How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective (Contributions to International Relations) 9811661898, 9789811661891

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Contributions to International Relations

Li Sheng

How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective

Contributions to International Relations

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas of international relations. Contributions to International Relations (CIR) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as IR-theory, international security studies, foreign policy, peace and conflict studies, international organization, global governance, international political economy, the history of international relations, and related fields.

More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/16658

Li Sheng

How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective

Li Sheng Faculty of Social Science University of Macau Macao, China

ISSN 2731-5061 ISSN 2731-507X (electronic) Contributions to International Relations ISBN 978-981-16-6189-1 ISBN 978-981-16-6190-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Preface

In the history of humankind, epidemics often play a transformational role when interacting with politics and the economy. The earliest recorded pandemic, the Plague of Athens, spread from Ethiopia to the city-states of Ancient Greece in the second year of the Peloponnesian War, killing thousands of people and taking the achievable victory from Athenians. Ultimately, this plague witnessed the doom of Athenian democracy and the rise of Spartan hegemony according to a report by Thucydides.1 In the realist discourse, the story of the Peloponnesian War is usually interpreted as the result of a power transition, while coincidences, such as the plague, are usually regarded as having a transformative effect on the result; similar scenes have replayed repeatedly throughout history with the Plague of Cyprian shrinking the boundaries of the Byzantine Empire and yellow fever altering the French expansion plan during the Napoleonic Age.2 In the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic, the same story seems to be playing out under US-China tension and the discussion of the Thucydides Trap. Are China and the United States inevitably headed for war? It is difficult to draw a conclusion purely according to lessons from the Peloponnesian War. However, this history reveals the role of epidemics during an era of great change. This book discusses the role of the COVID-19 pandemic in this transformational era and compares the different reactions of different international organizations to this unexpected coronavirus pandemic. First, in Chap. 1 “Unprecedented Times: The COVID-19 Pandemic that Swept the World”, the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic is chronicled. We underscore the impact of the epidemic on international relations, the uncertainty of globalization, and the process of regionalization. We argue that due to discrepancies in different political systems, different countries adopt different countermeasures in the face of similar governance crises. Therefore, this book specifically describes a series of countermeasures adopted by international organizations, regional organizations, and single states after the outbreak of COVID-19, including those that proved efficient and those that did not. 1

Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, Book 2. Drezner, D. W. (2020). The song remains the same: International relations after COVID-19. International Organization, 74(S1), E18–E35.

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Before the COVID-19 pandemic, battles between China and the United States had already begun in many fields, such as trade and technology, as a result of China’s rise.3 It is predicted that the current world order will decline from the unipolar hegemony of the United States to a game of great powers as a result of Donald Trump taking office in 2016.4 However, these problems were exposed earlier than those noted by Mearsheimer (2019).5 On the one hand, hyperglobalization by the United States’ hegemony caused a series of issues inside liberal democracies, accelerated the development of China as an emerging great power and helped Russia reestablish itself, which put an end to the unipolarity of the United States. On the other hand, the United States and its allies are very fascinated by liberal crusades that endeavored to create a peaceful regime change in China for a long time, which consequently aroused resistance. Interweaved with the issues of national interests and ideologies, the battles between China and the United States have become increasingly fierce in recent years.6 Henry Kissinger even warned that China and the United States were in the foothill of the Cold War on the eve of the pandemic.7 Moreover, the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic further intensified the bilateral relationship between China and the United States. Since the early stage of the pandemic, the dispute between China and the United States constantly escalated from topics, such as the origins of the coronavirus, to ideological issues breeding theories of a new Cold War. John Hemmings believes that the discourse between China and the United States exposes the gap in values and ideologies between the two great powers and that the ChinaUS ideological differences will increase and escalate their race in advancing better models.8 Additionally, the pandemic could potentially reshape the balance of material and soft power between China and the United States and exacerbate their competition for influence.9 Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, signs of the United States’ decline became even more obvious. The COVID-19 pandemic is regarded as the “Suez Moment” of the United States.10 This expression refers to the 1956 Suez crisis, which symbolized 3 Sheng, L. (2016) Explaining US-China Economic Imbalances: A Social Perspective. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 29(3), 1097–1111. 4 Drezner, D. W. (2020). Immature leadership: Donald Trump and the American presidency. International Affairs, 96(2), 383–400. 5 Mearsheimer, J. J. (2019). Bound to fail: The rise and fall of the liberal international order. International security, 43(4), 7–50. 6 Sheng, L., & do Nascimento, D. F. (2021). Geopolitics in the Trade War. In Love and Trade War (pp. 99–128). London: Palgrave Macmillan. 7 Bloomberg. (2019). Kissinger Says U.S. and China in ‘Foothills of a Cold War’. https://www.blo omberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-21/kissinger-says-u-s-and-china-in-foothills-of-a-cold-war. 8 Hemmings, J. (2020). The COVID-19 Crisis and the Coming Cold War. Daniel K. Inouye AsiaPacific Center for Security Studies. 9 Kahl, Colin, & Ariana Berengaut. (2020, April 10). Aftershocks: The Coronavirus Pandemic and the New World Disorder. War on the Rocks. 10 Kurt M. Campbell, & Rush Doshi. (2020, March 18). The Coronavirus Could Reshape Global Order China Is Maneuvering for International Leadership as the United States Falters. Foreign Affairs.

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the ultimate decay of the UK as a global power.11 This decline is due not only to its domestic disarray on pandemic management but also the contrast with China’s efficiency after the early period. Moreover, the consequences of mismanagement in the United States are more far reaching. Internally, the coronavirus is “jeopardizing the domestic foundation of US hegemony—a population free from existential threats”. Externally, global hegemony has failed in both public bad prevention and public goods provision. Consequently, interdependent liberal democracies are hit hard.12 In this circumstance, a comparison between democracy and authoritarianism is applied to determine the best solutions for coping with the pandemic. Accordingly, this book first analyzes the power transition based on the contrast in the pandemic response between the two powers in Chap. 2, “The Acceleration of the Global Power Transition: From West to East”. Chapter 3, “Comparison Between Authoritarian and Democratic Countries in the Pandemic Era”, further discusses the differences between authoritarianism and democracies and the issue of democracy erosion. This chapter considers both authoritarian and democratic countries, such as China and the United States, respectively, and shows that different forms of government lead to different responses to the pandemic. We also discuss the debate regarding which form of government prevailed during the pandemic. Considering these situations, we will discuss which type of regime, democracy or authoritarianism, is best suited to address the threats posed. The validity of authoritarianism in the fight against COVID-19 could potentially lead to an erosion of democracy, which is something all states should consider in the post-COVID era. In addition to the performances of states, especially great powers, nonstate actors such as international organizations are worthy of attention under such an unprecedented global crisis. However, most of the organizations were silent and even dysfunctional throughout the pandemic, while the whole world badly desires strong multilateral frameworks to facilitate cooperation in combating the coronavirus. In this case, the COVID-19 pandemic exposes the defects of current international organizations and multilateral regimes marking the second phase of globalization, where free trade and global cooperation have decreased while nationalism and geopolitical rivalry have risen.13 As seen in the pandemic, the performance of major international organizations is undesirable in terms of their emergency response. Therefore, this book analyzes this phenomenon in chapter four and chapter five from global and regional perspectives. On the one hand, challenged by the unilateralism of Donald Trump, China-US tension and the evolving world structure, postwar multilateral organizations, such as the UN, the WHO, and the WTO, are deeply struggling with 11

The new nationalist government of Gamal Nasser of Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal, which was run by Great Britain and was a critical lifeline for shipping from Europe to Asia. As a result, Britain, France, and Israel invaded Egypt to take back the Canal. In a huge humiliation, the United States forced the three countries to withdraw their forces. Their defeat symbolized the end of Great Britain and France as great, global powers. 12 Norrlöf, C. (2020). Is COVID-19 the end of US hegemony? Public bads, leadership failures and monetary hegemony.International Affairs, 96(5), 1281–1303. 13 Robert D. Kaplan. (2020, March 20). Coronavirus Ushers in the Globalization We Were Afraid Of. Bloomberg.

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financial issues and the upcoming polycentric world.14 Accordingly, Chap. 4, “Global International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence”, mainly focuses on the performance of the UN, the WHO, and the WTO in the fields of politics, health, and economy, respectively. On the other hand, with the game of great powers approaching, fragmentation will be inevitable in the future global governance under which regional arrangements will continue to proliferate and the strength of regionalism will greatly increase, especially in trade.15 Therefore, Chap. 5, “Regional International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence”, focuses on three regional organizations, i.e., the EU, NATO, and ASEAN. Macao, China

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Ostrom, E. (2010). Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global environmental change. Global environmental change, 20(4), 550–557. 15 Acharya, A. (2016). The future of global governance: Fragmentation may be inevitable and creative. Global Governance, 22(4), 453–460.

Contents

1 Unprecedented Times: The COVID-19 Pandemic that Swept the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 COVID-19: A Short Sketch of the Pandemic Through 2020 . . . . . . . 1.2 How the Pandemic Changed the World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 How State Actors and Nonstate Actors Reacted to the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 State Actors: Different Measures in Authoritarian and Democratic Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.2 Regional Cooperation: Will the EU Successfully Lead European Integration? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.3 International Cooperation: The Role of the WHO . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 The Acceleration of the Global Power Transition: From West to East . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 A Short Overview of Major Epidemics in a Historical Context . . . . 2.1.1 Plague of Athens (431–404 BC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 Plague of Justinian (541–549 AD) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 The Black Death (1347–1352) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.4 New World Smallpox Outbreak (1400s–1600s) . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.5 The Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Performances of China and the U.S. in the Battle Against COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 New “Suez Moment”: The Precipitous Loss of America’s Global Leadership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 China’s Challenge to a US-Led World Order in the Post Pandemic World . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 Easternization? A Global Power Shift from the West to the East . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 3 6 6 16 18 20 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 32 36 38 42 44

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3 Comparison Between Authoritarian and Democratic Countries in the Pandemic Era . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Crisis Management in Authoritarian States and Democratic States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 What Is Crisis Management? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 How the Relationship Between the Government and Civil Society Influences Crisis Management . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Human Security and the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Rethinking Human Security in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 The Relationship Between Human Security and Political Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Authoritarianism Versus Democracy: Which Is an Effective Remedy for the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 The Differences Between Authoritarian and Democratic Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Authoritarianism Pandemic and the Eclipse of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 The Likely Resilience of Democracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion: Which Regime Type Is More Effective? . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47 48 48 51 56 56 63 66 67 69 73 75 76

4 Global International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.1 The United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 4.1.1 The U.N.’s Challenge Under Trump’s Presidency . . . . . . . . . 84 4.1.2 Does the U.N. Lack a Coordinated Response to the Pandemic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86 4.1.3 U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Are Under Threat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 4.1.4 Calling for the Support for the U.N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 4.2 WHO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 4.2.1 The Fading Prestige of the WHO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 4.2.2 The Withdrawal of the U.S. from the WHO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 4.2.3 Do We Still Need the WHO? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 4.2.4 Will the COVAX Scheme from WHO Become Successful? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 4.3 WTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 4.3.1 WTO Is Threatened by the COVID-19 Pandemic . . . . . . . . . 97 4.3.2 WTO Is Threatened by Populist Nationalism . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 4.3.3 Could the WTO Deal with Trade Protectionism in the Post Pandemic Era? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 4.3.4 The Imperative of WTO Reforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

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5 Regional International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Europe Union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 Insufficient Coordination Among EU Members During the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 Crisis Thinking and Limitations Exposed When Measures Were Implemented . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 The Positive Role of NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 Epidemics and Internal Problems Faced by NATO . . . . . . . . 5.3 ASEAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Existing Shortcomings and Efforts by the ASEAN . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 The Causes of Adverse Effects and Future Focus . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

110 113 113 115 117 118 121 123

6 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 New Challenges Posed by COVID-19 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 COVID-19 and the New World Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

127 128 131 132

107 107 107

Chapter 1

Unprecedented Times: The COVID-19 Pandemic that Swept the World

1.1 COVID-19: A Short Sketch of the Pandemic Through 2020 The year 2020 was dominated by coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), and many countries worldwide are experiencing second or third waves of COVID-19 cases as the weather becomes colder during the winter of 2021. In such a circumstance, this book chronicles the pandemic evolvement in 2020 at the beginning. The COVID-19 virus was first reported in late December 2019 in Hubei Province in China, centered around the city of Wuhan, and soon became a pandemic affecting the entire world within months in 2020. While we are not 100% certain of how it originated, most medical specialists, including doctors at the World Health Organization (WHO) and the US and Chinese Centers for Disease Control (CDC), speculate that it probably began in a wildlife food market in Wuhan. On January 23, during the Lunar New Year holiday, the Chinese government ordered a very strict lockdown of Hubei Province, including Wuhan. However, by then, it was too late. Given the rapidity of the global transportation system, within weeks, most of the world reported confirmed cases. By January 30, the WHO designated the outbreak of novel coronavirus a worldwide public health emergency. Accordingly, China cordoned off entire countries and suspended many economic productions in a desperate attempt to halt the spread of the pandemic. With great efforts, the number of infections and deaths in China was successfully reduced by the end of March. However, the situation outside China worsened. By March 11, South Korea, Iran, and northern Italy became new hot zones. New York City also became the new epicenter of the pandemic, but during the eve of the outbreak, the U.S. president did little to prepare the country and the American people. Due to the incompetence of former President Donald Trump, his sheer inaction and lack of any national policy became a case in point of what not to do in a pandemic. The virus spread from cities in the northeast to cities throughout the country to rural areas and everywhere in the country by late summer. Hence, the U.S. was leading the world in the proportion of confirmed cases and fatalities by early April. Soon, by the end of April, the number of confirmed cases in the United States © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_1

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exceeded one million, accounting for approximately one-third of the total confirmed cases worldwide at that time. Subsequently, the pandemic further spread to Latin America, India, and South Africa. Currently, Europe is suffering a second wave of the pandemic with reports of a mutated virus. In the early spring, the COVID-19 virus hit Europe very hard. Within a few weeks, major tourist centers in Italy, Spain, and then France were in lockdown. Under this background, no country can preserve itself from the pandemic on its own. Despite vaccines and treatments, the pandemic is a global threat of staggering proportions. The virus has already infected much of the Earth. While almost no country was immune to the virus, several countries became epicenters, producing the world’s highest case numbers. The contributing factors included Presidents, particularly in Brazil and Mexico, who did not take the virus seriously, even mocked the disease and its deadliness, and refused to wear masks or practice basic social distancing; countries whose people are too poor to lockdown as was possible in Europe and the US; and a lack of PPEs (personal protective equipment), oxygen, ventilators, medications, and vaccinations. Additionally, we should be especially concerned that the virus hit Africa as millions will die because their health systems cannot address a sudden explosion of cases. Currently, there are approximately 100,000 cases throughout sub-Saharan Africa. Countries, such as South Africa, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, are already seriously impacted. Ten countries in Africa lack ventilators, which are crucial for treating this virus, preventing people from breathing. We are also concerned that there might be another large wave of cases in the fall in October and November. We have vaccines, yes. These vaccines were developed in record time. The previous record for a vaccine was the mumps vaccine, which took some four years to develop. Vaccines work. Most vaccines have 90% or better efficacy or effectiveness. Currently, several types of vaccines are being administered but are very simply not fast enough. For example, only 2% of India’s population has been vaccinated. Only 20% of Brazilians have been vaccinated. Most Europeans have not been vaccinated. While half or more of Americans, Brits, and Israelis have been vaccinated, they represent a small minority of the world’s 7 billion people. As the WHO stated, vaccinations divided the world into rich countries, which have vaccinations, and poor countries, which do not. The New York Times reported the following on May 5: “As of mid-April, wealthy countries have secured more than 87% of the more than 700 million doses of Covid-19 vaccines dispensed worldwide, while poor countries have received only 0.2%, according to the WHO”.1 For this disease to be wiped out, for the world to achieve herd immunity, rich countries must share with the poor. Again, we must consider that there are some 7.8 billion people worldwide. The New York Times article notes “Deep into the second year of the pandemic, the world is dividing along a powerful, and painful, line: Those who have vaccines and those who do not”.2

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Robbins and Goodman (2021, May 5). Turkewitz and Bengali (2021, June 2).

1.1 COVID-19: A Short Sketch of the Pandemic Through 2020

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The longer this pandemic lasts, the more dramatic changes will be.3 The demographics of new case numbers have also shifted dramatically. Throughout 2020, most new cases were in rich countries as follows: Europe had 30% of the cases, the US had 33% of the case, and the rest of the world had the other third. Currently, these values are very different as follows: the US declined to 6%, Europe declines to 15%, India rose to 43% and South America has 15%. The death toll has similarly shifted from 90% in rich countries one year ago in April 2020 to 20% today. Middle and poor countries, i.e., India, Brazil, and other South Asian and Latin American countries, have experienced most of the worldwide deaths. Governments that have authoritarian-minded, populist leaders who neglected the virus or were incompetent, such as US President Trump, Brazil President Bolsonaro, Mexican President Obrador, and Indian Prime Minister Modi, have caused millions of needless deaths through their policies or lack of policies.4

1.2 How the Pandemic Changed the World First, the novel coronavirus enhanced tensions among countries and between countries and intergovernmental organizations. Facing the uncontrolled spread of the virus, the U.S. did not choose to cooperate with other countries but raised a wave of self-protection of closing country’s borders, and developed strategies and methods to attack and discredit other countries. The U.S. did not immediately take active measures to prevent the spread of the pandemic during the eve of the large global outbreak of coronavirus. Instead, the U.S. accused the Chinese government of not effectively controlling and defending the disease, which caused the coronavirus to spread worldwide uncontrollably (Watts, 2020).5 Even though there is no clear evidence showing that Wuhan is the location where the virus originated, the Chinese government was sharply attacked by the U.S. because the first cluster was detected in Wuhan. Donald Trump even publicly called the novel coronavirus the “Chinese virus” many times (Chiu, 2020).6 Wang Yi, Chinese Foreign Minister, responded to Washington’s accusations by saying that those are “lies and conspiracy theories”. In response, the Chinese government proposed another possible explanation of the source of COVID-19 by stating that this virus originated from the United States and, was introduced by members of the American army who visited Wuhan for the Military World Games in October 2019. On January 20, the Chinese government argued that Fort Detrick, a military facility in America, should be investigated as a possible pandemic source (Mitchell, 2021).7 Obviously, the U.S. criticism of China

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See the special supplement, The Guardian (2020, December 12). Wintour (2020, April 11). 5 Watts (2020, April 13). 6 Chiu (2020, March 20). 7 Mitchell (2021, January 20). 4

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further strained US-China relations and resulted in open hostility (Myre, 2020).8 In addition to conflicts between great powers, the pandemic intensified underdeveloped countries’ antagonism to powerful states. Countries in Africa and Latin America complained that they lack medical equipment because the United States and European Union countries compete to acquire scarce medical supplies to combat the coronavirus (Bradley, 2020).9 Moreover, conflicts between countries and intergovernmental organizations also appeared. As one of the countries most affected by the outbreak of the pandemic, Italy accused the EU and its member states of being slow in providing aid to the country for the coronavirus epidemic (Boffey, 2020).10 Another example is that the U.S. accused the WHO of slow action of obtaining and sharing information when the pandemic emerged in China.11 On July 6, the U.S. sent a letter officially notifying the United Nations that it is leaving the World Health Organization, starting the formal process of withdrawal (Huang, 2020).12 The second change introduced by the pandemic was that it accelerated the reversal of globalization. Before the pandemic, a series of “black swan” incidents, such as the Brexit referendum and immigration control, aroused heated discussion regarding whether the trend of globalization reversed. America unilaterally withdrew from many multilateral agreements and international organizations. It has experienced a rise in social inequality associated with a decline in savings in recent years.13 By advocating his populist nationalism, Donald Trump directly attacked America’s allies and partners abroad and targeted liberal elites at home as “enemies of the people”, which threatened to undermine the existence of the US-led liberal world order (Löfflmann, 2019).14 The pandemic accelerated the reversal of globalization. During the pandemic, sentiment of nationalism and protectionism exceeded the aspiration of globalization. After the spread of COVID-19, barriers were established to stop the movement of people from other countries, and most countries also set restrictions on the trade of goods, greatly reduced international flights, and summoned people to return home. Countries’ economies laid prostrate, their economic progress will be reversed by decades; worldwide travel and trade largely ceased with repercussions rippling throughout societies and economies; and globalization, which has developed since 1980 at an accelerating pace, was reversed.15 The pandemic also made people rethink globalization. Obviously, globalization introduced not only greater benefits to human society but also more uncertainties.16 The basis of all parties’ arguments lies in not only how to respond to the national and industrial security issues caused by the coexistence of scattered and narrowly concentrated 8

Myre (2020, March 27). Bradley (2020, April 9). 10 Boffey (2020, March 11). 11 The Global Trade Alert Team (2020, May 4). 12 Huang (2020, May 30). 13 Sheng (2016). 14 Löfflmann (2019). 15 Boseley (2020, December 12). 16 Sheng, (2012). 9

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global industrial chains but also responding to the value and institutional conflicts involved (Khan & Faisal, 2020; Tooze, 2020).17 In the post pandemic world, the World Economic Forum recommended that companies “aggressively evaluate nearshore options to shorten supply chains”.18 Moreover, in April 2020, the World Trade Organization anticipated that worldwide trade would decline by approximately 32% in 2020, which was much more than that predicted in the fall.19 Developed countries have always been the most prominent camp in economic globalization. The past few decades have witnessed remarkable rates of technological progress and output growth in many developed countries.20 These countries dominate not only the international economic order but also international direct investment.21 In contrast, developing countries not only gain little through international trade but also take large risks.22 During the pandemic, weak countries suffered much loss compared with powerful countries. To date, some countries have already completed the development and production of vaccines. In China, free vaccinations for all people are underway as scientific researchers from all walks of life across the country worked together to overcome difficulties. However, it remains unknown if African countries can get enough vaccines for their people, as these countries are relatively less-developed, underdeveloped, and even poor in terms of the average development level worldwide. These countries lack funds, and the level of scientific research and quantity of materials represent difficulties in meeting the wave of epidemics that could sweep Africa in the event of a large-scale outbreak. Thus, vaccine shortages will continuously constrain the transportation, education, and trade abroad of people in underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, currently, the world enters an unknown new era of deglobalization, one that has affected international trade, politics, and international organization.23 Third, instead of international cooperation, regional cooperation and state solutions have become better ways to fight against the virus. Sovereign states have once again become the main actors in fighting the epidemic. Some scholars believe that after the COVID-19 epidemic, sovereign states will continue playing a leading role in the international community in the future, which could make sovereign states become the research focus of international relations again. Although this argument still needs time to be proven, globalization does seem to be undergoing reconstruction in practice, and regionalization may be a necessary detour toward a more rational economic globalization pattern (Hay, 2000).24 Regionalization is neither anti-globalization nor deglobalization nor did it initiate against the background of anti-globalization or

17

Khan and Faisal (2020), Tooze (2020). Betti and Hong (2020, February 27). 19 World Trade Organization (2020, April 8). 20 Sheng (2015a). 21 Sheng (2010). 22 Gu and Sheng (2010). 23 Sheng (2011). 24 Hay (2000). 18

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deglobalization. Therefore, economists proposed that the new era of “slowbalisation” characterized by regionalization has arrived (Kandil et al., 2020).25 In fact, regionalization can be considered a new pattern of international intraindustry division and intraproduct division, which is more complete and more reasonable based on the local market or regional market. Regionalization is not necessarily in the sense of geographical adjacency but can also be protocol-based regionalization beyond geographical space. Although the initiation of regionalization was not caused by the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic and was an ongoing trend of economic globalization that has been forming for many years, the epidemic seemed to accelerate its process (Wang & Sun, 2020).26 In conclusion, the pandemic has a great impact on international society and interstate relations. Significant reflection upon the existing system of international relations and more attention to global issues, such as crisis politics (Lipscy, 2020),27 border politics (Kenwick & Simmons, 2020),28 and health diplomacy (Fazal, 2020),29 are required. Diplomatic relations were also affected by tensions among medicine trade, transportation, diagnostic tests, and hospital equipment. In the following section, the efforts of single states, regional cooperation, and international cooperation to contain the spread and mutation of the virus are further discussed.

1.3 How State Actors and Nonstate Actors Reacted to the Pandemic 1.3.1 State Actors: Different Measures in Authoritarian and Democratic Countries During the outbreak of COVID-19, different countries adopted different countermeasures in the face of similar governance crises. These countermeasures vividly reflect the discrepancy among different systems and, in emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, show the superiority and uniqueness of the system for fighting an emergency, which in the COVID-19 case seems to expose the inherent defects of the governance theory with individual rights as its core value. i.

The scenario in China

First, we discuss China’s experience in responding to the sudden and unexpected public health security incident, which broke out in China at the end of 2019. As an 25

Kandil et al. (2020). Wang and Sun (2020). 27 Lipscy (2020). 28 Kenwick and Simmons (2020). 29 Fazal (2020). 26

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authoritarian regime, China is often criticized for its lack of freedom of speech and press, and critics often criticize some one-size-fits-all policies implemented in various aspects with obvious unity of collectivism. The country has observed a continuous drop in the labor income share of GDP and a considerable rise in income inequality.30 When the COVID-19 pandemic broke out, its measures, such as the urban blockade, compulsory isolation, and control of public media, were severely criticized (Enos, 2020).31 The COVID-19 virus emerged at the end of 2019 in Hubei Province in China, centered around the city of Wuhan. While the Chinese government is not 100% certain of how it originated, most medical specialists, including doctors at WHO and the US and the CDC, speculate that it probably began in a wildlife food market in Wuhan. The likely culprit was a bat whose droppings fell onto a mammal, possibly a Pangolin, which became infected and then was eaten by a human. As the virus is airborne, it spread throughout the city and then the province by mid-January 2020. On January 23, during the Lunar New Year holiday, the Chinese government ordered a very strict lockdown of Hubei Province, including Wuhan. However, by then, it was too late. Given the speed of the global transportation system, most of the world became infected with the virus within weeks. As of today, May 10, 2021, China, due to its initial very strict lockdowns and border closures, fared relatively well. As of the date of this writing, China has had a total of 102,613 cases and a death toll of some 4846. Hong Kong also faired very well, with almost 12,000 cases and 210 deaths. Macau performed exceptionally well, with a mere 49 cases and no deaths. The mainstream context of the domestic publicity of China, which is mostly reported by domestic mass media, generally focused on the increasing number of confirmed cases, a medical system on the verge of collapse, and frequently exposed social issues, such as the distribution of medical resources, employment and income issues, and the right to life safety. In the eyes of the mainstream media in China, this situation reflects the superiority of a socialist system responding to large-scale public health emergencies and deploying resources with the highest efficiency to solve problems in a concentrated manner. However, these behaviors have become targets of attacks by Western countries due to different interpretations and different values and social experiences. In addition, China’s strict restrictions on personal vehicle traffic during the blockade, the prohibition of stopping and leaving stations on some highways, and the requirement of residents in daily living areas to enter or exit with a permit were also criticized by those who questioned them. The excessively stringent loss-of-freedom policy severely restricted the free choice of personal travel. Moreover, the construction of emergency medical facilities (e.g., temporary centralized isolation places and treatment equipment) and the recruitment of emergency medical personnel from the top down in China, which was successfully completed in only a few days, were criticized as high-pressure politics that mechanize people to lose the right to choose freely on their own. The large-scale temporary observation and isolation medical center established for patients with mild pneumonia was also 30 31

Sheng (2014b). Enos (2020).

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considered a concentration camp in the new era. Even the Chinese national flag, the Communist flag hanging in the shelter hospital, and some singing and dancing activities spontaneously organized by patients with mild symptoms were interpreted as socialist brainwashing activities. Facing the external pressure of such a distorted interpretation, China struggled with global public opinion. However, China’s quick response and measures to actively integrate resources and the “whole nation system” also enabled Beijing to quickly control the epidemic, implying that China seemed to show its unique superiority in this situation. According to a BBC report (2021),32 although China’s strict confinement measures may initially seem harsh and confining to observers, the official data seem to prove the rationality of these measures as the number of deaths and cases was relatively low. In contrast to other countries, the number of infections appeared to have plateaued after the first outbreak. The pandemic and subsequent periodic closures had a significant impact on the economy and caused vast unemployment. China’s economic growth is currently the most sluggish that it has been within the past 40 years, although it quickly began to recover in 2020. However, in theory, life in vast areas of China almost returned to normal, and all eyes are currently on the vaccination plan. As the second wave of coronavirus infections emerged, Chinese authorities established new restrictive methods to intensify the battle and limit movements in and out of all cities. China’s successful containment of the novel coronavirus domestically not only eliminated public dissatisfaction regarding the lockdown policy in Wuhan but also largely relieved the international pressure that the government faced. Jacob (2020)33 noted that through external propaganda regarding the Chinese effort to fight against the virus, China did not receive any criticism from the WHO. Moreover, by advertising China’s contribution to helping other countries fight COVID-19, China gained good international prestige. While all developed countries were busy battling their own domestic epidemic and had no extra available resources to assist developing countries, China devoted much effort to helping other countries and take international responsibilities in the name of not the government but also private initiatives. China has been exporting masks and other medical equipment over the past year, even to developed countries, such as the United States. According to official data, from March to December 2020, China exported 224.2 billion masks, accounting for 30% of all masks exported globally, which is equivalent to supplying each person worldwide other than Chinese citizens with 40 masks. Hua Chunying, the Chinese Foreign Ministry officer, noted that since March 2020, China has offered more than 42 billion masks, over 900 million gloves, 780 million protective outfits, 50.66 million goggles, and 15,905 ventilators to the United States.34 Since Joe Biden won the election and started to adopt more effective measures to curb the virus, including mandating maskwearing in all public transportation and directing agencies, the quantity of exports

32

BBC (2021, January 22). Javorcik (2020). 34 Global Times (2021, January 22). 33

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will definitely increase. However, due to the unstable factors that formed and intensified between China and the United States in recent years, whether the United States will accept China’s offer of assistance remains unclear. Western scholars have expressed great concern regarding China’s international efforts. Gramer and Larsen (2020) believe that if China can seize this opportunity, it might portray itself as an emerging global superpower after this emergent public health safety crisis.35 Another concern originates from the vaccine developed by China. Recently, China’s vaccine has been widely used worldwide, including in several European, Asian, Latin American, and African countries. For example, in Serbia, vaccines from China were trusted and chosen by the people, and the President of Serbia expressed a friendly attitude toward China’s vaccine exports. As proposed by opponents of another camp, because of its uniqueness and limited supply, the COVID-19 vaccine could be regarded as a diplomatic tool serving, as another important convenient tool for foreign exchanges following the so-called mask diplomacy. From the view of Western scholars, the rudiment of Beijing’s willingness to establish new rules of the game can be observed in the process of vaccine distribution. These scholars worry that the future world order will be based entirely on the rules and laws formulated by China for its own benefit. This will be a mechanism based on dependence and debt, which Beijing can control at any time to safeguard its hegemony (Gill, 2020).36 The purpose of China’s vaccine diplomacy is to not only eliminate accountability regarding the source of the pandemic but also build a good international reputation and control the right to speak during the COVID-19 pandemic in this world of chaos and panic. As Kowalski (2021) writes, “because the transfers of Chinese medical supplies (no matter if purchased or donated) to Europe were in large part coordinated by the Chinese embassies, it appears that, in the critical moment of global competition for strategic resources, preference or priority in obtaining the supplies was given to countries enjoying good political relations with China or those in which providing “help in form of sale” could potentially translate into an improvement of China’s image”.37 If democratic countries cannot provide vaccines at reasonable prices without conditions of political exchange to compete with China’s vaccine diplomacy, many countries will see no other way and highly depend on Beijing. China may take advantage of this crisis and the weak position of other countries to establish its own new political order (Grizold & Jakliˇc, 2021).38 The rise of Beijing and the possible potential change in the new political order will be feared by several countries currently holding the main speaking right and dominant global power. ii.

The scenario in the United States

Next, we elaborate on the U.S. performance in the fight against COVID-19. Since the first case of coronavirus was reported in late January 2020, a significant number 35

Gramer and Larsen (2020, March 19). Gill (2020). 37 Kowalski (2021). 38 Grizold and Jakliˇ c (2021). 36

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of Americans worried about infection and the impact of the virus on the economy in the current highly globalized world. Millions of workers filed for unemployment each week in late March, which was several times higher than previous records (Mithani et al., 2021).39 The United States was seriously hit, with a quarter of all confirmed COVID-19 cases and deaths worldwide being reported here, while the US accounts for only 4% of the world’s population. This situation occurred despite its appreciable advantages in terms of the immense biomedical resources that it unleashed during the pandemic. In the early days, when China first reported a COVID19 case, the United States implemented a timely and rapid circuit breaker mechanism for flights to and from China. The United States did not adopt very effective and scientific protest measures in the early stage, and President Trump’s efforts and attitudes toward fighting the pandemic have shown a negative side as some scientific evidence and research prove that he did not take the situation seriously. After some time, anti-science and anti-intellectual public behaviors appeared and accelerated the speed of the virus’s invasion of the United States. All these behaviors bring the emergency medical system of the United States closer to the brink of collapse such that people’s medical protection is not perfected, and the people’s needs for medical facilities are not met, further worsening the nation’s coronavirus infection situation. While countries, such as Australia and South Korea, responded decisively to decrease infection rates, the curve changed to an appalling upward slope in the summer. Julia Marcus, an infectious-disease epidemiologist at Harvard Medical School, said that “The U.S. fundamentally failed in ways that were worse than I ever could have imagined” (Yong, 2020).40 Some scholars claimed that almost all mistakes in the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic were predictable and preventable. Within the Americas, the pandemic hit Latin America hard. While no country was immune to the coronavirus, several countries became epicenters, producing some of the highest case numbers worldwide. Brazil experienced the third-highest number of cases with 15.1 million and is the second-largest country in terms of deaths at over 421,000. Mexico is next at 2.3 million cases and is no. 4 worldwide with some 218,000 deaths. Below these countries are other Latin American countries, including Peru, Columbia, Argentina, and Chile. The contributing factors included presidents, particularly those of Brazil and Mexico, who did not take the pandemic seriously. In fact, these presidents even mocked the disease and its deadliness and refused to wear masks or practice basic social distancing. These countries have populations too poor to lockdown in the way we saw in Europe and the US, and the lack of PPEs (personal protective equipment), oxygen, ventilators, medications, and vaccinations exacerbated these issues. Although the American government correctly castigated China for its duplicity and the WHO for its laxity, it has also failed. The American government lost its best chance to restrain the coronavirus since the first case was confirmed in midJanuary, but the first significant outbreak emerged in mid-February (Branswell,

39 40

Mithani et al. (2021, July 23). Yong (2020, August 4).

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2020).41 The time that could have been used to prevent the spread of the virus was wasted. Instead, President Trump assured Americans that “the coronavirus is very much under control” and “like a miracle, it will disappear” (Goldberg, 2020).42 In America, the pandemic should have been alleviated by advanced medical technologies, detailed pandemic plans, and ample supplies of protective equipment and life-saving medicines. However, America faced a brittle system in danger of collapse and quickly created millions of virus hosts (Meyer & Madrigal, 2020).43 The government adopted illogical and inadequate actions. For example, not enough people were tested for COVID-19. As a national shortage of test kits unfolded, the virus spread uncontrollably. Additionally, America blamed the WHO for failing to “obtain the information that the world needed”. Donald Trump announced a drastic decision to stop funding the WHO because the Ethiopian Director-General of the organization accepted China’s contempt for the WHO’s reporting obligations and is unwilling to declare the global emergency capitulated to Chinese pressure to sideline Taiwanese warnings (Johnson, 2020).44 The Trump administration announced that the US would withdraw from the WHO, but President Biden criticized the decision and canceled this call after taking office. Furthermore, the United States scrutinized casting as the culprit in the global scrum for allegedly diverting shipments of crucial supplies intended for other countries. The Trump administration was accused of hijacking protective gear, which provoked anger abroad. The French president of the regional council of Grand Est Rottner criticized that the U.S. impeded mask delivery by purchasing at the last minute (Okello, 2020).45 German politicians also accused the United States of committing “modern piracy” since 200,000 N95 masks intended for German police were diverted to America, and the supply chain is under investigation (Moore, 2020).46 Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was concerned that medical supplies designated for Canada were shipped to the United States (Pitofsky, 2020).47 President Trump quoted the Defense Production Act of 1950 to suspend the export of 3 M masks to Canada and Latin America on April 2, 2020. Trudeau argued that restricting the trade of essential materials would be a mistake for both countries (Forrest, 2020).48 The Canadian government considered turning to other places, such as China, for crucial medical equipment while seeking to engage in a constructive discussion regarding this issue with the Trump administration (Blatchford, 2020).49 Such behaviors were called the “Lord of the Flies: PPE Edition” and reflected the international disputes and astonishing insufficiency of coordination among world 41

Branswell (2020, May 26). Goldberg (2020, March 19). 43 Meyer and Madrigal (2020, May 13). 44 Johnson (2020). 45 Okello (2020, April 2). 46 Moore (2020, April 5). 47 Pitofsky (2020, April 3). 48 Forrest (2020, April 3). 49 Blatchford (2020, April 5). 42

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leaders concerning the reaction to the coronavirus, which already occurred in more than 180 countries (Toosi, 2020).50 It is significant for the world’s leading power to contribute to global solidarity instead of international competition during the pandemic.51 The American vaccine hegemony also raised constant concerns. Many countries worldwide may not have the funds to buy vaccines or may be unable to buy enough vaccines with sufficient capital. In this regard, Iran, which suffered from U.S. sanctions, bears the brunt. It is difficult for Iran to obtain vaccines mainly because of the sanctions imposed by the United States, but many countries that were not sanctioned also face the dilemma of obtaining enough vaccines. In 67 poorer countries worldwide, only one in every ten people is expected to be vaccinated before the end of 2021. However, if the epidemic in these countries does not end, their medical systems will continue to bear tremendous pressure, and non-COVID-19 patients may not be able to receive effective treatment, which will result in more deaths. However, vaccine hoarding in developed countries, such as the United States, is in full swing. The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) quoted data suggesting that although the population of rich countries only accounts for 14% of the world’s total population, the number of COVID-19 vaccines they have or will have accounts for more than half of the world’s total.52 On December 8th, 2020, US President Trump signed an executive order to give Americans priority access to the vaccines, saying that this executive order will ensure that the US government will give priority to the distribution of vaccines to American citizens before sending them to other countries (Mason, 2020).53 iii.

The scenario in the United Kingdom

Finally, we discuss the measures adopted by the U.K. COVID-19 reached the United Kingdom in late January 2020. As of January 23, 2021, more than three million cases had been confirmed, and nearly 100,000 people have died, leading the UK to have the fourth-highest death rate per hundred thousand worldwide and the highest rate overall in Europe. Because of the devolution of the health system, England, Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales each have their independent public health systems, separate governments, and parliaments, and there is a gap in the severity of the pandemic across these four regions. According to the Prime Minister’s Office (2020),54 the British government issued the “Out of Home” order to “go out, protect the NHS and save lives” in March, banning all unnecessary travel, closing most meeting places, and notifying people with symptoms and their family members to self-isolate. The research conducted by the Imperial College’s COVID-19 Response Team (2020) estimates that lock-in will reduce the death toll from 510,000 to less than 20,000.55 50

Toosi (2020, April 3). Sheng (2014a). 52 BBC (2021, May 4). 53 Mason (2020, December 8). 54 Prime Minister’s Office (2020, March 16). 55 Imperial College COVID-19 Response Team (2020, March 30). 51

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Of course, such lengthy restrictions would severely damage the economy. Early illustrations of the impact of COVID-19 in the United Kingdom indicated that London’s number of deaths was higher than that in other regions of the country (Tubadji et al., 2020).56 It appears that chances of survival during the COVID-19 pandemic are unevenly distributed in the British population and are related to socioeconomic inequalities, which existed before the pandemic. Sadly, due to the discovery of a new virus variant in the UK, most countries introduced bans on travel from the UK by December 20, 2020. According to many critics, the high death toll in the UK served as a clue to the government’s failure, especially compared to Germany, and has been best explained by inadequate testing and delays (Freedman, 2020).57 The government could highlight regional variations in the effects of the coronavirus, the particular impact on London, and how premature it was to declare a winner in a morbid race to death during the early stages of the pandemic before appropriate analyses and comparisons could be conducted. Additionally, after being accused of not including those who died outside hospitals to downplay the tragedy’s scale, including those numbers at the end of April, the government used these numbers to claim tragedy and urged the public to continue the last two weeks of lockdown. It has been observed that during the early phase of this pandemic, Taiwan, New Zealand, Australia, and other isolated islands adopted good anti-epidemic and prevention measures (although Taiwan has been suffering from a serious wave of the pandemic since May 2021), but only Britain seems to be unable to justify its performance. Compared to the examples mentioned above, only Britain failed to block air and sea traffic in time and, as a result, failed to control the spread of the virus. Critics have noted that British policymakers and official health consultants proposed a strategy of “herd immunization”, which implies allowing the virus to unfold freely among the people to create enough of an immunized population to contain the spread of the virus. This strategy was abandoned because of the large increase in the death toll. In addition, the British government expected to effectively control a pandemic monitoring and tracking system, which failed to truly work because of its limited scale (Clemente-Suárez et al., 2020).58 Britain’s delay in implementing measures, such as traffic blockades and restrictions on going out, is also considered a missed opportunity to best curb the epidemic. iv.

The scenario in India

The current epicenter is India, where scenes of hospitals on evening news are apocalyptic. For months, India’s president and many of its people thought the country and its 1.4 billion people had largely escaped the pandemic. A year ago, when it was hit, the country locked down and did well after it emerged out of the lockdown. However, the Modi government rejected advice from its doctors and scientists that the virus was returning. Instead, in the past few months, the country held large election rallies and religious festivals and refused to practice mask-wearing and basic social 56

Tubadji et al. (2020). Freedman (2020). 58 Clemente-Suárez et al. (2020). 57

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distancing. Instead of vaccinating its population, India exported its large stocks of vaccines. When the virus hit, as it has done in the past three weeks, it hit very hard. Over the past two weeks, India has seen over 400,000 new cases per day and some 3600 deaths per day. As of this writing, May 2021, India has some 21.8 million cases, making it no. 2 worldwide after the US, and some 238,000 deaths, making it no. 3 worldwide after the US and Brazil. No end is in sight. Scientists claim that they do not expect the peak of the virus to arrive until late May, while currently, the country is running out of oxygen, ventilators, PPEs, etc. Its hospitals are overwhelmed, and its doctors and nurses are exhausted. From India, the virus has spread at a rapid rate throughout South Asia, embroiling countries, such as Nepal, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. The WHO is warning of a global famine this year due to the coronavirus as people will be too sick to cultivate the soil or too poor to buy food. Similarly, we all fear this virus and what it could mean as health is probably the greatest thing people can possess. Fear of the virus causes us to fear our neighbors. Fears of people from a pandemic epicenter can lead and have led to discrimination against people from those areas or cities. Flights from India are banned, and people from India are currently shunned. v.

Scenarios around the world

The demographics of new case numbers have also shifted dramatically. Throughout 2020, most new cases were in rich countries as follows: Europe had 30%, the US had 33%, and the rest of the world had the other third. Currently, the situation is very different as follows: the US declined to 6%, Europe declined to 15%, India has 43%, South America has 15%, and the rest of the world has 21%. The death toll similarly shifted from 90% in rich countries one year ago in April 2020 to 20% today. Middleand low-income countries, including India, Brazil, and other South Asian and Latin American countries, account for most current deaths worldwide. Some governments that have authoritarian-minded, populist leaders who neglected the virus or were incompetent, such as US President Trump, Brazilian President Bolsonaro, Mexican President Obrador, and Indian Prime Minister Modi, have caused millions of needless deaths through their policies or lack of policies. In conclusion, although a large price has been paid, Beijing only required a few months to effectively control the spread of the virus within the country, and some countries in East Asia and the Western Pacific also maintained low infection and mortality rates. However, the United States and major European countries have been widely criticized for failing to respond effectively in time. In Italy and Spain, the government failed to adopt effective precautions at the initial stage and failed to respond effectively when the epidemic began to expand soon such that the death toll surpassed that of China. France and Great Britain, two well known and established democracies, have also been questioned about their attitude and ability to fight the epidemic. Regarding the United States, which currently has the highest number of infected people worldwide, it is too late to implement restrictions and control measures. Also, to respect individual freedom, cities do not close and tourism is not restricted until the epidemic is out of control. The rapidly increasing number of

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infections and deaths in these countries led to a discussion regarding the dysfunction of democratic institutions (Forester & McKibbon, 2020).59 Global governance requires consensus and transnational cooperation. However, a country’s internal decisions often have a far-reaching impact on its foreign policy (Weiss, 2000).60 For example, in the strategy of addressing the epidemic, if a country’s internal decision-making process is in dispute, its willingness or effect of participating in international cooperation may be greatly reduced, and even regional cooperation or international cooperation may be damaged. This situation also reflects the fragility of international governance to a certain extent. Facts have proven that global governance has indeed been seriously challenged in this COVID-19 epidemic, and global and regional international organizations have not established an effective mechanism to fight the epidemic in time (Tourish, 2020).61 Some major countries, such as the United States, even openly questioned and criticized the WHO and other institutions and attempted to avoid the criticism and intervention of international institutions in their domestic policies. Given this situation, the global fight against the COVID-19 epidemic faces more uncertainties. The different results of containing the pandemic in different countries raised concerns leading to comparative political studies of this issue (Enos, 2020; Forester & McKibbon, 2020; Grint, 2020; Hale et al., 2020).62 In a comparative political study, research concerning the democratization that emerged in the 1980s and the cognition of the universal value of the democratic system after the 1990s were challenged after the rise of China (Manion, 2010).63 Scholars are also concerned that following the rise of populism, populists will launch new authoritarian leadership in the name of the democratic system, impacting the citizen culture where supervision and power balance exist universally. It can be observed that the governments and people in different countries have significant differences in their understanding of the COVID19 epidemic, while different political parties in the same country or federal and state governments may hold different views. Different departments within the government, such as economic departments and public health departments, may hold contradictory views. Therefore, many countries cannot form a unified and effective coping strategy in a short time, and their governance capacity is limited. There seems to be a positive correlation between the decline in governance capacity and the rapid spread of COVID-19. In developing countries that are deeply mired in praetorians, the social cost of this type of social tension seems even more unbearable. From the perspective of international politics, countries should cooperate to address common crises, such as exerting all efforts to stop the rapid spread of COVID-19 worldwide.

59

Forester and McKibbon (2020). Weiss (2000). 61 Tourish (2020). 62 Enos (2020), Forester and McKibbon (2020), Grint (2020) and Hale et al. (2020). 63 Manion (2010). 60

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1.3.2 Regional Cooperation: Will the EU Successfully Lead European Integration? The coronavirus outbreak is considered a critical test for the European Union (Gibson, 2020).64 Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez noted that if the EU does not propose a unified, adequate, and effective response to this health and economic crisis, not only will the impact be more serious but also the effect will last longer (Herszenhorn et al., 2020).65 Germany banned the export of personal protective equipment, and France also banned the export of medical equipment.66 Such behaviors drew criticism from EU officials who demanded unification (Tsang, 2020).67 Many Schengen countries closed their borders to prevent the spread of the virus. The EU summit rejected the “corona bond” proposal, a jointly issued debt instrument designed to finance the coronavirus pandemic (Herszenhorn et al., 2020).68 This dispute placed EU leaders on the brink of political collapse. Debates regarding how to address the epidemic and its economic impact opened a rift between the northern and southern members. France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, and Slovenia put forward this proposal to help their countries recover from the epidemic (Amaro, 2020).69 However, Nordic countries, such as Germany, Finland, Austria, and the Netherlands, opposed joint debt issuance (Thompson, 2020).70 Instead, these countries suggested that governments should apply for loans from the European Stability Mechanism. Under this boiling water situation, at the eve of the outbreak, the current EU member states were unable to protect themselves, and each member state established invisible self-protection barriers to other member states to varying degrees, not to mention the EU’s spare capacity and excess materials to help the countries in the Eastern Partnership program of the EU, such as Serbia, which is a very typical example. As a candidate country for eventual EU accession, Serbia has had pro-Europe foreign policy for almost two decades; Serbia, disappointed by the EU due to its slow response and even sitting idly by and blamed the EU for its lack of time and ability to consider potential future member states. However, in Serbia, the virus started on March 15, 2020, the day president Aleksandar Vuˇci´c declared a state of emergency. On the same day, a statement by the European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen appeared to suggest a ban on exporting medical supplies from the bloc. “European solidarity does not exist. It was a fairy tale.” Vuˇci´c told the nation. “It was not exactly what we would want to hear from a government that claims it is doing its utmost to join the EU”. However, even in Spain and Italy, there was anger due to the lack of a coordinated 64

Gibson (2020, March 18). Herszenhorn et al. (2020, March 27). 66 Reuters (2020, March 4). 67 Tsang (2020, March 7). 68 Herszenhorn et al. (2020, March 27). 69 Amaro (2020, March 25). 70 Thompson (2020, March 27). 65

1.3 How State Actors and Nonstate Actors Reacted to the Pandemic

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European response to coronavirus, and for those outside the bloc, including Serbia, the rejection was felt even more strongly. After several batches of humanitarian aid aiming to combat the virus from China and Russia successfully arrived in Belgrade, Serbia between the night of March 15, 2020, and March 27, the first aircraft carrying critical medical equipment arrived at Belgrade as a part of an effort by the EU and UNDP to support the country in coping with the COVID-19 epidemic. Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic is regarded as a stress test for democracy. The 16 member states of the European Union issued a statement warning that specific emergency measures adopted during the coronavirus pandemic may undermine the rule of law and democratic principles on April 1. The rapid spread of COVID-19 forced democratic countries to adopt emergency measures that are well known in dictatorships, such as curfews and bans on assemblies. Approximately 20 EU members passed emergency legislation to curb the coronavirus pandemic’s economic impact (Donadio, 2020).71 Strict restrictions on fundamental rights will probably weaken the democratic system. In contrast, in the fight against the virus, democracies have one significant advantage over dictatorships, i.e., trust. A trusting populace implies that the people largely support the government’s decisions. In the coronavirus case, this trust could imply stopping or accelerating the spread of the pandemic. Reportedly, the Italian opera singer Andrea Bocelli sand “Amazing Grace” outside the historic Milan Cathedral in April 2020. This hymn became a symbol of lockdowns, empty cities, and suffering everywhere. This white-haired opera star sung as images of empty deserted cities, i.e., Milan, Florence, Rome, Paris, Warsaw, Cape Town, and Beijing, spread on our television screens with no sounds, except for the cries of ambulances carrying the sick. Europe recovered well by the summer, and many Europeans thought that they had witnessed the worst of the pandemic and that their lives could return to normal. However, in the late fall, the pandemic returned, but this time, it was bolstered by variants from the UK, South Africa, Brazil, and other places, such as the current deadly Indian variant. For the second time, several European countries, including the United Kingdom, which was ravaged very hard and at one point was among those with the highest case count and death toll worldwide had to lockdown. Almost nowhere in Europe escaped this second wave. The virus spread from Western Europe and the Mediterranean world to Eastern and Northern Europe. Even remote areas, such as Iceland, suffered outbreaks. As of today, May 10, 2021, France has 5.8 million cases, Turkey has over 5 million cases, Russia has 4.8 million cases, the UK has 4.4 million cases, Italy has 4.1 million cases, Spain has 3.5 million cases, and Germany has 3.5 million cases; these countries rank 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, and 11th in terms of case numbers worldwide and 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th in deaths, respectively. The reasons for such catastrophic cases and death numbers vary across countries but include misgovernment, i.e., governments acting late or incompetently; popular resistance to another lockdown (pandemic fatigue); and a failure to vaccinate the population early enough and widely enough. A survey in the European Union at the end of 2020 and early 2021 showed that the COVID-19 epidemic strengthened the trust of citizens in EU countries, and 71

Donadio (2020, March 10).

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citizens recognized that the EU was playing an essential role in formulating effective solutions to cope with COVID-19 and its impact. By the end of 2020, compared with home countries, more respondents believed that the situation at the EU level is more optimistic. In addition, 72% of the respondents believed that the EU recovery plan will enable their national economy to recover from the negative impact of the COVID19 pandemic. Although EU people’s trust in the EU as a whole has increased, there may be significant differences in people’s attitudes in different countries.72 Italian people’s trust in EU institutions significantly declined during the epidemic period, decreasing by 10% compared with that in the same period in 2019 and was the lowest among the 27 EU member states. Under the epidemic situation, German people’s support rate for the EU increased, and more than 80% of the respondents believed that Germany’s accession to the EU is of positive significance. However, the overall increase in people’s positive attitude toward the EU does not imply that they fully recognize the EU’s performance. For example, in Germany, 49% of the respondents expected the EU to implement reforms.73 It is still a great challenge for the EU to rebuild its unity, reunite its attraction and cohesion, bridge the rift and help the economic recovery and reconstruction of EU countries after the epidemic.

1.3.3 International Cooperation: The Role of the WHO First, we discuss how the WHO reacted to the pandemic. As the directing and coordinating authority on international health within the United Nations system, the role played by the WHO in containing the pandemic is a significant question. Many countries blame the World Health Organization for its slow reaction when COVID19 emerged, not declaring the seriousness of the situation, and its neglect of the pandemic, resulting in the U.S. leaving the WHO. The WHO did not establish the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response to analyze the international health response level until the end of 2020. The panel claimed that the global pandemic alert system does not fit the original intention, with critical factors judged as “slow, cumbersome, and indecisive” on January 19 (Mahase, 2021).74 It has been suggested that the WHO emergency committee should have declared a public health emergency of international concern earlier, nonpharmaceutical interventions, such as wearing masks and limited gatherings, which China already adopted, should have been applied to help prevent the pandemic from spreading. The panel doubted global leadership and WHO’s function since it did not meet the pandemic’s challenge given its greater reliance. However, the WHO has to face the challenge of coordinating resources and supply and accelerating the development of vaccines and other countermeasures. The WHO failed to grasp its member states’ political priorities and realize that the Ministry of 72

European Parliament (2020). European Parliament (2021). 74 Mahase (2021). 73

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Health has a low status among them in many cases, making it difficult for the organization to manage and delegate power in recent years. Davies and Wenham (2020)75 propose that embracing the politics and engaging foreign policy and diplomatic expertise should become the core business of the WTO and other technical institutions that seek to improve the best diplomatic conditions to respond in a coordinated manner to the upcoming increasing technical challenges. In this era of COVID-19, political decisions directly affect lives and deaths. Therefore, meaningful interaction between public health and international relations is essential. The criticism of the WHO actually shows its embarrassing situation as an international organization. As a joint project of member countries, the WHO depends on the will, ability, and resources of its member countries to implement projects globally. According to its constitution, the WHO must listen to the opinions of the health institutions of its member countries rather than public opinions mixed with emotions and nationalism. It takes a long time to listen to and extensively discuss opinions and give suggestions, rendering their actions appear slow. As an important coordinator between governments, public health organizations, scientists, and leading pharmaceutical companies, the WHO’s core mission are to coordinate the information and resources of all parties rather than undertake specific tasks to fight the epidemic. In addition, as an international organization, the WHO has no coercive power and can only intervene in national epidemic prevention policies through initiatives and appeals. Although it has extensive influence worldwide, the WHO cannot eliminate the shortage of medical resources or undertake the task of fighting diseases (Gostin, 2020).76 The main players against COVID-19 are still sovereign states and their research institutions and medical teams. The response to the COVID-19 pandemic shows how difficult it is to supply global public goods effectively. In the absence of full cooperation, the international community failed to adequately provide many global public goods related to the control of this infectious disease (Brown & Susskind, 2020).77 For instance, there are export bans, equipment poaching, and beggar-thy-neighbor bidding wars rather than cooperation to develop a joint plan to share expertise and increase the global availability of medical equipment. Some countries unilaterally pursue independent research plans and even attempted to recruit research teams from other countries instead of jointly developing vaccines. Instead, “vaccine nationalism” occurred (Dyer, 2020).78 Moreover, some countries that do not excessively restrict the export of vaccines or other medical materials and even actively express their will to develop vaccines abroad have also been questioned to some extent regarding vaccine diplomacy or strategic material diplomacy during the pandemic. The proposed humanitarian assistance and the implemented vaccine export policy of these countries, such as China and Russia, were discredited as a means of diplomatic propaganda with political goals. Meanwhile, their exported vaccines and other materials are questioned in terms of quality 75

Davies and Wenham (2020). Gostin (2020). 77 Brown and Susskind (2020). 78 Dyer (2020). 76

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and recognition. Such a viewpoint is more related to a political stance than realistic scientific research results. Such suspicions and doubts also contributed to the burning of vaccine nationalism to a certain extent. In many developed countries, the first wave of the virus is about to end, and the second wave is approaching. Therefore, when countries reflect upon their longterm strategies for responding to the pandemic, they have the opportunity to adopt a different approach, i.e., agree that many tasks required to promote public health are global public goods that can be achieved only through the international community. Notably, the government is not the only participant in providing global public goods, for example, nongovernmental organizations, public-private partnerships, and charitable organizations are also participants. In response to this particular crisis, coordination across countries and regions plays a crucial role. Communication with other countries via innovation networks and alliances will also be essential in the future. However, in the case of a pandemic, the central government is a key player; thus, it is vital to pay attention to supporting cooperation between governments. To effectively distribute global public goods, this cooperative strategy must achieve several goals. According to Ulrich Berk’s risk society theory, the risks in society are not isolated but interrelated and even superimposed (Beck & Wynne, 1992).79 COVID-19 is not only a plague but also a risk that the international community needs to face together. The continuous spread of the epidemic may lead to economic recession, social unrest, and crisis of trust, which may increase conflicts between countries and hinder international cooperation, thus aggravating geopolitical risks. In this context, practicing multilateralism, actively carrying out international cooperation, and seeking inclusive international relations may be effective ways for the international community to jointly cope with the epidemic.

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Chapter 2

The Acceleration of the Global Power Transition: From West to East

Infectious disease which antedated the emergence of humankind will last as long as humanity itself and will surely remain, as it has been hitherto, one of the fundamental parameters and determinants of human history.

—by William H. McNeill.1 Throughout history, human beings have faced the threats of various viruses and diseases, and pandemics have had a tremendous impact on the development and evolution of history. As an unconventional threat, the catastrophic impact caused by COVID-19 is comparable to that of a world war. As UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned, the current novel coronavirus outbreak has been the greatest challenge worldwide since World War Two, and the recession it caused “probably has no parallel in the recent past” (BBC, 2020).2 Our lives and the world have been transformed by the pandemic, and we stepped into a world with greater “unknowability” than ever before (Gewirtz, 2020).3 Hundreds of millions of people on earth are currently experiencing this unprecedented darkness, and it seems difficult to foresee a bright future without effective global cooperation. The only certainties are that the COVID-19 pandemic is becoming the largest global crisis in this century, which will profoundly change the international system and balance of power and will have a far-reaching impact on the global order.

2.1 A Short Overview of Major Epidemics in a Historical Context Highly infectious diseases, known as epidemics, have created serious health and economic problems in history. Throughout history, pandemics have affected and 1

Quoted from McNeill (1976, Chap. 6). BBC (2020, April 1). 3 Gewirtz (2020, June 1). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_2

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even shaped political, economic, and cultural changes. Often, pandemics acted as an accelerant, spreading already apparent changes much more rapidly through society. The Black Death of the mid-fourteenth century almost certainly caused the Renaissance, particularly in the Italian States. Throughout Europe, feudalism collapsed due to a shortage of labor-aided salaries for Europe’s poor.4 The Bubonic Plague in London in 1666 aided the development of a limited constitutional government and shaped the architecture of modern London.5 The 1918 Spanish Flu Pandemic helped shape the vengeful peace of Versailles in 1919, a settlement that caused angry Germany to turn to Fascism and Hitler, leading the world to war in 1939. President Woodrow Wilson of the United States, one of the treaty’s main negotiators, was infected with the Flu, which impacted deliberations likely in an unfavorable direction toward Germany.6 Similarly, the current COVID-19 virus is affecting our entire world’s political, economic, social, and indeed cultural life. Undoubtedly, the coronavirus crisis is not the first global pandemic, and it will not be the last. In light of the book Plague and People, we see that the impact of epidemics on the development of human history should not be underestimated under any circumstances considering that epidemics can play a key role in influencing human society. Plagues and other lethal pandemics have previously played a crucial role in reshaping economic, social, political, and cultural change. If we review history and draw lessons, we can be better equipped to cope with the future. As Huremovi´c suggests, while epidemic outbreaks in human history “have decimated societies, determined outcomes of wars, wiped out entire populations”, these events also facilitate “innovation and advances in sciences (including medicine and public health), economy, and political systems” (Huremovi´c, 2019).7 Therefore, this section presents a brief historical and comparative overview of selected pandemics of historical significance, particularly in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, and then provides well-referenced coverage of the pandemic, contributing to the assessment of COVID-19’s impact on the human community.

2.1.1 Plague of Athens (431–404 BC) The Athens plague is the most famous ancient plague that has been recorded in detail. The Athens plague has traditionally been considered an outbreak of the bubonic plague; however, consensus regarding the cause of the disease is lacking. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), the plague decimated the population and dealt massive damage to Athens, fatally weakening the dominance and political strength of Athens and causing Athens to lose the war. The plague ravaged the whole society of Athens two years into the Peloponnesian War, and Athens never 4

Snowden (2019). McNeill (1976). 6 Barry (2004). 7 Huremovi´ c (2019). 5

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recovered, significantly contributing to the decline and fall of classical Greece. The historian Thucydides, an Athenian who suffered from the disease and survived, stated that the epidemic originated in Ethiopia, passed through Egypt and Libya into the Greek world, and spread throughout the wider Mediterranean. Thucydides described the pitiful sight of that moment as follows: “The bodies of the dead and dying were piled on one another”; those nursing the ill “died like sheep”. The plague had serious effects on Athens’ society, resulting in a lack of adherence to laws and religious beliefs. According to Thucydides, the plague also caused religious uncertainty and doubt as follows: “the plague marked the beginning of a decline to greater lawlessness in the city…; So they thought it reasonable to concentrate on immediate profit and pleasure, believing that their bodies and their possessions alike would be short-lived. No one was willing to persevere in struggling for what was considered an honorable result since he could not be sure that he would not perish before he achieved it” (Thucydides, 2019).8

2.1.2 Plague of Justinian (541–549 AD) The plague of Justinian, also known as the first Old World pandemic of the plague, struck the entire Mediterranean Basin, Europe, and the Near East world between 541 and 549 AD. The plague was considered to be caused by the bacterium Yersinia pestis and seems to have originated in Upper Egypt, arriving at the eastern Nile delta during the summer of 541. The beginning of the first plague pandemic may well have created the conditions for the decline of the Roman Empire. The plague caused up to 50–60% mortality in a few years (Harper, 2017).9 The plague affected up to 25–50 million victims across Europe and the broader Mediterranean area (Hays, 2007).10 Meier emphasized the importance of the pandemic due to its cultural and religious effects on the eastern Roman empire and believes that the Justinian plague prompted or reinforced processes of reorientation that were of fundamental significance to the transformation of eastern Roman into the Byzantine empire (Meier, 2016).11 This plague ravaged the Roman Empire at recurrent intervals for more than 100 years, played a significant role in the decline and fall of this great superpower, had a severe impact on its military and economic supremacy, and, thus, compromised the Byzantine emperor’s attempt to reconquer Italy and other core areas of the Western Roman Empire (Sarris, 2002).12

8

Thucydides (2019). Harper (2017). 10 Hays (2007). 11 Meier (2016). 12 Sarris (2002). 9

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2.1.3 The Black Death (1347–1352) The Black Death (also known as the bubonic plague), which hit Europe in 1347– 1352, was responsible for the worst mortality crises of the medieval and early modern period. This famous pandemic of the fourteenth century was named the Black Death since patients presented buboes with black discoloration. Although a universal consensus regarding where the virus originated is lacking, the flu is considered one of the deadliest pandemics in human history. This plague killed more than 25 million people in fourteenth-century Europe, accounting for at least one-third of Europe’s population at that time (Benedictow & Benedictow, 2004).13 Over centuries, trade in early modern Europe frequently spread disease. The Black Death’s advance in the fourteenth century also followed trade routes, such as the ancient Silk Road (Herlihy & Cohn, 1997).14,15 Most chroniclers and scientists testify that the Black Death began somewhere in the East and consider the causative agent to be Yersinia pestis, which caused the Second Pandemic and persisted periodically throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (NA, 2016).16 The Black Death is probably the worst plague of all times and has also long been recognized as one of the watersheds in European history due to the disease’s profound long-term effects. The previous literature provides well-referenced coverage of the important role of the Second Pandemic (Epstein, 2000).17 Benedictow concluded in the book the Black Death (1346–1353), “the Black Death was a disaster of such magnitude that it not only shook the Old World to its economic and social foundations but changed the course of human history”.18 Frankopan also noted that the succession of the plague cleared the way for positive long-term social and economic development in Europe. He noted the significant economic development and social change that occurred in Europe after the Black Death subsided (Frankopan, 2015).19 Bailey vividly describes, “the dislocation caused by pandemics (the Black Death) opens up possibilities for change, for increasing the pace of change, or, indeed, for embedding vested interests even deeper” (Bailey, 2021).20 Due to labor shortages caused by the Black Death, the Second Pandemic resulted in a long-run of development of labor-saving technologies and, consequently, higher

13

Benedictow and Benedictow (2004). Herlihy and Cohn (1997). 15 Regarding the transmission path of the Black Death, Glater and Finkelman provide a more detailed description, “the second pandemic or Black Death arrived in Messina in Sicily, probably from Central Asia via Genoese ships carrying flea-laden rats in October 1347, which initiated a wave of plague infections that rapidly spread across most of Europe like a relentless wildfire” (Glatter & Finkelman, 2020). 16 NA (2016). 17 Epstein (2000). 18 Benedictow and Benedictow (2004). 19 Frankopan (2015). 20 Bailey (2021). 14

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productivity (Scheidel, 2017).21 Due to the rapidly decreasing population, the value of the working class increased. Workers began to enjoy more freedom and traveled in search of the most favorable position economically to satisfy the increased need for labor (Netzley, 1998).22 Voigtländer and Voth consider the Black Death to be one of the “Horsemen of Riches” that significantly contributed to the “Rise of Europe” because some of its impacts increased mortality, preserved post plague wage gains, and subsequently triggered a large increase in the per capita income (Voigtländer & Voth, 2013).23 However, renewed religious fervor and fanaticism bloomed in the wake of the Black Death. Epidemics can create hothouse conditions leading to the development of mistrust and oppressive institutions.24 There was a series of violent attacks on Jewish communities falsely blamed for outbreaks of the Black Death (Marshall, 2006).25 This phenomenon did not change until the plague waned in 1350. The plague resulted in a shift in the world view of people in 14th-century Italy, which was particularly badly hit by the pandemic and led to the Renaissance (Tuchman, 2011).26 As a European trauma, the Black Death created a lasting bond among Europeans that amounted to crisis solidarity in the face of deadly common danger, facilitating the formation of a continental consciousness and the formation of the European identity (Binion, 2006).27 Moreover, women gained a higher status in society following the plague due to the scarcity of labor caused by the disease. Due to differentially devastating effects on the male population compared to females and the severe demographic losses caused by the plague, women found more economic opportunities and assumed more responsibility in the division of labor (Mitchell, 2012).28

2.1.4 New World Smallpox Outbreak (1400s–1600s) The Middle Ages ushered in the Age of Discovery, which triggered a string of epidemics (the most important of which was smallpox) associated with the sixteenthcentury “Columbian Exchange”, i.e., the exchange of diseases, ideas, food crops, and populations, between the New and Old World after Columbus (Nunn & Qian, 2010).29 Since several smallpox outbreaks occurred in Europe during the Middle Ages and smallpox had become entrenched across most of Europe by the sixteenth 21

Scheidel (2017). Netzley (1998). 23 Voigtländer and Voth (2013). 24 Hou et al. (2020). 25 Marshall (2006). 26 Tuchman (2011). 27 Binion (2006). 28 Mitchell (2012). 29 Nunn and Qian (2010). 22

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century, Europeans had an improved immune function in the fight against the disease. Smallpox was introduced to the Caribbean island of Hispaniola in 1509 and the mainland in 1520, when Spanish settlers from Hispaniola arrived in Mexico, inadvertently carrying smallpox with them. It is believed that smallpox arrived from the Americas in 1520 by a Spanish ship carried by Cuban-infected African slaves. After the disease arrived in Mexico, the disease immediately began its deadly voyage across the continent. Since the native Amerindian population had no acquired immunity to this new disease, their people were decimated by epidemics. The case fatality rate during the outbreak among Native Americans was as high as 80–90%. Mann discussed the fatal importance of the numerous newly introduced infectious diseases and the likelihood that these diseases played a far more significant role in Native Americans’ decline than warfare or other actions by Europeans (Mann, 2005).30 Such disruption and population losses represented important factors allowing the Spanish to achieve conquest of the Aztecs and the Incas (Fenner et al., 1988).31 At the beginning of the century, smallpox and other plagues almost destroyed the three major civilizations in the American continent, including the Maya civilization, Mesoamerican civilization, and Inca civilization. According to Drezner, “the ‘virgin soil epidemics’ in the new world had a powerful ideational effect on Amerindians who survived. The relative health of the Spanish conquistadors—because of their immunity to diseases that fell the indigenous population—convinced Amerindian survivors that the Europeans were god-like. This facilitated the spread of Catholicism throughout Latin America”.32 As a result, the Indians had to submit to colonial rule. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson state that the rapid population decline and social unrest in the early South American continent attributed to the deadly Eurasian diseases that rapidly spread to American Indians accelerated the process of the establishment of European domination over the Americas, suggesting that the main impact of disease environments on the economic development of nations is not due to the direct effect of health conditions on income but rather their indirect effects via institutions. Consequently, Europeans took advantage of quick and complete control of South America and formed institutions to confiscate resources (Acemoglu et al., 2003).33

2.1.5 The Influenza Pandemic of 1918–1919 The 1918 influenza pandemic, also known as the Spanish flu, was the deadliest pandemic in the twentieth century, is, the only pandemic parallel in modern times to the current pandemic and arrived in three waves, i.e., April and May, October and November, and the following spring in 1919. Before the pandemic ended in early 30

Mann (2005). Fenner et al. (1988). 32 Drezner (2020). 33 Acemoglu et al. (2003). 31

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1920, an estimated 50 million people died, 500 million people became infected, and approximately one-third of the Earth’s population became infected. The virus was first identified in military personnel in the spring of 1918 in the United States and then in April in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The primary vectors were military personnel who appeared to have been the initial victims of the disease, but the virus quickly spread to the civilian population.34 The pandemic was caused by an unusually severe and deadly virus belonging to subtype H1N1 of influenza type A. President Woodrow Wilson was more concerned with prosecuting World War I and shipping sick boys to Europe to fight. He adopted no action and did not even make one speech addressing the pandemic as Wilson feared that alarmed Americans would not allow their boys to go overseas.35 As a result, the pandemic influenza virus finally spread worldwide during 1918–1919, killing an estimated 20 to 50 million people worldwide, including an estimated 675,000 deaths in the United States.36 The virus killed even more people than those perished in the fighting of the First World War. The Spanish flu infected approximately 500 million people, approximately onethird of the world’s population (Taubenberger & Morens, 2006).37 In contrast to the annual ordinary influenza epidemics that mostly kill small children and the elderly, a striking feature of the Spanish flu was the unusually high death rate among healthy adults aged 15 to 34 years, which consequently lowered the average life expectancy in the United States by more than 10 years (Tumpey et al., 2005).38 Despite the high morbidity and mortality rates that resulted from the epidemic, which killed tremendous numbers of people, some historians label the Spanish flu a “forgotten pandemic” due to its declining public memory (Crosby, 2003).39,40 The Spanish flu accelerated the end of World War I to a certain extent and played a role in promoting Americans to turn their country decidedly inward in the 1920s, facilitating international cooperation and the formation of the Versailles-Washington System. As Price-Smith stated in his book Contagion and chaos, “the epidemic may 34

Flecknoe et al. (2018). Bristow (2012, pp. 1–3). 36 Further research has observed the consistent upward revision of the estimated global mortality of the pandemic. Based on a well-referenced coverage document, Johnson and Mueller revised the figure of the total numbers of death upwards to approximately 50 million, accounting for approximately 2.8% of the world population, while recognizing that even this vast figure may be substantially lower than the real toll, perhaps as much as 100% understated. A more recent study shows that in the worst-case scenario, as much as 80% of the total world population in 1918 might have been killed by the Spanish flu virus (Moxnes & Albert Christophersen, 2008). 37 Taubenberger and Morens (2006). 38 Tumpey et al. (2005). 39 Crosby (2003). 40 There are many reasons why the Spanish flu began to fade from public awareness over the decades. For instance, the frequent outbreaks of diseases in the late 19th and early twentieth centuries, including typhoid, yellow fever, diphtheria, and cholera, probably lessened the significance of the influenza pandemic for the public because the general population was familiar with these diseases. Additionally, other major events, such as the First World War and the economic crisis, attracted people’s attention. However, the Spanish flu has once again entered our consciousness with the spread of the novel coronavirus in 2020. 35

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have prevented a German victory, extended the war, and ultimately assisted in forcing the Central Powers to the table to negotiate peace at Versailles”. He provides data indicating that the waves of the pandemic influenza, with both higher morbidity and mortality in Germany and Austria than Britain and France, hit the armies of Germany and the Austrian-Hungarian Empire earlier and more virulently than their Allied opponents, indicating that the flu may have tipped the outcome of World War I (Price-Smith, 2008).41 Additionally, the 1918 Spanish Flu pandemic taught us to wear face masks, maintain distances from each other, implement quarantines, etc.42 However, the Spanish flu is believed to have weakened U.S. President Woodrow Wilson’s ability during the Paris Peace Conference to end World War I when the flu probably weakened both his body and mind. As a result, he signed the Treaty of Versailles, which set the stage for more conflict and death on European soil.43 A seminal study by Douglas Almond revealed that children in the womb of mothers who contracted this disease displayed reduced educational attainment, increased rates of physical disability, lower income, lower socioeconomic status, and higher transfer payments compared with other birth cohorts. By using the 1918 influenza pandemic as a natural experiment, he tested the fetal origins hypothesis and revealed the long-term adverse effects caused by the epidemic (Almond, 2006).44 Notably, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, the world experienced the largest trade war in history and the Sino-US technological cold war, which reached the largest scale in history (Sheng & do Nascimento, 2021).45 Similar to all epidemics, the impact of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic on the affected countries will be large and far from straightforward, which has provoked long-standing problems related to power transition and changes in geopolitics.

2.2 Performances of China and the U.S. in the Battle Against COVID-19 As two of the major powers worldwide, there is a sharp contrast between China and the U.S. in their responses and performance while facing the challenges introduced by the COVID-19 pandemic, not only in terms of aspects related to the ability to respond to the epidemic, such as the quantity and quality of medical supplies and the number and speed of research and development results of relevant scientific research 41

Price-Smith (2008). Langford (2005). 43 As Flecknoe et al. suggest, “it is impossible to say for sure to what extent his incapacity prevented Wilson from steering the eventual outcome of the conference—the Treaty of Versailles—away from the vengeful and punitive sanctions which his European counterparts wished to impose upon the German people. If it did, given how much that treaty contributed to the rise of extremist politics in interwar Germany, then the ‘Spanish Flu’ might also count as one of the causal factors of the Second World War” (Flecknoe et al., 2018). 44 Almond (2006). 45 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021). 42

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teams but also the ability to coordinate the national fight against the epidemic, such as the credibility, appeal, efficiency, etc. of the national government and discourse worldwide regarding the transfer and seizure of power. The novel coronavirus was first detected in the city of Wuhan in the province of Hubei; Wuhan is a major city in the central region of China with a population over 11 million at the end of 2019 and has served as one of China’s important transportation hubs since ancient times. After its exposure, the Chinese government’s early coping strategies received many negative comments, mostly from Western countries in the opposing camps and from the political perspective. Western scholars were critical of Beijing’s lockdown, speech control measures, and the absence of NGOs’ participation caused by government intervention (Enos, 2020).46 After experiencing mismanagement in the early phase from late December 2019 to January 2020, however, China successfully stabilized the pandemic through a series of tough measures; strict quarantines were imposed nationwide, and international and even intercity travel was highly restricted. Additionally, all confirmed patients were required to be hospitalized in designated hospitals, and the state paid for treatments, greatly releasing economic pressures. All these measures caused tremendous economic losses but successfully halted the pandemic inside China. As a result, in the short term, epidemic medical equipment was donated to 150 countries and four international organizations. Moreover, the Chinese also organized video consultations with medical teams in over 170 countries and sent medical teams to 30 countries, including Italy (Krastev & Leonard, 2020).47 Actually, the unprecedented epidemic had severe adverse effects on both the supply and demand chains globally, is described as the “Great Isolation”, similar to the 1929 crash known as the “Great Depression”. The pandemic represents an exogenous shock of uncommon magnitude imposed on firms with international commercial linkages, including large multinational enterprises (MNEs), small and mediumsized firms, new ventures, and their supply chain partners (Verbeke, 2020).48 WHO Director-General Dr. Tedros (2020) seriously cautioned that “we have a long way to go. This virus will be with us for a long time” (World Health Organization, 2020).49 During this tormenting epidemic period, all countries are also aware of the fragility of global supply chains under the impact of the epidemic, which, as an inevitable natural biological attack, has a greater impact on the global supply chains than the previous Brexit and Sino-US trade war.50 The struggle is a long-term battle; therefore, all countries need to recognize this serious situation, determine the position or role of global supply chains, predict various challenges that different countries with different positions will face in terms of global supply chains, strive to reduce 46

Enos (2020). Krastev and Leonard (2020). 48 Verbeke (2020). 49 World Health Organization (2020). 50 From “Coronavirus, Tariffs, Trade Wars and Supply Chain Evolutionary Design,” by Handfield, R. B., Graham, G., and Burns, L., 2020, p. 1. Copyright © 2020, Emerald Publishing Limited. Uploaded in accordance with the publisher’s self-archiving policy. 47

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losses in the long-term battle against the COVID-19 epidemic or during the long-term coexistence with the coronavirus and exert efforts to address difficult problems. In early 2020, economists estimated the economic growth of 30 countries worldwide under the spread of the epidemic and proposed pessimistic predictions, warning that the GDP of some countries may decline by more than 15%. According to the calculations, if the epidemic is out of control for more than three months, China’s economy may face negative growth in 2020 (Fernandes, 2020).51 Regarding China, from the perspective of the global economy, people will think that this country, which has actively participated in international economic and business affairs and continuously invested in global production, especially since the implementation of China’s reform and opening-up policy at the end of the twentieth century, has gradually become an important manufacturing country on the world stage in the twenty-first century and has an irreplaceable manufacturing position in global supply chains and global production chains.52 However, this unprecedented epidemic was first noticed and mentioned in this important manufacturing country and first attacked the country’s economy and people’s livelihood (World Health Organization, 2020). In the process of global value chains, some raw materials and some work-in-progress products are transported from one part of the world to another many time and finally located in a certain place to be assembled as industrial finished products (Seric et al., 2020).53 In the process of global supply chains, China has also produced various types of intermediate inputs while being actively responsible for several significant links, such as processing and assembling, which can be strongly proven by a typical example, i.e., Foxconn, a famous electronics contract manufacturer producing and assembling electronic accessories for many world-leading firms or companies. For many products within these global producing processes, China is at the center of such types of chains because, after several decades of economic development, China has played an unsubstituted role in these processes “as a primary producer of high-value products and components, a large customer of global commodities and industrial products, and a major consumer marketplace”.54 However, we need to acknowledge that because of the higher level of the degree of current globalization, global supply chains worldwide vary, and the division of each link of global supply and production chains is more detailed than ever before, the large but fragile chains will be delayed or even destroyed if some global force majeure factors, such as COVID-19, suddenly shock the global industry. Fortunately, as the nationwide pandemic was mitigated in April 2020, China’s economy gradually recovered. After the catastrophic first quarter, China’s economy rebounded during the second quarter with 3.2% growth in its GDP, which is regarded as a considerable increase for two reasons. On the one hand, China’s GDP suffered a steep decrease in the previous quarter. On the other hand, as a result of the worldwide pandemic, China’s main competitors, Japan, the USA, and the EU, simultaneously 51

Fernandes (2020). Sheng (2016). 53 Seric et al. (2020, April 27). 54 Ibid. 52

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experienced massive GDP declines. According to the latest World Economic Outlook growth projections, China is expected to reach 6.0% positive growth in 2021 (IMF, 2020).55 Consequently, experienced with COVID-19 treatments, China once again became a vital energy source for the global economy. Taking good advantage of an ample policy toolbox and stimulus measures, China’s economy recovered the fastest from the pandemic, although it was hit first (Liu et al., 2020).56 As Churchill’s words inspire, “Never let a good crisis go to waste.” China is believed to have used this opportunity as a stress test of its economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has been considered an accelerator of economic transition and financial innovation in China (Ba & Bai, 2021).57 In contrast, the U.S. badly bungled its response even though it had sufficient time to respond. President Donald Trump and his administration were too preoccupied with the senate impeachment trial and reelection campaign to manage the pandemic issues since the critical month of February. Moreover, Donald Trump politicalized the pandemic issue. After claiming that “the virus is no more than a flu”, the president of the U.S. insisted that prophylactic measures, such as wearing masks and quarantining, will ruin the lifestyle of America. Furthermore, he and his colleagues constantly blamed China and the WHO and called COVID-19 the “Chinese virus” to distract the public focus from his mismanagement, which greatly enraged Beijing. Almost certainly due to his total incompetence and likely criminal negligence, Donald Trump lost his bid for reelection and became the first US President to lose reelection since 1992 and only the fourth President in the past 100 years to lose. His political party, the Republican party, also lost control of the legislative branch, i.e., Congress. As a result, the US remains, by far, the worst hit in terms of numbers. It is expected that the death toll in the US will reach 300,000 by the end of 2020, ranking first worldwide. In addition, its GDP shrank at 31.7% in the second quarter, with unemployment increasing at catastrophic levels. Subsequently, economic depression stimulated racial conflicts and social instability in the US. It seems that historically high unemployment in the U.S. is likely to prevail for some time in contrast to, China’s economy, which is rebounding with strong employment and stable supply chains. Superimposed on the economic recession, the civil rights campaign, and the presidential election, the United States is actually in a relatively chaotic period. While China’s economy will continue to recover, however, the US will be in a far worse position to challenge China’s rise as it falls into a prolonged economic decline. Walt (2020)58 warned that the greatest source of US power and influence is its reputation for expertise. However, Washington’s disappointing performance during the coronavirus pandemic may come to an end. He describes Trump’s entire approach as an epic policy failure with a “belated, self-centered, haphazard and tone-deaf response”, which will tarnish the US’s reputation as a leading role with effective actions rather than making America great again. 55

IMF (2020). Liu et al. (2020). 57 Ba and Bai (2021). 58 Walt (2020, March 23). 56

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During the epidemic, the United States, whose lack of preparedness and national policy provided the world with a picture of absolute chaos in 2020 as its death toll increased daily, placed its citizens in unnecessary danger for a long time and was unwilling to play a leading role in addressing the global crisis. This negative coping strategy resulted in dual crises at home and abroad, which may become critical for the great turning point and an accelerator of the great change of global order. We are very possibly witnessing the end of the United States as the sole superpower due to its unpreparedness and, more importantly, refusal to play any leadership role in helping to lead the world out of this large crisis last year. Clearly, the post coronavirus world will be very different than the pre coronavirus world. Eventually, the worldwide power of the US may be generally weakened.

2.3 New “Suez Moment”: The Precipitous Loss of America’s Global Leadership After the Suez Crisis in 1956, the British Empire completely disintegrated, and the U.S. replaced it as the world leader. Accordingly, “Suez Moment” refers to the signature moment when the British Empire lost its existing leadership in global affairs and had to give way to the new world hegemon, the United States. Since the 1990s, American hegemony has been constantly challenged. In the book The Post-American World: The Rise of the Rest, Zakaria (2008)59 discusses the threats that are faced by America, such as the Islamic threat, the rise of nationalism, and the rise of the rest. Although America is currently the only superpower worldwide as the rest of the world rises in both economic and political terms, America will experience a relative decline. Both American hegemony and American-led liberal world order have been challenged. After the Second World War, America established a complex liberal order with which it was situated at the center. It is an order built based on the American provision of security and economic public goods, mutually agreeable rules and institutions, and interactive political processes that give states a voice in the running of the system (Ikenberry, 2005: p137).60 America’s massive power advantages give the order a hierarchical cast, but its liberal hegemonic and security community features render the American empire a structural impossibility. Meanwhile, its exorbitant privilege from the dollar’s reserve currency status is accompanied by increasing difficulties posed by the Triffin dilemma.61 John Ikenberry argued that the crisis of American liberal hegemonic order during the George W. Bush administration will persist. He noted that the strategic bargains and institutional foundations of the American liberal hegemonic order have eroded. As a result, the authority with which the United States wielded power in this system also diminished. If the United States seeks to remain the leading purveyor of global order, it will need to rediscover 59

Zakaria (2008). Ikenberry (2005). 61 Sheng (2014). 60

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and adapt its old strategy of liberal order building. The United States will need to renegotiate its relationship with the rest of the world, which will inevitably imply relinquishing some of the rights and privileges that it had in the earlier hegemonic era. The COVID-19 pandemic further accelerates the U.S.’s decline. In March 2020, at the early stage of the global epidemic of COVID-19, China flattened the curve of death and newly diagnosed patients. At the same time, although the epidemic was at the beginning stage in the US and the overall situation was still blurred, some keen analysts had already sensed that the crisis was quietly looming. Campbell and Doshi (2020)62 considered that this epidemic has signature geopolitical meanings and may start the new “Suez Moment” of the United States. During the 70 years after World War Two, the status of the United States as a global leader was based on not only its wealth and strength but also equally important legitimacy, which originated from three major elements, namely, domestic governance, the provision of global public goods, and the ability and willingness to convene and coordinate global crises. COVID-19 tests all three of the above elements, and Washington’s response was disappointing. However, Beijing is taking advantage of the vacuum caused by Washington’s mistakes while shaping itself into a global leader in the epidemic by providing medical assistance and material support.63 Three months later, the world witnessed that the United States had become the worst country to address the epidemic. The death of Floyd caused great riots advocating “Black Lives Matter” in the United States. Furthermore, the United States constantly provoked diplomatic disputes with China, the European Union, Iran, etc. These accelerated processes of de global leadership accelerated the disintegration of the leading international role of the United States. The outbreak of the epidemic and its potential results show that the U.S. is unable to contain China’s rise under the existing US-led global governance framework. Considering history, the decline of the British Empire and the Suez moment originated from the successive rise of other powerful countries worldwide. The United States played a critical role in the decline of the British Empire. Therefore, the “Suez Moment” in 1956 was regarded as the turning point when the United States took over global affairs as a future power, and the British Empire retreated as a second-class country as a past empire. For a long time, the United States pursued the diplomatic style of unilateralism. Although its military strength ranks first worldwide, similar to the latest generation of Western empires, its global rule often relies on morals, ideals, values, sense of responsibility, and the will and ability to lead the world, which are special features of the United States (Mead, 2013).64 However, currently, the world is witnessing the decline of American spiritual power, while other rising powers, such as China, are taking the responsibility to provide global goods and attempting to pursue a leading position in the world by coordinating global countermeasures.

62

Campbell and Doshi (2020). Ibid. 64 Mead (2013). 63

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America’s allies have noticed this situation, and while they may not publicly criticize Trump’s policy, many countries have obvious differences from the United States in their attitude toward China, the security of Chinese high technology, and other regional issues (Campbell & Doshi, 2020).65 China’s foreign aid in response to the epidemic may set parameters for a completely different relationship in the future, and China may quickly become a key force that cannot be ignored in the future.

2.4 China’s Challenge to a US-Led World Order in the Post Pandemic World Whether China or the US will emerge as leaders of the post coronavirus world remains controversial. Everything is up for debate, i.e., the trade-off between human lives and the economy, the trade-off between a trashed economy and public health, the exposed fragilities of globalization,66 the future of the European Union, populism, and the inherent advantage of authoritarianism vs. democracy. Competing ideologies, power blocs, leaders, and systems are being stress-tested in the court of the world’s opinion. President Emmanuel Macron of France stated, “This period will have taught us a lot. Many certainties and convictions will be swept away. Many things that we thought impossible are happening.” In Hong Kong, graffiti reads, “There can be no return to normal because normal was the problem in the first place.” The UN SecretaryGeneral Antonio Guterres said, “The relationship between the biggest powers has never been as dysfunctional. COVID-19 is showing dramatically, either we join together, or we can be defeated.”67 An excellent article discussing the international and political impact of the pandemic68 raises the question “Are state responses to the virus shifting the balance of power between China and the West?”. The article declares, “The pandemic has turned into a competition for global leadership, and it will be the countries that most effectively respond to the crisis that will gain traction.” Crisis Group Thinktank suggests, “For now, we can discern two competing narratives gaining currency—one in which the lesson is that countries ought to come together to better defeat COVID-19, and one in which the lesson is that countries need to stand apart to better protect themselves from it. The crisis also represents a stark test of the competing claims of liberal (democratic) and illiberal (authoritarian) states to better manage extreme social distress.” Many are already claiming that the East won this war of competing narratives. In an influential essay in the Spanish newspaper El Pais, the South Korean philosopher Byung-Chul Han argued that the victors are “Asian states like Japan, Korea, China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, or Singapore, that have an authoritarian mentality, which comes 65

Campbell and Doshi (2020). Sheng (2015). 67 All preceding quotes are obtained from the Wintour article “Who will be Winners and Losers”, Guardian, April 11, 2020. 68 Wintour (2020, April 11). 66

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from their cultural tradition of Confucianism. People are less rebellious and more obedient than in Europe (or the USA). They trust the state more. To confront the virus, Asians are strongly committed to digital surveillance.” The author believes that China has very cleverly repositioned itself from being the culprit to becoming the world savior by shipping supplies, medicines, and knowledge regarding the virus to newly afflicted countries and cities. China has shipped scarce masks, gowns, and ventilators to Italy, Spain, the US, the UK, Africa, and recently India. Harvard International Relations theorist Stephen Walt thinks that China may succeed. In the journal Foreign Policy, he declared, “Coronavirus will accelerate the shift of power from West to East. South Korea and Singapore have shown the best response, and China has managed well in the aftermath of its initial mistakes. The governments’ response in Europe and the US has been very skeptical and likely to weaken the power of the Western brand.”69 However, an Indian political scientist says, “Experience, thus far, shows that authoritarian or populists are no better at handling the pandemic. Indeed, the countries that responded early and successfully, such as Korea and Taiwan, have been democracies—not those run by populist or authoritarian leaders.” Notably, authoritarian Singapore faced a deadly second wave as new cases rose by the thousands several months ago. Singapore currently has over 61,000 cases. Furthermore, as we know, once largely politically free Hong Kong and Macau performed very well containing the virus. Stanford University Political Economist Francis Fukuyama agrees: “The major dividing line in effective crisis response will not place autocracies on one side, and democracies on the other. The crucial determinant in performance will not be the type of regime, but the state’s capacity, and above all, trust in government.” He praised Germany and South Korea, both democratic states. In fact, South Korea is selling itself as the democratic power that addressed the crisis the best. South Korea has over 124,000 cases but only 1,847 fatalities. However, two of the worst performers are the US and the UK, where there has also been limited trust in the central government, which has been inept, slow acting, and seemingly lacking any empathy for the thousands of victims (in the US case, up to January 20, 2021). Currently, the COVID-19 epidemic is still spreading globally. China has basically controlled its domestic epidemic, while the United States is still the main contributor to newly confirmed cases worldwide. Although the epidemic has had a great impact on the United States, there is no obvious sign of decline in natural resource endowment, control of core technologies, advantages of education and talent, especially military strength and comprehensive competitiveness. Therefore, it is unwise to believe that the United States will decline with the epidemic and that China will replace it as the leader of the world order. In research concerning international policy, the rise of China’s economy and political influence is always a hot topic, and related issues range from unresolved territorial disputes and suspicious trade practices to the growing military power of China.70 All these factors have raised the concerns of policymakers in the United 69 70

Walt (2020, March 23). For more discussion, please see Sheng (2012).

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States and its neighboring countries. There are also sharp divergent views regarding the future security order in Asia. Some scholars argue that there may be multilevel competition in Asia in the future, while other scholars note that China’s rise may be similar to that of the United States in the nineteenth century, foreseeing that China seeks hegemony over its neighbors. There are also assumptions that China may dominate the hierarchical regional order in East Asia or lead the construction of a regional community, thus eliminating the danger of regional wars. Acharya (2014)71 proposed an alternative conceptualization of Asian security order by arguing that it would make China keep restraint while seeking leadership position instead of taking the road of seeking hegemony. From this perspective, China and the United States have different judgments and influences on the international order. Even though China’s rise is far from reaching the level of a power shift among the current major powers and major changes in the world order, Western powers will still provoke ideological competition against China. China’s understanding of its responsibility in the international system may deviate from the expectations of the United States. With China’s wider participation in global affairs, this deviation will create more conflicts.72 The essence of the international order is the distribution of power. As each country has different goals and demands, subjective factors play an important role in the international order (Yan, 2019).73 The rise of China renders the global expectation of the future uncertain, and the United States will not relinquish its dominance on its own initiative in the post pandemic world. How to fully eliminate this uncertainty in policy and theory is an issue that China needs to explore. Furthermore, solving the problem of fairness in power distribution is a major challenge. Under the influence of COVID-19, there is still great uncertainty regarding the development of the world economic order, and China’s full rise will reduce this uncertainty. China has promised to provide millions of vaccines to countries globally after the outbreak of the pandemic. As developing states may have to wait long for Western vaccines, vaccines from China may have “appeal’ in these countries, and notably, Beijing is attempting to seek opportunities for “vaccine diplomacy”. If so, will Beijing win its reputation via the supply of vaccines? Will countries in good relations with Beijing prioritize vaccine accessibility? These questions may remain uncertain. However, it is certain that the elimination of coronavirus and economic recovery in regions, such as Africa, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. will benefit BRI projects and cooperation to return to normal situations. Currently, China should promote the reconstruction of the world economic order and win the trust of the international community. However, US-led Western countries should rethink how to cope with rising Eastern countries, such as China. The best way may be to attempt to accept them and establish cooperation with them. Eastern countries performed better in the pandemic partially because they had accumulated experience with the SARS epidemic. Furthermore, Confucianism and Eastern cultural traditions increased their ability to accept control under the 71

Acharya (2014). Hao et al. (2017). 73 Yan (2019). 72

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pandemic. Considering that the COVID-19 epidemic will not be the last pandemic, some Western countries may need to abandon their parochialism, respect and understand Eastern traditional culture, and jointly promote a world with diverse systems and cultures to work more cooperatively in fighting the epidemic and subsequent economic recession. Since 2016, the factors driving international deglobalization have concentratedly emerged. With the Brexit referendum and Trump as President of the United States, political conservatism, economic protectionism, diplomatic isolationism, and social populism in many European and American countries have gradually risen. Moreover, with the outbreak of the global epidemic, the recovery of the world economy has become weaker, and global trade has continued to slump. The voice of antiglobalization has become louder and stronger, and even anti-globalization voices and development trends have appeared.74 If China seeks to have a certain degree of economic discourse power in such a wave and have a more favorable position in the supply chains and production chains of the global economy, China needs to not only face the possible risk of a large-scale resurgence of the epidemic through import and export commodities, which may carry the virus in foreign trade but also face the challenges of importing and exporting strategic materials, avoiding trade barriers, and improving technological innovation capabilities and industrial transformation and integration. Especially during the epidemic period, the planning and arrangement of the import and export of medical and health supplies, which are strategic materials during the special period of the epidemic, and the risk assessment of foreign trade are important tasks. Moreover, the resistance and containment of China’s 5G technology and other new technologies from the United States in the Sino-US trade war that intensified after the epidemic is also a long-term challenge that needs to be overcome.75 Another important issue is that the export trade of rare earth resources, which are closely related to high-tech industries, is also an aspect that needs to be considered a longterm strategic resource. Regarding industrial transformation and integration, after this pandemic, relying on the advantages of its industrial chain and supply chain, China provided numerous anti-epidemic materials to international organizations and many countries worldwide, showing that China can provide stability and security for the normal operation of production chains and supply chains. The layout of multinational companies in China has been dynamically adjusted. In the process of China’s industrial upgrading and changes in the comparative advantages of production factors, some multinational companies will leave, and some new companies will enter. In the short term, a large-scale withdrawal of global supply chains from China is impossible, but some entries and exits could still occur. However, China’s current shortcoming is that the high-end links of the supply chain are weak. In the future, this shortcoming can be remedied through technological innovation and international cooperation.

74 75

Sheng (2010). Sheng and do Nascimento (2021).

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2.5 Easternization? A Global Power Shift from the West to the East In the early twenty-first century, a new situation emerged, i.e., the Western world, as we know, is rapidly losing its dominant position and is challenged by a new international system formed by BRIC countries and other powers in Asia. The West has dominated world politics for hundreds of years. However, with the rise of Asia, power shifts and influences the whole world. Therefore, the US and Europe are increasingly vulnerable to the political, social, and economic development of other parts of the world and have lost control of them (Turcsanyi, 2018).76 The twentieth century was once called the “American Century” by virtue of the comprehensive advantages of the United States in the fields of economy, military affairs, culture, and diplomacy (Phillips & Haskell, 1999).77 However, since the late twentieth century, there has been extensive discussion that Asia may dominate the twenty-first century. As a term originally and specifically used to describe “the spread of oriental management technologies to the West” (Kaplinsky & Posthuma, 1994)78 during the mid-1990s, “Easternization” is currently widely used in discussions in the field of economy, culture, and world order. Scholars have also discussed whether the resulting Asian model can be judged superior to the original Western model and the extent to which the West was infiltrated or shaped by values and beliefs originating from the East (Campbell, 2012).79 In his book Easternization: War and Peace in the Asian Century, Gideon Rachman (2016)80 adopted the concept of “Easternization” to discuss the future interaction between Asian countries, especially China, and the West. Although the book also has chapters devoted to Japan, South Korea, India, and other Southeast Asian countries, Rachman essentially studied China to explore these countries’ relationships with the West. The basic premise of Rachman’s long-term view regarding the political relations between Asia and the West is that by 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will live in Asia. Furthermore, numerous countries have risen in economic strength, which, in turn, translates into military influence. If Asian countries, especially China, surpass the West, especially the United States, in economic and military strength, the world will fall into the Thucydides trap. The United States will defend the belligerence of its superpower status, but the era of its dominance after World War Two is approaching an end (Rachman, 2016).81 There are also different views regarding the power shift from the West to the East. In his article, Michael Cox questioned the view that “the transfer of power is taking

76

Turcsanyi (2018). Phillips and Haskell (1999). 78 Kaplinsky and Posthuma (1994). 79 Campbell (2012). 80 Rachman (2016). 81 Rachman (2016). 77

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place and is unstoppable, and the western world and the United States are experiencing a sharp recession”. He believes that this statement pays close attention to the obvious changes occurring worldwide, but unfortunately, it ignores the insignificant changes. Therefore, this statement underestimates the broadly defined persistent structural advantages that still exist in the United States and its major Western allies. In addition, although the status of many emerging countries in the world economy is increasing daily, rising countries, including China, are still restricted by several internal and external factors. He also believes that although China, as a part of Asia, plays an increasingly important role in the whole world economy, this development does not pose a major challenge to the Western world (Cox, 2012).82 However, with the sudden outbreak of the COVID-19 epidemic, such a black swan incident seems to be disintegrating what Cox called “broadly defined persistent structural advances” in the West. In view of the economy, COVID-19 accelerated the downward trend and differentiation of the world economy. Since 2008, the world economic and financial crisis has not been fundamentally solved; in contrast, it has worsened. The crisis has only been concealed by the short-term response of monetary policy. The rapid recovery of China’s economy, the Belt and Road Initiative, and the establishment of the AIIB are also considered great challenges to the traditional West-led world economic structure. Lawrence Summers, the former US Treasury Secretary, believes that since the Bretton Woods system, no event can be compared to China’s establishment of the AIIB and the loss of American allies’ support as follows: “the United States lost its role as the underwriter of the global economic system” (Summers, 2015).83 Under the shock of the epidemic, the IMF projected a U.S. economic decline of approximately 6% in 2020 and a contraction of the Eurozone of 7.5%. The only group of countries worldwide projected to be in positive territory is in East Asia, at approximately 1%, where the predicted growth rate of China is 1.2%. The steeper economic decline and slower recovery in Eastern countries could lay the seeds for a long-lasting shift of global tectonic plates to the advantage of East Asian nations. Additionally, the lack of domestic and global governance of COVID-19 also exposes the arrogance and absence of Western countries in international affairs. China, whose authoritarian system has been criticized by Western countries for a long time, performed well addressing the epidemic. However, Western countries, which pursue the supremacy of democracy, are widely challenged in their domestic governance. Epidemic control calls for more effective international governance and cooperation, which will accelerate the change in domestic politics and the reorganization of international political order in Western countries.

82 83

Cox (2012). Summers (2015, April 6).

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References Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., & Robinson, J. (2003). Disease and development in historical perspective. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1(2–3), 397–405. Acharya, A. (2014). Power shift or paradigm shift? China’s rise and Asia’s emerging security order. International Studies Quarterly, 58(1), 158–173. Almond, D. (2006). Is the 1918 influenza pandemic over? Long-term effects of in utero influenza exposure in the post-1940 US population. Journal of Political Economy, 114(4), 672–712. Ba, S., & Bai, H. (2021). Covid-19 pandemic as an accelerator of economic transition and financial innovation in China. Journal of Chinese Economic and Business Studies, 1–8. https://doi.org/10. 1080/14765284.2020.1855394 Bailey, M. (2021). After the black death: Economy, society, and the law in fourteenth-century England. Oxford University Press. Barry, J. M. (2004). The great Influenza: The epic story of the deadliest Plague in history. Penguin. BBC. (2020, April 1). Coronavirus: Greatest test since World War Two, says UN Chief . Retrieved from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-52114829. Benedictow, O. J., & Benedictow, O. L. (2004). The black death, 1346–1353: The complete history. Boydell & Brewer. Binion, R. (2006). European identity: Its historic origins. Chinese Journal of European Studies, 1. Bristow, N. K. (2012). American pandemic: The lost worlds of the 1918 Influenza epidemic (pp. 1–3). Oxford University Press. Campbell, K. M., & Doshi, R. (2020). The coronavirus could reshape global order. Foreign Affairs, 18. Campbell, C. (2012). Easternization. In The Wiley-Blackwell encyclopedia of globalization. Wiley Cox, M. (2012). Power shifts, economic change and the decline of the west? International Relations, 26(4), 369–388. https://doi.org/10.1177/0047117812461336 Crosby, A. W. (2003). America’s forgotten pandemic: The influenza of 1918. Cambridge University Press. Drezner, D. W. (2020). Immature leadership: Donald Trump and the American presidency. International Affairs, 96(2), 383–400. Enos, O. (2020). How the Chinese Government undermined the Chinese People’s attempts to prevent and respond to COVID-19. Heritage Foundation. Epstein, S. R. (2000). Freedom and growth: The rise of states and markets in Europe, 1300–1750 (Vol. 17). Routledge. Fenner, F., Henderson, D. A., Arita, I., Jezek, Z., & Ladnyi, I. D. (1988). The history of smallpox and its spread around the world. In Smallpox and its Eradication (pp. 209–244). Fernandes, N. (2020). Economic effects of coronavirus outbreak (COVID-19) on the world economy. Available at SSRN 3557504. Flecknoe, D., Charles Wakefield, B., & Simmons, A. (2018). Plagues & wars: The ‘Spanish Flu’pandemic as a lesson from history. Medicine, Conflict and Survival, 34(2), 61–68. Frankopan, P. (2015). The silk roads: A new history of the world. Bloomsbury Publishing. Gewirtz, P. (2020, June 1). No one knows: How the unknowable consequences of COVID-19 affect thinking about foreign policy and US-China relations. Brookings. Available at https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/no-one-knows-how-the-unknowable-consequencesof-covid-19-affect-thinking-about-foreign-policy-and-u-s-china-relations/. Glatter, K., & Finkelman, P. (2020). History of the plague: an ancient pandemic for the age of Covid-19. The American Journal of Medicine. Hao, Y., Sheng, L. & Pan, G. (2017) Political economy of Macao since 1999: Dilemma of its success. Palgrave Macmillan. Harper, K. (2017). The fate of Rome: Princeton University Press. Hays, J. N. (2007). Plague and the end of antiquity: The pandemic of 541–750. Cambridge University Press.

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Chapter 3

Comparison Between Authoritarian and Democratic Countries in the Pandemic Era

A wide body of literature has long debated the pros and cons of democracy and authoritarian regimes. Democracy, with its openness and diversity, has been regarded as an ideal form of government. According to the latest Freedom House report in 2019, between 1988 and 2005, the percentage of countries ranked Not Free in Freedom in the World decreased by almost 14 points (from 37 to 23%), while the share of Free countries increased (from 36 to 46%).1 However, the successive waves of democratization did not lead to the end of authoritarianism. Abundant studies show that democracy has long been challenged by authoritarianism.2 Many studies have revealed that democratic recession and authoritarian backlash continuously occur.3 Given that COVID-19 is the latest blow to the ailing liberal international order, there are no happy times for liberal internationalists in the pandemic era. In particular, authoritarian governments represented by China have been praised for their great performance in responding to the epidemic, while many democracies, such as the United States, performed less than ideal. Even less than 30 years after Fukuyama declared liberal democracy’s eternal dominance, he also had to admit that the improper handling of new coronary pneumonia may hurt liberal international order and democracy.4 A heated debate rages regarding which political system, democracy or authoritarian, is 1

House (2019). See Calder and Lie (2006), Ottaway (2013), Cooley (2015), Diamond et al. (2016). 3 Huntington (1993) suggested the authoritarian backlash that followed successive waves of democratization. Larry Diamond (2015) noted that the democratic recession has been under way for nearly 30 years. Lührmann and Lindberg (2019) demonstrated that a third wave of autocratization is indeed unfolding. 4 In Francis Fukuyama’s book the end of history and the last man (1992), he argued that liberal democracy is the final form of government for all nations. However, after the outbreak of the novel coronavirus, Fukuyama (2020) predicts that the pandemic could lead to the United States’ relative decline, the continued erosion of the liberal international order, and a resurgence of fascism worldwide. Although he suggests the possibility of a rebirth of liberal democracy, his general forecast is gloomy unless current trends change dramatically. Quoted in Francis (1992) and Fukuyama (2020). 2

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_3

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better positioned to respond to COVID-19, although we still cannot judge whether the regime played a decisive role. This pandemic indeed presents an important and unique moment for scholars interested in comparative political studies to make sense of the performance of different types of government systems. In view of these situations, this chapter discusses whether democracy or authoritarianism is best suited to address unprecedented threats. The validity of authoritarianism in the battle against COVID-19 can lead to the erosion of democracy, which should be noticed by all states in the post-COVID-19 era.

3.1 Crisis Management in Authoritarian States and Democratic States This section mainly discusses the strengths and drawbacks of authoritarian states and democratic states in crisis management from the perspective of the relationship between the government and civil society and central-local relations. Cases in which authoritarian states and democratic states respond to large-scale emerging crises are selected in events related to the global or regional pandemic. Many studies discuss crisis management since it is significant for the survival of both authoritarian states and democratic states. Democratic governments are held accountable by citizens in the form of voting in general elections as follows: mismanagement leads to unpopularity, electoral blame, and low chances of reelection (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2014; Liu & Chan, 2017).5 In authoritarian regimes, similarly, nonviolent mechanisms of accountability are often unavailable, and there is no formal strict need for governments to be popular. However, when the government equals the regime, the stakes are significantly raised, providing an incentive to not upset the people, who have an attitude of practical expectations and hope. If a crisis exposes weaknesses that cannot be fixed or the government fails to prove its value as a provider of public service, the whole political system risks losing legitimacy (Chan, 2013; Liu & Chan, 2017).6

3.1.1 What Is Crisis Management? Crisis management has been widely discussed in the existing literature. Scholars have explained why the disasters that occur are not only the natural events that cause them. These disasters are also the product of social, political, and economic environments because the lives of different groups of people are structured by these elements (Wisner, 2004:p. 42).7 There are three different definitions of a crisis: a crisis is an event that has destructive consequences; a crisis is the result of an 5

Baekkeskov and Rubin (2014), Liu and Chan (2017). Chan (2013), Liu and Chan (2017). 7 Wisner et al. (2004). 6

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organization’s or individual’s cognition of themselves and their environment, and a crisis is a structural point of the social process. The first definition emphasizes the devastating consequences of a crisis. Alexander (2005) defined a disaster based on its damage to human life, nature, and the social environment.8 Hewitt (1983) noted that a crisis is “unwilling and unexpected” to people.9 Perry (2005)10 argued that a disaster refers to an event that suddenly occurs and seriously damages the function of a community or social community. People instinctively “hate” destructive events, such as disasters, accidents, conflicts, and risks. If a crisis is defined from the perspective of “destructive events”, crisis management is mainly carried out around “events” by emphasizing the establishment of an effective management system to address the crisis from the aspects of the system, process, resources, and technology. The second definition emphasizes the social construction result of a crisis. Halpern (1989)11 defined a crisis as the result of an interaction among individual or organization behavior, tendency, psychological and cognitive limitations, and organizational structure and system. The decisions made by individuals based on preferences, habits, and experiences may have disastrous consequences. Individuals may use denial, rejection, stubbornness, ostentation and other strategies to protect themselves, which distorts organizational information, leads to wrong decisions and behaviors and induces crises (Pauchant, 1992).12 A crisis is also the result of the “social construction” of key moments, situations, or states by organizations or individuals. This type of “situation” poses a serious threat to the basic structure or fundamental value of society, and decision makers face high time pressure and uncertainty and must make decisions quickly. Therefore, in essence, a crisis is the result of the subjective perception of organizations or individuals. An organization or individual imagines itself and its living situation, i.e., whether the situation is urgent, destructive, or deterministic, and then decides whether it is in a “crisis”. The goal of a crisis is to rebuild trust and build consensus through education, publicity, dialog, persuasion, and information control, which is essentially a communication management activity based on “people”. The third definition emphasizes the social system process of a crisis. Boin (2005)13 defined a crisis as the situation that occurs when policy makers experience “a serious threat to the basic structures or the fundamental values and norms of a system, which under time pressure and highly uncertain circumstances necessitates making vital decisions.” This definition has two meanings. First, a crisis is the sudden interruption of the functioning of a continuously running system, the structure of the system is broken or damaged, and the system cannot operate normally. Second, a crisis is also the starting point of system functional recovery and structural rebalancing. In summary, Drennan and McConnell

8

Alexander (2005). Hewitt (1983). 10 Perry et al. (2005). 11 Halpern (1989). 12 Pauchant and Mitroff (1992). 13 Boin (2005). 9

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conclude that the term “risk and crisis management”, which is related to extraordinary phenomena, covers events and incidents, such as natural catastrophes, terrorist attacks, corporate failures, threats to human and animal welfare, critical incidents, environmental degradation and policy failures.14 Managing crises needs to realize system rebalancing and restoration to normal function. From the perspective of a dynamic balance, a crisis is not only a functional obstacle to the system but also an initiator of structural change and functional renewal of the system. Under this definition, the goal of crisis management is to accept, adapt to and learn to use the crisis. Tamer (2004) noted that due to the increasing incidence of various disasters, crisis management has become the primary concern for policy makers in many countries.15 ‘t Hart and Rosenthal (1993) identified the following three distinct features of crises: crises pose a severe threat, constitute high time pressure for decision makers, and are shrouded in uncertainty.16 Koehler et al. (2014)17 further elaborated upon the difficulties in an emergency response situation. First, the type of disaster and its magnitude that could occur at any time is unpredictable. Second, where a disaster will occur is often unpredictable. Third, how a disaster will unfold in geographic space over time is often unknown. Fourth, the perception of threat by people living in the disaster area is related to the type and distribution of injuries, and the pattern of their arrival (least injured first, followed by more severely injured in bursts) in space and time is often unknown. Fifth, which elements of the emergency response system will be damaged, how they will be damaged, and the resulting delay in their response is unpredictable but can have profound unexpected effects on the response. Crisis management capability tests the resilience of society and exposes the shortcomings of its leaders and public institutions (Drennan & McConnell, 2007).18 According to Drennan and McConnell, a crisis can become a magnet for societal outpourings of questioning and criticism in liberal-democratic societies based on the dispersal of political power and the right to criticize political and administrative managers and decision makers.19 As the world is increasingly interconnected, a crisis becomes more trans-bordered. A crisis that appears easily contained at first glance can rapidly accelerate and develop unpredictably (Lagadec, 2007; Thompson, 2007).20 A global pandemic is a typical case of an emergency crisis in which outbreaks occur in a very short time and governments need to respond quickly.

14

Drennan et al. (2012). Tamer (2004). 16 ’t Hart et al. (1993). 17 Koehler et al. (2014). 18 Drennan and McConnell (2007). 19 Ibid. 20 Thompson (2007) and Lagadec (2007). 15

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3.1.2 How the Relationship Between the Government and Civil Society Influences Crisis Management According to the definition in the Encyclopedia Britannica, authoritarianism is a principle of blind submission to authority as opposed to individual freedom of thought and action. In terms of government, authoritarianism denotes any political system that concentrates power in the hands of a leader or a small elite that is not constitutionally responsible to the body of the people. Authoritarian leaders often exercise power arbitrarily without regard to existing bodies of law, and they usually cannot be replaced by citizens choosing freely among various competitors in elections. The freedom to create opposing political parties or other alternative political groupings with which to compete against the ruling group for power is either limited or nonexistent in authoritarian regimes.21 Many studies confirm the authoritarian advantage in crisis management.22 Compared with democratic regimes, authoritarian regimes are advantageous in achieving certain policy goals as a result of particular political and institutional characteristics (Lampinen, 2020).23 Both democratic and authoritarian institutions may have advantages and disadvantages in mitigating crises. By comparing different effective responses to COVID-19 in China and South Korea, Mao (2021) suggested that different regime types affect countries’ responses and the effect of crisis management by shaping the state capacity (including the following four types of capacity: information capacity, decision making, and implementation capacity, coercive capacity, and mobilization and cooperation capacity).24 According to Mao (2021),25 “democracies tend to possess strong information capacity to deal with crises. Their decision making and implementation capacity and mobilization and cooperation capacity depend on effective intergovernmental coordination and state-society synergy, respectively. The main problem for crisis management is weak coercive capacity. In authoritarian regimes, weak information capacity may hinder the timely response to crises in the early phase. However, the government tends to possess strong coercive capacity, centralized decision making and mandate-driven implementation capacity, and statedirected mobilization and cooperation capacity in crisis management.” One characteristic of and challenge associated with a crisis is urgency; the high time pressure demands quick action. Therefore, more time-consuming processes of consensus are not ideal when addressing crises. A dictator’s or group of small elites’ unrestricted capacity to make quick and consistent decisions is arguably the greatest strength of authoritarian rule (Hadenius, 2001).26 Crisis management in authoritarian states is a top-down approach, implying that the government has full control 21

Encyclopedia Britannica, Authoritarianism (politics) http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/ topic/44640/authoritarianism (accessed 12 01, 2010). 22 See Remmer (1990), Schwartz (2012), Lampinen (2020). 23 Lampinen (2020). 24 Mao (2021). 25 Ibid. 26 Hadenius (2001).

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of the agenda setting, and the public has limited participation (Chan, 2013).27 Thus, authoritarian states could have effective control of the whole society by adopting coercive measures, such as school closures, home isolation, and travel restrictions. These measures are called containment measures and aim to reduce mobility and create social distancing. In the case of the H1N1 crisis, although public reaction was rather passive, the Chinese government provided a quick response by coordinating senior officials to address the epidemic (Liu & Chan, 2017).28 The global H1N1 influenza pandemic emerged in 2009 and was first identified in Mexico and the U.S. It was the first pandemic of the twenty-first century to be declared. China’s response until September 2009 was characterized by an aggressive containment approach that sought to establish barriers against the spread of the disease. Therefore, emphasis was placed on reducing the surge. Since the Chinese government was criticized for delayed action in response to SARS, China was sensitive to allegations that it was not reacting responsibly in public health crises. A more visible and high-profile approach, as the containment strategy entails, would present an image that the government acted differently this time. In addition, the successful “containment” of the SARS virus encouraged the use of anti-SARS measures as the “natural” response to the H1N1 outbreak (Huang, 2010).29 Similarly, the Singapore government also adopted strict measures. Singapore practiced in-hospital-based quarantine, where all its early cases were kept until a negative PCR result was obtained. In Singapore, oseltamivir ring chemoprophylaxis, combined with the prompt identification and isolation of infected personnel, was effective in reducing the impact of 2009 H1N1 in military barracks (Fisher et al., 2011).30 Although containment policies have received contradictory comments in SARS and H1N1 prevention (Fisher et al., 2011; Huang, 2010),31 they have been proven effective in the COVID-19 pandemic (Deb et al., 2020).32 During the COVID19 pandemic, civilians were prohibited by law from leaving their houses unless a definite need arose. Fines can be charged up to S$10,000 and/or prison up to six months.33 In China, people did not pour into the streets without wearing masks to protest against the workplace closure policy. Moreover, authoritarian states have advantages in swiftly integrating medical resources. Finally, managing surveillance data is also a crucial function of authoritarian states (Huang, 2010).34 In addition to the fear of being punished by the government, cultural values influence the effectiveness of containment policies in authoritarian states. Several

27

Chan (2013). Liu and Chan (2017). 29 Huang (2010). 30 Fisher et al. (2011). 31 Ibid. Huang (2010). 32 Deb et al. (2020). 33 Jones (2020). 34 Huang (2010). 28

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studies confirm that collectivism can positively predict people’s preventive intention and reduce the infectious rate during the COVID-19 pandemic.35 Such collectivism is based on a strong centralized authority leading a vigilant population that is concerned with the public safety of others and the effective planning, communication, and enforcement of public safety measures (Liu, 2021: p. 26).36 In contrast to individualism, which values personal autonomy, uniqueness, and independence, collectivism values person-other relatedness or interdependence and the person being a part of a collective (Hui, 1986; Triandis, 1995).37 Many studies, including both normative research and empirical research, discuss the relationship between collectivism and authoritarianism. Historically, individualism is a product of liberalism with an emphasis on civil liberties and freedom and emerged in opposition to authoritarian oppression during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Kemmelmeier, 2003).38 It was widely believed by philosophers that obedience to authority was essential for controlling excessive individualism and avoiding lawlessness and anarchy. Altemeyer (1981)39 proposed three components of authoritarianism. First, submission to authorities is legitimate. Second, aggression toward those who deviate from norms is acceptable. Third, high adherence to social conventions is required. These components overlap with components of collectivism and remain unknown. Scholars have used empirical research methods to examine this hypothesis and found internal linkages between authoritarians and collectivism. Hofstede (1980)40 examined data from 40 societies and found a pronounced negative correlation (r = −0.67) between individualism and power distance, a construct referring to the degree to which relationships between individuals of a society are hierarchical. Thus, Hofstede demonstrated that the greater the power distance level, the lower the level of individualism in a society. Other analyses demonstrated that individualism and power distance loaded on the same factor, suggesting that these constructs are on opposite ends of an underlying continuum (Hofstede, 1980).41 These findings support the notion that at the cultural level, individualism and adherence to authority and hierarchy are incompatible. Because Hofstede considered collectivism the opposite of individualism, his findings also implied that power distance and hierarchy are inherently linked to collectivism. Kemmelmeier (2003)42 reported similar findings. He examined the relationship between individualism-collectivism and orientations toward authority at the individual level. He found that there is considerable similarity between collectivist and authoritarian beliefs, causing them to be highly correlated; however, there is no such relationship between individualism and authoritarianism. Scholars also explained why collectivism is linked to authoritarianism. Gelfand 35

See Huang et al. (2020), Liu (2021), Maaravi et al. (2021). Liu (2021). 37 Triandis (1995), and Hui et al. (1986). 38 Kemmelmeier et al. (2003). 39 Altemeyer (1981). 40 Hofstede (1980). 41 Ibid. 42 Kemmelmeier et al. (2003). 36

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(1996)43 argued that the main source of overlap between authoritarianism and collectivism is high adherence to social conventions and customs. Specifically, submissiveness and obedience to authorities and punishment toward those who deviate appear to be unique to authoritarianism. The emphasis on relationships (e.g., indebtedness, self-discipline, honoring and respecting parents, and family security) appears to be unique to collectivism. Although it is widely believed that in authoritarian states, civil society is largely constrained by a strong government, civil society in a nondemocratic state has informed a new wave of research concerning associational life under authoritarian regimes. Scholars have discussed why civil organizations could exist and the role they have played in authoritarian states. These scholars argue that civic associations could survive and flourish under authoritarian rule because they carry out important functions that overlap with the goals of the state (Hsu, 2010; Spires, 2011).44 State and civil society organizations develop a mutually advantageous mode of cooperation involving an exchange based on common goals and complimentary activities and functions (Lewis, 2013).45 The purpose of NGOs is not to weaken or replace the state but instead to strengthen the state and help it fulfill its responsibilities to its citizens (Hsu, 2010: p. 260).46 Thus, the development of civil organizations could not promote democracy in authoritarian states. In contrast, NGOs serve as supplementary organizations for the government. Lewis (2013) noted that on the one hand, authoritarian states have become adapted in restricting NGOs to roles commensurate with self-organization while severely restricting discursive activities. These discursive activities are viewed as threatening to the stability of the state because they undermine the maintenance of a hegemonic legitimacy discourse, which operates both domestically and internationally. Purely functional and organizational activity by civil society organizations, on the other hand, often serves to enhance the legitimacy of the state in terms of a shared international discourse on civil society and domestically in helping meet the challenges of rapidly changing societies. In nondemocratic countries, civil society has developed to some extent during the pandemic. When an authoritarian government cannot adopt effective measures to manage a crisis, civic associations could participate in the public service responsibility. In Myanmar, civil society organizations, religious organizations, and local companies provided food and other emergency supplies to the needy, filling the gaps left by the state.47 In addition, Buddhist monks, religious leaders of the Muslim minority, and Christian churches allowed their religious compounds to be used as quarantine centers.48 Some scholars also discussed the drawbacks of authoritarian states. Many scholars stress that authoritarian states have no accountability because they are not elected by people. These governments have not been responsible or have no intention to 43

Gelfand et al. (1996). Hsu (2010), Spires (2011). 45 Lewis (2013). 46 Hsu (2010). 47 Lorch and Sombatpoonsiri (2020, December 7). 48 Sein (2020, March 26). 44

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be responsible to the public (Chan 2013; San et al. 2020).49 Thus, these governments see no urgent need to address the incident. In contrast, these governments view crises as potential threats to the status quo as opposition parties or ‘external forces’ could make use of the crisis to challenge the legitimacy of the ruling party. Another problem is those authoritarian leaders may trigger social instability because they fail to respond to public expectations. Through the institutionalized mechanism of voting, the public can respond to a government’s response to a crisis without destabilizing the democratic system of government (Chan, 2013).50 However, the public in authoritarian regimes has no legal channel to express their opinion. Thus, the public and authoritarian leaders may have different expectations in managing a disaster. The public may challenge the government through mass campaigns and place the government in a passive situation (Liu & Chan, 2017).51 According to Mainwaring et al. (2001),52 modern democratic regimes meet at least the following four criteria: (1) executives and legislatures are chosen through elections that are open, free, and fair; (2) virtually all adults possess the right to vote; (3) political rights and civil liberties, including freedom of the press, freedom of association, and freedom to criticize the government without reprisal, are broadly protected; and (4) elected authorities possess real authority to govern because they are not subject to the tutelary control of military or clerical leaders. Although some scholars affirm the strength of authoritarian states in disaster management, democratic governments are also believed to go to great lengths to help victims of disasters according to political theory (Boin, 2005: p. 82).53 Boin et al. (2005) noted the importance of vibrant opposition parties. These authors argue that vibrant opposition parties present voters with a credible ruling alternative and might even be able to overturn the government directly through parliamentary procedures. Hence, the opposition, the electorate, and the media form a trinity responsible for the political dynamic that spurs the government to respond to disasters (Boin et al., 2005).54 Berengaut (2020) stressed the strengths of democratic states from another perspective. She argued that public health depends on transparency, public trust, and collaboration at the national and international levels.55 Another strength of the democratic regime is that civil society can participate when the government cannot adopt an effective response. Governance theory emphasizes individual rights and advocates that nongovernmental organizations, social organizations, and individuals should play an alternative role to address government failure. Scholars who support governance theory believe that degovernment governance can achieve fairness and transparency and political legitimacy (Furton

49

Chan (2013), San et al. (2020). Chan (2013). 51 Liu and Chan (2017). 52 Mainwaring et al. (2001). 53 Boin (2005). 54 Boin et al. (2005). 55 Berengaut (2020, February 24). 50

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& Martin, 2019).56 Therefore, through the democratic narrative framework, Western countries have established a common and stable political value base in their own countries. Alexander (2005)57 argued that grassroots-based participatory democracy has become an effective method in disaster mitigation and management worldwide because risks and emergencies cannot be approached effectively without robust local organization. He noted that modern Western presidential and parliamentary democracies have become insalubrious in three ways. First, people have become disaffected and, in many cases, disinclined to vote. Second, corruption in high places has become very difficult to stem, indicating a lack of accountability. Third, industrial and commercial lobbies seem to have gained as much power as voters. Therefore, unsurprisingly, resilience to disasters has only painfully slowly increased; many places lack the essential democratic base. Indeed, the discourse system of democratic politics also renders self-examination more difficult, and the government’s expected ability of openness, responsibility, correction capability, and effective implementation seems to have failed in the campaign to control the epidemic. Under the influence of governance theory, nongovernmental departments extensively participate in social governance, and the leading role of the government in administration and social management is diluted. In addition, because the democratic system emphasizes the separation of legislative, executive, and judicial powers and the multiparty rotation system is widely adopted, there is a long-standing tension within the country in the process of governance. This type of tension exists in the process of governance and political party elections and seems to exist among nongovernmental departments, individuals, and the government. Once the general consensus meets major divergence or disappears, this tension may become an unprecedented confrontation (Greer, 2006).58

3.2 Human Security and the Pandemic 3.2.1 Rethinking Human Security in the Context of the COVID-19 Pandemic Human security is an emerging paradigm for understanding global vulnerabilities, such as the current coronavirus pandemic sweeping through much of the world literally as we speak. These vulnerabilities would have been exposed by the various threats that have arisen since the COVID-19 outbreak. Therefore, we must carefully address acute crises as they arise while enhancing human security through crisis management and maintaining focus on the long-term challenges to human security. This section shifts the research perspective from the crisis management methods adopted 56

Furton and Martin (2019). Alexander (2005). 58 Greer (2006). 57

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by different regime types to the impact of their various COVID-19 responses on human security. Since the COVID-19 pandemic expanded the debate regarding how different political institutions influence human security, knowing why countries with different political systems effectively address crises and the implications for human security is significant. Next, the origin, definition, and forms of human security are introduced at length to allow us to illustrate how human security is constantly shaped and developed, its significance in pursuing sustainable development, and evaluating the measures adopted by democratic countries and authoritarian governments in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. The emergence of the human security discussion is the result of a convergence of factors at the end of the Cold War. Coined in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the term human security was used by thinkers who sought to shift the discussion concerning security from its traditional state-centered orientation to the protection and advancement of individuals within societies. These challenges challenged the dominance of the neorealist paradigm’s focus on states, “mutually assured destruction (MAD)”, and military security, which enabled a broader concept of security to emerge.59 These factors include the increasingly rapid pace of globalization (at least up to 2016, which saw the Brexit referendum in the UK and the victory of Donald Trump in the US Presidential Election), the failure of liberal democracy to address current problems, the reduced threat of nuclear war between the superpowers, and a great rise in the spread of international human rights norms opening a space for the development of human security. The large number of internal violent conflicts in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, and Europe (Balkans during the 1990s and currently Ukraine) resulted in concepts of national and international security failing to reflect the challenges of the post-Cold War security environment. The failure of neo-liberal (capitalist) development models to generate growth, particularly in Africa, or address the consequences of complex new threats (such as the coronavirus or climate change) reinforced the sense that international institutions and states are not organized to address such problems in an integrated way.60 The principal possible indicators of movement toward an individualized conception of security lie, in the first place, in the evolution of international society’s consideration of the rights of individuals in the face of potential threats from states. In particular, human security emerged as a challenge to ideas of traditional security, but human and traditional or international and national security are not mutually exclusive concepts. It has been argued that without human security, traditional (international and national) state security cannot be attained and vice versa. Traditional security refers to a state’s ability to defend itself against external threats. Traditional security describes the philosophy of international security predominance since the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 and the rise of nation-states. While international relations theory includes many variants of traditional security, from realism to liberalism, the fundamental trait that these schools share is their focus on the primacy 59 60

Tadjbakhsh (2006). Macfarlane and Khong (2006, September/October).

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of the nation state. Traditional security policies are designed to promote demands ascribed to the state. Other interests are subordinated to those of the state. Traditional security protects a state’s boundaries, people, institutions, and values. Human security is people-centered. Its focus shifts to protecting individuals’ or groups’ well-being and welfare.61 The important dimensions entail the well-being of individuals and response to ordinary people’s needs while addressing sources of threats. State security is related to a state’s ability to deter or defeat an attack. The state uses deterrence strategies to maintain the integrity of the state and protect the state from external threats. In addition to protecting the state from external aggression, human security would expand the scope of protection to include a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases (such as the Corona-19 virus), and economic deprivation. Examples to examine include the UN Charter, the UN Declaration of Human Rights and its associated covenants, conventions related to particular crimes (genocide), and the rights of particular groups (women, racial groups, and refugees).62 The United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report definition of human security argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in the following seven areas63 : I.

II.

61

Economic security. Economic security requires an assured basic income for individuals, usually from paid work, or as a last resort, from a state-financed safety net. In this sense, only approximately a quarter of the world’s people are presently economically secure. While the economic security problem may be more serious in developing countries, concern also arises in developed countries.64 For example, due to the coronavirus and policies of countries to “lock down”, millions of people have lost or are losing their jobs. In the US alone, some 22 million people have lost their jobs in spring 2020. The US government gave each person a total of US$3200 to tide them over during this crisis. One leader, Senator Bernie Sanders, proposed giving each person US$2000 each month until the crisis passes to give people real economic security. Obviously, unemployment and the resulting economic insecurity caused political tensions and ethnic violence as minorities are often scapegoated.65 Food security. Food security requires that all people at all times have both physical and economic access to sufficient food. It is what President Franklin Roosevelt referred to in the Atlantic Charter in 1941 as “freedom from Want”.66 According to the United Nations, the overall availability of food is not the problem; instead, the problem often lies in the poor distribution of food and lack of purchasing power. In the past, food security problems have been addressed at both the national and global levels. However, their impacts are limited. Although governments, nongovernmental organizations

Iqbal (2006). Ibid. 63 UNDP (1994). 64 Sheng (2012). 65 Ibid. 66 Brinkley et al. (1994). 62

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III.

59

(NGOs), and the United Nations have all attempted to address the issue of the lack of food security with varying results, famines still emerge in countries or regions. People still go to bed at night hungry. Wars, such as those in Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, do not help. Wars prevent necessary food from being distributed, and transportation networks are destroyed. The United Nations World Food Program has said that due to the virus, much of the world will face a famine of “biblical proportions” this year.67 Health security. The COVID-19 virus provides an example of health insecurity. We all fear becoming infected with the coronavirus and all its consequences. Health security aims to guarantee minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles. In developing countries, the major causes of death have traditionally been infectious diseases (e.g., influenza) and parasitic diseases (e.g., malaria), whereas, in industrialized countries, the major killers were diseases of the circulatory system (heart disease) and cancers. Currently, lifestyle-related chronic diseases are the leading killers worldwide, with 80% of deaths from chronic diseases occurring in low- and middle-income countries. According to the United Nations, in both developing and industrialized countries, threats to health security are usually greater among poor people in rural areas, particularly children. This situation is due to malnutrition and insufficient access to health services, clean water, and other necessities. In the United States, during this pandemic, poor people and minorities, i.e., blacks and Hispanics, suffered from the virus at a much greater rate than middle-class white people. We also see the deadly consequences as the epicenters of the virus shift from high-income countries to low- and middle-income countries.68

Health security prevents us from suffering the fate of tens of millions of sick, dying, and dead people from this current pandemic and future pandemics. Due to the horrible prospect of the current pandemic, large regions, cities, entire countries, and even continents have been or are in lockdowns, including Hubei Province, Italy, Spain, France, the UK, and most of the US, and several countries in South America and India have suffered crushing and cruel lockdowns during the past 18 months. Which cities, regions, and countries will be next? Governments need to work together; instead, they seem at war with one another as they did literally in 1918. Instead of leaders standing up and taking responsibility for their lack of action at critical times, they find scapegoats, such as the former US President who called the virus “the Chinese Virus”, deflecting from the fact that Trump was warned about the virus in January 2020 and did nothing for two months, except for calling it a “Democratic hoax”. The consequences of the lack of health security unfold before our very eyes. IV.

67 68

Environmental security. Environmental security aims to protect people from short- and long-term ravages of nature (floods, hurricanes, typhoons, earthquakes, fires, etc.), man-made threats (fires), and a deterioration in the natural environment. In developing countries, the lack of access to clean water is one

Ibid. p. 27. Ibid. pp. 27–28.

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V.

VI.

VII.

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of the greatest environmental threats. In industrialized countries, the major threats are air pollution and other forms of pollution, i.e., water and light. Global warming, caused by the emission of greenhouse gases, is another environmental security issue. Prior to the outbreak of the coronavirus, global warming was one of the most discussed issues as Australia and California faced unprecedented fires, the UK and other areas in the US faced terrible flooding, Europe had its warmest winter on record, and the Arctic Icecap had been melting at an unprecedented rate. The world is currently facing rising seas, which could inundate coastal cities, such as Hong Kong and Macau, by 2100 if not sooner.69 Personal security. Personal security aims to protect people from physical violence from the state or external states, violent individuals and substate actors, domestic abuse, or criminals. For many people, their greatest source of fear is crime, particularly violent crime. In the United States, the threat to personal security has been a hot-button issue. The issue of gun violence and how to address this issue has divided Americans, even families, as one gun atrocity after another afflicts Americans. School children learn to “shelter in place” as a part of their educational programs.70 Community security. Community security aims to protect people from the loss of traditional relationships and values and sectarian and ethnic violence. Traditional communities, particularly minority ethnic groups, are often threatened. Approximately half of the world’s states have experienced some interethnic strife. For example, millions of Indians died when the subcontinent divided into Moslem Pakistan and Hindu India in 1947.71 Recently, Moslems were attacked in a series of pogroms by their Hindu neighbors in New Delhi, while the police watched and did nothing. Other attacks have occurred in numerous African countries as one tribal group warred on another. The worst example occurred in 1994, when Hutus attacked their Tutsi neighbors, killing 500,000 to 1 million Hutus in Rwanda.72 In 2003, the President of the Sudan Omar al-Bashir launched a terrible war of ethnic cleansing using paramilitary forces. Hundreds of thousands of non-Arab civilians in the Darfur region were killed. For this genocide, al-Bashir was indicted as a war criminal and is currently sitting in a prison cell in Sudan.73 Sadly, interethnic violence will likely occur until the end of time.74 Political security. Political security is concerned with whether people live in a society that honors their basic human rights. According to a survey

Ibid. pp. 28–30. Ibid. pp. 30–31. 71 Ankit (2016). 72 Dallaire (2009). 73 ICC Prosecutor Presents Case Against Sudanese President, Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir for Genocide, Crimes against Humanity and War Crimes in Darfur. Office of the Prosecutor, International Criminal Court, 14 July 2008. 74 Ibid. pp. 31–32. 70

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conducted by Amnesty International, political repression, systematic torture, ill-treatment, or disappearances are still practiced in over 100 countries75 (there are approximately 200 countries in our world). Human rights violations occur most frequently during periods of political unrest. Along with repressing individuals and groups, governments may attempt to exercise control over ideas and information by censoring the internet or social media outlets. According to Freedom House, following a wave of democratization after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, in our current world, we had a revival of authoritarianism and serious decline in democracy in established democracies, such as the United States, Hungary, Poland, India, Turkey, and other countries.76 Many fear that the “distance controlling” measures enacted during this coronavirus crisis will cause a loss of political and personal freedoms as cities, regions, and countries are locked down.77 From the introduction of these seven specific forms of human security, we can see that human security proponents challenge the traditional idea of national security by arguing that the proper referent for security should be at the human rather than the national level. Human security reveals a people-centered and multidisciplinary understanding of security and involves a multitude of research fields, including medicine, science, statistics, development studies, international relations, strategic studies, and human rights.78 The United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report is considered a milestone publication in the field of human security, with its argument that ensuring “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want” for all persons is the best path to addressing the problem of global insecurity.79 On the one hand, “freedom from fear” seeks to limit the practice of human security to protect individuals from violent conflicts. “Freedom from fear” also recognizes that these violent threats are strongly associated with poverty, a lack of a strong or effective central government, and other forms of inequities, i.e., income, class, racial, or religious. It argues that limiting the focus to preventing violence is a realistic and manageable approach to human security. Emergency assistance, conflict prevention and conflict resolution, and peace building are the main concerns of this approach. On the other hand, “freedom from want” advocates a holistic approach to achieving human security. This perspective argues that the threat agenda should be broadened to include hunger, disease, and natural disasters because they are inseparable concepts in addressing the root of human insecurity. These threats (hunger, disease, and natural disasters) kill far more people than genocide, war, and terrorism combined. For example, the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic killed 50 million people, which is a greater number of deaths than those in World War I and World War II combined. Differing from “freedom from fear”, “freedom from want” expands the 75 Each year, Amnesty International conducts its Annual Report on the State of the World’s Human Rights, such as 2015–2016 (February 24, 2016). 76 Csaky (2021). 77 Ibid. pp. 32–33. 78 D’Anieri (2012). 79 United Nations Development Programme. Human Development Report, 1994.

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focus beyond the prevention of violence with an emphasis on development and security goals. Despite their differences, these two approaches to human security can be considered complementary rather than contradictory. Franklin D. Roosevelt’s famous Four Freedoms Speech in 1941 indicates that “freedom from want” is characterized as the third, and “freedom from fear” is the fourth such fundamental, universal, freedom.80 Currently, the coronavirus pandemic has brought both freedoms to the forefront. People worldwide fear that if the COVID-19 virus should attack them, they cannot provide for themselves and their families. The pandemic has considerable political, economic, and social consequences. For example, the WHO is warning of a global famine this year due to the virus as people will be too sick to cultivate the soil or too poor to buy food.81 Similarly, we all fear this virus and what it could mean as one’s health is probably the greatest thing we can possess. Fear of the virus causes us to fear our neighbors. Fears of people from a pandemic epicenter can lead and have led to discrimination against people from these areas or cities. Flights from India are banned, and people from India are currently shunned in numerous countries. Additionally, human security has a special relationship with development. Traditionally, embracing liberal market economics (laisse-faire capitalism) was considered the universal path to economic growth and, thus, development for all humanity. However, continuing conflict and human rights abuses following the end of the Cold War thirty years ago and the fact that two-thirds of the world’s population seemed to have gained little from the economic gains of globalization led to fundamental questions regarding the way development was practiced.82 Accordingly, in the 1990s, human development began to challenge the dominant paradigm of a capitalist economy in the development community. Human development proponents argue that economic growth is insufficient to expand people’s choices or capabilities. Areas, such as health, education, technology, the environment, and employment, should not be neglected. Human security could be said to further enlarge the scope of examining the causes and consequences of underdevelopment by seeking to bridge the divide between development and security. Too often, militaries do not address or consider the underlying causes of violence and insecurity. Instead, development workers often underplayed the vulnerability of development models to violent conflict. Human security springs from a growing consensus that these two fields need to be more fully integrated to enhance security for all.83 However, critics of the concept, who are mostly political conservatives, argue that its vagueness undermines its effectiveness. Human security has become little more than a vehicle for activists wishing to promote certain causes, which critics call “an agenda”. Critics complain that human security does not help the research community understand what security means or help decision makers formulate good 80

Franklin D. Roosevelt. The Four Freedoms Text, January 6, 1941. “Amid Threat of Catastrophic Global Famine, Covid-19 Response must Prioritize Food Security, Humanitarian Needs, Experts tell General Assembly”, General Assembly, Plenary Thirty-First Special Session, 4 December 2020. 82 Sheng (2011). 83 Stewart (2004) and Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2006). 81

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policies.84 Other scholars have argued that the concept of human security should be broadened to encompass military security. Human security would no longer be the vague amorphous add-on to harder edged areas of security, such as military security or state security. Perhaps the coronavirus crisis will remove some of this “amorphous” quality when it has become a part of our daily lives.85 The fact is that in this course, we can only meet in this classroom under numerous constraints. The fact that cities, regions, entire countries, and even continents are locked down indicates that human security has become very real and tangible. For human security to challenge global inequalities, there must be cooperation between a country’s foreign policy and its approach to global health.86 Again, consider how the trade war between the US and China impacted global health in the pandemic era. China makes most of the world’s gowns, face masks, ventilators, and other crucial tools used to aid doctors. However, despite suffering millions of cases and over 500,000 deaths, the US government refused to remove the tariffs on those critically needed items. It has a huge current-account deficit with China in recent years.87 The former US President refused to accept offers of help from the Chinese government and individuals, such as Jack Ma. Fortunately, individual governors, such as Gavin Newson of California and Andrew Cuomo of New York, did. This is an example before our eyes of an anti-Chinese foreign policy allowing needless deaths and suffering in the pandemic. The interest of the central government has continued to overshadow the interest of the people.

3.2.2 The Relationship Between Human Security and Political Institutions With the onset of COVID-19, authoritarian regimes and democratic states have adopted varying strategies to protect their citizens’ health security while addressing the crisis. The global expansion of COVID-19 has further intensified the discussion regarding the important issue of how different political institutions address the human security crises posed by infectious diseases. Are authoritarian regimes better able to guarantee human security than their democratic counterparts? What do authoritarian COVID-19 responses imply for the future of liberal democracy? To answer these questions, this section systematically reviews the performance of authoritarian and democratic countries in protecting human security during the epidemic and explains the subtle connection between human security and different political systems. Some studies indicate that authoritarian states are in a better position to protect their citizens from the existential threat posed by external crises, such as the coronavirus pandemic. It may be easier and beneficial for a developing country like 84

Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy (2006). Paris (2001). 86 Spiegel and Huish (2009). 87 Sheng (2016). 85

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China to strengthen the government’s ability to control the economy.88 According to the increasing spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, authoritarian countries have demonstrated strong authoritarian resilience, making it easier to respond quickly to the crisis through different strategies. For example, China has adopted effective measures, including tracking citizens’ movements with mobile technology and quarantining whole regions more effectively with military power to greatly stop the spread of the virus and ensure the health and safety of most people. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesu, the head of the World Health Organization, uses ‘speed, scale, and efficiency’ to praise Beijing’s COVID-19 response arising from the advantage of China’s system.89 In contrast, although states of emergency can be declared by both democratic and authoritarian governments, democratic countries face more institutional constraints and are subject to the rule of law and pressure from civil society, free media, and other opposition forces.90 Citizens’ fundamental basic rights are key in promoting democracy. By comparing the more effective responses in China with the US’ failure to control COVID-19 cases, Diamond (2020) stated that the COVID-19 pandemic exposed the shortcomings of democratic countries in health governance and further posed a particular challenge to current democratic governance.91 However, some studies argued that although authoritarian states are better able to provide security when facing virus threats, they also constitute a threat to the human security of their own people. Kung and Chen argued that authoritarian governments lack independent information sources and effective self-correction mechanisms. The political career incentives within China’s nomenklatura system drove officials to implement more radical policies. This approach damages human rights and leads to internal crises, such as agricultural crises and famine. This is how China’s Great Leap Famine emerged. Greitens (2020) indicated that the augmented use of health surveillance technology has threatened human rights and civil liberties in China. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated this trend. Specifically, authoritarian regimes and weak democratic states violate the human rights of citizens when pursuing the prevention and control of threats to both public health and public order. However, consolidated democracies have managed to navigate the initial stages of crisis without significantly compromising democratic standards with the employment of surveillance.92 For example, recent economic research studying the association between common democracy measures and coronavirus outcomes shows that democratic countries may react slowly in the short term to prevent higher COVID-19 infection rates but have lower mortality and place a higher value on human life and health, while the observed coronavirus case fatality rates are higher in less democratic countries.93 A strengthening of populist authoritarian tendencies is that many countries make use of the state of exception as a consequence of COVID-19 and the increase 88

Gu and Sheng (2010). Pilling (2020, February 9). 90 See Boin et al. (2016). 91 Diamond (2020, April 16). 92 Greitens (2020). 93 Karabulut et al. (2021). 89

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in surveillance capacities. As the foundation of democracy, the creation- and legitimization-related function of elections is also threatened. Some countries postponed or canceled elections; the principle of equal suffrage is difficult to implement in the age of the spread of COVID-19.94 While authoritarianism is enhancing its legitimacy through the epidemic crisis, the erosion of democracy has given authoritarian leaders more power, which may cause irreversible damage to global human rights. According to Milani (2020), “As the Hungarian, the Serbian, the Indian, and the Brazilian cases illustrate, the pandemic context may give authoritarian leaders the ‘perfect excuses’ to try moving much beyond rule of law, freedom of expression, and respect for human diversity. Because the current crisis is causing greater fear, some may in return have a desire to seek the comfort of a powerful leader, thereby putting democracies at risk, particularly in local contexts where political institutions are more fragile.”95 People’s basic livelihoods are paramount in advancing human security. Therefore, we need to pay special attention to the human security status in poor countries that have become more embarrassed by the impact of the pandemic. As the poorest continent worldwide, most countries in Africa have overwhelmed medical systems and unbearable financial burdens due to the surge in cases of the epidemic, which has raised concerns regarding the deterioration of human rights. Matlosa (2021) described the horns of the dilemma faced by Africa between promoting the right to vote (democracy) on the one hand and safeguarding the right to health for citizens (human security) on the other hand and calls for advancing human security at this critical moment. According to Matlosa, “COVID-19 has placed African countries in an awkward predicament wherein their focus on providing health security for citizens could risk the health of democracy. In the face of COVID-19, Africa does not have the luxury of choosing between democracy and human security. African states have to provide both the right to vote with a view to advance democracy and the right to health in order to advance human security.”96 In economically underdeveloped countries, democratic systems seem to be more vulnerable, and human security is even more difficult to guarantee. Takao (2020) emphasized various vulnerabilities faced by economically poor countries in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and noted that “Many countries would have adopted a narrow, intolerant form of nationalism, into which totalitarian nations insinuate themselves. Human rights would be suppressed, and unfair disparities would be widening. As a result, people’s dissatisfaction would become radicalized, and society hovers on the brink of destabilization.”97 However, the human security threats caused by COVID-19 can serve as opportunities for positive change in global public health security. Countries need to focus on health threats as a global human security issue. According to the WHO, global public health security is defined as “the activities required to minimize the danger and impact of acute public health events 94

Pyrzy´nska and Skoczylas (2020). Milani (2020). 96 Matlosa (2021). 97 Takao (2020). 95

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that endanger the collective health of populations living across geographical regions and international boundaries”.98 A recent study described “Public Health 3.0” as a renewed commitment to addressing the social determinants of health (DeSalvo, 2017), and more recent scholarship described “public health reimagined” (DeSalvo et al., 2020) in the wake of COVID-19 as an evolving strategy that will need to adapt and respond to changing health and social needs.99 To achieve this goal, public health professionals must continue to work to alter problem narratives through education and outreach, but they need to work alongside policymakers, advocates, entrepreneurs, engaged citizens, and other interdisciplinary scientists to frame information in ways that resonate with a more diverse set of stakeholders. The transformation of the global health governance system toward a more sustainable direction should be on the agenda as soon as possible to better protect human security from damage in the post pandemic era.

3.3 Authoritarianism Versus Democracy: Which Is an Effective Remedy for the Pandemic During the pandemic evolution in 2020, there was no strong correlation between efficacy and regime types. By comparing different countries worldwide, it can be found that among the authoritarian states, China and Singapore made several achievements in pandemic responses, while Russia and Iran failed; among the democracies, South Korea and Norway impressed the world, while America and India were dramatic disappointments. China closed its temporary hospitals on March 10th, 2020, and announced a victory over the pandemic. People’s lives in China have returned to normal since the second quarter. One of China’s neighbors, Singapore, another outstanding example of the success of Asian countries in fighting the pandemic, is generally being released from national lockdown and travel restriction by “travel safeguard lane” in December. Additionally, many countries, such as Spain, Italy, and the US, faced a shortage of medical equipment. Moreover, the lack of medical supplies and shortage of medical staff spawned panic and resentment among the people and urged the further outbreak of potential public health and social crises. At the end of 2020, a COVID-19 mutation was reported in Britain and many other European countries, causing another wave of unrest among people living in not only related areas but also other corners of the earth. In this context, the following stark questions regarding governance and regime types are raised: Is authoritarianism more advantageous than democracy when confronting the COVID-19 crisis? Is the democratic system hindered by inherent inefficiencies and political differences? Is openness and diversity more helpful with mobilizing

98 99

WHO (2020, Mar 24). DeSalvo (2017), DeSalvo et al. (2020).

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citizens and social organizations? However, we cannot deny that compared to democratic governments, it is easier for authoritarian regimes to adopt strict measures to stabilize the situation. Using inferential statistics, Norrlöf (2020) found that liberal democracies have higher case fatality rates than other regime types. This study noted that one reason for this finding is difficulty in implementing and sustaining lockdowns in democracies when the spread of the virus complicates the implementation of policies consistent with liberal international order. She observed that the spread of the virus also imperils the liberal international order in which liberal democracies participate with border closures, discrimination, and restrictions on the right to privacy harming political freedoms.100 Similarly, Cepaluni et al. (2020) demonstrated that countries with more democratic political institutions experienced deaths on a larger per capita scale and sooner than less democratic countries by using data of deaths during the first 100 days of the COVID-19 pandemic, implying that democratic political institutions may have a disadvantage in responding quickly to pandemics.101 There are many reasons that determine the performance of countries, and the type of government system is not the only explanatory factor. However, this epidemic seems to challenge our previous perception that democratic systems are generally good for health. Kavanagh and Singh (2020) summarized the mechanism of democracy to improve health, including incentives—median voters desire redistribution, and the norm of equality increases support for accessible health services; information—open media and opposition ensure that information regarding health flows to the public while information regarding how to calibrate policy flows from the public to the government; accountability—enabling voters can punish leaders who fail, and association—enabling knowledge networks and interest groups to drive good policy. These authors suggest that several of these mechanisms of democracy that have been shown to be beneficial for health do not properly explain the performance of governments in this pandemic.102 Notably, the evaluation of the pandemic response by governments cannot be based on traditional long-term trends, such as infant mortality or life expectancy. Effective responses in the pandemic require the ability to act quickly, implement effectively, and gain public compliance.

3.3.1 The Differences Between Authoritarian and Democratic Responses The response of a state to a public emergency is an acid test of its commitment to the effective implementation of human rights.

—By McGoldrick Dominic.103 100

Norrlöf (2020). Cepaluni et al. (2020). 102 Kavanagh and Singh (2020). 103 Quoted in McGoldrick (2004). 101

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Some scholars emphasize the importance of regime type (democracy or autocracy) for understanding the reasons for the COVID-19 responses.104 It is generally believed that authoritarian governments are conducive to coercive action, but the lack of transparency may lead to wrong decision making. Authoritarian regimes can suppress information regarding emergencies or resist popular response measures, while democratic regimes find it difficult to suppress information or ignore the public’s demands for action. Democracies with inherent decentralization have slow responses, but transparency helps them make good decisions. Li (2009) noted that in democracies, policies reflect the inputs and balances of different constituencies; mistakes can be corrected through elections and public debates; information is freely flowing and, due to transparency and competition on the media market, the quality of public information is higher. However, their pluralistic nature tends to make their policy process slow. In authoritarian regimes, the policy process is opaque and mainly reflects the ruling class’s views. There are no formal channels to effectively correct mistakes. Due to the lack of free flow of information and lack of media competition, public information is of low quality and untrustworthy, and people rely on private messages and rumors for information. Due to the lack of checks and balances and the lack of public debates, the policy process can be fast.105 China and Singapore have experience successfully responding to SARS; thus, they can respond quickly and successfully to this pandemic. Singapore has largely benefited from its highly centralized approach to policy-making, its ready access to residents’ private data, and the harsh penalties that it meted out for breaches of laws and regulations that may also not be acceptable in many other countries and polities.106 However, in the case of emergencies, as a country that has a small land area and many of the resources normally required to depend on imports, Singapore’s political choice and policy determination have certain advantages in the process of implementation and improvement. Schwartz (2012) used cases of the 2002–3 SARS outbreak to compare China’s relatively effective response with Taiwan’s relatively ineffective response and identified three variables that constitute China’s ‘authoritarian advantage’, namely, centralized decision making powers, public support for government initiatives, and relations with the mass media. During the SARS crisis, state-controlled information was released and ensured a unified and reassuring message. The study confirmed that the unified message clearly sent in China via all media outlets was a powerful tool in counteracting potential chaos and managing the pandemic response.107 During the COVID-19 pandemic, the advantages of such centralized decision making emerged again. In the battle against this pandemic, the response is controlled, top-down, and fairly uniform. The unified collection, deployment, distribution, and utilization of resources from all walks of life with relatively strong means shows the possibility 104

See Greer et al. (2020). Li (2009). 106 Woo (2020). 107 Schwartz (2012). 105

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of implementing and promoting high-quality and efficient measures in a specific period.108 Compared with China’s efficient actions, the United States performed much worse in response to the epidemic. In the initial stage of the epidemic, the Trump administration attempted to label COVID-19 the “Wuhan virus,” continuing trade war with China to win the presidential election.109 The Trump administration’s appallingly partisan, mismanagement of the pandemic’s consequences and the divergence of views regarding its seriousness along partisan lines show the negative effect of the democratic system’s inherent inefficiencies and political differences. The US under the Trump Administration has already shown its reluctance to share its power and privileges despite its gradual retreat from global leadership.110 An effective pandemic response depends on coercive government actions, including school closings, bans on public meetings, compulsory lockdowns, and shutting work, which is deeply unpopular and distasteful and, therefore, difficult to implement in a democratic society where rights are entrenched.111 The values of civil liberties are deeply embedded in the American ethos. Nearly all Americans oppose government interference in their liberal rights, including free speech, an independent press, freedom of religion, and the right to protest associations.112 This sentiment also explains why the U.S. epidemic has become so severe. Additionally, there was an unwillingness of the local government to subsume power to the federal government, even in emergency situations. Ren (2020) observed that the U.S. had the least coordinated effort to address the crisis at the national level compared to China and Italy, while China’s central government was the most powerful actor among the central, provincial, and municipal governments. As she urged, “The pandemic exposed the pitfalls of America’s dysfunctional federalism under the current administration, the ideology of small government, and partisan politics”.113 Therefore, the absence of rational decision making by the Trump administration and the lack of concerted government intervention in the U.S. led to tens of thousands of unnecessary deaths.

3.3.2 Authoritarianism Pandemic and the Eclipse of Democracy No form of government can survive that excludes dictatorship when the life of the nation is at stake.

108

Sheng (2010). For more discussion regarding the Sino-US trade war, see Sheng and do Nascimento (2021a). 110 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021b). 111 Cheibub et al. (2020). 112 Page and Xie (2010). 113 Ren (2020). 109

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The power of the countries was reinforced as the pandemic caused insecurity and the risk of death. In this context, both democratic and authoritarian countries can more easily justify their actions and seize the power to run emergency authorities and rules than would normally be the case.115 Since the pandemic outbreak, democracies have constantly confronted numerous difficulties, such as soaring confirmed cases, climbing death tolls, and shortages of medical equipment, for several reasons. On the one hand, it is not easy for democracies to impose mandatory policies. On the other hand, people’s ingrained individualism, free lifestyles, and even prejudice regarding government roles hinder democratic countries from carrying out mandatory policies, such as wearing masks, home quarantine, and travel restrictions. In contrast, the world is surprised to find that China is able to build several new hospitals in only a few weeks, produce millions of masks in a short time and provide medical advice and assistance to other countries, which appears impossible to achieve by the current democratic government. However, many scholars made pessimistic predictions regarding this authoritarian regime at the initial outbreak of the pandemic in Hubei Province, China.116 Pei (2020) described it as a “paper tiger” with Xi’s Strongman rule and argued that the economic tensions and political critiques arising from the Sino-US competition with the Chinese people’s dissatisfaction with the regime stemming from this pandemic may ultimately become “the straws that broke this camel’s back”.117 Minzner (2018) noted one of six possible scenarios as follows: continued hard or soft authoritarian rule; a surging rise in populist nationalism; an extended downward spiral Minzner dubs “dynastic cycle redux”; or regime collapse, caused by either a sudden political decompression or an entirely unanticipated “black swan” event.118 However, the reality is very different from their expectations and upsets those seeking cracks in authoritarian regimes hit hard by the pandemic. China ‘’s authoritarian rule did not collapse under the vicious impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as a very natural black swan event and instead has shown amazing resilience. China adopted harsh control measures, and the scale and speed of these measures have never been seen in history, including community policing by residents monitoring and reporting each other’s violations, extensive use of big data, and monitoring technology to track people’s contacts with the virus, and the setting of temperature checkpoints and health rating codes, which proves the untrammeled authoritarian state power in times of crisis.119 Consequently, China quickly recovered from the epidemic, proving the legitimacy of its regime and consolidating its authoritarian governance. 114

Clinton (1948). Heisbourg (2020). 116 Pei 2016. 117 Pei (2020). 118 Minzner (2018). Quoted in Thornton (2018). 119 Zhao (2020). 115

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Although Mattingly (2019) states, “For the time being, China still relies mostly on human, not digital, tactics of authoritarian repression and control”, some scholars are afraid of the state’s use of advanced technology and surveillance to manage the economy and society.120 Zeng (2020) also worries that the Chinese authoritarian regime has made bold moves to invest in technology to improve surveillance programs and adapt in the age of AI given that the coronavirus outbreak seems to be accelerating an irreversible trend toward mass surveillance on a global scale.121 The pandemic provides fertile soil for authoritarian advancement. When the epidemic rapidly spread in the rest of the world, Western countries also adopted strict control measures to restrict the movement of people. “This kind of infectious disease can be defeated,” Dr. Tedros, then Director General World Health Organization, said, “However, However, it can only rely on the centralized, coordinated, and comprehensive actions of the entire government machinery.” From this viewpoint, democratic countries are also forced to adopt tough measures similar to authoritarianism regimes, such as travel restrictions and assembly prohibitions. He also praised China as “actually setting a new standard for outbreak response” later. Many countries, even democratic states, adopt lockdown, which once was criticized as an authoritarian invention by China, as a necessary response to contain the pandemic. Italy quickly became the first Western democratic country to issue a nationwide lockdown. This type of emergency can easily create opportunities for authoritarianism and dictatorship. As we have seen in the experience of the epidemic, some measures to address the pandemic caused democracy to decay in many countries. Among the EU countries, Hungary is a typical example. Its government approved a controversial emergency decree, and the parliament gave Prime Minister Orban considerable powers. As long as the emergency persists, elections cannot be held, and the spread of “disturbing information” may be punished. In the context of domestic democracy being increasingly eroded, the Orban government seized emergency powers well beyond what would be needed to respond to the virus and obtain space to expand its political power.122 However, Hungary is not alone because Spain and many other EU countries followed its steps. Some countries decided to temporarily close their parliaments or hold parliamentary voting in a virtual space within the constitutional framework. Even in Germany, the Speaker of the Bundestag Schaeuble made a similar proposal to establish an “emergency parliament” to address crises, but it is only allowed under war status according to the German Constitution. This situation

120

Mattingly (2019). Quoted in Rithmire and Mattingly (2020). Zeng (2020). 122 For more discussion regarding the democratic decay in Hungary, see Buzogány (2017), Bogaards (2018), Bozóki and Heged˝us (2018), Enyedi (2018). 121

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deepened concerns regarding ‘new authoritarianism’123 and even posed many risks to the conduct of genuine and transparent elections worldwide.124 Worse still, these coercive policy choices have long-run consequences,125 and historical experience suggests that they are difficult to undo after the outbreak abates after the coercive power seized by the government reaches a certain scale in a time of crisis, such as COVID-19.126 In Paul Pierson’s path-dependence framework (2000), these particular institutions made at certain “formative moments or conjunctures” can be “sticky” and once introduced, can be almost impossible to reverse and shape political development consequently127 given the exploitation of the pandemic by authoritarian leaders to strengthen their coercive capacity. For example, the COVID19 pandemic changed the protest pattern. In Hong Kong, the administrative authorities and police invoked the breach of social distancing rules as a reason to disperse and inhibit large congregations of demonstrators.128 In addition, the debate concerning authoritarian resilience will be on the agenda once again.129 Scholars have only recently investigated how collaboration between authoritarian regimes contributes to authoritarian persistence, where China and Russia are typical cases.130 Significantly, Serbia and China have established close ties during the epidemic. Since the evening of March 15, 2020, the day that the president of Serbia Aleksandar Vuˇci´c declared a state of emergency due to the severe pandemic situation in Serbia, significant amounts of medical supplies and national medical teams for support and guidance have been provided by China in a timely manner. Moreover, Russia also provided humanitarian assistance in time. Various democracy indexes suggest that under Vuˇci´c, Serbia has re-established a competitive authoritarianism regime and experienced a process of democratic backsliding.131 China is expanding efforts to establish an international image and enhance the attractiveness of the authoritarian regime through the cooperation of the Belt and Road Initiative and its dual circulation strategy in the post pandemic era. As Chang (2020) argued, “the emergence of the authoritarian suborder would be prompted by China’s more proactive narrative power, given that the climate of opinion is 123

The term ‘new authoritarianism’ implies the adoption of various measures with authoritarian features by a democratic government as a backlash against liberalism in countries, such as Hungary, Poland, the Philippines, and Turkey. In this process, the new authoritarian is ideologically inclined to build a powerful state with reduced civil liberties. Consequently, populist, nationalist, and xenophobic strands of backlash politics have proliferated across the liberal democratic world. This term is used here to describe the behavior of a democratic government that undermines liberal democracy during the epidemic. Quoted in Ikenberry (2018). 124 Landman and Splendore (2020). 125 Pierson (2004). 126 Posner and Vermeule (2003). 127 Pierson (2000). 128 Dodds et al. (2020). 129 The term “authoritarian resilience” refers to the resilience or durability of authoritarian political systems that are able to resist or adapt to democratic demands. Quoted in Brownlee (2007). 130 Von Soest (2015). 131 Castaldo (2020).

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ambiguous when faced with the uncertainty of the pandemic”. The study suggests that China used its narrative power to spin the pandemic to its advantage in the reorganization of world order to improve its international image and advocate the authoritarian order as an alternative, concluding that China’s narrative power-play during the pandemic might have moved the post pandemic order closer to the authoritarian end.132 Huang (2020) argued that the entrenchment of authoritarianism characterized by authoritarian resilience, autocratization, and the consolidation of competing authoritarian political-economic models led by China and new challengers posed significant challenges to the foundations of the current liberal order and ideology in the pandemic context. He suggested that the shock caused by the pandemic provided ample opportunities for China to extend its authoritarian networks, build an image of strong authoritarian power, and thus, promote its alternative hybrid political-economic model to challenge the mythologized liberal international order.133

3.3.3 The Likely Resilience of Democracy Although COVID-19 has created a ramifying crisis in many democratic regimes, we still cannot underestimate the resilience of democracy. With concerns regarding democratic decay currently extending beyond the young democracies of the “third wave” to some of the world’s most established democratic countries, including the United States, Licia, and Hanley (2021) identified democracy’s global malaise as a real and complex problem along with democratic backsliding, democratic erosion, or “creeping authoritarianism” and call for different strategies for democracy promotion to address these cases.134 Using both current and historical comparisons of China and Western countries, Stasavage (2020) provided the following three alternative proposals for democracies to be able to act more decisively when addressing external emergencies: allowing for rule by decree, devolving responsibility to localities, and investing in preventative state capacity. He noted that the most effective method is allowing voters to reward politicians for investing in prevention, although this reward can hardly be assumed.135 Political researchers also noted that the COVID-19 pandemic represents an opportunity for democratic resilience if the following four conditions are present: free press critically assessing information by the government; independent courts ensuring that mitigation measures and restrictions remain within the constitutional framework; effective parliamentary opposition performing government oversight, and active civil society mobilizing to defend democracy.136 132

Chang (2020). Huang (2020). 134 Cianetti and Hanley (2021). 135 Stasavage (2020). 136 Weyland (2020). Quoted in Guasti (2020). 133

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As discussed above, another resilience of democracy originates from its strong civil society. Many scholars realize the inadequacy of representative democracy (Cohen, 1989; Glicken, 1999; Goffer, 2021).137 Flinders (2011)138 emphasized that “too much accountability can be as problematic as too little”. He argued that increasing levels of public accountability may result in falling levels of public confidence in politics. Since the 1990s, governance theory has been widely discussed. Governance theory emphasizes that the legitimacy crisis of representative democracy could be solved although the role of civil society and multiagency participation in policy decision making (Goffer, 2021). For example, the developed civil society in the U.S. took great responsibility when Donald Trump failed to adopt effective measures. Their efforts covered many fields. Large nonprofits that focus on human rights or civil liberties led the way in documenting the pandemic’s danger to neglected populations, such as detained immigrants, and filing lawsuits to protect those populations while fighting to uphold civil liberties.139 The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) focused on defending and expanding civil liberties and civil rights in the pandemic.140 A range of religious groups embraced roles in helping local communities address the pandemic and its second-order effects. At the height of the pandemic, the evangelical organization Samaritan’s Purse deployed a field hospital in Central Park to help New York City treat the wave of coronavirus patients.141 Seeds of Hope, the food justice ministry of the Episcopal Diocese of Los Angeles, worked to address food insecurity by placing farm-fresh fruits and vegetables directly into the hands of those in need. They currently serve more than 30,000 households per week in over 100 communities across six southern California counties through a network of urban farms, food pantries, meal programs, and nutrition education/healthy cooking classes.142 Moreover, community-level organizations and mutual aid groups have been established voluntarily. These groups use high-tech platforms, such as Slack, Airtable, and What’s App, to deliver groceries, pick up prescriptions, and find financial support for people affected by the pandemic.143 In Southeast Asia, the coronavirus pandemic presents both challenges for civic engagement and opportunities for positive change. On the one hand, the pandemic provided a pretext for autocrats to tighten their grip on power, deepening existing regional trends in autocratization and shrinking civic space. On the other hand, civil society organizations focusing on economic and social welfare needs have emerged, and their activism may challenge autocrats in the long run.144 In Indonesia, the government still downplayed the seriousness of the pandemic in March 2020, and 137

Cohen (1989), Glicken (1999), Goffer (2021). Flinders (2011). 139 Wong (December 07, 2020). 140 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), https://www.aclu.org/news/civil-liberties/how-theaclu-is-responding-to-the-pandemic-visualized/. 141 Stack and Fink (2020, May 10). 142 Derose and Mata (2020, April 16). 143 Tiffany (2020, May 29). 144 Lorch and Sombatpoonsiri (2020, December 7). 138

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professional groups were quick to respond. Tech start-ups launched crowdfunding campaigns to raise funds for informal-sector workers and buy personal protective equipment (PPE) for healthcare workers. By late March, approximately 15,000 medical students from 158 universities across Indonesia had volunteered in understaffed hospitals.145 The Women’s Police in West Java donated their already low salaries to buy food for affected residents.146 The COVID-19 pandemic presents an opportunity to refocus scholarly attention to the drawbacks of the democratic system. As Mikael described, exposing vulnerabilities provides a “stress test” of the current democratic system. According to Mikael, “Crafting effective policy responses involves deepening democratic infrastructure and values to make them more robust against illiberalism and institutional decay. Authoritarian regimes such as China, Iran, Russia, and Turkey did not create the initial conditions of the current polarizing tendencies that make Western democracy vulnerable—they are merely seizing the moment to opportunistically foment these tendencies. It is therefore up to the Western democracies themselves to address these underlying problems of social distrust, polarization, and weak institutions. If seen as an opportunity, it may catalyze democratic development”.147 In summary, democracies must properly arrange the political legacy with authoritarian features left by the pandemic and strive to improve the efficiency of the response for the next crisis.

3.4 Conclusion: Which Regime Type Is More Effective? Although the regime type is a critical factor that influences the government’s response to the global pandemic, it is deniable that other factors also play important roles. By observing the different experiences of different countries, we found that some countries performed well in both authoritarian and democratic countries. Additionally, the countries that failed to adopt effective measures include both authoritarianism and democracy. Some scholars also attempted to identify other factors in addition to the regime type that affects the effectiveness of epidemic prevention and control. Christensen (2016)148 argued that organizational arrangements and the legitimacy of government authorities will affect crisis management performance. The organizational structure and coordination mechanisms within government arrangements are crucial. However, peoples’ acceptance, perceptions, participation, and support are crucial and constrain capacity and instrumental action. Not only what the state actually does but also citizens’ views and expectations regarding what it should do are important for crisis management performance. Baekkeskov and Rubin (2014)149 analyzed vaccination policies in nine Western democracies in the H1N1 pandemic 145

Ghaliya (2020, March 27). Renne (2020, April 24). 147 Wigell (2021). 148 Christensen et al. (2016). 149 Baekkeskov and Rubin (2014). 146

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and found that expert-based agencies rather than political leaders are more crucial for pandemic control. The potential gain from expert-led responses may be greater in countries with weaker democratic institutions, ceteris paribus. Directly strengthening expert communities in countries with weak democratic institutions, e.g., through agency support and training, could boost the likelihood of a more scientific response to pandemics. This could be preferable to a political response void of well-functioning mechanisms for accountability to the populace. In authoritarian regimes, expert-led health policies are equally important. San (2020)150 compared different measures to contain COVID-19 in Turkey and Iran and explained how distinctions between the actions adopted by authoritarian regimes might impact crisis management. The first difference is related to the role of health bureaucracy. In Turkey, the Turkish health minister, the Scientific Advisory Board (SAB), and health bureaucracy found a temporary space to design and implement “evidence-informed” and “expert-led” health policies in the early stage of the pandemic. However, in Iran, the regime, including major figures, such as President Rouhani, usually opposed the imposition of strict public health measures to mitigate the crisis, such as quarantine or nationwide curfews. Second, the economic distinctions between Turkey and Iran seemed to have impacted their ability to limit the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the earlier stages of the outbreak. Thus, we could draw the conclusion that a regime that is civilian rather than military, democratic rather than authoritarian, or even inclusionary rather than exclusionary establishes only a limited basis for making predictions regarding policy outcomes. In the process of proposing, implementing, improving, and practicing policies, the effectiveness and degree of trust cannot be generalized.

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Chapter 4

Global International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence

In this chapter, we analyze the performance of global international organizations in the COVID-19 era. Three of the most influential global international organizations in politics, health, and economy, namely, the U.N., the WHO, and the WTO, respectively, are selected for case studies. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, it is urgent for the whole world to have a strong method of organization to take a leadership role in fighting the virus. Therefore, multilateral regimes are supposed to function and be strengthened under the background of a global crisis. However, such regimes are dysfunctional and even undermined by reemerging unilateralism worldwide.

4.1 The United Nations The United Nations, which is the most authoritative international organization globally, has not played its full due role while dealing with the crisis. In one aspect, the U.N. did nothing except to issue some announcements appealing to countries worldwide for solidarity in response to the plague. Even though the whole world is being exposed to a common threat, the Security Council responsible for international security issues was absent until July 1st, 2020, when it passed a global ceasefire resolution directly addressing the coronavirus pandemic. The United Nations Development Program’s 1994 Human Development Report defines human security and argues that the scope of global security should be expanded to include threats in seven areas, one of which is health security, thus providing a vivid example to the whole world. We all fear getting the virus, including all of its consequences. Health security aims to guarantee minimum protection from diseases and unhealthy lifestyles. In developing countries, the major causes of death are traditionally infectious diseases (e.g., influenza) and parasitic diseases (e.g., malaria), whereas, in industrialized countries, the major killers are traditionally diseases of the circulatory system (heart disease) and cancers. Today, lifestyle-related chronic diseases are leading killers worldwide, with 80% of deaths from chronic diseases occurring in low- and middle-income countries. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_4

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According to the United Nations, in both developing and industrialized countries, threats to health security are usually greater for poor people in rural areas, particularly children. This is due to malnutrition and insufficient access to health services, clean water, and other necessities. In the United States, during this pandemic, poor people and minorities—e.g., blacks and Hispanics—have been suffering from the virus at a much greater rate than middle-class white people. We also see deadly consequences as the epicenters of the virus shift from high-income countries to lowand middle-income countries.1 On July 1, 2020, the Security Council delivered its support for the Secretary General’s call for a 100-day global ceasefire to help unite efforts to fight the coronavirus. The 15-member agency also called for an immediate suspension of 90 days of humanitarian operations to ensure safe, unhindered, and continuous provision of life-saving assistance. In January 2021, senior officials in the United Nations were still alarmed during a video conference of the Security Council about the impact of the coronavirus outbreak on international peace and security, the widespread and devastating impacts of the coronavirus pandemic that are continuing to grow, and the apparent inequality in global recovery also bringing about risks related to instability and tension.2 The pandemic’s impact on peace and security has increased, and inequality and corruption have increased. This breeds misinformation, stigma, and hate speech and adds new flashpoints to tension and instability. Thus, it is hindering diplomatic action and elaborate peace-building efforts and, to a large extent, does not affect the internal dynamics of armed conflict. The influence on marginalized groups such as adolescents and women is particularly astonishing. On the other hand, it looks as though it is a “mission impossible” for the United Nations to maintain the multilateral system and prevent the whole world from falling into another Cold War, especially when the United States insists on the unilateral policies formed under Donald Trump’s administration. In this case, the U.N. must find a more substantial backer financially and politically, and China has shown a strong interest in filling this position. As the influence of COVID-19 spreads, the inequality of global recovery has exacerbated the risk of instability and tension. With the vaccination of the citizens of wealthy countries, developing countries, especially countries already in interference and turmoil, have been left behind, which has dealt a heavy blow to security and peace.

4.1.1 The U.N.’s Challenge Under Trump’s Presidency The populist nationalism formed under President Trump does not care to support any international institutions and organizations unless they can satisfy the “America First” notion and bring physical and financial benefits to the U.S. Trump and his administration are trying to either cut their international organizations’ budgets or 1 2

Sheng (2015b). UN Security Council (2021).

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withdraw the U.S. from such organizations. The U.N. is one of the budget-cut targets of the U.S. Trump has spoken for a long time about making budget cuts to the U.N., and while these budget cuts may not be the end of the U.N., under Trump’s administration, the president also proposed cutting the budget of the U.N.’s climate change programs and Children’s Fund.3 Such budget cuts have affected the U.N. and its functions. Trump’s administration cut the aid and budget provided by the U.S. to the U.N., which involved the U.N. having to play more significant peace-building roles (Diehl, 2019).4 More importantly, as the U.S. alone covers approximately 20% of the entire U.N. system’s budget, that money is not evenly distributed among agencies. Thus, some organizations are more vulnerable to the whims of U.S. funding decisions than others.5 However, Trump’s foreign policy and attitude toward the U.N. seem to damage America itself rather than the U.N. itself. The gap between the U.S. and its allies during the voting of the United Nations General Assembly has been enlarged since Donald Trump’s presidency, which highlights the estrangement between the U.S. and its Western allies (Mosler & Potrafke, 2020).6 Trump represents individuals who see themselves as those who put American first, i.e., sovereignty aggressors who are skeptical of international norms and laws and tend to treat dealing with international institutions, including the United Nations, in a narrow manner. According to this view, the United Nations is at best a useful tool to serve the interests of U.S. foreign policy.7 To solve this problem, Rudd (2017)8 suggested that, since as Trump and the U.S. will insist on keeping “America First” as their foreign policy, what Guterres can do is to work together with Trump to ensure that the policy of “America First” does not result in the U.N. coming in last and determine where the two teams (Guterres’ teams and Trump’s teams) can work together for mutual benefit. However, this kind of balance is not achieved overnight in the process of searching. It needs to go through some twists and turns or even face the possibility of a crisis of imbalance.

3 US NEWS. United States Announces $285 M Cut in U.N. 2018 Operating Budget. https://www. usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2017-12-26/united-states-announces-285m-cut-in-un2018-ope rating-budget. 2017-12-26. 4 Diehl (2019). 5 QUARTZ. Many UN agencies are in a precarious position if the US decides to cut foreign aid. https://qz.com/1405965/many-unagencies-are-in-a-precarious-position-if-the-us-dec ides-to-cut-foreign-aid/. 2018-09-29. 6 Mosler and Potrafke (2020). 7 UNU-CPR, “The UN in the Era of Trump”, https://cpr.unu.edu/publications/articles/the-un-inthe-era-of-trump.html. 8 Rudd (2017).

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4.1.2 Does the U.N. Lack a Coordinated Response to the Pandemic? The U.N. was criticized for lacking time and a coordinated response toward the current pandemic in the early outbreak of COVID-19. Some leading nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) blasted the U.N. Security Council’s “shameful” inaction toward the COVID-19 crisis.9 By April 2020, the U.N. had called the coronavirus pandemic “the most challenging crisis since the organization’s founding after World War II.” Nevertheless, the Security Council and its most potent arm have been criticized for remaining conspicuously silent and not taking action promptly.10 The United Nations was accused of not helping to establish a well-developed safety culture in the field of public health; also, it has not seemed to have learned from previous epidemics or epidemiology. Not until June 2020 did the Secretary General launch the “UN Comprehensive Response to COVID-19” and a vaccination initiative worldwide. The success of achieving a global ceasefire has been mixed with uncertainty. The fact that this pandemic has taken place at a time when the Internet is the dominant form of disseminating information and communication has caused numerous controversies and disinformation to appear due to the lack of control of truthfulness of information, which, in perspective, has to result in a reevaluation of the criteria of credibility, which is another consequence of the unreadiness of the world to face such a widespread pandemic. The world is in an unprecedented crisis. What threatens humankind itself is not only a health crisis but also a humanitarian, socioeconomic, political, and development crisis. Actions taken in this situation should ensure medical care for all and protect human dignity. They should also be based on ways to restore the economy, development, and peace sustainably. Under such circumstances, the U.N. has failed to respond to and lead the global crisis. For example, regarding the right to health, the U.N. and its related agencies have failed to respond to this crisis. Disrespect for human rights, environmental degradation, reduced composition, and the elimination of the veto are just some examples of the challenges and problems that the U.N. system faces. The global coronavirus pandemic has caused unimaginable destruction and suffering to the international community. Facts have shown that international organizations cannot solve the current global crisis. COVID-19 has raised issues related to the U.N. Charter’s principles, such as international cooperation, nonviolence, the peaceful settlement of international disputes, establishing peace in accordance with the law, fighting poverty, respect for human rights, and the right to health and the right to self-determination.

9

France 24. Leading NGOs criticize UN over ‘shameful’ inaction toward Covid-19 crisis. https://www.france24.com/en/20200520-leading-ngos-criticize-unover-shameful-inactiontoward-covid-19-crisis. 2020-05-20. 10 The New York Times. U.N. Security Council ‘Missing In Action’ in Coronavirus Fight. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/world/americas/coronavirus-united-nations-guterres. html. 2020-04-02.

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The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted deep rifts in global health governance. International organizations, especially the United Nations, are facing obstacles from nationalist governments in response to common threats. The COVID-19 pandemic is also changing global health governance. In the era of populist nationalism, vital structural constraints and how to best achieve global unity are serious and urgent issues. Due to the enormous scale of human, social, and economic turmoil, international organizations must coordinate various countries’ resources and strengthen global health institutions and governance. The U.N. system also relies on international cooperation. However, the ongoing political conflicts and the sudden outbreak of the epidemic have nearly paralyzed the U.N., thereby preventing it from leading globally coordinated actions. Due to its limited influence on global health governance, the U.N. Security Council has been plagued by conflicts between China and the United States over the root causes of the pandemic and early response adequacy. In the long run, the root of the collision is highly likely to be influenced, while at the same time facing the danger of terrorists and extremists and uneven access to vaccines. Successfully responding to the challenges faced by COVID-19 and related conflicts requires greater political expectations; expanded forecasts; development assistance; full compliance with international law, including international intervention laws; and severe dialog, compromise, and reconciliation. Every effort must be made to ensure that all people have fair access to vaccines. According to documents published by the Security Council on the initiative of members, the urgent need for a global ceasefire has been reiterated. The importance of equal access to vaccines should be emphasized, and it should be pointed out that failure in this area may exacerbate injustice and further increase tensions, which would run counter to the principles of collective security and human unity.

4.1.3 U.N. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) Are Under Threat The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), set in 2015 by the U.N. General Assembly and intended to be achieved by 2030 are also being heavily affected by this sudden and unpredicted pandemic, especially for Goal 3, “Good health and wellbeing.” Moreover, in addition to the pandemic itself directly damaging the SDGs, Mukarram (2020)11 found that the pandemic might negatively affect the SDGs even after the pandemic has concluded. To achieve the SDGs by 2030, we are in need of $2.5 trillion per year from the U.S., but this pandemic has created additional economic pressure. This pressure adds to the existing financing gap, as countries are facing a financial crunch in the post-COVID period. According to Leach, MacGregor, Scoones, and Wilkinson, COVID-19 has exposed the fragility of the current globalized capitalist economy, with its reliance on trans-continental financialized transactions, just-in-time production, and long, carbon-consuming international supply 11

Mukarram (2020).

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chains.12 In addition, Leal et al. (2020)13 argued that COVID-19 is damaging more in developing states’ healthcare systems, as such areas are also concerned about many other existing diseases, such as malaria and yellow fever. This pandemic also brings about severe mental health problems, which are also likely to be overlooked; thus, this pandemic will heavily affect SDG implementation. Moreover, the SDG related gender equality has a trend of deepening. Without active intervention, the negative impact on women and families may last for several years (Power, 2020).14 It is also necessary and possible to take into account the additional unpaid care burden borne by women and families during the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, Pan and Zhang (2020)15 argued that the coronavirus pandemic has severely damaged human lives and livelihoods. The pandemic did extremely harm human security, which is people-centered, and focus has shifted to protecting individuals. The important dimensions are to entail the well-being of individuals and respond to ordinary people’s needs in dealing with sources of threats. In addition to protecting the state from external aggression, human security has expanded the scope of its protection to include a broader range of threats, including environmental pollution, infectious diseases such as the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and economic deprivation. The realization of human security involves not only governments but also broader participation of different actors, regional and international organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and local communities. However, Pan and Zhang (2020)16 also declared that this public health disaster still provides an excellent opportunity for the world to unite and transform this crisis into a sustainable United Nations (U.N.) development, which is the motivation of the goals (SDGs). As Blaustein, Pino, Fitz-Gibbon, and White write, “Supporting this agenda means assisting with the design, implementation, and evaluation of projects that contribute to safe, just and sustainable societies. From a critical standpoint, it also means challenging harmful or inappropriate initiatives and resisting attempts to capitalize on this agenda for political gain. Both modes of engagement are informed by the values of ‘caution’, ‘skepticism’ and southern epistemologies”.17 This pandemic might be an excellent chance to make clear contributions to new significant challenges and other SDGs. As the pandemic continues to develop, COVID-19 has already changed the ways in which we live and work and has brought challenges to areas such as socioeconomics, governance, education, healthcare, and employment. We have obtained valuable information to earn from this pandemic and accumulate knowledge in regard to tackling future hidden perils.

12

Leach et al. (2021). Leal et al. (2020). 14 Power (2020). 15 Pan and Zhang (2020). 16 Ibid. 17 Blaustein et al. (2018). 13

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4.1.4 Calling for the Support for the U.N. The Lancet’s COVID-19 Commission called on the United States to reverse its decision to withdraw from the WHO and other institutions during this pandemic and to support the U.N.; it also called on all nations to honor the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and to contribute to the efficacy of the U.N. multilateral system (Sachs et al., 2020).18 Harman (2020) believed that a pandemic at the scale of COVID-19 would inevitably expose shortcomings in institutions such as the WHO and the broader U.N. system, which would lead to member state disagreement; thus, the author called for the involvement of a diffuse network of governance that rests more on a comprehensive U.N. system, civil society, and the epistemic community of research and advocacy.19 Despite these challenges, the United Nations peacekeeping mission has continued to perform its mandated tasks and demonstrate resilience, resilience, and innovation. However, it should be noted that the restrictions related to the pandemic pose a challenge to the continued drawdown of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur.20 Since the beginning of the pandemic, peacekeeping operations have been working to support host country authorities to contain the expansion of the coronavirus. Looking forward to the future, peacekeeping operations are trying to predict the risks of change through long-term horizontal scanning to better prepare for risks and at the same time learn lessons to develop acceptable practices. The Operations Support Department has activated its supply chain to support on-site tasks by purchasing and distributing more than 4 million personal protection and intensive care unit equipment, as well as 35 test machines and 150,000 antibody test kits. Although the aforementioned team members are helping to maintain and expand to unprecedented levels, this effort has surpassed the original efforts due to the crisis’s growing scale. As a complement to the World Health Organization, the more extensive United Nations system has established a global health initiative related to international health cooperation. In the past two decades, the U.N.’s actions regarding global health have increased dramatically. In response to the global threat of COVID-19, the United Nations has developed a COVID response plan, a humanitarian response plan, and a framework for mitigating social and economic impact. Recognizing the economic consequences of the earlier Ebola outbreak in sub-Saharan Africa, the United Nations is working to minimize the impact of the current epidemic on lives, livelihoods, and the economy and to build a more inclusive and sustainable future. To help countries maintain resilience under this socioeconomic framework, the Secretary General of the United Nations launched the United Nations COVID-19 Response and Recovery 18

Sachs et al. (2020). Harman (2020). 20 UN Security Council, 25 Jan 2021, “Risk of Instability, Tension Growing, amid Glaring Inequalities in Global COVID-19 Recovery, Top United Nations Officials Warn Security Council”, https://reliefweb.int/report/world/risk-instability-tension-growing-amid-glaring-inequalitiesglobal-covid-19-recovery-to. 19

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Fund to help low- and middle-income countries cope with the pandemic. However, even when the United Nations system seeks to unite the world, governments often respond individually because international organizations’ universal systems still face persistent obstacles in regard to achieving global unity. The Security Council cannot ignore the pandemic’s threat to peace and security. The pandemic has exacerbated poverty, education has been interrupted, and food insecurity has worsened. All these factors may either cause or intensify conflict. Thus, the Security Council must act immediately to prevent conflicts caused by the interaction between the epidemic and pre-existing vulnerabilities. As long as the pandemic continues, the risks of collision and tension, and threats to international peace and security will definitely increase. How the United Nations can ensure that affordable COVID-19 vaccines are distributed fairly and equitably across the globe, especially in conflict areas, is an urgent issue.

4.2 WHO The WHO, as a specialized agency of the United Nations that is responsible for international public health, has also been criticized harshly since the early phase of the pandemic. At the beginning of the crisis, this leading organization in global health was criticized for its relationship with China being so close that it could no longer be trusted because of its slow response to declaring COVID-19 a severe problem. It was not until the end of 2020 that the World Health Organization established an independent pandemic preparedness and response team to analyze the level of international health responses. The research team claimed that the global pandemic alert system did not match the original intention, and the critical factor was determined to be slow on January 19, 2021 (Mahase, 2021).21 Some have criticized the emergency committee of the World Health Organization for causing early international attention. In a public health incident, nonpharmacological interventions should be taken, such as wearing masks and restricting gatherings. These measures have been adopted by China and can help save the epidemic. The panel of experts doubted the global leadership and the World Health Organization’s role because it did not more quickly digest the challenges and greater dependence of the pandemic. As the pandemic evolved, more WHO deficiencies were exposed. Structurally, there is a mismatch between obligation and power in the WHO. Without the sufficient capacity to carry out enforcement, it is hard for the WHO to assume its obligations when handling global health issues. Economically, the WHO is also facing financial issues under a paradoxical solution; it accepts private funding while repeatedly refusing to increase membership dues, which leads to criticism from time to time. What is worse, after U.S. President Trump halted all American funding to the WHO, which eliminated 20% of its total budget, the organization fell into severe financial straits. Politically, the WHO has become an arena for great power. With so many 21

Mahase (2021, n172).

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countries fighting for more rights to speak out in regard to the global governance of public health, the WHO’s decisions generally became the products of the trade-off of big powers. As a result, the coordination of the WHO has been diluted. In summary, the ongoing pandemic has demonstrated the frustrating fact that it is difficult for current global health regimes to respond to a massive emergency in global public health. To safeguard the fundamental human rights lives, and health of humankind, the WHO’s role must be further empowered politically and economically to ensure its specialist decision-making abilities in regard to high-quality coordination.

4.2.1 The Fading Prestige of the WHO The WHO seems to have lost its prestige during this pandemic. The WHO has been accused of negligence, shoddy work, and various forms of malice against illegal business in cooperation with the pharmaceutical industry and multinational companies engaged in public health work.22 There have also been some doubts about whether China is controlling the WHO. The former WHO Director General was Margaret Chan Fung Fu-Chun, a Chinese Hong Kong citizen, while the current WHO Director General is Tedros Adhanom, who comes from Ethiopia, an African state with a good relationship with China. In the early stage of this pandemic, i.e., in January 2020, Tedros and his WHO teams declined to designate the ongoing outbreak of a novel virus in China, in spite of the global health emergency.23 This has been criticized by some states who argue that such a decisions were based on the WHO’s partiality toward China. By the end of January 2020, after nearly 10,000 cases had been reported worldwide, the WHO declared a global health emergency (PHEIC). Nevertheless, Tedros proclaimed that doing so was “not a vote of no confidence in China. In contrast, the WHO continues to have confidence in China’s capacity to control the outbreak”.24 “The WHO truly blew it,” tweeted Donald Trump on 7 April, summarizing one of the many lines of accusation the WHO was facing that time.25 Not only did Trump—and even some of the World Health Organization supporters in the government, academia, and NGOs—believe this sentiment since the outbreak of the coronavirus crisis, but the WHO also succumbed to nationalistic bullying, praised strict quarantine measures, and failed to protect its critical liberal international order. 22

Paul Forster, “To Pandemic or Not? Reconfiguring Global Responses to Influenza”, the STEPS Centre, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/286038816.pdf. 23 STAT. WHO declines to declare China virus outbreak a global health emergency. https://www. statnews.com/2020/01/23/who-declines-to-declare-China-virus-outbreak-a-global-health-emerge ncy/. 2020-01-23. 24 The New York Times. W.H.O. Declares Global Emergency as Wuhan Coronavirus Spreads. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/30/health/coronavirus-world-health-organization.html. 202001-30. 25 Stephen Buranyi, “The WHO v coronavirus: why it cannot handle the pandemic”, The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/news/2020/apr/10/world-health-organization-who-v-cor onavirus-why-it-cant-handle-pandemic.

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As a matter of fact, the U.S. is the largest contributor to the budget of the WHO, with provisions of $116 M each year or approximately 24% of the entire organization’s budget, while China remains in second place at $57 M each year or 12% of the organization’s total.26 Thus, the U.S. rather than China could be the actual controller of and the largest investor in the WHO. However, since a government’s response to the pandemic depends on politics, governments should try to coordinate state recommendations and continue to manage the epidemic. Considering the political motivation of COVID-19, we think this is a critical time to increase knowledge of international relations. Doing so is a necessary and unique method for integrating necessary and unique methods into the WHO’s epidemic control knowledge input database. The historic effort to politically assert technical expertise is redundant and outdated; the WHO has always been politicized by its member states. Davies and Wenham (2020)27 have suggested that the WHO embrace politics and absorb foreign policy and diplomatic expertise. The authors have also provided practical examples of entry points that the approach of international relations can provide for public health decision-making and technical policy coordination. Meanwhile, even the WHO is striving to get its 194 member states to comply with its guidelines; few countries have followed its instructions, such as the U.S. and the U.K. The WHO is fighting against a breakdown in international cooperation that is far beyond its capacity to control. The WHO does not promote globalization in the same way as the WTO or IMF; rather, it promotes globalization in a management style that is quietly committed to responding to the outbreak in an industrialized and interconnected world and relying on the norms of international cooperation that are often self-evident. Many wealthy countries have not only pursued their own national public health strategies but have also withdrawn from the globalized world of diplomacy and trade that they had previously established. However, countries have repeatedly ignored the WHO’s recommendations. In the U.K., the response has been very unstable; the government hovers between the norms put forth by the World Health Organization and their own strategies. For example, the pursuit of “herd immunity” has been abandoned. In addition, the United States did not recommend closing schools or avoiding travel until March 16, 2020.

4.2.2 The Withdrawal of the U.S. from the WHO Trump believes that China exerted “total control” over the WHO and thus decided to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO. However, Agartan et al. (2020)28 believed that the United States’ decision to leave the WHO was more about the changing nature 26

How Much. Net. World Health Organization Funding in one Map: How Much Each Country Contributes. https://howmuch.net/articles/who-contribution. 27 Davies and Wenham (2020). 28 Agartan et al. (2020).

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of multilateralism and politics at global and national levels rather than the problems related to the WHO itself. Gostin et al. (2020)29 also criticized Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO and argued that the U.S. cannot cut ties with the WHO without incurring significant disruption and damage, thereby making Americans far less safe; thus, the author called for the U.S. to engage in globally robust collaboration regarding health and security with the WHO to defeat this pandemic. Some politicians have also criticized that after withdrawal from the WHO, “states would suddenly find themselves cut off from some of the most important global health communication channels.”30 Global health experts have argued that Trump’s choice to leave the global health management agency during the pandemic was a dangerous call. Senator Bob Menendez criticized Trump’s decision, saying that “to call Trump’s response to COVID chaotic and incoherent does not do it justice. This will not protect American lives or interests—it leaves Americans sick and America alone.”31 Sen. Lamar Alexander, chairman of the Senate Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions Committee, said that “factors such as the withdrawal of the U.S. membership may interfere with clinical trials that are critical to vaccine development, which is needed by U.S. citizens and other countries and regions in the world.”32 In addition, exiting the agency may make it more challenging to work with other countries to prevent the virus from entering the United States. As the pandemic’s focus shifts to low- and middle-income countries, efforts are timely, and the WHO’s efforts to contain the pandemic are crucial. Larry Gostin, director of the O’Neill Institute of National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University, criticized the decision by saying that “to have that disruption and delay is inexcusable, as it would result in the loss of life.”33 Interestingly, after Trump made the decision to withdraw the U.S. from the WHO, Joe Biden said on July 8, 2020, on Twitter, “Americans are safer when America is engaged in strengthening global health. On my first day as President, I will rejoin the WHO and restore our leadership on the world stage”.34 Will this happen after the presidency transition in January 2021?

29

Gostin et al. (2020). Times. Trump Said He Would Terminate the U.S. Relationship With the W.H.O. Here’s What That Means. 2020-06-04. https://time.com/5847505/trump-withdrawal-who/. 31 Senator Bob Menendez. Twitter Post. July 8 2020. https://twitter.com/SenatorMenendez/status/ 1280556507365597190. 32 Pien Huang, ‘WHO’s measured reaction to Trump’s pledge to cut US ties to the agency’, NPR Goats and Soda, 1 June 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/05/29/865816855/ whos-muted-reaction-to-trumps-pledge-to-withdraw-u-s-from-the-u-n-agency. 33 Huang (2020), Southern California Public Radio. 34 Joe Biden. Twitter Post. July 8 2020. https://twitter.com/JoeBiden/status/1280603719831359489. 30

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4.2.3 Do We Still Need the WHO? Despite the criticism and suspicion of the WHO, some scholars have still praised the distinguished jobs that the WHO has carried out in this pandemic. Ekpenyong and Pacheco (2020)35 commended the WHO’s demonstration of strong leadership in regard to tackling the COVID-19 pandemic and its willingness to help counterbalance the colonial dynamics between the global south and global north. The COVAX scheme works for global equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines, both in developed and developing states. Scholarly works regard COVID-19 as an opportunity rather than a threat to the WHO. Mercado (2020)36 believed that it is an opportune time for the WHO to support pandemic preparedness and response infrastructures that use a humanitarian lens. These multidimensional and complex coronavirus disasters require actions to be taken in settings where people live, work, learn and play. As Lin (2020)37 mentioned, we should think about using COVID-19 as an opportunity to accelerate positive change and not return to the previous world order, which created pandemic problems, including having tough conversations about the future of global health governance rather than being stuck in geopolitical battles. Furthermore, the WHO must face the challenge of coordinating resources and supplies, accelerating vaccine development, and other countermeasures. The WHO fails to grasp its member states’ political priorities and realizes that the Ministry of Health is in a low position in many cases, which has made it difficult for the organization to manage and delegate power in recent years. Davies and Wenham (2020)38 proposed becoming the core business of the World Health Organization and other technical agencies by trying to improve the best diplomatic conditions and respond to upcoming technical challenges in a coordinated manner. In this COVID-19 era, political decisions directly affect lives and deaths. Therefore, meaningful interactions between public health and international relations are essential. The WHO is the international magnet that drives nations together to communicate and collaborate on health science-related issues. The WHO depends on science to persuade its member states to go beyond their instinctive preferences. However, scientific arguments are not always sufficient to shake off the yoke of political power. Political knowledge, political methods, and policy implementation expertise are also needed to help understand the problem-solving skills required for contemporary sovereign behavior. The International Health Regulations published by the WHO have already called on countries to develop public health capabilities to respond to disease outbreaks and other incidents share information about outbreaks in a timely manner, take response measures commensurate with the risks caused, and obtain scientific support based on human rights. 35

Ekpenyong and Pacheco (2020). Mercado (2020). 37 Lin (2020). 38 Davies and Wenham (2020). 36

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4.2.4 Will the COVAX Scheme from WHO Become Successful? Launched in April by the WHO, the European Commission, and France, the COVAX scheme responds to this pandemic by intending to provide innovative and equitable access to COVID-19 diagnostics, treatments, and vaccines.39 This is a milestone in the world’s efforts to promote life-saving vaccines to the world. The fact that scientists have developed multiple safe and effective vaccines against COVID-19 in record short times proves that the scientific community and industry have responded to this epidemic. Now, it is clear that to end this pandemic and accelerate the economic recovery process, we do not only need coronavirus vaccines but also to ensure everyone’s accessibility to them. Therefore, it is essential that the vaccines that have been developed should be urgently shared on a global scale to reduce the prevalence of diseases, slow down the mutation of the virus and end the pandemic. By the end of December 2020, 44 vaccines were in Phase 1 (testing safety and dosage), 20 vaccines were in Phase 2 (expanded safety trials), 19 vaccines were in Phase 3 (large-scale efficacy tests), 5 vaccines were in the Limited Stage (early or limited use), and 3 vaccines were approved (full service). The leading states in vaccines included China, the U.S., Russia, Germany, the U.K., and Sweden.40 Currently, as of early January 2021, many countries (including the U.K. and China, and soon the U.S. after Biden’s presidency transition) have started the vaccination process, especially for high-risk citizens (workers in the transportation system, doctors and nurses, etc.), international travelers, and government officials. The COVAX scheme has been established for a variety of occasions and crowd vaccine portfolio diversification and is expected to achieve its goal of providing at least 2 billion global vaccines to participating countries before 2021, including at least 1.3 billion donor-funded doses to 92 lower-income economics participants supported by Gavi COVAX AMC.41 As the research and production of vaccines are mainly controlled in Western developed states and emerging powers such as China and Russia, the COVAX scheme and the WHO still play essential roles. To a certain extent, they could eliminate the vaccine availability gaps between the global north and global south. The fact is that the developing states have often been hit harder in this pandemic, as their health systems are fragile and their economies are smaller. They do not have the ability to produce their own vaccines and lack the budget to purchase vaccines produced by developed states. On the other hand, Western countries and developed regions are buying up the global vaccine supply in excess of their needs. Poor countries are facing a long wait for vaccines despite promises; even the GAVI itself admitted 39

GAVI. “COVAX explained”. https://www.gavi.org/vaccineswork/covax-explained. 2020-09-03. The New York Times. “Coronavirus Vaccine Tracker”. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 2020/science/coronavirus-vaccine-tracker.html. 2020-12-28. 41 WHO, “COVID-19 vaccine doses shipped by the COVAX Facility head to Ghana, marking beginning of global rollout”, https://www.who.int/news/item/24-02-2021-covid-19-vaccine-dosesshipped-by-the-covax-facility-head-to-ghana-marking-beginning-of-global-rollout. 40

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that the risk of failure of the COVAX scheme is “very high”.42 As McAdams et al. (2020)43 pointed out, the COVAX goals are being threatened by rich nations’ bilateral purchase agreements with vaccine manufacturers, and it is impossible to stop these deals; the best we can achieve is to find ways to balance these deals, as well as the aims, to guarantee equitable access to vaccines worldwide. As an increasing number of variant coronaviruses are found in the U.K., South Africa, Brazil, Japan, and some other countries, whether vaccines will maintain their effectiveness remains uncertain. There is no doubt that we might have to deal with COVID-19 for a longer time than originally expected. Nevertheless, the current campaign is the most extensive immunization campaign in history. Hundreds of millions of affected children and families are on the road to recovery. With the first batch of vaccines, the world is very likely to fulfill the COVAX facility’s promise to ensure that people in poorer countries do not lag in the vaccine race to save lives.

4.3 WTO The WTO is also suffering enormously at the moment. With the ongoing COVID19 pandemic and worsening Sino-American relations, the WTO is struggling to address the devastating global supply chain and trading system, the U.S.-China trade war, and the reemergence of protectionism.44 Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the process of multilateralism was threatened as the result of Donald Trump’s “America First” policy, which isolated the world’s largest economy from its collective responsibility. For human security to challenge global inequalities, there must be cooperation between a country’s foreign policy and its approach to global health. Again, consider how the trade war between the U.S. and China has impacted global health. China makes most of the world’s medical gowns, face masks, ventilators, and other crucial tools to aid doctors. However, despite suffering millions of cases and over 500,000 deaths, the U.S. government refused to remove the tariffs on those critically needed items. During the global counterattack period of COVID-19, when the unstoppable and intense epidemic broke out on a global scale, to some extent, China managed to control the epidemic more effectively and avoid another large-scale outbreak within the country, thus demonstrating an economic volume with strong adjustment capabilities, adaptability, and resilience after experiencing a major crisis event and making the United States feel a certain economic threat from its perspective. In this sense, the WTO is currently at a crossroads. Therefore, it is necessary to revitalize the multilateral trading system in creative and pragmatic ways, establish new trade rules

42

Cheng, M., Ghosal, A. (2020) “Poor countries face long wait for vaccines despite promises”. AP News, https://apnews.com/article/poorer-countries-coronavirus-vaccine-0980fa905b6e1ce2f1 4a149cd2c438cd. 43 McAdams et al. (2020). 44 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021a).

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and strike a balance among member states to further consolidate the core role of the WTO in the post-COVID-19 world. Worldwide trades have also been under threat during this COVID-19 pandemic. For example, in regard to foreign direct investment (FDI) in global trade, the forecast for 2020 global flows is a decrease of up to 40% from the 2019 level, with a further decrease of 5–10% in 2021 (UNCTAD, 2020). The fall is projected to be more severe in developing countries (Sharma, 2021).45 Furthermore, the sudden global pandemic distorted supply chains, created a more competitive environment for attracting FDI among developing countries, adversely affected international trade, and set in motion forces for the rise of nationalism and the decline of globalization, thereby attempting to establish the primacy of the state (Bieber, 2020).46 Although the positive role of foreign investment in global development is emphasized, it may also have adverse effects on local sustainability.47 Moreover, the severity of the pandemic upended the fortunes of not only rare business organizations but also global employees, thereby affecting and striking at the employment situation and original business atmosphere (Anner, 2020; Lawrenuik, 2020; Pundir, 2020).48 Among the WTO’s challenges, the most important is the urgent need to revitalize the organization to help deal with the COVID-19 pandemic and rebuild the world economy, which is a very tricky issue at this stage. The WTO needs reform, but a reform plan will only waste actions on these broader health and economic goals. According to the latest version of World Economic Outlook, the growth projection for world output (real GDP) is −4.4% in 2020, with economic activity contracting dramatically on a global scale.49 Social distancing, lockdowns, and curfews in many cities and states have seriously affected production and consumption, and trade around the world. The extent of the slowdown depends on the length of the pandemic and the pattern of recovery. Predictions abound regarding likely scenarios for international trade in the post-COVID-19 world. Assuming there will be a V-shaped recovery, international trade is likely to trough in the later part of 2020 and achieve a swift recovery by 2021 (UNCTAD, 2020).

4.3.1 WTO Is Threatened by the COVID-19 Pandemic Scholars have investigated the incredibly negative effect of COVID-19 on world trade and the economy. Bekkers and Koopman (2020)50 expressed concern that the timeline of the economic crisis caused by COVID-19 cannot be answered clearly, 45

Sharma (2021). Bieber (2020). 47 Sheng (2013). 48 Anner (2020), Lawrenuik (2020) and Pundir (2020). 49 IMF. World Economic Outlook, October 2020: A Long and Difficult Ascent. https://www.imf. org/en/Publications/WEO/Issues/2020/09/30/world-economic-outlook-October-2020. 2020-10. 50 Bekkers and Koopman (2020). 46

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as such a timeline depends on how the pandemic develops, and they also expressed worry about extending export restrictions; i.e., increasing barriers to and restrictions on international travel would lead to a further reduction in trade. Another case is the European Union (EU). Although the EU remains one of the most integrated common markets globally, EU member states retain the right to impose quantitative restrictions on exports to the other EU member states (Pauwelyn, 2020).51 Therefore, we noticed the regulation of medical and healthcare product exports within EU member states in the pandemic’s early spread. For companies operating across supply chains, the COVID-19 pandemic may be the time to make meaningful contributions to major social threats. Countries have witnessed a surge in infections at different times, which means that a smoothly functioning supply chain can increase production and deliver medical supplies and medicines to destinations where demand has surged. In contrast, senior policymakers in many major economies in the world, i.e., not only government policymakers related to populist policies and economic nationalism, have drawn pessimistic conclusions about this distinctive form of corporate organization.52 In addition, the statements of many policymakers are consistent with the argument that globalization had gone too far before the pandemic.53 Many governments have taken measures to encourage the repatriation of production or to stimulate domestic production to replace imports. With the spread of COVID-19, an increasing number of governments have begun to adopt public health measures and restrict international travel, including restricting borders in some cases. Previous actions have led to a surge in demand for many medical suppliers and medicines, thereby raising concerns about shortages. Given a large number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the WTO global trade rules manual, one might conclude that systems and incentives have been developed to stop trade that disrupts essential commodities. In fact, there are more rules in the WTO rule book that restrict the use of import restrictions than those that restrict export restrictions, and the existing network of regional trade agreements can hardly fill the gap. Once the pandemic began to spread beyond China, this little-known flaw in global economic governance was exposed, thus damaging those companies engaged in international supply chain activities in the affected products. Although the pandemic is damaging trade and globalization around the world, researchers are also calling for policymakers to enhance trade policies to accelerate the recovery process. Therefore, we still need the WTO and other regional trade organizations in the post pandemic era. The WTO has correctly studied trade promotion activities to play an active role in the fight against COVID-19 and to ensure resilience in future health crises. For example, during the post pandemic era, in terms of FDI-related policies, several countries have amended their original principles and policies to fit the current situation for FDI inflows, such as screening mechanism amendments, the recalibration of FDI regimes, and the adjustment of policies for improving the attractive level for further FDI inflows. However, international capital flows may benefit capital-exporting countries at the expense of capital-importing 51

Pauwelyn (2020). Sheng (2012). 53 For more discussion, please see Sheng (2010, 2015a, 2015c). 52

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countries due to the financial risk of volatile capital flows.54 Rapid growth of international capital flows can also inevitably cause fluctuations in a financially immature economy.55 Obayelu et al. (2020)56 claimed that uncooperative trade policies lead to higher prices of goods in fragile and vulnerable African countries that have been seriously affected by COVID-19, thus calling for the united actions of policymakers to enforce social and trade policies. According to them, “The unavoidable decline in trade caused by COVID-19 is already having painful consequences on the economy, social anxiety among families, households, businesses and trade across countries in the continent. COVID-19 trade restrictions aimed at reducing the transmission of the virus have led to loss of income and jobs as well as closure of small and vulnerable businesses. Policymakers should enforce social policies that unite countries within the continents in bad times to reduce social anxiety and hardship”. Hoekman and Nelson (2020)57 believed that the COVID-19 pandemic and the changing international environment can help us rethink international subsidy rules, establish new regulations to develop, and keep the WTO relevant in the twenty-first century.

4.3.2 WTO Is Threatened by Populist Nationalism Other threats to the WTO in recent years have been deglobalization and nationalism, especially after Trump took power in the U.S. after 2016 and after the pandemic. With the notions of “America First” and “Make America Great Again,” President Trump and his administration are trying to withdraw the U.S. from some international organizations and treaties. However, from the perspective of political economy, Hopewell (2020)58 argued that such actions should be attributed not only to the rise of populism under Trump but also to the decline of the U.S. institutional power, the rise of China and other emerging powers, and the sharply diminishing ability of the U.S. to dominate global trade governance and write the rules of international trade. Moreover, the pandemic will trigger deglobalization, decoupling, and reshoring in its aftermath because it muddies the waters, thus obscuring a much more fundamental consequence, i.e., rapidly rising flows of data and knowledge around the world (Williamson, 2021).59 Among experts, a new consensus has emerged that the extinction of the virus will require a vaccine, but such a step has not yet occurred (Albertoni & Wise, 2021).60 At the same time, the closure of borders and entire economies has also contained the spread of COVID-19 in Europe and parts of Asia. The combination of the U.S. 54

Gu and Sheng (2010). Sheng (2014). 56 Obayelu et al. (2020). 57 Hoekman and Nelson (2020). 58 Hopewell (2020). 59 Williamson (2021). 60 Albertoni and Wise (2021). 55

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presidential election and the pandemic has also brought about major changes. For example, during Trump’s administration, the United States withdrew from the World Health Organization, the “Climate Change Treaty”, the TPP, and the Iran Agreement, and the government repeatedly threatened to leave NATO, the WTO, and the United Nations. Even those multilateral institutions that the United States still officially belongs to have suffered from cuts and delays in the usual financial contributions of the U.S. Moreover, the rise of populist nationalism in the U.S. also affects its regional cooperation organization; for example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has also undergone rethinking and renegotiation from Trump’s administration (Lester & Manak, 2018).61 This issue mutually affected the decline of regional economic cooperative organizations due to both public health crisis impacts and political economy impacts. The trade wars between China and the U.S. and the neglect of the WTO’s rules and regulations by the U.S. have been criticized by scholars. China’s shrinking domestic demand indicates that its output growth must increasingly rely on expanded manufacturing exports.62 Liu and Woo (2018)63 suggested that President Trump stop equating strategic competition with economic competition toward China; they argued that strategic competition with China is normally a zero-sum game, but while fair economic competition is usually a zero-sum game in the short run, it generally creates a win-win outcome in the long run. Malawer (2018)64 also believed that U.S. trade diplomacy ought to concentrate on building coalitions and viable proposals to address trade issues, including those concerning WTO rulemaking and dispute resolution. Trump and his administration also launched trade wars with the long-lasting partners of the U.S., even allies, such as Canada, the EU, and India. Athukorala (2020)65 analyzed the trade disputes between India and America and expressed concern that the Trump administration’s U.S. trade policy on U.S.–India relations would damage their mutual geopolitical interests and threaten the “Made in India” strategy of the Modi government. As Sheng and do Nascimento writes, “In any case, the trade war leaves some questions unresolved; however, the role of the state in the global economy and the changes in the domestic policy of the U.S. remain important considerations for the analysis of its international relations. The trade war may have represented the end of the period of cooperation and the beginning of conflicts that are mutually economic or geopolitical”.66

61

Lester and Manak (2018). Sheng (2016). 63 Liu and Woo (2018). 64 Malawer (2018). 65 Athukorala (2020). 66 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021b). 62

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4.3.3 Could the WTO Deal with Trade Protectionism in the Post Pandemic Era? A century ago, when the Great Recession began, the first thing that countries did was to implement trade protectionism with their trade partners. History is always surprisingly similar. To curb the spread of COVID-19, many WTO members have imposed temporary border closures and travel restrictions. The strict restrictions on cross-border movement are not for trade considerations but for public health reasons. However, they have had a significant impact on trade. During this pandemic, especially in its infancy in the first half of 2020, the first thing that countries did was to block the export of masks, protective suits, and other healthcare items to other countries. In February, the Ministry of Food and Drug Safety of South Korea declared that a measure to limit mask exports was authorized under Article 6 of the Price Stabilization Act. Manufacturers were allowed to export up to 10% of the masks they produced each day.67 In August, even though the COVID-19 situation had improved in Thailand, the Thai government continued its price control and mask export restrictions to protect themselves “in case there was a local shortage of supplies.”68 It is expected that even after this pandemic, on the one hand, some countries will continue their tight control toward strategic materials and facilities. On the other hand, we might notice that developing states accelerate their process of returning to manufacturing, especially for healthcare items such as masks and sanitizers. The U.S., Japan, the U.K., and the EU have undergone pains due to their reliance on China and ASEAN to import coverings. Thus, these areas no longer want to be controlled by others in regard to strategic materials manufacturing. To control the spread of COVID-19, governments have introduced temporary travel and mobility restrictions.69 Although public health considerations drive these measures, they have had a significant impact on trade because people’s movement across borders is the primary driver of trade in goods and services and is itself an actual trade in services. It is becoming increasingly clear that restarting individuals’ international movements will be more complicated than stopping them. The resumption of international travel is unlikely to be done in a linear fashion. Measures affecting cross-border flows have noticeable cross-border spillover effects, which means that it is necessary to supplement domestic actions through international cooperation efforts. After the pandemic subsides, WTO members may wish to review their reactions and their impact on trade. To better prepare for future crises, they can consider, for example, exchanging experiences about travel restrictions and their impact on

67

The Korea Herald. “Faced with shortage, Korea limits mask exports.” http://www.koreaherald. com/view.php?ud=20200225000692. 2020-02-25. 68 Xin Hua Net. (2020) “Thailand to continue price control, mask export restriction.” http://www. xinhuanet.com/english/2020-08/13/c_139285986.htm. 2020-08-13. 69 WTO, “Cross-border mobility, COVID-19 and global trade”, https://www.wto.org/english/tra top_e/covid19_e/mobility_report_e.pdf.

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trade and sharing the lessons they may have learned. This work could help governments determine ways to achieve travel measures that meet public health protection goals while minimizing the impact of trade distortions. Although the WTO has been established 25 years, it can be said that the entity has not yet truly become a real multilateral institution. The global value chain has clarified the risks of Lure’s unilateralism in the global trading system. It can be admitted that the destructive integration of trade protectionism, nationalism, and pandemics provides a critical opportunity for real change. The question remains who will lead the accusation and what will happen in the next few years.

4.3.4 The Imperative of WTO Reforms Finally, another thought is that the crisis and problems of the WTO had started well before the Trump administration took office and that it is the outdated rules of the WTO that has led to its crisis. Thus, the U.S. and China need to recommend to the WTO and the EU, which is a staunch defender of the WTO, that other likeminded members should have an important role to play here (Bronckers, 2020).70 Portanskiy (2019)71 argued that, in an era of rising protectionism and trade wars, even though the process of WTO reform is bound to be overly complicated and may take years, it is still imperative. Pigman (2018)72 also argued that the excessive “judicialization” of WTO trade diplomacy has marginalized the WTO’s allimportant legislative and executive functions; the author thus called for the reform of the WTO’s institutional structure and making the WTO more akin to the European Union. Currently, the existing multilateral trading system faces many threat variables that urgently need to be solved, such as the weakening US’s leadership, the recent rise of trade protectionism, and the regionalist WTO crisis decision-making system.73 The problem is that the government often announces changes in its trade policy to the media before issuing official orders and implements regulations before notifying the WTO. The economic policies in response to the pandemic are a combination of restrictive measures, orders, and emergency measures. Some of the most widely used measures include the most stringent business measures, such as lockdowns on business activities and other mandatory restrictions. Bilateral and multilateral trade agreements provide parties with many ways to challenge each other’s pandemic response measures (Arato et al., 2020).74 Under the WTO’s auspices, members can challenge another party’s pandemic response because they violate the GATT regulations on discriminatory treatment, the restrictions on freedom of transportation, or the

70

Bronckers (2020). Portanskiy (2019). 72 Pigman (2018). 73 The Global Trade Alert Team (2020). 74 Arato et al. (2020). 71

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restrictions on imports.75 The consequences of the global pandemic have accelerated a shift of exceptions. To be sure, such concerns are speculative; for example, in trade law, a country may not file a lawsuit at all, either based on the “House of Compatible Glass” theory or because of the collapse of the WTO appellate body.76 Treating the pandemic as a global exception to economic rules will bring about huge costs and reveal the fragility of the WTO. By re-examining the WTO’s organizational structure and international responsibilities and readjusting and passively resolving disputes, our trade and investment institutions may still become a vital source when needed. The WTO needs to establish a more robust multilateral governance framework for multilateral cooperation among WTO members and re-establish an effective dispute resolution system. Trump’s administration has reduced America’s leadership in trade negotiations to a questionable level, as it has repeatedly stated that the U.S. is prepared to abandon the WTO’s rules if they endanger U.S. national interests, as well as withdraw from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and suspend negotiations with the EU regarding the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Although the influence of developing countries, especially China, India, and Brazil, in WTO negotiations in the new century is increasing, none of them are prepared to play a leading role on short notice. However, the process of WTO reform is destined to be overly complicated and may take a long time. Although Trump lost his re-election in November 2020 and will soon be replaced by Biden in January 2021, it is still unclear whether the trade policies of the U.S. will revert sharply even though the reform of the WTO is necessary and imminent, regardless of who takes the U.S. presidency and no matter when this pandemic ends.

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Chapter 5

Regional International Organizations Under the COVID-19 Influence

Regional organizations are also being strongly impacted as COVID-19 spreads around the world. This chapter discusses three typical regional organizations, the EU, the NATO, and the ASEAN. These significant regional organizations not only play an important role in the integration of geopolitical concepts in their geographic regions, such as internal cooperation in aspects of politics, economy, and social culture, but also influence changes and the implementation of the world order as a non-negligible element in international relations, such as some organizations (NATO) that are political and military alliances with common essential and enduring purposes, or common values of ideology and goals (liberty, democracy, equal rights and so on) that actively promote foreign military and political processes as a whole to foreshadow or solve crises and safeguard the freedom and security of their members.1

5.1 Europe Union 5.1.1 Insufficient Coordination Among EU Members During the Crisis The European Union is the most powerful regional organization in the world, but it has also been the largest loser in the COVID-19 pandemic as it was unprepared, powerless, and timid in dealing with the crisis because of its disunity, timid response, and weak enforcement. The first instinct of the EU was to close borders, hoard equipment, and assemble national responses. Every country was left to itself, including badly hit Spain, France, and Italy. This dispute has widened into an ugly battle between northern and southern Europe over the issuance of common debt. The Dutch and the Germans suspected that Italy used the crisis to get its debts paid by the richer north. 1

NATO. “What is NATO?”. https://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_5

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The very popular Italian Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte said if the “EU fails, it could fall apart”. A former Portuguese Prime Minister called comments by a Dutch leader “disgusting and petty”. The Spanish Foreign Minister queried whether the Dutch understood that a “first-class cabin will not protect you when the whole ship sinks.” Certainly, attitudes in the south toward the Netherlands and Germany have changed for the worse. During the second wave of the pandemic, both Germany and the Netherlands fared badly. Germany has had 3.5 million cases, and the small Netherlands has had 1.5 million cases. The post pandemic world might well see the collapse of the EU, at least regarding its unity and common purpose. The weak performance of the European Union in the early stage of the pandemic made people suspicious about the effectiveness of its cooperation mechanism. Piggybacking on the dispute between the north and the south in the EU over common debt issuance, the pandemic was another accelerator of the EU division. The first response of the EU seemed to show that European countries were aimed at protectionism rather than regional integration. In the early stage of the pandemic, many EU states closed their borders unilaterally and even intercepted medical resources from each other. The selfish behaviors of EU member states undermined the solidarity of the EU to a large extent. Meanwhile, competition for urgent and scarce medical supplies significantly emphasized the mutual conflict among public health, the economic situation, and individual national security in gray-zone competition. When several pharmaceutical companies in Europe became a prime target of espionage attempts, a series of European countries joined forces in the “Inclusive Vaccine Alliance”, and trends of isolationism and protectionism were further strengthened and strongly highlighted by competition for access to vaccines during this global public health emergency (Remmits & Sweijs, 2020, p. 12).2 Despite high-level political commitment from the EU, the ongoing spread of COVID-19 exposes important obstacles to developing a comprehensive European response to infectious disease outbreaks (Anderson et al., 2020).3 Member states have long guarded their national responsibility for health services (Mossialos et al., 2010).4 At the beginning of the epidemic, Italy, as one of the EU member states that received the most attention due to its serious outbreak of the epidemic, faced a situation of increased isolation and helplessness due to the initial report of the epidemic, the spread of the epidemic and the deterioration of the epidemic beyond a controllable degree, while other members of the EU, as a community based on the shared destiny of the same important organization, maintained their own protectionism and behaved selfishly. Moreover, some EU member states and nonmember states (i.e., neutral states) have created friction during the transportation and transit of medical supplies. Italy’s formal request for exported medical equipment was rejected by EU countries. Italy asked to activate the European Union Mechanism of Civil Protection for the supply of medical equipment for individual protection.5 However, unfortunately, no 2

Remmits and Sweijs (2020). Anderson et al. (2020). 4 Mossialos et al. (2010). 5 Massari (2020). 3

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EU country responded to the commission’s call. Only China responded bilaterally and stepped in to help Italy battle the virus by delivering various humanitarian aid to Italy, although doing so was interpreted as brand-new mask diplomacy with a strategic surge or benevolent support by some skeptics from different positions. According to a report from April 2020, after an agreement was reached and signed by President von der Leyen and Premier Li Keqiang in March 2020, a donation of protective equipment from China to the EU arrived in Rome, Italy. Not only did a Chinese plane deliver direct donations to the EU, such as a multitude of medical supplies including 2 million surgical masks, 200,000 N95 masks, and 50,000 testing kits, but the Emergency Response Coordination Centre also coordinated the distribution of the goods to Italy.6 However, countries including Germany, France, and the Czech Republic announced bans on the export of protective gear to avoid shortages at home, which are measures that go against the spirit of free movement of goods within the EU.7 EU officials sought in vain to persuade these countries to lift their controls on the export of protective medical gear, as they could hurt the bloc’s collective effort to fight the coronavirus. This is a dilemma that foreshadows the EU’s further integration into several new aspects, such as common public health operations. After decades of evolution, the EU, as a typical regional organization with obvious geopolitical colors, has become increasingly close in other alternative aspects; however, the EU has been attacked by a sudden global biochemical disaster and now appears to be at the tip of the collapse of integration improvement. To a certain extent, the crisis of public health security has caused individual closure and retrogression in the results of integration within the EU. If this trend of gradual internal separation is difficult to reverse, then opening up more aspects and more in-depth integration within the EU will become a thorny problem. Moreover, the pandemic has also exposed deficiencies in the coordination of the EU’s executive, legislative, and judicial branches, which was caused by the structural contradiction between EU enforcement and the sovereign nature of its member states. With the chaos caused by COVID-19, the influence and attractiveness of the EU were weakened. However, in regard to the significance of influence from a foreign-policy perspective, the best way to consider influence is in terms of its two antonyms, namely, authority and control (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 80).8 In reality, the exercise of influence is the characteristic way in which states relate to one another because we have not yet formed global governance or established a worldwide empire. Without the relations of superiors and subordinates being present between states in international relations, there is no authority or control from states to other states, while propaganda, diplomacy, economic statecraft, and military statecraft remain techniques of influence, which are important elements and means by which states exert values and attractiveness to gain more rights to speak and more trust in the international stage.9 Although the EU has not currently reached a final 6

European Union (2020). Guarascio and Blenkinsop (2020). 8 Brown and Ainley (2005). 9 Ibid. 7

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stage of a completed union, according to Murray Forsyth, who pointed out the definition of a federal system, by some accounts, the EU is already regarded as a federal system within which member states should act closely in all situations, because the federal authority has some powers that it can exercise effectively without reference to the lower levels and vice versa; this is certainly the case within the EU.10 As a federal system, when responding to the epidemic, the EU has also exposed potential risks, unexpected loopholes, and problems that need to be resolved. Therefore, if the EU cannot solve the crisis properly, more skepticism about the legitimacy of the EU will be raised in the future.

5.1.2 Crisis Thinking and Limitations Exposed When Measures Were Implemented First, the EU’s role in public health has been narrowed and limited over the years by national governments keen to retain control of their health policies and systems. The current treaties permit the EU to harmonize national laws in a small set of specific areas; however, in all other areas of health, including crisis response, pharmaceutical procurement, and infectious disease management, the EU’s role is limited to supporting national policies and encouraging coordination. Consequently, its initial health policy response was constrained. The EU did not have the necessary stockpiles to respond to requests for personal protective equipment (PPE) and other critical resources and was not able to stop the wave of export bans adopted by national governments seeking to retain what supplies they had (Brooks & Geyer, 2020, p. 1057).11 Moreover, the EU has not reached the level of political alliances in politics, and the medical level of each member state is different. Thus, it is difficult to implement a one-size-fits-all public health policy aimed at regulation and control measures similar to those seen in unified countries. Therefore, regarding the public safety issue of integration seen within the EU, only compromise means can be considered to coordinate and assist internal member states in the procurement and circulation of medical supplies. Second, the reintroduction of internal border controls and the implementation of travel bans victimized the Schengen Area. The Schengen Area is a significant achievement for both EU member states and related states regarding the free movement of European integration, but the pandemic affected the circulation of citizens and products within the Schengen Area. To make effective responses and reduce free movement, European countries took several measures to enhance border management, such as the closure of EU external borders, the imposition of travel bans by national authorities, and the unilateral reintroduction of controls at internal borders. In the pandemic, national centrifugal forces continued to undermine the coherence 10 11

Brown (1994). Brooks and Geyer (2020).

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and effective functioning of the Schengen Area (Montalvo, 2020).12 Upon a joint decision of the EU Commission and the EU Council to ban all foreign travelers from entering the block, the Schengen Area member states have continued unilaterally reintroducing their internal border checks. As of March 21, 2020, only five countries in the Schengen Area—Belgium, Iceland, Sweden, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg— had not announced any move regarding border closure, while the other 21 Schengen Area countries had already introduced borders, most of the internal borders.13 The reintroduction of internal border controls and the suspension of the freedom of movement with a complete lack of coordination was not a positive sign for European integration (Wolff & Ladi, 2020, p. 1027).14 Third, the economic institutions and instruments that the EU member states relied on are also not enough to mitigate the crisis brought by the pandemic. Risk-sharing mechanisms are absent at the EU level, which means that the cohesion and sustainability of the monetary union could be threatened (Camous & Claeys, 2020).15 The European Central Bank (ECB) was the first supranational institution that took the timeliest substantial action. On March 18, 2020, following a significant increase in some countries’ funding costs, the ECB deployed its Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP), which was a temporary measure designed to ensure supportive financing for all sectors of the economy (Lagarde, 2020).16 The PEPP consisted of an initial amount of e750 billion, which was later expanded to e1350 billion and extended until the end of June 2021, or until the Governing Council estimates that the coronavirus crisis is over (Salvati, 2020).17 Its explicit objective was to diminish “any risks to the smooth transmission of its monetary policy in all jurisdictions of the euro area”. However, these programs attracted ferocious criticisms in some countries and have even been legally challenged in Germany, with critics arguing that asset purchase programs blur the line between monetary and fiscal policy. More fundamentally, the German Constitutional Court ruling highlights a vital problem of the euro area architecture: two decades after the launch of the euro, there are still uncertainties regarding the range of instruments the ECB is allowed to use to fulfill its mandate. These ambiguities are particularly problematic because they reduce the credibility of the ECB’s policies and, in the current pandemic situation, of the PEPP. This could lead to the re-emergence of self-fulfilling crises in euro area sovereign bond markets, similar to what happened during the euro crisis before ECB’s OMT was announced (Camous & Claeys, 2020, pp. 333–336).18 Germany’s highest court sent shockwaves through Europe’s legal and political system when it ruled that the ECB’s public sector bond purchases may be ultra vires or unconstitutional. The PEPP has been condemned as “an act of despair” from “a sovereign dictatorship” by 12

Montalvo (2020). Beirens et al. (2020). 14 Wolff and Ladi (2020). 15 Camous and Claeys (2020). 16 Lagarde (2020). 17 Salvati (2020). 18 Camous and Claeys (2020). 13

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Markus Kerber, a 64-year-old lawyer, and public finance professor at the Technology University of Berlin.19 The European Union also aims to provide financial assistance as compensation for ballooning public expenditures. On April 9, 2020, euro area finance ministers agreed to develop a specific European Stability Mechanism (ESM) credit line with limited conditionality. The ESM was established in 2012 as a permanent institution to provide financial assistance to euro area countries facing market stress. ESM loans are provided with interest payments that are lower than market rates. The newly created ESM Pandemic Crisis Support (PCS) credit facility allows countries within the euro area to borrow up to 2% of their GDP without the need to implement an adjustment program, as long as the money borrowed is used to finance healthcare, vaccine, and treatment programs, and other crisis-related expenses (Camous & Claeys, 2020, p. 333).20 In addition to this new ESM credit line, euro area finance ministers also agreed to create a temporary new EU instrument entitled “Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE). However, even if these two new instruments provide some relief to member states by allowing them to access cheap funds, they have not been perceived as decisively improving the resilience of the monetary union itself.21 Delatte and Guillaume (2020, p. 15)22 noted that financial assistance in the form of a loan does not work as an adjustment mechanism in the same way that fiscal transfers do. Loan-based financial assistance programs have contributed to widening the spread of heavily indebted countries. Fourth, another potential risk brought about by COVID-19 is that the gap among European countries may be widened. States differ in terms of the impact of the virus and the strength of their recovery. Some countries were affected by the pandemic earlier than others, some countries rely more on sectors (e.g., tourism) that have been heavily affected by the pandemic, and some countries have more policy space to react to the crisis. The COVID-19 pandemic is exacerbating this economic divide. Projections for 2020 outline the increasing heterogeneity of the monetary union. This is the result of three main developments. First, as documented in this paper, from a health perspective, the impact of the pandemic has been greater in Italy and Spain than in Germany or the Netherlands. Second, the direct economic cost of lockdowns is expected to be much greater in countries that rely on the services sector, particularly on tourism, as is the case in southern Europe. Third, to tackle the economic consequences of the pandemic, countries have adopted exceptional fiscal measures. These measures rely on debt issuance to finance health expenses and programs to support workers and firms. In particular, temporary layoff benefits (such as the German “Kurzarbeit”) and bank loan guarantees have been implemented to avoid permanent layoffs and to protect the solvency of viable companies during lockdowns. However,

19

Arnold (2020). Camous and Claeys (2020). 21 Ibid. 22 Delatte and Guillaume (2020) and Diamond (2015). 20

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the magnitude of these programs differs notably across countries (Camous & Claeys, 2020).23 To respond to COVID-19, the commission has decided to permit the flexibility of state aid rules that restrict individual governments’ ability to subsidize companies and to temporarily interrupt the stability and growth pact (SGP). While this decision enables national governments to independently organize their initial responses to the crisis, in the medium-long term, this decision, together with a limited degree of coordination, could increase the asymmetries among member states due to their different fiscal spaces.24 Member states with greater debt-bearing capacities and more resources to spend (i.e., Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands) will gain an unfair advantage over member states with more limited resources (i.e., Spain, Portugal, and Italy), thus skewing the functioning of the single market and the level of integration (Salvati, 2020).25 Furthermore, the EU has also proposed a targeted strategic program called Next Generation, which is a special budget for all aspects of recovery among the EU after the outbreak. Generally, when faced with the outbreak of COVID-19, the EU was aware of the limitations of regulatory capacity within internal member states to control public health crises, the fragility of the free movement of citizens and products, the fragility of the original economic institutions and instruments that the EU member states relied on, the differences in the ability to respond to huge public health problems of member states, and the possible risk of the enlargement of gaps among the member states during the post pandemic period. To avoid a greater risk of outbreaks, the EU’s changes and remedies in terms of economic assistance and public health adjustments reflect strong resilience and independence. The development of the EU in the post pandemic era still requires continuous exploration and improvement.

5.2 NATO 5.2.1 The Positive Role of NATO NATO, as a security organization based on the common values and primary goals of the collective defense of its members and the maintenance of democratic peace in the North Atlantic area,26 has been relatively proactive when confronting the pandemic. During the early period of the formation of NATO, once the campaigns initiated by NATO were won to some degree, NATO and the EU became involved in these areas; NATO gave full play to its own security intelligence to ensure most of the military

23

Camous and Claeys (2020). Gu and Sheng (2010). 25 Salvati (2020). 26 See NATO: What is NATO? https://www.nato.int/welcome/brochure_WhatIsNATO_en.pdf. 24

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safety in these areas, while the EU provided knowledge and advice on the construction of internal administration affairs and the formulation of foreign policies. This ambivalence was to be a feature of subsequent US-European reactions; sometimes two of them become closer, sometimes they become distant, but the perspectives from Western Europe have been gradually different from the U.S. and even other parts of Europe, and these differences reached their peak in Iraq War in 2003, during which Anglo-American attempts to achieve a U.N. Resolution authorizing action were thwarted by France, Germany, and Russia (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 243).27 Moreover, the old Machiavellian viewpoint that arms are more desirable than wealth because someone with weapons can always gain money still remains valid for Europeans. In this harsher environment, the more military minded America is needed to protect softer Europeans (Brown & Ainley, 2005, p. 244).28 Thus, in the 2020 timeline of when this global epidemic broke out, it was natural for the United States and Western European countries within NATO to have differences and frictions in regard to some aspects. Using military force in fighting global or regional public health problems has been shown in earlier conflicts; a typical example was in 1904 when the U.S. military and the “sanitary police” helped the Panama Canal Zone to reduce the area of mosquito-breeding sites, and another recent case was fighting Ebola in Sierra Leone in 2014 (Missiroli & Rühle, 2020, p. 2).29 Depending on military power, which usually consists of rapid and efficient scheduling capabilities and large-scale manpower and resources, to deliver humanitarian assistance or provide emergency aid is of obvious benefit, especially in areas where the public health system is faulty or the local government lacks the resources, experiences, and measures to solve the volume of biochemical problems. As a pivotal alliance with military functions, during this epidemic of COVID-19, NATO has also been regarded as having a powerful role, playing many important tasks in the fight against coronavirus. It has undertaken a series of measures, such as offering medical assistants to the member states and holding virtual conferences of NATO Minister of Foreign Affairs. On 18 March, 2020, a week after the WHO officially declared the pandemic, NATO ambassadors held a regular meeting of the North Atlantic Council and addressed measures being taken by NATO and Allies to curb the spread of the pandemic.30 Some member states made use of NATO crisis-management mechanisms to get help. Spain and Italy requested assistance through NATO’s Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) for medical supplies such as personal protection equipment, respirators, masks, and test kits. The NATO center passed the requests on to NATO allies and partners, who provided assistance on a bilateral basis.31 The Czech Republic was the first to respond by offering medical supplies to Spain and Italy. Other allies have decided to use the NATO Support and Procurement Agency 27

Brown and Ainley (2005). Ibid. 29 Missiroli and Rühle (2020). 30 NATO (2020a). 31 NATO (2020b). 28

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(NSPA), which manages strategic airlift capability programs (large transport aircraft) and can finance and coordinate infrastructure development. The NSPA supported the construction of a hospital in Luxembourg. The Czech Republic and Romania used NATO strategic airlift abilities to deliver medical supplies.32

5.2.2 Epidemics and Internal Problems Faced by NATO In the current situation, the EADRCC has failed to take the leadership of organizing and coordinating responses to the pandemic. As a result, the member states have to fight their own battles and raise their discontent with NATO. The loss of cohesion and solidarity among Alliance members has been accelerated by coronavirus. According to the Pew Research Center, 27% of residents across 16 NATO members have a negative attitude toward the Alliance’s activities. At the same time, NATO has to confront more challenges brought about by the pandemic. On the one hand, NATO’s mismanagement has cultivated closer relations between its allies and China. Since the early period of the pandemic, China has assisted Italy and Spain such that the Italian government has begun to believe in cooperation with China, including the Belt and Road Initiative. At the same time, Russia is closely monitoring NATO along its borders, aiming to enlarge the cracks among NATO members. Between 6 and 12 March 2020, RAF fighter jets were scrambled to intercept Russian aircraft that approached British airspace for the third time in a week.33 Russia’s 2015 National Security Strategy claimed that NATO is a threat to Russia’s strategic interests. In this case, it is not strange that any sign of discord in NATO is always closely monitored by Russia. Russia criticized NATO’s absence in the fight against the pandemic. Russian propaganda, backed by the actual deployment of planes and trucks to Italy, and domestic condemnation, fueled a sense of discontent in people with regard to the usefulness and effectiveness of international organizations at large, and more specifically of NATO and the European Union (Rittimann, 2020).34 On the other hand, NATO is also being bothered by an internal issue. First, the U.S. has not taken leadership in regard to pandemic affairs and has developed a coalition to confront such an unprecedented nontraditional security issue. In response to the pandemic, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that U.S. borders were closed to travelers from the Schengen Area, but he did so without consulting America’s European allies. This action may exacerbate anti-American sentiments in Europe and further weaken the transatlantic ties on which the Alliance’s credibility depends.35 Although the U.S. is currently in a strong position as an important leader of the world, possessing a concentration of the physical attributes of power not seen since the beginning of Westphalia System and being without potential competitors to challenge 32

Bulletin (2020). BBC (2020). 34 Rittimann (2020). 35 Bulletin (2020). 33

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them, the key questions are how long will the leader situation last, and what will the U.S. do to deal with the sudden situation of the pandemic and the possibility of losing the attraction of other countries, even the following and trust of their allies. As a leader among the countries, in major large-scale emergencies, if the U.S. does not perform as usual, or even does not perform as other countries and its allies have imagined, such as unsuccessfully or wrongly exerting its leadership, decision-making ability, and execution ability, will its leadership position be affected and shaken up to a certain extent? Second, the dispute between the U.S. and the rest of the state members over defense sharing has reduced the solidarity of NATO. Under the economic recession connected to the pandemic, some member states have tended to reduce their future defense budgets; thus, it is difficult for NATO members to reach the “standard line” of 2% of the GDP required by Trump. This may affect the planned investments that were to provide the Alliance with capabilities both to defend member state territory and deter Russia, as well as to combat threats related to instability in southern areas.36 In the long run, such a trend can fuel traditional divisions over fair burden-sharing between Europe and the U.S. and weaken the American political will to increase military involvement in Europe. Trump has been dissatisfied with the shortage of budgets. He has publicly stated views that NATO is “obsolete” and has repeatedly attacked NATO member states, especially Germany, for falling short of the NATO target of spending 2% of the GDP on defense. In Trump’s assessment, other countries ‘owe’ the United States ‘vast sums’ of money to underspend and neglect their NATO obligations (Löfflmann, 2019).37 Actually, while Trump’s language regarding NATO has been unusually direct, his main message aligns with a long-standing American position that the European allies need to do more to earn America’s protection (Ringsmose & Webber, 2020).38 The reluctance of the United States to continue to fulfill its responsibility to lead NATO has caused dissatisfaction among the member states. In early 2020, following concerns over comments made by French President Emmanuel Macron, who described NATO as “brain dead”, and calls for a new dialog with Moscow, both Macron (especially after his February 2020 visit to Warsaw) and German Chancellor Angela Merkel worked hard to create their own version of an Eastern European reinsurance initiative, arguing that any new efforts to promote a reset of relations with Russia will be accompanied by assistance from credible security for NATO’s Eastern area (Enache & Nistor, 2020). Donald Trump lost reelection, which means that Joe Biden will be the president of the U.S. for the next four years. However, Joe Biden has not released his agenda about NATO defense sharing, which still leaves many uncertainties about the future of NATO and the existence of America in Europe. Moreover, the military exercise of NATO has been canceled or delayed because of the impact of COVID-19. The Dutch training mission in Iraq was halted, and

36

Ibid. Löfflmann (2019). 38 Ringsmose and Webber (2020). 37

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the Norway-NATO “Cold Response” exercise was canceled, along with the military sports championships.39 NATO’s main European exercise for 2020, “DefenderEurope 20”, which was designed in part to demonstrate to potential adversaries the cohesion of the alliance, was much reduced, despite the U.S. Department of Defense Directive that completely banned the movement of U.S. forces and equipment (Enache & Nistor, 2020).40 Based on the above analysis, in general, NATO’s fundamental purpose—to safeguard the freedom and security of its members through political and military means— remains relatively stable; however, after the shock of the pandemic, the main tasks for NATO have changed into doing battle with the coronavirus, maintaining the consistency of internal affairs, and reconstructing solidarity among the allies of NATO. Facing new times and new challenges, with the threat from Russia, the rise of China, and the coming transition of leadership in the U.S., which is also the main leader of NATO, NATO’s direction in the future is uncertain because of continuously changing issues.

5.3 ASEAN The ASEAN is the epitome of observing the pandemic response of developing countries. The ASEAN was initially established to contain the expansion of communists in the region and mainly focused on traditional security issues, for example, conflicts and territorial disputes. Since the 2000s, as the regional security environment has become relatively stable, nontraditional security (NTS) issues have become increasingly important to the ASEAN security agenda. NTS issues have brought about great pressure for the ASEAN and pose serious challenges to security community building (Acharya, 2009).41 Over the past two decades, ASEAN has experienced a number of NTS issues that have had a significant impact on the security agenda of its member states, the nature of multilateral security and development cooperation that have evolved within and beyond Southeast Asia (Caballero-Anthony, 2020, p. 1).42 Infectious disease is a crucial part of the ASEAN’s NTS cooperation. The outbreaks of SARS in 2003 and H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2005 were the two most serious regional epidemics. The 2003 SARS epidemic generated unprecedented coordination among ASEAN countries, mainly, China, Japan, and Korea. Several measures were outlined to put in regional mechanisms to address the multiplicity of issues brought on by the SARS crisis, such as exchanging information, cooperation among front-line enforcement agencies, and the harmonization of travel procedures to ensure proper health 39

How COVID-19 may impact the European Defense (March 18, 2020), Finabel European Army Interoperability Center, https://finabel.org/how-covid-19-may-impact-the-european-defense/. 40 Enache and Nistor (2020). 41 Acharya (2009). 42 Caballero-Anthony (2020).

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screening at points of origin (Caballero-Anthony, 2005).43 However, these efforts were unable to enforce a collective will in states that did not agree with the policies under discussion (Curley & Thomas, 2004).44 Although an information-sharing network was created in the region, states could still prevent collective action from being taken. By the end of December 2008, six member states of the ASEAN were faced with the human H5N1 influenza public health crisis; it was an unprecedented challenge for the ASEAN to address such a large-scale pandemic. In response to the influenza epidemic situation at that time, the ASEAN Secretariat prioritized several key activities to assist ASEAN members in responding and dealing with the serious threat (Roy, 2009, p. 128).45 The activities included strengthening institutional capacity and linkages within countries and across borders, building an enabling environment for preparedness, and developing partnerships with all stakeholders (Roy, 2009, p. 129). Moreover, for ways forward, the Secretariat also pointed out a series of guidelines based on experiences and lessons, such as strengthening further regional and interregional cooperation; sharing information, knowledge, and success (from the SARS experience of 2003); changing mindsets in farming and poultry management practices; and exerting leadership (Roy, 2009, p. 131). Overall, the ASEAN’s strength is evidenced through active and personal engagement in collective responses to large-scale crises, especially those that are more complicated and multidimensional and require coordinated responses (Roy, 2009, p. 132).46

5.3.1 Existing Shortcomings and Efforts by the ASEAN Southeast Asia is one of the areas that have the highest infection rate of COVID-19. By the middle of May 2021, the ten member countries of ASEAN, which is a region with a population of 650 million, had reported 3,655,546 cases and a total of 72,581 deaths.47 The first Southeast Asian COVID-19 case was recorded in Thailand on 13 January 2020. Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Cambodia, and the Philippines soon followed, reporting their first infections between 22 and 30 January 2020. Indonesia and Philippines have had the greatest number of infectious cases. As of May 2021, Indonesia had reported a total of 1,728,204 cases, and the Philippines had reported a total of 1,124,724 cases.48 In the Philippines, since the government lifted most restrictions in June 2020, a new surge in cases has overwhelmed the public health system and further damaged the economy. Quarantines have since been reintroduced throughout the country, and testing has steadily increased, but the government has 43

Ibid. Curley and Thomas (2004). 45 Roy (2009). 46 Ibid. 47 Data from Center for Strategic & International Studies, https://www.csis.org/programs/southe ast-asia-program/southeast-asia-covid-19-tracker-0. 48 Ibid. 44

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yet to bring the virus under control.49 In Indonesia, traveling and gathering have been under control. The government plans to contain the virus through vaccination. President Joko “Jokowi” Widodo recently announced that all COVID-19 vaccines will be free for Indonesians and has been proactive in securing doses. However, storage and distribution will be difficult, as Indonesia faces serious challenges with regard to bureaucracy, corruption, refrigeration, infrastructure, and geography.50 When the new and large-scale pandemic broke out, to effectively respond to the new coronavirus, Southeast Asian countries took advantage of existing ASEAN mechanisms to strengthen their multilateral cooperation, especially cooperation with China, Japan, and the United States. At a special summit on 14 April 2020, which was chaired by Vietnam, ASEAN leaders, along with the leaders of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea, committed to acting jointly and decisively to control the spread of COVID-19. They resolved to further strengthen their public health cooperation and joint research on vaccines and antiviral medicines, to enhance public communication, to reduce stigmatization and discrimination, and to establish the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund for joint procurement and research.51 ASEAN sectoral bodies agreed to collective strategies to ease the pandemic’s impact in sectors such as tourism, defense cooperation, economic resilience, health, agriculture and forestry, labor, and employment.52 Although ASEAN leaders have devoted much effort to promote regional cooperation, cooperation among Southeast Asian states is currently mainly in the field of information sharing and risk assessment. The efforts of the ASEAN and its individual member states in responding to the spread of the disease include initiating the ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) Network for public health emergencies, the ASEAN Risk Assessment and Risk Communication Centre, the ASEAN BioDiaspora Virtual Centre (ABVC), the ASEAN Center for Humanitarian Assistance on Disaster Management (AHA Center), and the exchange of laboratory readiness and response actions to complement the goals stated in the ASEAN Post-2015 Health Development Agenda.53 The ASEAN Emergency Operations Centre Network for public health emergencies (ASEAN EOC Network) is led by Malaysia and has taken the initiative of sharing daily situational updates on the spread and progression of the disease. The ASEAN EOC Network provides a publicly available platform for ASEAN member countries and disease prevention centers to communicate and share information in a timely manner amid crises. The EOC network also produces and compiles data on national/local hotline/call centers in ASEAN member countries for public dissemination and to raise social awareness of disease hotspots and best practices for prevention 49

CSIS (2020). Ibid. 51 UN Report (2020). 52 Ibid. 53 Press Release on Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) by the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (May 15, 2020), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, https://kemlu.go.id/portal/en/read/1302/berita/press-release-on-cor onavirus-disease-2019-covid-19-by-the-asean-intergovernmental-commission-on-human-rightsaichr. 50

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and containment (Djalante et al., 2020).54 Complementing these efforts, the ASEAN Bio Diasporas Regional Virtual Centre (ABVC) for big data analytics and visualization has provided updated reports on national risk assessments, readiness, and response planning efforts. ASEAN publishes risk assessment reports for international dissemination of COVID-19 information to highlight responses and provide an overview of cases and deaths in ASEAN countries.55 According to the traditional cooperation model, the ASEAN method, it is not surprising that ASEAN’s cooperation prioritizes national sovereignty and is clearly subordinated to national responses. Rüland (2021)56 argued that late responses and slow implementation will not substantially weaken ASEAN in the future because it is an intergovernmental organization that prioritizes national sovereignty. While unbinding rules and slow responses may be inherent features of ASEAN, the lack of funding is a crucial factor that constrains further cooperation. After the human H5N1 influenza pandemic, the ASEAN Secretariat summarized the related experiences and lessons and expressed that it was necessary to continue to support the implementation of the work plan of the ASEAN Technical Working Group on Pandemic Preparedness and Response in the Public Health, Agriculture, and Disaster Management sectors (Roy, 2009, p. 130)57 ; the economic fallout of COVID-19 has strained and stretched various budgets in many aspects, and the lack of funding and the great gap in development of member states have caused stagnation and the hindrance of further cooperation. The Joint Statement of the Special ASEAN Plus Three Summit on Coronavirus Disease, which was released on April 14, 2020, proposed reallocating the existing funds and establishing the COVID-19 ASEAN Response Fund for public health emergencies. Although several countries have constantly contributed aid to this fund, disrupted supply chains and subdued capital flows have at least temporarily impeded the procurement of certain medical supplies and equipment for distribution in countries with fragile health care systems (Djalante et al., 2020).58 Considering that most of its members are developing and even undeveloped countries, the ASEAN has been highly vulnerable during the COVID-19 pandemic and has been forced to confront a series of issues. Rüland (2021)59 proposed three serious impacts of COVID-19 on regional cooperation: the impact of domestic emergency measures on ASEAN inclusiveness, the effects of the crisis-driven economic downturn on finalizing the ASEAN Economic Community by 2025, and the impact of COVID-related geopolitical shifts on relations with China and ASEAN cohesion. COVID-19 has accelerated democratic backsliding in the region. According to a survey conducted by the V-Dem Institution, the Philippines have exhibited some abusive enforcement, violated non derogable or absolute rights, and restricted media

54

Djalante et al. (2020). Ibid. 56 Rüland (2021). 57 Roy (2009). 58 Djalante et al. (2020). 59 Rüland (2021). 55

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freedom.60 In Myanmar, the military appears to be taking advantage of COVID-19 by leveraging the power it retained during reforms that gave rise to a quasi-civilian government. In late March, the military set up a powerful 10-member COVID-19 taskforce to investigate cases of the virus and suppress ‘disinformation’ by punishing those who create ‘panic among the people’. This taskforce, which is made up of senior military officers and cabinet ministers appointed by the military, was created two weeks after the government had established a COVID-19 committee led by State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi.61 Similar situations also occurred in Thailand and Cambodia. Rüland (2021)62 argued that the securitization of COVID-19 and the heightened military presence in crisis management; the curtailment of media freedom; the freedom of expression, association, and assembly; the erosion of democratic institutions; and the rise of human rights violations all curb the political space for civil society in the region.63 Social distancing rules significantly impair government critics in mobilizing protests, and harsh media laws curtail their (online) communication (Mietzner, 2020).64

5.3.2 The Causes of Adverse Effects and Future Focus Economically, travel restrictions and border closures have severely impacted the pillar industries of ASEAN states, such as tourism and transportation. In the six months after March 2020, when the World Health Organization declared the COVID19 outbreak a pandemic, the total international seat capacity within the ASEAN declined by more than 45%. Aircraft movements were also reduced by 44% over the same period (ASEAN COVID-19 Guidelines). The regional economy became trapped in recession, which has led to soaring unemployment and intense poverty.65 In the first half of 2020, regional growth contracted sharply to 0.5%, the lowest rate since 1967.66 Vietnam, whose economy has been surprisingly resilient, is the only Southeast Asian nation still projected to have positive economic growth this year. However, its growth will be limited to 1.6%. It will be the first time Vietnam’s GDP growth has dipped below 5% in at least 20 years.67 60

Kaiser (2020). Hiebert (2020). 62 Rüland (2021). 63 Rüland (2021). 64 Mietzner (2020). 65 Sheng (2010). 66 VASHAKMADZE ET. The outlook for East Asia and Pacific in eight charts. https://blogs.worldb ank.org/eastasiapacific/outlook-east-asia-and-pacific-eight-charts-coronavirus-covid19. Published 2020. Accessed. 67 The latest on Covid-19 in southeast Asia: December 17, 2020 (December 17, 2020), Center for strategic international studies, https://www.csis.org/blogs/latest-covid-19-southeast-asia/latestcovid-19-southeast-asia-December-17-2020. 61

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Politically, as the major arena of American and Chinese relations, the ASEAN is inevitably impacted by US-Sino tensions. The pandemic has been strongly challenging to the neutrality strategy of the ASEAN. During the pandemic, the direction and approaches of foreign policies of both America and China have shown a trend of change. The changes in foreign policies reflect another way to adjust diplomacy strategies based on hard and soft power.68 The American political scientist Robert Dahl suggested that power is the ability to get another actor to do what it would not otherwise have done or not to do what it would otherwise have done (Dahl, 1970).69 With urgent needs for medical assistants, it is very difficult for the ASEAN to maintain balance between the U.S. and China when facing “the mask diplomacy”. The U.S.’s poor performance in response to the pandemic, as well as the American First policy promoted by Trump, may cause the U.S.’s influence in the region to be undermined. In contrast, the relationship between China and Southeast Asian countries has become much closer.70 Because of the mutual efforts made by both China and ASEAN countries, the two entities came together to reinforce their perceptions of greater cooperation in the COVID-19 pandemic (Lim, 2020).71 China’s first offer of assistance to the Philippines and Cambodia was largely made because these two countries were among the first to render assistance to China. On 26 January 2020, the Philippines donated 3.16 million masks to China, while Cambodia donated 5000 masks on 5 February 2020, largely from families whose children had benefited from free medical treatment from China (Fook, 2020).72 On 15 March 2020, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, 3000 Cambodian and Chinese troops staged a 19-day Golden Dragon annual military exercise in Kampot Province to shore up solidarity in the middle of the pandemic and tackle “counterterrorism and humanitarianism”.73 Meanwhile, China has witnessed a continual drop in the labor income share of its gross domestic product (GDP) and a steep rise in income in recent years.74 Chinese President Xi Jinping also wanted to start personnel interactions/exchanges and bilateral cooperation as soon as COVID-19 mitigation/prevention measures stabilized and normalized between China and ASEAN countries such as the Philippines. To conclude, COVID-19 has brought great challenges to Southeast Asian countries. To avoid financial turbulence or economic crisis, developing countries are urged to avoid the damaging influences of free-market ideology.75 At present, the region is preoccupied with the pandemic and the related recovery process. According to a survey conducted by Yusof Ishak Institute (2020),76 the threat to health from COVID-19 was the region’s most pressing concern in 2020. People also worried about 68

Sheng (2015). Dahl (1970). 70 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021). 71 Lim (2020). 72 Fook (2020). 73 Kijewski (2020). 74 Sheng (2014, 2016). 75 Sheng (2012). 76 Yusof Ishak Institute (2020). 69

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the ASEAN’s ability to overcome pandemic-related changes. In dealing with the pandemic, ASEAN countries’ cooperation within and outside the region still follows the traditional ASEAN method, with national crisis management and control as the first priority. As the pandemic still remains a major threat to the region, the ASEAN and its member states should solve the problems in various aspects. However, when considering the transition of leadership in the U.S. in the coming days, it is still unknown how the U.S. foreign policy and epidemic prevention and control measures will change after the new administration takes office. If the U.S. foreign policy measures change, then ASEAN countries should not only focus on seeking better ways to promote internal cooperation during the post pandemic period but also try their utmost to find balance in the changing international political landscape and even the changing world order. Therefore, in the short term, to facilitate cooperation with the international community and diversify assistance sources, the ASEAN should reform the relations between its member states and the WHO to bring all member states from two different WHO regional offices under the same regional framework. In the long term, with the increasing global uncertainties mainly brought about by US-Sino tensions, it will take more effort by the ASEAN to keep the balance between China and the U.S. and recover the regional economy.

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CSIS. (2020, December 17). The latest on Covid-19 in Southeast Asia. Center for Strategic & International Studies. Available at https://www.csis.org/blogs/latest-covid-19-southeast-asia/lat est-covid-19-southeast-asia-December-17-2020 Curley, M., & Thomas, N. (2004). Human security and public health in Southeast Asia: The SARS outbreak. Australian Journal of International Affairs, 58(1), 17–32. Dahl, R. (1970). Modern political analysis. Prentice Hall. Delatte, A. L., & Guillaume, A. (2020). Covid 19: A new challenge for the EMU. Diamond, L. (2015). Facing up to the democratic recession. Journal of Democracy, 26(1), 141–155. Djalante, R., Nurhidayah, L., Van Minh, H., Phuong, N. T. N., Mahendradhata, Y., Trias, A., Lassa, J., & Miller, M. A. (2020). COVID-19 and ASEAN responses: Comparative policy analysis. Progress in Disaster Science, 8, 100129. Enache, R., & Nistor, A. (2020). Possible effects of COVID-19 pandemic on NATO policy. Bulletin of “Carol I” National Defence University, 9(2), 16–22. European Union. (2020, April 6). Coronavirus: Aid from China to the EU delivered to Italy. European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Available at https://ec.europa.eu/echo/news/ coronavirus-aid-China-eu-delivered-italy_en Fook, L. L. (2020). The fight against COVID-19: China’s shifting narrative and Southeast Asia. Gu, X., & Sheng, L. (2010). A sensible policy tool for pareto improvement: Capital controls. Journal of World Trade, 44(3), 567–590. Guarascio, F., & Blenkinsop, P. (2020, March 6). EU fails to persuade France, Germany to lift coronavirus health gear controls. Reuters. Available at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hea lth-coronavirus-eu-idUSKBN20T166 Hiebert, M. (2020, May 25). COVID-19 threatens democracy in Southeast Asia. East Asia Forum. Available at https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2020/05/25/covid-19-threatens-democracyin-southeast-asia/ Kaiser, S. (2020, February 2). Pandemic backsliding in the Philippines. V-Dem Institution. Available at https://www.v-dem.net/en/news/pandemic-backsliding-philippines/ Kijewski, L. (2020, March 14). Cambodia to host war games with China amid coronavirus outbreak. ALJAZEERA. Available at https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/3/14/cambodia-tohost-war-games-with-China-amid-coronavirus-outbreak Lagarde, C. (2020, March 19). Our response to the coronavirus emergency. European Central Bank. Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/blog/date/2020/html/ecb.blog200319~11f 421e25e.en.html Lim, T. W. (2020). The global fight against Covid-19: Sino-Asean cooperation in mitigating the coronavirus pandemic along with other global actors. China and the World, 3(03), 2050011. Löfflmann, G. (2019). America first and the populist impact on US foreign policy. Survival, 61(6), 115–138. Massari, M. (2020, March 10). Italian ambassador to the EU: Italy needs Europe’s help. Politico. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/coronavirus-italy-needs-europe-help/ Mietzner, M. (2020). Populist anti-scientism, religious polarisation and institutionalised corruption: How Indonesia’s democratic decline shaped its COVID-19 response. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 39(2), 227–249. Missiroli, A., & Rühle, M. (2020). The pandemic and the military: Towards total defence? NATO Defense College. https://doi.org/10.2307/resrep27745 Montalvo, S. (2020). The COVID-19 emergency and the reintroduction of internal border controls in the Schengen area: Never let a serious crisis go to waste. European Papers, 5, 523–535. Mossialos, E., Baeten, R., Permanand, G., & Hervey, T. K. (Eds.). (2010). Health systems governance in Europe: The role of European Union law and policy. Cambridge University Press. NATO. (2020a, March 19). NATO allies take stock of response to COVID-19 outbreak. Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174407.htm NATO. (2020b, March 19). Coronavirus response: Czech medical aid arrives in Spain, heads to Italy. Available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174623.htm

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Chapter 6

Concluding Remarks

Today, the world has entered into an unknown new era of deglobalization, one that profoundly reshapes the landscape of global economy, international politics, and international organization. In the wake of the unprecedented Covid-19 pandemic, the year 2020 has definitely been a turning point in world history. Rival ideologies, power blocs, leaders, and institutions are being stress-tested in the court of world opinion. President Emmanuel Macron of France stated, “This period will have taught us a lot. Many certainties and convictions will be swept away. Many things that we thought impossible are happening.” In Hong Kong, graffiti reads, “There can be no return to normal because normal was the problem in the first place.” The U.N. Secretary General Antonio Guterres has said, “The relationship between the biggest powers has never been as dysfunctional. COVID-19 is showing dramatically, either we join together, or we can be defeated.” Given these great changes and uncertainties, a plethora of questions remains to be answered. Regarding the global economy, will a pandemic-induced recession further expand the scope of business failures? How can the economy recover and stimulate employment in the post pandemic era? Regarding international politics, will there be a new paradigm after contrasting the health crisis responses between democracies and authoritarianism? How can the existing international organizations evolve to strengthen multilateralism and globalization? What kind of world orders will emerge from the great powers in the post pandemic era? All these questions deserve keener reflection on future development. At the end of 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic is still widely spreading. As the COVID-19 pandemic is still circulating widely at the end of 2020, more actions and cooperation are needed not only to contain the virus but also to build a genuine community with a common future for humankind.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022 L. Sheng, How COVID-19 Reshapes New World Order: Political Economy Perspective, Contributions to International Relations, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-6190-7_6

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6.1 New Challenges Posed by COVID-19 Since the outbreak of COVID-19 started in December 2019, so far it has spread to over 200 countries. Owing to its significant impact on the political, economic, social, and cultural life of the entire world, the direction of future world development is rather unpredictable. For starters, the pandemic presents a noticeable impact on global economic growth. According to the latest estimations from the IMF, the COVID-19 pandemic could trim global economic growth by as much as 20% per month, with a partial recovery of 2.5–5.2% projected for 2021 if the current conditions persist. Meanwhile, global trade could also drop by 13–32%, depending on the depth and extent of the global economic recession (Jackson et al., 2020).1 This raises the risk of a global economic downturn, similar in magnitude to the one experienced during the Great Depression in the 1930s. Escalating global inequality, the concentration of income, and the impacts on the “real economy” have accelerated with the onset of the pandemic.2 From the impacts generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, according to the World Bank3 (WB), Poverty and Shared Prosperity Report, extreme poverty will affect the equivalent of something between 9.1 and 9.4% of the world’s population in 2020. Before the pandemic, the poverty rate was estimated to fall to 7.9% in 2020. An estimated 115 million people were pushed into this situation, a number that could grow to 150 million in 2021, between 8.9 and 9.4% in 2021. According to the Inequality Virus report, issued by the OXFAM International,4 the world’s richest 1% have more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people, and the world’s ten richest have seen their combined wealth increase by half a trillion dollars since the pandemic began, more than enough to pay for a COVID-19 vaccine for everyone and ensure no one is impoverished by the pandemic. Their total wealth hit $11.95 trillion in December 2020, equivalent to G20 governments’ total COVID-19 rehabilitation spending. The increase in billionaires’ fortunes during the pandemic is perhaps the most impressive fact, given the lack of market regulation and mechanisms to protect the poorest. In view of the proliferation in unemployment and hunger on a progressive scale in all continents, the debate on “the welfare state” and the taxation of large wealth of companies and people are once again highlighted in Europe and the world, as an alternative in preserving public health and helping the unemployed.5 The economic recession has not only caused companies to suffer indelible losses due to the lockdowns imposed by various countries but has also posed multiple challenges to the global operations of MNEs, which will further “micromodularize” value chains to allow the easier substitution of one micromodule after another, thereby 1

Jackson et al. (2020). Sheng (2015b). 3 World Bank (2020). Poverty and Shared Prosperity 2020: Reversals of Fortune. Washington DC, USA. 4 Oxfam International (2021). 5 Hao et al. (2017). 2

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also reducing the possible negative impact of any micromodule in the GVC on the entire network (new georedundancy) (Verbeke, 2020).6 MNEs have used GVCs for decades as a governance tool to organize international business (IB) activities, thereby involving a myriad of other types of companies. Much empirical evidence has shown that more efficient governance modes in IB typically prevail over less efficient modes (Buckley, 2019).7 However, authoritative voices now claim that the pandemic will change everything in GVC design in response to the “new normal” (Verbeke, 2020).8 The stricter nationalist policies resulting from the epidemic have created higher expectations for the extreme localization of multinational companies, which makes the integration of cross-border subsidiaries’ businesses seem less relevant and more difficult to achieve (Hitt et al., 2021).9 In the context of global institutional fracturing and macrolevel institutions being less reliable than expected to protect business interests, as the pandemic indicates, MNEs may naturally reduce their reliance on these institutions; i.e., they may engage in more elaborate microlevel contracting with critical partners in their GVC networks (Verbeke, 2020).10 As a result, the trajectories of the economies and institutions and the strategy of multinational companies have been modified due to the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the pandemic has highlighted the contrast between democracy and authoritarianism in the scope of effective governance since their response to the public health crisis was fully disclosed and compared. The contrast between China as the example of authoritarianism and the United States as the democracy has been a heated discussion when it comes to effects of confronting the pandemic. Obviously, with Trump’s “America First” policies isolating the United States from the rest of the world and raising host domestic problems such as populism, racism, and xenophobia, the United States faces a formidable challenge to maintain its world hegemony.11 By contrast, China appears to have scored great successes in the battle against the pandemic. Internally, China has taken control of the pandemic and recovered its economy by the second quarter of 2020 with the high capability of social mobilization and organization. Externally, China has been proactively providing medical assistance and international public goods in health to its partners and the international community, by which China consolidates and promotes its global prestige and reputation. Admittedly, we cannot jump to a conclusion that democracy or authoritarianism works absolutely better in the battles against the COVID-19 pandemic, but one cannot neglect that the pandemic does expose certain potential shortcomings of the democratic system. Therefore, we are still keen to find out the answers to some questions: Will democracy absorb the authoritarian political legacy left by this pandemic, or will a new paradigm emerge, which is worth discussing in the future?

6

Verbeke (2020). Buckley (2019). 8 Verbeke (2020). 9 Hitt et al. (2021). 10 Verbeke (2020). 11 Sheng and do Nascimento (2021). 7

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As discussed in Chap. 1, the COVID-19 also provoked the discussion on the significance of “the visible hand”, the role of state, and its relations with the market, “invisible hand”. The pandemic reveals the serious fact that “the visible hand” is crucial to what cannot be solely resolved by “the invisible hand”. Due to the weakness of national industries, most developing countries and even the developed countries did not have a minimal structure to produce basic equipment to resist the fast spread of the COVID-19. Consequently, as we can see, the liberal democracies in the European Union have failed to help Italy in the worst moment of the pandemic and closed themselves off to address their internal troubles, even with the already consolidated instrument cooperation agreements. In England, Prime Minister Boris Johnson had to meet with the Imperial College to be convinced of the pandemic’s seriousness. Meanwhile, the liberal democracy also suffered setbacks out of the populist and negationist in emerging countries such as India and Brazil in the fight against the pandemic. Additionally, the global COVID-19 crisis also accentuated the lack of international cooperation in the field of health and hygiene. Coordination and collaboration are urgently needed in the existing international organizations such as the World Health Organization given their vital roles in tackling the pandemic. Considering health issues often involve the common interests of humankind, the function of the World Health Organization shall be further widened and strengthened. Also, international financial organizations such as the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank should contribute more financial resources to achieve Sustainable Development Goals and effectively cope with crises. Moreover, with the prevalence of international environment protectionism, populism, and the US unilateralism exacerbating the uncertainties in the world, there is a strong necessity to enhance international cooperation among relevant institutions, boost financial resources, and grant more assistance to countries struggling with debt crises.12 Indeed, the uncertainties are likely to bring about “the great changes”, but what ought to matter is that “big changes” are also “big tests”, and what runs through this process is a fundamental historic imperative. On a global scope, multilateral cooperation is the optimal key to the test after a series of traumatic experiences from unilateralism, impeded trade, and confrontation. At the same time, the role of emerging countries like China in the solutions against the pandemic should be valued considering that more resources are now flowing to developing countries.13 Thus, gaining the support of promising emerging potentials in global multilateral governance is vital.

12 13

Sheng (2012). Sheng (2015a).

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6.2 COVID-19 and the New World Order The COVID-19 is profoundly reshaping the current world from the regional and global supply chains and the Sino-U.S. power transition, which has triggered numerous debates on the tradeoff between human beings and the economy, or public health and market; the competitions between China and the United States, or authoritarianism and democracy. Also, the topics on the prospect of globalization, the future of the European Union, the prevalence of populism, and the issues of public health, information proliferation as non-traditional security are heatedly discussed in the international community under the background of pandemic. Towards those tremendous challenges, even as a unipolar superpower, the United States struggles to cope, especially when its ally EU is also trapped into predicament of controlling pandemic and internal divergence on Brexit, pandemic preventions, immigrant and sovereignty. As the United States and its allies waned in a relative manner, during the COVID19 pandemic. Via observing its performance in the battle against the pandemic, China turned out to be highly capable of social mobilization, policy implementation, and grassroots organizations. Due to a series of effective measures, China has earned the “time lag” to restore its domestic economy while the United States and its EU allies are still striving to take the lead in fully resuming normal production and life orders. Moreover, China has already planned a long-term strategy for the post pandemic era. Internally, China determines to accelerate industrial transformation and stress technological research to shift the current situation of overdependence on high-tech products import.14 Meanwhile, China is also attempting to relocate its position in the global division of the labor system by bridging the regional gap and optimize domestic environment for economic growth.15 Externally, China is continuing to pursue regional integration with periphery via various mechanisms such as SOC, ASEAN + 1, and RCEP, and expanding the BRI in the context of pandemic through the Health Silk Road. From this perspective, East Asia will play a more prominent role in the future with the governance-oriented value rather than power-oriented one. To sum up, interactions among countries cannot entirely avoid calculations of interests and conflicts, but the common interests outweigh the divergence when faced with global issues. The COVID-19 pandemic, indeed, is a daunting challenge to the world but a great opportunity to refine the multilateral functions of the regional community and the international organization, strengthen the transnational cooperation in non-traditional security areas and global governance to build a more dynamic, inclusive, and sustainable economic globalization for the future.

14 15

Sheng (2016). Gu and Sheng (2010).

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6 Concluding Remarks

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