawings, fiction, and songs created by users, which is a typical example of transmedia fandom (Plessis 2019; Lee 2019). Fans participate in creating transmedia contents in addition to being involved in regular fan activities such as listening to music and supporting idols. Whenever BTS members upload pictures, for example, fans create fiction and drawings out of them. Some fans have thousands of viewers and sometimes even commercialize the activity and make profits. Using new media technologies, these contents are circulated among BTS fans through P2P services. BTS’s agency HYBE (originally Big Hit Entertainment) newly opened up a metaverse called BTS Weverse in 2019 integrating all the previous social network systems. The company consolidated the fan bases into the metaverse. On its website, the company claims that its role is limited to providing a playground for users.2 According to Weverse, a subsidiary of HYBE, 1.5 million people visit the site daily, with 110 billion posts and other forms of UCC shared on Weverse per month on average. Weverse users employ the method of transmedia storytelling to create and share contents. Just one picture of a BTS member can turn into fiction, drawings, and crafts, which are shared by millions of people daily on Weverse. Some of these creations are commercialized and make profits. This metaverse technology not only supports

68  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia artists but also glues fans together and makes the BTS fandom a stronger community. Additionally, HYBE has created a virtual world known as BTS Universe or BU where BTS members and fans communicate with each other virtually. When BTS releases a song or an album, a set of stories is created on BU. The agency creates stories of the seven members of BTS, for example, describing the anxieties and uncertainties of the young protagonists. HYBE made an announcement of a future plan of BU saying that photo books and dramas will be produced in collaboration with one of the largest drama production companies in Korea, Chorokbaem. BU and Weverse promote social networking among BTS fans in the virtual world. The metaverse technology has helped boost connections between fans and their idols, especially during the pandemic era. BTS inaugurated virtual concerts using 3D technology in 2020, which attracted over 750,000 viewers, creating the record of the most viewed virtual concert ever. BTS consistently communicates with fans in the metaverse, and fans also connect with each other in the virtual world. Fans can participate in events and concerts while connecting with each other in the metaverse. Additionally, BTS released the music video of Dynamite on the virtual stage of the popular game Fortnite for the first time in 2020. While Dynamite has been ranked first in the Billboard Hot 100 chart, BTS continues to experiment with incorporating virtuality and reality. In short, the success of BTS and its strategies of maintaining strong fandom can be dedicated to the active deployment of new media technologies and social media. BTS ARMY and Social Media As BTS started with an underground band and has grown up as world celebrity, so did its fandom. BTS fans have been evolved from small individual networks and grown up to one of the strongest fandom communities in the world. In-depth interviews were conducted to investigate the evolution of BTS fandom and the role of social media for this chapter. Four Korean BTS ARMY members who have been active members since the beginning of establishing ARMY were recruited for the interviews. The participants were two teens, Choi (aged 16, female) and Wee (16, female), and two people in their 20s, Jin (26, female) and Ma (27 female). These ARMY members have been fans of BTS since the band’s debut and joined ARMY in the early stage. Despite joining ARMY at a young age, Choi and Wee who were just 10 when they became members, have been engaging in fan activities zealously and supporting their favorite idols. Jin and Ma were involved in establishing ARMY and supporting BTS since the early stage. Jin and Ma reminisced about their school days while talking about their fan activities during the interviews. They have worked very hard to support

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  69 BTS since its debut. The interview subjects were passionate about sharing their experiences in supporting BTS those days. Ma: We worked hard to increase the viewing rate on YouTube, just clicking and clicking. When we needed sleep, we handed it over to ARMY members in other countries. We have some kind of time table to contribute to raising the viewing rate. Usually, leaders make guidelines and distribute the time table. We call it a total attack, especially when important award ceremonies and events occur. Jin: Other fan clubs also have a total attack strategy. It’s just that BTS ARMY is so big and intensive. For the Billboard charts, radio rating is important. Since we don’t know much about American radio, US ARMY members work hard for radio requests, and we send flowers, cakes, etc., to concentrate on radio. As Jin and Ma stated, ARMY members are fully mobilized to increase the number of views and clicks on media. It is no secret that BTS could not have achieved global fame without the support of ARMY. BTS members acknowledge this contribution and appreciate the efforts of ARMY at every award ceremony. Jin’s statements almost sound like ARMY members engage in bribing and manipulation by sending presents to radio stations. ARMY members attempt to raise the online viewing rate by clicking on BTS music for 24 hours according to the timetable given by managers. Fan activities of ARMY demonstrate new strategies of the entertainment business and the transformation of consuming pop culture by a strong fandom community. During the interviews, ARMY members stated that it was their duty to engage in what they called Chonggong (총공 in Korean) or total attack and Jogong (조공 in Korean) or tribute. Chonggong is a strategy planned by the ARMY leadership to help BTS win in competitions. They set up tactics of total attack to help BTS obtain top ranking in Billboard charts and international awards. Jogong or tribute is considered to be another ARMY duty dedicated to BTS. Jogong originally meant diplomatic relations, and in ancient times, it referred to offerings that weak countries gave to strong countries to maintain peace in the region. Old dynasties in Korea had to offer Jogong to China to maintain Chinese protection and prevent battles in the territory. ARMY presumably chose this kind of humble word denoting offerings or Jogong to explain the dedication of fans to their idols. Jogong can have a dual meaning, both honor and burden of ARMY members. ARMY members revealed the motivation behind their dedication toward BTS during the interviews. Wee: We perform this duty because the idols entertain us. We want to compensate and reciprocate. They give us happiness and we give back by supporting them and engaging in fan activities.

70  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Choi: We upload shots of MV (music video) views and spread tweets to other people. When BTS has come backstage, etc., managers set up a total attack strategy. We follow the direction of the managers and initiate activities. We participate in the activities partly because we like them and partly because we are obliged to ensure their success by working for billions of views. Jin: We have grown up with BTS. The agency used to be small and struggled initially. Now they have become global stars while I am still here. One day, BTS said, “We were once shabby but you ARMY recognized us. You will all be okay and achieve what you dream for.” Then, I felt relieved and started supporting them strongly again. Ma: We have a special relationship with BTS, not because of appearance or fame. It’s our story of growing up. They are the model of our growth and future. Interview statements of these ARMY members demonstrate their relationship with BTS, which they consider to be a major part of their identity. For these fans, it is not simply a cultural preference or favorite music, but a part of their life stories. They feel that they are growing with BTS and that BTS music is created by the band and fans together. As Wee stated, fans feel obliged to work for BTS because they want to give back as a team as the band gives them happiness. These fans want to establish solidarity, which is considered to be an important part of their identity. As Jin stated, fans sometimes suffer from an identity crisis when they see the fast growth of BTS and the band’s global fame while they are still struggling in life. They feel encouraged again when BTS members express care for their fans and connect with them through social media. Jin: I think ARMY was most jealous in 2016 when The Most Beautiful Moment in Life (Hwayangyeonhwa) was released. There were so many rumors. We cried every time we listened to the music on stage and at concerts. We had a strong feeling and wanted to “destroy it all.” Ma: Now, we no longer have to listen to (BTS) music overnight. We, the Korean ARMY, believe that we can make it to the Billboard rankings so we have started expanding international participation. During the interviews, interview subjects often teared up when they narrated stories about the early days of ARMY. Jin and Ma shared the story of how ARMY members cried every day when BTS first won the first rank in a TV music show amidst rumors and scandals from fan clubs of other idols. This kind of absolute loyalty from ARMY to their idols cannot be explained without considering the tight networking using social media on a daily basis (Cho et al. 2018; Basil 1996; Oliver 1999; Wei and Lu 2013; Erdogan 1999). BTS has created a space where ARMY members can reside

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  71 side by side with their favorite idols using social media. And now BTS is expanding the space using new technologies such as metaverse and transmedia. Jin: If BTS uploads a photo or any other content, we can do many things: draw, make films, post comments, etc. We call it secondary content. We consume those secondary goods. Ma: In addition to creating content, we collect fandom statistics for Billboard rankings or international awards. If someone is good in drawing, then they draw, some make dolls out of a BTS picture, and if someone is good in English, then they collect information and statistics for awards. You can do anything and make things on the fan sites. BTS fans engage in activities in diverse manners as Jin and Ma stated. When BTS ARMY opened the sites of fan activities in 2014, Armypedia, named after Wikipedia, was the first such site to be launched and it is used for exchanging members’ content. Any ARMY member could fill up the contents to Armypedia and share them with others. This primary local networking site solicited the participation of ARMY members and consolidated the strong fan base. Fan sites have been evolved and networks have been reinforced through diverse uses of social media. BTS members share their works and daily activities with fans by launching BTS Universe or BU. It is a virtual world made up of stories and visual images, such as music videos, highlight reels, webtoon, and notes of BTS. BU not only enhances the social networks of fan communities but also makes it possible to share concepts of music. BTS fans use BU as a hub for understanding and interpreting BTS’s music. The interviewees in this study often reiterated the worldview of BTS as written in BU. They attempt to reinforce the solidarity of BTS fandom by sharing the BTS worldview and philosophy of BTS music provided by BU. Wee: BTS songs are always different from other idol music, more philosophical, I would say. I like that. From the beginning they have been singing about dreams and life stories. Choi: I find comfort and strength when I listen to BTS music. They sing about our generation. Wee: BTS is unique in their personality. Unlike other idols, they were not created by the company. BTS members grew on their own. People like BTS because of their good personality. Everyone speaks only good things of BTS and no bad things whatsoever. Choi: They have changed but in a good way, and they always improve themselves. BTS is known for their humility and perseverance. Foreign ARMY members especially appreciate these qualities. These BTS fans are exposed to not only music but also the personalities, philosophy of music, and daily lives of BTS members by using social media.

72  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Particularly, BU mixes the real-life stories with fiction through beautiful pictures and videos and produces the unique BTS world. When BTS proposes ideas and concepts regarding new albums and singles, fans create related content and post comments on social media. BTS frequently make comments citing old novels, art pieces, and sophisticated philosophy to explain the main concept of their music. When BTS briefly presents excerpts from art pieces and literatures, it becomes the fans’ duty to solve riddles and interpret BTS’s ideas on social media sites. Figure 5.1 illustrates the daily lives and routine of BTS members, but they are partly fictional stories with well-planned settings and visual images. The image of the black and white screen gives a visual cue to blur the boundary between the real and the virtual. BU often introduces art pieces and photos to illustrate concepts of music. Figure 5.2 shows a lonely spot in the ocean to portray the lonely and

Figure 5.1 BTS Members in BU

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  73

Figure 5.2 Image in BU for the First Album, Wings

wandering spirit of youth. It says “never walk alone” to assure fans that they are not alone and BTS is walking with them. As indicated by Choi during the interview, fans often feel healed and enlightened when they share the BU content. In addition, the images of lonely boys frequently appear in BU to illustrate how the lonely BTS members seek the company and friendship of fans. As the interviews with the high school students Choi and Wee illustrate, fans share the BTS worldview provided by BU. BU represents an integral part of their generational identity and youth culture. Fans devote effort to figuring out the meaning and message of the songs described in BU. BU is full of mysterious stories, philosophical and aesthetic messages, and art works. New messages of BU always ignite discussions among ARMY members. Sometimes, parents in their middle age join ARMY in order to understand their children’s passion. They usually confess difficulties in understanding BU.3 For BTS fans, they want to maintain an esoteric group identity. For this purpose, BU plays an important role as the channel to consolidate communal spirit and community solidarity. When the album Wings was released in 2017, for example, BTS released excerpts from the novel Demian (Hermann Hesse 1919) to convey the main concept of the album. The title song of this album Blood, Sweat and Tears cited Thus Spoke Zarathustra by Friedrich Nietzsche. Another album Love yourself was inspired by Erich Fromm, while the album Map of the Soul was inspired by Carl Jung’s psychoanalysis. In this way, BTS introduced vague ideas of philosophy or excerpts from novels to explain the themes and

74  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia concepts of their songs. When the concept of music was released through social media, fans rushed back to read those 19th-century philosophy books or early 20th-century literature. These albums and songs set records, while the books also became bestsellers among young people because of BTS. Content and art works relating to these theories and concepts are accumulated in Armypedia, BU, and other social media channels and circulated widely among fans. These activities on social media and direct communication through new media technologies such as metaverse and blockchain have further consolidated the BTS fandom. The most recent BTS album, Map of the Soul: 7, released on February 21, 2020, delves into Jung’s concept of psychoanalysis. This is the fourth regular album of BTS, integrating the lead single Map of the Soul: Persona and some previous songs into the album. This album is particularly meaningful as it celebrates the seventh anniversary of BTS’s debut and includes solos by all seven members of BTS. This album is said to have been motivated by the analytical psychology of Carl Jung and was named after Jung’s book titled Map of the Soul. This album consists of 20 tracks, including the lead single Persona, Boy with Luv, and the title song On. It was awarded the best K-pop title by Time magazine in 2020 and was the bestselling album of the year. In addition, the title song On was fourth on Billboard Hot 100, and 7 songs from the album ranked at the top on iTunes in over 100 countries. All songs in Map of the Soul represent the pursuit of self-identity emulating Jung’s psychological theories. The high-beat hip-hop song Persona starts with the lyrics “so I’m askin’ once again yeah who the hell am I.” The songs in the album describe characters facing their dark side; for example, the lyrics for On go on thus: “I have to be crazy to be sane, throw myself into the dual world; Can’t hold me down cuz you know I’m a fighter.” In Interlude: Shadow, the artist sings “Even if I run away, the light and shadow in proportion follow me, fear. I am afraid of flying high.” The lyrics reveal that the wandering nature of youth and the struggles of finding the true self are the common themes in the album. Each song in the album Map of the Soul has sparked numerous writings, interpretations, and other creations by various people including young teenagers, artists, and psychologists. These works spread through diverse social media platforms such as Weverse, blogs, and Facebook. A modern dance company in Slovenia has even choreographed a performance based on the song Black Swan in the album.4 As BTS often cites profound and controversial writings and art pieces, their songs and albums bring up diverse interpretations and related art and visual content (Figure 5.3). In the case of Map of the Soul, however, BTS’s music and other art works do not concur with Jung’s theory. BTS’s agency HYBE announced that the main concept of the album was the pursuit of self-identity by facing the dark side of one’s personality, whereas the previous BTS albums and songs have emphasized social themes like connection to fans and their friendship. Map

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  75

Figure 5.3 Slovenian Modern Dance after BTS Black Swan

of the Soul, especially the music videos of Persona, Black Swan, and Shadow, demonstrate the two sides of the self. The contrast of the dual characters is illustrated by the color of the stage and costume, beat of music, and speed of dance. The troubles and confusion, or the dark side of youngsters, and their light side are emphasized through the contrast between black and white costumes, high beat and melodious music, and fast and slow choreography in the music videos and live concerts. The duality of the worldview and characters described in the BTS songs and performance is, however, far from the original meaning of Jung’s Map of the Soul. It is exactly the theme Jung opposed in his works. Jung presented one of the most complicated and controversial theories. The complexity of Jung’s theory had its roots in the metaphysical nature of the “soul” as conscripted in spirituality and religion. This was one of the reasons why Jung had a falling out with his mentor Sigmund Freud. Freud was opposed to expanding the realm of psychoanalysis to spiritual and metaphysical understanding, aspects in which Jung had a keen interest. Jung invented a new school called analytical psychology after being expelled from the school of psychoanalysis by Freud. In the Jungian sense, the soul is more than the human mind and the two sides of the self. Jung explored the universality of the human spirit that exists beyond time and space. The main concepts of Jung’s theories such as anima and animus, persona, and archetype imago are all oriented toward universality that Jung called the “collective unconscious.” Jung describes his journey of finding the soul in his work, The Red Book. This book is one of the most complicated works to have ever been published. At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that one of the outcomes of Jung’s personal journey to Map of the Soul was his experience of transcending the dualism of

76  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia the worldview and human identity, which is easily depicted as dualities like vice and virtue and truth and fake. In The Red Book, Jung (2009) delves into the dark side of the self as a necessary way to meet the unconscious self. Although the pilgrim and the writer in The Red Book characterize the two sides of the ego, they do not represent the contradictory vice and virtue of the self. For Jung, the unconscious self or soul of human beings goes beyond the dichotomy of moral judgment and natural environments that we perceive as vice and virtue, or good and bad. The complicated notions and incomprehensible writings of Jung in his works seem to reflect his efforts to denounce the simplistic notion of spirituality and instrumental understanding of the human soul. He tried to overcome the scientific or mechanical concept of the soul and the stereotype of spirituality when he established a new school away from mainstream psychoanalysis. The journey to the soul and the visual dichotomy of the human mind that are frequently described by contemporary pop culture and digital media are contradictory to Jung’s understanding of the soul. BTS adopts a dualistic worldview in its songs and performance, which is similar to the approach taken by digital games and Hollywood movies. The official music video of Black Swan, for example, has visual narratives that are similar to images in digital games and gothic films. The stage setting looks similar to the parlor of a gothic castle with luxurious stairs at the center and chandeliers. The BTS artists dance in the parlor first wearing black and then white costumes to illustrate the duality of human nature (Figure 5.4).

Figure 5.4 BTS Black Swan Music Video

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  77 Despite the discrepancy between Jung’s original meaning and BTS’s interpretation of it in their music, young people are attracted to Jung’s works, which have become bestsellers among BTS fans. It is intriguing that the BTS album induced diverse interpretations and cultural products out of Jung’s theories despite differences in understanding of original meanings. BTS fan sites and Weverse are full of writings, drawings, and related art works citing Jung’s Map of the Soul. They are serious about discussing psychological issues, discovering their true identity, and understanding their personal desires and frustrations based on BTS’s struggles described in the songs and performances. Previously, the novel Demian and Erich Fromm’s book The Art of Living also became bestsellers when BTS released the albums Wings and Love Yourself. Map of the Soul: 7 solicited more participation because of the wider playground provided by metaverse technology compared to the previous albums. The agency created a new version of the platform using metaverse technology by integrating diverse social networks in 2020. The company plays the role of offering a platform to facilitate networking, and fans fill the metaverse with an enormous amount of content. It is not simply possible for one company to control and govern the massive amount of content created by international users daily. BTS’s metaverse Weverse illustrates a new model of business in the music and entertainment sector in current times. New technology, social networking, and metaverse do not always function to promote artists and strengthen fandom communities. In an interview, Choi shared her experience of withdrawing from ARMY due to transmedia. Choi: I once quit ARMY and then came back. That time I read a fanfic. When BTS uploaded a picture, fans wrote fiction using that picture. It was about things called BGP (business gay performance). I knew that it was fiction and some people made it for profits, but I was so shocked. Even though it is not true, I was surprised to see such things. I left ARMY. Wee: Fanfics describe intimate relationships because fans like bromance. People secretly enjoy it. These fanfics are popular. Besides fanfics, Bingeui (spiritual possession) writing is also popular. Writers pretend to be members of BTS and write stories. Some writers have over 20,000 followers. Choi’s experience demonstrates a downside of transmedia (Pratten 2015; Plessis 2019). A young girl of 15 was shocked by the overly explicit sexuality and discouraged by how fans commercialized transmedia. Some teenagers are critical of sensational products created by fans in transmedia. Some people like Choi quit the fan community, while others like Wee just accept it as a part of entertainment. Metaverse provides a playground for creating media content and establishing close relationships among fans, but it

78  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia may create conflicts and produce negative aspects like commercialization and sensationalism. Evolving Media Technology and BTS Fandom BTS has actively adopted new technology and adjusted to new media environments. The success of BTS demonstrates the changing mediascape at present when public media is no longer the prerequisite for becoming global celebrities. BTS has never appeared in public media in Europe and the US until recently, but it is recognized as one of the most influential bands by many in the American and British media. The global fame of BTS can be attributed to social networking and the use of social media. Since the band’s debut, BTS members have relied on social media for public relations and used the platform to share their music and details of their private lives with fans. The public media disregarded BTS because it was an obscure group managed by a small and minor agency. For the last three years, however, the value of this agency has grown, with its current market value estimated at 10 billion US dollars, making it the top player in the Korean stock market. BTS members became the most popular global stars among K-pop idols owing to social media. The use of social media by BTS evolved from simple networking to the creation of a metaverse. In the beginning, BTS employed social media such as V Live and YouTube to release their music and daily activities. BTS uses social media for sharing not only their music but also their everyday lives by releasing talk shows and making films on the training process, among others. Fans are attracted to the social media content from BTS, which includes intimate stories of the idols. Since BTS fans established the official fan club, ARMY, fans have emulated the band with their active use of social media. They use social media for not only receiving BTS content, but also creating content related to BTS. ARMY members launched Armypedia, which is like Wikipedia and allows any ARMY member to upload comments, information, and so on. With P2P and blockchain technology, BTS fans produce and share enormous amounts of UCC related to BTS. One photo of or remark by BTS can turn into thousands of fan fiction stories, drawings, and art works, which are circulated across diverse social media platforms globally. This transmedia storytelling consolidates the already strong fan community of BTS. The agency integrated the diverse social networking systems of BTS fans into a metaverse called Weverse. BTS is developing a new business model for contemporary entertainment by adopting new media technology. Social networking systems and transmedia are the basis of BTS’s popularity and the solidarity of its fan community. Yet, the new model is not without challenges. BTS is destined to face challenges in its experimentation with new technology. The commercialization and sensationalism of UCC in transmedia is too much for some fans. Sometimes, BTS becomes embroiled in political disputes because of the diversity of the BTS fan community, as was evident from the case of the Trump election

Social Media and Fandom Community: The Case of BTS  79 campaign in the US and the nationalist debate in Japan and China. Further challenges are expected as the BTS fandom keeps growing and becomes even more global. Notes 1 2 3 4

https://time.com/5912998/bts-army/ https://bts-weverse-trans.tumblr.com/ https://theqoo.net/bts/912319839 https://youtu.be/vGbuUFRdYqU

References Amos, C., Holmes, G., & Strutton, D. (2008). Exploring the relationship between celebrity endorser effects and advertising effectiveness: a quantitative synthesis of effect size. International Journal of Advertising, 27(2), 209–234. Basil, M.D. (1996). Identification as a mediator of celebrity effects. Journal of Broadcasting and Electronic Media, 40(4), 478–495. Cho, H., Cho, S., & Lee, K. (2018). Effects of star attributes on star’s satisfaction, trust, attitude and loyalty: focused on the Boy Band BTS. Journal of the Korea Entertainment Industry, 12(7), 3–17. Dredge, S. (2016). Blockchain: music without the middlemen. Music Ally. https:// musically.com/2016/05/12/can-blockchain-technology-really-fuel-music-withoutthe-middlemen/. Dutra, A., Tumasjan, A., & Welpe, I.M. (2018). Blockchain is changing how media and entertainment companies compete. MIT Sloan Management Review. https://sloanreview.mit. edu/article/blockchain-is-changing-how-media-and-entertainment-companies-compete/ Erdogan, B.Z. (1999). Celebrity endorsement: a literature review. Journal of Marketing Management, 15(3), 291–314. Hesse, H. (1919/1923). Demian. New York: Boni & Liveright. Jenkins, H. (2010). Transmedia storytelling and entertainment: an annotated syllabus. Journal of Media & Cultural Studies, 24, 943–958. doi:10.1080/10304312.2 010.510599 Jung, C. (2009). Red Book. New York: Philemon N & R. Koh, Y. (2018). Music industry using blockchain technology: trends and future prospects. Journal of Broadcast Engineering, 23(5), 701–713, 1226–7953. Lee, H. (2018). A successful case study of Hallyu (the Korean Wave) contents. Culture and Art, 12, 280–300. Lee, M. (2019). Brand marketing through transmedia storytelling: focusing on BTS’s branding strategy. Journal of the Korea Entertainment Industry, 13(3), 1–12. Marcus, O. (2016). Music on the Blockchain. London: Middlesex University. Oliver, R.L. (1999). Whence customer loyalty? Journal of Marketing, 63(5), 33–44. Plessis, C. (2019). Prosumer engagement through story-making in transmedia branding. International Journal of Cultural Studies, 22(1), 175–192. Pratten, R. (2015). Getting Started with Transmedia Storytelling: A Practical Guide for Beginners. Scott Valley: CreateSpace. Rogers, B. (2015). How the blockchain and VR can change the music industry. Cuepoint. https://medium.com/cuepoint/bc-a-fair-trade-music-format-virtual-realitythe-blockchain-76fc47699733.

80  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Sanchez, D. (2018). Why blockchain isn’t even close to fixing musicians’ problems. Digital Music News. https://www.digitalmusicnews.com/2018/05/16/ blockchain-streaming-music-choon/. Seo, I., et al. (2018). Boy Band BTS’s star attributes and their influences on star and fan community. Journal of Product Research, 36(5), 67–79. Wei, P.S., & Lu, H.P. (2013). An examination of the celebrity endorsements and online customer reviews influence female consumers’ shopping behavior. Computers in Human Behavior, 29(1), 193–201. Yoon, J. (2018). Top 10 blockchain industries in Korea by 2020. Startup Radar. http://startupradar.asia/top-10-industries-blockchain-industries-in-korea-by-2020/.

6

Emerging China as Global Superpower and International Tensions in East Asia

The current international conflicts between China and Korea reflect the transformation of the global power structure and changes in media environments. As a result of political disagreements between China and South Korea in 2016, Korean cultural products have been banned in China. Although it is initiated by governmental policy, the general public has taken the lead in the conflicts between China and Korea by boycotting Korean products and participating in anti-Hallyu protests. Also, the policy against Korean cultural products reflects anti-Hallyu (Korean Wave) sentiments that have been already widespread in China for a decade (Chen 2017). The international tension between Korea and China demonstrates the new role of the general public participating in international relations and cultural exchanges between nations. Digital platforms are the major tool for the public to participate in international conflicts between South Korea and China. Social media, especially, plays an important role in governing activities of the people as emerging agents (Puppis 2010; Karppinen & Moe 2011). The intensification of international conflicts and competitions among Asian countries demonstrates a new phase of global communication. Social media plays a key role for people to interact each other and to engage in political and intercultural issues. Changing global communication and the increasing role of public participations in international affairs turn the focus of study to the daily practice of ordinary people in their media use. In light of this, an ethnographic approach is attempted to illustrate new theoretical implication of social media and public participation in international issues. It highlights the changing pattern of media use that people employ while participating in intercultural interactions through digital platforms. Public Participation in International Communication and the Use of Social Media Chinese people who were once the most fervent fans of Hallyu started to turn their backs on South Korean culture. Growing conflicts in Asia demonstrate that public participation in international affairs using digital media leads to DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-8

82  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia further tensions. As for the current tension between South Korea and China, the Chinese government has officially denied any restriction against Korean cultural products.1 Chinese government officials continuously emphasize that there is no single institution prohibiting cultural interaction with explicit regulations. They claim that it is the public demands and reaction to Korean culture and policies that are important. It demonstrates that public participations take the lead, while monolithic control of regulatory bodies is largely hidden.2 General public participate in influencing Chinese policy against importing Korean cultural products while the government conceals visible hands of instigating political actions. Even Hallyu fans start to support Chinese cultural policy against Hallyu and give up their cultural preference. To explicate the complexity of public participation in international issues and use of social media, this study adopts post-structuralist theories. Foucauldian concept of power can be useful to examine the ambivalent nature of public participation in contemporary society. Foucault (1977) explains a new logic of power by empowering people instead of repressing them. Empowered people become active agents to participate in public matters, but at the same time they tend to conform to the dominant beliefs in the society by scheming their minds and bodies accordingly. The power/knowledge framework of Foucault explicates this ambivalent nature of public participations in cultural policy in the contemporary world. Foucault’s theory contributes to turning academic attention to daily behaviors of ordinary people which have been largely ignored in academic discussions. Additionally, theories of governance explain changing the focus of public policy from institutions to public participation (Barnet & Duval 2005; Antsell & Gash 2008; Beason 2011). This study turns the focus to ordinary practice of the people by looking into their use of media on the daily basis. China has been the primary importer of Korean media (KOCCA 2018) and Chinese fans of Korean media have been very active and passionate until the political dispute between the two countries occurred. The dispute was derived from the establishment of the THAAD (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) in a local area in South Korea, Songju. THAAD is an American anti-ballistic missile defense system that was deployed by the US military in Songju in 2016. While some Korean politicians and environmentalists as well as local farmers have demonstrations against THAAD deployment, China has been the strongest opposition party against the THAAD deployment in Korea. China has raised not only military concern but also privacy issues while arguing that THAAD installation would establish a constant surveillance system against Chinese people. As a result of the THAAD installation, most concerts of Korean idols and contracts of commercials with Korean actors have been canceled in China. The number of Chinese tourists in Korea decreased to 45.5% (Yeonhap News, May 1, 2017) in the first quarter of 2017, and this number has continued onward (Jungang Daily, Oct 4, 2018). Anti-Hallyu movement in

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  83 China derived Lotte Mart, a brand of Korean supermarket franchised in 90 cities in China, to shut down because of the boycott by Chinese customers who accused Lotte of selling its land to the Korean government to build up THAAD in Songju. There has been significant coverage of news reports and SNS contents with regard to conflicts and the violence of Chinese people protesting against Korean companies and damaging Korean stores and products. Although anti-Korean protests in China have diminished overtime, imports of Korean cultural products and tourism continue to ban in China for the last six years. Even if it is not a total ban, exports of Korean cultural products to China have decreased to 10% in 2017 compared to the amounts in 2016 and continue until recently according to statistics of the Korean government (KOCCA 2021). While the Korean government makes diplomatic attempts to relieve the ban against Korean cultural products, the Chinese government denies any of such policies against Korea, the so-called decree of the Korean wave ban (限韓令). Despite political contestations, some analysts argue that the Chinese government executes its policy over Korean media which has been planned and employed in a long run instead of simply a revenge against THAAD installation in 2016 (Lee 2018; Kim 2016). Korean media have been imported widely in China since the beginning when Korea started to globalizing its media contents at the end of 1990s. Korean dramas have been particularly popular since CCTV first broadcasted a Korean TV drama, What is Love, in 1997, and Jewelry Palace recorded the highest hit in China. It is argued that the outburst of the Korean wave in China can never happen without Chinese governmental support. While China attempted to adopt market economy and international culture since the open-door policy, China wanted to maintain the authority of the communist party and to control over liberalization to a certain degree. For this purpose, the Chinese government has emphasized the need of reviving Chinese culture while promoting economic development. Chinese media authority preferred Korean pop culture to Western or other Asian cultures because Korean media retain supposedly Confucian/Asian culture together with modern lifestyles (Jang 2012; Lee 2017; Tu 1991). The Korean drama, What is Love that CCTV first broadcasted, for example, portrays family values and Confucian virtues such as patriarchy, seniority, and family values in a fashion of modern melodrama and amusing comedy. Jewelry Palace is another example that emphasizes sacrifice and compliance to hierarchy and social norms in order to overcome difficulties and to improve social status by picturing a historical story of a heroine who was a slave at a royal court and became an emperor’s top medical officer. These dramas were popular in China while spreading the idea that Korean culture has preserved Asian values which are originally from China. Chinese audience in this study also makes the point that they want to revive Chinese traditional values that they have lost during the Cultural Revolution while watching Korean TV dramas.

84  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Additionally, the Chinese government attempted to mitigate the influence of Western culture after the open-door policy. The Chinese government tried to decrease the importation of Japanese and Taiwanese media which had been major programs on Chinese TV during the 1980s and 1990s. Chinese authority believes that these TV programs were more influenced by Western culture than Korean media (Yang 2012; Leung 2008). Additionally, since Korea began to increase media exports to foreign countries in the late 1990s by operating an aggressive policy, the price was relatively low, and rules and conditions of trade were flexible. Korean exporters tended to tolerate copyright violations of China at that time. Korean media became the majority on Chinese public TV stations in a decade. The price of programs has increased drastically and policy pressures such as copyright regulation frequently occurred. The Chinese government began to control the importation of Korean media since 2008, and Chinese Communication Commission (CCC) finally promulgated the quota of foreign media up to 25% and a restriction on releasing foreign programs during prime time in 2012.3 Additionally, CCC regulated the internet release of foreign dramas by changing the licensing system from the registration system in 2015 (KOCCA, 2017). As a result, releases of Korean dramas and TV programs on Chinese media have been significantly decreased. While emerging as a global superpower, China is developing an alternative international development plan known as Beijing Consensus, a new model of foreign policy to promote soft power, and international cooperation networks named the Belt and the Road strategy. Although these Chinese policies are aiming for building up alternatives against American global power, these policies give rise to international confrontations and ignite intercultural conflicts in various parts of Eastern Asia. The Chinese government currently supports producing national media products as a part of its cultural policy. Xi Jinping administration promotes a renaissance project for expanding Chinese soft power known as the Chinese dream in which cultural policy is an integral part of it (Lee, 2018). As a result of promoting soft power policy in China, the importation of Korean media has been slowed down (Kim 2016; Keane 2006; Lee 2017). Korean programs became localized in China. Majority of high-rated reality shows in China are remakes of Korean TV programs (Wang & Kim 2017). China transforms its media policy from importing Korean media to localizing it. The future of Chinese soft power policy aims to expand Chinese media and culture to the globe. It is not simply a short-term reaction to a political incident that China banned Korean media. It is rather a policy plan to enhance nationalist programs to promote Chinese dream and its soft power policy. The backgrounds of Chinese cultural policy and the emergence of Chinese global power explain the bases of current international conflicts between China and Korea.

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  85 Procedures of the Ethnographic Study An ethnographic study is conducted in China in order to draw theoretical implication from the pattern of using social media by the people. Ethnography is one of the most influential methods derived from Foucault’s theories. Ethnography entered a new stage by adopting Foucault’s theory and is considered one of the most salient research methods among Foucauldian ethnographers including Clifford (1988), Marsher, and Rabinow. They designate it as postmodern ethnography, which is different from the old one as a sub-discipline of anthropology. This new method of ethnography attempts to surmount the scientism of anthropology by scrutinizing the meaning-making process of normal people in their everyday lives. It applies Foucault’s frameworks of micropolitics and the new concept of power that is discursively formed by public participation and knowledge-making (Foucault 1989; Burchell et al. 1991). Referring to the method of post-modern ethnography, this study focuses on concrete practices of ordinary people participating in intercultural relations. By drawing upon theoretical implications from empirical research of Chinese audience, this study will contribute to building a new perspective to explain the changing structure of global communication and the use of media. As a part of ethnography, in-depth interviews and participatory observation were conducted in China. Additionally, textual analysis of Chinese TV and viewing patterns of Chinese audiences were observed. A fieldwork was conducted during 2018 in China by recruiting two groups of interview subjects; one that expressed anti-Hallyu attitudes; and the other that represented fans of Korean media and popular music (K-pop). Table 6.1 shows the demographic information of interview subjects in that groups 1, 3, and 4 are fans of Korean popular culture, whereas groups 2 and 5 are anti-Hallyu groups. Group 1, 2 are residents of Henan province, while 3, 4, 5 are Beijing residents. Beijing is a big city and the capital of China, whereas Henan province is one of the most remote and poor provinces in China, which provides a good contrast. Interview subjects are recruited by making announcement on K-pop fan sites in China. Some fans volunteered to participate in this research and gather other people by a snow bowling manner. Even a couple of fans contribute to recruiting anti-group in their workplaces and schools. Additionally, people in older generation are recruited with the assistance of the Korean Culture Center in Beijing. Table 6.1 illustrates that 34 females and 12 males participated in this study, while 38 were young teens or in their 20s, and 10 people were middleaged. This number reflects the pattern of the Korean media audience because Korean fans mostly consist of young females. Although 46 interview subjects do not represent the demographics of Chinese people, and thus it cannot be generalized, in-depth interviews and participatory observation can demonstrate important aspects of patterns of media use and motivations of public participations in cultural policy. A group interview with each group

86  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Table 6.1 Interview subjects ID

Gender

Age

Ethnicity

Economic Education status

Family

Group

TH SH DY DK MJ HG KJ YL YJ HK HY YN HN IM NK DE WY CW YH BM VC MK

Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Female Male Female Male Female Female Male

19 22 24 22 22 25 23 22 18 19 20 22 24 22 19 18 23 18 28 19 24 24

Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han Han

Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Low Middle Middle Middle Low Low Middle Low Low Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle Low

Student Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Undergraduate Undergraduate Undergraduate Graduate Graduate Graduate Undergraduate Undergraduate Graduate Undergraduate bachelor degree Graduate Undergraduate Undergraduate

F, M, S1 F, M F, M, S1 F, M, B1 F, M, B1, S1 F, M F, M F, M, B1 F, M, B1, S1 F, M, S1 F, M F, M F, M, S1 F, M F, M, B1 F, M F, M F, M, S1 4 F, M F, M F, M

1

SB LS YE SY JY NP

Female Male Male Female Male Female

22 24 23 19 19 20

Han Han Han Han Han Han

Low Middle Low Middle Middle Middle

Undergraduate Graduate Undergraduate Graduate Graduate Graduate

JK KT HS

Male Male Female

60 52 25

Han Han Han

Middle Middle Middle

Graduate Graduate Master degree

F, M F, M, S1 F, M, S1 F, M F, M F, M, GF, GM, S1, B1 3 3 F, M

HA KF JQ SW LW

Female Female Female Female Female

25 19 24 22 24

Man Han Man Han Han

Low Middle Middle Middle Middle

Bachelor degree Graduate Bachelor degree Graduate College degree

F, M F, M, S1 F, M M F, M, S1

LK KY LH JO TN

Female Female Female Female Female

50 55 50 38 70

Han Han Han Han Han

Middle Middle Middle Middle Middle

Bachelor degree Bachelor degree Bachelor degree Bachelor degree College degree

Husband, child F, M, H D, SL, GS F, M Son, DL, GD

4

WH RY JB LM TB

Male Male Female Female Female

32 45 31 24 28

Han Han Han Han Han

Low Low Low Low Low

Bachelor degree Bachelor degree Bachelor degree College degree Bachelor degree

F, M W, D F, M, S1, H F, M, H F, M, H

5

LS YR MJ JY

Male Male Female Female

25 36 24 24

Han Han Han Han

Middle Low Middle Middle

Bachelor degree Master degree Bachelor degree Bachelor degree

F, M, B1 F, M, B1, S1 F, M F, M

2

3

0

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  87 and individual interviews with each individual for two or three times were conducted. Each interview took about two hours. Interviews were designed in an unstructured and informal format, wherein the interviewer’s role was limited to listening to the statements of participants in order to hear people’s own voices and their description of motivations to participate in cultural policy and media use in their daily lives. Anti-Korean Sentiments and Social Media Since the political conflict between Korea and China in 2016, Korean fandom has decreased in China. An ethnographic study of international tensions between China and Korea demonstrates public participation of cultural policy and their use of social media. People in anti-groups were concerned about the invasion of Korean culture into China with its negative impacts on young people. Many of the people in the anti-groups support national pride and the Chinese dream (中國夢) while criticizing Hallyu in China. YE: We have been promoting cultural pride since the 18th communist party. As members of communism, we frequently have discussions about culture and art. Only the little ones are ignorant and follow the handsome stars. Idols can negatively influence these young ones. Like interviewer YE, people in anti-groups show their concern about the negative influence of Korean pop culture on young people. Many of them support the communist party and are proud of Chinese achievement. During interviews, young students share their experiences and engage in activities as members of the communist party such as attending regular meetings and study groups, managing the national flag, and distributing communist propaganda. Criticism of Korean media influences is frequently discussed in education sessions run by the communist party. People in anti-groups also have strong opinions with respect to current political issues including the deployment of THAAD in Korea. During interviews, young people in Henan province show the influence of communist propaganda to elevate national pride and the Chinese dream. Sometimes they change their minds from a pro- to an anti-Hallyu stance while participating in activities of the communist party. People in the anti-Hallyu group in this study all disclosed their support for anti-Korean activities practiced by Chinese people such as protests and boycotts as well as disapproval of Hallyu fandom both online and offline (Fisher 2006; Grote & Gbipkpe 2002). While these interviewees in the antigroup shared their experiences in boycotting Korean products and engaging in online debates against Korea, they argued that their activities were rational and legitimate for the purpose of maintaining national integrity. VC: We can see the whole picture of Korea now. I think since the Shanghai Expo in 2010, we found that Korean idols can negatively

88  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia affect young people in China… When we watch the news and hear of other people’s experiences in Korea, we realize that Koreans disrespect the Chinese and have too much pride. RY: The main motivation (of anti-Korea) is THAAD, but parents don’t accept their children being crazy about Korean pop culture… Koreans annoy the Chinese, while IT people disrespect the Chinese, even though Chinese IT has developed and become strong. TB: I thought Korean fans were lunatics during my school days. They always talked about Hallyu, followed Korean fashion, and wore makeup at a very young age. As interviewees stated, their attitudes are influenced by long-term life experiences instead of just a short-term political conflict. Some were concerned about the negative influences of Korean pop culture on young people, whereas others had life experiences involving cultural conflicts with Korean people through business or personal contacts. They even reflected back to the accident at the Shanghai Expo in 2010, in which tens of Chinese young people got hurt trying to meet the K-pop group, DBSK, at the Hall.4 This accident shocked the Chinese and is still frequently cited as an example of negative influence on young Chinese as interviewee VC stated. Interview subjects in anti-Korean groups are critical not only of Korea but also of Korean fans in China. During interviews, people in Group 5 showed a tendency to isolate their colleagues in the workplace who were Hallyu fans, even though they are grown up and middle-aged now. Although anti-Hallyu sentiments are intensified by a political incident, people in the anti-group have their life experiences as a reason to oppose Korea. During interviews, RY and LM share negative experiences with Korea in the workplace and schools, while VC has negative images of Korean on social media. Even though people in this study claim rationality of anti-Korean sentiments and activities, however, they did not support physical violence against Korean organizations such as damaging Lotte stores, Korean supermarkets, or destroying Korean products, as frequently portrayed in news reports. They point out that those destructive events are unusual and led by fenching, or angry youth (Yu 2007; Tu 2005), who are blindly mobilized by propaganda. Social media plays a significant role in spreading out anti-Hallyu sentiments. Interview subjects indicated that there are much debates on internet BBS (Bulletin Board System) regarding intercultural conflicts between Chinese and Korean people. During interviews, VC and RY state about their experiences in using SNS to share anti-Korean opinions. They are influenced by other people’s experiences who stay in Korea as students or workers. Chinese students studying in Korea actively participate in these online debates. Currently, Chinese students are major foreign students in Korea consisting of half of the total foreign students, and the number goes up to over 70,000 students in 2019.5 These students not only share their negative experiences in

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  89 Korea but also share Korean’s negative attitude toward China. Some Chinese students in Korea copy and translate negative comments written by Korean net users on Korean online sites, and upload on Chinese BBS sites. Chinese net users become furious of the negative attitudes of Korean net users toward China. During interviews, VC and others indicated these incidents. Increasing cultural and educational exchanges between China and Korea turn into intercultural tensions between people in the two nations. Social media became a channel to spread out frictions and intensify conflicts. Additionally, increasing business relations between Korea and China produce international tensions. China is the primary business partner for Korea and the major importer of Korean products. Business competitions between two countries create intercultural tensions. An interview subject, RY stated that he frequently read and wrote anti-Korean opinions in online chatting sites. Digital media plays a role of intensifying the anti-Korean sentiments as people widely share their experiences and opinions online. Social media serve as a means of spreading international conflicts more often than that of increasing mutual understandings. Cultural Consumption and Social Criticism Chinese people in anti-Korean groups view the fandom of Korean media and pop culture as superficial trend seekers and ignorant in social consciousness. During the interviews, the most frequently stated terms for Korean fans among anti-Hallyu groups were “crazy,” “lunatic,” and “mindless” people. Anti-Hallyu groups concern about the negative impacts of Korean pop culture on young people and women. However, the results of this ethnographic study demonstrate that Korean fans are motivated by social and political desires. Hallyu fandom among the middle-aged group shows the aspect of social aspiration in their choosing in Korean pop culture. KY: We are members of the fan club of the protagonist Shi-Hoo Park played in the Korean TV drama, Glory of Family. LK: Korea inherited Confucianism and Taoism. The drama showed the traditional family in Korea. We appreciate the Korean manner, and many of us watched the drama over a dozen times. TN: We Chinese also knew the Confucius manner and sense of honor but lost those things for a long time. Young people don’t know them, but Koreans inherited the tradition well. Middle-aged people who experienced both the Cultural Revolution under Mao and the new open-door policy that followed have social aspirations and their own ideas of development in a post-socialist country. They are critical of both the young generation and the political system. They are trying to find

90  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia an alternative to the Western capitalist system and to the old communist system that they experienced in order to develop a prosperous Chinese society. This social motivation drives them to be attracted to Korean media, which portrays honor and traditional ethics, along with economic development and a modern way of life, as in the drama Glory of Family illustrated as an example. In a group interview, LK and TN appreciate the values of tradition and honor that they find from a Korean drama. These people wish for economic development hand in hand with tradition while maintaining a cultural identity. Interview subjects easily identify traditions with ancient religions, Confucianism and Taoism though they did not elaborate religious ideas. For them, it is a name of cultural tradition and identity instead of religious belief of Confucianism and other religions. They appreciate the Korean model of economic development balancing with humanism or honor that TV shows consistently illustrate (Hong and Kim 2013; Iwabuchi 2010). Hallyu fans in China not only support their favorite celebrity but also organize diverse activities such as fan meetings, charity businesses, and help for members. Social media is the main conduit for them to organize such activities on behalf of their favorite idols. They interact with each other on a daily basis through social media and share their life stories together. They often pay money for underprivileged members in their fan groups and treat each other as family members. They mentioned that older members frequently make contributions to buy concert tickets for young members, and young ones offer physical care of senior members. During an interview, KY burst into tears while citing examples of how members of the fan club helped each other and developed communal spirits. Community activities and mutual interactions through social media are the key for them to maintain fandom communities among themselves. This is a way for them to practice their aspirations for social development in their own digital communities. Mundane activities such as viewing media, interacting with others through SNS, and organizing fan activities constitute cultural practices that ordinary citizens participate in their everyday lives. One of the most frequently stated reasons among young Hallyu fans for why they prefer Korean pop culture to Chinese media is creativity. All the young Korean fans stated that they prefer Korean pop culture because Korean programs are creative, while the Chinese ones are not. It may sound odd to find creativity in entertainment programs that are often criticized even domestically by Korean audiences because they are shallow. In-depth interviews disclosed that appreciation of entertainment is based on the social criticism of the media audience. YJ: Korean media can pick on the President, but it’s not possible in China. We Chinese have much fear. Do you also have censorship in Korea? HG: Korean media are fearless and criticize people in high positions, but we probably won’t see such things until we die here in China. Ha ha ha.

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  91 In a group interview with Korean fans in Henan province, YJ, HG demonstrate their cultural preferences derived from the perspective of freedom of speech. This implies that cultural preference is related to their political opinions and social criticism. It shows that Korean fandom is a reflection of social motivations to govern the society as the will of the public. The aspiration of Hallyu fans for freedom of speech is expressed in a form of their cultural preference, and social criticism demonstrates collective efforts to change society for the better. YJ: I like the Korean program, Entertainment Weekly. While the Chinese media does not directly expose scandals, Korean TV shows show every detail. YR: Korean TV programs are creative, while Chinese show monolithic themes like dramas. They mostly show the resistance against the Japanese, etc. The Chinese are not showing reality. LW: Even remakes look the same; they are just copies. We Korean fans know the problems. Chinese remakes are cheesy. They just show celebrities with no talent. These Hallyu fans appreciate creativity in entertainment and TV dramas because Korean programs express freedom with no strict censorship. This is a critical point of the Chinese audience against their own media and the political system. The popularity of Korean media, in fact, demonstrates the social consciousness of people and aspirations for social change. Because Hallyu fans are heavy users of digital media while avoiding watching public stations, they are aware of social backgrounds of Korean media by sharing information and having discussions among members through social media. They find meanings deeper than just entertainment contents and appreciate even gossip programs like Entertainment Weekly, which portrays celebrities’ activities and gossips, because of free expression with no censorship. These pro-Korean people develop ample discussions and exchange information with regard to Korean media and culture through social media. They come to praise creativity of Korean media after exchanging ideas on social media. Social media become more important in exchanging ideas and information among Hallyu fans in China since the political conflicts in 2016 than before. Due to the Korean wave ban, Korean TV programs became no longer available on public stations, and digital platforms of Korean media and pop culture have been mostly shut down in China. Nevertheless, DK stated during the interviews, Hallyu fans are able to find Korean programs on social media even though it is a little bit more difficult than before. It is Hallyu fans efforts to share Korean programs among themselves. Despite legal and social threats, they manage to enjoy their cultural preferences by forming collective activities and networking through social media. Social aspiration and criticism have been the main motivation for the Chinese audience in choosing their favorite media. Since China is in the transformation stage as a post-socialist country, social motivations of media use

92  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia play a stronger role compared to other countries. One of the Korean fans displayed a changing attitude toward Korea during an interview. TH: I felt that Korea was luxurious and unreachable before. Now, I feel it is close and normal. Before, it was not common to have a car, but now every family has a car, and Korean food is also easy to get. I can eat Bibimbab everywhere, even in the student cafeteria. Ha ha. Participant TH showed her feelings toward the Korean media, which has changed from a fantasy to the ordinary. Many fans shared similar experiences of when they were first attracted to Korean pop culture because of a fascination with the advancement of Korean society. This demonstrates that the popularity of Korean media in China is related to a desire for social development, and fandom is contingent on people’s aspirations for a better future. In this way, public motivations for and against Hallyu share a similar idea that constitute public participation in social issues. Chinese people tend to express their political opinions through cultural means such as enjoying entertainment, indulging in pop culture and sharing opinions through social media. Under the tight control of the communist party, Chinese people do not seek direct means to change politics such as massive protest and activism. Anti-Hallyu groups are critical of Korean fans because of disinterest in social issues and in promoting national integrity, whereas Hallyu fan groups are critical of anti-groups because of the blind acceptance of political propaganda and pressure against freedom of speech. Although each group degrades the other, both have a certain degree of social consciousness and political motivations in choosing their preferred media as interview result illustrates. Although the cultural choices between the two groups are quite contradictory, both are motivated by expressing their aspirations for the better society and participating in implementing cultural policy through mundane means they rely on. Rising Nationalism and Discursive Use of Social Media The most frequently cited statement among all groups in the interviews was “when it comes to the nation, there is no idol.” Although Chinese participants in this study have different opinions and evaluations of Korean popular culture, all agreed that the nation comes first in their cultural preferences. Obviously, people with an anti-Hallyu attitude strongly support this idea by criticizing Korean fandom and claiming the primacy of national interests, but strong Hallyu fans also agree to support patriotism before their favorite pop stars. LH: We frequently hear that there’s no idol before the nation. Patriotism is the most important thing. I now support him (Korean star) because he is my family.

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  93 NK: For me, I admire Dongbangshinki (DBSK, a Korean boy band) like a religion, but we must strike a balance between idols and patriotism. We don’t upload any news about idols on the sites when we have serious holidays and memorial days. We don’t talk about Hallyu with others involved in discussions these days. A middle-aged Korean fan living in Beijing, LK, stated how she evaluated patriotism over her cultural preference. Another strong fan in her 20s living in a province also explained how she maintains a balance between patriotism and fan activities. During interviews, all the Korean fans shared their experiences with direct or indirect criticism against their fandom and have sometimes received threats from Chinese people since the political dispute between Korea and China. Many of them have experienced direct criticism against their cultural preferences from family and close friends. In these situations, they avoid confronting others face to face and make efforts to adjust to new environments while continuing their fan activities, as LH and NK did. Even Hallyu fans respect patriotic motivations of people with anti-Hallyu attitudes. All the participants in this study support the government policy of Chinese dream, and are proud of economic development and global status of China that has been achieved in the last decade. Hallyu fan groups also have nationalistic attitudes equal to anti-Korean groups by saying that they are willing to give up their cultural preferences for patriotism. They prefer K-pop and Korean drama because they believe that there is no friction between K-pop and Chinese nationalism. However, pro- and anti-Hallyu groups have a distinctive interpretation of Chinese dream, and each is aspiring for national development differently. People in a pro-Hallyu group desire for liberty and cultural choice to enhance Chinese dream, whereas people in an anti-Hallyu group wish for social integration and expansion of Chinese power. Even though the two groups conceive social development separately, all support Chinese dream and soft power policy of Xi administration such as Beijing Consensus and the Belt and the Road which are Chinese models of international cooperation and development (Gries 2004; Kim 2016). People in both groups are ready to sacrifice their personal and cultural preferences for Chinese nationalism. Although Chinese people support nationalism and national policies, they practice it discursively instead of monolithic rule like bureaucratic institutions. As the result of interview illustrates, pro-Hallyu and anti-Hallyu aspire different dreams even though they equally supporting national policies and Chinese dream. People are often involved in public debates online BBS and criticize each other while supporting the same goal of nationalism. Social media open up the realm of public participation in social and political issues on a massive scale. People participate in creating contents on SNS and discursively engage in public discussions online.

94  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Discursive practices of public participation bring up paradoxical situations. Interview subjects in this study illustrated an example of this discursive practice of supporting governmental policies. HK: I am a member of a university dance group. Two months ago, we had a dance performance for a communist meeting. We danced accompanied by the BTS (Korean idols) song, “MIC drop.” There were about 300 communists, and the atmosphere was hot and fervent. The spectators probably did not know the tune was a Korean song. Anyway, whenever we perform, people are excited and zealous. When student meetings are organized to enhance nationalism and communist propaganda, they often use Korean tunes for dancing to excite the participants. After having a zealous debate on negative influences of Korean pop culture and THAAD issue in a discussion session, they used Korean pop music to excite student members of the communist party, ironically. This tendency illustrates discursive patterns of public participation in supporting governmental policies. Discursive practices of public participations give rise to ironic situations like HK stated; they use foreign culture to which they are exactly opposed in the course of promoting nationalism and protecting national culture. Additionally, people create their own meaning in nationalism and cultural identity in the cyberspace while using social media. WY: There is no relation between communism and Hallyu. There are many Hallyu fans among the members of the university communist party. If they enjoy themselves, it’s not a problem. As stated, WY supports the cultural preferences of individuals regardless of political positions and ideology as long as they keep to themselves. He is active in using social media and frequently advertise K-pop news on social media. In an individual interview, he shares his passion as a communist party member and his father is in a high position in the party. Still, he identifies himself as a Hallyu fan who enjoys K-pop. He was aware of the contradiction between Chinese nationalism in party policy and his choice of Hallyu fandom. He stated that he managed to maintain his cultural preference by keeping it to himself without announcing it in public. He maintains his cultural preference only online and actively engages in publicizing K-pop using anonymous ID in social media. The case of cultural conflicts between China and Korea demonstrates the ambivalent nature of public participation in cultural policy. People on one side are voluntarily participated in cultural conflicts by being active protestors against Korean products and protectors of Chinese dream while people on the other side maintain fandom of Korean media. Two sides of people are critical to each other by claiming legitimacy of their own side. Anti-Hallyu

Emerging China as Global Super Power and International Tensions  95 group criticize Korean fandom as superficial with no social consciousness, whereas Hallyu fans criticize the other as Fenching or angry mob blindly mobilized by the dominant ideology. However, anti- or pro-Hallyu sentiments are based on more complex motivations than one-sided denunciation. Both sides have social and political motivations albeit the different directions; one is toward national integrity while the other is toward freedom of speech, for example, as explained earlier. This ethnographic study discloses the complexity of the discursive formation and the knowledge-making process conducted by the public participation in cultural policy. Social media allows a space for people to practice their own versions of nationalism and social desires while engaging in debates with each other. Notes 1 In Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang’s regular press conference on November 21, 2016, he stated to the question: “It is said that China is tightening up its restrictions on the ROK by requiring Chinese TV stations not to air advertisements casting pop stars from the ROK. Can you confirm that? What is your comment on that? Does China take this move because of THAAD?” Geng Shueng: “First and foremost, I have never heard about any restriction on the ROK. Second, the Chinese side is always positive, with respect to peopleto-people and cultural exchanges with the ROK. However, I believe you can all understand that this type of exchange should be based on public support. Third, the Chinese side’s steadfast opposition to the deployment of THAAD by the US in the ROK is well known to all. The Chinese public has voiced their dissatisfaction, as well. Relevant parties must have taken note of that.” https://www.fmprc.gov. cn/web/fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1417148.shtml 2 Anti-Hallyu regulation is unclear. Although it may be that public agencies ordered this, there is no regulation or evidence. The government probably attempts to get away from being convicted by the WTO. Therefore, no one can find written evidence of releasing anti-Hallyu and reopening group tour programs in Sandong province, also, but it is known by statements of tourism companies. 刘水(2017 11.28). 游韩禁令松绑: 中国放行北京和山东团. 自由亚洲电台普通话 https:// www.rfa.org/mandarin/yataibaodao/junshiwaijiao/ko-11282017102406.html 3 China is allegedly easing restrictions over ROK, yet the market left for “Oppas” is much smaller than before. TMT Post. http://www.tmtpost.com/3302548.html 4 While Korean news announced the success of Korean events at Shanghai Expo 2010 by inviting DBSK and attracting 10 million people, Chinese people remembered it as a shocking accident that young Chinese teenagers fought each other in order to enter into the Korean Hall to meet DBSK. Chinese news reported the serious accident that over ten people were injured at the entrance of Korean Hall in Shanghai Expo. https://m.nocutnews.co.kr/news/709743 5 https://www.ajunews.com/view/20200205130621437

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96  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Beason, M. (2011). Globalization, governance and political economy of public policy reform in East Asia. Governance, 14(4), 481–502. Burchell, G., Gordon, C., & Miller, P. (Eds.). (1991). The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Chen, L. (2017). Emergence of the anti-Hallyu movement in China. Media, Culture & Society, 39(3), 374–390. Clifford, J. (1988). The Predicament of Culture. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fisher, F. (2006). Participatory governance as deliberative empowerment. American Review of Public Administration, 36(1), 19–40. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage. Foucault, M. (1989). Politics, Philosophy, Culture. New York: Routledge. Gries, P. (2004). China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: The University of California Press. Grote, J., & Gbipkpe, B. (Eds.). (2002). Participatory Governance. Opladen: Springer. Hong, S., & Kim, C. (2013). Surfing the Korean wave: a postcolonial critique of the mythologized middlebrow consumer culture in Asia. Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal, 16(1), 53–75. Iwabuchi, K. (2010). Globalization, East Asian media cultures and their publics. Asian Journal of Communication, 20(2), 197–212. Jang, S. (2012). The Korean wave and its implications for the Korea-China relationship. Journal of International and Area Studies, 19(2), 97–113. Karppinen, K & Moe, H. (2011). Media governance. In Loblich & Rudiger (Eds.), Communication and Media Policy in the Era of Internet. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Keane, M. (2006). Once were peripheral: creating media capacity in East Asia. Media, Culture & Society, 28(6), 835–855. Kim, H. (2016). Neo-sinocentric globalization through cultural soft power. Northeast Asian History, 57, 448–470. KOCCA (2017). Statistics of Korean Cultural Industries. Naju: KOCCA. KOCCA (2018). Statistics of Korean Cultural Industries. Naju: KOCCA. KOCCA (2021). Statistics of Korean Cultural Industries. Naju: KOCCA. Lee, C. (2017). Cultural policy and soft power in China: cultural strategy of the Belt and Road policy. Journal of Humanity, 43, 119–141. Lee, J. (2018). The study on the two views on the Korean wave. Chinese Studies, 65, 357–378. Leung, L. (2008). Mediating nationalism and modernity: the transnationalization of Korean dramas on Chinese (satellite) TV. In B. Chua & K. Iwabuchi (Eds.), East Asian Pop Culture: Analysing the Korean Wave. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, pp. 53–70. Puppis, M. (2010). Media governance: a new concept for the analysis of media policy and regulation. Communication, Culture & Critique, 3, 134–149. Tu, W. (1991). Cultural China: the periphery as the center. Daedalus, 120(2), 1–32. Tu Shiwen (2005, November 7). Real life of Angry Youth in China. Oriental Outlook, p. 1. Wang, S., & Kim, Y. (2017). A study on the history of Hallyu entertainment programs development in China – focusing on the programs since 2000. Discourse and Policy in Social Science, 10(2), 149–171. Yang, J. (2012). The Korean Wave (Hallyu) in East Asia: a comparison of Chinese, Japanese, and Taiwanese audiences who watch Korean TV dramas. Development and Society, 41(1), 103–147. Yu, Q. (2007, October 11). How far is ‘Angry Youth’ from patriotism. Theory Circle, p. 1.

7

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts between Japan and Korea

Although South Korea (Korea) and Japan have been in conflict for centuries, the relationship has recently become aggravated as historical issues are increasingly politicized. The international tensions between the two countries are exacerbated when citizens participate in political debates using social media as a reaction to political issues. During 2019 and 2020, imports of Japanese consumer products to Korea decreased by half because of boycotts by Korean consumers.1 This marks the first time that massive numbers of Koreans mobilized to boycott Japanese products. Even though antagonism between Korea and Japan has a long history due to frequent wars and the Japanese colonization of Korea from 1910 to 1945, it was not until 2019 that the Korean public engaged in organized boycotts in reaction to trade disputes between Korea and Japan. Such mass movements are mobilized by social media. The 2019 mass boycott was initiated by trade disputes between the countries when Japan eliminated Korea from the “white list” for trading three chemical products. Korean government argued that Japan banned exports of these products to Korea because the Korean Supreme Court ordered the Japanese government to compensate Koreans for forced labor provided under compulsion during the Japanese colonial period.2 The Japanese government has not officially recognized the Korean court decision. Even though Japan denies any connection between the court decision and the trade disputes, Koreans have criticized the Japanese trade policy against Korea. The Korean government appealed to the Japanese government to separate civilian court cases from trade issues. While the political authorities of the two nations remain in dispute, the Korean public initiated a boycott against Japanese products. As a consequence, Korean sales of Uniqlo (a Japanese attire brand) dropped 40% and imports of Japanese beers dropped 90%3 during the first year of the boycott. Korean people have been involved in civilian movements against Japanese colonial policies including protests against violations of human rights during Japanese colonialism, such as the conscription of comfort women, and forced labor (Min 2003; Hicks 1995; Lie 1997). These civilian protests DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-9

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Figure 7.1 No Japan Sticker on Social Media, the Boycott against Japanese Product

were not so massive in scale and tightly organized until the boycott against Japanese products in 2019. This large scale of boycott is made possible by social networking through new media technology. Boycotts against Japan are disseminated through social network services (SNS) such as Facebook, YouTube, and Instagram. Figure 7.1 illustrates the symbol of boycott against Japanese products in social media. People post about their protests and share it with other users on SNS throughout the country. People become participate in civilian movements and debating political issues more actively than ever before since the emergence of social media. In particular, people in East Asian countries such as Korea, Japan, and China participate in international affairs through social media because they have advanced technological infrastructures. China first organized boycotts against Korea in 2016 using social media due to international conflicts over THAAD (The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) installation in Korea, and later Korean people took the next lead by organizing boycotts against Japanese products in 2019. Technological development is assumed to facilitate open societies and democratic participation, as people transact with each other beyond local and national boundaries. Although technology connects people across national borders, it also provides a means of gathering people together within a nation and augmenting nationalism. When facing world crises and economic downturns, people tend to use social media to strengthen national unity and attack outsiders instead of opening boundaries to all. Through social media, ideological conflicts are often strengthened, and nationalism frequently acts to consolidate boundaries among nations.

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  99 New Media Technology and the Rise of Nationalism The augmentation of nationalist sentiments using new media technology is often called techno-nationalism. The term techno-nationalism was coined by Yoshimi (1999) while explaining a unique feature of Japanese nationalism. He examined the idea of Japanese national pride in the manufacture of electronic goods and export to the world during the 1980s and 1990s. The SONY Walkman was the symbol of cutting-edge technology and trendy culture at that time. Yoshimi argued that Japan focused on economic advancement and technological development in the last half of the 20th century to revive national pride and nationalism after being punished for war crimes committed during World War II. Additionally, Iwabuchi (2002) examined techno-nationalism in the context of Japanese pop culture trends such as animation and video games in the global market since the end of the 1990s. Iwabuchi elucidated the role of techno-nationalism in exporting Japanese soft power to the world when the Japanese economy started to decline and eventually to lose its prime position as a leader in electronic technological advancement. Techno-nationalism of Japan is advancing into a third phase, after the first and second phases described by Yoshimi and Iwabuchi, respectively. This new phase of techno-nationalism concentrates on the use of social media in the current decade. Current techno-nationalism is different from previous ones in that nationalist sentiments are outwardly expressed by the Japanese people. Techno-nationalism in the 1980s and the 1990s was different from now in a sense that people did not overtly express their nationalist sentiments. Before, it was indirect and hidden in a manner that Iwabuchi refers to as “no favor of the nation” or mukokuseki because they tend to hide Japanese traditions in cultural products and soft power. For example, there were no overtly nationalist culture meant to appeal to the world such as Pokemon and Miyazaki Hayao’s animations (Allen & Sakamoto 2006; Tezuka 2012). The third phase of techno-nationalism, in contrast, is led by right-wing nationalists who make outspoken public speeches against other nations and culture. The Japanese people are getting involved in protests against Korea on a larger scale than before. Social media mobilizes people participating in political protests, and international conflicts are ignited in both countries. Conservative protestors in Japan employ social media against Korea whenever diplomatic issues occur, further damaging the relationship between the two countries. In this way, social media aggravates the relationship between Korea and Japan instead of enhancing it. The Korean people are getting involved in international issues, and more people participated in protests against Japan. As the public participates in political debates using social media, ideological and political divides have become wider than ever before in Korea. The current political divide has become wider than even those under the harsh military regime in the 1970s

100  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia and the 1980s. Currently, people employ terms originating during colonial and cold war periods in order to attack others while calling the other party as pro-Japanese or pro-communist. Political conflicts and ideological cleavages are aggravated in the 21st century because of the widespread use of social media. Digital Platforms and Anti-Korea vs. Anti-Japan Speech It has been a couple of decades since social networking in digital media opened up international tensions between Japan and Korea. In Japan, Net 2 (Netto 2) or Channel 2 (2 ch) has been the major source of hate speech, particularly against Koreans and Korean immigrants in Japan. Discrimination against Koreans was a persistent social problem for several decades in Japan before social media became channels of hate speech. Although Japanese people are perceived as relatively homogenous in terms of race and ethnicity, Japan has encountered challenges of social integration due to maltreatment of ethnic groups such as the Ainu and Okinawans, the aboriginal people of Hokkaido and Okinawa, respectively (Gill 2018; Weiner 1994). These minority groups were swept from their homelands to make way for massive immigration from the main Japanese territory and to construct new planned cities. The Japanese government has made efforts to recoup historical debts to these aboriginal people, and to foster social integration of Japan as one nation. Korean immigrants in Japan are, on the contrary, exceptions to the Japanese policy of social integration because they are not recognized as a minor ethnic group, but as foreign residents. Korean people immigrated to Japan in large numbers as laborers during the colonial period of the early 20th century. After independence of Korea in 1945, half of the millions of Korean immigrants in Japan returned to Korea, while the other half remained (Itagaki 2015). Those who stayed have never recognized as Japanese citizens, and are accorded only foreign resident status. They are called Zainichi (在日) which simply means “residents” in Japanese; that said, the word mainly refers to Korean Japanese people and fosters targeting of Korean residents in Japan, who suffer from social discrimination and are treated as second class citizens with no legal status. In addition, Korean Japanese suffer from cultural prejudices, being stereotyped as inferior and dangerous people (Gill 2018; Lie 2008). North Korean descendants experience particularly serious discrimination (Ryang 1997). Social media and digital platforms ignite attacks against these Korean Japanese and encourage hate crimes against them. 2 ch was a main channel for planning and carrying out discrimination and hate crimes against Koreans. 2 ch was established in 1999 and became a major bulletin board system (BBS) in Japan, hosting a diverse group of over 400 discussion boards. It hosts 8 million users per day, and is the largest such BBS in Japan. Users are free to express their opinions anonymously and share their interests on topical networks (McLelland 2008; Sakamoto & Allen 2007). Among diverse sites

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  101 in 2 ch, such BBS including hangul (Korean language) threads became the foci of hate speech against Korea. Japanese users attack Koreans with slurs such as “kimchi eater” or “stinky hanbok” (Korean costume). North Korean descendants are likely to be targets of hate speech because they tend to use hanbok as high school uniforms, and maintain Korean curricula focused on Korean traditions. In Japan, 2 ch opened up the third phase of techno-nationalism and gave rise to a new stage of citizen activism. Unlike general attitudes of Japanese people who are known as being disinterested in politics and reserved in expressing opinions, many Japanese have started to engage anonymously in political debates and social issues on digital media since the opening of 2 ch. During the heyday of 2 ch, the number of boards grew up to 700, with boards such as “World History,” “East Asia news,” and “Hangul” functioning as networks of ethnic discrimination and hate against minorities and foreigners. 2 ch is seen as the initiator of techno-nationalism in the third phase distinctive from silent or mukokuseki nature of techno-nationalism in the first and the second phases. Public participation in political debates has gradually moved to social media such as YouTube and other social media channels later on. While 2 ch initiated citizen activism and the new techno-nationalism in Japan, citizen activism on social media became more conservative and aggressive after 2 ch was shut down. Since 2010, diverse right-wing networks or netto-uyo in social media have arisen. The reasons why social media tends to foster right-wing movements and techno-nationalism instead of social integration and global cooperation are a matter of debate. Some scholars explain trends of Japanese nationalism from the historical reasons (Sakamoto 2011; Dudden 2010). Japan has focused on economic development rather than national identity and nationalism since WWII due to the stigma of war crimes. Japan achieved fast economic development after the war and grew to be the second most advanced economy after the US in the 1980s. During this period, the Japanese people were devoted to economic achievement and dedicated to their jobs. Japanese people are well known for being loyal to the companies they work for, and are often portrayed as workaholics, with Japanese men putting their companies before their families, nation, and other social units. Loyalty to companies and economic development can be seen as one way that the Japanese expressed love for the country and sought to restore the glory of Japan during this period of time. However, the Japanese people started to seek new means of expressing their identities and nationalism when economic advancement decreased during the so-called bubble economy that has persisted since the end of the 1990s (Sakamoto 2011). The Japanese people no longer feel national pride in economic advancement, and regard companies out of their sense of loyalty. Sakamoto argued that the Japanese attempted to find other ways to express national pride. They started to form inner circles online in order to augment

102  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia national pride. Online nationalism increased in this period, and antagonism against other nations and other ethnic groups became widespread online. The third phase of techno-nationalism or online nationalism that arose in this period of time reflected changes in the Japanese economy and culture. The new Japanese cultural trend since 2000 is known as “cool Japan,” which indicates a switch of emphasis from hard power associated with manufacturing products such as cars and electronic goods to soft power (Ito et al. 2012). Japanese soft power, embodied in popular culture products such as animation, manga, and games, has drawn world attention since the turn of the 21st century. A unique Japanese pop culture genre known as Otaku culture spread worldwide along with this soft power, and inspired a unique subcultural fandom. Iwabuchi (2002) sees global Otaku as an expression of nostalgia for Western culture, and Morley and Robins (1995) consider it to represent techno-orientalism. Along with the globalization of Japanese pop culture and attention of global users, online nationalism has continued growing by enhancing subcultural movements online. During early 2000s, 2 ch was leading subcultural movements online. Despite being aggressive and discriminatory, 2 ch established a foundation for freedom of speech and the development of a subcultural space. 2 ch represents resistance against mass culture and mass media by opening up a space for public speech among net users. Kitada (2012) identifies nationalist speech on 2 ch with cynical nationalism, representing the “cool culture” of Japan. She contended that 2 ch encouraged subcultural movements by forming inner circles, and spread Otaku culture in this period. Even though 2 ch became a haven for hate speech, it has also represented the “cool Japan” and cultural trend over the last couple of decades. The new techno-nationalism spread through social media after 2 ch was shut down. New media technology and social media such as YouTube became the main network of online nationalism when PC-based BBS became less popular. Since the 2010s, online nationalism through social media has become integrated into political activities by merging with offline movements. Compared to previous online nationalism led by 2 ch that had subcultural characteristics limited to anonymous online activities, the current trends of online nationalism often lead to street demonstrations and outspoken political speeches. Current nationalist movements in Japan are different from movements in the previous decade that were a part of cool culture. Now, nationalist activities are much more organized and clearly ideological as opposed to subcultural activities of cool Japan in previous decades. This kind of new online nationalism have increasingly arisen since 2012 during the Abe administration. The Abe administration appeals to the nationalist and patriotic sentiments of the people by executing a new economic plan called “Abenomics”. Nationalism had negative connotations in Japan because of guilt and shame of Japanese imperialism and war crimes in the previous century. Abe elaborated a new concept of nationalism, known as

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  103 civic nationalism, inspired by the book Toward a Beautiful Country (Suzuki 2013), which described Japan as a model of democratic nationalism. Based on this new concept of nationalism, Abe tried to reconcile Japanese nationalism with liberalism. Abe rebranded Japanese nationalism while conglomerating liberal democracy and the market economy with national interests and national identity together. Japanese nationalism in the Abe era developed in a unique way compared to other countries in the world. The Abe administration is, on the one hand, cooperating with Western countries such as the US and nations in Western Europe to promote free trade and economic development. Abe government, on the other hand, engages in conflicts with neighboring countries such as Korea and China. The Japanese government frequently juxtaposes itself with Korea to portray itself as the ideal model of civic nationalism. With regard to the political issues between Japan and Korea, such as the series of kidnappings of Japanese people by North Korea in the 1970s and 1980s, territorial disputes regarding Dokdo (an island located midway between South Korea and Japan), and lawsuits of war crimes during Japanese colonialism such as the conscriptions of comfort women and forced labor, Abe often requests the Korean government to maintain rationality and trust between countries (Dudden 2010; Suzuki 2013). The Abe government presumed Korea as an emotional and frivolous country when it makes comments about diplomatic relations with regard to these political issues. Nationalist movements have increased in Japan under the Abe administration and often deployed hate speech against foreign countries and immigrants. Zaitokukai (Japanese citizens’ group advocating against privileges for ethnic Korean residents in Japan) is one of the most active organizations engaging in nationalist activities. It is an ultra right-wing nationalist organization devoted to attacking Koreans. Zaitokukai organized an attack against an elementary school for North Korean descendants in Kyoto, Japan (Focus 2013). Although the Japanese government denounces violence and illegal activities, nationalist movements become influencing the public policy of Japan. The Japanese government, for example, cut off funds for foreign schools and deprived Korean schools of public support in response to such movements. Japanese nationalist organizations weaponized social media while promoting discrimination against Koreans. YouTube users often posted comments against Korean people and culture by suggesting violent attacks or sometimes demanding calm and rational responses to the Korean people with regard to historical disputes. These comments echo Abe’s rebranded form of nationalism, namely civic nationalism, which positions Japan as a rational and civilized country as opposed to emotional and irrational Korea. These SNS users often proclaim Japan to be the savior of the Asian continent instead of a colonial invader in many parts of Asia. Korean net users also use social media to attack Japan as a competitor or enemy of Korean people. The relationship between Korea and Japan has been

104  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia increasingly aggravated because of the widespread use of social media. In Korea, major portal sites have served as networks of hate speech against Japan. Korean people express hate against Japan via portal sites such as Naver and Daum by making comments on news reports and BBS. These days, YouTube and other social media channels are increasingly used to express hate speech against Japan. More and more YouTube channels and podcasts feature nationalist contents, feeding a new popular genre called Kukpong (nation + heroin in Korean language) made up of ultra-nationalist user created content. Kukpong YouTubers and casters mainly attack Japan and China to praise the national pride of Korea. YouTube users on Kukpong sites express extreme hatred and violence against foreign countries. Social media becomes a means of augmenting emotional aggression and hate speech. Following this high tide of anti-Japan movements on social media, Korean net users organized large scale boycotts against Japanese products. Although the relationship between Korea and Japan has continued to be unfavorable for 70 years since the Korean independence, this kind of massive civic movement against Japan and boycotting occurred for the first time in 2019. Media technologies and the widespread use of social media drove Korean citizens to initiate boycotts, which resulted in major economic effects on international trade. K-Pop Fandom and Anti-Korean Sentiments in Japan Japan has continued to be the major importer of Korean cultural products, despite the unstable diplomatic relationship between the two countries. According to the recent annual report of content trade by the Korea Creative Contents Agency (KOCCA),4 65% of Korean music content was exported to Japan in the previous year. Japan is also the biggest importer of Korean TV shows, making up to 35% of the total exports of Korean cultural products. China was the second largest importer of Korean cultural products until 2016, but anti-Korean trends in China have caused Chinese imports of Korean cultural products to drop drastically. According to KOCCA, the amount of TV shows imported by China has decreased 90% since 2016. This is because of political disputes about THADD installation. China banned Korean cultural products in retaliation, though the Chinese government officially denies any policy against Korea. In contrast, Japan continues to be the largest importer of Korean media despite their diplomatic disputes. Even though Japan is a major importer of Korean cultural products or Hallyu, anti-Korean sentiments are rising in Japan. Particularly, political disputes against Korea were rising on a large scale in Japan when a member of K-pop group BTS wore a T-Shirt printed with an atomic explosion and Korean independence slogans in 2018 (Figure 7.2). It was spread through social media, and major news coverage and anti-Korean sentiments increased throughout Japan. As a consequence, BTS appearances on TV music shows were cancelled in 2018.

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  105

Figure 7.2 Atomic Bomb T-Shirt Worn by Jimin, a Member of K-Pop Group BTS

Since the atomic bombs that killed thousands of people in Hiroshima and Nagasaki represent major traumas of Japanese modern history, the Korean singer’s behavior stirred the Japanese people. Facing challenges from political dissents, Hallyu fans in Japan experience confusion and difficulties. This study attempts in-depth interviews with Hallyu fans and anti-Hallyu groups in order to examine cultural practices of ordinary people in the context of changes in international relations and the media use. As for Hallyu fans, I recruited particularly BTS fans among many Hallyu fans because BTS is currently most popular among Korean stars in Japan. Despite political controversy and antagonism against BTS, BTS fans maintain their passion and favor for their idols. As for anti-Hallyu groups, I conducted in-depth interviews with Japanese media audience members who are critical of Korea and Hallyu. I recruited interview subjects among ordinary media users who claim to be critical of Korea instead of ultra right-wing activists or members of anti-Korean organizations because the focus of study is cultural practices of ordinary people in changing political and social environments. Ideological swings and political activism are not the main subject of this study. Reactions of people in anti-Korean groups to cultural exchanges between the two countries and to current political and social conflicts demonstrate changes in social values and intercultural issues in Japan. Two age groups are examined, including five middle-aged BTS fans in their 40s and 50s, and six young fans in their teens and 20s to research the BTS fandom. Additionally, I recruited two groups of people, six young and two middle-aged, who are critical of the Korean wave to examine their reactions to political disputes and cultural exchanges. They do not claim to be particularly anti-Korean activists or to be right-wing nationalists, but are critical of Korean pop culture. The patterns of media use of these ordinary Japanese users, and their attitudes toward both Korean fans and right-wing nationalists, elucidate the political and social challenges that Japan is currently facing.

106  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Table 7.1  Interview participants5 K-pop fans (age, gender, occupation, home town)

Anti-Korean wave (age, gender, occupation, home town)

Young people

NN (18, F, student, Aisu P) AK (21, F, Student, Osaka) YO (21, F, Student, Chogo P) TK (21, F, Student, Osaka) HR (21, F, Student, Saga P) HN (14, F, student, Saga P)

Young people

NK (21, F, Student, Kunma P) SU (23, F, Student, Pusan P) MM (22, F, Student, Osaka) HK (22, M, Student, Osaka) MI (24, M, Student, Kyoto) DA (22, M, Student, Kyoto)

Middle age

SO (50, F, office worker, hj P) DN (40, F, office, Kyoto) WU (53, F, Office, Saga P) SH (47, F, Office, Chogo P) ER (47, F, Office, Rohynma P)

Middle age

AR (51, F, office, Tokyo) DK (39, F, homemaker, Osaka)

Table 7.1 describes the subjects interviewed for this study. They fall into two categories, K-pop fans and anti-Hallyu. K-pop fans are specifically BTS fans and are all members of BTS ARMY which is the official fan club of BTS. Anti-Korean wave participants are ordinary media audience who are critical of Korea and of Hallyu fandom. Each group consists of peers except for subject HN, who came to the interview with her mother, subject SH. K-pop fans were recruited by introduction and arrangement with an NGO, the international cultural exchange center (IEC) in Kyoto. Anti-Korean wave subjects were recruited with the help of a university in Kyoto since Japanese people do not usually express critical opinions in public and I experienced difficulty recruiting subjects for the anti-Korean sample. All interview subjects were residents of Osaka and surrounding provinces, and Kyoto districts. I chose these areas to examine the issue of cultural exchanges and intercultural conflicts, particularly with regard to the adoption of Korean pop culture in Japan. The Osaka area is located in Southern Japan, where many Korean Japanese and Korean immigrants reside. Since this part of the territory is easily accessible to the Korean peninsula by ship, immigrants have been transported in masse to Osaka and surrounding areas since the days of Japanese colonization. Because of the high population of Korean

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  107 immigrants, Osaka and surrounding areas became the main spots of cultural conflicts and nationalist movements against Korea. Although Kyoto (50 km from Osaka) is an old touristic town and the center of Japanese tradition and culture, hate crimes and right-wing protests frequently occur there as in the case of Zaitokukai’s attack on Kyoto Choseon Elementary School in 2009 illustrates. In-depth interviews were conducted both in groups and individually. Each participant engaged in a group interview as well as two or three separate meetings for individual interviews. Group interviews lasted about two hours and included a short survey of media use and demographic information. Individual interviews usually took one and a half hours. The locations for interviews were arranged by renting quiet local meeting rooms near participants’ homes. Interviews were conducted in Japanese and an interpreter accompanied the interviewer to ensure the inclusion of detail and nuance in the interviewees’ statements. Since we used spontaneous translation, time lag due to interpretation was minimal during interviews. Strong fandoms characterize Japanese popular culture. Otaku culture, which originated in the 1990s, is centered on dedication to pop idols, and spread worldwide in the 21st century through social media and digital platforms. In Korea, fans of pop culture call themselves Dukhoo, the Korean translation of Otaku. In other nations, dedication to certain pop genres and artists are also commonly referred to as Otaku. Although Otaku culture in Japan affects patterns of pop culture consumption throughout the world, it particularly characterizes strong fandoms of East Asian pop culture phenomena such as Japanese animation and Korean pop music. Such strong fandoms become enhanced as social media consolidates networking among fans of pop culture. Taking advantage of social media, the K-pop band BTS has consolidated a strong fandom worldwide. The official fan club of BTS is called ARMY. As indicated by the name, ARMY is strongly organized and aggressive, organizing fan activities to support their idols. There are about 1.5 million ARMY members in Korea, and 10–18 million worldwide.6 ARMY members are not only fond of BTS music but also organizing activities to support BTS. Japanese ARMY members are involved in strong fan activities among international ARMY groups. The uniqueness of Japanese ARMY lies in its diversity, with all ages included in its membership. While ARMY is made up mostly of young people in other nations, Japanese ARMY includes many middle-aged and older members who are equally passionate to support BTS. ARMY members express fascination with BTS in group interviews. YO: I like them because they are good at dancing and singing. They don’t have many scandals. They are from a small company Bighit. AK: BTS are professional. No scandals etc. I admire them. TK: Compared to Janis, BTS is high level in dancing. YO: Korean idols look staking their lives and high level compared to Japanese singers.

108  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia As these fans stated, ARMY fans appreciate their idols for more than just songs, but also their personality and attitudes. They feel close to the band as if they have a personal relationship with the band. This kind of unique relationship between idols and fans is possible through social media. BTS created diverse contents in social media besides songs which fans follow the activities of BTS by continuously connecting to social media. Although these fans are aware of marketing strategies to attract the audience, fans cooperate with the company to support their favorite idols. Middle-aged ARMY members are equally passionate in their support of their favorite idols during interviews. SO: We Japanese fans do not care about age. Koreans seem to care. We can be fans of singers 20 years younger than ourselves. EE: I think that’s Japanese idol culture. Age does not matter. SH: We (aged fans) buy many goods and CDs. We are able to spend much money on them. Middle-aged fans compare themselves with young people, and are proud of contributing to their idols and spending money to buy tickets and merchandise. They make frequent trips to Korea to go to BTS concerts and to participate in fan activities. In an individual interview, SO stated that her boss was surprised and asked, “Going again?” when she wanted to take days off to go to Korea to attend a BTS concert. In an interview, ER stated that her mother worried about her because she spent too much money on her idols instead of saving money. Despite these negative reactions, all members recognized the positive side of being a part of the BTS ARMY. Interviewees who were critical of Korea and Korean pop culture, on the other hand, demonstrated cynical attitudes about K-pop fandom. NK: They look like a cult. They so indulge in idols. MM: They put idols above their friends. They don’t even reply to us while uploading so many photos on Instagram. SU: Every day they upload something about Korea many times. MM: I hope they come back to this world. Come this world where we can talk about ordinary things. NK: They are often fascinated with just watching clips in Karaoke. They go to Karaoke just to see clips of K-pop stars. MI: I have many friends who are too devoted to games, anime etc. I think K-pop fans are the same. Young people in the anti-Korean group expressed criticism of K-pop fans, referring to fandoms as “cults” and fans as “abnormal people.” They are strong words considering that Japanese people do not usually express their feelings and accuse others. The main point of criticism is the emotional

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  109 devotion of K-pop fans. During a group interview, MI described K-pop fans as being in “another world”, and SU also described them as lunatics obsessed with watching video clips without singing at karaoke. These criticisms echo others made against Korea or Korean culture by Japanese new nationalists and political figures, identifying K-pop fans even with cultic and heretic activities. Although MI noted that K-pop fandom is similar to Otaku culture in Japan, most interviewees did not perceive K-pop fandom as part of Otaku culture, which represents the “cool culture” of Japan. During interviews, critical subjects described K-pop fandom as fervently noisy and emotional. Middle-aged anti-Korea interviewees were also critical of K-pop fans. In an interview, AR expressed antagonism against her mother-in-law and sisterin-law, who are fans of Korean dramas. She mentioned they only pursue superficial values. She described their appreciation of Korean celebrities (花やか or flower boys for male stars and かっこいい or glamor for female stars). AR despised valuing the physical appearance of flower boys and glamorous girls by Hallyu fans. While she considered herself to be open to international culture, AR stated that she prefers American pop music and Hollywood movies. She does not appreciate Korean pop culture as part of international culture. Another middle-aged respondent, DK, also presented herself as tolerant of others and open to international culture while preferring so-called high culture such as classical music and European cinema. She stated that she was not attracted to Korean drama or K-pop because they were patterned and cliché. She described Korean drama and songs as noisy and unrealistic. She also expressed criticism of K-pop fans, saying “they spend so much money on their idols which could be used for their boyfriends instead… they are usually single. They imitate 20 year old idols by wearing similar make-up and attire. Um…They are passionate people.” Since Japanese people do not generally express antagonism in a direct manner, DK described middle-aged K-pop fans as young and passionate, which actually means childish and too emotional. She presented a stereotype of old spinsters who were unrealistically obsessed with boy idols. This is an indirect criticism of Hallyu and its fans as childish and noisy. However, the critical respondents in this study did not support radical antiKorean movements organized by ultra right-wing conservatives. Interviewees often read comments by ultra-nationalists online and sometimes come across of street demonstrations, but stated that they had never participated in street demonstrations. During interviews, they made negative comments about ultra right-wing demonstrators. AR: They (nationalist demonstrators) are outsiders of society, just a few people. I think it’s a performance for promotion. They just do it for money or fame. We are not interested in talking about them. DK: I have worked around the Osaka consulate office, people had street demonstrations twice a week there. It was just too noisy.

110  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia We don’t often see them on the news. They are just scary people and we don’t want to be close to them, these high pitched noisy people. HK: We are not much interested in politics. Ninety percent of us have no interest. NK: When we watch TV news, just react um... to anti-Korean movements. The young generation has no interest. SU: We don’t learn about the negative side of history. Just a small number of people are anti Korean. MM: Only older people like my grandma have a bad image of Korea. These interviewees showed mixed feelings about the relationship between Korea and Japan. They were aware of the worsening relationship between the two countries through TV news and social media. Young people do not usually actively participate in social and political matters, believing that these are matters of the older generations. Middle-aged participants in this study, on the other hand, stated that anti-Korean movements and political protests are expressions of anger by extremists in Japanese society. While international conflicts between Korea and Japan continue igniting, Hallyu fans in Japan try to find a way to reconcile their cultural preferences with nationalist sentiments. During the third meeting with Yo, she expressed strong regret with regard to BTS member Jimin wearing a T-Shirt with an image of an atomic explosion. YO quietly stated, “To be honest, it was shocking to see him wearing such a T shirt.” In an interview, AK shared her experience of being attacked by others, saying “the couple that owns the convenience store where I work albeit (part-time job) asked me not to connect with dangerous people like BTS.” It is obvious that K-pop fans in Japan are challenged by nationalist sentiments and the behaviors of Korean artists. They expressed their feelings of confusion and the process of reconciliations at length during interviews. These reactions are quite contrary to the pattern of responses of Japanese interviewees who usually responded rather short and reserved. In a group interview, BTS ARMY members illustrated the patterns of fan activities of the Japanese ARMY, and examples of how they reacted to nationalist antagonism against BTS. YO: Korean Army are strong as a group and in cooperating whereas we Japanese are not as organized. AK: We do things individually. Buying tickets mainly. There are sometimes activities on Twitter and slogans etc. but we don’t communicate with the international ARMY much. YO: For the Tokyo Dome concert, because of the T shirt controversy, ARMY sent us a message not to respond to the media. Because the media can edit and distort messages, we responded with silence or meaningless answers. TK: I don’t participate on Twitter or in any group activities. When there was a lot of news about it (BTS T shirts), I avoided watching it.

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  111 As the statements above demonstrate, Japanese ARMY members are more individualistic compared to ARMY members in other countries. Regarding the atomic bomb T-Shirt, however, Japanese ARMY members developed organized activities to defend their idols against serious challenges spreading throughout Japanese society. They chose to disengage in conflicts with other people and in the media interviews. These fans avoided conversations and interactions with other people, refusing media interviews while attending the BTS concert. They tried to disengage in political disputes. HR pointed out that the T-shirt was given to BTS by a fan and therefore BTS band member Jimin had to wear it. In this way, ARMY members made efforts to separate politics from cultural matters and to legitimize the behaviors of their idols. Middle-aged members of BTS ARMY were more defensive about their favorite idols. Before interviews, they requested special arrangements from the IEC and would accept interview invitations only under the condition that they would not be asked any negative questions about BTS. Interviews were arranged to avoid any sensitive issues. These fans tend to address only the positive sides of being a part of ARMY and the support of people around them. During a group interview, SO and ER stated that their colleagues at work respected and praised them for being energetic and looking young. In an individual interview, SH also stated support of her husband who tried to analyze BTS songs that she listened to BTS CDs all day. Even though interviewees emphasized the positive reactions of family members and colleagues, the reactions of people neighboring these fans sound like the same points that the critical anti-Korea interviewees raised against K-pop fans. They indirectly spoke about K-pop fans as being emotional and superficial, just using positive language such as “passionate” and “young.” The passion and energy that colleagues of SO and ER ascribed to K-pop fandom are the same points that AR and DK in an anti-Korea group addressed negatively as childish and emotional as stated during previous interviews. Young people in the critical group also pointed out that the passion of K-pop fans is unrealistic and lunatic. Both young and middle-aged K-pop fans emphasized their devotion and contributions to their idols during interviews. These BTS ARMY members stated that spending money on tickets and BTS merchandise functioned to illustrate their passion and fandom. Many confessed that they had to make sacrifices in order to maintain their fandom. During the interview, SO stated that she had to sacrifice buying clothes or eating out with friends because she spent a large portion of her salary on concert tickets and BTS merchandise. Another middle-aged woman, ER, said that she had no savings because she made frequent trips to Korea and bought BTS tickets and merchandise, which worried her mother. Among young people, TK and HR stated that they work two albeit (part-time jobs) after school to support their BTS-related spending habits. Despite concerns about money, all experienced the positive side of being part of ARMY and showed willingness to make contributions to their favorite idols. However, the devotion and contribution of K-pop fans

112  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia to their idols are the points that people in anti-Korean groups raise criticism against K-pop fans. Anti-Korean respondents in this study denounced superficial values and emotional reactions of Hallyu fans which are opposed to civic nationalism and new values of Japanese society pursuing in changing political economic situations. Social Media, Techno-Fandom vs. Techno-Nationalism Social media is the main channel of K-pop fandom in Japan. K-pop fans participated in this study discussed the changing pattern of their media use since they joined BTS ARMY. They no longer consume public media such as watching TV while spending so much time with using social media for fan activities. Even though Japan is the top importer of Korean cultural products, ARMY members refrain from consuming public media because BTS does not often appear on TV shows or other public media. BTS has concentrated on employing social media to promote musical and other business activities since the debut. Accordingly, ARMY members mainly use social media to participate in fan activities and follow BTS schedules. ARMY members also engage in social networking among fans and being connected to their idol using social media. Moreover, social media become the major channel of anti-Korean movements in Japan. Social media bring in a new phase of techno-nationalism, and aggravate international tension between Japan and Korea. Unlike a hopeful vision of technological development for fostering social networks and democratic participation in theory, the current change of media environments and the expansion of social media use tend to bring up the growing rate of hate speech online and mobilization of hostile movements such as boycotts against products of another country. The current development of new media technology channels antagonism against others among users, and intensifies conflicts between Japan and Korea. Radical nationalists in both countries advance hate speech online, and social media make it easier to spread hate speech throughout the nation. Social media aggravate tensions instead of resolving misunderstandings, and foster the stereotyping of other cultures in Korea and Japan. Japanese respondents in the critical groups in this study mainly use social media to get information and express anti-Korean sentiments. They do not participate in offline protests and activities of anti-Korean organizations. During interviews, they stated ultra right-wing nationalists and antiKorean protesters as outsiders and extremists. These people in the critical groups expressed resentment about both fervent K-pop fans and right-wing nationalists. The main points of criticism against both K-pop fans and radical nationalists were identical in that they were noisy and emotional. The critical respondents in this study, on the one hand, consider the passion and loyalty of K-pop fans to be unrealistic and emotional. They view that K-pop fans

Techno-Nationalism and International Conflicts  113 are fervently following superficial values such as physical appearance and juvenile fashions. Interview subjects in critical groups, on the other hand, consider right-wing conservatives as noisy and annoying. Critical respondents stated that ultra-nationalists unrealistically express their political views through demonstrations likened to a performance on a stage. They perceive both K-pop fans and anti-Korean protests as outsiders of the general Japanese atmosphere. Despite the differences in expression exhibited by the two groups, both K-pop fans and radical nationalists are perceived as noisy and emotional instead of rational civilized by critical respondents in this study. These people view a new trend of Japanese values in current time as an extension of “cool Japan” (Ito et al. 2012; Iwabuchi 2002). These values evolved in civic nationalism and new identity of Japan in the context of changing social environments and international relations. Critical respondents portray K-pop fans and radical protests as the “other side” of civic and rational Japan that these critical people identify themselves with. K-pop fans also attempt to accommodate their cultural preferences in the context of rising nationalism and international tensions between Korea and Japan. BTS ARMY members in Japan, on the one hand, maintain a strong fandom by employing strategies such as avoiding conflicts and adhering to each other in their cultural community. In contrast to individualistic tendency in their private matters, Japanese K-pop fans made collective efforts to counter challenges against their favorite idols. Networking through social media become important for Japanese ARMY members to employ strategies for protecting their idols more than ever before. ARMY members, on the other hand, share a certain sentiment with ordinary Japanese people when international tensions between two countries are intensified. Especially, ARMY members were confused when BTS was accused by wearing atomic bomb T-Shirt and hurting historical trauma. Yet, they try to find a way of balancing between nationalist sentiments and their cultural preference. Complex reactions of K-pop fans to international tensions and strategies of social networking demonstrate a new role of social media in enhancing international communication and communal spirits among media users. Notes 1 2 3 4

https://www.joongang.co.kr/article/23811674#home https://m.yna.co.kr/view/AKR20190801160800073 The Korea Herald. August 7, 2019. https://www.kocca.kr/kocca/bbs/view/B0158948/1842698.do?searchCnd=&sea rchWrd=&cateTp1=&cateTp2=&useYn=&menuNo=204156&categorys=0&s ubcate=0&cateCode=&type=&instNo=0&questionTp=&ufSetting=&recovery =&option1=&option2=&year=&morePage=&qtp=&domainId=&sortCode=& pageIndex=1 5 F = female, M = male, P = province. Names are pseudonym. 6 https://edition.cnn.com/2019/10/12/asia/bts-fandom-army-intl-hnk/index.html, https://jmagazine.joins.com/forbes/view/335936

114  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia References Allen, M., & Sakamoto, R. (2006). Popular Culture, Globalization and Japan. London: Routledge. Dudden, A. (2010). Memories and aporias in the Japan-Korea relationship. The AsiaPacific Journal Japan Focus, 8, 14–13. Focus (2013). Rise of hate speech in Japan. Focus, 74, 1–6. Gill, T. (2018). The nativist Backlash: exploring the roots of the action conservative movement. Social Science Japan Journal, 21(2), 175–192. Hicks, G. (1995). The Comfort Women: Japan’s Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War. New York: Norton. Itagaki, R. (2015). The anatomy of Korea-phobia in Japan. Japanese Studies, 35(1), 49–66. doi:10.1080/10371397.2015.1007496. Ito, M., et al. (2012). Fandom Unbound: Otaku Culture in a Connected World. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Iwabuchi, K. (2002). Recentering Globalisation: Popular Culture and Japanese Transnationalism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Kitada, A. (2012). Japan’s cynical nationalism. In M. Ito, et al. (Eds.), Fandom Unbound. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 68–84. Lie, J. (1997). The state as a pimp: prostitution and the patriarchal state in Japan in the 1940s. Sociological Quarterly, 38(2), 251–263. McLelland, M. (2008). ‘Race’ on the Japanese internet: discussing Korea and Koreans on 2-Channeru. New Media Society, 10(6), 811–829. Min, P. (2003). ‘Korean “comfort women”: the intersection of colonial power gender, and class. Gender & Society. 17(6), 938–957. Morley, D., & Robins, K. (1995). Spaces of Identities: Global Media, Electronic Landscapes and Cultural Boundaries. London: Routledge. Ryang, S. (1997). North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. Sakamoto, R. (2011) ‘Koreans, go home!’ Internet nationalism in contemporary Japan as a digitally mediated subculture. The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, 9(10), 2. Sakamoto, R., & Allen, M. (2007). Hating the Korean wave comic books: a sign of new nationalism in Japan? The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus, 5(10), 1‒16. Suzuki, T. (2013). The re-branding of Abe nationalism: global perspectives on Japan. The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus, 11(28), 1–10. Tezuka, Y. (2012). Japanese Cinema Goes Global. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Weiner, M. (1994). Race and Migration in Imperial Japan. London: Routledge. Yoshimi, S. (1999). Home electrification in postwar Japan. Media, Culture and Society, 21(2), 149–171.

8

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics Hallyu and Anti-Hallyu in Taiwan

Taiwan has been one of the major importers of Korean cultural products among Asian countries since the beginning of the Korean wave. In fact, Taiwan was the first to use the term Hallyu (韓流, Korean wave) outside of Korea. Despite controversy regarding the origin of the term, Hallyu was first used by Taiwan media in 1997,1 even before mainland China (PRC), which was believed to be the inventor of the term (Hong & Lim 2018). Additionally, Taiwan is currently the second largest importer of Korean media, comprising 10% of total exports of Korean media. The PRC was the second largest importer of Korean media until 2016, after which it shrank to 2% from 30% due to the THAAD2 dispute between Korea and China (KOCCA 2021). Compared to PRC, Taiwan has been a more stable partner in exchanging cultural products with Korea. Taiwan is, on the other hand, an initiator of anti-Hallyu movements. Since 2002, Taiwanese people have been involved in anti-Korea and anti-Hallyu movements (Hwang 2018; Chen 2017). Anti-Hallyu movements in Taiwan emerged at the time when Korean media had just started to be globalized and Hallyu was still in its infancy. Although PRC currently hosts the most antiHallyu movements due to the THAAD dispute, Taiwan initiated anti-Hallyu movements among other Asian countries. Taiwan continues to spread these sentiments even though strong Korean media and K-pop fandoms persist among its population. The double faces of Taiwan’s reaction to Korean pop culture reflect the complexity of Taiwan’s cultural orientations and identity issues. Despite its minute size in terms of geography and global power, Taiwan engages in international and intercultural issues relating to many parts of the world. The international relations of Taiwan depend on the relationship with mainland China, known as cross-strait relations or China-Taiwan relations (Lee & Lim 2009; Wu 2004). The unstable status of Taiwan as a nation has made social and cultural matters involving Taiwan complicated. Cross-strait relations do not only affect political agendas but also cultural and social matters in Taiwan. This chapter explores the complexity of international and intercultural issues in Taiwan, and identity politics of Taiwanese people. In addition to DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-10

116  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia current political disputes between Taiwan and mainland China in cross-strait relations, the historical legacy of Japanese colonization, competition with Korea and other newly advanced Asian economies, and support for Hong Kong’s democratic movements give rise to challenges in Taiwanese society. Moreover, conflicting interests among Taiwan’s five quasi-ethnic groups burden Taiwanese society with the tasks of social integration. This research elucidates the international communication and identity politics of Taiwan by highlighting the reception of Korean pop culture in Taiwan. In-depth research among Taiwanese media users is conducted by comparing Taiwanese people in groups of K-pop fandom and anti-Hallyu movements. Korean Wave and Identity Politics in Taiwan Research Procedure

Taiwan has been open to foreign media and culture, and internationalization has been the basis of Taiwan’s cultural policy. Accordingly, Taiwan is open to the Korean wave and has strong Korean fandoms among all ages. At the same time, Taiwan has initiated anti-Hallyu movements. To examine this dualistic trend and its implication to identity politics of Taiwan, in-depth interviews were conducted by recruiting two groups of respondents; fans of Korean pop culture and anti-Korea respondents. Each group included young and middle-aged people. In-depth interviews and participatory observation of media consumption were conducted in order to examine the motivations and major activities of pro- and anti-Korean movements. The results of this study illustrate challenges and opportunities of identity politics and intercultural communication in Taiwanese society. The demographics of interview subjects are described in Table 8.1. It demonstrates that young females comprise the majority of K-pop fans. Since Kpop is made up mostly of idol band music, young people tend to like K-pop even though older generations are also familiar with some Korean songs since these songs are frequently used as background music in stores and on the street, as well as broadcast on public media. Mostly young females, including five in their 20s and three in their teens participated in this study, while two middle-aged women also participated in the study. Anti-Korean groups, on the other hand, consisted of approximately equal numbers of male and female and young and older people. Many people in the anti-Korean group are sports fans and businessmen, and shared their experiences in these activities during interviews. The young K-pop fans in this study are particularly members of BTS ARMY which is the official fan club of BTS. I recruited BTS ARMY members because they are the most active in K-pop fan activities, and currently make up the largest number of K-pop fans. Participants were recruited by posting announcements on fan sites with the help of language interpreters in Taiwan. Interview subjects among K-pop fans positively responded to the invitation

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  117 Table 8.1  Interview subjects K-pop fans

ID (age, female/ male)

Anti-Korean group ID (age, female/ male)

Young

KS (25, F) JW (25, F) LH (22, F) JO (21, F) HW (19, F) JS (24, F) LM (14, F) LY (13, F)

Young

OD (27, M) AH (31, M) SM (25, F)

Middle age

CJ (43, F) HC (51, F)

Middle age

AY (50, F) JE (50, F) PS (52, M) CS (59, F)

and participate in interviews of this study. Among the anti-Korean groups, by contrast, individuals were less willing to participate in the study when we concentrated on contacting people who posted anti-Korea comments on Facebook and Twitter. Thus, I needed a help and a local university assisted me to recruit interview subjects using a snowballing method. All interview subjects voluntarily participated in this study without compensation or reward. Interview subjects first participated in one group interview and then two or three individual interviews. The group interview lasted about two hours, including a short survey asking about demographic information and media use. Individual interviews lasted one or two hours depending on the participants. In addition to in-depth interviews, I visited fan sites and observed their activities, sometimes participating in group chats. All interviews are conducted face-to-face in Taipei between October 2019 and February 2020. An interpreter accompanied the interviewer to each meeting. Participatory observation continued for another four months using SNS and internet. K-Pop Fandom and Cultural Communities During interviews, members of BTS ARMY shared their feelings toward their idols. Their primary reason for being attracted to BTS is stated that the idol members are good looking. LY: I like them. Members are good looking. Ha ha. LH: At first, we are attracted by good looks, but find songs, performance as well as looks are all good. CJ: Taiwan singers are not good looking, just have good voices. HC: We don’t need to watch TV or video to listen to songs. We have to watch K-pop because looks and performance are important.

118  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia As stated, all ARMY members praised the good looks of K-pop singers as the main point of attraction regardless the age of interviewees. They become appreciative performance and songs after being attracted to looking as LY and LH stated. They compare BTS with local singers and choose BTS as their favorite idols like CJ and HC. BTS fans valued the unique communication skills of BTS, and this was the main reason for their fandom by making a comparison with other Kpop singers and Taiwanese singers. All interview subjects appreciated BTS’s “fan service” which enables them to directly communicate with the singers through social media as JS and LH stated. JS: I feel healing and like to have a conversation with BTS. BTS are good at fan service. They are good at communicating through SNS and connecting to fans through Twitter even during the break. LH: They are good at fan service. K-pop stars appear on TV reality shows and give us the impression that they are kind people. During interviews, these ARMY members talked about fan services much more than they talked about music by illustrating episodes during which BTS members appeared on video clips and media. BTS has employed social media as the main channel. BTS members have shared their everyday lives with fans by making live videos and SNS posts since their debut. The members of BTS employ social media as a main target of marketing and maintain Bangtan TV on YouTube and V Live on Naver, which is the dominant portal in Korea (Lee 2018). As a result, BTS is able to attract more viewers and followers on social media than any other K-pop groups. This new method of PR using social media is the secret of BTS’s success in becoming global celebrities. This method is sometimes referred to as “360-degree marketing”, in which singers share everything, not only their art, but also their private lives in public (Radbill 2012; Lee 2018). BTS has developed this method of 360-degree marketing by sharing their private lives for virtually 24 hours per day. BTS ARMY also work equally hard to support their idols by engaging in communication with idols and other fans using social media. It might not be an exaggeration that both artists and fans are involved in intensive labor in this era of network society using social media, even more so than factory workers in previous eras. This new model of entertainment business brings up questions of labor-intensive artistry and privacy issues in the age of social media. Using social media, BTS ARMY members develop special relationships with their idols. Fans are significantly affected by BTS and feel that their life’s meaning becomes connected to the singers. JW: (They sing about) young people’s stories. When I am constantly studying and sometimes I am tired, I feel lost and don’t know what I

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  119 am doing. The song Tomorrow says the same thing. I feel that I am not alone. They are also struggling. We have common feelings. JO: When I took the exam to enter the university, I was stressed out. I listened to Tomorrow, and I believed I could do it and was no longer afraid of failure. Tomorrow’s lyrics tell me that every day is the same; going to school and back home, but I can find my own meaning in my life. When I was just 18, I was scared about the future, just studying and studying and I did not know why I had to do it… Later, my family heard that I entered this university and their reaction was not good. “Don’t you feel shame?” they said to me. Now, I indulge in BTS and when I have time, I study the Korean language for them. The interview subjects shared their life stories while talking about their idols in the interviews. Their fandom lies in a deeper meaning than just cultural preference and physical attraction. They find meaning in life by sharing their everyday life with their favorite singers and with other fan members using social media. Under high pressure for success in studying and exams, and sometimes harsh discipline and criticism from parents and teachers, they feel empowered by the support of BTS and the messages of BTS songs. Subject JW stated that she recovered strength and emotional sympathy by listening to BTS. JO shared the story of her failure in the entrance exam to the university and criticism by her parents. During the interview, she stated that BTS was the only comfort for her in those days of hardship. For these ARMY members, BTS is an ideal model for young people that gives them strength to get through hardships in life. For them, BTS is not simply a music band, but a role model of young people. They are empowered by BTS and grown up together. Although Taiwan is tolerant of other cultures and pursues multiculturalism, however, more and more Taiwanese people have negative attitudes toward Korean culture and the popularity of Hallyu. BTS ARMY members stated that they experienced difficulties because of criticism from people with anti-Hallyu attitudes. JW: People think K-pop fans are crazy. They (friends) may think I am a bit crazy. I try to introduce them BTS songs and let them like the music themselves. JO: My parents think (K-POP) fans are crazy, and say to me, “don’t be like them. They waste their time. Idols don’t know why you are waiting (at the airport).” LM: I am very passionate about my idols. My friends thought I looked stupid, now they are accustomed to my behavior. Ha ha. Young BTS ARMY members suffer from the stigma of K-pop fans being seen as stupid and crazy. Sometimes when they meet anti-Hallyu attitudes, they

120  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia try to change minds of their friends, as described by JW and LM. Sometimes they passively listen to other people’s negative reactions like JO, especially when parents and adults criticize them. K-pop fans in older generations encounter even further negative reactions from people around them. HC: I sometimes have conflicts with my husband. He does not understand why I go to Korea to attend a concert. CJ: My husband doesn’t understand why I spend so much money on fan meetings. HC: People think K-pop fans are otaku because K-pop fans engage in so many activities. Since singers communicate with fans and offer fan service, we think we should correspond with them (singers) by buying goods, having cheer events, and going to concerts. CJ: Since we watch them so often, we feel like they are family. During a group interview, middle-aged BTS ARMY members CJ and HC shared their experiences of trouble with husbands due to their fan activities. Since older people are more often critical of K-pop fans than young ones, having a negative image of Hallyu and Korean pop culture, K-pop fans in the older generation experience more difficulties and troubles than fans in the younger generation. Both CJ and HC continue to support BTS and take parts in fan activities despite trouble with their husbands, who are not sympathetic to wives’ cultural preference. These ARMY members defend BTS treating them as family members by being strongly connected to each other. As interview statements of these ARMY members demonstrate, K-pop fandom is a strong part of their identity. It is more than just a cultural taste or attraction to appearance in that they devote enormous time and energy to support their favorite idols. Additionally, these fans not only consume cultural products as given, but also participate in creating contents through social media. Some people create their own products such as drawings and crafts making out of BTS photos. During interviews, JW and JS shared their drawings and short stories with me that they put on the Facebook fan site. BTS ARMY members participate in creating contents and sharing it with other members in the fan site on the daily basis. They consolidate a cultural community of fandom by engaging in diverse activities in social media. Anti-Hallyu Sentiments and Identity Politics Criticism against K-pop fandom and anti-Hallyu sentiments are currently growing in Taiwan society. Anti-Hallyu respondents in this study expressed their concern about and criticism against Korean cultural influence. CS: I am concerned about the influence of Korean culture on young people. They imitate fashion and make-up trends. Luckily my daughter

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  121 is not interested in Korea, but if you go around campus areas, the young people look all the same, same fashion and same makeup, and they dance and sing the same Korean songs. All the same. They lose their identity. Middle-aged subject CS expressed her concern about the negative influence of Korean pop culture on young Taiwanese people. The negative image of Korea that CS describes involves superficial values of appearance and imitations of Korean fashion. Taiwanese people often have a preconception that Korea is a kingdom of plastic surgery and Korean people only pursue physical beauties. CS’s criticism is based on her concern about lost identity among young Taiwanese people. In this way, the trend of anti-Hallyu sentiments in Taiwan is related to struggles with identity politics in Taiwan. Interview respondents in this study stated that they want to establish the national identity of Taiwan with no interference with foreign cultures. Taiwan has continued to face problems of ethnic tensions and international conflicts in modern history. Domestically, Taiwan has experienced ethnic tensions among its five different cultural groups. These five groups are not all ethnically distinctive, but have historically been set apart from each other. The population is divided into mainlanders (外省), Minnam (本省 or 閩南), Hakka (客家), foreign immigrants, and aboriginals (原住民) (Chang 2019; Kim 2015). Mainlanders who came to Taiwan after defeat by Mao’s army in the civil war built the nation led by Jiang and have been the mainstream of Taiwanese society.3 Although 97% of the total population of Taiwan is ethnically Han Chinese, including Minnam, Hokka, and mainlanders, Minnam and Hokka have historically been discriminated against by mainlanders (Shih & Thomson 2008; Shih & Liao 2015). Civil movements and DPP’s (Democratic Progressive Party) main policy have been targeted against the privileges of mainlanders and authority of KMT (Chinese nationalist Party) (Lee & William 2014; Trojnar 2012). These democratic movements have gone hand in hand with indigenization policy in Taiwan, which is aimed recovering the rights of minority groups, particularly Minnam. Since the 1990s, identity politics and intercultural issues have emerged as the main issues in Taiwanese politics and social matters. Identity politics began when Lee Teng-hui became the president of Taiwan, becoming the first Minnam or Taiwan-born citizen to be president. Indigenization is the main cultural policy used by Lee to promote the national identity of Taiwan. According to a survey in 1993, 28.55% of people identified themselves as Taiwanese, while 36.2% saw themselves as simultaneously Taiwanese and Chinese. In 1991, the percentages were 13.5% and 73.2%, respectively (Wu 2004; Wachman 1994). This shows that the number of people identifying themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese decreased significantly to 36.2% from 73.2%. Identity politics were reinforced when  Chen Shui-bian succeeded in the power transition to the ruling party of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), defeating the Kuomintang (KMT) for the first time in 2000.

122  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia As the most recent election in 2020 illustrated, identity politics of Taiwan and its relationship with mainland China are still the main political and social issues. Along with identity politics, multiculturalism and social integration have been emphasized by governmental policy (Cheng et al. 2009; Jacobs & Kang 2018). Media have been employed to foster multiculturalism, and 60 channels were established to show cultural diversity in 1994 (Fell 2005; Hsu 2012). Currently, hundreds of TV channels address ethnic diversity in the languages of each ethnic group. Taiwanese media users accept global media products in this social environment of cultural diversity and globalization. Taiwan’s media audience has been open to Hollywood and Western media, and Japanese pop culture has been popular since the 1980s and 1990s. Since the 2000s, Korean media became a new cultural trend as Hallyu in Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the major importers of Korean media, and K-pop is popular among young Taiwanese people. Korean dramas are consistently popular on regular TV channels. The popularity of Korean pop culture is due to Taiwanese multiculturalism and global communication. As the international status of Taiwan and economic development have recently advanced, people in Taiwan express growing demands for rebuilding national identity. In addition, facing with the growing threat of mainland China, Taiwanese people search for a new model of consolidating national identity (Lin 2019; Blanchard & Hickey 2012). In these changing environments, Taiwanese people are alert to invasion of foreign culture in Taiwan. More and more people become critical of Korean pop culture because it is known as superficial and commercialized. Among anti-Hallyu groups, young people specifically address criticism against Korea and Korean culture. SM: Negative images of Korea come from sports matches. We think Koreans are not fair and that we should beat them. Taiwan and Korea have been rivals in sports and IT, etc. AY: Anti-Hallyu comes from sports games. Korean soccer teams often show Hollywood actions. A few years ago, a Korean player cheated and then fell down on purpose to avoid a foul during a basketball game. Taiwanese people perceive that Koreans are cheaters. AH: Korea is economically competitive with Taiwan. Samsung and TSMC, etc. Korean companies steal customers by offering low prices. We are competitors and should keep our distance. We think Koreans are not fair in competition. The business conduct of Koreans is dirty. Taiwanese company TSMC beat Samsung. It is the best company in IT (information technology). During interviews, many people in the anti-Hallyu group mentioned sports matches between Korea and Taiwan. They stated that Korean teams were not

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  123 fair in play and often cheated. Interviewees stated that sports competitions between Korea and Taiwan are highlighted by the media and dominate news coverage in Taiwan. Additionally, business relations were often brought up during the interviews. Interviewees agreed that Korean businessmen are not fair. During an individual interview, AH even showed the news of TSMC defeating Samsung in the record of annual sales, and proudly announced that the Taiwanese company was the most advanced IT business in the world. The interviewees assumed that Korean economic development and achievements in sports games were only achieved by unfair means. This kind of anti-Hallyu sentiments is aligned to sensitive issues of international relations in Taiwan. Taiwan has complex issues with all neighboring nations. Anti-Hallyu movements emerged as part of international tensions. First, changes in the relationship between Taiwan and China influence growing anti-Korea sentiments. JE: More and more young people dislike China and want to be independent, as the election process showed. SM: We hate China. China tries to invade us. And Korea is our competitor. The relationship between Republic of China (ROC) and People’s Republic of China (PRC) has dominated Taiwanese politics for almost a century, and more and more Taiwanese people hope for independence from China. The presidential election in 2020 demonstrated a cleavage in Taiwan between supporters of unification and independence (Yonhap 2020; Moskowitz 2011; Yang & Chiu 2012; Alagappa 2001). During interviews, subjects JE and SM expressed a desire for young people to keep distance from China and support independent policy. Taiwan has disputed with mainland China regarding its territory since the beginning of establishing ROC in 1949. While Mao Zetong wished to unify Chinese territories, including Taiwan, Jiang Jieshi also dreamed of the restoration of Chinese territory under his authority. Thus, the one nation policy has been a political flag for both PRC and ROC. While mainland China is persistent regarding this policy, Taiwan has changed its attitude toward the one China policy in the process of democratization. Through diverse civil movements during the 1980s, Taiwan developed localization and indigenization (Makeham 2005; Chen 2010). In the early 1990s, more and more Taiwanese people started to identify themselves as Taiwanese rather than Chinese. Taiwan is not, on the contrary, recognized as a nation by most other states due to cross-strait relations fostered by the PRC (Friedman 2006; Hwang 2012). The US disconnected diplomatic relations with Taiwan in 1979, followed by Korea in 1992. Only a few countries have official relations with Taiwan, which resulted in its expulsion from the UN in 1971. Although

124  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia many countries including the US, Japan, and Korea maintain unofficial relations, Taiwan cannot but have complex emotions toward former allies and suffer from an identity crisis. The double faces of Korean media reception in Taiwan represent these complex issues in the realm of international and intercultural communication. People try to enhance national identity by being independent from China. As interview subjects JE and SM stated that they criticize China and want independence. Taiwanese people also promote nationalism and national identity by being critical of neighboring countries. As AH and AY stated during the interviews, young people are sensitive to international competition, which turn into targeting against Korea. In light of this, anti-Hallyu movements in Taiwan disclose the current status of identity politics and international tensions. However, Taiwanese people often identify themselves as Chinese in terms of culture, even when they support independence policy from China. AY: Korean people often claim that Chinese inventions like paper are their inventions. Sports fans are sensitive on this issue, and this kind of mistrust has piled up and become widespread. Most people don’t like China. The relationship becomes worse and worse. Yet, it has political aspects. Culturally, we think China is part of us. And paper was invented by Chinese not Koreans for example. JE: Taiwanese do not like Korea because its nationalism is too strong. They claim Danwu (Danoje) is theirs. Patriarchism and collectivism are too strong in Korea. Foreigners cannot get in. SM: Korea seems conservative and repressive when I see TV dramas, particularly to women. Interview participants side with mainland China in disputes with Korea, such as the origin and authenticity of cultural traditions, while identifying themselves as Chinese in a cultural sense. For example, disputes about the origins of Danoje,4 the invention of paper, and ancient printing techniques are frequently brought up by interview participants. As JE and SM argued, they perceive Korea as a nationalist and repressive country that co-opts the cultural products of other countries and promotes them for national pride. These statements imply that motivations underlying anti-Hallyu trends comprise more than just competition between nations but are aligned to the identity politics of people in Taiwan. These people support establishing Taiwanese national identity and integrating all Taiwanese together into the nation by distancing themselves from China. The duality of the TaiwanChina relationship, that is, growing economic cooperation with China and demands to establish Taiwan’s own identity independent from China, has become the major part of the political agenda and challenges in Taiwanese society (Kim 2012; Brown 2004; Lin & Lee 2017). The statements of

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  125 interviewees outlined in this study demonstrate the complexity and perplexity of Taiwanese people who hate China, and simultaneously side with China (PRC) in disputes regarding cultural issues with Korea. Moreover, this research discovered the unique relationship between Taiwan and Japan. Japan is considered to be an enemy and to be guilty of war crimes by Asian countries because Japan occupied many Asian countries including Korea, part of China, Taiwan, the Philippines, and others until the end of the World War II. Taiwan was the first colony of Japan, being occupied in 1895, and continued to be a colony for the longest time in Asia. While other former colonies demonstrate severe antagonism against Japan which leads to frequent diplomatic disputes and even military threats, Taiwan maintains a good relationship with Japan. PS: We learned a lot from Japan. And some older people have nostalgia for those days… Taiwan has been occupied by many nations. We are not nationalists like Korea. CS: We all like Japanese culture. I personally have liked Japanese animation since I was very young. We call 台日友好(Taiwan favors Japan), but not Korea. Since Japan colonized Taiwan, they built a lot of buildings and taught us customs and systems. We still use them and inherit the systems. Everyone, young and old generations, likes Japan. Interview subjects appreciate contributions of Japan to Taiwan’s modernization. Even though Japan introduced modern systems equally to its colonies as a tool to manage colonialism, Taiwan reacted differently from other former colonies. While other Asian countries resent Japan’s exploitation of natural resources and economies as well as violations of human rights during the colonial period, Taiwan acknowledges Japan’s contributions to modernization. Like interview subjects PS and AH, all interviewees declared their appreciation of Japanese modernization during the colonial period. As for the question of whether Taiwan’s unique reaction to Japan is different from other Asian countries, the subjects addressed the historical environment of Taiwan, which made it more accepting of colonialism than other sovereign nations because Taiwan had been colonized so frequently in the past. According to theories of post-colonialism, one of the main characteristics of post-colonial societies is a complex attitude toward former colonial countries (Quayson 2000; Spivak 1988; Nandy 1983). Bhabha (1994) describes it as ambivalence and Young (1995) calls it hybridity. While focusing on cultural and psychological aspects of colonial inheritance, post-colonial theorists address complex reactions of former colonies, which envy and imitate colonialist culture and system while simultaneously being antagonistic against it. Unlike European former colonies, however, former colonies of Japan in Asia do not typically demonstrate “ambivalent” attitudes toward Japan as much as European colonizers. Compared to European former colonies that show

126  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia love–hate feelings, referred to as “black skin and white mask” by Fanon (1952), by imitating the language and customs of colonizers, former colonies of Japan such as Korea and China stress more hatred against Japan than love relations. This is partly because post-colonial ambivalence and cultural hybridity are mediated by Western countries such as the US and Western European nations that have not officially colonized Asian countries. These Western countries have influenced Asian nations since the independence after World War II. This makes complicated to apply post-colonial theories to Asian countries because multiple power and cultural influences are involved in building post-colonial Asian countries. Theories of post-colonialism demonstrate limitations for explaining more complicated issues in Asian postcolonialism than former colonies of European countries. Taiwan is, on the contrary, unique in its attitude toward Japan. Interview statements suggest that the attitudes of Taiwanese toward Japan are not only different from those of other Asian countries but also from those of former colonies of European countries. Instead of antagonism (like Asian countries) or ambivalent attitudes (like post-colonies of Europe), Taiwan shows “love-love” attitudes toward Japan that belie theoretical assumptions of ambivalence or “love-hate” attitudes in post-colonialism. Theories of postcolonialism as well as mainstream international politics cannot properly explain the unique case of Taiwan. I would argue that Taiwan’s unique attitude toward Japan echoes the task of identity politics. SM: We pursue liberal democracy like that of America. Japan is also at a degree. Liberal democracy represents our values since the old days because Taiwan was occupied by many countries without having sovereignty. During an individual interview, SM addressed the motivations of Taiwanese people pursuing liberalism, and stated that Japan is the only example of liberal democracy in Asia. PS also mentioned about positive influences of Japan as opposed to negative ones of nationalist Korea. These statements disclosed that Taiwan’s love-love relationship with Japan is motivated by resistance against communist China and pursuit of liberalism. According to Taiwanese respondents, they maintain love-love relationship with Japan because they value freedom and liberalism as opposed to coercive China and nationalist Korea. Interview statements show that international relations form part of identity politics in Taiwan. Cultural trends and media use are integral parts of identity politics in Taiwan. Anti-Hallyu movements demonstrate Taiwanese expressions of desires to build a firm national identity. CS: Before we accepted China and maintained stable relations, but now we think of Taiwanese identity more than before. Previously we could

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  127 not claim Taiwan as a nation in international business meetings for example, but now ask ourselves why we cannot claim ourselves. We have changed our attitudes. SM: If China invades us, our freedom will be destroyed like Hong Kong and Uyghurs. Interview subjects seek to be independent from China and to build Taiwan’s own national identity. In an interview, subject CS shared her own experience in an international conference, and SM expressed a fear of China’s threats and the decline of freedom by illustrating cases such as protests in Hong Kong and Uyghur. Interviewees demonstrated a rising demand for independence as the global power of China is increasing, and the international status of Taiwan is also improving. As SM stated, people in Taiwan are against invasion of communist China and cautious of the growing influence of China on Taiwan’s economy and society. While international societies do not recognize Taiwan as a nation due to pressure from mainland China, Taiwanese people struggle against China and demand national sovereignty and identity of Taiwan as a nation. They pursue national identity by juxtaposing Taiwan as a liberal country with China representing repressive communism. During interviews, people in anti-Hallyu groups tend to support Taiwanese media and culture and consider media to be a tool for enhancing national identity. AH: In the 80s, Taiwanese pop culture was very popular because there was no such liberated culture in Asia except Taiwan. It was exported to the mainland, Singapore, and Malaysia. Afterwards, Taiwan culture was not enhanced but decreased, then Korean culture took the part… Now, Taiwan has started to change; our political system has become more advanced and our economy is strong. Now owing to new media like YouTube, young people are becoming more creative and the market is becoming more free. Taiwanese media and young creators are changing for the better. OD: I think Taiwanese media is number one in Chinese communities around Asia. Taiwan is one of a few countries that has freedom of expression in Asia. Taiwanese singers are very popular in Asia. Taiwan lacks money to make a fantastic dramas, but Taiwan is primary in creativity. In interview statements, subjects OD and AH appreciate Taiwanese media and culture as a pivot of liberal democracy unlike other repressive countries in Asia. They do not believe that other Asian countries including South Korea can be suitable models of democracy and freedom of expression like that Taiwan wants to pursue to establish a new national identity. Interviewees in anti-Hallyu group evaluate that Taiwan’s pop culture is more advanced than Korean in terms of freedom of expression and creativity.

128  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Moreover, interviewees expressed hope that Taiwan would regaining leadership of pop culture in Asia along with the development of new technology. They anticipated that changes in media environments and increases in the use of social media give them new opportunities to take a lead of pop cultural trends in Asia. During interviews, OD evaluated Taiwanese media as a leader in Asia, and AH appreciated the freedom and creativity of Taiwanese media. Because Taiwan is not able to make massive investments in producing media, social media and new digital media technology are expected to strengthen Taiwanese media and leverage Taiwan’s creativity. Interview subjects stated that the creative power of Taiwanese media and culture went along with liberalism and freedom of expression. Taiwanese people believe that liberal values that Taiwan has been pursuing in producing media and pop culture accord with the new environment of cultural production and increase in the use of social media. Taiwan’s New Cultural Policy and Inter-Asian Cultural Communication Taiwan is currently developing new cultural and media policies to consolidate national identity. Newly established Taiwanese film festivals and limits on the importation of foreign TV programs are some of the efforts being made to protect Taiwan’s national media and pop culture (Lin 2019). Compared to Taiwanese cinema that gained global fame but was ignored domestically in the 1990s, the current cinema movements in Taiwan attract domestic viewers (Berry & Farquhar 2006; Hong 2011; Ma 2015). In this study, many participants including both pro- and anti-Korean groups support new cultural policies and enhancement of local cultural products in Taiwan. Changing cultural policies and the attitudes of media users in Taiwan demonstrate growing public demand for national pride and identity. Taiwanese people believe that Taiwan has been at the forefront to protect freedom and democracy in Asia, while struggling against pressure from mainland China. In spite of China’s pressure and disruptions with international allies because of such pressure, people in Taiwan have worked hard to achieve economic development and protect their free and democratic system. As the global power of China has grown in the last couple of decades, Taiwan’s economic cooperation with China has also grown. China has attempted to expand its influence not only on the economy but also on politics and culture in Taiwan. Taiwan’s media became a boundary against Chinese influence. Chinese media companies employ various means such as ownership, advertising, and political pressure to control Taiwan’s media (Huang 2017, 2019). Additionally, Beijing opened regular meetings with Taiwanese media in a cross-strait media forum (Lin & Lee 2017). As pressure from China becoming broader and more intense, more and more people in Taiwan seek independence from China and enhancement of national identity. In particular, young people are more active in social movements for independence and identity politics using social media and new media technology than older people.

Inter-Asia Communication and Identity Politics  129 Both the popularity of Korean pop culture and anti-Hallyu movements in Taiwan exist in the context of this new cultural atmosphere and identity politics. Taiwan coined the term “Hallyu” and has been one of the primary importers of Korean media since the beginning of the Korean wave. The popularity of Korean media and pop culture in Taiwan, on the one hand, reflects the atmosphere of cultural tolerance and multiculturalism that Taiwan has pursued on the basis of cultural policy. Taiwan is open to international culture, and cultural tolerance is a policy target in a country with multiple ethnic groups. Hallyu have spread out in Taiwan since the early days in this social environment. Emerging anti-Hallyu movements, on the other hand, are aligned to changes of cultural policies and identity politics in Taiwan. Taiwanese desires to strengthen national identity and social integration in the face of aggressive policies of the PRC when economic relations between ROC and PRC are consistently growing. Recent economic accomplishment and enhancement of the international status of Taiwan also encourage people to pursue independence and national pride which derive people to promote national identity (Yang and Chiu 2012; Yueh 2017). While augmenting national identity, Taiwanese people in anti-Hallyu groups demonstrate criticism against Korea because they do not consider Korea to be a suitable model for Taiwan’s identity politics. Interview subjects in this study described Korea as a repressive country and aggressive cheater in efforts to accomplish success in sports and economic arenas. While perceiving Korea as a national competitor, these people often condemned Korea as an unfair player in competition. Korea is not considered a good alternative to “repressive and backward” countries like China. Additionally, people in anti-Hallyu groups are cautious about influences of Korean pop culture and media on young people in Taiwan. They consider that Korean pop culture and media represent superficial values such as plastic appearance and commercialism. These people are alert to the negative influences of Korean pop culture because it may interfere with the establishment of a new national identity in Taiwan. This kind of criticism and anti-Hallyu movements is not simply an emotional and nationalist reaction to foreign culture, but a part of identity politics of Taiwanese people. It is an extension of identity politics that Taiwan has developed in the process of democratization. It is rather an expression of desire for enhancing national identity to overcome threats and challenges that Taiwan is currently encountering. Another commonality between Hallyu fans and anti-Hallyu respondents in Taiwan lies in their expectation of social media. Hallyu fans employ social media as the main channel of social networking. They appreciate the networking endeavors of K-pop artists appear on social media, and consider them superior to artists in other countries including Taiwan singers. K-pop fans interviewed for this study expressed appreciation for the “fan service” of BTS and networks among fans. These fans discovered special meaning through their fan activities and networking with each other. BTS fans do not talk about their favorite music and idols without mentioning their own

130  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia life stories. When faced with life’s difficulties, these fans found comfort and meaning by engaging in fan activities geared toward their favorite idols. Social media act as tools for these fans to connect to artists and to each other. Although social media bring in a new type of labor-intensive business in entertainment, these fans find meanings and experience feeling of connectivity by constantly using social media involved in fan activities. Because of such humane connections, K-pop fandom represents more than just a cultural preference but has become an important part of their identity. Anti-Hallyu respondents in Taiwan also considered that social media might give them a new opportunity to revive Taiwan’s pop culture. These people appreciated Taiwan’s media and pop culture as superior to others by claiming that Taiwan maintained liberalism and freedom of expression above all nations in Asia. They believe that social media and new media technologies allow Taiwan media producers to create leading contents and pop culture, though Taiwan has limited resources to invest in media production. Young people participated in this study tend to support new cultural policies of Taiwan which promote Taiwan’s national cinema and pop music. They are especially interested in advancing new technologies and social media to develop Taiwan’s national cultural products. The people in Taiwan are motivated by identity politics in supporting national cultural products and advancing new media technologies. Anti-Hallyu respondents’ reactions to Korean media and K-pop also reflect complex issues of international relations in the regions and identity politics of Taiwan. Notes 1 游盈隆(1997). “族群認同的政治心理分析.” 徐火炎 台灣族群政治專題 月旦 2 THAAD (The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense). See Chapter 6. 3 Minnam, or original citizens, immigrated from Minnam areas in China during the Qing dynasty, while the Hokka were the first immigrants from China during the 17th century (Brown 2004). Minnam comprise the majority of the Taiwanese population at 70%, while Hokka and mainlanders comprise 12% and 13%, respectively. Aboriginal people make up 3% of the total population, while foreign immigrants comprise only 0.4% according to the official census of the ROC. https://ilhaformosaaltomtaiwan.wordpress.com/2016/12/23/ do-taiwanese-people-feel-chinese/ 4 China brought opposition against Korea when Gangneung Danoje was designated as a Masterpiece of the Oral and Intangible Heritage of Humanity by UNESCO in 2005, claiming that Danoje originated in China and was handed down to Korea.

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9

Social Media and CyberImagination of Asian Communities

East Asian media and pop culture have been globalized and are now attracting more global popularity than ever before. Japanese culture has formed a large part of global pop culture since the 1980s, with animation and games continuing to attract global users. Another example is Korean pop music (K-pop), which has consolidated a strong fan base among global audiences; BTS has become a global celebrity, breaking records on the Billboard Chart and winning the American Music Awards, a first for Asian musicians. Korean films have attracted global attention at international film festivals. The film Parasite won four Academy Awards in 2020, another first for an Asian film in the history of the Academy Awards. A Netflix original, Squid Game made by a Korean production house, attracted global viewers by breaking streaming records and paved the way for a new meme culture in cyberspace. Additionally, Chinese films and digital games have continued to break world records in terms of the user base. Although the statistics are influenced by large number of Chinese users, China is eager to expand its cultural power (or soft power) by merging with global production companies and investing in the cultural products of many countries. Furthermore, Taiwan and Hong Kong films are reviving and creating new genres for global appeal. Overall, East Asian media and pop culture from different countries in the region are attracting global popularity. At the same time, hate crimes and discrimination against Asian people have been growing. Many states in the US and several European countries have proclaimed war against racism and discrimination, as hate crimes and assaults, including those targeting Asian people, currently occur daily. Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic and the activities of the Black Lives Matter movement, hate crimes and racial confrontations have increased, with Asians often targeted. Although these two different reactions to Asian people and culture in the contemporary world appear contradictory, the reactions reflect part of the same image of Asia that has evolved in the media for generations. Asian media has achieved global success as a rare case even when Western countries dominated the world communication system in the mid-20th century. DOI: 10.4324/9781003411208-11

134  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia Japanese and Hong Kong films have attracted global attention since the 1950s and 1960s. Japanese animation, Japanese pop (J-pop), and games ruled the global market since the 1980s. K-pop and Korean cultural products (or Hallyu) have now taken the lead in global popularity. These East Asian media and pop cultures have created certain images of Asia to appeal to global audiences. Global genres of Japanese and Hong Kong films as well as J-pop and K-pop have evolved in a manner that stereotypes Asia and strengthens prejudice against Asian cultures. The global popularity of East Asian media has sparked contestations with respect to cultural identity since its inception, and notions of self-Orientalism and cultural hybridity have emerged in the critique of Asian media and pop culture. These notions explain the cultural domination of pre-existing global power in post-colonial times, with East Asian pop culture viewed as an exotic variation defined by the Western lens. Theories of post-colonialism provide critical insights to examine the influences of Western culture and the blurring of the cultural identity of Asian media in the process of globalization. Cultural hybridity and Orientalism are post-colonial theories to explain new means of cultural dominance by Western powers during the post-colonial period compared to colonial times. However, there is debate about the difficulties of applying post-colonial theories to specific cases. It is not easy to find empirical evidence of the involvement of post-colonial powers in creating cultural products in the former colonies. In contrast to the colonial period, when Western colonizers directly engaged in political dominance and intervened in internal societies and human rights violations, post-colonial power is not directly involved in local societies in current times. Instead, it is usually exercised by local people at an empirical level. This tendency blurs the boundaries of post-colonial influence because local people engage in creating hybrid cultures and emulating Western cultures without the direct involvement of former colonizers or Westerners. Some cultural theorists have turned their focus to local people and addressed new notions, such as self-Orientalism, re-Orientalism, and new Orientalism (Lau 2009; Dirlik 1996; Spivak 1993). These notions focus on global dominance exercised by local people. Even though these notions are, in a sense, an extension of post-colonial theories to examine the global power of the West, they are distinctive from the original notion of Orientalism (Said 2003, 1994). Orientalism was one of the well-known notions with regard to the cultural dominance of colonialism and helped establish theories of postcolonialism. Orientalism presumes the East is the negative Other, backward and dangerous, or sometimes exotic and mysterious, to promote a positive self, that is, the Occident. Said (2003) stated that “the Orient has helped to define Europe (or the West) as its contrasting image, idea, personality, experience” (pp. 1–2). Based on Foucault’s knowledge/power framework, Said delineated an ontological and epistemological force of reproducing Orientalism through the entire realms of system, knowledge, and art. This notion

Social Media and Cyber-Imagination of Asian Communities  135 assumes a kind of grand scale of Panopticon throughout the globe (Foucault 1977). The question is, however, who sits at the top of the Panopticon on the global scale when nations participate in reproducing the same framework of knowledge called “Orientalism.” Even when cultural practices of Orientalism occur on the cells of the global Panopticon at the bottom, it is hardly possible to identify the watcher at the top. The new notions of self-Orientalism and re-Orientalism make the concept visible and trace the concrete process of exercising global power by turning the focus on local agents. Intriguingly, the notion of re-Orientalism was anchored by dependency theorists, including Amin (1999) and Wallerstein (1999), who tried to explain the internal situations of Third World nations dependent on their former colonies (Arrighi 1999). Unlike Said and some post-colonial theorists, dependency theorists tried to explain the internal mechanisms of persisting dependency of the Global South even after achieving political independence. They critically examined persistent class relations and authoritarian political elites in the Global South coopting with Western powers. Said’s Orientalism, on the contrary, did not properly examine local people’s practices while assuming the epistemological lineage of Western powers. Said mainly focused on examining Western cultures, such as English literature and French history, to explain how the West views the East. While turning the focus on locality, new theories also make an epistemological break from Said’s Orientalism and created notions, such as selfOrientalism, new Orientalism, and re-Orientalism. Lau and Mendes (2011) addressed the discursive and fragmented nature of re-Orientalism as opposed to the ontological and epistemological unity of Said’s Orientalism. Self-Orientalism and re-Orientalism are notions that examine the process by which local people reframe certain aspects of their cultures to meet Western views. These notions, on the one hand, make it possible to trace the empirical process of accommodating Western standards, because local affiliates exercise cultural practices in the form of Orientalism, as they perceive how it is defined by Western views. On the other hand, these notions demonstrate multifaceted and inconsistent adoption of Western influences by locals, unlike original Orientalism, because locals have diverse interests and interpretations according to local situations. Lau and Mendes (2011) referred to the shallow and superficial natures of re-Orientalism while Desai (2011) called it “pulp Orientalism” (referring to the movie Pulp Fiction by Quentin Tarantino in 1994) to emphasize the distinctive nature of re-Orientalism from Said’s original notion. Since the early days of the globalization of Asian media, Asian nations have adopted self-Orientalism as a global media strategy and have been involved in creating certain images of Asia (Iwabuchi et al. 2004). Since the success of Japanese art films and Hong Kong action films in the 1950s and 1960s, East Asian films and cultural products have rooted the image of exotic Asia to meet the Oriental perspective of the West. These images spark shocking and

136  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia strange images of Asia among global viewers. Even as Japan became one of the most advanced and high-tech societies in the world, Japanese films emphasized its backwardness and projected a dark image of Asia. For example, global genre films from Japan were the genres of horror, depicting ghosts and shamanism. Historical films presented erotic geisha and violent samurai that sparked images of an exotic Japan. Hong Kong films also illustrated Kung Fu and gangster action against the backdrop of the dark side of cities. This image is quite different from Hong Kong’s positioning as a symbol of freedom and a hub of cultural exchange in Asia. As East Asian media are increasingly globalizing owing to new media technologies and social media, self-Orientalism and stereotyping of Asian images have intensified. Korean art films and dramas, for example, follow the preexisting images of Asia by exaggerating violence and eroticism. Aside from aesthetic standards, Korean art cinema, such as pieces by Kim Kiduck and Park Chanwook have often portrayed extreme violence. High-profile Korean dramas on Netflix, such as Kingdom and Squid Game, have depicted zombies and desperate underdogs in the context of a dark society. Zombie movies became a Korean genre after the emulation of the Western genre of films as Korean media globalized and are completely different from the traditional Korean image of spirits and ghosts. These Korean films and K-pop adopt selfOrientalism as a strategy for globalization by featuring exotic and dangerous images of Asia in the extreme. Globalizing Asian media and the expansion of its popularity might have accumulated stereotypes of Asia instead of facilitating a broader understanding of Asian culture. Racial and ethnic prejudices and stereotypes around Asian media might have driven intercultural tensions across nations and ethnicities around the world, as we see today. In the face of such challenges and threats against Asians and Asian cultures, people have started to question the cultural identities of Asia and seek other alternatives. People in East Asia have begun to resist the cultural hierarchy centered on the West and pre-existing images created by mainstream media. Even if this does not mean a total ban on Orientalism and the discovery of an entirely new identity of Asia, the cultural practices of Asian people frequently disrupt the industrial tactics of mainstream media and global influences of cultural imperialism. Asian media audiences exercise the cultural practice of resistance against pre-existing images of Asia and seek a more positive image and Asian identity. During the audience studies in this book, most Asian audiences have appreciated Asian identity, which is the primary motivation for preferring K-pop or Chinese cinema to Western culture. The major motivations for Asian people to be drawn toward Asian media and pop culture are their shared interest in common values and Asian identity. This has now expanded to global audiences, as the world is diversifying and diverse ethnic groups are spreading globally (Yoon 2020). The primary motivations for preferring Asian media and pop culture by global audiences are frequently referred to as seeking Asian values as an alternative to mainstream

Social Media and Cyber-Imagination of Asian Communities  137 culture. Although ordinary media audiences demonstrate the shallow nature of cultural practices by sometimes accepting pre-existing stereotypes and at other times being influenced by industrial interests, they exercise resisting power and discursive practices of seeking alternative values of Asia. People’s daily activities, like consuming media and enjoying pop culture, present a realistic picture of seeking the cultural identity of Asia. Social media plays an important role in promoting cultural diversity and emerging Asia as alternative values these days. Social media offers a channel for minorities in terms of age, gender, ethnicity, and social status, which have largely been ignored by the one-way communication of mass media. Social media empowers social minorities by providing a means for participation so that they can engage actively in public discourse. It increases the participation of minority groups in society and enhances the appearance of minor nations and ethnic groups at the global level. Asian media and culture that emerged from a lower position in the global hierarchy have begun leading the change of the global mediascape by attracting global audiences through social media. Since the 1990s, Japanese animation has established a new way of consuming media by consolidating fan bases throughout the world owing to the advancement of new media technologies. Now, the major channel of fan activities of Japanese animation has moved to social media. Other Asian media, such as Chinese and Korean media, are also largely disseminated the world over by social media and digital platforms. K-pop, for example, has established strong fan bases in Europe and the US through social media, even before it began to be broadcast on public media outlets. The global fame of K-pop singers has gained strength from the strong fan bases and participatory activities of its fans on social media. Fans of K-pop sometimes engage with political and social movements, going well beyond the mere enjoyment of pop music. Subcultural activities and participation in resistance movements by K-pop fans have become evident, as social minorities constitute the majority of K-pop fandom, particularly in Western societies. These fans are often involved in political campaigns, social protests, and cultural events using the same methods as those used in organizing fan activities through social media. The current popularity of Asian media demonstrates the changing patterns in media use and two-way communications via digital and social media. Interactivity and participatory use of social media by strong Asian pop culture fan bases can affect the new mode of creating cultural products through new technology. However, social and other new media technologies are not disseminated without contestations and conflicts. Public participation and the voices of social minorities do not always lead to revolutionary changes in social and cultural power. Instead, people often reproduce cultural prejudice and stereotypes that have evolved in the media in the form of Orientalism or self-Orientalism. Sometimes, social media users are also influenced by

138  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia industrial interests and mobilized by political and economic power. These cultural and political influences make public engagement in cultural practices fragmented and discursive, as the theory of re-Orientalism suggests. Nevertheless, the cultural practices of ordinary people often disrupt global power or Orientalist prejudices of the local culture, however fragmented and discursive their activities may be. Moreover, social media induces public participation in international and domestic political and social affairs while giving voice to minorities and enhancing cultural diversity. Consequently, East Asian countries are involved in international conflicts; for example, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan all have some tensions with each other. Although the historical legacy may be a cause of the increase in international conflicts in this region, the current pattern is distinctive in that public participation through social media is growing and intensifying. The double-edged sword of social media in social networking and communal activities, on the one hand, and nationalist competition and intercultural tensions, on the other, represent the struggles and desires of the people. Ethnographic studies on Hallyu and anti-Hallyu movements in East Asian countries conducted in this book have demonstrated complex aspects of cultural practices by the people of this region. People prefer Korean media and pop culture by engaging in public discourses through social media and by zealously participating in fan activities. For them, it is more than a mere expression of cultural tastes and enjoyment of pop culture. It is a part of their identity formation and cultural politics to enjoy pop culture, as these people have experienced real politics and life in the social arena. Some people search for freedom and an alternative model of development while enjoying Korean media and K-pop under harsh pressure and censorship in the case of China, whereas others have joined anti-Hallyu movements for fear of disturbing the liberalism and national identity that they have protected in the case of Taiwan. The strong fan base for K-pop in Japan against the backdrop of ultra-right movements and nationalist disputes between Japan and Korea is another example of the public desire to find Asian values that they feel have been lost in the course of economic development and globalization. Although Hallyu and anti-Hallyu movements in these countries seem to be contradictory, they represent the importance of cultural practices in contemporary politics and communications. The discursive reactions of the people and the results of ethnographic studies with respect to cultural practices in East Asian countries demonstrate new theoretical insights that differ from conventional theories. The results of the research in this book demonstrate the limitations of applying critical theories, including theories of post-colonialism and Marxist theories of international relations, as well as mainstream international communication and traditional cultural theories to East Asian media and their fan communities. Evidently, mainstream international communication and cultural diffusion

Social Media and Cyber-Imagination of Asian Communities  139 hypotheses do not properly explain the emergence of East Asian pop culture and the demand for cultural diversity in the contemporary world. Moreover, post-colonial theories and the conceptual framework of Orientalism demonstrate a limited ability to explain the complexity and dynamics of the emergence of Asian media and the reactions of the audience. East Asian media and pop culture have expanded to the world by adopting self-Orientalism as a global strategy. Asian people are the agents for promoting globalization by developing new models of production and consumption of cultural products. They are not passive reactors who follow the epistemological force of global power or Orientalism. East Asian media discursively adopts Orientalism and alters it according to their own interests and interpretations. The fragmented and shallow nature of cultural practices of Asian media that Lau and Spivak addressed by defining notions of re-Orientalism and new Orientalism explains certain aspects of globalizing Asian media more adequately than the original theories of post-colonialism and the concept of Orientalism. However, East Asian media and pop culture represent distinctive natures from new theories of post-colonialism such as re-Orientalism and new Orientalism. Lau and Mendes (2011) presumed that local affiliates who exercise Orientalism in their local cultures are elites by directly or indirectly coopting with Western powers on the basis of class relations, education, and common interests. This argument seems to be based on the original theory that established the notion of re-Orientalism by Amin and Wallerstein. These Marxist theorists explain the persistent underdevelopment and dependency of the Global South by focusing on class relations. In the case of East Asian pop culture, on the contrary, it is ordinary people, not elites, who exercise cultural practices and consolidate Asian communities. Because of changing media environments, ordinary people, particularly social minorities, have a voice and can participate in resisting mainstream cultures and seeking new alternatives through social media. These ordinary people make changes through their daily practices of connecting with each other and sharing visions and content on social media. It is a reaction distinct from Spivak’s (1988) negative answer to the question, “can the subaltern speak?” People at the bottom in the post-colonial countries might not be able to speak under the overall framework of Orientalism, as Spivak assumes, but they can act and make changes through their activities and cultural practices. Spivak’s thesis reflects linguistic priority based on Western philosophy, which is reproduced in the knowledge framework of Orientalism (Khair 2011; Mignolo 2000). Spivak’s new Orientalism highlights local practices but does not go beyond the epistemological basis of Western philosophy. Unlike Spivak’s assumption, there is a space, even if partial, for people to engage in the dynamic process of resisting ethnocentric power and seeking alternatives even under the pressure of knowledge and the linguistic framework of Orientalism. The empirical process of consuming East Asian pop culture demonstrates dynamic aspects of cultural practices and actions of media audiences and

140  Social Media and Cultural Politics in East Asia fan communities. The ethnographic research in this book on the cultural practices of people in East Asian countries demonstrates the role of public participation in global communication and identity politics in individual nations and the world at large. The discursive practices and cases whereby people engage in international relations among East Asian countries inductively construct an alternative theoretical framework, which includes a bottom–up approach and reflects Asian perspectives as defined by the people of Asia. References Amin, S. (1999). Re-orientalism? History conceived as an eternal cycle. Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, 22(3), 291–326. Arrighi, G. (1999). Re-orientalism? The world according to Andre Gunder Frank. Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, 22(3), 327–354. Desai, J. (2011). Pulp frictions. In L. Lau & A.C. Mendes (Eds.), Re-Orientalism and South Asian Identity Politic. London: Routledge, pp. 72–91. Dirlik, A. (1996) Chinese history and the question of orientalism. History and Theory, 35(4), 96–118. Foucault, M. (1977). Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage. Iwabuchi, K., Muecke, S., & Thomas, M. (Eds.). (2004). Rogue Flows: Trans-Asian Cultural Traffic. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press. Khair, T. (2011). Re-orientalisms: meditations on exoticism and transcendence, otherness and the self. In L. Lau & A.C. Mendes (Eds.), Re-Orientalism and South Asian Identity Politic. London: Routledge, pp. 144–159. Lau, L. (2009) Re-orientalism: the perpetration and development of orientalism by orientals. Modern Asian Studies, 43(2), 571–590. Lau, L., & Mendes, A. (Eds.). (2011). Re-Orientalism and South Asian Identity Politics: The Oriental Other Within. London: Routledge. Mignolo, W. (2000). Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Said, E. (1994). Culture and Imperialism. London: Vintage. Said, E. (2003). Orientalism. London: Penguin. Spivak, G. (1988). Can the subaltern speak? In ,& (Eds.), Marxism and the Interpretations of Culture. New York: Mcmillan, pp. 271–313. Spivak, G. (1993). Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York and London: Routledge. Wallerstein, I. (1999). Re-orientalism? Frank proves the European miracle. Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center, 22(3), 355–372. Yoon, S. (2020). Global Media and Asian Identity. Seoul: Seoul National University Press.

Index

Note: Bold page numbers refer to tables, italic page numbers refer to figures and page numbers followed by “n” denote end notes. Abe administration 102–103 Abenomics 102 Amin, S. 135, 139 Anderson, B. 10, 25 anti-Hallyu movement 5–6, 12–14, 81–83, 85, 87–89, 92–95, 95n2, 105–106, 115–116, 119–130, 138 anti-Korean sentiments 87–89 Appadurai, A. 2, 32 Arab Spring 34–35, 37 Armypedia 71, 74, 78 Asia 4–5, 10–14, 19, 127–128, 135– 137; civilization and cultural identity 20–22; communities 23–26; identity 22–23, 26–30; social media and democratic movements 37–39 Asian identity 10, 22–23; cultural practices 26–30; struggles for 57–60 Asian media 4–5, 10–12, 14, 28–30; globalizing 60, 135–136; pop culture 57–58; social media and cultural politics of 39–42 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 19, 23–25, 29 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 19, 23–25, 29; ASEAN +3 (China, Japan, and South Korea) 24 Belt and the Road strategy 84, 93 Benedict, R. 46 Bhabha, H. 125

Birmingham Center for Contemporary Cultural Studies (BCCS) 8–9 blockchain technology 66–67, 78 Bourdieu, P. 34 BTS (Bangtan Sonyeondan, Bulletproof Boys) 12, 40–42, 65–66, 133; atomic bomb T-Shirt 104–105, 105, 110–111, 113; Black Swan 74–76, 75–76; Interlude:Shadow 74; Love yourself (Fromm) 73, 77; Map of the Soul (Jung) 73–77; members 68–73, 72; metaverse technology 67–68, 71, 74, 77–78; Persona, Boy with Luv 74; technology and social networking 66–68, 78–79; transmedia 66–67, 71, 77–78; Wings (2017) 73, 73–74, 77 BTS ARMY 12, 40, 65–66, 106–108, 110–113, 116–120; social media 68–78 BTS fandom 40–41, 71, 74, 105; media technology and 78–79; new technology and social networking 66–68 BTS Universe 68 BTS Weverse 67–68, 77–78 Channel 2 (2 ch) 100–102 Chen, K. 26 Chicago School 7 China 11–14, 37–38, 55–60, 61n1, 81–85, 87–95, 95n3, 98, 104, 122–129, 130n4 Chinese Communication Commission (CCC) 84

142 Index Christianity 25–26 Clifford, J. 7, 85 Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) 57 Cold War 26, 45, 57, 100 collective oblivion 25 Confucianism 20–21, 90 contemporary ethnography 7 cultural capital 34, 49 cultural consumption 89–92 cultural hybridity 54, 58, 60, 126, 134 cultural identity 3–4, 11–12, 14, 21–22, 25, 27, 29, 46, 53–54, 57–58, 60, 90, 94, 134, 136–137 cultural politics 39–42 Cultural Revolution 83, 89 cyberbullying 36 democratization 37–39 Derrida, J. 7, 28 digital media 1–6, 13, 41, 50, 52, 59, 76, 81–82, 89, 91, 100–101, 128 discrimination 100–101, 103, 133 Dokdo 103 Dukhoo 107 East Asian 1–5, 11–14, 19–23, 29, 37, 39, 45–46, 55, 57–58, 59–60, 98, 107, 133–136, 138–140 economic capital 34 ethnography 6–10, 85, 87 European Union (EU) 10, 23–25 Facebook 2, 6, 32–34, 38, 98, 117, 120 Fanon, F. 126 Foucault, M. 7, 9, 28, 82, 85, 134–135 Freud, S. 75 Fromm, E. 73, 77 Gangnam Style (Psy) 39–40 globalization 1–3, 11, 48–49, 51, 53, 57, 102, 122, 134–136, 138–139 Great Fire Wall 37–38 Hallyu (Korean wave) movement 5, 13–14, 21, 28–29, 59, 81–82, 87–95, 104–106, 109–110, 112, 115, 119–120, 122, 129, 134, 138 Hong Kong film 11–12, 14, 28–29, 45, 54–59, 116, 127, 133–136

Huntington, S. 20–22 HYBE (Big Hit Entertainment) 67–68 hybridity 5, 54, 58, 60, 125–126, 134 imagined community 4, 10, 25 interpretive anthropology 7 Iwabuchi, K. 10, 29, 49, 51, 99, 102 Japan 22–23, 125–126, 136–138; animation 1, 11, 21, 27–28, 45, 49–50, 52, 107, 125, 134, 137; boycott against 97–98, 104; cool 102, 113; K-pop fandom and anti-Korean sentiments 104–112; pop culture 46, 46–54, 99, 102, 122 Jasmine Revolution 34 Jenkins, H. 67 Jin, D. 41 J-pop (Japanese pop) 11, 29, 45, 48–54, 57, 134 J-pop Jimusho 52–53 Jung, C. 73–76 Korea see South Korea (Korea) Korea Creative Contents Agency (KOCCA) 104 Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE) 40 Korean media 1, 5–6, 9–13, 28–29, 59, 82–85, 87, 89–92, 94, 104, 115, 122, 124, 129–130, 136–138 K-pop 1, 11–13, 21, 27, 39–41, 45–46, 52–54, 58, 60, 74, 78, 85, 93–94, 106–113, 115–130, 117, 133–134, 136–138 Kung Fu 11, 28, 54–55, 58, 136 Lau, L. 135, 139 mainlandization 57, 59 Malinowski, B. 7–9, 14n2 Mao Zetong 123 mediascape 2–3, 5, 11, 14, 32, 38–39, 41–42, 65, 78, 137 Meiji Restoration 22, 46 Mendes, A. 135, 139 metaverse technology 67–68, 71, 74, 77–78 middle-aged fans 89, 93, 105, 107–111, 116, 120–121 Minnam 121, 130n3

Index  143 The Most Beautiful Moment in Life (Hwayangyeonhwa) 65, 70 mukokuseki 51, 52, 54, 99, 101 national identity 14, 59, 101, 103, 121– 122, 124, 126–129, 138 nationalism 3–4, 12–13, 25–27, 29, 60, 93–95, 98–104 Net 2 (Netto 2) 100 network ethnography 8–9 new Orientalism 134–135, 139 new world information and communication order (NWICO) 28 Orientalism 49, 134–139 Otaku culture 50, 51, 53, 102, 107, 109 OTT (over the top) 41 Pan-Asianism 22–23 pay per play (PPP) method 67 peer-to-peer (P2P) service 66–67, 78 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 55, 115, 123, 125, 129 populism 36–37 post-modern ethnography 7, 9, 85 post-structuralism 7, 28 pro-Hallyu 93, 95 Psy 39–40, 46 public participation 2–3, 6, 11–13, 32, 34–39, 42, 81–82, 85, 87, 93–95, 137–138, 140 pulp Orientalism 135 Rashomon (Akira 1950) 11, 46, 47, 57 The Red Book (Jung) 75–76 reflexivity 8–9 re-Orientalism 135, 138–139 Republic of China (ROC) 123, 129 The Ring (1998) 48 Said, E. 21, 134–135; Orientalism 21 self-orientalism 11, 45, 47–49, 50–54, 58, 60, 134–137, 139 Sinicization 12, 57, 60 Smith, A. 24–25 social aspiration 89–92 social capital 34, 36 social criticism 90–91 social media 1–3, 6, 11–14, 32–33, 91– 92, 112–113, 118, 120, 137–138;

anti-korean sentiments and 87–89; BTS ARMY and 68–78; and cultural politics 39–42; defined 33; and democratization 37–39; and digital platforms 100–101; economic value of 34; nationalism and discursive use 92–95; and public participation 34–37 social network services (SNS) 98 Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC) 24 soft power 39, 54, 58–60, 84, 93, 99, 102, 133 South Korea (Korea) 5–6, 12, 36, 59, 81–84, 87–90, 92–93, 97–101, 103–113, 115–118, 121–127, 129, 138 Squid Game 46, 133, 136 Taiwan 13–14, 59, 115–116; antiHallyu sentiments and identity politics 120–128; cultural and media policies 128–130; Korean wave and identity politics 116–117 techno-nationalism 13, 99–102, 112–113 Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) 12, 82–83, 87–88, 94, 98, 115 3D technology 68 Top Social Artist award 66 transmedia 66–67, 71, 77–78 Trump, D. 27, 37, 40–41, 78–79 user-created content (UCC) 67 Wallerstein, I. 135, 139 Willis, P. 8 World Communication Order (WICO) 28 Xi Jinping 60, 84 Young, M. 14n2 Young, R. 125 YouTube 12, 33–34, 40, 52, 65–66, 69, 78, 101–102, 104, 127 Zainichi 100 Zaitokukai 103