Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World: The Case of Climate Negotiation (Contributions to International Relations) 9811697396, 9789811697395

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Contributions to International Relations

M. N. I. Sorkar

Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World The Case of Climate Negotiation

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations and related fields.

More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/16658

M. N. I. Sorkar

Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World The Case of Climate Negotiation

M. N. I. Sorkar Fudan University Shanghai, China

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-981-16-9739-5 ISBN 978-981-16-9740-1 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

The inspiration for all the works of my life, including this book, is the memory of my late father, who fought throughout his life for justice, equality, morality, and righteousness. This work is dedicated to his memory.

Preface

Anarchy among the States is hyped in International Relations literature as the cardinal problem that inhibits great powers from cooperating. It is identified as the fundamental stumbling block to develop rules-based order. This work explains how this assertion has been becoming increasingly meritless over the last few decades and how the institutional imperatives developed by the comity of the States serve as an underlying, somewhat abstract, but effective tool that disperses the perils of anarchy. There is a hierarchy to enforce law and orders for the citizens within the States, but there is no such order among the States, so they live in anarchy, most of the positivist theories argue. However, in practice, we find that the States follow, actually are bound to follow, certain norms in formulating their strategies and articulating their actions. Moreover, if anarchy is the problem for all the perils, the responsibility of the peace-loving people becomes finding a solution to this problem. As a student of International Relations (IR) as well as a practitioner, this line of thought stirred my mental faculty for the last one decade. Underscoring anarchy, the positivists constantly remind us that there is no hope for a durable peace among the States across time and space. The constructivists, on the contrary, offer some hope by claiming that there is no specific meaning of anarchy; we can make anything—garden of peace or ruins of hell—out of it depending on the culture we develop. This work brings about a new angle by shedding lights on the normative imperatives of the comity of the States that confine them to behave within its contour by diluting the color and vices of anarchy and by weaving underlying compelling set of rules. This, in turn, is bound to facilitate progressive betterment of the human society. The holistic theoretical proposition, a brainchild of the author’s long thoughts, founded on the above ontology, is the core of the intellectual contribution of this book. The plausibility of the proposition is probed through empirical studies on some major issues of the two decades of climate negotiations that culminated in the Paris Climate Agreement. For the case studies on climate negotiations, this work has applied the concept of framing, which is a widely used tool in media and communications research but has rarely been applied in the domain of international negotiation. It has extrapolated the concept from those domains and applying the tools of the vii

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concept has developed historic maps as to how the issues were framed up in the negotiation table and explored the processes of their evolution. The evidences from this were used in the second step of the research quest as to why only certain crucially contested frames succeeded while others did not. In this second step, the holistic theoretical proposition served as an invaluable tool in discerning a comprehensive answer to the question. Data from the coverage of the negotiations, reports of the negotiations prepared by the UNFCCC, statements of the parties in the plenary and other forums, etc., were used to answer the first part of the question, while data from the World Bank, Eurostat, and other world-wide-wave sources were used to answer the second part. Content Analysis and Process Tracing methods were applied for the first part, while conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter were tested in the second part, and consistency of the findings was checked by applying Mill’s logic of difference. I would like to express here my profound gratitude to professor Pan Zhongqi and Professor Gustaaf Geeraerts of the Fudan University in Shanghai for their invaluable guidance in developing my ideas with regard to the theoretical proposition. Professor Michael Brzoska of Hamburg University in Germany, Professor Klaus Segbers of the Freie Universitaet, Berlin, also should be remembered here as they have nurtured my thoughts in this regard. On climate negotiations, I remain indebted to Dr. Saleemul Huq of the International Centre for Climate Change and Development and Professor Bo Yan of Fudan University for kindling and directing my thoughts and works. Associate Professor Zuo Cai and Professor Jejin Zhu of Fudan University, Dr. Julian Junk and Dr. Stefan Engert of the Freie Universitaet taught and inspired me in terms of doing scientific research. A number of papers were presented at international conferences, and some papers have been published incorporating some part of this monograph. I remain immensely grateful to the anonymous reviewers of the papers and comments of the scholars during the conferences, which helped me to upgrade the works. I express my gratitude to many of my colleagues and friends who have inspired me to publish this book. Finally, my wife and daughters have sacrificed a lot as I had to spend time on my works and had to stay away from them. My wife has helped me in cross-checking the references and the acronyms. Without their motivation, I would not be able to complete this work, and they deserve a special mention here. Shanghai, China

M. N. I. Sorkar

Disclaimer

This monograph is an outcome of the author’s research during his Ph.D. study. He endeavored to develop an objective, purely academic and scientific analysis without any bias or affection for any State, society, or people. It contains only the works he has done as part of his Ph.D. dissertation and thoughts he upheld during that period of his study. It does not have any relation with his profession, his government, his subsequent beliefs, or his engagements.

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Contents

1 Power and Issue Framing in the Context of Climate Negotiations . . . 1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 The Role of Power in Climate Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Concept of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Organization of the Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Confines of Power in the Contemporary World: Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 The Normative Imperatives and the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Narrowing Down the Proposition for an Empirical Study . . . . . . . . . 2.3 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition vis-à-vis the Major Theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 The Prominent Theories of Realism vis-à-vis Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Classical Realism and Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Neorealism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4 The False Premise of Offensive Realism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.5 Robert Gilpin’s Realist Conjecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6 Liberal Tradition vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7 Neo-Liberalism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.8 Marxism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.9 Constructivism, a Holistic Paradigm Yet Not Complete . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.10 Some More Contemporary and Innovative Concepts . . . . .

1 1 4 7 7 8 11 11 28 31 32 32 36 41 43 43 45 48 49 52

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2.4 Measuring Power of the Nations: Further Review and Comparison with the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . 2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 The Analytical Framework of the Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 The Concept of Framing and Its Prospect to Analyze Climate Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 The Analytical Frameworks of the Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Data and Method for the First Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Process Tracing as a Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.4 The Method Adopted in This Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Data and Method for the Second Hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Coalitions in the Climate Negotiation Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.6 Possible Alternative of the Framing Concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 64 66 71 71 76 78 78 79 79 81 82 84 85 86

4 Framing Waves of the Issues Related to Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.2.1 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.2.2 Detailed Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104 4.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 5 Framing Waves of the Adaptation Funding-Related Issues . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Historical Mapping of the Evolution of the Issues . . . . . . . . 5.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 An Evaluation of the Outcomes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Institution Building in the Contemporary World: The Case of the Funding Mechanism and Policies in UNFCCC Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Evolution of the Funding Mechanism and Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 Contest on the Status of the GEF and Release of Fund from It . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.2 Generation of New Funds and Policies with Regard to Them . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.3 First Major Shift in Creating New Institute . . . . . . . . . . . . .

109 109 110 111 123 125 126 127

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6.2.4

Building New Institution in Line with the Normative Imperatives and Power of the Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2.5 The Issue of Parity on Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Why Only Certain Normative Imperatives Emerge: Analysis Through the Prism of the Holistic Theoretical Proposition . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition in Unraveling the Crucial Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition in Unraveling the Crucial Puzzles of the Particular Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Issues Related to Mitigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Issues Related to Funding Mechanism and Policies . . . . . . 7.3.3 Issues Related to Funding Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Consistency Check by Applying Mill’s Method of Difference . . . . . 7.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

139 143 144 146 147 149 149 152 162 162 163 165 167 170 171

8 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 Works Cited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178

About the Author

Dr. M. N. I. Sorkar is by profession a career diplomat. He has a Master of Arts (MA) degree in International Relations from the Freie Universitaet in Berlin, a postgraduate diploma in Public Administration from l’Ecole Nationale d’Administration (l’ENA) of France, and a Ph.D. degree in the field of International Politics from the Fudan University in Shanghai. He has extensively traveled to over fifty countries in the World. Dr. Sorkar has attended several international negotiations and engaged in bilateral negotiations with several countries. He has published several articles in international journals and presented several academic papers at international conferences. His areas of interests are international relations theories, international negotiation, renewable energy and development, and the political economy of the less developed countries.

xv

Acronyms

AF AFB AOSIS ASEM AWG AWG-LCA BAP BASIC BAU BC CAN CARICOM CBDR CBIT CDM CER CIA CIF CINC CIS CNP COP COW CVF DAP/DP DNA EIG ENB EU FDI G77

Adaptation Fund Adaptation Fund Board Association of Small Island States Asia Europe Meeting Ad Hoc Working Group AWG on Long-Term Cooperative Action Bali Action Plan Brazil, South Africa, India, China Business as Usual Before Christ Climate Action Network Caribbean Community and Common Market Common But Differentiated Responsibility Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency Clean Development Mechanism Certified Emission Reduction Central Intelligence Agency Climate Investment Funds Composite Indicator of National Capability Commonwealth of Independent States Comprehensive National Power Conference of the Parties Correlates of War Climate Vulnerable Forum Durban Platform for Enhanced Action Deoxyribonucleic Acid Environmental Integrity Group Earth Negotiation Bulletin European Union Foreign Direct Investment Group of 77 xvii

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GCF GDP GEF GHG GIF GNI GNP HTP ICC ICT IISD IMF INDCs IO IPCC IPR IR IV JUSSCAANZ KP LDC LDCF LMDC LTF MDG MOI MOP MRV NAMA NAP NAPA NATO NC NGO NSI ODA OR PLA PRC RAF SCCF SIDS TAN UK

Acronyms

Green Climate Fund Gross Domestic Product Global Environment Facility Green House Gas Global Investment Fund Gross National Income Gross National Product Holistic Theoretical Proposition International Criminal Court Information and Communication Technology International Institute for Sustainable Development International Monetary Fund Intended Nationally Determined Contributions International Organization Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Intellectual Property Rights International Relations Independent Variable Japan, USA, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, Norway and New Zealand Kyoto Protocol Least Developed Countries LDC Fund Like Minded Developing Countries Long Term Finance Millennium Development Goals Means of Implementation Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions National Adaptation Plan National Adaptation Plan of Action North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Communication Non-Governmental Organization National Security Index (Indian) Official Development Assistance Offensive Realism Peoples’ Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Resource Allocation Framework Special Climate Change Fund Small Island Developing States Transnational Advocacy Network United Kingdom

Acronyms

UMBRELLA

UN UNDP UNEP UNGA UNNFCCC US/USA USD USSR WB WTO WWII

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A Loose Coalition of Non-EU Developed Countries, Usually Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, The Russian Federation, Ukraine and the US United Nations United Nations Development Programme United Nations Environment Programme United Nations General Assembly United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change United States of America United States Dollar Union of Russian Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union) World Bank World Trade Organization World War Two

Chapter 1

Power and Issue Framing in the Context of Climate Negotiations

1.1 Introduction In the global village today, the political issues that concern preserving the collective commons of and developing public goods for the humanity at large are increasing in number. Given the immense military deterrence capabilities of the major States, their contemporary social contracts, and flow of information, solutions to these problems have mostly been drawn up through complex multilateral negotiation processes. How do issues concerning global collective commons framed up at the actual negotiation table, how do they evolve, and why do only certain frames succeed? The Paris Climate Agreement is an ideal and comparatively recent case in hand to explore these puzzles in the context of the contemporary world. The same is the thirst of this work. The cardinal objective of this work is to develop a structured understanding regarding why the actors act in a certain way with regard to such issues and, most importantly, to detect a theoretical clue as to why certain outcomes appear but not others. The two decades of climate negotiation, albeit thought to have failed to yield expected outcomes to save the mother earth, has witnessed quite remarkable achievements in terms of normative and institutional transformation vis-à-vis this short span of time. In the initial stages, the developing countries mainly focused on financial assistance and technology transfer from the developed ones, refusing even to discuss mitigating their GHG (Green House Gas) emissions, but finally, the Paris Agreement developed innovative mechanisms according to which all parties are required to contribute toward mitigation actions. The issue of adaptation was largely absent during the initial stages, but the final Paris Agreement’s texts attached equal importance to adaptation and mitigation. The developed countries, in the initial stages, exhibited utmost rigidity in favor of retaining permanent status for the traditional operating entity of the financial mechanism, i.e., the Global Environment Facility

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_1

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(GEF) but, ultimately, one premier new operating entity, i.e., the Green Climate Fund (GCF), evolved as the most vital one. The above developments are significant as they carry and reflect the current stature and nature of the power of the States that determine the effective outcomes. The existing theoretical understanding was found insufficient to grasp these developments comprehensively and they do not bear the reality of the contemporary world. The holistic theoretical proposition (HTP) presented in the next chapter evolved from this backdrop. The theoretical proposition is the intellectual foundation of the work. It is built upon extensive review of the International Relations (IR) theories of the major paradigms. In order to escape from vast volume of literature and discourses on IR theories, the focus of the theoretical proposition is narrowed down to the issue of power of the actors in the contemporary World. The journey was sailed through developing the theoretical proposition which is later examined by applying the evidences from the outcomes of three separate, but similar empirical studies conducted on three prominent issues of the climate negotiations, namely mitigation, the evolution of the funding policy/mechanism, and funding for adaptation. The concept of framing1 was used to illustrate the waves of generation of the frames, their life cycle, and historical mapping toward their evolution pathway with regard to these issues during the two decades of the climate negotiations that culminated into the Paris Agreement, through which they have acquired their current institutional commands. At the end, the theoretical proposition and insights and outcomes from the empirical studies were juxtaposed for a comprehensive understanding as to how the issues were framed up and why only certain crucially contested frames prevailed while others did not. The abovementioned approach helps in explaining how and why certain outcomes emerge from a complex global negotiation process concerning global collective commons in the contemporary world. The available literature in this regard was found scant and this study offers a distinct overture to conduct similar quests toward a holistic understanding. The theoretical proposition first outlines the confines of State power in the contemporary world delimited by the dictates of normative imperatives.2 The instrumentality of power is not only determined by the ingredients of it but is also structurally dependent on the global normative imperatives at a given point in time. It shows how, power, that determines the outcome of an international political process today, is a combined whole of material and normative factors. Because of the apocalyptic scale of deterrence and national and global public sentiment, the military might have become impotent to determine the outcomes particularly from non-security related domains. The power of the States has also become issue specific as there is no definitive hierarchy among the issues and as development of the independent issues 1

As elaborated later, framing is an effort selectively to increase the salience of an actor’s viewpoints about an issue. It is a purposeful act by the actors to present the world that fits their logic and mental schemata in order to achieve their desired goals. 2 The term “normative imperatives” signifies the tangible and intangible, formal or informal norms or institutions that the States in the milieu of their society are dictated to follow in their interactions and strategies. It is further elaborated in Chapter 2.

1.1 Introduction

3

are being mushrooming overwhelmingly. The outcome today is determined by the holistic genre of power, and this new property of power is destined to incrementally facilitate the betterment of the international system toward greater equity and justice, it explains. As all previous scholars concluded too, this work found it difficult to calculate the power of the nations. Power, like love, is easier to feel than to fathom. Power, at the same time, lies at the core of explanatory tools of all of the IR theories. Therefore, although difficult to measure, this is necessary to do so in order to be able to explain the current political courses and to predict future ones, as we cannot simply toss a coin and predict an outcome. What differentiates this work from the existing literature is its claim of a new virtue of power for the contemporary world and the proposition of a new method for measuring the same. Despite its enormous potential, the concept of framing has been, to date, mainly applied to the works in the fields of communication and political psychology and rarely to climate negotiations. The literature review in Chapter 3 elaborates this. The works of this book contain three case studies, each of which uses the concept of framing to illustrate the developments concerning three relatively thin but premier issues of the climate negotiation process, as mentioned above, over a period of two decades. In the way of doing frame analysis for each of them, through a historical mapping of the evolution of the issues and identifying the connecting dots (explained later) of the evolution process, it identifies the evidences to examine the conjectures of the theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter which, in turn, enables us to understand why only some crucially contested frames gained traction while others did not. Another prime objective of this work is to unravel why the outcomes appeared in the form they are found in the final Agreement. The evidences from the frame analysis also serve to detect why the outcomes appeared in a certain way that implicated the relative significances of the issues in the implementation phase. Data from the coverage of the negotiations, reports of the negotiations prepared by the UNFCCC, statements of the parties at the plenary and other forums were used to answer the first part of the question, while data from the World Bank, Eurostat, softpower30.com, and several other world-wide-wave sources were used to answer the second part. Content analysis and process tracing were used for the first part, while conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter and Mill’s logics of difference were used for the second. The literature review finds very few similar works that used the concept of framing in the field of climate negotiations. None of the available literature covers the issues comparable with the timeframes of this work; the third chapter explains this in detail. Moreover, none of the similar works found exploring the puzzle as to why only certain frames prevailed while others did not. The works done under this project has some notable contributions to the framing literature. It has extended the application of the concept to a relatively new arena— a multilateral negotiation on global collective commons. The identification of the connective dots of the evolution of the frames is an exclusive innovation of this work. By applying the notion of “action frames” and “rhetoric frames,” taken from Rein

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and Schön (1996), this work has detected and delineated an attractive phenomenon, i.e., the generative process of the frames that leads to the development of institutional norms. This work would also make a little claim in general IR literature. IR theories have developed over time with their own ontological bases and epistemological approaches. Classical realism emphasized on the nature of human beings and States that constantly strive for power. Their empirical analyses have also turned to this line. The cardinal argument of the neorealism is the culture of anarchy, due to which the distribution of material capability among the major units (States) of the international political system determines the outcomes of international politics. Neo-liberalism sheds light to a host of deterring factors that prohibit unbridled exercise of material power and poises the States into complex interdependence. Starting from a proper recognition of the context the neoliberalists fell into the same illusion as those of the realists which is due to its sole emphasis on material issues. Constructivists subsumed power and interest from the realist camp but asserted that these are embedded with ideas and culture, while the latter being more significant. The ontology of the holistic theoretical proposition largely aligns itself with the constructivist school but presents its distinct conjectures, elaborated in detail in Chapter 2. In the remainder of this chapter, some brief literature on the role of power in climate negotiations and the concept of framing will be captured which would justify the rationale of the study. These are further elaborated in Chapters 2 and 3.

1.2 The Role of Power in Climate Negotiations The role of major powers in influencing the courses of and determining the outcomes from climate negotiations has been underlined by many scholars. The two most prominent COP3 s, Copenhagen and Paris, are spectacular manifestations of major power competition. There was a high expectation in the 15th COP in Copenhagen that it would reach an ambitious outcome, but the major players were so rigidly divided on their stances shaped by their mental schemata, that it fell into the most notorious deadlock. The intractability of the positions of the powerful actors at that time has been underlined by the scholars as the main stumbling bloc. For example, Haas (2008, p. 2) noted that “those with the most political capacity for dealing with climate change are some of the most reluctant ones to make meaningful short-term commitments.” Terhalle and Depledge (2013, p. 575) noted that “the final stages of the Copenhagen negotiations of 2009 essentially descended into a bilateral deal between the US and the China- itself at the helm of the BASIC group- With United Nations (UN) officials and other major players, notably the EU (European Union) and the Russian Federation, left waiting outside the room.” It is argued by the scholars that (e.g. Obergassel et al. 2016, p. 7) the breakthrough in Paris was paved jointly by China and the United States of America (USA) 3

COP- Conference of the Parties.

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in the year 2014 when these two biggest emitters signed a bilateral agreement on climate change.4 The same was reaffirmed when Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Washington in September 2015, just a couple of months before the Paris COP.5 During the semi-structured key-informant interviews conducted under this work, the experts also similarly emphasized that nine-month “secret” negotiations between the two major players played a pivotal role in bringing about a breakthrough for the Paris Agreement.6 The declarations from the highest levels, the Presidents of the two countries, signaled a clear message for their negotiators and many of their pledges in the declarations actually shaped the groundbreaking terms of the Paris Agreement as well as some of the terms found place in the final Agreement. The declaration had generated inspirations for US diplomats to be more serious about finding a way to reach the Agreement (Obergassel et al. 2016, p. 7); no doubt it was so for Chinese diplomats too. Mentioned above are some of the conspicuous examples with regard to the role of power in climate negotiations. These imply that something beyond the formal negotiation had probably played the most crucially important role in deterring the outcomes in the formal negotiation table. This sort of informal negotiation behind the scenes might had mastered compromising positions among the major players, which helped to reach a deal. If it is so, the power of the major actors in making a breakthrough at the crucial point of time is palpable. It is not hard to realize that reaching such deals were not shaped merely by material power; the compulsion created by the global normative imperatives generated by constant framing efforts of different actors must have catalyzed the outcomes. In these considerations, the properties and instrumentality of power of the actors appeared as the prime interest of the initial thoughts of this research. Existing literature focusing on these aspects was studied elaborately and the theoretical proposition presented in the second chapter was developed out of this following scientific pathway. Viola et al. (2012) argue that there are three pillars of power in the contemporary world—military, economic, and climate. They conceptualize superpowers, great powers, middle powers in the realm of climate politics. China, the USA, and the EU are superpowers, whereas India, Brazil, Japan, Russia, and South Korea are great powers, they posit.7 They explain how the domestic factors of these powers 4

The deal was that China would aim for a peak in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030, while the United States will strive to cut total emissions by more than a quarter by 2025 See http://www. ndtv.com/world-news/after-months-of-talks-us-and-china-strike-climate-deal-692239 and ‘US and China strike deal on carbon cuts in push for global climate change pact’, Guardian, 12 Nov. 2014. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/nov/12/china-and-us-make-carbon-pledge, accessed on 27 December 2016. 5 See U.S.-China Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change, White House, 25 September 2015. Available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presid ential-statement-climate-change, accessed on 5 April 2018. 6 Author’s interview. 7 Geeraerts (2011, p. 59) classifies the contemporary global powers as multilayers instead of multipolar ones. He puts the USA and China in the first layer and India, Brazil, South Africa, Russia,

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compelled them to be conservative, moderate conservative, or reformist. They have elaborated how conservative powers are super-powerful in climate issues and argued that a handful of reformist powers cry for stronger actions, but their sounds disappear in the cacophony of the powerful conservatives. They made an insightful elaboration on the issue-specific power structure in the arena of climate politics and graded them accordingly, which appears congruent with the arguments with regard to issuespecific power posited in the holistic theoretical proposition in the second chapter. Their identification of major powers has been taken entirely in selecting the climate powers in Chapter 7 which delves on the roles of the major powers in determining the fates of the crucially contested frames. Appreciating the “Realpolitik” in this arena, Simonis (2002), much ahead of the time others realized it, predicted that an effective environmental institute appeared to be only attainable through horizontal structure and the radical proposals to create a sovereignty-impairing organization for the environment though desirable but was not achievable due to the inevitable prospect of resistance by the developing countries. The parties, specially the developing ones, maintained this line of position all along the way and the Agreement finally concluded in Paris had to be molded in a way that respects the sovereign authority of the States. Brenton (2013) illustrated how the great powers in climate negotiations were polarized in three major camps and emphasized on the fact that in order to break the deadlock, they had to come together, a possibility of which already had started cementing by the initiatives of the major economic forum around that time. By the notion of three major camps he indicated the poles led by three major actors—the EU, China and the USA. An outcome in Paris was evidently possible only when the great powers came forward to break the deadlock. The problem concerning mitigation is almost all about big emitters.8 Over the years, the role of the USA, the former top emitter, has changed. In the early days of climate politics, the USA led the world; in the early 1990s, a co-leadership of USAEU followed; and from 2001 to 2007, the USA withdrew from the entire negotiations (Karlsson et al. 2011, p. 93) then appeared as a stumbling block till 2013; from 2013 onwards, its positive role contributed to concluding the Paris Agreement (Obergassel et al. 2016).9 Ansari et al. (2013, p. 1031), in their historical study on the framing process of different climate issues, found that “when majority of powerful actors adopt a controversial practice, it can lose its contentiousness and become normalized, even staunch opponents shift their stances.” It means that the powerful actors can manipulate even

Japan, and the large EU States in the second tier. His classification falls almost similar to that of Viola et al. (2012), except that the former made the classification in consideration of overall comprehensive power while the latter emphasized on issue-specific power and identified the powers in the domain of climate politics. 8 See the trajectory presented in Graph 4. The top three emitters contribute around 53% of the global emission. 9 When Mr. Trump was the President of the USA, it seems to be reversing; however, this work has mainly focused on the developments up to December 2015 when the Paris Agreement was signed.

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controversial issues, there is no doubt that they can do so easily if their positions are justified, but less powerful actors do not have such a luxury. Scholars including Ansari et al. (2013) did not investigate why such outcomes that align more with the framing efforts of the powerful actors carry more possibilities of success. Answering such a question concerning this kind of complex global process is not an easy task. It requires to employ IR theoretical insights. The second chapter of this book presents a theoretical proposition which is tested through the evidences found from the empirical analysis made in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. The role of major powers in climate politics is further elaborately illustrated in Chapters 2 and 7.

1.3 The Concept of Framing The concept of framing is a widely used tool in media research. The availability of electronic data has been making it more popular and more productive. Multiple software tools are now available to conduct content analysis which is expanding the scope rapidly. However, the concept and the tools have rarely been found used for the UNFCCC10 negotiation process, as elaborated in the next chapter. One of the contributions that this book claims to have made is that it has extrapolated the tools of this concept from the arena of media research and applied the same in a multilateral negotiation setting, presented a model to illustrate the framing process, and developed a historic mapping of the framing process that led to structured qualitative analysis. The details about the concept of framing, existing works, definitions, and analytical framework for this work, are described in the third chapter. Three case studies applying this concept are presented in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. These three empirical studies, though are in separate chapters, are interrelated. The theoretical concept, hypothesis, data, and mode of operationalization, all are identical for all the case studies. The findings from these empirical studies are interwoven and contextualized in Chapter 7 while exploring the core research thirst—why only certain frames acquired traction while others did not.

1.4 Organization of the Chapters This introductory chapter set forth the rationales and significance of the work. It follows the holistic theoretical proposition in Chapter 2. The next chapter focuses on the concepts, definitions, measurement, and pertinent works with regard to framing based on which the empirical studies with regard to how parts of the research question are operationalized in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. It first posits the specific research questions

10

UNFCCC- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

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and then elaborates the overall analytical framework and model that this work applies, thereafter presents the hypotheses, data, and methods. The next three chapters contain the empirical analysis on three prominent issues namely mitigation, funding adaptation, and funding mechanism. The analysis in these chapters delve with how part of the research question. Each of these chapters first uses the analytical tools of the concept of framing to illustrate the development of the frames, and then the analogy of the connective dots is applied to trace the evolution pathways of the frames more systematically. Some specific literature, applicable only to each of these individual case studies, are also contextualized in these chapters. As the framing process, the fates of the frames, and the critical junctures are identified in these chapters, the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter is then applied in the next chapter to find a comprehensive answer to the research question. Following the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition, formulae for measuring the powers of the major actors were presented. Using the data described in the third chapter, several charts and graphs to illustrate the findings were generated. Some specific literature related to it are also contextualized in this chapter. The last chapter makes concluding remarks on the whole work. A faster way to read this book in a shorter period of time could be as follows. It consists of five large chapters—Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, of which the second chapter on the holistic theoretical proposition, is the longest. Reading only Sects. 2.1 and 2.5 on the holistic theoretical proposition would provide a quick understanding of the whole second chapter. In the case of Chapters 4–6, the sections after the introduction are the longest, which map the historical developments of the framing of the issues. These sections serve as the qualitative data for the results presented in the next short sections, entitled “Process tracing of the evolution of the frames.” Reading these short sections alone in each of the case studies would facilitate understanding all of the issues discussed in each of these three chapters. These short sections on all three empirical studies simultaneously summarize those chapters as well as test the assumptions regarding the evolution process of the frames. Finally, Chapter 7 deals with the why question and simultaneously summarizes the findings of the whole work. Reading this chapter alone would also give a glimpse of the whole content of this book. The conclusion section provides a summary of the findings of the whole work. It also clarifies some of the key concerns that may arise in the reader’s mind and outlines the contributions of this study.

Works Cited Ansari, Shahzad, Frank Wijen, and Barbara Gray. 2013. Constructing a climate change logic: An institutional perspective on the “tragedy of the commons”. Organization Science 24 (4): 1014–1040. Brenton, Anthony. 2013. ‘Great powers’ in climate politics. Climate Policy 13 (5): 541–546. Geeraerts, Gustaaf. 2011. China, the EU, and the new multipolarity. European Review 19 (1): 57–67. Haas, Peter M. 2008. Climate change governance after Bali. Global Environmental Politics 8.

Works Cited

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Karlsson, Christer, Charles Parker, Mattias Hjerpe, and Björn-Ola Linnér. 2011. Looking for leaders: Perceptions of climate change leadership among climate change negotiation participants. Global Environmental Politics 11 (1): 93. Obergassel, Wolfgang, Christof Arens, Lukas Hermwille, Nicolas Kreibich, Florian Mersmann, Hermann E. Ott, and Hanna Wang-Helmreich. 2016. Phoenix from the ashes: An analysis of the Paris Agreement to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change–Part II. Environmental Law and Management 28 (1). Rein, Martin, and Donald Schön. 1996. Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice. Knowledge and Policy 9 (1): 85–104. Simonis, Udo E. 2002. Advancing the debate on a world environment organization. Environmentalist 22 (1): 29–42. Terhalle, Maximilian, and Joanna Depledge. 2013. Great-power politics, order transition, and climate governance: Insights from international relations theory. Climate Policy 13 (5): 572–588. Viola, Eduardo, Matias Franchini, and Thaís Lemos Ribeiro. 2012. Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: The role of major powers. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55 (SPE): 9–29.

Chapter 2

The Confines of Power in the Contemporary World: Holistic Theoretical Proposition

2.1 The Normative Imperatives and the Holistic Theoretical Proposition International Relations (IR) theories provide essential tools to study issues related to international politics. Just as chemists use Mendeleev’s periodic table as a tool in their work, IR students use IR theories for a similar purpose. A theory is an intellectual framework through which we select and interpret facts (compare Waltz 1990, p. 22). Without a theory, one will be at loss while doing their research. At the beginning of this chapter, we first posit the holistic theoretical proposition (HTP). It has been founded upon extensive study of related literature which are not captured at the outset, rather, those are simultaneously contrasted and critically reviewed later in this chapter after the HTP is presented. We sail our journey with simple analogies from everyday life and gradually dig deep into the intellectual, ontological, and epistemological debates. IR theories have been classified by scholars into three prominent schools based on their ontology and epistemology (Sect. 2.3 makes detailed discussion on this). They are realism, liberalism, and constructivism. The theories can also be broadly grouped into two—positivist and constructivist. The theories have evolved over the time, building on the prevailing literature.1 The positivist school emphasized on the distribution of material power while the constructivist school emphasized on the distribution of identities. Geeraerts (2013, p. 59) argues that the changes happening in the contemporary world are due to both the distribution of power as well as the distribution of identities.

1

Tang (2010) posits that “international politics has always been an evolutionary system; nonevolutionary approaches will be intrinsically incapable of shedding light on the evolution of the system.” He explains how the grand theories have developed over time and how theories fit for one epoch will be inapplicable in another. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_2

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Robert Keohane (1984) in his “After Hegemony” brought about a revolutionary thought. Hegemonic power has all along the history dominated in generation and operation of global public goods. After the Second World War, with its immense power through the control of the Arab oil, international finance and enormous military might, the USA designed create the global order by forging cooperation with the Western European allies, Japan, and other western countries. The level of leverages the USA enjoyed at that time was overwhelming vis-à-vis all other actors. The world would not see this situation again because it requires a World War which in the current scenerio would entail destruction of all. Therefore, we now live in a reality of “after hegemonic” era. It is an uncharted territory, a situation which has appeared first time in the history of mankind. Keohane (1984) argues that States have learned to live in this after hegemonic era. He argues that it is still power, which will play a pivotal role in determining outcomes from State to State relations, but it will be a different genre of power that will do so. Constructivist Wendt (1999, p. 371) proposes combining power and interest from realism, the content of which is constituted by ideas and culture; these as a whole, can better explain the courses of international politics. This is the most holistic proposition so far. This work endeavors to present a holistic proposition which is complete. The recent offshoots of realism and liberalism, neorealism and neoliberalism respectively, draw most of their analogies from economics. Constructivists emphasize on social dimension of the States. States today have acquired a unit-like personality and endeavor to be socialized in the international milieu, so social attributes are more relevant today. The HTP builds on the inevitable and inescapable context of socialization of the States in today’s world. The States today have no option but to be socialized. There are only a few incidences where States sought to remain un-socialized (isolated) in the past. Japan sought to remain isolated from 1633 to 1853 AD amid the threat from the European colonial powers; China attempted the same for a while following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Countries that are vast in size, like China and the USA, may afford to remain isolated if they wish (even that may prove infeasible in the current intensely interwoven world), but most of the other countries of the world cannot. Interactions of the States are more akin to social life than doing business. Social life covers everything—politics, economics, culture. Economic activities are only a part of the whole. If two persons interact, there is a risk that they may fall into conflict, but there are also ample possibilities that they may develop a friendship. When a person interacts with multiple persons, the fact is that he will develop a friendship with some and adversity with others. In the past, the stronger one exploited the others bluntly. When weaker people tried to appease the stronger ones, the greed of the stronger ones usually tended to swell. Slavery was the ultimate outcome in such societies. When several such people interacted, some became stronger and others weaker. Both the stronger and weaker groups endeavored to forge their own alliances to safeguard their interests, but, usually, the stronger group was more capable of forming efficient alliances. They attempted to perpetuate their dominance. The weaker group tried to

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resist this and forge counterstrategies. Sometimes, through their morals, the weaker ones could surpass the stronger ones too. Immanuel Kant is one of the first scholars who identified the role of national morale that multiplies the strength of the weaker ones to sustain over the stronger ones. These interactions of the people over the centuries have created the norms, rules, regulations, laws under which we live today. These change with the advent of time to comport the reality of the respective epoch. It was possible in the medieval world to enslave people, but today this is impossible. Today, societies have changed. Every society has developed some conventional norms, customs, rules, and regulations. In other words, all societies across the time have developed certain institutions to which the relations of their people are anchored. Usually, States play a pivotal role in managing these for their citizens. In today’s world, the States themselves have acquired a personality of their own, and they live in a society of States where certain normative imperatives or institutions have evolved. The institutions that have evolved for the current epoch are relevant for us and have been at the center of the theoretical proposition presented in this chapter. Today, the relation between and among individuals, a service provider and a service taker, the owner of a private company and its employees, between States and their employees, among States are all required to follow the specific rules of the respective comity. These vary from society to society. The quality of life, equity, dignity, cultural attainment, hospitality, and hostility, all vary according to the level of normative worth that the respective domestic or international societies develop. Thus, in the society of people, or States, the institutions developed by them play vital parts, often intangible, in determining the nature of their engagements. Participation in this society is voluntary for the States but, in reality, it is difficult to evade because of the high cost that this would entail (compare Osiander 2001, p. 283). Individuals cannot live in isolation, nor can States, particularly in today’s globalized world. Realists caution that increased interaction of the States bears the risk of increased conflict. In fact, it is only one side of the whole scenario. Interaction of the people develops values and customs to enhance the quality of their citizen’s engagements. So do the societies of the States. It is a continuous process. The socialization of the States is particularly intense in a real-time world,2 where we live now, brought about by the third and fourth industrial revolutions.3 In the history of humankind, for the first time,4 we all share an intensively intertwined

2

The term is taken from Robinson (1999, p. 309). See the infographic 1 created by Lori Lewis depicting what happens on the internet in a minute for a few top applications. Taken from http:// www.visualcapitalist.com/internet-minute-2018/, accessed on 12 Nov 2021. 3 The First Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize production, while the Second used electric power to create mass production, and the third used electronics and IT to automate production. Now, a Fourth Industrial Revolution is occurring—the digital revolution. This is the most powerful one and is turning the world virtually into a global village, causing profound implications in every sphere of human life. 4 Bull (2002, p. 19) notes that, until the nineteenth century, no system existed that incorporated the world as a whole. The proposition presented in this chapter contends that the world began to be

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destiny, incorporating everyone on the planet. Information and Communication Technology (ICT) generate information that spreads at the speed of an electron. This is making geographic location, insularity, military power, hegemonic dominance, etc., less relevant and complex interdependence, comparative advantage, technological advancement, deterrence capability, influence of norms, ideas, and ideology, etc., increasingly more significant. Issues today quickly switch from the domestic to the international level, and vice versa, engaging a wide diversity of interest groups in the governing process to which policy makers must acclimatize at an ever-increasing speed. As a result, the traditional International Relations (IR) theories are gradually turning to be less potent. The speed of change is perplexing, policy makers often struggle in holding the tempo vis-à-vis the rapidly changing features of international politics.5 Presented below is an infographic that illustrates what happens in a minute in some of the major applications of the internet world today. These are just a small fraction of the total information flow (Infographic 2.1). The world is increasingly becoming inextricably interlinked, the occupied territories during the colonial period have escaped from colonial exploitation, human dignity and rights are at continuous pace of progress, and many of the larger developing countries are rising to prominence. The level of interaction between the people and the States reached today has made the entire world a global village. With the discoveries of the maritime routes and the continents, it was initiated and furthered by the inventions and persistent excellence of aviation technology. It reached a crescendo with the development of ICT technologies. The extent of State socialization that has happened during the last 20 years may be comparable with that which occurred during the preceding 200 years. In such a world, the socialized international system is destined to be directed toward the development of better institutions—this assertion is explained later in this chapter. All of the IR theories have some explanatory power. The theories of the major schools are united by their ontological foundations, though the conjectures of the specific theories vary. One thing is more or less common to all of them—as they were developed in the European and American context, a large portion of the rest of the world remained outside their coverage (Acharya and Buzan 2009). This was less problematic earlier, as the rest of the world beyond those regions remained so profoundly overshadowed by the western powers for the last three to four centuries that it did not matter much. The rapid advancement in the world fostered by the fourth industrial revolution is changing the dynamics fast. A new structure for the international system is evolving with the evaporation of America’s unipolar moment and the looming end of the Pax Americana (Geeraerts 2013, p. 55; Layne 2018, p. 89). In the a place for all after the decolonization following the Second World War and has become purely globalized during the last three to four decades. 5 See also (Tellis 2001, pp. 1–9), who explain in their own way the present momentous transition occurring in the world, which requires understanding the power of the nations through a new lens. They refer to Daniel Bell’s prediction of this, back in 1973, in their ground-breaking study entitled “The coming of the Post-Industrial Society”.

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Infographic 2.1 Internet minute 20216

backdrop of this increasingly intensifying digital revolution, the confines of power amid the contemporary normative imperatives, globalization and the complex interdependence and, above all, the rise of the rest (Zakaria 2008) this chapter develops a theoretical proposition that would be more befitting for the current world. Human beings’ innate impulse is to accept better ideals, and the collective will of the people endowed with continuous perfection of knowledge is bound only to excel the same. The demons can win from time to time, but they will be unable to sustain themselves; history has abundant such examples. Thus, human society continuously evolves toward better norms. Slavery, direct colonization, etc., were not perceived 6

Indebted for this infographic to LoriLewis and OfficallyChadd.

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as such a bad practice when these were the norms; today, these are impossible in overt form.7 Minimum wage and minimum human dignity have been acquired all across the globe, albeit in different degrees. When Europeans were expanding their colonies, the rule was that whoever arrived first had the right to colonize (Xuetong 2011). Today, that norm is no longer valid. Nobody can go to an uncharted area to colonize indigenous people; instead, everyone is required to protect indigenous people. Colonies are released irreversibly, and now most of them are prospering. In front of our eyes, over the last couple of decades, green growth to combat the adverse effect of the climate change has become a glaring example as to how the States living in a comity are bound to abide by the normative imperatives of the time. Despite the fact that the Paris Agreement is not that ambitious and do not oblige the States toward binding commitments for mitigation of GHG, all the countries across the World have been taking action to reduce the emission and adopting policies toward generating energy from renewable sources. Studying the English school, Barry Buzan (1993) comments that, in the current world, the States are no more excluded in the civilizational (Gemeinschaft) line, but instead, there is a hybrid way of inclusion that almost all States have developed by combining the civilizational and functional (Gesellschaft) threads where all States are legally equal sovereign entities. He notes that, during the colonial period, most of the non-European cultures and people were excluded by their un-equal status (it was far worse before the colonial period), but the current world has overcome this, and the cohesion has been furthered by the collapse of the Soviet Union (ibid.). The States do no longer enjoy unbridled liberty to act with their material power to invade, violate the territorial integrity, and subjugate the people of the other States. Moreover, they must behave in a certain manner dictated by the normative imperatives of their societies. Referring to research conducted at the University of Maryland, Zakaria (2008) notes that “wars of all kind have been declining since the mid-1980s and that we are now at the lowest levels of global violence since the 1950s.” Keohane and Nye (1987, p. 726) note that, by the 1980s, the USA was more willing to use force, albeit only against fragile States such as Grenada and Libya. In fact, later, we have seen a tendency for the most materially powerful country, the USA, to enter war with a mid-level materially powerful countries like Iraq, Libya, only after ensuring that their strength is crippled. One of the very practical and obvious reasons is that no country can afford loss of lives of their citizens in today’s world, which has altered the entire foundation of waging war. Keohane and Nye (p. 727) reiterated their assertion that the use of force has become costly for the major States due to the development of four conditions: first, the risk of nuclear escalation; second, resistance by the people; third, the uncertain and possible negative impact on the economy; and fourth, domestic opinion opposed to the human cost. 7

Compare Keohane and Nye (1987, p. 749), who made a similar point and argue that “practices or interests which are accepted in one period become downgraded or even illegitimate in a latter period because of normative evolution.” North (1989, p. 53) points out that the demise of slavery is not merely explicable under an interest group model, i.e., the normative dictate generated at that time was the prime reason for the change.

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Milner (1992, p. 483) posits that, if the cost of using force is high, the States would be bound to find alternative solutions through developing a cooperation mechanism. In contrast to his earlier assertion that distribution of material power determines the relations of the States Waltz (2000, p. 53), at the later stage of his life acknowledged the triviality of military might by recognizing that nuclear countries can neither gain nor lose much in military conflicts with one another. Today, we see that none of the nearly 200 States have met the fate of forceful disappearance since the creation of the UN. This minimal assurance of survival is the most significant factor that facilitates peace of mind for the States, allowing them to engage in other sectors exploring a better life for their citizens instead of preparing to kill or be killed. This settlement of survival issue and the threat of mutual destruction in the case of war among the major States have created an ambiance for the States to relieve themselves from gambling on the military frontline and to divert their focus toward the realistic world of comparative economic advantage, competence, technological skill, intellectual and normative superiority. The jungle rules are attractive to the powerful, there is no animal on Earth that kills its own species except human beings. However, today’s powerful actors are structurally contrived to restrain from military expeditions and live in a society of States that is increasingly contributing to decreasing rate of predation by engendering such normative imperatives. Anarchy has been identified by the positivist scholars as the structural problem due to which the prospect of lasting peace is like a mirage. Within the periphery of the States, they have the monopoly of using force through which, as well as by dint of an arrangement of organized hierarchy, States can maintain internal discipline. Among the States there is no such hierarchy, there is none to do policing, thus States live in anarchy. So, the prospect of peace and cooperation is an illusion, and conflict and destruction are the obvious destiny—the positivist scholars posit. Wendt (1999) argues that anarchy is what States make out of it, i.e., States can make the rules of the jungle or roles of civility out of anarchy. The jungle rules can be compared with the time when the brutal killing of people and conquering other people’s territory, such as Ghengis Khan or Alexander’s conquests, was the norm. Those people who were winning this race were hailed as heroes. Today, the world is different; if one do the same thing now, they would not have been treated by the people of the world as heroes but as murderers, and their actions would be considered as crimes against humanity. In this backdrop, anarchy among the States, that has been at the core of ontological base for the positivist theories, has acquired a profoundly different dimension. There are certain norms, ideals, institutions that the States living within the comity of States are bound to follow—termed here as normative imperatives. These normative imperatives dilute the perils of anarchy and oblige the States to behave in a certain way. The bedrock of the holistic theoretical proposition is that it departs from the conventional ontology on anarchy by positing its own ontology that normative imperatives play an underlying compelling force diluting the color, contour, and vices of anarchy, thus, the dynamics of international politics has taken a structural change.

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Anarchy in the contemporary world is nothing other than what these normative imperatives dictate it to be. Remainder of this section elaborates the above ontological base and presents the proposition founded on that. Before that, it should be clarified what norms, institutions, and normative imperatives refer to, particularly for the theoretical proposition developed in this work. Krasner (1982, p. 186) posits that “norms are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations.” Within the social interactions of the States today, a pattern of behavior has been instituted, which is expected to be followed. Deviation from this has reputation costs for the respective State as well as incur different degrees of punishment (as explained elsewhere in this section). Norms thus can be defined as standards that are perceived as rights and obligations in the social interaction of the States, deviation from which will cost in terms of reputation and/or different degrees of punishment. Norms are not synonymous with morals or ethics. Morals and ethics are individuallevel choices, while norms are systematic-level dictates. A State or statesman may propagate but may opt not to adhere to those moralistic and ethical behavior or may merely pretend to adhere to those. Moreover, if they adhere to those, it may not happen so for altruistic or benevolent motive but to enhance their soft power. On the contrary, normative imperatives form the standard norm of the time and they are systematic-level dictates that compel the States to behave in a certain way. In this work, the term norms and institutions have often been used interchangeably. The study of institutions has always been at the heart of sociological inquires (Tang 2011a). Von Moltke (2001) explains institutions as “social conventions or ‘rules of the game,’ in the sense that marriage is an institution, or property, markets, research, transparency or participation.” Keohane (1988, p. 383) defines institutions as “related complexes of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time.” North (1989, p. 50) argues, “Institutions are rules, enforcement characteristics of rules, and norms of behavior that structure repeated human interaction.” March and Olsen (1983, p. 741) identify them as “frozen decisions” or “history encoded into rules.” Philosopher John Rawls postulates that “rules are pictured as summaries of past decisions arrived at by the direct application of the utilitarian principle to particular case” which allow the observer to predict future behavior (Rawls 1955, p. 19; Keohane 1988, p. 384). Keohane (1988, p. 384) explains that “when we ask as to whether X is institutions, we ask whether we can identify persistent sets of rules that constrain activity, shape expectations, and prescribe rules.” While some rationalist scholars, particularly the neoliberalists, appear to have conceived the institutions and their imperatives they failed to accommodate their implications in their works because their ontology orbits around the rational behavior of the States that create the institutions (read organizations) where the roles of ideas, culture, values, ethics, and ideologies remain out of their purviews. Wendt (1999, p. 185) prefers to define norms as “shared beliefs which may or may not manifest in behavior depending on their strength, but norms can only have effects if they are so manifested.”

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Tang (2011b) made a detailed scholarly account of institutions and institutional change. He posits that institutions are both formal (e.g., constitutions, laws, international regimes) and informal (e.g., norms, taboos, and conventions) social rules, which are an essential embodiment of ideas or codified ideas. For States, such conventions and “rules of the game” create norms that are set by formal laws, customary laws, practices, so on and so forth. They simultaneously constrain as well as enable the agents, the rules of the game, and the constitutive players. In his view, institutional changes are the victory of some ideas over others that solidify into institutions, in the process of the struggle for power to make the rules. In this work, we define institutions as formal and informal social conventions that constrain as well as, at the same time, enable the States to engage in their interactions by generating normative imperatives. Institutions do not necessarily require the physical presence of international organizations, but the existence of organizations facilitates and bolsters their instrumentality. The UN, World Trade Organization (WTO), Conference of the Parties (COP) of the UNFCCC, etc., are some of the examples to this effect. Some basic customary conventions are fundamental and static, while others are gradually evolving. Physical organizations are proliferating with the rapid pace of socialization of the States in the current world. The norms and modus operandi of the engagements of the States are today bounded by the institutions created by the global comity. The global hegemons are constrained by the institutions of the global community like all other States are. The term “normative imperatives” signifies the tangible and intangible, formal or informal norms or institutions that the States in the milieu of their society are dictated to follow in their interactions and strategies. They are constituted and consolidated by the institutions of the societies of the States of the respective epoch. Normative imperatives are not aspirations of the individual States but are systematic-level dictates that they are required to comply with. It is not a choice of their will but a dictate of the culture they live-in in a given point of time. In today’s world, the normative imperatives serve as an underlying structure within which individual States operate their strategies in line with their capabilities. The imperatives are not static, rather dynamically revolving with the continuous evolution of the institutions it reaches at a given point in time as a result of the interactions of the States. The distribution of capabilities across the States is vital in determining the courses, but it is increasingly becoming confined by these institutional imperatives.8 International institutions help those States’ endeavors that adhere to their standards and punish those who breach them. International organizations facilitate this institution-building process by reducing the transaction cost, facilitating reciprocity, creating platforms for iterated interactions, linking issues, and pushing the 8

Cox (1981, cited in Keohane 1988, p. 391) finds the American hegemony in the current world a “coherent conjunction or fit between configuration of material power, a prevalent collective image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the order with certain resemblance of universality.” He seems to have recognized the confluence of material and normative power, but their conception remains myopic only for the American hegemony. We today need to consider how the major players behave in the international milieu and the role of the lesser States in it, which the holistic theoretical proposition offers.

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States toward more honest behavior as the shadow of the future haunts them (Keohane 1984). The process of institution-building is dynamic, continuously evolving, as well as gradually attaining greater inclusiveness. It is no longer the case that only the hegemon or the developed countries dominate the institution-building process. Developing countries are also imparting their share. For example, the non-aligned movement during the Cold War, the five principles of peaceful co-existence of China, the common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) to combat global warming, compliance with the UN norm of non-intervention, and the moral push by the climatevulnerable countries in the climate change negotiations are some of the instances where the developing countries apportioned the lion’s share in the institution-building process. The normative imperatives that the international institutions create are apparently loose and vague, but, in reality, they impose considerable constraints to oblige the States to adhere to the standard norms. A powerful State has some flexibility to play with the standard norms, but a lesser State cannot afford such a luxury. That is why the USA can sometimes disrespect the standard norms, but Iraq cannot afford to do so.9 The global standard norm is profoundly affected by the behavior of the leading State. Yan Xuetong (2011, pp. 242–243) sheds light on how the violation of the standard norms by the preponderantly powerful country, namely the USA, exacerbates the violation by other countries. However, the violation of norms even by the most powerful country does not go entirely unpunished—every single violation costs in terms of reputation. Reputation seriously affects the normative power of a State.10 Repeated violations affect the normative power severely and gradually lead to the downfall of a superpower by decreasing its holistic power.11 After delineating the above ontology of normative imperatives that dictate the States to behave in a certain way, the remainder of this section concentrates on the conception of power, which is termed in this proposition as “holistic power.” Power is defined as the potential to determine the outcome. It is the most instrumental conduit in deterring the outcomes from the interactions of the States. Power is a central topic of most of the IR theories. The specificity of the conception of power in this work is that it is built upon the ontological foundation discussed above, and it presents a holistic conception of power. Morgenthau (1948) defines power by the capacity to control man over man be it through coercion, psychological ties, moral ends, barbaric force, or constitutional safeguards. Power finds justification in nothing, but its own strength and its sole justification is in its aggrandizement. Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 10) posit that “power can be thought as the ability of an actor to get others to do something otherwise would not do.” He further elaborates 9

This comparison relates to the First and Second Gulf Wars, elaborated later in this chapter. Tang (2005) provides some examples of how the concern for reputation implicated the leader’s policymaking. 11 Explanation of the holistic power follows in this chapter. 10

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that power is a “potential ability,” a “potential to affect outcomes,” and “political bargaining is the means of translating potential into effect” (ibid.). We subscribe to these arguments. To be more precise, this work further clarifies the definition of power as “the potential to affect the outcomes emanating from a State’s international interactions.” By the word power, we imply holistic power. Most of the scholarly works only focused on material power or discursive power. By the notion “holistic power” or, simply “power” in rest of this work, we mean the power that has been defined by the holistic theoretical proposition developed in this chapter. As the physical integrity of the States has acquired sanctity under the normative imperatives of the current world, the principal objective of power is to reap maximum benefits from the respective sectors where the States bilaterally or multilaterally engage in. States today are simultaneously interacting in multitudes of sectors at an everincreasing pace fostered by ICT technology. It is no longer possible to attach hierarchical order among different domains. All the domains viz. military, economy, climate, ICT are interlinked with one another. Power of a State in respective domain play a deterring role toward favorable outcomes, military might alone have little to do with this power. The powerful countries today are compelled to establish a consensus in respective arenas through negotiations, where they still can manage to apportion a better part of the cake by leveraging their holistic power. The power of the States that is capable of determining the best outcome has to be comprised of both material and normative power. This holistic genre of power is both pertinent for general interactions of the States as well as for the specific sectors they engage in. A State only having material power and no normative power may find its instrumentality very minimal, may be close to zero. In the same way, only with normative power, it turns to similar output. Both heads and hands are essential for the human being. In the absence of heads, hands would be non-existent, and in the absence of hands, a person may only poorly survive. In the same vein, in the absence of either material power or normative power, the respective actor’s power would become lame. Therefore, it is proposed here to ascribe them roughly equal values. As we define the holistic power, next comes how can we measure it. Holistic theoretical proposition postulated above that normative imperatives define and confine the power of the States and instrumentality of power is conjointly determined both by material power and normative power. Material power and normative power have been further elaborated below. Former CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) Chief Ray Cline is the most cited scholar with regard to calculation of power (Xuetong 2008, p. 142). He contended that the comprehensive power of a State is the product of multiplying hard and soft power, i.e., Power = Hard power × Soft power. Here, in the absence of hard power or soft power, i.e., while either of their values is zero, the comprehensive power of that State turns to zero too and, if the value of either increases, it multiplies the value for the comprehensive power. This proposition is implausible because, even

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if the soft power becomes zero, this does not usually lead a materially powerful State’s comprehensive power to the level of zero and vice versa. For example, the former USSR12 ’s ideological collapse did not turn its comprehensive power to the level of zero, although it was reduced. Materially less powerful countries in the climate negotiation process, the AOSIS, could impart remarkable share in the Paris Agreement thanks to their normative power (Betzold 2010; Betzold et al. 2012). The withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement under President Trump did not render the USA’s climate power to the level of zero as its emissions still remained the second highest on the globe, so was its impact. Therefore, Cline’s proposition is exaggerated and invalid. We have presented an elaborated review of literature on measurement of power in Sect. 2.4 of this chapter. Here, basing on the ontology of the theoretical proposition, we straightforward submit a simple formula that a State’s holistic power is a summation of material power and normative power. The formula is as follows: Power = Material power + Normative power In the above equation, power is the dependent variable that derives its value from its independent variables: material power (IV-1) and normative power (IV-2). It is necessary here to define the variables and determine the indicators to measure them. The calculation of power is an elusive venture, as identified by all the scholars delved with this. It is discussed elaborately later in this chapter. The notion of power can be compared with terms like “love,” “anger,” “envy,” which we can feel the intensity but difficult to fathom. The depth of love or anger can be sensed, the impact of power can be sensed similarly, but these are difficult to measure. Nevertheless, we need to try to measure power because it would be better to have some rough estimation rather than having nothing, particularly when trying to examine some empirical cases. The formula presented above is an outcome primarily of the theoretical proposition developed in this chapter and secondarily of the extensive study of the literature in this regard. Section 2.4 cites some of those most relevant literatures that have tried to develop methods to gauge the power of the States. Waltz (1979, p. 131) suggested six indicators for calculating comprehensive material power, which are: the size of population and territory, resource endowment, economic capability, military strength, political stability, and competence. Waltz (2000, p. 50) later reiterated the same indicators while explaining the rise and fall of great powers. In this work, we try to limit the number of factors as low as possible, but, at the same time, attain as close estimation as possible. After all, the calculation is meant to be only indicative, and the purpose is to determine values which are representative while the same minimizes the complexity as much as possible. In case of material power, we find that the indicators selected by Waltz are vital. The sixth indicator, “competence” is vague and difficult to grasp. We propose that, in the contemporary world, the sixth indicator, “competence,” should be replaced 12

USSR—Union of Russian Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union).

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by three other indicators, viz. climate power,13 ICT and wealth of data, and level of scientific and technological advancement. This makes the number of indicators eight. Thus, the equation for material power appear as follows: Material power = (population + territory + resource endowment + economic capability + military strength + political stability green capability + ICT and data wealth + scientific and technological advancement) The fundamental distinction of the holistic theoretical proposition with that of Waltz’ selection of the indicators is that HTP considers these indicators only roughly a half of the total value, as the variable normative power comport another half. Moreover, the HTP posits that in the contemporary world the concept of issue-specific power, where different indicators are required to be opted for different issues, is more pragmatic. The next section explains it elaborately. Normative power depends on the normative imperatives, but normative power and norms/institutions are not the same. We have defined norms, institutions, and normative power earlier. A State’s normative power implies the likelihood of acquiring the support of other states when a specific issue is at stake. Normative power and soft power have many similarities, but they are not the same. Soft power is only a vital variable of normative power. In defining soft power, Joseph Nye (2004) posits that “it is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payment.” In another article, he defines it as “the ability to get what you want through attraction and persuasion, and without the use of coercion and payment” (Nye 2011). Soft power arises from a country’s attractiveness in different fields, like culture, social systems, political systems, values, policies, and enterprise. The website “softpower30.com” ranks the major countries in terms of soft power. It defines soft power as “the use of positive attraction and persuasion to achieve foreign policy objectives. Soft power shuns the traditional foreign policy tools of carrot 13

While the importance of the other two indicators may be familiar with the readers, the term climate power may appear alien. As such, it is necessary here to clarify what climate power means. Every single stone of development of any country depends on energy. Traditionally, the energy source had been carbon-intensive, but due to global concern on climate change, the energy source that deters economic competitiveness has become a strategic issue. Recognizing this, Viola et al. (2012) argue that there are three pillars of power in the contemporary world: military, economic, and climate. They conceptualize superpowers, great powers, and middle powers in the realm of climate issues. China, the USA, and the EU are superpowers, whereas India, Brazil, Japan, Russia, and South Korea are great powers, they argue. With the adoption of the Paris Agreement, all the countries have a specific cap to emit greenhouse gases. This delimits the climate power of the States within the normative imperatives in this domain. As the competitiveness of the economies depend on the cost of the energy, the emission cap and competence in generating green energy constitute a vital pillar of State power in the contemporary world.

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and stick, seeking instead to achieve influence by building networks, communicating compelling narratives, establishing international rules, and drawing on the resources that make a country naturally attractive to the world.14 ” Many scholars have highlighted the importance of soft power in the contemporary world. Qi Haixia (2017), for example, conducted a historical study of Chinese views on power in international politics and noted that “in the first decade of the 2000s, soft power superseded comprehensive national power as a main focus of attention in China’s academia, and variations in China’s foreign policy accompanied this shift of scholarly focus.” Her article also notes the rise of scholarly works on soft power across the world. In HTP, soft power and normative power are clearly distinct. Soft power implies the attractiveness of an actor when it floats an issue in a global political process. The “normative power” adds another variable, i.e., active support by other actors when an actor thrives to achieve its goals. Sheer attractiveness may not result in active support, which the term of normative power refers to. As such, normative power would be more issue specific because the support of other actors would depend on the particular case in hand. A State may find an issue attractive but may not support it actively due to different egoistical considerations. In these perspectives, the concept of normative power would be more appropriate, particularly when conducting outcome-oriented research. It is impossible to evaluate a State’s normative power without situating it in the global context. One way to calculate normative power can be estimating it based on the percentage of a State’s norm that matches the global standard institutional norm. Say, if the global standard institutional norm’s value is 100, then the respective State’s value can be 60 or 70 or 30% of it, and 60, 70, or 30 then becomes its numerate values with regard to normative power. The question is how to evaluate the standard global institutional norm that can be given full (100) marks and how to discern the percentage of it that a State achieves. This task seems almost impossible. It is necessary to recall here that the objective of this proposition is to find an indicative or approximate value. It is impossible to find such absolute values in political science, and our objective is not to delve into such impossibilities. Ascribing discretionary values out of in-depth qualitative studies can be another option. Another option could be to use survey data. Different entities like Pew Research, Democracy Watch, Eurobarometer, AsiaBarometer, and Gallup world survey, conduct such surveys. The survey data may not be perfectly suitable for ascribing a score as it depends on the issue, the type of question, the population, and many other factors, but it may be possible to attune them innovatively for the case of a particular research. Another and possibly the best way may be the researchers themselves conducting such surveys, describe the survey findings qualitatively, and ascribe a score thereupon.

14

See “What is Soft power”, available at https://softpower30.com/what-is-soft-power/, accessed on 18 August 2018.

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The values from such surveys would be more nuanced with regard to the particular issue at hand. These scores can then be used in the above equation. Other ways might also be innovated by the particular researcher based on his or her work. In light of the above discussion, this proposition postulates that the measurement of normative power would vary from case to case, and in most of the cases it will be as follows: Normative power = Softpower + Support Compared to the variable material power, the calculation of normative power is even more a daunting task. While, in the case of the material power, values for the indicators are available in various data sources, the normative power lacks such possibility. Researchers who choose to adhere to either school, positivist or constructivist, have more peace of mind in this regard because they usually adopt either a quantitative or a discursive methodology. However, as explained above, their works are more prone to yield putative, partial, or misleading outcomes. The objective of the theoretical proposition developed here is not to compromise a comprehensive and better theoretical conception, whatever difficulties may appear in operationalization. Researchers who take this path would need to be innovative to find approximate values for the normative power for their particular research. Some prospects have been discussed in the above paragraph. The case studies of this book also provide another alternative to this effect. Multiple such works may gradually develop better ways out for calculation. Pundits may question the logic behind combining the two variables which have so far been basically considered independently in line with their two distinct ontologies. However, if adhering to a theory solely for the sake of ontological sanctity yields a misleading, partial, or putative outcome, whereas a synthesis can produce a more guiding, holistic, and realistic elaboration, we should not be afraid to take up such a venture. What the ontological “fundamentalists” criticize about the methodology may be possible to overcome. Six hundred years ago, the oceans were obstacles to global trade but, when the Europeans discovered the routes, the oceans were transformed into a conduit for the same and opened up enormous opportunities. The obstacles faced may also turn into an opportunity if we can find an innovative way. Wendt (1999) posits that constructivists do not require solely adhering to a reflective, interpretative or qualitative methodology, as a quantitative methodology may also appear suitable for their research. Content analysis, using computer-generated tools, offers one such possibility which researchers are adopting nowadays. The bottom line is that we should not rely on a misleading theoretical base simply for the sake of methodological distinction or ontological perfection that leads to inaccurate, partial, or putative outcomes. Alexander Wendt (1999) proposed that material and idealistic power are constitutive together but insisted that elements like ideas and ideology are more important than material power (Wendt 1994, p. 24; 1999). After studying elaborately the constructivist works, we buy many of their conjectures but do not agree to emphasis on which one is more important. It may vary from time to time and from case to case

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as to which one is more vital, and it is almost impossible to calculate and confirm their relative importance. Thus, in the holistic theoretical proposition, power is defined as the potential to affect the outcome and is calculated as a combined whole of both material power and normative power, ascribing each of them roughly equal values. It is important to clarify that the number, percentage, or equation suggested here are not the biblical canons that claim cent percent validity. In fact, no theory or measurement method can claim so. For example, the indicators proposed by Waltz (1979, p. 131; 2000, p. 50) for material power can be challenged, as a multitude of other vital indicators appear to have been omitted from the proposition. Kant, Morgenthau, Xuetang, and many other scholars have identified national morale as a mysterious element that had multiplied the power of the States manifolds in many events in history. The scenario surrounding the US withdrawal from Saigon in 1975 or in Kabul in 2021 are some of the recent precedences. Geo-strategic location is another such element that cannot be generalized and depends upon the space, time, and alignment. The possible shortcomings of normative power have been discussed above. The calculation method proposed here are indicative, approximate, or perceptional. The half/half value of either variable may also vary considerably depending on the case, and timeframe one is studying. What we wanted to emphasize here is that this kind of shortcomings will always remain present when measuring the power of the actors. It is necessary to find the most plausible values for this purpose in the context of the current world. If so, then what are the concrete conjectures of this proposition that can clearly distinguish itself? This is clarified in the next paragraph. In a nutshell, the following eight elements are fundamental take-way of the holistic theoretical proposition that distinguishes itself in the IR scholarship. 1.

2.

3.

The ontological foundation of the proposition is that the States of the contemporary world do not enjoy unbridled liberty to play with their power. They are bounded by the normative imperatives of the time within which they have to operate their strategies. As such, the color and contour of anarchy, which the IR scholars have identified as the root cause of all the perils, has altered to a great extent today. Apart from the States, numerous actors play their parts, side by side the States, in shaping the normative imperatives. The States must anchor their strategies within these normative imperatives. The normative imperatives are determined by the institutions/norms of a particular epoch. Institutions/norms are defined as formal and informal social conventions that constrain as well as, at the same time, enable the States to engage in their interactions by defining the normative imperatives. The presence of the physical International Organizations (IOs) bolsters these institutional imperatives, but the imperatives are far above the IOs. That said, it should not be confused the difference between the IOs and the institutions; institutions are above the IOs. The norms/institutions continuously evolve, and in the current world, all the States are involved in the institution-building process; it is no more a monopoly of a single country or an absolute oligopoly of a group of countries.

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4.

27

The violation of the standard normative imperatives entails different degrees of punishment depending on the actors who are violating them.

After establishing the above ontology, the proposition has been narrowed down so that it can be used for empirical works. This has been realized by concentrating on the details of the power of the actors, which determines the outcomes. The following elements are to be added from this point: 5.

6.

7.

8.

The power of the actors continues playing a vital role in determining the outcomes from States’ interactions and for the generation of new normative imperatives. However, that power is holistic in nature; it is not merely the material power. The holistic power is constituted in a combination of material power and normative power. Deletion of any of these variables would be fatally erroneous, leading to flawed inferences. This conjecture departs from the positivist concept of measuring power and manifests its alignment more with the constructivist school, particularly with the works of Alexander Wendt. Neither material power nor normative power has been pitted one above the other. They are given roughly equal weight. Their weight may vary depending on the situations of the particular cases. This is a departure from the constructivist assertions that ascribe ideas, ideology, culture, etc., greater importance. The application of mathematical equations in the study of politics, or statistical data, or the quantitative method cannot be expected to yield a similar level of accuracy as we can attain in the fields of mathematics, physics, or natural science. A study that involves human society is complex to quantify in mathematical and statistical terms. Nevertheless, some quantitative values have been generated in this work just to visualize an indicative projection. A study that involves human society may be better explained in a combination of both, i.e., contrasting quantitative data with a qualitative explanation while maintaining a great degree of prudence. The objective of social science or political science research is also like physical science, i.e., to find the ultimate truth, but the possibility is not there. In natural science, we search for truth and exact laws while, in social science, we strive for plausibility; the more plausible a theory, the better it is. The claim here is that the theory and equation proposed above would yield better plausibility. Finally, the proposition does not claim that conflict among the States has disappeared but, rather, posits that it has taken a new form under the ambit of the normative imperatives of the time; and power of the actors that determine the relationships among the States has become holistic, issue specific, and is contrived by the normative imperatives. Not recognizing these features would lead to falling into erroneous analysis and destructive policies.

Above, we have summarized the cardinal conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition and the underlying normative imperatives within which the States are poised to engage today. We identified the properties of power, which is holistic, and we presented an indicative formula to calculate this power. One of the main pillars of the theory is the instrumentality of the issue-specific power, which remained unexplained so far. In fact, we attach lesser importance to

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comprehensive power than we do to issue-specific power because, in the contemporary world, there is no definitive hierarchy among the issues, and actors today act differently for different issues.15 If we want to apply the theoretical proposition for a particular case, it is essential to determine the power of the actors in the context of the particular issue under consideration. The next section elaborates the issuespecific power within the ambit of the holistic theoretical proposition. It particularly tailors the theoretical proposition to apply in an empirical study. Chaps. 4–6 of this monograph contain the empirical studies where the conjectures of the proposition are examined.

2.2 Narrowing Down the Proposition for an Empirical Study If a theory cannot be applied for an actual case (Waltz, for example, suggested that his theory should not be applied so [1979, p. 175]), we cannot be sure whether its conjectures are realistic or illusory one. It is the objective of this work to employ the theoretical proposition developed here for actual cases, and we would, in fact, testify the proposition by applying it for a few case studies on climate change negotiations under the UNFCCC. For this, we need to narrow down the proposition so that it can be applied to particular cases. Retaining the essence of the general theoretical proposition developed above, the following section tailors it for the empirical studies. As explained in the previous sections, in our current, highly interlinked world of flows, issues are becoming increasingly less dependent on one another. The power of the actors, should, thus, needs to be accentuated in the respective domains, and the indicators to measure it should be selected accordingly. It does not mean that the instrumentality of comprehensive power has become totally irrelevant. It has just acquired reduced preeminence compared to the past. It is indispensable to consider the comprehensive power when we analyze the overall politico-security relation and engagements of the States. Those are the situations where the general proposition presented in the previous section would be more suitable. The theoretical proposition developed in the previous section distinguishes itself through its conjectures that the power of the States is holistic in nature in the contemporary world, and its instrumentality is largely dependent on the global normative imperatives. The interstate interactions today involve a multitude of arenas at an everincreasing speed. It has been explained how the decreased utility of military power has created a situation where different issues need to be studied separately. Domains like defense, the economy, energy, climate, ICT, etc., each need to be studied in their respective arenas. If, for example, we wish to study climate politics, we need to calculate the material power, normative power, and holistic power of an actor with

15

One of the recent examples is that despite stark competition in the security domain, India and China has repeatedly aligned themselves in climate politics.

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regard to this particular issue, leverages of the actors on the basis of these, and how that particular actor interacts in the international milieu with those. When we study a particular issue, we can imagine global standard normative imperatives concerning that issue. For example, in the economic sector, the standard normative imperative is the free flow of four factors of production: capital, labor, goods, and services. A country that adheres to all of these factors perfectly may get full (100) marks, the lesser its adherence, the fewer the points. For the climate change issue, the global standard normative imperative is the lowest possible GHG emission and complete transformation to green energy in order to lead the globe to achieve a zero-emission balance. The more a country adheres to this standard norm, the more points it scores. For example, despite being smaller than the USA or China, Germany is projecting itself as a leader in the realm of climate change issues due to its adherence to the expected norms. For the defense domain, strict adherence to the UN norms of respecting the physical integrity of other States and maintaining internal peace and harmony would enhance a State’s normative power. The USA was condemned for attacking Iraq in 2003 but, had Iraq followed the international norm of respecting the territorial integrity of other countries or not created an image of an arrogant country that does not respect the global normative imperatives; it would have been impossible for the USA to attack Iraq at that point in time when the norm of non-intervention was sacrosanct. Attacking Iraq without a UN mandate also cost the USA hugely in terms of its reputation, respect, and leadership (Nye 2004). Using similar logic, we can discern issue-specific normative power for other cases. We have in the previous section defined that a State’s normative power implies the likelihood of acquiring the support of other States when a particular issue is at stake. Some general possibilities of determining the normative power have been discussed above. The difference between soft power and normative power has also been explained. Soft power is a vital pillar of the normative power, which facilitates acquiring support from other actors. In the case of the particular issue that we study in this work, a multilateral negotiation process under the UN framework, the support of other countries in favor of a particular actor, or the issue it floats can be easily discerned. In this consideration, it has been proposed that an actor’s normative power for the empirical studies under this work to be a simple combination of soft power and the prospective support it can garner in favor of its cause, ascribing them roughly equal values. The calculation of normative power, thus, for this specific case can be made out of the following formula: Normative power = soft power +

number of parties support the frame × 100 The total number of parties attending the COP

The indicators for issue-specific material power would differ from the comprehensive material power discussed in the previous section. The indicators of material power would vary from issue to issue. For example, it will be different for climate, commerce, or defense issue. Let us take the example of the empirical studies of this work. After explaining in detail in Chap. 3 as to why it should be so, the indicators for material power for this

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work are considered to be population, territory, GDP (Gross Domestic Product), and emission. The formula for material power for this specific case appears as follows: Material power = (population + territory + GDP + emission percentage)

There are other indicators, like military strength, political stability, cyber power, which are not crucial for this particular case. Demography and geography have been considered as fundamental components of power by most of the scholars who attempted to measure power (see Höhn 2011, p. 45). These indicators appeared pertinent for this case too. Emission is the most crucial element for the case at hand. What the equipment and soldiers are in the case of military power; GDP, and growth in the economic power, the emission is for the climate power. In these considerations, by adding this along with the abovementioned stable factors, it has incorporated the fundamental elements for material power in the realm of climate politics. It needs to be reiterated here that the measurement can only be indicative rather than exhaustive. It is lesser than and somewhat different from the proposed indicators of comprehensive material power in the previous section. By arguing that the material power should be considered issue specific, the indicators for it vis-à-vis particular issue become fewer and specific only for the issue. In this way, the number of indicators become fewer while it does not exclude the vital ones. Issue-specific material power for other issues, like the economy or defense, would differ similarly. The above selection process of the indicators may appear discretionary to some, but there, in fact, is no better way. All the prominent scholars, including Waltz (1979) and Morgenthau (1948), Mearsheimer (2001), had to resort to such discretionary considerations. Our selection outsmarts the others by applying the concept of holistic power incorporating both material and normative variables, and by its emphasis on the issue-specific nature of power. With the first one, we increase the number of indicators; with the second one, we decrease the same without compromising the accuracy. Thus, the number of indicators remains handy while, at the same time, the accuracy enhances. The above reduction process can further be nuanced by selecting more specific issues. From the climate change arena, we can, for example, select only the issue of mitigation, adaptation, or transfer of technology. This can be narrowed down even further; for example, in the case of mitigation, we can only select the highest target of the rise of the temperature, financing for mitigation actions, or the debate about differentiated actions on mitigation. The selection of the indicators of the material power can be accentuated according to the narrowed down topic keeping the essence of the theory, i.e., measurement of the power in the combination of material power and normative power unaltered. Several piecemeal studies on narrower topics can later be combined to create a broader picture of the whole issue. The empirical works under this book have found another way too. It first conducts an in-depth qualitative content analysis on the framing of the issues by the actors, which reflect their stances during the negotiation process. The words uttered by the

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actors are charged with and reflective of their power, we can detect indicative features of their power and preferences. The evidences from this qualitative and quantitative content analysis are later applied to examine the conjectures of the HTP. This was one choice for this particular work, and other researchers may find their ones as well, taking into consideration the essence of the theoretical proposition developed here. Under this work, the case studies investigated how the issues of mitigation, adaptation funding, and funding mechanism were framed up during the two decades of the apex form of climate negotiations that yielded the Paris Climate Agreement and why only certain framing efforts succeeded while others failed. Three separate case studies have been carried out on the three issues. The research question for each of them consisted of two parts. The first part was how the framing of the issues was carried out, and the second part was about why only certain frames succeeded. The theoretical proposition developed in this chapter was applied in the second part, whereas the first part was operationalized by applying the well-established concept of framing. The framing concept illustrated the process as well as identified the successful frames and which actor was behind their framing process. The concept of framing has been found to be a very useful tool for illustrating how issues were framed up but was unable to explain why certain frames succeeded while others did not. The theoretical proposition developed in this chapter was applied to address this crucial question. The HTP enabled us to unravel the crucial puzzle with regard to the why part of the research question which the concept of framing could not fulfill. Finally, it needs to be reiterated here that the selection of the indicators against normative power, material power, and holistic power, as delineated above, are only indicative. These cannot be exhaustive, and there are difficulties associated with collecting data of some indicators. Other researchers may pick the pathway that may appear more suitable for their works, just as this work has taken its own path. Use of survey data or conducting surveys by the researchers themselves, as discussed above, could be better options for those cases where the support of other actors may be less readily available and of less importance than the cases of this work. This section has placed the holistic theoretical proposition, which is the foundation of the entire work. In the next section, we will contrast the holistic theoretical proposition with the major IR theories in existence. The discussion in the next section further clarifies and elaborates the conjectures of the HTP, contrasts it vis-à-vis other major theories and distinguishes its own place in the literature.

2.3 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition vis-à-vis the Major Theories This section presents a brief critical review of the major IR theories and contrasts those with the holistic theoretical proposition presented above. It simultaneously serves as a literature review. It helps to grasp the ontological base more elaborately and expounds the logic behind the holistic theoretical proposition. The review identifies the gaps in the existing literature and explains how those have been filled by

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the theoretical proposition. These grand theories and the debates concerning them are widely known. The IR scholars are well-versed in the debates, but the critical review presented here is exclusively of the author’s own perspectives and would serve to contrast the theories vis-à-vis the holistic theoretical proposition and to isolate the submission of the proposition more conspicuously. Considering the enormous literature, the focus of the review has been primarily concentrated on the concept of power only. The cardinal conjecture of the HTP is the effect of the global normative imperatives in the contemporary world within which the confines of State power are delimited. The conception of power in the cases of major theories and the ontology behind those conceptions have been particularly reviewed in this section so as to present a comparison. It is impossible as well as has not been attempted here to examine the various other premises of the theories, and only the above aspects are kept in the center of discussion in this section. Lastly, although innumerable critical reviews of these grand theories exist in the literature, the views presented here are entirely of the author of this book. Although only a brief contrast with some of the major theories have been made here, this chapter is, in fact, an outcome of much broader studies of the IR theories, most of which have not come to discussion here, but they, nonetheless, nurtured they author’s mental faculty. The critical review follows.

2.3.1 The Prominent Theories of Realism vis-à-vis Holistic Theoretical Proposition The central philosophical logic of realism, the oldest school of IR, is not to engage in a moral commitment but to offer a realistic analytical tool to explain the political world where nation-states are not adequately restrained by international rules or moral dictates (Gilpin 2011). Realism itself is not a scientific theory that can be falsified but, rather, a philosophy; however, this broad school has developed theories (like the balance of power, hegemonic stability theory) that can be, and have been, empirically tested (ibid.). Realism is broadly classified by scholars into two distinct strands: classical realism and its contemporary offshoot “neorealism.” In addition to those, offensive realism has also acquired popularity to some scholars, particularly in the USA. These three prominent threads of realism are critically but briefly overviewed and contrasted with the holistic theoretical proposition in the following sub-sections.

2.3.2 Classical Realism and Holistic Theoretical Proposition Classical realism emphasizes that the State (city, imperial, or nation-state) is the prime actor both in national and international politics, and the nonexistence of any

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other authority above these sovereigns poises the States into an ambiance whereby the power capacity of the States determines their behavior and the outcomes thereof. Some of the key assumptions of the classical realism are that States exist in anarchy (Thucydides 400 B.C., Hobbes 1651; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979), they constantly thrive to increase power in order to safeguard their security and survival (Machiavelli 1950; Gulick 1955; Morgenthau 1963; Waltz 1979), material power is the most important determining factor for States’ behavior (Machiavelli 1950; Morgenthau 1948; Waltz 1979) and institutes simply reflect the interest of the strongest States (Pollack 2001; Carr 1946; Keohane 1984; Mearsheimer 1994). The most prominent scholar of classical realism, Hans Morgenthau, was profoundly influenced by psychologists like Sigmund Freud (compare Schuett 2007, p. 55). By conceiving the constant that the human nature is driven by a lust for power and eclipsed by egoism, that also transforms up to the State level, he posits that “whatever the ultimate aim of the international politics, power is always the immediate aim…when we speak of power, we mean man’s control over the minds and actions of other men” (Morgenthau 1948, p. 13). Six fundamental principles of political realism were identified by Morgenthau. The first one is the human nature that pervades up to the international politics too. However, today it is hard to believe that individual’s nature can overwhelmingly affect State behavior. Myriads of actors engage in the decision-making process, and multitudes of factors are intricately entwined with it. The possibility of transmitting individual human properties through these bureaucratic channels as well as through the complex interaction of the social forces makes little sense today. Moreover, systematic-level constraints fostered by normative imperatives would not allow the unbridled exercise of individual’s whims. Second, he asserts that States’ interest defined in terms of power from the vantage point of rationality is the core guiding principle to retrace and anticipate international politics. This is the most vital takeaway from classical realism. However, the interest and power both have assumed renewed dimensions amid the contemporary culture and information flow. States are assuming their interests differently depending on the issues, normative imperatives with regard to the particular issue and the bureaucracy in action. Morgenthau himself, in his lifetime, realized some of these phenomena. The holistic theoretical proposition developed in this chapter brings these aspects into the context. The third principle spells what this theoretical proposition also claims. It states that the interest, as well as the component of power that determines the political actions, are contingent upon the political and cultural context of a particular time. Morgenthau identified the normative dictates within which the European states had to operate their political aspirations at the modern age. Those similar dictates have been consolidated with new dimensions in the contemporary world. The fourth and fifth principles downplay the implications of moral principles and moral pursuits. The holistic theoretical proposition clearly differentiates moral buzzwords and normative imperatives. It agrees with the realists that moral buzzwords are mostly used as a disguise to gain in the political arena. It has been

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explained that normative imperatives are not an act of morality but are systematiclevel compulsion that they are poised to comply with. It is not a choice of their will but a dictate of the culture the States live in. In the sixth principle, he isolates the political spheres from all other fields, viz. economics, morality, religion. The HTP also realizes the same logic but, at the same time, finds that all the domains are today intertwined with each other. Economic gains contribute to or translate into political power, cultural connection contributes to soft power, so on and so forth. The HTP, therefore, uses the term “holistic power” instead of political power. It argues that the holistic power should also be counted issue by issue. The notion of the balance of power is the most important edict of classical realism. However, alliances have always proved to be uncertain, as Morgenthau has identified in many instances. Identity, not merely power potential, plays a vital role in alliance formation (Walt 1985). The balance continuously fluctuates, it never stays at a point, so there never appears a stable balance. Moreover, the concept of balance itself is imaginary. Balance vis-à-vis whom when the protagonists continuously change their stature and orientation? Calculation of power also always remains illusory because the national morale of the vanquished, which is never intelligible, disproportionately enhances the power of a State, particularly in the cases of the nations who have been humiliated by the victors.16 History has abundant of such examples, including Germany in the past one hundred years. Moreover, the Balance of power is, in fact, a manifestation of the normative imperatives of a particular epoch. Morgenthau himself identified those imperatives in the modern age by saying that there existed normative imperatives from the treaty of Westphalia until the Napoleonic war, monarchic sovereignty after the Napoleonic war until the First World War, the Holy Alliance between the two world wars, and the League of Nations. These were the “intellectual and moral climate” within which the protagonists of that particular epochs moved, and which permeated all the thoughts of the political actions. Today, we are in a different culture in which the United Nations play one of the most vital roles. Common civilization and brotherhood of the European citizens, as well as their common interest to retain their dominion, had catalyzed the culture within which the balance of power game was played out. Today, we are in a global village, have a profoundly restructured society for which a different genre of normative imperatives is at play. Military power can implicate little political maneuvering today as it has no option other than total mutual destruction. This has been spectacularly evident in the recent China-India skirmishes in the year 2020 along the “Line of Control,” particularly in the Pangong lake and Galwan River valley. The two juggernauts fought with their bare hands and killed at least 50 persons in total from each other’s sides. 16

National power in the military domain had been a riddle all over the history. In the history books, we frequently find examples that a smaller army defeated a bigger one. Immanuel Kant attributed this to an elusive notion of national morale, which multiplies the power of a particular group of armies.

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They did not dare to use any ammunitions because they realized the risk of escalation that could lead to a nuclear apocalypse. Such is the level of fear that spells the limitations of military power today. Morgenthau proposed nine components for calculating power,17 which are: (1) geography, (2) natural resources, (3) industrial capacity, (4) military, (5) population, (6) national character, (7) national morale, (8) the quality of diplomacy, and (9) the quality of government. The components he proposed constitute a mixture of quantifiable as well as non-quantifiable items. In this respect, the HTP developed in this chapter has some similarities with classical realism. Nonetheless, Morgenthau did not attempt to calculate power according to his proposed indicators. Classical realism now admits that in contrast to all the previous history, an increase in military power does no longer tantamount to an increase in political power (Morgenthau 1963, p. 375). One of the most axiomatic examples is cited about the USA’s defeat in Indochina; despite being a superpower having the capacity to devastate the entire world, the normative imperatives consolidated by the public opinion obliged the USA to restrain and withdraw from Indochina. The core focus of Morgenthau’s book “Politics Among Nations” is to identify and gauge national power (Chap. 3). He also explored the limitations of national power in Chaps. 4–7. The conjectures of the classical realism delineated by Morgenthau appear to retain considerable relevance today compared to the other theories (discussed later in this chapter). The theoretical proposition developed in this chapter differs from classical realism in many ways but has, at the same time, the closest affiliation with it in terms of holistic articulation and the identification of the limits of power. There is no denial of the fact that the basics of human nature have not dramatically altered since the classical philosophers of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover those. However, it can neither be said that the human species retain the same social and intellectual conception and that the ambiance within which international politics is at play today remained the same. The political relations among man evolve with their knowledge, intellect, and culture. The possibility of individuallevel traits transmitting to the State level dispositions is minimal today because of the multifaceted filters, constraints, and imperatives. IR theories not accommodating this reality would prove to be outliers. Interest defined in terms of power is the cardinal signpost that Morgenthau identifies in relation to international politics. However, he also emphasizes that the kind of interest determining political action depends upon the political and cultural context, and its generic ingredients and utility are also determined in the same way (p. 11). As such, the ontology and logic of the holistic theoretical proposition developed here are congruent with what Morgenthau left to us, in many respects. In relation to the implications of normative imperatives to struggle for power, Morgenthau posited that international law, international morality, and world public opinion play an insignificant role (Morgenthau 1963, p. 27). The theoretical proposition developed here argues that normative imperatives act as an underlying dictate 17

In his first book, published in 1948, Mearsheimer proposed eight factors, adding a ninth in his second book, published in 1954.

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within which States operate their strategies. The HTP does not argue that the power struggle among the States has disappeared altogether today. However, it does posit that the struggle is limited by the normative imperatives and that the entire conception of power needs to reconsider today by combining material power and normative power. It is argued that the indicators of the variables of power changed and it is destined to bring about continued betterment of human society.

2.3.3 Neorealism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition Neorealism, advanced by Kenneth Waltz (1979), is one of IR’s most prominent theories. Within the realist worldview, Waltz tried to contextualize the realist conjectures with the profound changes that had happened during his lifetime. He attempted to develop a parsimonious theory for a more straightforward understanding of international politics, but the theory ended up rendering only a partial capacity to explain the real-world. Waltz (1979, p. 7) believed that a theory could only explain some parts of reality. By doing so, he actually himself acknowledged that his theory is disposed to yield a partial explanatory tool. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that neorealism has probably been the most influential theory during the last couple of decades. In this sub-section, we make a brief critical discussion of the theory and contrast it with the HTP. If we attempt to summarize the cardinal conjectures of neorealism in a single sentence, we might say that—it is distinct from other realist theories by its assertion that States strive for security rather than power; anarchy is the structure, and the distribution of material power across the major units of this structure deters and determines the outcomes of international politics. Neorealism received tremendous academic attention, mainly due to this parsimonious explanatory proposition. Its reduction of the complexity to simply one independent variable of “distribution of capabilities18 across the units” under the ambiance of anarchy where all the States thrive on safeguarding and excelling their security had attracted the attention of the students of IR. However, its conjectures ended up with several fundamental flaws. Its radical reductionist approach, which eliminated some of the major variables and reduced the number of States to around five that, in Waltz’s view, are only significant for international politics, are some of the major defects. It posits that, since World War Two, only two major States (the USA and the USSR) have been the key players and that, throughout most of the history of humankind, there have not been more than five meaningful States and that no more than eight have ever existed (Waltz 1979, p. 131). This is too radical an argument, at least for the post-World War Two world, where the territorial integrity of all the States has become a sacrosanct norm. Later in this book, we will find that the support of all the States of the world crucially mattered for the outcomes of a 18

By this notion Waltz (1979) meant only material capability.

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global process and that disagreement even by a single one made it difficult to achieve the objective. Many of the predictions of neorealism, such as that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) would disappear while the Cold War or the bipolar world would last for a long time (Waltz 1979, Chapter 8), proved to be wrong. Neo-realism posits that States are always concerned about their security rather than power that the classical realists emphasized. Today, we are witnessing an absence of war among the major powers. War among the Waltzian States19 sounds insane because it would mean complete mutual destruction. Even a limited war that would directly involve the territory of another Waltzian State is no more an option because none will accept a humiliating defeat in a military conflict as long as they have the ultimate deterrence capabilities, i.e., nuclear weapons. This is evident from the fact that no Waltzian States have directly fought against each other since World War Two and logically would not do so as this would inevitably result in a “nuclear apocalypse.”20 Thus, the argument that the central focus of the States is “physical security” no longer appears to bear gravitational merit. This foundational change has eased the tension among the States prompting them to compete in other areas such as the economy, climate, energy, ICT, and sustainable development.21 The ongoing trade war between the two largest economies of the World, the USA and China, since 2018 is a testimony of this reality. The two behemoths cannot just afford to regress into a military conflict. However, conflict is inherent in the human social structure. It is now happening differently. The fight among the developed and the emerging countries in the realm of climate change, particularly regarding mitigation of GHG emission, is another example. The distribution of material capability is the sole independent variable of neorealism, while it overlooks that there exist knowledge and ideas that forge individual State’s capabilities as well as determine how that capability will be used. Both head and hands are essential parts of the human body. In the naked eye, we can see that the hands are the parts of the body doing all the works. However, we should not lose sight of the fact that the head is actually directing the hands. If we make a comparison with this, we can say that the greatest mistake in neorealism is that, while deducting the less important elements (dependent variables), it cuts off the head and just chooses the hands as the most instrumental tool.22 19

i.e., the two to eight major States that Waltz argued to be only cognizable as a State, as discussed above. 20 Noting these aspects, Mueller (1989) explained how war among the most advanced countries is disappearing. Even Waltz (1999, esp. p. 698) at the later stage compared to the first proposition of the neo-realism acknowledged that nuclear deterrence has made war too costly and peace more rewarding. The argument here is that these realities have created the space, as well as compelling them toward concentrating on finding solutions through other means, which is redefining the properties of their power. 21 Walt (1998, p. 36) mentions that many experts follow this line of thinking today. 22 The analogy refers to the human body. Both the head and hands are indispensable for the functioning of a human being. Hands are symbolic of might, the head for ideas.

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America was always there but did not become a superior country until knowledge, ideas, technology, etc., made it up.23 Material capability can be used tyrannically, benevolently, for capitalism, for socialism, or simply trying to make one’s country great again, etc. It is the nation’s leaders under any system, democratic or authoritative, who direct how it will be used. The leaders are guided by their brains, ideas, knowledge, and world views, rather than mere military might. Material capability is one of the essential components of a State’s capability, just as hands are an essential component of the body but not the most important one. Without hands, the head would be useless; without a head, the hands would be pointless.24 Neorealism excludes almost all intangible factors like States’ nature, ideology, traditions, habits, objectives, desires, forms of government and takes only into account the State’s material capability as the sole determining element. Many small entities in history have exploded into great empires thanks to the outstanding ideas and ideology of their leaders, while many great empires have fallen down due to their inferior ideas, ideology, and leadership. Likewise, great ideas and potential leaders failed due to the absence of material capabilities. In sum, both are essential—the States’ normative power25 vis-à-vis global expectations is no less important today than their material capability. According to Wendt, anarchy is nothing, and nothing cannot be structured, so Waltz’s theory is not a structural one; rather, he terms it as an individualist one since it posits an individual billiard ball-like properties of the States. Individuals live in a human society. Individual States also live in a society of States and have to follow the respective norms of their societies of the particular epoch. This aspect is missing in neorealism. While Waltz (1979) mentions the term “United Nations (UN)” only once in his entire book, he used the word “USA” and “we” many times. This reflects how negligible the institutions like the UN to him were and how profound importance he retained for the hegemonic actors. States have the legitimacy to use force to maintain discipline, while the international system does not preserve any such legitimacy, Waltz emphasizes (1979, p. 104). However, the international system has progressed considerably, particularly with regard to the use of force. The use of force without a UN mandate is considered a gross violation of international norms. Iraq did so against Kuwait during the First Gulf War, and the fate of Iraq we all know. The USA–UK engaged in a similar venture against Iraq during the Second Gulf War. They did not face a similar fate, 23

See Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) “why nations fail”—for an interesting account between the USA and other American countries. 24 In his review of neoclassical realism, Tang (2009, p. 801) observes that competition for ideas features prominently in the strategic assessment and strategy formulation, whereas the State capacity features more prominently in strategy implementation. Tang (2005) earlier suggested that integrating structural and psychological factors could serve as a productive enterprise in understanding State behavior. 25 As explained in the previous section.

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but the actions have significantly damaged their reputation and even, arguably, initiated the process of the evaporation of the US unipolar moment. It also culminated into immense turmoil in that region, including the rise of horrific entities like the “Islamic State.” These instances are the testimonies that though the violation of the norm by the global hegemon did not directly penalize them immediately, it, nonetheless, caused remarkable damage to their reputation and that similar attitude by the less powerful actors was self-destructive. Waltz (1979, p. 137) can “think only four States that have met involuntary ends in the last half century.”26 This is a valid observation, but why not attribute this reality to the normative imperatives generated during this period, which were consolidated by the UN charter and other customary norms?27 It is time to recognize the fact that the issue of the physical survival of the States has mostly been resolved. Even Waltz (2000, p. 52) later accepted that nuclear deterrence made the large conventional forces irrelevant and enabled the States to concentrate their attention on their economies rather than on their military forces. “Structure encourage certain behavior and penalize those who do not respond to the encouragement” (Waltz 1979, p. 106). We subscribe to this notion but in the sense that this structure today is more about normative imperatives than the sole function of material capabilities under anarchy. Even the most powerful hegemons cannot sustain repeated violations of the normative imperatives. Ignoring the UN’s role, which has created this compelling normative compulsion with regard to the non-intervention and physical integrity of the States, would only mean an illusionary attachment, with unrealistic “realist” theoretical claims. Waltz claims that the period from the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century was “the belle époque of interdépendance” in a multipolar world but less stable while in the post-World War Two world, interdependence has decreased due to the bipolar setting, and the system had become more stable. This inference sharply contradicts Keohane and Nye’s (1977) assertion that complex interdependence constrains States to engage in war. It rather prophases that increased interdependence causes increased risk. Waltz failed to realize that the world after World War Two had become polarized and that the interdependence among the countries within those poles had increased unprecedentedly. This increased interdependence that led to “Chained to Globalization28 ” on the one hand and the nuclear deterrence, 26

Although Waltz mentioned that four States (Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia and Tibet) met involuntary ends in the last half century (1979, p. 137), none of them were actually UN members at the time of their dissolution. 27 Osiander (2001) shows that, although the Treaty of Westphalia was signed in 1648, the concept of sovereignty following the Westphalian principle was only firmly fixed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Nevertheless, since the principle originated from that treaty and was at least loosely followed until the nineteenth century, in this work, we consider it from the time of signing the treaty. Huntington (1993, p. 22) and many other scholars argue that the modern international system emerged with the Peace of Westphalia. 28 See “Chained to Globalization” Foreign Affairs January/February 2020, available at https://www. foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-12-10/chained-globalization?utm_medium=newsle tters&utm_source=twofa&utm_content=20191220&utm_campaign=TWOFA%20122019%20C hained%20to%20Globalization&utm_term=FA%20This%20Week%20-%20112017, online accessed on 20 December 2019.

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on the other hand, has profoundly contributed to restrain the Waltzian States to wage war. After remaining strict to his “systematic” theory in the first seven chapters, where Waltz attached gravitational weight to anarchy and distribution of material capability, undermined the inner structures of the States and role of ideology altogether (see pp. 65, 109 particularly), in Chap. 7, he disconcertingly relaxed the rigidness by recognizing some of the profound changes in the world. He came to terms with some of the elements that reflect the real world, although they contradict his arguments in the earlier chapters. For example, he notes, “causes at both national and the international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable” (p. 175) whereas, in the earlier chapters, he emphasized the “gravitational” impact of the systematic-level determinants and the billiard ball-like properties of the States. He posits “if two powers can consider their mutual interest and fears without giving much thought to how the military capability of others affect them, agreement is made possible” (p. 174) whereas, in earlier chapters, he asserted on the futility of attempting cooperation and downplayed the role of international organizations as negligible. Waltz, in these chapters, recognizes that “States remain the primary vehicles of ideology” and that individual States have affected the international system rather than vice versa; e.g., the “International Brotherhood of autocrats” during the concert of Europe, communism since the Bolshevik revolution (albeit with no reference to the role of the USA for capitalism), socialism before World War One. This marks a sharp departure from his criticism of a State-centric causal explanation and his complete denial of ideology in the earlier chapters. There are many such examples of contradictions in these last two chapters. The exclusion of essential variables in his actual theoretical proposition, most importantly the implication of the normative imperatives, and the denial of ideas and ideology, was fatal. The last chapters of the book appear to have recognized it, but the earlier conjectures were not revised. This is probably why many of the predictions, like “Western Europe would become the next superpower,” proved incorrect; Europe emerged as ideologically congruent with the USA and did not even attempt to challenge the USA.29 On the contrary, China, whom he neglected (p. 180), has gradually emerged as a contender today. China’s distinct internal system and its worldview are definitely among the reasons why China is nowadays accorded such a profile. Waltz (2000) also failed in his later predictions that Japan and Germany would be the next challenger, but nothing like this happened, and NATO did not fall apart as Waltz predicted because identity matters. Yan Xuetong (2011) fared better in this respect. By adding norms to his realistic theory, he predicted that the “relative decline of American power may result in its isolation…conservatives may ascend to power…US may choose to take fewer international responsibility for the sake of own interest, withdraw from international 29

Compare (Hopf 1998, p. 187), where he posits that the distribution of power cannot explain the alliance pattern that emerged after World War Two, and the ideological difference with the Soviet Union was the root cause of the development of this alliance. Subsequently, the Soviet threat was securitized in the western block, which cemented the alliance further, and that constructivist theories can explain it better.

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engagements and may work as an obstacle to reform international norms in other fields” (pp. 261–262). Most of these predictions appeared happening during the Trump era, the withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the scrapping of the transpacific partnership, the retreat from the pivot to Asia, the insistence on isolationism by advocating “America First” and the pulling out from the Iran nuclear deal, the stark criticism of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and threat to withdraw from it, the withdrawal from UNESCO membership are some of the examples. In a nutshell, the fundamental flaws of neorealism postulated by Kenneth Waltz are—radical reduction of several crucial variables; the extreme reductionist view about the number of meaningful States; the radical denial of ideas, ideology, culture; the overemphasis on systematic-level determinants, ignoring State-level attributes; and, above all, the non-recognition of the global normative dictates present in the current world.

2.3.4 The False Premise of Offensive Realism Offensive Realism (OR), expounded by John Mearsheimer, distinguishes itself from other realist theories by arguing that the anarchic structure compels the great powers toward inescapable revisionist and aggressive behaviors to alter the status quo in order to establish hegemony in the international system. It posits that the great powers are destined to assume the worst of others’ intentions (Tang 2008), which inevitably leads to a tragic situation whether they want or not. Five bedrock assumptions developed in his theory are (1) the concept of anarchy, as emphasized in neorealism, where the States are poised in a self-help situation, (2) all of the States possess some offensive capability and, thus, are always prepared to cause some harm to other States when needed, (3) the intention of the States cannot be predicted in advance, (4) survival is the most important goal of the States as a result of which they seek to maintain their territorial integrity and autonomy in the domestic political order and (5) rationality—particularly the great powers are rational actors (Mearsheimer 2001, p. 30; Kirshner 2012, p. 60). The principal objective of the States is survival, which is a harmless one but, when these five conditions are at play, they collectively create a powerful incentive for the great powers to be offensive—this is the crux of all of Mearsheimer’s arguments. Tang (2008, p. 461) finds a sixth and fundamental bedrock assumption of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism. It is “the worst-case assumption over other’s intention.” According to him, this, and only this, logic lies at the core of the theory from where other assumptions emanate. According to this argument, the root cause of this tragedy is the fear factor. If the fear factor can be eliminated or minimized, the scenario should be different. Now, if survival is the objective of the States, as the theory asserts, and if that can be assured, the fear factor will disappear or would be profoundly diluted. In the previous sections, we have illustrated how the assurance of the physical survival of the States has been somewhat attained in the current world as a result of the normative imperatives of the contemporary time that the States are

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bound to abide by. Thus, all of the arguments about offensive realism fall on a lose ground in the present context. One of the six major riddles of Mearsheimer’s book entitled “The Tragedy of Great Power Politics” is the definition and measurement of power. Like Waltz, he also takes only the great powers into the cognizance and ignores all other States. Like Waltz, he also does not consider power based on outcomes and, unlike Morgenthau, his proposition excludes all of the non-tangible factors in calculating power. For the year 2000, he chooses four indicators of power, which are: (1) GNP,30 (2) population, (3) armed forces and personnel, and (4) the number of nuclear warheads (Mearsheimer 2001, pp. 60–67, 133–135, 383–385; Höhn 2011, p. 41). A careful reading of the whole book reveals that he only attached the utmost importance to military power measured by the number of military personnel and nuclear warheads and excluded all other variables. This makes his theory almost entirely unfit for the current world, as already explained earlier in this chapter as to how military power is losing relevance in the contemporary world. Although Mearsheimer, in the introduction to the book, indicated that he would present a method for calculating power, in the respective section (Chap. 5, last part) he indeed evaded this. In these chapters, he points out that many studies have attempted to measure power, but none could make it convincingly; there does not exist any good database that can be tapped to measure the power, so this lies beyond the objective of his book and, as such, he relies only on rough indicators of military might. With regard to cooperation, he posits that relative gain considerations and concerns about the possibility of cheating inhibit States from cooperating. The low political issues like trade and environment have considerable bearing on the high political issues, which are inseparable. Hence, the prospect of cooperation is a false promise because the gain in low political issues would ultimately translate into military might where the great power would never compromise (Mearsheimer 1994). The bottom line of the offensive realism is that whatever progress we see, people and States will ultimately continue to pursue their offensive motives. Mearsheimer (1994) is uncertain whether human beings are “hard-wired” to make their “software” in their head lead to good or bad intentions. The arguments sound ominously captivating, like all the bad news in the news media is, but they actually are grounded on a false premise. States today are required to design their strategies within the normative imperatives they live in, so their options are structurally contrived. OR was developed discounting the normative imperatives of the current world, miscalculating the power potential only on the basis of military might and confusing the context of the current world with that of the medieval one or the one prior to World War Two. Ruggie (1995) briefly responded to the criticism of Mearsheimer (1994) on the international institutions by revealing “the false premise of offensive realism.” He argued that the very fact that the States devote a substantial amount of time and energy to the international institutes speaks of their importance today, and he expressed deep concern about the policy implications of Mearsheimer’s propositions. 30

GNP—Gross National Product.

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It can be underlined here that the holistic theoretical proposition developed in this chapter does not posit that the arguments with regard to the vices of great power politics are entirely absent today, rather it is posited that the normative imperatives of the current world fostered by the deterrence capabilities confine them to act in a certain way which helps them to overcome the tragedy and leads them toward continuous healthier international system.

2.3.5 Robert Gilpin’s Realist Conjecture Robert Gilpin (1983) appears to be the most prudent realist who broke the monotonous aspects of realism that only shows a grim picture of the constant rivalry for power, security, and hegemony without offering any clue as to how the stature of a State is changed over the time which is ever happening. Explaining how changes occur in the global distribution of power, Gilpin argues that some States acquire relatively better skills and technological edge on the way to development, thus comparatively gains more in their economy, which is later translated into their military power. He notes that “the process of international political change ultimately reflects the efforts of individuals or groups to transform institutions and systems in order to advance their interest, because these interest and the power of groups (or States) change, in time the political system will be changed in ways that will reflect these underlying shifts in interest and power” (Glilpin 1983). Thus, Robert Gilpin’s perspectives offer some headway that can comport the dynamics of the ever-excelling interactions of the States in today’s world and explain how changes happen. However, role of individuals or group of individuals that ultimately translate into power stature of the States are profoundly contrived by the normative imperatives of the time to which we need to focus on. Above, we have briefly discussed major theories of the realist school. Since it is impossible to discuss all of the diverse theories of this school in a chapter, only the most prominent ones were considered above. Next, we turn to the liberal school.

2.3.6 Liberal Tradition vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition During the birth state of IR as an academic discipline, the scholars were primarily inspired by liberal ideas and philosophies. While realist scripts can be traced back to Thucydides and Chanakya’s time, liberal thoughts came to prominence during the European enlightenment period inspired by the ideas that the application of reason could produce solutions to the problems associated with anarchy. Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), John Locke (1632–1704), Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), Adam Smith (1723–1790), Richard Cobden (1804–1865) are among the many prominent scholars

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in this school. US President Woodrow Wilson’s (1856–1924) enthusiasm in creating the League of Nations was inspired by liberal thoughts. Two World Wars disheartened the liberalist scholars immensely, and realism acquired prominence in the discourse during this time. Until the emergence of another dominant school recently, the Constructivism, the IR scholarship observed the waves of dominance by realism and liberalism, which waxed and waned in parallel with the prevalence of war or peace. At the core of the difference between classical realism and liberalism is that the former considers human nature in the political arena as inherently charged with lust for power and dominance while the latter considers human as a rational being with the inherent ability of reasoning and developing institutions for betterment. If I consider myself, for example, I too have a lust for power and prosperity. I would try to achieve those if I am not contrived to limit my aspirations. I am rational enough not to cross the limit that may cause my destruction or losing what I have now. For example, I would not go out with a sword to kill other people or to pillage their properties because first of all, I can be killed, and the second, I would definitely be put into jail. Moreover, I have ethical restrictions within myself that would prohibit me from such a venture. I have been deterred by the State apparatus that has certain normative dictates and practical deterrence. I believe almost all human beings would be similar to me in this scenario. Human minds are supernaturally connected to behave similarly in the cases of some basic instinct. That is why we find a pyramid in Egypt and Mexico, the territories that were disconnected but the polity developed in a similar way. We find the empires in China, Persia, Greece, or Rome had similar pathway of growth and decline. If so, we can say that people and their societies across the world must have had similar rational behavior. Human being has an unlimited aspiration for power and dominance, but they are also rational enough not to attain those risking their life or losing the existing ground by playing a foul. What is lacking in these two schools’ ontology is the recognition of the normative imperatives that define both the extents and limits of State behavior. This has been discussed in the previous sections and would also be followed later in this chapter. Liberal theories are diverse, and one can often lose the path to correlate them with one another. Most contemporary liberal scholars do not consider the State as the only actor (Strange 1996; McGrew 2008), emphasize on democracy and the individual’s rights for a better world (Doyle 1998; Kant 1795), posit that material power is not everything but just one of the many considerations of the States (Keohane and Nye 1977), reject the idea that the State’s international interaction is a zero-sum game for power and argue that international institutes can play a vital role in reducing conflict and in promoting peace (ibid.). One basic assumption can determine whether certain theory falls within liberalism. It is the doctrine of the freedom of individuals, which is to be achieved through civil rights, juridical equality, representative institutions, private property, and a market economy (Doyle 1986). Another distinct conjecture is that the State’s interest is determined not by its place in the international system but by the government agents who are in power to determine the State’s interest, ideals, and activities; as such, the

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nature of government, whether democratic or autocratic, is of the utmost importance as these implicate the systematic-level output in determining whether the system will be war-prone or would cultivate a “garden” of peace (Kant and Doyale 1998). In filtering out the basic difference between the liberal theories and the holistic theoretical proposition, we can identify that the Liberal theories emphasize on the conditions which are resultant of the normative imperatives of the time. Liberal theories require the conditions like civil rights, juridical equality, representative institutions, private property, market economy, and ideals of the agents in the government to make the theory work. In contrast, the holistic theoretical proposition posits that the normative imperatives dictate the States to behave in a certain way. We can explain and predict State behavior applying the concept of normative imperatives, but liberal theories require certain conditions or merely prescribe to attain those situations for a better world. Theories should not suggest what to do rather explain why it is happening so and what can be expected as a result of this in the future. The holistic theoretical proposition does not suggest what a State or individual should do but, rather, explains what is happening in reality, theorizes why it is happening in that way and what can be expected in the future. It comports the real-world, does not attempt to sell an ideology.

2.3.7 Neo-Liberalism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition The term neoliberalism emerged in the early 1970s and appeared prominently in the IR discourses following the publication of a book entitled “Power and Interdependence” in 1977 by the Harvard university professors Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. The term neoliberalism is misleading, as it sounds like a new version of liberalism. Although it comports many of the liberal assertions, it is more aligned with the realist ontology. An explanation follows. On the one hand, neoliberalism escaped itself from the grim realist picture of a jungle-like prospect of international politics by arguing that contemporary developments and international institutions can foster cooperation. On the other hand, it falls back on the realist ontology by its argument that only material power deters the formation of international institutions and determines their subsequent operation. Three central assertions are essential to distinguish neorealism and neoliberalism. They are: First, the implications of anarchy, the debate about absolute and relative gains, and the complexity centered around cooperation and the distribution of benefits (Powell 1994). Neoliberalism posits that the state of anarchy does not mean that States cannot cooperate. It instead argues that States, being rational egoists, will try to develop a cooperative mechanism to maximize their gains.

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Second, while realists (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 1994) argue that the relative gain concern is likely to inhabit any cooperation attempt, neoliberalists posit that “ironically the problem of the relative gain might even facilitate cooperation by narrowing down the range of viable cooperative agreements and thereby reducing absolute gain bargaining problem” (Snidal 1991). Milner (1992) argued that an increased number of players decreases the problem of relative gains and, as the States interact repeatedly, this iteration produces a shadow of the future, which promotes cooperation. Third, the role of international regimes is a central element in the neoliberal theories. Keohane and Nye (1977, 1987) explained how nuclear deterrence, public sentiment, and complex interdependence have transformed the war-prone international system toward an ambiance for cooperation. Keohane (1984) argues that international regimes are created by the hegemons, but once they have been in place for some time, they acquire sunk-costs and can survive even after the decline of the hegemon. Neoliberalists posit that the international regimes foster cooperation by means of, inter alia, checking cheating, helping cooperation to converge, providing more information and coordination through bureaucracy, alleviating fear, settling distributional conflicts, and issue linkages. Axelrod and Donald Hamilton (1981) point out that States seek to maximize utility, which prompts them to cooperate. Axelrod and other scholars (viz. Keohane and Martin 1995) emphasize that cooperative behavior is more likely to arise when States pursue a strategy of reciprocity. Keohane (1984) is the pioneer scholar who explained how, despite the peril of anarchy, States can cooperate through institutions. He explained how international institutions after World War Two were created by the global hegemon, the USA, and how they have acquired survival capacity even at the relative decline of the hegemon and how they are proliferating in line with the normative pulse generated thereof, even after the decline of the hegemony. He offered a “plausibility probe” (Powell 1994) of his theory by examining the cases of international trade, finance, and petroleum. In his After “Hegemony,” Keohane shows how power of the States became issue specific in determining the outcomes in the 1973 oil embargo case and how military power proved to be impotent in that case. It has been becoming more so in the current world. The HTP and neoliberalism have common ground here both identify the impotence of military power and emphasize on increasing instrumentality of issue-specific power. One of the core assertions of the holistic theoretical proposition is the instrumentality of issue-specific power in the contemporary world. Keohane and Nye (1977, p. 44), in fact, presented the concept of issue structuralism where power resources in one area have little or no relevance for another area. They considered the power of the actors in two dimensions: issue structuralism and overall structuralism. Their conclusion is that new theories in a combination of the issue structure and international organization models would increasingly become more useful in explaining world politics. It is very close to the conceptions of the holistic theoretical proposition but fundamentally differs from it as the former ultimately rely solely on the materialistic elements without taking into cognizance the importance of normative imperatives. Normative imperatives define and determine the power of the actors,

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be it at the specific issue level or the overall structure level—this is the central argument through which the holistic theoretical proposition and neorealism can be distinguished. Neo-liberalism rightly identified that the gap between power capabilities (in terms of resources) and effective power (to contribute something to happen) has been expanding. Neoliberalism smartly departs from the realist emphasis on a single, integrated measurement of national power and suggests instead a multidimensional approach (compare Baldwin 2002); however, by emphasizing material power alone, it again falls in the similar shortcomings.31 Keohane and Nye (1977) acknowledged that their knowledge was limited to only a few developed western countries, i.e., their theories did not capture the situation of the vast number of other countries around the world. It is true that, during the time of their works mentioned above, only a few western developed countries were the decisive players in the global political economy but, today, the world is very different. At that time the developed countries constituted two-thirds of the World GDP, today the developing countries constitute two-thirds. Today, emerging countries like China, India, Brazil, and South Africa wield no less clout than the developed ones. These contemporary realities need to be captured in IR theories. The theory of complex interdependence pioneered by Keohane and Nye (1977, 1987) identified three characteristics: multiple channels of contact among the societies, absence of clear hierarchies of issues, and impotence of the military might today. They posit that “insofar as military force is ineffective on certain issues, the conventional notion of power lacks precision. In particular, different power resources may be needed to deal with different issues” (1977, p. 7). The conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition align with all these assertions. Today, multinational and transnational companies constitute at least 25–30% of world output, 70% of world trade, and 80% of investment (McGrew 2008). Most of them (96%) are based in highly developed countries, and most of the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is circulated within the developed and the emerging countries. These companies are the technology leaders who account for almost all of the research and development funding (above 80%). Any unrest would affect them, may cost the career of the political leadership, and overthrow them from the power. These complex situations also act as a deterrence to pursue cooperation instead of war. Keohane was one of the first few scholars who recognized that the hegemonic world order was ending and that, after the hegemonic order, a rule-based international system was the anticipated path ahead. The recognition of the importance of the international institutes made their theory distinct from realism but, while many of their conjectures were novel and extraordinarily brilliant, they failed to appreciate and emphasize the cardinal role of the contemporary global normative imperatives that act as a vital force behind the diminishing importance of hegemony. 31

Keohane and Nye (1987, p. 728) also clarified that both realism and the theories deriving from this school had the common ontology that orbited around a utilitarian view of the world where the actors pursue their own interests in response to incentives. The role of intangible elements like Ideas, norms, normative imperatives, and culture is absent from their theory too.

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Keohane clearly states that he considers the existence of mutual interest as given (1984, p. 6); neither attach importance on normative imperatives, nor do count the prevailing socio-economic conditions. However, mutual interest can be anything. For example, a few countries can gang up to exterminate certain populations they consider problematic for their “holy ambition,” to occupy other countries for economic exploitation, or to expand national territory through mutual consensus, as we have seen during the middle age. In reality, today taking these kinds of projects is not possible because all the States are contrived by the normative imperatives of the time. Keohane and Nye, in the preface of the first edition of the book “power and interdependence,” criticized the one-sided realist purview that emphasized the everpresent possibility of war among sovereign States and asserted the role of formal and informal international institutions (read organizations) that is creating a different culture. However, in the end, they did not pay attention to the normative imperatives; instead presented rationalist logic that is based on self-interest. Starting from a proper recognition of the problem, the neoliberalism fell back to a similar deficiency as the realist theories do.

2.3.8 Marxism vis-à-vis the Holistic Theoretical Proposition Marxism is a tradition of social theory that emerged in the mid-nineteenth century. Within this tradition, several theories, such as Imperialism, Revolution, the World System, etc., emerged. The State and its roles in international interactions are nearly absent from Marxist theories. In contrast, the culture created by the Westphalian State system has acquired irreversible path dependency in the international system today, and there does not seem any prospect that this path will be altered in the foreseeable future. We cannot rewrite history with our own will or imagination, and developments in the human world do not occur in a vacuum instead grow from preexisting foundations. Marxist theories attract little academic attention today. The countries where Marxism flourished most, like Russia or China, are more nationalistic today than Marxist. This fact discourages us to delve much with Marxist theories here. Geeraerts and Jing (2001) opine that, like all other theories, Marxism might have had merit when it was developed but, in the changed world situation, especially since the time of nuclear deterrence, it has become obsolete. Nonetheless, the spread of Marxism is an example of how vital the effects of ideas can be. These ideas fueled the former USSR’s power to such an extent that it became one of the world’s two superpowers. Among the Marxist theories, Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974, 1980, 1989) “World System Theory” probably is the most persuasive in the context of the current world. In his theory, he divides the world into three segments: a core, semi-periphery, and periphery. The economies of these segments are characterized by technology and innovation, capital, and labor, respectively. Wealth is transferred from the bottom

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(labor-intensive economies) to the top (technology and innovation-based economies) in this system. This fragmentation is evident today too, but the less developed States are also catching up within this system. As long as direct exploitation is not the case, the comparative advantage of the economies of the lesser states will gradually minimize the gap and create indigenous capital. This will lead to a gradual erosion of the dominance of the wealthy countries, as we have been witnessing today. The historical path has already established the role of the States in governing the affairs of their citizens, and their prosperity and progress all depend on how the States develop the institutes, discipline, and system. All Marxist theories seriously fail to accommodate this reality about the role of States. Thus, the Marxist theories fundamentally differ from the perspective of the holistic theoretical proposition. In view of the above, this work restrains from further discussion on the Marxist theories.

2.3.9 Constructivism, a Holistic Paradigm Yet Not Complete Constructivism is one of the three most prominent schools of IR. Compared to the other prominent schools, i.e., liberalism and realism, constructivism is rather a new tradition. Constructivism offers alternative purviews against many basic tenets of the rationalist theories, such as its conjecture that anarchy is nothing other than a manifestation of culture, so it becomes what the actors want it to be; a State’s identity and interest determine its adversary and utility of its power, not merely the material capability; the power of the actors is holistic (explained in detail later); and that the changes in the world happen due to the interactions of the agents and the structure, which are mutually constituted. Thus, the balance of power profoundly revolves around the identity and alignment of the States, not merely the material power. While the rationalist scholars rely on the behavioral models based on utility maximization, Constructivists instead focus on the underlying conceptions as to how the social and political world works. The merit of Constructivism is that it recognizes the environment in which the actors act in accordance with their social as well as material resources and that this setting, in turn, dictates them to define their interests (compare Checkel 1998). In other words, when the actors ask, “What is this? What should I do about this?”, the prevailing environment (norms) guides them about what to do. If there is no intersubjective set of norms and practices, then the structure, what is termed anarchy by the major IR theories, becomes meaningless (Hopf 1988). These intersubjective sets of norms and practices can be compared with the term “normative imperatives” that the proposition developed in this chapter refers to. Hopf (1988) further postulates that “determining the outcome will require knowing more about the situation than about the distribution of material power or the structure of authority” (ibid.) and that neorealism assumes only one meaningful identity of the States, i.e., self-interest, while Constructivism assumes multiple variables, like the historical, cultural, political, and social context. One will need to know about

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the culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules, and social practices that constitute the actors and structure alike. According to Wendt (1999, p. 185), anarchy is not the structure but, rather, the practice exercised by the States because “structure exists, has effects, and evolves because of agents and their practices” (original emphasis). Wendt (1999), in his “Social Theory of International Politics,” consolidated a persuasive and holistic proposition by suggesting to incorporate ideas and powers constitutive together.32 In the view of Wendt (1999, p. 32), Constructivism (along with English school, World Society Theory, Postmodern IR, and Feminist IR) is situated in the highest echelon with regard to holism and idealism, while realism/neorealism lies in the lowest echelon, with the characteristics of individualism and materialism. He posits liberalism and, to some extent, neoliberalism in the higher echelon concerning idealism but in the lower one with regard to holism. The Marxist theories are more holistic but materialist, he postulates. Wendt proposed to combine power and interest from realism, the content of which is constituted of ideas and culture that, as a whole, determine the courses of international politics (Wendt 1999, p. 371). This is a holistic proposition that breaks through the reservations of many scholars who emphasize keeping positivist and post-positivist theories separated as their ontologies are different. This assertion on ontological sanctity has been an obstacle that leads to a cursory understanding of the problem, which the holistic theoretical proposition also aspires to overcome. Both oxygen and the heart are essential for human life, as both of them are indispensable for running the respiratory and blood circulation system. We can easily see the heart and find its circulation system, arteries, and veins, but we cannot see the oxygen. Similar to this is the role of ideas and knowledge in international politics. Material factors, like military power, GDP, geo-political location, are easy to identify and measure, but the role of ideas in global politics, like the role of oxygen in the body, is difficult to discern. We can logically realize that the system would fail in the absence of either the heart or oxygen. In that case, the question regarding which one is more important is irrelevant. Similarly, in the absence of either material or ideational factors, an actor will not sustain its power for long. If so, the insistence of some scholars on remaining ontologically monotheistic by adhering only to either side sounds absurd, and it may lead to the conception of a theoretical proposition that is lame. Constructivist theories attempt to overcome this limitation, the HTP do so too.

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Hopf (1998, pp. 177–178) mentions that “the notion that ideas are a form of power, that power is more than brute force, and that material and discursive power are related are not new. Mechel Foucault’s articulation of the power/knowledge nexus, Antonio Gramsci’s theory of ideological hegemony, and Marx Weber’s differentiation of coercion from authority are all precursors to Constructivism’s position on power in political life”. He adds that (p. 199) since, in Constructivism, power is both material and discursive, the States’ pattern of behavior should be understood as a result of material or economic power, which work in concert with the prevailing ideological structures, social practices, institutionalized norms and intersubjective webs of meaning.

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Hopf (1998, p. 180) articulates one specificity of the constructivist conception of power: it posits that power is “the power to reproduce, discipline and police…conceives the politics of identity as a continual contest for control over the power necessary to produce meaning in a social group.” In this way, the contest to define the meaning induces the potential for change. Copeland (2000) points out that the central difference between structural realism and Constructivism is that the former concentrates on anarchy and the distribution of relative power that determine the course of international politics while the latter contends that intersubjective ideas shape behavior, instead of merely the distribution of power, by constituting the identities and interests of the actors. As it is also posited in the HTP, Constructivists assume that the great power in the contemporary world would differ from earlier epochs because we are now living in a world of flow instead of a world of borders (Holslag and Geeraerts 2011). Tang (2011c) elaborately explained how the foundational paradigms of the social sciences are dictated by their ontological logics and how each leads only to a (highly) limited understanding of a problem as a whole. He proposes that an adequate understanding of an issue requires the synthesis of all 11 foundational paradigms or at least several of the more prominent and relevant ones. He emphasizes that we first need to find our ontology and epistemology correctly because no amount of methodology will be able to compensate for this if they are wrong; ontology comes before epistemology and epistemology before methodology (p. 215). In his view, a synthesis of the ontological distinctions mentioned above can lead to a better foundation visà-vis remaining rigid to a single angle (compare p. 219). In the same vein, we also advance here that we should not fall into a flawed theoretical conception due to a fear of methodological difficulties. Instead, we should try to invent a methodology for comprehensive theoretical propositions that can offer better, realistic, and holistic explanations. It may sound odd to note Waltz’s (1990, p. 27) comment that complexity does not work against a theory; rather, the objective of a theory is to deal with complexity. The holistic theoretical proposition is profoundly indebted to the constructivist perspectives. The proposition of Wendt to combine power and interest from realism, the content of which is constituted of ideas and culture that, as a whole, determine the courses of international politics, has the closest affinity of all the IR theories with the holistic theoretical proportion. The idea of combining positivist and postpositivist ontologies provides a strong base for the holistic theoretical proposition. While there are ample affinities like these, the holistic theoretical proposition can be distinguished by its distinct claim of the normative imperatives, which pushes the States to behave in a certain way. Constructivism discussed it differently under the rubric of culture, but there are subtle distinctions between the two; culture does not necessarily means imperatives. The holistic theoretical proposition developed a model to measure power, which can be applied in real cases, which is also distinct.

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2.3.10 Some More Contemporary and Innovative Concepts A common fallacy that the students of IR often fall-in is bluntly correlating the analogies from historical events to the context of the current world without considering the profound changes that have happened, as discussed in the introduction.33 For example, many realists confuse themselves by connecting their works with Thucydides or Machiavelli. Kenneth Waltz was too much infused with the realist thoughts that the profound changes in the contemporary world sounded to him as cacophony on the sidelines. Chinese realist scholar Yan Xuetong tries to develop indigenous theories taking lessons from the ancient Chinese scholarship, but China’s world view was very different at that time because Chinese people did not know much about the outside world. China was the world for them; only a few inferior “barbarians,” in their view, were staying out of the “tianxia” (land under heaven) (Chen 2005). During the European colonial period, they suddenly discovered that some “barbarians” intruded on their country surprisingly with better military refinement. Some Chinese scholars recognized the existence of IR scholarship in China since the invasion by the Western countries in the nineteenth century, and China only had the concept of “tianxia” and “chengbang” (city-state) in the past (Geeraerts and Jing 2001, p. 259). In the Indian subcontinent, two prominent ancient political philosophy is notable. One is Ashoka’s (c. 304–233 B.C.E.) policy of winning the hearts of the subjects by spreading the ideology of peace while keeping the army most strong among all. The other is Kautilya’s (c. 350–283 B.C.E) shrewd and crooked strategy of competing with the neighboring powers while making alliances with distant powers, appeasing and challenging, attacking the rulers who are unpopular to its subject (Ahmed 1993, pp. 216–226). In the case of the Middle East, teleological conceptions shaped politics for a long period of time. They tried to imagine themselves as divine creatures sent to the Earth for a certain period of time and would go back to heaven or hell if they fail to fulfill the duties they are given to perform on the Earth by the Almighty God. Most of the abovementioned ancient conceptions have little relevance in today’s profoundly interconnected world, which has acquired a stature of a global village. All the essential information is at the reach of a fingertip in real-time to almost all the people around the world. The politics in such a world is tremendously perplexing to which the ancient scholars did not live in. In such a world, the concept of framing could serve as a useful tool to conceptualize and interpret the political waves.34 What is possible is to contextualize the essence of the cultural molding acquired over time that affects the behavior of the polities and societies. It may be that the cultural traits have been infused in the psyche of the polity, and they today try to 33

The arguments of Brown et al. (2002, p. 4) is notable in this regard: “It is a mistake to think that there is a timeless agenda of political questions that thinkers from all ages can be taken to be addressing; instead each thinker addresses the agenda of his or her own age in his or her own terms. It may be that their agendas can, in certain circumstances, be seen to be not dissimilar to ours, but this identification cannot be taken for granted; it has to be argued for on a case-by-case basis”. 34 This book contains three individual case studies that use the concept of framing.

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synchronize those with the intensely interconnected world, an admixture of which dictates distinct national identities and conceptions of roles when they engage in international interactions. Various concepts and analytical tools are being developed by the practitioners of IR, which largely evade the theoretical debates, as discussed in the previous section. Some of those are briefly discussed below. Network power: The World today is more about flows than about frontiers. ICTgenerated flows are creating myriads of actors and generating as well as disseminating discourses within the networks. Castells (2013, p. 779) rightly observed that “Social power throughout history, but even more so in the network society, operates primarily by the construction of meaning in the human mind through process of communication. In the network society, this is enacted in global/local multimedia networks of mass communication, including self-communication…”. Keck and Sikkink (1999) denote three major types of networks: economic actors and farms, scientists and experts, and transnational advocacy networks (TAN). ICT-generated networks have no boundary, and information is flowing in real-time. Information is power, and it has profoundly empowered the people in the current world. The farms which have more up-to-date information perform better than those lacking it. Those scientists and experts who are in a better network are in a better position to succeed. Many TAN exert their powers by creating pressures for their preferred policies like democracy, human rights, environment, transparency. To do so, they engage in information politics via issue framing. These networks are “lighter on their feet” than hierarchy and are particularly apt for circumstances in which there is a need for efficient, reliable information. Epistemic Community: Before the Westphalian system, religious leaders had a tremendous influence on political power. Framing was a premier conduit for them through which they molded up the mindset of the populace. They were the sages of their time, at least in the perception of the people of that time. The epistemic community can be compared as the sages of today’s world. Epistemic community is “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” (Adler and Haas 1992). They help eliminate the artificial boundary between international and domestic politics and accentuate dynamics between structure and human volition. In today’s world, it is complicated for political leaders and policymakers to conceptualize complex problems, like the issue of climate change, for example, and take decisions accordingly. In such an environment, the epistemic communities help policymakers to identify and conceptualize the problems, suggest various policy options and possible outcomes from those options. In today’s globalized world, they are highly interconnected, and national boundaries cannot obstruct them from their own world of knowledge. Hass (1992) elaborated on how epistemic community contributes to altering the perception of the people and how they frame issues in the contemporary world. The epistemic community is increasingly shaping the policymaker’s vision; thus, they are becoming a part of the policymaking process in international politics in their respective issue arenas.

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Mass Collaborative Actions: ICT has brought about vistas of opportunities for mass collaborative generation of knowledge. It has even created the possibility of mass collaborative generation of knowledge in complicated fields like mathematics, needless to mention the arenas of philosophy or political science. The works of the IPCC, where thousands of scientists and experts collaborate to find out the causes and impacts of climate change, is another glaring example. The project “correlates of war” is another. Castells (2013) rightly observed that “Social power throughout history, but even more so in the network society, operates primarily by the construction of meaning in the human mind through a process of communication. In the network society, this is enacted in global/local multimedia networks of mass communication, including self-communication…”. Let us take an example. Wikipedia is one of the most visited websites for first-hand information. The information is generated by mass people, but there are controllers who check and reformulate sensitive information and thus hold considerable power to shape up the output. There are innumerable such examples of mass collaborative knowledge generation tools like YouTube, Linked-in, Youku, Khan Academy, virtual schools, google scholar. The people of the world have globally overcome the obstacles of the availability of information. Constructivists argue that a world shaped by better knowledge would foster peace and cooperation. Securitization: Securitization theories are promoted by the Copenhagen School of IR, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver are the pioneer scholars (see particularly Buzan and Wæver 1998). Securitization means constructing a referent object by securitizer(s) as an existential threat through the public speech act. A referent object is an entity or issue that is under threat and needs to be protected. Securitizer is an actor who presents issues as an existential threat to the referent object. Political elites and security professionals are the most prominent securitizers (Karyotis 2007, p. 274). Delivering a speech to frame-up the mindset of the people about an existential threat is a speech act. An utterance of the word “security” itself is the speech act (Wæver 1993). The concept almost always poses the State as a referent object though society can also be, sometimes, referred to so. In today’s world, all serious political intervention, especially military intervention, requires securitization of the issue. Interventions like that in Iraq in 2003 and Libya in 2009 would not have been possible without securitizing the regimes. The issue of climate change has also been studied by some scholars using this lens (for example, Brzoska 2009). Framing: The concept of framing has been widely used in media research. Three chapters of this book contain separate empirical studies using this concept. The concept has been discussed in detail in the latter part of this book. The pioneer of the concept, Entman (1993), defines it is as follows. “Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience…Texts can make bits of information more salient by placement or repetition or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols” (p. 53). In the current world of “flow,” the concept of framing can serve as a vital tool to analyze international politics. Framing embodies and, at the same time, shapes the mental schemata of individuals, society, and States. Sometimes frames become

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so solid that their effects become not any less consequential than the destructive weapons are. Just think about fundamentalist suicide bombers whose mental schemata are shaped by absolutely non-sense superstitions. Think about the Nazi people in Germany or, in contrast, Napoleonic France. If we consider the religious wars or ideological wars that occurred in the past, we can understand how profound the effects of framing had always been. In the contemporary world, it has become complicated due to the spread of information through ICT-generated tools. Both States and media have lost their monopoly to frame the issues within their territory because ICT-generated tools have no boundary and are too immense to maneuver (see the sixty minutes’ diagram presented at Infographic 2.1). Nonetheless, the concept has immense potential to serve as a useful tool to analyze political events and processes, albeit differently from earlier times. The concept and its tools are more elaborately discussed in Chap. 3 and are applied in Chaps. 4–6.

2.4 Measuring Power of the Nations: Further Review and Comparison with the Holistic Theoretical Proposition Power has always been the most crucial topic of IR theories; however, there had not been commensurate efforts to measure the power of the nations. Mearsheimer (2001) posits that what money is to economics power is to IR. Morgenthau (1948) defines power as “man’s control over the minds and actions of other men.” Joseph Nye (1990) compares power with love because “it is easier to experience than to define or measure.” We cannot say that we love one person 4.9 times more than another person. We feel it. Xuetong (2006) concludes that quantitative measurement of power can hardly be accurate and reliable because assigning values and selecting the factors of power is a very subjective process. Nevertheless, power defined as potential to determine the outcomes is necessary to measure, because we should not just toss a coin and blindly predict an outcome. Despite the difficulties, it is much better to try to develop the best possible measuring method than to give it up. While this chapter has earlier elaborated the pertinent theories and propositions of the calculation of power by some prominent scholars like Morgenthau (1948, where he identified nine components), Waltz (1979, p. 131; 2000, p. 50 where he proposed six indicators), Cline (1975, 1977), Xuetong (2006, 2008, 2011), Mearsheimer (2001), and Nye (1990, 2004, 2011); here it concentrates on some of the other works which have exclusively delved with measuring power. It needs to acknowledge here that Höhn (2011) has made the most comprehensive literature review ever, as we have found, on the measurement of national power. His Ph.D. dissertation has brought about all the known major scholarly efforts by presenting 69 power formulas developed by the scholars from 1741 till 2010. Recently Qi (2017) and Beckley (2018) also exclusively focused on this topic. It can

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be assumed that after studying all of them, the literature on measurement of power has been sufficiently reviewed. Like our case, Höhn (2011, p. 252) also reached the conclusion that he was unable to prescribe a reliable solution to the problem of measuring power. It needs to underline here that the primary objective is not to develop the best measurement method in our case. Our understanding is that it is not possible. What we have tried here is to grasp the contour of power in the context of the contemporary world, its confines, and an indicative method for measurement, which has later been tested through empirical studies. Of the 69 power formulas Höhn (2011) summarized, discussion on a handful of the most important ones follows. Frank Clifford German (1960) published a seven-page article titled “A tentative evaluation of world power” in which he presented a complicated power index. Höhn (2011, p. 83) extracted the arguments of German and presented the following simplified version of the formula: G = N (L + P + I + M ) G = national power; N = nuclear capability; L = land ; P = populaiton; I = industrial base; M = military size The cardinal objective of the formula was to calculate fighting power. The proposition developed in this chapter first clarified why the “fighting force” has become less relevant today and why we need to focus on issue-specific power. In this view, the formula does not bear much merit today. However, following aspects are worth taking away from it. First, though it is about fighting power, the immense weight given to nuclear capability speaks about the reality of the time when the article was written. It was a time when nuclear capability overshadowed all other conventional wisdom with regard to the components of power. It reveals how the scholars perceived the power at that point in time and advocates how the factors of power change with technological innovation. This is what the proposition presented in this chapter also argues. Second, German presented some straightforward and commonsensical elements of power; in fact, he honestly acknowledged that he had no option but to opt for this selective and subjective criterion (p. 139). The HTP has acknowledged the same. Nonetheless, his formula had subsequently acquired remarkable scholarly attention and has garnered many citations. The pioneer of the project entitled “Correlates of War (COW)” Joel David Singer (1925–2009) had also pioneered the establishment of the Composite Indicator of National Capability (CINC) project. Together with Stuart Bremer, Singer in 1972 published an article that proposed the CINC, and since then, it has probably served as the most widely used method in measuring power (compare Russett et al. 2004, p. 110). More than 1000 peer-reviewed works have used (CINC) in calculating power. The CINC uses six indicators, which are as follows:

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%ME + %MP + %IS + %NRG + %UP + %TP % 6 = means calculated vis-a-vis World total of the respective indicator;

CINC =

ME = military expenditure; MP = military personnel; IS = iron and still production; NRG = energy consumption; UP = urban population; TP = total population Iron and steel production and energy consumption have been given great importance which reflect the time this formula was formulated. Alike the previous one and the HTP, it also signifies that the variables of power are dependent on the instrumentality of the indicators at a given point of time. Some scholars tried to improve the CINC calculation method by adding soft power variable to compose a “Composite of Hard and Soft Power” (Höhn 2011). This indicates that the essence of our theoretically guided proposition presented in this chapter had also somehow come to some scholars’ minds earlier. Kadera and Sorokin (2004) proposed to use the concept of geometric mean instead of CINC’s arithmetic mean. Their formula is termed GINC, and it turned to be as follows: (%ME + %MP + %IS + %NRG + %UP + %TP)1 % 6 = means calculated vis-a-vis World total of the respective indicator; ME = military expenditure; MP = military personnel;

GINC =

IS = iron and still production; NRG = energy consumption; UP = urbanpopulation; TP = total population We also had tried geometric mean in our initial attempts, but later it was dropped as differences in outcomes were not much significant; instead, it increased the complexity. In essence, it is not much different from the formula of the CINC. Höhn (2011) opines that the power formula posited by former American CIA analyst and political scientist Ray Steiner Clein (1918–1996) is globally the bestknown formula ever produced. The idea of attaching importance both on the political and economic competitiveness alongside the military might made his formula attractive to the scholars. The formula has acquired special appreciation by Chinese scholars, too (Höhn 2011). A basic version of his formula can be presented as follows (Xuetong 2008; Höhn 2011) Pp = (C + E + M ) × (S × W ) Pp = perceived power; C = critical mass = population + territory E = economic capability; M = military capability; S = strategic purpose; W = National will

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Many scholars have identified the extraordinary implication of national will, German philosopher Immanuel Kant is most known in this regard. Strategic purpose might also implicate the same. However, there is a serious problem with this most acclaimed formula. If either of the “strategic purpose” or the “national will” fall to zero, the perceived power also turns to zero. The logic of multiplication appears fatally erroneous because it can mathematically poise the Pp of a country to the level of zero, which is in reality absurd.35 The equation is all about the comprehensive national power, it does not delve with issue-specific power, which is, as explained earlier, more relevant today. An attractive concept in classifying issue-specific power appears not to have derived from a purely academic work but from an article published in a renowned newspaper titled “Newsweek” headquarter of which is situated in New York. It categorized the issue-specific power as follows (taken from Höhn 2011, p. 154): Military power

Economic power

Military Exports spending

Resource power

Oil reserves Nobel prizes in science

Nuclear Competitiveness Freshwater warheads (WEF Index) supplies

Weapons Total GDP exports

Technology Diplomatic power power

Patents granted

Agricultural Internet exports users and personal computers

Movie power

Donors in foreign aid

Feature-film production

UN Security Council

Film investment

Environmental Movie treaties tickets sold per year

Social power

Quality of life (UN Index) Housing: people per room

The above chart represents the components of issue-specific power (as assumed by the writer) in the respective fields. The first four columns represent material power, and the last three columns can be categorized as components of soft power. However, the issues today also interweave with one another, which require to accentuate the issue-specific power to be holistic, that the holistic theoretical proposition posits. The US National Intelligence Council, a body that advises the US president, uses an index that combines military spending, GDP, population, and R&D spending (Beckley 2018, p. 17). Commissioned by the United States Army, Tellis (2001) made an extensive study to measure “national power in the post-industrial age.” Though by virtue of the commission, it is to serve the interest of the USA exclusively, they have reviewed 35

An example has been cited earlier that the complete ideological collapse of the former USSR did not turn its comprehensive power to the level of zero, although it did reduce the same. Materially less powerful countries in the climate negotiation process, the AOSIS, could achieve remarkable gains from the Paris Agreement thanks to their normative power (Betzold 2010; Betzold et al. 2012). The withdrawal of the USA from the Paris Agreement under President Trump did not render the USA’s climate power to the level of zero as its emissions remained the second-highest on the globe, so was its weight. Thus, this proposition is flawed.

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some of the notable works to this effect, and it is a valuable resource for the literature of calculation of power. It appears that Höhn’s (2011) dissertation is considerably indebted to this work as many of the references and trends of the explanation of the book have been found similar in Hohn’s work. The book also contains all the references made in his dissertation. The authors suggest to calculate power in three spectrums: national resources, national performance, and military capability. For national resources, they suggest the components like technology (measured by seven indicators), enterprise (measured by three indicators), human resources (measured by formal education, which have six sub-indicators), financial and capital resources (measured by three indicators), and physical resources (measured by two indicators). For national performance, they suggest infrastructure capability (measured by three indicators) and ideational resources (measured by three indicators). For military strength, they suggest strategic resources (measured by six indicators), conversion capability (measured by two indicators), and combat proficiency measured by various technology and integration indicators. However, none of the measurement methods suggested bear any concrete formula; they merely remain descriptive. Qi (2017) studied the Chinese scholars’ publications on power and found that Chinese scholars tended to show China’s comprehensive power lesser than the foreign scholars did (p. 221). The reasons behind such a trend, as she opines, could be due to the fact that the Chinese scholars who worked on this issue came mostly from mathematics or statistics background, and they usually tended to incorporate many indicators. The Chinese scholars sometimes incorporated more than 100 indicators in calculating comprehensive power while the foreign scholars considered a much lesser number of indicators. She mentions that the prominent Chinese scholar Huang Shuofeng, for example, includes 150 indicators in his calculation, while US prominent scholar Ray Cline used only 44 indexes. The calculation method of the scholars having background only in natural science bears the veritable risk of misconceiving the logic behind the selection of the indicators because they may not have a proper understanding of the nature of the international politics. The usefulness of the factors of power also varies across time, as it has been explained above. The inclusion of more indicators does not necessarily lead to more accuracy; instead, it risks yielding misleading or ambiguous indications. It is necessary to properly grasp the fundamentals of international politics, the blends of the contemporary world, the confines, and the crucial elements of power that strike the stroke. The IR scholars, as discussed above, have done better in this regard. Yan Xuetong of the Tsinghua University of Beijing is one of the most prominent Chinese scholars who has worked to fathom the power status of China vis-à-vis the global powers. His works have been referred to in different parts of this book. Xuetong (2006) denotes that since the 1990s, there has been more than ten evolutions of methods used for the purpose of measuring power, but there has neither developed a common method nor a consistency of any single method in the subsequent works. He cited examples that Tsinghua University classified 8 categories and 23 indices, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences used eight categories and 63 indices, The Academy of Military Science of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) developed a seven-category system which consists of 29 secondary indices and over 100 tertiary

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indices, the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations have proposed seven categories and 115 indices (ibid.). The ranking of the countries also differed as per the variation of the indicators selected. By using common sense in IR, Xuetong (2006, p. 21) instead posits that China ranked second in the world by virtue of its military, political, and economic power. The scholars of China and Japan concentrated on comprehensive national power (CNP) since the 1980s. Chinese scholar Huang Shuofeng (Quoted in Zheng 1999) claims to have pioneered the concept. Höhn (2011), in his extensive study of the literature, finds that, compared to the westerners, Chinese thinkers had a tendency toward a broader conception of national power and national security, particularly with regard to intangibles like strategy, culture, and some other similar aspects which can be compared with the recently acclaimed concept of soft power in the west. Chinese scholar Ding Fengjun presented the following formula for the CNP in the year 1987 (Höhn 2011) CNS = SP × HP = (P + T + S) × [R(N + H + E + D)] CNS = comprehensive national power; SP = soft power; HP = hard power; P = political power; T = science and technology competitiveness; S = spiritual power; R = hard power coefficient; N = forces of nature; H = human; E = economic strength; D = defense force Huang Shoufeng, a senior colonel of Chinese Military Academy, put forward a dynamic conception of national power in 1989 and presented the following motion formula (Höhn 2011): Yt = kt + (Ht)α × (St)β y = comprehensive national output; k = coordinated coefficient; h = mass of CNPs = acceleration of CNP ; t = time; α = hard elasticity index; β = soft elasticity index In the indigenous Indian IR, Kautilya’s Arthashastra serves as the key source. According to Kautilya, “strength is power, and happiness is the end…, hence a king shall always endeavor to augment his own power and elevate his happiness” (Kautilya, Arthashastra 6.2.). The term “Arthashastra” literally means mantras of economics. Baru (2009) explains the essence of this book: treasury is the source from where military strength emerges and bolsters, and wealth begets wealth and strength. The Indian National Security Index (NSI) is the premier body in India that endeavors to fathom the power of the nations. The NSI’s method is essentially an adaptation of the Sino-Japanese CNP style, with some exceptionality of addition of

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human development index and holistic security paradigm, which are very pertinent for a largely underdeveloped country like India (Höhn 2011, p. 231). The calculation of soft power has been identified by scholars as a paramount difficult task. Joseph Nye and other scholars used various indirect indicators like per capita usage of information technology, the number of patents, R&D expenditure, book sales, music sales, the number of top brand names, etc. Such calculations reach flawed conclusions, which were proved by the causal observations (Wang and Lu 2008, p. 446). Though Joseph Nye pioneered the attention toward this “attractive” feature of power in the contemporary world, he could so far offer little clue as to how to gauge the power. In this work, we use the ranking presented in a website which is developed by the scholars working particularly to develop measurement criterion of power and soft power for the last three decades; still, we have no alternative but to admit that the scores taken in this work are nothing more than indicative figures. Paradise (2009) suggests invoking public opinion polls to gauge soft power, which could be a good alternative. In the case of China, though the Chinese scholars only started paying attention to soft power from the late 1990s (Cho and Jeong 2008; Wang and Lu 2008).36 Soft power had been considered a vital conduit of Chinese foreign policy since Chairman Mao’s time. The most glaring example of it is the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. During that time, China took a social mobilizing strategy to acquire moral superiority by aligning itself with the Third World, a term that became popular all around the world after Deng Xiaoping’s stipulation of it in a 1974 speech before the UN General Assembly (Larson 2015). At that time, China’s military weakness had been compensated by the moral appeal to the developing countries and, thus, acquiring their support. This solid conviction and understanding of the then world’s normative imperatives enabled Deng Xiaoping to downgrade the importance of military modernization and cut the defense spending that helped generate more funds for domestic investment and that translated into China’s march toward faster development (Larson 2015; Vogel 2011). Despite the memory of 200 years of subjugation, China could dare to take up such policies because of proper understanding of the normative imperatives that have been in place after the Second World War, which is the core of the conjectures of the proposition presented in this chapter. After the late 1990s, the terms like “responsible power theory” and “harmonious world” have served in a similar way to boost China’s soft power to attract the moral support of the other States. Cho and Jeong (2008) argue that the foundation of China’s soft power today lies in the Chinese development model, foreign policy centered on the peaceful rise or peaceful development theories, and the longest continuous civilization in the world that China to date belongs to. 36

Through a search in the Chinese Academic Journal database, they found that the phrase first appeared in Chinese academia around 1997 but it genuinely embarked on academic discourses since 2001. Qi (2017, p. 225) posited that the term was first introduced in 1993 by Wang Huning, a former professor of Fudan University and current key adviser of President Xi Jinping.

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Hu Jintao’s period realized more concretely that in order to enhance China’s international status, it is required to advance both hard power and soft power and that a country cannot be recognized as a great power unless its values, norms, and way of life have appeal for others (Larson 2015). Though most of the study on the literature revealed that most of the Chinese scholars were worried about China’s soft power, some western scholars appear to be believing that in recent years China’s soft power has increased profoundly and even had exceeded that of the USA in case of the attractiveness of development model, stability and market management (see Lyane 2018). A recent work by Beckley (2018) titled “The Power of the Nations” claims that almost all the previous works on measuring power were founded on the wrong percept. After studying all the previous works that measured the power of the nations, he convincingly claims that all of them, including around one thousand research articles that calculated the power based on CINC data, were flawed as they based their calculation on gross resources. He proposes to contrast the net resources of the States instead, where the costs a State already is exposed to bear internally due to its, among other things, large population, geographic location, to maintain internal instability are to be deducted. He reruns some of the existing works, makes qualitative explanations against some major cases in history, and proves that the previous assumptions were founded on wrong premises. Though Beckley’s (2018) work establishes that his concept of net resources yields better results than the indicator of gross resources other scholars used, the explanations made in his article per se reflect that the actual cause was more about the technological edge that crucially and effectively mattered in determining the outcomes of the wars. Thus, his claim is probably better than earlier works, but it can be assumed that if he used the lens of technological edge, it could explain his case studies yet better. However, that is not the concern of our case in hand; our objective is to identify what matters today. Beckley’s (2018) work is congruent with the claim that there is no sufficiently convincing method to calculate power. Most scholars who tried to measure power also concluded that they could not definitively find a convincing formula. Beckley, nevertheless, has also failed to subsume the contemporary world where the normative imperatives define the confines of power, which is the cardinal conjecture of the holistic theoretical proposition. He operationalizes the hypothesis by contrasting it with the historical events, but this chapter has explained how the contemporary normative imperatives do not allow the States to leverage their power at their free will, which they used to do in the past. The States cannot go to war anymore solely with their material power because of, inter alia, the normative imperatives, nuclear deterrence, global public sentiment, complex interdependence, and citizen’s resistance. Beckley’s (2018) case studies on the wars between Britain vs. China in 1839– 1911, Japan vs. China during 1874–1945, Germany vs. Russia during 1891–1917, etc. all bear considerable merit, but his discussion on the USA vs. the Soviet Union during 1946–1991 fails completely to bear his logics per se as there was no direct war between them due to the deterring factors described above. The loss of China from

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the Soviet camp due to the USSR’s egoistic policies37 had been the prime underlying factor which paved the way for this implosion. Some of the other main reasons of the collapse of the USSR are its lack of soft power and scant support of other States, as it is also narrated in Beckley’s article. The normative power variable of the holistic theoretical proposition, which incorporates soft power and support of the other actors and subsumes the instrumentality of normative imperatives that shapes the confines of power today, overcomes these shortcomings. The normative imperatives deter States from using violence at their free will and, as it is explained elsewhere, the military power has become mostly impotent for the outcomes in arenas other than military conflict, for example, economic or climate negotiations. It has also been explained in this chapter that the military conflicts today are not happening among the major States. Beckley (2018) and Höhn (2011) posit that wealth can buy soft power, but it is not as simple as assumed. Soft power depends on so many other aspects, as described above. Their assumptions are eclipsed by their ontology that orbit only around materialistic considerations which are devoid of the context of the contemporary world. Xuetong (2006), Qi (2017) and Beckley (2018), as well as some other scholars mentioned above, have extensively studied the previous works, and they have the following observations in common. It is not easy to calculate the power of the nations. Power, like love, is actually suitable to feel than to fathom. From the literature review, it is also evident that the scholars have opted different variables to calculate power at different times, i.e., the context of the changed international system changed their perceived factors of power. This makes it further challenging to develop a consistent effort to measure it. However, as it was always so, power remains at the core of explanatory tools of all the IR theories. It is the most crucial element for understanding international politics in a scientific way. Therefore, though it is difficult to measure, we cannot escape from it. As said earlier, we cannot afford just tossing a coin to guess an outcome blindly. We need to keep trying to gauge it in order to be able to retrace the past and predict the future political courses. Most of the scholars measured power in terms of material resources like wealth and military assets. The difference and the reason as to why the measurement method presented here is distinct are as follows. It first explains the limits of effective power in the contemporary world due to the instrumentality of normative imperatives. Thus, the power capability is not only determined by its factors but is also profoundly dependent on the global normative imperatives at a given point in time. It does not admit that material power is the only determinant; it explains how normative power is equally important in the contemporary world. The HTP posits that the concept of issue-specific power is more pragmatic in the context of the current world than a general account of power. The power of the actors would vary from issue to issue, so would the components of it. Xuetong (2006) also 37

See the conclusion in this chapter.

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posits that a State’s power does not rely on its abstract comprehensive national power; rather, it depends on the specific issues; for example, military power is relevant for security issues, economic power for economic issues, political power to deal with political courses, so on and so forth. The specificity of this proposition is that it reflects on the confines of the issue-specific power too in the context of the abovementioned normative imperatives. Due to the confining effect of the normative imperatives, the normative power has acquired preemminence today; the military power has become less potent. In this context, different issues should be examined separately due to issue-specific instrumentality of power. Therefore, the power should be calculated by taking into account the factors relevant to that particular issue. While almost all the known power formulas have dwelt with comprehensive power, mostly in the perspective of military strength for war, the holistic theoretical proposition underlines the instrumentality of the issue-specific power in today’s world. In this way, the power formulae developed in this chapter is founded through reviewing the works of the other scholars but it is fundamentally distinct. It deems necessary to reiterate here that the objective of the measurement method presented in this work is to provide an indicative formula in line with the fundamentals of the theoretical proposition. It has been explained that other researcher may determine their own indicators for measurement based on the issue they study. It is not possible to reach perfection in calculating power—all the scholars endorsed that their methods of calculation were indicative and not conclusive. The proposition developed here also reaches to the conclusion that the calculation of the power of the actors would be indicative, not definitive, but the essence of the calculation method adopted here could be most suitable in the context of the current world.

2.5 Conclusion In this chapter, we have presented the holistic theoretical proposition, explained how it is founded upon the footprint of the existing literature and how it is distinct in the literature. The norms, and culture of the human society have always been under constant pace of change toward betterment, with occasional retrogression. The difference today in the realm of the 4th industrial revolution, and amid the apocalyptic scale of deterrent capabilities of the major States, is that it is happening at a mesmerizing pace. It is in this context, and amid the impotence of military might among the major protagonists, we presented the holistic theoretical proposition. Eight cardinal takeaways of the proposition are summarized at the end of the sub-Sect. 2.1. The critics of the literature, elaborated in Sect. 2.3, has delineated the shortcomings of the existing major theoretical paradigms and theories, contrasted the proposition with those, and, at the same time, elaborated how the proposition is founded upon those works. The literature on measurement of power was extensively reviewed revealing that the formulae presented in this work were not developed on the void. In essence, the proposition has two basic segments. First, it explained how normative imperatives chain the States toward certain path, diluting the color, contour, and

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vices of anarchy. Second, in line with this ontology, it narrowed down the proposition toward nuanced conception of power and finally presented the proposition, termed a “holistic theoretical proposition.” It postulates that it is still power that determines the outcome of international political processes, but the property of this power is holistic as well as issue specific. The holistic power comprises both material and normative variables and the indicators of the variables vary from issue to issue. In the next step, the proposition was tailored so as to apply it in the cases of some empirical works, which have been presented in Chaps. 4–6 of this work. Power is the central element of most of the IR theories. As such, there are plenty of works that delved with actors’ power and those have been reviewed. It is eventually the theoretical proposition derived through intense brainstorming that led to the selection of the variables of the holistic power counted in combination of the material and normative power variables as the available measurement methods found to be inconsistent with the current world. The identification of normative imperatives is the exclusive specificity of this theoretical proposition. The normative imperatives determine the confines of power, and, in the wake of this reality, the power needs to be calculated issue by issue and as a combined whole of material and normative power vis-à-vis those issues. The variables and their indicators vary from time to time depending on the normative imperatives of the respective epoch. The proposition’s cardinal claim is about this ontology. The formulae developed here should primarily be considered as theoretical attainment and secondarily an operational one. While the theoretical attainment claim superiority, the operational one that tries to find indicators of measurement is only indicative, and it is stated that the latter can be further honed through more rigorous exercises. While the variables and indicators of power have been suggested, it has been clearly stated that the objective of this proposition was not to assert on the selection of those. Almost all such scholarly works found that it is impossible to make a conclusive claim about the measurement. As Beckley (2018) also denotes, although power is the cardinal element of IR theories, it is unreasonable to expect any single power indicator to predict the outcome of every dispute. Nevertheless, it is essential to develop a method for headline indicators instead of tossing a coin to predict the outcomes. It is inescapable to admit that the power struggle is universal in time and space. Whatever context appears in the future, this cardinal pulse would not disappear. However, humanity has developed ways to gradually improve the quality of engagement through continuous upgradation of their social contracts that fosters checks and balances in finding peaceful space by delimiting unbridled whims and greed. Within States, there are agencies to maintain law and order; among States, it is loose but normative imperatives do play a confining role. Finally, we would like to denote here some exceptional or force majeure like situations that create path dependence. Events like 9/11, which destroyed the World Trade Centre in New York, the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, the victory of the Chinese Communist party against Kuomintang, the Sino-Russian sudden rivalry initiated due to the issue of the long-distance radiofrequency on the Pacific Coast, the discovery of nuclear weapons, the sudden Japanese attack on the Pearl Harbor, the

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emergence of Adolf Hitler in Germany, East Indian Company’s unexpected victory against the ruler of Bengal in the war in Plassey, the discovery of America by mistake by Christopher Columbus, are such grand occurrences that implicated lasting effects for the future courses of the global politics. These kinds of unpredictable courses are beyond the scope of any theory. The emergence of the Westphalian State system is another example that has created lasting and irreversible path dependency. These occurrences can be both manmade as well as natural. Holsti (1970) notes “perhaps the foremost example of foreign policy decision which overturned all foreign and domestic expectations and explicitly contradicted the government’s official national role was Stalin’s rapprochement with Nazi Germany in the summer of 1939.” No theory would make their way in this kind of situation. Byman and Pollack (2001) described how the actions of “great man”—i.e., some charismatic national leaders with revisionist traits to disrespect existing norms— determined the courses of many decisive changes and directions of global politics. The year 2018–2019 has seen mushrooming of this kind of traits with the emergence of ultra-nationalist and isolationist leaderships in some major countries. If we lived hundred years back, these “great mans” would have by this time brought us to a world war. The forces of the contemporary normative imperatives and deterrence are safeguarding us from such a menace, but sudden devastating actions by these so called “great mans” cannot be completely ruled out. When a mutation occurs in the DNA (Deoxyribonucleic Acid) code of an animal’s body, an evolution in a particular direction occurs. Events like these cause mutations in the genotype of the political wave and create a path that is followed by the system for a long period of time. If these kinds of change happen, and if human beings are still alive then, new normative imperatives would arise where the societies of the States would again live in. Good to note that every time such changes engulfed human society, the normative imperatives reached newer heights toward betterment, with some exceptions.

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Chapter 3

The Analytical Framework of the Work

The sections of this chapter collectively constitute the analytical framework of the whole work.

3.1 The Concept of Framing and Its Prospect to Analyze Climate Negotiations Framing can be defined as an effort selectively to increase the salience of the viewpoints about an issue in line with the mental schemata of an actor. Frames broadly suggest how an audience should think about a topic (Vossen and Schulpen 2019). It involves the purposeful efforts of the actors to present a world that fits their purview, shaped by their mental schemata, in order to achieve their desired goals. For example, genetically modified food can be framed as an opportunity for alleviating food shortages, while it can also be framed as a dangerous, unseen threat to human health, depending on the logic embedded in the mental schemata of the actor. Snow et al. (1986) defines mental schemata as a phenomenon “that enable individuals to locate, perceive, identify, and label occurrences within their life space and the world at large.” We would further add that “schemata” are perceptions or understanding of a particular issue that organize the categories of information and relationships among them. It is a mental structure for receiving ideas and information. It dictates the way in which knowledge is received. Actors are more likely to notice things that fit into their schema, while information that contradicts them will be considered misinformation or an exception. Proposing social science frames for policy analysis Dryzek (1993, p. 222) posits that “social science frames of reference can be applied to the analysis of policy. It is not just that these frames give different answers to policy questions. Rather, each frame treats some topics as more salient than others, defines social problems in a

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_3

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unique fashion, commits itself to particular value judgments, and generally interprets the world in its own particular and partial way.” Entman et al. (2009) illustrate how political actors, bloggers, political satirists, editorial writers engage in strategic framing to influence the outcome. There are ample works in the field of media and communication research that applied the concept of framing, but in the arena of international negotiation, a very limited number of works have been found to have applied this. This work extrapolates the techniques and methods in this regard from those fields. At the end of this study, it appeared that choosing the concept as the analytical tool was rewarding because it could illustrate the events systematically and scientifically. The act of framing has sometimes been studied by IR scholars without ascribing the notion of “framing.” For example—Tang (2005), in his work on “reputation, cult of reputation and International conflict” posits the term “operational code” that dictates State behavior, which they exhibit through rhetoric. His paper on “reconciliation and remaking of anarchy” refers to the works of Ynian He, who shows how the mental schemata of the people of Germany and Poland could be reconciled through constructing national narratives (comparable with the concept of framing) whereas Japan and China remained stuck with their past in the absence of the same (Tang 2011). Of the many works that have applied the concept in the field of media and communications research, those by Entman (1993), Rein and Schön (1993, 1996), Goffman (1974), Benford and Snow (2000), and Snow (2004) have influenced the most for this work. Entman (1993) is one of the most authoritative and pioneering scholars who advanced the theory. Describing how frames work, he posits that “Frames highlight some bits of information about an item that is the subject of a communication, thereby elevating them in salience…Texts can make bits of information more salient by placement or repetition or by associating them with culturally familiar symbols.” He identified four locations in the communication process of frame building: the communicator, the text, the receiver, and the culture. Ogan et al. (2018) extract Entman’s concept in the following way: framing describes the power to communicate text by embracing aspects like selection and salience; frames are used to create and comprehend pieces of information by making them more noticeable, meaningful, or memorable (salient) in connection with existing values and beliefs (schemata). Entman (1993) postulates that, if an idea or word, even unillustrated, fits existing schemata, the audience will accept it more readily and, once it has been widely accepted, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to change the perception of an audience by offering an alternative or opposing facts, as they will ask about the credibility of the information and even fail to understand the communicator. Rein and Schön (1993) defined frames as “a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting and making sense of complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and acting. A frame is a perspective from which an amorphous, ill-defined, problematic situation can be made sense of and acted on.” Thus, frames provide a cognitive and normative tool that enables policy-actors to perceive an event in their own non-objective way. They suggest recognizing a particular frame

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by viewing it from four angles: the structure, the boundary, conceptual schemata, and generic narratives. In this work, we recognize the frames by considering this suggestion as a linchpin. Rein and Schön (1996) identified two major kinds of frames: rhetoric frames (identified from discourses, speech, memorandum, etc.) and action frames (identified by actual actions like the formulation of laws, regulations, and programs). Using their analogies, our works here can be considered a scrutiny on the rhetoric framing of the actors in line with their logic and how the same yielded the action frames. The Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement are examples of prominent action frames that are products of rhetoric framing by the actors in the UNFCCC negotiations. Some of the prominent action frames exerted significant normative imperatives in their life cycle; the Kyoto Protocol in the past and the Paris Agreement in the present are examples. Benford and Snow (2000) explained three processes regarding how frames generate, develop and evolve. They are discursive, strategic, and contested processes. Rein and Schön (1996) identified that frames become intractable when the actors exacerbate the dispute by providing information about their competing frames. In the empirical chapters of this work, we would see plenty of competing frames that are full of the history of intractability. Rein and Schön (1996, p. 87) underlined the works of John Rawls, Jurgen Habermas, and Joshua Cohen with regard to public controversies. In his “Law of People,” John Rawls illustrated two thought-provoking concepts—“original position” and “veil of ignorance.” The veil of ignorance is part of a long tradition of thinking in social contract theory. Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Jean Jacques Rousseau, and Thomas Jefferson are prominent scholars to mention in this respect. Ernest Svenson (2002) described it succinctly, as follows Imagine that you have set for yourself the task of developing a totally new social contract for today’s society. How could you do so fairly? Although you could never actually eliminate all of your personal biases and prejudices, you would need to take steps at least to minimize them. Rawls suggests that you imagine yourself in an original position behind a veil of ignorance. Behind this veil, you know nothing of yourself and your natural abilities or your position in society. You know nothing of your sex, race, nationality, or individual tastes. Behind such a veil of ignorance, all individuals are simply specified as rational, free, and morally equal beings. You do know that in the "real world," however, there will be a wide variety in the natural distribution of natural assets and abilities and that there will be differences of sex, race, and culture that will distinguish groups of people from each other.

The frames in the real-world exist because our thoughts do not reside in their original position, and our concepts are already shaped by our nationality, race, country, education, perception, etc. The concept of framing, in the contemporary context, was first introduced by Goffman (1974). Since then, works using this concept multiplied manifolds (Olausson 2009), most of them are on media or specialized media framing (e.g. Hjerpe and Buhr 2014; Reese et al. 2001). The concept has considerable potentials to serve as a useful tool to explain the process of evolution of issues in multilateral negotiation tables, like the ones we conduct in the later chapters of this book, but it has been scantly applied so far in the field of multilateral negotiations. There are

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numerous works that applied this concept to investigate framing of climate issues in media with regard to a specific country (e.g., Asplund et al. 2013; Boykoff 2007; Good 2008) as well as the same concerning multilateral context (e.g., Allan & Hadden 2017; Baumer et al. 2017; Nisbet 2009; Verweij et al. 2006). In climate politics, the concept has been so far mainly used to find out how the media or specialized media framed the issue (e.g., Asplund et al. 2013; Boykoff 2007; Olausson 2009; O’Neill et al. 2010) and how the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC) framed it in their assessments and at scientific conferences (e.g., Bjurström and Polk 2011). The concept has been rarely used in the case of the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiation framework. Comparable works are by Sorkar (2020a; b), Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016), Ansari et al. (2013), and Moore (2012). “How does an idea emerge and gain traction in the international arena when its underpinning principles are contested by powerful players?,” these were the quests of Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016). Their frame analysis about the issue of loss and damage illustrated how it found traction in the final Agreement. Moore (2012) elaborated on how the issue of adaptation was framed in climate negotiations as well as how new frames emerged based on the earlier ones. Ansari et al. (2013) conducted inductive research on institutional innovations concerning how various climate politics issues evolved over time. While their research explains how the “institutional field” changed over time, the authors did not attempt to identify why such changes happened and suggested that further research might identify what mechanism induces conflicting frames to reach a consensus (p. 1018). Our works here seek to indicate a sensible mechanism for the evolution process and the correlation of the same with the powerful actors. In addition to exploring the framing process in the negotiation table, this work, applying the holistic theatrical proposition developed in the previous chapter, also endeavors to find out why certain crucially contested frames sustained to reach consensus while others failed. In a sense, all of the social interactions are dictated by the mental schemata of the actors, and they try to elevate the salience of their frames through speech acts.1 The mental schemata that the negotiators carried in the COP setting can be considered refined representations of their particular society, country, and culture as well as the underlying power composition, interest, and alignments of their States vis-à-vis their contenders. Their deliberations at the negotiation table are recorded and are available electronically. In this consideration, research applying the concept of framing with regard to the development of issues in the COP negotiation setting is not only possible but also provides scope for employing the concept in a sophisticated context that can refine our understanding of a complex process in a structured way. Framing may sound like agenda-setting, particularly for the UNFCCC’s Conference of the Parties’ (COP) negotiation process. Scheufele (2000), in fact, terms 1

Speech act is the frequency and intensity of speaking for a particular frame. Chong and Druckman (2007, p. 106) notes that the speech act “has become a virtual cottage industry” in the framing research.

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framing as second-level Agenda-Setting, but they are distinct in the sense that the framing process selects certain angles of an issue and increases their salience in order to make one’s interpretation more prominent over others, whereas agendasetting introduces the topics to the audience. In other words, agenda-setting sets the tone, and framing involves playing with them thereafter. Scheufele (1999, 2000) concisely distinguishes them by saying, “Whereas agenda-setting is concerned with the salience of issues, frame-setting, or second-level agenda setting, is concerned with the salience of issue attributes.” Agenda-Setting research explores how we reach to “what to think about”; whereas framing research delves into “how actors think about a particular agenda.” They are eventually interrelated. Interactions of the actors in line with their mental schemata (how) lead to the generation of the new issue (what), and actors repeat the same process on that issue (what) in line with their mental schemata (how). To cite an example, the whole issue of the necessity of climate change negotiation is an agenda or its sub-topics viz. mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology, all are first-level agenda items. We do not here explore how these agendas are set but how the issues related to them were framed up in the negotiation table in line with the actors’ mental schemata. For the frame analysis, this paper applies the terms “action frames” and “rhetoric frames” adopted from Rein and Schön (1996). It identifies a process of generation of action frames as a result of rhetoric framing in line with the actor’s primordial logic. The framing of the generated frames also orbited around the same logic. Rhetoric framing of the actors in line with their mental schemata yields to “action frames.” In a sense, the “action frames” then appear as a kind of new “agenda” for the future framing process. Indeed, the objective of the entire empirical works of this study using the concept of framing is to detect which action frames ultimately succeeded to sustain and which failed. This detection then serves to investigate why only certain crucially contested frames got traction while others did not. The explanation of the second part requires the employment of IR theoretical insights, and we do so by applying the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the previous chapter. Most of the conventional approaches on climate politics focused on the role of interest, power, and domestic politics.2 The approach taken here is a more reflective one. As explained above, the statements of the actors at the negotiation table are charged with their interests shaped by the pressure of the domestic stakeholders and reflect their holistic stature. Thus, they already embody as well as constitute the reflections of the State’s power, interest, and domestic politics. In this sense, the approach taken in this work is more holistic in nature and is poised to introduce a different angle of understanding the politics compared to the conventional ones.

2

Plenty of works exist in this line, a couple of noteworthy works are Keohane and Oppenheimer (2016), Keohane and Victor (2011), Qi (2011), Lange et al. (2010), Weiler (2012), Hallding et al. (2013), Betzold et al. (2012), Betzold (2010).

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3.2 The Analytical Frameworks of the Case Studies In the next three chapters, we study the framing process of the contested issues during the two decades of the negotiation, from the first COP in 1995 up to the 21st COP in 2015, which culminated into the Paris Climate Agreement. We specify the research question here as “How had the issues concerning climate change been framed-up at the UNFCCC negotiation table, how did they evolve, and why did only certain frames attain traction while others failed?” In this quest, we develop a three-pronged analytical framework for the how part of the question, namely, a simultaneous content and frame analysis, a historical mapping, and an application of the assumption of the connective dots of the evolution process. The content analysis was conducted by using a software named “atlas.ti.” The output from it profoundly helped toward in-depth content analysis and historical mapping of the evolution process of the frames. The frame analysis used the notions of “action frames” and “rhetoric frames,” which were borrowed from the works of Rein and Schön (1996), as discussed in the previous section. Linking the research questions and the concepts, definitions, review of existing works that applied the framing theory, the following hypothesis for the first part of the research question is formulated. The hypothesis is identical for all the three separate case studies under this work; therefore, it is presented only here and is not repeated in those respective chapters, i.e., Chapters 4, 5, and 6. Those issues which are more fervently framed-up are more likely to attain traction. It is dependent on the salience attributed to an issue, the number of actors involved doing so, and embeddedness of the logics of the frames in the mental schemata of the actors. (Hypothesis 1)

The hypothesis is operationalized by developing a historical mapping of the framing process that led to tracing the gradual evolution of the issues. The dependent variable is “successful traction of an issue through framing,” while the independent variables are “speech act to intensify salience of the frames”, “number of actors involved in the framing act”, and “how better a frame fits the actor’s schemata.” It is necessary to clarify the meanings of the terms used in the above hypothesis. Salience here means “making a piece of information more noticeable, meaningful or memorable to audiences” (compare Entman 1993, p. 53). Salience can be rated by observing a “speech act.” A speech act is the frequency and intensity of speaking for a particular frame. Chong and Druckman (2007, p. 106) note that a speech act “has become a virtual cottage industry” in framing research. Schemata, as already defined above, is the perception or understanding of a particular issue that organizes categories of information and relationship among them. Through historic mapping applying the concept of framing, a phenomenon was markedly detected—the contested rhetoric framing on an issue yields action frames, but, at every emergence point, there appeared to be a deadlock. This prompted us to wonder whether a pattern of emergence and evolution of the action frames can be discerned from it. Several authors have explained their work by developing a process cycle.

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Beach and Pedersen (2013, loc. 668) provided an excellent example of connecting aspects with regard to a theorized rational decision-making mechanism, which is: (1) gather all relevant information; (2) identify all possible courses of action; (3) assess the alternatives based on the decision-makers’ utility function; and (4) choose the alternative that maximizes the expected utility. Tang (2009, pp. 595–596) developed a similar model to trace the process of the security dilemma. He captured the process as follows: (1) anarchy generates uncertainty; (2) uncertainty leads to fear; (3) fear then leads to power competition; (4) power competition activates (dormant) security dilemmas; and (5) activated security dilemmas lead to war through a spiral. Inspired by the abovementioned models, and after going along with a substantial part of the content analysis, it appeared that a similar analogy of connecting the dots with regard to the evolution of the frames could be developed for this work too. The connective dots for the evolution process of the frames have been assumed as: (1) the actors conceive their underlying logic, (2) they frame up their competing issues as per their conceived logics, (3) the contested issues hit a deadlock, and (4) a new action frame emerges from that deadlock (Hypothesis 2). For the second part of the question, i.e., why only certain frames found traction while others failed—we posit a hypothesis based on the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter and after reviewing the scholarly works with regard to the role of power in the climate negotiations as delineated in the first chapter. The hypothesis is as follows: Those issues which are supported by the powerful actors are more likely to prevail over those supported by the less powerful actors, but the crucial point is that the properties of this power have been transformed to become holistic and issue-specific in nature, not merely materialistic or normative/idealistic one. (Hypothesis 3)

The hypotheses developed above derive from the theories, concepts, and existing works and form the designs of the analytical framework. First, we develop a model for simultaneous frame analysis and historical mapping. It is captured in a flow chart at the beginning of each empirical studies, depicting and summarizing the entire work. It applies conceptual tools from the framing literature to explain the frame conception, contestation, deadlock, frame shift, and conversion of rhetoric frames to action frames. The core of the frame analysis is how the rhetoric framing process yields to the action frames and how those action frames, in turn, dictate new rhetoric framing. The uniqueness of this work is that it finds a generative process of emergence of action frames that themselves went through the rhetoric framing process again, carrying the primordial logics of the actors. In the third step, the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter serves as the basis of the analytical framework for the second part of the research question. The hypothesis is founded on the conjectures of the proposition. The equations for calculating the powers of the actors, as per the proposition, have been presented later in this chapter. The data and method of calculation of the scores are discused there too. The charts and graphs that appeared from the equations and data are presented in the respective place of chapter 7. Qualitative analysis is

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conducted as per the reflections from these charts and graphs, as well as the conjectures of the theoretical proposition developed in Chapter 2. A consistency check against this qualitative analysis is made by using Mill’s logic of difference. The truth table of Mill’s logic uses the outcomes of the qualitative analysis made in Chapters 5, 6, and 7, which identified the fates of some of the prominent frames. The author’s practical knowledge from attending the climate negotiations and insights gathered from the key informants through the interviews helped to maintain a prudent course while conducting the qualitative analysis. Finally, the two bodies of the analysis using the concept of framing and the holistic theoretical proposition met the single objective of comprehensively answering the research questions. Thus, the whole work is planned in a structured manner that leads to a holistic answer to the research question.

3.3 Data and Method for the First Hypothesis 3.3.1 Data Three potential sources of data were considered for this study. The first one was the original negotiation Hansards of the parties, but it simply proved impossible to collect them from so many actors penetrating their bureaucracy. To compensate for this, eight semi-structured key-informant interviews were conducted with eight experts living in China, Germany, and Bangladesh. All of them had attended COP negotiations, and one of them had attended all 21 COPs, offering a rare chance for a researcher to consult such a person. It is uphill task to take interviews of such resource persons living in different countries and by penetrating their bureaucracies. Though the number of the interviews is very few, they were invaluable for enhancing the insights for this work. Besides, the author himself had attended three COP negotiations between 2009 and 2013 as a state delegate. During that time, he witnessed the process in action regarding how the positions are framed up by the State actors. The second potential source was the reports of the UNFCCC, but it has been found that they do say little about the actors’ positions at the negotiation table, apart from summarizing the outcome as a whole and the details of the texts of the decisions. They appeared to be not much conducive. Nevertheless, a total of 21 reports of the COP Negotiations, downloaded from the UNFCCC website and some statements delivered by the major actors found in webcast format on the same website, have been selectively studied for this work but were not incorporated in the coding process. The third consideration was the media reports. Newspaper and electronic media reports appeared to be unsuitable for this work. Two specialized news bulletins, namely The Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB)3 and another bulletin entitled “ECO,” published by the Climate Action Network (CAN), appeared to be the most promising 3

Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB). Available at http://www.iisd.ca/enb/, accessed on 31 March 2019. It is published by the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD).

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sources of data. However, it has been found that CAN reports are NGO4 -biased, and some scholars have questioned their neutrality. ENB data appeared to be more neutral (Vanhala and Hestbaek 2016, p. 114), so some scholars used this data source (e.g. ibid.; Boyd et al. 2008; Friman 2016). In light of these considerations, this work used the ENB coverage reports as the main source of data. A total of 261 such coverage reports of the apex form of the negotiations from the 1st COP up to the 21st COP were used. Some secondary sources of data, which had appeared pertinent when reviewing the literature, were also contextualized to consolidate the arguments.

3.3.2 Method The method we applied for the first two hypotheses can generally be termed process tracing. Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016) relied on a three-pronged methodology as part of process-tracing analysis for their work: a content analysis, a historical mapping, and a frame analysis. The works of this book also have similar three steps, albeit in a different way. First, the structured content analysis conducted for each of the case studies leads to a historical mapping of the framing process. Second, the frames are simultaneously analyzed by applying the tools of the framing concept. The most prominent feature of the frame analysis is the articulated illustration of the “rhetoric framing” process and identification of the “action frames” that emerged thereby. Third, the connecting dots of the evolution process of the frames, as presented in hypothesis 3 above, are examined.

3.3.3 Process Tracing as a Method It appears pertinent here to make a brief discussion on process tracing and its application for similar works. Vanhala (2017) investigated the use of the process-tracing method exclusively employed for research on environmental politics. She found that a great deal of research on environmental politics relied on process tracing though the researchers often did not explicitly mention the term in their works. She outlines the best practices in the application of the process-tracing method used in the studies of environmental politics as well as the most notable works in this regard. The works she referred to were studied. Two books (Beach and Pederson 2013; Bennett and Checkel 2015) on process-tracing methodology were also extensively studied for this work. Smoking causes cancer, but how? If we ask “why cancer is caused,” we can answer “due to smoking,” but if we ask how it is caused, the answer would be more revealing as it would explain that smoking changes the body’s cell and that culminates into cancer. Similarly, for the question of how industrial growth occurs—the method 4

NGO—Non-Governmental Organization.

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of process tracing may lead to the finding that planned vocational education leads to industrial growth by generating skilled human resources. The process-tracing method not only indicates the causal effects but also offers an illustration of the mechanism as to how a particular outcome appears. Beach and Pedersen (2013) note, “The essence of process-tracing research is that scholars want to go beyond merely identifying correlations between independent variables (Xs) and outcomes (Ys).” Process tracing examines “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case in order to establish or overturn an alternative hypothesis (Bennet 2011; Collier 2011). It is a qualitative method that is poised to identify the relationship between cause (X) and effect (Y). Relying on co-variation alone does not usually explain the underlying mechanism as to how we have reached Y, which process tracing offers. There could be several mechanisms that X has yielded to Y, and relying on only one co-variation bears the risk of making a wrong inference. Therefore, we need to examine how X and Y are linked together. Process-tracing in social science means the ambition to trace these causal mechanisms. Process tracing does not overly emphasize the co-variation factor. It selects a very small number, often one single case, and makes a detailed descriptive causal mechanism as to how X has reached Y. Process-tracing in social science means the ambition to trace these causal mechanisms (Beach and Pederson 2013, loc. 110; Bennet 2008; Checkel 2006; George and Bennett 2005). Causal mechanism can be defined as “a complex system, which produces an outcome by the interaction of a number of parts” (Glennan 1996). It is like connecting the dots of independent events in order to strengthen our claims about causal mechanisms and their outcomes. Since we select one or a very few cases, it is crucial to select the case meticulously. A carefully selected case can lead the research outcome to contextualize it with broader literature and contribute to build-up a general theory. Since process tracing defies many of the traditional aspects of research design (i.e., number of cases, co-variation, control variables, etc.), it should be fit to achieve a proper research outcome in a clearly pre-specified set of propositions about how the world works. Usually, these assumptions are rooted in our theory. Besides, the causal mechanisms that we theorize should be at work in a given case. Careful description and temporality are inalienable components of process tracing. Process tracing continuously analyzes trajectories of change and causation (Collier 2011). It is a useful tool in evaluating the plausibility of a theory, provided that we select the case carefully. Thus, the theory we select itself becomes a subject of examination. A researcher who uses process tracing has much flexibility in the types of data and evidence he would employ to reconstruct the causal process. He can narrate the behavior as shreds of evidence in the course of his research, which is difficult in the case of quantitative methods. The diverse nature of observation is the nature of observation in process tracing. For example, one step of the causal chain can be constructed using qualitative analysis, while another step can be reconstructed using statistical data or archival material. Mapping of the process is the most effective way to design a good process tracing. The events of the map should be individually proved. It is undeniable that the same process can be mapped in different ways. Therefore, it is essential that the map

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which is followed bears adequate explanatory power, and it should be one of the best possible maps of the problem in hand. A precise mapping helps the researcher to elaborate his thesis more concisely with better arguments. Beck (2010) underlines that a good research design is the most important thing for a good research outcome in any study, whether it is qualitative or quantitative. Quantitative works often suffer from bad research design. Process tracing offers the prospect to start with robust design (mapping) and thus visualize an insightful causal process, which the empirical studies of this work try. Above, the most important aspects of the process-tracing method pertinent for this work have been discussed. The remainders of this sub-section exclusively focus on the methodology used in this work.

3.3.4 The Method Adopted in This Work In the first step of each of the three empirical case studies conducted under this book, a structured qualitative content analysis was undertaken on the framing process. The content analysis was conducted by using the latest version of Atlas.ti software. In the software, the “fingerprints5 ” of the frames of the actors were first identified by using the keywords “mitigat*|reduc*|”6 for the mitigation-related issues, “fund*|finance*|GEF|GCF|amount|proceed|compensation for the evolution of funding mechanism-related issues and “adapt*|fund*|finance” for the adaptation funding-related issues. The respective loci of the fingerprints were studied elaborately and ascribed to different codes. The software identified all of the loci where these words were uttered. There was an option for auto-coding, but it was not chosen. Rather, each quotation was read carefully and hand coded. The quotations and codes were then exported to Word format, printed out, read repeatedly, and the arrangements between the codes and quotations were modified as per the new understanding. The analysis was carried out by generating various types of charts and diagrams using the powerful tools of the software; by revisiting the respective loci of the fingerprints to gain a better understanding of the connections and correlations with the related codes, quotations, and actors; and by repeatedly reading the printed reports generated by the software. Opinions from the interviews were contextualized, where relevant. After a substantive part of the works were done, a flow chart that systematically summarizes the sequential mapping of the framing processes appeared to be sketchable. At the end of the journey, the flow charts appeared to be identical for all the three individual case studies. They have been placed at the beginning of the operationalization part of each of the empirical studies. The “pre-existing mental schemata” of the parties, the rhetoric framing process, and the “action frames” have been detected in the course of the content analysis. The 5

Meanings the points where the respective words had been uttered by an actor. The term is adopted from Vanhala and Hestbaek (2016). 6 The “*” would locate all of the words formed with these roots.

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frame analysis was carried out using the terms, concepts, definitions, and variables explained in the literature and hypothesis sub-sections above. At the core of the analytical framework of the frame analysis is the concept of rhetoric frames and action frames, postulated by Rein and Schön (1996), as discussed in the literature review section. A chronological historical mapping of the evolution of the frames was summarized in the flow charts, presented at the beginning of each of the empirical case studies, which helps to keep track of the discussions followed. In the next step, the connective dots of the evolution process of the frames, as presented in hypothesis 3, have been examined. The assumption of connective dots was tested against the evolution process of the major action frames in each of the empirical studies. In order to qualify to claim that the assumption was valid, it has to show that temporal sequencing of the dots across the issues was followed as well as that the situations under which the same is found should also have had happened repeatedly.

3.4 Data and Method for the Second Hypothesis The second hypothesis delves into why only certain framing efforts saw the light of success while others failed. Making something happen is a function of power in terms of outcomes, as we defined it in the second chapter. The concept of framing alone was found to be inadequate to explain this. It appeared that the adoption of IR theory-based analysis was necessary to solve this puzzle. A theoretical proposition was developed in the second chapter claiming that it would be the most suitable lens in explaining outcomes. At this stage, the conjectures of the theory will be examined vis-à-vis the findings from the case studies applying the framing concept. As the actors’ power is the determining factor for the outcomes and, as per the holistic theoretical proposition, power has become issue-specific in the contemporary world, it appeared necessary to identify who the major powers in this particular issue arena are. Viola et al. (2012) identified superpowers, great powers, and middle powers in the domain of climate politics. They constructed persuasive arguments as to why they should be ascribed to such profiles. This work does not take another venture to grade the powers because it then would require another research of a similar scale. It just takes the superpowers and great powers identified by Viola et al. (2012), which are the USA, China, the EU, India, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and Russia, respectively. It calculates the points of these powers using formulae derived following the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition. The formulae emanated from the holistic theoretical proposition presented in second chapter and elaborated in Chapter 7 are as follows: Normative power = soft power + × 100

number of parties support the frame The total number of parties attending the COP

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Material power = (population + territory +GDP + emission percentage) Power = Material power + Normative power The indicators of material power and normative power derive from the holistic theoretical proposition developed in the second chapter. It has been explained in detail in the second chapter as to why and how these indicators were chosen. Discussions in Chapter 7 also justify the selection of the indicators. Data with regard to these factors have been taken from the website of the World Bank. The points of each indicator of each actor have been divided by the total quantity of the world against that indicator. The points of each indicator were then added together. The final points were converted to percentile values of two digits. For soft power, the data was taken from https://softpower30.com/?country_years= 2015, a site which includes a forward by Joseph Nye, one of the best-known scholars on soft power. As it was unavailable on that website, one score has been taken from https://monocle.com/film/affairs/soft-power-survey-2016-17/, through logical comparison. So far, these constitute two of the very few websites which have a gradation for soft power of a few top countries, but they do not contain data for many years. At the time of doing this research, softpower30.com had rankings only for the years 2015, 2016, and 2017 and it used six indicators to count it: digital, enterprise, engagement, education, culture, government, and polling. For this reason, and as there is no better source of data, the figures of the year 2015 were taken as a dummy. For the second portion of the normative power, a rough estimation of the prospective support that a country could expectedly garner when it floated an issue was taken as dummy points for calculation purposes. The USA and Japan, who were likely to attract the support of the annex parties of Kyoto Protocol only, were given points equivalent to the number of Annex parties, i.e., 43. EU has been given points equivalent to Annex + LDC (48) + AOSIS (49) because the EU’s positions were likely to gain the support of these two groups.7 Russia maintained a unique position, as it changed its strategy frequently and often aligned itself with the petroleum exporting countries (14) and former Soviet states, i.e., the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (9), and so it was awarded 25 points (14 + 9 + 1). China, India, Brazil, South Korea were all given points equivalent to G77 (133), as they belonged to this group and were likely to attain their support. It is understood that the readers may raise questions about such discretionary allocation of the scores. This approach was indeed quite reluctantly taken after struggling a lot to find alternatives. Since there is no better way and a rough estimation is better than having nothing, we had to resort to it. In the second chapter and in the conclusion of this book, this point has been clarified more in detail. It has been elaborately discussed in the second chapter that all the previous attempts to measure power 7

The EU had been a normative leader in climate negotiation, supporting more generously the causes of AOSIS and LDCs despite its position in the developed country league. Four countries of LDCs and AOSIS were found to overlap and were deducted.

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had to reach such discretionary assumptions. Waltz (1979, first chapter) explains, in social science, we need to appreciate the cardinal perspective of a theory, not most prominently the figures that would derive from its conjectures. It needs to explain here how we had adopted these rough numbers. In a nutshell, these estimations were founded upon a detailed study of the contents of the actors deliberations, as found in the ENB reports, where positions of the actors have been expressed. It needs to underline that the estimations are rough and general. From experience, it is known that there are differences of positions within a group when an issue is debated. For example, within the group of G77/China, there are vast differences of positions among the emerging countries, vulnerable countries, LDCs, LMDCs, etc. One such example can be seen in Chapter 7 on the adaptation funding case, where the parties were divided over special funding for the LDCs through NAPA projects. However, they worked out their differences and forged a common text enabling them to speak in one voice on most of the issues. The same is applicable for the most homogenous group, i.e., the EU. The broad groups internally discussed their differences, and their final deliberations are the joint positions of the group as a whole. The frames and deliberations considered in this work mostly concern these common positions. Thus, ascribing these numbers is founded on reasonable logic. There are, nevertheless, huge complexities behind the scenes, and a common position does not mean that the game behind the stage is any less crucial. However, that is a different dimension; the case studies of this work mainly used the observed and expressed positions of the actors. After repeated examination of the expressed positions of the parties, the above scores appeared logical, and there is no other better way to ascribe such numbers. These explanations may serve to meet the concerns of the readers.

3.5 Coalitions in the Climate Negotiation Table As we study the multilateral negotiation on climate change under the UN format, it is necessary to explain the coalition formation in the negotiation table briefly. The understanding of the coalition formation would help grasp the analyses made in the next chapters where the coalitions have been frequently mentioned. All the UN negotiations more or less witness coalitions and actors’ positions aligning to those coalitions. Climate negotiations are particularly renowned for coalition formation. Coalition helps limit the number of scattered speakers and reduces the transaction costs (Gupta 2000, p. 33; Richards 2001, p. 15), thus catalyzes the framing attempts of the individual actors. The primary coalition in climate negotiation essentially divides the parties into two binary groups: developing and developed countries. The next major coalition is the Group of 77 (G77, basically constitute all the developing countries) plus China, the European Union (EU), and the USA-led JUSSCANNZ (Japan, the USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and sometimes also Switzerland, Norway, and

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other EU countries) or UMBRELLA (a loose coalition of non-EU developed countries, formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol. Although there is no formal list, the Group tends to consist of Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Kazakhstan, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the USA.8 It is similar to JUSSCAANZ and is often used in this book interchangeably). The parties to the abovementioned broad groups also form other clusters, viz. Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Arab Group, Most Vulnerable Nations, Climate Vulnerable the Small Island States, Landlocked countries. The most notable groups, from the above, are G77+ China, the EU, JUSSCANNZ/UMBREALLA, LDCs, and AOSIS, as they have manifested an overall cluster pattern in most of the Sustainable Development negotiations (Wagner et al. 2012, p. 85; Dimitrov 2010, p. 805). Since 2007, another coalition of emerging economies, BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India, and China), has gradually consolidated to become a powerful group. In the cases under this book, the generic term “actor(s)” was often used for the analysis purpose; it represents a common notion both for the individual States as well as their coalitions. For more details about coalitions and groups in climate negotiations, Wagner et al. (2012) would be a good read. In this work, we present the deliberations of a particular actor as well as of the groups. When a particular group speaks, it represents the collective positions of all the actors in that group because a group usually speaks after reaching a consensus on their deliberations on a particular issue. It has been found from this study that, often, individual States of a group concerned spoke separately and repeated the same by multiple States of that group in order to enhance the salience of their position. We have mostly identified these deliberations by mentioning both the name of the State and the group they belong to. Above all, the debates on the topic we discussed here could be generally divided between the developed and the developing countries, and our references to these two broad groups would be found most frequently. The UMBRELLA group, EU, the LDCs, and the BASIC slightly differed their positions within their developed and developing country capping, but the G77/China position could generally be equated with the positions of the developing countries. The distinct positions of these vital groups were also articulated when necessary.

3.6 Possible Alternative of the Framing Concept With regard to institutional change, punctuated equilibrium model of institutional change has a strong pedigree (e.g. Baumgartner et al. 1993, 2006; Jones et al. 2003, 2005). It posits that exogenous shocks suddenly attack long assumed inertia of traditional institutions’ structure creating critical juncture and path dependence for new 8

See UNFCCC website http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/negotiating_groups/items/ 2714.php, for details of the groups. Accessed on 9 December 2017.

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institutional innovations. This model has also been employed in researches on International Organizations. Lundgren et al. (2017) listed a number of IR works that used this model. Thelen (2003, p. 35) adds to this that layering, that involves grafting of new elements in the traditional institutes, and conversion, that brings in new goals or new actors, also play vital roles in institutional innovations. Béland (2007, p. 23) adds to the above two that a full understanding of institutional changes requires appreciating “central role of ideational process in politics and policy making.” In this work, particularly on the funding mechanism, it is found that the long inertia of existing institutional structure was attacked though not that suddenly; both layering and grafting facilitated reform toward a new structure; there were identifiable critical junctures; path created by one innovation (for example Adaptation Fund Board) was followed by the next (Green Climate Fund) and ideas travelled through the mental schemata of the actors all along the way. However, the analytical tool that the empirical studies of this work used to illustrate those is different, as described above. This work has just chosen a different framework because its objective was not only to investigate on the institutional change but also to visualize the entire process vividly and the underlying reasons behind it. It is assumed that the framework adopted here is more appropriate for the research question in hand.

Works Cited Allan, Jen Iris, and Jennifer Hadden. 2017. Exploring the framing power of NGOs in global climate politics. Environmental Politics 26 (4): 600–620. Ansari, Shahzad, Frank Wijen, and Barbara Gray. 2013. Constructing a climate change logic: An institutional perspective on the “tragedy of the commons.” Organization Science 24 (4): 1014–1040. Asplund, Therese, Mattias Hjerpe, and Victoria Wibeck. 2013. Framings and coverage of climate change in Swedish specialized farming magazines. Climatic Change 117 (1–2): 197–209. Baumer, Eric PS., et al. 2017. A simple intervention to reduce framing effects in perceptions of global climate change. Environmental Communication 11 (3): 289–310. Baumgartner, Frank R., and Bryan D. Jones. 1993. Agendas and instability in American politics. University of Chicago Press. Baumgartner, Frank. R., Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Jones Bryan D. 2006. Comparative studies of policy agendas. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (7): 959–974. Beach, Derek, and Rasmus Brun Pedersen. 2013. Process-tracing methods: Foundations and guidelines. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Beck, Nathaniel. 2010. Causal process “observation”: Oxymoron or (fine) old wine. Political Analysis 18 (4): 499–505. Béland, Daniel. 2007. Ideas and institutional change in social security: Conversion, layering, and policy drift. Social Science Quarterly 88 (1): 20–38. Benford, Robert D., and David A. Snow. 2000. Framing processes and social movements: An overview and assessment. Annual Review of Sociology 26 (1): 611–639. Bennet, Andrew. 2008. Process tracing: A Bayesian perspectice. In The Oxford handbook of political methodology, 702–721. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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Chapter 4

Framing Waves of the Issues Related to Mitigation

4.1 Introduction Mitigation, in the parlance of climate change, refers to efforts to reduce or prevent the emission of greenhouse gases.1 Global climate is an undersupplied public good, and mitigation of Greenhouse gas (GHG) is prominently so because no State has sufficient self-interest-based incentive to contribute for it (Keohane 2019). Issues related to GHG mitigation were some of the most contentious ones during the two decades of negotiations on climate change that culminated in the Paris Agreement. The intense framing of the issue generated normative imperatives for the actors as a result of which renewable energy has now turned to be the cheapest source of off-grid energy in most locations and increasingly competing with fossil-fuel power plants for on-grid energy (Glemarec 2019). How did the actors framed up the issues related to mitigation in the negotiation table, how did the frames evolve, and why did some frames find traction while others did not? So far, no research on this precise topic has been found, but there exists some work on the framing of various climate issues prior to the Paris Agreement and a handful of work on other issues after the Paris Agreement. This chapter delves with how the issues related to mitigation were framed up by prominent actors/coalitions and the mechanism of the evolution of the frames. The insights acquired from this work are also applied in Chap. 7, which exclusively concentrates on the question as to why only certain frames have prevailed over the others. Since the theory, hypothesis, data, method are all described in the previous chapter, this chapter presents only the findings of the work. Some literature relevant solely for the issues of mitigation is contextualized in the respective places of this chapter.

1

The definition is taken from “UN environment.” See https://www.unenvironment.org/explore-top ics/climate-change/what-we-do/mitigation, accessed on 14 May 2019. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_4

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The findings section below is divided into two sub-sections. The first sub-section identifies the frames and illustrates how the rhetoric framing resulted in the emergence of action frames as well as how those action frames went through similar framing processes and evolved over time by carrying the logics embedded in the primordial mental schemata of the actors. In the second sub-section, the analogy of connective dots, as presented in hypothesis-II is applied, and the evolution process of four major frames is elaborated. The assumption of connective dots of the evolution of the frames was found to have been followed, and it has been found to be an iterative process for all the action frames identified here.

4.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution 4.2.1 Summary Shaped by their preexisting mental schemata, the actors of the two broad groups of the developed and the developing countries conceived two distinct genres of logics (mental schemata) from the very beginning of the COP negotiations. The first one was espoused by the developed countries and orbited around the UNFCCC convention article no. 2, based on which the developed countries argued that the key objective of the parties should be meaningfully mitigating greenhouse gas emissions on an urgent basis so as to be able to save the mother Earth. The urgency of mitigation actions to be taken by all the actors in unison is found to be the most frequently uttered notion by the developed countries. The second strand, espoused by the developing countries, capitalized on the notion of “in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention” of the same Article no. 2 and further pointed to Article no. 3.1 of the Convention, where the provision of achieving the objective refers to “equity” and “common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and respective capability.” Based on the abovementioned first schema, the developed countries attempted to blur the line of differentiation or to dilute the notion of differentiation. For this purpose, they repeatedly quoted the provisions of the UNFCCC mentioned above, elevated the salience of their frames by frequently mentioning the terms like “all/ inclusive/ global” mitigation efforts, and asserted that mitigation, rather than adaptation, was the most urgent need. In contrast, based on the second schema, the developing countries tried to elevate the salience of their frames by repeatedly highlighting the notion of CBDR/differentiation. They asked the Annex-1 countries to lead the process of mitigation, to be ambitious, to transfer the technology and to relax the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), and to provide adequate financial support, to assume the responsibility considering the historical record or, at least, to be judicious in this respect. Multiple action frames emerged and evolved along the course of the negotiations through the contested rhetoric framing in line with the above logics. Of the survivor action frames, five are most notable—an annex party-based frame, as institutionalized

Bali Action Plan (BAP)/ NAMA Registry Mechani sm

Durban Platform (DP)

The Paris agreeme nt

Diagram 4.1 Flow chart: framing of mitigation-related issues

The connective dots of the evolution process of the action frames were assumed as: 1. Conception of Actor’s logics in line with their primordial mental schemata, 2. Rhetoric framing of the issues and action frames in line with their conceived logics 3. The contested issues reach a deadlock, and 4. New action frame emerge from that deadlock.

Kyoto Protocol (KP)

Developing countries Referring to Article 3.1. of the UNFCCC convention conceived that the principle of CBDR should be followed keeping historic record in mind. Developed countries need to lead mitigation actions in line with the principles of equity.

Contested rhetoric framing by the actors in line with the above two distinct logics led to generation of the following prominent action frames. The primordial logics of the actors permeated in the rhetoric framing process with regard to the action frames too.

Developed countries Referring to the Article 2 of the UNFCCC convention conceived that the key objective should be meaningfully mitigating GHG emission on an urgent basis so as to save the mother Earth. All the parties irrespective of their development level should be taken on board to this effect.

Actor’s primordial Mental Schemata

4.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution 93

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4 Framing Waves of the Issues Related to Mitigation

in Kyoto at the 3rd COP; the two-track mitigation frame emerged at the 13th COP; the registry mechanism and the bottom-up approach surfaced at the 13th and the 15th COP; the Durban Platform for enhanced action regarding the Paris Agreement (DP) at the 17th COP; and the final institutional frame formalized by the Paris Agreement. Some of the action frames, like the Kyoto Protocol, Bali Action Plan (BAP), Allinclusive reduction of GHG, historical responsibility, financial and technological support, sectoral approach, failed to sustain or could not attain traction in the final Agreement. The remainder of this section elaborately explains how, and in which circumstances the rhetoric framing yielded the abovementioned major action frames. Furnished below is a flow chart that depicts the analytical framework and indicates a summary of rest of the discussion . (Diagram 4.1) Presented below is a figure, that has been generated by the software, delineating the network of the quotations against the codes of major actors. If we click on a particular actor code (highlighted in blue color), all the relevant quotations for that code, their relations with other codes, and quotations would appear (not visible here but can be operated in the electronic version). Similar networks of quotations for important issues were also generated. This facilitated in a great way to conduct a robust content analysis and frame analysis simultaneously (Fig. 4.1). 1:291 China… 1:159 Belgiu… 1:74 New Ze… 1:126 Australi… 1:100 Conten… 1:241 Nauru,… 1:115 Parties… 1:173 BRAZI… 1:202 The Pr… 1:206 INDIA s… 1:267 NORW… 1:289 Japan… 1:118 n contr… 1:259 China… 1:276 BRAZI… 1:256 China… 1:271 SOUTH… 1:113 Costa… 1:201 It took… 1:93 SOUTH… 1:89 The Beiji… 1:171 The EU… 1:292 Norwa… 1:251 On enh… 1:242 CANA…

1:321 IRELA…

1:13 G-77/CH… 1:46 Noting t…

1:19 the G- 7…

1:268 CHINA…

1:215 The Ch…

1:45 CANAD…

1:166 CHINA…

1:71 During i…

1:275 JAPAN… 1:146 The EU…

1:208 NORW…

1:90 RGENTI…

1:222 Russia,…

1:216 Australi…

1:300 On miti…

1:59 On mitig…

1:262 On lon…

1:234 The EU…

1:153 states t…

1:287 Chile s…

1:151 SOUTH…

1:211 CHINA…

1:138 INDIA s…

1:280 China s… 1:84 ndia dre…

1:283 the EU,…

1:60 Grenada…

1:231 empha…

1:24 CHINA, f…

1:285 In a par…

1:266 AUSTR…

1:284 Brazil,…

1:269 JAPAN…

1:257 The US…

1:99 South K…

1:181 AOSIS…

1:139 JAPAN…

1:102 Costa…

1:140 ORWA…

1:109 On regi…

1:238 CHINA…

1:81 Agreem…

1:174 AUSTR…

1:323 he G-7…

1:25 JAPAN s…

S. Korea

1:110 The EU…

G77/China

1:294 On the…

1:207 NEW Z…

EU

BASIC

JAPAN

LDCs

1:274 The EU…

1:288 Saudi…

India

1:176 The EU… 1:48 the G-77…

JUSSCAANZ

1:160 Belgiu…

1:258 India e…

1:248 SWITZ…

1:265 NORW… 1:277 The EU…

Russia

1:124 weden,… 1:63 The EU…

Brazil

AOSIS

1:322 AOSIS… 1:52 BRAZIL…

1:30 he EU wi…

China

1:154 The iss…

1:80 Finally, t …

1:43 NORWA…

1:325 The G-…

1:103 JAPAN…

1:38 BRAZIL…

1:233 CHINA…

1:279 On pari…

1:210 BOLIVI…

1:91 The Bah…

1:252 CHINA…

1:10 CANAD…

1:8 The EU a…

1:70 China sa…

1:204 At the…

1:209 Mali, fo…

1:112 AUSTR…

1:237 INDIA…

1:299 A majo…

1:41 The EU…

1:184 Grenad…

1:286 The Ru…

1:195 India s…

1:28 he EU e…

1:51 CHINA s…

1:79 The miti…

1:185 mitigati…

1:205 Algeria,… 1:203 At the… 1:85 When th…

1:327 the EU,…

1:111 CHINA…

1:243 The EU… 1:101 The EN…

1:148 Highlig…

1:39 Australia…

1:235 She ca… 1:263 CHINA…

1:249 The EU… 1:264 CHINA…

1:240 Regard…

1:114 Differe…

1:62 On acco…

1:320 The CE…

1:40 Develop…

1:34 CHINA a…

1:281 Japan…

1:319 GHAN…

1:64 On acco…

1:26 CHINA, f… 1:27 JAPAN,…

1:47 Europea… 1:293 The EU…

1:175 Australi… 1:250 Ministe… 1:165 The EU… 1:116 In addit … 1:22 MOROC… 1:127 The EU… 1:164 INDIA s… 1:290 Australi… 1:244 Australi… 1:272 On co… 1:218 The EU… 1:57 INDIA ex… 1:232 China,… 1:246 INDIA s… 1:31 He said… 1:92 JAPAN… 1:32 Ian Cam… 1:167 the AW… 1:61 AOSIS 1:141s… CANA…

1:78 The deb… 1:324 The EU…

Fig. 4.1 Major actor-codes and their relations with the quotations: mitigation-related issues

4.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution

95

Table 4.1 enumerates the percentage of talk on the prominent issues as found from the coding process (automatically calculated by the software). Table 4.2 enumerates the percentage of talk by the major actors as found from the coding process (automatically calculated by the software). It reveals that the developed countries talked mostly on the issues related to mitigation. Table 4.1 Frequency of discussion of the issues related to mitigation as appeared through the coding process

Issue

Frequency of discussion found from the coding (%)

BAP

11.56

Developed countries’ mitigation efforts

10.25

Developing countries’ mitigation

11.18

Differentiation Durban platform Financial and technological support

2.93 10.56

Flexibility mechanisms

4.04

Global mitigation

5.59

Kyoto Protocol

Table 4.2 Share of discussion on mitigation-related issues by the major actors as found from the coding process

6.52

11.18

Legal boundedness

3.42

MRV

8.07

NAMA

8.76

National communications

8.21

Priority

7.14

Registry mechanism

6.97

Name of the actors

Share of the talk (%)

AOSIS

5.90

BASIC

2.48

Brazil

4.66

China EU G77/China

9.32 13.66 5.90

India

5.90

Japan

7.14

JUSSCAANZ countries

12.73

Russia

1.24

S Korea

1.86

USA

9.63

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4 Framing Waves of the Issues Related to Mitigation

4.2.2 Detailed Discussion 4.2.2.1

Mitigation Actions to Be Taken Mainly by Developed Countries (Kyoto Protocol)

The topic of mitigation by developing countries was a kind of taboo for them in the initial COPs. In line with their primordial mental schemata, the developing countries even denied that their reports contained any reference to mitigation measures, asserting instead that the developed countries should first take up mitigation actions (ENB Vol. 12, No. 34). They endeavored to pressurize developed countries to this effect by referring to their historical emissions, their emission profile at that time, and their financial and technological capacities. The Kyoto Protocol (KP) is a product of these contested framing efforts and the normative imperatives embedded in those logics. The KP divided the parties to the Convention into two groups: Annex-I and non-Annex parties. The annex countries are basically the European States and a few other western countries, i.e., the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, as well as one developed country in Asia, i.e., Japan (these developed countries apart from the European countries formed the UMBRELLA group). Although adopted at the 3rd COP, it took a long time for the KP to come into effect. The USA withdrew from the Protocol on the relative gain concern (Vezirgiannidou 2008; Steurer 2003). The KP came into effect in 2005 with multiple mechanisms for flexibility.2 That helped the ratifying countries, particularly the EU, to fulfill their mitigation commitments. Apart from the EU, other developed countries like Japan and Australia could not live up to their commitments,3 and Russia did not have anything to contribute as it was not required to reduce emissions, as per the Protocol. Nevertheless, the developed countries did not delay capitalizing on the fact that they had taken the lead in reducing emissions and that now it was the time to pursue an all-inclusive endeavor regarding mitigation. At the 12th COP, the year after the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, the European Union (EU) and the UMBRELLA group started insisting the developing countries to commit to mitigation. Their rhetoric framing revolved around the logic that mitigation by the Annex-I countries alone was insufficient, and a new long-term goal needed to be set, which should be inclusive of all parties. Through these rhetoric framing efforts, they succeeded in establishing a work plan and a schedule to this effect (see ENB report Vol. 12, No. 318, p. 11). Although there existed widespread skepticism about the implementation of the KP, it was later found that the commitments were achieved more than 100% by the adhering countries (Shishlov et al. 2016; Grubb 2016). Nevertheless, the principles embedded in this action frame did not sufficiently cater to the interests of the major 2

At the fourth COP, Ghana expressed concern that “flexibility mechanisms are a way of avoiding domestic responsibility”; see ENB report No. 97, p. 11. In the latter COPs, it has been found that developing countries were frequently emphasizing domestic mitigation by the developed countries. 3 On the 2nd day of the 11th COP, China and South Africa expressed concern about the increase in greenhouse gas emissions by the developed countries; see ENB report Vol. 12, No. 281.

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actors, but they faltered all along the way and, with the adoption of the Paris Agreement, its principles were altered. It would cease to exist once the Paris Agreement comes into effect.

4.2.2.2

Bali Action Plan (BAP), NAMA

No sooner was the Kyoto Protocol adopted than the developed countries intensified their rhetoric framing regarding the urgency for mitigation actions to be taken by all parties. This yielded the next action frame in Bali, within two years of the ratification of the Protocol. The moment when the new action frame emerged was dramatic, on the final day of the Bali COP, as ENB reports: Agreement remained elusive until Saturday afternoon, when parties finally agreed to a proposal by India and other developing countries to text referring to nationally appropriate mitigation actions (NAMA) by developing country parties in the context of sustainable development, supported by technology and enabled by finance and capacity building in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner. After the EU and all other parties had accepted this language, the US agreed to join the consensus, and the decision on long-term action under the Convention was adopted. The AWG and COP/MOP then adopted decisions on the other elements of the Bali roadmap.4

It appeared in the next stages that this was a decisive and profoundly significant moment for the entire climate negotiations. It marks the emergence of a new action frame “NAMA,” a mechanism which pervaded the mental schemata of many delegates up until the Paris Agreement, as well as the frame “support to developing countries for NAMA,” which also remained as one of the most hotly debated issues until the Paris Agreement. The US delegation firmly opposed these frames, particularly the provision to link finance, technology, and capacity building to the mitigation efforts of the developing countries. In the face of the deep pressure by the overwhelming majority of the countries favoring this frame, where Papua New Guinea even asked the USA to “go out of the way” unless it were willing to lead, finally, the US delegate dropped its opposition to the Indian proposal. It also involved the intervention of the US President who talked to his delegate over phone from Washington (ENB Vol. 12, No. 354, p. 20). The US delegate stated that the arguments put forward by other delegates appeared heartening, that she accepted the position, and that the USA wished to go forward with this new framework (ENB Vol. 12, No. 344, p. 1). The terms of the BAP reflect that, though the action frame yielded to the fervent framing efforts of the developed countries, at the same time, they were markedly attuned by the major emerging economies, like China and India. As India’s framing efforts fit the existing schemata of an overwhelming majority, the normative pressure concentrated thereby could not be ignored, even by the most dominant players. In Bali, China also steadfastly aligned with the emerging countries affirming its firm position for a two-track parallel but independent process for dialogue to address

4

ENB report Vol. 12, No. 354, p. 15.

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the critical issues of mitigation, technology, funding, and adaptation (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 344, p. 1). Bali COP entailed significant implications in the subsequent COPs with regard to mitigation issues. In addition to the BAP, it marks the emergence of the term “NAMA,” a term that influenced the delegates’ minds until the Paris Agreement. The less developed countries were persuaded by a promise that developed countries would extend support to developing countries for their NAMA. The BAP created the momentum for a high expectation that an ambitious “global” climate deal would be reached within two years at the Copenhagen COP. It was expected that two years of work, following the BAP, would result in an inclusive, legally binding protocol, encompassing the non-Annex I Parties’ mitigation pledges too and that it would cover all of the building blocks (ENB Vol. 12, No. 449). At around the same time, in October 2008, the Beijing declaration on sustainable development was delivered at the Asia Europe Meeting (ASEM). It reflected the mental schemata and tension of the major players at that time. It states that “developed countries should continue to show strong leadership and take measurable, reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives… and provide financial support and technology transfer to developing countries.” For developing countries, the declaration states that they should take “nationally appropriate mitigation actions in the context of sustainable development, supported and enabled by technology, financing and capacity- building, in a measurable, reportable and verifiable manner, with a view to achieving a deviation from business as usual (BAU) emissions” (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 385, p. 2). The declaration embodies the pivotal points of contest at that time which were molded in line with the logics of the primordial mental schemata of the developing countries regarding differentiation. In some critical moments, statements of a group are most readily available and valuable determinants in detecting the actors behind, which we can sense out from this. Around this time, the IPCC prepared an assumption about the correlation of emission reductions by Annex-I countries and non-Annex countries, which states that “25–40% reductions by Annex I countries by 2020 would mean 15–30% deviation from the baseline for non-Annex I countries to achieve 450 ppm and 0–20% deviation for 550 ppm.”5 The contributions could be somewhat different based on the parties agreeing on their share, but in this estimation lies all of the numbers’ secrets. If the temperature rise were targeted to be 1.5 °C, or 2 °C, etc., the percentage of the contribution of the parties and the timeline for achieving this would had to have been fixed in line with these principles. The presentation of this kind of numbers was also a subtle way to promote the salience of the non-Annex party’s mitigation issues. The opposing frames of the two broad groups reached the crescendo at the Copenhagen COP when the most notorious deadlock occurred in the history of climate negotiations. The crescendo was encountered when the developing countries were pressurizing for an amended KP, in which the EU also had some interest, but other 5

ENB report Vol. 12, No. 388, p. 1.

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developed countries adhered strictly to their demand for a “unified protocol” (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 453, p. 2). Both the groups fought very hard in this dividing line. It appeared at one point that the parties did not care whatever the other side pointed out; they continued their own assertions. The AWG-LCA6 chair expressed surprise that “parties had mainly repeated their well-known positions” during their deliberations; nothing new was popping up (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 454, p. 4). The opposing frames reached the tipping point when the competing parties failed to understand each other’s logic. With regard to the concept of framing, it is worth noting here that Entman (1993, 53) mentioned the possibility of this situation arising from the intense contestation of the framing efforts. The BAP was too ambitious that the leading actor at that time, the EU, was not optimistic about its fruition in the Copenhagen COP. Realizing that the BAP may not meet its objective in Copenhagen, the EU hoped that the same could be achieved within a year following the COP and endeavored to reach a framework to this effect in Copenhagen. These hasty attempts could not hold the tempo and eventually the Copenhagen COP broke in despair. One expert, however, opined that Copenhagen was not an utter failure, as it was portrayed by many, but rather paved the way for a new sort of mechanism that appeared within the Paris Agreement (Author’s interview). She also opined that Copenhagen COP was too early to reach a comprehensive agreement, as the BAP required more time in which to organize a consensus for an inclusive agreement. This is actually what happens in this kind of contested framing, further elaboration follows in the second sub-section of this section. Nevertheless, the developed countries could not escape from their mental schemata regarding a uniform and all-inclusive mitigation. The BAP had two distinct tracks: the Adhoc Working Group-Long-term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), which aimed to find a way out toward long-term mitigation by all of the parties, and AWG-KP, which exclusively focused on developed countries. However, to the surprise of the developing countries, sometimes, AWG-KP also discussed the mitigation issues of developing countries (ENB Vol. 12, No. 388). The emerging countries resolutely opposed this trend (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 459 and 498; No. 456, p. 30). Over the course of time, the mistrust concerning two-tracks became acute and fell into deadlock. BAP, like the KP, also could not accommodate the expectations of the parties. The infamous deadlock in Copenhagen meant that the emergence of a new action frame was inevitable in order for the negotiations to continue. This exactly is what had happened at the next COP. The idea of a new action frame (registry mechanism) was already in the discourses but remained, until then, overshadowed by the overwhelming rhetoric for an ambitious outcome. The explanation follows.

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Registry Mechanism

The action frame “registry mechanism,” one of the vital pillars of the Paris Agreement, first appeared when, on the 5th day of the 14th COP, South Korea, on behalf of the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), proposed a “registry” of NAMA. Many actors responded to this with diverse opinions viz.: that it should be voluntary (South Korea); financing would be essential for it (Association of Small Island States [AOSIS]); voluntary actions are uncertain (Madagascar); registry for the developing countries should not be reviewed for adequacy (India); developed countries like Japan emphasized Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV); the USA argued for an all-inclusive registry system; the EU stressed registering actions too (ENB Vol. 12, No. 389, p. 2 and No. 392, p. 2). In the later phases, the term “registry” attracted profound attention, and the most vital pillar of the final Agreement in Paris appeared to be the global registry of greenhouse gases, the global stocktake thereof, and the ratcheting of ambition, thereby. A search for the term ‘registry’ revealed that the term was first pronounced at the 5th COP concerning the mechanisms for reducing GHG emissions by the annex parties; at the 6th and 7th COP regarding funding and Certified Emission Reduction (CER); at the 8th and 9th COPs about a Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and training and, at the 10th COP, the term acquired a place in protocol article no. 7.4 for a registry mechanism of the issues as mentioned above and received regular citations thereafter. However, the term regarding the registry of NAMA was first pronounced on the 5th day of the 14th COP, received accelerated salience from the Copenhagen COP onwards, and found a home as the most successful action frame within the Paris Agreement. The shock of the Copenhagen COP forced the actors to be more realistic with regard to their expectations. Soon, it appeared to them that the registry mechanism could be a point of convergence. It downplays differentiation but does not fix a definitive target for the developing countries. A group of developing countries at Copenhagen supported this action frame on the condition that it also included information about support along with actions (ENB Vol. 12, No. 490 and 491). It found a solid ground when the NAMA registry process was adopted at the 16th COP, accommodating the above demands of the developing countries. It stated that it would match the finance, technology, and capacity-building support to NAMAs seeking international support and that the NAMAs of developing countries would be placed in a separate registry compared to those of the developed countries (ENB Vol. 12, No. 498, p. 18). Following the Copenhagen setback, the 16th COP in Cancun, thus, fostered hope, as “in the end, parties and observers alike seemed satisfied with the balance reached under the Convention track” (ENB Vol. 12, No. 498, p. 29). At the 17th COP, in Durban, the developed countries, including the EU, stressed the need for common accounting rules (ENB Vol. 12, No. 526, p. 2) and reiterated that the developing countries should be under a similar regime (ENB Vol. 12, No. 533, p. 2). China reasserted that the discussion of developed and developing countries’

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mitigation efforts should remain separate (ENB Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 16), India argued that it should be less onerous, and other developing countries reminded that their mitigation effort was linked to the extension of support (ibid., p. 17). Malaysia, in Durban, expressed concern about the insufficient mitigation target of the developed countries and that the issues of the developing countries, like equity, IPR, were being deferred to future meetings (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 26). At the 20th COP, the USA asserted that, apart from the LDCs, all other countries were required to contribute to mitigation and opposed references to any other groups, including vulnerable countries.7 Ultimately, the registry of actions to be taken by all of the parties appeared acceptable to all. Thenceforth, this action frame acquired normative imperatives for the actors, appeared as one of the most vital pillars of the final Paris Agreement and, if not it is the most important outcome of the two decades of climate negotiations, it is definitely one of the most vital ones. The registry of actions for mitigation by all of the parties was a tacit victory for the developed countries as it meant that other countries had also agreed to mitigate. However, the emerging countries also conceived it as sustaining their position because they would be able to retain their sovereignty over determining their mitigation actions and their mitigation targets would not be imposed upon them from the outside. In this way, by axing out this win–win situation, this action frame strengthened its roots, which has become one of the most vital pillar of the Paris Agreement.

4.2.2.4

Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (DP)

The 17th COP in Durban produced a successful action frame—the DP. The EU effectively persuaded Brazil to be more positive; South Africa as a host, as well as due to its competing commitment to the African Union, disposed to be more accommodating; and China appeared to be content to support India to take the lead on the BASIC’s positions (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 30).8 It is interesting to note that, although BASIC had been working as a powerful group at least since the 13th COP in Bali, at the 17th COP, for the first time, it formally spoke as a group in the plenary but, paradoxically, the influential group lost coherence from the beginning of this very COP in Durban. Thus, entrenched boundaries and positions were shaken up, and critical new alliances were forged (ENB Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 29). It was against these backdrops that Durban agreed to launch a process for developing a protocol or “agreed outcome with legal force” under the Convention that was applicable to all (ENB Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 30). BAP here was abandoned but formally buried in the next COP in Doha, and the new action frame, i.e., DP, emerged. 7

ENB report Vol. 12, No. 619, p. 31. It appears that the USA was unwilling to recognize anything about climate vulnerability for special treatment but the economic backwardness of LDCs only. It indicates the economic logic through which the USA views the entire problem. 8 BASIC—Brazil, South Africa, India, and China group. Inspired by a 2001 report by Goldman Sachs, the BASIC group originated in 2006 as a discussion forum, which was formalized in 2010, but it is a loose group, with significant differences among its members (Viola et al. 2012, p. 12).

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The DP outlined that the AWG-DP would complete its work by no later than 2015 in order to give effect to the new Protocol or Agreement from 2020 (ENB Vol. 12, No. 534, p. 28). Unlike the BAP, this timeline has been achieved to the point as the Paris Agreement was adopted within this timeframe. The Kyoto Protocol almost came to an end in Durban: Russia did not sign up for the second commitment period, while Canada, Australia, and Japan withdrew, leaving mainly the EU countries, which were responsible for only 15% of global emissions (ENB Vol. 12, No. 594, p. 30). Yet, the EU was eager to extend the second commitment period, as they already had legislation on this at the EU level (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 567, p. 5). EU was unwilling to give up all its onerous achievements under the KP mechanisms; in fact, until that time it was only the EU among the major developed countries that has made considerable emission reductions since the UNFCCC convention has been adopted. The EU managed to extend the second commitment period until 2020, effective from January 2013, thus ensuring the continuity of the process. The action frame KP lost the life, and the action frame DP started beaconing the negotiations from thereupon, culminating in the Paris Agreement.

4.2.2.5

Measurable, Reportable, and Verifiable (MRV) Actions

MRV of the mitigation actions was one of the most frequently flagged issues by the developed countries, especially the UMBRELLA group (see Table 4.1). It was initially emphasized by the developed countries so as to ensure that the commitments of the developing countries are implemented. At the initial stages, the national communications, registry mechanism and whatever actions are being taken by the developing countries toward mitigation, featured prominently on the debates on MRV. The MRV of the BASIC countries was of particular concern for the USA (ENB Vol. 12, No. 494, p. 2) which is related with relative gain concern. After the 13th COP, the developing countries, particularly the BASIC group, started to strike back using the same terms, arguing that the “finance,” “technology transfer,” “support,” etc., to be given by the developed countries should also come under equal MRV scrutiny (ENB Vol. 12, No. 395). They asserted that MRV of the mitigation actions has to be legally binding for the developed countries and mitigation actions of the non-Annex countries will depend on sufficient commitment and implementation of technological, financial, and capacity-building assistances by the developed countries to the developing ones (ENB Vol. 12, No. 391, p. 2). The Copenhagen Accord mentioned that MRV would be implemented in such a way that national sovereignty is respected and that NAMAs supported by the developed countries will be subject to international MRV. At the 16th COP, the USA made it clear that it would not accept any legal form unless it were stated that major emerging economies would take mitigation actions similar to those of developed countries (ENB Vol. 12, No. 494, p. 3). The USA continued emphasizing the reporting by developed and developing countries equally (see ENB report Vol. 12, No. 613, p. 3), while Brazil reiterated that MRV is

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linked to the Means of Implementation (MOI) and that transparency cannot replace accountability (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 614, p. 3). As the Final Agreement in Paris loomed within reach, the USA and its group accentuated their framing terms regarding transparency of mitigation actions. They insisted that all parties should submit nationally determined commitments under a single but flexible rule to all, global consultation process and regular reviews at the implementation stage (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 588, p. 2; No. 590, p. 1) and that the ambition gap cannot be closed solely by the developed countries (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 589, p. 3 and report No. 593). The developing countries criticized the bias of the MRV frame toward mitigation. The LDCs supported by China emphasized on accurate, complete, and regular reviews; and stressed on the need to avoid lowering the standards of the MRV and compliance system of the Kyoto Protocol (ENB Vol. 12, No. 588, p. 2). Brazil opined that “transparency cannot substitute accountability, and is linked not only to mitigation, but also adaptation and MOI.” It emphasized on a transparency framework reflecting the principle of differentiation of the convention (ENB Vol. 12, No. 614, p. 3). In the final Paris Agreement, we find a compromise on this, as the actions that are taken domestically would have domestic MRV, and the actions taken with foreign support would have international MRV. Emerging countries like China have little to complain about here as their actions are assumed to be basically taken domestically, and thus they retain their sovereignty over them. At the same time, other developing countries also have little to complain about as funded projects can logically go through international MRV. This convergence was the result of a compromise between the USA and China (see ENB No. 459, p. 29). Providing information for the registry is legally binding under the Paris Agreement, but the substance of that information is not, so it can remain vague. Thus, the action frame on MRV finally found traction in the Paris Agreement. Above, we have developed a historical map on how the actors’ rhetoric framing, in line with their logics, generated action frames and how those action frames ended or attained traction along the way. The two distinct logics, which had existed since the beginning, continued dictating the rhetoric framing of the generated action frames too. The principle of differentiation of the actions was the cardinal point throughout this debate. The developed countries tried to draw a distinction among the developing countries by citing the notion of “respective capabilities” that the provision of the UNFCCC on CBDR also contains and pointed to the fact that some developing countries had become qualified for graduation to contribute toward mitigation. Emerging countries defended this by saying that “re-categorizing the developing countries would be tantamount to reinterpretation of the convention” (ENB Vol. 12, No. 561, p. 2). Despite all of these conflicting stances, the 20th COP adopted the “Lima Call for Climate Action,” that had arguably diluted the wall of differentiation by tagging the principles of CBDR with the term “in light of different national circumstances,” which apparently opened the door to the subjective interpretation of CBDR (ENB Vol. 12,

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No. 619, p. 44). In the final Paris Agreement, we see that the reference to differentiation is there but that it has been diluted in a subtle way through the notion of nationally determined contributions toward mitigation actions which was accepted by all parties. This section illustrated how the rhetoric framing efforts yielded the action frames while the primordial mental schemata of the actors pervaded all along the process. The next section traces the mechanism regarding how these frames evolved over time. It would also serve as a summary of what has been discussed in this section.

4.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames The historical mapping in the previous section delineated the process through which some prominent action frames were generated in the course of the two decades of climate negotiations. It identified the critical juncture points when new action frames emerged. Four prominent action frames (see the analytical framework at Fig. 4.1 above), before reaching the Paris Agreement, have been distinguished. From the above historical mapping, a phenomenon can be clearly noticed—the contested rhetoric framing on an issue yields action frames, but, at every emergence point, there appeared uncompromising positions of the major players leading to a deadlock. This phenomenon is explored here by applying the model of connective dots, as posited in hypothesis-II. First, in the early days of the negotiations, the underlying logic of historical responsibility and level of emissions justified the argument that the developed countries should lead the mitigation actions. Concerted rhetoric framing efforts by the developing countries gave it an overwhelming salience, so the Berlin Mandate was adopted in conformity with the normative imperatives of these logics. Subsequent negotiations in line with the Berlin mandate yielded a prominent action frame at the 3rd COP in Kyoto (i.e., Kyoto Protocol). The normative imperatives of the Protocol entailed an annex-based mitigation process. Second, within a short time after the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol, the developed countries revamped their rhetoric framing discourses with the logic that, without an inclusive global protocol, it would be impossible to save the mother Earth. All the actors broadly, and JUSSCAANZ/UMBRELLA, the EU, and the G77, more rigorously fought along the line of their mental schemata, i.e., the urgency for a universal protocol vs. historical responsibilities and differentiation. The contested frames stroke a deadlock, the climax of it appeared on the final day of the 13th COP in Bali. A new action frame, “BAP” emerged from this deadlock, where the USA and its group made a compromise on their position and the G77/other developing countries also ceded by, for the first time, agreeing to a mitigation project, albeit in two-tracks. Third, since the Bali COP the prominent actors and coalitions fought within the ambit of the BAP, but they still carried the logics of their primordial mental schemata. One side argued that AWG-KP should be more ambitious and lead the mitigation actions, while the other side argued that AWG-LCA should be more homogenous,

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inclusive, less differentiated, and lead to global mitigation actions. These contested frames hit a complete deadlock during the Copenhagen COP. The ENB report notes— “Few delegates emerging from the meeting seemed surprised that parties had mainly repeated their ‘well-known positions’” (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 454, p. 4, COP 15). Some key developed countries maintained sustained pressure expressing serious concern concerning the mitigation aspect of the text and opposed its use as a basis for further work (ibid.). The intensity of the contested framing efforts by the competing actors reached a situation whereby their mental schemata became so confined within their logic that they failed to comprehend the rationales of each other’s arguments. Notable that Entman (1993) mentioned the prospect of surfacing this sort of situation out of competitive framing. The obvious result was a breakdown in despair, which is what happened in Copenhagen. The Registry mechanism and bottom-up approach started building up in the mental schemata of the parties from this impasse. Fourth, though BAP did not die at Copenhagen, it was only provisionally extended with life support until a new frame surfaced matching the expectation of the key powers. The new frame “Durban Platform” emerged at the 17th COP, and BAP was totally abandoned at the next COP. The registry mechanism and the bottom-up approach took prominence at the DP, and these were given salience exceptionally by all of the parties in unison, albeit in line with their primordial logics of differentiation and priority. This process finally led to the lowest common denominator-based outcome in the Paris Agreement. In Bali COP, the developing countries agreed to mitigation for the first time in the condition that they would receive technological and financial support. It created a hope for the high ambition of the developed countries that all the parties can be taken on board toward their mitigation efforts. However, the Copenhagen COP was filled with over-ambition, non-transparency, and immaturity which led to its failure. NAMA emerged in Bali, and its principles injected impetus until reaching the Agreement in Paris. Some frames like NAMA, CBDR, etc., accommodated all the major players’ expectations, created historical paths, and succeeded the test of time. There was also some other deadlock like situations concerning the nature of the differentiation, MRV, prioritization of mitigation or adaptation, etc., but the parties could unlock those deadlocks perhaps due to the fact that they shared a common platform concerning the logics of “registry,” sovereignty through the “bottom-up approach,” competitive checking through “MRV,” etc. Finally, the parties could work out a concession on differentiation, in which they reached a win–win situation for all. This sub-section analyzed the evolution of four action frames. It can be detected from the above discussion that the evolution process contained more or less four similar connective dots and patterns of evolution, which are (as assumed in hypothesis-II): (1) the actors conceive their underlying logics, (2) they frame up their competing issues as per their conceived logics, (3) the contested issues hit a deadlock, and (4) a new action frame emerges from that deadlock. It can also be noticed that the shifts of the frames happened toward somewhat more conciliatory ones. The claim with regard to the evolution process of the frames, as

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hypothesized, has appeared to have generally been followed. The recurrence of this mechanism has been observed with regard to the prominent action frames identified here, and it may be valid for other issues of climate negotiation as well as other fields of international negotiations that concern global collective commons. In this chapter, we discussed the framing process and then the mechanism of frame evolution. While the mechanism of frame evolution has been found to be generally congruent with the assumption of connective dots set forth in the method section above, the hypothesis posed with regard to the framing process appears only partially valid. It was not always the case that only those frames that received the intensified salience by the actors could succeed; many of them, as noted in conclusion below and in Chap. 7, could not. A framing process is essential for all of the frames to hold the tempo towards traction in the final Agreement, but it cannot address the puzzle of why only certain frames prevail while others do not. This problem is addressed in Chap. 7.

4.4 Conclusion Applying the concept of framing, this chapter has developed a frame analysis and systematically delineated the evolution mechanism of some of the prominent action frames with regard to mitigation. The frame analysis applied the terms “action frames” and “rhetoric frames” adopted from Rein and Schön (1996). It identified a process of generation of action frames as a result of rhetoric framing in line with the actor’s primordial logics. The framing of the generated frames also orbited around carrying the same logics. The study detects that the act of framing was the sine-quanon for the sustenance of all of the issues in the subsequent settings of negotiation as well as for finding a place in the final outcome, but the fates, as well as implications of the crucially contested frames, were determined by the major actors. The assumption of the connective dots of the evolution of the frames was found to have been followed. The time span of this study covered is two decades, from the first COP till the Paris COP. Major action frames around which the rhetoric framing of the actors revolved are the UNFCCC Convention, Kyoto Protocol, Bali Action Plan, registry mechanism, Durban Platform, MRV, and the final institutional form through the adoption of the Paris Agreement. The analysis with regard to rhetoric framing used the terms like primordial mental schemata, salience, speech acts, contested frames, and deadlocks. These terms were applied to test the first hypothesis. Identification of the action frames, their success, and relative success in sustaining throughout the time yielded the ground for the second hypothesis as well as identified the fates of the frames which served as evidences for the analysis with regard to the why part of the question, which is conducted in Chap. 7. The connective dots have been found to be iterative across the issues. This work adds values to the framing literature by showing that works applying the concept of framing can effectively and systematically discern the developments

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and illustrate the outcomes in the cases of such complex multilateral negotiation process. Some frames have generated normative imperatives that would have lasting implications in this field as well as there are ample possibilities that the norms and the development path9 this case has shown would have been replicated in the future in other fields of multilateral negotiations concerning global collective commons. Examples of the normative imperatives that dictated the actor’s orientation during the negotiations are, inter alia, CBDR in the UNFCCC convention, NAMA in Bali, and the registry of emissions at the 14th and 15th COPs, the bottom-up approach at the 15th and 21st COPs. Once the normative imperatives were generated, the global powers had to innovate their strategies within their confines.10 The same they have to do in the future with regard to the greater normative imperatives generated by the Paris Agreement. By summarizing the illustrations made in the first segment, the process tracing has intercepted an iterative mechanism of the evolution of the frames and recurrence of similar connective dots with regard to the evolution of different frames. It helps to understand this complex process in a structured and systematic way. The findings support the hypothesis made in the first part that those frames which were given intensified salience through speech act had seen the light of success, albeit it is only partially valid because some of the frames, despite going through intense framing efforts by some actors, could not sustain. For example, the frames concerning the 1.5 °C target, equity, adaptation, loss and damage, finance, justice, etc., either completely failed to secure a place in the Paris Agreement or at best had been accommodated with phrases of lesser significance. As such, the conclusion from this case study is that the process of framing was an inevitable necessity for the sustenance of the frames of the actors; without useful framing, there is no scope for an issue to get traction, but something beyond the formal framing process remained veiled that deters the fates of the crucially contested frames. It is presumably, as well as manifestly, the power of the actors which makes this crucial strike. To put it simply, the framing process was essential for all the issues for their sustenance, but the power of the actors behind those framing efforts might have played the conclusive deals in determining the fates of the crucially contested frames. This aspect is addressed in Chap. 7.

9

Development path means the evolution mechanism of the frames discussed in the previous section. This is to say that, once the action frames CBDR, NAMA, or the registry mechanism were adopted, everyone, including the global climate superpowers, had to operate their strategies within the imperatives of these frames, as they would also have to do so in the future COP negotiations, within the ambit of the Paris Agreement. As described in the introduction, renewable energy has already gained competitiveness vis-à-vis fossil fuel and is increasingly getting parity in other areas. This is obviously an outcome of the normative imperatives accrued over the time of two decades of negotiations and, most importantly, the Paris Agreement.

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Works Cited Entman, Robert M. 1993. Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm. Journal of Communication 43 (4): 51–58. Glemarec, Y. 2019. Aligning national interests and global climate justice: The role of human rights in enhancing the ambition of nationally determined contributions to combat climate change. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 12 (2): 309–327. Grubb, M. 2016. Full legal compliance with the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period—Some lessons. Climate Policy 16 (6): 673–681. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2016.1194005. Keohane, R.O. 2019. Institutions for a world of climate injustice. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 12 (2): 293–307. Rein, Martin, and Donald Schön. 1996. Frame-critical policy analysis and frame-reflective policy practice. Knowledge and Policy 9 (1): 85–104. Shishlov, I., R. Morel, and V. Bellassen. 2016. Compliance of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol in the first commitment period. Climate Policy 16 (6): 768–782. Steurer, R. 2003. The US’s retreat from the Kyoto Protocol: An account of a policy change and its implications for future climate policy. European Environment 13 (6): 344–360. Vezirgiannidou, S.E. 2008. The Kyoto Agreement and the pursuit of relative gains. Environmental Politics 17 (1): 40–57. Viola, Eduardo, Matias Franchini, and Thaís Lemos Ribeiro. 2012. Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: The role of major powers. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55 (special edition): 9–29.

Chapter 5

Framing Waves of the Adaptation Funding-Related Issues

5.1 Introduction While the issues related to mitigation were the priority for the developed countries, the issues related to adaptation were most crucial for the countries which are already being affected by climatic change. UNFCCC glossary defines adaptation as “Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.1 ” Ironically, the least advanced, poorest, and most vulnerable countries are more exposed to the adverse effects of climate change and, so, compared to richer countries, must drain much of their scant resources to address the problem. The United Nations Framework Convention (UNFCCC) articles 4(3), 4(4), 4(5), 4(7), and 4(9) delineate the funding options for developing countries. A careful examination of the articles reveals that funding for adaptation lacks appropriate attention, the full cost of funding has been concurred for the preparation and submission of information in the form of National Communications (NC), and the incremental and negotiated cost has been envisaged for technology development and transfer, capacity building, etc. Funding for adaptation is not specifically cited, but funding for adverse effects is mentioned, albeit in a relatively weak phrase: “shall also assist the developing country parties … that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effect … in meeting cost of adaptation ….” The above deficient articulation of the term adaptation and funding for adaptation actions entailed considerable implications in shaping the subsequent debates on funding for adaptation. Scholars have also pointed out that the issue of adaptation was not prominent in the initial stages of climate negotiations, the UNFCCC Convention and the Kyoto 1 See “Glossary of climate change acronyms and terms.” Available at UNFCCC website https://unf ccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-convention/glossary-of-climate-change-acronyms-and-terms#a, accessed on 14 May 2019.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_5

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Protocol (KP) attached little emphasis to it, but the issues related to adaptation acquired salience over time, with the publication of the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) which indicated that the adverse effect of climate change is imminent, inevitable, and already happening (Burton et al. 2002; Helgeson and Ellis 2015; Schipper and Lisa 2006; Klein and Persson 2008). It is surprising to note that though adaptation turned out to be one of the key issues, a collective global understanding on it had evolved only after 21 COPs, in Paris (Magnan and Ribera 2016, p. 1281). While there are several works that explained how the issues for adaptation funding acquired salience in the debates, systematic investigations on how they emerged and were framed-up in the COP negotiation settings that culminated into the adoption of the Paris Agreement, and why only certain frames finally succeeded to secure a place in the Agreement have not been explored sufficiently. This work filled the gap by elaborating the framing process comprehensively. It identified the successful and failed frames and who were the actors behind those frames, as well as what were their logics behind. The definition, theory, data, method, and hypothesis all remain the same for all the three empirical works under this book, and they have been presented in the third chapter. The outcome of this particular exercise is presented in this chapter dividing into two segments. In the first segment, a frame analysis has been conducted, which led to a historical mapping of the evolution of the frames. In the second segment, the mechanism of their evolution has been delineated using the analogy of connective dots as presumed in the second hypothesis. Finally, a conclusion is drawn highlighting the contributions of this work. It should be noted that, given the vast volume of documents and discourses that this topic incorporates, it appeared impossible to delve into all of the relevant aspects of adaptation-related issues, like technology development and transfer, capacity building, compensation, loss and damage, etc. The issues related to funding for adaptation alone form the focus of this chapter.

5.2 Prominent Frames and Their Evolution It has been identified in this case too that two distinct primordial mental schemata had been conceived by the actors of the two broad groups2 (the developed and the developing countries) since the pre-negotiation phase of the UNFCCC Convention and these logics were carried forward all along the courses of the negotiations. First, the core of the mental schemata of the developed countries maintained that, given the global challenge of anthropogenic climate change, all the countries, irrespective of their development level, should come forward to contribute to the 2

. This broad bifurcation is acceptable in climate politics because the debates are very much a subject of “North–South” politics (compare Najam 2005, p. 304). Otherwise, desperate groups attain more cohesive patterns in these broad groups in the case of climate negotiations.

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mitigation of greenhouse gas (GHG) emission and the neediest ones can be supported through the Global Environment Facility (GEF) basically regarding the accumulation of their GHG emission data and the additional burden that they would have to bear with due to their mitigation actions. Second, the core of the developing countries’ mental schemata held that the less developed and vulnerable countries would be affected the most by the anthropogenic climate change for which they were not liable. The historic emission records justify that the developed countries should extend financial and technical support to them. However, the particular issue of adaptation funding was mostly not in the discourse until the 5th COP. It suddenly emerged as one of the hot issues in the 6th COP, and the subsequent four COPs witnessed intense debates on it. Adaptation issues featured prominently in the debates from that point until reaching the Agreement in Paris. The contested framing yielded action frames, some of the prominent ones of those are: funding for National Communications (NC); relations with the Official Development Assistance (ODA); three major Funds—the Adaptation Funds (AF), the Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and the LDC Fund (LDCF); the National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) and the National Adaptation Plan (NAP); Measurable, Reportable and Verifiable (MRV) funding; the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB); the Green Climate Fund (GCF); the relative importance of adaptation or mitigation; and loss and damage and country ownership. Of these, the framing process of the most notable action frames, as presented in the following flow chart, is elaborated in the remainder of this section (Diagram 5.1). Presented below is a diagram that has been generated by the software through the coding process. It shows the major actor-codes and identifies what that actor talked about at the negotiation table. Though it cannot be shown in the paper printout, if we click on a code on the electronic version, all of the relevant quotations for that code, together with their relations with other codes and quotations, will appear. In this way, we can study the relevant quotations connected only with that particular code, which helps conduct the analysis efficiently and systematically. This is just a sample; we can select actor code or issue code, identify the statements related to those codes and systematically conduct our analysis. In this way, the software-generated tool helped to conduct a precise and in-depth qualitative content analysis and frame analysis simultaneously (Fig. 5.1).

5.2.1 Historical Mapping of the Evolution of the Issues 5.2.1.1

National Communications (NC)

In the first few COPs, the most frequently debated issue concerning funding was related to NC. NCs are national reports that contain information about GHG emissions and removals by sources and inventories. The GHG data of the developed countries were available, but the data on the developing countries were disorganized, and they also lacked the necessary expertise to compile them. It appeared to be the

ODA, Addition ality and MRV

Three Funds and their derivativ es,

Post Kyoto Funding goals and GCF

The Paris Agreeme nt

Diagram 5.1 Flow chart—major actor-codes and their relations with the quotations: adaptation funding-related issues

The process tracing finds four connecting dots of the above evolution process: 1. Conception of logics in line with the primordial mental schemata, 2. Frame contestation through speech acts, 3. Conflicting frames reach deadlocks, 4. Emergence of new frames.

National Commun ications

Developing countries The developing countries, particularly the vulnerable countries would suffer the most due to the anthropogenic climate change for which they are not liable. Therefore, the developed countries should extend financial and technical supports to them.

Interaction in the negotiation table. Most notable action frames are: NC; ODA, financial additionality and MRV debate; three new funds: LDCF, SCCF and AF and their derivatives; Post-Kyoto funding goal and GCF; The Paris Agreement

Developed countries Given the global challenge of the climate change, all the countries irrespective of their development level should come forward to contribute for mitigation and the neediest countries can be supported through GEF basically for their additional burden with regard to mitigation related activities.

Actor’s Primordial Mental Schemata

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Fig. 5.1 Major actor-codes and their relations with the quotations: adaptation funding-related issues

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foremost priority of the UNFCCC to gather all of the data and trends on the emission and removal of GHG so that a proper master plan could be devised at the global level. As per the convention, the developing countries were required to submit their NCs within three years of entering the convention and every four years after that. The less developed countries generally agreed to this arrangement, but they found that the money, technique, and expertise needed to achieve this goal posed additional burdens on their weak economies. Hence, they sought full funding in this regard. The developed countries also recognized this necessity, but they imposed the condition that in order to get financial support the developing countries were required to engage in a constructive review process of the NC submission. The developing countries argued that providing information through NCs depended on the condition of meeting the financial pledges by the developed countries (ENB Vol. 12, 1998, No. 96, p. 1). By the 5th COP, some of the developing countries had begun to suspect that the data submitted through NCs might be used in the future to set targets and the ranking of performance towards mitigation efforts for sustainable development, while they would be seeking access to GEF funding (ENB Vol. 12, No. 123, p. 15). In the later phases of the COPs, it was indeed found that the developing countries tried to relate the release of funds from LDCF and SCCF conditional on the submission of NCs. Both the European Union (EU) and UMBRELLA countries attached high importance to the submission of NCs as frequently and as accurately as possible. The G77/China was reluctant to discuss the frequency of the submission of NCs and continued to emphasize the availability of financial resources (ENB Vol. 12, No. 231, p. 8; No. 253, p. 2). Although it was found from the content analysis that the frequency of deliberations of the actors on NCs had decreased in the negotiation table since the 6th COP onward, probably due to the finalization of the modalities and accumulation of the initial data, the UNFCCC constantly considered this a vital pillar for understanding the global scenario and the developed countries always kept it as a high priority on their agenda. Cancun Agreements, an outcome of the 16th COP, require the developing countries to submit full update reports through NCs every four years and interim update reports every two years (compare Breidenich 2011). The Paris Agreement reaffirmed this (Article 15). Actors from both sides were of the view that the national communications needed to be submitted; they basically contested the frequency of submission and sources of the funds to prepare the reports. This trivial difference was the reason why this action frame sustained throughout the time and secured a place in the Final Agreement.

5.2.1.2

ODA and the Financial Additionality Debate

Until the 5th COP, the debate on funding tended to pivot around the NCs. The lesser developing countries were fixated to articulate their demands for other funding necessities. For example, funding for adaptation, compensation, and technology did not feature much in the discourses. The concern that the financial support by the developed countries has to be additional to their ODA pledges did not surface until then. At

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the 6th COP, the developing countries argued that the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) fund should be over and above ODA, GEF, and other financial commitments, to which the UMBRELLA countries replied that no financial additionality was in the provision and that ODA could also be a source of funding (ENB Vol. 12, No. 158; No. 160, p. 2; No. 170, p. 2). The LDCs pursued a new Fund for themselves, or at least that it should be separated within the GEF (ENB Vol. 12, No. 114). The salience of this debate was intensified in the subsequent COPs. As a result, the 6th COP decided that the public funding for CDM would be separate from ODA and would not be counted as part of the Annex-I parties’ financial obligations (ENB Vol. 12, No. 176, p. 6). However, the issue of additionality to ODA remained as a critical concern of the LDCs all along the way (see ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 451, p. 2; No. 457, p. 2; No. 560, p. 1; No. 611, p. 3; No. 626, p. 1; No. 616, p. 2). During the 18th COP, the LDCs asked for a clear definition of climate finance and Bangladesh pointed out the absence of differentiation between climate finance and ODA (ENB Report Vol. 12, No. 560, p. 1). In the 20th COP, India and Algeria suggested mobilization provision of finance be enhanced as “additional to” instead of the proposed term “in coordination with” ODA (ENB Vol. 12, No. 611, p. 3) and Saint Lucia on behalf of CARICOM proposed to define climate finance that is provided entirely to address climate change and that is new and additional to ODA (ENB Vol. 12, No. 626, p. 1). France in the same COP called how to combine the climate and developing finance (ENB Vol. 12, No. 616, p. 2), this appeared another indirect way to bypass pure climate finance. Climate finance and ODA are tricky to disentangle due to the modalities designed to channelize the funds, requiring co-financing. The calculation of climate finance managed by the GEF is a daunting task. Any climate-related project is usually part of broader development projects. For example, if a country adopts a project to redress salinity intrusion, the GEF would finance a portion of the project proportional to the additional harm that salinity intrusion had taken place as a result of climate change. Now how to calculate this additional harm? Moreover, most of the LDCs do not have the financial capacity to launch such projects since they have to bear the bulk of the finance. As a result of the abovementioned complexity, co-financing requirements tagged by the developed countries appeared to be a formidable burden for the LDCs. LDCs, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) repeatedly referred to the impediment of co-financing as a troublesome obstacle to them accessing the Funds (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 251, p. 1; No. 253, p. 2; No. 254, p. 2; No. 395, p. 3; No. 489, p. 1). Despite that, the developed countries continued insisting on co-financing, saying that it creates countries’ sense of ownership over projects (ENB Vol. 12, No. 253, p. 2; No. 388, p. 2; No. 167, p. 2). LDCs, who lack the bargaining power vis-à-vis their contenders (Gupta 2000; ENB Vol. 12, No. 260, p. 15), were struggling to stand cohesively in favor of their frame. In line with the logic of their primordial mental schemata, the developed countries insisted that the funds should be provided only for the part of adaptation requirements that was caused as a result of climate change. In the 14th COP, Bangladesh proposed an excellent idea of having a “vulnerability index” (ENB Vol. 12, No. 390,

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p. 1) but it was not supported by other actors especially from the emerging countries camp and did not sustain in the discourses any further. A vulnerability index could circumvent the requirements of complicated calculations if the funds were allocated as per the rankings. This is an example that despite having firm ground, if a frame of the LDCs was not supported by the emerging countries, it could not see the light of success. In the 11th COP, some developed countries proposed to devise a sliding scale on co-financing, to which the G77/China as well as the emerging countries objected by urging to avoid onerous operational policies and eligibility criteria (ENB Vol. 12, No. 285, p. 2). This attempt of the developing countries succeeded. This is an example that when the emerging countries came up in support of the LDCs or weaker groups, their framing efforts saw the light of success, and in its absence, they faltered. In the protracted first phase of the 6th COP, the G77/China asserted that Annex-I countries should also report the implementation of their commitments concerning the transfer of technology and “new and additional” financial resources (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 163, p. 9). The term “new and additional finance” had been given elevated salience by many developing countries in the subsequent COPs. The notion of new and additional fund was mentioned to distinguish the climate finance from the already settled ODA pledges of the developed countries for the least developed countries. The scheme of Official Development Assistance (ODA) by the developed countries to the least developed ones did not appear out of blue. Given the economic disparity among the States and considering its responsibility to minimize the gap, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) on 24 October 1970 adopted a resolution that each economically advanced country will progressively increase ODA to lesser developing countries towards a minimum net amount of their 0.7% of Gross National Income (GNI) by the middle of the decade.3 So far, only Sweden and Finland could meet this target for a short fraction of the time since then, but all the other developed countries’ contribution has always remained far below this “minimum” target. The developed countries tried to assert ODA to be counted as climate finance too. The developing countries found no reason to accept this double counting. It has been observed that in the later phases of the COP negotiations, whenever developed countries talked about the issue of MRV for mitigation, the developing countries raised the issue of MRV for “funding additionality” too. This contest appeared more tightened with the rise of Brazil, South Africa, India, China (BASIC) group. In the 17th COP, the developing countries led by the BASIC group intensified the framing in this regard by emphasizing “reporting with total transparency” and by asking to ascertain that the nature of funding would be new and additional (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 532, p. 2). In the 19th and 20th COP, the developing countries furthered their framing efforts for “new, additional and scaled-up” finance and added that public finance should be the main source (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 587, p. 1; No. 610, p. 1; No. 619, p. 33). In the 20th COP, they proposed to devise a common methodology to evaluate support and Means of Implementation (MOI) 3

See further details at “History of 0.7% ODA Target”, available at https://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/ ODA-history-of-the-0-7-target.pdf, accessed on 30 March 2018.

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by the developed countries (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 613, p. 3). In the Paris COP, G77/China pointed that MRV in finance was missing and asked to add it before finalizing the Agreement (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 657, p. 1). They also demanded to cite reassurances of MOI in the text adequately (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 661, p. 1). With the advent of time, the actual contribution of the developed countries plummeted. In the Copenhagen COP, South Africa flagged that the adaptation funding at that time was only coming from the developing countries themselves through CDMs (ENB Vol. 12, No. 451, p. 2). The developed countries tried to divert the focus by repeatedly insisting on a new frame of “country ownership” for adaptation. This frame implied that the recipient countries should mainly contribute to their adaptation projects. Ultimately, this is what is happening, as almost no country is waiting for money, and the vulnerable countries have been compelled to allocate a portion of their own budget for their adaptation purposes. For example, Bangladesh, one of the most vulnerable countries, has contributed around US$100 million from its budget annually since 2011.4

5.2.1.3

The Emergence of Three Funds and Their Derivatives

The issue of funding for adaptation acquired salience after the publication of the reports by the IPCC that the most vulnerable countries will be hit by the adverse effects of climate change soon (see introduction). Global Environment Facility (GEF), the funding institute of the UNFCCC, had nearly exclusive focus on mitigation through the so-called Resource Allocation Framework (RAF) (Müller 2006). Its conditionality and bureaucracy have been a real difficulty for the least developed countries to penetrate the Fund; the larger developing countries like China and India seized this opportunity (Mace 2005, p. 208). In this way, the actual necessity of the most affected countries, i.e., adaptation, had been neglected by GEF mechanism (Burton et al. 2002, p. 147). In the 5th COP, Bangladesh and Bhutan proposed creating a separate Fund for the LDCs, prioritizing their needs (ENB Vol. 12, No. 114; No. 123, p. 13). In the next COP, this turned out to be a vital topic (ENB Vol. 12, No. 156, p. 2; No. 168, p. 26). The 6th COP, in The Hague and Bonn, respectively, was so contested that, unprecedentedly, a second phase of the COP had to be called for. The chair listed the issue of funding for adaptation in “Box A” of the “crunch” outstanding issues to be solved in the second phase (ENB Vol. 12, No. 163, p. 4 & p. 8). The COP president proposed creating an Adaptation Fund, a Convention Fund, and a Climate Resources Committee, as well as an increase in the resources for climate change funding (ENB Vol. 12, No. 162, p. 2). Although not all of these proposals could sustain in the later phases, this served as the foundation for the creation of the AF, LDCF, and SCCF. The Marrakech Accord institutionalized the establishment of these three Funds. The

4

See “We are not waiting for Money,” Sallemul Huq, 15 March 2018; available at http://blog.hel vetas.org/climateinterview/, accessed on 26 March 2018.

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first two Funds were created under the ambit of the convention and the GEF, while the third one is the most significant and new one, created under the Kyoto Protocol. Marrakech Accords marked a shift in policy orientation Predominance of mitigation issue had been balanced by recognizing adaptation as a policy and with mushrooming of adaptation projects as a consequence.5 However, LDC Fund (LDCF) and Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), which were created in Marrakech in response to challenges to GEF, had been left only to discretionary contributions with some major developed countries including the USA opting not to contribute in these Funds (Mace 2005, p. 245). In line with the primordial logics of the actors, the G77/China emphasized new, additional, predictable, and adequate finance while the EU advocated for mainstreaming it with individual nations’ sustainable development, Millennium Development Goals, and poverty reduction strategies (ENB Vol. 12, No. 226, p. 2). In the subsequent COPs, the G77/China repeatedly reiterated the terms “adequate” and “predictable” (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 344, p. 2; No. 610, p. 2; No. 611, p. 2). The AOSIS argued that the failure to mitigate emissions had deepened the need to increase adaptation measures (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 225, p. 1; No. 257, p. 1 & p. 2; No. 258, p. 2; No. 259, p. 2; No. 290, p. 1). Although LDCF was created, the less developed countries repeatedly pointed out their difficulties in getting funds released from it. In the 10th COP, many LDCs complained about unavailability of funds from LDCF, urged to activate it as soon as possible, some expressed disappointment at the renegotiation of terms of the Fund which meant that progress on this in previous COPs was negligible (ENB Vol. 12, No. 257, p. 1 & p. 2; No. 258, p. 2; No. 259, p. 2). In the 10th and 11th COP, many LDCs reiterated these difficulties and urged for its activation as soon as possible, with some expressing disappointment at the renegotiation of the terms of the Fund. This resulted in the generation of NAPA intending to facilitate a smoother release of the funds for the LDCs. NAPA was prepared as per the suggestion of the COP so that LDCs can acquire funds easily from LDCF. NAPAs identify priority activities about the adaptation of the LDCs. LDCs have been preparing NAPAs since 2001 (Klein and Persson 2008). Soon it appeared that funds for NAPA projects were insufficient, and the less developed countries argued that the allocation for them should not be restricted to NAPA alone (ENB Vol. 12, No. 450, p. 1). The persistent complaints of the LDCs resulted in the creation of NAP, designed explicitly for the LDCs. Despite all of this, LDCs had never found it easy to access the Fund designated to them, a problem that constantly haunted them (see, for example, ENB Vol. 12, No. 661, p. 1). Nepal and Bhutan in the 11th COP reported that the Funds were not operationalized yet and urged to operationalize the LDCF so that they can implement NAP (ENB Vol. 12, No. 290, p. 1). The most significant breakthrough secured through the regrouped developing countries’ intense framing efforts was the creation of the Adaptation Fund and its 5

See Schipper 2006, 83 and Burton et al. (2002, p. 148), where they discussed growing importance of adaptation after the Kyoto Protocol period.

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derivative, the AFB. This Fund under the KP is designed to be generated from actions, i.e., CDMs thus it would not require depending on meeting pledges by the developed countries. Developing countries claimed that it was their own money as the proceeds would be generated from the activities in their countries, the developed countries responded that the companies who would generate these funds were from the developed countries so the ownership claim of the funds should be at both sides. The outcomes from the contested framing on this ultimately favored the developing countries. The creation of the AF was a highly significant development as it signaled a way to escape the domination of the rich countries by establishing a mechanism of selfsustaining funding to be derived from the 2% share of the proceeds of the CDMs, which was expected to increase incrementally with the excelling of the projects. International organizations suffer from two major hurdles to their effectiveness. They lack military or policing capacity and financial resources. The creation of AF signaled promising institutional innovation to overcome the second of these (compare Klein and Persson 2008, p. 9; Grasso 2011, p. 363; Ciplet et al. 2013, p. 63). The AFB induced great expectations for the developing countries in need of funds, as it was designed to be managed by the CDM executive board to finance “concrete adaptation projects” with special attention to the LDCs and AOSIS (ENB Vol. 12, No. 162, p. 3). The G77/China, EU, and UMBRELLA countries contested hard on the AF’s governance structure, i.e., whether to build it from the GEF/World Bank’s existing institutional framework or whether to build-up a new architecture (see ENB Vol. 12, No. 395, p. 14). The ultimate outcome was a compromise that entailed accepting the GEF to render services on an interim basis, the World Bank as a trustee on an interim basis, and the AF working under the more active guidance of the COP (ENB Vol. 12, No. 350, p. 2). The insertion of the terms “interim basis” and “more active” guidance by the COP constituted a remarkable success for the developing countries. The most significant achievement of the developing countries was that the AFB’s governance structure was made equitable6 while the other Funds, i.e., the LDCF and SCCF, retained exclusive domination and discretionary funding by the developed countries (compare Mace 2005, p. 245).

5.2.1.4

Copenhagen-Cancun COPs, the Peak of Success for Funding but Not for Adaptation Funding

Copenhagen’s 15th COP is often portrayed as an utter failure (compare Dimitrov 2010, p. 818). This may be somewhat true concerning mitigation issues. However, this work finds that the Copenhagen COP and the 16th COP in Cancun mark

6

It was decided that the AFB will comprise 16 members: two from each of the UN geographical regions, one each from SIDS and LDC, two from non-annex, and two from annex parties. Thus, it became more equitable.

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the pinnacle of whatever modest success the developing countries could garner concerning funding. Paragraph 3 of the Copenhagen Accord mentions that the developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable, and sustainable financial resources, as well as technology and capacity building, to support the implementation of adaptation actions in the less developed countries, with particular attention to LDCs, SIDS, and African countries. To date, article 8 of the Accord is the most explicit declaration about funding, which mentions the creation of a Fund amounting to USD 100 billion a year from the post-Kyoto climate action period (from 2021). This figure of pledges could not be exceeded so far, and the funding provisions of the Paris Agreement are basically founded on this. However, this most explicit declaration has been weakened by the subtle wording that the developed countries collectively commit to the goal of USD 100 billion. These are slippery terms since if a “goal” cannot be met, there are endless options for excuses. The foundation for failure has been furthered by using the notion of “collective commitment” without providing any hint regarding how the funding requirements will be assigned to different developed countries, which have been found profoundly divided during the negotiations and have a history of failing to meet their commitments. Copenhagen pledges were formalized in the next COP in Cancun articulated in a package for finance, technology, and capacity-building support for the less developed countries and adopting the decision of creating a Fund of USD 100 billion a year. This culminated into establishment of the GCF a year later, the most important financing institute created to date on climate funding. The GCF is assumed to play the most vital role by facilitating finance for both mitigation and adaptation. Presented below is a chart reflecting the funding status of the four major climate Funds7 (Graph 5.1). The paltry size of the AF is likely to be dwarfed by the GCF (Moore 2012, p. 41) and is already drying up due to halted CDMs (Fridahl and Linnér 2016, p. 107). As such, although both GEF and GCF remain the financial mechanisms in the Paris Agreement, GCF is already the leading funding institute and can be expected to consolidate its preeminence in the coming days (Author’s interview). In this way, the rhetoric framing for the new funding institute ultimately yielded action frames under the ambit of the GCF. The GCF reflects the interest of the developed countries and, to some extent, the emerging countries who are at the forefront of the technological innovations for green growth, for which the GCF stands mainly. The most promising success of the developing countries, more particularly the affected ones, thus, has been profoundly diluted. The GCF just took the institutional structure of the AFB by accommodating the actors both from the Developed and Developing camps, but unlike the AF, it does not have a prospect of self-generating fund and 7

GEF covers the funding arrangements of LDCF, SCCF, Trust Fund, and CBIT. Global Investment Fund (GIF) is supposed to disappear after the GCF takeover, and the declaration that the key donor USA would not fund it any longer means its obvious demise. GCF funding was initiated in 2015 and started operating in 2016. For data, see “Mapped: where multilateral climate funds spend their money,” available on the “Carbon Brief” website at https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-wheremultilateral-climate-funds-spend-their-money, accessed on 5 May 2020.

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Graph 5.1 Major climate Funds

would basically rely on the donors who have a history of failing to keep up the promise and have a tendency of prioritizing their interest while channeling funds.

5.2.1.5

Relative Importance Between Adaptation and Mitigation

Parity between adaptation and mitigation finance or relative importance between them turned out to be a hotly contested topic by the last phases of the negotiations. Until the 16th COP, the developed countries tried to frame their arguments that funding for adaptation should be conditional to mitigation and mitigation should be given the first priority (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 207; No. 230), while the developing countries asked to attach equal emphasis between the two (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 229, p. 1). On the 5th day of 10th COP, EU posited that mitigation is the key issue. On the 4th day of the 9th COP Japan and on the 9th day of the same COP USA and on the 10th day Australia argued that adaptation and mitigation should be addressed globally, and that adaptation should not be an excuse for mitigation, etc. (ENB reports). It may be noted that at that time, with the fresh release of IPCC reports, the issue of adaptation appeared to be an immediate existential threat to the vulnerable countries. By saying that both adaptation and mitigation actions should be taken up globally at that point in time they actually tactfully tried to favor the mitigation issues. In the later phase, it has been found that the JUSSCAANZ/UMBRELLA group downplayed adaptation and often denied to address adaptation at the global level while emphasizing that mitigation should be addressed at a global level. In the 10th and 12th COPs, the developed countries enhanced salience of their frames in this respect by arguing that mitigation was the most important issue and adaptation was a short or medium-term response that cannot counter long-term impacts (EU), urgent action on mitigation could help not to exceed the critical threshold (Japan), adaption is not a new issue, so it needs to be addressed in the

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context of risk management (Canada), mitigation today will reduce adaptation cost tomorrow (EU), both mitigation and adaptation should be addressed at the global level (Japan), engaging in adaptation should not be an excuse for mitigation (Australia), etc. (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 252, p. 3; No. 254, p. 2; No. 310, p. 2; No. 318, p. 5; No. 253; No. 259). EU in the 2nd day of 12th COP took a middle ground by saying that in a long-term action adaptation needed to be complemented by mitigation, and on the 5th day, it reiterated that looking at the potential of mitigation by only a number of parties will be insufficient (see ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 308, p. 311). G77/China reasserted on the final day of the 12th COP that adaptation was the key concern in line with Common but Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR) (see ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 310; No. 318, p. 3). Some developing countries regarded mitigation as an “unacceptable basis” for discussion (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 453, p. 2). The efforts of the developed countries to tag them together had an underlying purpose. It meant that those who had historically made no contribution in GHG emission, whose emission till that time remained close to zero but were poised to be the foremost victim of the adverse effect, required to, as per this logic, contribute for mitigation whatever their economic condition is; otherwise, they would not be qualified to receive financial support. In the advent of the continued relative success of the developing countries’ framing efforts, a surprising trend of frameshift has been observed in the later phases. The USA as a country and its group UMBRELLA collectively reversed their earlier tendency to tag adaptation and mitigation together but for different objectives. They tried it so that now mitigation does not become conditional to an extension of funds by the developed countries in a comparable way. They endeavored to dissociate legal parity between adaptation and mitigation, not to set a global goal on adaptation and not to link long-term temperature goal conditional to financial support for adaptation (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 611, p. 4; Vol. 12, No. 611; Vol. 12, No. 619, p. 36). The developing countries, led by the emerging ones, opposed those attempts in unison by asking for “full legal parity” with MOI, to maintain a balance between mitigation and adaptation funding and cautioned against the trend to shift responsibilities to the developing countries (ENB reports Vol. 12, No. 611, p. 4; No. 612, p. 2; No. 617; No. 619, p. 36; Vol. 12, No. 586 & 593; Vol. 12, No. 589, p. 3; No. 593). LDCs asserted to stick to the principle of half–half finance without any pre-condition for mitigation (ENB report Vol. 12, No. 592, p. 2). The result of the above-contested framing is reflected in Article 9 of the Paris Agreement. It embodies details on finance. Paragraph 4 of the Article mentions to “aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation.” It represents the success of the developing countries’ framing efforts. Here we can recall that, as discussed in the introduction, the UNFCCC convention largely lacked adaptation issues, but the developing countries’ framing efforts made it possible to inject many of the terms with regard to adaptation in the Paris Agreement. If we look back to the discussion made above, we can intercept a trajectory which can be detailed as the issue of adaptation funding was mostly absent till the 5th COP, turned out to be an important issue in the 6th COP, and gradually acquired prominence until the 15th/16th COP. The developed countries from the 10th COP onwards tried to

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downplay adaptation by saying that mitigation was the most important objective but initiated their concerted efforts to pit mitigation above adaptation since the 17th COP. The developing countries, especially the emerging ones, strongly defended against this trend. Finally, the Paris Agreement adopted a conciliatory phrasing about parity between mitigation and adaptation funding. The support of the powerful emerging countries, i.e., BASIC, played the most vital role behind the success of the framing efforts of the lesser States. From the above frame analysis and historical mapping, it is crystal clear that the actors had framed-up their issues in line with their mental schemata through speech act. Intense salience in favor of a particular frame by multiple actors had been an essential factor for their success, but that was not decisive for all; involvement of the powerful actors had served as a vital determinant, particularly for the crucially contested frames. The failed framing effort with regard to “vulnerability index,” Saudi Arabia’s proposal to pool the resource commitments by the developed countries and action pledges by the developing countries,8 ambiguity with regard to financial additionality to ODA and the way to reach the goal of US$100 billion a year for the post-Kyoto finance are some of the evidences in favor of the argument made above. At the same time, the notional reference to parity between adaptation and mitigation, as discussed in the above paragraph, is an example of success where powerful emerging countries played crucial roles. In other words, those frames which were taken up and/or supported by the powerful actors were more likely to succeed. Chapter 7 of this book interprets this role of power along with some other examples, while the following section traces the mechanism of the evolution of successful action frames discussed in this chapter. It would also serve as a summary of what has been discussed in this section.

5.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames The frame analysis conducted in the previous section led to a historical mapping of the evolution process of the issues. The actors contested in line with their distinct logics, which yielded the action frames, and through repeating a similar process, the action frames finally attained traction in the Paris Agreement. It already indicated a sense as to how the issues evolved. This section tries to intercept a pattern of evolution of the action frames by applying the analogy of connective dots as assumed in the second hypothesis. As explained above, the issue of adaptation funding was mostly absent from the discourses until the 5th COP. Up until then, the funding issues for the NCs of the developing countries featured prominently. The reports of the IPCC that the vulnerable countries will be affected shortly woke up the developing countries, and since 8

See ENB report Vol. 12, No. 395, Page. 13. Saudi Arabia made this proposal, reiterated later too, but no other country has been found to have supported this apparently highly justified proposal, and it has failed totally.

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the 6th COP onward, they concertedly intensified their rhetoric framing regarding funding for adaptation. This storm of regrouped developing countries’ framing efforts apparently had overwhelmed the negotiators of all the camps. This resulted in a deadlock, which, for the first and to date the last time, necessitated a second phase of a COP (6th). The US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol apparently had rather pushed all other major actors to be more enthusiastic to save the process, and all the parties made concessions as much as they could. The second phase of the 6th COP generated action frames orbiting around three Funds: AF, LDCF, and SCCF. The actors thenceforth contested the operating mechanisms and policies of these Funds. The contestations yielded the derivatives of these Funds, which are NAPA, NAP, AFB, and GCF. The creation of AFB and GCF mark milestone innovations. The 13th COP, in Bali, almost ground to a halt due to opposing frames on different issues, among which AF was one of the most prominent. Ultimately, as we have seen in the previous chapters, this deadlock-like situation yielded to the creation of AFB, which is one of the most significant outcomes not only for climate issues but also bears the potential to serve as an example in the coming days for other similar issues with regard to institution building for global collective commons.9 For example, the institutional structure of the AFB was already mostly replicated by the GCF during the time of its creation in the Cancun COP. Copenhagen’s 15th COP is portrayed as the most conflicting one and was regarded as an utter failure. However, the stalemate in Copenhagen facilitated the creation of GCF in the next COP, which is, as discussed above, probably the most significant institutional innovation in the contemporary World after the Bretton Woods Institutions. While the framing objectives of the developing countries acclaimed considerable success until the 16th COP, it has been found that from the 17th COP onwards, the developed countries regrouped against the issue of parity, importance, and tagging of adaptation funding with the mitigation requirements but the final Agreement in Paris adopted more compromising phrasings on all these issues. In the end, the Paris Agreement devised a smart way to favor the developed countries. It diluted the obligations of the developed countries’ public funding provisions and presented an ambiguous “great prospect” of funding that will be generated by the private sector. The experts have criticized this prospect as a “blank check” or “empty shell.” From this summary, four connective dots of emergence and evolution of the frames, as assumed in the second hypothesis, can be discerned. First, the actors conceived their logics, which were latent in their primordial mental schemata and permeated through the action frames across the issues all the way up to the Paris Agreement. Second, the actors’ rhetoric framing of the action frames orbited again around the logics shaped by their primordial schemata on the respective issues. Third, the contested framing efforts reached deadlocks (for example, in The Hague, Bali, Copenhagen COPs). Fourth and interestingly, every time a deadlock occurred, a new action frame emerged with some innovative components that mostly accommodated the concerns of the emerging and less developed countries. The above process was 9

Moore (2012, p. 36) also reached a similar prediction.

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repeated over and again. This phenomenon is revealing to understand how contested issues are framed-up and evolve in a multilateral negotiation setting and how they finally produce an outcome.

5.4 An Evaluation of the Outcomes The plausibility of the second hypothesis, on the assumption of the connective dots in the evolution of the frames, has been established in the section above. However, the first hypothesis appears to be only partially valid. It is clear that the framing of the issues was the sine-qua-non for the sustenance of all of the issues, and the salience for a particular frame was the determining factor regarding their traction. However, the act of framing alone did not guarantee the sustenance of all of the frames, nor did it determine their relative significance. For example, the attempt to establish ODA as part of climate finance has been thwarted by the developing countries. It was a success for the recipient countries but later we have seen that the meaning of this success turned out to be minimal as the donors are not funding and the affected and financially weak countries are poised to bear the brunt of climate finance which is an additional and formidable burden towards their development stride. A highly logical scaling method, the vulnerability index, proposed by Bangladesh was not able to garner support from the countries apart from the most affected ones and was not even welcomed by the G77/China group (compare Ciplet et al. 2013, p. 60). It has utterly failed to sustain. These are the shreds of evidence that, despite having firm ground, if the frames of the less powerful countries were unsupported by the emerging or powerful developed ones, they failed to sustain in the process. As the third piece of evidence, though the action frames concerning financial additionality, AF, LDCF, and SCCF could secure a place in the text of the Paris Agreement, the qualitative content analysis in the previous sections disclosed how the recipient countries fell into illusory pledges and how the affected countries ultimately became the main contributors of their adaptation costs. If the donors simply fail or do not want to contribute, what can the recipients do? The lesson is that regardless of the level of vulnerability, no country should expect others to solve its problems but, instead, they should try to address the problem themselves while remaining mostly unperturbed by the logics of historical responsibilities. The fourth piece of evidence, the creation of the AFB signaled a meaningful achievement for the less developed countries. It created a path for the generation of the new institutional mechanism, which was followed when the GCF was created. However, the GCF has, in a subtle way, diverted the focus. In the case of the AFB, the main focus was adaptation funding, from which the most vulnerable countries were supposed to receive most of the benefits. In the case of the GCF, although a 50:50 ratio for adaptation and mitigation is mentioned, in reality, until 2016, the GCF has extended 41% of its funding to mitigation projects, 32% to cross-cutting projects,

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and 27% to adaptation projects.10 Indeed 27–30% is the percentage that is received for purely adaptation funding from the GCF. There is no timeframe for achieving this 50:50 ratio, which is a loophole that is being exploited. The GCF funding for adaptation is designed for mega projects of so-called “global benefits,” from which the most vulnerable countries may not be able to reap comparable benefits, as was the case for the AF. Most importantly, the AF’s funding prospect has fallen drastically due to the lower profit from the CDM projects and the diminished number of projects. Thus, the GCF is more conducive to serving the interests of the powerful countries, both from the developed and emerging camps, and its activities regarding adaptation have also been made amenable to the interests of these powerful countries. In this subtle way, the interest of the major powers, both from the developed and the emerging camps, has acquired prominence at the expense of the less powerful and most vulnerable countries. In view of the above, we can conclude that the framing of the issues was an essential condition for all of the issues that secured traction through the negotiation process but did not alone form a sufficient condition since it is evident that the fates of the crucially contested frames as well as their relative significance were determined by the powerful actors.

5.5 Conclusion Applying the concept of framing, this case study has developed a frame analysis and systematically delineated the evolution mechanism of some of the prominent action frames with regard to adaptation funding and discerned how the frames got traction in the Paris Agreement. It has found a process of frame generation through contested rhetoric framing, which again contested carrying the logics of actor’s primordial mental schemata. The exercise helps to conceptualize this complex negotiation of two decades in a systematic and perceptible way and, at the same time, it summarizes developments of the key issues with regard to adaptation funding. The systematic historical mapping of the evolution of the issues sheds light as to how different issues emerged and were framed up. The developing countries were late to identify their key interest in the early stages of the negotiations when funding for the “national communications” was mainly in the discourse. Their lack of knowledge and complexity to understand this whole complicated issue are apparently the reasons behind it. However, once they understood the magnitude of their perilous situation, as the IPCC reports revealed, they coalesced into a consolidated group to frame-up their issues like additionality to the ODA; special fund for the LDCs, technology, adaptation, fixation of a funding goal, and precise identification of the sources of the

10

See “Mapped: where multilateral climate funds spend their money” on the Carbon brief website at https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-where-multilateral-climate-funds-spendtheir-money, accessed on 12 January 2019, p. 20.

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fund, devising a way to escape from onerous co-financing requirements, and, most rigidly, to emphasis the term “parity” between the adaptation and mitigation finance. The developed countries, from the very beginning of the UNFCCC negotiation, signaled that the most vulnerable countries would receive financial support to combat the challenges of climate change. On the contrary, this case study illustrated how the pledges of financial support for the adaptation of the vulnerable countries remained elusive all along the way and why this situation continues prevailing to date. It elaborated how the issues related to adaptation funding emerged, evolved, and attained traction or failed to do so. The application of the concept of framing is meaningful as it embodies and manifests all of the elements of mental schemata, logics, and culture, as well as the power of the actors. Framing efforts proved to be a sine-qua-non for the sustenance of all the issues; however, it alone could not sufficiently explain the remaining puzzle regarding why only certain crucially contested frames prevail while others fail. Like the case in the previous chapter, evidences from this case study also indicate that the powerful actors played a decisive part in determining the fates of the crucially contested frames as well as how they would be treated during the implementation phase. These aspects would be analyzed in Chapter 7.

Works Cited Breidenich, Clare. 2011. Improving reporting of national communications and GHG inventories by non-annex I parties under the climate convention. Natural Resources Defense Council, February. National Resources Defense Council White Paper. Burton, Ian, et al. 2002. From impacts assessment to adaptation priorities: The shaping of adaptation policy. Climate Policy 2 (2–3): 145–159. Ciplet, David, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan Khan. 2013. The politics of international climate adaptation funding: Justice and divisions in the greenhouse. Global Environmental Politics 13 (1): 49–68. Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2010. Inside UN climate change negotiations: The Copenhagen conference. Review of Policy Research 27 (6): 795–821. Fridahl, Mathias, and Björn-Ola Linnér. 2016. Perspectives on the Green Climate Fund: Possible compromises on capitalization and balanced allocation. Climate and Development 8 (2): 105–109. Grasso, Marco. 2011. The role of justice in the North-South conflict in climate change: The case of negotiations on the Adaptation Fund. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 11 (4): 361–377. Gupta, Joyeeta. 2000. On behalf of my delegation,...: A survival guide for developing country climate negotiators. Washington, WA, USA: Centre for Sustainable Development for Americas. Helgeson, Jennifer, and Jane Ellis. 2015. The role of the 2015 agreement in enhancing adaptation to climate change. OECD Library. Available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/ the-role-of-the-2015-agreement-in-enhancing-adaptation-to-climate-change_5jrxg3xb0h20-en. Accessed 2 May 2019. Klein, Richard J. T., and Asa Persson. 2008. Financing adaptation to climate change: Issues and priorities. Climate Policy Research Programme and the Centre for European Policy Studies, Svartsjö, Sweden, European Climate Platform (ECP).

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Mace, Mary Jane. 2005. Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF developments since COP-7. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 14 (3): 225–246. Magnan A. K., and T. Ribera. 2016. Global adaptation after Paris. Science 352 (6291): 1281. Moore, Frances C. 2012. Negotiating adaptation: Norm selection and hybridization in international climate negotiations. Global Environmental Politics 12 (4): 30–48. Müller, Benito. 2006. Climate of distrust: The 2006 Bonn climate change adaptation fund negotiations. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Najam, A. 2005. Developing countries and global environmental governance: From contestation to participation to engagement. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 5 (3): 303–321. Schipper, E., and F. Lisa. 2006. Conceptual history of adaptation in the UNFCCC process. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 15 (1): 82–92.

Chapter 6

Institution Building in the Contemporary World: The Case of the Funding Mechanism and Policies in UNFCCC Negotiations

6.1 Introduction In order to deal with climate finance, the UNFCCC convention established a financial mechanism to provide funds to developing country Parties. It also serves the Kyoto Protocol. The Convention states that the operation of the financial mechanism can be entrusted to one or more existing international entities. The GEF has served as an operating entity of the financial mechanism for many years, and, at COP 17 in 2011, Parties also decided to designate the Green Climate Fund (GCF) as an operating entity of the financial mechanism (Taken from UNFCCC glossary). The institutions designed to run the current global collective commons (viz. the World Bank, IMF,1 and WTO) were mainly established after the Second World War in the context of the power capabilities of the actors prevailing at that time.2 The issue of climate change had been identified as an existential threat; so new institutions to save Mother Earth appeared essential. The necessity of new and well-designed institutes to address climate injustice has been identified by many scholars including Keohane (2019). Apart from the institutions mentioned above and their adherents, one prominent and recent attempt to build institutions and their policies in the context of the contemporary power distribution across the actors had been under the UNFCCC framework on the climate fund operating entity and distribution policies. This had been one of the most contested issues that have arisen during the two decades of climate negotiations that culminated in the Paris Agreement. It yielded new institutes, the Green Climate Fund (GCF) being the most prominent of these. Although the outcomes of more than two decades of negotiation that yielded the Paris Agreement have been widely criticized as unimpressive, the institutional 1 2

IMF- International Monetary Fund. Keohane (1984) is the most prominent scholar among many who support this line of argument.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_6

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imperatives accrued by it have fostered the growth of green energy generation technologies. Since 2008, over half of the new power production globally has been renewable. Today, renewable energy has become the cheapest source of off-grid energy in most locations, and it is becoming an increasingly attractive alternative to fossil-fuel based power plants in providing on-grid energy (Glemarec 2019, p. 315). This is a spectacular manifestation of positive outcomes as a result of institutional imperatives generated over the debate of climate change. There have been profound volumes of the works of the Institutionalists in the IR scholarship who delved with formation and implication of institutions. Reflecting on their works, it appears a great opportunity to investigate how the issues related to the funding policy and mechanisms were framed up at the climate negotiation table and why did only certain policies and institutional mechanisms to operate the Funds finally evolved. This would enable us to understand how institutions are shaped up in the contemporary world, how priorities are set, and why. A funding mechanism means the institutional arrangement designed to operate the Funds, and the term “policy” entails how the Funds will be generated, how they will be disbursed, and who will receive what amount. Most of the works on funding elaborated how the funding issues appeared late in the discourse (Burton et al. 2002; Helgeson and Ellis 2015; Schipper 2006; Klein and Persoon 2008), how the new trend of institution-building was set (Moore 2012; Abbott et al. 2016), justice-oriented framing (Grasso 2011), the role of Global Environment Facility (GEF) in funding for adaptation (Mace 2005), the financing status of the GCF vis-à-vis other Funds (Cui & Huang 2018; Fridahl and linnér 2016; Schalatek et al. 2015), and the role of Global Environment Facility (GCF) as an effective compensatory mechanism (Antimiani et al. 2017). No work has been found that systematically addresses the above question covering the period from the beginning of the COP (Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC) negotiations until reaching the Paris Agreement. At the inception of the UNFCCC, the GEF was designated as the Fund operating entity on an interim basis. There was no alternative at that time either. The GEF was established in 1991 by the World Bank in consultation with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) to manage the funds of different environment-related entities. As such, like other Bretton Woods institutions, GEF also comported an institutional framework that facilitated the dominance of the donor countries.3 During the courses of the negotiations that led to the Paris Agreement, new funding institutes, like Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) and GCF, emerged. These new institutes appeared remarkably different from the earlier entities in that both the emerging countries and the developed ones had imparted equal influence in determining their 3

At the heart of this process lies a double-weighted majority voting, where 60% is taken from the total participating parties and 60% proportionately from contributions (Cui and Huang 2018, p. 178). Since the contributions are basically made by the developed countries (Mace 2005, p. 227), prominently the USA and EU, they dominate here (Mace 2005, p. 230; Bodansky and Rajamani 2012, p. 31); Ciplet et al. (2013) equate this domination with near veto power.

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policies and modus operandi, and the less developed countries also have got representation within them, while the previous institutes of this kind preserved the exclusive domination of the rich countries. This chapter details how the framing efforts of the actors yielded such outcomes and why certain policies prevailed over others. Like the previous chapters, by applying the concept of framing, it maps the historical developments and evolution of the frames, and then it applies the analogy of connective dots as assumed in the second hypothesis. This leads to an illustration of the process as to how the contested rhetoric framing by the actors yielded to action frames and how the action frames evolved over time. The literature, data, hypothesis, and method presented in Chapter 3 remain the same, as those were for the previous two cases. Some literature that are exclusively relevant for this chapter are added here. With regard to the content analysis, presented below is a diagram that has been generated from the software through the coding process. If we click a code in the code-quotation network presented in Fig. 6.1 below, all the relevant quotations for that code, their relations with other codes and quotations would appear. It cannot

Fig. 6.1 Major actor-codes and their quotations network: issues related to funding mechanism and policies

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be displayed in the printed copies, but on the electronic version of the software, it appears so. Using this tool, such networks with regard to the major actors and main issues were generated which facilitated conducting a robust content and frame analysis in a structured way. The outcomes of the exercise with regard to the first part of the research question are presented below, segmenting into two aspects. The first segment presents the outcomes through a historical mapping of the framing of the issues related to funding mechanism and policies; the second segment delineates the evolution process applying the analogy of connective dots as assumed in the second hypothesis of the third chapter. The final section presents concluding remarks.

6.2 Evolution of the Funding Mechanism and Policies Like the previous one, this case study has also discerned that the actors of the two broad groups of the developed and the developing countries contested in line with their primordial mental schemata on funding policy and operating entity and their distinct logics had permeated in their deliberations throughout the negotiation process. Even prior to adopting the UNFCCC convention, the developed countries tried to confer the status of the permanent Fund operating entity on the GEF (See ENB report Vol. 12, No. 2 p. 2). The developing countries were unwilling to accord this status but did not have any alternative institution or concrete idea in mind.4 In this situation, they tried to persuade to make the GEF to be more responsive to their causes and, if not, they hoped that they would find an alternative to this in the future. They agreed to accord the GEF an interim fund operating status, and, as inscribed in UNFCCC Article 11, the fourth COP was supposed to decide the fate of this interim status. At the 3rd and 4th COP, the developed countries enthusiastically sought to adopt a resolution to accord the GEF a permanent status but without success. They did not conceal their dissatisfaction regarding this outcome. In terms of the policy, the developed countries asserted that mitigation should be the primary focus for funding. The developing countries, in the initial stages, spoke little about adaptation but, with the new scientific reports confirming that climate change is imminent, inevitable, and will soon affect the vulnerable countries and that mitigation effort alone cannot avert the immediate damage (Parry et al. 1998; Schipper 2006), from the 5th COP onward, they claimed that adaptation should be the main focus of finance or, at least, that equality should be maintained between mitigation and adaptation finance.

4

This argument is based on a detailed study of the documents and will be elaborated on later in this section. Müller (2006, p. 4) also posited a similar argument. The EU maintained until the end stages of the negotiation that the parties should examine the existing institutions, find the gaps in them and develop from those (see ENB report Vol. 12 No. 585 p. 2).

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The debates at the successive COPs evolved from the above two distinctive schemas. This work identified five key junctures when the rhetoric framing of the actors yielded new action frames. First, at the initial few COPs, funding for National Communications (NC) through the GEF was the key focus; second, at the protracted 6th COP, three Funds, namely the LDC Fund (LDCF), Special Climate Change Fund (SCCF), and Adaptation Fund (AF), were created and subsequent COPs debated the policies and operational modalities with regard to these Funds; third, contestation on policy and modalities with regard to the creation and operation of the AF and the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB) at the 13th and 14th COPs; fourth, the emergence of the GCF at the 15th and 16th COPs, followed by the selection of its headquarters; and, fifth, the adoption of the Paris Agreement through which the role of GCF as a permanent, premier fund operating entity was consolidated and, moreover, the equity between adaptation and mitigation finance was articulated. While GEF retained the operating authority with regard to LDCF and SCCF, AFB had, for the first time in history, brought about a new genre of institutional structure and policies where an equal share for the developing countries and the developed ones had been accorded. AFB later appeared insignificant, as it failed to meet the expectations of both the developed countries and the emerging ones who were the key fund generators. However, AFB served as a model for the invention of the GCF, in which the interest of the developed and the emerging countries acquired preeminence. The GCF finally emerged as the premier fund operating entity. The remainder of this chapter elaborates on the above findings. The flow chart presented below depicts and summarizes the remainder of this chapter, and it helps to navigate the discussions (Diagram 6.1). Detailed discussion

6.2.1 Contest on the Status of the GEF and Release of Fund from It In the early stages, the funding was channeled through GEF and was basically for National Communications (NCs). From the very early COPs, the developing countries criticized the GEF due to, inter alia, its delay in fund release, inefficiency, conditionality, and inaccessibility.5 The developed countries responded to this criticism mainly by emphasizing on the necessity of maintaining cost-effectiveness and efficiency.6 They expressed their disappointment as the COP could not reach a consensus 5

This was detected by the content analysis. See also Grasso (2011, p. 367). Although the developed countries tried to accord the GEF permanent status, due to the opposition of the developing countries, the first COP (Decision No. 9/CP.1) decided to accord it only interim status with a provision to review the same in four years. The GEF consistently sought a definitive status; see the 2nd COP report No. FCCC/CP/1996/15, p. 39, and 4th COP report No. FCCC/CP/1998/16/Add.1, p. 5. 6 Ibid.

Diagram 6.1 Flow chart: framing waves of funding policy and mechanism-related issues

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about conferring the GEF a permanent status (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 70 p. 1, 3rd COP). Until the 5th COP, the issues related to funding were basically concentrated on full cost for National Communications (NC).7 The funds were also basically released for the NCs (compare Mace 2005). The developed countries defended the criticisms of the developing countries on delayed and insufficient release of funds mostly by emphasizing the necessity of maintaining cost-effectiveness and efficiency. They expressed their disappointment against the COP for not agreeing to accord GEF a permanent status (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 70 p. 1, 3rd COP). The main task of the NCs is to accumulate data of all the parties with regard to their greenhouse gas emissions and removals by identifying the inventories. Funding was basically intended for the less developed countries because it was assumed that the developed ones had enough financial and technological resources (compare Burton et al. 2002, p. 147). Additionally, incremental and negotiated costs were also marginally discussed with regard to technology development, transfer, and capacity building.8 By the 5th COP, some of the developing countries became suspicious that the data submitted through the NCs might be used to set targets and ranking of performance for getting access to the GEF funding (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 123 p. 15). The mistrust about GEF, which had been embedded in the primordial mental schemata of the developing countries spiraled rapidly. The developing countries accentuated their voice over the difficulties to access the Fund (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 97 P12, No. 231 p. 11). In the face of intense criticism by the developing countries, the developed countries lowered their tones by saying that improvements of the GEF were needed (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 90 p. 2). The developing countries responded that a political reorientation of the GEF was the real necessity (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 90 p. 2). The mistrust about the GEF appeared so acute in the first phase of the 6th COP that the G77/China even tried to thwart the GEF’s attempt to submit its report to the COP regarding its activity, arguing that the report was not sought (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 153 p. 3). They pushed for finding an alternative to the GEF (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 157 p. 4). Eventually, as a result of the concerted rhetorical framing of the developing countries, the developed countries relaxed their stance. Canada conceded by agreeing to reform the GEF by creating a window within it to deal with special climate change issues like adaptation. Japan, and later the UMBRELLA group in general, supported it and the UK and Denmark joined them, adding their enhanced pledges (ENB reports Vol. No. 163 p. 5, 6th COP first phase; No. 160 p. 2). The developing countries proposed to enhance the Fund from financial sanctions for 7

Between the Rio Conference and the first COP in Berlin, negotiations succeeded in reaching a legally binding process for submission of NCs, its methodology, review, and financial mechanism. See 1st COP report No. FCCC/CP/1995/7, p. 43. 8 The GEF’s had the mandate only to fund those “incremental” cost that produces global environmental benefits. This vague term of “global environmental benefits” made it difficult to fund other causes of the developing countries. See (Bodansky and Rajamani 2012, pp. 31–32; Mace 2005, p. 232; Müller 2006, p. 2).

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non-compliance, suggested three mechanisms to feed into it, and urged for the prompt establishment of an adaptation fund (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 160 p. 2; No. 161 p. 2).

6.2.2 Generation of New Funds and Policies with Regard to Them The conflicting frames of the two groups reached a deadlock and for the first and, until the Paris Agreement the last time, a second phase of a COP had to be called for, for which the finance issue was one of the key outstanding ones (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 114; No. 123 p. 13; No. 168 p. 26; No. 156 p. 2). During this protracted COP, the LDCs insisted to create a separate Fund for them (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 114; No. 123 p. 13; No. 168 p. 26; No. 156 p. 2). The EU favored the demand of the LDCs as well as the creation of an “adaptation fund plus” within the GEF.9 The COP president placed these in Box A of “crunch issues” and the creation of Funds and entities like the Adaptation Fund, a Convention Fund, and a Climate Resources Committee (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 162 p. 2). Although not all of these survived, these are the seeds from which the new funds emerged, and their sources were identified in the later phases. In this way, the above-discussed contested rhetoric framing of the actors resulted in the birth of new action frames in the second phase of the 6th COP, as it decided to create three distinct Funds: LDCF, SCCF, and AF. As per the dictates of their primordial mental schemata, the developed countries asserted that any new institutions must build on the existing ones; it must add values and not duplicate GEF’s work mandate (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 169 p. 2). The EU and other developed countries maintained this position all along the way. The decision on creation of the Funds was formalized in the next COP through Marrakech Accords, accommodating the demands of the developed countries.

6.2.3 First Major Shift in Creating New Institute The most significant Fund of the above-mentioned ones is the Adaptation Fund.10 The COP decided that the Fund would mainly be raised from the proceeds of the 9

ENB report vol. 12 No. 162 p. 2. The proposal of the EU later resulted in the creation of the SCCF. Amongst other two Funds, SCCF primarily was directed towards NC, information accumulation, and adaptation activities related to NCs, while LDCF was primarily directed towards the National Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) with a very little amount of Fund (Bouwer and Aerts 2006, pp. 51–52; Mace 2005, p. 238). These Funds rely on discretionary pledges of donors while a major donor USA had denied lending support (Mace 2005, p. 245; Müller 2006, p. 3). During the semi-structured interview, one State negotiator responded that “they have been showing us the prospect of finance for years but so many years have passed, little has been given. Bangladesh government though do not have enough money is bearing the lion’s share of adaptation costs, US$

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Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which is a Kyoto Protocol product (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 176 p. 5). Ironically, the USA was the key protagonist of the flexible mechanisms devised, but it withdrew itself from the Protocol before the second phase of the 6th COP and was not a beneficiary of the mechanisms anymore11 (compare Boyd et al. 2008, p. 106; Bodansky and Rajamani 2012, p. 11). After the creation of the Funds, the next contest surfaced with regard to the operating mechanism of the Funds. GEF reported that the existing operational procedures would be applied until a guideline is received from the COP (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 209 p. 9). Guidelines to the LDCF was given in the 8th COP, to the SCCF in the 9th COP, and to the AF lately12 in the 14th COP. In the 10th COP, many developing countries argued that determination of the eligibility criteria to access the Funds should not be a function of the GEF; rather, it must follow the guidance of the COP, and they even questioned the efficiency of its administrative costs.13 Japan, an UMBRELLA group country, defended the GEF by asserting that the COP should limit itself within guidance for project eligibility but not on its management issues (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 260 p. 9). In the 15th COP, G77/China reasserted that GEF replenishment should be driven by all parties, not just by the GEF governing council, and should involve the active participation of recipient countries (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 450 p. 2). In this way, the conventional operating procedure of the GEF had been questioned by the developing countries, and their rhetoric framing with regard to a more equitable and responsive operational entity had been accentuated. The most significant Fund of these three Funds, the Adaptation Fund, was designed to be primarily raised by a 2% share of the Certified Emission Reductions (CER) of the CDMs,14 and thus sparked an exceptional potential for self-sustainability15 (compare Klein and Persson 2008, p. 9; Grasso 2011, p. 363). The distinct logics of the actors with regard to who should operate the Fund surfaced prominently in case of the AF.16 The developing countries claimed that the 100 million a year, for last seven consecutive years, which has been necessitated due to the past and present actions (emission) of the developed countries”. 11 During a semi-structured interview, one expert who attended all the COPs said that the US withdrawal worked as a blessing. Other major countries became enthusiastic, and they conceded from their positions, which facilitated to break the deadlock. He even opined that if the USA really withdraws from the Paris agreement, as President Trump declared, it may induce the other major players in the same way in the coming days, leaving the USA as a loser in global leadership. 12 In fact, though AF was established with other two Funds in 2001, the discussion about its management and governance started lately in 2006 (Grasso 2011, p. 367). 13 ENB report Vol. 12 No. 251 p. 1. Guidance by COP signified that the weaker parties would have greater recognition than GEF where donors dominate (Grasso 2011, p. 372). 14 As per the decision of the 6th COP, see report No. FCCC/CP/2001/5, p. 43. See also “Adaptation fund” by The World Bank, Accessed at http://fiftrustee.worldbank.org/Pages/adapt.aspx (2 May 2018). 15 The option of self-sustainability changes the game substantially. Other Funds under GEF depend on the discretionary donation of the developed countries, so the receiving countries can only negotiate the modalities if the donors agree to discuss them (Grasso 2011, p. 368). The self-sustainability of a Fund would avoid this problem. 16 See also Müller (2006, p. 1).

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proceeds generated through the CDMs were their own money as the activities would be operated in their country.17 The developed countries responded that the companies that would generate these funds would come from the developed countries, so the ownership claim of the funds should be global.18 At the 12th COP, the G77/China, EU, UMBRELLA, and other parties fought hard in line with their logic regarding the AF’s governance structure, the modalities of the operation, and the institutional arrangement. The developed countries argued for building upon the existing institutions (namely, the GEF) while the developing countries urged on the need for the development of a new financial architecture by making the COP/MOP (Meeting of the Parties to KP) the supreme body (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 310 p. 1; No. 395 p. 14). Responding to the GEF’s report to the COP, the G77/China passionately remarked that it had spent 15 years trying to make the GEF, as an operating entity, more responsive to the concerns of the developing countries, to no avail (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 393 p. 2). Regarding the evaluation of support needed from the GEF for capacity building, the G77/China preferred to adopt language expressing disappointment with the implementation of the framework and registered a desire to develop a performance indicator for monitoring and evaluating the capacity building, which all of the developed countries opposed in unison, claiming that it was unnecessary (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 395 p. 5). At the 13th COP, Japan and the EU conceded by requesting at least a role for the GEF (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 354 p. 12). Moore (2012, p. 36) notes that the fiercest battle in the history of adaptation negotiation was about the governance structure of the AF. The contested rhetorical framing of the parties culminated in a new action frame when the COP finally decided that a secretariat for the AF would be established which would operate in a functionally independent and effective manner, agreed to accept the GEF as to render this service on an interim basis with the World Bank as a trustee on an interim basis that would be reviewed every three years, and a complex system of representation with guaranteed seats for the UN regions, LDCs, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and Annex-I parties.19 Many developed countries were unhappy about the outcomes and expressed dissatisfaction particularly on the term “interim basis” and the “review” option. With the formation of the AFB, the 14th COP witnessed a milestone development with regard to funding. In AFB, the decision-making process had been made equitable.20 The AFB introduced a new model for international finance that was in line with the realities of the contemporary world (compare Moore 2012). The developing 17

See also Grasso (2011, p. 374). From content analysis. See also Müller (2006, p. 4). 19 ENB report Vol. 12 No. 350 p. 2. See also Abbott et al. (2016, p. 266); Grasso (2011, p. 364). See also “Adaptation Fund,” accessed at https://www.adaptation-fund.org/about/governance/ (2 May 2018). 20 AFB comprises 16 members: two from each of the five UN geographical regions, one each from the SIDS and LDC, two non-annex, and two annex parties. GEF and World Bank had been accorded interim oversight responsibility, but COP had been given the ultimate power (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 395 p. 9). 18

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countries urged the full operationalization of the adaptation fund with sufficient and predictable resources, to accord a legal personality under COP/MOP authority and direct access to the Fund (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 386 p. 2; No. 388 p. 1). At the 15th COP, Germany offered the legal capacity to the AFB, and, at the next COP/MOP, it reported that this legal capacity had been conferred. The Adaptation Fund finally adopted the option of direct access in addition to a further two traditional means of accessing the Fund (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 395 p. 9 14th COP). The institutional structures developed under the AF and the AFB constituted a breakthrough. The AF was designed to be independent of donor funds, and their dominance was also minimized through the creation of the AFB. It signaled a departure from the existing trend of global governance in dealing with collective commons with the potential to serve as an example for other fields too in the future.21 The AFB’s principles and institutional structure later indeed served as the precursor to the next funding institution, i.e., the GCF.22 However, the prospect of the AF per se proved to be grim in the subsequent years. The developed countries conceded to the rhetoric framing efforts of the developing countries, but the action frame evolved thereof failed to match their expectations. Many of the expectations of the emerging countries also remained unaddressed within it. All of this paved the way for the next and most prominent multilateral Fund operating entity, i.e., the GCF.

6.2.4 Building New Institution in Line with the Normative Imperatives and Power of the Actors At the Copenhagen COP, the developed countries, particularly the EU, presented a concrete proposal regarding finance. From the beginning, they expressed the objective of creating a Fund of US$100 billion per year by 2020, tabled this figure at the climax of the stalemate (compare Dimitrov 2010, 807). Although EU was sidelined from the final decision-making process (Dimitrov 2010, p. 810; Bo and Chen 2011), the Accord mentions this “goal”; i.e., the creation of a fund equivalent to US$100 billion per year for post-Kyoto climate finance. The UN Secretary-General called for the launch of the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund immediately in order to “Jump-start” clean energy growth in the developing countries. The GCF was not framed up and created like the other Funds discussed above. Its proposal surfaced suddenly during the very highly expected as well as protracted Copenhagen COP. However, the devil remained in the details, i.e., the term “goal” of US$100 billion per year and designating that goal as collective without identifying how much would be contributed by whom. Many experts portrayed these loopholes as “a blank cheque,” “an empty shell,” and several developing countries reminded

21

Moore (2012, p. 36) also made a similar argument. See Abbott et al. (2016, p. 266), wherein they state that the GCF adopted a basic design comparable with AFB.

22

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the developed countries of their habit of forgetting their promises.23 The developing countries tried to solve this problem by demanding that the developed countries should commit 1.5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in addition to Official Development Assistance (ODA) rather than the collective goal of US$100 billion, which the developed countries concertedly opposed.24 This proposal was an excellent attempt towards predictable and concrete finance but did not succeed. At the 19th COP, Australia and Canada even endeavored to deepen the muddle by proposing that the “goal” should be met through “jointly” mobilizing the funds from a “wide variety of finance sources” (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 594 p. 27). The developing countries, at the 16th COP, witnessed the pinnacle of whatever modest achievement they had garnered with regard to financing. The COP decided that a scaled-up, new and additional, predictable, and adequate fund shall be provided to the developing countries, taking into account those particularly vulnerable, through a variety of sources, including public and private sources.25 The emphasized words are the iconic rhetoric framing terms that had been given intense salience by the developing countries at the earlier COPs. The COP formalized formation of the GCF, which would function under the guidance of the COP, would be governed by 24 board members equally represented by the developed and developing countries; the World Bank would serve as an interim trustee but would be subject to review after three years once the Fund were operationalized, and the operation of the Fund would be conducted by an interim secretariat.26 Here again, the emphasized words are the terms that were given intense salience by the developing countries. The developed countries fought hard to confer on the World Bank the status of permanent trusteeship, but it was only given “interim” validity. They also fought hard against the provision of a review three years later, but this survived intact. In this way, the “GCF” embodied many of the favorable terms of the developing countries. At the 17th COP, the developing countries called for a strengthening of the guidelines by the COP regarding the Fund, insisted on opening up a bidding process for selecting the trustee, while the developed countries, particularly the USA, proposed lifting the restrictions regarding who can contribute to the Fund and criticized the interim secretariat, claiming that it was not credible to assign financial responsibility to this body since it lacked technical management expertise (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 528 p. 1; No. 524 p. 1). The parties, however, finally agreed to confer a legal personality on the Fund, devised a host country selection process, decided that the interim secretariat would be fully accountable to the board and that the Head of the secretariat should have experience of working in the developing countries (ENB 23

ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 315 p. 2; Vol. 12 No. 525 p. 1; Vol. 12 No. 526 p. 1. During a semistructured interview, one expert expressed uncertainty about raising US$100 billion a year, which is nevertheless insufficient, and referred to the US preference for the Climate Investment Fund under the World Bank since GCF is unlikely to receive further US finance. 24 ENB report Vol. 12 No. 495 p. 2. See also Dimitrov (2010, p. 802). 25 Paragraph 8 of the Copenhagen Accord mentioned these, which were finalized in Cancun, See ENB report Vol. 12 No. 498 p. 19. 26 Ibid; 16th COP report No. FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1. p. 17.

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report Vol. 12 No. 533 p. 2). These outcomes again reflect the continued success of the developing countries. One expert, during the semi-structured interview, however, opined that unless sources of funding are identified, it will be “more of the same.” The success of the developing countries continued with regard to the selection of the host city of the GCF. Montreal, Geneva, and Incheon city of South Korea contested for hosting the headquarters of the Fund. The developing countries, especially China, argued that the headquarters should be located in Asia while the developed countries wanted to keep it in their territory. Through a voting process, the developing countries finally prevailed, and the second meeting of the GCF, on 18–20 October 2012, selected Songdo Incheon city in South Korea as the location for the Fund’s headquarters. Following the establishment of the GCF, an interesting reversal of framing rhetoric was noticed. At the earlier COPs, the developed countries advocated for the GEF, which the developing countries opposed while, after the establishment of the GCF, the developing countries pushed-up the issues of adequate guidance, replenishment, etc. to the GCF (See ENB report Vol. 12 No. 559 p. 2), while the developed countries regarded it as not very trustworthy due to a lack of experience. At the Paris COP, Japan downplayed the GCF by saying that it was premature to discuss replenishment arrangements, which was opposed by multiple developing countries (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 661 p. 3). This reverse trend of rhetoric framing efforts by the developed countries persisted in the subsequent COPs. At the 18th COP, the developed countries were reluctant to discuss funding issues any further, arguing that there was no further necessity to reach a deal on this in Doha, while the developing countries replied that an outcome in Doha would be impossible unless finance were made part of the package. They urged for the operationalization of the GCF.27 At the 19th COP, the developed countries emphasized private finance, partnerships between developed and developing countries, country ownership, support for outcomes that can be measured, and that public finance should not crowd out private sector engagement (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 592 p. 2; No. 611 p. 3). They attached high importance to the creation of an “enabling environment” to motivate the private sector (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 610 p. 2; No. 611 p. 3; No. 619 p. 31; No. 619 p. 36, No. 594 p. 11). At the 20th COP, Japan called for finance by “all parties in a position to do so” (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 611 p. 3). The indication was clear; i.e., China and possibly other emerging countries were being called on to extend financial contributions. In reply, China cautioned against board-shifting behavior with regard to private financing (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 613 p. 3 20th COP). Brazil asserted that involving the private sector does not ensure climate finance (ibid.). If we compare these rhetoric framings efforts of the developed countries with the early stages of the COP negotiations, a significant shift can be noticed, i.e., 27

ENB report Vol. 12 No. 561 p. 2. See also the statements by LDCs and Mountainous LDCs, accessed at https://unfccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/doha-climate-change-confer ence-november-2012/statements-and-resources/statements-delivered-at-high-level-segment-ofcop-18--cmp-8 (9 May 2018).

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the possibility of talking about financial contributions by the developing countries like China, India was little at that time. The reasons behind such a shift can be understood from the EU’s statement that, at that point in time, a few emerging countries had already become more prosperous than certain EU member States, and so, in this logic, the EU expected them to assume their evolving responsibilities and capabilities.28 China and India immediately united against these arguments and called for the deletion of the text, which incorporated the phrase “parties mobilize and provide financial resources in a manner which is capable of adapting dynamically to changing realities and future developments and needs” (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 611 p. 3). On another note, although the term “scaled-up finance” had been included in the discourse during the earlier COPs and the 16th COP had taken a decision to this end, the USA, at the 19th COP, argued that the target of US$100 billion was set in the context of a broad package of decisions and that new commitments could not be made along the way (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 591 p. 2). The G77/China, LDCs, and other actors continued to repeat their demand for scaled-up finance and a balance between adaptation and mitigation finance and also asked that funds be provided for the GCF as soon as possible.29 Japan, at the 20th COP, specifically proposed the deletion of the term “scaled-up” while the EU suggested using the word “updating” instead of “upscaling” (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 611 p. 3). The EU, at the Paris COP, stated that the target of funding of more than US$100 billion per year from the post-Kyoto period might be scaled-up by expanding the donor base (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 656 p. 2), clearly an indication towards China and other emerging countries. At this COP, several developed countries opposed making new commitments regarding finance and even tried to reverse the previous pledges, but G77/China termed these as redline issues. Finally, the developed countries conceded to the demand by establishing a “goal” “from a floor of US$ 100 billion per year” by 2025 (Dimitrov 2016). The notion of a “floor” implies that the developed countries would continue the current trend30 of bearing the bulk of the finance up to the baseline set, but that scaling it up might involve other countries in the post-2025 period. Thus, a delicate balance with regard to “scaled-up” finance and the extension of the donor base had been worked out in the Paris Agreement. This creative phrasing was further

28

Bodansky and Rajamani (2012, p. 14) further note that 50 non-annex parties acquired higher per capita income than the poorest Annex-I party. 29 ENB report Vol. 12 No. 592 p. 1. The LDCs, in their statement at the 18th COP, suggested the annual scaling-up of the developed countries’ finance from the proposed US$30 billion to a minimum of US$100 billion per year from 2013 to 2020. See the Statements, accessed at https://unf ccc.int/process/conferences/pastconferences/doha-climate-change-conference-november-2012/ statements-and-resources/statements-delivered-at-high-level-segment-of-cop-18--cmp-8 (9 May 2018). The 18th COP took a decision that was in line with these arguments; see UNFCCC report No. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, p. 25. 30 See Markandya et al. (2015) and Cui and Huang (2018), who worked on the current financing trend and future prospects of the GCF.

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honed by citing that the developed countries “shall” provide financial resources while the developing countries are “encouraged” to do so “voluntarily”.31

6.2.5 The Issue of Parity on Financing The issue of parity of finance between adaptation and mitigation had become a crucial one at the last few COPs before Paris. The developed countries argued that the issue of mitigation had been given the utmost importance in the UNFCCC convention and that its relevance remained so always. In order to pit mitigation above adaptation, Australia proposed deletion of the text regarding legal parity between adaptation and mitigation (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 611 p. 4). New Zealand opposed a global goal on adaptation (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 611). Canada, New Zealand, and Austria opposed linking long-term temperature goal with the financial support to the developing countries for their adaptation (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 619 p. 36). The developing countries defended against abovementioned attempts. India asked for full “legal parity,” and Brazil joined them, adding Means of Implementation (MOI) with it; Pakistan, Egypt, Mexico, Republic of Korea, Argentina, Saudi Arabia, and LMDC reiterated the same (ENB reports Vol. 12 No. 611 p. 4; No. 612 p. 2; No. 617, No. 619 p. 36.). The LDCs repeated the demand of half–half finance for mitigation and adaptation (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 592 p. 2). In the 20th COP South Korea, Mexico, Argentina, etc., reiterated their demand for parity between Mitigation and adaptation finance (ENB report Vol. 12 No. 617 p. 1 & 2). The GCF has later made an explicit aim to achieve a 50:50 split of the multilateral Fund over time and that 50% of the adaptation fund would be exclusively spent for the LDCs and SIDs (Fenton 2014, p. 5; Schalatek et al. 2015, p. 4). The Paris Agreement also finally adopted conciliatory phrasing in this regard. Paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Paris Agreement mentions to “aim to achieve a balance between adaptation and mitigation,” this had relieved much of the concern of the developing countries facilitating the adoption of the Agreement. Above, a historical mapping of the framing process with regard to funding policy and mechanism has been illustrated. It explained how the framing process carried the logics of the primordial mental schemata of the parties and, through generations of action frames, yielded the final institutional frames in the Paris Agreement. The most important and visible outcome from it is the establishment of the GCF as the chief fund operating entity32 and the policy of operation of the Fund. These have 31

Eight developing countries, namely South Korea, Mexico, Peru, Colombia, Panama, Mongolia, and Indonesia, had already pledged some contributions in 2015, prior to the Paris Agreement (Schalatek et al. 2015, p. 1). 32 The argument that the GCF has become the main Fund operating entity has been argued by many scholars; for example, Fenton (2014, p. 2), Markandya et al. (2015, p. 105); UNFCCC report No. FCCC/CP/2011/9, p. 20.

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generated new pathways for future such cases. The fixation of the target of the Fund is also a vital outcome. The chronological mapping of the framing waves broadly supports the first hypothesis as many of the rhetoric frames which had been given intense salience through speech acts had successfully yielded to action frames and finally found their home in the Paris Agreement. Some of the examples are AF, AFB, LDCF, GCF, and parity between adaptation and mitigation finance. However, some of the rhetoric framing efforts (for example, the issues with regard to contribution of a certain percentage of the GDP to ensure predictable finance, the vulnerability index, liability, financial contributions by the emerging countries too, etc.) did not succeed to yield to action frames. The hard-fought achievement of the AF and the AFB, which represents the interests of the affected countries, has little prospect now in terms of the amount of Fund and its stature vis-à-vis the GCF. The GCF, in fact, better comports the interest of the powerful countries and some emerging countries as well but not primarily the interest of the most affected countries. Thus, the findings from this study provide shreds of evidence that the ultimate success of the crucially contested frames was dependent on the support of the powerful actors. These aspects are explained in Chapter 7, while the forthcoming section traces the mechanism of the evolution of the frames. It applies and examines the assumption of connective dots as posited at the hypothesis-II.

6.3 Evolution Mechanism of the Frames The previous section identified the prominent action frames and mapped a historic pathway with regard to how the rhetoric framing efforts of the actors revolved around them, carrying the logics shaped by their primordial mental schemata. The critical juncture points when new action frames emerged have also been identified but have not been elaborated in detail, which is the aim of this section. This will serve as a summary of the previous section as well as trace the process of the evolutionary pathways of the prominent action frames by applying the assumption of connective dots, as posited in the second hypothesis in Chapter 3. From the very beginning, the mental schemata of the actors were divided along the line of two opposing logics concerning the operating entity and policy on funding, broadly bifurcated between the developed and the developing countries concerning their national communications. The mental schemata of the developed countries that shaped their logic and induced their framing orbited around the permanent status of the GEF, while the developing countries’ mental schemata contained an inherent mistrust regarding the GEF. This also caused the developed countries to frame their arguments that funding should be mainly aimed at global all-out mitigation projects and subsidiary actions that are required for that objective, for example, the accumulation of information. In contrast, the developing countries were late in articulating their position with regard to funding policy, which they suddenly but solidly conceived from the 5th

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COP onward, following the revelation of scientific reports about the immediate and irreversible danger of climate change, that will mostly affect them. From that point onward, they orchestrated concerted rhetoric framing efforts towards more favorable funding institutes and policies. The first stark contest in line with the above two distinct logics surfaced during the 6th COP. The differences in logics on funding policies were one of the main causes of the deadlock that arose during the COP and, unprecedentedly, led to the necessity for the second phase of a COP. In this second phase, the developing countries appeared to have been able successfully to persuade the developed countries to concede in favor of some of their positions while they themselves also made some compromises. This resulted in the adoption of a decision to create three Funds (LDCF, SSCF, and AF) focused on adaptation, which were finalized at the next COP through the Marrakech Accords. The most significant one of the above Funds was the Adaptation Fund, which introduced a creative way to generate self-finance through CDMs. The developed countries tried to retain their operating mechanism within the ambit of the existing institutional structure (i.e., the GEF), but the developing countries, for the first time, succeeded in introducing a reform. At the height of the contested framing that led to deadlock, the 13th COP made a decision on the AF, and the 14th COP created the AFB, where the developed countries profoundly conceded with regard to the policies, composition of the board, operating mechanism, and institutional structure. Although the AF and the AFB were later undermined by the donors and the CDM projects actually did not flourish much, they created a path that was followed by the next and most important institutional innovation to operate the multilateral climate Funds, i.e., the GCF. The development of the institutional structure was far easier in the case of the GCF as the parties already had the precedence of the AFB. The post-Kyoto climate actions required a more robust fund. A target amounting to US$100 billion was already fixed at the Copenhagen COP, and the next COP finalized this. The developed countries failed in their attempts to bestow permanent trustee status on the World Bank and in selecting a host city for the Fund, which they wanted to be in a developed western country, as it is in case of the most existing institutes. The 17th COP formally established the GCF as the operating entity of the Funds (Decision Nos. 1/CP.16 and 3/CP.17) and, through the adoption of the Paris Agreement, it became the chief financial entity. It is likely that, as long as the global collective action against anthropogenic climate change continues, the GCF will play the most prominent role with regard to financing. The above concise process tracing detects four connective dots within the evolutionary pathways of the action frames. First, the actors conceived their logics, which were latent in their mental schemata from the beginning, and these logics permeated the action frames all the way up to reaching the final Agreement. Second, the rhetoric framing of the actors orbited around those logics with regard to the generated action frames too. Third, the contested framing efforts encountered deadlocks. The most conspicuous examples are those that happened at The Hague and Bali COPs. Fourth, and interestingly, every time a deadlock occurred, new action frames

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emerged, comprising several innovative components that mostly accommodated the concerns of the emerging and less developed countries; examples are: AF, LDCF, SCCF, and AFB. The GCF is the final outcome of this two-decade-long process, and it followed a path dependency exemplified by the AFB. The above findings supports the assumption of the connective dots of the evolution pathway posited in the second hypothesis. It also unfolds an interesting phenomenon regarding how contested and complex framing processes at the negotiation table inject new normative imperatives.

6.4 Conclusion Applying the framing theory, this chapter has illustrated the contested frames of the actors and how they yielded to action frames with regard to the policy and operating entity of the climate funds. The simultaneous historical mapping and frame analysis illustrated how the prominent issues gained traction and how a new fund operating entity along with its distinct policies evolved in the final Agreement. It has found a generative process of action frames, which again contested carrying the primordial logics of the actors. The analytical model developed in this chapter helps to conceptualize the complex, two-decade-long negotiation on funding mechanism in a structured way. The concept of framing appears capable of serving as a useful tool to illustrate such a complicated negotiation process, but the outcomes from this is only able to explain a part of the whole question because the framing efforts were the sine-quanon for all of the issues to sustain but did not guarantee their sustenance nor could determine the prospective implications of the outcomes. The fates of the crucially contested frames and their significance appear to have been dependent on the roles of the powerful actors. As explained above and in the previous section, the first hypothesis developed for this part of the research question appears only partially valid because many of the issues (discussed in the second sub-section above) which were framed up with intense salience and fitted the mental schemata of a maximum number of actors appear to have found the traction in the final Paris Agreement but some of them also failed to attain this basically due to lack of support by the powerful actors. The puzzle as to why it happened so is addressed in Chapter 7. The role of power of the actors and the importance of institutions have been profoundly manifested in this case study. It can be summarized in the following way. First, the major powers from the camps of the developed countries and the emerging ones have been found fervently contesting the issues related to funding policy and operating mechanisms. As it concerned formation of new institute and policies, the major players leveraged all their tools to determine the composition, modus operandi, and policies of the new institutes. The outcomes and critical junctures of this competition are precious evidences to examine the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition.

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Second, the simple fact that the major players have fought so hard to retain or to exert their influence on the new institutional mechanism for fund management and in determining the location of the host city reminds the points of the institutionalists that—If international institutions are not important, then why do the States spend so much time and resources for them? (Ruggie 1995). The studies of this chapter indicate that the international institutions are profoundly important to the States; as such, they have fought hard to safeguard their perceived interests while new institutions are developed. Third, from the above study, it becomes clear that in the contemporary world, the developed countries do no longer retain exclusive dominance in creating new institutional mechanisms; the major emerging countries also play vital roles in determining the general policies and the prospective operational mechanisms of the new institutions. Actually, in the current world, all the countries matter, albeit in some different degrees, because the support of the less powerful countries also has implications for the outcomes. Fourth, though the actors’ power appeared to have played a crucial role in the complex world today, simple material power did not appear to have been the decisive factor. It appeared that the supports of the other actors and the clout of the actor concerned played crucial parts in shaping the outcomes. In short, normative power (as defined in the second chapter) in conjunction with material power appeared to have been able to determine the fates of the crucially contested frames, neither of them alone could deter a headway. The puzzles with regard to the role of power in deterring the crucial outcomes largely remained incomplete in this chapter, which the seventh chapter of this book fills up.

Works Cited Abbott, Kenneth W., Jessica F. Green, and Robert O. Keohane. 2016. Organizational ecology and institutional change in global governance. International Organization 70 (2): 247–277. Antimiani, Alessandro, et al. 2017. The Green Climate Fund as an effective compensatory mechanism in global climate negotiations. Environmental Science & Policy 77: 49–68. Bo, Yan., and Zhimin Chen. 2011. EU’s weakening leadership in climate change governance. China International Study 8: 74–81. Bodansky, Daniel, and Lavanya Rajamani. 2012. The evolution and governance architecture of the climate change regime. International law and international relations (Detlef Sprinz & Urs Luterbacher, eds., MIT Press, 2nd ed. 2013). Boyd, Emily, Esteve Corbera, and Manuel Estrada. 2008. UNFCCC negotiations (pre-Kyoto to COP-9): What the process says about the politics of CDM-sinks. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 8 (2): 95–112. Bouwer, Laurens M., and Jeroen C.J.H. Aerts. 2006. Financing climate change adaptation. Disasters 30 (1): 49–63. Burton, Ian, et al. 2002. From impacts assessment to adaptation priorities: The shaping of adaptation policy. Climate Policy 2 (2–3): 145–159.

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Ciplet, David, J. Timmons Roberts, and Mizan Khan. 2013. The politics of international climate adaptation funding: Justice and divisions in the greenhouse. Global Environmental Politics 13 (1): 49–68. Cui, Lianbiao, and Yuran Huang. 2018. Exploring the schemes for Green Climate Fund financing: International lessons. World Development 101: 173–187. Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2010. Inside UN climate change negotiations: The Copenhagen conference. Review of Policy Research 27 (6). Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2016. The Paris agreement on climate change: Behind closed doors. Global Environmental Politics 16 (3): 1–11. Fenton, Adrian. 2014. Green Climate Fund. Accessed at http://www.sean-cc.org/wp-content/the mes/new_sean-cc/activities/Regional/RR2014.2g.pdf. 2 May 2018. Fridahl, Mathias, and Björn-Ola Linnér. 2016. Perspectives on the Green Climate Fund: Possible compromises on capitalization and balanced allocation. Climate and Development 8 (2): 105–109. Glemarec, Y. 2019. Aligning national interests and global climate justice: The role of human rights in enhancing the ambition of nationally determined contributions to combat climate change. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 12 (2): 309–327. Grasso, Marco. 2011. The role of justice in the North–South conflict in climate change: The case of negotiations on the Adaptation Fund. International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 11 (4): 361–377. Helgeson, Jennifer, and Jane Ellis. 2015. The role of the 2015 agreement in enhancing adaptation to climate change. OECD Library. Available at https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/environment/ the-role-of-the-2015-agreement-in-enhancing-adaptation-to-climate-change_5jrxg3xb0h20-en. Accessed on 2 May 2019. Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After hegemony: Cooperation and discord in international political economy. Princeton University Press. Keohane, Robert O. 2019. Institutions for a world of climate injustice. Fudan Journal of the Humanities and Social Sciences 12 (2): 293–307. Klein, Richard J.T., and Asa Persson. 2008. Financing adaptation to climate change: Issues and priorities. Climate Policy Research Programme and the Centre for European Policy Studies, Svartsjö, Sweden, European Climate Platform (ECP). Mace, Mary Jane. 2005. Funding for adaptation to climate change: UNFCCC and GEF developments since COP-7. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 14 (3): 225–246. Markandya, Anil, et al. 2015. Analyzing trade-offs in international climate policy options: The case of the green climate fund. World Development 74: 93–107. Moore, Frances C. 2012. Negotiating adaptation: Norm selection and hybridization in international climate negotiations. Global Environmental Politics 12 (4): 30–48. Müller, Benito. 2006. Climate of distrust: The 2006 Bonn climate change adaptation fund negotiations. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. Parry, Martin, et al. 1998. Adapting to the inevitable. Nature 395 (6704): 741. Ruggie, John Gerard. 1995. The false premise of realism. International Security 20 (1): 62–70. Schalatek, Liane, Smita Nakhooda, and Neil Bird. 2015. The Green Climate Fund. Overseas Development Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America. Accessed at https://us.boell.org/sites/ default/files/uploads/2015/11/cff11_2015_gcf.pdf. Accessed on May 2, 2018. Schipper, E. Lisa F. 2006. Conceptual history of adaptation in the UNFCCC process. Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 15 (1): 82–92.

Chapter 7

Why Only Certain Normative Imperatives Emerge: Analysis Through the Prism of the Holistic Theoretical Proposition

7.1 Introduction The two decades of climate negotiations, though is relegated by some experts that it has failed to devise a satisfactory and dependable outcome, if we contrast the initial frames of the parties with the final outcomes, as delineated in the previous three chapters, it appears to have been able to inject quite impressive and fresh normative imperatives. While the discussion on mitigation by the developing countries was kind of taboo in the initial stages, the final Agreement has innovated a way that requires all the States to contribute to mitigation. The issues related to adaptation were largely absent in the initial phases, but in the final Agreement, it has at least notionally acquired equal status vis-à-vis mitigation. Another very significant outcome appeared with regard to institutional mechanisms for the operation of the Funds. These outcomes are impressive if we consider that this breadth of compelling normative imperatives were injected within two decades. It has also been identified in the previous three case studies that the power of the major States and coalitions formed by them played decisive parts in determining the fates of some of the crucially contested frames. The following key points from the three case studies provide a glimpse outcome of these aspects. (a) In case of mitigation, the frames like the 1.5 °C target, equity, finance for mitigation, means of implementation, technology transfer, capacity building, justice in consideration of historical emission records, etc., salience for which were fostered by the less powerful countries, acquired a nominal or almost no significance in the final Agreement. During the semi-structured interviews with the key informants, one expert, who has attended all the 21 COPs, in explaining how important the notion of 1.5 °C had always been for the AOSIS countries, stated that their causes acquired tremendous public support, yet the notion was about to be entirely abandoned after the final Agreement. In the end, this could only secure a notional mention in the final

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_7

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Agreement, i.e., “to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels” (Article 2, Paris Agreement). In the press conference that was conducted immediately after the signing ceremony of the Paris Agreement by the most prominent NGO group comprising 700 NGOs, the “Climate Action Network,” Tim Gore from “Oxfam” observed that the Agreement has shown the “brutal nature of power politics” and that the terms were more detailed on the negative aspects (that concern the interests of the developed countries) and less focused on the positive ones (that concern saving the Earth and the interests of the developing countries).1 In their perspective, outcomes from the Paris Agreement reflect the dominance of the frames and phrases of the developed countries. Major turning points during the two-decade-long negotiation like US withdrawal from Kyoto Protocol on relative gain concern, the crescendo of tension between the USA and the emerging powers on the debate on double track or single track mitigation actions in Bali COP, the notorious deadlock in Copenhagen COP where emerging countries appeared as an invincible fortress, the nine-month-long secret negotiations on mitigation policies between two behemoths (China and the USA) that is projected by some scholars as a key catalyst for the final deal in Paris are all reflections of the power of the actors as the determining factor at the crucial points of time. (b) The case of adaptation funding also finds that salience of the framing terms was the conduit for the sustenance of an issue, but here too, the fates of some crucially contested frames were heavily dependent on the powerful actors. As elaborated in Chap. 5, the failed framing efforts with regard to “vulnerability index”, ambiguity with regard to financial additionality to ODA, and way to reach the goal of US$ 100 billion a year for the post-Kyoto finance, loss, and damage, etc. are some of the examples which, despite fervent framing efforts of the lesser States, either failed or only symbolically sustained in the final Agreement. In contrast, the notional articulation of parity between adaptation and mitigation, as explained in the respective case study, is an example that could attain traction, thanks to the support of the powerful emerging countries. The policy adopted to channelize the proceeds from CDM projects to Adaptation Fund was a milestone achievement for the developing countries towards a reliable source of self-generating funding. However, this prospect did not last long as it does not serve the interest of the powerful actors. In fact, no attempt to ensure sustainable and reliable funding from self-generating sources like taxing the aviation industry or “polluters pay” principle, could see the light of success as these did not match the interest of the developed countries. From the developed countries, only EU has been found occasionally favoring the adaptation funding issues but in the condition that the recipient countries engage in mitigation actions. In this situation, those frames which were nurtured or seriously supported by the powerful emerging countries had some chances to attain traction 1

See the webcast at https://unfccc6.meta-fusion.com/cop21/events/2015-12-12-14-00-climate-act ion-network, accessed on 3 December 2017.

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151

and their relative significance in terms of phrasing the words also remained dependent upon the same. (c) The case study on funding mechanism reveals that the framing efforts of the powerful emerging developing countries had been successfully able to push forward reform for new institutional structure as well as to adopt policies that assumed much higher influence of them in AFB and GCF decision-making process (compare Fridahl and Linnér 2016, p. 107). Many of their rhetoric framing terms like “scaled-up,” “new”, “additional”, “predictable”, “adequate fund”, and policies like “guidance by COP”, “equal representation”, “review”, “secretariat for new Funds” and “simplified approval procedure” have got traction in the final Agreement. The developed countries had also been able to attain their cardinal goal of keeping the funding prospect vague and not that ambitious. The affected and less developed countries could not gain much from this because the donors are not living up to their words, they have kept the terms vague, and the recipients actually have no remedy if the pledges are not met. The hardest contest between the two broad groups of the developing and developed countries was about AF and the decision-making structure of the AFB. Moore (2012, p. 36) referred to a number of the interviews with experts who opined that the AFB had defined redistribution of power in international finance and implicated considerable departure from the historical norms, which will set the trend in the future in case of the institution-building process. This postulation appeared to be true with the establishment of the GCF. GCF’s total grant amounted to nine times higher than GEF in the year 2015 (Schalatek et al. 2015). The Climate Investment Fund (CIF) conceived a “sunset clause” during its establishment, which says that it will be closed once new financial architecture becomes effective under the UNFCCC.2 Graph 5.1 presented in the previous chapter shows the funding status of the four major climate funds. The paltry size of the Adaptation Fund is likely to be dwarfed by the Green Climate Fund (Moore 2012, p. 41) and is already drying up due to halted CDMs (Fridahl and Linnér 2016, p. 107).3 As such, though both GEF and GCF remain the financial mechanisms, GCF has already attained the position of the leading institute for the financial mechanism and can be expected to consolidate its preeminence in the coming days too.4

2

GEF includes all the fundings of LDCF, SCCF, Trust Fund, and CBIT. As per the sunset clause of the CIF, it is supposed to disappear after the GCF takes over, and the declaration by the key donor, the USA, that it would not fund it anymore would result in its demise. GCF funding was initiated in 2015 and started from 2016. Data is taken from the above website titled “carbon brief.” 3 During the 19th COP, a goal of reaching US$ 100 million was fixed for AF, while the goal of US$ 100 billion for climate finance was reiterated. See UNFCCC report No. FCCC/CP/2013/10/Add, p. 9. 4 During the Paris COP as well as the G7 summit in 2015, the leaders agreed that a major share of the pledged US$ 100 billion a year should be channeled through GCF, and it would be the key institution for finance. See “Resource mobilization” available at https://www.greenclimate. fund/how-we-work/resource-mobilization, accessed on 5 May 2018. The 18th COP decided that a

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Funding is most urgent for the least developed, less powerful, and vulnerable countries. However, through the creation of the GCF, the interest of the powerful countries was given prominence at the expense of the others. At the later phases of the negotiation, a divergence gradually became more apparent within the developing countries, particularly among the BASIC countries and the rest which made the interest of the lesser States less attended. The positions of the emerging countries comported the interests of the developing countries in many instances, and when they joined hands, they could attain goals, but the ultimate result predominantly aligned with the interests of the powerful developed ones or the emerging ones. The above introduction with regard to the three case studies provides testimony that for the crucially contested issues, the powerful actors stroke the final deal. They were able to do this not merely because of material power, they did so through forging coalitions with other actors and through framing the issues within the dictates of the normative imperatives of the time. The outcomes from these case studies appear at this stage as invaluable sources of evidence to examine the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition. The same is followed in the remainder of this chapter.

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition in Unraveling the Crucial Puzzle We have now come to the central thirst of our research quest. As an excerpt of the case studies, we have identified above that in the cases of some crucial issues, the simple framing effort of the actors was not the defining factor; the powerful actors determined the final deals. The instrumentality of the military might is clearly unrelated in these cases. Simple material power, as postulated by the realist scholars, neither appear productive. Yet, it is evident that the powerful actors determined the ultimate outcomes. In this backdrop, evidences from the findings of the previous three case studies are applied here to examine the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition that we presented in the second chapter at the outset of the empirical works. It has been explained in the second chapter why the power of the actors should be considered issue specific as well as, at the same time, holistic. The proposition was also narrowed down for specific cases and an indicative measurement method of the holistic power of the actors against the cases we are studying were posited. It was proposed that the indicative holistic power of the actors would be a summation of the material power and normative power with roughly equal values for each of them. The headline indicators for their estimation were also proposed. The following equations captured the proposition for indicative measurement of the holistic power:

significant share of the multilateral fund will be channeled through GCF, see UNFCC report No. FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, p. 28.

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition … Normative power = soft power +

153

number of parties support the frame The total number of parties attending the COP

× 100

Material power = (population + territory + GDP + emission percentage) Power = Normative power + Material power

5

As explained in the third chapter, this work has not ventured to identify the major powers in the realm of climate politics rather adopted the classification made by Viola et al. (2012). They argued that China, the USA, and the EU are superpowers, whereas India, Brazil, South Korea, Japan, and Russia are great powers in this issue arena. After applying the data, most of which were taken from the World Bank data sources as well as some websites dealing with soft power, as detailed in Chap. 3, following graphs appeared against the above-identified major climate powers (Table 7.1 and Graph 7.1). Graph 7.2 visualize the emissions of the superpowers up to the year 2015.6 The figures appeared above from the calculation of powers are only rough estimations, as the holistic theoretical proposition explained in Chap. 2. These rough estimations, nevertheless, provide an assessment about the great powers in the domain of climate politics. The objective here is to apply these assessments in contrasting with the findings from the three qualitative case studies conducted in the previous three chapters. The works that are done here involve one negotiation setting where the chairs, actors, and their coalitions, venues, etc., are identical. Moreover, the issues were widely linked, and they were traded in the bargaining process. As such, if the indicators for these three issues were treated separately for more specific ones, it might have improved the accuracy marginally but not significantly. Therefore, these indicative figures were granted as standard for all three cases, i.e., mitigation, funding mechanism, and adaptation funding issues. The trajectory of emission presented in Graph 7.2 reflects the profound changes that happened in the last two decades. Remarkably, the emission trajectories of the States go in parallel with their economic growth. The material power variable of the major States, as reflected on the estimation, above also changed in parallel with the same. It also goes in parallel with perceived major power status in commoner’s viewpoint. Other indicators of material power, like population, territory, etc., remain static. Thus, it reflects how emission had been decisive elements in the actor’s power 5

The second chapter of this book has explained the selection process of these indicators. It is not repeated here. 6 Data source: European Commission, available at http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/overview.php?v= CO2ts1990-2015, accessed on 10 June 2017. See also http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_coun. htm, accessed on 6 December 2017. The second chart, entitled “Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions”, is taken from https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data, accessed on 5 December 2017.

32

24

13

EU

India

Brazil

25

24

Japan

Russia

4

45

China

South Korea

59

US

1995

22

22

4

13

25

54

45

65

2000

Material power

22

16

4

12

26

55

52

59

2005

22

14

4

14

28

47

62

50

2010

21

11

4

13

29

41

69

50

2015

46.58

66.86

54.32

46.63

48.07

73.89

40.85

73.68

Soft power

25

43

134

134

134

121

134

43

Support

30

45

62

58

59

70

55

48

Normative power

54

70

66

71

83

102

100

107

1995

52

67

66

71

84

124

100

113

2000

Holistic power

Table 7.1 Major climate powers during the two decades of COP negotiations, as per the holistic theoretical proposition

52

61

66

70

85

125

107

107

2005

52

59

66

72

87

117

117

98

2010

51

56

66

71

88

111

124

98

2015

154 7 Why Only Certain Normative Imperatives Emerge …

Graph 7.1 Reflections from calculation of major powers during the two decades of COP negotiations

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition … 155

Graph 7.2 Trajectory of greenhouse gas emission by the major emitters during the last two decades

156 7 Why Only Certain Normative Imperatives Emerge …

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition …

157

dynamics and how important the climate politics is. This is particularly so in today’s world, where the norm of territorial integrity has become sacrosanct. The correlation between emission and economic growth shows that the latter is dependent on the former. Thus, the key to change in material power today lies in energy consumption, which is so far basically through the emission of carbon gas. Unfortunately, energy consumption until now depends primarily on GHG emissions. If renewable energy becomes competitive in the future, it would not be GHG emission, but still, it would be energy consumption which will act as the central pillar of economic growth and, thus, of the material power of the States. Other indicators of material power selected here are relevant and also valuable ones, but the energy consumption is the crucial element that calibrate the change in the power stature; others do not have much impact on the change. It does not mean that we should count power of the actors only based on emission; in the absence of the other elements considered here, material power in this issue arena would be much less reflective. However, adding more indicators apart from the ones opted here for material power in this particular issue arena would not enhance the accuracy much further, but would deepen the complication. Thus, the selection of these handful of indicators bear merit. From the above tables and graphs, it appears that China’s material power has increased rapidly since 2001. This had contributed to the increase of its holistic power. Had material power been the only determining factor, China should have been in a dominating position to determine the outcomes in this domain, but this did not happen because China considerably lacked normative power which comprise both soft power and support of other actors and, above all, instrumentality of power is confined by the normative imperatives which in this case requires adopting policies and taking actions for carbon neutrality. The score of soft power has been taken from a professional website which counted six broad and 77 specific indicators. However, the case studies of this book reflect that the clout China exhibited in the negotiation table does not reflect the meager score China is ascribed on soft power. The concept of normative power, explained in the theory-building process in the second chapter, helps to explain this contradiction and presents a better account in this respect. Soft power alone is not a reflection of normative power as per the definition and explanation made in the second chapter. In this particular work, the support of other actors is also counted as one of the two variables of normative power. Due to China’s positions that were congruent with most of the developing countries, as well as through situating itself in the G77 group, China gained higher normative power. As it is reflected in the above graphs, and the qualitative analysis made in the three empirical studies, materially China is clearly one of the three superpowers, but it lay much below in terms of soft power. However, unlike the other two superpowers, its stances were congruent with the developing and underdeveloped States. This, in turn, was helpful to overcome its lower score in soft power as the support of the other States supplemented its normative power as well as in its overall holistic power. The stature China exhibited all along the negotiation and the outcomes from it, as elaborated in

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three empirical studies and summarized in the next section, is congruent with this argument regarding the normative power. The sudden increase of the EU’s material power in the 2000s was due to the expansion of its member countries through which all the indicators of the material power, i.e., territory, population, GDP, and emission, increased. This expansion poised the EU in superpower status; none of the EU countries would have been in such a stature alone. This explains why the other components like territory, population, and GDP are vital for the calculation of material power in this domain. Viola et al. (2012) have reasonably posited EU as a superpower in this domain. Additionally, the EU had the highest score in normative power, thanks to its high scores both in soft power and support of other actors. This is congruent with the arguments that the EU is the normative leader in climate regime (compare Jordan et al. 2012; Pavese and Torney 2012). EU’s decline in material power was associated with its absolute as well as relative decline of emission and economy vis-à-vis other superpowers. Despite the gradual decline of its material power, the EU could maintain its superpower status thanks to its high score in normative power. It was the EU that had shaped many of the issues and made the maximum contributions to set the agendas as well as the process of evolution of most of the frames discussed in the case studies of this book. A simple consideration of material power alone would have failed to explain it. Despite lower score on material power compared to both the USA and China, the EU had been able to play this leadership role thanks to its higher score on normative power. This provides testimony that our proposition of holistic power in the combination of material and normative power in determining political courses of the contemporary world comport much higher merit compared to the ontologies that solely rely on materialistic or discursive variables. The power of the USA had diminished, while that of others scaled-up. As seen in the case studies, the USA and its group maintained stances that were not congruent with the interest and positions of most of the actors. This had shrunk their normative power. Here the variable “support” came into play. Despite the high score in soft power, the USA and its group’s normative power score fell significantly due to lack of support by other actors. This account is congruent with the fact that many of the USA’s attempts faltered; the Bali Action Plan in the 13th COP is just an example of this. It provides shreds of evidence that HTP’s arguments of normative power, in combination of soft power and support of other actors, variable is better suited in the context of the contemporary world. The USA’s overwhelming military power had no leverage for the outcomes illustrated in the three case studies. This fact profoundly weakens the realist theories’ utility which attach overarching emphasis on military might. The USA had a high score in material power as well as in soft power, but its stances considerably lacked the support of other countries, which affected its score in normative power. Had US positions been favorable to the interest of the developing countries and congruent with the normative imperatives of the time, its holistic power would have increased, and it might have been in such a hegemonic stature to determine the outcomes in a similar way it did for the Britton Woods institutions. Despite its overwhelming

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition …

159

military power, it failed to do so. Thus, it is still power that is the decisive factor that determines the outcome, but the nature of that power has transformed in the contemporary world in a way where normative imperatives play the cardinal role. It is not simple superiority in material capability, but the power that can determine an outcome requires a normative power variable, which is not any less vital one than material power. This holistic property of power is poised to facilitate the gradual transformation of the international system towards betterment because the normative power component requires normative conformity, and the normative imperatives that define the confines of power dissuade much of the vices. The power of the emerging countries, most prominently that of China, has excelled steadily over the course of these two decades of negotiations. Starting from the lowest score in terms of holistic power in the beginning, it topped all others after one decade and continued flourishing. The success of the framing efforts of the emerging countries in the last halves of the COPs compared to their unimpressive achievements in the earlier COPs, as delineated in the historical mapping of the three case studies, appears to have gone in parallel with these changes. It is often accused that the Copenhagen COP had failed due to China and the BASIC group (see Dimitrov 2010). China has also been praised for playing a constructive role in working out the Paris Agreement. It is doubtless that a deal without China, whose emissions in 2015 amounted to 30% of global emissions, would have been pointless. This fact alone was sufficient to oblige other countries to be more attentive to China’s dispositions, but China could not appear heartless through capitalizing on this. It had to show flexibility to the normative compulsion on the negotiation table along the diverse waves of the framing efforts and had to compromise to some extent to its shortage of soft power. This had facilitated the accommodative outcome, as we see in the Paris Agreement. Among the great powers, India has been found to play a vital role in respect of some issues and frames. The most spectacular manifestation of this was seen in the 13th COP in Bali when India led the developing countries for two-track mitigation policies, and the USA was sidelined against a solid coalition of the developing countries under the leadership of India. The case studies of the previous chapters hold plenty of examples of India taking a leading role on behalf of the BASIC group, the case of notional parity between adaptation and mitigation finance is another example. However, India’s material power had been meager compared to the clout it exerted in the negotiations; the holistic power somewhat matches it. Coalition with the emerging powers under the ambit of BASIC and alignment of the positions with the developing countries in general facilitated such leverages for India. The same goes for Brazil and South Africa. They acquired leverages by situating themselves in the powerful group of the BASIC and through their in-principle alignment with the developing countries. The situations of Japan and South Korea are particularly interesting. South Korea’s material power had been negligible compared to the superpowers and other great powers, but it had demonstrated notable clouts in some of the cases during the negotiations. Viola et al. (2012) rightly listed it as a great power. It minimized the shortcomings in material power by its higher score in soft power as well as by

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acquiring support from its group G77. Though South Korea’s development level is comparable with the developed countries, it’s alignment with the group of G77 gave it the scope to punch over the weight. The Headquarters of one of the vital and newly formed institutes, the Green Climate Fund (GCF), was decided to locate in South Korea. This is reflective of South Korea’s holistic power. Its soft power combined with support from its group G77/China helped realizing this goal despite the fact that the developed countries had different choices. Japan’s normative power had been much lesser than South Korea as its stances lacked the support of majority of the countries, which in turn tarnished its holistic power. Due to this fact, despite that Japan had a higher score in material power and it held an impression of a strong player than South Korea, many of its attempts faltered. In contrast, despite its modest profile in material power, South Korea has been found to be comparatively more successful. For example, South Korea had been able to sustain its bid to host the Headquarters of the GCF despite opposition of the developed countries while many of the attempts of Japan withered away along the way of negotiations. Russia has been included as one of the great climate powers in the list of Viola et al. (2012). Its holistic power lies at the bottom as per the calculation under the holistic theoretical proposition developed in this work. It has acquired such a profile due to its lower score in material power and the lowest score in normative power, which in turn is due to the lowest scores in soft power and support of other States. We have observed in the case studies that, compared to all other superpowers and great powers listed above, Russia played the least active as well as a least-effective role in the negotiation table, which is congruent with our estimation. In terms of military power, Russia still is the second most powerful country, but in the case of this particular issue of climate politics, its position has sharply fallen down. This provides another evidence that the conjecture of issue-specific power, as explained in the HTP, bears better merit in the context of the contemporary world. Russia most strikingly lacked normative power. The consequence of this was conspicuous in the 18th COP in Durban when the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol was adopted with the principle that countries not a party to the second commitment period would be able to get the benefits for the flexibility mechanisms. Russia and its most close allies Ukraine and Belarus, attempted to block the adoption of this decision at the closing plenary, but the COP president tactfully gaveled its adoption, ignoring Russia’s flag or by pretending that he had not noticed that the flag was raised (see ENB report Vol. 12 No. 567, page 5). It was a departure from the consensus-based UNFCCC decision-making process where every single party has a veto power; however, considering the immense normative compulsion in the room, the exception was accepted ultimately by them. It is also a glaring example of how normative imperatives compel the powerful States to do something which they would not have done otherwise. Russia’s economy is heavily dependent on fossil fuels, and it assumes that it may not be that much affected due to climate change, rather some parts of Siberia may become cultivable as a result of global warming. It does not have much to lose from the emission reduction projectile fixed against it either because Russia is not required

7.2 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition …

161

to reduce much, thanks to the calculation of the base of emission reduction target from the year 1990 when Russia had very high emissions.7 As a result of all these considerations, Russia did not play much active role in the climate negotiations but given its strength in other areas and considering its particular self-interest, Russia has probably been included by Viola et al. (2012) as one of the great powers in this sector too. Though no single country from the group of AOSIS, LDCs, and climatevulnerable countries are included in the list above, they have been found to wield considerable influence as a group. Compared to other groups like JUSSCANZ, EU, BASIC, etc., the material power of the States under these groups is deficient. However, due to their high ethical ground, these groups could punch over their weights. As per the measurement following HTP, the power of the actors changed remarkably fast, as reflected in Table 7.1 and Graph 7.1. Since holistic power determines the outcomes, these changes should be congruent with the outcomes across the critical junctures of the negotiations. It indeed happened so, Bali and Copenhagen COPs are the most notable examples as explained above. This dynamic is also evident from the fates of some of the action frames and shift in policy orientations of the actors. For example, in the early stages of the negotiations, when their holistic power was much less, the emerging countries were not able to play as effective roles as they could during the 13th summit that adopted the Bali Action Plan accommodating their preference of double track mitigation plan. The emerging countries manifested their rigidity in line with their growing holistic power which resulted into the Copenhagen deadlock. The coherence in the BASIC group had got diminished since the 17th COP in Durban, which was reflected in the outcome of Durban Platform for enhanced action. And, most importantly, China appeared to be in a position at par with the USA since 2013. It was the bilateral resolve between the USA and China, reached through a nine-month of secret bilateral negotiations, which ultimately catalyzed the crucial way forward to reach a decisive outcome in Paris. The discussion made above, the critical junctures, and the outcomes from these provide sufficient shreds of evidence that the holistic nature of power can explain the crucial outcomes more convincingly. In the following section, we further dig into it as to why only certain crucially contested frames sustained while others did not.

7

See “Kyoto Protocol Base year Data” available at https://unfccc.int/process/transparency-and-rep orting/reporting-and-review-under-the-kyoto-protocol/first-commitment-period/kyoto-protocolbase-year-data-for-the-first-commitment-period-of-the-kyoto-protocol, accessed on 10 January 2019. Though the base year was fixed for the Kyoto Protocol but it will be considered for the reduction targets under the Paris Agreement as well.

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7.3 The Holistic Theoretical Proposition in Unraveling the Crucial Puzzles of the Particular Issues 7.3.1 Issues Related to Mitigation The issues related to mitigation were most blatantly contested by the major players. It is evident from the case studies that the major actors were most purposively concerned about the issues related to mitigation. While China and other emerging countries consistently accentuated the salience of their framing terms that the mitigation of carbon gas emission should be led by the developed countries first, one of the main reasons, in contrary, shown by the USA for withdrawing from the Kyoto Protocol was that China was not obliged for comparable mitigation actions under the Kyoto Protocol. The developed countries seemed to be oblivious about their historical emissions through which they acquired current economic riches. Thanks to their financial fortune, they are in advantageous state to attain their mitigation targets relatively at ease. However, the developed countries, particularly the USA, seemed to have been gripped by the relative gain concerns rather than reasons. The emerging countries highlighted the historic emission records while accentuating their justice and equity-oriented framing. US withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol was a veritable blow for the global community but they could not afford to give up the hope to save the future generations from the adverse impact of the climate change. The normative imperatives accrued over the time through constant framing efforts of the State and non-state actors obliged the USA to return to the negotiation table at a later stage. Fixated by the relative gain concerns, the USA had shown similar rigidity in the 13th COP in Bali. Despite overwhelmingly materially powerful country, it had no other option but to explore the solution through negotiation in this time too. What could have happened if an innovative solution, as we have seen in most of the cases, could not be sorted out from such deadlocks? In earlier epochs, it might have led to war. This is no more a feasible option in the contemporary world. Deadlocks had happened many times along the course, and the most obvious reason for this was the relative gain concern that implicates the power stature of the behemoths. However, they had no option other than sorting out a consensus through negotiation. The outcomes from abovementioned cases reveal that it is still power, a power which is dictated by the normative imperatives and comprised as a combined whole of material and normative one, that mattered. This is exactly the point where the ontology of the holistic theoretical proposition claims its theoretical ingenuity. It was not also possible for the emerging countries just to refer to the historical emission records and their development needs and make no contribution towards mitigation. The normative imperatives generated through the two decades of the framing and securitization of the climate change issue were compelling for them, and they had to concede. In the initial stages, the mitigation issues for the developing countries were kind of taboo, but in the end, all the States have been taken on board

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to this objective through innovative ways like the “registry mechanism,” “ratcheting up of the ambitions,” “naming and shaming” for implementation, etc. Military might had no impact on this, material power alone was neither productive. Normative imperatives implicated normative power and holistic power of the actors that comprise both of material power and normative power, proved here bearing the potential to offer some clue as to how breakthroughs from these complicated situations were made. The critical junctures of the evolution of the issues related to mitigation are also revealing. For example, at the Bali and Copenhagen COPs, the overwhelming pressure by the developed countries could not compel the emerging countries towards global common mitigation commitments nor could the USA sustain the normative pressure jointly exerted by the emerging countries and the EU and both of them had to agree on two-track mitigation negotiation. Thus, the most notable outcomes were the results of the normative imperatives of the time. These shreds of evidences support the holistic theoretical proposition in three main ways; first, the normative imperatives generated in the process of framing the issues created somewhat abstract but forceful structural dictates that led to the outcome as it appeared; second, all the countries, especially the emerging ones were very much in the game of new institutions building process while in the earlier times the hegemon predominantly used to set it; third, and most crucially, the power of the actors was a decisive element in determining certain outcomes, but that power was not simple material one rather holistic in nature.

7.3.2 Issues Related to Funding Mechanism and Policies The evolution of the funding mechanism provides invaluable evidences for this work as it sets off a new trend in developing institutions in the context of the power structure of the contemporary world. Unlike the existing global institutes under the auspices of the UN and its sister organs, viz. the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, no single hegemonic power could overwhelmingly dominate the formation and future modus operandi of it. Moreover, a group of newly emerging countries has played the pivotal role, if not the determining part, in formulating the terms of its operation, composition, principles, and location of the Headquarters of the new institution. However, this shift in organizational innovation did not happen as it happens in the case of tectonic plates, as Krasner (1983) used the metaphor,8 instead, the normative imperatives generated over the course of the two decades of framing has culminated into the creation of this institute along with its modes and principles 8

Krasner posits that at the time of the first creation of the regimes, they reflect the distribution of power, but over time, this distribution erodes, which creates pressures to change the regime. Using the tectonic plate metaphor, he postulates that this change does not lead to a smooth adjustment; rather, the pressure grows until an earthquake alters the location of the plates in line with the new distribution of power. In this case, we have seen that the new distribution of power accommodated and evolved the institutional mechanism instead of creating an earthquake-like situation.

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and the holistic power of the actors, both from the developed and the developing countries camps, determined its archetype as well as how the benefits will be shared. Due to the compulsion of the normative imperatives, it was not possible for the current system to regress into an earthquake-like altercation and, so, the reality has compelled the actors to find an accommodative way. As delineated in the respective case study, in the initial stages of the negotiations, funding for the national communications through the GEF was basically the key concern for all the parties. As it would accumulate the emission data of all the countries, which would be helpful to plan for all-inclusive mitigations in a systematic way, it converged the interest of the developed countries. The IPCC reports revealed that the most vulnerable countries are situated in the less developed world, and they would be the first victims of the adverse effects. This made the less developed countries wary, and they started framing up their issues out of fear and from a solid moral ground. The normative imperatives generated through the justice and equitycentered framing efforts culminated into the creation of the three Funds: AF, SCCF, and LDCF. Among them, the Adaptation Fund was the most significant one, which signaled a shift in the existing institutional structure and policy. This was finally realized through the creation of the AFB, as the new structure of the Board turned to be more equitable by incorporating the developing countries’ representatives. The AFB had pioneered a path for the generation of new institutional mechanisms, which was followed when the GCF was created. The GCF automatically embodied the negotiated principles and policies under the AFB. However, it has, in a subtle way, diverted the focus. In the case of the AFB, the main focus was adaptation funding, as per which the most vulnerable countries were poised to get the highest share of the benefits. In the case of GCF, though 50:50 ratio for adaptation and mitigation was mentioned, in reality, so far until 2016, GCF has extended 41% of its fund to the mitigation projects, 32% on cross-cutting projects, and 27% to adaptation projects.9 Indeed 27–30% is the percentage that is allocated purely for adaptation funding. There is no timeframe for achieving this 50:50 ratio, a loophole that is being exploited. The GCF funding for adaptation is also designed for mega projects of so-called “global benefits,” from which the most vulnerable countries may not get equal benefits, as was the case for the AF. Most importantly, the funding prospect of the AF has gone tremendously down due to lesser profit from CDM projects and the diminished number of projects. Thus, the GCF is more conducive to serve the interest of the powerful countries, both from the developed and emerging camp, and its activities on adaptation have also been made amenable to the interests of these powerful countries. In this subtle way, the interest of the major powers has acquired prominence at the expense of the less powerful and most vulnerable countries. Above outcomes support the holistic theoretical proposition in the following ways. First, the normative imperatives that compel the States towards a certain direction 9

See “Mapped: where multilateral climate funds spend their money,” in Carbon brief website at https://www.carbonbrief.org/mapped-where-multilateral-climate-funds-spend-their-money, accessed on 12 January 2019, p. 20.

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are evident from the creation of the three funds as a result of the justice and equityoriented framing efforts of the actors, Second, the formation of the AF and AFB reveals that not merely the developed countries, but the developing countries are also imparting their appropriate shares in the institutions building process in today’s world. The support of the countries is vital in shaping the outcomes; thus, even the least powerful countries are also contributing to the institution-building process. Third, the subsequent developments, with the creation of the GCF, reflect that the powerful countries eventually dominated in harnessing the lion’s share of the prospective benefits from the new institutional structure. Nonetheless, the difference from the earlier epochs, that is significant and clear, is that it is not a single hegemon, but a group of powerful countries from the developed world as well as from the emerging ones that had jointly shaped the outcomes, and almost all other countries had also taken part in the process.

7.3.3 Issues Related to Funding Adaptation Funding for adaptation is primarily a concern of the least developed and vulnerable States, which also are less powerful. As they are severely deficient of material and soft power, the normative imperatives and support of a large number of States were their main conduit to wield their negotiating strength. The issue of climate change had been portrayed as an existential threat by the developed countries where the vulnerable and least developed countries would be the imminent victims, although they have not caused this problem. However, it has been detected in the case study that in the initial stages of the COP negotiations, salience was given mainly on the issue of National Communications (NC) of these countries, not about their adaptation. The objective of the NCs was to devise a way to drag these lesser States towards mitigation efforts in later phases; it is evident that this had been tried by some countries in the later phases.10 The issue of adaptation came to the discourse only from the 6th COP onward after the IPCC reports revealed that the underdeveloped countries would be the imminent and foremost victims of climate change, as detailed elsewhere in this work. The least developed countries suffer from a lack of information power. In addition, lack of procedural and domestic capabilities, the deficit in negotiating and language skills, as well as technical and legal knowledge and hollow negotiating mandate, terribly constrain less developed countries, particularly the LDCs. In such a situation, they make general and rhetoric remarks and become vulnerable to horse-trading, side-payments, and issue linkages (Gupta 2000, p. 58). These facts had been most palpable in the initial stages of the negotiations. Nevertheless, once they had learned about the imminent danger, revealed in the IPCC reports, they also regrouped to flag their issues by using sentimental framing terms. Their concerted efforts led to deadlocks and resulted in the creation of new Funds like LDCF, SCCF, and AF, as 10

See ENB reports Nos Vol. 12 No. 96, p.1, No. 123, p. 15 and discussion on this in Chap. 5.

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well as a new institute for running these Funds. Although these actors did not have much material power, their moral grounds engendered profound normative imperatives which facilitated enhancing their normative power. The normative imperatives generated through their emotional framing terms could not have been possible to be evaded by the developed countries. The attempts of the developed countries to designate the ODA given by them be counted as climate finance too had been challenged in unison by the least developed countries. The current wealth disparity among the countries has not appeared out of the blue. Some countries had either exploited the resources through colonization or exploited the labor of the other countries, or it has been acquired through imbalanced trade. Considering these, the decision on ODA had been made long ago, in the 1970s, to inject some justice in this regard. None of the developed countries extended ODA as much as fixed by the United Nations (0.7% of their GDP), and whatever amount was given (usually negligible percent of the fixed amount) had been mostly used in line with the national interests of the respective donor country. Yet this ODA had been tried by the developed countries to label as a part of climate finance. The least developed countries had solid reasons to resist this attempt, and their framing efforts in this regard generated genuine appeal. The final consensus was reached to keep the climate finance and ODA distinct, albeit the outcome just remained notional at the implementation stage. The developing countries could not persuade the developed countries to agree to allocate a certain percentage of their GDP for climate finance. If donors simply do not donate, what can the recipient countries do? They can actually do nothing except bear the cost by themselves. That is what is actually happening now.11 As a result of the normative imperatives consolidated over the time, the demand of the lesser States could attain de jure traction, though the powerful (donor) countries ultimately made those de facto unattainable. Funding for the adaptation projects of the vulnerable countries had acquired a strong ground through the constant framing efforts of the the less developed countries. They fought hard to ensure the parity between the adaptation and mitigation finance. It was also supported by the emerging countries. The pressure could not be evaded and was accommodated with the notion of 50:50 finance policy for adaptation and mitigation. The above principle of equality between mitigation and adaptation funding mentioned in the Paris Agreement just remained notional so far. As discussed in the previous chapter, the focus has been subtly diverted towards mitigation issues. The source of money, how much will be contributed by whom, etc., has been kept vague. The developed countries did not agree to earmark any concrete percentage of their share. The “hope” is mainly that the private sectors would come up to contribute for the Funds, but that fund would generally go for their business purpose. The ultimate, if not the only, objective of the private sector is to do business. It is already clear that the affected countries would have to bear the lion’s share of the cost

11

See “We are not waiting for Money,” Sallemul Huq, 15 March 2018; available at http://blog.hel vetas.org/climateinterview/, accessed on 26 March 2018.

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needed for their adaptation12 ; for the little assistance they would receive, they have been dragged to voluntary mitigations for sustainable development. This reflects that though framing efforts of the less powerful actors could secure to adopt a policy, at the implementation stages these appeared unavailing. The complicacy with regard to excluding the least developed countries from mitigation actions is that even though they are not responsible for climate change, they are vulnerable, and their emission is minimal, if they are left out for free emission, it will affect the comparative advantage vis-à-vis their peers, particularly those who are competing with them in certain sectors. In this complicated situation, there was not much room too for skipping the vulnerable countries entirely. The vulnerable countries thus had to heed the normative imperatives by agreeing to contribute for mitigation voluntarily. They could not achieve much due to a deficiency in their holistic power. Although they had strong ethical grounds, the vulnerable countries profoundly lacked material power and soft power. Simple support of other States without having soft or material power is too minimal to attain a favorable outcome because the holistic power turns out to be meager. Those actors who have more holistic power shaped the outcome in a way that is more suitable for them.

7.4 Consistency Check by Applying Mill’s Method of Difference Consistency of the arguments made and conclusions drawn in the previous sections is checked in this section using Mill’s (1843) method of difference. While the historical mapping and process tracing explained the mechanism, Mill’s method helps us to see the simple co-variation between the cause and effect. The consistency is checked by contrasting the outcomes through developing a cause-effect matrix applying Mill’s method vis-à-vis the causal mechanism that was traced in the previous chapters. A truth table is developed below using the method.13 In the truth table, “Y” signifies strong support, “y” weak support, “N” strong opposition, and “n” weak opposition. In the outcome, “0” represents the failure of the frame, and “1” represents success (Tables 7.2 and 7.3). On the issue of mitigation, the truth table leads us towards an impression that more or less matches with the fates of the frames discerned in the case studies made in Chaps. 4, 5, and 6. On the one hand, the final institutional forms of the frames in the Paris Agreement emphasize the leadership of the developed countries; the registry mechanism; the global stocktake and the ratcheting mechanism thereof 12

Ibid. with slight modification. Instead of Mill’s proposition of simple YES (Y) or NO (N), considering the complexity here, weak support is taken as (y) and weak opposition as (n). The result shows that the presence of n or N resulted in 0, whereas the presence of y could still result in 1. This means that any kind of direct opposition results in failure in such negotiations, and weak support can still facilitate an outcome but may weaken the phrasing.

13

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Table 7.2 Analysis of the outcome using Mill’s method of difference: mitigation issues Frames

The USA/UMBRELLA countries

China

EU

Other basic countries

AOSIS/LDCs vulnerable countries

Outcome

Lead by developed countries

y

Y

Y

Y

Y

1

KP

N

Y

Y

Y

Y

0

BAP

n

Y

y

Y

Y

0

All-inclusive reduction of GHG

Y

N

Y

N

Y

0

Registry

Y

y

Y

y

Y

1

NAMA

Y

Y

y

Y

y

1

Financial Support for NAMA

n

Y

y

Y

Y

0

Bottom-up

Y

Y

y

Y

y

1

MRV

Y

y

Y

y

Y

1

Financial and Technological Support

n

Y

y

Y

Y

0

(probably the most vital innovation); a bottom-up approach for mitigation; and the half-heartedly adopted MRV, implementation of which would be basically by means of “naming and shaming.” On the other hand, the frames like annex-based mitigation as per KP, two-track mitigation as per BAP, all-inclusive mitigation efforts, financial and technological support for developing countries regarding mitigation, etc., did not sustain or insignificantly survived because of the opposition of the powerful countries from either of the camps. In the case of funding mechanism and adaptation funding, the weak support (n) of major players like the actors of the UMBRELLA group and the EU speaks for the little prospect of the Funds like LDCF, SCCF, AF, and AFB. The GCF primarily stands for the mitigation purpose and funding for it so far remained unfulfilled. They have sustained in the final Agreement but insignificantly. In comparison, the replenishment of NC had been always a successful framing term in the COPs because it had generally acquired the support of all the parties. The issues like permanent status for the GEF and Means of Implementation (MOI) for mitigation could not hold ground because of disagreement by major players from either of the camps. The resolute opposition by the less developed countries in general successfully resisted the efforts of the developed countries to impose the ODA be counted as part of climate finance. Though, the vulnerability index was a brilliant idea but could not sustain due to opposition by most of the actors.

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Table 7.3 Analysis of the outcome using Mill’s method of difference: issues with regard to funding mechanism and adaptation funding Frames

The USA/its group (UMBRELLA)

China/its group (BASIC)

EU

Most of the other big powers

AOSIS/Vulnerable countries

Outcome

GEF status as a Y permanent entity

N

Y

N

y

0

NC

Y

Y

Y

Y

Y

1

LDCF

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

SCCF

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

AF

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

AFB

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

GCF

y

Y

Y

Y

Y

1

Parity between mitigation and adaptation

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

MOI

N

Y

n

Y

Y

0

ODA to be Y counted as part of the finance

N

y

N

N

0

New and additional funding

y

Y

y

Y

Y

1

Vulnerability Index

N

y

y

y

y

0

In general, though most of the frames appear to sustain in the case of the funding mechanism and policy, their phrasing remained anemic because of the weak support (n) of the powerful developed countries. The above truth tables, however, also misleads us to a conclusion that it was the USA whose role was the defining factor for the outcomes. The careful, in-depth qualitative analysis undertaken in the previous three chapters helps to overcome this. The empirical studies revealed that the disagreement of any of the superpowers referred to above resulted in a stalemate. The overwhelming material power of the USA and its group, in conjunction with support from its ally, the EU, could not bend the emerging powers to agree with their frame of all-inclusive mitigation, but the emerging powers could also not sustain the normative pressure and had to yield ultimately to frames like “registry”, “bottom-up”, “MRV”, etc. The texts of the final Paris Agreement do not simply represent the material power-based phrases but more holistic ones which were fostered by the normative imperatives concerning the issues. Similarly, normative power comprising soft power and support of the other actors alone could not yield a concrete outcome either. As, for example, the idealistic

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and most appealing frames of the weak parties of the AOSIS/vulnerable countries witnessed nominal attainment due to the lack of material power. In sum, the above two-pronged analyses are consistent with the claim that it is the power that is holistic in nature that crucially determined the fates of the crucially contested frames. The conclusion section below summarizes the findings of this chapter.

7.5 Conclusion As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the framing concept, though could explain how the issues had evolved and reached their current state, it could not offer a clue why only some of the crucially contested frames succeeded while others failed. While the mechanism of the evolution of the frames has generally been congruent with the assumption of connective dots posited in the third chapter, the first hypothesis developed regarding the framing process appeared to be only partially valid for all the three cases studied under this work. It was not always the fact that only those frames that had been framed with intense salience could succeed—many of them could not. The framing process has proved to be sine-qua-non for the sustenance of the frames, but it could not offer a clue as to why only certain frames prevailed while others did not. This puzzle is addressed in this chapter. The conclusion it arrives is that in the case of the crucially contested frames, the power of the actors played decisive parts in determining their fates, but that power was holistic in nature. For this, this chapter has adopted a two-pronged plausibility probe. First, the charts and diagrams generated by using the conjectures, formulas, and data of the holistic theoretical proposition were contrasted vis-à-vis the evidences that appeared from the three empirical studies enshrined in Chaps. 5, 6, and this chapter. A qualitative analysis was made out of this contrast and the conjectures of the HTP. Second, a consistency check was conducted by using Mill’s logics of difference, identifying the prominent frames and their fates that were detected from the empirical studies made in those chapters. The holistic theoretical proposition was developed much ahead of the case studies conducted here. The plausibility of the proposition has been examined in this chapter and, at the same time, it helped to fill the remaining gap of the research question as to why only certain framing terms succeeded while others failed. The insights from this work also offer a renewed understanding of the archetype of change that happens in the contemporary world. It is not that the major powers have today learned to pursue their ambition differently than the historical tradition. It is not that non-western juggernauts have inherently got a different trend, it is partially but not entirely due to the complex interdependence (compare Holslag and Geeraerts 2011, p. 1) in the current world, but it is because of the fact that the structure of the international system today has reached to a state in which the great powers have to act

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differently where issue-specific holistic power is a more effective tool in determining the outcomes from their interactions.14 The normative power variable of holistic power bears an innate force to push the global institution-building process towards betterment. It has appeared true for the climate issue and may appear so too with regard to other such regimes concerning global collective commons. The normative power variable also embodies some implications for justice and morality. Both the indicators of the normative power substantially depend on global public sentiment towards righteousness. It depends on the support of the other countries that are less powerful, thus injects some kind of democratic power into it. A Simple material power-based outcome would have meant that it would only reinforce the tyranny of might. The holistic power-based outcome facilitates gradual progression of the global system towards betterment, towards more equity, and justice. Given the complexity most of the similar works seem to have bypassed investigating why certain outcomes prevail in such a global process. This work may inspire the students of IR to engage in such ventures in the future. The holistic theoretical proposition can serve as an effective foundation for such endeavors. More similar works can facilitate enriching the methodology of the inquiries. Some more rigorous quantitative analysis may be employed in future works, and it is recommended. While referring to the fact that most of the previous works evaded the why question, it is also necessary to acknowledge that the issues studied here are very complicated to answer the why part of the question. Though before sailing the project, the ambition was to make a firm claim on the research findings, we remain humble to make a modest claim about findings on the why part of the question. It has been tried from different angles and thoughts but couldn’t be agreed more that this sort of modest claim might only be possible from such complicated works. Though the claim is modest, the approach taken here is valuable because, from this work, we convincingly and comprehensively understand the problem, developments, underlying logic, and the deterring factors that determine outcomes on crucially important issues concerning global collective commons in the contemporary world.

Works Cited Dimitrov, Radoslav S. 2010. Inside UN climate change negotiations: The Copenhagen conference. Review of Policy Research 27 (6): 795–821. Fridahl, Mathias, and Björn-Ola Linnér. 2016. Perspectives on the Green Climate Fund: Possible compromises on capitalization and balanced allocation. Climate and Development 8 (2): 105–109. 14

Zakaria (2008) notes that in the past when countries grew, they wanted to overturn the existing order, but since the rise of Japan and Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, none have done this; instead, they preferred to get rich within the system. This disjuncture from the historical path requires reconsidering the contemporary context afresh. Since the States operate their strategies within existing order, the normative imperatives of the system dictate the way forward.

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Gupta, Joyeeta. 2000. On behalf of my delegation,...: a survival guide for developing country climate negotiators. Washington, WA, US: Centre for Sustainable Development for Americas. Holslag, J., & Geeraerts, G. 2011. Discussion paper: Will China redefine great power politics? BICCS, Oktober 5, pp. 1–13. http://www.vub.ac.be/biccs/site/assets/files/Events/Discussion% 20paper.pdf. Jordan, Andrew, et al. 2012. Understanding the paradoxes of multilevel governing: Climate change policy in the European Union. Global Environmental Politics 12 (2): 43–66. Krasner, Stephen. 1983. Regimes and the limits of realism. In International regimes, ed. Stephen Krasner, 355–368. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Mill, John Stuart. 1843. (publ. 2002) A system of logic ratiocinative and inductive. Hawaii: University Press of the Pacific. Moore, Frances C. 2012. Negotiating adaptation: Norm selection and hybridization in international climate negotiations. Global Environmental Politics 12 (4): 30–48. Pavese, Carolina B., and Diarmuid Torney. 2012. The contribution of the European Union to global climate change governance: explaining the conditions for EU actorness. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55.SPE: 125–143. Schalatek, Liane, Smita Nakhooda, and Neil Bird. 2015. The Green Climate Fund. Overseas Development Institute and Heinrich Böll Stiftung North America. https://us.boell.org/sites/default/files/ uploads/2015/11/cff11_2015_gcf.pdf. Accessed 2 May 2018. Viola, Eduardo, Matias Franchini, and Thaís Lemos Ribeiro. 2012. Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: The role of major powers. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55.SPE: 9–29. Zakaria, Fareed. 2008. The future of American power: How America can survive the rise of the rest. Foreign Affairs 87: 18–43.

Chapter 8

Conclusion

This work has elaborated how the major political actors acted on a major political issue of the time, how they have developed new institutional imperatives, and why only certain angles of actors’ endeavors got the traction while the others failed. It has extracted the concept of framing, which is extensively used in the media and communication domain but has been so far rarely applied for similar cases on global collective commons. On the way, the work has identified actors’ logics, mental schemata, and positions on the issues studied, developed historical mapping to identify how the issues evolved, and discerned a typical process of evolution of the action frames that generate normative imperatives. It has developed a distinct model to this effect. Other researchers have the option to replicate this model for future works on similar cases on global collective commons. Finally, it has shown how the holistic theoretical proposition, developed at the beginning of the journey, is the best suitable lens to explain the puzzle as to why only certain angles of new imperatives emerge and that the holistic property of power is the most effective tool for explaining the outcomes emanating from a global multilateral negotiation process in the contemporary world. The entire work has two distinct strands, and ultimately the two strands met one objective to find out a comprehensive answer as to how the issues evolved and why only certain frames succeeded. In order to avoid possible confusion, it is necessary to succinctly clarify here the concrete claims this work makes and what it does not claim because these bear the risk of being misconceived. They are elaborated below. First, the holistic theoretical proposition clarifies its ontology that the color and contour of anarchy in the international level today has altered due to the normative imperatives of the time (normative imperative is defined in the respective place). The normative imperatives may be opaque but is an effective force that dilutes the perils of anarchy and compels the States to behave in a certain way; thus, the States can no longer act based solely on their military or material power. However, it has not been claimed that the ever-present prospect of conflict has disappeared altogether today; instead, the proposition states that the conflict has taken a new form under © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 M. N. I. Sorkar, Power and Issue Framing in the Contemporary World, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-9740-1_8

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8 Conclusion

the contemporary normative imperatives and power of the actors that determine the relationships among the States has become holistic, issue-specific and contrived by the imperatives. Second, it has contrasted the holistic theoretical proposition vis-à-vis major theories. Along the path, it has made a critical review of the grand theories; however, it remained focused on its objective, i.e., to gauge actor’s power, so that the discussion does not engage in the other aspects, which are very broad and endless. After clarifying the ontology of the proposition, it concentrated on the concept of power in the context of the contemporary world. The proposition ascribes equal values for the two variables of power, material and normative, but does not claim that this principle of equal values is like a biblical canon that claims cent percent validity. It identifies the indicators to calculate the material, normative and holistic power but does not claim that the selections are cent percent definitive; rather posits that they are just indicative. The above two points are of utmost importance to keep in mind because readers may misperceive that the proposition has argued in those lines. It has been discussed in the respective place that making the above claims are not feasible, and that this proposition has not ventured toward this end. The concrete claims of the proposition were summarized at the end of Sect. 2.2. Third, the scholars may question the selection of the eight great powers in the Seventh chapter in the domain of climate politics. However, the selection of the great power was not an output of this work; it has been adopted from the works of Viola et al. (2012). Their work appeared to be persuasive, so the selection of the powers was opted as they posited. This work should not be given any credit or discredit to this effect but, the author is convinced that the selection serves for the rough assumption about great powers that this work required. Fourth, the case studies conducted in this work may be misperceived as expert works on the issues of mitigation, adaptation, and funding mechanism, but they are not necessarily so. The objective of this work is not to make technical enquiries on the issues of mitigation, adaptation, or funding mechanism but how these issues were framed up, why they were framed up in a particular line, and why only certain frames succeeded. It is essentially and primarily about the framing process in the negotiation table, and the role of power in it is explained in light of IR theoretical insights. The climate change issues like mitigation, adaptation, and funding mechanism were studied here to find the evidences for the operationalization of the hypothesis on the why part of the research question. It has extrapolated the conceptual tools from framing literature that has been rarely used for a multilateral negotiation process and developed its own analytical model, which may be replicable for similar cases. Fifth, the conjectures derived from the holistic theoretical proposition are not idealistic beliefs, rather they are outcomes of systematic scientific quest and related literature in this regard was duly reviewed. The claim that the holistic property of power is more relevant in the contemporary world and is bound to foster comparative betterment of human society is proven through scientific analysis. The normative imperatives and the values of support of other States are the factors within the holistic power that would facilitate such progress. The works done here do not

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claim or prophase as to what should be the motive of the States to reap maximum benefit from today’s interstate interactions, but from the findings of this book, the policymakers may automatically realize that the best way to harness maximum selfinterest is to appreciate this holistic nature of power in the contemporary world and act accordingly. This realization is destined to usher in the continued betterment of global institutions for the progress of humanity. Following the above clarifications, we would turn below to the concluding remarks on the whole work. This work has two distinct research thirst. They are—how the issues were framed up and why only certain crucially contested frames succeeded. If we asked the question only about why certain frames succeeded, we would not have had a clear idea as to which are the frames succeeded and what were the circumstances of their developments. If we asked only how the issues evolved, it could make sense of good research, like the three empirical cases of this work do, but it would not have led to a complete understanding of the issue, i.e., why did only some crucially contested frames succeed while others did not. In this perspective, the two questions of this work actually led to one objective. It was more onerous but comprehensive. It is true that if we delved with only one part of the question, the issues could be analyzed more in-depth, but we cannot expect everything at the same time. It was felt that striving to find a comprehensive answer would be better than to explore either of the answers in more detail with a partial understanding of the whole problem. In natural science, the research findings are concrete; scientists investigate if a theory and formulae thereof (if any) perfectly yield the outcome it predicts. However, social science is a chaotic world; such concrete confirmation is simply not possible here. Though chaotic, our objective is to find the most plausible, conceivable, and concise explanatory tools in social and political science. The objective of IR research is to develop or refine such tools as much as possible. The claim of this work is that it has developed such a tool to illustrate the process of framing in a more articulated way and to explain why some crucially contested frames succeed while others did not. The findings using the concept of framing identified the crucially contested frames and their fates, consistency of which was again checked by applying Mill’s logic of difference. The empirical studies extracted evidences regarding the fates of the frames and the actors behind them. A matrix on the actor’s power vis-à-vis the fates of the frames was developed out of this. The outputs from this matrix were then examined by applying the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition. The plausibility of our conclusion was strengthened as the findings from these two distinct approaches appeared consistent. I have traveled, lived, and mingled with people from more than fifty countries of the world. I have seen how their mental schemata are divided, remain rigid and contingent. How do people commit suicidal attacks? Why do people go to fight in wars? Why do people devote their life to religion and other such idealistic reasons? These are products of framing that shape their mental schemata. The positions the negotiators took at the COP negotiation tables are sophisticated, refined, diplomatic versions of their mental schemata; they contain and represent their society, polity, and State. The political and social world is chaotic so is the framing process. The

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empirical studies of this work have shown that the concept of framing can be an effective tool to minimize the difficulties in explaining this complexity, discern the trend, unravel the phenomenon as to how issues are framed up in this messy world. There exist many works in the domain of communications and media research that applied the concept of framing, but there is not much in the field of international negotiations. The outcomes from the empirical works using the concept were applied for our ultimate goal, i.e., to examine the conjectures of the holistic theoretical proposition. The journey has yielded a novel, thought-provoking, and plausible explanation and claims to have made some theoretical contributions, but there is no end of refinement. When I look back to this work, I always feel that there remains something more that I understand but have not yet delivered to my entire satisfaction. Tang (2011), in his general theory of institutional change, made an analogy with the biological world comparing ideas for a particular institutional arrangement as “gene” and the institutional arrangement as the “phenotype.” Just like a mutation in the gene causes changes in the physical stature of the animal body, the change of ideas does the same for the institutions. Following the findings of this work, we can also posit a similar analogy by equating the primordial “mental schemata” of the actors as “gene,” which dictated the rhetoric framing process of the parties and yielded the “phenotypes” (action frames). In the empirical studies, the “genes” (mental schemata) have been found to retain their originality through the fabric of the “phenotypes” (action frames) that have occasionally changed with some “mutations.“ It has been found that a similar trend was followed across the issues, which indicates that a similar model may be replicable if we study other issues concerning environmental politics or any other relevant issues that concern multilateral negotiation process and global collective commons. Addressing the “why” part of the question proved to be the most daunting task. However, we need to keep in mind that in political science, we only strive to find the most plausible explanation of the question. It can be claimed that, by adopting a holistic theoretical approach, which is largely aligned to the constructivist school, this work was able to make a more plausible attempt to answer the “why” question. In that case, this work would claim a small contribution in the general theory building on IR that it has discerned a distinct and productive tool, aligned in the constructivist school, i.e., the holistic nature of power is the most effective means for explaining the outcomes emanating from a global multilateral negotiation process in the contemporary world. We have argued in the theoretical proposition in the second chapter that the theories have to be befitting for respective epochs, and theories need to be continuously refined as per the contexts for the epoch concerned. If we look more carefully today, it is crystal clear that the world which political philosopher Hobbes not very long ago found as a place of wild savagery and brutish one has remarkably transformed; norms of slavery, colonialism, etc., have transmuted gradually toward betterment. If material power and ill motives were the dominating driving force, we should not have seen such signs of progress. The development of human society can both be affected by the good and bad intended political motives, but there must be some innate force that aggregately pushes the human societies toward betterment; otherwise, we should not

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have seen such progress. The holistic theoretical proposition unearthed that secret and made an explanation as to why this progressive betterment of human society is destined to happen. The holistic theoretical proposition clearly states that sole material power does retain little instrumentality in the contemporary world. Three individual studies in this book also found and established that sole material power is impotent to determine the fates of the crucially contested frames. It has been explained how logics, perceptions, ideas, etc., played vital roles in framing up the issues. The difficulty was how to incorporate them. The normative power variable of the holistic theoretical proposition made in the second chapter incorporated the indicators, which in a way embodies these aspects. As elaborated in the second chapter, most of the realist theories posit a static and grim picture of the international politics viz. distribution of material power or a hegemonic actor determine the outcome, without offering any clue as to how changes happen in the system whereas changes are happening in the system consistently. Among realist scholars, Robert Gilpin (1983) proposed an explanation that in the course of their development, some countries acquire better competitive edge and skill which increase their economic power that later translates into their military might and, thus, a change in the system occurs. In the why part of the exercise made in Chap. 7, we have found a correlation as to how the material power of a State changes. It has been found that economies of the States in the current world changed in parallel with their energy consumptions (the primary source of energy until now is unfortunately through the emission of carbon gas) and change in economic fortune was the key mover for the changing scenario of the material power because other factors are more or less static. This leads to a direct indication that the change in material power of a State is mainly related to its emission of GHG (until the time of the work done in the year 2018, meanwhile green revolution has been occurring, and in some sectors, the cost-effectiveness of the renewable energy is getting parity with fossil-fuel-generated energy. It may so happen in the future that the correlation would not depend on emission but still on energy consumption). The expansion of this material power is now under the watch of the normative imperatives of the Paris Agreement. Another important aspect of the normative imperatives of the Paris Agreement is that it has yielded a new form of institutional mechanism, which is more equitable and less dominated by a single country or group of countries, as it had been in the earlier cases like the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization (WTO), etc. This signifies that, although it is still power that determines the outcome, the crude nature of power is gradually becoming more civil, equitable, and holistic in the contemporary world. Would the similar normative imperative as mentioned in the above paragraph be applicable for other cases like contested issues under the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Where are such rationales? In fact, there are plenty of such possibilities. Three case studies of this book illustrated how intensely the parties framed up the issues. The same would appear for other cases too. Take the example of WTO. For a long time, the logic of free trade had been a sacrosanct normative imperative with

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regard to global trade for which WTO served the role of organizational management. It is certain that the parties framed up their issues within the confines of that normative imperative. The issues framed up in the process of the negotiations for free trade regime may be possible to explain in the same way as we have done here. Similar studies may also be possible to conduct on other issue-based political developments under the United Nations and its subsidiaries. In this sense, the concept of framing and the methodology adopted in this book may serve as an ideal tool to illustrate the developments under such regimes. The application of the holistic theoretical proposition and the methodology this study innovated may also be applicable to find answers as to why only certain frames prevailed over the others in case of those issues too.

Works Cited Gilpin, Robert. 1983. War and change in world politics. Cambridge University Press. Tang, Shiping. 2011. Reconciliation and the remaking of anarchy. World Politics 63 (4): 711–749. Viola, Eduardo, Matias Franchini, and Thaís Lemos Ribeiro. 2012. Climate governance in an international system under conservative hegemony: The role of major powers. Revista Brasileira de Política Internacional 55.SPE: 9–29.