Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory: The Case of the United Arab Emirates (Contributions to International Relations) 3031446364, 9783031446368

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Contributions to International Relations

Spyridon N. Litsas

Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory The Case of the United Arab Emirates

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields. All titles in this series are peer-reviewed.

Spyridon N. Litsas

Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory The Case of the United Arab Emirates

Spyridon N. Litsas University of Macedonia Thessaloniki, Greece

ISSN 2731-5061     ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-3-031-44636-8    ISBN 978-3-031-44637-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Preface

A cloud gathers, the rain falls; men live; the cloud disperses without rain, and men and animals die. In the deserts of southern Arabia there is no rhythm of the seasons, no rise and fall of sap, but empty wastes where only the changing temperature marks the passage of the year…No man can live this life and emerge unchanged. He will carry, however faint, the imprint of the desert, the brand which marks the nomad and he will have within him the yearning to return weak or insistent according to his nature. For this cruel land can cast a spell which no temperate climate can match. (Wilfred Thesiger, “Arabian Sands”)

This book is the product of two years’ work during my sabbatical leave from the University of Macedonia in Thessaloniki, Greece, which I spent in the capital of the United Arab Emirates, Abu Dhabi, at Rabdan Academy and the Zayed Military University. It combines a theoretical study of the Smart States Theory with an empirical analysis that places the UAE on its focus as a Smart State case study in the twenty-first century. Many exciting books have been written about the UAE’s history, economy, culture, and architecture. Nevertheless, this is the first scholarly endeavor that explores the ontology of the state through the analytical International Relations tools of the new theory about the Smart States, focusing on its internal structure, leadership model, and behavior in the international arena. One of the fascinating things regarding any form of creativity in arts or science is the primary spark of inspiration. In other words, the moment an idea is born, and from that point onward, nothing is the same until this vague inspiration transforms into substance, coherent analysis, or a geometrical dimension that will dictate the horizon or the thoughts of the people forever. Mahatma Gandhi once said, “A journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.” My 2127-mile journey from Thessaloniki to Abu Dhabi began with an official invitation. The idea for this book started some years ago, in 2017, during my first visit to Abu Dhabi. The National Defense College had invited me to give a guest lecture on Thucydides, based on an article I had published about the Thucydidean dimension of Stasis and the Arab Spring.1 It was the first time I was traveling in the Gulf. I did not know what to  “Stranger in a Strange Land: Thucydides’ Stasis and the Arab Spring”, Digest of Middle East Studies, 2013, vol. 22, no. 2, pp. 361–376. 1

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expect. Definitely, I was not expecting a walk in the third-world lane, after all the fame of Dubai as a global megapolis had already reached us in Europe; however, I was pleasantly surprised by the technologically advanced capital I landed after a 4.5-hour flight. Beyond a doubt, I was absolutely charmed by the fully engaging audience inside the NDC’s auditorium, comprising elite white-collar bureaucrats and members of the Armed and Security Forces. An exceptional assembly of white kanduras and black abayas, of bright smiles and keen eyes. These female and male people were in the middle of their careers. They had been, as I had been later informed, thoroughly scrutinized and selectively hand-picked to attend the most prestigious post-­ graduate institution in the country. I was staying in Abu Dhabi for two days, flying back to Athens early in the morning of the third, so the first night before my guest lecture, I decided to spend inside the hotel, very close to the premises of the National Defense College. However, on the second night, I decided to explore the neighborhood around my hotel. I passed inside a well-kept park that was sending a strong message against the desertification process. After a long stroll, I ended up in the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque, elegantly emerging on the urban horizon. I remember it was a humid and hot October evening, and when I reached the mosque, I was exhausted. I decided to sit on a bench outside the mosque, where I saw that it was equipped with mobile and laptop chargers. I watched a colorful crowd, tourists and locals, mingling harmoniously under the impressing marble domes of the mosque, children were playing in the gardens, and there was an aura of happiness and calmness, so different from the European urban environments that I was used to. I remember thinking, out of professional vice, what type of political label I could attribute to the state even without knowing many things about its history or the institutional structure. I immediately thought of “Smart,” without clarifying inside me why. It was an instinctive reaction to all the pictures archived in my mind since my arrival in Abu Dhabi. I could not justify the “Smart” adjective; however, this thought accompanied me on the flight back home and for the years to come. After I finished my book on the US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, I knew it was the right time to begin my journey to this part of the world. To feel the people, breathe the air, mingle with the history, and try not to close my eyes, staring at the sun of the desert. Smart States Theory was searching for its place in the alleys of Social Science, and the UAE kept reminding me how this idea was born. Diving into the theoretical essence of the term Small States Theory, a popular approach in International Relations with a solid geographical stigma of the Scandinavian School of International Politics, I developed a rather critical approach toward it. The rationale is thoroughly presented in the first and the second chapters. During that period, I constantly tried to explore the theoretical framework regarding the link between all these successful states in the international arena. I was trying to identify their characteristics and make some safe generalizations. I noticed a pattern regarding their institutional behavior between states such as the USA, Israel, the UAE, Singapore, Finland, Canada, Norway, Japan, and New Zealand – a configuration of choices and not just random events that go well beyond success. My approach

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to the term “Smart” defines the ontological connection between the citizens and the political authority; it penetrates the collective societal awareness regarding the relationship between human volition and the institutional structure. This pattern affects to a large extent the way that the state reacts successfully in front of military and political challenges, for example, establishes a distinctive form of taking responsibility for an internal crisis or meets effectively any defiance, a natural disaster, or an existential threat toward rationality, collective memory, or hope. However, I observed that generalizations could be applied in all the above, meaning that I could construct a path linking all the states already mentioned with the new mantra of “Smart.” An articulate description of “Smart statehood” seemed much more appropriate to endorse the pattern of the state’s success in the international environment. Since the end of my trip to Abu Dhabi, I began to familiarize myself with the history of the state, the type of government, the federal structure, its leadership, the Emirati society, its melting pot system, its economy, its technology, and more. Everything indicated that the UAE would have been the ideal paradigm to endorse my theory of Smart States with a coherent empirical case; however, I wanted to be sure before committing myself to the writing of such a demanding task. Nevertheless, when on August 13, 2020, Israel and the UAE signed the Abraham Accords, I was fully convinced about my endeavor. At this point, it is vital to answer the first of many questions this book will pose in the following chapters. Why is Bahrain not smart since it signed the Abraham Accords too? The answer relates to the ontological essence of the Smart State. The UAE, like Israel, the USA, New Zealand, Singapore, Norway, etc., is Smart in every core of its existence. Being a member of this prestigious club is challenging since it takes more than a rational decision or an unexpected success to be accepted inside the Shangri-La of the international system. Still, it relates to the nation’s heart and mind and its choices in a macro-­political context. The UAE is a Smart State, a fact that can be probed even during the decision process for the transition of the region from a Trucial past to a unified future, a decision that profoundly shaped the balance of power of the Arab Gulf, but also of the international system as well. I wrote about this new theory using the UAE as its empirical paradigm for various reasons. First, I have already written a book about the USA and its foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean; therefore, I needed a new challenge. Second, many academics have produced excellent analyses of Israel, Japan, Singapore, and New Zealand. Thus, I was between Norway and the UAE. However, my research interest in the MENA region and my mental connection with the term “Smart” during my first visit to the UAE weighed decisively on my final decision. I feel, nevertheless, the need to clarify the following issues. This is not a book about the UAE. This is a book on why the UAE is a Smart State, instead of how the UAE is as a State in general, as much as it aspires to discuss why Smart States Theory has something new and fresh to offer in categorizing states according to something other than their size. In addition, as usual, with my books, I hope for the emergence of a broader theoretical dialogue regarding the very essence of the Smart States theory. In Social Sciences, nothing is written in stone. Instead, science progresses through discussion, mental friction, educated arguments, and thorough analyses.

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One of my main aspirations with this book is to generate a scientific conversation among academics worldwide about the Smart States Theory, especially with those who will find this concept vague and incoherent. Another primary aspiration is to present an analysis of the UAE that will not remain on the surface. The UAE deserves to be seen as a modernizer of the Gulf region, as a champion of the Arab brand name and Islam, and as a dynamic model of the new form of modernity in the post-COVID-19 era. It is an international actor with a pivotal role as an interconnector, a Lilliputian nation with an Achilles’ courage and an Odysseus’ IQ. This book is a scholarly reply to James Mattis’ well-known quote, labeling the UAE as a contemporary Little Sparta. It is time to move on with this restricting mantra regarding the size of the state, seeing the UAE as a Smart Sparta instead and discussing this, too. Moreover, this book argues against those simplistic voices, considering the Gulf region an identical ethnopolitical and administrative mass. In every societal or political sense, the UAE is not Qatar, Oman, or Kuwait. At the same time, its positive role model as a vehicle of progressive policies in the region, e.g., its positive influence on the liberalization process of Saudi Arabia under Mohammed bin Salman, is striking. These fundamental issues must be underlined and presented to larger audiences. Last but not least, another aspiration that this book sets is to be the cornerstone for the creation of an international network of Smart States, bringing politicians, academics, diplomats, journalists, students, artists, and societies in general into a creative osmosis with a constant exchange of views, ideas, proposals on how to use this Smartness for making this globe a better and safer place for everyone, especially for the less privileged. Smart States can lead in international affairs, especially during high political and economic volatility, where solidarity and assistance are welcome. The first chapter presents the Small States Theory, identifying whether this approach is a theory, a trend, or simply a convenient leap of faith. The second chapter will set the foundations for constructing a new Smart States theory. Various empirical examples will endorse the theoretical foundations of what is smart and what is not in international politics. The third chapter will argue that the UAE’s past, even from the days of the Trucial States in the Arab littoral of the Gulf, particularly its route toward the Unification of the seven Emirates in one federal state, is a process that endorses smart ontology. The fourth chapter argues that Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum are two representatives of Smart Leadership for different reasons, yet introducing some modernizing dimensions in Leadership Theories with a Smart orientation, too. The fifth chapter discusses the connection between positivism and Smart State theory, exploring the links in Emirati Foreign Policy. In contrast, the sixth chapter goes one step beyond Smart Power, exploring tolerance’s unique role in the UAE’s structure in the state’s smart ontology. Last but not least, the seventh chapter will present a thorough analysis of the significant internal and external challenges that the UAE will have to face in the future, exploring the level of the existential risk that these challenges represent for the state itself, as well as smart methods to deal with those effectively.

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This book aspires to open a new chapter in International Relations Theory and Gulf regional analysis. This is why it should be approached as an attempt to theorize empiricism while attributing empirical notes to theoretical explorations. At the beginning of this fascinating trip, I feel like Jason, the Ancient Greek mythological hero, who is about to sail with his fellow Argonauts to unknown waters. I feel like looking all of you in the eyes, my brave and noble companions, yet I wonder if Argo or we can return safely with no losses on the way. However, this is irrelevant to the noble goal of this “expedition.” Whether we can reach back to the safe waters of Ithaca is irrelevant. As in real life, in Social Sciences too, what truly matters is the journey, the experiences that the trip offers, and the chance to move a step closer to the exit of Plato’s Cave. If you have decided to embark on this trip, be prepared. Soon enough, you will find yourself escaping the theoretical Scylla and Charybdis, sailing toward the edge of Felix Arabia, where the past meets the future and reality eradicates stereotypes, where grand theories and ambitious ideas blend with the enticing smells of the Oud perfume, the silent nights in the desert under starlight sky, and the aspirations of those who choose to label the century that unfolds before their eyes as the beaming framework where the theoretical saga of the smart states, instead of big, small, dwarf, or gigantic actors, takes place. Let our travel begin then, or as a Bedouin would have said, staring at the vastness of the desert opening before him; Yallah! Thessaloniki, Greece

Spyridon N. Litsas

Acknowledgments

All my life, one of my greatest desires has been to travel to see and touch unknown countries, to swim in unknown seas, to circle the globe, observing new lands, seas, people, and ideas with an insatiable appetite to see everything for the first time and for the last time, casting a slow prolonged glance, then close my eyes and feel the riches deposit themselves inside me calmly or stormily according to their pleasure until the time passes them at last through its fine sieve, straining the quintessence out of all the joys and sorrows. (Nikos Kazantzakis, “Report to Greco”)

It becomes a cliché since I tend to start this section of every book of mine with the recognition that writing, not just an academic book, requires solitude, but the writer is not alone. As Aristotle, one of the greatest Ancient Greek philosophers and scholars, said, humans are social animals. Therefore, my sincere thanks go to the following individuals, and by now good friends too: Dr. Faisal Al Kaabi, for giving me the space and time I so much needed to research and write this book. Without him, I could not have successfully met the Publisher’s deadline. Dr. Maria Stafyllarakis for her language editing in Chaps. 5 and 6. Dr. Shamma Al Naqbi and Dr. Asma Al Nuaimi, for their warm smiles and for always being eager to answer my questions about the country, the people, and the Emirati customs. Mrs. Shamma Al Nuaimi and Ms. Shamma Al Ameri, for their continuous support. I would also like to thank all those who responded to my queries but either wish to remain anonymous or their views have not been included in this book. Dr. Hamad Al Ustath for some truly enjoyable fresh pineapple juice sessions with thorough analyses and discussions about the Emirati legal system, regional history, and local customs on the side. My sincere acknowledgments must also go to Dr. Mohamed Alhmoudi, who has opened his heart and house and made me always feel welcome, following the hospitable traditions of his forefathers. He was a source of kindness, intelligent humor, and a unique thesaurus of knowledge regarding the region’s history, Emirati traditions, and politics. I am more than sure that our conversations on the Peloponnesian War, or about the balance of power in the Gulf today, still have many more chapters to cover. Dr. Petros Violakis for his unconditional friendship and for always being there for me. As people get older, making new true friends becomes harder and harder; with Petros, that was not the xi

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case. Many thanks to Lorraine Klimowich. This is the second book I have published with Springer, and every time she succeeds in making the whole process a great experience. Lorraine also kindly remembers every time to send me her wishes for a “Happy Independence Day” on the 25th of March to my Twitter account (@ Spyros_Litsas). As always, I feel the need to state my gratefulness to my parents, Nikos and Eleni, for all the reasons that a son will always feel truly blessed to have them in his life. Lena, the love of my life, for being my good omen and compass in one more trip. As with every book since her birth, this work is dedicated to Elena, my everything. Besides being her dad, the most outstanding achievement of my life, I am always grateful that she allows her mother and me to be an active part of her life, sharing her dreams, joys, and secrets. However, this time Elena will have to share this dedication with all the Emiratis of every age and gender, who daily contribute significantly to making applicable the UAE to the Smart States Theory. I hope this book will inspire them to look to International Relations Theory, probe their past, absorb pride in their ancestors’ achievements, and set their eyes on the future for the following generations. With no further ado, let us begin our quest in the alleys of the Smart States Theory. … ‫ وسالف العرص واألوان‬،‫يف قدمي الزمان‬،‫اكن اي ما اكن‬   Thessaloniki, June 20th 2023

Contents

1

Small States Theory and the Failing Process of Normative Analysis����������������������������������������������������������������������������     1 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������     1 Theorizing the Sophistry: Mind the Gap ������������������������������������������������     4 Small States: Trend, Theory, or Approach? ��������������������������������������������     7 Beyond the Small States Theory��������������������������������������������������������������    10 Beyond Small States Theory��������������������������������������������������������������������    15 Comparison Between the States��������������������������������������������������������������    16 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    20

2

Smart Instead of Small: Which Are the Different Variables That Make a State Act Smart? ������������������������������������������������������������    21 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    21 Systemic Naivety Versus the Systemic Perceptive State��������������������������    24 The Anti-Blanche DuBois State��������������������������������������������������������������    27 The Right to Pursue Happiness����������������������������������������������������������������    31 Invest in Technology��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    34 Progressive Leadership����������������������������������������������������������������������������    37 National Unity������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    42 Unconventional Diplomacy ��������������������������������������������������������������������    46 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    48

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 rom Oblivion to Modernity: The UAE’s Smart Birth������������������������   51 F Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    51 The British and the Trucial States������������������������������������������������������������    52 The Years of Dust������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    56 The Crossing of the Rubicon ������������������������������������������������������������������    62 A Smart Start��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    69 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    74

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Smart Leadership: The Cases of Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum����������������������������������������    75 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    75 Leadership Theory and Politics���������������������������������������������������������������    76 Lead Rationally������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    78 Lead by Example ��������������������������������������������������������������������������������    80 Lead to Collective Happiness��������������������������������������������������������������    82 Two Contemporary Styles of Leadership in the UAE�����������������������������    84 Mohamed bin Zayed: Leading from the Front����������������������������������������    87 Hamdan bin Mohamed al Maktoum: Leading as a World-Class Influencer ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    94 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    96

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Smart States Act Positively in the International Arena: The UAE Case����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    99 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������    99 Foreign Policy: A General Atheoretical Discussion��������������������������������   100 A Positive Regional Actor������������������������������������������������������������������������   101 The Establishment of the GCC������������������������������������������������������������   102 The Greek-Emirati Defense Agreement����������������������������������������������   102 The Abraham Accords��������������������������������������������������������������������������   103 A Positive International Actor������������������������������������������������������������������   110 The Systemic Interconnector ������������������������������������������������������������������   114 US-Emirati Relations ��������������������������������������������������������������������������   114 Russian-Emirati Relations ������������������������������������������������������������������   117 Sino-Emirati Relations������������������������������������������������������������������������   119 The Systemic Interconnector ��������������������������������������������������������������   122 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   125

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 eyond Smart Power: Tolerance as a Source of Smart Ontology ����   127 B Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   127 It’s a Beautiful Day����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   128 The Importance of Soft Power in Contemporary International Politics��   130 The UAE Smart Power����������������������������������������������������������������������������   134 From Smart Power to Smart Ontology����������������������������������������������������   136 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   143

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I nternal and External Challenges for the Years to Come������������������   145 Introduction����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   145 Internal Challenges: The Economic Dimension Versus Domestic Societal Stability��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   146 The Case of the Emiratis’ Radicalization��������������������������������������������   151 The Case of the Expatriates’ Radicalization����������������������������������������   153 The New Citizens’ Challenge��������������������������������������������������������������   156 The Challenge of National Unity������������������������������������������������������������   159

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External Challenges: Systemic Developments and Regional Conundrums��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   163 The Systemic Transition: From Multipolarity to Bipolar Multilateralism������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   163 The Positioning Challenge in the New Systemic Structure ��������������������   178 The Iranian Challenge and Its Proxies ����������������������������������������������������   186 Conclusion ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   191 Epilogue����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   193 Index����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   201

Chapter 1

Small States Theory and the Failing Process of Normative Analysis

Impossible! I’d never come with a single thing about celestial phenomena, if I did not suspend my mind up high, to mix my subtle thoughts with what’s like them-the air. (Aristophanes’ “Clouds”)

Introduction Why is defining various theoretical terms in International Relations (IR) Theory so difficult? The first thing that comes to mind is that the discipline, as a part of social sciences, needs to have the proper procedures to distinguish professionals, i.e., academics and specialized analysts, from amateurs. The willingness to read history and the ability to comprehend the fundamentals of International Relations Theory do not automatically qualify you to navigate the difficult waters of theoretical analysis regarding deciphering international phenomena. Millions of people worldwide confuse international politics, everyday developments in the international sphere, with International Relations Theory. The majority of them seem not to be aware of the fundamentals that a first-year student in International Studies learns in the lecture theater about the way that the international system is structured, how the international balance of power is directly affected by the different systemic conditions, which are shaped by the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of polarities, and about the influence of the anarchic and antagonistic international environment on the behavior of individual states. The majority of those who are convinced of their understanding of international politics, and are therefore entitled to enlighten the rest of humanity with their writings, podcasts, or seminars in front of a live audience, are mainly concentrated on (a) circumstantial events, which are taken as general theories, and (b) behavioral patterns of international actors or conspiracy theories without focusing on the sociopolitical, economic, or legal framework of the states, which are the subjects of analysis. This is why the Theory of International Relations is continually bombarded by © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5_1

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oversimplifications of the complex conditions in which states find themselves. Stereotypes and hyperbole, mixed with insistent Cassandrian omens and predictions of the international system’s future, can be found nowadays in analyses that are as plentiful as they are inadequate. After all, it is much easier, and sometimes more “politically correct” in our alleged metapolitics era, to publicly denounce a state for raw imperialism rather than offering a thorough analysis of primordial fear or linking this kind of behavior to the almost instinctive response to a Security Dilemma. The blanket denunciation is much more easily consumed than the two other cases.1 A personal story may give the reader a better understanding of my argument. A few years after 9/11, I was a guest on a popular TV show on a Greek national broadcaster about how the USA had dealt with the attack, domestically and internationally. I was putting forward the argument that 9/11 must be seen as the end of the brief, incomplete unipolar period that emerged immediately after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, while US foreign policy should be examined in the light of the fear that a new sense of vulnerability was causing to a nation that had previously lived for many decades with the seductive narrative of absolute security. My analysis so utterly absorbed me that I even compared the USA after 9/11 with Rome after Hannibal invaded the Italian peninsula during the beginning of the Second Punic War in 218  BCE.  I naively believed that the presenter appreciated my analysis since he smiled politely during my reply to his question. However, as soon as the commercial break arrived, all the smiles vanished. He told me that, on a rival TV channel, there was a show with two analysts who were fervently exchanging verbal blows regarding the post-9/11 era, with the one characterizing the USA as an imperialist power (no surprise there, as he was a well-known member of the Greek Communist Party). The other insisted that there would soon be a Third World War between the USA on the one side and Russo-Chinese forces on the other side since neither Beijing nor Moscow was willing to allow Washington to continue to control Iraq and Afghanistan. I remember him saying, “Enough with the theory. Nobody cares about these things. After the break, let us concentrate on the prospects of a violent confrontation between the three Great Powers over Afghanistan and Iraq. For God’s sake, this is a prime-time TV show, not a university lecture theatre.” I politely refused to dance to this particular tune and became even more technical about the theoretical aspects of our discussion. He was undoubtedly unhappy, unlike my students, who gave me their enthusiastic feedback the next day

 The US response toward Iraq and Saddam Hussein is characteristic of the overall aura surrounding decision-making processes. Various analysts and IR theorists have openly accused the USA of a new over-boosted kind of militarism, Bacevich J. Andrew, The New American Militarism: How Americans are Seduced by War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); the Bush administration of constructing a pretext to strengthen the American position in the Middle East, Bamford James, A Pretext for War: 9/11, Iraq and the Abuse of America’s Intelligence Agencies (New York: Anchor Books, 2004); or of simply being mistaken, since the 2003 war against Iraq an exaggeration of the actual threat that Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime presented to the post-Cold War balance of power, Mearsheimer J.  John & Walt M.  Stephen, “An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy, January/February 2003, issue 134, pp. 50–59. 1

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in the lecture theater. How can international politics be analyzed without addressing all the theoretical dimensions? Obviously, this is a purely rhetorical question. Nevertheless, a theory is not a substitute for a thorough and captivating analysis of international politics. Quite often, a theory is misused, either to promote specific state policies or thanks to the eagerness of researchers to offer an original approach that will take the entire discipline a step further while at the same time ensuring them a prestigious post in academia. With regard to the first objective, the political one has a short duration. No theory that lacks solid foundations and the capacity to meet Karl Popper’s Falsification Method can defy scientific fundamentals, even in the field of social sciences, where very often creativity takes the place of precision and a systematic method. For example, Democratic Peace Theory2 reemerged soon after the end of the Cold War, during the period when the White House, amid the narrowing of the international economic horizon and intense pressures on the domestic front by the “yellow-ribbon” movement, was desperate to produce a coherent thesis as to why it was essential to pursue the democratization of Iraq and Afghanistan. Democratic Peace Theory had a sound impact, yet its normative idea that democratic states do not fight each other did not survive the end of the Bush administration. This theory became very popular for a limited period and is now barely remembered, except as an oversimplification. At this point, however, it is essential to offer a brief answer to the question my students usually ask me: Why do states resort to International Relations Theory to support their decision-making? Why are the media, conventional or (nowadays) social, not enough? Primarily, it allows those in office to express their views grandiosely. If someone argues as an academic and makes all the decisions as a CEO, then she or he is an incarnation of an exemplary political figure today. Second, it gives them the patronizing benefit of not being over-challenged by people. The masses have no knowledge of international theory, so they cannot argue against something beyond their capacity or their interest to grasp. In this case, the majority seems eager to accept the person who promotes the theory by virtue of their status as an academic rather than the theoretical concept itself. For example, the chief spokesmen of the pro-Brexit movement throughout the campaign referred to the weakening of UK sovereignty thanks to the country’s membership in the European Union. The pro-Brexiters made ample use of this particular argument to arouse the primitive patriotism of the masses. However, no one ever mentioned that the sovereignty of a state might also collapse as a result of internal issues, such as the desire of a strong ethnic group, e.g., the Scots, to continue to enjoy the benefits of EU membership when the rest of the UK keeps itself stubbornly trapped in the BREXIT decision.

2  Doyle Michael, “Kant Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 1983, vol. 12 no.3, pp.  205–235 & vol. 12, no.4, pp.  323–353; Russett Bruce, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a post-Cold War World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); Weart R.  Spencer, Never at War: Why Democracies will never fight one another, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).

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Theorizing the Sophistry: Mind the Gap The most frequent contribution of International Relations Theory is the formulation of a new approach. While these new approaches are sometimes coherently constructed, they primarily result from a shallow understanding of international events without basing it on any coherent empirical paradigm. As I have mentioned above, efforts like these are produced from the eagerness of (primarily junior) researchers to develop an innovative approach. I fully sympathize with all these researchers and their understandable need to leave their mark on International Relations Theory. This is a common wish for every young PhD holder who, after a successful viva, sees only opportunities before him without educated dragons or cerebral arguments. A junior scholar’s healthy ambition is to look back after some years and recognize their contribution to the discipline. Still, very often, these aspirations need to be reflected in the actual result of the given analysis. Various theories have emerged at the heart of International Relations over the last decades. Feminist ideas, constructivist approaches, neo-geopolitical analyses, and behavioral theories have produced some hype yet less memorable ways to understand better how international events develop. Innovation, testing new theories, and going beyond the scholarly safety zone are all approaches that unquestionably enrich International Relations Theory. However, every new theory must be able to withstand the falsifiable test. If not, it is just another over-ambitious attempt, more superficial than aspiring, with limited prospects of surviving for long. So, which elements of a theory ensure a satisfactory level of falsifiability testing? First, the new theory must include the fundamental theoretical elements that have proven their credibility in explaining actual or past events. For example, regarding the domain of International Relations, a new theory must acknowledge and be able to incorporate at its conceptual nucleus that states compete in the international arena for different reasons and to achieve different survival levels. For the USA, the struggle for survival refers to its attempt to maintain its position as a Great Power and limit the influence of China and Russia in the international arena. For Lebanese society, survival has to do with adopting a domestic constitutional formula that will limit the impact of radical elements such as Hezbollah while adopting the necessary economic policies that will enable the country to promote development and limit corruption. Both the USA and Lebanon have to work hard daily to attain their survival level. However, the survival process’s political, diplomatic, and economic objectives differ for each of them. Moreover, protecting national interests always comes first for a state, no matter what ethical burden a decision may carry. Here, it is essential to differentiate the approval process from political practice. A theorist of International Relations does not present an analysis to justify or condemn the political decision-making of a state but rather to bring the fact itself and the methodology used to the surface. After all, “the strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must,” as has been confirmed from the time of Thucydides to the present day. A theoretical analysis that claims that power and rivalry do not predominate in the international arena or that states must provide for themselves because there is no

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Deus ex Machina to come to their rescue if they are in danger will perhaps sound morally engaging, but in reality, it does nothing to contribute to a better understanding of how states behave. In other words, if a new theoretical approach does not recognize the fundamentals of the discipline, does not contribute to their better understanding, or their structural modification thanks to conceptual irrelevance, or cannot be applied to real-time situations. It does not serve the discipline but rather the ego of those who formulated it. This, in social sciences, is a pretty standard spectacle reminding Leo Tolstoy’s magnificent passage from War and Peace, “Pfuel [Karl Ludwig von Phull] was one of those theoreticians who so love their theory that they lose sight of the theory’s object -its practical application. His love of theory made him hate everything practical and he would not listen to it.”3 Interestingly enough, von Phull, responsible for organizing the Russian army in the 1812 campaign against Napoleon, is being accused by Tolstoy of his failure to connect his theory with the realities of the war, a subject so close to the core of International Relations and development so frequent in the alleys of military strategy, since the defeat of the Elamites by the Sumerian king of Kish in Mesopotamia in 2.700 BCE in the first recorded military campaign in human history. Second, a new theory should connect with those already validated by reputable academic institutions, scholarly works, etc. By this, a novel theoretical contribution will be able to pave new roads for the discipline rather than simply making a new entry with no scholarly substance. Suppose a new theoretical approach proves to be incompatible with the academic core of the field. In that case, the former is not truly thematically related, even if its creators have decided to place it at the heart of the existing discipline. For example, because today, International Relations is a strong trend both in social sciences and politics, various tested theoretical contributions from sociology or political anthropology are presented as new theoretical approaches to International Relations. As a result, we read or hear about theories with persistent analysis of societal conditions or about the narratives that shaped the identity of a nation under the label of International Relations, mainly because the author thinks that it will be better for the theory to be boosted with new theoretical formulae and an appeal to a larger audience. As a matter of fact, this is an excellent objective. Nevertheless, it fails to recognize the profound theoretical and empirical differences between disciplines that focus on the inner workings of a state or an ethnic group and others that focus on the big picture of the state’s interaction in the international environment. Although scientific relativity is a crucial parameter for the theoretical evolution of each discipline in social sciences, any new addition must have a methodological equivalence with the already established academic core. Conversely, the new theory features an alien component not assimilated with the rest of the conceptual setting. Third, the new theory must be able to present its research results based both on qualitative and quantitative data or make comprehensible comparisons between the two categories above. Especially for International Relations theory, it is essential to

 Leo Tolstoy, War and Peace, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010, σελ. 686.

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remember that it is a part of social sciences that bases its existence on comparative data about the power of the states and their decision-making to act as status quo or revisionist elements in the international environment. The presentation of coherent comparative data is best achieved by directly comparing states with common (geographical or institutional) characteristics or through the deductive process. A new contribution to the theory that is neither comparative nor considers the distinctive features of power does not belong to this discipline. It takes up space, like a free rider who only wishes to take without giving in return. After all, this process is crucial to establishing and sharing the empirical dimension of theoretical causality with members of the scientific community and the rest of society if necessary. Regarding the three above elements that can contribute to the scientific validity of a new theoretical approach in International Relations, I do not claim to have invented the wheel. It is my exegesis of Raymond Aron’s well-known analysis of the elements that formulate a theory, “(1) Does this definition permit the delimitation of the sub-system that is being considered? (2) Does it allow us to deduce or include other elements of the sub-system? (3) Does it permit us to rediscover (and explain) the original data that served as a starting point for the theoretical elaboration.”4 A view that argues that Aron wrote this back in 1967; therefore, his thesis cannot explain the current developments in the theoretical sphere of International Relations and will be utterly atheoretical, exposing the fixation of many in the context of social sciences who base their choice on contemporary analysis over timeless research to a superficial aspect of the chronological dimension. I will not choose urban graffiti over a painting by Monet just because the latter was first recognized in the nineteenth century. In social sciences, unlike natural sciences, a contemporary analysis must not be seen as the Holy Grail or as the touchstone of relevance. This is even more striking in International Relations, where axioms about the phenomenon of war or the conduct of diplomacy are still as relevant today as in the days of Thucydides, Sun Tzu, or Machiavelli. I presume that the latter is chiefly related to the fact that time has a different relationship to human life than to various forms of science. A phenomenon that refers to the international structure and shapes how collective consciousness evolves regarding political events needs considerable time to mature and produce coherent analytical results. Take, for example, the concept of modernity. Pharaonic Egypt and then Judaism laid the cornerstone for developing this fundamental sociopolitical concept for the evolution of humanity thousands of years ago. Yet, it only officially appeared in 1648 with the signing of the Peace of Westphalia. This is an excellent example of the relativity of time in International Relations, which directly affects contemporary trends and beliefs. This does not mean that International Relations Theory is not an area for innovative thinking, fresh ideas, alternative suggestions, provocative approaches, and novel methodologies. On the contrary, daily, IR theorists compete to see who can impress the academic community or the public with new avant-garde suggestions

 Aron Raymond, “What is a Theory of International Relations?,” Journal of International Affairs, 1967, vol. 21, no.2, p. 192 (pp. 185–206). 4

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and out-of-the-box analyses. As will be argued in the following paragraphs, this constant need for breakthrough analyses sometimes reaches the point where theory turns to narration and scholarly argumentation to normativism. One is the Small States Theory.

Small States: Trend, Theory, or Approach? Let us begin this section with the general assumption that there is no commonly accepted definition for “small states,”5 even from those who advocate in favor of the associated theoretical approach, while it is quite common that small- and middle-­ sized states are blended to produce a rather extended typology. Is this a negative aspect of the theory itself? Yes, because its constituent parts show a profound lack of coherence. Coherence is an important criterion for epistemic justification of any natural or social sciences theory. If we presuppose that every theoretical approach is the sum of various fragments of belief, then it is reasonable to expect these to be linked by epistemological agreement on the basic dimensions of the theory itself.6 This specific point has to be underlined. The various approaches are unrelated to a specific Small States Theory dimension. Something like that would have been utterly logical, and the wider scholarly conversation would have resulted in useful theoretical and empirical additions that strengthened the overall conceptual coherence of the subject. The reason there are different approaches, in other words, a hidden lack of agreement about the very fundamentals of the theory itself, has to do with what a “small state” is. A vibrant, colorful, yet so much discordant Tower of Babel is being erected on the basic question of what a “small state” actually is. An interesting definition of “small states” comes from Godfrey Baldacchino and Anders Wivel.7 According to this approach, (1) “small states” are characterized by the limited capacity of their political, economic, and administrative systems and (2)

 Olafsson, G. Bjorn, Small States in the Global System. Analysis and Illustrations from the Case of Iceland. Ashgate, Routledge, 1998, p. 3; Mouritzen Hans & Wivel Anders, “Introduction” in H. Mouritzen & A. Wivel (eds.), The Geopolitics of Euroatlantic Integration, London: Roultedge, 2005, pp. 1–11; Raadschelders J.B., “Definitions of Smallness: A comparative study” in R.A. Baker (ed.), Public Administration in Small and Island States, West Hertfort, Kumarian Press, 1992, pp. 26–33. 6   For more regarding Epistemological Coherentism, see Hanson O.  Sven, “Coherence in Epistemology and Belief Revision,” Philosophical Studies, 2006, vol. 128, no. 1, pp.  93–108; BonJour Laurence, “Knowledge and Justification, Coherence Theory of.” In Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol.5, Edward Craig (ed.), New York: Routledge, 1998, pp. 253–259. 7  Baldacchino Godfrey & Anders Wivel, “Small States: Concepts and Theories” in G. Baldacchino & A. Wivel (eds.), Handbook on the Politics of Small States, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2020, p. 7 (pp. 2–19). Regarding the view of the weaker factor in asymmetric relations see also: Wivel Anders, Bailes J.K.  Alysson & Archer Clive, “Setting the scene: Small States and International Security” in C. Archer, A.J.K. Bailes & A. Wivel (eds.), Small States and International Security: Europe and Beyond, London: Routledge, 2014, p. 9 (pp. 3–25). 5

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“small states” typically find themselves as the weaker party in asymmetric relationships, unable to change the power configuration and its institutional expression. The definition aims to offer a complete interpretation of the term since it presents a two-­ level analysis, one relating to the domestic condition of the state and the other one to its international status. An additional approach asserts that “small states” attract most of the challenges in the international arena thanks to their relatively insignificant size.8 This rather normative approach, which does not present a clear quantitative or qualitative definition of what “small” actually is, posits the “small state” as the lighting conductor in the international system. This perpetually challenging condition results from the high vulnerability that “small states” [sic] seem to express in their daily interactions with other state or nonstate actors. What makes this approach engaging is its implied Hobbesian essence, admitting that a “small state” is either a punching bag or a sitting duck in the ever-troubled waters of the international pond. In their edited volume about “small states,” Baldur Thorhallsson and Sverrir Steinsson define “small states” as states that seek the shelter provided by larger states, owing to their economic and political fragility.9 Other advocates of the “Small States Theory” focus their analysis exclusively on the economic capacity of a state, proposing financial vulnerability as the main criterion for differentiating a “small state” from the rest. David Vital, one of the first to argue for Small States Theory,10 refers to the material inequality of states as the determining factor between small and not small, and others have followed in his wake.11 Lino Brigugllio holds that the basic criterion for determining a “small state” is its economic capacity to withstand or bounce back from external shocks.12 In this case, the size of a state is determined by its decision-making processes in times of crisis. Matthew Louis Bishop, in an article that I found very absorbing, presents another dimension of small states, the legal and economic damage that these elements suffer as a result of the direct competition of international actors.13 He offered the example of the Banana War between

 Cooper F.  Andrew & Shaw M.  Timothy, “The Diplomacies of Small States at the start of the twenty-first century: How vulnerable? How resilient?” in A.F.  Cooper & T.M.  Shaw, The Diplomacies of Small States: Between Vulnerability and Resilience, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009; Maass Matthias, Small States in World Politics: The story of Small States Survival, 1648–2016, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2017; Sarapuu Kulli & Randma Liiv Tiina, “Small States: Public Management and Policy Making” in G.  Baldacchino & A.  Wivel (eds.), op. cit., pp. 55–69. 9  Thorhallsson Baldur & Steinsson Sverrir, “A Theory of Shelter” in B. Thorhallsson (ed.), Small States and Shelter Theory: Iceland’s External Affairs, London, 2019, pp. 24–58. 10  Vital David, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small in International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967. 11  Rickli Jean – Marc & Almezaini S. Khalid, “Theories of Small States’ foreign and security policies” in K.S. Almezaini & J M Rickli (eds.), The Small Gulf States: Foreign and Security Policies before and after the Arab Spring, London: Routledge, 2020, pp. 8–30. 12  Briguglio, L., Cordina, G., Vella, S. and Vigilance, C. (eds), Profiling Vulnerability and Resilience: A Manual for Small States, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2010. 13  Bishop Matthew Louis, “The Political Economy of Small States: Enduring Vulnerability,” Review of International Political Economy, 2012, vol. 19, no.5, pp. 942–960. 8

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the USA and the EU and the consequent collapse of the banana industry in St. Lucia and St. Vincent in Dominica. According to Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw,14 small states are those elements that exhibit an extrovert attitude in the international environment, aiming at external cooperation for interstate communication, domestic development, security, and technology. Evidently, this extrovert attitude results from the constant insecurity felt by small states and the internal urge to minimize external risks by exercising constant mobility to achieve as much socialization as possible in the international environment. For Naren Prasad, certain variables define a small state since there is no unanimously accepted definition, such as the size of the population, GDP, land area, and volume of trade. Yet Prasad ascribes greater importance to the population factor, reminding us all, agnostics or true believers of the cult of Smallness, that the Commonwealth Secretariat and the World Bank proposed a single standard to recognize a “small state” for those sovereign entities with a population of 1.5 million inhabitants or below.15 Donna Lee,16 however, considers small countries to be those with a population under 14 million, with economies heavily dependent on a single commodity. De Wijk17 argues that the main characteristic of “small states” is their inability to project power away from the narrow zone of their regional geostrategic interests. Rayemaeker18 considers “small states” to be those thirsty for security and generally adopt a defensive stance. Nevertheless, most of the analysts consider “small states” to be those elements in the international arena with either a small population (the precise number differs from analyst to analyst19), a small territory (without again agreeing on a specific figure20), or a fragile economy and limited military capacity.21 From all the above, it is evident that it is fruitless trying to assess all the definitions related to the so-called Small States Theory, thanks to their large numbers, especially since not even the theory advocates agree on the fundamental question. What defines a “small state”? This revealing lack of consistency, characteristic of every approach with a profound lack of a theoretical core, such as Constructivism in  Cooper F. Andrew & Shaw M. Timothy, op.cit., p. 3.  Prasad Naren, “Small but Smart: Small states in the Global system” in A.F. Cooper & T.M. Shaw (eds.), op. cit., p. 44 (pp. 41–64). 16  Lee Donna, “Bringing an Elephant into the Room: Small African State Diplomacy in the WTO” in A.F. Cooper & T.M. Shaw (eds.), op. cit., p. 197 (pp. 195–206). 17  De Wijk Rob, “Security Implications of NATO Transformation for Smaller Members” in Setälä M. (ed.), Small States and NATO, Atlantic Council of Finland, pp. 17–23. 18  De Raeymaeker Omer, “Introduction” in Raeymaeker, O.D., W.  Andries, L.  Crollen, H.  De Fraye, and F.  Govaerts (eds.), Small Powers in Alignment. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1974, p. 18. 19  Charles Eugenia Dame et  al., A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 1997. 20  Hanggi Heiner, “Small State as a Third State: Switzerland and Asia – Europe Interregionalism” in Goetschel L (ed), Small States Inside and Outside the European Union: Interests and Policies, Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, p. 81 (79–95). 21  East A. Maurice, “Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models,” World Politics, 1975, vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 556–576. 14 15

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International Relations, reveals a conceptual weakness that directly affects the fundamentals of discussion of “small states” too. In the following paragraphs, I will examine why all these definitions apply to states that are not “small” in any shape or form.

Beyond the Small States Theory One might conclude from all the above definitions that “small states” are all weak, but this is not necessarily accurate. Let us consider China during the 100 years of its period of humiliation.22 Between 1839 and 1949, China lost every major or minor war it engaged in against the Western powers and Japan, jeopardizing its territorial status. It was an administrative caricature of its glorious past and a puppet of Britain in international affairs. Who can claim that China back then was a “small state”? Yet still, it had developed and fully assimilated all the characteristics of a weak state in an unconscious mode of a traumatic inferiority complex. Thus, it is apparent that a vast country like China may act as a weak player in the international arena for an extended period thanks to its failing leadership, poorly equipped army, fragile economy, collapsing society, etc. Does this make it a “small state”? Of course not. Instead, this weakening process turns it into a failing or a failed state for as long as its sociopolitical, military, and economic decay endures. Moreover, a so-called small state may act in the international arena as a highly successful example of statehood, with a leading economy, enlightened leadership, undisputed national unity, and a thriving economy. Is Norway a “small state” from the point of view of weakness? Clearly not; it has been anything but weak since the end of the 1990s up until today. During its 100 years of humiliation, was China a “small state” compared to Norway? From the point of view of weakness, it certainly was. If this is confusing, there is more confusion to come. The idea that a “small state” can be identified from the many systemic challenges it faces is equally mistaken, given the realities of international politics. First, functioning as a systemic lightning rod cannot be measured quantitatively. In other words, how many annual challenges make a state entitled to be characterized as small? [sic] If this quantitative approach were admissible, we would see that the number of challenges a state faces may result from various political and economic factors, such as geography, natural resources, and diplomatic choices. The number of challenges does not determine the state’s smallness. Thus, this approach would be more helpful if we considered the question from a qualitative point of view. It might make better sense to assert that a state is “small” when its existential  Wang Zheng, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations, New York: Columbia University Press, 2012, pp. 71–94. Regarding the influence of that period in the contemporary Chinese mainstream way of thinking, see the fascinating analysis of Callahan A.  William, China: The Pessoptimist Nation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. 22

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challenges threaten its very survival. However, a well-known example demonstrates that things are not conventionally simple: the stand-off between Melos and Athens in Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. Melos is a minor element in the Aegean Sea, in alliance with Athens’ main opponent, Sparta. Athens sends its mighty fleet against Melos, demanding to abandon Sparta and join its alliance. The normative approach of the qualitative dimension of challenges is that Melos faces an existential threat from the hegemonic power of Athens. Therefore, Melos is a “small state.” Suppose Melos rejects the Athenian proposal, which it did, and is subsequently defeated, which it was. In that case, the polity will be wiped from the international map, and its citizens will face either death or slavery. This is indeed what happened to Melos when it rejected the Athenian ultimatum.23 After all, Athens’s city-state was notorious for its cruelty toward anyone who did not comply with its demands. However, I would argue that Athens faced the same existential threat. Since the dawn of time, it has been the case that a great power will suffer a critical blow to its prestige and ultimately to its international status if it does not succeed in imposing its own will, either through soft or hard power. Other states begin to question, publicly or privately, the actual primacy of the great power, while other antagonists begin to test the waters by openly challenging the latter’s prestige and status in the international arena. The increase in resistance to the great power generates systemic volatility, which sharpens predatory instincts in its rivals, leading to violent incidents in which the great power is directly or indirectly involved. Every questioning of the great power’s prestige leads to a weakening of its status. An example of this was the change in the status of the USA since the end of the Cold War when it emerged victorious after a long period of friction with the USSR and its satellites. No state dared challenge the USA’s wish to proceed with NATO enlargement and the accession of not only all former members of the Warsaw Pact but also the Baltic Republics, which had previously been part of the Soviet Union. Today, however, a large number of states, such as Turkey, Iran, Russia, and China, and Muslim fundamentalists, like ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, have challenged American predominance in the light of Washington’s feeble reaction to the Arab Spring and (later) the re-emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan. It has become clear that this challenge can also have existential significance for great power since questioning its predominance can open a Pandora’s Box of challenges to its status or security. The fate of Athens in the Peloponnesian War, Carthage in the Third Punic War, or the Soviet Union between the demise of the Warsaw Pact in 1989 and its demise in 1991 openly contradicts the view that only so-called small states face existential challenges. The international domain is a minefield where a seven-foot NBA player is daily facing the same potential threats as a dwarf warrior, a ballet dancer, or a Sunderland’s dock worker. At the same time, they all try to secure survival, protect their prestige, and maintain a sustainable level of living conditions with the means they are equipped with or by socialization, brinkmanship, etc. Of

 Seaman G. Michael, “The Athenian Expedition to Melos in 416 B.C.,” Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 1997, vol. 46, no. 4, pp. 385–418. 23

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course, one could justifiably argue that the fate of the Soviet Union was not as dire as that of, say, Carthage, but this is chiefly because the failing USSR still controlled the mighty Soviet nuclear arsenal, as well as the fact that unlike Rome, the USA wished to be seen as a benevolent hegemon. By extension, it could be argued that Great Powers face greater challenges than so-called small states. First, the competition they face is more challenging than the rest of the other states, mainly because Great Powers have more to lose in the case of a defeat. Thus, they attract different predators in the international system, contributing to the quantitative and sometimes qualitative challenges they face. Second, the systemic structure constantly forces the Great Powers to question the existing international status quo, as John Mearsheimer brilliantly describes in his monumental work The Tragedy of the Great Powers. The idea that “the bigger you are, the safer you will be” is not as true today as it would have been during the Dark Ages, for example (or vice versa). Baldur Thorvaldsen’s approach is fascinating, I have to admit. “Small states” seek shelter; thus, they decide to bandwagon,24 under the protective shadow of the Great Powers. However, no matter how solid this approach is, it has to be said that it is not only so-called “small states” that seek shelter from the perils of the international arena, but almost every state in the international system  – including even Great Powers. The only difference is that while “normal” states seek shelter under the wings of a Great Power, the latter seeks it among “normal” states. Let us consider the main reason for forming an alliance. For a Great Power, it is vital not to balance the threat or equally to balance the power of an emerging, possibly revisionist, power but to confirm its primacy. This can be done by imposing its will through force or coercion or promoting bandwagoning under its protective, probably oppressive, shadow as a concealed ultimatum. In international politics, cooperation, or even alliance, can frequently be achieved through coercion. As Thomas Schelling argues, coercive force gives the appearance of offering a choice about compliance. Still, submitting or being ready to accept the consequences is a question.25 Yet, this is just one side of the coin. Let's take a step back from normative rhetoric about imperialistic powers and tyrants or sovereigns and look at the cruel reality of the international arena. We can recognize the fundamental need of every Great Power to take shelter in the willingness of other states to come under its banner, whether this is achieved by coercion or attraction. No hegemon can exist without subjects, and those who are prepared to face the music without first making sure that they have  About bandwagoning, see Waltz Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, Long Grove: Waveland Press, 1979, p. 126; Walt M. Stephen, “Alliance Formation in Southwest Asia: Balancing and Bandwagoning in Cold War Competition” in Robert Jervis & Jack Snyder (eds.), Dominoes and Bandwagons: Strategic Beliefs and Great Power Competition in the Eurasian Rimland, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991; Glaser L.  Charles, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010, p. 89. 25  Schelling C.  Tomas, Arms and Influence, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966 pp.  3–4; Mattern Jannice Bially, “Why ‘soft power’ isn’t so soft: Representation Force and Attraction in Word Politics” in Felix Berenskoetter & M. J. Williams (eds.), Power in World Politics, New York & Abingdon: Routledge, 2007, pp. 110–111. 24

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fortified their presence on the front line of the international arena by placing around themselves allies and partners will inevitably face the cruel reality of international politics: defeat, collapse, demise. In other words, every state in the international arena is seeking a place of shelter. This is to reinforce its survival prospects for a normal state, while, for a Great Power, it is to maximize or reassert its influence and might in the international arena. The argument for defining a “small state” based on financial vulnerability is also popular, though much less well-structured than the basis of the shelter case. According to this approach, a “small state” is economically fragile; smallness is synonymous with deficiency. Indeed, states with fragile economies play a nonpositive role in international developments, mainly because they cannot influence global developments, whether positively or negatively. However, economically fragile states can also be states that play an influential role in international politics. Turkey, for example, was for 19 years in debt to the IMF. Its economy is still between a rock and a hard place.26 At the same time, Britain was forced to abandon the Suez campaign against Egypt after the White House explicitly warned that it would stop baling out the weakened British economy, with the dire consequences that would entail.27 Can Turkey or Britain be labeled as “small states”? Of course not. Therefore, financial vulnerability is not an objective criterion of whether a state is “small” or not, as many examples attest. If economic fragility is a characteristic of a “small state,” then what do we make of the eco-financial structures of Nigeria, with the largest population in Africa, compared with those of a wealthy country like Luxembourg, which has less than a million inhabitants? Or of Bangladesh (with a population of 165 million) compared with Norway (5.5 million)? Many similar examples demonstrate that economic fragility does not determine what a “small state” really is. Last but not least, the idea that the small suffer from the misadventures of the big reminds me of Aesop’s well-known fable of the frogs and the fighting bulls. The story is as follows. Two frogs, one young and one old and wise, are watching two bulls fighting. The old one expresses his concern about what they are witnessing, while the young one does not understand his concern. The old frog warns that whichever bull loses will be forced to retreat to the reeds of the marsh where the frogs live, resulting in the frogs being trampled into the mud. The young frog arrogantly dismisses the old frog’s fears until the beaten bull is driven into the marsh, and the frogs are crushed under its big hoofs. This tale seems to offer a more accurate definition of so-called small states. In the international system, the small suffer from the consequences of the collision with the big. If this is the case, the continuing rivalry between the three great powers now competing at the center of the  Onis Ziya & Barry Rubin (eds.), The Turkish Economy in Crisis, London, Frank Cass, 2003; you may also hear the well-produced podcast by Bruegel, with Maria Demertzis, Elina Ribakova and Refet Gurkaynak discussing the structural problems of the Turkish economy today: https://www. bruegel.org/2022/01/turkeys-economic-struggles/. 27  Litsas N.  Spyridon, US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Power Politics and Ideology Under the Sun, Geneva & New York, Springer, 2020, pp. 75. 26

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international arena will inevitably lead to negative consequences for every other state. This is a normative rather than an analytical argument since it brings the comparative dimension to the surface of this discussion of small states. An International Relations theorist might argue that the amount of suffering indicates the “smallness” of a state, but this argument should be closely scrutinized. In the case of conflict between Great Powers, especially when one or more protagonists collapse, the international structure will enter a long and painful phase of fundamental reconstruction. In this case, however, who suffers the most? The “small,” in any way this is defined in the international system, or those state actors who, independently of their size, were more closely connected with the defeated elements and have fewer alternatives for ensuring survival without their support? Hypothetically, let us assume that the US collapses under coordinated diplomatic and military pressure by Russia and China. Which state will be more affected by this development? Bulgaria or Germany? I argue that Germany will be much more negatively impacted, despite being a much “bigger” state than Bulgaria, and it will be harder to recover from this structural change in the international balance of power than the latter. This is due to the much greater interdependency between Berlin and Washington than between Sofia and Washington. I argue that it is not the size of the state that determines whether it will suffer from a change in the systemic paradigm that results from conflict between the Great Powers. It is the amount of asymmetric interdependency28 that exists between it and a Great Power. Thus, I argue that asymmetric interdependency is not simply a diplomatic choice of the weaker element that defines its route in the international system. On the contrary, it is the result of poor decision-making by this state, failing or neglecting to apply an effective self-help policy29 in cases where systemic volatility demands that every participant accepts responsibility for their actions for an undefined period. A state’s failure to develop an efficient self-­ help policy obliges it to be asymmetrically interdependent with a Big Power, with its fortunes conditional on the latter’s status. Let us consider the case of the Ottoman Empire. During the last phase of its life, 1871–1914, the Ottoman Empire was asymmetrically interdependent with Kaiser Wilhelm’s Germany, which was because

 Asymmetric interdependence is the unlimited power of one state over another, usually through the control of its domestic economic life, defense, and politics, in a dyadic relationship in the international system. In this relationship, the dependent element adds to the power and the prestige of the Great Power by admitting its weakness of surviving away from its shadow. For an archetypical asymmetric interdependence relation in the twenty-first century, see Greece  – the USA; Belarus – Russia; the EU – the USA; Canada – the USA; Hezbollah – Iran; Turkey – Russia after the failed coup d’état in the former in 2016 et al. See among others Onis Ziya & Yilmaz Suhnaz, “Turkey and Russia in a shifting global order: Cooperation. Conflict and Asymmetric Interdependence in a turbulent region,” Third World Quarterly, 2016, vol. 37, no.1, pp. 71–95. For the theoretical roots of Asymmetric Interdependence, see Keohane O. Robert & Nye S. Joseph, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1977. 29  Mearsheimer, op.cit, pp.  32–33. See also the approach that defines self-help in our times by defining the broader aspect of the term through the analysis of the internal and the external efforts a state should do in order to enhance its survival prospects in Waltz, op.  cit., pp.  105–107, 111–114, 118. 28

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Germany, once it had secured a dominant place on the international scene, was eagerly exploring every opportunity to expand its influence whenever possible. At the same time, Britain, after the Sublime Porte became bankrupt in 1875, decided to withdraw from Ottoman affairs.30 When Germany collapsed on the battlefields of the Great War, the Ottoman Empire followed its path to extinction. No one could argue that the Ottoman Empire was a “small state,” yet it suffered the same fate as the two frogs in the marsh. Therefore, the suffering of certain states caused by rivalry between the Great Powers cannot simply be attributed to the fact that they are “small states” but rather to their failure to develop their self-help policies and their choice to rely on a policy of asymmetrical interdependence. When the champion collapses, the footmen will follow.

Beyond Small States Theory First, it is crucial to clarify the following: I do not support the view that only the Great Powers play a significant negative or positive role in international developments.31 On the contrary, I concur with Randal Schweller’s refined analysis in “Bandwagoning for Profit”32 and the pivotal role that other states besides Great Powers may play in the evolution of the systemic balance of power. I have to admit that I find it fascinating that a normal (in other words non-Great) power may have the capacity, the intelligence, the appetite, or even the nerve to look the giants of the international system straight in the eye and try to prove that quality can come before quantity. While most people believe that the “giant” does whatever it wishes to in the international system, history gives many examples that prove this idea wrong. While generally, the “giants” dominate the “dwarfs,” it is the case that more often than one might imagine, the “dwarfs” manage to turn the game around. The Greco-­ Italian War of 1940–41, the First Indochina War of 1946–54, the Vietnam War of 1955–75, and the Algerian War of 1954–62 are a few of the many cases that prove that the biblical myth of David’s victory over Goliath is not so distant from the realities of international politics, under specific conditions of course. For a normal state to achieve this, it needs (among other things) skillful leadership, national unity, and a good sense of the so-called political momentum. For example, when two or more

 For more on this subject, see the very interesting doctorate dissertation of Illich Stefan Niles, German Imperialism in the Ottoman Empire: A Comparative Study, Texas A&M University, 2007 http://oaktrust.library.tamu.edu/bitstream/handle/1969.1/ETD-TAMU-2078/ILLICHDISSERTATION.pdf?sequence=1. 31  For an interesting analysis of this specific direction, see, among others, Bernstein Steven, “The absence of great power responsibility in global environmental politics,” European Journal of International Relations, 2020, vol. 26, no.1, pp. 8–32; Van der Putten Frans-Paul, Jan Rood, Minke Meijnders, Great Powers and Global Stability, The Hague: Clingendael, 2016. 32  Schweller l. Randall, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back-in,” International Security, 1994, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 72–107. 30

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Great Powers are dueling over a region and a regional power decides to ally itself with one of the contenders and contribute to the final result of the duel, this is a sign that this specific state has a good understanding of political momentum. Consider the example of the Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule during World War I. The fact that a united Arab State from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen was not established after the war was not because Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, the Sharif and Emir of Mecca, was unaware of the political momentum; it was thanks to the colonial policies of London and Paris. If the leadership of a normal state plays its cards right, then its role in the region may be key and thus secured. From the pivotal role of Corinth during the Peloponnesian War to that of Greece in southeastern Europe during the Cold War or of the United Arab Emirates in the Arab Gulf in the twenty-first century, international developments clearly show that political choices and practices count more than size in the way the international arena works. In addition, it is important to remember the pivotal role of the unexpected. The case of the COVID-19 pandemic clearly shows that when a “black swan”33 enters the international arena, the size of states counts for little or nothing. Singapore, one of the most successful paradigms in confronting the pandemic, offers an interesting example, as does the pivotal role the United Arab Emirates has played in distributing medical aid to neighboring states that had difficulty responding effectively to the catastrophic consequences of the pandemic. Comparing the success of Singapore or the UAE with the collapse in India during the COVID-19 pandemic spike in the spring of 2021 confirms that size is of limited significance when rare or unforeseen events occur in international politics. I will examine the role of the UAE during the COVID-19 pandemic in greater detail in other chapters of this book. Still, for now, it is sufficient to say that this example clearly shows that normal states with talented leadership and an effective crisis management apparatus can play a pivotal role in international affairs.

Comparison Between the States So far, I have argued that there is no small state, mainly by highlighting the inconsistencies of the advocates of the Small States Theory. However, another aspect of the inadequacy of the theory is revealed through a quantitative evaluation of states. Allow me to offer you an example. What is Greece compared to Russia, China, Australia, or the USA? Greece is smaller in size and population than all the above. What is Greece compared with Albania, Malta, Bulgaria, or Moldova? The answer is straightforward: It is more prominent in size and population than all. However, the argument becomes more interesting when we compare them from a qualitative point of view. What is Greece compared to Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen, or Somalia? In  For more regarding the role of rare and unpredictable events in international politics, see Taleb Nicholas Nassim, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New  York: Random House, 2007. 33

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population and size, Greece is smaller than the above. Internationally, however, Greece enjoys greater power than they do. Why is this? Greece is a European Union and NATO member and enjoys undisputed political stability and national unity. In contrast, Nigeria, Ukraine, Yemen, and Somalia, for differing reasons, are fragile or failed states. Therefore, if one asks which is the more significant state regarding political, economic, or military clout, the answer is multifaceted but straightforward: Greece. In International Relations Theory, academics, diplomats, politicians, and analysts constantly compare one state with another, consciously or unconsciously. Thus, nothing is static in International Relations Theory; everything is relative and depends on comparing A to B, and so on. This lack of static ontology is one of the fascinating aspects of International Relations Theory. Therefore, the USA is not a Great Power, even though that is what we call it! It is a greater power than Russia or China. Haiti is not a “small state”: It is smaller than Albania or Chile. How can this be proven, either theoretically or empirically? Power is the primary and ultimate comparative element in the systemic framework. As Robert Dahl argues about power comparability, “…it is reasonable to define the power of A as greater than the power of B if, with respect to the remaining variables, the responses associated with A’s acts are greater than the responses associated with B’s acts.”34 A state is constantly setting itself alongside one or more other states, measuring its capacity of hard, soft, and economic power compared to the others. This comparative procedure is not the result of a preset agenda. It is a structural process that derives from the international system’s architecture. States constantly compete with other states in the international environment. As Michael Mazarr and others argue about these kinds of competitive relations between states, “In the context of international relations, competition can be understood as a state of antagonistic relations short of direct armed conflict between actors, which reflects the three basic distinguishing factors…: perceived contention, an effort to gain mutual advantage, and pursuit of some outcome or good that is not generally available. This implies a common pursuit of power, influence, prosperity, and status at the same time when others are also seeking those things and when supply is limited.”35 Constant rivalry prompts the comparison of states with other states in the region or at an international level if they are a world power. In addition, this perpetual comparison between states takes place in the empirical knowledge that the survival of states is a daily Herculean task and not the result of a Deus ex Machina to the benefit of some states and the detriment of others. On any given day, states must strive hard, work harder, and sometimes fight strenuously to ensure survival. Moreover, it is equally painfully clear that, in the international system, the concept of power is not inexhaustible in its material form. Sources of power are assets that states have to struggle hard for, but also  Dahl A.  Robert, “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral Science, 1957, vol. 2, no.3, p.  206: (201–215). 35  Mazaar J.  Michael et  al., “Understanding the Emerging Era of International Competition: Theoretical and Historical Perspectives,” Rand Corporation, 2018, p. 3 https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR2700/RR2726/RAND_RR2726.pdf. 34

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intelligently and effectively, to incorporate security into the nation’s core or obtain new ones. Power can be understood theoretically only through direct comparison with another state, and size is insignificant in this comparison. Only qualitative characteristics are crucial. For example, Holland is smaller than Greece in size but is stronger economically and more stable from a societal point of view. As a result, Holland enjoys greater prestige than Greece internationally despite being smaller than Greece in size. However, both are smaller than Canada, not only in territorial size or population but also in hard and soft power and economic leverage. If any analysis within the framework of International Relations Theory is a continuous process of comparison between two or more states (unless the focus remains purely on domestic issues), it could be asked why states do not also resolve their differences in international politics through direct comparison. Why do states resort to war, brinkmanship, coercion, etc., when a direct comparison between two competing states can determine which side must step down? This, after all, is a domain where the weak suffer what they must while the strong do what they will. Why, for example, don’t Greece and Turkey resolve the question of sovereignty in the Aegean Sea by comparing their hard, soft, economic, and sharp power? Such an approach would allow geopolitics to enjoy a genuine period of Kantian peace for the first time. Sadly, however, I cannot share this Utopian approach, as I do not believe the premise it is based on. Not only because such a process would de jure transform the international arena into a Hobbesian terrain, where the most powerful enjoyed undisputed primacy without even having to test it, but also because it is impossible to calculate with any accuracy the element of immaterial power held by each state or to forecast how a state will put the advantage it enjoys on paper into practical effect. After all, as has already been argued above, the concept of power in International Relations is purely contextual, offering a state less richly endowed in natural resources, for example, the possibility of nonetheless putting together an efficient foreign policy. In the opposite case, Britain would have remained forever a marginalized entity off the west coast of Europe. At the same time, the Mughal Empire would have continued to be the imperium where the sun never set. Things are never as normative as this in the international environment. As Tanguy Struye de Swielande and Dorothee Vandamme argue, “Power is above all contextual; for example, detaining nuclear weapons does not imply an increase in the economic influence of a country. The fact that power is characterised by material and immaterial components does not mean that all power’s determinants have the same value or significance, but none can claim alone to determine alone a nation’s degree of influence; it is enabled by their correlation.”36 The immaterial components of each state’s power are those elements, which, even if they cannot be seen by the naked eye or even evaluated quantitatively, still influence how the state addresses the challenges that confront it. The immaterial components of power can only be assessed  De Swielande S.T & Vandamme Dorothee, “Power in International Relations: Modernising Holsti in the 21st Century,” in S.T. de Swielnade & Dorothee Vandamme (eds.), Power in the 21st Century: Determinants and Contours, Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, 2015, p. 16: (pp. 9–27). 36

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through the personally preferred qualitative process and be constantly compared with the immaterial power of other states that inhabit the same region or compete for the same geostrategic or geoeconomic objectives. Nevertheless, what immaterial elements can only be defined through a qualitative analysis based on a comparison process? By way of an answer, I will use an example I have already referred to that of Greece and Turkey. Comparing the two nations quantitatively, Turkey is bigger than Greece. It has a larger population, larger armed forces, larger GDP, and larger tax revenues, etc.; nevertheless, a comparison between the ontological weight and size of the two states has to take a more complex and thorough direction. Why is this? Because population size is less significant than the degree of national unity felt by the country’s citizens. National unity cannot be accurately calculated using only quantitative criteria: It needs to be evaluated from a qualitative point of view as well, during a crisis, focusing on issues such as the “rally round the flag” effect, as it will be discussed later on. Moreover, population size is not as crucial as societal happiness. A large but disgruntled population is worth little compared with a smaller, more contented population ready to stand up to any challenge to preserve its way of life. If Greece and Turkey are compared according to this criterion, then Greece is clearly in a much more favorable position than Turkey, despite their relative size. National unity is much more robust in Greece since Turkey has problematic relations with a large part of the country’s significant Kurdish minority37 and with the sizeable Alevi community.38 Additionally, since neither Greece nor Turkey is nuclear power, the size of the Armed Forces is not vital to deciding who is smaller or bigger in this complex geostrategic equation. What matters are the state of Army morale, their training and preparedness level, and the technological level of their military hardware. Again, Greece fares better in this qualitative comparison, especially after the failed coup d’état in Turkey in 2016 and everything that followed to undermine the prestige of the Turkish Army and its once undisputed primacy in Turkish politics.39 It is clear that when the analysis is not quantitative, not every conventionally large state will retain its dominant position. Immaterial aspects of a state’s power are those elements related to societal morale, the people’s skills, national prestige, the expertise of its political elite, etc. These cannot be assessed the same way as the number of aircraft in the national air force. Imagine a navy with a technologically advanced fleet but with low morale or

 See among others Candar Cengiz, Turkey’s Mission Impossible: War and Peace with the Kurds, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2020. 38  Fliche Benoit, “The Narcissism of the Minor Difference and Religious Violence: The case of the Alevis and Sunnis of Central Anatolia” in Gilles Dorronsoro & Olivier Grojean (eds.), Identity Conflict and Politics in Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, pp. 23–44. 39  Gabriele Aristide, “The Turkish Army has lost its Lustre,” OrientXXI, 24 November 2021 https:// orientxxi.info/magazine/question-mark-over-the-turkish-army-s-place-in-politics,5202. 37

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poorly trained officers and sailors. It will not perform well in a clash with a less developed naval force with higher morale or training. History offers many examples, including the technologically advanced Red Army, which in the 1980s could not defeat the highly motivated Mujahideen in Afghanistan in guerilla warfare.

Conclusion In this chapter, I have argued that the term small states is imprecise because of the way the international system is structured and because of the controversial process of comparing states according to their military power, economic strength, or territorial size. My central thesis in this chapter is that in the international system, rather than simply “small” and “big” states, there are, in fact, “smaller” and “bigger” states, a distinction that underlines the comparative aspect of power. But again, as I will argue in the next chapter, this approach is normative and old-fashioned. The complexity of the multipolar world in the twenty-first century; the technological advances in artificial intelligence that have opened a new chapter in human evolution; the current multidimensionally impenetrable diplomatic functioning of states; the ever-changing effective leadership theory; and the very role of the state in an international system that is balanced between the eras of truth and post-truth and, of course, between modernism and postmodernism. All of these aspects produce a new, challenging, and at the same time, lethal environment for “smaller” or “bigger” entities. These are outdated terms with a diminishing role in labeling a state as strong or weak, as a potential success or an expected failure. Therefore, in the next chapter, a new approach will be made to the current term “Smart Power,” proposing a series of criteria to understand this term. After all, a smart state succeeds in the daily business of international politics, while a state that does not behave smartly will fail. The only comparative element in the latter category is that there are states that have failed and states that are in the process of failing. However, the distance between a failed or failing state and a smart state is the same as the distance covered by Dante when he went from Hell to Purgatory and then to Paradise. No real comparison can be made between these elements: Only the policy components distinguish a smart state from a nonsmart one. This will be the main focus of the analysis in the following chapter.

Chapter 2

Smart Instead of Small: Which Are the Different Variables That Make a State Act Smart?

Some even go so far as to say that the Argives first invited the Persians to invade Greece, because of their ill success in the war with, Lacedaemon, since they preferred anything to the smart of their actual sufferings. Thus much concerning the Argives. (Herodotus, The Histories)

Introduction In this chapter, I will set out what is meant by “Smart States Theory,” with a detailed analysis of the different elements that promote the smart functioning of states in international politics. First, however, it is important, for both theory and practice, to give a general definition of what the term “smart” means. At the risk of sounding like an all-time cliché, let us start at the very beginning. Dinosaurs were the dominant creatures on our planet for almost 179 million years. They were indeed big, but they were not very smart. They failed to adjust to the change in natural conditions during the Cretaceous period1 and thus gave the most evident proof that size in itself is not enough to guarantee survival or prosperity. Let us take another example. A much smaller but highly resilient creature, the best-­ known member of the Blattodea order of insects, is the visually repellent cockroach, yet scientists have determined that a cockroach can easily survive the intense radiation fallout produced by a nuclear weapon, as was verified at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. This, however, is thanks to the cockroach’s biology and not its intellect. The fact is that despite its small size, a cockroach arouses such disgust in humans that everyday acts of atrocity are committed against them using chemicals or other

 Condamine L. Fabien, Guinot Guillaume & Currie J. Philip, “Dinosaur Biodiversity declined well before the asteroid impact, influenced by ecological and environmental pressures,” Nature Communications, 2021, vol.12 https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-021-23754-0 1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5_2

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lethal means. Cockroaches are tiny and endowed by nature with the ability to survive a nuclear attack. Still, they are not smart enough to change their repellent appearance and gain humans’ sympathy. Both dinosaurs and cockroaches are victims of the inability to overcome the limitations nature has imposed on them. Humans, unlike dinosaurs or cockroaches, have since the dawn of time tried to defend themselves unceasingly from the hazards of the natural world, improve the way they live, refine or conceal their Hobbesian inclination to be Homo Homini Lupus, and develop sophisticated ways of organizing themselves collectively. As a matter of fact, human history is an unending story, whether reported or not, of humankind’s attempt to test and escape from our Hobbesian condition, depending on the environment in which we live. As Hobbes argues in Leviathan, “For all men are by nature provided of notable multiplying glasses, (that is their passions and self-love) through which, every little payment appeareth a great grievance; but are destitute of those prospective glasses (namely moral and civil science) to see afar off the miseries that hang over them, and cannot without such payments be avoided.”2 We humans have directly challenged our biological limitations and those of nature too. We have tamed Mother Earth, learned how to rule the waves, and constantly improved the physics behind our mastery of the air. We are by far the most intelligent and gifted creatures that have appeared on this planet – so uncompromisingly that we will probably become extinct due to the toxic effect our hubristic faith in our abilities has had – on ourselves and our surroundings, in a self-destructive normative process. The obvious conclusion to be drawn from this is that humans are not big in size, and they do not have DNA capable of withstanding nuclear radiation. Still, we have pushed the word “evolution” as far as it can go by acting smart and trying to understand and control our natural surroundings and the laws regulating human activity. The compelling myth of Prometheus and his decision to defy the will of gods and bring the gift of fire to humankind exemplifies man’s unchanging impulse to transcend all physical or metaphysical limits. Prometheus risked the gods’ wrath, suffering cruel punishment for all eternity. His goal was to improve the daily lives of his fellow humans, who (according to the myth) had been living in terrible conditions, in darkness, and in total ignorance.3 Cogito, ergo sum: Descartes’ axiom is synonymous with human existence. The essential purpose of thinking is to question everything, including yourself. Questioning leads one to defy nature’s limitations on one’s existence. This results primarily in the willingness and the capacity to achieve self-improvement. To go a step further demands sacrifice. According to another Greek myth, Icarus lost his life due to his natural, hubristic curiosity while giving humans the knowledge that flying too close to the Sun is fatal. I would argue that being “smart” is the willingness to recognize and challenge one’s weaknesses and strive for self-improvement. Whether

 Hobbes Thomas, Leviathan, ed. by J.C.A Gaskin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 122.  See the masterly translation of James Scully and C. John Herrington of Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975. 2 3

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this is successful or not is of no fundamental importance as long as failure does not stop you from aiming higher each time you make a new attempt to do better. The effort to transcend yourself makes progress possible, facilitating a slow but essential pioneering process. While Ancient Athens, one of the two great powers of the Ancient Greek world, ostracized whoever attracted power and glory and was therefore considered a threat to the domestic balance of power by the Ekklesia, the Athenian citizens’ assembly, Athens’ main rival Sparta followed the opposite course. Individual or collective progress was closely aligned with the ontological existence of the city-state, promoting a new way of developing in the political and military context of the time. Characteristically, during the famous annual festival of the Gymnopaedia in Sparta, the following lyrical dialogue between the three male generations of the city-state was sung in public. The first circle consisted of veterans, who sang with pride of their valiant deeds on the field of honor “We once did deeds of prowess, and we were robust young men.” The second circle, made up of serving soldiers, praised the glory that Sparta presently enjoyed thanks to their efforts on the battlefield “We are here now, try us if you like.” In reply came the song of a third circle of adolescents receiving their initial military training during that time: “We will become mightier men than both.”4 Athens was defeated by Sparta in the Peloponnesian War. Although it was the Athenians who built the Parthenon, the unsurpassed wonder of architectural symmetry, it is also true that they did not hesitate publicly to denounce Pericles, the Athenian political leader of the time, for fraud. They also expelled Phidias, the famous sculptor, painter, and architect, for the same reason. When Sparta defeated the Athenians in 404 BCE, it not only preserved the Parthenon but also maintained the site’s glory during the period when Athens was under its military control. The desire for progress always pays off and makes society more resilient in the face of new challenges, especially if you continue to set high standards as a society. In general, it is not smart to remain static in life. It does not allow you to develop, reduces social interaction to a minimum, and places you permanently in the corner, defined as someone who prefers watching trains depart rather than daring to discover what lies beyond the gray, dark, remote train station. The same applies to states and individuals. This chapter will define what is meant by “smart” in International Relations Theory, focusing on the various factors that can elevate a state to thinking, acting, and feeling like a smart actor in the volatile international environment. I am attempting to go one step beyond conventional wisdom. Therefore, the variables determining the smart capacity of a state do not include an analysis of its hard power capacity. This is a conscious choice, not because I question the importance of hard power but because it is clear that a smart state has to have an efficient hard power capacity to survive. This is fundamental, and as many International Relations theorists have adequately explained it before me, further analysis is not called for in this chapter.

 Robertson Noel, Festivals and Legends: The formation of Greek cities in the light of public ritual, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 147–165. 4

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Systemic Naivety Versus the Systemic Perceptive State The International System is the domain of constant interstate friction, where competition and antagonism between state or nonstate actors take precedence over every other political activity. The ability to recognize this and act accordingly requires theoretical and empirical effort. Whether this ongoing competition derives from the dimension of moral anarchy that Hans Morgenthau identifies as one of the fundamentals of the international scene5 or a stable condition that is dictated by geography, like friction between neighbors, as Thucydides argues in Book One of the History of the Peloponnesian War,6 or as the result of the perpetual desire of Great Powers to achieve global dominance, as John Mearsheimer argues,7 is of no fundamental importance. Competition is readily seen in how states behave in the volatile international domain. However, only some systemic actors can spot this. There are many examples of states, or better of political elites in those states, which are in so-­ called systemic denial for a specific period. This is mainly due to a fundamental misconception of how global politics evolves. These sleep-walking political elites are oblivious to the constant interstate antagonism or that because there is no Deus ex Machina in the international system, states are prepared to exercise any form of deception or commit any atrocity to survive and promote their national interests. There are many reasons for this fundamental misconception. First, the political elite governing the country genuinely believes in ideals or is simply naive. They tend to forget that there is no such thing as harmony in the competing national interests of each state in the international system. What is an ideal status quo for some might, for others, be an opportunity to put their revisionist schemes into action.8 Second, they hide their weaknesses and inefficiencies behind idealistic slogans and quixotic rhetoric. Instead of genuinely believing in these empty mantras, they exploit them to justify their hesitant decision-making in the international sphere. As Henry Kissinger famously said, “The most fundamental problem of politics is not the

 H.J. Morgenthau first mentioned the concept of moral anarchy during a lecture he gave at the University of Chicago in 1946: “…no particular interpretation of moral principles is able to prevail, and so you arrive not only at a political and social, but also at a moral anarchy” in Neascu Mihaela, Hans J.  Morgenthau’s Theory of International Relations: Disenchantment and Re-enchantment, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 113. 6  Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Martin Hamond (translation), Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, p.10. 7  Mearsheimer J. John, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2001. 8  Regarding the naivety, or utopianism, of idealism, see Carr H. Edward, The Twenty Years’ Crisis 1919–1939, London, 1939; Morgenthau J. Hans, Scientific Man versus Power Politics, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1946, pp. 71–72. Herz H. John, Political Realism and Political Idealism: A Study in Theories and Realities, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951, pp.  43–128; Howard Michael, War and the Liberal Conscience, New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1978, p. 134. Drolet Jean-Francois & Williams C. Michael, “The Radical Right, Realism and the politics of Conservatism in postwar international thought,” Review of International Studies, 2021, vol. 47, no.3, pp. 273–293. 5

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control of wickedness but the limitation of righteousness,”9 which emphasizes the incompatibility between idealism and the politics of survival. Third, they are convinced this is the best way to ensure their state’s survival. Idealistically naïve states and leaders are usually those who disregard the fundamental workings of international politics, the need to accumulate power to counter the predatory instincts of other states, or else they are oblivious to the pivotal role of international systemic polarity in the maturing process of intestate relations, the preservation of peace, the confirmation of security, etc. History is littered with examples of states that failed to comprehend their systemic surroundings or the prevailing sociopolitical and economic realities of their time and region, which resulted in complete failure. The most notorious example of a politician whose idealistic naivety almost led his country to disaster is that of the British Premier, Neville Chamberlain. His policy of appeasement gave Germany and Italy the space and time to strengthen their position in Europe and extend their control over the entire continent.10 The culmination of this idealistic naivety was the Munich Agreement of 1938 when Chamberlain agreed to support Hitler and Mussolini for almost a year before the outbreak of the Second World War. Germany used this valuable period of reprieve to prepare for its Blitzkrieg against Europe. It occurred mainly because Chamberlain had failed to understand Hitler’s true political objectives and the ultra-­ revisionist character of Nazi Germany, which the political volatility after the Great War had prompted. Despite the recent campaign to redeem Chamberlain’s reputation, which includes the Netflix film about the Munich Agreement (whose only virtue is Jeremy Irons’ acting), Chamberlain was, in truth, a naïve politician whose policies resulted only in disaster. This systemic naivety mainly derives from pure ignorance or the “goodwill syndrome” that various leaders adopt as a hallmark of their period in office. On the one hand, naïve states are ignorant of what systemic polarity11 is or disregard its importance. Systemic polarity, the quantitative snapshot of power between states or between states and essential nonstate actors, such as the United Nations, the Open Society Foundations, the Apple, the Islamic State, or Al Qaeda, assesses most coherently the level of the volatility of the international system at a specific period. However, perceptive states are fully aware that the type of systemic polarity influences the behavior of states in the international arena. For example, state “X” can be  As cited by Isaacson Walter, “Henry Kissinger Reminds us why Realism Matters,” TIME, September 6, 2014, time.com/3275385/henry-kissinger/ 10  Bouverie Tim, Appeasement: Chamberlain, Hitler, Churchill, and the road to War, New York: Tim Duggan Books, 2020. 11  For more about Systemic Polarity see among others Mansfield D.  Edward, “Concentration, Polarity and the Distribution of Power,” International Studies Quarterly, 1993, vol. 37, no.1, pp. 105–128; Ikenberry G. John et al., ‘Introduction: Unipolarity, State Behavior, and Systemic Consequences’, World Politics, 2009, vol. 61, no.1, pp. 1–27; De Keersmaeker Goedele, “Polarity: The Emergence and Development of a Concept” in G. de Keermaeker (ed.), Polarity, Balance of Power and International Relations Theory: Post-Cold War and the 19th Century Compared, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 11–46; Sabrosky Ned Alan (ed.), Polarity and War: The Changing Structure of International Conflict, New York: Routledge, 2019. 9

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aggressive in a unipolar system and selective about which of the two main alliance systems it chooses to join in a bipolar system while being openly revisionist in a multipolar system. The urge to survive remains the same primordial call to collective instincts and inner strengths in all cases, but how it is secured will differ according to the type of polarity. How can this kind of behavior be justified? The answer is found in the number of political, military, and economic challenges each polarity produces. Let us take the example of Germany during the Second World War. Germany, leaving for a second its unparalleled cruelty toward the Jews aside, was not a perceptive state, for at a time when bipolarity was gradually emerging in the international system, it decided to challenge both the USA and the USSR in the belief that a pact with Italy, Japan, and Bulgaria would be enough for it to emerge victorious. Berlin completely disregarded the new polarity that resulted from the American decision to become actively involved in European affairs after it entered into the First World War on April 2, 1917, or the success of the October Revolution on November 7 of the same year, and decided to pursue its narcissistic foreign policy objectives, as if the systemic polarity was still solidly multipolar instead of in transition to bipolarity. German naivety was so profound that the actual result of its lack of awareness gave its two primary opponents, the USA and the USSR, the opportunity to attain the highest status ever witnessed in the international system, that of superpowers, thus establishing a concrete bipolar systemic framework. The systemically perceptive state is always aware of the crucial importance of polarity in the way the international environment evolves. For example, systemic stability is fragile in unipolarity, mainly because there is only one dominant international actor and many contenders. This lack of balance encourages revisionist actors or states that hope to implement a hegemonic agenda at the expense of the single chief actor. In addition, in a bipolar system, total wars12 are liable to occur much more frequently than in a multipolar one, mainly because systemic polarization is excessive in the first case. In contrast, in the latter case, antagonism between more than two main competitors prevents a state from fully concentrating the entire of its national capacity against a single opponent. In a multipolar system, the main actors are forced to distribute their attention and resources to meet the challenges from multiple directions. Thus, the multidimensional challenges created by multipolarity make it more stable than either bipolarity, in its conventional or nuclear versions, or unipolarity. It must be said that the latter is the most unstable of all three because of the enormous corresponding competition that it brings into the everyday functioning of the international system. Overall, a perceptive state intelligently comprehends the variables of systemic stability according to the polarity prevailing at any given time. A systemically perceptive state is a smart element within the international system because it understands that preserving national interests is not linear but has various curves in both negative and positive directions of the structural unknown.

 Gray S.  Colin, War, Peace and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History, New York: Routledge, 2007, pp. 124–142. 12

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Nor is this process normative since it is directly or indirectly influenced by the systemic polarity, which demands that states adapt their approach according to changes in the balance of power. The high level of volatility in the systemic polarity makes survival a difficult and wholly unpredictable task for every state. It is a task that requires states to hone their smart reflexes or else fail.

The Anti-Blanche DuBois State In Tennessee William’s play “A Streetcar Named Desire,” Blanche DuBois is a profoundly insecure female character, a self-defeating femme fatale, constantly worrying about her declining beauty. She knows her survival will be difficult once she loses her looks, for she has “always depended on the kindness of the strangers.” Her behavior finds a perfect match in International Relations Theory. The Blanche DuBois syndrome describes states dependent on the kindness [so-called] of other states to survive. They devote little attention to strengthening their defense or stabilizing their economy, believing that they will be able to meet every challenge thanks to the support of their allies. However, since the international arena is a domain of constant interstate competition, Blanche DuBois states tend to adopt an unambiguously passive role in international affairs, de facto handing over their fundamental sovereign rights to other states for their support. They have accepted their structural weakness. Rather than developing a long-term plan to address those weaknesses and rebuild themselves on solid foundations, they offer earth and water to other states to continue their peaceful, passive existence. Essentially, Blanche Dubois states choose to bandwagon with stronger states in a stifling form of absolute dependency. Here, it is essential to clarify what bandwagoning is and how it functions in International Relations. According to Stephen Walt, states tend to bandwagon when the threats they face come from a much stronger opponent, when there are no available allies, or when an armed conflict is in progress.13 This is an accurate analysis of the behavior of states in a bipolar system. A state may bandwagon even during peacetime when there is no apparent threat simply because the burden of survival is too heavy to lift alone. This choice may be motivated by a lack of resources, poor leadership, fragile national unity, or simply by the political elites’ poor understanding of structural realities in the international arena. For example, immediately after the end of the Cold War, at a time of peace and systemic stability, various states chose to bandwagon with the USA simply because there was no other choice. From 1989 until 2001, the international balance of power moved swiftly toward a raw, incomplete, yet distinct form of unipolarity. Thus, it becomes evident that bandwagoning may become the only option for certain states when there is a unipolar balance of power. The choice of bandwagoning may likewise become attractive in a multipolar

13

 Walt M. Stephen, Origins of Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987, p.30.

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systemic structure. However, this time bandwagoning may appear to be the best option, as the alternative would have been a de jure capitulation to another state. Again, there is no real benefit here for the bandwagoner, simply the least bad option. The complex case of Transnistria and the bandwagoning of the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavskaya Republic with Russia after 1992,14 to resist pressure from Moldova, is a typical example of having to choose who will have the pleasure of devouring you, Scylla or Charybdis. Nevertheless, as history shows, the asymmetric pact offered by bandwagoning is frequently not one way. Quite often, it ends up with the stronger element milking the weaker of every type of natural resource it may possess. The Blanche DuBois state offers its national resources to its protectors, and the only reward is protection from external or internal threats. The primary energy deal between the Russian company Gazprom and the Algerian state gas company Sonatrach, in 2006,15 which was signed to keep the Army in power in Algeria, is just one of the many examples history gives of this kind of “unholy” relationship, where the natural resources of a nation are used as ransom money by a rogue regime to safeguard the support of a revisionist state. Blanche DuBois states can be described as one of those rogue regimes whose only concern is the continuation of their rule while ruthlessly disregarding the interests of the society and, eventually, of the state itself. Usually, these regimes follow a gradually descending orbit, with a complete collapse at the end. Still, before the final act, they will have managed to exhaust the state’s natural resources and devastate its institutional and civic structure. A Blanche DuBois state lacks grassroots initiatives or genuine connection with society. It is therefore prepared to sacrifice everything, even its people’s future, to remain in power. States that prop up such regimes can be called cynical or even amoral. Still, they cannot be accused of failing to do whatever is necessary to strengthen their international presence, support their economy, etc. After all, since the dawn of history, it has always been better to be Athens or Rome rather than Melos or Cartagena. The anti-Blanche DuBois states have the ability and good sense to adopt policies that permit them to stand on their own feet and ensure their survival through their capabilities and actions. Evidently, we must now address the state’s willingness to exercise, as efficiently as possible, the Thucydidean concept of “Self-Help.”16 As Chan describes it, “States must ultimately rely on their own material capabilities, defined by their position in the system, to guarantee their continued existence.”17 Systemic Anarchy creates an international self-help environment where states must  For more analysis of this specific case, see Roper D. Steven, “Regionalism in Moldova: The case of Transnistria and Gaugazia” in James Hughes & Gwendolyn Sasse (eds.), Ethnicity and Territory in the Former Soviet Union: Regions in Conflict, London: Routledge, 2002, pp.101–122. 15  Pham J. Peter, “Russia’s Return to Africa,” Atlantic Council, March 14, 2014. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/russia-s-return-to-africa/ 16  For more see: Waltz N.  Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, New  York: McGraw Hill, 1979, pp. 105–107, 111. 17  Chan O. Francis Aaron, “A Study of Self-Help in Anarchic International Systems,” E-International Relations, July 17, 2010, https://www.e-ir.info/pdf/4697 14

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provide primarily for their survival. However, it should be noted that this is not a panacea in international politics: Self-help is not the key to international success, but it is one of its main ingredients when properly applied. After all, history is full of failed states that tried to exercise “Self-Help” but implemented “Self-sufficiency” instead. These two approaches, alas, are not the same. Two of the most well-­ notorious failed states in the last phase of the Cold War, Romania and Albania, embarked on a rigid self-sufficiency policy for different reasons, eventually leading to their complete geopolitical self-isolation for a certain period of utterly traumatic for both societies. The narrative, however, of the leadership of those two states was that they were implementing a self-help policy that would allow them to be a top dog in the Balkans. Self-sufficiency was the quickest way to create a shell state, burning bridges with the outside world. This form of antisocialism, deriving from fear and the leadership’s inability to face the complexities and challenges of the international environment, is strong evidence of failure. An anti-Blanch DuBois state is not antisocial. It fully recognizes that global volatility obliges states to forge alliances, make trade agreements, arrange for cultural exchanges, etc. They also understand that, in an era of globalization, it is necessary to open the gates to foreign investment, qualified white-collar expatriates, or participation in major overseas development schemes. Thus, while self-sufficiency is interpreted as a state’s desire to survive only on what it produces, self-help is the ability to deal with a crisis relying mainly on your capabilities. While a self-sufficient state is, by definition, introverted and can only offer its citizens a below-par standard of living, a self-help state relies primarily on its capacity to face an emergency, like an act of aggression or a natural disaster. Self-help does not compel a state to refuse offers of help, but it reserves the option, because it has the power, to evaluate the terms on which the support will be given and make its decision based on those. In order for a state to effectively exercise a self-help policy during an emergency, it has to promote collective participation as the essential way the state functions, such as obligatory military conscription for both male and female citizens, encouragement of the creative involvement of its citizens in voluntary social services, the creation of a flexible public sector with a formidable strategic culture in automatization and decision-making during the zero hour, investment in education and continuous technological development, and funding of a technologically advanced defense industry infrastructure. The goal of a self-help policy is not to be isolated from the rest of the international system but rather to reduce systemic interdependency. There are examples of states that have managed to promote a successful self-help policy, such as Israel since its establishment in 1948, the United States, and Russia after Vladimir Putin came to power. On the other hand, despite being one of the Big Three in the twenty-first-century international system, China is dependent on external energy supplies, especially fossil fuels, owing to its massive energy consumption and the scarcity of national resources.18 In an era of  In the last decade (2010–2020), Chinese primary energy demands have increased by more than 45%, being the largest importer of oil and natural gas in the world today. British Petroleum, “Statistical Review of World Energy 2020,” London, 2020 https://www.bp.com/en/global/corpo18

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asymmetric interdependence, where global politics and the global economy form a vast network of interconnection and “spillover” effects, a state cannot stand alone. Neither can it depend on the kindness of the strangers. The Greek economic crisis of 2010–2019 is a warning of what can happen to states that behave like Blanche DuBois in the international system. As a member of the European Union and the single European currency, Greece had become so used to stabilizing its fragile economy with European subsidies that the point came when the European Union decided that enough was enough. As a result, Greece faced an unprecedented socioeconomic crisis, almost leading to its exit from the European Union. The bitter lesson learned from the 2010–2019 crisis was that no matter how kind strangers are, there comes a point where you must accept responsibility for your survival, or you will end up in a failed state.19 On top of that, contemporary international politics under the influence of multipolarity requires states to be as proactive as possible in participating in international affairs. In today’s international system, a state’s status is seen from the level of its active participation. Take the example of France, a significant European power and permanent member of the Security Council. After the Second World War, it could not retain its colonial possessions. It was soundly defeated in wars that concerned its core geostrategic interests, like the First Indochina War, the Suez Crisis, or Operation Lamantin (1977–1978) during the Western Sahara War. For a long time, France experienced a highly volatile domestic political scene, exemplified by the riots of May ’68. Despite its status as a nuclear power, it never managed to attain the standing of the United Kingdom during the Cold War. After 1991, it remained the weaker partner in the so-called Franco-German axis, dominating the European Union. Nevertheless, its readiness to send combatant units to all the major geostrategic crises that have arisen in the new millennium, for example, Afghanistan, Syria, and sub-Saharan Africa, and the fact that, after an extended period, the country once again has been influential under Emmanuel Macron, have allowed France to enhance its role in international affairs. Today, France is not self-sufficient, but it is a state that can effectively apply self-help policies. In September 2021, the White House sabotaged the 2016 $43 billion Franco-Australian agreement to construct 12 diesel-­ electric submarines by offering an alternative security partnership to Australia with a $79 billion deal to build nuclear power submarines for the Australian Navy. In response, Paris showed that it did not rely on the kindness of strangers to guarantee its survival. France recalled its ambassadors from the USA and Australia, thus communicating Paris’s outrage about the American intervention. Two weeks later, in

rate/news-and-insights/press-releases/bp-statistical-review-of-world-energy-2020-published. html; See also, Clemente Jude, “China is the World’s Largest Oil and Gas Importer,” Forbes, October 17, 2019 https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2019/10/17/china-is-the-worldslargest-oil%2D%2Dgas-importer/?sh=1392f5d35441 19  For more regarding the Greek crisis, see among others Pelagidis Theodoros & Mitsopoulos Michael, Who’s to Blame for Greece? Life after Bankruptcy: Between Optimism and Sub-standard growth, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 3rd ed; Lavdas A. Kostas et. al., Stateness and Sovereign Debt: Greece in the European Conundrum, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013.

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October 2021, it announced a $6 billion agreement with Greece to deliver three Belharra frigates on top of an existing contract to provide $8 billion of military equipment, jets, and helicopters. It should be pointed out that despite the close historical relationship between Greece and France that has existed since the Greek War of Independence in 1821, this mega-agreement (by Greek standards) could not have been made without Washington’s consent, especially since Greece’s existence has been dependent on the USA since the end of the Second World War.

The Right to Pursue Happiness Humans differ from other mammals because we constantly reevaluate our living conditions out of awareness of our mortality. To implement this kind of evaluation, we strive to comprehend the concept and the level of happiness at both the individual and collective levels. Thus, happiness has been a primary philosophical and political concern for human societies since the dawn of time. The first solid attempt to define happiness in connection with the evolution of a polity comes from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. He describes it as “an activity of the soul that expresses virtue.”20 Individual happiness is reflected in the citizens’ virtue, which influences the state’s domestic stability. In this case, happiness is not measured by material consumption but by the collective observance of the polity’s laws. The first traces of modernity in classical Greece can initially be detected in the city-state concept. As Ober argues, “…the comparative historical case of the world of the Greek-states permits the radical thought that our own modernity may not be in every sense unparalleled.”21 A polity is the sum of its citizens; therefore, how individuals function within its framework profoundly affects its development. This strong bond between citizens and institutions encourages an idea of civilian identity to form, demonstrating that it is primarily a sociopolitical value instead of a mere legal abstraction. Therefore, in Ancient Greece, as can also be seen in Plato’s writings, happiness is not a subjective emotional condition that remains concealed behind the closed gates of the citizens’ homes but a strong indication of the collective might that influences the polity’s evolution. The construction of the Parthenon, the iconic monument of Athenian power, began and was concluded at a time when the citizens of the Polis were at the summit of collective happiness due to Athens’ rise to its period of most significant prestige as a superpower, an economic giant, and the cultural capital of the Hellenic world. During the medieval era, thanks to a sharp rise in Europe’s population and the establishment of absolute monarchy as the standard form of government in the Christian world, happiness was transformed from being a collective virtue into  Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, translated by David Ross, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009, new ed. 21  Ober Josiah, Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in Classical Athens, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, p.279. 20

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collective submission to the monarch. The latter, depending on the extent of the people’s submission and the capabilities of every state, would ensure fewer wars, fewer revolts, fewer executions, lower taxes for the masses, etc. Interestingly, this specific idea of happiness in Medieval Europe can be found in the well-known first form of the social contract, the Magna Carta Libertatum.22 This document was a legal agreement signed on June 12, 1215, between the English King, John Lackland, and the Barons of the state. It acknowledged the need for limitations on feudal payments to the Crown. The King subsequently revoked the agreement, and the Barons withdrew their allegiance from him, leading to the First Baron’s War. This denial from the head of the state, no matter its particular content, would lead to misery and a long period of political volatility. The complete collapse of the Magna Carta Libertatum is an excellent case study of the need to guarantee the right of the people to pursue their own happiness, no matter their social class or origins. For centuries after the First Barons’ War, 1215–1217, all major revolts in Britain occurred because the Head of State failed to guarantee the people’s fundamental right to the pursuit of happiness. The French Revolution and the American War of Independence were also important stages in this grassroots process,23 and it was one of the American founding fathers, Thomas Jefferson, who enshrined this sacred and inalienable right of the American people, and by extension of humanity, to the pursuit of happiness. Jefferson adopted the basic Epicurean philosophy principle regarding life’s true meaning in an impressively enlightened approach. Epicurus, an ancient Greek philosopher, supported the central thesis that humans deserved to enjoy happiness [ευδαιμονία], a life free from fear [αταραξία] and free from pain [απονία].24 This approach was very progressive for its time, since human societies during the Classical Era, and for many centuries after that, promoted collective discipline toward political authority and blind obedience to the religious decrees of the clergy too. Thomas Jefferson, along with the other American founding fathers, adopted the rational materialism of Epicureanism for the first time since 1648, offering the people the freedom to aspire and work for their happiness. This specific principle from the Declaration of Independence is undoubtedly one of the cornerstones of American soft power. The USA, implementing one of the first-ever “smart” policies, managed to attain the leading position in geopolitical power, mainly by balancing its formidable hard power and the quality of its soft power. However, the latter played the Sirens’ song and attracted millions of immigrants from four corners of the globe. This right to pursue happiness allowed newcomers to strive for a better life, free

 For more regarding Magna Carta, see Linebaugh Peter, The Magna Carta Manifesto: Liberties and Commons for all, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008. 23  For the socioeconomic origins of these two crucial Revolutions for shaping Modernity’s Western image, see Blanning W.C.T., The French Revolution: Class War or Culture Clash? London: Macmillan Press, 2008; Hampson Norman, A Social History of the French Revolution, London: Routledge, 2007; Bailyn Bernard, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1992, enlarged ed. 24  Lobel Diana, Philosophies of Happiness: A Comparative Introduction to the Flourishing Life, New York: Columbia University Press, 2017, pp. 42–54. 22

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from the social burdens of the Old World, and feel that the New World was their own country. Thus, their well-being was also associated with the socioeconomic strengthening of the state. One can imagine the impression the phrase “the right to the pursuit of happiness” would have made on a desperate Irish farmer in the mid-nineteenth century, at the time of the Great Famine, who was unable to offer his family and children not just a better life but life at all. Of course, there is a big gap between the right to pursue happiness and the means of attaining it. Again, this can be easily understood in the case of the Irish farmer who arrived at Ellis Island, full of hopes for a new beginning, to find that to be accepted as a member of American society, he first had to be enrolled in the military service and sent to fight against the Confederate army. Nowadays, the smart state not only grants its citizens the right to pursue happiness, but it has also developed an institutional framework in which citizens can exploit their skills, cultivate their intellect, and be rewarded by the state for their contribution to the advancement of the society, the strengthening of the country and human progress in general. How can a state implement such a policy? First, it is important to emphasize that this approach goes beyond Soviet authoritarian statism. A smart state refrains from intervening in the individual’s daily life, beliefs, values, or practices. Moreover, a smart state does not erect an authoritarian system reminiscent of Orwell’s 1984, where the state dictates what is permissible and what is not in bringing happiness to the people. In recent human history, every state that has tried to follow this track, whether the France of Robespierre or Ceausescu’s Romania, has eventually collapsed due to civil unrest. I am not a fan of Marx or Engels but must agree with them about the appeal of revolution to those who live as modern enslaved people, and thus profoundly miserable human beings, who choose to revolt because the only thing they can lose is their chains. History shows us that disaster awaits those states with minimal interest in the happiness of their citizens, such as Ben Ali’s Tunisia or Muammar Gaddafi’s Libya. A smart state knows it has to offer its citizens the opportunity to pursue happiness according to their abilities and hard work by creating a stable political environment and a developing economic framework. In most cases, for example, in modern Scandinavia, the ability of the citizens to achieve happiness goes hand in hand with a systemic meritocracy and the state’s collective encouragement of society to be creative, entrepreneurial, and risk-taking. Furthermore (and this is where the American model of happiness differs from the Scandinavian), there is always a safety net in place, which guarantees the citizens’ right to fail and have the chance of a new beginning. No wonder the Scandinavians are among the happiest people on earth today. This specific dimension is something the leading Western states, such as the USA or the United Kingdom, fail to put into practice. These days, people face tremendous obstacles to getting a reasonable second chance. No doubt it is still better to live in London or New York rather than in Tehran or Pyongyang, where there is not even the right to a first chance to create something meaningful, pursue success, social recognition, and a better life from an economic point of view, outside of the official framework of the regime. However, the prospects for the second half of the

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twenty-first century do not look very bright, even if they are still much brighter in the West compared with the other states mentioned above. For example, even though the USA is the cradle of the “right to pursue happiness” in the modern world, today, it is a state that offers no-second chance, despite Barack Obama’s efforts to change this. This “no-second chance” trend, promoted by the Chicago School and the Washington Consensus, both gurus of neo-liberalism, has resulted in people becoming more phobic and conservative toward everything new, giving credit to conspiracy theories and every kind of nihilistic scenario. The widespread belief in the QAnon conspiracy theory, and even the electoral win of Donald Trump in 2017, clearly shows that American society has lost its ability to act and think as the archetypical smart state, despite still having the most innovative academic and political elite of any state in the world. A smart state is a polity that offers its people the right to be as creative and productive as possible, striving to secure happiness for themselves and, consequently, for the rest of society. The people who have the opportunity to pursue and attain happiness will be able to contribute to strengthening the state and raising its cultural, economic, and political progress at a national level. However, this can only be achieved if the state applies the proper institutional framework, assuring citizens that there is a safety net beneath them in case of failure. The right to pursue happiness does not guarantee success, but (in the words of the famous Greek poet Cavafy in his Ithaca) what matters is the journey rather than arriving at the destination itself.

Invest in Technology Investing in technology to promote hard power capacity or develop the economy is the mark of a smart state. Technological progress offers the state the opportunity to emerge from its mediocre comfort zone, end conventional ways of approaching international politics, and act on the international scene as an agent for innovation, one that embraces and welcomes progress. A technologically advanced state can reform its public sector in such a way that cutting out the red tape is achieved without risking a bureaucratic blackout. Thus, a technologically advanced state can effectively cut public sector expenditure, contribute to a better quality of life, and raise productivity, since its citizens will not be obliged to spend endless hours in queues. It also contributes to public health and environmental protection since it drastically reduces the consumption of petroleum products for transportation, etc. Moreover, a technologically smart state can more easily deal with a humanitarian crisis when it arises.25 For example, when there was a sudden need for extended lockdowns in order to limit the spread of the pandemic around the globe, the more

 Bounie Dominique et.al. “The role of food science and technology in humanitarian response,” Trends in Food Science and Technology, 2020, vol. 103, pp. 367–375. 25

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technologically advanced states were quickly able to develop smart applications for their citizens’ mobile phones, enabling them to work, shop, and communicate from home. It also made it possible to track cases of COVID-19, which were breaking the law by failing to exercise self-isolation. One of the main reasons why states like the USA, Japan, Israel, the United Arab Emirates, Australia, and New Zealand were able to control the spread of the pandemic and achieve high percentages of vaccination among citizens of every age was the fact that their Smart Administration capacity, in other words, the construction of the states’ systems on information technology systems, was sufficiently developed to enable their citizens to adapt to the new conditions created by the pandemic within a short period. On the other hand, states such as India, Turkey,26 Albania, and Moldavia, with low technological adaptability, collapsed under the burden of the COVID-19 pandemic. The crucial role of innovation in the development of states is not only a twenty-­ first-­century trend. There have been various notable cases since the dawn of time. The Hyksos, nomads from the Levant, managed to invade Egypt and bring a large part of its territory under their control for a century, establishing the Fifteenth Dynasty (1550–1650  BCE) because they were the first who used the chariot in battle. They also invented the compound bow that gave their arrows a more extended range and made it possible to hit targets from a great distance.27 Athens became the leading naval power of the ancient world thanks to the trireme superfast galley, which had a three-meter keel in front and was fitted with bronze plates, which made it possible to use it in battle as a combat ramming tool.28 The trireme’s long narrow shape made it easy to maneuver so that it could attack other ships at unprecedented speed. Rome invented modern engineering, especially in water supply and urban development. This made it possible for the Empire to be connected, with an extended network of roads and bridges permitting trade goods and Legions to move fast throughout the vast Imperium.29 The Byzantines invented the art of fortification,30 which made Constantinople invincible between 330 and 1204  CE when the Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade finally succeeded in sacking the city. The invention of the wind power sawmill by the Dutch farmer Cornelis Corneliszoon in 1594 made it possible for Holland to build a large fleet and establish itself as a great naval

 During the first period of the COVID-19 pandemic and until the appearance of the specialized vaccines, the Turkish state was trying to minimize the outbreak by offering free bottles of traditional lemon cologne, the well-known kolonya in Turkish that may decisive in the fight against foul odors, but its capacity as a sanitizer is dubious and utterly outdated, to say the least. 27  Van Seters John, The Hyksos: A New Investigation, Eugene: Wipf & Stock, 2010 28  Hale R. John, Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the birth of Democracy, New York: Viking, 2009. 29  Garrison Ervan, A History of Engineering and Technology: Artful Methods, London: Routledge, 1999, sec.ed. 30  Kontogiannis D.  Nikos, Byzantine Fortifications: Protecting the Roman Empire in the East, Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2022. 26

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power. This, in turn, opened the gates to the Dutch Golden Age.31 The British invention of the steam engine played a crucial role in the rise of the United Kingdom as a significant naval power and eventually as the empire on which the sun never set.32 At the same time, nuclear weapons made superpowers of the USA and the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War. However, the most impressive examples of technologically advanced states can be found in the cases of postwar Japan, West Germany, and post-Cold War Russia. Even though all three emerged from defeat, the level of their technological infrastructure, together with the conciliatory attitude of the victors, made it possible for them to rise quickly from the ashes and secure leading positions in twenty-first-­ century international affairs. A state that invests in technology can train its workforce to acquire new skills and abilities. A skilled workforce guarantees low unemployment, while the national economy is boosted by high innovative production. Last but not least, a technologically advanced state has all the necessary means to preserve and promote national prestige, one of the most critical components of success in international politics.33 Gilpin writes about this, “Prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations, much as the authority is the central ordering feature of domestic society … prestige is ‘enormously important’ because ‘if your strength is recognized, you can generally achieve your aims without having to use it’.”34 Moreover, as Markey rightly comments, in the international arena, “the thirst for prestige is never entirely quenched.”35 When a nation enjoys significant prestige internationally, even if it is not among the great powers, it will attract the positive interest of other states in making agreements or alliances. Israel offers a clear example of the importance of national prestige in diplomacy and national security.36 Last  See more about this: Cook J. Harold, “Science and Technology” in Helmer J. Helmers & Geert H. Janssen (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to the Dutch Golden Age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018, pp. 350–369. 32  Gray Steven, Steam Power and Sea Power: Coal, the Royal Navy and the British Empire, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017. 33  See, among other sources, Thornton Bruce, “Prestige as a Tool of Foreign Policy,” Hoover Institution, June 12, 2017; Renshon Jonathan, Fighting for Status: Hierarchy and Conflict in World Politics, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2017. 34  Gilpin Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 31. 35  Markey S. Daniel, “Prestige and the Origins for War: Returning to Realism’s Roots,” Security Studies, 1999, vol.8, no.4, pp.169–170 (pp.126–172). 36  In 1950, the First Knesset passed the Nazi and Nazis Collaborators (Punishment) Law. It referred to establishing an institutional framework to prosecute Nazi collaborators and Nazi officials for crimes against the Jews. The 1950 law must be seen as a de jure attempt by the state of Israel to bring to justice Nazis and their agents who had survived the war and managed to conceal their true identities and criminal past. Still, it was also a clear message that Jews would never again allow themselves to be persecuted with impunity. The arrest of Adolf Eichmann or the Mossad operation against the Palestinian Black September Group for the 1972 Munich Olympic massacre, codenamed “Wrath of God,” must also be seen as a systematic effort to protect Israeli prestige to deter future threats. For more about this fascinating subject, see Wenig M.  Jonathan, “Enforcing the 31

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but not least, a nation that invests in technology can attain an advanced level of hard power, giving its citizens’ confidence that the state is able and willing to meet possible acts of outside aggression. Besides this boost to collective confidence, a technologically advanced military industry can also support the national economy, mainly through its sales to other states. This also advances diplomatic ties between states, which sell and those which buy, making it possible for the state with an advanced hard power industry to create strong links with the national defense structure of the state that is buying from them. Many states today, including the USA, Russia, China, Britain, and France, promote their national prestige, economy, and diplomatic objectives by selling the technologically advanced products of their hard power industries.37 In general, a state that is prepared to welcome new advances in technology and adapt to the new socioeconomic conditions that technological advancement generates, without being hesitant or afraid in the face of progress, or its attendant socioideological challenges, is an entity that sends strong assertive signals about its present and future prospects. This positive attitude to the possibilities offered by human development must also be channeled toward the social majority. However, for this to be achieved, the role of progressive leadership is equally essential.

Progressive Leadership Under which theoretical or empirical conditions can leadership be characterized as progressive? Is it an institutional form of government? Is progressiveness a comparative or superlative concept in politics? These questions will be addressed below, taking progressive leadership as fundamental for a smart state. As already stated, smart states are those entities firmly in step with each era’s systemic realities and trends. Most of the time, this is affirmed by the state’s leadership. Thus, according to Yukl, leadership is “the process of influencing others to understand and agree about what needs to be done and how to do it, and the process of facilitating individual and collective efforts to accomplish shared objectives,”38 while according to Northouse describes leadership as “a process whereby an lessons of History: Israel Judges the Holocaust” in Timothy L.H. McCormack & Gerry J. Simpson (eds.), The Law of War Crimes: National and International Approaches, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1999, pp.103–121; Porat Dan, “Changing Legal Perceptions of Nazi Collaborators in Israel, 1950–1971” in Laura Jockusch & Gabriel N.  Finder (eds.), Jewish Honor Courts: Revenge, Retribution and Reconciliation in Europe and Israel after the Holocaust, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2015, pp.  303–326; Pedahzur Ami, The Israeli Secret Services & the Struggle against Terrorism, New York: Columbia University Press, 2009, pp. 40–46. 37  Regarding the importance of the subject see Balakrishnan Kogila, Technology Offsets in International Defence Procurement, New  York: Routledge, 2019; Hartley Keith & Belin Jean (eds.), The Economics of the Global Defence Industry, New York: Routledge, 2020. 38  Yukl Gary, Leadership in Organizations, Upper Saddle River: Pearson -Prentice Hall, 2006, p.8, 6th ed.

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i­ ndividual influences a group of individuals to achieve a common goal.”39 However, what is it that connects leadership with effectiveness? Many will offer a normative reply, such as the quality of the given results from a leader’s time in office. However, I would like to link effective leadership with progressiveness. Therefore, it is necessary to answer first what makes a leader progressive. I argue that progressive leadership has to be appropriate to its age; in other words, it has to unfold in accordance with the cultural, economic, societal, and technological conditions of its time. However, it must not be one of the many, but always one step ahead. Otherwise, it will be trapped in a collective subjectivity of opinions and views. A progressive leadership first has to be responsive to the changes in the international system and, if possible, to be the first to introduce those new trends to the rest of society. In addition, progressive leadership is one that fully understands the responsibilities of governing an organized community, seeing this as a great responsibility rather than just a task or a hereditary right that cannot be evaded. However, while a progressive leader is a true pioneer concerning the era’s sociopolitical characteristics that affect a state’s ontology, at the same time, she or he must remember that it is essential to inspire the people who follow. A leader is not a hermit but someone who, through their personality and decision-making style, gives others the confidence to follow them. This is why a progressive leader must always be in touch with the collective subconsciousness of the nation, in other words, its tradition, beliefs, ethical code, and aspirations for the future, and gradually lead society toward the next stage of its progress. Being idle or having a reactionary response to everything new does not make you a leader; you become a custodian of the old ways. If you fail to meet new challenges instead of making decisive steps forward, it will probably make you lead no one but yourself because everyone else will be left behind. After all, you cannot lead without followers. Shock approaches may either lead to total collapse or societal revolt. When 1966 Mao Zedong launched the notorious Cultural Revolution, he was considered the epitome of a progressive leader. Western writers, journalists, famous singers, and even politicians glorified Chinese Communism and Maoism as the appropriate alternative to Stalinism and capitalism. After Mao Zedong died in 1976, it finally became known to the rest of the world that the Cultural Revolution had ruined the Chinese economy, resulting in the deaths of 1.5 million souls and the persecution of 36 million.40 As it turned out, Mao was not a progressive leader but a tyrant with no real connection with the Chinese people’s needs or the nation’s socioeconomic condition. A progressive leader must inspire and, at the same time, lead by example. This is necessary to show that he is mentally and psychologically connected with the social base of the nation and fully aware of what people are experiencing in their daily lives. For example, one of the main reasons why Nicolae Ceausescu and his wife,  Northouse G. Peter, Leadership: Theory and Practice, Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2007, p.3, 4th ed.  Mishra Pankaj, “What are the Cultural Revolution’s Lessons for our current moment?,” The New  Yorker, February 1, 2021, https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/02/01/what-are-thecultural-revolutions-lessons-for-our-current-moment; Dikotter Frank, The Cultural Revolution: A People’s History, 1962–1976, New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016. 39 40

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Elena Petrescu, were executed without first facing a fair trial when the Communist regime collapsed in Romania was because they had flaunted their luxurious lifestyle. At the same time, most Romanians were condemned to living in third world conditions. Leading by example also requires the leader’s empathy with those they lead, whether in days of plenty or scarcity. The most prominent example of leading by example was Alexander the Great.41 The Greek king defeated the mighty Persian Empire with a few thousand men. One of the reasons for this tremendous military success was his ability to inspire his men by leading the Greek cavalry in the first line of the battle and with his general attitude toward them. While his opponent, Darius III, always remained far from the action, hidden behind the Ten Thousand Immortals, the elite Persian force, Alexander fought in the front line alongside his soldiers. Moreover, he knew well how to raise his troops’ morale. One typical deed illustrates the true meaning of leading by example in times of peril. While the Greeks were crossing the Bactrian desert between modern-day Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, their main problem was the lack of water. Thousands died from dehydration. On one of those terrible days, Alexander met two of his soldiers from the vanguard who had gone several days ahead of the main body of the Army to find a suitable location for the next camp. When they recognized Alexander, they approached him and offered him a cup of water. Alexander asked them where they were going, and when he heard that they had returned to bring water to their sons who were marching with the main body of the army, he gave them back the cup, saying, “I cannot bear to drink alone.” Moreover, after one more day’s march, the Greek army finally reached the river Oxus; Alexander refused to drink water before his soldiers had. At the same time, a progressive leader must never allow being disgraced, whether by shirking responsibility or showing hesitation or fear in public. The worst recent collapse of a leader’s prestige occurred during a live TV broadcast. While waiting to be interviewed by the BBC during the Russo-Georgian War in 2008, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili started to chew his tie nervously as he listened to news of the advance of the Russian army toward Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. He was unaware that the camera was filming this pitiful scene, which the BBC would broadcast many times in the following days. The moment the Georgian people witnessed Saakashvili’s psychological collapse was the point they lost confidence in their leader.42 Georgia was soundly defeated by the Russians, and Saakashvili faced organized social resistance until he exiled himself a few years later. Today, he is in a Georgian prison, accused of illegally crossing the nation’s borders. In contrast, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, demonstrated a very different approach to leading by example during the Russian invasion of Ukraine; very quickly, he managed to get a grip on the situation. Social media were full of short videos of Zelensky speaking to Ukrainian soldiers to raise their morale while

41 42

 See among others Fox Lane Robin, Alexander the Great, London: Penguin Books, 2004.  Sosnowski Alexander, The Georgia Syndrome, Rotternburg: Mauer Verlag Wilfried Kriese, 2012.

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reassuring the civilians that he had chosen to remain in Kyiv and face the same destiny as them, fighting the invader. Within a few days, Zelensky had become the symbol of Ukrainian resistance to the Russian invasion and someone for whom the Western world expressed, quite understandably, profound admiration. It must also be noted that progressive leadership does not always derive from the ideology, which defines a country’s government type. Winston Churchill would have been as great serving as Prime Minister of a liberal democracy as of an oligarchic nation, etc. The systemic conditions and how someone reacts to them make a leader. Winston Churchill stood up against Germany and Italy when the rest of the world had either signed a nonaggression pact (the USSR), was watching from a safe distance (the USA), or had been defeated on the field of battle by the Nazi army (France, Poland, Greece, etc.). He chose to meet the crisis before him with a tremendous level of statesmanship. However, he would not have been as effective at another time in British history as his not-so-bright postwar performance in 10 Downing Street suggests. The form of government should not be seen as a guarantee of progressive policies. Otherwise, every leader of any democratic state could be considered progressive simply because of the country’s constitution. This is not the case. A progressive leader can lead the state to new heights, no matter the polity’s governing style. Usually, how a state is managed results from many different factors, such as history, domestic culture, or the regional balance of power. In a liberal democracy, rather than a country where the voting system is used to conceal the absence of genuine democracy, as is the case in Russia, Iran, or Turkey, a leader is called upon to abide by the will of the majority and the letter and spirit of the constitution. However, from a political and constitutional point of view, simply adhering to these principles makes a leader legitimate but not necessarily progressive. A progressive leader penetrates the constitutional bubble of the state, introducing a series of new policies that test collective normative beliefs, etc. A leader can be progressive within a nondemocratic institutional framework or reactionary at the head of an unambiguously democratic state. Let us compare the President of the UAE, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, on the one hand, and Viktor Orban, Prime Minister of Hungary, on the other hand. The first is the leader of a federal constitutional monarchy based on the union between seven absolute monarchies and the second of a liberal and democratic European state. While the first is the archetype of a progressive leader, for many reasons presented in the following chapters of this book, the second is emphatically not progressive, according to many analyses of his period in power.43 Why is this? Because the idea of political progress stems from the leader’s personality and willingness to challenge political norms to introduce new policies for his country, as Mohamed bin Zayed tries to do with various doctrinal issues of Islam. There are many cases in history where a reactionary leader takes advantage of the benevolence of liberal democracy, going against the institutional provisions of  Zerofsky Elisabeth, “Viktor Orban’s far-right vision for Europe,” The New Yorker, January 7, 2019 https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/01/14/viktor-orbans-far-right-vision-for-europe; Lendvai Paul, Orban: Hungary’s Strong Man, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 43

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the state to pursue nondemocratic objectives and goals. A progressive leader is prepared to exit the comfort zone offered by the structural civic conditions rather than one who pretends to follow the people’s will while openly disregarding the state’s constitution. Let us compare Mohamed Bin Zayed and Donald Trump, the 45th President of the USA, the first liberal democracy in the Western world. Which of the two is genuinely progressive? Mohamed Bin Zayed (as will be shown in later chapters) has transformed the United Arab Emirates into a global bastion of cultural and religious tolerance. In contrast, the populist Donald Trump openly undermined democracy on various occasions during his office in a country that, since its establishment, has unequivocally stood as the beacon of liberalism and freedom in international affairs. Of course, the question is purely rhetorical. Suppose the degree of progressiveness is shown by the extent of political change a leader promotes in the face of existing norms aimed at modernizing the state with bold decision-making procedures. In that case, Mohamed bin Zayed is undoubtedly one of the most progressive leaders in the world today. Suppose the ideological identification of the country confers the label of “progressive” on the leader of every liberal democracy. In that case, Donald Trump is a progressive leader, and all of us who openly consider his presidency one of the worst political offices in the Western world since the end of the Second World War are pure sycophants. This rather normative approach, as can be easily understood, shows that the type of government is not always the safest way for an analyst to determine whether or not the governing style of a leader is progressive or reactionary. This is important if social scientists wish to effectively differentiate the analysis’ essence from just the framework. However, it is crucial to admit that, in most cases, nondemocratic regimes do not have progressive leaders. The example of Sheikh Mohamed Bin Zayed al Nahyan is unique, which makes the subject of this book even more positively distinctive. A progressive leader promotes rationalism as the main focus of her or his political practice. I define as rational every policy that forsakes revisionism and contributes to the state’s prospects for survival. As Glaser affirms in his Rational Choice Theory, a state must be able to recognize the opportunities for cooperation in the international arena rather than simply competing for more power.44 As progressive leaders are all too aware, the international environment sadly cannot be transformed into a valley of blooming roses. Nevertheless, a progressive leader also knows that the international system must not be transformed into an arena for gladiators where the last standing is the winner. Such a policy would significantly waste national resources, people, and, sooner or later, the state itself. Since the dawn of history, any developmental stage humans reached at a sociopolitical level has occurred under the rational leadership of an individual or group of individuals. After all, history shows that the masses are never progressive or rational. Politicians, inventors, scientists, composers, and writers were and still are leaders in human affairs since they have freely taken their place in the front row of the developmental process since the dawn

 Glaser L.  Charles, Rational Theory of International Politics: The Logic of Competition and Cooperation, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010. 44

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of time. Irrationality has contributed positively to human endeavor, especially if we understand hubris as representing the highest form of absurdity.45 The myth of Icarus, the son of Dedalus who defied human limitations and flew as close as possible to the Sun, with the result that his wax wings melted and the irrational young man fell into the sea below, still named Icarian Sea, is a well-known Ancient Greek myth illustrating the catastrophic consequences of hubris and the irrational decision-­ making it gives rise to. Irrationality is synonymous with hubris, and, as history shows, the latter is characteristic of leaders who do not view public service as the highest duty an individual can perform but simply as a way to nourish their narcissism. A polity with such a profound leadership gap cannot be considered a smart state. This is not merely because poor leadership deprives the state of international cooperative schemes or other opportunities in the international environment. It may also weaken the state’s institutions up to the point that national unity is extensively undermined.

National Unity Since 1648, the main protagonist of international politics, in peace or war, has been the “nation-state.” The Treaty of Westphalia, which brought to an end the Thirty Years War between Catholics and Protestants, or more accurately, the War between Catholic France, which used the Protestant kingdoms of Europe as proxies, and the Catholic Habsburg dynasty, gave rise to the nation-state and the modern legal and political concept of sovereignty.46 According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, “a nation-state is a territorially bounded sovereign polity that is ruled in the name of a community of citizens who identify themselves as a nation.”47 I have made use of this particular definition, as it clearly shows that the cornerstone of a nation is the willingness of its citizens to form an active part of a collective group who share a common understanding, and a devotion to the polity they represent, with their presence, consensus and often with their sacrifice, for the sake of the ultimate goal of survival. Otherwise, the nation-state will collapse and will either give rise to a new nation

 Hubris in Ancient Greek philosophy denotes excessive spiritual pride and arrogance in imitating the gods. Thus, the famous poet Pindar writes in his Isthmian Odes “Do not try to become Zeus, mortal things suit mortal best.” Amir Lydia, Taking Philosophy Seriously, Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2018, p.205. The tower of Babel in the Tanakh and the Bible is a well-known example of hubris mentioned in the holy books of Judaism and Christianity, while in the Quran, there are many quotes against hubris such as “And when it is said to him, guard against (the punishment of) Allah; pride carries him off to sin; therefore, hell is sufficient for him; and certainly, it is an evil resting place.” 46  For more about the Thirty Years War and the Treaty of Westphalia, see among others: Lee J. Stephen, The Thirty Years War, London: Routledge, 1991. 47  https://www.britannica.com/topic/nation-state 45

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from its ashes, such as the birth of Turkey from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire,48 or it will be divided into one or more new states, as with the establishment of Austria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia after the dissolution of the Austro-­ Hungarian Empire in 191849 or of the Czech Republic and Slovakia following Czechoslovakia’s demise after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1989.50 A state’s prospect for survival depends significantly on the wish of a specific group of people who consider themselves the basis of a nation-state to create a coherent national identity. The question of the intensity of this desire prompted Ernest Renan, the nineteenth-century French historian, to state, during a famous lecture (“What is a Nation?”) at the Sorbonne in 1882, that a nation is a daily referendum. As he said during the lecture, “A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future. It presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation’s existence is, if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily referendum, just as an individual’s existence is a perpetual affirmation of life.”51 The health of every nation lies primarily in its citizens’ willingness to live, produce, create, and die under its banner, which is a mark of their collective desire to live together within a specific political and legal framework. This is what national unity is all about. It is the necessary ingredient for a nation’s survival. However, the true challenge here is to describe something other than the phenomenon itself. The desire of a collective body of people to peacefully coexist, collaborate, and contribute to the strengthening of the community, sharing the same ideas or beliefs, as well as the right (and privilege) to disagree about them without provoking the collapse of the polity, approaching the duty of citizenship and everything that this entails, for example, economic contribution through paying taxes, personal sacrifices of every sort for the preservation of national sovereignty, and much else, can be easily understood. Ultimately, we are all children of the Enlightenment and of Reason, whether we endorse this or not, and can, therefore, easily understand what it means to be a citizen of a modern nation-state. It is also clear that the more extended and durable the national unity of a state, the better its prospects of meeting challenges that the competitive international system might present. Here, it is essential to observe in parentheses that if the idea of national unity in a state includes not only its citizens but also the expatriates who live and

 Qaisar Mohammad, From Ottoman to Turk: The Transition from Caliphate to Secular Republic in Turkey, Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2019. 49  Kann A.  Robert, A History of the Habsburg Empire, 1526–1918, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974, pp. 468–520. 50  Cabada Ladislav & Waisova Sarka, Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic in World Politics, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2011; Mahoney M. William, The History of the Czech Republic and Slovakia, Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011. 51  As cited by Wright L. Jacob, War, Memory and National Identity in the Hebrew Bible, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, p.209. 48

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work there, it is yet more successful. However, to distinguish a smart state from an ordinary one, it is crucial to focus on how it seeks to create national unity. First of all, national unity is manifested daily in the connection the political elite of a state maintains with the people. This daily connection is achieved by making the leadership, and the rest of the political system, visible and accessible not only at official events but also in simple, routine happenings that give the heads of the state an air of “normality” and allow the ordinary citizen to connect with them psychologically. Every political system, whether monarchy, oligarchy, or democracy, that remains hidden behind high walls and rarely opens itself to public observation is destined to fail. Consider, for example, the Chinese political system of the Forbidden City, which lasted for five centuries. The lack of psychological or even visible connection between the head of the state and the masses was one of the main reasons for the deterioration of the state. It produced the collapse of the Imperium, the hundred years of humiliation, the rise of Communism, and the country’s division after a lengthy and disastrous civil war. Strong similarities with China are also found in the Sublime Porte’s Ottoman system and the Imperium’s end. Contemporary examples exist in North Korea or Thailand, where the leadership presents itself as super-­ human in the first case and as god-like in the second, to conceal weaknesses and failures and impose on the masses an institutional conformity that resembles more a metaphysical connection between god and man, or between ideology and the masses, rather than a political interaction between the head and the body of a nation. Nonconformity is usually a safe choice for heads of state who wish to promote national unity through their exposure to the public eye. For example, the fact that the Prince and the Princess of Cambridge are seen escorting their children to school at the beginning of each school year gives a solid message to the British people that they honor family and can show their children affection, just like every single citizen of the country. Likewise, when Mark Rutte, the Dutch Prime Minister, succeeded in forming a government with a coalition of four parties in 2017, he rode to the Palace on his bicycle to inform the King. No doubt, this was a calculated public relations decision by the Prime Minister to send the message to the Dutch people that he was not a member of the old guard but a modern politician with modern ideas and practices. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Mark Rutte continues to ride his bicycle in public. Suppose nonconformity is an effective way to promote national unity. In that case, it has to be consistent and not a firework that will soon be forgotten or even used against the same politician as proof of his or her unreliability. Mark Rutte, winner of elections for the fourth time in January 2022, still rides his bicycle in Amsterdam or The Hague and often in Brussels during official visits to the EU headquarters. Nonconformity is an excellent way to connect with the people and strengthen national unity during political stability. During troubled periods, however, such as war or pandemics, national unity is strengthened when the leadership is seen to be empathizing with the rest of society. This can often be achieved by the public appearance of the leadership after large-­ scale destruction or loss rather than hiding away. For example, on Friday, September 13, 1940, a German raider dropped five explosive bombs on Buckingham Palace.

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The Foreign Office immediately advised the King and the Queen Consort to flee the country and take refuge in Canada until they were safe enough to return. The reply from Queen Consort Elizabeth became one of the most famous declarations of the Second World War: “The children will not leave unless I do. I shall not leave unless their father does, and the King will not leave the country in any circumstances, whatever.”52 On the other hand, there is the negative example of the Greek royal family, who fled the country while the Greeks were still fighting the Italians and the Germans. During the Axis occupation of Greece, the void created by the flight of the royal family was filled by the Communist Party, society became deeply divided between Royalists and Communists, national unity was profoundly weakened, and after the restoration of King George II, the country experienced a disastrous Civil War (1946–1949), followed by a long period of political instability.53 Empathizing with wider society sets an excellent example of leadership during trouble and collective loss. A remarkable example of empathy was the way Jacinda Ardern, the ex-Prime Minister of New Zealand, publicly shared her feelings with New Zealanders on March 15, 2019, after the terrorist attacks on two mosques in Christchurch when 49 people were killed and another 48 injured. She demonstrated her sympathy to the New Zealand Muslim community by physically embracing survivors and families of the victims, wearing the hijab, and 10 days after the attack, attending Friday prayers outside of one of the two mosques that had been attacked.54 In contrast, British Prime Minister Theresa May was heavily criticized in the media and by the public for her coldness when she visited Grenfell Tower in North Kingston, West London, after a deadly fire that had caused the deaths of 72 people. She remained emotionally distant, choosing to be officially informed by members of the emergency services rather than going to meet the people and comfort the bereaved.55 While New Zealand was united in condemning the terrorist attack against its Muslim community, in London, violent clashes broke out, with crowds chanting “No Justice, No Peace.” In the first case, national unity was preserved and strengthened; in the second, it was damaged, along with Theresa May’s popularity. Nevertheless, empathy is not enough in itself to preserve national unity. A smart state wishing to promote national unity must also be able and willing to demonstrate compassion when needed. This process is about showing the people that a government is capable not only of sharing the sentimental burden of the tragedy that has befallen them but is also there to exercise efficient postcrisis management, offering more than just a helping hand to those who have suffered and learning from the  Bovee L. Courtland, Contemporary Public Speaking, San Diego: Collegiate Press, p.450.  For more regarding this period, see Brewer David, Greece, the decade of War: Occupation, Resistance and Civil War, London: I.B. Tauris, 2016 54  https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-asia-47592358; Byman L. Daniel, “Five initial thoughts on the New Zealand terrorist attack,” Brookings, March 15, 2019, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/ order-from-chaos/2019/03/15/five-initial-thoughts-on-the-new-zealand-terrorist-attack/ 55  Walker Peter, “Theresa May calls her response to Grenfell fire ‘not good enough’,” The Guardian, June 11, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jun/11/theresa-may-grenfell-towerfire-response-not-good-enough 52 53

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tragic event to prepare the nation for similar events that might happen in the future. This is extremely important too. The state has to send a clear message to its citizens that it is capable of connecting psychologically and can guarantee that similar lapses in public safety during a natural disaster, or failures in national security during a terrorist attack, will not be repeated. National unity is strengthened when there is a solid collective consciousness of safety and order within the state. In other words, when the theoretical dimensions of the social contract regarding the well-being of the citizens within the legal and political framework of the state are accompanied by successful actions, which not only encourage but also improve societal security. People may generally be more willing to accept a state’s limited ability to deal effectively with an unexpected event. The so-called black swan phenomena56 are more readily accepted in a well-run society as damaging events that are rare and cannot be avoided entirely. Society is not so prepared to accept their repetition when national unity can give way to collective wrath, violent rallies take place, and society, or at least its most extreme members, mutates into an uncontrollable mob. A characteristic example of this was the outbreak of the Arab Spring in Tunisia. The cruelty of state officers in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid caused the street vendor Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi to set fire to himself in December 2010. The next day, protesters appeared on the city streets to express their rage and grief at his suicide. Local authorities suppressed the protests with supreme violence, which sparked a national uprising against the regime. When the authorities again resorted to excessive violence, the citizens’ anger resulted in overthrowing of the Tunisian government.57

Unconventional Diplomacy The majority of states in the international system follow conventional diplomacy. Thus, they form or join alliances to meet the threat or the power of a revisionist element, or else they bandwagon,58 sometimes even for profit.59 They make trade agreements when the opportunity arises, promote their soft power abroad by organizing museum exhibitions and similar events, carry out joint military exercises with other states, etc. All these are positive steps toward safeguarding the state’s interests through conventional diplomacy. However, as already mentioned, a state

 Taleb Nicholas Nassim, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, New  York: Random House, 2007. 57  For an analysis of the concept of Stasis during the Arab Spring, see Spyros N. Litsas, “Stranger in a Strange Land: Thucydides’ Stasis and the Arab Spring,” Digest of Middle East Studies, 2013, vol. 22, no.2, pp. 361–376. 58  Walt M. Stephen, op. cit., pp. 17–49, 147–180. 59  Schweller L.  Randall, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, 1994, vol. 19, no.1, pp. 72–107. 56

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hesitant about leaving its comfort zone and putting alternative policies, including its diplomatic operation, into action cannot be considered smart. First, smart diplomacy must be differentiated from the concept of smart defense. The latter has to do exclusively with implementing the state’s hard power using hi-­ tech operational means and hybrid military strategy. The first, as I argue, promotes the state’s political, economic, and cultural objectives without being confused with the use of its armed forces. Therefore, smart diplomacy is a platform where the combination of a state’s smart, economical, and sharp power is used by Machiavellian diplomats60 to promote the nation’s interests, objectives, and goals as fully as possible when they relate to the grand strategy core of a smart state. A Machiavellian diplomat must be able to win over the opposite side, excite their expectations, or make them apprehensive of the state he represents, depending on the situation and its objectives: Sometimes all the above are required in a single negotiation. However, smart diplomacy must know its limits. For example, in cases where the state has to decide whether to send troops abroad on a peace mission or assist an ally under direct threat, this must be determined according to the state’s overall grand strategy. It is, therefore, no longer the responsibility of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but of the Head of State. This is important because many times in history, ambitious diplomats or Ministers of Foreign Affairs have played a role contrary to the state’s interests, implementing an unthought-out policy. The rift between Antonis Samaras, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis over the so-called Macedonian Question in 1992–1993 undermined Athens’ efforts to find a positive solution to the dispute about the official name of the state that had emerged from the dissolution of Yugoslavia. After many years, Athens recognized the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as North Macedonia, which for the Greeks was the most challenging option for reasons that had to do with a sentimental attachment to the name “Macedonia.” The end of the Macedonian question took this particular root mainly because Samaras could not curb his political ambitions and adhere to Mitsotakis’ grand strategy.61 The smart functioning of a state’s diplomatic policy should take the following form. Imagine a highway filled with vehicles traveling in both directions. The smart diplomatic vehicle moves against the current. Smart diplomacy not only promotes peace with existing or potential allies but also seeks to anticipate possible disruptions of the balance of power, regionally or internationally, which might lead to limited or extended conflict or even total war. An influential diplomat must also be a skilled analyst of domestic political conditions and not just a good PR man able to

 I am making use of the term Machiavellian diplomats, not in the form of immoral diplomacy but as those who, during their daily practice and especially during critical negotiations, can present the Janus’ ability to show two faces at once, that of the Lion and the other of the Fox, as Machiavelli urges Lorenzo di Piero de Medici in The Prince. 61  For more regarding this period, see among others Tziampiris Aristotle, Greece, European Political Cooperation and the Macedonian Question, London: Routledge, 2000; Zahariadis Nikolaos, Essence of Political Manipulation: Emotion, Institutions & Greek Foreign Policy, New York: Peter Lang, 2005, pp. 73–136. 60

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throw successful cocktail parties. Nor does smart diplomacy stop in peacetime. Also, in wartime, it should be able to explore possibilities for peace and peace with advantages. Although the ultimate decision regarding the end of a war is in the hands of the head of the state, the role of the diplomats, if they function smartly, is vital in defeating the enemy or seeking peace. This process usually occurs in neutral states allowing diplomats from the opposing sides to communicate and exchange proposals that might bring the fighting to an end. Even when two states explicitly seek to destroy each other, smart diplomacy will always keep an open communication channel and promote every opportunity to re-establish peace. As the famous American diplomat Richard Holbrook said, “Peacemaking is like jazz, you have to listen to the other instruments and improvise.”62 The two Superpowers in the Cold War maintained direct diplomatic contact to resolve a serious problem as it arose. The peaceful resolution of the Cuban missile crisis is one example of smart diplomacy. The two actors explored diplomatic means of de-escalating the crisis while preparing for the outbreak of direct hostilities.

Conclusion Being a smart state in international politics means being active, alert, and conscious of the systemic surroundings. It can function as a polity not simply monolithically but always flexibly in a way that protects and expands its national interests. Choose the best of the advanced guard, rather than the mediocre, or the least bad of the inadequate, to lead the society and not simply to satisfy a narcissistic ambition. To lead is, first and foremost, to serve others. Being smart as a state means that you are able and willing to put forward alternative policies and exit your comfort zone. Ignore your size and focus on your qualities. Hide your fears and move in the volatile international arena with confidence and self-control. To be rational is always to look for the silver lining without disregarding the power of the people who are the cornerstone for every smart state if it wishes to function successfully in the international environment. Have there been many smart states in history? The answer can be imagined. Not every prosperous state is smart, but being not a smart state is synonymous with a failing or failed entity. From time to time, smart states appear on the systemic landscape. Due to profound internal inconsistencies, some of them follow the route of a falling star. They make an impressive entrance but soon vanish into oblivion or lose their leading role. Other states have the skill to last for an extended period. We should remember that the international system is a cruel domain. If you are smart but lack the smartness to protect yourself from the predatory instincts of other states, your energies and resources will soon be expended merely in the effort to survive.

 Bot Bernard, “The Call of Unorthodox Diplomacy,” Carnegie Europe, October 14, 2019, https:// carnegieeurope.eu/2019/10/14/call-of-unorthodox-diplomacy-pub-80032 62

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Suppose you do not have the opportunity to develop and make progress. In that case, your advantage will quickly become redundant, for smartness is closely bound up with constantly evolving as a political entity. If you are smart as a state but fragile as a polity, you will only survive for a short time, not only because of your enemies but also because of the stifling embrace of your allies. Therefore, it is not enough for a state to start smart; it must prove that every new day functions smarter than the day before. In the following chapters, I will focus on the archetype of the smart state, which shows that it learns from its mistakes and is always ready to take the next big step. A detailed portrait of the United Arab Emirates will be offered, and through an analysis of its history, legal and administrative structure, leadership model, and foreign policy, I will argue that it is an excellent empirical paradigm for my theory on the nature of “smart states” in the international environment.

Chapter 3

From Oblivion to Modernity: The UAE’s Smart Birth

O! You, our brothers of Kuwait and Euphrates O! You, our brothers, north and south in the Arab world. Zayed has called out to us with dedicated resolve A call whose commitment rekindles true hearts. Listen to Zayed! Abandon sleep! He has called us to denounce division. He who follows Zayed may hope to survive. Following Zayed is a duty – a vital duty. (Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, My Hopes)

Introduction In international politics, an event in time X may have origins in another event long before. This nonlinear chain reaction resembles the process that begins with the birth of a volcano and leads to its eruption. The period between the inception of an event and its realization prompts the gears of history to turn, resulting in a series of events that are largely invisible to the masses. Nevertheless, while natural laws determine the evolutionary process in the volcano, in the political case, unpredictability and collective action, frequently interconnected but also chaotic, have the primary role. The role of gifted people, smart leaders, politicians, or pioneering personalities in arts and academia can often be crucial to how the phenomenon manifests itself internationally. This chapter will describe the birth of a smart state, the United Arab Emirates. This federation of Arab Sheikhdoms in the Trucial Coast, born under the unforgiving Arabian sun, was deeply influenced by the unique role played by a gifted leader, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, and also by a series of chaotic but interconnected events, which occurred in the lower Arabian Gulf from the time that the British first emerged as a colonial power in the area. This chapter will argue that the state’s smart foundations were laid when Sheikh Zayed began to realize the Union of the Trucial States vision. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5_3

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The British and the Trucial States Like nature, the international system abhors a vacuum. After the Second World War, the two main victorious actors, the USA and the Soviet Union, were elevated to superpowers in the new world order. At the same time, the lesser victor, the United Kingdom, suffered a demotion from its prewar position, being downgraded from the status of Great Power to that of a regional actor.1 London contributed immensely to the defeat of Nazism and Fascism. Although it enjoyed a solid special relationship with the USA,2 it was nevertheless impossible to maintain the status it held before the outbreak of the Second World War. The demise of the Empire, the loss of the Jewel in the Crown (1947), that is, the Indian subcontinent, the departure from Greece (1947) and Palestine (1948), and the great fiasco of the Suez Crisis (1956) were all stages in a story of decline that Paul Kennedy has eloquently described in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. The forced evacuation of British forces from the Suez Canal compelled London to seek a new location in the broader region that would permit it to maintain an influential presence in the Arab world. This location was Aden, Yemen. Situated at a highly strategic point near the eastern approach to the Red Sea from the Indian Ocean, with a natural deep port, Aden had been an important outpost for the British East India Company since 1839.3 However, during the 1950s and 1960s, it came under the disruptive spell of Arab nationalism,4 with most of the local population wishing fervently to see the end of colonial rule. Soon enough, an uprising broke out in Aden against the British forces, and in the following years, the exercise of violence became ever more systematic. In 1964, two British military personnel were killed and twenty-five wounded in thirty-six recorded violent incidents in Aden. In

 The economic and political deterioration of the United Kingdom was a gradual process from the end of the Second World War until Margaret Thatcher’s Premiership. Especially, the first decade of the Cold War era was traumatic for Britain and the people in Old Albion. For more, see among others Kynaston David, Austerity Britain, 1945–1951, London: Bloomsbury, 2007. 2  For more regarding the term “Special Relationship” and the connection between Washington and London, see among others Xu Ruike, Alliance Persistence within the Anglo-American Special Relationship, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017; Burk Kathleen, “Old world, new world: Great Britain and America from the beginning” in John Dumbrell & Axel R. Schafer (eds.), America’s “Special Relationships:” Foreign and Domestic Aspects of the Politics of Alliance, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 24–44. 3  For a thorough account of the British arrival in Aden, see, among other studies, Gavin J.R. Aden Under British Rule, 1839–1967, London: C. Hurst & Company, 1996, pp.62–70, second ed. 4  The roots of Arab nationalism can be traced in Egypt back to the end of the eighteenth century, when Muhammad Ali Pasha, the de facto ruler of Egypt, during a military campaign against the Wahhabi movement in Arabia that the Sublime Porte ordered, came in touch with the Arab masses and developed the vision for the establishment of a great Arab Empire that was to antagonize the Ottomans both militarily and religiously. For more regarding this very interesting issue, see, among others, Khalidi Rashid et  al. (eds.), The Origins of Arab Nationalism, New  York: Columbia University Press, 1991; Aziz M.A., “The Origins of Arab Nationalism,” Pakistan Horizon, 2009, vol. 62, no.1, pp. 59–66. 1

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the next three years, forty-four British soldiers were killed, and 325 were injured, in 2980 recorded violent incidents.5 It was clear that the British in Aden would be engulfed in a storm, as had happened in Cyprus 10  years before, and London decided it was time to act. On January 16, 1968, British Premier Harold Wilson proposed the withdrawal of all British troops from the Gulf, plus Malaysia and Singapore, by the end of 1971. The House of Commons voted in favor of Wilson’s proposal, agreeing on the end of the British era on the Trucial Coast.6 The decision to withdraw from the Gulf aimed to achieve two main objectives. On the one hand, the British wished to drastically reduce British military expenditure in Aden and the wider region. In 1966, the Labor government rejected a further devaluation of the pound after one had been carried out in 1964 and voted instead for a deflationary package of rigid austerity. As a result, any imperial narcissism had to be put away, and London was obliged to follow a more balanced approach to international affairs. On the other hand, 10 Downing Street did not wish to jeopardize future economic collaboration with the regional actors by challenging them militarily. Besides Aden, London also announced that it was withdrawing from the rest of the Arabian Gulf, canceling its treaties with the Trucial States by 1971. What precisely does the term Trucial States mean? Returning to the beginning of European colonialism in the Arabian Gulf is necessary to answer this question. Ancient Greeks living in Libya or Egypt communicated with the Arabian Peninsula. Eratosthenes of Cyrene, a famous Greek astronomer, mathematician, and poet, called the southwestern and southeastern regions of the peninsula Prosperous Arabia [Ευδαίμων Αραβία] due to its fertile grounds, compared with Desert Arabia in central and northern Arabia and Stony Arabia in northwestern. It was mainly inhabited by four major ethnicities: Minaeans, Sabaeans, Qatabanians, and Hadramites.7 The region attracted the interest of the rest of the world after the establishment of Islam at the beginning of the seventh century. Still, European attention was mainly directed at the great kingdoms of north-central Arabia rather than the southeastern part of the peninsula since the former were attractive locations for looting. In addition, the Great European naval powers regarded the modern Gulf region as a Terra Incognita or a base with no other value than to exercise control over the rich and alluring Indian subcontinent and Persia. The Portuguese were the first European naval power to start regular visits to the Arabian Gulf after completing the voyage around the Cape of Good in 1498. However, their main objective was to use the southeastern coast of the Arabian Gulf as a base for trade and military operations

 Peter Hinchcliffe, John T. Ducker, and Maria Holt, Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden, New York: I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd., 2006, p.36. 6  Smitson Scott, “The Road to Good Intentions: British Nation-Building in Aden,” Center for Complex Operations, case study, no.10, Washington: National Defense University, 2010 https:// cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/case-studies/10_the_road_to_good_intentions_teacher_edition.pdf; Sato Sohei, “Britain’s Decision to Withdraw from the Persian Gulf, 1964–1968: A Pattern and a Puzzle,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 2009, vol. 37, no. 1, pp. 110–111 (99–117). 7  https://www.britannica.com/topic/history-of-Arabia-31558/Sabaean-and-Minaean-kingdoms 5

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against Persia. In 1507, the Portuguese, under the leadership of Afonso de Albuquerque, sacked Muscat and Khor Fakkan to bring regional naval rivalry with the local powers to an end and built a series of forts all along the Gulf to establish a permanent presence on the broader region.8 However, Lisbon’s primary interest was in what was happening on the other side of the Gulf, in Central Asia. The Portuguese stayed in the region for a century without leaving a significant mark on the area. They were forced to abandon southeastern Arabia under pressure from the powerful navies of Holland and England and also due to the rising military challenge from the Persians. In 1602, the Persian Shah Abbas I brought the Portuguese presence in Bahrain to an end; in 1622, a joint Persian-English force captured Hormuz, while in 1633, the Omani dynasty of Yaruba under Imam Nasir bin Murshid ended the Portuguese presence in Juifar and Dibba, followed by Sohar in 1643. The last major Portuguese defeat was in Muscat in 1650 by the Yaruba Imam Sultan bin Saif.9 The end of the Portuguese presence in the region allowed the Dutch to expand their influence on the southeastern coast of the Arabian Gulf. In 1623, the Dutch East India Company signed an agreement with Shah Abbas I to open free trade routes for the Dutch fleet on the Persian coast. Like Lisbon, Amsterdam attached little importance to the inland; its primary interest was controlling the trade routes between Persia and the Indian subcontinent. For that reason, the Dutch built a stronghold on Kharg, an island close to the shore of modern Iran, which was offered to them by Mir Nasr of the Za’ab tribe, the ruler of Bandar Rig on the Persian coast. However, the cruelty of the Dutch occupation and their neglect of the people of Kharg led to a violent uprising in 1766 under Sheikh Mir Muhaanna. He defeated the Dutch in Kharg, signaling the end of the Dutch East India Company in southeast Arabia.10 The British East India Company first appeared on the Persian coast of the Gulf in the early seventeenth century in the strategically located port of Jask, seeking to be a part of the profitable silk trade.11 However, the high status of the East India Company was to be challenged by the strengthening of the Qasimi dynasty, which controlled Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah on the Arab coast of the Gulf. The Qasimi dynasty demanded a share of the naval trade in the Arabian Gulf and began to harass European trading vessels entering the Gulf. This was taken as an open provocation by the British, who first tried to resolve the situation with a maritime treaty with the Qasimi side in 1806 to ensure that the naval routes would not suffer attacks or other provocations. However, the Qasimi continued to challenge British control of the Gulf. In 1809, the Qasimi fleet attacked the British ship, Minerva, capturing the  Agius A. Dionisius, Seafaring in the Arabian Gulf and Oman: The people of the Dhow, London: Routledge, 2005, p.70. 9  For more regarding the Portuguese presence in the Arab Gulf, see Mikaberidze Alexander, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World, Santa Barbara: ABC Clio, 2011, vol. 1, pp.721–723. 10  For more, see Barendse J. Rene, The Arabian Seas: The Indian Ocean World of the Seventeenth Century, London: Routledge. 11  Good Peter, “The East India Company’s Farman, 1622–1747,” Iranian Studies, 2019, vol. 52, no.1–2, p. 183 (181–197) 8

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crew and demanding a ransom to set them free.12 This outraged the British, who responded with a full-scale attack against the port of Ras al-Khaimah. The British troops quickly overcame all resistance before setting the city alight. The Qasimi dynasty, however, did not heed the warning and continued being hyperactive against the British ships. Therefore, in 1819 the British attacked Ras al-Khaimah again and eradicated it. Other major Qasimi fortifications and ports were dealt with similarly, such as Fasht, Sharjah, Umm al Quwain, and Ajman. The blow suffered was so great that the Qasimi tribe never regained its pre-1819 position, and in 1820, a General Treaty of Peace was signed between London and all the Sheikhs of southeastern Arabia. This was an essential step toward London establishing greater control over the region. One of its main provisions was that all tribes were forbidden to build large ships or erect fortifications along the coast, and the only naval activity permitted was pearl fishing. The 1820 Treaty was a disaster for the locals, a typical manifestation of raw colonialism, condemning the local populations to economic misery for many decades since pearl fishing did not guarantee a steady income. However, the political significance of the Treaty was that, for the first time, a Great European power acknowledged de jure that there was a lot more to southeastern Arabia than simply the vast emptiness of the desert. Furthermore, while the Portuguese and the Dutch ignored the needs of the local population, the British acknowledged the sovereign right of the local leaders to come to an agreement with London about the future of their region. After the destruction of the Qasimi in 1819, the tribes of southeastern Arabia emerged as legitimate interlocutors with London, setting the cornerstone for the first building blocks of modernity in the Arabian Gulf. This de jure recognition by London and the designed framework offered the tribes an upgraded role and status too. According to Donald Hawley, the Truce was “the first treaty to impose an obligation on any part of Arabia.”13 It was a significant step for the future of the region, acknowledging the right of the tribes to secure their future despite the scarcity of food or water in one of the most inhospitable natural environments of the globe. This daily Herculean task meant that the tribes would quickly resort to violence to ensure access to a well with drinking water, the monopoly of the well’s use, or control of an oasis. This violent rivalry also added more friction to the British presence; thus, in 1835, London forced the Sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and Ajman to sign a ten-year truce that banned hostilities at sea during the pearling season. After 10 years, London compelled the Sheikhs again to sign a permanent marine peace treaty. London had managed to implement a sui generis occupation of the region. It dominated the coasts and naval trade routes without being involved in domestic affairs, establishing the economic and political framework for its presence and diplomatic relations between the different tribes in an area now known as the Trucial Coast because of the numerous truces that had been agreed upon. This sui  Qasim Al Muhammad Sultan, The Myth of the Arab Piracy in the Gulf. New York: Routledge, 1988, p. 60. 13  As cited in Muaddi Darraj Susan & Meredith Puller, Creation of the Modern Middle East: United Arab Emirates, London: Chelsea House Publications, 2008, p. 21–22. 12

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generis colonial presence in the southern regions of the Arabian Gulf affirmed British determination to safeguard sealines to the Indian Ocean and the Indian subcontinent, so vital to London’s geostrategic interests. For the Arab tribes, it was a source of sovereign status regarding how the rest of the world saw the region while, to some extent, regulating the rivalry between the different Sheikhdoms. The Trucial States were the product of colonialism, defining the region’s status internationally for the first time. At the same time, the colonists also set the rules for political coexistence by the tribal entities that were competing for control of the vast outback of southeastern Arabia.14

The Years of Dust The birth of the Trucial States gave the British side absolute control of the region of southeastern Arabia. After 1820, London became much more aware of the area’s geostrategic value but was unwilling to dedicate the time or the necessary resources to studying and understanding local culture and customs to guarantee the Sheikhdoms a more prosperous future. The typical British idea of the Trucial Coast is seen in the following description by the famous travel writer Wilfred Thesiger: “The deserts in which I had traveled had been blanks in time as well as space. They had no intelligible history, the nomads who inhabited them had no known past. Some bushmen paintings, a few disputed references in Herodotus and Ptolemy, and tribal legends of the recent past.”15 Therefore, British objectives in controlling the Trucial States can be summarized as follows: (1) maintain peace between the tribes and Sheikhdoms to preserve the maritime balance of power in favor of the British status and (2) prevent any other European power from entering the Arabian Gulf. As James Onley argues, “To protect its trade and communication routes through the Persian Gulf and prevent the establishment of a foreign naval base there, British India established spheres of influence in Persia and Ottoman Iraq, and offered a series of treaties through which it became increasingly responsible for the protection of central Eastern Arabia and the island of Bahrain. Through these treaties, the British were able to get local rulers to collaborate in the pacification of the Persian Gulf and in the later exclusion of foreign influence threatening British Indian interests.”16 London had succeeded in establishing peace and order on the Trucial Coast, yet clashes between different tribes in the region were intense and recurring. One major dispute arose between the Al Saud and the Bani Yas tribes over control of the oasis  For more regarding the British rule in the Trucial Coast between the mid of the nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century, see Onley James, Britain and the Gulf Sheikhdoms, 1820–1971: The Politics of Protection, Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 2009, pp. 7–10. 15  Thesiger Wilfred, Arabian Sands, London: Penguin Books, 2007, reprinted ed. p.37. 16  Onley James, “The Raj reconsidered: British India’s informal Empire and spheres of influence in Asia and Africa,” Asian Affairs, 2009, vol.40, no.1, pp. 44. 14

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of Al-Ain/Buraimi.17 As Kelly sets the origins of the dispute, “The fists seizure of the oasis by a Saudi force took place in 1800, as part of the great Wahhabi expansion which eventually brought most of Arabia under the rule of Abdul Aziz I ibn Saud, Amir of Daraiya in central Arabia.”18 The region’s geopolitical value was high because of its many wells and the strategic location as crossroads on the caravan routes between Saudi Arabia and Oman. The Saudis, who were at war with the Ottoman Empire and Egypt between 1811 and 1818 and with the Rashidi Emirate until 1921, wanted to control the inner transport corridors of the Trucial States. This was mainly because they wished to use continental southeastern Arabia as a strategic hinterland, where they could withdraw and regroup around the Al-Ain oasis and thus avoid Ottoman-Egyptian assaults. However, the Bani Yas and the Omani tribes opposed the Saudi objectives efficiently. From 1800 until 1869, punctuated by long intervals of peace or preparations for war, the Bani Yas tribe confronted Saudi expansionism in the Al-Ain oasis, affirming their role as key regional actors and an anti-Wahhabi barrier. In contrast, other local tribes, such as the Qasimi of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, openly supported the Saudis and embraced Wahhabism.19 The Bani Yas tribe was a loose confederation of twenty subgroups in the southern part of the Trucial framework, around the Liwa Oasis on the northern edge of the Rub al’ Khali desert.20 They had no desire to come under the austere Wahhabi control of the Saudis; thus, they struggled for autonomy. This fierce opposition to the strongest Saudi grouping encouraged the tribal exceptionalism of the Bani Yas, ensuring a solid basis for cooperation between different branches of the tribe, such as the Al Bu Falah, who were and still are ruling Abu Dhabi through the Al Nahyan House, and the Al Bu Falasah, who were and still are ruling Dubai through the Al Maktoum House. The continuous clashes between the tribes in the interior of the Trucial Coast, the British indifference to what was happening away from the coastline, the inhospitable natural environment, hostile to any agrarian production, and the gradual decline of pearling, the only source of profit in the first decades of the twentieth century, created primitive social conditions for the locals. Living standards were barely above subsistence level, while the lack of even the most primitive form of health care made stifling conditions for the people whose survival was precarious. However,  I am making use of the two names “Al-Ain” and “Buraimi” since today the oasis is divided between the city of Al-Ain in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi and the town of Al Buraimi of the Sultanate of Oman. 18  Kelly B. John, “The Buraimi Oasis Dispute,” Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1956, vol. 32, no.3, p.320 (318–326). 19  Kelly B. John, ibid. For more regarding the doctrinal analysis of Wahhabism, see Delong-Bas J. Natana, Wahhabi Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 7–92. 20  Website of Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashed al Maktoum, https://sheikhmohammed.ae/en-us/ baniyastribe According to Christopher Davidson in Abu Dhabi: Oil and Beyond, New  York: Columbia University Press, 2009, the origin of the Bani Yas is either from the Najd region in modern Saudi Arabia or from Oman’s Yas bin Sasa. 17

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the relations with the British were at a good status. The only outbreak of violence between the British and the locals after the defeat of the Qasimi in 1819 was the Hyacinth incident in 1910. HMS Hyacinth landed troops in Dubai to search for illegal guns after receiving intelligence about an illegal shipment from Muscat. The British suspected the load would be sent to the northwest frontiers of India for Afghan tribesmen raiding British territories. The arms were discovered in a house, and during the operation that followed for the arrest of the smugglers, an outbreak of violence occurred where thirty-seven Dubaians and four British soldiers were killed.21 As a result, the Dubai ruler, Sheikh Butti bin Suhail Al Maktoum, paid 50,000 rupees to the British side in reparations for the violent encounter. The Trucial States did not participate in the First or Second World Wars, unlike the Sharifian Army of the Hashemites, who fought against their Ottoman overlords during the Great War. The only exception was the small RAF military base of Sharjah, which allowed the British to monitor everyday developments of the lower Gulf region.22 Nevertheless, the apparent dearth of significant events taking place on the surface of the Trucial States did not reflect what was happening beneath the ground in the Gulf region. The first discovery of oil took place in Bahrain in 1932. Soon enough, Qatar followed, while in 1939, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan, granted permission to the British Iraq Petroleum Company to explore for oil in his lands. However, this undertaking was interrupted by the outbreak of the Second World War. Shakhbut was a traditionalist but was open to turning Abu Dhabi into an oil-producing country. He was not corrupt, unlike other regional leaders who spent the revenues from oil on themselves. Still, he was also unwilling to exit his conservative way of thinking and lead his compatriots toward collective development and progress by investing oil revenues in constructing civic infrastructures, which would have made people’s lives more bearable and humane. His main preoccupation, besides oil, was to strengthen his rule and effectively confront the continuous Saudi pressure over the Al-Ain oasis. He understood that to achieve this, it was essential to minimize the influence of the Saudis on the local populations and revive the old connection of his tribe with the Bedouins of the interior, whose numbers would allow him to show to the British his claim to rule the Trucial State with the largest population. To accomplish this, Shakhbut appointed his younger brother, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, governor of Al-Ain, in 1946. Zayed’s leadership skills were soon recognized by the local tribes and the British, who held him in high regard. Wilfred Thesiger, who met Zayed in Al-Ain in 1948, said, “He was a powerfully built man…He had a strong, intelligent face with steady, observant eyes, and his manner was quiet but masterful…he had a great reputation among the Bedu. They liked him for his easy informal ways and friendliness and respected his force of character, cunning, and physical strength.” They said

 Elsheshtawy Yasser, Dubai: Behind an Urban Spectacle, London: Routledge, 2010, p.97.  Dennehy John, “How Sharjah played its part in winning the Second World War,” The National, September 2, 2020. https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/heritage/how-sharjah-played-its-partin-winning-the-second-world-war-1.1071217 21 22

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admiringly, “Zayid is a Bedu. He knows about camels, can ride like one of us, can shoot, and knows how to fight.”23 In the mid-1950s, oil was finally discovered at Murban Bab, 84 kilometers northwest of the city of Abu Dhabi. In 1958, the first offshore discovery was made in the Umm Shaif field close to Das Island, 153 kilometers northwest of the city of Abu Dhabi.24 However, despite the people’s hopes that a new, shiny, and prosperous chapter in their lives was about to begin, things still were not improving. Mohamed Al Fahim, a renowned Emirati author, vividly describes the disappointment of the people of Abu Dhabi during the final stage of the days of dust: “The days, weeks and months went by without any significant change. No new departments or government institutions were set up to manage the oil, or the oil revenues, no hospitals or schools were established, nothing was done to improve the lives of the people who lived there. People became somewhat resigned to the fact that we seemed stuck in the nineteenth century.”25 As a matter of fact, nothing was done to improve the lives of the people in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. As Peter Lienhardt, Shakhbut’s advisor and a British political anthropologist with deep experience in the Gulf region, writes about the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, “Many readers will remember that Shaikh Shakhbut’s unwillingness to spend the increasing sums of money that he received from Abu Dhabi oil became one of the jokes of the world press in the later years of his rule. In Abu Dhabi itself, the fact that people were getting very little out of their oil caused increasing dissatisfaction among both the ruling family and the general public. It was clear that the situation could not go on like that indefinitely. Indeed, when I discussed the position in Abu Dhabi with a shaikh from another state in the early 1960’s, he asked me why I thought the British Government went on supporting Shakhbut. I said I did not think they were supporting him, but it would be difficult for them to depose him since gunboat diplomacy was now considered objectionable.” He replied, “There would be no need for the British Government to depose him. If the Government simply let it be known that it was not supporting him, the people would depose him in no time.” “And his own brother [the present Ruler of Abu Dhabi] [it is obvious he refers to Sheikh Zayed] had told him that unless he spent more money the people would come and burn the palace down.”26 Despite the discovery of oil, Abu Dhabi continued to be a small town lost in the dust of the desert, with primitive infrastructure and a society experiencing nineteenth-century living conditions. This was because of Shakhbut’s decision not to use the oil earnings, $70 million per year in the mid-1960s, to raise the people’s standard of living. It is noteworthy that it was not only the British who were disappointed in Shakhbut’s underachievement but also his family members. As Sheikh Zayed once confessed to  Thesiger Wilfred, op. cit., pp.268–269.  Neuhof Florian, “The Start of an Epic Journey,” The National News, November 6, 2011 https:// www.thenationalnews.com/uae/the-start-of-an-epic-journey-1.414185 25  Al Fahim J.A. Mohammed, From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi, Abu Dhabi: Makarem, 2021, p. 68, 3rd. ed. 26  Lienhardt Peter, Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001, pp. ix-x, edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi. 23 24

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A.J.M. Craig from the British Political Agency in Dubai, “Shakhbut did not understand the value of anything new. Education, hospitals, public works – all had to be explained to him over and over again.”27 It was more than evident that he could not keep up with the rapid momentum for change that the discovery of oil was generating in Abu Dhabi. Thus, it came as no surprise when, on August 6, 1966, the Council of the Al Nahyan family, true to Bedouin tradition, replaced him with his progressive and charismatic brother, Sheikh Zayed.28 This pivotal decision was about to change everything for the Trucial Coast and the people there. The bloodless overthrow of Shakhbut and his replacement by his brother Zayed did not counter London’s wishes. On the contrary, Britain has been working toward overthrowing Shakhbut since 1962,29 seeing him as the main obstacle toward the modernization of Abu Dhabi and the opening of a new chapter for the Emirate and its people. Characteristically, the British Political Agent in Abu Dhabi, A.T. Lamb, described Shakhbut as “an autocrat who tries to run the state single-handed and his insistence on personal control of even the minutest details of government would make Louis XIV look like a constitutional monarch.”30 During a visit of Sheikh Zayed to the United Kingdom in July 1966, he had various meetings with British politicians and diplomats, where he was persuaded that he had to lead the Emirate

 As cited in With United Strength: H.H. Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan al Nahyan, the Leader and the Nation, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2013, p. 110, 3rd ed. 28  Sheikh Shakhbut rejected his family’s decision; however, he accepted his fate when he realized that a squadron of the Trucial Oman Scouts had surrounded the palace. He was escorted to the airport, where he was flown first to Bahrain and then to Iran. After some years in exile, he was allowed to return to Abu Dhabi and live with full honors as a senior House of the Al Nahyan member in a palace in Al-Ain. He died in 1989 in Al-Ain. For more about Shakhbut’s bloodless overthrow, see Paul Balfour Glencairn, Bagpipes in Babylon: A life-time in the Arab World and Beyond, London: I.B.  Tauris, 2006, pp.  203–205; Rabi Uzi, “Oil Politics and Tribal Rulers in Eastern Arabia: The Reign of Shakhbut (1928–1966),” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2006, vol. 33, no.1, pp.37–50. 29  The relationship between the British side and the Emir of Abu Dhabi has been turbulent since Sheikh Shakhbut’s era began. In 1935 and 1938, the British Raj threatened to seize Abu Dhabi’s pearling fleet because Shakhbut was not cooperating in the suppression of the slave trade, while for an extended period, until 1939, he refused to sign an oil concession with the Iraq Petroleum Company, unlike all the other Sheikhs in the region. The National Archives, Peel (India Office) to the Undersecretary of State (Foreign Office), August 3, 1938, FO371/21825/E4579; Zahlan Said Rosemarie, The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman, Reading: Garnet Publishing, 1998, pp. 109–110, rev. Ed. The problematic relationship reached a climax in April 1962 when Sir William Luce, then Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Sir Hugh Boustead, then Ambassador of the United Kingdom in Abu Dhabi, began to work secretly for the overthrow of Shakhbut. Still, their efforts failed because he managed to receive support from the House of the Al Nahyans, while another plan in 1963 failed, too, because, again, the family refused to move against the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi. Bradshaw Tancred, The End of Empire in the Gulf: From Trucial States to the United Arab Emirates, London: I.B. Tauris, 2020, pp. 83–84. 30  UK Public Record Office (PRO), London, Foreign Office Archives, FO371/185523, A.T Lamb to Sir William Luce, Annual Review of Events in Abu Dhabi in 1965, Dispatch No. 1, January 1, 1966. 27

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of Abu Dhabi to a new era.31 London had already planned to abandon the sandy fields of the Arab Gulf, therefore, wanted to leave behind capable leaders with a progressive agenda that would have allowed the continuation of the cooperation with it. In the 1966 Defence White Paper, it was stated that Britain had to withdraw from Arabia for economic reasons,32 while in 1967, the Foreign Office argued that, “After our decision to withdraw militarily as well as politically from Aden by 1968, no one really believes that we shall be able (or even wish) to stay indefinitely in the Gulf. By the mid-1970s we must expect a world where almost all colonial and quasi-­ colonial traces have disappeared and the overseas deployment of British power has contracted further than at present. If we have not gone from the Gulf, the pressures on us to are likely to be very severe indeed.”33 London’s goal was not to abandon the region once and for all but to maintain its bond with the Gulf, so it could continue taking advantage of the rich oil reserves without sustaining a permanent military presence. For this to be achievable, open-minded Arab leaders were needed with a good understanding of the international balance of power, pro-British attitudes, and the ability to handle efficiently the tremendous wealth of black gold. However, Zayed was not only an ideal choice for the British. The Council of the Nahyan family found in Zayed not just a good caretaker of Abu Dhabi’s subterranean wealth or a skillful and charismatic frontman but also a true leader with a vision of his homeland’s future. It can therefore be argued that the first pillar of the “Smart State” was set up by the Royal Council of the Nahyan House, when it proceeded to make this pivotal change in the leadership of the state of Abu Dhabi, the selection of Sheikh Zayed and the removal of Sheikh Shakhbut. From all the above, someone may think that the overthrow of Sheikh Shakhbut was another case of colonial intervention in the domestic political realities of the Trucial Coast. Nevertheless, some crucial details differentiate this specific event. First, the British did not want to see Shakhbut away from the office to obtain a better economic agreement regarding the exploitation of the rich oil resources of Abu Dhabi. On the contrary, because the decision to evacuate the Trucial Coast had been made, London wanted a more progressive leadership for Abu Dhabi that would be able and willing to lead the region toward political stability for profitable economic cooperation with the British side to be steadily continued. After all, by the 1960s, Britain was dependent on Arabian oil. Second, Sheikh Shakhbut’s overthrow was not another plot against the lawful ruler by some over-ambitious siblings, as human history is full of those incidents all over the globe. On the contrary, it has to be seen as a genuine effort by the Nahyan House to respect, on the one hand, the political leadership of Sheikh Shakhbut and allow the people of Abu Dhabi to have this kind of leadership that would lead them safely from the primitive living conditions that were living up until then to modernity and economic prosperity. This is why, as  UK Public Record Office (PRO), London, Foreign Office Archives, FO371/185527, Foreign Office to Certain Missions, August 6, 1966. 32  Morton Michael Quentin, Keepers of the Golden Shore: A History of the United Arab Emirates. London: Reaktion Books, 2016, p.179. 33  As cited in Bradshaw Tancred, op. cit., pp. 98–99. 31

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presented in this section, Sheikh Shakbut’s close family was trying to persuade him to abandon his inflexible position and be open to progress. At least twice before 1966, his brothers rejected London’s offer to assist them in overthrowing him. I strongly believe that the turning point for Sheikh Zayed to accept the responsibility of replacing his brother was immediately after his return from Britain in the summer of 1966 when he had a series of meetings with leaders of the most influential tribes of Abu Dhabi. In these meetings, he had been told that if the ruling family was unwilling to do something against Sheikh Shakhbut, they were ready to turn against him.34 Zayed understood that the situation was critical and that a civil war within the Emirate was approaching that would not only jeopardize the prestige and authority of the Al Nahyan House but also put the territorial integrity and the sovereign status of Abu Dhabi at risk. Last but not least, unlike many other cases where a strong and righteous leader is being overthrown for the arrival of a weak and soft substitute who would be the ideal puppet in the hands of external factors, in this case, we witnessed the replacement of a stubborn and old-fashioned leader by a dynamic, modern, and capable leader that was ready to lead the Trucial Coast and its people toward the future with realism and a genuine concern for his compatriots. The days of Sheikh Zayed were bringing the Trucial Coast out of the desert, as will be argued in the following paragraphs.

The Crossing of the Rubicon From his early days as ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed aimed to change the everyday life of the citizens of his Emirate completely while simultaneously strengthening ties with the other Trucial States. As the fascinating documentary “Farewell Arabia” observes, Zayed’s vision was to transform Abu Dhabi into the model state of the Arab world. In one of his first official statements as ruler of Abu Dhabi, he said, “If God Almighty has blessed us with this wealth, then the best way for us to please Him and thank Him, is to use that wealth to improve the country and to do good for its people, and that’s by building a society that is provided with all the means for education, health, food and shelter. We believe that our country and its people deserve to be rid of the bitterness of poverty and the harshness of underdevelopment and to move towards the path of a decent life.”35 Thus, in the first months of his reign, he signed $70 million worth of construction contracts.36 He built schools, hospitals, roads, and a commercial port in Abu Dhabi.  The National Archive, Lamb to Crawford, November 5, 1966, FO371/185529/BT1016/79; The National Archive, Lamb to Crawford, January 2, 1967, Abu Dhabi Annual Review for 1966, FCO8/827. 35  As cited by Bani Hashim Reem Alamira, Planning Abu Dhabi: From Arish village to a Global, Sustainable, Arab capital city, Berkeley: University of California, 2015, Ph.D dissertation, p.120 36  The International Television Federation, Farewell Arabia, by David Holden, London, 1968, (34:57) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KnPrI2fc_vo 34

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He also hired the famous Japanese-American architect and city planner Dr. Katsuhiko Takahashi and the Egyptian Dr. Abdulrahman Makhlouf to produce a modern urban design for the Emirate’s capital. Mohamed Al Fahim offers a vivid description of Abu Dhabi’s development from a small, primitive fishing village to a modern metropolis, “I returned home…in the autumn of 1967. When I arrived, a little over a year after Sheikh Zayed had become ruler; the town was changing at a dizzying pace. As we drove into Abu Dhabi town from the air strip I was amazed at the transformation that had taken place during my absence. The sleepy fishing village I had left was now a bustling construction site. There were trucks, bulldozers, cars and people everywhere – they were doing everything from building roads to laying cables -Abu Dhabi was a hive of activity…Commercial buildings, government buildings, housing, warehouses, shops  – all were going up simultaneously…Abu Dhabi was finally making its way into the modern day.”37 Zayed was determined to give the region’s transition a concrete foundation and to open a new chapter for the sociopolitical structure of the Trucial Coast. Moreover, unlike Shakhbut, Zayed increased the Emirate’s financial contribution to the Trucial States Development Fund to enhance relations with the region’s other states. He emphasized education, establishing nonreligious schools in Abu Dhabi for the first time. At the same time, he welcomed the first blue- and white-collar expatriates, mainly from Egypt, India, and Pakistan. Their enthusiasm and willingness to work would immensely contribute to realizing Zayed’s vision. Zayed did not simply wish to rule the Emirate of Abu Dhabi but to bring all the Trucial States together to form a dynamic and prosperous new state. Even before he became the ruler of Abu Dhabi, he clearly articulated his wish to see the Trucial Coast united under a single flag: “The sons of this region are brothers with one origin; their language is the same; their religion is the same; even the land they have lived on for thousands of years has always been one unit.”38 Both Zayed and London desired the unification of the Trucial States. After the Suez fiasco and the commencement of the Enosis independence struggle in Cyprus, where the Greek Cypriot community was forcefully demanding the end of British control of the island and its unification [Ένωσις] with the Greek state, London understood that the rise of nationalism threatened its relations with regions that remained vital for British Foreign policy in the postimperial era. The Trucial Coast was one of these areas, not merely as a vantage point from which to control the naval routes from the Indian Ocean to the Arabian Gulf (and vice versa) or as an alternative approach to Central Asia but also because of the region’s rich oil and natural gas deposits. Therefore, a Union of the Trucial States under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed, a visionary pragmatist who wished to build a better and more stable future for his people, was the most desirable development for London. As Miriam Joyce notes, “In 1960 the British had three major goals in the Trucial States: the preservation of stability, development of potential oil resources and

37 38

 Al Fahim J.A. Mohamed, op. cit., p. 208.  As cited in With United Strength, op. cit., p. 172.

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elimination of support for Arab Nationalism as promoted by champions of Egyptian leader Gamal Abdul Nasser. To achieve these ends, the British encouraged Trucial State rulers to improve the quality of life in their territories and to work together to achieve unity.”39 On the other hand, Sheikh Zayed was eager to achieve the unification of the Trucial Coast. He was fully aware that the departure of the British from the region would provoke Saudi Arabia to pursue its territorial claims at the expense of Abu Dhabi, and the same was true of Persia, which also saw the territories of the Trucial Coast as potential protectorates, thanks to their geographic proximity. Furthermore, the void opened up by the British departure would also give the Soviets the opportunity to infiltrate the Trucial Coast, as they had already succeeded in doing in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa, and promote a policy that would openly challenge the position of the current regime.40 Last but not least, he knew that as soon as the British left, old border disputes would flare up again between the Emirates and probably lead to a long and debilitating war. Under one flag, the Union of the Trucial States would be the best guarantee of preserving peace and security in a region notorious for the volatile relations between neighbors. Sheikh Zayed was perhaps unfamiliar with the Thucydidean concept of the “Security Dilemma”41 that Abu Dhabi’s large oil and natural gas reserves presented for the other states in the region and around the Trucial Coast. Still, he was experienced enough to know that to protect his rule and its territorial integrity, he had to work with London and establish a union with the rest of the Trucial States. As a matter of fact, Sheikh Zayed was so perceptive regarding the preservation of peace and order in the region that he

 Joyce Miriam, “On the road towards unity: The Trucial States from a British Perspective, 1960–1966,” Middle Eastern Studies, 1999, vol. 35, no.2, p.45 (45–60). 40  The most alarming development for the balance of power in the Arab Gulf was the establishment of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen in South Yemen in 1967, a Soviet puppet that served Moscow’s plans to create a permanent political and military base in the Arab Gulf. In 1968, a Soviet-supported guerilla movement appeared in Oman under the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman. The group officially stated that its primary goal was the establishment of Marxism-­ Leninism in Oman. It is interesting to note here that the PFLO was under Chinese economic support and political influence in an apparent attempt for Beijing to establish connections with the guerrilla movement in the Arab Gulf. For more, see Behbehani H.S.  Hashim, China’s Foreign Policy in the Arab world, 1955–1975: Three case studies, London: Routledge, 2016, chapters 6 & 7, re-edition; Yodfat A & M. Abir, In the direction of the Persian Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf, London: Frank Cass & Co., 1977, pp. 103–116. 41  According to Thucydides, the Security Dilemma produces one of the worst political and diplomatic conundrums in international politics, the well-known “Thucydides’ Trap.” The Security Dilemma is the product of the conception, or most usually the misconception, of a state’s actions to strengthen itself. These are perceived as acts of threat from another state. The Security Dilemma is the most frequent cause of a war outbreak. For more, see Herz John, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, 1950, vol. 2, no.2, pp. 157–180. For Thucydides’ Trap, see Chan Steve, Thucydides’ Trap? Historical Interpretation, Logic of Inquiry and the future of Sino-American Relations, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2020, pp. 16–36. 39

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even proposed to the British side to maintain a military presence in the Gulf, the expenses of which were to be fully covered by Abu Dhabi.42 Zayed turned toward the state most likely to sign up to his vision of a union, Dubai, ruled by the equally talented Smart leader, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum.43 As already stated, the Al Maktoum was a branch of the Bani Yas tribe that had moved from the Liwa Oasis to Dubai in 1833 under the leadership of Maktoum bin Butti. It is important to note that relations between the two Emirates had not been without tensions. In 1947, for example, a limited war broke out between the two Emirates in a border dispute that obliged the British to intervene as arbitrators. However, these differences belonged to the past. Rashid was also a forward-­thinking ruler, dedicated to realizing his vision of Dubai as the wider region’s economic and trade hub. On February 18, 1968, the two Sheikhs met in a Bedouin-style gathering in the desert at the small hill of Seih Al Sedira near the border between the two Emirates. It was there that a federation of the two Emirates was agreed upon. It should be noted that the meeting and subsequent agreement were only made possible by Sheikh Zayed’s decision to resolve an ongoing dispute about the offshore border between the two Emirates to Dubai’s advantage.44 According to Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum’s testimony, the youngest person present at this historic meeting and responsible for filling the coffee cups of the two Sheikhs, the dialogue that sealed the agreement was terse and direct. “So Rashid what do you think? Shall we create a Union?” Zayed asked, immediately  “Secrets and Deals: How Britain Left the Middle East,” BBC News Arabic Investigations (25:59–26:34) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A2iQ52qNyvE&t=440s 43  Sheikh Rashid was born in 1910 to Sheikh Saeed bin Maktoum Al Maktoum and Sheikha Hessa bint Al Murr Al Falassi. He became ruler of Dubai in 1958 after his father’s death. Alfred Jamed M. Craig, the British Political Agent in Dubai from 1961 until 1964, argued that Sheikh Rashid was the main reason for Dubai’s prosperity, describing him as “hard, realistic, unsentimental shrewdness.” According to Craig, he had the talent to learn fast and listen to his advisors’ opinions. Unlike other local rulers who preferred to be idle and were always suspicious toward everyone, Sheikh Rashid had a strategic mind that was able to understand the prospects that were deriving from Dubai’s geographic location. The National Archive, Craig to the Acting Political Resident, September 20, 1964, FO371/174711/BT1101/7. On another occasion and from another British diplomatic source, he was described as “astute, charming, unspoiled, energetic, practical, expeditious in business, contemptuous of eyewash and nearly always sound in judgment.” The National Archives, Dubai and the Northern Trucial States annual review for 1969, December 30, 1969, FCO8/1509. Last but not least, John Coles, the British Assistant Political Agent in Dubai from 1968 to 1971 says about Sheikh Rashid “I had a great admiration for Rashid…He had very little education but he didn’t seem to matter to the slightest. He had a very quick mind, there was always a twinkle in the eye, he had a very good sense of humor. I think he could have told you any hour of the day what public opinion was thinking about issues…” “Secrets and Deals: How Britain Left the Middle East,” BBC News Arabic Investigations (6:57–7:22’) https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=A2iQ52qNyvE&t=440s 44  For a full document of the Agreement that was reached between the two Emirates on February 18, 1968, see Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, United Nations, Offshore Boundary Agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, February 18, 1968. https:// w w w. u n . o rg / D e p t s / l o s / L E G I S L AT I O NA N D T R E AT I E S / P D F F I L E S / T R E AT I E S / ARE1968OB.PDF 42

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receiving a reply from Dubai’s ruler: “Give me your hand Zayed. Let us shake upon the agreement. You will be President.”45 However, Zayed knew a Union with Dubai alone would not be enough. This was because relations between the two Emirates would be volatile due to the constant potential for border disputes. A union between Abu Dhabi and Dubai would establish a prosperous state with poorer neighbors, consequently creating a source of continuous insecurity for them and the broader region. He, therefore, hoped to include all the other Trucial States in the future Union: Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, Fujairah, Umm al Quwain, and Ajman, as well as Bahrain and Qatar. From a strategic point of view, the adhesion of the last two would have enabled the new state to control the naval routes of the largest part of the Arabian Gulf and given it additional oil and natural gas resources. Last but not least, this Union of the Nine Emirates would have established the nation-state for most Arab tribes in the Middle East, offering the new state unprecedented soft power leverage in the political and cultural objective of Pan-Arabism. Zayed did not simply wish to create a loose union in the Gulf with the inclusion of different Emirates but to build a state that would play a leading role in the Cold War international system. Sheikh Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani of Qatar shared the desire to create a unified state, though for different reasons. When Ahmad was informed of the Seih Al Sedira agreement between Abu Dhabi and Dubai, he perceived it as an attempt to sideline Qatar. At the same time, he rejected the leading role that Zayed claimed for himself in reshaping the Trucial Coast.46 Ahmad believed that a Union between all nine Sheikhdoms was a positive development to enhance Qatar’s role in the post-­British Arabian Gulf and control the leading position adopted by Abu Dhabi. Thus, he took the initiative for a new meeting of all the nine Trucial Coast leaders at the Guest Palace in Dubai. Between February 25, 1968, and February 27, 1968, the nine Sheikhs, after exhaustive negotiations, reached an agreement on the establishment of the Union. Nonetheless, the vagueness of the final statement about strengthening ties between all participants showed that, at this stage, the initiative was unripe, and everything was still on the table. The unreadiness of the initiative was visible in the cases of Bahrain and Qatar. Although they both participated with great enthusiasm in the meeting of February 1968, their agendas were not fully dedicated to the cause of the Union. On the one hand, Bahrain was under enormous pressure from Iran to reject participation in the Union. According to an American Intelligence Note about Iran from 1969, the Shah hoped to prevent any other state from playing an influential role in the Gulf after the British departure, wishing to expand Iranian influence in the Arab littoral. Therefore, he opposed the formation of an Arab Union and was able to exert the most influence over Bahrain due to its sizeable Shia community.

 As cited in Langton James, “How the UAE was formed: Meetings in the desert led to new Union,” The National, November 15, 2021 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/heritage/2021/11/15/ how-the-uae-was-formed-meetings-in-the-desert-led-to-new-union/ 46  Friedman Brandon, The End of Pax Britannica in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1971, Cham: Springer, 2020, p.39. 45

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Tehran convinced Sheikh Isa bin Salman Al Khalifa that Zayed’s initiative would soon collapse and clarified that it would not tolerate Bahrain becoming a member.47 Therefore, as expected, Bahrain did not pursue its membership in the Union, and Qatar subsequently followed the same course, choosing to be an independent entity in the Arabian Gulf. Qatar was unwilling to accept the financial burden of stabilizing the weaker northern Emirates, both economically and politically, which Abu Dhabi and Dubai had already carried as a necessary step. Finally, Sheikh Ahmad of Qatar sensed that it would be impossible to limit Zayed’s authority among the other Sheikhs and (most significantly) among the other tribes. He was unwilling to accept a de facto secondary role, even though it had been decided that the Presidency of the Union would revolve around all the nine Sheikhs in the union, changing annually. Thus, Qatar chose to go its autonomous way. Nevertheless, the decision sealed in the desert between Zayed and Rashid was too solid to be annulled. After intense negotiations, the establishment of the United Arab Emirates was announced on July 18, 1971, in Dubai, by Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi of Sharjah, Sheikh Rashid bin Humaid Al Nuaimi of Ajman, Sheikh Ahmed bin Rashid Al Mualla of Umm al Quwain, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad Al Sharqi of Fujairah. All objections and hesitations on the part of the smaller Trucial States were finally put aside for two main reasons. The first was that the departure of the British would create a power vacuum in the Gulf, and their uneasiness about the region’s future stability was growing. The second factor was Zayed’s positive attitude toward the Herculean task in front of him. He was so determined to achieve the union that he was prepared to offer the other Sheikhs more political and economic gains than the size of their Emirates warranted. The ruler of Abu Dhabi did not hesitate to share the profits from his Emirate’s rich oil deposits. Forming a union was difficult because each of the Trucial States saw the others as rivals, and this mindset had to change. The joint statement signed by the Sheikhs affirmed the following: “It is our desire and the desire of our people of our emirates to establish a union between these emirates to promote a better life, more enduring stability and a higher international status for the emirates and their people.”48 It is clear that the emphasis on giving the people of the new state an improved standard of living and higher standing internationally was thanks to Sheikh Zayed himself. The union was established with the agreement of the majority of the Trucial Sheikhs, which would have been considered impossible a few years ago. On December 2, 1971, the proclamation of the new state was made known in Dubai, and it was completed when the last of the Trucial States, Ras al-­ Khaimah, became a full member of the UAE on February 10, 1972. The Union  Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, volume E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, National Intelligence Estimate 34–69, Washington, January 10, 1969 https://history. state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d1 48  Langton James, “The Most precious of things: Sheikh Zayed and the road to the Union,” The National, February 11, 2021 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/heritage/the-most-preciousof-things-sheikh-zayed-and-the-road-to-the-union-1.1118729 47

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resulted from British withdrawal and Zayed’s determination to secure the long-term viability and stability of the Trucial Coast. The United Arab Emirates came into being as a constitutional federation. Five federal institutions were established to secure its institutional stability: the Federal Supreme Council, the Presidency and Vice Presidency of the Union, the Cabinet, the Federal National Council, and the Judiciary. The Federal Supreme Council, comprised of the seven rulers of the Emirates, is the highest decision-making body of the state. It was decided that the Federal Supreme Council should elect the President and Vice President for 5 years. Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi was elected as the first President of the United Arab Emirates, while Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum of Dubai was made Vice President, and his son, Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum, became Prime Minister. The Union recognized Zayed’s defining role in establishing a new nation out of seven different Emirates, which, despite their shared affiliation to Sunni Islam and a common language and history, had significant differences that often resulted in violent conflict in the past. The establishment of the Union was not a random event but a moment of great political significance that initiated the Arabian Gulf into a new phase of its history. On December 2, 1971, Sheikh Zayed was the first Emirati citizen to raise the red, green, white, and black flag of the new state, signaling the success of his delicate negotiations to persuade the other Sheikhs of the Trucial States to put aside mutual distrust and form a Union. Despite this auspicious beginning, the UAE soon encountered challenges. Saudi Arabia quickly made its intentions visible, including reasserting its old claim on the Al-Ain oasis; in Sharjah in January 1972, there was a bloody coup to overthrow Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed al Qasimi, which resulted in his death,49 and just a few days before the official declaration of the establishment of the UAE, the Iranian Imperial Navy seized the islands of Abu Musa and the Lesser and Greater Tunbs, which were critical strategic locations in the Gulf.50 However, none of these events  The coup had been organized by the ex-ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi, who was overthrown by the British in 1965 due to his pro-Nasserist ideas that were publicly proclaimed. He was replaced by his cousin Sheikh Khalid who was murdered during the coup in 1972. For more, see Ahisha Gafoor and Paul Mitchell, “Secret Deals ending Britain’s control in Gulf revealed,” BBC News, August 30, 2022 https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-62713025 50  Buderi L.  O. Charles & Ricart T.  Luciana, The Iran  – UAE Gulf Islands Dispute: A journey through International Law, History and Politics, Leiden: Brill, 2018. According to new British documents that had been given public access only lately, the islands were offered by the British to the Persian Shah in return for Iran’s recognition of the sovereign status of the UAE and also for not making any de facto or de jure claims over Bahrain, which according to Tehran belonged to Iran both historically and geographically too. According to British sources, London began to pressure the Sheikhs of the Trucial Coast to give the islands peacefully to Iran. At the same time, it also informed the Sheikhs that it would not come to their support in case of a war with Iran over the islands. Sheikh Zayed said the best solution was for the ruler of Sharjah to consent to the British proposals. In a different case, the three islands had to be taken by force by Iran before the establishment of the federation of the UAE. “Secrets & Deals: How Britain left the Middle East” BBC News Arabic Investigations (28:22–46:18). Many would accuse Sheikh Zayed of this. However, I find this to be a pragmatic and rational, therefore also smart, political gambit. Iran was the leading 49

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was severe enough to derail the establishment of the new state. The Rubicon had already been crossed, and the die was cast. The Saudi territorial claims against the UAE were resolved in 1974 when a 24-kilometer coastline east of Khwar Ubaid and the Saybah-Zayrah oil field were granted to Riyadh in return for Saudi acceptance of the UAE’s claim to Al-Ain.51 The Sharjah coup ended with Sheikh Saqr’s arrest and the beginning of the rule of the brother of the killed Sheikh Khalid, Dr. Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi. Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, who led the operations against the conspirators after Sheikh Zayed instructed him to act quickly, carried out his mission effectively.52 The Iranian occupation of the islands in the Gulf was not resolved. Still, Tehran’s aggression caused the USA and France to strengthen their naval presence in the Gulf, sending a solid message discouraging similar acts in the future. Thus, a new smart state was born in the face of adversity.

A Smart Start The establishment of the United Arab Emirates, the qiyam al-dawla, through the union of the seven Emirates, the qiyam al-ittihad, was the culmination of a series of smart decisions that had either been taken by Sheikh Zayed himself or arose from the agreement between the other Founding Fathers, which he had promoted. First and foremost, the decision to create a union of the Trucial States resulted from regional geostrategic conditions. It did not seek to upset the international balance of power. The birth of the UAE did not follow the pattern of many other states in the modern international system. The Union was not the fruit of nationalistic fervor, or a violent uprising of the people against their oppressors, as had happened so often since the dawn of the modern age in other parts of the world. On the contrary, it was a rational decision made at the right time. Sheikh Zayed calculated that the challenges for all of the Trucial States after the departure of the British would be best

regional actor; the Trucial States were profoundly weak and unable to stand against the organized Iranian army. In contrast, other regional elements, such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia or Oman, were always present and ready to take advantage of any geostrategic anomaly in the Trucial Coast for their benefit. The climax of a crisis before the birth of the UAE was allowing the newly established Union to make its first fragile steps in the international system and work efficiently for its survival without such a heavy burden. At the end of the day, a Smart State is the one that chooses its battles and the right momentum to give them, and a Smart Leader is the one who is not paving the way for the collective mass murder of his people. In the case of the Lesser and Greater Tunbs and of Abu Musa, history must credit Sheikh Zayed and how he decided to take responsibility in front of this geostrategic Gordian Knot, which meant either the loss of the islands or the destruction of the Trucial Coast. 51  Seddiq Ramin, “Border Disputes on the Arabian Peninsula,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, March 15, 2001 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/border-disputesarabian-peninsula 52  Salah Hisham, “How Sheikh Mohammed helped foil coup attempt in Sharjah,” Khaleej Times, February 13, 2019 https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/how-sheikh-mohammed-helped-foil-coup-attempt-in-sharjah

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met by a union. Since 1648, nation-states had been formed with fire and water to fulfill a great idea, a nationalist obsession, or a historical myth. Only a few were established to strengthen the regional status quo and promote peace. That was the path and goal that was set for the UAE by its founders. For some, the actual motive behind the decision of the Trucial States to form a single political entity may seem businesslike. However, it should be remembered that survival in the anarchic international arena requires pragmatism and rationalism. In addition, Sheikh Zayed did not aim to build a Union out of nothing, as had happened in the case of Yugoslavia, for example. The seven Emirates had a common religion, language, historical past, sociocultural foundation, and a shared sense of belonging to the same ethnological womb. The true challenge for the President was to persuade the other Sheikhs to step outside their familiar comfort zone. There was never any doubt that the people would accept their leaders’ decision implicitly, as this was normal among the Arab tribes in the lower Gulf, who “see their Sheikhs primarily, not as a source of political authority but as a figure of paternal order.”53 In the same vein, Dr. Al Naqbi comments, “The UAE leaders lead as a family, taking care of their people. For example, we call Sheikh Zayed ‘the father of the nation’ because he was seen as more of a father than a leader for us.”54 From the beginning, Sheikh Zayed used this special, almost unique, connection between the Sheikhs and the people of the Trucial Coast very effectively in his mission to lay the cornerstone of the Union. Sheikh Zayed also understood that London wished the new Union to be open and friendly to British oil and gas and construction companies. With its establishment, he fulfilled that desire. Last but not least, he was fully aware of the particular aspects of the Cold War status quo internationally and was ready to use the systemic balance of power to the advantage of the UAE. From the beginning, Sheikh Zayed had made it clear to the USA that he sought multidimensional cooperation with the Western superpower, showing his anti-Soviet instincts.55 The next day, the establishment of the new state was duly recognized by Washington. Indeed, the Americans were charmed by Sheikh Zayed. In a telegram sent on April 20, 1972, Roger P. Davies, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, expressed his enthusiasm about the good sense of the Gulf leaders before referring to its new leader, “Abu Dhabi is disorganized but Zayid appears to be rapidly learning realities of modern world and establishment UAE could serve to bring outside professional and bureaucratic expertise to make trucial states federation work.”56 Even  Quoted from personal interview with Dr. Mohammed Khalifa Alhmoudi, Abu Dhabi: April 2022  Quoted from personal interview with Dr. Shamma Hamdoon Al Naqbi, Abu Dhabi: April 2022 55  The UAE established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1985, when Michail Gorbachev launched his political reforms under Perestroika. The two states signed an agreement allowing the Soviet naval vessels to visit UAE ports. For more, see Duncan W.  Raymond & Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl, Moscow and the Third World under Gorbachev, New  York: Routledge, 2018. 56  “Telegram 69032 from the Department of State to the Embassy in France,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-4, Documents on Iran and Iraq, 1969–1972, Washington: April 20, 1972 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76ve04/d306 53 54

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though Zayed frequently disagreed with American foreign policy over the Palestinian question,57 he proved at critical moments that he did not hesitate to place the UAE at the core of the Western camp. The Gulf War of 1990–1991 and the War against Terror are two characteristic cases in which Zayed did not hesitate explicitly to give the UAE’s support to the USA.58 Another example of the smart beginning for the new state was the process the Founding Fathers chose to create a sense of Emirati national identity in the citizens. Numerous examples of nation-building, particularly the creation of national identity, are deeply traumatic for a society, leaving deep scars in the collective memory. The paradigm of Turkey, with the rapid and uncompromising changes introduced by Kemal Ataturk immediately after establishing the new state, is characteristic. Kemal set out to compel the Turkish people and other ethnic minorities to abandon their former Ottoman ideas and adopt a Turkish identity. He achieved this by aggressively imposing reforms from above to reach the civic homogenization of the people he desired.59 These were carried out during the 1920s. Still, even today, one of Turkey’s primary sources of domestic instability is the friction between adherents of the Kemalist tradition and those identifying with political Islam. It is apparent that nation-building is a delicate process that, if not judiciously implemented, may leave permanent scars in the collective consciousness. If the foundations of a country are not solid, then its collapse is only a matter of time. Since the first days of the UAE’s existence, it has embarked on a careful step-by-step process of nation-building rather than promoting the jingoistic obsessions observable in other states around the globe. In the case of the United Arab Emirates, the federal structure, a durable and elastic institutional framework, has contributed immensely to the transition of the Trucial Coast into a stable Union. The choice of the Founding Fathers to promote a federal union instead of a single-­sovereign civic structure gave the UAE flexibility in confronting the internal crisis, which arose after December 2, 1971, and was related to past animosities and the present necessities. A typical case was the Emirate of Ras al-Khaimah and its initial refusal to join the Union. The main reason for this was its long-standing

 In a CIA memorandum for the first 4 years of the UAE, the author argues that “US–UAE relations are basically good. The UAE values US technological strength; Americans are personally popular there. But Zayid is sensitive to the ups and downs of the Arab-Israeli situation; Abu Dhabi was the first Arab state to announce an embargo against the US during the October 1973 war.” “Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, vol. E-9, Part 2, Documents on the Middle East Region, 1973–1976, Washington: January 29, 1976 https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/ frus1969-­76ve09p2/d65 58  Rugh A. Williams, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” Middle East Journal, 1996, vol. 50, no.1, pp. 57–70; Coates Ulrichsen Kristian, “Reflections on Mohammed bin Zayed’s preferences regarding UAE foreign policy,” Arab Center Washington DC, July 24, 2020 https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/reflections-on-mohammed-bin-zayeds-preferences-regarding-uae-foreign-policy/ 59  For more, see among others Brennan Shane & Marc Herzog (eds.), Turkey and the Politics of National Identity: Social, Economic and Cultural Transformation, London: I.B Tauris & Co., 2014. 57

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hostility toward the Emirate of Sharjah. In 1820, Ras al-Khaimah was convincingly defeated by the British, and as a result, Ras al-Khaimah came under the control of Sharjah. This situation continued until 1869 when a revolt led by Sheikh Humaid ibn Abd Allah made Ras al-Khaimah a de facto independent entity. After Humaid died in 1900, Sharjah again exerted control over Ras al-Khaimah, and the British only recognized it as a sovereign Trucial State in 1921.60 However, the federal structure of the newborn state, as well as Iranian aggression against the Ras al-Khaimah islands of Lesser and Greater Tunbs, convinced Sheikh Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qasimi to enter the Union without having to worry about the status of his Emirate.61 Despite tense relations between two or more Emirates due to past differences, the UAE continued functioning smoothly since each Emirate was responsible for its domestic policies. At the same time, the federal entity was focused on the representation and participation of the state in international affairs, national defense, sovereignty issues, etc. This dual institutional structure had a positive effect on the citizens’ identity. The real challenge was that during the Trucial era, an individual was obliged to pledge allegiance to two sources of authority, his tribe and the Sheikh. These two elements of the political structure on the Trucial Coast were an impediment to progress mainly because the tribes were constantly moving in the vast and empty spaces, while the Sheikh’s authority could not always be imposed within the vague boundaries of his Sheikhdom because of distance or primitive lines of communication. The critical role of tribal identity and allegiance to the Sheikh for Arabs in the region is described by Tancred Bradshaw: “The tribal structure of the Trucial States was complex because of the lack of defined boundaries the sheikhdoms and their neighbours…Amongst the tribes, the sociopolitical role of the sheikh or ruler was

 https://www.britannica.com/place/Ras-al-Khaimah  An excellent account of the events regarding the acceptance of Ras al-Khaimah into the Union from the stance of the Emirate of Sharjah is being given by Sharjah’s ruler himself. As Sheikh Sultan remembers, “On Sunday 6 February 1972, HH Shaikh Rashid bin Sa’id al-Maktoum, Ruler of Dubai and Vice-President of the United Arab Emirates, approached HH Shaikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, President of the United Arab Emirates, regarding Ras al-Khaimah joining the Federation…After the meeting, Shaikh Zayed decided that Ras al-Khaimah should be allowed to join the Federation, if he managed to talk me into accepting Ras al-Khaimah’s membership…the President sent a message requesting that I meet with him at al-Bahr Palace regarding an important matter…At the palace…I found him sitting on a carpet laid for him under some palm trees whose branches were dangling on the ground. He was with HH Shaikh Rashid bin Sa’id al-Maktoum, his Vice President. After they welcomed me and seated me between them, HH Shaikh Zayed commented: ‘The consequences of Ras al-Khaimah being outside the Federation could be dire, and so I am asking you, Shaikh Sultan, to accept our invitation to Shaik Saqr bin Muhammed al-Qasimi, Ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, to join the United Arab Emirates; I am prepared to meet all the demands that Sharjah may make’. ‘I fully agree with both of you that If Ras al- Khaimah remains out of the federation there could be grave consequences, and that its admission would add to the strength of the Federation. As for making demands on you in return for my approval of the principle of strengthening the Federation, I shall refrain from doing so, Your Highness. This goes totally against my nature and principles’, I said.” Qasimi al bin Muhammad Sultan, Taking the Reins: The critical years, 1971–1977, London: Bloomsbury, 2010, pp.5–6. 60 61

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crucial. The sheikhs were responsible for defending their followers and, in return, they pledged their loyalty to the sheikh. The system of rule was tribal, patriarchal and oligarchic. Tribal politics was focused on authority over people rather than territory…the European concepts of the nation-state and territorial sovereignty were neither applicable nor comprehensible in the sheikhdoms.”62 Nonetheless, despite constant movement from one part of the desert to the other, their tribal label always followed them, no matter how frequently or how far they moved from their ancestral lands. For the Arabs of the Trucial Coast, who had maintained the Bedu style of life for many centuries, unlike the economically and politically developed Arabs of the Levant, tribal identity was an anchor and compass in the volatile sandy archipelago in which they lived. According to Wilfred Thesiger, who made a thorough study of the tribes of the Gulf over a long period, “The society in which the Bedu live is tribal. Everyone belongs to a tribe and all members of the same tribe are in some degree kinsmen, since they are descended from a common ancestor. The closer the relationship the stronger is the loyalty which a man feels for his fellow tribesmen, and this loyalty overrides personal feelings…There is no security in the desert for an individual outside the framework of his tribe.”63 The newborn state saw its tribal heritage as the key to transitioning from the individual’s pledge of allegiance to their Sheikh to the collective identity of the citizenship to the UAE. Thus, being a part of collective Arab unity was rationalized as being utterly compatible with the tribal affiliation of each individual, signifying the source of Pure Arabism [sic] in modern times.64 Since 1971, traditional modernity has been developed in the UAE in a highly sophisticated process, whereby the tribal version of southeast Arabia, this unique form of individual belonging, has produced a stable version of national unity. Emirati national identity coexists harmoniously with a tribal identity that is still reflected in the surnames of the citizens. At the same time, loyalty to a Sheikh plays a significant role in the creed of the individual. Therefore, the expatriate who lives in this part of the world will understand that all national holidays affirm the importance of national unity and the values that the United Arab Emirates represents in the modern world, with the same zest and vigor of glorification that every nation-state advances through its soft power leverage. In contrast, every cultural festival affirms the tribal diversity that the citizens of the UAE proudly  Bradshaw Tancred, o. cit., pp. 24, 26.  Thesiger Wilfred, op. cit., p.94. 64  I define the term Pure Arabism as a blend of ethnic features, that is, the people who were born and inhabited the Arab Peninsula, of cultural elements, that is, the people who speak one or more of the Arab dialects, which form the linguistic framework that according to Islam God revealed his Quran to Prophet Mohammed, and of the practice of all the religious duties that derive from the word “al-hanifiyya,” which underlines pure monotheism within the framework of Sunni Islam. Alexander Kristian et al., “Beyond the Bedouin path: The evolution of Emirati National identity,” Middle East Institute, December 1, 2021 https://www.mei.edu/publications/beyond-bedouin-path-­ evolution-emirati-national-identity#_ftn7; Heard  – Bay Frauke, “The United Arab Emirates: Statehood and Nation-building in a traditional society,” Middle East Journal, 2005, vol. 59, no.3, pp. 357–375; Webb Peter, Imagining the Arabs: Arab Identity and the Rise of Islam, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2016. 62 63

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partake in. The ultimate smart decision taken by the UAE’s founders, with Zayed’s encouragement, was that from the start, the state should become a melting pot where national identity and tribal origins would merge, creating a solid intercommunal connection between all seven Emirates.

Conclusion The creation of the United Arab Emirates was a unique process when compared with the normative transition of states from premodernity to modernity, which in most cases has gone through some or all of the following stages: uprising, war, liberation, a period of reconstruction, civil war, or significant violent political transfigurations of the first civic countenance of the state. The United Arab Emirates emerged out of the hiatus created by the British departure from the Trucial Coast and was also a fruit of Zayed’s acute political instincts, a truly gifted leader who understood that without the Union of the Trucial States, the area would have become the setting for Saudi and Iranian expansionism and an arena for bellum omnium contra omnes between the different Emirates. Zayed made generous use of the wealth derived from Abu Dhabi’s natural resources to overcome the hesitation of the other Sheikhs.65 Rashid of Dubai proved to be an influential supporter of his efforts in this respect. At the same time, the other Sheikhs were receptive to the institutional flexibility upon which the new state was built. This is not to suggest that there were no setbacks in this process. For example, Sheikh Zayed threatened to resign twice, first in 1978 over the question from the members of the Federal Council regarding the appointment of his son Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan to the command of the federal armed forces66 and then in 1979 when the Sheikhs of Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah opposed his ten-point plan to strengthen the Union institutionally.67 Nevertheless, the Union survived all of these challenges, which were well expected since it was the first time that the seeds of modernity were introduced in this part of the globe, and despite all these, the state showed the political maturity and decisiveness to overcome every obstacle on its path. Thus, today it occupies a top position in the international structure for reasons related to its many-sided smart interventions in various areas of statehood. The following chapters will set out the smart structure and operation of the UAE, institutionally, politically, and diplomatically.  As he had stated more than once during the different rounds of discussion with the other Sheikhs between 1968 and 1971 to persuade the less rich Emirates that the Union would have granted them a series of benefits: “Abu Dhabi’s oil and all its resources and potentialities are at the service of all the Amirates” as cited by Heard-Bay Frauke, From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition, London: Longman, 1982, p. 349. 66  Shoup A. John, The History of the United Arab Emirates, Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2022, p.115 67  Morton Quentin Michael, op. cit., p. 197. 65

Chapter 4

Smart Leadership: The Cases of Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan and Hamdan bin Mohammed Al Maktoum

Yesterday these Emirates were torn apart In them destructive men created havoc. And today we are enjoying security and stability forcing envious people to admire us. Yesterday, these were disunited Emirates Suffering ignorance, poverty, illness and chronic disease. And today the Lord has bestowed upon us his grace in uncountable abundance Yesterday, few people knew of our name And today our voice reaches all corners of the Earth. Oh! What a difference between our yesterday and today. (Hamad Bu Shihab)

Introduction The question of leadership is central to each polity. For example, Karl Popper poses the fundamental question “Who should rule the state?” in a labyrinthine yet fascinating esoteric analysis in The Open Society and Its Enemies. He immediately quotes Plato’s timeless thesis that kings with the ability to think as philosophers must rule, yet not without disputing Plato’s argument. Popper openly questions Plato’s view by focusing on how such a development will be realized. He is worried that this kind of profound elitism will harm the collective reflexes of the polity.1 Popper’s approach produces an exciting echo. Suppose the quest for power transforms humans into fierce wolves, Homo Homini Lupus est, as the well-known Latin proverb reveals, then the rise of the Kings to the level of the Philosophers is an almost impossible task. Nevertheless, Plato is not engaged with the process of the

 Ryan Alan, “Popper’s politics: Science and Democracy” in Philip Caton & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Karl Popper: Critical Appraisals, London: Routledge, 2004. 1

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rise in power but with the mental characteristics that a leader must cultivate to lead.2 Suppose leadership is the mere outcome of the political process that entails antagonism between different contestants. In that case, the analysis must concentrate on a state’s societal and institutional mechanisms to reassure the uninterrupted exercise of power within its sovereign framework. This kind of analysis is mainly preoccupied with the methodology that someone uses to acquire power in the internal of a state. Thus, it has to do with the everyday management of a state. However, if leadership is connected with the level of success that the head of the state is responsible for endorsing for the effective quotidian running of the state, then the discussion moves to the core of this chapter’s analysis that of smart leadership. Leadership in politics is the capability to convince most people to achieve the state’s goals. This must be distinct from the skill of persuasion because the leader is the one who stands in the front row of the collective effort rather than the one who manipulates the masses from a distance. Achieving goals is neither easy nor normative, especially when the perplexities of governing a polity pop up. The constant volatility of the international system, the fierce antagonism between state actors to achieve survival, and the tendency to deceive foes and allies regarding their agenda make the art of leading a state like the delicate balancing on a tightrope with no safety net below. Smart or unintelligent leadership mainly influences the scale of success or failure. This chapter will focus on the leadership style of the UAE government today. It will focus on two unique cases: the UAE president, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed bin Sultan al Nahyan, and the Crown Prince of Dubai, Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum.

Leadership Theory and Politics The first forms of expanded political structure can be found in Ancient Egypt and Mesopotamia when in 3100  BCE, Pharaoh Menes, founder of the First Dynasty, unified Upper and Lower Egypt. In Mesopotamia, Sargon of Akkad conquered the Sumerian city-states between the 24th and 23rd centuries and established the Akkadian Empire. However, leadership, the most refined version of the noble art of politics, appeared mainly in Ancient Greece. There, frontmen had to be brave warriors, orators, philosophers, athletes, champions of arts, etc. They had to promote the prestige of their city-state with their status and abilities. Therefore, based on the Socratic or Platonic philosophy, a leader is not just one who exercises authority through his rule as the sovereign head of a polity. On the contrary, a leader can elevate the state to new moral, philosophical, scientific, technological, military, economic, and diplomatic heights. According to Socrates in Plato’s Gorgias, the leader is the one who stands in the front row of the state as a paradigm of virtue and

 For more regarding this see among others, Schofield Malcolm, Saving the City: Philosopher – Kings and other Classical Paradigms, London: Routledge, 2012. 2

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innovation.3 According to Socrates, leadership goes beyond exercising authority and has to do with the polity’s evolution under the leader’s positive influence. A leader can take the state many steps forward. This process is not an individual task but a team’s work since the leader is the one who can coordinate and synchronize the work and the abilities of many to achieve the common goal. As William Prentice argues, “Leadership is accomplishing a goal through the direction of human assistants. The man who successfully marshals his human collaborators to achieve particular ends is a leader. A great leader is one who can do so day after day, and year after year, in a wide variety of circumstances.”4 This specific dimension of leadership can be identified as the fundamental of smart leadership. A measure of personal charisma blended with generous doses of the ability to coordinate the capabilities of different individuals, all harmonized to a final result that will enhance the state’s status internationally and the opening of new roads of collective harmony, security, and growth internally. Smart leadership is the practical application of all those different principles of politics that can effectively lead a state to fulfill its objectives and goals and go one step further. It displays the Latin phrase “Citius, Altius, Fortius”5 in the DNA of the state and of the Emirati society as well, not by coercion but through collective embracement. Leadership is much more than simply the exercise of authority. This realization relates not only to the type and size of the authority someone has but also to the psychological connection with the hearts and minds of the people. If a leader fails, the state faces an existential challenge because the defeat will also reflect societal sentiments. If the one who merely exercises authority fails but is not regarded as a leader by his people, then the challenge for the state is still present but does not threaten its survival. For example, when British Premier David Chamberlain failed to identify the Nazi challenge, Britain faced a herculean task dealing with German aggression. However, eventually, the state prevailed victorious out of the flames of WW2. David Chamberlain was an experienced politician, but he never succeeded in becoming the leader of the United Kingdom. This lack of psychological and mental connection between Chamberlain and the citizens had to do with his distant personality and nonengaging governing style. He never became a leader for Britain; therefore, his departure from power while the drums of war were banging in Europe did not cost the nation its survival. Nevertheless, this was not the case in Yugoslavia after the death of Josip Broz Tito, who was the true leader of the state. Tito died in 1980, and Yugoslavia followed in 1991 with the outbreak of a civil war. Yugoslavia collapsed because Tito, who kept it united, was not in office anymore. Tito was not elected since Yugoslavia was a communist regime. Nevertheless, the intense psychological attachment of the majority of Yugoslavs to their leader and his  Stauffer Devin, The Unity of Plato’s Gorgias: Rhetoric, Justice and the Philosophic Life, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 4  Prentice H.C.W, “Understanding Leadership,” Harvard Business Review, January 2004 https:// hbr.org/2004/01/understanding-leadership. 5  This is the motto of the Olympic Games, meaning Faster, Higher, Stronger, which signifies the everlasting try of the individual to over exceed her or his limitations and weaknesses. 3

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undisputed political skills led the Yugoslav federal structure to collapse after he was not in life anymore. Britain survived Chamberlain’s fallacy due to the brilliance of Winston Churchill, the durability of the British people, and the US’s entry into the war by the side of London. Yugoslavia did not have the opportunity to survive Tito’s loss because he was the cornerstone of the state, and his predecessors, i.e., Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, were not his equals.6 It is important to remember that history is full of ordinary politicians and unremarkable heads of states. However, there is a profound scarcity of leaders. The distinction between a politician and a leader is not the product of a normative process. It is more than certain that leaders are not born with the ability to pave the way for a nation toward success. Leaders are made through a long process of personal introspection, sacrifices, and bold steps out of the ordinary. Being a leader is not a linear process or a pre-decidedly metaphysical event, and although DNA plays its role, being a leader requires so much more than just family ties. After all, history is full of cases where a leader gave birth to a colorless politician or a dull bureaucrat. In the following paragraphs, the main characteristics of a leader will be presented, establishing the nucleus of smart leadership in the twenty-first century.

Lead Rationally From a social science perspective, humans are a combination of sentiments, beliefs, and ideas. These three elements formulate our emotions daily. Emotions are the vibes humans send to others daily, shaping our social circle. Emotions define our behavior, lead us to choices, generate action, and enhance our intellectual identity, which is the fundamental communication code with other human beings. According to Paul Ekman, every human being, aside from ethnic, cultural, social, or economic background, has five universal emotions: (a) enjoyment, (b) fear, (c) disgust, (d) sadness, and (e) anger.7 Humans are subject to emotional conditions, defining how to think and act in front of every challenge. This form of correlation reveals the importance of emotions in the decision-making process that each faces daily, from the color of the tie to match his suit to the profession she chooses to follow. Thus, the American Psychological Association defines emotion as “a complex reaction pattern, involving experiential, behavioural and psychological elements.”8 Rationalism is the catalyst that activates the proper emotion toward a compelling set of actions, individually or collectively. Rationalism defines human beings as the  West Richard, Tito and the Rise and Fall of Yugoslavia, New York: Carrol & Graf, 1995; Crnobrnja Mihailo, The Yugoslav Drama, Montreal: McGill – Queen’s University Press, 1996, pp. 81–92. 7  Ekman Paul, Emotions Revealed, New Yor: Henry Holt & Co., 2003. 8  For more, see Ruba Ashley, “What is an emotion?,” Developmental Psychologist, January 2021 https://www.apadivisions.org/division-7/publications/newsletters/developmental/2021/01/emotion; Brazier Yvette, “What is psychology and what does it involve,” Medical News Today, February 1, 2018 https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/154874. 6

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ultimate positive characteristic someone is trained to exercise or allows them to remain in perpetual lethargy. Everyone can act rationally; however, not everyone is willing to do so.9 Therefore, a leader is someone able and willing, pro-rata, to think and act rationally. The base of rationality in leadership can be found in the ability of the leader to act free from the psychological burden of collective doctrines or beliefs. While these collective intellectual virtues are the outcomes of past wisdom or failures, it is not always appropriate to search for solutions in the past for challenges of the present. An ordinary politician governs according to the likings of the people, follows the majority’s will, and sets the foundations for a populist administration that will please the citizens’ sentiments but not their needs or ambitions. A populist politician tends to appease the people’s emotions by excessively flattering them and not stressing that success always comes after smart planning and collective hard effort.10 On the contrary, a smart leader is not permitting personal or collective emotions to dictate his decision-making process, thus the state’s course of action. Thus, a smart leader is one who decides according to the interests of the state and society instead of collective sentiments and likings. History has often shown that the masses do not have the instinct to choose rationally. For example, Adolf Hitler was elected to power in 1933 by a sound German majority who saw in him a figure craving revenge for Germany’s defeat in WWI. The German masses had neither the maturity nor the rationality to understand that they elected a stygian shadow who was to lead Germany to total collapse and millions of people, soldiers, and civilians, to death, among them nearly six million European Jews who were brutally murdered in the Nazi extermination camps or during the advancement of the Nazi army in Europe. On the contrary, states with smart leadership that can exercise politics with logic instead of sentiment have a clear advantage. For example, as soon as the first commercial oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi, the instinctive choice for the Ruler would have been to disassociate his Emirate from the rest of the region. Perhaps this would have been the desire of some heads of those tribes living in the Trucial State of Abu Dhabi. Nevertheless, Sheikh Zayed decided to unite his Sheikhdom with the rest of the Trucial States and not only that but also to give for an extended period the most significant part of the annual oil revenue to the other Emirates to elevate the living standard of the people there too. This decision is the archetypical paradigm of a smart leader who can govern with logic for the people’s good, ignoring normative sentiments.

 As Boethius, a well-known Roman senator and philosopher, argued, every person is defined as “an individual substance of rational nature.” This particular approach profoundly influenced the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and of Descartes about human nature and the characteristic of rationalism. For more, see among others Copleston Frederick, Contemporary Philosophy: Studies of Logical Positivism and Existentialism, London: Continuum, 1972, p.103, ed. III. 10  For more about populism in politics, see De la Torre Carlos (ed.), Routledge Handbook of Global Populism, London: Routledge, 2019. 9

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Lead by Example Many politicians today rely on the powers deriving from the institutional structure of their state to exercise their mandate. Nevertheless, this approach disregards the fundamental rule that politics is the ultimate art of governing humans. The head of a state can rely on the laws to endorse its status and exercise authority. The head of a state can do this without, morally and sentimentally, connecting with the people simply by relying on the powers deriving from the state’s institutional core. This is not an act disregarding the constitution of a state or its laws; however, it keeps people at a distance. Unlike what a conventional politician would do during the period in office, a smart leader tries first to connect mentally with the rest of society. To establish a psychological code of communication, and, most of all, to inspire the people by her or his example. Only then will the people be willing to withstand every kind of collective hardship and make every humanly possible sacrifice necessary to keep the state alive. However, for this mental connection to be created, the head must be able to positively influence the minds and hearts of the people by leading by example. What exactly does this mean, in any case? Leading by example is the ultimate connection between a state’s social base and leadership.11 Primarily, it relates to the activation of positive collective behavior through the public demonstration of exemplary personal performance by the head of the state or the circle of leadership. Therefore, this process is initiated from top to bottom of the social ladder, not vice versa. Leading by example is a systematic self-­ motivation from the highest levels of the political authority of a state, governed by taking into account the collective ethical code of the society, by not provoking the societal state of mind but also without becoming a blind follower of traditionalism without taking into account present systemic conditions and social needs too. For example, the failure of the Taliban regime to establish itself through the support of the Afghan people and not with the use of violence can be seen as a combination of two main elements. On the one hand, it suppresses every civic freedom, especially for the female population, promoting a style of governing based on terror instead of public appreciation and support. On the other hand, it is the provocative rejection of the collective needs of the Afghans in public health, education, and food today, applying a draconian regime that has its antennas toward a vague interpretation of the past. The Taliban is not a smart regime not only because of the unprecedented amount of violence they used to return to power or because, during the recent past, they collaborated with Al Qaeda, but also because they are obliging the Afghans to follow mindlessly a code of societal behavior that has nothing to do with the ethos and the demands of the twenty-first century. At the same time, they disregard the

 For more about the subject, see Winkler Info, Contemporary Leadership Theories: Enhancing the Understanding of the Complexity, Subjectivity and Dynamic of Leadership, New  York: Springer, 2010; Cronin E. Thomas & Genovese A. Michael, Leadership Matters: Unleashing the Power of Paradox, London: Routledge, 2016; Helms Ludger, Comparative Political Leadership, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012. 11

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needs and aspirations of the Afghanis, condemning them to a perpetual condemnation in sectarian fanaticism and educational annulment. The success of leading by example refers to the quality of a government’s decisions and public behavior since it is always at the center of public scrutiny. For example, the decision of Boris Johnson, the British Premier, to throw a party at Downing Street on November 13, 2020, while the rest of the country was experiencing the consequences of the COVID-19 lockdown is not just a wrong decision but a direct provocation of the public sentiments and an emphatic lack of empathy. Indeed, leading by example refers to the level of empathy the head of a state shows with the rest of society, especially in times of collective distress. Empathy, in this specific context, is the ability of the leader to comprehend the public mood and act in a way that is not provoking, unlike Boris Johnson and his lockdown party gate. The head of the state, as it was mentioned above, must govern without being emotionally affected by the collective preferences of society. After all, a smart leader must be the one who will pave the way for others to follow; therefore, it is crucial to be able to walk in front without being limited by what others believe or say. Nevertheless, this smart governing method must not occur against core collective ethics, widely accepted customs, cultural features, historical roots, and beliefs. The leader must balance personal beliefs and collective convictions when this can be achieved. Spectacular turnovers or unconditional surrendering to the collective expectations must be avoided in favor of finding a silver line. The head of the state, who leads by example, can accompany the people to those critical momentums where Scylla and Charybdis are awaiting to inflict fatal wounds against the state, internationally or domestically. Yet, for a smart leader to achieve this, it is important not to question the people’s collective identity and instead lead toward modernization by avoiding erasing the past. One of the main reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union, besides the economy’s failure, was that the people were feeling tremendous pressure from the violent eradication of their past identity and the forced adoption of Marxism Leninism as the only feasible way toward collective salvation. Sheikh Zayed led the newborn state toward the challenging highways of modernization but without waiting for collective amnesia of the past. He urged the citizens of the new state to feel the aura of change. He paved the road for the state to take firm steps in the international arena. However, he never tried to eradicate the people’s identity. On the contrary, he embraced the tribal structure and the rich Bedouin tradition while navigating the state safely between the Scylla and the Charybdis of the international arena. He introduced a blend of collective pride of the Trucial past and encouraged anticipation for the future under the pre-condition of a commonly shared effort. By that, Sheikh Zayed managed to lead by example and show his empathy toward the collective moral code of the citizens while he was asking them to be active in building a shared future, a perfect implementation of smart leadership. Characteristically, in the Federal National Council in 1972, he concluded his speech by saying, “The future of the United Arab Emirates depends on sincerity, effort and sacrifice, yours and mine.”12  Khaleej Times, “Sheikh Zayed – A True Visionary,” January 18, 2018 https://www.khaleejtimes. com/uae/sheikh-zayed-a-true-visionary. 12

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Lead to Collective Happiness Unlike the USA, where citizens’ right to pursue happiness is an ideological mantra and a constitutional privilege, most modern nation-states do not have an analogous institutional specification. The USA is a smart state because, among many other reasons, it offers institutional reassurance to its citizens that the state itself will accommodate their attempt to pursue individual happiness. However, the UAE has taken an even bolder step in this. Instead of affirming the right of the citizen to pursue happiness, it endorses this prerogative not as a conditional privilege but as an unconditional birthright through its unique welfare social system. This sui generis system places the state as the ultimate provider to the people, especially when they fail to increase their wealth and provide for their families. Nevertheless, this must be seen as something other than a form of charity. On the contrary, the UAE follows a traditional economic liberal approach with an Islamic twist in this area. While the state encourages citizens to be entrepreneurial, mainly through the low VAT and the quick and easy process for opening a business in the UAE, for both Emiratis and expatriates, at the same time, it exercises a modern form of Zakat. Zakat, which means “to cleanse,” is one of the five pillars of Islam which obliges the Ummah, the global Muslim community, to assist those who do not have the financial means to support themselves or their families. Since the UAE is a Muslim nation, the social safety net set by the state to protect citizens from their descent must be seen as a blend of politics and religion. The outcome benefits people who can enjoy happiness without worrying about the consequences of bad choices. While for the USA, happiness is a privilege in the hands of every individual, for the UAE is a civic preoccupation to ensure that citizens are experiencing happiness now. Perhaps some analysts alien to how the Emirati state functions will refer to this as an indirect result of the “rentier state effect.”13 Nevertheless, happiness must not be strictly defined as economic affluence or a life free of commitments. On the contrary, it means societal security and individual and collective financial and cognitive advancement. This was the vision of Sheikh Zayed too. As Dr. Abdel Rahman Makhlouf, the well-­ known Egyptian architect who created the urban plan of Abu Dhabi, confesses

 The term “Rentier State” refers to entities that generate the most significant part of their national income from sources outside their geographical boundaries by distributing their natural resources, mainly hydrocarbon, managing to establish a client–patron relation with other states or corporations in the international system. For more, see Beblawi Hasem, “The Rentier State in the Arab world,” Arab Studies Quarterly, 1987, vol. 9, no.4, pp. 383–398; Puranen Bi & Olof Widenfalk, “The Rentier State: Does Rentierism Hinder Democracy?” in Mansoor Moaddel (ed.), Values and Perceptions of the Islamic and Middle Eastern Publics, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 160–178; Heaphy Mia, “The impact of Rentier States on political economies of the Arabian Peninsula; Past, Present and Future,” The Organization for World Peace, July 9, 2021 https://theowp.org/reports/ the-impact-of-rentier-states-on-political-economies-of-the-arabian-peninsula-past-present-­and-­future/. 13

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“H.H. Shaikh Zayed had his vision and dreams. He wanted to create an environment to facilitate the economic and spiritual growth of his people.”14 The importance the UAE gives to the right of the citizens to experience happiness, not just to be free to pursue it, can be traced in both the public and private spheres of the UAE’s life. For example, the federal government established the Ministry of Happiness in 2016 in Dubai, assigning it the role of coordinating various policies among the different state entities to endorse happiness for the people now instead of postponing it for the future.15 This was mainly implemented by enhancing societal security, urban tranquility, a greening agenda, well-kept free spaces, etc. According to a 2018 annual United Nations Sustainable Development Solutions Network report, the UAE was the happiest nation in the Arab world while it held the 21st position globally among 117 states.16 The data show that the high percentages of people’s happiness in the UAE are not the product of an Orwellian recipe for enforced happiness from above. For example, the state’s capital city, Abu Dhabi, is an exemplar paradigm of a contemporary megapolis with one of the lowest global urban stress rates and the Middle East’s greenest capital.17 It is refreshing and genuinely hopeful, especially for someone from South Europe, that, in the UAE, happiness is not seen as a vague idea or an empty slogan of a spoiled political elite before every national election. For the UAE, happiness is a fundamental civic right for all that has to be experienced during the citizens’ lifetime. Under no circumstances is it supported that the UAE is the modern version of Disneyland. Neither that every citizen of the state enjoys the same amount of happiness. After all, the UAE does not claim to be a people’s commune or a twenty-first-­ century stateless society. However, the state offers excellent opportunities to the citizens to enjoy happiness and create a better life for themselves and their families. It lays at the people’s discretion to utilize any given opportunities by the leadership to their benefit. No matter what they choose, the state’s visionary and smart leadership offers the right to the people to experience happiness instead of spending a life chasing it as a chimera. This is why, in his first statement to the nation as the President of the UAE, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed said that the happy lives of the people of the UAE remain “the basis of all our future plans…the fist and end  With United Strength: H.H. Shaikh Zayid bin Sultan Al Nahyan, the Leader of a Nation, Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2013, p. 269. 15  In the summer of 2020 with the introduction of the new structure of UAE government, the portfolio of the Ministry was transferred to the Ministry of Community Development https://wam.ae/ en/details/1395302853277. 16  The National “The UAE is the happiest country in the Arab world, report shows,” March 15, 2018 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/uae-is-the-happiest-country-in-the-arabworld-report-shows-1.713169. 17  According to the Time Out global index of 2021, Abu Dhabi is the third most relaxed city in the world, third in environmental sustainability, and first in the Middle East and North Africa in the Smart Cities Index, while Dubai in 2021 was third globally regarding people wanting to move there and live according to the Boston Consulting Group https://www.timeoutabudhabi.com/ news/473665-abu-dhabi-voted-third-most-relaxing-city-in-the-world; Gulf Today “Abu Dhabi, Dubai and Sharjah best cities to work and live in the world,” October 31, 2021. 14

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priority.”18 A stunning story was given to me about Sheikh Zayed’s sincere concern for the Emiratis’ happiness and well-being. One day I received a dinner invitation that I could not turn down. I arrived at an Italian Restaurant that looked like, or, as I discovered later, tasted, nothing like Italy. I sat beside Gerhart Cornelsen, a tall German Geoecologist and Project Director of the Dornier Group in Abu Dhabi. The company, among other activities, is specialized in renewables and water worldwide, with a long presence in the Gulf and the UAE since the early days of the Union, conducting hydrogeological investigations for the state. During the night, after we talked about Munich, Athens, Thessaloniki, and Crete, we began discussing the UAE and my book topic. Eventually, we reached the modus operandi of the Emirati leadership, particularly Sheikh Zayed. This is where Gerhart shared with me the following story that he agreed to be put under his name in this book. Whenever the company announced to the officials that it had discovered a new body of clean water suitable for consumption, Sheikh Zayed asked for a sample to be sent to the Presidential Office. The reason was that he was personally tasting the water, and only when he was convinced that the quality was good and the taste was right was he giving the green light for the new finding to be incorporated with the existing water supply network. As Gerhart told me, Sheikh Zayed said he was tasting the water because his people deserved the best.19 Perhaps, such an approach seems nowadays as old-fashioned. However, who does not want to know that the head of the state is genuinely connected with society and taking all the necessary steps to safeguard their well-being? I am raising my hand first since I firmly believe that a true leader allows people to flourish by operating as a shield, companion, compass, and motivator. Everything that Sheikh Zayed was. To conclude, the concept of happiness in the UAE as a fundamental political value, instead of a political tool or empty rhetoric as it happens in various states around the globe, adopts a unique aura that reminds me of the modern mantra about happiness that instead of spending our lives pursuing it, we must endorse it as a fundamental sociopolitical cornerstone for modern societies and smart states I would personally add too.

Two Contemporary Styles of Leadership in the UAE In the following paragraphs, the leadership models of two different political figures of the UAE in the twenty-first century will be presented: Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed al Nahyan and Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum.20  The National, “Five key quotes from President Sheikh Mohamed’s speech to the UAE,” July 13, 2022 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/2022/07/13/five-key-quotes-frompresident-sheikh-mohameds-speech-to-the-uae/. 19  Personal interview with the Project Director of the Dornier Consulting International GmbH at Abu Dhabi, April 2023. 20  From now on MbZ and HbM. 18

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Before going further with the analysis, it is crucial to clarify the following. For an outsider, a profound aura of nepotism surrounds the UAE political system at the very top positions of the state. For example, for someone who approaches epidemically the UAE, both MbZ and HbM rose to the highest power levels because of their family names. However, someone with a deep knowledge of the country, its political tradition, and its institutions knows this is an uneducated conclusion. Unlike what most people believe worldwide, the UAE is not a dictatorship where the sons of the fathers rule with an iron fist, no matter their political abilities and leadership skills. The UAE is governed by implementing a blend of modern provisions and traditional methods from the Trucial past. At its core, the custom of majlis21 exists. According to UNESCO, “Majalis [plural of majlis] are ‘sitting places’ where community members gather to discuss local events and issues, exchange news, receive guests, socialize and be entertained. The Majlis is where the community gathers to resolve problems, pay condolences and hold wedding receptions.”22 This fundamental socialization structure represents the pillar of political action for the Arab tribes. During the open sittings, people of both sexes could attend, mingle, hear the news, exchange views, and express their skepticism or complaints to the head if something was troubling them. The majlis was offering all members of the tribe the opportunity to come into direct contact with the frontman and exchange views with him in a fully protected environment where every thought could be heard and expressed freely since all fully respected majlis as a significant pillar of the tribal sociopolitical system. People were not prosecuted if they were to express a direct complaint to the head. At the same time, the latter received a substantial flow of information regarding the actual living conditions the tribe was experiencing. Honesty and communication, blended with local formalities and hospitality, were the two main ­ingredients making majlis the ultimate form of political interaction, a successful dimension of “mobile democracy”23 as Christopher Davidson describes this

 Regarding the origins of the Majlis as an institutional form of governing, someone has to look back to the sui generis political customs that existed in the Middle East even before the arrival of Islam in the region and in particular the custom of the Shura that constructs the framework of consultative Leadership. As Asma Afsarudin argues, “Shura was known in the pre-Islamic period as well. Arab tribes before Islam had a loosely formed council of elders called shura (also known as majlis or mala), which adjudicated intratribal and intertribal matters through consultation.” Afsarudin Asma, “Consultation or Shura” in Joseph W. Meri (ed.), Medieval Islamic Civilization: An Encyclopedia, London: Routledge, 2006, vol.1, p.171. The Majlis can be seen as the product of this consultative process, offering the opportunity to the head of the tribe to acquire a thorough knowledge of the people’s needs and beliefs, or their likings of him as the head of the collective group of people. Shura infused Islam with the legacy of the dialectic process, which with its blending with the tribal customs of the people in the Gulf produced the Majlis process, an interesting political custom in the region. 22  https://ich.unesco.org/en/RL/majlis-a-cultural-and-social-space-01076. 23  As cited in Al-Sharek Alanoud & Courtney Freer, Tribalism and Political Power in the Gulf: State Building and National Identity in Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE, London: I.B.  Tauris, 2002, p.38. 21

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institution.24 A sui generis political system that combines achieving the state’s political goals with stable and efficient governing through the daily endorsement by public opinion. As Yousef Al-Otaiba, the UAE Ambassador in Washington DC says about this sui generis political system, “People always think we do not pay attention to public opinion inside the Emirates because we’re not a democracy and it’s actually quite the opposite. Because we are not a democracy we have to be very in tune with what our people want and what the street feels…”.25 The majlis tradition and practice fully reveal that the Ambassador’s statement is not a diplomatic invention but an everyday reality inside the country. Al-Otaiba’s approach is deeply influenced by the views of the great fourteenth-century Arab philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who has argued that the desert nomad leaders were, more or less, fair, open, and democratic because of the necessity to secure the tribe’s survival in the most inhospitable environment humans can experience, that of the desert. According to Ibn Khaldun, the survival prerequisite creates strong bonds between the tribe and the leader, that of the asabiyah, which may be translated as loyalty, solidarity, and comradeship.26 Ibn Khaldun’s notion of democracy is directly linked with the ultimate necessity of the tribe to stay united under harsh climatological and societal conditions. For this to be achieved, a Primus Inter Pares status is established where the head of the tribe leads but with the consent and support of the tribe and not against its interests, with open procedures and continuous evaluation of the leader’s skills to safeguard survival. This equation produces the fundamentals of direct democracy described by Ibn Khaldun and can be found in the UAE since the establishment of the state in 1971. In addition, the political culture of the Trucial States and the UAE is focused on the visible outcomes of governing. The most characteristic example of this was the case of Sheikh Shakhbut bin Sultan al Nahyan as was presented in the previous chapter. If someone cannot deliver the common good, no matter how high, she or he will be replaced by someone more capable and efficient. This, together with the UAE being a federal union, makes governing the state a daily test of political merit. No name, no matter how strong this is, will protect its holder if it undermines the

 It is very interested to note that majlis is held in the UAE by the heads of the state even today. Sheikh Hamad bin Mohammed Al Sharqi, the ruler of Fujeirah, still offers these open sittings once a week. Ulrichsen Khristian, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics, and Policy-Making, Abingdon: Routledge, 2016, p. 29. Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed has modernized the institution of the majlis, organizing scientific fora for the young Emiratis under the label of majlis where pivotal issues of Science, Medicine and Social Sciences are discussed. For more, see https://mbzmfg.com/ en-us/. For a thorough analysis of the majils and the political tradition and value that surrounds them until today in the UAE; see also Hurreiz Hamid Sayyid, Folklore and Folklife in the United Arab Emirates, London: Routledge Courzon, 2022, p. 58. 25  As cited in Magid Jacob, “UAE Envoy: We are not a democracy but public support allowed for normalization,” The Times of Israel, 29 September 2020 https://www.timesofisrael.com/ uae-envoy-its-because-were-not-a-democracy-we-know-public-backs-normalization/ 26  Anderson N.E & Christopher Chase-Dunn, “The Rise and Fall of Great Powers” in Chase – Dunn Christopher & E.N. Anderson, The Historical Evolution of World-Systems, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005, p.2. 24

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state’s interests and the people. Especially since a vote of confidence from the Federal Supreme Council, in other words, from the rulers of the seven Emirates, is compulsory for the unity of the state. An influential family name opens the doors in the UAE, as in the rest of the modern world. Yet, it takes more than that to keep them open in a state like the UAE, where political meritocracy is not just a precious sociopolitical value but a mere necessity to maintain the federal union strong and the people happy. It is important to note that there are other paradigms of brilliant leadership models in the UAE, such as Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum or Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Muhammad al Qasimi, the ruler of Sharjah and a scholar with whom I share the same Alma Mater, the University of Durham in the UK. Why, then, are they not included too in this chapter? The main reason is that both MbZ and HbM offer excellent case studies of smart leadership in the twenty-first century, breaking away from every form of conventionality and traditionalism. They are unique examples of smart leadership, each from their perspective, as will be argued in the following paragraphs.

Mohamed bin Zayed: Leading from the Front MbZ is the third son of Sheikh Zayed, born in the cradle of the House of the Nahyan, Al Ain, in 1961. His mother is Sheikha Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi. He followed a military education, graduated from the British Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in 1979, and was trained as a pilot. In 1993, he was appointed as the Armed Forces Chief of Stuff; in 2003, he was appointed as the Deputy Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi; and in 2005, he was assigned as Deputy Supreme Commander of the UAE Armed Forces. After the death of Sheikh Zayed and the elevation of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, ΜbZ’s half-brother, to the Presidency of the UAE, MbZ became the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, while after the worsening of Khalifa’s health in 2014, he became the de facto head of the UAE.27

 This is a significant dimension of UAE politics, showing that the old tribal traditions still operate among the local population. Even though the seriousness of his health condition was given the right to the Council of the House of Al Nahyan to remove him from duty, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed remained the de jure president of the state until his death on May 13, 2022. He appeared in family meetings from time to time while he was fully respected and deeply loved by the state’s citizens. When Sheikh Khalifa died, I was in Abu Dhabi, and I witnessed first-hand the dignified sorrow of the Emiratis for the death of their President. The decision of the Al Nahyans to maintain the de jure role of KbZ, despite no one would have accused them of overthrowing the legitimate President due to his poor health, can be justified by the following two main dimensions of UAE politics. First, removal from office while KbZ was still alive for health reasons and not of competency would have been portrayed as a direct move against Sheikh Zayed’s legacy, thus a severe blow against the cornerstone of the state. Second, removal from office for health reasons would have touched the collective reflexes of the Emiratis, being seen as an act of indifference toward the nation’s father figure in a time of need. 27

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On May 14, 2022, MbZ was elected by the Federal Supreme Council as the third President of the state, one day after the death of Sheikh Kalifa. So, why is MbZ an archetype of smart leadership in world politics today? First, MbZ’s grasp of international affairs is striking. He was one of the first who linked the various collective uprisings against the ruling regimes in the MENA region after 2011, the so-called Arab Spring, with a well-orchestrated effort of the fundamentalists of the Muslim Brotherhood to place under their direct political control various states in the region. Unfortunately, the talented and gifted Barack Obama failed to comprehend that. Even though the American president had an excellent view of MbZ’s leadership qualities, describing him as “the savviest leader in the Gulf,” still, he could not understand that the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt was not a step closer to the modernization of the political system of Egypt but as the opening of Pandora’s Box for the Middle East, as MbZ warned him.28 What followed after Egypt in the whole of the Arab world proved MbZ’s smart analysis and Obama’s failure to comprehend the perplexities of the MENA region. The Muslim Brotherhood is a political group established in Ismailia, Egypt, 1928 by Hassan al Banna, a school teacher. During his early days, the movement developed an anti-colonial approach against the British by promoting an Islamic revival for the country.29 The transition from an anti-colonial movement to the primary expressions of radical Islam occurred with Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Muslim Brotherhood between the 1950s and 1960s. Qutb created an ideological base for the Muslim Brotherhood that was predominantly anti-Western, anti-­ Semitic, pro-jihadist, and pro-fundamentalist.30 Thus, Qutbism was named as Qutb’s ideological formula is the foundation for all the contemporary radical Islamist groups such as Al Qaeda or ISIS. After the end of the Tunisian Revolt in 2011, many Arab societies questioned the existing political establishment. In many cases, due to profound corruption or political inadequacy, the Muslim Brotherhood benefited from it, precisely as MbZ had warned Barack Obama. The Muslim Brotherhood did not generate the cataclysmic events of the Arab Spring. Nevertheless, as various cases showed, e.g., in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood took advantage of the sociopolitical turmoil and elevated its role in the region due to its widespread communal mechanisms in various Arab states. As Nawaf Obaid comments, “The Islamists did not initiate the Arab Spring…Rather, it occurred across religious, political and social lines…However the MB [Muslim Brotherhood] was quick to take advantage of the unrest.”31  Obama Barck, A Promised Land, New York: Crown, 2020, p. 651.  Kirkpatrick D.  David, “Is the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist group?,” The New  York Times, April 30, 2019 https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/30/world/middleeast/is-the-muslim-brotherhood-terrorist.html. 30  Berridge J.  W, Islamism in the Modern World: A Historical Approach, London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019, pp. 117–132. 31  Obaid Nawaf, “The Muslim Brotherhood: A failure in political evolution,” Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, p. 9 https://www. belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/Muslim%20Brotherhood%20-%20final.pdf. 28 29

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The Muslim Brotherhood tried to drag the UAE into the Arab Spring conundrum through its local branch, al-Islah.32 In March 2011, during the early months of the Arab Spring, more than 100 Emiratis, all members of the al-Islah, signed a petition. They sent it to the president of the state, Sheikh Khalifa, demanding elections and granting full legislative authority to the Federal National Council.33 Perhaps an analyst with no knowledge of the region and the UAE will think that the Islamists were trying to liberalize the UAE’s political system. However, al-Islah’s objective was to create internal unrest that would have harmed national unity and the state’s political balance.34Arrests followed due to the petition and the protests in Abu Dhabi by the al-Islah supporters. The person who led the anti-al-Islah campaign was MbZ.  However, it is important to note that his efforts to eradicate the Muslim Brotherhood’s influence inside his country had begun some years before 2011. In the early 1990s, MbZ, then an influential advisor of Sheikh Zayed, started to limit the Brotherhood’s rising influence in public education, religion, and the public sector by law. He initiated specific alterations in the school textbooks’ content and began revising teaching and clergy posts to tackle the Brotherhood’s influence. According to Nawaf Obaid, “In the early 1990s, Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed…led a crackdown on Islamists. ‘Sheikh Mohammed had long been suspicious of the MB, viewing them as a creeping Islamist threat, due partly to his very bad academic experience with Ezzedine Ibrahim, an MB teacher and Sheikh Mohamed’s former tutor’, a former counter-terrorism director of the UK’s Secret Intelligence Service told me in April 2016...Not long after, Sheikh Mohammed implemented a plan called ‘drying the springs’ to curb Islamist influence. Authorities shut down al-Islah (in all emirates except Ras al-Khaimah).”35 How accurate was MbZ to remove al-Islah from Emirati political life can be seen in the tragic event of 2014, when Ala’a Badr Abdullah al-Hashemi, an Emirati radicalized Lone-Wolf, stabbed to death Ibolya Ryan, an American kindergarten teacher, in the Al Reem mall in Abu Dhabi.36 This  al-Islah [the Reform] was founded in 1974 in the UAE by Emirati students in Egypt and Egyptian expatriates who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood and worked in the UAE in various jobs, mainly as school teachers. 33  Boghardt Plotkin Lori, “The Muslim Brotherhood on trial in the UAE,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 12, 2013 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/muslim-­ brotherhood-­trial-uae; Almezaini Khalid, “The Transformation of the UAE foreign policy since 2011” in Kristian Coates Ulrichsen (ed.), The Changing Security Dynamics of the Persian Gulf, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017, p. 196 (pp. 191–204). 34  One of the leading figures of al-Islah during that period was Sheikh Sultan bin Kayed al Qasimi, a member of the ruling family of Ras al-Khaimah. Apparently, he saw the spread of the Arab Spring in the UAE as an opportunity to rise in power in Ras al-Khaimah and strengthen his political authority in the country too. Sultan bin Kayed’s case can be seen as a mixture of radicalization and a plot against the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, Sheikh Saud bin Saqr al Qasimi, and the then President of the state Skeikh Khalifa bin Zayed. 35  Obaid Nawaf, The failure of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Arab world, Santa Barabara, California: Praeger, 2020, p.105. 36  Amos Deborah, “Mall Murder of American Teacher Stunts UAE, Where violence is rare,” NRP, December 5, 2014 https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2014/12/05/368728434/ mall-murder-of-american-teacher-stuns-uae-where-violence-is-rare. 32

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is the only Lonely’s Wolf attack in the UAE since 9/11, directly resulting from MbZ’s systematic effort to erase al-Islah’s influence in the UAE. However, his campaign did not only aim to strengthen the UAE’s internal security. Additionally, his goal was to end the influence of other states, such as Qatar and Turkey, over the UAE through their close links with the Muslim Brotherhood.37 MbZ saw the al-Islah as the fifth column inside the UAE, willing to play the role of the Trojan Horse for other Muslim states that wanted to blockade the strengthening of the state in regional and international affairs. After interviewing two Western and two Emirati officials, Peter Salisbury states, “MbZ is said to regard political Islamism as a tool used by regional rivals including Iran, Qatar and Turkey to project their own power and weaken Gulf monarchies and secular republics alike.”38 The isolation of the radicals inside the UAE was the product of MbZ’s proactive anti-Brotherhood initiatives, clear evidence of his smartness as a leader. The al-Islah case reveals one of the fundamental characteristics of MbZ’s leadership style, the ability to see the “big  – picture” in every event related to the UAE.  The UAE President has the rare talent for a leader to act internally while thinking internationally, a characteristic of front-row leaders such as Eleftherios Venizelos, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, John Fitzgerald Kennedy, Konrad Adenauer, Margaret Thatcher, or Emmanuel Macron. Having the skill to connect international developments with the buildup of domestic events and act systematically at the right timing is proof of smart leadership since it shows that the everyday running of the country is not confining the head of the state to micromanagement. Even today, most political elites seem hesitant in front of pivotal international events about which road to follow to exit a conundrum. However, this uncertainty is because they are not prepared to comprehend that international events always influence their countries in one way or another. MbZ proved with the al-Islah case that he is equipped with one of the fundamental characteristics of smart leadership: the mastery of linking the big picture of the international arena with every dimension of state affairs. However, the al-Islah case is not the only proof of MbZ’s smart leadership. Smart is the leader who encourages society to take a step further away from its comfort zone. Only then the goal of the daily collective evolution can be accomplished. Nevertheless, society must also be informed about the rationale of this  McElroy Damien, “Turkey provides base for 20,000 Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood supporters’, The National, August 21, 2020 https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/turkey-provides-basefor-20-000-egyptian-muslim-brotherhood-supporters-1.1065871?gclid=Cj0KCQjwsdiTBhD5AR IsAIpW8CLwW3D-­S ibnX9hCAayVl9PnR_eqcZL9ke7AGk6kkm0us_0OQxkzn6caAiYkE ALw_wcB; As Fadi Elhusseini, The Arab Spring Effect on Turkey’s role, Decision Making and Foreign Policy, Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2018, p. 124, indicates: ‘Turkey aimed to be more than a model with the initial success in Egypt, Tunisia and Syria of Islamists of the Muslim Brotherhood type  – an organization with which the AKP leadership had had close relations.” 38  Salisbury Peter, “Risk Perception and Appetite in UAE Foreign and National Security Policy,” Chatam House https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/ risk-perception-and-appetite-uae-foreign-and-national-security-policy-0/4-threat-perception. 37

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decision and the collective gains from its realization. Smart leadership differs from the so-called enlightened absolutism, where citizens have the clumsy role of an extra. In an enlightened absolutist political framework, people may blindly follow the orders of the head of the state. However, a smart leader knows that it is necessary to be as analytical as possible to win the hearts and minds of the people. MbZ is the driving force behind the spectacular advancement of the Emirati Armed Forces, especially that of the Presidential Guard, to one of the most reliable armies in the MENA region.39 First, elements of his smart leadership can be found in his decision to limit the state’s dependency on foreign partners. He set the framework for developing an Emirati defense industry that would be able to provide the UAE Armed Forces with weaponry and become a global market supplier. MbZ, who combines military experience with an almost instinctive knowledge of diplomatic procedures, knows that the defense industry is the safest way to forge strong ties in the international arena and further boost the status of the state. The primary political goal is to reduce dependency and allow the UAE to act autonomously in international affairs. In 2019, twenty-five Emirati defense companies merged into a mega-corporation under the EDGE label.40 Within a short period and amid a disrupting pandemic that has disorganized the global economy, EDGE has managed to be among the top 25 military suppliers globally. MbZ’s vision regarding the construction of an influential national defense industry, limiting the dependency of the state and using it as a diplomatic bridge internationally, can be seen in the following statement by Faisal Al Bannai, the executive chairman of the board of directors of the EDGE group “We are ultra-determined to show that we can build a sovereign product to serve our nation and to be able to send to our allies and friends. We are determined to be known in three key fields: autonomous, electronic warfare and smart weapons. We are learning from the best practices of other nations, but we are creating our own operating model. We want to be the reference model in the future.”41 Second, MbZ took a decisive step in 2014 by introducing the compulsory military draft for all young male Emiratis.42 The obligatory military service offers various benefits to the young people actively involved. According to the Draft Military Service Bill, all males between 18 and 30 must do their military service, 16 months for high school graduates and 24 months for those who have not completed their secondary education. Females can serve voluntarily for 12 months, given additional  Pollack Kenneth, “Sizing up Little Sparta: Understanding UAE military effectiveness,” American Enterprise Institute, October 22, 2020 https://www.aei.org/research-products/report/ sizing-up-little-sparta-understanding-uae-military-effectiveness. 40  Helou Agnes, “UAE launches ‘Edge’ Conglomerate to address its ‘Antiquated Military Industry’,” Defense News, November 6, 2019 https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/dubai-airshow/2019/11/06/uae-launches-edge-conglomerate-to-address-its-antiquated-military-industry/. 41  Kumar Ashwani, “UAE aims to be major defence industry player,” Khaleej Times, March 2, 2022 https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/uae-aims-to-be-major-defence-industry-player. 42  On the occasion of the 46th Armed Forces Unification Day, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid praised the role of Mohamed bin Zayed regarding the introduction of the Military Service in the UAE publicly, characterizing him as the driving force behind this specific development https://www.thenationalnews.com/ uae/2022/05/05/sheikh-khalifa-says-threats-to-region-means-uae-must-continue-to-develop-its-military/. 39

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employment and welfare benefits after service. By introducing this measure, MbZ aimed to strengthen the state’s national unity, enhancing the young Emiratis’ self-­ control and ability to deliver their best as individuals and team members under challenging conditions. At the same time, he also offered a solid base for changing the misconception that there are limitations to female participation in public life, as so many other Muslim countries put into practice. Nevertheless, this particular measure has also to be seen as an additional booster to the citizens’ sense of collective belonging to the same sovereign entity, as a step toward the civic education of young Emiratis who have a much more secure, less competitive, and economically vigorous future than the majority of the people at the same age around the world, as a step toward the closing of the gap between the two sexes and their placement in the Emirati society. An exciting description of MbZ’s decision to execute his conscription plans comes from Richard Alan Clarke, the former Counterterrorism Czar in the White House from 1998 until 2003. According to Clarke’s confession to Robert Worth of the New York Times, one day in 2013, while Clarke was working in Abu Dhabi as a Consultant for MbZ, his mobile phone rang. On the other side of the line, he heard MbZ’s voice saying he was sending him a car. After a drive in a remote warehouse district, Clarke arrived in a building where MbZ and his wife watched their daughters and nieces in military uniforms shooting at targets. MbZ said to his American advisor, “I am starting a draft. I want everyone in this country to feel like they’re responsible. A lot of them are fat and lazy.”43 As a matter of fact, he introduced the national conscript by sending first all the young members of the Royal family there. The national conscription was undoubtedly a brilliant MbZ decision derived as an inspiration from his military background. He had the empirical knowledge to evaluate the benefits of the draftee to the Union and the benefits toward the mental and physical strengthening of the Emirati youth; therefore, he decided to implement this with no hesitation. The same smart leadership characteristic of being one step ahead of the rest of society and inspiringly innovative can also be found in two other cases. The first is his central role in the signature of the Abraham Accords with Israel, an agreement that will be thoroughly analyzed in Chap. 5. The second is his decision to introduce the measure to switch the UAE’s weekends to Saturday and Sunday, without changing the Friday noon prayer, the Jummah, but instead introducing a four-and-a-halfday working week. The federal government placed the state’s private and public sectors in line with global markets.44 This development is an almost obligatory commitment for every national economy in the era of globalization. At the same time, it also shows that MbZ does not hesitate to change inherent customs in favor of the nation’s interest. On top of that, this decision was not taken at the expense of  Worth F.  Robert, “Mohammed bin Zayed’s Dark Vision of the Middle East’s Future,” The New  York Times Magazine, January 9, 2020 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/09/magazine/ united-arab-emirates-mohammed-bin-zayed.html. 44  El-Naggar Mona, “Sundays off: UAE changes its weekends to align with the West,” The New York Times, December 7, 2021 https://www.nytimes.com/2021/12/07/world/middleeast/uae-weekend-­ shift.html. 43

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people’s happiness, since with the new working week, citizens work four and a half (4,5) days and enjoy long weekends. MbZ’s smart leadership style can be characterized as resourceful, comprehending the continuous developments in the international environment and linking these with the internal events in the Union. In addition, he is inspiringly innovative, breaking free from conventional beliefs and customary ideas. MbZ proves with all his pivotal decisions about the nation’s modernization that he is leading from the front line, paving new ways for the state and the people without demolishing society’s foundations. This positively affects the nation, while the Emiratis show affection to their president in every way they can. Touring the roads of Abu Dhabi, someone will witness posh SUVs with the sticker of MbZ on their backside or will see young Emiratis holding the latest smartphones with cases having MbZ’s image. MbZ, unlike other sons of great fathers, seems at ease being compared with his father. Thus, he does not hesitate to publicly share his vision to lead his country to unprecedented heights, presenting this as the continuation of Zayed’s vision. The analyst who will pay attention to MbZ’s official Twitter account or the content of his words in public appearances would find constant references to Zayed’s work and ideas, with the founder of the Union being at the center of the UAE’s political agenda after so many years from his death.45 By this, MbZ projects the public message that the political vision of Sheikh Zayed from the day of the establishment of the Union until today is uninterrupted, transfiguring the past to the central pillar of the Emirati national identity. Each Emirati is not just a digit in the state’s records but an active part of the uninterrupted sociopolitical process of the nation since 1971, according to the MbZ’s vision. In this, he has a nation by his side, and perhaps his primary source of smart leadership is his proficiency in making his interlocutor feel like a vital part of his vision and, therefore, an active component of the uninterrupted evolution of the Union from the past to the present day, instead of just another ­subject. As Dr. Al Naqbi shared with me the memory of her graduation from the prestigious National Defense College, “I had the honor of meeting Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed and it was one of the best days of my life. To be in his presence and to listen directly to his words is priceless. His words meant a lot to me If you are here today, you are special, which means I count on you to care for your country.”46 At the end of the day, a smart leader does not behave like Atlas, the Titan who was holding the globe on his shoulders, according to the Ancient Greek myth. Still, the one who inspires many more to join the ranks, embrace the vision, and accept the responsibility to contribute to strengthening the state.

 Characteristically, on April 10, 2023, on the eve of Zayed Humanitarian Day, the UAE’s President made the following statement on his Twitter account (@MohamedBinZayed): “As we mark Zayed Humanitarian Day, we continue to be guided by the values of the late Sheikh Zayed who cared deeply about all people and their dignity. His generosity and compassion touched lives around the world and continues to inspire the UAE’s humanitarian work today.” https://twitter.com/ MohamedBinZayed/status/1645396333178634244. 46  Personal interview with Dr. Shamma Hamdoon Al Naqbi. 45

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 amdan bin Mohamed al Maktoum: Leading H as a World-Class Influencer Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohamed al Maktoum was born in November 1982 by Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum and Sheikha Hind bint Maktoum bin Juma’a.47 He, as MbZ too, graduated from the Royal Military Academy of Sandhurst in 2001. In 2006, he was appointed as Chairman of the Dubai Executive Council, the political heart and mind of the Emirate of Dubai. After the sudden death of his older brother, HbM was appointed Crown Prince of Dubai on February 1, 2008. What makes HbM so special that his leadership skills must be included in this book? It is important how he has chosen to expose himself to the public eye, while his public image matches perfectly with the unique urban aura of Dubai. Avoiding any superficial analysis of social media trends or trivial influencers and a sparkling digital lifestyle that evaporates as soon as someone logs off, the information technology era sets new rules in every dimension of public life.48 From how nations strive to promote their soft power or propagandize their decision-making in starting a war, #Instagram, #TikTok, and, more importantly, #Twitter are the new digital political venues where diplomacy, spinning, coercion, hoaxing, and other forms of political practice are materialized on a 24/7 basis. Smart leaders today are those who choose wisely to promote their image through the new electronic sanctuary of our times. Politicians, military commanders, entrepreneurs, religious leaders, breakthrough academics, artists, and pioneers with the ability and willingness to leave their mark on human affairs can use Social Media today to promote their work and themselves. However, HbM is using Social Media for an additional reason. To achieve one of the fundamental objectives of every smart politician nowadays, transparency. One of the most common accusations today against politicians worldwide, especially for those who are appointed instead of being elected, is that they fail to live outside of their ivory towers. Heads of state or ministers with a bright future ahead of them forget that it is not enough to be a hard-working and efficient technocrat; you must also endorse the role of the public figure. In other words, to connect directly with society and make the public understand that you are in office to serve them instead of just feeding your narcissism and contributing to your postmortem positive legacy. A smart leader uses Social Media to establish a well-regulated connection with the people inside the state or outside of it. This connection can be set for the politician by projecting political work, public appearances, or personal moments. It is the cornerstone for the construction of a transparent public image. This form of transparency, if used correctly, offers a good sense of the everyday life of the politician. However, public image transparency does not force the focus of  https://hamdan.ae/en-us/biography.  Schillinger Celine, “Three Ways Social Media make you a better leader,” Forbes, January 24, 2019 https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkotter/2019/01/24/three-ways-social-media-make-you-a-­ better-­leader/?sh=38087fbff82f; Taras David & Richard Davis, Power Shift? Political Leadership and Social Media, London: Roultedge, 2019. 47 48

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collective interest to remain 24/7 under the spotlights of communal scrutiny. Unlike conventional media coverage, the advantage of social media is mainly the power of the handler of the account to regulate the amount of transparency according to the likings of the politician. It is like building a crystal tower, instead of an ivory one, where everybody can look inside; however, the tenant has control of the shades. Despite this sounds relatively easy, most modern politicians fail to comprehend society’s need for transparency on the one hand. On the other hand, they seem unable to control Social Media as a tool to promote their smart leadership skills. Most of them seem trapped in the echo chambers of Social Media, where it is very easy to lose connection with reality and instead develop a disturbing narcissistic ego. Many politicians today experience Social Media burnout due to overexposing themselves and passing into oblivion because they refuse to establish a transparent public image. Failure of that kind undermines the politician’s popular support or ruins the international image. Twitter or Facebook is full of failing cases I intend to avoid bringing forward. However, every public figure must remember that social media can take you to the highest peaks or the lowest plateaus within seconds and portray you as a positive or negative trend. Thus, they require skills and responsible management. HbM has achieved spectacular support in his Social Media accounts and established solid public image transparency. Characteristically, his Instagram account has 15 million followers under the name Fazza (@Faz3), which means “the one who helps” in Arabic. Although someone may think that Fazza’s posts are random moments of a luxurious life, in reality, they are aspects of a daily routine full of gymnastics and horse-riding, drives and barbeques to the desert with friends, falconry, reciting poetry, playing with his twins, taking care of animals, etc. Nothing from all of these is out of context for HbM’s smart leadership framework. For example, horse riding and falconry are the two traditional sports for the Arabs, closely connected with life in the desert and the rich Bedouin tradition. These sports deepen companionship and establish the connection between the individual and the desert, which is not just an empty space covered in sand but the cradle of the Arabian identity. At the same time, Fazza also sends a clear message to the Emirati citizens that he serves his country as a cultural link between the past and the present through Social Media. Alternatively, his poetry reciting may seem to most Westerners as a manifestation of an artistic personality. In reality, it is a strong declaration of his role as the cultural link between the Bedouin tradition and the modern Emirati identity. The importance of poetry for the Arabs, the Nabati poetry as it is known, is central to Bedouin tradition.49 These poems are oral, not written, following the example of the tradition of the Quran that was orally transmitted to the Arabs until it was composed into a book by Abu Bakr, the first Caliph of Islam. Nabati poems held a central position in Bedouin life as a significant social and cultural event during the night in the desert camps, where only enlightened members of the tribe could compose or

 Sowayan Abdullah Sayad, Nabati Poetry: The Oral Poetry of Arabia, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985. 49

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recite lyrics. These poems allowed those who were reciting to express the beliefs, fears, and anxieties of the tribe about the harsh daily effort of survival in the desert, pose a complaint toward the head about a decision that was not well taken, or about the behavior of another member of the tribe. The Nabati poems represent a pillar of the Bedouin cultural tradition and a source of great pride for contemporary Emiratis about their tribal roots. It is not a coincidence that Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid is a well-known Nabati poet and a champion of the Nabati tradition by establishing cultural institutions in the UAE and abroad. Last but not least, Fazza’s uploads on social media with friends during nights in the desert or on holidays abroad may be seen by the nonconnoisseur of the Arab tradition as expressions of a modern lifestyle of a privileged son of a powerful father. However, spending time with friends, sharing everyday experiences, and bonding are elements of an unwritten ethical code of masculinity in the Arab Gulf, where friendship and comradeship are considered indispensable social values. HbM is a solid example of smart leadership. Instead of remaining idle and waiting to succeed his father, he built a novel role for himself by creating an advanced status through Social Media. He has achieved transparency, where the whole of the globe knows the dynamic Prince of Dubai; he has established strong links with his compatriots around the UAE and not just those in Dubai, where he is regarded as the champion of the cultural and ritual values of the Bedouin tradition and also as the ambassador of the UAE’s dynamic image internationally. He has succeeded in connecting the urban cosmopolitan vigor of Dubai with his image, operating simultaneously as a member of the Emirati political elite and as an institutional and cultural pillar of the contemporary Emirati identity. Perhaps, some readers will think that it is not Fuzz who has managed to create all these but his social media team. The reply to this comes from Abraham Lincoln, “You can fool all the people some of the time and some of the people all of the time, but you cannot fool all of the people all of the time.” No spin doctor can fool millions of people for long, no matter how skillful. HbM is a fascinating case of a smart leader mainly because, in a society where the son awaits patiently for the father to attribute him a role, he chooses to open his wings and dictate his position on the national and international spectrum. As mentioned above, being a pioneer is a sign of smart leadership.

Conclusion The strong influence of Sheikh Zayed is still vivid in today’s leadership of the UAE. Two different models of smart leadership underline the UAE’s rich political and cultural diversity. In particular, Mohammed bin Zayed al Nahyan and Hamdan bin Mohammed al Maktoum stand out for entirely different reasons. While the first is archetypal of the smart leader capable of securely seeing the UAE to its next evolutionary phase, the second is a smart leader who has established himself as synonymous with the cosmopolitan Dubai, yet with a strong connection with the region’s past too.

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This chapter presented two types of smart leadership, revealing that the UAE is not a bastion of nepotism, as many worldwide may believe, but a sui generis blend of meritocracy and influential family names, an analogous condition with other smart states. Both MbZ and HbM are two cases that promote in the best possible way the dynamic Emirati brand in today’s international affairs. Both are from a different angle but complimentary as well. A unique blend of vision, confidence, and symmetry between the roots of the past and the needs of the present produces a distinctive flavor of smart leadership in twenty-first-century politics.

Chapter 5

Smart States Act Positively in the International Arena: The UAE Case

We don’t live on an isolated island so it is only natural that, in many instances, we adapt our aspirations, ambitions and undertakings to various changes at the regional and international levels. (Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahyan)

Introduction Since the dawn of time, foreign policy has been the main instrument of choice states use to communicate with their external surroundings, in other words, the rest of the international system. This sui generis form of communication was, and still is, a synthesis of words and actions of hard, soft, and economical means to achieve the desired survival.1 Thus, its existence has always been closely connected with the ontology of every sovereign entity. The importance of foreign policy can be seen in the way that states tend to endorse their presence and facilitate their survival in the international environment through, inter alia, a variety of political and legal tools, such as interstate agreements, announced threats for the use of organized violence, or even full usage of it. JFK once said, “Domestic policy can only defeat us; foreign policy can kill us.”2 Smart states, from a foreign policy point of view, are those sovereign actors who avoid being fatally wounded in the international arena and  Survival does not have the same meaning for every state entity in the international system. For some states, no matter the size or the magnitude of their army, survival has to do with the passive endeavor of preserving their sovereign status, while, for other states, survival means the fulfillment of their objectives. For example, both the USA and Moldova try to attain survival. However, this process is more demanding for the first but much more rewarding, while the second is more restricted and thus less advantageous. 2  Dickerson John, The Hardest Job in the World: The American Presidency, New York: Random House, 2021, p. 18. 1

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succeed in turning the tide of the systemic archipelago in their favor. In this chapter, it will be argued that the Emirati Foreign Policy is a smart implementation of the UAE’s presence in the international arena of the twenty-first century.

Foreign Policy: A General Atheoretical Discussion Before going any further, it is crucial to answer the following question: What is Foreign Policy? According to Glenn Palmer and T. Clifton Morgan, it is the expression of what states want in the international environment, given existing constraints.3 Foreign Policy for Keohane and Nye Jr. is a combination of external and domestic political strategy that offers the state the opportunity to focus on its long-term systemic interests.4 According to William Martel, Foreign Policy comprises all these actions – guided by political, military, and economic objectives – undertaken by a nation in its relationships with other nations.5 Last but not least, Kenneth Waltz argues that a theory of foreign policy in international political theory cannot exist, since every nation has its own foreign policy.6 Waltz is influenced by the generic approach of Rosenau’s pre-theory,7 which advocates that Foreign Policy is the direct result of the combination of the following variables: (a) the ontological status of the state combined with the quality of its leadership, (b) the strength of national unity, and (c) the systemic balance of power. Therefore, due to the extensive subjectivity of every state, producing a systematic theoretical code about Foreign Policy creates a conceptual gap. While, from a theoretical point of view, every state tries to secure its strategic interests with a series of rational foreign policy choices, this process  Palmer Glen & Morgan Clifton T, A Theory of Foreign Policy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006, p. 3. In this book, Palmer and Morgan produce their theory of Foreign Policy, the Two-­ Good Theory, which supports the view that states try to achieve two composite goods, change and maintenance, in the international environment p. 97. 4  Keohane O. Robert & Nye Jr. S. Joseph, Power and Interdependence, Boston: Longman, 2012, p. 202, 4th ed. 5  Martel C.  William, Grand Strategy in Theory and Practice: The need for an effective foreign policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 4. 6  As Waltz says, “An international political theory does not imply or require a theory of foreign policy any more than a market theory implies or requires a theory of the firm. System theories, whether political or economic, are theories that explain how the organization of a realm acts as a constraining and disposing force on the interacting units within it…A theory of international politics bears on the foreign policies of nations while claiming to explain only certain aspects of them. It can tell us what international conditions national policies have to cope with. To think that a theory of international politics can in itself say how the coping is likely to be done is the opposite of the reductionist error.” Waltz N. Kenneth, Theory of International Politics, New York: McGraw Hill, 1979, p. 72. 7  Rosenau N. James, “Pre-theories and theories of foreign policy” in R. B. Farrell (ed.). Approaches to Comparative and International Politics. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 27–92; Rosenau N. James, “Comparative foreign policy: Fad, fantasy, or field,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 3, pp. 296–329. 3

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takes a different path for every state, influenced by its geography, economy, history, society, leadership, and international momentum. Unlike International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy is atheoretical. It is mainly based on the proceedings of recent international, regional, and domestic events that are in constant transition due to the volatile nature of the international system. A successful foreign policy produces more gains than losses with the prudent use of means to reach desired ends. Thus, foreign policy is a purely technocratic process, unlike the academic dimension of International Relations Theory, which is defined by the state’s grand strategy and regulated by the material capacity of the polity. Nevertheless, a smart foreign policy adopts a proactive attitude to face any challenges before they become existential threats and uses the state’s soft power to win the hearts and minds of other societies in the international arena. Alliances are marriages of convenience based on mutual interest. As Thucydides argued in his Peloponnesian War, such political merges are vital to enhancing survival prospects in the international system. Moreover, a smart foreign policy is designed according to the current systemic balance of power and regional conditions. The size of the state or the population does not influence it. Unlike the UAE, not many states in the twenty-first century may boast that they are following a smart foreign policy. In addition to being a positive regional and international actor, the latter is also investing in promoting its role in the regional scene of the Middle East as a systemic interconnector. The reasons for this supposition are thoroughly analyzed in the following paragraphs.

A Positive Regional Actor To begin with, what does the term “positive” mean in a Foreign Policy context? The international system is an arena of constant antagonism between states, even those linked with an alliance agreement; thus, it is a domain of continuous interaction. As a perpetual systemic condition, the interaction between states paves and maintains an open route of de jure and de facto communication. It can be argued that antagonism preserves the Westphalian systemic structure that offers states the political option to shield and enhance their sovereign status instead of returning to the medieval structural flatness, where every socio-political and ethnic entity existed under imperial banners that governed the globe under the divine mandate. In modern times, a positive foreign policy is neither aggressive nor passive. It maintains the vigor of a state ready to pursue its national interests by implementing international law. It is also willing to preserve a state’s sovereignty by effectively applying its hard power while appealing to the public opinion of other states through its soft power. It is even prepared to implement constructive diplomacy to maintain the anarchic status of the international system. In other words, a positive foreign policy does not pursue political goals through raw aggression, nor does it strive to eradicate the Westphalian balance of power through vague postmodernist ideas. For example, in the twenty-first century, Turkey is an archetypical nonpositive state

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because its foreign policy is based on raw aggression from Syria to Libya and North Iraq, while it strives hard to construct a hegemonic status for itself at the expense of the sovereign rights of every neighboring state.8

The Establishment of the GCC In contrast, the UAE promotes a positive regional and international foreign policy. The role of the UAE and, in particular, of Sheikh Zayed in establishing the Gulf Cooperation Council, a central pillar of openness and cooperation between the Arab states of the Gulf, is a strong case in point. In 1977, Sheikh Jaber al Ahmad al Sabah, the Emir of Kuwait, met with Sheikh Zayed. They both agreed that the establishment of a regional organization to coordinate the connections between the Arab Gulf states would be beneficial for the preservation of the Gulf’s status quo.9 In May 1981, the emergence of the GCC was publicly announced from Abu Dhabi’s InterContinental Hotel with the participation of the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman. The location choice for the GCC’s announcement underlined the crucial role of the UAE in this positive development for the interstate communication of the Arab states in the Gulf.

The Greek-Emirati Defense Agreement Another event showing the positive foreign policy of the UAE was the signing of the Strategic Partnership Agreement with Greece—on defense and foreign policy—in Abu Dhabi in November 2020, during the official visit of the Greek Prime Minister, Kyriakos Mitsotakis.10 Various analysts have approached this as a manifestation of Greek and Emirati mistrust regarding Turkey’s role in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East.11 The latter’s presence in the Gulf in the Tariq bin Ziyad military base outside of Doha, Qatar, since 2015, or the firm support that Ankara offered to top officials of the Muslim Brotherhood from Egypt after the intervention of the  Litsas N. Spyridon, “Bandwagoning for Profit and Turkey: Alliance formations and Volatility in the Middle East,” Israel Affairs, 2014, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 125–139. 9  Langton James, “How the GCC helped the Gulf find a common voice and purpose,” The National News, May 25, 2021 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/heritage/ how-the-gcc-helped-the-gulf-find-a-common-voice-and-purpose-1.1229190. 10  Bianco Cinzia & Rocha Rodrigues Andre, “Understanding the Emirati-Greek Relationship,” The Middle East Institute, January 27, 2001 https://www.mei.edu/publications/understanding-emirati-greek-relationship. 11  See among others Chaudhary Smriti, “UAE, Greece sign Defence Pact to counter Turkish Aggression,” The Eurasian Times, November 23, 2020 https://eurasiantimes.com/uae-greece-sign-­defense-pact-tocounter-turkish-aggression/; Aydintasbas Asli & Cinzia Bianco, “Useful enemies: How the Turkey – UAE rivalry is remaking the Middle East,” European Council on Foreign Relations, 15 March 2021 https://ecfr. eu/publication/useful-enemies-how-the-turkey-uae-rivalry-is-remaking-the-middle-east/. 8

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Egyptian Army in 2013 and the collapse of Mohammed Morsi’s presidency lend credence to this view. Nevertheless, the Greek-Emirati connection is not an anti-­ Turkish pact in the Gulf. First, the UAE with Turkey have fully re-established their relations, a development that had been fully advertised with the official visits of R.T. Erdogan in Qasr al-Watan, the Palace in Abu Dhabi, in February and in May 2022,12 while in March 2023, the two countries signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.13 Therefore, today the links between Abu Dhabi and Ankara are stronger than ever. Second, the publicly expressed will of Greece and the UAE to implement a foreign policy agenda that was not to be bounded by geography appears to have manifested in the emergence of close diplomatic ties between the two states. It has to be noted that it was the first time for both Athens and Abu Dhabi to sign a defense agreement that included mutual military aid with a state with no shared borders, while additionally, in the case of Greece, with a no-NATO state too. Through this crucial diplomatic step, the UAE emphatically declared its vivid geostrategic interest in the Eastern Mediterranean by opening a strategic depth connection with Greece. Additionally, it sends a clear message to the rest of the international system that the UAE is not a secondary regional actor that is constrained between Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Iran but a smart state able to diplomatically allure a full member of the European Union and NATO, thereby opening a new circle for its political and economic involvement in a region between the Middle East and Europe.

The Abraham Accords The signing of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel sets a similar tone but with a more significant challenge for the socio-political reflexes of all parties involved.14 In Chap. 2, it was mentioned that a Smart Foreign Policy dimension is the usage of diplomacy, and certainly of intelligence, and is akin to a “vehicle” that travels in the opposite direction from all the other “vehicles” on the highway to be able to spot opportunities and challenges ahead. When two or more states enjoy the fruits of peace, then the diplomacy and intelligence of each element are responsible for scanning the terrain ahead and spotting every possible threat that may ruin the  In February 2022, the Turkish President visited Abu Dhabi after ten years of no diplomatic connection, while in May, the Turkish President visited Abu Dhabi to pay a condolence visit for the death of Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed. 13  According to the CEPA, bilateral non-oil trade in areas such as construction, telecommunications, logistics, pharmaceuticals, agricultural technology, and Information and Communication Technology between the two countries will surge $40 billion in the next 5 years. For more, see Gulf Today, “Presidents of UAE, Turkey witness signing of CEPA trade deal,” 4 March. 2023 https://www.gulftoday.ae/business/2023/03/03/presidents-of-uae-turkey-witness-signing-of-cepa-trade-deal. 14  There is a dual dimension of the term related to the “Abraham Accords.” The first is a joint statement on August 13, 2020, that signaled the normalization of the Israeli–Emirati relations between Israel, the UAE, and the USA. The second is the signature of the normalization agreement between Israel, Bahrain, and the UAE in the White House on September 15, 2020. 12

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strong connection. The exact process from an antithetical starting point can also be found when two states are trapped in a conflict or facing a Thucydides’ trap conundrum. Then, the diplomacy and intelligence of each state test the waters to allow for a peaceful settlement while every other part of the states’ bureaucracies are getting ready for the collision. A characteristic paradigm is the exchange of letters between John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 and secret meetings between diplomats and intelligence officers from both sides to avoid the absolute catastrophe.15 While the two Super Powers’ armies were nearing a nuclear collision, the two leaders and top diplomats explored the possibilities for a crisis de-escalation. A similar approach can also be detected in UAE-Israeli relations, even when the two entities were officially enemies. Since the establishment of the state of Israel, Israel-Emirati relations have followed the course of the heated Arab-Israeli interaction. For example, in 1971, in one of his first interviews as President of the Union, Sheikh Zayed drew the official line of the UAE toward Israel by stating in the Egyptian newspaper Akhbar el-Yom, “Israel’s policy of expansion and racist plans of Zionism are directed against all Arab countries, and in particular those which are rich in natural resources. No Arab country is safe from the perils of the battle with Zionism unless it plays its role and bears its responsibilities in confronting the Israeli enemy.”16 The bitter taste of the outcome of the Six-Day War in 1967 among Arab leaders and citizens can be fully revealed in Sheikh Zayed’s words about Israel. However, the UAE and Israel had unofficial relations between their heads of Intelligence since the early 70s to establish a direct link and exchange of security information of mutual interest. According to Yossi Melman, intelligence columnist for the Israeli daily Haaretz, “Intelligence was an early point of contact between Israel and the UAE, dating to at least the 1970s and continuing ever since. Every head of Israel’s Mossad intelligence agency since then has had a relationship with his counterpart in the UAE. And as Israeli intelligence officials left the service, many went into security businesses that found ways of selling goods and services to the Emirates and creating some of the first and most important commercial ties between the countries. The pace of those contacts accelerated after Israel and the Palestinians signed the Oslo peace accords in 1994. It was a revolving door.”17 Official, sporadic diplomatic meetings started after the Madrid Conference 1991 on Arab-Israel peace.18 A characteristic  See among others Chang Laurence, “The view from Washington and the view from Nowhere: Cuban Missile Crisis Historiography and the Epistemology of Decision Making,” in James A. Nathan (ed.), The Cuban Missile Crisis Revisited, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992, p. 144 (pp. 131–160). 16  As cited by Al-Alkim Hamdan Hassan, The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates, London: Saqi Books 1989, p. 175. 17  Hendrix Steve, “Inside the secret-not-secret courtship between Israel and the United Arab Emirates,” The Washington Post, August 14, 2020 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/inside-the-secret-not-secret-courtship-between-israel-and-the-united-arabemirates/2020/08/14/3881d408-de26-11ea-b4f1-25b762cdbbf4_story.html. 18  Ulrichsen Coates Kristian, “The Gulf States and the Middle East Peace Process: Considerations, Stakes and Options,” Baker Institute for Public Policy, 25 August 2020 https://www.bakerinstitute. org/media/files/files/25b245c0/bi-brief-082520-cme-gulfstates.pdf. 15

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incident occurred in 1994, according to Elie Podeh, which underlines the operation of two smart states in the secret alleys of international politics. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the UAE comprehended that in order to facilitate its presence in the volatile Middle Eastern environment, the state had to invest in its hard power. A technologically advanced air force was the key; thus, the Emiratis focused on purchasing F-16 fighter jets from the USA. However, to achieve that, they needed the involvement of a third party to exercise a kind of persuasive campaign so Washington could sell the F-16 to Abu Dhabi. The UAE turned toward Israel, knowing the power of the Israeli lobbies in the American capital. Israel accepted that role, with Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin saying, “Why not? The UAE is not an enemy of Israel.”19 In 1999, the USA officially agreed to sell 80 F-16 Fighting Falcons to the UAE, setting the cornerstone for modernizing the Emirati hard power and enhancing its national security. In the Emirati-Israeli secret connection of 1994, we can see the case where two smart states decided to ignore the negative tides of history and approach each other to satisfy their national interests, from the Emirati point of view, and enhance a secure communication channel with an Arab element in the Gulf, from the Israeli point of view. Under this, small part of the post-Cold War history of the Middle East is hidden a fundamental operation of smart states operation; work silently and systematically in favor of the interests of your country, having your eyes set on the future instead of the past. After 9/11, UAE’s top officials in Washington, such as the Emirati Ambassador, Yousef Al-Otaiba, began to hold secret meetings with Israelis, mostly discussing about Daniel B.  Shapiro. He was to be sent as the American Ambassador to Israel; thus, both states were interested in exchanging views and information about him.20 All of these show an open communication channel between the two states concerning issues affecting the balance of power in the Middle East and their security agenda. The White House was fully aware of these meetings and did nothing to prevent them since Washington was always in favor of a direct approach between Israel and the Arab states, at least those who have proven they can be rational units at the diplomatic table. Despite a brief setback in Emirati-Israeli relations in 2010 due to Mahmoud al-­ Mabhouh’s assassination, a senior figure of Hamas, in Dubai by Mossad,21 the connection was soon to re-emerge. After all, both states share a status quo mentality, while they also see Iran and the rise of fundamentalism in the region as significant security threats. In January 2016, Zvi Mazel, the ex-Israeli Ambassador to Egypt, stated, “During the Iran nuclear talks, Israel’s intelligence community started having more effective ties with Gulf countries … The Emirates have ties with us due to our common security interests against Iran and the Muslim Brotherhood … You can

 Elie Podeh, “Israel’s Covert Diplomacy in the Middle East,” LSE Middle East Centre Podcasts, 15 May 2023, (39:42–40:17). 20  Al-Alkim Hamdan Hassan, ibid. 21  Lewis Paul et al., “Dubai Murder: Fake identities, disguised faces and a clinical assassination,” The Guardian, February 16, 2010 https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/feb/16/ dubai-murder-fake-identities-hamas. 19

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definitely sense that in certain fields the Gulf countries and Israel are becoming closer.”22 Therefore, analysts who closely follow the developments in the Middle East were not surprised when on September 15, 2020, the signing of the Abraham Accords occurred between the UAE, Israel, and Bahrain on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington D.C. After signing the agreement as the representative of the Emirati side, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan stated, “Today, we already witness a change taking place in the heart of the Middle East, a change that will send hope throughout the world.”23 Sheikh Abdullah, together with the Israeli Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, the Bahraini Foreign Minister, Abdullatif bin Rashid al-Zayani, and the then-American President Donald Trump, posed for photographs and were seen smiling on that sunny day, sending the message to the rest of the globe that the Middle East is not doomed to a Hobbesian future of a bellum omnium contra omnes. However, why was the Treaty not signed earlier, especially since the relations between the UAE and Israel were well established since the Madrid Peace Conference? The answer is the deteriorating relations between the Obama administration, Israel, and the UAE. Regarding the worsening of Emirati-American relations, the first split occurred during the early days of the Arab Spring, when the USA perceived the various uprisings against the established regimes of the region as a step toward the strengthening of the socio-political structure of the Arab world, while the Arab regimes saw this as the opening of Pandora’s box in the MENA region, as well as a brilliant opportunity for fundamentalists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, to overturn the existing status quo. In addition, the Obama administration’s treatment of the Egyptian President, Hosni Mubarak, was another reason for worsening relations between the White House and the Qasr al-Watan, especially since the Egyptian President was the most pro-American leader in the Arab world since his rise to power in 1981.24 Therefore,  Hagar Shezaf, “Israel Eyes Improved Ties with Gulf States after ‘Foothold’ Gained in UAE,” Middle East Eye, January 18, 2016 https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/israel-eyes-improvedties-gulf-states-after-foothold-gained-uae. 23  As cited in: Boms Nir & Ahmed Khuzaie, “Warm Peace and the challenge of people-to-people relations after the Abraham Accords,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy/Fikra Forum, April 15, 2022 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/warm-peace-and-challengepeople-people-relations-after-abraham-accords. 24  Muhammad Hosni Mubarak Said Mubarak became the Egyptian Vice President in 1975 and, after President Anwar el-Sadat’s assassination in 1981, rose to the position of the President of the state. He played a positive role in establishing a peaceful modus vivendi with Israel and was one of the most pro-Western Arab leaders in the MENA region. When the Tahrir revolt began in January 2011, the White House favored Mubarak’s end of his political career. However, Hillary Clinton, the Secretary of State, held an opposite view regarding the fate of the Egyptian President. As Geoff Dyer and Heba Saleh wrote in their analysis for the Financial Times on October 27, 2016 (https:// www.ft.com/content/38aead1a-9614-11e6-a80e-bcd69f323a8b), “On January 28, a Friday, Egyptian police clashed with protesters ... In Washington, it was the moment where the fissures within the administration about the emerging revolution started to become apparent. On one side in the situation room was a group of national security staff who had been with Mr. Obama on his election campaign ... who had written the president’s 2009 Cairo speech offering a new opening to the Arab world ... ‘We wanted to believe that this was a 1989 moment’ says one official involved in 22

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Obama’s rejection to offer President Mubarak support after the beginning of the Tahrir Square uprising was received as a sign of unreliability by the Emirati side.25 The other crack in Israeli-American and Emirati-American relations during the Obama administration was inflicted by the Iran Nuclear Agreement between Washington and Tehran in July 2015. Iran agreed to dismantle much of its nuclear program and open its facilities to international inspection in exchange for sanctions relief.26 This agreement was based on the absolute trust of the USA toward Tehran and its political objectives. However, can Iran be trusted? From a foreign policy point of view, the answer is no. In 2016, while the agreement with the USA was on, the German domestic intelligence agency, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, revealed in its annual report that Tehran tried to pursue nuclear technology from German companies, while on another occasion during that same period, Iran tried to purchase tons of controlled carbon fiber.27 On top of that, while the agreement was active, Iran attempted to exceed the amount of heavy water that it was allowed to possess, while it never offered a persuasive answer as to the ­reasons for the detection of radioactive particles and traces of uranium in Turquzabad, a village in the Kahrizak rural district in Tehran.28 From a Grand Strategy point of the discussions ... In contrast, Mrs. Clinton suggested that Iran was a more appropriate analogy. Supported by Mike Mullen, the chair of the joint chiefs of staff and Joe Biden, the vice president, she pointed out that the 1979 revolution in Tehran had been greeted as a liberal opening, only to end up in Islamic repression.” Just a few days later, on February 1, Mubarak announced that he was not to run for President again in the next elections that were to be held in a few months. The White House officially denounced the Egyptian President, with Barack Obama stating that the transition in Egypt “must be meaningful, it must be peaceful and must begin now.” As a result, Mubarak’s regime collapsed, and the radicals of the Egyptian Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt. For more regarding the American approach to the Egyptian Spring, see Litsas N.  Spyridon, “US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Power Politics and Ideology under the Sun,” Cham: Springer, 2020, pp. 122–128. 25  This is a specific detail that the State Department and Barack Obama’s Middle East advisor failed to inform him correctly about the high value of comradeship that the Arabs, especially Bedouins, are giving. A characteristic passage is coming again from the Arabian Sands, one of the most accurate analyses regarding the Bedouin culture and values ever written about the Gulf region and its people. As Wilfred Thesiger says, “They were Bedu and I was not; they were Muslims and I was a Christian. Nevertheless, I was their companion and an inviolable bond united as, as sacred as the bond between host and guest, transcending tribal and family loyalties. Because I was their companion on the road, they would fight in my defence even against their brothers and they would expect me to do the same.” Thesiger Wilfred, Arabian Sands, London: Penguin Classics, 2007, p. 139, new ed. Obama administration not only failed to protect Hosni Mubarak but was the element that officially pushed him to resign and to everything that followed. This was not just one of the most severe mistakes that Obama ever made in his Middle Eastern foreign policy, but something that the Arabs will never forget unless the American side does something that will show them that it was a wrong calculation and not an American habit to refuse a helping hand to an ally in need. 26  Robinson Kali “What is the Iran Nuclear Deal?’, Council on Foreign Relations, April 28, 2022 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-iran-nuclear-deal. 27  Dr. Rafizadeh Majid, “Iran cannot be trusted to obey any nuclear agreement,” Arab News, May 12, 2021 https://www.arabnews.com/node/1857921. 28  ibid.

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view, Iran would like to enter the prestigious nuclear club as the ultimate step to enhance survival and elevate its status globally as not just the doctrinal but also as the political and military champion of Shia Islam.29 As a matter of fact, the Israeli side immediately denounced the agreement between the Obama administration and Tehran through Benjamin Netanyahu’s statement characterized it as a “stunning historic mistake,”30 while the Emirati side followed course, though without raising its voice as high. The result was that both states limited their diplomatic connections with the White House, waiting for the end of Obama’s tenure. Thus, it is no surprise that both the UAE and Israel were quick to celebrate the election of Donald Trump in the White House and his decision to cancel the nuclear agreement with Iran. For example, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed officially urged the international community “to respond positively to President Trump’s position to rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.”31 The Israeli government of Benjamin Netanyahu held the same positive line toward Washington’s decision to end the nuclear deal with Iran. Characteristically, Naftali Bennet, the then Minister of Education and later on the 13th Prime Minister of the State, tweeted on his official Twitter account, “President Trump’s courage and boldness today made the world a much safer place. Thank you @realDonaldTrump.”32 Therefore, it becomes clear that the signing of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel was not a creation of the Trump administration that came out of the blue but a long-standing good understanding between the two states that was meant to occur and was waiting for the end of Obama’s tenure. The significance of the Abraham Accords between the UAE and Israel goes beyond every other agreement between the latter and an Arab state. For example, in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty was signed, leading to the normalization of their relations, followed by the Jordan-Israeli peace treaty in 1994. However, the 2020 Abraham Accords Peace Agreement was much more critical for the following reasons. First, the normalization of Emirati-Israeli relations opens the path for upgrading the relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel. The special relations status between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, on the one hand, and the strong personal connection between the Emirati President, Mohamed bin Zayed, and the Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister, Mohammed bin Salman al Saud, paves the road for a de facto strengthening of the ties between Israel and Saudi Arabia, as well as a possible de jure positive development in the future. Second, the Abraham Accords brought the two smart states of the region, i.e., Israel and the UAE, closer with significant economic results for both. In May 2022, the two countries signed a free trade deal,  Litsas N.  Spyridon, “Iran Remains unworthy of Trust,” The Begin Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, April 2, 2021 https://besacenter.org/iran-remains-unworthy-of-trust/. 30  Kershner Isabel “Iran deal denounced by Netanyahu as ‘Historic Mistake’,” New York Times, July 14, 2015 https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-­ israel.html. 31  Reuters, “UAE supports US withdrawal from Iran nuclear deal,” May 8, 2018 https://www. reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-emirates-idUSKBN1I92Z1. 32  https://twitter.com/naftalibennett/status/993956965511520257 29

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the first of such an agreement between Israel and an Arab country, that scraps customs duties on 96% of all traded products. The agreement boosts the Emirati-Israeli collaboration in renewables, consumer goods, tourism, and life sciences, offering $2 billion in revenue for 2022 and a realistic calculation of $5 billion in revenue in the next 5 years.33 Dubai is opening its gates to Israeli companies that wish to expand to South Asia and the Far East. At the same time, the UAE, with the opening to Israel, further secures a strong position in the Eastern Mediterranean, building on the Alliance Pact it signed with Greece in 2020 and the trade agreements signed between the UAE and Greece in May 2022. The Abraham Accords was an agreement with a sound diplomatic echo and a firm economic outcome. It showed that both the UAE and Israel, two smart states of the twenty-first century, are ready to welcome future challenges by embracing cooperative schemes that defy the turbulent historical past and generate regional peace, stability, and primary wealth for the sides involved. On top of that, Sheikh Abdulla’s visit to the Yad Vashem on September 15, 2022, projects another dimension in the UAE’s Foreign Policy since it was not just a visit to strengthen the ties between the two countries. It was a brilliant response by the top figure of the Emirati foreign policy toward all these senseless figures around the globe that insist on historical oblivion and deny, directly or indirectly, the Holocaust of the Jewish people by the Nazis and their allies a little before and during World War II.  It was also a brilliant response against stereotypes and shallow beliefs regarding “perpetual rivalries” that are seeing international politics through their simplistic lenses instead of being able to comprehend that smart states, like the UAE and Israel, don’t forget their past but are not willing to live the present in accordance to the old days’ realities. Sheikh Abdulla’s words inside Yad Vashem can undoubtedly carry the substance of the Smart States theory in contemporary international politics. After he laid a wreath at the Hall of Remembrance, he wrote in the guest book, “I am here today to remind ourselves of the lessons that history teaches us and the great responsibility upon us to act with tolerance for building our community and society. We must take the brave steps of building a bridge of true peace for coming generations.”34 As a direct result of this visit, in early January 2023, the Emirati Embassy in Washington, through its official Twitter account, announced that the Holocaust would be a topic of teaching in History classes in primary and secondary schools in the UAE.35 The UAE will be the first Arab state to introduce pupils to the Nazi atrocities against the Jewish populations in Europe, breaking a historical taboo of decades that had to do with presenting one of the blackest moments in human history to young Arabs. This step will be one more decisive action toward  Kerr Simeon, ‘UAE eyes ‘new paradigm’ for region with Israel trade deal,” Financial Times, May 31, 2022 https://www.ft.com/content/78ee71a3-0b77-4b85-9b34-1057594862d8. 34  The Times of Israel, “UAE foreign minister tours Yad Vashem; meets Lapid, Herzog on 1st Jerusalem visit,” 15 September 2022 https://www.timesofisrael.com/uae-foreign-minister-toursyad-vashem-meets-lapid-herzog-on-1st-jerusalem-visit/. 35  Gambrell John, “United Arab Emirates says it will teach Holocaust in schools,” The Washington Post, January 9, 2023 https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/united-arab-emirates-says-it-willteach-holocaust-in-schools/2023/01/09/33595c16-8ffa-11ed-90f8-53661ac5d9b9_story.html. 33

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strengthening collective tolerance and the notion of acceptance of others in the modern UAE, a decision that paves the road for other Arab states to follow too. Last but not least, the opening of the UAE toward the bitter memories of the Holocaust is so meticulous that the private Crossroads of Civilizations Museum in Dubai unveiled for the International Holocaust Remembrance Day a Torah scroll that was saved from the Holocaust and was later sent to London. As the founder of the Museum, Ahmed Obaid Al Mansoori, stated regarding this new display, “…it would help combat ‘big denial’ of the Holocaust in the region. For us Peace is a complete peace. Many people have forgotten the Jews are part of the region. So here, we’re trying to show…the good days between the Jews and the Arabs in the past.”36 It goes without saying that the Abraham Accords offered the opportunity to the signatory states to establish new ties and make new beginnings in their diplomatic connection. The UAE’s opening toward Israel and the genuine sensitivity that the state shows toward the Holocaust, offering the opportunity to the Emiratis to familiarize themselves with one of the darkest periods in human history, fully reveals the power of Smart foreign policy in new positive beginnings in the international system.

A Positive International Actor On the occasion of the 2003 UAE National Day, the founder of the Union, Sheikh Zayed, made the following statement, “Foreign Aid and assistance is one of the basic pillars of our foreign policy. For we believe that there is no true benefit for us from the wealth that we have unless it does not also reach those in need, wherever they may be, and regardless of their nationality or belief.”37 As a matter of fact, since the early days of the Union, the state produced an effective Foreign Aid38 mechanism. In the beginning, this Foreign Aid was part of the Emirati approach to establish itself in the region as a sovereign entity and attract the positive attitude of its neighboring states. The objective of winning the hearts and minds of the Arab world and reducing any shadow of a Security Dilemma toward itself was so dominant in the UAE’s first foreign policy steps that it thoroughly influenced its foreign policy line. Instead of being another competitor in the Gulf, searching for more diplomatic gains at the expense of others, the UAE implemented a smart foreign policy. It  Shakhsir Bushra, “UAE Museum unveils Torah scroll that survived the Holocaust in tolerance push,” Reuters, January 29, 2023 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-museumunveils-torah-scroll-that-survived-holocaust-tolerance-push-2023-01-29/. 37  Al Abed Ibrahim et  al (eds.), United Arab Emirates Yearbook, 2006, London: Trident Press, 2006, p. 66. 38  One of the first and still very accurate definitions of Foreign Aid comes from Raymond F. Mikesell, The Economics of Foreign Aid, New Brunswick: Aldine Transaction, 2009, p. 194, sec. ed. He portrays it as “a transfer of real resources or immediate claims on resources (for example, foreign exchange) from one country to another, which would not have taken place as a consequence of the operation of market forces or in the absence of specific official action designed to promote the transfer by the donor country.” 36

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invested in being a positive factor willing to support the Arab elements in case of need. This sui generis approach can be viewed in Article 12 of the 1971 Constitution, “The foreign policy of the UAE shall be directed towards supporting the Arab and Islamic causes and interests and towards establishing closer friendship and co-­ operation with all the nations and peoples on the basis of the principles of the charter of the United Nations Organization and international ideals.”39 During the 1970s and the 1980s, the UAE provided more than $20 billion to the Palestinians.40 At the same time, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon also became recipients of Emirati donations.41 By assisting the other Arab states, the UAE aimed to declare its presence as an influential element in the Gulf that all others had to consider seriously and not as a moribund federation sandwiched between Saudi Arabia on the one hand and Iran on the other. As Abdul Hamid Mohamed Abdul Ghani argued regarding this UAE’s pro-Arab orientation of financial aid, “by building her image as a responsible Arab state, the UAE was indirectly solidifying her own independence.”42 However, as the UAE evolved, its Foreign Aid became more active toward other geographic entities of the international system, including non-­ Arab or Muslim states.43 For the state to systematize its actions, in 2008, the Office for the Coordination of Foreign Aid was established. This was subsumed under the Ministry of International Cooperation and Development in 2013 and 2016 under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Under the influence of Mohamed bin Zayed and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah bin Zayed, Foreign Aid became the spear’s tip for the state in recent years. Characteristically, in 2017 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation published its main line of foreign policy under the title “Promoting Global Peace and Prosperity: UAE Policy for Foreign Assistance, 2017–2021.” It put forward three aid priority areas: (1) infrastructure, (2) government effectiveness, and (3) women’s empowerment.44 From all the above,

 https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf  Al Mashat Monem Abdul, “Politics of constructive engagement: The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates” in B. Korany & A. Kossany (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Globalization, Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press, 2008, p. 472. 41  Ulrichsen Coated Christian, The United Arab Emirates: Power, Politics and Policymaking, London: Routledge, 2017, Chap. 5. 42  Abdul Ghani M. H. A, Culture and Interest in Arab Foreign Aid: Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates as case studies, Ph.D. Thesis, Santa Barbara: The University of California, 1986, p. 358. 43  For more regarding specific data, see Rugh A. William, “The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates,” Middle East Journal, 1996, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 57–70; Cochrane Logan, “The United Arab Emirates as a Global Donor: What a decade of foreign aid data transparency reveals,” Development Studies Research, 2021, vol.8, no. 1, pp. 49–62. 44  Al Saif Bader, “The UAE: Aid Serves Many Purposes,” Carnegie Middle East Center, June 9, 2020 https://carnegie-mec.org/2020/06/09/uae-aid-serves-many-purposes-pub-82004. Regarding women empowerment the UAE, since 2017, has launched the 100% Women Policy that aims to enhance gender equality and empower the role of women in societies that receive the Emirati economic support. Until 2020, the UAE allocated around $1.68 billion to women’s empowerment and protection. See Godinho Varun, “UAE’s Foreign Aid from 2010 to 2021 totaled $56.14bn,” Gulf Business, August 25, 2021 https://gulfbusiness.com/uaes-foreign-aid-from-2010-to-2021-totalled-56-14bn/. 39 40

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is it safe to claim that the UAE is a sui generis element in the international arena, acting as the “Good Samaritan,” instead of a normal nation-state that strives to preserve its interests and enhance its survival prospects? The UAE is choosing to project itself as a positive international actor. This decision strengthens its diplomatic connections with other states around the globe but is also boosting its national prestige. The concept of National Prestige is one of the main pillars of effective Soft Power, offering the opportunity to states with high prestige worldwide to operate advanced campaigns for the allurement of foreign societies on the international scene.45 For a state such as the UAE, which is situated in one of the most volatile regions of the world, surrounded by numerous geostrategic challenges and perils, every step to protect its status by combining its hard and soft power leverage is a manifestation of acute awareness of the systemic conditions, thus of smartness too, primarily when this manifestation of smartness is being implemented through smart diplomacy. As Khalid Almezaini concludes regarding the significance of national prestige in the UAE’s foreign policy, “In sum, the UAE has gained a good reputation in return for its aid, in addition to strong diplomatic relations with the aid recipient countries. These gains are important and can be considered as a ‘currency’ for the UAE to spend at times when political leverage is needed to serve the UAE’s national interests. However, in the past ten years, the UAE does not seem to have used foreign aid as a political or economic tool, which indicates that prestige remains the primary purpose of its foreign aid.”46 The role of the positive international actor was especially underlined in two major crises with a global magnitude, one in the human health sector and the other in the domain of a central humanitarian air bridge. In 2020 alone, during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, the UAE supported 128 countries by sending 1742 tonnes of medical and food aid; three specialized field hospitals were established in Sudan; Jordan; and Guinea, Conakry, while $10 million were given directly to the World Health Organization.47 In addition, on May 2022, at the II Global COVID-19 summit, the Minister of State for International Cooperation, Reem bint Ibrahim al Hashemy, announced that the UAE would donate an additional $60 million to address the COVID-19 pandemic globally as a recognition of the added responsibilities deriving from the state’s seat in the United Nations Security Council.48

 Wood Steve, “Nations, National Identity and Prestige,” National Identities, 2014, vol. 16, no. 2, pp. 99–115; Thornton Bruce, “Prestige as a Tool of Foreign Policy,” Hoover Institution, June 12, 2017 https://www.hoover.org/research/prestige-tool-foreign-policy; Chong Alan, Foreign Policy in Global Information Space: Actualizing Soft Power, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007, pp. 59–81. 46  Almezaini S. Khalid, The UAE and Foreign Policy: Foreign Aid, Identities and Interest, London: Routledge, 2012, pp. 114–115. 47  UAE Humanitarian Aid and Efforts to Combat COVID-19, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, February 1, 2021 https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/justice-­ safety-­and-the-law/handling-the-covid-19-outbreak/humanitarian-efforts. 48  Emirates News Agency, “UAE Pledges to donate AED 220 million to support global efforts to address COVID-19,” May 13, 2022 https://www.wam.ae/en/details/1395303047116. 45

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Regarding the air bridge operation, the UAE was one of the key actors in avoiding a humanitarian crisis in Kabul, Afghanistan, after the re-capturing of the city by the Taliban and the withdrawal of the US Forces in mid-August 2021. The UAE Air Force offered a safe exit from Kabul to 39,000 individuals while accommodating 8500 Afghan refugees on Emirati ground.49 Besides the humanitarian dimension regarding the UAE involvement that allowed tens of thousands to escape Taliban cruelty, the Emirati operation in post-American Afghanistan also has a strong security dimension, revealing the proactive nature of Emirati Foreign Policy. By having eyes on the ground, the UAE can monitor the activities of various radicals that have already found shelter in Afghanistan and threaten humanity again with their nihilistic ideology and eschatological aspirations. Since early September 2021, the UAE has offered more than 250 tons of humanitarian aid to the Taliban to face the lack of food and medicine supplies. As a result, GAAC Solutions, an Abu Dhabi corporation, was permitted by the Taliban to handle all the logistic operations of the three main Afghan airports in Kabul, Kandahar regions, and Herat.50 In so doing, the UAE manages to be one of the few states with access to Afghanistan while also being able to monitor political developments inside the country closely. This further amplifies the UAE’s role as a key international security factor since the re-emergence of jihadist groups, other than the Taliban, is currently under process in Afghanistan.51 As Kirsten Fontenrose points out, “The Emirati government is concerned about the growth and consolidation of other violent extremist groups inside Afghanistan. It fears that vocal opposition to religious extremism from its leadership will make the country a target for these groups. It will not rely on the United States for the most accurate information about these groups going forward.”52 By enhancing its security capacity, the UAE offers a window of opportunity to other states to monitor the domestic developments in Afghanistan. After the Taliban’s reappearance, Afghanistan has abruptly stopped being interconnected with the largest part of the international system. This is another dimension of the UAE’s role as a positive international actor. It firmly supports its smart branding and the central role of the UAE’s Foreign Policy in the international arena today, the systemic interconnector.

 Saab Y. Bilal, “In Afghanistan the Gulf Arab States stepped up,” Middle East Institute, September 1, 2021 https://www.mei.edu/publications/afghanistan-gulf-arab-states-stepped. 50  Airport Technology, “UEA Firm to manage operations at key Afghanistan airports,” May 25, 2022 https://www.airport-technology.com/news/uae-afghanistan-airports/. 51  Litsas N.  Spyridon, “Afghanistan and the new Taliban,” The Cairo Review of Global Affairs, January 17, 2022 https://www.thecairoreview.com/global-forum/afghanistan-and-the-new-taliban/. 52  Fontenrose Kirsten, “What the Arab Gulf is thinking after the Afghanistan withdrawal,” Atlantic Council, September 23, 2021 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/ what-the-arab-gulf-is-thinking-after-the-afghanistan-withdrawal/. 49

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The Systemic Interconnector US-Emirati Relations As mentioned, the UAE had a clear pro-Western stance during the Cold War. This was justified by the naval superiority of the major Western actors (the USA, the UK, and France) compared with the rather outdated Soviet naval capacity and was partly due to the close trade and energy ties with the Western free-market economies. In addition, the first generation of the Emirati leadership rightly perceived a close connection between an Islamic nation with the atheist Marxist-Leninist superpower as a profound inconsistency. The UAE established official diplomatic relations with the USSR in the mid-1980s. However, the end of the Cold War was to bring considerable changes in this specific dimension. The gradual emergence of multipolarity and the arrival of Mohamed bin Zayed at the helm of the country offered the opportunity for the UAE to develop a more complex foreign policy that was thoroughly accustomed to the multipolar balance of power of the post-9/11 era, the role of the systemic interconnector, or else that of a bridge for the Big Three, in the strategically located region of the Arab Gulf. Despite the distance between Washington DC and Abu Dhabi during the Obama administration due to the different way the two states approached the emergence of the Arab Spring, US-UAE relations are still in good condition; not as good as they used to be, but still at a pretty satisfactory level. Emirati-American relations have been very close since the early days of the Union. As has already been mentioned in Chap. 3, the USA was one of the first international actors who recognized the sovereign status of the UAE in 1971, while just 2 months after the establishment of the Union, on February 29, 1972, William A.  Stoltzfus Jr. was appointed as the US Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary in Abu Dhabi.53 In addition, the UAE participated in the American military expeditions in Kuwait against the Iraqi Baathist regime, in Afghanistan against the Taliban, in Somalia in 1992, in Syria against ISIS, in Kosovo during the troubles of 1999, in Iraq in 2003,54 and Libya against the Gaddafi regime. The connection between the two states was invigorated during the Trump administration, mainly because Washington had decided to pull out of the Iran nuclear deal, as stated earlier, and also because Washington back then had a much warmer approach to the Gulf states and their style of governing, compared with the Obama administration’s attitude that was much more focused on its unique foreign policy approach that less tolerable to the sui generis political

 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/stoltzfus-william-a  The cooperation between the UAE and the USA during the American invasion in Iraq had been publicly characterized in 2005 by the then US Assistant Secretary of Defence, Peter Rodman, as “good quiet co-operation.” As Rodam stated “I don’t want to get into the specifics, but we are very pleased at the [military] cooperation that we have.” Alterman B. John, “Iraq and the Gulf States: The Balance of Fear,” United States Institute of Peace, August 2007 https://www.usip.org/sites/ default/files/sr189.pdf. 53 54

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­ ethodology of the Gulf regimes.55 Nevertheless, the cooperation between the m Emirati and the American Armed Forces effectively countered various Houthi missile attacks against Abu Dhabi and Dubai in January 2022. Specifically, the Americans provided the Emirati Air Force with the KC-135 aerial refueling tanker aircraft that offered the strategic advantage to the UAE’s F-16s and Mirage 2000 to be in the air at all times, patrolling the national airspace most effectively.56 Moreover, the Al Dharfa air base in Abu Dhabi hosts around 2000 US troops. As this chapter is written, both countries are in lengthy diplomatic discussions concerning signing a new advanced security cooperation agreement to the previous one in 2019. On top of that, the economic ties between Abu Dhabi and Washington DC have continued to be vigorous even during the COVID-19 pandemic period,57 while there is close cooperation at an academic level through the operation of the New York University in Abu Dhabi, the American University of Dubai, the American University of Sharjah, and the 2021 partnership agreement between the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy and the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. Last but not least, in November 2022, both countries signed the “UAE-US Partnership for Accelerating Clean Energy” during the Abu Dhabi International Petroleum Exhibition and Conference. The agreement unlocks $100 billion in financing clean energy projects in the UAE, the USA, and other countries, intending to add 100 gigawatts globally by 2035. The agreement arrived as a reminder to all those who

 I have given a distinctive label to Barack Obama’s foreign policy under the term “Obamianism.” According to it, “For the Obamian school of thought, the U.S. has an undisputable military capacity that derives mainly from its technological advancement. However, the Obamians comprehend to a great degree than all the other schools of thought on American foreign policy that hard power is not enough by itself to preserve the primacy of the state in international affairs. According to the Obamian approach, unlike Jacksonians, international affairs do not function through a zero-sum game but through a multi-dimensional process of asymmetric interdependencies where soft power matters the most. In this specific aspect, Obamianism comes closer to Wilsonianism. However, while Wilsonianism promotes liberal democracy as a cornerstone for interstate communication, for Obamians, converting the other states to a free-market economy and humanitarianism is of prime importance.” Litsas N. Spyridon, US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Power Politics and Ideology under the Sun, Cham: Springer, 2020. p. 32. 56  It has to be noted here that according to Barak Ravid’s research, this specific support spread a negative aura to the US-UAE relations due to American misconduct. Some days after the second Houthi attack on Abu Dhabi, in late January 2022, when the Emirati Air Force intercepted two ballistic missiles, the military attaché in the US Embassy in the UAE handed the bill to his Emirati counterparts for the refueling of their jets. Everyone with little experience with the Arab culture would have known that such an approach was to be taken as a significant offense by the Emirati side, as it happened. According to Derek Chollet, Counselor at the US Department of State, “Sheikh Mohamed was understandably upset.” The relations between the two states faced diplomatic frostiness and were only repaired after the meeting between President Biden and Sheikh Mohamed in Jeddah in July 2022. For more, see Barak Ravid, “Why a bill the U.S. handed to the UAE last year shocked MBZ,” Axios, May 10, 2023 https://www.axios.com/2023/05/10/uae-mbz-­ us-state-biden; Barak Ravid, Trump’s Peace: The Abraham Accords and the Reshaping of the Middle East, Independently Published, 2022 (for the Derek Chollet’s quote p. 537). 57  In 2021, the USA had an $11.13 billion trade surplus with the UAE, the 6th largest trade surplus for the USA globally https://www.uae-embassy.org/uae-us-cooperation/economic. 55

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were promoting the view that Emirati-American relations had been severely damaged after the dispute over the OPEC decision to cut oil production in October 2022 that the connection between Washington and Abu Dhabi may still produce positive results for the region and the international balance of power too. However, it has to be said that the links between the two states are not the only ones that affect the UAE’s route in the contemporary international arena. However, it is more than evident that the ties between Washington and Abu Dhabi are less robust than they used to be. A strong sentiment, half a rumor and half a view, exists among Emirati political, diplomatic, and academic circles that the USA is no longer interested in the Middle East. In particular, the view circles around the conviction that other than oil, Washington does not want to be any more involved in the mercurial political conditions that penetrate the Arab world. This has been further underlined by the over-promoted idea about the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific that began after Hilary Clinton’s article in 2011 on Asia as the new center of gravity of international politics.58 In addition, the American approach during the Arab Spring and later on in Afghanistan that led to the re-emergence of the Taliban further strengthened the Emirati views that the Americans are not as committed as they used to be in the region. Those analysts in the UAE who argue that the USA has already developed an emphatic indifference to what is happening in the Gulf region clearly underestimate the American capacity to be heavily involved with the socio-­ political conditions in various locations around the world, independently of what various politicians, academics, diplomats, or columnists may claim from time to time. In addition, these views tend to underemphasize the fact that the USA was and still is the principal naval power in international affairs, and the Gulf, independently of its oil and hydrocarbon resources, still holds a pivotal role in maritime affairs, either as a route to the Indian Ocean or as an alternative naval route to the coasts of Pakistan and Iran, two states that hold top positions in the South Asia American agenda. Even so, Washington must understand that it has to show the flag more often in the Gulf. The times when a gala in the American Embassy in Abu Dhabi or the visit of an American official in the UAE were enough to enhance Emirati-­ American relations have gone for good. A more coherent agenda for the Gulf and the UAE must be prepared at the Foggy Bottom, including the smart state variable to understand better the Emirati society, the institutions, and the leadership. Both the White House and the State Department must show a vivid interest in the developments in the Gulf once again instead of dealing with the region as a potential quicksand field that will engage American resources and the Armed Forces for an extended period. Engagement is key regarding Emirati-American relations, especially in a period where Beijing shows hyper-diplomatic activity in almost every corner of the international system. The American style of lead-from-behind, or in this case from-distance, seems insufficient for the UAE nowadays, perhaps because there are some genuinely persistent suitors for the state’s heart and mind.

 Clinton Hilary, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy, October 11, 2011 https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 58

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Russian-Emirati Relations The reason that the UAE-US connection is no longer a diplomatic monopoly is not due to a sudden rise of anti-Americanism in the seven Emirates.59 Rather, it is because Abu Dhabi aspires to achieve diplomatic diversification. Western analysts often forget that the UAE is not a NATO member obliged to follow diplomatic and military exclusivity toward the USA. From the end of the Cold War until now, the UAE has developed an open communication channel with Moscow and Beijing. For example, in 2018, the Russian Direct Investment Fund and Mubadala Petroleum, the Emirati oil and gas exploration and production company, announced a joint venture with PJSC Gazprom Neft to develop several oil fields in the Tomsk and Omsk regions of Southern and Western Siberia.60 In 2019, during Putin’s official visit to Abu Dhabi, the two sides signed various deals in energy, advanced technology, and the health sector.61 The connection between the two states crossed conventional diplomatic politeness during the early days of the Arab Spring. At the same time, Abu Dhabi was monitoring the American approach to the extensive changes the Arab Spring caused to the MENA’s status quo, particularly in Egypt with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood or with the electoral strengthening of Islamist political parties such as Ennahda or the Daya Salafiya in Tunisia and Algeria. During that time, Russia presented itself as a guarantor of stability in the MENA and as a key mechanism for deterring religious radicalism. In Libya, between 2014 and 2020, Moscow and Abu Dhabi found common ground for cooperation against the rise of the fundamentalists by supporting General Khalifa Haftar,62 while since 2022, the UAE has come closer to Bashar Al Assad, whom Moscow fully backed since the early days of the Syrian Civil War. The  It has to be said that anti-Americanism in the UAE is not different from analogous cases worldwide. Those Emiratis who publicly admit that they do not like the USA follow either the popular trend around the Arab world that is closely connected with the Palestinian question or out of ignorance since they connect anti-Americanism with their Arab identity. However, especially in the UAE case, it has to be said that most people consume American products; they probably drive an American SUV and generally follow the American way of life. This inconsistency shows that anti-­ Americanism in the UAE is shallow and must not be parallelized with that in Syria, Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon in the regions under the control of Hezbollah. 60  https://www.mubadala.com/en/news/rdif-mubadala-petroleum-and-gazprom-neft-announcejoint-venture-develop-siberian-oil-fields 61  Arab News, “UAE and Russia sign deals worth $1.3bn during Putin’s Abu Dhabi visit,” October 15, 2019 https://www.arabnews.com/node/1569171/middle-east. 62  It has to be noted, however, that lately and due to the Emirati-Turkish rapprochement, the UAE’s stance in Libya has changed, with Abu Dhabi opening a solid communication channel with Abdul Hamid al-Dabaiba, the head of National Unity. This shift has to be seen more as Abu Dhabi’s aspiration to play once again the role of the bridge between the two poles in Libya rather than fully adopting the Turkish approach. For more, see Badi Emadeddin, “The UAE is making a precarious shift in its Libya policy. Here’s why,” Atlantic Council, October 27, 2022 https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ blogs/menasource/the-uae-is-making-a-precarious-shift-in-its-libya-policy-heres-why/. 59

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r­approchement between Damascus and Abu Dhabi was sealed during the official visit of Bashar Al Assad to Abu Dhabi on March 2022, his first visit to an Arab State since the beginning of the Civil War. The fact that a traditional Sunni state is reaching out to an Alawi leader reveals how Mohammed bin Zayed is unwilling to limit his country’s foreign policy to what is religiously permissible or not, while it also shows the increased influence that Moscow plays in the Emirati foreign policy. This meeting paved the road for re-establishing the Syrian diplomatic status quo in the Arab nucleus. In May 2023, during a meeting of the member states of the Arab League in its headquarters in Cairo was decided that after an 11-year suspension, Syria was to be accepted back into the organization.63 The Russo-Emirati connection was also enhanced by the American mantra of the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific64 and Washington’s Retrenchment Strategy65 that forwarded a spirit of disengagement from regions where the USA was exposed diplomatically and militarily for an extended period, such as the Middle East. The USA retrenchment policy was mainly targeted at disengaging from the Middle East and North Africa, encouraging regional actors to be more actively involved in suppressing the various sources of geostrategic instability there. Nevertheless, International Politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum; thus, the Russian willingness to be more actively involved in Middle Eastern realities was the main reason for the deeper connection between Moscow and Abu Dhabi that began during that period. For some analysts, the nonliberal governing style of the two states was the primary reason for bringing these two together.66 These approaches became even more popular when in February 2022, the UAE abstained from a UN Security Council resolution condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine.67  Mohamed Gobran, “Arab League re-admits Syria after 11-year absence,” Arab News, 7 May 2023 https://www.arabnews.com/node/2299161/middle-east. 64  For more about the Pivot to the Asia-Pacific US Foreign Policy, see among others Davidson Janine, “The US Pivot to Asia,” American Journal of Asia Studies, 2014, vol. 21, pp.  77–82; Hashimoto Naofumi, “The US ‘Pivot’ to the Asia-Pacific and US Middle East Policy: Towards and Integrated Approach,” Middle East Institute, March 15, 2013 https://www.mei.edu/publications/ us-pivot-asia-pacific-and-us-middle-east-policy-towards-integrated-approach. 65  The Retrenchment Strategy is a Grand Strategy decision by a state wishing to reduce its international commitments and military spending. In the American framework, this strategy was implemented by Barack Obama as a direct result of the 2008 mega-economic crisis that hit the USA. For more, see Parent M. Joseph & Paul K. MacDonald, “The Wisdom of Retrenchment: America must cut back to move forwards,” Foreign Affairs, 2011, vol. 90, no. 6, pp.  32–47; Wolf B.  Albert, “Strategic Retrenchment: Rethinking America’s Commitment to the Middle East,” Comparative Strategy, 2020, vol. 39, no. 1, pp. 94–100. 66  See among others Ramani Samuel, “Russia and the UAE: An Ideational Partner,” Middle East Policy, 2020, vol. 27, no. 1, pp. 125–140; Hamid Shadi, “What Russia’s invasion of Ukraine means for democracy promotion in the Middle East,” Brookings Institute, March 23, 2022 https://www. brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/03/23/what-russias-invasion-of-ukraine-means-fordemocracy-promotion-in-the-middle-east/. 67  Coughlin Con, “The UAE’s vote on Ukraine signals a strategic sift,” The National News, February 26, 2022 https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/2022/02/26/the-uaesvote-on-ukraine-signals-a-strategic-shift/. 63

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Sino-Emirati Relations Emirati-Chinese relations have followed an analogous course of unfolding in the post-Cold War era. The two states established de jure diplomatic relations in 1984, while in 1990, Sheikh Zayed made his first official visit to China. After Zayed’s trip to Beijing, Sino-Emirati relations entered a new phase of gradual warming until they reached a level of cordial cooperation with the introduction of the Belt and Road Initiative from Beijing.68 The Chinese interest in the Middle East was publicly expressed by Xi Jinping during his speech at the 6th Ministerial Conference of the Chinese-Arab States Cooperation Forum in July 2014, describing the Arab states as partners in jointly building the Belt and Road Initiative in the region.69 Nowadays, China plays an influential multidimensional role in the wider region and, in particular, in the two littorals of the Gulf, as Beijing’s successful shuttle diplomacy between Riyad and Tehran fully showed in March 2023.70 Since 2014, the relations between Beijing and Abu Dhabi have become closer, mainly in the energy sector. The Chinese Foreign Policy is approaching the Gulf region as one of the main routes of its “Oil Roads”71; the Gulf states see Beijing as a major partner in trade and the new technologies sector. For example, in October 2019, the Chinese ICT company Huawei closed a mega deal with the Emirati telecommunication company Du to provide 5G network services to the UAE, while in March 2022, at the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona, Spain, Huawei signed a deal to jointly provide 5G edge computing services to the UAE, with Du and with the other Emirati

 For more regarding the Belt and Road Initiative in general, see Jones Lee & Jinghan Zen, “Understanding China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Beyond Grand Strategy to a State transformation analysis,” Third Word Quarterly, 2019, vol. 40, no. 8, pp. 1415–1439; Janardhan Narayanappa, “Belt and Road Initiative: China’s Diplomatic-Security Toll in the Gulf?”, Asian Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 2020, vol. 40, no. 1, pp. 1–17. 69  https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceiq//eng/zygx/t1164662.htm 70  On March 10, 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia agreed to resume diplomatic relations and reopen embassies in each other countries following China-led negotiations in Beijing. The Saudi-Iranian rapprochement was an apparent success of Chinese diplomacy, sending the message to the rest of the globe that can influence diplomatic developments too between states that either belong to its sphere of influence, e.g., Iran or Beijing has spent a great deal of effort to establish an excellent level of communication, e.g., Saudi Arabia. For more, see Gambrell Jon, “Iran, Saudi Arabia agree to resume ties with China’s help,” Washington Post, March 10, 2023, https://www.washingtonpost. com/world/2023/03/10/saudi-arabia-iran-diplomatic-ties/08e88d28-bf3c-11ed-9350-7c5fccd598ad_story.html. 71  The Oil Roads are parallel trade agreements, besides the Belt and Road Initiative, that Beijing is sealing exclusively in the area of energy. The “Oil Roads” have as their main objective to promote oil and gas investment schemes between China and energy producing countries to expand Beijing’s network for gas and oil infrastructure connectivity. For more, see Rakhmat Zulfikar Muhammad, “The Belt and Road Initiative in the Gulf: Building ‘Oil Roads’ to Prosperity,” The Middle East Institute, March 12, 2019 https://www.mei.edu/publications/belt-and-road-initiative-gulf-­buildingoil-roads-prosperity; https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-981-15-9283-6. 68

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telecommunication company, Etisalat.72 This agreement problematized Washington and resulted in the suspension of talks on a $23 billion deal between Washington and Abu Dhabi, including the purchase of 50 F-35s, 18 MQ-9 Reaper drones, and $10 billion in advanced munitions from the latter.73 According to Washington, China is using the 5G infrastructure and equipment for espionage, concerns that Huawei dismissed as totally unfounded. In addition, the USA does not want China to take advantage of the 5G network as the leading global provider, even to states with a long-established relationship with the great Western power. Nevertheless, Abu Dhabi’s decision to close the 5G deal with Huawei was purely practical. According to the Emirati side, the Chinese 5G network was much cheaper and equally technologically advanced as the available Western networks. In contrast, the Chinese side offered the UAE the opportunity to become a high-tech partner in artificial intelligence projects and not just a buyer.74 Adopting the Chinese COVID-19 vaccines by the UAE at a very early stage of the Pandemic widened Washington’s suspicion toward the UAE. The citizens of the Seven Emirates became the first people outside of China to use Chinese vaccines. The high prestige of the UAE persuaded more governments around the globe that the Chinese vaccines were reliable, partially changing international suspicion toward the country after the outbreak of the coronavirus disease at Wuhan in the Hubei Province. However, this decision had nothing to do with the alleged diplomatic favoritism of Abu Dhabi toward Beijing. On the contrary, the decision of the Emirati Health authorities was dictated by the following reasons: First, the UAE wanted to boost the immune system of its citizens as soon as possible to stop the uncontrollable spread of COVID-19 inside the country. Pfizer could not meet the UAE’s needs on time due to the high demand for its vaccine from around the globe. Second, unlike Western pharmaceutical corporations, the Chinese authorities offered the formula and trade rights to the UAE to produce vaccines in Emirati laboratories, thereby reducing costs and accelerating the production line.75 However, the most strategically important Sino-Emirati cooperation can be seen not in the Gulf region but in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. The strong multidimensional Chinese presence in the Horn of Africa is closely connected with Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road initiative, a Belt and Road initiative branch that elevates the Orient Dragon as an influential regional element. Zhang Hongming, a

 Hatch Rhett, “What the United Arab Emirates sees in Huwaei,” The National Interest, March 26, 2022 https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/what-united-arab-emirates-sees-huawei-201462. 73  Rumley Grant, “Unpacking the UAE F-35 Negotiations,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, February 15, 2022 https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ unpacking-uae-f-35-negotiations. 74  Helou Agnes, “F-35 Fighters, 5G Networks and how the UAE is trying to balance between the US and China,” C4ISRNet, January 27, 2022 https://www.c4isrnet.com/ smr/5g/2022/01/27/f-35-fighters-5g-networks-and-how-the-uae-is-trying-to-balance-relations-­ between-the-us-and-china/. 75  Kerr Simeon, “UAE to produce China’s Sinopharm Covid Vaccine,” Financial Times, March 28, 2021 https://www.ft.com/content/040e867b-a0d1-4e6a-9a58-888da31a220c. 72

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senior research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, describes the importance of the Chinese policies in Africa for Beijing as follows, “Africa is the cornerstone of Chinese diplomacy, […] its unique position and role should not be underestimated […] because the 53 [African] allies not only widen the radius of China’s activities on the international stage, but also enhance the strategic depth of China’s game with the United States, thus strengthening China’s initiative and influence in international affairs.”76 The Chinese prime economic presence in Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic, along with the military deployment of the Chinese peacekeeping Armed Forces in both South Sudan and the Central African Republic,77 and the military base in Djibouti78 reveal the extent of Chinese influence over the region. For the UAE, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea play a dual role as a security outpost and a trade route. On the one hand, due to the volatile political situation in the Horn of Africa and the rise of Jihadism there, Abu Dhabi approaches the broader area as a potential corridor for channeling weaponry and jihadist fighters to Yemen to the local ISIS and Al Qaeda branches. Therefore, intelligence cooperation with China regarding human flows or illegal arms smuggling is crucial for implementing a proactive Emirati security agenda. On the other hand, this specific region is pivotal for the new economic role that the UAE aspires to play, seeing itself not only as a major energy hub but also as a great power in the global naval transportation network. In particular, with Jebel Ali Port in Dubai as its cornerstone, the UAE currently invests heavily in the management or the development of a wide string of strategically located ports from the Euro-Mediterranean to the Indo-Pacific Ocean, with the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea serving as a bridge. The UAE has decided that a strong connection with China is necessary to enhance this role, making the Sino-Emirati relations an advanced chapter of the contemporary UAE Foreign Policy.

 As cited in Pairault Thierry, “China’s Presence in Africa is at Heart Political,” The Diplomat, August 11, 2021 https://thediplomat.com/2021/08/chinas-presence-in-africa-is-at-heart-political/. For a thorough analysis of the Chinese presence in Africa and the Red Sea, see among others Albert Eleanor, “China in Africa,” Council on Foreign Relations, July 12, 2017 https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-africa; Alden Chris et al. (eds.), China and Africa: Building Peace and Security Cooperation on the Continent, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018. 77  Meester Jos & Guido Lanfranchi, “A Careful foot can step anywhere: The UAE and China in the Horn of Africa, Implications for EU engagement,” Clingendael, June 2021 https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/2021-06/Policy_brief_China_and_UAE_Horn_of_Africa_implications_EU_June_2021.pdf. 78  Cabestan Jean – Pierre, “China’s Military Base in Djibouti: A Microcosm of China’s Growing Competition with the United States and New Bipolarity,” Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 29, no. 125, pp. 731–747. 76

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The Systemic Interconnector Nevertheless, it is vital to decipher the UAE Foreign Policy to identify the fundamental reasons behind Abu Dhabi’s decision to intensify its diplomatic connections with Moscow and Beijing and its long-standing relationship with Washington. First, the various theses presented above, which offer their nondemocratic type of governing as one of the main reasons for the current status of Sino-Emirati and Russo-­ Emirati relations, are superficial, to say the least. Ideology plays a minor, or no role, in drawing a foreign policy line, which both the USA and the UAE, as smart states, know full well. If the type of governing were a decisive factor in the orientation of a state’s foreign policy, then the connection between the UAE with China and Russia would have been developed much earlier, during the Cold War. In addition, there is no common link between the Chinese, the Russian, and the Emirati governing type to enable such a connection. The Chinese governing model, a hybrid blend of Maoism, authoritarian capitalism, communist bureaucracy, and Confucian paternalism, on the one hand, and the Rusian institutional facade of a Potemkin-Villageparliamentary-democracy with generous doses of raw despotism, on the other, bear no resemblance to the UAE. The Gulf state is a constitutional federal monarchy with an absolute ruling in each Emirate, with an open market economy, liberal local values at a societal level, and the de facto political traditions of hybrid direct Democracy, e.g., the majlis, based on its Bedouin past and the political necessity of continuous balancing between all the Emirates due to the federal structure of the state. If ideology and the type of governing were indeed pivotal factors in international politics for the alliances of each state, instead of political interest and geostrategic necessities, then the American-Emirati connection, or the American-Saudi link, would have never existed in the first place. I argue that the Emirati foreign policy goals do not project any form of anti-­ Americanism. First, such an approach is an antithesis of how the UAE perceives its role in the Gulf today. Second, formulating an anti-American foreign policy correlates neither with Mohamed bin Zayed’s political philosophy about international affairs nor that of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah bin Zayed,79 nor with the existing realities of the multipolar system. A characteristic incident that shows  As was well expected, the US Embassy already had a clear opinion about the President of the UAE and the Minister of Foreign Affairs since their first steps in the Emirati political scene. Mohamed bin Zayed was described in a cable from the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi dated March 2, 2005, as “an articulate, forceful interlocutor…He is seen as a dynamic leader and a modernizer, and throughout the Emirates, there are high expectations for change from his influence in Abu Dhabi and by extension the federation of the seven Emirates.” The same cable says about Abdullah bin Zayed, “Abdullah is a candid and engaging official, and generally couches his criticism of U.S. policies in the Middle East in terms of ‘friendly advise.” “Abdullah is thoughtful and weighs his responses carefully. He is extremely well read, a news – junkie, very bright and known for thinking outside the box.” Both of these men do not have the profile of the typical anti-American zealot. The cable from the US Embassy in Abu Dhabi is cited by Alshateri AbuBaker Albadr, “How Washington learnt to stop worrying and love the UAE,” American Diplomacy, February 2020 https://americandiplomacy.web.unc.edu/2020/02/how-washington-learned-to-stop-worrying-andlove-the-uae/. 79

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Abu Dhabi’s unwillingness to jeopardize its close relations with Washington is the Emirati decision to stop the construction of a Chinese facility at Khalifa Port in Abu Dhabi in November 2021. According to Wall Street Journal, American satellite imagery showed that a secret Chinese military facility was constructed inside the port’s container terminal by COSCO, the Chinese shipping corporation.80 The UAE’s reaction was swift and direct, and the construction stopped immediately. As Dr. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, for years Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and since 2021, senior diplomatic advisor to the UAE’s President, stated regarding this specific incident during a meeting at the Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, “We took these American concerns into consideration and we stopped the work on the facilities, but our position remains the same, that these facilities were not really military facilities.”81 Nevertheless, according to American sources, 1 year after the UAE decided to halt this specific project, the construction began again, linking the site to the Chinese “Project 141” mega-scheme.82 Nevertheless, supposing Abu Dhabi does not want to end Washington’s long and mutually rewarding connection, why does it diversify its foreign policy, adding more elements to the Emirati foreign policy equation? The answer is that the UAE implements a smart foreign policy and exercises systemic awareness per the political requirements of multipolarity. Since the UAE is one of the world’s wealthiest states and independent from an energy point of view, this foreign policy diversification is a tool to elevate its international status. Abu Dhabi wants to avoid being trapped in the tangled Web of the twenty-first century’s global politics, facing the dilemma of which power to follow and which to oppose. Mohamed bin Zayed and his well-chosen circle of trust know very well that in systemic multipolarity, if the UAE is under the shadow of one great power, its survival prospects will be adjusted to the likings and interests of this specific element. Such an approach is unsuitable for a smart state since it allows for the less creative foreign policy choice, bandwagoning. The implementation of bandwagoning means that a weaker element aligns with one or more great powers to increase its security if there is no other option.83 Nevertheless, the UAE is choosing a smarter way to boost its security. As long as Abu Dhabi deepens geostrategic and economic interdependencies with the Big Three, i.e., the USA, Russia, and China, its survival prospects are strengthened. Through this approach, the UAE promotes itself as the Apple of Discord instead of  Lubold Gordon & Warren P. Strobel, “Secret Chinese Port Project in Persian Gulf Rattles US Relations with UAE,” The Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2021 https://www.wsj.com/articles/ us-china-uae-military-11637274224. 81  Shanif Abu Mona, “Strategic Maneuvering: The Gulf States amid US-China tensions,” Middle East Institute, January 20, 2022 https://www.mei.edu/publications/strategic-maneuvering-gulfstates-amid-us-china-tensions. 82  Project 141 is a plan by the People’s Liberation Army, the Chinese Armed Forces, to build a global military network, including five overseas military bases and ten logistical support sites. For more, see Hudson John & Nakashima Ellen, “Buildup resumed at suspected Chinese military site in UAE, leak says,” The Washington Post, April 26, 2023 https://www.washingtonpost.com/ national-security/2023/04/26/chinese-military-base-uae/. 83  Schweller L.  Randall, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In,” International Security, 1994, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 72–107. 80

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a marginalized state, which gracelessly awaits to be saved by the Deus ex Machina. Nevertheless, as is discussed in Chap. 7, this mercurial approach is only suitable in a multipolar international structure. As soon as the transition starts toward a bipolar systemic status, a more stable and committed agenda must be produced concerning the placement of the UAE to one of the two poles. The UAE has behaved as a truly smart state in the brief era of multipolarity. Nevertheless, as it will be thoroughly analyzed in Chap. 7, the tides are gradually changing, and the time for adopting a completely different approach to the perplexities of the international system, much more committed to one of the two contestants, is galloping toward each international actor, the UAE included. It is important to note here that Emirati foreign policy is even more complex than just a state who tries to benefit the most from what is happening at the higher levels of the systemic pyramid. The UAE does not aim to enhance its survival solely by deepening the interdependency process and through the emerging antagonism of the three great powers to secure the Apple of Discord on their side. In conclusion, Abu Dhabi seeks a more advanced role in the Middle East and the Gulf. Through deepening its political, economic, military, and technological relations with all three main actors of the international system today, the UAE aims to be the interconnector, or in other words, the bridge, between the Great Powers for issues relating to the Gulf region. While, as an Apple of Discord, the UAE generates antagonism over its “mind and soul” among the Big Three, in the role of the interconnector, it promotes the prospect of cooperation to enhance the national interests of all sides. This cooperation can be indirect through the UAE. It may include areas such as research on alternative means of energy where the UAE has made tremendous progress in the past decades; the tackling of Jihadism in the MENA region or naval piracy in the Horn of Africa; the promotion of a progressive environmental agenda where the UAE again is a leading global element in research, and so on. Interestingly, none of the Emirati officials has publicly referred to the interconnector’s role. However, it can be spotted if someone pays attention to what prominent members of the Emirati political elite say in their public appearances. For example, during a public lecture 2022 in the Majlis Mohamed bin Zayed, Dr. Gargash openly discussed the role of the UAE as a bridge between the region and the rest of the international system.84 The UAE is putting forward an advanced role in the contemporary international system that enables it to look the Big Three straight in the eye without provoking their primacy or challenging their status. The most recent example is the central role that the UAE has adopted in the I2U2 Group. This cooperative network was launched by the USA, India, Israel, and the UAE on July 14, 2022, and is focused on joint initiatives in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security.85 In particular, the UAE announced through its President, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al  Majlis Mohamed bin Zayed, “Security and Stability in our changing world: a UAE perspective,” 14 April 2022 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=youjvu_6J78&t=2290s. 85  Suri Navdeep & Hargun Sethi, “The I2U2: Where Geography and Economics meet,” Observer Research Foundation, February 27, 2023 https://www.orfonline.org/research/the-i2u2-wheregeography-and-economics-meet/. 84

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Nahyan, that it would invest $2 billion to develop a series of integrated food parks across India that will “incorporate state-of-the-art climate-smart technologies to reduce food waste and spoilage, conserve fresh water, and employ renewable energy sources.”86 This reveals how the UAE sees the international environment of the twenty-first century as a cooperative multinational venture of those able and willing to sail far away from the traditional paradigm of perpetual antagonism and systemic collisions and head toward new lands of smart co-existence. The UAE implements a smart foreign policy that combines the projection of itself as an object of desire, on the one hand, and as an effective mechanism to promote cooperation at an international level, even between the Big Three, or the inclusion of them in a cooperative scheme. The alluring processes of the East meet with the practicality and the effectiveness of the UAE in the twenty-first century, generating a pure smart foreign policy for the state without undermining its pivotal role in the international environment as a regional and positive international element. For all these reasons, the UAE’s foreign policy promotes diversification instead of just placing all its efforts under the wings of one of the three great powers. This is the product of a smart foreign policy in a multipolar balance of power. However, as analyzed in the following chapter, the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered a systemic transition that poses a new challenge for Emirati foreign policy and its international status. Nevertheless, smart states must be well prepared for every challenge a volatile international environment may generate.

Conclusion The UAE’s Foreign Policy can be characterized as utterly realistic. It establishes a positive role for itself as a status quo element that successfully faces the responsibility to contribute to a safer and more stable region and a more stable international environment. However, the UAE must not be confused with the contemporary paradigm of the Good Samaritan. On the contrary, it is a normal state that has as its first objective the enhancement of its survival and the safeguarding of its national interests. As this chapter has argued, its foreign policy has striven to project positivity, especially during times of high crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and to be as diversified as possible toward the great powers of our time. The Smart Foreign Policy of the UAE can be spotted in the way it strives to promote its national prestige, on the one hand, and its role as an interconnector in the Gulf region, on the other. However, its foreign policy is not limited to a small, stifling geographical circle around its national frontiers. The Union, once again, defies its small size by adopting an active role in twenty-first-century international politics. This is a  The White House, “Joint Statement of the Leaders of India, Israel, United Arab Emirates and the United States (I2U2),” July 14, 2022 https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-­ releases/2022/07/14/joint-statement-of-the-leaders-of-india-israel-united-arab-emirates-and-theunited-states-i2u2/. 86

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well-calculated move by the state’s leadership to identify the destabilizing sources ahead, act proactively, foresee any challenges, and ensure its presence in the front row of international activity to send the appropriate message to allies and foes regarding its active status. To the former, the message is that the UAE is not a free rider but a reliable partner that strives hard to secure its interests and those of its allies while contributing to the protection of peace, the enhancement of security, and the preservation of the existing status quo. To the latter, the UAE seeks to make an emphatic statement that it is able and willing to protect its sovereignty with smart foreign policies that go beyond conventional expectations and practices, as illustrated in this chapter.

Chapter 6

Beyond Smart Power: Tolerance as a Source of Smart Ontology

The most valuable advice for my children is to keep away from arrogance. I believe that the great and strong people cannot be degraded or weakened by treating people with modesty and tolerance. Tolerance among humans begets mercy. One should be merciful and peaceful towards his fellow human brothers. (Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan) & Without tolerance, there can be no future. Tolerance means giving our countries and ourselves the opportunity to make a fresh start. (Archbishop Desmond Tutu)

Introduction Moving on from earlier discussions pertaining to the high value of soft power in international politics and the importance of so-called smart power in the twenty-first century, the focus in this chapter shifts to the concept of tolerance as another source of the UAE’s smart approach as an active entity in the international system. In addition to describing the phenomenon, which is observable to anyone who follows sociopolitical developments in the UAE, and highlighting its importance as a pillar of the state’s ontology, this chapter further seeks (i) to delineate the scope of tolerance in the UAE’s sociopolitical structure and, (ii) given its centrality to the state’s smart approach, to associate the implementation of this specific policy of tolerance with the political causation of the state’s more comprehensive smart agenda.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5_6

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It’s a Beautiful Day It was a glorious February morning at Mamsha in Saadiyat Island, a much sought-­ after neighborhood of Abu Dhabi named Cultural District,1 with the uniquely white sandy beach of the Gulf contrasting sharply against the backdrop of the turquoise sea. I was enjoying my morning walk along the promenade, feeling invigorated as a gentle breeze wafted over. Reminiscent of spring in Europe, the absence of humidity in the air and the warm caress of the winter sun bore little resemblance to the unforgiving temperatures of a typical day in the Gulf. The plethora of cozy cafes and restaurants that line the area were already heaving with locals, tourists, and expatriates; the euphony of multiple languages being spoken was a suitable accompaniment to the colorful, cosmopolitan mosaic of people from diverse ethnic backgrounds, donning all kinds of traditional and modern attire all blending in harmoniously. The unique, authentic, and unpretentious scenes unfolding before me spoke of the possibility of a stable, unblemished future. Children from the four corners of the globe were playing together, laughing, and calling out to each other in a colorful linguistic mosaic; adults were enjoying the ambiance at their leisure without having to check on their girls and boys every few minutes, confident in the high levels of security afforded to all in the UAE. Others were taking full advantage of the splendid weather and their surroundings, with several swimmers enjoying the waters of the Arabian Gulf. Suddenly, my eyes were drawn to an unexpected sight. A young man in his early 30s was leisurely reading his book in one of the coffee shops sitting at a table overlooking the promenade enjoying the ambiance like everyone else. Usually, I read the titles of the books people hold to be able to understand a bit about themselves. This time, however, it was not the book’s title that drew my attention but his blue kippah. Having shared many Hanukkah celebrations and wonderfully quiet and relaxing Shabbat dinners with good Jewish friends in Thessaloniki, New York, or Tel Aviv, I fully understood the moment’s significance. I was genuinely exhilarated because I was witnessing one of the most significant parts of the UAE’s smart ontology. For many decades, the UAE did not recognize the existence of the State of Israel, following the common practice of the Arab world since 1948. However, the Abraham Accords changed everything; therefore, people can hear numerous groups of tourists speaking Hebrew in Al Bastakiya, Dubai’s old residential quarter, or see people enjoying their books in public without hiding their religious identity. With anti-Semitism being an ideological trend for both sides of the political extreme, i.e., far-right and far-left, Jewish tend to avoid  On this specific island connected to the mainland by the Sheikh Khalifa Bridge, there is the iconic Louvre Museum, the first universal museum in the Arab world. At the same time, in the next few years, the Zayed National Museum and the Guggenheim Museum will also open their gates. In Saadiyat Island, there is also the Abrahamic Family House, which will be presented in the following paragraphs of this chapter, the Manarat Al Saadiyat Center, which is a major cultural hub for the country, and the Golf Club at Saadiyat, which also serves as a natural protected environment for the Arabian sand gazelle. As it can be easily understood, Saadiyat Island is the avant-garde neighborhood of the city with an exceptional urban aura and a unique architectural environment. 1

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wearing their kippah publicly when they are not in Israel. Therefore, someone can truly appreciate the image of a young Jew wearing his kippah publicly in an Arab state, as it happens in the UAE today. At this point, it is essential to make the parallel with another smart state, Israel, so that the visitor can see Muslims walking in the streets of Jerusalem or Tel Aviv wearing their hijab or kaffiyeh. While seemingly inconsequential, random events, these are rather significant in that they reflect a bona fide decision of the UAE government to transform the nucleus of the Emirati state purposefully. Unlike other states worldwide, the UAE promotes a new form of soft power that blends the following three factors: (a) tolerance of all religions and cultures, (b) encouragement of all the citizens in the country to freely and publicly follow and express their religious and cultural identity, and (c) the assurance of the government to provide a safe environment in which to do so. This hybrid dimension of soft power offers the opportunity for the UAE to elevate its international status and reintroduce itself to the rest of the international system as the most successful exemplar of a societal assimilation model of our era, the so-called melting pot process.2

 There are various approaches regarding the melting pot process. Often, this is presented as a negative, sometimes violent, assimilation process of different cultural dimensions into the dominant one. In this book, the melting pot process is being taken as a positive systematic effort of the state to allow newcomers to be a part of the country’s economic, political, and cultural daily life. On top of that, unlike theories that refer to the triumph of the dominant culture, a melting pot system allows the established cultural identity to be inspired and positively influenced by the trends and customs the arriving groups will bring. This has resulted in developing a new identity that will be the direct and indirect product of a state’s different cultural dimensions. For this book, the melting pot system does not mush up everything different from the prevailing paradigm into an amorphous mass, but a process mainly based on the dynamics of constant and perpetual evolution, as the UAE’s melting pot system implements. As Jieli Li argues about the central concept of this assimilation methodology, regarding its methods and scopes, “The ‘melting pot’ tradition has perceived assimilation as a process by which peoples and cultures would fuse with the core national structures to produce a new people and national hybrid culture.” Barry Jones J.R. (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of International Political Economy, London: Routledge, 2001, p.  1297. Today’s most successful melting pot systems in international politics are those of the USA, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, Israel, and the UAE, in other words, many of the most notable smart states of the international system. In contrast, the less successful can mainly be found in Europe today, in countries such as the UK, Sweden, France, and Spain. It has to be said that this lack of success is not always the responsibility of the states but also the unwillingness of large parts of the community to embrace the normative institutional codes that these countries present. For example, Sweden has one of the highest numbers of Muslim youth who, for various reasons, chose the radicalization path and ended up in Raqqa to join the ranks of ISIS when the Swedish state accepted a significant number of refugees from Arab and African states and is continuously subsidizing various social programs and other kinds of initiatives aiming at the successful entry of young immigrants and refugees to the country’s daily life and procedures. 2

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 he Importance of Soft Power in Contemporary T International Politics Most European states consider their historical legacy and contribution to humanity’s cultural evolution as their primary asset in terms of soft power. Pivotal soft power European states like Greece,3 Italy,4 France,5 or the UK6 seek to appeal to foreign crowds to multiply their annual touristic income, promote their diplomatic goals, or elevate their status in the international scene primarily through reminding humanity of the great deeds of their forefathers that shaped the modern physiognomy of our globe. Furthermore, from an institutional point of view at the core of the Western world, the utilization of culture as an engine for peaceful inter-community relations has been one of the main agendas of the European Commission since 2016. It forms a common pillar of soft power for all European Union member states.7 However, this is not only a European recipe to increase tourism income. The USA similarly promotes a kind of contemporary soft power by exploiting its cultural scene as the global intellectual center of gravity of our times. This is usually achieved by advancing the well-known narratives of American exceptionalism and the so-called American dream,8 both of which permeate American literature, music, and the film industry and which serve to promote American political values or boost the predominant economic and technological might that the country is equipped with.9  Klarevas Luis, “Greeks bearing Consensus: An outline for increasing Greece’s Soft Power in the West,” The Hellenic Observatory of the London School of Economics and Politics: Discussion Paper, September 2004 https://www.lse.ac.uk/Hellenic-Observatory/Assets/Documents/ Publications/Past-Discussion-Papers/DiscussionPaper18.pdf; 4  Rose-Greenland Fiona, “Cultural Internationalism and the Italian Model of Repatriation,” The Brown Journal of World Affairs, 2016, vol. 23, no.1, pp. 143–152. 5  Gochaevich Adleiba Emil & Timerjanovich Sakaev Vasil, “Cultural Diplomacy of France: Essence, Main Directions and Tools,” Journal of Educational and Social Research, 2019, vol. 9, no.4, pp. 199–204. 6  James Pamment, British Public Diplomacy and Soft Power: Diplomatic Influence and the Digital Revolution, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016; Ramscar Helen & Michael Clarke, Britain’s Persuaders: Soft Power in a Hard World, London: I.B. Tauris, 2021. 7  Garner Ben, “Towards a European strategy on culture and development: Learning from the CARIFORUM-EU Economic Partnership Agreement,” Politique Europeenne, 2017, vol. 2, no. 56, pp. 146–168; Moreno Naomi et al., “The European Union’s Soft Power: Image Branding or neo-­ Colonialism?”, Center for Global Affairs & Strategic Studies, 2018 https://www.unav.edu/documents/16800098/17755721/DT-05-2018_EU-soft-power.pdf 8  The phrase “American Dream” was used for the first time in 1931 by James Truslow Adams in his book, The Epic of America. Adams sees the USA as the polity where all individuals can improve their lives and where opportunities for social and economic elevation exist for all, depending on their societal activities and intellectual capacity. For more, see Kochan Sandra, The Great Gatsby and the American Dream, Norderstedt: Grin, 2007; Samuel R. Lawrence, The American Dream: A Cultural History, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2012. 9  Nye Jr. S. Joseph, “American Democracy and Soft Power,” Project Syndicate, November 2, 2021 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/american-democracy-and-soft-power-byjoseph-s-nye-2021-11?barrier=accesspaylog. 3

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Other states like China10 or Japan11 who are enjoying the luxury of a glorious past and an impressive technological status promote their soft power with direct references to history and the future too. Other states like Turkey, especially after the rise of R.T. Erdogan in power, or North Korea do not seem to care about the positive influence of other societies around the globe through the promotion of a soft power agenda.12 They both share the same conviction that the international arena is a Hobbesian domain where provoking fear is more efficient than generating collective positive feelings. For Pyongyang and Ankara, international politics evolves into an utterly atavistic zero-sum game. Thus, hard and sharp power are the only applicable tools in the mentality for international affairs held by these two regimes. This raw revisionism, coupled with a continuous notion of insecurity, is likely the main reason for both countries’ geostrategic and economic failure in decades to come. Other states, such as Saudi Arabia or Iran, promote a focus on religion soft power, which aims primarily at the hearts and minds of societies with the same religious beliefs. Saudi Arabia, for example, is the guardian of the two holiest places of Islam, Mecca and Medina, and the champion of Wahhabism around the globe.13 In a similar fashion, Iran is the political, economic, and theological center of Shia Islam globally, which offers the opportunity to Tehran to reach out to various states in the Middle East with strong Shia communities, e.g., Iraq, Syria, Bahrain, Yemen, or Lebanon, through state funding organizations, such as the Islamic Culture and Relations Organization, the Imam Khomeini Relief Foundation, the Ahl Al-Bayt World Assembly, or the Assembly for the Proximity of Islamic Schools of Thought.14 The role of these institutions is pivotal in promoting Shia theology and, as an extension, the Iranian image worldwide. It is understood that Iran’s access to international affairs is a slow, arduous process after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and the implementation of Western sanctions against Tehran’s regime. However, religion has offered a multidimensional vehicle to project Iran’s image to every corner of the globe where a Shia community exists. Soft power is a multidimensional tool with numerous sources that allow states to present a more attractive image to the international environment, providing a considerably valuable tool for foreign policy. As Joseph Nye Jr. argues, soft power  Zhang Guozuo, Research outline for China’s Cultural Soft Power, Singapore: Springer, 2017.  Kimura Tets & Harris Jennifer Ann (eds.), Exporting Japanese Aesthetics: Evolution from Tradition to Cool Japan, Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2020. 12  To be more precise, in the case of R.T. Erdogan, his soft power agenda is limited to promoting an Islamic agenda in the Balkans, in states like Albania, Bulgaria, or the Greek Muslim minority. At the same time, the promotion of shared cultural and historical ties, all blended in a nationalistic, almost metaphysical, narrative, can also be seen in the so-called Turkic states in Central Asia and the Caucasus region. 13  Mandaville Peter (ed.), Wahhabism and the World: Understanding Saudi Arabia’s Global Influence on Islam, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022. 14  Wastnidge Edward, “Iran’s Shia Diplomacy: Religious Identity and Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic,” Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs, Brooking Institution, 2020 https:// s3.amazonaws.com/berkley-center/200918WastnidgeIransShiaDiplomacyReligiousIdentityForei gnPolicyIslamicRepublic.pdf. 10 11

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gives access to a state to appeal to the collective consciousness of other societies to fully embrace its ethical codes and political wishes without the prior exertion of coercion. According to Nye, “A country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries – admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness – want to follow it. In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, and only to force them to change by threatening military force or economic sanctions. This soft power – getting others to want the outcomes that you want – co-opts people rather than coerces them.”15 Notably, no country can survive in the international arena by constantly promoting the image of an aggressor, no matter the magnitude of its hard power leverage. The main reason for this is that a persistent aggressive agenda will eventually lead other states to form alliances and join forces to face the aggressor. The ultimate fate of the aggressors can be seen in the outcome of the Italian, German, and Japanese revisionism during World War II. In addition to the domain of perpetual antagonism, a distinct characteristic of the traditional Hobbesian approach, the international environment is also a sphere of multidimensional cooperation in direct counter-­ response to the dangers that stem from the perpetual antagonism among states. Fear brings states closer, strengthening these various forms of connection with an assortment of political and legal resolutions where the primary goal is to enhance the prospect of survival for each participant. Richard Ned Lebow argues, “All actors recognize that cooperation sustains that nomos that allows all of them to advance their interests more effectively than they could in its absence. Conflict exists in reason-­informed worlds, but it is tempered not only by recognition of the importance of order, but, as Aristotle notes in his description of an homonoia, by a fundamental agreement about underlying values that minimizes the nature of conflict and the cost of being on the losing end.”16 Moreover, hard power, even its exhibit without the implementation of its destructive nature, leads to various forms of agitation, which drives states to bring their military capabilities to the forefront, i.e., the threat of the use of it. From this point onwards, the prospect of a crushing defeat for the aggressor who perpetually reverts to hard power to secure its international status without considering other nonviolent options becomes a strong possibility that, at some point, it will be carried out. Therefore, a soft power approach that does not challenge the ontological existence of other states but can support the state’s international status that efficiently effectuates it can be much more productive as a cost-­ effective approach. It will not eliminate the prospect of war but reduce its probability. Moreover, soft power is the safest and shortest way for a state to enhance its prestige. Athens, the mighty naval force of the classical Hellenistic world, dominated the Mediterranean during its prime in the fifth century BCE.  However, its intellectual superiority in Philosophy, Arts, and Architecture over its competitors  Nye Jr. S. Joseph, Soft Power: The means to success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs 2005, p.5. 16  Lebow New Richard, Why Nations Fight: Past and Future Motives for War, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, p.81. 15

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gave the state a leading role in the political and economic affairs of the Hellenic world, even after its military defeat by Sparta in 404 BCE. After the end of the Cold War in 1991, international affairs have focused more on the quantitative and qualitative rates of a state’s soft power than just its hard power. It is not because our planet suddenly became a safer place. On the contrary, the rise of jihadism and extreme right terrorism and the development of revisionist agendas by key international players, e.g., Russia, Turkey, Iran, North Korea, and China, prove quite the opposite. The point here is that the prestige of a state does not relate exclusively to the number of nuclear heads it controls but primarily to its contribution to the sciences, its capacity to offer aid and financial support to regional natural disasters, and its role as a pioneer in Medicine, Artificial Intelligence, or Renewable Energy Sources. The extreme conditions worldwide created by the COVID-19 pandemic, for example, revealed that a nuclear arsenal is not a panacea for survival in the international system today. The Indian paradigm is a case in point here. India is a nuclear power; however, it failed to deal effectively with the extreme rise of COVID-19 cases domestically. For New Delhi to survive the dire consequences of the pandemic, international aid was sent to the state, with the UAE, a nonnuclear state, being one of the main contributors to medical equipment and supplies. Both the USA and Russia are nuclear powers with immense hard power leverage. Yet, American prestige is predominant around the globe due to its soft power compared with that of Russia due to the latter’s deficit in soft power policies on the international stage since the end of the Soviet era. Prestige directly results from the positive views other societies hold about a state’s collective ethos, moral values, and principles, the level of the economy, and the quality of life the citizens enjoy. Positive collective views influence, to a certain degree, the government of a state to hold a high consideration regarding the prestige of another one, creating a positive aura between them. This does not mean the importance of protecting a state’s national interests declines regarding establishing a direct link with another high-­ prestige state; however, it must be seen as a booster for an overall positive connection. As Robert Gilpin underlines regarding the value of positive status in international affairs, prestige is the everyday currency in the international arena that offers the capacity for more powerful states to effectively realize their goals without using hard power.17 Prestige can also be seen as a key capable of opening not the hearts but the diplomatic agendas of other states to benefit from building ties with states with a positive aura in international affairs. If we refer to the example of Classical Greece once more, we will notice that the Spartan prestige was far less than the Athenian, despite Sparta being the great hard power of that era. In reality, only a few outsiders wanted to be part of the Spartan way of living and witness the city-state’s well-known laconic and austere daily reality that was perpetually geared around preparing for war. In contrast, everybody was drawn to the allure of Athenian

 Gilpin Robert, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981, p.30. 17

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prestige and desired to enjoy the indulgent way of living of the city-state of Athens, which was full of cultural events and opportunities to enjoy life to the full. It goes without saying that with inefficient, hard power, a state may be unable to maintain its high prestige in the international environment. Nevertheless, to be able to maintain a high standard of prestige, one must first be able to establish it. Soft power is much more beneficial to allure others to the set of values a state seeks to project to the international system to promote and export its ethos outside of its national frontiers as part of its identity and also so that these can be adopted by other societies. Thus, states in the twenty-first century tend to dedicate just part of their annual budget to expand their hard power, channeling the major cash flow to projects that are directly related to their soft power, such as education, scientific research, and cultural infrastructure and development.

The UAE Smart Power The ideal standard for a state is to combine its hard and soft power in a single coherent smart power policy that will enhance the overall survival effort.18 Only a few states can follow this specific pattern. For a sovereign entity to fulfill such a task, it must have the economic leverage to maintain a high consideration for its hard power while primarily investing, enriching, and promoting its soft power. The problem with this multidimensional nonlinear political equation is that it is not feasible to calculate the actual cost of an effective smart policy. How much of its annual budget should the USA spend next year to maintain a high level of national security while promoting its political and cultural agenda to the four corners of the earth? The question is purely rhetorical. Yet, one of the reasons for the economic collapse of 2008 was that the USA did not have the economic dexterity to keep absorbing the colossal spending of maintaining a military presence in Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001, further maintaining an efficient and active military and diplomatic presence in international affairs, and at the same time financing its soft power networks all over the globe.19 The 2008 economic crisis indicated how expensive smart policy is, on the one hand, and the negative role of a lengthy war effort in the smart power networks of a smart, great power like the USA. On top of that, a state must also be able  Nye Jr. S. Joseph. “Recovering America’s Smart Power,” Project Syndicate, December 11, 2007 https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/recovering-america-s%2D%2Dsmart-­ power?barrier=accesspaylog&utm_term=&utm_campaign=&utm_source=adwords&utm_ medium=ppc&hsa_acc=1220154768&hsa_cam=12374283753&hsa_grp=117511853986&hsa_ ad=499567080225&hsa_src=g&hsa_tgt=dsa-19959388920&hsa_kw=&hsa_mt=&hsa_ net=adwords&hsa_ver=3&gclid=CjwKCAjwzNOaBhAcEiwAD7Tb6I4ED3wJ lRj-­1IpnldPmtwxMn-­dS3IBahvTwXCMkYCeKrn3Q0r5kghoCBnoQAvD_BwE; Nye Jr. S.  Jospeh, “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power,” Foreign Affairs, 2009, vol. 88, no.4, pp. 160–163. 19  For more regarding this issue, see Oatley Thomas, A Political Economy of American Hegemony: Buildups, Booms and Busts, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 18

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to subsidize its daily smart power operation without exhausting its citizens with excessive taxation. The sound failure of the Greek experiment, mainly due to the wrong crisis management implemented by Athens, the IMF, and the European Union, between 2010 and 2019, must be edifying for every Western government for the many decades to come. Greece not only saw its prestige decrease in the international arena, leading a substantial part of Greek society to be marginalized, but it also witnessed a broad weakening of its smart power worldwide. The UAE is one of those few states globally with an unprecedented smart power advantage. The booming Emirati economy and the clear intention of the state’s leadership to play an active role in the international environment through highly constructive diplomacy in the years to come20 have resulted in the UAE being one of the top players globally in terms of smart power. Various Gulf analysts underline the high Emirati Smart Power leverage. At the same time, senior state officials compare the UAE with ancient Athens, a leading holder of unprecedented smart power for over a century.21 For example, in 2022, the Emirati EDGE, an advanced consortium of 25 high-tech firms based in Abu Dhabi, signed multiple deals with top elements of the defense sector, such as Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, or Embraer, for the construction of drones and robots to enhance its hard power leverage, while during the well-known hi-tech defense exhibition, UMEX and SimTEX 2022 in Abu Dhabi, EDGE presented its newest unmanned ground vehicle (UGV), Scorpio B.22 In addition, the UAE has sealed an important agreement with Israel to buy Rafael’s advanced Air Defence System SPYDER Mobile Interceptors, strengthening even further its aerial security, especially against suicide UAVs or surface-to-surface missiles (SSM).23 As discussed in previous chapters, these moves and key defense cooperation schemes with France, Greece, the USA, Turkey, and China show that the UAE constantly tries to equip its hard power infrastructure with the latest military technology. The same systematic efforts are taking place in the area of soft power. In May 2017, the federal government established the Soft Power Council, launched at the highest political level by the Prime Minister and ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum. As he stated during the launch of the Council, “We have been celebrating milestones such as national days and co-operating on  Al Ketbi Ebtesam, “Contemporary Shifts in UAE Foreign Policy: From the Liberation of Kuwait to the Abraham Accords,” Israel Journal of Foreign Affairs, 2020, vol. 14, no.3, pp. 391–398. 21  Al Qassemi Sooud Sultan, “The Athens of the Arab World,” Emirates Diplomatic Academy Reflection, September 2017 https://www.agda.ac.ae/docs/defaultsource/Publications/eda_reflection_the_athens_of_arab_world_eng.pdf?sfvrsn=2; Janardhan N, “The UAE evolves into a ‘smart’ power,” Gulf Today, April 24, 2019 https://www.gulftoday.ae/opinion/2019/04/23/the-uaeevolves-into-a-smart-power. 22  Godinho Varun, “UAE signs defense deals worth Dhs1.62 bn on first two days of UMEX and Simitex 2022,” Gulf Business, February 23, 2022 https://gulfbusiness.com/uae-signs-defencedeals-worth-dhs1-62bn-on-first-two-days-of-umex-and-simtex-2022/. 23  Cornwell Alexander & John Irish, “Israel to sell air-defence system to the United Arab Emirates,” Reuters, September 22, 2022 https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/exclusive-israel-sell-airdefence-system-united-arab-emirates-sources-say-2022-09-22/. 20

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development initiatives with our brothers and sisters in the Gulf and Arab World; now we want to develop a different strategy to introduce our culture and values to all people across the world. We want to utilise new tools and methods in order to reach more people, and share our knowledge, culture and history with the world. The UAE Soft Power Council is a stepping stone to achieving this vision, and promoting our country through successful public diplomacy to many people from various backgrounds.”24 Today, the UAE is among the most influential states in the MENA region regarding soft power, while it is constantly rising internationally too. In 2022, the UAE moved up by 52 places, taking 15th place in the global rankings.25 The Emirati culture is traveling around the globe with dynamic extrovert initiatives. For example, in the autumn of 2022, the UAE was the country of honor at the 86th Thessaloniki International Fair [TIF], the biggest and most prestigious exhibition event in Southeast Europe. The UAE participated there with various cultural promotional events, such as Al-Ayyala, Bedouin folk dancing, local dishes and desserts, and Nabati and Al-Taghrooda poetry, along with the presentation of a large number of Emirati private firms, as well as the Economic Development Departments both at a federal level and an Emirate level. The UAE’s smart power is an area that the leadership of the state gives great importance to, the fruits of which are collectively enjoyed in the form of higher and more sophisticated living conditions and domestic security at a societal level. However, as discussed in the following paragraphs, the high standards of the national smart power do not seem to be enough for the state’s leadership in its perpetual pursuit of excellence.

From Smart Power to Smart Ontology All of the above represent the endorsement of smart Ppwer by the systematic efforts of the UAE to enhance both hard and soft power at its national core. Nevertheless, a gap from smart power to smart ontology exists that only a few states have managed to bridge. In the Emirati case, the unequivocal tolerance policy the state implements constitutes the translation of the UAE’s smart ontology into a coherent policy. According to the Federal Constitution Article 25: “All persons shall be equal before the law. No discrimination shall be practiced between citizens of the Union because of race, nationality, religious belief, or social position,” while Article 32 establishes the right of non-Muslim citizens to freely demonstrate and worship their religious customs: “The freedom to hold religious ceremonies in accordance with established custom shall be safeguarded, provided such ceremonies are consistent with public

 Emirates News Agency – WAM, “Mohammed bin Rashid launches UAE Soft Power Council,” April 29, 2017 https://wam.ae/en/details/1395302611062. 25  Forster Sarah, “Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid hails UAE’s rise in Global Soft Power Index,” The National, October 24, 2022 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2022/03/15/america-anduk-top-global-soft-power-index-as-uae-moves-up-charts/. 24

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order and with public morals.”26 It has to be noted here that according to Article 7 of the Federal Constitution, the Sharia Law is a principal source of legislation for the Union. According to the Sharia Law, it is illegal for a Muslim to convert to another religion in the UAE, like in most Muslim states around the globe; since Riddah (individual apostasy) or Irtitad (collective apostasy) is considered heresy, a Murtad (apostate) is punished with capital punishment under the Penal Code.27 This approach has its roots in the period immediately after the death of Prophet Muhammad, when various Arab tribes renounced their allegiance with the Islamic Empire, with most of them returning to their pre-Islamic rituals and polytheistic religions, while others established their own sects by announcing themselves as prophets. These apostasies put the unity of the Arab world under existential question, prompting the new Caliph, Abu Bakr, to start a series of wars, the Riddah Wars, against the apostate tribes between 632 CE and 633 CE. The Arabian Peninsula was the theater of these violent clashes.28 Despite the short period of the Riddah Wars, the sociopolitical and military events were traumatic for the collective Arab consciousness and Islamic jurisprudence, a fact that has to this day profoundly influenced the severe approach to Islamic law toward any form of religious conversion from Islam. Nevertheless, in the UAE presently, there are Shia mosques; Christian churches of all the main denominations; Buddhist, Hindu, and Sikh temples; and synagogues. It has to be underlined that while, according to the Quran, official recognition must be given to the two other monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, the UAE takes this a step further by offering full religious rights to Hinduism, Buddhism, and Sikhism, which for other Muslim countries are considered as Shirk, or, in other words, sources of polytheism. Acknowledging the theological status of the religions mentioned above and their right to worship their gods freely, the UAE government is not only differentiating itself from the ultra-conservative stance of other Muslim states or groups but also establishing a moderate approach to Islam while maintaining the central role of Sharia. It also institutionally implements its political goal to elevate tolerance toward the “other” as a pivotal element of the systemic structure of the nation and as one of the perennially transcendent foundations of the state. This combination of tolerance with Sharia Law is a hybrid development at an international level, offering the opportunity for scholars studying Islam as an organized sociopolitical structure to reach new depths in their analyses. Moreover, it has to be said that the UAE’s approach to the domestic sociopolitical balance offers a boost to the state to implement one of the fundamentals of being a smart state, that is winning the hearts and minds, primarily of those living within the federation. The UAE’s modus operandi to religion in general and culture in particular uniquely places tolerance as the foundation of a harmonious coexistence  https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/United_Arab_Emirates_2004.pdf.  Baker Man, “Capital Punishment for Apostasy in Islam,” Arab Law Quarterly, 2018, vol. 32, no.4, pp. 439–461. 28  See among others Etheredge Laura (ed.), Islamic History, New  York: Britannica Educational Publishing & Rosen Educational Services, 2010, p. 49. 26 27

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in the MENA region and the rest of the globe. It thus opens up a new chapter on how a Muslim state perceives the fundamentals of Islam, how it can coexist with other religions, and how a Muslim state can function as a positive paradigm of cultural and religious divergence at an international level. As a result, the UAE government is proving itself as a smart entity that is also progressive and brave. It is not easy to adopt such an extended level of tolerance in the internal state and maintain the high percentage of peace and security that the people of the UAE enjoy. The smart, therefore progressive, leadership of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed increases the success prospects of this courageous attempt to make the UAE the avant-garde exemplar of a modern state of the twenty-first century, that is, a state where tolerance, mutual respect, and cooperation among the citizens and between the state and the society can be a sociopolitical reality and not just the wishful thinking of an idealist. In the Cultural District of Abu Dhabi, on the iconic Saadiyat Island, just opposite the magnificent Louvre Museum with the impressive dome resembling palm tree branches in an oasis, a new thematic park opened in the spring of 2023. This was named the Abrahamic Family House, where Judaism, Christianity, and Islam share the same ground. In this area, which bears the creative signature of Sir David Frank Adjaye, the well-known Ghanaian-British architect, the Moses Ben Maimon Synagogue, the Saint Francis Church, and the Imam Al-Tayeb Mosque stand side by side as a global sign of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between the three monotheistic religions. Beyond its conventional use as an operational location of worship, the site also is a source of open dialog and perpetual communication between Christianity, Judaism, and Islam that during the past and in more recent years has crossed swords and fought fervently, leaving unprecedented misery and chaos in their wake. The construction of the Abrahamic Family House was the vision of Mohammed bin Zayed who publicly announced its creation to commemorate the visit of Pope Francis and the Grand Imam Ahmad al-Tayyeb of Al-Azhar al-Sharif in Abu Dhabi in February 2019.29 At the very urban core of the capital of the UAE, where you still find people praying on the sides of the highway, having stopped their SUVs in a nonorderly way to face toward Mecca, the Abrahamic Family House intensifies the role of the UAE as a beacon of tolerance in international affairs. Even before this, in October 2017, the Ministry of Tolerance was established as an independent administrative unit with Sheikh Nahayan Mabarak al-Nahayan at its head, further showing the state’s importance on the issue of tolerance and the policies surrounding it. A deeper analysis suggests that the tolerance agenda has direct political smart goals above and beyond the obvious sociocultural objectives of the State. The utilization of tolerance as a cornerstone of the state’s approach has to be seen as more than just a matter of achieving collective happiness and harmonious coexistence. Instead, it represents the desire of the government to construct one of the most efficient and well-functioning melting pots globally. Indeed, the pivotal smart goal here  The National, “Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed announces Abrahamic Family House to be built,” February 6, 2019 https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/pope-2019/sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayedannounces-abrahamic-family-house-to-be-built-1.822410. 29

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is to elevate the UAE to the highest point of the international scale as the model Muslim state of the twenty-first century. Immediately after the end of the Cold War and especially since 9/11, a widespread dialog in International Relations academic departments, between Western governments, diplomatic missions, and prominent journalists, has revolved around whether Islam is compatible with democracy, tolerance, and respect for others.30 As a matter of fact, this is not just a debate among academics, diplomats, or analysts. For a large part of the duration of the George W. Bush administration, the political agenda regarding the transformation of Islam into a hub of perpetual peace through the introduction and the adoption of liberal democracy by the political establishments in the MENA region was prevalent, and it absorbed a significant part of the American foreign policy. According to this highly controversial meta-Kantian approach, only if Muslim states embraced liberal democracy could the region be transformed into a zone of perpetual peace.31 In addition, both during the G.W. Bush and the Obama administrations, the search for the ideal candidate state to be “crowned” by the Western world as the appropriate model of an Islamic Democracy with the skills to strike a balance between the East and West and the aptitude to combine the full letter of the Sharia Law with the Habeas Corpus was ongoing. For an extended period, the USA thought this rare political hidden gem lay in the face of Recep Tayyip Erdogan in his post-Kemalist Turkey. The undoubtedly talented mayor of Istanbul had been presented by various Western journalists, with little or no knowledge of Turkey other than the local cuisine, as the political figure who would modernize the state and bring Islam to the twenty-first century.32 Needless to say, Erdogan proved to be the one who not only brought Turkey back to its atavistic Ottoman past by amplifying the traditional revisionist foreign policy in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East since the days of Kemal Ataturk, but he also flirted openly with various elements of radical

 See among others Bernard Lewis, “Islam and Liberal Democracy,” The Atlantic, February 1993 https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/02/islam-and-liberal-democracy/308509/; Reed D.  Melanie, “Western Democracy and Islamic Tradition: The application of Shari’a in a Modern World,” American University International Law Review, vol. 19, no.3, pp. 485–521; Voll O. John, “Islam and Democracy: Is Modernization a Barrier,” Religion Compass, 2007, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 170–178; Jeremy Menchick, Islam and Democracy in Indonesia: Tolerance without Liberalism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016; Arifianto R.  Alexander & Ioana Emy Matesan, “Democracy, Inclusion and Political Moderation: Lessons from Religious Movements in the Middle East and Indonesia,” Middle East Institute, January 9, 2018 https://www.mei.edu/publications/ democracy-inclusion-and-political-moderation-lessons-religious-movements-middle-east. 31  Bilgin Pinar, Regional Security in the Middle East: A Critical Perspective, New York: Routledge, 2005; Markakis Dionysis, US Democracy Promotion in the Middle East: The pursuit of Hegemony, London: Routledge, 2016; Lynch J. Timothy, “George W. Bush” in Michael Cox et al (eds.), US Foreign Policy and Democracy Promotion: From Theodore Roosevelt to Barack Obama, London: Routledge, 2013, pp. 178–196. 32  Goodman S. Peter, “The West Hoped for Democracy in Turkey. Erdogan had other ideas,” The New  York Times, August 18, 2018 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/18/business/westdemocracy-­turkey-erdogan-financial-crisis.html. 30

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Islam around the globe, i.e., Hamas, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Muslim Brotherhood.33 The role of the model Muslim state, combining Islam with the principle of tolerance and a free-market economy, offers the opportunity for the UAE to construct a new form of soft power that boosts its overall smart power. This new form of soft power is not only related to a flourishing economy. It includes new technologies that have already been introduced to the daily life of the people of the UAE, impressive buildings such as the tallest skyscraper in the world, the Burj Khalifa in Dubai, and architectural masterpieces such as the Sheikh Zayed Grand Mosque in Abu Dhabi. It also serves as a magnet for attracting white-collar non-Muslim expatriates to the country. The rise in the number of highly specialized expatriates in areas such as information technology and robotics, hydroponic farming, food safety, renewable energy, advanced recycling, aerospace engineering, and academia is one of the highest goals the UAE government has set.34 The construction period for the state has been completed. The Emirati leadership transformed an inhospitable desert into a flourishing urban environment. Now the UAE is entering a new growth phase: hybrid achievements in renewable energy, net-zero carbon urban environments, aeronautics and space industry, robotics, and IT networks that will preserve the state’s leading position internationally. However, the societal advancement of the state is not without harsh competition from neighboring states. Saudi Arabia under the liberalization process that is inspired by the Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman, Oman with the new scheme of granting long-term residence visas to scientists and foreign investors, and Qatar with the positive aura that is left from the successful hosting of the FIFA World Cup 2022 are three Gulf States that are in constant search of highly skilled expatriates in Robotics, Information Technology, Sciences, and Arts. Therefore, since highly qualified individuals are in demand from the UAE35  Ulbricht Bailey, “Justifying Relations with an Apostate during a Jihad: A Salafi-Jihadist Group’s Relations with Turkey in Syria,” Middle East Institute, March 14, 2019 https://www.mei.edu/publications/justifying-relations-apostate-during-jihad-salafi-jihadist-groups-relations-turkey; Uslu Emrullah, “Jihadist Highway to Jihadist Haven: Turkey’s Jihadi Policies and Western Security,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 2016, vol. 39, no. 9, pp. 781–802. 34  For more, see among others Mogielnicki Robert, “UAE moves to Retain and Attract Talented Expatriates,” The Arab Gulf States Institutes in Washington, March 18, 2021 https://agsiw.org/uae-­ moves-­to-retain-and-attract-talented-expatriates/; Turak Natasha, “The UAE is now offering citizenship to foreigners, and the economic gains can be transformative,” CNBC, February 2, 2021 https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/01/the-uae-is-offering-citizenship-to-foreigners-sees-economic-­ potential.html. 35  On January 30, 2021, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid tweeted from his official account about the changes in the legal framework of the Residence Visa scheme and the dual citizenship that the UAE introduced in 2021 for highly talented individuals from around the globe and their families: “We adopted law amendments that allow granting the UAE citizenship to investors, specialized talents & professionals including scientists, doctors, engineers, artists, authors, and their families. The new directives aim to attract talents that contribute to our development journey” https://twitter.com/HHShkMohd/status/1355426127951572994?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etwe etembed%7Ctwterm%5E1355426127951572994%7Ctwgr%5E328d592ddd0dd185022f6633e30 33

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prolific compensation schemes are only some of the incentives for them to choose to move to the UAE. Religious and cultural tolerance and high levels of societal security are strong incentives too. Last but not least, by aspiring to become one of the world’s leading cosmopolitan centers of the globe in the twenty-first century through the attraction and the efficient assimilation of as many nationalities as possible in the national core, the UAE aims to strengthen its position in the international system through the smart implementation of interdependency. In this case, interdependency functions as a diplomatic booster between the UAE and the states, with large numbers of nationals as expatriates in the country. The more that foreigners depend on the growth of the Emirati economy for their economic future and that of their families, the fewer frictions between their countries with the UAE itself. By opening up its economy, the UAE offers a stable economic future for the expatriates that have been professionally active within the country and their relatives back home. This form of interdependency becomes even more visible in cases where citizens from poorer states arrive in the UAE and begin to contribute to the national economy. Their income is a source for a brighter and more secure future for them and their families, relatives, and friends back home. In other words, this economic interdependency constructs a multidimensional connection between the UAE, the expatriates, and their country of origin. Through this, the UAE becomes a key variable for many national economies, the governments of which hold a positive attitude toward the Emirati state and its citizens. This form of interdependency had already appeared before in history, in the case of the USA during the nineteenth century, in the diplomatic connection it established with various European states, especially those in Central or South Europe. For the whole of the nineteenth century and for a large part of the twentieth century too, the USA was the magnet for the economic immigrants that were leaving behind the low living conditions that they were experiencing in Europe and were seeking a new life within the nucleus of the so-called American Dream. Nevertheless, the UAE promotes this interdependency in the twenty-first century by using modern methods and aiming at a global range. Abu Dhabi has secured 179 votes out of the valid 190 ballots from the UN member states, becoming a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council for 2022–2023 and a member of the Human Rights Council for 2022–2024 with 180 votes.36 Even though this is not the first time for the UAE to be elected as a nonpermanent member of the UN Security Council (it held the seat in 1986–1987 and consecutively twice more in the Human Rights Council between 2013 and 2018), this is an important development for the nation, which fully reveals the popularity of the state at an international level. The smart utilization of interdependency must not be taken out of the equation as an influential variable for the UAE’s international popularity and dynamism. 6 a 3 1 1 6 e 4 e 3 c a 5 % 7 C t w c o n % 5 E s 1 _ & r e f _ u r l = h t t p s % 3 A % 2 F % 2 F w w w. b b c . com%2Fnews%2Fworld-middle-east-55869674. 36  Emirates News Agency – WAM, “UAE Election for membership in the Security Council, Human Rights Council crowns its partnership with UN,” October 24, 2021 https://wam.ae/en/ details/1395302984479.

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In addition, through the endorsement of tolerance as one of the ontological pillars of the UAE, President Mohammed bin Zayed sets another ambitious goal for the State to accomplish. Since 9/11, Islam has become synonymous with terrorism, sectarian violence, autarchic political methods, bigotry, and discrimination against non-Muslims, women, etc. Without a doubt, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, ISIS, and the Iranian Mullahs are parts of Islam, offering their plentiful stygian aura to a religion with millions of devotees around the globe. However, the aforementioned extreme elements and many more that are activated worldwide monopolize neither Islam nor the doctrinal theses that follow this religion. This chapter does not aim to present a theoretical analysis of the doctrinal dimensions that indicate why Islam is not a religion of hate and bigotry. While various radical elements in the post-9/11 era find shelter under the wide range of Islamic jurisprudence [Fiqh], the various principles of Islamic jurisprudence [Usul al-Fiqh], and the different schools of jurisprudence [Madahib], views that link the whole of Islam with terrorism and violence are superficial generalizations without scientific or empirical credentials. Each religion has its extreme followers, yet those elements do not characterize its doctrinal entity. This is not an attempt to find an equivalent of Al Qaeda, ISIS, the Taliban, or Hezbollah in Judaism or Christianity because there is none. Nevertheless, it would be a fallacy to link the doctrinal depth of Evangelical Christianity selectively with QAnon radicalism,37 or to link Judaism exclusively with the Lehava or the Sikrikim,38 Hinduism with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh, or with the militant youth group Bajrang Dal,39 and Buddhism with Bodu Bala Sena40 et  al. All these extremist groups, some of which can even be characterized as the epitome of religious terrorism, proselytize their followers from the religious pools they are associated with. However, only Islam had been so widely portrayed as the theoretical hub for sectarian violence. 9/11 and what followed after, with the appearance of various radical Islamist groups in the Middle East, Central Asia, and Africa, created a wide circle of negativity surrounding Sunni and Shia Islam until today. With the implementation of such a high degree of religious tolerance, the UAE automatically elevates its political leverage in the international system. In addition, it also takes an open stance against any form of radicalism, sectarianism, or bigotry that may exist ­internally or in the broader region of the Middle East by presenting its unique  Stanton Zack, “Its time to talk about violent Christian extremism,” POLITICO, April 2, 2021 https:// www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/02/04/qanon-christian-extremism-nationalism-violence-466034. 38  Pedahzur Ami & Arie Perliger, Jewish Terrorism in Israel, New  York: Columbia University Press, 2011, pp. 31–37. 39  Marshall Paul, “Hinduism and Terror,” Hudson Institute, June 1, 2004 https://www.hudson.org/ national-security-defense/hinduism-and-terror; Subramanian Samanth, “How Hindu supremacists are tearing India apart,” The Guardian, February 20, 2020 https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2020/feb/20/hindu-supremacists-nationalism-tearing-india-apart-modi-bjp-rss-jnu-attacks. 40  Robertson Holly, “Buddhist extremism: Meet the violent followers of a religion widely known for its pacifism,” ABC News, October 20, 2018 https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-10-21/buddhist-­ extremism-­meet-the-religions-violent-followers/10360288; Gunasingham Amresh, “Buddhist Extremism in Sri Lanka and Myanmar: An Examination,” Counter Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 2019, vol. 11, no.3, pp. 1–6. 37

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approach to Islam through the blending of Sharia with unconditional tolerance and acceptance of the Other. This is both a gallant and a smart goal, too, elevating the UAE to the role of the model Muslim state of the post-9/11 era. Through this approach, the UAE sets the bar of good governance even higher than an efficient welfare system and a booming economy that allows its citizens to live a uniquely carefree life. By constructing a sociopolitical model with the efficient coexistence of Islam and liberal tolerance, the Gulf state presents an ideological alternative to the democratic prerequisite for all the other Muslim states that do not share the same ideals with the Western world but still aspire to play a positive and constructive role in twenty-first-­century international politics. Whether this turns out to be a realistic goal, an idealistic bubble, or even a predicament for the unity of the state will be determined mainly by the political decisiveness of the UAE’s leadership to safeguard the institutional role of tolerance in the state’s domestic affairs and also by the willingness of Western states, primarily of the USA, to cooperate with the UAE free from parsimonious, some might even say neo-colonial, convictions such as the Democratic Peace. This is not an easy task, especially for the UAE’s federal system, where not every political element shares the liberal spirit of its leadership. Nevertheless, it is an inspiring goal that fully reveals the high expectations that the UAE has for itself in the decades to come. In addition, it fully shows that smart states wish not to follow others but to positively lead toward peace and security in international affairs.

Conclusion This chapter argues that the UAE has efficiently developed its soft and hard power structure, thus strengthening its smart power leverage internationally. However, this advanced position that the state possesses in the international affairs of the twenty-­ first century is clear to the UAE government from exploring new grounds and setting higher goals. Since 2016, tolerance toward others has become a key feature of Emirati society. This can be easily spotted in areas such as religion or culture, where the UAE has produced one of the most successful assimilating processes in the world for everyone who reaches the country seeking employment and a more stable economic future. Throughout this chapter, it has been shown that the criterion of tolerance is opening new grounds for the UAE to promote itself in the international environment and, at the same time, to become the point of reference for the Islamic religion and philosophy globally, restoring the prestige of the faith that was profoundly damaged after 9/11. However, this must be perceived as something other than a moral campaign the UAE government has decided to implement. The institutional tolerance that the state has adopted in its daily operation is unique in the Muslim world and exceptional even for many Western states. This dimension directly refers to Islam since the UAE government offers all the citizens living in the country the right to freely and openly practice their religion. This precise development allows the state

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to set its standards for good and effective cosmopolitan governance, making the UAE a leading actor not only in the economic and technological sectors but also in shaping a hybrid identity with an international caliber that brings forward an optimistic pragmatism about shaping a brighter humanity’s future. Such a transcendental goal underlines the smart ontology of the UAE, as well as the liberal spirit of its federal leadership. Although the UAE is a hub of tolerance in the Muslim world, there is still a subject that the state has to take bolder steps regarding LGBTQ rights. According to federal laws, homosexuality is illegal. It can lead to imprisonment, while various humanitarian organizations accuse the UAE that its approach fails to distinguish between rape and sex between members of the same sex due to the legal perplexities around the intercourse per annum. Many specific decisions must be taken to modernize the state’s legal framework toward the civil rights of the LGBTQ community in the UAE. Nevertheless, it has to be said that today, there is a silent forbearance toward gender identity issues, especially in the two more cosmopolitan and open Emirates, Abu Dhabi and Dubai. In addition, I discussed this particular subject with a few Emirati experts who want to keep their anonymity, and they are confident that within the next few years, the UAE will be ready to make considerable openings toward the rights of the LGBTQ community. Judging from the bold steps that the state has taken on various issues, such as religious freedom or the position of women in Emirati society, I fully share their optimism. The UAE will pleasantly surprise us once more, opening the gates for the other states in the Gulf to reconsider their stance on this particular matter. It will not be easy since it stands against deeply rooted religious doctrines and societal beliefs. However, the strong emotional connection between the leadership of the UAE and the people will play a pivotal role once again in introducing this liberal agenda to Emirati society when the conditions mature.

Chapter 7

Internal and External Challenges for the Years to Come

…Of Laistrygonians and Cyclops, the raging Poseidon, never be afraid. You’ll never find such things on your way if all your thoughts remain noble, and if your spirit and body are touched by worthy emotion. The Laistrygonians and Cyclops, the fierce Poseidon, will never be encountered if they’re not carried in your soul, and if your soul does not erect them on your path, before you. (Constantine P. Cavafy, “Ithaki”)

Introduction The international arena is a volatile framework where the combination of perpetual antagonism between the states and the structural uncertainty regarding their true intentions amid the daily struggle for survival produces an unstable domain where security cannot be absolute, thereby eluding even smart states.1 What differentiates

 The reason absolute security is not feasible comes from various theorists of the twentieth century. I give Henry Kissinger’s exegesis, which seems the most direct and pragmatic. According to Kissinger, the only way for a state to achieve absolute security is to neutralize its opponents. However, he asserts that if such an action is successful, it will be considered a threat, therefore a direct source of insecurity, for all the other actors in the international arena with dire consequences for the relative security of the seeker of absolute security. Kissinger A. Henry, A World Restored, New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964, p. 2. Here, Kissinger is referring to international security. Absolute internal security, at least theoretically, is achieved more efficiently since the domestic sphere is not characterized by anarchy and perpetual antagonism of all between all. However, the question arising here is at what cost? Is a smart state willing to transform its internal framework into a military camp to achieve absolute security? If the question is yes, then (a) that State is not Smart, and (b) it disregards all the perils and challenges that such a decision can inflict on national unity or domestic security in the long run. States like North Korea or Iran, which have a draconian approach to domestic security, have to live with the constant fear of the fifth column, which is a power-consuming approach and a significant reason why these states will never be genuinely secure or happy, even from a relative point of view. 1

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a smart state from others is that it always proactively seeks to address challenges that pose a threat to its status by adopting effective countermeasures. This chapter analyzes the main internal and external challenges surrounding the UAE’s ontological existence and suggests steps for the most effective means to cope with these. These challenges are either existing predicaments, for example, Iranian aggression, or problems that may appear in the future that will test the State and its present socioeconomic structure. The analysis of these future challenges is not based on unsubstantiated futurology but on scientific hypotheses extracted from existing data on the state’s contemporary ontological structure. The present chapter further focuses on the societal factors regarding the UAE’s internal security under the hypothesis of a deep economic crisis in the post-oil era. It also presents the main external challenges for the Union, focusing on Iran and its proxies in the region. Regarding the case of the Houthis, an Islamist militant group originating in North Yemen, the emphasis is on analyzing the threat this particular group poses for the UAE instead of diving into the depths of the Civil War in Yemen. Undoubtedly, Iran and its proxies will continue to pose various direct and indirect challenges to the very existential core of the State for decades to come, despite the slow rapprochement that Tehran, with Beijing’s support, has implemented since the spring of 2023 with Riyad and Abu Dhabi. Certainly, many more such challenges exist, the environmental crisis being one example. However, in this chapter, I have decided to present the major challenges that pertain exclusively to the UAE’s future rather than address collective challenges that apply to the Gulf region or the Middle East. It is important to note that evaluating the UAE’s main internal and external challenges derives from the state’s goals in the coming years. The higher the targets set for the nation by the state’s leadership, the more complex and bewildering the challenges the state will face are likely to be.

I nternal Challenges: The Economic Dimension Versus Domestic Societal Stability Since the establishment of the Union in 1971, two major crises have occurred in the state’s economic history. The first of these was the mid-80s recession. This condition affected the whole of the Gulf region and the UAE in particular because the costly reconstruction phase coincided with the collapse of the oil prices.2 As has already been discussed in a previous chapter, after the establishment of the Union  In the global oil market, the price was pushed down as an organized reaction of the Western governments to establish equilibrium after the oil increase price crisis in the 70s. From $40 per barrel in 1981, the price declined to $25 per barrel in 1985 and $10 per barrel in 1986. For more, see Hertog Steffen, “Gulf Economies: The current crisis and Lessons of the 1980s,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 7, 2009, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/23359; Gately Dermot et al. “Lessons from the 1986 Oil price collapse,” Brooking Papers on Economic Activity, 1986, vol. 2, pp. 237–284. 2

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between the Trucial States and the emergence of the sovereign United Arab Emirates, the federal government under the leadership of Sheikh Zayed and Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed was emphatically committed to the ambitious plan to turn the desert to a modern urban environment by building an advanced infrastructure from the one end of the state to the other. This herculean struggle against the natural conditions surrounding the largest part of the State was not a pharaonic aspiration of its leadership but a political necessity for the survival of the Federation. All of the Emirates needed to receive proportional economic aid from the federal reserves, allowing the transition of the society from poverty and backwardness toward the opening of a new chapter for the newly founded state in the Gulf. Despite extensive oil and natural gas revenues, mainly from Abu Dhabi,3 which the federal state was using for the country’s modernization from one side to the other, the national economy faced tremendous systemic pressure due to the colossal scale of the required infrastructural work. This, in combination with the economic recession that hit the national economy during the mid-1980s, tested the state assiduously. The second crisis occurred in 2008 when the Emirate of Dubai was beaten by the tsunami created by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in the USA and the emergence of a global real estate bubble. Since the late 70s, Sheikh Rashid, followed by his sons, Sheikh Maktoum and Sheikh Mohammed, committed their policies toward diversifying Dubai’s economy. The construction of the Jebel Ali Port (1976–1979), the world’s largest manmade harbor and one of the largest container ports globally,4 together with the elevation of Dubai to a major real estate and tourist hub in the Middle East, enabled Dubai’s economy to achieve impressive accelerated growth without depending exclusively on oil.5 Mega construction projects, such as the Palm Islands, the Burj Al Arab Hotel, and the Burj Khalifa Tower, further helped to showcase the success of the city as one of the modern cosmopolitan metropolises of the globe. Without the benefit of the amount of energy sources available to Abu Dhabi, since the founding of Dubai in 1833, the Maktoum House has focused on the construction of an open economy that has achieved fiscal diversification with systematic efforts in sectors such as naval trade and pearling and later on tourism and real estate. While Abu Dhabi and the other northern Emirates have been more ­conservative regarding their models of economic growth, even before 1971, Dubai  The Umm Shaif, the Bu Hasa, the Upper and Lower Zakum, and the Habshan are the main oil fields in the country, all located in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi. At the same time, the Habshan location is also a natural gas field and a scale producer of sulfur. 4  Regarding the importance of the Jebel Ali Port in the global economy today, see among others the analysis from Hallak Fadi, “What makes the port of Jebel Ali a Wonder,” Spire, March 4, 2022, https:// spire.com/blog/maritime/what-makes-the-port-of-jebel-ali-a-wonder/. According to a study that had been produced by the Boston Consultancy Group in 2019, the J.A.P contributes 26.1% to Dubai’s GDP, while the J.A Free Zone 23.8%, offering 450,000 jobs in Dubai’s economy https://www.transportandlogisticsme.com/smart-sea-freight/jebel-ali-port-and-free-zone-play-key-role-in-dubais-success. 5  For a very interesting analysis see Mishrif Ashraf and Harun Kapetanovic, “Dubai’s Model of Economic Diversification” in Mishrif Ashraf and Yousuf Al Baloushi (eds.), Economic Diversification in the Gulf Region Volume II: Comparing Global Challenges, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, pp. 89–112. 3

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has always been more daring in putting new methods and procedures into practice to produce primary wealth. It has hence been well known in the two littorals of the Gulf as the city of merchants since the early twentieth century.6 For example, during a Majlis in 1904, in an exceptionally smart and liberal move, Sheikh Maktoum bin Hasher Al Maktoum announced that Dubai port would be a tax-free and control-free zone of trade activity, simultaneously declaring the removal of the 5% customs fees. After 1 year, Dubai was the main port for British commerce with the Indian subcontinent in the Gulf, the annual volume of cargo was raised to 70,000 tons, and the British India Steam Navigation Company made Dubai the strategic entrepot for all its trade routes in the wider region.7 Without a doubt, Dubai has had a long history of dynamic economic initiatives, distinct from the conventional methods followed by the other Trucial States, thereby making the city an open hub in the Gulf. Coming back to the present, Dubai’s decision to open up to the international economy at full tilt by following the path of diversification has made the Emirate susceptible to the volatility of the globalized market economy. The main characteristic of the global economy is that each element interconnects and is interdependent with various others in the international arena. As Marius Razvan Surugiu and Camelia Surugiu argue regarding the meaning of interdependency in a globalized economic environment, “Economic interdependence refers to the relationships that are between countries, in which each country is dependent on another for necessary goods or services. Economic interdependence is occurring due to specialization of countries, as they are dependent on others in the purchase of products which are not manufactured nationwide.”8 With the exception of North Korea, a fortress state, the volume of interdependency meted out to each state in the international system today is regulated according to each country’s qualitative and quantitative economic standards and its presence in the international markets. The more dynamic its participation in the latter during a period of international prosperity, the more the gains for the state’s economy, but at the same time, the greater the losses during volatile periods. Thus, the 2008 global crisis9 hit Dubai’s extrovert growth model particularly hard. Dubai’s Real Estate market was the first sector to face the dire consequences of the global recession, resulting in the suspension or cancelation of more than $300 billion worth of projects.10 This shock focused global markets on Dubai’s  Sayegh Al Fatma, “Merchants” role in a changing society: The case of Dubai’, Middle Eastern Studies, 1998, vol. 34, no. 1, pp. 87–102. 7  Ramos J.  Stephen, “The Blueprint: A History of Dubai’s Spatial Development through Oil Discovery,” Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs of Harvard Kennedy School, June 2009, p. 7. 8  Surugiu Razvan Marius and Camelia Surugiu, “International Trade, Globalization and Economic Interdependence between European Countries: Implications for Business and Marketing Framework,” Procedia Economics and Finance, 2015, vol. 32, p. 133 (131–138). 9  Freedman Jeri, The U.S. Economic Crisis, New York: The Rosen Publishing Group, 2010. 10  International Monetary Fund, “United Arab Emirates,” IMF Country Report No. 14/188, Washington D.C., July 2014, pp. 3–22; Lewis Paul, “Dubai’s six-year building boom grinds to halt as financial crisis takes hold,” The Guardian, February 13, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2009/feb/13/dubai-boom-halt. 6

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domestic developments over concerns that its economy was about to collapse like a tower of cards. Indeed, Dubai’s liquidity and credit soon dried up. In November 2009, for example, the global holding company, Dubai World, asked for a repayment standstill and a restructuring of its loans. The company could not pay its annual Islamic bonds worth $3.5 billion, destroying investors’ trust in Dubai’s economic capacity to keep its head above water. Eventually, this situation was stabilized with the catalytic support of Abu Dhabi. Dubai sold $10 billion worth of bonds to the Central Bank of the UAE while securing a $10  billion loan from the two state-owned Abu Dhabi Banks.11 Thus, since the establishment of the Union in 1971, Dubai proved capable of dealing successfully with two major economic crises without the aid or involvement of external parties such as other states or multinational organizations like the IMF. Drawing on the national economic strength that derives mainly from the Abu Dhabi affords, it offers the rare luxury to the country to face every financial disturbance through self-help policies. Even during the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic, when Dubai’s economy was affected by the collapse of tourism,12 the crisis was effectively averted by adopting measures such as large-scale vaccinations to boost the immunity of the population and the opening of the Emirate to tourists, while the rest of the world was in quarantine.13 The COVID-19 economic crisis did not lead to political clashes or social unrest as in many other states around the globe. The national economy did not collapse because the state could support the public and the private sectors. Once again, as in previous periods of financial instability, this was made possible due to the oil revenues that maintain the national economy in one of the highest positions globally. Yet, the commencement of the post-oil era for the nation is approaching, given that the new Grand Strategy of the state is to diversify its economy effectively. One of the four pillars of the UAE Centennial 2071 plan signaling the main goals for the nation for the next 50 years, which was presented by the Prime Minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, in November 2022, heralds the creation of a diversified knowledge economy that will enable the nation to preserve its top position in the international system.14 This smart thinking by the UAE’s leadership is preparing the national economy for the shock that the  Bajaj Vikas and Graham Bowley, “Arab Emirates aim to limit Dubai crisis in pledge to Banks,” New York Times, November 29, 2009; Wearden Graeme, “Dubai receives a $10bn bailout from Abu Dhabi,” The Guardian, December 14, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/dec/14/ dubai-10bn-dollar-payout. 12  Law Bill, “Covid-19 puts the breaks on the World’s Fastest city,” Fair Observer, June 15, 2020, https://www.fairobserver.com/region/middle_east_north_africa/covid-19-puts-the-brakes-on-the-­ worlds-­fastest-city/; Bloomberg, “Business conditions deteriorate in Dubai as Coronavirus continues to impact,” November 9, 2020, https://www.arabianbusiness.com/industries/ industries-culture-society/454322-business-conditions-deteriorate-in-dubai-as-coronavirus-­ continues-­to-impact. 13  Hosany Al Farida et al., “Response to COVID-19 pandemic in the UAE: A public health perspective,” Journal of Global Health, 2021, vol. 11, pp. 1–5. 14  https://u.ae/en/about-the-uae/strategies-initiatives-and-awards/strategies-plans-and-visions/ innovation-and-future-shaping/uae-centennial-2071 11

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end of the oil era will bring to the global economy and further seeks to control the negative consequences on domestic growth and productivity. The 2014–2016 collapse in oil prices, generated by a growing supply glut,15 was a shocking reminder that oil economies remain under the direct influence of international developments, something that the UAE’s leadership wants to control as much as possible. As discussed in previous chapters, the state is taking all the smart steps to make this herculean task possible without compromising its citizens’ high-living standards and national unity. Anticipating and managing the unexpected is a vital component in the international political strategy of smart states. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic is a potent reminder of the dire consequences of unforeseen events for states that are never prepared for the worst-case scenarios. No matter how successful the transition to the next stage, the end of the oil economy era will apply considerable pressure on the state because it will increase its connection to the global economy and intensify its dependency on international developments. Since 1971, the UAE has been economically capable of facing international or domestic crises by mobilizing its forces and resources and exercising suitable self-help policies. In the post-oil era, this would no longer be possible, at least to the same extent as today, not because of a sudden collapse of the national economy as various Cassandrian omens predict but because its economic system will be firmly interconnected with the international structure. I call this new phase the era of regularity. Instead of being detached from international realities due to its rich energy resources, the end of the oil era will find the UAE functioning under usual political and economic constraints just like any other state in the globalized environment. For anyone following the preparation process that the UAE is putting forward to face the transition to a new era, the end of the oil economy will not have an eschatological effect on the already diversified Emirati economy. However, this does not mean the transition will not cause various disturbances in the state internally. In the future, the true challenge for the UAE will come from the magnitude of the unpredictability that the end of the oil economy is likely to cause in the daily lives of the country’s citizens. This raises a big question about the nature of the main challenge and the reaction of various segments of Emirati society. The rest of the chapter explores the main possible internal challenges that the UAE might face in years to come. It advances a series of proposals for smart crisis management in domestic and international politics.

 Killian Lutz, “Why did the price of oil fall after June 2014?” Centre for Economic Policy Research, February 25, 2015, https://cepr.org/voxeu/columns/why-did-price-oil-fall-afterjune-2014; Samuelson J. Robert, “Key facts about the great oil crash of 2014,” The Washington Post, December 3, 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/robert-samuelson-key-factsabout-­t he-great-oil-crash-of-2014/2014/12/03/a1e2fd94-7b0f-11e4-b821-503cc7efed9e_ story.html. 15

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The Case of the Emiratis’ Radicalization As shown previously, the two prominent economic disturbances in the UAE since 1971 did not lead to profound social crises mainly due to the oil economy functioning in the best possible way to absorb the crises and prevent any spillover effects on the state’s core. However, Emirati society has no experience dealing with issues that might threaten its high-living standards and the certainty of financial security it has been afforded to date. Today’s Emirati citizens have not developed the collective dexterity required to deal with hardship, even though their grandfathers and grandmothers had fully witnessed the dark days of absolute poverty and scarcity. Indeed, since 1971, two successive Emirati generations and a third one crossing the threshold of maturity in a few years will have been raised in unprecedented financial security. Unlike their forefathers, they have only witnessed days of untold luxury in the land of plenty. Of course, this is not simply a case of serendipity. Instead, it is the product of the nation’s smart leadership since 1971, making the UAE one of the leading states today, not only in the Gulf and the MENA regions but across the globe. Nevertheless, the question remains. How will Emirati citizens, who have only witnessed days of economic security, react when faced with scenarios of half-­ empty supermarket shelves and food scarcity arising out of a major global crisis that will require the distribution of food coupons? Similarly, how will they react when gas prices are too high to fill up the tanks of their gigantic SUVs, and they are forced to take public transportation instead, which is now only used by blue-collar expatriates? What if their savings lose half their value following a severe economic downturn, and the state can no longer subsidize the bountiful well-fare system they have used to? Will public demonstrations take place in every major urban center? Will religious radicals, previously emphatically defeated with the collapse of the Al-Islah group in 2012, find the opportunity to re-emerge and strive to turn layers of the Emirati society against the liberal leadership of the state? Will a series of harsh social conditions lead parts of the Emirati population down the dark alleys of radicalism, analogous with those that plagued other countries in the Arab world during the stygian days of the “Arab Spring”? While these scenarios are entirely plausible, answering any of the above hypotheses is impossible. That said, given the high levels of national unity that the UAE enjoys today, it is also possible that even if a major crisis does occur in the future, the majority of the Emirati society will rally round the leadership of the state. However, this does not mean that an opposing, radicalized minority would not be able to inflict a severe blow on the unity of the state, making the UAE another fragment of the Middle Eastern conundrum for a certain period. As a popular Emirati proverb says, Aind I-buTuun ti’mal-‘yuun. This means that minds are lost where stomachs are concerned. Therefore, how can the state prepare for such a scenario, especially since domestic security is already at its highest level in terms of efficiency? A proactive approach to counter phenomena like those described above can focus on the development of anticonsumerism trends in Emirati society. The excessive consumerism that permeates Emirati society, enhanced by the booming national

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economy and an overgenerous State welfare system, is a hyper-habit-forming trend.16 Moreover, this excessive consumerism compromises the Emirati culture and identity since it leads society to extravagant spending that is alien to the Spartan way of life of a not-so-distant past in this part of the globe. The construction of an anticonsumerist stance as a collective trend can function as an airbag in the case of a collision, preserving national unity and social coherence, at least for a large part of Emirati society. Such a measure is not a panacea. It is almost inevitable that in the case of an economic crisis, some Emirati citizens will follow the path of radicalization, blaming the leadership or structure of the state for their hardships, as in other states of the world where this has happened. However, in the event of the proactive adoption of anticonsumerism as a choice of life instead of a necessity, these numbers will be considerably lower since Emirati citizens will learn to consider consumerism a societal pathogeny instead of a normative trend. Here, the UAE has a unique advantage. The strong emotional ties between the Emirati citizens and their leadership may promote a sound anticonsumerist agenda. If today, for example, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed17 or Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohamed, the two most popular politicians in the country, circulate an anticonsumerist campaign from their accounts on Social Media, the absolute majority of the Emirati citizens, as well as a significant number of expatriates, will most likely willingly follow. This results from the smart leadership approach presented in a previous chapter and is mainly linked to the compulsive concept of leading by example. Some theorists may argue that radicalism cannot be stopped with public campaigns aimed at reshaping the collective behavior of a society, a point I would agree with, given that radicalism has to do with the emergence of collective instincts at the expense of logic and the transformation of individuals into an uncontrollable mob. Nevertheless, the adoption of an anticonsumerist stance will allow the vast majority of Emiratis to absorb the crisis and continue with their daily lives under the new socioeconomic conditions, especially since the process of radicalization is targeting those silent minorities that even today maintain a distance from the normative evolution of the State for ideological reasons.

 Regarding excessive consumerism in the UAE today, see among others: Kazim Aqil, “The Emergence of Hyper-Consumerism in UAE Society: A socio-cultural perspective,” Perspective on Global Development and Technology, 2018, vol. 17, no. 4, pp. 353–372. 17  As a matter of fact, MbZ has already referred to the negative results of consumerism in Emirati society, underlying its incompatibility with the traditional principles and culture of the region. On May 5, 2020, in an online Ramadan majlis on food security together with Mariam bint Mohammed Saeed Hareb Almheiri, then Minister for Food Security, she asked all the citizens of the country to go against a culture of excess, stating, “We have a habit of excess that we need to restrain. If this excess or overspending is for a good cause, like charity, it is good, and we support it, but overspending for no reason is bad.” The majlis was conducted under the title “Nourishing the Nation: Food Security in the UAE” and mainly discussed that the UAE’s national policy would not be affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. For more, see Nowais Al Shireena, “Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed calls for end to ‘culture of excess’ to protect food security,” The National, May 7, 2020, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-calls-for-endto-culture-of-excess-to-protect-food-­security-­1.1015943. 16

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The Case of the Expatriates’ Radicalization The Gold and the White Collars The direst condition in the event of a major socioeconomic crisis in the UAE in the post-oil era relates to the role of expatriates. Most gold- and white-collar expatriates will abandon the state in severe sociopolitical, economic, or military turbulences. Of course, such a development will deepen the crisis even more since many vital positions in the private and public sectors will be left vacant. It would be challenging for a crisis to be efficiently faced without the support of the highly skilled gold- and white-collar expatriates, a dimension that shows the importance of the Emiratization process, i.e., the elevation of Emirati citizens to key positions in the state and the private sector to reduce the reliance on foreigners.18 Another step to help establish a strong sense of bonding between the gold- and white-collar expatriates and the UAE can be the introduction of a pension scheme for non-UAE citizens. Such a development will produce a more permanent commitment between those highly skilled expatriates and the UAE. Through this scheme, larger numbers of gold- and white-­ collar expatriates with the necessary skills, expertise, and experience that will be greatly needed in times of crisis will remain in the country and unite forces with the Emiratis to find a way out of the conundrum. The main issue with the majority of the gold- and white-collar expatriates is that they consider the UAE as a temporary station for their lives, a suitable environment either to gain job experience or to facilitate their established professional status by earning considerable amounts of money and then returning to base after a certain period. While most high-standard expatriates have a positive attitude toward the UAE, they still view it as a temporary stepping stone. This reality reduces their willingness to remain and work for the re-­ stabilization of the country in times of profound internal or external disturbances. For this to change, the UAE government can adopt measures to prove to gold- and white-collar expatriates that they must hold their ground and help the state overcome any crisis, not for sentimental reasons but because this attitude would serve their interests too. By taking all those measures that would persuade the white and gold collars that the UAE is not just an in-between station for their lives and careers but the place where they can invest their present and future, the Union will demonstrate to those who are necessary for the efficient running of the state that it considers them as valuable members of the Emirati society and not merely as practical tools of ingenuity and brilliance from 7:30 until 16:30 from Monday to Friday.

 In August 2022, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization announced its intention to have at least 10% of the private sector workforce of Emirati citizens by 2026. For more regarding this specific policy, see Matthews – Taylor Joanna et al., “New Emiratization Laws to protect business as Government drives local employment,” Middle East Insights, August 3, 2022, https://me-­insights.bakermckenzie.com/2022/08/03/ uae-new-emiratisation-laws-to-protect-businesses-as-government-drives-local-employment/. 18

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The Pink, Black, and Blue Collars However, the most severe challenge in a significant crisis may come from the pink-, black-, and blue-collar expatriates, the less-skilled layers of the working classes. In the UAE, these population segments come mainly from Southern and Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa. According to the government portal of the UAE, the number of expatriates in 2021 was around nine million out of a population of ten million.19 Most belong to the pink-, black-, or blue-collar categories.20 What makes this specific category of expatriates a major challenge for the UAE during a major socioeconomic crisis? On the one hand, their large numbers. This aspect attracts the state’s interest regarding their collective behavior during periods of high internal volatility. On the other hand, in a major socioeconomic crisis, their job positions will be the first to be negatively affected. This means that unemployment of the lower income population will automatically rise; therefore, poverty will also affect them directly. While the upper expatriate classes can leave the UAE to take up their subsequent employment elsewhere globally, this will not apply to the low-income expatriates. Most will have no other option but to remain in the UAE, hoping for a rapid return to normality. However, what their societal etiquette will be like if a crisis continues to deepen and their employment status will not be restored? A considerable number of those may present an easy target for radicalization from external elements that would benefit from major social unrest in the internal context of the UAE to fulfill their political goals. This has to do mainly with the fact that large numbers of the working classes in the country come from fragile, failing or failed states, where radicalization of the masses, violent uprisings against the local governments, and acts of civil disobedience are part and parcel of their ideological identity and their sociopolitical upbringing.21 This means that there is a critical mass inside the UAE with a propensity to radicalization that can occur under a prolonged and severe socioeconomic crisis with negative results for internal peace and security. Consequently, this can end the Emirati tolerance policy and will, in turn,

 https://u.ae/en/information-and-services/social-affairs/preserving-the-emirati-national-identity/ population-and-demographic-mix 20  https://www.globalmediainsight.com/blog/uae-population-statistics/ 21  It is essential to make the following clarification here. The inclination toward civil unrest has nothing to do with nationalities or social origins but strictly with poor education, financial misery, and national environments that corrupted politicians had intoxicated. When for example, I refer to the unskilled Afghan worker who is more likely to resort to violence than a Norwegian Professor of Clinical Psychology that they are both in Dubai, I am underlying the vast difference in the education they have received since their childhood, as well as their trust to the State of Law. The Norwegian academic has been raised in a civic environment where every citizen has equal rights and obligations. The Afghani worker is raised in a state where domestic clashes are frequent, where justice is less than minimal, and where the local warlords have the right of life or death upon the citizens. Therefore, when the Norwegian academic is involved in a legal dispute with the Academic Institution, she or he works in the UAE will resort to legal proceedings. In an analogous case, the Afghani worker will resort to violence since he is coming from a country where the Kantian dictum of the rule of the strongest prevails over any other form of societal principal. 19

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p­ recipitate the mass exodus of large parts of the middle and upper middle classes of expatriates from the country. There were two major internal riots in the UAE during the 2008 global economic crisis, an international turmoil that tested hard the socioeconomic resilience of the state. The first occurred in mid-March 2008 at the living quarters of the industrial area of Saaga in Sharjah when around 1500 workers rioted, demanding higher wages due to the falling value of the Dirham, the Emirati currency. The rioters burnt dozens of cars, damaged public and private property, and openly attacked the police forces and the officials from the Ministry of Labour that were sent to the location to implement an on-the-spot crisis management plan.22 The second violent uprising occurred in early July 2008 in the emirate of Ras al-Khaimah, where 3000 workers from India rioted, protesting poor living conditions and low, or in some cases, even unpaid salaries. The use of violence by the rioters was so intense that the Special Riot Squad was called for the first time in Emirati history to control the situation and arrest those involved in the acts of violence.23 Another violent incident occurred some years later, in January 2013, at Jebel Ali Labour Camp in Dubai, when 4000 South Asian workers resorted to violence after many days of protests for higher wages and better living conditions. One hundred fifty-nine workers were arrested and charged with violence.24 Various other sitting protests or strikes have also occurred occasionally but did not result in clashes with the Police. Even though organized protests that turn violent are low in number in the UAE in comparison with analogous situations in other parts of the world, mainly because strikes and labor unions are illegal, the examples provided above serve to illustrate how easily violence can erupt in cases where salaries are delayed, or poor living conditions exist. This propensity can be seen in every country around the globe, and the UAE is not an exception. The UAE has identified these critical internal peace and security challenges as a smart state. Therefore, decisions have been taken at the highest level to elevate the working and living conditions of the lowest income groups in the UAE. For example, in the summer of 2019, the Ministry of Human Resources and Emiratization implemented a noon-work ban between 12:30 and 15:00 from mid-June to mid-­ September for those working in the open field.25 In addition, in November 2022, the Federal No. 33 Labor Law replaced the No. 8 Labor Law of 1980, signaling the

 Al Arabiya News, “1500 laborers stage violent wage protest in the UAE,” March 19, 2008, https:// english.alarabiya.net/articles/2008%2F03%2F19%2F47164. 23  George P. Daniel, “UAE arrests 3000 Indian workers for rioting,” The Times of India, July 8, 2008, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/uae-arrests-3000-indian-workers-for-rioting/articleshow/3208446.cms. 24  Business Standard, “90 Indians charged for violent protests in Dubai,” January 19, 2013, https:// www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/90-indians-charged-for-violent-protests-in-­ dubai-­107103100033_1.html. 25  The National, “UAE’s midday summer break for outdoor workers to start on Sunday,” June 13, 2019, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/ uae-s-midday-summer-break-for-outdoor-workers-to-start-on-saturday-1.873966. 22

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federal government’s intention to modernize the Emirati employment legal framework by implementing a regulatory and statutory approach that resembles the Western global standards up to a certain degree. The new Labor Law, among other provisions, issued an unemployment insurance scheme for public and private sector workers, covering 60% of their basic salary for 3  months.26 Nevertheless, while decisions like the modernization of the Labor Law can attract higher-quality expatriate employees, it does not appear to extend to workers from the lower levels of the employment scale. Still, many steps can be adopted by the federal state in this particular aspect to elevate the living and working conditions of the low working classes in all seven Emirates.

The New Citizens’ Challenge The UAE is changing daily. This perpetual modernizing process is evident by traveling on the E11 Highway from Al Sila in the West, the first town of the UAE that borders Saudi Arabia, to Ras al-Khaimah in the North and then further down to Fujairah. The change can also be seen by watching the gradually rising role of Emirati women in modern society. Financially and legally independent, with good academic studies, most participate equally in every step the State makes toward the future. From the first line of politics, both at a Federal and Emirate level, to Academia, Hospitals, and the State administration, Emirati women are contributing to the growth of the UAE. Others may notice the change by watching the behavior of Emirati youth. For example, nowadays, many young women appear in public without covering their head, neck, and ears with the traditional Hijab,27 donning haute couture Abayas28 in various earth tones instead of the traditional black. The young men often wear designer baseball cups instead of the traditional Ghutra29 with the Igal30 in their night-out sessions. Emirati couples can also be seen browsing in malls and restaurants while holding hands in public displays of affection that would be unthinkable for their parents or older siblings. Groups comprised local boys and girls are often seen enjoying a night out at the movies as people of the same age do in other parts of the world. In addition to these urban images, the wave of change can also be seen in other UAE life sectors. Ramadan is now celebrated in the UAE with the religious significance that Islam prescribes. Yet, a non-Muslim can still enjoy lunch, an afternoon coffee, or a cold pint of beer without hiding behind heavy black curtains, which used to cover the windows of restaurants and  Reuters, “UAE launches new unemployment insurance scheme,” October 11, 2022, https://www. reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-launches-new-unemployment-insurance-scheme-2022-10-11/. 27  Head-covering for Muslim women. For example, the current Minister of Climate Change and Environment, Mariam bint Mohammed Saeed Hareb Almheiri, has chosen not to wear the Hijab. 28  Cloaks for Muslim women. 29  Headdress for Muslim men. 30  A doubled thick black cord which is worn to keep the ghutra in place on the head. 26

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coffee shops during the fasting hours for the duration of the holiday in the past. Alcohol can also be found in licensed liquor shops, restaurants, hotels, and pubs nationwide. As discussed in the previous chapter, the UAE has been preparing itself to establish an institutionally stronger connection with expatriates who work there and can contribute their expertise to the country’s further growth. With the change of the legal status in citizenship, the UAE gives all talented and highly skilled individuals such as scientists, artists, entrepreneurs, and their families the opportunity to obtain Emirati nationality and keep their first nationality.31 This means a new type of citizenship will emerge, further enhancing the UAE’s already established, cosmopolitan character. The transition from an expatriate scheme to full citizenship bears an engaging challenge for the UAE. Many talented individuals will respond positively to the open call from the federal government to move with their families to the UAE and embrace the Emirati cosmopolitan lifestyle as full-status citizens instead of just “nomads.” The excellent living conditions, high level of domestic security, low taxation, and cultural and religious tolerance are magnets for highly talented and skillful professionals seeking to make a new beginning in this part of the Gulf. As a result, a new type of Emirati citizen will emerge, a cosmopolitan, talented, energetic, and dynamic foreigner with proven unique or rare professional skills, wealthy and eager to enhance their personal and professional status while influencing the further development of the state in every dimension possible with breakthrough ideas and innovation and active involvement in social affairs. Since most of these New Citizens will be arriving from Western destinations, they will soon search for participation in the social structure of the urban environment in which they and their families will live. Participating in the majlis will not be enough for them since their high intellectual status will push them to more active involvement in the public life of their adoptive country. This social activity will be the starting point for a deep sociopolitical process inside the ontological core of the UAE, leading toward either the collapse of the scheme of the New Citizens, with negative results for the nation’s economy and societal evolution, or to the complete change of the current Emirati administrative and political system. On the one hand, a large number of the New Citizens will be arriving from various political and cultural environments, with profound sociopolitical differences with the established Emirati norms, where polyphony in the Media, de jure freedom of expression even in matters of religion or political ideologies, or free criticism against the decisions of the administration even in the highest posts are considered as fundamental civil rights. The amount of discord this will generate between the established sociopolitical structure of the State and the alternative sociopolitical trends of the New Citizens will be a crashing test for the opening of the gates of the State to foreigners under the status of full citizenship. Nevertheless, a smart state has to find suitable methods to transform any possible discords into durable institutional formulas of civic modernization that, rather than disorganizing the operation  Jarallah Juman and Shireena Al Nowais, “UAE to grant Emirati citizenship to ‘talented and innovative’ people,” The National, February 1, 2021, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/uae-to-grant-emirati-citizenship-to-talented-and-innovative-people-1.1156264. 31

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of the state, will lead to administrative and societal advancements in general. This first generation of New Citizens will generate a novice challenge for the UAE leadership to identify and define the silver lining between the institutional and cultural foundations of the state and the modernizing process that the state’s opening to the global employment market through a postexpatriate mode dictates. All these attributes and qualities that the state seeks from those who will heed the call and adopt Emirati citizenship will positively affect how the state operates. However, all these qualities come with a different sociopolitical culture with a greater appetite for direct participation in the sociopolitical framework than native Emirati citizens. The challenge for the UAE leadership is to assimilate all the modernizing elements that the New Citizens will bring and prevent the creation of a resentment gap between the Emiratis and the newcomers. In a previous chapter, the successful melting pot that the UAE has created by assimilating all the cultural and religious features that the expatriates bring with them has been labeled as one of the pillars of the UAE’s smart policies. Under the New Citizens scheme, this melting pot must not only be enlarged, but also be able to produce a new national identity that will involve everyone in the state without provoking the sentiments of the Arab core. On the other hand, a greater challenge will come from the second generation of New Citizens. They will come from wealthy family backgrounds, while their parents will have vast social recognition as members of the state’s economic, scientific, or cultural elite. Besides dual citizenship, the second generation of New Citizens will also have a dual national identity. The majority would probably consider the UAE their home since most childhood memories will reside here, following Antoine de Saint-Exupery’s words, “We are of our childhood as we are from a country.” However, many of them will not be Muslims, and their families’ ethical and moral codes may differ from those of traditional Emirati families. Among other things, there is a strong possibility for the second generation to search for direct involvement in the Emirati political scene. Following the example of the European Middle Class of the eighteenth century that had economic power but asked for political participation in the continent’s affairs too, the second generation of the New Citizens will search for the endorsement of its high social and economic status through the enhancement of its political influence. This will either lead to a direct clash between the political establishment and the New Citizens or will move toward the creation of a new form of political divergence in the systemic core of the state. In the first scenario, the blow will also be terrible for the domestic economy and society. In the second scenario, there may be more than one route. Will the UAE adopt the political structure of Kuwait by introducing a sui generis system that will combine constitutional provisions with monarchic autocracy and an elected parliament?32 Does this mean that a bolder step will be taken in the following 30–40 years toward the establishment of a constitutional monarchy like Britain with two chambers, one appointed by the head of the State and the other elected by the people? No one can safely  For more regarding Kuwait’s sui generis political structure, see among others: Crystal Jill, Kuwait: The transformation of an oil state, London: Routledge, 2016 with particular focus on chapters 2, 4, and 5. 32

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answer these questions. The only certainty is that incorporating the New Citizens into the national core and that of their children will generate a series of new challenges for the state. The ultimate test regarding the UAE’s smartness on this particular aspect of the new societal structure will be the state’s leadership to meet these challenges with the utmost positive approach since every form of evolution also carries a series of changes and adjustments. The UAE is making the right decision to open its gates and admit the global elite through its new citizenship arrangement. This decision, along with all the direct benefits for the economy, arts, and sciences, will also bring long-term changes at a societal and political level. These challenges must be embraced as opportunities for further and deeper advancement instead of a series of provocations against the establishment. After all, the level of adaptability to new conditions is a clear sign of the IQ of a state.

The Challenge of National Unity Traveling from one end of the UAE to another, one can observe striking differences in topography, urbanism, and regional growth. While rapid urban development surrounds everything in Abu Dhabi and Dubai, with colossal hotels, malls, and skyscrapers dominating the horizon, a different condition can be seen in the northern Emirates. For example, a striking difference is evident when leaving the city of Dubai and entering the Emirate of Sharjah. Within a short distance, the scenery of a global metropolis with six-lane boulevards, well-preserved parks, and unique architectural skyscrapers is replaced by a less extravagant urban environment with two-­ lane roads, more traditional buildings, and fewer urban green zones. The transition is abrupt for someone taking this route for the first time and does not do justice to the beautiful yet less-blinking city of Sharjah. The same can be said for the other northern Emirates too. Leaving behind the bustle of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, entering the other Emirates is like taking a trip back to the beginning of the twenty-first century, with less traffic, fewer construction sites, and a greater sense of tranquility. However, these come at a cost. None of the other Emirates offer young Emiratis the quality and the number of opportunities that Abu Dhabi and Dubai can provide for those who want to climb fast the social and professional ladders of the country. Having visited all seven Emirates, I feel that while Abu Dhabi and Dubai live in the twenty-second century regarding the urban growth pace, the rest of the country is fully witnessing a twenty-first-century status. This striking gap that I have labeled as the 2 + 5 phenomenon makes you think about the future of the Union in case of a major crisis. Having had the opportunity to discuss with many young Emiratis, both female and male, from every corner of the UAE, in lecture theaters and libraries, café shops,

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or even in queues at the cinemas,33 I have reached the following conclusions: While their parents still consider the Emirate from which they originate as their ontological foundation, the younger generation adopts a less federal approach and primarily identifies itself as Emirati without feeling the need to clarify from which Emirate they come from. At an invitation to an Iftar34 in the city of Al Ain,35 I was seated at the same table with many other Emiratis, including a father and a son. The father was in his late 40s, while the son was in his early 20s. When I asked the father where he was from, he answered that he was from Al Ain, with the typical pride of people coming from the cradle of the House of Nahyan. When I posed the same question to his son, he immediately replied that he was from the UAE. The great idea of the founder of the state, Sheikh Zayed, to construct a durable national identity out of the Trucial framework that would involve all the citizens of the seven Emirates has been met with absolute success in the conversation I had with the representative of the younger Emirati generation. Today, young Emiratis consider the Emirate they were born in as their birthplace instead of their place of origin, just like an American, for example, will say that she or he is a US citizen, born and raised in Californian. The Emirati national identity, which goes beyond tribal affiliation or the Emirate one was born into, is essential in today’s UAE. The big cultural festivals in the country that function as opportunities for mass gathering from every corner of the UAE, such as the Al Hosn or the Sheikh Zayed Festival in Abu Dhabi and Al Wathba, or the SIKKA Art Fair in Dubai, construct the foundation for the collective cognitive acceptance of unity through a blend of history, tradition, and a taste of the commonly shared future. In almost every public announcement since Sheikh Zayed, the country’s leadership underlies the importance of unity as a choice of conscience, with the state fully supporting initiatives that strengthen the core of the Emirati national identity even more.36 However, during conversations with young people from the North Emirates, it soon became apparent that there is dissatisfaction over the fact that almost everything is situated in either Abu Dhabi or Dubai, all the prestigious academic institutions, the federal Cadet Schools of the Armed Forces and the Police, and all major public and private economic, technological, and medical  Most Emiratis are incredibly kind and ready to speak to you and learn where you are from, what you are doing in their country, how old you are, how many wives you have, etc. This adorable curiosity makes them very open to any foreigner who wishes to have a friendly conversation with them. While, for example, in Manhattan or London, a “good morning” to a stranger may even be taken as totally inappropriate, in every corner of the Seven Emirates, an As Salam Alaikum will offer you a Wa Alaikum Salam as a response and most of the times a big smile and an eagerness to start a conversation in the traditional hospitable Bedouin way to every stranger. 34  The evening meal, which ends the daily Ramadan fast at sunset. 35  Al Ain is the second largest city in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi on the western side of the Al Buraimi Oasis and the cradle of the House of Nahyan. 36  On November 25, 2021, the film Al Kameen was released in all the cinemas around the country. The film is based on an actual event of a Houthi ambush against Emirati soldiers during the Yemen Civil War in 2018. The film, an impressively well-directed effort, and an expensive production too, was widely welcomed throughout the country as the virgin step of the Emirati film industry to produce a work directly referencing the Emirati national identity. 33

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institutions. I have to admit that I was stunned to trace the same tone of disappointment that can be found in the voice, for example, of a young Sicilian regarding the very few opportunities that his island is offering to satisfy every personal ambition compared with what is happening in Rome or Milano, in a young person from Umm al Quwain or Ajman when she or he speaks about Abu Dhabi or Dubai. This distinct lack of balance in growth and development between the seven Emirates can potentially generate severe societal turbulences during a crisis, affecting the unity of the state as a direct result. The acknowledgment by the third generation of Emiratis that there is an uneven growth structure in the UAE is primarily balanced by the booming economy of the state that offers positive developments, although not to the same extent, to the living conditions of all the UAE citizens regardless of which Emirate they live in. This impressive economic growth, combined with an emphatically strong sense of national identity, is a barrier to any resentment the asymmetry mentioned above might generate. Yet, in a major crisis, this socioeconomic asymmetry may well provide a rationale for harming national unity and eventually leading to the collapse of the existing federal structure. It is a fact that during major sociopolitical or economic crises, national unity is the first area that receives pressure from external or internal factions searching for an opportunity to harm the established sociopolitical order. Characteristically, the attempted coup d’etat in 1987 in Sharjah reveals how easily a political crisis in an Emirate might affect most negatively the unity of the state. In mid-June 1987, while the ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, was in the UK for a short private visit, his elder brother, Abdulaziz, staged a palace coup, accusing his brother of ruining the Emirate’s economy and declaring himself the new ruler.37 As a matter of fact, the economy in the Emirate of Sharjah was far from flourishing. Due to another collapse in the oil prices in 1986 and because of an ambitious urban construction plan by Sheikh Sultan for the capital of the Emirate, Sharjah’s debt in 1987 rose to around $400 million. The difficult economic situation that Sharjah was finding itself in was a pretext that Abdulaziz had promoted to endorse his move against his brother. No economic collapse was on the horizon for Sharjah, while there was always the option for federal economic support in case things got out of hand. However, the coup against Sheikh Sultan presented a crisis for the federal union since it could not be resolved with a simple statement from the UAE’s Supreme Council nor by sending federal forces to restore peace and order, as had happened in the 1972 coup against the then ruler of Sharjah, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qassimi, by his brother Saqr. Abdulaziz had the support of 3000 guardsmen and made it clear at the beginning that he would not hesitate to use them in case of a military intervention by the other Emirates. The perils of a civil war sounded emphatically and convincingly inside the state’s federal corridors of power, perhaps for the first time that loud since 1971. Abdulaziz’s coup further produced a division inside the Federal Supreme Council. While Abu Dhabi seemed not willing  Phillips John, “Troops set for fight in Arab Emirates,” The Washington Post, June 20, 1987, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1987/06/20/troops-set-for-fight-in-arab-emirates/b7a1d318-391d-4bc6-995a-17051688591d/. 37

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to be heavily involved in Sharjah’s political turmoil, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed al Maktoum openly sided with the ruler of Sharjah, who had returned to the UAE as soon as he learned of his brother’s mutiny and was monitoring the unfolding of the events from the Guest Palace of the Ruler of Dubai as his guest.38 The main reason behind Abu Dhabi’s attitude during the initial period of the coup was that it had lost confidence in the willingness of Sheikh Sultan to lead Sharjah to a more stable economic future. Abu Dhabi interpreted this as an additional economic burden while Sheikh Sultan operated his economic agenda blocking the Emirate from creating alternative revenue sources. Characteristically, in October 1985, Sheikh Sultan banned the sale of alcohol in all the Emirate’s hotels,39 resulting in a direct blow to Sharjah’s tourist industry and indirectly to the Real Estate sector, as thousands of tourists and expatriates relocated a few kilometers away, to the cosmopolitan Dubai. At the same time, the House of Maktoum supported Sheikh Sultan as a continuation of a long friendship between the political establishments of the two Emirates since the nineteenth century, while Sheikh Rashid saw a possible change of Sultan with Abdulaziz as a strike against the balance of power inside the Federal Supreme Council. The resolution of Sharjah’s crisis reveals once more the effectiveness of the UAE’s smart approach to dealing with existential dilemmas. The coup ended without any casualties or bloodshed, Sheikh Sultan remained in power, and his brother Abdulaziz was given the title of the Crown Prince of the Emirate of Sharjah. It was a master stroke resembling the delicate moves of a funambulist balancing on a tight rope without a safety net to break his fall. As a result of this smart crisis resolution management, the unity of the state remained unharmed. However, even though the 1987 Sharjah crisis was eventually averted, this does not mean that it may not re-appear in a different form or shape, yet with the same or even greater capacity to traumatize the unity of the State. This is widely understood, so the Federal government is adopting measures to strengthen the nation’s unity. After all, this is something that every nation-state has to be attentive to. To paraphrase Ernest Renan, national unity is a daily referendum.40 Notably, to strengthen national unity, a de facto proportional representation of UAE civil servants, military, and police officers from across all seven Emirates is enrolled on an annual basis in the National Defense College, which is the Emirati equivalent to the famous French Ecole Nationale d’Administation, to pursue with a postgraduate diploma in leadership, international relations, and security studies. This ensures that all seven Emirates have high-ranking affiliates in all sectors of the UAE’s public structure. In

 Huxley Christian, “A Central American situation in the Gulf,” Middle East Research and Information Project, September/October 1987, https://merip.org/1987/09/a-central-american-situation-in-the-gulf/. 39  Sabi Al Alia, “An unrelenting lens: Social Engagement as Journalism in Alzmenah Al Arabiya” in Sultan Sooud Al Qassemi and Todd Reisz (eds.), Building Sharjah, Basel: Birkhauser, 2021, p. 327 (283–358). 40  The French historian gave a famous lecture in 1882 at the University of Sorbonne under the title Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? (What is a Nation?) He argued that a nation’s existence is a daily referendum, meaning that the daily survival process to be effective presupposes the existence of national unity, at least from the majority of the citizens. 38

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addition, in 2022, two major foreign direct investment projects were announced in the UAE. The first of these came from the Indian Nakhat Group regarding the construction of the first automotive battery recycling center in the UAE. The second came from the American company Falcons AI regarding the opening of a platform to expand its artificial intelligence services in the whole of the Middle East. Both investments are located in Ras al-Khaimah41 in a strategic decision that the federal government encouraged and supported to promote foreign direct investments in the other Emirates besides Abu Dhabi and Dubai. An additional step toward establishing a more balanced growth policy across the seven Emirates includes a future relocation of some of the Ministries’ headquarters or pivotal public organizations from Abu Dhabi or Dubai to the North. This will generate a major move of public servants from the two main cities of the UAE to the other Emirates, thereby offering a solid economic boost to the North of the state.

 xternal Challenges: Systemic Developments E and Regional Conundrums  he Systemic Transition: From Multipolarity T to Bipolar Multilateralism From a systemic point of view, the international balance of power has been predominantly volatile since 1648, causing profound apprehension to all the units in the international arena. The table beneath shows the fluctuations of power or, in other words, the different types of systemic polarities that have affected international politics since the Westphalia Treaty and the emergence of the modernity era.

Chronology 1648–1814 (from the Peace of Westphalia to the Congress of Vienna) 1815–1946

1946–1991

Main cause for the end of the specific Polarity type Protagonists polarity era Multipolar France, the Ottoman Empire, The defeat of system England, Spain, the Holly Roman Napoleon Empire, the United Provinces of the Bonaparte’s France Netherlands, the Russian Empire, and Prussia Multipolar Great Britain, Russia/the USSR, the The route of the system USA, Germany, France, Japan, and Second World War Italy Bipolar The USA and the USSR The demise of the system USSR

 Whiteaker John, “The growing importance of the ‘other emirates’ of the UAE,” Investment Monitor, August 16, 2022, https://www.investmentmonitor.ai/analysis/other-emirates-of-the-uae-sharjah-ras-al-khaimah-ajman. 41

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Chronology 1991–2003

Polarity type Protagonists Incomplete The USA unipolarity

2003–2022

Multipolar system

The USA, the USSR, and China

Main cause for the end of the specific polarity era The 9/11 and the War against the Axis of Evil The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian War

Evidently, a systemic evolution has taken place under multipolarity for the most prolonged period from the Westphalian Treaty until the outbreak of the Ukrainian War. This has various explanations, the most interesting being that the international system welcomes and promotes constant antagonism between states as a regular structural operation. Due to the antagonistic nature of the international arena, cooperation is a viable option, usually through forming alliances between states.42 Alliances, according to the well-known work of Stephen Walt,43 occur either because a group of states wants to balance the threat of a revisionist state or to balance the excessive power a state or group of states possesses. The blend of antagonism and cooperation makes the option for the establishment of a unipolar system44 a relatively rare occurrence. Rarity has mainly to do with the fact that when a global hegemon arises in the international arena, a group of states will align themselves to face the challenge to their sovereignty, and since power is a relative variable, the global hegemon will eventually be defeated. Despite the rarity of this phenomenon, the USSR’s demise and the USA’s triumph produced a unipolar post-Cold War era for a short period. As the Berlin Wall came down amid public declarations of joy and relief from millions in Europe, America emerged as the leading global actor, given that the Soviet Union had neither the political nor the economic capacity, nor even the conventional hard power, to maintain an antagonistic attitude toward the USA. As the globe turned a corner and the Cold War took its place on the shelves of History, the USA’s international role reached its highest position and became the cornerstone of the most powerful military alliance the world had ever witnessed in the form of NATO, while also emerging as an economic giant with immense technological capacity that no other state was able to match, much like a soft power Titan that could only be compared with Classical Athens or Rome in the fields of

 See among others: Slobodchikoff O. Michael, Strategic Co-operation: Overcoming the barriers of global Anarchy, Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013. 43  The Origins of the Alliances, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990. 44  According to Stephen Walt, “A unipolar system is one in which a single state controls a disproportionate share of the politically relevant resources of the system. Unipolarity implies that the single super-power faces no ideological rival of equal status or influence; even if ideological alternatives do exist, they do not pose a threat to the unipolar power’s role as a model for others.” Walt M. Stephen, “Alliances in a Unipolar world,” World Power, 2009, vol. 61, no. 1, pp. 91–92 (86–120). 42

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culture, science, academia, cinema, and so on. Consequently, it was no surprise that the winner of the Cold War was at the top of the international system and could establish a unipolar systemic condition. This form of unipolarity, however, could be viewed as incomplete (see the table above) for the following reasons: On the one hand, the USA had no adequate means to act as the absolute hegemon of the international system, since both China and the USSR’s descendant, the Russian Federation, were both nuclear powers and permanent members of the Security Council. On the other hand, the USA, as a smart state, did not have a revisionist agenda that promoted an a-sole-global-hegemon approach. On the contrary, immediately after the Cold War, many voices inside the country, from top politicians, academics, and journalists, clamored for implementing a Jacksonian foreign policy; in other words, a foreign policy more focused on domestic than international affairs.45 Last but not least, in the post-Cold War era, Washington tried to position its leading role in international affairs more as an economic giant and a soft power proprietor instead of a hard power Leviathan. Nevertheless, 9/11 and the aftermath changed the White House’s approach and ended the short yet intense American unipolar moment. The US military overexpansion in Afghanistan and Iraq, as has already been analyzed in a previous chapter, produced significant political and economic fatigue for the state. At the same time, the two other main competitors to the American eagle, the Russian bear, and the Chinese dragon, seized the opportunity to make a resounding comeback to international affairs. This comeback in the central political scene of the international system led to changes to the systemic polarity structure once again, establishing a more customary status quo in international standards than that of unipolarity, the familiar multipolarity.46 However, two major events in the international scene led to a turning of the tide once again. The first was the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which was a severe blow to the global economy47 and precipitated a multidimensional humanitarian crisis. The second was the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, which brought Russia’s conventional hard power weaknesses to the surface and the Russian leadership’s predisposition to hubris. The long and substantial war attrition over the Russian pillars of power opens the road for the emergence of a new polarity structure that is gradually becoming visible to the systemic horizons of the international environment. ­

 Litsas N.  Spyridon, US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Power Politics and Ideology under the Sun, Cham: Springer, 2020, pp. 25–29. 46  Multipolarity is the most related systemic condition to the archetypical definition of the anarchic international system. It exists when three or more powers play a leading role in global affairs without being able to dominate the others. The multipolar system subsists through high, constant, and multidimensional competition among the top international actors, generating intense systemic volatility. For more, see Litsas N. Spyridon, “War, Peace and Stability in the Era of Multipolarity: What lays at the end of the Systemic Rainbow?” in Spyridon N. Litsas and Aristotle Tziampiris (eds.), The Eastern Mediterranean in Transition: Multipolarity, Politics and Power, Farnham: Ashgate, 2015, pp. 1–20. 47  For more, see Jackson K. James et al, “Global Economic Effects of COVID-19,” Congressional Research Service, November 10, 2021, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/R46270.pdf. 45

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Humanity is witnessing the birth of a sui generis bipolarity which this bool labels as Bipolar Multilateralism. First, why has bipolarity emerged as the new polarity from the ruins of the COVID-19 pandemic and the War in Ukraine? Second, what is the meaning of multilateralism within this bipolar context? For a start, the intensity of the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on the restructuring of public life across states due to the long quarantine periods, combined with the high numbers of deceased or incapacitated sufferers with Long COVID, created high volatility in global socioeconomic conditions that in various cases led to social unrest, mass radicalization, political instability, and the financial marginalization of many around the globe. Arguably, the COVID-19 pandemic, like the Spanish Flu a century ago, openly questioned the sociopolitical norms inside various states that had hardly ever been beaten on humanitarian or economic levels. This further generated a series of changes on an international level, with the domestic crisis negatively influencing the international status of several actors. Second, the War in Ukraine produced major power transitions,48 mainly because of its duration and the heavy friction the conflict is causing in the Russian power leverage. These two elements intensified the clash’s severity, leading Russia and Ukraine to a climax of power consummation that generated a gap in the highest levels of the current systemic balance of power. To stipulate a state’s status in the international arena, the analyst should collect all the necessary data to compare and contrast the available quantitative power components with the analogous features of other states that share a relatively aggregate equivalent amount of power. Through this delicate process from a theoretical point of view, it is feasible to quantify the material factors of power that the states under scrutiny possess. Intangible power factors also play a pivotal role and can be compared during large-scale crises, such as war or a pandemic. Therefore, to assess the dexterity of the existing multipolar systemic balance of power and to evaluate the probability of a transition to a bipolar systemic structure, the three existing Great Powers, along with India (due to its population size and its nuclear status), must be analyzed, in terms of their power context. The Indian Case India took a severe beating from the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, such that it was categorized as the worst in the globe.49 According to a report by the World Health Organization, the number of deaths from COVID-19 between January 1, 2020, and December 31, 2021, was nearly 10 times more than that reported by the  For more regarding the role of War in Power Transition Theory, see Koch J. Charles, “Testing the Power Transition Theory with Relative Military Power,” Journal of Strategic Security, 2021, vol. 14, no. 3, pp. 86–111; Kavanagh Jennifer, “The Ukraine War shows how the nature of power is changing,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, June 16, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/06/16/ukraine-war-shows-how-nature-of-power-is-changing-pub-87339. 49  Runwal Priyanka, “How India’s COVID-19 crisis became the worst in the world,” Science News, May 9, 2021, https://www.sciencenews.org/article/coronavirus-covid-india-crisis-social-distancing-masks-variant. 48

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Indian authorities, reaching around five million people.50 This excessive humanitarian crisis further impacted on Indian socioeconomic structure. For example, according to PEW Research, during the three major pandemic waves, there was a massive quantitative reduction in the Indian middle class by 32 million people. At the same time, 75 million new cases descended below the poverty line.51 This constituted one of the worst cases of abrupt social remodeling for a state in modern times and signaled the worst collapse in living conditions in the history of the Indian state. The rise of the numbers of the lower classes gave a substantial boost to the Communist Party and the other representatives of the Indian Left. In contrast, the middle class rallied ‘round the Hindu center-right and nationalist parties.52 The main result of the empowerment of class politics in the historically segregated Indian political framework is that it again put tremendous pressure on national unity. In addition, the severity of the blame game between the central government in New Delhi and the state governments emphatically jeopardized the efficient operation of the federal administration.53 Moreover, during the pandemic lockdowns, India’s cyber-security infrastructure failed to deal effectively with the rapid rise of electronic attacks, revealing a substantial gap in the national anticybercrime firewall.54 At the same time, at an international level, the country gradually modified its traditional stance from Aatma Nirbhar [self-reliance] to Vishwa Nirbhar [reliant on the world] to face the rising costs from the spread of the pandemic.55 This U-turn in the country’s Grand Strategy was well expected since India could not face the humanitarian crisis during the first and the second wave of the COVID-19 outbreak without external help, a condition which struck a critical blow to the country’s international image. As stated in a previous chapter, India received substantial international support in the form of medical supplies to face the soaring demand that, in some districts, took  Biswas Soutik, “Why India’s real COVID toll may never be known,” BBC World News, May 5, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-60981318. 51  Pathi Krutika, “Covid-19 pandemic relapse spells trouble for the middle class in India,” Mint, June 13, 2021, https://www.livemint.com/economy/covid19-pandemic-relapse-spells-trouble-forthe-middle-class-in-india-11623582065443.html. 52  Jaffrelot Christophe, “India’s Covid-19 Crisis: Assessing the Political Impact,” Institute Montaigne, May 12, 2021, https://www.institutmontaigne.org/en/analysis/indias-covid-19-crisisassessing-political-impact. 53  For more regarding the negative results of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Indian political framework, see among others: Jha Ramanath, “Impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on India’s federalism,” Observer Research Foundation, November 27, 2021, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/ impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-indias-federalism/. 54  At the beginning of 2020, the number of cyber-attacks in India was 93.1 million. A year after, in February 2021, there were 377.5 million attacks, revealing the failure of the Indian cyber shield. It has to be noted that until the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, India had been considered one of the most advanced states in Information Technology and Cyber Security too. However, under real pressure, the system failed to meet the expectations. For more regarding the issue, see Pandita N.K, “Covid-19 and After: Internal Security Challenges,” India Foundation, July 1, 2021, https://indiafoundation.in/articlesand-commentaries/covid-19-and-after-internal-security-challenges/#_edn14. 55  Tyagi Ritik, “Indian Foreign Policy during COVID-19 pandemic,” Modern Diplomacy, November 4, 2021, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/11/04/indian-foreign-policy-during-covid-19-pandemic/. 50

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the form of a humanitarian tsunami, with the UAE being one of the major contributors. A state with markedly poor performance during a major humanitarian crisis cannot realistically claim to be one of the main protagonists in the post-COVID-19 era. As Christian Wagner argues about the Indian performance during the pandemic and the prospects of the state, “India’s rise seems in contrast to stand more on feet of clay than to be based on firm foundations. In view of its international aspirations it is understandable that India is conducting a great power discourse on the international stage. That said, it cannot always live up to its partners’ resulting expectations because de facto it has only the resources and capacities of a middle power.”56 A giant with clay feet, India in this case, cannot be included in the equation of the main actors of the next evolutionary phase of the international system. The Russian Case Since 9/11, Russia has been one of the main systemic pillars of the multipolar balance of power. Its impressive comeback to one of the top positions of the international system was a combination of Russia’s primary focus on the hard power sector and the gap that the USA left internationally, especially in the MENA region during the Arab Spring. Especially for the Middle East, Vladimir Putin and his entourage showed from the first days a clear interest in re-establishing Russian influence there. As Oded Eran says about the Russian focus in the region since the early days of Putin in the Kremlin, “Relating specifically to the Middle East, what transpires is that Russia’s top objective in that geographical space is political stabilization for the purpose of forestalling the spillover of political and military crises, endemic to the region into the volatile regions of central Asia and the Caucasus, inside Russia and out, in its near abroad.”57 From his early days in power, Putin showed that Russia was unwilling to bandwagon for profit58 with the USA and was ready to follow an autonomous route in the international arena. However, the Arab Spring allowed Russia to show the flag, together with its intentions, while the USA was repeating in a monotonous rhythm that it was ready to focus on the military and political developments in Southeast Asia through the well-known motto of the “Pivot to the Asia-Pacific.” While Washington was giving the cold shoulder to the Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak or was monitoring from a distance and with an  Wagner Christian, “India’s Rise: On feet of Clay?” Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 31, 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/10.18449/2022RP02/. 57  Eran Oded, “Russia in the Middle East: The Yeltsin era and beyond” in Gabriel Gorodetsky (ed.), Russia between East and West: Russian Foreign Policy on the Threshold of the 21st Century, London: Frank Cass, 2003, p. 159 (pp. 159–170). 58  Bandwagoning for profit is the strategic choice a state makes to ally with a stronger actor to safeguard its survival and obtain various advantages from the “spoils of war” the stronger element will offer its allies as a reward for their obedience. Usually, this specific form of bandwagoning is implemented by failed revisionist states who strive to climb higher on the systemic ladder. For more, see Schweller L. Randall, “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State back in,” International Security, 1994, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 72–107. 56

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emphatic sense of exhaustion that the perplexities of Middle Eastern politics had generated the developments in Syria,59 Russia found the space to develop an active foreign policy in the region.60 However, the most decisive moment for the endorsement of the Russian hard power, signaling the comeback of Russia to the systemic avant-garde, was the elevation of the operational capacity of the Black Sea Fleet from Green Water to Blue Water, a process that lasted from 2007 to 2015 and offered the strategic advantage to Russia to extend the military pressure for the USA from the Black Sea until the northeastern Atlantic coast with the Yasen-class nuclear-­ powered cruise missile submarines.61 The enhancement of the Russian hard power offered the opportunity to Moscow to re-define its geostrategic red lines in Eurasia, restructure its diplomatic relations with the states in the Gulf, Egypt, and Turkey, and play an active role in the Libyan Civil War, or the Second Nagorno Karabakh crisis, not as a conciliator but as the master of puppets. Nevertheless, what this rapid rise of Russia in the international scale of power caused was the fundamental sin in international politics, of hubris which can be easily seen in the case of the invasion of the Russian army in Ukraine first on February 20, 2014, and then on February 24, 2022. It is not the scope of this book to present Moscow’s decision to invade Ukraine in detail, especially since it is about smart theory and smart states, and the Russian move against Ukraine is far from these categories. However, it has to be said that Russia seemed unfit to manage the Ukrainian resistance and the overall war attrition efficiently.62 This had, as a result, the Russian prestige and its military credibility receiving a great blow since the war against Ukraine brought to the surface the various weaknesses of the Russian Armed Forces in matters such as logistics, training, and battle efficiency of the conscript’s units, middle and high-rank leadership, etc. In a thorough investigation made by the New York Times about the reasons for the collapse of the Russian Army in Ukraine, someone can monitor Moscow’s hubris and ill preparations, the lack of national unity and smart leadership, and the structural weaknesses of the Russian Armed Forces that proved to be decisively in favor of the Ukrainian side. As Mikhail, a young drafted Russian soldier, is monitored to say on the phone from a military hospital outside of Moscow, “This isn’t war. It’s the destruction of the Russian

 For a detailed analysis of the US foreign policy in the Middle East during the Arab Spring, see among others: Litsas N. Spyridon, US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean: Power Politics and Ideology under the Sun, New York: Springer, 2020, chapter 3. 60  Litsas N. Spyridon, “Russian Foreign Policy in the Middle East: Can Bears Walk in the Desert?” in Yannis A. Stivachtis, Conflict and Diplomacy in the Middle East: External Actors and Regional Rivalries, Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2018, pp. 64–77. 61   Litsas N.  Spyridon, “Russia in the Eastern Mediterranean: Intervention, Deterrence, Containment,” Digest of Middle East Studies, 2016, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 56–73. 62  For a very interesting analysis of the devastating effects of the war on the Russian Armed Forces and the Russian prestige too, you may hear the podcast produced by The Daily on January 4, 2023, with Michael Schwirtz as a guest under the title “Inside Russia’s Military Catastrophe” https:// www.nytimes.com/2023/01/04/podcasts/the-daily/russia-ukraine-military-catastrophe. html?action=click&module=audio-series-bar®ion=header&pgtype=Article. 59

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people by their own commanders.”63 Only for 2022, the war in Ukraine cost the Russian economy more than 7% of its GDP, while growth suffered immensely from the mobilization of 222,000 conscript troops and the lowering of energy demand by the European states.64 National Unity proved to be much less concrete than analysts expected since many men escaped from Russia to neighboring states to avoid being sent to the front, a direct blow against Putin’s regime.65 Nevertheless, the Russian Armed Forces was the factor that failed emphatically to rise to the occasion, something that surprised military specialists due to the intensity of the failure itself, even though the Army had never ceased to be a hub of corruption and inefficiency since the early days of the post-Soviet era. For example, during the early days of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, many Russian vehicles, including tanks and infantry fighting vehicles, were abandoned due to lack of fuel, the communication lines, both the nonencrypted and the ERA cryptophone system, proved to be a technological impediment giving the Ukrainians the military advantage in various crucial battles, while the rigid structure of command of the Russian Army proved to be a clear disadvantage since it was not allowing a rapid decision-making on the spot but everything had to be checked and verified by the higher levels of command that had not a clear view regarding the theaters of war, the high morale of the Ukrainian Army, or reciprocally the low morale of the Russian Army.66 Russia, in the Ukrainian War, reminds us of Fascist Italy back in late 1940. Rome decided to attack Athens, considering it an easy target, to cut off the British forces from the Eastern Mediterranean and show the flag internationally. The crushing defeat of the Italian forces during the invasion of northwestern Greece by the Greek Army and its general retreat during the counter-offensive of the latter inside Albania and toward the  Schwirtz Michael et  al., “Putin’s War: The inside story of a Catastrophe,” New York Times, December 17, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2022/12/16/world/europe/russia-putin-­ war-failures-ukraine.html. 64  For some very interesting data from the first year of the War in Ukraine concerning the Russian economy, see Hannon Paul, “Russia to suffer worst slowdown to any major economy,” The Wall Street Journal, October 28, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-economy-expected-toshrink-under-weight-of-sanctions-11666956390. 65  Sauer Pjotr, “I will cross the border tonight: Russians flee after news of draft,” The Guardian, September 22, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/sep/22/my-heart-sank-with-news-­­ of-draft-russians-flee-in-droves; Hopkins Valerie, “Where have all the men in Moscow gone?” The New  York Times, October 19, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/10/19/world/europe/russia-­ moscow-­army-draft.html. 66  Morris Christopher, “Ukraine War: Russia’s problems on the battlefield stem from failures at the top,” The Conversation, September 14, 2022, https://theconversation.com/ukraine-war-russias-­ problems-on-the-battlefield-stem-from-failures-at-the-top-189916; Bryen Stephen, “The fatal failure of Russia’s ERA cryptophone system,” Asia Times, May 26, 2022, https://asiatimes. com/2022/05/the-fatal-failure-of-russias-era-cryptophone-system/; Massicot Darra, “Russia’s Repeat Failures,” Foreign Affairs, August 15, 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/ russia-­repeat-failures; Deutsche Welle, “Russia struggling to reinforce front line,” September 9, 2022, https://www.dw.com/en/russia-ukraine-updates-russia-struggling-to-reinforce-front-lineas-it-prioritizes-emergency-­defensive-­actions/a-63088953. 63

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Adriatic coastline forced Hitler to invade Greece from the northeast to support Mussolini. Finally, Greece had to capitulate, but the Italians were considered the defeated side from the rest of the globe. Until the commencement of the Greek– Italian War, October 28, 1940, Italy was a Great European power. After June 1, 1941, when Greece surrendered to the German–Italian forces, and until the end of the War, Italy had been considered a secondary Axis power compared with Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan. The same status deterioration is occurring in Russia due to the military failures of the country’s Armed Forces to put down the Ukrainian resistance. As Taras Cuzio argues, “For centuries, Russia has seen itself as one of the world’s great powers… The war in Ukraine has ruthlessly revealed Putin’s Russia as a Potemkin Great Power. Like the Potemkin villages erected along the banks of Ukraine’s Dnipro River in the late eighteenth century to impress visiting Russian Empress Katherine the Great, Russia’s much-hyped revival under Putin is in fact a masterly facade designed to disguise a far less impressive reality. This illusion has now been shattered by the harsh realities of Europe’s largest armed conflict since World War II. Russia is heading toward an historic defeat in Ukraine that will have profound ramifications for the way Russians view their state and themselves… it already looks unlikely that anyone will continue to view the country as one of the world’s superpowers.”67 Thus, from all the above, Russia too must be taken out of the equation as one of the pillars of the new systemic condition that will arise in the post-COVID-19 era. The Chinese and the American Cases The two powers that remain as valid components of the polarity equation in the post-COVID-19 era are China, on the one hand, and the USA, on the other. It is more than a fact that the COVID-19 pandemic hit hard the Chinese prestige, mainly because the virus’ ground zero was at Wuhan in Central China. Various Western countries experienced a soar of verbal and physical attacks against Asians in general, confusing them as Chinese, for the COVID-19 outbreak. The situation reached such alarming numbers that in the USA, for example, President Biden signed the COVID-19 Hate Crimes Act in May 2021.68 This anti-Chinese avalanche hit hard the Soft Power policy that Beijing was systematically promoting since the end of the Cold War as a leg of its economic and political infiltration in various countries around the globe through the Belt and Road Initiative. In addition, the zero-­ COVID-­19 policy that China followed until the end of 2022 has tested to its limits the national unity and the trust of the citizens in the Communist regime. Mega-scale violent clashes between the citizens and the security forces occurred in various  Kuzio Taras, “Putin’s Failing Ukraine invasion proves Russia is no superpower,” Atlantic Council, November 1, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ putins-failing-ukraine-invasion-proves-russia-is-no-superpower/. 68  BBC News, “Covid Hate Crimes against Asian Americans on rise,” May 21, 2021, https://www. bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-56218684. 67

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cities, e.g., Shanghai, Guangzhou, and Tibet, with protesters attacking not just Xi Jinping’s political decisions but the ideological identity of the regime in general.69 In addition, the Chinese economy and the sui generis growth model of “autocratic Capitalism” were, for a certain period, negatively affected too due to the pandemic and slowing in the production line that the zero-COVID-19 policy generated; however, due to the state control nature of the Chinese economy, ultra-destabilizing phenomena that occurred in various open market economies such as the dramatic rise of the inflation had been avoided. As a matter of fact, the Chinese GDP grew by 4.5% in the first quarter of 2023, a sign of the country’s economic transition toward a more solid ground than the previous years.70 China took advantage of the COVID-19 pandemic to strengthen its diplomatic ties with various states around the globe. Beijing exceedingly capitalized in the area of “vaccine diplomacy,” providing either Sinovac’s CoronaVac or Sinopharm’s BBIBP-CORV vaccines to various countries around the world, such as Turkey, Hungary, Serbia, Oman, Brazil, the whole of Central and Latin America, Africa, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia.71 This massive opening to the rest of the international system allowed China to successfully play the interdependency card, establishing cooperative medical schemes with various countries such as the UAE. As seen above, the Ukrainian War and the high volumes of attrition causing the Russian side are another critical dimension strengthening Chinese status. The European and American sanctions against Russia gave the opportunity to China to enhance its ties with Moscow by becoming its major trade partner.72 On the one hand, the advanced Sino-Russian ties increase interdependency between Beijing and Moscow. Nevertheless, this interdependency is not based on an equilibrium base but offers a clear advantage to Beijing since Moscow tries hard to meet its increasing international isolation efficiently. As the leading expert in Sino-Russian relations and head of the Institute for Asian and African countries at the Russian Academy of Science, Alexei Maslov, argues, “Russia’s isolation from the West is tying the country more closely to China. A paradox of the sanctions is that Russia is, in a sense, at China’s

 Wax Eddy, “Protests against zero-COVID policy spread across China in challenge to Beijing,” Politico, November 27, 2022, https://www.politico.eu/article/anti-lockdown-coronavirus-protestsspread-­across-china-zero-covid/; Ruwitch John, “China’s lockdown protests and rising COVID leave Xi Jinping with 2 bad options,” NPR, November 29, 2022, https://www.npr. org/2022/11/29/1139509250/china-lockdown-protests-xi-jinping-zero-covid-policy. 70  For a more thorough analysis, see He Laura, “China’s economy shakes off Covid legacy to grow 4.5% in Q1,” CNN Business, April 18, 2023, https://edition.cnn.com/2023/04/17/economy/china-­ gdp-­q1-2023-intl-hnk/index.html; Yao Kevin and Joe Cash, “China’s economy gathers speed, global risks raise challenges to outlook,” Reuters, April 18, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/ china/chinas-gdp-recovery-likely-picked-up-q1-end-covid-curbs-2023-04-17/. 71  https://bridgebeijing.com/our-publications/our-publications-1/china-covid-19-vaccines-tracker/; Bodeti Augustin, “China’s Vaccine Diplomacy in the Middle East,” The Diplomat, January 16, 2021, https://thediplomat.com/2021/01/chinas-vaccine-diplomacy-in-the-middle-east/. 72  Romei Valentina and Martin Arnold, “China becomes top exporter to Russia as sanctions hit Moscow’s Trade with the EU,” Financial Times, November 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/ c6d20177-f734-4db9-81e1-76e5cd70ec72. 69

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mercy.”73 On the other hand, during a period of high economic setbacks at a global level due to the negative influence of the pandemic on agricultural and industrial production, the opportunity for China to take the lion’s share of the gigantic Russian market regarding trade goods functions as a boost to the Chinese exports at a time where, for the first time since the COVID-19 outbreak, the official rates showed a notable reduction.74 On top of all these, the War in Ukraine offers an excellent opportunity for China to systematize the strengthening of its status quo in the international arena without feeling the pressure anymore of Obama’s “Pivot to the Asia Pacific” doctrine since the USA and NATO are concentrated on the developments in Eurasia, and neither Japan nor ANZUS seems capable of balancing China without the American involvement. The Chinese Belt and Road Initiative continues to expand despite the setbacks from the pandemic. At the same time, for the first time since the appearance of the USA in the international setting, nowadays China has established a more extensive network of diplomatic facilities than the American diplomatic infrastructure worldwide.75 In addition, nowadays, Beijing has managed to construct a network with spheres of influence around the globe, something that China had never succeeded in before. For example, China influences to a large degree, the economic and political developments in the African continent.76 At the same time, the Caribbean is a region where Beijing invests heavily in all aspects of the local economy, from touristic infrastructure to public constructions, on the backyard doorstep of the USA.77 Iran, through the signature of the 25-year agreement of strategic cooperation with Beijing in March 2021, is offering a solid pivot to China

 Bathon Roland and Liudmila Kotlyarova, “How Russia has put itself at China’s mercy,” International Politics and Society, April 1, 2022, https://www.ips-journal.eu/topics/foreign-and-­ security-policy/how-russia-has-put-itself-at-chinas-mercy-5848/. 74  Zhang Elen and Ryan Woo, “China’s Trade unexpectedly shrinks as COVID curbs, global slowdown jolt demand,” Reuters, November 7, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-­ exports-­imports-shrink-oct-covid-curbs-global-slowdown-jolt-demand-2022-11-07/; Hale Thomas and William Langley, “Chinese exports fall for first time since 2020,” Financial Times, November 7, 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/3a29822d-2e57-451d-8666-29c2217dcaf3. 75  Toosi Nahal, “Frustrated and Powerless: In flight with China for global influence, diplomacy is America’s biggest weakness,” Politico, October 23, 2022, https://www.politico.com/ news/2022/10/23/china-diplomacy-panama-00062828. 76  The Chinese approach to Africa presents a great interest to the analyst. First, China provides local governments with loans without focusing on their political practices, or interfering in their internal policies up to the point that these do not jeopardize Beijing’s status. In addition, there is no particular fervor of exporting the Maoist Communist agenda in Africa, while the Chinese overseas foreign direct investments have over exceeded those of the USA since 2013. For more, see John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “Chinese Investment in Africa” http://www. sais-cari.org/chinese-investment-in-africa; Dr. Vines Alex (OBE) and John Wallace, “China  – Africa Relations,” Chatham House, January 18, 2023, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2023/01/ china-africa-relations. 77  Elis R. Evan, “China’s advance in the Caribbean,” Wilson Center, October 2020, https://www. wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/uploads/documents/China%E2%80%99s%20 Advance%20in%20the%20Caribbean.pdf. 73

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in the Middle East through the network of the so-called Shia crescent,78 while the Chinese Dragon has forged a close diplomatic connection with Pakistan too since the early 60s.79 Last but not least, the growing Chinese influence in Southeast and East Asia on countries such as Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Indonesia, and North Korea reveals that Beijing under Xi Jinping’s leadership follows, perhaps for the first time in its long history, such an active foreign policy, both in the economic and in the political sphere.80 Nowadays, China behaves as a hegemon in the non-Western world, a role that no other state can play today, especially after the emergence of the Ukrainian War and Russian involvement. The Chinese role as a Primus Solus competitor of the USA signifies the gradual transition from a multipolar to a bipolar system. The process has already begun since the early days of the war in Ukraine, but no one can safely argue about the duration of this transition. For the USA, both the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukrainian War have managed to underline American supremacy over the Western pole; however, this process had been made possible by the electoral defeat of the ultra-Jacksonian Donald Trump in the Presidential elections of 2020 and the victory of the Hamiltonian Joe Biden. First of all, Pfizer, an American pharmaceutical company with its BioNTech vaccine, played a pivotal role in efficiently facing the COVID-19 outbreak in various places around the globe. Many governments trusted the American vaccine to offer better protection to their citizens from the lethal consequences of the pandemic, a development that functioned positively for the American status at an international level. This process enhanced the damaged American prestige from the Trump period and the M.A.G.A absurdities. At the same time, the decision to evacuate Kabul and allow the Taliban to re-capture the Afghan capital had an equally

 See among others: Vaisi Ghazal, “The 25-year Iran – China agreement, endangering 2500 years of heritage,” Middle East Institute, March 1, 2022, https://www.mei.edu/publications/25-year-­ iran-china-agreement-endangering-2500-years-heritage; Cordesman H. Anthony, “China and Iran: A major Chinese gain in ‘White Area Warfare’ in the Gulf,” Center for Strategic & International Studies, March 29, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/china-and-iran-major-chinese-gainwhite-area-warfare-gulf. 79  Miller Chatterjee Manjari, “How China and Pakistan Forged Closed Ties,” Council on Foreign Relations, October 3, 2022, https://www.cfr.org/article/how-china-and-pakistan-forged-close-ties; Lalwani P.  Sameer, “A Threshold Alliance: The China-Pakistan Military Relationship,” United States Institute of Peace, March 22, 2023, https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/03/ threshold-alliance-china-pakistan-military-relationship. 80  For a general overview of the current Chinese foreign policy, see among others: Lanteigne Marc, Chinese Foreign Policy: An Introduction, London: Routledge, 2020, 4th ed.; Doshi Rush, The Long Game: China’s Grand Strategy to displace American order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2021. Regarding the Chinese foreign policy in Southeast Asia, see Hiebert Murray, Under Beijing’s shadow: Southeast Asia’s Chinese challenge, Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2020. Regarding the Sino–Iranian relations, see among others: Singleton Craig, “How Beijing benefits from a new Iran deal,” Foreign Policy, September 7, 2022, https://foreignpolicy. com/2022/09/07/iran-nuclear-deal-china-us-geopolitics-middle-east-asia-gulf-sanctions-belt-road/; Zhang Sheng, “The 25 year agreement between China and Iran: A continuation of previous policy,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, August 3, 2020, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/ policy-analysis/25-year-agreement-between-china-and-iran-continuation-previous-policy. 78

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negative result in the American image worldwide in the recent past. Second, the fact that American Intelligence, together with the British one, managed to reveal Putin’s plans to attack Ukraine despite the Kremlin’s official rejection of this,81 and also the support that the USA offered to Kyiv, especially in intelligence and in logistics of war,82 reminded the rest of the globe about the American unprecedented power leverage. All the above, together with the fact that the American economy was not affected as much as the Russian, the Chinese, or the European one by the pandemic and the war in Ukraine, emphasize the undisputable role of the USA as the leading state of the Western pole in the new systemic reality that is gradually rising in the horizons of the international arena. The Systemic Transition to Bipolar Multilateralism The above analysis clearly shows that Russia, which currently holds a central position in the multipolar status quo, and India, which a significant number of specialists had considered as a Great Power on the rising, cannot antagonize China and the USA in the systemic framework that the COVID-19 pandemic and the War in Ukraine are currently producing. The incapability of Moscow and New Delhi to present a high level of antagonism in the international arena leads to the decisive failure to act as independent poles in the international system. This creates a systemic gap, and since the international system abhors a vacuum, just like nature does, a new systemic condition arises to fill in the gap, that of Bipolar Multilateralism. For reasons of analytical clarity, it is essential to mention here that this form of bipolarity does not have any other similarities with the post-Second World War bipolarity, which remained known as the Cold War, other than the two prevailing poles in the international arena, which are antagonizing for additional power or new international actors to include them in their sphere of influence. The reasons why Bipolar Multilateralism will not be a contextual extension of the Cold War are many; however, the main ones are the following: On the one hand, Chinese Communism seems to have neither the doctrinal leverage nor the ideological zeal to unite citizens from all over the world under the Maoist banners. An openly autarchic ideology with profound obsolete agrarian depositions for the “well-being” of the global society from above, which lacks the gloss of Marx and Engel’s critical theory or the depth of the nineteenth-century Russian intellectual intelligentsia, is incapable of attracting the interest of the youth nowadays, as the Soviet Union managed to do back in the twentieth century. It is evident that China, unlike the Soviet Union, lacks all the necessary ideological tools to infiltrate Western societies and create a positive stance for itself there. The only means China uses nowadays to insinuate itself into the  Sabbagh Dan, “US and UK intelligence warnings vindicated by Russian invasion,” The Guardian, February 24, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2022/feb/24/us-uk-intelligence-russian-invasion-ukraine. 82  Garamone Jim, “U.S. announces $2.98 billion in aid to Ukraine,” U.S.  Department of Defense, August 24, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/Article/Article/3138602/usannounces-298-billion-in-aid-to-ukraine/. 81

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Western nucleus is through Sharp Power methods in social media.83 However, these methods aim to disrupt the Western world’s balanced political and economic daily life instead of promoting the Chinese sociopolitical agenda. Unlike in the Cold War era, when the USA and the USSR were antagonizing ideologically, militarily, and economically, nowadays’ emerging bipolar international structure has a different political orientation. The USA and its allies, on the one hand, and China and its allies, on the other, do not antagonize on a socioideological level but on trade zones and global influence. On the other hand, as has already been mentioned, the new bipolar system will be based on multilateralism. What exactly does this mean? During the Cold War’s bipolarity, the two superpowers had wide control over the states that were parts of their sphere of influence. In the Soviet case, the term “satellites” is more appropriate to describe the balance of power inside the Warsaw Pact. At the same time, a dividing line must be drawn between the Western European allies and Canada compared with the Latin American states regarding the American sphere of influence. While Western Europe was seen as part of the Primus inter Pares American scheme, Latin America was perceived by Washington as its backyard. Therefore, the local regimes were not regarded as political partners but as pawns in the big systemic chessboard and had to face severe consequences when they challenged Washington’s views on the geostrategic status of the region. The cases of Chile and Cuba offer a characteristic account of the American perception of Latin America and Washington’s deliberation of the states of the region as satellites and not as allies. This control over the two poles of the Cold War international order was not absolute since a third group of states, the nonaligned countries, manifested a neutral stance between the Western and the Eastern camps. Nevertheless, mainly due to the political, economic, military, and ideological magnitude of the two superpowers, the division between the two poles was emphatically deep and thoroughly influenced the international affairs of that period. Of course, it would be useful for the analytic accuracy of the above lines to underline the qualitative way that the two superpowers were treating the states that were members of their alliance in a completely different way. While the USA was promoting the smart approach of the Primus Inter Pares, offering the opportunity to NATO to enhance its unity by giving the right to the other states to be more flexible regarding their political decision-making in the international arena of  For a general overview regarding the theoretical and empirical dimensions of the term “Sharp Power,” see Walker Christopher and Ludwig Jessica, “The Meaning of Sharp Power: How Authoritarian States Project Influence,” Foreign Affairs, November 16, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2017-11-16/meaning-sharp-power. For the Chinese Sharp Power, see Nye Jr. S. Joseph, “China’s Soft and Sharp Power,” Project Syndicate, January 4, 2018, https:// www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/china-soft-and-sharp-power-by-joseph-­ s%2D%2Dnye-2018-01?utm_term=&utm_campaign=&utm_source=adwords&utm_ medium=ppc&hsa_acc=1220154768&hsa_cam=12374283753&hsa_grp=117511853986&hsa_ ad=499567080219&hsa_src=g&hsa_tgt=aud-1249316001117%3Adsa-19959388920&hsa_ kw=&hsa_mt=&hsa_net=adwords&hsa_ver=3&gclid=EAIaIQobChMIjcKNnuvm-­ wIVE7TVCh2iJwyxEAMYAiAAEgI99PD_BwE; Zhou Jinghao, Great Power Competition as the new normal of China-US Relations, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, pp. 184–190. 83

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that time, the USSR was promoting the stiff approach of the Primus Solus. Every member of the Warsaw Pact that was not ready to offer earth and water in every demand Moscow was putting on the table was to pay the dire consequences of its insubordination. Hungary and Czechoslovakia are the two well-known examples that witnessed the invasion of the Red Army because they tried to differentiate from the Soviet directions. The two Western cases, not with the same analogy but still with a different style from Moscow’s operation, can be found in France and Greece. When the two states decided to pull out of the integrated military structure of NATO for different reasons and in different chronological frameworks, Washington did nothing to challenge this decision. Still, it cooperated closely with these two in regional and international affairs. Still, despite this undoubted flexible position, the USA was demanding the compliance of its allies when developments were severely affecting its national interests. The Suez Crisis and Washington’s decisiveness not to support Britain, France, and Israel is a characteristic episode inside the Western camp during the Cold War era. However, under bipolar multilateralism, the nature of the relations inside each wing between the members and the leading state will differ from that during the Cold War. I argue that there will be greater independence in both decision-making and operating in the international system for the members of each side, therefore, less direct control upon them coming from the top, at least up to the point where the national interests of the Great Powers will not be compromised. The multilateral dimension derives not as a concise decision of the two Great Powers but as a normative evolution of the power capacity of some key states of the two poles. For example, suppose that Russia is under the Chinese umbrella. Moscow will be synchronized with Beijing in all the major decisions the latter will take regarding international affairs. However, this does not mean that Russia will stop having its separate agenda or will not publicly express a different opinion than that of Beijing. Russia is too big to be tamed, with a nuclear arsenal that does not pass unnoticed; therefore, it will be allowed to have its way in many different cases, mainly because China will not have an alternative. Yet, Moscow will be willing to rally ‘round the Chinese flag in a crisis because Russia, in the new bipolar system, will not have the capacity to face severe challenges alone. The same can be said for Pakistan or Iran regarding the Chinese case, and Canada, Britain, France, and Germany for the USA.  States like Turkey still generate obscurity regarding their positioning in this new bipolar system, even though I argue that Ankara will be fully incorporated into the Western sphere no matter who is in power. Yet, since the main topic of this chapter is not New Delhi’s or Ankara’s foreign policy, I will not go further in this analysis. The above-presented systemic condition produces a sui generis international balance of power with two main poles under the control of the USA and China, respectively, and various elements that will be able to make more independent decisions in the international arena, as long as this will not put under doubt their allegiance or compromise the unity of the wing itself. The result of this sui generis systemic form will be realized in two primary forms. The heads of the poles, i.e., the USA and China, will be highly preoccupied with monitoring and, when necessary to control, the decision-making process of their allies. Yet, the true challenge for them is to

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operate in a way that they would jeopardize neither the quantitative nor the qualitative consistency of their poles. At the same time, for many states, their allegiance toward the American Eagle or the Chinese Dragon will be an issue of continuous diplomatic bargaining and secret negotiations. From the above, it becomes clear that while international antagonism between the two Great Powers will be high, as is well expected in a bipolar system, after all, the consistency of the alliances and the relations between states, either within the same pole or with the opposite one, will be more volatile and in many cases emphatically problematic. The friction between states will be high not only with the rival pole but also within the same alliance in cases where the political differences and the geostrategic goals contradict each other. Someone may imagine that today’s problematic connection between Greece and Turkey inside NATO, with Ankara’s full responsibility due to Turkey’s revisionism, will occur more frequently in bipolar multilateralism. The interesting aspect is that the heads of the poles will not be heavily involved in controlling the intensity of those interstate frictions as a tool to preserve the alliance structure intact. This means that states during bipolar multilateralism will have greater autonomy to formulate their foreign policy. In contrast, the head of the two poles, i.e., the USA and China, will have to dedicate much more diplomatic and economic effort to maintain their connections with the allies with the least possible damage. Since the two Great Powers will be under permanent pressure either to balance the rival pole or to control any form of disruptive actions within their alliance formations, the pressure will also be transferred to the other states as well to show off their colors on a more frequent basis than it was asked from them since the emergence of the Cold War era.

The Positioning Challenge in the New Systemic Structure The birth of the new systemic balance of power can produce a fundamental challenge for the UAE regarding its positioning in the new international status quo. As mentioned in a previous chapter, during the Cold War and until the emergence of the Arab Spring in the MENA region, the state was one of the closest allies of the USA in the Gulf. However, after the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt while the USA was watching the collapse of Hosni Mubarak, and when Mohammed bin Zayed emerged as the central political figure in the Emirati political scene, the UAE began to implement a more diverse foreign policy. This included an opening toward Moscow and Beijing without jeopardizing the Emirati ties with Washington. In a multipolar globe, the UAE sees itself as a bridge that aspires to bring closer the three Great Powers for issues relating to the Gulf or the role of Sunni Islam in international affairs. It goes without saying that this role elevates the Emirati status in regional politics. At the same time, it also allows the UAE to play a more decisive part in shaping the multipolar balance of power. Characteristically, back in 2013, in an interview given to the Joint Command and Staff College Magazine of the UAE Armed Forces, Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State, offered a clear sign of this balanced approach of the UAE toward the

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three Great Powers. Without denying the close connection between the UAE and the USA, the Minister offered the official view for China and Russia: “We have principal and critical interests with both Russia and China. We are fully aware of their political weight in the world today. We are also fully aware that cooperation and interaction are the means of foreign policy, and this has been the approach of the UAE.”84 This balanced approach can be seen in various cases; however, the most recent one was on February 26, 2022, wherein the UN Security Council Resolution, the UAE, together with China and India, abstained from condemning the Russian invasion of Ukraine, despite that on March 2, 2022, the UAE voted in favor of deploring the war in Ukraine and calling for an immediate halt to all hostilities in a UN General Assembly Resolution. The role of the bridge had also been fully endorsed in the case of the release of the American professional Basketball player Brittney Yevette Griner after 10 months of detention in a Russian prison for possession of cannabis oil.85 Griner was exchanged with Victor Bout in December 2022, a Russian arms dealer convicted in the USA. While Washington claims that the negotiations for the exchange were a direct process between itself and Moscow, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the UAE and Saudi Arabia issued a joint statement claiming that the mediation was led by the Emirati President, Mohamed bin Zayed, and the Saudi Crown Prince, Mohamed bin Salman, “The success of the mediation efforts was a reflection of the mutual and solid friendship between their two countries and the United States of America and the Russian Federation.”86 No matter which side of the story is closer to what happened with the case of Brittney Griner’s release from a Russian jail and her return to the USA, the exchange between the former and Victor Bout took place at a UAE air base, underlying once more the role that the UAE wants to play as a bridge between the three Great Powers. Nevertheless, the soundest declaration of the Emirati foreign policy was given by Dr. Anwar Mohammed Gargash, a well-experienced Emirati politician and International Relations academic, who, during the ninth Abu Dhabi Strategic Debate in November 2022 made the following statement regarding the choices of the State in the international arena, “The UAE has no interest in choosing sides between great powers…The UAE will pursue a multilayer approach and maintain balanced and diversified economic partnerships in a multipolar world…This multi-layered approach is not only key for national security, but by avoiding complete dependence on just one or two other countries, it also ensures we retain our autonomy as a sovereign state…Our primary strategic security relationship remains unequivocally with the United States…Currently, we are not dependent on just one or two other countries for both our economic prosperity and security. Our trade relations increasingly look to the  http://www.nationshield.ae/index.php/home/details/interviews/abdullah-bin-zayed:the-­ uae%E2%80%99s-foreign-policy-aims-to-defend-and-promote-national-interests/en#. Y3dgBuxBwWo 85  On February 17, 2022, Griner was arrested at Moscow Airport when she arrived in Russia to play for Ekaterinburg. 86  Al Monitor, “Inside UAE, Saudi roles in facilitating release of Brittney Griner,” December 8, 2022, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2022/12/inside-uae-saudi-roles-facilitating-release-brittney-griner. 84

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East, while our primary security and investments relations in the West.”87 Diversification in the context of foreign policy shows a direction where the UAE, in the era of multipolarity, aspires not to be just a close ally of the USA but a connector of all Big Three to serve its national interests in the best possible way and also to intensify its role in the international arena, not just as a capable regional actor but as a global factor. Undoubtedly, this is an ambitious yet well-positioned inside the multipolar structure where the Big Three are searching for allies in an international system that lacks the need for definite political connections in an outdated diplomatic exclusivity. Thus, this Grand Strategy under multipolar systemic conditions is Smart. While the UAE’s Grand Strategy is to play the role of the potential bridge between the three Great Powers and establish a different kind of cooperation with each one of them, e.g., with the USA in Security matters and with China and Russia in matters of energy, technology, and trade simultaneously, is a smart approach in multipolarity and is unfeasible in bipolar multilateralism. In a multipolar condition, the UAE is taking advantage of the fact that the system has three main pillars that not only allow the former to exercise constant mobility without jeopardizing its international status but is also offering the option to the State to take advantage of the need of the Great Powers to safeguard the highest number of cooperative schemes in the international arena. In a multipolar system, due to the higher number of protagonists, compared with unipolarity or bipolarity, the international actors can implement creative diplomatic zigzagging. This means that they can maintain open channels with all or some of the Great Powers mainly because the main preoccupation of the latter actors in this systemic condition is the available, friendly networks in the international arena instead of the conventional alliance-core structure. In a multipolar world, as Jeniffer Kavanagh argues, “Networks- of states, businesses and individuals – offer policymakers a path forward. Networks are at the center of any discussion about power and how it works because building ties and streaming goods, technology, people, and ideas across them creates power. As the world grows more contested, states that can build, harness and employ networks as competitive tools will have decisive advantages.”88 As a matter of fact, due to the highly competitive character of the specific systemic condition, Great Powers strive to safeguard new networks of willing associates first and then to maintain the core of their allies. A look at a past multipolar condition, in particular the one during the interwar  Anjana Sankar, “UAE has no interest in choosing sides between Great Powers, says Anwar Gargash,” The National, November 14, 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/government/2022/11/14/uae-has-no-interest-in-choosing-sides-between-great-powers-says-anwar-gargash/. 88  Kavanagh Jennifer, “Advantage in a Contested World,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, November 28, 2022, https://carnegieendowment.org/2022/11/28/networks-and-­ competitive-­advantage-in-contested-world-pub-88461. For more about the role of networks in a multipolar systemic condition, see among others: Slaughter Anne-Marie, The Chessboard and the Web: Strategies of Connection in a Networked World, New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017; Ramo Cooper Joshua, The Seventh Sense: Power, Fortune, and Survival in the Age of Networks, New York: Little, Brown, 2016; Avant Deborah and Oliver Westerwinter (eds.), The New Power Politics: Networks and Transnational Security Governance, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 87

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period, will reveal the diplomatic fervor of all the Great Powers to expand their networks with states that most of which had close allied relations with more than one of the main protagonists, e.g., the case of Turkey which was the apple of discord between Britain and Germany, while Ankara had very close ties with Moscow too. Nevertheless, as argued above, the current systemic condition moves gradually to bipolar multilateralism, generated by the dire results of the COVID-19 pandemic and the war in Ukraine. In this new systemic balance of power, the UAE will either promote a nonaligned policy or eventually choose sides. In bipolarity, the international system becomes excessively polarized because it is divided into two opposing camps, antagonizing global supremacy and the collapse of the other sphere. Unlike multipolarity, in bipolarity, the camps are well-defined and visible to friends and foes, functioning as alliance hubs and deterrence mechanisms toward the aggressive plans of the opposing pole. The available paths for the UAE in the new systemic era are the following: • If the UAE chooses to show off the neutral color of the nonaligned state and keep its options open toward both the USA and China, then this will be an indirect positioning in the no man’s land of the international system. Being in-between the two camps in highly polarized systemic times means that, rather than attracting the interest of the two suitors as a highly prestigious apple of discord, it may draw heavy fire from both sides instead. In international politics, the state will be alone or without substantial support during excessive military, economic, or political volatility periods. Volatile conditions for the UAE might lead to major food-supply crises since the country is predominantly dependent on food commodity imports or to critical geostrategic challenges to national integrity due to the complex regional environment the country is living in. In addition, not choosing sides in a bipolar condition can be perceived as an admittance of free-riding. This political hesitation damages every state’s prestige and credibility while attracting the Great Power’s predatory instincts amplified in bipolar conditions. Therefore, under this specific hypothesis, the prospect of diplomatic or military blackmail from the two Great Powers toward the UAE to enter their alliance network becomes plausible. This will apply tremendous pressure upon the UAE since it will make the State a central part of the bipolar antagonism, mainly due to the Emirati geostrategic role and the UAE’s soft power within the framework of Sunni Islam. In general, nonalignment is not a smart choice for any state, especially during bipolarity. My arguments can be verified from the historical analysis too. Most international actors that followed the so-called Third Road during the Cold War era did not enjoy stability or success. For example, Cyprus had been invaded twice in July and August 1974 by Turkey; Yugoslavia had been dissolved in 1991, entering a bloody war between the different components that formed the federal mosaic of Tito’s country; and Egypt with severe domestic political turbulences for decades during and after the Cold War era reveals the negativity that surrounded some of the nonaligned states. Someone might say that their hesitation to enter one of the two poles functioned as the attraction of the lightning rod toward the systemic thunders during an electrical storm some-

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where in the international arena, at no man’s land. Others might support the view that their denial regarding the necessities of the systemic conditions generated negative results for their ontological existence. No matter the exegesis that someone gives regarding the above-mentioned historical examples, systemic bipolarity does not welcome noncommitment foreign policies. • Success in international politics comes not only through rational decision-­ making but also when these rational decisions are implemented appropriately. After all, what every actor strives to achieve in the international arena daily is the efficient link between the causation of success with its related magnitude in the proper momentum or, as Peter Baehr argues, “Correct timing can be a decisive factor for achieving maximum impact.”89 The amount of daily actions a state has to take to serve its national interests and to achieve daily survival is immeasurable. If, in this continuous process, other variables are added, such as the decision-­making process of the other international actors, state and nonstate, it can be easily understood that for a smart state is extremely important not just to make the right decision but also for this decision to be reached within the right timing and ahead of its antagonists. History is full of paradigms with states that took the right decision but with considerable delay, and this had a series of negative consequences on their international status and prestige. For example, Turkey’s evasive opportunism during World War II and its late entry into the conflict by the side of the allies, just a few months before Germany’s unconditional surrender,90 had, as a result, the Dodecanese Islands with absolute Greek majority, to be unified with Greece, as a recognition of the latter’s herculean efforts by the side of the Allies Forces since the commencement of the Greek– Italian War in 1940 and throughout the struggle against the forces of Nazism and Fascism. Another example regarding the value of the right time can be found in WW1, this time regarding the delay of Greece to enter the War by the side of the Entente Powers. This delay was due to the pro-German King Konstantinos I, who did not want the nation to go against Berlin’s military plans. Eventually, Greece joined the Entente on July 2, 1917; however, the loss of momentum cost dearly to Athens since the unification of Cyprus with Greece, a promise that Britain gave to Athens if the latter was to support the Kingdom of Serbia in 1914 against the Central Powers, never occurred. The two paradigms mentioned above clearly show that the UAE has to implement a proactive foreign policy and make its choice even before the two poles begin to shape at the early dawn of bipolar multilateralism. In an opposite case, where the UAE will delay making its final decision, this may not be perceived as an act of open support toward one of the two existing poles in the international arena but as a move of necessity. Thus, the political, military, and economic rewards will be considerably less than those that would have come from a timely decision. At the same time, it will also take  Baehr R.  Peter, Non-Governmental Human Rights Organizations in International Relations, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009, p. 47. 90  Turkey declared war on Germany on February 23, 1945, while Germany surrendered between May 7, 1945 and May 9, 1945. 89

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more time and effort for the state to convince the head of the pole of its true intentions. As a result of hesitation, a late decision by the UAE to abandon the role of the bridge will mean that the state will have to work harder to elevate its status inside the alliance and strengthen its ties with the head of the pole by gradually winning its trust. This drawback condition can be compared with the high status and prestige it will obtain in the opposite case, where the Emirati foreign policy will decide to enter into one of the two available alliances as soon as the new polarity era appears on the horizon. In the second case, the UAE will be highly appreciated for choosing the right momentum and its clear stance toward the rising new systemic balance of power. This section will also discuss which side the UAE has to choose. Without a doubt, this is an important topic. Since this book is about the smart states theory, not discussing the potential positioning of the state in one of the two spheres of influence in the new systemic era would create an empirical analysis gap. In the previous chapters, the main factors that established the argument of the UAE as a smart state were as follows: (1) The high leadership quality since 1971. Sheikh Zayed, Sheikh Rashid, Sheikh Kalifa, Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed, and Sheikh Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum establish a long line of smart leaders, all different in style but sharing the same passion for innovation and progress; (2) the broad sense of tolerance toward different ideas, other cultures, and religions, which make the UAE a unique paradigm in the MENA region; (3) the federal administrative system that offers a sui generis dimension of operational flexibility regarding the ties between the center and the peripheries; and (4) a well-­ supported national unity. Therefore, what must be answered regarding the direction of the state in the emergence of bipolar multilateralism is which of the two poles will endorse the Emirati smart features, allowing the UAE to continue its prevailing sociopolitical route with the less possible interventions. The objective answer which automatically arises is the USA. The American political culture, together with its liberal approach, offers the opportunity to the UAE to preserve its smart character and enhance it even more. The American political and economic system guarantees that the UAE will be able to maintain its unique features in the international system and continue being a pivotal partner in the global free-market economy. At the same time, it is more than certain that Washington will be exporting the Emirati melting pot system to other Muslim countries, too, as an ideal way of Islam’s evolution into the new systemic era. Being in the Chinese pole, the UAE will be obliged to follow the central directives from Beijing. These directives will not try to change the fundamentals of the sociopolitical or economic policies of the State. However, there would be an apparent attempt to incorporate all these Emirati policies to an approved-by-China status with profound negative consequences for the UAE’s sovereignty. The Communist trajectory, no matter how different the twenty-first century is from the twentieth century’s mantras and political practices, leads to a more interventionist approach toward allies. In addition, China, like the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, has a Primus Solus approach in dealing with its sphere of influence. Therefore, if the UAE decides to enter the Chinese sphere of influence,

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the nation’s leadership must be ready to alter the government style toward a more autarchic direction that will not be very attractive to the Emiratis or the expatriates. For example, it will be obligatory for future Emirati leadership, both at a federal and an Emirate level, to have the blessings of the Chinese Communist Party, affecting to a great extent the smart governing of the state. For China to be able to influence the political evolution inside the UAE, it will have to operate an infiltration into the Emirati sociopolitical structure, from local majlis to the synthesis of the administrative councils and from the operational leadership of the Armed Forces to the religious and academic intelligentsia of the State too. To put it in simple words, where Western academics are in the Emirati Universities and institutions around the country today will be replaced by Chinese, Russians, and other representatives of the Russian sphere of influence. A shallow argument in favor of the UAE’s entry into the Chinese pole may be that both states are nondemocratic, sharing an authoritative method of governing. The answer to this is that there is no connection between the Chinese Communist governing style and that of an Arab authoritative monarchy such as the UAE, with strong de facto and de jure local and federal institutional provisions for the indirect, yet firm, participation of the Emirati citizens in the governing of the State. Where the Chinese citizen must obey the directions from above, the Emirati citizen is encouraged to discuss and participate in shaping the daily political reality of its State. This makes the two political systems emphatically incompatible, meaning one shall receive considerable structural changes. Moreover, while the ideological cornerstone of China is a sui generis blend of the Confucian philosophy with Maoist ideology, producing an authoritarian, paternalistic political model where any form of disagreement between the societal base and the top political layers of the state is considered an open subordination, calling for a violent suppression, the Emirati ideological cornerstone is different. The Islamic–Bedouin ideological cornerstone of the State produces a connection between the people and the leadership that resembles a family more than a paternalistic structure. The relations between the family members are distinct; everyone has a different role inside; however, disagreements among the members are resolved through open meetings, i.e., the majlis, instead of violent suppressions of the disobedient ones. While the father/leadership figure in the paternalistic Chinese ideology is always ready to impose his/its will, knowing what is best for the children/citizens, in the Emirati tradition, the father/leadership figure is more willing to forgive than to punish and to discuss than impose to protect the unity of the family and its consistent evolution. Moreover, a possible close connection between atheist Communist China and the Sunni Maliki-Hanbali Muslim UAE seems awkward, both from a doctrinal and political point of view. While the USA will respect the religious identity of the UAE and its people, the same cannot be said for China which is responsible for targeting the Muslim Uyghurs in the Xinjiang Autonomous Region and the Tibetan Buddhists in the western and central Tibet today. Last but not least, the Emirati goal to attract the global elite from every sector of science, arts, sports, business, academia, etc., will be stopped abruptly if the UAE decides to join the Chinese network in a bipolar system. As mentioned above, these talented and highly skilled people will demand further liberalization of the system instead of deepening conservatism, as the

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Chinese influence will probably generate inside the UAE. Instead of a wave of newcomers, an exodus of expatriates will occur in the same fashion and volume that happened in Hong Kong after China annexed it on July 1, 1997. Others may support the view that it is only logical for the UAE to choose the Chinese side as a secure way to deter Iranian aggressiveness. This argument is based on the growing view in the Middle East that the USA is not able or willing to guarantee the region’s security anymore. Characteristically, during the World Policy Conference in Abu Dhabi in late 2022, Dr. Anwar Gargash stated, “The world today is more dangerous and more complicated. We are less assured of stability. We [the UAE] have always had a US support for the region, but is that going to be assured for the next 30 years? This is one of the big challenges. The region is more concerned of specific threats now.”91 I challenge these views, mainly because the decisive American role in the Ukrainian War sends the message that it can openly support its allies against every act of aggression. Second, I argue that any attempt from China to control the Iranian aggression against the UAE will be blocked by the functioning of bipolar multilateralism, as presented above. China will not intervene in favor of the UAE against Iran, the key to the heart and mind of the Shia world and a potential nuclear state. Beijing’s stance can be fully seen in its attempts to bring the Saudis and the Emiratis closer to Tehran and vice versa to reduce the prospects of a future conflict between the two littorals of the Gulf. At best, the Chinese attitude toward the UAE and Iran will resemble today’s attitude of the USA toward Turkey and Greece. China will be the guarantor of no-war status between Iran and the UAE; however, in case of a severe crisis, it will not intervene in favor of the UAE at the expense of its connection with the Tehran. It is well expected that China will choose to maintain its focus on the Big Picture instead of intervening in a regional dispute, especially in the post-oil era, where the geopolitical gravitas of the Gulf would be fundamentally revised. This will negatively affect the UAE’s foreign policy and defense since the state will find itself confined in a perpetual geostrategic conundrum against a neighboring state, i.e., Iran, with a profound revisionist agenda. In this case, the best scenario for the UAE is to abandon the Chinese pole and enter the American one, but with the negative results that losing the right timing will generate for the Emirati status. Iran’s deterrence will be much more effective for the UAE from the Western pole, with all NATO members, plus pivotal states such as Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Israel, keeping a close eye on Tehran’s moves in the Gulf region and beyond. Others may also argue that the concept of Multilateralism in the bipolar systemic context will allow the states in both camps to move freely, making frequent changes regarding their allegiance. Up to a point, this is correct. However, continuous changes will negatively affect the credibility of the states which will operate in this fluid way. Nobody truly holds in high regard a defecting state that turns against its selection of camps more than once. In addition, maneuverability also has limitations dictated by each state’s ideological and institutional modus operandi. For  Webster Nick, “Political Solution the only way to restore peace in Ukraine, says UAE official,” The National, December 2022, https://www.thenationalnews.com/uae/2022/12/10/ political-solution-the-only-way-to-restore-peace-in-ukraine-says-dr-anwar-gargash/. 91

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example, under the current regime, North Korea will not be accepted in the Western pole. At the same time, the same can be said for the EU states or Canada, for example, regarding a potential placement in the Chinese sphere of influence. Once again, those who find ideological similarities under the label of authoritarianism between China and the UAE fail or do not have the theoretical and empirical knowledge to differentiate the sociopolitical systems and ideological principles that formulate the ontological essence of those two states. As has already been mentioned in this book, the strict Communist–Confucian governing style of China has no resemblance with the tribalistic Arab hierarchical political system of the UAE, where the head of the state does not perceive the collective entity as an amorphous mass but as the sum of individuals and families, a practice which derives from the Bedouin tradition and the religious doctrines of Islam. For all the above reasons, I support the view that in the rising of the new bipolar systemic balance of power, the smart choice for the UAE will not be to remain in the systemic no man’s land but to search for a close connection with Washington. The right momentum for this step will be immediately after the cease-fire between Russia and Ukraine.92 This will be the period when the international system will start to assess the level of damage that the War had inflicted on the Russian power leverage, while systemically, the international balance of power will begin to move toward the next phase of the systemic evolution in the international arena, Bipolar Multilateralism.

The Iranian Challenge and Its Proxies The first turbulent encounter between the Arabs and the Persians occurred between 633 and 654 CE during the Arab conquest of Iran by the Rashidun Caliphate, which caused the collapse of the Sassanid Empire, the beginning of the spread of Islam in the region and the demise of the old Persian religion, Zoroastrianism. The Arab conquest created tremendous resentment among the Persians. This can be seen in the epic poem of Shahnameh written by Abul Qasem Ferdowsi Tusi between 977 and 1010 CE and is considered the pillar of the Persian national consciousness. The poem speaks about the glory of Greater Iran, having to face the invasion of the Arabs, who are presented as barbarians who were drinking camel’s milk and eating lizard meat. Another source of Iranian resentment toward the Arabs can be found in the former’s positioning within the Islamic framework. At the beginning of the spread of Islam in Iran, the absolute majority of the Persians converted to Sunnism  As I have presented above, my analysis regarding the War in Ukraine is that it will only be concluded briefly, mainly because neither Russia nor Ukraine will be satisfied from a shallow draw. Instead, large spells of no-war will be interrupted by a short period of mutual clashes and back to the previous condition again in a perpetual repetition of the no-war vs. war periods. This condition will further weaken Russia economically and militarily, while Eurasia will also enter a long period of geostrategic volatility. 92

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until the rise of the Safavid Empire in 1501 CE confronted the Arabian influence in the region as external domination, initiating large-scale conversions, usually violent too, into Twelvers’ Shiism. The Safavids’ decision to introduce the local population to Shia Islam worsened the relations between the former and Sunni Arab majority in the Middle East, especially those of the Hanbali school of Islamic jurisprudence, such as the Emirate of Diriyah or the Emirate of Sharjah in the Gulf region. However, despite their different political and religious approaches, the two coasts of the Gulf had established a micro-environment of communication through trade and mobility of the people, a much more tranquil condition than that between the Arabs and Persians in the Northern parts of the Arabian Peninsula.93 The arrival of European colonialism in the Gulf and the fierce antagonism between the European naval states regarding the shaping of spheres of influence in the region raised the political tension between the two littorals, with the local political forces exploring the opportunities to consolidate a sovereign status by actively participating in the regional affairs. For example, in 1715, the powerful Al Qasimi tribe of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah attacked Bahrain, which was under the control of the Safavids after the expelling of Portuguese rule. The war lasted for 2 years and ended with the Al Qasimi victory that managed to take control of Bahrain and expand their rule in the Larak and Qershm Islands off the Iran coast at the Straits of Hormuz.94 European Colonialism and the imposing shadow of the Ottoman Empire over Muslim affairs set the foundations for the rise of Iranian nationalism, which in turn triggered analogous sentiments among the Arabs too. Without halting the close trade relations between the two littorals of the Gulf, Dubai was the main gate for Persian imports and exports in the Arabian Peninsula; Iran and the Arab Tribes entered the phase of territorial claims against each other. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the apple of discord was the three strategically located islands of Abu Musa, the Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb in the Strait of Hormuz. The British recognized the rule of the Al Qasimi over these, while the Iranians regarded those as an extension of the mainland and vital for their security. Another source of tension between the Arabs and the Iranians in the region was the status of Hengham Island, which since 1826 had been inhabited by members of the Bani Yas tribe and was under the rule of Sheikh Ahmad, a member of the Al Maktoum House of Dubai.95 Iran claimed the island and tried to collect taxes from the inhabitants without Sheikh Ahmad’s permission; however, the British interfered with averting a clash without offering their consul a permanent solution. Looking at the map today, one may think that the Arab claim over the sovereignty of the islands mentioned above in the Strait of Hormuz was provocative to Iran due to their proximity to the latter’s coast. Nevertheless, it is important to note that large parts of the Iranian coast were inhabited by Sunni Arabs for many centuries, establishing thriving communities there. The main  See among others: Hala Fattah, The Politics of Regional Trade in Iraq, Arabia, and the Gulf: 1745 1900, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1997. 94  Chelsi Mueller, The origins of the Arab Iranian conflict: Nationalism and Sovereignty in the Gulf between the World Wars, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020, p. 13. 95  Chelsi Mueller, op. cit., p. 30. 93

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reasons for this were the ecological conditions that were much better on the Iranian side and were attracting Arab migrants, and also because for many centuries, the Iranian coasts of the Gulf lacked in strong central administration, a fact that was enabling mass population movements from the Arabian side. Characteristically, the German Carsten Niebuhr, a mathematician, cartographer, and explorer, after visiting Iran and the Indian subcontinent in the 1760s, wrote, “…the Arabs possess all the sea coast of the Persian Empire, from the mouth of the Euphrates, nearly to those of the Indus.”96 The ethnological synthesis of the population began to change with the continuous waves of immigration of the Arabs in the second half of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, from the Iranian littoral, especially from the Lingah district of southern Iran, to Kuwait and Dubai.97 Easa Saleh al Gurg, an Emirati diplomat and businessman, describes the story of his family, which can be said to be the story of so many Arab families that moved to the Arabian Peninsula from the Iranian coasts, searching for protection from the rise of Iranian nationalism and protection of their religious and social customs, “[I]n my grandfather’s time my family crossed the waters of the Gulf from the coastal plains of Iran, from the region known as Fars, and returned to our ancestral Arabia. … For some of us, particularly those families for whom the traditional ways of Islam and the way of life of the Arabs were of special importance and pride, there was another event which made the return to Arabia imperative. In the years after the end of the First European War … a revolution in Iran brought to power Reza Shah Pahlavi. … Ironically, it was [his] attempts to reform many aspects of Islamic custom which encouraged many of the Sunni Arab families, living like my own on the coast, to return to Arabia. Not the least amongst the innovations to which the Arab families objected was the decision that women should go unveiled. … For the Arabs, on both sides of the Gulf, especially those from the old families of which mine was one, such proposals were wholly unacceptable.”98 Evidently, the problematic relations between the Arabs and Iran derived from historical animosity; doctrinal religious differences, since the majority of the Arabs are Sunnis while Iran is the center of gravity of Shia Islam; geopolitical and geostrategic antagonism about the control of the naval routes from the Gulf to the Indian Ocean. Despite the aggressive Iranian approach toward the Trucial States, and afterward toward the UAE, the latter is following a smart approach to face the major security challenge that Tehran represents for the Union without closing the door for a future rapprochement with Iran. In general, the UAE exercises a balancing foreign policy toward Iran by either supporting the sanctions against the regime of the Islamic  As cited in Potter G. Lawrence, “Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil,” Center for International and Regional Studies at the George Town University Qatar, 2017, p. 10. 97  Wheeler Julia and Paul Thuysbaert, Telling Tales: An Oral History of Dubai, Dubai: Explorer, 2005, pp. 68–69. 98  Easa Saleh al Gurg, The Wells of Memory: An Autobiography (London: John Murray, 1998), p. 2. It also has to be said here that another famous Emirati family with the same roots as Gurg’s is the Gargash family of Dubai. Both these families belong to the so-called Bani Huwala, a term for Iranian Arabs deriving from the Arab word Huwali which means “to change over.” 96

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Revolution, aligning with Saudi Arabia, or trying to maintain an open communication channel with Tehran on issues that were even affecting Emirati sovereignty.99 Regarding the creation of communication links between the two littorals of the Gulf, in 2019 and in December 2021, the National Security Advisor of the UAE, Sheikh Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan officially visited his counterpart in Tehran, sending the message that the Union is willing to discuss with the other side of the Gulf.100 Moreover, in July 2022, Dr. Anwar Gargash publicly stated that the UAE is considering sending an Ambassador again to Tehran after the closing of the Emirati Embassy in 2016 following the ransacking of the Saudi Embassy in the Iranian capital.101 It must be noted here that Abu Dhabi made various openings toward Iran before Beijing adopted the role of the diplomatic intermediator to broker the Iranian–Saudi rapprochement.102 Despite the diplomatic opening toward the Tehran regime, the UAE also opened parallel roads to deter Iranian aggression. The signing of the Abraham Accords is a clear message to Iran that the UAE does not stand alone to meet its revisionist challenge. Some might support the view that Iran may perceive the Abraham Accords as a colossal Security Dilemma or an excellent pretext to justify its aggression in the Gulf. In one way or the other, Iran’s revisionism against the UAE is constant. Therefore, formulating an efficient deterrence policy is the only smart approach for the UAE to face the Iranian challenge. Iran’s aggression today toward the UAE mainly adopts the following two dimensions. The first is the development of a nuclear arsenal by Iran. If this prospect is realized, then the only smart strategic solution for the UAE is to elevate its deterrence network by developing its nuclear arsenal. This is feasible since the UAE already has a nuclear energy plant, the Barakah, at Al Dhafra in Abu Dhabi. This means that in a short period, if required, the UAE can use the high-speed gas centrifuges producing nuclear fuel to achieve uranium enrichment and thus elevate its  On November 30, 1971, the Iranian army occupied the Greater and Lesser Tunb, while in 1992, Tehran unilaterally canceled the interim agreement of 1971 with the Emirate of Sharjah regarding the sharing of the Abu Musha’s offshore oil revenues by sending an army to the island and thus claiming full sovereignty over it. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/ persian-gulfs-occupied-territory-three-island-dispute. 100  Hafezi Parisa, “UAE security official pays rare visit to Iran to discuss ties, regional issues,” Reuters, May 23, 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/uae-security-official-irandiscuss-ties-regional-issues-state-media-2021-12-06/. 101  Tahnoun bin Zayed’s first visit to Tehran occurred immediately after an Iranian attack against commercial vessels in the Gulf for talks regarding maritime security. For more, see Jacobs Anna and Laure Foucher, “The myth of an emerging Mid-east NATO,” Responsible Statecraft, October 9, 2022, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/10/09/the-myth-of-an-emerging-mideast-nato/; Golshiri Ghazal, “Against Iran, the UAE proceed with more caution than their new ally Israel,” Le Monde, July 18, 2022, https://www.lemonde.fr/en/international/article/2022/07/18/against-iran-­ the-uae-is-proceeding-with-more-caution-than-its-new-ally-israel_5990508_4.html. 102  On March 6, 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia met in Beijing under the Chinese side’s open encouragement. Four days later, the two actors officially agreed to normalize relations and reopen diplomatic missions in Riyadh and Tehran. For more, see Young Michael, “How do Carnegie Scholars interpret the impact of the Saudi-Iranian deal on their area of interest?” Carnegie Middle East Center, March 16, 2023, https://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/89273. 99

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hard power status from conventional to nuclear. Is this a smart decision, or will it force the UAE to adopt the same rogue methods that Iran or North Korea implement to enter the prestigious international club of nuclear powers? Developing a nuclear arsenal in case Iran becomes a nuclear power is the only smart way of protecting the Union and its people under the Mutual Assured Destruction doctrine for the UAE, as every status quo state must do in an analogous situation when it has to face a revisionist element. Another way for Iran to harm the UAE’s security is by proxy destabilizing terrorist actions. The two main Iranian proxies for this are Lebanon’s Hezbollah103 and Yemen’s Houthis.104 The Houthis had already achieved terrorist strikes against Abu Dhabi and Dubai in early 2022 with drones, while Hezbollah is constantly trying to establish cells inside the UAE for destabilizing purposes.105 The combined challenge that both Hezbollah and the Houthis pose to the UAE security, different in shape and volume but equally perilous, can be faced by the latter with a combination of conventional methods that aim at the strengthening of domestic defense and security and unconventional nonviolent methods with an overall positive approach. The UAE strengthened its conventional aerial defense structure by purchasing the South Korean Cheongung II mid-range surface-to-air-missile (M-SAM) weapon system and the Indo-Israeli Barak 8 missile defense batteries. These purchases aim to safeguard the country’s internal from aerial attacks with drones or rockets from the Houthis. In addition, as has already been mentioned, Emirati internal security is utterly efficient and technologically advanced. This enables the Emirati forces to maintain a high level of domestic peace and order without jeopardizing the living conditions by stifling the citizen under a cloud of perpetual emergency that resembles more Kantian dystopia than a modern state with a highly developed sense of self-protection. Regarding unconventional nonviolent methods, the UAE can target the societal reasons for radicalizing people in Lebanon or Yemen. I am not suggesting that religion is not playing a decisive role in defining the political and  Hezbollah appeared in 1982, after the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, as a Shia militia under Iran’s financial and political support. Today, Hezbollah plays a pivotal role in Lebanon and the broader Shia politics in the Middle East as the significant proxy actor of Tehran, with a paramilitary wing, the Jihad Council, and a parliamentary section in the Lebanese Parliament, the Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc. For more about Hezbollah, see Farida Mariam, Religion and Hezbollah: Political Ideology and Legitimacy, New York: Routledge, 2020. 104  The Houthis is a large clan from Yemen’s northwestern Saada province. They practice the Zaydi form of Shiism, predominantly anti-Sunni and anti-American. Iran supports them politically and economically in the long and destructive Civil War in Yemen. For more about the Houthis, see Brandt Marieke, Tribes and Politics in Yemen: A History of the Houthi Conflict, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. 105  For example, in late 2017 and early 2018, 11 Lebanese were arrested in the UAE, and six were sentenced to life for setting up a Hezbollah cell. For more, see Reuters, “UAE court sentences six Lebanese to jail in Hezbollah trial,” May 15, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-emirates-­ security-lebanon-hezbollah-idUSKCN1SL1WB; In 2016, the Lebanese wife of a prominent Emirati was arrested and jailed for 10 years for spying inside the UAE for Hezbollah, The Times of Israel, “UAE jails Emirati woman on charges for spying for Hezbollah,” June 28, 2016, https:// www.timesofisrael.com/uae-jails-emirati-woman-on-charges-of-spying-for-hezbollah/. 103

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ideological identity of the Shia populations in both states, a dimension that goes beyond poverty, illiteracy, or unemployment, the fundamental reasons for the radicalization of the masses worldwide. In fact, radicalization exists in a stabilized socioeconomic environment as an expression of marginalized minorities but does not flourish as a major sociopolitical trend. Lebanon and Yemen, with their collapsing political institutions, ruined national economies, high levels of corruption, and the lack of an alternative way of life for the majority of the people, no matter their religious affiliation, offer themselves as fertile ground for the flourishing of ultraradical ideas and practices through the support and encouragement of Iran. The UAE is already supporting both Lebanon and Yemen financially, especially during the spike of the COVID-19 pandemic, to ensure the avoidance of a total collapse that would have caused a major humanitarian crisis and a climax of sectarian violence as a direct consequence. Perhaps, it is the right time to invest in building modern educational infrastructures in those two countries that will promote the teaching of contemporary skills to young students from low-income families, e.g., Coding or Robotics, offer scholarships to Lebanese and Yemenis to study in Emirati schools and Universities and in general send the message to the societies of these two tormented nations that the UAE is a status quo power that promotes peace and stability in the Middle East as a counteraction to ultra-radicalism, hate, and violence. Is this approach enough to end the current problematic situations in Lebanon and Yemen? The answer, alas, is No! However, a smart state can understand the difference between building a future with open prospects and the normative unfolding of daily misery without any sign of hope for the end of violence and hate. At the end of the day, a smart state knows it is much better to face 100 potential terrorists than 101. Terrorism is not just the product of volatile sociopolitical conditions; however, internal political and economic inefficiencies function as its fertilizers.

Conclusion Dangers and challenges apply to all the actors in the international system, smart or not. What differs is the methodology a state follows to meet those, deal with them effectively, and apply persuasive crisis management that would enable the state to pursue its goals in the international arena. Unlike Sartre’s saying that “hell is other people,” in International Relations, hell comes into sight between the international structure’s conundrums. The actors inside the systemic framework interact with each other and, with the structural feature, experience the friction from the daily struggle to safeguard survival and either succeed in meeting the next day or follow the route of so many actors to political oblivion. This chapter discussed a series of possible challenges that may refer to the ontological future of the United Arab Emirates, both internal and external. The transition of the State from a regional actor on the edge of the Gulf to a global Smart player multiplies the challenges ahead. A smart state, like Odysseus, is not intimidated by the challenges ahead. Like the hero in C.P.  Cavafy’s Ithaca, a smart state is not

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petrified by the sight of Laistrygonians, Cyclops, or wild Poseidon. Since 1971, the evolutionary course of the UAE was with obstacles but also opportunities for growth and development in a challenging region, climatologically and politically. The following steps into the future may be equally productive and challenging. Only thorough preparation for what lies ahead and national unity may continue the smart steps that the State has made since 1971. The challenges are there and are awaiting the time to compete with the State and its people and either be removed successfully or continue their detrimental course of action against national sovereignty and societal happiness. In the end, the fundamental importance of a smart approach is to prepare the state and its officials to acknowledge the existence of systemic challenges before they realize their full potential and prepare for them. This would be a decisive step toward their effective management. That was the primary goal of this chapter, presenting and analyzing the major challenges that may appear on the way of the UAE in the decades to come and referring to the nation’s existential core.

Epilogue

We stayed for twenty days at Abu Dhabi, a small town of about two thousand inhabitants. Each morning the Sheikhs visited us, walking slowly from the castle…We talked for an hour or more, drinking coffee and eating sweets, and after they had left us; we visited the market, where we sat cross-legged in the small shops, gossiping and drinking more coffee; or we wandered along the beach and watched the dhows being caulked and treated with shark-oil to prepare them for the pearling season, the children bathing in the surf, and the fishermen landing their catch. (Wilfred Thesiger, “Arabian Sands”)

When I decided to commence the process of writing this book, my biggest concern was if I was probing the intellectual boundaries for the production of a new theory that could include the United Arab Emirates as a case study or if I, unconsciously, was trying to make the UAE fit into my theory. Many sleepless nights I spent in my office with the light on trying to understand whether or not I was following Procrustes’ hideous steps, and like he was stretching or cutting off the legs of the innocent travelers that had fallen into his trap to make them fit on his iron bed, I was customizing my theory of Smart States to the UAE’s ontological proportions. Let’s admit it. This is the worst-case scenario for every scholar who tries to construct a thriving empirical base for the theory he or she is working on. I have seen so many dawns caressing the Arab Gulf, trying to decide whether or not this tiny strip of land in the Southeast Arabian Peninsula, a very young nation-state, is suitable to enter my theory of Smart States as the main case study. The moment of inspiration I had back in 2017 inside the Grand Mosque that I describe in the Preface of this book about the UAE being a Smart State was a juncture of scholarly celebration, influenced by the imposing figure of the Grand Mosque as was surrounded by a celebrated colorful aura that was produced by a plethora of hidden headlights. My thoughts were allured by the beauty of the Arabian night, but as soon as I returned to my office at the University and was once again absorbed by the daily tasks an academic has to do, I began to ask myself. Was this the right decision? Was the UAE the Muse to inspire me to write my next book? I decided to allow the idea of the Smart States Theory to settle inside me first. I gave all my effort to © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5

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the research and writing of a book on the US Foreign Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, published in 2020 by Springer. As soon as the book was ready and out, I was happy as every time I am producing a new book or article. However, this was the first time I did not feel this sense of liberation that every scholar deserves as soon as she or he delivers the idea that carries inside for years. I was thrilled by the magic sensation of the spiritual release after a long and intellectually painful process of transforming my thoughts into words that make sense to me and a large audience worldwide; however, I felt ready to embark on a new journey. My mind and body were pushing me toward the shore of the scholar archipelago, commanding me to embark on a subsequent trip, this time to the Gulf. It was apparent that the Smarts State Theory was trying to find a way out of me. Therefore, I left my comfort zone; I closed my ears to the Sirens of writing about a more known-to-me Smart State case and placed the UAE as the cornerstone of this new research endeavor. My first step to getting familiar with the state was to study its past. After all, history is the most important and valuable instrument for an IR Theorist, obviously after political philosophy and International Relations theory itself. As I keep saying to my students, History is our laboratory where we commit ourselves to endure falsification experiments. If a new theory can be applied to various decision-making processes that have been already tested in the past, and if it relates to the socio-­ political analysis that has already been produced by bringing new and fresh elements to it, then it can stand out as an intellectual approach worthy of dedicating endless nights and days to make a coherent result that will give inspiration to others to produce something new based on it, or to produce something new against it. The former or the latter will be a positive development for the perpetual trip toward knowledge. Every time during these years that I was working on this book, striving against my constant doubts about the new theory or its empirical base, I was reminding myself that Social Science, like human evolution, is not a venue of absolute consensuses, and that humanity progressed since the dawn of times not just by saying “Yes” or “No,” but mainly by struggling to comprehend the limits of existing ideas, beliefs, and even socio-political systems that were constructed by itself and were bringing them down with no hesitation whatsoever. After all, humans have organized our lives around venues of socialization and discussion, not consensuses. From the Agora in Classical Athens to the Senate in Rome and from the House of Lords in London to the Majlis in Al Ain, humans learned to survive, triumph, or evaluate through critical thinking and discussion. I truly hope this book will be able to contribute to this timeless process of recollection, invention, and production that has characterized us as humans since day one. When I began to study the History of the Trucial States, and later on about the early days of the UAE, I came in front of leaders who tried to place glory by their side, to secure prosperity, or endorse public opinion. However, when I came across the personality of Sheikh Zayed, I was fully persuaded that his case was unique, not just as a successful leader but as an exemplary paradigm of Smart leadership. The majority of humans, successful leaders or failed politicians included, tend to make small, secure steps in order not to face colossal defeats. Human nature plunges the individual toward safety and uses the legend of Icarus and his hubris as proof of the

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almost metaphysical fallacy of crossing the limits of normality or testing the boundaries of mortality. However, only some of us decide to go beyond those self-imposed limits to discover what is beyond, to try what has yet to be tested, to construct a reality out of a dream and offer it to the rest as a legacy. Sheikh Zayed was one of those rare people who not only succeeded in turning his dream into a civic reality, the establishment of the United Arab Emirates, but he was also a leader who never stopped inspiring his people to follow him. Beyond a doubt, Sheikh Zayed’s nation-­ building was a Smart political process. At the same time, he was a brilliant architect for building a national house for seven Emirates by implementing a series of decisions that are worthy of studying and analyzing since, as Chap. 3 of this book argued, these steps he made to build a Union in the Trucial coast are parts of a more comprehensive smart policy that characterized his presence as the head of the state and now is regarded as a smart legacy by his successors. How can a Smart policy be defined today in the challenging international scene of the twenty-first century? How can a Smart policy be endorsed today, when humanity experienced the dire socio-economic and psychological consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic? Can we discuss Smart leadership today as a part of International Relations Theory, or do the domestic and international results determine the level and depth of the academic conversation? This book argues that a Smart leader primarily cares about society and works daily to enhance national unity. Unlike many countries worldwide, people’s happiness is the government’s primary concern in the UAE.  This is a Smart Policy because happy people will respect the laws, protect the state’s institutional operation, and rally around the government in a crisis. Moreover, this book has presented two different styles of smart leadership that currently exist in the UAE. That of Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed and Sheikh Hamadan bin Mohammed.1 MbZ is the politician who, after the death of the  At this point, it is essential for future analysis of the UAE to give the following story. One night, I enjoyed a coffee session with some Emirati academics; some were good friends; thus, the conversation flowed easily. As usual, I was enquiring about various historical events that affected the route of the Trucial Coast or the UAE while they were asking me about the current events in the international arena. The discussion about leadership has reached an exciting point, remarkably comparing Sun Tzu’s and Machiavelli’s related theories on War. During the discussion, I turned to the rest of the group and said that, according to my humble opinion, a long time would pass before the UAE would be able to find a leader with the qualities of Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed when his political career will come to an end. One of the confidants who wished to remain anonymous smiled and said, “May God give Sheikh Mohamed a long life to prepare his successor fully.” In a typical Arab way, my interlocutor refrained from giving me straight the name of the one he was referring to; however, I was ready to face the challenge. “Are you referring to Sheikh Khaled bin Mohamed” I asked, and he made this characteristic gesture with his hand, showing at me with all his fingers closed, meaning I was right. I had heard various positive views about Sheikh Khaled from Emiratis and Westerners. I searched for him on the web, but there was not much information that could assist me in constructing his political profile. I also tried to find a contact with Sheikh Khaled to interview him, but all my efforts had no luck. It is tough to approach for an interview even top officials in the UAE, let alone members of the Royal families. A few months after the above conversation, Sheikh Khaled was nominated Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi, a prestigious post that leads to even higher positions. Whether or not Sheikh Khaled will be able to follow in his father’s and grandfather’s footsteps when the time comes, only the future can show. However, the 1

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founder of the state and the severe health problems that Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed was facing, stepped forwarded and accepted the responsibility not just to carry on with the smart governing of the state but to transform the Union in a major international actor gradually. However, he did not do this by leaving the people behind. He did not choose to modernize the state at the expense of the people and their living conditions. As this book argues, the smart leader is one step in front of the rest of the people to foresee the challenges ahead and hear and sense the needs of those responsible for leading toward stability and prosperity. However, the smart leader is always title of the Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi endorses him with the institutional power to leave his mark on the political life of the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, preparing him for higher federal posts in the future. As mentioned in previous chapters, the UAE has some very interesting leadership personalities that someone must focus on to comprehend the political equilibrium of power within the state. Sheikh Dr. Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, the Ruler of Sharjah, is one of those personalities. More of a scholar than a technocrat, Sheikh Sultan has transformed the capital of the Emirate into a modern hub of galleries, libraries, and museums, giving Sharjah a mesmerizing glow of intellectual awareness. He is now of a certain age, and his political views are too conservative for the epoch and also for the orientation of the UAE; however, he has managed to modernize his Emirate and play an overall positive role in the strengthening of the unity of the state, in particular during the first months of the Union. Another fascinating political personality for me is Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the state. The first thing that made me focus on him was his Twitter account (@ABZayed), where he uploads fascinating articles from reputable international journals about diplomatic issues, healthy lifestyles, books, archaeology, etc. For example, I was overwhelmed when one day he uploaded an article by Mustafa Akyol in the New Lines Magazine about Mutazila, the first school of jurisprudence of Islam to develop kalam (Islamic Theology). The article goes beyond the systemic Sunni approach, bringing new challenging arguments to the inner theological discussion. Only a true scholar and, at the same, some with coherent leadership skills would have dared to do something like that and challenge the normative pattern of religious approach. Other than that, he seems to have various interests in life, which I always consider a virtue for every politician. One night Lena, my wife, returned from an open event at the Emirates Arena in Yas Bay, Abu Dhabi, where a well-known American clinical psychologist, Dr. Shefali, was giving a lecture. Lena, a psychotherapist herself, returned home, discussing endlessly the lecture and how inspiring the speaker was. “You never come in any of these meetings,” she said, expressing quite rightly her frustration about my preposterous reluctance to attend events that remind me of the mental work I have to do with myself to be a good son, brother, husband, friend, citizen, academic, and most importantly a father. “There was a member of the Royal Family with his wife, though,” she continued, and immediately my interest moved to this. “Do you remember his name?” I asked, but she replied negatively. I showed her photos of all the senior members of the Nahyan’s House, and it turned out that Sheikh Abdullah and his wife attended the event. “What have you thought of him” I asked her, knowing that her judgment is primarily proper on people and situations. “He had a kind smile, and I liked that he participated when Dr. Shefali asked the audience to name some causes for any problems that may arise between themselves and their children.” “What did he say?” I inquired, and I saw my wife’s face smiling again. “How can someone face the fact that the son supports a different football team than the one he follows.” Humor and especially self-sarcasm are signs of people with charisma. Although I have never met him, as an academic who taught for years Leadership Theories, I immediately thought that this person has the charm to positively attract the interest of the people around him, not by projecting his status but with his personality, a fundamental characteristic of Smart Leadership.

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near the people to feel the collective pulse and understand their needs. Alexander the Great, one of the greatest leaders ever, lost the hearts and minds of his Greek army when he stopped hearing those voices who told stories about their children and wives back in Pella, Korinthos, or Argos around the fire camp on the nights before another battle in the next morning. Perhaps, some might say that MbZ has easy work to do because of the country’s rich energy resources. Those who claim something like that are unfamiliar with the structural perplexities and challenges that states must meet in the challenging international system. The absolute majority of the state and non-state actors in the international arena are constantly seeking opportunities that will maximize their power or profit and harm the status of their competitors too. Being rich as a state in the international environment, where resources are limited, and desires are endless, is not a shield against aggression but a call of the predatory instincts of those states, or non-state entities, who endorse chaos and act like destabilizing elements. A state with the energy resources of the UAE, in a region where revisionism and sectarianism are regarded as common practice by predatory states such as Iran, or terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, the Muslim Brotherhood, Hezbollah, or the Houthis, is a daily target. Thus, being the leader of such a state requires high skills and qualities. However, MbZ goes even further than that. Instead of just making the UAE a strong fortress-state of the Gulf is turning the country into a global protagonist in sciences and new technologies. Instead of rallying the people round him by stressing the perils surrounding them, he is liberalizing the institutional and societal processes, making the UAE a champion of religious tolerance, smart diplomacy, and technological innovations. Nevertheless, the most striking characteristic of MbZ’s smart leadership can be found in the fact that he is fully aware that the process of transforming the UAE from a regional energy actor to an international protagonist is a daily struggle that demands the best of him and of the people that surround him. The federal government and the people in all the key positions of the state’s administration are comprised of impressive CVs, proven skills of efficiency, and patriotism in its purest, non-chauvinistic form. All these highly talented Emirati women and men had been selected by MbZ, whose smart leadership represents one of the main pillars of success for the state. Sheikh Hamdan is the other side of the same smart coin. He inspires the support of the people through his image in social media in a profoundly deep and constructive way. Studying his public appearances and social media accounts closely, one can find a political figure who primarily functions as a link between the past and the present of the country, on the one hand, with a clear reference to the country’s future, on the other. In addition, his extrovert approach promotes the image of the UAE abroad, too, against stereotypes and concealed campaigns of disinformation against the state in general. Fazza has found an original way to make himself fully noticeable in the domestic political scene of the state, becoming the main Emirati soft power source in the international sphere. Such a decision, as well as the way that this decision is being implemented in social media, fully reveals an alternative mode of Smart Leadership today, which Sheikh Hamdan serves with a unique style and unprecedented success too.

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Smart States Theory creates new opportunities for every state that can and is willing to follow this path. The UAE, for example, as the fifth and the sixth chapters argued, promotes a positive foreign policy agenda. At the same time, it also appears on the international scene as one of the strongest bastions of religious tolerance in the Muslim world. This positive role in the international scene has been revealed many times during times of crisis, such as the most recent outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. It derives from the state’s leadership’s deep understanding of the dynamics of international interdependence and the importance of domestic stability in international peace and security. Unlike some striking cases of provocative attitude, where trouble-maker states try their hardest to jeopardize international peace and security to serve their revisionist agendas, the UAE, since the early days of its presence, has been exercising a role of a positive pole in the international scene. In the beginning, this positive role was mainly concentrated on supporting financially other Arab states in times of distress; however, after the arrival of MbZ, this role adopted a global range and nowadays refers not only to humanitarian or financial aid toward states that are facing tremendous difficulties to face an internal crisis effectively but also in decisive diplomatic moves in the regional and international arena that enhance not only regional and international peace and security but also the Emirati national interest too. The signing of the Abraham Accords; the humanitarian aid to Syria, Yemen, India, Lebanon, and Libya; and the active military involvement under the auspices of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in Kosovo and Yemen are some of the paradigms that fully underline the positive role that the UAE holds in the international affairs of the twenty-first century. This does not mean the UAE is not acting as a normal state, seeking to protect and expand its national interests first. The smart approach, yet, in this entirely realistic concept that is being dictated by the necessities of survival in the volatile international environment, has mainly to do that the UAE strengthening its status as an element of positivism that is ready to offer support and solutions to the others as a firm step toward the stabilization of an uncertain condition or the successful management of a crisis. As MbZ said, among other issues, on July 13, 2022, in his first national broadcast after he was appointed President of the state by the Federal Supreme Council, “We will continue to offer a helping hand to all societies, regardless of race, color, and religion. We support all countries who share our values of peace and cooperation to ensure prosperity.”2 Today, the UAE is an international champion of religious tolerance, and the Emirati society enjoys an open, liberal, and at the same time fully secure societal environment. This promotes the international image of the state as a unique example of the Muslim world. At the same time, it also influences other pivotal Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, to follow the Emirati example. The state has to take bolder steps in issues related to identity choices and, in particular, the rights of the  Ahmed Zubina, ‘UAE President Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed addresses the nation, outlines the country’s future ambitions’, Gulf Business, July 13, 2022 https://gulfbusiness.com/ uae-president-sheikh-mohamed-bin-zayed-addresses-the-nation-outlining-the-nations-future-­ ambitions/. 2

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LGBTQ community. Nevertheless, as the UAE history shows, the state progresses rapidly in making decisive steps toward its next evolutionary phase; thus, I am convinced that the UAE will be the first Arab state to open the chapter on the right of free choice over sexuality for Emiratis and expatriates. Every Smart State attracts many challenges, especially in a complex region like the Gulf. As discussed in the seventh chapter, the UAE is facing various challenges both at a domestic and an international level. Challenges that will define not just the future of the state but, in some cases, its very existence too. However, the choices that will be made to meet these challenges will be the actual falsification test regarding this book’s same topic: the relevance of the UAE with the Smart States Theory. To conclude, the answer must be whether or not the UAE as a Smart State is infallible. The question is purely rhetorical since being Smart does not mean someone is always successful with zero losses overall. A Smart State scrutinizes its mistakes thoroughly to avoid repeating those in the future while constantly modernizing its civic structure and institutional effectiveness to keep up with the socio-political and technological advancements the time brings. It is not feasible as a state to commit no mistakes domestically or internationally since interstate antagonism is constant and societal issues extremely complex. However, what differentiates a Smart State from a naïve one is that while the second awaits the predicaments to be resolved with the Deus ex-Machina’s intervention or simply by ignoring those disregarding public opinion and collective I.Q, the first never stops to find ways to do things better, faster, and with the less cost when this is feasible. That being so, what are the main mistakes that the UAE is making as a Smart State? I find the Grand Strategy choice of being a bridge in the region for the Great Powers to be a fallacy, especially since the international system gradually enters a new form of bipolarity. In particular, as I argued in the seventh chapter, the UAE can only safeguard its status and national interests by being by the side of the USA and in the core of the Western world for reasons that have to do with the very character of the state and the political ethics that penetrate its internal operation. Regarding the internal front, the process of Emiratization must be further systematized. The new generation of the UAE has great qualities; however, many still follow a career either in the Army or in the Police instead of pursuing a career in science, academia, or the private sector. Nevertheless, like other Smart States, e.g., the USA, Israel, Norway, or Singapore, the UAE shows that studying the wrong steps is making and can change the route of things within a spectacularly short time. Being Smart is also a recognition of your weaknesses and making a realistic plan to change these into your strengths. Since 1971 the UAE has proven that it has the political capacity and the institutional effectiveness to improve things instead of merely being a Bystander, like so many other states in the alleys history’s evolution that are choosing to sleepwalk until them being over the cliff. I had decided to take a long walk by the Corniche. Early Sunday morning, I have a flight to catch back to Athens in a few hours. On my left hand, the skyscrapers of downtown, and on my right, the turquoise waters of the Arab Gulf. Since it is that early in the morning, the traffic is still low, and the sun is not as harsh as it will be

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in a few hours. Few people are running on the promenade due to the rising heat; however, this place is popular with joggers in winter, while some are cycling or skateboarding. If you pay attention, you can hear various languages passing by you. Some of them are easy to understand their origin, and some are not. But they all coexist peacefully in a cosmopolitan mosaic at the end of the Arabian Peninsula. When I first visited the country, I was impressed that I saw only smiling faces around me. I was trying to understand what was the source of this happiness. Now, I can fully understand. It is the prospect that makes people optimistic. The belief that the future will be even better than the bright present. Who can genuinely object to that? The UAE managed to maintain its composure during the COVID-19 pandemic, with one of the lowest death rates globally. It also succeeded in preserving its economy and societal unity during the financial distress the war in Ukraine caused for the rest of the world. People here have the opportunity to smile because they have the luxury of dreaming of better days. Happiness and talent are the two main ingredients that Smart states are made of. I have to return to my hotel. The rising humidity and the intense sun remind even me, an Eastern Mediterranean born and bred, how hard life was a few decades earlier in this part of the world and how proud the Emiratis nowadays are for their efforts and the works of their forefathers transforming the desert into a land of prosperity, order, and unity. I have reached Qasr Al Hosn. This is where the Bani Yas tribe, under the leadership of Sheikh Shakhbut bin Dhiyab bin Isa al Nahyan, began to reside in 1761—a life covered in sand dust, full of hardships and deprivations, even of drinking water. And here I am, 262 years after this first move of the Bani Yas tribe from the Liwa Oasis, at the northern edge of the Rub al Khali [the well-known Empty Quarter, which is the world’s largest uninterrupted desert] to the island of Abu Dhabi, watching a contemporary metropolis to be confidently and constantly developing, sometimes in a frenzied rhythm but steadily embracing its past and welcoming the future. Whoever thinks that this process occurred only because of oil simply is failing to hear the heart and understand the mind of this nation; a combination of the lyricism of a Nabati poem, the comradeship of an Ayyalah dance, a night walk in the desert with friends and family, and a self-controlled sense of pride when a collective success is achieved. After all, a Smart nation is in close contact with its roots while dreaming high to achieve success, prosperity, and happiness by investing in the future. The beginning of the noon prayer, the Salat Al Zuhr, echoes from the nearby mosque of Jafaar bin Ali Talib. It is time to return to my hotel, pick up my luggage, and head to the Airport. I enter my car, and as I glance at my rearview mirror, I can see the images of Corniche unfolding behind me. For some reason that only Freud would have been able to explain, I remember one of the many brilliant quotes of Anthony Bourdain from “Roadrunner,” “Travel isn’t always pretty. You go away. You learn. You get scarred marked, changed in the process. It even breaks your heart.” I smile for a reason. Bourdain’s educated perspicuity always sounds like a smart call to my unconsciousness…

Index

A Abraham Accords, 92, 103–110, 115, 128, 135, 189, 198 Abrahamic Family House, 138 Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 106 Abu Dhabi, 55, 79, 102, 128, 146 Aegean Sea, 11, 18 Afghanistan (Mujahideen), 2, 3, 11, 20 Africa, 13 Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, 66 Ahmed bin Rashid Al Mualla, 67 Ajman, 55, 66, 67, 161 Al Ain / Buraimi, 57 Al Bu Falah, 57 Al Bu Falasah, 57 Alexander the Great, 39 Algeria, 15, 28, 117 Al Qaeda, 11 Al Islah, 89, 90, 151 Arab Gulf, 16 Arab Spring, 11 Ardern, J., 45 Athens, 11 B Banana War, 8 Bani Yas, 56, 57, 65, 187, 200 Bashar Al-Assad, 117, 118 Bedouin, 58, 60, 65, 73, 81, 95, 96, 107, 122, 136, 160, 184, 186

Bahrain, 54, 56, 58, 66–68, 102, 106, 131, 187 Bashar Al Assad, 117, 118 Beijing, 2 Berlin, 14 Biden, J., 107, 115, 171, 174 Bipolar system, 26, 27, 124, 163, 166, 174, 176–178, 184–186 Black Swan, 16 Blanche DuBois (syndrome), 27–30 BREXIT, 3 Britain, 10, 13, 15, 18 Bulgaria, 14, 16 C Chamberlain, D., 77, 78 China, 4, 5, 10, 11, 14, 16, 17, 29, 37, 44, 119–123, 133, 165, 171–180, 184–186 Clinton, H., 106, 116 Cogito, ergo sum, 22 Corinth, 16 COVID-19, 16 D Democratic Peace Theory, 3 Deus ex-Machina, 5, 17 Dubai, 55, 57, 58, 60, 65–68, 72, 74, 76, 83, 94, 96, 105, 109, 110, 115, 121, 128, 135, 144, 147–149, 155, 159–163, 187, 188, 190

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 S. N. Litsas, Smart Instead of Small in International Relations Theory, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-44637-5

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202 E East India Company, 52, 54 Egypt, 6, 13, 35, 52, 53, 57, 63, 76, 88, 102–108, 117, 168, 169, 178, 181 European Union, 3, 14, 17 F Falsification method, 3 Fatima bint Mubarak Al Ketbi, 87 France, 30, 31, 33, 37, 40, 42, 69, 70, 114, 129, 130, 135, 163, 177 Fujairah, 66, 67, 156 G Gazprom, 28, 117 Germany, 14, 15 Greater Tunbs, 68, 72 Great Powers, 2, 4, 11–17 Greece, 16–19 Gulf Cooperation Council, 102 H Hamdan bin Mohammed bin Rashid al Maktoum (HbM), 76, 84 Hard power, 11 Hezbollah, 4 Homo Homini Lupus, 22, 75 Houthis, 146, 190, 197 Hussein bin Ali al-Hashimi, 16 I India, 16, 35, 52–54, 56, 58, 63, 116, 124, 125, 133, 148, 155, 163, 166–168, 175, 179, 188, 198 International Monetary Fund (IMF), 13, 135, 148, 149 Iran, 11, 14, 40, 54, 60, 66, 68–70, 72, 74, 90, 103, 105, 107, 108, 111, 114, 116, 119, 131, 133, 142, 145, 146, 173, 177, 185–191 Iraq, 2, 3, 56, 58, 60, 102, 105, 114, 117, 131, 134, 165 Islamic State (ISIS), 11, 25, 88, 114, 121, 129, 142, 197 Israel, 29, 35, 36, 92, 103–110, 124, 128, 129, 135, 177, 185, 190, 199

Index J Japan, 10, 26, 35, 36, 63, 131, 132, 163, 171, 173, 185 Jebel Ali Port, 121, 147 Jefferson, T., 32 Jinping, X., 119, 172, 174 Jordan, 108, 111, 112 K Khaled bin Mohamed Al Nahyan, 195 Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, 67, 68 Khalifa bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 87 Kuwait, 102, 105, 114, 158, 188 L Leadership, 10, 15, 16, 20 Lebanon, 4 Lesser Tunbs, 68, 69, 72, 187, 189 Libya, 33, 53, 102, 114, 117, 169, 198 Luxembourg, 13 M Macron, E., 30, 90 Majlis, 85, 86, 122, 124, 148, 152, 157, 184, 194 Mao Zedong, 38 Mariam bint Mohammed Saeed Hareb Almheiri, 152, 156 Melos, 11, 28 Mitsotakis, K., 47, 102 Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MbS), 40, 41, 75–97, 125 Mohammed bin Hamad Al Sharqi, 67 Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, 65, 69, 87, 94, 135 Mohammed bin Salman al Saud, 108 Moscow, 2 Mossad, 36, 104, 105 Multipolar system, 122 Munich Agreement, 25 Muslim Brotherhood, 11, 102, 105, 106, 117 N Nabati poetry, 95, 96, 136, 200 NATO, 9, 11, 17, 103, 117, 164, 173, 176–178, 185, 189 Nahayan Mabarak al-Nahayan, 138

Index Nigeria, 13, 16, 17 Norway, 10, 13 O Obama, B., 34, 88, 107, 108, 115, 118, 139, 173 October Revolution, 26 Oman, 57, 60, 64, 69, 102, 103, 140, 172 Orban, V., 40 Ottoman Empire, 14, 15 P Pakistan, 63, 116, 174, 177 Peace of Westphalia, 6 Peloponnesian War, 11, 16, 101 Putin, V., 29, 117, 168, 170, 171, 175 Q QAnon, 34, 142 Qatar, 56, 58, 66, 67, 90, 102, 140 R Ras al Khaimah, 54, 55, 57, 66, 67, 71, 72, 74, 89, 155, 156, 163, 187 Rashid bin Humaid Al Nuaimi, 67 Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum, 65, 67, 68 Rational Choice Theory, 41 Red Army, 20 Rentier state, 82 Riyad, 69, 108, 119, 146 Rome, 2, 12, 28, 35, 161, 164, 170, 194 Russia, 4, 11, 14, 16, 17 S Saakashvili, M., 39 Saqr bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, 72 Saudi Arabia, 57, 64, 68, 69, 102, 103, 108, 111, 119, 131, 140, 156, 179, 189, 198 Security Dilemma, 2, 110 Sharia Law, 137, 139 Sharjah, 54, 55, 57, 58, 66–68, 72, 87, 115, 155, 159, 161, 162, 187, 196 Shakhbut bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 58, 86 Sharp power, 18 Shia, 66, 108, 131, 137, 142, 174, 185, 187, 188, 190, 191 Singapore, 16 Small States Theory, 1–20

203 Smart Power, 20 Soft power, 18 Soviet Union (USSR), 2, 11, 12 Sparta, 11 Suez Crisis, 30, 52, 177 Sultan bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, 69 Sunni, 68, 73, 118, 142, 178, 181, 184, 187, 188, 190, 196 Syria, 16, 30, 102, 111, 114, 118, 131, 169, 198 T Tahnoon bin Zayed Al Nahyan, 189 Taliban, 11 Thucydides (self-help), 28 Trucial Coast, 51, 53, 55–57, 60–64, 66, 68–74, 195 Trucial States, 52–58, 62–70, 72, 74, 79, 86, 147, 148, 188, 194 Trucial Oman Scouts, 60 Trump, D., 34, 41, 106, 108, 114, 115, 174 Turkey (Turkish Army), 19 U Ukraine, 16, 17 Umm al Quwain, 55, 66, 67, 161 United Arab Emirartes (UAE), 16, 40, 67–74, 82–92, 96, 99–126, 128, 129, 134–144, 146, 149–163, 168, 172, 178–186, 188–192 United States of America (USA), 14 W Warsaw Pact, 11 Washington, 2, 11, 14 White House, 3, 13 Wilson, H., 53 Women in the UAE, 111 Y Yemen, 16, 17, 52, 64, 117, 121, 131, 146, 160, 190, 191, 198 Yousef al-Otaiba, 105 Z Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, 51, 58, 67, 68, 72, 76 Zelensky, V., 39