Sacramentum Mundi, An Encyclopedia of Theology: Habitus to materialism [3]

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SACRAMENTUM VOLUME

THREE:

MUNDI

HABI'TUS — MATERIALISM

SACRAMENTUM

MUNDI

An Encyclope-dia of Theology Edited by KarL RannNer S]], Minster and

Juan Arraro S, Rome ALBERTO BELLINI, Bergamo Carvro CoLoMBO,

Venegono

Hexr: CrouzeL S], Toulouse

JeAN Danierou S], Paris AporLr DarLapr, Munich CornELIus ErnstT

OP, Oxford

Josk FonpEviLLa S}, Barcelona Prer Fransen, Louvain Fercus

KErr OP, Oxford

PIET SCHOONENBERG, Nijmegen

Kevin SmytH, Paris 1 Gustave WEIGEL S], Woodstock

© Hermann-Hetder-Foundation, Basle—Montreal “

Published by Herder and Herder New York - Burns & Oates London - Palm Publishers

Montreal - Herder Freiburg - Editions Desclée de Browwer Bruges - Editorial Herder Barcelona + Edizioni

Morcelliana Brescia « Paul Brand Hilversum

'SACRAMENTUM MUNDI AN

ENCYCLOPEDIA

VOLUME

OF

THEOLOGY

THREE

HABITUS TO MATERIALISM

BURNS

& OATES

1969 HERDER

AND

HERDER

NEW

YDRK

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General Editor: Adolf Datlap

Nibil obstat: Lionel Swain, Censor

Imprimatar: T Patrick Casey, Vie, Gen,, Auxiliary Bishop of Westminster Westminster, 11th November 1968.

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Nibil obstat and Imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions ot statements exptessed.

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ABBREVIATIONS The following list does not include biblical and other well-known abbreviations.

Whenever an author, not listed below, is cited in an article by name only, followed

by page number(s), the reference is to a work listed in the bibliography at the end of the article. AAS ACW Billerbeck

Acta Apostolicae Sedis (19091) J. Quasten and }. C. Plampe, Ancienz Christian Writers (1946 1) (FL. L. Strack and) P, Billerbeck, Kommentar qum Neunen Testament

aus Tabmud wnd Midrasch, 1-IV (1922-28; reprint, 1956), V: rabbinical index, &d. by J. Jeremias and K. Adolph (1956)

CBQ Chalkedon

CIC ciO Collertio Lacensis

CSEL D

Catholic Biblical Quarterly (193911.)

A. Gtillmeier and H. Bacht, eds., Das Kongil von Chalkédon, Gesehichte und Gegemvart, 3 vols. (1951-54; 2nd enlarged ed., 1962) Codex [uris Canonici Codex [uris Canonici Orientalis (Unless stated otherwise, the

references are to the law relating to petsons.)

Collectio Lacensis: Acta et Decreta Sacrorum Cosiciliorum Recentiorum,

ed. by the Jesuits of Maria Laach, 7 vols. (1870-90) Corpus Seriptorum Ecclesiasticornm Latinoram (18661L)

H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declara-

tionum de Rebus Fidet et Morwm (31st ed., 1957); see also DS E. Vigouroux, ed., Dictionnaire de la Bible, 5 vols. (1895-1912) L. Pirot, ed., Dictionnaire de la Bible, Supplément, continued by A. Robert (19284.)

H. Denzinger and A. Schénmetzer, Enchiridion Symboloram, Definitionnm et Declarationum de Rebus Fidet et Morum (331d ed.,

1965); see also DD

M. Viller, ed., Dictivinaire de Spiritualité ascétigme et mystique. Doctrine et Histoire (193241.)

A. Vacant and E. Mangenot, eds., Dictionnaire de théologie catholigue, continued by E. Amann, I-XV, Table analytique and Tables générales, XVIH. (1903 1L.) v

ABBREVIATIONS

Enchiridion Biblicum Enchiridion Biblicum.

ETL GCS Hennecke-

Schneemelcher-

Wilson

Documenta

Eiclesiastita Sacram Seripturan

Spectantia (3rd ed., 1956) Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses (19241.)

Die privchischen, christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten dréi Jabrhunderte

(1897 f1.)

E. Hennecke, W. Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson, eds., New

Testament Apoerypha, 2 vols. (1963—-65)

HERE

J. Hastings, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 12 vols. +

JBL JTS

LTK

Journal of Biblical Literature (18811f) Journal of Theological Studies (189911.) J. Hofer and K. Rahner, eds., Lexikon fir Thevlogic md Kirche,

Mansi

J. D. Mansi, Sacroram Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima

NRT NTS§ PG PL

J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia La:?m:, 217 vols. 4 4 index vols.

Pritchard

RGG

index (1908-26; 2nd rev. ed., 1925-40)

10 vols. + index (2nd rev. ed., 1957-67)

31 vols. (1757-98); reprint and contihuation ed. by L. Petit and J. B. Martin, 60 vols. (1899-1927) Nospelle Reyue Théologiqne (1879 1) New Testamens Studies (19544.) J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Graeca, 161 vols. (18574.) : (1844 1) J. B. Pritchard, ed., Aurient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament (I 950; 2nd revised and enlarged ed,, 1955) K. Galling, ed., Die Religion in Geschichté nd Ga;gmwar; 6. vols,

index (3rd rev. ed., 1957-65)

Revue &’histoire ecclésiastique (19008.) Revne d*bistoireet de philosophic religienss (1921 )

RHE RHPR RSPT RSR RSV 75 I

Recherches de science religiense (191068

TWNT

G.

ZAW ZRKT

VI

Gollectio,

Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologigues (1907H.)

Revised Standard Version of the Bible

|

Theological Studies (19404.)

Texcte und Untersuchungen sur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatnr. Archiv fiir die griechisch- christlichen S fbr#f:t&ller der ‘ersten drei Jahrhunderte, hitherto 62 vols, in 5 series (1882) Kittel, ed.,

Theologisches Warterbuch zm

Newen

Testament,

comntinued by G Friedrich (1933#); E.T.: T égafqgm! Dictionary of the New Testament (196418) Zestschrift fir die alttestamentliche Wissenschaf? (1881 ) Zeitschrift fir Katholische Theologie (187TH.)

takes place in the world, which structures are

HABITUS

1. The general notion. The notion of babitus

is used to explain the special nature of human

action. Since man is spirit realizing himself in freedom, he comes upon himself not merely as a neutral entity, but primarily as a task imposed. Through and in his-action he must make himself what he is and ought to

be. But this power to make himself does not

mean that he is totally indeterminate, as if he had t0 makean absolute beginningat each

not

comprehended

in

an

abstract,

formal

definition of man’s essence but are found in

the conctete being of man, Insofar as exist-

ence itself is an orientation to action, the existentials

are

Aabifuses.

But

since

the

babitus, unlike the existential, indicates not

only a basic structure but its individual dif-

ferentiation in each person, the habitus has

more sharply defined characteristics than the existential.

This description of the ebstus differs some-

man as spirit always starts from 2 determinate

what from the classical definition given by Aristotle: ““The habitus (£5.¢) is an aequisi-

given act and enters into it as a determining

off as regards itself (i.e., its own nature) or

moment. On the contrary, the free action of state of the subject, which is prior to any

factor.

We

call this subjective

disposition

habitys — insofar as a) its nature cannot be deduced from a formal definition of the essence and hence could have been other-

wise, andb) the act in guestion is related to

man a$ a totality, that i3, to his being good or bad. If we call bodily constitution a habit (babitns), this can only be in a transferred sense, 25 when we speak of a “sickly” or healthy habit. The spiritual, free action of

man is pnly determined by thoese modes of

being which refer this action te the absolute

of truth and love. Thus these modes of being

are characterized by the fact that they are

orientated to the absolute itself: they are the

modes of existence, and a habit (Jabitus) is

a determinate quality of existence insofar as it is orientated to man’s action.

With

this,

tion whereby another

something is better or worse

(i.e., the final end of its nature).”

(Meta., V, 20; 1022, 1041.) Aristotle’s more

static view sees the habitus primarily as 2 further determination of the subject, and only then ag related to action, which is not confinéd to human action. We take it mote dynamically and strictly, primarily as the

basic possibility of specifically human action, spiritual and free and also part of the world

process.

Only when taken in this sense can

it help to explain the specific nature of human action.

2, Definition in detail. In view of what has

been said abowve, the further determination of the notion of babitus must begin with the

characteristics of existence, insofar as they

the notion of hsbitus approximates to that

determine human action. a) Existence is otientation te the Absolute,

mean the basic structutres of existence, that

bestowal of the Absolute itself. Existence as

of the existential. For by existentials we also

is, of the orientation to the absolute which

This orientation is set on foot by the self-

thus founded is the being of man in its inmost

1

HABITUS an

intefionty

not

coun-

sciously grasped. In this merely formal con-

sideration of the core of being as spurce of action, it is not yet hsbizus, since 1t has no

particular determinations beyond its essential

constitution. It is only Aebitus when it is considered in its ingriasic determination. This determination of the substantial being

(which qua produced does not yet formally

imply relationship to the world) is brought about by the fact that the Absolute bestows itself (by giving rise to the being in question) and in the way in which it bestows itself. In the pre-Christian and non-Christian realtns,

this self-bestowal remains veiled in an ano-

nymity which, though not indeterminate, is still ultimately mexphcable For Christians,

dition calls this determination of the faculties

habitus aperativ. Thereare two such operative habituses:

(i) The relationship-of the Absolute to the

world in general, accomplishéd through the

operative faculties, is c’oflsci@ufily grasped in

the act of existence, that is, in the free action,

of the spirit, though such knmwlcdgc doesnot necessarily take the form of articulate statement. But this relationship is the structuriz-

ing of worldly beings by the Absolute as they

are bmught.- about, and it is formulated ini-

tially and in general by means of the fiest prin-

ciples of being.

Since this relationship is

grasped in every spiritual activity of man, the opetative fachlties are at once materially determined in their first act by mmght irito the

it is characterized as Jesus Christ, in whom

first principles — which insight is not simply

our being to Christ thfough the offer of

factualness of the world in general. Hence the scholastics terined this imselleitas privcipiorym the primary habitus of the human

the living God turns t6 us in love, ordaining

salvation, transfcrmmg and determining it

in: Christ. It is a self-bestowal which enables men to share profoundly, though gratui-

tously, the possibilities of God’s own self-

existent being, This determination, which is

the adaptation and otdination of existence to Christ, since it iz paft of existence and yet is only intelligible in view of Christ,

- 18 the “supernatural existential” of mdn (K. Rahner). As thé dequisition which in Christ affects man in the core of his being,

elevating and changing him, it is sanctifying

gtace. Both of these, supernatural existenitial

and sanctifying grace, had to be called by

scholastic

tradition

babitus infusi,

because

absolutely inexigible by man and oaly im-

planted by God, and bebizus entitativi because

determinative of the core of man’s being — though as 4 rule only sanctifying grace is designated as an entitative isifused Aabitys. b) The orientation to the Absolute takes

place in the world, that is, the substantial

interiority of man is only there 4s related to the world. Fundamentally, it is the spiritual facnlties which realize this telationship. But

since of themselves they do not specify the relationship

any further, they must

them-

selves reeeive a further determination, s that ‘each act of ittan has not to be accomplished a5 an absolute beginning (k. 1). In contrast to the entitative bubifus, which did not formally include stich relatmnshlp to the

world, the determination

in question, in

which the relationship to the world is crystallized, implies dn immédiate relationship to 2

a logical deduction, but presupposes the

spirit.

(ii) This pflmar}* insight which is always present gives humanaction acertain (general) telationship to. the wotld, but not to history,

which being action accomplished in freedom

is never complete. And here it is not only 2,

Ly

though

the actien of man in the world Heérice tia-

matter of the history of the individual; for

his his’terry only takes forim in his réaction to history in general, which offers him, and imposes on him, its harvest of thought and experience and is thus a prior factor deter-

mining each action. The individual action

must b¢ made dn organic part of one’s own history and hence of general history, if onie is to take 2 responsible attitude to one’s own

and others’ acts. Hence the condition of

pfismb;hty of regponsibleé action is that the

operative faculties both end and preserve

this history by taking it over a8 a determisation. And this determination, being the imptint of personal and general history (in-

sofat as the individual is concerned with it), makes the actions of the individual chatac-

teristic of his petsonality — and makes them good or bad. Such determinations of the

operative faculties are then ‘thé mote in-

tellectual

virtues

of science, wisdom

and

prodence. (or their absence) or the more practical soral

virtues (6¢ vices), which

equip each action ¢f man for its fimffime af'

freedem, where the life 'of man is gathi up Hito one, 15 Yes of No to the Absaiute hence really to the living God of Jesus Christ.

TP ASPErTY e

his action,

determinant of

T TN

core, which is the primary

HEALTH

3. Conclusion, The importance of the habitus

is not merely that it can give rise to habits,

favouring an economy of effort in certain ordinaty coutses of action. First and fore-

2. For the terms “well” and “ill”’ there are

apparent synonyms, e.g., the concepts of normal and abnormal. Norms are to be found

in biology and medicine alike. They divide

lessening of freedom. Its specific character

into three groups. a) The essential qualities of the species and breeds are their “norm”,

freedom,

be exercised by

example) are abnormal. Yet such abnormali-

importance of the hebitas is that it is the

b) The average of a group already classified

most, the babitas may not be regarded as a

thakes it an invitation and outline for our which

can

enly

virtue of it and in teaction to it. Hence the means whereby man is inserted into history,

including his own, which is always history of salvation. And this organic link enables

him to confront reality as a whole com-

ptehensively, and to give the acruation of his freedom a deeper and fuller reality in this confrontation, See alse Man I, Freedom, Essence, Existence,

Human Agt, World, Principle, History 1.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. ]. Chevalier, L’Habitude, Essai de métaphysigue scientifigne (1929); P. de Roton, Les Habitus, lenr caractire ipirituel (1934); A. Arsighini, L’abitudine (1937); J. Valbuena, “De significatione specialis Praedicamenti ‘habitus’”, Angelivum 2223 (1945{46), pp. 1727, R. GarrigouLagrange, De beatitudine, de actibus bumanis ot babitibus. Comment. i 5. Th, I, I, gq. 1-54 (1951); G. Funke, “Gewahnhelt” Arehiy filr Bagriffspeschichzs, 1H (1958); K. Rahner, Thévlogical

Tnpestigations, 1 (1961}, 11 (1964).

Crswald Schwemmer

ties do

not

necessarily

connote

sickness.

as healthy could be defined as the norm

in

relation to individually widely distributed qualities (blood pressure, basic metabolism,

etc.). Yet variations from the standard are by fio medins unhealthy in every case {e.g.,

great size of body). They ate so only when

the averages concern vital functional values

such as, for example, blood pressure. Such values always include the mandatory standards of a regulative mechanism, any considerable

change in which is consequéntly unheslthy.

¢) In human life there are norms of behaviour

stemming from social custom. They are of special importance to the notion of mental illness. “Unhealthy” is the adjectival determination of a state or process which injures the health of individuals, and so makes them

ill.

The

terms

‘“‘“wounded”

or

“injured”

denote illness following a wound, the term

“dainaged” refers to the permanent result of

4 wound.

It too need not be identified witth

illgess.

3. The problematic nature of the concepts.

HEALTH

health and sickness is seen from the fact that

I, Physical Health. IL. Psychic Hygiene.

I. Physical Health 1. There is no simple, generally accepted de-

finitton of health and disease. *“Health” can indeed, as an ideal norm, be described accord-

ing to the definition of the World Health Organization as 2 “state of perfect bodily,

mental and social well- being™. This -definition is, however, neither useful in practice

not entirely acceptable in theory. Health can bé defisied only with referenceto sickness and only to the extent that the concepts are mutually ‘exclusive when they refer to a partic-

ular individual {(one is either sick ot well, never both at the same time), but a br@ad neutral area is left, where the individual feels himself neither flnurely

deviations from which (6 fingers, albino, for

well nor

yet sick.

Why this is so becomes clear if we analyse the facts.

modern medicine by its fight against disease in the last hundred years has doubled life expectation {to an average of seventy years), whereas the number of days” illness of the insured has increased roughly threefold. 4. Cur notions of health and sickness are derived from daily experience, especially that of doctors. The first guide to understanding these concepts ‘must, therefore, be the phe-

someng Of actual -manif&stati_nn-s. The basic phenomenon is how the person feels: when

he falls sick he becomes a “patient” (pati =

suffer). Pain drives him to the doctor. Subjective discomfort, however, accompanies many “physioclogical” processes and arises with innumerable

adaptive manifestations:

after use of the muscles in the form of stifftiess, in adapting to heat as a feeling of fatigue and inability for heavy work, ete. “Feeling”

can therefore be considered as a sign of illness

3

HEALTH. Dfl!}F whin it points to disturbances that are; in the widest sense, a thieat to life. Evety sickness “has death for itsaim® (Jores). Thus

a disturbanice in the way one feels is to be

taken all the more seriously the morte it seems.

to be justified by bodily indications (“’symp-

toms™) which tark a departure from the notmal. Symptoms Eive support to the

diagnosis which starts from the way

the

patient feels (e.g., fatigue through lack of

blood

pigmentation);

they

ate

usually,

though not always, sufficient to establish the

preserice of an illness. They can be -absent

evén wheére there is considerable subjective

disturbance (e.g., headache); they can be a threat to life withiout any subjective disturb-

ance {Cancer).

5. The patient is il when he himself be-

lteves he is no longer able to wotk. He alone

makes this decision, he “goes sick™; yet his decision calls for confirmation by th;e doctor who ““signs” to that effect. Health is therefore

much subject to social influences of this kind (Mitschetlich). The religions factor makes itself felt in this area and the loss of religion

in the rapid structural change in society and the wotld of work has contributed greatly to

the rise of sociosomatic disturbanees. The ability to “put up” with things has dwindled

mote and mote.

7. Here it becotnes appatent that there is 2

moral aspect to health and to sickness i the

social

sense, Most

“illnesses’” in

medical

practice are minor and are never fatal. Many

could be endured without work stoppage.

They would then be regarded as “subjectiveobjective” disturbances but not as “illnesses”. Thus classification as illness is the resultof a complex judgment. A person who is indisposed will have 2 place somewhere along

the scale between absolute health and fatal illness, and he will be all the nearer to illness

sccordance with the individual’s owa judg-

the more he feels himself subjectively threaténed, the worse his objéctive symptoms are, orat Jeast-appear, and the mote inclined heis by temperament to take his symptoms

can, however,

this case is obvious: society formerly had

in the

fuirst place

capability

for

work

id

ment. The threat of future inability to work

also constituté illness (e.g.,

cancet or arteriosclerosis). The quflstmn of

whether 4nd to what extent the patient is justified in going sick is one that cannot always

be objectively answered.

Even

the

words of the doctor can so alter the way

é patient feels that he can feel sick without any objective canse (medically induced

illness).

6. The diagnosis of the actual presence of

an illness: is complicated by the fact that the spititual and bodily elements in man react

seriously. The. sx‘gmficaflce of social norms in

fixed ethical

Iimits

to: what

one

should

endute. Today cofiventions fiil ‘or have become flabby for the most part: mén cossiders

himself or others sick at every minor in-

disposition. The rate of illness of the insured

(i.e., the nimber who are sick at any one. tlrne as & percentage of the total employed) is thereby increased and determines the statistical level of the nation’s health,

8. The moral problems

health have become

of sicknégs dnd

more extensive as a

on each otherso that he can be understood

result of the great economic importance of

somatic” approach). This mutual influence has recently been experimentally confirmed in animals. Animals tooean be psych osommatically ill (miost recent literdture in Baust-

large part of the Gross National Product is lost. The individual hds a Zuty fo bis health and

anly as 2 unity of body and soul (“psycho-

these phenomena. Because of the raté of illness and of early invalidity every year, a especially

to preserving health since the

Man’s mental coo-

community has to provide for him when he

wings of hope and success; lack of prospects,

not orily has he less resistance to feeling ill

it can to protect the individual’s health and ini case of illness to provide relief, Both the right and the duty can, however, be pasitively established -only with diffculty. That

because of the chafiges in the sympathetic

result of the modern way-of thlflklflg swith its,

indications

doubt as a cénsequence of the Christian tra-

Golenhofen-Zanchetti),

dition is also strongly influeniced by his social position and envifontnent, rises on the

monotony

of wotk, isolation, loneliness

niake him depressed ind so affect him that

but he is also more subject te such feelings

nervous system. We speak of “‘soeiosomatic’

and

illnesses and

of “social

health”. Neuroses and psychoses are véry

4

183ll. There is to be sure the corresponditig right to health: the community must do, all

they afe so miuch eémphasized today is the

strong orientition towards society, pmly ng

dition (the idea of charity as 2 dfity}

HEALTH

2. Sickness is nevertheless not a primary moral phenomeneon despite the fact that in the Middle Ages it was frequently seen in

that

light and the

étymology

of many

languages points to it (ill from evil, malade from mal!). This has not been enurely ovetcome In respect to mental illness. Here the role of convention as a basis for judgment is

very much in evidence: in matters of the

far the social structure under consideration tallies with the bias of the viewer, that is,

corresponds with his views of what is right

and hormal. Accordingly, every padgment on the health of social institutions is a political judgment, to be made only on the basis of a pre-existing concept of social order. See also filness, Death, Freedons, Body, Soul.

mirrd what is unusual is frequently regarded as illness (genius and madness according to Lombroso). It seems misleading to regard

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

can indeed

W. Sargant and E. Slater, Somatic Methods in ngréiaf{jr (1944); H. ¥. Dunbar, Mind and Bady: Psychosomatic Medicine (1947); R. Frazer, The Incidence of Newrosis-among Factory Warkers (1947);

illness

as the

be

conisequence the result

of sin.

of a lively

Iliness con-

sciousness of sin (e.g., the scrupulous con-

scietice) and would in such a case be-classified as psychosomatic. It can also be the natural

consequence of sinful bebaviour (venereal

diseases). But for the ostpart the theologian underestimates the considerable effect of emotions and suggestibility on the human body and the compulsive natute of biological

phenomena.

10. Health is a guarantee of freedom and

every illness implies a loss of freedom, i.e.,

a loss of possibilities (Jores, Mitschetlich). The sick person is unfree because sickness imposes on him a reduction in performarice,

forces hitn to take precautions, or (in the case

of psychesomatic or mental illnesses) tesults

in abnormal, jour.

But

socially unacceptable

héealth can also be the

behav-

cause

of

mental and moral mediocrity,

whereas sick-

won

sufféring

negs can bethe source of mental development through

suffering.

All

en-

riches the wotld of psychesomatic experience

and leads to mental and moral reactions that

are of the highest social importance. For that

teason too, the definition of health quoted above from the World Health Organization is unibiclogical: man without sufféfing is 2 man without adaptation to a world in which suffering of all kinds has.a great social, politi-

¢al and religious significance. In particular a

A.F. Bonnar, The Catholic

Dactor (1938); C. H. Best and N. B. Taylor, The Physiological Basis of Medical Practive (1940);

P.T. Young, Emotion in Men and Animals (1943);

E. Weiss and Q. 3. English, Psychosomatic Medicine

(1949}; A. ]. Catlson and V. Johnson, Th Machinery of the Body (1954); A. Jores and others, eds., The Fourth European Conferénce on Prychosematic Research, Huamburg {1959), A. Jores and H. Freyberger, eds., Advances in Psychosomatic Medicine (1960); A. I\rhtscherhch “Methods and Principles of Research on Psychosomatic Fundamentals®™,

Cuitare,

Seciely and Health,

Anpual

of the New York Acadenmry of Science 84 (1960), pp. 783-1060; W. Kiitemeyer, Die Krankbeit in ihrer Mmm&.’fmésff (1963);

H.

H.

Wolff and

P. Hopkins, eds. Principles of Treatments of Psychosomatic Dirorders, pub. by the Society for Psychosomatic Research (1965); W, Braust, K. Golenhavfen

and A.

Zanchetti,

Verbandlungen der dest-

schen Gesedischaft fiir Kreislaufforséhung 32 (1966), pp. 23--56,

Hans Schacfer

IX. Psychic Hygiene Mental health is 2 state of harmenious furic-

tmmng in our personality, wheféin we peiceive ourselves and the world around us with

a sense of accuracy, alertness and dynamic awareness, by meeting stimuli and respond-

ing with a measure of urge and initiative for action, or with a restful sense of satisfaction;

by enjoying the confrontation, and enduring reverses with a sense of challenge marked by

long, severe illness inclines the patient to call

commitment

lead to a constderable strengthening of these,

of the situation and the nature of our per-

on his mental and moral resources and ean

11. The terms health and illness are alsé

frequently used of higher units: the family, the State, hurnanity or certain social or political structures

(Kiitemeyer).

Since the con-

cept of health is scarcely capable of definition even in the case of the individual human being, there is much less possibility here, It

mersely serves to give a judgment as to how

patience

to

action

according

to

or

the

resolution

to

circumstances

son; recognizing limitations and emphasiz-

ing endowments and the need to expréss ourselves as individuals freely yet in keeping

with divine law,

As the personality functions, it unfolds and develops towardsa maturity which is reached

on the average around the age of 30, leading

with continued growth to the emergence of

character and finally to the development of

5

HEALTH a philosophy of life which crystallizes with

advancing

age.

Essendally,

the parts or

spheres unfolding in the petsonality are the emotional, the intellectual and the spiritual. The emotional, which is primarily of an instinctive type at and shortly after bitth, is

the predominant frame of reference in the lite of a child. Around the age of seven the intellectual cdpacities ate displayed more pmmlnefltl}g ready for schooling, and also permit the appearance of a simple logic, essetitial t6 the first masnifestations of reason,

conscience and will, Around the age of four-

teen the intellectual equipment of the individual reachies the adult level with full potential for abstraction, induction and deduction, and it is then that the spiritual activitics may

begin to uafold in the full sense. This is the time when the sense for a religious vocation may be experienced more clearly; also when

scrupulosity

may first become a problem.

The individual learns to manage these three spheres in the personality in a practical sense

in the next decade or more and shows maturity

around

the age

of thirty

regarding

choice, decision and effective mdependent' and interdependent responsible action.

Fromi birth onward 2 series of problems

make their dppearanice at cerfain successive stages in life, keep recurring thereafter and

often pose econflicts pertaining to passivity-—aggressivity, good—evil; masculinity —femininity, dependence—independence,

our iminediate knowledge. Analysis of the

uncansmflus pflini:s to thé fact thiat even thE

gu:md Re:latwe: sh.ifts inhlemrthwal prcc_e’id ence.occur during sleep, dreains, conditions

of hypnosis, brainwashing and passion, but

at no time can our mofal conceptof good be opposed

When

conflict.

without

we act

maturely our motivation is to 'de geod and

avoid evil, whether for ourselves or for the

sake of othets; » in attaining our objective; we proceed with intelligent dispatch, and seek pleasure while

aveiding

pain

insofar -as

possible. These are considerations of the

spiritual, intellectual and emotional -erder. Disregard of this hierdrchy in action

denotes immaturity. When immature, we may inadvertently or erroneously become invalved with evil Wilful involvement with evil does not fnake spititual sense;

evil action is unhealthy and per » immature. In practical living, we must realize the. need fot eommitment to zction, yet not any

action, but rather that which is good or is apprfihcndfid as good in keeping with the principle of double effect. In makmg healthy judgments, pride both conscious and. unconscions {(narcissism) is the greatest obstacle. Acceptarice of the divine will with hul:mht}r is. the greatest asset. The pitfall

is the urge {often unconscions) to get even

(seek justice vengefully thmugh one’s own hand) This represents regression to primi-

anonymity— prestige, pride— humility. The

tive,

fuller sense of the word., Maturing requires,

basis, distinct from those environmentally conditioned and interpersonally détefimined.

healthy individual acquires proficiency in handling them. As life-roles are defined, the formation of character follows in the in brief, a transition froin self-cénteredness to self-giving

Mental health permnits us as individuals to

realize our worth with dignity and to participate in the social scene, helping to resolve famllj;r andsociological issues while engagmg in the many aspects of the expression of charity-as St. Paul wmnderfillly described it. Our person is active in three spheres, emotional; intellectual and spiritual, harmonious-

ly interrelated in the psychologically mature

adult according to a hierarchical precedence: the spiritual, the intellectual and the eémotional.

It is

essential

to recognize

that,

inr addition to our conscious life guided by teason, discerning through conseience and

acting through will, there is also unconseious

menizl activity in us, vast and concealed from

law-of-the-jungle

behaviour.

Also

practical is the need to appraisé obsérvable petsonality differences on a constitutional

There

are

faster-to-act,

definite

intense

contrasts

pefson

between

with

the

multi-

faceted, superficial thinking and the slower-

t0-act, sensitive person with precise, detajl-

ed thinking. They are related to matter and

‘energy factors, aiid they point to a natural tissue predominance of the fast and solid (ta::hysteflc) ot the slow and delicate (brady-

leptic) kind, bologically inkierited at different somatic

levels,

which

determine

warious

degrees of personality activity in the emotional and intellectual spheres (reflecting in turn on spiritual activity). Consequently, various types of reactions and attitudeés regarding work, social perforini habits, etc., result

€8, persondl

o T 2L B Ly ) The flpfirfimflmn Efif pfii’@flflfllfi’? fllfi

15 6f parambunt practical impeortance but wAll

HELL

not be construed

ethically as requiring

relative rather than absolute spiritual noem

a

of conduet, fot it merely broadens the understanding ‘about pace of living, tastes and

values,

susceptibility

to

temptation,

the

meaning of communication and culture and the conception

of character and

ideals. It

should facilitate co-operation between persons

and

render

human

relations

more

fruitful, especially in martiage. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

G. Besgsten,

where eternal, unquenchable fire burns (Mt

5:22; 13:42, 50; 18:9, etc.), where there is darkness, howling and gnashing of reeth (Mt 8:12;

22:13;

25:30,

ete.).

A

similar

desctiption is found in Rev 14:10; 20:10;

21:8. St. Paul speaks of hell in abstract theological terms as eternal destruction, ruin

and

loss

(2

Thess

1:9;

Rom

Phil 3:19; 2 Thess 2:10, etc.).

9:22;

3. In its official teaching, the Church has

Pastoral Pyy-

chology (1951); W. Cartington, Pyychology, Religion and Human Need (1957); G. Vann, The Paradise Tree (1959); ]. Dominian, Pspeliatry and the Christtan (1962); L. de Lavareille, Prycholagie ot shristianisme (1962); Research in Rfi!fgrm and Health, pub. by the Academy of Religion and Mental Health, Fordham (1963); H. A. Carroll, Menta! Fygiene (4th ed., 1963); D. Brink, Readings in Mental Flygiene: Princifiles and Pmm‘m: (1965); M. Leach, Christianity and Menial Health (1967). Edward L. Suareg-Murias

defined the existence of hell (D 16, 40, 429, 464, 693, 717, 835, 840) (on the interpreta-

tion see below, 4c) and its eternity against the

doctring of the aponatastasis ag put forward

by Origen and other ancient writers (2 211).

Asserting implicitly an important principle of

hermeneutics,

the

Chutrch

eliminated

temporal patterns from the éxistence of the

dead, by affirming against the doctrine of an

intermediate

state

of the lost

before

the

general judgment that entry into hell takes place 1mmcd13teljr after their death (D 464, 531). A certain distinction is made between

the loss of the vision of God (peena damnni)

and the pain of sense (poena sensus} (D 410),

HELL

but

o

1. In the history of revelation the notion of hell as the place and state of those who are

finally lost goes back to the OT notion of Shf:fll as the place and state of the dead — the

“underworld”. a long, slow process of theological reflectmn, the state in question

differently of the

good and the bad, in keeping. with their The

(1.0 Hodayot[Qumran

“sheol

of damnation™

Thanksgiving

Hymns),

3, 19) was the final lot of the wicked (Ge-

henna;

of.

bibliography).

LTK,

The

V,

cols.

notion

445f,

this

there

is

no

official

though the difference of punishments hell is mentioned (D 464, 693).

I. Doctrine

life on earth.

from

declaration on the nature of the pains of hell,

1. Doctrine. I1. Descent of Cheist into Hell.

came to be understood

apart

with

of the fire of

judgment burning in the Valley of Hinnom (Gehenna) (Jer 7:32; 19:6; Is 66:24) also

influenced the development of the theme.

2, In keeping with the theclogy of his time; Jesus, like the Baptist, spoke in his eschatological menaces of hell as the eternal

place of punishment, prepared not only for the devil and his angels (Mt 25:41) but for

all who have réjected the salvation offered by

Ged. It is the punishment of their unbelief and refusal to repent (Mt 5:29 par.; 13:42, 50; 22:13, etc.). He speaks of hell as a place

in

4. Inspeculativeand kerygmatictheology, the following points should be noted: a)

For

a proper

understanding

of the

matter, all the rules for the hermeneutics of

eschatolagical assertions are to be observed,

as must also be done in all preaching on hell.

This means that what Scripture says about

hell is to be interpreted in keeping with its litetary character

of “threat-discourse”

and hence not to be read as a preview of

something which will exist some day, Insofar

as it is a teport, it is rather a disclosure of the situation in which the persons addressed

are actually to be found. They are placed befotre a decision of which the consequences

are irrevocable. They can be lost for ever if they reject God’s offer of salvation. The metaphors

in

which

Jesus

eternal perdition of man

describeg

the

as a possibility

which threatens him at this moment are

images

(fire, worm,

darkness,

etc.) taken

from the mental furniture of contemporary

apocalyptic. They all mean thé same thing, the possibility of man being finally lost and

estranged from God in all the dimenstons of his existenice, Hence it can be seen that v

HELL.

ate to be

the question of whether the “fire” of hell

since these prouficuncements

“fire” and suchlike wofds até metaphorical

discourses. of Jesus, which they reiterate.

18 redl or metaphorical 18 wrongly put, since

expressions for something radically not of this world. Hence they cannever be described in tefms proper to their own “phenorena™ and even when they seem to be-expressed in the maost abstract terms, they ean only be

spoken of “in images’’. Even such a term as “eternal loss™ is in the nature of an image. This does not mean that “fire” is to be given

a

indicates

Ioss

“psychological”

the

which

cosmic,

is outside

explanation.

objective

aspect

It

of

the consciousness.

contradiction

will be

torment. It also follows that speculations dabout thé “place™ where heil is to be found are pmmtless

inserting hell around us.

There

into

is no possibility

the

empirical

a

of

world

b) As regards preaching, the following

considerations are important. “Hence, the theological exposition of the dogma canniot

be primarily devoted to an objectivating speculation

on the othex

world.

It must

apply itself ‘above all to bringing out the

real relevance of the affirmation of hell to human

existence.

Herice the preacher who mounts the palpit

must not appeal to visions of the saints or

private revelgtiong in these matters. To deny or toraffirm that ahy of many were lost

would be to go outside the termsof reference set by these summonses to decision and would be an ithmediate contradiction of

the statement involved in the discourses, We miust maintain side by side and un-

waveringly the truth of the omnipotence of the universal salvific

will of God,

the

possibility of etegnal loss. Hence too light-

contradiction of the abiding and petfected this

as the judgment-

bliss with the glorified

environment, so too- loss means a definitive and

way

redemption of all by Christ, the duty of all

vision of God also involves an openness in

wotld,

in the same

of the immediate

Just as the blessedness

sharing. love and

read

Hence

it ennot

be

the

task of theology to go ititc details about

supposed facts of the next life, sach as the number of the damned, the severity of their pains and so on. But it has the task of maintaining the dogma of hell in all the severity

of its realistic claim. For without this claim it cannot fulfil its task ag part of revelation, which i t6 bring men to contrel

men to hope for salvation and also the true

heatted appeals to the dogma of hell, as for instance when pfeachitig on $in, are' te be deprecated, espcclall}r if they only induce.a servile fear which is insufficient for justifica-

tion

and

which

is unconvincing

today.

Hence the preacher must try to bring home to his hearets the seriousness 'of the threat

to eterfial salvation, with which the Christian must

reckon

without

any sly look at a

possible apocatastasis. Nonetheless, the em-

phasis on the possibility of hell as perpetuil obduracy must be paralleled by insistent

encouragement to rely with confidence on

the infinite mercy of God. d) It is possible, and indeed necessary

today, to explain the eternity ‘of hell (with Thomas Aquinas) as the consequence of the

inward

obduracy

of man,

and

not

either as cause of it or as an independent element. This innet obduracy, the rejection

of the grace which inspires a salutary act, springs from the essence of freedom and jis

not in contradiction to ficedor. Freedom is

their livesin the light of the real possibility of

the will and the possibility of positing the definitive. It is not the-possibility of constatit

as & claim of thé utmost seriousnéss. This

the continued

eternal -failure and to recognize reveélation salutary purpose of the dogma must always

set bounds to and provide the guiding lihes for all speculation in this matter.” (J. Ratzinger in LTK, V, col 448.) c) Bven in his “judgment-discourses™

Jesus. gave no cleat revelation about whether en are actually lost of how many may

be. That he restricts himself to the possibility

follows from the réal pature of these discourses,

decision.

which

For

is to

be a summons

this reason,

there

aré

to

no

decisions of the agisteriuin on the matter,

8

revision of decisions. And “etermty‘” i$ fiot duration of time -after the

historyof freedom, but the definitive achieve-

ment of history. Hence hell is “eternial’” and

thus a manifestation of the justice of God.

Hell is not to be thought of as a2 most

drastic but merely additional punitive meas-

ute of God’s vefigeance, punishing those whe. would improve but for the infliction of

this. punishment. The just God is “4ctive” in the punishment of hell {mly msnfar a5,

he does not telease muan ft‘mm the reslity of the definitive state which than himself hds achieved on his own bfihfilf eontra-

HELL

dictoty though this state be to the world as God's

creation.

Hence

the

notion of

vindictive punishment, such as inflicted by political

society

on

those

who

infringe

social order,13 not at all suitable to explain

spitit, united with his bedy in a fully hutnan

manner:

he was

no

longer

in the

earthly

state and not yet ini the heavenly. As man, he

no

longet

possessed

his humanity

as a

pilgrim; but neither had he it in its glorified

the doctrine of hell.

state

See also Aporatastasis, Eschatology, Last Things, Apocalyptic, Salvation 1, IV A, Freedom, Merey.

The redemption was not yet completed, for

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

terbeck, IV, pp. Per; fim(l%i") 146-9,

;flei}.mée# (2nd

Qid

COMPARATEVERELIGION: Bil-

1016-1165;

F. Cumont,

Lux

J. Jeremias in TWNT, 1, pp. 9f.,

6571. BiBLTICAL: P. Volg, Em&afia:’ag;e dor

ed.,

Geemeinde 1934);

Testament,

1

im

W.

nentestamentlichen

Eichrodt,

(1961).

Theslogy

Zeitalfer

of the

rueEorLoGICAL:

|. B.

Agar, “The Doom of the Lost”, Expository Times 22 (1910/11), cols, 2074.; J. P. O’Connell,

The Eschatology of St Jerome (1 948), F. von Hiigel,

“What Do We Mean by Heaveri and What Do We Mean by Hell?”, Efla s and Addresses on the

Phifprophy of Rafzgmn (1949 51); G. Bardy and others, L'enfer (1950); M. Pontifex, “The Doctrmfl of Hell”, Downside Review 71 (1953), pp. 135-52;

M.

Schmaus,

Kathelische

Dogmatik,

V(2

(Bth

ed.,, 1959, pp. 452-510; A Winklhofer, T4¢ Coming of His Kingdom. A Thealogy of the Last

Thingr (1963); A. Roets, “De

hel”

Collationes

PP

323-46.

as he did during

the beatific

his earthly life).

he was not yet glorified. In the Creed, the descent into hell is mentioned among

the

Christological mysteries. It follows upon his death and burial, and precedes the resur-

rection

and

ascension.

The

words

heaven

and hell are here used to indicate the absolute extfemes: for Christ, the condition of death,

his being less than a full human being, was

his most radical self-emptying; the ascension

in his glorified humanity was his fulfilment. As the mystery of Christ was unfolded in the:

course

of the liturgical year, the descent

into hell, the state of death, was given its

place in the liturgy on Holy Saturday.

2. The descent inte hell as a salvific evént. The

descent

into

hell

does

not

mean

a new

redemptive act of Christ beyond his death. Nonetheless,

as

the

state

of death

it is

Theological Investigations, IV (1966), Kar! Rabner

to us by reason of our being creatures, but

190-210;

K. Rahner, “The Hermeneutics of Eschatological

B,

he possessed

significant for salvation. a2} _Awibropelogically. By his death, Christ entered the state of the dead and thus expetiénced this further

Brugenses ot Gandavenses 9 (1963),pp. Assertions™,

vision

(although

element of our human lot, which is natural should not have happened to us according

to the concrete

I1. Descent of Christ into Hell

In the article of the creed ““the descent into

hell”, mode

one must distinguish between the of expression and the statement

intended.

The

terms. botrowed

expression from

to the underworld

gions,

But

the

makes

accounts

use

of

of descents

in various ancient reli-

stateinent

genuinely Christian one.

intended

is a

1. Descent into hell as assertion of death. ““The

descent into hell” {Apostles” Creed, ) 6) or “the descent into the underworld” (Fourth

order

of things.

In this

way Christ became one with us even in the

loss of the pretérnatural gift of immortality, in order to unite us with himself through 2 solidarity comprehensive enough to include even dying and the state of death. Thus our

death, which is a consequence of sin, has been “redeemed’, so that the visien of God

can be experienced in death, though only

perfectly at the resurrection of the flesh,

b) Casmically. By submitting to'death, by thus

allowing his human natuteto be rent asunder (as happens to all who die), Christ surrendered himself in the most complete

way

Lateran Council, D 429; Second Council of Lyons, [ 462) means first of all that Jesus

possible to the nothingness of all cteation.

beyond the dct of dying to the state of death,

nothingness — both of being fallen and of

truly died. This article of the Creed points

For Christ this meant that while he was still connected with the world, it was nevertheless withdrawn from him. In this state

of death (a state and not a geographical plice)

he was 1o

longer,

th his

created

And thus, beginning with his own resurrection,

he

could

emancipate

it

from

this

being “mere creation”. c) Historically. In the history of salvation, the descent into hiell is a special event, sifice it brought the vision of God to thc:sc whe died in grace. Even though those who lived before Christ

9

HELLENISM

CHRISTIANITY

AND

could have had sanctifying grace (grace of Christ), so that they could live and die as

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Q. Rousseau, “La descente

aux enfers, fonidement sotériologiqy

chrétien”, RS R 40 (1952),pp. 273-97; ©. Simmel,

rédeemed and justified, still, from the purely

“Abgestiegen zu der Hu]le”, SHmmen dor Zad 156

no access

auwx enfers duns le cadr& dés liturgiés elirétiensies”,

temporal point of view of vur lifé on earth, to the

glory

of the Father

(1954/55), pp. 1-6; O. Roussean, “La descente

was

possible until the historical completion of

the Christ Event — froim the incarnation to the exaltation. For us human beings, the

visioh of God is possible only “in the glorified Lord™. At his descent into hell, Christ identified himself ‘with the dead, but unlike them, had the vision of God; he was victor over death,

on the threshold of his glory, about to bring with him those who had died in the state of justice and were ready for the vision of God. But his entry into glory and heace the entry

of the saved into the blessed vision of God took place only after his resutrection snd

pp. &‘1 84; K. Rahner,

Maison Dien 43 (1955),

On the Theology ¢Dm;‘& quasstmfl:s Disputatae 2 (1960); J. Galnt “La descente du Christ aux enfers”, NRT 83 (1961), pp. 471-91; W. J.

Dalton, Christ's Proclapation do i Epam.r A Study of 1 Pueser 3: 18— 4:6, Analecta Biblica 23 (1965); Hell:

Is

H.

It

Vorgrimler,

Important?™,

“Christ’s

(1966), pp. 75-81.

Descent into

Conciliam

1, 0o,

2

Robert Lachenschmid

'HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY

A. GENERAL FEATURES

ascension. Hence this aspect of the descent

inte hell points of itself to the exaltation.

Hence the significance of the descent into

.....

hell in the order of salvation is that ef the whole paschal mystery. In the Fathers, this aspect of the descent

into hell appears in three themes, that of

“the preaching to the dead”, in which Chzist proclaimed the completion of his work of salvition, that of “baptism”™, in which he

bestowed salvation to those who were under the earth, and that of “the harrowing of hell” in which he conquered the hostile

rcv_elatmn afid

the fthulatlon

ofdqgma

from the 2nd to the 4th century, must not bé takcnasahamogcnemusphfimmphmalsystem, such as that of Plato, Atistotle orf the Stoics. It consists of syncretist structures

— neo-Pythagoreanism, ‘middle Platonism,

neo-Platonism — in which Platonistn predominates but nearly always permeated

by Aristotelian and Stoic elements. The vhanimity with which the Apmlflg_isem Gne

the liturgy, the descent into hell is

after another affirm the as it were necessary convergence of Platonism and Chmnam“ty

end of Holy Week, but also at each celebra-

larity between Moses and Plato in their dfittflflfi of the Logos and the Spirit {Ape/.,

powers.

In

célebrated as a salvific eveént whenever the paschal mystery is recalled in its unity; at the

is. very striking. Justin speaks of the sitni-

tion of the Eucharist and above all at baptism, in which we die; are buried and tise with Christ (cf. Rom 6:3-11).

to a theme that was to become classical,

of Chtist into hell is the answet given by revelation to the human questions which are

Alexandria (Szrom., ¥V, 14), Busebius {Prae-

The teaching of the Church on the descent

behind the various descents inte the under-

world of which the various religions speak. It is not an addition to the kerygma of the

I,

59£.), Plato being the plagiarist, according

Justin also accepts

God. (Dal.,

21.).

Plato’s

PFollowing

definition of Clement. -of-

paratio Evangelica, X1, 17, 20) and others find the Christian doctrine of the three hypostases

anticipated in Plato (Ep., II, 312d-¢). Plo-

death and resurrection of Christ, but is alteady contained in it, sifice’ the descent into hell is part of the mysterium paschals. It is part of the “passage from mortal life

Theedoretus (Greee: aff. onr., VI, 13) finds allies in Plato (Laws, Ti, IV, X} a;fld Pletinus

tiofi.

he is no less clear on the paint. He elaims to have found in “certain writings of the

into the: gloty of the Father™ for our salva-

See also Salvation 11 A, IV A, Ascension of Christ,

Reésurrection,

Original Sm, States of

Man { Theological), Beatific Vision. 10

|

(Enngads, 111, 2) for thn d@ctrmfi of pwwda

ence.

Augustine is not quite so: dnwmigl'rt, but

Platonists” (Confesstons; VIL,9,13) the whole

doctrine of the prolegue of st. Jthfl o ‘the etermal Word, thflugh not his incathation

HELLENISM AND CHRISTIANITY and humility. As regards the vision of God,

he goes so far as to affirm of these samé

Platonists, particularly Plotinus, that Chris-

tians are entirely in agreement with them:

“Non est nobis ullus cum his excellentioribus

philosophis

in hac quaestione conflictus.”

(De Civitate Dei, X, 2) He finds in Porphyrius “the shadow of 2 faint notion’” of the final end, the Trinity, and even some notion

of the necessity of grace, but not of the

means of attaining the end, the redemptive incarnation (De Civitate Dsi, X, 29, 1).

Augustine’s last wotds, as cited by Possidius (PL, XXXII, col. 58), are 4 literal quotation

from

Plotinus

(Emmeads,

which the content is Stoic.

1, 4, 7, 23£)

of

The influence of Stoicistm was widespread, though often not recognized as such, and attributed to other sources, as modem tesearch has revealed (Theiler, Hadot, Span-

neut). Aristotle was mostly regarded as an

adversary by Christian writers (for his denial of ptovidence); cf. J. de Ghellinck in

RHE 26 (1930), pp. 5-42. But important

exceptions were made, as when the distinction betweenh “‘substance” and ‘“‘quality”

(Categories, 6, 11a, 15) was adopted in the

contraversy with the Homoiousians (Athanasiug,

De

Symodo,

53;

Marius

Victorinus,

Adversus Arium, 1, 20, 53), and when the

concept of “relation”

was applied to the

persons of the Trinity (perhaps Alexander of Alexandria

or his

orthodox fellows,

XXVI, col. 709 ¢; Trin., V). Albert the Aquirms then became *“the philosophet™). denied the existence

PG,

esp. Augustineg, De Great and Thotnas disciples of Aristotle Epicureanism, which of the gods and the

inmortality of the soul, was unanimously

rejected (as by Origen, for instance, Conira Celsum, 1, 21), or simply ignored.

B. Tz

1. The

PROBLEMS

explicit

testitmhonies

of

Christian

‘wtiters to the pagans whom they name and quote are only a small part of what has to be investigated, though it has the advantage

of being well defined. A tnuch more exten-

sive; complicated and far-reachihg matter is,

of course, the actual — unacknowledged —

influénce of the Greeks on Christianity. 1t is - neatly always very difficult to estimate,

gitice the manuals in which Hellenism was

passed on are lost, or preserved

onlyin

fragments. Critical research has often noth-

ing else to go upon when reconstructing these missing links except the authors who

are dependent.on them, so that the coefficient

of uncertainty is. high. But some general results may be considered as assured.

2, In general, the relationship of Hellenism

to dogma

poses

three sets of questions:

) What are the topics which (i) tend to coincide

with

Christian

dogmas,

(if) are

incompatible with it, (iif) are represented

only in the Bible and were developed solelyby Christian theology? b) (1) Did the themes

adopted

by

theolegy

and

dogma

remain nnaltered, or werée théy transposed and even given an opposite meaning?

(ii)

Did these transformations or novelties he-

come patt of the strictly philosophical think-

ing of the West, perhapsina totally secularized form, and if so, under what aspects? (Cf. the able investigations of H. A. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy [1947] ) ¢) What

were

the reactions,

conscious

or

unconscious, of orthodox theologians and the Councils, and again, of heretics, with tegard to Hellenism, especially from the

2nd to the 4th century ? The great heresies of the 5th century onward, and their épponernts, paid far less attention to philosophy than to

the tradition of the Fathers and the Councils. Here Chalcedon is typical.

3. To illustrate the effects and extent of this influence we propose the following four

working hypotheses as guiding lines. (For a more

and

ptecise enunciation of their natare

limits,

P. Henry,

and

for

Some

proofs,

see

The Christian Tdea of God and. its

LDevelopment [1961].)

a2)

detailed

main

themes

|

of Hellenism,

especially those of “Platonism”, were na-

turally sympathetic to Christian thought: God, the soul and their mutual relations, especially in miysticism. In this sense Pascal was right in saying: “Platon pour disposer

au

christianisme,”

Under

the

pressure

of

the heresies, orthodox doctrine as elaborated

by the theologians and confitmed in the Councils was “forced” (Athanasius, Decreta Nicaeae, 19; Ad Afros, 5-6; De Synodis, 45) to go beyond the affirmatmns of Scripture and use the terminology and even the ideclogical schemas of the suspect “Greeks”, though the vocabulary is often restored to

its pre-scientific meaning,

as for instance

in “one pefson in two natures”. This gives us the right and the obligation to fll out

11

HELLENISM. AND

CHRISTIANITY

silences by analegy (cf. Marius Victorinus,

theless admitted the value of the argurent

componere”, a principle of Hellenistic law quoted by Cicere in the form “ex eo qued

Augustine

Adp. Arinm, 11, 7, 12, “de lectis non Fecta

sit ad

scriprim

nen

id quod

scriptum

petvenire”, De Inventione, 11, 50, 152).

b) In the attempt to reach a rational synthesis of dogma, the slivish repetition of

ftom authotity and antiguity. It appears in necessario

in the form:

dupliciter

discendum

“Ad

auctoritate

ducimur,

atque ratione.” Heace at least at this period

the ideologicsl atmosphere: was less rémote than is usually thought from biblical Chtistianity, with its basisin prophecy and history.

contemporary thought-forms was often the

Plotinus appeals to the philosaphia perennis

was right in saying that Plato was the sonrce of all heresies (“doleo Platonem omnium

Gnostics for “bmakzing with Greek antiq-

source of heresy. In this sense Tertullian

hereticoruth condimentarium

factum®™,

De

Agzima, 23). 'The latent philflmphy of a heresy makes it conformist; it tries to be conservative in theology and there is nothing revolutionary in its speculation. ¢ Otthodexy, én the other hind, while on principle avoiding philosophy, is in fact mostly original and creative. Under the pressute of biblical revelation and its frequently existential categories, themes derived

from Hellenism were modified, corrected, comipleted and made more precise. Distinctions previously unknown were introduced,

as for instance between “image’’ and “like-

fiess””, cf. Clement of Alexindria, S#rom., 11,

22, 131, 5; Origen, De Principtis, 111, 6, 1. Terms

are

given new

meanings,

as

in

“homoousios” and quite new but fundamen-

tal conceptsare foried.

d) Such new creations often survived in

the philosophy of the West, sometimes even

in a secularized form. The most significant examples are the three allied concepts of

creation,

history

and

person,

which

-are

absent from Hellenism but make themselves

heard in Scripture and were developed and systematized in Christian thought, especially by Augustine in his Confessions, City of God and Trinity. The commeon basis of the three

concepts is the notion

of freedom

and

creative power (implying uniqueness, irre-

versibility 4nd so on; cf. P. Henty, Axgusting on Personality [19607). C. FUNDAMENTAL

PRINCIPLES

TrEOLOGICAL, METHOD

OF

1. Reason and tradition. It has been shown by

€. Andresen in his Logos and Nomos. Dz

Polemik. des Kelsos wider das Christentum (1955} that philosophers like Celsus, in spite of their prescinding from historical process in their feligious philesophy, none-

12

1, 8; IV, 8, 1) and blames the

(Enmeads, V,

uity” in order to be “innovators”, whereby “they abandoned the truth’ (11, 9, 6, 5-12).

2. Allegory. The parallels in the “allcg@n-

cal” methods of exegesis between paganism,

Judaisr (m Philo and others), and biblical and patristic Christianity are hotly debated.

The discussion is catried on mostly by three writers and centres on Ofigen. J. Pépin

(Mythe et Allégorte, Les origines grecques e

les comtestations judéo-chrétiennes [19587), while maintaining the “‘unquestionable originality

of Christian allegory™ (p. 479), stresses the borrowings from Greek allegory and the identity of method and accuses beth Celsus and Qrigen of “inconsisteney” (#bid., p- 261). His

thesis

is radically

réjected

by

H.

de

Lubac (RSR 46 [1959], pp. 1-43; cf. esp. Histoire et Esprir [1950]) who tries to show that the ““‘spiritual” exegesis of ‘the Fathérs s of a totally different inspiration and orientation from pagan allégory. The intermediaté position of J. Dasiélou (@rfgéfle [1948]} is a distinction between patristic “typology™” which is theologically valid and Jewish or Hellenistic “allégory”

which is

to a great extent untenable. Here one may well ask, with

de Lubac (op. .,

p. 34)

whetheér this distinction “takes all the texts into account and corresponds 1o the ter_rmnmlogy of the ancient wrriters™, espcmally

Otigen.

Along with the “spiritual” exegesis of the.

Alexandrians and the “literal” exepesis of the Antiochieries, there existed a third trend, less

widespread

and

hardly

noticed

by

historians, which aimed at the literil sense

and paid little or no artesitionto synibolisti, bmsuugh‘t a metaphysicalmntfintm'biblimai

partlcular b}r Manus ’Vx-xma flfw in the first Latin commentarics which have sutvived 6n Gal, Phil and Eph {PL, VIII, cols. 1145--294), |

HELLENISM

D, Herrenism in DogMa axp THEOLOGY

God. New attributes are mentioned and the of others is modified.

Infinity as

an attribute of God — not clearly affirmed

in Scripture — was rejected by ancient philosophers, for whom the infinite, indeterminate. and formless was essentially

the material (UAn). Origen still maiiitained

(D¢ Principiis, 11, 9, 1, undoubtedly a true

rendering of the original Greek)

CHRISTIANITY

ning or end, eternal, and hence immutable,

1. The attributes of God. In eatly Christian times there took place, even in philosophy, a profound alteration in the concept of meaning

AND

that the

and those with beginning and end. Chris-

tianity took ovet this division but added a new

category,

that of beings and events,

such as the created soul and the incarnation,

which go “from beginning to beginaing” and do not end. Gregory of Nyssa applies

this category even to the vision of God (In Canticum, bom., 8), where he supposes

constant progress, on account of the infinity and 1nmmpre.henslb1hty of God.

The

attribute

of omaipoténce

evolved

slowly.In Scripture and the early creeds it

divine power was not infinite, since othérwise

meant primarily God as Lord of history, mavTonpaTLp, but gradually came to be

and

Arium,

it could not know itself. Philo, however, and perhaps his sources, then middle Platonism

Plotinus

— for

whom,

however,

the

Absoluteis rather potency than act { Euneads, IV, 4, 4; cf. 111, 8, 10; V, 4, 2) — like Christian theology (cf. Il above), considered God

and

thc

world

of forms

as infinite

(cf. E. Gilson, “L’infinité divine chez St. Augustinn®”, Augustinus Magister, 1 [1954],

pp. 569-74; A. H. Armstrong, “Plotinus’ Doctrine of the Infinite and Christian Thought”,

Demmside

Review 73 [1955], pp.

47—58), Thisis the basis of the doctrine of the divine incomprehensibility and the “negative”’ theology.

used as an atteibute of God’s absolute being, The transition in Marius Victorinus (4ay. Hadot.

I,

3,

18)

Of the eight

has

been

attributes

described

by

enumerated

by the Fourth Lateran Council (I 428), and given in fuller form by the First Vitican

(D 1782), at least four were elaborated and defined under the influence of Hellenism,

mediated to a great extenit by Augustine,

while two (omnipotence and eternity) were transposed from the plane of history to that of immutable

essence, to some

under the same influence.

extent

‘The really new and central attribute is that of creator, unknown to classical antiqui-

In Plato, the world of the divine was characterized as immutable, to distinguish it

ty and only implicit in Scripture, though not so remote from the Greek notion of

though even this was held to be eternal.

son; also H. Junker, “Die Chaosvorstellung Gen 17, Mélanges Bibliguss powr A. Robert

from the visible world subject to change, This

moderate

dualism

was

retained

in

Christianity but completed by the concepts of divine freedoimm and creation.

But im-

mutability becomes so essential an attribute

of God that in the Arian controversy the opposition

of &rpemrog — TpenTdc Was used

to distinguish creator and creature. And for

Augustine, the main content of the concept

of God

was

not “the

Good”

of Plato,

the “Pure Thought” of Aristotle, the “One”

of Plotinus or the * Hyse'? later suggested by

Thomads, but Exod 3:14}.

immutability

(Serme

7 in

The allied attribute of eternity is stressed,

as among the Greeks, but with the difference that a

cyclic

time

as image

of eternity

is

eliminated in favour of the linear time of

history, which Christians contrast with the

eternity of God (cf. Cullmann).

Philosophy kfiows — and this may be

true of all “pagan” philosophy — only two

categories of beings: those without begin-

demiurgeas is usually supposed (cf. H. Wolf-

[1957], pp. 27-37). The clear and explicit

notion

of creation

only

developed

slowly

in the 3rd ceatury (Denis of Rome, DD 49f,; to some

distinctive

extent in Origen), with

notes

of freedom,

cam

the thtee

fempore

and ex nébilo. It was given full expression at

Nicaea through the sharp opposition between vevwndévra and momPévra which Arius and

Meanwhile,

the Greeks

without

found

unthinkable.

undergoing

any dis-

cernible influence from Christianity, Hel-

lenism ecame ““asymptotically” to a similar

concept. Atticus (cf. BEusebius, Pragparatio Eflaflgefim,

XV,

6, fr. 4) gives

a “funda-

mentalist” interpretation of Plato ( Timaens,

41b, etc,) which ascribes a beginning to the world without den}flng the eternity of

matter (so too Plutarch, in Proclus, Timuens,

I, 381; II, 153). He affirms that the world will remain eternally, but by the will of

God (cf. Justin, Dialogue, 5, 4), which is 13

AND

HELLENISM

CHRISTIANITY

compared to the creative will of man. The monist tendencies of Plotinus, however, lead hifn to a position whichis revolutionary

mulate and explain the divine processions.

Platonism.

‘The fundaterital analogy ceased to bethe pro-

2. The Trinity. a) The Nicene {Nicaea-

tionism, and became the spiritual processes in the mind of man himself. This explanation, which had been begun by the Greek Fathers

with

even

to

regard

middle

Matter emunates from the Absolute (Enueads, TV, 8, 6, 21), necessarily and éternally, as the result ofa gradual déscert,

Gonstantinople ) Creed, the confession of faith

put

before

neo-Platonic

Alexander schema

by

Arius and

of the

“threc

the

chief

hypostases™ (Emnicads, V, 1, title) are at one in affirming the strict oneness of God, a

certain trinity of supreme priflci'pk:&' and

theitr being united by emandtions or “processions”,

which

are often described by the

same words and prepositions, as for instance ¢, But the twe Cliristian ereeds always see

these principles in their relation to the his-

tory of creation and salvation — in conitrast

to the*‘essentialise® Quicumagne —and provide

the whiole confession of faith with tempotal

coefficients, affirming, for instance, that the: Son created, became and remains in-

carmate ind will comeagain, causality and “salvation’

But in Platonism remain outside

time. The conformist heresy of Arianism succeeded as little 45 Plavo {7imaeus, 28b) in

distinguishing between mathp and mointHs, or as Plotinus in distinguishing between and yhyvopoar It applied slavyewaopar ishly the schemme of déscending degtees of causality to Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Orthodox thought worked out a hitherto

undreamt-of distinction and rejected such inequalitiés' (between the divine persons).

The key-word of Nicaez, dpoodaoug, does not cote from Plate, Aristotle, the

middle: Platonism

Steics or from

of neo-

Platonism, but from the great adversaties of

“Greeks” and Christians, the Gnostics, who

used it to describe the generation of the first

natures.

It

was

rejected

by

Arias

as Manichaean and materialist. According to Basil of Ancyra (¢f G. L. Prestige,

God in Patristic Thonght [1936], pp. 209-9; Athanasivs [De Synodis, 41-45), Basil [Ep., 52), Hilary [De Synodis, 77-84), Marius Victorinus [Ady.

Arinm,

1, 28f,

II, 14]), an.

attempt ‘was madeat Antioch to give a Pla-

tonizing interpretation (“substantiain prae-

existére et sic ex ipsa patrem et filium esse”,

cited by Victor, gp. ¢it., 1, 29, 10}, but it was

rejected by bath partiess In spite of all these dangers, the term was adopted at Nicaea.

14

A third nevelty appears during the quest for an analogy which would help to forduction of the wotld “ontside God?”, which subordinahad occasioned pre-Nicaean

and sketched by Marius Victorinus (“esse — vivere — intelligere™) was given its classical expression in the psy chological theories of

Augustine (De Trin., VHI—XV) which took sevetal forins. The Logos, primarily directed

ad exira even in the prelogue of St. John (s, Aoyos mpogopindy) is now seen as

primarily God’s self-exptession for himself; and the Holy Spirit the petfect unity (through

consciousness ar love) of the immanent life of the Teinity (cf. Augustine, Di diversis quaestionibus, 63; PL, XL, col. 54).

b} The Lagos is alsa the site of the forms, the archetypcs of this wortld; zll the exem-

plarism of the order of being and knowlédge

stems.from the Logos. From Plato to Augus-

ting the development went in two §tages. The fifst transferred the forms, against Plato

but along with Platonism, into the wvolc and identified the demiurge with his ereative forms. This was as early as: Posidonius, but remained a debated point among the “Pla-

tonists™ for 2 long time (cf. Porphyriug, 1/#s Piotini, 18, 10-19). The notien was taken up

by Christians, who were alone in taking it stage further. Since the Logos is of the sami¢

substance as the Father, the forms are ity the

Absolute itself, in the first order of existence,

while in philosophy they remain in the “second God”. But Christiansavoided speiaking of the forms as being in the Father, though

the Son was in the Father (cf. Origen, fn ffl ”

1, 22). ¢)

Tbe

Holy

Spirit.

Explicit

reflection

started later (about 360) and the influence of

Hellenisin is at once noticeable, though less strong than in the doctrine of the Logos. One mfitaucr. will :suffice. When attesipti g

to-express “il accordance Wwith St::flp“l:t.w&1 the concepts by which the Spirit is to be de-

scribed” (De Spirita Sancte; 9), Basil has récourse atmiost exclusively fo tetms used

by Plotinus (Haneads, 1, 6; V,1; V1, 9}, which he also uses in Fow: XV D #3s snd elsewhere, And 2 shore treatise De Shiritu (PG, XXIX, cols. 763—73) probably by Baml blfi " certainly from his titnie, is so mucha mpsate

HELLENISM

of texts from Plotinus that it can be used to restore the text of Plotinus himself. But Basil

is quite clear (De Spiritu Sancto, 16, 38) on

what separates him from the doctrine of the “three hypostases™ (Fwmeads, V, 1, title).

3. Christelogy. The system of Apollinaris,

which is known from fragments and pseudepigrapha, is'perhaps the most profound and consistent effort ever made by the East to come to grips with the psychological prob-

lerns of Christology. It was a sort of Kenosis-

theory

in

reverse.

It was also

the

most

thoroughly penetrated by contemporaty thought, which, however, Apollinaris had not thought out creatively enough. His “metaphysical” exegesis of the Spolepx (Phil 2:7) is already 2 piece of Platonizing,

emphasizing, in contrast to Paul (Rom1:23; 5:14; 6:5; 8:3), the formal dissimilarity and

infetiority. Like Arius, who used the same

philosophic intuition as the basis of the eontrary heresy, he pushed the scheme of the Logos-Sarx, which was latent in Alexandria

and even in flnu-ach to the utmost extremes,

and applied the Platonizing Stoic vitalism,

according to which man is “‘z spirit in a body”, with absolute rigous, to the incarna-

tion of the Logos.

4. Christian anthropology. a) The immortality

of the sonl. Here again Plato is an ally of Chris-

AND

CHRISTIANITY

and terms from Plotinus (Conf., IX, 10, 23-26) and quotes (ibid., 25) 2 sentence from

the Enneads (V, 1, 2, 14-17). But just as the

“dark night of the soul”, a classic theme from Gregory of Nyssa to John of the Cross, was unknown to Plotinus, so too Augustine departs from Plotinus on two essential points. The Enneads (1, 6, 9, 23