Sacramentum Mundi, An Encyclopedia of Theology: Philosophy to salvation [5]

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- W

SACRAMENTUM VOLUME

MUNDI

FIVE: PHILOSOPHY— SALVATION

SACRAMENTUM MUNDI An Encyclopedia of Theology

Edited by Karr RauNER S], Miinster and

Juan ALFARO S], Rome

ALBERTO BELLINI, Bergamo Carro Coromso, Venegono

Hengr1 CrouzeL 5], Toulouse JeaN CarDINAL DaniErou S], Paris ApoLF DarLAP, Munich Cornervius Ernst

OP,

Oxford

José FonpEvILLA S], Barcelona PieT FrRANSEN, Louvain

FErcus

Kerr

OP, Oxford

P1ET SCHOONENBERG, Nijmegen KEeviN SMyTH, Paris

T GustavE WEIGEL S ], Woodstock

© Hermann-Herder-Foundation,

Basle— Montreal

Published by Herder and Herder New York - Burns & Oates London - Palm Publis hers Montreal

- Herder

Freiburg

- Editions

Desclée

de Brouwer

Bruges

- Editorial

Barcelona - Edizion) Morcelliana Brescia - Paul Brand Hilversum

Herder

SACRAMENTUM MUNDI AN

ENCYCLOPEDIA

VOLUME

OF

THEOLOGY

FIVE

PHILOSOPHY TO

SALVATION

BURNS

&

OATES

|

1970

.

HERDER AND HERDER 232 Madison Avenue, New York, N. Y, 10016

BURNS & OATES LIMITED 25 Ashley Place, London S. W. 1

General Editor: Adolf Darlap

Nibil obstat: John M, T, Barton, $.T.D., L.S.8., Censor

Imprimatar: + Patrick Casey, Vic. Gen., Auxiliary Bishop of Westminster Westminster, 24th November 1969,

The Nihil obstat and Imprimatur are a declaration that a book or pampbhlet is considered to be free from doctrinal or moral error. It is not implied that those who have granted the Nibil obstat and Imprimatur agree with the contents, opinions or statements expressed.

First published in West Germany

© 1970, Herder KG

Printed in West Germany by Herder

SBN 223 97682 2

ABBREVIATIONS The following list does not include biblical and other well-known abbreviations. Whenever an author, not listed below, is cited in an article by name only, followed by page number(s), the reference is to a work listed in the bibliography at the end of the article.

AAS ACW Billerbeck

Acta Apostolicar Sedis (19094.)

J. Quasten and ]. C. Plumpe, Ancient Christian Writers (1946 1.) (H. L. Strack and) P. Billerbeck, Kommentar gum Newen Testament

CB{

ans Talmud wnd Midrasch, 1-1V (1922-28; reprint, 1956), rabbinical index, ed. by J. Jeremias and K. Adolph (1956) Catholic Biblical Quarterly (1939 11.)

Chalkedon

A.

CiC CiO Collectio Lacensis

Grillmeier

and

H.

Bacht,

eds.,

Das

V:

Kongil von Chalkedon,

Geschichte und Gegenwart, 3 vols. (1951-54; 2nd enlarged ed., 1962) Codex lTuris Canonici Codex Iuris Canonict Orientalis (Unless stated references are to the law relating to persons.)

otherwise,

the

Collectio Lacensis: Acta ei Decreta Sacrorum Conciltorum Recentiorum,

CSEL D

ed. by the Jesuits of Maria Laach, 7 vols. (1870-90) Corpus Secriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (1866 11) H. Denzinger, Enchiridion Symbolorum, Definitionum et Declara-

DB

F. Vigouroux,

tionum de Rebus Fider et Morum (31st ed., 1957); see also DS L. Pirot, ed.,

ed., Dictionnaire de la Bible, 5 vols. (1895-1912) Dicitonnaire de fa Bible, Supplémeni,

A. Robert (1928f1) DS

DSAM DIc

H.

Denzinger

and

A.

Schoénmetzer,

Enchiridion

continued

by

Symbolorum,

Definitionum et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei ef Morum (331d ed,, 1965); see also DD M. Viller, ed., Dictionnaire de Spiritnaltté ascctique et mystigie. Doctrine et Histoire (193211} A, Vacant

and E. Mangenot,

eds., Dictionnaire de théologie catho-

ligue, continued by E. Amann, I-XV, Table analytique and Tables

genérales, XVIH

(1903 f1.)

\‘..'l'

ABBREVIATIONS

|

-

r

.

Enchiridion Biblicum Enghividion Biblicum. Dotumenta Ecilesiastita Sacram Seripistran: Spectantia (3rd ed., 1956)

ETL GCS

Hennecke-

SchneemelcherWilson HERE JBL JjTs$ LTK Mansi NRT NTS PG PL Pritchard RGG

RHE RHPR RSPT RSR RSV s U TWNT

Ephemerides Theologicar Lovanienses (1924 1. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jabrbunderte (1897 {£.) E. Hennecke, W. Schneemelcher and R. McL. Wilson, eds., New Testament” Apocryphba, 2 vols. (1963—65)

J. Hastings, ed., Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, 12 vols. + index (1908-26; 2nd rev. ed., 1925-40) Journal of Biblical Literature (18814.) Journal of Theological Studies (189911.) J. Hofer and K. Rahner, eds., Lexikon fir Theologie und Kirche, 10 vols. + index (2nd rev. ed., 1957-67) J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio, 31 vols. {1757-98); reprint and continuation ed. by L. Petit and J. B. Martin, 60 vols. (1899-1927) Nouvelle Revue Théologique (1879 f1.) New Testament Studies (19544) J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Graeca, 161 vols, (1857H.) J.-P. Migne, ed., Patrologia Latina, 217 vols. + 4 index vols. (1844 11.) J. B. Pritchard, ed., Awmcient Near Eastern Texts relating to the Old Testament (1950; 2nd revised and enlarged ed., 1955) K. Galling, ed., Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegemwart, 6 vols. +-

index (3rd rev. ed., 1957-65) Revue d'bistoire ecclésiastique (190041.) Revue d’histoire et de philosophie religiense (19211.) Revue des sciences philosaphigues et thévlogiques (1907 ) Recherches de science religiense (191041.) Revised Standard Version of the Bible Theological Studies (194011.) Texcte und Untersuchungen gur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur., Archi far die griechisch-christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jabr. bunderte, hitherto 62 vols. in 5 series (188211.) G.

Kittel,

ZAW ZKT

VI

Theologisches

Wirterbuch

zum

Newen

Testament,

contifiued by G. Friedrich (19338.); E. T.: Theological Dictionary

of the New

WA

ed.,

Testament (1964 1L.)

Martin Luther, Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (*“ Weimarer Aus-

gabe’’ ) (188311)

Zeitschrift fiir die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft (188141.) Zettschrift fiir Katholische Theologie (1877 f1.)

(continued)

PHILOSOPHY

If the primary source of errors is thought to be in the illusions of the senses, the negative

I. The Basic Questions: A. Philosophy: The Word and its Many Meanings. B. Philosophy and Christian Faith. IL. History of Philosophy.

effort of the philosopher will be to liberate

I. The Basic Questions

effort of knowledge.

A. Parrosoruy: MeanNINGS

T

WORD

thought from the entanglement of the senses,

the positive

to practise a purely

spiritual

Ultimately he tries to

“purify” the soul from all bodily influences:

AND 1Ts MaANY

According to the literal meaning of the word, philosophy is not a learned science, but an attitude to life: hence the call *to live philosophically” (priocoguedig CFv). 1t differs from

other attitudes inasmuch as its goal and supreme value i1s “wisdom” (copia), while other attitudes see the highest values else-

where {puiapyupix aims at riches, prioTipio at

honours, and so on). For the self-understanding of philosophy, 1t 1s always of decisive importance to know whether it

maintains the claim to be a way of life, as its

philosophy

is catharsis,

with a leaning

to-

wards a body-hating dualism, as in Platonism.

When it is noticed that the body and its senseorgans are not of themselves a menace to knowledge, but only through the excitation of affections and passions which hamper

thought with prejudices, the philosopher tries negatively to liberate himself from these

affections and passions, positively to practise a courageous imperturbability (philosophy as araraxia, indifference, especially in Stoicism). But if the unquestioned validity of traditional opinions is thought to be the most dangercus source of misleading prejudices,

the philosopher

tries negatively

to

origin demands, or whether it is content to be a particular type of knowledge or a particular method of attaining knowledge.

criticize the accepted notions, positively to practise independent judgment by 2z skilful

1. Philosophy as a way of life. Philosophy as a way of life is orientated both by its goal (cogta) and by its relationship (puiia) to this

thinking

goal.

a) Since the philosopher values wisdom (oopix) 2bove all other goods, he is inclined to prefer the contemplative attitude to the practical. The philosophical life i1s regarded as the Biog OewpnTinds, vita contemplativa, Negatively, he strives with particular care

to overcome error and blindness. Positively, he tries to practise the dispositions which are favourable to the acquisition of knowledge.

use of probative arguments, and to attain

the

high-minded

subject (philosophy

mept Tuhg AGyuug, Plate’s

sovereignty

Phaedo;

the

as the

art

of the

free-

as the Téyvy

of reasoning,

methodical

In

assurance

of independent judgment and hence liberation

from

authority

Enlightenment;

and

as practice

tradition

in

the

in the virtue of

highmindedness [générosité] in Descartes). This notion of philosophy as a way of lite forms the transition to an understanding of

philosophy as science or the fundamentals of science. In more recent times, a still more dangerous source of errors has been found in the

1

.

~

+

. PHILOSOPHY | methode&ngwal mflmsm” of one or other

particular scienice or of modern science in

than thc thwrctleai reason. 'I‘he qacmm as

nflgatwely, to refute the universal claim of 2

Kant attacks pseudo-scmnnfic dogmatism,

sal of the mind) or social upheaval (revolution) is objectively prior remains one of the main points of controversy between Marxist

claims universal validity (philosophy as ra-

enumerated and many others claim to be ways of life, or at least to make possible 2 way

general. The effort of the philosopher is then, science which transgresses its bounds. Thus

Jaspers “scientific superstition”. Positively, the effort is to be open to the modes of truth which threaten to be lost sight of as science

tional faith in Kant, as philosophical faith in Jaspers, as a questioning more primordial

- than science in Heidegger).

Finally, it may also be thought that the most radical threat to the faculty of knowledge is that human thought is swayed by economic and social group-interests. Then the philosopher sees as his main task, nega* tively, the critique of ideologies, positively,

the preparation of social upheaval which is to

libetate thought from ideologies as well as

bring about the classless society {philosophy as the pioneer of revolutionary praxis in

Marxism). These and a number of other views of the nature and task of philosophy agree in affirming that philosophy should not merely

give certain insights, but by that very fact

should also make possible a way of life — catharsis, ataraxia, générosité, philosophical

faith, revolutionary action, etc. — and sum-

mon men to it. In each case the way of life in

question is not what is actually practised but

what is “demanded™. It can only be attained by turning away from the manner of life and the self-understanding in which man *mostly and most easily” lives. Plato spoke in this sense

of a “‘reversal

of the whole

mind”,

using terms and thoughts which recall the

tamiliar demand for “conversion” in religion. In modern times this reversal of the whole

mind was understood by Descartes as the eversic omnium opinionum and thus also pro-

pounded as the elimination of traditional and authoritative opinions. Kant saw the required conversion

through

as a “Copernican

which

man

revolution”,

learns to understand

that it is not nature which gives him laws but his mind which gives laws to nature. He saw it further as the moral “revolution in the mind” through which man gains moralauton-

omy and restores the proper relationship between reverence for the moral law and the

search for happiness. The Marxist notion of

philosophy as a preparation for social revolution seeks to link up with the anti-traditional elements of the Cartesian erersio and the

2

to-whether individual conversion {the rever-

and non-Marxist philosophy. The fact that all the philosophies hitherto. of life, does not exclude, but rather implies,

that knowledge is demanded for these ways of life and is made possible by them. Since in all these types of self-understanding the philosophical way of life aims at wisdom, it remains orientated to philosophy as a form of knowledge and a method of secking knowledge (see under A 2 below). b) For the philosopher — the term being still understood as designating a way of life — cogle, wisdom, is not an assured possession but the object of a @iAix, loving desire. The philosopher knows enough to recognize his ignorance and to see that it is necessary to

overcome it. But he is so ignorant that he must first strive for wisdom. This love of wisdom distinguishes him from the fool who

does not see his own defects and hence cannot strive to overcome them. It also distinguishes him from the sage (or a godlike intellect} who lacks nothing and hence does not need to strive. Since he differs from the fool not by the real possession of knowledge but merely by consciousness of his own ignorance, if he ever took himself for a wise man, he would

at once become the greatest and most help-

less fool of all. Hence philosophy, as love of wisdom, 15 based on self-critical reflection —

compare Plato’s interpretation of the Delphic inscription I'véd ceavtov, “Know thyself!” In the course of his reflections the philosopher comes upon the paradox that selfcriticism consists in thought measuring itself and its supposed attainments against a standard, and judging itself to be inadequate. The

standard,

however,

by which

the in-

adequacy of thought can be demonstrated,

(s none other than truth itself. But in order

to be able to measure itself by this standard, the mind must first know it. Thus selfcriticism seems only necessary because the mind does not know

the truth, but at the

same time only possible if it knows it, Hence philosophy is based on the

ex-

perience that we men are seekers, that is, not

knowers,

but that without a precognition

L

PHILOSOPHY

/

of what is sought we should neither know that we did not know it, nor weigh critically our attempted answers (cf. the dpoTinde Myog in Plato’s Mems). Many types of docttine about a knowledge which. is active a priori but only becomes explicitly conscious later are based on this experience. These include Plato’s doctrine of the unknown ideas working unbeknown in the consciousness (“forgotten” but as residual memories stimulating search and self-criticism); also the Cartesian doctrine of the idea

of the ens perfectissimum which is what makes possible all questioning and even ali doubt. Thus

the

intermediate

position

of the

philosopher between God and the fool is based on the knowledge of the unknown implied in (conscious) ignorance. This is

what

makes

unknown

it possible

in explicit

to designate

questioning,

to

the

see

whether the answers one sketches or others

offer bring one closer to the object of the search or lead away from it, and hence gradually to make progress in knowledge. The knowledge of truth implied in knowledge

of one’s own ignorance makes philosophy, as 2 way of life, into a pursuit (uéfodog}. And

this alone provides the basis on which a philosophy can be deveioped as a method.

Hence

the sense

of philosophical

methed

stems from the fact that the philosopher reflects on his way of life under the aspect of

euia (love as pursuit of wisdom). The manifold consequences of this consideration include — along with the directives thereby gained — the two following

elements which can appear in many modifications. (i) There is a dialecrical relationship in the strict sense of the term between truth and human thoughr. Truth, precisely 1n the form of non-realization, is *“closer’ than any object into which it can enquire, closer

indeed than man himself. It is the hiddenness of truth that makes possible all searching

and

finding.

The

negativeness

of its non-

realization proves to be the positive and the impelling, absolutely. Here one may note in particular Hegel’s exposition of the un-

known and the negation.

Truth in the form of the non-realization

which makes all searching and questioning possible is often distinguished as the “veritas gua cognoscitur” from all real and possible objects of knowledge, the “veritas guae cognoscitur”, and then often represented by the metaphor of light. The light becomes

“visible”

by

its

making

the

illuminated

objects visible. The specifically philosophical knowledge is in this sense not knowledge of abjects, but knowledge of the conditions

under which the objects as such can appear. The transition from knowledge of objects to knowledge of the conditions of possibility of their existence as objects, first made in Plato’s metaphor of the sun, later became one of the main tasks of philosophy, under the name of “transcendental reflection”’. (1) The truth which the philosopher aims at in his love of wisdom, as the one possible

source of the wisdom sought for, has therefore for him a twofold function. It is the

standard by which he critically measures himself (veritas iudicans de bomine), and the

ground of possibility by which he is enabled to know objects, to see through to the preconditions of their appearance and to pass criticat verdict on the manner of their appearance (wverilas qua bomo iudicat}. It is precisely to his self-criticism, in the light of the unknown truth which makes all knowledge possible, that the philosopher owes his

ability to be objectively critical of the objects before his eyes. The specific nature of philosophical @uix necessarily brings

with it this unity of self-criticism and objectcriticism which is the criterion which marks it off from all else.

2, Philosophy as a learned discipline. 2) The

transition from philosophy as a way of life

to philosophy as one of the learned disciplines was

brought

about

historically

chiefly

through the following internal processes. (i) Since philosophy directs its effort to

wisdom and hence reflects on the origin of error and seeks a criterion to distinguish truth from falsehood, it becomes a special type of knowledge. More than any knowl-

edge of objects, it seeks knowledge of how ostensible

(illusory)

knowledge

is

to

be

distinguished from real knowledge. Thus Plato designated philosophy as a “knowledge of nothing” (i.e., of no particular

object) “but of knowledge itself”. Since true

knowledge must prove itself in contrast to illusory knowledge by means of argument to and fro (in the dialogue) with a skilful use of proofs, philosophy becomes the art of dialogue (dtahextiny; Téxvy) and the skilful use of arguments (téxvy Tept Toug Abyoug Of noyuen texvy).

This in turn could demand

the effort to propound

“dialectic”

and

“logic”.

it in a theory This

of

knowledge

3

PHILOSOPHY.

about knowledge thus became the model for all later theoties of knowledge snd critiques

of knowledge, for theories of science and

othier words, the functionof the philosophi-

cally basic téyvn mept sobg Mdyoug — the art

methodology. But it also contained an invitation to the thinker to reflect upon himself

of argument — can be claimed by the phi-

of the soul and philosophical anthropology, of the doctrine of the rational subject or

be a form of guala. ¥t tries to understand

and thus became the origin of the doctrine

existence, and prepared the transition from

“ronsciousness” to “consciousness of self”’,

the analysis of existence and so on. In this

process the question could arise s to whether

priority was to be accorded to the “anthro-

pological” or “logical” foundations of phi-

losophy. This is a question which has led in recent times to the controversy (iméer alia) about whether philosophy should be founded on purely formal logic for its questions and initial answers, or whether there should not

be an “anthropological reduction” of philosophy. Compare, for instance, the opposition between the Kantian school and lifephilosophy. This does not prevent the above-mentioned questions being detached from their origin in reflection on the nature and con-

ditions of possibility way

of

“partial

They

life.

disciplines”

of the philosophical

become

in

independent

philosophy,

and

debate can arise as to which of them takes

priority among them as the “basic discipline” of philosophy.

In the course of the history of philosophy, the anthropological starting-point under-

went essential modifications, as the variation

in thought-forms from culture to culture, from social group to social group and at various

of history

epochs

was

explicitly

noted. The doctrine of the thinking I took on an ethnological, social and historical dimen-

sion. The philosophy of culture, society and history was added to the ancient “doctrine of

the soul” or took its place, taking over also

its claim to discipline. The logical thed through logos exists in as the spoken deduced that completed by

be

the

basic

philosophical

starting-point was also modthe consideration that the the concrete for man only word, From this it could be tormal logic needed to be a philosophy of langurage or a

linguistic analysis, or that logic itself was

basically the unselfconscious theory of a special language — that of science. But since

language must go with hearing and hearing with understanding, the task of a philosophy

of language involved the task of a philosophy

4

losophy of language, as also by hermeneutics, (if) Philosophy then understands itself to of the conditions

of

itself in the

light

the unknown

implicit in its conscious ig-

possibility of its effort to move onwards, and hence of its search for the knowledge of

norance. This gives it at once its own propet

theme. It does not ask merely about knowl-

edge itself or the objects of knowledge. It

also investigates the conditions of possibility which underlie two possibilities at once. It

asks how it is possible that the thinker seeks,

asks and is capable of judging his (real or ostensible) findings. It also asks how it is possible that the objects are capable of showing themselves to the secker as that which they are. In this sense, Plato describes the object of philosophy as the “third factor”, which “imparts power to thought and truth to the thing known”. This tpltov yéveg is not a particular object but lies “beyond being™. Nothing can then be known of it except that ““it is essentially there to link together (mediate) the two” (thinking and the thing known).

With this description, transcendental reflection, i.e., the question of what is behind the subject-object relationship, was designated for the first dme, and in a historically effective

way,

as the special

task

of phi-

losophy. But with this special theme, philosophy is also assigned a special type of knowledge. What it seeks must be prior — as the condition of seeking and finding — to all knowledge of objects and indeed to all questions about objects, since it makes this

possible. In other words, what is sought in

philosophy is the objective 4 priori of knowl-

edge in general. Hence even with regard to its form it can only be found when thought reflects on the elements which are active

in thought

itself “from

knowledge

they

a priorf, though quently

the very

outset”,

in the order of conscious

are

in reflection.

grasped

only

Philosophy

as

subse-

tran-

scendental reflection is a striving for knowl-

edge of the 4 priors, and as regards its form, also reflection on the 4 prisri elements of knowledge.

Thus transcendentai reflection and the problem of the a prieri can also be deduced from the way in which philosophy, as a way

PHILOSOPHY of life, explains its own nature and condittons of possibility. But this does not prevent it in turn from becoming an independent discipline with regard to phi-

losophy as a way of life. And as it makes itself independent, it too can enter a claim to

play the role of a basic philosophical discipline. However,

transcendental

reflection,

like

the working out of the problem of the 4

priori, admits of many variations, In the search for the “mediating third factor”, for the light which illuminates the

intellect (gives it the power to know) and

throws light on the objects (makes them knowable), Plato found himself referred to

the good, as the sun in the realm of the

spirit ( Repaublic). In his later works he sees the One more and more clearly as the common principle of being and knowledge. Aristotle could prove negatively that the

loss of unity

(in contradiction

with

itself)

makes thought incapable of thinking, and the object incapable of existing (the priaciple of contradiction as the gnoseological and also the ontological principle being the principle of mediation between thought and being). Finally the principles of wmitas and bomifas discovered in the search for the

mediating

ground

of thought

and

being,

joined to the veritas thus made possible (knowability) were ascribed as passiones gene-

rales to all beings as such. In this way tran-

scendental reflection became the doctrine of the transcendentals. The rediscovery of the transcendental enquiry in its original sense was due above all to Kant and after

him to the German Idealists. Kant, however,

did not seek the conditions of possibility of

known

objects in a third factor, but in the

forms of thought (and intuition) itself. Schelling took the indeterminareness of the

undifferentiated

ing-point.

Hegel

subject-object as his start-

sought

to

describe

the

constitution of the subject and the objectworld as the life of the self-realizing spirit.

Hence too the a priori form of philosophi-

cal knowledge could be understood in different ways: as the original (innate but “forgot-

ten””) insight into determinate principles (ideas), reflection on the forms of thought

and intuition,

the conscious

of the spirit and so on,

self-realization

(iii) Philosophy, as a special way of life, does not consider itself as a subjectively

conditioned “variant? of the possibilities of

human life. It claims to be a form of life which

is necessarily demanded of man. Hence it expresses itself in norms of behaviour and thus gives rise to a special philosophical treatise under the name of “ethics”. This

too, as in Kant, can make the claim to have

a central role among the philosophical disciplines, which by now have become independent of each other. b) Once the transition has been made from

philosophy as a form of life to philosophy

as a rmultiplicity of special treatises, the question arises as to how philosophy is distinguished from the other modes of knowledge and acquisition of knowledge and then as to how it can be co-ordinated with them. As regards this process, it is significant

that

as early

as

Aristotle

the

name

“philosophy” had been extended to take in all types of knowledge. But philosophy in

the strict sense, as the “first philosophy™, claimed an objective precedence over all

philosophies, partly as the formal logical erganon (made possible by reflection on the

TEXvY Tepl Toug Aoyuug), partly as the doctrine, with ontological content, of the “first

and most universal principles” {made possible by reflection on the conditions of pos-

sibility for all objects of knowledge}).

On this basis philosophy became the way of founding the sciences. It was the foundation which was to assure the various steps in the acquisition of knowledge. And it

became the specific doctrine of the universal principles which was to assign to individual

objects and individual items of knowledge their place in the ordered whole of beings {or of the knowable) and thus make it possible to synthetize the known into a system. And

sinice both the formal rules tor the acquisition

of knowledge and the system-forming principles claim to be universally valid for all that is known, philosophy could contrast itself as the “universal science” with all other forms of knowledge. Inasmuch as philosophy claims to be the universal science, it has to make it its business

above

all tc assure the universality of the

knowledge at which it aims. It has to avoid

being “bogged down in the particular™.

As regards the formal rules of the acquisi-

tion of knowledge, their purely formal character seemed to guarantee of itself indifference to the variery of content and hence assure their universal validity for all types of knowledge. (The principle of contradiction for the formation of concepts and the exercise of judgment, the dictum de omni el de nulio for 5

PHILOSOPHY

deductions, are principles which simply because they are pureljr formal, hold good for ‘all concepts; all judgments and all conclusions, no matter what objects are referred to.) It is only in recent times that doubts have

been ralsed as to whether the formalization of thought through such logical rules does

not restrict knowledge to certain spheres of possible content — for instance, to the sphere of “objects” which according to the view of life-philosophy, Heideggerian ontology and Jaspers’s metaphysic constitute only a partial region of the possible content of thought. . It has been felt still more difficult from the beginning to assure the universality of the “supreme principles” of things, which were to permit the philosopher to order the results of the particular sciences within a totality of the true and real. This concrete universality

could be sought in the logical universality of a supreme concept under which the concepts of all particular objects could be subsumed or in the physical reality of a real structure in which all the particular realities are incorporated. In the first case philosophy becomes the science of “being

sciences

varions

while

as such”,

the

deal with the gemera entis

proper to them in each case. In the second case philosophy understands itself as the

ROW

ap

OB

s

Gl

LR

thhal

from the seien;:cs of the regmfis in-qfi'; (natural science, histoty, art) by the ¢laim to go beyond appearances and to answer the question of the essence of the phenomenon, Philosophy, which had become a theory of

the most universal principles through reflec-

tion on a way of life, changes once more into the question of the particular essences of particular types of beings. When it is thus understood, philosophy is exposed to the sharpest criticism from the

various sciences in question. It is objected

that the universality of its notion of being is

gained at the expense of the content of the

notion, which becomes empty. The content of its notions of essence 15 said to be due to the “arbitrary speculation™ of 2 non-demonstrated point of departure. The individual sciences strive to adduce examples which will contradict and shatter the ostensible philosophical concept of essence, in order to demonstrate its arbitrary character. This is particularly clear in the polemics of histor-

ical science against all speculative philosophy

of history. As a reaction to the twofold accusation of formal emptiness and *“arbitrary speculative-

ness” of content, philosophy has recourse

regions of the world. But then the universe

mainly to the following attitudes. (1) It maintains its claim to universality in the realm of logic, if necessary by expanding

understood in the light of an ultimate real

matical logic or linguistic analysis.

science of the universe or cosmos, while the

patticular

sciences

a5 a2 whole

investigate

the various

cannot be described

unless

it is

ground, while the particular sciences do not endquire into the ground of the world but

have

to

be

concerned

with

the

various

regional systems of explanations within the world. In other words, philosophy tries to

justify its self-understanding as universal science by becoming ontology, natural philosophy or philosophical theology (natural theology, philosophy of religion).

If in the course of furthet development the “world” is no longer taken as the sum total of the real, but as a special region of

beings — along with God and the soul — cosmology, theology and psychology become

types of “special metaphysics” and are sub-

ordinated

inersal

word.

to

“general

ontology™

as

the

science in the strict sense of the

Bur once

metaphysics”

the notion

has come

of 2 “special

up, the view

that

only what is strictly universal can be the theme ot philosophy is already in principle abandoned. Regional philosophies — of nature, history, art, the State, religion, etc. —

6

classical logic through new forms of mathe-

(1i) It tries to take the notion of beings in

general (or of being) in such a way that — in

contrast to all other concepts — it can combine the greatest concreteness and fullness of content with complete universality. One example of this is the notion of existence, as

used

in existential

(existence)

philosophy.

Since it is 2 matter of “myself and my power

to be”, I am concerned

with “my

own

in

each case”, which is at the same time “the

whole”,

within

which

all particulars

and

individuals can enounter me. Another pos-

sibility of proving that the concept of being need not be empty of content in order to be universal is based on the revival of the ancient doctrine of the intrinsic connotations of the one, the goad, the true, the beautiful and so on, which being itself has, (1) It revives the ancient programme

of

transcendental reflection, according to which

the object-world is left to science and sur-

mounted. The task of philosophy then remains the profounder question of the condi-

PHILOSOPHY

tions of possibility of the object as over

against, or of the self-disclosure of beings in general. An example of this is the ontology

of Heidegger, which seeks to speak not of beings but of being and hence enquire into

the condition of possibility of beings as such. (iv) It re-activates the origin of transcendental reflection itself by considering anew how this reflection can be the possible basis

of 2 special way of life. Marxism understands

its critique of ideology (in reflection on the

conditions of possibility of thought and its object) as initiating revolutionary changes in ways of life. Martin Heidegger’s philosophy, with its “remembrance of being”, the ground of possibility of thinking as of beings, tries to prepare men for a new “coming of destiny”. Philosophies as diverse in form as these are examples of how philosophy, while bearing in mind all the possibilities of theory-formation gained in the course of history, gains a new relationship towards its original self-

1. Love of wisdom and love of God. One point of comparison between the Christian and the

philosophical way of life is that both present themselves as a form of love which demands

that for the sake of the prized good all other goods should be despised. (According to Plato, all goods should be exchanged for “the true coin™. According to Mt 13:45, all possessions are to be sacrificed for the “one

pearl of great price”.} Here there is a similat-

ity of form (purla) but a problematical relationship as regards content (cogixor Gebe), a) Christian and philesophical love. 'The Christian as well as the philosopher knows himself to be a dweller in an intermediate realm, even

though for different reasons and in a different way. He i1s part of this world and still not simply subject to the “world-elements”. He

1s of the “household of God” and still not absolutely at home in the divine sphere. And

he knows himself, like the philosopher, as a

As soon as the Christian message entered the

traveller. He has received the Spirit as a “pledge” and still lives entirely in expectation. And though it is certainly not merely his own reflection which has made him a being in an intermediate realm and a traveller on the way, he is nonetheless called to assimilate the work of God’s grace in him and its promise for the future. He must make

join issue with philosophy.

just as the philosopher becomes really and

understanding: as thought which by the form it takes guides human life into new

ways,

B.

PaiLosoruy

anD

CHRISTIAN

FArTH

sphere of Hellenistic culrure, it was forced to

This necessity

was based in part, as it still 1s today, on the tact that the biblical preaching (the kerygma} produced a Jewish and Christian doctrine of the faith (didascalia). The discussion was also necessitated zabove all by the very fact that the

biblical preaching claims to make a new way

of lifepossible and summonsto it. Hence itap-

pearsasarivaltophilosophyasashaper of life. In the early days of Christianity this

rivalry was signalled above all by the fact that the procedures of the Christian preachers

resembled those of the wandering teachers of

the Stoic and Cynic type. This led to the forging of certain links — the lists of virtues and vices in the Pauline letters resemble the

corresponding

texts

from

the

diatribe

of

popular philosophy — but also to sharp conflicts. The only text in the NT which uses the word philosophy warns against falling

victim to “philosophy and empty deceit” (Col 2:8). The highly chequered history of

the encounter between biblical (chiefly Christian} preaching and philosophy cannot be

traced here. But some of the main issues involved may be indicated in order to understand the discussion.

it his own in his own /Joges (dporoyeiv). And

hopelessly foolish when he does not see and

proclaim himself a fool, so too the Christian

is really and hopelessly a sinner when he does not see and proclaim himself a sinnet but tries to ‘“‘establish his own justice” (the

apostasy of the “‘Judaizers”). And just as the philosopher misunderstands and forfeits his

relation to the truth when he takes it as an assured possession instead of as the goal of

his love, so too the Christian misunderstands

and

forfeits

his

relation

to the

promised

glory when he fancies that he already pos-

sesses it (the apostasy of the “enthusiasts’™).

Like the way of life of the philosopher, the Christian way is also a self-understanding which is intrinsically self-criticism.

When the philosopher affirms that he can only seek truth inasmuch as it has already presented itself to him (as the wveritas gua

cognoscifur), the Christian can regard this as an

interpretation

for

he

can

of

only

his

be

relationship

on

the

way

to

God,

to God

because God 1s already with him, and indeed

—

like truth to the philosopher —

“more

intimately than he to himself”’. The philos-

opher owes his critical freedom with regard

v

PHILOSOPHY

.

to objects to his self-criticism in the light of the veritas ludicans dr homine which discloses his inadequacy. The Christian can see here an interpretation of his own relationship to the world. He is free to judge the world critically precisely because he knows himself as one

who

is judged by God

and who

cannot

survive under the judgment of God. And if

truth is present to the philosopher precisely in

the form

of its non-givenness,

so too the

glory and grace of God is essentially manifest to the Christian swb comtrario. Thus philo-

sophical reflection on the pature and conditions of possibility of the philosophical life can prefipure ways by which he can understand himself in his own Christian existence and in the light of its grounds of possibility. This seems to be an essential reason why the

given b}r thnsc wha see: the istim truth as the “true wisdom™ — after 1 Cor 2168, for instance —

and

hence proclaim the

Christian faith as the true love of wisdom,

The difficulty of the relationship between love of God and love of wisdom becomes

clearer and more concrete when the Christian

tries to assess the philosophical answers to the question of where the source of human

faults is to be sought and what practices are to be adopted if man is to attain “wisdom™.

Here philosophy and the preaching of faith agree in demanding of man 2 radical con-

version {cf. Mk 1:15). But the object from

which one must turn away, and the direction

to which one is called to turn, are far from

there is a resemblance between the Christian

being determined in the same way. The depreciation of the senses, and with them the body, in favour of the intellect is justified for the philosopher by theories of knowledge and hence has no primordial function within the Christian message. None-

are determined by love (ptAla), the different

(volg)

self-understanding

of the Christian can be

expressed in a theology using philosophical

instruments.

b} God and truth as object of love. Though

and the philosophical life, inasmuch as both

objects of this love — God for Christians,

wisdom for philosophers — sct up a large nurnber of tensions between the philosophical

and the Christian life. The following ques-

theless, Paul uses the contrast between mind

and members

(péin)

to indicate an

inward division of a completely different type in sinful man (Rom 7:23). This was one of the circumstances which enabled some Christian theologians to bring the Christian

tions arise.

demand for catharsis from sin into close con-

sibility which enters into rivalry with the love

mainly Platonic — for the catharsis of the

Is love of wisdom, as a shaper of life, a pos-

of God,

so

that

a choice

must

be

made

between them? Such is the answer given by

those who emphasize the foolishness of the

cross — after 1 Cor 1:18-25, for instance —

and conclude that the lover of the God of the

crucified is forced to say Yes to foolishness, so that he cannot recognize wisdom as the supreme value. Or is love of wisdom fundamentally (implicitly or explicitly) an expression of the

yearning for the “divine light”, so that it

nection with the philosophical demand —

soul from the body. The struggle against the emotions and the

summons to practise the attitude of ataraxia

(indifference) were variously judged on the part of Christians. As early as the Letter of James, desire (émbupia) is said to be the mother of sin, and anger (dpy+) the opponent of divine righteousness (Jas 1:15, 20}, though the other NT authors seem to understand the

evil passions as consequences of sin rather

than its origin (cf. Rom 1:24-27). But on the other hand Augustine affirms that Stoic ataraxia deserves to be called a stupor animi,

comprises implicitly the love of God and in the course of its further effort paves the way for the explicit love of God? Such is the answer given by those who understand the Christian message — after Acts 17:23-28, for

while fear and hope, grief and joy should be

rightly received by those who have first recognized how well worth guestioning is

maintained as authoritative by traditions and

instance — as an answer which can only be

their human condition, have learned to put

questions and long for an answet. Or

15 the

God

of

the

message

really identical with the wisdom

of

faith

for which

the guhdoopag strives, so that philosophy only really understands itself properly when it 8

counted as necessary elements of the Chris-

tian life. The repudiation

institutions,

and

of

untested

the demand

opinions

to practise

a

generous independence of judgment were concerned with myth in the actual polemics of antiquity. In the age of the Enlightenment, polemical eftort was directed against the authority of Christian tradition and the institutions established to protect it. Hence

PHILOSOPHY

the attitude to life articulated in these philosophical claims found expression above all in criticism of religion and of the Church. Inasmuch as the Christian message challenges all human boasting, it cannot accept the ideal of the autonomous subject and must oppose the claim to autonomy with the demand for

the “obedience of faith”. On the other hand

the Christian knows that precisely because he is subject to God’s judgment and grace, he is emancipated from the world and empowered to judge it dispassionately. “The spiritual man judges all things, but is himself to be judged by no one” (1 Cor 2:15). In this sense practice of independence of judgment 1s to be demanded in the name of Christianity as well as in the name of the philosophical way of life. And “growing out of culpable infancy” (Kant) can be seen as a demand for Christian maturity as well as the programme of the Enlightenment. The struggle against the methodological monism of this or that science or of the modern notion of science in general, along with the development of attitudes of another kind, has engaged both philosophy and Christian faith in a defensive artitude common to both. They reject positivism and also all systems of interpretation of the world

based on mechanism, biologism or any other

particular science. But this common ground should not obscure their difference. Philosophical critique of science demonstrates the

sin) not merely as the moral defect of individ-

uals, but as a state in which mankind and the world in general find themselves. The Chris-

tian call to individual, on a2 new individual’s

conversion is addressed to the but Christian hope is firmly set state which far surpasses the transformation and brings about

a “new heaven and a new earth”, But while Marzxist philosophy sees true philosophy as

the pathway to revolutionaty praxis, the Christian must bear in mind that he cannot expect the renewal of the world from his own effort. This would be to fall victim to 2 new form of “righteousness by works”

which would contradict the hope of salvation

from grace alone.

The examples show that wherever Christian love of God encounters in the concrete the human love of wisdom, philosephia, and

the Christian and philosophical summons to

conversion have to show their compatibility or their opposition,

distinctions have to be

made. This can only be done by a new con-

sideration of the nature and conditions of possibility of the philosophical and the Christian way of life. Such reflection on the

philosophical and the Christian way of life

(inspired by the kerygma) gave rise to philosophy and theology as learned disciplines. Hence the discussion between the two forms of life is followed by discussion between philosophical and theological doctrine.

2. Philosophy as a learned discipiine and Chris-

limited nature of all possible scientific knowledge, by analysing the form in which science arrives at its results. The Christian critique

tian theology. 1t is characteristic of the biblical

its

learned discipline from the proclamation of a

of human

wisdom,

inadequacy

from

however,

the

demonstrates

inability

of the

“wisdom of this world” to grasp a definite content: the saving work of God

(cf. 1 Cor to extend restricted based on

in Jesus

2:7-8). The philosophical effort the mental horizon which was by a methodological monism is the given mode of being of the

reason or of existence, or on a transformation

of consciousness which man himself brings about. The Christian effort to hear the word

confesses that God himself as he speaks must

open man’s ears and eyes in a new way, so

that he can see and hear God’s sign and word. Finally, when Marxist philosophy sees the cause of human enslavement not in a subjective and individual failure butr in an objective and collective state of society, the

Christian critique of the world agrees with

it in one respect. Christianity also sees the

enslavement of man (under the lordship of

and post-biblical religions {Judaism,

tianity, Islam)

Chris-

that they have developed

2

message (kerygma). Like Christian faith and philosophy as a way of life, Christian theology engages in a close but complex relationship

with philosophy as a learned discipline.

First the kerygma has to mark itself off both from philosophy and mythology. These latter

are two ways of interpreting the direct experience of man — they reduce phenomena

to their ultimate ground (&gy7) — and remind men of what they already knew in 2 way unknown to themselves: they have the character of anamnesis. But the kerygma announces what has proceeded from the

decree

of

God

hitherto

kept

secret,

and

says something to man which he could never

find himself in any process of anamnesis.

Hence too the message does not put forward arguments {which would mean leaving the hearer to judge of the message) but announces 9

PHILOSOPHY God’s judgment and grace (and 50 places.the

hearer under God’s judgment). But this very characteristic of the biblical religions, that they are based on 4 kerygrna, neeessitated in the second place a theology. For the kerygma is itself interpretation. The newly proclaimed action of God interprets

all earlier ones, and needs itself tb be inter-

preted, It does not work magically by the recitation of a spell, as it were, but demands

to be understood. But since the kerygma is

~ interpretation and demands interpretation,

it calls for an art of interpretation (éppmvela) and also a theory of interpretation (hermeneutics). These take shape in reflection on controversies of interpretation (e.g., the

Sententize of Peter Lombard) and in the effort

to reach a critical decision on them (e.g., the Onaestiones of Aquinas). The learned theology which was built up in this way had already foreruniners in the biblical writings of the OT and the NT. It developed its methodology later, especially in the sphere of Hellenistic

eapable of undmmdmg it, must there firstqfafitrytopmducemhishmxersam! e which cor~ — & task of their own ignoranc re:spflnds to the use of antinomy (apomm:s) in philosophy. Thus the evocation of 2 critical self-understanding, which is one of the central tasks of philosophy, is a prerequisite for initiation into understanding of the message. Theology, like philosophy, needs both an anthropological and a logical foundation and hence has no other instruments at its disposition than those which it takes over from philosophical reflection. (iii) The biblical message claims to be true, And here it does not merely claim to display correctly a particular matter. Rather, in the salvific event which it proclaims, e.g., the exodus of Israel from Egypt or the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, it seeks to proclaim the manifestation of the unlimited and

hence all-embracing lordship of God over

been collected {senfentiae) and the question

the world and man. Hence it cannot make the salvific action which it announces intelligible, unless it also proclaims the God who acts there 25 Lord of heaven and earth — which means that the proclamation of history has to be interpreted by a theological cosmology.

theology no less than philosophy needs an art

the NT the “cosmological Christology” of

téyvy) and hence a skilful management of proofs (téxvy mept Toug Adyoug). The rules of this dialectic and logic cannot be other than those alteady developed in philosophy. Theology cannot avoid using the logic and methodology of philosophy. In arguing

to compete with philosophical theories of the cosmos and its supreme priaciple and is

culture, in controversy with philosophy. a) Theology as reflection on the message of faith

with the instraments of philosophy. (1) As soon 2s divergent interpretations of the message have of their assessment of reciprocal

({gwaestiones) is raised,

argumentation

(SlxhexTixn

agatnst one another, each of the participants

can appeal to the rules of logic to demand

that his partner be consistent in his affirmations (Sporoyel éautd). This forces every attempt to interpret the message to become a coherent whole in relation to its individual

assertions. In this way systematic theology grows out of the guaestionss under the influence of philosophical dialectic and logic. (11) The fact that the message needs inter-

pretation at all presupposes

that it is not

(See for the OT the account of creation, for

Col 1:15-17.) But with this, theology begins

forced either to acknowledge philosophical cosmology and *“‘theology™ (doctrine of the

supreme principle of the world) as “natural

knowledge” of the truths which theology proclaims on the basis of ‘“supernatural

revelation”, or to outdo them by a specifically

biblical cosmology and theology. For the former, one may compare Thomas Aquinas, who explains the philosophical reflection on the cawra prima of the world as similar in content to the confession of the divine creator

of the world: “Er hoc est quod omnes dicunt Deum.”

(1v) The claim to truth put forward by the

biblical message not only involves the claim

immediately intelligible of itself as soon as it

to speak of the unqualified and hence uni-

hearers cannot at first hear in the way which is demanded for a proper understanding. This is because the hearers are impelled by their illusory knowledge to pass a hasty verdict onthe message (e.g., “foolishness and

which the message speaks can recognize the

is proclaimed. The announcer finds that the

scandal’®), instead of allowing it to convince

them of their ignorance. He who intetprets 10

versal lordship of God biblical cosmology — the event which alone the hitherto concealed who are chosen by God

— the occasion of a but also to announce enables man to grasp mystery. Only those in the act of grace of

message as the “power of God” (1 Cor 1:25).

To the rejected it remains foolishness (/44

PHILOSOPHY

1:8). Hence the message does not merely

proclaim the lordship of God as the central veriias guae cogmoscitar. It also proclaims the grace of God as the transforming wserites gua

cogmoscitwr,

Tt

is

undoubtedly

no

zccident that one finds in the OT (Is 42:6) and in the NT (Jn 12:35f.) the comparison

so well-known from philosophy by which

the new source of knowledge is compared to the light which illumines the eyes and makes the object recognizable. To explain this claim of the message, the interpreter must appeal to the hearer’s sense of not being himself master of his powers of hearing, but of needing to be enabled to hear by a condition of possibility over which he cannot dispose. Here the theologian appeals

to the transcendental reflection of the philosopher on the conditions of possibility of “being able to see” in general. Only thus does it then become clear how the interpretation of the biblical message differs from philosophical reflection. For the message claims that the conditions of possibility of the new

hearing and understanding are mediated by a definite figure within history: I am the

hght” (Jn 8:1). (v) It follows from what has been said that theology uses the logical and anthropological principles of philosophy in order to make the gospel message properly intelligible. It claims to answer the question of philosophical cosmology about the beginning and ground (2pyn) of all things and the question of tran-

scendental philosophy about the conditions of possibility of knowledge by pointing to the true Lord of the world and the true light which enlightens every man who comes into the world. And by asserting the uncenditional

Luther objected) or of “Hellenizing” the understanding of the biblical message, that 15, submitting it to the conditions of specifically Greek thought for its understanding. Thus the positive association of theology with philosophical questions in cosmology and transcendental analysis and with philosophical principles of logic and anthropology is open on principle to theological criticism — among the ‘“anti-dialecticians” of the Middle Ages and above all in the theology of the Reformers and their successors.

(i) Philosophical logic is either classical or dialectic. The former takes the principle of non-contradiction as its supreme principle,

the latter ranges oppositions under a perspieuous law for their mediation. But theology

can underline the “paradox” as the necessary

form in-which the divinely-wrought salvation is manifested and in which it must be

proclaimed. Against theses of philosophy,

the anthropological theclogy can object

that faith cannot build on the rightness of man’s self-understanding.

On the contrary,

only the light of faith can free man from his

self-deceptions and enable him to reach a true seli-understanding. Philosophical “theology”’, as doctrine of the supteme “principle”

of the world, is opposed by Christian eschatology, which shows that the God of the

Bible is not to be defined as the ground of the world, but is equally capable of destroying

the existing world and bringing about, at his good pleasure, a new heaven and a new earth,

The natural relationship of the philosophicallv-investigated ground of the world to the world contrasts with the relationship of the judge of the world, as proclaimed by the bib-

of the divine illumination it also makes this

lical message, to a world condemned by his judgment and dependent on his free grace. The transcendental reflection of philosophy

its programme,

knowledge and knowability in general. But

lordship of God and the sovereign freedom

claim, in point of fact, even when, taithful to

it refrains from intervening

in philosophical debate.

b) Theslogical critigue of philosophy as theolopical self-criticism. The programme just mentioned, that of refraining from inter-

ventionin intra-philosophical debate, wasnot adopted merely in order to leave due room for freedom in natural reflection. Very often, the effort of theologians to exclude philosophical problems from their own terms of reference was in the nature of a fundamental critique of philosophy. The use of philosophical reflection to interpret the biblical message is open to the suspicion of mixing

the word of man with the word of God (as

enquires into the conditions of possibility of the biblical message is the historical announcement of an ever new possibility of hearing a definite content. To use the metaphor of light: the eternal, necessary light of truth is contrasted

with the free, historical

illumination of grace. (ii) Nonetheless, these fundamental contrasts do not spare theology the necessity of undertaking in tact philosophical reflection — though often against its will and then for the mast part unconsciously. Theology can-

not renounce the effort of relating the various

enunciations of the Bible to oneanother(e. g., relating them to some “central” affirmation 11

PHILOSOPHY - of Scripture). It mnst therefore.accept the . be to bring abeut a theology “patif challenge to remain in harmony with itself ok ';;_phlcai elements; Its fusction (m:gq:mw'i‘i isutd) throughout the multiplic-

ity of its assertions. If it then engages in

polemics with classical and dialectical logic, it is continually forced to take its stand,

explicitly or implicitly, on another logic (as

the regulator of its harmony). Further, since theology cannot rencunce the effort to-make

the message intelligible to the hearers, it must always seek out man in his self-understanding and convince him of the inappropriateness of his existing self-understanding. If, in doing so, it considers that the

traditional notions of the “soul”, the “I”,

the “reason” and so on are inadequate, it is forced to substitute another “anthropological

contrary, is to produce an sttitude azE aa%:tl if thealogy counti criticism intheology. For the laws of phllflsophlcal logic (m its dtalactical a5 well as its: classical form) with the

paradox as the manifestation of divine freedom, it questions the possibility of all systematization, in theology as well as in philosophy. But this would

imply

renunciation of all

possibility of assuring its own consistency (oupgovsiy éavré).

sophical

If

anthropology

it

counters

philo-

(in its traditional,

idealist or existential form) with the noveity of the new creation which frees the divine

word from a link with the hearing of the

“old man”, it questions the philosophical

of the

method of appealing to a pre-existing though

philosophy), in which case it throws itself open to philosophical criticism. And then,

of the message is kept apart from all anamnesis. But further, it calls in question any possible theological appeal to the self-

foundation™

(as,

for instance,

that

analysis of existence in the sense of existential

theology may regard the world asa wholeasa creation dependent on its creator, or as an object of judgment submitted to its judge. But it has spoken of the world “as a whole”,

and hence has in fact made a cosmological

statement.

Finally,

when

it contrasts

the

“light” which makes zll knowledge posstble by its nature, with the “illumination™ which takes place in grace, it has undoubtedly given

a historical and event-oriented turn to transcendental reflection — and thus called

the attention of this branch of philosophical effort to a new possibility of enquiry. None-

latent consciousness, and the announcement

consciousness of the “old man®. This, how-

ever, involves renunciation of all argumenta credibilitatis intended to bring the message closer to unbelieving hearers. It is, in 2 word, reliance on the power of the self-explanatory word. But such exclusive reliance would ultimately make all theology superfluous. Finally, if theology counters the philosophical

enquiry into the wholeness of the world and the ground of the world with the freedom of the divine Lord who can destroy or renew the

theless, it has thus intervened in the philo-

world in judgment, it calls in question not only “metaphysical theology” but also all

“seetng”, “hearing” and “understanding”.

this involves renunciation of all possibility

sophical discussion of the grounds of human

In a word: even when undertaking on principle a critique of philosophy, theology

inevitably does in fact philosophical work and intervenes precisely in the intra-philosophical discussions in which according to its programme it did not wish to be involved. The corresponding observation may be made that the repudiation of philosophy in the

name of the faith — as propounded above all by the representatives of dialectical theology

— generally takes the field against one philosophy in the name of another, e.g., against

Aristotelianism in the name of existence philosophy. Its claim to be free of philosophical premises then turns out to be an evasion of the duty of critical reflection on

the philosophical

principles

which

are in

fact applied. (11t} Hence the function of a fundamental

critique of philosophy

12

by theology cannot

possibility of “theological cosmology™. But

of joining in, in the name of faith, when matters of this “worldly world” are spoken of. If it remains

consistent,

2 radical

theo-

logical critique of philosophy makes an equally radical self-criticism of theology necessary. In this way it brings about not a separation between philosophy and theology (which shows itself as impossible), but the recognition of the difference between theology and faith. The critique of philosophy undertaken

in the name

expounded.

This self-critical consciousness

of faith reminds

theology that every effort to expound the message of faith through human reflection necessarily falls short of the message to be which proceeds from the debate with philos-

ophy seems to be as necessary for theology

as the positive service which philosophical logic, anthropology, cosmology and metaphysics have to render in this matter.

PHILOSOPHY

c) Particular tasks of theology and philosophical aids. Under the influence of this self-criticism induced by criticism of philosophy, theology may be inclined to renounce systematization (with the help of philosophical logic), the

appeal to human

self-understanding (with

the help of philosophical anthropology and existence-analysis), interpretation of the

world (and debate with philosophical cosmology and metaphysics) and reflection on the possibilities of its own intelligibility (with the instruments of transcendental

reflectinn). For in all these activities it had

found itself necessarily making use of philos-

ophy. To avoid this, theology can try to

restrict itself to making the word of God audible, announcing the hour of this word and confessing this word before the peoples

in the urgency of its claim. But even so theol-

ogy does not escape the necessity of calling on the help of philosophy. Pure service of the word is not possible without reflection on 15

what

“word”,

how

the

word

can

be

“administered’ and how the passage is made from hearing to “‘understanding”. But with such reflections one has already entered the

field of linguistic philosophy and hermeneut1cs. tion it is that

The announcement of the hour of salvaor judgment calls for reflection on how that the world and man are so constituted decision is taken about them as a2 whole

in such an “hour”. The question arises, for instance, as to how the “historicity” of men

existing in such hours is related to the *“history as dates” of such events. But with such re-

Aections theology is immediately involved in the themes of philosophy of history (see Histery 1). Finally, it the urgency of the message 1s to be proclaimed to the peoples,

the theologian has to reflect on how this message stands to the religions or the irreligion of these peoples. The question arises, for instance, as to whether Christianity 1s to be presented as the “true™ religion in contrast

to the “false” religions of the peoples or as

the “fulfilment of religion in general”, or whether its very essence takes it out of the

genus “religion”, so that it has to achieve the conquest of all religion positively, and hence more radically than modern atheism.

How-

ever the relationship of the Christian message to the religion or the irreligion of the peoples

many reasons for thinking that philosophical

effort in the field of linguistic philosophy, hermeneutics, philosophy of history and philosophy of religion have more pressing services to render theology in its present-day problems than reflection on logic, natural philosophy and metaphysics {though even today these cannot be dispensed with). d) Retrospect: Basic elements of the relationship between philosophy and theology. (i) In the minds

of philosophers and theologians, the mutual

relationship of these two modes of “love of truth” seems, for some hundreds of years

now, to be marked by the fear that each of them threatens to limit the freedom and

independence of the other. On the side of philosophy there is the implicit or explicit suspicion that theology expects philosophy to help it to prove or at least make probable, with the help of natural

reason, propositions which faith finds certain for other reasons. Given such 2 mandate as

to

its contents

by

theology,

philosophy

would be forced from the outset to link its questioning and seeking to predetermined results and could exemplify only externally frankness of questioning and the critical nature of research. It would be condemned to the slavish role of the ancilla theologiae. On the theological side there 1s the suspicion that the systems sketched by philosophy see the contents of the message of faith as new ‘‘cases” to be subsumed under the ancient rules of logic, metaphysics and anthropology, of non-theological origin. The hu-

man spirit would be judge of the word of God. If philosophy penetrated into theology,

it would submit the free call of God to the laws of human wisdom. (i1} This suspicion, voiced from both sides,

can be documented by historical examples,

likewise on both sides. In the history of theology, repeated efforts have been made to

exploit philosophy, for missionary or apologetical purposes, as a2 subsequent confirmation of matters of which the assured on other grounds. So

believer is too in the

history of philosophy, repeated efforts have been made to “‘explain™ biblical assertions or even to “save” them, by expounding them

as testimonies

to a basically

philo-

always include a statement about religion as

sophical consciousness which only expressed itselfin religious form for lack of an adequate self-understanding. But their truth is said to

philosophy of religion. The history of the human sciences suggests

anthropology or even existential philosophy is made explicit.

may be described, this characterization must such,

and

hence

has

entered

the

field

of

be clear as soon as their inherent metaphysics,

13

PHILOSOPHY

(it} But-these historically verifisble efforts

subject-abject

are based, nonetheless, on mutnal misander-

thing known, such 2 are to be&fi'-'_' At

and the resulting fundamental mutual distrust

standing between theology and philosophy. Theology and philosophy relate to a truth which is neither exlusively nor primarily the

mdiatim.

.

ditions of poussibility of knowing:

and the

philosophically, do not contain 4 law for such factual changes through which thaught can be given a new-power of

perspicuity of an object, but much more the

objects a new mode of visibility. And thc

“thing seen™. Hence each of them grasps its own nature only inasmuch as it remains conscious of the necessaty inadequacy of its

conditions

condition of possibility of “seefng” and the

utterance. They must use the language of objects to designate something which, as the condition of possibility of knowing as of the known, remains essentially distinct from all objects. Both are therefore modes of service of a truth which is always greater than what

can be said of it in philosophical or theo-

logical propositions. This constitutive relationship to the veritar semper maior prevents both theology and philosophy from discharging their task within the closed frame-

work

of a system.

language

and

hence

But

if inadequacy

corrigibility

and

of

in-

completeness of thought are essential notes

both of philosophy and theology, there is no teason to fear that either of them could impose its own closed system on the other

and hence subject it to an alien law. That the contrary impression may

arise,

however, i1s due to the fact that the intrinsic

incompleteness

of philosophy is otherwise

based and hence of a different type than that

of theology. The basis in philosophy is the transcendental and hence non-objectivated character of truth, in theology the sovereign

and hence incalculable

decision of divine

freedom. The resulting type in philosophy is the non-definitive transcendental reflection, in theology the confession of the mysterious character of the divine decree.

The philosopher then has the impression that

theology breaks off discussion about the conditions of possibility of the factual by

theologian is still free to allot the detual ‘“‘under which

thought

to power and the known its knowability” the constitution of sinful reason or to that of an understanding enlightened in grace. In a similar way, theology has been compelled by intrinsic reasons, when speaking of God’s free saving acts, to change from a description

of “brute facts” indifferent to interpretation,

to an exposition of events which by their very natute gave tise to a new understanding (cf. the unity of the Easter event and the initiation of the Easter faith). Hence the theological appeal to God's free acts does not demand that philosophy should cease to enquire further as to how this act as such had to be able to make itself intelligible to the new human understanding which it produced. And the philosopher remains free to take this unity of new truth and new under-

standing as a particular mode of historical and factual subject-object mediation, and to enquire into its transcendental constitution (see also Hermeneutics). It therefore appears that philosophy and

theology can only threaten to force systems

on each other when they disregard in each

of the two doctrinal systems its specific relationship to the truth. The fundamental openness

which

the

relationship

other. This openness will be safeguarded insofar as both theology and philosophy remember that as learned doctrines they have their historical origin and their actual source

in the love (ptAla) which inspires philosophy

of possibility subjects God’s freedom to a

and Theolagy.

by tntrinsic reasons to change from a doctrine

of eternal 4 priors forms to a doctrine of so

many 14

historical and factual modes

of the

the

them into a much closer relationship to each

or theology as the case may be.

law which has decided beforehand what is possible and what is not, But this impression too is only superficial and is fundamentally countered by the history of the sciences of the spirit. Transcendental philosophical reflection has been compelied

to

veritas semper maior demands of them brings

declaring that “such was the good pleasure of God”. The theologian gets the impression

that philosophy’s reflection on the grounds

has its

See also Theological Methodology 1, Philosophy BIBLIOGRAPHY.

on

A:

On

the

basic

texts,

see R. Schaefller, Wege 2o einer ersten Philosophie (1964), pp. 221-9. — W. Dilthey, Das Wesen der Phitpsophie (1907), E. T.: The Essence of Philosaphy (1954); ]. Rehmbke, Philosaphic als Grundwissenschaft (1910); H. Rickert, “Vom Begriff der Philosophie”, Leogos 1 (1910-11), pp. 1-34; E. Husserl,

“Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft™, ibid., pp. 289-341.

W.

Windelband,

.4wn

Introduction

1o

PHILOSQOPHY Philosophy (1921); H. G. Gadamer, “Das Verhiltnis der Philosophie zu Kunst und Wissenschaft”,

Uber die Ursprimglicbkait der Philosophic (1948), pp.

15-28;

K. Jaspers, The Perennial Scope of Philosopby

(1949); ]. Pieper, Lessure: The Basis of Cwlinre (1952); W. Stegmiller, Metapbysk — Wissen-

sehaft — Skepsis (1954); M. Heidegger,

Was ist

das — die Philosophie? (1956), E. T.: What is Philosopby? (1958); D. Robinson, Crwcial Issues in

Philosophy

(1955);

.

Pieper,

Was

heisst phi-

losophieren? (1959); K. Lowith, Weltgeschichte und Heilsgescheben (4th ed., 1961); D. ]. B. Hawkins, Approach te Philesaphy (1964); K. Jaspers, Philosapbical Faith and Revelation (1967); J- Breanan, The Meaning of Philosophy (2nd ed., 1967); J. Passmore, “Philosophy”, The Encyciopedia of Pbilosophy, V1 (1967), pp. 216-26. on &: E. Przywara, “Religionsphilosophie katholischer Theologie”, Handbuch der Pbhilosopbie (special vol., 1927) = Sebriften, 11 (1962), pp. 373-511; id,, Analogta Entis (1932) = Schrifien, 111 (1962); W. Bange, “Formeinheit von Philosophie und Theologie?”, Catholica 2 (1934), pp. 10-26; E. Brunner, Natural Theology (comprising “Nature

and Grace” by E. Brunner and the reply “No!”

by K. Barth) (1946); G. Schngen, Die Einbeit der Theologie (1952);

id., Philosopbische Einlibung in dir

same

time,

doxography

represents

a first

stage in the writing of the history of philosophy,

1. The first stage in the transition from

doxography to history of philosophy took

place when the question was asked whether disagreement among contemporaries corresponded essentially to the “change” of opinion in the course of generations. Aristotle tried, especially in the Mezaphysies, to arrange the answers given by “the ancients” to the question of the “principles” into a temporal and also intrinsic sequence. The solution which he himself offered — the doctrine of the “four causes” — was presented as the provisional goal to which the efforts of his predecessors had gradually approximated. From Aristotle down to the present day,

systems of philosophy have often been preceded by a historical introduction.

2. A further step to attaining a historical

Theologie {(1955); R. Bultmann, Ersays Philosophicat

view of philosophy was taken by Augustine

G. Ebeling, “Theologie und Philosophie”, RGG,

2f1.} that it was not merely opinions with regard to identical problems which differed, bur that the questions themselves varied according to place and time. The interests

and Theologiral (= Glanben snd Verstebhen, 11) {(1955); V1,

cols.

782-830;

E.

Brunnet,

Philosophy

1:

The

Heidegper

of

Religion (1958); R. Bultmann, Existence and Faith (= Glanben und Versteben, 1, 111, selections) (1961}; J. M. Robinson and ]. B. Cobb, Jr., eds., New Frontiers i

Theology,

Later

and

Thealogy (1963); id., New Frontiers in Theology, 1H Theology ar Histery (1967), W. Pannenberg, History and Hermenentte (1967);, W, Weischedel, *Von der

Fragwiirdigkeit einer logie™, Philosophische

151-78.

philosophischen TheoGrengginge (1967), pp.

Richard Schaeffler

I1. History of Philosophy The history of philosophy and its meaning

are themselves

philosophical

problems.

In

earlier times, it was mainly seen as the various solutions which could be given to

the same problems. The registration of such opinions, “‘doxography”, is best known from the relatively late work of Diogenes Laertius

(Lives of the Philosophers, 3rd century A.D.; Theophrastus collected the

[4th century 8.c.] had also oquowal 36Ear, Dactrines of

the Physicists, preserved in frg.). Doxography could be made to serve systematic philosophy. Typical solutions could be compared, and each new solution was compelled to take into account divergent opinions and discuss the arguments critically. But at the

when he pointed out (De Civiiate Dei, VIII,

of the

those

lonians

of the

were

Italians

mainly

cosmological,

anthropological

and

ethical, those of Plato embraced both trends

synthetically. The question remained as to whether the differences in the problems

raised were due to differences of regional

cultures or of periods of time.

3, The third and decisive step to a historical understanding of philosophy was taken

when the theses of the ‘“*historicity of reason” was put forward (not without opposition). [t means that not only are philosophical problems and the doctrinal solutions to

them subject to historical change, but also and

above

enunciates

all human

such

reason

questions

itself,

which

and offers solu-

tions. Hence the same type of question and

answer was not and is not possible at all times. On the contrary, the traditional assertions of philosophy display in each case a specifically historical form of human reason.

Hence

too problems

which

were felt at a

certain period of history need not necessarily

be capable of appealing to other ages, and

the apswers given at any particular time need not be acceptable as such by all men. Both question and answer have to be under15

IR

PHILOSOPHY stood in the light of their times, and the liter

mm forr athm ehmgw i ptineiple of mm

cally” his own attitade to them. This thesis presents the history of philosophy with 2 double task. It must read traditional philos-

osophical) reason is opposed by the notion Elf . a pbzlampfim perennis, which ~was proclaimed

see contemporary philosophy as distinct from and as in continuity with earlier philosophy. The history of philosophy has therefore to take a “historical” view both of its own and of other philosophies.

fact already upheld by the rationalistn of the 17th century against the incipient historical relativism of the English empiricists.

reader must be prepared to “state histori-

ophy against its historical background, and

a) The thesis of the historicity of reason has been put forward in various terms. Vico tried to discern 2 development in the reason

of the various

families

of languages

by

examining the history of language. He assigned “academic” language, and hence philosophy and science, to a relatively late stage in the history of the various nations.

in human life, b) The thesis of the historicity flf ljphil«-

chiefly by neo-Thomism against the histnrifi:i’am of the 19th century. But it was in

According to the upholders of the pbilosophia peremnis, it is irrevelant to historical problems that they should have been first formulated or answered, for extrinsic reasons at particular times. Hence questions once enunciated and answers guaranteed by suffi-

cient proofs belong henceforth to a perma-

and hence the political raison d'état are the older forms of language and speech. Lessing, however, abandoning the consideration of

nent tradition and can be re-lived by all men at all times, given sufficient formation. The “classical” findings of philosophy can be adopted, in spite of their actual origins at various times, into a supra-historical system of objective questions and answers. History

universal history of human

deutic role. The student of systematic philos-

Poetry and hence the poetical reason, law

national

characteristics

and,

envisaging

reason,

a

saw in

the development of the philosophical spirit a divine “pedagogy of the human race”, which permits the errors which beset this

spirit on account of the stimulus which they provide. Vico and Lessing are typical of subsequent

history-writing in philosophy inasmuch as

both of them assign the history of philosophy

a place in history as viewed by philosophy.

History of philosophy becomes part of the philosophy of history. But they differ in the view 'they take of the significance of the

history of philosophy in history as a whole.

For Vico, history of philosophy is part of national history, with a universally valid law

of development which guides the spirit of peoples from a poetic youth to a political

and practical maturity and then to a late academic phase. But Lessing regards universal history as essentially the development

of theoretical and practical insights. History of treligion and philosophy is not a random

part of the total historical development,

but

its central action. Thus the two writers may

be

consideted

as representatives

of two

notions of the task of history of philosophy. One view tries to explain the historical change of philosophical reason by non-philosophical factors such as biogenetic or socio-economic changes. In the other view, the history of philosophy can be explained by intrinstc elements and can be used as a 16

of philosophy is assigned a purely propaeophy is to “go back™

which problems

to the situations in

were first posed and an-

swered. His task of finding for himself, as it were, the same “classical” answer is thus

made easier on two counts. He travels once more

the way

to the answer

and

he also

understands subjectively the “erroneous paths” on which others wander who have

come upon the questions but have not yet

found the right answer., The main argument that “true philosophy” should display the

characteristics of a pbrlosopbia perensis is that the historicity of reason precludes all hope of establishing a set of eternal truths. It can

only engender scepticism. The

rejoinder

relativism

and

ultimately

is that it is the very im-

practicability of the ideals of the philosophia perennis itselt which forces men into scepticism. No philosophy up to this time has in fact resisted historical change, and even the “classical” philosophers have always been understood in a different way historically by each of their followers. Hence, since only one philasapbia perennis can be true, and since so many generations, in spite of continual improvements

in method,

have never suc-

ceeded in finding the “true philosophy” in this sense, the effort should be abandoned as

hopeless.

¢} In this exchange of arguments, the history of philosophy seems to become a

PHILOSQPHY

school for scepticism. It proves that what is demanded systematically is impossible his-

torically. This poses a question of principle.

Is there 3 necessary and indissoluble link between the “historical” self-understanding of philosophy and the attitude of scepticism? The way was paved for an answer by Kant’s allotting to scepticism a merely

relative historical role. Kant considered it to

be a necessary outcome of philosophical experience at a certain stage, but interpreted it as an intermediate stage in the development of reason. Reason goes from dogmatism to criticism via scepticism (H. Liibbe). He thus provided the historian of philosophy with a schematic system. The schema was taken over by Hegel, but given a completely new function as part of an altered complex of problems.

Hegel sought to resolve two kindred problems by means of one principle. The

experience

of evil

in

history

in

general

suggests that there are only two choices: moral despair (immoralism) which abandons

all effort to measure the historical process by the

standard

of

the

good,

and

rigorism,

which demands that the world be morally condemned and hence leads to the notion of a

maoral élite apart from the mass of those who

fall victim to the world. In the same way, the

experience

ot error

in the

history

of the

pursuit of knowledge suggests that there are

oaly two choices: noetic despalr (scepticism) which abandons all effort to measure actual

opinions by the standard of the true, and a dogmatism which dismisses all other opinions as irrevelant to its own insights and thus leads to the formation of an intellectual élite in contrast to the mass of those who are incapable of true insight. Once the alterna-

tives are recognized as pernicious, the task of the student of universal history is to solve the problem of evil in such a way that the demand for the victory of the good in history and the

experience of the actual rule of evil do not

lead to the condemnation of the actual course of history. (This is the task of an “ontodicy” or “theodicy”.) In the same way, the historian of philosophy has the double task of answering the problem of error in such a way that the demand for the conquest of all deceit by truth and the experience of the de facto rule of error do not lead to a condemnation on principle of the actual facts of philosophical history. The solution offered by Hegel is to show

that in both cases the negative element (error

or evil) is a driving force, which does not cven disappear when conquered, in the

“negation of negation”, but remains on a higher level. But rigorism and dogmatism,

moral despair and noetic despair, are modes

of the negation of evil or error, and hence modes of the negation of negation. But both

are subject to misunderstanding. In despair,

the immoralist or the sceptic abandons the norm and hence no longer recognizes the negativity of evil and error as such. And the rigorist

and

dogmatist

merely

seeks

to

destroy the negative, not to save it on 2 higher level. But even this misunderstanding 15 2 propulsive error, since it produces the alternatives mentioned above, and which

called for a solution. The principle to which

Hegel appealed for the understanding of the

negation and its resolution, and hence for his answer to the problem of evil and error is the

nature of the spirit. The spirit, as consciousness of something, is necessarity lost at first in its object and hence alienated in the “other of itselt” (first negation}. Ina second movement,

it rescues itself from this self-forgetfulness

and estrangement, in a consciousness which negates this foreign object in doubt (negation

of negation). Finally, it recognizes itself once

more in what had hitherto seemed foreign, in the act of true knowledge. (This is the

structure of the Phenomenology of the Mind, which describes this way of the spirit’s

tinding itself in terms which also provide a guiding-line for the presentation of the history of religion and of philosophy.) Hegel thus succeeds in giving the Kantian schema of the philosophy of history a systematic foundation which in turn gives it

universality. Kant had used the metaphor of

childhood, youth and manhood to describe

the development of reason. Hegel deduces it from the nature of spirit itself, which must find its way back to itself through alienation. Kant had traced his three stages of evolution

only in the history of modern philosophy,

where dogmatism corresponded tionalistic systems, scepticism to tions of the English empiricists, himself introduced the critical

Hegel

presents

to the rathe objecwhile Kant approach.

this third stage as a basic

structure of philosophy of history as a whole and one traceable in all its epochs.

The view as thus presented by Hegel in his

lectures on the History of Philasophy may be regarded as the first effort to present the

whole history of philosophy in the guise of a philosophical

treatise.

Many

textbooks

of

17

PHILOSOPHY . the history of philosophy have since tried to follow this programme, drawing on wider

historical resources and working out details more

The

precisely.

of Erdmann

wotk

shows most clearly the influence of the Hegelian model. Marx also explains evil and error as the consequences of alienatien, and understands

these forms of negativity as driving forces in history. But he is not concerned with interpreting evil and error in such a way that

the actual course of history can be justified. Against.

efforts,

such

his

concern

is

to

“change” the world by revolution. In furthering (or resisting) such change, philos-

ophy also has a historical function — mostly unconscious — that of a tevolutionary (or reactionaty) ideology. It is the task of the Marxist historian of philosophy to desctibe this function. History of philosophy is understood not as the autonomous development of the spirit but as the reflection of social conditions at each stage. While Hegel could deduce from the nature of spirit the necessity of transitory alienation, Marx had to give it an economic and social

foundation.

Men

are

forced

to

produce

goods to satisfy their natural needs. To do this they must enter upon social relationships based on the division of labour. The division of labour calls for exchange of goods, and thus subjects individuals to laws of the

market which they find less and less intelligible (first form of alienation). Society with its division of labour only allows its members

to produce insofar as the owners of the means of production ordain. The owners are thus enabled to exploit the labours of other

men like natural resources such as lands and

mines. The “proletariat’ is subjected to the

laws which the search of the “capitalists” for profits imposes on them (second form of alienation).

This

twofold

alienation by division

of

labour (commodity market) and exploitation (labour market) is unavoidable at the stages

of development characterized by them in the

relationships of production. Tt cannot there-

fore be dealt with by positing ideal moral

values

in the

name

of which

it can

be

condemned. Hence the historical significance

of philosophy takes on another guise in the Marxist presentation of the history of philosophy. Each historical critique of alienation is itself merely a symptom of the fact that the existing relationships of production do not allow the forces of production which they 13

consrol to deploy their full offieacity. (Difh- culties of marketing, for example, preventthe

full utilization of the forces of productivity

developed in capitalism.} In the history of philosophy, critique in the arder of ideds 15 to be intetpreted as a “reflection” of this disturbance in the order of the real. On

recurring

this basis, the constantly

phenomena of dogmatism and scepticism are given a Marxist interpretation. As soon 4s. division of labour has led to a social division between men of thought and men of practice, dogmatism appears as a form of theory-building which refuses to be tested by practice. When the theoretician notices his alienation from reality, he can react against it,

while still remaining within the bounds of his

theory, by calling reality fundamentally in question. His dogmatism is transformed into scepticism. Hence dogmatism — even when it appears in a Marxist society — reflects the alienation of the theoretician from the working masses, and scepticism — 2 late feudal or late bourgeois phenomenon — reflects the alienation of the sceptic from social reality in general.

The Hegelian and the Marxist theories of the history of philosophy have remained to the present day the most fully developed concepts of the history of philosophy in general. Subsequent histories of philosophy were either merely doxographical (factual historiography of philosophy)

the model

or followed

of Aristotle and presented

the

history of philosophy as 2 series of precursors

leading up to some author seen as classical (neo-Kantian history of philosophy). Other

authors, like Spengler, had recourse to Vico’s concept of recurring cultural cycles.

Others confined themselves to presenting the history of particular problems or sketched a typology of “great philosophers”™ (e.g., Jaspers). d} The initial stages of an integrated notion of the history of philosophy are also to be found

Comte

in

and

Nietzsche,

though

without detailed application and hence without verification in the light of existing materials.

For

Comte,

philosophy

begins

with religion and develops through a stage of speculative metaphysics to the fundamental methodology of science. The growth of empirical knowledge and the formation of the sense of rational method determine this development. Nietzsche calls the the philosophy history of (European) history

of

Platonism,

which

he

sees

as

PHILOSOPHY

characterized by the dualism between sensible reality and ideal values. This dualism

appears in the cultured ss philosophy, in the uneducated as religion (Christianity is the “Platonism

of the

people™).

The

recent

history of philosophy is mainly the process of

the “emptying out of the supreme values” and hence identical with the “tise of nthil-

ism™. This process in turn paves the way for

the

“‘reversal

of

all

values”,

to

which

Nietzsche dedicated his own philosophical effort. The aim is to free life from the

bondage of spirit and to present the “pres-

ervation and intensification of life” as the real principle of all values, and indeed as the fundamental activity of all the real. ¢) M. Heidegger’s notion of the history of (European) philosophy links up with Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism, but takes a critical attitude to his programme of the “reversal of values”. Heidegger too sees the history of philosophy as the history of metaphysics, which i1s now drawing to 2 close. But it is not in the dissolution of metaphysics, the emptying out of the supreme values, that he sees the first signs of nihilism. Metaphysics itself is “‘nihilistic”,

not because it dentes life in the name of ideas,

but because of its “oblivion of being”. Metaphysics sought the transcendental condi-

tion of possibility of beings in a supreme being: the ideas, God, values, etc. In doing so

it constantly forgot the “ontological difference” by which being itself is distinguished

from all beings. But this oblivien of being was not an avoidable error on the part of thinkers. It is essentially due to the fact that

being

‘“‘sends”

(“equips”)

and

‘‘uses”

{“needs’”) men in different historical ways to “disclose’ beings as such. In this disclosure

of beings being itseif remains undisclosed. In modern technology and scitence, where beings are disclosed and presented as “ob-

jects”’, and man understands himself as a “subject” in relation to these objects, this oblivion

which,

of being

however,

elimination.

4.

At

the

arrains

prepares

its clearest

the

way

form,

for

its

can be shown to omit many instances to the

contrary, and every present-day interpreta-

tion is alive to the fact that its way of understanding earlier philosophy is different from the way the latter understood itself. Further, every effort to give an overall picture finds itself opposed by the higher value now placed on non-European interpretations of reality. These are now designated by the Greek term “philosophy™, in 2 broad sense of the word perhaps, but still must be included in a presentation of the history of philosophy. Hitherto it had still been possible to regard the history of European philosophy 25 a more or less continuous tradition, which could therefore be examined

for certain dominant trends. The possibility ceases when the independent traditions of Indian or Far Eastern “philosophy™ have to

be taken into account. Hence the effort to present a consistent “history of philosophy”™ and a2 theory to explain it is giving way to the effort to make

the “historicity of philosophy™ intelligible.

But this makes it impossible to treat relativism and scepticism as a necessary but

provisional stage in a logical development of philosophy,

Kant. A theory of the historicity of philos-

ophy is faced once more with the question of

how a historical self-understanding of philos-

ophy can be preserved, without the effort to

establish necessary truths being abandoned. See also Philasophy |, History 1. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

time,

most

students

of the history of philosophy have fundamental misgivings about deducing the overall movement of the history of philosophy from

sets of principles. This is partly due to the growth in material knowledge of European philosophy, and partly to a more refined approach to history. Every systematic survey

See

bibliography

on

_Aris-

toteltanism, and the histories of philosophy, e.g., F.Ueberweg, Grundriss der Geschichie der Philosophie,

1 (12th ed., by K. Praechtet,

1926), I (11th ed,,

by B. Geyer, 1928), IIl {(12th ed., by M. Frischeisen-Kohler and W.

Moog,

1924), TV (12th ed.,

by T. Oesterreich, 1923}, V (12th ed., by T. Oesterreich

1928), reprinted

1n 3 vols.

(1956-57);

]. E.

Frdmann, Geschichie der Philosophie, 2 vols. (4th ed., 1896); F. Caopleston, Hisior1 «f Philosophy, &8 wvols. (1946-66); A. Rivaud, //listire de la philesophie, 5 vols. (1960-07); also: Aurelius Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, ed. by E. Hoffimann, in CYEL,

present

as has been the tendency since

XL,

2 parts (1899-1900);

G.

B. Vico,

Principii di wna sctenga nwova d'intorno alla natura commune defle nagions (1725), BE. T.: The New Science

by T. Bergin and M. Fisch, from 3rd enlarged ed. (1048); id., De Norirs Temporis Studeoram Ratione, E. T.: On the $tudy Methods of our Time, by E. Gilan--

turco (1963); G. l.essing, Die Menschengeschiechts (1780}, L. Kant,

Ergiehung des Werks, ed. by

W. Weischedel, 1II (On the progress of metaphysics in Germany) (1959): G. W. I'. Hegel,

T.eciures on the Flistory of Philosephy, tr. and ed. by

19

PHILGSOPHY AND THEOLOGY E. Haldane, 3 vols, (1892} 3rd impression, 1963);

id., Reason iu Flistory, E. T. by R. Hartroann (1953); A. Comte, Conrs de la philosophie positive, 6 vols. (1830-42); F. Nietzsche, The Us and Abwse of

History, B. T, by A. Cellins (1957); M. Heidegger,

Essays in Metaphysics: Identity and Differsnce (1960); id., Nietzsche, 2 yols. (1961); H. Liibbe, *Philosophiegeschichtc als Philosophie”, Ejnsicbien (Fessshrift G. Kruger) (1962), pp. 204-29; H.-G. Gadamer,

Wabrbeit snd Methode (20d ed., 1963);

K. Marx and F. Engels, German Ideology, ed. by

L. Goldmann (1969).

Richard Schasffler

P

_

sense to.

philosophy as an independent activity of man

(cf. D 1799 etc.)? The solution given by

Vatican I, that the truth in both cases comes

ultimately from the same God and hence

cannot be contradictory, is not enough when

taken by itself. For then it is postulated that

the same results will be arrived at, but philosophy and theology are not shown to be reconciled in their claims to be sciences and

methods, each universal in its own field. It is

AND

PHILOSOPHY

THEOLOGY

A. INTRODUCTORY

[t is hard today to define philosophy. Any

answer to what philosophy is proves to be

itself one of the many philosophies which now exist. Naturally —— because philosophy differs from “regional” thinking by including its own nature in its thought and hence neither can nor will exclude anything from its questioning « prieri. (Hence it can on principle take in a self-understanding of man

based on revelation, since philosophy finds

it at least a datum of history.) Then again, in

spite of its claim to absolute “universality”

in its object and methods, the historicity of

man and the endless multiplicity of his (sources of) experience suggest strongly that

there will be

more

than one philosophy

(quite apart from disagreement among philos-

ophers). And this pluralism is again a matter of conscious reflection, prior as such to the

not clear whether one can be both a philosopher and a theologian or whether a choice has to be made. This is still true when one

affirms that faith has a “healing” function, not only in the realm of moral action but also in the realm of natural knowledge, to counter its de facto exrors, and that the Church has the right to claitn that its magisterium is at least a negative norm for the Christian philosopher and his philosophy (D 1619, 1642—5, 1674, 1710-14, 1786, 1798f., 1815, 2085, 2146, 2305, 2325) — which would still leave room for a positive assessment of philosophy (Vatican I, Gaadium et Spes, arts, 44, 57, 62; Optatam Totius, arts. 14, 15).

In answering this question, one should not be tempted to try to set a higher value on the independence of theology by stressing the discredit which now attaches to philosophy — “the end of metaphysics”. At the very least, one would merely transfer the problem

to the realm of science, inasmuch as it claims

question of the truth of any particular phiiosophy. There are so many different themes,

to be the heir to classical philosophy. The other problems which have to be discussed will be immediately clear.

to other sciences, and to philosophical tradi-

B.

starting-points, terminologies, relationships

tion that no individuzl or small (efficient) teatmn can take in the whole of philosophy,

though they know that other philosophies

exist besides their own. The question arises

at once as to how theology is to deal with

this — at least de facto — pluralism. Another question at oace involved is how philosophy

and theology can co-exist, since both claim

to be basic sciences, that is, to throw light scientifically, methodically and consciously on existence as such and as 2 whole and hence to

be

universal.

How

can

this

be,

when

faith — and hence theology — judges all things and is itself judged by no man (cf. 1 Cor 2:15), while the same faith in its Catholic understanding rejects fideism and traditionalism and so recognizes a natural 20

Tue

FuNDAMENTAL.

TWEEN

We

PHILOSOPHY

RELATIONSHIP

AND

BE-

THEOLOGY

prescind for the moment

from

the at

least d¢ facto pluralism of philosophies today,

among which even the Church can no longer

simply choose one particular philosophy as the only true one (in spite of what will be said under D below

on “Christian philos-

ophy”). We also prescind from the fact that philosophy cannot today be the only means by which the theological relevance of the “world” can be made clear to theology. The

basic question is the possibility of the coexistence of two fundamental sciences in the Christian.

1. In approaching the question, it should first be noted that Catholic theology makes

PHILOSOPHY AND THECLOGY

an essential distinction between nature and grace, and hence between natural knowledge of God and revelation. Hence by its very

essence, It not merely tolerates philosophy

but actually calls for it. Revelation and faith are not built up on the absolute incapacity of man (the sinner), and the failure of his thought. Then, it is a matter of history that theology has always used philosophical instraments in its thinking, and against modernism and all religions of feeling Catholic theology maintains that this historical process was justified. Revelation and grace are addressed from the outset to the whole man,

and hence to the thinking man,

this claim to human ary clement in the believing Christian by the conviction

and

cthought is not a subsidinature of religion. The is as such always inspired that spirit, nature and

history are the creation, revelation and pos-

. session of God, who as the one truth is the

source of all reality and truth and who has also given revelation by his words in history,

to perfect and surpass the creation which is his own. There are things which lie outside the realm of reality in the world demarcated

by

historical

revelauon,

the

Church

and

theology. But the Christian does not see them as outside the realm of his God. Hence he may not and need not set an absolute value

on theology, to the detriment of philosophy.

If he did, he would be confusing his theology

with his God. But the Christian in particular recognizes that there is a pluralism in the world, the unity of which is mastered positively and adequately by no one (apart from God), not even the Church and its theology. This is not, of course, to suggest that there could be a “double truth” in the sense of

behaves as if the religious question no longer existed either does not know what we mean by God or is a transparent technique of flight from God — and a pose.) 2. This second point, however, is decisive. Insofar as philosophy tries to be systematic transcendental reflection (and if it does not, it now falls under the heading of a nonphilosophical discipline), it cannot by its very nature claim to be a concrete, salutary and adequate interpretation of existence. Hence it is impossible for it to claim to

replace the concrete and historical reality of

religion — and so its theology. Philosophy might try to be more than such transcendental reflection (*‘mediation”), and attempt the concrete introduction into real

existence, which can never be exhaustively analysed but still remains as such imperative and 1nexorable. This would be an effort to

generate an actual religion, and philosophy

would then be the manifold unity of theology and philosophy. It would be both o priors

self-understanding and revelation, under the

guise of philosophy — or it would be a false theology, because mostly secularized. It

would then be a question of terminology and

of the correct analysis of the one comprehensive attempt to master existence. The analysis would show that this existence was something

which could never be adequately mastered

by reflection — the unity of the 2 priori of the spirit and of history, of reason and revelation,

of theology and philosophy.

But if, in keeping with its whole tradition,

philosophy

regards itself as transcendental

reflection, it can never materially embrace the whole

concrete

nature

of

existence,

even

other while still remaining true.

though the concrete is known to be a ground of existence and not regarded as an indifferent

the intellectual grasp of human existence as it

concrete

assertions which simply contradict one an-

On the other hand, if philosophy is to be

actualily is and in its whole breadth and depth

— and even purely transcendental inmitiatives in philosophy

have to have

regard

to the

history of the spirit — philosophy cannot overlook the phenomenon of religion. Even

where atheism is extolled as the true interpretation of existence and hence as ““religion™, religion remains everywhere and at all times

part of the fundamental structures of human life. A philosophy which did not in some way include “philosophy of religion” and “natural theology” would be a poor kind of thing,

since it would subject-matter.

not be looking at its own (A tranquil atheism which

residue. Historicity is less than real history,

love

is

more

than

subjectivity

formally analysed (“one can and ought to love”), experienced dread is more than the concept of this basic condition in which man finds himself. But such assertions are self-

determinations of philosophy. They are therefore among the fundamentals of philosophy, inasumuch as it is the “first” (basic)

science, to which

as such no other science

except

reality

can be prior (as ground) — nothing in fact the

actual

which

is greater

than it. But then philosophy, as the doctrine

of the transcendence of the spirit, points on

to God as the absolute mystery “in person’.

As anthropology and philosophy of religion, 21

PHILOSOPHY AND THEOLOGY

L

it makes man a possible “hearer of the word™

of this lving God (pethaps already under the influence of the supernatural existenual) And as pure reflection and never-ending mediation it sends man — who finds himself historically and not merely reflectively — to

history itself for his real existence. Hence

ph.llusr::phy, by nature, is not -the type of basic science which would claim to be the

sole illumination and master of the concrete

existence of man. If it rightly understands

itself and its own freedom (freed by the secret grace of God), it is the first conscious light on existence which gives man courage to take history and the concrete seriously. But then it opens up for man the possibility of finding God in concrete history, where God has communicated himself to man in the incarnation.

3. Revelation in the concrete, and hence

the Church and its magisterium,

make the

claim — necessarily, by their nature — to represent the whole of reality (as supreme

principle and salvation of all things).

By

virtue of the unity of his existence, therefore,

the Christian qua believer, living this unity and hierarchical gradation in faith, cannot

treat the doctrine of the Church as simply indifferent and irrelevant to him qua philos-

opher. For his philosophy as such this doc-

trine is not a source of truths, but it is at least

a norma negativa (cf., for instance, I 1675,

1703f., 1711, 1714, 1810). In view of the permanent distinction between philosophy

and theology demanded by theology itself, this does not mean that there must always be

a positive synthesis (comprehensible in terms of the historicity of man) which man must be able to grasp as he gives himself to philosophy and theology. He may and must leave the ultimate unity of his philosophical and theological destiny to the one God of philosophy and theology, who is always greater than

either or both.

C. ParLosorny

ot

itions and mental

horizons

mvjl?f a g:@m;T historically: gmated selfi.unde:mtandmg of man which 18 due in part

to philasophy oris the material of philosophy

in a spontaneous, pre-scientific state. This: self understanding may be termed rightly a

pre-scientifi¢ philosophy. Leaving this aside, we must at any rate. note that theology — in contrast to fevelation and preaching — is a reflection on revelation and Church preaching. The theologian, questioning and critical in both directions,

confronts

revelation

with

his

whole understanding of existence, on which he has also reflected philosophically to some extent. This confrontation,

in the concrete

situation, is to help him really to assimilate revelation, to interpret it as it affects him,

to eliminate misunderstandings by an effort

of criticism — and vice versa, to allow his

own pre-existent mental horizons to be called

in question by revelation. This means that in

theology one necessarily ‘“‘philosophizes™. Such “philosophical” self-understanding

(implicit or explicit) which the theologian brings with him is (at least) one of the forces

which divide theology from revelation and set it in motion. This philosophical start of theology is possible because revelation is a call to and a claim on the whole existence of man and is therefore open at once to the selfunderstanding of man. And revelation itself also contains some such self-understanding,

philosophical, pre-philosophical or originally philosophical but having relapsed into the apparent obviousness of ordinary life and common sense. Those who think that they must not “philosophize” when doing theology merely fall victim to a dominant philosophy which is unconsciously accepted or confine themselves to edifying discourse which does not discharge the theologian’s task. To do philosophy in theology does not mean that a closed philosophical “system” is presupposed as permanently valid and

directly applicable. Philosophy may in fact

IN THEOLOGY

We prescind here from what is no doubt the more important problem, philosophy in the

original revelation. Its first utterances and the traditions by which they were handed on

be somewhat *eclectic” in reflecting the unsystematic pluralism of the history of human experience and thought, and it must be ready to undergo changes in its theological use.

were In human concepts and propositions, within mental frames of reference, which

D.

word of) revelation, though they were no

If such a thing exists at all, it must remain

existed prior to and independently

of (the

doubt also modified by that revelation. These 22

THE OPHY’

ProerLEM

oF

“CHRISTIAN

PHILOS-

philosophy in principies and method, and aim

PHILOSOPHY

AND THEOLOGY

at being nothing else. Otherwise it would not be philosophy as a fundamental science. Philosophy can be the “ancilla” of theology, that is, a mere element in a higher totality to-

the world. Here too philesophy is now ac-

afraid of open-ended dialogue, not steered in

do not allow philosophy to prescribe to them

wards which it points of its own nature, only if it remains free. Theology too must not be a certain direction from the outset by man himself and the Church. Theology must also

be prepared to listen to things that it does not

know g priori.

The philosopher can be “Christian” inasmuch as he accepts his Christian faith as a negative norm. This is not contrary to philosophical principles, as has been shown under B above. A philosophy can be called Christian inasmuch as it received impulses from Christianity to do its own work. Without such impulses it would not have been what it is in

fact. A philosophy will also be Christian when the philosopher who is a Christian strives for the greatest possible convergence between

his philosophy and his faith, and so with his theology, without overlooking the essential difference and disproportion between the two realms, and hence the asvmptotic nature

of his effort. Such effort prevents his assuming

a harmony

between

philosophy

and

faith

with no threat of tension, and also forbids

companied

by

the

modern

sciences

(of

history, nature and society). And these do not

consider themselves branches of a single philosophy, though they undoubtedly recognize philosophy as their origin. But they their self-understanding, their nature and their methods. They are rather inclined to regard philosophy as superfluous for contact with existence, or as an after-thought which analyses formally the methods of the autonomous sciences. Whether this self-understanding of the modern non-philosophical sciences is fully justified or not is another question. But the fact 15 there, and theology has to take it into account. The sciences are

also partners in a dialogue which has effects on both sides. Theology has then to consider the various methods and results of these

sciences, and as well as this, the basic mentality of modern science and its titillating situa-

tion with regard to knowledge (an irreducible pluralism of sciences). try to help the scientist dignity in face of this cence (which can at schizophrenia).

Theology must also to maintain his human situation of concupistimes be a spiritual

F. PuiLosoraicAar TEACHING

IN THE CHURCH

him to take refuge in 2 “double truth™, A philosophy can also be Christian when it

In spite of the pluralism of philosophies today, which will never be thoroughly

Christianity as a de facto phenomenon in the

pluralism in theology, certain points must be maintained. The ene Church with the one

uses philosophical methods — with the help of the history of religion — to analyse

philosophy and phenomenology of religion. This is legitimate, since philosophy is essentially a fundamental science. But in practice, the distinction between such philosophy and a theology working philosophically will be Auid.

E.

PurLosopHy, SCIENCE

THEOLOGY

AND

MODERN

The de facto relationship between philosophy and theology has been changed by the extensive pluralism of present-day philasophies, which in this age of historicism, of the “one world” and the greater range of communtcation media is perceived at once as existing

and irremediable. But the relationship has also been changed by the fact that philosophy is no longer the unique and not even in fact the primary mediation of the “world” for theology, whose work is done in contact with

synthetized, and which also evokes a parallel

confession and the one magisterium for all its members cannot but havea theology which is to some extent identical throughout. The Church needs it for the interpretation and

preservation

of the one confession

of faith,

terminology

beyond what is demanded by

and it can even imply a certain regulation of the nature of the matter in question. Such a standard theology, homogeneous to some extent, in terminology and so on, at the disposal of the magisterium, implies also a certain teaching philosophy, standardized in

methods,

in concepts,

presupposed

as ac-

cepted and current etc. — in spite of remaining in the stream of historical development. It may of course be asked whether such a

Church philosophy is still philosophy in the strict sense, or is really nothing more than a language and mental hotizon which may indeed have been taken over from philosophy

but now represents only the general mentality 23

'PIETISM

4.

of an epoch

in its unreflecting and

non-

systematic state, ' | | But this stock of standard philosophy does exist. It is necessary in a theology which is

demanded by the onen¢ss of the confession of faith. It must still be respected and cherished, though this ecclésiastical teaching philosophy cannot close its mind to outside factors or claim to call itself the philosophia

peresmis in the manner of the neo-scholasticism of the last century (cf. Vatican I,

Optatam Totiss, art. 15).

E. Brunner,

Revelation and

Rearon (1946); M. Blondel, Exigences phitosophigues du christianisme (1950); J. Moller, Existentialphilosaphic wnd katholische Theologie (1952); J. Trethowan, An Erray in Christian Philosophy (1954); A. Flew and A. Maclntyre, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (1955); L. Foucher, La philoropbie catheligue (1955); A. Marc, Raison philosophique et religion révélée (1955); G. S6hngen, Philosophische Eindibung in dis Theologie (1955); E. Reisner, “Die Frage der Philosophie und die Antwort der Theologie”, Zeitschrift fir Theologie und Kirche 53 (1956), pp. 230-51; P. Tillich, Biblical Religion and the Search Jor Ultimate Reality (1955); H. Bouillard, “Théologie et philosophie d’aprés Karl Barth et Rudolf Bultmann”, Archives de Philosophie (1957), pp. 163 f.; H. Duméry, Philosophse de la religion (1957); B. Lohse, “Ratio und Fides”, Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte 8 (1957) (on Luther); W.

Schulz, Der Go#t der nenseitlichen Metaphysik

(1957);

P.

Delhaye,

La

philosophic

chritienne

au

- Moyen Age (1959); G. Siewerth, Das Schicksal der

Metaphysik von Thomas gu Heidegger (1959); L. Bogliolo, /f problema della filosofia cristiana (1959); M. Nédoncelle, Ir there a Christian Philosophy?

(1960); J. B. Metz, “Theologische und metaphysische Ordnung”, ZKT 83 (1961), pp. 1-14;

M. Blondel and L. Laberthonnitre, Correspondance pbilosopbigue (1961}; G. Ebeling, “Theologie und Philosophie”, RGG, VI, cols. 782-830; H. Goubhier, Bergson et le Christ des évangiles (1962);

E. Gilson, Philssopby and Theolagy (1962); C. Tres-

montant,

Les

idées maitresses

chritienne (1962);

G.

Noller,

de la métaphysigue

Sein und Existenzy

(1962); L.-B. Geiger, Philosaphic et spiritualité (1963); B. Rioux and others, “Saint Thomas d’Aquin aujourd’hui”, Recherches de Philosophie 6 (1963); R. Bultmann,

Glanben und Versteben, IV

(1965), pp. 104 . (on “philosophical theology™); K. Rahner, Schriften zur Theologie, V1 (1965), pp.

91-103; H. Goliwitzer and W, Weischedel, Denken

und Glauben;

M.

Curtain,

“The

Integration

of

Philosophy and Theology™, Irish Theological Quar-

terly 33 (1966), pp. 457 66; C. ]. Curtis, “The Task

of Philosophical

Theology”,

Chureh

Lnarterly

Review 167 (1966); 1. A. Martin, The New Dialogue

Between Philosophy und Theology (1966); 1. Mnitma;m, “Theologie in der Welt der modernen Wissen-

24

-

.

pp. . Dvengelisehs Thoolsgje filos26 (1968), fico & fimlfl- |

",

621-38; . Murio; "Plaralismo

g

gico gell'ambito di nd flosofin

Pesch, °

hermencutische Ort der Theologie bei Thomas von Aquin und Martin Luther und dic Frage nach dem Verhiltnis von Philfis‘l?hie und Theologie™,

Theologische Puartaischrift 146 (1966), pp. 159—212;

G. Picht, Dar Gott der Philosophen wnd die Wissenichaft der Newzeit (1966); D, ]. Shine, An Interior Metaphysics: The Philosophical Synthesis of P. Schessr

(1966); B. Welte, Heilsverstindnis (1966); K. Rah-

ner, Schriften gur Theologie, VIXI (1966); H. Urs von Balthasar, The God Duestion and Modern Man (1967);

See also Philoiophy, Faith IV, Fundamental Theolegy, Transcendenial Philosophy. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

schaften”,

1-

K. Jaspers, Philosopbiral Faith and Revelation (1967);

O. Muck, The Transcendental Method in Philésophy

(1968).

Karl Rabner

PIETISM Pietism is a comprehensive term for a widespread and manifold movement within Protestantism in the early 17th century. The first half of the 18th century was its heyday but it made itself felt in 19th-century tevivalism

and

1s still a force even

today

(e.g., among the Moravian Brethren and some types of Methodism). Pietism does not look onthe Reformation asa mere occurrence in the past that is now embodied in an institution, but as an event that the Church must

constantly acrualize if Christ’s kingdom is to be a living reality. The substance of all pietism

is a longing

for praxis pietatis, the

“exercise of godliness”. For pietism, the real purpose of redemption is to bring the

teligtous

subjectivity

of man

into

lively,

spontaneous play, and such is also the main

interest in theology. There is no difficulty in

the old-established Protestant denominations about stressing a subjective approach, but radical pietism has the effect of loosening Church bonds.

Calvinist pietism derives from 17th-century

English Puritanism. John Bunyan (d. 1688),

author of The Pilgrim’s Progress, held that salvation

is

communicated

in

a

“break-

through” which one feels happening at a particular moment. Preachers driven from England brought this Puritan idea to Holland, where it soon spread. ]J. Labadie led the first group of pietists who formed a separate Church (1669). Calvinist pietism was sustained through the efforts of Gerhard Tersteegen-(d. 1769), composer of many hymns, Samuel Kollenbusch (d. 1803), G. D. Krummacher(d. 1837), and H. F. Kohl-

briagge (d. 1875).

-PIETISM

P. J. Spener’s Pia Desideria (1675) marks the first appearance of German Lutheran pietism. He set down the classic programme of pietism in his six proposals for reform. The codisgia pietatis which he founded soon proved

to foster separatism, and therefore met with much opposition from the authorities of the otficial Church. Spener’s work was continued in the pietism of Halle, notably by Spener’s

disciple August Hermann Francke. Being a

professor of theology (1691) and the founder of an orphanage with 2 college attached to it {1695),

Francke

was

able to exert

a very

prevasive influence on the religious, intellectual and social life of his time. His orphanage contributed towards shaping the spirit of Prussia and the minds of many philosophers of early German Idealism. It soon became a centre for foreign and Jewish missions, for the

distribution

of the

care of the Protestant

Bible,

diaspora

and

for the

in South-

Eastern Europe and North America. Francke gave pietism an educational theory of its

own; guided by the experience of his own

conversion, he educated children in view of

leading them to conversion. Count

Nikolaus

T.udwig

of Zinzendorf,

Pietism in general must be seen as part of

the great process whereby modern man has been discovering his own autonomous subjectivity, Pietism is a grandiose attempt to refer this process back to the sources of Christian life. Emancipated from tradition, autonomous man is to decide the shape of his own religious life by confronting the Bible and contemplating the situation of the primitive Christian community. No doubt the understanding of faith largely in terms of religious life, as it can be actually led and experienced, released considerable moral and religious energies and ensured that pietism would make its mark on the history of the spirit. Protestantism is indebted to pietism

tor more than stimulation of missionary activity, of religious instruction and education, and thus of personal piety. Having to

conduct controversy with the impatient and lively pietist mind gave official theology a

flexibility in its understanding of religion that enabled it more than anything else to enter upon constructive discussion with the post-Christian 1ntellectual life of modern times. In particular, by reviving appreciation

ot Scripture, pietism helped to pave the way

who had been a member of the Halle group, created an independent pietist body by tounding the settlement of Moravian Brethren at Herrnhut. They adopted an imaginative form of religious life, blending preReformation traditions with the spirit of Luther (their own calendar of feasts, congregations divided into choirs, etc.). The zealous life led at Herrnhur left 2 mark on Protestant piety that has endured to the

faith is an open-ended discussion with history. All forms of pietism are prone to look on religious subjectivity as the actual source of religious life, so that doctrine

powerfully

life. Looking for verifiable conversion in the

preseat day (the “warchwords of the Brethren””). Pietism in Warttemberg

affected the existing Church there. In J. A. Bengel and F. C. Oetinger 1t was combined with mystical speculation (from Jakob Béh-

me, E. Swedenborg) to produce a devotion based on literal interpretation ot the Bible. Lt

greatly

influenced

19th-century

German

Protestant

Idealism

theology

().

Beck, d. 1878; Adolf Schiatter, d. 1938). Compared

and

T.

with these schools of thought,

radical pietism had only a transitory influence, owing to its anti-ecclesiastical enthusiasm. Still it can boast a number of important

personalities,

above

all

Gottfried

Arnold

(d. 1714). His Impartial History of Churches

and Heresier {1699)

is the first large-scale

attempt to present the history of the Church since NT times as the progressive decay of

Christian life.

for modern

biblical

science.

Thus

it ulti-

mately helped to hberalize the rigid outlook

of the various denominations. Stressing, however, subjective independence at the expense of tradition, pietism was

always in danger of forgetting that the life of

becomes a purely pragmatic function of that

Christian, regarding the converted person as an ecclesiola in ecclesia, imperils the concept of grace, makes the Christian fellowship an

arbitrary association of religious individuals, and at worst leads to separatism. The heir of pietism and the champion of modern Prot-

estantism,

has

Schleiermacher,

drawn

the

logical conclusion as instructively as could be wished: religious experience becomes the

criterion according tn which one selects such

points of tradition as one cares to consider still valid. The ambivalence of pictism shows the task which the preaching of the faith will

have in coping with modern subjectivity., See

also

C hurches.

Protestantism

1,

N,

Methodist 25

PILGRIMAGE

BIBLIOGRAPHY. A. Ritschl, Die Geschichsr des

Rome. In the time of Christ, pilgfimages€8 to10

X, pp. 6-9; H. Leube, V, cols. 370f; 1. Hirsch,

B. Kétting traces this to-2 general decline in

Pigtismus, 3 vols.

“Pictism”, HERE, “Pietismus”, RGG,

Watechouse,

E.

(1880-86);

der neueren evangelischen Theologis, 11 {1951), Geschichte

pp. 91£.; . Weinlick, Couns Zingendorf (1956); C. Towlson, Moravian and Methodist (1957); E. Langton, History of the Moravian Church (1957).

Wenzgel Lobff

1. Definition. The idea of pilgrimage has three agpects. 2) Under cettain circumstances God responds to prayer in a special way. b) This

special activity of God

or a divinity

1s

particulatly manifest in certain places which on that account become centres of pilgrimage. ¢) In order to benefit by this special responsiveness of God, of the divinity or of certain heroes and holy persons, one must make a pilgrimage to this place of favour of deliverance, undertake 4 journey which forms a unity with the visit to or stay in the

sacred place. K. Nitzschke accordingly gives the following definition: Pilgrimage is a “journey to (and from) a holy place, of sucha kind that the visit to the shrine in conjunction with the journey forms one cultic action™,

The saving power of God or of the divinity, in Christianity

as espe-

is regarded

cially operative through the intercession of certain saints, especially of the Blessed Virgin Mary, takes effect as tangible help in sickness and distress. Or it may be that

people want blessing and assurance in important decisions, and pray for this at a

of pilgrimage.

place

Sometimes

man

is

tormented by the uncertainty of his lot after death and is impelled to seek out particular holy places in order to gain certainty about his after-life. Or he may undertake a pilgrim-

age in gratitude for benefits already received or in ordet to preserve divine goodwill by regular visits to the holy places (B. Kotting, p. 12). 2.

Non-Christian

pilgrimages.

a)

Graeco-

Roman antiguity. The chief places of pilgrimage were indubitably those of the gods of healing, for belief in miracles largely concerned miraculous cures. Healings were not

expected from all the gods but only from

certain

divinities,

the

best

known

being

Asclepius with his sanctuaries in Cos, Epi-

daurus,

26

Pergamon,

health, The intense interestinoracles suggests a wide drop in vitality and psychic energy,

with the majority affected by neurasthenia

and psychosomatic illnesses. The seeking of

divine oracles for the merest trifles indicates a

general passivity (ibid., pp. 4301.). At leastat this stage, therefore, pilgrimages were 4 sign

of religious weakness and dispiritedness, and

PILGRIMAGE

which

shrines of Asclepius were very populir.

Tricca,

Athens

and

were thus distinguished from the Christian pilgrimages which soon started and which, at

beginning,

least at the

a sign

were

of

religious energy. As a result the early Christians very soon drew theé contrast between Asclepius and their true Asclepius,

Christ, the Saviour. Apologists led the way,

Justin in particular: “If we say that (Christ) healed the lame and the halt and people ill since birth, and raised the dead to life, that

may be considered similar and equal to what are related as the deeds of Asclepius” { Apology, 1, 22, 6). Those afraid of the future

consulted the god

Apollo at the ancient

Greek oracles of Dodona and Delphi, or visited the sibyls, augurs, soothsayersand representatives of Roman divipation or supposed prophecy in their special centres. Others journeyed to obtain earthly blessings and hopes for a better lot after death (Eleusis), or went as pilgrims to Ephesus to

Artemis “from whom visited places

relics and honoured.

where

statues

all good comes” or

the

graves

of “‘divine

of heroes,

men”

were

b) Jewish centres of pilgrimage. There were

certain sanctuaries of Yahweh (Siloh, Bethel,

Gilgal, Beersheba) which were opposed by

prophets because of inadmissible practices

(cf. Amos 5:5), certain places of healing (in Jerusalem, the pool by the Sheep Gate

[the efficacy of the water connected with an

angel],

the

pool

of

Siloam

[]n 5:7],

springs near Tiberias) and tombs of holy

people.

But

the temple

of Jerusalem

was

pre-eminent. In the eyes of the Jews, who had to go on pilgrimage to it from the age of 12 onwards,

it was

the

centre

of the

whole

world, to which in the last days the Gentiles too would go on pilgrimage (Is 2:24.). At

the same time this piigrimage was a profession of faith in the one God and had great

social importance {cf. Kétting, p. 62). c) Other pilgrimages. We may also note the pre-lslamic, Arabian centres with pilgrimages

to the gods and cult of burial-places, the

PIL.GRIMAGE sanctuaries of Hinduism (seven holy cities) and of Buddhism (places of the birth, illumination, preaching and passing over of

the Buddha).

3. Pilgrimages in Christianity. At first pilgrimages did not enter into the perspective of Christians. They at first avoided this form

of devotion because it had flourished among the

pagans.

Moreover,

unlike

the

Jews’,

Christian worship was not centralized. Their imminent expectation of the parousia made the idea of pilgrimage to the places of our Lord’s earthly life seem superfluous. Finally, there is no sign at the beginning of veneration have

would

which

martyrs,

of saints and

prompted pilgrimages to their graves. Very

soon, however, the extreme reserve in regard

to paganism

diminished,

and

the

its forms

of expression

was

coming

Lord’s

not

scen, and veneration of martyrs and saints,

and liturgical forms developed. Legal recognition of Christianity also represented an important condition for the development of pilgrimages, which now could be public. Very soon the various goals and motives of pilgrimage were defined. B. Koétting

has listed eight for eacly Christianity: burialplaces and memorials as places of pilpersons;

living

to

pilgrimages

grimage;

pilgrimage as an ascetical mode of life; the

pilgrimage site {grave of martyr) as Chris-

tian burial place; pilgrimages of intercession (healing, help and advice as pilgrims’ inten-

tions), pilgrimages of devotion, pilgrimages of penance, pilgrimages to relics.

Particularly

among

important

these was

the pilgrimage to the holy places in Palestine

(Helena, mother of Constantine, after 324; Itinerarium Burdigalense, 333; Peregrinatio ad

foca sancta of the pilgrim Aetheria, about 400).

This also explains the coasiderable influence of Jerusalem on liturgical practices and rites in other countries {procession of palms, veneration of the Cross on Good Friday),

and also the fact that Rome had 2 “ Jerusalem” of

its

own,

“Bethlehem”,

very

important

Santa

Croce,

and

Santa Maria Maggiore. were

pilgrimages

own

its

to

Also

the

graves of the saints, above all to the tombs of

the Apostles Peter and Paul, Sergius in the Syrian desert, Thecla at Seleucia, Menas in

Palestine more closely connected with her life (D. Baldi, “I santuari mariani in Terra Santa”, Studi biblici franciscani 3 [1952-3),

pp-

219-69).

It is certain that numerous

Marian pilgrimage churches were built in Constantinople (icons of Mary and articles of clothing : the Church at Blachernae; Chalcoprateia, ¢. 450}, In the Middle Ages the penitential system played a very important role in promoting pilgrimages to Jerusalem, Rome and Compostela. These long pilgrimages, it has been noted, also served to remove the penitent from his usual surroundings for some time, which was important where he had committed a crime of violence. He was out of the reach of the primitive law of the blood-feud (cf. V. and H. Hell, p. 14). There were also

the pilgrimages to famous pictures of Christ (Holy Face at Lucca), relics (shrines at Aachen, Cologne, Trier), to places where “bleeding hosts” were kept {(Seefeld near Innsbruck, Heiligenblut) and to Marian shrines and those of other saints (Matthias in Trier, Francis and Anthony in Assisi, Padua and Alverna}. From the Counter-Reformation down to the present day the centres of Marian

pilgrimage

have

predominated,

and

this

meant, at least tn Germany, that the medieval

long-distance pilgrimages gave way in the Baroque period to local pilgrimages (A, Veit

and L. Lenhart, Kirche und Volksfrimmigkeit im Zeitalter des Barock [1956], p. 178). Austria in particular became well-known for its Marian pilgrimages (Mariazell). Among the most important pilgrimage

centres at the present time are: Lough Derg, Guadalupe,

Einsiedeln,

Kevelaer,

Czesto-

chowa, La Salette, L.ourdes and Fatima.

In connection with present-day pilgrimages, Popes and bishops have pointed out the deeper meaning of pilgrimage: “The

pilgrim’s journey is long, and begins with a

parting. He leaves his home, his everyday

life, and forgets all his unimportant, trivial

cares . . . 2nd then sets off courageously . . . and so prayer makes its way to God more easily. The company of other pilgrims

increases the ardour of the soul and gives rise to prayer in common, singing, exchange of thoughts and feelings. It culminates 1n

hear nothing of Marian pilgrimages in the

restrained exuitation when at the altar Christ offered in sacrifice comes with his body to strengthen the Christian on the way to God.

have developed soon after in the places m

of

the Maraeotic desert, Demetrius in Thessa-

lonica, Felix at Nola and Martinat Tours. We first

four

centuries;

they

must,

however,

The pilgrimage reawakens in you the spirit penance,

the

sense

of

Providence

and

27

PLATONISM

"

)

_

trast in ‘God. It instructs you afresh about the meaning of life: to turn away from the present, from everyday joys and sorrows,

~and to turn towards the goal whose radiance | shmes on you” (Pius XII 1952).

4. Theolagical assessment of pilgrimeagss today. Some are inclined to assign pilgrimages to

the peripheral zone of piety (B. Kotring in

LTK, X, cols. 945-6). A pointer in the same

direction is the absence of any reference to

pilgrimages in the new German catechism.

- Nevertheless it seers that this practice which is found in nearly all religions should maintain its central place even in Christianity at the present day. Stronger emphasis should of course be laid on aspects that have been largely lost sight of, which is why this form of religious expression has come to seem peripheral.

A new impulse to pilgrimage might be given by the idea of the pilgrim Church, in

the midst

of distress, imperfection,

tainty and perplexity,

uncer-

wanderng

yet not

aimlessly, but as a community whose aim is

petfect salvation and redemption in Christ.

That goal, however, is still distant, for the

Churchasa wholeand for each of its members. The remoteness of the still unattained goal leaves the Church without

rest, and

some-

times even weakens the hope of what is securely promised, and the faith that the promise has already been attained by the saints in the vision of God. If the Church’s great journey is given symbolic expres-

sion In a pilgrimage, the Church’s wayfaring is experienced on a smail scale as a

living

process,

and

not

merely

as

a sad

luum::yflnwlnmhthe?

mma&

eagaged. Obscutely pemeiwwg thiut perteet redemption is already at work within them, they can rejoice that the goal which in anticipation is already visibly ‘reached in the pilgrimage, is their own oal, though still to be attained, namely to bae wholly in and with Chtist.

See also Sacred Times and Places, BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Gretser,

religiosis peregrinationibus (1606);

De

saerir

P. Geyer, ed.,

Itinera FHlierosolymitana Sascwli fifi—vifii (CSEL, XXXIX, 1898); The Library of #the Palestine Pilgrimy Text Society, 12 vols. (1888-97); G. Schreiber, Wallfabrt und Volkrtum (1934); H. Leclercq,

“Pelerinage saints”,

4 Rome”,

in

F.

Dictionnaire

“Pélerinages

Cabrol

and

4'archiclogie

H.

chritienne

aux

Leclercq,

ef de

lieux eds,

litwrgie,

XTIV (1939), cols. 40-176; B. Kétting, Persgrinatio

Religiosa. Wallfabrien in der Antike und das Pilgerweren in der alten Kirche (1950); Reallexikon fir Antike und Chrittentum, 1 {1950) (Asclepius); R. Roussel, Ler Pélerinages d travers les siécles (1954); T.

Klauser,

Christlicher

Mdrtyrerksnit,

heidnischer

Heroenkult und spitisidisebe Heiligenvershrang (1960}; K. Nitzschke, Evangelisches Kirchenlexikon (2nd ed., 1962), col. 1729; H. Graef, Mary: A History of Doctrine and Devoiion, 2 vols. (1963, 1966); V. and H. Hell, Tke Grear Pilgrimages of the Middle Ages

(1966).

Ekkart Sanser

PLATONISM A. MEaNING

distance from the goal, fulfilment in God.

The meaning of Platonism depends on how

Christ

elements are considered essential and char-

Pilgrims zlso feel in this way that the goal, and

saints

who

the

are

saints,

comes

closer.

honoured,

specially

The

with

Christ at their head, strengthen faith in the

active presence of the Redeemer and the efficacious intercession of his saints with

him. The pilgrim congregation at the shrine is more intensely conscious of itself as a

community

united

to

the

Lord

and

the

Church triumphant. It has 2 better understanding of the redemption and of the

presence of Christ and his saints, realizing

that Christ and the saints do not stand aloof from the pilgrim Church on earth, but form

with

it a communion

the

work

acteristic.

of Plato

is assessed,

Till the beginning

and

which

of the

19th

century, Plato was considered above all for his contribution to ontology, natural theology and cosmology. This was the view

transmitted through the interpretation and continuation of Plato’s philosophy by his pupils Aristotle, Speusippus and Xenocrates, by Middle Platoaism (Plutarch, Albinus, Apuleius, etc.) and by neo-Platonism. The Timaens, which deals with cosmology (Latin

translation and commentary 4th-5th

century

A.p.)

was

by Chalcidius, probably

the

intercession and aid. In the unity thus experi-

dialogue which had the greatest influence down to the Middle Ages. The effort to

pilgrim

Platonist tradition began with Schleierma-

enced

28

between

group

“above”

of saints, and

offering

“below”,

the

also realizes that the saints

understand Plato independently of the neo-

'

PLATONISM

cher’s translation and commentary. The writer, artist and the philosophical significance of the dialogue form came to the fore.

constantly

at once

with

(Phasdo, 742-T5¢),

itself (Svrwg 8v)

Plato was scen as the setter of problems and dilemmas rather than as the constructor of systems. Stress was laid on his dialectic (Hegel), his epistemology (neo-Kantianism: Natorp), and his political and pedagogical theories. Recent research points to the

(témog Gpardc), in spite of the difference of

and medieval interpretations. It does not base itself solely on the dialogues, like

immutable

historical justification

of the neo-Platonist

Schleiermacher, but also on the lecture “On

the Good”, preserved only in the later writings of his disciples. The work had considerable influence on the traditiohs of the school. It is oot certain whether the work was first produced in Plato’s old age or whether the system here apparent was already at work behind all the dialogues. B. Basic THEMES

1. The form (idea). Plato’s starting-point was the ethical investigations of Socrates, whose

debate with the relativism of the Sophistic

Enlightenment was concerned with the establishment of an inviolable norm for moral action. Man cannot be good, just, brave and so on, unless he knows what is the

goodness,

mains

the

justice, courage,

same

in all

etc., which

situations.

re-

Hence

Socrates sought for definitions of the general concepts of ethics. According to Plato, the moral norm cannot be derived from experience. For no

particular good action is good from every respect. The good man 1s not necessarily

always good. The action is good and the man is good, but they are not the good. There is need of a spiritual vision which grasps the

good in its perfect and unchangeable “form”

(e180¢,18éa). Plato then transferred this doc-

trine from the ethical to all predicates. Their application to visible things, in the judgment, presupposes an z prier; knowledge ot them. In the proposition, “These two pieces of wood are the same size”, the concept of

2. Participation and analogy. If the vision of

the forms is to give us a true judgment of the things perceived through outward show,

the world of the forms {xéopog vanréc) can-

not be fully separated from the visible world

being, The thing participates in the form (wéOebig, participation). The being which is changeable manence

and necessary

is preseat in the

and contingent (mapovsie:

of the transcendent),

But

im-

it is a

being {obstx) which is realized only in an imperfect way in the visible thing. Since the form represents the good, all things “strive” to be like it; it is the archetype and goal (téhog) for whose sake they exist. The various

degrees

of participation

set up an

analogy between beings, which is illustrated by means of a line in which two unequal divistons are made.

The smaller reptresents

the realm of the visible, the larger that of the

intelligible. The sections are then divided again in the same proportions. The lower sections of the visible stand for shadows and

bodily things, those of the intelligible for mathemathical proportions and forms (Re-

public,

509d

— 511a).

The

meaning

of the

simile is that the visible and the intelligible are as different from each other (ywptowpdc) by virtue of their being as shadows and reflections are from real things. But just as the thing is reflected in the shadow, so too the intelligible appears in the visible (tébezeg).

The visible has only the being of a reflection,

but as an image, it points to the archetypal being. The shadows (or words) can lead to

sight of the things, the things to knowledge of mathematical laws vision of the forms.

and

these

to

the

The analogous participation brings about degrees of being, which the Symposium (210a - 212a) expounds with teference to the

beautiful, which is the only form which can

be grasped

in sensible as well as spiritual

equality cannot be derived from experience,

vision. The beauty of individual beings is a less perfect presence of the form of the

exist

This again is only a stage which leads to the beauty of morals and laws, which point in turn to that of the sciences and through them

since this only offers objects of approximate equality. But the presupposition of this knowledge of “equality itself” is that it has

an object.

Hence

ideal essences

must

‘apart from perceptible things. In contrast to the changing visible things which include a variety of aspects, the forms are unchangeable, simple and true reality, which remains

beautiful than the beauty of all bodily things.

to the unchangeable

ultimate beauty,

The

lecture “On the Good” illustrates by analof model the participation and ogy

the mathematical

sequence of the one (&)

29

"PLATONISM ’

|

of multiple positing of the one}—numbers —

lines — surfaces — bodies. The principles of

unity ahd duality are present'in all sub-

sequent “‘dimensions” and also transcend

them. So too the higher are contained in

. the following “dimensions”™.

3. Ascont and dialectic. 'The human soul posscsses an 2 priori knowledge of the

mathematical proportions and the forms, of

which it had vision in a pre-existence and which can be awakened through instruction and sensible perception (&véuwaig). Hence man can know the structure of being at the level of the forms. Plato distinguishes the method of mathematical knowledge (Siavera)

from that of eidetic (vénotg or émoethun or dialectic) (Republic, 510b — 511¢). The mathematician starts from

untested presupposi-

tions (Omobésets) from which he draws conclusions. He proceeds deductively, He

cannot reduce his axioms to some ultimate

principle. And he must also invoke the aid of sensible intuition. The dialectician exam-

ines the conclusions from his hypotheses to see if they are free from contradiction. If

they are not, he rejects the hypothesis and proposes another. Otherwise he looks for a higher hypothesis which is contained in the as

it~

presupposition

and

from

which the latter can be deduced as its con-

sequenice. The procedure is continued till a first principle (&pyh} is reached which has no

presuppositions and cannot be derived from anything else. This is the form of the good

{@yaltdv)

or the One. The dialectical ascent

takes place without the help of the visible.

From the form of the good the dialectician can then descend to the individual forms.

The good itself is beyond the forms (eménewva. tiic odolug, Republic, 509b). Fach

form

partakes

of the good

(just as in its

quality of ideal number it partakes of the One) and is ordained to the good as its end

or goal, as is particularly

clear from

the

forms in the ethical realm. Thus the relation of things to the forms as their exemplars and

goals has a parallel in the relation of the various forms to the good, the One, as the

Absolute.

The

seventh

epistle (341cd)

de-

scribes the knowledge of the highest beings in the language of later mysticism: through

long familiarity with the truth, a light is “suddenly” enkindled in the soul and this light then nourishes itself. The dialectical ascent is not s be separated 30

PR

.

.

i

and the dyad (Suds) (the latter as the principle |

previous

.

good in order to be himself good

edge

serves the ‘“assimilation to

GO

(buolwoong 7 663) which consists of man’s growing just and pious through insight

(Theastetns, 176b). The philosopher is to return from the vision of the good to political reality. The dialectic of the later dizlogues

( Phasdrys, Sophist, Statesman, Philebus) dis-

plays greater interest in logic. It is concerned with the division of concepts (Swxlpeoig),

their hierarchical arrangement and the possibility of uniting them in the judgment. Plato shows in the Sophist that there is nonbeing even in the realm of the forms. The identity of each form with itself implies a difference as regards the non-identical forms and hence that it ““is not” — they. 4. Soul, State, cosmos. Since the unchange-

able forms have no efficient causality, another principle is needed to co-ordinate the: world of becoming with that of being. This principle is the soul. It moves itself and the inert, and is therefore immortal rus, 245c—). Plato compares it

objects

of mathematics.

Like

(Phaedto the

them,

it is

between the form and the appearance. The

totality of beings is reflected in the soul as in the realm of mathematics. Hence it can know all beings. As Eros, the soul is the desire of ascending to the eternal essences and of rendering them visible in the world of becoming. Since it is a principle of movement it can bring about participation. The threetold division of the human soul expresses its intermediate position. The rational or spititual soul is endowed with thought, and its function includes that of guiding the other parts of the soul. Its immortality and its affinity with the forms is proved in the Phaedo. The lowest part is the instinctive passionate soul (gmupmtindv), while the

courageous {Supoedéc) is the bridge between

them. Plato’s myths of the other world atfirm the freedom and responsibility of man.

The Platonic State follows the siructure of the

soul.

There

are

three

corresponding

classes: the ruling class of the philosophers, the warriors and the providers. The analogy

of structure is based on the common end: both soul and State are to realize the good in

the visible order. Each part of the soul and

the State is ordained to a virtue: the first to

wisdom or prudence, the second to courage and the third to self-discipline. The cooperation of the parts leads to justice. The

\

PLAY

harmenious movement of the cosmos is ascribed to the world-soul. According

PLAY

(Smiuovpyds), who arranges the all according

the usual contrast between the playful and the serious, play is primarily thought of in

the myth of the created by the

Timaexs, this is d1rectl Maker of the Wurld

to the ideal pattern of the “perfect soul”, since he is good and without envy and wishes that all should be as like him as possible. Through the world-soul, divine

providence (mpévoix) makes

animated and rational living demiurge uses the rest of the which he made the world-soul immortal part of the human Aristotle and Xenocrates the been asked as to whether the teaches

Timacus

the world

an

thing. The matter from to make the soul. Since question has myth of the

thar the world

had a be-

ginning in time, or merely its dependence ona cause. But the debate is of secondary impostance compared to the central philosophical assertion that the visible world participates in the good. It is an image of the order of the forms and so has the good as its end and goal. The rational soul is the cause of this participation and finalitv. The order of the cosmos 1s knowable because the law of the cosmos 15 also the law of the human spint.

See

also

Neo-Platonism,

Analogy

of Being,

Good, Participation, Dialectic.

BIBLIOGRAPHY. souvrcrs: |. Burnet, Plasonis Opera, 5 vols. (1900-7); F. Ast, Lexicon Plate-

aicwm, 3 vols. (reprint, 1936); E. de Places, Lexigue

de la langse philosepbique ef religrense de Platon, 2 vols.

{1964). TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS: Floeb Classical Library, 12 vois. (1921-33); B. Jowen, The Dia-

logues of Plaro, 4 vols. (4th revised ed. by ID. Allan

and

H.

Dale,

1953).

WORKS:

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

T. G. Rosenmever, “Platonic Scholarship, 1945

1953, The Classical Weekdy 50 (1957), pp. 172-211;

H. F. Chermiss, ' Plaro Seudies, 1950 - 377, Lusiram 4 (1939, pp- 5-308; 5 (1960), pp. 323-048. WorKs:

GENERAL

and F. Praechrer,

F. Ueberweg

Grundriss der Geschichte der Phifosaphie, 1 (12th ed., 1926); A. E. Tavlor, Plafa: The Man and His [Varia of Plats (1930); (1926); G. C. Field, The Philosaphy

R. Klibansky, The Continuity of the Platonic Tradi-

tion during

the

Middle

Ages

(1939);

].

Stengel,

Plata’s Method of Dialecric (1940); M. Heidegger,

Febre ron der Wabrbes' (19477, W. Ross, Plates Theory of fdeas (1951); P. Merlan, From Plato to \e:capt“.-,:ram:m 933}, 31 Armstrong, ed.,

Flatons

The Cambridge Histary of Later Greek and Early Mediaeral Philosophy {1967} vaRIOUS DIALOGUES, E. T. AND CcoMmMENTaRIES: Fo M. Cornford, Theaesetus and Sophist (1933), Timaens (1937), Parmenides (1939}, Repubiic (1941); R. Hackforth, Philebus (1945), Phaedrus (1952); ]. B. Skemp,

Statesman (1952); R. 5. Bluck, Phaeds (1953}, E. R.

Dodds,

(1960).

Gorgias

(1939);

G.

R.

Morrow,

Laws

Friede Ricken

1. Introduction: Homo Iudens. In keeping with

connection

with

childhood,

of which

it is

thought to be the typical activity. Thus it is explained as excess of energy (H. Spencer), as rest after strain, or as practice and selfeducation for the serious matters of life (K. Groos), though subjectively stemming from the urge to activity and motivated by “delight in fuactioning™. E. Haigis, how-

ever, sees it a5 an encounter with the risks of

life in which the I becomes conscious of itScheut]l

H.

self, while

notes

it is con-

that

cerned less with a function than with the resulting form of movement (as with whipping-tops or the play-group). This definition

is influenced by the aesthetics of Schiller and thus goes beyond the usual contrast of the playful and the setious. The various types of

play {which can be classified from different be carried

can

viewpoints)

in various

on

frames of mind, from the “merely playful”

which is not “play” because not “‘serious”

enough, to an unbending tension which is no

ionger play and *‘ruins the game” because it takes it “‘too seriously”. Since it is so easily transformed

only

be

very

into

something

widely

else,

Its

defined.

play can

charac-

teristics, according to J. Huizinga, are its freedom — that it cannot be a *‘command performance” — its departure from ordinary,

“real” life, that is, from the direct effort 1o

supply one’s needs and desires, its setting up in consequence a sort of closed and limited universe (in space and time) and, throughout all, its orderliness {(“‘the rules”), in spite of the elements of chance and uncertainty. Thus play is the construction of a sort of “freefloating” form. But as such it is an action which is meaningful in itself, with a function

outside the utilitarian (so that it can have a

therapeutic value), not merely in the child (J.-]. Rousseau, W. Frobel, M. Montessori)

but in the realm of the specifically human. No doubt animals zlso play, especially in the “colt” stage between being dropped and reaching

maturity,

though

also

at

other

times, as in mating-play. But their “world” of play remains within their specific environment.

Thev

are, so to speak,

limits and “playing while still in 2 “‘fAuid” in human play is the and the freedom and

finding

their

out” their possibilities stage. What is essential constitution of a world openness which make

31

PLAY such an effort posgible: the world of play is

the play [“display”] of 4 wosld. 2.

Philesophical:

2

As

the world af play.

world at play, play appears along with work, language, love and other forms of the structure of the world. But it is not simply on the same level as these. The dimensions of human existence penetrate one another. Man

world

‘gam

shauM

really be uflderstm -

the playground

of superhuman

foroes a: destiny or luck. It is either “mere? play, from which one taust stand aloef and detached ot an emblem of bliss which can raise one above all distress, even the anxieties

of one’s own life.

At the present time, this notion of play has been stripped of all emotional content and is

characteristics which distinguish it from the other dimensions of existence. Hence it is

used in a purely formal sense. Apart from its usage in individual sciences (such as the sketch-plans of logic or economic theory) it is used to interpret the world and the existence of man in general, and not merely in such

mode of existence like the others; however,

philosophy (cf. the theme of the “language-

is 2 whole man not merely at play, but when

working,

fighting,

loving,

confessing

his

guilt and accepting his death. But play has

not a marginal phenomenon,

but a basic

it still remains in 2 strange contrast to them. We can “play” at being serious, authentic, working, fighting, that is, we can transform the actions in which man expresses his concern for himself (as an “anxious being’’) into the unquestioning detachment of an action which has no set purpose but still remains rational. Man at play along with others takes with him into this free-floating universe his partners {and to some extent the spectators) and also the world of things along with his “playthings” (which need be

no more than his own body).

When things become playthings and partners playmates, they have been transformed, rmt through a (sick[y) confusion between “appearance” and reality but through a knowledge which is agam “poised”’, not

fixed, of their two meanings, each validin its own way: the world of play is a symbolic

world. Here, therefore, one must pay careful

attention to the power and reality and zlso

the ambiguity of the symbol. It must not be

whittled away to a “mere symbol” in contrast to ““reality”’, but neither should its value be

aesthetically exaggerated into an absolute. This consideration leads to the conclusion that the player “plays with something that

fields

as

those

of art,

mathematics

and

game” in the later Wittgenstein). It then becomes a “‘game without player” (E. Fink), since all questions about the player are rejected — either man or God or luck — since there is nothing outside the totality considered. (It is not yet clear in what sense the later Heidegger assigns a source [a “whence”] to the “happening” of the play of mirrors between the heavenly, earthly, divine and human;

see D.

Sinn in Philoso-

phische Rundschaw 14 [1967], pp. B1-182). Such formal thinking may be contrasted with the existentie/ and concrete concepts of a theology of play.

3. Theological: racred piay. Play, especially in

its purest form, that of the dance, is one of

the primary phenomena of the history of religions {van der Leeuw). Here it functions as responsible participation in the foundation and conservation of the world (its order, fertility, etc.), as a re-enactment in praise and

thanksgiving of the “cosmic” order and as a prayerful and efficacious component

in an

anticipation of its pure and final fulfilment. The main work of collecting patristic texts

unpre-

on this theme has been done by H. Rahner. Here it appears that man joins in God’s play by taking part in the dance of the cosmic liturgy, in the seriousness and gaiety of

they must be if play is not to lose its “charm” and very nature. The world of play as a2 whole 15 more than the production of the player. It

ness” (Plato, Laws, VII, 803 be). According

plays with him” (Buytendijk). It is not only playthings

and

playmates

that are

dictable (within the rules laid down) — as

abandonment in humility, knowing that his own life is at stake, but trusting in him “who alone is worth taking seriously in all glad-

also holds 4z spell-bound — above all, when

to the allegorical interpretation of Gen 26: 8,

which

in this way before the “King™, as an image

he joins others at play. From this it is only a shott step to an idea

Socratic

is not

confined

thought

(cf.

to Indian

Heraclitus,

or pre-

frg.

52)

and which is also propounded in many forms in myth and ritual: that even the “real” 32

the Fathers find that in man himself “Laughter”” (Isaac) and “Patience” (Rebecca) play of

“Wisdom”,

the

first-fruit

of

which according to Prov 8:27-31 before God in the beginning,

creation,

played

PLURALISM

It is thus that the Church can see itself not only as militant or on pilgrimage, but also as /udens: “‘playing before him” in its liturgy

social ethics, the Catholic approach,

angels and ‘the blessed, where the Logos

individuality. The principles arising from

as the pre-lude to the heavenly dance of the

himself is the “leader of the dance™ (Hippolytus), and, most profoundly, the triune God himself. For the circum-insessio of his processiones is not static, but both in himself and as “all in all”’, “the love that moves the

sun and the other stars” (Dante), See also Ared, Aesthetics,

World,

gwage, Charity 1, Symbol. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

F.

von

Work, Lan-

Schiller,

On

the

Aesthetic Education of Mar (from the German) (1795); J. Buyrendizk, Wesen und Sinn des Spicles (1933); R. Guardini, The Church and thr Catholic (1940); id., The Spirit of the Liturgy (1940); V. AxeR. Hartley and others,

line, Play Therapy (1947);

Understanding Children's Play {1952); ). Huizinga,

Homo Ludens: < Study of tbe Play Element in Culture (1955);

M.

Vortrdge

Heidegger,

und

Aufidtze

Denken™ and **Das

(especially “Bauen, Wohnen,

Ding”, cf. “What is a Thing?”" [1966]) (2nd ed.,

1939); A. Sapora and H. Mitchell, Theory of Play

and Recreation (3td

Play

and

Guamer

ed.,

(1961);

1961):

Sacred and Profane Beauty:

). Pieper,

G.

R. Caillois,

van

der

Man,

Leeuw,

The Holy in Art (1963);

Theory of

In Tune with the World: A

Festivsty (1965); H. Rahner, Man ar Play (1967).

Jorg Spleit

PLURALISM

society displays a high degree of heterogeneity in comparison with a society regarded

as homogeneous. Sometimes the term is used unfavourably, to signify disintegration in comparison with a society regarded as

integrated. It can also be used to contrast the immanent dvnamism of modern society with Instead

of “pluralist”,

it would

be pre-

ferable to speak of the “"plural” society when registering existing structures. Pluralism

would then be a positive assessment, the programme of a society conceived of in this way. It would be contrasted with integralism, the tendency to overcome plural structures. Historically, the theory of pluralism can be referred to sources as diverse as liberalism and Christian social teaching. But whereas the pluralist notions of liberalism were

strongly

individualistic,

its emphasis on the person and subsidiarity, was towards a pluralism which saw that the

social nature of man was as essential as his such pluralism guarantee not only individual rights but the equal riphts of the various societies against trespass. Social pluralism appears mainly under the following aspects.

1. Group pluralism. In the strict sense, this

15 the division of society into numerous groups with varying interests, each of which

considers itself equal to the others. In a wider sense it is a non-systematic and

dynamic organization and associations with A society with such represented by a series as if 1t were built up

of society in groups goals chosen at will, structures cannot be of concentric circles into a whole by the

integration of each unit into a larger one.

Group pluralism should be rather represented by a number of intersecting circles, arranged unsystematically and mobile in

character.

And

overlapping

occurs

within

the individual himself. He belongs simultancously to various social units, with no intermediate unit to provide continuity. Nonetheless, this is where pluralism reveals its ambivalence,

for

the

plural

structure

is

constantly being reinforced by intermediate

formations.

2. Value pluralism. This aspect reflects the

Pluralism is a term now used to characterize madern society in various ways. The pluralist

motre static societies.

with

to the

neglect

of

absence or the weakening of a homogeneous

system of norms and values. The system of norms extends from absolute values accepted as universally valid to moral norms and then conventional views of behaviour. But de-

peading on the width of the field of observation,

a

certain

multiplicity

of

wvalues

and

norms has always existed, specifically attached to

various

regions

or

strata.

Hence

what

strictly characterizes a value pluralism is that society as a whole is confronted with it. The apenness and mobility of society are responsible for the fact that the development of social forms is no longer characterized by the spread of a homogeneous system of norms but by the competing offers of several

possible ways of life. On pluralism of world views

( Weltanschaunngen)

see World (Views

of }, Ideolngy; see also Religion 1 A, Philosaphy, Thealagy 1.

3. Partial social integration.

in the plural society

The tendency

is for the individual

to

33

POLITICAL THEQLOGY

be integrated only partially into any given social group. This means that no group can claim him totally. But then-again thete is no group which will help him to bear his social burdens as a whole.

4. With the partial social integration and

the division of functions in modern society

there is an increasing differentiation of roles. The various

social interactions no longer

involve the whole person. The individual

IflfiP@flHH1HHWy;:nflu¢ orienttate its pedagdgy living of such stroctures to the sac Liberal democracy is the political a anin zation propex to such a social structure. Th:s is the only form which allows group life to develop

freely.

But

pluralism

presents

a

political problem, since public policy must

take the common good 35 its norm. Hence

democracy must be prepared to wotk for

civic integration,

because

a pluralism

of

There is no such thing as a purely monistic

opinions and interests, even when institutionalized, does not suggest political decisiops orientated to the total needs of society. Nonetheless, since pluralism is a partial social integration, it provides a norm or orientation for politics, since it insists on proof being shown that a given policy is

can evoke contraty trends and defensive reactions. And the assessment of these phenomena as normative in anthropology

regulated by the government. Pluralism helps men to see that the common good is a social goal and not merely a political objective and cannot therefore be attained by

plays various roles as father, as worker, as member

of a Church,

as citizen, etc. The

change of roles .can occur frequently and at short intervals.

This is all 2 matter of dominant trends,

ot putely pluralist society. Further, the trends are only relatively compulsive. They

really of universal interest, and should be

is also debatable. But there seems to be general agreement that justice is not done

merely political means.

from the point of view of loss of unity, either

Integralism, Politics

or above all of decay of culture. As always,

BIBLIOGRAPHY. H. A. Myers, Syrtepatic Pluralism (1961); W. Walter, Die sogialethische Definition der Demokratie (1962); K. Rahner,

to the social situation by envisaging it solely in society or individual, or of disintegration it is a matter of dangers and opportuntties.

At first sight pluralism of groups and values

seems to increase the number of possible social conflicts. But partial integration and differentiation of roles also function in favour of peace, since the conflicts are then only

partial, which must already be regarded as an element of the elimination of conflict. This is apparent, for instance, when a two-tiered class society (*‘dualistic™) is followed by 2 plural group-society.

The dangers, for instance, of fragmentary adaptation, which can react on the person,

See

also

Society

1,

Social

Movements

1V,

Schriften gur Theologie,VI (1965), pp. 46-58 (on dialogue in a pluralist society); M. Banton,

Raoles: An Introduction to the Study of Social Relations (1965); M. Hattich, “Das Toleranzproblem in der Demokratie”,

Civitas

4

(1965);

id.,

National-

bewussirein und Staatshewusstsein in der pluralistischen Geselischaft (1966); R. A. Dahl, Pluralist Democ-

racy in the United States (1967); ]. P. Schaver and H. Berlak, Controversy in a Pluralistic Society (1967); K.

Bosl,

(1967).

Pluralismus und pluralistische Gesellschaft

Manfred Hittich

should not obscure the increased sense of

responsibility which results from this structure of society, both in the individual and the groups, with regard to their own way of life. The integralist patterns of society develop

social structures on the basis of one single principle and hence neglect the real differ-

POLITICAL

THEOLOGY

The term “‘political theology™ is used in present-day theology in the context of a

definite

set of problems

and

ideas.

This

ences in human life. While the pluralist principle keeps the relationship between individ-

context must be taken into account, because

for all in favour of collective elements. Since

the latter tendency can appeal toa certain need

actual term comes from Stoicism which divided theology into three parts, mythical, natural and political {ct. Varro in St. Augus-

to provide opportunities

political theology took precedence over natural theology (in contrast to the Hellen-

uality and social obligations in the balance, integralism tries to solve the problem once and in man of total integration, a society which is resolved to mainrain its pluralist structure,

34

for freedom

and

the term could be ambiguous and misleading, as well as being historically “loaded”. The

tine,

De

Civitate

Dei,

VI,

5).

In

Rome,

POLITICAL THEOLOGY

istic tradition). Here it was used to justify

theologically the primacy of politics and the “absalute” claims of the State. This political

Human society is seen primarily as an essential medium for the discovery of theological truth and for Christian preaching in general.

1. This notion of political theology was in

2. In this sense, political theology is not primarily a new theological discipline among others, with a regional task of its own. And it is not simply a sort of “applied theology” — theology applied to politics and human society. It cannot then be simply identified with what is called in theology *“political ethics” or with what was aimed at by the laudable movements of a social theology or the “Social Gospel”. Political theology

theology of Rome was revived in the Renaissance. It was championed by such writers as Machiavelli and Hobbes, and by the French traditionalists of the 19th century with their notion of restoring the “Christian State™.

force until Romanticism,

when

social con-

ditions forced it to take on a restorative and Integralist tinge or voluntarist traits. But in present-day theology, when dealing with the hermeneutics

of basic problems,

it has

the two following aspects. a) Political theology is a critical corrective

of a certain tendency to confine theology to

the realm of the private and personal, as in its transcendental, existential and personalist forms.

is 2 tendency

There

to reduce

the

heart of the Christian message and the practical exercise of faith to the decision of the individual standing apart from the world — a reaction to the separation between religion and society as suggested by the Enlightenment. Here political theology intervenes, not in the sense of a spontaneous, pre-critical identification of religion and society, but as a new deliberate effort to

define the relationship.

In this eflort at critical correction, political

theology aims at “nationalization” — taking

theological concepts, and the language of preaching and spirituality out of the private realm. It tries to overcome the exaggerated of

csotericism

discourse

about

stubborn opposition between itual

life

and

social

God,

the

private spir-

freedom,

which

1s

claims

to be a basic element

structure

of critical

in the whole

theological

thinking,

motivated by a new notion of the relation between theory and practice, according to

which all theology must be of itself “practical”,

orientated

to action.

Only

when

this

fundamental interest of political theology is ignored can it be mistaken for a theology dabbling

in politics,

ie., in direct contact

with socio-political public life, which would be wrong. It is in fact one of the aims of political theology and its society-directed thinking to prevent the Church and theology

being saddled as it were unwittingly with this or that political ideology.

3. This political theology sees everything in the light of the eschatological message of

Jesus.

But

provided

it tzkes

the

new

standpoint

by the critical reason, for which

the way was paved by the Enlightenment

and which was given articulate expression at least since the middle of the 19th century, since Hegel and Marx. In the wake of the

purely ldealist and then the personalist and

obviously widening the universal gap berween what theology and preaching puts forward as peremptory and what the Christian in fact lives by and surrenders to. b) Political theology is now also the effort to formulate the eschatological message of Christianity in the conditions of present-day

obscured in the eyes of theclogians. The distinctive feature of the new starting-point is the fundamental relation between reason and soclety, the society-directed character of critical reflection, the compulsion felt by

structure in public life. In other words, it 15 an effort to overcome z purely “passive”

light of society and the impossibility of the critical reason’s justifying its claims “‘on the

of present-day society. Society 18 not regarded as a secondary object of Christian

problem

claim to be heard in public on the loeal, national and international level — 2 claim

“hermeneutic problem”

primarily

coloured by the desire for political power.

and history. It is rather the problem of the

society, taking into account the changes of hermeneutic

of Christianity

in the context

activity. And it is not a matter of the Christian which

seems

always

to

be

more

or

less

existentialist

tradirions,

the

wvalue

of

this

approach had long been underestimated or

the critical reason to consider itself in the level of pure reasoning”. Thus the classical of the relation between

faith and

teason appeats once more in political theology on this new plane. And the basic

and

the

historical

relation

of theology is not

between

theology,

systematic

between

dogma

35

POLITICAL THEOLOGY

understandmg

of faith and

Sociflty.. cerod

practice.

Ay The mew theory-practice relationship, theologically. In the context of new developments

in Protestant theology after Bultmann, especially in J. Moltmann and W. Pannenberg,

political theology stresses the basic nature

of eschatology and brings the eschatological message of the kingdom of God into the foreground of theological thinking in 2 new

way. It thus tries to do justice to the close and

intrinsic

link between

God

and

the

coming reign of God in the NT tradition. The futurity of this loedship of God is an intrinsic and permanent element of theological assertion about the Godhead of God. The category “future” and the societydirected category of “kingdom”

and reign

of God become fundamental in all theologi-

cal reflection. For if the promised “new wotld” corresponds to the Godhead of God, the truth of God’s Godhead cannot in any

way be adequately conceived under the con-

- ditions of the present. The world as it exists

at any given moment cannot be a sufficient

basis for the understanding of this truth. Only a change of the present age and of the

Idealism and: jts successots ji petsoualisi and ‘existentialism. But the tradit

Hegelian Left with its characteristic skete:hu

plans of the philesophy of history was more

or less lost sight of. Political theelogy also takes up the discussion with the critique of teligion based on this philosophy, where it appeared as critique of ideologies. Religion was there seen as a derivative function of certain social practices and power groups. The notion of “false conscience” was used to explain the religious believer in terms of a society as yet unaware of its nature.

b) Public affairs, theologically. Taking into

consideration the world situation which has felt the impact of the Enlightenment and secularization, political theology tries to

study afresh the relationship to public life and human soctety which is implicit in the NT message of salvation, forgiveness and reconciliation. Tt insists that the trial is on,

on a capital charge, between the eschatological message of the kingdom of God and any given form of social and political life, in its various historical changes. It does not deny the legitimate individual relationship to God

(as an element of the NT in contrast to OT

conditions which make its insights possible

tradition),

Godhead of God. A theology which takes seriously the eschatological nature of its

freedom,

can give access to the future truth of the “object”

is

condition

necessarily

orientated,

of possibility

transcendentally,

self-understanding

to an

of thought,

which

articulation

as

a

i.e,

of its

will be directed

to action (J. Habermas). This is the perspective in which political theology regards the new theory-practice

relationship as propounded in the dialectical

philosophies of history (with the history of revolutions

in mind)

especially since Hegel,

in the and

19th

century,

in the tradition

of the Hegelian Left. It does not see it as a poor version of Christian eschatology in

popular terms, as the degradation eschatology

into blue-prints

of this

of a self-con-

tained world history and social utopias. It sees It as a token that the eschatological sense of crisis here becomes part of historical (world)

consciousness

(cf.

J.

Habermas),

Thus political theology undertakes to con-

front critically a philosophical tradition which was too little considered in modern

theology. Recent systematic theology (and Catholic theology chiefly where it broke out of the neo-Scholastic system) debated the transcendental philosophy of Kant, German

36

but

it affirms

peace,

justice,

that

the

central

promises of the reign of God in the NT — reconciliation

—

cannot be made radically private affairs. They

cannot be entirely interiorized and spiritual-

ized as corresponding to the individual’s longing for freedom and peace. They make

the individual free with regard to the political soclety around him, in the sense of commit-

ting him to it in a free critique of it. The view of the society-directed, “public” character of the Gospel promises can be distorted in tw0 main ways. (1) The first mistake is to follow the type

of political theology which was worked out in early Christian tradition under the influence of the metaphysics of the State in

Rome. It becomes 2 “political Christology”

(H. Schmidt) or a “political monotheism” (E. Pedersen), in which a dangerous fallacy

turns the kingdom of God into a political entity. This meant, in the Constantinian age,

that political theology

couid

be the direct

successor of the religious ideology of the State in ancient Rome. This way of giving

the Christian message a political bearing has

had a detrimental effect up to the present day, distorting the fundamental societydirectedness of the NT message and barring the way to an unambiguous use of the term

POLITICAL THEOLOGY

“politieal theology”. Indirectly too this line of tradition had questionable effects. Particularly since Augustine, thete was an understandable critical reaction to this ideological

degradation of Christian eschatology. The content of the promises was unduly inter-

torized, spiritualized and individualized. (i) There is another misapprehension which hinders a proper grasp of the “public” natute of the eschatological message. Its critically negative function — negativity which is a liberation — is commonly overlooked. When the public element of the message is emphasized, the spectre of a Christian or ecclesiastical neo-integralism is conjured up, as if political theology sought to undermine a secularized and religiously emancipated society and infilrrate it with “restorative’’ tendencies. But in fact political

theology tries to take this “secularized” world seriously, as the starting-point of theology and preaching. This does not mean “emancipating it” unconditionally by eliminating the social bearings of the eschatologi-

cal message, as in many modern theological

theories of secularization. It means that it

asserts its essentially universal categories “only” as a negative critique in this society.

Being 2 particular element in society, Chris-

tianity can only formulate the decisiveness (““absoluteness’’) and universality of its message without falling into an ideology when it formulates it as critical negation (of and in given situations).

This shows that when political theology brings out the public pature of the Christian

message, it does not relapse into a direct challenge to the socio-political world. There

are two reasons. One is that Christianity and its message cannot be simply identified with a given political institution {in the narrow sense). For there is no political party which

can be merely such a critique. And no political party can take as its platform — without

falling

in

the

totalitarianism

end

—

into

that

Romanticism

which

or

forms

the

*whole

of

horizon of the critical stipulation of Christianity: the totality of history as reserved

eschatologically

to God.

(The

history under the eschatological reserve of God” sums up the negative critique. There

is nothing intramundane which can be identified as the motive force of all history, so that it could take the coming of all histnry as the programme of its polirical action). On the other hand, the “negative conscience”, the critical attitude to society in which the

public claim of the gospel makes itself heard,

must

not

be

underestimated.

Its critical

contestation of socio-political conditions is a “determinate negation”. It flares up in criticism of very definite conditions. Being a critical artitude to society, it may well take the form, under certain conditions, of revo-

lutionary protest. This negative voicing of the gospel is not the void and vagueness of the “purely negative”. It has within it a powerful force for the positive. New possibilities are opened up in and through this critical negation, though only by going right through and out of it (a strictly dialectical process). It gives contour to the formal figure of Christian hope, inasmuch as the promised fulfilment in the resurrection of Jesus Christ can only

be attained through the *death-dealing” negation of the existing world, such as is expressed in the message of the crucifixion of Jesus.

The other reason why political theology

to society is that

1s not a direct challenge

problems of political rule can never be strictly reduced to the single dimension of technological rationalization {cf. H. Marcuse). The political decision itself — above and beyond all technological planning — remains orientated to debatable goals. The process of rationalization undertaken by political

has

itself always

action

a certain

horizon of utopian interests. This may be denied by the pragmatism that takes decisions

in the dark, but the horizon cannot be eliminated and must be answered for (“dia-

lectically™). H this is regarded as the site of the theoretical decisions of Christianity’s

critique of human society, its utterance cannot

be open

to the

suspicion

a

of being

ditect and therefore misplaced challenge to the social and political realm. 4, Political theology

as described

above

could also be termed “‘dialectical theology™,

in view of its methodology and the historical problems which form its context. But it 1s not a dialectical theology in the sense of the early Barth, where it indicates that the God-

man relationship is a paradox which cannot be

resolved

(and

hence

too

works

non-

historically). It is dialectical theology in the sense of a historical communication of the biblical

message,

in which

communication

of the message attests its transcendence in a critical, liberating “over-riding” of existing conditions, 37

5. Political theology can and wnust also

propound the. central truths of theology in the light of its statement of the relation be-

tween faith and society-directed teason. It displays the Christian faith in the form of freedom to be critical of society, and the

Church as the homeland of this freedom to which the Christian knows that he is called in face of the eschatological message.

a) Faith, bope and Jove as the form of freedom

fo criticize society. “Dogmatic faith” appears

here as acceptance of doctrinal propositions in which 2 perilous past is remembered and revived,

which

means

that

the

claim

of

promises held out and hopes experienced are

BIBLIOGRAPHY. HistoRY OF TBE THRM: G Schmitt, Politisché Theologie (20od ed., 1934); E. Peterson, “Der Mbnotheismusals politisches

. Problem®, Thealogische Trakiate (1951), pp.

147; H. Schmidt, “Politics and Christology: the

Historical Background”, Concilium6, no. 4 (1968),

pp. 39—45. PRILOSOPRY AND THEOLOGY: H. Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (1964); H. Cox, Tht Secular City (1965); J. Moltmann, The Theologyof

Hope (1967); W. Pannenberg; Grundfragen systematischer Theologie (1967); ]J. B. Metz, “The Church’s

Social Function in the Light of ‘Pelitical Theo-

logy’*”’, Concilium 6, no. 4 (1968), pp. 3—11; sec also the essays in nos. 5 and 6 of this volume (on faith and the socio-political reality); ]. Habermas, Erkenntnis und Interesse (1968); ]. B. Metz, Theoiogy

¢

of the World (1969).

Jobann Baptist Meiz,

called to mind to break the spell of the predominant mentality — and its “repressions” — by a critical thrust. Hope appeats

as the protective criticism which liberates the individual so that he can definitely reject any totalitarian view of history and society. For in the foresight of hope, the totality of history is reserved to the eschatological action of God. Love is not merely an interpersonal happening. It is a social matter, being the unconditional and selfless resolve to work for freedom and justice for others. This could be the point of insertion for theological discussion of revolution.

b) The Church as the place and institution for socio~critical freedom. 'This tentative definition of the Church is not an adequate dogmatic

definition of its essence. But the Church in

action (in preaching, worshipping and sacraments) and in its central task of reconciliation and forgiveness may take the direction of social criticism. This description of the Church implies above all 2 new hermeneutic of the Church in society. This will explain

the role of tradition and institution in the

post-histoire

society;

how

the

ecclesiastical

institution, conscious of its own provisional

status, does not repress critical freedom but makes it possible, this being the formal contour

of

the

“servant

Church”:;

how

criticism 1s part of the public life of the

Church; how partial identification with the institution is to be positively treasured; how rights and freedom in the Church are not merely constitutionai problems but elements

of the process of attaining knowledge in the Church’s theology; and so on.

See also Politics, Enlightenment,

Theory and

Practice, Reign of God, ldealogy, Secularigation, Society TV, 38

45~

POLITICS 1. Definition. In the broadest sense, a policy is a calculated, purposeful line of action. But since there can be policies in every field of life, this does not give any specific notion to attach to politics. This is also true if politics is defined as the activity of the *“powers that be” or as activity directed by the desire for power. To escape the difficulties involved in distinguishing specifically political activity from other social fields of action, it is sometimes attributed to the social entity. A social

entity is considered as a subject which deploys itself in face of other social entities. One

speaks of the politics of the State, but also of

an enterprise, an association or of the Church.

But this notion of politics is again too wide.

If the concept is restricted to the politics of the State, the definition will depend on that

of the State. The specifically political element comes more clearly to the fore if that means

governmental actton and action in the State

designed to influence the government. In contrast to these dehnitions which prescind

from

values,

efforts are made

to

define political action as an activity orientated to

certain

instance,

norms.

Politics

as the realization

is defined,

for

of the common

good. The classical tradition of political theory always sought to understand politics with the help of cthical categories. An un-

critical acceptance of the political theory of Aristotle seems to be hardly possible in the conditions of modern

society. At any rate,

in the perspectives ofa liberal society, it would

be an undue restriction of the norm if the attainment of the common good were linked

exclusively to the phenomenon of the State.

-t

4

EEN -

POLITICS

POLITICS

Since we can no longer identify State and

soclety as in the (Greek) city-state { polis}, the political realization of the commor good presents itself as a special case of the general norm of the common good. The specifically political is not the common good as such, but

the particular mode of its realization.

Another approach is to take politics as a certain aggregate of social existence. Social

relations would then crystallize under certain

coaditions to political relations. This is the

concept

underlying

the defnition

of the

political as a friend-and-foe relationship. This political theory is now rightly rejected, but one should not forget it contains elements which go to determine political practice. The stress on the friend-and-foe relationship points to a certain stage of integration

of

societies in which the strictly political can be seen. The possibility of enmity reflects the highly integrated existence of the social

body

in

question.

other

aside

Leaving

society political rule is one of the most important factors in order. The order of society, insofar as it is produced by political rule, can be called political order. Political activity is then action related to this order. be

2. The concerns of politics. Three aspects may which

distinguished,

are

in

practice

combined, but which represent specific objects. a) Politics concerned with order is interested above all in the necessity of authoritative regulations for human life in society, Politics always includes the authoritative imposition of rules of order and their implementation. b) Politics concerned with welfare is orientated to the satisfaction of economic needs, which must be assured by the positive material achievements of political rule. c) Politics also appears as concerned with certain interests. It is an activity carried

on between groups, each of which seeks to

have its interests recognized and catered for

limited.

by the others. The combination is obvious when the three aspects are formally considered. Rules of order are elements of welfare and always

of politics from the modern concepr of the

of orderareatleastto some extent conditioned

objections, this makes it clear that the defini-

tion in guestion is orientated to the modern national State and hence is historically too Basically, the derivation of the definition since such

State is problematic,

definitions

constantly presuppose the existence of a “political society”, the maintenance of which is then the primary constituent of politics. This function is then appealed to to justify the necessity of rule. But in reality, political rule is not just 2 consequence of the existence of societies. Often enough it is a decisive

factor in their origin. Political structures are as much

of political

consequences

rule as

their causes. Even the political integration through which the structure is maintained is to some extent produced by the sovereign power. It may be affirmed that political rule

have an impact on group interests. Notions

by vested interests, ot they become group interests by having

notions.

Welfare

to compete

with rival

politics is penetrated by

group interests and sees itself as confronting such interests. Since it intervenes to shape social life, it also affects the de facto order. This is also true of the politics of interests,

whose connection with the general welfare is evident.

These three aspects can be verified in the

regions under political rule and the subject-

matters of politics. They can be used to analyse political procedures on all territorial levels. Here the units in each case themselves

in

turn

groups

upholding

is a universal phenomenon of society and that political societies are to a great extent a

become

Since the definition of the State in general presents no small difficulties, it 1s well to start with the general fact of authority or

aspects regularly appear combined.

consequence of this phenomenon of rule.

rule. Political rule is distinguished trom other rule by the universality of its character. It s universal.

materially

personally

and

historically

variable

social realm to which

The

such rule extends is

but

the

phenomenon

itself is always met with. If one prescinds from historically condirioned goals, one can affirm in general that political rule has the function of maintaining order. In every

their

interests against units on the same or a higher level. In traditional interior politics the three

Where

the structure is federal or where there is local communal authority, the same applies to the provinces or other divisions, The politics

of the national State has also determined the difference between home and foreign aftairs. Foreign affairs have been primarily politics concerned with the interests of the naticnal State. The notion that foreign policy takes

precedence reveals how restricted the actual activity of polirics has become.

Social welfare can no longer be catered for 39

on the national level slone. International

affaits’ are in great need of sorre positive inciple .of order in wotld politics, where

with democratic pflnflplas, But if thielmmts

tion have given tise to groups of interests on

to be ass.ured,_ there must be a pluralist

a]]mnr:cs, blocks and the general social situa-

a scale wider than the npational. Fot this

reason, the subject-matter of politics (constitutions, laws, social conditions, economics,

finance, cultute, armaments) can no longer be regarded asinternal politics. These are matters

which must be dealt with on all regional levels, like the demarcation of the regions where political action applies.

3. Political norms. The centtal problem is the legitimacy of political rule and its reguiations. De facto rule is not fpss facto legitimate. Nonetheless, not all the regulations of an illegitimate governmentlack legitimacy, since they can derive their legality from indispensable necessities (e.g., traffic laws or the struggle against crime). And on the other hand, since the legitimacy of 2 government

laid down by the nosm for pelitical rule are

structure of rule, so that transgression of the

limits by 20y one organ of government may

be hindered of penalized by the decisions of another.

See also Society 1, 111, State, Law 11, Pluralism. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

D.

Easton,

The

Political

Jystem: An Inguiry into the Siate of Political Scicnce (1953); L. Freund. Pofitik sl 1450 (1033 E. Welil, Philosophie politigns (1956}, G. Burdeau,

Miéthods de la scignce politigne (1959); F. Hermens,

Introduction to Modern Politics (1959); M. Cowling, The Nature and Limits of Political Science (1963);

M. Durverger, The Idea of Politics (1966); M. Hit-

tich, Lebrbuch der Politikwissenschaft, 1: Grandlegung wnd Systematik (1967); H. Kuhn, Der Staat: Eins philssophirche Darstellung (1967). Manfred Histich

does not at once establish the legality of all its regulations, a distinction must be made

between the legitimacy of a government and

the legality of its actions. Further, the de facto process of legitimation must be distinguished from legitimacy as a norm higher than positive law. Without entering into the controversy about the knowability of supra-positive norms, the

POPE 1. Theological: A. Definition. B. Biblical Foundations. C. Historical Development. 11. History of the Popes: A. The Roman Empire. B. The Early

the legitimacy of a government is a matter

Middle Apes. C. The Predominance of the Popes in the Middle Ages. D. Late Middle Ages and Renzissance. E. Catholic Reform and Counter-Reformation. F. From the Peace of Westphalia (1648) to the French Revolutivn. G. The Papacy in the

it is not necessary that all should vote for the government, but all must consent to the

I. Theological

fact that only agreement on their existence

works shows that there must be such a set

of norms for every society. The question of of its installation, In a free democratic order,

procedures by which the government comes

to power. This legitimation confers legality on many of the political decisions. But it is

not sufficient, since even a legitimate government may offend against positive and supra-

positive norms. To register such trespasses,

there must be a consensus which goes beyond

the formalities of appointing a government

and of legislative procedures to envisage the

cthical

quality

of political

means that human

decisions.

This

rights and basic rights

must be listed in modern constitutions. One

of their main objects is to mark the limits within which anything can be regulated

politically, i.e., in a universally binding way. Without such norms all types of rule, from one-man dictatorship to majority rule, become the rule of the arbitrary. Hence the 40

19th Century. H. The Papacy in the 20th Century.

A. DEFINITION

The Pope is the vicar of Jesus Christ, the

successor of the Apostle Peter, the head of

the Catholic Church and also Bishop of Rome, Patriarch of the West, Primate of ltaly,

Archbishop and Metropolitan of the eccle-

siastical province of Italy, Sovereign of the

Vatican City (cf. _Annuwario Pontificie). In ancient times, the title “Pope” (“Father”) was given to bishops. It was widely used in

monastic

circles

Catholic

Church.

and

became

the ordinary

title of a priest in the Orthodox Churches, as also in the Romanic parts of the Roman In

Egypt,

it

was

the

prerogative of the Bishop of Alexandria. From the middle of the 6th century on, the title came to be restricted in the West to the

POPE

Bishop of Rome. This usage was juridically

and in conjunction with the rest of the apos-

established by Gregory VII.

tles, and indeed, with the Church as a whole.

B. BisLicaL FOUNDATIONS

further defined by Jesus as the power of the keys and the power to bind and loose. In the

The function of the rock foundation is

The papacy can only be understood in the

tramework of the Church as a whole and in connection with the hierarchical structure of the Church. The Church cannot be properly understood either as a papal or a5 an episcopal Church. But it does not exist except with the Pope as the visible representative of Christ, the invisible head of the Church. According to Catholic faith, the papacy grew out of the mission of the apostle Peter, who, according to reliable testimonies (not, however, universally accepted), ended his life tn Rome.

In the N'T, Peter appears as the first of the

apostles in rank. The gospels show him as

their spokesman (Mk 58:29; Mt 18:21; Lk 12:41; Jn 6:67£.). In the lists of the apostles

given in the synoptics he is always named frst (Mk 3:16-19; Mt 10:1-4; Lk 6:12-16; cf. Acts 1:13; Mk 1:26; Lk 9:32; Mt 16:7).

A most important point is that, in what 1s obviously a traditional formula, Peter is named by Paul as the first to whom the risen

Christ appeared, though chronologically he

house where Jesus is the householder, Peter 18 given authority to rule as representative df the master. The formula also includes authority to teach and to impose doctrine. The

metaphor of binding and loosing means to

exclude from the community and to re-admit,

also to impose an obligation and to release

from it, finally, to declare something lawful or prohibited. This triple function is also assigned by Jesus to the other apostles (Mt 18:18), but it is clearly Peter’s in a special way which is his alone. The Gospel of Matthew does not explain what the primacy of Peter

consists of. But the two-fold conferring of

authority does not make sense unless a single function is meant, though shared at various

levels.

According

to

Lk 22:27-32,

a

quartel

among the disciples inspired by ambition and desire for power gave Jesus the occasion

of proclaiming the law of the kingdom of

God,

readiness

to serve the brethren.

And

here Jesus gave a special task to Peter, promising him his prayer to enable him to

was not the first (1 Cor 15:5). The Easter apparition is a revelation of his call. Since

tulfil 1t. According to the words of Jesus,

primordial

Peter was not to be spared this crisis of faith (cf. Lk 22:33f.). But the prayer of Jesus,

the formula in 1 Cor 15 15 a very ancient piece of tradition, it is an expresston of the

conviction

that Peter

was

the

primary witness to the resurrection. Three texts in particular bring out specifically the

special

22:311€.;

place

of Perer:

Jn21:158f.

In

Mt 16:13-19;

the

first

text,

Lk

the

authenticity of which as part of the gospel cannot be seriously doubrted, though its place

in the arrangement of the text is perhaps due

to the redaction, Jesus gives Simon 2 new and

symbolic name, by calling him Petres (Kephas — Rock). Jesus promises the apostle that he is to be the rock foundation of the Church

which

he planned.

Peter

is to guarantee

stability and security, permanence and untty.

the foundation of the Church, Christ is himself

but this foundation appears visibly mn Peter. The other apostles are also included in this function (Eph 2:19f). One must also re-

member that according to the Letter to the Ephesians, the Church is also founded on the

prophets, i.e., the charismatics. None of these elements should be overlooked. Though

Peter alone was given a special charge, 1t 1s clear that he can only exercise it in unity with

Satan

was

to

bring

rhe

disciples

into

a

situation of severe trial for their faith. This took place in fact at Jesus’ death. And even

offered for Peter in particular, was to help

him to recover, and it would then be his task

to provide support for his “brothers™, that 1s, for the whole community. Peter is to be a stronghold of the faith.

According to Ja, Jesus fulfils his promises

and completes his transmission of authority after the resurrection. It is understandable that the confirmation of the authority should

be after the resurrection, since the existence

and life of the Church are linked to the resurrection of the Lord. Peter is made

shepherd

common

of

the

flock.

This

metaphor,

in the OT and NT, comes from an

agrarian culture and is based on the notion that the shepherd has to find pastures and watering-places for the flock, to defend 1t against attack and to preserve due order within the flock. What is meant therefore is that the I.ord who will no longer be visibly and historically present appoints a representative who

has to mediate Christ’s salvation,

41

POPE the life of salvatxnn, by

preaching

-

and establishing salfl.fic symbnls He must

also protect this life from all threats from

within agd from without.

In the Acts of the Apostles, Peter appears

as the head of the young Church, conscious

of his responsibility and full of the power of the Spirit. He is the successful, enterprising

and courageous preacher of the gospel. He is equipped with authority to combat anything unholy within the Christian community. It is he who breaks through the bounds of Judaism into the universality of the message of salvation. He is the pace-maker for the mission to the world. This is all described without any effort to glorify him or to gloss over his weaknesses (cf., for instance, Acts 1:15-26;

5:29;

2:14-40;

8:14-17;

3:1-26;

8:18-25;

4:8;

9:32-43;

5:1-11;

10:15).

The importance and the limits of Peter’s authority are shown in the dispute between him and Paul at Antioch when the question of the persistence of the ritual law of the OT arose {Acts 15:7-12; Gal 2:11-21). And in general, it was only normal, in view of the simple, rudimentary and hence undeveloped organization of the primitive Church, that the exercise of the Petrine functions should have been on a modest scale. Further, according to the words of Jesus, the authorities were to see themselves and to behave as the

servants of the rest and not as their lords (Mt 20:26ff.; Lk 22:254.; In 13:1-20). The primacy of Peter was not in any way dimin-

ished by the fact that he exercised his function

of head by keeping in touch with the consensus of the Church and remaining in loving

fellowship with it. He remained head of the Church when he left Jerusalem and went to

Rome (cf. Acts 12:17;1

11:13).

Lyons. Peter’s going 1o Roine p— be‘ adcribed to the impulse of the Spirit pervading

the Church s well as to Petat’smdmfim

- And it is not mpasmble that the link between

Rome and succession to Peter was based on a decision of the Church towards the end of the apostolic age. The Roman papacy passed from a rudimentary to a fully-developed stage. Under the stress of circumstances, in the

course

of history,

many

alien tasks

accrued to the Popes, including the government of the Papal States. Then as political,

cultural and social conditions changed, the Popes freed themselves once more from such tasks, though only slowly, hesitantly and often uawillingly, fearing that the loss of worldly power might involve restrictions on their spiritual mission. The changing shape of papal power corresponds to the changes in the whole Church. It is determined by political and cultural shifts in the course of history, though also by the personal character of any given Pope.

In the early centuries, there are many proofs that the Church was conseious of the primacy of the Roman Pontiff, but the testimonies are in germ, so to speak, and not fully explicit. The first is provided by a letter of Bishop Clement of Rome to the Church in Corinth at the end of the 1st century, Quarrels

have broken out in Corinth, and Clement acts

as peace-maker. He does not intervene authoritatively, but displays a deep sense

of responsibility for the whole Church. It is this sense of responsibility which inspires his initiative. The spirit, the force and the claim of the Roman Pontiff are heralded in the letter, which was held in extraordinarily high esteem throughout the Church in the 2nd century.

Church is “president of love”, that is, first in

DEVELOPMENT

himself did not appoint

successors

either to Peter or 1o the other aposties. The

succession follows from the nature of Peter’s

mission (Mt 28:18f.), which is to the ends

of the earth and the end of time. The succession to Peter is not on the same lines as succession to the other 1pnstIcs since he can

have only one successor at a time. According to the faith of the Church, this is the Bishop

of Rome, since Peter was in Rome and suffered a martyr’s death there. Sufficient proof for

this is given

Romanoes,

42

Tre

[gnatius of Antioch says that the Roman

C. HistoricaL

Jesus

Pet 2:11:5:13; Heb

Roman preshyter G&,ma and

4,

in lgnatius

3),

Dionysius

of Antioch

of Corinth,

(.44 the

the realization of the new principle introduced by Christ into history. He goes on to say that the Roman Church teaches others but does

not itself receive instruction. He begs it to take care of the Church in Syria. The reason

for Rome’s precedence, as explained by Ignatius, is that Peter and Paul lived in the Roman Church and preached the gospel there.

Irenaeus of L.yons defends tradition against Gnosticism. To establish what the tradition is, the local Churches founded by the apostles

ate the competent witnesses. The apostolic

succession guarantees the truth of the doc-

.

POPE

trine. In such a matter sufficient proof has been given when it is shown that in the

greatest and most ancient Church, one universally known and founded by the glorious apostles Peter and Paul, its line of bishops goes back to the apostles and that its

doctrine is therefore apostolic. “With this

Church,

on account of its more

primordial

authority (or: more effective priority, “propter potentiorem principalitatem’) all other

Churches in every place cannot but agree,

since in it the Christians of all places have preserved the apostolic tradition™ (.Adrersus

Haereses, 111, 3, 3).

Tertullian and Hippolytus regard Peter as the first in the line of Roman bishops. Cyprian sees the unity of the Church as founded on Peter. The link with Peter provided by succession to the episcopal office is, according to Cyprnan, the fundamental justification of all episcopal power and likewise determines the unity of the Church universal.

When Peter settled in Rome, the primitive

Church embodied in Peter also settled there. Hence the Roman Church is the ecclesia principalis. Optatus of Milevis (d. before 400) held that communion with the Roman Church guaranteed the legitimacy and divine authority of the other Churches. Ambrose (on Ps 40:30) says: “Where Peter is, there is the

Church.” Augustine 1n his struggle against Pelagianism strove with growing vigour to gain the support of Rome, because, as he said, only the verdict of the Apostolic See could give the proper emphasis to the decision of the African bishops (Epistle, 172, 29).

From the 2nd century on, the Bishop of Rome was asked to decide in questions of controversy, e.g., the date of Easter (see the

accounts of the numerous journeys to Rome

in Eusebius’s History of the Church). From the 4th century on there is the fact that bishops

lock to Rome

for protection

of their rights,

and that Rome is the court of appeal in matters of law, while appeals against its

decisions were held to be inadmissible. The Roman baptismal Creed came to be authot-

itative. Rome played 2n essential role in the fixing of the canon of Scripture, as also in the struggle against Gnostics, Marcionites and

Montanists. In the Middle Ages, the papacy was dis-

cussed only incidentally, in connection with other problems such as the manner of ordination of priests, the analysis of faith and especially in solving the questions raised by the founding of new religious orders in the

13th century. These orders wished to be dependent only on the Pope, and not the bishops, especially in financial matters, Religious thus became in a special way the “sons of the Pope”. A tendency in the opposite direction has only set in recently, In late scholasticism, the pressure of historical circumstances, i.e., the occupation of the papal

throne by rival Popes, gave rise to the “conciliar theory”, which made the Council and not the Pope the supreme authority in the Church (see Concrliariom, Schism IV). The conflict between Conciliarism and the doctrine of papal primacy went on for centuries,

in spite of the condemnation of the theory at

the Council of Florence, till the First Vatican Council, at which the question was decided

in favour of the papal primacy (see Gallican-

ism}. But at the Second Vatican Council a

certain

synthesis

was

arrived

at, withourt

prejudice to the primacy of the Pope. Thomas Aquinas used ancient Greek notions of monarchy rather than biblical ones

to justify the papal primacy

as the most

perfect form of government.

It guaranteed

the unity and peace of the Church. According

to Bonaventure, there is a first and supreme principle in every realm, to which all particu-

lars can be reduced, and from which mn turn

all particulars derive. The Pope is the summit

of the whole hierarchical structure of the Church. All duly constituted power in the Church stems from him. This was a consideration inspired by neo-Platonist think-

ing, and led Bonaventure to a view of the

primacy which differed considerably by its exaggerations from what was later defined as Church doctrine. Peter John Olivi came in the course of his defence of the Spirituals against the Curia to hold the view that the Pope was Antichrist. Here he anticipated one of the theses of the Reformers. In theology

after the Council of Trent, as the concept of

the of

ecclesiastical

the

hierarchy,

magisterium,

was

especially

worked

out

that m

opposition to the Reformation, the doctrine

of the primacy was given a more and mote systernatic

form

till it finally

reached

the

stage in which it was adopted by the First Vatican Council,

The way in which the Bishops of Rome understood their universal mandate 1s Instructive. To some extent, such self-interpretations were included in the declarations of the First

Vatican

Council.

This

is

true,

for

instance, of the declaration of the papal legates at the General Council of Ephesus

43

' POPE. -flffi%,thflfig‘htfittflififim'

Eastern bishops and thus ended the Acacian

themselves took the injtiative more and mozreé in making decisions. For 2 long time they

das, which was subscribed to by some 250 Schism (484-519; cf. DS 3066, 363). It was

also accepted by the eighth General Council,

Constantinople IV (869; DS 128). So too

finally the profession of faith of the Emperor

Michael

which

Palaeologus,

he

made

as

representative of the Eastern Church and swore to through his legates at the Council

of Florence. Mention may also be made of 2 pronocuncement of Pope Siricius (384-98; D5 181), which says that it is the task of his office to bear the burdens of all, since “the

blessed Apostle Peter bears them in us” (DS 181) and thus protects his heritage. Innocent I (401-17), in the course of a letter written at the instigation of Augustine to the bishops of Africa during the Pelagian contro-

versy, wrote as follows: ““In your search for

the things of God . . . you have followed the examples of ancient tradition ... and confirmed the strength of your faith in true insight, since you affirmed that the matter in dispute among you should be referred to our judgment, knowing as you did what was due to the Apostolic See. For from this See comes all episcopacy, and 2ll the authority which goes with this title” (DS 217). In 1302 Boniface VIII declared in the bull Unam Sanctam: ‘““Therefore this one and only Church has not two heads like 2 monster, but only one body and one head, Christ and his vicar Peter and the successor of Peter . . . For all men, it is absolutely necessary for salvation to submit to the Roman Pontiff. This we declare, affirm and proclaim™ (DS 872;

D 469). Wycliffe’s spiritualizing image of the Church

and

the views

of Huss,

who

was

theologically dependent on Wycliffe in many respects, gave rise to a number of papal

condemnations of theses in which the papacy was

rejected

or

underestimated

(D

633,

635-9, 646-50, 652, 655; D5 1207, 1209-13, 1220-3; 1226, 1229). Other important affirmations of the primacy include that of the

Council of Florence (17th General Council,

1438-45), the Lateran (18th General Council,

1512-17), the bull Exsarge Domine of 5 July 1520 and the rejection of Gallicanism

Febronianism,

two movements

and

in which the

Concilianism rejected by Florence lived on. A distinction must be made between the

dogmatic

statement

of the

primacy,

e,

explicit faith, and the actual exercise of the

44

. !

tlon

{431; of. DS 3056), which was acclaimed unanimously by all the fathers present. So too the profession of faith of Pope Hormiis-

1

between affirmation and action. Inthefirst.

thousand years the exercise of papal

pfi

took the form of arbitration: Latee the Pfipm

'

exercised their authority by mieans of fraternal admonitions. But as early as the 2nd

century, it also tock the form of juridically binding precepts. Pope Victor (189-98) gave

forceful expression to the primacy. The Churches in Asia Minor had refused to accept

the Roman dating of Easter. In face of the

resulting disunity, Victor excommunicated

them,

not just by bresking

off his own

communion with them but by expressly excluding them from the fellowship of the whole Church. In doing so he appealed to the fact that the graves of the Apostles Peter and

Paul were in Rome. Pope Stephen 1, the first,

as far as we can see, to appeal to Mt 16:18f,, demanded of all the acceptance of his doctrine on the baptism of heretics and threatened those who opposed it with excommunication, appealing to the authority conferred on the Apostle Peter, which he claimed had been transmitted to Peter’s successors. From the 4th century on the Roman Pontiffs, Siricius

(384-98), Innocent I (402-17) and Zozimus (417-18) in particular, claimed the primacy in more and more explicit terms. Leo the Great

was

especially

clear

and

definite

on

the

matter. Human and subjective elements may

have played a part, bur their action was primarily inspired by the conviction that as successors of Peter they had a task to fulfil

which was committed to them by the Lord of the Church. That the claim of Rome was fully in keeping with the mind of the whole

Church was clearly manifested at the General Council of Chalcedon, to take one example.

When the letter of Pope Leo was read to the

Council, the fathers cried out: *“This is the

faith of the Fathers. This is the faith of the apostles. Peter has spoken through Leo.” The letter sent by the Council to Leo describes the Pope as the interpreter of the voice of the Apostle Peter. Gelasius (492—6) laid down the basis of the theory of the two powers which led in the Middle Ages to the subordination of the temporal to the spiritual

power (Innocent III, Innocent IV, Boniface VIID), If the

affirmations

and

exercise

of the

primacy in Christian antiquity are compared with the doctrine of the First Vatican Council and subsequent practice, the extent of the

i

POPE

develepment cannot but be apparent, Nonetheless, there is an undeniable continuity between apostolic times and the present day.

In action and reaction, both the Bishops of

Rome and the Church universal became more

and more clearly conscious of the primatial position of Rome. For the organization of the wide-ranging Church provinces, the patriarchate structure was historically characteristic.. This form was undoubtedly affected by the development of papal authority, but it was not eliminated. For in general, this structure only came into play in its function of supreme judicial authority, even in matters ot faith. In later history, since the beginning

of the Eastern

Schism

(1054), patriarchal

authority in the West was absorbed into the

primatial. Bishops are appointed directly by Rome and are directly subject to the Bishop

of Rome, withourt the intermediate authority of a metropoliran. The First Vatican Council determined the full extent and also the limits of papal authority, against episcopalist tendencies on

the one hand and integralist tendencies on the

other. The Council aimed at stating its faith in such a2 way that the rotal self-understanding of the Church could find expression in it. By reason of external circumstances and also of the immarmrity of ecclesiclogy, only part of the problem could be dealt with, that of the

papal primacy. As regards the bishops, the Council was content to pur in a saving clause, which was meant to ensure that no detriment should be done to the ordinary power of the

bishops, given them by Christ. The strong emphasis on the primacy launched a line of development which took the concrete form of Roman centralization and which now prompts a search for a form of exercise of the which

primacy

will allow

the bishops,

not

merely in theory but also in practice, the freedom of movement which properly be-

longs to them. The most important text of

Vatican I is as follows: “We

teach

and

declare

that the Roman

Church has the primacy in ordinary authority,

by the disposition of the Lord, over all other Churches.

This jurisdictional power

of the

Roman Pontiff, which is truly episcopal, is direct. Towards this authority the pastors

and

faithful

of every

rite

and

rank,

both

individually and collectively, are bound by

the duty

of hierarchical subordination

and

true obedience, not only in matters of faith and morals but also in matters of discipline and government in the Church throughout

the whole world, By maintaining the unity of fellowship as well as of the same faith with the Roman

Pontiff, the Church of Christ is

thus one flock under one supreme pastor . . . The authority of the Supreme Pontiff does no detriment to the ordinary and direct power of jurisdiction by which the bishops, the successors of the apostles, appointed by the Holy Spirit, are truly pastors of the flocks assigned to each of them to rule and feed. It is, on the

contrary, acknowledged, strengthened and defended by the supreme and universal pastor, as was affirmed by St. Gregory the Great when he said: ‘My honour is the honour of the universal Church, My honour

is the vigorous strength of my brothers. I am only truly honoured when due honour is paid to each of them ...” Because the Roman Ponuff 15, by divine right of the apostolic primacy, head of the whole Church, we also teach and declare that he is the supreme judge

of all the faithful, to whose judgment appeal can be made in all matters which come undet ecclesiastical examination. But the verdict of the Apostolic See may be rejected by no one, since there is no higher authority, and no one

may pass judgment on its judgmeni. Hence

they stray from the right path of truth who affirm that it is permissible to appeal to a

General Council against the judgments of the as if the General

Pontiffs,

Roman

Council

were a higher authority than the Roman Pontift. “If anyone therefore says that the Roman Pontiff has only the office of supervision and guidance, bur not full and supreme power of jurisdiction

the

over

whole

Church,

not

merely in matters of faith and morals but also in matters of discipline and government tn

the Church throughout the whole world; or if he says that the Pope has only the major share

but

supreme

not

power;

the

whole

fuliness

of this

or that this power is not

ordinary and direct over both the Churches

individually and collectively and the pastors and faithful individually and collectively: let him be excluded’ (D) 1827-31; D.5 3060-64), Other statements about the papal primacy are to be found in the encyclical of Pius XII

Mystici Corporis, 29 June 1943, and in many texts of the Second Vatican Counctl. The primacy of the Pope defined

by

Vatican I refers not to the power of orders

{ potestas erdinis} but to the pastoral power { potestas jurisdictionis). The teaching authori-

ty, the magisterium,

incorrectly,

regarded

which s often, though

as a distinct

type of 45

|I

T

L

-

authority, should be ranged under the pastoral or jurisdictional power. (See Bl siastival Axthority; Magisterism.) As regards the power of ordets, the Pope is not superior to the bishops. Nonetheless, power of

jurisdiction and power of orders are linked very closely to the Pope, since his supreme pastoral power is based on the fact that as Bishop of Rome he is the successor of the Apostle Peter. Even though a baptized person when elected Pope at once possesses papal power when he accepts the election,

episcopal consecration, by virtue of the link between power of ordets and power of jurisdiction, is essential to the taking up of supreme power in the Church. The two powers form an organic unity, though they need not come at the same time.

In the realm of jurisdiction, the Pope possesses supreme, full and universal power in the Church. Itis truly episcopal and takes in every member of the Church. Its extent is determined by the revelation which took place in Jesus Christ. The Pope has no authority in purely worldly matters. Claims

. of such a nature put forward in the Middle Ages

were due to historical circumstances

and did not derive from the to the Pope. According to Vatican I, the papacy is to instituted by Jesus Christ

primacy proper the teaching of be regarded as and not as the

result of historical developments or even as

the outcome of intrinsic necessities in the Church. The Pope is not given his mandate by the Church, and he is not the delegate of

the bishops, even though he acts in the name

of the whole

Church

and of the bishops

representing the whole Church — as he does, even when acting on his own initiative. The election,

which

has

gone

through

many

represented by the Pope a8 the visible head.

from

excluding,

rather presupposes

the

spontaneity, freedom and individual qual: ities of each wieclder of the primacy. In the activities of the primacy, Christ comes to the fore precisely in the fragility of men. The

personal character of each Supreme Pontiff is

fraught with consequences, in spite of his cail

to be the instrument of Christ. Nonetheless,

the authority of the Pope is ultimately the authority of Christ. When the Pope exercises his power of jurisdiction, his pastoral office,

he is owed internal and external obedience.

Since it is Christ who acts in the primatial actions of the Pope, the papal power is rooted in the sacramental character of the universal for

(cf.,

Chuzch

example,

Jn

20:21-23).

Normally, only those united with Christ in the Spirit are called to transmit to others the salvation given by Christ. According to Jn 21:15€, Peter’s love of Christ is the presupposition of his being charged to feed the flock of Christ. The wielders of spiritual

authority are to live in peace with God and

with the brethren. The Church had indeed to learn by experience in the course of history that union of heart with Jesus Christ ¢an be lacking, but that this does not mean the loss of papal

authority

(against Wycliffe,

Huss

and Luther). The primacy would in fact be null and void if it were dependent for its value on something which could never be definitely ascertained, like the mind and heart of the holder of the office. Nonetheless,

the normal situation is that the representative of Jesus

Christ lives in union

with

Jesus

Christ, Otherwise not only would the salva-

tion of the Pontiff himself but that of the

whole

messianic

papacy itself is based on the commissioning

of the Apostie Peter, though the Pope is not

question has yet to be solved as to who should determine the fact of heresy in such a

apostles were at once the (direct) bringers and

primacy isa grave scandal. The intrinsic bond between power of orders and of jurisdiction

witnesses of revelation, while the bishops are

always

endan-

gered.

the Apostle Peter, any more than the bishops are apostles, The main difference is that the

toc it has

be

changes of form in the course of history, though now long since stabilized, serves to

designate the holder of the office. But the

Hence

community

been

the

conviction of the Church that a Pope who fell into heresy would lose his office. But the case.

In any

case, a sinful holder

of the

shows that the actions of the Pope, even in

about in the course of Church history. The

juridical matters, are concerned with salvation and sanctification. The reason why Christ combined the full and supreme pastoral power in one member of the Church,

one, tnasmuch as the invisible head, Christ, is

continuity and unity of the Church are guaranteed and displayed in this office. Communion with the Pope brings out the

{indirect) transmitters of revelation,

Vatican I gave no formal explanation of

how the succession to Peter actually came

Christological perspective in which the Pope was placed is of particular importance. The Church does not have two heads, but only 46

the Bishop

of Rome,

seems to be that the

| i

{

|

'

.

.

POPE

full membership of the saving community,

the communio samctorum as communion

szints and communion

of

in the holy, in the

most visible zad reliable way. Hence the institution of the primacy appears as a mani-

festation of Christ’s concern for the inner

unity and the reliable proclamation of the

message of salvation both within and without the people of God. The universal episcopate of the Pope naturally brings up its relationship to the episcopate. The question is all the more important because Vatican 1 affirmed that papal power was truly episcopal. In spite of

the division into local Churches under the

personal rule sal bishop, so as comprised the pope is

of a bishop, the Pope is univerthat the whole Church appears within one diocese. Though not superior to his fellow-

bishops by virtue of the power of orders, he

is, in this view, jurisdiction and members of the faithful. And he copal power in Nonetheless,

by virtue of his power of its primacy, bishop over zll Church, both bishops and can make use of this episany part of the Church,

there

are

not

two

bishops

in

each diocese, the local ordinary and the universal Pontiff. In spite of the direct episcopal power of the Pope, the local bishop

remains the immediate

pastor of the flock

entrusted to him. It seems impossible to reduce the relationship between the universal episcopal authority of the Pope and the local episcopal authority to a satisfactory juridical formula. But it is certain, at any rate, thart the

universal

episcopal

authority

of the Pope

does not entitle him to intervene at will. In particular, he could not abolish episcopal rule in the Church. “The right of the Pope to intervene in the government of a diocese rests therefore not on an authority of like nature to that of the local ordinary, and one which would be in competition with it in every way, but on a higher right which is

people of God and hence of the salvation of the individuals. The Pope is appointed as

member Church.

of the Church

on behalf of the

His actions, by virtue of Christ’s

dispositions, stem from the Church and in turn serve the Church. Pope and Church do not face each other like strangers who come from different parts. On the contrary, the

Pope speaks as a member of the Church to the other members, though as one equipped with special and indeed supreme authority.

And the Church in turn is a brotherly fellow-

ship within which the Pope lives as brother

and father. Highly as 2 member of the Church

may be placed by the primacy, he is just as

profoundly at the service of all. Thus the primacy may mean supreme authority, but its truest meaning is the most intensive

service (rervus servoram ). The Pope has to answer to Christ for the way in which he serves the salvation of all (1 Pet 5:1-4). Thus

the primacy is itself also a form for the expression of love, placing itself at the service of men in obedience to God’s eternal plan of

salvation

(1 Cor 13:13).

But

the

love

of

which we speak here is of such a type that it

cannot connive at or confirm man’s selfassurance or selfish ease, his worldly longings ot his enslavement to the world. It has to teli the arrogant and self-centred to go out of themselves and find the liberty of the children of God, freedom from anguish and freedom

in joy. For man, this often means disquiet

and disturbance. He shrinks from taking the

step across the abyss to God and hence finds the challenge to do so an imposition. Hence

an iastitution which binds him formally by law to go out of himself and give himself to Christ, is for him 2 scandal. While it is true

that all the eflorts of the Church can become

a scandal, the character of scandal is concen-

trated in the papacy as in a focus, because from it comes the supreme statement of the obligations which are intended for man’s

prevented by the principle of subsidiarity from intervening except when the ordinary competent organ fails’ (K. Mérsdorf). But here again it is for the Pope to judge when

well-being but can nonetheless be felt as threats to earthly self-assurance and appear furthermore at times in forms which are not consistently understandable, since they have

in fact grave obligations on the holder. He is

same

speak, and again, he may not speak out of turn. There is much in all this which remains and must remain the decision of the Supreme

the salvation of men. It cannot be used to

such a situation has arisen. The primacy lays

not free to remain silent when he ought to

Pontiff

himself,

Christ.

This

but

he

is nonetheless

in-

exorably bound to the charge given by Jesus charge

means

service

of the

to pay the tribute of human frailty. At the time,

these considerations

show

that

the exercise of the primacy is determined as to its necessity, its proportions and its limits, by the approach of the reign of God and by train

men

obedience.

in obedience Hence

it must

for the

respect

sake

of

human

freedom, which is man’s highest natural good

47

POPE

to

the extent

that

restriction is necessary for his salvation.

such

Vatican I left the question open as to how

the relationship between primacy and epis-

copacy should be determined. The solution

given by Vatican II was the affirmation of the

collegiality of the bishops. It was not the

intention of Vatican I¥ to limit the primacy, but to complete the affirmations of Vatican 1 and supply what was omitted there. The collegiality of the bishops is to be understood in a broad

sense.

Vatican

II used

gteat

emphasis and piled up formulations to point put that the college of bishops essentially includes the Bishop of Rome, the Pope, and that as head of the college he is so much part of it that without the Pope there is no college of bishops, and that the college only possesses spiritual authority inasmuch as the Bishop of Rome is a member of the college and is over it as its head. Without his membership, the college would be reduced to a sum total of individual bishops. An exceptional situation occurs when a Pope becomes incapable of acting as Pope, as for instance when he is

mentally ill or falls into heresy or has died. In such an exceptional case, the college of bishops would not cease to exist as a college.

It would not disintegrate into a number of individual bishops, because important factors

of unity remain eflective —unity in confession of Christ, unity in the Spirit, in love, in the celebration of the memorial sacrifice. These

factors are also effective and play a decisive role in normal times, when the Pope presides over the college of bishops as its head. And

these factors make it clear that the unity of the college is not just an external juridical bond. Its basis must be uaderstood as sacramental. That the Pope is essential to the

constitution

of the college

is the visible

manifestation of a unity which is ultimately based on the sacramental element. For the rest, in an abnormal and exceptional case the Church 1s obliged to give itself a head once more. This is done by the election of a new

which

universal

n

supplemented it to the effect that the college af' bishops, in common with the Bishop of Rome as its head, is also {guague) holder of full and supreme power over the Chutch universal. The Council thus affirmed with regard to the college of bishops a doctrine had

already been

in the

Church with regard to the General Councils.

The statement on papal power includes the

word “‘universal”, which is not used in the Council’s statement on the power of the

college of bishops. But this does not change matters in any way. Though the relationship between the holder of the primacy and the college of bishops (with the Pope as its head) is made quite clear in the texts of the Council,

the “Nota

Praevia

Explicativa” added

to

Lumen Gentium (cf. H. Vorgrimler, ed., Com-

mentary on the Documents of Vatican I, vol. 1

[1967], pp. 297fL.) put the matter beyond all possible doubt by saying that the distinction is not “between the Roman Pontiff and the bishops taken collectively, but between the Roman Pontiff by himself and the Roman Pontiff together with the bishops. Since the Supreme Pontiff is bead of the college, he alone can perform certain acts which in no

wise belong to the bishops, for example, convoking and directing the college, approving the norms of action, etc.” But it is worth noting that the introductory explanation says that the Pope can use various methods

in

making these decisions, as the circumstances of the times demand. He need not confine

himself to a form laid down once and for all.

The Pope being entrusted with the care of the whole

flock of Christ, it is for him

to

judge, as the needs of the Church change in the course of time, the manner in which he

will exercise this charge, either personally or collegially. Though the final text of the Council does not say so, it may be assumed that even when the Pope acts on his own initiative, without the suggestions of the bishops

and

without

their

co-operation,

in the

exercising his authority for the whole Church, he then acts as head of the college. For he always speaks in the name of the Church as

with a difficult problem. Vatican 1I declared

he never acts as a private person, but always

Pope.

The

context

collegiality

of the

of the primacy

bishops

presents

theology

that the Bishop of Rome, by virtue of his office as vicar of Christ and as pastor of the

Church

universal

48

universal,

authority,

has

full,

which

he

supreme can

and

exercise

well as for the Church. When he acts as Pope,

a3 successor of the Apostle Peter, whose task it is to give effect to what has been handed down in the people of God. The college of bishops possesses full and supreme power not

g

except

I. .Bu’t me

o

freedom

mspended to Yam

o o

and takes priority in doubtful cases, since man in his freedom is analogously the lmagt of God. Hence the primacy cannot restrict man’s

POPE

because this has been given it or conceded to

it by the Pope, but by virtue of its own competence, in consequence of institution. But since the Pope, his teristic membership, is essential constitution and effectiveness of the

Christ’s characto the college,

the consent of the Pope is required for every decree of the college of bishops. This

consent is to be taken in the strict sense. It is

notasubsequent confirmation, butan element

intrinsic to the decree from the start and indeed a vital element. This is so even if the consent of the Pope only comes in the external form of a subsequent approbation. The same conclusion may also be drawn from the formulas used in the publication of the decrees of Vatican II since the holding of the Council.

But the manner in which the Pope exercises

his function as chief member of the episcopal college can vary very widely. Here the actual situation can be of extreme importance. The participation of the Pope can range from a voluntary or even silent acceptance of a decree of the bishops to a solemn promulgation. And the Pope can decide which form he chooses.

especially

In view of the historical facts,

the

proceedings

of the

ancient

Councils, we are justified in assuming that the way in which the Pope exerts the rights

or authority which are his by divine institution, is dependent on human factors and historical circumstances — so much so, that the observer who does not view the processes in the light of faith may be able to sec only the

human and historical factor. The fact that the Pope with the college (or the college with the Pope as its president) possesses full and supreme authority in the Church, while the Pope alone also does so without the college, leads to a question which seems to be insoluble and indeed to contain an inner contradiction. The question is: are there two supreme powers in the Church, in rivalty with one another? Or: is not the college of bishops once more stripped of its power by the fact that the Pope exercises supreme power, even without the bishops?

The Council itself left the question open. The

traditional answer is that there inadequately distinct organs of

ecclesiastical

power:

inadequately

are two supreme distinct,

inasmuch as the Pope is himself a member of the college of bishops. Another view is that there is only one wielder of supreme authority in the Church, the college as constituted under the Pope, the holder of the primacy. To avoid

prejudicing the primacy of the Pope, the supporters of this thesis add that even when the holder of the supreme authority is so defined, a distinction must be made between

actions which the Pope alone performs, without the college, even though in the name of the college, and actions which have a strictly collegiate character by virtue of authoritative papal participatios. To proceed according to the strict logic of law, it would perhaps be more correct to say that the Pope is the one organ of supreme authority, and then add that he can exercise this authority either alone or along with the

bishops in a collegiate act. This thesis would

appear most suitable to ensure the unity of

the Church insofar a2s it stems from the supreme living authority within it. Burt the unity is also assured by the supposition of two tnadequately distinct organs, since the two organs are combined together in unity

by the fact that the Pope is head of the college. Parallel to this is the truth that the primacy suffers

no

detriment

or danger

when

the

supreme authority of the college of bishops is affirmed, with the due precautions.

It may

well be that in deciding for one or the other

solution, psychological and jurisprudential factors may be more strongly at work than strictly theological ones. What is always true is that the Pope is never alone, but i1s always in essential union with the bishops. Even if it is undeniable that he can always exercise freely his supreme authority, nonetheless, by virtue of his

responsibility for the unity of the Church, he is perpetually being thrown back upon his

unity with the bishops. Rather than being a

“free’ agent, the Pope, like the college of the bishops, has to adhere to divine revelation,

as attested in Scripture and tradition, as handed on incorrupt through the apostolic succession and in particular through the

concern of the Bishop of Rome, and as preserved in its purity and faithfully inter-

preted in the light of the Spirit of truth in the Church {(Vatican 11, Lumen Gentium, art. 23).

The activity of the Bishop of Rome must be

directed to the well-being of the Church (¢bid., Introductory Explanation, art. 3).

Hence

not only the bishops but also the

Supreme Pontiffs are bound to take adequate steps, by appealing, for instance, for help to

theological science, by exploring the faith of believers, to strive to ascertain correctly the revelation attested in Scripture and also to

find the way to present it in adequate terms.

49

. POPE

o

: Thmcfieflmanmu&mmfllmtofthepuw

" of jurisdiction belonging to the Pape. He has nofl: therefore just a formal authority, but one

which is also determined as to its content. If it is to be exercised in accordance with the “will of Christ, it must, like the exercise of the

freedom which is man’s right, a2lways submit

itselfto the true message which-comes from

God, that is, to what is attested in Scripture.

But then, it is the Holy Spirit who is at work in the Church universal, It is he who links the

faithful who discharges a spiritual office with

the faithful who have not such an office,

binding them together in a unity which is

ofter: full of tension.

See also Church 111, Bishop 111, Conciliariem, Episcopalism, Gallicanism. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

See bibliography

msrory.

ot Pope IT; also P, Aratd, “Bibliographia historiae

pontificiae”,

_Arcbivum

historize pontificiae

1L,

(1963 ff.). THEOLOGY. See the textbooks on Fun" damental Theology and De Ecclesia; also: S. H. Scott, The Eastern Churches and the Papacy (1928); M. Maccarrone, Vicarivs Christi (1952); M. ]. Wilks, “Papa est nomen jurisdictionis”, /7.5, new

series 8 (1957), pp. 71-91, 250-71; U. Betti in

Antonianum 34 (1959), pp. 161-244, 369-408; id. in Divinitas 3 (1959), pp. 95-143; C. Colomboin Secuola cattolica 88 (1960), pp. 401-34 (on episcopate and prunacy); F. Afanasieff and others, lLa primanuté de Pierre dans Eglise Orthodoxce (1960) G. Thils, Primanté pontificale et prérogatives épisco-

pates (1961); W, de Vries in Scholarerke 37 (1962), pp.

341-69;

U.

Betti,

Divinitas 6 (1962),

pp.

113-33; K. Rahner and J, Ratzinger, The Epir ¢copate and the Primacy, Quaestiones Dispuratae 4

(1962);

H.

Kiing,

Sirukturen der Kirche

(1962),

E. T.: Structares of the Church (1965), cf. Kevin

Smyth in frish Theological Quarterly 33 (1963), pp. 53-66; T. L. Jiménez-Urresti,

Episcopade’”

(1962),

G.

£ binomio " Primado-

Baum

and

P.

de

Letter in The Thorusr 27 (1963), pp. 211-35 (Pope and bishops); P. Bertrams, De Relatione inter episcopaininm et pnmmfmw (1963); B. M. Xiberta, “Il papa e i vescovi’, Divas Themas (Piacenza) 67 (1964), pp. 165-82; Y Congar, ed., La coliegialite épiscopale. Histoire et thévlogie (19(}5:}; G. Baum,

s e Coneinati copecilly o fihurch“b eftlie

ical

K.,

(un arts. 18-—27); L Bachit, *Pritinat tmd Ep

im Spannungsfeld der beiden Vatikanischen: Konzile”, Wabrbeit und Verkindigung ( Festuchrift M. .i':bm) (1967), pp. 1447-66. Michael Schpmans

I1. History of the Popes According to the Catholic faith, the papacy

was instituted by Jesus Christ (for which it appeals in particular to Mt 16:16-18, 28:20; Lk 22:31f.; Jn 21:15-17 and to the tradition of faith). The Popes are thus successors of the

Apostle Peter in his office of Bishop of Rome and the primacy connected with it. Histori-

cally, it may be taken as certain that Peter

worked in Rome for some time with apostolic

authority and was martyred there in the persecution under Nero, The martyrdom may be dated to between 64 and 68. The development of the papacy from the modest form of Peter’s office to the papacy of the present day was accompanied by considerable resistance and

hesitation

within

and

without,

in

a

tension between episcopal federalism and papal centralism which was due to the nature of the Church itself.

A. TeE

RoMaNn

EMPIRE

Little beyond their names is known of the Bishops of Rome in the first two centuries. But the list given by Irenaeus of Lyons ¢. 180

(Adversus Flaereses, 111, 3, 3) gives us a reliable

account of the succession of the guardians and guarantors of the apostolic tradition: “The Blessed Apostles (Peter and Paul),

after founding and buiiding up the Church,

handed over to Linus the office of bishop. Paul mentions this Linus in his letters to

Timothy.

He was succeeded by Anacletus,

The Constitution on the Church (1965); P. Anciaux,

after whom, in the third place after the Apostles, Clement was appointed to the bishopric. He not only saw the Blessed

Le Pape et le concile (1965); W. Bertrams, Papst and

had their preaching ringing in his ears and

The Episcopate in the Church (1965); O. de la Brosse,

Bischofskolleginm als Trager der Rirchlichen Hirtengewalt (1965); id. in Gregorianum 48 (1907}, pp. 28-48; P. Bilaniuk, D¢ magisiratu ordinario Summi

Pentificis (1966); D. Flanagan, The Meaning of the Church

(1966);

H.,

King,

The

Church

(1967);

A. Flannery, ed., Vafican I1 on the Church (2nd ed.,

1967);

G.

Thils,

“Papauté

Gottes ( Festschrift J. Hifer)

et Episcnpat”,

"olk

(1967), pp. 41-63;

H. Fries,

“Ex

sese, non ex consensu

Element

der

Kirchenverfassung”

ecclesiae”,

ibid., pp. 480-500; K. Mérsdorf, “Das Synodale (Vatican

II},

ibid., pp. 568-84; H. Vorgrimler, ed., Commentary

50

Apostles but also conferred with them, and

their tradition before his eyes . . . Now while Clement was bishop thete arose no small dissension among the brethren in Corinth, and the Church in Rome sent 2 most weighty letter to the Corinthians . .. Evaristus suc-

ceeded this Clement, Alexander followed Evaristus; then Sixtus was appointed, the

sixth after the Apostles. After him came Telesphorus, who had a glorious martyrdom, Then

Hyginus,

Pius,

Anicetus

and

Soter;

POPE

and now, in the twelfth place from the Apostles, Eleuthetius occupies the see. In the same order and succession the apostolic preaching in the Church and the preaching

of the truth has come down to our time.” The chronology later supplied for the most

ancient list of the Bishops of Rome down to

¢. 230 is unreliable. But the list of names is genuine ancient tradition. Meagre as is our information about the early years, it is still clear that the Roman community with its bishop appears as the centre of Church unity, with a certain precedence in the whole Church. The exercise and acknowledgment of this precedence become more and more clear, especially in matters of doctrine and discipline. The priority is based — according to the self-understanding of the Roman Church and the mind of Christianity —

on

the activity and martyrdom of the Apostles

Peter and Paul, especially of Peter, in Rome,

where their tombs were also preserved. In

the whole of this early period, the office of

Peter appears to function according to the principle of subsidiarity — only in urgent cases, when the authority of the local

bishops and patriarchs is inadequate. When Constantine the Great transferred the imperial residence to the East, the Bishops of

Rome

became

of increasing

political

im-

portance. They were more widely active in social welfare and at times, during the

Barbarian Invasions, could protect and feed the peoples of Rome and Italy. But the

Bishop-Patriarch

of

Constantinople

soon

became, with the help of the Emperor, the rival of the Pope (can. 2 of the Council of

Constantinople, 381; can. 28 of the Council

of Chalcedon, 451).

After the able Popes Damasus I, Siricius

and Innocent I, a period of steady advance

began with Celestine 1 (422-32), to reach its high-point under Leo the Great (440-061). Following in his footsteps, Gelastus [ (492

96) propounded in a letter to Emperor Anastasius I the outlines of the theory of the

two powers:

“There are two means, your

Majesty, by which this world is chiefly ruled,

the sacred authority of the bishops and the royal power. Of these the importance of that of the priest is all the greater, because they

will have to render an account in the divine

judgment even for the kings of men™ (DJ

347). These views

were taken over by the

False Decretals (attributed to lIsidore of Seville), and in conjunction with the legend of Pope Silvester (from the end of the 5th

century), which was further enhanced by the

“Donation of Constantine™ (probably in the

8th century), gained widespread currency in

the Middle Ages, being taken to mean that the worldly power of the Emperor was

subordinate to the spiritual authority of the Pope. The baptism of the Frankish king, Clovis I, as 4 Catholic, in 496 was a turning-

point in history. The cultural, linguistic and national gulf between the Latin and German West and the Greek East grew steadily

greater. The unity of Holy Church as desired

by Cyprian of Carthage came to an end, chiefly through the fault of the East, though not without grave responsibility on the part of the West. For on the Roman side the spirit of love and unity cherished by Cyprian had

weakened as early as Gelasius I, and was re-

enkindled in this period only for a time by Gregory 1. Most of the German rulers were

Arians and set up national Arian Churches in their kingdoms. The close ties established by the papacy with the East after 519 (begun by the successes of Popes Hormisdas and

Agapetus I) led to the long subjection of the

Roman Church to the imperial Church system of Emperor Justinian I (527-65). The Exarch of Ravenna ruled Italy as part of the Byzantine Empire and the Bishop of Rome was treated as a patriarch under the Empire — as was, for instance, Pope Vigilius I, 537-55. The great figure of Gregory 1 (590-604) comes at

the end of the history of the Popes in antiq-

uity. He knew he belonged to a vanishing

Christian antiquity but could still pave the way

Popes

for the

in the

world-wide

Middle

authority

Ages.

The

of the

papacy

appears in its purest form under Gregory: a

rule which meant responsibility; a pastorai office embracing the whole Church and wholly given up to Christian service of the brethren. B. Tur

EarLy

MiDDLE

AGES

In the early Middle Ages the Popes played an

important part in the entry of all the Germanic peoples into the Church and to some extent

that of the Slavs. The special reverence 1n

which the Germans held the Prince of the Apostles, Peter, the “‘keeper of the gates of

heaven’”, meant that they also held his successors in high esteem, since they bound

and loosed on earth for heaven. At the same

time,

the

papacy

extended

its

authority

universally, in spite of checks during some

periods of profound decadence. lts history 51

POPE in the Middle Ages was determined to a great

extent by the close connection between the spiritual and the temporal (imitiated by

Constantine), with all the problems this involved for both sides. The gulf widened between Rome and the Edstern Empire, which was profoundly shaken by wars and

religious disturbances and could no longer offer protection to Italy. The breach was

complete with the eastern schism of the 11th ceatury. The unity of Christendom was

destroyed. After the painful experiences of

the Crusades, the Unions of Lyons (1274) and of Florence (1439), carried out on the level of the hierarchy and involving political issues, with the papal primacy strongly underlined in both cases, remained ineffective.

The Anglo-Saxon (Benedictine) missionaries set up a close link between the German Church and the papacy, from the end of the 7th century on. Boniface also established close links between the papacy and the Frankish

Chutch,

which

had

almost

lost

touch with Rome, and with the ruling mayors of the palace. Thus the Franks became

conscious once more of the papacy as the

supreme authority in the Church, and the way was paved for the alliance between the papacy and the Frankish kings, and the link between Pope and Emperor which was to be

fraught with such consequences. The alliance

Nicholas I (858-6?) thm:twasna mn::e thgn an empty € of the end of the S‘Ith and mur:h aft:iw 1Uth

century was the saddest period in the history

of the Popes, apart from some pontificates of the Renaissance. Where the Emperor didnot

intervene effectively, the Holy See was at the

mercy of various despots and the jungle law of the Roman nobles.

The pdpacy was rescued by the German

King Otto I, who was then crowned as Emperor by John XII at 5t. Peter’s, in 962. The dignity of Roman Emperor remained

attached to the German King till the end of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806, Anointing and coronation were tesetved to the Pope in 1452

(last done

at Rome

and

at

1530

Bologna). In the following decades, the Popes were only safe as long as the imperial

power

was

conscientious

at hand.

The

energetic

and

Salian king, Henry III, took

swift steps to end the distress of the Church. Under his leadership the synods of Sutri and Rome in 1046 deposed the three rival Popes, Benedict IX, Silvester III and Gregory VI The move was almost universally accepted,

and greeted indeed with applause

friends of reform.

by the

C. THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE POPES IN THE MI1pDLE AGES

with the Franks materialized under Pope Stephen II (7527}, who came to France for help. Pepin the Younger swore an oath of friendship to Peter, Stephen II and his suc-

Along with the hereditary status of patrician, Henry III received from the Romans the

The rich donations of the Carolingians helped

German Popes in succession, able men and

cessors, promising to defend and help them.

the ancient Patrimonium Petri to take on the dimensions

of a Papal State, which

was to

remain for centuries in (contested) dependence on the FPrankish-German King and

Emperor. Charlemagne, 786-814, ordered his whole kingdom to adopt the Roman liturgy and canon law, while at the same time

Church and papacy became subject to strong Germagic influences. For all his reverence

for the Prince of the Aposties, Charlemagne left no room for doubt that he was the

temporal This was crowned Christmas

and spiritual ruler of his kingdom. not affected by the fact that Leo III him as Emperor in St. Peter’s at 800. As the power of the Carolin-

greater

independence

right of designation for the next appoint-

ments to the Holy See. The result was four zealous for reform: Clement II, Damasus 11,

Leo IX and Victor II. A new epoch began. A reformed papacy rose swiftly to be a worldpower. The Popes began at last to take the

work of reform in hand (Cluny, Gorze). Leo IX in particular (1049-54) brought home to

the whole West the universal significance of the papacy. Through his forceful and sometimes radical helpers, mostly from Lorraine

and

Burgundy,

the

college

of cardinals

quickly developed from a mainly liturgical

ministry into 2 body which was henceforth to be at the service of the Pope for the government

of the universal Church

—

2

to

change with which the establishment of the Roman Curia was closely connected. After the decree of Nicholas II on papal elections,

and Saracens. Even under the able rule of

sole right to choose the Pope. As the programme of the Gregorian Reform was pro-

gians

declined,

the

Popes

—

seemed

they

to

began

gain

bestow the imperial crown — but found themselves defenceless against the Normans 52

1059,

the

cardinals

gradually

obtained

the

POPE

gressively

realized, especially through

the

efforts of Cardinals Humbert of Silva Candida and Hildebrand (Gregoty VII), the urge for

faller “freedom™ for the papacy (libertas esclesiae) became more insistent. The papacy should not be part of an imperial Church system but be independent and above all kingdoms. The contrasting views of the Imperium held from the start by the Curia and by the German court, the differences of opinion with regard to royal and papal rights led under Gregory VII (1073-85) to open conflict with the Emperor Henry IV in the

Investiture Controversy, which had parallels

— though less violent — in most countries. With all the dedicated passion of his personality, Gregory upheld the purity and freedom of the Church and the absolutely unlimited authority of the Pope in the Church, to which kings and emperors must bow. The powers which earlter Popes had at times claimed were clearly and indeed drastically formulated by Gregory (in the Dictatus Papae) and were actually exercised, even to the excommunica-

tion and deposition of the most eminent ruler of Western Christendom. This papal

policy brought with it strong trends to ecciesiastical centralization and the imposition of Roman canon law and liturgy on the whole

Church.

Along

with

the

Emperor,

the layman, the non-cleric in the Church was

also in principle affected. The Gregorian age — in its glories as in 1ts miseries — is un-

doubtedly the greatest turning-point in the

history of the Popes. Right down to presentday efforts at a new orientation, the Catholic

Church has essentially been dominated by the thinking of Gregory VIL

The new authority and leadership of the

papacy was shown in the initiative taken — by the Pope and not the Emperor — in the

direction of the liberation of the Holy Land

(Urban I, 1088-99). Inspired by their sense of responsibility for all Christianity, the

Eugene I (1145-53), depicting the ideal papacy as spititual in character, The Pope

should be the successor of St. Peter and not of Constantine. Under the Emperor Frederick I, Barbaros-

sa, the second great conflict between medieval Imperium and Sacerdotium began (Hadrian IV, 1154-59, the only English Pope; Alexander

I11, 1159-81). The main issue was the imperial

suzerainty over Italy, Fearing that the Papal

State would be encircled and absorbed, papal

policy opposed the union of the kingdom of Sicily with the Empire. The conflicts became

more

and

empire”’

more

bitter.

of Innocent

from the new mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans), were clouded by the conflict

with the Emperor Frederick II, which finally

became a merciless war of annihilation against the whole house of Hohenstaufen. The fall

of the ancient imperial house of Germany was

soon followed by the decline of the worldwide authority of the papacy. There was no

winner in the end in the struggle between the “two heads of Christendom™. The two

institutions

suffered

irreparable

the “secularization”

losses

in

power and standing. The “protection” lent

by the French kings to whorm the Popes appealed weighed far more heavily on them

than the rule of the Hohenstaufens. As the national consciousness of the European

peoples awoke,

there was universal protest

against the “‘secularization™ of the papacy, the misuse of tithes collected for the Crusades

and the frequent imposition of ecclesiastical penalties to further political ends. The desire for a Pastor Angeliews who would renew the

Church was fed from many sources. But the

hermit Celestine V (1294} was followed by the domineering Boniface VII1 (1294-1303). His immoderate attempts to regain universal

D. Late

dangers:

the

during which Church and papacy gained strong though at times troublesome support

after the Gregorian age brought with it grave

Curia,

III (1198-1216)

greatest heights. The following pontificates,

of the King of France.

of the

“spiritual

power of the medieval papacy reached its

Popes devoted themselves for centuries to the Crusades, during which, from the end of the Middle Ages on, the notion of liberating Jerusalem was succeeded by the need to ward off Turkish aggression. The

increased political commitment of the Popes

In the

recognition

for the worldly power

of the

papacy (the Bull Unam Sanctam) ended in ruin. He was = -attered by the national power

MIDDLE

AGES

AND

RENAISSANCE

its lust for power and money, unheaithy centralization which disregarded the tradi-

In the early Middle Ages the young nations

This was what Bernard of Clairvaux opposed

whole

tional rights of the bishops and national traits. when he wrote his De Consideratione to Pope

of Europe

Later,

the

had gathered

circle

Church

ruled

of Western

round

from

life.

the Church.

In

Rome the

the

later

Middle Ages the forces at work in all realms

53

POPE of life were centrifugal. Nationalism became

stronger and stronger in States and peoples, Men

began

to be preoccupied

with the

freedom of the individual and sought to loosen the close social ties of the medieval

order. The Defensor Pacis of Marsilius of

Padua (1324) already anticipates, long before their time, the great upheavals of modern society,

After the failure of Boniface

VIII

the

(French) Popes — to the great detriment of

their universal standing — came to a great

extent under the influence of the French crown. From 1309 to 1377 they resided in the . “Babylonian Captivity” of Avignon. During this period, when existing canon law was disregarded in favour of a new system of

appointments and finances, the centralizing

trend of the Curia was greatly intensified and the influence of the Pope within the Church thereby greatly extended. But the papacy suffered still further losses in religious substance, 1n spiritual standing and in political importance, 2s the nation-States grew stronger and their rulers built up national Churches successfully. The struggle between the Avignon Popes, especially John XXII (1316-34), and the Emperor Ludwig IV,

the Bavarian —— the last great conflict of Impersum and Sacerdotinm in the Middle Ages — showed how dangerously low papal authority had suak. Interdict and excommunication,

too

often

abused,

had

become blunted weapons. The call for “reform of the Church in head and members” became ceaseless. There was radical criticism of the papacy as an institution from such men as Marsilius

of Padua,

William

of Occam,

John Wycliffe and John Huss. The “Exile”

had weakened the papacy so much that its greatest humiliation came upon it: the great Western Schism (1378), not conjured up by wotldly powers, like so many anti-Popes of the past, but induced by the highest circles in the Church, The difficult question ot whether after 1378 the Pope in Rome or the Popein Avignon had thebetter credentials could not be satisfactorily answered by the men of the day, as it still cannot be by Church

historians. The “Conciliar Theory”, propounded by earlier theologians and canonists and with roots in the thinking of the ancient Church,

was

now

voiced

more

firmly

as

jadge and deposs him.

This.

was’the

lin

taken at Pisa in 1409 and then by the General

CouncilofConstance, whichin the toomentary emergency affirmed the superiority of the General Council and happily re-established unity. In the long Conciliarist conttoversy it became clear that the greatest .crisis of the Church of the late Middle Ages was 2 constitutional one. The election of Martin V

(1417-31) was the turning-point in the highly dangerous Conciliarist movement. It was

due 10 no small measure to the tactlessness of Eugenc IV (1431-47) that a crisis arose

once more, at the General Council of Bagle,

with regard to the place of the Pope in the

Church. And it was also due to Eugene IV that so much stress was laid on the primacy of the Pope on the occasion of the union with the Greeks at Florence (1439). With the noble, cultured Nicholas V (1447-55), under whom the last anti-Pope (so far) abdicated (Felix V), the close relationship

between papacy and Humanism or Renais-

sance began on the whole to take shape, which -was to last till well into the 16th century. He 2nd many of his successors were interested in lending new lustre to the papacy and the Church by making them leading forces of culture. But the urgent question of reform was left unresolved. Under the successors of Pius I1 (1458—-64) the religious character of the supreme spiritual

office in the Church was woefully obscured

(Sixtus 1V, Innocent VIII, Alexander VI).

Julius 1T (1503-13) was a typical Renaissance

prince, full of warlike energy and with a fine feeling for art. Julius strengthened the Papal States as the external buttress for the modern papacy. With the undistinguished Fifth Lateran Council (1515-17), the last chance of self-reform before the “Refo:mation” was missed. Since the reform of the

Church had not been realized, the action of

Luther in the pontificate of the easy-going

Medici Pope, Leo X (1513-21) meant the gravest catastrophe for the Church and the papacy: the separation of the Germanic North and great parts of Central and Eastern Europe, as also of parts of France, in the

Protestant Reformation. E. CatHoLIC

MATION

REFORM

AND CounTER-REFOR-

the tribulations of the Church grew more dite. The General Council, as the representa-

With the cleavage of the Church in the 16th century the universal authority of the Pope

above the Pope and to be able if necessary to

shock

tive of the universal Church, was held to be

54

finally ceased to function, But the dreadful

finally

helped

the

movement

for

f

POPE

renewal within the Church to succeed, even

in the Curia, in a very painful process. The

short-lived efforts of the noble Hadrian VI (1522-23)

ended

in failure, and then

the

turning-point came slowly with the reign of Paul IIT (1534-49). reform,

lending

new

A thorough-going

life

to

Catholicism,

was powerfully launched by highly active new religious orders, especially the Jesuits, but above all by the General Council of Trent (1545-63). The Romans were now heavily predominant, and this gave postTridentine Catholicism its characteristic stamp. In contrast to the radical attack of the Protestant reformers, the Catholic reaction was manifested in the Counter-Reformation,

F. FroM THE PEACE Or WESTPHALIA (1648) TO THE FrRENCH REVOLUTION

The modetn age has been signalized by a progressive secularization in every field. Individualism and subjectivism quickly flourished. But the great rejection of faith and revelation only came with the Enlightenment of the 17th and 18th centuries. The papacy, though highly esteemed and inwardly consolidated, had to suffer further losses in

political and ecclesiastical influence, even in the Catholic States. It was a time of difficult

conflict with State and royal absolutism, with

an Enlightenment which was often hostile to the Church and the Pope, with Gallicanism

and theologically also in the special stress laid on the office in the Church, especially that of the Pope. After the merciless criticism

in France, Episcopalism (Febronianism) in

spontaneity and women in the late past. There

in the hope of avoiding political conflict, the cardinals elected honourable but mostly not outstanding men in the period between

voiced by the Reformation, authentic criticism within

the necessary, the Catholic

Church became difficult. The and frankness with which men had expressed their misgivings Middle Ages were things of the

was a new narrowness of mind. Strict pro-

hibitions and close supervision of the faithful became major preoccupations of the ad-

ministration. The grandiose flowering of Baroque splendour and even the world-wide

thrust of the missions under the guidance of the papacy could not make up for the losses

of the 16th century. Only minor successes attended later efforts at reunion with Protestants,

for

which

minds

noble

on

sides strove. The place of the Pope

both

in the

Church proved to be, as 1t still is, the most intractable problem, Though some post-Tridentine Popes betrayed serious faults of character or intelligence, there could be no question now of “unworthy Popes™. The great reform Popes, Pius V (1566-72), Gregory XIII (1572-85) and Sixtus V (1585-90) made the papacy,

as was fitting, the decisive and successful leader of the Catholic reform. Clement VIII, Paul V and Gregory XV continued the work. The permanent papal nuncios became henceforward important figures in the po-

litical

and

ecclesiastical

realm.

With

the

establishment of the Propaganda Congregation (1622) the papacy finally took over the guidance of the expanding foreign missions. But the political weakness of the papacy was exposed in the Thirty Years” War and

the

Peace

of

Westphalia

(Urban

1623—-44; Innocent X, 1644-55).

VIII,

the German State Church, with Josephinism

in the Hapsburg lands and in general with

the sovereignty increasingly claimed by the national Churches everywhere. Probably

the

Peace

and

of Westphalia

the

French

Revolution. The incorruptible, deeply reli-

gious Innocent X1 (1676—89) and the learned, conciliatory Benedict X1V (1740-58) formed between Relations brilliant exceptions. Church and State underwent a series of

grave

crises

throughout

at the end

of the

17th

and

the 18th century, especially in

Catholic lands. The problem was to find a modus vivendi which would do justice to the

modern State and satisfy the Church, without

detriment to the essence of the Church or the

just claims of the State. The problem was not to be solved without fierce struggles,

The papacy was not prepared at first to

yield any of the rights which it had hitherto exercised or claimed or even to give up the wishful thinking of the Middle Ages as regards papal authority in the Church. The

ecclesiastical doctrine of papal rights was further developed. It was confronted by

the actuality of the State Churches of the 18th century, where the central notion which

dominated everything wasthat of the absolute

power of the State to which all were to be subject, whether as individuals oras corporate

bodies.

According

Enlightenment,

to

the

jurists

of the

even in Catholc lands, the

ordre naturel de [ Etat was such that its sovereignty could not be challenged from within or from without. The rights exercised and claimed by the bishops and superiors

of orders were thereby questioned, as was

55

POPE

thepasition of the Pflp& in the Church. The

Papal States, the whole notion of 2 State under a priest, had become questionable to the new age. The programme of the Enl.lght:nmcnt of the 18th century remained in essentials the ideal of the 19th and even of the early 20th century. The attitude taken by Church and papacy towards the Enlightenment was to

be decisivein their relationship to the modern wotld. From the beginning of its history the

Church had always been the spearhead of each new break-through of fertile impulses

in various realms of life. But in the modern

age it allowed itself to be forced back on the defensive or even withdrew voluntarily to such positions. In the 18th and 19th centuries the Popes often clutched convulsively at the traditional forms and formulas of a2 vanishing or vanished world. The clearest losses of the Church in the 18th century were in France,

where it lost vital contact with the cultured classes. Thete was a disastrous separation of faith and knowledge and there was no intellectual giant among the faithful, like Augustine or Albertus Magnus or Thomas, to build a new bridge between the brothers

who

had become enemies. There was no

lack of sincere efforts in the 18th, and above

all in the 19th, ceatury. But success was slight,

The preliminaries to the suppression of the Society of Jesus, and the actual suppression by the Pope (1773), or the humiliating and

practically fruitless pilgrimage of Pius VI

in, Previous diffic: Mpate with what Pius V1 {1??5—»99) nmi h.is smwsor Pius VIIT (1800-23) had to suffer from the French Revolution and Napoleon. two Popes had to undergo the

These wosst

humiliations which befell the modern papacy.

The brutal violence done to them and the courage with which they bore their grievous fate won

them

sympathy

throughout

the

whole civilized world. The final act of the Congress of Vienna on 9 June 1815 restored the Papal States to the Popes with little loss

of territory, Consalvi, the Cardinal Secretary

of State to Pius VII, began carefully to rebuild the badly shattered order. The new otder in Church and Papal States was set up, like the structure of most European countnes of the time, in the spirit of “restora-

tion”, the closest possible approximation to

conditions as they had been before the Revolution. But no *“Holy Alliance”, no between covenant concluded painfully “Throne and Altar” could bring back the days before 1789. The papacy seemed at first to find strong support in the new trends of the day. The Pope was applauded, by Protestantsas wellasCatholics, as the mainstay of the religious and conservative tendency and the guardian of “legitimacy”. Even more eagerly than the political forces, whose sincerity was often questionable and whose main interest was the preservation of order, the

poets

and

thinkers

of the

Romantic

Movement such as Novalis and F. Schlegel in Germany, hailed the papacy as their champion.

of the papacy. But the Popes of this century

In France, the genius and eloquence of Chateaubriand depicted Christianity as the religion which towered high above all

disasters that came upon them. When one looks at the long list, there are only a few

gyrics of the papacy is given by Joseph de Maistre in his Da pape of 1819.

to the Emperor Joseph IT at Vienna in 1782 are telling examples of the political impotence were

entirely

not

unmistakable

without

blame

for the

to changed

others. The classical example of such pane-

circumstances and abandon ocutmoded claims,

The French Revolution and the meteoric passage of Napoleon had unleashed forces

(1721-24),

channelled for a short while by the triumph

though short

efforts

to adapt

there were such efforts under

reign

of lnnocent

XIII

the

and especially under the cultured Benedict X1V (1740-58), as also under the unhappy pontificate of Clement XIV (1769-74). G. Tye Paracy

iN THE 191H CENTURY

The 19th century, the era which really runs

from the French Revolution to the First World War, is the century of revolution and

industrialization. With the revolution against tradition the tradition of reveolution also set

56

in Europe which could only be superficially

of the ancient regimes. The spirit which had provoked the upheaval could not long be gainsaid. After the banishment of Napo-

leon Europe was in a ferment in which forces

were working for and against the Church and the papacy. The new dawn which had come up in thunder also revealed new positive possibilities for the Church, Had they been taken up, the Church could have contributed considerably to the inward peace of the disturbed continent. But down to the end of

the century

the Popes

mostly

missed

the

POPE

chance of allying themselves with the just demands for freedom, for better living conditions for all and for sound progress — as they ought to have done to enable the

Church to carry out its task in the world. Time and again throughout the many years of grave decision the papacy of the 19th century proved to be completely at a loss. It took no major and inspiring initiatives. Down

to the pontificate

of Leo

XIII,

the

Popes were content in general with a hostile condemnation of the real and sup-

posed errors of the age, which were, however,

very widely regarded as laudable progress. Retrospectively it is clear throughout that the

restoration of the Papal States, which were in

the spiritual liberty of the Holy See, Pius refused to transform his crumbling

States

into 2 modern constitutional State. After the

revolution of 1848, when he had to flee in

disguise, he returned completely to the system of his predecessor, with the support of his Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli. The educated classes in the Papal States became more and more estranged from the Church and the papacy. They were embittered by a spiritual government which allowed no political freedom to the citizens and even interfered gravely with private life. The Ttalian Minister Cavour had little difficulty in exploiting this situation in

the

favour of national unity under the Piedmontese House of Savoy. During the FrancoPrussian War the remnants of the Papal

of Consalvi, and like his successor, Pius VIII,

porated into the new kingdom of Italy (1870). After some hesitation, Pius rejected the guarantees offered in the law of the new

a permanent state of mortal agony till their

inglorious

end

in

1870,

constituted

gravest hindrance to the universal task of the papacy. Leco XII (1823-29) abandoned the policy steered

a

strictly

centralizing,

absolutist

course. Gregory XVI (1831-46), personally

amiable and undemanding, remained as Pope the unworldly political innocent which he had been as 2 monk. His uncompromising notion of papal authority, as depicted in his 11 trionfo della Santa Sede of 1799, determined

the whole policy of his pontificate. The Papal States were heavily in debt and badly

administered,

but

the

necessary

reforms

were neglected. The Pope, like his successors, refused

to

countenance

the

Risorgimento,

the popular movement for nationzl unity in Italy. The Papal States were constantly convulsed by rebellions and assassinations, and papal rule could only be maintained

States, Rome and its hinterland, were incor-

Italian State. From then on he regarded himself as a prisoner in the Vatican. The Catholics of Italy who were loyal to the Church found themselves faced with a grave conflict of conscience, since they were

forbidden

by the Holy

See to co-operate

actively in any serious way with the State. Peace was only made in 1929 between the

Vatican and the Quirinal, the papacy and

the Italian State. Within the Church, the long reign of Pius was marked by the further growth of foreign missions and of the hierarchy, but still more by the increasing centraltzation in

Rome, by the flourishing state of popular

piety, in which the papacy playedanimportant

phenomena of the new age. In the encyclical

role, by the universal growth of Ultramontanism and by the progress of Catholic movements and parties in the potlitical

errors and the concrete claims of the liberalism

of neo-scholasticism,

with the help of unpopular foretgn troops. Gregory showed himself hostile to all the

Mirari vos of 5 August 1832, he rejected the which was then a mighty force throughout Europe, condemning along with indifferent-

ism the freedom

of the press and freedom

of conscience, and the principle of the separation of Church and State. Under Gregory, the way was paved for the predominance of the “Roman” theology of neo-scholasticism. He steadily supported the expanding foreign missionary activity of the Church and the development of the hierarchy. Under the pontificate of Pius IX (1846-78), the jubilztion which had greeted the accession of a supposedly “liberal” Pope soon gave way to a sober re-appraisal. In the name of

sphere. There was also the full development

the great affair of the

Syllabus with its list of eighty of the “main errors of the day” and the First Vatican

Council. The intention of Pius IX in publish-

ing

the

encyclical

Quanta

Cura

and

the

annexed Syllabus (1864) was to protest againstlaicization, naturalist views of religion and the erection of the will of the State or of

the human will to an absolute. A solid barrier was to be set up against the general process of

secularization and the spiritual revolution of the new age. The publication of the Syllabus,

in a set of propositions in which no reserves

ot distinctions were made, was greeted by a storm

of protest.

In libera] circles, and

also

57

a

1

-

-

'

.

f

-

A L

*

*

S LR

' I"|I’

POPE

" subseq there uen were varions tly forms of the mpf. giins and lay people, it was zegarded as 3 KulturkaFirst Vatican Council had taken up The among many open-minded Catholic theolo-

harsh rejection of modern culture and the

modern

State, as also of the conguests of

whete the Council of Trent had left off three

liberty in the last two hundred years. The preparations for the First Vatican

bundred years before, at 2 point whete the

declarations (1869-70) can only be under-

a2 definitive solution: the relationship of papal power to the other powers in the

Council, its actual course and its doctrinal

stood in the light of the situation of the Catholic Church and the papacy in the 19th century.

Only two of the schemas or drafis came before

the Council for discussion and these again were only voted on in part. The dogmatic constitution Def Filius, drawn up against

pantheism, materialism and rationalism, was

a clear, brief summary of Catholic doctrine

on God the Creator of all things, on revela-

tion, faith and

the relation between

faith

and reason. Serious difficulties arose only with the draft text of the De Eeclesia Christi

in which the position of the Pope in the

Church, his primacyand universal episcopacy, including the infallibility of his magisterium

in matters of faith and morals, were to be

dealt with. The dogmatic constitution Pastor Aetersus of 18 July 1870, having described the papal primacy over the whole Chutch, the full effective jurisdiction of the papacy, then goes on to define papal infallibility as follows: ‘““The Roman Pontiff, when speaking ex cathedra, that is, when in the exercise of his

office of pastor and teacher he defines with his supreme apostolic authority a doctrine

of faith or morals to be held by the universal

Church, possesses, through the divine assistanice which was promised him in blessed Peter, the infallibility with which the divine redeemet wished that his Church be endowed in the definition of a doctrine of faith

ot morals. Hence such definitions of the Roman Pontiftf are irreformable of themselves, and not by virtue of the assent of the

Church.” With the enunciation, as dogma, of the universal jurisdiction and the doctrinal infallibility of the Pope a long development had

reached a climax. As the worldly power of the papacy collapsed, the solidity of the Church was impressively demonstrated at a central point of vital importance. Some countries wrongly feared that the new dogma would cause a shift in the relationship

had struggled

Fathers of Trent

mast

pas-

sionately and finally given up the effort to find Church and in the wotld, the doctrine of the Chutch. In 1870, however, the solution given

was only a partial one, with the stress entirely on the papal element. The intespreta-

tion of the texts, which were very difficult in parts, and further clarification of the relation-

ship between Pope and bishops remained

a task for theologians. It was taken up once more ninety years later at the Second Vatican Council, where 2 more precise view of the functions of the Catholic episcopate was to restore the displaced balance. On the whole, the legacy of Pius IX was an oppressive one. Undoubtedly, the Catholic Church was inwatdly strengthened, but it stood in isolation within a hostile world. Leo XIIT (1878-1903), with his humanistic and conciliatory approach, succeeded in calming most of the storms and disturbances which had arisen, and in many ways initiated the correct approach of the Church to the modern world and its problems. Leo’s openness as regards the “social questions™ which had long become acute is significant. His Rerum Novarum {1891) began the series of the great papal social encyclicals. Intellectual discussion in the Church had been lamed and repressed in the fight for the Syllabus

Vatican

and

totally quenched.

I, but had

The views

not been

of the many

important theologians and laymen who aimed at up-to-date reforms soon led to new

conflicts, which are associated with the terms “Americanism”, ‘““Modernism’ and “‘Inte-

gralism”.

and

They

reached

started

a dramatic

under

Leo

climax under

XII

the

non-political Pius X (1903-14), whose main

concern was religious revival. Along with some wayward developments and errors

a

number

of

promising

initiatives

were

mercilessly suppressed. The fact that so many good men of all ranks, bound in love

medieval Popes. In some countries, especially

and a sense of responsibility to their Church and the papacy, were needlessly treated as heretics casts a dark shadow on the pontificate of Pius X — a Pope who did much for

were taken against the Catholic Church, and

Christo”)} and reforms within the Church.

between Church and State, seeing jt as a new assertion of the authoritarian claims

Prussia

58

and

Switzerland,

harsh

of the

measures

religious

renewal

(“Instaurare

omnia

in

POPE H., Tue Paracy 1Ny Tae 201w CENTURY

work,

As a historical era, the 19th century ended only with the First World War (1914-18).

The whole reign of Benedict XV (1914--22)

was within the shadows of this war, which he

tried in vain to shorten. His repeated efforts to act as mediator in the cause of peace, especially in 1917, ended in failure. In 1917

Benedict published the Code of Canon Law

which had been in course of preparation for many years and came into force at Pentecost, 19 May 1918. His encyclical Maximum illud of 30 November 1919 gave new directives

to Catholic missions. Europeanization was to be abandoned and due attention paid to the national and cultural charactenistics of the peoples in missionary lands. Continuing the preliminary work of Benedict XV, Pius XI (1922-39) worked hard

ruled the Church

from a centralized

standpoint during the war and the post-war

years. He found himself forced to extreme caution. The Pope had to be among and aboveall nations. He was soberly and emphatically reserved as regards all political systems and forms of State organization. True to the

motto which he had chosen on his election —

“Opus justitiae pax” — he strove for peace on the basis of justice. He took up many fundamental religious questions in his frequent allocutions and encyclicals. The greatness of his pontificate will only be fully measured in later times, when partisan hatred and favour have yielded to a dispassionate assessment. The brief but epoch-making reign of John XXIII displays clearly an unremitting

but completely relaxed and unhurried effort to understand and exercise the Petrine office in the spirit of sacred Scripture. John’s new

at the ecclesiastical consolidation of countries ravaged by war and constant revolutions. In the bankruptcy which was the legacy of

and often unconventional and even improvized style of Church government grew out

attention to the supra-temporal kingship of

Christian pastoral concern — but also out of

the

World

First

War,

called

Prmus

men’s

Christ. In 1929 the “Roman question” which had been kept open since 1870 was finally resolved. The Lateran Treaties made

peace between the Holy See and the Italian State. The Pope received the tiny Vatican City with some extra-territoriai estates as a

sovereign State ( Statodella Cittadel Vaticano ). It

was

a happy

The

solution.

necessary

external independence was preserved, without the burdens of a large State. Since the end of the old Papal States, the papacy has stood out all the more clearly as a spiritual institution, as a moral authority in the world, down to the present day. Many of the concordatsand otheragreements between Church and State under Pius XI were but of short duration. The Second World War (1939-45) shook

the world to its foundations in new upheavals.

This devastating war, withitsstill incalculable

consequences,

could

be prevented

neither

nor shortened by Pius X1 or his Cardinal Secretary of State and successor, Prus XI1.

Since the days of Benedict XV, the Popes had found themselves confronted —

in the

midst of a world to a large extent unChristian — by the anti-Christian totalitarian

systems of the century: by Fascism, National

Socialism and Communism

transmutations. formation,

Pius

extensive

XII,

in their various

with

historical

a classical

knowledge,

sober objectivity and a strong appetite tor

of his compelling human kindness and his

the conviction that the Church had to find

new, contemporary forms if it was to do its work properly in the modern world. The

hieratic rigidity in which

the Church

was

undoubtedly locked now came to be loosened. After a long period of papal centraliza-

tion, a2 new

sense of the significance of the

episcopate and of the co-responsibility of lay-folk in the Church began to develop. Immpelled by the spirit of brotherly love and a sincere desire to understand, a new phase began in the encounter with the Churches

separated

from Rome,

and a new encounter

ensued with the modern

world and all its

problems. The new insight into the Petrine

office was manifested above all in the effort

to promote the unity of all Christians and in

the

convocation

and

actual

course

of the

Second Vatican Council {1962-65), in the introduction of necessaty ecclesiastical re-

forms,

in

the

presentation

of

the

true

universality of the Church as transcending all

national and cultural barriers, 1n 2 new sense

of Christian responsibility for all mankind. The Second Vatican Council, brought to its conclusion by Paul VI (Pope since 1963), was the clear sign of the serious will of the

Catholic

Church

to

self-reform.

It was

a

fundamental re-consideration on the part of the Church with regard to its missionary mandate in the world of today. The pontificate of Paul V1 is wholly in the service of this

59

POSITIVISM programme. This may be seen from the consistent implementation of ecclesiastical reforms, and, externally, from such matters

as the meetings with the Ecumenical Patriarch

of Constantinople at Jerusalem and Istanbul,

the reciprocal annulment of the excommunications of 1054, the journey to the Eucharistic

Congress at Bombay and to the headquarters of the United Nations Organization at New York, meetings with representatives of non-

Christian religions, contacts with statesmen

including those of communist countries and the ceaseless, passionate endeavour to bring about peace and social justice.

It should not be forgotten that the break-

through

in the Church since John XXIII

would not have been possible without the

preparatory work done by the papacy since Leo XIIL In the last century and a half of the history of the Popes, the way has led from a hostile rejection of all seemingly menacing trends to a loving understanding

of the modern world, even of the fallen, guilty, irreligious world, inspired by a sense of Christian responsibility. In the 20th century

the papacy appears as a world power of the Spirit, which proclaims the word of God and serves the cause of justice and peace in an

unquiet and gravely threatened world. The Catholic knows in his faith that the Church and its papacy will live till the consummation of the world.

See also Early Church, Constantinian Era, Invasions ( Barbarian), Schism 111, IV, Crusades,

Middle Ages, Reform, Investiture Controversy, Avignon

Exile,

Renatssance,

Conciliarism,

Reformation,

ularization, fansenism,

Humanitm

Enlightenment,

Gallicanism,

1,

Sec-

Episcopa-

lism, Josephinism, French Revolution, Romanti-

cism, Liberalism and Liberal Theology, Indiffer-

entism, Charch and State,

Infallibility, American-

s, Modernism, Integralism, Ecumenical Movement, Church and World. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

See¢ the articles on the indi-

vidual Popes in DTC,

LTK,

Oxford Dictionary

of the Christian Church (1957), New Catholic Encyclopaedia (1967); also: L. von Pastor, The History

of the Popes from the Close of the Middle .Ages, 40 vols, (1891 8.); H. Mann, Liver of the Popes in the F:orly Middle

Ages,

18

vols.

(1902-32);

E.

Caspar,

Gesehichte des Papsttums von den Anfingen bis gur Flibe der Wheltherrsehaft, 2 vols. (1930-33); ]. Schmidlin, Papstgeschichte der newesten Zeit, 4 vols.

(1933-39); |. T. Jalland, The Church and the Papacy (1944);

(1960);

E. P.

E.

Y.

Paschini

Hales, and

Revolution

V.

and

Monachino,

Papacy

eds.,

I papi nella storia, 2 vols. (1961); F. X. Seppelt and

60

é!:.r zm' G’gamrr (1%@ Job# and bis Revolution (1965), G SCMe@_ Grschichie dar Pdpsie im 20, Jabrbunders,

sources and bibliographies (1968).

with

Georg Schwaiger

POSITIVISM 1. Philosophical, I1. Moral.

1. Philosophical 1. Concept. Positivism is not a definite doc-

trine which can be assigned to any particular

epoch of philosophy, but 2 certain attitude towards science and theory. It is always characterized by distaste for traditional philosophy, with especially sharp criticisin of metaphysics, not only with regard to certain tendencies or results, but even with regard to its basic problems and methods. It is further

characteristic

of neo-positivism,

as

the genuine development of older positivist principles, to make philosophy a science directed by the methods of the exact natural sciences. This does not lead to a categorical rejection of philosophy, but to the effort to set up a “‘new’”’, “different” philosophy, purified from zll unscientific, speculative or metaphysical elements.

The starting-point of positivism, epistemclogically, is that the only possible source of

knowledge is the empirically tangible datum, by which is understood the multiplicity of

sense

impressions.

All

the

assertions

of

traditional philosophy which go beyond this cannot be vertfied in the light of given facts

and hence are not objects of science.

The

human ego is ultimately the sum of a number of regular psychological, logical and other relationships. Its independence with regard to the world, in the sense of its being a person, cannot be deduced from the data and

hence i5 not an object of human knowledge.

2. History. There were positivist tendencies

in ancient scepticism, in Epicurus and the nominalism of the Middle Ages (in the controversy about universals). But the English empiricists are regarded as the real

founders of positivism. F. Bacon (1561-1621) sought to base all human knowledge on ex-

perimental and inductive science. T. Hobbes (1588-1679) rejected all metaphysical bases of law and only recognized law as laid down by the State. But the most decisive contribution to the development of posi-

POSITIVISM

tivism was that of D. Hume, who held that.

human knowledge could only rest on mathematics of on empirical facts. of causality is nothing of an

the sciences dealing with His discussion of the principle typical. Experience tells us intrinsic connection between

cause and effect. We can do no more than register how often the same result follows

the same cause and apply our experience to natural phenomena in the guise of “laws” recognized by us. Causality is not an objective link between

cause and effect, founded

on

being, but a subjective recognition of temporal succession which is arranged systematically

with

the

help

of

psychological

associations. Hume divides the data accessible to our cxperience and knowledge into two main groups: impressions, which arise both from sense perception and our experience of our

outward

ideas,

and

states,

inner

and

which are reflections of our impressions. Positivist

notions

to

came

the

France with the Encyclopédistes

fore

in

(I3’ Alem-

bert [1717-83] and Turgot [1727-81]). They also demanded that scientific activity should be restricted to what is perceptible by the senses and rejected all specuiative and hypothetical knowledge which went beyond the

of

domain

sociological

The

experience.

positivism of A. Comte (1798-1857) was the most influential of all. Applying the notion of science as concerned with facts to history, he divided it according to the three

scientific stages of humanity into the ages of

theology, metaphysics and positive sciences. In this process man frees himself from the

hondage and tutelage of faith in God and the then

gods,

fruitless

the

from

eflort

of

philosophy, and finally attains to independence

and

to mastery

over

nature,

whereby

he creates for himself the possibility intervening in the course of the world

of to

change and improve it (“voir pour prévoir, prévoir pour prévenir,

voir’).

prévenir pour pou-

The basic positivist attitude was given a new orientation in the neo-positivism which

originated in the Vienna Circle. It is distinguished from the older positivism by the

shift of philosophical enquiry to the realm of logic and linguistic research — the instru-

ments of scientific assertions. The most important representatives of this trend are M. Schlick, L. Wittgenstein,

Neurath

and

B.

Russell,

one

R. Carnap, of the

O.

main

proponents of symbolic logic. The task of philosophy is not the investigation

of facts,

which are left to the exact sciences, but the

logical analysis of the units of language (words, propositions, speech as a whole) with which we speak of the wotld (investigated by science). Neopositivists allow only two types of meaningful propositions: propositions about factual relationships stemming from experience (4 posteriori) and verifiable by experience; propositions about purely logical relationships which provide no knowledge about facts and hence are valid independently of experience.

The logical analysis of these propositions, which are made with the help of language, is the task of philosophy. According to Wittgenstein, philosophy is not a doctrine but an results

It

activity.

not

in

“philosophical

assertions” but in the clarification of propositions. Language can be reduced to “elementary propositions” deducible, as logical

data,

constructions,

from

elementary

the

them

the effort is to give

and

sense-

greatest possible consistency and exactness. This also helps to show that all the traditional

of philosophy

problems

are either strictly

scientific ones or are actually meaningless,

since the exact investigation of the logical

structure of language ultimately eliminates all false views about the object of scientific research.

3. A critical discussion of positivism must start with its claim to make philosophy an

exact

science.

The

positivist

attitude

is

induced by the scandal of disagreements in philosophy. In contrast to the natural sciences, with their constant gaining of ground,

philosophy gives the impression of being at a stand-still. The problems which philosophy took up at the beginning of its course still

remain unsolved. Positivism draws the con-

clusion

that

whatever

be

the

interest

of

philosophy, it provides no access to knowledge in the sense of science.

The preference of positivism for the purely factual and experimental is in keeping with the

mood

of

modern

times.

But

while

positivism boasts of its objectivity, it repre-

sents in fact an arbitrary and unjustified restriction both of the object and method of enquiry. Its method is to determine beforehand what can be accepted as real, thereby

forbidding reality to display itself in its full

ambit.

FExperience

is more

than

what

1s

equally available to all. Experience of the given is only open to us within a transcendental horizon. If philosophers failed to reach

61

N,

B

SITWISM .

agresment, amnm

")

frmlackufpxwfs

' but because their approach was dictated by

different presuppositions. in each case. Positivismn fails because it lacks openness to

experience in all its dimensions including the

religious and metaphysical, from which synthetic 4 priori judgments could be jus-

tified. This want of openness means that pasitivismo, in spite of its humane intentions,

is silent in face of the great human problems. But the verdict on positivism should not

be entirely negative. Without its restrictive negations it can be salutary. When it insists

that knowledge must build on human ex-

perience, it is a sharp reminder to the philosopher that his task is to explain and change

this world and not to construct possible worlds.

Further,

for proofs

its unconditional

of a statement

forms

demand

a good

counterpoise to the dogmatism which can appear in philosophy. The nature of truth is not just to satisfy the mind. [t must express the reality which is displayed in experience. Positivism has also a contribution to make to theology. It reminds the theologian that faith and redemption are not so much a matter of theory as of history and experience. If theology is taking on a new form today, it is partly because it recognizes that its first task is not the erection of a logical system but the

patienit investigation of what God has revealed. — For positivistic aberrations in exegesis, dogmatics, and moral theology, see

Biblical Exepesis1, DogmalV, Moral Theology . See also Principle, Knowledge, Logic, Natural Law 11, Empiricism.

IE Maml‘

L

|

1. The conceps. Motal positivisms hotiu&t the

denizl ‘of universal,

fibjflfitlw and changeiesy

norms in the moral order. Whenever the good is reduced to defimble norms and not

lc& in the state of a general exclusion of the bad, there is always some changein standards.

But moral pnfltwlsm also rejects all absolute

imperatives in morality, which might then in turn be formulated as changeless norms, No

human

acts are essentially good

or bad,

absolutely imperative ot forbiddtn, and hence possibly so for all men. The objective

morality of an act and the moral obligation in its regard do not depend on the mentality

and on the object of the act, but on something which is outside the object and can be subject to change,

2. Types. Two kinds may be distinguished.

a) Theonomous moral positivism holds that

the moral order depends for its structure and obligation entirely on the “absolutely” free will of God. It is not founded on the nature of God and a reality formed according to his “tmage”. Good is whatever God decrees is good, evil is whatever God decrees is evil. Moral values depend entirely on God’s free will. This view, held by Occam and the nominalists, is based on the assumption that

there is neither good nor evil prior to the decree of the divine will, which is absolutely free to decide one way or the other, b) Autonomous moral positivism holds that moral norms are not derived from the nature of things or of man, or from divine

A, Comte, Cours de philosophie

revelation. They are rather “invented” than

positive, 4 vols. (1851-54), E.T.: System of Positive Polity (1875-77; teprint, 1966); John Stuart Mill,

soctal life in its various political, economic and human relationships. This notion of the

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

positive, 6 vols. (1830—42); id., Systéme de politique

“uncovered”, their purpose being to regulate

A. Comie and Positivism (1866); L. Wittgenstein,

moral norms was already put forward by the

Tractatus logico-philosophicus (1922),

German

text

with E. T. by D. Pears and B. McGuinness {1961); R. Carnap,

The Logical Syntax of Langaage (1937);

M. Black, Language and Philosophy, Studies in Method (1949); V. Kratt, Der Wiener Kreis: Der Uriprang des Naapa.rififif:mm

(1950);

M.

Macdonald,

ed.,

Philosophy and Analysis (1954); R, Carnap, Meaning and Necessity (2nd ed., 1956); ]J. Lacroix, La soctologie d Anguste Comte (1956); ]. Hospers, Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (1956); A. ]. Avyer, ed., Lagical Positivism (1959); W. M. Simon,

Enropean Positiviim in the Nineteenth Century

(1963);

R. Carnap, The Logical Structure of the World (1964); id., Pseudoproblems in Philesophy (1964);

F. Belke, Spekulative und wissenschaftiiche Philosaphie (1966); K. Dirr, Metaphysik und wissenschaftiiche Philosophie (1967).

Robert Q. Johann

62

Sophists

of antiquity,

provides

no universally

who

held

that the

difference between right and wrong, good and evil, was based not on the nature of things but on human convention (so Protagoras, Aristippus and Gorgias). Montaigne and Hobbes likewise held that nature

valid norms,

The

only general rules are those laid down by the law of the State.

With the progress of the empirical sciences,

ethnology and comparative religion, more was learned about the differences in the moral

laws as formulated among various peoples. Doubts were expressed abour the existence of general and objective norms recognizable

POSSESSION, DIABOLICAL

as such. Developments were also noted in

the course of the history of ethics, which suggested that morals, like the rest of cul-

ture, had evolved from primitive starting-

points,

3. Critigue. It cannot be denied that morals

differ from people to people. And the differences are due to the various social,

“prophetic” formulation, the moral “imperative”, Seealso Discernment of Spirets, Ethics, Morality, Naitnral Law 1, Situation Ethics. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Morakity;

also:

E.

A.

See bibiiographies on E#bicr,

Westermarck,

The

Origin

and Development of Moral Ideas, 2 vols. (1906-8);

the conclusion drawn from these data by the

H. Sidgwick, Outlines of the History of Ethics (6th ed., 1931); J. Leclercq, Les grandes lignes de la philosophie morale (1946); D. ]. B, Hawkins, M and Morals (1960); B. Russell, Human Society in

historical world of values, but because of an

lagir bumain (1962); A. tion: The Foundations of (1964); J. Maritain, J. Pieper, Reality and Melsen, Physical Science

economic and political conditions in each case. But the question remains as to whether

moral positivists is valid. Morality is reduced to an empirical problem. Nonetheless, it is more than a question of statistics and history — not in the sense that there is a supraunconditional dimension in moral reality, which remains beyond human measure even though ittakes concrete form in the historical. It is given with the essence of man and the

nature of things. Man’s self-realization as a

Ethics and Politics (1962); 1. de Finance, Fssai sur

Sesonske, Value and Obligaan Empiricst Etbical Theory Mora/ Philosophy (1964); the Good (1967); A. van and Etbics (1968).

Irenee Gonzdley POSSESSION,

DIABOLICAL

person and in society, his shaping of the world or his dealings with it, confront him with an “ought” in the demands of morality which is not at the mercy of his arbitrary will, The obligation is tc be defined for each concrete situation, but is of itself prior to each historical situation. The fact thar this claim of morality is given different answers at

In the study of religions, “possession’ means

that he is conditioned to some extent by his

hour™ of the good itself. The very changes

though his responsibility is diminished or at times totally absent, his personality is not tully disintegrated. The many evil powers mentioned in the

permanently the same, point not only to the opposition between an abstract, non-his-

power of evil, which is designated as Satan or the devil. Since they are called “power”,

contrast between a concrete, ““incarnational™

threats from higher powers. Their inward drive is towards corruprion and destruction

various times and in various places is simply due to the “‘historicity” of man - the fact

culture. But his history is what it is not just by the favour of man, but because it 15 “‘the which

ensue,

being

changes

of

what

is

torical “rationalistic” morality and the relativism opposed to it, but, above all, to the morality and a moral positivism which 1s in fact amoral. The contrast therefore is not between

being dominated by extraordinary forces of

good, personal or non-personal (see Enthuszasm). In Christian usage, it means the exceptional action of non-hurman but personal evil,

the

“principalities

and

powers”.

Someone is “beset” from outside or taken

possession of from within. He can fall sick,

physically and mentally, and break out in aggressive and blasphemous rages, but

NT

appear there as the agents uf a basic

“force”, “‘might”, etc., that s what they are:

(1 Cor 10:10;

]Jn 8:44),

iliness

and

death

(cf. the affinity with death, Mk 5:1f.), sin

the

(often connected with the devil, cf. 1 Jn 3: 8). They lie, disguise themselves as angels of

tions of it. Moral positivism has a real task to perform, but in a new and legitimate sense.

sow weeds among the wheat (Mt 13:39), They make themselves masters of the world.

rationalism and relativism, but between

comprehensive truth and one-sided falsifica-

The changeless good has in fact to be realized differently in time and place, on the social as

well as on the individual plane, and there is

always need to establish new positive norms.

In this sense, the task of moral positivism 1s

both to maintain the permanent cizims of the

“principles” and to aim also at the “applications™, the “discernment of spirits”, the

light (2 Cor 11:14), set saares (1 Tim 3:7),

They make the elements appear as gods (Gal 4:8f.; Col 2:104.). Political and social institutions (Rev 13) and historical situations (1 Thess 2:18; Rev 2:10) heir mischievous spirit. sphere, they are active in (1 Cor 10:196.;12:2; Rev

are permeated by In the religious heathen worship 9:20), they induce

feelings of self-complacency within the law

63

POSSESSION, DIABOLICAL (Ju 8:44; Rev 2:9), and defbrm the wisdom

of Christian teaching inte heresy (2 Cor 11:13€.; 1 Tim 4:1; 1 Jn 4:1). If men allow themselves

atmosphere,

to be infected by the they

become

Satanic

themselves: car-

riers of disease. They make room fotr the devil {Eph 4:27) and become his “children™ (cf. Jn 8:41,44). Thus sin is the work of both

man

and the

demonic

forces

devil

show

Mote

palpably,

themselves

the

in men

through illness and possession. The latter is then simply an exceptional manifestation

of a “religious” element which affects all men, that of demonic influences, ana can only be properly understood against this %‘El-?em background of dizbolical activity. ough in the NT possession as such is distinguished from sickness, the latter always has the connotation of possession, because

ultimately caused by The victim “‘has” the is his dwelling-place. is the place where the and the source from

the great destroyer. demon (Lk 8:27) and And again, the demon possessed man dwells which

he lives. The

usurpation can be so complete that the victim identifies himself with the demon{Mk 5:6.). However,

the

observable

phenomenon

of

possession is “already a combination of demonic influences and the mentality of an individual {or age), his dispositions, susceptibility to illness and even parapsychological powers. It 15 neither possible nor necessary

to distinguish

their various

proportions”

(K. Rahner, LLTK, 11, cols. 29941},

Though

God,

they

the

use

demons

their

were

power

as

created their

by

own,

in opposition to God. They have been overcome by Christ. His work on earth was an endless struggle against them. “The reason

the Son of God appeared was to destroy the

works of the devil” (1 Jn 3:8). Jesus commands in the power of God (Lk 11:20),

which is his through his obedience. His victory is complete, though the triumph is

not manifested before the parousia. Till then, the “principalities and powers” continue to work, though knowing that they are doomed (Mt 25:41; 1 Cor 2:6). Hence the virulence of their assaults (Rev 12:12), which

is particularly manifest in possession (Mt 8:28f.).

Their

attack

is

concentrated

on

Christ and his Church. Through baptism, Christians are exposed more than ever to such attacks, but are equipped to meet them,

Here it is also true that God allows no one

to be tempted beyond his strength and that the Christian can be his Christian self, 64

through grace, in every sitwation {cf+ D

1092). Jyst as the demon. is at work in the

“sons of disobedience” (Eph 5:6), so toa the

obedience of the Christian places him within the sphere of Christ’s victory. He bears in Christ the “armour of God”, part of which is “all prayer and suppliciation” (Eph

6:11-18). This usually takes the form of the “deliver us from evil” of the QOur Pather,

but there is also an exceptional form, the solemn prayer of exorcism uttered in the name of Christ and the Church and by their command. Since a clear distinction cannot be made

between possession and sickness, be-

cause every sickness can be at least to some

extent the effect of demonic forces, exorcism

and medicine go hand in hand in the struggle against possession. In view of the remarkable similarities between posscssion and the symptoms which can be observed in psychiatric clinics, extreme

reserve is necessary in diagnosing a case of possession. “The guiding lines laid down

by the Church are clear and firm, both for the recognition of a miracle or apparition

and for deciding on the reality of a case of demonic possession. A supernatural explana- |

tion of the facts may be accepted only when

every natural explanation is impossible and

has been proved to be so. To have reasonable

doubts, it is not necessary that the natural

explanation should be proved or that it is probable. It is enough if it remains possible. Furthermore, if something which is really pathological is taken to be supernatural on grounds which are not absolutely compelling, the harmful consequence ensues that the illness is ultimately encouraged and reinforced,

instead

of being

cured”

(J.

de

Guibert), It must also be noted that modern parapsychology shows that we must not be too hasty in declaring that something is beyond man’s powers. Hence many things which

were

once

taken

as

signs

of true

possession can no longer be taken as such, without further proof. In practice, the victim must be helped

to bear his trials with resignation, whether they be sickness or possession. He must be

convinced that even the demonic is spanned by divine providence and that God allows nothing that would be beyond human strength, with the help of grace. Anything which might make the sufferer more excitable must be avoided, such as any publicity, This latter precaution is very necessary where there is 2 disposition to hysteria. If the

POTENTIA OBOEDIENTIALIS

condition persists and deteriorates, the doctor

accepted (pofentia oboedientialis for the act). The legitimacy of this concept can of course

must be called in and eventually the Church

authorities, the latter alone being competent to decide whether the rite of exorcism should

only

Summers,

The

History

of Witcheraft and Demonology (1926); J. de Tonquédee, Les maladier merveuses ou mentales ot les

manifestations

diaboligues

(3td

ed.,

1938);

J.

de

Guibert, ZLegons de théologie spirituelle, 1 (1946), lecons 23--24; Safan { Etudes Carmelitaines) (1948); E. Fascher, Jesus und der Satan (1949); A. Rodewyk, “Die Beurteilung der Besessenheit”, ZKT 72 (1950), pp. 460-80; A. Huxley, The Dervils of Londun (1952); ]. Lhermitte, V'rais et fanx possédés (1956); H. Thurston, Gbhests and Poltergeisis (new ed., 1959); B. Thum, R. Schnackenburg, A. Rodewyk 294-300; H.

the

New

and K. Schlier,

Testamens,

(1961).

Rahner in L.7TK, 11, cols. Principafities and Powers in

Quaestiones

Disputatae

in

the

light

of the

his sclf-communication, the fulflment of the

See also Devil, Psychology IV M.

recognized

revealed truth that God himself can be, by

be used (cf. Ritwale Romansm, Titulus X1I, czp. 1, no. 3).

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

be

3

Karl Viadimir Trublar

spiritual creature. The creature is open to such fulfilment but still must accept it as a grace, not something owing to it. Hence too the concept can only be legitimately

applied to the relationship of nature and

grace (and hence also union). This does not analogy with the notion of in which every degree of because

of

the

divine

to the hypostatic exclude a certain self-transcendence, the created world, dynamism

of

its

becoming, leaves itself behind by rising to the next degree of being (see God-Worid

Relationship,

FEvolution).

But

this

self-tran-

scendence, which is implied in an evolution-

ary

world-view,

differs

from

the potentia

oboedientialis in the classical sense, inasmuch

as self-transcendence means the ahsorption of the earlier in the new (matter-life-spirit), while the porentia oboedientialis specifies a

possibility of self-transcendence in the direc-

POTENTIA

tion of immediacy

OBOEDIENTIALIS

found

in

Thomas

looser sense,

Aquinas

is already

and

Peter

of

Tarantasia. It is not found in early scholastic-

ism. In a very general sense, it means the capacity of the creature, obediently accepting the disposition and action of God, to receive a determination for which the creature 1s not “inpotency” in sucha way that this determination is *due” to it. The potency is not such

that if not actualized by the determination in question it would be frustrated, and hence

could not have been constituted by a wise creator

unless

this

determination

were

to

be added. The concept is used above all to

define

more

supernatural

in the

precisely

order (of grace) the relation between nature

and grace. Nature communication

to the creature.

2.

is a pofentia choedientialis

supernatural

the

for

The

a) Hence

grace,

of God,

material

the concept

which,

as self-

is in no way owed

content

of

the

which

does not

eliminate the nature of man. The concept of

1. The formal notion. The actual term, though

used in a somewhat

to God,

nolion.

of the potentia obne-

dientialis points to the fact that there can be a genuine fulfilment (act of the potency)

which is not due to the natute in guestion,

ie., cannot be counted on and claimed by virtue of the nature but only “obediently”

potentia oboedientialis can be explained in human terms through the experience of love between two persons. Each receives the love of the other as the fulfilment of his existence,

but still as a gratuitous gift which he cannot claim. by The potentia oboedientialis of man ot another spiritual creature for grace cannot be any individual potency (faculty, etc.) of a

particular,

regional

kind

/7 man.

This

is

excluded by the nature of grace as the selfcommunication

of God,

which of its nature

necessarily claims the whole man. It s also

excluded

by

the

concept

of

the potentia

oboedientialis ttself. For a particular faculty,

ordained from the outset only to actualization by grace would be frustrated without this actualization and hence would not be “aboedientialis’”. Hence the patentia oboedientialis

must be identical with the spirituai, personal

nature of man as such. By reason of 1ts unlimand konowledge in transcendence ited freedom, this nature can be potentiality for the

self-communication

of God,

since it is

thus capable of receiving this self-communica-

tion without being eliminated thereby and

ceasing to be a human

and creaturcly being,

This being is purely pofentia “obaedientialis”, hecause this unlimited natural transcendence

in knowledge and freedom, being the condi65

tion of possibility of personal being and

sexi’”, Angustinus concinente Thotma-séhisel

have meaning without this self-communica-

“La stmcturc analogique de'!’ tellfict, fondem ent

the mete condition of encountering the world (fellow-men and environment} in knowledge

and action. But if this transcendence is recognized as the material element of the

poténtia oboedientialis, one sees that grace fs still the fulfilment of the spiritual nature itself — not something tacked on arbitrarily and ‘“‘extrinsically” to the being of man, Nature is not pure potency for grace in the sense of a purely negative non-repugnance,

as it is often described in modern theology. In warding off this misunderstanding, the doctrine of Aquinas about the desiderium naturale of the vision of God is still relevant. The fulfilment of a nature and the gratuitousness of that fulfilment are not contradictory concepts in the case of spiritual beings. c) Inasmuch as the spiritwal faculties (intellect, will) participate in the unlimited transcendence of human nature and effectuate it, one can of course also speak of their being

potentia oboedientialis for supernatural grace. Inasmuch as these faculties necessarily have active aspects as well as passive, the notion of a potentia obeedigntialis activa cannot be absolutely rejected as meaningless. But when

Lagrange,

obédientielle

av

surnaturel”,

miste 10 (1927, pp. 3-1%; R. Gamgou “L'appétit

naturel

et la puissance

obédienticlle”, Reswe Thomiste 11 (1928}, pp 474-528; G. Laporta, “Les notions d'appétit naturel et puissance obédienticlle chez S, Thomas”, ETL 5 (1928), pp. 257-77; P, Balzaretti, “De natura appetitus naturalis”, Asgeficum 6 (1929),

pp- 352--86, 519-44; H. Lange, D¢ Gratia (1929),

especially pp. 525fl' A. Pirotta, “Disputatio de

potentia nboedlentmh“ Divus Thomar (Piacenza) 32 (1929), pp. 574-85; 33 (1930), pp. 12548,

360-85,

560-75;

M.

Blondel,

Lz problime de /s

Natural Desire for God

in 8t. Thomas”™,

philosophie satheligue (1932); A. Darmet, Les notions de raison séminale et de puissance obédientielle cheg S. Thomas et S. Angustin (1934); A. Rainer, “De possibilitate videndi Deum per essentiam”, Divus Thamas (Piacenza) 39 (1936), pp. 307-30, 409-29; 40 (1937), pp. 3-21, 113-28; W. R. O’Connor, “The

New Scholastivism 14 (1940), pp. 213-67; V. Carro, “La distincién del orden natural y sobrenatural, segian St. Tomas y su trascendencia en la teologia y en el derecho”, Ciencia Tomista 62 (1942), pp. 274-300;, H. Bouillard, Conversion et grice cheg St. Thomas d' Aquin (=

Théologie 1} (1944}, pp.

80-82; E. Elorduy, “La potentia obédiencial en Suirez”, Lar Ciencias 9 (1944), pp. 815-33; L.-B. Gillon, “Aux origines de la puissance obédientielle”, Revwe Thomiste 47 (1947), pp. 304-10; V. de Broglie, De fine uitimo bumanae vitae (1948),

pp- 245—6G4; G, Frénand, “Esprit et grice sanctitiante”, La pensée catholigue 5 (1948), pp. 25-47;

H.

de Lubac,

“St. Thotnas.,

Compendium

theo-

rightly understood, in contrast to many Molinist theologians, it means that man per-

logiae, c. 1047, RS R 36 (1949), pp. 300-5; M. ].

from a faculty already elevated by grace. The

all’apertura dell’ordine naturale a quello

forms a salutary action which does not come

action only receives this elevation qua act.

See Grace and Freedom.

3. The notion of potentia oboedientialis can also be applied correctly to the relationship

of the human nature of Jesus Christ to the

hypostatic union. (See Imcarnation.) Human nature

is

a pofentia

oboedientialis

for

the

radical self-expression of God, which is actualized in Jesus Christ. (See K. Rahner,

Theological

157-92.)

Investipations,

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

V

[1966),

pp.

See bibliographies on Grace,

Nature and Grace; also: |. von Kuhn, Natur and Ubernatur (1864); K. von Schitzler, Natur und Ubernatur (1865); M. Limbourg, “Uber die

potentia oboedientialis”, ZX7T 16 (1892}, pp. 231-72; R. Martin, “De potentia passiva hominis ad gratiam et de potentia obocdientiali®, £TL 1 (1924), pp. 3526f.; A. D'Alés and A. Gardeil, “Autour

de

la

puissance

obédientielle’”,

Revwe

Thomiste 3 (1926), pp. 523 -7; . Sestili, “De natura

Deo

66

subiecta

in ordine ad supernaturalia

quid

Scheeben, Gesammelte Gnade (4th ed., 1949);

Schriften, 1: Natur und G. Cali Ulloa, *“Intorno

naturzle”, Sapienga 5 (1952), pp. 242-56;

sopra-

H. Urs

von Balthasar, “Der Begriff der Nartur in der Theologie”, ZXT 75 (1953), pp. 452-64; E. Gutwenger, “‘Nator und

Ubernatur™, ZKT 75 (1953),

pp- 482-97; ]. Martin Paluma, “La potencia obédiencial activa en el plano metafisico segin

Suirez”, Archive Teoldgico Granodine 16 (1953), pp. 32?—75; G. Colombo, “Il problema del sopra-

natutale”, Problemi et orientaimenti di tealogia dom-

matica (195?)

pp. 5>45-607

(with bibliography);

V. Canchy, Diésir naturel et béatitnde chez §. Thomas (1958); J. Alfaro, “Person und Gnade”, Mflnrbe— ner Theologische Zeitschrift 11 (1960), pp. 1-19; U. Kihn, Nater and Gnrade (1961); K Rahner,

‘Cflncernmg the Relationship between Nature and Grace”, Theological Investigations, 1 (1961) pp. 297-318; E. Przywara, Religionsphilosophische $chriften (]962) especially PP 443-59; B. Stoeckle, “Gratia supponit naturam’, Geschichte wnd Anralyse

eines theologischen Axioms (1962); H. Rito, Recentioris theologiae guaedam tendentiae ad conceptum ontologica-personalem gratize (1963); G. de Braglie,

“Possibilité et impossibilité de la ‘foi naturelle’”, RSR 52 (1964), pp. 541, 370-410; D. Dockx, “Du désir naturel de voit 'essence divine selon St. Thomas

d’Aquin®,

Archives de Philosophie 27

TN

the transcendence were actualized only as

R#FHETga

uissance

T T

tion of God, i.e.; if the reference to God in

Thomas (Piscenza) 4 (1?2'?},;? 57-93; A.Gatdeil,.-

N

freedom’s histoty,; can be in act and hence

Diows

N

POTENTIA OBOEDIENTIALIS

POVERTY

(1964), pp. 49-96; H. dc Lubac, Augustinisme o théologie moderme (= Théologie 63) (1965); K.

Rahnet, “Nature and Grace™, Theological Investigafioms, IV (1966), pp. 165-88; H. de Lubac, The Mystery of the Supermatural (1967); K. Rahner,

Hearers of the Word (1968).

Karl Rabner

POVERTY I. Christian Poverty. II. Medieval Movements.

they embody men’s sheer need of deliverance,

I. Christian Poverty

Poverty is a lack of the means of subsistence

(food,

clothing,

shelter,

and

so

on).

But

besides privations of this kind, poverty also connotes helplessness when faced with the demands of life: ignorance, wezkness, bondage, isolation, defencelessness against injustice. Such poverty is more or less relative. The most radical experience of poverty is the absolute destitution of death. 1. Seripture. Revelation gives poverty its

full meaning which

both

opens

a man

as inescapable for God,

and

distress

as the

humble, loving abandonment of one’s own

rights. a) Though the OT often represents wealth as a blessing and poverty as divine chastisement and retribution, the rich man as godly, the poor man as a sinner, the prophets and

post-exilic thinkers began to realize that the rich man is all too likely to harden his heart

at the distress of his neighbour, to succumb

to self-righteous “‘impiety”’, ruthlessly using his power to exploit others, whereas personal

experience of distress often fosters solidarity with one’s fellow-sufferers {(in exile, for

instance). It was the humiliating experience of want

and

servitude

in Babylon

tion. So seriously did he take men’s distress that he proclaimed the poor blessed and promised that they should have their £l (Mt 5:1-12). He promised salvation (Mt 11:1-6) to all who in their need should trust him, not presuming to shut themselves against him (Mt 9:12). The “food” which Jesus promises the hungry is the kingdom of God. Thus he does not come as a social revolutionary. He loves the poor because

which

and because in their distress they are prepared to listen to his message. He shares their poverty, requiring the same poverty of those who would follow him (Mt 8:20 par.; 19:12-21

par.),

so that they

may

devote

themselves wholly to God’s kingdom. Jesus

does not commend poverty out of contempt

tor wealth or for purely ascetical reasons (ct. Mk 14:3-9; Lk 8:2f.; 10:38). Christ makes love for our suffering brethren mean-

mgful (Mt 25:31-40) as a disclosure of the Father’s perfection and glory (Mt 5:16, 48). The famifia Dei (Jn 15:9-17) is grounded in helplessness freely accepted and sincere altruism. Acts 4:32 (““they had everything in

common”) does not mean that the primitive

Church rejected private property; it explains the preceding statement: ““The company

of those who believed were of one heart and

soul.” In the NT

only the Letter of James

ical

his

actually condemns possessions and riches. Jesus’ attitude, especially the sacrifice of his life for his brethren, reveals the soteriologcharacter

of

poverty.

In

him,

ali

poverty is a sign of man’s forlorn and needy state, and at the same time a possible way of salvation. 2. Moral

recognized

theology.

by

the

Poverty

sufferer

must

first be

as a fact.

By

chiefly made poverty a religious term, synonymous with “humility” and “piety” (Isaiah, Psalms, Zechariah, Proverbs). For

nature every form of poverty demands admission of one’s own inadequacy. It is

Israel, which

finds refuge only in its God

efforts, whatever the successes of civilization

and

development brings new problems and dangers — or first makes us aware of them. Man can never make his life perfectly secure,

Isaiah

(14:32;

the

preached

“poor”

25:4;

are

49:13).

to these,

simply

God's

“Yahweh's

oppressed

kingdom poor”,

1is

they are exhorted to await his coming glory

with perfect trust. b) New Testament. It is only with Christ that the religious significance of poverty

becomes fully clear. His unbounded abnega-

tion and self-sacrifice unto death reveal the glory of the Father (Phil 2:5-11}. Sharing

men’s distress unto the end, Christ made the

living God present by his death and resurrec-

part of the human condition that distress can

never be altogether abolished, whatever our

and technology, that each advance, each new

Certain privations are thrust upon us; certain

others

must

be “voluntary”

in a special

sense - the sacrifice of our life, or something

precious, if the gnod of our neighbour or of the community requires it, or it we know we are called to follow Christ and serve God’s kingdom.

67

POVERTY

a) Material poverty. In the Western wotld

only

isolated

individuals

lack

the

bare

necessities of life. The understanding of povetty bas largely disappeated from these countries. Instead of material poverty we often find other forms of poverty— desolation of heart, a sense that life is meaningless,

anxiety, isolation —which must be interpreted 2s 2 kind of longing for redemption and love. A Christian who finds these things in himself ot in others must accept them in the spirit of Christ as a means of encountering God, as a call to travel new roads in Joving our neighbour. Besides such distress, there is the appal-

ling poverty of Asian and African peoples, which demands an enormous extension of

Christian love. We may no longer confine it to a narrow circle of people close to us, we must love people afar, everywhere. For if

voluntary poverty can be a redempttve thing,

destitution can beget hatred, bitterness, and

despair, and be a sign that men have not found love. Particular works of mercy alone

(almsgiving and works of “supererogation”)

can no longer cope with world-wide poverty.

Rational planning

is necessary.

Christians

must realize once more, as the primitive Church did, that private property is a trust,

given us to be intelligently used for the needs of all in accordance

with

*“social justice”,

This may mean renouncing personal wealth and the power it brings. Certainly we must consider how far certain economic systems (such as economic liberalism and uncontrol-

led capitalism) can be transformed so as to satisfy

justice

and

answer

contemporary

needs. No effective help can be given in modern mass societies without soundly organized, well-directed co-operation. b) “Spiritual poverty” plays an important role in Chnstian life. It means trying to live “as one who hopes”, humbly, in expectation

of Christ’s coming, leatning to dismiss the

cates of this acon in Christian detachment, The Christian is undemanding, and frugal in managing his goods. Religious seek to practise a special form of spiritual poverty, the basis of which

munities as such, St. Francis of Assisi gave this poverty its deepest and most beautiful form, Coenstant readiness to serve the kingdom of the good of one’s fellow-men, patience, love of one’s enemies,

are the fruit of spiritual poverty, which is 68

and

phatisaic formalism, the touchstone of genuine spitituality, what makes our total expropriation at death a salutary testimony.

3. The Church of the poor. People sometimes

speak romantically of the “Church of the poot”, There are two dangers here. Firstly,

Christians may be asked to livein a “Franciscan” way which is in reality only a dream of

the past,

This

is to ignore the changed

economy and manners of modern society, which is after all part of God’s providence. Secondly, this romantic ideal could be used

to evade the duty of alleviating (or even abolishing) distress to the extent which Jesus’ command of charity imposes on his disciples. After all, man’s increasing mastery of the world and his own political economy must be seriously acknowledged as a divine challenge, which summons Christians to be abreast of such developments in giving practica! effect to their charity. Nonetheless, just as there is no ultimate security in human life, whatever man'’s technical achievements,

so0 too in a deep theological sense the Church

will always remain “poor” — men following the Lord who emptied himself, accepting in faith and confidence the abandonment into which Christ preceded them in his death.

See also Charity 11, 111, Justice Y1, Evangelical Counsels, Soctal Mavements 111, IV, V. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

religiense

panvreté

La pauvreti. Probiimes de ia

daujourd’bni

(Paris

1952);

A.

Gelin, Ler panvres de Yapré (1953); P. Grelot, “La

pauvreté dans I’ Ecriture Sainte™, Christas 8 (1961),

pp. 306-30; G. Lucques, La nonvelle pauvreté (1961); ]. B. Metz, Armut im Geiste (1962); V.

Breton,

ed.,

Lady

Christian

Porerty

(1963);

Responsibility

(1963); G. Montin,

and

A.

McCormack,

World

Poverty

The Christian in the Material

World (1964); P. Régamy, Poverty (1964); Y. Congar, Power and Porverty in the Church (1964); A. -van Corstanie, The Covenant with God's Poor

(1966); 1. Gobry, Through the Needle's Eye (1967); F. Mussner, Der fakobusbrief (2nd ed., 1967), especially Excursus 1 on the spiritnality of the poor (E.T. in preparation).

Sigismund Verbey

is the actual, voluntary

poverty of individuals if not of their com-

God and penitence,

self-righteousness

for

best cure

the

II. Medieval

Movements

Many currents in a complex and many-sided

movement for renewal of the Church in the 12th, 13th and 14th centuries were stimulated

and

shaped

by

the

ideal

of evangelical

poverty, The Church — not only or even mainly the hierarchy — was attempting to do

POVERTY

justice to the contemporary

situation,

to

find a form for itself that would both accord

with its tradition and be appropriate to the times. The original concem of the reform movement was to establish the “liberty of the Church”, to free it from lay control as embodied in the system of imperial and proprietary churches. Its efforts to this end, first directed against the abuses resulting from too close an involvement of the Church in the world, led to 2 major separation of the

spiritual

domain

from

the

temporal

and

fostered the ideal of a spiritual Church apart from the world (thus Joachim of Fiore, for example). The conflict between Church and

Empire logically followed from the Church’s

growing sense of independence, its claim to primacy over the temporal power, and an associated idea of the Church that was rather narrowly clerical. Once disengaged

from the structures that had hitherto given it support and protection, the Church itself

laid claim to worldly powers, as was particu-

larly clear in the centralization of the Roman Curia and the papal claims to universal rule, e.g., by Innocent ITI. But the medieval Church, in spite of all its efforts, could not altogether separate itself from secular structures. The leading role in this Christian society increasingly devolved upon it, and even in the nonspiritual realm it had become part of the texture of the West. This may be seen from

the

impractibility

of the

solution

to the

Investiture Controversy proposed by Paschal IT and the unsuccesstul pontificate of Celestine

V. At the turn of the millennium, to be sure,

the compenetration of the spiritual with the power

temporal

had

been

beneficent,

and

prince bishops (like Ulrich of Augsburg) were revered as the kind of saint appropriate to the times. Even when the papacy had

triumphed over the emperar, the best representatives of the poverty movement did not object to the Church’s temporal grandeur;

and the mightiest of the Popes, [nnocent 111,

recognized poverty.

the

legitimacy

of evangelical

Moreover, the Crusades

were mo-

tivated not simply by the Church’s new consciousness of power but to a great extent by religious enthusiasm as well, and there is no doubt that they helped to turn the renewal

of secular politics, and not alone in the

struggle for supremacy berween Pope and emperor and in the tremendous influence of the Cluniac reform, Even the movement of the Pawperes Christi was not devoid of worldly interests. This is clear as early as the Patarines of Lombardy. Evangelical poverty influenced the Crusades and the foundation of the orders of chivalry. And it did not prevent St. Bernard of Clairvaux from intervening in politics. It sometimes threatened Church and State with nearanarchy (cf. Arnold of Brescia and Peter Waldo with the one-sided spiritualist conclusions they drew from the evangelic renewal; the Catharists with their unchristian dualism),

Nevertheless,

the tendeny

from the world, which

to withdraw

for various

reasons

kept reappearing in one form after another,

was basic to the medieval reform movement.

Large numbers were attracted to the monastic

life, and this flight from the wotld found characteristic expression in the eremitical

movement, which combined the tradition of the Eastern anchorites with the cenobitical

life, usually

Benedict

on the basis of the Rule

(for

example,

the

of St.

Camaldolese

and Carthusians). The simplicity and austerity

of life in the wilderness were also found attractive, as by the Cistercians. The cases of St. Bernard, and of St. Peter Damian, who

exerted a powerful influence as an ecclesiastical statesman

and author,

show

that strict

detachment from the world did not necessarily mean that one could not make oneself felt in the life of the Church.

The popularity of pilgrimage, which en-

couraged

many

to forsake

all things,

was

another facet of flight from the world. This

form of piety, which also contributed to the

Crusades (cf. Peter of Amiens and his followers), took on 2 different character when the more mobile townsmen began to

develop a monetary economy alongside the

stable,

localized,

agricultural

feudal society. The new

bourgeoisie

{rising

both

economy

of

men of the rising economically

and

soctally) now take abandonment of the world to mean turning their custom of “travelling about the world for the sake of gain” (St.

Francis of Assisi, Regula non bullara, cap. 8)

into an apostolic way of life, and proclaim

the gospel

as itinerant

preachers

without

of medieval piety in the direction of evangelical poverty.

money or possessions, living on alms (7644., cap. 9). No doubt, the beginnings of this

movement made themselves feltin the domain

mitical and monastic life, Robert of Arbrissel,

On the other hand, the effects of the reform

movement are closely linked with the ere-

69

POWER

for example, and Norbert of Xanten, with their followers, based their community life on the Benedictine or Aungustinian rule, in accordance with the requirement of eccle-

siastical authority that some existing rule be

adopted (for example, Fourth Lateran Council, can. 13). But the later forms of the

mavement for poverty retained their own

proper character — the Waldensians in opposition to Church authority, and the Franciscan Order as a renewal of Christian

life 2ccepted by the Church as thoroughly Catholic.

In this situation the dualistic rejection of

the world

preached

by the Catharists

was

dangerously misleading. Their condemnation of the Church’s wealth and worldliness sprang from such wholly unchristian prin-

St. Bernard

of Chiirvaux — increasingly

became the spur of reform, the standard in the light of which men judged the successors

of the apostles,

sometimes

therefore

occasion of anti-clerical movements (the Waldensians, for example) in cases where the clergy were hostile to change. St. Francis of Assisi set the most felicitous example of holy poverty, combining affirmation of the world with utter seif-denial in an evangelical life that he made acceptable to the Church of his titme, without any suggestion of dualism or anti-clericalism. Quarrels

among the Friars

Minor (over the question of mendicancy and communal property) later led to institutional forms being imposed on the spirit of religious poverty in the Order of 5t. Francis and in the Church.

The vital urge was thereby,

tion and the visibility of the Church.

no doubt, to overshadowed.

which the reform movement characteristically referred, whether aiming at correcting

See also Reform 1, Middle Ager 111, Crusades, Catharists, Religious Qrders.

ciples that they even denied Christ’s incarna-

Primitive observance was the criterion to

abuses or at establishing new forms of life. Thus monks who adopted oriental practices and withdrew into desolate places revived the Benedictine rule in a new, austere observ-

ance, notably in the Cistercian reform. The case of St. Bernard indicates on what depths the renewal of religion drew, not motivated by the letter of the rule or human achievement but by the redemptive image of the incarnate

Son of God who became poor for our sake.

Many clerics, too, no doubt influenced in part by the monastic revival, began to embrace a life of poverty. It was chiefly the Augustinian rule that commended itself to these zealous reformers. It became the rule,

for example, of Orders founded tensians) and St. affected by the entered

the Austin Canons and the by St. Norbert (PremonstraDominic. Laymen too were religious awakening: they

monasteries

as

cemverst,

or

formed

secular brotherhoods associated with religlous houses 50 as to live a semi-momnastic lite in the world. The orders of chivalry are

notable examples.

Whatever part was played by the influence of the Crusades and by changing social conditions, the religious renaissance in the

medieval Church sprang largely from new

reflection on the gospel and the life of Christ,

on the manner of life of the apostles (ILk

9:111.) and the primitive Church in Jerusalem (Acts 2:4411. and 4:32f1.). The poverty and

humility of Christ, the vita apostolica — already the theme of the new Benedictine piety, as in 70

thé

some

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

extent

repressed

or

Curia,

D. Douie, Nature and Effect

of the Heresy of the Fraticelli (1932); H. Grundmann, Religidse Dewegungen im Mittelalter (1935); P.

Hughes,

A

History of the Chaurch,

111 {1947);

A. Fliche and V. Martin, eds., Histoire de 7’ Eglice (194811.), VII, pp. 427-62; IX[1, pp. 13-42, 91-132; 1X/2, pp. 288-352; X, pp. 156-94; M.

D.

(1961).

Lambert,

Franciscan

Poverty,

1210-7323

Sigtsmund Verbey

POWER 1.

Nature

of the gquestion.

There

are

two

theological reasons why it is important to understand what is meant by power. a) Power is one of the primary religious tdeas;

mankind’s

awareness

of God

is an

awareness ot him as powerful. Power is of the first of God’s attributes. That is the case in OT and NT revelation. possihility and existence of the creation

on

God’s

omnipotence;

the

election

one also The rest and

guidance of Israel are viewed as its manifesta-

tion in history; Jesus’ good news concerns the reign and kingdom

of God,

that is, the

perfect expression and exercise of his power;

as Christ and Lotd, Jesus shares in that power and even the new knowledge of the God who is love discloses this love precisely as the essential and central feature of God's power. b} A right attitude to power is fundamental in human social relations. The Christian’s

POWER

citizenship

in heaven

(Phil 3:20), and

the

knowledge that to Christ the Lord all power

is given in heaven and earth (Mt 28:18) and that he will return to establish and perfect

God’s kingdom, exclude any absorption in

the possession of, striving for, exercise of or dependence on earthly power. Renunciation of force and the passive suffering of violence are imposed as an obligation on his disciples

by Jesus’ teaching and example. Nevercheless, power 13 to be exercised by God’s commission

for the sake of 2 well-ordered life in this aeon

(Rom 13:1). Readiness to accept this acon as

the moment granted by God will lead to serious respect for power as well, In fact, out of charitable respoasibility for others, the Christian must even be ready on occaston to

the second degree, the difference enters into the being of beings itself: power as active self-preservation in being. This stage is met with when the being of beings goes out of

itself, when this present being determines its future form. Such power only occurs where

being is “‘present to itself”; then it attains the

plane of self-determination and is an active potency and faculty, freedom. Yet power is only perfect and reaches its highest and authentic level, when being can determine not only itself, its own form, but can also determine what is other than itself which comes to exist by it, yet without its origina-

tor’s ceasing to be one with itself and to endure. This is power no longer as persistence

in being,

nor as self-preservation,

but as

assume and exercise power, though here too he will only hold it as though he did not

giving. Such power, however, annuls in itself the difference between present and

2. Natnre of power. 2y Power is chiefly in question in the sphere of human social

everything

(1 Cor 7:2911).

reiations, but it is also present in nature and

indeed in all domains of reality. To exist is the most universal and primordial form of power; what s, In proportion as it is, is powerful; being and power are identical, Why then speak of power at all and not merely of being? Power is both identical with being and an intenstfication of being, 2 “plus”

being,

alwavs

being.

At

the

intended

very

in

and striven for by

least

it signifies

that

mysterious “plus” contained in the fact that

the being of beings does not simply disappear

and

dissolve

quired

remains

1nto,

when

it is contemplated,

grasped:

tdentical

with

it is

“‘still”

itself, remains

it was despite the difference berween and earlier; man

perceived

it, inquired

in-

there, what

later Into

future. power

It is the productive, creative of being itselt, thanks to which exists and

is what

it is, and

by

which everything ultimately — in the passive sense — can be, in other words, omnipotence.

c) All beings presuppose the omaipotence which causes them to be and determines their

being. Such a power itself cannot therefore

be

a particular

powerful

being,

it must

yet

in

absolutely

order

and

to

be

pre-emi-

nently bear within it the degrees of power. Omnipotence absolute

must

source,

be

thought

in possession

of as

an

of itself and

freely deciding what is not itselt. By causing this

other

to

be,

it gives

it a share

in its

power, empowers what is not itself to persist

in being,

freely

to preserve

itself and

to

transcend itself by giving. For finite being to transcend itself freely into what is other than

itself, is only possible in social inter-relationships; here power has its authentic and

The idea of power does not arise in the silent

highest place within the creation. Power is thus essenatially identical with love: power, like love, is unity with itself in bestowing being on what 1s other than itself and allowing 1t to be and to be free.

maintain its unity with irself if it is to manifest

3. Political sncial pewer is the will of individ-

it, dealt with i1, but it proves resistant to his grasp, maintains itself against him, For power

to be in question a “difference”™ must intervene, the possibility of negation, or otherness.

absorption of pure being; the latter has to itself as powerful. Power 1s unity of being with itself despite a difference, the presence of future being in present being.

uals or groups exercising determining influ-

lowest, which belongs to the being of beings, and is identical with it, has just been examined:

powerful by the mere fact of willing, but because it imposes what it wills externally.

outside and maintains its own identity. With

at the same time it represents their will, by

b)

Power

exhibits

three

degrees.

The

power as persistence in being. The difference here, in face of which being persists, 1s external to it; being is called in question from

ence

on

people

the communal

within

otganized

life of a number

a common

strucrure.

Such

living a

will

space 1s

of

or

not

This external domain is the living space shared by a number ot people; they carry on their existence there, 1t is their “world”, and

71

PRAGMATISM

L}

which they fulfil themselves in their world.

If the powerful will works through the freely consenting

1

L]

will of others

in 2 common

domain of reality, power assumes the form of authority. If it acts directly on the external

" and manifested by the Father in the tesurreeof the Son.

power

tion as the supreme

Nevertheless the cross of power involves for

the Christian not only readiness for seifsacrifice, but willingness to accept power in

reality and determines the world of other people’s wills from outside, it takes the form of force. The possibility of foree belongs to power, but the latter is all the more powerful the less force it needs to employ and the more

its vulnerable earthly conditions. But even then it will only be accepted with detachment and will be valid only because it comes from

from extrinsic means. However, in the world

tions

nated; in the widest and fundamental sense

Totalitarianism, Revolution and Restoration Political Theology.

the power flows from within and not merely

as it is in fact, force cannot be entirely elimiit is posited by the very fact of corporeal

existence. The powerful will must not only be at one with the world and with the consenting will of the others who acknowl-

edge it, it must be at one with itself. This demands that what it wills ought to exist and its act ought to be posited, i.e., power must

be good and must be rightful. Finite will is not its own independent ground, consequently it must be responsible, and therefore good;

it must be empowered to act and therefore

God.

On the problems of the concrete manifestaof

power,

Authority,

State,

BIBLLIOGRAPHY.

see

the

Church

B.

articles

and

Russell,

Sitate,

Power,

Socdety,

Law,

A

1,

New

Social Introduction to its Stedy (1938); G. Ritter, Démonie der Macht (1940); B, de Jouvenel, Dx powvoir.

Histoire naturelle de sa croissance

E. Brunner, Mclver,

(1945);

The Divine Imperative (1947);

R,

The Web of Government (1947); A. Pose,

Philosophie du Freedom, Power P. Tillich, Love, dini, Power and

powveir (1948); and Democratic Power and Justice Responsibility. A

K. Mannheim, Planning (1951); (1954); R. GuarCosurse of Action

rightful; in that way it becomes authority. The real purpose of power is the powerfulness of what is good and right, in the form of the

Jor the New Age (1961); W. Foerster, ' ¢ovola™,

of the will with the world, “horizontally” in

Kiaus Hemmerle

common good. Power is therefore a harmony harmony

with

other

wills

in

a

TWNT,II,

pp. 560-75; K. Rahner, ““The Theol-

ogy of Power”’, Theological Investigations 1V (1966),

pp. 391-409; |. B. Metz, (1969).

Theology of the World

society

deciding and shaping a common world, and

“vertically” in harmony with the norm of the

PRAGMATISM

effective ordering of human society as existence in the world.

Pragmatism is the name gtven to a philosophical trend which appeared in the U.S.A.

4. Pawer and powerlessness. Power is at once

tounder was Charles Saunders Peirce (1839

good and rightful. In short, power

is the

persistence, self-preservationand giving. The

dimensions which are coterminous in omnipotence, split up in the realm of the finite. By willing itself, power wills what is other than

towards

the end

of the

1%th century.

Its

1914) and its most important representatives William James (1842-1910), who helped to

itself. The transition to the other, to allowing

make it widely known, and John Dewey (1859-1952), whose long activity ensured its continuing influence. Pragmatism is the

to the generosity of the divine will, demands

Western

the will of others, to unconditional consent

of the finite will, which is not the source of its

own power, a self-abandonment,

fice, self-mediation

questioning

its own

through

power.

self-sacri-

weakness, That

by

is why

first great original American contribution to

philosophy.

It began

by being a

method of logical analysis, i.e., of explaining

the content or significance of concepts and phrases and it went on to present itself in consequence of its analyses as a doctrine of

finite power is tempted to establish itself in

the nature of truth, at least insofar as this is

independence in face of the competition of other finite wills and against the claim of the absolute power. The redemption of power is

beginning.

self-assertion, to shut itself off in ostensible

the

cross.

Supreme

love,

in

Jesus'

death,

accepts self-abandonment to the will of the

Father on behalf of many, to be confirmed 72

known by man. As a theory of truth and knowledge 1t found wide hearing at the Pragmatism, as a theory of meaning, was

first formulated by Peirce (Fow to Make Our

Ideas Clear [1878]): “Consider what effects, that might

conceivably

have

bearings,

we

PRAGMATISM

conceive the object of our conception to have, Then our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.” The

notion of an object or event contains no more significance than that of the practical consequences to be considered, the attitudes and behaviour suggested, the experiences to be foreseen. If the concept is wrongly applied to a situation, the actual consequences will be other than those foreseen with and in the concept. If a number of concepts have the same results in practice, they are only different in name, but really mean the same thing. A concept without practical consequences, which

means

nothing

for our actions,

our

expectations and possible reactions, has really no meaning. This pragmatic rule for meaning, which included

the

reactions

of our

senses,

was

derived from scientific practice. In the theory

of Peirce, it was primarily a means of analysing

concepts

and

meanings

which

was

also,

to

his mind, the first if not the only task of philosophy — compare the preseni-day “linguistic

analysis”

in

England

and

the

U. S, A. Nonetheless, Peirce also had in mind

to re-shape traditional metaphysics, showing up its “verbalism and endless discussions™ as meaningless by means of his pragmatic

criterion of signification. This idea recurs in

logical positivism in a still more form.

emphatic

One consequence of the pragmatic criterion of meaning is that the truth of an assertion cannot be recognized through purely contemplative consideration or through comparison of the proposition with the object of

which it is asserted. The assertion has to be

tested in practice to see whether the empirical

results coincide with the expected ones or not: the “testing of a hypothesis by its actual working”. A judgment is true if it actually

regulates

our conduct,

that 1s, 1f it leads

to

successful adaptation to the possibilities and

demands of the matter in hand, As W. James

and F. C. S. Schiller said, more succinctly than

truth is concerned only with the “value” of thoughts. Dewey therefore suggested a correction which James afterwards accepted: truth is merely the value which is characteristic of thoughts which under practical testing

lead to the expected experiences. A judgment

about reality is true if and only if it is con-

firmed or is or can be verified by the further

course of experiences, directly or indirectly, A judgment about the past is only indirectly verifiable, by means of the traces which the past has left and which can be registered in the present. But no verification of judgments of experience can ever be complete, i.e., check all implied expectations. Hence the certainty which they offer can never be absolute. Thetr evidence is never apodictic. They can give rise only to judgments of a possibly

fallacious type — to what Peirce called “fallibilism™. They are propositions for which there are good grounds or a certain degree

of probability,

speaking proved.

They

but are not strictly

have what Dewey

called “warranted assertibility™, Finally, it is characteristic of pragmatism that it does not consider knowledge as an

independent function but as part of the process of life in the concrete. Knowledge

and science are in the service of life. They are

the most important means at man’s disposal

tor adapting himself to his natural and social environment and for meeting successfully

of daily life.

the difficulties and problems

Ideas, hypotheses and theories are so many “tools” for bringing about concrete aims in life. Hence Dewey could also term his theory “instrumentalism’™, Pragmatism was applied to the field of sncial science by George Herbert Mead

(1863-1931). He develeped a theory of the

genetic relationship of individual and society,

according to which society can be regarded as a complex of social customs developed by

man in order to master his environment. It is only by assimilaring these social customs in

his thinking,

feeling

and

that the

action

In

individual develops spiritually and is enabled 1o become a “‘self’’. Ideas like those of Peirce

has the right to hold this faith as true. But even Peirce and Dewey found themselves forced to modify the formula suggested

and W, Jerusalem of Vienna. What pragmatism was trying to determine

clearly, something is true if it is useful in life

and

brings

about

satisfactory

results

practice. If faith in God is usetul tor life, one

were represented outside of the U.S. A, by such thinkers as F.C.S. Schiller of Oxford was not truth in the abstract, independent of

by James. They held that while all that is true is 2 good, it did not follow that all that is good

.the process of knowledge, but truth as 1t 1s

value are not to be identified. In particular,

process of living experience. Butits upholders disregarded the important distinction be-

is also true. Endless peace would be a good, but must it therefore come abourt? Truth and

also

verified

and

justified

in

the

actual

73

PRAYER

Philosopher of the Secial Individusl (1945);

tween the element of validity or truth in jtself, and the procedure by means of which this

Thayer, The Lagicef Pragmatism(1952); A. Reeban,

The Pragmatic Humanism of F. C. 8. Schiller (1935);

validity is established or this truth is recog-

W. B. Gallie, “Pragmatism”, Engyclopasdia Britan-

nized. Truth and knowledge of the truth

wica, XVIII

rmust not be confused.

'This obscutity is compounded by a further defect of pragmatism, that the method of

establishing a truth is unduly empirical. The truth to be known and the field of meaningful discourse are restricted to what is given in

rience. This means the exclusion of all « priori or essential knowledge of a nonanalytic, i.e., synthetic type. In consequence, there could be no metaphysical principles by virtue of which, in a categorically valid way, experience could be transcended and the suprasensible known. And there could be no absolute moral norms by which one could determine what is good in itself, independently of what “one” (individually or socially) wishes or likes or in fact pronounces good. An ethical relativism, extending to the order

See

also

Experience,

be

would

Science

the

sources:

W.

James,

The Encyclopedia

“Pragmati_sm",__

Thayer,

H.

(1967),

VI

of Philosophy,

pp.

430-36: G. Bzorsky, ‘Pragmatic Theory of Truth”, ibid., pp. 427-30; J. Habermias, Erkesninis und Interesse (1968).

PRAYER A. Tue History oF CHRISTIAN PRAYER

Prayer, as generally understood, can take many forms. And it is significant that “in early times . .. the OT contains no general term for prayer” (RGG, 11, col. 1213). This

suggests that we should consider the subject,

which is certainly a unified theme, from more

than one aspect if we are to avoid over-hasty

conclusions. There are two classical defini-

tions. “Speaking to God” (or Christ) has been a spontaneous desctiption of prayer since the Apostolic

Fathers

(Swxhefic,

the

“raising

of the

bomilia,

con-

versatic). But theology adopted another definition, generally attributed to John Damas-

11, Positiviim,

Truth 1, Value, Social Philosophy.

BIBLIOGRAPHY.

(1959);

Clemens Schoonbrood

experience or what can be tested by expe-

of society and the State, inevitable consequence,

H.

cene:

God™.

to

soul

Undue stress on the notion of speaking to

ke

Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy

God

Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking (1907); id., The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to * Pragmatism’

of reducing the divine person to the level

(1897;

reprint,

1937);

id., Pragmatism:

A

New

Journal

Does

Pragmatism

of Philosophy

Democracy

and

5

Education:

Mean

(1908), An

by

pp.

Introduction

id,

to the

Philosophy of Education (1910); id., Human Nature

and Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology

(1922); id., Logic: The Theory of Inguiry (1938}; id.,

“Philosophy of W. James’’, Problenss of Men (1946), po. 3794, id., *The Development of American Pragmatism™,

in

D.

D.

Runes,

ed.,

Twenticsh

Century Philosophy (1947), pp. 449#.; — F. C. S. Schiller,

Studiesin Humanism (1907} ;id., Humanism .

tmatism’,

Encyclopacdia Britannica,

A Philpsophical Essay (2nd ed., 1912); id., “Prag-

Papers,

ed.

by

8 (1927); C.

C.

S. Peirce,

Hartshorne

and

P.

Collected Weiss,

V: Pragmatism and Pragmaticism (1934); ]. Buchler, ed., The Philosophical Writings of Peirce (1955). sTUDIES: H. G. Mead, “Working Hypothesis in Social

Reform™,

(1899), pp- 3674.;

American fournal of Sociology id., “Genesis

5

of the Self and

Social Control”, ibid. 35 (1924-25), pp. 2511%; B. Russell, *Pragmatism and William James’s Conception of Truth”, Philosephical Essays (1910} C. Morris, Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiviciem (1937); 1. Buchler, C. . Peirce's Empiricism (1939); P. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of /. Dewey (1939); G. Lee, G. H, Mead,

74

runs

the

insignificant nonentity of Deism or of thinking in terms of magical influences. Undue

stress on “lifting up the heart”, however,

may easily obscure the fact that we meet God in the man Jesus Christ. The encounter may be treated as a pleasant occasion for indulging in pious sentimentality. Or there

may be a “mystical”’ effort (see Neo-Platonism)

to lead back the scattered multiplicity of the

creature to the unity and recollection of the

Origin.

X XII (1922,

id., “W. James and the Making of Pragmatism”’,

The Personalist

1123--30)

of other beings, of making the Absolute the

Practical?”,

85ff.;

11, cols.

risk of seeming to profane the divine mystery,

(1909); id., The Will to Believe (1910); ]. Dewey, “What

(DSAM,

1. History of religion. A glance at the history of religion provides examples of such errors.

But in judging the prayer of the nations, there are two points to which more attention must be paid than was done by the historians of comparative religion. One is that prayer is not something that can be adequately described

in

equivalent

terms

from

other

fields of reality. The other is that prayer, of its nature, is an effort to give expression to a personal attitude which is only fully real in

this effort at expression — while it can never

PRAYER

find conceptual categories to comprise its total riches. It mass be an effort to objectify something which cannot be fully objectified. It must be the impossible effort to translate

the personal into terms of things. Hence we

the truth that Israel is a holy people (Lev 20:7). This basic assurance gives unity to the many forms which prayer can take: from almost disrespectful argument (Gen 18:234,; Jer 14f.) to peaceful confidence in

true attitude,

way

supplication to despairing protest (Ps 74:1 1., Job 31), from adoration, praise and thanksgiving (1 Chr 29:31) to humble repentance

with God is vaporized in speculative thinking

enumerating here the various forms, texts, gestures and postures (cf. Krinetzki). It is more important to insist on the all-pervasive attttude, which may be roughly described as confidence in the divine goodness, and at the

must “demythologize”, reduce the many “alienated” forms to their ultimate content. This will undoubtedly bring to light the which

will be in some

theistic, even though combined with idolatry and badly disfigured by magical practices. The same process must be applied to the philosophical ar “mystical” forms of prayer in the higher religions, where the encounter or nihilistic self-annihilation. Here too only extremely cautious interpretation will avoid

confusing a profoundly religious act with its possibly atheistic form of expression. 2. Old Testament. Prayer in the OT shows

with an astonishing clarity that all such errors, actual

An

or

possible,

examinarion

have

of rhe

been

left behind.

inirial stages,

as

disclosed by the sources, shows that magical practices,

long

since

integrated

into

true

prayer, are only marginal phenomena. The theological ground for the purity of this praver 1s to be sought in Israel’s experience of the saving deeds of God, who after the

wanderings of the parriarchs and the trials in Egyvpt finally gave his people the covenant made with Abraham: 1 will be with you and bless vou™ (Gen 26:3). The faithfulness

of Yahweh (Exod 34:6) is the serting of all forms of praver, which has three aspects. One

1s the memory

of the past:

“He

has

delivered his people from the bondage of Egvpt (cf. Exod 32). Then there is the present certainty: “He will not forget the covenant™ (Deut 4:31) and finally the expectation of the great final deliverance: “See, thy king comes

to thee’” (Zech 9:11).

Israel’s

prayers,

A large portion

as collected,

for

of

instance,

in the Psalter, are inspired by the memory of

God’s great deeds in the past to beg for his help in present distress. Just as the prophets recall the past in their constant exhortations to repentance, so too the sapiential books may reflect on it in hymns of praise and

thanksgiving.

This

sense

of the personal

guidance

of

God pervades the prayer of the individual,

and also that of the community.

The king-

ship, the sacred precincts of the temple, the sacred times and rites, the prohibition of certain types of food and clothing embody

God’s

providence

(1 Chr 21:17;

(Ps 127),

Ps 51). There

from

ardent

is no point in

same time a sense of awe before the divine majesty.

This basic attitude could undergo changes.

The familiar conversation with Yahweh in early times appears later in reflections which

may seem perhaps too sentimental — “When

Israel was a child, I loved him” (Hos 11:2;

cf. Jer 2:2; Is 5:1ff.). But in the disasters of

the monarchy, the Babylonian exile and the

dramatic struggles of Yahweh with his people it came to appear 1n a2 purer form as a reverent personal ptety: “For thou hast no delightin sacrifice. . . Thesacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit” (Ps 51:16¢f.). It

was finally stabilized as prayer according to

the law and the liturgy in the last five centuries B.C. (**Then wilt thou delight in right

sacrifices”, Ps 51:19). This shift of emphasis within the one basic attitude is associated with

the growing

sense

of

of the majesty

Yahweh. Thus his proper name is not uttered in prayer, mediators such as angels intervene between him and his people, and a painfully

meticulous legalism threatens to form a barrier, impeding free dialogue between them,

3. New

Testament and the primitive Church.

Though it was only in the course of Christian dogmatics that the traits of prayer described

above came to stand out so clearly, the prayer

of Jesus — inextricably interwoven in the

sources with that of the primitive Church —

may undoubtedly be regarded as a definitive

stage in the history of prayer (cf. Lk 11:1).

The

Sermon

on

the Mount,

in both redac-

tions, shows Jesus’ childlike confidence in the Father in heaven, his sense of security, his conversing with God as the child speaks to

its father. Gethsemane and Calvary provide the clearest instances of the polarity of active and passive tension in the prayer of the Lotd.

It is a dialogue with God which can go so far 75

PRAYER

as to beg that the Father’s will may be avetted, and also submit silently to the divine plan.

everyday attitude expressed in the exhorta-

cannot tell whether the frequency with which our Lotd is portrayed as praying in Lk is

or again in the bold and frank approach to

Both

attitudes

one.

are indissolubly

We

theological interpretation or historical fact.

But there is no doubt that Jesus’ prayet

reveals the perpetual unity of his will with

that of the Father (cf. the invocations before healing the sick or Mt 11:25fL.). In Jn this unity is 50 central that the prayer of Jesus,

which could express some kind of subordina-

tion, is explained as merely uttered for the benefit of the bystanders (Jn 11:42). The prayer of the primitive Church is inspired by the actuzl encounter with Jesus, the intercourse (bomilia) with the Lord, as well as by his example. The model proposed by Jesus is seen most clearly in the QOur Father, though here as elsewhere(Jn 4:22 deals with another matter)

Jesus distinguishes his own prayer from that of others, Two things were taken over by the

Church from the Lord. One was an absolute

confidence in the goodness and power of the heavenly Father. This was so dominant that

the “certainty of being heard” does not seem

to have been a problem in the early years. The other was the expectation of the parousia

of the Lord. All prayer was focussed on this. The certainty of being heard in all petitions was centred and founded on the “Maranatha

—

Qur

Lotd,

come!”

(1 Cor 16:23;

Rev

22.:20; Didacke, 10, 6). Itechoesthe preaching

of the kingdom of God by the Lord. But the NT

also shows clearly how the

intercourse of the disciples with Jesus, with

the risen Lord and the Spirit of Christ, became the medium of prayer (cf. the development in the use of the title Kyrios). Closeness to Jesus gives access to prayer. This conviction,

intensified by the experience of the Resurrec-

tion, underlies such texts as “Lord, teach us

to pray” (Lk 11:1), the accounts of the sick kneeling to Jesus (especially in Mt) or the confessions of the demons. The classic ex-

pression of this conviction is the “through

Christ” of the Pauline letters. According to

St. Paul,

it is the mvebua

Christi,

i.e., the

closeness of the Lord (gradually distinguished

as 2 person} which enables us to pray. It is the

Spirit within us who cries, “Abba, Father!” (Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6). The Spirit is the bond which unites the many forms of prayer in the primitive

Church:

charismatic

stammering

or choral hymns, cultic assemblies or private

prayer, the high-point in the Eucharist or the

76

tion to “prayalways”. The Spirit bestows the

new assurance which is expressed in ecstasies

God {rappnoix). Through the medium of the Spirit, with the person of the Lord as the historical focus, the three factors of Jewish prayer are brought to their fulfilment. There is the backward look to the historical action of God in raising up the Crucified — the supreme and all-embracing saving deed of God in history. There is the presence of the Lord in the

Spirit in the Church, by which all the prayer

of Christians is inspired. There is the expectation of the coming of the Lord. But his return was experienced day by day in its initial stage in the prayer of the Church, and was far more important to the Church than the expectation of the Messiah had been in the OT.

4. Tradition. We examine here the transmission of the biblical heritage merely to see how the innumerable manifestations of Christian spirituality, in its most personal act, that of prayer, can fertilize our present thinking. Prayer is not only part of Christian history, it is perhaps one of its main driving forces.

Hence a sketch of the history of prayer must

retrace the many

factors of the history of

dogma, which are here briefly summed up under a number of headings. We cannot of course attempt to describe the whole tradition, but in a negative way, by mentioning

some of the main deformations, some notion of the true riches of Christian prayer may be given,

a) It is quite clear, and to some extent already visible in Scripture itself, that prayer

turned from the Jesus af time, soon to return

to judge the world (the expectation of the

imminent parousia), or at death (theology of martyrdom), to the Jesws of supra-temporal vlessings. Contemplation frees itself from past and future to sink tranquilly into itself.

Historical expectations are sometimes revived

in heresies (e.g., Joachim of Fiore). While the world-picture

was

symbolic,

this static and

spiritualizing tendency — the lingering look instead of the urgent expectation — was

checked. The inner unity of concrete reality and spiritual sense still linked prayer to time and place. But when the symbolic worldpicture was “demythologized™, prayer came dangerously close to a contemplation of the beyond, denying the world to cleave to the spiritual.

PRAYER

b) Equally obvious is the decline of the

charismatic element, such as was apparent in

the Church of Corinth with its prophecy, hymnic inspitation, etc. No doubt the religious orders must be regarded as a series of fresh charismatic approaches. But it is typical that the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius, in which there is a delicate balance of the charismatic movement of the Spirit and the regulated procedure, were soon reduced to the

element

of “exercise”.

A

number

of

developments fit in here. The charismatic element appears only in heresy or in private prayer, where the gratia gratic data for the sake of the Church becomes an individualistic mysticism. Public prayer is strait-jacketed by laws

becomes

and

the prerogative

of the

hierarchy: the priest officiates, the faithful “attend”. Increasing stress is laid on the formula,

so

that

where

faith

is active

it is

misinterpreted legalistically, and elsewhere

misused as a sort of magic. c) In practce, from the Middle Ages on, the place of Christ in the economy of redemption, the biblical “through Christ”, is hardly

a real factor any longer, even in devotion to the Sacred

Heart or the incarnation, as the

latrer was practised in the school of Bérulle ( Ecole Frangaise). Indulgences, pilgrimages,

adoration of the Host and so on, which have

no meaning except in relation to the historical humanity of our Lord, were accorded a sort of absolute value. Even if much Protesrant polemic must be dismissed as mistaken, there is no doubt that in the practice of piety devotion to the saints and the Blessed Virgin often enough took the place of the humanity

of Christ. The pendulum naturally swung also

in

the

opposite direction.

The

ecclesial

character of private praver, which can only be offered per Christum et Ecclesiam, was lost

mystical obscurity in which man ceases to be the partner of God in dialogue. The final exaggeration is found among the ' followers of Evagrius of Pontus (4th century) as well

as in the “Brethren of the Free Spirit™ (13th century): man rids himself of all impurity, including that of prayer, and merges in sheer purity with God himself. We for our part seem to hear a faint echo of this movement when, for instance, as in Origen, St. Thomas Aquinas or O. Karrer, the prayer of petition 15 stripped of all real activity and is reduced to abandonment to the divine will. e) When the degrees of the “way of perfec-

tion” were kept rigidly separate, perfect prayer was reserved for the perfecti, and the difference in state of life was equated with a difference in perfection. But since the basic

sense of sinfulness before God, of humility,

of always falling short of one’s call belongs to the existentials of prayer, the too static

notion of the degrees of prayer could be easily transformed, especially by seekers of perfection, into tormenting doubts about one’s election. There is a wide literature to attest this — Luther being by no means a marginal case,

f) In the same way, the analysis of the

various elements of prayer led to a series of “methods of prayer”, where it could be too easily forgotten that no method was more than a handmaid to prayer. On the same

principles,

distinctions

were made between

Scripture reading and prayer,

between the

pursuit of theclogy and the longing for God,

etc. At the opposite extreme, the reaction to this was to identify too readily the Christian attitude with actual praver. Clement of Alexardria could say that the true Gnostic was always praying, Evagrius that true theology was prayer. Ebeling, following

sight of. d) The temptation to spiritualize is intrinsic

Luther, takes a similar position,

Christianity cannot be traced merely to Gnostic or neo-Platonist influences. Possibly the whole history of prayer is that of the struggle against such temptations. They suggest that prayer must be elevated to “pure prayer”, since the prayer of petition s only for beginners and all emotions are

turned

to all forms of piety, and its appearance In

unworthy. Gregory the Great’s longing for

contemplation reappears as the enjoyment of

esoteric truth. As the effort is intensified, it

becomes the purely intellectual intuition of the apex mentis, the cime d'esprit, the fine point of the mind; or it becomes pure darkness, the

g) A similar principle is at work when 5t. Paul's “Pray constantly” (1 Thess 5:17) 1is

into

such

exercises

as the

“Jesus

Prayer” (incessantly repeated, cf. J. Salinger’s “Franny and Zooey”). The “attitude™ is identified with an “exercise”. The true Christian attitude must comprise both things. The Christian prays and asks at regular intervals, He “lifts up his heart” to God

afresh on each occasion. And heis perpetually

in the attitude of prayer, which is what really makes a2 man a Christian, h) A further splintering occurred when normal prayer was distinguished from the

mystical, There were broad historical reasons

77

PRAYER

behind this development, but the impulse

happiness, not seeking emoti Honal sati’fificflah

censolation?”) and from movements outside

action, which ultimately can only be-reglized in face of a person who is imamanent to all

also came from controversy within the Church {*May one, or must one, strive for

but personal fulfilment. It is the will to free

that

possibilities of freedom and summons man

degrees of prayer, but the common ground, the experience of personal eficounter with

therefore sensitive openness to the God who transcends all the encounters of everyday life but who uses them and goes beyond them to demand an answer to the basic question of

the Church

(the Messalians

holding

grace was vision of God). There are of course God,

is greater than all differences.

It is

understandable that in view of such distine-

tions normal prayer should lose much of its freshness. To be truly addressed by God was

reserved for the higher degree of prayer.

Normal, everyday prayer was regarded rather as a duty to be performed and an exercise to

be done, not as something also capable of

soaring to the heights, under the impulse of the petsonal summons of God. i) Many of these phenomena may be explained by the growing distinction between the subjective, the proper realm of prayer, from the objective, which means in Christianity Christ, Scripture, the Church, the sacraments, the liturgy, and so on. Thus, for instance, the same principle is at work when the Eucharist, the communion in common,

“‘private communion”,

becomes

when

the

strictly sacramental element is separated from

the many

other religious acts, and when

adoration of the Blessed Sacrament is performed in isolation. One result of this development is the persistence of the notion that true prayer must be in private, a misinterpretation of “in your room” (Mt 6:6)

which is not yet fully eliminated.

B. Tue

EsseNceE oF CHRISTIAN

1. The concepr. An

informed

to freedom. In a word, it is unconditional and

our existence, the meaning of life. Hence

tradition tries to define prayer as the “ascent

to God” and Scripture speaks of “‘pouring out the soul before God” (1 Sam 1:15), of

longing for God “as the hartlongs for flowing

streamns” (Ps 42:1), of lifting up the heart (Ps 25:1), of taking refuge in the Lord (Ps 31:1f.). Inmodern terminology it can become “man’s self-commitment to the transcendence of his own being, hence the humble, receptive

and reverent admission of, and the re-active,

responsive affirmative dedication to his call and destiny, the impact of the mystery of God as person on human existence, to which man cannot but be somehow sensible” (K. Rahner in LTK, IV, col. 543). But it is equally important to recall the simple description of prayer as “the great art of conversing with Jesus” (Imitation of Christ, I, 8). It is like Abraham’s negotiations with Yahweh (Gen 18:23-33) which strike us as

very anthropomorphic, or the dialogue of

our Lord in Gethsemane as he wrestles with

the will of his Father, or the encounters with

God of which we read in the lives or legends

of the saints, and

familiar

PRAYER

discussion

of

as almost

which

we

to seem

find so over-

blasphemous.

While the first definition strives to convey the majesty and uaiversal omnipotence of

Christian prayer has to take into account in ‘the matters described above. The two classical definitions mentioned at the outset will also be important factors.

God, the definition of prayer as “speaking

really is in the depths of his being, something that cannot be static but must be realized in a fundamental activity in time yet transcend-

above all in the prayer of petition. The attempt to make abandonment to God’s

Prayer s the great religious act. What man

ing time — that is prayer. It is the acceptance

of the prime fact of being created, not in a stupor of resignation, but alert to its coming from the Father’s hands. It is committing oneself to the basic dynamism of the kernel

of the person, wishing

in 2 way to break

through all limits of time and space, but still

seeing its fulhilment not in infinite being, but in the Thou who speaks and answers and

first calls. It is the all-pervasive longing for 78

to God” bears on the truth that God hears “me”, that he has chosen “me” very per-

sonally, and that “my"” casual steps are guided

by his infinite wisdom. This truth is operative

providence the quintessence of prayer ignores its character of dialogue. It stresses one truth,

the immutability of God

isolation

would

mean

(which taken

that

real prayer

in

is

impossible} and forgets the other, that God

s “personally”

concerned with our affairs.

The immutability of God must not be reduced

to a proposition which can be manipulated in the usual categories of human thought. [t must be kept open for the truth of the

incarnation

and

crucifixion,

for

the

truth

PRAYER

that God “changes” for the sake of man. This is the only possible source of the dialogal

character of prayer. In true Christian prayer, the granting or refusal of requests is not a problem. One

need only think of the typical pilgrimage where the believer whose request has not been granted in spite of or because of his ardent prayer still gains the profound peace of answered prayer. This may be illustrated by an analogy from personal relationships. Any genuine request is always put forward as the minor wish in which the general plea for the other’s favour is crystallized. But the Christian prayer of petition takes its impetus (1.e., has its certainty of being heard) from the saving gift of God to men, which is Jesus Christ, 2. Basic forms.

whole

distance

(Bonaventure’s with

praise,

God,

sacrifice,

If prayer then

between

swrsamactio)

its

basic

thanksgiving, etc.

connotations.

—

are

ascent and

forms

—

petition,

seen

Adoration

to be

is

spans

to

the

God

dialogue

adoration,

repentance,

its natural

undoubtedly

closer to the “asceut”, bur withourt dialogal encounter there can be no adoration, just as

there can be no genuine petittion without the

inward impulse of the Spirit of God, such as is expressed in the wriumactio.

This span is wide enough to take in much

that

is often

too

quickly

rejected

in

the

phenomenology of religion as un-Christian. Christian praver, in which the intrinsic tension is again surpassed in the person of the Lord, who is God, filling all things while remaining the same, and man, limited and changing historically,

appears

even

phencmenolog:-

cally as the climax and fulfilment of the prayer

of the nations. And this does not mean that

non-Christian prayer must be at once branded

as un-Christian non-prayer.

3. The essential structures. a) The first essen-

tial component follows at once from what has been said. Prayer is a grace, a gift of God,

a response to something which waspreviously

put on man’s lips and in his heart. But prayer is also man’s own free act. To have some idea of this mystery, we must first distinguish the aspect of what is given by God from the aspect of what is accomplished by man’s own force. All prayer is wholly the gift of God. There is nothing in it that we can keep for ourselves.

There is no previous foot-hold that we can provide for God’s action, and no later response that we can give of ourselves. But prayer is likewise human action. Man is not a machine kept in motion by God. He is free, and there can be no question of prayer unless

it is rooted in man’s freedom, an action fot

which

he is personally responsible.

These

two aspects, which both take in the total act

of human prayer, must be clearly distinguished. Only then can we truly admire the new mystery, that prayer is after alla response to the call of God,

that cutting across the

different levels, divine grace and human freedom still meet. This has been the bliss of great saints, often experienced in fear and trembling. But this interplay of call and

response is at the heart of all prayer, even the praver of petition, whose structure only

seems to be different when it is considered

superficially.

b) Prayer is also a unity of the inward and

outer man. Man prays when he is inwardly and outwardly recollected, when he is himself. “Interior prayer” always seeks to

express

itself in word

and gesture,

while

“external” or vocal prayer can influence the inner attitude when one is tired and distracted. The traditional distinction between “atten-

tion” and “intention”

is relevant here, and

this s one way to understand the rosary (though there are also other approaches). But the practical consequences are more important. Prayer must of course aim at being

“interior”, but since man lives in the external

world it must also be guided by external

rules, postures and formulas and follow the

cycle

of feast-days

and

times

for

prayer.

See Breviary, Liturgy 111, Worship. ¢) The importance of the link between the inner and the outer appears plainly in the third essential factor: prayer is always both individual and social. The theological reason for this is the unity of the Spirit, who is the Spirit of the Church and also animates each of

the

faithful.

praise God

The

has

Christian

both

to

in a fellowship of prayer and

formulate his own

prayer for himself. But

he must not forget that the prayer of the individual relies on the community which it serves, and that the only ultimate meaning

of community prayer is to lead the individual to God. There can be no problems of preced-

ence

here,

since

each

man

is,

irreducibly,

at the same time both an individual called

personally by God and part of the chain of

mankind

whose

link

with

God

is Jesus

79

PRAYER

Christ. The closer it is to the Eucharist, the

centre of prayer in.commeon, the higher the degree of unity in prayer. The breviary is

C. SYsTEMATIC OUTLINE

Any “systematization” of the complex reality

congregational devotions. The same principle of social prayer also explains, for

of prayer, the “concretissimum” of Christian life, must note that it is conditioned by the given historical and personal situation. One

for

encounter, take “the encounter of man with

prayerin common in its own way, as are also

instance, the precept of going to Mass on

Sundays,

and

the

of praying

duty

parents and relations. The notion of proclaiming fellowship before God can throw new light on a feature of the early Church, prayer as a confession of faith, which in turn may throw new light on pilgrimages and so on. d) A further basic structure of prayer bond

tellowship. It is the most perfect expression of the inward man. Language here means

that the Word

became

encounters us in the word of Scripture and the articulate action of the sacraments. It is only today that this dominant role of language is coming into view. If prayer is

really the basic religious act and the verbaliza-

tion (its personal outcome) is not merely a vehtcle of prayer but its essence — prayet is speaking to God — we can measure the

responsibility of those who have to deal with the words. The verbal character also throws light on prayer as a confession of farth, since all honest language is at once the

giving of testimony. e} The essential deficiency of human prayer.

These demands bring cut one further quality,

that prayer

falls short of what

it should

really do. This is not a matter of sin, though closely connected with it, nor of incidentals

which

might

be avoided,

say, by greater

recollection. Man, as he encounters God, is

at once conscious of his darkness before the radiant light. This is not a matter of a mystique of sin or of fiducial faith, though the existentiell ground of such notions may well be found here. Man essentially receives at prayer, and prayer, with all the due

reserves made above, is essentially a process of receiving. It has often been experienced as such by great men of prayer, who saw theit own poverty better the more gifts they

received. The prayer, “Lord, 1 am not worthy” is not just for beginners but also —

to keep to the terminology — for the perfect. Penitential prayer, adoration and many other torms must be interpreted this ptinciple.

80

of human

God in Jesus Christ” as the quintessence and the comprehensive description of prayet. Thete are three points here. One is that God and man face each other, an oppoesition

which is clearest, phenomenologically, in the prayer of petition. The second is a

consciousness of unity which is perceptible

flesh and

the

simply

the analogy

encounter of God and man it can cover everything from the touch of grace to the

Language

words, which in its highest form is identity. personal

using

of

the link between prayer and real

then,

on the personal level of will, but is rooted in the depths of being. A good phenomenology can note such consciousness in human

follows from

is

may

in the light of

encounters,

but when

it is applied to the

supreme forms of mystical union. The third point is that this “vertical” relationship is localized in the “horizontal” encounter with Jesus Christ in space and time. The whole riches of Christian prayer can be easily taken in from this vantage-point.

Objectively, the encounter with Jesus Christ gives rise to the trinitarian movement of prayer, which is expressed, for instance, in the doxologies of the liturgy. A Christocentric pneumatology and ecclesiology also founds the social character of Christian prayer. A

petition which is communal in character is at once “intercession”.

And

prayer to the

saints 18 also rooted in this sense of fellowship,

which is more pneumatological than sociological in origin. Liturgical and sacramental

prayer, like scriptural prayer, which stems from meditation on the Scriptures and rises

to contemplation,

are

based

us by the Church

through

on

the

fact

Scripture

and

that the encounter with Christ 1s mediated to tradition.

The

importance

of tradition

for

prayer should not be underestimated, because

prayer is a concrete act and not an abstract construction of the mind. But life is transmit-

ted by life, not by abstractions. The subjective aspect also gives access to

the social character of prayer. The Church, the liturgy, the example and intercession of

the saints, etc., are the type of thing which

modern

anthropology

actually

finds

im-

perative. The relationship between the inner and the outer could also be inserted into the system at this point, the external action

not being considered as merely the “prac-

PREACHING

tice of prayer” involving problems of method

and so on. It is the relationship to activity in general, the age-old problem of action and contemplation. The inward action would take in such matters as mysticism and the prayer of quiet. The degrees and types of prayer (as types of encounter with God) would also be in place here. In general, it should not be difficult to take advantage of the findings of modern anthropology from this perspective, applying it, for instance, to prayer at the various ages of life and the traditional themes of impediments to prayer, distractions and the fruits of prayer. A psychology of prayer according to personal or ethnic dispositions would soon expose such generalizations as “ecstatic-prophetic” or “Hellenistic-Semitic” as over-simplifications. Finally, to sum up the many components, It seems to us that it is best to group them under two heads, which are really aspects of the same thing. One is the grace of God, which could be directly defined as the bond of unity between the two aspects, “subjective” and ““objective”, described above. It comprises the whole range of individual and community prayer. The second is the verbal

expression, which would rather sum up the

“external side”. The theology of the word,

as the word of God, shows at once that this is

not an exaggeration of what might perhaps

be taken to be theologically incidental. The

linguistic element makes it possible to consider all human activity, including praver, from a single perspective, which can also take the varieties of time and place into account. And it also underlines the dialogal character, the dimension in which Christian

prayer reaches its greatest heights.

C. Vagaggini and others, La preghiera nslia bibbia ¢ nella tradivions patristica ¢ momastica (1964);

W.

Godel,

Irisches Beten im frithen

(dissertation,

Inasbruck,

cf.

1963),

Mittelalter ZKT

85

(1963), pp. 261-321, 389-439; L., Krinetzki, Lrraels Gebes im Alten Tostament (1965); 1. Hausherr, Hiésychasme ¢t pritre (1966), PHENOMENOLOGY OF RELIGION: F, Heiler, Prayer (1932); E. Gruehn, (1956); E, de Places,

LYie Frimmigkeit der Gegenwari

“La priére des philosophes grecs”, Gregorianum 41 (1960}, pp. 253-72; H. Sundén, Die Religion und die Rollen (1966). THEOLOGY AND PRACTICE (MODERN): A. Poulain, The Gracer of Interior Prayer (1910, reprint, 1950); K. Rahner, Happiness

through Prayer (1948); id., Encounters with Silence

(1960); ). de Guibert, The Theology of the Spiritual Life (1956); R. Guardini, Prayer in Practice (1957); H.

Urs

(1961);

C.

Letters

to

Comtemplative

Balthasar,

von

i

Prayer

Butler,

Prayer

Practice

(1962);

Prayer

{1964);

F. Moschner, Christian Prayer (1962); F. Fisher, Prayer in the New Testament (1964); C. S. Lewds, M.

Malcolm:

Chiefly

on

The Nature and Uses of Prayer, or,

Nédoncelle,

Man's Encounter with God (1904); F. von Hiigel,

Writings,

Selected

). de Fraine,

ed.

Praying

P.

by

with

Chambers

(1964);

the Bible (1965);

R.

The Interpretation of Prayer in the Early

Simpson,

Church (1965); G. Ebeling, On Prayer (1966).

Josef Sudbrack PREACHING I. The Mediation of the Word. 11, Homiletics.

I. The

Mediation

of the Word

Preaching can mean a2 number of different types of spiritual discourse (see part I1, 2 b, below), such as are indicated, for instance,

in the N'T: gospel (ebayyéhov), Acts 8:40; 15:7; 16:10; proclamation {x7puypa), Acts 8:5; 10:42; discourse (Adyos), 1 Cor 2:4;

1Tim4:6;consolation-encouragement (mapd-

winarg), 1 Cor 14:3; 1 Cor 1:6; 2:1.

testimony (paptiplov),

wutstoricar: H. Bremond, BIBLIOGRAPHY. Histoire littéraire du sentiment religieux en France, 11 vols. (1916-33), E. T. {vols. [-I1l}: A Literary

The nature and function of preaching may be described as follows. Preaching is the public proclamation of the word of God in the Church, in the form of discourse, by the consecrated and authorized ministers of the Church (Rom 10:15; 2 Tim 1:2; 1 Tim

P. Pourrat, Christian Spirftuality, 3vals. (1922-27),

individuals

See also Martyrdom,

Spiritual Exercises,

sticisam 11, Saints 11, Lord's Prayer.

My-

History of Religious Thought in France (1928-306);

H. Hempel, Gebet wnd Frimmigkett im Alten Testa-

ment (1922);

J. Nielen,

Gebet and Gottesdienst im

Nenen Testament (1937); E. Behr-Siegel, Priére ef sainteté dans ! Epfise russe {1950); A. Hamman,

La Pritre, 11 Le Nouvean Testament (1959), 11: f.es irois premiers siécles (1963); L. Bouyer, L. Cognet,

). Leclercg

Spirttualité “La priére

and

F. Vanderbroucke,

Flistoire de fa

B. Bobrinsky, chrétienne (1960f.}; ... dans la tradition orthodoxe”,

Verbam Cara 15 (1961), pp. 338-56; H. Beintker

(on

Luther),

Luther-fabrbuch

(1964),

pp.

47-68;

5:22). Its object is to bring the hearers, as deliberate

and

as a community,

acceptance

of the

to a free,

message

of

salvation which will be a testimony in action. It strives to make them alert to the divine life within them, to promote its

growth, to strengthen their unity as Church and people of God, to present them as "a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God”

(Rom art,

7;

12:1;