The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Volume 5: The Philosophy of the Grammarians 9781400872701

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ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES The Philosophy of the Grammarians

HAROLD G. COWARD and K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, New Jersey

C o p y rig h t © 1990 by P rin c e to n U n iv ersity P ress P u b lish e d by P rin c e to n U n iv ersity Press, 41 W illiam S tre et, P rin c e to n , N e w J e rs e y 0 8 5 4 0 In th e U n ite d K in g d o m : P rin c e to n U niv ersity P ress, O x fo rd AU R ig h ts R eserv ed L ib ra ry o f C o n g re ss C a talo g in g -in -P u b licatio n D ata T h e P h ilo so p h y o f th e G ra m m a ria n s / e d ite d by H a ro ld G. C o w ard a n d K. K u n ju n n i Raja, p. cm .— (E n cy clo p ed ia o f In d ia n p h ilo so p h ies ; v. 5) In c lu d e s b ib lio g ra p h ic a l re fe re n c e s a n d in d ex . IS B N 0-6 9 1 -0 7 3 3 1 -7 (alk. p a p e r) I. B h a rtr h a ri. V ak y ap ad ly a. 2. P an in i. A stadhyayl. 3. P atan jali. M ah ab h asy a. 4. S a n sk rit.Iarygutyte—JRhilnszynlyv 5. S an sk rit la n g u a g e — G ra m m a r— H istory. 6. In d o -A ry a n la n ­ gu ag es— G ra m m a r— H isto ry . 7. S anskritists— In d ia . I. C ow ard, H a ro ld G. II. K u n ju n n i R aja, Κ. I I I . Series: E ncy clo p ed ia o f In d ia n p h ilo so p h ies (P rin c eto n , N .J.) ; vol. 5. P K 4 7 5 .P 4 8

1990

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T h is b o o k was c o m p o se d in In d ia by J a in e n d ra P ra k a s h J a in a t S h r iJ a in e n d r a Press, N ew D elhi P rin c e to n U n iv ersity P ress books a re p rin te d o n a c id -free p a p e r, a n d m e e t th e g u id e lin e s fo r p e rm a n e n c e a n d d u ra b ility o f th e C o m m ittee o n P ro d u c tio n G u id e lin e s fo r B ook L ongevity o f th e C o u n cil o n L ib ra ry R esources P rin te d in th e U n ite d S tates o f A m erica by P rin c e to n U n iv ersity Press, P rin c e to n , N e w Je rse y 10

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Contributors: Ashok Aklujkar, University of British Columbia John G. Arapura, McMaster University S. R. Bannerjee, S. D. Joshi, University of Poona Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University G. B. Palsule, University of Poona Karl H. Potter, University of Washington V. K. S. N. Raghavan, University of Madras K. A. Subramania Iyer, Lucknow University

CONTENTS

PREFACE

xi

PART ONE : I N T R O D U C T I O N T O T H E PHILOSOPHY OF THE GRAMMARIANS (.Harold G. Coward andK. Kunjunni Raja) 1. Historical Résumé 2. Metaphysics 3. Epistemology 4. Word Meaning 5. Sentence Meaning PART T W O : SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE G R A M M A R I A N PHILOSOPHY

3 33 51 63 83

OF

1. Philosophical Elements in Vedic Literature {John G. Arapura andK. Kunjunni Raja) 2. Philosophical Elements in Yaska's Nirukta {K. Kunjunni Raja) 3. Philosophical Elements in Panini's Astadhyayi (K. Kunjunni Raja) 4. Philosophical Elements in Patanjali's Mah.abh.asya (K. Kunjunni Raja) 5. Bhartrhari Trikandi or Vakyapadiya, with Vrtti on Books 1 and 2 (Ashok Aklujkar) Tika on Patanjali's Mahabhasya (K. Kunjunni Raja) 6. Durvinita or Avinita 7. Dharmapala 8. Hari Vrsabha or Vrsabhadeva {Ashok Aklujkar) 9. Mandana Misra Sphofasiddhi (G. B. Palsule, Harold G. Coward, and Karl H. Potter)

101 107 111 115 121

175 177 179 181

CONTENTS

viii

10. Heläräja Commentary on Bhartrhari's Trikändi (K. Kunjunni Raja) 11. Prameyasamgraha 12. Punyaräja 13. Kaiyata Pradipa on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (S. R. Bannerjee and K. Kunjunni Raja) 14. Jyesthakaläsa 15. Maitreya Raksita 16. Purusottamadeva

193

199 201 203

205 207 209

17. Dhanesvara 18. (Rsiputra) Paramesvara II Sphotasiddhigopälikä (K. A. Subramania Iyer) 19. SesaKrsna Sphotatattoanirüpana (G.B. Palsule) 20. Satyänanda or Rämacandra Sarasvati

211 213

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

221 223 225 227 229 231

31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

Sesa Cintämani Sesa or Rämesvara Sesa Bhatta Visnumitra Isvaränanda or Isvaridatta Sarasvati Bharata Misra Sphotasiddhi {G. B. Palsule) (G. B. Palsule) Annambhatta Appayya Diksita I Bhattoji Diksita Sabdakaustubha Sesa Visnu Sivarämendra Sarasvati (Sesa) Cakrapäni (Datta) Mallaya Yajvan NilakanthaSukla Näräyana (Sästrin) Kon^a (or Kaunda) Bhatta

38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

(.S. D. Joshi) Täraka Brahmänanda Sarasvati Gokkanätha or Sokanätha Diksita Tirumala Y a j v (Räma") Näräyana ( S a r ' Hari Diksita

27. 28. 29. 30.

215 219

235 237 239 24-1 243 245 247 249 251 253 255

a m

n a

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309 311 1 3 3 1 5 317 319

CONTENTS

ix

44. Ràmabhadra Dïksita ÇaddarSinisiddhânta samgraha (Vyäkarana Section) (K. Kunjunni Raja ) Sabdabkedanirüpana (K. Kunjunni Rajà)

321

45. Nàgesa (or Nâgoji) Bhatta Paramula"humañjüsü (K. Kunjunni Raja) (F. K. S. M. Raghavan) Sphotaväda {K. Kunjunni Raja) 46. Jñanendra Sarasvatï 47. Gopâlakrsna Sâstrin 48. Dharan.id.hara 49. Vaidyarxâtha Payagunda 50. Satyapriya Tïrtha Svâmin 51. Jayakrsna Maunin 52. Harivallabha 53. Vàsudeva Dïksita 54. Srïkrsna Bhatta Maunin Sphotacandrikä (G. B. Palsule) 55. Umàmahesvara or Abhinava Kâlidàsa 56. Nïlakantha Dïksita 57. Âsàdhara Bhatta 58. Rämasevaka 59. Indradatta Upâdhyâya 60. Krsnamitràcârya or Durbalâcàrya 61. Haribhatta 62. Dharanîdhara ( I I ) 63. Mannudeva or Manyudeva or Gopâladeva 64. Bhairava Misra 65. Kumàra Tâtaya 66. Satàrà Ràghavendrâcârya (Gajendragadkar ) 67. Gangâdhara Kavirâja 68. Târànâtha Tarkavâcaspati 69. K h u d d i j h à (Samxan) 70. Nityânanda Panta Parvatïya 71. Dravyesajhâ 72- Süryanäräyana âukla 73. Gopâla Sàstrï Nene 74. P. S. Anantanârâyana Sâstrl 75. Brahmadeva 76. V . Krçnamâcârya 77. (Sarman) 78. Bala Krsna Pañcoli 79. Rama Prasáda Tripàthï 80. Rudradhara Jhä áarman

323

351 353 355 357 359 361 363 365 367 371 373 375 377 379 381 383 385 387 389 391 393 395 397 399 401 403 405 407 409 411 413 415 417 419 421

CONTENTS

X

81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

423 Sabhâpati Sarman Upâdhyàya Raghunàtha âarman Satyafeàma Varmà Râmàjnà Pândeya

BIBLIOGRAPHY O N G R A M M A R (Fyâkarana) {Karl H. Potter)

425 427 429 431

433

Part 1 : Authors Whose Dates Are (More or Less) Known

439

Part 2 r Authors and Works Whose Dates Are Unknown

517

Part 3 •. Secondary Literature on Vyâkarana NOTES

549

CUMULATIVE INDEX

563

PREFACE T his volum e, th e fifth in the Encyclopedia o f Indian Philosophies, is devoted to the philosophy o f the G ram m arians. T h e introductory essay is intended to set their school in its context a n d to sum m arize the m ain G ram m arian teachings. T h e sum m aries of p rim ary sources th a t follow the introduction aim a t m aking available the substance of the m ain philosophical ideas contained in these works, so th at philosophers who are un ab le to read th e original Sanskrit a n d who find difficulty in understanding an d finding their way ab o u t in the translations (where such exist) can get a n idea o f the positions taken and argum ents offered. T h e sum m aries, then, a re intended prim arily for philosophers a n d only secondarily for indologists. C ertain sections o f the works have been om itted or treated sketchily because they are repetitions or deem ed less interesting for philosophers, though they m ay be of great interest to Sanskritists. T h e sum m aries are not likely to m ake interesting consecu­ tive reading: they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. T he appendix, w hich contains a lengthy bibliography o f original an d secondary w ritings on the philosophy o f G ram m ar, is also presented as an a id to research. References in the footnotes such as “ G273” are to the bibliography presented in th e appendix. References such as ttR B l 0337” a re to the first volum e of this encyclopedia, 2nd edition (1984). A bbreviations used a re listed a t th e beginning of th e appendix. P reparation of this volum e has been m ade possible by grants from the A m erican In stitu te of In d ia n Studies an d th e U niversity o f Calgary. These grants m ad e possible th e obtaining o f th e sum m aries a n d funded th e travel th a t th e editorial w ork required. T h e editors wish to thank P rad ip R . M eh en d iratta for his good offices. A debt o f g ratitu d e is also owed to th e late Professor T . R . V . M u rti, who gave generously of his tim e in woxking w ith H aro ld C ow ard in the volum e’s p lan n in g stages. A research fellowship aw arded to K . K unju n n i R a ja by the C algary In stitu te for th e H um anities enabled the tw o editors to w ork together in com pleting th e project. Special gratitu d e is due to K arl H . Potter, editor of the Encyclopedia o f Indian Philosophies, for his m any contributions, w hich have added greatly to th e value o f this volume. 1987

H A R O L D G. C O W A R D K . K U N JU N N I R A JA

PART ONE INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE GRAMMARIANS

I HISTORICAL RfiSUMfi

I.

T h e P l a c e o f L a n g u a g e in I n d ia n P h il o s o p h y

Language has been one of the fundam ental concerns o f Indian philosophy an d has attracted the serious attention o f all thinkers from the outset. I n In d ia the study of language has never been the m onopoly o f the G ram m arians or the Rhetoricians. AU schools o f thought began their philosophical discussions from the fundam ental problem of comm unication. T he poet-philosophers o f the Rg Veda were greatly concerned w ith the powers and lim itations of language as a m eans o f com m unicating their mystic, personal experiences o f an ecstatic nature to their fellows and they tried to stretch the power o f language by various means. They praised language as a powerful and benign deity (vac), ever ready to bestow favors on her devotees. T he entire creation of the world was attributed by some sages to divine language, an d it was generally recognized th at the ordinary speech of m ortals was only a fraction of th a t language. Among the six accessories to the study o f the Vedas (Vedangas) two are directly concerned w ith language: gram m ar (Oydkarana), or linguistic analysis, and etymology (nirukta), or interpretation o f the m eanings of selected words in the Vedas through etymological methods. A nother accessory, metrics (chandas), is concerned w ith prosody. Among the systems of Indian philosophy (dariana), Purvam im am sa is called vakyaSastra or the science o f sentence interpretation, and the N yaya system was also intrinsically language oriented. T he Buddhist an d J a in schools of thought have also devoted considerable attention to the working of language. G ram m ar and literary criticism (sdhitya) are directly interested in language problems, including semantic and philosophical issues, and G ram m arians have claimed the status of an independent darSana for themselves. T he Indian approach to the study of language a n d linguistic prob-

lems has b een ch aracterized b y b o th analysis a n d synthesis. O n th e o ne h an d , a system atic a tte m p t w as m ad e to analyze speech u ttera n ce in term s o f sentences a n d words, stem s a n d suffixes, m orphem es an d phonem es. T h e v erbal ro o t was considered as th e core elem ent to w hich preverbs, p rim ary suffixes, a n d secondary suffixes, as w ell as n o m in al or v erbal term inations, w ere ad d e d to evolve th e w ord. O n th e o th er h a n d , rules o f coalescence (sarridhi) betw een these various elem ents a n d betw een w ords in a com pound w ord o r a sentence w ere studied and system atized. R ules o f syntax w ere also studied carefully a n d attem pts m ad e to identify th e cem enting factors helping to form a n in teg ral unit. T h e an aly tical m eth o d w as older a n d m ore po p u lar. T h e Sanskrit te rm for g ram m ar, vyakarana, m eans literally “ linguistic analysis” . K u m arila B h atta, in th e beginning o f th e seventh century, said th a t “ w e can n o t th in k o f an y p o in t o f tim e totally devoid o f som e w ork or o th er dealing w ith th e gram m atical rules tre a tin g o f th e different kinds o f roots a n d suffixes.” 1 S akalya’s Padapafha o f th e R g Veda was one o f th e early attem p ts in th e direction o f analysis; h e broke dow n th e samhita te x t of th e Rg Veda in to w ords, identifying even the sep arate elem ents o f com pound words. T h e BrhaddeOata, a ttrib u te d to S aunaka, says th a t a sentence is m ad e u p o f words, a n d w ords are m ad e u p o f phonem es (varna) .2 P anini, w ho flourished ab o u t the fifth cen tu ry B .C ., b ro u g h t th e descriptive g ra m m a r o f th e Sanskrit lan g u ag e to its highest perfection in his Asfadhyayl, w hich has been praised by L eo n ard Bloomfield, th e fa th e r o f m o d em linguistics, as “ th e greatest m o n u m en t o f h u m a n intelligence.” 3 P an in i’s p rim ary concern w as th e building up o f Sanskrit words, b o th V edic a n d classical, from v erbal roots, preverbs, p rim ary a n d secondary suffixes, and nom inal a n d v erb al term in atio n s; b u t h e was also interested in syntactic problem s involved in th e form ation o f co m pound words a n d th e relationship o f th e nouns in a sentence w ith the action in d icated b y th e verb. P anini d id n o t neglect m eaning, b u t h e was aw are o f th e fact th a t m eaning was likely to change over tim e and th a t th e final au thorities reg ard in g m eaning a re th e people w ho speak th e language. I t was th e etym ological school o f Yaska, a u th o r o f th e Nirukta co m m en tary on th e Nighanfu list o f select w ords in V edic literature, th a t und erto o k a sem antic analysis o f words w ith th eir com ponents in o rd er to explain th eir m eanings in th e contexts o f th eir occurrence. T his school generally subscribed to th e view th a t nouns are derived from v erb al roots. T h e UnadisStras follow this view a n d a tte m p t to find derivations for even ap p a ren tly in teg ral words. Mlmamsa., called Vakyadastra, w as m ainly concerned w ith th e m e­ thodology o f tex tual in terp re tatio n in o rd e r to give a cogent explana­ tio n o f prescriptive scriptural texts. I t h a d to deal w ith a p p a ren t

absurdities, inconsistencies, and contradictions, besides ambiguities, a n d evolved rules of interpretation th a t were accepted generally by all schools of thought an d were used freely in legal practice an d in commentaries. T h e M imamsakas used both analysis and synthesis in their approach to textual problems. They gave a semantic definition o f the sentence, evolving the concepts of m utual expectancy (akSnksa), consistency (jogyata), an d contiguity (asatti) as factors necessary for the existence of a sentence. I t was the M imainsa school th at developed th e theory of m etaphor to explain the apparent absurdities and in ­ consistencies in V edic texts. T he N yaya school, m ainly interested in the theory of knowledge and the tru th or falsity o f judgm ents, h ad to be concerned w ith the theory of m eaning, because understanding the proposition was a prim ary requirem ent for m aking any significant study about it. T h e literary critics who were concerned w ith the understanding and appreciation o f literature were very m uch interested in the stylistic analysis of language a n d in finding o ut the deviance of literary language from ordinary language, in order to see how far poets have been able to com m unicate their vision of beauty and emotional experience through th e m edium of words. I t is clear th a t for centuries th e various schools o f thought in In d ia have carried out studies th a t have produced insights into the working of language. T he G ram m arians’interest was not confined to the description and analysis o f a particular language, b u t extended to the true nature an d potentialities of language, including its role in effecting liberation.

2. T

he

B a s ic P

roblem s o f

P h il o s o p h y

of

L

anguage

A. Linguistic Elements O ne o f the fundam ental problem s discussed is the relation between the linguistic elements (Jabda) and their m eanings (artha). T he term Jabda is norm ally used by the G ram m arians to refer to a linguistic elem ent, a m eaningful unit o f speech.4 P atanjali’s definition is th at Jabda is th a t which, when articulated, is seen to convey the idea of the referent. M andana M isra defines it in his Spkofasiddhi as the cause that produces th e idea of its m eaning. I n any case, it is the m eaning bearer. In ordinary parlance people m ay use the word Jabda to m ean sound, as pointed out by Patanjali himself, b u t for the G ram m arian it is the m eaning-bearing unit. Is it the articulated sound, or the phonem e (varna), or the word (pada), or the sentence (vaicya) th a t is referred to by the term Jabda? According to the sphofa theory of Bhiirtrhari it is th e com plete utterance of the sentence th a t is the unit, and it is called vakyasphofa) b u t a t a

low er an a ly tica l level th e w ord can b e considered as th e u n it, for w hich th e te rm padasphota is used by th e G ra m m a ria n . T hose w ho know th e la n g u ag e very w ell th in k a n d speak in u n its o f sentences a n d also h e a r w hole sentences. I t is only those w ho do n o t know th e language p ro p e rly w ho h e a r w ords o r phonem es o r bits o f sounds a n d h a v e to struggle w ith th e m to get th e con n ected sentence m ean in g . B ut in g ra m m a tic a l texts th e w ords are tak en as th e u n it for th e sake o f easy u n d ersta n d in g . T h is view is n o t accep tab le to th e M im am sakas, w ho consider th e le tte r (p e rm a n e n t a rtic u la te d so u n d -u n it) o r p h o n em e ('varna) to be th e Jabda o r u n it o f lan g u ag e a n d th e m ean in g b ea rer. T h e y assum e ph o n em es to b e p e rm a n e n t a n d ea ch u tte ra n c e to be th e ir realization. T o th e N aiyayikas Jabda m ean s so und p ro d u c e d by th e speaker an d h e a rd b y th e listener, a n d it is im p e rm a n e n t; pada m ean s a m o r­ p h em e (m eaningful u n it). B. M ea n in g (Artha) W h a t is m e a n t b y artha o r m eaning? Is i t th e universal t h a t is in te n d e d , o r th e p artic u la r? A ccording to K a ty a y a n a a n d P atan jali, tw o d ifferen t positions w ere h e ld b y tw o a n c ie n t G ram m arian s, V y ad i a n d V a ja p y ay an a , th e form er h o ld in g th a t w ords refer to dravya, “ su b stan ce” o r “ in d iv id u a l” , a n d th e la tte r hold in g th a t w ords (including p ro p e r n am es) refer to j ati, “ u n iversal” o r “ a ttrib u te ” . P a n in i seems to h av e left th e question open, hold in g th a t w ords could refer to in d iv id u als o r to th e universals. T h e M im am sakas h eld th a t th e p rim a ry m e an in g o f a w o rd is th e u n iversal a n d th e sense o f the p a rtic u la r in a sentence is o b ta in e d e ith e r th ro u g h secondary signifi­ cativ e p ow er (according to B h a tta M im am sak as) o r th ro u g h b o th the universal a n d th e p a rtic u la r bein g g rasped b y th e sam e perceptive effort sim ultaneously (according to th e P ra b h a k a ra s ). T h e early N aiyayikas co n sid ered th e m e an in g o f w ords as com prising universal (Jati)i co n fig u ration (akrti), a n d p a r tic u la r;5 la te r N aiyayikas h eld th a t th e p rim a ry m e an in g o f w ords is th e in d iv id u al as qualified b y the universal (JativiJisfaOyakti). T h e B uddhists o f D ig n ag a’s school h e ld th a t th e m ean in g is vikalpa, a m e n ta l co n stru ct th a t has no d irec t correspon­ d en ce w ith th e real, its n a tu re b ein g to exclude o th e r things (anyapoha). T h e fu n ctio n o f a w o rd o r a n a m e is th e exclusion o f o th e r possibilities. G. Significative P o w er (Sakti) T h e significative p o w er o f w ords (Jakti) is based o n th e relatio n th a t exists b etw een a w o rd a n d its m ean in g . T h e G ra m m a rian s h o ld th a t in th e case o f o rd in a ry w ords in everyday speech it is p e rm a n e n t; b u t in th e case o f tech n ical term s it is based on th e conven­ tion. T h e M im aipsakas consider th e re latio n as “ o rig in al” (autpattika) ,

f

*

H ISTO R IC A L RESUME

th a t is, as p e rm a n e n t o r eternal. T h e G ram m arian s explain this p e rm a ­ n en ce in tw o w ay s: pravahanityata a n d yogyatanityata. W e learn language from o u r elders; they in tu rn learned it from th e ir forefathers; thus it could be tra c e d b ack to an y conceivable period o f h u m a n society. T his ty p e o f p erm anence is pravahanityata. T h e o th e rv ie w is b a s e d o n th e in n a te cap acity o f w ords to express an y m ean in g ; this capacity (yogyata) is restricted by convention. P atan jali m ad e a distinction betw een absolute etern ality (kufasthanityata), by w hich a n item is n o t liable to a n y m odification, a n d th e p eren n ial n a tu re as used th ro u g h generations o f speakers (jiravahanityatS). D . Polysem y I t is generally believed th a t in a n id e a l lan g u ag e a w o rd m u st h av e only one m eaning, a n d a sense m ust h av e only one w ord to express it. T h is b in a ry relationship betw een a w ord a n d its m ean in g is accepted in p rin cip le b y all schools o f th o u g h t. I t is also believed th a t this relationship, w hich is the basis for th e significative pow er o f words, is stable a n d constant because linguistic com m u n icatio n w ould be im possible w ith o u t it. I f th ere is n o general u n d ersta n d in g o f the m ean in g o f w ords shared by th e speaker a n d listener th ere will be chaos a n d m u tu al com prehension w ill b e jeo p ard ized . T h e existence o f polysem y is recognized in ac tu a l p ractice, how ever. T w o w ords m a y h av e th e sam e form , a n d th e sam e w ord m a y develop m ore th a n one m eaning. T h e p ro b lem o f hom ophones a n d hom onym s has b een discussed b y scholars like B h artrh a ri. Y aska’s discussion a b o u t th e principle o f w ord derivation in S anskrit also sheds consider­ a b le lig h t on th e pro b lem of synonym s. N ouns are norm ally derived from v e rb a l roots. I f all nouns are so derived from v erb al roots denoting action, every object will have as m an y nam es as th e actions w ith w hich it is associated, a n d by th e sam e token each n o u n could b e ap p lied to as m an y objects as are associated w ith th a t action in d icated by th a t v erb al root. Y aska’s answ er to th e pro b lem is th a t th ere a re no restric­ tions. L an g u age designates things in an incom plete m a n n e r; it can choose only one o f th e m an y activities associated w ith a n object. H ence th ere is some sort o f p e rm a n e n t relatio n betw een a w ord a n d its m eaning. I t is accep ted th a t even th e p rim a ry m ean in g o f a w ord is n o t definitely circum scribed a n d th a t th e bo u n d aries o f th e m eaning often change on th e basis o f co n tex tu al factors, n o t only in th e case o f am biguous w ords b u t even in th a t o f o rd in ary w ords: th u s “ m a n is m o rta l” does n o t m ean “ w om an is im m o rta l” ; b u t in th e ph rase “ m a n a n d w o m an ” , “ m a n ” does n o t include “w o m an ” . W hen th ere is conflict betw een th e correct etym ological m eaning a n d th e p o p u la r usage, th e m eaning cu rre n t in p o p u la r usage am ong th e educated

elite is to be accepted. G ram m atical analysis and etymological inter­ pretations are only m eans of approach; the final authority is the popular usage of the cultured. E. Secondary M eaning (Laksana) Even though it is accepted th a t every w ord has a prim ary stable m eaning core, in actual practice shifts in meaning, m etaphoric transfers, a n d secondary usages are quite common. I f there is discrepancy in sense when the prim ary m eaning is taken, the passage will have to be explained by resorting to the secondary m eaning. T here are three conditions considered necessary for resorting to secondary m eaning. T he first, is inconsistency or incongruity of the words taken in the literal sense. A sentence like “ H e is an ass” or “ H e is a firebrand” cannot be taken in the literal sense because the hum an being referred to cannot be an anim al or an inanim ate object. A sentence like “ The house is in the river” does not m ake sense, because a house cannot exist in the river. In such cases the prim ary m eaning of the word has to be given up and another m eaning used. T he second condition is that the actual m eaning and the prim ary m eaning must be related in some way; it m ay be on the basis of similarity or common quality or it may be on the basis o f some other relationship like proximity. T he example “ H e is an ass” can be explained if the term “ ass” is interpreted as “ a fool” (as the donkey is notorious for its dullness). T he example of the house on the river has to be explained by taking “river” to m ean the bank of the river on the basis of proximity. T he th ird condition for resorting to secondary significance is either sanction by popular usage, as in the case of faded m etaphors, or a special purpose for which it is resorted to, as in the case of intentional m etaphors. T he inconsistency of prim ary m eaning can m ean impossibility of syntactic connection from the point of view of m eaning, or it can m ean inconsistency in the context. As an exam ple, in “ see th a t crows do not spoil the curd” “ crows” implies all beings, including a dog, who m ight spoil it. lite r a ry critics like A nandavardhana proposed the elem ent of purpose in intentional m etaphors and pointed out its im portance in enriching literature’s content. F. Conditions for Syntactic Relation How can we get a connected m eaning from a sentence if each word gives only its isolated sense, which is of a universal nature? This problem has been discussed in In d ia since ancient times, a n d three m ain factors have been pointed out as unifying of sentence m eaning: expectancy (SkaAksa), consistency (yogyata), and contiguity (asatti). W ords in a sentence m ust have m utual expectancy. Panini hinted as m uch when he stressed the need for samarthya or capacity am ong the meanings of

w ords for m u tu a l connection, m ainly in com pound words.® T h is samarthya h as b een in te rp re te d as sim ilar to SkdAksa o r m u tu a l expec­ ta n c y a n d u n ity o f sense. L ate r th e M lm am sakas developed this concept, a n d th e logicians m a d e fu rth e r m odifications. M u tu a l expectancy consists in a w ord bein g u n ab le to convey a com plete sense in th e absence o f an o th er w ord. L iterally it is th e desire on th e p a r t o f th e listeners to know th e o th er w ords in th e sentence in o rd e r to com plete th e sense. A w ord is said to have expectancy for a n o th er i f it cannot, w ith o u t th e latter, produce know ledge o f its interco n n ectio n in a n u tteran ce. T h e M im am sakas w ere m ore interested in psychological expectancy, w hile th e logicians a n d th e G ram m arian s stressed th e need for syntactic expectancy. T o this p rim ary condition w ere ad d e d two m ore, yogyatd o r consis­ tency o f sense a n d dsatti o r th e contiguity o f th e words. G ram m arian s d id n o t em phasize th e im p o rtan ce o f yogyatd for to th e m it is enough for a sentence to give a syntactically connected m eaning. Its veracity is n o t a condition. F rom th e G ra m m a rian ’s p o in t o f view laksand, secondary m eaning, is also o f Uttle interest. “ H e is a b o y ” a n d “ H e is a n ass” are equally valid for them . E ven em pty phrases Uke “ th e child o f a b a rre n w o m an ” a re UnguisticaUy vaUd to them , for G ram m arian s are n o t concerned w ith th e real existence o f th e th in g m e a n t b y an expression. Togyatd involves a ju d g m e n t on th e sense o r nonsense o f a sentence. T h ere is difference o f opinion ab o u t w h eth er it should b e tak en as a positive condition. I f the lack o f yogyatd— inconsistency— is only a p p a re n t a n d can b e explained aw ay b y resorting to th e m e ta ­ ph o rical m eaning o f a w o rd in th e sentence, th e re is no difficulty in u n d erstan d in g th e sehtence’s m eaning. Asatti o r contiguity is th e u n in te rru p te d u tte ra n c e o r th e u n b ro k en apprehension o f th e w ords in a sentence. I n th e case o f elliptical sentences, one school beUeves th a t th e syntactic relatio n is know n by supplying th e necessary m eaning, w hile a n o th er school insists th a t th e m issing w ords h av e to b e suppUed a n d th e m ean in g o btained. Som e tak e tdtparya, th e in ten tio n o f th e speaker know n from contextual factors, as a fourth condition for u n d erstan d in g th e m eaning o f a sentence. G . S entence M eaning R eg ard in g th e com prehension o f th e sentence m eaning th ere are tw o m ain theories, called arwitdbhidhdna a n d abhihitdnvaya. Speech is purposive in n atu re . People use w ords w ith th e in ten tio n o f conveying a connected, unified sense. H ence from th e use o f w ords in ju x tap o sitio n it is assum ed th a t th e speaker h as u ttere d th em w ith th e in ten tio n o f conveying a connected sense. E xpectancy, consistency, a n d conti­ guity h elp in this com prehension o f a unified sentence m eaning. T h e

sen ten ce m e a n in g is so m eth in g m o re th a n th e sum o f th e w o rd m e a n ­ ings. Besides th e w o rd m eanings, th e sy n tactic con n ectio n o f th e w ord m ean in g s h as to b e conveyed. T h e abhihitanvaya th e o ry says th a t in a sentence ea ch w o rd gives o u t its in d iv id u a l isolated m e a n in g (w hich is u n iv ersa l) a n d th e ir significative p o w e r is e x h a u ste d w ith th a t. T h e n w ith th e h e lp o f laksana (secondary significative p o w e r) th e syntactic re la tio n sh ip is o b tain ed , a n d th u s th e sentence m ean in g is u n d ersto o d . A cco rd in g to th e anvitabhidhana school, b y c o n tra st, e a c h w o rd in a sen ten ce conveys n o t only its isolated m e a n in g b u t also th e sy n tactic elem en t. T h e w ords convey th e m e a n in g o f th e u n iv ersal a n d sim u ltan ­ eously th e m e a n in g as re ferrin g to th e p a rtic u la r. T h e w ords th e m ­ selves also give th e sy n tactic re latio n sh ip . T h u s th e e n tire sentence m e a n in g is co n veyed b y th e w ords them selves. T h e N aiyayikas, w ho believe th a t th e w ords in a sentence d e n o te p rim a ry m ean in g s t h a t are p a rtic u la rs as q u alified b y universal traits, co n te n d t h a t th e sentence m e a n in g is a n association o f th e w o rd m eanings (samsargamaryada) . H . Sphota T h eo ry E v en in an c ie n t In d ia th e re w ere som e scholars w ho em phasized th e u n re a l n a tu re o f w ords a n d ad v o c ated th e n eed for ta k in g th e sen ten ce as a w hole. I n th e N irukta Y aska refers to A u d u m b a ra y a n a ’s th eo ry th a t it is th e sta te m e n t as a w hole th a t is re g u la rly p re se n t in th e p ercep tiv e faculty o f th e h e a re r.7 T h e sphota th eo ry , fully p ro m u lg a t­ ed by B hartjrhari in th e fifth ce n tu ry o f th e C h ristia n era, is o n e o f th e m ost im p o rta n t co n trib u tio n s o f In d ia to th e p ro b le m o f m eaning. H e insisted t h a t th e fu n d a m e n ta l linguistic fa ct is th e co m p lete u tte ra n c e o r sentence. J u s t as a le tte r o r a p h o n e m e h a s n o p a rts, so also th e w o rd a n d th e sentence are to b e ta k e n as com plete in te g ra l units, n o t as m a d e u p o f sm aller elem ents. B h a rtfh a ri says th a t alth o u g h lin g u istic analysis— sp littin g sentences in to w ords a n d fu rth e r in to ro o ts a n d suffixes a n d in to phonem es— m a y b e a useful m ean s for stu d y in g lan g u ag e, it h as n o reality . I n a speech situ atio n , co m m u n ica­ tio n is alw ays th ro u g h com plete u tteran ces. T h e speaker th in k s a n d th e listen er u n d ersta n d s th e u tte ra n c e as a single u n it. I t is on ly those w ho do n o t know th e la n g u ag e th o ro u g h ly w ho an aly ze it in to w ords, a n d fu rth e r bits, in o rd e r to g et a con n ected m ean in g . T h o se w ho know th e lan g u ag e w ill conceive th e id e a a n d th e expression as a single u n it a n d express it; a n d th e listener likewise co m p reh en d s it as a w hole, th e u n d e rsta n d in g is as a n in stan tan eo u s flash o f insight (pratibha). T h e fact th a t th e expression h as to b e th ro u g h th e m e d iu m o f phonem es, th ro u g h a te m p o ra l o r sp atial series, does n o t w a rra n t o u r considering it as m a d e u p o f p arts. W h e n a p a in te r conceives a p ic tu re in his m in d a n d p ain ts it o n a canvas, h e m a y use various colors, a n d m ake various strokes; t h a t does n o t m e a n t h a t th e p ic tu re is n o t a u n it. A nd

t

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we see th e p ictu re as a unit, n o t as different colors a n d strokes. J u s t as th e m ean in g is u n itary , integral, a n d indivisible, th e sym bol th a t signifies it m ust also b e u n itary a n d indivisible. T his concept is called sphopa— th e sentence tak en as a n integral sym bol, in w hich its a p p a re n t p a rts a re irrelev an t to it as parts. I t is n o t som ething hypothetically assum ed to explain language b eh av io r; it is actually experienced a n d know n th ro u g h perception. O n h earin g a sentence those w ho know th e lan g u ag e w ell h e a r th e sentence, n o t th e phonem es o r sound bits o r even words. T hose who do n o t know th e language m ay h e a r only th e sound bits. T h e sphota th eo ry says th a t h earin g th e w hole sentence is th e re al experience, while th e a p p a re n t experience o f h ea rin g the sound bits is only for those who do n o t know th e language. I. C o m p o n ential Analysis o f W o rd M eaning I t m ay be no ted th a t even th e so-called u n ity o f m ean in g is often a n illusion, for it is th e language th a t m akes th e unity. Y aska in the fifth cen tu ry B.C. and, following him , B h artfh a ri in th e fifth cen tu ry o f th e C h ristian e ra have p o in ted o u t th a t a v erb conveys a series of operations or activities taking place in a p a rtic u la r tem p o ral sequence. T h u s th e w o rd “ cooks” conveys th e id ea o f a series o f activities— p re p a rin g th e fire, p u ttin g th e vessel on it, p o u rin g w a te r in th e vessel, w ashing th e rice, p u ttin g it in th e w ater, blow ing th e fire to m ake it b u rn pro p erly, p u ttin g o u t th e fire, rem oving th e excess w ater, a n d so on. I t is th e w o rd “ cooks” th a t collects all o f these activities into a u n itary , in teg ral action. E ach o f these activities can b e fu rth e r analyzed in to a series o f activities tak in g place in tim e. L a te r philosophers o f language m ad e fu rth e r com ponential analysis o f w ords from th e sem antic p o in t o f view a n d declared th a t every v erb al ro o t (dhatu) involved tw o sem antic factors, activity (vyapara) a n d goal o r result (phala). T h e v erb “ h e coOks” m eans a n activity d irected to w ard th e softening o f th e rice, a n d so forth. T h e re is a difference o f opinion ab o u t w h eth er b o th a re p rim ary m eanings o f the v erb al ro o t or one can b e taken as th e m ain m ean in g a n d th e o th er as subsidiary. T h e verb w as divided into th e ro o t a n d th e suffix, a n d sep arate m eaning bits assigned to th em . M afid a n a M isra said th a t th e m ean in g o f th e ro o t is th e result, a n d it is th e suffix th a t indicates th e activity. W ith th e ad d itio n o f preverbs th e m eaning changes considerably in Sanskrit, a n d th e re h av e b een discussions o f w h eth er all th e m eanings are present in a la te n t form in th e ro o t, to b e revealed b y th e preverbs, o r these preverbs can b e assigned specific m eanings. J . Suggestion ( vyahjana) T h e th e o ry o f literal (p rim ary ) a n d m etap h o ric (secondary) m ean ­ in g developed by th e N y ay a a n d M im am sa schools o f sentence inter-

p re ta tio n in an c ie n t In d ia was extended fa rth er b y A n a n d av ard h a n a in th e second h a lf o f th e n in th cen tu ry to include em otive an d o th er associative m eanings u n d e r linguistic m eaning. H e d id n o t attack th e usual division o f speech in to words, into stem s a n d suffixes a n d the distinction betw een th e p rim ary a n d secondary m eanings o f words. H e accep ted all o f these concepts, b u t in ad d itio n h e postulated a th ird cap ab ility o f language, w hich he called vyanjana or th e capacity to suggest m eaning o th er th a n its literal or m etaphoric m eaning. A nandav a rd h a n a p o in ted o u t th a t this suggestive function o f language has a v ita l role to play in literature. K . T im e T h e concept o f tim e a n d its divisions w ere discussed by such G ra m ­ m arian s as P atan jali a n d B h a rtfh a ri. T h e division o f tim e in to past, present, a n d fu tu re has a place in g ram m ar, b u t th e rules o f usage given are n o t strictly follow ed in a c tu a l practice. T h e present tense (Iaf) is used to in d icate th e en tire stretch o f tim e included from th e beginning o f th e action till its com pletion. “ H e is cooking” can m ean h e has sta rte d cooking a n d th e operations are n o t yet com pleted. T h e present need n o t b e m o m entary. Usages like “ th e m ountains are standing” a n d “ th e rivers a re flow ing” m ean th a t they continue to stand or flow. B h artrh a ri considers tim e to be th e m ost im p o rta n t pow er o f S abda B rah m an , relatively m ore in d ep en d en t th a n o th er powers, a n d to be responsible for regulating them . T h e an cien t a u th o rity V ar§ayani said th a t becom ing (bhava) has six stages from b irth to decay.8 L. G ender G ram m atical g en d er has a ttra c te d m u ch speculation because in Sanskrit th e g ra m m a tica l gender does no t coincide w ith sex, a n d words referrin g to th e sam e object m ay occur in different genders.

3 . T h e L it e r a t u r e o n G r a m m a r

G riim m ar (vyakarana) was recognized from th e earliest tim es in In d ia as a distinct science, a field o f know ledge w ith its ow n p aram eters th a t distinguished i t from o th er sciences such as astronom y (Jyotifa) , arch itectu re (JilpaJastra) , ag ricu ltu re (krsiJastra) , a n d th e like. T he coverage in this encyclopedia thus presents a peculiar problem som ew hat different from th a t faced in dealing w ith th e lite ratu re o f o th er philo­ sophical systems. W hereas in th e cases o f those o th er systems the “ philosophical” lite ratu re is confined to th a t m ateria l w hich relates to th e overall aim o f liberation a n d those treatises w hich discuss theoretical issues p e rtin e n t to th a t aim in a polem ical context, in th e case o f the

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RESUME

g ra m m a tica l lite ratu re th e coverage has b een w id en ed to in clu d e those works w hich d eal w ith theory o f m eaning a n d th e re la ted issues discussed in th e previous section. As a result, th e lite ra tu re th a t is sum m arized h ere in th e subsequent pages represents a selection from th e to ta l corpus o f vyakarana lite ra tu re classified as such in In d ia . F or th a t reason it seems a p p ro p riate to a tte m p t a t this p o in t to place th e w riters tre a te d in th e b o d y o f this volum e w ith in th e to ta l ro ster o f au th o rs whose works constitute th e en tire corpus o f g ra m m a tic a l lite ratu re . T o this e n d w e h av e provided as a n ap p en d ix a b ib lio g rap h y o f vyakarana works a n d authors th a t covers w h a t is cu rren tly know n o f th e lite ratu re on g ra m m a r in general. W ith in th e confines o f this lite ratu re th e presen t volum e provides sum m aries o f som e w orks th a t a re ( I ) in p rin t a n d (2) especially relev an t to th e concerns to u ch ed on in th e preceding section. M a n y of th e w orks th a t are n o t sum m arized do, w ith o u t d o u b t, b e a r on these topics. T h e distinction d ra w n m u st seem from th e stan d p o in t o f In d ia n trad itio n ra th e r artificial. W e can only re m in d o u r readers th a t th e en tire project o f this encyclopedia is d irected to w ard a readership th a t com prises in th e m a in those tra in e d in philosophy as u nderstood in th e w estern w orld. T h e biblio g rap h y w ill suggest to such readers th e extent o f classical w ritings o n g ra m m a r in general. F ro m these w ritings w e h av e selected th e ones th a t seem m ost inform ative concerning m atters o f general philosophical interest, as “ philosophy” has b een und ersto o d for th e purpose o f this en tire encyclopedic project. T h e origin o f g ra m m a r in In d ia, as w ith so m u ch else, is u n clear. W h a t is clear is th a t it was recognized as a field o f study from a very early tim e. P an in i a n d Yaska, w ho m ust rep resen t a stage o f th o u g h t several centuries p rio r to th e C hristian era, b o th refer to a n u m b e r of g ram m atical authorities a n d th eir views. I n some cases th e nam es cited b y b o th w riters a re identical. A ccording to a statem en t in th e B rahm anas it was th e god In d r a w ho first analyzed a speech u tte ra n c e in term s o f its p arts.9 Som e scholars speak o f a n “ A in d ra ” school o f G ram m arian s in locating th e origins o f g ram m ar. P atan jali refers to a trad itio n involving th e futile a tte m p t o f Byhaspati to teac h th e language b y en u m eratin g its w ords a n d th e ir m eanings.10 T h e earliest historical figure w ho d ea lt w ith linguistic study seems to be S akalya, a u th o r o f th e Padapatha o f th e Rg Veda, w ho is m en tio n ed b y P anini. A ccording to B hartyhari, the sage A u d u m b a ra y a n a (also m en tio n ed b y Y a sk a ), to g eth er w ith V a rtta k sa, seems to have h eld views sim ilar to th e sphofa th eo ry .11 A late trad itio n m akes S p h o tay an a, m en tio n ed by P an in i, th e founder o f th e sphofa theory.12 S ak atay a n a held th e view th a t all w ords m u st b e derived from v erb al ro o ts; som e people consider h im to b e th e au th o r o f th e Unadisutras. G arg y a a n d others held th e view th a t n o t all nouns can b e tra c e d to v erb al roots. B ut no au th e n tic a t-

ed w orks o f a n y o f these p re -P a n in ia n w riters h av e com e do w n to us, a n d it is difficult if n o t im possible to say w hich, if any, o f P a n in i’s rules m ay h av e b een ta k e n from his predecessors. Y aska a n d P a n in i a re th e tw o g re a t early w riters o n lan g u ag e. T h e y b elo n g to a p erio d several centuries before C hrist, possibly th e fifth cen tu ry . Y aska is generally considered to b e e a rlier th a n P an in i, b u t P a u l T h ie m e holds th a t Y aska knew P a n in i.13 G eorge C a rd o n a th in k s it wise to leave th e p ro b lem o p e n .14 T h e tw o w riters a re classified in to d ifferen t genres o f lite ra tu re b y th e In d ia n tra d itio n . Y aska’s Nirukta provides th e n a m e for a discipline o f etym ology co u n ted as s e p a ra te from g ra m m a r (vyakarana), th e discipline for w h ich Panind stands as th e m a jo r sem inal figure. (T h e b ib lio g rap h y a p p e n d e d to th is volum e confines itself to w orks classed in th e la tte r discipline.) A. P a n in i’s Astadhyayi P a n in i’s b asic w o rk is m erely title d “ T h e E ig h t-C h a p te re d ” (Astadhyayi). B ut a very re m a rk ab le w ork it is, p ro v id in g a m o d el for re cen t a n d c o n tem p o rary w ork in descriptive linguistics th a t c a n stan d w ith th e b est efforts o f m o d e rn analysts. T h e eight ch ap ters co n stitu te a com plete descriptive a n a ly tic a l g ra m m a r o f th e S anskrit language, com prising a b o u t fo u r th o u san d rules called sUtras p reced ed b y a list o f sounds d iv id ed in to fourteen groups, w h ich a re called th e Hva-, pratyahdra-, o r maheivara-sUtras. I n these rules th e la n g u ag e is an aly zed in to v erb al a n d n o m in a l bases, so th a t th e bases h av e com e to b e cataloged in tw o lists kn o w n as dhatupatha— th e exhaustive lists o f p rim itiv e verb al roots— a n d ganapatha— th e selective lists o f nouns, verbs, a n d so o n for ap p lica tio n in his rules. I t is n o t clear w h eth er o n e p erso n w ro te all these different com ponents o f th e fu n d a m e n ta l P a n in ia n corpus. A fu rth e r featu re o f P a n in i’s m e th o d is a set o f m etarules o f paribhasas, w h ich tell us in w h ich o rd e r to ap p ly th e rules, w here exceptions are to b e m ad e, a n d so forth. AU o f these com ponents are, in a n y case, m a d e th e su b ject o f a g ra n d c o m m e n ta ria l tra d itio n ex ten d in g to th e present. C ertain a d d itio n a l m aterials a re ascribed to P a n in i b y th e trad itio n , th o u g h scholarship is less ag re e d on th e a u th en ticity o f these ascriptions. A m o n g th e m , o ne g ro u p o f sUtras, th e Unadisutras, provides rules for in tro d u cin g affixes after v erb al roots to .derive n o m in al bases. T h e au th o rsh ip o f these Unadisutras is freq u en tly a ttrib u te d to S ak a ta y a n a in stead o f P a n in i; a n d som e scholars h a v e fo u n d th e m to d a te fro m a la te r p erio d . I t is likely t h a t th e re is tr u th in all o f these views, in o th er w ords, th a t th e sUtras re p resen t a developm en t o f analysis over a long perio d . A second set o f anciU ary sUtras a re th e PhitsUtras, w hich pro v id e p rinciples o f ac cen tu atio n . A featu re o f these rules is th a t accents are presu p p o sed for n o m in a l bases, fro m w h ich th e ru les d eriv e revisions

o f accentuation for th e wholes o f w hich those bases form a p a rt. Because P an in i’s rules contain no n e specifying accents for n o m in al bases, C ard o n a reports th a t “ it is clear th a t t h GphifsUtras cannot b e attrib u te d to P ardni.” 15 I n fact, th ey a re trad itio n ally ascribed to S an tan av a, a ra th e r later w riter. Still, th e re are scholars w ho believe th e Phitsutras d ate from a p re-P an in ian period. T h e LinganuSdsatia rules concern g e n d e r; th ey dictate how to determ ine th e gender o f linguistic item s based on th eir structure a n d m eaning. A lthough some scholars believe th a t this set o f rules an ted ates P anini a n d was know n to him , P anini in fact h a d his ow n rules governing gender, w hich in som e respects com plem ent a n d in others contradict th e rules in th e LifigdnuSasana. T h ere are also tw o texts dealing w ith phonetics called PdniniyaSiksd, one o f w hich has regularly been a ttrib u te d to P anini. I t seems unlikely th a t eith er o f th em is b y P anini him self.16 P an in i’s system is rem arkable in several respects. I t p u rp o rts to derive all th e forms o f th e Sanskrit language th a t correspond to correct usage from operations on tw o kinds o f prim itives— affixes (Jrratyaya) a n d bases (prakrti). T h e bases are o f tw o kinds them selves, verbal (dhdtu) a n d nom inal (Jrrdtipadika). T h e rules indicate how affixes are to b e in tro d uced after bases to generate th e correct inflected forms o f th e language. T h ey also tell us w h a t com pounds can b e form ed, a n d how to derive, for exam ple, active a n d passive sentences. Some rules tell us u n d e r w h a t conditions one form can b e substituted for another. T hese rules are ordered, th o u g h n o t in a recognizable, system atic fashion th ro ughout. I n som e cases th e ac tu a l o rd er in w hich th e rules are given dictates th e ord er in w hich th ey are to be applied. I n other cases one ru le blocks application o f an o th er— for exam ple, a p articu lar ru le governs its own dom ain a n d restricts th e scope o f a m ore general one. T h e re are negative rules (nisedhasUtra), w hich p reclude application, as w ell as definitions (samjndsutra) a n d m etarules (paribhdsa) w hich serve to in terp re t a n d fix th e scope o f th e operational rules (vidhisutra) . Still an o th er type o f ru le is th e extension rule (atideSasutra) , w hich extends th e scope o f a ru le beyond its n o rm al bounds. T h e rem arkably system atic n a tu re o f P an in i’s g ram m ar is further reflected in P an in i’s use o f abbreviated expressions— symbols— to in d icate certain recu rren t features, notab ly syntactic functions such as agent, action, a n d object (know n generally as karakas). H e also introduces “ m arkers” (C ard o n a’s term for it) to provide placeholders for certain functions a n d to form abbreviations (such as a m ark er X followed by a m arker M signifies X a n d all th e item s following in a list u p to a n d including M ).17

B. VdrtHkakSras In e v itab ly , in such a com plex u n d erta k in g as P a n in i’s system provides, th e re w ere attem p ts to criticize a n d im prove on his ru les a n d definitions. W ith in w h a t com es to b e know n as th e P a n in ia n school of g ra m m a r, com prising those w ho accep t a tra d itio n going b ack to P an in i a n d n o t to others to b e discussed shortly, th e first em en d atio n of th e Astddhydyl o f w h ich w e know ap p ears to have com e in th e form of com m ents (Odrttika) a ttrib u te d to K a ty a y a n a . C onsiderable tim e m u st h av e elapsed betw een P an in i a n d K a ty a y a n a b ecause th ere a re sufficient differences in th e ir lan g u ag e to account for some o f th e Vdrttikas. A sim ilar g ap o f tim e has to b e assum ed betw een K a ty a y a n a a n d P atafijali, a u th o r o f th e Mahdbhdsya, so K a ty a y a n a m a y b e assigned to th e th ird cen tu ry B.C. A lth o u g h h e is now adays co u n ted as a P an in ian , h e m ay have belonged to a different school. V arious o th e r au th o rs o f com m ents on a n d criticism s o f P an in i p ro b a b ly lived in this period, a n d som e nam es a re m en tio n ed th a t likely in clu d e a n u m b e r o f th em , such as S akat ay an a, Sakalya, V a ja p y ay an a , V yadi, a n d Pau§karasadi. W e know little a b o u t th eir ideas, th o u g h a few o f V y a d i’s rules a re h e ld trad itio n ally to have com e dow n to us, a n d S ak atay a n a is believed to h a v e b een th e au th o r o f th e Uiiddisutras accep ted b y P anini. C. P atafijali’s Mahabhdsya K a ty a y a n a ’s Vdrttikas com e to us as a p a r t o f th e “ g re a t com m entary” (mahdbhdsya) o n P an in i ascribed to P ataftjali (w ho m a y o r m a y n o t b e th e sam e as th e au th o r o f th e Togasutras'). T h e Mahdbhdsya takes th e form o f dialogues betw een stu d en t a n d teachers, som e o f w hose solutions to problem s are unacceptable, w hile one provides th e final tru e view (siddhSnta). N o t all o f P a n in i’s rules a re discussed, a n d it is n o t alw ays easy to identify th e final view or to differentiate K a ty a y a n a ’s contri­ b u tio n s from those o f Patafij ali, n o t to speak o f th e possibility o f su b sequent in terp olations. Nevertheless, th e Mahdbhdsya provides th e classical in te rp re ta tio n o f P a n in i’s system a n d is m ad e th e subject o f su b sequent com m entaries th ro u g h th e centuries u n til th e p resen t tim e. F u rth erm o re, in P ataftjali’s w ork, especially in its in tro d u cto ry passages, im p o rta n t philosophical ideas are bro ach ed , so th a t th e Mahdbhdsya is p erh ap s th e earliest philosophical tex t o f th e G ram m arian s. D. O th e r Schools o f G ra m m a r F o r th e p erio d betw een th e tim e o f P atafijali (perhaps 150 B .C .) a n d th a t o f B h a rtrh a ri (perhaps fifth cen tu ry after C h rist), scholars trac e th e origins o f a n u m b er o f th e o th er systems o f S anskrit G ram m ar,

including th e D ig am b ara school o f J a in e n d ra a n d th e B uddhist G andra school, as w ell as th e K a ta n tra tradition. T h e Katantrasiitras are traditionally ascribed to S arvavarm an, w ho is d a te d by S h rip ad K rish n a B elvalkar w ith o u t m u c h evidence as having flourished in th e first cen tu ry o f th e C hristian era. T h e evidence, such as it is, is th a t D urgasim ha, a com m entator on these sutras w ho m ust h av e lived a ro u n d o r before A .D . 800, h a d a tex t o f th e sutras th a t h ad already u ndergone considerable transform ation o r h a d possibly been lost, as th ere is a q u ite distinct version o f th em cu rren t in K ash m ir by approxim ately th e sam e tim e. T h e origins o f K a ta n tra seem to have com e o u t o f a felt desire for a m ore po p u lar a n d easier g ra m m a r th a n P an in i’s form idable system provides. I t has spaw ned a fairly consistent line o f com m entators lasting u n til th e p resen t tim e. I n keeping w ith the m otivations to brevity a n d sim plicity, the Kdtantrasutras re tu rn to th e older m eth o d o f ordering th e syllables (as found in th e Prdtifakhyas), arran g e discussions o f things m ore natu rally (sim ilarly to the arran g e m e n t later ad o p ted w ithin th e P aninian tra d itio n b y B hattoji D iksita in his Siddhantakaurmdi), a n d o m it m an y o f th e m ost difficult rules prescribed b y Panini. T h e result is a w ork o f ab o u t fourteen h u n d re d sutras only, in contrast to P an in i’s four thousand. As is well know n, th e Ja in s w ere divided from a n early period into th e D ig am b ara a n d S vetam bara traditions. E ach developed its own literatu re, a n d n o t surprisingly each developed its peculiar g ram m atical trad itio n . T h e D ig am b ara trad itio n goes back to th e Jainendravydkarana, w hich th e Ja in s attrib u te to M ahavira, th e J in a (founder o f Ja in ism ), who answers questions p u t to him by In d ra , b u t w hich is a w ork th a t appears to h ave been com posed ab o u t A .D . 500 by P ujy ap ad a or D evan an d in , who is also know n as the au th o r o f certain fundam ental philos­ ophical works (see th e first volum e o f this encyclopedia [2d ed. p. 99] ). A ccording to Belvalkar th e Ja in e n d ra g ram m ar is a condensation o f P an in i a n d th e varttikas, a condensation accom plished by the use o f sh o rt tech n ical term s th a t m ake study o f the w ork very com plicated. T his difficulty m ay account for th e relative d e a rth o f com m entaries th a t have b een com posed on it, those o f A b h ay an an d in (perhaps 750) a n d o f Som adeva (1250) seem ing to b e th e only ones still extant. T h e S vetam bara version o f g ram m ar stems from a later date. Its basic works are th e Sabddnufdsana a n d Amoghavrtti o f A bhinava S ak atayana, n o t to be confused w ith th e an cien t au th o rity by th a t nam e. T his Sabdanufdsana draw s on th e w ork o f all the authors discussed so far, as w ell as on C andragom in’s B uddhist tra d itio n ; indeed, the dependence on this last trad itio n is fairly w idespread. T his system was carried on th ro u g h th e usual com m entarial works u n til it w as supplant-

ed for th e m ost p a rt b y th a t o f H e m a c a n d ra ’s Sabddnuidsana, also address­ ed to th e S v etam b aras. B uddhist G ra m m a r dates a t least from G andragom in3 to w hom th e Candrasutras are ascribed, a n d who appears to have lived ab o u t B hartp h ari5S tim e, in the fo u rth o r fifth century. O nce again it depends largely on P an in i, K a ty a y a n a , a n d P atanjali, th o u g h it is som ew hat briefer— 3,100 sutras in all. T h e re a re also accessory lists: s-Dhdtupdfha, LiAgdnuidsana, Ganapafha, Upasargaortti, a n d Vamasutras, a n d a com m ­ en tary on this m ateria l w ritten b y C andrag'om in, fragm ents o f w hich have com e dow n to us. T h is g ram m ar seems to h av e b een p o p u lar, w as tra n sla te d in to T ib e ta n a n d was circulated th ro u g h o u t B uddhist lands. I t is still studied in T ib et, th o u g h n o t in Sri L anka, w here it was later superseded b y K a sy a p a 5S Bdldvabodha (ca. 1200). E. B h artphari (p erhaps fifth cen tu ry ) I t was B h artrh a ri w ho led G ra m m a r in to philosophy pro p er, by m ak in g a case for vyakarana as a dariana, a view ab o u t u ltim ate things, eventually ab o u t lib eratio n . H e was also th e m ajo r arch itect o f th e sphofa theory, w h ich is regularly identified as th e u n iq u e co n trib u tio n o f G ram m arian s to th e philosophical p ro b lem o f m eaning. T h e locus classicus for his th o u g h ts on these m atters is the w ork pop u larly called Vdkyapadiya, b u t h e also w rote a com m entary on the Mahdbhdsya a n d possibly o th er works. W e have m ad e th e com m entarial trad itio n on B h artp h ari’s Vdkyapadiya c e n tral to th e concerns o f this volum e. T h e first such co m m en tato r was B h a rtrh a ri him self, it w ould seem, for h e now ap p ears to h av e b een th e a u th o r o f a com m entary on a t least th e first tw o books o f th e th re e th a t constitute th e Vdkyapadiya or Trikandi. F. T h e F ifth T h ro u g h T e n th C enturies A ttacks w ere leveled against B h a rtrh a ri5S sphofa th eo ry by K u m arila B h atta, th e fam ous M im am saka, a n d by th e B uddhist D h a rm ak irti. M a n d a n a M isra, th e g re a t A d v aitin a n d M im am saka, w rote an in d ep en d e n t w ork, Sphofasiddhi, defending sphofa against these attacks a n d vin d icatin g B h a rtrh a ri5S position. A n d ju s t a t th e en d o f this perio d w e d a te H elaraja, p ro b a b ly th e m ost im p o rta n t co m m en tato r after B hartphari himself. T h is p erio d also features th e p ro d u c tio n o f a very influential com m ­ en tary , th e oldest ex tan t com plete ru n n in g com m entary, on P a n in i5S g ram m ar, th e Kdiikdvrtti. I t was com posed by tw o authors, Ja y a d ity a a n d V a m a n a, a ro u n d th e m id d le o f th e 7th century. T h e Kaiikd was in tu rn com m ented u p o n by Jin e n d ra b u d d h i, a B uddhist know n for philosophical works as well as for his g ra m m a tica l erudition. T o this perio d likewise belong A b h a y an an d in , th e J a in e n d ra

β

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re su m e

com m entator, A bhinava S akatayana, au th o r o f Sabdanuidsana, an d D urgasim ha, th e K a ta n tra com m entator, all m entioned earlier. G. Eleventh T h ro u g h S ixteenth C enturies W e h av e now arrived a t an era in w hich a n u m b er o f gram m atical traditions w ere in place. T h e next few centuries featured in th e m ain com m entators explaining an d furthering these traditions, w ith one or tw o new additions to th e field. W ith in th e P an in ian trad itio n itself the m ost im p o rtan t com m ­ entators early in this period included K sirasvam in, au th o r o f a com m ­ entary on P an in i’s Dhatupatha; H a ra d a tta , a com m entator on th e KaSika; M aitreya R aksita, a Bengali G ram m arian w ho w rote on th e theory o f verbal bases; a n d m ost notably, K aiyata, th e m ajor com m entator on P atan jali’s Mahabhasya. I t is on K a iy a ta ’s Pradipa ra th e r th a n on th e Mahabhasya itself th a t th e subsequent com m entators m ainly based th eir rem arks. K a iy a ta m ust have lived about th e beginning o f the eleventh century. Still o ther figures o f im portance are P urusottam adeva, au th o r o f com m entaries on Panini an d P atanjali (though th e la tte r has been lost), a n d R am acan d ra, au th o r o f Prakriyakaumudi, on P an in i. T h e period is likewise m arked by th e com position o f various m aterials stem m ing from th e traditions of K a ta n tia . In Jainism , as was pointed ou t before, th e field was com m andeered, at least w ithin th e S vetam bara branch, by H em acandra, a polym ath w riter who is probably the m ost im p o rtan t a n d influential J a in scholar the trad itio n has ever known. His Sabdamiasana is even longer th a n P an in i’s— som e 4,500 sutras— a n d draw s on his predecessors, especially on S akatayana’s work. A t least a q u arte r o f th e w ork deals w ith th e various prakrta (P ra k rit) languages, th e ancestors o f th e m odern regional languages o f n o rth ern In d ia, w hich are to day beginning to take on th eir developed form. H em acan d ra also com posed a com m entary, the Brhadvrtti, w hich quotes m any w riters either to support or to criticize them . A new school o f G ram m ar, know n as the J a u m a ra school a n d influen­ tial especially in W est Bengal even today, takes its rise from a gram m ar called Samksiptasara, com posed by K ram ad isv ara ab o u t th e m iddle o f th e eleventh century. T his w ork again depends on P anini, w ith a few rules rejected a n d the sutras rearranged. H e m akes m any innovations b o th in th e m ethod a n d in the organization. T h e tex t as know n to G opicandra, another influential w riter o f this system, contains a ch ap ter on P rakrit. T he school actually takes its nam e from Ju m a ra nan d in , w ho revised the Samksiptasara, probably in the fourteenth century. Tw o o ther new systems are those o f the Sarasvata an d th e M ugdhabodha. T h e Sarasvata school appears to have been po p u lar in n o rth ern

In d ia from its in cep tio n in th e th irte e n th ce n tu ry dow n to th e tim e o f B h atto ji D ik sita, w h e n th e re v iv a l o f th e P a n in ia n tra d itio n p u t m ost o f th e o th e r schools o f g ra m m a r in to a decline. T h e basic w ork o f the system is th e Sarasvatiprakriya, com posed by A n u b h u ti S v aru p acary a a b o u t 1270. A n u b h u ti S v a ru p a c a ry a also w ro te w orks o n A d v aita V e d a n ta . A b o u t th e sam e tim e V o p a d ev a (or B o p ad ev a ), a nativ e o f th e M a h a ra s h tra co u n try , w ro te a g ra m m a r know n as Mugdhabodha, w h ich o nce m o re represents a n a tte m p t to sim plify a n d a b b rev iate P a n in i5S system , this tim e w ith evidence o f a religious purpose. V o p a d e v a ’s arra n g e m e n t, like th a t o f th e K a ta n tr a , prom ised to m ake his g ra m m a r m o re accessible, b u t as h e also re a rra n g e d th e o rd er o f th e syllables a n d rem oved all th e m ark ers his system was n o t easily recogniz­ ab le to P an in ian s. N evertheless, the M u g d h a b o d h a system was very p o p u la r u p to th e tim e o f B hattoji, w ho w e n t o u t o f his w ay to refute it. T h e p ictu re , th e n , o f G ra m m a r d u rin g th e fifteenth a n d sixteenth cen tu ries is o ne in w hich a n u m b e r o f com peting g ra m m a tic a l systems flourished w ith d ifferent degrees o f p o p u la rity in different p a rts o f th e su b co n tin en t, a n d th e P a n in ia n system itself was only one am o n g them . H . T h e M o d e rn P e rio d : B h atto ji D iksita, K o n d a B h atta, a n d N a g esa B h a tta T h e P a n in ia n tra d itio n suffered th ro u g h th e difficulty o f its system so th a t, as w e h a v e seen, o th e r trad itio n s grew u p over th e centuries th a t riv aled o r surpassed P a n in i5S school in p o p u la rity a n d influence. A lth o u g h som e a tte m p ts h a d b een m a d e b y g ra m m a rian s who re m a in e d w ith in th e P a n in ia n tra d itio n to sim plify th e system , n o tab ly R a m a c a n d ra 5S Prakriyakaumudi, i t w as B h atto ji D ik sita a t th e e n d o f th e six teen th ce n tu ry w ho p ro d u c ed a version o f th e P a n in ia n g ra m m a r t h a t m a d e it g en erally accessible a n d served to elevate th a t tra d itio n to its p re sen t place o f u n riv ale d em inence. B h atto ji5S w ork is called Siddhantakaumudi. C ard o n a , referrin g to a tra d itio n a l explanation, notes th a t kaumudi m eans “ m o o n lig h t,55 a n d ju s t as m o o n lig h t brightens a n d cools, th e kaumudi w orks “ dispel ig n o ran c e w hile n o t involving th e g re a t effort necessary to u n d e rsta n d w orks like th e Mahabhasya, 55 w orks th a t previously h a d to b e m astered in o rd e r to grasp th e sense o f P a n in i5S rules. B h atto ji also w ro te a co m m en tary on th e Siddhantakaumudi, th e Praudhamanorama,. T h e m o d e rn c o m m en taria l lite ra tu re c o n cen trates o n th e Siddhantakaumudi version o f th e system ; th e n u m b e r o f co m m en taries o n it a n d o n Praudhamanorama far o u tn u m b ers th e n u m b e r com posed after B h atto ji on P a n in i a n d P a ta n ja li them selves. T h ese co m m en taries a re n o t alw ays in a g reem en t w ith B h atto ji; in ad d itio n to a b rid g m e n t, his a p p ro a c h involved new in terp re tatio n s o f som e o f th e rules, w h ich d e p a rte d in several instances from the in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e classical P an in ian s.

B h atto ji w ro te, in a d d itio n to th e Siddhantakaumudi a n d its co m m ­ en ta ry , a n o th e r w ork, th e Sabdakaustubha, in w h ich h e collected th e in te rp re ta tio n s o f earlier w riters o n P a n in i’s rules, especially those o f P a ta n ja li. T h is w ork is in com plete, d ea lin g on ly w ith th e first, second, fo u rth , a n d p a r t o f th e th ird ch a p te rs o f P a n in i’s eig h t. I n ad d itio n , B h atto ji is responsible for seventy-four verses o n g ra m m a r, som etim es re ferred to as th e Vaiyakaranamatonmqjjanai w h ich fo rm th e te x t a ro u n d w h ich K o n d a B h atta, th e n e x t g re a t figure after B h atto ji, assem bles his m a g n u m opus, th e Vaiyakaranabhusana w ith its sara. K o n d a B h a tta p ro v id ed in his w ork o f 1630 re fu ta tio n s o f riv al th eo ries o f m e a n in g p ro posed b y o th e r schools, p rin c ip a lly th e N y a y a a n d M im am sa. T h e w ork th u s stands as th e m o st im p o rta n t tre a tise afte r B h a rtrh a ri’s to stem from th e P a n in ia n school co n cern in g p h ilo so p h y as u n d ersto o d for th e p u rp o se o f th is volum e. K o n d a B h a tta ’s Vaiyakaranabhusanasara is a n a b rid g e d version, p re se n tin g th e arg u m e n ts a lo n e w ith o u t th e considerations o f o th e r view s th a t ac co m ­ p a n y th e m in th e VaiyakaranabhHsana itself. S im ilarly, N ag esa B h a tta in th e early e ig h te e n th ce n tu ry d e a lt w ith p h ilo so p h ical m a tte rs. N ag esa w as th e p u p il o f H a ri D ik sita, a u th o r o f Sabdaratna (or p e rh a p s tw o Sabdaratnasi a lo n g er a n d a s h o rte r), w ho in tu r n w as B h a tto ji’s g ran d so n . H is o u tp u t w as lavish, in clu d in g co m m en taries o n B h atto ji a n d K a iy a ta as w ell as a n u m b e r o f o rig in al w orks. O f th e la tte r, th re e versions o f a M anjusa developing from B h a tto ji’s verses are p a rtic u la rly p e rtin e n t to questions o f philosophy. T h e sh o rtest o f th em , Paramalaghumanjusai is su m m arize d below . N a g e sa is th e m o st acknow ledged g ra m m a ria n o f m o d e rn tim es, th o u g h h e also w ro te treatises o n several o f th e o th e r p h ilo so p h ical system s— S am k h y a, Y oga, a n d N yaya. T h e re is also a s e p a ra te w ork o n th e sphofa th e o ry , o f g re a t in te re st for purposes o f this discussion. T h e foregoing su m m ary m entions only a sm all n u m b e r o f w riters o n g ra m m a r w ho h av e g raced th e ages in In d ia . T h e b ib lio g rap h y a p p e n d e d to th is v olum e w ill suggest to th e ca su al re a d e r th e extensive d ev e lo p m e n t o f th is to p ic a n d th e a tte n tio n given to it, a n d i t m ay o ffer th e less casual re a d e r g u id a n c e in seeking m o re d etailed in ­ fo rm a tio n . F ro m am o n g th e w e lte r o f a u th o rs a n d w orks m en tio n e d th e re , th is vo lu m e co n c en trate s o n those w ho c o n trib u te d mo’St tellingly to th e p h ilo so p h ical aspects o f th e subject— its th e o ry o f m e a n in g a n d re la te d m a tte rs. A lth o u g h it is h a rd , a n d p e rh a p s n o t really necessary, to d istin g u ish th e m ost p h ilosophically re le v a n t texts from th e rest, T a b le 1.1 will h e lp th e re a d e r pick o u t those a u th o rs w hose w ritings p ro m ise th e m ost re w ard s for th e philosophically o rien ted .

5

ENCYCLOPEDIA TABLE

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

1.1

Vyakarana Philosophy: Checklist of Authors and Works This list is not exhaustive and emphasizes writers on philosophy— See appendix for details T = Edited and translated E=Edited, but not translated M = N o t published, but manuscript (s) available Name 1. Patanjali 2. Bhartrhari 3. Vrsabhadeva or Hari Vfsabha 4. Man^ana Misra 5. Helaraja 6. Punyaraja 7. Kaiyata 8. (Rsiputra) Paramesvara II 9. Satyananda or Ramacandra Sarasvati 10. Sesa Kfsna 11. Aimambhatta 12. (§e$a) Narayaria (Bhatfa) 13. livarananda or Isvaridatta Sarasvati

Date

Place

150 B.C.? A.D. 450? 650?

North of Ayodhya?

690? 980?

? Kashmir

1000? 1150? 1410

? Kashmir Kerala

1500

?

1540 1540 1546 1550

Bharata Misra 1550 Author unknown 1550 (Sesa) Cintamani 1557 Bhattoji Diksita 1590 Sesa Visnu 1605 Sivaramendra 1605 Sarasvati 20. Narayana (gastrin) 1640 21. Kon^a Bhatta 1640 22. Narayana Bhattatiri 1640

? ?

Varanasi Andhradesa Varanasi ?

14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19.

? ? Varanasi Andhradesa Varanasi? ?

23. Cokkanatha Diksita 24. Sadasiva 25. Hari Dik$ita

? Varanasi Melputtur (Kerala) South ? Varanasi

1650 1667 1670

Tttls Mahabhasya on Panini's Atfadhyayi (T) Vakyapadiya or Trikandi (T) Mahabhasyadipika or Tripadi (E) Paddhati on book 1 of Vakyapadiya (E) Sphotasiddhi (T) Prakaia on book 3 of Vakyapadiya (E) tTikd on book 2 of Vakyapadiya (E) Mahabhasjapradipa (B) Sphotasiddhigopalika (E) Mahabhasyapradtpalaghiwivarana (E)

Sphotatattuanirupaiia (E) Mahabfiajyapradipuddyolana (E) Mahabhasyasuktiratnahara ( M ) Mahabhd^yapradipabfhadvisara^a (E) Sabdabodhatarangitfi (M) Sphotasiddhi (E) Sphotasiddhinyayavicara (E) Mahabhasyapradipaprakala (M) Vaiyakaranasiddhantakarika (E) MahabhayyaprakaSika (M) Mahabhasyaratnaprakaia (E) Matebhasyapradipavyakhyu (E) VaiyakarariabhlLsana and Sara (E) Apaniniyapramaiiata (T) Mahdbha$yaratnavali (M) MahabhasyagHdhdrthadipani (M) Sabdaratna (Bfhat- and Laghu-) (E)

HISTORICAL

/ t RESUME

Name 26. Jagannätha Pandita 27. Râmabhadra Diksita 28. Nägeia Bhatta

29. Gopâlakrsça Sästrin 30. Dharanldhara 31. Vaidyanâtha Paiyagunçle 32. Käsisvara Sarman 33. Satyapriya Tirtha Svâmîn 34. Jayakrsna Maunin

Date

23

Place

1670

Patna

1700

Tanjore

1714

Maharashtra/ Allahabad; Nagesa spent his scholarly life in Varanasi Pudukottah

1720 1730 1740 1740 1745

Tiksnajnatiya Varanasi y f •>

1745

35. Harivallabha

1747

36. Srikrsna Bhaffa Maunin

1750

37. Äsädhara Bhatta

1770

38. Rämasevaka 39. Indradatta Upâdhyâya 40. Krsriamiträcärya or Durbaläcärya 41. Manyudeva 42. Bhairava Misra

1770 1800 1800 1815 1824

Gives his native place as Kurmagiri ?

Traditionally considered to have come from Baroda ? p ? ? ? ? •>

Tide Prabodhacandrikd (M) Saddariiyiisiddhantasamgmha (E) Sabdabhedanirupana (E) BrhatmaRjusd (M) Laghumafljusa (E) Paramalaghumatijusa (part T ; E) Mahabhasyapradipoddyota (E)

Mahabhasyaiabdikacintamani (M) Bodhapaddhati (M) Mahabkasyapradipoddyotachaya (E) Laghumaftjufakala (E) jMnamjla ( M ) Mahabhasyavivarana (M) Sabdarthas&ramafijari (M) SabdaTthatarkamfta (M) VaiyakaranabhiXsariasaradarparia (M)

Sphotacandrika (E) Tarkacandrika (M) Vrttidipika (E) Sabdatrioeziika (E)

Mahabhasyapradtpavyakhyd ( M ) $abdatattvaprakaia ( M ) Vaiydkar

H ISTO R IC A L RESUME

N aiyayikas accep t secondary m ean in g only for a n in d iv id u al w o rd in a sentence, n o t for th e sentence as a w hole, b y co n trast to th e RCm am sakas, w ho accep t secondary m ean in g for a sentence. T h e early N aiyayikas considered th e im possibility o f connecting th e w ord m eanings in a sentence to b e th e in co m p atib ility th a t p ro m p ts th e ir h av in g secondary m e a n in g ; b u t acco rd in g to th e N avya-N yaya school i t is th e u n su it­ ab ility o f p rim a ry sense in view o f th e sense in te n d e d in th e context. T h e th ree conditions o f expectancy, consistency, a n d contiguity necessary to unify th e sentence a re accep ted b y th e N aiy ay ik as; b u t to th em th e expectancy is syntactic, n o t psychological. Som e o f th e N aiyayikas accept in te n tio n (tatparya) as a n o th e r condition, b u t n o t all. Suggestion (vyanjana) is n o t acceptable to th e logicians w ho include it u n d e r inference. C. B uddhist L ogicians21 T h e B uddhist Logicians o f D ig n ag a’s school h av e been very interested in th e philosophy o f language. H o w far can v erb al com m unication be successful ? D ig n ag a w as greatly influenced b y his elder co n tem p o rary B h a rtrh a ri. A ccording to th e B uddhist idealists re ality consists o f u n iq u e p artic u la rs (svalaksana), w hich are m o m en tary a n d in p e rp e tu a l flux. P erception is th e sensation o f th e u n iq u e p artic u la rs, b u t all cognitions a re based o n concepts th a t a re conceptual constructions (vikalpa), w hich ca n n o t directly grasp reality. W ords pro d u ce con­ cep tu al constructions, a n d conceptual constructions p ro d u ce words. T h e B uddhists do n o t accep t th e universal as a reality. T h e function o f a w ord, th a t is, a nam e, is th e exclusion o r elim ination o f o th er pos­ sibilities. C onstruction-free (nirvikalpaka) p erception o f th e u n iq u e p a rtic u la r alone is re a l p ercep tio n ; v erb al know ledge based o n concepts is only inference, according to th em , a n d has no d irect correspondence w ith th e real external things. B h a rtrh a ri too seems to h av e held a n idealistic view o f reality. AU verbal discourse is m eaningful in term s o f o u r co n cep tu al im ages a n d th e w ords th a t sym bolize th em . H e seems to deny th e possibility o f a construction-free know ledge b eyond th e re a c h o f w ords. AU know ledge is in te rp e n e tra te d w ith w ords, a n d it is im possible to h av e a cognition free from w o rd association (see Vakyapadlya 1.123). D ig n ag a’s indebtedness to B h a rtrh a ri can b e discovered in his m ain w ork, PramanasamuccayaOrtti 5, on apohapariccheda.22 Looking for p ro to ­ ty p e o f th e th eo ry o f anyapoha (exclusion o f o th e rs), M asaaki H a tto ri successfully d em onstrates th a t th e re is a striking resem blance betw een D ig n ag a’s co ncept o f apoha a n d B h a rtrh a ri’s concept o f th e universal (jati) discussed in Vakyapadlya 3.1, jatisamuddeSa.2S D ig n ag a quotes th ree verses o f Vakyapadiya in Prammasamuccayavrtti 5 in o rd e r to su p p o rt his argum ents. T o clarify th e g ram m atical distinc-

tions betw een tw o words w ith different nom inal endings a n d those w ith identical endings, he quotes Vakyapadiya 3.14.8.24 T o support the arg u m en t th a t a universal w ord (jatifabda) m ay be applied directly to m em bers o f th a t universal, he quotes Vakyapadiya 2.158. T o su p p o rt the arg u m en t th a t a universal w ord m ay never be applied to m em bers o f th a t universal, h e quotes Vakyapadiya 2.155.25 Finally, D ignaga declares in Prammasamuccayavrtti th a t the m eaning o f a sentence ('pakyartha) is “ in tu itio n ” (pratibha), ap p aren tly u n d er the influence o f Vakyapadiya 2.143ff.: “ W hen abstracted from a sentence, th e m eaning o f a w ord is discrim inated. T h e m eaning o f a sentence called pratibha is first produced by it [th atis, th e m eaning o f a w ord] .” 2e D. L iterary C riticism G ram m ar provided th e foundation from w hich th e detailed discu­ ssions o f literary criticism arose. T h e im portance o f em otions w ith special reference to th e th e a te r w ere stressed in B h ara ta’s Nafyaiastra (th ird cen tu ry o f th e C hristian e ra ), w hich gives detailed directions re­ garding th e com m unication o f em otions by th e actors. A n an d av ard h an a accepted th e im p ortance o f em otions in all lite ratu re an d evolved his dhvani theory to explain the p o et’s com m unication o f aesthetic experience th ro u g h th e m edium o f language by using th e m ethod of suggestion. A n a n d av ard h an a, th e au th o r o f th e Dhvanyaloka, flourished in K ashm ir u n d er th e p atronage o f K in g A vantivarm an in th e la te r h a lf o f th e n in th century. T h e th eo ry o f p rim ary a n d secondary m eaning, developed by th e M im am sakas a n d th e N aiyayikas in an cien t In d ia, was fu rth er extended by him to include em otive a n d o th er associative m eanings also u n d e r linguistic m eaning. H e postulated a th ird potency o f language n am ed vyanjana, w hich h e called the capacity to suggest a m eaning o ther th a n its literal a n d m etaphorical (secondary) m eaning. U n d e r th e term “ m eaning” is included n o t only the inform ation conveyed b u t th e sociocultural significance, th e figures o f speech, and also th e em otion in d u ced ; a n d am ong th e indicators o f m eaning, A n a n d av ard h a n a did n o t confine him self to th e w ords a n d sentences, b u t included all th e contextual factors, th e in to n atio n a n d gestures, the sound effect p ro duced, th e rh y th m a n d th e m eter, as well as th e literal sense. A lthough suggestion (vyanjana) is a com prehensive linguistic phenom enon, A n a n d av ard h a n a confined his atten tio n to poetic language a n d studied the problem only from th a t standpoint. Strictly speaking, th e dhvani theory o f A n a n d av ard h a n a is only an extension o f th e rasa theory o f B h ara ta to th e dom ain o f literature, as has been p o in ted o u t b y w riters like A bhinavagupta. A n a n d av ard h a n a’s basic postulate is th a t a n em otion cannot be evoked in th e read er by m erely referring to its n am e or by its bare

/

HISTORICAL

e

RESUME

description. I t has to b e suggested b y describing th e situ atio n a n d co n tex tu al factors such as th e reactions o f th e characters. N o t only th e lite ral m ean in g, b u t also th e suggestive possibilities o f th e expression, such as th e sound echoing th e sense, rh y th m , im agery a n d symbols, selective ex ag geration o f th e p ro m in en t elem ent, a n d th e suppression o f th e irrelev an t, a n d b rin g in g o u t th e etym ological significance th ro u g h su b tle su p p lem en tatio n — all o f these devices are to b e used for helping to evoke th e rig h t response in th e re ad er. W ords a n d expressions are to be selected from those in com m on usage in such a w ay as to help evoke th e em otional effect desired. T h e linguistic speculations o f a n c ie n t In d ia n s such as th e g ra m m a r­ ians a n d logicians generally took a w ord as th e u n it o f speech a n d considered a sentence as a co m b in atio n o f w ords for th e pu rp o se o f co m m u n icatin g m eaning. H ow is syntactic u n ity effected from a series o f iso lated w ords u tte re d in a sequence? T h is question w as discussed a n d various explanations given by different schools o f th o u g h t. T h e lite ra l a n d m etap h o ric al m eanings o f w ords w ere also discussed a n d th e conditions for reso rtin g to a w o rd ’s m etap h o ric al m ean in g in a sentence w ere evolved. B ut th ere w ere som e scholars, like B h a rlrh a ri, w ho exposed th e unsatisfactory n a tu re o f a linguistic th eo ry d ep e n d en t en tirely on in d iv id u a l w ords a n d th e ir lexical m e a n in g s; B h a rtrh a ri’s th eo ry o f sphota em phasized th e im p o rtan ce o f tak in g th e w hole u tte ra n c e as a significant u n ita ry linguistic sym bol. A n a n d a v a rd h a n a took his cue from B h a rtrh a ri in developing his th eo ry o f suggestion in p o etry . L ogicians, in tere ste d m o re in accuracy a n d precision in th e use o f w ords th a t th ey w a n t to analyze objectively th a n in th e fullness o f expression a n d th e possibilities o f ex tending th e ra n g e o f m eanings to th e d o m ain o f th e inexpressible, a re satisfied w ith th e n o rm a l sense; b u t po ets a n d critics w ho d eal w ith th e to ta lity o f h u m a n experience c a n n o t ig n o re vast areas o f h u m a n behavior. T h e suggested m eaning is to o vague, fleeting, a n d subjective to h av e a place am o n g logical m ean in g s; th e su b tle a n d subjective suggestions im plied in language (;vyanjana) do n o t le n d them selves to logical discussion a n d analysis. T h e suggested m e a n in g d epends o n co n tex tu al factors, a n d th e sam e u tte ra n c e m a y convey different suggestions to d ifferent people d ep en d ­ in g o n th e ir m e n ta l m ak eu p a n d expectations. T h e re is no in v ariab le con n ectio n b etw een a n expression a n d th e suggestions conveyed. A n a n d a v a rd h a n a in clu d ed th e em otions evoked in th e listeners u n d er th e ru b ric o f m eaning, w hich n a tu ra lly necessitates th e assum ption o f a lim itless suggestive pow er for language, for even logicians can n o t arg u e .th at th e em otions in d u ced by lan g u ag e can b e in cluded u n d e r th e lite ra l m ean in g . E m otions can be evoked b y m usic or d an ce w here no expressed sense is involved; th e em otive elem ent in a language

cannot b e explained in term s o f th e p rim ary literal m eaning or even th e m etaphorical sense o f words. I t is tru e th a t in tentional m etaphors can suggest fu rth er ideas; b u t these suggested m eanings have to be assigned to the suggestive pow er o f language. T h e b reak in th e flow, due to th e incom patibility of th e expressed sense, in the case o f a m etaphor is a signal to th e listener to stop a n d th in k ab o ut th e possible interpretations a n d thereby lead him in to th e sphere of suggestions. A n an d av ard h an a was concerned only w ith poetic language and confined his atten tio n to th e suggestion o f m eanings o f aesthetic value. H is theory o f dhvani is vyanjam o r suggestion as ap plied to poetry. I t w as A n an d av ard h an a who for th e first tim e enunciated the theory o f angirasa according to w hich th ere should be one pred o m in an t sentim ent or rasa in a literary w ork such as a dram a, epic, o r lyric to w hich all th e o th er rasas introduced should be subordinate. M utually conflicting or supportive em otions could be delineated appropriately in a work, provided there is one rasa p redom inant throughout, the others being k ep t in th e background as subsidiary. E arlier w riters like B h arata h ad n o t stressed this point b u t considered th a t a w ork such as a d ra m a has to cater to the different tastes o f various types o f people an d m ust therefore deal w ith various em otions a n d rasas. B harata seems to have felt th a t each character in a play m ay have one dom inant em otion, b u t he did no t consider the need for a p redom inant rasa for th e work as a whole. S tru ctu ral u nity in plot was, however, stressed b y him . A n an d av ard h an a perhaps felt th a t u n ity in them e im plied a p red o m in an t rasa for th e work as a whole a n d th a t great classical w riters have always taken this idea for g ran ted ; so he boldly stated th a t even th e construction o f th e p lo t m ust b e m ade in such a way th a t th ere is scope for a pred o m in an t rasa·, incidents a n d descriptions irrelevant to th e developm ent o f th e m ain rasa should b e avoided, and even th e in tro d u ction o f figures o f speech a n d selection o f the w ork’s texture should be in keeping w ith the rasa delineated. In all such cases th e p ro p riety from th e p o in t o f view of th e rasa is th e m ost im port­ a n t factor to be considered. A nother p o in t stressed by A n an d av ard h an a is th a t th e im aginative sensibility requisite for p ro p er literary appreciation can be acquired only by a close study o f classical works an d by th e constant practice o f response to works o f art. Because the m ost im p o rtan t elem ent in the m eaning o f a poem is th e em otion suggested, it can be understood and appreciated only by sahrdayas o r m en o f like sensibility, no t by all scholars an d logicians, who m ay only be able to get a t the literal m eaning th rough analytical study. T h e process is one o f getting th e re ad er’s h e a rt an d m ind tu ned to the sam e frequency as th a t o f the transm itting artist. Poetry does no t give out its full charm to all, only to a select few.

As th e Rg Vedic seer observed, th e goddess o f speech exposes h e r full ch a rm a n d yields herself com pletely only to th e deserving devotee, ju st as a loving wife does to h er husband. B h arata, w ho h a d to deal w ith th e problem s o f th e th e a tric a l perform ances, considered th a t a d ra m a should please all types o f people, n o t m erely th e specialists. A n a n d av a rd h a n a , b y contrast, considers th a t lite rary taste has to b e acq u ired th ro u g h practice. E ven am ong connoisseurs tastes differ; som e them es such as love stories a n d adventures m ay have a w ider a ttra c tio n th a n stories d ealin g w ith th e q u iet life o f a recluse. T h e id eal sakrdaya, how ever, is o n e w ho can raise him self above his p etty prejudices a n d in d iv id u al p redilections a n d ap p reciate things from th e p o e t’s p o in t o f view. A n a n d a v a rd h a n a exalts th e freedom o f th e creative w riter, w hich tran scen d s even th e pow ers o f n atu re . H e says th a t in th e boundless samsara o f p o etry th e p oet is th e sole creator, th e w hole w orld transform s itself d ep e n d in g on his wishes. I f th e p o et is p erv ad ed w ith rasa, th e w hole w orld o f his creatio n w ill b e suffused w ith th a t rasa. A good poet m akes even in sen tien t objects a c t as sentient beings. As A b h in av a g u p ta explains it, th e p o e t’s in tu itiv e pow er (pratibha) enables h im to create a w o rld acco rd in g to his wish. T his tendency o f infusing life in to in sen tien t objects o f n a tu re is a special featu re o f In d ia n p o etry , th o u g h it has b een criticized b y R uskin as th e “ p a th etic fallacy.” 27 In In d ia even poetics o r lite rary criticism claim s to be n o t only a science (alamkaraiastra) b u t also a darsana o r philosophy. T h e m ain aim o f lite ra tu re a n d d ra m a tu rg y is to give unalloyed p leasu re to th e read ers o r th e aud ien ce by evoking rasa. T h is rasa realized a n d enjoyed has often b een co m p ared to th e bliss experienced by th e m ystics on g ettin g a glim pse o f th e u ltim a te R eality or B ra h m a n ; some have claim ed th a t rosa-realization is id en tical w ith B rah m an -realizatio n ; th e re has also b een a claim th a t it is superior to th e bliss th e yogins get in th e ir d eep m ed itatio n , for less effort is involved in it. T h e Rg Veda ca n be considered n o t only as th e earliest religious text, b u t also as th e earliest lite rary w ork in In d ia , if no t in the w orld. T h e V ed ic seers w ere m ystic poets fully conscious o f language’s im p o rtan ce a n d o f th e problem s o f faithfully com m unicating in tim ate personal experiences. Som e o f th e concepts th a t a re universally accepted by th e critics a n d are clearly found in th e V edas in clu d e: (1 ) T h e n eed for a vision in th e m in d , w hich is in teg ra l a n d pleasur­ able, as th e source for all p o etry a n d philosophy. T h e term pratibha was n o t found, b u t th e root dri, “ to see” o r “ to visualize” is frequently used to convey th e idea. (2) T h e im p o rtan ce given to craftsm anship in com posing poetry. W ords h av e to b e selected (from those used in everyday life) a n d arran g e d p roperly, w ith d u e re g ard to the m eter used. T h e w ords

m ust be “ as sharp as arrow s” a n d the hym n is to be composed carefully, like a n artisan constructing a chariot. (3) Poetry can be understood a n d appreciated only by the few who are of th e sam e m ental natu re as th e poet (“ sakhayah sakhyani janate” Rg Veda 10,71.2c). B hattanayaka (late n in th a n d early te n th centuries) seems to have been th e first to associate aesthetic experience w ithm ystical experience. T h e subject is com pletely dissolved in th e object contem plated an d the entire surroundings disappear from his attention, because of the con­ centration on the th ing contem plated, in b o th aesthetic experience a n d mystical experience. B hattanayaka stated th a t aesthetic experience is sim ilar to th e experience o f th e Absolute B rahm an. A bhinavagupta also accepts B h attan ay ak a’s opinion regarding th e sim ilarity betw een aesthetic experience a n d the m ystic experience of th e Absolute. B hattanayaka seems to have gone one step fu rth er to claim the superiority o f aesthetic experience to the yogins’ m ystical vision. H e says th a t rasa or aesthetic pleasure is poured forth spontaneously by speech Hke a cow giving forth its m ilk to its calf; therefore, it is different from (and superior to ) th a t (mystical vision) m ilked (laboriously) by th e yogins. A bhinavagupta recognizes th e sim ilarity betw een aesthetic experi­ ence an d the m ystical experience, b u t points out th e bou n d ary line th a t separates th e two. T h e m ystical experience of the ultim ate reafity is to ta l an d com plete, an d theyogin is far beyond any form o f discursive thought. Aesthetic experience gives bfiss only tem porarily a n d cannot b e considered suprem e bliss, though it is superior to the w orldly joys. A n an d av ard h an a was an advocate o f rasa, b u t realized its lim itations, for in one of his verses quoted in the Dhvanyaloka he says th a t after experim enting w ith th e im aginative poetic vision capable o f affording aesthetic experience a n d also w ith th e intellectual powers for analyzing a n d understanding th e tru th a b o u t reality, he is exhausted a n d has realized th a t the bliss th a t the devotee gets by contem plation o f God is far superior. L ater J a g a n n a th a P an d itaraja, au th o r of th e Rasagangadhara, states th a t rasa is identical w ith consciousness (cit) or B rahm an, a n d aesthetic experience, in its tru e sense, is the realization o f th a t consciousness b y th e rem oval o f th e veils covering it. Rasa is unique a n d a t th e u ltim ate stage there is no plurality. T he division o f rasa into eight or nine is based on th e different p erm an en t m oods (sthayibhavas) th a t lead to the rasa. A t a still lower level even the sthayibhavas a re sometimes referred to as rasa.

2 METAPHYSICS

I.

Vy&karana

as a

P h i l o s o p h i c a l S y s te m

T h e goal o f th e In d ia n G ra m m a ria n s’ philosophy, w h ich w e h e re call Oyakarariai is n o t m ere in telle ctu al know ledge, b u t d ire c t experience o f u ltim a te tru th . K now ledge o f g ra m m a r resu ltin g in co rrec t speech n o t only conveys m e a n in g b u t also enables one to “ see” reality . T h is is th e p h ilo so p h ical m e an in g o f th e In d ia n te rm darSana, w h ich literally m ean s “ sig h t” . I t is this fe atu re th a t sets In d ia n philosophy a p a rt from m o d e rn w estern perspectives on language. Vyakarana n o t only addresses itself to th e analysis o f g ra m m a tic a l rules (th o u g h t h a t is certain ly im p o rta n t) o r to th eo riz in g a b o u t th e w ay speech conveys m e an in g (th o u g h th a t to o is ac h ie v ed ), it also insists th a t o n e should n o t b e satisfied w ith m ere in tellectu al conviction b u t should tran sfo rm th a t co n v ictio n in to d ire c t ex p erien ce.1 F ro m th e early V edas th e In d ia n a p p ro a c h to la n g u ag e h as never b een n a rro w o r restrictive. L an g u a g e w as exam ined in re la tio n to consciousness— (th e scope o f th e in q u iry ) n o t even lim ited to h u m a n consciousness. A ll aspects o f th e w orld a n d h u m a n experience w ere re g a rd e d as illu m in a te d b y language. In d ia n philosophy also p o stu lated th a t lan g u ag e h a d b o th p h en o m en a l a n d m etap h y sical dim ensions. I t is re m a rk ab le th a t in th e an c ie n t h ym ns o f th e R g Veda a sem itechnical v o cab u lary was a lre a d y developed to d ea l w ith such linguistic m a tte rs as g ra m m a r, p o etic creatio n , in sp iratio n , illu m in atio n , a n d so on.® A lth o u g h th e re w as careful concern for th e p h en o m en a l o r o u ter aspects o f lan g u ag e, th e In d ia n s alw ays p a id eq u al a tte n tio n to th e in n e r or m etap h y sical aspects o f language. In d ia n philosophers o f lan g u ag e seem to h av e successfully avoided th e tw o re d u ctio n ist m istakes o f m u ch w estern m o d e rn lan g u ag e speculation. T h e y d id n o t re d u ce lan g u ag e to th e co n d itio n o f a m erely h u m a n convention h a v in g only scientific or factu al referents j n e ith e r d id th ey fall in to th e e rro r o f m etaphysical

reductionism th a t so devalues th e m eanings o f h u m an w ords th a t language ends u p as obscure m ysticism .8 G ram m arians like P anini a n d Patafijali a n d etym ologists like Yaska w ere clearly concerned w ith h u m an speech in the everyday em pirical w orld, b u t th ey also m ade room for m etaphysical study. Sim ilarly, th e great In d ia n philosopher o f language, Bhartirhari, begins his Vakyapadlya w ith a m etaphysical in q u iry into th e n a tu re a n d origin o f language in relation to B rahm an, b u t th e n goes on in th e second a n d th ird chapters to explore technical gram m atical points involved in th e everyday use o f language. In classical In d ia n th o u g h t on language, th e study o f a p a rticu la r phenom enon a n d th e contem plation o f it as a m etaphysical m ystery are n o t m u tu ally exclusive. T hey are b o th considered p arts o f a darSana or system atic view o f tru th . T h e re is one m ore aspect of tra d itio n al In d ia n philosophy of langu­ age th a t m ust b e understood by th e m o d em reader. W hereas the contem porary w riter often thinks in term s o f using language creatively, th a tis , to create som ething “ original” or “ new ” , th e vyakarana conception is q u ite different. T h e correct or insightful use o f language is n o t seen as conveying new knowledge, b u t ra th e r as uncovering ancient know ­ ledge th a t has been obscured due to the accrual o f ignorance. T he V edic sage does n o t pro d u ce som ething new out of his ow n im agination, b u t ra th e r relates o rd in ary things to th eir forgotten eternal tru th . T hus, from th e perspective o f gram m atical philosophy th e philo­ sophical study o f language a n d correct gram m atical usage a re seen as “ ignorance-clearing activities” , w hich together open th e w ay to a direct perception o f tru th . As a system atic m eans to know ledge vyakarana suffers from certain special difficulties. L anguage is th e object of study in vyakarana, yet all th inking a b o u t language m ust, by v irtu e of h u m an lim itations, be done in language itself. O n e cannot get outside o f language so as to exam ine it objectively. L anguage m ust be used to study language from w ithin. Vyakarana does n o t d raw back from this difficulty b u t relishes its challenge; it recognizes th a t, as H ans-G eorg G adam er puts it, all know ledge o f ourselves a n d all know ledge o f th e w orld comes to us th ro u g h language.4 T h u s th e correct know ledge o f language is basic to all o th er approaches to reality— all o th er darSanas.6

2.

Sa

bda

B

rahm an

and

I

ts

M

a n if e s t a t io n s

I t was B h artrh ari who in Vakyapadlya 1.1 first system atically equated B rahm an (the A bsolute) w ith language {Sabda), going on to argue th a t everything else arises as a m anifestation o f this one S abda B rah­ man.® But eq u ating B rahm an w ith language is found m uch earlier

in the Vedic literature. T he Asyavamiya H ym n ( ¾ Veda 1.164) states th a t the ultim ate abode o f language (vac) is B rahm an.7 Language is described as being a t the pinnacle o f the universe. T hree-quarters o f language rem ain hidden in a cave, while the fourth p a rt fashions creation (Rg Veda 1.164.10, 41, 45). In Rg Veda 10.71 it is m ade clear th a t the manifestations of Brahm an in language are not equally perceived by all people. Those who have purified themselves, nam ely, the ffis or “seers” , experience the full manifestation of language. Others, whose ignorance obscures their m inds and sense organs, hear little of the fullness o f language. T he Vedic seers are not considered to be composers of the hymns b u t rath er the “seers” o f eternal truth. In Big Veda 1.164.37 language is related to cosmic order (rta) and is understood as logos, which manifests itself as both the uttered word (for use in ritual chanting) and the inner w ord th a t reveals tru th . T he equation o f B rahm an w ith language is also found w ithin the Upanisads. In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4.1.2 Brahm an is identified as the one reality, w ithout a second, which is identical w ith language. T he Mandukya Upanisad 3.3 links the unspeakable absolute w ith the speakable via the symbol of aum. Aum is described as traversing the phenom enal levels of waking, dream ing, and deep sleep an d as reaching out to the absolute. B rahm an is identical w ith language, the basic m anifestation o f which is aum. B hartrhari echoes this assertion in Vakyapadiya 1.9 in describing aum as “ the source of all scripture and the common factor of all original causes.” 8 Vyakarana scholars have focused on those Vedas an d U panisads which equate language, Brahm an, and absolute reality. Passages th a t state otherwise are ignored or passed over. This practice, of course, is usual w ithin each of the Indian philosophical schools (darianas)—a t least in those which claim to be orthodox (astika) or grounded on the Vedas. T h e Vedas occupy a prim ary place in the m anifestation of Sabda Brahm an, as well as being the means by which Sabda B rahm an m ay be realized and release experienced. T he Veda, though O ne, is divided into m any and spreads out through its various recensions and m ani­ festing sounds (dhvani) to the diversity o f people. Although th e experi­ ence o f the Vedas m ay be m any, the reality they reveal is the one Sabda Brahm an. Vedic language is a t once the creator and sustainer of the world cycles and the revealer of the Divine. Language is taken as having Divine origin (daivi vak), as Spirit descending a n d embody­ ing itself in phenom ena, assuming various guises and disclosing its tru th to the sensitive soul.® As Aurobindo describes it, T he language o f the V eda itself is Sruti, a rhythm not compos­ ed by the intellect b u t heard, a divine W ord th a t came vibrating out of the Infinite to the inner audience of the m an who had

previously m ad e him self fit for th e im personal know ledge. T h e w ords them selves, drsti a n d Iruti1 sight a n d h earing, are V edic expres­ sions; these a n d cognate w ords signify, in th e esoteric term inology o f th e hym ns, revelatory know ledge a n d th e c o n ten tso f in sp iratio n .10 I n co n trast w ith w estern views o f revelation, th ere is n o th in g m iraculous in th e m an ifestation o f th e V edas to th e rsi. T h e rsi “ sees” th e divine tr u th n o t because it is given to h im in a n a c t o f grace, b u t because he has m ad e him self fit, th ro u g h heroic practices o f self-purification, to “ see” th e tr u th directly. H e th e n p u ts it into spoken words, th e V edic hym ns, for th e purpose o f h elp in g others w ho a re still cau g h t in ign o ran ce to purify them selves u n til they to o h av e th e experience o f directly “ seeing” S ab d a B rahm an. Vyakarana h as th e special task o f keeping th e V edas u n c o rru p te d so th a t th e m anifestation o f S ab d a B rah m an rem ain s available to all in p ristin e form .11 S hould vyakarana fail to pro v id e this service a n d allow th e V edas to becom e co rru p ted th ro u g h sloppy usage a n d transm ission, th e n th e possibility o f realizing tr u th could b e lost for th e generations yet to com e in this cycle o f creation. F o r th is reason vydkarana is described by B h a rtrh a ri as m ore im p o rta n t th a n o th er darlanas. As th e o th er schools base them selves o n th e V edas, th e loss o r co rru p tio n o f th e V edas w ould re n d e r the fruits o f th e ir p a rtic u la r approaches useless a n d m isleading. T h e fact th a t In d ia n philosophy is based on o ra l trad itio n s12 is an o th er reason w hy Oyakarana takes its teach in g to b e o f p rim ary im p o r­ tance. Because th e au th o rita tiv e m anifestation o f S ab d a B rah m an is fo u n d first in spoken form a n d only secondarily in w ritten forms, the role o f vyakarana in providing th e rules a n d teach in g th a t keeps the oral form s o f lan g u ag e p u re is o f fu n d a m e n tal im p o rtan ce to all o th er philosophic schools. F o r exam ple, P a n in i’s Asfadhyayi is a g ra m m a r fo u n d ed u p o n oral usage ra th e r th a n u p o n etym ology o r d eriv atio n .13 T h e sam e stress o n lan g u ag e’s o ral ch a ra c te r is found in th e discussions offered by P atan jali in his Mahabhasya a n d B h a rtrh a ri in th e Vakyapadiya o f th e w ay u tte re d w ords convey m eaning. I t is perh ap s w o rth noting in passing th a t for In d ia n philosophy, th e n orm ative form o f language is n o t w ritte n b u t o ra l a n d th a t vyakarana plays th e im p o rta n t role o f keeping th e o ral form disciplined a n d p u re in its presentation. W ith o u t this p u rity th e tru th -b e a rin g capacity o f lan g u ag e could be restricted a n d th e m anifestation o f S ab d a B rah m an obscured. K n o w ­ ledge o f th e V edas is n o t sim ply th e “ book-learning” o f m ain ideas th a t characterizes m o d ern w estern scholarship. I n th e In d ia n trad itio n , language is only fully alive w hen spoken. T h u s know ledge o f th e V edas includes a n d req u ires th e ab ility to speak th e w ords w ith correct accent a n d m eter. A n d consistent w ith th e o ral em phasis, thin k in g is seen as in te rn a l speaking to w hich n o t enough pram o r b re a th has been added

to m ake it overt. W riting, th e focus o f a tte n tio n for the m o d em W est, is seen by OySkarana as a coded recording o f th e oral, w hich can never perfectly represent all th e nuances o f th e spoken w ord a n d is therefore always secondary. T h e vyakarana ap p ro ach is opposite to th a t taken in m odern w estern scholarship. I n m odern biblical studies, for exam ple, th e scholar’s aim is to get back to th e earliest available w ritten m anus­ crip t a n d th e n to use it as a criterion against w hich to check th e text th a t is in use today. T h e rationale is th a t errors th a t have crept in over th e years w ould n o t be present in the earlier m anuscript. I n addition, th e m o d em school o f F orm Criticism has arg u ed th a t before m any of th e scriptures (such as the Gospels) were w ritten dow n th ere was a period o f oral transm ission, d u ring w hich tim e th e text (for exam ple, th e original teachings o f Jesus) was m odified by the needs o f th e people a n d th e p a rticu la r conditions u n d e r w hich they lived. T his period o f oral transm ission is ju d g e d to b e unreliable d u e to its failure to carry forw ard th e original sayings in a p u re a n d unchanged form .14 T h e vyakarana practice is th e exact opposite. W hen In d ia achieved independence in 1947, one o f th e first acts o f th e new governm ent was to establish a commission of senior scholars to go from place to place a n d listen to th e assem bled B rahm ins reciting the V edas. T hey w ould listen for errors in m eter, accent, a n d sarridhi a n d for an y loss or change in words. I t was th e rigorous practice o f the Pratiiakhyas th a t was being checked by th e senior scholars. T hey h a d m astered the Prdtiiakhyas a n d p u re presentation o f th e V edas th ro u g h m any years o f careful oral practice a n d checking w ith th e ir teachers. A nd the teachers o f th e present senior scholars h a d acquired th eir expertise n o t from books h u t from oral p ractice w ith the best teachers o f the generation before th em , w ho in tu rn h a d been ta u g h t by th e best teachers before them , a n d so on in an unbroken oral tra d itio n b ack to th e V edas. I t is n o t th e dead o r entom bed m anuscript b u t th e correct a n d clear enunciation o f th e w ord in th e here a n d now th a t m akes for a living language a n d scripture. L arge num bers o f copies o f “ T h e Living Bible” stacked in bookstores o r reverently placed on personal bookshelves a re n o t tru e language or living scripture, according to vyakarana. O nly w hen a passage is so well learned th a t it is w ith one w herever one goes is th e w ord really know n. I n such a state th e w ords becom e p a rt o f or, even m ore exactly, are one’s consciousness in th e act o f speaking. Books a n d all w ritten forms are n o t knowledge in this sense o f th e w o rd ; ra th e r th ey represent a lower, inferior, second order o f language suitable only for the dull or th e uneducated. T h e vyakarana provides th e tra in in g rules for the oral learning o f language a n d for th e presen­ ta tio n o f th e V edic w ord in its p u re form. For vyakarana, th en , spoken language is th e m edium th rough w hich

38

EiiC Y C LO PfeD iA

OF I N D I A N P H I L 0 S O P H I E S

Sabda B rahm an is manifested, an d the V edas are the criterion expres­ sion of th a t m anifestation.

3. T

he

F

unction of

T

ime

I n B hartfhari’s system atization o f vydkarana philosophy tim e (kdla) is assigned the function of enabling the one Sabda Brahm an to appear as the m any. This position is consistent w ith th a t given tim e in the Atharva Veda a n d the Maitri Upanisad.15 In Vakyapadiya 1.3 B hartfhari describes the creation o f the objects of the universe as occurring in the first instance through th e creative power of Sabda B rahm an5S kdla or tim e power. Kdla is not different from Sabda B rahm an b u t is th at aspect of Sabda B rahm an w hich allows m anifested sequence to come into being. W hen such tim e sequences ap p ear as differentiated objects, then tim e as a power seems to be different from Sabda Brahm an, b u t really it is not (Vdkyapadiya 1.2). Vdkyapadiya 1.3 states th a t all other powers w ithin th e created universe are in th e first instance governed by the creative power of tim e. T hrough tim e things come to be and pass away. T im e is the efficient cause by w hich B rahm an controls the cycles of the universe. Two illustrations are offered by B hartfhari to m ake clear his m ean­ ing. T h e power o f tim e in the creative process is like th a t of the wire­ puller in a pup p et play (Vdkyapadiya 3.9.4). Ju st as the w ire-puller is in com plete control o f th e pu p p et play so kdla has full control over the running of th e world. O rdinary cause-and-effect processes cannot ope­ rate unless kdla or tim e pow er infuses them w ith life-force. This control o f ordinary cause a n d effect by tim e is further illustrated in relation to the strings a h u n ter ties to the feet o f small birds th a t he uses as bait for larger ones. T h e small birds can fly over a lim ited distance b u t they cannot go beyond the len g th o f their strings. Like the strings controlling the m ovem ent o f birds, so th e objects o f the created w orld are con­ trolled by the “ string of tim e55 (Vdkyapadiya 3.9.15). I t is in Vdkyapadiya 3.9 th a t B hartfhari presents his detailed analysis o f tim e. J u s t as num ber measures m aterial objects, tim e measures activity (3.9.2). I n answer to the question o f how activities are m ea­ sured by tim e, B hartfhari states in verse 3, “ In the creation (arising), existence a n d destruction (of beings) w hich possess these (activities), tim e, rem aining in a divided state, is said to be the (instrum ental) cause.551® H elaraja, in his com m entary, explains the m eaning o f the verse as follows. T im e is the cause o f the birth , existence, a n d decay of everything. Thus we say some things are born in the spring, others in the autum n. T he same can be said about their existence and their death. Tim e, though one, differentiates or sequences things through

states o f b irth , existence, a n d decay. I t i s in th is sense t h a t tim e is called th e “ w ire -p u lle r” o f th e universe. Y et, these everyday ch an g es o f s ta te o r sequences o f a c tio n a re n o t th e tru e n a tu re o f tim e b u t su p erim p o si­ tions. T i m e in its o w n n a tu re , as o n e w ith S a b d a B ra h m a n , is tra n sc e n ­ d e n t o f a ll ch a n g e, y e t also its cause. T o o n e fa m ilia r w ith A d v a ita V e d a n ta , th e p re c e d in g d esc rip tio n o f tim e so u n d s v ery sim ilar to S a m k a ra 5S n o tio n o f maya in re la tio n to B ra h m a n . T h is view is c e rta in ly h e ld b y tw o e m in e n t c o n te m p o ra ry in te rp re te rs o f th e Vakyapadiya, G a u rin a th S astri17 a n d K . A. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r.18 As w e ex a m in e B h a rtrh a ris 5 d esc rip tio n o f k&la in Vakyapadiya 3.9, w e w ill test th is c o n ten tio n . V erse 14 o f Vakyapadiya 3.9 is w o rth careful a tte n tio n in th is re g a rd . I t re ad s, “ By m ean s o f activities sim ilar to th e tu rn in g o f th e w a te rw heel, th e e te rn a l a n d all-pervasive tim e tu rn s o u t (kalayati) all th e frag m en ts (kal&h — o b jects) a n d th u s a c q u ire s th e n a m e o f k&la (tim e ).55 L ik e th e ev er-ren ew ed p u sh in g o r liftin g u p o f w a te r b y th e w aterw h eel, so th e a ll-p e rv a d in g a n d a ll-p e n e tra tin g tim e drives o r p u sh es (kalayati) bein g s o r objects, releasing th e m from th e ir m a te ria l causes a n d m a k in g th e m m ove. T h a t is w hy tim e is giv en th e a p p ro ­ p ria te n a m e o f k&la. H e la ra ja goes o n to observe t h a t w h a t B h a rtrh a ri m ean s to say is, T h e soul o f th e universe is b u t o n e, called “para-Brahman” i.e., th e re a l B eing. T h is sam e o n e, d u e to its b ein g th e a g e n t o f m an ifo ld actions, is d efin ed as possessing u n lim ite d p ow er. A n d th u s, m an ife stin g successive beings w h ich revolve like th e tu rn in g s o f a w heel, i t “ d riv es55(kalayati) th e beings. T h erefo re i t is called tim e (kala). T h is a ll-p e rv a d in g o n e is in d e p e n d e n t. F o r th is very reaso n , i t h as b e e n estab lish ed as b e in g a n in d e p e n d e n t p o w e r in th e Vakyapadiya.19 I f H e la ra ja is rig h t, th e n B h a rtrh a ri view s tim e as a p o w e r o f S a b d a B ra h m a n , in d e p e n d e n t o f a ll bein g s a n d o bjects y et also in h e re n t in th e m , p u sh in g th e m th ro u g h th e successive ch an g es o f life. In s te a d o f th e passive e x te rn a l su p erim p o sitio n o f th e successive ch an g es u p o n B ra h m a n (th e A d v a ita m o d e l), th e im ag e h e re is m o re c h a rac te ristic o f u rg e n t ch a n g e th ro u g h p re g n a n t forces w ith in S a b d a B ra h m a n . T h e d istin c tio n b etw e en B h a rtrh a ri5S co n cep tio n o f tim e a n d th e A d v a ita V e d a n ta view o f may& is n o t t h a t th e locus o f tim e o r may& is in B ra h m a n (for b o th schools seem to a g ree on th is p o in t), b u t ra th e r a q u estio n o f th e ontological p o w e r ascrib ed to tim e o r may&. B h a rtfh a ri5S tim e d o c trin e em phasizes th e d riv in g (kalayati) p o w er in h e re n t in S a b d a B ra h m a n , w h ic h is th e first cause o f th e b u rstin g fo rth o f w orldly p h e n o m e n a . T h e A d v a ita co n cep tio n o f m&y&, th o u g h i t does in d e e d

(in th e V iv a ra n a tra d itio n , a t least) locate maya in B rah m an ao does n o t a ttrib u te to maya th e sam e degree o f ontological “ p reg n an cy ” o r “ driving force” as B hartirhari ascribes to tim e. W hile it is acknow ledged th a t maya h as tw o aspects, obscuring (avarana) a n d projective (viksepa), th e stress in A d v a ita in te rp re ta tio n is o n th e form er m ore th a n th e la tte r. F o rth e A d v a itin , th e focus is on mayo’s obscuring o f B rah m an ; for B h artrh a ri, it is th e projective pow er o r driv in g force o f tim e th a t occupies ce n te r stage. W hile this difference m ay a t first a p p e a r to b e m erely a question o f em phasis, a substantive distinction ap p ears w hen th e ontological status o f th e p h en o m en a l projection itself is analyzed. W hile for A d v a ita th e p ro jected w orld o f maya is n eith er real n o r u n re al b u t inexplicable (anirvacaniya), th e tim e-driven w orld o f B h a rtrh a ri, th o u g h increasingly im p u re as it becom es m anifested as w orldly p h en o m en a, nev er loses its d irec t ontological id en tity w ith B rah m an . T h e relatio n betw een th e phen o m en al w orld a n d B rah m an for B h a rtrh a ri is continuous a n d does n o t h av e th e m ysterious break o f a n “ all o r n o th in g ” sort th a t S am k ara5S maya d octrine a n d its rope-snake an alo g y requires. W hereas superim position (adhydsa) is a fitting te rm for S arpkara,21 i t does n o t seem ap p ro p ria te to B h artrh a ri. T h e illu strations offered in th e Vdkyapadiya are m ore often associated w ith im ages o f S a b d a B rah m an b u rstin g fo rth in illu m in atio n (sphopa), o f p reg n an cy (th e peacock egg p ro d u cin g all th e colors o f c re a tio n ), a n d o f driv in g force like th e pushing-up or lifting-up actio n o f the w aterw heel (kalayati). A ccording to B h artrh a ri, tim e is a creative pow er, w hile for A d v aita (the V iv a ra n a A d v aitin , a t least) th e obscuring function o f avidyd is eq u a te d w ith maya.22 B h a rtrh a ri in his co m m en tary on 1.1 describes avidyd as th e diversity o f p h en o m en a created by S a b d a B rah m an 5S tim e pow er. I t is p ro b a b ly op en to question w h eth er th e te rm avidyd m ean t th e sam e for B h a rtrh a ri as it cam e to be defined by S am k ara some centuries later. M o d ern co m m entators som etim es incorrectly ap p ly concepts th ey h av e learn ed from A d v a ita V e d a n ta w h en in terp re tin g th e Vdkyapadiya. N otions such as “ superim position” (adhydsa), i f seen th ro u g h A d v a ita eyes, a re p ro b a b ly m isleading a n d unhelpful in u n d e r­ stan d in g B h a rtrh a ri. W e m ay m ak e m ore progress b y staying w ith th e w ords o f th e verses a n d th e clear illustrations offered in th e com m entary. B h a rtrh a ri a p p a re n tly never w ro te a co m m en tary for c h a p te r 3. A t p resen t only H e la ra ja 5S Tikd (ca. A .D . 1050-1100) is av ailab le.23 In Vdkyapadiya 3.9.62, B h a rtrh a ri discusses directly th e ontological status o f tim e, a n d H e la ra ja adds som e helpful com m ents. B h a rtrh a ri observes th a t th e re are different doctrines ab o u t tim e : som e call it “ pow er55 (§akti), som e call it “ soul55 (dtman), a n d others, “ d eity 55 (devatd). T im e is th e first (stage) o f avidyd, a n d does n o t exist in know ledge.24 H e la raja in his Tikd fu rth e r describes tim e as a n in d e p e n d e n t pow er o f B rah m an

a n d discusses its ontological status in re latio n to avidyai “ A ccording to B h a rtfh a ri3 tim e is th e svatantrya Sakti o f B ra h m a n .... D u e to avidya, th ere is, first o f all, ap p e ara n ce o f diversity. D iversity is tem p o ra l a n d sp atial. T h e form er comes first. Consciousness, a t th e stage called paSyantij is w ith o u t a n y sequence. W h en it becom es associated w ith pranavrtti, it ap p ears to h av e sequence d u e to tim e .” 25 As this com m ent m akes clear, th e re a re th ree ontological levels in B h a rtrh a ri’s th o u g h t: B rah m an , his pow ers o f tim e a n d space, a n d th e diversity o f th e p h en o ­ m en al w orld. O n c e ag ain h e contrasts w ith S am k ara’s A dvaita, w here th e re is only one ontological level— B rah m an — w ith maya as a n epistem ological second level (w hich is n e ith e r real n o r u n re a l b u t in ex p lica­ b le ). F o r B h a rtrh a ri th e highest ontological level is p u re B rah m an w ith o u t sequence o r diversity. I t is th e cu lm in atio n o f o u r experience o f vac o r lan g u ag e .26 A lthough tim e is in h e re n t in S a b d a B ra h m a n a t th is stage, no sequence has yet occurred— i t is still p u re po ten tiality . T h e n ex t ontological level, in descending order, is madhyamcL. I t is a t this level th a t tim e begins to p u sh o r d riv e delim ited p o rtio n s o f S ab d a B rah m an in to sequence, w h ich i t accom plishes w ith th e help o f prana o r b re a th . I n o u r experience o f lan g u ag e this stage corresponds to th e sep a ratio n o f th e u n ita ry sphofa in to th e m e n ta l sequence o f thoughts. T h e full-blow n a p p e ara n ce o f diversity ap p ears w h en tim e has released all th e secondary cause-effect relations th a t h av e b ee n w aitin g as stored m em o ry traces (sarpskdra) or “ seed states” in all th e cycles o f th e universe. I t is in this th ird o r vaikhari level th a t th e pow er o f tim e as th e sequence evidenced in o rd in ary cause-effect relations is fully experienc­ ed. T o re tu rn to B h a rtjh a ri’s ow n analogy, a t th is stage w e see th e bird s o n tim e ’s strings flying a b o u t to th e full lim it th a t th e ir strings allow . T im e is th u s th e governing pow er o f all ac tiv ity in th e universe o f m anifested objects. I t is tim e th a t drives o r pushes objects in to action to th e p o in t a t w hich th e ir ow n secondary cause-effect relations take h old. B u t i t is also th e behind-the-scenes activity o f tim e th a t controls th e ex ten t o f th e secondary actions o f objects, alo n g w ith th e ir m o m en t o f d ecay o r w ithdraw al. T h e n o tio n o f tim e functioning b y p erm ittin g a n d p rev en tin g w orldly activ ity is sta te d in Vakyapadiya 3.9.4 a n d re ap p ea rs freq u en tly th ro u g h ­ o u t section 9 : “ T im e h as b een called th e w ire-puller o f th e w orld M ach in e. I t regulates th e universe th ro u g h p rev en tio n a n d perm is­ sion.” 27 T h e S anskrit term s involved a re abhyanujna (perm ission) a n d pratibandha (p rev en tio n ). As th e w ire-puller o f th e universe, tim e allows som e th in g s to a p p e a r a t a p a rtic u la r tim e a n d prevents others from ap p e arin g . T h is scheduling activity is m ost im p o rta n t, for w ith o u t it ev ery th in g w ould a p p e a r sim ultaneously a n d th e re w ould b e mass confusion.28 T h e function o f tim e called “ perm ission” allows things to be b o rn a n d to continue in existence.29 By its o th er function, p revention,

tim e obstructs th e inherent capacities o f objects an d “ old age” is then experienced. I t is in this way th a t the stages o f life a n d the seasons are ordered. W hen tim e is functioning under its impulse o f prevention, decay (Jara) occurs. Decay a n d grow th (Jirama) operate like pairs of opposites. W hen decay is active, grow th is blocked, an d vice versa.30 B ut th e underlying substratum o f all o f this activity is the driving im pulse o f tim e.81 T im e rem ains eternal even though the actions of grow th an d decay come an d go. As a result o f the activity o f grow th an d decay, tim e, w hich is one, attains the states o f past, present, a n d future. Thus w hen a n action ceases, tim e, conditioned by th a t action, is called past. W hen som ething is about to happen, tim e, conditioned by th a t event, is called future. W hen action has been initiated b u t is n o t yet com pleted, tim e is then called present.82 In this way the one transcendent reality—tim e—is experienced, through th e actions of the secondary causes it i eleases or restrains, to be sequenced into past, present, and future. T im e, says B hartrhari, is like the everflowing current of a river, w hich deposits some things on th e river bank a n d at the sam e tim e takes away others.33 So it is th a t the seasons change, as symbolized by th e m otions of the sun an d stars. As H elaraja puts it, “ T he seasons m ay be looked upon as th e abode o f tim e, because it appears as the seasons. T h e power called ‘Freedom ’ o f B rahm an is really tim e a n d it appears diversified as the different seasons like Spring, etc.” 34 Thus th e appearance o f the universe, w hich is really w ithout sequence, as som ething w ith sequence, is the work o f tim e.85 In another analogy, past, present, and future are said to be like three paths on w hich objects m ove w ithout any confusion.36 H elaraja’s com m ent likens this view to th e Sam khya-Yoga explanation of tim e found in V yasa’s com m entary on Togasutra 2.13. H ere the activity of tim e is equated w ith the ever-present m ovem ent o f the gunas on the three paths of being (adhvan). T he notion th a t objects a n d m ental states do not all occur sim ultaneously due to the prevention a n d permission activities o f tim e is clearly stated. T h e psychological m echa­ nism involved is th a t of inherent tendencies or m em ory traces (samskdra), w hich sprout like seeds w hen the conditions created by the ever-changing gunas are favorable.37 T h e p oint o f this parallel between Sainkhya-Yoga a n d vydkarana doctrine is to show how the three apparently conflicting qualities can coexist in harm ony. As H elaraja puts it, J u st as the three ingredients, having th e characteristics o f serenity (sattva), activity (rajas) an d in ertia (tamas), though existing sim ultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and principal relation a n d effect beings through their peculiar evo-

lu tio n , in a p ro p e r m a n n e r in th e sp len d o r o f th e ir o w n course o f actio n , so also, these (th re e ) tim e-divisions, by th e m agnificence o f th e ir ow n p o w e r (becom e) c a p ab le o f effecting sequence in e x tern al aspects.38 T h e p a s t a n d th e fu tu re h id e objects, so th e y a re like tamas o r darkness (says B h a rtfh a ri). T h e p resen t enables us to see th e objects, so i t is like lig h t o r th e sattva o f th e S am khyas. Rajas stan d s for th e ac tiv ity o f tim e itself.39 F o r b o th Saxnkhya-Y oga a n d th e G ra m m a ria n th e h arm onious coexistence o f objects o n th e th re e p a th s o f tim e m akes th e o rd e red sequence o f th e w o rld possible. T im e, like a n e te rn a l ro a d , is th e su b ­ stra tu m o n w h ich th e objects o f th e w o rld com e a n d go. T h e ro a d , like tim e , alw ays re m a in s th e sam e.40 T h e essence o f B h a rtrh a ri’s v iew p o in t is th a t tim e is a n in d e p e n d e n t po w er (Jakti) o f S a b d a B rah m an . T im e is c h a rac te rized b y its tw o energies o f p re v en tio n o r decay a n d perm ission o r g ro w th . I f w e look for th e precursors o f this d o ctrin e o f tim e, w e ca n fin d a co n tin u ity b ack th ro u g h P a ta n ja h ’s Mahabhasya to th e V edas. A lth o u g h P a n in i is silent on th e ph ilo sophical aspects o f tim e, P a ta n ja li in his Mahabhasya dis­ cusses tim e in tw o places. A t 2.2.5, kala is described in term s o f th e g ro w th o r d ecay o f bodies. Vakyapadiya 3.9.13 seem s to b e a d irec t reference to this passage o f th e Mahabhasya. A gain, a t 4.2.3 o f the Mahabhasya, P a ta n ja li defines tim e as e te rn a l.41 B ut P a ta n ja h does n o t say w h e th e r tim e is to be ta k e n as a pow er o f B ra h m a n (B h a rtrh a ri’s view) o r as a substance (th e N y ay a-V aisesik a v ie w ).42 I n N yayaV aise§ika th e o ry tim e is view ed as a n in d e p e n d e n t substance. T im e is p re se n t ev eryw here as th e e te rn a l connecting relatio n s betw een p airs o f objects.43 S om e la te r N yaya-V aisesika theories seem to h av e followed B h a rtrh a ri’s le a d a n d id en tified tim e a n d space w ith akaJa a n d w ith B ra h m a n .44 A d irec t p recu rso r for B h a rtrh a ri’s view in th e Vakyapadiya is av ailab le in th e M aitri Upanisad discussion o f tim e. As m en tio n ed earlier, in M aitri 6.15 tim e is described as th e form o f B ra h m a n t h a t h as p arts. T h ese p a rts (nam ely, th e year, a n d so o n ) grow a n d decay. T im e is said to cook all th in g s in th e G re a t Soul (mahatman). B h a rtrh a ri h as o n occasion b een m istakenly called a B uddhist. T h e B u d d h ist (M a d h y a m ik a ) view o f tim e, how ever, is ra d ic ally different fro m th a t o f th e Vakyapaiiya. F o r th e B u d d h ist th e re is n o p re sen t tim e (Vartamanakala) a p a rt from th e p a st a n d fu tu re .48 B ut th e B uddhist em phasis o n th e co n stan t process o f ch ange— a n d th u s th e necessary reference to p a st a n d fu tu re— seems too one-sided w hen i t leaves no ro o m for th e p resen t. W e d o experience th e p re sen t as a n ongoing m o m en t, a n d this concept B h a rtrh a ri accom m odates successfully. B h a rtrh a ri’s n o tio n o f th e d y n am ic lim itin g function o f tim e

(kalaiakti) lies b eh in d th e discussion o f th e levels o f language in the V&kyapadiya. A fter setting fo rth th e absolute n a tu re o f B rahm an as being th e one e tern al essence o f w ord a n d consciousness, B h artfh ari in tro ­ duces th e n o tio n o f tim e as th e pow er o r m eans b y w hich this one u n ch an g in g absolute (S abda B rah m an ) m anifests itself as th e dynam ic diversity m an k in d experiences as creation. T im e is th e creative pow er o f S ab d a B rah m an a n d is thus responsible for the b irth , d eath , a n d co n tin u ity o f everything in th e cosmos. T im e is one, b u t w hen broken o r lim ited in to sequences appears as m om ents or actions. T hese seg­ m en ts o f tim e a re m entally categorized as seconds or m inutes. Such lim ited segm ents o f tim e are th e n m entally unified in to day, week, m o n th , a n d year. I n th e sam e fashion notions o f past, present, a n d fu tu re a re developed. W hen tim e is view ed as a n action n o t yet com ­ p leted, th e no tio n o f th e present is established. A n action th a t has been com pleted is tim e as past, a n d a n actio n yet to b e com pleted is tim e as fu tu re. AU o f o rd in ary life is sequenced by these three pow ers o f tim e. Y et aU th e while, declares B h artfh ari, th ere is really n o sequence a t all. F ro m th e u ltim ate view point all th ree pow ers o f tim e are constantly present. T im e is one. A lthough th e effects o f th e th ree pow ers o f tim e (th a t is past, present, a n d fu tu re ) are m u tu ally contradictory, they function w ith o u t causing an y disorder in th e cosmos. T hey are like th ree p a th s o n w hich objects m ove ab o u t w ith o u t any confusion. B h a rtfh a ri enters in to this deep discussion o f tim e in relation to the absolute n o t as a fascinating m etaphysical aside, b u t to explain how th e u n ita ry S ab d a B rah m an m anifests itself in experience as th e diver­ sity o f words cafied language. As a G ram m arian , h e is also providing a m etaphysical basis for th e experience o f the tenses past, present, a n d fu tu re in language. A n d it is p ast a n d future th a t h av e th e veiling function o f keeping one a p a rt from th e absolute etern al present. In religious term s u n io n w ith th e etern al present is un io n w ith th e divine, w hich, for B h artfh ari, is th e in h ere n t goal to w ard w hich all language, all g ram m ar, is reaching.

4.

Vyakaraqa a s a M e a n s o f (Sabdap Uroayoga )

R

elea se

F o r th e H in d u th e u ltim ate goal o f philosophy is liberation (moksa). Before B h artfh ari, P atan jali in his Mahabhasya included in th e aim s o f g ram m atical study (oyakarana) th e a tta in m e n t o f heaven {soargo) th ro u g h th e correct use o f w ords a n d liberation from bondage {moksa) .46 W hile it is clear th at for P atan jali liberation is th e divine W ord, h e does n o t specify how this divine W o rd is to be achieved. S atyakam V arm a solves this p ro b lem b y assum ing th a t the P atan jali o f th e Mahabhasya

is the same as the Patanjali of the TogasUtras and th a t the description of how yoga of the W ord is to take place is given in the latter work.47 W hile not all scholars agree th a t the same PatanjaIi authored both the Mahabhasya and the Togasutras, Satyakam V arm a’s suggestion of obtain­ ing help from the Togasutras has independent m erit in the attem pt to understand the gram m arian concept o f SabdapUrvayoga or the yoga o f the W ord (literally, yoga preceded by the W ord). For present purposes, however, an attem pt will be m ade to interpret SabdapUroayoga by using only the Vdkyapadiya. B hartrhari emphasizes the aim of gram m ar as leading both to heaven a n d to liberation not only in the Vdkyapadiya b u t also in his com m entary on Patanjali’s Mahabhdsya.48 At the beginning of the Vdkyapadiya B hartrhari says th at'g ram m ar is the door leading to liberation (1.14); it is th e straight, royal ro ad for those who desire salvation(1.16); and by m eans of it one attains the suprem e Brahm an (1.22). A t the end of the first chapter B hartrhari returns to th e topic and states th a t “ the purification of the word is the m eans to the attainm ent of the Supreme Self. O ne who knows the essence of its activity attains the im m ortal B rahm an” (1.131). T he yoga of the W ord, then, has the power to take one from the ordinary experience of the w ord all the way to union with the Divine. The First Stage T he first requisite step is the purging of corrupt forms from one’s everyday language. W hile B hartfhari allows th at corrupt forms of words can convey m eaning, spiritual m erit can be attained only by the knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, which is the spiritual role of gram m ar. As B hartrhari puts it in the vrtti on 1.131: when speech is purified by the adoption o f the gram m atically correct forms and all obstruction in the shape o f incorrect forms is rem oved, there results a spiritual m erit th a t brings the experience o f well-being (abhyudaya). This abhyudaya is also translated into English as “m oral power” of the sort th a t begins to move us in the direction of identifying ourselves w ith the divine.49 This identification is the first step in the yoga of the W ord— the repeated use o f gram m atically correct language th a t generates m ore and m ore abhyudaya until the way is prepared through the lower levels of language (vaikhari and madhyamd vdk) for the daw ning of the mystical vision [paSyanti). For the m odern m ind it is h ard to im agine ju st how the gram m atically correct use of words could be understood as generating m oral power, spiritual well-being, and the daw ning of the mystical vision. In order for us to em pathize w ith this first step in the yoga of the W ord, it will help to rem ind ourselves how B hartrhari understands the function of tim e in relation to th e correct use of words. T he appearance of the

A.

u n itary S ab d a B rahm an as having p arts (words) a n d sequence (word o rd er) is th e work o f tim e.60 T h e entire universe is like a p u p p et show w ith tim e as its w ire-puller. T im e regulates th e universe through p revention o r decay an d perm ission.61 T im e controls the birth, death, a n d sequence o f all objects, including all words. T im e allows some things to a p p e ar a t a p artic u la r tim e an d prevents others from ap p e ar­ ing. As th e sequencing activity o f all experience, tim e translates into g ram m ar as th e rules b y w hich th e ap pearance a n d disappearance of w ords in correct linguistic sequence is to take place. U nderlying all activity, including all linguistic activity, is th e driving im pulse o f tim e.62 T im e, as th e first pow er o f th e divine W ord, rem ains eternal, though th e activity o f language m ay come an d go.53 In co rrect usage results from attem pts b y hum ans to change the sequencing o f language to suit themselves, w ithout reg ard for th e divine W ord. Such ego-centered w ord use leaves behind m em ory traces, w hich serve to conflict a n d obscure the p ro p e r sequencing o f S abda B rahm an b y its tim e power. W ith o u t th e aid o f g ram m ar a n d its purifying rules, such a confused m en tal state is th e usual result. T h e tru th o f th e V edic teach in g a n d glimpses o f S abda B rahm an are obscured w ithin con­ sciousness by th e layers o f traces laid dow n by incorrect w ord use. S trict adherence to gram m ar, a n d its teaching o f correct w ord use, g rad u ally results in rem oval o f these obscuring traces from consciousness. As th e proper, non-ego-centered sequencing o f language is established, th e tru th o f th e V edic teaching can be seen a n d responded to. T h en increased m o ral pow er a n d th e first glimpses o f the divine W ord are experienced. T his achievem ent is th e tru ly creative function of th e W ord— n o t th e m aking o f som ething new by h u m an ego-centered activity (the m o d em w estern notion o f creativity), b u t th e revelation o f th e real n a tu re o f things th ro u g h th e reflective pow er o f language.64 O nly w hen th e rules o f gram m ar are followed is w ord use crystalline enough to let th e divine show through. R ep eated practice o f proper w o rd use restores to language its m irrorlike quality, enabling a reflec­ tion o f th e tran scendent W ord to take place. Such a polishing an d p urification o f th e m ind an d its constituent w ord structures is th e goal o f stage one in th e yoga o f th e W ord. B. The Second Stage Stage tw o occurs w hen one focuses on th e purified reflective pow er of th e w ord u n til union w ith S abda B rahm an is realized. B h artfh ari quotes som e verses describing th e process in the vrtti on Vakyapadiya 1.131: “A fter taking his stand on th e w ord w hich lies beyond th e activity of breath , after having taken rest in oneself by th e union resulting in th e suppression o f sequence,”

“ A fte r h a v in g p u rifie d speech a n d a fte r h a v in g re ste d i t o n th e m in d , a fte r h a v in g b ro k e n its b o n d s a n d m a d e i t b o n d -fre e ,” “ A fter h a v in g re a c h e d th e in n e r lig h t, h e w ith h is k n ots c u t, becom es u n ite d w ith th e S u p re m e L ig h t. ” 6B T h e m id d le p assag e sh o u ld b e ta k e n first. S p e ec h h as b e e n p u rifie d (stag e o n e ) u n til th e m in d is u sin g o n ly c o rre c t g ra m m a tic a l stru c tu re s, w h ic h is w h a t th e p h ra s e “ re stin g it o n th e m in d ” im p lies. T h e p u rg in g o f eg o a tta c h m e n t is essen tial in s u c h a p u rific a tio n a n d m u s t b e c a rrie d ev en fa rth e r in sta g e tw o . T h e “ b re a k in g o f b o n d s” re fe rre d to a r e th e m e m o ry tra c e s a n d th e ir ta in te d m o tiv a tio n s left b y e g o ce n tric a c tiv ity — in e ith e r sp o k en w o rd s (Oaikhari vak) o r in n e r th o u g h ts (madhyamd vak). T h e s e ego b o n d s a re re m o v e d b y m e d ita tin g o n th e d iv in e W o rd (S a b d a B ra h m a n ) so t h a t th e p u rifie d form s o f la n g u a g e a r e b e in g c le a rly reflected . T h e a m o u n t o f su ch m e d ita tio n re q u ire d w ill b e e q u a l to th e s tre n g th n e e d e d to n e g a te th e e g o c e n tric tra c e s s to re d u p w ith in th e m in d . T h e first p assag e em p h asizes th e n e e d fo r “ su p p ressio n o f se q u e n c e .” T h e fu n c tio n o f tim e in s e q u e n c in g th e d iv in e W o rd in to th o u g h ts a n d u tte r e d so u n d s m u s t n o w b e su p p ressed . W h ile su c h se q u e n c in g o f la n g u a g e is essen tial in o rd in a ry d a y -to -d a y activ ities, as w ell as in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f th e V e d ic te a c h in g , th e re com es a tim e w h e n a ll th a t m u s t b e left b e h in d . Im m e rs io n in w o rld ly life as a s tu d e n t o r h o u se­ h o ld e r, w h ile n ecessary a n d g o o d in itself, is n o t th e u ltim a te g o al. S tu d y o f th e V e d ic te x ts, w h ile n ecessary, is n o t to b e c lu n g to as i f it w e re th e fin a l e n d . A tta c h m e n t to la n g u a g e use in e ith e r o f th ese a re a s is o n ly in d ic a tiv e o f a fa ilu re to go b e y o n d ego. E sp ec ia lly d a m a g in g is eg o a tta c h m e n t to th e V e d ic w o rd s them selves— a te x tu a l lite ra lism o r fu n d a m e n ta lis m re m in isc e n t o f a lin e fro m T .S . E lio t’s p la y M urder in the Cathedral·. “ T o d o th e r ig h t d e e d for th e w ro n g re a so n is th e g re a te st sin . ” 66 S p iritu a l p rid e is alw ay s tra g ic , a n d s p iritu a l p rid e a tta c h e d to t h e d iv in e W o rd is especially so. T h e Oyakarana p ra c tic e o f Sabdapurvayoga g u a rd s a g a in st su c h a re su lt b y in sistin g t h a t th e se q u e n c e d w o rd o f s c rip tu re b e a llo w e d to c a rry o n e b e y o n d itse lf to lib e ra tio n . T h is o b sta c le w ill u n d o u b te d ly b e th e m o st d ifficu lt o n e fo r th e g ra m m a ria n y o g i to o v erco m e. A fter h a v in g h o n e d h is g ra m m a tic a l style a n d k n o w ­ le d g e o f s c rip tu re to a fin e ed g e, i t w ill b e d ifficu lt to le t g o o f th a t la b o rio u sly w o n a c h ie v e m en t. B u t t h a t is e x a c tly w h a t B h a rtrh a ri re q u ire s, o th erw ise th e tra c e s o f ego a tta c h m e n t to th e u tte re d w o rd w ill b lo c k o u t th e re fle c tio n o f th e d iv in e in it. G iv in g u p a tta c h m e n t to se q u e n c e d la n g u a g e , p u rifie d th o u g h it m a y b e , im p lies m o v in g fro m sp o k en w o rd s (vaikhari) a n d in n e r th o u g h ts (:madhyamd) to th e d ire c t m y stic a l v ision (paSyantl, pratibha, o r sphota). A s th e first p assag e in d ic a te s, th e fu n c tio n o f b r e a th h e re is im p o rta n t.

In. vaikhari breath is very active in producing the sequence o f uttered sounds. A t the level o f inner thought (madhyamd) b reath is still active, though in a m ore subtle way, in fashioning sequences of thought. Paiyanti lies beyond the activity of breath and sequence.87 T h e m ind is quiet and focused, allowing the pratibha or intuitive perception o f Sabda Brahm an. Thus, through iabdapiirvayoga, the yoga of the W ord, we are to pass on from the gross sequence to the subtle sequence and finally to th a t stage in which sequence is entirely eliminated. Like a perfectly still pond, consciousness, when stilled from its sequencing activity, clearly reflects the reality before it. For Bhartrhari, it is Sabda Brahman, the essence of consciousness, th a t stands revealed a t the center o f the stilled m ind. T he third passage quoted by B hartrhari reflects ju st such an expe­ rience: “After having reached the inner light, he, w ith his knots cut, becomes united w ith the Supreme L ight.” A lthough the “ cutting of the knots” is n ot defined by B hartrhari, Vr§abha describes it as a cutting o f the bonds and knots of “ ego sense.” Going beyond the egosense of “ I ” and “m ine” is obviously a m ajor challenge in the yoga of the W ord. I t is repeatedly m entioned by Bhartrhari. For example, in the vrtti on Vakyapadiya 1. 130 he says th a t those who know the yoga of th e W ord break the knots of ego-sense a n d are m erged w ith the divine W ord. I f ego attachm ent in any form remains, Hhepaiyanti stage will not be fully realized. In the vrtti on 1.142, paiyanti seems to be endowed w ith a num ber of phases (of increasingly pure reflection). In the lowest it seems to be still echoing some of the faint sequencing activity of madhyamd. A t a higher level it assumes a quality in which all word forms are submerged beyond recognition. A t th e highest level it completely transcends all associations w ith word forms. Hence paiyanti can reflect worldly word forms a n d can also totally transcend them . Even though it m ay come into contact w ith the sequenced and often egocentric word forms of vaikhari and madhyamd, it rem ains pure, untouched, and spiritual in nature. To those who are trapped in ego knots and im pure w ord usage, paiyanti m ay appear to be mixed up and contam inated. But in reality it is not. As one adopts correct word forms through a rigorous and reverent study of gram m ar, one’s consciousness is purified and the true inner vision of paiyanti revealed. As B hartrhari puts it, those whose inner vision is unobstructed (with ego knots) see, without error, the power o f words and know the true nature of things.88 The w ord forms are seen for w hat they are, namely, partial manifestations of the one divine W ord, which in paiyanti stands clearly revealed. T he yoga o f the W ord is the m editational exercise in which the m ind is concen­ trated on th e unity of the divine W ord and turned away from the diverse thoughts and sounds th a t manifest it.69 T he whole m editational process, w ith its culm ination in the vision of the divine W ord and final

reunion w ith it, is poetically described in the Rg Veda stanza “ M aho devo m arty am avivesa” : T h e spiritual aspirant reaches the Essence o f Speech— th e p u re lum i­ nous E tern al V erbum , w hich lies beyond th e v ital p lan e (pranavrttim atikmnte) by w ithdraw ing his m ind from external n a tu re {atmanam sarflhjtya') a n d fixing it u p on his in n e r n a tu re (atmani). T his entails th e dissolution o f tem p o ral sequence o f th o u g h t activity (kramasamhara-yogena). T h e purification o f th e V erbum results from this a n d th e asp iran t enters into it having severed all his ties w ith th e m aterial objective plane. T his leads h im to th e atta in m e n t o f th e in tern a l light a n d he becom es id entical w ith th e u ndying a n d undecaying Spirit, th e W o rd A bsolute.60 B h artrh a ri claims th a t in th e spirituality atta in e d th ro u g h th e p ractice o f th e yoga o f th e W ord a g re ater m easure o f divine light shines th ro u g h : “ T hose persons in w hom correct speech exists in a greater m easure, in th em also resides, in a g reater m easure, th e holy form o f th e creato r.” 61 A nd as long as a g ra m m a rian in th e state o f spirituality is alive, th e divine light o f th e W o rd resides in h im as in a covered vessel. W h en such a one dies this holy luster m erges into S ab d a B rahm an, its source.62 T h e yoga o f the W o rd dem onstrates th a t th e m eaningfulness o f words is n o t m erely intellectual, it is m eaningfulness th a t has spiritual pow er. W ith th e p ro p e r yoga, w ords have th e pow er to rem ove ignorance (avidya), reveal tru th (dharma), a n d realize lib eratio n (moksa). T h e vrtti on Vakyapadiya 1.5 states it cle a rly : “J u s t like m aking gifts, perform ­ in g austerities a n d practicing continence are m eans o f attain in g heaven. I t has been s a id : W hen, b y practicing th e V edas, th e vast d ark ­ ness is rem oved, th a t suprem e, b right, im perishable light comes into being in this very b irth .” 63 I t is n o t only this lofty goal o f final release th a t is claim ed for th e spiritual pow er o f words, b u t also th e very avail­ ab ility o f h u m a n rqasoning. W ith o u t th e fixed pow er o f w ords to convey m eaning, inference th ro u g h w ords could n o t tak e place.64 Because o f th e pow er in h ere n t in mantras for b o th h u m an inference a n d divine tru th , g re at care m ust be given to th e yoga o f words. In w ord yoga, th e rep eated ch an tin g o f mantras is a n in stru m en t of pow er. T h e m ore traces th ere are to be overcom e th e m o re repetitions are needed. Vakyapadiya 1.14 Vrtti suggests th a t rep eated use o f correct mantras rem oves all im purities, purifies all know ledge, a n d leads to lib eration. T h e psychological m echanism is described by B h artrh ari as a holding o f th e sphofa in place by continued chanting. J u s t as from a distance, or in semidarkness, it takes repeated cognition o f a n object before one sees it correctly, so also rep eated ch anting of th e mantras

results in th e sphofa b ein g perceived in all its fullness.06 M ancfana M iira describes it as a series o f progressively clea rer im pressions u n til a clear a n d co rrec t ap p reh en sio n takes p lace in th e e n d .00 T o b eg in w ith , such mantra c h a n tin g w ill b e m ain ly a t th e Oaikhari o r o u te r w o rd level. B ut as sp iritu al im p ro v em en t is m ad e, th e c h a n t w ill b e m o re a n d m ore in te rn a liz e d o n th e madhyama o r in n e r w o rd level. E v en tu ally all seq uenced c h a n tin g ac tiv ity w ill subm erge in to th e still steady mantra samadhi o f paSyanti, a n d th e final goal o f th e yoga o f th e W o rd w ill h av e b ee n realized . F o r th e vyakarana o u r o u ter w ords a n d in n e r th o u g h ts a re b u t reflec­ tions, m o re o r less perfect, o f th e o n e divine W o rd . T h e g re a t rsis o r seers recognized th is fact a n d m a d e them selves em p ty channels th ro u g h w h ich th e d iv in e W o rd co u ld re v e rb e ra te w ith little d isto rtio n . T h e g re a t G ra m m a ria n teachers, basing them selves o n th e rsis' utteran ces, fo rm u late d this w isdom in to a teac h in g in fo n n in g all o f life a n d even in to a p ath w a y to final lib eratio n . W h ile n o t all m a y ag ree w ith th e sp iritu al vision o f th e H in d u G ra m m a rian s it m u st b e conceded th a t we do find h ere a view o f lan g u ag e th a t m akes sense o f po etry , revealed scripture, science, a n d th e m y stical c h a n tin g o f mantras, a n d w h ich in a d d itio n strongly reso­ n ates w ith o u r o rd in a ry everyday experience o f coffee-cup ch at. I t is a w ay o f seeing lan g u ag e th a t effectively explains w hy it is th a t som etim es w h en we listen w e d o n o t h ea r. I t also teaches how to rem ove the obstru ctio n s in o n e’s consciousness so th a t re al h ea rin g becom es possible a n d suggests in a d ifferent w ay th e u ltim a te w isdom o f th e observation. “ I n th e b eg in n in g w as th e W o rd , a n d th e W o rd w as w ith G od, a n d th e W o rd was G o d ” (Jo h n 1 :1).

3 EPISTEMOLOGY

R ecent western thought has focused m uch attention on the relation betw een language a n d knowledge, b u t it has consistently taken a narrow er perspective th a n vyakarana w ould accept. W ithin the contem ­ porary school of linguistic philosophy, language seems to be restricted to th e p rin te d w ord and th en analyzed for a one-to-one correspondence w ith objective reality. W hile th e computer-like functions o f language m ust be highly respected, m odem linguists a n d philosophers often seem to consign all other dimensions o f th e w ord to the unreality o f a m ystic’s silence.1 E m st Cassirer has taken a m uch broader perspective including the natu ral sciences, th e hum anities, an d all hum an cultural activity of language.2 Vyakarana w ould applaud Cassirer b u t expand the realm of language even further. According to B hartrhari, “ T here is no cognition w ithout the operation of words; all cognition is shot through and through by th e word. All knowledge is illum ined through th e w ord.” 8 T h e fundam ental epistemological presupposition from B hartrhari’s perspective is th a t th e problem o f m eaning is basic. I t is through the m eaning conveyed by words th a t all knowledge is experienced. In this sense, then, th e philosophy o f language is n o t ju st another school of philosophy b u t is th e basic foundation for all philosophy. As T .R .V . M u rti has so aptly p u t it, “ T h e problem of w hat we can know is closely bound up w ith th e question o f w hat w e can say. It is only thought as expressed in words th a t can be understood, com m unicated an d criticiz­ ed. Language is n ot an accidental, dispensable garb w hich could be p u t on a n d p u t off. I t grows w ith thought, or rath e r thought grows w ith it. In the ultim ate analysis they m ay be identical.” 4 M eaning and cogni­ tio n are understood to m anifest themselves together as expressions of one deep spiritual impulse to know a n d to com m unicate. Consciousness (Caitanya) is identical w ith speech (vac) .e

I. Sabda

as to

Pramana i n r e l a t i o o t h e r Pramdnas

n

Before a discussion of iabda or testim ony as a m eans of knowledge (pramana), it m ay be useful to sketch the scholastic In d ian conception o f knowledge {prama). I n Sanskrit th e w ord jnana stands for all kinds of cognition, irrespective o f th e questions o f tru th or falsehood. Prama, however, is used to designate only a tru e cognition {yatharthaj'ndna) as distinct from a false one {mithydjnana). A pramana is an active and unique cause of a prama or knowledge.® T h e Sam khya an d Yoga schools o f In d ian philosophy accept three pramdnas: pratyaksa (perception), anumdna (inference), a n d iabda (testim ony).7 T h e M im am sa school defines six pramdnas: pratyaksa, anumdna, iabda, upamana (analogy), arthapatti (presum ption), and abhava (nonapprehension).8 T h e same six pramdnas are also stated by V e d a n ta.9 O f course, there are m any diffe­ rences of definition regarding specific pramdnas am ong the schools. W ithin vyakarana, B hartrh ari in his Mahabhasyafikd accepts three pramdnas: perception {pratyaksa), inference (anumdna), an d scripture {dgama or iabda). Perception is ju d g ed as liable to be erroneous, a n d at tim es inference is seen as superior to perception. But dgama or iabda, w hich consists o f the revealed (iruti) a n d rem em bered (smrti) scriptures, is a strong pramana an d is m ore dependable th an inference. Several verses in the Vakyapadiya (1.27-43) exam ine th e relations obtaining betw een th e pramdiiias o f reason a n d scripture. In B hartrh ari’s view it is not justifiable to replace scripture w ith inference in nonem pirical m atters or to hold th a t philosophical views (vada) can be free from scripture. Inference alone, w ithout the steadying influence of scripture, is an inadequate m eans of valid knowledge. As Vdkyapadiya 1.34 puts it, “ W hatever is inferred w ith great effort by clever reasoners is explained otherwise by cleverer ones.” 10 T hus dharma o r rig h t conduct cannot be determ ined by reasoning w ithout th e help o f the scriptural tradition (verses 1.30-31). A nd any attem p t to establish th e natu re of objects by inference will likely fail because their properties differ according to place a n d tim e (verse 1.32). Know ledge of this sort can only be derived from the scriptural tradition {iabda), a n d th en only after long hours of practice {abhydsa·, verse 1.35). T h e words of th e rsis convey supersensory knowledge th a t cannot be set aside by inference, because w ith their consciousness purged o f ignorance {avidya) they have directly perceived divine tru th (Sabda B rahm an; verse 1.38). T h e role of vyakarana is to safeguard th e transm ission o f this scriptural knowledge a n d to assist the hearer in realizing the tru th o f iabda. T h e early gram m arians Panini an d Patanjali define iabda prim arily in term s of th e spoken w ord. I n th e beginning of his Mahabhdsya, P atanjali defines th e w ord as “ T h a t on th e utterance o f w hich there is

u n d e rs ta n d in g re g a rd in g o bjects (sampratyaya) .’n l T h is d efin itio n o f Sabda does n o t id en tify th e w o rd w ith th e u tte re d so u n d only. T h e dis­ tin c tio n b etw e en w o rd (Sabda) a n d so u n d (dhvani) is b asic to th e u n d e r­ s ta n d in g o f la n g u a g e in I n d ia n p h ilo so p h y .12 T o t a k e t h e p h y sical so und as th e w o rd is to co n flate en titie s o f tw o d iffe re n t orders, lik e th e co n ­ fusion o f th e soul w ith th e b o d y . “ T h e w o rd , like th e soul, h a s a p h y sical e m b o d im e n t in th e so u n d a n d is m a d e m an ife st th ro u g h th e la tte r, b u t th e co n v ey an ce o f m e a n in g is th e fu n c tio n o f th e w o rd ; th e so u n d only in vokes th e w o rd .” 13 I f th e w o rd (Sabda) is o n ly in v o k ed a n d n o t c o n stitu te d by th e u tte re d sounds (dhvani), a q u estio n th e n arises a b o u t th e n a tu r e o f th is Sabda t h a t is m an ifested . T h e C a rv a k a , B u d d h ist, a n d J a i n schools, alo n g w ith m a n y m o d e m linguists, th in k a ll w o rd s to b e th e re su lt o f h u m a n co n v en tio n . W h e re h u m a n co n v e n tio n is n o t allo w ­ ab le, th e d iv in e co n v e n tio n o f G o d m a y b e in v o k ed — as is d o n e b y th e N y a y a, fo r ex am p le. A g a in st this view , a n d in a g re e m e n t w ith th e M im am sa, vyakarana m a in ta in s th a t th e re la tio n b etw e en w ords a n d m e a n in g is e te rn a l, u n d e riv e d , a n d im p erso n al. T h e re la tio n b etw e en Sabda a n d its m e a n in g is n o t a n a r b itra ry co n v e n tio n estab lish ed b y m a n o r G o d o r b o th . N o t o n ly is th e re n o re c o rd o f a n y su ch co n v en tio n , says th e vyakarana, b u t th e v ery id e a o f “ co n v e n tio n ” itse lf p re su p ­ poses la n g u a g e — th e th in g c la im e d to b e d e riv e d fro m c o n v e n tio n .14 T h erefo re, la n g u a g e m u s t b e ta k e n as h a v in g existed w ith o u t b eg in n in g . M u r ti suggests t h a t th e a tte m p t to discover a te m p o ra l b eg in n in g o f la n g u a g e m a y arise from a confusion o f Sabda w ith dhvani.18 W h ile sp eak in g so u n d s a n d le a rn in g h o w to g ro u p sounds in to syllables a n d th e lik e m a y w ell b e co n v e n tio n a l, th e fact o f v e rb a l c o m m u n ic a tio n necessitates th e a c c e p ta n c e o f Sabda as a giv en t h a t th e le a rn e d sounds m an ifest b u t do n o t co n stitu te . O th erw ise, th e re w o u ld b e as m a n y d iffe re n t w o rd s “ cow ” as th e re a re p e o p le speaking, for e a c h person p ro d u c es th e c o m p lex o f so u n d s in v o lv ed slightly d ifferen tly , n am ely , w ith d iffe ren t a c c e n t, speed, a n d so o n . E a c h single u tte ra n c e o f th e w o rd w o u ld b e u n iq u e . T h e fu n d a m e n ta l p o in t o f th e vyakararta posi­ tio n is t h a t in sp ite o f th e in d iv id u a l differences in sp eak in g i t “ cow ” is reco g n ized as th e sam e w o rd , “ co w ” . T h is a s p e c to f vyakarana d o c trin e p ro v id es a n ea ste rn p a ra lle l to th e w estern n o tio n o f P la to n ic form s. T h e w o rd “ cow ” , lik e a P la to n ic form , is id e n tic a l a n d im m u ta b le even th o u g h in stan ces o f its u tte ra n c e m a y v ary . T h e n u b o f th e a rg u m e n t, as in P la to , is t h a t v e rb a l co m m u n ic a tio n necessitates th e a c cep tan c e o f so m e k in d o f e te rn a l w o rd form s. T h e P la to n ic p ro b le m o f th e re la tio n o f th e Id e a to th e “ co p ies” a p p e a rs in vyakarana as th e re la tio n o f th e im m u ta b le w o rd to th e m a n y v e rb a l m an ifestatio n s t h a t evoke it. B ut vyakarana goes b ey o n d ju s t estab lish in g th e e te m a lity o f Sabda. I t id e n ti­ fies Sabda w ith B ra h m a n , so t h a t all w o rd s u ltim a te ly m e a n B ra h m a n —

thus the absolute as Sabda Brahm an. As M adhava puts it in his Sarvadarianasamgraha, B rahm an is the one object denoted by all words; and this one object has various differences imposed upon it according to each particular form ; b u t the conventional variety of the differences produced by these illusory conditions is only the result o f igno­ rance. N on-duality is the tru e state; b u t through the power of “ concealm ent” (exercised by illusion) a t the tim e o f the con­ ventional use of words a m anifold expansion takes place.16 Thus, knowledge o f the m eaning o f words not only removes ignorance b u t also leads to the final bliss o f identity w ith Sabda Brahm an.

2. T

h e o r ie s

of

E

r ro r

In vyakarana as in m ost other In d ian philosophies, error or ignorance (avidya) is ascribed the im portant function of obstructing the real from view. A lthough some scholars suggest th a t B hartjh ari’s theory o f error is analogous to Sam kara’s analysis of the rope-snake illusion,17 other interpretations, which w ould distinguish vyakarana from A dvaita V edanta, appear viable. Sainkara describes error (avidya) as being over­ come by a single negation. B hartrhari, however, in his Vdkyapadiya seems to hold th a t error is overcome positively by an increasingly clear cognition of the w ord form or sphota, which the succeeding perceptions reveal. W hereas the overcoming of error for Sam kara takes a negative form, for B hartrhari it is positive. T he vrtti on B hartrhari’s Vakyapadiya 1.89 a n d M andana’s com m ent on s utra 19 of the Sphofasiddhi state th a t the final clear perception of the sphota is achieved through a series of errors. T he analogy is offered of the way th a t, from a distance, one m ay (if one is in In d ia) m istake a tree for an elephant. But if one keeps on looking a t it, the tree is ultim ately recognized in its tru e form. I n this situation the tru th has been arrived a t through a series of errors. T he sense organ (in this case the eye) has been in contact w ith th e tree throughout. T he errors of perception have h a d the tree as their object, b u t the cognitions produced by the eye have h ad an elephant as their form. W hen th e final or true cognition takes place, however, it has the form o f the tree itself and is one w ith its object; b u t this tru e cognition has been arrived a t by going through the series o f erroneous perceptions th a t preceded it. Now this change from error to tru e perception cannot be explained by factors such as change in distance, for simply standing in th e same spot an d gazing w ith intense concentration often produces the desired result. According to M andana,

“ it is th e p rev ious cognitions (h av in g tre e as th e ob ject a n d th e form o f th e e le p h a n t) leaving progressively c lea rer resid u al im pressions, w h ich beco m e th e cause o f th e clea r p e rc e p tio n o f th e tre e .” 18 T h e re co u ld h a v e b ee n n o erroneous cognition o f e le p h a n t h a d th e tre e n o t b ee n th e re as a n o b ject for th e sense o rg a n to c o n tac t in th e first place. T h e e rro r, th erefo re, m a y b e d escrib ed as m isap p reh en sio n o r v ag u e p e rc e p ­ tio n . I n B h a rtrh a ri’s th e o ry o f lan g u ag e, th e sphot a is sim ilarly said to b e th e o b ject o f th e cognitions o f ea ch o f th e letters, a n d y et i t a t first ap p e a rs in th e fo rm o f a le tte r. B ut th ro u g h th e a d d itio n a l cognitions o f th e su b seq u en t letters, th e spkota is seen w ith in creasin g clarity u n til, w ith th e u tte rin g o f th e fin al le tte r, th e fo rm o f th e letters h a s becom e id e n tic a l w ith th a t o f th e spkota. H e re th e le tte rs a re seen in a po sitio n th a t a t first g lan ce seem s p a ra lle l to th e snake in th e fam ous ro p e-sn ak e illusion o f th e A d v a ita V e d a n tin s. T h e p erc e p tio n o f th e ro p e as snake is erro r, b u t it is th ro u g h n e g a tin g th e erroneous snake p e rcep tio n t h a t th e tr u e ro p e p e rc e p tio n is finally realized . A n d w ere it n o t for th e p rio r existence o f th e ro p e, th e erroneous p e rc e p tio n w o u ld h a v e lack ed th e necessary g ro u n d for its p h e n o m e n a l existence. S im ilarly, in th is case, th e letters a re seen as d e p e n d e n t o n th e sphota for th e ir p h en o m en a l existence, b u t in th a t p h e n o m e n a l existence as b ein g th e m ean s b y w h ich th e n o u m e n a l sphota m a y b e perceived. T h is a p p a re n t p arallel, ho w ev er, does n o t h o ld u p u n d e r closer analysis. A d v a ita th e o ry p ro ­ vides for o nly tru e o r false cognitions a n d allow s n o progressive a p p ro x i­ m a tio n to th e re a l,10 as is th e case in a series o f erro n eo u s sphota p e rc e p ­ tions. W h ereas th e A d v a itin describes his e rro r as b ein g tra n sc e n d e d v ia a single n e g a tio n (such as w h e n it is realized t h a t “ it is n o t sn ak e” ), th e g ra m m a ria n h o ld s th a t his e rro r (for exam ple, th e vagueness o f th e p e rc e p tio n o f th e w hole in th e first le tte r) is positively overcom e b y th e in creasin g ly clear p e rc e p tio n o f th e sphota re v ealed b y th e succeeding letters. T h is analysis o f th e w ay e rro r is overcom e w o u ld seem to give fu rth e r w e ig h t to G a u rin a th S astri’s suggestion t h a t in som e w ays th e d o c trin e o f reflection (abhasa) o f th e K a sh m ir T rik a w riters m a y p ro v id e th e closest p a ra lle l to sphota th e o ry .20 I n th e K a sh m ir T rik a view consciousness (caitanya) is th e only re ality , a n d a ll e x te rn a l m an ifestatio n is h e ld to b e a reflection o n consciousness as o n a m irro r. E rro r, in this view , occurs n o t b ecau se th e in itia l p e rc e p tio n h as no existence b u t becau se its reflection o f th e ob ject ca p tu res o r in clu d es only a p a r t o f its to ta lity a n d fills in th e gaps w ith o th e r m a te ria l (traces) ta k e n fro m th e o ld stock o f m em o ry . T h is e rro r is positively tra n sc e n d e d as th e form o f th e reflectio n is progressively p u rified o f m em o ry m a te ria l u n til it p erfectly reflects th e object. T h is perfect reflection, w h ich is tru e know ­ ledge, is fu rth e r d escrib ed as a u n io n o f th e subjective a n d objective aspects o f consciousness— a re tu rn to th e oneness th a t is its essential n a tu re .21 F ro m th is b rie f glance a t th e K a sh m ir abhasa th eo ry , i t w ould

seem to provide a helpful parallel supporting the vyakarana view of the way in which th e mainfest letters erroneously b u t positively approxi­ m ate their true object, the sphofa itself. To retu rn to M andana, his explanation of th e paradox of th e way the indivisible sphota appears as the letters, and the letters as th e parts of the partless sphota, is as follows. H e says it is the sounds th a t resemble one another th a t are th e cause o f both the error and the final correct cogni­ tion of the sphota. If, for the m anifestation of two different word -sphotas, one has to m ake sim ilar m ovements of the vocal organs, the letters produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of the indivisi­ ble words.22 This error is fostered by the construction of such artificial devices as alphabet letters or word syllables, usually for teaching pu r­ poses. I t is precisely because of this kind of confusion, says M andana, th a t sentences, words and letters appear to have parts, while in reality they do n o t.23 T he obverse applies to the sphota. From th e phenom enal viewpoint the sphota “ cow” , for example, m ay appear to possess qualities such as accent, speed, loudness, tim e, place, and person in its utterance. T h a t they are qualities o f the phenom enal sounds and not the noum enal sphofa is w hat makes possible the comm on recognition of the word “ cow” in spite of its diversity of utterance. From the sphota viewpoint, it is this noum enal grounding or basis th a t makes possible such things as the translation of thought from one phenom enal language to another. M andana offers the exam ple of a picture. H e points out th a t in our cognition of a picture, although we m ay be aw are of the different parts and colors, the picture is perceived as a whole over an d above its parts.24 Similarly, w hen we perceive a piece of cloth our cognition is of th e cloth as a whole and is quite distinct from the particular threads an d colors involved.25 In both of these examples there is a necessary perception of th e parts prior to the perception o f the whole. This aspect is brought out clearly by B hartrhari, who describes the p ainter as going through three stages when he paints a picture: “ W hen a painter wishes to p ain t a figure having parts like th a t of a m an, he first sees it gradually in a sequence, then as the object o f a single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on a wall in sequence.” 26 So also the hearer of a w ord perceives the w ord in a sequence of letters, which manifest in him the whole w ord as the object of a single cognition. As a speaker, however, he utters th e whole w ord in its differentiated appearance as a sequence of letters. I t is in this context th a t the perception of th e m any letters, before the final perception of the unitary sphofa, is described as error, illusion, or appearance. But it is a unique kind of error in th a t it has a fixed sequence and form, ultim ately leads to the perception of the truth, and is thus regarded as a universal error.27 T he c h e f cause of this universal error is described as avidyd, the lim itation of the individual self-con-

sciousness. A characteristic o f this avidya is th a t it provides no m eans for cognizing th e sphofa o th e r th a n th e letters. T h a t is w hy all in d iv id u a l selves universally experience th e sam e e rro r w ith re g a rd to sp eech ; b u t it is a n e rro r t h a t ultim ately leads to cognition o f tru th . I t is only th ro u g h this erro r o r ap p e ara n ce o f d ifferentiation th a t th e in d iv id u al sphofa com es w ith in th e ra n g e o f w orldly usage so th a t w e o rd in ary m ortals h av e a w ay o f com prehending i t .28 W ith th e p receding u n d ersta n d in g o f B h a rtrh a ri’s sphofa theory in m in d , w e are now ab le to observe its significant difference from S am k ara’s view o f error. W hereas th e A dv aitin usually describes his erro r as b eing tran scen d ed via negation (such as w hen it is said th a t “ it is n o t snake” ), th e G ra m m a rian holds th a t his e rro r (for exam ple, th e vagueness o f th e p ercep tio n o f th e w hole in th e first le tte r) is positively overcom e by th e increasingly clear cognition o f th e sphofa revealed by th e succeeding letters.29 A n d th e final clear cognition is a case o f perfect p ercep tio n o r pratibha — a flash o f in tu itio n revealing th e sphofa o r w hole w o rd .30 A t th e m ore m u n d a n e level o f psychological functioning, how ­ ever, th e positive process o f perfecting th e p erception is described by S u b ra m a n ia Iy er as follows: (T h e fin al) clear cognition is a case o f perception. T h e previous cognitions also h a d th e sphofa as th e ir object, b u t th e cognition o f it w as v ag u e a n d th a t is w hy th ey h a d th e form o f th e sounds. B ut w h en th e final cognition reveals th e sphofa in all its clarity a n d distinctness, it no longer h as th e form o f sounds. T h e erro r has given p la c e to tru th . S uch a cognition can only b e perception. T h e ob ject a n d form s o f th e cognition a re now id en tical.31 B h a rtrh a ri characterizes th e conform ity betw een th e object a n d th e form o f th e cognition in th e final in tu itio n as a certain fitness (yogyata) betw een th e sounds a n d th e sphofa, w h ich results in th e clear m anifesta­ tio n o f th e w o rd .32 T h e perfect p ercep tio n in w hich th ere is id e n tity betw een th e object (nam ely, th e sphofa) a n d th e form o f its cognition (nam ely, th e letters o f sounds) is a special k in d o f p erception th a t— th e m o d em re a d e r m u st realize— is h eld to b e a function o f th e m in d 83 ra th e r th a n o f th e ex tern al sense. T h e designation o f th e final cognition o f th e sphofa as a case o f perception, n o t o f inference, has im p o rta n t logical im p lications.34 M a n d a n a expresses th e p o in t clearly: “ T h e rev elation (o f an object) clearly o r vaguely is confined to d irec t p ercep ­ tion. I n th e case o f th e o th er m eans o f know ledge th e re is eith er ap p rehension (o f th e object) o r n o t a t a ll.” 85 A ccording to alm ost all schools o f In d ia n -philosophy, th e valid m eans o f know ledge {pramana) o th er th a n p ercep tio n eith er reveal th e object com pletely o r do n o t reveal it a t all. T h e re can b e increasing clarity o f revelation only in th e

case o f perception. This point is most im portant for the sphota theory in its contention th at the error due to the vagueness o f perception o f the initial letters m ay be gradually and positively overcome, as described above. I t is also crucial for th e sphota theory in its contention th a t the existence of the sphota is not a postulation, as the M imamsakas m aintain, b u t is proved by direct perception. Sam kara in his com m entary on Brahmasutra 1.3.28 argues against B hartrhari5S notion th a t the sphota is directly perceived. According to Sam kara, only the individual letters of a word are perceived, and they are combined through the inferential activity o f the m ind into a word aggregate,38 Because the psychological process is one o f inference instead of perception, there can be no question of degrees of cognition. T he inference pramaiia is an all-or-nothing process. T he error, if it is to be overcome, m ust be completely replaced all at once by a new inferential construction of the m ind or by a superconscious intuition of Brahman. Thus the position of Bhartyhari (that the overcoming o f error is a perceptual process adm itting of degrees of positive approxim ation) and the position of Sarnkara (that the overcoming o f error is a negative process of inference—adm itting of no degrees) are not at all analogous.

3. T

h e o r ie s o f

P aradoxes

T he logical principle “ everything is either P or not P ” has its limitations, especially in Indian philosophical discussions. Indian G ram m arians and Logicians have classified negation into two types: prasajyapratisedha, verbally bound negative, and paryudasa, nominally bound negative. T h e nom inally bound negative like a-bmhmana (“nonbrahm in,” generally referring to a ksatriya, or the like) has a positive significance, and the negation is m ainly for excluding some from the scope of the term negated. T he verbally bound negation is a form o f total negation and precludes an activity. T he M adhyam ika Buddhist proposes the fourfold negation (catuskoti) to deny all alternatives to the absolute. T he A dvaitin5S “indescribable,” used to indicate the nature of maya, is also not w ithin the “ either yes or no” principle. T he M adhyam ika thesis “T he phenom enal world is indeterm inate” m eans th at no predicate is applicable to the world. Now the question is raised, “ Is ‘indeterm inate5 a predicate or not ?” If it is, then the world is not indeterm inate, for a t least one predicate is applicable to it. If it is not, then we cannot say th a t the world is indeter­ m inate. Such paradoxes are m et w ith the reply that “ indeterm inate55 itself is not a predicate. B hartrhari discussed some paradoxes in his Vakyapadiya. O ne is the famous Iia r5S paradox. “ I am not telling the tru th 55; i f this statem ent is

tru e, h e is a lia r a n d his statem en t ca n n o t b e tru e , in w h ich case it is tru e. B h a rtrh a ri says th a t a statem en t o f this ty p e does n o t refer to itself. A n o th er interesting re m a rk from B h a rtrh a ri regards th e te rm “ in d escrib a b le” (avacya) : “ W h a t you consider as avacya can a t least b e referred to by th e te r m Atiacya(Indescribable), a n d th e n it becom es vacya o r d escrib ab le.”

4. L

evels o f

L

anguage

T h e id ea th a t various levels o f lan g u ag e a n d know ing exist is present in several schools o f In d ia n philosophy, b u t it is a n id ea th a t m o d em scholars in th e ir first encounters w ith eastern th o u g h t eith er miss or m isu n d erstan d. T h e n o tio n o f levels o f lan g u ag e is a necessary develop­ m en t in view o f B h a rtrh a ri5S absolutism . A m onistic h iera rch y such as th e following necessarily re su lts: ju s t as th e phonem es a re only unreal abstractions o f th e w ord, so also w ords are u n re a l abstractions o f th e sentence, a n d th e sentences a re u n re a l abstractions o f th e p arag ra p h . E ven th e p a ra g ra p h is n o t th e u ltim a te unity, for it is only a n artificial division o f th e c h a p te r o f th e book. A t th e top o f this language h ierarch y th ere is o nly one indivisible reality w ith in o u r lite ra ry self, w hich, due to o u r h u m a n ignorance o r lim itatio n (avidya), ca n only m anifest itself in su ch u n re a l form s as th e book, th e c h a p te r, th e p a ra g ra p h , the sentence, a n d th e w ord. T h e u n d erly in g p rinciple, m ain tain s B h artrh a ri, is th a t all difference presupposes a u n ity (abhedapurvako hi bhedah). W h ere th e re is difference or p a rts th e re m u st b e a n u nderlying id en tity , otherw ise th e o n e could n o t b e re la te d to th e o th er a n d each w ould co n stitute a w o rld b y itself. T h is concept provides th e g ro u n d in g for B h a rtrh a ri’s m etaphysical speculation a n d for th e notion o f a h iera rch y o f levels o f languages (Vakyapadiya I . I ). L an g u ag e can b e seen to o p erate on a t least tw o levels. T h ere is the id ea th a t comes as a n in n e r flash (the carto o n im age o f th e lig h t bu lb going o n ), a n d th e re is th e o u te r speaking o f w ords a n d sentences th a t attem p ts to convey th e id ea to others. T h e w ords a n d sentences are called b y B h a rtrh a ri Oaikhari vac— th e u tte re d sounds th a t com bine to m ak e u p th e sentence, book, o r poem . T h e in n e r id ea or sphofa is ap tly designated as palyanti vac— th e in tu itiv e flash o f u n d erstan d in g o f th e sentence, book, o r poem as a w hole.87 B etw een these tw o levels th ere is a m id d le o r madhyamd vac— th e level o f th o u g h t. H e re th e u n itary id ea or sphota ap p ears sep arated in to its sequence o f thoughts, w ords, a n d phrases, n o n e o f w h ich h as yet re ach e d th e level o f u tte re d sound. A ccording to B h artrh a ri, vac o r lan g u ag e passes th ro u g h these th ree levels w henever one speaks. Sabda, w h ich is a t first q u ite in tern a l, is g rad u ally ex tern alized for th e purpose o f speaking. H e arin g , o f course,

o p erates in th e reverse d irec tio n . W h e th e r o n e is d ea lin g w ith factu al scientific la n g u ag e o r a po em th a t ca n b e u n d ersto o d o n vario u s levels, B h a rtrh a ri’s sphota th eo ry seems to p ro v id e a n a d e q u a te ex p lan atio n . T h e co m p lete co n tin u u m o f co g n itio n is covered. AU o f these p o in ts are in co m p lete acco rd w ith B h a rtrh a ri’s basic p rem ise a lre a d y m en tio n ed , n am ely , t h a t th e re is n o possible co g n itio n in w h ic h la n g u a g e does n o t figure. K n o w led g e, consciousness, a n d th e w o rd a re aU inex tricab ly in te rtw in e d .38 O n c e this supposition is accep ted , th e id ea o f levels o f la n g u ag e seems q u ite logical. T h o u g h t a t th e buddhi o r d iffe re n tia te d stage o f w o rd sequences is p erh ap s b est u n d e rsto o d as in te rn a l speaking. A n d pratibha, in tu itio n , m a y b e seen as a k in d o f m u te d speaking. T h e p o in t b ein g em phasized is th a t for B h a rtfh a ri speaking is th e essence o f consciousness a n d th e m ean s to all know ledge. A n d it m u st also b e clearly u n d e rsto o d th a t by “ sp eak in g ,” “ la n g u a g e ,” o r “ th o u g h t” w h a t is m e a n t is th e conveyance o f m e a n in g — “ th in k in g ” h e re does n o t p rim a rily refer to co n cep t for­ m atio n , th e d ra w in g o f inferences, a n d so on, all o f w h ic h w o u ld exist a t th e tw o low est levels (vaikhari a n d madhyama) only. W h e n “ m e a n in g ” is iden tified as in te rtw in e d w ith consciousness (as B h a rtrh a ri identifies i t ) , it satisfies instances o f pratibha as weU as instances o f m o re co m m o n ­ p lace co g n itio n a n d c a n th erefo re b e h e ld to b e logically possible a t all levels o f vac, in c lu d in g even th e v ery hig h est (nam ely, th e pramana). L e t us n o w exam ine e a c h level in som ew hat m o re d e ta il.39 Vaikhari is th e m o st e x tern al a n d d iffe ren tiated level in w h ich vac is com m only u tte re d b y th e sp eaker a n d h e a rd b y th e h e a re r. I t is prana (b re a th ) th a t enables th e o rg an s o f artic u la tio n a n d h ea rin g to p ro d u c e a n d perceive sounds in a te m p o ra l sequence. Prana m a y therefore b e ta k e n as th e in stru m e n ta l cause o f vaikhari vac. T h e c h ief c h a rac te ristic o f vaikhari vac is th a t it h a s a fully developed te m p o ra l sequence. A t this level a sp eak er’s in d iv id u a l p ec u liarities (such as a c c e n t) a re presen t, alo n g w ith th e lin g u istically re le v a n t p a rts o f speech. G oing fu rth e r in w a rd , as it w ere, madhyama vac is th e n e x t level, a n d its association is chiefly w ith th e m in d o r in telle ct (buddhi). I t is th e id e a o r series o f w ords as conceiv­ e d b y th e m in d after h e a rin g o r before speaking o u t. I t m a y b e re g a rd e d as in w a rd speech. All th e p a rts o f speech th a t are linguistically re le v an t to th e sen ten ce a re p re sen t h e re in a la te n t form . A t th is level a v arie ty o f m an ifestatio n is possible. T h e sam e sphota o r m e a n in g is c a p a b le o f b ein g rev ealed b y a v a rie ty o f form s o f madhyama, d e p e n d in g on th e lan g u ag e ad o p ted . A lth o u g h th e re is n o t full te m p o ra l sequence o f th e k in d ex p erien ced in spoken w ords, w o rd a n d m e a n in g a re still d istin ct, a n d w o rd o rd e r is p resen t. So te m p o ra l sequence m u st also b e presen t, alo n g w ith its in stru m e n ta l cause, prana. T ra d itio n a l yoga is ab le to d e m o n strate a su b tle b u t d ire c t connection b etw een b re a th in g a n d co g n itio n .40

T h e next a n d innerm ost stage is paiyanti vac. Paiyanti is th e d irect experience o f th e vakya-sphota— o f m e a n in g as a n o um enal whole. A t this level th ere is no distinction betw een th e w ord a n d th e m eaning, a n d th e re is n o tem p o ral sequence. AU such phen o m en al differentiations d ro p aw ay w ith th e in tu itio n o f th e p u re m ean in g in itself. Y et th ere is present a t this level a kin d o f “ going-out” o r desire for expression. T h is im pulse is th e pratibha “ in stin c t,” w hich in one sense m ay b e said to m o tiv ate th e phenom enalization in to sentences a n d w ords o f the paiyanti vision, so th a t com m unication m ay occur. T h u s th e V edic vision or dhi o f th e rsi, w hich in itself is paiyanti, becom es phenom enalized so th a t by its u tte re d w ord m en m ig h t rise above th e ir ignorance a n d b e grasped in th e ir cognition by th e revelation o f u ltim a te reality. T herefore, th ere is a sense in w hich V e d a a n d pratibha are identified as paiyanti vac. Because paiyanti is, by definition, beyond th e level o f diffe­ re n tia te d cognition, it is im possible to define it in w o rd sentences. I t occurs a t th e level of d irect in tu itio n a n d therefore m u st finally be u n d erstood th ro u g h experience. Nevertheless, th ere has been no d e a rth o f speculation over the exact n a tu re ο ΐ paiyanti a n d th e possibility o f yet a h ig h er level o f language, nam ely para vac.*3·

4 WORD MEANING

I.

S ig n if ic a t iv e F

u n c t io n

Significative pow er (Jakti) is defined as th e relatio n th a t exists b etw een a w ord (Jabda) a n d its m ean in g (artha). T h is relatio n is considered to b e p e rm a n e n t a n d stable, so th a t linguistic discourse be possible. T h e N aiyayikas consider this significative pow er to b e conven­ tional, hav in g b een established b y th e w ill o f G od. T h e G ram m arian s consider th e relatio n to b e based o n th e superim position o f one on th e o ther, creatin g a sort o f id en tity , one evoking th e other. T h e B uddhist L ogicians also consider th a t th e re is a causal re la tio n betw een a w ord a n d its m ean ing. T h is re la tio n is p rim a ry d en o tativ e pow er a n d is called abhidha. T h e function o f w ords for conveying m e an in g is n o t restricted to this p rim ary significative pow er. T h e b in a ry relationship— every m eaning h av in g only one w ord a n d every w ord hav in g only one m eaning— m ay b e a n id eal, for avoiding confusion a n d am biguity. B ut in all n a tu ra l languages th e re are several exceptions to this rule. E ven th e borders o f th e m ean in g are n o t alw ays fixed a n d d ep en d on co n tex tu al factors, b o th situ atio n a l a n d syntactic. M oreover, unconscious shifts o f m eaning a n d figurative usages as well as conscious, in ten tio n a l devices used by poets a n d m ystics h a v e m a d e th e p ro b lem o f m ean in g m ore com plex. V arious o th er functions o f language are accep ted by d ifferent schools o f th o u g h t to explain th e diverse types o f language b eh av io r w ith in th eir field o f investigation. T h e n u m b e r o f functions also varies, d epending on th e areas m e a n t b y Jabda a n d artha. Abhidha, Iaksana, gauni, tatparya, vyanjana, bhavakataa, a n d bhojakatva are th e m ain functions in tro d u ce d to explain th e various types o f m ean in g conveyed b y speech. Som e are for w ords, others m ay b e for sentences o r for th e com plete u tteran ce. O f these types laksana, secondary significative pow er, is th e m ost im p o rta n t a n d p o p u lar. T h re e conditions for a laksana a re generally

accep ted by all schools. T h e first is in co m p atib ility o r inconsistency o f th e p rim a ry m ean in g in th e context, w hich produces a b reak in th e flow o f th o u g h t, forcing th e listener to th in k in order to u n d ersta n d w h a t th e speaker h as m ean t by th e uncom m on usage a n d w hy h e has used th e w o rd in a n irre g u la r way. T his inconsistency can b e eith er th e im possibility o f associating th e n o rm al m ean in g w ith th e o th er w o rd m eanings o f th e sentence o r th e n o rm al m ean in g ’s unsuitability in th e context. T h e second condition is some k in d o f relatio n betw een th e p rim ary , n o rm al m ean in g o f th e te rm a n d its actu al m ean in g in te n ­ d ed in th e context. T h is relatio n can b e one of p roxim ity w ith c o n tra ­ riety o r one o f sim ilarity o r com m on quality. T h e la tte r type is called gauni laksana, w h ich th e M im am sakas tre a t as a n in d ep en d e n t function called gauni; according to them , real laksana is only o f th e first type, a re la tio n o f p ro x im ity w ith co n trariety . T h e th ird condition is eith er accep tan ce by com m on usage o r a special purpose in te n d e d for in tro ­ d u cin g th e laksana. All faded m etaphors {nirUdhd laksana) fall into th e form er category, a n d m etap h o ric usages, especially b y poets, fall into • th e la tte r. I t m ay b e n o ted h ere th a t P an in i d id n o t accep t laksana as a separate function in language, th o u g h la te r G ram m arian s such as P atan jali did so. I t was th e M im am sakas w ho developed it to enable th em to explain V edic passages p roperly. T o th em th e re can b e laksaiid no t only for w ords, b u t also for sentences as a w hole.1 T h e B uddhist w ho considered th a t w ords d eal only w ith m e n ta l constructs (vikalpa) th a t h av e no d irec t connection w ith reality considered secondary m eanings (laksana) o r m e ta p h o r ('upacara) as h elping language to deal w ith reality. D ignaga, th e p ro m u lg ato r o f th e apoha theory, accepted th a t w ords m ay n o t h av e an y positive content, b u t th e sentence conveys a m eaning th a t is o f th e n a tu re o f pratibhd. A dditionally, J a y a n ta B h atta in tro d u ced a new function called tatparyavrtti to ex plain how ind iv id u al w ord m eanings in a sentence co m b in ed to form a unified sentence m eaning. A lthough h e accepted a k in d o f ahhihitdnvaya (v erb al com prehension) theory, h e could n o t reso rt to laksana like th e B h atta M im am sakas, because N aiyayikas accep t laksana only for w ords. A n a n d a v a rd h a n a , w ho advocated th e vyanjand vrtti, included th e p u rp o se o f in ten tio n a l m etap h o rs u n d e r it a n d p o in ted o u t its im p o r­ ta n c e in enriching th e contents o f lite ratu re . T o h im Jabda m e a n t n o t only th e words, b u t co n tex tu al factors also, a n d u n d e r artha h e included n o t only ideas, b u t figures o f speech a n d em otions. B h attan ay ak a claim ed th a t poetic language has a special function (vydpdra), w hich h e called bhavand o r bhdvakatva, th a t h elp ed in th e universalization o f th e em otions depicted a n d h elp ed th e readers to co n cen trate. H e also claim ed an o th er function ,bhojakatva, for lite ratu re ;

bhojakatva is th e pow er o f m aking th e listener share th e poetic em otions. T hese functions a re n o t accepted b y o th er scholars. P an in i d id n o t accept laksana as a separate function in language. T h e so-called incom patibility, eith er im possibility o r unsuitability to th e context, on w hich laksana is based according to la te r w riters on the various schools, including th e G ram m arians, h e did n o t consider to be linguistically relevant. “ H e is a n ass” a n d “ h e is a b o y ” are equally correct from th e gram m atical p o in t o f view. H is g ra m m a r accounts for som e o f th e p o p u la r exam ples o f laksana like “ th e village on th e riv er” (gangayam ghosah) b y considering proxim ity as one o f th e m eanings of th e locative case. Sim ilarly, P an in i does n o t m en tio n o r provide for th e co n d itio n o f yogyata o r consistency, given as one o f th e conditions for th e u n ity o f th e sentence. Agnina sincati (“ H e sprinkles w ith fire” ) is g ram m atically correct, th o u g h from th e sem antic p o in t o f view it m ay n o t b e proper, because sprinkling can be done only w ith a liquid a n d n o t w ith fire. T hese tw o cases are sim ilar; in b o th th ere is an inconsistency or in co m patibility eith er real o r ap p a ren t. I f it is real, th ere is lack o f yogyata a n d th e sentence becom es a nonsentence. I f it can be explained by resorting to a transferred m eaning for one o f th e term s, th e sentence becom es acceptable as an instance o f laksana. P anini does n o t m ake provision for th e sem antic appropriateness o f th e utterances derived b y his rules. S tatem ents m ay b e tru e o r false intrinsically o r extrinsically. T h e correctness o f a statem ent like th e following depends on external factors a n d h as to b e checked before decision, for exam ple: “ T h e re are fruits on th e tre e n ear th e riv er.” B ut th ere are o th er statem ents the correctness o f w hich can b e self-evident if one exam ines th e w ords a n d th e ir m eanings: “ H e is th e son o f a b a rre n w om an” ; “ T h is trian g le h as four sides” ; “ T h e circu lar sq u are” are all anom alous utterances. I f o ne o f th e lexical item s arrived a t by com ponential analysis o f a w o rd in a sentence prevents its co-occurrence w ith a n o th e r w ord in it, it is said to b e anom alous. B ut sentences th a t h av e no such resistance are acceptable. “ A square has four sides” ; “ Linguistics is th e science d ealin g w ith lan g u ag e” ; such sentences a re intrinsically true. As far as P an in i is concerned all o f these sentences are gram m atically accept­ able, a n d th e G ra m m a rian is n o t concerned w ith th e correctness or com p atib ility o f th e m eaning. A m etap h o ric sentence a n d a n o rm al sentence can n o t b e distinguish­ ed by th eir syntactic form . All m etap h o ric sentences are sem antically d ev ian t b u t syntactically n orm al. In such cases th ere is a sem antic o b stru ctio n based on th e violence to th e co-occurrence restrictions for o n e o f th e lexical item s. In the sentence “ H e is an ass,” th e w ord “ ass,” referring norm ally to th e an im al also called a donkey, is syntactically identified w ith th e boy, who is know n from th e context to b e a h u m an

b ein g (co m p o n en tial analysis also s h o w th a t h e is a h u m a n b e in g ). S em an tically th is id en tificatio n is im possible. T h e a p p a re n t a n o m aly c a n b e solved b y in te rp re tin g th e w o rd p ro p e rly in th e co n tex t o f u tte ra n c e . S u ch in te n tio n a l dev ian ce is re so rted to as a co m m u n icatio n device b y po ets everyw here. I f th e a n o m aly c a n n o t b e solved th e sen ten ce becom es n o sentence. B ut from P a n in i’s p o in t o f view all su ch sentences, m e ta p h o ric as w ell as an o m alo u s ones, a re g ra m m a ti­ cally ac cep tab le.

2.

Sphota a n d

W

ord

M

e a n in g

I n his SarvadarSanasamgraha M a d h a v a describes sphot a in tw o w ays: first, as t h a t fro m w h ich th e m e a n in g b u rsts o r shines fo rth ; a n d , second, as a n e n tity t h a t is m an ife ste d b y th e spoken letters o r sounds. Sphota m a y th u s b e conceived as a tw o-sided coin. O n o n e side i t is m an ifested b y th e w o rd so u n d ; o n th e o th e r side it sim ultaneously reveals w o rd m ean in g . I n m o r e p hilosophic term inology sphota m a y b e d escrib ed as th e tra n s c e n d e n t g ro u n d in w h ic h th e spoken syllables a n d co n veyed m e a n in g fin d them selves u n ite d as w o rd o r Sabda. N ag esa B h a tta identifies th is th e o ry w ith a sage S p h o ta y a n a , m e n tio n e d b y P a n in i in o n e o f his rules. T h is tra d itio n is u n k n o w n to B h a rtrh a ri, w ho considers A u d u m b a ra y a n a (m en tio n ed b y Y ask a) as h a v in g a view sim ilar to su b seq u en t sphota th eo ry . T h e o rig in al co n cep tio n o f sphofa seems to go b a c k to th e V e d ic p erio d , w h e n vac o r speech w as co n sid ered to b e a m an ife sta tio n o f th e a ll-p e rv ad in g B ra h m a n , a n d th e pranava (aum) w as re g a rd e d as th e p rim o rd ia l speech so u n d from w h ich all form s o f vac w e re supposed to h a v e evolved. Aum, th e sacred syllable, is said to h av e flashed fo rth in to th e h e a rt o f B ra h m a n w hile h e w as ab so rb ed in d eep m e d ita tio n a n d to h a v e given b ir th to th e th re e V ed as c o n ta in in g a ll know ledge. P e rh a p s this claim p ro v id ed th e m o d e l u p o n w h ich th e vyakarana philosophers b ased th e ir concep­ tio n o f sphota. In d e e d , sphota is often id en tified w ith th e pranava.2 A . P atafijali’s Sphota T h e G ra m m a ria n s dev elo p ed sphota th e o ry as th e y set o u t to an aly ze th e w ay w o rd know ledge is m an ifested a n d co m m u n ic a te d in o rd in a ry experience. P a ta n ja li provides th e p o in t o f d e p a rtu re for th e dev elo p ­ m e n t o f sphofa th e o ry w hen, a t th e b eg in n in g o f his MdhAbhasya, h e asks, “ W h a t is th e w o rd ‘cow ’?” a n d answ ers, “ I t is t h a t w h ich , w h e n u tte re d , b rin g s u s know ledge o f creatu re s w ith dew lap , ta il, h u m p , hooves a n d h o rn s.” 3 T h u s P a ta n ja li em phasizes th e fact th a t knowledge is th e key facto r— a w o rd is a w o rd only w h e n i t h a s a m ean in g . H e re h e is a rg u in g a g a in st th e M im am sa view th a t a g ro u p o f letters w h en

spoken is a word, even w hen there is no m eaning o r w hen the m eaning is not understood.4 After discussing th e need for som ething to hold the letters together as they come in tem poral sequence so as to provide a cognition of the whole,5 Patanjali concludes th a t even though the letters cannot coexist a t th e tim e of utterance, they can do so in the m ind o f the speaker as well as in the m inds o f the listeners. H e distin­ guishes betw een sphota and dhvani. Sphota is th e perm an en t elem ent in th e word an d m ay be considered the essential word. Dhvani—'the u ttered sounds—is th e actualized a n d ephem eral elem ent a n d an aspect o f the sphota.* For Patanjali th e sphota m ay be a single letter or a fixed p a tte rn of letters. I t is the norm th a t rem ains unaffected by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Thus th e sphota is perm anent, unchanging, and is m anifested by the changing sounds (dhvanis) uttered by the speaker a n d h eard by the listener. O n the basis of P atanjali’s thought sphota, though one, m ay be classified as both internal a n d external. T h e internal form o f sphota is its innate expressiveness o f th e w ord m eaning. T h e external aspect of sphofa is the u ttered sound (or w ritten w ord), which is perceived by our sense organs b u t serves m erely to m anifest the inner sphota w ith its inherent w ord m eaning.7 B . B hartrhari’s Sphota T heory W hile Patanjali provided the initial framework, it is in B hartrhari’s Vakyapadiya th a t sphofa is given systematic philosophical analysis. Vakyapadiya 1.44 states, ‘T n th e w o rd sw h ic h a ie expressive th e G ram m a­ rians discern two aspects: the one (the sphofa) is the cause o f the real w ord (while) the o ther (dhvani) is used to convey the m eaning” .8 These two aspects, though they m ay ap p ear to be essentially different, are really identical. T h e a p p aren t difference is seen to result from the various external m anifestations of the single internal sphofa. T he process is explained as follows. A t first th e w ord exists in the m ind of the speaker as a unity or sphota. W hen he utters it, he produces a sequence o f different sounds so th a t it appears to have differentiation. T h e listener, though first hearing a series of sounds, ultim ately perceives the utterance as a unity—the same sphofa w ith w hich the speaker began·—-and then the m eaning is conveyed.® In his discussion, B hartrhari employs several technical term s: Sabdaj sphofa, dhvani, an d nada. By Sabda and/or sphota, h e refers to th a t inner unity which conveys th e m eaning. T he dhvanis are described as allpervasive and im perceptible particles, which, when amassed by the m ovem ent of the articulatory organs, become gross and perceptible sounds and are then called nada. These nadas function to suggest the w ord, sphota, or Sabda. Because these nadas, which are gross and audible, have division an d sequence, it is naturally assumed th a t th e suggested

w o rd also h a s p a rts w h e n in re a lity it is changeless a n d sequenceless.10 B h a rtrh a ri offers th e illu stra tiv e exam ple o f reflection in w ater. J u s t as a n ob ject reflected in w a te r m a y seem to h a v e m o v em en t b ecau se o f th e w a te r’s m o v em en t, so th e w o rd o r sphofa takes on th e p ro p e rtie s o f u tte re d speech (sequence, loudness o r softness, accen t, a n d so o n ) in w h ich it is m an ifested .11 T h e q u estio n m a y arise o f w hy th is changeless w hole o r sphota should ever com e to b e expressed in th e p h e n o m e n a l diversity called lan g u ag e. I n B h a rtrh a ri’s view , such p h en o m en a liz atio n occurs because th e sphota itse lf co n tain s a n in n e r energy (Jcratu) t h a t seeks to b u rs t fo rth in to expression. T h u s th e u n ita ry sphota is seen to co n tain all th e p o ten tialitie s for diversity, like th e seed a n d th e sp ro u t o r th e egg a n d th e chicken. B h a rtfh a i i, in his vrtti o n Vakyapadiya 1.51, explains it as follows: T h e e x tern al (a u d ib le ) w ord em ployed in v e rb a l usage is m erg e d in th e m in d afte r suppressing all assu m p tio n o f d ifferen tiatio n , w ith o u t, how ever, a b a n d o n in g th e re sid u a l force o f th e d iffe ren tia­ tio n , as in th e case o f th e yolk in th e egg o f th e p ea -h en . J u s t as o n e single w o rd c a n m erge, so ca n passages consisting o f as m a n y as te n p arts. T h e w o rd , th u s m erged, w ith all d ifferen tiatio n suppressed, a g a in assum es d iffe ren tiatio n a n d sequence, w h e n th ro u g h th e sp eak er’s desire to say so m eth in g , th e in n e r w o rd is a w ak en e d a n d it becom es th e sen ten ce o r th e w o rd , ea ch w ith its divisions.12 H e re B h a rtrh a ri seems to b e suggesting tw o w ays in w h ich th e energy o f speech (kratu) causes th e p h e n o m e n a liz a tio n o f th e sphota. O n th e o n e h a n d , th e re is th e p o te n tia lity for b u rstin g fo rth p e n t u p in th e sphofa itself, w h ile o n th e o th e r h a n d th e re is th e desire o f th e speaker to co m m u n icate. T h is desire for co m m u n icatio n , how ever, is described as existing solely for th e p u rp o se o f revealing th e sphota th a t is w ith in .13 U n lik e th in k ers w h o conceive o f la n g u a g e in con v en tio n al o r u tilita ria n term s, B h a rtfh a ri finds la n g u a g e to c o n ta in a n d reveal its ow n telos. G. M a n d a n a M is ra ’s D efense o f B h a rtrh a ri’s Sphota T h e o ry I n th e Vakyapadiya B hartjrhari m asterfully su p p o rts his sphota th eo ry w ith illu stratio n s from o rd in a ry life. W h ile th e y m a y convince o n e th a t th e sphofa th e o ry is n o t im plausible, such exam ples c a n h a rd ly b e ta k e n as p ro o f o f th e th eo ry . M a n d a n a M isra to o k u p th is challenge in his Sphofasiddhi— to d e m o n stra te th e existence o f th e in n e r w o rd as d istin c t from its sounds in term s o f logical necessity a n d consistency. H is o p p o n e n t in th is task w as th e skillful M im am sa philosopher, K u m a rila B h atta. T h e d e b a te begins w ith a re sta te m e n t o f P a ta n ja li’s qu estio n , “ W h a t

is m e a n t b y ‘w o rd ’?” a n d h is answ er, Sabda, o r t h a t w h ich h as a m e a n in g .14 K u m a rila objects th a t P a ta n ja li’s d efin itio n fails b y b ein g b o th to o w id e a n d to o n a rro w . T h e defin itio n o f “ w o rd ” in term s o f m e a n in g alo n e is to o w ide. Sm oke, for exam ple, signifies th e m e a n in g fire b u t is n o t ta k e n as a w o rd for fire. T h e defin itio n is to o n a rro w in th a t i t ho ld s Sabda to b e th a t w h ic h is h e a rd . B ut th e e a r h e a rs only a g ro u p o f p h o n em es o r le tte r sounds, e a c h o n e o f w h ich (according to P a ta n ja li’s d efin itio n ) should b e re g a rd e d as a w o rd even th o u g h it does n o t signify a n y e x te rn a l fact. T h is p ro b lem results in th e difficulty th a t in th e w o rd “ cow ,” for exam ple, th e in d iv id u a l p honem es c, o, a n d w m a y b e h e a rd b y th e e a r o f th e y o ung ch ild a n d th erefo re qualify as Sabdai even th o u g h th e w o rd “ cow ” as y e t carries n o m e a n in g for h im . T h is view conflicts w ith P a ta n ja li’s co n ten tio n t h a t th e Sabda is th a t signi­ fican t w o rd -w hole w h ich conveys m ean in g . C onsequently, th e u tte re d w o rd “ cow ” w o u ld a t th e sam e tim e b e Sabda a n d n o t-Sabda. I t w ould b e Sabda in th e sense th a t it consists in a com m only u n d ersto o d spoken w ord. B u t i t w ould n o t b e Sabda before its m e a n in g w as know n— a lth o u g h i t w o uld b ecom e Sabda after th e m e a n in g is know n. F o r th re e reasons— first, th a t sm oke should n o t b e called Sabda even th o u g h it causes th e co g nition fire; second, th a t phonem es, even th o u g h th e y a re a u d ib le , sh o u ld n o t b e called Sabda; a n d th ird , th a t th e sam e th in g sh o u ld n o t a t o n e m o m e n t b e aSabda a n d th e n e x t m o m e n t Sabda— K u m a rila m a in ta in s t h a t P a ta n ja li’s d efin itio n o f Sabda ax in te rp re te d by th e G ra m m a ria n s is n o t co rrec t.16 I n K u m a rila ’s view , it is th e fact o f b e in g a u d ib le th a t is th e crite rio n for Sabdai a n d th e p h onem es alone m e e t th is re q u ire m e n t, so it is th e ph o n em es t h a t a re com m only ac cep ted as Sabda. A n y th in g over a n d ab o v e th e phonem es (such as spho}a) does n o t deserve to b e called Sabdai for th e re is n o such com m on usage. M a n d a n a rejects K u m a rila ’s criticism as frivolous m isin terp retatio n . S ay in g t h a t th e signifying p o w er is th e crite rio n for Sabda does n o t m e a n th a t a w o rd ceases to b e a w o rd w h en it fails to c o m m u n icate a m e a n in g to a n u n le a rn e d child. A cco rd in g to th e G ra m m a ria n , th e key p o in t is t h a t th e w o rd is ca p a b le o f conveying m ean in g — regardless o f its b e in g u n d ersto o d o r n o t u n d ersto o d in specific instances. A n d b ec au se th e p h o n em es o r letters t h a t co n stitu te a w o rd do n o t h a v e this c a p a c ity in d iv id u ally , th e y c a n n o t b e called Sabda. H a v in g refuted K u m a r ila in this su m m ary fashion, M a n fla n a goes o n to e lu cid a te th e G ra m m a ria n in te rp re ta tio n o f Sabda in answ er to P a ta n ja li’s q u e s tio n : “ I n t h a t com plex cognition expressed by th e w o rd ‘cow ’ a n d w hich consists o f m a n y aspects su ch as th e universal, th e p a rtic u la r, q u ality , ac tio n , pho n em es, sphota, etc., w h ic h asp ect is it to w h ich th e n a m e Sabda refers?” 16 Sabda, m a in ta in s M an fla n a, ca n n o t refer to th e ind iv id u al p h o n em es because in them selves th e y convey n o m ean in g . I n com m on ex p erien ce th e w hole w o rd is th e u n it o f la n g u a g e th a t is ta k e n to b e

m ean in g -b earin g . T h e com m on m a n takes a n o u n o r v erb to b e a u n ity signifying m ean in g — w ith o u t reference to th e p lu ra lity o f letters a n d syllables, w h ich a re th e p ro d u c ts o f speculative th o u g h t. M a n d a n a fu rth e r criticizes K u m a rila 5S objections a n d establishes th e basis for th e sfihofa p o sitio n as follows: As for th e d efin ition th a t a w o rd is w h a t is cognized b y th e au d ito ry sense-organ, i t is v itia te d b y serious defects. T h e au d ito ry o rg a n also ap p reh en d s q u alitativ e differences o f p itc h a n d m o d u la tio n a n d such universals as w o rd h o o d a n d th e like. T hese a ttrib u te s th o u g h k n o w n th ro u g h th e o rg a n o f h e a rin g a re n o t w ords. M oreover, w o rd is n o t know n only b y th e a u d ito ry o rg a n b u t also b y th e m in d . So th e definition proposed b y K u m a rila is m isleading a n d a p t to c re a te confusion. T h e v e rd ic t o f u n so p h isticated com m on sense th a t “ cow 55 is a w hole w o rd w h ic h yields m ean in g , o u g h t n o t to b e b ru sh e d aside as a n u n c ritic a l ap p raisal. T h e u n ity o f th e significant w o rd is a felt fact a n d n o a m o u n t o f q u ib b lin g ca n co n ju re i t aw ay .17 O f th e v ario u s aspects o f th e com plex cognition “ cow, 55 M a n d a n a m akes clear t h a t it is th e sfihofa o r felt w o rd -u n ity th a t is ca p ab le o f conveying m e a n in g a n d th erefo re is th e essential characteristic— w ith ­ o u t w h ich it w ould cease to b e w h a t i t is. O th e r aspects o f th e com plex cognition, such as th e p a rtic u la r, th e q u ality , th e phonem es, a n d th e like, a re m ere ly occasional aspects. T h e n e x t step in th e a rg u m e n t occurs w h e n K u m a rila extends his defin itio n o f th e phonem es as iabda to re st n o t only o n th e ir u tte re d q u a lity b u t also n ow o n th e co n ten tio n th a t i t is th e y (a n d n o t a socalled sfihofa) th a t cause th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f m eaning. “ W h y n o t say th a t th e p honem es them selves a re th e cause o f th e u n d ersta n d in g o f m ean in g a n d th a t, w hen g ro u p ed according to u n its o f m ean in g w h ich a re u n d ersto o d , th ey a re called w ords (fiada)?”ls I n re b u ttin g th is n ew co n ten tio n th a t i t is th e phonem es t h a t convey m ean in g , M a n d a n a reasons as follows. P honem es ca n n o t singly convey th e m e an in g because, as K u m a rila adm its, a collection o f th e m in th e form o f a w o rd o r pada is needed. N e ith e r ca n th e phonem es coexist as a pada, for th e y a re u tte re d singly a n d perceived in a certain o rd e r. W h e n th ey a re spoken b y d ifferen t speakers o r in a different o rd e r o r a t th e sam e tim e, th e y do n o t convey a m ean in g . A t no tim e c a n all th e pho n em es o r letters o f a w o rd exist to g e th e r a n d w ork to g e th e r; th e ir in d iv id u a l n atu re s, bein g e te rn a l a n d u n changing, a re such th a t n o jo in t sim u ltan eity is possible. P honem es a re necessarily successive a n d th erefo re ca n n o t w ork to g e th e r to p ro d u c e a pada th a t conveys a m ean in g. T herefore, th e u n d ersta n d in g o f m ean in g , w hich

cannot be d u e to th e phonem es, points to a cause th a t is something different from the phonem es.19 K um arila counters this reb u ttal by giving further developm ent to the M im am saka view as stated in the Sahara Bhasya on Mimarnsasiitra 1.1.5. L et it be adm itted th a t th e understanding o f m eaning does not take place from th e phonem es in their individual condition. But if, w hen grouped as pada, they are seen to acquire some special efficacy th a t provides for th e conveying of m eaning, w hat then rem ains to block th e acceptance of th e collection o f phonemes alone as pada ? N othing is required b u t th e phonemes. W ithout them , however, there is no possibility of conveying m eaning. I n this regard, th e case of the phonem e is very m uch like th a t o f the com m on seed. T h e seed will not produce a new effect (a sprout) as long as it is isolated, b u t when it is helped by a group o f other factors such as soil, m oisture, an d so on, th e sprout appears. Now the sprout is comm only ju d g ed as being the effect o f th e seed w hen com bined w ith a group o f helping factors. Similarly, these phonemes, w hen com bined w ith a group of helping factors (such as being uttered by th e same person in a particular sequence), are com m only held to becom e the cause o f th e understan­ ding o f m eaning. As a partin g shot, K um arila invokes a principle o f econom y: “As long as there is a visible cause a n d a visible m ode of its being, there is no occasion for thinking of an invisible cause.” 20 I n reply, M an d an a adm its th a t a special efficacy m ay be shown to be th e property o f an otherwise ordinary cause b u t m aintains th at it is ju st th a t special efficacy w hich has not been dem onstrated in the case of phonem es as potential conveyers of m eaning. M an d an a asks, W h at is th e difference betw een o in th e w ord go (cow) a n d an isolated o ? T h e obvious difference is th a t in one instance the o is isolated, while in th e w ord it is accom panied by another phonem e. But can it really be called accom panim ent when, by th e tim e o f th e speaking or hearing o f the o, the other phonem e is no longer being perceived a t all ? A previously uttered phonem e, w hich has ceased to exist leaving no trace, an d an u nborn phonem e (or one th a t is as yet unspoken) are on th e same footing. I f previously spoken phonemes can be said to give help to a successor, then it should also be adm itted th a t unspoken phonem es could also be o f help— clearly discrediting th e argum ent. Thus, the previously uttered phonem e g cannot in any way help the o to produce a special functional effect because it is dead and gone.21 K um arila responds by putting forth yet another explanation. He offers th e exam ple of how th e new-m oon an d full-moon sacrifices, along w ith other rites, have sequence a n d yet produce their effect together—as do the repeated saying o f th e V eda for its m em orization. I n such examples different acts occurring a t different tim es are still found to produce qualitatively an d num erically different effects. This

sam e k ind o f process, h e argues, should b e accepted in th e case o f phonem es.22 M a n d a n a is quick to note, how ever, th a t alth o u g h these exam ples m ay seem plausible they are n o t parallel to th e case o f th e phonem es. In sequences such as th e exam ples offered, w here th e resu ltan t is u n itary , thinkers agree th a t th e new effect is d u e to a trace or lasting im pression th a t each p a rt in the series leaves b e h in d a n d w hich helps to w ard th e one result. As M a n d a n a puts it, “ I n new a n d full m oon sacrifices a n d th e like, w hich have sequence, certain new elem ents (apiirva) w hich are produced by th e acts a n d w hich last a n d are looked upon as powers o r functions actu ally help (in producing th e single effect).” 23 I n th e case o f V edic recitation, th e final learning is achieved w ith th e aid o f th e m em ory traces left by th e preceding repetitions. I n th e case o f b o th th e sacrificial apurvas a n d th e m em ory traces, there is a k ind o f co n tinuing existence or sim ultaneity th a t allows for co­ op eratio n am ong th e serial instances to w ard a u n itary result. But, as M a n d a n a points out, th e sam e is clearly n o t possible in th e case of th e phonem es, w h ich h av e already been described as leaving no trace. K u m a rila counters by allow ing th a t phonem es m ay indeed leave lasting traces o r im pressions (Samskaras)i a n d th ro u g h th e traces left by th e perceptions o f th e earlier phonem es a n d th e last phonem e, the u n itary m ean in g o f th e w ord m ay be conveyed.24 T h e last phonem e, w hen h elp ed o u t by th e traces o f th e previous phonem es, conveys th e m eaning. M a n d a n a finds a fallacy in K u m arila’s reasoning. H e points ou t th a t traces th a t are g en erated by individual phonem es can only reinstate those sam e in d iv id u al phonem es. T h e m em ory tra c e for each phonem e w ill be p resen t b u t, ju st as in th e case o f th e original u ttera n ce or h e a r­ ing, only individually— w hen th e o is u ttered , or rem em bered, th e trac e for th e g will h av e ceased to exist. T h e re can only b e th e cognition of one p h o n em e a t a tim e, a n d this p rinciple applies equally to th e traces a n d th e original u ttera n ce o r h ea rin g o f th e phonem e. T hus, th e possi­ bility o f th e phonem es p roducing traces gets one no closer to accounting for th e g en eratio n o f a m ean in g w hole.26 K u m a rila defends his position by once again intro d u cin g a n arg u ­ m en t o f econom y (th a t position w hich resorts to th e sm allest n u m b er o f p o stu lated special pow ers o r entities is b est). N ow it is agreed th a t each phonem e, w hether in its original u ttera n ce or hearin g o r in its trace, ca n n o t coexist w ith o th er phonem es so as to give th e m eaning o f th e w ord. T herefore, some cause for th e occurrence o f m eaning m ust be postulated. T h e weakness o f th e sphota theory is th a t it has too m an y postulations: first, it m ust postulate th e existence o f th e sphota as some k ind o f unseen entity, an d , second, it m u st th e n im pose upon this postulat­ ed sphofa th e capacity to convey m eaning. F o r th e sphota theorist two

things h av e to b e postulated. T h e up h o ld er o f th e phonem e, by contrast, h as to m ake only one ad d itio n al postulation. As has already been m ade clear, th e existence o f th e trace is accepted by b o th th e disputants. T h e only p o in t a t issue is w hether it can b e the cause o f th e understanding o f m eaning. AU th a t is needed, claim s K u m arila, is th a t a new function b e postu lated for the trace, w hich everyone agrees exists. I t is th e cogni­ tion o f th e final phonem e, accom panied b y th e special function o f the traces o f th e previous phonem es, th a t conveys th e m eaning. T h u s only one ad d itio n al p ostulation is required, th e postulation o f a new function for th e traces. T h e sphota theorist is in a n inferior position because he h as to postulate b o th a new substance (nam ely, th e sphofa) a n d a new function (its ability to convey m e a n in g ).26 T o M anffana, K u m arila’s explanation seems to be an oversim plifica­ tion. T h e m em ory im pression or tra c e is n o t seen b u t is a capacity or function th a t is inferred from th e existence o f th e original phonem e. T h e difficulty comes w hen K u m arila postulates yet an o th er function as resulting from th e trace, w hich is itself already a n inferred function. M a n d a n a m aintains th a t th e postulation o f functions a n d th e like is u n accep tab le because it results in a n infinite regress. In ad d itio n to this p ro b lem o f infinite regress, M a n d a n a finds logical weaknesses in K u m a rila ’s view th a t it is th e cognition o f the final phonem e, accom ­ p an ied by th e cognitions o f th e previous phonem es, th a t conveys th e m eaning. T h is view cannot hold, says M an d an a, because th e traces left by th e letters a re th e sam e even w hen th e ir order is reversed. H ow is it, then, th a t th e m eanings o f th e words “ now ” a n d “ w on” are n o t identical? As th e letters a n d traces involved in th e tw o w ords are identical, th eir m eanings should also b e identical, w hich is clearly no t th e case. L ettin g go o f this argum ent, K u m arila takes u p his final a n d seem­ ingly m ost p o ten t line o f attack. H e retu rn s to th e proposition th a t th e last phonem e, accom panied by th e tric e s o f th e previous phonem es, expresses th e m eaning. T o avoid th e difficulties encountered earlier, h e now defines samskara no t as a m em ory trace, b u t ra th e r as “ som ething else w hich is b ro u g h t ab o u t b y the cognition o f th e phonem es u tte re d sep arately in a fixed ord er by a p a rtic u la r speaker a n d leading to th e u n d erstan d ing o f m eaning a n d it is sim ilar to th e effect called apurva (residual force) b ro u g h t ab o u t b y th e perform ance o f th e different rites like a sacrifice a n d leading to h eaven.” 27 T h e distinguishing feature o f th e trac e th a t causes rem em brance is th a t it causes som ething sim ilar to th a t w hich p ro d u ced it, w hich is no t, how ever, th e case o f apurva in a sacrifice. In a sacrifice, th e individual acts perform ed perish im m e­ diately, b u t th e apurva o r aftereffect o f th e w hole sacrifice inheres in th e self o f th e sacrificer as a special kind o f potency u ntil it brings the re w ard o f heaven. Its result is thus very different from its cause, a n d

th is u n u s u a l k in d o f c a u sal re la tio n sh ip is n ecessitated b y s c rip tu re ’s d e c la ra tio n t h a t th e p e rfo rm a n c e o f a sacrifice p ro d u c es su ch a resu lt. I n K u m a r ila ’s view , th e apuroa o r aftereffect k in d o f sarriskara, w h ich is left b y th e d iffe re n t letters u p o n th e su b ject, is an alo g o u s to su ch relig io u s h ea v en . J u s t as in a sacrifice i t is th e d e te rm in a te o rd e r o f p e rfo rm a n c e b y a single a g e n t t h a t is responsible for th e sp iritu a l leaven, h e re also th e d e te rm in a te o rd e r o f th e p h o n em es u tte re d b y a single p erso n is resp o n sible for th e u n u su a l re su lt. T h erefo re, i t is w h e n th e la st p h o n e m e is spoken o r h e a rd in th e m id st o f th e “ le a v e n in g ” effect o f th e sarrtskaras o f th e p re v io u s p h o n em es t h a t th e m e a n in g is conveyed. F o r K u m a rila , Mbda is th e la st p h o n e m e b e in g h e a rd o r sp oken a n d co n v ey in g th e m e a n in g (w h en h e lp e d b y th e samskaras o f th e p re v io u s p h o n e m e s). T h e e x a ct n a tu re o f th is h e lp is t h a t th e samskaras o f th e previous p h o n em es b eco m e a k in d o f in te rm e d ia te cause (vyapara). T h e y h e lp th e last p h o n e m e in its task o f conveying m e a n in g . T h is h e lp does n o t d e p re c ia te th e ca u sal v a lu e o f th e p re v io u s p h o n em es in a n y w ay, for it is in h a rm o n y w ith th e ir p u rp o se— th e p h o n em es a re n o t u tte re d ju s t fo r th e sak e o f p ro n o u n c in g le tte rs o r leav in g im pressions, b u t also fo r th e p u rp o se o f co nveying a m e a n in g . T h is im p o rta n c e o f a n d necessity for th e p h o n em es as ca u sin g th e co n v ey an ce o f m e a n in g m u s t also b e a d m itte d b y th e p ro p o n e n t o f th e sphofa, K u m a r ila claim s. T h e p ro p o ­ n e n t o f th e sphota o r u n d iv id e d w o rd e n tity h a s to a d m it t h a t i t is m an ife ste d b y th e p h o n e m e s u tte r e d o r h e a rd in a d efin ite o rd e r. A sn o single le tte r c a n b e said to re v eal th e sphofa, i t m u s t th e n b e re v e a le d b y a ll th e p h o n em es c o m b in e d w ith o n e a n o th e r. N e ith e r c a n i t b e th a t ea c h p h o n e m e in succession reveals on ly a p a r t o f th e sphofa, b ecau se th e sphofa, b y d efin itio n , is h e ld to b e a sim p le indivisible w hole. F o r th e v e ry reaso n s g iv en b y th e sphofa th e o ris t him self, th e p h o n e m e s o f a w o rd ex istin g in a fixed seq u en ce h a v e n o w a y o f p o o lin g them selves o r th e ir tra c e s so as to re su lt in a u n ita ry w hole. J u s t as th e M im a m sa k a h a s b e e n fo rced to d o , so also th e sphofa th e o ris t is fo rced to p o stu la te som e sp ecial k in d o f le a v e n o f a tra c e b y m e a n s o f w h ich th e ph o n em es re v e a l th e w h o le m e a n in g . W h y th e n , asks K u m a r ila (revealing his eco n o m y p rin c ip le o n ce m o re ) , does h e n o t a ttr ib u te th e conveying o f m e a n in g to a sp ec ia l tra c e fu n c tio n itse lf a n d leav e o u t th e e x tra step o f p o s tu la tin g a sp ecial k in d o f tra c e a n d th e n p o stu la tin g th e sphofa? F o r th ese reasons, concludes K u m a rila , “ i t is b e tte r to assum e t h a t th e sp ecial tra c e w h ich h a s to b e p o stu la te d conveys th e m e a n in g (ra th e r th a n t h a t i t reveals th e w o rd ) .” 28 M a n d a n a answ ers th e foregoing criticism b y m a k in g clea r t h a t th e sphofa th e o ry does n o t p o s tu la te a n ew k in d o f apuroa for th e conveyance o f m e a n in g . Sphofa th e o ry n eed s n o th in g m o re th a n th e p o stu la tio n o f th e o rd in a ry m em o ry tra c e . I t is ju s t th e co m m only a c c e p te d trac es

(.sarriskara) o r dispositions (ztasana) th a t result in th e revelation o f th e sphota. T h e only new th in g p o stu lated b y sphofa th eo ry is th e sphota itself, a n d in fa ct even th a t n ee d n o t b e p o stu lated because it is directly p erc e p tib le .29 N ow , m ain tain s M a n d a n a , th is p osition is far superior to K u m a rila ’s, in w h ich th e one new th in g (nam ely, th e apurua-type tra c e ) c a n n o t b e p erceived a n d h a s to b e p o stu lated on th e a u th o rity o f scrip tu re a n d o n analo g y to religious m erit. E ven this analogy is very w eak, for a lth o u g h th e p o stu latio n o f apurva o r religious m e rit is necessary to v alid ate th e m o ra l law a n d religious rites, th e re is n o such necessity in th e ap p reh en sio n o f th e w o rd a n d its m eaning. T h e cases a re n o t p arallel. Also ig n o red is th e com m on m a n ’s in tu itio n , “ I u n d e r­ sta n d th e m ean in g from th e w o rd ,” a n d th e teac h in g o f tra d itio n th a t “ th e w ord, th e m ean in g , a n d th e ir re la tio n a re e te rn a l.” T h e re is a n a tu ra l con n ection b etw een w o rd a n d m e a n in g th a t is in alien ab le. T h e conventions w e le a rn as ch ild ren serve only to b rin g th a t re la tio n o u t a n d to m ak e th e m e an in g p resen t to us. M a n d a n a sum m arizes his rejectio n o f K u m a rila ’s position as follow s: “ B ecause i t has b een said th a t th e im pressions, afte r all, do n o t co n stitu te th e w ord, th e final p h o n em e is n o t expressive, (therefore) a collection o f phonem es does n o t co n stitu te th e w o rd a n d i t does n o t convey a n y m e a n in g .” 30 I n this d e b a te K u m a rila ’s a tte m p t to identify Sabda w ith th e u tte re d p h o n em e seems to b e discredited by th e reasoning o f M a n d a n a , w ho a t th e sam e tim e h as v in d ic a te d th e id en tificatio n o f Jabda w ith sphota. N evertheless, M a n d a n a still h a s to show how Jabda as sphota m a y be co m p re h en d ed using only o rd in a ry m em o ry traces o f th e phonem es to rev eal th e sphota. H e m u st also show th e sphota to b e n o t a m ere p o stu la­ tio n b u t a p erceiv ab le re ality , otherw ise m u ch o f his logical arg u m e n t sim ply collapses. T h ese tasks h e u n d ertak es in karikas 18 a n d 19 o f th e Sphotasiddhi. I n his ex p lan a tio n M a n d a n a depends on th e basic concepts p u t fo rw ard b y B h a rtfh a ri in c h a p te r I o f his Vakyapadiya. T h e sphofa is so m ething over a n d above th e phonem es. T h e phonem es a re change­ ab le (cap ab le o f v ariatio n s such as accent, speed, a n d th e lik e ), a n d w hen u tte re d serve only to m anifest th e changeless sphofa, w hich exists w ithin th e sp eak er a n d is p o ten tially p re sen t w ith in every h ea rer. T h e ph o n em es d o n o t convey th e m eaning, b u t th e sphota, once m anifested, does so. B etw een th e sphofa a n d its w o rd -m ean in g aspect th e relatio n is th a t o f expression a n d th in g o r m ean in g expressed. I t is a n a tu ra l relatio n sh ip , a n d is in d estru cta b le a n d beginningless. C onvention only serves to b rin g it o u t. B h a rtfh a ri em phasizes th a t th e sphofa is a n en tity th a t exists w ith in each person. All o f us h a v e th e cap acity instinctively to feel its existence w ithin, a n d u ltim ate ly to perceive it directly w ith th e m in d . T h e co n ten tio n th a t th e sphofa m ay b e directly perceived, a n d is n o t m erely a n inference, is o n e o f th e key p oints o f sphofa th eo ry .

K eep in g these basic concepts in m in d , le t us now ex am in e M a n d a n a ’s d etailed descrip tio n o f th e w ay th e sphofa is b o th cognized a n d perceived w ith o u t recourse to a n y new apHrva-type postulations. M a n d a n a explains th e process b y w h ich th e sphofa is cognized in his co m m en tary on kdnka 18 o f th e Sphofasiddhi: E ac h so u n d in d iv id u a lly reveals th e w hole sphofa. N o r do th e o th e r sounds th u s becom e useless because th e re is a difference in th e revelatio n . I t is like th is : AU th e previous sounds b rin g a b o u t in th e listen er w hose m in d is free from an y p a rtic u la r residual im pression (samsk&ra), cognitions in w h ich th e w o rd figures vaguely a n d w h ich sow seeds in th e form o f re sid u a l im pressions ca p ab le o f p roducing a la te r clear cognition o f th e w ord. T h e last sound produces a clear cognition in w h ich figures, as i t w ere, clearly th e im age o f th e sphofa caused by aU th e seeds in th e form o f residual im pressions le ftb y th e v ag u e cognitions o f th e previous sounds.31 M a n d a n a offers th e an alogy o f a jew eller w ho assesses th e genuineness o f a precious stone. H is co n tin u o u s g aze is reaUy a series o f cognitions, ea ch o f w h ich perceives th e genuineness o f th e stone b u t w ith increasing clarity. E a c h cognition leaves its samskdra o r com m on m em o ry trace. T h e last cognition, h elp ed by th e tra c e o f th e previous ones, fuUy perceives th e genuineness o f th e sto n e; b u t for th e traces o f th e in te rv e n ­ in g cognitions, th e re w o u ld b e n o difference betw een th e last one a n d th e first o ne. A n im p o rta n t p o in t is th a t th e jew eller is described as “ ex p e rt” , m ean in g th a t before beg in n in g th e ex am in atio n h e already h a d th e im ag e o f a precious sto n e in g rain e d in his subconscious, a n d it w as th is im ag e (like th e in h e re n t sphofa) t h a t w as rev ealed to th e jew eller’s m in d by his series o f p a rtia l perceptions. T h e sphofa is a u n ity th a t alre ad y exists in th e m in d o f th e speaker. H e u tters sounds in o rd e r to m anifest it, a n d once m anifested th e sphofa conveys th e m ean in g . A reaso n ab le ex p lan a tio n o f this process by w h ich th e sphofa a n d its m ean in g a re h e ld to b e rev ealed is offered by S esa K ysna in his SphofatattOanirHpana. As th e p h o n em e c is spoken b y som eone w ho in ten d s to say “ cow ” , th e h e a re r grasps n o t only th e p h o n em e c b u t also th e w hole w o rd ra th e r vaguely, as it is now know n th a t th e speaker is p ro n o u n c in g a w o rd b eg in n in g w ith c a n d n o t w ith a n y o th e r sound. B ut th e re a re a m u ltitu d e o f w ords b eg in n in g w ith c, a n d w e do n o t know w h ich o n e is going to b e u tte re d ; th u s th e v ag u e­ ness o f o u r know ledge. B ut, w h en th e speaker u tte rs th e n ex t phonem e, o, th e field o f possible w ords is fu rth e r n arro w ed . A ll w ords n o t h av in g co a t th e b eg in n in g a re now excluded, a n d th e h e a re r’s know ledge o f th e w hole is less vague. W h e n th e final ph o n em e, w, is u tte re d , a ll d o u b t

d isap p ea rs as th e w u n ites w ith th e m em o ry traces co to m anifest th e w hole sphofa “ cow ” , w hich im m ed iately conveys its m e a n in g .32 T h e p reced in g e x p lan a tio n m akes clear th e reason b e h in d M a n d a n a 5S insistence t h a t a sp eak er5s efforts to u tte r th e p h onem es w ill differ acco rd in g to th e sphofa th a t h e w ants to m anifest. E ven th o u g h th e p h o n em e m a y b e th e sam e (for exam ple, th e w in “ w o n 55 a n d “ n ow 55), th e physical effort involved in vocalizing it will v a ry acco rd in g to th e p o sition it occupies in th e w ord. T h u s th e overall physical effort in saying “ w o n 55 w ill b e m ark e d ly different from th a t involved in saying “ n o w ,55 even th o u g h th e sam e th re e phonem es a re involved in each case. C onsequently, th e sphota th eo rist h as a basis for claim in g th a t th e sphofas m an ifested b y th e tw o vocalizations w o u ld b e different, as w o u ld th e m ean in g s revealed. T h is last p o in t is im p o rta n t in re la tio n to th e M im am sak a co n ten tio n th a t, becau se th e p h o n em es a re changeless, n o m ere difference in o rd e r o r effort o f vo calization can b e im p o rta n t to th e p ro d u c tio n o f d ifferent m eanings. T herefore, acco rd in g to th e M im am saka, w ere it n o t for th e p o stu la tio n o f th e special “apiirva-like effect,55 th e sam e m ean in g should re su lt from “ n o w 55 a n d “ w o n .55 F ro m th e sphofa view point, how ever, it is th e sphota th a t is changeless a n d n o t th e p h o n em e, a n d th e ev id en t v aria tio n s in th e p ro n u n c ia tio n a n d o rd e rin g o f p h onem es in speaking d ifferen t w ords is seen to b e consistent w ith b o th sphota th eo ry a n d th e ev id en ce o f experience. “ N o w 55 a n d “ w on55 a re com posed o f th e sam e th re e p honem es b u t do re q u ire th a t th e vocalization o f those phonem es b e g iven d ifferen t orders a n d in ten tio n s o r efforts for th e a p p ro p ria te sphofa to b e m an ifested a n d its m e a n in g revealed. T h e stren g th o f this sphofa ex p la n a tio n o f th e w ay th e w o rd m ean in g is rev ealed rests n o t only o n its co n cu rren ce w ith experience b u t also on th e fact t h a t n o new k in d o f tra c e is p o stu lated . T h e tra c e em ployed is th e usu al tra c e p ro v id in g for th e re m e m b ran ce o f th e p h o n em e th a t orig in ally caused it. “ T h e w eak p o in t o f th e M im am sak a ex p lan a tio n , 55 as S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r p u ts it, “ w as t h a t it e ith e r p o stu la te d a new pow er for th e o rd in a ry k in d o f re sid u a l tra c e , o r p o stu la te d a new k in d o f re sid u a l tra c e in o rd e r to ex p lain th e fact th a t, th o u g h caused b y th e co g n itio n o f th e so und, it does n o t stop a t causing a re m e m b ran ce o f it b u t causes th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f th e m e a n in g also.5533 I n o th e r w ords, th e tra c e is su pposed to h a v e a n object d ifferent from t h a t o f th e cogni­ tio n th a t d ep o sited it in th e first p lace, w h ich is, says th e sphofa th eo rist, a logical im possibility. In h is case, th e o rig in al sphofa (w hich lay b eh in d th e v o calizatio n o f th e p h onem es b y th e sp eak er) a n d th e e n d sphofa (w hich is th e object o f b o th th e u tte re d phonem es a n d th e ir traces) a re id en tical. C onsequently, th e object (th a t is, th e sphofa) o f th e p h o n em es a n d th e traces is th e sam e, a n d th e re is n o logical difficulty o f th e k in d th a t besets th e M im am saka.

M a n d a n a ’s e x p la n a tio n o f th e p a ra d o x o f th e w ay th e indivisible sphofa a p p e a rs as th e phonem es, a n d th e phonem es as th e p a rts o f th e p artless sphota, is as follows. H e says i t is th e sounds t h a t resem ble o n e a n o th e r w h ich a re th e cause o f b o th th e e rro r a n d th e final co rrec t co g n itio n o f th e sphofa. If, for th e m an ifestatio n o f tw o different w o rd sphofas, o n e h a s to m ak e sim ilar m ovem ents o f th e vocal organs, th e ph o n em es p ro d u c e d b y these m ovem ents a p p e a r to b e p a rts o f b o th o f th e in d iv isib le w o rds.34 T h is e rro r is fostered b y th e con stru ctio n o f such artificial devices as a lp h a b e t le tte rs o r w o rd syllables, usually for te a c h ­ in g purposes. I t is precisely because o f this k in d o f confusion, says M a n d a n a , t h a t sentences, w ords, a n d ph o n em es a p p e a r to h av e p a rts w h ere in re ality th e y h a v e no n e. T h e obverse applies to th e sphofa. F ro m th e p h en o m en a l v iew p o in t th e sphota “ cow ” , for exam ple, m a y a p p e a r to possess q u alities such as ac cen t, speed, loudness, tim e, place, a n d p erson in its u tte ra n c e . T h a t these q u alitie s belong to th e p h en o m en al sounds a n d n o t to th e n o u m e n a l sphofa is w h a t m akes possible th e com m on re co g n itio n o f th e w o rd “ cow ,” in sp ite o f its diversity o f u tte ra n c e . F ro m th e sphofa view point, i t is th is n o u m e n a l g ro u n d in g o r basis t h a t m akes possible such th in g s as th e tra n sla tio n o f th o u g h t fro m o n e p h e n o m e n a l la n g u a g e to a n o th e r. A la te r sch o lar o f considerable n o te, V a c a sp a ti M isra, a tte m p ts to re je ct M a n d a n a ’s co n c ep t o f th e re la tio n b etw e en th e ph o n em es a n d th e sphota .35 T h is criticism occurs in its fullest form in V a c a sp a ti’s Tattvabindu. T h e a rg u m e n t is sta te d as follows: “ T h e p a rtic u la r sounds w h ich m an ifest sphofa, a re th e y d ifferen t from sphofa o r non -d ifferen t th erefro m ?” 38 I f n o n d iffe ren t, says V a c a sp a ti, th e n e a c h p h o n em e sh o u ld m an ifest th e sphota, a n d th e re m a in in g p honem es w ould be futile. I f d ifferen t, th e n th e re is no g ro u n d for re la tin g th e phonem es to th e m a n ife sta tio n o f th e sphofa. I f th e p honem es a re tre a te d as illusory, th e n th e ir re a lity is discredited— y et in experience w e u n ­ d o u b te d ly co g n ize in d iv id u a l letters. W h a t is th e ju stific atio n for tre a tin g su ch cognitions as illusory? I n su p p o rtin g th e sphofa a rg u m e n t o f M a n d a n a , S.S. S u ry a n a ra y a n a S astri effectively answ ers these criticism s o f V acasp ati. T o th e criticism s re g a rd in g d ifference a n d no n d ifferen ce S astri replies, “ S uch a question h a s little ap p lic a tio n to M a n d a n a ’s d o ctrin e . T o h im in d e e d sphofa is n o n -d iffere n t fro m th e sounds, as a w hole is fro m its p a rts ; a n d y e t it is d iffe ren t to o , since th e w hole is n e ith e r ea ch p a r t n o r a m ere ag g reg ate o f p a rts . T h e existence o f fu n ctio n in g o f su c h w holes c a n only b e d e n ie d b y defective psychology.” 37 As re g ard s th e ju stific atio n for tre a tin g cognitions o f th e phonem es as illusory, S astri an sw e rs: T h e obvious re p ly is th a t n o t th e existence o f these cognitions b u t th e ir significance is in question, ju s t as in th e case o f th e reflection.

T h e reflection exists w ith o u t d o u b t, b u t i t is n o t real. A n d su b la tio n in th is case consists n o t in t h a t p resen tatio n ceasing to b e o r giving p lace to a n o th e r p resentation, b u t in th a t p re sen tatio n as such failing to fulfil w h a t is expected o f it. I f each cognition as a n in d ep en d e n t p a r t co uld b y co m b in atio n w ith o th e r such p a rts explain th e whole, th e n it w ould b e u n su b la te d ; since, how ever, it fails o f its purpose, since i t seems to fit in m o re n a tu ra lly w ith a th e o ry w h ich tre a ts it n o t as a p ro d u c er b u t as m anifester, it is in so far fo rth su b lated . T h e reflection is su b lated n o t as a reflection, b u t as th e face; th e letterco g n itio n is su b lated n o t as letter-co g n itio n b u t as a n in d ep en d e n t p ro d u c tiv e co n stitu en t o f m e a n in g .38 Sastri observes th a t V acasp ati ad o p ts a n d atte m p ts to develop K u m ari la ’s v iew point fu rth e r b y try in g to show th a t m e an in g som ehow results from th e phonem es en terin g in to a single m em ory. As Sastri p o in ts o u t, how ever, such a n e x p lan a tio n is u n te n a b le in th e lig h t of experience. I f “ cow ness” is associated w ith th e re m e m b ered letters c, o, w, th a t m ean in g should n o t b e re called except w h e n all th re e letters a re presen t. H ow is it, th en , th a t w h en th e re is a m isp rin t such as “ coe” o r a m isp ro n u n ciatio n su ch as “ coo” w e still correctly a p p re h e n d th e m e an in g to b e “ cow ” ? T h e sam e so rt o f th in g is ev id en t w h e n a le tte r o r sou n d is o m itted in th e course o f w ritin g o r speaking. T h e ex p lan a­ tio n in all o f these situations w ould seem to b e th a t w e do n o t pass from p a r t to p a r t b u t ra th e r a p p re h e n d th e w hole, filling u p gaps o r c o rrectin g errors w h e n th e y occur. W ith re g a rd to m em o ry a n d sequence, V acasp ati, following K u m a rila , m ain tain s th a t in th e m em o ry itself th e phonem es h a v e no sequence, b ein g p resen ted to g eth er, b u t th a t m em o ry follows expe­ rien ce, conform s to it, a n d th e sequence in w h ich th e letters a re ex perienced is re p eated in m em ory. T h is co n ten tio n , how ever, does n o t sq u are w ith th e view th a t letters, being e te rn a l a n d pervasive, can h a v e n o sequence belonging to them selves. T h is difficulty is overcom e in th e sphota view , w h ich holds th a t th e sequence is d e te rm in e d by so m ething o th e r th a n th e letters— b y th e sphota in ten d ed . I t is n o t th e case t h a t th e letters in sequence co n stitu te th e w o rd ; ra th e r, it is th e w o rd o r sphota th a t d eterm in es th e sequence. T h e question m ay th e n b e asked, Is th e w o rd existent o r non ex isten t p rio r to th e phonem es bein g a p p re h e n d e d in sequence? In p u re ly em p irical term s, this question m ay b e shelved b y saying th a t, th o u g h n o t p resen t in m y m in d before I learn th e sequence, i t is p resen t in th e m in d o f a n o th e r w ho in stru cts m e ; a n d in this fashion th e process m a y b e p u sh ed fa rth e r a n d fa rth e r back, th e re b ein g n o a u th o rity for p o stu latin g th e origin o f lan g u ag e a t an y p a rtic u la r tim e. B ut such em pirical indefiniteness does n o t seem a d e q u a te in th e face o f th e com m on g ro u n d th a t necessarily ap p ears

to u n d e rlie all e m p iric a l lan g u ag e s— re q u irin g th e sphota in te rp re ta tio n t h a t th e w o rd b o th is a n d is n o t p rio r to th e a p p re h e n sio n of sequence. T h is p a ra d o x is rid ic u le d b y V a c a s p a ti, w h o describes it as th e sphofa c la im t h a t th e u n re a l helps th e real. S astri, in answ er, states th e sphota a rg u m e n t, “ I t is re a l, o th erw ise it co u ld n o t b e m an ife ste d in seq u e n ce; i t is n o t ex isten t, oth erw ise th e re w o u ld b e n o n e e d for m a n ife sta tio n .” 89 T h is so lu tio n , S astri observes, is in lin e w ith th e so lu tio n to th e p ro b lem s o f h u m a n k n o w ledge a n d a c tiv ity in g e n e ra l. “ K n o w le d g e is o f th e n o v el a n d y e t n o t o f th e n o n -e x isten t. A c tiv ity realizes a p u rp o se w h ic h is re a l y e t n o t a c tu a l.” 40 As b o th th e A d v a ita V e d a n t a a n d t h e sphota th eo rists p o in t o u t, th e on ly so lu tio n to th is p a ra d o x , w h ic h seem s to b e u n iv e rsa lly p re se n t in h u m a n ex p erien ce, w o u ld seem to b e to ta k e th e p h e n o m e n a l as p a r tia l a n d th e re fo re defective a n d illusory a p p e a ­ ra n c e s o f th e u n ita ry re a l. I t is fro m th is v iew p o in t t h a t sphofa th e o ry claim s th a t th e re is a w h o le (nam ely, sphota) th a t is in cre asin g ly re v ealed b y p a r tic u la r p h o n em es u tte re d in sequence. As S astri concisely p u ts it, “ T h e su cceed ing sounds m a k e m o re c le a r w h a t w as less clearly ex pressed b y th e p re c e d in g s o u n d s ; th e la tte r p ro v id es th e su b stru c tu re , fo rm e r s u p e rstru c tu re , w h ile all o f th e m to g e th e r re v e a l th e o n e d esig n , w h ic h w h ile p ro m p tin g th e ir u tte ra n c e is c e rta in ly n o t p ro d u c e d b y th e m .” 41

3. U

n iv e r s a l

and

P

a r t ic u l a r

I n h is Sphofasiddhi M a n d a n a M is ra also a n a ly z e s th e re la tio n b etw e en th e u n iv e rsa l a n d th e p a rtic u la r. W h e n o n e perceives th e u n iv e rsa l o f a n o b ject, th e p a r tic u la r a n d its q u alitie s a re also p erceiv ed , y e t th e essen tial co g n itio n is t h a t o f th e u n iv ersal. T o p u t i t a n o th e r w ay, w h e n th e c o g n itio n o f th e w h o le tak es p la c e w e a re also a w a re o f th e p a rts t h a t m a k e u p th e w hole, b u t i t is th e co g n itio n o f th e w h o le th a t is d o m in a n t.42 M a n d a n a offers th e ex a m p le o f a p ic tu re . H e p o in ts o u t t h a t in o u r c o g n itio n o f a p ic tu re , a lth o u g h w e m a y b e a w a re o f th e d iffe re n t p a r ts a n d colors, th e p ic tu re is p erceiv ed as a w h o le th a t is o v e r a n d a b o v e its p a r ts .43 S im ilarly , w h e n w e p erceiv e a p iece o f c lo th o u r co g n itio n is o f th e clo th as a w h o le a n d is q u ite d istin c t fro m th e p a r tic u la r th re a d s a n d colors in v o lv e d .44 T o illu s tra te th is p o in t, b o th B h a rtrh a ri a n d M a n d a n a refer to th e V a ise sik a c o n c e p tio n t h a t w h e n tw o th in g s a r e b ro u g h t b efo re us w e first p e rc e iv e e a c h o n e se p a ra te ly , a n d on ly o n th e basis o f th ese se p a ra te p e rc e p tio n s does th e n o tio n o f tw o arise. T h is m e th o d o f p e rc e p tio n a p p lies to a ll h ig h e r n u m b e rs— th e ir co g n itio n a n d p ro d u c tio n is po ssib le o n ly b y w a y o f prev io u sly co gnized lo w er n u m b e rs. So also

it is b y w ay o f th e low er d iffe ren tiated form s o f speech t h a t th e h ig h e r u n ities, th e w o rd sphofas, m a y b e u n d e rsto o d .46

4. C

ontextual

F

actors

T h e n e e d for tak in g in to co n sideration th e c o n tex tu a l factors in d e te rm in in g th e exact m e a n in g o f a n expression h as b e e n em phasized b y v ario u s th in k ers in In d ia from very early tim es. T h e Brhaddevata says th a t th e established ru le re g a rd in g th e m e a n in g o f a V ed ic passage as well as o f a n o rd in a ry sentence is t h a t th e p u rp o se to b e served {artha), th e su b ject m a tte r u n d e r discussion (prakarana), a n in d icatio n from a n o th e r p lace in th e te x t (Iihga), its su itab ility (aucitya), th e p la c e (deSa), a n d th e tim e (kala) h a v e to b e ta k e n in to co nsideration for d e te rm in in g it. O f these term s, vakya, prakarana, linga, a n d artha a re also k n o w n to th e M im am sa school o f in te rp re ta tio n . A ccording to th e m th e re a re six m ean s o f p ro o f to b e ta k e n in to co n sid eratio n : Sruti o r d ire c t sta te m e n t, linga o r im p lic a tio n fro m a n o th e r w o rd , vakya o r sy n tactic connection, prakarana o r co n tex t o f situ atio n , sthana o r position, a n d samakhya o r th e etym ological m ean in g . O f these six, each o ne is stro n g er th a n th e succeeding ones. I n th e Vakyapadlya B hari.rhari gives tw o lists o f co n tex tu a l facto rs; th e first is alm ost a p a ra p h ra se o f th e list given in th e Brhaddevata.. T h e second is a bigger list a n d is g iven as co n tex tu a l factors t h a t d e te rm in e th e ex act m e a n in g o f a w o rd in th e case o f am b ig u o u s a n d equivocal expressions. T h is second list is discussed in d e ta il b y la te r w riters like N ag esa, th e G ra m m a ria n a n d A lam karikas like M a m m a ta a n d J a g a n n a th a P a n d ita ra ja . T h e co n tex tu a l factors ta k e n in to co n sideration in d e te r­ m in in g th e m ean in g s o f a m b ig u o u s expressions in c lu d e th e factors o f situ a tio n a l co n tex t a n d th e co n tex t w ith in th e sentence. E v en to u n d e rs ta n d th e p u rp o r t o f a n essay o r a te x t as a w hole, th e M im ariisakas h av e p o in te d o u t c e rta in factors to b e ta k e n in to account. T h e six factors for d e te rm in in g th e p u rp o se o f a te x t a re given t h u s : consistency in th e m e a n in g b etw een th e in tro d u c tio n a n d conclusion; re p e titio n o f th e m a in to p ic ; th e n ovelty o f th e subject m a tte r; th e re su lt in te n d e d ; c o rro b o rativ e a n d eulogistic rem arks, as distinguished from th e m a in th e m e ; a n d arg u m e n ts in favor o f th e m a in topic. T h ese six lingas o r in d icatio n s for d ecid in g th e p u rp o rt o f a te x t a re ac c e p te d b y all schools o f th o u g h t. L ite ra ry critics from th e tim e o f A n a n d a v a rd h a n a la y g re a t stress o n th e im p o rta n c e o f co n tex tu a l factors in conveying suggested m e a n ­ ing. T h e situ a tio n a l co n tex t— such as th e speaker, th e listener, th e tim e a n d place, th e tone, as w ell as th e social a n d cu ltu ra l b a c k g ro u n d —■ h a s a n im p o rta n t role in b rin g in g o u t th e suggestion. I t w as B h art^h ari

who pointed out th a t in m any cases of language behavior, th e literal m eaning conveyed by the expression is not the intended m eaning an d th a t contextual factors play a vital role in determ ining the intended sense o f a passage. I t is because o f these contextual a n d gram m atical factors determ ining the intended sense th a t hom onym s do not introduce the slightest confusion in actual speech.

5 SENTENCE MEANING

I . F actors

of

Sentence U

n it y

A. Akanksa T h o se w h o believe t h a t a sen ten ce is m a d e u p o f w ords, e a c h w ith a n in d e p e n d e n t m e a n in g o f its ow n, w ill h a v e to e x p la in h o w a connec­ te d a n d co g en t m e a n in g is u n d ersto o d from th e sentence. T h is p ro b lem h a s b ee n discussed b y all schools o f th o u g h t in In d ia , a n d v ario u s th eo ries h a v e evolved. M im am sa, th e vakyai&stra, tak es a le a d in th is field. B h a rtrh a ri to o h as discussed various aspects o f th e p ro b le m a n d m a d e h is o bservations, th o u g h his final view is t h a t th e p artless sentence is th e u n it o f u tte ra n c e . P a n in i uses th e te rm vakya in th e g en e ral sense o f a n u tte ra n c e b u t does n o t d efine a sentence. I t is K a ty a y a n a w h o defines it as th a t (group o f w o rd s) c o n ta in in g a fin ite v erb . P a n in i does n o t seem to h a v e su b scrib ed to such a view , for his ru le tinatinah, re ferrin g to th e a p p li­ ca tio n o f th e ac cen t o f “ a finite v erb w h e n n o t follow ed b y a n o th e r fin ite v e rb ” , show s t h a t h e h a d n o difficulty in allow ing m o re th a n o n e v erb in th e sam e sentence. P a n in i’s view o f th e sentence seems m o re a k in to th a t o f th e M im am sakas th a n to th a t o f th e L ogicians. E v en la te r G ra m m a ria n s ag reed t h a t th e re ca n b e sim ple sentences w ith m o re th a n o n e fin ite v e rb i f o th e r con d itio n s a re fulfilled, for ex am ple, pajya mrgo dhavati, “ See th e d e e r is ru n n in g .” 1 T h e Nydyasutra does n o t refer to th e sen ten ce o r th e sentence m ean in g , th o u g h N y a y a is v ery m u c h in te re ste d in th e w o rd m eanings. P erh a p s ea rly N aiyayikas b eliev ed th a t a sen ten ce is a collection o f w ords a n d t h a t th e sentence m e a n in g is a co m b in atio n o f th e w o rd m eanings. A form al definition o f th e sen ten ce is also fo u n d in th e Brhaddeaatd (2. 117). B u t it is in th e Mimdmsasutra t h a t w e first com e across th is d efin itio n : “ A g ro u p o f w ords serving a single p u rp o se form s a sentence, i f o n analysis th e s e p a ra te w ords a re fo u n d to h a v e akanksa o r m u tu a l expectan cy ”

(Mimurnsasutra 2.1.46). T his definition was m ainly for the Y ajurveda passages. H ere for the first tim e the im portance of akdhksd in unifying th e words in a sentence is brought out. In this definition tw o term s deserve special attention, arthaikatva (unity of purpose) a n d akanksa (m utual expectancy). T he term arthaikatva can also be interpreted as u nity of m eaning; explained in this way it can have an extended application, even to ordinary sentences. T h e M im am sa principle of syntactical unity (ekavakyati) states th a t if a group of words can be interpreted as a single sentence, it is no t proper to split it an d interpret it as two sentences. A sentence like palya mrgo dhdvati, “ see th e deer is ru n ning,” w ould be a single sentence according to this principle (not treatin g it as two: “ the deer is running” a n d “see him ” ). T his condition o f m u tu al expectancy, first prom ulgated by the Mimarnsakas and later accepted by other schools, stresses th e necessity o f interdependence o f words to give a unified sense as in a com pound w ord or a sentence. P anini seems to have accepted som ething o f the sort while m entioning samarthya, “ capacity” , as a condition for forming com pound words (Asfadhyayi 2 .1 .1 ); for samarthya refers to sem antic connection by syntactic elements.2 Tw o m eanings are given by K atyay ana for th e term samarthya: first, ekarthibhiva, emergence of single integrated m eaning, which is sim ilar to arthaikatva in the M im am sa definition o f th e sentence; and, second, vydpeksa, w hich is equivalent to dkaAksa in th e MimirnsdsUtra. I t is n o t clear w hether P anini him self intended those m eanings or K atyayana is reading them in th e light o f the M imarnsa definition. Strictly speaking, samarthya is the capacity o f the words for m utual association, vydpeksa is their interdependence, a n d akdhksd is th e need one has for the other in order to com plete th e sense. Panini is referring to the com pound form ation while the M im am sakas are dealing w ith the V edic sentence, b u t the principle involved is th e same. P atanjali explains th e two views as m utually exclusive a n d accepts the ekarthibhdva point o f view as th e final one, for according to th e G ram m arians the elements o f a com pound give u p th eir individual m eanings an d acquire a special signification. H e thinks th a t according to th e vydpeksa view the individual m em bers retain their own m eanings b u t a re m utually related. K aiy ata points out th a t th e form er is a condition for th e com pound w ord, a n d th e latter for th e sentence. According to B hartrhari the sentence is the u n it spho(a, a n d u nity o f m eaning is certainly necessary. W e m ay say th a t in all cases there should be unity o f m eaning w hen viewed as a n integral u n it a n d interdependence w hen viewed from the point o f view o f the parts. Akdhksd can be seen from tw o points of view, psychological an d syntactic. T h e M lm am sakas are interested in the psychological expec­ tancy, while the Naiyayikas take it as a syntactic expectancy. B hartfhari

actually criticizes the M im am sa definition of the sentence on the ground th a t its akanksa w ould im ply th a t a passage of several gram m atical sentences would have to b e considered as one sentence. TheM im am sakas have to solve th e problem by referring to the basic psychological expectancy. Salikanatha, a follower o f P rabhakara, says th a t akanksa, being the curiosity on the p a rt o f th e listeners, has been explained by some as invariable association.3 This definition will lead to com plications, as there is no lim it to such m ental association. H e says th a t only those th a t are essential for the accom plishm ent o f the intended purpose need be taken as requirem ents, n o t all the karaka associations. “ Bring the cow ” is com plete in itself, b u t if the phrase “ w ith a stick” is added, th a t phrase is in need o f a verb for completeness, and hence “ Bring th e cow w ith a stick” becomes a single sentence. I f the phrase were not added, it w ould m ean th a t the speaker was indifferent to the way the cow was brought. T o th e P rabhakara M lm am sakas the three basic requirem ents for th e accom plishm ent o f the intended purpose are: the person who is enjoined to do the act, w hat to do, a n d how to do it. I f one o f these essential requirem ents is not given in the sentence it has to be assumed as in elliptical sentences. T o the B hatta M imamsakas, by contrast, th e essential psychological requirem ents in a sentence are: the act enjoined (itikartavyatd) , th e m eans (s&dhana or karana), a n d the fruit of action [phala or prayojana). T h e G ram m arians a n d the Logicians take akanksa as syntactic, as it is only the need for the syntactic completeness o f the sentence. T he later Naiyayikas define akanksa as a kind of syntactic need th a t one w ord has for another in a sentence in order to convey th e interrelation o f words. I t is th e akanksa th at leads to the knowledge o f the syntactic relation in a sentence. Akanksa plays an im p o rtan t role in the teaching m ethod of Sanskrit texts. In a sentence the finite verb is taken first a n d th en questions asked to get the necessary words to fill the kdraka relations. N agesa says th a t dkafikfS is the desire on th e p a rt o f the listeners, on hearing a w ord in a sentence, to know th e idea th a t can be related in o rd er to get a com plete sense; it is only in a figurative sense th a t the expectancy is a ttrib u te d to the word. In th e VedSntaparibhdsS (4.4-7), D harm arajadhvarIndra says th at th ere are two kinds o f dkdnksd, n atu ra l expectancy (utthitakdfiksd) and p o ten tial expectancy (utth&pyak&nksa). Akanksa can also be m u tu al or one-sided. In “ bring th e cow w ith a stick,” the phrase “ w ith a stick” h as expectancy tow ard th e verb “ bring,” b u t “ bring the cow” has no direct expectancy tow ard th e phrase. T here is no en d to potential

expectancy, a n d th e a d d itio n o f th e w o rd to resolve it depends on th e speaker’s in ten tio n . B. Togyata T o th e p rim a ry condition o f m u tu a l expectancy w ere ad d e d tw o m o re b y th e M im am sakas, yogyata (consistency o f sense) a n d asatti o r samnidhi, w h ich stands for th e contiguity o f th e words. T hese th re e conditions h av e been generally ac cep ted b y all schools o f th o u g h t as essential for Sabdabodha. T o th e m som e h ave ad d e d a fo u rth , nam ely, th e know ledge o f tatparya, th e in te n tio n o f th e speaker o r th e g en eral p u rp o rt o f th e sentence. Togyata is th e logical com patibility o f th e w ords’ consistency in a sentence for m u tu a l association. R eally it involves a ju d g m e n t on a sen ten ce’s sense o r nonsense. T h e m ean in g o f a sentence should n o t b e co n tra d ic te d b y experience. “ H e w ets i t w ith w a te r” — h e re th e re is yogyata, because w e ttin g is generally done w ith a liq u id ; b u t in a sen ten ce “ H e w ets it w ith fire” th e re is n o yogyata, b ecau se th e id ea o f w e ttin g is incongruous w ith th a t o f fire. T h e re is no u n a n im ity o f opin io n re g ard in g th e exact role o fyogyata in th e com prehension o f m e an in g from a sentence. Som e N aiyayikas h o ld t h a t a decisive know ledge o f yogyata is a p re req u isite for v erb al cognition. O th ers say th a t w h a t is re q u ire d is only th e absence o f a know ledge o f in com patibility. K u m a rila B h a tta says th a t in co m p ati­ b ility w ith th e a c tu a l facts does n o t p re v e n t v erb al com prehension, b u t on ly th e v alid ity o f th e know ledge.4 P erh a p s it is th e inconceivability o f th e m u tu a l association o f th e w o rd m eanings th a t ren d ers th e w hole sentence nonsensical; it is n o t th e lack o f correlation w ith th e actual facts b u t th e im possibility o f connecting th e w o rd m eanings th a t stands in th e w ay o f v e rb a l com prehension. Som etim es th e lack o fyogyata is only a p p a re n t a n d can b e explained aw ay b y reso rtin g to th e m etap h o ric al m ean in g o f a w ord in th e sen ten c e; i f th e in co m p atib ility can b e rem oved th u s a n d yogyata restored, th e re is no difficulty in co m p reh en d in g th e m e an in g o f th e sentence. T h e a p p a re n t in co m p atib ility o f th e expressed sense is a n essential co n d itio n for laksana (secondary m e a n in g ). G. Sarpnidhi o r Asatti S arnnidhi o r asatti is generally exp lain ed as th e condition th a t th e w ords in a sentence should b e tem p o rally contiguous. I t is th e u n in te rru p te d u tte ra n c e o r th e u n b ro k e n com prehension o f w ords w h e n th ey a re in ju x tap o sitio n . K u m a rila B h a tta says th a t i t is th e co n tin u o u s m oving a b o u t o f th e w ords in th e listen er’s m in d (buddhau viparivrtti). T h e P ra b h a k a ra s also explain it th a t w ay. L ack o f sarpnidhi c a n o ccu r in tw o ways—'not b eing u tte re d to g eth er a n d n o t being

signified by words. T h e B h atta M im am sakas hold th a t verbal cognition is possible only w hen th e necessary words are together in th e m ind. T h e P rabhakaras consider th a t only th e contiguity o f cognition o f the sense is necessary. T hus in th e case o f elliptical sentences, th e B hatta MimamsaJias w a n t th e missing w ords to be actually supplied. T h e N avya-N yaya school defines dsatti as an im m ediate recollection o f th e m eanings o f words th ro u g h th eir expressive pow er o r secondary signification (Iaksand); even if th e words are separated there is dsatti if th e m eanings o f th e words are recollected w ithout any interruption. This recognition happens in th e case o f verses. Early Naiyayikas thought th a t th e know ledge of dsatti is th e cause o f verbal com prehension. T h e N avya-N yaya school considers th a t dsatti itself is th e cause (svarupe sati Sabdabodhahetuk). In th e case of elliptical sentences, in w hich th e in ten d ed m eaning is understood from th e context even though some o f th e words necessary for syntactic completeness a re lacking, th e B hatta M im am sakas believe th a t it is necessary to supply the missing words in order to have verbal com prehension o f th e sentence m eaning. T he Prabhakaras hold th a t it is easier to supply th e m eaning th a n to presum e th e missing words as im plied. 2.

T

he

R

ole of

Tatparya

or

I n t e n t io n

T h e term tdtparya has been used by the different schools o f th o u g h t in In d ia w ith varying subtle nuances, depending on th e basic stand­ po in t tak en by each; b u t th e general idea is q u ite clear.® T h e term refers to th e m eaning in ten d ed to be conveyed by a n utterance, a n d it can be view ed as th e m eaning in tended by th e speaker or as the p u rp o rt o f th e utterance. T h e role o f contextual factors in deciding this tdtparya is also generally accepted by all, along w ith th e im portance o f tdtparya in deciding th e m eaning of a sentence. T here is, however, no u nanim ity o f opinion regarding the exact role played by tdtparya in verbal comprehension. T h e m eaning o f a sentence can be considered from two distinct standpoints, from th e p o in t o f view o f th e speaker a n d from th e p o in t o f view o f th e listener. T he general western ap proach has been from th e speaker’s p o in t o f view, w hile th e In d ia n approach, especially the later Sdbdabodha approach, has been m ainly from the listener’s point o f view. I n a norm al speech situation there can be five different aspects of th e m eaning of a n u tte ra n c e : w hat is in th e m ind of the speaker who makes the utterance, w hat the speaker w ants the listener to understand, w hat th e u tterance actually conveys, w h at the listener understands as th e m eaning of th e utterance, an d w hat is in the m ind o f the listener on hearing th e utterance.

I n a perfect linguistic com m unication all five o f these m eanings m ust coincide; b u t often due to various causes th ere are b o u n d to be differences standing in the w ay o f easy com m unication. I n all cases o f successful lying o r m isdirection, w h a t is in th e m ind o f the speaker a t th e tim e o f utteran ce is different from w hat is in ten d ed to be conveyed to the listener. A nd very often w hat the listener understands as the m eaning o f the u tteran ce is different from w h at the speaker intends to convey; this problem can be caused by th e lack o f expressive pow er on th e speaker’s p a rt or th e in ability to u n derstand on th e listener’s p a rt. W h a t is in th e speaker’s m in d before he speaks or in th e listener’s m in d after hearing th e u tteran ce is ra th e r intangible a n d does not easily yield to objective scientific analysis. I t is th e actu al utterance th a t can be objectively analyzed into its com ponents o f words, m orphem es, a n d phonem es, a n d studied; b u t th a t does not m ean th a t th e other aspects a re less im portant. T h e M im am sakas a n d the Naiyayikas, who take th e sentence to be a concatenation o f th e individual words it contains, have necessarily to depend on th e pow er o f tatparya to explain how a connected m eaning is com prehended from a sentence. E ach w ord in a sentence gives its ow n isolated m eaning; b u t a string o f unconnected isolated senses cannot produce a unified m eaning. People use words w ith th e intention of conveying a connected sense; hence from th e use o f words in ju x ta ­ position [samabhmyahara) it is assum ed th a t th e speaker has u tte red th em w ith th e intention of conveying a connected sense, for otherwise th e sim ultaneous utteran ce w ould b e o f no avail, b u t for such an intention tatparya works as a general m otivating force to help in correla­ tin g th e w ord m eanings a n d form ing th e sentence m eaning. Tatparya is th e in ten tio n or the desire o f th e speakers, according to th e Naiyayikas. A ccording to th e M im am sakas, it is th e p u rp o rt o f th e sentence. T his tatparya is all-com prehensive, b u t n o t all-powerful o r absolute. N orm ally it cannot change th e iakti, th e prim ary m eaning o f a w ord. A ccording to th e M im am sakas, th e iakti o r th e relation betw een a w ord a n d its m eaning is autpattika, in n ate or perm an en t; according to th e Naiyayikas, this iakti is conventional or sarriketika, b u t perm anent, being based on the will or iccha o f G od in th e case of ordinary words a n d o f th e authors in th e case of technical term s a n d the like. A ccording to th e N aiyayika, th e iabdabodha or understanding o f th e sentence’s m eaning is possible only through th e knowledge o f the words’ m eanings, w hich form th e im m ediate cause (karana) ; the knowledge o f th e expressive pow er o f iakti in th e individual words obtained th ro u g h recollection is th e sahakari karana. Before one considers th e question o f th e speaker’s intention, understanding th e individual m eanings o f w ords on th e basis o f their iakti is essential. I t is only in

th e case o f am biguous words, in w hich m ore th a n o n e sense is possible, th a t th e speaker’s in ten tio n o r contextual factors a re taken in to account. I n th e c a s e o f m etap h o ric expression, such as “ th e village on th e G anges,” in w hich th e lite ral m eaning is unsuitable, th e incom patibility has to be rem oved by tak in g one o f th e w ord m eanings as having been used in a sense different from its n o rm al sense, b u t som ehow re la ted to it. I n a p a rtic u la r sentence in w hich th ere is contextual incom patibility, it is on th e basis o f th e tatparya th a t th e listener decides w hich o f th e w ords is to b e tak en as m etaphorical. S om efarfetched relationship can always b e assum ed betw een th e p rim ary m eaning a n d th e in ten d ed m eaning. A long w ith akanksa, yogyata, a n d asatti, som e N aiyayikas w a n t to in clude tatparya o r a general know ledge o f th e m eaning in ten d ed by th e speaker, w hich m ay be term e d “prehension,” as a n essential factor in all cases o f v erbal com prehension. Som e others believe th a t th e speaker’s in ten tio n n eed n o t b e considered as a d irect factor, as i t could b e in clu d ed in akanksa itself. Tatparya plays a p a r t in deciding asatti also. G angesa a n d V isv an a th a h av e included tatparya as a fo u rth requisite. E ven th o u g h th e M im am sakas do n o t accept tatparya as a separate factor, it is accepted as a general m otivating force. A ccording to th e P rab h ak aras, th e tatparya enables p rim ary m ean in g itself to give b o th its w o rd m eaning a n d th e syntactic relation. T hese Onaitabhidhanavadins th in k th a t th e Sakti 'of w ords is understood w ith reference to a m eaning th a t is related to som e .karya. AU sentences, especially in th e V eda, h ave to b e u ltim ately m eaning injunctions o r prohibitions. T h e la te r th eo ry o f D hanika, w ho includes dhvani u n d e r tatparya, follows this anvitabhidhanavada. A ccording to th e B h atta M im am sakas, th e ind iv id u al w ords in a sentence give th e ir isolated m eanings, a n d th e sentence m eaning is located th ro u g h laksana, based on t&tparyamipapatti. I t is J a y a n ta B hatJa w ho in his Nyayamanjari advocates tatparya as a separate factor to explain th e em ergence o f th e sentence m eaning from th e associationist p o in t o f view. H e does n o t refer to lakfana in this case, because sentence laksana is n o t acceptable to th e N aiyayikas. H arisiddhantavagiSa, in his com m entary on Sahityadarpana, says th a t this tatparyaSakti is th e sam e as th e sarpsargamaryada o f la te r N aiyayikas. A m ong A lam karikas, A n a n d a v a rd h a n a accepts only th ree functions o f words, abhidha, laksana, a n d tatparya. H e m entions th e padarthavakyarthanyaya b u t does n o t refer io it as a function. Tatparyavrtti was accepted for th e first tim e by A b h in av a g u p ta in his Locana. H e followed J a y a n ta B h atta in this respect. L a te r A larnkarikas took i t as a general view accepted by D h v an ik ara him self. T h u s R u y y ak a says w rongly th a t D h v an ik ara accepted vyanjana as th e fourth vyapara, distinct from abhidha, laksana, a n d tatparya. L a te r A lainkarikas took th e tatparyavjtti

as th e view o f abhihitanvayavddins a n d confused it w ith th e B h atta view, th o u g h th e B hattas h av e definitely stated th a t they accept only laksana a n d n o t tatparya to explain th e em ergence o f th e sentence m eaning from th e w o rd m eanings. 3.

Anvitabhidhana

and

Abhihitanvaya

T

h e o r ie s

W e saw earlier th a t th e tw o m a in theories ab o u t sentence m eaning are th e anvitdbhidhana, advocated by th e P ra b h a k a ra M lm am sakas, a n d th e abhihitanvaya, h eld by th e B hafta M im am saka. P ra b h a k a ra a n d his followers d enied th a t w ords convey a m eaning except in th e context o f a sentence, even th o u g h they re g ard e d w ords as re al a n d actu al constituents o f language. Like th e B hattas, th e P rab h a k aras h av e to accept th e reality o f in d iv id u al w ords a n d th eir individual m eanings, a n d agree th a t th e p rim ary m ean in g expressed by th e w ord is a universal (Jati). All o f these points a re specifically stated in the MimdTnsdsBtras, a n d no M im am saka can d o u b t its validity. I t is also clear th a t th e pu rpose o f w ords in a sentence is to give a cogent, connected m eaning. T h e difference betw een th e tw o schools involves th e following questions: (1 ) Does th e u n ita ry sentence m eaning arise directly from the w ords them selves o r indirectly th ro u g h th e recollection o f th e w ord m eanings? T h e anvitdbhidhdna theory takes th e form er view, w hile th e abhihitanvaya th eo ry takes th e latter. (2) T h e m ean ing o f a sentence is m a d e u p o f th e in d iv id u al w ord m eanings a n d th e ir m u tu a l relation. C an b o th o f these elem ents be directly conveyed by th e words? T h e P rab h a k ara s say th a t th e in ­ ten tio n o r p u rp o rt, know n from contextual factors, will m ake th e p rim ary , d en o tativ e pow er o f th e w ords convey both. B ut B hattas h o ld th a t th e p rim ary denotative pow er o f w ords is exhausted by conveying th e ir isolated, ind iv id u al m eanings a n d stop w ith th a t. T h e connected m eaning is conveyed th ro u g h th e secondary pow er o f th e sentence (Iaksarid). T h e individual m eaning is a universal; b u t in th e sentence m eaning has to apply to th e individual. T h e la tte r is also achieved by th e pow er of laksana. Som e o f th e N aiyayikas also accept th e abhihitdnvaya theory, b u t because according to th em th e p rim ary m eaning o f a w ord is th e p a rti­ cu lar qualified by th e universal (Jdtiviiistavyakti) , they do no t h av e to d ep en d on laksana to g et th e sentence m eaning. T o get the syntactic relationship betw een th e words, they can n o t resort to laksana, because th ey accep t it only for w ords, n o t for a sentence. O n e o f th e N aiyayikas, J a y a n ta B hatta, proposed a new function o f th e sentence, tatparya, to account for th e syntactically connected m eaning. T h e P rab h ak aras stress th e n a tu ra l process b y w hich children learn

th eir language. I t is by w a tch in g lan g u ag e used a n d b y w itnessing th e activ ity o f elders in d aily life th a t ch ild ren com e to know th e significance o f w ords. T h ro u g h th e sub stitu tio n m eth o d th e y com e to know th e m ean in g o f w ords; this process is n a tu ra l a n d subconscious. L a te r th e child com es to u n d e rsta n d th e m e an in g o f even new sentences. B ut from th e w orld h e know s th a t w ords a re never used in isolation b u t h av e m ean in g only in th e context o f a sentence. T h e co n stitu en t w ords in a sen ten ce convey m ean in g only as th ey a re re la te d to th e sentence m ean in g . T h u s in th e sentence “ B ring th e cow ,” th e w ord “ cow” m eans n o t th e isolated concept cowness, b u t cow as re la te d to th e action o f b rin g in g . So also th e w o rd “ b rin g ” m eans th e ac tio n o f b rin g in g in re latio n to th e cow. T h e w ords them selves give th e ir ow n m eanings a n d th e ir sy n tactic re latio n , so th e sentence m ean in g is directly conveyed by th e sentence. T h is view is rejected by th e B h a tta M im am saka because o f th e fallacies o f in terd e p en d en c e a n d com plexity. A ccording to th e m w e a re ab le to u n d e rsta n d th e in d iv id u a l m eanings o f w ords, even th o u g h w e m ig h t h av e learn ed th em b y h e a rin g peo p le u tte rin g sentences a n d w atch in g th e ir reactio n . U n lik e th e w ords, th e sentence does n o t h av e a n in d iv i­ d u a l m ean in g o f its ow n. W h e n w e h e a r a sentence, w e h a v e first a n u n d ersta n d in g o f th e sep a rate m eanings o f th e w ords one after a n o th e r; th e n these w o rd m eanings a re re la te d o n th e basis o f expectancy a n d o th er factors, a n d we arriv e a t th e unified m ean in g o f th e sentence as a whole. T h e association o f th e w o rd m eanings is b ro u g h t a b o u t b y laksana, according to B h atta M im am sa, b u t th e N aiyayikas explain it b y resort­ in g to sarrisargamaryada. 4 . S e n t e n c e Spkofa

B h a rtrh a ri identifies B rah m an , th e u ltim a te b ein g , w ith th e essence o f th e speech p rin c ip le ; it is w ith o u t beginning o r e n d a n d in d estru cti­ ble. T h e e n tire w orld is a n ap p e ara n ce (vivaria) o f this speech principle. Sym bol a n d m ean in g a re only tw o aspects o f this speech essence. I t is th e sam e speech essence th a t a p p e ars in th e form o f various ideas a n d m eanings on th e one h a n d a n d th e ir sym bols— w ords a n d sentences— on th e o th er, a n d th u s constitutes th e p h en o m en al w orld. T h is speech essence is o f th e n a tu re o f consciousness: th o u g h u n ch a n g in g a n d p a rtless, it ap p e ars to b e ev o lutionary a n d pluralistic o n th e basis o f its ow n pow ers like tim e , w hich, th o u g h really id e n tic a l w ith it, seems to b e different. T h e etern al, tim eless speech prin cip le ap p e ars to b e changing because o f th e w orking o f th e tim e factor. T im e is a n in h e re n t pow er o f th e absolute, b u t it is relatively in d e p e n d e n t a n d exerts its influence in b rin g in g ab o u t th e o th e r pow ers o f th e speech essence.

T h e basic principle o f B h a rtjh a ri5S theory o f language is th a t th e com plete u ttera n ce o r th e sentence is th e u n it o f speech a n d should be considered as a single, unanalyzable entity. T h e u tteran ce alone is valid w ith respect to actual language. T h e m eaning o f th e u tteran ce or sentence is also in tegral a n d indivisible a n d is o f the n atu re o fpratibha, an intuitive flash o f insight. This partless expression in th e sentence sphota m anifests in a flash th e integral m eaning. Sequence a n d tim e factor do n o t really belong to the sentence b u t are unavoidable as m eans for revealing th e sentence. Sentence sphota as th e expression (Sabda) a n d pratibha as th e m eaning (artha) are th e basic factors in linguistic behavior. I n th e Speaker5S m ind before he begins to speak an d in the Iistener5S m in d after hearing, this unity is clear. B ut because o f oui inability to com m unicate it in an instantaneous flash, the sentence has to be uttered as a sequence o f words, each w ord in its tu rn being a definite sequence o f phonem es o r letters. I f b o th th e speaker a n d th e listener a re q u ite proficient in th e language, as in th e case o f th e m other tongue, they do n o t feel th a t th ey are uttering o r hearing articu lated sound-bits or words. T h e speaker u tters th e sentence a n d th e listener hears it as a sentence. I f th e language proficiency is m eagre, th e listener m ay be h earin g th e w ords a n d trying to organize th e m eanings into a unit. I f th e h ea rer does n o t know th e language, he will hear only a series o f articu lated sounds o r m ere sound bits. All analysis o f th e sentence into lesser m eaningful elem ents such as the w ord, bases, a n d affixes m ay be a convenient fiction. I t is tru e th a t G ram m arians5 m ain work is to analyze th e u ttera n ce into its com ponent p arts in order to help th e students u n d erstand th e m eaning, b u t they are aw are th a t this linguistic analysis has no real validity except as a help to th e students. E ven th o u g h th e sphota theory envisages different subdivisions o f th e Sphotai B h artfh ari accepts only th e sentence sphota as th e real u n it of speech. L etters a n d w ords have only a prag m atic value, as useful units th a t b u ild u p h ig h er units o f speech, th e sentence. T h e m eaning o f this single, indivisible u tteran ce is pratibha, a flash o f insight, th e real n atu re o f w hich is indefinable. Its existence is ratified only in th e in d iv id u a l^ experience o f it, a n d th e experiencer him self cannot describe it adequately. In th e discussion o f th e sphota theory it has b een p o in ted ou t th a t th e actual sounds u ttere d b y th e speaker a n d h ea rd by th e listener are th e vaikrta dhvani, containing m an y irrelevant, idiosyncratic, a n d nonlinguistic elem ents. This vaikrta dhoani reveals th e prakrta dhvani, w hich is th e linguistically relevant phonem atic p a tte rn o f th e utterance, free from th e variations in intonation, tem po, pitch, a n d so on, w hich do no t affect th e language. O f course in languages in w hich th e tone o r pitch o r length is relevant, these factors will be p a rt o f the prakrta dhvani itself.

I n n o rm a l linguistic discourse b o th th e speaker a n d th e listener a re conscious o f th e n o rm a l phonological o r p h o n em atic p a tte rn only. AU n o n linguistic m a tte r is elim in a ted a t this stage; b u t th e tim e sequence is still p resen t. I t is this prdkrta dhvani t h a t reveals g ra d u ally , p h o n em e by p h o n em e a n d w ord b y w o rd , th e sentence sphota, th e in teg ra l linguis­ tic sym bol. T h e role o f th e phonem es (varna) is only to reveal th ' w o rd sphota a n d th e ro le o f th e w ords to reveal th e sentence sphofa. T h e sm aller elem ents ca n n o t, in d iv id u ally or collectively, reveal th e in teg ral u n ita ry m e an in g d irectly because o f th e ir a p p e a ra n c e in a tem p o ra l sequence, because o f th e ir n o t bein g associated w ith p a rts o f th e m e a n in g ; th e ir ro le is to b u ild u p th e h ig h e r u n it u n til th e sentence sphota is revealed. T h is sentence sphota gives fo rth in stan tan eo u sly in a flash th e m e a n in g o f th e sentence. B h a rtrh a ri h as sta te d th a t th e speech p rin cip le (Sabdatattva) has th re e stages in th e course o f its m anifestation, nam ely paSyanti, madhyama, a n d vaikhari. T h e vaikhari level corresponds to th e vaikrtadhvani o f th e sphota th eo ry a n d is th e a c tu a liz ed a n d m anifested speech, th e sounds spoken b y th e sp eak er a n d h e a rd b y th e listener. T h e madhyama level seems to co rresp o n d to th e prdkrta dhvani, because th e linguistically re le v an t elem ents, in clu d in g th e sequence, a re p resen t in b o th . T h e n e x t stage, paSyanti, has b een id en tified w ith pratibha in d ic a te d b y th e vdkyasphota. W h e n w e speak o f th e vdkyasphota as th e m e an in g rev ealer a n d of pratibha as th e m ean in g , th e tw o seem to b e d iffe ren t; b u t actu a lly they a re only tw o aspects o f th e sam e en tity . W h e th e r B h a rtfh a ri considered th e S a b d a B ra h m a n as a level h ig h e r th a n th e paSyanti is n o t ce rtain , for scholars a re n o t u n an im o u s o n this p o in t. H e says th a t g ra m m a r is th e h ig h est p lace for vac in its threefold aspect—paJyanti, madhyama, a n d vaikhari. T h a t claim does n o t p re clu d e th e possibility o f a h ig h er level ab o u t' w h ich one ca n n o t say a n y th in g . A ccording to som e scholars th e paSyanti level h as tw o aspects, th e h ig h e r being also called para paJyanti, a t w h ich all distinctions a re o b lite rated . E v en th o u g h B h a rtfh a ri considered th e sentence to b e th e only u n it o f expression in a c tu a l life, h e w as fully conscious o f th e im p o rta n c e o f linguistic analysis in to w ords a n d o th er u n its as a useful m eans for u n d e rsta n d in g th e languages. T h is aw areness is a p p a re n t from th e th ird book o f th e Vakyapadiya, w h e re various problem s a re discussed o n th e basis o f m o rp h em es a n d phonem es th a t m ak e u p th e sentence. 5. Sabdabodha In d ia n th in k ers o n la n g u ag e belonging to th e d ifferent schools o f th o u g h t considered la n g u ag e b e h a v io r in a linguistic situ atio n n o t only from th e sp eak er’s p o in t o f view b u t also from th e listen er’s. T h e various

theories of Iabiabodha or judgm ent consider the process of cognition of the sentence m eaning from the listener’s point o f view. T he m odern technique of Sabdabodha was developed and perfected by the school of Navya-Nyaya, founded by Gangesa about A.D. 1320 using technical term s for specifying th e m eaning of a sentence precisely and accurately. Literally the term Sabdabodha means “ verbal com prehen­ sion” or “verbal cognition” ; it is used to indicate the m eaning o f a sentence as understood by th e listeners. I n m odem works the term is used to refer to the linguistic paraphrase of the sentence, in which the exact denotation of each element in the sentence is clearly and precisely indicated. T he Sabdabodha approach of understanding a sentence m ean­ ing is intended to avoid syntactic am biguity by specifying the exact relations among the various elements in a sentence. T he vagaries o f the sentence’s surface structure will be absent in the Sabdabodha paraphrase, and the linguistic analysis a t the syntactic level will become precise. T he Stadabodha approach o f analyzing the m eaning o f a sentence is analogous to the deep-structure level in N oan Chomsky’s analysis of a sentence. H e distinguishes between the surface level and th e deepstructure level.® T he underlying relations between the elements of a sentence a t the Sabdabodha level need not always be the apparent rela­ tions at the surface level. Thus ghatasya nirmitih, “m aking the pot,” and caitrasya nirmitih, “creation by C aitra,” though similar in Sanskrit at the surface level, have different Sabdabodhas. T he genitive case in the first phrase indicates the object of the verb, while in the second expres­ sion the genitive case indicates th e agent; th e form er is ghalakarmika nirmitih, creation th a t has the pot as its object, b u t the latter is caitrakartrka nirmitih, creation th a t has caitra as its agent. T he technique of Sabdabodha was also adopted by later workers in the various other schools of thought. But on the basis of the difference in their basic assumptions there is difference in the emphasis, and the same sentence or expression has different Stadabodha paraphrases in the diffe­ ren t schools, Nyaya, M imamsa, and G ram m arians. They differ particu­ larly about which element in a sentence shouldbe regarded as predom i­ nant. T he Logicians (the Naiyayikas ) are m ainly interested in analyzing propositional sentences from a static point of view, so they consider the substantive (in the nom inative case) to be the most im portant element. T he Gram m arians, as well as the early etymological schools, consider the sentence from the dynam ic point o f view an d take the finite verb to be the most im portant element. T he followers of the Mimamsa school, m ainly concerned w ith the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, try to analyze the implications of im perative sentences. T he same Sanskrit sentence m ay be interpreted differently a t the deep-structure level in the Stadabodha by the different schools of thought, because they differ in their basic standpoints.

T h e sen ten ce caitrah ghatam karoti, “ C a itra m ak es a p o t,” w ill b e in te r­ p re te d b y th e G ra m m a ria n s as “ e k a tv a v a c c h in n a c a itra k a rtrk a h e k a tv a v a c c h in n a g h a ta k a rm a k a h v a rta m a n a k a la k a h k a ra n a v y a p a ra h , th e o p e ra tio n o r ac tiv ity o f m ak in g , in th e p re s e n t tense, w h ic h has G a itra in th e sin g u la r n u m b e r as its a g e n t a n d p o t in th e sin g u la r n u m ­ b e r as its object. T o th e N a iy a y ik a o r th e lo g ician th e sam e sentence w ill m e a n ‘‘g h a ta k a rm a k a k a ra n a k rtix n a n c a itr a h ,” C a itra w ho h a s th e ac tiv ity o f m ak in g w h ic h h a s p o t as its object. T h ese in te rp re ta tio n s co u ld b e fu rth e r e la b o ra te d b y p o in tin g o u t all th e im p lica tio n s o f th e sen ten ce. T h e passive sen ten c e “ c a itre n a g h a ta h k riy a te ” (a p o t is b e in g m a d e b y G a itra ) co u ld b e a n a ly z e d in th e sam e w ay, because fro m th e Mbdabodka p o in t o f v iew th e re is little d ifferen ce in m e a n in g b etw e en th e a c tiv e sen ten ce a n d its passive form , ac co rd in g to th e G ra m m a ria n s. T h e N aiyayikas, how ever, m a k e a clea r d istin ctio n b etw e en th e tw o. A m o n g a n c ie n t w riters n e ith e r P a n in i n o r G a u ta m a w as in te re ste d in discussing th e sentence. J a y a n ta B h a tta says in his Nyayamanjan th a t th e ab sen ce o f a n y referen ce to th e sen ten c e in th e NyayasUtras shows th a t th e ea rly N aiy ay ik as co n sid ered th e sen ten c e to b e m e re ly a c o m b in a tio n o f w ords. A m o n g In d ia n G ra m m a ria n s it w as K a ty a y a n a w h o first d efin e d a sen ten c e as ekatin, th a t w h ic h h a s o n e fin ite v erb . P a n in i seem s to h a v e h e ld th e view t h a t a sen ten ce m a y c o n ta in m o re th a n o n e fin ite v erb , fo r h is ru le tin atinah o rd a in s th e a c u te a c c e n t to a v erb w h e n it follows a n o n v e rb (in a se n te n c e ). L a te r G ra m m a ria n s h a v e also a c c e p te d su ch sentences. S tric tly fro m th e fo rm a l surfacelevel a p p ro a c h , as a d v o c a te d b y K a ty a y a n a , su ch a sen ten ce m a y b e co n sid ered a com plex sen ten c e m a d e u p o f tw o sentences, b u t a t th e d e e p -s tru c tu re level, fro m th e sem an tic p o in t o f view , th e y c o n stitu te a single sen ten ce. W e h a v e a lre a d y seen t h a t th e M im am sak as first p ro m u lg a te d a n d th e o th e r schools la te r a c c e p te d th e th e o ry t h a t th e w ritin g o f th e sen ten ce is b ase d o n th e th re e factors o f m u tu a l e x p e ctan cy o r in te r­ d e p e n d e n c e o f th e m ean in g s o f th e w o rd s in it, c o m p a tib ility o r absence o f in c o m p a tib ility , a n d p ro x im ity . T h e M im an isak as co n sid ered m u tu a l ex p ectan cy to b e psychological, w h ile th e L ogicians a n d G ra m m a ria n s to o k i t to b e sy n tactical. B etw een th e tw o schools o f M im am sa, th e B h a tta a n d th e P ra b h a k a ra , th e re is d ifference in view a b o u t th e factors in v o lv ed in a n in ju n c tiv e sentence. A c co rd in g to K u m a rila B h a tta , every c o m m a n d to d o so m eth in g raises th re e q u e stio n s: W h a t sh o u ld b e done? H o w is i t to b e done? a n d W h o is to d o it? A c o m m a n d o r law sh o u ld b e o b ey ed b ec au se i t is a law , n o t b ecau se o f a n y p ro fit m o tiv e o r fe ar o f p u n ish m e n t. K u m a r ila ’s view w as t h a t n o b o d y w o u ld a c t w ith o u t a p u rp o se . A c c o rd in g to th e tw o schools o f M im am sa, every co m p lete sen tence m u st satisfy these b asic psychological re q u ire m e n ts.

T h e M im am sa schools h e ld th a t th e fin ite v e rb is th e c e n tra l elem en t in a sentence. I t consists o f tw o elem ents: th e v erb al ro o t (dhdtu) a n d th e v erb al suffix {pratyaya). O f these tw o, th e M im am sakas h e ld th a t th e v e rb a l suffix is sem an tically m o re im p o rta n t th a n th e ro o t. T h e v e rb a l suffix den o tes bhavand o r th e efficient force, w h ich is d efin ed as th a t ac tiv ity w h ic h b rin g s so m eth in g in to b ein g, “ b h a v itu r b h a v a n u k u IaIi b h a v a k a v y a p a ra v ise sa h ,” th e o p eratio n o f th e o p e ra to r conducive to th e p ro d u c tio n o f th e result. Bhavand in tu r n is o f tw o k in d s : iabdi bhavand a n d arthi bhavand. T h e in ju n c tiv e sen tence induces th e h e a re r to p erfo rm som e ac tio n , w h ich is d e n o te d b y th e o p ta tiv e suffix Iin ; this ty p e is th e iabdi bhavand. T h e arthi bhavand is b ase d o n i t a n d is th e activ ity o f th e a g e n t t h a t leads to th e result. I n th e Bhdvandmveka, M a n d a n a M isra defines bhavand as th e absence o f in a c tiv ity in g en e ral (auddsirvyavicchittisdmdnyariipa). T h e M im am sakas a n d th e N aiyayikas accep ted in d iv id u a l w ords a n d th e ir in d e p e n d e n t m eanings. T h e B h a tta schools a c cep ted th e abhihitdnvaya th e o ry o f v e rb a l com prehension, according to w h ich th e w ords in a sen tence escape th e ir isolated m ean in g s a n d th e sy n tactic co n n ectio n a m o n g th e m is fo u n d th ro u g h secondary m ean in g . T h e P ra b h a k a ra school h e ld th a t th e w ords them selves conveyed th e ir in d iv id u a l m ean ings a n d th e syntactic re la tio n (the anvitdbhidhana th e o ry ). T h e N y a y a school espoused th e association th e o ry o f v erb al co m p rehension a n d h e ld t h a t th e sy n tactic con n ectio n a m o n g w o rd m eanings is o b ta in e d th ro u g h th e samsargamaryddd, th e pow er o f m u tu a l association. I n nilo ghatah, “ a b lack p o t” , th e syntactic re la tio n b etw een th e tw o w o rd m ean in g s is id e n tity ; it is conveyed th ro u g h th e p o w er o f associa­ tio n , called samsargamaryddd b y th e L ogicians. I t is n o t directly conveyed b y a n y elem en t in th e sentence. I f th e u n d erly in g sy n tactic re la tio n b etw een th e elem ents in a sentence is conveyed th ro u g h som e m o rp h e ­ m ic elem en t in th e surface s tru c tu re itself, i t is called prakara. T h u s in th e p h ra se dhanyena dhanavan, “ possessed o f w e a lth in th e form o f g ra in s,” th e re la tio n o f id e n tity o f dhanya a n d dhana is conveyed b y th e in stru ­ m e n ta l e n d in g ena (dhdnydbhinnadhanavan). T h u s a d istin ctio n is m a d e b etw een th e tw o types, o n e in w h ich th e sy n tactic re la tio n is in h e re n t in th e c o n stitu e n t elem ents a n d th e o th e r in w h ic h th is re la tio n is ab sen t a n d h as to b e fo u n d th ro u g h im p lic a tio n o r suggestion. E v ery v erb al ro o t consists o f tw o elem en ts: phala, “ th e re su lt,” a n d vydpdra, “ a n ac tiv ity .” T h u s th e m e a n in g o f every ro o t ca n b e an aly zed as a k in d o f ac tiv ity p ro d u c in g som e resu lt. T h u s pac, “ to cook,” m ean s viklithydnukula vydpdra, a n ac tiv ity conducive to th e softening. I n a tran sitiv e sen ten ce th e activ ity p erta in s to th e a g e n t (kartr) a n d th e re su lt o f th e o p e ra tio n accrues to th e object. I n this c h a p te r a n d th e p re ced in g ones w e h av e show n how th e

G ram m arian p hilosophers d evelop ed a con sisten t system for h a n d lin g tech n ica l g ram m atical issues as w ell as ep istem ology an d m etaphysics. T ru e to th e In d ia n trad ition th e p h ilosop h y o f G ram m ar h as sh ow n itse lf to b e b o th a m ean s o f th eoretical k n ow led ge a n d a spiritual d iscip lin e lea d in g to moksa or release. T h e G ram m arians b egan sim p ly w ith th e in v estigation s o f w ords, o f h o w to m a n ip u la te an d acq u ire th em . B ut th is system atic stu d y o f overt sp eech le d to a n aw areness o f h igh er a n d h igh er levels o f la n g u a g e u n til th e W ord A b solu te, S ab d a B rahm an, w as d iscovered. F rom th is m etap h ysical p ersp ective, S ab d a B rahm an is th e u n d erlyin g p rin cip le o f u n ity th a t m akes p ossib le a ll diversity. For th e p h ilo sop h y o f G ram m ar th e d ivision o f sp eech in to words an d letters is a co n v en ien t fictio n m a d e for p ed a g o g ica l purposes, to tea ch w ords w ith p recision a n d eco n o m y o f effort. T h e b asic d ivision o f sen ten ces in to w ords a n d w ords in to bases (nouns an d verb roots) w ith th eir respective suffixes is seen to b e p h en o m en a l a n d n o t u lti­ m a tely real. A clear analysis o f a h ierarch y o f levels o f la n g u a g e is offered from o v ert or vaikharl sp eech to in tern al or madhyama speech, w ith a ll o f th ese levels b ein g p reced ed lo g ica lly b y a m o re u n itary stage, paiyanti, in w h ic h th ere is n o seq u en ce o f w ords b u t ju st a glim p se o f th e sep a ra tio n o f w ord a n d m e a n in g — th e in ten tio n a iity o f th e prim or­ d ial u rge to express onself. A ll o f th ese con cep ts presu p pose a u n itary g ro u n d o u t o f w h ich d istin ctio n is m an ifested . T h is g ro u n d is called S a b d a B rah m an b ecau se th e ap p roach to this A b so lu te (B rah m an ) an d th e m an ifestation o f it is th rou gh w ords (Jabda). T h e p h ilo so p h ical an alysis o f la n g u a g e offered in th e G ram m arian literature th a t follow s is n o t ju st a logical exercise to satisfy in tellectu a l cu riosity, b u t a n earn est a n d su stained spiritual ap p roach to id en tify o n self w ith th e g rou n d o f all sp eech p h en o m en a , S ab d a B rahm an. T h e p h ilo so p h y o f G ram m ar sees itse lf fin ally as a straigh t p ath w ay to u ltim a te freedom (rrwksamanam&m ajihmd rajapaddhatih) .

PART TWO SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE OF GRAMMARIAN PHILOSOPHY

I PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN VEDIC LITERATURE John G. Arapura and K. Kunjunni Raja

Rg Veda T h e earliest available litera tu re , th e R g Veda, contains glow ing trib u tes to th e pow er o f speech. T o th e V edic seers, w ho w ere feeing th e problem o f com m unicating th e ir m ystic experiences, language was n a tu ra lly a n object o f w onder a n d reverence. M a n y o f th e la te r philosophical theories on language m ay b e seen in a subtle form in th e V edic litera tu re itself. T h e re a re th re e hym ns th a t d e a l m ainly w ith divine Speech (Vac) : th e Asyavamiya hym n (1.164), w hich is one o f th e m ost p h ilo­ sophical hym ns o f th e Rg Veda, b u t full o f difficult sym bols; 10.71 on th e origin o f language, w hich has been subjected to a g re a t deal o f in te r­ p re ta tio n b y la te r G ram m arian s; a n d 10.125, w here th e Goddess o f Speech, V a g a m b h rn i3 herself describes h e r pow er a n d functions. (T hese follow p arap h rases of these th re e hym ns.) Asyavamiya H y m n T h e seer D irg h ata m a s asks th e question: “ I ask th ee a b o u t th e u ltim a te ab o d e o f speech,” a n d answers “ th e u ltim a te ab o d e o f speech is this B ra h m a n .” T h e place o f Vac is a t th e peak o f th e universe. “ O n th e to p o f yonder sky, they say, is Vac, w ho knows all, b u t does n o t e n te r a ll” (verse 10). Vac has been divided in to four p arts. T hose B rahm ins w ith insight know th em . T h re e p a rts th a t a re h id d en in th e cave, th e m ortals do n o t activate. T h ey speak only th e fo u rth p a rt (verse 4 5 ) .1 T h e seer D irg h atam as tells us th a t Vac, like a bull, low ed a n d thus fashioned th e tu m ultuous, chaotic floods (verse 4 1 ). B ut she h a d also

produced th e akfara, th e p erm anent syllable w ith w hich th e chaotic m aterial was to be organized. She tau g h t it to Agni. Vac possessed the aksara of th e Rg (verses 39, 4 2 ), w ho possesses a thousand aksaras. T h e sam e Vac is described by th e Brahm ins by different nam es: Agni, Y am a, a n d M atarisvan (verse 46). Vac is also identified w ith th e river Sarasvati. I n th e B rahm anas the tw o are equated: “Y our inexhaustible breast, Sarasvati, a source of delight w ith w hich you cause all th e choicest things to flourish, w hich grants treasure, bestows w ealth, confers good food— present th a t here to be sucked” (verse 4 9 ). Bg Veda 10.71 Brhaspati ! W hen they cam e forth to establish th e first beginning of language, setting up names, w h at has been hidden in th em as their best a n d p urest good becam e m anifest th rough love. ( I ) W hen th e sages fashioned language w ith th eir thought, filtering it like parched grain th rough a sieve, friends recognized their fHends. T h e ir beauty is m arked on their language. (2) T hey tra c ed th e course of language th ro u g h ritu a l; they found it em bodied in th e seers. T hey gained access to it and distributed it widely; th e seven chanters cheered them . (3 ) M any w ho look do n o t see language, m any who listen do n o t hear her. She reveals herself like a loving a n d w ell-adorned wife to her husband, only to some. (4) A lthough all th e friends have eyes a n d ears, their m en tal intuitions are uneven. Som e a re like shallow ponds, w hich reach up to th e m outh or a rm p it; others are like ponds th a t are fit for bathing. (7) H ere the contrast betw een th e two types o f people is clearly indicated—those who see Vac a n d understand h er an d those who see the form b u t do n ot understand her. T h e V edic seers were not claim ing to be composers o f the hym ns, rath e r th e seers o f an eternal, im personal tru th . Bg Veda 10.125 H ere Vac is a personal deity. I travel w ith th e R udras a n d th e Vasus, th e A dityas and the V isvedevah. Both V a ru n a an d M itra do I support, In d ra , Agni, and th e Alvins. ( I ) I am th e sustainer an d nourisher o f Soma, T vastr, Pusan, a n d Bhaga. I bestow w ealth on th e zealous p a tro n o f the sacrifice who m akes the oblation an d presses th e Som a. (2) I am th e queen, th e gatherer o f treasures, th e one w ith penetrating perception, th e first o f those who should be worshipped. T h e gods have

distributed m e m anifoldly a n d caused (the chants) to enter m any places. (3) I am th e one through whose maya everyone sees, breathes, a n d hears. (4) I am th e lone speaker o f welcoming words for th e feast to th e gods a n d m en. W hoever is m y favorite, him I m ake powerful, a tru e knower o f th e mystic pow er, a rsi a n d an intelligent m an. (5) I stretch the bow for R u d ra so th a t his arrow m ay reach the h a te r of religion a n d destroy him . I rouse th e battle fury for th e people. I have p enetrated heaven a n d earth. (6) I breathe like th e w ind supporting all th e worlds. Beyond th e sky, beyond this ea rth so great h ave I becom e by m y m ight. (8) T he V edic seers believed th a t m etaphysical knowledge can be h ad through transcendental vision by th e exercise o f m ental concentration. I t is a sort o f intuition. T h e source o f all tru e knowledge is Vac, who m ay com m unicate it to whomsoever she favors. Rg Veda 1.164.37 deals w ith th e question o f m an ’s self-knowledge. “ W h at This is I know n o t (w hat I am in reality I know n o t). Shackled in m ind, I move about. As th e first b orn o f rta has approached m e, th en I got a portion o f th a t Vac.” This first b orn of rta is A gni; Agni possesses a p a rt of Vac, has a function in the cosmos, a n d is im m ortal. H ere Vac m ust be clearly understood as Logos, a n d its connection w ith self-knowledge is a sem inal thought already exhibited by this text. F urtherm ore, its connection w ith rta is significant, because the latte r stands for th e regularity, invariability, a n d consistency of such param o u n t im portance in th e Logos insofar as it is th e ratio th a t goes w ith it. T h e idea th a t th e im perishable Vac (W ord/Logos) is th e first b o m of rta shows u p again in the Taittiriya Brdhmana 2.8.8.5 (“ V ag aksaram prath am aja rtasya” ). Now the question ab o u t Vdc a n d the question ab o u t th e self are n o t associated w ith each o ther accidentally, for, on th e contrary, th a t they are related a t th e greatest depth becomes evident in th e B rahm anas a n d th e U panisads. Cows are often used as symbols for Vac. A ncient texts on etymology a n d in terp retatio n inform us th a t "cow ” stands for speech. T he Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (5.8.1) says th a t “ one should m editate on speech as a m ilch-cow.” T h e deity Vdc was identified w ith Sarasvati in th e Atharva Veda (5.7.5) as Vdc S arasvati; also in th e Brahm anas. I n th e Rg Veda, Sarasvati is an earthly river, 1.164; 49 foreshadows th e later identification. O ne o f th e m ost rem arkable characteristics of th e Vedas is th a t the tw o aspects of Vac, w hich m ay be distinguished as th e revealing w ord a n d th e w ord in invocation (or rec ita tio n ), are a t root th e same. T h e integrity of these two is quite significant in th e way th e Logos functions in th e V edas. A nd it is because Vac as th e Logos is th e basis o f th e ratio

th a t ra tio c in a tio n has th e p o te n tia l to a c t as th e op en d o o r to tru th (satya), th o u g h b y itself it ca n nev er realize its ow n po ten tiality . B ut this fru stratin g in cap acity o f ra tio c in a tio n teaches a positive lesson too, n am ely, th a t as th in k in g (manana) i t is d ep e n d en t on, a n d follows, th e h ea rin g (Jraaana) o f th e Vac a n d th a t it also leads th e w ay to th e d eep er th in k in g called nididhyasana. T h e p rim a ry com plem ent to th e m ystery o f self-revelation, in d eed to th e very concrete possibility o f it, is th e o th e r m ystery, nam ely, th a t o f th e release o f tru th th e invoking w o rd signifies. W ith b o th these, m a n ’s pow er to know encounters its ow n transcendence. T h e unfolding o f all these h id d e n dim ensions takes place in th e U p an isad s. Atharoa Veda S tanzas 1--47 o f R g Veda 1.164 a re re p ro d u ce d w ith som e variations, omissions, a n d ad d itions in Atharva Veda as hym ns 9.9 (Rg Veda, 1-22) a n d 9.10 (Rg Veda 2 3 -4 7 ). S tanzas 4 8 -5 2 o iR g Veda 1.164 a re om itted. I t m a y m ean th a t Rg Veda 1.164 is a b le n d o f tw o hym ns originally separate. Upanisads E q u a tin g o f B rah m an w ith speech is also found in th e U p an isad ic lite ratu re . “ Speech, tru ly , is B ra h m a n ” (“ V a g v ai b ra h m e ti” , Brhadaranyaka Upanisad, 4 .1 .2 ). H e re Brahman is defined as one reality , w ith o u t a second, w h ich is id en tical w ith speech. T h e Mandukya Upanisad (3.3) tries to link this absolute, w hich is u nsp eak ab le, w ith th e speakable th ro u g h speech itself “ b y creatin g th e d eep ly m eaningful sym bol o f a u m w hich traversing th e p h enom enal levels o f consciousness, w aking, dream in g , a n d deep, sleep reaches o u t b eyond to th e tran sc en d en t w here th e sound itself comes to a n e n d .” B rah m an , id en tical w ith speech, is also id en tical w ith a u m . J u s t as leaves a re h e ld to g eth er b y a stalk, so is all speech h e ld to g eth er by a u m (Chandogya Upanifad 2.23.3). T h e supersensuous vision o f Vac is th e u ltim a te experience o f th e R eal. F o r th e U p a n isa d ic seers this in tu itio n o f th e self has a n in tern a l, ra th e r th a n a n ex tern al, focus in its sym bolic expression. U d d a la k a ’s teach in g in th e S advidya passage o f Chandogyopanisad refers to th e ro le o f Vac o r lan g u ag e in th e m anifestation o f th e w orld (“ V a c a ra m b h a n a m v ik aro n am ad h e y am m rttik ety ev a saty am ,” 6 .1 .3 ). I n clay p ro d u cts clay alone is th e real (satya), w hile th e p ro d u c t such as a p o t o r a b o w l is th e creatio n o f Vac in its d u a l role o f n am e a n d form (namarupa), th e ap p earances. Vac represents B rah m an as th e p ow er fill a n d creative w ord.

T h e re a re several a n c ie n t statem en ts q u o te d in B h a rtrh a ri5S vrtti on his Vakyapadiya p ro c la im in g th e greatness o f th e goddess o f speech. M a n y o f th e m h a v e n o t b ee n id en tified . I t is Vac a lo n e th a t c reated th e e n tire u n iv erse ; th e im m o rta l a n d m o rta l— all cam e from Vac. I t is Vdc t h a t sees objects, th a t talks a b o u t th e m ; F e e a lo n e b rin g s o b je c ts to g e th e r; i t is th ro u g h Vac th a t th e w o rld becom es m an y , th a t o n e re a lity tran sfo rm s itse lf in to m an y . T h is a ttitu d e o f h ig h a p p re c ia tio n o f la n g u ag e finds its echo in th e w o rd s o f D a n d in in th e KavyadarSa (1 .3 ) : “ T h e e n tire w o rld w o u ld h a v e b ee n p lu n g e d in darkness, i f th e lig h t in th e form o f lan g u ag e h a d n o t b e e n sh in in g th ro u g h o u t.55 I t m ay , how ever, b e n o te d th a t U p a n is a d ic seers h av e a t tim es spoken also a b o u t th e ab so lu te re a lity as b e in g b ey o n d th e ra n g e o f la n g u ag e a n d m in d , to p o in t o u t th e in a d e q u a c y o f la n g u a g e to reveal R e a lity fully a n d clearly; for exam ple, “ F ro m w h ich th e w ords, as w ell as th e m in d , re tu r n u n a b le to a p p ro a c h it.55 VedaAgas T h e re a re six VedSAgas o r a u x iliary sciences in th e stu d y o f th e V e d as; Siksa (p h o n e tic s), vyakarana (g ra m m a r), chandas (m e te r), nirukta (ety m o lo g y ), kalpa (ru b rics a b o u t rites a n d ritu a ls ), a n d jyotisa (astro­ n o m y /astro lo g y ). T h e first four a re linguistic disciplines a n d th e o th er tw o a re non lin guistic. P honetics, g ra m m a r, a n d m e te r a re tra d itio n a lly assigned th e task o f safeg u ard in g th e so u n d asp ect o f th e w ords in th e V ed as, k eep in g th e o ra l tra d itio n in ta c t. Nirukta is co n cern ed w ith th e co rrec t in te rp re ta tio n o f th e w ords o f th e V e d ic te x t, a n d i t goes h a n d in h a n d w ith vyakarana. Y aska says th a t a know ledge o f g ra m m a r is a p re req u isite to th e stu d y o f nirukta. T h e v alid ity o f nirukta is based o n th e fa ct t h a t it follows from a long tra d itio n fro m th e B rah m an as them selves. L ik e th e Siksas, th e pratiSakhyas w ere also d ev o ted to th e p reserv atio n o f th e co rrec t p ro n u n c ia tio n for th e tex ts o f th e V e d ic mantras a n d d id th e ir w o rk w ith m eticulous care, p rescrib in g ru les for prosody, phonetics, ac c e n tu a tio n , a n d th e ru les o f eu p h o n ic co m b in atio n . T h e te rm in d icates th a t it is a p ra c tic a l h a n d b o o k for ea ch school o f th e V edas. T h e re is a m a x im th a t in case o f conflict b etw een th e Siksa a n d th e pratiSakhya, th e pratiSakhya is to b e follow ed. W h ile vyakarana deals w ith linguistic analysis to d e te rm in e th e ex act form o f w ords, nirukta is co n cern ed w ith linguistic analysis o f th e w ords to g et th e p ro p e r m e a n in g o f th e w ords in th e context. N irukta e m p h a ­ sizes th e d e riv a tio n o f difficult a n d a p p a re n tly u n a n a ly z a b le term s. T h e UnddisiZtras ta k e a n in te rm e d ia te sta n d p o in t a n d try to analy ze irre g u la r term s, u sin g to a g re a t ex ten t P a n in i5S tech n iq u e .

T h e earliest a tte m p ts a t th e in te rp re ta tio n o f V e d ic mantras is fo u n d in th e B rah m an as them selves, th o u g h n o t in a system atic m a n n e r. E x p lain in g th e ritu alistic b a c k g ro u n d a n d p o in tin g o u t th e esoteric significance u n d erly in g th e ritu als, th e y le d th e w ay for th e ritu alistic (adhiyajna) a n d m etap h y sical (adhyatma) in te rp re ta tio n s o f th e V edas, th o u g h th e em phasis is o n th e form er. I n his Nirukta Y ask a refers to th e a n c ie n t view th a t th e mantras o f th e R g Veda a d m it o f a threefold in te rp re ta tio n — from th e p o in t o f view o f th e p erfo rm an ce o f religious rites (adhiyajna), w ith reference to th e deities (adhidevata), a n d w ith reference to th e soul (adhyatman) . T h e re w as also a fo u rth w ay o f in te r­ p re tin g th e V edas, th e h isto rical o r aitihasika, considering th a t th e gods m en tio n e d in th e te x t a re in d iv id u a ls figuring in legends a n d n arrativ es. I t is g en erally a c c e p te d th a t a te x t n ee d n o t h a v e a n ab so lu te single m ean in g . T h e V ed ic poets like ellipses, d o u b le m eanings, a n d obscurities. T h & Satapatha Brahmana (6.1.1.2) says th a t th e gods like su b tle w ays (“ p a ro k sa p riy a h i d e v a ta h ” ). T h e Brhaddevata, a n o th e r a n c ie n t tool o f V e d ic exegesis, ascrib ed to S au n ak a, co n tain s som e discussions a b o u t lan guage. A t 11.117, it says th a t a sen ten ce is a collection o f w ords, a w o rd is a collection o f p h o n ­ em es. A n d a t 11.118, i t says t h a t th e m e a n in g o f V e d ic passages has to b e u n d ersto o d w ith th e h e lp o f c o n tex tu a l facto rs: th e p u rp o se to b e served (artha), th e subject m a tte r u n d e r discussion (prakarana), a n in d icatio n from a n o th e r p la c e (IiAga), p ro p rie ty , th e p lace, a n d th e tim e. T h is re q u ire m e n t applies even to o rd in a ry sentences.

2 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN YASKA’S NIRUKTA K. Kunjunni Raja

T h e JVirukta1 by Y aska (fifth c e n tu ry B . C . ) is a co m m en tary o n th e JVighanpu o r collection o f V ed ic w ords, discussing th e etym ology in co ntext. JVirukta is o n e o f th e Vedangas o r ancillaries to th e stu d y o f th e V edas, Y aska is g en erally considered to b e e a rlier th a n P a n in i; b u t P a u l T h ie m e holds th a t Y aska k new P a n in i’s w o rk .2 C a rd o n a thinks t h a t it is b e tte r to leave o p e n th e q u estio n o f p rio rity o f o n e o v er th e o th e r.3 Y aska follows a lo n g tra d itio n in th e B rah m an as o f giving th e etym ological e x p la n a tio n o f w ords. C ritics w ho fin d som e o f his etym o­ logies fanciful forget this fact. H e w a n te d etym ology to w ork h a n d in h a n d w ith g ra m m a r. H e stressed th e im p o rta n c e o f considering th e c o n te x t w h ile ex p lain in g th e m e a n in g a n d etym ology o f w ords. T h e sam e w o rd co u ld b e d eriv e d a n d ex p lain e d in d iffe ren t w ays to suit d ifferen t contexts. Y ask a’s D efinitions o f th e V e rb a n d th e N o u n “ A v erb is chiefly co n c ern e d w ith bhdva, w hereas n o u n s h a v e sattva as th e c h ief elem e n t in th e ir m e a n in g .” 4 T h e te rm hhava is d eriv ed from th e ro o t bhu, m e a n in g “ to beco m e,” a n d th e te rm sattva is d eriv e d fro m th e ro o t as, m e a n in g “ to b e .” T h ese tw o roots, as a n d bhu, a re alm o st synonym ous a n d m e a n “ to exist.” JVirukta 1.2 refers w ith a p p ro v a l to th e view o f V a rsa y a n i th a t th e re a re six m odes for th is bhava o r “ b eco m in g .” V a rsa y a n i says th a t th e re a re six m odes for bhava'. a th in g com es in to existence, exists, changes, grow s, decays, a n d ceases to exist.6 O n e o f these m odes, “ exists” (asti) is d eriv e d fro m th e sam e ro o t as sattva, h e n c e th e re is a possibility o f confusion.

B h a rtrh a ri ex p lain s t h a t re a lity (satta), w h e n i t a p p e a rs in a te m p o ra l seq u e n ce in v ario u s p a r tic u la r th in g s, is c a lle d kriyd o r bhava a n d , w h e n v iew ed w ith o u t a n y su ch te m p o ra l seq u en ce, is c a lle d sattva. T h u s, sattva a n d bhava a re tw o asp ects o f th e sam e existence seen fro m th e sta tic a n d th e d y n a m ic p o in ts o f view , resp ectiv ely .6 Y ask a h im self h a s su g g ested th e sam e b y saying, “ T h e v e rb in d ic a te s th e a c tio n , w h ic h tak es p la c e in a te m p o ra l seq u e n ce .” 7 A n d P a tafijali says t h a t ev e n v e rb a l n o u n s h a v e th e s ta tic ele m e n t p re d o m in a tin g th e ir m e a n in g .8 A u d u m b a r a y a n a ’s T h e o ry “ I t is th e s ta te m e n t as a w h o le t h a t is re g u la rly p re s e n t in th e p e rc e p tiv e fa cu lty o f th e h e a r e r .” 9 A c c o rd in g to th e in te rp re ta tio n o f th is p assag e, A u d u m b a ra y a n a a n d V a r tta k s a h e ld th e view t h a t i t is o n ly th e sen ten c e t h a t is re a lly fo u n d in th e m in d s o f th e sp e a k e r a n d th e lis te n e r; th ere fo re , th e fo u rfo ld classification o f w o rd s in to n o u n s (naman), v erb s (akhyata), p re p o sitio n s (upasarga), a n d p artic le s (nipata) h a s n o ab so lu te v alid ity . A u d u m b a r a y a n a ’s th e o ry is co n sid ered th e fo re ru n n e r o f B h a rtrh a ri’s sphofa th e o ry .10 D e riv a tio n o f N o u n s fro m V e rb a l R o o ts T h e fu n d a m e n ta l assu m p tio n o f th e etym ologist w as t h a t n o u n s w ere d e riv e d fro m v e rb a l roots. Y ask a g en e rally su b scrib e d to this view , a n d w e fin d in h is N irukta th e te n d e n c y , o ften m e c h a n ic a l, to d eriv e w ords fro m im a g in a ry roots, as in th e case o f pumdn fro m pums. S a k a ta y a n a , to w h o m o n e tra d itio n a sc rib e d th e Unadisutras a n d w h o is m e n tio n e d b y b o th P a n in i a n d Y aska, seem s to h a v e b e e n a s ta u n c h a d v o c a te o f th is th e o ry . B u t G a rg y a a n d som e o f th e G ra m m a ria n s h e ld a m o re so b e r v iew t h a t i t is n o t possible t o tr a c e a ll n o u n s to v e rb a l ro o ts.11 F o llo w in g G a rg y a , Y a sk a discussed th e p ro s a n d cons o f th is p ro b le m . I f all n o u n s a r e d e riv e d fro m v e rb a l ro o ts t h a t d e n o te a c tio n , o n th e o n e h a n d ev ery o b ject w ill h a v e as m a n y n a m e s as th e ac tio n s w ith w h ich i t is asso ciated, a n d o n th e o th e r h a n d e a c h n o u n c a n b e a p p lie d to as m a n y o b jects as a re asso ciated w ith a n a c tio n in d ic a te d b y th a t v e rb a l ro o t. T h u s th e te rm aiva, “ a h o rse ,” d e riv e d fro m th e ro o t aS, “ to m o v e ,” w o u ld h a v e to b e a p p lie d to a c a m e l as w ell, a n d fo r a p illa r t h a t sta n d s u p rig h t fixed to a h o le a n d jo in s a b e a m , d iffe ren t n am es in d ic a tin g th ese d iffe re n t asp ects w o u ld h a v e to b e a p p lie d . Y a sk a’s e x p la n a tio n o f this p ro b le m is t h a t th e w o rd s a re u sed n a tu r a l­ ly (svabhdvatah) . L a n g u a g e d esig n ates th in g s in a n in c o m p le te m a n n e r ; it c a n choose o n ly o n e o f th e m a n y activ ities asso ciated w ith a n o b ject. In c id e n ta lly , this discussion also in d ic a te s th e e x p la n a tio n for th e p re sen ce o f synonym s a n d h o m o n y m s in la n g u a g e . Y aska accep ts th e g e n e ra l ru les t h a t all n o m in a l form s a r e to b e

derived from v erb al roots a n d th a t in deriving w ords p ro p e r a tte n tio n sh ould b e p a id to accen t, g ra m m a tica l form ation, a n d m ean in g . T h e p a rtic u la r rules m en tio n ed a re th e follow ing: (1 ) A n o m in al form is to b e d eriv ed from a v erb al ro o t t h a t h as th e sense o f th a t a c t w h ich solely belongs to th e th in g d en o ted by th e n o u n in su ch a w ay th a t its accen t a n d fo rm a tio n a re b ase d o n rules o f g ra m m a r, for exam ple, karaka from Ar. (2 ) W h en th e c u rre n t m e an in g o f a w o rd does n o t agree w ith th e m ean in g o f th e ro o t a p p a re n t in i t a n d w hen its n o m in al form ca n n o t b e developed in th e o rd in ary m a n n e r from th e ro o t b y th e rules of g ra m m a r, o ne should ta k e o n e’s sta n d on th e g en eral m ean in g only a n d ex plain th e w o rd th ro u g h its resem blance to th e v e rb a l or n o m in al form o f a ro o t w ith th e re la te d m eaning. F o r exam ple, hasta, “ a h a n d ,” sh ould b e d erived n o t from has, “ to la u g h ” a p p a re n t in it, b u t from han, “ to strik e” because th e h a n d is quick a t striking. (3) W h e n th e re is n o resem blance betw een a w o rd a n d an y form o f a ro o t th a t has its m ean in g , th e resem blance o r co m m unity o f even a single le tte r (vowel o r co nsonant) should b e th e basis o f etym ology. (4) E ven inflected case form s m a y b e ad ju sted to th e m eaning. (5) Sim ilarly, secondary (taddhita) derivatives (form ed b y a d d in g suffixes to n o u n s) a n d com pounds (w hether o f tw o o r m o re m em bers) should b e b ro ken do w n in to th e ir com ponent elem ents a n d th e com ­ p o n e n t elem ents explained. O n e should never give u p th e a tte m p t a t d eriv atio n (“ n a tv ev a n a n irb ru y a t” ). S econdary M ea n in g (Laksana) Y aska knew th a t in etym ology th e sem antic aspect is as im p o rta n t as th e p h o n etic aspect; a w o rd m a y b e a p p lie d to a th in g th ro u g h sim ilarity o f m e a n in g as well, th ro u g h m etap h o ric transfer. H e was also aw are o f o n o m atopoeia (Sabdanukrti) as a factor in th e n am in g o f som e birds, such as kaka; also dundubhi is d erived sim ilarly. B ut h e does n o t m e n tio n secondary m e a n in g (Iaksand) explicitly. Y aska’s aim w as to ex p lain V e d ic w ords in th e contexts o f th e V edic passages them selves; h en c e to su it th e contexts h e gave different d eri­ v atio n s for th e sam e w o rd as i t o cc u rre d in d ifferent contexts. M ean in g w as th e p rin c ip a l elem ent to w h ich o th e r elem ents w ere su b o rd in ated . Y aska w as co n cern ed m ain ly w ith th e p rim a ry sense o f w ords a n d d id n o t p ay m u c h a tte n tio n to th e im p o rtan ce o f m etap h o ric m eaning. T h u s th e te rm asura referrin g to th e gods a n d th e sam e te rm referrin g to th e dem ons a re differently d eriv ed ; h e does n o t consider th a t th e la tte r sense is th ro u g h pejo rativ e tendency. I t m a y b e n o te d h ere th a t even P a n in i d id n o t recognize m e tap h o ric tran sfer as a n extension o f th e p rim a ry sense, a n d h e gave sep a rate en u m eratio n o f th e use o f th e co n tain er for th e co n tain ed am o n g th e m eanings o f th e n om in ativ e case,

Classification o f W ords Y aska divided Sanskrit words in to four p a rts o f speech: noun, verb, preposition, a n d particle. A verb is concerned w ith dynam ic activity involving th e tim e factor, w hile nouns represent static things.12 Sarvanaman (pronouns) are also recognized. R egarding prepositions, Yaska says th a t Sakatayana held th e view th a t a preposition detached from th e verb has no m eaning, th a t it is only suggestive (dyotaka). G argya held th e opposite view, th a t prepositions do have a m eaning. Yaska seems to have agreed w ith G argya, for he enum erates tw enty preposi­ tions together w ith th eir m eanings.

3 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PANINI’S ASTADHYAYI K. Kunjunni Raja

P a n in i’s Asfadhyayi o f th e fifth c e n tu ry B.C.1 is a co m p lete g ra m m a r o f th e S an sk rit lan g u ag e, in c lu d in g th e V ed ic lan g u ag e. I n eig h t ch a p te rs, e a c h su b d iv id ed in to fo u r padas, i t co n tain s a b o u t fo u r th o u sa n d ru les in sutra style, p re ced e d b y ab b re v ia tio n rules g ro u p in g th e p h o n em es o f S anskrit. T h e swtras refer to gro u p s o f v erb al roots idhatu) a n d o f n o m in a l bases (gana), h en c e th e dhatupafha a n d th e ganapafha form ad ju n cts to th e w ork. I t is believed t h a t m ean in g s w ere a tta c h e d to th e ro o ts la te r b y B him asena a n d d id n o t form p a r t o f th e o riginal. T h e UnadisUtras as th e y survive to d a y a re n o t P a n in i5S. P a n in i refers to te n ea rlie r a u th o rities, m o st o f th e m p resu m ab ly g ra m m a rian s. H e also refers to differences in th e usage o f w ords b y p e o p le in d iffe ren t p a rts o f In d ia (“ n o rth e rn e rs, 55 “ easterners, 55 a n d so o n ) . C o n sid erab le th o u g h t h a d b e e n d ev o ted before P a n in i to ph o n o lo g ical a n d g ra m m a tic a l statem en ts. O n th e basis o f all o f th ese a n d his ow n observations o f th e lan g u ag e, P a n in i com posed th e Asfadhyayii w h ich rem ain s a m o n u m e n ta l w ork, even now , as a m odel o f d escrip tiv e g ra m m a r. C u ltu ra l U sag e o f L an g u a g e P a n in i uses th e te rm bhdsa (speech) for th e S anskrit spoken b y th e c u ltu re d a n d e d u c a te d p eo p le (Hsfa). T h e y a re th e fin al a u th o rity in th e case o f lan g u ag e, says P a ta n j ali, w ho p o in ts o u t th e im p o rta n c e o f c u ltiv ated usage in m a n y p laces.2 P a n in i (or K a ty a y a n a ) says t h a t th e a u th o rity o f th e p o p u la r usage o f w ords (aijijna) m u st supersede th e a u th o rity o f th e m e a n in g d ep en ­ d e n t o n d e riv a tio n .8 T h e m eanings o f w ords (th e relatio n s betw een

w ord (Jabda) a n d m eaning (artha) ) are also established b y p o p u lar usage.4 D erivation o f N ouns from V erb al R oots P an in i generally accepts th e view th a t verbal roots are th e basic u n its to w hich affixes are added. B ut h e does n o t accept S ak atay a n a’s view th a t all nouns a re derivable from v erb al roots. T h e Unddisutras, explaining th e derivation o f irre g u la r nouns from v erbal roots, a re n o t P a n in i’s, th o u g h P an in i w as aw are of such attem p ts (3.3.1, 3.4.75). P atan jali refers to such irre g u la r nouns as n o n derivable nom inal bases.® P a n in i seem s to accep t G argya’s view th a t it is n o t possible to derive all nouns from v erb al roots.® S yntax P an in i is m ain ly concerned w ith th e form ation o f correct words. B ut syntax is n o t com pletely excluded. H is system im plies a sentence analysis, a n d his discussion o f com pound form ations is based on syn­ tactic considerations. R u le 2.1.1 is samarthah padavtdhih, “ a n o p eratio n involving tw o or m ore w ords (padas) applies only to such w ords as a re syntactically a n d sem antically re la ted .” T h e term samarthya is explained b y P atan jali a n d K a ty a y a n a as im plying u n ity o f sem antic function (ekarthibhava) a n d m u tu a l syntactic connection (paraspara vyapeksa). T h u s P a n in i’s concept o f a sentence seems to b e alm ost th e sam e as th a t o f Jaim in i, w hose Mimamsasutra defines i t th u s : “ A g roup o f w ords serving a single purpose forms a sentence i f on analysis th e separate w ords a re found to h a v e m u tu a l expectancy.” 7 O f th e th ree conditions o f syntactic u n ity for a sentence, nam ely, m u tu a l expectancy (akaftksa), p h o n etic contiguity (sannidhi), a n d sem antic fitness (yogyatiz), th e first tw o are tacitly accepted by P an in i b u t n o t th e th ird . P an in i does n o t m ake a n y provision for a n u ttera n ce d erived b y his rules to b e sem antically a p p ro p ria te ; even deviant a n d sem antically u n accep tab le sentences can b e g ram m atically correct. P a n in i does n o t define a sentence (vakya). K a ty a y a n a ’s definition (ekatin vakyam), “ a sentence is th a t collection o f w ords h av in g one finite v erb ,” does n o t seem to reflect P a n in i’s view. P an in i’s rule “ a n item term in atin g in a v erb al ending (tin) has n o h ig h p itch ed vowel, after a n ite m th a t term in ates in a n ending o th e r th a n a verbal ending (tin atifiah) ” (8.1.28), shows th a t P an in i accepted th e possibility o f a finite v erb p reced ed b y a n o th er finite verb in th e sam e sentence.8 Laksana o r S econdary M ea n in g P an in i sanctions th e n o m in ativ e case e n d in g n o t only for th e n o m in a l stem no tio n (praHpodika) b u t also for in d icatin g th e a d d itio n al notions

o f g en d er, m easure a n d n u m b er. T h e ru le re a d s: “ T h e nom in ativ e en d in g is to b e a d d e d w hen th e re is n o th in g b u t th e n o m in al stem n o tio n , n o th in g b u t th e gen d er, n o th in g b u t th e m easure, n o th in g b u t th e n u m b e r55 (2.3.46). F ro m th e discussion o f th e te rm “ m easu re55 (parimana) in this ru le b y la te r w riters it is clear th a t P a n in i w a n te d to justify th e nom inative en d in g in tran sferred uses such as th a t o f th e c o n ta in e r for th e contained. J in e n d ra b u d d h i explains t h a t th e te rm parimana h ere is a n in d ic a to r (upalaksana) o f o th e r tran sferred senses, as in “ th e boy is a lio n 55 (simho mdnavakah') .9 T h e te rm “ m easu re55 sanctions use o f th e n o m in a­ tiv e in cases like “ a m easure o f g ra in 55 (prastho vrihih), in w h ich th e re is th e ad d itio n a l n o tio n o f b ein g m easu red b y ; hence even in cases like “ th e B rah m an a is fire,55 in w h ich th e ad d itio n a l n o tio n o f “ sim ilarity to th e fire55 is to b e in d icated , th e nom in ativ e en d in g is justified. F ro m th e p receding it is clear th a t P a n in i d id n o t accep t secondary m ean in g as a sep a rate function o f w ords, for otherw ise th e re w as n o n eed to in clu d e m easu re in th e siitra. E x p lain in g th e siitra 1.4.42, sadhakatamam karanam (“karana is th a t in stru m e n t w hich is th e m ost im m e d ia te o n e in accom plishing a c tio n 55), P a ta n ja li says th a t th e use o f th e su p erlativ e tama h e re is to in d icate th a t th e rules re la tin g to th e case endings (k&raka) m a y b e ap p lied even in ex ten d ed cases, n o t only to those expressly stated b u t also to those im p lied th ereby. T h u s instances o f im p lied usages o f secondary m ean in g co uld also co m e u n d e r th e scope o f th a t siitra. F o r exam ple, p ro x im ity c a n b e o n e o f th e im p lied m ean in g s o f th e locative case, a n d gafigayam gavah, “ cows o n th e G anges,55 c a n com e u n d e r th e p u rv iew o f th e ru le gov ern in g th e locative. R eference a n d U se T h e d u a l function o f a n expression to refer to b o th its ow n form a n d its m ean in g is n o ted by P anini. R u le 1.1.68 (“ svam ru p a m IabdasyaIab d asam jfia55) states th a t in his g ra m m a tica l tex t a n expression serves to d en o te itself unless it is a technical term . In o rd in a ry lan g u ag e a w o id n orm ally refers to its m ean in g unless i t is a q u o ta tio n ; a n d usually to in d ic a te th a t it is a q u o ta tio n th e w ord iti (th u s) is ad d e d a t th e e n d o f th e w ord q u o ted . B ut in g ram m atical m etalan g u ag e, a w o rd n orm ally refers to its ow n form except w hen it is a tech n ical term . T h e ru le agner dhak (4.3.23) in tro d u ces (jlhak eya after th e te rm agni; th e suffix is ap p lied to th e form agni a n d obviously n o t to its m e a n in g (or synonym s). W h e n iti is ad d e d to a n expression in a ru le, th e p re ced in g refers to th e m ean in g a n d n o t to th e fo rm ; th u s in na veti vibhdsa th e sanctioning optio n applies to th e m ean in g “ o r n o t55 a n d n o t to th e form na vd.10

4 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PAT AN JALFS M AHABH AS YA K. Kunjunni Raja

P a tan jali’s Mahabhasya of the second century b . c . is a n extensive discussion o f select rules from Panini an d K aty ay an a’s comments on them given in his varttikas. I t is n o t a full com m entary on P anini’s Aftadhyayi. I t incorporates K aty ay an a’s varttikas; it also contains varttika-like statem ents in verse (called tlokavdrttikas). I t is an elaborate com m entary th at analyzes each rule into its components, adding item s necessary to the understanding of the rule, giving examples and counterexam ples illustrating how th e rule operates an d discussing the need for the varttikas to bring out the full significance o f Panini’s sutra or to account for usages apparently n o t covered by the rule or against th e rule. Both K atyayana a n d P atanjali w anted to test th e validity an d consistency of the rules. Some scholars have suggested th a t histo­ rical changes in Sanskrit are responsible for K atyayana’s comments th a t modify and correct Panini. P atanjali often presents argum ents to support or reject several views, leaving it difficult to know his “ finally accepted view” (siddhdnta). As far as the philosophical ideas are concerned, P atanjali seems to have been influenced by V yadi’s Samgraha, which is not e x ta n t; he quotes m any ideas from th e Samgraha w ith approval. M ost of th e philo­ sophical ideas are found in th e introductory section. Sabda a n d Artha P atanjali discusses w hether th e relation betw een a linguistic item {tabda) an d its m eaning {artha) is perm anent or th e invention of someone. A linguistic item , according to th e gram m arian, is n o t m erely th e sound b u t th a t u n it (or symbol) which, w hen articulated, brings about th e notion o f the thing m ean t.1

“ W h a t is th e w ord ‘cow ’? I t is th a t b y m eans o f w hich, w h en u ttere d , th ere arises th e u n d erstan d in g o f creatures w ith dew lap, tail, hu m p , hooves, a n d h o rn s.” 2 T h e com m entators h av e m ad e it clear th a t th e term “ u tte re d ” (uccarita) is used in th e sense o f “ revealed” o r b ro u g h t to Hght (abhivyakta). T h u s PatanjaH lays special em phasis on th e fact th a t a Hnguistic item is a w ord only w hen it h as a m eaning. T his concept contradicts th e M im am sa view th a t a n aggregate o f letters, w hen m a n i­ fested, is a Hnguistic u ttera n ce, even w hen th ere is no m ean in g o r w hen th e m ean in g is n o t u n d ersto o d .3 A Hnguistic item is considered e tern al a n d n o t cap ab le o f being new ly pro d u ced . P atan jali says th a t one goes to a p o tte r requesting h im to m ak e a p o t so th a t one m ay use i t ; b u t one does n o t go to a g ra m m a ­ rian, w ith th e request to m ak e new w ords so th a t one m ay use them . A distinction is m ad e betw een absolute eternaH ty (kUtastha nityata) a n d th e p erm an en ce o f th e item s as used th ro u g h generations b y speakers (Jiravdhanityata). B h a rtrh a ri distinguishes betw een n o rm al p erm a n en t w ords in a lan g u age (ajdnika) a n d m o d ern technical term s coined by w riters Hke P an in i (adhunika). R eg ard in g th e m ean in g o f a w ord, th e problem discussed is w hether it is th e universal (jati) o r th e ind iv id u al (dravya). A ccording to PatanjaH , P an in i accep ted b o th as m eanings, a n d in eith er case “ m ean in g ” refers to som ething p e rm a n e n t.4 T h e re latio n betw een Hnguistic item a n d m ean in g is estabHshed (siddha) a n d is know n from th e usage o f edu cated people.5 A re L etters M eaningful? O n th e o ne h a n d , letters m a y be said to b e m eaningful, because m ean in g can b e understood from verbal roots, stems, suffixes, o r particles th a t consist o f a single letter, a n d also because th e su b stitu tio n o f a different le tte r can p ro d u ce a different m eaning, w hile th e absence o f a letter m a y m ak e it im possible to u n d ersta n d th e m eaning o f a w ord. O n th e o th er h a n d , it m ay also b e said th a t letters axe m eaningless in them selves, because a m eaning is n o t understood b y th e h e a re r from each letter separately.® P atanjaH does n o t give an y final answ er to this question. U n lik e B h artrh a ri, PatanjaH d id n o t consider th e w ord to b e a n indivisible a n d tim eless sym bol, a p a rt from th e letters th a t are revealed w h en th e w o rd is uttered . T h e P rim ary M ean in g o f a W ord PatanjaH discusses th e p ro b lem o f w h eth er th e p rim a ry m ean in g o f a nom inal w o rd is th e p a rtic u la r substantive o r th e universal essential a ttrib u te . A m ong g ram m arian s V yadi, a u th o r o f th e Sarrigrahai held th a t a w o rd p rim arily denotes a substance (dravya), w hile V a ja p y ay an a

h e ld th e M im a ip sa k a view t h a t i t is th e u n iv e rsa l (jati) t h a t form s th e p rim a ry m e a n in g o f a w o rd .7 P a ta n ja li says t h a t a c c o rd in g to P a n in i th e p rim a ry m e a n in g o f a w o rd is b o th th e u n iv e rsa l a n d th e p a rtic u la r, for sutra 1.2.588 is b ase d o n th e v iew t h a t a w o rd m e a n s th e u n iv ersa l, w h ile sutra 1.2.649 is b ase d o n th e a ssu m p tio n t h a t a w o rd m e a n s a p a rtic u la r.10 H e la ra ja says th a t a c c o rd in g to th e school o f P a n in i a w o rd m e a n s b o th th e u n iv ersa l a n d th e p a r tic u la r.11 B h a rtrh a ri discusses e la b o ra te ly th e v ario u s p ro b lem s in v o lv ed in th ese tw o view s a n d concludes t h a t w h e th e r th e m e a n in g o f a w o rd is th e u n iv ersa l o r th e su b stan ce i t is so m eth in g re a l a n d p e rm a n e n t. P a ta n ja li h a s also d efin e d a n “ in d iv id u a l” (dravya) as t h a t w h ic h does n o t lose its essence w h e n d iffe re n t q u a litie s com e to in h e re in it.12 P e rc e p tio n o f a T e m p o ra l Series P a tafijali a n d K a ty a y a n a discuss th e p ro b le m o f h o w a w o rd c a n b e g ra s p e d as a w hole, i f th e d iffe re n t so u n d s com e o n e a fte r a n o th e r in th e e x a c t o rd e r in w h ic h th e y a r e u tte re d a n d th e re is n o t a single m o m e n t in w h ich all o f th e sounds a re p erceiv ed to g e th e r.13 T a k in g th e e x a m p le o f th e w o rd for cow , gauh, h e says, “ W h e n th e sp eech is in g , i t c a n n o t b e in au a n d h \ w h e n i t is in au, i t c a n n o t b e in g a n d h, a n d w h e n it is in ft, i t c a n n o t b e in g a n d au. ... E a c h le tte r re q u ire s a sp ecial effort to p ro d u c e it, a n d i t d isap p ea rs as th e effort is c h a n g e d to p ro d u c e th e n e x t le tte r.” 14 P a ta n ja li solves th e p ro b le m th u s : even th o u g h th e le tte rs c a n n o t coexist a t th e tim e o f u tte ra n c e , th e y c a n d o so in th e m in d o f th e sp e a k e r as w ell as in t h a t o f th e listen ers; th e seq u en ce o f th e le tte rs is also to b e g ra sp e d in th e m in d o n th e basis o f th e m e a n in g .15 P a ta n ja li does n o t discuss th e p ro b le m in d e ta il; b u t h e says t h a t th e sim u ltan eo u s g ra sp in g o f th e w o rd as a w h o le is som ehow effected in th e m in d , even th o u g h th e le tte rs th a t m a k e it u p a re p ro n o u n c e d sep arately . P a ta n ja li’s V iew o f th e Spkofa P a ta fija li distinguishes b e tw e e n spkota a n d dhvani. T h e fo rm e r is th e p e rm a n e n t elem e n t in th e w o rd a n d m a y b e co n sid ered th e essential w o rd , w h ile th e la tte r is th e a c tu a liz e d a n d e p h e m e ra l elem e n t a n d a n a ttr ib u te o f th e fo rm er.16 T h e sphota as d esc rib ed b y P a ta n ja li m a y b e a single le tte r o r a fixed p a tte r n o f letters. I t is th e n o r m : it re m a in s c o n sta n t a n d is n o t affected b y th e p e c u lia ritie s o f th e in d iv id u a l speakers. E v en w h e n p ro n o u n c e d b y d iffe re n t speakers w ith d iffe ren t tem p o s its lin g u istic v a lu e is th e sam e. T h e a b so lu te vow el le n g th a n d th e in d iv id u a l p e c u lia ritie s o f th e p a r tic u la r in stan ces a re th e sounds (dhvani) a n d d e p e n d o n th e in d i­ v id u a lity o f th e sp e a k e r a n d on th e effort w ith w h ic h th e w ords a re

u ttered. T h e sphofa is perm anent a n d unchanging a n d is m anifested by th e ephem eral sounds u ttere d by th e speaker a n d h eard by th e listener, w hich are analogous to B h artrh ari’s prnkrta sound a n d vaikrta sound. T his distinction is supposed to have been m ad e by V yadi, au th o r of th e Samgraha. Vakyapadiya 1.77,17 defining th e tw o types o f sounds, is ascribed to V yadi by com m entators. According to this account, prnkrta sound ( = P atan jali5S sphota) causes th e perception o f letters, a n d paiAriasound ( = P atafijali5S dhvani) causes th e differences in speed of utterance. K aty ay an a on 1.1.70 says th a t th e letters are fixed a n d th a t th e styles o f diction depend on th e speech habits o f the speaker.18 Explaining this concept, P atafijaliillustratesit w ith th e analogy o f a d ru m b ea t: “ W hen a d ru m is struck, one d ru m b ea t m ay travel tw enty feet, another thirty, an o th er forty; b u t th e sphota is precisely such a n d such a size, the increase in length is caused by th e sound.5519 Patafijali uses th e term sphofa even to designate a single letter (vama) :20 “ In bo th cases (r an d I) it is only th e sphota th a t is ta u g h t in th e sutra.55 G ender T h e Mahabhdsya on sutra 4.1.3 takes u p th e question o f gram m atical gender a n d first attem pts to correlate it w ith sex: “A female is charac­ terized by breasts a n d hair, a m ale by his body h air, a n d th e others by n eith er.5521 B ut this concept o f gender (Iihga) does n o t apply to Sanskrit gram m ar. So Patafijali tries to explain gram m atical gender in term s of th e constituents (gurias). H e states clearly th a t th e gram m arians cannot take th e gram m atical gender to b e th e sam e as th e gender o f norm al worldly usage (referring to th e sex).22 Every object is characterized by different states o f constituent elem ent (guna), a n d these states constitute th e gender o f th e thing.23 P atafijah does no t refer to th e th ree Sam khya gunas o f sattva, rajas, a n d tamas h ere; bu t later com m entators consider th a t they are im plied. PatafijaJi also proposed a form al definition o f gram m atical gender: th a t w hich is referred to by th e pronoun ayam is m asculine, th a t which is referred to by iyam is fem inine, th a t w hich is referred to by idam is neuter. Purpose o f Studying G ram m ar O n e who knows the correct form ation o f words (dabdasamskara) can discrim inate correct words (sadhu) from incorrect words. A lthough com m unication m ay be possible even b y using incorrect words, it is only by th e use o f p ro p er words th a t one achieves m erit (dharma). W hile discussing th e V edic hym n beginning “ catvari sfrig ah ...55 Patafijali does n o t refer to th e later theory o f B hartrhari according to w hich th e symbolic m eaning o f th e passage refers to the four stages in

PATANJALI'S

MAHABHA?YA

119

the evolution of speech from the highest speech principle—-para, paiyanti, madhyama, and vaikhari. The "four horns of the bull" are explained by Patanjali as the four classes of words, noun, verb, prefix, and particle (namakhyatopasarganipatah).

5 BHARTRHARI

T h e central figure of th e philosophical developm ent o f gram m ar is B h artrh ari3 whose dates a re still in dispute, though recent scholarship has come to general agreem ent about their likely confines. I t has been shown th a t quotations from B hartrhari’s works appear in the Pramariasamnccaya of D ignaga, the great Buddhist logician, who m ust be dated in the fifth an d sixth centuries. Furtherm ore, Simhasurigani, a sixth-century J a in w riter, tells us th a t B hartrhari studied u n d er a G ram m arian nam ed V asurata, w hom he identifies as a brother-in-law o f a pupil of another famous Buddhist, V asubandhu. Erich Frauw allner suggests, on th e basis of these considerations, th a t because Dignaga presum ably flourished betw een A.D. 485 a n d 540, we m ay date B hartrhari betw een 450 a n d 510 a n d V asurata betw een 430 a n d 490.1 These dates are accepted by m ost recent scholarship as the best we can currently do. As w ith m any great figures o f classical tim es in In d ia, a large num ber o f works have been a ttrib u ted to B hartrhari, an d once again current scholarship has h ardly settled all questions concerning th e authenticity o f some o f these claims. By definition, th e B hartrhari w e are speaking o f is th e au th o r o f th e w ork th a t is regularly referred to as the Vakyapadiya, a sem inal w ork on G ram m ar a n d gram m atical philosophy the influence of which, though difficult to calculate precisely, is certainly considerable in subsequent philosophical developments, both w ithin G ram m ar an d outside it. This work has three chapters, an d it was m ore properly term ed Trikanii on th a t account. Ashok A klujkar has argued th a t only th e first two chapters constitute the Vakyapadiya. I t seems likely th a t B hartfhari also composed th e com m entary called vftti on a t least th e first two chapters of th e Trikandi.2 Beside this body o f literature—verses a n d prose com m entary—B hartfhari apparently also w rote a com m entary— or p a rt o f one— on P atanjali’s Mahdbhasya. Again, th e proper title is a m atte r of discussion: A klujkar points out

th a t th e title Tripadi for it h as extensive san ctio n a m o n g early co m m en ­ ta to rs in th e g ra m m a tic a l tra d itio n , w h ile th e title u n d e r w h ich it is freq u en tly k n o w n now adays, Mahabhasyadipika, h a s only o n e m a n u ­ scrip t m e n tio n in its favor. N o d o u b t th e w ork is referred to reg u larly as a fikd o n th e Mahabhdsya. I t seems likely th a t it w as a len g th y w ork, p e rh a p s covering th e e n tire scope o f P a ta n ja li’s m asterp iece, th o u g h o n ly a sm all p o rtio n is now available. T h e re a re o ccasional references to a n o th e r w ork, called Sabdadhatusamiksa, w h ich is a ttrib u te d to B h a rtfh a ri b y S o m a n a n d a a n d U tp a la c a ry a , tw o K a sh m iri Saivas o f th e n in th a n d te n th centuries. U tp a la c a ry a in d icates t h a t in th is w o rk B h a rtrh a ri set fo rth th e k in d o f aw areness h e calls paSyanti, w h ich is also discussed in th e Tnkandi- T h is w o rk h a s u n fo rtu n a te ly n o t b een preserved, as far as w e c a n tell. In d ia n tra d itio n identifies B h a rtrh a ri th e G ra m m a ria n w ith th e fam ous p o e t w ho w ro te th e Subh&sitatriiati, th re e sets o f a h u n d re d stan zas ea ch b e a rin g th e titles o f N iti-, Srngara-, a n d Vairagya-Sataka. A ctu ally , th e n u m b e r o f stan zas is m a n y h u n d re d s m o re th a n th re e h u n d re d , w h ic h com plicates th e arg u m e n ts o n id e n tity o f au th o rsh ip p erh ap s b ey o n d h o p e o f a n y definitive solution.

B r i e f A n a l y s is

Ashok Aklujkar L an g u ag e (1) L an g u a g e (yak) h as fo u r levels o rp h a se s: speech (vaikhari), m e n ­ ta l/in te lle c tu a l o r p o te n tia l speech (madfyama), la te n t to ta lity o f u n its (paJyanti) , a n d p u re , b asic lan g u ag e p rin c ip le (para pasyanti-rupa). (2) V iew ed as a specific to ta lity o r sign system , la n g u a g e consists o f th re e classes o f u n its: p h o n e m e (varna), w o rd (pada), a n d sentence {vdkya). (3 ) I f w h a t is cognized is a m e a n in g h a v in g no expectan cy for a n u n u se d o r ab se n t w o rd , th e n its signifier is a sentence. S u ch a signifier m a y consist o f o n ly o n e w o rd . (4 ) A single p h o n em e signifying som e fairly w ell-associated m ean in g is a w ord. (5) T h e sentence, w o rd , a n d p h o n em e a re u n ita ry entities (sphofa). O n ly w hile b ein g p erceiv ed (d u e to association w ith so und, w hich b y n a tu re h as a seq u en ce) a n d w h e n conscious o r subconscious g ra m ­ m a tic a l analysis is b ein g c a rrie d o u t d o th e y a p p e a r to b e m a d e u p o f p a rts. E v en so, th e p arts, th o u g h a c cep ted com m onsensically a n d on th e level o f analysis, d o n o t ex h au st th e wholes. (6 ) T h e linguistic u n its sentence, w ord, a n d p h o n e m e c a n b e re ­ g a rd e d e ith e r as universals (iabdakiti) o r as p a rtic u la rs (Jabdaoyakti) .

(7) T h e linguistic units a re p e rm a n e n t (nitya) .3 (8 ) T h e sentence is th e p rim a ry linguistic u n it. (9) L an g u ag e is infinite. T h e re is n o n u m eric al lim it to th e sentences possible in a language. ( 10) S en tence m e an in g is th e d irec t o r in d ire c t basis o f m ean in g a t o th er linguistic levels. I t is in th e form o f a n ac tio n -o rien ted cognition or “ in tu itio n ” [pratibha). I t com es in to b ein g th ro u g h th e in stru m en tality o f w o rd m eanings b u t is n o t confined to th em . As a n event, i t is a u n ita ry en tity . O n th e level o f analysis, it can b e conceived in various w a y s: as a coalescence (samsarga) o f gen eral w ord m eanings; as a m ean in g th a t comes in a d d itio n (adhikya) to th e w o rd m eanings; as d ifferentiation (bheda, apoha) from entities th a t a re n o t in te n d e d ; as establishm ent o f a relatio n (sambandha); as re la tio n th a t brings w ords, associated w ith g en eral (samanya) m eanings, in to association w ith specific o r qualified (mfisfa) m ean ings; a n d as ac tio n as cognized from th e verb (not th e physical a c tio n ) a n d as q ualified b y th e m eanings o f o th er sentence com p o n en ts (vitista kriyd). (I I ) W o rd m e an in g s a r e o fth e signified (zwcya, d en o ta tu m ) orcosignified(v," VIJ 12, 1974, 235-240. G1645 : V . Raghavan, " H o w Many Grammars?" CDSFV 1974, 271-278. G1646 : H.G. Ranade, "Parts of Speech in Sanskrit," IL 35, 1974, 129-138. G1647 : J.M. Shukla, "Grammatical paribhasas of the Jaina Grammarians," JOI 24, 1974—1975, 128-138. G1648 : P. Sriramamurti, "Some Secondary RootsinSanskrit," SPAIOC 27,1974,235. G1649 :J. Frits Staal, " T h e Origin and Development of Linguistics in India," in D. Hymes, ed., Studies in the History of Linguistics, Bloomington, 1974, pp. 63-74. G1650 : Siddheswar Varma, "Separation, Philosophical and Grammatical, in Indian Tradition," VIJ 12, 1974, 468-471. G1651 : George Cardona, "Paraphrase and Sentence Analysis: Some Indian Views," JIP 3, 1975, 259-282. G1652 : Madhva Deshpande, "Phonetics of Short a in Sanskrit," n j 17, 1975, 195-209. G1653 : , Critical Studies in Indian Grammarians I: The Theory of Homogeneity (Sdvartgia). Ann Arbor, 1975. G1654 : Pierre-Sylvain Filliozat, " O n the Analysis of Sanskrit Compounds," in AOR Silver Jubilee Volume, 1975, pp. 81-95. G1655 : Manjulika Guha, "Sphofa Theory," JASBe 17, 1975. G1656 : S.D. Joshi, "Sabdabodha and Theories of Verbal Denotation," svuoj 18, 1975, 21-32. G1657 : K.. Krishnamoorthy, "Tatparya and dhvani," in AOR Silver Jubilee Volume 1975, pp. 21-33. G1658 : K . Kunjunni Raja, "Vyafijand: Suggestive Function of Language," in AOR Silver Jubilee Volume 1975, pp. 602-607. G1659 : Angelo Morretta, "Sanskrit and the Sacred Language," ITaur 3 - 4 , 1975-1976, 339-352. G1660 : Kenneth H. Post, "Samkara's Objection to the spkofavada," A B O R I 56, 1975, 67-76. G1661 : Satya Vrat Sastri, "Sanskrit Usage," ITaur 3 - 4 , 1975-1976, 449-454. G1662 : J. Frits Staal, " T h e concept of Metalanguage and Its Indian Background," JIP 3, 1975, 315-354. G1663 : J.M. Shukla, "Particle in Sanskrit," JOI 25, 1975-1976, 252-259. G1664 : S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, " T h e Concept and Scope o f adhikarana in Sanskrit Grammar," V R F V 1975, 145-162. G1665 ; Ashols Aklujkar, "Sanskrit and the Linguistic Science," PISC 1.2.2, 1976, 85.

G l 666 : M ich ael C oulson, Sanskrit'. A n Introduction to the Classical Language. L o n d o n , 1976. G 1667 : S.D . Jo sh i, “ S anskrit G ra m m a r,” in R .N . D a n d e k a r, ed., Ramakrishna Gopal Bhandarkar as an Indologist'. A Symposium, P o o n a, 1976, p p . 113-142. G 1668 : S.G . K a n ta w a la , “ Som e R em ark s o n th e T e a c h in g o f th e S an sk rit G ra m ­ m a r ,” jo i 26, 1976—1977, 1 64-169. G 1669 : H a ri M o h a n M ish ra , “ S an sk rit a n d S em an tics,” p i s g 1.2.2, 1976, 8 6 -9 0 . G 1670 : S aty a S w aru p M ish ra, “ C o n trib u tio n o f S an sk rit to th e S tu d y o f L inguis­ tics,” Pisa 1.2.2, 1976, 98 -1 0 1 . G l 671 : K . R a g h a v a n P illai, “ S an sk rit L inguistics in th e C o n tex t o f G en eral L inguistics,” p i s g 1.2.2, 1976, 8 3 -8 4 . G 1672 : H a rtm u t Scharfe, “ A S econd ‘In d e x fossil’ o f S an sk rit G ra m m a ria n s,” j a o s 96, 1976, 27 4 -2 8 0 . G 1673 : K .A . S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r, “ S an sk rit a n d th e P h ilosophy o f L a n g u a g e ,” p i s c 1.2.2, 1966, 7 0 -8 1 . G 1674 : S a ty a k a m V a rm a , “ T h e P h ilosophy o f U n iv e rsa l G ra m m a r,” svsi, p p . 160-184. G 1675 : ---------- , “ B rief S u rv ey o f S an sk rit G ra m m a r,” svsi, p p . 103—132. G 1676 : --------- , “ D ivisibility o f P h o n e m e ,” svsi, p p . 144—159. G 1677 : S id d h esv ara V a rm a , “ R ela tio n sh ip — P hilo so p h ical a n d G ra m m a tic a l— in In d ia n T ra d itio n ,” v ij 14, 1976, 1—4. G l 678 : G eorge C a rd o n a , “ A N o te o n M o rp h o p h o n e m ic a n d P h o n etic R u les in S an sk rit,” m o 10 , 1977 , 1- 6 . G l 679 : S.D . Jo sh i a n d J .A .F . R o o d b e rg en , ‘‘Vakyasamskdra a n d padasamskara,” j b b r a s 5 2 -5 3 , 1977-1978, 142-148. G l 680 : P ra d ip a K u m a r M a z u m d a r, The Philosophy o f Language in the Light o f Paninian and the Mimamsaka Schools o f Indian Philosophy. C a lc u tta , 1977. G 1681 : H a rtm u t Scharfe, A History o f Indian Literature'. Grammatical Literature. W iesbad en , 1977. G l 682 : A . S esh ak u m ar, “ T h e Parihhasds in S an sk rit G ra m m a r: A S tu d y .” P h .D . diss., A n d h ra U n iv ersity , 1977. G l 683 : J .M . S hukla, “Bhdva a n d abhdva A cco rd ing to th e G ra m m a ria n s,” j b b r a s 52 -5 3 , 1977-1978, 26 0 -2 6 7 . G l 684 : M a d h v a D esh p an d e, “ P a n in ia n G ra m m a ria n s o n D ia lec tical V a ria tio n ,” A LB 40, 1978, 6 1 -1 1 4 . G l 685 : P ie rre F illio zat, “ L ’ecole m o d e rn e des V a iy a k a ra n a d u M a h a ra s h tra ,” I T a u r 6, 1978, 143-150. G l 686 : G . G ren. E ck lu n d , A Study o f Nominal Sentences in the Oldest Upanishads. A ct. U n iv ersitatis U psaliensus. S tu d ia In d o e u ro p e a e U psaliensis 3 . U p p sala , Stockholm , 1978. G l 687 : H .V . N ag araj'a R a o , “ T h e Scope a n d N ecessity o f angadhikara,” J i P 6, 1978, 145-176. G 1688 : M a rio P ia n te lli, “ S a m k a ra ’s T re a tm e n t o f Sabdaprabhauatva in BSBh 1.3.28 a n d th e P ro b le m o f a N exus B etw een th e S o-called Iabdabrahman a n d sphofa: Som e C o n sid eratio n s,” I T a u r 6, 1978, 241—250. G l 689 : D .S . R ueg g , “ M a th e m a tic a l a n d L in g u istic M o d els in In d ia n T h o u g h t the C ase o f Sunyata,” w z k s o a 22, 1978, 171-182. G 1690 : K rish n a S iv a ra m a n , “ T h e S aiv a a n d th e G ra m m a ria n Perspectives of L a n g u a g e ,” i p r 19 -3 2 . G1691 : S aty a V ra t, “ S an sk rit g ra m m a r,” in c h i 5 , 1978, 31 2 -3 2 0 . G l 692 : Sh. B ira a n d O . S u k h b e a ta r, “ O n th e T ib e ta n a n d M o n g o lian T ra n sla ­ tions of S an sk rit G ra m m a tic a l W orks,” I T a u r 7, 1979 127-138,

G1693 : Jo h a n n e s B ronkhorst “ Y aska’s C lassification o f nipatas” a b o r i 60, 1979 137-149. G 1694 : R ic h a rd G o m b rich “ H e Cooks Softly: A dverbs in Sanskrit G r a m m a r ” b s o a s 42, 1979, 2 44-256. G.1695 : W ilhelm R a u “ G ram m atik ” in H . B echert a n d G . von Sim onson eds. Einfahrung in die Indologie. D h a rm sta d t 1979 p p . 159-161. 118ff. G1696 : J . Frits S taal “ O rie n ta l Ideas on th e O rig in o f L an g u ag e ” J a o s 99, 1979 1-14. G1697 : M .M . D eshpande Evolution o f Syntactic Theory in Sanskrit Grammar: Syntax o f the Sanskrit Infmitive -turn U N . L inguistica E x trem a S tu d ia 10. A n n A rbor, 1980. G1698 : V .S. Jo sh i, “ ‘Para oak' a n d S an sk rit G ram m arian s ” v j p s g 1980, 34 -3 5 . G1699 : ---------- “ A n In tro d u c tio n to th e L ast A ge in P a n in i’s School, v j p s g 1980, 79-90. G l 700 : ---------- “ T re a tm e n t o f L o an W ords in Sanskrit G ra m m a r ” v j p s g 1980 1-19. G 1700A : H a ro ld C ow ard, The Sphofa Theory o f Language. D elhi, 1980. G 1701 : B ernfried S ch lerath , Sanskrit Vocabulary. L eiden, 1980. G 1702 : E .R . Sreekrishna S arm a, “Sphofa a n d S am k ara,” a l b 4 4 -4 5 , 1980-1981, 223-228. G l 703 : T . V en k atach ary a. “ Significance o f th e D ictu m ‘y a ta evakaras ta to n y atra n iy a m a h ,’ ” v ij 18, 1980, 80 -8 7 . G l 704 : Alex W ay m a n , “ N otes o n M e ta p h o ric T ran sfe r,” a l b 4 4- 4 5, 1980-1981, 272-285. G l 705 : M .M . D eshpande, “ S an sk rit G eru n d C onstructions: S yntactic D isp u ta­ tions,” iij 23, 1981, 167-185. G 1706 : K . M eenakshi, “ Sanskrit G ra m m a r as M o d el for W ritin g T a m il G ram ­ m a r” (sum m ary ), sw sc 5, D elhi, 1981, p p . 4 9 -5 0 . G l 707 : J . O u sep ara m p il, “ T h e P ro b lem o f G en d er in S anskrit a n d In d o -E u ro p ean L anguage” (su m m ary ), sw sc 5, D elh i, 1981, p p . 5 9 -6 0 . G1708 : A.G. S aran g i, “ A n cien t G ram m arian s a n d T h e ir ‘C o rrect’ In te rp re ta ­ tions,” B hV 40.4, 1981, 26 -3 1 . G l 709 : M .S. N a ra y a n a M u rti, “ C au sality in S a n sk rit G ra m m a r” (su m m ary ), sw sc 5, D elhi, 1981, p . 58. G l 710 : J . B ronkhorst, “ O n th e H isto ry o f P a p in ia n G ra m m a r in the E arly C en­ turies Follow ing P a ta n ja li,” j i p 11, 1983, 357-412. G1711 : S.D. L ad d u , “ O n th e E arliest H an d b o o k s o n D eriv atio n (prakriya) in Sanskrit G ra m m a r,” d n s f v 1982, 8 3 -9 0 . G1712 : V .N . J h a , “ T h e S tru ctu re o f a SabdabodhaN d n s f v 1982, 77 -8 2 . G1713 : M .S . N a ra y a n a M u rti, “ Divisions o f T im e A ccording to In d ia n G ra m ­ m arian s,” a l b 46, 1982, 12-24. G 1714 : J . F rits S taal, “ R itu a l, G ra m m a r, a n d th e O rigins o f Science in In d ia ,” j i p 10, 1982, 3-3 6 .

NOTES "G" references are to the Bibliography in this Volume, " R B " refers to Volume I : Bibliography (Revised Edition) of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Other abbreviations are identified in the Bibliography.

1 :

HISTORICAL

RESUME

1. Kumarila, Tantravarttika, translated by Ganganatha Jha (RB155), p. 306. 2. Brhaddevata, ed. A.A. Macdonnell, Harvard Oriental Series 5 (Cambridge, Mass., 1904:), 2.117. 3. Leonard Bloomfield, Language (New York, 1933), p. 5. 4. See, part two, summary 4. 5. Gautama, Nydyasiitra 2.2.65. 6. Paijini, Atfadhyayi 2.1.1: "samarthah padavidhih." See Kunjunni Raja (G1556), pp. 154-156. 7. Yaska, Nirukta 1.1: "indriyanityam vacanam audumbarayanah.'' See also Brough (G8). 8. Yaska, Nirukta 1.2. The six stages are " a thing comes into existence, exists, changes, grows, decays, and ceases to exist." 9. Kffpa Tajurveda 6.4.7. 10. Patanjali, Mahabhdsya 1.1.1. 11. Bhartrhari, Vakyapadiya 2.347. 12. Nagesa Bhatta, Sphofavada, concluding verse. See part two, summary, 45 on Sphofavada. 13. Thieme (G458), pp. 23-24. 14. Cardona, p. 273 (cf. abbreviation list in the bibliography). 15. See part two, summary 13. 16. See Gode (G1128). 17. Also called VaiyOkarattamatonmajjini. It is quoted under that title in Nagesa Bhafta's Spho(avada. 18. Ganganatha Jha (RB9473), p. 189. 19. Bhartrhari, Vakyapadiya 2.3. See also Kunjunni Raja (G355), pp. 165-170. 20. See Jagadisa's SabdaSaktiprakaiika. 21. This subsection was written by Shoryu Katsura. 22. For Dignaga's theory of anyapoha and references to previous studies of the subject, see S. Katsura, "The Apoha Theory of Dignaga," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies. 28.1 (1979); 16-20. 23. Masaaki Hattori, "The Sautrantika Background of the Apoha Theory," in Buddhist Thought and Civilisation-. Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth Birthday (Emeryville, Calif., 1977), pp. 50-52. 24. Dignaga, Praraanasamuccayavrtti (Vasudharaksita's version) 70b 8 ; M . Hattori, " A Study of the Chapter on Apoha of the Mimamsas'lokavarttika ( I I ) " (in Japanese), Memoirs of the Faculty of Letters, Kyoto University 15, 1975: 25, n. 20. 25. Pramapasamuccayavrtti 169a2-4=83a6-8; See also Iyengar (G795), pp. 147-149.

26. A p o d d h are p a d asy ay am v a k y ad a rth o vivecitah / V a k y a rth a h p ra tib h a k y o y a m te n a d a v u p a ja n y a te .” 27. J o h n R u sk in j Sesame and Lilies unto T his Last (L o n d o n , 1952). 2 :

M

e t a p h y s ic s

1. H iriy a n n a (R B I 1464), p p . 182-183. 2. S ta a l (G 16 6 2 ), p . 319. 3. See, fo r exam ple, th e c ritiq u e o f m o d e rn la n g u a g e theories b y K la u s K losterm a ie r in “ M a n G arries th e P o w er o f AU T h in g s in H is M o u th ,” in Revelation in Indian Thought, ed. H . .C o w ard a n d K . S iv a ram a n (E m eryville, C alif., 1977)', p . 8. 4. H an s-G eo rg G a d a m e r, “ M a n a n d L a n g u a g e ,” in Philosophical Hermeneutics, tra n s. D .E . L inge (Berkeley, 19 7 6 ), p p . 5 9 -6 8 . 5. Vak I (1 9 5 8 ):1 0 -1 4 . 6. Ib id ., p p . 1 -2 . 7. Pg Veda 1.164.35 “ b ra h m a y a m v a c a h p a ra m a m v y o m a h .” 8 . As tra n sla te d b y K .A . S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G721 ), p . 14. 9. See M u rti (G 1 6 4 3 ), p p . 32 1 -3 3 1 . 10. S ri A u robindo , The Secret o f the Veda (P o n d ich erry , 1 9 7 1 ), p . 8. 11. B h a rtrh a ri, Vakfapadiya 1.11. 12. See F rau w alln er (R B 1 2 16 0 ). 13. See p a r t tw o, su m m a ry 3, o f P a n in i’sAstadhyayi, sHtras 1.1.21, 1.1.65. 14. See, for exam ple, th e fine critic a l survey o f m o d e rn b ib lical scholarship presen t­ ed b y H a rv e y M c A rth u r in his in tro d u c tio n to In Search o f the Historical Jesus (New Y ork, 1969). T h e survey o f fo rm criticism is fo u n d o n p p . 6—7. A lth o u g h this analysis focuses o n b ib lical studies, th e sam e p oin ts w o u ld g e n erally a p p ly to all m o d ern w estern lite ra ry criticism . 15. T h e V edas also offer th eir ow n specu latio n s re g a rd in g tim e. T im e is described in o n e h y m n as th e first god, existing in m a n y form s. T im e g en erates th e sky a n d the e a rth a n d sets in m o tio n th e p ast, th e p resen t, a n d th e fu tu re. T im e is th e lo rd o f all a n d th e fath e r o f P ra ja p a ti. T h e universe is set in m o tio n a n d su stain ed b y tim e. In d e e d , in th e Atharva Veda 19: 53 a n d 54, tim e (Jcala) is cele b ra ted as th e p rim o rd ia l pow er a n d unifying p rin cip le o f th e universe. I n kala lie th e w orlds a n d th e sun. By kala was th e universe u rg ed forth. Kala is B rah m a n . “ T im e co n tain s a n d conquers all, a n d still continues o n w ard ” (W . N o rm a n B row n, “ V e d a a n d R e lig io n ,” in India and Indology, ed. R . R o c h e r [D elhi, 1978] , p . 4 5 ). B u t th e h ig h p lace a c co rd ed kala in th e Atharva Veda is seldom re p e a te d in th e U p a n isa d s, a n d in th e SvetaIvatara th e view th a t every­ th in g cam e o u t o f tim e is re g a rd e d as a h ere tic a l d o c trin e (S.N . D a sg u p ta [R B I 1488, ] 6 6 ). I n the M a itri Upanisad, th o u g h , tim e is g iven th e sam e h ig h statu s as in th e Atharva Veda. I n M a itri 6 : 1 5 w e r e a d : T h e re are, assuredly, tw o form s o f B ra h m a : T im e a n d th e T im eless. T h a t w h ich is p rio r to th e su n is th e Tim eless (akala), w ith o u t p a rts (akdla). B u t th a t w h ich begins w ith th e sun is T im e , w h ich h as p a rts. V erily , th e form o f th a t w hich has p a rts is the y ear. F ro m th e y ea r, in tru th , a re these c reatu res p ro d u ced . T h ro u g h th e year, verily, after h av in g b een p ro d u ced , d o th e y grow . I n the year th ey d isap p e a r. T h erefo re th e y ear, verily, is P ra ja p a ti, is T im e , is food, is th e B rah m a-ab o d e, a n d is A tm an . F o r th u s h as it b e e n said : T is T im e th a t cooks c re a ted things, AU things, ind eed , in th e G re a t Soul (mahatman) I n w h a t, how ever, T im e is cooked— W h o know s th a t, h e th e V e d a knows.

(T ranslation by R .E . H um e, The Thirteen Principal Upanisads [Oxford, 1968] , p . 434.) As in the Atharva Veda, tim e is here given the highest status o f being identified w ith P rajapati, b u t now also w ith B rahm an an d A tm an. Verse sixteen goes on to describe embodied T im e as the g reat ocean of creatures, planets, a n d all things. 16. As translated by P eri Sarvesw ara S harm a (G 738), p . 42. 17. Sastri (G 706). 18. S ubram an ia Iy er (G 734). 19. G738, p. 50. 20. See M ahadevan (RB5466), pp. 236-251. 21. See Sam kara, introduction to Brahmasutrabhdsya, trans. G. T h ib a u t (R B 243), 3ff. 22. RB5466, P . 229. 23. A n English translation o f H elaraja’s Tika has been included b y P eri Sarvesvara Sharm a in G738. T h e d a te in dicated is the one proposed by Sharm a, p . 12. 24. B hartrhari, Vakyapadiya 3.9.62. See the translations in G738 a n d G748A. 25. K .A. S ub ram an ia Iy e r’s parap h rase o f H elaraja’s com m entary on Vakyapadiya 3.9.62. See G748A, p . 54. 26. Vakyapadiya 1.142. 27. Ib id . 3.9.4. T ran slated by S u b ram an ia Iy er (G 748A ). 28. Ib id . 3.9.5. 29. Ib id . 3.9.23. 30. Ib id . 3.9.24. T his balance, says H elaraja in his com m ent on 3.26, is B h artrh a ri’s m eaning of the term vivarta, w hich appears in VdkyapaAiya 1.1 an d 3.3.81. S I. Ib id . 3.9.74. 32. Ibid. 3.9.37. 33. Ibid. 3.9.41. 34. Ibid. 3.9.45, an d Tika thereon. 35. Ibid. 3.9.46. 36. Ibid. 3.9.52. 37. P atanjali, Tagasutra 3.13, translated by R a m a P rasad a (New Delhi, 1978), p p . 190ff. 38. Vakyapadiya 3.9.52. 39. Ibid. 3.9.53. 40. Ibid. 3.9.74. 41. Patanjali, Mahdbhdsya 4.2.3. 42. See introduction to G738, p. 37. 43. P otter (R B 9446), pp. 91-93. 44. Ibid. 45. See introduction to G738, p. 19. 46. See S ubram an ia Iy er (G 719), pp. 112-113. 47. svsi, p. 242. 48. S ubram ania Iyer, (G 734), p . 58. 49. Sastri (G 1428), 1980 ed., p. 82. 50. Vdkyapadiya 3.9.46. 51. Ib id . 3.9.4. 52. Ib id . 3.9.74. 53. F or a full analysis of th e function of tim e see Cow ard (G 777). 54. Cf. K laus K losterm aier, cited in n. 3 above. 55. S ubram an ia Iy er (G 721), p. 119. 56. T .S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (L ondon, 1955), p . 44. 57. Vdkyapadiya 1. 142 w ith vrtli. 58. Ib id . 1.143, vrtti. See also ibid. 1.14.

59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66.

Ib id . 1.14. S astri (G 1 4 2 8 ), 1980 e d ., p . 85. Vakyapadiya 1.120 a n d vrtti. Ib id . 1.120 a n d vjrtti. Ib id . 1.5 a n d 1.14. Ib id . 1.137. Ib id . 1.89. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 8 7 2 ), kdrikas 19—20.

3. E

p is t e m o l o o y

1. See, fo r exam p le, R ussell F ra se r, The Language o f Adam (N ew Y o rk , 1977), especially c h a p t. 4, “ M ysticism a n d th e Scientific D o o m .” 2. E rn st C assirer, Language and M yth, tra n s. S .K . L a n g e r (N ew Y o rk , 1 9 5 3 ), p p . 8 -9 . 3. Vakyapadiya 1.123 as tra n sla te d b y T .R .V . M u r ti in his forew ord to C ow ard (G 1 7 0 0 A ), p . vii. 4. M u r ti, (G 1 6 4 3 ), p . 321. 5. Ib id ., p. 322. 6. D a tta (R B 101 3 4 ), p p . 2 7 -2 8 . 7. See Samkhyakarika 4 , Sarpkhyasildras 1.88, a n d TogasUtras 1.7. 8. See G an g an ath a. J h a (R B 9 4 7 3 ), p . 8 0 . P ra b h a k a r a ac c e p ts only five pramdnas. 9. See D h a rm a ra ja d h v a rin d ra , Vedantaparibhasa, tran s. S. S u ry a n a ra y a n a Sastri (R B 6 3 0 6 ), chaps. 1 -6 . 10. I n S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 7 2 1 ), p . 45. 11. T r a n s l a t i o n i n M u r t i (G 164-3), p . 325. 12. Ib id . 13. Ib id ., p . 326. 14. Ib id . 15. T h e follow ing discussion re g a rd in g th e P la to n ic p a ra lle l w ith oyakarapa is based o n M u r ti (G 1 6 4 3 ), p . 327. 16. Saroadarianasarpgraha o f M a d h a v a tran s. E.B . C ow ell a n d A .E . G o u g h , (L ondon, 1 8 9 2 -1 8 9 4 ), p . 219. 17. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 7 3 4 ), p . 163. 18. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 8 7 2 ), karikd 19. S im ila r arg u m e n ts a re offered to show h o w th e progressively c lea re r p e rc e p tio n c a n n o t b e a ttrib u te d to defects o f th e senses o r m em o ry th ro u g h resem b la n ce, p . 4 9 . 19. M a h a d e v a n (R B 5 4 6 6 ), p . 62. 20. S astri (G 7 0 6 ), p . 50. 21. P a n d y (R B 4 1 3 1 ), p p . 4 0 0 -4 2 7 . 22. G 872, siitra 20, p p . 51—5 2 ; a n d Vdkyapadiya 1.88 a n d ojtti. 23. Ib id . 24. G 872, stlira 24, p. 6 4 . See also S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 1 4 4 5 ), in w h ich h e m akes cle a r th a t fro m th e sphofa v iew p o in t w h a te v e r d istin c tio n o f d eg ree o r p a r t is m a d e in a n o b ject m u s t be d o n e th ro u g h a guria (q u a lity o r p a r tic u la r ) . F o r th e g ra m m a ria n s i t is th e guria a n d n ev er th e u n iv ersal th a t serves to express degrees in objects. I t should also be n o te d th a t o f th e m a n y possible w ays o f in te rp re tin g th e u n iv ersal, B h a rtrh a ri prefers the follow ing. A m o v e m e n t like liftin g th e h a n d consists o f a series o f m ove­ m ents. As these m ov em en ts a re tra n sito ry th e y c a n n o t coexist a n d fo rm a w hole o f w h ich th e y w o u ld be th e p a rts a n d in w h ic h th e u n iv ersal o f th e m o v em e n t o f lifting th e h a n d w ould in h ere. N o w su ch a u n iv ersal is m o re specific th a n th e w id e r universal

NOTES

553

o f m ovem ent in general. A lth o u g h it inh eres in each m o m en t o f m o v em en t, it is n o t cognizable in th e m alone d u e to too m u c h sim ilarity b etw een m o m en ts o f lifting a n d those o f th e m om ents o f each m o v em en t, such as tu rn in g the h a n d . T h e m o m en ts o f each m ovem ent a re th e resu lt o f a special effort to m ak e th a t m o v em en t, a n d th ey are the su b strata o f th e univ ersal o f th a t m o v em en t. B u t th a t u n iv ersal c a n n o t be cognized u n til a series o f m o m en ts has b een cognized. O n e o r tw o m o m en ts o f m ove­ m e n t a re n o t enough, b u t a fte r a series o f m o m en ts is cognized th e cognition o f th e universal in h e re n t in each m o v em en t becom es clear. L ifting, fo r ex am ple, m a y b e identified, a n d o th e r m ovem ents su ch as tu rn in g excluded. T h e process is sim ilar in th e m anifestation o f sphofas. E a ch is m anifested b y a series o f special efforts to u tte r letters. O n e o r tw o u ttera n ce s o f th e series a re n o t en o u g h to e lim in ate o th er w ords w ith sim ilar sounds. B u t as th e co m plete series o f letters is cognized, th e co gnition o f th e sphofa or universal o f th e p a rtic u la r w o rd is clearly perceived, a n d m ean in g fu l usage o f it in speech becom es possible. ( Vakyapadlya 2.20-21 as in te rp re te d b y S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r [ G 734] , p p . 1 6 8 -1 6 9 .) 25. Ib id . 26. Vakyapadiy a, 1.52. 27. M oving beyond S anskrit itself a n d in to th e w orld o f languages, I w o u ld take th e universal e rro r as referring to th e necessity o f going fro m th e d ifferen tiated letters (th e e rro r) to th e w hole sphofa (m ean in g o r u ltim a te re a lity ). T h e fixed sequence a n d form o f differen tiatio n for a p a rtic u la r w o rd -sphofa w o u ld o n ly b e a co n sta n t erro r w ithin each lan g u ag e (such as S a n sk rit). 28. Vakyapadiya 1.85. 29. Sphofasiddhi, sStra 22. 30. K av iraj (G 1 3 9 4 ), p p . 1-18 a n d 113-132. 31. K .A . S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r’s in tro d u c tio n to G 872, p . 26. 32. Vakyapadlya 1.78-84. A m ong th e analogies offered to explain th e process, B h a rtrh a ri’s favorite seems to b e th a t th e sounds leav e im pression seeds (satriskara, bhivana, o r bija), w hich, as th ey m a tu re in th e m in d , a re conducive to a n increasingly clear p ercep tio n o f th e sphofa— to w h ich th ey fin ally offer a p erfect “ fitness” o r id en tity . A literal ren d erin g o fy o g ya ti could b e “ to fit in a fram e” — th e “ fit” o f th e “ m atured* series o f letters in to th e “ fra m e ” o f th e sphofa. See also th e vjtti o n Vakyapadlya 3.1.8. 33. T h e p h rase “ fu n ctio n o f th e m in d ” h ere is in te n d e d to in d ic a te th a t pratibhi is n o t a fun ctio n o f th e o rd in a ry senses o f th e buddhi stage o f consciousness, b u t is characteristic o f th e p r o-buddhi o r Sabdatattva stage. 34. I t should b e clea rly u n d ersto o d h e re th a t p erfect p e rc e p tio n o f pratibhi, how ­ ever valid in itself, rem ain s outside th e realm o f prami&a (w hich is c h a ra c te riz e d b y sensory percep tio n a n d discursive c o g n itio n ). W ith re g a rd to lan g u ag e , therefore, it is sphofa w hen m anifested as speech th a t is pramana (a n d n o t sphofa a t th e un ified level o f pratibhi). T h e p o in t m a d e abo v e, how ever, still stands. T h e co g n itio n o f sphofa a t th e level o f e ith er Sabda pramana or pratibhi is v ia d ire c t p ercep tio n , n o t v ia inference. 35. Sphofasiddhi, sUtra 23, as tra n sla te d b y S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 8 7 2 ), p . 60. 36. S am kara, BrahmasUtrabhisya, as tra n sla ted in T h ib a u t (R B 2 4 3 ), vol. I, p . 210. 37. Vikyapadlya 1.142. 38. Ib id ., 1.123. 39. T h e follow ing su m m a ry d ep en d s m a in ly o n S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r’s p resen ta tio n o f B h a rtrh a ri’s position in G 734, p p . 144-146. 40. P a ta n ja li, Togasutra 2.53. 41. T h e re is considerable d e b a te in c u rre n t scholarship over w h e th er th e re should or should n o t be a fo u rth level o f lan g u ag e, p a ri v ik. B h a rtrh a ri h im self seems to leave open th a t possibility. T h e O jtti o n Vakyapadiya 1.142 does q u o te am ong num ero u s o th er passages R g Veda 1.164.45, w h ic h refers to four levels o f vie. C ard o n a , p . 302, seems to

c o n tra d ic t him self, suggesting fo u r levels in th e m a in te x t—paiyanli b e in g d iv id e d in to tw o aspects— b u t in th e fo o tn o te observ in g “ th a t B h a rtrh ri d id n o t reco g n ize a n ab so lu te fo u rth level called para vac. ‘su p re m e sp e e c h ,’ w h ic h w as reco g n ized b y la te r th in k ers, especially in th e K a sh m ir S a iv a school o f th o u g h t” (p. 3 6 9 ). 4:

W o r d M e a n in g

1. See K . K u n ju n n i R a ja , “ P a n in i’s A ttitu d e T o w a rd s L a k s a n a ,” Adyar Library Bulletin (19 6 5 ) : 177-187. 2. Sarvadarianasamgraka o f M a d h a v a , tra n s. E.B . C ow ell a n d A .E . G o u g h (L o n d o n 1892-1894, p p . 210ff. 3. See C h a k ra v a rti (G 1 4 0 2 ). 4. P a ta n ja li, Mahabhasya 1.1. 5. K u m a rila , Slokavarttika, sphofavada section, verse 5. 6. P a ta n ja li, Mahabhasya 1.4.109. 7. Ib id . 8. See C h a k ra v a rti (G 1 4 0 2 ), p . 100. 9. Vakyapadiya 1.44. 10. Ib id . 1 .4 5 -4 6 . 11. Ib id . 1.47. 12. Ib id . 1.49. 13. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 7 2 1 ), p . 58. 14. Vakyapadiya 1.1 a n d vrtti. 15. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 8 7 2 ), p . 2. 16. Ib id ., p. 3. 17. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 1 4 6 4 ), p. 124. 18. A su m m a ry o f p a r t o f M a n d a n a ’s an sw er to K u m a rila in M a n d a n a ’s SphofaSiddhii karika 3, as p re se n te d b y G a u rin a th S astri in G 706, p . 105. 19. Sphofasiddhii k&rika 4. 20. Ib id . 21. Ib id . 22. U n lik e th e su b se q u e n t discussion, th e p re c e d in g d e b a te assum es n o invisible tra c e o r samsk&ra. K u m a rila h o ld s th a t th e la st p h o n em e , h e lp e d b y th e m o re visible going before o f th e o th e r p h o n em es in th e w o rd , causes th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o f m ea n in g . 23. S u b r a m a n ia I y e r (G 8 7 2 ), p . 14. 24. Sphofasiddhii karika 5, G 872, p . 16. 25. Ib id . 2 6. Ib id ., karika 6, G 872, p . 16. 27. I b id ., G 872, p p . 17-18. 28. Ib id ., karika 10, G 872, p . 30. 29. Ib id ., G 872, p . 31. 30. Ib id ., karika 11, G 872, p . 34. 31. Ib id . 32. Ib id ., karika 18, G 872, p . 44. 33. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 1 4 6 4 ), p . 136. 34. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r’s in tro d u c tio n to G 872, p . 13. 35. Ib id ., karika 20, a n d Vakyapadiya 1.88 w ith vrtti. 36. I t sh o u ld b e n o te d th a t n o less a p erso n th a n S a m k a ra a rg u e d a g a in s t th e sphofa th eo ry (in Brahmasutrabhasya 1 .3 .2 8 ). See also th e re c e n t analysis o f S a m k a ra ’s o b jectio n sphofa in H e rm a n (G 1 5 4 9 ). S a m k a ra a n d K u m a rila b o th b ase th e ir criticism o n acarya U p a v a rs a , a n d th e ir o bjections a re so m ew h at d iffe re n t fro m th e d e b a te betw een V a c a sp a ti a n d M a n d a n a .

555

NOTE S

37. T h is passage a n d th e follow ing ones a re tak en from th e tra n sla tio n b y S.S. S u ry a n a ra y a n a Sastri in G 1414, re p rin te d in Collected Papers o f S .S Suryanarayana Sastri (M ad ras, 1961), p. 296. 38. Ib id . 39. Ib id . 40. Ib id ., p . 301. 41. Ib id . 42. Ib id ., p. 293. 43. See S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r’s in tro d u c tio n to G 872, p . 17. 44. Sphotasiddhi, kdrikd 24, G 872, p . 64. S ee also S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 1 4 4 5 ), in w h ich he m akes clea r th a t from th e sphofa view point w h a te v er distin ctio n o f degree o r p a r t is m ad e in a n object m u st b e d o n e th ro u g h a guria (q u a lity o f p a rtic u la r). 45. Vakyapadiya 1.85. F o r m o re on this to p ic see c h a p te r 3 p a r t 2 o f this in tro d u ctio n .

5. S en ten

ce

M

e a n in g

1. See Sphotasiddhi, kdrikd 23. 2. F o r d e ta ile d discussion see K u n ju n n i R a ja (G 3 5 5 ). 3. See K u n ju n n i R a ja (G 1 5 5 6 ), p p . 154-156. 4. K u m a rila , Slokavarttika. 5. See K . K u n ju n n i R a ja , “ T h e R o le o f Tdtparya in U n d e rsta n d in g th e S entence,” in Ancient Indian Theories on Sentence Meaning (P oona, 1980). 6. N o an Chom sky, Language and M in d (N ew Y ork, 1968), ch ap . 3.

N O T E S T O SU RV EY I.

P

h il o s o p h ic a l

E

lem ents

in

V

e d ic

L

it e r a t u r e

I. N ages'a B haffa has in te rp re te d this verse as referrin g to th e fourfold m a n i­ festation o f vac in to para, paiyanti, madhyamd, a n d vaikhari. 2.

P

h il o s o p h ic a l

E

lem ent

in

Y

a s k a ’s

JSirukta

1. See B. B h atta c h a ry a, TaskaJs Nirukta and the Science o f Etymology (C alcu tta, 1 9 5 2 ); S iddhesw ar V a rm a , The Etymology o f Taska (H o sh iarp u r, 1953 ) ; K u n ju n n i R a ja (G 696). 2. T h ie m e (G 4 5 8 ), p p . 23-24. 3. C a rd o n a , p p . 270-273. 4. “ B h a v a p ra d h a n a m a k h y a ta m , sa ttv a p ra d h a n a n i n a m a n i.’’ 5. “ S ad b h av a v ik a ra, b h a v a n titi v a rsa y a n ir ja y a te ’sti viparin.am.ate v a rd h a te p ak siy ate v in asy atiti.” 6. “ P ra p ta k ra m a visesesu k riy a saiv ab h id h iy a te k ra m a ru p a sy a sam h are ta t sattv am iti k a th y a te ,” Vakyapadiya 3.1.35. 7. “ P u rv ap arib h Q ta m b h a v a m a k h y ate n acasfe.” 8. “ K rd a b h ih ito b h a v a d ra v y a v a d b h a v a ti.” 9. “ In d riy a n ity a m v a c a n a m a u d u m b a ra y a n a h ,” Vdkyapadiya 2.347. 10. Cf. B rough (G 8 ). 11. “ N a m a n y a k h y a ta ja n iti sak afay an o n a iru k ta sa m a y a sc a ; n a sarv a n iti g argyo v a iy a k a ra n a n a m caike,” Nirukta 1.12. 12. “ B h a v a p ra d h a n a m ak h y a ta m , sa ttv a p ra d h a n a n i n a m a n i.”

3.

P

h il o s o p h io a l

E

l e m e n t s in

P

a n i n i ’s

Affadhyayi

1. G enerally tak en to b e la te r th a n Y ask a; b u t T h iem e takes h im to b e earlier. See th e ex ten d ed discussion su m m arized in C ard o n a. 2. “ Sistah sabdesu pram anam .” 3. “ L o k av ijn an at sid d h a m ,” see sRtras 1.1.21, 1.1.65. 4. “ T a d asisyam sa m jn a p ra m a n a tv a t,’’ siltra 1.2.53. “ S id d h e sab d arth asam b a n d h e lo k a ta h ,” Varttika. 5. “ A v y u tp a n n a p ra tip a d ik a .” See also th e discussion in Y ask a’s Nirukta. 6. ' “ P ratip a d ik a v ijn a n a c c a P a n in e h sid d h a m / U n a d a y o v y u tp a n n a n i p ra tip a d ik a n i.” 7. “ A rth a ik a tv a d ekam v ak y am sak an k sam ced v ib h ag e sy a d ,” P a tan jali, Mahabhafya 3.2.41. 8. See KLtmjunni R a ja (G 3 5 5 ); also D ev asth ali (G 3 2 7 ), p p . 206—215. 9. Nyasa o n KdMkat e d ited b y S.C . C h a k ra v a rti in G 851, p . 423. See B rough (G 1478), p p . 28-29; also S ta al (G 1 5 6 6 ), p p . 164-167. N a ra y a n a B h a tta tiri elucidates this p o in t in his PrakHyRsaroasva. 10. N agesa B h atta discusses lakfatta a t le n g th in his MaRjRfa a n d says in th e ParamaIaghumaRjRfR th a t acco rd in g to th e g ram m a ria n s th ere is n o necessity to ac c ep t IaksattR as a sep arate fun ctio n o f w ords.

4.

P

h il o s o p h io a l

E

l e m e n t s in

Pa

t a n j a l i ’s

MahabhRsya

1. T h e M im am sakas ta k e Sabda to b e th e so u n d only, w h ile to th e g ram m arian s m eaningfulness is a n essential fe a tu re o f a linguistic sign. See M a rid a n a M isra ’s Sphofasiddhit verse 3 : “ a Sabda is th e cause for c re atin g th e u n d e rsta n d in g o f the m ean in g ” (“ arth a v a sa y a p ra sa v a n im itta m sa b d a isy a te ” ). 2. MahabhRfya 1.1. 3. K u m a rila , SlokaOarttikat sphofavRda section, verse 5. 4. See the discussion in c h a p te r 5 o f B h a rtrh a ri. A m o n g th e followers o f P an in i, V a ja p y a y a n a considered th e m ea n in g to b e Rkfti o r jRti, w hile V y a d i took it to b e the in d iv id u al o r dravya. A m ong o th er scholars o f philosophy, th e M im am sakas took akrti to b e synonym ous w ith jR ti, w hile th e N y ay a school took it to be th e stru c tu ra l form, as d istin ct fro m th e univ ersal. Cf. G a u ta m a , NyayasRtrat “Ja ty a k rtiv y a k ta a s tu p a d a rth a h .” 5. VRrttika I : “ sid d h e sa b d a rth a sa m b a n d h e lo k ata h . . . .” 6. MahRbhRfya I : “ a rth a v a n to v a rn a h . . . .” 7. K a ty a y a n a ’s varttika o n 1.2.64: “ d ra v y a b h id h a n a m v y a d ih ” a n d “ akrtyab h id h a n a d v aik am v ib h a k ta u V a ja p y a y a n a h .” 8. “Ja ty a k h y a y a m akasm in b a h u v a c a n a m a n y a ta ra sy a m .” 9. “ S a ru p a n a m ekasesa e k a v ib h a k ta u .” 10. MahRbhRsya I. 11. “ P a p in id a rsa n e ja tid ra v y a u sa b d e n a b h id h iy ete .” 12. “ Y asya gunan tare§ v ap i p ra d u rb h a v a tsu ta ttv a m n a v ih a n y a te ta d d ra v y a m ” (on 5 .1 .1 1 9 ). 13. O n P ariin i’s sutra 1.4.109. 14. MahRbhRfya 1.35.5. 15. B u d d h a u k rtv a sarv as cesfah k a rta d h ira s ta n v a n n itih . S ab d en a rth a n v a c y a n d rs tv a b u d d h a u k u ry a t p a u rv a p a ry a m .” 16. “ D h v a n ih sp h o tas ca sabdanaxn dh v an is tu k h a lu lak sy ate A lpo m a h a m s ca kesam cid u b h a y a m ta t sv a b h a v a ta h .” A lso: “ sp h o ta h sa b d a h d h v a n ih sa b d a g u n a h .”

17. “ V a m a sy a g ra h a n e h e tu h p ra k rto d h v a n ir isyate. V rttib h e d e n im itta tv a ip v aik rtah sa m a p a d y a te .” 18. “ A v asth ita v a rn a v ak tu s c iracirav acad v rttay o v isisy an te.” 19. Mahibhasya 1.181. 20. “ K ip o ro la h ,” P a m n i’s sitra 8.2.18. 21. “ S tan ak esav ati stri syal lo m asa h p u ru s a h sm rta h . U b h a y o r a n ta ra m y acca ta d ab h a v e n a p u m sa k a m .” 22. “ N a v aiy ak a ran ais sakyam lau k ik am lih g a m a sth a tu m .” 23. “ S am styanavivaksayam stri, p rasav av iv ak say am p u m a n u b h ay av iv ak say am n ap u m sak am .”

5.

B h a r t h jh a r i

1. CF. F ra u w a lln e r (R B 12599), p p . 134-135. 2. T h e title Vakyapadiya could h av e referred o rig in ally to th e second o f th e th ree kitidas (chapters o r books) th a t m ak e u p th e w ork. I t is definite th a t a b o u t a .d . 1000 Vikyapadiya was generally re g ard ed as ap p ly in g o n ly to th e first tw o books; Trikandi w as the term th a t in clu d e d all th ree books. T h e use o f th e title Vakyapadiya to speak o f even th e th ird book, th e Padakinda o r th e Prakmiaka (M iscellany) seems to b e n o old er th a n the sixteen th cen tu ry (cf. A k lu jk ar [ G 733] , p p . 5 4 7 -5 5 5 ). I t is this use th a t is m ost com m on a t p resent. T h e first tw o books, acco rd in g to one m a n u sc rip t trad itio n , consist o f verses (kirik&s) as w ell as a prose c o m m en tary (Dftti). T h e o th e r m an u scrip t trad itio n s h av e only th e kirikas, o r kirikas acco m p an ied b y a prose com m en­ ta ry (Iika) evidently a u th o re d b y som eone o th e r th a n th e karika a u th o r. A lo n g line o f w riters in the S an sk rit tra d itio n h as consistently h eld th a t th e Vrtti too is B h a rtrh a ri’s w ork a n d is a n in teg ra l p a r t o f th e Vdkyapadiya (cf. A k lu jk ar [ G743] . I n th e ir u n d e r­ standing th e reference o f th e title Vikyapadiya is n o t confined to th e kirikas. F o r m an y m o d ern students o f B h a rtrh a ri’s w orks, how ever, th a t title stan d s for th e kirikas, p rim arily as w ell as exclusively. T h e Vrtti is n o t g en erally view ed as in c lu d ed w hen references such as “ Vikyapadiya 1.5” a re m a d e . 3. T h e w o rd nitya is n o t in te n d ed h ere in th e sense “ e te rn a l” (as in “ G o d is e tern al” ). E ven as signifying “ p e rm a n e n t” i t has tw o o r th ree shades o f m ean in g , depending on the th eo retical context. See A k lu jk ar (G 7 3 5 ), p . 82. 4. See th e preced in g n ote. 5. Cf. A k lu jk ar (G 7 6 2 ), p . 12, n. 12. 6. W h en a n expression is m en tio n ed , as d istin c t fro m w hen it is used, it is th o u g h t to convey its ow n form as m ean in g . A th eo retical d istin ctio n is m a d e betw een a n expression a n d its ow n form in cases o f m en tio n , a n d th e fo rm er is said to b e th e signifier a n d th e la tte r th e signified; th a t is, w h en self-referring o r q u o te d expressions a re com pared w ith th e expressions h av in g a n ex te rn al reference, th e distin ctio n is n o t seen in th e m o d e o f em p lo y m en t (“ use-m en tio n ” ) o f th e tw o, b u t in w h a t th ey convey— w h a t th e outco m e is. 7. T h e concept oarriasphofa, as u n d ersto o d b y th e P an in iy as, differs fro m “ p h o ­ nem e” as generally u n d ersto o d b y linguists in one im p o rta n t respect. A , a, a n d a th a t is, short (hrasva), lo n g (dirgha), a n d p ro lo n g ed (pluta) a— a re reg a rd ed as differen t realizations o f varrtasphofa a; in o th e r w ords, th e varrtasphofa h e re is a n ab stra c ted o r generalized com m on facto r form . 8. T h e im plicatio n is th a t linguistic u n its a re assum ed to b e in d iv id u als o r p a rti­ culars in th e discussion su m m arized in th e p reced in g p a ra g ra p h . O n e o f B h a rtrh a ri’s com m entators (P uniy araja/H elaraja, a t 2 .1 -2 , 19, 3 9 -4 0 ) system atizes th e sphofa view o f linguistic expressions as follows: (a ) bihya sphofa·. indiv id u als (vyakti) a n d universals

(ja l i) ; (b ) abhyantara sphofa: Sabdatattva. T h is sy stem atiza tio n is co n firm ed b y th e sequence o f statem en ts in 1.84—97. 9. T h e foregoing in te rp re ta tio n o f 1 .1 4 8 -1 5 4 is c o n je c tu ra l, fo r th e passages d o n o t c o n ta in a n ex p lic it sta te m e n t to this effect: “ T h e fo llo w in g /p rec e d in g is th e ju s tific a tio n o f th e c la im th a t k n o w led g e o r SSstra-b ased use o f g ra m m a tic a l expressions c a n le a d to m e rit.” I h av e assu m ed th a t su ch a s ta te m e n t w as in te n d e d b y B h a rtrh a ri, b ecau se th e c o n te x t (1.144—147 a n d 1 .1 5 8 -1 7 4 ) is o n e o f p o in tin g o u t th e im p o rta n c e o f g ra m m a r a n d becau se th e im m e d ia te ly follow ing verses (1 .1 5 5 -1 5 7 ) a re co n cern ed w ith th e re la tio n b etw e en sadhu Sabda a n d dharma. I t is, h o w ev er, possible th a t 1 .148-157 a re n o t a t th e ir o rig in a l p la ce in th e BrahmakSrida. 10. AnvitabhidkSna-vSdins o f th e la te r w orks. 11. T h e last th re e co rresp o n d , respectively, to madhyama, paSyantl, a n d parSpaSyantirUpa. Speech (vaikhari) is m a rk e d b y a n o b serv a b le p resen ce o f b re a th a n d sequence in b o th its upamSu a n d n o n -upamSu varieties. 12. As w ill b e a p p a re n t fro m this su m m a ry , th e lin k a m o n g verses 1 1 2 -1 1 5 is n o t clear. 13. T h e re is som e o v erlap in th e list th a t follows b y th e v e ry n a tu re o f th e m a tte r involved a n d because th e list evolved th ro u g h th e efforts o f g en e ra tio n s o f th in k ers. F o r th e la tte r reason, th e re is also a n ele m e n t o f v a ria tio n in th e u n d e rs ta n d in g o r d efin itio n o f term s involved. F o r ex am p le, prakaratfa a n d samarthya obviously h a d w id er m ean in g s in a d d itio n to th e ir specific m ean in g s d e te rm in e d o n th e basis o f o th e r factors in c lu d e d in th e lis t(s ). 14. T h e V a iy a k a ra p a s u n d e rs ta n d dravya in tw o senses: first, th e e v erlastin g su b ­ stan c e th a t u n d erlies a ll tra n sie n t p h y sic al sh a p e s; a n d , second, w h a t a d e m o n stra tiv e p ro n o u n (e q u iv alen t to “ v a ria b le ” o f m o d e rn lo g ic) c a n refer to . T h e second c h a p te r, a su m m a ry o f w h ich begins a t this p o in t, e x p an d s o n th e first sense. T h e second sense is g iven in c h a p te r 4. 15. I n th e first c h a p te r o f th e th ird b o o k , a ll expressions a re said to re fer, in th e fin al analysis, to E x isten ce. T h is E x iste n c e is th e n view ed as a u n iv e rsal p e rv a d in g ev ery th in g . H e re in th e second c h a p te r a sim ila r co n clu sio n is re a c h e d , b u t th e E xis­ ten ce is said to b e a p a rtic u la r. T h u s , th e re a re tw o c u rre n ts o f th o u g h t, ro u g h ly co rresp o n d in g to o n to lo g ical re d u c tio n (a ) to classes o r (b ) to in d iv id u als in re c e n t w estern p hilo sophy. 16. M o st, i f n o t a ll, c o m m o n sentences w o u ld b e lo g ically p ro b le m a tic (in te rn a lly in co n sisten t) i f th e w ords in th e m w e re view ed as re fe rrin g to a c tu a lly existing entities (for exam ple, in th e case o f “ sp ro u t is b o rn ,” o n e c o u ld ask : H o w is th e sp ro u t said to b e b o m w h en it e x isted ?). E x p la n a tio n s o f h o w these sentences a re possible v a ry . O n e involves d istin ctio n b e tw ee n refe re n c e a n d sense (or m e a n in g ). A n o th e r ad v o cates ac c e p ta n c e o f a n o th e r k in d o f (v e rb a l o r lin g u istic) ex istence. T h e th ird rests o n th e o b serv atio n th a t w ord s c a n n o t re fe r to en tities in th e ir e n tire ty — in a ll o f th e ir aspects— o r p u re ly in them selves. T h e follow ing su m m a ry allu d e s to th is v a rie ty o f ex p lan a tio n s. 17. T h e in te n tio n b e h in d ca llin g th e a risin g o f a n effect a m ira c le c o u ld b e o f tw o so rts: e ith e r th e b eco m in g o f th e effect c a n n o t b e expressed w ith o u t g iv in g rise to u n in te n d e d im p licatio n s— w ith o u t re a liz in g th e in a d e q u a c y o f la n g u a g e , as in th e d e scrip tio n o f a m ira c le— or w e c a n n o t d e te rm in e th e p o in t o f tra n sitio n — th e ex act m o m e n t o r p h ase in w h ich th e cause ceases to exist a n d th e effect com es in to being. T h e tra n sitio n seem s to ta k e p la c e in a flash lik e a m ira c le . H e la ra ja (3.3.81 ) is aw are o f b o th in te rp re ta tio n s, a n d th e re is c o n te x tu a l su p p o rt fo r b o th . V erses 3 .3 .7 8 —80 a n d 82—86 suggest th a t B h a rtrh a ri lo c a te d th e lo g ical p ro b le m s o f cau se-an d -effect re la tio n ­ ship in th e expression o f t h a t re la tio n sh ip a n d in b e in g n o t a w a re o f g e n e ra l tru th s a b o u t la n g u a g e ’s re la tio n to re a lity in u n d e rs ta n d in g th a t expression. I n o th e r w ords, h e seem s to h a v e dissolved th e p ro b le m s r a th e r th a n solved th em . T h u s, th e first

in te rp re ta tio n is co n te x tu ally ju stified . S u p p o rt for th e second in te rp re ta tio n c a n be seen in th e adjectives abhdgam, “ partless,” a n d akramam “ sequenceless,” w h ich a re used in 3.3.81. 18. T h e e n tity n eed n o t be explicity qualified. AU th a t is necessary is a presupposi­ tio n th a t x can b e q ualified if necessary (bhedyatoena vivaksita). Second, q ualification is to be u n d ersto o d as in clu d in g p red icatio n , even o f th e sim ple ty p e such as “x is/ exists.” T h e present defin itio n allows us to view universals a n d th e like as p a rtic u la rs a n d perm its c h a racteriz a tio n o f all w o rd m eanings as p a rtic u la rs or indiv id u als. T h u s, all w ords a re said to refer to draoya in tw o w ays: th e o n e state d in c h a p te r 3.2 (see th e p reced in g n o te ) a n d th e o n e sta te d h e re in c h a p te r 3.4. 19. T h is excelling c an also b e in su ch neg ativ e respects as b ein g disliked, b ein g despised, an d so on (for exam ple, kutsitatara, “ m o re censured o f th e tw o” ). 20. T h e in ten d ed c h a ra c teriz a tio n o f sddhana o r karaka should b e clea r from the s u m m a ry o f the follow ing c h ap te r. T h e im p o rta n t p o ints to re m e m b e r a re , first, th a t th ey a re view ed as sup p o rts o f th e a ctio n as expressed in the sentence; second, th a t th e ir a c tu a l relatio n to th e a ctio n as seen in th e physical w o rld does n o t m a tte r— w h a t m a tte rs is th e capacities in w h ich th e speaker places th e m — an d , th ird , th a t th e a ctio n m e n tio n ed in this co n te x t is n o t necessarily physical, ob serv ab le a c tio n c h a racterized b y a series of m o m en ts; even th e m ean in g o f “ is” o r “ exists” is action. 21. As H e la ra ja (p. 2 0 9 .1 2 -1 3 ) observes h ere, w hile th e definitions o f Sadhanai kriya , a n d so on, like those o f th e p reced in g dravya a n d guna, a re established b y stud y in g P a n in ia n rules, the ch ara c te riz a tio n o f space, tim e, a n d so o n is a resu lt o f a d ire c t a tte m p t to u n d ersta n d th e ir n a tu re ; th e rules d o n o t p ro v id e clues as in th e o th e r cases. F o r B h artrh a ri, dkaSa does n o t seem to be a n y positive, physical en tity . I t is now here distinguished from diS in his w ritings. H e seems to h av e used th e w o rd con­ ven tio n ally in th e sense “ visible, p erc e p tib le sp ace,” w h ich , in view o f his fin al rejection o f space as a n actu a lly ex istent en tity , u ltim a te ly comes to m e a n “ space th a t is generally thought to be percep tib le.” 22. V aisesikas, acco rd in g to H e la ra ja , p p . 2 3 9 .3 -4 , 243.9. 23. (a) H e la ra ja (p. 315.18) labels this view in verse 107 as svasiddhanta, “ B h a rtrh a ri’s ow n thesis,” acco rd in g to th e av a ila b le editions. B u t th e view in verse 109 is also soasiddhAnta, acco rd in g to H e la ra ja (p. 3 1 6 .1 2 ). (b ) T h e re a re n o w ords such as atha vd, kesdmcit, o r anyesdm, in d ic atin g paksdntara, in verses 108 a n d 109. T h a t these verses express views d ifferen t fro m th e o n e co n ta in e d in 106-107 is som ething one has to accep t on th e au th o rity o f H e la ra ja , w ho, in tu rn , seem s to h a v e (rig h tly ) n o ticed th a t the w o rd in g o f 1 08-109 in d icates d ifferen t p hilosophical assum ptions. 24. T h e assum ption h ere is th a t a n a g e n t m u st really exist to a p p e a r as a n ag en t in a sentence. I n the view expressed in verse 105, real existence is n o t h e ld to b e neces­ sary ; a ten tativ e, im ag in ed existence is h e ld to b e sufficient. A m ong th e thinkers ad v o catin g necessity o f “ rea l existence” th ere a re tw o gro u p s: one (p ro b ab ly S am khya ) locates such re a l existence in th e cause, m a in ta in in g th a t cause a n d effect a re essen­ tially id e n tic a l; th e second explains re a l existence as existence as a univ ersal, clearly im plying th a t the universals a re re a l (as in th e N y a y a view ) a n d beyond question (w hich, o f course, is n o t th e case, as th e questions o f B u d d h ist logicians sh o w ). A ltho ug h B h a rtrh a ri ca n acco m m o d ate these views (th ree in a ll: buddhyavasthdnibandhana or mvaksdnibandhana, existence; satkdrya; a n d jdtivyakti) as w ell as th e upacdrasattd (secon­ d a ry , derivative existence) view expressed in 3.3.45, his first p referen ce is th e Sabddrtho ’rtha view, expressed in 3.7.109 110. M e a n in g (Sabddrtha) a n d reference (oastvartha o r bdhydrtha) a re to be distinguished. In u n d e rsta n d in g usage, a tte n tio n to w h a t is reflected in la n g u a g e is sufficient. W h e th e r th e e n tity spoken o f ac tu ally exists (a w orthw hile concern if th e purpose o f in q u iry is som eth in g else) need n o t be considered to acco u n t for usage, such as “ As sp ro u t comes in to b ein g .” F o r w ords c a rry in g o u t d en o ta tio n in

sentences like this, all existent entities are n o different from nonexistent entities. To p u t the p o in t differently, i t is im p ro p er to see contradictions in a sentence b y asking questions like: “ D id the sp ro u t exist before com ing in to being? I f it d id , how can it new ly com e in to being? I f it d id not, how can it p erfo rm the action o f com ing into being?” T h e use o f the w ord “ sp ro u t” is in n o w ay p re d ic ate d on th ere b eing an actu a l sprout o r a referent. T h e se n te n c e w ith “ sp ro u t” as the subject can proceed as long as there is m eaning or sense (Jabdartha) for “ sp ro u t.” 25. I n the original, verses 109-110, th e observation a b o u t language (specifically, d en o tatio n ) is said to h o ld good also in th e case o f prajHa or buddhi, “ intellect” (speci­ fically, a cognition reflecting a n e n tity ). J u s t as d en o tatio n im plies acceptance o f (some kind of) existence, cognition im plies conceding (some kind of) existence. I have left o u t this m ention o f intellect a n d cognition h ere in o rd er n o t to obscure th e present discussion an d also because language a n d intellect tu rn o u t to be ultim ately identical in B h a rtrh a ri’s philosophy. 26. (a ) Actions such as p u ttin g th e p o t o n the stove, p o u rin g w ater in to th e pot, ad d in g rice to the w ater, lig h tin g the stove, a n d m ore, a re subsum ed u n d e r the one action denoted by “ cooks.” See su m m ary o f the eighth ch ap te r (Kriydsamuddeia). (b) H elaraja points o u t th a t this w ay o f accounting for “ A sp rou t comes in to being” differs from the first w ay (a ), in th a t h ere the id e n tity o f cause a n d effect is based on a feature o f usage called upacdra (“ extended ap p licatio n ” o f a verbal ro o t like “ cook” to cover subsidiary actions leading to cooking), w hile in (a ) th e id e n tity o f cause a n d effect is held to be factual (vdstava). 27. T h e exam ples in d icated b y B h artrh ari a re : “ yavagu m u tray a sam p ad y ate,” ‘ ‘suvarriapindah kupdale b h a v a ta h ,” “ b ra h m a n a h sam gho b h a v a ti,” “ brahm aniah sam ghibhavanti,” “ tvad-bhavasi,” a n d “ ra ja n a ra ja sam padyase/bhavasi.” T o them H elaraja ad d s: “ ksiram d a d h i sam p ad y ate,” “ b ijad an k u ro ja y a te ,” “ yavagva m u tram ja y a te ,” “ m a h ad b h u ta s c a n d ra m a h ,” an d “ m a h a d b h u ta b ra h m a n i.” T h e discussion o f these exam ples is d eterm ined to som e ex ten t by th e peculiarities o f the Sanskrit language. F or this reason, as well as to indicate th e relationship of the p o in t h ere w ith th e preceding, I have p referred sim pler exam ples. 28. A t the beginning o f this section, a verse giving th e definition o f apddana is expected, as in the case o f sections o n o th er kdrakas in this S am uddesa. B ut th e first statem ent we see a t presen t in it deals w ith th e varieties o f apddina. I t seems, therefore, th a t a t least one verse has been lost in th e know n m anuscripts. T h e form o f the lost verse is likely to have been “ ap ay e y a d udasinam calam v a y adi v acalam / d h ru v am evatadavesat ta d ap a d a n a m u cy ate ,” th a t is, essentially th e sam e as th e verse quoted by Bhoja (^fngdraprakdSa, ch ap te r 4 ), H a ra d a tta (PadamaHjari 1.4.24), B hatfoji D iksita (iSabdakaustubha 1.4.24), a n d others. 29. As the last exam ple indicates, th e actio n o f m oving aw ay associated w ith the concept o f apdddna is n o t necessarily th e a c tu a l or physical action o f m oving aw ay. In conform ity w ith th e V aiy ak aran as Sdbda (conceptual o r sem antic, as distinct from artha, actual, physical) concept o f action (see sum m ary o f the Kriydsamuddeia, book 3, section 8 instances in w hich th e m ovem ent is only im agined o r intellectually entertain ed are also relev ant here. 30. Cf. Jo sh i (G 1194) p p . 29, 3 9 -4 0 , etc. 31. Sw am inathan (G 780), p p . 3—4. 32. “ D vau sab d atm an a u n ity ah k ary as ceti kaiscid n ity a iti drsfah kaiscid anitya ltd. A th a v a ja tir vyaktis ceti a th a v a sphoto dhvanis c a ,” ibid. p . 13. 33. S u b ra m a n ia Iy e r (G 734), p . 171. 34. Sw am inathan (G 780), p . 28; also S u b ram an ia Iy e r (G 734), p . 74, 35. “ S aksat p ra tip a tte r an u m a n a p ra tip a ttir gariy asi.”

561

NOTES

9.

MANDANA

MISRA

1. In this logical argument, it seems clear that Rumania's attempt to identify Sabda with the uttered phonemes is effectively discredited by the reasoning of Mandana, who at the same time has vindicated the identification of Sabda with sphofa. Although the logical groundwork has largely been completed, Maijdana still has to describe in detail exactly how Sabda as sphofa may be comprehended using only ordinary memory traces of the phonemes to reveal the sphofa. He must also show the sphofa to be not a mere postulation but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in karikas 18-19 of the Sphofasiddhi. 10.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

HelARAJA

See Subramania Iyer (G734), pp. 39-40. Gf. G709, G747. Aklujkar (G750), pp. 165-188. Ibid. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 38. 12.

1.

PUNYARAJA

Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 41. 13.

KAJYATA

1. Gf. Sarma (G907). 2. "Yathottaram muninäm prämäi).yam" sütra 1.1.29. 3. "Munitraya matenädyatva sädhvasädhu pravibhägah," sütra 5.1.21. 4. Kaiyata's views on different problems connected with language are found scattered in different parts of the commentary. Many of them have been noted and discussed in Korida Bhafta's Bhüfana(sära). 21.

¡"¡ESA CrNTÄMANr

1. Gf. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Saijiskrta vyakarana-S&stra kä itikäsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 418-419. 28.

ANNAMBHATTA

1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyäkarana-Sästra kä itihäsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, p. 422. 2. P.P.S. Sastri's introduction to G587. 32.

SIVARÄMENDRA

SARASVATI

1. Theodor Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, pp. 718, 440,

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

562 33.

(SESA)

CAKRAPÄNI

OF

INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

(DATTA)

1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyäkararia-Sästra kä itihäsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 540-541. 2. Gf. New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 3, p. 275a, and Mimamsaka, Sariskrta vyäkarana-Sästra, pp. 487-49535.

NILAKANTHA

SIJKLA

1. See New Indian Antiquary 5 (1942): 177-183; also Journal of the Tanjore Sarasvati Mahal Library (1955 1956). 37.

KONDA

(OR

KAUNDA)

BHATTA

1. See volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed., p. 387. 2. Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts of the Adyar Library, vol. 9, no. 575. 3. Volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed., p. 422. 4. The summary of this section was prepared through consultation of the dissertation of Gune (Gl 197). 5. The summary of this section is based on the unpublished dissertation of Deshpande (Gl 196). 40.

TIRUMALA

YAJVAN

1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyäkarana-Sastra kä itihäsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. 1, pp. 413ff. 42.

SADÄSIVA

1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sariskrta vyäkararia-Sästra kä itihäsa (Sonipat, 1973), vol. l , p p . 416-417. 45.

NÄGESA

(OR NÄGOJI

BHATTA)

1. For a relative chronology of his works see Gode, (RB6813); also P.V. Kane, History of DharmaSästra Volume One (Poona 1930), 453-456. 57.

1.

ÄIÄDHARA

BHATTA

Shah, RB4735. 66.

SATÄRÄ

RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA

GAJENDRAGADAKAR

1. B.N.K. Sharma, A History of the Dvaita School of Vedänta and Its Literature (Bombay, 1961), vol. 2, p. 358; Theodor Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum-. An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, p. 500.

CUMULATIVE INDEX

References are to pages unless preceded by " G " , in which case the reference is to numerical entries in the Bibliography. This cumulative index combines indices of names, titles, and topics into one alphabetized guide. Abbreviations used are the following: a = article b = book d = dissertation e = edition t = translation —consciousness. See consciousness Abegg, Ernst a: G1391 —eternality. See eternal, absolute abhasa. See reflection Acaksanaviveka (of Rajiva ¡Sarman) 530 abhava. See absence ABHAYACANDRA (ACXRYA) (1329) ACARYA DIK.SITA 239 ACCAN D l K S I T A 239 484 accent (svaraj 15, 149, G185, G199, ABHAYANANDIN (750) 17-18, 474 G298, G324, G397, G457A, G1367, abhidha. See primary meaning G1580, G1584, G1594 abhihitdnvqya (verbal comprehensive theoVedic G i l 7 , G1420 ry) 9-10, 66, 92, 98 ABHINAVAGUPTA (1014) 28, 91, 193, accomplisher (uddeiya ) 330 accusative case 259, 272, G1461, G1519, 476 ABHINAVA KALIDASA (1750) 371, G1520 507 Acharya, K. C. a: G366 ABHINAVA NRSIMHASRAMA (1630) Acharya, Mrityunjay a: G16 Acharya, Narayana Ram e: G1167 496 Acharya, Ramananda a: G1611 abhinrtarupa. See adjective ABHIRAMA V I D Y A L A M K A R A (1500) Achyatan, Mavelikara b : G493 action (kriyd) 168-70, 196-97, 256-58, 487 261-62, 264, 268, 337, 559, G1477 abhivyakti. See revelation means to (sadhana) 25, 163-68, 262 Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev 128. miraculous course of (atadbhutavrtli) a: G242, G322, G519, G573, G726, 161, G748 G1215, G1217, G1502, G1517, G1563, G1594, e: G536, G781, G858, G1331, activity (pravrlti) 169 activity (rajas) 44-45, 120, 275 b : G1546 activity (spanda) 328 abhyanujfid. See permission ACYUTANANDA SASTRI (1963) 517, abhyasa. See practice e: G168 ablative (apadana) 168, 270, 337, 338, 560 absence (abhava) 54, 127, 149, 288, 334, A C Y U T A PISHAROTI (1610) 494 ADENNA 517 G1683 adhikarana. See locative absolute G1532. See also Brahman

564

E N C Y O L O P E D IA O F I N D I A N

adhisfhana. See basis adhiyqjfia. See ritualistic interpretation of the Veda ädhunika. See technical term adhyäsa. See superimposition adhvan. See path of being Adityas 104 adjective (abhinnarüpa) 292, Gl 571 Adredos, F. R . b : G1486 adrsfa 146, 186 Advaita Vedänta 20,41-43, 54, 56-57, 5960, 82, 216, 239-40, 255, 287, 305, 341, 369-71, 375, 397, G790, G809 Advaitaviveka (of Äsädhara Bhatfa) 375 Advayasiddhi (ofHeläräja) 193,475 adverb G1632 Adyar Library 211, 240 aesthetic experience 32-33 ägama. See scripture, tradition agent (Mraka) 269-70, 336-37

PHILOSOPHIES

Aklujkar, Ashok 123-73, 179, 193, 201, 559, 563, a: G731, G733, G736, G741, G743, G750, G762, G764, G765, G769, G774, G782, G806, G1607, G1665, d : G735 akrti. See configuration aksara. See syllable AKSAYASORI 371 alambana. See supporting object Alamkara literature 239 Alamkarasarvasva (of Ruyyaka) 203 alarpkaraiastra, Alamkarikas 31, 83, 91-2, 240

alataeakra. See fire-wheel Al-George, Sergiu a: G142, G212, G228, G243, G367, G491, G1567, G1608, G1612 Allen, William Sidney a: G132, b : G1478, G1547 alphabet G1467 (kartr) 98, 16-167, 255-60, 268, 559, AMARACANDRA (1250) 481 Amoghavarsa I G883 G259, G324, G1627 prompting agent, see prompter abdattuSasana) Amoghavjtti (by Sakatreflexive agent 268 ayana) 17, 474, G884, G890, 476 Agni 104-5 —Nyasa (of Prabhacandra) 476 Agrawala, Vasudev Sharan a: G95, G l 12, Amttatarangini (of Ksirasvamin) 476 G468, G469, G472, G572, G577, Gl 473, analogy. See comparison ANANDADATTA 518 b : G476, G485 agreement (anvaya) Gl579 ANAKDAPORNA . VTDYASAGARA (1350) 484 and difference (anvayavyatireka) 146, ANANDA SIDDHANTAVAGISA 518 275, 290 ANANDAVARDHANA 8, 12, 28-32, 66, agriculture 12 83, 91 Aindraschool 13, G l , G5, G6, G7 ANANTA 518 Aitareya Brahmana 234, Gl 375 ANANTA BHATTA 518 ajahatsoärtha 279-80 ANANTACARYA (1900) 23, 518 äjänika. See permanence of word ANANTACARYA of Musarapakkam AJITASENA Ä C Ä R Y A 518 (1906) 514 äkänkfä. See expectancy ANANTANARAYANA SASTRIN äkära. See form (1750) 507 äkäfa 162, 168 ANANTANARAYANA SASTRI, P. S., akhandapada. See spkofa See P. S. ANANTANARAYANA SASakhandaväkya. See sphofa TRI äkhyäta. See verb ANANTA SORI 518 Äkhyätacandrikä (of Bhattamalla) 530 Ananthanarayana, H. S. a: G238, G1609, —KriyäkoSa (of Rämacandra) 530 Äkhyätärthacandrikänirnaya (of ¡Srikrsna Bha- b : G350 tta Maunin) 506 anantya. See infinity Äkhyätaväda (of Raghunätha Siromani) Andhra G1635 —Arthanirrtaya (of Jayakrsna Maunin) Anekamanyapadarihasutravicara (of Udayan361, 367 karaNanapathaka) 509 Äkhyätavyäkamria (of Vangasena) 481 Anekarthasamgraha (of Hemacandra) 203 Äkhyätavyäkhyäna (of Visvesvara Tarkä- angadhikara G1687 cärya) 534 ahgirasa 30

INDEX

565

anipsitakarman 269 Arapura, John G. 103, a: G1629 anirvacanïya. See indescribable architecture 12 anityaspho(avâda G1434 Arora, Sudarshan Kumari a: G618, ANNAMBHATTA (1540) 22, 223, 237, d: G629 249, 313, 489, 561 artha. See meaning; See also purpose antaryämin. See inner controller arthaikatva. See unity of purpose armbandha G149, G417, G296, G619 arthâpatti. See presumption Anubaadhakharidatiavada (of Dayâsamkara) Arthasamgraha (of ¡Srideva Paçdita) 533 520 Arthasamgraha (of Vaidyanàtha PaiyaANUBHÜTI SVARÜPÄCÄRYA (1270) gunda) 505 20, 481-82 arthavâda. See supplementary description Anuhyasâra (of Varendra Campahattiya Arthavatsûtravàda (of Manyudeva) 387, Mänasarman) 534 509 anumäna. See inference artisans G234 anuväda 25 Aryavaraguru, S.P.S. Jagannathaswamy muvrtti G120 e: G1067 Anvayadïpikâ (of Devadatta) 520 ÂSÂDHARA BHATTA (1770) 23, 375, anvayavyalireka. See agreement and diffé50?, 562 rence àsatti. See continuity anvitäbhidhäria (väda) 9-10, 91-2, 98, 558 asatya. See unreal aorist Gl 392 Asiatic Society Library of Calcutta 207 apabhrarjiia G804 Asoka G504 apadäna. See ablative aspect (upagraha) 173, G1494 ÄPADEVA (1650 ) 499 âSrayâsiddhi. See fallacy of unestablished Apäriiniyaprumänatä (of Nârâyana Bhafta- locus tiri) 22, 497 association of word meanings (saijisargaAparavisay/ipramänäni (of Kavi Vallabha)525 maryâdà ) 10, 98, 125, 161, 284, 304, 330, apaéabda 321-22 333, 340, 344 ApaSabdaniräkarana (of Jagaddhara) 484 Aslàdhyâyï (of Pànini) 4, 14, 16, 38, 86, apaoada. See exception 113-17, 257, 322,441-54, 550, 556 äpekfabtiddhi. See enumerative cognition —Mitâksara (of Annambhaffa) 237,489 APISÄLI 440 —PrakâSa (of Appayya Dxksita) 240, 507 ApiSäliSiksä (of Api sali) 440 apoddhära. See meaning, abstracted Commentary (of Sivarâmendra Sarasapoha (exclusion of others) 6, 27, 66, 125, vati) 245, 508 549 —Vârttikas (ofKàtyâyana). See VSrttikas —pariaheda 28 —Laghubhasya (author unknown) 459 —Mahâbhâsya (of Patanjali). See MahâAPPAN NAINÄRYA (1510)'487 bhâsya APPA SÜRI (1730) 504 —Vrtti G542 APPAYYA DÏKSITA 518 Appayya Dïksita, grandfather of Nilakan—Kâéikâ (of Jayàditya and Vamana). (ha Dikçita 373 See Kâiïkâ Appayya Dikçita, author of PatfinisütraCommentary (of Dharanïdhara) 509 Commentary (of Kâsinâtha) G26 prakäSa 353, 507 —Vrtti (of Mâdhava) G35 APPAYYA DÏKSITA I (1585) 239-40, —"TattvaprakâHkâ (of Gangàdatta Sâs397 APPAYYA D l K S I T A III (1670) 500 tri) 516, 521 appearance (vivaria). See manifestation —Vrtti (ofJayanta Bhaffa) 475 application (praufttinimitta) 294 —PrakïrçaprakâSa (ofHelàràja) 475, 551 apposition 185 —Rûpâvatâra (ofDharmakïrti). SeeRùpâapraSastya. See impropriety vatâra apürva 74-9, 164, 184, 213, 265-67, 300, Commentary (of Govardhana) 478 344 —Durghatâvftti (of Saraçadeva) 480

566

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

Athalekar, S. L. a: G294 —Bhàfàvflti 480 Commentary (of Srsfidharacarya ) Atharva Veda 40, 105-6, 550 Athavale, R.B. a: G1465 G969 —Prakriyàkaumudi (of Ràmacandra). atideiasûtra. See extension rule âtman. See self See Prakriyàkaumudi —Siddhântakaumudï (of Bhatfoji Dik- atom 148 çita). See Siddhântakaumudï aucitya. See suitability —Vrttisamgraha (of Ràmacandra) 505 AUDAMBARSYANA 10, 13, 68, 110, —Pradipa or SabdabhUjana (of Nâràyana 123, 342, 440 Sudhi) 507 AUDAVRAJX 440 —Mitâvj-ttyarthasamgraha (of Udayan-Aufrecht, Theodor 393, 561. a:G29, G432, kara Nânapàthaka) 509 G434, G1040, b:G364 —Vrtti (of Gokulacandra) 510 Auktika (of Kulamandana Suri) 485 —Bhàsya (of Dayânanda Sarasvati) 511 Auktika (of Somaprabhà) 533 —Chandaprakàia (of Gangàdhara Kavi- Auktika (of Udayadharma or Dharmasûri) 486 râja) 512 Commentary (ofDevidin) 512 —Commentary (of Harsakûlagani ) Commentary (of Jivarâma âarman) 489 512 —VàkyaprakâSavarta 497 —Bhâfyaprathamavrlti (of Brahmadatta aum 37, 68, 106 (Sri) Aurobindo (Ghose) 37-8, 550 Jijnasu) 517 autpattika. See original relation of word to —Sûci (of Cudâmis'ra) 519 —Vrtti (of Datta Râma Bhatta) 520 meaning —Laghu (vftti)vivrti (of Devasahâya) avadhi. See limit 520 (King) Avantivarman 28 âvarapa. See màyâ, obscuring Commentary (of Hari Pandita) 523 Commentary (of Mânalur Vïrarâgha- avasthà. See phase avidyà. See ignorance vâcàrya) 527 —Pradipa or Sabdabhifajia (of Nârà- Avinita. See Durvinita Avyayakoia (of Dvàrakanâtha Nyàyabhùyaija) 528 —Vyâkaranadîpikà (of Oram Bha{(a) 528 çana) 513 —Tippani (of Sanâtana Tarkàcàrya) Avyayârtha (of Dayânanda Sarasvati ) 511 Avyayârtha (of Harikrsna) 523 532 —Pàpinisûtravyàkhyâ (of Virarâghavâ- Avyayârtha (ofRàdhakrsna Gosvàmin) 529 AvyayârthakoSa cârya) 535 Astàdkyiyt-Dhâtupâtha (of Pàriini) 14, 19, —Mahjari (ofRâmarsi) 531 113, G58, G59, G210, G236, G239, Avyayârthalaharï (of Devakînandana) 520 G240, G392 Avyayârthanirrfaya (of Kâluràma Sàstrin) 514 —Ksirataranginî (of Ksirasvàmin) 476 —Sabdikàbhararta (of Hariyogin Sailà- Avyayàrthapradipikà (ofYatïsa) 535 AvyayaSabdavjtti (of Trilocana ) 534 vâcârya) 478 —MàdhaviyadJiàtuvftti (of âayana) 484 Avyayavftti (of Brahmadatta ) 514 Ayachit, S. M. a:G151, G156 —Tàrâvalï (of Krsnasudlii ) 526 AstàdhyâyisùtrakoSa (of Laksmanàràyana Bahulikar, Saudamin a:G310, G319, Vyâsa) 527 G1568, d:G293 âstika. See orthodox Bahuvrihyarthavicâra (of Udayahkara Nânaastronomy (jyotisa) 12, 107 ASubodha (of Râma Kinkara Sarasvati) pàthâka) 510 530 bâhyârtha. See reference Aiubodhavyâkaratia (of Tàrànâtha Tarkavà-Bakre, M. Gangadhara 216, 268 Bala, Indu d :G360 caspati) 512 Bâla {,la) bodha (ofNarahari) 528 Asvins 104 BÂLACANDRA SASTRI 514, e:G1086 Asyavâmïya hymn 37, 103-4

INDEX

BÄLA K R SNA PAftCOLI 24, 417, 516 BALAKRSNA ¿¡ARMA Y O G I 513 BALAMBHATTA. See VAIDYANATHA PAIYAGUNPA BÄLARÄMA 518 Bâlasarman, son of Nâgesa Bhafta 323 BALASÄSTRIN RANADE 511 Balasubrahmanyam, M . D. a:G163, G185, Gl98, Gl 99, G270, G291, G292, G320, G351, G375, G379, G619, G1584, Gl595, G1596, d:G213 Bälävabodha (ofDämodara Sarman) 519 Bälävabodha (ofKäsyapa) 18,480 Bali, Surya Kant b:G1130, d:G1129 Ballantyne, James R. b:G1442, e:G521, et:G1148 Banaras 215, 237, 241, 247, 255, 357, 399 Bandhu, Visva b:G308 Bandini, Giovanni a:G776 Bandyopadhyay, Pratap a:G1637 Banerji, Priyatosh a:G133 Banerji, Suresh Chandra e:G1132, Gl 293 Bannerji, S. R. 203-4 Barlingay, S. S. a:G1559 Barua, Anandaram e:G915 Basavaraju, C. N. a:G964 basis (prakfti, gana ) 15, 113 (iadhisfhäna) 216 nominal (prâlipâdïka). See nominal stem verbal. See roots Bechardas, Shravak Pandit e:G979 becoming {bhava) 12, 109-10, 169 modification of (vikära) 169 Belvalkar. Shripad Krishna 17 Benaraji, Satya Ranjan e:G914 Benfey, Theodor b-.Gl 366 Bengal 19,207 209, 211 BETARAYA 518 Bhaga 105 Bhagavadgïtâ Gl 15 Bhagavat, Vamana Balakrishna e:G725 BHAGAVATBHAKTA 518 BHAGAVATPRASÄDA SARMAN (1890) 513, e:G846 BHAIRAVA MISRA (1824) 12, 389, 510 Gl 088 bhakti G62 BHAMAHA G873, G874, G875 Bhämati (of Väcaspati Misra I ) 302 Bhandare, Madhava Sastri e:G1360 Bhandarkar, R. G. a:G32, G53, G523, G524, G525, G532, G539, G541, G546, G1370

567

Bhanuji Diksita 241, 319 BHARADVAJA 440 Bharadvaja, Damodara Sastri e:G433, G849 Bharadvaja, Gangadhara Sastri e:G1277 Bharadvaja lineage 239 Bharata 28, 30-31 BHARATA M A L L I K A (1836) 493, 510 BHARATA M l S R A (1550) 22, 231-35, 488 BHARTRHARI (530) 6-7, 10-13, 17-18, 22, 26-29, 36, 38, 40-62, 68-70, 77, 8287, 93-95, 107, 110, 118-76, 181-82, 193-97, 203, 231, 242, 270, 286-89, 293, 295, 297, 307, 323-31, 334, 342, 476-81, 557-60 (As(adhyayi) Bhasavftti (of Purusottamadeva) 203-9, 480 —Commentary (of Sjsfidharacarya) 533 BHASKARA 518 Bhaskara, Paramesvarananda Sarma e:Gl 100 Bhat, M. S. 389. a:G18, G200, G744, G1064, G1218, G1291 Bhate, Saroja V . a:G407, d:G258 Bhatnagar, Veena d:G1630 Bhatta, Govinda Parasurama e:G997 Bhatta Mimatnsa 6, 25-26, 66, 89-93, 97-98, 181, 213, 255, 273, 301, 336 Bhatta, Ratnagopala e:G1115, G1184 Bhattacharjee, Umesha Chandra e:G60 Bhattacharya, Bishnupada 557; a:G1510, G1526. b:G1548 Bhattacharya, Biswanath a:G1345 Bhattacharya, Dinesh Chandra a:G968, e:G971 Bhattacharya, Gaurinath Sastri 551-52, a:G1428 Bhattacharya, Gurunatha Vidyanidhi e:G651, G653, G656, G1027 Bhattacharya, Madhavacandra Tarkacudamani e:G643 Bhattacharya, Prasanna Kumara e:G657 Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar a:G118, G122, G129, G130-31, G134, G139-40, G369, G470, G473-74, G499, G591, G595-96, G1488, G1496, G1518 Bhattacharya, Siddheswar a:G484 Bhattacharya, Sitanatha Siddhantavagisa e:G658 Bhattacharya, Siva Prasad a:G843 Bhattacharya, Trilokyanatha G1046

568

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

Bhattacharya, Vidhusekhara a:G71, G1474 Bhattacharya, Visvanatha e:G921 BHATTAMALLA 530 Bhattanathaswamy, Acharya e:G1067 Bhattauayaka 32, 66-67 BHATTA SlROMANT 518 BHATTOJI D l K S I T A (1590) 17, 20-22, 227, 240-42, 247, 251, 280, 319, 323, 335, 490-93, 560, G555 bhdva. See becoming BHAVADEVA (1649) 498 Bhavadeva Misra 389 BHAVADEVA MISRA (1799) 508 bhavakatva 65, 67 BHAVA M I S R A (or §A R MA N ) 518 BHAVAN 458 bhaoand 67, 98, 336, 553 arthi- and ia.bd.i- 25, 98 BHAVANATHA 518 Bhavanaviveka (of Mandana Misra) 98 BHAVASENA T R A I V I D Y E g A (1250) 481 Bhave, D. G. a:G579 Bhawe, Shrikrshna a:G123 bheda. See difference Bhikshu, Bhadanta Shanti a:G1097 Bhikshu, Narada e:G661 B H l M A C A R Y A GALAGALI (1796) 508 BHIMASENA (550) 113, 472 BHlMASENA (AGARYA) (1350) 484 BHIMASENA SXSTRI 517, G1168, e:Gl 195 bkoga. See experience Bhoja 560, G889 BHOJADEVA or BHOJARAJA (1055) 477 bhojakatva 65, 67 (Rao) Bhojaraja G1211 Bhoja Vyakarapa 497 Bhusari, R. M . a:G62 bhutarthavada 25 Bhutiraja 193 Biardeau, Madeleine b;G720, et:G722, G871, G1558 Bible 39 bija. See seed Bikaner 243 Bilhana 205 BILVESVARA 519 bindu 328, G1455 Bira, Sh. a:G1692 birth 46, 127, 129, 169, 196

OF

INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

Birwe, Robert a:G135, G147, G157, G201, G833, G932 bliss 32 Bloomfield, Leonard 4, 549. a:G64 Bodhapaddhati (of Dharanidhara) 23, 355, 505 Bohtlingk, Otto a:G47, G436, G441, G502, G548, G648, Gl 368, G1373, e:G50A, G410, G1013, eb:G27, et:G38 BOPADEVA. See V O P A D E V A Bopp, Franz a:G1620 Boudon, Pierre a:G90 B R A H M A D A T T A (1914) 514 B R A H M A D A T T A JIJNASU (1964) e:G511 BRAHMADEVA (1943) 24,411, 516 (PEDDINTI) B R A H M A D E V A 519 Brahman (Absolute) 31-33, 36-37, 41-43, 45, 47, 56, 60, 68, 93, 99, 106-7, 128-30, 148, 194-97, 216,308,328,341,348-49, 551 BRAHMANANDA SARASVATl (1915) 514-15 Brähmatias 13, 24, 104-5, 107-9, 234 Brahmasiddhi (of Mandana Misra) 181 Brahmasütrabhäjya (of Samkara) 60, 551, 553 Brahmasütramitäksara (of Annambhafta) 237 Brahmins 39 breath {pram) 39, 43, 49-50, 62, 197, 558 Breioer, B. a:G76 Bxhadärayyaka Upanisad 37, 105-6 Brhaddevatä (ofSaunaka) 4, 82-83, 86, 108, 549 Brhaspati 13, 104 Bfhaticandrikä (of Somanätha) 533 Brhaimafijusd (of Nägesa Bhatta) 23 Bronkhorst, Johannes a:G376, G381, G392-93, G495, G818, G1693, G1710 Brough, John 557-58, a:G8, G809, G1478, G1489, GI631 Brown, W . Norman 550 buddhi. See intellect BUDDHISÄGARA SÜRI 476 Buddhism 3, 6, 45, 55, 66, 190-91, 209, G445, G787, G789, G793, G807 Buddhist Logic 27-28, 65, 559 Bühler, J. George a:G44, G535, G678, G879, G962, G1374, G1383, b:G962 Buiskool, Hermann b:G73 Burnell, A. G. b : G l

i N D E X

569

G338, G1375, G1387, G1609 accusative case. See accusative case dative case 270 genitive case. See genitive case caitanya. See consciousness case-inflected words 276-77 CAKADASA. See CANGADASA (SESA) GAKRAPANI (DATTA) (1595) Cassirer, Ernst 53, 552 category (padartha) 213 247, 493, 562 Caturveda, Giridhara Sarma e:G1100 C A K R A V A R M A N 440 catuskofi. See negation, fourfold GAKRIN 519 cause (hetu) 164-67, G1611 Galand, Willem a:G69, G1406 Candra (school) 17, G1624 (karam) 65, 90, 125, 131, 161, 559, CANDRA (GOMIN) (470) 17, 471-72 G260, G1709 CANDRADATTA JHA 519 auxiliary (sahakarikarana) 129 material (prakfli) 167, 170, 196 CANDRAKANTA TARKALAMKARA Chacko, I. C. e:G137 (1880 ) 512 CANDRAKANTA VIDYALAMKARA Chakravarti, Prabhat Candra 554, 519 a:G561, G1418, b:G1402, G1415, t:G558 GANDRAKlRTI (1607) 494 Candrapmbhdvyakarana (of Meghavijaya)Chakravarti, Srish Chandra 556, e:G851, G934, G970 502 Chandamaruta 239 CANDRASEKHARA (1638) 497 chandas. See metrics CANDRASEKHARA 519 CANDRASEKHARA VIDYALAM- Chandogya Upanisad 106 Chandrasekhara, S. e:668 K A R A 519 Candrasutras or -vyakarana (of Candrago-Ghandrasekharan, T. e:G590, G1359 change, illusory G1531 min) 18,471-72 Chatterji, Kshitish Chandra a:G19, G72, —Parijika (of Purriacandra) 475 G74, G77-78, G111, G454, G477, G571, —Tika (of Ratnamati) G600, G842, G928, G1127, G1416, —Commentary (of Sariputta) 479 b:G1466, e:G830, et:G601 —Paddhaii (of Anandadatta) 518 Chatterji, S. K. a:G136, G1424 Commentary (of Dharmadasa) 520 Chattopadhyaya, Kshetresh Chandra —Balavabodkana (ofKasyapa) 525 CANDRIKA (of Harirama) 511 a:G325, G461, G465, G562 Candrika (of Krsnacarya) 526 Chaturvedi, Mithilesh a:G746, G766, Candrika (of Srikanta Misra) 533 G810-12, G814 CANGADASA 519 Chaturvedi, Saraswati Prasad G466, Cangasutra. See Vaiyakarajfajivatu a:G79-80, G89, G96-98, G103-5, G108, CANNAVIRAKAVI 440 G114, G120, G124, G460, G463, G471, capacity (sdmarthya) of words 8-9, 86, 149, G581, G1436 329 Chaudhuri, Rajendra e:G1173 GHICGHU BHATTA 519 =iakti 127 Chidambara 239 C A R C A D A S A . See C A N G A D A S A Cardona, George 14-16, 20, 109, 549, 553- Chinna Bomma 239 55, a:G13, G259-61, G280, G311, Chinna Timma 239 G323-24, G342-43, G380, G394, G637, Chintamani, T. R . a:G413, e:G1354 Chitari, Saroja Sadashiv a:G186 G1579, G1632, G1651, G1678 Chitrao, Siddhesvar Shastri b:G82, C A R I T R A S I M H A ( G A N I ) (1569) 490 (Kalapa) Carkaritarahasya (of Kavi Kan- G564 Chomsky, Noan 96, 555 thahara) 525 Choudhari, A. N. a:G666 Carnoy, A. b:G1429 CHUCCHU BHATTA. See CHICCHU Carvaka 55 case-ending (karaka) 115, 267-72, 559, BHATTA G277, G318, G323-24, G331, G334, CIDROPAiSRAMA 494 Burrow, Thomas a:G1423, G1481, G1490, G1497, G1535, G1597

570

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

CINNA APPAYYA. See APPAYYA contradiction (virodha) 149, 288, G1544 DÏKSITA III convention, conventional (samketa, saijikecit. See consciousness tika) 7, 26, 55-56, 65, 77, 90, 163, 194, 286, 292 coalescence, rules of (samdhi) 4, 39, G1421, G1480, G1547, G1630 conventional (rüdhi) power of words —samsarga. See association of word 325, 368-69 meanings conventional-derivative (yogarüdhi) cognition (jftdrta) 54 power 325-26, 368-69 extraordinary 126 corrupt word (melcchaiabda) 263, 287, 325 final 216 «»signified (dyotya) 125 C O K K A N A T H A DÏKSITA (1650) 22, cosmic order (rta) 37, 105 Goulson, Michael b :G1666 311, 321, 498-99 Coward, Harold G. 182-91, 550, Golebrooke, Henry T. a:G1363 collection (samudqya ) of words 145,185 a:G757, G777, b:G813, GI700A isamSha) of parts 169 Cowell, E. B. 552,554 communication 263 creation of the world 3, 40 comparison (upamàna) 54, 170, 213, G178, creativity 48 CUDAMISRA 519 G723, G751 complexity. See fallacy of complexity composition, nominal. See nominal com- Daiva (of Deva) 480 position —Puntfakdra (of Krsnalilásukamurti) 483 compound (samâsa) word 4, 125, 173, 276-86, 292, 334, 339-40, G166, G810, Daivakarana, Virajananda e:G365 G1390, G1503, G1617, G1654 daivi vdk. See language (dvandva) 283, G814 Dalai, Chimanlal D. e:G368 genitive. See genitive case, compound D Á M O D A R A 519 conceptual construction (vikalpa) 6, 27, D Á M O D A R A DEVAáARMAN 519 66, 128, 147, 325 D Á M O D A R A SARMAN 519 concomitance (anvayavyatireka ). See agree- Dandin 107, 177, G875 ment and difference Dange, Sadashiv Ambadas a:G262 condition (nimitta) 128. See also ufiddhi Danielou, Alain a:G1452 configuration (akrti) 6, 26, 131, 553 Danielson, P.A. a:540 conjunction or contact (samyoga) 195 D A Ñ O (KACARYA) 519 connection (sdmarthya ). See capacity darkness. See inertia (tamas) syntactic. See syntactic connection darSana. See (Indian) philosophy connotation G1526 Dariapurpamasamantrabhasya (of Mallaya consciousness (cit, caitanya, samvid) 33, 35, Yajvan) 249 Das, Govinda a:G549 43, 57,93,126,128,163 consistency (yogyatâ) 5, 7-9, 14, 27, 59, 67, Das, Karuna Sindhu a:G296, G395 DASABALA 520 83, 88, 125, 131, 195, 286-88, 329, 553 capacity restricted by convention (yog- DaSabálakárikd (ofDasabála) 520 DaSadhatusádhana [of Daño (kácárya)] 520 yatdnityatd) 7 Dasgupta, Surendra Nath 550 consonants, order of G167 Dash, Prafulla Chandra a:G838 construction, mental 171 construction-free (nirvikalpaka) perception Datta, Dhirendra Mohan 552 D A T T A R A M A BHATTA 520 27-8 Dattatreya 317 context (prakaraw) 149, 1.75, 268, 322 contextual factors 7, 26, 30, 82-3, Dave, T . N. a:G1560, G1569 DAYANANDA SARASVATl 511, 326-27 e:G63, G241, G416, G429 sensitive features, rules G195 contiguity (dsatti, samnidhi) 5, 8-9, 27, 88- DAYAPALA (MUÑI) (1025) 476 D A Y Á á A M K A R A 520 89, 114, 329-30 De, Sushil Kumar a:G829 continuity 46, 196

iNDEX death 45, 127 Debels, Rosane a:G1271 Debrunner, Albert b:G1405, G1498 decay (jard) 43-44, 47, 171 definition (sumjfläsütra) 15 deity (devatä) 42, 294-95, 302 Delia Gasa, Carlo a:G745 demon (rdksasa) 132, 146 denotation (Sakti) 263, 274,285,287-88 direct 271-72 (väcyd) 125, 147 denotative (väcaka) 146, 289, 301, 343 Deo, Kapil d:G152 dependence, mutual {vydpeksa) 277-84, 329 derivation (vyutpatti) of words 7,146 derivative power of words (yogayaugika) 325-26, 368-69 (.prokriya) G1711 deSa. See place Deshpande, Gangesh Tryambak a:G153, Gl87, G202, G216, G271-75, Gl 580 Deshpande, Handerao e:G861 Deshpande, Madhav Muralidhar 562, a:G25, G263, G297, G344-45, G836, Gl652-53, Gl684, Gl705, b:G1697, etd:G1196 designative. See denotative De Smet, Richard V . a:G1541 destruction 169, 196 of the world 40 deva. See god(s) D E V A (1200 ) 480 Deva, Kapil a:G171, G805, b:G218 D E V A D A T T A 520 D E V A K l N A N D A N A 520 Devalekara, Bapu Hara Set a:G987 DEVANANDIN. See PUJYAPADA DEVASAHÄYA 520 D E V A S A R M A N 520 Devasthali, Govind Vinayak 556, a :G32627, G361, G481A, G487-88, G512, G517, G588, G1598, G1639, b:G217, et:G667, G l 137 devatä. See deity Devayasas, father of Vrsabhadeva 179 DEVENDRAKUMÄRA VIDYÄRAT N A (1915) 515 D E V E N D R A S Ü R I (1210) 481 Devi, Prajna e:G177 deviation. See false, deviation DEVIDÄSA 520

571 D E V l D A S A C A K R A V A R T I N 520 Devidatta, grandfather of Krsnamitracarya 381 D E V I D A T T A GASTRIN 520 D E V I D I N (1875) 512 D H A N A C A N D R A (1533) 488 DHANAJIT 520 DHANANjAYA 520 DHANANJAYA B H A T T A c A R Y A 520 DHANAPALA (1100) 478 DHANAPRABHA S O R I 520 D H A K E S V A R A (1250 ) 211, 481 Dhanika 91 D H A R A N A N D A (1825) 510 D H A R A N l D H A R A (1397) 485 D H A R A N l D H A R A (1730) 505 D H A R A N l D H A R A (1809) 23, 355, 375, 385, 485, 505, 509 dharma 54, 175, 234, 342. See also merit literature 239 = truth. See truth D H A R M A D A S A 520 D H A R M A D E V A 521 Dharmadhikar, Vidyadhar d:G1273 D H A R M A K I R T I (640) 18, 203,476 D H A R M A P A L A (625) 177, 472 Dharmapradipa G1211 D H A R M A R A J A D H V A R I N D R A (1615) 87, 253, 552 (RAJAKUMARA) DHARMASASTR I N 521 D H A R M A S O R I (1700) 501 D H A R M AStJRI. See U D A Y A D H A RMA Dharmottarapradipa (of Durveka Misra) 177 dhatu. See (verbal) root Dhatucandrikd (of Kavicandra Datta) 493 DhatucandrikS. (of Tarkalamkara Bhattacarya) 534 Dhatucandrikd (of Thakkuradasa Nyayapancanana) 534 Dhatucintamapi (of Visvanatha Nyayalamkara) 535 Dhatudarpana (of Vuramisra) 535 Dhatukalpalafika (ofDhanajit) 520 Dhatukdrikavali (of Varadaraja) 495 Dhatukaya (ofNarayana Bhattatiri) 497 •—Krsnurpana 497 —Vivarana (of Ramapanivada) 530 DhatukoSa (of GhanasyamS.) 522 Dhalulaksam ( o f D a n o (kacarya)) 519

572

E N oY oL O P E D I A

Of

INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

Dhatumala (of Isvarakantha) 523 Dhdtuvrtti (of Kasyapa) 440 Dhatumala (of Sasfhidasa) 532 Dhatvavali (of Kedaresvara Sarman) 525 Dhatumalika (of Betaraya) 518 DHUNDIRAjA (1700) 501 Dhatumafljari (of Candrakanta Vidyalam- dhvani. See sound Dhvanikara 92 kara) 519 Dhatumaftjari (of Kasinatha) 504 Dhvanyaloka (of Anandavardhana) 28, 32 Dhatupallava (of Bhavanatha) 518 DHYANAKARA 465 Dhatuparayana (of Srutasagara) 533 difference (bheda) 6, 125, 145, 149, 197, Dhatuparayapa (of Trilocana) 534 278 Dhatiiparyayamariimald (ofMahesaJha) 527DIGNAGA (480) 6, 27-28, 66, 123, G794, dhdtupdtha G126, G143, G149, G150, 549 G1383 dik. See space Dhdtupdtha (ofBhaskara) 518 Dikshitar, V . R. Ramachandra a:G509 Dhdtupdtha (of Gandra school) 18 Dikshitulu, R . B. d:G362 Dhdtupdtha (of Kasisvara) 525 Dlrghatamas 103-4 Dhdtupdtha (of Narendrapuri) 483 disjunction (vibhdga) 268 dispositional tendency (satriskara, vasana), Commentary (by Ksemendra) 488 or latent disposition. See trace Dhdtupdtha (of Pariini). See Astadhyayldistortion. See false: deviation (viparyasa) Dhatupafha Divanji, Prahlad C. a:G115 Dhdtupdfha (of Puijyasundaragaiji) 529 diversity 42-43 Dhdtupafha (of Purnacandra) 529 Dhdtupa(hakdrika (of Kocca Sankaran DIVYASIMHA MI&RA 521 Doraswamy, K. a:G305, G1599 Susad) 510 Dhatupathakramakaumudi (of Dhananjaya)Doshi, Bechardas Jivaraj e:G1034 Dravidian G1381 520 Dhatuprabodha (of Kalidasa Cakravartin) dravya. See substance DRAVYESA JHA 403, 521 524 Dhatupradlpa (of Maitreya Raksita) 207, Drutabodha with Drutabodhini thereon (of Bharata Mallika) 510 478 DhatuprakaSa (samgraha) and Tippani (ofDube, Harinatha e:G981 duration (sthiti) 304 Balarama) 518 Dhatupratyayapancika (of Taladevasudhi) DURBALACARYA. See KRSNAMITRACARYA 533 Dhatupratyayapatijikd (of Hariyogin Saila-D U R G A ( S I M H A ) or DURGADASA vacarya). See Aftadhyayi-Dhatu-Sabdi(950-1050) 17, 19, 475, 477, G641-42, kabharatia G645, G656-58 Dhdtuprayogdvali (of Kasinatha) 525 DURGADASA V I DYAVAG ISA (1639) Dhatwratnakara (ofNarayana) 315,499 497 Dhdturatndkara (of Sadhusundara Gani) DURGADASA VIDYAVAGISA SRI495 RAMA TARKAVAGISA (1908 ) 514 DhaturatnamaHjari (of Ramasimha) 531 Durgaprasad, Kedarnath e:G918 Durghafavrtti (of Maitreya Raksita) 207, DhaturatnaprakaSa (of Sesa Visnu) 494 Dhaturatnavali (of Radhakrsna Sarrnari) 478 D U R V E K A M l S R A (1020) 177 507 Dhaturupa (of Vangasena). See Akhyatav- DURVTNiTA (550) 177, 471 Dutt, Nomita a:G422 yakararta DhaturupadarSa (of Taranatha Tarkava- DVADASAHADHVARIN. See T I R U M A L YAJVAN caspati) 512 DVADASAHADhatusadhana (of Kavicandra [Datta ] ) 493 (BALAPATANJALI) YAJIN (1680) 311, 501 Dhatusadhana (of Ramakanta) 487 Dhatusanigraha (of Kasinatha Misra) 525 Dvaita Vedanta 240 Dhatusarjigraha (of Subrahmanyam Nam- dvandva. See compound, dvandva Dvandvaikafefavada (of Raghava Jha) 529 buttiripad) 512

i N D EX

DVARAKANATHA NYAYABHUSAISTA (1899) 513 Dvikarmavada (of Laksmana Dvivedin) 527 Dvivedi, H. P. a:G347, G396, b:G363 Dvivedin, Vindhyesvari Prasada e:G673, G1125, G1131 Dyen, Isidore b:G1435 dyotaka. See suggestive meaning dyotya 125

573

eulogy 83 excellence imparted by phonemes 235 exception (apaväda) 150 exclusion. See apoha existence (saltâ) 127, 169, 183, 234, 33031, 558 (mutual) expectancy(äkämksä) 5, 8-9,27, 85-88, 114, 124, 149, 300, 329, 343-44, G1524 experience (bhoga) 129 expressional (samvyasahärika ) 194 extension rule (atideSasütra) 15

Ecklund, G. Green b:G1686 economy, principle of 76 Edgerton, Franklin a:G1503, b:G1459 Faddegon, Barend a:G66, G1467, b:G85, Edgren, Hjalmar a:G1371 G1425 effort, speaker's (yatna) 187, 258, 330, 332 fallacy, of complexity 93 Eggeling, Julius e:G642, G938 of interdependence 93 EkadaSakarika (of Raghurama) 512 of unestablished locus (äSrayäsiddka) EkagatrasitraparamarSa (of Devidatta Sas189-90 trin) 520 of unknown qualificandness 189 ekarthlbhdva. See meaning, single "pathetic" 31 ekaSesa. See reduction of two verbs to one false, falsity, error 5, 54, 59, 187-89, 213, ekauakyata. See syntactic analysis 217, 233, 236, 553 Ekavarrtirthasarrigraha (of Bharata Mallika) theory of error 56-60 —deviation (viparyäsa, vyabhicära) 149, 493, 510 273 E L E S V A R A G N I H O T R A 521 Eliot, T . S. 49, 551 .feasibility (kftisâdhyatva) 265-66 elite, spiritual (tif(a) 132 feature. See configuration (äkjti) elliptical sentence 149, G530 feminine bases G265 Emeneau, Murray B. a:G1504, G1585, function G238 b:G1480 figurative meaning. See meaning, figuraemotion, emotive meaning 12, 28-30, 67 tive (case-) ending (vibhakti) 163-64 Filliozat, Jean a:G800 personal 257-58, 263-64 Filliozat, Pierre-Sylvain a:G1213, Gl 654, primary 260 G l 685 verbal 255, 262 Finot, L. ae:G659 energy, inner (kratu) 70 fire-wheel (älätacakra.) 169 enumerative cognition (apeksabuddhi) 173 fitness. See consistency epic Sanskrit G1630 form (âkâra) 129 epistemology. See knowledge, theory of (linguistic) (complex) formation (vj-tti) error. See false 173, 295-96, 329 essence (rasa) 28-33, 130 Form Criticism 39 (.soarUpa) 188 Foucher, A. a:G442 eternal (nitya) 169, 175, 216 Fowler, Murray a:G190, G312 absolute (kufastha) 7, 118 Franke, R . Otto a:G42, G45, G437, as preserved by speakers (pravahanityatd) Gl 380, e :G840, et:G940 7, 118, 130-31 Fraser, Russell 552 etymology (nirukta) 3, 8, 14, 38, 107-9, Frauwallner, Erich 123, 550, 559, a:G607, i l l , 555 G1536 etymological meaning (samakhya) 83, function, operation (vyupära ) 11, 67, 75175 76, 98, 165, 169, 255-56, 258-61, 266, etymological words (yaugika) 368-69 330-31, 336 Euclid G196

574

ENcYclOPEDIA

OF I N B T A T T PHILOSOPHLFIS

G A U R A M O H Ä N A B H A T T A (VIDYÄGadadhara (1660) 521 R A T N A ) 522 Gadamer, Hans-Georg 36, 550 Gadgil, Dinkar Keshava Shastri e:G1083 G A U T A M A (150) 97, 522, 549,556 Gawronski, A. b:G1411 Gaidani, M . G. a:G593 Gajäsülraväda (of Tirumala Bukkapatta- Geiger, Bernhard a:G551 gender (IiAga) 12, 15, 83, 115, 120, 149, nam Srinivasäcärya) 504 173, 196, 262, 273-75, 339, G712, Gajäsütraväda (of Venkatadäsa) 508 G1457, G1707. See also person Gajäsütravädärtha (of Ganapati Sastri) 513 genitive case 271, 339 Gajäsütravädärtha (of Mannu Deva) 509 G A L A V A 440 compound 285 gerund G1705 Ganadarpana (of Kumärapäla) 486 GEYADEVA 522 gariap&tha 14, G1496 GHANASYÄMA 522 Gaifapätha (of Bhärata Mallika) 510 Ghat (a)ge, Amrit Madhav a:G230, Gai}apä(ha (of Candra school) 18 G516 Gawp&tha (ofPänini) 113, G l 29, Gl 51-52, Ghosh, Amalananda a:G570 Gl 56-57, G161, G227, G278, G630 Ghosh, Batakrishna a:G102, Gl09, G455, Gaifapätha (of Rämakrsna Diksita) 497 Ganapäfhasamgraha (of Geyadeva) 522 G466, G1426, G1453; b:G1430 GANAPATI SÄSTRI (1900) 513 Ghosh, Manumohan et:G427 Ganaratnarruihodadhi and Vjtti (Vardha-GIRIJA 522 mäna) 478 GIRISACANDRA VIDYÄRATNA G1019 Commentary (of Gangädhara) 521 Commentary (of Govardhana Bhatta) Girvarriapadamanjan (of Dundhiräja) 501 522 Girvarrtapadamafijan (of Varadaräja) 495 Gayaratnavali (of Yajnesvara Bhatta) 512 Gitäsundara (of Sadäsiva Diksita) 311 God (Uvara) 26, 32, 52, 55, 65, 90, 237, Gapavrtti (of Purusottamadeva) 209 GANESA 521 286-87, 324, 330, 334-45, 557 god(s) (deva) 108, 132 GANGÄDÄSA (PANDITA) 521 Gode, P. K. a:G839, G1057, G1060, GANGADÄSÄCÄRYA 521 Gl 128, G l 177, Gl 191, G1211, G1268, C A N G Ä D A T T A 521 G1275 G A N G Ä D A T T A SÄSTRI 521, e:Gl 19 Godes, B. S. a:G313 GANGÄDHARA (1800) 509 Gokhale, Pratibha P. a:G352-53, Gl 111 G A N G Ä D H A R A 521 GANGÄDHARA D I K S I T A (1617) 494 Gokhale, V . N. a:G94 G O K U L A C A N D R A (1839) 510 GANGÄDHARA KAVIRÄJA (1850) Golds tucker, Theodor a:G32, G430-31, 23, 395, 511-12 Gangadhara, Mahadeva Sarma e:G1061 G A N G Ä D H A R A N Ä T H A 521 G A N G Ä D H A R A SARMAN 521 GANGÄPRASÄDA SÄSTRIN 514, e:G1089 G A N G Ä R A M I T R A P Ä T H I N (MÄLAV A ) 521 GANGESA (1350) 91, 96, 273 GANGESA M l S R A UPÄDHYÄYA 521 GANGESA SARMAN 521 Ganguli, Hemanta Kumar a:G729, b:G713 Gani, Vinaya Vijaya b:G950 Garbe, Richard t:G50A G Ä R G Y A 13, 110, 112, 114, 140 gaiuta, gaurti words 65-66, 326, G1484

e:G529-30 GOLHÄNA 522 Gombrich, Richard a:G1694 G O N Ä R D I Y A 458 Gonda, Jan a:G314, G1451, G1470, Gl476, Gl481-83, G1505, G1519-20, Gl686, G1640, b:G!447 G O N I K A P U T R A 458 Goonatilleke, William e:G820, etb:G34 Gopal, Ram a:G860 GOPÄLA 522 GOPÄLA BHATTA (1590 ) 490 GOPÄLA C A K R A V A R T I N (BANERJ I ) (1672) 500 G O P Ä L Ä C Ä R Y A 522. See also GOPÄLADEVA VIDYÄVAGISA GOPÄLADEVA. See M A N Y U D E V A

INDE X

GOPXLADEVA VIDYAV&GISA (1800)

508 GOPALAKRSNA SASTRIN (1720) 23, 353, 504 GOPALANANDA YATI 309 GOPALA SASTRI NENE (1919) 24, 407, 515, e:G1048, G1094, G1101, G1120, G1186 GOPlGANDA. See GOYlGANDRA GOPINATHA 522 GOPINATHA BHATTA 522 GOPINATHA TARKAGARYA (1550) 488 Gore, Vitthala Narayana Sarma e:Gl 155 (Christian) gospels 39

575

GUNACANDRA (1210) 481 (SIDDHA) GUNAKÄRA 523 GUNANANDIN (890) 475 GUNARATNA SÜRI (1411) 486 Gune, Jayashri Achyut 564, etb:Gl 197 Gune, Saroj a:G1330 Gunjikara, Ramacandra Sarman G1079, e:Gl 155 Gupta, Chandra Bhan a:G1521 Gupta, Rajanikanta e:G1022 Gupta, Suddhir Kumar a:G121, G125, Gl 299, Gl 300 GURUWARA BALA SASTRI 523 Hahn, Michael a:G834-35

GOSVAMI SRI SIVANANDABHATTA Haimacatuskavfttitippanika (ofGolhana) 522

522 Gough, A.E. 552, 554 GOVARDHANA (1100 ) 478 GOVARDHANA BHATTA 522 Govardhana Bhatta, grandfather of Jayakrsna Maunin 361 GOVINDA BHARADVAJA SXSTRI (1835) 510 GOVINDA BHATTA 522 GOVINDA MlSRA 522 GOVINDA PANDITA 523 GOVINDA PARASURAMA BHATTA (1888) 513 GOVINDARAMA VIDYASIROMANI 523 Govindarriava (of Sesa Nrsiipha) 215 GOVINDA SENA 523 GOVINDASIMHA (1900) 513 GOYlGANDRA (1400) 19, G912, 485 grammar (vyakarapa) 3-4, 6-7, 12-14, 35, 128, 161, 163, 170, 196, 233, 323 grammatical analysis G767 grammatical derivation (pratipa.da.ka). See nominal stem grammaticality (sadhutva) 161 Grantovskij, E. A. a:G169 Greece G1599 Grierson, George a:G50 grouping (sahitya, samagri, samuha) 127 growth (krama) 43-44 Guha, Dinesh Chandra e:G1106 Guha, Manjulika a:G1655 Guleri, Chandradhar a:G554 guria G1445, 120 in Panini G186 in Samkhya 44, 120, 173 quality (in Vaisesika, etc.). See quality

Haimalaghuprakriyä (of Vinayavijayagani) 499 HAMSAVIJAYAGANI (1650 ) 499 HARADATTA (1059) 19, 203, 279-80, 477, 560, G849, G857, G877 HARAGOVINDA VIDYÄVÄCASPATI 523 HARANATHA VIDYÄRATNA 523

HARENDRANARAYANA

DEVASA-

RMAN (1912) 514, e:G1028 hare's horn 325 Hargovindass, Shravak Pandit e:G979 HARI BHÄSKARA AGNIHOTRA (1677) 500-01 HARIBHATTA (1801) 383 HARIDATTÄ (DAIVAJNA) 523 HARI DlKSITA (1270) 21-22, 241, 319, 500 HARIKRSNA 523 HARINÄTHA DVIVEDIN (1850) 511 HARI PANDITA 523 HARIRÄMA (1850) 511 HARIRÄMA BHATTÄCARYA 523 HARIRÄMA KALÄ (1797) 508 HARI SAMKARA JHÄ (1929) 515, e:G566

HARI SARMAN OR SASTRI (i9oo)5i3,

523 HARISIDDHÄNTAVÄGISA 91 HARIVALLABHA (1747) 4, 23, 363, 505-6, Gl 18 H A R I VRSABHA. See VRSABHADEVA HARIYOGIN SAILÄVÄCARYA (1150) 478 H A R S A K l R T I SÜRI 523 HARSAKULAGANI (1557) 489 HARSAVARDHANA (630) 472

576

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

Indira (of Padmadhara) 528 indirect object (of dative) (sampraddna) 167, 270-71, 337-38 individual. See particular Indra 13, 17, 104, 295 INDRA (GOMIN) 439-40 INDRADATTA UPADHYAYA (1800) 23, 379, 508 Indravyakararia (of Indra) 439-40 indriya. See sense-organ INDU ( M I T R A ) (1070) 477-78 Tnduraja 193 inertia (tamas) 44-45, 120, 275 inference (antmana) 27, 51, 54, 59-60, 126, 132, 175, 213, 273 infinitive 262 infinity (anantya) 273 inflection G1426 inherence (samavaya) 195, 268 injunction. See prescription inner controller (antarydmin) 129, 132 inseparable existence (svarupasat) 274 insight. See intuition Insler, Stanley a:G613 instigation (pravartana) 265, 336-37 instrument of knowledge (pramaxia) 25, 54-56, 59-60, 175, 553 instrumental case-ending. See means integration (vrtti) 278-79 icchä. See will intellect {prajfia, buddhi) 62, 146, 551, 560 I-ching. See I-tsing intention of the speaker (tatparya) 9, 27, identity (tdddtmya) 129, G324 65-66, 89-93, 145, 165, 300, 322, 327, syntactic identity 271 329-30, 344-46, 557, G1540, G1657 ignorance (avidyä) 42, 51, 54, 58, 61, 128, interdependence. See fallacy of interde147, 197. See also falsity pendence imitation word 276 intuition (pratibha) 10, 28, 31-32, 49-50, imperative, Vedic G301 59, 62-66, 94-95, 125, 130, 146, 327, imperceptibility (paroksatva) 264 553, G763, G771, G1394, G1441 implication 273 Ipsitakarman 268-69 impropriety (apraiastya) 288 Ipzzagalli, A. M . b:G1408 incompatibility or inconsistency of mea- isfasadhanatvii. See means to a desired result ning 66-67, 148, 346 ifvara. See God indeclinable particle. See particle ISVARAKANTHA 523 independence (svdtantrya) 167 ISVARAMISRA 523 indescribable, inexpressible (anirvacaniya) ISVARANANDA or ISVARlDATTA 42, 60, 147-48 SARASVATI (1550) 22, 219, 229, 488 India, nation of 39 iSVARlPRASADA 524 indication (lihga) 149 itihasa 108 indicator (upalaksarta) 115, 183, 186, 273, itikartaoyata 25, 87 339 I-tsing 177, G689, G803, G1631 dyotaka. See suggestive meaning Iyengar, H. R. Rangaswami a:G795 jMpaka 186 Iyer, K. A. Subramania 41, 59, 79, 128, indices, referential G307, G348 182, 201, 213-14, 517, 550-55, 561, Hartman, O.G. b:G1570 Hartmann, P. b:G1506 HARYAKSA (350) 465 Hattori, Masaaki 27, 549 Hauschild, Richard b:G1561 HAYAGRIVACARYA 523 Hazra, Rajendra Chandra a:G141 hearing (Srauana) 106 heaven (svarga) 46-47, 342 Heimann, Betty a:G1438, G1463, G1511, b:G1522 Hejib, Alaka a:G382 HELARAJA (980) 11, 40-44, 193-97, 203, 292, 475, 551, 557-61, G776 HEMACANDRA (1150) 203,479, G889 HEMAHAMSAVrjAYAGANI (1457) 486 Henry, Thomas 385 Herman, Arthur L. 554, a:G1549 Hertel, Johannes a:G443 Herzberger, Hans G. a:G773 Herzbörger, Radhika a:G773 ketu. See cause in grammar Gl84 Hiriyanna, Mysore 550, a:G501, G778 Hoffman, Karl a:G328-29 homogeneity Gl 653 Hume, R. E. t:551

i N D EX a:G65, G670, G693, G728, G732, G751, G767-68, G804, G1434, G1441, G1445, G1457, G1464, G1469, G1477, G1494, G1509, G1673, b:G734, e:G709-10, G721, G727, G747, et:G 872, t:G742, G748A, G758 Iyer, S. Venkatasubramania a:G397, G421, G1107, G1205, G1664, b:G1205

577

J A Y A D E V A M l S R A G1259, G1264 J I N A D E V A S O R I 524 J A Y A D I T Y A (650) 18, 203, 472-73 J A Y A K R S N A M A U N I N (1745) 23, 351, 361, 367, 505 J A Y A N T A (1650) 498 J A Y A N T A B H A T T A (870) 66, 91, 9394, 97, 475 J A Y A N T A B H A T T A 524 Jayaswal, Kashi Prasad a:G444, G506, Jacobi, Hermann a:G961, G1389 J A G A D D H A R A (1325) 484 G560 J A G A D D H A R A 524 Jesus 39, 550 JAGADlSA 524, 549 Jha, Ganganatha 549, 552 JAGAN M O H A N A PANDITA (1670) Jha, Govinda d:G866 500 Jha, Krishna Deo d :864 Jha, Subhadra a:G128 J A G A N N A T H A 524 (MAHAMAHOPADHYAYA) JAGAN- Jha, Sukheswar a:G298 Jha, Taranisa e:G1171 N A T H A 524 JAGANNATHA PANDITARAJA TAI- Jha, Triloknath a:G1527 LANGA (1650) 23, 32, 83, 215, 241, Jha, V . N. a:G1712 370, 499 Jhajjar, Vedananda Vedavagisa e:G668 Jagrahitetivada (of Cakrin) 519 Jijnasu, Brahmadatta e:G177 jahatsvdrtha 279 Jijnasu, Raghuvira e:G1296 JAIMINI (25 A.D.?) 25, 114 JINAPRABHA S"ORI (1280) 483 Jain, Jainism—3, 17-19, 54, 123, G1647 JINASAGARA. See D H A N A G A N D R A Jainendravyakarana 17, 466 JINAVIJAYA (1637) 497 —Mahauftti (of Abhayanandin ) G673, Jinavijaya, Muniraja e:G663 JINENDRABUDDHI (725) 18, 115,474 G676 —Sabdarxuaiacandrika (of Somadeva) J I V A N A N D A V I D Y A S A G A R A (1894) G985 G917, e:G645, G991, G1023, G1041 —Vrtti (ofVasudeva Sastri Abhyankar) J I V A N A T H A R A Y A (1925) 515 JXVARAMAN SARMAN (1928) 515 516 jfiana> See cognition —Laghuvj-tti (of Dharmasastrin) 521 Commentary (of Gunanandin) G674 Jftanamrta (of Kasisvara ¡Sarman) 23, 505 Jaiyafa Upadhyaya 203 J N A N A T I L A K A (1646) 498 JAJALI. See UJJVALADATTA J N A N E N D R A S A R A S V A T ! (1730)351, JalpamaHjari (of Sudhanandasurisisya) 373, G1100, 505 500 J N A N E § V A R A 524 jfidpaka. See indicator Janacek, Adolf a:G603 Janakzparinayanana (aka (of Ramabhadra JRdpakasarngraha (of Nagesa Bhatta) 504 —Vivrti (ofN. S. Ramanuja Tatacarya) Diksita) 311, 321 517 J A N A R D A N A S A R M A N 524 Jani, A. N. a:G170, G203, G276 Jtiapakasamuccaya (bhasya) (of Purusottajara. See decay madeva) 209, 480 JARANATHA TARKAVACASPATI Jttapakavali (of Haragovinda Vidyavacaspati) 523 (1870) 512, G1020 j nap ana G128 Jafakas G1386 jati. See universal JONARAJA or JOGARAJA (1450 ) 486 Jatttaktivada (of Ananta Bhatta) 518 Joshi, Bechardas e:G832 jatispkofa. See sphofa, jati Joshi, Bhargavasastri Bhikaji e:G582 jativiSisfavyakti, see particular qualified by Joshi, Dayashankar Madhusudan a:G277, d:G245 a universal Jaumara school 19 Joshi, Shivarama Dattatreya 174 255-

578

ENCycLOPEDIA

308 340, 560, a:G172, G246, G330-31, G354, G370, G398, G614, G620, G763, GI198, GI200, G1270, G1550, G157172, G1656, G1667, G1679. d:G1193, et:G625, G627, G632-34, G1192 Joshi, Venkatesha Laxman G1122 Joshi, Venkatesha Shastri a:G346, G38389, G975, G1219, G1699-1700 J U M A R A N A N D I N (1350) 19, 488,484, G912 Junankar, P. B. b:G364 Jvalananda of Tiksnajnatiya 355 JYESTHAKAEASA (1060) 205, 477 jyotisa. See astronomy

OF INBTATT PHILOSOPHLFIS

kâraka. See agent; case-ending; syntactic function Kârakacakra 528 —Dipaprabhâ (of Nârâyana ) 528 Kârakacakra (of Ananta ) 518 Kârakacakra (of Dharmakïrti ) 476 Kârakacakra (of Râmatararia Siromani) 512 Kârakacandrikà (of Râmacandra ) 530 Kârakacandrikâ (of Târapada Nyàyaratna ) 533-34 Kârakâdibodhinï (of Devakinandana ) 520 Kârakakoia (of âivânanda Gosvâmin ) 532 Kârakânanda (of Ananda Siddhântavâgïsa) 518 K A I Y A T A (1030) 19, 21-22, 86, 174, Kârakanirûpana (of Amaracandra ). See 203-4, 278-80, 289, 293-94, 304,339-42, Satkarakalaksana 476, 561, G551, G877 Kârakanirûpana (of Krsriàvadhuta) 526 kala. See time Kàrakapariksâ (of Pasupati ) 529 K A L A D H A R A 524 Kârakarahasya (of Ruparâma NyâyapanKalapasarp.graha (of Ramananda Tirtha,) cânana) 531 530 Kârakârtha (of Krpàrama) 526 Kalapasara (of Ramakumara Nyayabhusa- [Sat) Kârakârthanirtiaya (of Trilokanâtha) 534 ija) 530 Kalapatyadivrtti (of Sarvadhara Upadhya- Kârakârthapradipikâ (of Sudaréanàcàrya ) ya) 532 533 K A L A V A T I D E V i (1909) 514 Kârakârthavicâra (of Ràghava Jhà) 529 KALIGARAJNTA VIDYOPADHYAYA Kârakasambandhoddyota (of Rabhasanandin) 475 (1887) 512 Kalidasa G475 Kârakasambandhoddyota (of VinâsvarananKALIDASA C A K R A V A R T I N 524 din) 535 K A L I K A PRASADA ¡§UKLA (1961) Kârakatattva or Kârakavicâra (of [iSesa] 24, 324, 423, 517, e:G857, G1245, Cakrapani) 247, 493 G1286 Kârakavâda (of Srikrsna Bhatta Maunin) 506 K A L I K U M A R A S A R M A N 524 Kalpa (a Vedanga) 107 (Sa{) Kârakavivarana (of Ratnapàni) 531 K A L U R A M A SASTRIN (1910) 514 Kârakavyutpattirahasya (of Gopinàtha BhaK A L Y A N A M A L A S A R M A N 524 tta) 522 K A L Y A N A SARASVATl (1790) 508 Kârakiya (ofDayànanda Sarasvati) 511 Kalyanov, V . I. a:G1390, G1528 Kârakoktisamuccaya (of Srîprabhà Suri) 533 K A M A D E V A G H O S A 524 Kârakollâsa (of Bharata Mallika) 510 K A M A E A K A R A BHATTA (1640) 497- karana. See means 98 kàrana. See cause Kamalakara Diksita 317 KARAPUTUGALA DHARMA âRl K A M A L A S I L A (770) G775 (1925) 515, e:G1093 Kamarupa school G1070 Kârikâbhàsya (of Divyasimha Misra) 521 Kamsa 196 Kârikâvalï (ofNârâyana) 499 K A N A K A L A I A SARMAN 524 —Tîkâ (of Râmaprasâda) 501 KANAKAPRABHA (1240) 481 K A R M A D H A R A (1501) 487 Kane, Pandurang Varman a:G584, G873 karman. See object (of action) Kansara, N. M . a:G904 karmapravacanïya. See postposition K A N T A N A T H A 524 kartr. See agent Kantawala, S. G. a:G1668 kartfsiddhântamafijarl (of Ràmacarana ) 530

INDEX

579

KÂRTTIKEYA SIDDHÂNTA BHAT- Kâtantrapariéispa (of Srîpatidatta) 486 TACARYA (1800) 509 —Vaktavyaviveka (of Pundarïkâksa VidKÂâAKRTSNA 440-41 yâsàgara Bhattàcârya) 487 Kashmir, 28, 203, 205, G535 —Prabodha (of Gopînàtha Tarkàcârya) Kashmir Saivism 57, 124, 324, 342, 554 488 Kâsï. See Bañaras —Prakâéïkâ (of Samkara Sarman) 532 (Aspâdhyâyï) KâHkâ (vrtti) (of Jayâditya and Vamana) 18, 271, 472-73, G586, —Siddkàntaratnâkara (of Sivarâma CaG596, G821, G863 kravartin) 493 —Candrikâ (ofRâmadâsa Cakravartin) —Tippanï (of Bhagavatprasâda bar493 man) 513 —Padamañjari (of Haradatta ) 477, 560 Kâtantrasûtras (of ¡Sarvavarman) 17, 464—KusumavikâSa (of Siva Paiidita ) 551 65 —JVyâsa (of Jinendrabuddhi). See KâH- —Vrtti (of Durghasimha ). See Kâtantrakânyâsa Vftti —Kpvmafgarï (of Sivarâma Sarman) —Prakriyâmafijarï (of Anandapûrna G647 Vïdyàsâgara) 484 —Tïkâ (of Pundarïkâksa Vïdyàsâgara —Paritispa (of áripattidatta ). See Kàtantrapariiisfa Bhattàcârya) 487 —Tikâ (of Mahendranàtha Bhattàcâr—Vrttipradïpa (of Ràmadeva Misra) ya) 513 531 —Asfamañgala (ofRàmakisoraSarman) —Sâra (ofVàsudeva) 534 513 Kâiikânyâsa (of Jinendrabuddhi ) 474 —Anunyâsa (of Indu) 478 —Kalàpacandra (of Bilvesvara) 518 —Tantradïpa (of Maitreya Raksita) —Sâra (of Hariràma Bhattàcârya) 523 207, 478 Kâtantraurtti (of Durghasimha) 475, 477, G641, G642, G645, G653 — (Vyâkararia) Prakàia (of Narapati —Paftjikâ (of Trilocanadàsa). See Mahàmisra) 486 —Prabhâ (ofSanàtanaTarkâcàrya) 532 TRILOCANADASA KÂSINÂTHA (1725) 504 —Tïkâ (of Durghasimha) 477 KASÏNATHA (1810) 510 —Vistara (of Vardhamàna) 478 KÂSINÂTHA 525 —Tïkâ (of Pradyumna Suri) 480 —TattvaprakâHkâ (of Gunacandra) 481 KASïNATHA BHATTA (1500) 487 —Rûpamâlà (ofBhavasena Traividyesa) KASïNATHA DEVAáARMAN 525 481 KÂSÏNÂTHA M l â R A 525 KÂSIRAJA 525 —Bâlaéiksâ (of Samgramasimha) 483 KÂàïSVARA 525 Commentary (of Moksesvara) 484 —Bâlà(va)bodhinï (ofjagaddhara) 484 KÀSïàVARA BHATTACARYA (1550) —Nyâsa (of Sïtikantha) 486 489 —Bàlâvabodha (of Merutunga) 485 KASIáVARA g A R M AN (1739) 23, 505 —Pariéispa (of áripattidatta ). See g R l KÂâYAPA 18, 440 KASYAPA (1200) 480 PATTIDATTA KÂâYAPA 525 —Padaprakarattasamgati (of Jonaràja) 486 Kàtantra commentary (of Kumàralabdha ) —PrakâSa (of Karmadhara ) 487 465 —Pradipa (of Pundarïkâksa VidyâsàgaCommentary (of Ràma Panditavara) 513 ra Bhattàcârya) 487 —Manoramâ (of Ràmanàtha Sarman) Kàtantra system 17, 19-20, G664 488 Kàtantrakaumudï (of Gangesa S arman) 522 Kâtantrakaumudï (of Govardhana Bhatta) Commentary (of Ràma Tarkavàgïsa) 489 522 Kâtantrakaumudï (of Krpala Paridita) 526 —Durgânâkyaprabodha (of Kulacandra) KâtantrapariSisfa (of Govinda Pandita) 523 489

580

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

—Avacuri (of Garitrasiinha) 490 —UttaraparUista (of Trilocana) 493 —Vyakhyasara (of Ramadasa Cakravartin) 493 —Rahasya or Tika (of Ramanatha Vidyavacaspati) 498 —Chandahprakriya (of Candrakanta Tarkalamkara) 512 —Paribhasavj-lti (of Bhava Misra) 518 —Laghuvrtti (of Chiccliu Bhatta) 519 —Vjrtti (of Devadatta) 520 —Dhuridika (of Durgasimha) 520 —Vyakhyalekha (of Gangadasacarya) 521 —Dlpika (of Gautama) 522 —Dhatupatha (of Govinda Bhaffa) 522 —Suyaprabodhika (of Govinda Bhafta) 522

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

Katanlrottara (of Vijayananda) 478 Katre, Sadashiv Lakshmidhar a:G24 Katre, Sumitra Mangesh a:G1427, b:G219, G231, G278, G483A, G1448 Katsura, Shoryu 549 K A T Y A 458 K A T Y A Y A N A (250 B.C.) 6, 16, 18, 26, 85-86, 97, 114, 117, 119-20, 193, 204, 261, 277, 283, 293, 322, 558, G444, G446-47, 458-59, G593, G618 Kaumudisudhakara (of Candrakanta Tarkalamkara)' 512 KAUNDA BHATTA. See K O N D A

BHATTA KAUTILYA G1493 KAUTSA441

Kavi, M . Ramakrishna a :G686 K A V r C A N D R A ( D A T T A ) (1600) 493 K A V I D A R P A N A R A G H A V A (1375) 485 Kavikalpadruma (of Hemacandra) versification (of Harsakulagani) 489 —Avacuri (of Vijayamala) 534 Kavikalpadrumaskandha Upasargamaridana (of Mandana Kavi) 485 K A V I K A N T H A H A R A 525 529 —Prabodha (of Ramanatha Cakravar- K A V I K U N J A R A 371 K A V I N D R A N A N D A N A 525 tin) 530 —Vanmayapradipa (of Sarvadhara Upa- Kaviraj, Gopinatha 553, a:GI394, G1455 Kavirajapairika (of Pitambara Vidyabhudhyaya) 532 sana) 529 —Sarpjivam (of Sitanatha Sastrin) 532 —Martoramd (of Srinatha Siromani) 533 Kaviratna, Syamacarana G1025, e:G555 —Kalapacandra (of Susena Kaviraja K A V I S A R A N G A 525 K A V I V A L L A B H A 525 Misra) G656 KavyadarSa (ofDaijdin) 107 —AkhyHtatika (of Vidyasagara) G653 —Laghuvftti or Sisyahita (of Yasobhuti)Kavydlanikdrasutravjtti G852 Kavya literature G557 535 Kdtantra (sutra)vrtti-Parljikd (of Trilocana K E D A R E S V A R A S A R M A N 525 Keith, Arthur Berriedale G559, a:G110, dasa) G643, G656-58, 475-76 G459 —Uddyota (of Trivikrama) 478 —Pradipa (of Kusala) 480 Kenghe, G.T. a:G700 —Durgd (pada)prabodha (of Jinaprabha) Kephart, Calvin b:G1471 483 K E S A R I M I S R A 525 K E § A V A (1650) 498 —Kalapatattoabodhini (of Ramacandra) K E S A V A 525 502 —Tika (of Candrakanta Tarkalam- KESAVADEVA TARKAPANCANANA kara) 512 B H A T T A C A R Y A 525 —Dhmdika (of Dhanaprabha Suri) 520 K H A N A N R P A T I 526 —Prabodha (ofNarahari) 528 Kharbas, S. Datta b:G1638 —Candra or Vyakhyasara (of Susena Khare, G. H . a:G1220 Kharwandikar, D. K . a:G926-27, d:G925 Kaviraja Misra) 533 K H U D D I J H A ( S A R M A N ) (1910) 23Commentary (of Visvesvara Tarkaca24, 399, 514 rya) 535 —Sdra (of Harirama Bhaf(acarya) 523 Commentary (of Kasiraja) 525 Commentary (of Maunisekhara) 527 —Dhatusutriya (of Pitambara Vidyabhusana) G656 —Daurgdsimhavftti (of Prthvlcandra) 529 —Tattvdrruiva (of Raghunanda Acarya)

iNDEX

Kielhorn, Franz G549, a-.G14, G46, G425, G434, G535, G542-43, G545, G671, G677, G679, G785, G821, G848, G880, G882, G941, G1378, G1386, b:G2, G503, G1369, e:G536, et:G665 Kiparsky, Paul a:G247, G377 Kiratàrjunïya (of Bhàravi) 175 Kiurste, J. e:G942, G944 Kiuttel, F. a:G1381, G1384 Klostermaier, Klaus 550-51 Knauer, Fricdrich a:G1377 knowledge, theory of 5, 43, 53-63, 68-69, 126, G720, G1558, G1615. See also cognition =*prama 54 =*vidya 128, 147 K O C C A SANKARAN SUSUD (1825) 510

581

K R S N A M A G H A R I A R . See K R S N A SUDHI K R S N A M l S R A (1780) 508 KfsriamiSraprakriya (of Krsna Mis'ra) 508 K R S N A M I T R A c A R Y A or DURBALAGARYA (1800) 23, 377, 381, 508-9 K R S N A PANDITA 526 K R S N A SASTRIN 526 KIi.§iyASUDHI 525 K R S N A V A D H D T A 526 Krsna Yajurveda 549 kjti. See volition kjtisadhyaiva. See feasibility KftpariSiffa (ofRatideva Siddhanta Vaglsa) 531 KxtprakaSa (of NilakaiJtha Diksita) 506 KSAPANAKA (1650) 472 K S E M A N K A R A (1653) 499 KSEMENDRA (1525) 487-88 K O L A H A L A 526 Kshirsagar, V . K. a:G370 K O D A N D A R A M A 526 KONDA BHATTA (1630) 21-22, 241, K S I R A S V A M I N (1050) 19, 476 Kudala, S.D. e:G552 255-308, 324, 369, 495-96, 562 K U L A C A N D R A (1550) 489 Konow, Sten a:G106, G1431 K U L A K A C A R Y A 526 Koparkar, D. G. a:G423, G895 Kotbhaskara, Ramachandra Sastri K U L A M A N P A N A SORI (1394) 485 K U L A M U N I (1800) 508 e :G680 K U L L U K A BHATTA 527 krama. See growth; sequence Kumar, Avanindra b:G399 K R A M A D ISV A R A (1050) 19, 477 KUMARALABDHA or K U M A R A L A kratu. See energy, inner krdanta. See primary derivative T A (200 ) 465 Kjdmvarana (of Kàsinàtha) 525 K U M A R A P A L A (1461) 486 Kjdvrtti (of Kavxndranandana) 525 K U M A R A T A T A Y A (1825) 23, 391, 510 Krishnamachariar, R.V. e:G1095, G1294 Kumari, Sudesh d:G332 Krishnamacharya, V. 342, 363 K U M A R I L A BHATTA (660) 4, 18, 25Krishnamoorthy, K. a:G1657 26, 71-77, 81, 88-89, 97, 181, 189-190, kriya. See action; verb 213, 237, 282, 549, 554-56, 561, G682, KriydkaXapa (of Jinadevasüri) 524 G786 Kriyartighanlu (ofBhaftoji Diksita) 492 KUNARABADAVA 458 Kriyaratnasamuccaya (of Gunaratna Süri) kundalinl 328 486 K U N I 458 KUPPU GASTRIN (1750) 507 Kriyàviveka (ofHelaràja) 193, 475 KUSALA (1200) 480 Kfnmaüjarï (of Sivadàsa) 532 Kushwaha, Mahesh Singh e:G1172 KRPALA PAUDITA 526 kufasthanityata. See eternal KRPARS.MA 526 (God) Krsija 195, G532 KRSNA (1645) 498 Laddu, Sueshacandra Dhyaneshwar K R S N A BHATTA 526 a:G180, G220, G264, G279, G299, KRÇNA BHATTAGARYA 526 G482A, G487A, G492, G513, G515, KRSNACARYA" 526 G621, G640, G1581, G1614, G1711 K R S N A C A R Y A IX (1430) 486 Laghubodha (of Krsn.a) 498 KRSNADVAIPAYANA 146 Lagkurnailjusa (of Nagesa Bhatta) 23 KRSNA DVIVEDIN 526 —Kala (of Veudyanatha Paiyaguijda) KRÇNALÏLASUKA (1280) 483 2 3 , 357

582

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

LaghuSabdakaustubha (of Nilaka^tha Dik- daivi vdk 37 —learning 93 $ita) 373, 506 levels of 61-63 LaghnSabdaratna (of Nagesa Bhatta)323, para vdk 63 367 philosophy of 27, 36, G720 Laghusdrasvata (of Kalyaria Sarasvati) 508 —principle (Sabdatattva) 95, 128, 553 Laghusiddhantakaumudi (of Varadaraja) Lanka 322 494-95 L A T A V I H A R I N (1850) 511 —Tika (of Jayakfsna Maunin) 505 La Terza, Ermanagilda a:G681, G788 —Tika (of Rupacandra) 512 —Sarabodhini (of Rancchodji Odhavji) Lehman, J. a:G1479 Leidecker, Kurt F. b:G1419 514 LESAPRABODHA. See JINAPRABHA —Tinantapradipika (of Kalavati Devi) (STJRI) 514 letter. See phoneme —Tippagi (of Sivadatta Sarman) 514 —Tika (of U. K . Verikatanarasimha) Levi, Sylvain a:G48, G498, G504, G826 lexicography G1388 515 —Tippani (ofjivanatha Raya) 515 liar's paradox. See paradox —Balabodhini (of Vasudev Visnu Mira- liberation (mokfa) 18, 46-47, 49, 51, 99, shi) 515 130, 342, G719 —Tika (of Girija) 522 Liebich, Brunoa:G823-24,G1375,G1395, —Sarpkfiptabalabodhini (of Kanakalala b:G57, G59, G67, G438, G822, G828, e:G58, G825, G827, et:G660, t:G847, Sarman) 524 G923 —Sarala (of Jivarama Sarman) G1159 —Bhairni (of Bhimasena Sastri) G1168 Lienhard, Siegfried a:G1587 LaghusiddhantamaUjufd (of Nagesa Bhafta) Limaye, V . P. 128, a:G205, G221-22, 323 G372, G669, b:G635, e:G726, G781 —KuOcika (of Kr§namitracarya) 381 limit (avadhi) 132 Lahiri, Prabodh Chandra b:G81 linga. See gender; indication lMkdra.rthaniry.aya (of ¡§rikr;na BhaffaLihganitxiayacandrikd (of Anantasuri) 518 LinganuSasana Maunin) 367, 506 Lak^ana ( = K i n g Muktapida of Kashmir) of Candra school 18 193 Commentary (by Harsavardhana) LakfcmA. See secondary meaning 472 Laksmaria, 12th cent, ruler in Bengal 209 —Sarvalaksana (of Pfthivisvara) 529 L A X $ M A NA D V I V E D I N 527 of Vamana 473 L A K $ M A N A T R I P A T H I (1915) 515 rules 15 Laksmi 341 LinganuSdsana (of Hemacandra) 504 L A K § M l D A T T A 527 —Durgaprabodha (of Srivallabhavacarya) Laksmidhara 241 504 L A K § M l K A R A 527 —Sarvarthalaksana (of Sabarasvamin) L A K $ M 1 N A R A Y A N A V Y A S A 527 531 Lakfminisasdbhidfia (of Sivarama Tripa- LinganuSasanavrtti (of Utpala) 479 Linge, D. E. 550 thin). See UnddikoSa L A K $ M l N R S I M H A (1660) 499 linguistic element (Sabda) 5-6, 182-85 Laksyamali (of Elesvaragnihotra) 521 linguistic monism (Sabdadvaita) 193 Lalamani Upadhyaya 379 linguistics, diachronic G1523 Lambert, F. a:G1600 linguistics, modern G314 Langer, Susan K . 554 literary criticism (sahitya) 3-5, 28-33, 67. (spoken) language (Sabda) (vac) 3-4, 37, See also alarpkdraSastra 94, 103-7, 114, 118, 124-25 loan words G1613 —acquisition G763 Locana (of Abhinavagupta) 91 as means of release (Sabdapurvayogd) locative (case-ending) (adhikaram) 168, 270, G1664, 337-39 46-47, 49-50, G755

iNDE X

583

—Tikâ (of Samkara) 531 —Cintâmapi (of Dhanesvara) 211, 481 —RatnaprakäSa (of Sivarämendra Sarasvati) 22, 245, 487 —Süktiratnäkara (of [Seça ] Nàrâyana Bhatta) 22, 225, 488 —Sphürti (of Sarvesvara) 489 —Prakâêikâ (of Sesa Vi§nu) 22, 243, 494 Macdonnell, A. A. 549 MADHAVA or SAYANA (1350) 56, 68, —Vyakhyâdaréa (ofKamaläkara Bhatta) 498 484, 554, 556 MADHAVA (1887) 513 —SiddhänlaratnaprakäSa (of Sivarämen(ARRA or ERRA) MADHAVA BHAdra Sarasvatí) 499 —Ratnävali (of Cokkanätha Dlksita ) T T A (1450 ) 486 22, 311,499 MADHAVA BHATTA (1520) 487 —Anüpáta (of Tirumala Yajvan) 277, MADHAVA SARASVATL (1550) 489 499 MADHAVA SASTRI BHANDARI —Gûdhârthadîpanî (ofSadäsiva) 22,317, (1920) 515, e:G565, G1117 500 MADHUKANTA S A R M A J H A (1950) —PrakäSa (of Nilakantha Diksita) 500 24, 516 —Säbdikacintämaxii (of Gopâla Krsna MADHVA (1280) 266 Mádhyamaka Buddhism 45, 60 Sästrin) 23, 353, 504 madhyama vac 43, 47, 49-50, 52, 61-62, 95, —Vivararia (of Satyapxiya Txrtha Svämin) 23, 359, 505 99, 121, 124, 328-29, 342, 555, 558 Madhyasiddhántakaumudi (of Varadarája) —Tattvaviveka (of NilakanVha Diksita) 373, 506 494 —Parij&tam Nätakam (of Kumära Tatä—Tika (of Jayakj^na Maunin) 505 Commentary (of Balakjrsna Sarmá ya) 23, 391, 510 —Tripâfhaga (of Satärä RäghavendräYogi) 513 cärya) 23, 393, 510 —Visarnasthalatippani (ofGovindasimha) —Mapiratnaprabhâ (of Viprarajendra) 513 511, G37 —Sudha (of Sadásiva Sástrijoshi) 516 —Tippanî (of Dayänanda Sarasvatí) —Vyákhyá (of Brahmadeva) 519 511 —Prabhakara (ofVisvanáthaSástri) 535 Magha G873 —Prakäia (of Madhukänta Sarmä Jhä) 214, 516 Mah&hharata 146, G264, G1568 —Kuñciká (ofHari Samkara Jhä) 515, Mahabhasja (of Patañjali) 16-17, 19-22, G566 38, 45-47, 55, 68, 117-21, 124,165, 167, 182-83, 196, 242, 264, 267, 271, 278, —Tattväloka (of Rudhradhara Jhä 325, 327, 334-35, 340-42, 345, 459-64, Sarma«) 24, 421, 516 549, 553, 551, 556-57, G181, G502, —Tippartï (of Guruwara Bäla Sästri) G515, G586 523 —Süktiratnäkara (of Nrsimha) 528 —Diptká or —Tripadi or Tika (of —Vidaanmukhaihüfatia (of PrayogaveñBhartrhari) 18, 22, 54, 124, 174-76, katàdri) 529 470 —BMgavrtti (of Vimalamati) 472, G791 Mahäbhäjyapradipa (of Kaiyata) 19, 22, 174, 203-4, 476 —Pradipa (of Kaiyata). See Mahábháf—Laghuvivarafta (of Satyánanda or yapradipa Rämacandra Sarasvatí) 219, 487 Commentary (of Jye§thakalasa) 205, — (Bfhad) Vivarapa (of Isvaränanda) 477 22, 219, 229, 488 —Tika (of Maitreya Rak$ita) 207, 478 —UddyoUma (of Annambhatta) 22, 237, —Prarfápana or —Laghuvjlti (of Puru$o489 ttaraadeva) 209, 480 absolute 262 logic G563, G1545, G1559 prepositional G243 logos 37, 105-6 LOKEáAKARA (1683) 501 LOK.ESVARA SARMAN SUKLA 527 Lüders, H. e:G664

584

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

MANDANA (1330) 484 —Sphürti (of Sarvesvara) 489 —Tippani (of Mallaya Yajvan) 249, MANPANA K A V I (1400) 485 MANDANA MI&RA (690) 5, 11, 18, 22, 496 51,56-59, 70-80, 82, 98, 181-91, 231 —Vyäkhyä (of Näräyana [Sästrin] 22, 233-35, 266, 331, 473-74, 554, 556, 561 353, 498 —PrakäSa (of Nilakantha Diksita) 500 Mandukya Upanisad 37, 106 —Uddyota (of Näges'a Bhatta) 23, 340- MANGARASA 527 manifestation (vivarta, vyaHjaka) 93, 129, 42, 503 216, 236, G1587 —Chäyä (of Vaidyanätha PaiyaguMANIKYADEVA 527 nda) 23, 357, 505 —Tippani (of Bäla Sästrin) G522, MaRjusa (of Nagesa Bhatta) 323 Manoramacandrika. (of Nilambara Misra) G547 528 —Vyäkhyä (of Rämasevaka) 23, 377, 507 Manoramakharidana (of Kesava) 498 Mansion, J. b:G1407 —Sphürti (ofÄdenna) 517 —PrakäSa (ofPravartakopädfayäya) 529 mantra 24, 51-52, 107-8, 148, 188, 234 —PrakäSa (of Sesa Cintämani) 22, 221 —samadhi 52 Mahäcärya 239 Manu G493 MAHÄDEVA (1270) 482 MANYUDEVA or MANADEVA (1815) Mahädeva, fatter of Vaidyanätha Paiya23, 387, 509 Marathi 287 guncia 357 Mahädeva Diksita, father of Väsudeva marker (it) 16 Marulasiddaiah, G. b:G1573 Dik§ita 365 Matarlsvara 104 Mahadevan, T. M. P. 551-52 mathematics G208, G1689 MAHÄDEVA VEDÄNTXN (1694) 501 Matilal, Bimal Krishna a:G204, G1542, MAHÄLlNGA SÄSTRIN 527 Maharashtra 20, 241, 323, G1685 G1574, G1633, b:GI615 Mahashabda, M . V. a:G1267 matter, material thing (murti) 162 Mahävärttika (of Kätya or Bhävan) 458 MUNlSEKHARA 527 Mahavir a:G333, G400-01, G406, Maurya G548 maya 41-43, 60, 105 b:G373 obscuring (avarana) 42 Mahävlra 17 projective (viksepa) 42 MAHENDRANÄTHA BHATTÄGÄRMayrhofer, M. a:G1513, g:G1491 Y A (1900) 513, e:G652 Mazumdar, B. G. a:G52 MAHESAJHÄ 527 Mazumdar, Pradip Kumar a:G1621, Mahesvara, teacher of Kaiyata 203 b:G1680 Mahesvara Süri 203 MaheSvarasütras of Pänini's Asfädhyäyi 14,Mazumdar, Surendra Nath a:G850 G65, G341. See also Asfädhyäyi McArthur, Harvey 550 Mailrayani Samhita a:G433 meaning, theory of 5, 8-10, 18, 27-30, 90, MAITREYA R A K § 1 T A (1109) 19, 207, 145, 186, 232-34, 324, G1396, G1555478 56. See also connotation, sphofa abstracted (apoddhara) 13 Maitri UpattUad40, 45, 550 =artha 5-6, 26, 94, 114, 118-19, 149, Majumdar, Baradaprasada e:G1021 559 MALAYAGIRI (1280 ) 483 MALLAYA YAJVAN (1630) 34, 496 figurative G5, 370 Mammata 83, 203, 370 nominal. See nominal meaning MÄNALUR VIRARÄGHAVÄCÄRYA relation of word to 7-8 527 secondary. See secondary meaning sentence. See sentence meaning manana. See thinking single (ekdrthibhava) 277-84, 340 (SRI) MÄNASARMAN 527 stable 131 Manavalli, Gangadhara Sastri e:G680 Manavalli, Rama Sastri e:G1114 verbal. See verbal meaning

iNDEX

585

Mishra, Avadh Bihari e:G690 Misra, Brahmashankara e:G1320 Mishra, Hari Deo a:G608 Mishra, Hari Mohan a:G402, G490A, Gl 669 Misra, M. P. e:G906 Misra, Narayana e:G862 Mishra, Ramasakala e:G885 Mishra, Satya Svarup a:G1670 Misra, Sobita e:G853 Misra, Sri Narayana a:G250 Misra, Sudama Sarman e:G1048 Mishra, Umesh a:G1397 Mishra, Vidhata b:G1622 Misra, Vidya Niwas a:G181-82, G1610, b:G206 Misra, Vir Bhadra a :G390 Mitäksarazrftii (of Balambhafta) 357 Mitra 104 Mitra, Rajendralal a:G497 mlecchaSabda. See corrupt word Moghe, R. G. a:G1616 Mohana Lala, grandfather of Indradatta Upadhyaya 379 Mokate, Ganapati Sastri e:G1125, G1344 moksa. See liberation MOKSESVARA (1350) 484 Mongolian Gl 692 monism 61, G730 mood 263-67, 335-37 different permanent moods (sthayibhäva) 33 Mookerji, Radhakumud a:G446-47 moral power 47-48 morpheme 4, 6, Gl537 analysis Gl 76 morphophonemics G336, Gl678 Morretta, Angelo a:G1659 motion, movement 552-53 motivating force (prayojana) 204 Mugdhabälävabodha (of Kulamandana Sfiri). See Auktika Mugdhabodha (ofVopadeva) 20,482-83 —ParUisfa (ofNandakisoraBhaftäcärya —Slokavarttika (of Kumarila). See SlokCakravartin) 485 avarttika —Pramodajanani or —Karaka (of Räma —Tantravarttika (of Kumarila). See Tarkavägisa) 489 Commentary (of Käsisvara) 489 Tantravarttika —Subodha (of Durgädäsa Vidyäväisa) —Kutuhalavrtti (of Vasudeva Diksita) 497 365 — (Kavikalpadruma) Dhätudipikä or —Pamiracle (atadbhuta). See action, miraculous ribhäsä{ikä (of Durgädäsa Vidyäväcourse of gisa) 497 Misra, Adya Prasada G1052

word-meaning. See word means or instrument (karana) 25, 87, 163, 165, 168, 270, 337-38, G1542 =sadhana 145, 162-68, 195-96 = upaya 148 to a desired result (isfasddhanatva) 26566 measure (parirnana) 115 Meenakshi, K . a:G1706 MEGHARATNA (1400) 485 MEGHAVIJAYA (1700) G952, 502 Mehendale, M . A. a:G408 Meisezahl, R. O. a:G1007 memory, recollection (smjti) 30, 184, 216, 235, 303, 321, 324 —traces (samskara) 43-44, 48, 74-78, 81. See also dispositional tendency (inner) mental word 231, 234 merit (dharma) 121, 132 M E R U T U N G A (1388) 485 metalanguage G266, G286, G323, G1662 metaphor (upacara) 5, 8, 11, 29-30, 67-68, 91, 194, 258 faded 66 metaphoric transfer 26, G1704 metaphysics 35-52 metarule (paribhdsd) 14-15, G326, G352, G1502, G1598, G1616, G1647, G1682 metrics (chandas) 3, 39, 107 Millonig, Harald a:G1601 (Purva) Mimamsa 3-6, 9, 12, 21, 25-28, 54-55, 60, 66, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 83, 8591, 95-98, 118-19, 181, 184, 186, 190, 213, 233, 237, 240-41, 255-57, 260-63, 271-72, 282, 284-87, 292-93, 295-96, 324, 328, 331, 334, 339-40, 344, 346, 556, G797, G802, G1526, G1616, G1680. See also Bha{(a; Prabhakara Mimamsaka, Yudhisthira 205, 207, 211, 225, 241, 247, 249, 313, 359, 373, 56162, a:G844, b:G285, ce:G23, e:G3l5, G420, G909, G977, G1328, t:G20 Mlmamsasutras (of Jaimini) 25, 86,92,114, 213, 230 233

586

EN

oY

oL

O P E DIA

—Subodha (of Karttikeya Siddhanta Bhattacarya) 509 —Setusaijigraha (of Gangadhara) 512 —Tippani (of Syamacarana Kaviratna) 514 —Parimala (of Harendranarayana Devasarman) 514 —Dhatuvftti (ofDamodara) 519 Commentary (of Devldasa Cakravartin) 520 —Tippani (of Girisacandra Vidyaratna) G1019 —Sabdadipika (of Govindarama Vidyasiromaru) 523 —Dhatupradipa (of Haranatha Vidyaratna) 523 —Tippani (of Sivanarayana Siromani) 532 Mugdhabodha school 19 MugdhaparUiifa (ofKasisvara Bhattacarya) 489 Mukhabhu$aria 487 Mukhopadhyaya, Sunjit Kumar a:G1051 mukhya words G1484 Muktikalasa, grandfather of Jyesthakalas'a 205 (King) Muktipada of Kashmir. See Lak^ana Miiller, F. Max a:G39, G520, G845 Miiller, Reingold F. G. a:G1499 Muni, Jambuvijaya a:G794 Municandravijaya e:G959 Muralidhara, greatgrandfather of Indradatta Upadhyaya 379 M U R L l D H A R A M I § R A (1977) 517, e:G1053 Murder in the Cathedral (of T. S. Eliot) 49 murta. See matter Murti, M. S. Narayana a:G225, G249, G770, G772, G783, GU09, G1602, G1634, G1709, G1713, d:G1617 Murty, Farasuram Gopala Krishna a:G481 Murti, T.R.V. 53, 55, 550, 552, a:G1643 music G203 mystical experience 32,47 mysticism 65 nada 69-70, G1455 NAGESA BHATTA (1714) 21, 23, 68, 83, 87, 203, 319, 323-49, 357, 379, 387, G1081, G1084, 502-4, 549, 555-56, 562 NAGOBA PANPITA (1775) 508

Of

I N D I A N

P H I L O S O P H I E S

Nakamura, Hajime a:G697, G745, G803, G807 Nalla Perumal Diksita 311 namadhatu. See verb, nominal NamakarthaprakaSasarfigraha (of Abhinava Nrsimhasrama) 496 naman. See noun Namanirmaladarpana (of Laksmidhara) 527 name and form (namarupa) 107 Namputiri, E. V. Raman e:G1201 naR. See negation, negative particle NANAKARAMAGASTRIN (1924 ) 515, e:G1092 N A N D A K l R T l 527 NANDAKLSORA

SARMAN

BHATTA-

CARYA C A K R A V A R T I N

(1398) 485

NANDASUNDARA.

See

DHANACAN-

D R A

NANDASUNDARA GANI 528 Nandi, T . S. a:G1588 NARAHARI 528 NARAIN D A T T A TRIPATHIN N A B A N A R A Y A N A . See M A

V1DYAVAGI§A

528

PURUSOTTABHATTAGAR-

Y A

Narang, Satya Pal a:G978 NARAPATI MAHAMISRA (1425) 486 Narasimhacarya, M. S. e:G1059 NARASIMHA SORI 528 NARAYANA 528 NARAYANA BHARATI 528 (SESA) NARAYANA (BHATTA) (1546) 22, 215, 225, 243, 488, G1107 NARAYANA BHATTATIRI (1640 ) 22, 497 NARAYANA 478

NARAYANA

DANDANATHA

(1100)

X^TYAYAPANCANANA

(1550) 488-89 NARAYANA (SADHU) (1667) 500 ( R A M A ) NARAYANA (SARMAN) (VANDYOPXDHYAYA) (1664) 315, 499 NARAYANA (GASTRIN) (1640 ) 498 NARAYANA (SASTRIN) 22, 253, G1059 NARAYANA SUDHI (1750) 507 NARENDRAPURI (1300) 483

NAROTTAMA VIDYALAMKARA BHATTACARYA 528

Nath, Narendra Candra a:G265, b:G251 natural (svabhava) intuition 146

i N D EX Nâtyaiâstra (ofBharata) 28 NAVACANDRA NYÂYARATNA (1905) 514 N A V K I S H O R E J H Â (1931) 516 Nawathe, P. D. a:G300 N A Y A S U N D A R A 528 Nazzeri, O. b:G1468 negation 262, 288-89, 291-92, 334, G124, G1554 fourfold (catuskofi) 60 negative compound G815 negative particle G815 paryudâsa 334 prasajyapratijedha 60, 334 Neranâva tisûtravyâkhyâ. See Gajàsûtravâda (of Venkatadâsa ) neuter G1499 Mew Catalogm Catalogorum 215 nididhyâsana 106 JVigharilu (list of words) 4, 109 N Î L A K A N T H A D Ï K S I T A (1675) 500 N Î L A K A N T H A D Ï K S I T A (1750) 239, 317, 321, 351, 373, 506 N Î L A K A N T H A S U K L A (1637) 251, 497, 562 N Î L A K A N T H A VÂJAPEYIN (1605) 373, 493 N Î L A K A N T H A VYÂSA 393 N Ï L A M B A R A M I á R A 528 nimitta. See condition; occasion nipàta. See particle Nipâtazyayopasargavrtti (of Ksirasvàmin) 477 —Tîkà (of Tilaka) 534 nirukta. See etymology Mrukta (of Yâska) 4, 10, 14, 108-12, 234, 258, 330-31, 549j 556, G393, G422, G605 niruikalpaka (pratyakfa) 27-28 nifedha. See prohibition NüiSataka section of Subhâfitatrîsatï 124 nilya. See eternal N I T Y Â N A N D A PANTA P A R V A T Ï Y A (1918 ) 24, 401, 515 niyojya (person enjoined to act) 25 nominal composition G1577, G1586 formations G232, G1590 meaning (nâmàrtha) 272-76 stem or suffix (pratipâdika ) 15, 115, 131, 258, 275-76, 284, 291, 325, 339, 343, G1513-14, G1578 quotative G1641

587

sentence. See sentence, nominal verb (nàmadhâiu). See verb, nominal nominalization G1566 nominative case 257, G1483 nonapprehension. See absence noun (naman) 110, 112, 114, 121, 149-50, 256-57, 339, G696, G1550 abstract 292 formation of G1490 novelty 83. See also apûrva N R S I M H A (1650) 498 N R S I M H A 528 N R S I M H A S R A M A (1559) 237 N R S I M H A T À R K A P A N G A N A N A 528 number (sarpkhyà) 115, 127, 149, 172-73, Î88, 213, 273, 275, 284, 335,G130 singular/plural 163,257,261-62,295-97, G1593 nuns G445 Nyàya 3, 5-6, 9-11, 21, 26-29, 45, 55, 60, 65-66, 85, 87-88, 90-93, 96-98, 237, 255, 258-59, 263, 265, 268, 272, 274, 282-92, 298-301, 303, 306, 324-40, 34445, 368-69, 381, 397, 556, G1526 JVyâyabhûfatia (of Bhàsarvajna) 262, 26465, 296, 369 JVyâyamaiïjarî (of Jayanta Bhafta) 91, 97 JVyayasaipgraha (of Gangàdatta) 521 Nyâyasamgralia (ofHemahamsavijayagarii) 486 —Nyâyàrthamafljufâ (autocommentary) 486 Nyâyasudhà (of Somesvara Bha{{a) Commentary (of Annambhatta) 237 Nyayasùtras (of Gautama) 85,97, 549, 556 (grammatical) object (ofaction) (karman) 164-65, 255, 257-62, 267, G1606 —kâraka 337-38 occasion (nimitta) 147 Ojihara, Yutaka a:G148, G154, G158, G192, G226-27, G281, G518, G609, G615, G630, G638, G855, G859, G1582, t:G854 old age (jarà ). See decay onomatapoeia (Sabdânukrti) 111 ontology 127 operation. See function (vyâpâra) operational rule (vidhisûtra) 15 Oppert, Gustav e:G881 opposition. See contradiction option G378 O R A M B H A T T A 528

588

ENCycLOPEDIA

OF INBTATT PHILOSOPHLFIS

Pandeya, Harisankara e:G91 Pandeya, Kalika Charan a:G1543 Pandeya, Kesava Deva a:G1035 Pandeya, Kshitish Chandra 552 Pandeya, Ram Chandra b:G1555 Pandeya, Umesh Chandra e:G159 Pandit, M. D. a:G165, G174-5, G208-9, pada. See word G252, G283, G303, G317, G488A, Padacandrika (of Sesa Krsna) 488 d:G1623 —Kjsnakautuhvda (autocommentary) Pandye, Ram Awadh d:G418 488 PACINI (350 B. C.?) 4, 6, 9, 13-21, 36, Padamafijan (of Haradatta) 38,45,55,66-68,85-86,97,108-19,165, Commentary (of Narayaria) 498 167, 194, 204, 261-64-, 267-72, 276-77, —Makamnda or —Parimala (of Ranga284, 293-97, 322, 331-45, 441-58, 549natha Dikjita) 498 50, 554, 556-57, G4, G503 —Kusumavikaia (of Sivabhatta) 509 Pariinipariiisfavyakarana (of DevendrakuCommentary (ofJagaddhara) 524 Commentary (of Ramasimha) 531 mara Vidyaratna) 515 Commentary (of Ratnesvara) 531 Paninipradipa (of Sundaresvara Yajvan) Padapatha (of Sakalya) 4S 13 373 padarlha. See category Pattinisara (of Navacandra Nyayaratna) Pad&rthadipika (of Konda Bhaf(a) 255, 514 G1181 PaninisutrarthasaJfigraha (of Devidasa) 520 Pariiniyadipika (of Nilakantha Vajapeyin) Padarthadipikd (of Nagesa Bhatta) 323 PadasarpjUdvicara (of Asadhara Bhatta) 493 375, 507 Pdrtinipradipa (of Sundaresvara Yajvan) padasphofa. See sphofa: pada 373 Padasuryapvakriya (of Utsavakirti) 534 Pariiniyamatadarpana (of Kavidarpana Padavyavastha (sutra) karika (of Vimalakirti) Raghava) 485 488 Paniniyasdra (of Jagadisa) 524 PdniniyaSikfa. 15, 455 —Vivrti (of Udayakirti) 499 Padavyavasthakofa (of Gosvami Sri Siva- —Pafljikd (of Dharanidhara) 485 Commentary (of Dayananda Sarasnandabha(ta) 522 vati) 511 Padhye, D. G. e:G861 —Pradipa (of Rudra Prasada Sarma) PADMADHARA 528 516 PADMANABHADATTA (1375) 484-85 (RAJA) PADMANARAYANA 528 Pdniniyatattvadafpana (of Kalicarana VidPADMASUNDARA 529 yopadhyaya and Surya Prasada Misra) Paik, T. S. d:G316 512 painting 58 Papiniyavadanakfatramald (of Umamahesvara) 371, 507 Palsule, Gajanan Balkrishna 182-91,215Vasudev Laxman Shastri 17, 231-36, 367-70, a:G21-22, G116, Pansikar, G149-50, G207, G232-33, G266, G301e:G918, G1001, G1083 02, G1589, G1590, G1099, G1644, Parab, Kashinath Pandurang e:G943 d:G143, e:G1033 paradox 60-61, G773 Paftcagrardhi (of Buddhisagaia Sari) 476 paragraph 61 PaRcamatabhanjana (of Sri Tatacarya) 239Paramalaghumafijusa (of Nagesa Bhatta) PASCANANA KANDALI 529 21, 23, 323-40," 342, 502-3, 556 Paftcapddikavivararia (of Prakasatman) 287 —Arthadipika (of Sadasiva Sastri Joshi ) PafUasamasiya (of Ramacaritra Tripathin) 24, 415, 503 530 Commentary (of Nityananda Panta Pancholi, Bala Krishna 417, G1189, Parvatiya) 24, 401, 515 —Jyotsna (of Kalika Prasada Sukla) 24, e:Gl 104-5 324, 423, 517 Pandey, Chandra Kanta:G604, b:G173 Orara, E. de Guzman a:G623 original relation of word to meaning (autpattika) 7, 90 orthodox (astika) 37 Ousaparampil, J. a:G1707

i N D EX

589

—Ratnaprabhä (of Sabhâpati Sarman —Vijaya (of Manasarman ) 527, 535 ParibhdfenduSekhara (author unknown) 503, Upädhyäya ) 24, 425, 517 519 —Ratnadipikä (of Sivänanda Pandeya) 503, 532 Visami (of Cidrupasrama) 490 päramärtkika. See real Citprabha (of Taraka Brahmananda Paramatakhandana (of Cakrapani) 247 Sarasvati) 498 (ÇLSIPUTRA) P A R A M E â V A R A II ParibhasenduSekhara (of Nagesa Bhatta) 323, 503, G972 (1410) 22, 213-14, 485-86 Paranjpe, Vasudeva Gopala b:G507 —Kasika or —Gada (of Vaidyanatha Paranjpe, Vinayak Wasudeo a:G144, Paiyagunda) 357, 505 G856 —Brhadaiastrarthdkala (of Venimadhava) 506 Parapaksakhandana (of Näräyana Bhattatiri). See Apävimyapramäriatä —Trisikha (of Laksirunrsimha) 507 paraphrase G1651 —Vyakhya or —Sarrikari (of Samkara parä väk. See language Bhatta) 508 paribhäsä. See metarule —Arthamaftjari (of Bhimacarya GalaParibhäsä ( o f V y ä d i ) 458 gali) 508 Paribhäsäbhäskara (of Hari Bhäskara AgniCommentary (of Krsnamitracarya) hotra) 500-01 381, 509 Commentary (of Srïnivâsa) 533 —Induprakaia (of Gangadhara) 509 Paribhäsäbhäskara (of Sesädrisudhi ) 507 —Bhairavi or —Vivrti (of Bhairava —Paribhäsäbhäskara (of Kuppu gastrin) Misra) 510 507 —Tippanisarasaraviveka (of Balasastrin Ranade) 511 Commentary (ofHariräma) 511 —Candrika (of Visvanatha DondiCommentary (of Râjarâma Diksita) 530 bhatt») 511 Paribhäsäma$imälä (of Candradatta Jhä) Commentary (of Lala Vidarin) 511 519 —Akhandatandava (of Harinatha DviveParibhâsâpradipa (of Govinda Sena) 523 din) 511 Paribkäsäpradipa (of Kolähala) 526 —Bhuti (of Ramakrsna Tatyasastrin) Paribkäsäpradipärcis (of Udayankara Näna513 päthaka) 509 —Haimavati (of Yagesvara) 513 Paribhäsäratna (of Appa Süri) 504 —Vakyarthacandrika (of Hari Sarman) Paribhäsärthadipikä (ofTeknätha) 534 513 ParibhäsärthaprakäHkä (of Dharmasüri ) —Citprabha (of Brahmananda Saras501 vati) 514-15 —TattvaprakaSika (of Laksmana TriParibhäsärthasamgraha (of Vaidyanätha Dlk?ita) 502 pathi) 515 —Vyäkhyä (of Appa Süri) 504 —Tika (of Gadadhara) 521 —Candrikä (of Svayamprakäsänanda ) —Vrtti (of Ganesa) 521 505 —ArthamaHjari (of Hayagrivacarya) 522 Paribhäsävrtti (of Gopïnâtha Tarkäcärya) Commentary (of Krsna Bhatfa) 526 488 ' —Laghu (IkS (of Raghunatha ¡Sastri Paribhäsävrtti (of Purusottamadeva) 209, Vaiyakarana) 530 480 —Sarvamangala (of Sesa Sarman) 532 Paribhäsävrtti (of Nïlakantha Diksita) 373, Commentary (of Valabhidatta) 534 506 Commentary (of Visvanatha Bhatta) Paribhasavrtti (of Ramacandra VidyaG1255 bhusana) 501 Paribhäsävrtti (of Siradeva) 480-81 —Vijaya (of Jayadeva Misra) G1259, —Vyäkhyä (of Ramacandra Diksita) G1264 501 —TattvadarSa (of Vasudeva Sastri AbhCommentary (of Govinda Misra) 522 yahkar) 516

590

ENCycLOPEDIA

OF INBTATT PHILOSOPHLFIS

Paribhasopanyasa (of Vaidyanatha Dlksita) Pawte, I. S. b:G83 Payagun^e Balakfsna 387 502 (Vedantakalpataru) Parimala (of Appayya Payyur family 213 PEDDINTI BRAHMADEVA. See BRADiksita I ) 297, 304 HMADEVA parimatfa. See measure Peijer, J. S. b:G1376 parinama. See transformation Pendse, Narahari Shastri e:G1006 paroksatva. See imperceptibility perception (pratyaksa) 59, 126, 175, 188, P X R T H I V A G506 196, 213, 232-33, 236 particle (nipata) 110, 112, 118, 121, 147, erroneous 56-57 289-92, 337, 333-35, G319, G1425, valid 54 G1435, G1570 G1585, G1621, G1637 Peri, N. 203 G1663 particular or individual (vyakti) 6, 10, 26, periphrastic future G1482 82, 118-19, 145, 161, 185, 194, 231-36, permanence of linguistic units 125-26 273, 334, 556 permanence of word (ajdnika) 118 qualified by a universal (jativiSisfavya- permanence of word-meaning relation (pravahanityata). See eternal, as preserkti) 6, 27, 92 ved by speakers Sabda-vyakti 126 persmission (abkyanujM) 43, 47 unique (svalaksana) 27 person (puruja) .172 parts and wholes 131, 215, 235, 552 personal ending. See ending, personal parts of a sentence 191 ParyayaSabdaratna (of Dhanaiijaya Bhatta- PERUSURI (1755) 507 Peterson, Peter G532, G539, a:G439, carya) 520 G538 paryudasa. See negation PASUPATI 529 Phadke, Ananta Sastri e:G1038, G1187 paSyantl vac 43, 47, 49-52, 61-63, 95, 99, Phakkikadarpana (of Dharananda) 510 121, 124, 197, 328, 554-55, 558 Phakkika Saralartha (of Ramacaritra Tripara vac 5, 121, 124, 558 pathin) 530 Patanjal, Deo Prakas Shastri b:G486, phala. See result e:G193 phalaSraya. See Substratum of the result P A T A f t j A L I (150 B.C.) 5-6, 12-13, 16- phase (avastha) 127 22, 36, 38, 45-47, 55, 66, 69, 71, 110, (Indian) philosophy (darSana) 3-4, 18, 31, 114-21, 124, 174-75, 182, 204, 261, 272, 35-37 275, 277-80, 283, 289, 297, 321-22, 329, Phirinda, King. See Pirinda 338-42,459-64, 549, 551, 554, 556, G81, Phitsutras (of Santanava Acarya) 14,465, G220, G446-47, G502-3, G513 G242 PATANJALI (author of Togasutras) 551, —Pradipa (of Sudarsanadeva) 533 553 phoneme or letter (varpa) 4-5, 10-11, 5761, 69-81, 94-95, 99, 108, 118-19, 124Pataftjalicarita (of Ramabhadra Diksita) 25, 147, 182-91, 213-14, 216-17, 232-36, 321 242, 302, 304-8, 329, 347-48, 367-68, Patavardhan, Ramakrishna Shastri 561, G1676 e:G680, G1181 phonetics (Siksa) 107, 275, G337, G345, path of being (adhvan) 44, 171 G359, G1401, G1422, G1487, G1591, Pathak, K . B. a : G 4 l l , G414, G451-52, G1599, G1622, G1652, G1678 G553, G568, G672, G675, G682, G786Pillai, K . Raghavan 128, a:G1671, et: 87, G874-77, G883-84, G887-88 G739 Pathak, Ram Adhar d:G1532 Pathak, Shridhar Shastri b:G82, G564 Pillai, N. Gopala a:G694 "pathetic" fallacy. See fallacy, "pathetic" Pillai, S. Vaiyapuri a :G585 Patil, Gajanan Moreshwar a:G155, G284, Pinatelli, Mario a:G1688 G1537 Pirinda, King 225 PAUSKARASXDI 16, 440 Pisani, Vittore a : G l l , G75, b:G1399, Pavolini, P. E. a:G692 G1449

i N D EX P I T A M B A R A VIDYABITOSANA 529 place (deSa) 83 Plato, Platonic 55 poetry 30-32, 35, 65-67 polysemy 7-8 position (sthana), a means of proof 83 Post, Kenneth H. a:G1660 Postal G489A postposition (ikarmapravacaniya) 147 Potter, Karl H . 128-73, 182-91, 551 power (Sakti) 128, 162-64, 195, 233, 28688, 324-26, 369 of complete freedom (svdtantryaSakti) 42, 196 sentence-power (mkyaiakti) 344 P R A B H A C A N D R A ( A G A R Y A ) (1040) 476 P R A B H A K A R A (700) 25-26, 87, 92, 554 Prabhakara Mxmamsa 6, 25-26, 87-93, 97-98,265-67,273-74,300-01, 336, 346 Prabhavali (of Ramabhadra Diksita) 501 Prabodhacandrika (of Jagannatha Panpita) 23, 500 Prabodhacandrika (of Vaijaladeva) 534 practice (abhyasa) 54, 132, 146 pradhana. See principal element Pradipa (of Kaslnatha Devasarman) 525 P R A D Y U M N A SORT (1170) 479-80 Praisadipaprabha (of Narayana) 498 Prajapati 551-52 prajM. See intellect PRAJNANASVARUPA. See N A R E N DRAPURI prakara 98 prakarana. See context; subject-matter Prakash, Buddha a:G224, G253 Prakrit language 19-20, G71, G543, G1431 prakriya. See derivation Prdkriyddipika (of Appan Nainarya) 487 (Asfadhyayi) Prakriyakaumudi (of Ramacandra) 19-20, 485 —Prasada (ofVitthala) 486 —Gudhabhavavivfti or =PrakdSa (of Sesa Krsna) 448 —Sudha (of Madhava Sarasvati) 489 Commentary (of Kamalakara Bhatta) 497 —Tattvacandra (of Jayanta) 498 —Prakaia (of Srikrsna Bhatta Maunin) 506 —Vyakhya (of Nilakanfha Dlksita) 506 —RaJmi (of Riuralidhara Misra) 517 —Prakriydsara (of Kafinatha) 525

591

—Vimaria (of Adya Prasada Misra) G1052 —Siddhântakaumudî G1051 Prakriydpradlpa (of Cakraparu) 493 Prakriydratnamaiii (of Dhanesvara) 211, 481 Prakriyasamgraha (of Abhayacandra) 484 Prakriydsara (ofNârâyana) 528 Prakriydsarvasva (of Nàrâyana Bhaftatiri ) 497, 556 prakfti. 128-30, 146 See also basis; cause, material pramd. See knowledge pram&na. See instrument of knowledge Pratnartasamuccaya and = Vftti (of Dignâga) 27, 123, 549 prdrta. See breath Prasada, Rama t:G553 prasajyapratisedha. See negation Prasiddhaéabdasartiskâra (of Appayya Diksita I I I ) 500 prasthdnatrayï G724, G1565 pratibandha. See prevention pratibhd. See intuition prdtipadika. See nominal stem PratUdkhyas 17, 39, 107, G86, G449, G461-64 pratifedha. See prohibition pratydhdra s Titras oi As lâdhyay î 14, 204 Pratydhdrasûtravicâra (of Timmanàcàrya ) 506 pratyaksa. See perception pratyaya. See suffix Pratyayamaukikamâld (of Damodara Sarman) 519 Pratyayodbhedapaddhatï (of Ksemankara ) 499 (rSiddhântakaumudî) Praudhamanorâma (of Bhattoji Diksita) 20, 247, 367, 492 — (Paramata ) Kharidana (of Cakrapani) 247, 493 —Kucamardana (of Jagannatha Panditarâja Tailanga) 499 — (Bfhat)Sabdaratna (of Hari Diksita) 21, 23, 323, 500 —BhdvaprakdSika (of Vaidyanâtha Paiyagunda) 357, 505 Commentary (of Bhavadeva Mis'ra) 389, 508 —Bhairavl (of Bhairava Mis'ra) 389, 510 —Dipa (of Kalyânamala) 524

592

E N OY OL O P E D I A

OF INDIAN

PHILOSOPHIES

— (Laghu) Sabdaratna (of Hari Diksita) principal element (Jpradhäna) 162 319, 500 probability (sâmarthya ). See capacity —Prabhä (of Sätära Räghavendrä- product (vikâra) 167 cärya) 511 production (utpatti) 302, 304 —Citraprabhä (of Hari Sarman) 513, prohibition (nisedha, pratisedha ) 15, 24, 150 523 PROLANÄCÄRYA. See HARIYOGIN —BhävaprakäSa (of Vaidyanätha Paiya- SAILÄVÄGÄRYA gunda) 357, 505 prolation, ritualistic G300 —Kalpalatä (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381, prompter (prayojaka) 268-69 509 prompting (pravartana). See instigation — (Sabdaratna)Bhairavi (of Bhairava pronoun (sarvanäman) 112 prose passages of the Vedas. See Brähmanas Misra) 510 —Prabhä (of Mädhava Sästrin Bhandäri) PRTHVÎCANDRA 529 PRTHVISVARA 529 515 P. S. ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRI —Säralä (of Gopäla Sästri Nene) 515 pravähanityatä. See eternal, as preserved by (1940) 24, 409, 516 speakers PUJYAPÄDA or DEVANANDIN (500) 17, 466 PRAVARTAKOPÄDHYÄYA 529 praoartaria. See instigation PUNDARÏKA VIDYÄSÄGARA BHAPraveiaka (of Acyuta Pisharoti) 494 T T Ä C Ä R Y A (1520) 487 pravftti. See activity PUNJARÄJA (485) 486-87 PUNYARÄJA (1000) 22, 193, 201, 476, pravrttinimitta. See application prayoga. See use 557, 561 Prayogamukha (of Dharmakirti). See Kära- PUNYASUNDARAGANI 529 kacakra Purandhara, N. H. a:G1400 Prayoga (uttama) ratnamälä (of Purusot- Puratam Tirumal Devanarayana of Amtama Vidyävägisa Bhattäcärya) 490 balappuzha 373 Commentary (by Candrasekhara) 497 PUR^ÎAGANDRA (950) 475 —Kantimälä (of Gopäladeva Vidyävä- PÜRNACANDRA 529-30 gisa) 508 purpose (artha) 26, 82, 108, Gl628 Commentary (of Siddhanätha Vidyävä- purusa. See person gisa) 532 PURUSOTTAMADEVA (1175) 19, PrayogaSiksä (of Anantasüri) 518 203, 209, 480 PRAYOGAVENKATÄDRI 529 PURUSOTTAMA VIDYÄVÄGISA prayojaka. See prompter BHATTÄCÄRYA (1560) 490 prayojana. See motivating force Pärvapaksaprainottari or =marijusä or Prayuktäkhyätamaüjan (of Kavisaranga) —mafijarï (of Äsädhara Bhafta) 375, 525 507 Püsän 105 precative G1497 predicate G356 prefix or preposition (upasarga) 110, 112, qualificandness, fallacy of unknown. See 121, 146, G400, Gl 522, G1637 fallacy of unknown qualificandness prescription or injunction (vidhi) 24, 26, quality (gupa) 127, 161-62, 171, 195, 213, 265, 336 552 555, GI633 Vedic 96 quotation Gl 566 present time 45, 336 presumption (arthäpatti) 54, 213, 235, 273 RABHASANANDIN (950) 475 prevention (pratibandha) 43, 47 RÄDHAKRSNA GOSVÄMIN 529 preverb 4, 11, 289-90, 333 RÄDHAKRSNA SARMAN (1764) 507 primary derivative (kjdanla) 173, 292 Radicchi, Anna a:G837 primary meaning or denotative power R Ä G H A V A JHÄ 529 (abhidkä) 27, 65, 91-92, 273-74, 301, Raghavan, V . a:G899, G905, G930, 322, G732 G1645

iNDEX

593

Raghavan, V . K . S. N. 340-42 R A G H A V A N A N D A A C A R Y A 529 Raghava Somayaji 237 R A G H A V A S U R I 529 R A G H A V E N D R A C A R Y A 530 R A G H U N A N D A &IROMANI 529-30 R A G H U N A T H A (1620 ) 495 Raghunatha Bhaffa 361 R A G H U N A T H A JSARMA (1963) 24, 427, 517, e:G711

R A M A K I Ñ K A R A S A R A S V A T l 530 R A M A K I S O R A S A R M A N (1905) 513 R A M A K R S N A A D H V A R I N (1650 ) 351 R A M A K R S N A B H A T T A (1690) 501 R A M A K R S N A D l K S I T A (1638) 497 RAMAKRSNA SARMA T R I P A T H I (1907) 514

N A C A R Y A 530, G1260 R A G H U R S M A (1871) 512 Raja, G. Kunhan 201, G145, a:G689 Raja, K . Kuujunni 103, 109, 203-4, 32122,324-40,342-49,549, 554-56 G191, G355, a:G696, G715, GI058, G1209-10, G1225, G1530, G1540, G1551, G1658, b:G1556, e:G1223, G1226 Rajagopalan, N. V . a:G334 Rajakalasa, father of Jyesthakalasa 205 RAJA K U M A R A D H A R M A S A S T R IN. See ( R A J A K U M A R A ) D H A R M A SASTRIN Rajapurohit, B. P. a:G1603 R A J A R A M A D l K S I T A 530 rajas. See activity R A j I V A S A R M A N 530 raksasa. See demon Ram, Kanshi d:G419 Ram, Sadhu a:G702, G796 R X M A B H A D R A D l K S I T A (1692) 23,

530 Ramamurti, K . S. a:G1635 R A M A N A N D A T l R T H A 530 R A M A N A R A Y A N A § A R M A N 530 R A M A N A T H A C A K R A V A R T I N 530 R A M A N A T H A S A R M A N R A Y I (1546) 488

RAGHUNATHA SASTRI VYAKARA-

311, 321-22, 373, 501 RAMABHATTA (1650) RAMAAANDRA (1400) RAMACANDRA (1700) RAMAGANDRA (1744)

498 19-20,485 501-2 505

RAMACANDRA 530 RAMAGANDRA PANDITA (1690) 501 RAMACANDRA SARASVATL. See SATYANANDA R A M A C A N D R A S R A M A (1600) 493 RAMACANDRA VIDYABHtJ§ANA (1688) 501 R A M A C A R A N A 530 R X M A C A R I T R A T R I P A T H I N 530 Ramachari, C. a:G234, G705 R A M A D A S A C A K R A V A R T I N (1600) 493

RAMADEVA MLSRA 530 RAMADEVA &ARMAN 530 RAMAJN A PANPEYA 24,431, RAMAKANTA (1489 ) 487

530

RAMAKRSNA TATYA§ASTRIN(1897) 513 Rámakrsna Yajvan 253

RAMAKUMARA NYAYABHUSANA

RAMANATHA

VIDYAVACASPATI

(1650) 498

RAMA PANDITAVARA (SAHIBHA)

(1900) 513 R A M A P A N I V A D A 530 R A M A P R A S A D A (1694) 501 R A M A PRASADA T R I P A T H I (1952) 24,419, 516, e:G1190 R A M A R S I 531 R A M A áARANA SASTRÍ (1931) 516 R A M A S E V A K A (1770) 23, 377, 381, 507

RAMASIMHA 531 R A M A S R A M A .

See

BHANUJI

D l K -

SITA R A M A T A R A N A S l R O M A N I (1883) 512 R A M A T A R K A V A G I S A (1550) 489 Ramavarman of Srñgaverapura 323 Ramaya&a G533 R A M E S V A R A . See ¡?ESA V l R E S V A R A RAMESVARA TARKAVACASPATI B H A T T A C A R Y A 531 Ranade, H. G. a:G1646 RANCCHODJX O D H A V J I (1905) 514 Rangacharya, Kandur e:G1036 Rangacharya, M . e:G901, G903 R A N G A N A T H A D l K S I T A (1650) 498 Rañgarájadhvarindra 239 Rangaswami, O. P. a:G791 Rarigoji Bhatfa 241, 255 Rao, H . V . Nagaraja a:G1687, e:G1349 Rao, K. V . Lakshmana a:G445 Rao, P. S. a:G801 Rao, S. K . Ramachandra a:G482

594

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

Rao, Veluri Subba b:G1605 revelation (abhivyakti) 302 Rapratyähärakhandana (of VaidyanàthaRg Veda 3-4, 14, 31-32, 35, 37, 50,103-6, Payaguijda ) 357 108, 234, 341, 550, 553, G222, G486, Rapratyähärama&dam (of Kes'ari Misra) G481A 525 rhetoric, rhetoricians 3, G1388 rhythm G1406 rasa. See essence Rasagangädkara (of Jagannätha Pandita- ritualistic interpretation of Vedas (adhiyaräja) 32 jOa) 108, G1439, G1714 Rasamaüjarivyäkhyä (of Sesa Gintämani) Rocher, Ludo a:G160, G1271 215 Rocher, Rosane a:G183-84, G236, G254, RATIDEVA SIDDHÄNTAVÄGISA G1553, G1564, b:G235 531 Rogers, David Ellis d:G255 {Tarka) Ratnamälä (of Täranätha Tarka- Roodbergen, J. A. F. a:G1679, d:G631, väcaspati) 512 et:G627, G632-34 Ratnamälä (verbal) root (dhâtu) 4, 7, 10-15, 19, 98, 113-14, 118, 146, 255-64, 268, 330-33, —Chandraka Bhâçya (of Pancänana 335, 337, G254, G294, G353, G387, Kandali) 529 G1458 —Kärakamälätikä (ofRämcsvara Tarkaväcaspati Bhattäcärya) 531 Roy, Kumudranjan et:G1167 RATNAMATI479 tfi. See sage RATNAPÂNÏ 531 RSIPUTRA PARAMESVARA II. See Ratnäuali (of Gauramohana. Bhafta ) 522 (RSIPUTRA) PARAMEâVARA II RATNES V A R A 531 rta. See cosmic order Rau, Wilhelm a:G707, G716, G760-61, rudhi. See conventional powers of words Rudra 105 G819, Gl695, b:G740, e:G759, G900 Rävana G366 R U D R A D H A R A J H A éARMAN (1954) real (päramärthika) 194-95 24, 421, 516 reality (sattä) 110, 195 R U D R A P R A S Â D A â A R M A ( 1 9 4 8 ) 516, recognition {pratyabhijüä) 302, 306 e:G428 reduction of two verbs to one (ekaéeça) 173 Rudras 104 reference (vastvartha, bähyärtha) 115-16, Ruegg, David Seyfort a:G1531, G1689, 559-60 b:G1537 reflection (âbhâsa) 57 rule reflexive passive 259 negative (nifedha). See prohibition reification Gl 566 Paninian 559 relation (sambandha, saijisarga ) 125, 127,RtJPACANDRA (1853) 512 Rûpamàlâ (ofNrsimha) 528 149, 195, 278, 328 Rûpamâlà (of Vimala Sarasvati) 483 syntactic. See syntactic relation Rùpapràkâia (of Kulluka Bhatta) 527 relational seam (samsargamaryädä ) 300 RÛPARÂMA NYAYAPANCANANA relationship Gl 677 531 remembered scripture (smjti ) 54, 132 Renou, Louis G975, a:G127, Gl 38, G417, Rûparatrtamàlâ (of Nayasundara) 528 G486A, G578, G594, G831, G967, Rupatarangini (of ïsvaramisra) 523-24 G972-73, G982,. G1439, G1492-93, Rûpavatâra (of Dharmakirti) 203, 476 G1514-16, Gl525, G1544, b:G1403, —Prakriyàkalpavâllarï (of Nrsimha ) 498 G1432, G1443, G1460, et:G966,t:G113, Ruskin John 31, 550 G854 Ruyyaka 92, 203 renunciation G705 replacement technique in Pâçini G223 Sabarabhàsya (on MïmÊrfisàsûtras ) 73, representation, simultaneous 283-84 G584, G588 result {phala) 11, 83 SABARASVAMIN 531 revealed scripture (¡rati) 54, 87, 98, 255- iabda. See language; linguistic element; 59, 262, 330 sound; (verbal) testimony

i N D EX

595

Sabd&nuéâsana (of Sakafäyana) 17, 19, ¿abdabhäskara (of Tarkatilaka Bhaftäcär474-75, G908 ya) 494 Î'abdabhsdanirûpana (of Näräyana Sudhi) —Amoghavftti (of !§akatäya.na). See Amoghavrtti 507 Sabdabhedanirupana (of Ramabhadra Dik- —Cintämani (of Yaksavarman) 476 —PraköSikä (of Ajitasena Äcärya) sita) 321-22, 501 517-18 fabdabodha. See verbal cognition. Sabdabodha (of Jnänesvara) 524 —Pratipadä (of Mangarasa) 527 ¿abdabodhaprakäia (ofjayakrsna Maunin). —Tippani (of Samantabhadra ) 531 —Rüpasiddhi (ofDayäpäla) 476 See Sâramafijarî Sabdabodhatarangim (of ïsvarânanda) 23, Sabdänuiäsanabfhadvftti (of Hemacandra) 19, 479 299, 488 —Laghuvftti (of Hemacandra) 479, iabdabrahman 12, 36-43, 45-50, 54, 56, 95, G946 99,132, 216,341,369-70, G724, G1543, G l 565, G l 587, Gl 688 —Avacürikä (of Dhanacandra) 488 Sabdadhätusamiksä (of Bhartrhari) 124,470 —Nyâsa (of Udayacandra) 480 éabdâdvaita. See linguistic monism —Lagkuvyäkhyä (of Devendrasüri) 481 ¿abdähäraria (ofSesa Krsna) 215, 488 —Nyäsasära (of Kanakaprabhä) 481 iabdaj fiäna. See verbal knowledge —Vrtti (of Malayagiri) 483 Sabdakaumudï —Duridhika (of Dhanacandra ) 488 —Durgäprabodha (of Srïvallabhavacana Commentary (of Nalla Perumal Dïksita) 311 Äcärya) 494 Sabdakaumudï (of Cokkanätha Dïksita) —Haimakaumudï or Candraprabhâvyâkaraxta (of Meghavijaya Gani) 502, 311, 321, 498 G952 —Säbdikaraksä (of Dvädasahayäjin) 311, 501 —Vivarapa (of Harsakïrti Süri ) 523 Sabdaprabhâ (Chapter one of Heläräja's —Vyâkhyà (of Vaidyanâtha Dïksita) commentary on Trikàndï) 193 502 Sabdakaustubha (of Bhattoji Dïksita) 21,SabdaprahäSa (of Khana Nrpati ) 526 Sabdapürvayoga. See language as meané of 240-42, 492, 560 release —Visampadï (of Näges'a Bhatta) 323, 503 Sabdaratna (of Janärdana Sarman) 524 Sabdaratnakara (ofKâsïsvara Bhattäcärya) —Prabhä (ofVaidyanâtha Paiyagunda) 489 357, 505 Sabdaratnakara (of Kämadeva Ghosa) 524 —Bhâvapradîpa (of Krsnamiträcärya) Sabdaratnaprabhâ (of Sätära Räghavendrä381, 509 cärya) 393 —Prabhâ (of Sätära RäghavendräcärSabdaratnâvalî (of Appa Süri) 504 ya) 393, 510 Sabdakaustubha (of ïsvariprasâda) 524 Sabdaratnâvalî (of Känta Nätha) 524 Sabdaratnâvalî (of Rämanätha GakravarSabdakaustubhagurta (of Indradatta Upätin) 530 dhyäya) 508 Sabdakaustubhamatfdana (of Jagannätha Sabdärtharatna (of Täränätha) 533 Sabdärthasärama üjari (of Jayakrsna MauPariditaräja Tailanga) 499 nin) 23, 361, 505 Sabdalaksaria (of Buddhisägara Suri). See Sabdärthatarkämxta (ofjayakrsna Maunin) Pafkagranthx Sabdälarpkära (of âesa Krsna) 215,488 23, 361, 505 Sabdamafijari (of Näräyana Sudhi) 507 Sabdarüpävali 536 Sabdänantasägarasamuccaya (of Nägesa BhaSabdasädhyaprabodhini (of Rämanätha Gaktta) 503 ravartin) 530 éabdânaucitya G l 527 ¡SabdaSaktiprakäSikä (of Jagadisa) 549 Sabdanirüpatia (of Râmabhadra Dïksita)Sabdasiddhäntamafijari (of Kodaijdaräma) 23 526 iabdänukfti. See onomatapoeia Sabdasiddhi (ofMahädeva) 482

596

ENCycLOPEDIA

Of

INBTATT

PHILOSOPHLFIS

SabdaSobha(of Nilakantha Sukla) 251,497 SADASIVA B H A T T A (1780 ) 508 Sadasiva Diksita 311 Sabdasudha (of Ananta Bhatta) 518 Sabdasudhanidhi (of Gangaramitra Pa thin) SADASIVA ¡SASTRIJOSHI or S A R M A (1946) 24,415, 516, e:G1038, G i l 19, 521 G1166, G1188, G1347 iabdatatta. See language-principle SabdatattvaprakMa (of Indradatta Upa- Sadasivendra Brahmendra 351 Sadbhasasubantarapadaria (of Nagoba Paridhyaya) 23, 379, 508 dita) 508 Sabdatrivenika (of Asadhara Bhatta) 23, 375, 507 Saddarfinisiddhantasamgraha (of Ramabhadra Diksita) 23, 321-22, 501 Sabdaoatara (of Durvinita) 177, 471 s&dhana. See means iHabdavrtti G1573 Sabdavydkhyd (of Gopinatha) 550 S A D H U S U N D A R A GANI (1624) 495 (Bfhat) SabdenduSekkara (of Bhattoji Dik- sadhutva. See grammatically; nominal sita) 343, 502 stem —BhdvaprakaSika (of Vaidyanatha Pai- Sadhutvddinirvacana 535 sadhya 25 yaguij^a) 505 (Laghu) Sa.bdenduiekh.ara (of Nageia Bha-sadfSya. See similarity; simultaneity tta) 323, 367, 502, G1081 S A G A R A M A T T L See S A R I P U T T A —Cidasthimala (of Vaidyanatha Paiya- sage (fit) 36, 38, 52, 54, 63, 103 S A H A j A K i R T I (1623) 495 gunda) 505 Sahaji, King ofTanjore 321 —SadaSivabha((i (of Sadasiva Bhatta) sahakarikararia. See cause, auxiliary 508 sahilya. See grouping; literacy criticism —Tika (of ¡Samkara Bhatta) 508 Sahityadarpana (of Harisiddhantavagisa) —Jyolsna (ofUdayankar Nanapathaka) 91 509 —InduprakaSa (of Gangadhara) 509 Sahityasastri, Janakinatha e:G1292 —Dosoddhara (of Mannu Deva) 509 sahrdaya 31 —Candrakala (of Bhairava Misra) 510 Saiva G1690 —Candrika (of Satara RaghavendracarKashmir Saivism. See Kashmir Saivism; ya) 510 Trika —Prasada (of Subrahmanyam Nambu- g A K A L Y A 4, 440 S A K A T A Y A N A (850) 14-16, 19, 110, ttiripad) 512 —Vyakhya (of Srldhara Sarman) 513 112, 114, 440, G876, 474-75 —Bhavabodhini (of Setumadhavacarya iakti. See denotation; power; significative power Nadatiram) 513 Commentary (of Anantacarya) 513 Saktisphufa (of Kaladhara) 524 —NageSoktiprakaia (of Khuddi Jha S A L I K A N A T H A M I S R A (925) 87 Salus, Peter H . b:G489A Sarman) 514 —Guruprasada (of Tata Subrahmanya samadhi 328 samagri. See grouping Sastrin) 515 Commentary (of Gopala) 522 samakhya. See etymology, etymological —Candrika (of Raghavendracarya) 529 meaning —Varavarpini 535 samanadhikaranya G717 —Vijaya 535 S A M A N T A B H A D R A (650) 531 —Visamapadavivfti 535 Samanvayapradipa (of Kudakacarya) 526 —Abhinavacandrika 536 samanya. See universal SABHXPATI SARMAN UPADHYAYA samarthya. See capacity samasa. See compound (1963) 24,425,517,531 SabharafijanaSataka (of Kavikunjana) 371 Samasarrtava (ofKulamuni) 508 SamasaSamkhd 536 S A C d D A N A N D A 532 samavaya. See inherence sacrifice 183, 267, 336-37 Samavayapradipasamketa (of Devasarman) SADANANDA 531 520 SADASIVA (1670) 22-23, 317, 500, 562

i N D EX

597

samuha. See collection of parts; grouping sambandha. See relation sattwid. See consciousness SambandhoddeSa (of Cangadasa) 519 satpvyauakarika. See express ional Sambasiva Sastir, K . 232 sarpyoga. See conjunction sambodkana. See vocative S A N A T A N A T A R K A C A R Y A 532 Sarngraha ( o f V y a d i ) 117, 119-20,458 sandhi. See coalescence, rules of S A M G R A M A S I M H A (1279) 483 Sanghvi, Ratnalal e:G955 samjfid. See use Saiijaya 146 samjfiasutra 15 SAMKARA (ACARYA) (710) 41-43, Sankaran, A. e:G587 56, 59-60, 531, 551, 553-54, G1569, Sankaran, C. R . a:G1420 Sanskrit 237, 287, 321 G1660, G1688, G1702 S A N T A N A V A A C A R Y A (350) 15, 465 S A M K A R A B H A T T A (1770) 241, 508 S A N T A R A K S I T A (750) G775 S A M K A R A S A R M A N 531 Saptasvarasindhu (of Narasimha Suri) 528 SAMKARA SASTRI MARULKAR (1957), 517, e:G574, G1192 SARADARANJAN RAY VIDYAVIsamketa. See convention N O D A (1920) 515, et:G1091 Samkhya 21, 44-45, 54, 381, 397, 559 Saraldhari (of Kavicandra) 493 samkhya. See number Sdramailjari (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 505 Saijikhyasutra (of Kapila) 552 S A R A N A D E V A (1172) 480 —Laghuvrlti (of Nagesa Bhatta) 323 Saratudabdarlhavicdia (of Anantacarya) Samksiptasara (of Kramadisvara) 19, 477 514 Commentary (of Jumaranandin) 484, Sarangi, Aneka Ghandra a:G335, G636, G912 G1708 Commentary (of Damodara Deva- Sarasiddhantakaumudi (of Varadaraja) 494 sarman) 519 Sarasvataprakriya (of Anubhuti Svarupaca—Vivarapa (of Goylcandra) 485 rya) 20, 481-82 —Kaumudl (of Abhirama Vidyalam—Samihiprakarana (of Mandana) 484 kara) 487 Commentary (of Punjaraja) 486-87 Commentary (of Narayana Nyaya—Subodhika (of Amrtabhava ) 487 paiicanana) 489 —Bhasya (of Kasinatha Bhatta) 487 —Arthabodhini (of Candrasekhara —Pradipa (of Dhanesvara Bhatta) 487 Vidyalamkara) 519 —Sarasvataprasada (ofVasudeva Bhatta) —Vyakaranadurghatodghata (of Kesava490 deva Tarkapancanana Bhatta—Visamapadarthadipika or Gopalabha((l carya) 525 (of Gopala Bhatta) 490 —Dipikd or —PrakaSa (of Narayana — (Vaiyakaranu.) Siddhantacandrikd (of Nyayapancanana) 489, 502 Ramacandrasrama) 493 —Arlhadipika (of Gopala Cakravartin) Commentary (by K.§emendra) 488 500 —Tattvadipika (of Lokesakara) 501 —Dhatup&tha-Sara (of Nrsimha TarkaCommentary (of Sadas'iva Sastri pancanana) 528 Josi) 516 —Utwdisutra—commentary (of Sivadasa -«-.Avyayarthamald (ofNavkishorejha) Cakravartin) 532 516 —Rasavati G912 —Sttbodhini (of Sadananda ) 531 Samksiptasarakarikd (of Narottama Vidya—Vrtti(ofTarkatilaka Bhaftacarya) 494 lamkara Bhattacarya) 528 —Subodhika (of Gandrakirti) 494 satruiidhi. See contiguity —Laghubhasya (of Raghunatha) 495 sampraddnakaraka. See indirect object (of —Varttika (of Sahajaklrti) 495 dative) —Siddhantacandrikd (ofJnanatilaka ) 498 sartisargamaryadd. See association of word —Sabdarthacandrika (of Hamsavijayameanings gani) 499 samskara. See trace —Nitnaya or —Anuvfttyavabodhaka (of samudaya. See collection of words Narayana Sudha) 500

598

E N OY OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

Satkärakaväda (of Rabhasänandin) 475 —MädhavI (of Mädhava) 513 —Siddhäntaralnävali (of Mädhava Bha-Safpadi tta) 513 Commentary (of Krpäräma) 526 —Tippani (of Govinda Parasuräma sattä. See existence; reality sattva 120, 275 (See also serenity) Bhatta) 513 —Tippani (of Vi§nuprasäda Sarman) satya. See truth 514 SATYAKÄMA VARMÄ (1970) 24,429, 517 —Panßkä (of Dharmadeva) 521 —Särapradipikä (ofjagannätha) 524 SATYÄNANDA or RÄMACANDRA —Vädighatamudgara (of Jayanta Bhatta) SARASVATI (1500) 22, 219, 229, 487 524 SATYAPRlYA TlRTHA SVÄMIN (1745 ) 23, 359, 505 —Bhäfya (of Rämanäräyarta Sarman) SATYAVARYÄRYA 532 530 SAUBHAVA (350 ) 465 —Subodhini (of Sadänanda) 531 SAUNAKA 4, 108 Särasvatasärasaifigraha (of Näräyana BhäraSauträntika 549 ti) 528 SAYANA. See MÄDHAVA Särasvata school 19 Särassatauyäkarana (of Nayasundara) 528Scharfe, Hartmut a:G391, G483, G1672, Särasvatavyakaranadhundhika or —Dipikäb:G286, G610, G1681 (of Megharatna) 485 Schärpe, Adrian b:G1456 Sarasvati 105 Scheller, M. a:G1461 Sarasvatikanthäbhararia (ofBhoja) 477 Schlerath, Bernfried b:G1701 —Hrdayaharini (of Näräyanta Danda- Schroeder, Leopold Von a:G433 Schropfer, A. b:G1500 nätha) 478 Schropfer, Johann a:G1433 —Tikä (of Jagaddhära) 484 Commentary (of Jivänanda Vidyäsä- science G616 gara) G917 scientific treatise (Sästra) 132 Commentary (of Rämasimha) G918 scripture (ägama) 235 Commentary (of Ratnesvara) G917, secondary derivative (taddhita) III, 173, G918 292, Gl 495 Sarasvati Makhin 313 secondary meaning (lak$a$a) 6,8-12,26-28, Sarasvati river 104 65-67, 89-92, 111-12, 115, 217, 272-73, Särävalt (of Näräyana) 315,499 282-86, 322, 324, 326-27, 334, 343, 346, —VfUi 315,499 554, 556, Gl 91, G243, G732, Gl 612 SÄRIPUTTA (1150) 479 based on common quality (gaurtt). See Sarma, see Sharma gauni SarvadarSanasarpgraha (of Mädhava) 56,pure 326 secondary nature 195 68, 552, 554, Gl 391 secondary roots Gl 648 SARVADHÄRA UPÄDHYÄYA 532 seed (bija) 555 sarvanäma. See pronoun SARVÄNANDA PÄNDEYA Gl 243. self, soul (ätman) 42, 130, 550 e:G1243 Great Self (mahätma) 46-47 SARVARAKSITA 480 semantics 5, Gl 669 SARVAVARMAN (50) 17, 464-65 generative G318 SARVESVARA (1555 ) 489 semantic relations G247 SASTHIDÄSA 532 Sen, Malati a:G852 Sästra. See scientific treatise Sen, Sukumar a:G166, G592. b:G267, Sastri. See Shastri Gl 533 Satapafha Brähmana 108, G452 SENAKA 440 SÄTÄRA RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA Sengupta, Devendranatha e:G1031 GAJENDRAGADKAR (1840 ) 23, Sengupta, Sailendraaath a:G171, G210, 393, 510-11, 562 G889, G958 Satkärakalaksapa (of Amaracandra) 481 Sengupta, Upendranatha e:G1031

I N D E

5 9 9

X

sense-organ (indriya) 56, 189, 214, 286 sentence (vàkya) 4, 10, 26-29, 61, 65, 83, 85-99, 108, 114, 124-25, 149-50, 216, 233,304,348, G204, G246, G355, G768, G1574 definition of G715 —formation 163 —meaning (vâkyârtha) 9-10, 28, 146, 148, 191, 343, 346-47 nominal G1686 parts of 233 —-spho{a 62, 95. See also sphofa separation G1650 sequence (krama) 50, 94, 161, 169, 171, 184-86, 191, 196-97, 216, 232, 235-36, 303, 558 suppression of 49, 81 serenity (sattva) 44-45 âEÇA CINTAMANI 22, 215, 221 SESADRISUDHI (1750) 507 âEÇA GOPINATHA 247 §E§A KÇ.ÇNA (1540) 22, 78, 215-17, 221, 223, 237, 241, 247, 488 S E Ç A N A R A Y A N A . See

(SESA)

NARA-

YAJSTA (BHATTA) Seça Nfsiraha 215 Seça Purusottama 247 Seça Ràmacandra 215 (RAS!) SESA SARMAN 532 Se§a Viresvara 215, 223, 225, 237 SESA VIÇNU (1605) 22, 243, 494 Seshakumar, A. d:G1682

SETUMADHAVAGARYA

NADITI-

R A M (1895) 513 Shah, Neelanjana S. a:G931 Shah, Umakant Premananda 375, a:G1287, e:G1175, G1227 Sarma, Arvind a:G382 Sharma, Aryendra e:G861 Sarma, Batuka Natha e:G1285 Sharma, B. N. Krishnamurti 393, 562, a:G4 Sarma, Dadhi Ram e:G1360 Sharma, Dipti a:G403 Sarma, E. R . Sreekrishna a:G602, G708, G712, G1539, G1557, G1702, et:G1202, t:G1501 Sharma, Indra Datta e:G1289 Sharma, Jagdish P. a:G963 Sharma, Krishna Kumar a:G336 Sarma, Kanakalala e:G239 Sharma, K. Madhava Krishna a:G99101, G415, G467, G485A, G511, G580,

G583, G695, G783, G792-93, G897, G929, G1214, G1437, G1440, G1450 Sarma, K. V. a:G1207 Sharma, Mukund Madhava a:G1562 Sharma, Mahesh Dutt a:G404, G863, Gl 108 Sharma, Mangal Deva a:G586 Sharma, Peri Sarvesvara 561, a:G748, G907, t:G738, 551 Sarma, Ram Nath a:G307, G348, b:Gl638, d:G282 Sarman, Rudradatta Jha e:G598 Sharma, Uma Shankara a:G1272, e:G164 Sarman, V. Anjaneya a:G724, Gl 565 Sarma, Virendra d:G752 Sharma, V. Venkatarama e:G841 Sastri, A. Mahadeva e:G1036 Sastri, Bahuvallabha e:G550, Gl 248 Sastri, Bala e:G31, G522 Sastri, Bala Krishna e:G1116 Shastri, Bhim Sen b:G878 Shastri, Biswanarayana a:G1070 Sastri, Bommakanti Ramalinga a:G176 Shastri, Charudeva a:G685, e:G611, G687, G692 Sastrin, G. Samkara Rama e:G1095 Sastri, Damodara e:G35, G922, G1037 Shastri, Dharmendra Nath a:G484A Shastri, Dwarikadas e:G1039 Sastri, Gangadhara e:G35, G49, Gl 114 Sastri, Gaurinath 41, 57, 542, 552, 554, a:G699, G701, G730, G1532, b:G706 Sastri, Gosvami Damodara e:G680 Sastri, Guru Prasada e:G575 Shastri, Haraprasad 201, G892 Sastri, Jivarama e:G1156 Sastri, K. A. Nilakantha a:G902 Sastri, K. A. Sivaramakrishna a:G357 Shastri, Kali Charan a:G935-36, G983, b:G1624 Shastri, Kapil Deva a:G717-18, G1246, eb:G1247 Sastri, Karnataka Kfççia e:G1084 Sastri, K. Sambasiva e:G488, G497, G688 Shastri, Lallurama Jivarama e:G650 Shastri, Mangala Deva a:G464, et:G86 Sastri, Patavardhana Narayana e:G1082 Sastry, P. C. Naganatha b:G1110 Sastri, P. P. Subrahmanya 237, 561, a:G1409, b:G589, e:G587 Sastri, P. S. a:G1516

600

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

—Candrika (of Satara RaghavavenSastri, Sada Siva Sarma (Joshi) e:G1118, dracarya) 393, 510 Gil74, G1244 Notes (of Khuddi Jha) 399, 514 Sastri, Samkara Rama e:G88 —Dipika (of Nityananda Panta Sastri, Santi Bhiksu ta:G714 Parvatiya) 401, 515 Shastri, Satya Vrat a:G799, G1661, — (Laghu) iabdenduiekhara (of Nagesa b:G399 Bhatta). See (Lagku)SabdenduSekhara Sastri, Sitarama e:G1123, Gil56, G1228 —Lalita (of Gopalakrsna ¡Sastrin) Shastri, Sitaramacari e:G683 504, 507 Sastri, S. K. Ramanatha e:G870 —Tattvabodhini (of Jnanendra SarasSastri, S. S. Suryanarayana 80-82, 552, vati) 351, 505 555, a:G924, G1414, G1446 Subodhini (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 351 Sastri, Sulavatanka Kalyana Sunvamba361,505 samkara e:G1003 —Vidydvilasa (of Sivarama Tripathin) Sastri, Tarakesvara e:G1189 506 Sastri, T. Ganapati 235, e:G505, G965, —Kalpalafika (of Venimadhava) 506 G976, G1065, G1281 —Balamanorama (of Vasudeva Diksita) Sastri, Tata Subbaraya e:G1216 365, 506 Sastry, T. S. Gourypathy a:G1641 —GudhaphakkikaprakaSa (of Indradatta Sastry, T. V. Kapali a:G1454 Upadhyaya) 508 Sastrio, V. A. Ramaswami a :G698, G789—Ratnarpava (ofKrsnamitracarya) 381, 90, G1412, e:G1205 509 Sastrigal, S. Chandrasekhara e:G1087 —ArthaprakaHkd (of Kocca Sankaran Shaw, J. L. a:G356 Susad) 510 Shefts, Betty b:Gl 62 —RatnaprakaSika (of Bhairava Mis'ra) Shembavnakar, K. M. a:G107 G1088 Shende, Sita Rama Sastri e:Gl 360 —Sarala (of Taranatha TarkavacasShukla. See Sukla pati) 397, 512 SIDDHANATHA VIDYAVAGISA 532 —Balacandri (of Balacandra Sastri) 514 siddhanta. See view Siddharttakaumudi (of Bhattoji Diksita) 17, —Pankticandrika (of Garigaprasada Sastrin) 514 20, 240, 319, 367, 490-92 —Praudhamanorama (autocommentary) —SaradarSani (of Sivadatta Sarman) See (Siddhantakaumudi)-Praudhamano- 514 —Mitabhasini (of Saradaranjan Ray rama Vidyavinod) 515 —Sukhabodhini (of Nilakaritha Vajape—Panktipradipa (ofNanakarama Sastri) yin) 493 515 —Vilasa (of Laksminrsiipha) 499 —Ratnakarafika (of Sivaramendra Sara- —Bhavabodhini (of Karaputugala Dharma Sri) 515 svati) 499 —Sunamanorama (of Tirumala Yajvan) —Kathakollolini (of Rama Sarana Sastri) 516 499 —Siddhantaratnakara (of Ramakr$na —ViSesavivfti (of Somanatha Sarman) 516 Bhatta) 501 — (Bxhat)SabdenduSekhara (of Nagesa —Sugartdha (of Acyutananda Sastrin) 517 Bhatta) 323, 502 —BhavaprakaSika (of Vaidyanatha Pai- Commentary (ofShridharenda Sharma Ghildiyal) 517 yagunda) 357 —Cidasthimala (of Vaidyanatha Pai- —Bkasya (of Bhagavatbhakta) 518 —Vilasa (of Bhaskara) 518 yagurida) 357, 505 —Dufapoddhara (of Manyudeva) 387, —Sudhakara (of Krsija Sastrin) 526 —Lakftni (of Sabhapati Sarma Upadh509 yaya) 531 —Candrakala (of Bhairava Misra) —Sdrasatjigraha (of Vedantacarya) 534 387, 509

i N D EX

601

(Vyäkarana) Siddhäntasudhänidhi (of Vis- Sioasiitras (of the Affadhyayi) 14, 203-4, G74, G145, G203, G244, G453 vesvara Süri) 535 Skold, Hannes a:G449, b:G448 Siddhäntatattsa (of Jagann ätha) 524 Sieg, E. e: significative power (Sakti) 6-7, sleep, deep 37, 106 26, 42, 45, 65-68, 90-91, 330-31, 346 (Mimaipsa)Slokavarttika (of Kumarila svätantryaAakti. See power of complete Bhafta) 181, 189-90, 213, 549, 554-56 freedom smallness (tadalpata) 288 Jikfd. See phonetics smjti. See memory; remembered scripture SikfäprakäSa G427 Smrtiratna, Taranatha Gosvami e:G1069 Hlpeäästra. See architecture S O K A N A T H A D I K S I T A . See C O K K A Silverstein, Michael e:G1618 NATHA DIKSITA Simenscly, T h . b:G146 soma 105 Simhasuragani 123 S O M A D E V A (1250) 17,481 similarity (sädftya) 288. See also analogy; Somananda 124 S O M A N A T H A 533 comparison; simultaneity S O M A N A T H A S A R M A N (1952) 516, Simhasürigani 123 e:G1096, G1102 Simonsson, Nils a:G9 S O M A P R A B H A 533 simultaneity (sädjiya) 184-85, 289 Singh, Jag Deva a:G287, G304-5, G337- S O M A Y A J I N D I K S I T A . See SARVESVARA 38, Gl 591, Gl 636 Somesvara Bhatta 237 Sinha, Anil G. a:G318 sound [dhoani) 28, 30, 37, 55, 69, 91, S I R A D E V A (1250) 481 119-20, 132, 153, 187-88, 231, 303, 308, Sircar, Dinesh Chandra a:G576 329, 342, G728, G1637 S l R O M A N I B H A T T A . See B H A T T A physical theory of G1397 SlROMANI prakfta 94-95, 120, 174-75, 236, 329, S l R O M A N I B H A T T A 532 G1588 Siffa. See elite SUubodha (of Käsinätha) 525 Süubodha (of Padmanäräyana) 528-29 Sifyahitanyäsa (of Ugrabhüti) 476 S I T I K A N T H A (1450 ) 486 S l T Ä N Ä T H A SÄSTRIN 532 Siva G554 Siva Bhaffa, father of Näges'a 323 S l V A B H A T T A (1810) 509 S l V A D Ä S A 532 S l V A D Ä S A C A K R A V A R T I N 532 S I V A D A T T A PÄNDEYA 533 S l V A D A T T A S A R M A N (1914) 514, e:G943 SlVÄNAKDAYOGASVÄMIN. See BHATTA SlROMANI S l V A N Ä R Ä Y A N A S I R O M A N I 532 ¡SIVA P A N D I T A 532 S I V A R Ä M A C A K R A V A R T I N (1600) 493 Sivaraman, Krishna 550, a:G1690 ¡SIVARÄMA g A R M A N ( V Ä C A S P A T I ) 532 S I V A R Ä M A T R I P Ä T H I N (1750) 506 SIVARÄMENDRA SARASVATl (1660 ) 22, 227, 245, 499, 561 S l V A R Ä M E N D R A Y A T I (1780) 508

vaiktta 94-95, 120, 174-75, 236, 329 sound (Sabda) 183, 308, 558 Sowani, V . S. a:G1393 space, spatial direction (dik or diS) 43, 45, 127, 149, 162-63, 184, 195, 559 a:G703 spanda. See activity specification (viSesavidhi) 150 speech (vac or vak) 49,93-94, 103, 341, 555 = bhafa 113 daivi 37 madhyama. See madhyama vak para 63, 121, 328, 553-55 —principle (Sabdatattva). See language principle —vaikhari. See vaikhari vak sphofa, theory of 5, 10-11, 14, 18-21, 29, 42-43, 49, 51, 56-62, 68-82, 110, 232-36, 242, 298-99, 303-08, 324-29, 342-43, 347, 367-70, 552-55, G1391, G1394, G1412, G1428, G1454, G1464, G1510, G1512, G1518, G1543, G1549, G1562, G1569, G1655, G1688, G1700A, G1702, 552-55 akhatidasphofa 242, 298, 305, 348-49 jatisphota 306-8 padasphota 6, 242, 298-99,303,305,328

E N Oy OL O P E D I A

602

OF I N D I A N

PHILOSOPHIES

AGARYA vdkyasphofa 6,93-95, 242, 298-300, 305, SRIVALLABHAVACANA (1607) 494 328, 369-70 Srfiga.rapra.kaSa (of Bhoja) 560 varvasphota 242, 298, 308, 557 SjngaraSataka section of SubhasitatriSali 124 vyaktisphofa 306-7 Sphofacandrika (of Srikrsna Bhaffa, Mau- S R § T I D H A R A C A R Y A 533 S R U T A S A G A R A 533 nin) 23, 36, 215, 367-70, 506 Sruti. See revealed scripture SphofanirUparia (of Apadeva) 499 Sphotanirûpana (of Seça Krsna) 22,78,215- Staal, J. Frederick (Frits) 550, 556, a:G167, G195-96, G211, G247, G1545, 17, 488 G1554, G1566, G1576-77, G1604, Spho tap arîkfâ (of Bhairava Mis'ra) 23, 389, G1649, G1662, G1696, G1714, G1182 b:G1583, G1625 Sphofapratisfha (ofKes'ava) 526 Sphofasiddhi(of Bhârata Misra) 22, 231-36, state (bhava) 129 statement, direct (Sruti), a means of proof 489 83 Sphofasiddhi (of Maridana Misra) 5,18, 22, 56, 70-80, 82, 181-91, 213, 232-36, 473- stem 4, 118,146,348. See also nominal stem 74, 553-56, 561 Stenzler, A. F. b:G1485 —Gopâlika (of [Rsiputra ] Paramesvara sthana. See position, a means of proof sthayibhava. See mood I I ) 22, 213-14, 486 Sthemadarpana (of Gopalacarya) 522 Sphofasiddhi (author unknown) 535 Sphofasiddhinyâyavicâra 22, 231, 235-36, Sthiroratna, Loharam G1018 sthiti. See duration 489 Strauss, Otto a:G563, G1398 Sphofatattva (of Krsna Dvivedin) 526 SphofatattvanirUpaça (of Sesa Krsna) 22, structure, deep/surface G306 SubantaprakaSa (of Krsna gastrin) 526 78, 215-17, 488 Sphofavâda (of Nâges'a Bhatta) 242, 342- SUBHAglLA GANil (1425 ) 486 SubhasitatrUati (of Bhartrhari) 124 49, 504, 549 —Subodhini or —Upodghàta (of V . Krç- subject-matter (prakarana) 82-83, 108 subjunctive G1432 namâcârya) 24, 413, 516 SphofavimarSinî(oîMâdhava gastrin Bhan- sublation (badha) 188, 214 Subrahmanyam, K. G. a:G61, G412, dâri) 515 S P H O T A Y A N A 13, 68, 349, 440 iravana. See hearing g R Ï D E V A P A N p I T A 533 g R Ï D H A R A N A N D A S A R M A GHILD R Y A L (1962) 517, e:G1103 GRÏDHARA ÂARMAN (1889) 513 ÂRLKANTA MISRA

533

Ô R L K R Ç N A B H A T T A M A U N I N ( 1750 )

23, 361, 367-70, 506 SRÎKJÇ.§IïJA ISARMAN 533 Sri Lanka 18 ê R Ï N A T H A âlROMAIsfl 533 â R l N I V A S A 533 Srinivasacaryulu, Bommakanti ÉRLPATIDATTA

(1450)

SRÏPRABHÂ SORI

533

S R I R A M A G A R Y A . See

VIDYAVAGISA

Sriramamurti,

GOPALADEVA

P. a:G771,

âRÏ TATAGARYA (1718)

504

G1648

(1580 ) 239

ÉRÎVALLABHAVACAKA Y A

a:G1575

486

or

= A C A R -

G450, G508, G557, G559-560, G684 Subrahmanyam, P. S. a:G306 SUBRAHMANYAM NAMBUTTIRIPAD (1860) 512 substance (dravya) 6, 119, 161, 164, 170, 194-95, G1509, 558-59, G1633 substantive G1571 substratum of the result (phalaSraya) 267 of agency 269 subde body (suksmaiarira) 132 S U D A R S A N A C A R Y A 533 SUDARSANADEVA 533 Suddhicandrikd (of Jayakrsija Maunin) 361 Suddhi (tattva) karikd (of Narayana) 315, 499 SUDHANANDASURlgI§YA (1671) 500 suffix (pratyaya) 4, 10, 12, 15, 98, 118, 146, 257-58, 262, 266, 292-95, 335, 343, 348, G198, G292. G335 inflectional 276 nominal. See nominal stem

INDE X

603

personal 331 svdtantryaiakti. See power of complete primary 4, 261, 297-98 freedom secondary 4, G347, G349, G396 SVAYAMPRAKÄSÄNANDA (1740) suggestion {vyattjand) 11, 27-30, 65, 92, 505 287, 324, 327, 341, G1508, G1521, SVETANIVASIN 533 G1658 SveidSvatara. Upanisad 550 suggestive meaning (dyotaka) 112, 146-47, Swaminathan, V. 560, a:G605, G779, 289, 322, 333 G802, Gl047, e:G780, G898 suitability (aucitya) 83, 149 Syadisamuccaya (of Amaracandra) 481 Sukhbeatar, O. a:G1692 SYAMACARANA KAVIRATNA Sukhthankar, Vishnu S. e:G486 (1910) 514 Shukla, J. M. a:G798, G891, G960, syllable (aksara) 104, 128 G1647, G1663, G1683 syntactic analysis. See syntactic unity Shukla, Karunesha a :G809 syntactic connection (parasparä vyäpekfä) Sukla, Rama Govind e:G324,G1348 114, 330 Sukla, Sri Rajanarayana e:G1280 a means of proof (vdkya) 83 sûksmaiarîra. See subtle body syntactic function (käraka) 16, 87, 164, Sûktiratnàkara (of [Sesa ] Nâràyana 195, G215 [Bhatta]) 215 syntactic identity. See identity Sumanoramâ (of Garigesa Misra Upàdhyà-syntactic relation 8-9, G247, G257 ya) 521 syntactic unity (ekaväkyatä) 26, 29, 86, Sundaraprakdiaiabdamava. See Unàdisâdhana Gl 572 SUNDARESVARA YAJVAN 373 syntax 4, 114-15, G1539 iunyatà G1689 Supadma (of Padmanàbhadatta) 484-85 tädätmya. See identity —Makaranda (of Visnumisra) G1043, taddhita. See secondary meaning, derivative G1044 Taddhitacandrikä (ofHariräma) 511 —Vivaran apa ncikâ G1045 Taddhitakoia (of Bhatta Siromarii) 518 —Tippanï (of Trilokyanâtha Bhattàcàr- TaddhilakoSa (of Bhavadeva) 498 ya) G1046 Taddhitakoia (of Bhatta Siromarii) 518 superimposition (adhyâsa) 42, 65, 126, Taddhitaungadipika (of Saccidananda) 531 TaddhitopadeSa (of Vangadäsa) 534 216-17, 306, 324 supplementary description (arthavdda) 24 Tagare, G. V. a:G1358 Taittinya Ärapyaka G858 supporting object (âlambana) 189 Taittiriya Brähmapa 105 Suptinantasdgarasamuccaya (of Nàgesa BhaTaksan G234 tta) 504 TALADEVASUDHI 533 Suri, Chandra Sagara e:G953 tamas. See inertia Suri, Vijayalvani e:G954 Suryanarayana, S. e:G691 Tamil (Nadu) 321, G1409, G1706 SORYANARAYANA SUKLA (1937) Tantravärttika (of Kumärila) 213, 549 24, 405, 516 Commentary (of Annambhafta) 237 StJRYA PRASADA MlSRA (1887) 512 Tantric works 324 SUSENA KAVIRAJA MlSRA 533 Tantrism 342 svabhdva. See natural TARAKA BRAHMÄNANDA SARASsvara. See accent V A T l (1650) 309, 498 Svaramanjarï. See Saptasvarasindhu (ofTARANATHA 533 Nàrasimha Suri) TÄRANATHA TARKAVÄCASPATI Svaraprakriyâ and autocommentary (of (1867) 397, 512, e:G30, Gl 178 Ràmacandra Paridita) 501 TÄRAPADA NYÄYARATNA 533-34 svarga. See heaven Taraporewala, I.J. S. a:G1462 svarûpa. See essence tarka 132 svarupasat. See inseparable existence Tarkabhäjäyuktimuktävali (of Nägesa Bhasvdtanttya. See independence tta) 323

604

ENCycLOPEDIA

Of

INBTATT

PHILOSOPHLFIS

Tarkacandrikä (of ¡Srikrsija Bhatta Mau- Thirujnanasambandham, P. a:G1619 Thumb, Albert b:G1404 nin) 23, 367, 506 Tarkacudamani, Madhavacandra e:G933 Tibet 18 T A R K Ä L A M K Ä R A BHATTACÄRYA Tibetan G368, G397, G1007, G1051, G l 692 534 Tarkalamkara, Madana Mohana e:Gl 178 T I L A K A 534 time (kola) 12,40-49, 83, 93-94, 119, 127, G1014 129, 149, 162, 164-65, 170-72, 196-97, Tarkapancanana, Navakumara e:G641 257-58, 261, 263-64, 335, 550, G624, Tarkapradipa (of Konda Bhatta) 255 G694, G704, G772, G777, G798-99, Tarkaratna (of Konda Bhatta) 255 G1455, Gl544, G1713 Tarkaratnamälä (of Täranätha Tarkavälimiting function of time (kälaiakti) 45, caspati) 397 129, 164 Tarkasarfigraha and —Dipikä (of Annam(VARKHEDI) TIMMANÄCÄRYA bhatta) 237 (1750) 506 TARKATILAKA BHATTÄGÄRYA Tinam Saktih. (of Srikrsna Sarman) 533 (1614) 494 (Candra) Tiiianta (of Laksmikära) 527 Tarkavaglsa, Durgadasa Vidyavagisa SriTinantapaiyayasamgraha (of Virapandya) rama e:G1024 535 Tarkikas 369 TinantaSefasamgraha 240 Tarpatam apau gha s&tracvicära (of RämaTinioicära (of Srikrsna Sarman) 533 bhadra Diksita) 501 TÄTÄGÄRYA, N. S. RÄMÄNUJA Tirumala Äcärya 237 TIRUMALA BUKKAPATTUNAM (1972) 517, e:G1266 SRlNIVÄSÄCARYA (1720) 504 T Ä T A SUBRAHMANYA SÄSTRIN T I R U M A L A YAJVAN (1660 ) 313, 499, (1926) 515 562 tätparya. See intention of the speaker Tiwari, Kapil Muni a:G288, d:G237 Tattvabindu (of Vacaspati Misra) 80 Tolkappiyam G305, G585 Tattvabindu (ofJnänendra) —Güdhärthadipikä (of Nilakantha Dik- trace (samskära) 184, 186-88, 213, 216, 233, 235, G1679, 553-54 §ita) 373, 506 tradition (ägama) 132 Tattvadipikäprabhäkaracandra (of Nägesa Traividyädeva, Bhavasena G650 Bhatta) 323, 504 Tattvamimämsä (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381 transformation (paririäma) 129 Tattoasarpgraha (of Säntaraksita) G775 transitive 259 Trapp, Valentin t:G569 Tattvaviveka (of Nrsimhäsrama) TrikätidaSabaSäsana (of Gangädhara KaviCommentary (of Annambhatta) 237 räja) 23, 395, 512 technical terms (ädhunika) 118 Trikändi (of Bhartrhari). See Väkyapadlya TEKNÄTHA 534 Trika system. See Kashmir Saivism Telang, Kashinath Trimbak a:G531 TRILOCANA (1600) 493 Telugu 237, 241 tense 149, 263-64, 331, 336, G302, G1528 TRILOCANA 534 TRILOCANADÄSA (1000) 475-76 termination 4 (verbal) testimony (Jabda) 54-56, 126, T R I L O K A N Ä T H A 534 Tripädoddyotini (of Mädhava Bhatta) 486 175, 324 THAKKURADÄSA NYÄYAPANCÄ- Tripathi, Bhaviratprasada b:G197, e:G40 Tripathi, Gayacarana e:G1323 NANA 534 Tripathi, Kailas Patil a:G337 Thakur, Kanakalal e:G1162 Tripathi, Ram Suresh a:G606 Thibaut, Georg 553 Thieme, Paul 14, 109, 549, 555-56, a:G84, Tripathi, Shambhu Nath e:G890 G409, G458, G462, G465, G479-80, Trisütravyäkarapa (of Gangädhara Kaviräja) 23, 395, 512 G490, G617, Gl 269, G1410, G1413, Trivedi, Kamalasankara Pranasankara Gl 592, Gl 626, b:G457 e:G1050, Gl 185 thinking (manana) 106

INDE X

605

understanding. See knowledge T R I V I K R A M A (1U 8) 47 8 unestablished locus. See fallacy of unestatruth (satya) 5, 54, 106 blished locus = dharma 51 union (yoga) 138 Tvastr 105 Tyadyantasyaprakriya (of Sarvadhara Upa- unity of purpose (arthaikatva) 86 unity, syntactic. See syntactic unity dhyaya) 532 universal (jati, samanya) 6, 10, 26, 28, 82, Tyadyantasyaprakriyapadarohana (of Nanda92, 118-19, 125-27, 131, 145, 148, 161, kirti) 527 169, 183, 185, 191, 194, 231-32, 234, 236, 273-74, 339, 552-53, 556, 558, U. K. VENKATANARASIMHA (1916) G226, G602, G606, G723, G1582 515 great universal (mahdsamanya) 194 UDAYACANDRA (1180) 480 =Sabdakrli 125 U D A Y A D H A R M A (1451) 486

sphoja-vaaiversal (jdtispho(a) 349 U D A Y A K l R T I (1654) 499 universal word (jatiiabda). See word, U D AYAN K A R A NANAPATHAKA universal (1800) 509-10 UDAYASAUBHAGYA. See DHANA- unnecessary assumption 216, 280 unreal (asatya) 129 CANDRA upacara. See metaphor Uddalaka 106-7 upadhi 145, 162, 171, 305 uddeiya. See accomplisher Upadhyaya, Krishnadeva a:G87 Udipi 240 upagraha. See aspect UGRABHDTI (1000) 476 upakrama-upasarrihdra G1560 UJJVALADATTA (1350) 484 upalaksana. See indicator U M A M A H E g V A R A (1750) 371, 507 upamd. G1393 Umarji, Varadaraja a:G5-7 upamana. See comparison Upadigantu (of Verikatesvara) 504 Upani?ads 105-6,161, 342, 348, G1387, 550 UnadikoSa (of Mahadeva Vedantin) 501 UriadikoSa (of givarama Tripathin) 506 vpasarga. See prefix Uijadimamamala (of gubhas'ila Gani) 486 Upasargarthadipika (of Haridatta) 523 Ur^adimanidipika (of Ramabhadra Diksita)Upasargdrthasamgraha (of Krsnacarya I I ) 501 486 Unadiparisisfa (of Kraraadisvara) 477 Upasargavrtti (of Bharata Mallika) 510 Urtddirupavali (of Mahalinga gastrin) 527 Upasargavrtti (of Candra school) 18 Uyadisadhana (of Padmasundara) 529 UPAVARSA 234, 554 Unddisutras 4, 13-14, 16, 108, 110, 113-14, upaya. See means 434-35, G242 use, usage (prayoga) 145 (in) correct 47-48 Commentary (ofPurusottamadeva) 209 —Uriadimanidipika (of Ramabhadra Dik- =samjfta 114-15 UTPALA (1170) 479 sita) 321 Commentary (of Gopalakrs^ta gastrin) UTPALACARYA (930) 24 utpatti. See production 353, 504 U T S A V A K l R T I SARANGA UpADHCommentary (of Ksapanaka) 472 —Vjlti (of Ujjvaladatta) 484 Y A Y A 534 —Upadikapadarriava (of Perusuri) 507 utthita. See expectancy: natural —Bhasya (ofDayananda Sarasvati) 511 U V A T A G86 Commentary (of Sarvadhara Upadhyaya) 532 vac. See speech Commentary (of Satyavaryarya) 532 paSyanti. See paSyanti vac —Vftti (of gvetanivasin) 533 vdcaka. See denotative Upadisutras (of Haridatta) 523 VACASPATI MISRA I (960) 80-81, 240, Uriddisutras (of Vrajaraja) 535 G1414, 554 Urtudisulras (Jain) vacya. See denotation —Vftti or Z>ai