Peace on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia 9789812306067

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PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND EAST ASIA

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia, particularly the many-faceted problems of stability and security, economic development, and political and social change. The Institute's research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). The Institute is governed by a twenty-two-member Board of Trustees comprising nominees from the Singapore Government, the National University of Singapore, the various Chambers of Commerce, and professional and civic organizations. An Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is chaired by the Director, the Institute's chief academic and administrative otlicer.

Singapore Lecture 27 November 2000

PEACE ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA AND EAST ASIA

Kim Dae-jung

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Published by Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 Internet E-mail: [email protected] World Wide Web: http://www.iseas.edu.sg/pub.html © 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Singapore

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Kim, Dae-jung. 1925Peace on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia. (Singapore lecture series, 0 129-1912; 19) I. Korean reunification question ( 1945-) 2. Korea (South)-Politics and government-19883. Korea (South)-Relations-Korea (North) 4. Korea (North)-Relations-Korea (South) I. Title. DSSO 1 1597 no. 19 200 I sls200 100303 t ISBN 981-230-118-6 (soft cover) ISSN 0129-1912 All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced. translated, stored in a retrieval system. or transmitted in any form or by any means. electronic. mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise. without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Seng Lee Press Pte Ltd

CONTENTS

I

Opening Address

Lee Hsien Loong

II

Peace on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia

Kim Dae-jung

III

Discussion

IV

Closing Remarks

4

12

Chia Siow Yue

18

I

Opening Address Lee Hsien Loong

Your Excellency, President Kim Dae-jung, Distinguished Guests, Ladies and Gentlemen. I extend a warm welcome to all of you present today. It is a great honour to have President Kim Dae-jung with us today to give the 19th Singapore Lecture. President Kim is the first leader from South Korea to address this forum. President Kim needs no introduction. He was awarded this year's Nobel Peace Prize as a tribute to his lifelong work to better the lives of the people of Korea, and for his vision and courage in reaching out to North Korea. Sceptics doubted the wisdom of his "Sunshine Policy", but President Kim's patience and vision led to the meeting between the two Korean leaders in June this year. It was a historic breakthrough on the Korean Peninsula, opening a window of opportunity to ease tensions in Northeast Asia, and to evolve a new strategic landscape. The road ahead will be long and not without difficulties. The interaction between the United States, China, Japan, and Russia will be worth watching. So will the effect of Korean developments on the U.S. security presence in Northeast Asia. An important step has been taken by President Kim and his counterpart in North Korea. This has given the international community cause for hope, that a longstanding flashpoint in the region is being defused, and will one day see peaceful resolution. While bringing about these dramatic geopolitical developments on the Korean Peninsula, President Kim has had to deal with equally

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demanding challenges of a different kind back home. He took office just as South Korea was severely hit by the Asian economic crisis. When foreign lenders suddenly withheld credit to Korean banks in November 1997, South Korea plunged into a severe crisis of liquidity and confidence. The depreciating Korean won and downward spiral of the economy starkly exposed the weaknesses of the chaebols (large conglomerates). South Korea's established model of economic development, based on close relations between the government, the banks, and the chaebols, was breaking down. It was a desperate situation. The liquidity problems were eventually resolved with the foreign lending banks. The U.S. banks took the lead in rolling over credit to South Korea, with strong encouragement from the American Government and Federal Reserve Board. However, the structural problems in the Korean economy also demanded tough, bitter remedies. This called for strong leadership and great political will. President Kim met the challenge head on. He strongly endorsed the International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, and set out aggressively to restore international confidence in South Korea. His government pushed hard for restructuring, buying up and disposing off non-performing loans in the financial system. It pursued bank recapitalization, forcing closures, mergers, and acquisitions. President Kim personally led the effort to restructure the chaebols. The government also liberalized foreign ownership restrictions over Korean companies and banks. As a result, foreign direct investments and portfolio investments have risen strongly. Externally, South Korea, like Singapore, pushed for bilateral free trade arrangements, in order to speed up economic integration. These efforts were important signals which gave analysts and investors confidence in South Korea, and helped turn the situation around.

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The process has been difficult and painful, and is far from complete. Much hard work still lies ahead, but overall, among the crisis-hit economies, Korea has made the most progress in putting its house in order. Credit must go to President Kim's personal commitment to the economic reforms. This morning, President Kim will share with us his thoughts on how peace on the Korean Peninsula will affect East Asia. The topic could not have been more timely, and the speaker more qualified. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me now in welcoming President Kim Dae-jung to deliver the 19th Singapore Lecture.

II

Peace on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia Kim Dae-jung

Thank you, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for that very warm introduction. Your Excellency, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, Deputy Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Chairman Chi a Cheong Fook, and Director Chia Siow Yue of I SEAS, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. I am infinitely honoured to be given this opportunity to speak at the prestigious Singapore Lecture organized by the world-renowned Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Under the outstanding leaderships of Prime Ministers Lee Kuan Yew and Goh Chok Tong, Singapore has attained the highest levels in international competitiveness, as well as social stability and welfare. I am quite aware that behind this national feat has been the input of such an outstanding think-tank as the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Ladies and gentlemen, history tells us that peace on the Korean Peninsula has far-reaching implications for the fate of East Asia as a whole. At the end of the 19th century, imperial Japan was victorious in war against China and Russia in the early 20th century, and thus colonized the Korean Peninsula. Building upon this strength, Japan went on to invade mainland China, and further - Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. More recently, the Korean War of the early 1950s, which is still a vivid memory. for many of us here, affected most countries of East Asia, directly or indirectly. Because of the unique geopolitical location, peace on the Peninsula is closely linked to that of East Asia.

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It has been fifty years since the Korean War broke out. During the half century since, South and North Korea have lived as hostile enemies in extreme distrust of each other. It was as if the two Koreas were unaware that the Cold War had ended elsewhere. However, in February 1998, with the start of the government of the people in South Korea, a new mood began to unfold on the Korean Peninsula. Upon inauguration, I proclaimed my "Sunshine Policy" towards North Korea with its three basic principles: first, South Korea would not tolerate any armed provocation from North Korea; second, the South would not seek to harm North Korea in any way or attempt reunification through absorption; and third, both South and North Korea should strive to reconcile and co-operate towards peaceful coexistence and peaceful exchanges. The four powers surrounding the Korean Peninsula - the United States, Japan, China and Russia- as well as Singapore and other nations of the world fully supported this initiative of mine towards the North. Prime Minister Goh and Senior Minister Lee came to Korea and gave their official endorsements for the "Sunshine Policy". We were greatly encouraged by this global support. North Korea's initial response was very negative. They publicly denounced the "Sunshine Policy" as a scheme to bring down their system and to weaken their military readiness. However, convinced that the policy was the only way to realize durable peace and eventual peaceful unification on the Korean Peninsula, my government and I stayed with the policy and tried to put it into action with consistency and patience. Unlike the previous governments of South Korea, we encouraged the United States, Japan, and other friends to engage in dialogue with North Korea and to give it much needed economic assistance. We asked all members of the international community to open diplomatic ties with North Korea and start friendly exchanges with it.

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Despite these sincere efforts on our part, North Korea did not respond to our calls. In fact, Pyongyang seemed to intentionally ignore our calls, while it sought to negotiate with the United States. However, this could not succeed in the face of the close policy coordination between South Korea, the United States, and Japan. In particular, the United States told the North that under no circumstances would it work without South Korea as South and North Korea were the principal parties involved. The United States was steadfast in saying that without rapprochement with South Korea, North Korea could not expect to achieve rapprochement with the United States. On numerous occasions, President Bill Clinton of the United States endorsed my "Sunshine Policy". Japan also took the same stand. Even China and Russia- erstwhile allies of North Koreaand many other countries of the world urged North Korea to engage in dialogue with the South. In the end, North Korea began to change. Ladies and gentlemen, on 9 March this year, I spoke at the Berlin Free University in Germany. In the speech, I reiterated the three principles of the "Sunshine Policy". I stressed that South Korea does not want to realize unification by absorbing the North, in the way the unification of West and East Germany was brought about. South Korea, I pointed out, does not have the resources to do so. I made it clear that it is imperative for the two Koreas to realize peaceful coexistence and interaction. I also said that South Korea is ready to actively help the North in overcoming its economic difficulties, and I proposed that the top leaders of the two sides meet face to face and talk. I believe that my Berlin Declaration was effective in convincing North Korea of our genuine intentions. Thus, North Korea eventually agreed to talk to us. Ladies and gentlemen, I went to Pyongyang on 13 June for the historic inter-Korean summit. I was filled with profound and mixed

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emotions. I was excited to be able to visit the northern part of my divided homeland for the first time, but I was also filled with apprehension over whether I would be successful in the encounter with the North Korean leader. Fortunately, in a series of long talks over three days, I was able to engage Chairman Kim Jong-il of the North Korean National Defence Committee in serious and sincere discussions and achieved some significant successes. First, we agreed that the Korean people must take the initiative on the road to national unification, although we acknowledged that immediate complete unification would be difficult to achieve. We concurred that for now the two Koreas should focus on realizing peaceful co-existence and exchanges. What was noteworthy in this regard was that the North withdrew its longstanding demand that a centralized federal government be set up for Korea to achieve unification, and instead proposed a "loose form of federation" as the formula for unification. This proposal is very similar to South's formula of a South-North confederation of one people, with two systems and two governments. Thus, common ground has been found upon which the two sides can start negotiating eventual unification. Secondly, what I regard as the most important outcome of the summit discussion is that North Korea has consented to the South's view that U.S. troops should continue to stay on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula, as you can see, is a bridge linking the Pacific Ocean to the Eurasian continent. As already mentioned, the SinoJapanese War at the end of the 19th century, and the Russo-Japanese War at the beginning of the 20th, were motivated by the desire to take control of the strategically important peninsula. Japan won both wars, and as a result, could annex the Korean Peninsula. The Korean Peninsula sits between big powers. Korea is the only country in the world where the interests of the four powers -

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the United States, Japan, China and Russia- converge. I have long been convinced that the U.S. military presence on the Korean Peninsula is necessary for the stability and balance of power in Korea and Northeast Asia. I explained this to Chairman Kim of the North, and to my surprise he readily concurred with me that it was for the safety of the Korean people, in a sharp departure from North Korea's demand for half a century that the U.S. troops must withdraw. It was truly a significant concurrence of views. This would not only prevent another war from breaking out between South and North Korea but also contribute to maintaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, even after unification. I take it that you will all agree with me that the strengthening of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula will be a positive force for the peace and stability of all of East Asia, of which Singapore is a key player. Thirdly, South and North Korea agreed on co-operation and exchanges. We agreed to seek ways to enable the 10 million separated family members living across the South and North to reunite and to find out the whereabouts of their long-lost loved ones. The two sides also agreed on economic co-operation, as well as cultural and social exchanges. Fourthly, Chairman Kim agreed to visit Seoul in return for my visit to Pyongyang. This is very significant. We expect the visit to materialize by the spring of next year. Distinguished guests, since the June inter-Korean summit, South Korea has been advancing the dialogue with the North along two tracks. The first is to ease tensions between South and North Korea. The defence ministers of South and North Korea have met. They have agreed not to wage another war on the Korean Peninsula, to actively support the 15 June South-North Joint Declaration, and to co-operate with each other in the demilitarized zone on the relinking of the severed inter-Korean railroad.

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Along with these inter-Korean developments, as you may be aware, relations between North Korea and the United States have also been making great progress. In Pyongyang, I had stressed to Chairman Kim the need for North Korea to forge better ties with the United States to ensure its security, and to resolve its economic difficulties. Seeing his positive response to my advice, I called President Clinton after I returned from the North. I stressed to President Clinton that direct talks with Chairman Kim would be the only way for the United States to succeed in the negotiations with the North on various issues, including its missiles. I also recommended to Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori to take a more active stance towards North Korea. Improvement in inter-Korean relations, without parallel improvements in North Korea's relations with the United States and Japan, will not be enough for peace on the Korean Peninsula. In this respect, I hope that East Asian nations will actively support the efforts of North Korea to improve relations with the United States and Japan. At the APEC Leaders Meeting in Brunei, not only I but also the leaders of Japan, China, and Russia expressed support for a meeting between the top leaders of North Korea and the United States, for this is indispensable to peace on the Korean Peninsula and all in East Asia. The second track is to overcome the 50 years of division, distrust, and confrontation between South and North Korea and to restore love and trust among all Koreans. To this end, we have agreed to engage in numerous exchanges in the social and cultural fields. As part of the efforts, we are trying to ascertain how many of the 10 million members of separated families are still living, and their reunions are taking place. In the field of economic co-operation, a project to relink the South-North Railway is under way. A new highway is also under

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construction linking the South to Kaesong city, just north of the demilitarized zone, where an industrial complex will be built. The South and the North have also worked out draft agreements on investment protection, avoidance of double taxation, clearance of accounts, and settlement of business disputes. Inter-Korean exchanges in the social and cultural areas have also been activated, as could be seen in the joint march by South and North Korean athletes at the opening of the Sydney Olympic Games. The international community has wholly welcomed these peace efforts on the Korean Peninsula. Support has been extended by statesmen at the G-8 Summit in Okinawa, the Millennium Summit of the United Nations, the Korean Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Third ASEM in Seoul, the APEC Leaders Meeting in Brunei, and the A SEAN plus Korea, China, Japan summit here in Singapore. I am convinced that continuing support from around the world will greatly contribute to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in East Asia. I wholeheartedly thank Prime Minister Goh for his leadership in forging the support at the ASEAN plus Korea, China, Japan summit that he so ably chaired, and the support he has so graciously expressed in his press statement. Ladies and gentlemen, improvements in inter-Korean relations and the settlement of peace on the Korean Peninsula will provide the East Asian countries with greater economic opportunities. The economic conditions in North Korea are poor at this point, especially in terms of the social infrastructure. However, North Korea also has a high-quality low-cost work-force, abundant mineral resources, and beautiful tourist attractions. Because of its geographical location, North Korea can become a gateway to great economic opportunities in the three northeastern provinces of China, Russia's maritime province of Siberia, Mongolia and further in Central Asia, and even further in Europe. Going through North Korea, the cost and time for cargo transport can be reduced significantly. I urge all countries of East Asia, including

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Singapore, to take an active interest in trading with and investing in North Korea. South Korea will do all it can to support such efforts with information and materials. We will of course welcome such efforts taking the form of joint ventures with South Korean companies to advance into North Korea. Distinguished guests, North Korea has begun to take part in joint efforts for the security of East Asia by joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July this year. The APEC leaders have decided to welcome North Korea's participation in the activities of its working groups. We have also begun to accept North Korea as a responsible member of the international community. Ladies and gentlemen, peace on the Korean Peninsula and peace in East Asia are indivisible. Prosperity on the Korean Peninsula and prosperity in East Asia are also closely linked. Let us work together for the greater peace and prosperity that will be shared by Koreans and all other peoples of East Asia. The future, I am convinced, will reward us very handsomely in these efforts. Thank you for your kind attention.

III

Discussion

Chairman: Ladies and gentlemen, I thank President Kim for his Lecture. President Kim has kindly agreed to take questions from the floor. If you should wish to ask a question, please identify yourself, put forward your point, keep it brief, and confine it to one point at a time. I ask for the first question. Question: I am Geraldine Goh, from Channel NewsAsia. Sir, how can the success of the Korean peace initiative be emulated across the Taiwan Strait to bridge the ideological divide and promote greater dialogue and engagement that will foster peace, security and stability in East Asia? Kim Dae-jung: I must say that it is a very difficult question and I am not sure I have an easy answer to that. This may not be an answer to the question but my feelings, my perceptions about the situation there. When I was first faced with the very hostile stand-off between South and North Korea, which was the situation not too long ago, it was a situation far more intense than that which exists between China and Taiwan at this point. South and North Korea have lived as hostile enemies for half a century, we have fought a very serious war that resulted in millions of casualties, and even today, whereas China and Taiwan are separated by the sea, South and North Korea are separated by only barbed wire. So when I first faced this situation, it seemed an almost impossible situation to overcome.

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However, given this extreme situation, a couple of factors were very vital. The first factor is the conviction that no matter what the rhetoric is, no matter the hostility in terms of the words spoken, deep inside both sides must want peace; deep inside both sides must want to avoid a violent conflict which will result in great destruction for both sides. Based upon this assumption, based upon the trust in the aspirations for peace on both sides, I thought I must come out with a proposal to the other side, a proposal that would be good for both sides, a proposal that would be appealing to the other side. Having made the proposal, I should continue to repeatedly table that proposal even though the other side may initially refuse it. Thirdly, such a proposal must be something that would appeal to all the other countries who are closely watching, who are worried that something may flare up from the very tense situation. And finally, that to succeed in the end you must be patient, consistent, and sincere in intentions. Thank you. Question: Mr President, my name is Richardson from the International Herald Tribune. You have emphasized the importance of direct high-level talks between the United States and North Korea, and Japan and North Korea. Do you think that U.S. President Bill Clinton should visit Pyongyang to hold such talks before he leaves office on 20 January, or would you prefer to see his successor, whoever that may be, undertake that delicate diplomatic task? Secondly, do you think that Japan is being flexible enough in its negotiations with Pyongyang on normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea? Kim Dae-jung: This is a very difficult question from a journalist from an outstanding newspaper. Whether President Clinton should or should not go, this would be a decision for the President to make, depending upon his reading of all the situations concerned, including the domestic situation in the United States.

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In Brunei for the APEC summit, on the sidelines, I had a bilateral consultation with President Clinton, and he presented that exact question to me in the bilateral talks. I responded to that by saying that since the June summit, since my return from Pyongyang, I had been consistent in saying that the United States must present somebody who can deal directly with Kim Jong-il, whether that be President Clinton or somebody else. I also commented on how, as I saw the results, Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright's visit to Pyongyang and discussions with Kim Jong-il had achieved very significant successes in terms of working towards the resolution or the issues that lay between the two sides. I went on to say, from my perspective, of course we want all the issues - the pending issues between the two sides, including the North Korean missile issue - to be resolved as soon as possible. That's my basic position. But whether this should be done by President Clinton or not, the decision has to be made based upon various considerations, including the domestic political considerations in the United States. I added, should President Clinton, after having taken into consideration all the factors including the domestic political consideration, decide to go, I will fully welcome the decision. Concerning North Korea-Japan talks, I must say that I have been like an "errand boy" between Prime Minister Mori and the North Korean leader. Before going to Pyongyang, I spoke to Prime Minister Mori, and he asked me to convey to Chairman Kim Jongil his wish for an early normalization of relations between Japan and North Korea. I conveyed the Prime Minister's wish to the Chairman. The Chairman said, please tell Mr Mori that he received the message with gratitude. So upon returning from Pyongyang, I called Mr Mori and conveyed the message from the Chairman, and I added that, like the United States, Japan, in order to make any progress to reach key decisions, must present someone who can deal with Kim Jong-il, the

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Chairman himself, because he calls all the shots, he makes all the decisions in the North. Since then, Prime Minister Mori has taken some bold steps towards North Korea. I understand that he has sent several letters to the Chairman. He has also decided to extend 500,000 tons in food assistance to the North. But in the negotiations, the Japanese Government is in a very difficult situation because of the domestic public opinion. On both sides, the colonial past still stands as a very big barrier. In Japan also, the public resentment is very strong, calling for a resolution to the issue of Japanese nationals that have been reportedly kidnapped by North Korea. However, with advances in South-North Korean relations, and advances in U.S.-North Korean relations, I believe that this will be a very positive stimulus for things to progress between Japan and North Korea as well. South Korea, the United States, and Japan have closely coordinated a trilateral agreement in the area of security thus far- the security of the Peninsula and the region. Since the summit and with the beginning of reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula, security will continue to be our common task, but along with this, we now have another task to promote among the three countries, and that is, to improve relations with North Korea and all three countries. Question: I am Eunice Yoon from CNBC. When do you expect the peace process to get into talks on actual arms reduction, and why hasn't that come up so far in any serious way? Kim Dae-jung: Well, it's difficult to say when serious talks will begin in this regard but that is the direction we are aiming at. As mentioned in my speech, our approach to the dialogue with North Korea is, at this point, two-track. The first track is to expand exchanges and cooperation in various areas, in terms of separated families, in terms of

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economic co-operation, and in terms of social and cultural exchanges, so as to strengthen the understanding, trust and homogeneity of the Korean people. The second track, as I have said, is tension reduction in order to achieve durable peace. We have already had the first South-North Defence Ministers Meeting, and it produced three basic agreements. The first is that the two sides will not engage in another war, that the military of the two sides will actively co-operate and support the implementation of the 15 June joint declaration. Thirdly, on a more concrete level, that the two sides would render all the assistance necessary to relink the railroad, to rebuild the highway linking the Kaesong industrial complex with the South, as the construction work requires the co-operation of both sides because these efforts have to be made in the demilitarized zone. To further implement these agreements, especially on the construction within the demilitarized zone, we have working-level military consultations between the two sides. We have proposed to North Korea that the second Defence Ministers meeting be held as soon as possible, when we hope to be able to get the North to engage in discussions on some concrete measures towards confidence-building, such as the establishment of a military hotline, agreement to notify each other in terms of massive military troop movements, and to invite observers from the other side to various military exercises and to participate in military personnel exchanges. Once these small steps have been agreed on, in further consultations between the two defence ministers, we will be able to take more concrete steps towards a durable peace system on the Korean Peninsula. Then there is the four-party talks among South and North Korea, the United States, and China- talks designed to discuss a peace system for the Korean Peninsula. But the four-party talks have

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not been held since August last year. The primary reason for the break in the talks last time was North Korea's continued insistence on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula, but as I have told you, they no longer make that demand. Therefore, I see the need for the revival of the four-party talks and I took the occasion of my talk with Chinese Prime Minister Zhu Rongji on the sidelines of the ASEAN plus 3 summit here, to ask his views on the four-party talks, and he readily agreed that they should be revived. We already have an agreement with the United States that the talks should be revived. Our plan at this point is therefore to make the proposal to North Korea that the four-party talks should resume. Our approach to the four-party talks is that South and North Korea should be the principle parties to sign the peace treaty that will replace the amnesty. With the United States and China providing encouragement and support for the peace treaty, the issue that you raise of arms reduction can of course be discussed within the fourparty framework. Thank you.

IV

Closing Remarks Chia Siow Yue

Mr Chairman and Deputy Prime Minister, Brigadier-General Lee Hsien Loong, Your Excellency President Kim Dae-jung, Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong and members of the Singapore Cabinet, your excellencies, distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is honoured and privileged to have the President of the Republic of Korea deliver the 19th Singapore Lecture. We congratulate President Kim on winning this year's Nobel Peace Prize. The international media has called him "Asia's Mandela". He has crowned his lifelong struggle for human rights and democracy in South Korea with a successful "Sunshine Policy" of peace and reconciliation with North Korea, which brings to an end a half century of hostility between the two Koreas. East Asia, including Singapore, looks forward to enjoying the peace dividend in political, strategic, and economic terms. It is now my very pleasant task to ask all of you to join me in thanking President Kim for sharing with us his vision of peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula and his bold and persevering efforts towards realizing this vision. We wish him well in the exciting yet difficult task ahead. We would also like to thank General Lee for so graciously agreeing to chair this 19th Singapore Lecture, and we are privileged by the presence of the Prime Minister, members of the Cabinet and judiciary, members of the diplomatic corp, and so many distinguished

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guests. As a token of the Institute's appreciation we would like to present President Kim with a water-colour painting of Singapore by Mr Ong Kim Seng, Singapore's leading water-colour artist. The Chairman of the Institute's Board of Trustees, Mr Chia Cheong Fook, will make the presentation. Ladies and gentlemen, the 19th Singapore Lecture is now concluded. I thank you all for your support and your presence today, and wish you a good day.

KIM DAE-JUNG Kim Dae-jung is President of the Republic of Korea. He was elected to the presidency on 18 December 1997. Born on 3 December 1925 in the South Cholla Province of South Korea, he graduated from the Mokpo Commercial High School in 1943. In 1970, he obtained a Master's degree in Economics from Kyunghee University, Seoul. He was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard University from 1983 to 1984, and completed his Ph.D. in Political Science at the Diplomatic Academy of the Foreign Ministry of Russia, Moscow, in 1992. He also spent six months as a Visiting Fellow at Clare Hall, Cambridge University, in 1993. Kim Dae-jung began his political career in 1960 as the spokesman of the ruling Democratic Party. In May 1961 he was elected to the Fifth National Assembly, but it was dissolved four days later following a military coup. In November 1963 he was elected to the Sixth National Assembly, and continued to serve in the Seventh, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fourteenth National Assemblies. In August 1966, he became the chairman of the Policy Planning Council, and a member of the Central Executive Board of the Minjungdang (People's Party), but in February 1997 he became the spokesman of the New Democratic Party, formed by the merger of two opposition parties, and was elected a member of the Party Central Executive Board. In 1971 he contested in the seventh presidential election and won a substantial percentage of the votes but in October 1972 President Park Chung Hee suspended the Constitution and instituted the Yushin System. Kim Dae-jung went into exile and organized anti-dictatorship movements from Japan and the United States. In August 1973 he was abducted in Tokyo by the Korean Central Intelligence Agency. He survived two assassination attempts but was forcibly taken back to Seoul and placed under house arrest. He was charged and imprisoned for five years for violating the Emergency Decree No. 9, but his sentence was later suspended and he was again put under house arrest. In 1979, his house arrest was lifted when President Park was assassinated. In May 1980, however, he was rearrested and charged with treason. He was sentenced to death but in 1981 the sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and subsequently reduced to twenty years. In December 1982 the prison term was suspended and he again went into exile in the United States. In 1987, he was cleared of all charges and regained full political rights. He founded the Party for Peace and Democracy and contested the thirteenth presidential election that year, obtaining 27 per cent of the votes. In April 1991 he founded the New Democratic Party through the merger of two parties and became its president.

21 Later that year the party merged with the old Democratic Party to form the Democratic Party. Unsuccessful in the fourteenth presidential election in 1992, he resigned from the National Assembly and retired from active political life. However, he inaugurated the National Congress for New Politics in September 1995, and went on to contest the presidential elections in December 1997, which he won handsomely. Kim Dae-jung has received numerous awards and honours and been conferred many honorary degrees from universities in Korea, China, the USA and Russia. He has also published about forty books in Korean, as well as English and other languages.

THE SINGAPORE LECTURE SERIES

Inaugural Singapore Lecture 14 October 1980 The Invisible Hand in Economics and Politics by MILTON FRIEDMAN 2nd Singapore Lecture 30 October 1981 American Foreign PoliCJ'.' A Global View by HENRY KISSINGER 3rd Singapore Lecture 2 December 1982 Peace and East- West Relations by GISCARD D'ESTAING 4th Singapore Lecture 10 November 1983 The Soviet Union: Challenges and Responses as Seen from the European Point of View by HELMUT SCHMIDT 5th Singapore Lecture 8 November 1984 The Western Alliance: Its Future and Its Implications for Asia by JOSEPH M.AH. LUNS 6th Singapore Lecture 5 December 1985 Deficits, Debts, and Demographics: Three Fundamentals Affecting Our Long-Term Economic Future by PETER G. PETERSON

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7th Singapore Lecture 25 November 1986 Trends in the International Financial System by RAYMOND BARRE 8th Singapore Lecture 27 November 1987 The Challenge of Change in the Asia-Pacific Region by BOB HAWKE 9th Singapore Lecture 14 December 1988 Regionalism, Globalism and Spheres of Influence: ASEAN and the Challenge ()f Change into the 2 I st Century by MAHATHIR BIN MOHAMAD lOth Singapore Lecture 15 October 1989 Trade Outlook: Globalization or Regionalization by BRIAN MULRONEY 11th Singapore Lecture 3 April 1991 International Economic Developments by R.F.M. LUBBERS 12th Singapore Lecture 4 January 1992 U.S. Policy in the Asia-Pac(fic Region: Meeting the Challenges of the Post Cold- War Era by GEORGE BUSH

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13th Singapore Lecture 8 September 1994 India and the Asia-Pacific: Forging a New Relationship by P.V. NARASIMHA RAO 14th Singapore Lecture 17 January 1996 Australia, Asia and the New Regionalism by PAUL KEATING 15th Singapore Lecture 14 January 1997 Reforms for the New Era of Japan and ASEAN: For a Broader and Deeper Partnership by RYUTARO HASHIMOTO 16th Singapore Lecture 6 March 1997 South and Southern Africa into the Next Century by NELSON R. MANDELA I 7th Singapore Lecture 30 November 1999 China and Asia in the New Century by ZHU RONGJI

18th Singapore Lecture 14 February 2000 Global Values: The United Nations and the Rule of Law in the 21st Century by KOFI A. ANNAN 19th Singapore Lecture 27 November 2000 Peace on the Korean Peninsula and East Asia