A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons: Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development [1st ed. 2023] 3031452321, 9783031452321

Citation preview

A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development Edited by

Chan Young Bang

A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons

Chan Young Bang Editor

A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons Perspectives on Socioeconomic Development

Editor Chan Young Bang DPRK Strategic Research Center KIMEP University Almaty, Kazakhstan

ISBN 978-3-031-45232-1 ISBN 978-3-031-45233-8 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

Following two previous international conferences, first in Almaty and then Beijing, the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University organized a third conference in collaboration with the Institute of World Economics and Politics at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (IWEP-CASS) and the Charhar Institute, both based in Beijing, on the topic of denuclearization and the establishment of permanent peace, stability, and economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. The conference was held online in the spring of 2022, and attended by scholars and experts from the USA, the UK, France, Germany, South Korea, and China, as well as six scholars from KIMEP University. Among the attendees who have since contributed to this book, we are honored to present chapters by eminent figures including Zou Zhibou, deputy director of IWEP-CASS, John Everard, a former British Ambassador to the DPRK, and Sung-Wook Nam, director of the Institute for National Unification at Korea University. This book addresses such a timely issue while the DPRK is facing an economic and humanitarian crisis and is increasing its hostility. In addition to the outstanding contributions produced by the conference participants, two additional chapters have been added which discuss the essential topics of the implications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and the benefits that South Korea could gain from the North’s denuclearization. The following chapters are the product of fruitful discussions between like-minded scholars, who share a belief that there is a way for the DPRK v

vi

PREFACE

to denuclearize in a peaceful and organized way, which will lead to permanent peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and joint economic prosperity in the Northeast Asian region. The DPRK is a threat to world peace, making the question of whether there is a way for it to denuclearize without collapse or war one of paramount importance. Added to this is the question of whether North Korea’s denuclearization can provide an environment conducive to peace, stability, and prosperity across the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The contributors to this book believe that both outcomes are possible and should be prioritized in scholarship and policy. The main objective of this book is to clearly and persuasively explain the genuinely achievable possibility of an orderly denuclearization of the DPRK, which could provide invaluable benefits not only to those suffering under the oppressive Kim regime but also to South Korea, China, Japan, Russia, and the USA. As editor of this book, the chapter I have contributed on the one effective approach to bringing about North Korea’s denuclearization is a topic which is both close to my heart, and of exceeding importance. South Korea could see a wealth of benefits from a well-orchestrated denuclearization process but is not the only country that would gain. The economies of all Northeast Asia would see a more prosperous future from a South Korean-led initiative for a package deal in which the DPRK trades its nuclear weapons for a bright future. I hope that you, as a reader, will be as convinced as this book’s contributors that North Korea can achieve economic development in the future if denuclearization efforts follow the right path. There remains hope that the people of North Korea will see a future free of oppression and poverty. Almaty, Kazakhstan

Chan Young Bang

Acknowledgments The DPRK Strategic Research Center of KIMEP University consists of a team of prominent researchers who are dedicated to exploring peaceful prospects for a resolution to the North Korean nuclear crisis. The dedicated efforts of Anthony Rowett and Jeremy Lonjon served as a great help in the publication of this book.

Contents

1

Introduction Chan Young Bang

1

2

North Korea and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Chan Young Bang

7

3

Only One Approach to Denuclearization Will Work, and It Will Bring Economic Benefits to South Korea Chan Young Bang

11

North Korea’s Nuclear Capability and What the Implications Are for Wider East Asia Sung-wook Nam

27

Learning to Love the Bomb: Depictions of Nuclear and Missile Technology in North Korean Literature Meredith Shaw

35

The North Korean Nuclear Issue: Root Causes and Solutions Zhibo Zou

51

4

5

6

7

The Situation on the Peninsula Out of the Vicious Circle Requires Consideration of the Concerns of All Sides Guohong Qiu

75

vii

viii

CONTENTS

8

Can the DPRK Preserve Its Sovereignty Without Nuclear Armaments? John Everard

85

Armistice, North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula Lei Wang

101

9

10

Conclusion Chan Young Bang

Index

129

137

Notes on Contributors

Chan Young Bang Ph.D. is the Founder and President of KIMEP University, Principal Investigator at the DPRK Strategic Research Center, and a former economic adviser to Nursultan Nazarbayev, the first President of Kazakhstan. His current research focuses on nuclear nonproliferation and the economic development of the DPRK (North Korea). Dr. Bang was born in 1936 on the Ongjin Peninsula, at the time a part of South Korea, but which changed hands during the Korean War and is now part of North Korea. He taught economics for four years at the University of California, Los Angeles, and subsequently obtained a tenured position as Professor of Economics at the University of San Francisco in 1978. At USF, he served as the Chairman of the Economics department for 16 years and served as executive director of the university’s Research Institute of Asian/Pacific Studies. Dr. Bang has received numerous orders and awards, including for his contribution to education in Kazakhstan from the country’s Ministry of Education and Science, and the highest order that can be granted to a foreigner, the Dostyk Order. Dr. Bang has been awarded many honorary degrees and professorships, among them an honorary doctoral degree from the Institute of Far-Eastern Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences and distinguished professorships from Beijing Normal University and Capital University of Economics and Business, in Beijing. He has published numerous articles on prospects for the peaceful settlement of the North Korean nuclear conflict. His latest book in the

ix

x

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

English language Transition beyond denuclearization - A bold challenge for Kim Jong Un was published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2020. John Everard a former British diplomat, served as British Ambassador to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. He was educated at Emmanuel College, Cambridge where he studied French, German, and Chinese. He then attended Beijing University for a year, studying history and economics, as one of only the third group of foreign students allowed into China after the Cultural Revolution. He also holds an M.B.A. from Manchester Business School. He served in the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office for twenty-seven years, working in Austria, Bosnia, Chile, and China. He served as Ambassador to Belarus, to Uruguay, and finally to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea from 2006 to 2008. After his retirement in 2008, he was appointed Pantech Fellow at the Shorenstein AsiaPacific Research Center at Stanford University from 2010 to 2011 when he wrote a book “Only Beautiful, Please” discussing his experiences of North Korea. From 2011–2012 he coordinated the UN Security Council Panel of Experts on North Korea. Since 2012, he has written extensively for the media, broadcast, and lectured, both on Korean issues and on international affairs generally. Sung-wook Nam is a former President of the Institute for National Security Strategy (2008–2011) and General Secretary of the Democratic Peaceful Reunification Advisory Committee (Vice Minister, 2012–2013). Dr. Nam is also a director of the Institute for National Unification at Korea University, having held the post since 2022. He has been a professor in the Department of Diplomacy and Unification at Korea University since 2002. Dr. Nam is an East Asia expert with theoretical and practical experience in academia, government, and intelligence services in North Korea and China. He has worked as an analyst for South Korea’s National Intelligence Service. He received a Ph.D. in Applied Economics from the University of Missouri-Columbia, USA. He is the author of “North Korean Food Shortage and Reform of Collective Farm” (Utz Verlag, Munchen Germany 2006), “Chronic Food Shortages and the Collective Farm System in North Korea” (Journal Of East Asian Studies, Volume 7, Boulder, CO, 2007). “Evaluation of the North Korean July 2002 Economic Reform” (North Korean Review, Volume 3, Jefferson, North Carolina 2007), “Current Status and Future Tasks of the New SEZs in North Korea” (East Asian Review, The Institute for East Asian

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

xi

Studies, Seoul, 2006), Serious Food Shortage of North Korea and Agricultural Cooperation between North and South Korea” (The Journal of peace studies, Vol. 7, No. 2, Seoul, 2006). Guohong Qiu is the Former Chinese Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to South Korea. Chief Research Fellow of Northeast Asian Affairs at the Charhar Institute. Qiu Guohong was born and raised in Shanghai. After graduating from Shanghai International Studies University he was assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. Mr. Qiu spent 20 years working in the Chinese Embassy in Japan before serving as Deputy Director of the Asian Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China in 2006. In 2008 Ambassador Qiu was promoted to become the Chinese Ambassador to Nepal, a position he held until April 2011. From 2011 to 2014, he was the Director of Security Affairs at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China. In January 2014, he was appointed the Chinese Ambassador to South Korea by the 12th Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress. After his assignment in South Korea ended in 2020, he acted as Chief Research Fellow of Northeast Asian Affairs at the Charhar Institute. Meredith Shaw is an associate professor in the Institute of Social Science at the University of Tokyo and the managing editor of the Social Science Japan Journal. Her work examines cultural politics and state efforts to manipulate culture in Northeast Asia. Her research has been published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, The Pacific Review, and Journal of East Asian Studies, and she has also written for The National Interest, Global Asia, and The Diplomat. Dr. Shaw worked for several years as a research assistant and translator at the Korea Institute for National Unification before obtaining a Ph.D. in Political Science and International Relations from the University of Southern California. She was a 2019 Korea-US NextGen Scholar and is in the inaugural cohort of the Mansfield-Luce Asia Scholars Network. Since 2017, she has maintained the North Korean Literature in English blog project (http://dprklit.blo gspot.com/). Lei Wang received his Ph.D. in international politics from Renmin University of China. He was a visiting scholar at Seoul National University. He is now an assistant researcher at the Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS). His main

xii

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

research interests are the transformation of international order, China’s regional security environment, China’s foreign policy and strategy, Northeast Asian security, North Korean nuclear issues, and Iranian nuclear issues. He has published several papers in high-quality journals, including the Journal of World Economics and Politics, Diplomatic Review, Contemporary World and Socialism. In the field of policy research, Dr. Wang is the author of many policy research reports from CASS, including the assessment of China’s border security environment and the security situation of the Korean peninsula. He has received many research awards from universities and institutions. Zhibo Zou is a senior fellow and deputy director of the Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), his research field focuses on international relations and security strategy. Zou has been engaged in research on missile and nuclear technologies, nuclear strategy, arms control, and non-proliferation successively, and has won several National Science and Technology Progress Awards. After having completed research in social sciences, He has published a dozen CSSCI papers and many articles. As delegation advisor, he participated in UN negotiations, and multilateral and bilateral meetings on arms control, disarmament, and strategic security. He served as head of the research division and deputy director of the institute under the Ministry of Defense, inspector of United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Committee (UNMOVIC) and as counselor for disarmament at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs successively.

CHAPTER 1

Introduction Chan Young Bang

Uncertainty over the North Korea denuclearization problem has grown with the onset of the war on Ukraine and the new conservative South Korean President, Yoon Seok-Yeol. Achieving peace and prosperity within the entire Korean Peninsula is becoming increasingly challenging for the same reasons. These uncertainties will inevitably affect the policies of surrounding countries toward North Korea and will likely raise not only diplomatic tension but, more importantly, military tension in the region. Bargaining costs became higher as North Korea completed nuclear weapons development. This cost will increase once the DPRK succeeds in developing sophisticated weapons such as downsized missile warheads. Therefore, this book, which discusses how to reach a nuclear-free Korean peninsula and bring peace and prosperity to the DPRK, is highly relevant to the future of the Korean Peninsula. A bipolar world system seems to have been restored. This has changed the dynamics of geopolitics. The duration of the Russian war in Ukraine has long surpassed a year, and there is no sign among the Russian troops of a ceasefire. North Korea may try to seize this opportunity and stand

C. Y. Bang (B) DPRK Strategic Research Center, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_1

1

2

C. Y. BANG

with China and Russia as a united front again. China’s confrontations with the US on trade since Donald Trump’s presidency of the US and Russia’s war in Ukraine aggravated US–China and US–Russia relations. Recently we saw clear evidence of the shift in the balance at the United Nations Security Council meeting where China and Russia vetoed a UNSC resolution to further sanction North Korea for its missile tests. While China and Russia were supportive of sanctions in 2017, these two states opposed the adoption of additional sanctions on North Korea to condemn its recent missile test in which three different types of missiles were fired at once. This bipolarization is an opportunity for North Korea because its military threats, like missile tests and restoring the nuclear program, are unlikely to be challenged by sanctions. The new South Korean president changed the dynamics of geopolitics in two ways. First, the conservative president takes a tit-for-tat policy on North Korea and is supportive of nuclear deterrence power. This is likely to raise tension in the Korean Peninsula. Within the first six months of Yoon’s presidency, Pyongyang fired more missiles than it had done during previous administrations. Further, the two countries put on an airshow by flying twenty fighter jets over the western water of the peninsula. Second, unlike the previous administration, which balanced between China and the US on the economy and politics, the new administration argues for a stronger security alliance with the US and takes a firm stance against China. President Yoon urges large-scale joint military exercises with the US and Japan. Whereas, when President Moon Jae-in was in office, exercises were kept small in order to minimize provocations toward North Korea. Since our last volume in 2016, there have been massive developments on the issue of North Korea’s denuclearization, both positive and negative. China and Russia agreed to additional and severe UNSC sanctions that devastated North Korea’s economy. Sanctions ban the export of coal, iron, lead, and seafood, which are North Korea’s most exported items. Further, sanctions limit crude oil and petroleum imports. However, political dynamics between the two Koreas and the US exponentially changed after President Moon and Kim Jong-un met at Panmunjom, the de facto border between the two Koreas, on April 27, 2018. This led to bilateral meetings between President Trump and Kim Jong-un. However, the failure of the Hanoi Summit led the issue again to a stalemate. The outbreak of COVID-19 and North Korea’s complete border closure further deepened the deadlock. Uncertainties grew, as explained

1

INTRODUCTION

3

earlier in the chapter, on solving the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula within the new bipolar world and with the new conservative South Korean president. The discussion in this volume covers issues of timing, recent developments, and constraints. It also looks into the geopolitical situation of the Korean Peninsula from the perspectives of China, South Korea, the US, and North Korea. The first chapter of the book, North Korea and the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty, by Chan Young Bang analyzes the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the flaws in its text which have led a number of countries to query its legitimacy. Prior to the initiation of its nuclear weapon program, North Korea acceded to the Non-Proliferation treaty under pressure from Mikhail Gorbachev, who demanded that Kim Il-sung sign the treaty in return for the Soviet Union’s construction of a nuclear power station in his country. The DPRK accepted this while the Soviet Union was still in existence, but in the early 1990s, Russia, quickly followed by China, began diplomatic relations with South Korea, and the Soviet subsidies on which North Korea depended ceased. By the time of the Arduous March, the Kim regime was losing its controlling mechanisms as it turned a blind eye to the non-socialist practice of marketization from below, staving off state collapse, but also losing claims to legitimacy. With Russia and China drawing close to the US and South Korea, North Korea found itself in a crisis, with no nuclear umbrella, as its Southern neighbor received from the US, and facing an existential crisis as famine began to set in. It took ten years from the 1993 declaration that the DPRK would withdraw from the NPT before it did so in 2003, and conducted its first nuclear test in 2006, initiating the UNSC sanctions which have since deepened the country’s inevitable crisis. The chapter Only One Approach to Denuclearization Will Work, and It Will Bring Economic Benefits to South Korea by Chan Young Bang discusses the inter-related issues which have led to the DPRK’s current regime crisis, and posits the sole solution to Kim Jong Un’s woes: a package deal which, if Kim makes the decision to accept it, would greatly increase the regime’s chances of survival. The chapter is a compilation of articles by the author, which have been recently published in the media, namely the South China Morning Post and Daily NK. If the Kim regime is to survive, North Korea must experience rapid economic development, which can only be achieved through reform of its dysfunctional system.

4

C. Y. BANG

Sung-wook Nam in his paper North Korea’s Nuclear Capability and What the Implications Are for Wider East Asia provides a grim view on solving the nuclear weapons problem. He reviews the nuclear development history from Kim Jong-il’s era. He claims that history repeats itself, with Kim perceiving the war against Ukraine and its withdrawal of nuclear armaments as a reason for North Korea to reconsider complete denuclearization and continue military provocations. Meredith Shaw takes a different approach to the North Korean nuclear issue. In Learning to Love the Bomb: Depictions of Nuclear and Missile Technology in North Korean Literature, she asks how North Koreans evaluate the dangers and value of their nuclear armament. She surveys North Korean state literature which plays a unique and important role in social order and mass political education. She finds that the nuclear program, and its superiority over any similar technology possessed by South Korea, is central to North Korean national pride. North Korea emphasizes the value of nuclear technology to national pride in widely spread propaganda, therefore, to denuclearize would be to deprive the public of their perceived global status. In The North Korean Nuclear Issue: Root Causes and Solutions, Zhibo Zou reviews the history of North Korea’s nuclear development project and claims that an asymmetric strategic security balance between the two Koreas after the Cold War, and the same logic that the US placed toward the Eastern Bloc to dominate regional power in Europe during the Cold War, motivated Pyongyang to develop its nuclear weapons. Despite rounds of talks during the Trump administration, substantial disagreements between North Korea and the US made it difficult to denuclearize the DPRK. Unless the US makes a strategic decision to comply with a long-term step-by-step approach, it is likely that the best chance of denuclearization will be a voluntary abandonment of its nuclear program by the DPRK, in which China can play a constructive role. Guohong Qiu, in The Situation on the Peninsula Out of the Vicious Circle Requires Consideration of the Concerns of All Sides, sees that North Korea is motivated by security concerns, maintaining domestic stability, and increasing bargaining power. These are the main reasons it is developing its nuclear capability. However, the problem is difficult to solve because of the following core problems: a vestige of the Cold War still exists in the Peninsula, all parties involved in the six-party talks have dyad conflicts, the end-goals of the DPRK and the US do not align, and the absence of a consistent South Korean governmental policy toward North

1

INTRODUCTION

5

Korea. He suggests that strategic patience based on mutual trust and a step-by-step approach can solve these issues. Former Ambassador John Everard asks Can the DPRK Preserve Its Sovereignty Without Nuclear Armaments? in his paper. He discusses what sovereignty is to the DPRK and claims that it perceives it as not only freedom of decision and action in various fields but also as a sense of national prestige and dignity. However, he suggests that the development of nuclear weapons has weakened its sovereignty because of constraints that are imposed on the DPRK’s economy and international politics. John Everard, then, analyzes why the DPRK’s claim that nuclear weapons are a deterrence power against the US’s potential invasion is flawed, and how the development of nuclear weapons has shifted the international perceptions of the DPRK. Finally, he discusses the direct and indirect costs to the DPRK of having a nuclear program and implications of COVID-19 and the Ukrainian war. In Armistice, North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula, Lei Wang expresses concern over the decreased efficacy of the armistice regime, and how it affects the stability of the Korean Peninsula. He claims that a weak agreement that limits the binding force, as well as the collapse of the balance of power in the region has reduced the efficacy of the regime. Further, nuclear weapons put the DPRK at greater risk because of the hardline policies against it, in turn making the country unable to develop its diplomatic relations and economy, and increasing the possibility of nuclear proliferation in the region. He then analyzes bilateral and small/large multilateral solutions to solve the nuclear problem and provides paths that serve the best interests of engaged countries to build peace in the Korean Peninsula and the region. This conference was of great significance to KIMEP University and the DPRK Strategic Research Center. In the months following the conference, the Center’s Principal Investigator, Dr. Chan Young Bang, initiated the establishment of a jointly run research center, specializing in SinoNorth Korean relations, past, present, and future, in collaboration with Professor Shen Zhihua, of the Institute for International and Area Studies at Tsinghua University, in Beijing. This promises to be a greatly beneficial endeavor, not only for the institutions involved but also for the future of the DPRK and its people.

CHAPTER 2

North Korea and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Chan Young Bang

What motivated the DPRK to develop its own nuclear weapon program? Chairman Kim Jong-un believes his regime cannot survive without nuclear weapons. The regime follows the ideology of Juche, which can be loosely translated as self-reliance and is a tool used to channel power toward Kim and away from the Workers’ Party. Until the fall of the Soviet Union, North Korea depended on its communist “allies” for its security in the bipolar world of the Cold War. In the 1990s, the DPRK was left with no nuclear umbrella and did not trust its neighbors, making a nuclear weapon program a necessity to avoid dependence on China and Russia. Today, the nuclear weapon program upholds North Korea’s rivalry with the South, which is twice as large in terms of population and has an economy more than 50 times as large as the DPRK’s. To the regime, the nuclear weapon program is a way to promote a belligerent foreign policy, which emanates from its ideology. In short, the

C. Y. Bang (B) DPRK Strategic Research Center, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_2

7

8

C. Y. BANG

DPRK considers its nuclear weapon program to be a strategic asset and a means for its survival as a sovereign state. In this chapter, we discuss four critical questions on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its connection to the DPRK. Our conclusion is that, if any attempt to denuclearize the DPRK is to succeed, all involved must understand the benefits which Kim believes the nuclear weapon program provides, and the importance of compensating for these if the DPRK is to survive as a non-nuclear weapon state. 1. What is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and what is its aim? The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), aims to prevent the global spread of nuclear technology other than for peaceful use, and ultimately to achieve complete nuclear weapons disarmament. The treaty was adopted in June 1968 and took effect in March 1970.1 In the NPT, “nuclear weapon state” refers to countries that possessed nuclear weapons prior to January 1, 1967. The nuclear weapon states recognized by the NPT are limited to five countries: the United States, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China. 2. What prompted the leadership of the DPRK to join the framework of the NPT in 1985? The DPRK signed the NPT on December 12, 1985. At the time, Mikhail Gorbachev persuaded Kim Il-sung to join the NPT framework in exchange for the delivery of two reactors.2 North Korea joined the NPT in 1985 but did not sign a Safeguard Agreement until 1992. Even after signing the agreement, the regime obstructed thorough inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and removed questionable nuclear facilities from the list of declarations.

1 2021. 북핵을 넘어 통일로. pp. 98–100. 2 Pollack, Jonathan. 2011. No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International

Security. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. p. 94.

2

NORTH KOREA AND THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION …

9

3. Why did the leadership of the DPRK feel compelled to withdraw from the framework of the NPT in 2003 (after a first attempt in 1993)? On January 7, 1992, South Korea announced the suspension of the South Korea-U.S. Team Spirit joint military training exercise. However, in early March 1993, Seoul and Washington reneged on this decision, triggering a reaction from Pyongyang. North Korea defined the exercise as “practice for nuclear war against North Korea” and declared a “quasi-state of war.” North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT on March 12, 1993. According to the regulations of the NPT, a withdrawal would take effect only after a three-month grace period. When the grace period ended on June 12, North Korea became the first country in NPT history to voluntarily withdraw.3 4. What are the shortcomings of the treaty? Specifically, what is the double standard between the club of “official” nuclear weapon states and the “unofficial” nuclear weapon states such as India and Israel? The premise of the NPT is that further proliferation of nuclear weapons could lead to the destruction of mankind because of their formidable power. While this may be the official line taken by the treaty’s authors, many assert that it constituted a strategy to guarantee the nuclear weapons oligopoly of the great powers and to maintain the shared global hegemony of the United States and Soviet Union. As a result, the NPT became an unequal treaty that granted privileges to the five nuclear powers and imposed obligations on the rest. All non-nuclear countries handling fissile materials such as uranium or plutonium must report to the IAEA and undergo inspections. Countries also have an obligation to prove that nuclear material is not used to develop nuclear weapons. The inequality of the NPT has been controversial since its inception.4 Israel, India, and Pakistan succeeded in developing nuclear weapons without joining the NPT. Israel was the first country outside the NPT to develop nuclear weapons, as the country believed that nuclear armament was essential to national security against hostile neighboring states. 3 2014. 핵보유국 북한. p. 100. 4 Ibid. pp. 9–27.

10

C. Y. BANG

Despite widespread acknowledgment of Israeli nuclear weapons, the country will neither confirm nor deny ownership. The US double standard has been recognized as a problem in relation to Israel’s nuclear weapons development. As soon as Israel’s nuclear development became a fait accompli, the United States changed its stance to one of support. In 1969, a secret agreement was signed between President Richard M. Nixon and Prime Minister Golda Meir. In exchange for condoning Israel’s nuclear armament, the United States promised to maintain “nuclear obscurity,”—a policy of refusing to acknowledge Israel’s nuclear program on the condition that it would not test a nuclear weapon, officially declare its possession of nuclear weapons, or make use of its nuclear weapon program in diplomacy. India is the second country outside the NPT that has successfully developed nuclear weapons. China’s nuclear test in October 1964 spurred India to begin its own nuclear program. China’s nuclear development became a major threat to India and, in the late 1980s, India began to develop nuclear weapons, because Pakistan had begun nuclear development with the help of China. Attempts to resume nuclear testing in the 1990s were thwarted by US pressure. ∗ ∗ ∗ North Korea’s withdrawal from the NPT raises the question of what strategic importance the nuclear arsenal provides for the DPRK. The program has five attributes: (1) it is a credible means of deterrence against military threats, real or imagined, (2) it is a cost-effective way to achieve military parity with the South, (3) it is a pillar of the byungjin policy, (4) it provides legitimacy to the Kim regime, and (5) it enables North Korea to wage its belligerent foreign policy, which emanates from its ideology. In order to achieve the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, all the above-mentioned attributes must be compensated for. The DPRK must be offered a package deal that will provide the country with a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear state.

Bibliography Kim Tae-U, 북핵을 넘어 통일로, 명인 문화사 (2021). Pollack, Jonathan, No Exit: North Korea, Nuclear Weapons and International Security, The International Institute for Strategic Studies (2011). 핵보유국 북한 (2014).

CHAPTER 3

Only One Approach to Denuclearization Will Work, and It Will Bring Economic Benefits to South Korea Chan Young Bang

Introduction South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol has a rare window of opportunity to initiate an orderly denuclearization of North Korea and establish permanent peace and stability through economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula. Yoon is the only actor who can devise a transformative package deal to ensure the DPRK a better chance of survival as a non-nuclear armed state. To achieve this, the South Korean government must formulate a viable shared policy through the framework of the Six-Party Talks. The five stakeholders must join together and collectively make Kim Jong-un an offer he can’t refuse. Relinquishing nuclear weapons per-se in return for security guarantees, the lifting of sanctions, and the provision of financial resources

C. Y. Bang (B) DPRK Strategic Research Center, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_3

11

12

C. Y. BANG

will neither ensure the survival of the regime nor lead to permanent peace and stability on the Korean peninsula, unless the DPRK transforms its economy into one based upon market socialism, by undertaking market-oriented reforms. Depending upon Chairman Kim’s denuclearization strategy, the DPRK regime will either fail or have a high likelihood of achieving economic prosperity and bringing permanent peace and stability to the Korean Peninsula. There are three potential scenarios that will result in distinctly different outcomes: (1) maintaining the status quo, which will both impede survival and instigate acute instability, (2) abandoning nuclear weapons with the aim of building a socialist state, which would neither result in the necessary peace and stability, nor ensure the DPRK’s survival, or (3) dismantling nuclear weapons and trading them for a bright future of rapid and sustained economic development, which is his only viable option. It goes without saying that if the DPRK is to achieve economic prosperity, which can only come about with peace and stability across the Peninsula, it must be preceded by the implementation of market-oriented reform, therefore radically altering the ruling ideology by renouncing Juche. As long as the Juche ideology, euphemistically defined by the regime as self-reliance based upon class struggle, remains, North Korea will neither be able to achieve economic development, nor permanent peace and stability. This ideology is the root of the country’s confrontational foreign policy, and for as long as the regime upholds its belligerence, there can be neither peace and stability, nor economic integration, which are necessary for economic development. Should Kim adopt these radical changes, South Korea will see the greatest opportunities of any country. The DPRK’s transformation would bring new opportunities in industries including logistics, seafood, and tourism, and rapid growth of exports, as well as a low-cost and welldisciplined labor force across a newly open and stable border. South Korea must therefore be the largest provider of essential financial resources to the DPRK, because it would benefit the most from the economic development of its Northern neighbor. This would be part of a package deal which also includes a peace treaty, security guarantees, and the previously mentioned market-oriented reforms. It must be noted that without a radical change to North Korea’s ruling ideology, denuclearization would bring neither peace and stability, nor economic prosperity since this is the root of the belligerence which impedes its development.

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

13

Kim Jong-un’s Miscalculations Leave His Regime in North Korea Hanging by a Thread Kim Jong-un faces a critical challenge to his leadership, which will decide the fate of North Korea as a sovereign state. The country is looking at its worst socio-economic crisis since the “Arduous March” of the 1990s, which resulted in the deaths of millions. The Kim regime is experiencing acute insecurity, and this is manifesting both economically and politically. Three events precipitated this crisis. First, North Korea’s decision to conduct a sixth nuclear test in 2017 prompted a severe escalation of sanctions, which were adopted by the United Nations Security Council with the support of China and Russia. These sanctions caused North Korea’s economy to deteriorate. Gross domestic product contracted, causing a reduction in per capita income and subsequently consumption. A prolonged decline in exports also led to a cumulative trade deficit. Attempts to compensate for this trade deficit depleted foreign exchange reserves, impeding the country’s ability to import. The sustained contraction of exports, the state’s main source of revenue, also meant a fiscal crunch, while shrinking imports of raw materials and consumer necessities, including food, jeopardized the output of the state manufacturing sector, induced food insecurity and instigated inflation. The resulting depreciation of the domestic currency eroded purchasing power, stimulating the circulation of foreign currencies. The disruption of state manufacturing also contributed to “marketisation from below” and the proliferation of the non-state sector—also known as the shadow economy—which now accounts for an estimated 70% of the economy. This led to the spread of corruption and an unequal income distribution, and the state losing the ability to effectively coordinate economic activity, impairing its legitimacy. Second, the regime’s disproportionate response to the coronavirus pandemic exacerbated the deterioration of the state agricultural and manufacturing sectors, already in decline since 2017. Subsequently, the economy has shrunk further. To compensate for the fiscal deficit, the government has had to squeeze financial resources out of the merchants, and the donju (“masters of money”) involved in moneylending, in the jangmadang, the country’s private market grounds.

14

C. Y. BANG

Thus, UN sanctions and the pandemic have accelerated North Korea’s economic contraction. Between 2017 and 2021, its gross domestic product shrank by an estimated 12–13%. As a result of UN sanctions, exports plunged by 91%, from US$2.82 billion in 2016 to US$240 million in 2018. Exports continued to plummet during the pandemic. By 2021, North Korea’s trade deficit with China had grown to an estimated US$8.29 billion, which led to the further depletion of foreign exchange reserves. Meanwhile, the contraction of the state manufacturing sector encouraged the proliferation of the jangmadang, where workers can earn 80 times their state salaries. To uphold national unity and his legitimacy, Kim turned to a belligerent foreign policy, involving armed provocation and nuclear saberrattling. North Korea launched 69 ballistic missiles last year, and has fired more than 27 more missiles so far this year. The cost of missile testing was an estimated US$650 million in the first half of last year, more than 2% of its GDP. Coupled with setbacks in the manufacturing sector, the decline in grain production has led to a food shortage. The lack of fertilizers and equipment, an inefficient farming system, and recurring droughts and floods contributed to the low agricultural productivity. The country needs an estimated 5.95 million tonnes of grain annually but produced only 4.5 million tonnes last year—a shortfall that is causing mass starvation. Third, given the dire socioeconomic situation, Kim desperately needed a breakthrough. He has chosen a bold strategic initiative: declaring North Korea a de jure nuclear weapon state, endorsing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and attempting to form a trilateral partnership with Russia and China. Kim’s decisions were based on two critical premises. One, that Russia would achieve its strategic military objectives in Ukraine and emerge as the victor. Two, that China would embrace North Korea as a fully fledged alliance member and give it much-needed economic help as a way for Beijing to counter the alliances led by the US as part of its China containment policy. Kim’s gamble backfired and the alliance did not materialize. His assumptions are incorrect and based on miscalculations. Nuclear weapons are not only a threat to the US but also to China. Beijing is focused on unification with Taiwan. North Korea’s military provocation, backed by nuclear weapons, will incite Washington to deploy advanced weaponry to the region, compel the US, Japan and South Korea

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

15

to form a trilateral military alliance, and may push Tokyo and Seoul to adopt their own nuclear weapons programs, all of which are detrimental to China’s strategic objectives. For China, the geopolitical polarization caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine also means the cost of providing illegal economic help to North Korea has skyrocketed. The threat posed to North Korea does not stem from a hostile external military invasion, but from internal contradictions and system irrationalities. Ironically, the more Kim provokes other countries with his intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons, the more vulnerable his regime becomes. The regime has lost its legitimacy, having seen the erosion of its bureaucratic controlling mechanisms—the rationing system—and the collapse of the “small coalition” system of leadership. The only remaining means of preserving state integrity is the use of terror and repression, and as the predicament worsens, the regime must escalate these measures. For Kim, there is no light at the end of the tunnel and the survival of his regime hangs by a thread. North Korea’s Ideology—Not Its Weaponary—Is Preventing Peace in the Peninsula American acceptance of North Korea as a nuclear state would do nothing to de-escalate the situation or reduce the risk of war. De jure recognition of North Korea’s nuclear weapon program would prevent an amicable resolution to end the conflict around WMDs in North Korea. There are six reasons for this. First of all, it is essential to understand the underlying motivations and implications surrounding the DPRK’s nuclear program. The nuclear weapon program facilitates the country’s already hostile foreign policy. Recall Mikhail Gorbachev’s reminder that foreign policy is a continuation of domestic policy, and domestic policy is embodied and regulated by ideology. In North Korea, the ruling ideology, which is based upon class struggle, has fostered a hostile foreign policy. This has led to the development of the nuclear weapon program. The DPRK’s nuclear weapon program is a consequence of its hostile ideology, though many experts erroneously believe the reverse.

16

C. Y. BANG

Consequently, whether the DPRK’s illicit program is recognized or dismantled, it will continue its constant military threats toward the South and others. As the late Georgian president and former Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs, Eduard Shevardnadze, stated: “returning to the absolute of class origin means to resurrect the ‘image of the enemy,’… Presupposing a totally hostile encirclement means cultivating a siege mentality [and] engaging in confrontations and conflicts without respite.” Many fail to understand this point. Recognizing the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state and hoping for peace is illogical; as long as hostile ideology prevails, foreign policy will be belligerent. Dismantling nuclear weapons may alleviate the severity of the threat, but the threat will nevertheless remain. In order to achieve permanent peace and stability, the ideology must be abandoned. The second point is that should the DPRK be allowed to become a nuclear weapon state, which blatantly violates international law, it will propagate massive illicit proliferation of weapons of mass destruction elsewhere. It goes without saying that accepting the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state would instigate intense armed competition among countries in the region. South Korea and Japan would both initiate their own nuclear weapon programs, undermining world peace and stability. The third argument: the US sees the DPRK’s threat as a regional one, but for South Korea, it is existential. The problem is compounded by the stark variation in economic success. South Korea has a GDP of $1.8trn, whereas the North’s is around $30bn. Per capita income in the DPRK is around $1,000, compared to $35,000 for residents of the South. This extreme disparity creates a rivalry between the two states and leaves no room for peaceful coexistence. While extreme inequality between the two states persists, there will be no peace. Should aggression transform into war, the conflict would exponentially grow to involve superpowers and regional states, much in the way of the Korean War, many decades ago. Fourthly, it is widely assumed that warmongering is aimed only at Seoul and Washington, but the DPRK’s nuclear weapons also threaten China and Russia. This underscores why China and Russia voted in favor of severe UNSC sanctions against North Korea in 2017. There is a deeply held mistrust between North Korea and China, with both seeing the other as having betrayed the principles of socialism. The hereditary and monolithic dictatorship of the DPRK and its claim to be the only state to succeed in establishing a worker’s paradise, based upon the Juche

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

17

ideology, i.e., a scientifically advanced, sublimated form of conventional socialism, clashes with the principles of China’s market socialism. Should the US recognize the DPRK as a nuclear weapon state, South Korea and Japan, as well as China and Russia, will not follow suit. Acceptance will impinge upon their strategic interests. Comparisons with India and Pakistan, or Israel, are unreasonable. India and Pakistan are rivals, but do not threaten countries with different socio-political systems. For Israel, nuclear weapons serve as a means of deterrence against foreign invasions. The DPRK is ideologically bound to threaten countries that do not share the same socio-political system. The fifth point to be made concerns the DPRK’s desire to reunify with the South, and on its own terms. Since the end of the Korean War, reunification has been an overriding strategic aim of Pyongyang. The unyielding commitment of the US military has thwarted North Korea’s armed aggression. Finally, there is a misunderstanding among specialists as to why all previous US initiatives to denuclearize the DPRK have singularly failed. The US’s failure to achieve denuclearization stems from its inability to introduce a shared policy, which the stakeholder states would faithfully endorse, and to collectively offer a package deal North Korea cannot refuse. Acceptance of the package deal would ensure a genuinely better chance of survival for the DPRK as a nuclear weapon free state, while refusal would lead to regime collapse. It should be noted that the nuclear weapon program is a means of survival, not an end unto itself, for North Korea. A package deal consisting of economic compensation and security guarantees will not ensure a genuine chance of survival unless dismantling nuclear weapons brings robust economic development. Only the achievement of sustained dynamic economic development with the implementation of viable market-oriented reforms would ensure a genuine chance of survival, and in doing so, preserve the regime’s legitimacy. Should this deal be consummated by the DPRK, it would pave the way to peace and stability, as well as joint economic prosperity on the Korean Peninsula.

18

C. Y. BANG

China Has One Good Policy Option as a Nuclear-Armed North Korea Cozies up to Russia The Russian invasion of Ukraine has ravaged facilities in major cities and displaced millions of refugees. It has also caused a geopolitical polarization, splitting the world into two blocs: South Korea, Japan and most European countries have joined the US to counter China, North Korea, Belarus and Russia. In response, North Korea is devising a new role by firmly aligning with Russia against the US alliance. Firstly, North Korea was one of five countries in the United Nations to support Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and has reportedly committed to supplying labor and ammunition, a charge it denies. Secondly, Pyongyang supports Russia’s latest annexations of Ukrainian territories and recognizes Donetsk and Luhansk as independent states. Thirdly, Pyongyang has changed its nuclear doctrine, codifying nuclear arms development into constitutional law on September 8, 2022, claiming it will use nuclear weapons preemptively if a threat is perceived. Lastly, it is rapidly modernizing its weapons of mass destruction, with 69 ballistic missiles tested in 2022. Pyongyang’s belligerent stance, taken under these geopolitical circumstances, undermines the stability of Northeast Asia and poses a serious dilemma to China in optimizing its geopolitical objectives. Though Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping have a “no limits” partnership, Russia’s military debacle in Ukraine has turned Xi’s relationship with Putin into a liability. Given North Korea’s newly evolving role as a nuclear state and strategic alignment with Russia, any policy option China may adopt will affect its geopolitical and strategic aims. China’s strategic objectives in a nutshell are permanent peace and stability in the region, joint economic prosperity, reduction of US military and political influence in the region, its own regional dominance and emergence as an eminent global power, and a military and economic environment conducive to the one-China policy. Faced with North Korea’s new role, China has three policy options, the first being that it could maintain the pre-war status quo. Pyongyang’s new stance calls for intensified armed provocation. In 2017, following North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, China and Russia endorsed the US initiative to escalate sanctions against the country. Should North Korea conduct a seventh nuclear test, China would have

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

19

to join any US-led initiative at the UN Security Council supporting a severe escalation of sanctions—or abstain from the vote. If the stakeholder states (South Korea, China, Japan, Russia and the US) fail to block North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, its military provocations and nuclear testing would bring acute instability. This would provide justification for the US to reinforce its military presence in the region and deploy advanced strategic military assets, including expanding its Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, an anti-missile shield installed in South Korea. Furthermore, should the US, South Korea and Japan formally establish a trilateral alliance, it would invigorate their military power and result in more frequent joint military exercises. This would impede China’s strategic objectives and thwart Beijing’s efforts to create an environment conducive to its one-China policy. Finally, if China were to enforce sanctions on North Korea, it would further exacerbate hardship and instigate even greater economic instability. This instability will aggravate the Pyongyang regime and reflect back on the outside world in the form of greater armed aggression. This is an option that will deepen the uncertainty of Pyongyang’s survival. As a second option, Beijing could embrace North Korea as a nuclear state and formally establish a trilateral strategic alliance with Moscow. But such a decision would also impinge upon China’s geostrategic objectives. It would be a potential disaster for the nuclear non-proliferation movement, possibly inciting Japan and South Korea to initiate their own nuclear weapons programs. Moreover, Beijing would be breaching its UN nuclear non-proliferation treaties, tarnishing its international image. Russia’s defeat in Ukraine is a distinct possibility while North Korea uses nuclear weapons to wage hostile foreign policy as a means of survival. Such an alliance would only attract retaliation from the US and its allies, including Japan and South Korea, leaving Beijing isolated. The global supply chain would have to be forcibly rearranged. The US Chips and Science Act, for instance, could further restrict the transfer of microchips, constraining China’s participation in the global value chain and significantly slowing down Chinese economic development. A China-Russia-North Korea alignment would also give the US the impetus to bolster its China containment policy, and a pretext to invigorate regional alliances such as Aukus, the Quad, and the Indo-Pacific Economic Forum. This would jeopardize Beijing’s security and make the one-China policy harder.

20

C. Y. BANG

A third option is that Beijing could, in collaboration with the stakeholder states, make an offer North Korea cannot refuse, providing a distinctly better chance of its survival as a non-nuclear state. This package deal must entail a lifting of all sanctions, including military threats, an offer of security guarantees, and economic development funds to enable North Korea to achieve a sustained and dynamic economic development, together with market-oriented economic reforms and opening. These provisions would imply that North Korea would be trading its nuclear weapon program for a bright future. Should such a deal be consummated, it would pave the way for permanent peace and stability in the region, joint economic prosperity, and the curtailment of US military presence on the Korean peninsula. It would also create an environment conducive to the achievement of the one-China policy. Success would redefine US–Chinese relations, enhance China’s prestige on the international stage, and promote world peace.

With North Korea on the Edge, Kim Jong-un Has Three Options---But Only One Will Ensure Regime Survival North Korea and its leader, Kim Jong-un, are living on borrowed time. This brutal truth is evident given the nation’s dire state of affairs. The protective shield that has served as a bastion for Kim has evaporated. A derelict and inefficient command economy, harsh sanctions, and the Covid-19 border closures have left Kim in an untenable position. He has no viable exit strategy to guarantee his survival or that of North Korea. In light of these issues, Kim has three options as North Korea struggles for survival. The first is to maintain the status quo and seek survival as a nuclear weapon state, but this is untenable. Nuclear weapons fulfill four essential functions in sustaining North Korea and Kim’s rule. First, the nuclear armaments deter all real and imagined US military threats while cost-effectively providing military superiority over South Korea. Nuclear weaponry is also one of the two pillars of the byungjin policy (economic development and military development in parallel through nuclear arms). By disarming, North Korea would simultaneously be

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

21

relinquishing byungjin by losing its most cost-effective source of military power. Moreover, the development of a nuclear weapons program symbolizes a monumental achievement, from which Kim draws his legitimacy as supreme leader. Internally, nuclear weapons secure public solidarity through the waging of a belligerent foreign policy. Yet internal, not external, threats will lead to North Korea’s demise. Its steep trade deficit has drained the treasury and foreign reserve funds. This imbalance has essentially halted all imports and exports necessary for even the basic functioning of the economy. Since the state command economy has failed to provide for its citizens’ basic needs, a robust shadow economy (estimated to constitute 70% of North Korea’s economy) has emerged via “benign neglect.” The collapse of state enterprise has rendered the rationing system effectively useless. The prevailing reality of life in North Korea, aided by the inflow of uncensored information, contradicts the ruling ideology. With no other controlling mechanisms, Kim’s only remaining tool is terror, which will eventually lead to a breaking point when Kim loses control of the nation. The second option is to trade nuclear weapons for the lifting of sanctions, and security guarantees from the international community, while continuing to build up a socialist country based on the ideology of class struggle and Juche. However, Kim cannot restore a socialist state because of the irreconcilable contradiction between the ruling ideology and prevailing reality that will precipitate a loss of legitimacy and the disintegration of the regime. The ideology of class struggle precludes market-oriented reform, opening up, or any peaceful coexistence with the international community. Without the credibility and cost-effectiveness of a nuclear arsenal, a confrontational foreign policy is untenable. In the event that Kim decides to give up his nuclear arsenal without radical economic reform, North Korea is likely to disintegrate. As a distorted socialist state on the verge of collapse, the nation faces chronic economic deficits as it is burdened by a military budget that takes up about 20% of its gross domestic product, which has weakened Kim’s internal and external controlling mechanisms. Pursuing this second option would obstruct the necessary structural economic reform—a viable restructuring from heavy industry into exports and the consumer goods-oriented industry—and would halt integration with the global economy. To ensure Kim’s legitimacy without nuclear weapons, popular support is required.

22

C. Y. BANG

This will only come from spectacular economic development and improvements in people’s economic well-being. The third—bold and audacious—option, is if Kim were to trade nuclear weapons for a “bright future,” which would more than compensate for what he loses by giving up nuclear arms. In delivering this “bright future,” Kim would become a benevolent authoritarian leader, engineering a spectacular economic miracle through robust economic development. This can be accomplished via a multilateral deal with a tangible economic fund, tied to market economy reform and disarmament conditions. A shared framework between the US, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea would align the strategic interests of all stakeholders, while employing all the “sticks” and “carrots” that no one stakeholder, not even the US, could. Under such a deal, all sanctions would be lifted for North Korea to sustain economic growth at 10% per year over an initial 10-year period, to maximize its chances of survival. Consequently, Pyongyang would have to cease its brinkmanship and adopt a friendly foreign policy to attract foreign investment. Shifting from a totalitarian system to an authoritarian one would usher in free-market economic principles: property rights, a free labor market, and the legalization of free enterprise. Fuelled by a US$300 billion economic development fund, financed by stakeholder nations, this package would deliver a “bright future” with sustainable economic development as a market socialist state by implementing market-oriented reform, which would foster infrastructure, institutional, and human resource development. For this deal to materialize, the US should normalize relations and diplomatically recognize North Korea, North and South Korea should sign a peace treaty, and the US should assure its military withdrawal from the Korean peninsula on fulfillment of the terms. In addition, newly reaffirmed defense pacts with China and Russia would provide added security. North Korea’s transformation into a vibrant economy would stabilize the geopolitical balance between US and Chinese strategic interests, and ensure the only viable exit strategy for Kim.

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

23

Why South Korea Must Lead Efforts to Denuclearize the Peninsula The Yoon Suk-yeol administration in South Korea is the only party that can lead the deal and institute denuclearization. It must do so by establishing permanent peace and stability through joint economic prosperity on the Korean peninsula. These essential attributes must either all come together or not at all. In 2022, North Korea’s ballistic missile testing hit a record high. At the time of writing, Pyongyang is thought to be planning another nuclear test, its seventh overall, which would be a blatant violation of UN Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the regime’s dysfunctional socialist economic system, coupled with the pressure of harsh sanctions, perpetuates the country’s dire economic situation and chronic instability. Only Yoon can resolve the issue, by formulating a viable shared policy involving all stakeholder states. This must include a comprehensive and economically transformative package deal offered in return for the cessation of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un’s nuclear weapons program. The deal must provide North Korea with a genuine chance of survival, trading its nuclear weapons for a bright future. There are four critical reasons the South Korean government must take the lead in devising a shared policy aimed at the denuclearization of the peninsula. First, the US’ past attempts to denuclearize the peninsula have singularly failed, due to its inability to make North Korea an offer it cannot refuse. The US is heavily dependent on a “sticks” only approach, failing to incorporate the essential “carrots” necessary to achieve strategic success. China, for its part, can wield credible “sticks,” as it accounts for 90% of North Korea’s trade, including in energy. Threats and promises, as defined in James W. Davis’ theory of international influence, constitute the only viable tool to achieve the denuclearization of North Korea. Kim must understand that his regime will end if he keeps nuclear arms. However, the sole application of “sticks” would instigate further armed provocation from North Korea and could trigger an all-out war. Only Yoon can introduce a shared policy that all stakeholders will support and that North Korea cannot refuse. Second, Yoon’s government should lead the talks as there is a critical difference in the core policy objectives of the US and South Korea. The US’ overriding objective is denuclearization. However, for South Korea, denuclearization must be accompanied by permanent peace, stability and

24

C. Y. BANG

economic prosperity on the peninsula. To accomplish these policy objectives, two conditions must be fulfilled. There must be a practical end to hostility between the two Koreas. This will only come about if denuclearization is preceded by a radical change of the Juche ideology, the main source of North Korea’s belligerent foreign policy. In addition, the North must pave the way for a bright future with sustained economic development, transforming into a market socialist system, and receiving enough financial resources from the South Korean government to support economic prosperity. For the US, North Korea is a regional threat, but for South Korea, the issue is one of life and death. Third, attempts to achieve denuclearization in the framework of the sixparty talks cannot succeed without the active support of China. Beijing has a dual function in the talks. It is the only country able to apply the debilitating 2017 UN Security Council sanctions against North Korea, and is its only socialist ally. Without South Korea leading the efforts, rather than the US, the chances are slim that China would come on board. Some conditions will also need to be met to secure Chinese support. Denuclearization must be accompanied by the realization of permanent peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. It should not take place in a way that results in the demise of North Korea. Moreover, North Korea, as a non-nuclear weapon state, must contribute positively to regional peace and stability, and serve as a buffer to counter US military influence on the peninsula. Upon the establishment of permanent peace and stability through the package deal, US troops should depart the peninsula. The US military presence is intended to provide deterrence against North Korea’s military threat and would become redundant once the North Korean threat has evaporated. Fourthly, for the deal to succeed, it must offer North Korea a better chance to survive without nuclear weapons. As previously stated the Kim regime perceives the nuclear program as a strategic asset that is essential to its survival for several reasons. The program provides deterrence against US military threats both real and imagined. It is a cost-effective way to maintain a military edge over South Korea and its vastly superior economy. It is a pillar of the byungjin policy, involving the simultaneous pursuit of military might and economic development. As a monumental achievement for Kim Jong-un, the program provides legitimacy to the regime. Finally, it is a means for North Korea to wage its belligerent foreign policy. To survive, the regime must be compensated for these attributes. It thus follows that security guarantees,

3

ONLY ONE APPROACH TO DENUCLEARIZATION WILL …

25

peace treaties, and the lifting of sanctions alone will not suffice to ensure North Korea’s survival. The only way for North Korea to survive is to secure legitimacy through the achievement of sustained, dynamic, and robust economic development, with global economic integration, implementing marketoriented reforms, and securing sufficient funds. For North Korea to survive as a non-nuclear state, Pyongyang must lay the foundation for economic modernization by achieving 10% growth per annum for at least a decade. For the package deal to ensure the survival of North Korea as a non-nuclear state, it has to be not only transactional but also transformational, converting a distorted socialist economy to market socialism.

Bibliography Bang Chan Young, ‘China Has One Good Policy Option as a Nuclear-Armed North Korea Cosies Up to Russia’, South China Morning Post (November 1, 2022). Bang Chan Young, ‘North Korea’s Ideology—Not Its Weapons—Are Preventing Peace on the Peninsula’, Daily NK (November 17, 2022). Bang Chan Young, ‘Why South Korea Must Lead Efforts to Denuclearise the Peninsula’, South China Morning Post (March 10, 2023). Bang Chan Young, ‘With North Korea on the Edge, Kim Jong-un Has Three Options—But Only One Will Ensure Regime Survival’, South China Morning Post (October 4, 2021).

CHAPTER 4

North Korea’s Nuclear Capability and What the Implications Are for Wider East Asia Sung-wook Nam

North Korea has been preparing for nuclear development much longer than most people think. The time when North Korea was supposed to have decided to develop nuclear weapons for the first time dates back to the time of the Korean War (1950–1953). North Korean founder Kim Il-sung had watched Japan, which had the loyal military forces of the Emperor in August 1945, surrender unconditionally after the dual use of nuclear weapons by the United States.

S. Nam (B) Institute for National Unification, Korea University, Seoul, South Korea e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_4

27

28

S.-W. NAM

On November 30, 1950, Chairman Kim Il-sung was frustrated by President Truman’s statement that the use of nuclear weapons and the atomic bombing could become a reality in North Korea.1 The fear of nuclear weapons felt by the leadership of North Korea, including Kim Il-sung, would have been the first motive to recognize the necessity of nuclear weapons for self-defense.2 From that time, Kim Il-sung decided to hasten the development of nuclear weapons in order to achieve a nuclear balance with the United States. North Korea began to develop nuclear weapons in September 1950, when General MacArthur landed at the Incheon port and deployed the military forces of South Korea and the United States on a 38th parallel.3 In October 1952, before the armistice, North Korea established the Korea Institute of Science and Technology (KOSE) to systematically study science and technology and established the Atomic Energy Research Institute under the Chosun Academy of Sciences.4 Around the same time, in 1954, the People’s Armed Forces Department set up a nuclear-armed defense force to take measures against the US military attack. Accordingly, the United States focused on identifying North Korea’s intentions to develop nuclear weapons.5 Since the 1960s, Kim Il-sung had already made several official references to his desire for nuclear possession. North Korea, which had feared that the United States might use nuclear weapons at the time of the Korean War, rebuilt the People’s Army in 1954 and set up a “nuclear weapons defense” division

1 Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War”, International Security,

13 (3) (Winter, 1988–1989), pp. 72–76. 2 Kim Il-sung pledged in his writing that his father Kim Hyung-jik emphasized the following statement: “When burglars come into the house and threaten you with a sword, no matter how much you ask the burglary to save your life, the burglary can’t save your life. If the guy outside the house is also a robber, hearing the clamor, other people can’t help you. In order to defend my life, I must fight the robbers with my own strength. When you fight a robber who is holding a sword, you have to fight with a knife to win.” “Contents of the Pledge,” in Kim Il-sung, Reminiscences: With the Century Vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Chosun Labor Party Publishing Company, 1992), p. 47. 3 Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences: General of Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 384. 4 Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 3 (9) (September 1991), p. 405. 5 Kim Il-sung, “Current Situation and Current Task”, Kim Il-sung Collection 6 (Pyongyang: Labor Party Publishing House, 1980), p. 45.

4

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND WHAT …

29

within the People’s Army. The reason why North Korea paid much attention to nuclear weapons during the 1950s and 1960s originated from the international situation in which North Korea was involved. First, North Korea was very afraid of the US Air Force and nuclear weapons during the Korean War, and in particular was disappointed by the indifferent behaviors of the Soviet Union during the Korean War and the unwillingness of the Chinese Army to participate in the initial stage of the war. Due to the neutral stance of friendly socialist countries in the 1950s, North Korea was determined to have a military strategy of securing its “ability to perform its own war.” As the conflict between China and the Soviet Union became very clear in the mid-1960s, North Korea chose “Juche diplomacy,” which maintained a certain distance from China and the Soviet Union. North Korea’s nuclear arsenal development had been attempted in the political and global context of North Korea, while both China and the Soviet Union were seen as unreliable.6 It was only in 1989 that the North Korean nuclear issue was publicized as an international concern, even though North Korea began to show interest in the nuclear issue from the end of the Korean War. As North Korea conducted six nuclear tests since 2006,7 various sanctions were adopted by the UN Security Council. Despite the enormous sanctions and maximum pressures, however, North Korea claimed to have succeeded in experimenting with nuclear weapons and launching the ICBM, a transport vehicle, and also completing its weight reduction, miniaturization, and diversification. In recent years, North Korea has threatened that the US mainland has been placed within range of the ICBM strike. Since the unconventional Trump administration was established in 2017, the North Korean nuclear issue has been deployed at a new level. In 2018, the first summit between the United States and North Korea was held in Singapore. Since then, the two countries have been unable to find any meaningful contact point between North Korea’s request for a declaration to officially end the Korean War and the lifting of sanctions and the United States’s claim for reporting, inspection, and verification of nuclear weapons and facilities in North

6 Sung-wook Nam, North Korean Nuclear Weapon and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (Singapore: World Scientific, 2020). 7 Olli Heinonen, “North Korea Has Started Nuclear Development Since the Signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1994”, Joongang Daily News Paper (May 18, 2018), p. 10.

30

S.-W. NAM

Korea. The second summit between the United States and North Korea was being pursued in Hanoi in 2019 but failed to reach an agreement. Pyoungyang will not accept in the near future the denuclearization type like the Ukraine Model pushed strongly by former US Secretary of Defense William Perry in the 1990s. He described in his book “My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (2015)”8 that the process of bridge between Congress and the administration to finance the removal of nuclear weapons left in new independent countries such as Ukraine after the Soviet Union was disbanded. Perry led the process of dismantling 80 ICBMs and 800 nuclear warheads.9 The recent crisis in Ukraine also describes the situation in which a new Cold War order is constructed and diagnoses new changes in Northeast Asian international politics swiftly developed due to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Before and after the Singapore and Hanoi summit during 2018–2019 between the United States and DPRK, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un visited China five times in six years of power and has strengthened friendly Sino–North Korean relations. In fact, Chinese leader Xi Jinping had been in full engagement with Kim Jong-un in advance of the summit with US President Trump as he intended to utilize North Korea as leverage so that he would be able to resist against the pressure of the United States demand in the trade and hegemony war. The complex international order of Northeast Asia is being built on the occasion of the North Korean nuclear crisis. History repeats itself. International politics is also repeated. The Northeast Asian international politics, in which the Cold War frame has not changed much since the middle of the twentieth century, is being operated with a fusion of past, present, and future, based on tactical strategies of North Korean diplomacy. Faced with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea will reinforce its negative perception of complete and verifiable denuclearization. North Korea’s supreme leader, Kim Jongun, is likely to come to the conclusion that Ukraine’s tragedy was in part due to denuclearization in 1990. International politics entering the new Cold War era will have a negative impact on the denuclearization and unification of the Korean Peninsula. This is because North Korea is

8 William J. Perry, My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford University Press, 2015). 9 Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy

for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999).

4

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND WHAT …

31

likely to reject complete denuclearization and the international community will not agree to a reunification of the Korean Peninsula with nuclear weapons. On the other hand, if North Korea persists in military provocations such as missile launches while insisting on possessing nuclear weapons, South Korea will try to solve the problem diplomatically and at the same time seek a balance of horror by attempting to independently, not feasibly, develop nuclear weapons. According to a poll conducted by the Chicago Global Affairs in December 2021 through a Korean polling agency, Support for nuclear weapons is robust, with 71% in favor of South Korea developing its own nuclear weapons, while 56% support a deployment of US nuclear weapons in South Korea.10 Now, the Ukraine crisis will further complicate the resolution of the Northeast Asian nuclear issue. In 2022, North Korea is highly likely to review various military provocation cards, such as the ICBM launch and the 7th nuclear test, in order to resolve sanctions against North Korea using the vulnerability of the US front line. With the inauguration of President Yoon’s government this month, the fight for hegemony between Pyongyang, Seoul and Washington began again in earnest. The difference from the time when the conservative Korean government was established in the past is the full appearance of nuclear weapons. General Secretary Kim Jong-un declared “the preemptive use of nuclear weapons” at a military parade in April. He published the Nuclear Doctrine, which presented the ambiguous criterion of “deprivation of the fundamental interests of the state” as a “precondition for the use of nuclear weapons.” The standard use of nuclear weapons has been lowered by shifting from a defensive standpoint of preventing war to an offensive one. In an interview with foreign media, President-elect Yoon announced that he would “invigorate investment in North Korea” and “provide important technology-related information” assuming that North Korea takes denuclearization measures. However, instead of responding to the demand for denuclearization, Kim Jong-un responded by declaring a “preemptive use

10 Toby Dalton, Karl Friedhoff, and Kim Lami, Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2022), retrieved from: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/public-opinion-survey/thi nking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons.

32

S.-W. NAM

of nuclear weapons” and launching the 14, 15, 16, and 17th missile in May 2022. Kim Jong-un’s remarks on the use of nuclear weapons for attack are a declaration that nuclear weapons are the first means of foreign policy. The denuclearization, which was put forward to evade sanctions by the international community every six times, removed the camouflage of Kim Il-sung’s practice. The tragedy brought about by the denuclearization of Ukraine, the strengthening of the ROK-US alliance since the inauguration of the government, and Pyongyang’s intention to lift sanctions against North Korea with China and Russia on their backs were combined. The second and third underground rock tunnel at Mantapsan Mountain, Punggye-ri, Gilju-gun, North Hamgyeongbuk-do, at an altitude of 2200 meters, has completed preparations for the 7th nuclear test. The North Korean-style strategy, which combines nuclear warheads, ballistic missiles, and artificial satellites, has become visible. The 7th nuclear test will be D-day before and after President Biden’s visit to Korea and Japan on the 20–25th of May. The variable is the timing of pressure on the United States to lift sanctions. North Korea, backed by China and Russia, is struggling to find the optimal time to neutralize sanctions against itself by pressing the United States, whose front has expanded to Eastern Europe. The 7th nuclear test aimed at miniaturizing nuclear warheads means the collapse of the Maginot Line, not the Red Line of security on the Korean Peninsula. The North Korean nuclear weapon is an asymmetric weapon that bypasses South Korea’s three-axis missile defense system. An extreme phenomenon in which thousands of conventional weapons cannot compete with a single nuclear weapon is the “asymmetry” of nuclear weapons. This is why superpowers and dictatorships insist on possessing nuclear weapons. Starting with the first nuclear test in 2006, the previous five nuclear tests were conducted using the plutonium method of a multi-step process, whereas the sixth nuclear test in 2017 was conducted in the method of mass production of uranium using enrichment technology. North Korea has entered the path of a mass nuclear weapon production system. If you live with the nuclear in your head until the 5th nuclear test, the 6th nuclear test is about living with the nuclear in your heart. The Korea National Defense Research Institute predicted that North Korea would have a maximum of 232 nuclear warheads in 2026. The 7th nuclear test

4

NORTH KOREA’S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY AND WHAT …

33

will strangle us with the actual deployment that utilizes various delivery means, such as a submarine-launched missile (SLBM) and a small multiple warhead monster intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). North Korea’s 7th nuclear test is like opening a Pandora’s box. When people opened the lid that should not open, all kinds of disasters and demons jumped out and spread to the world. It seems that hope for security on the Korean Peninsula is disappearing and all kinds of disasters are coming. It will open the prelude to a nuclear domino game not only on the Korean Peninsula, which is a geopolitical “pivot state,” but also on international politics in Northeast Asia. Taiwan, which is already in a state of emergency due to the Ukraine crisis, as well as Japan, which is concerned that China’s invasion of Taiwan is not a long-term concern, but a short-term concern, can also shake off the image of an atomic bombed country and agonize over the discourse of nuclear weapons. According to a poll conducted by the Chicago Council on International Affairs (CCGA) of 1,500 Korean adults in December last year, 71% supported the development of nuclear weapons. In October of last year, two professors, Jennifer Lind and Daryl Press, of Dartmouth College, wrote an article in the Washington Post titled “Should South Korea Make Nuclear Weapons?”. The two experts, husband and wife professors, believed that South Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons could be legitimate and justifiable based on Article 10 of the NPT, which states that “in an emergency that jeopardizes the country’s terrestrial interests, it may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).” Even US professors judged that South Korea’s own nuclear armament was the only option left in a situation where the United States showed no interest in NATO-style nuclear sharing. However, South Korea’s nuclear program is not simple. South Korea has a traumatic nuclear program. In 2000, a research-level uranium separation experiment conducted at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute in Daejeon raised serious concerns in the international community, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Foreign media made special headlines every day, saying, “Korea has started developing nuclear weapons.” The South Korean nuclear wave that shook world diplomats for several months ended with the chairman’s conclusion that the IAEA board of directors concluded that “the amount of nuclear material involved in this case is not significant and there have

34

S.-W. NAM

been no tests so far, and South Korea welcomes corrective measures and cooperation with inspections.” At that time, it was before the North Korean nuclear test and nuclear development was taboo, but in 2022, as the North Korean nuclear weapons are deployed together with various delivery means, security instability on the Korean Peninsula is deepening. During Biden’s visit to Korea, it is also necessary to discuss the revision of the nuclear power agreement in order to establish a joint uranium enrichment production facility between Korea and the United States. As illustrated by the title of the 2015 movie “Right then, Wrong Now” directed by movie director Hong Sang-soo in South Korea, a sophisticated roadmap for the changed world is essential. The South Korean government cannot step forward and must start with the discourse of academia and the media. It’s unclear how long it will take. However, it is clear that North Korea’s 7th nuclear test will only accelerate this.

Bibliography Bermudez Jr., Joseph S., “North Korea’s Nuclear Programme”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, 3 (9) (September 1991). Carter, Ashton B. and Perry, William J., Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999). Dalton, Toby, Friedhoff, Karl, and Lami, Kim, Thinking Nuclear: South Korean Attitudes on Nuclear Weapons (The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2022), retrieved from: https://www.thechicagocouncil.org/research/publicopinion-survey/thinking-nuclear-south-korean-attitudes-nuclear-weapons. Dingman, Roger, “Atomic Diplomacy During the Korean War”, International Security, 13 (3) (Winter 1988–1989). Heinonen, Olli, “North Korea Has Started Nuclear Development Since the Signing of the Geneva Agreement in 1994”, Joongang Daily News Paper (May 18, 2018). Kim Il-sung, “Current Situation and Current Task”, Kim Il-sung Collection 6 (Pyongyang: Labor Party Publishing House, 1980). Kim Il-sung, Reminiscences: With the Century Vol. 1 (Pyongyang: Chosun Labor Party Publishing Company, 1992). MacArthur, Douglas, Reminiscences: General of Army (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964). Nam Sung-wook, North Korean Nuclear Weapon and Reunification of the Korean Peninsula (Singapore: World Scientific, 2020). Perry, William J., My Journey at the Nuclear Brink (Stanford University Press, 2015).

CHAPTER 5

Learning to Love the Bomb: Depictions of Nuclear and Missile Technology in North Korean Literature Meredith Shaw

Introduction Thirty years after the first North Korean nuclear crisis, after decades of failed negotiations and six verified nuclear tests, a nuclear-armed North Korea seems an inescapable reality. While diplomatic minds and security analysts cycle through endless debates over how to get denuclearization back on the agenda, little attention has been paid to how North Koreans themselves evaluate the dangers and value of their nuclear armament. How do North Koreans conceive of nuclear weapons on their own soil? How do they reconcile the horror of the atomic bombings with their role in ending Japanese military imperialism and, today, their putative peacekeeping function as a deterrent? How do they navigate between their ingrained loathing of foreign nuclear threats and their own media’s bellicose nuclear rhetoric? Do they have clear conceptions of the dangers of

M. Shaw (B) Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_5

35

36

M. SHAW

radiation, meltdowns, explosions, improper spent fuel disposal, and other hazards associated with nuclear energy production? These questions are ignored in large part because of the impossibility of conducting a scientifically rigorous survey of ordinary North Koreans inside the country today. As ethnographer Sandra Fahy wrote of the value of interviewing North Korean defectors: [I]t would be highly insightful to hear [North Korean defectors] reflect on what they knew about the word nuclear in general in North Korea… Did they know what it meant? These questions could inform the researcher about how portions of the North Korean community in their area understand, conceive, and reflect upon nuclear-capable North Korea… If ordinary North Koreans never hear discussion of nuclear weapons, think nothing of the matter, and never reflect on it, then such insights could indicate a topic for information campaigns into North Korea. (Fahy 2020)

Although I lack access to conduct a survey of “ordinary North Koreans,” I have found some intriguing hints to how North Koreans perceive nuclear and missile technology in my own survey of North Korean state literature produced by the Korean Writers’ Union (KWU), which is the only literature most North Koreans are legally permitted and encouraged to read. This literature plays a unique and important role in the social order and mass political education system of North Korea, and as such it can shed light onto some of the above questions through an analysis of what it reveals, distorts, and omits about nuclear science and nuclear history. In the following pages, I explore literary references to the atomic bomb, nuclear radiation, ballistic missile technology, and past denuclearization negotiations drawn from KWU literary publications, supplemented by Rodong Shinmun editorials and articles. This analysis is based on a large corpus of North Korean novels, short stories, poetry, and “true stories” (실화) published between 1994 and the present, constructed from several private collections of digitized content as well as texts extracted via web crawling (python) script from North Korean websites (primarily uriminzokkiri.com and dprktoday.com). This corpus is not exhaustive, but it currently comprises 40 full-length historical novels and thousands of short stories, essays, and poems from the last twenty years of KWU literary output. Compiling these texts in digital format makes it possible to search all usages of certain keywords and their context—useful

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

37

for determining which subjects are emphasized, downplayed, or avoided altogether. North Korean literary fiction can get quite detailed and technical when sufficiently motivated on a given topic; stories will often pause the narrative for several paragraphs to explain a complex scientific concept or manufacturing process as if the text is intended partly as an educational supplement. This owes in part to the important role of KWU literary products in North Korea’s unique organizational life and adult political study system (Lim 2014), and it is also likely a byproduct of the unusual way in which KWU authors are recruited and fostered via the “literary correspondent” system [문학통신원]. These are part-time writers working in various industries while producing stories, essays, or poems that depict their working life (Oh 2019). Indeed, most of the biggest names in North Korean literature have histories of working in more humble industries like mining, farming, and manufacturing, and their stories reflect their backgrounds. For instance, Paek Bo H˘um was trained in the geological sciences and has written stories about developing hybrid trees and plants to solve the country’s environmental problems; Chong Ki Jong had an engineering background and has written some of the more detailed highprofile novels concerning the satellite and nuclear programs. On the other hand, certain subjects seem to be given very cursory treatment or avoided altogether—in particular, any potential dangers or negative consequences of scientific inquiry and technological development fall into this category. The following section will examine how the subjects of radiation, atomic bombs, nuclear accidents, and other aspects of nuclear technology are covered (or ignored) in state literature. This will be followed in the section titled “Narrating Past Nuclear Crises Through Fiction” by an analysis of literary depictions of North Korea’s various negotiations with the US, incorporating both technical and political aspects of the nuclear program. The section titled “Satellites, Warheads, and Scientists as Heroic Figures” will highlight literary depictions of nuclear/missile scientists and engineers as sources of tremendous national pride and hope for the future. “Conclusion” will offer some implications for how all of this affects prospects for denuclearization.

38

M. SHAW

Literary Depictions of Radiation and the Atomic Bomb Modern Western narratives of nuclear technology are heavily weighted by an assumption of shared collective memories of past precedents. Such is the expected nuclear literacy of the average Western reader that writers striving to summon a sense of urgency can simply draw upon any of a series of ominous proper nouns: Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Lucky Dragon, Idaho Falls, Windscale, Chernobyl, Fukushima. Supplementing these reallife terrors, generations of popular science fiction from Godzilla and On the Beach to The Chernobyl Diaries have further terrified Western audiences with nightmare scenarios of radiation sickness, mutations, ecological transformation, and nuclear apocalypse. With this background, it is easy to assume that the entire world must surely have similar associations of nuclear technology with the risk of terrible suffering and must therefore have similar aversions to further nuclear testing and proliferation. But what of people who have not been exposed to the same historical and popular culture narratives? Do North Koreans conjure the same terrifying word associations from nuclear disasters of the past? Do they imagine similar nightmares for the future? It is a long-established rule of North Korean literature, inherited from the Soviet socialist realist tradition, that human development must always be depicted as moving positively toward improvement. Even if there are problems in the present, visions of the future must always be utopian (Zur 2014: 328). Thus, from the outset, one might say North Korean popular culture is handicapped by a general prohibition against some of the most terrifying yet compelling storylines of an imagined nuclear future. It cannot depict a future nuclear war or post-apocalyptic vision of nuclear winter, even on the premise that the bombs were dropped by their enemies; such a story would be swiftly rejected by KWU editors as “defeatism.” Without the historical precedent of a nuclear bombing or (acknowledged) nuclear accident on Korean soil to draw upon, North Korean literature thus seems ill-equipped to give domestic readers a realistic sense of the specific terrors of the nuclear threat that they are ostensibly building a deterrent against. A search of the aforementioned corpus for radiation [방사선, 방사능, 방사성물질] yields only five entries. The only one to describe radiation in frightening terms is the 1998 novel Sabers Raised, which describes the US military dropping irradiated foodstuffs on North Korea during the

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

39

1990s famine (along with an irradiated baby dropped by parachute), and later describes workers heroically risking their lives to fix a radioactive gas leak in a mine shaft, presumably radon (Song 2002). The other references are of a nonthreatening scientific bent. A 2016 science fiction story makes passing mention of the danger to astronauts from solar radiation (Shin 2016). A 2010 novel from the Imperishable History series mentions radiocarbon [방사선탄소] amidst a detailed technical discussion of carbon dating procedures performed on remains found in Tangun’s tomb (Song 2009). A novel about North Korean agricultural science in the 1960s references radium in a passing reference to Marie Curie (Paek 1996). In fact, Curie appears frequently as something of a patron saint of female scientists, often in a role of romanticizing and humanizing scientific discovery as something that an “ordinary housewife” [가정주부] can do. Only one novel in the corpus references Curie’s discovery in connection with nuclear weapons; this occurs in the first chapter of Great Flow of History, Ch˘ong Ki Jong’s epic novel of the first nuclear crisis. In this chapter, Moon Son-gyu (the novel’s pseudonym for Kang Sokju, the chief North Korean negotiator during the first nuclear crisis) is returning to Pyongyang by overnight train when he strikes up a conversation with a young KPA officer who, unaware of his interlocutor’s identity, bluntly opines about the ongoing nuclear negotiations with the US. After listening to the soldier’s rather bellicose ideas about handling the crisis, Moon ponders quietly to himself: Nukes! Known as the double-edged sword [‚날의 검]. When she discovered radium and received the Nobel Prize, Madame Curie said that scientific inventions are like a sword with two sharp edges, and she hoped that her invention would be used only for the peace of mankind. However, contrary to her hopes, nuclear material was first used in military weapons, causing the world’s first nuclear disaster [핵참화] in Hiroshima, Japan… (Ch˘ong 1997, Part 1 Chp 1)

The same chapter provides the only detailed description of the Hiroshima bombing to be found in the corpus: August 6th , 1945, 8:15 am; An atomic bomb of unprecedented destructive and lethal power exploded in Hiroshima. The world soon learned of the horrors of that terrible day.… Some sort of detonation sparked a flash in mid-air. The next instant, the whole city shook as if an earthquake struck, trembling and undulating in a

40

M. SHAW

roar of thunder. At the same time an impossible dusk settled over the city that soon turned to complete darkness. An oddly electric gas permeated the air, and there was a foul odor. No one knew yet that it was the smell of death. Some days later, before the funeral bells had even ceased, reports confirmed 100,000 dead or missing and 50,000 injured, out of a total city population of 200,000 at the time. But even this terrible disaster was still only the beginning. Tens of thousands of people who contracted “atomic bomb syndrome” [원폭증] died one after another, beginning just days or a few weeks later. This road of death continued for many years. This gruesome nuclear disaster is precisely what the US invaders are trying to visit upon our land. (ibid.)

This is one of the very few literary references to radiation sickness I could find in the corpus; note the use of the term 원폭증 [lit. atomic explosion syndrome] does not incorporate the Korean word for radiation [방사선] and thus would be less likely to be associated with nuclear power or nuclear science research. Later in that novel, President Clinton is preparing a dastardly plan to attack North Korea under the pretense of the annual Team Spirit military exercises. As he finalizes his plan with the Joint Chiefs, we are treated to some of his thinking as he ponders historical precedents: When Truman ordered the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, immediately after signing the order he boarded the USS Augusta bound for Europe for the Potsdam Conference. He wanted to distance himself, so that when the news of the devastation came three days later, it would seem far away and unconnected to him. (Ch˘ong 1997, Part 3 Chp 13)

There are several revealing points in the above. First, the timeline appears oddly twisted; President Truman was aboard the USS Augusta when the first bomb was dropped, but he was headed home from Europe, the Potsdam Conference having already ended the week before. The timing of Potsdam is rather significant and a well-trod subject among WWII historians; Japan’s failure to respond to the Potsdam Declaration is crucial to American justifications for the atomic bombings. If North Korean readers are taught that Truman had already signed off on the bombing before Potsdam, that would represent a considerable historical misinterpretation, on par with disputing who invaded whom in the Korean War.

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

41

Second, the excerpt suggests that Truman felt shame, or at least horror, in anticipation of the world’s first atomic bombing. Similarly, the novel Eternal Life, which covers the 1994 Carter-Kim summit, describes President Carter as uncommonly ashamed of the US’ role in unleashing nuclear weapons on humanity: “After the atomic bombing of Japan in 1945 the majority of America’s youth were basking in a sense of superiority as ‘citizens of the Great American Empire,’ but the young Carter was filled with fear. He understood the horrific tragedy that the bomb represented for humanity” (Paek and Song 1997: Chp 15). Yet there are other depictions, such as the 2007 novella “The Time Has Come to Answer,” in which an American POW detained in North Korea seems absurdly proud of his country’s invention and use of the atomic bomb; in fact, the young man had left a graduate program at Harvard to join the military after hearing the news of the atomic bombing (Kim 2007). In the novel 2009, an American intelligence agent appears simultaneously proud of the scientific achievement of the bomb and disappointed by what he considers as America’s unforgivable failure to preserve its monopoly on nuclear weapons; this character’s inner monologue nicely illustrates the North Korean view of the American view of global nuclear proliferation: In the world of power, nukes could make anyone a superpower. In July 1945 Truman appeared at the Potsdam Conference to discuss the end of WWII and the post-war order, confident that the world was at America’s feet. But then the USSR had been able to match the US because it, too, developed nukes. Britain, once known as a great empire with colonies all over the place where the sun never set, lost its empire status in WWII but luckily escaped from becoming another middle-power because it, too, had a successful nuclear test in 1952. When France had its successful nuclear test in 1960, President de Gaulle shouted “Hooray for France! (프랑스 만세!) France is a greater and prouder nation as of this morning!” Experts believed that the reason China achieved equal power status with the USSR and détente with its erstwhile foe the US was because it had conducted a successful nuclear test in October 1964. Nukes were the reason why India had reached a nuclear accord with the US; why Pakistan, which had leaned one-sidedly toward China, was now embraced by both China and the US; and why Israel was able to brazenly take on the whole Arab world of 3 hundred million people. All was made possible by nuclear weapons. (Kim 2014: Chp 4)

42

M. SHAW

This cynical character later disparages past American presidents as too weak and soft-hearted to use nuclear weapons on North Korea, and he urges President-Elect Obama to use them to settle the North Korea problem before they, too, join the nuclear club. As this character is clearly an untrustworthy narrator and the “bad guy” of the novel, this raises the question: are North Korean readers supposed to feel the opposite, that past American presidents had some virtue in restraint? Such passages hint at the moral dilemmas associated with possessing nuclear weapons, but North Korean authors appear to struggle between the conflicting images of pride and guilt that they project upon Americans as the inventors of the atom bomb. It is intriguing to speculate that this may be a projection of North Koreans’ conflicted emotions about their own actions in bringing nuclear weapons onto their peninsula. By contrast, industrial nuclear accidents receive no attention at all in literary fiction; my corpus contains no descriptions of any of the major nuclear power plant accidents of the past (admittedly, the collected texts were primarily published after 1994, so some references to older disasters may be overlooked). A search of North Korea’s online Rodong Shinmun database (which regrettably only includes articles from 2016 to the present) yields only six brief passing references to Chernobyl.1 By contrast, references to Fukushima are abundant and verbose; indeed, a silver lining on the Fukushima disaster may be that it has finally drawn North Korean media attention to the dangers inherent in nuclear power. One representative article from 2019 describes Japan’s ongoing water disposal problems: It is said that if Japan dumps radioactively contaminated water into the sea, the waters near Jeju Island will be contaminated within a few months, the entire waters of the East Sea of Chos˘on will be contaminated within a year, and then the entire Pacific Ocean will be contaminated, causing serious damage to mankind.... The fact that the Abe gang intends to discharge radioactively contaminated water from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant

1 Of these, a 2019 article about Korean traditional medicine briefly mentions that Chernobyl radiation victims were brought to North Korea and healed with Korean ginseng, and a 2018 article about radioactive material from Japan’s Fukushima disaster says that Fukushima is often compared to Chernobyl. The other four all point to the same 2016 quote by South Korean President Park Geun-hye that a fire at North Korea’s Yongbyon plant “could lead to a disaster potentially worse than Chernobyl”—a statement which the articles dismiss as mere South Korean jealousy of their nuclear achievements.

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

43

into the sea reveals the uniquely cruel and savage nature of Japan, which does not hesitate to destroy the natural environment and sacrifice mankind for the sake of its own interest. Many countries around the world are operating nuclear power plants. However, Japan is the only country that wantonly discards nuclear pollutants to serve its own interests, threatening the survival of other countries and peoples. Japan is a barbaric country, a criminal country that threatens the ecological environment and safety of the world just for its own survival, not caring who else lives or dies.2

If, in general, North Korean media shows an aversion to graphic depictions of nuclear accidents, at the same time it rarely misses an opportunity to bash Japan, and it seems that the Fukushima accident was too rich a target to pass up—at least in newspaper editorials. Nonetheless, the above article seems careful to assign blame for the tragedy entirely to the villainous nature of the Japanese, thus making it appear unique to Japan and not something that could happen at any well-intentioned nuclear facility by accident or simple bad luck. The article further exaggerates Japan’s villainy by making it seem as if it plans to release untreated, still-dangerous irradiated water into the ocean.

Narrating Past Nuclear Crises Through Fiction North Korea’s nuclear negotiations with the US have been treated extensively in KWU literature; indeed, most of the American characters to receive detailed character development in North Korean fiction post-1994 are involved in some aspect of nuclear issues. The major North Korean novels covering US–DPRK nuclear diplomacy depict North Korea’s negotiators as smart, courageous, blunt, and undiplomatic—often to the point of rudeness. This contrasts with the depictions of the UN and IAEA as craven, toothless puppets of the US, and the Americans as cunning, deceitful, and desperate to defeat North Korea but also grudgingly respectful of its resourcefulness. In the aforementioned novel Great Flow of History, North Korea’s threatened withdrawal from the NPT in 1993 is explained to the reader via the mechanism of a conversation between two high-level foreign 2 Rha, Sul-ha. 2019. “핵재난을 몰아오는 범죄적망동 [Criminal act leading to nuclear disaster, haekjenanul molaonun bumjuijeok mangdong]”, Rodong Shinmun, September 4, retrieved from https://dprktoday.com/news/41227.

44

M. SHAW

ministry officials and a young officer they meet by chance on the train. The officer seems already quite knowledgeable on the subject, frustrated with the slow pace of diplomacy, and eager for a bold military solution. Their conversation serves to educate and remind readers of the major issues from North Korea’s perspective: [Foreign Ministry official:] “To explain this problem, we have to go over the whole story of how we signed the NPT and accepted inspections in the first place. As you know, the NPT designated five nuclear weapon states - the US, the Soviet Union, England, France and China. Those five can have nukes, and nobody else can. It also forbids the nuclear states from transferring nukes to any non-nuclear states, and prevents the have-nots from producing or buying them. The whole thing is designed to give the nuclear states a monopoly on nuclear weapons. It’s a very unfair treaty.” The soldier waved a hand. “I know all that.” “Of course you do. But then why on earth did our country sign this unfair treaty? This is key. The treaty also talked about forbidding nuclear states from threatening non-nuclear states, preventing the annihilation of mankind, and ultimately pursuing de-nuclearization. That’s why we signed on, so that based on these clauses we could demand that the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons and nuclear bases from the South and stop threatening us....We signed, the IAEA started its inspections, five times they proceeded normally, then all of the sudden last year, prodded on by the US, they said there was some discrepancy between our report and the inspection findings and asked to inspect military installations. That’s when the bickering started.” [First Deputy Foreign Minister] Moon S˘on Gyu quietly cut in: “The nuclear problem is just a ruse. Comrade, once they get into our military facilities they won’t stop until they expose everything. Should we quietly acquiesce? Shall we pull down our pants as well?” (Ch˘ong 1998: Chp 1)

Moon S˘on Gyu, a pseudonym for chief North Korean negotiator Kang S˘ok Ju, is a major heroic figure in the novel. He is depicted as smart, well-informed, creative, and an out-of-the-box thinker, and his cautious strategizing contrasts with the hot-headed young military officer in interesting ways. The Foreign Ministry official’s summation of events obfuscates critical background about the IAEA’s objections and the nature of those “military installations,” but it is probably a good reflection of the average educated North Korean’s understanding of the crisis based on the limited set of facts their government would have provided them. The “pull down our pants” line reflects a common trope in North

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

45

Korean protests over nuclear inspections. In an email communication after reviewing the above excerpt, veteran US negotiator Robert Carlin recalled, “We heard many, many times from Kang (S˘ok Ju) over the course of the meetings from 1993–1994 that the US or the IAEA or someone was asking him/the DPRK to take down its pants.” Later in the novel, Moon/Kang bluntly confronts Hans Blix at the IAEA headquarters in Vienna, accusing the agency of deliberately sending them a “discriminatory agreement” for inspections exceeding the requirements of the NPT. Blix feebly apologizes and insists it was a mistake, to which Moon responds by blatantly accusing him of “attempting to fool us.” Blix, clearly thrown off balance, eventually asks: “Are all the diplomats in your country so direct?” To which Moon glibly replies: “Why, don’t you like it?” In his own analysis of this scene, Myers (2011) interprets the interaction as demonstrative of North Korea’s warrior-like ethos toward diplomacy: “The ‘diplomatic warriors’ of the DPRK’s ‘Foreign Ministry’ roam the world at will, barging into the offices of frightened officials to make rude, blunt demands”; this has been “Attributed to Kim Jong-il’s own desire to see his Foreign Ministry behaving ‘aggressively and combatively.’” The long catalog of such scenes across three decades of literary output helps to impress upon North Korean readers a deep sense of pride in their nation’s past negotiating performance, both when signing nuclear agreements and later reneging upon them.

Satellites, Warheads, and Scientists as Heroic Figures Literary depictions of North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs display an overwhelming sense of pride in these developments as scientific achievements that put North Korea in the category of “scientific great power.” In these depictions, the global consternation and criticism over their nuclear and missile programs are portrayed not as a source of embarrassment but rather as positive confirmation of the magnitude of their scientific achievement. The novel Field Train, which covers the last year of Kim Jong-il’s life, includes mention of the delegation led by Dr. Siegfried Hecker that visited North Korea’s Yongbyon nuclear facility in 2010:

46

M. SHAW

Late last year the Obama administration sent Hecker, former director of the Alamos Nuclear Research Institute and a US nuclear expert who had toured our uranium enrichment facility, to the UN Security Council. Hecker testified, “North Korea’s enriched uranium facility is ultramodern, on par with what the US currently has. The fact that it was able to develop such a facility by itself shows the high level North Korea’s nuclear technology has attained.” “With our own eyes we have seen that the centrifuges at the concentrated uranium facility, if operated, could produce several tens of kilograms of highly enriched uranium per year. In the near future, their nuclear capacity could increase exponentially. It’s a nightmare-like reality.” Hecker gave this concrete and reliable [구체적인 신 빙성있는] testimony to the UN Security Council. The Obama administration sought to convince the UN Security Council members with Hecker’s testimony and issue a strong statement of criticism against North Korea. (Paek 2018: Chp 8)

The above seems to correspond to the following portion of Hecker’s actual testimony: The control room was astonishingly modern. Unlike the reprocessing facility and reactor control room, which looked like 1950s US or 1980s Soviet instrumentation, this control room would fit into any modern American processing facility… I expressed surprise that they were apparently able to get cascades of 2,000 centrifuges working so quickly, and asked again if the facility is actually operating now – we were given an emphatic, yes. We were not able to independently verify this, although it was not inconsistent with what we saw. (Hecker 2010)

Comparing the two accounts side by side, two things are noteworthy: The North Korean novel indicates that Hecker’s visit was explicitly ordered by President Obama himself for the express purpose of pressuring the UN; and it also selectively crops precisely the portion of the report in which Hecker seems impressed with North Korea’s technological prowess. The actual report expresses much more skepticism, particularly about the extent of North Korea’s indigenous capability and the independence of its program from foreign know-how or material support. “Sky, Land and Sea,” a 2014 story about the April 2009 Kwangmyongsong-2 launch, depicts the satellite mission control center as a dazzling high-tech hive of engineering talent, lingering on the large plasma screens, supercomputers, and trajectory measuring equipment. At

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

47

the conclusion, Kim Jong-il personally congratulates the assembled missile control staff and engineers on Kwangmyongsong-2’s successful entry into orbit, saying: “What pleases me most is the fact that all the scientists and technicians who took part in building and launching this rocket are young, in their 20s to 40s” (in reality, Kwangmyongsong-2 failed to achieve stable orbit but was nonetheless regarded as a significant advance of North Korea’s missile program). This is emblematic of a theme of the Kim Jong-un era, showcasing young scientists as symbolic of the nation’s bright future (Hy˘on 2018), with a particular focus on alternative energy and propulsion engineering. Stories like this also highlight the important role of North Korea’s “satellite” launches in firing the North Korean collective imagination as symbols of future potential and scientific discovery. Though these launches are widely understood by the Western world to be thinly veiled missile launches with no practical application to any realistic space program, KWU literary products appear fully committed to depicting Kwangmyongsong launches as North Korea’s version of the Apollo program. For instance, a 2015 science fiction story entitled “The signal that flew from Kwangmyongsong-30” depicts the titular satellite as the culmination of decades of sequential Kwangmyongsong launches. In this story, Kwangmyongsong-30 is an advanced high-orbit satellite designed to deploy a vast solar power cell array [태양전지판] in space. The collected energy will then be converted to laser light [레이자빛] and transmitted via fiber optic cable [빛수송관] to a North Korean power hub on the surface, and from there providing unlimited power throughout the country. It must be noted that this story is labeled “science fiction” [과학환상소 설]; however, it represents a broader literary pattern of depicting how the long years of sacrifice of material, financing, and manpower drained into the missile program can connect to a practical and universally beneficial goal—in this case, securing a limitless energy supply.

Conclusion North Korea’s literary depictions of its nuclear and missile technology development hint at how difficult it will be to convince them to ever give them up. These are not merely functional deterrents that might be exchanged for some hypothetical security guarantee or financial incentive. They are an immense source of national pride, presented as the culmination of diplomatic and scientific efforts by North Korea’s finest scientific

48

M. SHAW

and diplomatic minds, achievements that put North Korea on par with the US and other members of the “nuclear club” and—most importantly—ahead of South Korea. As has been written elsewhere, national pride in scientific and cultural achievements plays a considerable role in maintaining support for a regime that has otherwise failed miserably to resurrect the economy and emerge from isolation. Any serious attempt at a future denuclearization deal will have to take into account the importance of North Korean pride, not only in their nuclear armament but in the global status that comes from being continuously sought after for direct negotiations with the world’s dominant superpower. Surrendering their nuclear armament would effectively mean surrendering the one thing that puts them in the global spotlight; it is very difficult to imagine an alternative source of national pride that could compensate for that loss. On the other hand, state literature hints at some possible blind spots within the North Korean information environment concerning nuclear research and development. If North Koreans are relatively uninformed about how the hazards of the nuclear industry have humbled even scientifically advanced Western countries in the past, this could be a point deserving of greater emphasis in future informational campaigns. Such campaigns need not resort to the sly subterfuge of smuggled videos and balloon campaigns; foreign delegations might strive to include relatives or surviving victims of past nuclear accidents and radiation exposure in their own countries, to testify to the dangers from a position of humility and appeal to common humanity. Countries reliant on nuclear power could invite North Korean participation in collaborative efforts to address the environmental problems caused by spent fuel disposal. If the elite technocratic class grows sufficiently concerned about the possibility of a radiation leak or meltdown, they may be more willing to accept foreign assistance on secure waste disposal and system upgrades for safety. A more cooperative relationship with the IAEA could foster a deeper understanding of “safety protocols” as something meant to protect, rather than punish. Implementing such safety standards could be a mutually beneficial first step to a more practical, incremental negotiation method.

Bibliography Ch˘ong, Ki Jong. 1997. Ry˘oksa u˘ i taeha [Great Flow of History]. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa.

5

LEARNING TO LOVE THE BOMB: DEPICTIONS OF NUCLEAR …

49

Ch˘ong, Ki Jong. 2014. “Han˘ul gwa ddang, pada” [Sky, Land and Sea]. Chos˘on Munhak, August, pp. 9–19. Fahy, Sandra. 2020. “Qualitative Interviewing: Approaches and Techniques for Sensitive Topics.” NKEF Paper Series 2020. Hecker, Siegfried S. 2010. “A Return Trip to North Korea’s Yongbyon Nuclear Complex.” NAPSNet Special Reports, November 22, 2010 [https://nau tilus.org/napsnet/napsnet-special-reports/a-return-trip-to-north-koreas-yon gbyon-nuclear-complex/]. Hy˘on In-ae. 2018. “‘Sahoeju˘ui munmy˘ongguk k˘ons˘ol’ kuho wa hy˘onshil” [‘Building a Nation of Socialist Culture’: Slogan and Reality]. W˘olgan Bukhan, February. Kim, Ch˘ol Min. 2007. “Hoedabhal dae ga toey˘otta” [The Time Has Come to Answer]. Choson Munhak, July. Kim, Yong Hwan. 2014. 2009 ny˘on [2009]. Pyongyang: Munhak Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Lim Ok-gyu. 2014. “Pukhan munhak kyoyuk yangsang gwa ch˘onmang” [North Korean Literary Education Aspects and Outlook]. In S˘onj˘on gwa kyoyang: Pukhan u˘ i munye kyoyuk [Propaganda and Culture: Education of Art & Literature in North Korea], ed. Dankook University Korea Culture Technology Institute. Seoul: Kyongjin Ch’ulpan, pp. 43–72. Myers, B. R. 2011. The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters. Melville House. Oh, Tae-ho. 2019. “Bukhan e do chagga ga chonjae handa” [Authors Exist in North Korea Too]. In Naeil u˘ l y˘on˘un chagga [Writers Opening Tomorrow] 75. Writers Association of Korea, pp. 38–51. Paek, Bo H˘um and Song, Sang W˘on. (1997). Y˘ongsaeng [Eternal Life]. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Paek, Nam Nyong. 1996. Tonghae ch˘onri [One Thousand Ri on the East Sea]. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Paek, Nam Nyong. 2018. “Yaj˘on Ry˘olcha” [Field Train]. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Shin, S˘ung Gu. 2016. “Kwangmyongsong 30 ho es˘o naraon j˘onpa’” [The Signal That Flew from Kwangmyongsong-30]. Chos˘on Munhak, August. Song, Sang Won. 2002. Ch’ongg˘om u˘ l d˘ulgo [Sabers Raised]. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Song, Sang Won. 2009. Daebaksanmaru. Pyongyang: Munhwa Yesul Chonghab Ch’ulpansa. Zur, D. 2014. “Let’s Go to the Moon: Science Fiction in the North Korean Children’s Magazine. Adong Munhak, 1956–1965.” The Journal of Asian Studies, 73(2), 327–351.

CHAPTER 6

The North Korean Nuclear Issue: Root Causes and Solutions Zhibo Zou

The North Korean nuclear issue can be dated back to the early 1990s. After conflicts and confrontations between the US (US) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and tensions on the Peninsula, the issue eventually developed into a reality that the DPRK possesses nuclear weapons, which has become a factor affecting the security of Northeast Asia and the world and hindering the construction of a peaceful, stable, and prosperous order in Northeast Asia. To promote the denuclearization of the Peninsula and ultimately achieve long-term peace, stability, and prosperity in Northeast Asia, it is necessary to explore the historical background and root causes of the issue and find a long-term way out and a short-term breakthrough for the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue in light of the changes in the world landscape and the geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia.

Z. Zou (B) Institute of World Economics and Politics (IWEP), Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), Beijing, People’s Republic of China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_6

51

52

Z. ZOU

The Historical Roots of the North Korean Nuclear Issue Currently, nuclear weapons, the only one among all the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) on the Earth that can instantly destroy a region, a country, or even the entire planet, are of unparalleled threat and irreplaceable strategic value. In the meantime, the development, production, and possession of nuclear weapons will pose severe political, economic, and technological pressures and challenges to a country, and have a huge impact on the development of a country. For the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which is closed, small in size, and backward in its economy, its development of nuclear weapons will also be subject to severe international sanctions and blockades. Therefore, the decision to develop nuclear weapons is an extremely difficult and important one DPRK has made. The emergence of the North Korean nuclear issue has a profound historical background and motivation. The Start of DPRK’s Nuclear Capability Development The research on nuclear technology in the DPRK started in the 1950s with the assistance of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). In 1956, the DPRK signed the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Institute for Nuclear Research with the USSR, and then it sent about 300 students to the USSR to learn nuclear technology. In 1959, in response to the Agreement for Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of Korea Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, the USSR and the DPRK signed an agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy. Following the conclusion of this agreement, the USSR began to help the DPRK construct nuclear-related facilities such as the Yongbyon Atomic Energy Research Center. When the US started to deploy tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the late 1950s, the DPRK attempted to develop its nuclear weapons, but this time it did not receive support from the USSR, which did not transfer core technologies to it. Then, the DPRK shifted its attention to China as the country had possessed nuclear weapons in the mid-1960s. However, its request for assistance in developing nuclear weapons was refused by China. Without the support of its two strategic allies, the DPRK gave up the idea of developing nuclear weapons. Later, it joined the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1974 and acceded to

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

53

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985. The NPT stipulates that a non-nuclear-weapon State acceding to the Treaty must accept IAEA’s verification and monitoring of its nuclear facilities, which the DPRK has so far refused to comply with. The end of the Cold War changed the world’s strategic landscape and the geopolitical situation and had a major impact on nuclear strategic patterns. With the strategic confrontation between the US and the USSR (Russia) in Europe and Asia coming to an end, in September 1991, the US announced the removal of major tactical nuclear weapons deployed around the world, including those in the ROK. This action of the US has satisfied the DPRK’s request for the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons deployed in the RoK and eliminated the factor that motivates DPRK to develop nuclear weapons, thus promoting the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. At the end of 1991, the DPRK and the ROK signed the Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (JDDKP). The declaration stipulates that the South and the North shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, shall use nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes, and shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities. At the same time, the two sides also signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-Aggression, and Exchanges and Cooperation Between the South and the North (or “Mutual Non-Aggression Agreement”). One month after the signing of the declaration, the JDDKP came into effect. In late January 1992, the DPRK and the IAEA signed a nuclear safeguards agreement, with the former beginning to accept IAEA’s verification and monitoring and fulfill denuclearization obligations. It seemed that the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula was going to come true. However, this denuclearization process came to an abrupt end with a sudden change in the situation. Since the second half of 1992, there has been a complete reversal. The DPRK refused IAEA’s verification of nuclear facilities, and the contradictions and conflicts with the IAEA escalated. On March 12, 1993, the DPRK announced its withdrawal from the NPT. Since then, the North Korean nuclear issue has gone through repetitions, from the 1994 Agreed Framework Between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (the US-DPRK Agreed Framework), DPRK freezing its nuclear and missile activities, the introduction of thenPresident George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” Theory, the DPRK’s second withdrawal from the NTP in 2003, to the September 19 Joint Statement

54

Z. ZOU

of 2005. This situation continued until October 2006, when the DPRK conducted its first nuclear test. Eventually, the DPRK crossed the nuclear threshold and with the possession of nuclear weapons, became a de facto nuclear country. Subsequently, the DPRK conducted five nuclear tests in 2009, 2013, 2016, and 2017, and completed the weaponization of atomic and hydrogen bombs. This has led to more severe sanctions by the United Nations, and the Peninsula has been in tension and confrontation. The Root Causes of the DPRK’s Development of Nuclear Weapons There is no doubt that the US threat is the main reason for the DPRK’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. If there is no US military threat and just a confrontation between the North and the South on the Korean Peninsula, there is little motivation or even no need for the DPRK to develop nuclear weapons. However, the problem lies in that throughout the Cold War period following the end of World War II, the US military threat toward the DPRK on the Peninsula always existed, and the threat at that time was much greater than it was after the Cold War, but the DPRK made no decisions to develop nuclear weapons. Instead, the DPRK made such a decision after the Cold War ended, the US withdrew its nuclear weapons deployed in ROK, and the DPRK and the ROK signed the Mutual Non-Aggression Agreement. It can be seen that the US military threat was not the only motive for DPRK’s decision after the Cold War. In other words, there was another important factor that drove the decision-making: a major imbalance in the strategic security pattern on the Peninsula. During the Cold War, out of strategic confrontation, the two major camps formed a military alliance confrontation pattern on the Korean Peninsula with the 38th Parallel as the boundary. The US–ROK military alliance was located in the South, supplemented by the US–Japan military alliance. In the North, no similar military alliance system was formed. However, in July 1961, the DPRK signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the USSR and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) successively. Both treaties contain information that indicates a military alliance, stipulating that “The Contracting Parties undertake jointly to adopt all measures to prevent aggression against either of the Contracting Parties by any state. In the event of one of the Contracting Parties being subjected to the armed attack by any state or several states jointly and thus being involved in a state of war, the

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

55

other Contracting Party shall immediately render military and other assistance by all means at its disposal.” Once the DPRK was invaded by the US, ROK, etc., the USSR and China were obliged to help the DPRK counter aggression to maintain national security under the Treaty. Therefore, during the Cold War, even in the face of powerful military threats from the US and the ROK, the DPRK’s national security could be guaranteed by the USSR and China, and thus it did not need to develop nuclear weapons, not to mention its willingness to develop them, which was not supported and even opposed by the two allies. In this sense, the DPRK had no motivation or reason to develop nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War broke the balance of strategic security on the Peninsula: the US and Japan failed to achieve simultaneous reconciliation with the DPRK; there was no peaceful and stable relationship between the North and the South of the Peninsula; the maintenance of peace and stability on the Peninsula was based on the Korean Armistice Agreement that ended the Korean War. Legally speaking, the North and South were in a temporary truce during a war with the 38th Parallel dividing the warring parties. The US maintained its military alliance in East Asia and the Peninsula, which continued to pose a military threat toward the DPRK in the Cold War period. The DPRK’s national security was under threat from the US and ROK, while the ROK was under the protection of the US and enjoyed a protective umbrella of the US nuclear weapons. But at the same time, the DPRK’s major power security system during the Cold War was under attack. The USSR (Russia) and China not only achieved reconciliation with the ROK and dissolved mutual hostility, but established friendly and cooperative relations. Thus, the DPRK questioned the USSR (Russia) and China’s obligation of protection. The Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the USSR and the DPRK remained in force for 30 years. When the Treaty expired in 1991, Russia, the successor of the USSR, chose not to automatically renew the Treaty and officially announced its abolition in 1994. By then, the DPRK could only count on China to ensure its security. However, the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and the ROK in August 1992 caused a huge psychological blow to the DPRK. With declining trust in China, it even doubted the reliability of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance Between the PRC and the DPRK, and believed that it must maintain security independently. Given the fact that the DPRK was at a significant disadvantage to the US and the ROK in their conventional military forces that was

56

Z. ZOU

difficult to change, the DPRK resolved to develop nuclear weapons for self-protection. As a result, in the second half of 1992 after the establishment of diplomatic relations between the ROK and China, there were serious frictions and conflicts between the DPRK and the IAEA over the verification of nuclear facilities, and in March 1993 it withdrew from the NPT. It can be said that as far as the North Korean nuclear issue is concerned, this was the true beginning of the DPRK nuclear crisis. The subsequent evolution of the North Korean nuclear issue also indicates that the second half of 1992 was the starting point for the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons which it made the decision. The Logical Contradictions of the US and the DPRK The North Korean nuclear issue was stuck in a dilemma or deadlock, which was all due to the logical contradiction between policy stances and goals of the US and the DPRK. Certainly, there were in-depth strategic considerations. The Logic and Contradictions of the DPRK From the perspective of the DPRK, since the Korean War, the they have been living in the shadow of threats from the US and the ROK; the overthrow of the DPRK regime and the unification of the Peninsula by force have always been the goals of the US and ROK’s strategic policies. Over the years, the US and the ROK have drawn up military plans in preparation for invading and attacking the DPRK, and have conducted military exercises on a regular and irregular basis. With the country and regime under threat and conventional military forces at an absolute disadvantage, the DPRK has made a strategic choice to develop nuclear weapons. With nuclear weapons, it can deter military attacks from the US and the ROK and defend national security. It can demonstrate strength and achievements and maintain the legitimacy of the regime. The DPRK has already incorporated the development of nuclear weapons into its national constitution, and it seems that the development of its nuclear weapons is irreversible. This seemingly sound decision ran contrary to reality, with policies diverging drastically from the goals. From the perspective of international politics and reality, first, DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons violated the NPT, challenged international law, and threatened regional and international security and stability. Therefore, it is generally opposed

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

57

by the international community. Second, the threat to the DPRK can be dealt with within the framework of existing international mechanisms. In light of the special geopolitical relations of East Asia, the ROK cannot initiate a war against the DPRK, especially when China and the DPRK maintain the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance. The security of the DPRK can be guaranteed in a logical manner within the existing geopolitical pattern of East Asia. That said, the DPRK has fallen into a trap in developing nuclear weapons. The regime believes that the more advanced the DPRK’s nuclear missile weapons are, the safer and stronger it is, resulting in the opposition between policies and objectives. The DPRK believed that by developing and possessing nuclear weapons that can threaten the US, it can deter the US from using force against it and ensure its security, which was a serious logical error. The reality was quite the contrary. The more severe and realistic DPRK’s nuclear threat to the US is, the closer it is to a “red line” of the war. The greater the pressure and motivation for the US to use force against the DPRK to resolve its nuclear armament, the more realistic the war will be, and the more dangerous the DPRK will be. Those who cited the fate of Saddam and Gaddafi as evidence that the US dare not resort to the use of violence against nuclear-armed countries misunderstood international politics and strategic logic. In addition, the more advanced the DPRK’s nuclear weapons, the stricter the international sanctions, and the more isolated it is, the more difficult it will be to develop. The Logic and Contradictions of the US The US is not only the main cause of DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons but also the key party in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. It bears the primary responsibility for resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, there are two logical contradictions in response to the development of nuclear weapons in the DPRK. First, the US believed that the greater the military pressure on the DPRK, the more probable it would be to contain the development of DPRK’s nuclear and missile weapons, deter the DPRK from using nuclear weapons, and accelerate the collapse of the DPRK regime. However, it turned out that the US policy toward the DPRK was counterproductive. The US military threat has prompted the closed and obstinate DPRK to step up the development of nuclear and missile weapons, with more frequent nuclear and missile tests and expedited development of missiles and nuclear weapons. Hence, the threats to the US and the pressure

58

Z. ZOU

on the US to protect the ROK increased. Moreover, the high-handed measures such as isolation and sanctions by the US did not bring about the desired result—the collapse of the DPRK regime. It can be seen that the tough policies of the US toward the DPRK led to the opposite result of its strategic goal, thus pulling the US into an incorrect strategic logic. Second, the US has taken the DPRK nuclear threat as a driving force to consolidate and enhance its leadership over the geopolitical structure and security order in East Asia. Since World War II, the military alliance system has always been one of the main means for the US to dominate and control the international and regional order, and common security threats are the basis for maintaining this system. However, the end of the Cold War posed a challenge to this foundation, and the US had to spare no effort to find new common threats. This is the deepseated reason why Russia’s determination to join the Western camp after the Cold War was rejected by the US It disregarded Russia’s resolute opposition and continued to promote the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) eastward expansion and strengthen the deployment of an anti-missile system in Europe. This is the reason for constant frictions and escalated confrontations between Russia and the West. Likewise, the US applied the same logic to the North Korean nuclear issue. Even though the DPRK’s conventional force was barely worth mentioning, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons were sufficient to pose a huge threat to the ROK and Japan, which was a bond to tighten the relationship between the ROK, Japan, and the US military alliance, and an effective means to maintain the political and security pattern and order in East Asia under the new East Asian pattern and situation. Thus, maintaining the existence of the North Korean nuclear issue properly was conducive to the US in maintaining its leadership and control in East Asia. No wonder that, when the DPRK denuclearization began to turn around, the US always violated the agreement under certain pretexts, hindering the implementation of the agreement and the DPRK’s abandonment of nuclear programs. History abounds with such examples. The US-DPRK Agreed Framework signed on October 21, 1994, and the September 19, 2005, Joint Statement of the Fourth Round of the Six-Party Talks (the September 19 Joint Statement) contributed to the DPRK’s abandonment of nuclear weapons. Later, the US violated its commitments under some pretext, which led to the failure in the DPRK’s performance of the agreement. In the implementation of the US-DPRK Agreed Framework, the US delayed in honoring its commitment to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

59

reactors with light-water (LWR) power plants, making it impossible to perform the agreement; more than a month after the September 19 Joint Statement was concluded, the US suspended the execution of the agreement under the pretext that the DPRK was laundering money and counterfeiting US currency. The US logic of taking advantage of the North Korean nuclear issue to achieve its strategic goals in East Asia is contradictory and even dangerous, i.e., how to strike a balance between maintaining the DPRK’s threat and not posing a real nuclear threat to the US If not adequately addressed, the US would take the consequences of its action.

The Solutions to the North Korean Nuclear Issue Judging from the historical experience of the world’s nuclear issue resolution, the characteristics of the North Korean nuclear issue, and the geography of Northeast Asia, there are three ways to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue in the future, namely, multilateral settlement, voluntary settlement, and settlement through armed force. In this regard, efforts should be made to promote the best approach to solve the North Korean nuclear issue and strive to prevent and suppress the worst possible solution. This is the shared responsibility of the stakeholders of the Peninsula issue and the international community. Possible Solutions to the North Korean Nuclear Issue Multilateral Settlement The nuclear issue is one of the most difficult political and security issues to resolve in the world, but there are also examples in the history of successful settlement through negotiation. Solving the North Korean nuclear issue through negotiation is an optimal solution and conforms to the common interests of all parties. The successful settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue has provided an example of the multilateral settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. On July 14, 2015, a comprehensive agreement on the Iranian nuclear issue was reached, setting a model for resolving the nuclear issue through peace talks, which also provides an option for addressing the North Korean nuclear issue. Despite the fact that the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue was a result of the Six-Party Talks, in light of the root causes

60

Z. ZOU

and essence of the issue, the US and Iran played a key role in the settlement; in light of the process and outcome, the political decision of the US and the compromise between the US and Iran played a decisive role in the settlement. Likewise, the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through peace talks is also a political decision for the US to make. History has shown time and again that threats and pressure do not work in deterring the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons, and the use of force will only lead to unpredictable catastrophic consequences for the US and the ROK. The US should make rational and correct political decisions. Meanwhile, the parties concerned should uphold the spirit of compromise, treat and deal with the concerns of the other party while following the principle that “Do not do to others what you do not want others to do to you,” and not pursue selfish goals aggressively or insistently. China has put forward a “dual-track” approach, which aims to promote denuclearization and the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty, taking into account and dealing with the core concerns of both parties. It is the best option to tackle the North Korean nuclear issue and should be accepted and promoted by all parties. The achievement of this plan and its successful implementation depend mainly on the US In fact, the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994, the September 19 Joint Statement of 2005, and the US-DPRK Joint Statement announced at the DPRK-US Summit in June 2018 have all contributed to a balanced plan for the abandonment of nuclear weapons and security guarantees. The main content includes: the DPRK committed to abandoning all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs and returning, at an early date, to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons and to IAEA safeguards; the US affirmed that it has no intention to attack or invade the DPRK with nuclear or conventional weapons; the DPRK and the US committed to take steps to normalize their relations; the US and the DPRK will join their efforts to build a lasting and stable peace regime on the Korean Peninsula. However, this plan has not been implemented due to changes in the US. In the future, the peace talks for the settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue should also focus on the above content, the success of which depends on the US keeping its promises and earnestly fulfilling the agreement.

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

61

Voluntary Settlement The voluntary settlement comes out of the change in a country’s knowledge, ideas, and policies or changes in the internal system. It is a result of internal changes rather than external forces. Many countries in the world have chosen to voluntarily give up their nuclear weapons. South Africa and Argentina are cases in point. China has always hoped that the DPRK will follow the path of its own reform and open up to achieve reconciliation with neighboring countries and Western countries, establish normal relations with them, and gradually integrate into the world. In this case, the DPRK has no motivation in terms of thinking, philosophy, and political and security environment to develop nuclear weapons and its voluntary abandonment of nuclear programs would be a natural result. Although it is difficult to guide the DPRK to the road of China’s reform and opening up through political and diplomatic means, in the future, with changes in the international landscape and situation, there is still the possibility that the DPRK will change its mindset and voluntarily abandon nuclear weapons. This peaceful settlement deserves consideration. Concerning the nuclear issue, the international community should promote such a settlement. As for the DPRK, this would be the best solution. It can not only solve its major concern—national security, but also bring bright prospects for its economic and social development, and lay a solid foundation for the stability of the regime and the country’s long-term law and order. The success of China’s development speaks volumes for all this. During the seven visits of the former Leader of DPRK Kim Jong-il to China, China showed him the fruitful achievements of its reform and opening up. With the improvement and the growth of the China–DPRK relationship, prospects for the DPRK’s voluntary abandonment of nuclear weapons are promising, if the DPRK security improves and demand for development rises strongly by following China’s path of reform and opening up. Settlement Through Armed Force The use of force is always an option in practice to resolve the nuclear issue. Israel and the US carried out military strikes on Iraq’s nuclear facilities in the early 1980s and 1990s respectively, preventing the development of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities. Concerning the North Korean nuclear issue, this extreme solution cannot be ruled out in an extremely severe situation.

62

Z. ZOU

The long-standing North Korean nuclear issue has undergone a winding and complex process, but the basic facts and trends are clear. First, the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue lies in the hands of the US side. If the US does not make a political decision to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, even if the agreement concerning the DPRK’s giving up of nuclear weapons is reached due to a temporary political need, the US will suspend the agreement with an excuse, resulting in failure of the DPRK’s implementation of the agreement. The settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue requires the US to abandon its Cold War mentality of controlling the political and security order in East Asia through the DPRK threat. Second, the US and the DPRK confront and threaten each other. As a result, both sides are under greater threat and higher risks of a war, with actions seriously deviating from goals. On the one hand, the DPRK withdrew from the NPT and began to develop nuclear weapons in 1993. It conducted its first nuclear test and successfully crossed the nuclear threshold in 2006 and successfully tested long-range missiles and a hydrogen bomb in 2017. The nuclear threat to the US has gradually increased to be a reality. On the other hand, in response to the DPRK nuclear threat, the US displayed a clear intention to attack and made comprehensive deployments, alongside a dramatically rising threat to the DPRK. Third, the geography of Northeast Asia made it impossible for the US to use force. The peace talks are the only way out of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. The US should understand that the use of force against the DPRK may not only cause huge disasters on the Peninsula due to the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons but also lead to major powers plunging into conflicts or wars, which is unpredictable, in light of the geopolitical pattern of the coexistence of major powers in Northeast Asia. The US will never have exclusive control of the situation or win the war and withdraw safely. History has proved that resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through peace talks is feasible and in line with the interests and demands of all countries in the world, including the US allies. The Main Problems of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula Since 2018, the DPRK has adjusted its national policy and frozen nuclear and missile tests and there were significant changes in the North Korean nuclear issue and the situation on the Peninsula. The US and the DPRK leaders met in summits and reached a joint statement for

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

63

denuclearization. The two sides have also conducted many rounds of consultations. However, the relationship between the US and the DPRK has experienced ups and downs and no progress has been made in the denuclearization of the Peninsula. This shows that the US and DPRK still have substantial disagreements. From the standpoint of the two sides, the main disagreement between the US and the DPRK lies in the model and content of giving up nuclear weapons. Whether or not the differences can be bridged and eventually resolved will determine the direction and outcome of the North Korean nuclear issue and the future development of the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Nuclear Abandonment It is necessary to clarify the concept of nuclear abandonment before the analysis. From the essentials of nuclear abandonment, it refers to the abandonment of the possession and development of nuclear weapons. For this reason, nuclear-abandoning countries should surrender their nuclear warheads, nuclear weapons components, and weapons-grade nuclear materials for destruction or civilian use, the abolition of nuclear weapons research institutions, and the dismantling or destruction of nuclear weapons production and testing facilities for nuclear weapons development. However, judging from the practice of global nuclear abandonment, due to the uneven international strategic pattern and the low mutual trust in international politics, the connotation of nuclear abandonment has been expanded, resulting in two other concepts, the extended nuclear abandonment, and the complete nuclear abandonment. These two concepts are beyond the conventional scope of nuclear abandonment. The so-called extended nuclear abandonment includes the abandonment of uranium enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Some countries believe that simply giving up the possession and development of nuclear weapons cannot convince them that nuclear-abandoning countries can no longer develop nuclear weapons because as long as they can enrich uranium and reprocess, they can produce weapons-grade nuclear materials, and nuclear weapons in a short time under political decisions. As a result, some countries insist on nuclear-abandoning countries giving up uranium enrichment and reprocessing rights. A typical example of this is the dispute between the US and Iran over the nuclear issue. The socalled comprehensive abandonment of nuclear weapons means that the ballistic missiles that are used as launch tools, and even biological and chemical weapons should be given up. This goes far beyond the scope

64

Z. ZOU

of nuclear abandonment. The Trump administration once adopted this stance against Iran. Disagreements Between the US and the DPRK on Nuclear Abandonment a. Nuclear abandonment models The Trump administration has proposed a nuclear abandonment package, that is, demanding the DPRK to implement a one-time nuclear abandonment plan, and even stated that it will apply “the Libya model” to the DPRK—abandonment first and then compensation. Under this model, all nuclear weapons should be abolished and transported to Oak Ridge, Tennessee, USA for dismantling. In return, the US has proposed a “Marshall Plan” for the DPRK, which allows US private investment in DPRK to support its infrastructure such as power grid and roads and agricultural development while consolidating the DPRK regime. The US stated that it will insist on sanctions against the DPRK before it abandons its nuclear weapons. This is not in line with the principle of “commitment for commitment, action for action,” and is difficult for the DPRK to accept. The DPRK adheres to the step-by-step nuclear abandonment approach, that is, a phased and synchronized plan to advance denuclearization. This plan means that as the DPRK takes steps to implement nuclear abandonment in a phased manner, the US should also take synchronous and balanced actions in lifting sanctions, ending the state of war on the Peninsula, establishing diplomatic relations with the DPRK, and finally establishing a permanent peace regime on the Peninsula, so as to realize the synchronization and reciprocity of the actions of the two sides. b. Nuclear abandonment content On May 13, 2018, John Bolton, then National Security Adviser of the White House, said that the US seeks complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization of the DPRK, explaining, “When we say abandonment, we mean all aspects of the nuclear program, which would require the complete elimination of DPRK’s domestic uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities. No doubt, as in the case of Iran, the

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

65

ballistic missile program designed for nuclear weapons delivery would need to be abandoned, and I think we would also need to check their chemical and biological weapons programs.” Bolton also said on verifying DPRK’s nuclear abandonment, “The DPRK should disclose the location of all nuclear and missile facilities for public inspections. The verification would be IAEA’s responsibility, but the actual abolition of nuclear weapons would be carried out by the US, and assistance from other countries may be needed at that time.” This was the first official demand of the US for the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons, which belonged to the complete nuclear abandonment that went far beyond conventional nuclear abandonment. It is self-evident that the DPRK will not meet such a harsh requirement. The Establishment of a Peace Mechanism on the Peninsula In the final analysis, the North Korean nuclear issue was due to the unbalanced security pattern on the Peninsula. Therefore, to tackle the nuclear issue, the unbalanced security pattern must be changed, which requires the establishment of a new peace mechanism on the Peninsula to ensure the safety of all parties. This is in line with China’s idea of dual-track progress in the denuclearization of the Peninsula and the establishment of a Peninsula peace mechanism. As for building a peace mechanism, there are still big differences between the parties concerned. The DPRK insisted that the denuclearization of the Peninsula and the replacement of the armistice agreement with a peace treaty proceed simultaneously, while the US required that the DPRK complete its nuclear abandonment before discussing the issue of building a peace mechanism. Even on the issue of lifting sanctions requested by the DPRK, the US stood firm in its position. Senior Trump administration officials have stated that they will not consider lifting sanctions until the DPRK has achieved complete abandonment of nuclear weapons. It can be seen that the US has made excessive demands for lifting sanctions on the DPRK, building a peace mechanism on the Peninsula, and improving relations with the DPRK, running contrary to the principles and logic of international politics. The United Nations sanctions against the DPRK are due to the DPRK’s continuous nuclear and missile tests, banned by the United Nations. Under general international political principles, after the DPRK expressed its firm determination to abandon nuclear weapons, announced that it would not conduct any more nuclear tests or missile test launches,

66

Z. ZOU

and took substantive actions to freeze nuclear weapon development, such as shutting down its nuclear and missile test sites, the UN should in response lift some of the sanctions against the DPRK. In line with the principles and objectives of the United Nations regarding sanctions, these efforts will encourage the DPRK to work toward nuclear abandonment and promote denuclearization on the Peninsula. The Possibility of the DPRK’s Nuclear Abandonment in the Near Future From the perspective of the root cause and crux of the North Korean nuclear issue, the resolution depends on the strategic decision of the US rather than temporary changes in the situation. Thus, the chances of solving the North Korean nuclear issue in the foreseeable future do not seem to be encouraging, and the issue is likely to continue. What’s more, the DPRK has possessed nuclear weapons and enhanced its nuclear deterrence capability against the US. This is a far cry from the situation under which the two nuclear abandonment agreements were reached in 1994 and 2005. From the perspective of DPRK, although it has once again confirmed its goal of denuclearization and has taken the initiative to take unconditional measures to freeze nuclear weapons and show its sincerity, geopolitically, historically, and realistically, there is no possibility that the DPRK will give up its nuclear weapons shortly. The main reasons are as follows. First, the DPRK’s development and possession of nuclear weapons has been a strategic goal pursued for decades. Nuclear possession has been incorporated into its constitution. The DPRK has made great efforts and a heavy price for this. Once possessing nuclear weapons, it will never give them up readily, unless its security is guaranteed. However, the US will not satisfy the requirement easily. Second, the DPRK has completed the historical cause of building a nuclear weapon. If it gives up and fails to get a reliable security commitment from the US, it will lose the leverage of security and be unable to justify its action domestically. The DPRK clearly stated in the report of the third plenary meeting of the 7th Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea (WPK) that it will never use nuclear weapons and will not disclose nuclear weapons and technology as long as it is not subject to nuclear threats and provocations, which is an announcement of the DPRK’s nuclear policy as a nuclear power. Third, in light of the stand of the DPRK, it regards denuclearization as an ultimate

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

67

goal, rather than a short-term goal, and takes a step-by-step approach of a phased and synchronized process. Fourth, history has proved that even if the DPRK and the US finally reach a nuclear abandonment agreement, there will be uncertainties in the implementation. The credibility of the US in fulfilling the agreement is questionable, and the DPRK will not completely abandon its nuclear weapons before achieving reliable security guarantees, whereas the DPRK’s complete abandonment of nuclear weapons is the prerequisite that the US insists on seeing, before providing DPRK with these guarantees. In this sense, denuclearization is bound to be a complicated and tortuous process full of contradictions. From the perspective of the US, the DPRK’s abandonment of nuclear weapons is critical to its geostrategy and position in Northeast Asia. In the case that the DPRK fulfills the US’s goal of abandoning nuclear weapons, the DPRK and the ROK achieve complete reconciliation, and a long-term peace mechanism is established on the Peninsula, then the military alliance system between the US and the ROK, and the US troops stationed in Northeast Asia will become a problem. In addition, US dominance and control over the strategic landscape of Northeast Asia will also become a problem, and the hegemonic position of the US will then be significantly affected, which probably cannot be accepted by the US at this stage. Solutions to the North Korean Nuclear Issue in the Future The final resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will depend on changes in the overall situation, especially changes in the international landscape and geopolitical patterns. When the US is unwilling to make a strategic decision to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue, the best and most feasible way out is the DPRK’s voluntary abandonment of its nuclear program, in which China can play an important constructive role. The Resolution of the DPRK Issue Depends on Changes in the International Landscape and the Geopolitical Pattern The resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue will be a complicated and long-term process full of contradictions. If the global strategy and East Asian strategic goals of the US remain the same, the US is bound to strengthen its leadership and control over Northeast Asia’s political security, resulting in difficulties in fundamentally resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. However, with the evolution of the global strategic pattern

68

Z. ZOU

and the geopolitical pattern of Northeast Asia, when the US cannot maintain its global strategic goals and has to withdraw from Northeast Asia, there will be a promising prospect for the full settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue. At present, the world’s strategic pattern and international order are in the most profound adjustment stage since World War II, and the world is evolving toward a brand new pattern and order. The international structure and order since World War II have experienced the tremendous impact of the intense confrontations during the Cold War and the end of the Cold War, but on the whole, they have remained stable. However, with the decline of the US and the West and the rise of emerging economies, the evolution of the international landscape is at a historical point from quantitative change to qualitative change, and once the total economic volume of developing countries exceeds that of developed countries, the international landscape will usher in a historic transformation. The Trump administration has upheld trade protectionism and taken unilateralist actions to withdraw from many international multilateral mechanisms and agreements. It means that the US is shirking its international responsibilities and obligations, showing the powerlessness of the US in “leading” the world and the decline of its hegemonic status. The future development of this pattern and situation will certainly be reflected in the geopolitical pattern and politics. As this pattern continues to evolve and undergo qualitative and quantitative changes, the hope for a peaceful resolution of the Korean nuclear issue may become a reality. The DPRK’s Voluntary Nuclear Abandonment is the Best Possible Way Out Under the current East Asian geopolitical pattern, and with combined effects of history, environment, and reality, as the situation develops, there is a possibility that the DPRK may choose to give up its nuclear weapons voluntarily. In 2018, the DPRK made a major adjustment to its national policy and development direction, shifting its focus from simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and the economy to economic development. Generally, this adjustment is irreversible. However, whether the DPRK can continue to move forward and implement the reform and opening up has become a critical issue. If the DPRK continues to make solid progress, it will then see a leap in economic growth and an improvement in its external relations and environment, so that the security pressure on the DPRK and the motivation for the DPRK to

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

69

develop nuclear weapons will gradually diminish, and the likelihood of the DPRK voluntarily abandoning nuclear weapons will increase and be worth waiting for. Making this possibility a reality depends not only on the steadfastness of DPRK’s policy adjustments but also on the support of other countries, especially neighboring countries. It is necessary to make the DPRK have a sense of gain and satisfaction in choosing this policy and path and to foster confidence to advance along this path. Based on maintaining basic peace and stability on the Peninsula, stakeholders should not wait for contact and negotiation between the US and the DPRK, but take the initiative to promote the realization of DPRK’s voluntary nuclear abandonment. China Plays an Important Role In facilitating the DPRK’s voluntary nuclear abandonment, China will play a key role in guiding and promoting the process. Politically, as socialist countries, China and the DPRK are similar in values, social systems, development paths, and other national attributes. Under the overall circumstance of jointly promoting socialist construction in the world, China will always support its socialist development. It is essentially different from the US–DPRK relationship, that is, in order to meet the needs of the temporary situation, the US may seek to improve its relationship with the DPRK, and seize the opportunity to overthrow its regime if possible. Politically, China is the most reliable force for the DPRK to rely on. Given the changing international and Peninsula landscape over the past few decades, the DPRK should recognize this. In terms of security, due to the geographical proximity and friendship between China and the DPRK, China shoulders international obligations of protecting the DPRK from other countries’ invasion by force and containing war on the Peninsula, and in doing so, China also serves its own interests. In this sense, China can safeguard the DPRK’s national security; economically, China will provide strong support for the DPRK’s development in fields of economy, trade, technology, energy, infrastructure, markets, etc., historically, the DPRK has always been under the protection of China, which ensured the DPRK’s national security for most of the time, with the exception of the failure to protect it from being colonized by Japan in the late Qing Dynasty. In the real situation, after 40 years of reform and opening up, China has made great achievements in human history. China’s development concepts, roads, models, and policies have been widely recognized by the international community. If the DPRK wants

70

Z. ZOU

to fully develop its economy, it can draw on the experience of China’s reforms and opening up to achieve success. To sum up, when the US and the DPRK fail to communicate on, negotiate and resolve the nuclear issue, China can guide and support the DPRK to take the path of reform and opening up to develop itself and improve external relations, and eventually make the DPRK voluntarily give up its nuclear weapons.

Breakthrough in the North Korean Nuclear Issue Under the Current Situation Although the Biden administration has adjusted its DPRK policy, there appears to be no significant change in nature. The possibility of substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue under Biden’s presidency is still unlikely. In this case, the relevant parties, especially the stakeholders from China, the ROK, and the DPRK, should seek cooperation, take the initiative to break the deadlock, and make dramatic breakthroughs in easing the situation on the Peninsula and denuclearization. An Analysis of the Biden Administration’s Policy Toward DPRK On April 30, 2021, the White House Press Secretary Psaki announced that the US has completed its review of the country’s policy on the DPRK. The US government’s goals remain the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but it will not follow the policies of the former president. He further stated, “With a clear understanding that the efforts of past four administrations have not achieved this objective, our policy will not focus on achieving a grand bargain, nor will it rely on strategic patience.” The current administration’s policy calls for a “calibrated, practical” approach that is open to and will explore diplomacy with the DPRK to make practical progress that increases the security of the US, its allies, and its deployed forces. The White House will continue to consult on the DPRK with allies such as the ROK, Japan, and other partners at every step along the way. Judging from the announcement and the performance of the US on the North Korean nuclear issue for a while since then, the considerations and future trends of the US policy toward the DPRK are as follows: First, the Biden administration’s DPRK policy will be a middle course between Obama’s policy and Trump’s policy.

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

71

The US claims that its policy toward the DPRK will not focus on reaching a “grand bargain,” nor will it rely on “strategic patience.” Instead, it will adopt a “calibrated and practical” approach, which means that the Biden administration abandoned the Obama administration’s extreme way of urging the DPRK to change its policy or facilitating the collapse of the regime through isolation, sanctions, and pressure, and Trump administration’s radical way of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue through a package arrangement. Instead, it took a middle road. In other words, it keeps up certain political, military, and economic pressure on the DPRK while maintaining dialogue with it, with the hope that the DPRK will make progress in denuclearization under pressure, thereby serving its political goals and creating favorable conditions for the 2024 presidential election of the Democratic Party. Second, the US will not set its goal on denuclearization but on controlling the situation on the Peninsula. It can be seen that the Biden administration has conducted a comprehensive assessment of the previous four administrations’ policies toward the DPRK and their results, and has returned to a “practical” approach, which means that the Biden administration will pursue certain achievements in the denuclearization process rather than completing the denuclearization of the DPRK. In light of the strategic intentions and reality of the US, the Biden administration is likely to set the following goals: (1) freezing the development of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, including its testing, production, and facility construction; (2) preventing the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation. These goals can satisfy the US security interests to the greatest extent. Third, the US will tighten the US–Japan–ROK trilateral alliance with the North Korean nuclear issue to serve its strategic containment against China. On the North Korean nuclear issue, the Biden administration especially emphasized communication and cooperation with Japan, the ROK, and other allies, but said nothing about China, which has a great influence on the situation on the Peninsula. This means: (1) the US takes advantage of the North Korean nuclear issue to tighten relations with allies in East Asia, and to bridge the differences between Japan and the ROK in an attempt to build a trilateral military alliance; (2) the North Korean nuclear issue no longer promotes the Sino-US cooperation and becomes an excuse of the US to take actions against China. Both show that the US uses the

72

Z. ZOU

North Korean nuclear issue as a means to serve its strategic containment against China. The Trend of the North Korean Nuclear Issue and the Situation on the Peninsula Judging from the Biden administration’s policies and actions toward the DPRK, its relations with major powers, and the geopolitics of Northeast Asia, the recent trends in the North Korean nuclear issue and the situation on the Peninsula are as follows. There is No Hope of a Breakthrough on the North Korean Nuclear Issue The Biden administration’s policy toward the DPRK is the result of an assessment of the four previous administrations’ policies toward the DPRK. Given that no substantial result has been achieved through its soft and hard policies toward the DPRK, the Biden administration no longer expects the DPRK to abandon its nuclear weapons. In this context, it is unlikely that the US is willing to improve relations with the DPRK. At the same time, Kim Jong-un, General Secretary of the WPK and Chairman of the State Affairs Commission of the DPRK, said at the 8th Congress of the WPK that Pyongyang will “counter the US on the principle of strength for strength and good faith in kind” thus defining his policy toward the Biden administration. Besides, the DPRK has repeatedly stated that the key to establishing new DPRK-US relations lies in the abolition of the US hostile policy toward the DPRK. This shows that the DPRK will make its policy choice in response to the Biden administration’s policy and will not take proactive measures for the improvement of DPRK-US relations. In this way, it is unlikely that the US and the DPRK will improve relations and achieve a breakthrough on the nuclear issue. The Tension on the Peninsula Will Be Controllable It is clear that the DPRK issue is not a priority for the Biden administration and there is not much chance that the US will actively improve relations with the DPRK, not to mention the hope of substantive progress on the North Korean nuclear issue. Despite that, the Biden administration will work to prevent the situation on the Peninsula from getting out of hand, which will result in the depletion of strategic resources of the US and impinge on its strategic containment against China on a global

6

THE NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR ISSUE: ROOT CAUSES …

73

scale. Also, the US will keep the situation on the Peninsula at a certain level of tension, so as to urge the ROK and Japan to follow the US and strengthen its initiative and dominance of political security on the Peninsula and Northeast Asia. The North Korean Nuclear Issue has Become a Tool for the US to Take Actions Against China Different from previous US administrations, the Biden administration regards China as its main strategic opponent and has launched a “wholeof-government effort” in response to its rise. Under this strategy, the North Korean nuclear issue has also become a tool serving the US strategy. This can be seen from his statement on the DPRK nuclear policy and a series of diplomatic actions since then. Ways to Break the Impasse on the Peninsula Under Current Situation Judging from the Biden administration’s policies and actions toward the DPRK, there is not much chance of substantial progress on the North Korean nuclear issue shortly or improvement of the situation on the Peninsula. Thus, how to promote the sound development of the Peninsula has become a major issue when the US does not take actions such as lifting sanctions against the DPRK to improve the situation. One feasible way is to promote economic cooperation between China, the ROK, and the DPRK, so as to break the impasse on the Peninsula. Under the condition that the UN sanctions against DPRK will not be lifted, China and the ROK can provide humanitarian relief to the DPRK in fighting against natural disasters and epidemics, and then help the DPRK overcome difficulties in economic development, thereby facilitating trilateral economic cooperation and improving relations between the North and the South of the Peninsula and the situation on the Peninsula. To achieve this goal, first of all, China and the ROK should strengthen communication and reach a consensus, and then make joint efforts to assist the DPRK in the fight against natural disasters, Covid-19, and food shortages based on trilateral communication and consultation, exploring possible paths for improving the situation on the Peninsula. Secondly, as the DPRK continues to maintain a freeze on its nuclear facilities, China, Russia, and the ROK should strengthen coordination and cooperation, and join hands with the international community to promote the United Nations to ease sanctions against the DPRK, and

74

Z. ZOU

remove political and legal obstacles to economic cooperation between all parties and the DPRK. Efforts should be made to support the DPRK’s economic development without violation of the UN resolutions. With economic growth and social development, the DPRK will have a sense of gain, and be willing to maintain its nuclear freeze, expand reform, and opening up. Finally, with the lifting of UN sanctions against the DPRK, China will step up efforts in further aligning the Belt and Road Initiative on the Peninsula with the New Northern Policy of the ROK, speed up the interconnection between the North and the South, and help the DPRK further integrate into Northeast Asian regional economic cooperation, advancing the building of a Peninsula Economic Community and a Northeast Asian Economic Community. In doing so, the DPRK’s voluntary nuclear abandonment will be around the corner.

Bibliography Zou Zhibo, “The Situation and Prospect on the Peninsula”, Yellow Book of International Politic (2018), pp. 245–262. Zou Zhibo, “The Significant Change and Evolution on the Peninsula”, Yellow Book of International Politics (2019), pp. 252–268.

CHAPTER 7

The Situation on the Peninsula Out of the Vicious Circle Requires Consideration of the Concerns of All Sides Guohong Qiu

As we all know, the Peninsula issue has a long history, it is more than 70 years since the Korean War and nearly 30 years since the outbreak of the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. The Korean War is still in a state of armistice which has not been converted into a peace agreement for more than 70 years. In addition, the Nuclear Issue on the Korean Peninsula has been in a plight of repeated cycles of tension and de-escalation for 30 years after several twists and turns. Therefore, it can be said that the Peninsula issue is an international problem following World War II. In a sense, it is also a world-class miracle among international problems in the post-World War II era, as no large-scale direct conflict has ever occurred over some 70 years of tension and confrontation, despite the rife crisis. How can we break the ongoing cycle of tension and de-escalation on the peninsula, which is an international problem, and promote lasting

G. Qiu (B) Charhar Institute, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_7

75

76

G. QIU

peace? I think we need to clarify the crux of the current dilemma on the peninsula. So what is the crux of the current dilemma on the Korean Peninsula? I think there are four main factors: First, the Peninsula issue stems from the confrontation between major powers and is driven by the Cold War. The core issue, namely the security concerns of relevant parties on the Peninsula, has not been resolved as it should be as a result of the improved major-country relations and the end of the Cold War. The worldwide Cold War ended with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the easing of major power relations, but the strategic game around security issues on the peninsula has not stopped, and some countries, mainly the US, still cling to the Cold War mentality, trying to transform the peninsula’s antagonistic pattern, which used to be mainly characterized by the US–Soviet rivalry, into a strategic front aimed at containing the rise of China and Russia. Among these attempts, the most pronounced is that the US has been inviting Japan and South Korea to coordinate their actions on the peninsula on the grounds of jointly responding to the DPRK’s nuclear and missile threats, exerting extreme pressure on the DPRK and holding back the non-existent socalled China–Russia–DPRK cooperation. By doing so, it can both restrain the strategic autonomy of Japan and South Korea on the Peninsula issue, and also promote the construction of a trilateral military alliance between the US, Japan, and South Korea for the purpose of containing the rise of China and Russia. Second, all parties involved in the Peninsula issue have their own interests and demands. Among all the complicated conflicts, the major US–DPRK issue is the most prominent one, which has dominated the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula since the end of the Cold War. There are three pairs of conflicts that can have an important impact on the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula: the US–DPRK conflict, the DPRK–Korean conflict, and the China–US conflict. There are also three pairs of conflicts that can have some influence: the US–Russian conflict, the China–DPRK conflict, and the Japan–DPRK conflict. Among the six pairs of conflicts mentioned above, the DPRK–Korean conflict focuses on the issue of who unifies whom, while at this stage, neither of them has the ability or condition to unify the other. Therefore, how DPRK–RoK relations evolve will have an important impact on the situation on the Peninsula and has caused local tensions in the past. They have not, however, had an overall impact on the evolution of this situation.

7

THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA OUT …

77

Although the China–US conflict will be more of a strategic security game, at this stage, there is still a considerable need for cooperation between the two countries to stop the nuclear missile development on the Peninsula, and therefore it has never emerged as a dominant factor in the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula. Other pairs of conflicts have generally had a very limited impact on the overall evolution of the situation on the Peninsula. If we look back on the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula in the past 30 years since the DPRK nuclear missile crisis, we can find a constant pattern, that is, almost every time the overall tension on the Peninsula is triggered by the US or the DPRK. It can be found that the US–DPRK conflict has been the decisive factor in the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula, as well as the main one among the various conflicts on the Peninsula. The US is a superpower while the DPRK is a small country. As they are vastly different in strength, why does the US–DPRK conflict still dominate the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula? I think the reason is related to the different strategic goals pursued by the two sides. For the DPRK, which is a small country and is most worried about subversion from the US, the US–DPRK relationship is a life-and-death institutional security issue. It is not in their intention to develop nuclear power at all costs and confront the US head-on, but “hard-to-hard” is more of a strategy and gesture to mobilize the US and other major powers and use conditional nuclear abandonment as a bargaining chip to make breakthroughs in its bilateral ties with the US in exchange for security guarantees and economic benefits. While, for the US, the US–DPRK relationship is a matter of global strategic application. It is clear to the US that the DPRK is a small country that cannot pose a real threat to it. However, if the country keeps causing trouble, it is very beneficial for the US to maintain a long-term military presence in Northeast Asia. In the US view, if the Peninsula is really peaceful, then there is no good reason to continue to maintain a military presence in Northeast Asia. Therefore, the US is willing to see the DPRK “hard confrontation” and hopes to portray the DPRK as a “troublemaker” to ensure the US strategic advantage in Northeast Asia by keeping the tension on the Peninsula manageable. It is this pursuit of different strategic goals by the US and the DPRK that has determined that the conflict between them is difficult or even impossible to reconcile, leading to a cycle of tension and de-escalation that has been repeated on the Peninsula for nearly 30 years.

78

G. QIU

Third, the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and medium- and long-range ballistic missiles has touched the red line of interests of all parties concerned on the peninsula, intensified conflicts with all parties, incurred severe sanctions from the international community, and triggered multiple rounds of spiraling tensions on the peninsula. Why is North Korea vigorously developing nuclear weapons? I believe there are three main reasons. The first is a lack of security. During the Cold War, North Korea was on the side of the socialist camp, and the overall military power contrast on the peninsula was relatively balanced. Although North Korea had always had the intention to develop nuclear weapons and had some early preparations, there was no sense of urgency at the time. After the end of the Cold War, the DPRK began to have a strong sense of crisis and fear for the survival of its own regime in the face of the arbitrary bullying of disadvantaged countries by the US-led Western powers. In addition, the disintegration of the Yugoslav Union, the fall of Saddam’s regime in Iraq and Gaddafi’s regime in Libya exacerbated this feeling. As a result of its own weakened strength and unwillingness to be protected by other powers, the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons and means of delivery in order to create a new asymmetric strategic balance became an inevitable choice for the sake of maintaining its own regime security. Secondly, it is necessary to maintain domestic stability. The DPRK has a highly centralized leadership system and has been pursuing the political line of “military first” for a long time. At the same time, years of natural disasters have complicated the domestic situation, thus leading to a long-term stagnation of economic growth and diplomatic isolation from the international system. As a result, there is a potential political crisis in the country. In this context, it is necessary to build a “strong and powerful country” to rally domestic people and stabilize the domestic political situation. To this end, one of the hallmarks of the “strong power” goal is the possession of a nuclear deterrent. The third is to increase the bargaining power with the international community. The DPRK is well aware that its existing national strength and backward conventional military power alone cannot give it the status and right to engage in dialogue with the major powers on an equal footing in the international arena. Therefore, it expects to increase its bargaining chips and discourse power with the major powers by possessing a nuclear deterrent that will be of great concern to them in the short term and is waiting for an opportunity to exploit the conflicts of the major powers on the Peninsula issue to break through the economic sanctions and political siege imposed on the DPRK

7

THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA OUT …

79

by the US-led Western countries and seek the best space for survival in the cracks. If necessary, it can also play the “nuclear abandonment” card in exchange for security guarantees and economic compensation from major powers. The DPRK’s vigorous practice of developing nuclear weapons and medium- and long-range missiles in spite of the strong opposition of the international community and at the expense of undermining regional peace and stability has not made the DPRK safer in terms of results. Instead, it has only resulted in a vicious cycle of sanctions and provocations, which has become the main cause of many rounds of tensions on the Peninsula and has led to the DPRK’s unprecedented international isolation and serious constraints on its economic development. Fourth, South Korea’s different policy toward the DPRK based on the change of regime has caused local tensions on the Peninsula many times. During the administrations of Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun, both governments adopted a moderate “sunshine policy” toward the DPRK, with the pursuit of peaceful coexistence as the core goal, which broke the ice in the long-standing confrontation between the North and the South since the Korean War and contributed to the de-escalation of the entire Peninsula. As time went by, under the administrations of Presidents Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, South Korea’s policy toward the DPRK changed significantly by abandoning the “sunshine policy” and becoming more assertive, thus repeatedly causing tensions between the North and the South and negatively affecting the overall situation on the Peninsula. Under the administration of President Moon Jae-in, South Korea has returned to a “sunshine” policy toward the DPRK by seizing the opportunity of the PyeongChang Winter Olympics to promote the improvement of North–South relations. Meanwhile, it promptly interceded between the US and the DPRK, playing an important role in bringing about a historic meeting between the heads of state in the two countries and a new round of de-escalation of the situation on the Peninsula. The new President Yoon Seok-yul took office in May 2022. His remarks on the DPRK before and after his election show that he will not continue the “sunshine policy” and will return to the “pressure for talks” and “hard against hard” approach of past conservative regimes. However, it will not be as tough as under President Park Geun-hye. Instead, it may be closer to the approach under President Lee Myungbak, depending on the DPRK’s movement to decide whether to talk or to press. The DPRK–Korean relations may tend to deteriorate or even become tense.

80

G. QIU

Of course, there are many other factors affecting the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula, but the above-mentioned four factors are the most important. Therefore, in order to solve the international problem of the recurring cycle of tension and de-escalation on the Peninsula, we should start by solving the above-mentioned four aspects and find the right remedy. In my view, to resolve the current dilemma facing the peninsula, we should maintain strategic patience and take into account the concerns of all sides. The most critical issues of denuclearization of the Peninsula and the conversion of the ceasefire mechanism can be considered in a step-by-step manner. And it is advisable to advance in phases after accumulating trust. All parties concerned with the Peninsula should focus their efforts on the following four aspects. First, it is necessary to maintain the relatively low-tension situation that is ongoing since 2018 in the Korean Peninsula, to buy more time for the political resolution of the nuclear issue through diplomatic dialogue and negotiation, as well as lay a solid foundation for future interaction. The past recurring tension within the Korean Peninsula was mostly caused by the conflicts between the US and the DPRK. There has been a relative easing of the tension since 2018, mainly due to a direct dialogue between President Trump and Chairman Kim Jong-un. Therefore, whether the US and the DPRK can continue to maintain dialogue and contact is the key to maintaining the ongoing relative low-tension situation within the Peninsula. Currently, the Biden administration has determined a pragmatic foreign policy toward the DPRK that is different from the Trump administration and the Obama administration, and which does not rely on strategic patience but focuses on seeking practical progress and seeking direct dialogue with the DPRK. Although the DPRK has not yet made a positive response to the current US foreign policies and continues to test the US reactions by launching missiles and other means, it has not resolutely refused to engage with the US, which demonstrated that both sides are willing to resume direct dialogue under certain conditions. At the current stage, it is estimated that the DPRK is still evaluating the real intention behind the new US foreign policy. What the DPRK needs is not a verbal commitment from the US, but a sincere practical action in terms of lifting pressure on the DPRK. While the US and the DPRK are still probing each other and are hesitant on whether and how to conduct dialogue, all concerned parties related to the Peninsula issue should jointly push the US to do something that could alleviate the pressure imposed on

7

THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA OUT …

81

the DPRK so that the DPRK could feel the sincerity, and help to resume the US–DPRK engagement and dialogue as soon as possible. Second, in accordance with the easy-to-hard principle, different parties should begin by reducing the level of confrontation, building trust, and actively creating a healthy atmosphere for the political settlement of the nuclear issues on the Korean Peninsula. The current tension within the peninsula originated from the Korean War, yet it did not end with it. For nearly 70 years after the war, North and South Korea have only settled on an armistice agreement while a peace agreement has not yet been signed. The core of the current issue within the Peninsula, namely, the tension between the US and DPRK, as well as the confrontation between North and South Korea, were also the result of the Korean war. In this sense, having a peace agreement signed in a timely manner will be a fundamental solution to the problem. However, the current tension coupled with a low level of mutual trust between the US and the DPRK as well as complicated great power politics has made the effort of pushing for a peace agreement in the short term highly unrealistic. Therefore, it is necessary to first reduce the level of confrontation and gradually build up trust while maintaining the current hard-won situation of relative relaxation on the Peninsula and to create a favorable atmosphere and environment for the future political settlement of the Peninsula issue through negotiation and dialogue. In this light, I believe that it is worth affirming President Moon Jae-in’s proposal about a joint release of an “end-of-war declaration” by related parties during his attendance at the 76th UN General Assembly last September. His proposal is conducive to maintaining and prolonging the current relatively relaxed situation within the Peninsula, as well as breaking the stalemate in the stagnant negotiation. Moreover, the endof-war declaration is mainly a recognition of the fact that the Korean War has been over for nearly 70 years. As it only carries symbolic meaning, it is much easier to achieve than turning the current armistice agreement into a peace treaty. Therefore, China generally supports President Moon Jae-in’s proposal in this regard. However, another challenge ahead is that the newly elected President Yoon Suk-yeol has a vastly different policy toward the DPRK compared to President Moon Jae-in. It is possible that President Yoon Suk-yeol may stop the pursuit of the end-of-war declaration. Third, it is imperative to support and encourage the North and South of the Peninsula to further improve their relations and reach a consensus to achieve the reunification of the peninsula through reconciliation and

82

G. QIU

cooperation and eventually achieve peace on their own, so that North– South relations can become a positive energy for peace and stability on the Peninsula. When President Moon Jae-in came to power, he adhered to the “Sunshine Policy” that was established by presidents Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun and made great efforts to improve North–South relations. He achieved a number of significant results. For example, South Korea took the PyeongChang Winter Olympics as an opportunity to promote direct dialogue with the North; it also built a bridge for direct dialogue between the US and the DPRK which led to the historic meeting between the leaders; it also took the initiative to stop provocative behaviors such as broadcasting and disseminating propaganda to the DPRK, and the temporary suspension of its joint military exercises with the US These efforts all contributed significantly to the relaxation of the ongoing tension within the Peninsula. Despite President Yoon Suk-yeol’s stands toward the North having become harsher after he took office, there is still leeway in his policies. For example, in a recent interview with US media, President Yoon Suk-yeol noted that if the DPRK takes the initiative toward disarmament, his government will provide the North with more “incentives” than humanitarian aid promised by previous governments. Therefore, although it is more likely that DPRK–Korean relations will deteriorate during President Yoon Suk-yeol’s administration, it is not entirely impossible to maintain the status quo or even improve the North–South relationship. How the situation will evolve during Yoon’s administration is primarily dependent on three factors: First, the DPRK’s nuclear and missile development tendency, especially whether it will conduct new nuclear tests; Second, the scale of the joint military exercise between South Korea and the US and whether it has provocative contents that would provoke the DPRK; Third, Whether South Korea will reopen political broadcasts to the DPRK through speakers in border areas and allow civil groups to spread political leaflets. Fourth, it is important to gradually push toward denuclearization of the peninsula and armistice-to-peace transition step by step and take into account the security concerns of all parties. The nuclear issue of the DPRK can have profound impacts on the overall situation within the Peninsula, and the armistice-to-peace transition is closely linked to the return of peace. These two significant and troublesome issues are not only products of different periods, but also highly interrelated. On the subject of the nuclear issue, the US insists that the DPRK should abandon its nuclear weapon program first before any negotiation on sanctions lifting

7

THE SITUATION ON THE PENINSULA OUT …

83

can be carried out and any guarantees of its security can be given. The DPRK on the other hand insists that it can only denuclearize when its security is guaranteed by the US and the imposed sanctions are lifted. Although the two sides advocate completely opposite stands, there is also a point of convergence, that is, it is possible to abandon nuclear weapons under certain conditions, but each has its own demands to make. As for the armistice-to-peace issue, the US advocates that the transition should be discussed after denuclearization, while the DPRK believes that they are two different issues, and the transition should be regarded as a priority. At this stage, their contradictory positions on the issues are difficult to reconcile. How can we break the current stalemate of confrontation between the US and the DPRK, and promote progress in the DPRK’s denuclearization and transition to peace? I believe that the solution to the problem should be sought by taking the concerns of all parties into account. The DPRK’s core concern is its security and its economic development under sanctions. The US’s demands focus on denuclearization, which aims to prevent nuclear proliferation and the emergence of new nuclear states in Northeast Asia. The main reason for the DPRK’s reckless development of nuclear weapons is the sense of lacking security. Thus, the DPRK will not give up nuclear weapons easily until its demand for security is recognized. History has shown that the US’s practices of sanctions and maximum pressure approach toward the DPRK have failed to force the abandonment of nuclear development. On the contrary, these measures strengthened its counterpart’s determination toward having nuclear weapons, thus leading to a spiral intensification of tensions on the Peninsula. Therefore, to achieve denuclearization, it is necessary to start with addressing the DPRK’s reasonable security and development demands, such as easing the imposed sanctions conditionally. If the DPRK promises to stop further nuclear development and missile tests, related parties should consider easing or partially lifting sanctions on it in accordance with the “UN Security Council Resolutions on North Korea” to encourage the DPRK to gradually move toward denuclearization. At the same time, related parties should also strive to create a new virtuous cycle of gradually accumulating trust through negotiation and dialogue and advancing the denuclearization process in phases. Both the US and the DPRK insist that the other side should take the lead in addressing its opponent’s demand and will not give in to each other on the issue of DPRK’s nuclear development as well as the

84

G. QIU

issue of armistice-to-peace transition. Such a stalemate has resulted in an impasse on bilateral as well as multilateral dialogues regarding the issue. In February 2016, Chinese State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi proposed a new “dual-track” approach which represents China’s take on the mentioned deadlocks. The “dual-track” approach, that is, carrying out the process of resolving denuclearization of the DPRK and armisticeto-peace mechanism at the same time, is a balanced, just, reasonable and realistic solution to the issue as it takes both the US and DPRK’s demands into consideration. As the first step of the “dual-track” approach, China proposed a “suspension for suspension” plan, namely, the DPRK suspends nuclear and missile activities, and the US and South Korea suspend largescale joint military exercises. As far as the current situation is concerned, I believe that China’s above-mentioned new plans and new ideas are still the most effective solution in breaking the deadlock, promoting denuclearization and achieving lasting peace within the Peninsula. In conclusion, the Korean Peninsula issues affect the strategic interests of all parties concerned, and the conflicts between the US, South Korea, and the DPRK are profound and complex. As there is still a long way to go for an ultimate solution, strategic patience must be maintained. The ancient Chinese Confucian sage Xunzi has a famous saying “patience wears out metals and stones,” that is, one shall never give up as long as there is a glimmer of hope, and the hard work will pay off in the end. Now, the Korean Peninsula has come to a crossroads where one leads to de-escalation and the other returns to tension. All parties concerned on the Peninsula issue should work together to maintain the hard-won easing situation from 2018, create suitable conditions, and lay down a solid foundation for the political resolution of the various challenges ahead through negotiation and dialogue in the next stage.

CHAPTER 8

Can the DPRK Preserve Its Sovereignty Without Nuclear Armaments? John Everard

A Brief History of the DPRK’s Nuclear Programme In discussing the DPRK’s nuclear programme it is important to remember that it was not initially intended to defend national sovereignty. The origins of the programme are murky, but it seems likely that it first began when President Kim Il-sung visited China in July 1961 and was shown the Chinese nuclear programme. He appears to have instructed on his return that the DPRK also, for reasons of national prestige, should develop a nuclear capacity. However, the nuclear programme was not emphasized in the DPRK media for some decades thereafter, and information on its development during this early period is scant. It seems to have been only with the profound external shock that the DPRK suffered from the collapse of the USSR that the objectives of the programme changed. —Although it is impossible to indicate a single point of transition, it seems that at some point during the early 1990s, when the DPRK was suffering severe economic contraction caused largely by both the almost

J. Everard (B) London, UK © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_8

85

86

J. EVERARD

complete loss of its overseas markets—exports to the USSR contracted sharply, and few customers in free markets were interested in buying DPRK goods—and by the Soviet, later Russian, decision to supply oil only at commercial rates, that the regime seized on the nuclear programme as a means of boosting its flagging prestige with the people of the DPRK. It also seems to have seen the programme as a means of fending off a feared invasion. This was a time when the DPRK felt profoundly vulnerable. Kim Jong-il once remarked to a Japanese journalist that, had Kim Young-sam, the then president of South Korea, simply traveled to Pyongyang to attend his inauguration following Kim Il-sung’s death, he could probably have taken over the entire Peninsula just with a speech announcing reunification. The social and political disruption caused by the famine had sharply reduced the DPRK’s ability to defend itself, and there were reports by NGOs working in the DPRK at the time of large numbers of deserting soldiers. With its conventional forces in chaos, a threat to develop nuclear weapons and to use them as a deterrent must have seemed attractive to the beleaguered regime. The fact that nobody in fact took advantage of the situation to attack the DPRK, but rather that the international community rallied around the country and provided large amounts of aid, does not seem to have registered with the regime. The DPRK’s March 1993 announcement of its intention to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT—which it had only begrudgingly signed, at Soviet insistence, in 1985) is a milestone in the move of the regime’s view of the nuclear programme from being a simple prestige project toward an arm to defend national sovereignty. The DPRK realized that its development of nuclear weapons was incompatible with its obligations under the NPT. Although this declaration of intention did not translate into immediate withdrawal—it was suspended in June 1993 and the DPRK did not formally withdraw for another ten years, in April 2003—it led to intense negotiations which eventually crystallized into the Agreed Framework, signed in 1994. At the heart of this complex agreement was a trade between a DPRK undertaking to suspend its plutonium-based nuclear programme on the one hand and on the other hand an undertaking by the international community (not just the USA) to meet most of the DPRK’s energy needs through the construction of two light water reactors at a site near the city of Kumho and, pending their completion, 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil a year. (Perhaps curiously, the DPRK never seems seriously to have attempted to use its

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

87

growing nuclear expertise to meet its energy needs by generating electricity directly, and its efforts under Kim Jong-il to portray its programme as essentially a civil energy programme were at best half-hearted). It is significant that although the DPRK at this point had started to see its programme in predominantly military terms—it would not otherwise have found it necessary to withdraw from the NPT—it was nevertheless content to suspend its nuclear programme in exchange for economic aid, probably because in the face of the Arduous March economic collapse was still regarded as a greater threat to the regime than foreign invasion. The fact that at this time the nuclear programme was still tradable showed that it had not therefore at this point become the sacred icon of the regime that it later became. It seems nevertheless to have wished to hedge against the possibility of foreign invasion. It is difficult otherwise to explain its decision to launch an undeclared uranium enrichment programme, in parallel with its declared efforts to reprocess its limited existing holdings of plutonium. With great effort, it obtained the technology required to build the nuclear centrifuges necessary for this programme and strove to keep this programme secret for many years so as not to jeopardize deliveries of desperately needed aid and energy under the Agreed Framework. (In fact, the USA came to know of the illicit programme from an early stage, but the Clinton administration chose to ignore it. It was only under the Bush administration that it decided to confront the DPRK with what it knew). It is impossible now to know whether or not the Agreed Framework would have continued indefinitely had it not been for the visit in 2002 by James Kelly, during which the USA not only told the DPRK that it was aware of its illicit parallel uranium enrichment programme, but gave considerable detail about the facilities at which the programme was being run. The DPRK negotiators were visibly startled. Once the USA had made clear that it was not prepared to tolerate the continued operation of this second programme the DPRK started to withdraw from the Agreed Framework. The decision to do so, despite the fact that this would involve the sacrifice of the economic benefits that the Agreed Framework had offered, and in particular the abandonment of the light water reactors at Kumho (they had not yet been completed and are still there, half-built), shows how far DPRK thinking had evolved in the intervening years. Although the economic situation remained difficult it was no longer the overriding concern of the regime. The worst of the famine was over

88

J. EVERARD

by this time and the economy seems to have started slowly to grow. This gave the DPRK leadership more options than they had had at the time the Agreed Framework was signed. On the other hand the need for a nuclear deterrent to defend national sovereignty must have become a higher priority in Pyongyang’s thinking—at any rate, the decision to leave the Agreed Framework suggests that the regime by this point attached greater importance to an, at that time, still rudimentary uranium enrichment project than to the assured benefits that the Agreed Framework had provided. It was from this point too that the programme started to grow in political significance, a process that had already started in the last years of Kim Il-sung and accelerated under Kim Jong-il. It is noteworthy that the Agreed Framework was the last point at which the DPRK entered into and implemented (to a greater or lesser extent) an agreement under which it suspended its nuclear development in exchange for economic (specifically, energy) aid. There was however one further occasion when it seemed willing to do so. This was in February 2007 when, under the subsequent Six Party Talks, the DPRK agreed to abstain from further nuclear developments in exchange for a package that included the provision of substantial amounts of heavy fuel oil, but this agreement was never in fact implemented as it broke down almost immediately. This failed deal marked the last time that the DPRK has been willing to trade away its nuclear programme under any terms, a significant step toward its political elevation to the main defence of national sovereignty. Alarmed, the international community led by the USA attempted to retrieve the situation through a multilateral process that came to be called the Six Party Talks, in which the USA, China (as chair), the DPRK, ROK, Japan and (at its insistence) Russia participated. Although the Six Party Talks showed moments of promise, in particular in a 2005 agreement that briefly seemed to stabilize the situation, over time it became clear that the DPRK was no longer willing to negotiate in good faith toward any outcome that involved its surrendering its nuclear programme. Events then led steadily to the DPRK’s first nuclear test on October 9, 2006. By that point, the linkage between the nuclear programme and national sovereignty was firm. Even at this first test the accompanying DPRK statement was fiercely nationalistic in tone. The test, said KCNA, “marks an historic event as it greatly encouraged and pleased the (North Korean army) and people that have wished to have powerful self-reliant defence capability.” Elsewhere, DPRK media made clear that the country’s nuclear

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

89

weapons were intended to deter an imagined US or ROK attack. Statements following the DPRK’s subsequent five nuclear tests reinforced these points. By the time of the sixth nuclear test the nuclear programme was being justified almost entirely in terms of sovereignty and national dignity (the two terms have a complex and often unclear relationship in DPRK usage, but often seem to mean the same thing).

The DPRK’s National Nuclear Weapons Programme and National Sovereignty What does the DPRK mean by sovereignty? The meaning of sovereignty in common diplomatic parlance is quite precise. It refers to the ability of a state to manage its own internal affairs and to conduct its own external relations, without control or excessive interference from another state or states. As has often been pointed out, complete sovereignty is usually unattainable as all states are constrained to a greater or lesser degree by their relationships with other states. Nevertheless, it is this concept of sovereignty on which the UN charter is founded. The DPRK however often seems to use sovereignty in a rather different sense. Although its concept of sovereignty embraces the one above, it also seems to include elements of protection of national prestige and dignity. Indeed, the need to preserve “sovereignty and dignity”—this has become a fixed phrase as if the two concepts were welded together—has appeared more and more frequently in DPRK justifications of its nuclear tests (and also of its missile tests). Prestige and dignity are of the utmost importance to the DPRK regime. Although it never avows this, it has inherited concepts of kingship both from old Korea, in which the kings were semi-divine and infallible beings and from imperial Japan. Under this political construct the leader must be seen as wise and infallible—any suggestion that he is in fact capable of error would fracture the political structure. So the preservation of the prestige and dignity of the ruling Kim is not just a matter of ego but an intrinsic part of the way in which the DPRK is run, and a loss of prestige and dignity would threaten the political stability of the state. Moreover, the DPRK concept of sovereignty also reflects the identification of the leader with the nation that is intrinsic to the political view outlined above. In the experience of this writer, questions to North

90

J. EVERARD

Koreans about their attitude to the ruling Kim often elicit answers referring to the North Korean nation—in the common North Korean mind the two merges so that the leader is the nation, and the nation is the leader. This naturally means that sovereignty, as traditionally defined, also means the freedom of action of the leader, unconstrained by outside forces, not just the freedom of action of the North Korean state. In the same way, the prestige and dignity of the leader are taken as coterminous with the prestige and dignity of North Korea. So the regime’s sensitivity to perceived slights, and its conflation of criticism of it—which it regards as threats to its prestige—with threats to its sovereignty is understandable if unusual. To a very large extent, the DPRK regime can protect itself from any internal criticism of its leaders (or, at least, from any overt criticism) by cowing its populace and monopolizing the means of communication. But it is of course unable to use these techniques to prevent criticism from outside its borders. Countering these criticisms—there have been many—and, above all, preventing them from entering the DPRK, always has been a major regime preoccupation. Most recently this can be seen in the efforts to prevent computer files of ROK material from entering the DPRK, and in the angry dispute with the Moon Jae In administration in 2021 over “hostile” materials delivered by balloon across the DMZ. The depth of North Korean sensitivity to perceived slights rises and falls over time, largely depending on how self-confident it feels at any given moment. For example, in the depths of its confrontation with the USA under President Trump in 2017, even a London hair salon that jokingly displayed a photograph of Kim Jong-un’s hairstyle was described by the DPRK embassy in London as an assault on DPRK sovereignty.

Has the Development of Nuclear Weapons Protected DPRK Sovereignty? This paper will first consider whether the DPRK nuclear programme has defended its sovereignty in the traditional sense of this word, and then consider whether it has defended its sovereignty in the wider sense of the word to include prestige and dignity, as discussed above. The DPRK has frequently linked the nuclear programme not only to the defence of sovereignty but specifically to the defence of that sovereignty against the USA, which it continues to regard as its primary enemy. How far therefore can it be shown that the USA has constrained

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

91

the DPRK’s external relations or prevented it from the free control of its own internal affairs? The DPRK was badly shaken by the Korean War. Despite all the triumphalist rhetoric during and after that conflict, its leadership knew that its forces had essentially been routed following the Incheon landings and that, had it not been for massive and humiliating Chinese intervention (for most of the remainder of the war the Chinese hardly even consulted the DPRK military leadership, and Kim Il-sung personally was marginalized), the DPRK would probably have ceased to exist as a state. Its helplessness in the face of massively superior US (and wider UN) firepower scarred the DPRK consciousness. For many years after the Korean War Pyongyang’s fear of US invasion was deep and real. But few outside the DPRK believed that a further US invasion was at all likely. The US, war-weary after WW2 and cautious of another confrontation with China, showed no interest in a further attack. Indeed the USA, far from pursuing aggression, after the Korean War insisted on restraint and refused to support President Syngman Rhee’s constant demands to reignite the Korean War, which he regarded as unfinished business. So from the end of the Korean War until the DPRK’s withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty the USA essentially pursued a policy of critical neglect, lamenting the DPRK’s appalling human rights record and occasionally expressing concern at its leadership style but, apart from occasional flare-ups along the DMZ, it did not invest effort in attempts to change DPRK behaviour. Nor was the ROK in any position to launch a credible attack on the DPRK of its own. Its economy was shattered by the war, it had huge numbers of refugees to house and its military would not in any case have been equal to the task. But then comes a paradox. It was the DPRK’s declared intention to leave the NPT in 1993 that prompted the USA to seek actively to engage with the DPRK and to curtail its nuclear ambitions. It was also from this point onward that US scrutiny of DPRK human rights abuses became much more intense. In effect, the DPRK, by drawing attention to itself through its nuclear programme, had also attracted the critical attention of US and other Western human rights monitors. Moreover, since the US-led intervention in Iraq, DPRK statements accompanying nuclear tests have frequently referred to the need to deter US aggression. The DPRK is fond of pointing out that no nuclear-armed state has ever been successfully invaded, and of pointing to the US intervention in Iraq as a cautionary tale. If we did not have nuclear weapons,

92

J. EVERARD

so runs the DPRK narrative, we too should have suffered the fate of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, of being overrun and subjected to a US puppet government. But this analysis is deeply flawed. The reason that the US was prompted to intervene so sharply in Iraq was the latter country’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. There is little indication that up to that point the US was considering any intervention—indeed, it took no part in the brutal Iraq–Iran War. It is likely therefore that the DPRK drew the wrong conclusion from recent history. It was not Iraq’s lack of nuclear weapons that precipitated a US-led intervention but its invasion of a neighboring state. (This probably also means that the only other action by the DPRK than the development of nuclear weapons that would have drawn the hostile attention of the USA would have been a further attempt to invade the ROK.) In fact, the only point at which the US seems to have come anywhere close to considering a military intervention in the DPRK was in the last year of President Clinton’s administration, in response to the DPRK growing nuclear ambitions. But any move that the US may have planned was thwarted, not by the DPRK’s nuclear deterrent, but by the Monica Lewinsky scandal. Moreover, when US analysts have been asked about the feasibility, regardless of political will, of military intervention in the DPRK, they have pointed not to the DPRK nuclear deterrent but to its conventional artillery ranged against Seoul. Even were there the political will to invade the DPRK (there is not) the USA would be reluctant to move on a state that would be able seriously to damage the capital of an ally with massive artillery strikes. That is to say that, even if the USA were considering an invasion of the DPRK, the DPRK nuclear programme would still be redundant as a deterrent. Its artillery ranged on Seoul is already sufficient for that purpose. The ROK is usually seen in Pyongyang simply as an appendage of the USA. But in various conversations with Americans, senior DPRK officials have made clear that the DPRK’s nuclear programme was not in any case aimed against the ROK as such since it would be inconceivable to use nuclear weapons against fellow Koreans. (Although Kim Yo-jong’s comments in April 2022 that the DPRK might after all be prepared to use nuclear weapons against the ROK suggested that the DPRK might be moving away from this position her remarks have never been echoed or ratified by official spokespeople or, crucially, by her brother). So even if the ROK intended to attack the DPRK—it does not—the DPRK’s nuclear weapons would not be used against it (though they might be used against

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

93

US bases in the ROK) and so have no deterrent value in this context either. It is therefore most unlikely that the nuclear programme has in fact contributed to the preservation of the DPRK’s sovereignty in the traditional sense of the word. Has it though preserved its prestige and dignity, concepts that in the DPRK mind are closely bound with sovereignty? Until its development of nuclear weapons the DPRK was simply not taken seriously by most of the Western world. There was a certain fascination with its unique leadership style, and its occasional pronouncements drew mirth rather than scorn. Even in the USSR, with which the DPRK had a formal alliance, DPRK materials were circulated as a joke. In short, for many decades, the DPRK was simply a slightly comical footnote to world history. The regime doubtless chafed at some of the things that were said about it, but at that point engagement between the DPRK and the wider world was so limited that there was very little risk of scornful comments abroad about the DPRK ever entering the country and causing the damage to the regime’s prestige that it was so anxious to avoid. However international perceptions of the DPRK shifted significantly with the development of nuclear weapons. From its declared intention to withdraw from the NPT in 1993, but especially after its first nuclear test in 2006, the tone of international interactions with the DPRK became much more critical, and the UN Security Council passed a series of draconian resolutions sanctioning the country for its illegal nuclear programme. Within the space of a few years the DPRK had moved from being a joke to being an international pariah. Even in Moscow and Beijing its new activities were regarded with alarm. It is therefore very difficult to argue that the nuclear programme enhanced the DPRK’s prestige. Rather the contrary seems to have been the case. Had it not embarked on its nuclear adventure it is probable that the DPRK would still be regarded as a bumbling but basically non-threatening state, and allowed mostly to go its own way in the same way that Paraguay, the Central African Empire and other idiosyncratic states were too. It would probably have enjoyed much greater freedom of action on the international stage—so a higher degree of real sovereignty—than it does now. It seems unlikely therefore that the DPRK’s nuclear programme has succeeded in protecting its sovereignty in either the more limited sense of the word or in the wider sense often used by the DPRK. Below this paper discusses whether, on the contrary, the costs of the programme may actually have damaged the DPRK’s sovereignty.

94

J. EVERARD

Costs of the DPRK’s Nuclear Programme There have been various attempts to assess the costs of the DPRK’s nuclear programme. South Korean academics assessed that, up to 2017, it had probably spent around US$3 billion on this (including the missile delivery systems). The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons estimated that in 2019 the DPRK had spent a further US$0.6bn. No figures for spend in 2018 or years after 2019 are available, but on the assumption that spend in those years was similar to that in 2019 it seems reasonable to estimate that the DPRK so far has spent perhaps US$5.5bn (spend in 2022 is likely to have been high because the DPRK has tested so many delivery systems for its nuclear weapons). This is a huge amount of money for a fragile economy—in 2021 DPRK GDP was probably only about US$28bn. It is possible to estimate these direct costs, but much more difficult to estimate the indirect costs, which are likely to be substantially greater. These include the long-term damage to the DPRK economy through persistent capital starvation, the blockage of external trade both from sanctions imposed as a result of the programme and because the DPRK has failed to engage profitably with the international commercial system, and also the negative effects on the DPRK’s economy of failure to maintain, let alone develop, its crumbling transport infrastructure. Probably just as important though very difficult to quantify is the effect of the distraction of the DPRK leadership’s attention for long periods away from the country’s pressing economic needs while it focussed on the nuclear programme. Kim Jong-il used to leave “the economic portfolio” to his advisers, thus depriving economic projects of the prestige and impetus that direct involvement by the leader would have given them. While early in his reign Kim Jong-un appeared focussed on his country’s economy and attempted some economic reforms, he too soon appeared much more frequently at missile launches and nuclear tests. In North Korea perhaps more than in most other societies a clear and consistent leadership signal of the importance of generating wealth would probably have led to much less disappointing economic outcomes than those observed. After a brief recovery from the Arduous March in the first decade of this century the DPRK economy has, over long periods of time, either stagnated or contracted. There are many reasons for this, including its bizarre and hideously inefficient economic management structures, the

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

95

lack of any incentives for ground level economic activity, corruption, international isolation, and a perpetually malnourished and under-skilled workforce. But it is almost certain that the drain on the nation’s resources for the nuclear programme has also contributed significantly to the DPRK’s economic woes. This economic underperformance has not only caused great human misery but has also significantly constrained the very sovereignty that the DPRK nuclear programme was aimed to protect. It has rendered the DPRK dependent on the generosity of its allies, and particularly on that of China. Neither the DPRK nor China publishes relevant figures, but it is likely that Chinese aid covers a significant percentage of both the DPRK’s external account and its food needs. This gives China considerable influence over the DPRK—ironically, much greater influence than that of the USA, the power for which the nuclear programme was developed to counter. Not just the fact of this diversion of capital to the nuclear programme but also its timing has greatly disadvantaged the DPRK. While it was spending huge sums developing nuclear weapons, other countries in the region (and elsewhere) were using their capital to build up exportoriented light industries. In so doing they were able to take advantage of the explosive growth in international trade that has taken place from the 1970s onwards, and that accelerated just as the DPRK seems to have been ploughing maximum resources into its nuclear programme. This interaction with a vigorous world economy has brought these countries tremendous benefits and in many cases quite transformed the lives of their citizens. The DPRK would have been well placed to ride this wave, not least because in the 1960s and 1970s it had good links with many Latin American and African countries that might well have proven lucrative markets for a developed light industrial sector. But that moment has now passed. Even were the DPRK now to abandon its nuclear programme and to use the resources thus liberated to develop its industry it would face a world in which barriers to trade are rising and many key economies face recession. The tide that floated the economies of so many other Asian countries has now started to ebb. The nuclear programme has deprived the DPRK of significant economic benefits in another way too. In the 1990s there was considerable international goodwill toward the DPRK, and aid agencies of various kinds expressed a willingness not only to help the country out of its immediate crisis but to work with it to develop its economy. The nuclear

96

J. EVERARD

programme stopped all that. Even before the first nuclear test national governments had decided that, in view of the DPRK’s nuclear adventure, they would support only humanitarian rather than developmental aid (the sole standout was Switzerland, and the Swiss too ended developmental aid in 2011 after several DPRK nuclear tests aroused anger in the Swiss parliament). After the first nuclear test this position hardened, and no developmental—as opposed to humanitarian—aid has been rendered to the DPRK since then by any Western donor. The nuclear programme thus cut the DPRK off from what could have been a transformative source of support and expertise. Finally, but very important, the sanctions that the DPRK has suffered as a result of its nuclear programme have badly damaged its economy. With each nuclear test, the UN Security Council has imposed ever more draconian sanctions, originally focussed on denying the DPRK access to key items for its nuclear programme but later aimed at halting the economic activity that financed that programme. Again, it is impossible to point to reliable figures, but the distortions of its trade caused by a UN Security Council ban on its exporting its most important commodities or importing more than limited quantities of oil must be considerable. The DPRK regime has frequently called for sanctions to be removed—at the failed Hanoi Summit between General Secretary Kim Jong-un and President Trump in February 2019 Kim insisted that they should all be lifted. The DPRK has had to devote considerable effort and resources to finding ways around these sanctions and has in practice found its trade limited to those countries that take a flexible view of them. The divergence of the historical experiences of the DPRK and Vietnam is instructive. In the 1970s both countries were at a similar stage of economic development, with the DPRK probably ahead as Vietnam had been ravaged by the Vietnam War. But from that point, Vietnam’s efforts at economic reform (doi moi) have yielded rich dividends and created sufficient prosperity to allow it considerable freedom of international action. It is certainly not beholden to China. The DPRK on the other hand, having instead attempted to ward off imaginary external threats through a nuclear weapons programme, has ended up badly impoverished and beholden to its neighbours. It is possible in general terms to trace over time the erosion of the DPRK’s real freedom of action as a result of its economic impoverishment, and the rising power of China over its decision-making. Kim Il-sung visited China on eleven occasions but, partly because his economy

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

97

was relatively strong (for much of his rule it was actually stronger than that of South Korea), and partly also because he was able successfully to play off the influence of China against that of the Soviet Union, he was able to maintain a considerable degree of real independence. The fact that through much of his reign, DPRK foreign policy was effectively inert reflects more the inward-looking nature of the regime than any constraints on its freedom of action. (That is not to say that his freedom of action was complete. When he contemplated the invasion of the ROK in 1950 he still needed to secure the agreement of both Chairman Mao Zedong and Comrade Stalin to his plan). On the other hand, Kim Jong-il, who came to power when the DPRK economy was much weaker, visited China eight times and was repeatedly shown examples of the fruits of China’s economic reforms. Chinese officials have told this writer that he was a difficult guest, curmudgeonly and taciturn. He was clearly there against his will. By the time Kim Jong-un came to power, Chinese influence in Pyongyang was much stronger. It is likely that he ordered the execution of his uncle Jang Song Tek because he was seen as a key Chinese influencer in the ruling circles of Pyongyang. Despite this, for some years Kim Jong-un avoided visiting China. But then by 2018, his need for Chinese economic (and political) support became too great and he traveled to Beijing to see President Xi Jinping three times that year and received a state visit from President Xi in 2019. From that point on their contacts have been quite frequent. Although, despite Chinese disapproval, Kim Jong-un has been able to conduct six nuclear tests and several missile tests (it is unclear how far China really objects to the latter) he has always had to tread carefully so as not to annoy his major sponsor and protector. Although other factors contribute to this weakness, such as the ineptitude of the DPRK’s economic management and more recently, the struggle to contain COVID-19, the weakening of the economy through the drain on its resources because of massive diversion of funds to the nuclear programme will have been a significant factor. While President Kim Il-sung was able, within wide margins, to pursue an independent foreign policy, General Secretary Kim Jong-un constantly had to avoid any action that might put at risk the vital economic and political support that he receives from China. The DPRK’s position in relation to China is comparable now to that of Finland to the USSR during the Cold War, when no Finnish government could take a decision that actively went against the wishes of the USSR or crossed USSR red lines. It is possible to speak of the Finlandisation of North Korea.

98

J. EVERARD

This relationship is further exemplified by the structure of the DPRK’s trade. Because capital starvation caused wholly or partly by the diversion of resources to the nuclear programme has prevented the DPRK from setting up competitive light industries, the DPRK’s main export items have remained raw materials, mostly coal and iron ore, and it is now closely tied into Chinese markets even for these. A significant proportion of such light industrial factories that do exist are either joint ventures with China or wholly owned by Chinese enterprises, and the great bulk of their product is shipped to China. China absorbs something over 90% of all DPRK exports, so it is not only that country’s principal political backer and main supplier of aid but also holds a virtual monopsony in its trade relations with the DPRK.

The Present Situation As this paper goes to press the DPRK faces a catastrophic outbreak of COVID-19. Virologists predict very high death rates as the virus spreads throughout the country. The reasons for this catastrophe go well beyond the nuclear programme. They stem largely from the DPRK’s decision to isolate itself from the world in an attempt to hold the virus at bay, and its refusal to vaccinate its people. However, the attitudes that led to the mishandling of this outbreak were fostered by the effects of the nuclear programme. To an extent, but only to an extent, the DPRK’s isolation is a conscious political choice, but it has also largely been forced on the country by an international community angered at the DPRK’s nuclear weapons. Had it not been so isolated and had its relations with the wider world not degenerated into such hostility as a result of the nuclear programme, it is likely that the DPRK might have chosen a different and more effective response to the pandemic. It might, for example, have allowed Covax to supply it with the vaccines it needed, which would have made a considerable difference to the present situation. Meanwhile, the war in Ukraine shows the limits of deterrence through nuclear weapons. For this deterrence to be effective the opponent has to believe that the weapons will in some circumstances be used. Russia has been unable to leverage its own, much more advanced, nuclear weaponry to achieve its military objectives in Ukraine. Similarly, there must be doubts as to whether the DPRK’s very expensive, but much less

8

CAN THE DPRK PRESERVE ITS SOVEREIGNTY WITHOUT …

99

advanced, nuclear weapons programme would actually provide a credible deterrent to an aggressor. This paper has already noted that there is, in fact, no military threat from the USA or the wider West. But even if there were, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons would only provide deterrence if Washington believed that Pyongyang would risk a devastating nuclear counterstrike by massively superior nuclear weapons, if it were to use them. The evidence that policymakers in Washington do in fact believe this is, at best, inconclusive.

What If… How might the DPRK look today if it had not embarked on its nuclear programme? Of course, the question reduces quickly to imponderables. But it is quite possible to believe that it would now be a modestly prosperous—and probably more stable—society, with a much higher degree of interaction with the outside world and a much greater range of international partners than it at present actually has. The resources that it chose to devote to its nuclear programme could have built up a much larger economy, it would have had access to a much wider range of foreign technology and its policymakers—unconstrained by nuclear-related travel bans—would be able to see and understand much more of the world than they do (and as they did before so many of them found themselves on UN blacklists). Crucially, the DPRK would probably today have a much wider degree of freedom in international affairs than it in fact enjoys—so greater sovereignty in the traditional sense—as well as enjoying much greater international respect. The nation’s “sovereignty and dignity” would be under much less threat than they now are. It is most unlikely that this putative non-nuclear DPRK would have suffered military aggression, either, for the reasons set out above. Furthermore, the DPRK’s response to the covid pandemic would probably have been much more effective, with early vaccination and access to a much wider range of expert medical advice.

Conclusion The DPRK’s nuclear programme is a technical triumph. For a country with such a low economic base to achieve the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is an astonishing achievement.

100

J. EVERARD

But it has failed comprehensively to meet the aims set for it since the early years of this century. Far from protecting the DPRK’s sovereignty, it has actually constrained it. It has failed to counter the (mostly illusory) problems for which the DPRK regime intended it and caused much worse ones of its own.

Bibliography Carrel-Billiard, Francois and Wing, Christine, ‘North Korea and the NPT’, in Nuclear Energy, Nonproliferation and Disarmament (International Peace Institute, 2010, pp. 28–32). Council on Foreign Relations, North Korean Nuclear Negotiations 1985– 2022, retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/timeline/north-korean-nuclearnegotiations. Davenport, Kelsey, The Six Party Talks at a Glance (Arms Control Association, 2022), retrieved from: https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/6partytalks. International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, North Korea, retrieved from: https://www.icanw.org/north_korea. Ramani, Samuel, “These Five Things Help Make Sense of North Korea’s Nuclear Threats and Missile Launch” Washington Post (February 18 2016) retrieved from: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/ 2016/02/18/these-5-things-help-make-sense-of-north-koreas-nuclear-testsand-missile-launch/. Snyder, Scott, The Economic Costs of North Korean Nuclear Development (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013), retrieved from: https://www.cfr.org/ blog/economic-costs-north-korean-nuclear-development. Smith, Frank “‘Letters of Truth’ from South to N Korea Strain Moon’s Diplomacy”, Al Jazeera (May 19 2021), retrieved from: https://www.aljaze era.com/news/2021/5/19/south-korea-debates-freedom-of-speech-northkorea-engagement.

CHAPTER 9

Armistice, North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula Lei Wang

The continuous tensions on the Korean Peninsula are largely due to the lack of a stable and effective security regime that is suitable for the development of the times in the region. The Korean War in 1950 was a result of this. Although the Korean Armistice Agreement signed in 1953 brought an end to the hostilities, the armistice regime failed to be modified to adapt to the much changed international landscape and regional security situation. The outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis in the 1990s was in essence a manifestation of the imbalance in the original security regime on the Peninsula. The diminished efficacy of the armistice regime has resulted in constant crises on the Peninsula despite the overall positive progress in the international situation. Such a situation shows that the traditional security architecture based on the balance-of-power politics could no longer effectively maintain regional security and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and also underlines the

L. Wang (B) Institute of World Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_9

101

102

L. WANG

urgency and necessity for various parties to build a new peace regime there under the new circumstances. In view of this, this paper aims to discuss the evolution and reconstruction of the security regime on the Korean Peninsula from three aspects: first, analyzing the security architecture on the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War period, with focus on the reasons for the diminished efficacy of the armistice regime and the influence; second, studying the internal relationship between the outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis and the security regime on the Peninsula, with focus on how the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) impacted the security architecture on the Peninsula by possessing nuclear weapons; third, exploring the ideas and paths to construct a new peace regime in the new era on the Peninsula, with focus on new trends, new thinking and new strategies.

Security Regime on the Korean Peninsula During the Cold War Period Although the Korean Armistice Agreement brought an end to the Korean War, it never meant real peace on the Peninsula. The armistice regime has played both positive and negative roles in its actual operation. On the one hand, shots haven’t been fired for more than 60 years due to risk management under the armistice regime; on the other hand, however, it has failed to adapt to the changeable situation as its inherent defects and hysteresis have diminished its efficacy, making the Korean Peninsula the last “living fossil” of the Cold War. Formation and Functions of the Armistice Regime The Korean Peninsula issue originated from the Yalta system which was formed at the end of World War II. After the surrender of Japan, according to the arrangements of the Yalta Conference and Potsdam Conference, the US army occupied the southern part of the 38th parallel, whereas the Soviet army occupied the northern part of the 38th parallel in Korea, and the two countries began fostering pro-American and proSoviet regimes respectively, causing intense hostility between the northern and southern parts of Korea in the course toward reunification. The Korean War broke out in June 1950, when the North Korean People’s Army advanced southward quickly, causing a strong reaction from the United States. In July 1950, the UN forces organized by the United

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

103

States intervened in the Korean War. After landing at Inchon, the US troops moved toward the China–North Korea border, which severely threatened China’s national defense and security. Upon North Korea’s request for military assistance, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army (PVA) entered North Korea on October 25 and pushed the battle line back to the 38th parallel after three years of dauntless fight. After several rounds of talks, the two sides signed the Korean Armistice Agreement in July 1953. The Agreement stipulates that a military demarcation line shall be fixed by the actual line near the 38th parallel and both sides shall withdraw two kilometers from this line so as to establish a demilitarized zone between the two opposing forces. In order to maintain the ceasefire status and prevent new conflicts or wars, the two sides also established the Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission to supervise the implementation of the Korean Armistice Agreement and jointly deal with events of default. With the above institutional arrangements, the Korean Armistice Agreement assumed the responsibilities of arms control, communication and risk management. Its signing stopped the fratricidal hot war on the Korean Peninsula and reduced the risk that war might spread beyond the peninsula. Moreover, the security regime established in the Korean Armistice Agreement also fixed the later security architecture on the Korean Peninsula. During the Cold War period, the security regime was the only channel for military force communication between the two sides and played a role in eliminating the impact of emergencies, reducing misunderstandings arising from military activities and avoiding hostile activities. As an important heritage from the Korean War, however, the Agreement failed to put a complete end to the security issues on the Korean Peninsula, but further consolidated the cold war system on the Peninsula instead. Obviously, the signing parties formed two opposite military alliance groups around the Korean Peninsula. One was the US-centered US–Japan–ROK triangle, with US–Japan alliance and US–ROK alliance as its major axes. The other one was the USSR–China–DPRK triangle established after the signing of the USSR-DPRK Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance and the China-DPRK Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. The establishment of the military alliances and the signing of their treaties legalized and institutionalized the intervention of international forces in the security affairs on the Peninsula. Thus, a stable Cold War system was established there.

104

L. WANG

Defects and Limitations of the Armistice Regime Although the armistice regime discontinued the hot war, there were inherent defects and limitations that were getting more and more obvious with the development of the times and the change in regional patterns. First, the binding force of the Agreement was weak. The document signed between the two sides only provided for a truce but was not a peace treaty. Therefore, the belligerency didn’t end entirely in the legal sense. The Armistice Agreement doesn’t clearly define the liability of a party in the event of non-compliance or breach of the agreement. In terms of agency operation, although the armistice agreement stipulates that the Military Armistice Commission and Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission shall be to supervise the implementation of this Armistice Agreement, it does not give the above-mentioned agencies the sufficient authority to deal with violations, nor does it provide substantive means of management. In terms of troop withdrawal, although the Armistice Agreement stipulates that all foreign forces shall withdraw from the peninsula, it does not specify the concrete withdrawal time or the concrete punitive measures against violations. The American troops are still stationed on the Korean Peninsula today. In terms of arms control, the Agreement also fails to prevent the escalation of an arms race on the Peninsula. In terms of follow-up negotiations, the agreement expressly stipulates that “within three months after the Armistice Agreement is signed and becomes effective, a political conference of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, etc.” But the fact is that such follow-up negotiations never took place. Second, the balance-of-power security architecture was unstable. The armistice regime constructed a security architecture based on the balance of power, under which the southern and northern military alliances confronted each other neck to neck and the Peninsula was in relative stability as a result. However, with the gradual deterioration in Soviet–Chinese relations since the late 1950s, the northern alliance began cracking. After the Sino-Soviet border conflict and split in the late 1960s, China and the United States began substantially improving their relations for strategic security reasons, and the United States, the USSR and China formed a triangle, leaving the northern alliance on the brink of splitting. In the context of the Sino-Soviet split and disintegration of the

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

105

socialist camp, the DPRK had attempted to remain neutral and seek a balance between China and the USSR. Kim Il-sung proposed the official ideology of “Juche”, which was used to refer to economic self-reliance and self-defense in the military context. But such ideology conflicted with the strategies of China and the USSR in different periods and the DPRK blew hot and cold in bilateral relations with China and the USSR, making their alliance seemingly in harmony but actually at variance and on the verge of collapse. In contrast, the ROK and Japan, members of the southern alliance, signed a peace treaty in 1965 and Japan began providing the ROK with economic assistance, which accelerated the rise of the ROK and further reinforced the strength of the southern alliance. By the complete split of China and the USSR, the DPRK had fallen behind the ROK in terms of overall national strength. What was worse, the USSR also became as weak as a cat in the prolonged arms race with the United States. Facing the out-of-balance situation between the south and the north, the DPRK felt like it was walking on ice and gradually lost confidence in the armistice regime. Ending of the Cold War and the Plight of the Armistice Regime The collapse of the USSR marked the end of the Cold War. The cold war security system on the Korean Peninsula was further imbalanced under this huge impact. Although the DPRK struggled hard in the geopolitical game not to duplicate the USSR’s failure, the seriously imbalanced cold war system on the Peninsula sharply worsened its national security situation. Seeing the collapse of the USSR, its major supporter during the Cold War period, the DPRK was much disappointed and panic-stricken. The collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries meant that the DPRK suddenly lost its most powerful source of support. China’s reform and opening-up in the same period also made the DPRK believe that “China is going to capitalism and betraying their original common belief in communism”, with the USSR–China–DPRK triangular alliance also collapsed. Following this, the DPRK’s relations with Russia and China cooled extremely and high-level bilateral exchanges were all but ceased. At that time, the DPRK had lost trust in all its allies, including China. In contrast, the South Korean government actively developed its relations with China and the USSR during that period, striving to have the

106

L. WANG

initiative in hand in the confrontation situation on the Korean Peninsula. At that time, the capital and technology of South Korean companies were obviously attractive to the USSR and China, as the two countries were implementing the reform and opening-up policies. The USSR and China also wanted to improve their relations with the ROK in order to create a favorable external environment for their own development. As a result, after decades of Cold War and confrontation, the USSR and China successively established diplomatic relations with the ROK in the early 1990s. All these were undoubtedly a hard hit on the DPRK. In the political and diplomatic field, the DPRK was in a more and more isolated plight. In the economic field, the USSR and China followed the rules of the market economy and gradually changed the traditional modes of economic exchanges with the DPRK. Roughly from 1992, Russia demanded that the DPRK pay standard international prices for oil supplies and that it pay in currency. China has also demanded that the DPRK trade in currency since 1993. As a result, the DPRK’s foreign trade system collapsed and the country ran short of energy and food. Throughout the 1990s, the DKRK saw unprecedented negative economic growth year in and year out, and the institutional dilemma was also aggravated by the economic crisis. To make things worse, the US–Japan–ROK triangular alliance didn’t make any adjustments to respond to the above change. Instead, the United States continued its large-scale military presence in Japan and the ROK based on its post-Cold War security strategy in East Asia and beyond. To enhance security cooperation, the United States and Japan signed the new US-Japan Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, expanding the scope of their security cooperation and incorporating the regional affairs in the surrounding areas of Japan including the Korean Peninsula into the scope of their bilateral military cooperation. In the meanwhile, the United States continued to strengthen its military deployment in the ROK. By reinforcing the US–ROK and US–Japan military alliances, the United States strove to expand its two bilateral alliances to a major “US-Japan-ROK multilateral alliance”, which further worsened the military confrontation situation on the Korean Peninsula. Thus, although the situation in Northeast Asia was ameliorating with the ending of the global Cold War and relations between the southern and northern parts of the Korean Peninsula were also bettered to some extent during this period, the confrontation situation formed during the Cold War period wasn’t broken yet. All these presented extreme threats to the national security

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

107

of the DPRK, a former frontline of the Cold War. In order to continue its social system and improve the security environment, the DPRK had to take a series of drastic measures to cope with the crisis. In short, the United States and the USSR could strategically control the evolution of the situation on the Peninsula under the balance-ofpower security architecture during the Cold War period. But the ending of the Cold War also broke the balance between the northern and southern alliances, and the situation on the Korean Peninsula became increasingly unstable. This meant that the original security regime marked by the armistice regime on the Peninsula could no longer guarantee the security and stability of the Peninsula after the Cold War and that various parties urgently needed a new security regime.

North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Security Regime on the Korean Peninsula The ostensible equilibrium and confrontation situation on the Korean Peninsula was quickly destroyed by the North Korean nuclear crisis in the early 1990s. This crisis was the intensification of the confrontation that continued from the Cold War period as well as an embodiment of the disequilibrium in the original security regime on the Peninsula after the Cold War. North Korean Nuclear Crisis and the Country’s Nuclear Brinkmanship North Korea’s interest in nuclear weapons could date back to the 1950s, when it faced “nuclear blackmail” from the United States, the United States and the ROK signed the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1953 and the United States was granted indefinite permission to send troops to the ROK. In 1956, the DPRK signed the Agreement on the Establishment of a Joint Institute for Nuclear Research with the USSR and then it sent a large number of students to the USSR to learn about nuclear technology. In 1958, the United States began to deploy nuclear weapons in the ROK. In response to this, the USSR and the DPRK signed an agreement on the peaceful use of atomic energy in 1959. Although the DPRK repeatedly urged the United States to remove all its nuclear weapons from the ROK, it didn’t receive any positive response from the United States or the ROK. In 1985, the USSR-supported Yongbyon nuclear reactor went

108

L. WANG

into operation and the DPRK acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) at the end of the year. In 1986, the DPRK came up with the proposal of making the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free and declared that it would not test, produce, stock or import nuclear weapons. The statement urged the US government to withdraw all nuclear weapons already present in the ROK and to call off operation plans related to the use of nuclear weapons on the Korean Peninsula. But this time the United States and South Korea didn’t give a positive response either. In April 1990, the United States officially raised the North Korean nuclear issue, doubting that the DPRK was developing nuclear weapons and asking it to sign the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement and receive inspections from the international communication, but the DPRK refused. In November 1991, the ROK announced its declaration of denuclearization and peace of the Korean Peninsula, under which the ROK promised not to produce, possess, store, deploy or use nuclear weapons, observe the NPT and receive IAEA’s thorough inspections. Following this, the DPRK raised its suggestions on the signing of the Nuclear Safeguards Agreement: first, the United States should withdraw all its nuclear weapons from the ROK; second, simultaneous inspections should be conducted on the US nuclear weapons in the south and the nuclear facilities in the north; third, the DPRK and the United States should negotiate on nuclear investigation and elimination of the nuclear threat to the DPRK, and the South and North Korea should negotiate on not developing nuclear weapons and denuclearizing the Peninsula. In December 1991, the ROK declared that there did not exist any US nuclear weapon whatsoever anywhere in the ROK, and South and North Korea signed the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Later the DPRK signed a nuclear safety agreement with IAEA and began receiving IAEA’s inspection. However, the agreement ended up with nothing as both sides had no trust in each other at all. On March 12, 1993, the DPRK announced its intention to withdraw from the NPT. The United States then conducted several rounds of talks with the DPRK to deal with the North Korean nuclear issue, and the two sides concluded an agreement—the Agreed Framework, in October 1994. According to the Framework, the United States agreed to arrange to build two new light water reactors (LWR) in the DPRK with a generating capacity of 2,000 megawatts by the year 2003 to replace its graphitemoderated reactors; in the interim, as compensation for the DPRK’s freezing of its nuclear program, the United States would deliver 500,000

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

109

tons of heavy oil annually to the DPRK as an alternative energy until the completion of the first LWR power plant. The DPRK agreed to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and other relevant facilities. The United States promised to the DPRK that it would not use nuclear weapons of its own on the DPRK; the DPRK would take steps to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and remain a party to the NPT; the two countries also agreed to establish liaison offices in each other’s country and upgrade bilateral relations to ambassadorial level. This agreement was supposed to be a fair and reasonable trade, but its implementation turned out to be a complete failure. The DPRK felt a heightened sense of crisis after the death of Kim Ilsung in 1994 and was in sore need of consolidating its regime, which was expected to soon collapse by the US government. So the United States intermitted its heavy oil supply to the DPRK, and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) which promised to build the LWR in the DPRK never commenced its operation. What further ruined the DPRK’s confidence in the US implementation of the Agreed Framework was that new president George Walker Bush completely ended the Clinton administration’s policy of “limited engagement” with the DPRK, and the United States also raised an objection to the “Sunshine Policy” of the Kim Dae-jung administration toward North Korea. In their new “Nuclear Posture Review Report”, the Bush administration also threatened to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and characterized it as “an axis of evil”. The “pre-emptive” strategy pursued by the United States heightened the DPRK’s concern about its regime. What was worse, after the United States overthrew Saddam Hussein’s regime by force in 2003, the DPRK believed that it could hardly prevent the US invasion, so it declared withdrawal from the NPT again on January 10, 2003. To resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis, China organized the Six-Party Talks without substantial breakthrough. It’s not hard to see that North Korea’s nuclear brinkmanship is intended to achieve the following objectives: first, to counter the nuclear threat from the United States and maintain its military and institutional security. Having lost the nuclear umbrella after the collapse of the USSR, the DPRK must develop its own nuclear weapons to rebuild the security equilibrium on the Korean Peninsula. Second, to balance the advantage of the United States and South Korea in conventional military strength. Limited by economic conditions, the DPRK knows that it could hardly contend against the United States and South Korea in conventional

110

L. WANG

strength, so it hopes to turn the tables by developing nuclear weapons and deter the possible military strikes and provocations by the United States and the ROK. Third, the increasing gap in economic strength between North and South Korea gradually puts North Korea into an inferior position in competition. Unable to rapidly improve its comprehensive national strength in a short period of time, the DPRK attempts to close the gap by developing nuclear weapons, so that the government can demonstrate its achievements to its citizens and maintain the legitimacy of its regime. Fourth, the DPRK wants to take nuclear weapons as the bargaining chip in negotiations with the United States to find a way out of its internal and external plights. Impact of the DPRK’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons on the Security Framework on the Korean Peninsula After the Six-Party Talks reached a deadlock, the DPRK performed its first-ever nuclear weapons test in October 2006, crossing the nuclear weapons threshold. After that, it developed nuclear technology quickly and performed five tests respectively in 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017, causing high tensions and confrontation on the Peninsula. Although it attempted to rebuild the balance-of-power security architecture on the Peninsula by possessing nuclear weapons, things didn’t go its way. First, the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons hasn’t led to a major shift in the US policy toward it. The DPRK believed that with nuclear weapons, it would gain greater security and that by developing nuclear weapons that could threaten the United States, it could effectively deter the United States from military strike plans, force the United States to change its policy toward the DPRK and establish normal state-to-state relations. But it is the other way around that the greater its threat to the United States becomes, the more pressing the latter’s sense of insecurity will be. The DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons provides an excuse for the US hardliners to take coercive measures to resolve the issue, while also discouraging the moderates who try to resolve the issue through peaceful and diplomatic channels. In fact, as long as the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are enough to pose a threat to the security and interests of the United States, the United States will never lack the pressure and motivation to use force against the DPRK to resolve its nuclear armament, no matter whether the democrats or the republicans are in power. This will also

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

111

increase the risk of war between the two countries and bring far more uncertainties to the DPRK than before it had nuclear weapons. Second, having nuclear weapons has put the DPRK in a tougher situation. Developing nuclear weapons was partly intended to be a political, economic and diplomatic solution to the country’s manifold difficulties, but things didn’t turn out that way. From the economic perspective, after possessing nuclear weapons, the DPRK was subjected to severe economic sanctions by the international community, which seriously affected the normal operation of its national economy and people’s living standards. The DPRK wanted to develop nuclear weapons and the national economy simultaneously, but the truth is that it has been hit hard by food crises, currency crises and natural disasters over the years of possessing nuclear weapons, and it could hardly achieve the economic goals as planned. At present, the United States, Japan, the ROK and the international community are still firmly opposed to the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and the protracted nuclear crisis is bound to bring down the DPRK’s fragile economic system. Weak as it is, the DPRK is unable to withstand a prolonged contest and game with the United States. From the perspective of politics and diplomacy, having nuclear weapons has also left the DPRK in a more isolated status in the international community and made it the target of public criticism and condemnation. At the regional level, as long as the DPRK continues to possess nuclear weapons, it is difficult to substantially improve its relations with the ROK and Japan, and this is bound to intensify a new round of the arms race. Third, the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons has increased the risk of nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia. If the DPRK goes nuclear, the ROK, which remains in a military standoff with the DPRK, might have to start a nuclear armament program, and Japan, which is also in hostility with the DPRK, could gain a legitimate reason to develop nuclear weapons too. As a matter of fact, the debate over whether to possess nuclear weapons has been no secret in Japan in recent years. In 1994, then-Japanese Prime Minister Tsutomu Hata famously told reporters that “it’s certainly the case that Japan has the capability to possess nuclear weapons”. And Japanese media has also reported that “Japan could produce atomic bombs in a short period of time if necessary”. In material terms, Japan now has the world’s largest weapons-grade plutonium stockpile. In the face of the nuclear proliferation risk in Northeast Asia, the United States certainly does not want to lose its nuclear constraint over Japan and the ROK and sit watching the collapse of

112

L. WANG

their triangular alliance to threaten its predominance over this region. But this also means that the United States has very limited wiggle room in the North Korean nuclear issue, as it can suppress the DPRK only by strengthening nuclear protection for Japan and the ROK, conducting nuclear deterrence against the DPRK, strengthening economic sanctions and consolidating its military alliances. As a result, the huge resources invested in nuclear research and development by the DPRK have also largely lost the expected strategic value and leverage effect. Fourth, the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons poses an obstacle to the normal development of China–DPRK relations. Due to the special historical and current relations between the two countries, the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons has increased China’s interest, relevance and concerns in its North Korea policy. The DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons may cause a chain reaction from the ROK and Japan. And if China’s Taiwan attempts to possess nuclear weapons, it is bound to seriously deteriorate cross-Straits relations. As long as the DPRK has nuclear attack ability, there is always the possibility of war, including the risk of nuclear war, between the United States and its allies and the DPRK on the Korean Peninsula and in the whole of Northeast Asia. If a new Korean war were to break out, China would certainly face some kind of strategic decision dilemma, even if it were not involved in it. Last, once the DPRK has a nuclear arsenal, the United States is bound to significantly strengthen its military deployment in Northeast Asia and the Western Pacific, which will enhance its ability and posture to “help Taiwan defend itself” and further encourage the forces for “Taiwan independence” under the situation of high tension in the Taiwan Strait in the future. In respect of the North Korean nuclear issue, China understands the DPRK’s legitimate security concerns, but China believes that it should be resolved through political means. China is committed to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and the DPRK’s nuclear-possessing policy clearly disagrees with China’s policy toward the Peninsula. Efforts and Explorations by Various Parties in Resolving the North Korean Nuclear Crisis The outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis highlighted the defects in the design of the Armistice Agreement and related security regimes. All parties concerned have gradually realized that, in order to solve the North Korean nuclear issue and maintain peace and stability on the Peninsula,

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

113

it is necessary to build a new security cooperation regime. To this end, relevant parties have begun to actively explore solutions. First, inter-Korean bilateral talks. This is the model adopted by the two Koreas to seek solutions to the crisis through national dialogue. In fact, the two Koreas started direct North–South talks to ease tensions as early as the 1970s. The outbreak of the North Korean nuclear crisis accelerated their dialogue process and they held three summits. The first summit was held in June 2000, which marked the first meeting of the top leaders of the two Koreas since the division of the Korean Peninsula 55 years ago. As a result of the inter-Korean summit, the two sides adopted the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration. The second summit was held in October 2007, at which the two sides adopted the Declaration for the Development of North–South Relations, and Peace and Prosperity. The third summit was held from April to September, 2018, during which the top leaders held three meetings and adopted the Panmunjom Declaration and the Pyongyang Joint Declaration of September 2018, and the two sides confirmed the standpoint of completely denuclearizing the Peninsula, which eased the tensions to some extent. In practice, however, the interKorean dialogue mechanism still faces insurmountable hampers. First, The DPRK has always been wary of the ROK’s “Sunshine Policy”, fearing that the South would take the opportunity to carry out peaceful evolution against the North. Second, the ROK’s policy toward the DPRK still lacks autonomy and it tends to link the DPRK–ROK relations with the DPRK–US relations, which results in limited room for policy adjustment. In case of a reverse process in DPRK–US relations, the North–South relations would be largely affected by their respective domestic politics and external “third party” factors. Moreover, the DPRK has always held that the key to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue is direct negotiation between the United States and the DPRK, while the inter-Korean talks are the subordination, and this is one of the reasons why there haven’t been substantive breakthroughs achieved in the inter-Korean talks. Second, US–DPRK bilateral talks. This is an attempt by the DPRK and the United States to seek a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue through direct dialogue, which also has had two active periods. The first active period was after the Cold War, when the North Korean nuclear crisis broke out, the Clinton administration sought a negotiated solution and the two countries concluded the Agreed Framework in 1994. It was the first time that the United States moved away from its Cold War hardline stance toward the DPRK and began to recognize

114

L. WANG

its strategic value, which accelerated the process of normalizing the relations between the two countries, although the underlying motive was to expand its dominance and control in Northeast Asia. Regrettably, however, the implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework turned out to be a complete failure. After George W. Bush came to power, the United States’ stance toward the DPRK quickly turned back to be hardline, leading to a new breakout of the North Korean nuclear crisis. During the Obama administration, the United States pursued strategic patience in its DPRK policy and sought to force the DPRK to yield through economic sanctions, while the DPRK vigorously developed its nuclear weapons, which stalled their bilateral dialogue for a long time. It was not until Trump took office in 2018 that the DPRK–US dialogue ushered in a second active period, and state leaders of the two countries held three summit meetings in Singapore, Hanoi and Panmunjom respectively. But the deal also ended up with nothing, as there were deeply divisive issues such as how to define and realize denuclearization, and how the United States would provide security assurance and economic development assistance to the DPRK. In addition, the US hawks on the DPRK still stuck to the old model of “pressuring the DPRK to change”. Therefore, the Trump administration had two North Korea policies in effect: one was the Trump-centered engagement with North Korea which pursued to continue the private relationship between top leaders of the two countries; the other one was the traditional policy held by the US hawks and bureaucracy that stressed pressuring North Korea and seeking a regime change. The two policies were not coordinated and the “pressuring” policy was in a dominant position. As a result, the US–DPRK bilateral dialogue model came to a deadlock again. Third, small-scale multilateral talks, i.e., the model to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis in the form of three-party or four-party dialogues. In terms of three-party talks, similar plans were proposed during the Cold War by the Nixon administration in the United States and the Kim Il-sung administration in the DPRK, with the main aim of reducing tensions on the Peninsula. However, the international environment and the prolonged hostility between the United States and the DPRK prevented such talks from reaching a breakthrough. But those three-party talks surely laid the foundation and accumulated experience for subsequent larger-scale dialogues and negotiations. After the DPRK and the United States signed the Agreed Framework in 1994, the ROK worried that the United States would eventually compromise with the

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

115

DPRK for its own sake and leave the ROK aside, so it proposed the fourparty talks which involved the DPRK, the ROK, China and the United States. The ROK did so out of four major purposes: first, to have the initiative in hand in its diplomatic relations with the DPRK; second, to establish its leading role in establishing the new peace regime on the Peninsula; third, to improve the government’s image of independence in the eyes of its people, and establish its dominant position in developing North–South relations; fourth, to prevent the DPRK from making trouble and ease the tensions on the Peninsula. The United States also supported this plan for its own purposes. First, it hoped to maintain engagement with the DPRK and promote a “soft landing” of the North Korean nuclear issue; second, it wanted to maintain the US–ROK alliance, improve the status of the ROK in dealing with the Korean Peninsula issue, and promote the peaceful and ROK-led reunification process of the Peninsula; third, it sought to establish a US-centered security cooperation regime on the Peninsula to contain China, Russia, Japan and other countries and ensure its predominance in Northeast Asia. Obviously, such a model of four-party talks was essentially the product of US–ROK consultation, cooperation and compromise, and their common goal was to engage the DPRK to find a solution to the North Korean nuclear issue, while trying to pump the brakes on the DPRK’s attempt to drive a wedge between the United States and The ROK. Certainly, such a flawed plan could not win support from the DPRK, and China also showed little enthusiasm as it was supposed to only serve as a supporting role, not speak of Russia and Japan, which were not even invited. The practice has proved that small-scale multilateral talks on the Korean Peninsula, whether three-party or four-party, can hardly succeed without extensive regional inclusiveness and a fair agenda. Fourth, large-scale multilateral talks, i.e., the model to further expand the parties involved to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue on the basis of bilateral, three-party and four-party talks. The United States once proposed the program of five-party talks, but it came to nothing because of Russia’s objection, which was excluded. The Six-Party Talks were a solution proposed by China after the second North Korean nuclear crisis. Thanks to China’s good-faith diplomatic efforts of “promoting peace and talks”, the United States and the DPRK both took half a step back, which contributed to a breakthrough in the diplomatic settlement. The Six-Party Talks were essentially held in the form of three-party talks, that is, the United States and the DPRK talked with each other as the leading parts,

116

L. WANG

while the other four countries acted as one part to mediate between them. In this way, it maintained the “multilateral” form while narrowing the difference in the United States’ original position of “five-party talks”. For the DPRK, at least the Six-Party Talks were the closest form of dialogue to “bilateral talks”, which satisfied its goal of bringing the United States back to the negotiating table for a direct meeting with it. However, despite some significant outcomes including the agreement on the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks, the lack of mutual trust between the United States and the DPRK and between the DPRK and the ROK, the high complexity of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue and the uncertainties in internal politics of various countries, these outcomes failed to be implemented effectively. Owing to this, later talks also failed to achieve substantive breakthroughs. Since the DPRK’s withdrawal in 2009, the Six-Party Talks have stalled for a long time. Nevertheless, as an exploratory attempt to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through a large-scale multilateral approach, the Six-party Talks deserve recognition. Since it involves the interests of various parties amid complex relations, some difficulties and zigzags are unavoidable, especially in the crucial stage of the talks in the process of resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. We should note that this model is still the one and only multilateral dialogue mechanism that can bring parties concerned together to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue through exchanges and negotiations.

Path Selection for Peace Regime Building on the Korean Peninsula in the New Era Past experience and lessons have taught us that the continuous tension on the Korean Peninsula is not indeed because of the military confrontation between the United States and the DPRK or between the DPRK and the ROK, nor because of the DPRK’s development of nuclear weapons. It is due to the lack of a stable and effective security regime that is suitable for the development of the times in the region. The armistice regime and related arrangements built based on the balance-of-power principle during the Cold War period have fallen far behind the development of the times and reality. The diminished efficacy and even collapse of the armistice regime has shown the urgency and necessity for various parties to build a new peace regime there under the new circumstances.

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

117

Tendencies and Positions of Various Parties Regarding the Building of a New Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula Based on the positions and tendencies of various parties regarding the building of a new peace regime on the Korean Peninsula, there are basically the following six programs. First, the DPRK hopes to conclude a DPRK–US “peace treaty”. The DPRK has borne the pressure from the US–Japan–ROK military alliance all by itself after the ending of the Cold War. Since the United States is at the core of the southern military alliance, the DPRK hopes to conclude a peace treaty with it in order to end the military confrontation formed under the Armistice Agreement, completely get rid of the Korean Peninsula cold war system, integrate into the international community while ensuring institutional security, gain a status equal to that of the ROK and thus recover its dominance over the intra-peninsula affairs. It is worth noting that there have been significant changes in the DPRK’s domestic and foreign policies since Kim Jong-un took power. Internally, the government emphasizes economic reform to improve people’s livelihood. In respect of the nuclear issue, the DPRK has reiterated its efforts to completely denuclearize the Peninsula and stopped tests of nuclear weapons and transcontinental ballistic missiles. At the regional level, it has conducted benign interactions with neighboring countries by easing the tense relations with the ROK and the United States and paying highlevel visits to China and Russia. The DPRK–US negotiations came to a deadlock by the end of the Trump administration, and the Kim Jongun administration also realized that the confrontation between the two countries was protracted and complicated and lowered its expectations about getting rid of sanctions through the DPRK–US summits. Nevertheless, the DPRK didn’t give up the negotiations and it hopes to break the predicament by strengthening self-reliance and to gain more favorable bargaining chips. The DPRK has long held a negative attitude toward multilateral security cooperation, but it has to adopt a more flexible attitude toward multilateral negotiations after no substantive breakthrough has been made in its bilateral negotiations with the United States. Second, the ROK seeks to establish a “dual-track” multilateral security regime, i.e., to simultaneously promote the ROK–US alliance and the multilateral security cooperation in the region. Since the Cold War, Northeast Asia has seen increasing economic interdependence and deepened political dialogues, and the strength of the United States has

118

L. WANG

declined while the influence of China and Japan has continued to rise. The ROK believes that China, the United States, Russia and Japan have formed a “non-hostile equilibrium relationship” in Northeast Asia, in which they compete with and restrict each other amid cooperation and interdependence. Such change has brought both opportunities and challenges to the ROK as it is surrounded by great powers. The ROK believes that, if there is such a “dual-track” multilateral security mechanism, it can contain the threat from the North by relying on the ROK–US security alliance; on the other hand, it can improve its surrounding environment by improving the multilateral security regime, so as to create conditions for resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis, build mutual trust with the DPRK and control the arms race. At the same time, the ROK also hopes that it can get rid of the situation of over-dependence on neighboring powers for national security through the institutional and organizational structure of the multilateral security regime. Under the circumstances of division and confrontation on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK has also realized that the ROK-US military alliance remains the footstone for its national security and the building of a “dual-track” multilateral security regime won’t happen overnight. However it still believes that this is conducive to safeguarding its own interests and creating conditions for building a peaceful peninsula. Third, the United States seeks a hegemony-dominated regional security regime. Bilateral military agreements and cooperation have always been the main mechanism and basic means for the United States to maintain national security and interests in Northeast Asia. However, with the collapse of the USSR and the ending of the Cold War, the United States began showing interest in a multilateral security regime on the Korean Peninsula while continuing to consolidate the bilateral alliance system. Such a shift in strategy began at the end of the George H. W. Bush administration and took shape under Bill Clinton. After George W. Bush came to power, the United States resumed its hardline policy toward the DPRK, while the Obama administration pursued a policy of “strategic patience”, followed by the Trump administration’s strategic opportunism. Even so, the United States has taken part in all the multilateral talks on the Korean Peninsula issue, either willingly or reluctantly. Strategically, the United States continues its long-term attempts to promote building a new multilateral security regime on the Peninsula for the following purposes. First, the United States can relieve its financial and security burdens through multilateral security cooperation; second, it can maintain

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

119

the nuclear non-proliferation regime, appease and control its allies and calm down the anti-American sentiment in Northeast Asia; third, such a regime can isolate the DPRK both politically and diplomatically and improve the US plan of economic sanctions and military strikes on the DPRK. Obviously, the United States does not reject the establishment of a new multilateral security cooperation regime on the Peninsula with itself at the core, only on the condition that it can effectively contain regional forces such as China, Russia and Japan and ensure the strategic dominance of the United States over the Peninsula and the whole of northeast Asia. Fourth, China seeks a cautious and flexible multilateral security regime. In respect of the Korean Peninsula issue, China supports North–South dialogue and stresses that the Korean Peninsula issue should be resolved peacefully by the people on the Peninsula and other big countries should play a constructive mediating role in promoting peace talks. Regarding the North Korean nuclear issue, China opposes the DPRK’s provocative actions such as developing weapons of mass destruction and withdrawing from the NPT, but China also takes a stand against the US actions of seeking to overthrow the DPRK regime by abusing sanctions. China stands for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and hopes that all parties concerned can address the legitimate security concerns of the DPRK. China advocates a “two-track” approach to the issue, i.e., to denuclearize the Peninsula and build a new peace regime at the same time. China’s proposal on multilateral cooperation has the following characteristics: flexible organization forms, inclusive members and agenda, step-by-step solutions and negotiation-based decisions. China’s efforts in promoting multilateral security dialogue on the Korean Peninsula issue and the North Korean nuclear issue are aimed at the following: first, to prevent the deterioration of the situation on the Peninsula and the outbreak of war; second, to effectively contain the unipolar hegemony of the United States and the US–Japan alliance; third, to promote East Asia integration and create a better environment and opportunities for countries in the region. Fifth, Japan seeks a strategic multilateral security regime. Japan has always been ambivalent in the building of a multilateral security regime on the Korean Peninsula. Obviously, Japan has realized that engaging in the building of a security regime on the Peninsula can enhance its say in the region and it can play a bigger role on the international stage

120

L. WANG

through this platform, which is in line with the goal of becoming a political power it has pursued for long. But Japan’s practical actions have just gone against this idea. For example, the issue of North Korean abductions of Japanese citizens was supposed to have been addressed according to the Japan–North Korea Pyongyang Declaration, but Japan put it on the table of the Six-Party Talks, trying to force the DPRK to make concessions under multilateral pressure, which surely hampered the advancement of multilateral cooperation on the Peninsula. Moreover, Japan is also very concerned about how the United States would provide security assurance to the DPRK, and is inclined to play hardball to stop the DPRK’s nuclear development, and has even imposed its own sanctions on the DPRK. As far as Japan is concerned, it intends to build a multilateral security regime on the Peninsula that falls between the “dual-track” model of the ROK and the “hegemony-dominated” model of the United States. To be specific, on the one hand, it advocates building a multilateral security regime jointly led by the United States and Japan on the basis of the US– Japan military alliance; but on the other hand, it also hopes to take this opportunity to get rid of the control of the United States, realize Japan’s “normalization” and become an important “pole” in the game among great powers. Sixth, Russia seeks a multi-pole-dominated multilateral security regime. Building an East Asia or Asia–Pacific multilateral security system has been the consistent policy of Russia toward East Asia after the Cold War. Among the relevant countries in East Asia, Russia is the most active in seeking to build a multilateral security regime on the Peninsula. By doing so, Russia strives to regain its great power status, for otherwise it may lose its influence on the Korean Peninsula and even in the whole East Asia. The second reason is to safeguard national security and interests. If the DPRK goes nuclear, so will Japan and the ROK, and this would lead to the unbalance of powers and arms race regionally and even globally, which will also have adverse effects on Russia. Besides, Russia is also worried that the North Korean nuclear issue will lead to nuclear military conflicts, which are bound to pose a major threat to Russia’s national security. Another reason is to promote Russia’s economic interests. By actively engaging in the North Korean nuclear issue Russia also intends to promote economic cooperation with the two Koreas. By promoting multilateral cooperation, Russia would not only attract South Korean investment in Siberia and the Far East but also export energy to the two Koreas and link up the railway networks of the three countries, which

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

121

would bring it huge economic benefits. In short, Russia’s core position on the building of a new security regime on the Peninsula is to strive to become one pole in the multipolar East Asia. Conception and Path for Building a Peace Regime on the Korean Peninsula in the New Era In view of the above situation, the following questions must be handled properly before the building of a new peace regime on the Korean Peninsula: first, how to effectively restrict the unreasonable security objectives and interest demands of the DPRK, the United States, the ROK, Japan and other countries; second, how to deal with the contradiction between the existing bilateral alliances and the future multilateral peace regime; third, how to review experience and draw lessons to ensure that the new security regime can solve practical problems in a better way; fourth, how to handle the relationship between the new peace regime on the Peninsula and the overall security structure of Northeast Asia and even the whole Asia–Pacific region. To this end, this paper puts forward the following suggestions. First, clear objectives should be set. A “proper” Peninsula peace regime in the future should achieve the following objectives. First, it should be conducive to peacefully resolving the North Korean nuclear issue. To achieve this objective, it must take into consideration the DPRK’s demands for survival, stability and development. Second, it should be conducive to guaranteeing stable North–South relations on the Peninsula. Warfare on the Peninsula is not in the interests of various parties concerned, and the new peace regime should ensure no warfare on the Peninsula and help control the arms race. Third, it should be able to ensure the balance of power and interests within the security architecture. Fourth, it should be able to promote regional economic cooperation and prosperity to achieve a win–win situation. Second, relevant principles should be established. A “proper” peninsula peace regime in the future should abide by the following principles. First, the political basis of the peace regime should be the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, the United Nations Charter, international law and universally recognized norms governing international relations. Second, it should guarantee equal power of various parties in decision making, in order to prevent the situation from being dominated by a single country of hegemony and follow the principle that major issues

122

L. WANG

and matters should be addressed through negotiation. Third, rather than an alliance that pursues exclusiveness and confrontation, the new peace regime should be a cooperative and open one and effectively restrict factors like balance-of-power confrontation and power politics within it. Fourth, more than a simple and isolated strategic security relationship, the new peace regime should be closely linked with security issues in economy, culture, society, science and technology and other fields. Peace keeping, mutually beneficial cooperation and common prosperity should be the purposes of building a peace regime on the Peninsula. Third, relevant platforms should be established. The following platforms should be established under a “proper” peninsula peace regime in the future. First, institutionalized negotiation platforms for DPRK– US, DPRK–ROK and DPRK–Japan relations should be established to break the deadlock in their respective relations, where China and Russia can provide guarantees as mediators and supervisors. Second, under the framework of the existing “Six-Party Talks”, it is necessary to activate the previous platform of “Four-Party Talks” between the DPRK, the ROK, China and the United States and reset the agenda, with the purpose of completing the historical task of transforming the Armistice Agreement into a lasting peace treaty. Third, a denuclearization platform on the Korean Peninsula should be established with the participation of the United States, the DPRK, the ROK, China, Russia, Japan and the IAEA, and this platform can be an important part and an early stage of the establishment of the Northeast Asia Nuclear-free Zone and the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). Fourth, a platform for energy assistance and economic reconstruction in the DPRK with the participation of the United States, the DPRK, China, the ROK, Japan, Russia and the UN should be established to promote the DPRK’s reintegration into the international community. Fourth, a proper security regime should be shaped. In the new era, the Korean Peninsula should devote itself to building a comprehensive multilateral security regime that organically combines balance of power, concert of powers and cooperative security. The new peace regime on the Peninsula in the future should not only pay attention to the important role of balance of power and regional strategic balance in maintaining regional peace and stability, but also overcome the shortcomings of mutual suspicion and confrontation between major powers in the balance-of-power regime. It should recognize the unique role of the concert of powers in dealing with the Korean Peninsula issue and the North Korean nuclear

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

123

issue, while preventing major powers from monopolizing and dominating the affairs in Northeast Asia as well as on the Korean Peninsula. It should not only absorb and give full play to the advantages of the controlling role of collective security regimes but also overcome the defect that collective security regimes are often detached from reality. In addition, it should fully learn from the value and role of the new security concept of cooperative security, while also making up for the lack of an institutional framework and insufficient executive force in cooperative security. All in all, the new peace regime on the Peninsula is supposed to be a comprehensive multilateral security cooperation regime guided by the concept of cooperative security, based on the concert of powers and equal consultation among various parties, and backed by the balance of power and regional strategic balance. Fifth, a proper path should be adopted. There are still many disputes about the path to build a new peace regime. The ROK, for instance, has suggested declaring an “end to the war” before formal negotiations. But this proposal has been opposed by many of its own people, who argue that a hasty declaration of ending the war before the official building of a peace regime is not conducive to the peace on the Peninsula, and it will bring about disorder on the contrary. The DPRK holds that, before it gives up nuclear weapons, a peace treaty should be signed to normalize its relations with the United States, and that it will join the international efforts in building the peace regime after securing security commitments in legal terms. However the United States insists that the DPRK should give up nuclear weapons first before a peace treaty can be signed. Obviously, the above-mentioned disagreements will not be resolved overnight. Faced with the complex situation on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia, it’s necessary that relevant countries should follow the approach of “giving priority to the easy” in the process of building the peace regime, which is specified as follows: First, various parties should take goodwill actions to ease the tensions on the Peninsula. For its part, the DPRK needs to continue to suspend testing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, while the United States and the ROK should suspend joint military drills, so that they can sit down for talks. Additionally, the United States should also appropriately lift some sanctions against the DPRK as an incentive for stopping nuclear and missile tests, in exchange for more substantial steps toward denuclearization by the DPRK. Moreover, China, the United States, Russia and Japan, as responsible major countries, and the ROK, as

124

L. WANG

the DPRK’s brother, should help the DPRK solve its difficulties and provide humanitarian assistance by easing its natural disasters, fighting the epidemic situation and coping with the food crisis, so as to find a starting point for further improving the North–South relations and easing the tensions on the Peninsula. Second, various parties should increase efforts to replace the armistice with a peace regime. At present, it is practical to adopt a “dual-track” approach to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and replace the armistice with a peace treaty at the same time. The replacement process requires the joint efforts of various countries, and the signing of a peace treaty should involve the signatories to the Armistice Agreement, countries directly involved in the war, as well as influential major countries in the region. This means that not only the two Koreas but also China, the United States, Japan and Russia should be involved. Stakeholders should meet each other halfway to realize the replacement. The DPRK has been very active in establishing a peace regime on the Peninsula, but due to the passive attitude of the United States, there hasn’t been positive progress in the talks and signing of a peace treaty between the two countries. The United States, Japan and the ROK should realize that the most effective way to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis is to seriously consider the DPRK’s national interests and security demands. At the same time, the DPRK needs to live up to its denuclearization commitments if it is to gain security assurance for real and reintegrate into the international community. Third, various parties should take active measures to build mutual trust. The top priority at the moment is that relevant parties should respect, value and implement the established agreements, which is the prerequisite and basis for building mutual trust on the Peninsula. Pending the establishment of a new peace regime on the Peninsula, it is necessary that the DPRK, the United States and the ROK should continue to abide by and fulfill all the provisions and requirements agreed under the armistice, so as to avoid new conflicts or wars. At the same time, the two Koreas should also respect and fulfill the principles agreed in documents like the June 15th North–South Joint Declaration, the Declaration for the Development of North–South Relations, and Peace and Prosperity and the Panmunjom Declaration, and continue to strengthen North–South dialogue to practically improve their bilateral relations. In respect of the denuclearization issue on the Korean Peninsula, relevant parties should attach importance to the foundation and conditions established by the

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

125

DPRK-US Agreed Framework, the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement of the Six Party Talks and other major documents, remain committed to resolving the issue by political and diplomatic means, resume dialogue and negotiation in various forms as soon as possible, and strive for a new consensus on denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula agreed upon by all parties. Last but not least, various parties should return to the Six-Party Talks at an appropriate time. Facing the current predicament, returning to the Six-Party Talks is a realistic choice for the DPRK to improve relations with the United States and obtain the much-needed economic assistance. For the United States and the ROK, now that no substantive progress has been made in the US–DPRK and DPRK–ROK talks, it is better for them to return to multilateral talks to seek a breakthrough for new dialogue and deals than to just sit watching the DPRK develop nuclear missiles rapidly. Similarly, from the perspective of safeguarding national and regional security and promoting regional economic cooperation and development, Japan and Russia should also advocate conducting multilateral dialogue to ease the tensions on the Peninsula. More importantly, China firmly believes that the Six-Party Talks mechanism is the best solution to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and building a regional security cooperation regime, and China is ready to continue its efforts and make contributions to that end. It is fair to say that these new changes and trends have undoubtedly provided new opportunities for resuming and improving the Six-Party Talks mechanism and building a multilateral security cooperation regime on the Peninsula in the new era.

Bibliography ‘Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, (October 21, 1994). Cha, Victor, D, ‘Powerplay: Origins of the U.S. Alliance System in Asia’, International Security, vol. 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/2010). Chen Fengjun, and Wang Chuanjian, Asia-Pacific Powers and the Korean Peninsula, Beijing: Peking University Press (2002). Chu Shulong, and Lin Xinzhu, ‘The Six Party Talks: A Chinese Perspective’, Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, Special issue on North Korea and Regional Security (2008).

126

L. WANG

Clemens Jr, Walter C, ‘North Korea’s Quest for Nuclear Weapons: New Historical Evidence’, Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 10, no. 1 (January–April 2010). Foster-Carter, Aidan, ‘North Korea-South Korea Relations: Pyongyang shuns and snarls; Seoul seems in denial’, Comparative Connections, vol. 21, no. 2 (September 2019). Funabashi, Yoichi, The Peninsula Question: A Chronicle of the Second Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007). Goldschmidt, Pierre, ‘Nuclear Nonproliferation: Six Lessons Not Yet learned’, Arms Control Today, vol. 48, no. 2 (March 2018). Ha, Eunyoung, and Hwang, Christopher, ‘The U.S.-North Korea Geneva Agreed Framework: Strategic Choices and Credible Commitments,’ North Korean Review, vol. 11, no. 1 (Spring 2015). Han Yong-Sup, ‘The Sunshine Policy and Security on the Korean Peninsula: A Critical Assessment and Prospects,’ Asian Perspective, vol. 26, no. 3 (2002). Hughes, Christopher W, ‘North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan’, Asia Policy, no. 3 (January 2007). ‘Joint Declaration on The Denuclearization of The Korean Peninsula’, (February 19, 1992). KCNA ‘Detailed Report’ Explains NPT Withdrawal, Pyongyang KCNA, (January 22, 2003). Kim Hong Nack, ‘U.S.-North Korea Relations under the Obama Administration: Problems and Prospects’, North Korean Review, vol. 6, no. 1 (Spring 2010). Kim Yong Kyun, ‘The Mutual Defense Treaty of 1953 with the United States: With an Appraisal on the Possibility of a Pacific NATO’, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. 2, no. 2 (Fall/Winter 1982). Lee Inbae, ‘A Study on Multilateral Approaches to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Maze’, The Korean Journal of International Studies, 1–1, (December 2003). Lee Shin-wha, ‘South Korea’s Middle Power Multilateral Diplomacy: 1 Optimistic and Pessimistic Views’, Open Forum, (December 7, 2015). Matveeva, Natalia, ‘Diplomacy Among Comrades Natalia Matveeva’, North Korean Review, vol. 16, no. 1 (Spring 2020). ‘North Korea Proposes Talks’, New York Times, (January 11, 1984), Section A, Page 10. ‘Panmunjom Declaration for Peace, Prosperity and Unification of the Korean Peninsula’, (April 27, 2018). Park Hyeong-Jung, Kim Jin-Ha, Jea Hwan Hong, Eun Mee Jeong, An Assessment of the Last Decade of the Kim Jong-un Regime, Study Series 22–01, Korea Institute for National Unification, (July 2022).

9

ARMISTICE, NORTH KOREAN NUCLEAR CRISIS AND PEACE …

127

Pritchard, Charles L, The Korean Peninsula and the Role of Multilateral Talks, Brookings, (March 1, 2005). ‘Pyongyang Joint Declaration’, (September 2018). https://www.mofa.go.kr/. Revere, Evans J. R, Kim’s ‘new path’ and the failure of Trump’s North Korea policy, Brookings (January 26, 2020). Ross, Robert S, ‘US grand Strategy, the rise of China, and US national security strategy for East Asia’, Strategic Studies Quarterly, vol. 7, no. 2 (2013). Shapiro Zacek, Jane, ‘Soviet and Russian Relations with the Two Koreas’, International Journal of Korean Studies. Soeya, Yoshihide, ‘Japan and Peace on the Korean Peninsula: The Need for a Flexible Approach’, Asia Policy, vol. 14, no. 1 (2019). Stokreef, Mark, ‘A Rising Middle Power Facing a Strategic Dilemma: South Korea and East Asian Security’, Atlantisch Perspectief , vol. 38, no. 5 (2014). Toloraya, Georgy, ‘The Six Party Talks: A Russian Perspective’, Asian Perspective, vol. 32, no. 4, Special issue on North Korea and Regional Security (2008). ‘Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance between the People’s Republic of China and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’, (July 11, 1961). Zhang Yeliang, ‘The Bush administration’s North Korea Policy and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis’, American Studies (Meiguo Yanjiu), no. 1 (2004).

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion Chan Young Bang

This book is based upon the outcome of the 2022 international research conference organized by the DPRK Strategic Research Center at KIMEP University, Free of Nuclear Weapons and Economic Development on the Korean Peninsula: Prospects for a Peaceful Settlement, which attracted eminent scholars and experts in their fields from multiple countries: China, South Korea, the UK, the US, and Kazakhstan among others. The essential tenet it has sought to convey is twofold: (1) the Kim regime is in a dire political and economic predicament and is facing a profound threat to its survival; (2) despite the predicament, the tide can be changed should Kim choose to trade the nuclear weapon program for a bright future; radically reforming his country’s political and economic systems with the assistance of stakeholder states. Denuclearization for the purpose of economic development and accompanied by radical reform is the only way to improve the chances of regime survival and a bright future for the country. The legal context of North Korea’s nuclear weapons is set by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The creation of a club of

C. Y. Bang (B) DPRK Strategic Research Center, KIMEP University, Almaty, Kazakhstan e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8_10

129

130

C. Y. BANG

legally nuclear-armed states and a small number of non-signatory nuclear weapon holders is proof of the duality of the Treaty. Kim Il-sung’s decision to initiate the DPRK’s nuclear weapon program in the 1980s was a result of his perception that, in order to preserve the integrity of the state, the DPRK had to possess nuclear weapons. This belief remains and is based upon the following logic: (a) while South Korea is under the nuclear umbrella of the United States, the DPRK needs nuclear weapons for its own security because it cannot rely on China, with which it shares a deep-rooted mutual mistrust; (b) nuclear weapons are a cost-effective means of deterrence against real or imagined threats, and they provide military parity with South Korea; (c) the nuclear weapon program also fulfills the byungjin policy of simultaneous economic modernization and building a militarily powerful country; (d) for the DPRK, nuclear weapons are a means of waging belligerent foreign policy; (e) nuclear weapons are a source of legitimacy for the regime because they are seen as a monumental achievement. This belief gained momentum under Kim Il-sung’s successors, Kim Jong-il and Kim Jong-un, who accelerated the nuclear weapon program. The perception that nuclear weapons are a strategic asset for survival prompted the regime to defy the Non-Proliferation treaty, much to the dissatisfaction of the recognized nuclear weapon states. The chapter by Chan Young Bang entails the following sections: (1) Kim Jong-un’s regime is facing great insecurity, and uncertainty for its survival because of three critically flawed decisions, beginning with North Korea’s sixth nuclear test in 2017, which resulted in severe UNSC sanctions, followed by the country’s excessive response to the COVID-19 pandemic, both of which contributed to an economic downturn, and since then, the failed attempt to form a trilateral alliance with China and Russia; (2) recognizing the DPRK as a de jure nuclear-armed state would neither help to diffuse tension nor foster peace on the Korean Peninsula because North Korea’s crisis stems from its ideology, not from its nuclear weapons; (3) China must play a leading role in the framework of the Six-Party Talks if the denuclearization agreement is to ensure (a) that the regime is able to survive, (b) that the DPRK continues to serve as a buffer between China and South Korea, and (c) that there is permanent peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula; (4) as nuclear weapons are a strategic asset essential for regime survival, the deal must provide Kim Jong-un’s regime with a better chance of survival than that which it has as a nuclear-armed state. If the deal offered by the stakeholders does not provide this, Kim will not be able to accept it. The

10

CONCLUSION

131

regime will collapse unless it trades nuclear weapons for a bright future by implementing radical reform, and achieves rapid economic development; (5) South Korea’s president, Yoon Suk-yeol, is the only person who should lead the talks because: (a) he is the only one able to both formulate a shared policy which will be endorsed by stakeholders including China, Russia, Japan, and the US, and who can lead in jointly making an offer of a package deal Kim cannot refuse, (b) the past policies pursued by the United States have not only singularly failed, but the United States also has different strategic objectives to South Korea. (c) It goes without saying that the major burden of financial support must be borne by South Korea because it would benefit the most from North Korea’s denuclearization. Sung-wook Nam opined that Pyongyang will not accept in the near future a denuclearization type similar to the Ukraine Model pushed strongly by former US Secretary of Defense William Perry in the 1990s. He described this in his book “My Journey at the Nuclear Brink” (2015). The recent crisis in Ukraine also describes a situation in which a new Cold War order is constructed and will lead to new changes in Northeast Asian international politics which have swiftly developed due to the North Korean nuclear crisis. The Ukraine crisis will further complicate the resolution of the Northeast Asian nuclear issue. Faced with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, North Korea will reinforce its negative perception of complete and verifiable denuclearization. The 7th nuclear test, aimed at miniaturizing nuclear warheads, means the collapse of the Maginot Line, not the Red Line of security on the Korean Peninsula. The chapter by Meredith Shaw explained the important role of narratives in shaping how people perceive abstract scientific concepts, using North Korea’s own state-produced literature as a window into how educated North Koreans are informed about nuclear and missile technology, the history of nuclear science, the dangers of radiation, and their country’s past performance at nuclear negotiations. Drawing from an extensive corpus of literary output from the [North] Korean Writer’s Union, this article provided an overview of how North Korea’s narrative creators have handled various nuclear developments over the years. North Korean literature also testifies to the tremendous pride North Koreans take in their nuclear program as a scientific achievement through the elevation of nuclear and missile technicians as heroic figures. Of note is the way the US atomic bombings of Japan are treated in novels. Some American characters are depicted feeling shame or horror about

132

C. Y. BANG

the bombings, but others seem to swagger with obscene pride, incorporating extremist Christian beliefs into a pious conviction that nuclear weapons are a sign of God’s favor upon America, that “God gave us these weapons, and they were meant to be used.” These fanatical Christian convictions are then deeply shaken by the news that North Koreans have developed their own nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, a series of highprofile novels covering US–DPRK nuclear diplomacy have depicted North Korea’s negotiators as smart, courageous, blunt, and to-the-point; UN and IAEA officials as craven, toothless puppets of the US; and Americans as cunning, deceitful, desperate, but also grudgingly respectful of North Korea’s pluck and resourcefulness. Some foreign characters, such as Jimmy Carter and Siegfried Hecker, are depicted in respectful terms as nuclear experts, the better to show how impressed they are with North Korea’s nuclear achievements. Scenes of confrontational nuclear diplomacy leave an impression of a deep longing to be evaluated highly, not just by sympathetic allies, but by leaders and thinkers at the very pinnacle of world affairs. They also imply that North Koreans believe their nuclear programs have raised them up on the global stage, putting them in the categories of “scientific great power” and a military power standing toeto-toe with the superpower United States. In these depictions, the global consternation and criticism over their nuclear and missile programs is portrayed not as a source of shame but rather as positive confirmation of the magnitude of their scientific achievement. In his chapter, Zhibo Zou explored the historical background and logic of the North Korean nuclear issue from the root causes, and proposed methods aligned with the long-term objective of solving the North Korean nuclear issue and the short-term objective of seeking a breakthrough in the North Korean nuclear issue based on the evolution of the international landscape and the geopolitical realities of Northeast Asia. South Korea, China and Russia must strengthen their ties and provide humanitarian relief to the DPRK. These three countries should also integrate North Korea into the Northeast Asian economy. With cooperation between the four countries, Zou asserts that voluntary denuclearization of the DPRK will be achievable. In his chapter, Guohong Qiu discussed the four main sticking points surrounding the Korean Peninsula issue: the first centers on the fact that the Koreas’ security concerns have not been resolved because of the warming of relations after the end of the Cold War; the second is

10

CONCLUSION

133

that the stakeholder states in the Korean Peninsula issue have contradictions between their various interests in demands, particularly North Korea and the United States; thirdly, North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles has touched the redline of all involved parties and resulted in severe sanctions and spiraling tensions on the Peninsula. The DPRK lacks a sense of security, wishes to maintain domestic stability and seeks bargaining chips with the international community; and fourthly, the diametrically different policies toward North Korea caused by regime change in South Korea have caused tensions on the Peninsula several times. Solving the problems will require solutions to the four sticking points, consideration of all parties’ interests, and strategic patience. The problems can be dealt with from easiest first to hardest last. The denuclearization process requires the accumulation of trust. First, we must maintain the relatively relaxed situation on the Peninsula which has persisted since 2018, second, we must engage in activities that reduce confrontation and build trust, third, the North and South should be encouraged to improve relations and to reach a consensus on how to achieve peaceful reunification, fourth, the denuclearization of the DPRK and the transformation of the peace mechanism should be promoted simultaneously and in stages, which will be considerate of the security concerns of all parties. It must be taken into account that the core concerns of the DPRK are security and the lifting of sanctions, while the United States’s sole concern is the dismantling of nuclear weapons, therefore denuclearization must address North Korea’s reasonable demands for security and development. As part of its “dual-track parallel” China has proposed a “suspension for suspension” plan in which North Korea would suspend its nuclear and missile testing activities in return for the United States and South Korea’s suspension of large-scale joint military exercises. China’s plans are the most effective means of breaking the deadlock on the Peninsula issue, promoting the denuclearization of the Peninsula and achieving lasting peace. John Everard highlighted the failure of the DPRK’s nuclear program to achieve what the regime hoped it would: strengthened sovereignty and national security. Instead, the program has had the opposite effect as its threat to other nations has intensified, and these states have sought to reduce that threat through the use of tough measures against North Korea. The DPRK’s nuclear program is a technical triumph. For a country with such a low economic base to achieve the production of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems is an astonishing achievement. But

134

C. Y. BANG

it has failed comprehensively to meet the aims set for it since the early years of this century. Far from protecting the DPRK’s sovereignty, it has actually constrained it. It has failed to counter the (mostly illusory) problems for which the DPRK regime intended it and caused much worse ones of its own. As Everard noted in the abstract to his chapter, far from preserving DPRK sovereignty, the development of nuclear weapons may actually have weakened it. Lei Wang gave guidance on how to build a new regional security regime on the Peninsula. From the perspective of China, there are the following suggestions: First, the new peace regime is supposed to be a comprehensive multilateral security cooperation regime guided by the concept of cooperative security, based on the concert of powers and equal consultation among various parties, and backed by the regional strategic balance. Second, it’s necessary that relevant countries should follow the approach of “giving priority to the easy” in the process of building the peace regime. The top priority at the moment is that relevant parties should respect, value, and implement the established agreements, which is the prerequisite and basis for building mutual trust on the Peninsula. Third, various parties should take goodwill actions to ease the tensions on the Peninsula. The DPRK needs to continue to suspend testing nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic missiles, while the United States and the ROK should suspend joint military drills, so that they can sit down for talks. Additionally, the United States should also appropriately lift some sanctions against the DPRK as an incentive for stopping nuclear and missile tests, in exchange for more substantial steps toward denuclearization by the DPRK. Fourth, the various parties should increase efforts to replace the armistice with a peace regime. At present, it is practical to adopt a “dual-track” approach to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula and replace the armistice with a peace treaty at the same time. The replacement process requires the joint efforts of various countries, and the signing of a peace treaty should involve the signatories to the Armistice Agreement, countries directly involved in the war, as well as influential major countries in the region. Last but not least, various parties should return to the Six-Party Talks at an appropriate time. As past experience and lessons tell us, The Six-Party Talks is the most pragmatic solution to resolving the North Korean nuclear issue, maintaining peace and stability on the Peninsula and building a regional security cooperation regime. If the world is to see permanent peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, a package deal must be offered to the Kim regime. Without

10

CONCLUSION

135

radical economic reform and suitable support from the stakeholder states, the country will not be able to denuclearize and avoid collapse. If the leaders of South Korea, China, Japan, the US, and Russia can achieve the denuclearization of North Korea, it will earn them a fine legacy, and end the suffering of the country’s 25 million citizens.

Index

A Armistice, 5, 28, 60, 65, 75, 81, 101, 102, 104, 105, 107, 116, 124, 134 Asia, 53, 119

B Byungjin, 10, 20, 21, 24, 130

C China, 2–4, 7, 8, 10, 13–20, 22–24, 29, 30, 32, 33, 41, 52, 55–57, 60, 61, 65, 67, 69–74, 76, 81, 84, 85, 88, 91, 95–98, 103–106, 109, 112, 115, 117–119, 122–125, 129–135

D Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), 1, 3–5, 7, 8, 10, 12, 16, 17, 30, 51–74, 76–100, 102, 105–125, 130, 132–134

Denuclearization, 1, 2, 4, 10–12, 17, 30–32, 35–37, 48, 51, 53, 58, 60, 63–67, 70, 71, 80, 82–84, 108, 112, 114, 119, 122–125, 129–135 Deterrence, 2, 5, 10, 17, 24, 66, 98, 99, 112, 130 Donju, 13

E East Asia, 55, 57–59, 62, 71, 106, 119–121 Economy, 2, 5, 7, 12, 13, 20–22, 24, 25, 48, 52, 68–70, 88, 91, 94–97, 99, 106, 111, 122, 132

J Jangmadang, 13, 14 Japan, 2, 14, 16–19, 22, 27, 32, 33, 39–43, 55, 58, 69–71, 73, 76, 88, 89, 102, 105, 106, 111, 112, 115, 118–125, 131, 135 Juche, 7, 12, 16, 21, 24, 105

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 C. Y. Bang (ed.), A Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-45233-8

137

138

INDEX

K Kim Il-sung, 3, 8, 27, 28, 32, 85, 86, 88, 91, 96, 97, 105, 109, 114, 130 Kim, Jong-il, 4, 45, 47, 61, 86–88, 94, 97, 130 Kim, Jong-un, 2, 7, 11, 13, 20, 23, 24, 30–32, 47, 72, 80, 90, 94, 96, 97, 117, 130 Korean Peninsula, 1–3, 5, 10–12, 17, 20, 22–24, 30–34, 53, 54, 60, 63, 70, 75, 76, 80, 81, 84, 101–109, 112, 113, 115–125, 130–134 Korean War, 16, 17, 27–29, 40, 55, 56, 75, 79, 81, 91, 101–103, 112

L Law, 16, 18, 56, 61, 121 Literature, 4, 36–38, 43, 48, 131

M Marketization, 3

N Non-proliferation treaty, 3, 86, 91, 130 North Korea, 1–5, 7–25, 27–38, 40–48, 78, 90, 94, 97, 103, 107–110, 112, 114, 129–133, 135 Novel, 36–46, 131, 132 Nuclear development, 4, 10, 27, 34, 83, 88, 120, 131 Nuclear weapons, 1, 3–5, 7–12, 14–24, 27–35, 39, 41, 42, 51–58, 60–72, 78, 79, 82, 83, 86, 89, 91–96, 98, 99, 102,

107–112, 114, 116, 117, 123, 129–134

O Opening, 20, 21, 33, 61, 69, 70, 74

P Package deal, 3, 10–12, 17, 20, 23–25, 131, 134 Peace, 11, 12, 16–18, 20, 23–25, 39, 51, 55, 59, 60, 62, 65, 67, 69, 75, 76, 79, 81–84, 102, 108, 112, 119, 122, 123, 125, 130, 133, 134 Peace regime, 60, 64, 102, 115–117, 119, 121–124, 134 Peace treaty, 12, 22, 60, 65, 81, 104, 105, 117, 122–124, 134 Pride, 4, 37, 42, 45, 47, 48, 131, 132

R Republic of Korea (ROK), 52–58, 60, 67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 88–93, 97, 105–108, 110–118, 120–125, 134 Rights/Human rights, 22, 63, 78, 80, 91 Russia, 2, 3, 7, 13–19, 22, 30, 32, 55, 58, 73, 76, 88, 98, 105, 106, 115, 117–125, 131, 132, 135

S Socialism, 12, 16, 17, 25 South Korea, 3, 4, 9, 12, 14, 16–20, 22–24, 28, 31–34, 48, 76, 79, 81, 82, 84, 86, 108–110, 129–133, 135 Sovereignty, 5, 85, 86, 88–90, 93, 95, 99, 100, 133, 134

INDEX

Stability, 4, 5, 11, 12, 16–18, 20, 23, 24, 51, 55, 56, 61, 69, 78, 79, 82, 89, 101, 104, 107, 112, 121, 122, 125, 130, 133, 134

Story, 38, 39, 46, 47

139

U USA/US, 2, 4, 5, 10, 14, 16–20, 22–24, 28–33, 37–39, 41, 43, 44, 46, 48, 52–73, 76, 77, 79–84, 86–93, 95, 99, 102, 103, 108–110, 114, 117, 119, 129, 131, 133, 135