Rollback: The Red Army's Winter Offensive Along the Southwestern Strategic Direction, 1942-43

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Rollback: The Red Army’s Winter Offensive along the Southwestern Strategic Direction, 1942–43 covers the period from mid-December 1942 to mid-February 1943, one of the most critical periods of the war on the Eastern Front. It was here that following the encirclement of an entire German army at Stalingrad, the Soviets sought to take advantage of the ruptured Axis front in southern Russia to finish off the Germans’ Italian and Hungarian allies and liberate the economically vital areas of eastern Ukraine. This study is drawn from a number of wartime and postwar articles, published by the General Staff’s directorate for the study of wartime experience. Also featured are documents relating to the operationalstrategic conduct of the various operations, which were compiled and published after the fall of the Soviet Union. Several articles deal with the preparation for and conduct of the Southwestern Front’s Middle Don operation of December 1942. Originally intended as an ambitious offensive to cut off the German forces in the North Caucasus by driving on to Rostov, the operation was later reoriented to meet the threat of the German effort to relieve Stalingrad. The offensive not only accomplished its objective of turning back the German attack, thus dooming the Stalingrad garrison, but also destroyed the Italian army in the East as well. The Soviet Voronezh Front then struck further up the Don River, and in the Ostrogozhsk–Rossosh’ operation destroyed what remained of the Italian forces in the area, as well as the Hungarian army. The territorial results of this operation set the stage for the front’s subsequent Voronezh–Kastornoe operation, which enabled the Soviets to push as far west as Kursk. Elsewhere, the Soviets were also able to capture Khar’kov and almost reach the Dnepr River by mid-February, before being thrown back by a skillful German counteroffensive. Further to the south, the Soviets were able to capture Voroshilovgrad and penetrate into the industrial Donets Basin.

The book also contains a detailed Soviet examination of the employment of tank and mechanized corps during the campaign. The conclusions reached here had a direct bearing on the restructuring of the Red Army’s tank armies in time for the summer campaign of 1943.

Richard W. Harrison earned his undergraduate and master’s degrees from Georgetown University, where he specialized in Russian area studies. In 1994 he earned his doctorate in War Studies from King’s College London. He also was an exchange student in the former Soviet Union and spent several years living and working in postcommunist Russia. Dr. Harrison has worked for the US Department of Defense as an investigator in Russia, dealing with cases involving POWs and MIAs. He has also taught Russian history and military history at college and university level, most recently at the US Military Academy at West Point. Harrison is the author of two books dealing with the Red Army’s theoretical development during the interwar period: The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940 (2001), and Architect of Soviet Victory in World War II: The Life and Theories of G.S. Isserson (2010). He has also authored a number of articles on topics in Soviet military history. He is currently working on a history of the Red Army’s high commands during World War II and afterwards. Dr. Harrison currently lives with his family near Carlisle, Pennsylvania.

ROLLBACK

THE RED ARMY’S WINTER OFFENSIVE ALONG THE SOUTHWESTERN STRATEGIC DIRECTION, 1942-43

ROLLBACK The Red Army’s Winter Offensive along the Southwestern Strategic Direction, 1942-43

Soviet General Staff

Edited and translated by Richard W. Harrison

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Contents List of Maps List of Tables Preface to the English-language edition

Part I The Soviet Counteroffensive along the Middle Don: Preparation 1The Planning and Preparation of the Southwest Front’s Offensive Operation in December 1942 2The Disposition and Composition of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies on the Don 3The Southwestern Front’s Artillery in the December 1942 Operation 4Some Conclusions on Employing Tank and Mechanized Corps for Developing The Breakthrough

Part II The Soviet Counteroffensive Along the Middle Don: Execution 1The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense on the Don by the Southwestern Front’s Forces and the Troops’ Activities in the Operational Depth 2Aviation Activities in the December Operation along the Middle Don

Part III The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh’ Offensive Operation (13-27 January 1943) Introduction 1The Situation by the Start of the Operation’s Preparation

Part A Preparing the Operation 2The Stavka of the Supreme High Command’s Instructions and the Decisions by the Front Commander and the Army Commanders 3The Plan for the Tank Troops’ Combat Employment 4The Organization of the Artillery Offensive 5The Organization of the Air Offensive 6Engineer Support for the Operation 7Operational Support for the Operation 8Organizing Control and Communications 9The Combat Training of the Troops and Staffs 10 Materiel Support for the Operation 11 Political Support for the Operation 12 The Regrouping of Troops and the Correlation of Forces by the Beginning of the Operation

Part B The Conduct of the Operation 13 The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Tactical Defense (The First Stage of the Operation, 13-15 January) 14 The Encirclement and Destruction of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Enemy Group of Forces (The Second Stage of the Operation, 16-27 January)

Part IV The Voronezh-Kastornoe Operation by the Voronezh Front and Bryansk Front’s Left Wing (24 January-17 February 1943) 1Introduction 2Operational Preparation 3The Conduct of the Operation

Part V The Voroshilovgrad Operation 1The Fighting for Voroshilovgrad

Part VI Documents

List of Maps 1The Development of the Soviet Forces’ Counteroffensive in the Stalingrad Area. 2The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense Along the Axis of the 1st Guards and 6th Armies’ Main Attacks, 16-18 December, 1942. 3The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense Along the Axis of the 3rd Guards Army’s Main Attack (16-18 December 1942). 4The Soviet Forces’ Offensive Along the Upper Don, JanuaryFebruary 1943. 5Overall Course of the Voronezh Front’s Combat Operations in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation. 6The Overall Course of Military Operations by the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts in the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation. 7Thoughts of the Stavka Representative and the Commander of the Voronezh Front on the Conduct of the Khar’kov Operation. 8The Soviet Forces’ Offensive in Ukraine. The Repulse of the Enemy’s Counteroffensive. January-March 1943.

List of Tables I/1.1 Strength and Operational Density of the Enemy Group of Forces, December 1942 I/1.2 Composition of Soviet Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation I/1.3 Correlation of Soviet and Enemy Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation I/2.1 Enemy Forces Facing the Southwestern Front, November/December 1942 I/2.2 Organizational and Combat Composition of the Romanian Third Army, 15 December 1942 I/2.3 Organizational and Combat Composition of the Italian Eighth Army, 15 December 1942 I/3.1 Southwestern Front Artillery, December 1942 I/3.2 Distribution of Anti-Aircraft Weapons by the Start of the Operation I/3.3 Ammunition Loads Planned for Southwestern Front Artillery, December 1942 I/3.4 Ammunition Loads Available for Southwestern Front Artillery, 15 December 1942 I/3.5 Expenditure of Artillery & Mortar Ammunition During the Southwestern Front’s December 1942 Offensive Operation I/4.1 Reinforcements Available for Tank & Mechanized Corps During

the Offensive Operations Around Stalingrad and the Middle Course of the Don I/4.2 2nd Tank Army Mechanical Losses During Period of Concentration, February 1943 I/4.3 Tank Corps Provisioning During the Preparatory Period Before the Offensive I/4.4 Motorised Transport Available for Provisioning of Tank Corps During the Preparatory Period Before the Offensive I/4.5 The Pace and Depth of the Tank (Mechanized) Corps’ Advance During the Stalingrad Operation I/4.6 The Pace and Depth of the Tank (Mechanized) Corps’ Advance During Operations Along the Middle Don II/2.1 Strength of Soviet Air Armies, 16 December 1942 II/2.2 Comparison of Soviet and German Air Strength in Zone of the Planned Offensive, December 1942 II/2.3 Distribution of Soviet Aviation Sorties, 16-31 December 1942 III/3.1 The Distribution of Tank Formations and Units Among the Voronezh Front’s Armies in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation III/3.2 Tank Densities Along the Breakthrough Sectors of the Front’s Shock Groups III/4.1 The Distribution of Artillery Among the Armies in the Voronezh Front’s Offensive Sector III/4.2 The Composition of the Infantry-Support Groups in the 340th Rifle Division III/4.3 The Number of Guns Detached for Firing Over Open Sights in

the 40th Army’s Divisions III/4.4 The Composition of the Army (Corps) Long-Range Artillery Groups III/6.1 Densities of Engineering Troops Along the Breakthrough Sectors of the Front’s Groups of Forces (in Sapper Companies) III/6.2 The Volume of Chief Work for the Engineering Outfitting of the Jumping-Off Area in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation III/7.1 The Distribution of Anti-Aircraft Artillery by the Start of the Offensive Operation III/8.1 The Quantitative and Qualitative Composition of Mobile Communications Equipment Among the Voronezh Front’s Armies by the Start of the Operation III/10.1 The 3rd Tank Army’s Materiel Supplies by the Start of the Operation III/12.1 The Distribution of Formations and Units Taking Part in the Offensive Between the Front’s Shock Groups III/12.2 The Correlation of Men and Materiel in the Voronezh Front’s Sector by the Start of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation III/12.3 The Correlation of Men and Materiel in the Front’s Offensive Sector (in the 40th Army’s, 18th Rifle Corps’ and 3rd Tank Army’s Sectors) III/12.4 The Correlation of Men and Materiel along the Attack Axes of the Front’s Shock Groups III/12.5 Tactical Densities and the Correlation of Men and Materiel Along the Armies’ Breakthrough Sectors During the Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Main Defensive Zone

III/14.1 The Offensive Pace of the Voronezh Front’s Forces in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh Operation (in kilometers) IV/2.1 The Composition of the Armies, the Armies’ Shock Groups, and the Width of the Breakthrough Sectors IV/2.2 The Distribution of Artillery Units and Formations Among the Armies Taking Part in the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation IV/2.3 The Distribution of Tank Formations and Units Among the Armies IV/2.4 Tank Densities Along the Breakthrough Sectors IV/2.5 Intra- Front Troop Regroupings During the Preparatory Period of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation IV/2.6 The Correlation of Men and Materiel Along the Armies’ Breakthrough Sectors by the Start of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation

Preface to the English-language edition Unlike previous and projected works in this series, which contain translations of a single major work, this study is a composite one, consisting of six parts, each drawn from a different source. Given the broad scope of the operations depicted here, it would have admittedly been more helpful to present full-scale studies of the Middle Don, Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’, Voronezh—Kastornoe, and Voroshilovgrad offensive operations as separate works. Unfortunately, such studies, and they must surely exist, have not yet been released for public consumption, leaving us with the expedient at hand. The first part of this book, dealing with the preparations for the Red Army’s offensive operation along the middle Don River in December 1942, was taken from an article that appeared in issue no. 8 for 1943 of the Sbornik Materialov po Izucheniyu Opyta Voiny, a wartime and postwar publication issued by the Red Army General Staff’s Section for the Employment of the War’s Experience for the purpose of drawing lesson from the experience of the Great Patriotic War at the operational and tactical levels. The second part is taken from the November-December 1943 issue of the same journal, which examines the actual conduct of the operation in greater detail. The third part is taken from an article that appeared in issue no. 9 in the Sbornik Voenno-Istoricheskikh Materialov Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny, in 1953. This article deals with the preparation and conduct of the Voronezh Front’ Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ offensive operation, which completed the destruction of the Italian Eighth Army, the Hungarian Second Army, and part of the German Second Army. Part four is taken from issue no. 13 from the same journal, which appeared in 1954. This article is dedicated to

the preparation and conduct of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, which was conducted by the Voronezh Front and the left wing of the neighboring Bryansk Front. Part five is a small article from the Sbornik Materialov po Izucheniyu Opyta Voiny of NovemberDecember 1943 and deals with the fighting around Voroshilovgrad in February 1943, during the latter half of the Red Army’s general offensive along the southern direction. Part 6 is drawn from a post-Soviet publication: Velikaya Otechestvennaya Voina, a multi-volume compilation of documents from that period. This section includes numerous documents generated by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and the various fronts during the Soviet counteroffensive. This study contains a number of terms that may not be readily understandable to the casual reader in military history. Therefore, I have adopted a number of conventions designed to ease this task. For example, a front is a Soviet wartime military organization roughly corresponding to an American army group. Throughout the narrative the reader will encounter such names as the Southwestern Front and the Voronezh Front, etc. To avoid confusion with the more commonly understood meaning of the term front (i.e., the front line); italics will be used to denote an unnamed front. Similar German formations (i.e., Army Group Center) are also spelled out in full. I have chosen to designate Soviet armies using the shortened form (i.e., 1st Guards Army). German or Axis armies, on the other hand, are spelled out in full (i.e., Italian Eighth Army). In the same vein, Soviet corps are designated by Arabic numerals (25th Tank Corps), while German and other Axis units are denoted by Roman numerals (e.g., XIII Army Corps). Smaller units (divisions, brigades, regiments, etc.) on both sides are denoted by Arabic numerals only (184th Rifle Division, 168th Infantry Division, etc.). Given the large number of units involved in the operation, I have

adopted certain other conventions in order to better distinguish them. For example, Soviet armored units are called tank corps, brigades, etc., while the corresponding German and allied units are denoted by the popular term panzer. Likewise, Soviet infantry units are designated by the term rifle or motorized rifle, while the corresponding German units are simply referred to as infantry or motorized. Many of the place names in this study are hyphenated, such as Fomino-Svechnikovo and Mikhailovo-Aleksandrovskii. In these cases, the names are separated by a single hyphen, which is to distinguish them from the recitation of a particular line, often countered in such works, such as Ivanovka—Tsapkovo—Orobinskii—Dubivikovka. In the latter case, the individual villages and towns are separated by two hyphens. The work subscribes to no particular transliteration scheme, because no entirely satisfactory one exists. I have adopted a mixed system that uses the Latin letters ya and yu to denote their Cyrillic counterparts, as opposed to the ia and iu employed by the Library of Congress, which tends to distort proper pronunciation. Conversely, I have retained the Library of Congress’s ii ending (i.e., Vasilevskii), as opposed to the commonly-used y ending. I have also retained the apostrophe to denote the Cyrillic soft sign. The original works contain a number of footnotes inserted by the authors, in order to explain this or that technical question. These have been retained as footnotes and have been supplemented by a number of appropriately identified editorial notes, which have been inserted as an explanatory guide for a number of terms and individuals that might not be readily understandable. Elsewhere, I have taken some small liberties as regards the book’s overall organization, although there is nothing here that deviates in a major way from the original. These liberties primarily involve leaving out some maps, copies of orders, and tables, the inclusion of

which would have made the final product too long. On the other hand, I do not take issue with some of the claims made in the text, and any errors or interpretations should be disputed after examining the relevant documents in the two countries’ military archives. Nor have I attempted to make the language more “literary,” and have striven throughout to preserve the military-bureaucratic flavor of the original.

Part I

The Soviet Counteroffensive along the Middle Don: Preparation

The following took part in drawing up the materials for Sbornik no. 8: lieutenant generals Ye.A. Shilovskii and N.G. Korsun; Lieutenant General of Tank Troops M.L. Chernyavskii; major generals K.F. Vasil’chenko, Ya.A Kutsev, Z.Ya. Rudinov, S.G. Timokhin, L.V. Oianov, N.A. Talenskii, B.I. Kuznetsov; major generals of artillery V.G. Guleiko and N.T. Selyakh; Lieutenant General of Engineering Troops A.I. Proshlyakov, major generals of technical services A.S. Kubasov and F.Ya. Gerasimov; Lieutenant General of Communications Troops P.D. Miroshnikov; colonels A.P. Alekseev, A.N. Red’kin, I.A. Cherkezov, V.D. Utkin, I.N. Kharuk, V.N. Zhelannov, M.R. Mazalov, M.N. Kochergin, A.S. Rogov, G.V. Litvinov, and A.N. Trofimov; Captain First Class V. I. Sumin; lieutenant colonels I.V. Parot’kin, D. A Borshchev, V.I. Sidorov, V.G. Romanov, A.N. Sandal’tsev, V.M. Tret’yakov, and N.G. Pavlenko; majors N.A. Fokin, S.I. Patrikeev, A.M. Tselebritskii, and A.M. Rapoport.

Editor: Major General P.P. Vechnyi.

1

The Planning and Preparation of the Southwestern Front’s Offensive Operation in December 1942 The offensive operation by the Southwestern Front’s forces, which unfolded in the second half of December 1942 along the broad steppe expanses of the Don’s middle course, was accomplished by the Southwestern Front command in accordance with the overall plan by the Stavka¹ of the Supreme High Command for the defeat of the German-Fascist forces in the south of Russia. The events of this period were partially examined in Sbornik no. 6, which was dedicated to a description of the Stalingrad operation. However, a separate study of the experience of the Southwestern Front’s December operation is of undoubted interest and has great practical value in the operational training of the Red Army’s officer cadres. The December offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces was carried out for the purpose of operationally supporting the activities of the Don and Stalingrad fronts in eliminating the Germans’ Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies around Stalingrad. A characteristic feature of this operation is the massed employment of tank and mechanized formations, which performed a leading role during all stages of the operation. A second feature of the operation is that it was conducted in difficult winter conditions, over broken terrain, under conditions of the extensive lengthening of communications and the great remove of

the supply bases from the attacking troops, as well as the absence of railroads in the area of operations and extremely limited automobile transport. All the consecutive stages of the operation’s development are fully expressed here: the breakthrough, the development of the success, pursuit, encirclement, the defeat of the encircled enemy forces, and the consolidation of the success. Finally, it should also be noted that an instructive feature of the operation is its bold and flexible planning. The above-enumerated problems are briefly laid out in two articles: “The Planning and Preparation of the Southwestern Front’s Offensive Operation in December 1942,” and “The Breakthrough and the Southwestern Front’s Forces’ Activities in the Operational Depth of the Enemy’s Defense.”² Only the most important and instructive aspects of the operation are illuminated in these articles, chiefly the planning for the front operation, its preparation and the organization of the breakthrough. The entire remaining material is laid out only in passing, in order to preserve an integral impression of the content and character of the Southwestern Front’s December offensive.

The Overall Situation

As a result of the November offensive,³ the forces of the Southwestern Front broke through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive zone along a front from Rubezhinskoe (15 kilometers east of Veshchenskaya) as far as Melokletskaya (five kilometers east of Kletskaya) and, while pursuing and destroying in detail the formations of the Romanian Third Army, which was covering this

sector, by 25 November their left flank had reached the Chir River and the center the Krivaya River. The Southwestern Front’s right flank remained as before along the Don River. As a result of this offensive, the Romanian Third Army was routed and only the remnants of its defeated divisions managed to fall back behind the Chir River and consolidate along its right bank, with the support of German units that had arrived during the fighting. Following the Romanian army’s abandonment of the line of the Don, the Germans were forced to hurriedly begin fortifying new positions along the Chir River and to strengthen the defeated Romanian forces by means of their extremely limited reserves, which were absolutely vital in the developing situation. Besides this, the extremely difficult situation, in which the encircled German forces in Stalingrad found themselves, forced the fascist command to adopt emergency measures for relieving this group of forces. At the end of November and the beginning of December, the Germans made repeated attempts to launch an attack with limited forces against the Southwestern Front’s center. However, the Germans’ fierce attacks along the Bokovskaya—Kletskaya axis did not yield the expected results—the fighting resulted in only insignificant tactical successes. The attacking German-Romanian units, upon encountering our forces’ stubborn resistance, wore themselves out and, without achieving their goal, were forced at the end of November to go over to the defensive along this sector of the front. At the same time, the enemy began to hurriedly transfer troops to the Southwestern Front’s left flank. Thus the following forces were transferred to the Tormosin area: the 11th Panzer Division from the Central Front,⁴ the 336th Infantry Division from the Voronezh Front’s front, the 45th Infantry Division from the Bryansk Front’s

front, and the 7th and 8th Luftwaffe field divisions from France. The enemy was simultaneously trying to create a major group of forces in the Kotel’nikovo area; the following units were arriving here: the 17th Panzer Division from the Bryansk area, the 23rd Panzer Division from the Northern Caucasus, and the 6th Panzer Division from France. Other small units were arriving along these axes from neighboring fronts and from the deep rear. Divisions from France, Belgium and other occupied European countries were also moving there. The somewhat extended operation by the Don and Stalingrad fronts for eliminating the enemy’s encircled armies and the increased activities of his Tormosin and Kotel’nikovo groups of forces demanded that we speed up the Southwestern Front’s offensive activities.

A description of the area of combat operations

Combat operations by the Southwestern Front’s forces in December 1942 unfolded in the area between the Don and Severskii Donets rivers. The terrain in this area is an open, hilly plateau, very short on vegetation, cut by a large number of rivers and deep ravines, with steep and precipitous banks, which form natural anti-tank defensive lines and make even entire areas difficult for an attacker to reach. The majority of rivers are shallow. By the start of the operation they had iced over heavily (with the exception of the Bogucharka River, through which crossings had to be erected during the offensive) and did not present formidable obstacles for forcing them with tracked or wheeled vehicles, not to mention the infantry. The deep and abundant Don River occupied a special place in the

area’s river system; its width along the sector from Novaya Kalitva to Veshchenskaya varies from 200-350 meters. Due to the late freezing, the thickness of the river’s ice cover in December 1942 did not allow for crossings without special work to strengthen the ice or laying down bridges, all the more so as the enemy along the 1st Guards Army’s main axis of attack was systematically blowing up the ice. This required additional engineering work for supporting the crossings while forcing the river. The absence of rail lines in the area of combat operations was deeply felt during the operation’s preparation and conduct. The front was based on the Povorino—Liski and Povorino—Stalingrad rail sectors, which ran 150-200 kilometers from the front line and which created serious difficulties for the materiel supply of the troops and the arrival of reserves. The troops’ communications could only be over the dirt roads, a network of which covered the area of combat operations comparatively thickly. A feature of the area in which the Southwestern Front’s December fighting took place was that a majority of the area’s inhabited locales were located in the ravines and river valleys and sometimes stretched for tens of kilometers in an uninterrupted chain; the main roads ran, as a rule, along the rivers and the ravines. Thus it was planned to launch the main attacks chiefly around the heights, while the most stubborn fighting usually unfolded along the approaches to the inhabited locales and immediately in them. The meteorological conditions in December 1942 were quite favorable for combat operations. The air temperature in the middle of December varied from zero to minus ten degrees Celsius and did not fall below -20 throughout the entire month. The insignificant snow cover, which did not exceed 14-15 centimeters in December, and the absence of snowstorms and heavy drifts, created favorable conditions for the movement of all combat arms along the roads, and partially off the roads.

The disposition of the enemy’s forces

The German command sought through the stubborn defense of its allies—the Italians and Romanians—along the line of the Don and Chir rivers to tie down the Southwestern Front’s forces and to hold these positions at all costs. By thus covering their left flank and the rear of their southern armies, the German command planned to create powerful groups of forces in the Tormosin and Kotel’nikovo areas, and through concentric attacks in the general direction of the northeast, to break through our positions along the boundary between the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. In the event of success, this offensive operation was to be combined with a meeting offensive by part of the German Sixth Army’s forces from the east and result in, in the opinion of the German command, the elimination of the encirclement and the restoration of the communications of the forces in the Stalingrad area. The enemy’s group of forces was to be created in accordance with the plan laid out above. Opposing the Southwestern Front’s right wing and center; that is, opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies,⁵ the forces of the Italian Eighth Expeditionary Army were defending, which also included only a small number of German units.⁶ Opposite the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank armies were the remnants of the Romanian Third Army, and German forces. By the start of the operation the 7th and 8th Luftwaffe field divisions, the 336th Infantry Division, 11th Panzer Division, the rear of the 14th and 16th panzer divisions, the headquarters of the XLVIII Panzer Corps, the 63rd Independent Motorized Battalion, up to 15

battalions of special troops, and the scattered elements of Romanian units, which had been thrown beyond the Don as a result of the November offensive, were opposite the front’s left wing. Besides this, German units were located in the areas of Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii. A shortage of forces forced the German command to commit almost all of its operational reserves into the fighting as early as the Red Army’s November offensive. Thus by the middle of December the enemy’s operational reserves opposite the Southwestern Front were extremely insignificant and consisted chiefly of small garrisons located in the area’s major inhabited areas. The overall number of enemy forces along the front from Novaya Kalitva to Rychkovskii, taking into account the units located in the second line, comprised up to 16 infantry and three panzer divisions, and two of the latter (1st and 22nd) had suffered losses up to 70 percent. Besides this, up to 25 composite battalions of special troops and up to six artillery regiments as reinforcements were operating along various sectors of the front. The strength and operational density of the enemy’s group of forces is shown in Table I/1.1.

Table I/1.1 Strength and Operational Density of the Enemy Group of Forces, December 1942

Total Along the Front (320 km)

Strength and WeaponsPer Km of Front

About 200,000 8,054 1,468 1,037

Men Machine Guns Mortars Anti-Tank Guns

523.3 21 3.9 2.7

1,145 Up to 600

Field Guns Tanks

3 1.5

Due to the front’s significant length and the enemy’s limited forces along this sector, his defense was built along a broad front. The features of the enemy’s defense on the Don are detailed in the article “The Disposition and Composition of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies on the Don.” The densest enemy group of forces was being created opposite the Southwestern Front’s left wing, where the overwhelming number of formations defending the Chir River belonged to the Germans, while at the same time the Italians and the remnants of the Romanians were located opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies on the Don. Such a distribution of forces may be explained by the following considerations. First of all, the front along the Chir River had only just stabilized and had not yet been much fortified in the engineering sense, as was the case opposite the Southwestern Front’s right wing and center; secondly, the Germans expected that the Red Army’s new attacks, should they follow, would be launched predominantly from the line of the Chir River against the immediate rear of the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces; finally, such a group of forces could be created for the purpose of restoring the situation and linking up with the group of forces encircled around Stalingrad. Aside from this, the Germans themselves planned to go over to the offensive along this sector of the front; thus it is perfectly natural that the German command would primarily concentrate German units here, as they were the most combatworthy.

Planning the December Operation

The Southwestern Front’s tasks

In December 1942 the Red Army was faced with an extremely important task: to prevent the linkup of the enemy’s main forces with the encircled Stalingrad group of forces and to destroy the latter. The Southwestern Front was to resolve this task by defeating the main Italian-Romanian and German group of forces on the Don and the Chir River, followed by its arrival at the line Derkul River— Kalitva River—Severskii Donets River. According to the plan by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces was to unfold in general connection with the operations of the Don and Stalingrad fronts and in close cooperation with the Voronezh Front, which was simultaneously preparing an offensive along its left wing with the task of operationally supporting the offensive activities of the Southwestern Front’s forces.

The decision by the Southwestern Front command

At the moment the plan for the new operation was drawn up at the end of November, the Southwestern Front included General Lelyushenko’s⁷ 1st Guards Army, which occupied a front from the Osetrovka bridgehead as far as Chernyshevskaya, about 240 kilometers in length, and General Romanenko’s⁸ 5th Tank Army, which was operating along a front from Chernyshevskaya to the mouth of the Chir River, 140-150 kilometers in length. Due to the difficulties of command and control, the 1st Guards Army’s right wing was detached as an independent operational

group, under the command of General Kuznetsov,⁹ on 27 November. The main idea contained in the plan for the Southwestern Front’s new operation came down to the following. Having concentrated powerful shock groups in the area of the Osetrovka bridgehead and in the area east of Bokovskaya, to break through the enemy’s defensive front along the sectors KrasnoOrekhovoe—Solontsy and Astakhov—Krasnokutskaya. Following the breakthrough, by developing the success along converging axes by the right shock group in the direction of Man’kovo-Kalitvenskaya and Degtevo, and by the left shock group in the direction of Bokovskaya and Kashary, to surround and destroy the Italian Eighth Army, the remnants of the Romanian Third Army, and the German formations operating along the front from Krasno-Orekhovoe to Bokovskaya. Without waiting for the start of the offensive along the 1st Guards Army’s front, the 5th Tank Army was to develop the offensive along its left flank and by 12 December reach the line of the Kalitva and Severskii Donets rivers. The Voronezh Front’s 6th Army was to attack along its left wing simultaneously with the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards Army, launching an attack from the line Novaya Kalitva—Derezovka in the general direction of Kantemirovka, with its main task being the creation of a serious screen against possible enemy attacks from the west. By the end of the operation the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ front was to run along the line Novaya Kalitva—Markovka—Voloshino— Millerovo.

Changes in the initial operational plan

By 10 December 1942 the situation at the front had changed drastically. The elimination of the encircled German group of forces at Stalingrad had become protracted. The enemy continued to concentrate in the Tormosin, Nizhne-Chirskaya and Kotel’nikovo areas major forces for an attack to link up with the encircled forces. On 10 December the Germans’ Tormosin group of forces made an attempt to attack the 5th Tank Army’s left flank. The German offensive was beaten back. On 11 December the front commander assigned the 5th Tank Army the task, in conjunction with the Stalingrad Front’s newly-formed 5th Shock Army, of destroying the enemy’s Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces and at all costs to prevent his breaking through to link up with the encircled Stalingrad group of forces. Following the defeat of the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin groups of forces, our forces would then attack toward Morozovskii and Il’inka, as well as in the direction of Tormosin, Tatsinskaya and Likhaya. However, our offensive attempts did not yield tangible results and the 5th Tank Army’s formations continued to fight along the previous line. On 12 December the enemy’s Kotel’nikovo group of forces, the so-called Manstein group,¹⁰ attacked. The enemy, thanks to the superiority in forces he had created along this sector, began to successfully advance to the northeast, pushing back our forces. The real threat arose that this group of forces might link up with the encircled troops. Taking into account the developing situation, the Stavka ordered the front commander to direct all his efforts toward supporting the operations of the Don and Stalingrad fronts to foil the German command’s plans to link up with its encircled group of forces. In order to resolve this task, it was proposed that the Southwestern Front launch its attack not to the southwest, but in the general

direction of the southeast, through Nizhnii Astakhov toward Morozovskii with the forces of the 1st and 3rd guards armies,¹¹ with the immediate task, in conjunction with the Voronezh Front, of encircling and destroying the Italian Eighth Army and to then attack toward Morozovskii.¹² The attack was set for 16 December. The changes in the direction of the attack and the operation’s depth required that the front command redirect the armies toward their new missions. Based on the Stavka’s instructions, the front’s military council, in directives nos. 0055/op and 0056/op, of 14 December, made changes to the earlier plan. These changes came down to the following. The front would launch its main attack with the forces of the 1st and 3rd guards armies, not to the southwest, but to the south and southeast, in the general direction of Morozovskii. The immediate task was the defeat of the Italian Eighth Army and our arrival on the communications of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces. For this purpose, the 1st Guards Army’s tank corps, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, were to develop a vigorous offensive to the southeast and by the close of the operation’s fourth day seize the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii areas, cutting the communications of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces. The army’s rifle formations, taking advantage of the tank corps’ success, were to encircle the Italian Eighth Army’s Boguchar—Mogulinskaya group of forces by the close of the operation’s third day and on the operation’s sixth day reach the security line Voloshino—Galitsin. The 3rd Guards Army, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, was to eliminate the Kruzhilin group of enemy forces in the course of three days and then launch an attack in the general direction of Nizhnii Astakhov and Morozovskii, and by the close of the operation’s third day its mechanized corps was to occupy

Morozovskii and part of its forces occupy Chernyshkovskii. On the operation’s sixth day the rifle formations were to occupy the security line Pokrovskaya (20 kilometers east of Millerovo)—Il’inka—Pulichev —Morozovskii—Chernyshkovskii. The 1st and 3rd guards armies’ refined tasks came down to the following. The 4th Guards Rifle Corps was to set up a security front along the line excluding Kononovka—excluding Voloshino on the operation’s fourth day, with its forward elements to reach the line by the close of the operation’s third day. The 35th Rifle Division was to be directed through Tverdokhlebova, Sloboda Sokhrannaya and Degtevo toward Millerovo, which it was to reach on the operation’s fifth day. The division was to dispatch detachments from the Alekseevo-Lozovskaya area to clear the enemy out of Setrakovskii, Pavlovka and Degtevo. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps’ immediate task was to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Boguchar—Meshkov—Migulinskaya area. The corps was to carry out this mission over three days, in conjunction with units of the 153rd Rifle Division, which was to attack in the direction of Meshkov. Upon completing the immediate task, it was planned to concentrate the corps in the Mal’chevskaya— Degtevo—Mikhailovo-Aleksandrovskii area. On the operation’s sixth day the 6th Guards Rifle Corps was to occupy the security line Voloshino—Krasnovka—Ivanovka—Galitsin. In the event of a failure along the 3rd Guards Army’s front, it was planned to dispatch the 6th Guards Rifle Corps to Nizhnii Astakhov. Following its commitment into the breach, the 18th Tank Corps was to develop the offensive in the direction of Lofitskoe, Malaya Lozovka, Setrakovskii, and Verkhnyaya Makeevka, while part of its forces would attack through Kashary toward Pervomaiskoe, the Gusarovskii State Farm and Morozovskii. It was planned to reach the

Morozovskii area on the operation’s fourth day. It was planned to commit the 25th Tank Corps into the breach simultaneously with the 18th Tank Corps, with the mission of attacking in the direction of Millerovo, and to aid in the retention of this area until the arrival of the rifle formations. The corps’ subsequent task would be determined by the situation as it developed. It was planned to commit the 24th Tank Corps into the breach behind the 18th and 25th tank corps, with the mission of reaching the Tatsinskaya area on the operation’s fourth day. The axis of the corps’ movement was Tverdokhlebova—Man’kovo-Kalitvenskaya— Degtevo—Skasyrskaya—Tatsinskaya. The following changes were made in the 3rd Guards Army’s plan. Following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, it was planned to turn to the north not two, but three rifle divisions. It was planned to eliminate the enemy’s Kruzhilin group of forces in three days. Following the completion of this task, it was planned to reach with the forces of five rifle divisions and two rifle brigades the following line on the operation’s sixth day: Pokrovskaya—YefremovoStepanovka—Il’inka—Gusynka—Zakharovo-Oblivskii—Pulichev. Following the breakthrough, it was planned to try to immediately begin to roll up the enemy’s front to the south, for which purpose the forces of the 203rd and 50th Guards rifle divisions, joined subsequently by the 346th Rifle Division, were to reach the front Morozovskii—Chernyshkovskii on the operation’s fifth day. By the close of the first day the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was to reach the area Kamenskii—Popovka—Nizhnii Astakhov, and on the third day capture Morozovskii and, with part of its forces, Chernyshkovskii. This was the plan of the Southwestern Front command, transmitted to the troops on 14 December for execution.

It was suggested by the Stavka that the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army reach the line indicated in the front plan not on the fifth, but on the operation’s fourth day. The 17th Tank Corps was to be committed into the breach simultaneously with the 18th and 25th tank corps and, while developing the success in the direction of Kantemirovka and Voloshino, by the close of the operation’s second day reach the area Voloshino—Krasnovka—Sulin and secure it until the arrival of the rifle divisions. However, this plan still had to undergo one more change. The situation along the Kotel’nikovo axis was growing more complex with each day. The enemy, having committed significant forces into the fighting, was rapidly advancing to the line of the Myshkova River. In order to get into the rear of the enemy’s Tormosin— Kotel’nikovo group of forces as quickly as possible, the Stavka demanded that the Southwestern Front increase the planned rates of advance to the southeast and reinforce this axis with mobile forces by reducing the scope of the front’s tasks along the southern and southwestern axes. Based upon the Stavka’s instructions, the front commander on 15 December, the eve of the offensive, ordered the commander of the 1st Guards Army to arrange his security front along the line excluding Markovka—Zorinovka—Chertkovo and then along the Kalitva River, without advancing it to the line of the Derkul River— Millerovo. The new security front was to be occupied by units of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps by the close of the operation’s third day, while forward detachments, mounted on auto transport, were to reach the indicated line by the close of the operation’s second day. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, following the accomplishment of its immediate objective, was to concentrate in the area Vyazhinskii— Alekseevskii—Meshkovo—Setrakovskii by the close of the fourth day of the operation for subsequent operations toward Nizhnii Astakhov or Millerovo.

The 18th Tank Corps’ mission was recast. Following the commitment into the breach in the direction of Lofitskoe and Krinitsa, it was to occupy the area Mikhailovskii—Verkhnii Chirskii—Alekseevskii as early as the close of the second day. The corps’ mission was to, in conjunction with the 6th Guards Rifle Corps and the 153rd Rifle Division, encircle and destroy the Italian units on the south bank of the Don. The corps’ subsequent mission would be determined by the situation—either to launch an attack on Chernyshkovskii, or on Kruzhilin to support the 3rd Guards Army. The 25th Tank Corps received an entirely new mission. Following the corps’ commitment into the breach it was to reach the area Shirokii —Neledovo—Lebedinka by the close of the operation’s first day, and subsequently, while developing a vigorous offensive along the route indicated earlier for the 18th Tank Corps, reach the area KostinoBystryanskii—Bol’shoi Khlopovskii—Morozovskii on the operation’s fourth day. The tasks of the front’s remaining units and formations remained unchanged. This was the operation’s final plan, according to which the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces would unfold in December 1942. Comparing the initial operational plan with the final version, it is necessary to note first of all the change in the direction of the main attack from the southwest to the southeast. At the bottom of this change lay a principally new mission, laid down for the Southwestern Front in the middle of December, due to the changed situation along the Stalingrad axis. If in the initial plan the task of operationally securing the Don and Stalingrad fronts was to be carried out as a spin-off task, to be resolved during the course of the operation itself and aimed, for the most part, at striking a deep blow in the rear of the southern group of German forces, then in the final plan that was drawn up in light of the changed situation, the task of operationally securing the defeat of the German troops around Stalingrad was the main one.

In accordance with the changed mission and direction of the main attack, the depth of the operation changed, while the rapidity of the development of events demanded that the operation’s pace be speeded up. However, the path toward achieving both the first and second tasks lay through the defeat of the Italian Eighth Army and the remnants of the Romanian Third Army. Thus the front’s immediate task remained unchanged. The methods of resolving this task remained almost without change. This circumstance enabled the front command to rapidly redirect its forces toward carrying out a new task.

Planning the breakthrough

It was planned to move the artillery to its firing positions in the course of three nights, so that on the day before the start of the offensive all of the artillery would be in place. So as not to reveal the artillery’s dispositions, it was planned to register targets and benchmarks with a limited number of guns. The rifle divisions received orders to occupy their jumping-off positions with their main forces on the night before the offensive, observing all measures for maintaining the secrecy of their concentration. Analogous instructions were issued to the tank formations. An hour and a half before the beginning of the infantry attack, all available guns were to fire on the enemy’s positions and for five minutes carry out fire with maximum intensity. It was then planned to use the artillery’s aimed fire for 75 minutes to destroy and suppress the enemy’s fire system. And, finally, in the final ten

minutes all the guns were to take part in suppressing the enemy’s fire system along the forward edge of the defense. The infantry was assigned a minimal amount of ammunition expenditure for this period: 20 rounds per rifle and two disks (belts) per machine gun. Worthy of attention are the Stavka’s instructions on employing M30¹³ guards mortar units, the enormous destructive power of which was to be used to a maximum degree. It was ordered to particularly carefully define the forward edge of the enemy’s defense and the location of his forces, because the Germans (knowing the destructive capabilities of our M-30s) would set up the main forward edge of their defense 4-5 kilometers from the false forward edge, along which they would leave only a security force. In accordance with these instructions, the front’s forces carried out a vigorous reconnaissance in force for several days, which enabled us to determine the forward edge of the enemy’s defense and to assign specific tasks to the guards mortar units. Our aviation had the task of suppressing from medium and low altitudes the enemy’s positions and his immediate reserves and to simultaneously cover the shock groups’ jumping-off areas, especially of the tank and mechanized formations. It was planned to massively employ all antiaircraft weapons in these areas. In accordance with the front command’s instructions, planning tables were drawn up in the armies, in which all questions of organizing cooperation and the combat support of the activities of the various combat arms during the breakthrough were reflected. The front command planned to commit the success development echelon as soon as the first-echelon units successfully attacked the enemy’s defensive zone. As soon as the infantry made a breach into the enemy defense to a depth of 2-3 kilometers, the mobile formations were to overtake it and, developing the success, follow along the paths laid out by the plan.

Engineering units were attached to the tank and mechanized formations in order to lay down routes and bridges and clear mined areas. For this purpose, part of the sappers were to be placed with the tank landing forces on combat vehicles, in order to quickly assist the tanks at the necessary time. It was planned to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense on the operation’s first day. By the close of the first day the tank corps were already supposed to reach the edges of the tactical zone and be operating against the rear and communications of the first-line troops. From the above, it is clear that the Southwestern Front’s operational plan was a bold one and had a number of characteristic features.

1. The task of operationally supporting the forces of the Don and Stalingrad fronts was to be resolved by means of conducting a major, independent front operation for the defeat of an entire enemy army; furthermore, this task was to be resolved as the immediate one during the course of carrying out the main task— reaching the rear and communications of the German group of forces striving to link up with the forces encircled around Stalingrad.

2. At the basis of the operation lay the idea of a deep concentric envelopment of the enemy’s main forces located along the Don. The realization of this idea was to be entrusted to powerful groups of forces from rifle, tank and mechanized formations, created along the flanks of the 1st and 3rd guards armies. The favorable shape of the front line facilitated the launching of a concentric attack against the enemy’s forces along converging axes, which had been fully taken into account by the Southwestern Front command in planning the operation.

The leading role in resolving this was to be given over to the tank and mechanized formations, which were to develop the success of the first-echelon rifle divisions, and through bold and vigorous actions attack the enemy’s deep rear, demoralize his forces and disrupt control and communications between them, cut off the enemy’s routes of retreat and tie down his arriving reserves until the completion of the defeat of the enemy’s first-line forces.

3. Simultaneously, the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ plans also called for a concentric envelopment of the enemy forces located immediately opposite these armies, which would create conditions for breaking up the enemy’s position into separate isolated groups, which would enable us to eliminate them in detail. The fulfillment of these tasks was to be supported by the creation along the armies’ secondary axes of such groups of forces that would, in conjunction with the shock groups along the main axes, encircle and destroy the enemy forces located in the tactical zone of his defense.

4. The task of creating the conditions for the commitment of the mobile formations into the fighting was entrusted to the rifle formations, along with the artillery and aviation, during the first stage of the operation. They were to resolve this task by breaking through the first line of the enemy’s fortifications and suppressing his fire system along the sectors designated for committing the mobile formations into the breach. Subsequently, the rifle formations, while following behind the mobile formations, were to complete the encirclement and destruction of the enemy forces and consolidate the success achieved by creating security lines outlined by the plan.

5. The movement of the tank corps in the enemy’s operational rear was planned parallel to the front of the Italian, Romanian and German troops, which would create particularly favorable conditions for disrupting, as early as the operation’s first days, the entire system of control, communications and materiel supply of the enemy forces.

6. The depth of the planned operation, taking as the axis of the main attack as the point of departure, was 220 kilometers. The operation was to last 5-6 days. Thus the average rate of advance for the mobile formations was planned at 50 kilometers (70 kilometers for the 17th Tank Corps). The average daily rate of attack for the rifle formations was determined at 20-30 kilometers. The planning of a winter offensive operation of such a scale and vigor was based on the assurance that by creating an overwhelming superiority in force along the axes of the main attacks, the ability to break through the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive zone on the operation’s first day would be guaranteed, and that the vigorous advance by the mobile formations, given the absence of the enemy’s operational reserves immediately adjacent to the front line, would disorganize the control of his forces, create a panic within his ranks and enable our forces to rapidly reach the lines indicated by the plan.

7. Worthy of particular attention is the organization of operational security against possible attacks from the west into the rear of the Southwestern Front’s attacking forces. The necessity of creating a powerful flank screen while conducting a deep operation has been confirmed by the entire course of the Great

Patriotic War. This experience was fully taken into account in planning the present operation. The role of such a screen was entrusted by the Stavka to the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army. Such were the main characteristic features of the Southwestern Front’s plan for the December offensive operation.

The disposition of forces

In accordance with the operational plan, the necessary disposition of forces was to be created for carrying it out. Because the plan for breaking through did not undergo any significant changes during the preparation period for the operation, the disposition of forces went on basically in accordance with the initial concentration plan. Changes in the armies’ composition were carried out by the following means: the transfer of the 25th Tank Corps from the 6th Army to the 1st Guards Army and the latter’s reinforcement with the new 24th Tank Corps; the transfer of the 22nd Mechanized Brigade from the 1st Guards Army to the 3rd Guards Army; the transfer of the 5th Mechanized Corps from the 3rd Guards Army to the 5th Tank Army and the transfer from the 5th Tank Army of part of its forces for the newly-formed 5th Shock Army. The composition of the armies by the start of the operation is shown in Table I/1.2. Very powerful groups of forces were created along the axes of the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ main attacks, which fully corresponded to the overall operational plan. The operational formation of the front’s main forces is shown in Table I/1.2.

Table I/1.2 Composition of Soviet Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation

Notes 1. The artillery data is taken from materials contained in the Red Army artillery headquarters. 2. The 9th Artillery Division, consisting of the 47th and 127th artillery regiments, the 212th, 221st and 230th howitzer regiments, and the 407th, 442nd and 456th anti-tank artillery regiments, except for the 407th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, had not arrived by the start of the operation.

The disposition of forces along the axes of the main attacks was expressed sufficiently clearly. Thus, along the 6th Army’s front of five rifle divisions, four divisions, along with reinforcements, were concentrated along a 9-kilometer sector where it was planned to carry out the breakthrough. One division occupied the remainder of the army’s 18-kilometer front. Along the 1st Guards Army’s front, of seven rifle divisions, five divisions (minus one regiment) were concentrated along an 18kilometer sector. Four tank corps were to be committed along the center of this sector, along a 5-kilometer front. The army’s remaining forces (two rifle divisions and a rifle regiment) occupied a front 127 kilometers in length. Thus along the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ two neighboring breakthrough sectors, which covered an overall front of 27 kilometers, there were concentrated nine rifle divisions and four tank corps, with reinforcements. Along the 3rd Guards Army’s front, of seven rifle divisions, four rifle divisions were concentrated along a 14-kilometer breakthrough sector, of which three divisions were along a 9-kilometer front. A

mechanized corps, a motorized rifle brigade and a rifle brigade were to be committed here. The remaining three divisions occupied a front 75 kilometers in length. The organizational-numerical composition of the Southwestern Front’s groups of forces along the axes of the main attacks and the correlation of forces along these axes are shown in Table I/1.3. Only the composition and weapons of the first-echelon forces are given. In order to get a more exact idea of the correlation of force along the axes of the main attacks, it is necessary to take into account the following:

•the presence of guards mortar units in the amount listed in Table I/1.2 ; •the presence of tanks in the breakthrough development echelon, accounting for the following correlation of forces by army: 1st Guards Army, 8:1; 3rd Guards Army, 3.3:1; moreover, along the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ breakthrough sectors (5-6 kilometers) up to 100 tanks per kilometer of front were to operate; •the employment of the second echelons’ artillery, which enabled us to create an artillery density along the breakthrough sectors of 4569 guns and mortars per kilometer of front in the 1st and 3rd guards armies and up to 100 guns and mortars in the 6th Army.

Table I/1.3 Correlation of Soviet and Enemy Forces at the Start of the December 1942 Offensive Operation

In analyzing the operational formation of the Southwestern Front’s forces along the axes of the main attacks, it is worth noting that the commanders of the 6th and 1st Guards armies each had in reserve a single rifle division, while the 3rd Guards Army had only a single rifle brigade. The front commander had no reserves at all. Such an echeloning of forces diverges from the accepted view of organizing the combat formation of forces in breaking through a heavily fortified defensive zone. However, taking into account the existing conditions, the given decision by the command is justified by the situation and the course of combat activities. The enemy had a powerful, well-outfitted tactical defensive line, 510 kilometers in depth. In places the defensive depth reached up to 20 kilometers, although beyond this defensive zone the enemy lacked a prepared rear defensive line and there were no operational reserves. In order to break through such a defense, it was necessary to quickly concentrate the maximum efforts in order to smash through the first defensive zone like a powerful ram, to rapidly achieve operational freedom and thus exclude the possibility of the enemy using his deep reserves. The echeloning of the front’s main forces was done in such a way so that the maximum number of forces could be committed into the fighting from the very beginning, to create an absolute superiority over the enemy and thus, as early as the beginning of the battle, determine its outcome. It is necessary; however, to keep in mind that in such operational planning the restoration of second echelons and reserves (when their arrival is not expected from the depth) must be carried out by removing part of the first-echelon’s forces from the fighting immediately following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. The creation of a dense concentration of forces along the axis of the

main attacks by maximally weakening the auxiliary axes was boldly and decisively realized by the front command, because a serious offensive by the enemy was excluded, while the presence of a powerful water line like the Don would fully secure the retention by our forces of the positions occupied along these axes. Such were the basic characteristics of the distribution and echeloning of the Southwestern Front’s forces along the sectors of the planned breakthrough.

Preparing the Operation

Troop training

The operation’s preparatory period embraces the end of November and the first half of December. The overall length of this stage was about 20 days. During the first days of December the front had already received two new rifle corps (six divisions), three tank corps and a large number of reinforcement units. This circumstance demanded that the front command, alongside the drawing up of plans for conducting the operation and its materiel support, carry out a great deal of work to throw together units and prepare them for the forthcoming combat operations. By 5 December, when the operational plans and other documents had basically been drawn up in the front and army headquarters, the troops had the opportunity to begin purposeful combat training in accordance with their forthcoming missions.

The front commander’s instructions in regard to the troops’ combat training came down to the following:

•to devise the organization of the troops’ combat formation for the breakthrough, to organize cooperation between the infantry, tanks, artillery and aviation during the attack and development of the battle in depth, to organize and secure the commitment of the mobile formations into the breach, as well as their activities in the depth of the enemy’s operational defense; •to teach the troops to consolidate their captured lines, to repel tank attacks and to combat the enemy’s aviation with their own weapons; •to train the command element and staffs to broadly employ radio communications equipment in the battle; •to plan for and teach the troops to maneuver on the battlefield for the purpose of attacking the enemy in the flank and rear and encircling him.

In accordance with these instructions, combat training commenced in all units and formations upon their concentration. The troops prepared theoretically and practically on site for the forthcoming battles. In order to disorganize the enemy’s command and control system, to seize his command posts and headquarters and to destroy his lines of communications, special select groups of bold soldiers and commanders were prepared, which were to get into the rear of the enemy’s position during the battle. Special “navigators”— commanders with the task of leading their unit (or elements) to its designated area at any time—were chosen and trained in all units.

Corps commanders carried out reconnaissance with the commanders of their divisions, attached units and artillery commanders before issuing orders to the divisions. The same sort of work was carried out by the division commanders with their regimental commanders, and the regimental commanders with their battalion commanders. The commander of the 1st Guards Army personally carried out exercises with unit commanders down to the regimental commanders, inclusively, while such exercises were conducted with corps and division commanders twice. A number of exercises on the forthcoming fighting were also conducted in the tank corps with the command element of the brigades and headquarters. For example, eight field rides to the combat area were conducted with the 25th Tank Corps’ command element, five tactical exercises on the theme of “The Commitment of Tank Corps into the Breach,” of which two were conducted on maps showing the dynamic nature of the battle in the enemy’s tactical and operational depth. Analogous work was carried out in the front’s other units and formations.

The Organization of Troop Control

The overall control over the operation’s preparation was exercised by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command through its representatives—Marshal of the Soviet Union comrade A.M. Vasilevskii,¹⁴ and Marshal of Artillery N.N. Voronov,¹⁵ as well as by means of the Stavka’s conversations with the front command through direct wire communications and personal interaction with the front leadership, when they were summoned to the Stavka. The control of the armies by the front command and staff during

the preparatory period for the operation was exercised chiefly through personal interaction by the front commander and his staff officers with the army commanders, and also through written directives, which were transmitted either personally, or through the command’s communications officers. The use of wire and radio communications during this period for problems of operational preparation was forbidden. Army plans were reviewed and amended by the front commander. During the preparatory period the front’s military council conducted several conferences with the army command, during which the details of the forthcoming combat operations were examined and refined. On 3 December an inter-front conference was held with the commander of the Voronezh Front on questions of coordinating the activities of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts in the forthcoming operation. The main communications and control equipment during the operation following the breakthrough were to be radio, mobile equipment and aircraft, as well as cable communications with the rifle formations and the armies. An important role during the preparatory period and the conduct of the operation was entrusted to communications officers. All the mobile formations were supplied with radio sets, through which they were to maintain contact with the headquarters of the front and armies and cooperating units. However, the power of the corps’ radio sets was not great, which is why communications could only be maintained through intermediate sets when the corps were far removed from the front and army headquarters. The front commander retained general control over the tank corps, without relieving the army commanders of responsibility for the

direct control of these formations during the operation. This duality of control can be explained, on the one hand, by the presence of powerful radio sets at front headquarters, which enabled the commander to control the corps if they were at a great distance from the army headquarters and, on the other hand, by the necessity of rapidly coordinating the activities of all the corps in case the situation at the front changed drastically. It was planned to decentralize the artillery following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. Air corps were attached to the armies, which were to employ them in a centralized fashion to the end of the operation. Thus rigid centralization of control was called for during the operation’s first stage. Foreseeing the difficulty of controlling the troops during a vigorous development of events, the front commander allowed the formation commanders the opportunity to manifest the broadest initiative directed at realizing the command’s overall plan. In order to assure command secrecy, a system of radio signals was drawn up; map coding for the front and armies, as well as coding the positions and names of the leading officers and generals. During the operation’s preparatory period, a number of training exercises were conducted on questions of general and secret control, particularly involving radio equipment. Preliminary work on questions of organizing cooperation between the armies, formations and combat arms, as well as on questions of troop control during the operation, to a significant degree, facilitated the operation’s success. However, the insufficient supply of communications equipment (particularly radios) and the officer element’s insufficient skill in correctly and professionally employing this equipment created certain difficulties during the operation that negatively affected troop control.

Measures for Ensuring Operational Secrecy

All the measures for concentrating and regrouping the troops were carried out while observing the strictest secrecy. An extremely limited number of individuals were privy to the command’s plan, even within the front staff. The front commander’s orders to the army commanders were transmitted only orally, in person, or sent through communications officers. Documents were drawn up by hand in a single copy by either the commander or the chief of staff. All conversations over the wire and correspondence on questions of the operation with the troops or among them were categorically forbidden. Radio sets were authorized only to receive. Troop movements to the concentration areas were conducted only at night. The elements and units occupied their jumping-off positions in secrecy. Oral commands, smoking, conversations and any kind of light signals were forbidden. Commanders responsible for concealment were appointed in the units. False regroupings and movements and reinforced reconnaissance along secondary axes were carried out to disorient the enemy on a large scale. The concentration, regroupings and the disposition of troops were also ensured by the activities of anti-aircraft defense, including fighter aviation. Moreover, particular attention was paid to covering the crossing areas over the Don and Chir rivers. The main mass of anti-aircraft weapons was concentrated here along the designated breakthrough sectors. As a result of the measures adopted, the enemy was not able to uncover in any reliable way the disposition of our forces and to determine the direction of the main attack. Although the enemy had information as to the attack being prepared and undertook

measures to repel it, the measures listed above ensured surprise, in the sense of time, axis and the force of the Red Army’s attacks.

Engineer support

During the operation’s preparatory period the engineering troops built six wooden bridges over the Don River, with a capacity of six, 16, 40 and 60 tons, for the timely concentration of men and materiel in the area of the Osetrovka bridgehead. Aside from these, 12 special ice crossings were built by strengthening the ice. Boats, sledges and travois for crossing the artillery and supply trains were built by hand from local materials. Besides this, bridges 8-10 meters long were built to cross tanks over small water obstacles. The 1st Guards Army’s engineering elements, on special vehicles with treadway bridges, were detached to the 18th and 25th tank corps as mobile groups to support and accompany the tanks. Storm groups and obstacle detachments were created and trained for making passages in the minefields and wire obstacles, as well as for sealing off and clearing mines from the enemy’s minefields left in our troops’ rear. At the same time, blocking groups were trained for destroying the enemy’s firing points and earth and timber pillboxes that survived the artillery preparation. The engineering troops built command and observation posts for the commanders of the armies, corps and divisions.

Materiel support

During the preparatory period and the operation itself the Southwestern Front was based on the Povorino—Liski and Povorino —Stalingrad railroads, which were 150-200 kilometers from the front line. Only the Talovaya—Kalach (Voronezh) rail spur approached the front’s right flank, some 70 kilometers from the 1st Guards Army’s area. The difficulty of materiel supply for the operation was exacerbated by the fact that the Voronezh and Don fronts were also based on these main lines. The underdeveloped and overloaded rail net presented the front and army commands with the problem of fully employing the dirt roads. The number and condition of the latter could fully make up for the shortage of railroad communications, although the shortage of auto transport told negatively on the timely supply of all kinds of ammunition, food and forage for the troops. The front’s main rail communication were divided among the armies in the following manner: the 1st Guards Army had the Aleksikovo— Uryupinsk sector; the 3rd Guards Army was based on the Kumylga station—excluding Filonovo sector, and; the 5th Tank Army on the Rakovka—excluding Kumylga station. The front regulating station was located in Balashov and the forward depots were distributed along the railroad in the Budarino and Filonovo areas. The army bases were distributed in Uryupinsk for the 1st Guards Army, in Panfilov and Kumylga for the 3rd Guards Army, and in Rakovka for the 5th Tank Army. Besides this, the armies deployed forward sections of their depots in the open for the main types of supplies. The following were unloading stations for the armies: Kalach

(Voronezh) for the 1st Guards Army, Kumylga for the 3rd Guards Army, and Log and Kachalino for the 5th Tank Army. Until the end of the December operation the basing of the front and armies was carried out with small changes on the same main railroad. The 6th Army, which was subordinated to the Southwestern Front on 19 December, had the railroad sector excluding Talovaya— Shirinkin. By the start of the operation the front’s provisioning was as follows, taking into account all supplies: 2.5 combat loads of rifle rounds, 1.5 combat loads of mortar rounds, up to 2.5 combat loads of artillery shells, up to four refills of fuel and lubricants, and 10-12 days of food and forage. Despite the presence at the bases of a sufficient amount of ammunition, fuel and food, the factual provision of the troops, as a result of the extended communications and auto transport, was significantly lower than planned. For example, despite a number of measures adopted to increase deliveries in the 1st Guards Army, the availability of ammunition by 16 December varied from 0.8 to 1.5 combat loads in the rifle divisions and 2-2.5 combat loads in the tank corps. In the 3rd Guards Army the overall amount of ammunition by 16 December varied from 1-1.5 combat loads. Thus the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s forces began in conditions of incomplete materiel supply, which told on the success of the artillery offensive and the pace of the operation. The above-listed measures during the preparatory period are only a part of the colossal work carried out by the front command and staff and troops. Nonetheless, the operation began with an incomplete concentration of forces (the 9th Artillery Division, a number of tank regiments, as well as the rear organs of a number of formations newly-arrived with the 1st Guards Army, failed to arrive) and with a significant under fulfillment of the plan for materiel supply. Such

circumstances created great additional difficulties in realizing the plan and influenced the pace of the operation.

General Conclusions

An examination of the preparation and planning for the Southwestern Front’s December offensive operation enables us to draw certain conclusions relating to the preparation of modern operations.

1. The enormous experience accumulated by the Red Army and its generals and officers during the Great Patriotic War, plus the great saturation of the armies with modern equipment, created conditions for planning and conducting large-scale deep operations, which usually go beyond the scope of individual fronts and have grown into operations of a strategic character, according to their goals and scale. The experience of the preceding November operation involving three fronts speaks eloquently of this, as does the plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation. The plan for the December offensive operation called for the operational interaction of the Voronezh, Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts. Moreover, the task of defeating the enemy’s main group of forces along the middle Don was entrusted to the Southwestern Front’s 1st and 3rd guards armies, with the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army operationally securing their activities. The elimination of the enemy’s lower Chir and Tormosin groups of forces was to be carried out by the forces of the Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army, in close coordination with the Stalingrad Front’s 5th Shock Army.

The basis of the enumerated fronts’ plans was the single idea of the Stavka of the Supreme High Comamnd—supporting the Don Front’s activities for completing the elimination of the Germans’ Sixth and Fourth Panzer armies encircled around Stalingrad.

2. The character of the majority of major modern operations demands the coordination of the activities of several fronts, in order that the planned operations issue not only from the tasks assigned directly to the fronts, but that they should support, in the final analysis, the achievement of an overall strategic goal in the overall plan of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. The plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation was drawn up under the direct control of the Stavka and according to its directives underwent changes in connection with the rapidly developing situation in the area to the southwest of Stalingrad.

3. A particular method of controlling fronts and armies developed during the Great Patriotic War, which flows from the overall character of the ongoing war, the difficulty of modern operations, the degree of the Red Army’s technical supply, the level of the troops’ training, and the generals’ and officers’ level of skill. This method is expressed in the fact that the Stavka and front are not limited to assigning overall tasks to subordinate formations, but rather actively participate in the drawing up of operational plans, determining the content and method of their conduct.

4. The plan for the Southwestern Front’s December operation, despite the specificity of conditions in which it was to be conducted (a shallow defense, an absence of the enemy’s powerful reserves, the insufficiently stable enemy along the front’s right flank—the Italians and Romanians), deserves special attention in studying the

modern front offensive operation. This plan was aimed at defeating an entire enemy army, with the simultaneous arrival in the rear of another large enemy group of forces. The depth of the planned operation was about 220 kilometers and one may judge the vigorous pace of its conduct by the length of the operation, which, according to the plan, was to be completed on the sixth day after the start of the offensive. The plan foresaw a concentric envelopment of a major enemy group of forces along with the simultaneous splintering of the enemy’s defensive front and the destruction of his forces in detail. The shock groups of two armies were to carry out operational cooperation, being separated from each other by a distance of 230 kilometers. The operational plan foresaw a simultaneous attack to the entire depth of the tactical and operational zone of the enemy’s defense. The leading role in this operation was reserved for the tank and mechanized formations. Their pace of attack was planned at an average of 55-60 kilometers per day in winter conditions. All of this data testifies to the fact that the planned operation completely corresponded to the spirit and character of modern operations and was an expression of the high level of the Red Army’s operational art.

5. The experience of the Great Patriotic War once again confirmed that given the modern character of the defense along the axes of the main attacks of the attacking armies it is necessary to have a significant superiority in suppression and destruction weapons in order to have the opportunity of destroying as quickly as possible the enemy’s defensive system, to create conditions for breaking through his defense and completing the breakthrough before the enemy can bring up his reserves from the depth to the breakthrough sector. As is evident from the material enumerated above, the

Southwestern Front command was able to create just such a concentration of forces along the breakthrough sectors, which, in the given situation, gave us the opportunity to carry out the tasks placed before the front.

6. In order to break through modern permanent and deep defenses, it is necessary to deeply echelon the troops. The attack must be uninterruptedly augmented by the commitment into the battle of follow-on echelons, in order to constantly maintain a superiority of forces and to retain the initiative in one’s hand to the end of the operation. However, there may be cases when the enemy’s defense will be limited to the tactical zone and he will have no operational reserves along the axis of our attack. In this case, while breaking through the defense, the enemy will have to bring up forces from other axes in order to eliminate the breakthrough, which will demand a minimum of 3-5 days. The planning for the Southwestern Front’s December operation took place in just such conditions. Thus the operational formation of the front’s troops differed somewhat from the generally accepted formation. Of the armies’ 19 rifle divisions and two rifle brigades along the attack axis (including the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army, which was carrying out the same mission as the Southwestern Front), 17 divisions and one brigade were located in the first echelon and were to enter the fighting simultaneously. Four tank and one mechanized corps were located behind the divisions of the attack axis, of which three tank and one mechanized corps were to also simultaneously enter the fighting as soon as the infantry broke through the forward edge of the defense. Two rifle divisions and one rifle brigade comprised the three armies’ reserve. There were no front reserves.

7. The success of the modern operation more than ever before depends upon the secrecy of its preparation and the surprise of the attack. Should the enemy manage to discover beforehand the idea, forces and axis of the attacker’s blow, he will be able to bring up to the planned breakthrough sector sufficient forces he needs to parry the attacker’s blows and to foil the entire offensive plan. The Southwestern Front command performed a great service in that it was able, by secretly concentrating and regrouping its forces and by means of disinformation and demonstrations, to deceive the enemy as regards our actual intentions and the composition of our forces. As a result of all of these measures, the enemy, although he knew in general terms about the planned offensive, the strength and scope of the attack by the armies of the Southwestern Front proved unexpected for him.

8. The materiel supply of the troops and planning the work of the rear organs occupies a particularly important place in the planning and preparation of the modern operation. The success of the modern operation depends, to a significant degree, on how these tasks are resolved. In the Southwestern Front’s December operation the tasks of materiel-technical support were the most complex of those that the front command was called upon to resolve. Here, of course, the extremely difficult conditions in the theater of military activities, in which the operation was prepared and was to unfold, made themselves felt. During the course of the entire winter campaign the front was based upon a single railroad, Liski—Povorino—Stalingrad. Because of this, the dirt sectors of the military roads, which were heavily extended before the beginning of the operation, had to become more and more extended with each day of the operation’s development. This circumstance, given the extremely limited

amount of auto transport, led to a situation in which the operation began against a background in which there was a significant under fulfillment of the plan for supplying the troops with fuel and ammunition. The conclusion inevitably arises that in the modern military organism, given its saturation with a large number of mechanized forces and a mass of firepower, the motorization of the rear must be proportional to the technical saturation of the troops. The motorization of the rear must at least be at such a level that the rear be in a condition to deliver, in a limited period of time, to the troops an amount of fuel and ammunition necessary to conduct an operation, the success of which in modern conditions is decided by great mobility and massed fire.

9. In the final analysis, the Southwestern Front command, under the Stavka’s leadership, compiled a bold and fully realizable operational plan, based upon a sober consideration of the developing situation, the tasks facing the front, and the presence of forces for carrying out these tasks. At the same time, the realization of this required great bravery, decisiveness, initiative, vigorous actions, and the maximum exertion of spiritual and physical forces from the troops, officers and generals. As is known, the Southwestern Front’s forces carried out the mission assigned to them. The enemy was defeated and the front’s troops, following a regrouping of forces, went on to carry out a new and even more grandiose task, which comprised the content of the front’s subsequent operations during the winter campaign of 194243.

1Editor’s note. The Stavka of the Supreme High Command ( Stavka

Verkhovnogo Glavnokomandovaniya ) was the highest wartime military body in the Soviet Union. 2The article “The Breakthrough and the Southwestern Front’s Forces’ Activities in the Operational Depth of the Enemy’s Defense” will appear in Sbornik no. 9. Editor’s note. This article, under a slightly different title, constitutes part II of this study. 3Editor’s note. This refers to the Stalingrad counteroffensive operation of November, 1942. 4Editor’s note. This is a mistake, as there was no Central Front. The author here is evidently referring to the area occupied by Army Group Center. 5By the start of the operation the Southwestern Front’s defensive line ran along the Don from Verkhnii Mamon, and from 19 December and the inclusion of the 6th Army in the Southwestern Front, from Novaya Kalitva. 6For the detail disposition of the Italian Eighth Army’s corps and divisions, see the article “The Disposition and Composition of the Third Romanian and Eighth Italian Armies on the Don.” 7Editor’s note. Dmitrii Danilovich Lelyushenko (1901-87) served as partisan in the Russian civil war and joined the Red Army in 1919. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a mechanized corps and a rifle corps and went on to command a combined-arms army and a tank army. Following the war, Lelyushenko served as an army and military district commander. 8Editor’s note. Prokofii Longvinovich Romanenko (1897-1949) joined the Russian imperial army in 1914 and the Red Army in 1918. He later served in the Spanish civil war and in the 1939-40 war with Finland. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a number of armies. Following the war, Romanenko commanded a military district.

9Editor’s note. Vasilii Ivanovich Kuznetsov (1894-1974) joined the Russian imperial army in 1915 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded several armies and also served as a deputy front commander. Following the war, Kuznetsov served as a military district commander and also worked in the army’s central administrative apparatus. 10 Editor’s note. Erich von Manstein (1887-1973) joined the imperial German army in 1906. He served in the First World War and later with the postwar Reichswehr . During the Second World War he served as an army group chief of staff and later commanded a corps and army on the Eastern Front. In November 1942 he was appointed commander of Army Group Don (later, South), where he served with distinction until his relief by Hitler in March 1944. Following the war, Manstein spent several years in prison for war crimes, until his release in 1953. 11 In accordance with Stavka directives nos. 994284 and 994285 of 5 December, General Kuznetsov’s operational group retained the name of 1st Guards Army (4th and 6th guards rifle corps, 153rd Rifle Division, 18th Tank Corps); the 3rd Guards Army under General Lelyushenko was created from the remaining formations of the former 1st Guards Army (14th Rifle Corps, 50th Guards, 157th, 197th, and 278th rifle divisions, and the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps). 12 Editor’s note. The original offensive plan (“Saturn”) called for Soviet forces to advance southwest on Rostov, in order to cut off the German forces engaged in the Northern Caucasus. The revised and less ambitious plan was appropriately dubbed “Little Saturn.” 13 Editor’s note. The M-30 was the 300-caliber variant of the Soviet multiple rocket launcher system, mounted on trucks. This weapon was popularly known as “Katyusha” and first appeared in 1941. These weapons were organized into guards mortar units.

14 Editor’s note. Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevskii (1895-1977) joined the Russian imperial army in 1915 and the Red Army in 1919. During the Great Patriotic War he served in the General Staff apparatus and was appointed chief of staff in 1942. In 1945 he was made a member of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. He also served as a Stavka representative to several fronts , where he coordinated their activities. In 1945 Vasilevskii commanded the Third Belorussian Front and served as commander-in-chief of Soviet forces in the Far East during the brief war with Japan. Following the war, he again served as chief of staff and minister of the armed forces. 15 Editor’s note. Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov (1899-1968) joined the Red Army in 1918 and made his way through the ranks of its artillery branch. During the Great Patriotic War he served as chief of the Main Anti-Aircraft Defense Directorate and head of the army’s artillery branch. He also served as a Stavka representative with several fronts . Following the war, Voronov occupied a number of posts in the army’s central administrative apparatus.

2

The Disposition and Composition of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth Armies on the Don During the summer campaign of 1942 the supreme command of the German-Fascist army employed allied troops chiefly for securing the flanks of its groups of forces attacking toward the Caucasus, Stalingrad and Voronezh. With the arrival of the German forces at the Don, the main goal, which the German command assigned the Hungarian, Italian and Romanian forces, was to cover the further offensive operations of the southern group of German forces operating along the eastern and southern directions, by means of a firm defense, relying on a water barrier. The arrival of the allied forces at the Don and their relief of the German formations were carried out consecutively, beginning with the area south of Voronezh and ending with the Kletskaya sector. In the beginning, the Hungarian forces arrived and took up defensive positions along the Don south of Voronezh, followed by the Italian Expeditionary Corps along the middle Don, and finally, units of the Romanian Third Romanian Army were moved up to the Serafimovich axis. By the end of September 1942 the arrival of the allied forces at the Don had been essentially completed. By this time the allied forces had been organizationally united as follows: the Romanians into the Romanian Third Army, the Italians into the Italian Eighth Army, and

the Hungarians into the Hungarian Second Army. The Romanian Third and Italian Eighth armies (the latter lacking a corps) were located opposite the Southwestern Front, while the Hungarian Second Army and an Italian corps operated against the Voronezh Front. Each of these armies operated within its own boundaries and with a defensive sector, the retention of which it was responsible for before the German command. German units were located within the allied forces’ combat formations along the most important axes and controlled the activities of their allies and their preparation of defensive positions. The overall length of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth armies’ front reached 350 kilometers. In all, up to 26 divisions were located along this front, of which 13 were Romanian, ten were Italian, and three were German. The greatest operational density (15 kilometers per division) was created along the Romanian Third Army’s front. Upon their arrival at the Don, units of the allied armies immediately begin to outfit defensive positions and prepare them for operations in winter conditions. In Hitler’s order no. 420817/42 of 14 October 1942, the task of the Eastern Front’s forces for the winter campaign and an evaluation of the existing situation were formulated in the following manner:

The troops of the Eastern Front, with the exception of those sectors where combat operations are taking place, or where they are expected, have the mission of defending their defensive line, at any cost, against the enemy’s attempts to break through. Preparations for the winter campaign are in full swing. A second Russian winter will find us ready and better prepared. The Russian forces, which

have declined significantly as a result of the latest fighting, are no longer capable of putting into the winter fighting of 1942-43 the kind of forces that they did in the last winter campaign. Whatever happens, a harsher and more difficult winter cannot be.

Further on, in speaking about the specific tasks of the troops on the defensive, Hitler wrote in his order:

1. The winter defensive line must be held at all costs. 2. We must wage an active defense everywhere, so as not to let the enemy rest and to deceive him as to our intentions. 3. If the enemy attacks, one should not avoid battle and employ an operational withdrawal. 4. Where the enemy has broken through, it is necessary to hold him off, while those positions along our front untouched by the enemy must be defended at all costs, so that they may serve as jumping-off points for launching countermeasures. 5. Those formations that have been cut off or encircled must defend to the last drop of blood until they are freed. The commanders are personally responsible to me for the fulfillment of these orders.

It is evident from Hitler’s order that there was one decisive demand placed on the troops during the winter period—to stubbornly defend their lines. The high command of the German army miscalculated on this score, having underestimated the Soviet Union’s forces and capabilities. The first attack along the Don against the German-Fascist divisions, against the armies of the enemy’s allies and his communications was launched by the forces of the Southwestern Front, in conjunction with the Don and Stalingrad fronts.

By the start of the November and December operations the enemy forces facing the Southwestern Front disposed of the forces listed in Table I/2.1.

Table I/2.1 Enemy Forces Facing the Southwestern Front, November/December 1942

The Romanian Third Army

The Romanian Army’s Condition by the Fall of 1942

By the fall of 1942 Romania disposed of armed forces in the form of 19 infantry divisions, six cavalry divisions, four mountain rifle divisions, one panzer and one guards divisions (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 14th, 15th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21st infantry divisions; 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th mountain rifle divisions; 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th cavalry divisions; 1st Guards Panzer Division, as well as a border division and a gendarme corps). All the divisions were organizationally subordinated to seven army corps (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, and VII), a mountain rifle and cavalry corps; the corps were organized into three armies, of which:

•The First Army was stationed in Romania and was commanded by General Macic Sibio. ¹ •The Third Army was stationed on the Soviet-German front along the middle course of the Don River and was commanded by General Dumitrescu. ² •The Fourth Army (being formed) was also located on the SovietGerman front and was commanded by General Constantinescu. ³

Among artillery reinforcements, the Romanian army disposed of eight heavy artillery regiments (1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th) from the high command and seven independent heavy battalions. The army was completely outfitted with rank and file and equipment, although in order to do this the Romanian government had to call up reservists up to 50 years old. One battalion from each infantry regiment from the divisions operating on the SovietGerman front and a single battalion from all the artillery regiments from corps and army artillery remained in Romania for purposes of the army’s further deployment. These elements were simultaneously designated for guarding Romania’s borders. By the winter of 1942-43 units operating on the Soviet-German front were fully supplied with winter clothes, while sufficient stores of food and a month’s supply of ammunition had been created. The divisions, despite the cadres remaining in Romania, had an average strength of 13-14,000 men and their weaponry was up to authorized strength. The troops’ combat training, especially the infantry’s, was at a low level. The artillery and mortar units were well trained.

The Composition of the Romanian Third Army

The Third Army consisted of the following: four army corps, two cavalry divisions, a panzer division, four heavy corps artillery regiments, and a single heavy artillery battalion. The organizational and combat composition of the Romanian Third Army, as of 15 December 1942, is shown in Table I/2.2.

Table I/2.2 Organizational and Combat Composition of the Romanian Third Army, 15 December 1942

Organizational and Combat CompositionNumber Notes Infantry Divisions 8 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 13th, 14th, and 15th Cavalry Divisions 2 1st and 7th cavalry divs Panzer Divisions 1 1st Panzer Division Heavy Artillery Regiments 4 2nd, 4th, 5th, and 8th heavy artillery rgts Heavy Artillery Battalions 1 41st Artillery Battalion Soldiers and Officers 130,000 The 15th Infantry Division, 7th Cavalry Divisi Machine Guns 4,500 Mortars 1,100 Anti-Tank Guns 680 Field Guns 480 Heavy Guns 92 Anti-Aircraft Guns 140-150 Tanks 130

The Defense Plan

Guided in its conduct of the 1942-43 winter campaign by Hitler’s order, which demanded that the allied forces, including the Romanian Third Army, hold at all costs the defensive line reached by the winter of 1942, the Romanian army command assigned its forces the main task of preventing the possible breakthrough by the Red Army’s forces to the south from the Don and thus secure the activities of the German forces around Stalingrad and in the Northern Caucasus. The Romanian Third Army had not trained for active offensive operations during the course of the winter. Having been fully convinced by the Hitlerite drivel as to the Red Army’s inability to launch offensive operations, the Romanian Third Army counted on sitting out the winter along the Don, having deeply entrenched in the earth and having blocked the approaches to the defensive line with barbed wire obstacles and minefields. The army’s defensive plan chiefly counted on stubborn resistance by the first line, which was occupied by the main mass of troops (eight divisions) and on a well-prepared system of artillery fire in front of the forward edge of the defense, which was to disrupt an offensive by the Red Army’s units before they reached the defensive line. In order to eliminate possible breakthroughs, a mobile reserve consisting of the 1st Panzer Division, the 7th Cavalry Division and the 15th Infantry Division was located in the army’s second echelon. At the same time, the Romanian command placed great hopes on timely aid from the German forces in case of a serious attack by units of the Red Army. According to the German command’s plan, in the beginning of November units of the 22nd Panzer Division and

the XLVIII Panzer Corps began concentrating, for the purpose of launching a concentric attack from the Chernyshevskaya and Perelazovskii areas to destroy the Red Army’s forces in case they broke through the Romanian Third Army’s front. The Romanian Third Army command considered the sector opposite the V and IV army corps in the direction of Kletskaya the most likely axes of the Red Army’s attack, for which reason these corps were more supplied with artillery weapons at the expense of the other corps’ artillery. Up to the middle of October 1942 the Romanian command in no way expected active offensive operations by units of the Red Army and thus did not adopt any kind of special measures for strengthening its defense. Only at the end of October, having received some information about preparations for the Red Army’s offensive on the Don, did the Romanian command issue a special order to its troops, in which the following missions were laid down.

•to fortify the defensive zone by deepening the trenches to a man’s height and creating new positions in the defensive depth; •to strengthen the covering of observation posts and firing points, create trenches for tank destroyers, to lay down additional wire obstacles and plant anti-personnel minefields along all possible approaches to the forward edge; •to fortify heights so that the reserves located there would have a ready defense in case they would have to fight; •to organize anti-tank obstacles (ditches, barricades, minefields) in the defensive depth along the main axes open for tank infiltration; •to review the infantry’s fire plan and to refine questions of its interaction with the artillery; to refine the plan for artillery fire so

that the artillery would operate only by concentrated massed fire; to adopt all necessary measures for rapidly maneuvering the artillery, particularly heavy guns; •to reconnoiter within the corps all possible axes for attack by enemy tanks and to indicate to the tanks where the firing positions of the anti-tank artillery (particularly 75mm guns) are located.

In the opinion of the Romanian command, all of these measures were supposed to strengthen the Romanian army’s defense; but they were not realized because only a few days remained before the start of the Red Army’s offensive. If the Romanian command did manage to fortify its first defensive line, then, as before, they had not been able to create any defensive zones in the defensive depth.

The Third Army’s Disposition in the Defense

The army occupied defensive positions of 130 kilometers in length along the sector Baskovskaya—Yarkovskii (northeast of Kletskaya), with the forward edge running along the line Baskovskaya— Yagodnyi—Bol’shoi—Raspopinskaya—Yarkovskii. Seven infantry and one cavalry divisions were in the first line of defense. The second line contained as an army reserve one infantry, one panzer and one cavalry divisions. The average operational density of the defense in the first line was 15 kilometers per division. The average tactical density (per kilometer of front) was as follows: 1,000 men, 34 machine guns, eight mortars, 4.5 anti-tank guns, 3.5 field guns, 0.8 heavy guns, and 1 tank. The army’s formations were deployed as follows:

I Army Corps (7th and 11th infantry divisions), Bakovskaya— excluding height 226 (four kilometers east of Yagodnyi); the defensive front was 30 kilometers;

II Army Corps (9th and 14th infantry divisions), height 226—Bol’shoi —height 220 (12 kilometers northeast of Bol’shoi); the defensive front was 32 kilometers;

V Army Corps (5th and 6th infantry divisions), excluding height 220 (12 kilometers northeast of Bol’shoi)—Raspopinskaya; the defensive front was 36 kilometers;

IV Army Corps (13th Infantry Division, 1st Cavalry Division and the 15th Infantry Division’s 12th Infantry Regiment), excluding Raspopinskaya—Kletskaya—Yarkovskii; the defensive front was 30 kilometers.

The army reserve was located as follows: the 7th Cavalry Division in the Pronin area; the 1st Panzer Division in the Perelazovskii area; the 15th Infantry Division (minus the 12th Infantry Regiment) in the Verkhne-Solomakovskii area.

The Disposition of the Army’s Artillery

A total of 14 artillery regiments of divisional artillery were operating along the army’s front, consisting of 84 batteries, four regiments and one independent battalion of heavy corps artillery, consisting of 23 batteries, for a total of 107 batteries. The disposition of the artillery by corps was as follows:

I Army Corps—four regiments of divisional artillery and an independent heavy battalion, for a total of 108 guns, of which 48 were 75mm, 48 100mm and 12 105mm;

II Army Corps—four regiments of divisional artillery and a regiment of corps artillery, for a total of 116 guns, of which 48 were 75mm, 48 were 100mm, 12 were 105mm, and eight 150mm;

IV Army Corps—four regiments of divisional artillery, the 4th Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment of corps artillery, for a total of 124 guns, of which 48 were 75mm, 16 were 100mm, and 12 were 150mm;⁴

V Army Corps—four regiments of divisional artillery, the 8th Artillery Regiment and the 1st Battalion of the 5th Artillery Regiment of corps artillery, for a total of 128 guns, of which 48 were 75mm, 48 were 100mm, 20 were 105mm, and 12 150mm.

The densest grouping of the Third Army’s artillery was along the front of the IV and V army corps.

The Organization of the Romanian Third Army’s Defense

The army’s formations occupied defensive positions along a front of 15 kilometers per division; and this was in conditions when each division numbered only six battalions. The divisions, as a rule, occupied defensive positions with all three regiments in the first line, having in reserve 1-1.5 battalions. Despite the fact that the army had a sufficient amount of time to create a developed system of defensive structures, by echeloning them in depth, this was not done. Fully-developed trenches and light timber and earth pillboxes, connected by communications trenches, overhead covers and dugouts for quarters had been prepared. A barbed wire network crisscrossed the main axes of the approaches to the forward edge, and in certain cases covered the company positions from all sides. Mining the terrain in front of the forward edge of the defense was widely practiced. Command posts were dug into the earth and had cover from the fire of field artillery. The insufficiency of fortifications for the positions is explained by the lack of transport, on the one hand, and on the other by the fact that the Romanian command did not believe in the Red Army’s offensive capabilities. At the last moment, 2-3 weeks before the start of our offensive, the Romanian command adopted a number of measures aimed at strengthening its defensive positions, but due to a shortage of time it did not manage to do anything serious in this regard. The basis of the fire system in the defense was covered machine gun nests along the forward edge of the defense, supplemented by fire from open rifle and machine gun trenches. The mortar and anti-tank gun positions were located at an insignificant depth and had reserve lines. Of particular interest is the organization of the system of artillery

fire. Against the background of all the shortcomings in the organization of the defense, the Romanian Third Army’s artillery was well prepared for defensive activities. All approaches to the forward edge of the defense were covered by concentrated fire from divisional and corps artillery; a good system of barrage fire immediately along the approaches to the forward edge had been worked out, as well as in the depth of the defensive position. All lines had been previously registered and the control for concentrating massed fire against this or that defensive sector had been well organized. A widespread system of observation posts supported the conduct of observed fire along all the main axes, as well as oblique and flanking fire. All the artillery batteries had prepared reserve firing positions and observation posts.

The Enemy’s Evaluation of the Romanian Army’s Defeat

From the beginning of the offensive by the Red Army’s units on 19 November 1942 the Romanian command made great efforts to prevent the breakthrough of its defense along the II Army Corps’ sector in the direction of Bol’shoi, and that of the IV Army Corps in the direction of Kletskaya, combining a rigid defense by the units along the forward edge with numerous counterattacks by the regimental and divisional reserves.⁵ The Southwestern Front’s powerful blows crushed the enemy’s resistance. The forces of the Romanian Third Army rapidly melted away in the course of ten days of bitter fighting. By 29 November the II, IV and V army corps, and the 1st and 7th cavalry and 1st Panzer divisions had been completely routed. About 90,000 soldiers and officers had either been captured or killed. The remnants of the defeated and demoralized units, lacking weapons, ran in panic behind the Chir and Severskii Donets rivers.

It is of no small interest the quote the enemy’s comments on the activities of our forces and the reasons for the defeat of the Romanian Third Army. The Romanian generals and officers rate highly the actions of the Red Army’s units and the control of the operation on the part of the Soviet command. For example, Gen. Mazarini⁶ (the commander of the 5th Infantry Division and the former deputy chief of staff of the Romanian army) offers the following explanation of the reasons for the defeat in short order of the Romanian army, which was defending in well-prepared positions:

The splitting and thus the destruction of the army in detail could take have taken place only thanks to the great mobility of the troops, both motorized and infantry. The concentration of such a large mass of troops along a comparatively narrow sector of the front was carried out with the Romanian command being completely ignorant, although there was information about the offensive under preparation. The correctly chosen axis of the main attack where the Romanian troops did not expect it also, in its turn, had great significance.

Aside from this, according to testimony by the majority of captured Romanian generals and senior officers, the Romanian Third Army suffered a defeat for the following reasons:

•the defending troops’ overextension; in some cases a battalion had to defend 5-6 kilometers of front; •the absence of deep operational reserves and the incorrect employment of the army’s reserves, mainly the 1st Panzer and 7th

Cavalry divisions, which were thrown into a counterblow against the Red Army’s motorized and mechanized forces and, as a result, were completely routed in meeting engagements (in the opinion of many prisoners, these divisions should have occupied defensive positions in the depth along the axis of our main attack); •the absence of a prepared defensive line in the depth of the army’s position, along which second echelons might have offered resistance and even stopped the further offensive by the Red Army’s forces; •the incorrect determination of the Red Army’s main attack axis by the German and Romanian command, as a result of which the wrong sectors were strengthened, as opposed to the right ones; •the insufficient provisioning of the Third Army’s forces, located in the first line, with ammunition, which led to a situation whereby as early as 20 November, with the arrival of the Red Army’s tank units at the corps’ communications, the delivery of ammunition ceased and the troops began to experience extreme shortages; •the low morale condition of the Romanian army’s soldiers and officers; soldiers and officers separated by thousands of kilometers from their country were not particularly desirous of fighting against the USSR on the side of Germany; •the failure of the German command to render the promised assistance to the Third Army’s forces, upon which they had placed great hopes.

All of these reasons, in the opinion of the Romanian generals and officers, led to a situation in which the army was unable to hold its occupied defensive line and, what is more, was not able to put up serious resistance to the offensive by the Red Army’s forces, with the exception of the units of the 4th and 5th infantry divisions, which even while encircled showed sufficient fortitude and organization.

The Italian Eighth Army

The Army’ Composition

All of the Italian forces operating on the Don were organizationally grouped into the Italian Eighth Expeditionary Army, which included the II Army Corps, an Alpine Corps and an Expeditionary Corps, which was renamed the XXXV Army Corps in September. Besides this, the Eighth Army had been reinforced with special units and fascist troops (up to 12 battalions of Blackshirts),⁷ which arrived from Italy mainly in November and in the first days of December 1942. The Expeditionary Corps arrived in Russia first and consisted of four divisions: “Pasubio,” “Torino,” “Celere,” and “Sforzesca.” The corps had been reinforced with artillery, mortars, and sapper and chemical units. The Alpine Corps had earlier operated in the Caucasus, after which it was transferred to the Don, and included three divisions: “Cuneense,” “Tridentina” and “Julia.” The II Army Corps reached the Don in August, having two divisions: “Cosseria” and “Ravenna.” The 156th Infantry Division “Vicenza” was located in the army reserve in the Kupyansk area. Table I/2.3 shows the organizational and combat composition of the Italian Eighth Army as of December 15 1942.

Table I/2.3 Organizational and Combat Composition of the Italian Eighth Army, 15 December 1942

In November and December the divisions received reinforcements of 1,200 to 1,300 men apiece. The strength of the divisions was raised to 9-10,000 men by the second half of December.

The Army’s Disposition

On 15 December 1942 the Italian Eighth Army occupied defensive positions along the Don on a front reaching 220 kilometers, with its densest group of forces along the Boguchar axis. In all, there were eight infantry and one motorized divisions in the first line of defense. The Germans’ 298th Infantry Division occupied defensive positions along the boundary between the Italians’ II and XXXV army corps, covering Boguchar from the north, and the Germans’ 318th Infantry Regiment was defending between the 3rd Infantry Division “Ravenna” and the 5th Infantry Division “Cosseria.” The 156th Infantry Division “Vicenza” and two brigades of Blackshirts were in the second line. The average operational density was 25 kilometers per division; the greatest density (15 kilometers per division) had been created by the Italian army command in the Don bend along the Boguchar— Novaya Kalitva sector. In the first half of December the Germans’ 27th Panzer and 385th Infantry divisions, which were also moving along the Boguchar axis, were transferred from the Voronezh Front to reinforce the Italian Eighth Army. The situation of the Italian forces on the defensive on 16 December was as follows.

II Army Corps. The corps’ headquarters was in Taly.

5th Infantry Division “Cosseria”: Novaya Kalitva—excluding Derezovka (25 kilometers), with the headquarters in Pisarevka.

3rd Infantry Division “Ravenna”: height 158.1 (five kilometers west of Krasno-Orekhovoe)—Tikhii Don (15 kilometers), with the headquarters in Tverdokhlebova.

The German 298th Infantry Division: Solontsy—Galievka— Tereshkova (24 kilometers), with the headquarters in Boguchar.

XXXV Army Corps. The corps’ headquarters was in AlekseevoLozovskaya.

9th Infantry Division “Pasubio”: excluding Tereshkova— Monastyrshchina (24 kilometers), with the headquarters in Medovo.

52nd Infantry Division “Torino”: Sukhoi Donets—Garmilovskii (25 kilometers), with the headquarters in Makarov.

3rd Infantry Division “Celere”, which relieved the Germans’ 62nd Infantry Division on 20 November 1942: Stogovskoi—Kalinovskii (30

kilometers), with the headquarters in Meshkov.

2nd Infantry Division “Sforzesca”: excluding Kalinovskii— Baskovskaya (24 kilometers), with the location of the headquarters unknown.

The “Sforzesca” division was operationally subordinated to the Germans’ XXIX Army Corps, which was operating along the Bokovskaya axis.

The Alpine Corps, consisting of three divisions (“Julia,” “Cuneense” and “Tridentina”), occupied defensive positions along the Don north of Novaya Kalitva.

The disposition of the artillery

In all, the Eighth Army disposed of ten divisional artillery regiments, with each regiment having 12 100mm howitzers and 24 75mm guns. In all, there were 240 75mm guns and 120 100mm guns. Corps artillery contained three artillery regiments, with two of them containing five battalions and one having three. In all, there were 108 105mm guns and 48 149mm guns. There were four independent heavy artillery battalions, with each having two batteries of 149mm guns and one battery of 210mm howitzers. In all, there were 32 149mm guns and 16 210mm guns.

There was an independent light anti-tank artillery regiment with 36 75mm guns. There were 216 anti-tank guns in the infantry regiments and divisions. In all, the army disposed of 144 45mm, 348 75mm, 120 100mm, 108 105mm, 80 149mm, and 16 210mm guns. In all, there were 816 guns. Each corps in the defense was reinforced with 1-2 battalions of heavy artillery and a battalion of army anti-tank guns. The divisions, as a rule, were reinforced with 1-2 battalions of corps artillery, 1-2 batteries of heavy artillery and 1-2 mortar batteries; for example, the 3rd Infantry Division “Ravenna” had attached to it 149mm howitzers from the 2nd Corps Artillery Regiment’s 103rd Battalion, while the 3rd Infantry Division “Celere” had attached to it the 73rd Independent Heavy Battalion, consisting of three batteries; the 52nd Infantry Division “Torino” had been reinforced with a battalion from the XXXV Corps’ Artillery Regiment, the 24th Independent Heavy Battalion and the 5th and 9th independent mortar battalions. In a division’s defensive sector (20-25 kilometers) there were 60-70 mortars, 26-28 anti-tank guns, 44-50 light guns, and 8-12 heavy guns. In all, there were up to 70-80 guns per division, which comes out to three guns per kilometer of front.

The immediate reserves of the II and XXXV Army Corps

There were no immediate operational reserves in the army from line units by the start of the operation, The Italian command filled in this gap with fascist troops (Blackshirts). Each army corps had a brigade of Blackshirts as a reserve, consisting of six battalions of infantry and

accompaniment artillery. 1-2 battalions of Blackshirts operated in a division’s defensive sector as the division commander’s shock groups. All of the fascist troops were mainly employed for counterattacks along axes dangerous for the enemy. Part of the fascist battalions was committed into the fighting during 11-14 December 1942. The 156th Infantry Division “Vicenza” guarded the army’s rear and communications in the Kupyansk area and did not take part in the December operation.

The Defensive Plan

The Italian Eighth Army had the mission of covering the Rossosh’— Millerovo rail line by means of a rigid defense along the southern bank of the Don and prevent the arrival of the Red Army’s units at the deep communications of the German forces operating against Stalingrad and in the Caucasus. The densest group of forces in the tactical defensive zone and a broadly developed network of engineering structures had been created along the Boguchar— Novaya Kalitva sector. The corps reserves were also mainly stationed along this axis. A second defensive zone had not been prepared. The enemy calculated on preventing a breakthrough of his defensive zone through a well-organized system of fire, in conjunction with engineering obstacles and counterattacks by tactical reserves. Thus the Italian Eighth Army command planned to fight only in the tactical defensive zone to a depth of 5-6 kilometers. In case of a breakthrough by the Red Army’s units along the Boguchar axis, it was planned to launch a counterblow with German forces (27th Panzer and 385th Infantry divisions) from the line Taly

—Novaya Kalitva to the east. The course of events showed that the Germans were not able to realize the planned counterblow.

The Organization of the Defense

The location of the Italian forces in the defense had its specific features:

•units in the defense were located along a broad front, with the greatest density along the Boguchar axis; the divisions occupied defensive sectors 15-25 kilometers broad, having four battalions in the first echelon and two battalions in the second; •the defense was up to five kilometers deep for a division and up to 2-3 kilometers for a regiment; •the divisions had been on the defensive for 5-6 months; this was a perimeter defense, with platoon and company strong points; •fascist troops (Blackshirts), numbering 1-2 battalions per division, were used in the defense as shock groups; •German units (298th Infantry Division and the 318th Infantry Regiment) were defending along the boundaries between the Italian corps; •there were no operational reserves and no prepared lines in the defensive depth.

During 11-14 December, when our forces were carrying out

reconnaissance in force along the main axis, the commanders of the Italian divisions and regiments took such measures to be a general offensive and during this period committed into the fighting almost all their regimental and part of their divisional reserves. The defensive zone was organized by the Italian units according to the principle of sectors and strong points. Strong points were built for perimeter defense; their garrisons consisted of infantry reinforced with anti-tank guns, mortars, and sapper and flamethrower elements. The organizational basis for building defensive positions was the platoon strong point, which involved perimeter defense. Strong points were located along the forward edge of the defensive zone, near inhabited locales, and on heights towering above the terrain in the depth of the defense. Light earth and timber pillboxes were the chief defensive structures in the strong points. A wire network of 1-2 rows was widely employed from infantry and anti-tank obstacles, as well as mining terrain sectors open to tanks (roads, gullies and approaches to the forward edge and inhabited locales). All the defensive structures had been built to repel our forces’ attack and for prolonged habitation by the defending garrison in winter. The construction of the Italian army’s defensive zone was carried out under the supervision of German officers. The captured commander of the “Ravenna” division’s 38th Infantry Regiment testified on this question:

There was a German general in the corps headquarters, who was a representative of the German command and who inspected the defensive construction work. The Germans demanded that there be four-layered coverings over the earth and timber pillboxes; that is, besides the supporting layer, there was a distribution layer, a hard layer, and a layer of sprinkled dirt. However, due to the insufficient

amount of materials and time, we were forced to diverge from the Germans’ instructions and our earth and timber pillboxes had a covering of two flat logs and 60-100 centimeters of earth.

The fire system

The main firing point in the strong point was the machine gun caponier, the fire from which was supplemented from machine gun and rifle trenches. Barbed wire in 1-2 rows was laid down along the forward edge. The approaches to the forward edge along the dangerous axes were mined and under flanking fire from machine guns, mortars and artillery. Strong points were organized in the defensive depth for firing to a depth of 1-1.5 kilometers. The strong points were enclosed with wire obstacles in one row. Structures for the firing points were built for oblique fire. There was fire liaison between the firing points in the strong points and also between the strong points themselves. The artillery weapons were mainly located near the roads and close to inhabited locales. Antitank guns were located, for the most part, in the strong points along the forward edge and in the depth of the battalions’ defense.

Defensive structures

Among the defensive structures, earth and timber pillboxes, with a predominantly light covering and fitted out for firing from machine

guns and artillery anti-tank guns, were broadly employed. The typical earth and timber pillbox was a caponier with three embrasures and with cover from two layers of logs, 14-15 centimeters wide and an earthen embankment up to one meter. Earth and timber pillboxes were also built for all-round fire and represented foundation pits with an earthen table in the center and a pole shed, above which sandbags were piled. In the inhabited locales part of the houses and barns were configured as firing points for firing along streets, roads or ravines. All the structures were linked together by communications trenches 1.2-2 meters deep; part of the communications trenches had covering. Rifle trenches were dug both as a continuous ditch and as ovalshaped paired emplacements, up to 1.2 meters deep. The trenches were linked by communications trenches, while the latter had exits to shelters and earth and timber pillboxes. Shelters were built with a cover, one per section, so as to live there in the winter. Dugouts were 4x6 meters and cover 60-70 centimeters thick. A wire network was built in 1-2 rows, rarely in three rows. Wire obstacles were set up both along the forward edge and in the defensive depth, around strong points and centers of resistance. Minefields were the main type of anti-tank obstacles. Anti-tank ditches and stone barriers were built along the “Ravenna” division’s sector. There were up to 12 minefields in front of the forward edge. The anti-tank ditches were five meters across, up to 1.2 meters deep, and with an embankment of 1.5 meters. Minefields occupied a space 350x700 meters. Mines were laid in two rows at a distance of 3-4 meters between them. In conclusion, one must note that the weakest feature of the Italian defense was the insufficient depth of the positions and the absence of deep reserves.

Combat operations and the defeat of the Italian Eighth Army

The Southwestern Front’s combat operations to defeat the Italian Eighth Army began on 16 December 1942. The German command received some information about the Red Army’s operational plans and a few days before the start of combat operations began to transfer several formations from the Voronezh area (385th and 387th infantry divisions) to the Boguchar area, as well as the 3rd Alpine Infantry Division “Julia” from the front north of Novaya Kalitva, and the 27th Panzer Division, for the purpose of creating reserves for parrying attacks, and also adopted a number of other measures to strengthen its defense. The formations being transferred did not have time to concentrate by the start of active operations and were committed into the fighting piecemeal, even in individual units. During the fighting, when the command of the Italian Eighth Army had lost organized control over its forces, the Germans made an attempt to take control themselves; at first they were unable to do this, and only later was control established. Seeing the futility of efforts to save the forces of the Italian Eighth Army from defeat, the Germans began to pull back their own formations, saving them from encirclement and defeat. During the first days of the Red Army’s offensive, 16-19 December, the enemy sought with all his might to prevent the breakthrough of his defensive zone on the southwestern bank of the Don along the sector Novaya Kalitva—Sukhoi Donets, and on the Bokovskaya axis along the front Dulenskii—Krasnokutskaya. Subsequently, faced with the fact of our forces’ penetration into his defense, the enemy made desperate attempts to halt our offensive along the rear lines, by throwing reserves coming up from the depth into the fighting.

From 19 December the defeated units of the Italians’ II and XXXV army corps and the Germans’ XXIX Army Corps and the Romanians’ I Army Corps began to retreat to the south and southwest, while putting up stubborn rearguard actions with cover units. By 22 December the defeated and demoralized units of the Italian army were running from the battlefield along some axes, abandoning their equipment and weapons and began surrendering en masse. Only in the areas of Gartmashovka, Chertkovo and Millerovo were individual garrisons putting up a stubborn fight, while completely surrounded. Units of the Germans’ XXIX Army Corps (62nd and 294th infantry divisions and the remnants of the 22nd Panzer Division, as well as the Germans’ 306th Infantry Division, which arrived during the battle) put up the most prolonged and stubborn resistance along the Bokovskaya axis. However, by the close of 22 December, having suffered enormous losses, these units also began to fall back to the south under the blows of our forces. By 27 December the enemy along the Southwestern Front’s right flank managed to halt our forces’ further advance along a line west of Novaya Kalitva and Smagleevka, while his retreat continued along the remaining sectors. By 25 December fighting there was fighting for Millerovo along the Millerovo axis, which continued until 17 January 1943. By 29 December the Germans, having brought up to the front the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division to the Millerovo area, the 304th Infantry Division to the line Millerovo—Krivorozh’e—Golovo-Kalitvenskoe, and the 6th and 11th panzer divisions to the sector Skosyrskaya— Morozovskii, created a continuous front from German units. By this time the operation to defeat the Italian Eighth Army had basically been completed.

Thus in the course of eight days of fighting, during 16-23 December, the Italian Eighth Army’s main forces (II and XXXV army corps) were routed and the remnants of the defeated units were running away from the front. In order to stop up the breakthrough front, from 20 December the German command hurriedly transferred its troops from the depth and threw them into the fighting from the march. By the end of December the Germans had managed to seal the breakthrough front and thus temporarily delay our forces’ offensive. By 30 December there were only German units operating opposite the Southwestern Front.

Overall Results

As a result of the Southwestern Front’s combat operations along the territory to the west of the middle course of the Don in the period 16-30 December 1942 the Italian Eighth Army’s II and XXXV army corps were completely routed. Only the pitiful remnants of these corps managed to save themselves by hurried flight, and without their equipment and weapons. Along with the main forces of the Italian Eighth Army, during this period there were also defeated: the Germans’ XXIX Army Corps (62nd, 294th and 298th infantry and 22nd Panzer divisions), the Romanians’ I Army Corps (7th and 11th infantry divisions), and a serious defeat inflicted on the Germans’ XXIV Panzer Corps (385th and 387th infantry and 27th Panzer divisions). As a result of the Southwestern Front’s two operations conducted in November-December 1942, the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth armies were completely routed, with the exception of the Alpine Corps, which at this time was operating opposite the Voronezh

Front, where it was also later defeated. Simultaneous with the defeat of the Romanian Third and Italian Eighth armies, seven German divisions were also defeated and a serious loss inflicted on six other German divisions. Despite its attempts, the German command could not manage to save the armies of its vassals on the Don. The defeat of these armies was completed by the forces of the Southwestern Front consecutively, methodically and quickly, and in difficult winter conditions. As a result of combat operations during 19-30 November and 16-30 December 1942, 11 Romanian and six Italian divisions, three Italian brigades, and seven German divisions were completely routed, for a total of 27 divisions and brigades. The enemy’s overall losses were as follows: up to 210,000 soldiers and officers, of which 120,000 were prisoners, of which number there were up to 2,000 officers and four generals. Up to 3,600 guns of various calibers were destroyed or captured, as well as up to 700 tanks and 1,030 planes. The defeat of the German-Fascist forces on the Don put an end to the existence of the Italian forces on the Soviet-German front and forced the German command to transfer up to 20 divisions from other fronts and from the deep rear, which had been designated for employment in an offensive in the spring of 1943.

1Editor’s note. This individual could not be found. 2Editor’s note. Petre Dumitrescu (1882-1950) joined the Romanian army in 1901 and fought in the First World War. He commanded the Third Army throughout Romania’s war against the Soviet Union,

until the country switched sides in the summer of 1944. Following the war, Dumitrescu was imprisoned for war crimes, but was acquitted. 3Editor’s note. Constantin Constantinescu-Claps (1884-1961) joined the Romanian army in 1913 and fought in the First World War. He was appointed commander of the Fourth Army in 1941 and retired in 1943. Following the war, he was imprisoned by the country’s communist government, but was later released. 4Editor’s note. There is no explanation for the mistake in the author’s math. 5The defeat of the Romanian Third Army is described in greater detail in Sbornik no. 6. 6Editor’s note. Nicolae Mazarini (1889-1955) joined the army in 1910 and fought in the First World War. During the Second World War he served as deputy chief of the General Staff until his appointment as commander of the 5th Infantry Division in February 1942. He was captured in November 1942 and returned from captivity in 1948. 7Editor’s note. The Blackshirts were paramilitary units organized under the auspices of the Italian fascist movement after the First World War. In theory, at least, they were seen to be more ideologically reliable than the average army recruit, much like the German SS units.

3

The Southwestern Front’s Artillery in the December 1942 Operation The concentration of the artillery. The artillery’s preparation for the offensive operation lasted from 30 November through 15 December 1942. During this period artillery units and formations arrived at the disposal of the Southwestern Front’s artillery commander. A great deal of attention was devoted to organizing the meeting and reception of newly-arrived units. The front’s artillery staff prepared for each arriving artillery regiment a map showing its unloading points, route of march and concentration point; it was also indicated to whom the regiment would be subordinated. Representatives of the front’s and armies’ artillery staffs would meet the arriving trains with these maps. The meeting and reception of units arriving by railroad took place in their detraining points, while units arriving on foot were met at the concentration point. Immediately following unloading, the unit commanders would organize a reconnaissance of the march route and traffic control and presented themselves to the army’s artillery commander for orders. For masking purposes, all unit movements took place only at night. Units would arrive at their night halt or concentration points so as to carry out all masking work before sunrise. Day movement was authorized only in conditions of non-flying weather (fog, snowfall, etc.).

Headquarter commandant’s service was organized in areas of the artillery’s combat quartering. Area commanders were chosen from among the most energetic officers, capable of ensuring masking discipline, precision and organizing ability as the artillery occupied its firing positions. The laying down of wire communications was, in the majority of cases, completed before the arrival of the artillery at its firing positions. A great deal of attention was devoted to disguising lines of communications in the jumping-off position and preventing the enemy from breaking the wire with his artillery fire. Topographical preparation was completely finished before the start of the operation. The tying in of elements of the reinforcement artillery’s combat formation was mainly conducted on a complete topographic basis. The tying in of the divisional artillery’s firing positions and observation posts was carried out by map. The engineer outfitting of the reinforcement artillery’s firing positions and observation posts was carried out at night, with camouflage measures. The artillery was moved up to its firing positions 2-3 days before the start of the offensive. Regiments of artillery reinforcements located with the front arrived on time to their concentration areas. Units from other fronts and the high command reserve, which were moving by rail, arrived late. For example, the 9th Artillery Division’s regiments began to arrive at Buturlinovka station beginning on 7 December, without towing equipment. Towing equipment arrived 10-15 days late, while tractor tows for the 127th Artillery Regiment did not arrive before February 1943. Because of this, the 9th Artillery Division’s regiments could not take part in the artillery preparation of the breakthrough. The artillery’s disposition fully corresponded to the operational idea. By 16 December; that is, by the beginning of the offensive operation, the Southwestern Front’s artillery comprised 26

regiments of divisional artillery and 40 regiments of reinforcements.¹ Table I/3.1 shows data showing the density of artillery and 82mm and 120mm mortars per kilometer of front.

Table I/3.1 Southwestern Front Artillery, December 1942

Artillery reconnaissance

As a result of reconnaissance in force and observation, it was established that the enemy had a dense network of observation posts on the commanding heights on the southern bank of the Don, and behind the heights, in the folds of the terrain he had covered firing positions for artillery and mortars. The command of the river’s southern bank allowed the enemy to have better field of view and observation, while the steepness of the bank significantly strengthened the defense along some axes. It was also established that the enemy’s defensive system was based on inhabited locales that had been transformed into strong points and defensive centers: Novaya Kalitva, Gadyuch’e, Filonovo, Pereshchepnoe, and others, which were in fire liaison with the artillery and mortars. Machine gun nests, overhead covers and dugouts, in a number of cases, had stone walls and embrasures. In each strong point there was a garrison numbering 1-2 companies, supported by the fire of 10-16 mortars and 2-6 batteries of 75mm and 105mm guns. The enemy had no durable permanent engineering structures along the front’s central sector opposite the 3rd Guards Army’s units. Although this line had not been prepared beforehand by the enemy, by the start of our offensive along the central sector there were nevertheless fully-outfitted trenches, sometimes with light covering, and dugouts, heated with straw for keeping the rank and file warm, minefields, and in some places a single row of barbed wire, and a small number of earth and timber pillboxes. In carrying out an active reconnaissance, the front’s forces had a general impression of the enemy, his dispositions, the contour of the

front line, the distribution of his artillery, and the character of his engineering structures. In the meantime, it was necessary to have more exact and detailed data about the forward edge of the defense for planning the artillery offensive. For this purpose, a reconnaissance in force was carried out in all the divisions immediately preceding the operation. During the infantry elements’ reconnaissance our artillery reconnaissance carried out a thorough observation from their observation posts, while the artillery, which was supporting the reconnaissance elements, attached their scouts directly to the infantry’s combat formations. Commanders at all levels took part in the reconnaissance for the purpose of defining in greater detail the forward edge of the enemy’s defense, his weapons, engineering structures, and centers of resistance. Aerial reconnaissance was carried out opposite the front of the 1st Guards Army, which confirmed the data gathered by ground reconnaissance and uncovered the depth of the enemy’s defense along some axes. For a more detailed study of our artillery reconnaissance, it is useful to become acquainted with the work of the artillery units’ reconnaissance organs, for example, in the 6th Army. By 15 December 1942 123 observation posts, four platoons of sound reconnaissance, two platoons of optical reconnaissance, two photo platoons, and three sections of a geotriangulation detachment were deployed along the front Novaya Kalitva—Krasno-Orekhovoe, working to develop and fill out the system of topographical control points. For the organization and synchronization of reconnaissance questions, officers from the army artillery staff’s reconnaissance section rode out to the units and the observation posts to render concrete assistance. As a result, the quality of reconnaissance was increased, and along with it the number of reconnoitered targets and the exactness of their location grew.

It is particularly necessary to note the broad deployment of combined observation in all the artillery units and the participation of the topographical platoons in this work. One can follow the quality and quantity of the reconnoitered targets by this concrete example. Before 18 November about 100 targets had been reconnoitered along a sector 28-30 kilometers wide, of which we had the coordinates for 28 targets, and by the start of the operation we had reconnoitered about 350 targets, of which we had the precise coordinates for 277. The 399th Independent Army Reconnaissance Artillery Battalion did a great deal of work in reconnoitering the enemy’s defensive structures, and especially unearthing his artillery. Of the overall number of targets (277) for which we had coordinates, the battalion was responsible for finding 148, or 53.3 percent. In the reconnaissance activity of the Southwestern Front’s artillery there were shortcomings alongside the positive results. For example, artillery reconnaissance, having reconnoitered the forward edge well, was unable to fully unmask the fire system in the depth of the enemy’s defense. There was not sufficient coordination in the actions of the aviation’s fire correction planes; as a result of this, as well as the unfavorable weather, its work was ineffective. The aerial photography plan of the entire forward edge and the enemy’s immediate defensive depth was not carried out. Despite the shortcomings in organizing and carrying out artillery reconnaissance, in the final analysis we were able to quite fully discover the disposition of the enemy’s artillery, and by the start of the operation the troops possessed the following data. By the start of the operation, facing the 6th Army’s left wing along the line Novaya Kalitva—Krasno-Orekhovoe, up to three artillery regiments (108th and 125th artillery regiments and up to a

regiment of unknown number) were noted. The main areas for the enemy’s artillery were as follows:

•up to three battalions along the southeastern outskirts of Novaya Kalitva; •up to three battalions along the northern outskirts of Tsapkovo; •up to two battalions along the southwestern outskirts of Derezovka; •up to a battalion on the eastern edge of the woods north of Dubovikovka.

Opposite the 1st Guards Army’s shock group the enemy’s artillery was located as follows: the 121st Artillery Regiment in the Filonovo area and to the north; the 298th Artillery Regiment in the Ol’khovyi —Grushevo area, and; the 9th Artillery Regiment in the Krasnogorovka—Abrosimovo—Monastyrshchina area. The Romanian 8th and 21st artillery regiments and the German 299th Artillery Regiment were located opposite the 3rd Guards Army. Besides this, no less than eight artillery battalions were uncovered opposite the 5th Tank Army’s front. Thus by the start of the offensive the following had been identified opposite the Southwestern Front: 697 anti-tank guns, 937 divisional and reinforcement guns and 664 battalion and regimental mortars, for a total of 2,298 weapons.²

Planning the artillery offensive

In the 1st Guards Army the preliminary work in planning the operation was carried out by an operational group, consisting of officers from the front’s artillery staff, because the army’s artillery staff arrived only immediately before the start of the offensive. In the remaining armies the preparations for the operation and planning were carried out by the armies’ artillery staffs, with the participation of representatives from the Main Directorate of the commander of the Red Army’s artillery. As a result of the staffs’ work in the armies, the following documents were drawn up: the artillery commander’s order, the plan for the artillery offensive, a firing chart, a registration plan, a reconnaissance plan, a plan for resubordinating the artillery, a plan for moving the artillery, a schedule for interacting with the other combat arms, and a fire control map. The artillery offensive was planned throughout the entire tactical depth of the defense (up to six kilometers) and up to 12-14 kilometers for the army groups’ artillery. At the same time, possible enemy actions were considered, particularly along the flanks and boundaries, as well as a plan for the infantry and tanks’ activities according to time and lines, and a plan for the actions of the breakthrough development groups. Our artillery fire was planned according to concrete targets or limited areas. In view of the poor visibility in winter conditions, a great deal of attention was devoted to the precise and complete preparation of data for firing and registration. Registration was carried out beforehand, employing masking measures, and a few days before the operation with the aid of distance registration lines (LPD).

Planning for the artillery offensive and the readiness to carry out the plan in the artillery staffs was controlled by the senior artillery chiefs. They refined on site their subordinates’ knowledge of the location of the forward edge of the enemy’s defense, the jumpingoff lines for our infantry and tanks’ attack, important zones and axes, the location of targets slated for destruction and suppression, the order of carrying out firing tasks according to the period of the battle, the number of guns slated for firing over open sights, their firing positions and distribution, and their knowledge of control and cooperation signals. The artillery preparation was planned to last one and a half hours. During the first five minutes of the artillery preparation a fire onslaught from all weapons was to be carried out along the entire depth of the enemy’s defense. Strong points, anti-tank weapons, firing points, artillery and mortar batteries, reserves, communications centers, and command and observation posts were to be subjected to our fire. This surprise fire onslaught had the task of disrupting the enemy’s fire system, hitting his personnel, suppressing his artillery and mortar fire, and disorganizing the enemy’s observation and control. During this period the guards mortar units would launch a salvo against targets located along the forward edge and in the defensive depth. Following the five-minute fire onslaught would come a period for destroying and suppressing the enemy’s reconnoitered targets: observation posts, earth and timber pillboxes, structures configures for defense, firing points, anti-tank guns, and other defensive targets. In order to destroy these targets, it was planned to broadly employ firing over open sights by guns of all calibers from 45mm to 152mm howitzers. Army long-range artillery groups were to launch fire onslaughts against the enemy’s revealed batteries, command posts and

reserves, and also to carry out fire observation. During this period the guards mortar units would launch another seven salvos. During the final ten minutes of the artillery preparation the artillery was supposed to conduct a fire onslaught at maximum strength against the forward edge, while the artillery of all calibers set their detonators only on blast effect. This would give us the opportunity to bring up our infantry closer to the artillery’s fire and to better strike hidden targets. At the end of the ten-minute onslaught, the guards mortar units were to conduct a salvo along the forward edge, which would simultaneously serve as the signal for the infantry attack. It was planned to accompany the infantry and tanks through the method of consecutively concentrating fire.

The artillery offensive

This began at 0800 on 16 December 1942 with the fire from more than 5,000 guns and mortars. The first onslaught’s main targets were discovered resistance centers along the forward edge and in the depth, as well as headquarters and immediate reserves in the zone of the artillery’s range. In view of the fact that the breakthrough tanks had not arrived by the start of the operation, the artillery had to blast passages in the barbed wire obstacles along a number of sectors. The artillery made nine passages in the barbed wire obstacles along the axis of the 1st Guards Army’s main attack. The first period of the artillery offensive was effective: the enemy’s command and control system was disrupted and he suffered significant losses in men and materiel. However, despite the intensity of the artillery fire and our superiority

in men and materiel along the axes of the main attack, we were not able to break through the enemy’s defense on the first day of the offensive. One of the reasons for the lack of success on the offensive’s first day were the poor meteorological conditions, which lowered the accuracy of the artillery’s fire during the period of suppressing the enemy’s fire system. This circumstance led to a situation that when the infantry attacked a certain number of the enemy’s firing points came to life and met our attacking troops with intensive artillery, mortar and machine gun fire. Besides this, upon the start of the offensive new enemy firing points were unearthed, which had not been discovered earlier by our reconnaissance. Along the 3rd Guards Army’s breakthrough sector the enemy’s artillery, which had been suppressed by our long-range artillery group, was quiet during the artillery preparation. Along the 1st Guards Army’s breakthrough sector, where the long-range artillery group basically consisted of divisional artillery guns, a part of the enemy’s artillery remained unmolested by our artillery, as a result of which immediately following the artillery preparation the enemy opened fire with his long-range and artillery and part of his divisional guns. As a result of the fighting on 16-17 December the 1st Guards Army’s artillery along the axis of the main attack destroyed 67 overhead covers, up to 60 firing points, suppressed nine mortar and five artillery batteries, and scattered and destroyed up to two regiments of infantry. In coming to conclusions regarding the first period of the artillery offensive, it is necessary to note the following features of the combat employment of our artillery.

1. The presence of thick fog prevented us from carrying out

observable aimed fire, as a result of which it became necessary to maximally move the observation posts forward. In some cases the forward artillery observation posts moved to a distance of 250-300 meters from the forward edge of the enemy’s defense. This circumstance made it necessary to move a significant amount of the artillery forward for firing over open sights. 2. Long-range artillery was completely absent along the axis of the 1st Guards Army’s main attack, and thus the counterbattery fight along this sector was conducted with all of the divisional artillery, which also required the movement of its combat formations as far forward as possible. 3. During the operation a major role was played by guns firing over open sights, both during the artillery preparation and during the subsequent periods of the fighting. For example, up to 170 guns firing over open sights took part along the breakthrough sectors of the 14th Guards Rifle Corps and the 197th Rifle Division (3rd Guards Army). These guns moved in two echelons, as infantry accompaniment guns. We see a similar picture along the 1st Guards Army’s breakthrough sector. Typically, during the destruction period along the axis of the main attack, not only did the 76mm divisional artillery batteries fire over open sights, but 122mm howitzers, the fire of which was especially effective, because there was not a single enemy structure that could withstand a direct hit from a 122mm shell.

Securing the commitment of the mobile groups into the breach

Powerful mobile forces, consisting of four tank corps, were to be committed along the axis of the main attack from the area of the Osetrovka bridgehead.

The commitment of the tank and mechanized formations into the breach was to be secured by artillery fire of the 6th and 1st Guards armies in depth to the maximum extent of the long-range artillery groups’ range. It was planned to entrust the support of the tank corps during their activities in the operational depth to units of the 9th Artillery Division, but because it had not arrived by the start of the operation, a part of the mission for the artillery support for the commitment of the mobile group into the breach, was to be carried out by the infantry-support artillery. As a result of this, the group of mobile forces was covered against counterattacks and enemy artillery fire only from the flanks. Besides this, during the tank corps’ offensive activities their artillery support and cover was also handled by artillery attached to them. In order to strengthen the breakthrough sector’s fire screens, a 76mm battery each was detached from the from divisional artillery of two neighboring rifle divisions, which were assigned the mission of advancing along to the flanks of the breakthrough, occupying firing positions for firing over open sights, and be in readiness to prevent the enemy’s anti-tank artillery from firing on our tanks. On the operation’s first day units of the mobile group encountered minefields that delayed their further advance. It was only on the second day (17 December) that the enemy’s defense was pierced and the tank formations, having achieved freedom of maneuver, began to rapidly move forward. The artillery accompanied the mobile groups and supported their advance. The artillery played an especially big role in the fighting to seize inhabited locales, strong points and centers of resistance; the gunners fired point-blank on the enemy over open sights, destroying his engineering structures. During the mobile groups’ activities in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, part of the artillery that had towing that was out of order and a shortage of horses gradually fell behind the tank

corps. The lagging artillery was employed for fighting against blocked centers of resistance in Gartmashevka, Chertkovo and Arbuzovka, and later in Millerovo. The 1st Mechanized Corps was to be committed into the breach along the Astakhov—Bokovskaya sector on the second day of the offensive. The commitment of the corps into the breach was to be supported by all the artillery along the breakthrough sector, as well as artillery summoned from three neighboring rifle divisions. As early as the preparatory period, the breakthrough sector had been well reconnoitered by the artillery intelligence organs. A great deal of attention was devoted to unearthing the system of anti-tank defense and obstacles in front of the forward edge and in the tactical depth. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ artillery commander, along with the corps and brigade officers, refined on site all problems of the artillery’s cooperation with the tank units and motorized infantry. The artillery headquarters, along with the headquarters of the mechanized units, drew up signals for cooperation and detached artillery observers to the radio tanks. The commitment of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps into the breach was to be supported by a long-range artillery group, which had the task of destroying the strong points along the path of the corps’ likely advance, to suppress the enemy’s resistance in the depth of the defense and to try to prevent his reserves from arriving at the breakthrough sector. In order to more timely and effectively support the advance of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ brigades with artillery fire, it was planned to move one-third of all the artillery’s combat formations forward as soon as the corps’ units reached the line of Dulenskii. The corps artillery commander had in reserve the 116th Guards Artillery Regiment and the 532nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment. In supporting the corps’ advance, the artillery cooperated by battalions with the corps’ brigades by division.

During the commitment of the motorized rifle brigades into the breach, the mechanized corps’ 82mm mortars and regimental and anti-tank artillery operated directly in their combat formations. The accompaniment artillery was to resolve tasks for destroying antitank and anti-personnel weapons in the enemy’s defense, as well as for destroying earth and timber pillboxes and houses that had been configured for defense, and also to destroy tank groups and selfpropelled artillery.

Anti-aircraft defense

The distribution of ant-aircraft defense weapons by the start of the operation is shown in Table I/3.2. Throughout the entire period of the December offensive operation the enemy’s aviation carried out 2,641 sorties and was most active along the 3rd Guards Army’s offensive front. The front’s anti-aircraft weapons had the mission of supporting the front’s forces with massed fire, and in close coordination with our aviation, against the air enemy during the breakthrough and activities in the operational depth. While breaking through the defense, the front’s anti-aircraft units were to be used en masse, and subsequently each anti-aircraft regiment had its anti-aircraft defense targets. Each mobile group was also to be covered by one or two regiments of anti-aircraft defense. During the December operation 67 enemy aircraft were shot down and 22 damaged out by anti-aircraft artillery, while the main part of the shot-down planes was due to small-caliber artillery.

Artillery supply

In order to carry out the operation, it was planned to have in the front’s formations the amount of ammunition (in combat loads) shown in Table I/3.3.

Table I/3.2 Distribution of Anti-Aircraft Weapons by the Start of the Operation

Army

Unit Composition

Two anti-aircraft artillery regiments, an independent anti-aircraft artillery ba 6th Army 1st Guards Army Four anti-aircraft artillery regiments, two independent anti-aircraft artillery b 3rd Guards ArmyFour anti-aircraft artillery regiments, one independent anti-aircraft artillery b 5th Tank Army Six anti-aircraft artillery regiments and two independent anti-aircraft artillery Front Two anti-aircraft artillery regiments

Table I/3.3 Ammunition Loads Planned for Southwestern Front Artillery, December 1942

As a result of deliveries, by 15 December there was actually the amount of ammunition shown in Table I/3.4.

Table I/3.4 Ammunition Loads Available for Southwestern Front Artillery, 15 December 1942

The expenditure of ammunition on artillery and mortars during the operation was established according to the norm listed in Table I/3.5 (in combat loads).

Table I/3.5 Expenditure of Artillery & Mortar Ammunition During the Southwestern Front’s December 1942 Offensive Operation

A majority difficulty in supplying ammunition was the extreme extension of the rear and the shortage of auto transport and fuel, which told particularly on the activities of the troops in the depth. As the troops advanced, particularly the mobile forces, difficulties arose in supplying the troops with ammunition and fuel. The howitzer batteries of the divisional artillery’s artillery regiments and reinforcement regiments on mechanized transport began to fall behind because of fuel shortages, without taking part in the success of the breakthrough and pursuit of the enemy. The insufficient provisioning of the reinforcement artillery units with auto transportation made the delivery of ammunition difficult. The transport of ammunition told sharply on the artillery’s operations, because it did not cover their expenditure. Due to the shortage of transport, the advanced army depots (PAS) were not moved, and with the units’ advance the distance from them increased and the elongation of the rear grew daily. In many cases ammunition was brought up by front auto transport and transport planes from front depots, directly to the sectors of the advanced army depots, which had been brought up to the troop rear. In the tank and cavalry corps ammunition was delivered directly to the units’ temporary depots. In cases where the shortage of ammunition in the units threatened the operation’s further development, the mobilization of all the empty vehicles to Kalach was carried out. There were cases when particularly needy units had ammunition delivered to them by air over the course of seven days. A major shortcoming in the work of artillery supply for the troops was the insufficient return of spent shell casings from the troop bases back to the army and front ones. The reason behind this was the overburdening of the returning empty transport with wounded.

Conclusions

1. The front’s artillery, both during the breakthrough period and during its development period in the depth of the enemy’s defensive zone, accomplished its mission. According to incomplete data, during the operation the front’s artillery knocked out and burned up to 220 tanks, destroyed up to 60 batteries, destroyed more than 500 earth and timber pillboxes and fortified points, and knocked out more than 150 motor vehicles, etc.

2. The artillery’s disposition before the start of the operation fully corresponded to the command’s plan. The artillery’s main forces concentrated along the armies’ main axes. The density of artillery and 82mm and 120mm mortars along the armies’ main attack axes varied from 45 to 100 pieces per kilometer of front.

3. By the start of the operation artillery intelligence had gathered very accurate reconnaissance data on the disposition of the enemy’s firing points, his fire system and the contours of the forward edge of his defense. Artillery reconnaissance was worse during the fighting in the depth, where the artillery units did not always possess sufficient data on the enemy, his artillery and disposition, and the engineer outfitting of his strong points. The experience of the December operation showed that the verification of reconnaissance data and its analysis has great significance. The comparison of reconnaissance data from all the

combat arms should be mandatory, particularly for defining the contours of the forward edge. The artillery’s cooperation with infantry, tanks and aviation during the preparatory period should always begin with the organization of reconnaissance.

4. The planning of the artillery offensive corresponded to the operational design. Artillery documentation at all staff levels was essentially drawn up satisfactorily, although individual instances were noted when the planning documents for the artillery offensive were not communicated to their executors.

5. Guns firing over open sights played a major role in the success of the December operation. During the period of the artillery preparation, the entire regimental artillery and a large portion of divisional artillery, up to 122mm howitzers, was given the mission of attacking open positions. Guns firing over open sights operated quite effectively, while suffering insignificant losses. The role of guns firing over open sights increases particularly in conditions of poor visibility (heavy fog, snowfall). In this case, while organizing the artillery offensive during the artillery preparation, a large percentage of the divisional artillery should fire over open sights.

6. Surprise fire strikes by artillery and aviation gave us the opportunity to suppress the enemy’s artillery batteries, reserves and centers of resistance and disrupted his command and control of the troops for a long time. This significantly facilitated the successful offensive by our forces. The fire accompaniment of the infantry and tanks was carried out through the method of the consecutive concentration of fire. Given the front artillery’s density, this method

of accompaniment fully justified itself. In order to secure the breakthrough’s flanks and repel possible enemy counterattacks, it’s necessary to have along the flanks of the army’s shock group special artillery units (1-2 artillery regiments), as well as no less than a regiment in the army artillery commander’s reserve.

7. During the attack and the fighting in depth, guns for accompanying the infantry and tanks operated in two echelons, and when the first echelon was located in the infantry’s and tanks’ combat formations in motion the second echelon’s guns facilitated their advance with fire. Such a method of accompanying the forces supported the uninterrupted waging of fire and facilitated the firmness of the infantry’s combat formations while repelling the enemy’s infantry and tank counterattacks.

8. Experience showed that in order to combat blockaded enemy groups of forces, it is necessary to centralize the control of the artillery taking part in the elimination of these groups of forces. Upon carrying out a reconnaissance of the blockaded enemy group’s fire system and his main pockets of resistance, the artillery carries out a short but powerful fire onslaught and, in conjunction with the infantry and tanks, eliminates the group.

9. The practice of combat operations fully confirmed the artillery’s extremely significant role in supporting the operations of the mobile tank and mechanized formations. In order to support the commitment of the tank and mechanized corps into the breach, it is necessary to assign tasks not only to the long-range artillery groups, but also to the infantry-support artillery groups, chiefly for securing

the flanks. In order to support the tanks corps during their activities in the operational depth, it is expedient to detach anti-tank regiments (76mm guns) and anti-aircraft units (37mm guns), which are highly maneuverable and with reliable transport and capable of hauling 1.5-2 combat loads.

10. An inventory of the tactical-technical features of the artillery detached for accompanying the tank formations is one of the most important means of correctly employing the artillery in mobile groups. Ignoring these requirements led to excessive losses in men and materiel for the artillery accompanying the tanks. There were instances when the commanders of tank units and formations, which were operating in the enemy’s operational depth, assigned local maneuver tasks to the artillery without taking into account their materiel-technical readiness or their provision with fuel and transport means. The tank formation commanders had a tendency to limit themselves to only the operational employment of the attached artillery, without taking upon themselves the responsibility and concern for the materiel-technical support for the high command artillery regiment reserves.

11. The shortage of motor and horse-drawn transport, as well as the shortage of fuel, made the artillery’s actions considerably more difficult. In a number of cases the artillery lagged behind the rifle and motor-mechanized formations and its movement took 2-3 trips. The operation’s experience showed that the employment of tanks for towing the guns of the antitank artillery is not expedient, because this leads to major losses among the crews and equipment.

1The distribution of artillery regiments among the armies is shown in the article “The Planning and Preparation of the Southwestern Front’s Offensive Operation in December, 1942.” 2In reality, the enemy had more artillery and mortars.

4

Some Conclusions on Employing Tank and Mechanized Corps for Developing The Breakthrough The Red Army’s major offensive operations in the winter of 1942-43 around Stalingrad and along the middle course of the Don offered us rich experience in employing tank and mechanized corps as success development echelons. This article is an attempt to generalize in short conclusions certain questions of an operationaltactical character on the basis of this combat experience.

The Role and Place of Tank and Mechanized Formations in the Breakthrough

The launching of a deep attack against the enemy in the modern operation is entrusted to the mobile forces and may be accomplished with the aid of a large number of tanks, while cooperating in echeloned combat formations with the other combat arms. The character of cooperation will vary, according to the operation’s stages. For example, while breaking through the enemy’s defensive front, the tanks operate in close cooperation with the infantry. While developing the breakthrough, the tanks, while comprising or being part of the second (third) echelon of the larger group of forces along

the given axis, will work in operational cooperation with the infantry, which is attacking from the front, and in tactical cooperation with the mobile forces (motorized infantry and cavalry), as well as with the infantry, which has the task of consolidating the tanks’ success. In the first case, the tanks are necessary to strengthen the infantry for accomplishing the breakthrough and, being organizationally grouped into separate tank units and formations, are subordinated to the commanders of the combined-arms formations for the period of the breakthrough. In the second case, the tanks must have relative independence, both as regards their designation as well as their organizational principle and be employed as large tank and mechanized formations, possessing operational independence and being capable of resolving not only tactical but operational tasks as well. In employing tanks for breaking through the operational zone in those instances when it is necessary not only to break through the defense, but also to widen the breach in the direction of the flanks and in depth, to clear the breach of the remnants of the enemy, to secure the commitment of the mobile forces into the breach and at the same time repel the enemy’s counterattacks, the tanks must operate in the infantry’s combat formations. Despite the fact that tanks possess great shock strength, they are not capable of independently breaking through modern anti-tank defense and consolidating the captured terrain. The tank and mechanized forces have to operate in a completely different environment during the offensive operation’s second stage —during the development of the breakthrough. First of all, the very organizational formation of the tank and mechanized corps (the presence of one’s own infantry, artillery and other reinforcements) enables the tank and mechanized formations to operate at a certain remove from the attacking infantry. Secondly, the tank and mechanized corps’ chief mission at this stage of the operation is the launching of a rapid blow to a great depth; they should not be

delayed in fighting against secondary objectives and should bypass the enemy’s strong points. Thus if during the operation’s first stage the tanks’ shock power may be manifested only in tandem with the other combat arms (particularly with the attacking infantry, artillery and sappers); that is, then when their mobility cannot be employed to full effect—the tanks cannot be considered the leading combat arm. In these situations they are a means of directly supporting the infantry. During the offensive operation’s second stage the tank and mechanized forces, which have been organizationally grouped into corps and mobile groups, fully manifest their shock strength in conjunction with maneuver and are, as the experience of recent operations shows, the main shock means of the front and army command. The tasks at this stage consist of successfully completing the offensive operation, just as thoroughly and rapidly and with such results as would lead to the most rapid achievement of the overall goal—the encirclement and defeat of the enemy. In pursuing this aim, all the troops must fight in a coordinated manner and in their efforts are obliged to emulate that combat arm which possesses the greatest shock power. Thus all the command’s efforts for organizing the operation should be directed toward the other combat arms supporting the mobile forces developing the breakthrough and to immediately taking advantage of and consolidating the success achieved by them, in order to prevent them from being squandered after a while, as was the case, for example, in the Khar’kov area in March 1943. It is only by thus fundamentally and precisely putting the question of realizing the cooperation of the mobile forces with the other combat arms in developing the breakthrough that one can guarantee that in the future the tank and mechanized corps will not participate alongside the direct infantry support tanks for completing the breakthrough and that during the success development stage their actions will be supported by the other

combat arms, particularly combat aviation. In the operations conducted in the Stalingrad area and the middle course of the Don, the tank and mechanized corps, in the majority of cases, were committed into the breach at that time when the enemy’s defense had not yet been pierced; nor were their actions supported by aviation (1st Guards, 25th, 4th Guards, and 18th tank, and the 1st Guards Mechanized and other corps; for example, the 25th Tank Corps lost 27 of its tanks in unreconnoitered minefields during its commitment into the breach). At the same time, the enemy’s aviation often attacked the tank and mechanized corps’ combat formations with impunity, without encountering resistance by our aviation.

Cooperation with the air force

As to this question, the experience of recent operations allows us to draw the following general conclusions:

1. The mobile forces, having entered the breach, complete the defeat of the retreating enemy and consecutively launch attacks against his arriving reserves, which have already been sufficiently roughed up by our aviation, which operates in order to support the mobile forces’ defeat of the arriving reserves in detail. This cooperation of the mobile forces with aviation will be planned on the front or army scale and supported by uninterrupted reconnaissance of the location of the enemy’s operational reserves and the precise calculation of their ability to arrive at the breakthrough area, according to space and time.

2. Cooperation should be organized in such a way that it is possible to launch a simultaneous attack from the ground and the air against a target immediately on the battlefield. For this, the air forces’ cooperation with the mobile forces developing the breakthrough should be as close as possible. In any event, it must guarantee to the tank (mechanized) corps commander that our aviation will appear over the battlefield at a maximum of 20-30 minutes after being summoned. The experience of the operations conducted around Stalingrad and the area of the Don’s middle course did not yield, for a variety of reasons, positive examples of cooperation between aviation and the mobile forces; moreover, in all of these operations the aviation was subordinated to the fronts and armies in the majority of cases. From this we can arrive at conclusions regarding the expediency of subordinating a part of combat aviation to the tank and mechanized corps during their actions in the depth of the enemy’s defensive zone, particularly assault and fighter aviation. It should be required of the aviation, as well as the artillery, attached to the mobile forces that it carry out an air offensive as its bases advance along the axis of the mobile troops’ operations and its headquarters or aviation representatives along with the headquarters of the tank (mechanized) corps. Attached aviation is obliged to support the operations of the tank and mechanized corps directly from their deployment area, building landing strips, if necessary, for basing, or using the enemy’s captured airfields. For this purpose, special airfield teams should move with the tank (mechanized) corps.

3. Although examples of cooperation between tank (mechanized) corps with airborne landings are absent from the materials on recent operations, nevertheless during the breakthrough development

phase, at the time when combat operations take on a maneuver character and the attacker’s combat formations are advancing, the employment of air infantry in the broadest way possible should be considered the most expedient.

4. Airborne landings may delay the arrival of the enemy’s reserves to the battle area more reliably and for a longer period than combat aviation. Airborne landings may seize targets of operational significance in the rear of the enemy’s defensive zone and turn them into support bases for the arriving mobile forces (there have been similar precedents and they should not be regarded as isolated incidents). Under favorable conditions, landings may seize enemy airfields and deprive the enemy of the capability of operating against our mobile forces from nearby airfields. Each success by the air infantry, given the precise organization of cooperation, should and will be employed by the mobile forces developing the breakthrough and transformed by them from a temporary success into a prolonged one.

5. Judging by the results of the enemy air’s operations against our tank and mechanized formations, the conclusion inevitably arises as to the necessity of reinforcing them with anti-aircraft weapons. If the tanks, thanks to their armor, are comparatively invulnerable to attack from the air and can defend themselves from air attack with their own weapons, the infantry and the remaining unarmored units, lacking special anti-aircraft weapons, are in extremely difficult conditions and suffer heavy losses due to enemy air attacks. In the operations conducted in the Stalingrad area and the middle course of the Don, the tank and mechanized corps, in the majority of cases, were each reinforced with an anti-aircraft artillery regiment. Such a practice completely justified itself, but experience showed

that these means nevertheless proved to be insufficient for defending our combat formations from enemy air attack (for example, the actions of the 25th Tank Corps near Morozovskii), as a result of which our fighter aviation covered the corps’ operations unreliably and, in a number of cases, did not appear at all over the mobile forces’ areas of operation. Thus one should conclude that in all cases the success of the tank and mechanized corps while developing the breakthrough was directly dependent upon our fighter aviation’s superiority in the air. Given the precise securing of cooperation of the tank and mechanized corps with aviation, the mobile forces will save at least 20-30 percent of their equipment for attacking the enemy’s ground forces in the depth.

Reinforcement and support equipment

Tank and mechanized formations, while developing the breakthrough, must be sufficiently powerful and have a maximum of reinforcement weapons, although not at the expense of mobility and maneuverability. While operating in the enemy’s operational depth, it’s extremely important that the mobile forces retain their shock power for decisive battles with the enemy’s arriving reserves. In the offensive operations around Stalingrad and the middle course of the Don, the tank and mechanized corps had the reinforcement equipment listed in Table I/4.1. It is clear from the table that reinforcement equipment was most abundant in the 4th (5th Guards) Tank Corps. The practice of their combat employment allows us to draw the following conclusions:

1. Experience has shown that howitzer artillery, due to its

insufficient mobility, lowers the tank corps’ maneuverability, or lags behind them. Thus one must consider the reinforcement of mobile formations with howitzer artillery as expedient in those cases when they are assigned missions such as that of the 4th Guards Tank Corps, which operated in the area of the Don’s middle course—to reach a definite area and hold it for a definite time. Then, having advanced, it holds another area; that is, when the mobile formation is not given an assignment calling for a vigorous advance. In all other cases it is expedient to attach to the mobile formation selfpropelled howitzer artillery, capable of advancing with the tanks and supporting them with powerful fire briefly, as well as repelling the enemy’s tank attacks.

Table I/4.1 Reinforcements Available for Tank & Mechanized Corps During the Offensive Operations Around Stalingrad and the Middle Course of the Don

2. Guards mortar units showed themselves to be an irreplaceable means of reinforcing the tank and mechanized corps. Possessing great maneuverability and the capability of briefly creating powerful fire, these weapons, when skillfully employed, can accompany the tanks with sufficient effect during their operations in depth. In recent operations, in the majority of cases the tank and mechanized corps had one guards mortar regiment or battalion (see Table I/4.1). An increase in the guards mortar units’ mobility by putting them on all-terrain vehicles will make this weapon an irreplaceable means for accompanying major mobile formations.

3. The necessity, when developing the breakthrough, of reinforcing the tank and mechanized corps with anti-tank weapons should be especially stressed. While not renouncing, under specific circumstances, the employment of tanks for battling the enemy’s tanks, one should consider such an employment, in principle, as inexpedient, particularly during the tank (mechanized) corps’ actions in developing the breakthrough. It is necessary to keep in mind that the mobile forces’ main mission at this stage is the defeat of the enemy’s rank and file and also, being isolated from its infantry and cut off from its rear organs, the enemy’s tanks lose their capability for prolonged maneuver. Thus it is more expedient to bypass the enemy’s tank group and launch an attack against his rank and file and tank rear organs, striving to operationally encircle them, than to get bogged down in prolonged fighting with them. Possessing powerful anti-tank weapons, the corps commander can cover his flanks during a bypassing maneuver; secure his concentration area, jumping-off areas in the depth, and also to employ these means as accompaniment weapons. The experience of recent operations offers the following norms— one anti-tank regiment per corps. The anti-tank weapons were

usually towed by jeeps, which were highly maneuverable and could follow the tanks everywhere. The organizational inclusion of powerful anti-tank weapons with tank, and particularly with mechanized corps, is extremely desirable.

4. The corps’ sapper units should be entrusted with the tasks of supporting movements in the depth of the enemy’s defensive zone. Supporting the movements of the mobile formations during the commitment into the breach should be entrusted to the sappers of the combined-arms formations, and even better to specially detached sapper units subordinated for the period to the command organizing the operation. Thus it is desirable to make the tank (mechanized) corps’ sapper subunits relatively invulnerable to at least the enemy’s machine gun fire and to increase their mobility by arming them with armored transports.

5. While operating at a great remove from the troops attacking from the front and not having secure communications, the tank (mechanized) corps often did not have communications with higher headquarters and could not establish cooperation with each other. For example, during the operation along the middle course of the Don, the 25th and 2nd Guards tank and 1st Guards Mechanized corps, operating in the general direction of Tatsinskaya and Morozovskaya, had no contact with each other until their arrival at the line of the railroad. During the Stalingrad operation the 1st and 5th guards tank corps, operating in the general direction of Kalach, established communications only while crossing the Don on the operation’s fourth day. Aside from the general command and control shortcomings, a reason behind the insufficiently established communications between the corps and the higher headquarters was oftentimes the

small operating radius of their radio sets and the absence of sufficient back-up communications equipment. From this arises the necessity of reinforcing the corps with communications equipment, attaching more powerful radio communications to the corps for communications with higher headquarters and neighbors, as well as attaching a wing of communications planes to them. The latter could be employed by the corps headquarters as a means of aerial command and control.

6. A no less important problem for the tank (mechanized) corps is the problem of reconnaissance during their activities in the depth of the enemy’s defense. Experience shows that in a number of cases the tank (mechanized) corps operated without having a clear idea as to the location of the enemy’s reserves and the possible time of their arrival in the area of forthcoming battles. As a result, the corps acted unsurely, which slowed down their rate of advance. For example, on the second day of the Stalingrad operation (20 November 1942), the 5th Guards Tank Corps’ right column was in the Manoilin area, while the left-flank column had been fighting for 18 hours in the Zakharovka area and had concentrated in the Manoilin—Maiorovskii area only by 1800 on 20 November. The corps moved out of this area only on 21 November, taking advantage of the significant time for inspecting its equipment and supplying the tanks with ammunition and fuel, when at most this would have required 12 hours. One must consider the chief reason for the tank corps’ delay the desire to bring up its lagging left-flank column and ascertain the overall situation, because the corps lacked communications with its neighbor to the right (1st Guards Tank Corps) and with army headquarters and thus lacked sufficient information about the enemy. The corps commander, while operating in the depth of the enemy’s defense and constantly acting in conditions of encirclement, is obliged to know of the approach of the enemy’s reserves

beforehand and about their movements. It follows that it is necessary for the corps to have its own reconnaissance aviation, through the help of which it can conduct reconnaissance within a radius of not less than 100 kilometers. It would be better if reconnaissance were organizationally included as part of the corps. The air force’s ability to work with the mobile forces, carry out special reconnaissance for them, to cooperate with tank ground reconnaissance, and to guide the tanks to their attack targets may be achieved through prolonged joint work.

Surprise and massing

The success of the tank and mechanized corps’ actions while developing the breakthrough, aside from the conditions listed above depends first of all on their correct operational employment, particularly on the surprise of their employment and massed employment on terrain favorable for their operations. Experience has shown that given the corresponding organization of the troops’ concentration and preparation, we are, on the whole, able to achieve operational surprise. The matter is less favorable concerning tactical surprise. Despite the most painstaking measures for masking and covering the concentration area from the air, in the majority of cases we were not able to achieve tactical surprise (the concentration of the 5th Tank Army’s 1st and 1st Guards tank corps and the 3rd and 4th guards mechanized corps in the operation around Stalingrad during the first stage of our forces’ offensive). The secrecy of regrouping is one of the decisive conditions for success in the offensive operation and is always necessary as one of the elements of surprise, particularly while breaking through the front. The achievement of operational surprise is a mandatory

requirement of any operation pursuing a decisive goal. No less a role in the achievement of surprise is played by the vigor of launching deep attacks against the enemy. Thus all of the unit’s auxiliary and support tanks, particularly the motorized infantry, should possess at least the same speed and road performance as the tanks. As experience has shown, motorized infantry, placed on auto transport, disposes of insufficient maneuverability without roads. It is possible to resolve this problem by furnishing the motorized infantry of the tank (mechanized) corps with armored transports, which will impart to it relative invulnerability against the enemy’s fire from the air. It should be noted that motorized infantry is employed in a number of cases without sufficient effect; this comes about mainly because the practice of removing motor vehicles from the tank corps, which are designated for motorized infantry, has become standard operating procedure, as a result of which the motorized infantry is forced to follow behind the tanks in infantry formation. Thus during the preparatory period for the offensive operation around Stalingrad, the motorized infantry’s special vehicles for transporting cargoes were removed from the 3rd and 4th guards mechanized corps. Of the 250 vehicles allotted by the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps for hauling the 51st Army’s goods and personnel, by the beginning of combat operations (20 November 1942) 150 had not arrived. In the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps, 140 vehicles were sent after ammunition by order of the 57th Army’s headquarters, and the corps entered the breach with its 62nd Mechanized Brigade’s motorized infantry on foot, because the vehicles had not returned back to the corps by the start of the operation. Given such a practice, the motorized infantry loses its chief feature of mobility and is transformed into ordinary infantry, while the corps lose their organizational integrity and their shock power is

dissipated. Thus it is necessary to categorically forbid the tank and mechanized corps’ special equipment for non-designated purposes. As experience showed, the mass employment of tank and mechanized forces in several echelons along the axis of the main attack was achieved through the following:

•by removing the tank and mechanized forces from well fortified defensive sectors, as well as those where the terrain is difficult for passage, and by forgoing their stereotypical distribution along the entire front and the conduct of bold maneuver with this combat arm on a large scale; •by forgoing the employment of tank and mechanized corps for the independent and prolonged defense of captured areas and lines.

Tank and mechanized corps hold the captured line only until the arrival of the army’s (front’s) main forces. After this, they should be immediately pulled out of the fighting for their infantry and, after they put themselves in order, are employed along those axes where our forces continue to successfully advance for the development of the success, or for flank attacks against the enemy’s counterattacking group of forces. Maneuver by tank (mechanized) formations during the operation affords the command the opportunity to have a reserve at the critical moment and to augment the attack along those axes where operational success has become apparent. In this fashion the 3rd, 4th and 6th guards and 13th mechanized corps were employed to defeat the enemy’s Kotel’nikovo group of forces. The massing of tank and mechanized forces for the development of the breakthrough simultaneously calls for their deep operational

formation. In recent operations the tank and mechanized corps operated either along separate axes, carrying out an independent task, or in conjunction with other corps, without being united by an overall leadership. Practice has shown that the greatest success was enjoyed by those corps following in the second echelon and committed into the breach as a group along a single sector. On the other hand, corps operating in isolation had a limited objective in depth and their actions were less effective (16th Tank Corps). Based on this, the conclusion must be drawn that for the purpose of augmenting and supporting the uninterrupted nature of the attack throughout the entire depth of the operation, it is necessary to join the tank and mechanized corps into a mobile group, consisting of several corps (no less than two) and to commit this group into the breach by echelon, in two and even three echelons, along a single axis. This group should include one mechanized corps, with the rest consisting of tank corps. It is significantly more difficult to create and hammer together the staff and command of such an improvised group right before the operation than in the infantry. Thus while forming and hammering together formations, the commanders must be furnished with their own organ of control and study combat operations as part of large mobile groups. Given a deep formation, if a corps operating in the first echelon encounters stubborn resistance, the corps of the second (third) echelon carry out a turning maneuver under its cover, launch flank attacks or continue to develop the success along a new axis. With the infantry’s arrival, a corps operating in the first echelon becomes part of the second (third) echelon, ready to augment the attack from the depth. The deeper it has been decided to launch an attack on the enemy, the more powerful the mobile group committed into the breach must be and the deeper must be its formation. The tank (mechanized) corps must be employed for developing the breakthrough, depending on the overall plan of the offensive operation, its concrete objectives, and its adopted form.

A frontal attack may be launched along a single sector with its subsequent development into the depth along diverging axes. The objective is the splitting of the enemy front and his destruction in detail by means of the envelopment and turning of the flanks. The tank and mechanized corps developing the breakthrough may receive orders to penetrate to a great depth in order to disrupt communications and cooperation between the split enemy groups of forces and create conditions for encircling these groups of forces, or one of them. They will subsequently have to operate either along diverging axes, or toward one of the flanks, if the objective is the defeat of one of the split enemy groups of forces. An example of a similar usage of mobile forces is the Southwestern Front’s operation in the area of the middle course of the Don. Such an operation, as experience showed, may be realized only by a group of corps, united under a single organ or in a tank army. The operation may be organized in the form of a simultaneous frontal attack along two or several axes, with the subsequent development of the breakthrough along converging axes. In this case, one of the axes may be the main one and the other auxiliary. In this case, a less powerful mobile group will be committed into the breach, and even an independently operating corps having a shallower mission. Depending on the conditions of the overall situation, it is possible that it will be necessary to commit a more powerful mobile group into the breach along the sector of the secondary axis and securing its subsequent arrival at the main attack zone of the troops operating from the front. The operation to encircle the Germans’ Stalingrad group of forces is an example of carrying out an attack along converging axes and developing it with mobile forces.

The Commitment into the Breach and the Development of the Breakthrough

Concentration

The commitment into the breach and its development by the mobile forces is a stage of the offensive operation, the duration of which is measured in several days. The actions of a tank (mechanized corps), independent of the form of its employment (as part of a mobile group, or along a separate axis), consist of, as experience has shown, of the corps’ concentration in the breakthrough area, the preparation for the commitment into the breach, the commitment into the breach, and actions in the enemy’s operational depth. The corps may concentrate toward the area of forthcoming operations from the deep rear or be shifted from a neighboring sector of the front. In the first case it, as a rule, is concentrated by rail and, in the second, from the march. In certain cases (the destruction or absence of railroads) the corps may also concentrate from the deep rear from the march. In any event, its tanks should first of all be delivered by rail as close as possible to the area of the forthcoming battle, while the motorized infantry and rear organs on wheels may concentrate in march order. For example, the 3rd Guards Mechanized Corps’ tank units concentrated along the railroad to its end point (Kapustin Yar), while the remaining units were delivered by rail as far as Kamysh, from which point they marched to their concentration area. The movement of the tank (mechanized) corps over long distances in march order should be avoided and this method resorted to only in extraordinary cases. As a rule, prolonged marches before an operation lead to a great deal of motor wear, equipment wear, the

exhaustion of the rank and file, and the loss of tanks due to technical breakdowns, particularly under roadless conditions. The example of the 2nd Tank Army’s concentration in February 1943 will serve to confirm this. The army completed a march of more than 200 kilometers without roads and lost on the march about 55 percent of its equipment (Table I/4.2).

Table I/4.2 2nd Tank Army Mechanical Losses During Period of Concentration, February 1943

For masking purposes, the tank (mechanized) corps should arrive in the concentration area by echelons, regardless of its means of movement. In concentrating by rail, the off-loading areas should be dispersed over a large area, while it is more expedient to carry out unloading at passing tracks configured for this purpose, or along convenient sectors of the line, if this does not entail the delay of rail movement. For example, the 4th Guards Tank Corps off-loaded at the Buturlinovka, Talovaya and Khrenovoe stations and was dispersed in an area more than 25 kilometers in radius. The 5th Tank Army was off-loaded at stations at passing tracks along a section of the Filonovo—Rakovka rail line. In concentrating by march order the corps’ columns should arrive at the concentration area by different roads and, if possible, from different directions. It is also necessary to foresee this while moving the corps’ echelons to the concentration area by rail. For masking purposes, it is expedient to carry out the march at night and select it at some distance from major inhabited locales and railroad stations, predominantly in wooded areas. In recent operations involving the movement of corps by rail, they would concentrate at a distance of 60-100 and more kilometers from the front line. In those cases when the corps moved by marching they would concentrate at a distance of 20-30 kilometers from the front line. In this case, the concentration area usually became simultaneously the intermediate position area, where the corps would receive its orders and prepare for its commitment into the breach. It is necessary to prepare the concentration area beforehand and carry out the concentration itself in secret and under cover of fighter aviation and ground-based anti-aircraft defense. Thus it is expedient in each case to send to the concentration area a part of the

headquarters’ officers with communications and traffic control equipment and sappers before the start of the concentration. The tasks of this group are:

•the reconnoitering of the off-loading area (if the concentration takes place by rail) and the movement routes to the concentration areas and their preparation; •the reconnoitering of the concentration area, its subdivision and preparations for masking it; •the organization of an anti-aircraft defense of the concentration area, as well as the organization of cooperation and communications with aviation and anti-aircraft weapons for covering the concentration area of the army or front , to which the corps is subordinated; •the familiarization with the overall situation along the planned operational sector.

The preparation for the commitment into the breach should begin immediately upon the corps’ arrival in its concentration area. By this time the corps commander will usually be aware of the command’s general decision on employing the corps and its planned zone of operations. Thus the corps commander must, without awaiting the completion of the concentration, become acquainted with the situation by traveling along with the formation commanders and part of the staff officers to the area designated for the corps’ commitment into the breach. Simultaneously the reconnoitering of routes and intermediate position areas for the corps’ formations must be

organized. For the most part, all the work for preparing for the corps’ commitment into the breach is carried out in the intermediate area, to where the tank (mechanized) corps arrives after receiving its orders. As the experience of the winter campaign of 1942-43 showed, 7-10 days were spent on preparing the tank (mechanized) corps for the commitment into the breach, which should be considered a normal deadline. Given such a lengthy stay by the corps in the intermediate area, strict masking discipline and the powerful covering of the intermediate area by fighter aviation and ground-based anti-aircraft weapons is necessary. The intermediate area should be chosen no closer than 20 kilometers from the front line and, as a rule, in wooded areas. In the winter campaign’s recent operations the intermediate areas were located on average 20-40 kilometers from the front line. However, this distance is not a cliché, and in certain cases, if the terrain and concealment conditions allow, the intermediate area may be designated significantly closer to the front line. The preparation for the commitment of the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach, which is carried out in the intermediate area, includes:

•the reconnoitering of the zone for committing the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach; the routes of march to the jumping-off position, if it is indicated, the area of the jumping-off positions, the approaches to the forward edge of the enemy’s defense; •the reconnoitering of the enemy in the zone of the corps’ commitment into the breach; the enemy’s defensive system throughout the tactical depth, the location of his reserves, their

capability and the time needed to reach the area of the corps’ actions in the enemy’s operational depth; •the organization of cooperation with combined-arms formations for the time for the passage through the breach; •the preparation of the officers and headquarters for forthcoming operations; •the preparation of the equipment and the materiel-technical support for the forthcoming operation; •the drawing up of a plan for committing the corps into the breach and a plan for combat support.

Because these measures are carried out simultaneously, they must be coordinated and reflected in a separate preparation plan, compiled by the corps staff along with the chief of the army’s (front’s) chief of armored and mechanized forces in which the corps is operating. The reconnoitering of the terrain as far as the edge of the enemy’s defense was usually carried out by commanders at all levels. At the same time, the routes of march were prepared by sappers and column guides for these routes were trained. The preparation and securing of the march routes as far as the forward edge of the defense, and in the depth as far as the point where the tank (mechanized) corps’ formations were to overtake the infantry, should be entrusted to especially detached sapper subunits, subordinated to the corps commander or headquarters organizing the operation. This guarantees the tank (mechanized) corps the opportunity to organize engineering support for operations following the overtaking of the infantry with its own means; that is the continuity of engineering support for the corps.

In those cases when the terrain (open steppe, the absence of local markers) made it difficult to orient oneself, azimuth axes were established for each formation (unit) by compass, as was the case in the 3rd and 4th guards mechanized corps, operating south of Stalingrad during the first stage of the offensive. In studying the depth of the enemy’s defense, the terrain and the defensive system, data from the rifle and artillery headquarters was used, as well as that of the headquarters of special combat arms carrying out the breakthrough, questioning local inhabitants and information from partisans. This information was augmented by data received through studying the zone of forthcoming operations on the map, from aerial reconnaissance data, and prisoner interrogation. On the basis of the data received about the terrain and the future combat zone and the enemy, an orientation plan for organizing the corps’ combat formations and its operations in depth was drawn up. The chief shortcoming in reconnoitering the enemy, as the experience of the operations has shown, was that reconnaissance was conducted to an insufficient depth and not always purposefully. In any event, the commanders of the tank corps and their staffs, and sometimes the headquarters organizing the operation, did not know the details of the location of the enemy’s operational reserves, their strength, their composition and the capability to arrive in the combat area. For example, the presence of the Germans’ 22nd Panzer Division, as a result of insufficient reconnaissance of the defensive depth, was a surprise for the formations of the 5th Tank Army, which were operating along the Kalach axis. The tactical depth of the enemy’s defense was studied better and in more detail. One may, to a certain extent, explain the caution and even indecisiveness of some corps in the depth of the enemy’s defensive zone by the lack of data on the enemy’s operational reserves.

Thus the tank commanders’ knowledge of the terrain in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense was of prime importance in developing the breakthrough, as was knowledge of the enemy’s disposition of forces and the possibility of his reserves arriving. The completeness of the data will enable us to foresee all kinds of unexpected situations and plan out a series of measures beforehand for parrying possible counterblows by the enemy’s reserves and ensure the vigorous actions of the tank (mechanized) corps in the defensive depth. It is necessary to spare neither forces nor time in order to get this data. Information on the enemy’s operational depth enables the corps to carry out vigorous reconnaissance during the development of the breakthrough and not look everywhere for the enemy. During the preparatory period for the breakthrough the corps headquarters should devote a great deal of attention to the study of the air situation and determining the enemy’s capabilities for resisting from the air. This information should form the basis for the plan for anti-aircraft defense and cover for the corps during the development of the breakthrough. During the preparatory period, sufficiently reliable communications with our airfields must be organized, while the commanders of the air formations (units) supporting the corps’ activities, or attached to it, should be familiar with the details of the corps’ operational plan. Air cooperation with the tank (mechanized) corps was usually planned at the front or army level, by the operation’s stage and foresaw:

•besides the cover of the tank corps during the preparatory period, also reconnaissance, aerial photography of the corps’ operational zone, gathering data about the enemy’s reserves (by request), delivered in such a timely manner that the data may be used by the corps commander;

•during the commitment into the breach and operations in the defensive depth, the air force, besides covering the corps’ combat formations, which is one of its chief tasks, conducts special air reconnaissance according to the corps’ plan and requests, directing the tanks toward objectives for attack and joint attacks against the enemy’s arriving reserves in order to defeat them in detail.

The following problems must be resolved with the commanders of the combined-arms formations during the organization of cooperation: the order of freeing up the tank (mechanized) corps’ march route into the breach, the order in which the corps overtakes the attacking infantry, and measures for securing the tank (mechanized) corps’ flanks. Experience has shown that the enemy, as a rule, launches flank attacks, throwing in forces from other nearby sectors of the front. For example, During the breakthrough of the front by the 5th Tank Army along the Ust-Khoper bridgehead on 19 November 1942, the Germans concentrated along the flanks a motorized and a panzer divisions, whose mission was to launch an attack against of the 1st and 1st Guards Don tank corps, which had entered the breach, and to isolate them from the infantry attacking from the front. Thus the combined-arms formations, in order to secure the commitment of the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach, must not only complete the breakthrough, but also immediately broaden it along the front, enveloping the emerging flanks and tying down and destroying the enemy’s local reserves. Problems of employing and consolidating the success of the tank (mechanized) corps and the destruction of strong points bypassed by the corps and the enemy’s centers of resistance must also be resolved with the commanders of the combined-arms formations. It is more expedient to entrust these tasks to the second echelon of the breakthrough forces. However, experience has shown that non-

motorized infantry usually lags behind the mobile forces, as a result of which a large gap in time and space arises between the tank (mechanized) corps developing the breakthrough and those forces having the mission of consolidating its success. By taking advantage of this gap, the enemy in some cases was able to either infiltrate or extract his forces that had become encircled, or to encircle the tank (mechanized) corps with his arriving reserves. For example, in the Southwestern Front’s offensive operation, by taking advantage of the gap between the 18th Tank Corps, which had arrived in the Meshkov area, and our attacking infantry, parts of the Italians’ and Germans’ infantry divisions that had been falling back from the southern bank of the Don on 19 December 1942, seized the inhabited locale of Pozdnyakovo in the corps’ rear and, upon organizing its defense, began to extract their forces from the encirclement. For a certain time the 18th Tank Corps was essentially isolated from the attacking infantry and its communications were cut by the enemy. In another case, by taking advantage of the large gap between the 2nd Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Corps and our attacking infantry, the enemy, by bringing up his reserves, encircled the corps on the night of 26-27 December and forced it to abandon Tatsinskaya and exit the encirclement. Thus experience gives us reason to believe that the activities of the tank (mechanized) corps will be all the more successful the more rapidly their success is employed and consolidated by the infantry. Thus it is more expedient for fulfilling these missions to have motorized infantry, or in any case to organize behind the corps developing the breakthrough the pushing forward of common infantry by auto transport, either wholly or in part. The fulfillment of these missions may be entrusted to the cavalry. One should keep in mind that the tank (mechanized) corps’ remove from the main forces advancing from the front should not exceed 2-

3 days of marching by the infantry. If not, cooperation between the echelons in the offensive operation may be disrupted. Cooperation with the artillery must envision the support of the tank corps during the commitment into the breach to the maximum range of the artillery’s fire. The artillery is obliged to suppress the enemy’s artillery and his mortar batteries along the flanks of the corps’ commitment zone into the breach. The practice of the 194243 winter campaign saw the detachment for this purpose of special artillery groups of long-range and howitzer artillery, as well as of guards mortar units. The group’s fire was prepared beforehand against defined areas and lines not only along the flanks, but also in the corps’ operating area. The chief of the artillery group, who is located with the tank corps’ headquarters during its commitment into the breach, should control fire. For example, artillery support for the left flank of the 1st Guards Don Tank Corps was organized during its commitment into the breach along with the 1st Tank Corps on 19 November 1942. The artillery would open fire prepared beforehand by radio signal and the tank corps would move into the breach, as if behind a fire barrier.¹ The artillery’s subsequent support during the corps’ operations in depth should be entrusted to the corps’ reinforcement artillery and anti-tank regiments.

Materiel-technical support

While developing the breakthrough, the tank (mechanized) corps operates at a definite remove from the main forces attacking from the front, which forces us to have within the corps sufficient supplies to support the launching of an attack to a great depth. On the other hand, the presence of bulky rear organs lowers the tank

(mechanized) corps’ maneuverability while operating in the depth of the defensive zone. Based on these considerations, when committing the corps into the breach it is often necessary to restrict the amount of supplies and rely on their delivery during the operation, despite the vulnerability of our communications. This situation requires that special attention be paid to the problem of the materiel-technical support of the tank (mechanized) corps during the commitment into the breach. A plan for materiel-technical support must be drawn up, but not divorced from the operational plan for employing the corps, and only on the basis of this plan an in conformity with it. The plan for the materiel-technical support for the operation is a part of the operational plan, a fact that up till now has been insufficiently understood by some headquarters charged with organizing the operation. During the preparatory period for the commitment into the breach the corps’ headquarters is obliged to determine and place at the heart of the plan for materiel-technical support the following:

•the requirements of the main types of supplies, which grows out of the corps’ mission; •the capabilities and conditions for delivering supplies from the rear; •the possibility of using local resources and captured equipment during the operation.

The supply norms that were concentrated by the start of the tank and mechanized corps’ operation are shown in Table I/4.3. It is clear from this table that the average expenditure per day for

the operation was planned as follows: up to one combat load of ammunition and one fuel refill. However, in recent operations the corps, in the majority of cases, suffered shortages in fuel, as a result of which the operations stretched out greatly in time vis a vis the plan and that the delivery routes, as a rule, were overextended, thus the distance of the supply bases to the operating formations often reached up to 200-250 and even 350 kilometers (2nd Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Corps). As a rule, the accumulation of supplies by the start of the operation required great efforts from the corps’ auto transport. Special motorized infantry vehicles were often used for delivery purposes. This naturally led to a great loss of special vehicles and auto transport due to technical problems by the start of the operation and weakened the corps’ rear as a combat echelon during the development of the breakthrough. For example, during the operation’s preparatory period more than 70 percent of the formations’ motor vehicles took part in bringing up supplies for the 5th Tank Army, as shown in Table I/4.4.

Table I/4.3 Tank Corps Provisioning During the Preparatory Period Before the Offensive

Table I/4.4 Motorised Transport Available for Provisioning of Tank Corps During the Preparatory Period Before the Offensive

Formations and Units

VehiclesNumber of Vehicles Involved in the Delivery of Supplies

500 1st Tank Corps 8th Guards Tank Brigade 40 8th Motorcycle Regiment 28 Three anti-aircraft battalions 90

360 36 16 76

All of this gives us reason to make the following conclusions regarding the organization of supply support for the tank (mechanized) corps slated for commitment into the breach.

1. It is necessary to strive for the maximum shortening of the delivery routes before the start of the operation by bringing the supply bases closer to the front line. If this is impossible, due to the situation, it is necessary to deploy a forward army base and locate the supplies on the ground.

2. The accumulation of supplies should be carried out by army (front) transport, or by reinforcing corps transport, and during the tank (mechanized) corps’ activities in the enemy’s operational depth, the corps should have attached to it additional transport equipment (up to a single automobile battalion). The plan for the materiel-technical support of the tank (mechanized) corps’ operation during its commitment into the breach should include: 1. The arrangement of the rear in the jumping-off position and the movement of the rear’s subunits during the operation (the echeloning of the rear). 2. The organization of the delivery of supplies of all kinds according to time, place and volume, and by what means. 3. The employment of local resources and captured equipment. 4. The organization of the repair and evacuation of disabled equipment.

5. The collection and evacuation of captured equipment and that lying on the battlefield. 6. The organization of communications support and the defense of rear sites. 7. The organization of communications and control of the rear during the operation.

The experience of recent operations shows that while organizing supply it is necessary to plan for the supply of the tank (mechanized) corps’ formations while operating in the depth through air transport. This necessity is brought about by the fact that while operating apart from the main forces, the corps will not have reliably secured communications and it will often have to fight in the most diverse types of situation, including encirclement. These were the conditions, for example, in which the 2nd Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Corps operated. The Tatsinskaya Corps was encircled by the enemy’s 100th Infantry and 11th Panzer divisions, which from the morning of 27 December attacked from all directions with the support of aviation and artillery. By this time the corps, having seized depots of fuels and lubricants in Tatsinskaya, had refueled, but was seriously short of ammunition. Responding to the corps commander’s radio report, at 2300 on the same day our aviation dropped ammunition by parachute. The corps gathered up 200 76mm shells, 250 45mm shells, 4,500 rifle rounds, and 6,000 rounds for automatic rifles. One can only explain the dropping of such an insignificant amount of ammunition by air by the fact that such support of the corps involved in developing the breakthrough had not been foreseen earlier, although one could have foreseen the possibility of fighting in encirclement by the type of operation. If the corps had received a larger amount of ammunition, then having on hand 39 T-34² and 19 T-70³ tanks, it’s possible that it could have

held Tatsinskaya until the arrival of the 25th Tank and 1st Guards Mechanized corps, which reached the Kachalin—Lesnoi area by 29 December. Experience has shown that the corps’ means for carrying out the evacuation of damaged equipment are insufficient. Great difficulties are encountered in evacuating damaged heavy tanks, which were often towed by other tanks out of necessity. This indicates the necessity of reinforcing the corps operating at a remove from its own forces, with an evacuation company equipped with powerful tractors. The securing of the corps’ communications should be entrusted to the commanders of the rifle (cavalry) formations operating in the corps’ zone. In the necessary cases, this task should be entrusted to special attached covering detachments and should be foreseen beforehand by the plan. In individual cases it is possible that it will be necessary to carry out combat operations for securing supply. The security of rear targets is to be carried out by the rear elements’ rank and file, and for this purpose they will employ damaged and captured combat vehicles and weapons.

Assigning the mission

The chief combat documents for planning the commitment of the corps into the breach are as follows:

•individual combat orders on moving to the jumping-off area (line); •a table (graphic or written) for cooperating with the other combat arms, according to the operation’s stage;

•a rear order and a graph for the delivery and movement of rear units and establishments; •orders and instructions for the corps’ combat and materieltechnical support.

As experience has shown, the main task of the operation’s first day in developing the breakthrough will usually be the overcoming of the depth of the enemy’s tactical defense and the seizure of some sort of road junction straddling the march routes of the enemy’s reserves coming up from the rear. Before carrying out the first day’s objectives the corps’ combat activities will involve a collision with the enemy’s local reserves coming up, which will attempt to delay the corps’ advance (if the corps does not take part in completing the breakthrough). The corps’ main goal upon its arrival in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense may be actions to encircle and destroy the enemy’s main group of forces in conjunction with units operating from the front. In this case the corps will have to cover its flank with part of its forces against the enemy’s arriving reserves. The corps, operating as part of a mobile group, may be ordered to penetrate deeply into the enemy’s rear, in order to split the enemy’s main group of forces and create conditions for the operational encirclement of some part of it. The corps’ actions in this case will take on the character of meeting collisions with the arriving reserves, or an attack against an enemy who has hurriedly taken up the defensive along intermediate lines, and in some cases fighting while encircled. The corps’ formations should not get bogged down in prolonged fighting against secondary targets and centers of enemy defense. If these cannot be destroyed from the march, they should be bypassed, blockaded and left in the rear. Finally, the enemy may manage to concentrate to the breakthrough

area his mobile reserves, with the help of which he will attempt to close the breakthrough and isolate the corps from the front’s main forces. In this case the tank (mechanized) corps will be forced to concentrate its attack against the enemy’s arriving reserves and only after their defeat undertake to carry out its main task. At the same time the corps’ actions must be so rapid and decisive so as not to be late in carrying out its main task. The targets and consecutive order of launching an attack against them should be pointed out in the corps’ orders, and this requires from the higher headquarters organizing the operation concrete knowledge of the type and location of the enemy’s operational reserves and the realistic possibility of their arriving at the area of the breakthrough. The orders to the corps should be formulated in such a way that the corps commander should clearly see what the command wants to achieve on this or that day of the operation and what role is reserved for the corps. Should the corps be assigned the task of capturing some kind of target or area on a particular day of the operation, then it is necessary to indicate for what purpose. Knowing the goal and task for each day of the operation and clearly seeing the command’s idea, the corps commander will be able to find the most expedient means of carrying out the assigned task. A clear idea of the overall idea is necessary; because the concrete situation changes very quickly and sharply and the headquarters organizing the operation will not always be able to react in time to the situation in its instructions. In assigning the task one should not go into detail, attempting to foresee the means of carrying it out. This is unrealistic and also restricts the corps commander’s initiative. In all instances, precise data as to the location of the enemy’s reserves, rear units and headquarters in his operational depth

enables the corps commander to operate more decisively. It would be wrong, on the whole, to maintain that communicating the operational idea to the corps commander makes it impossible to disguise its preparation. Evidently for this reason corps commanders have announced the corps’ mission only on the eve of the offensive (1st Guards Don Tank Corps). The corps commander and chief of staff are obliged in all instances to clearly understand the idea of the operation and relay the corps’ mission to the officer element in time, so as to ensure the purposefulness of its preparation. In order to secure secrecy, it is necessary to undertake a number of measures (for example, not to carry out reconnaissance and not include tank crewmen in combined-arms reconnaissance following the announcement of the corps’ task).

The Pace and depth of the advance

Planning the operation’s depth and its pace of advance is based on information about the enemy and the terrain in the operational zone, the operation’s goals and other data about the concrete situation, which means that they cannot be defined mechanically. The tank (mechanized) corps’ practical capabilities while developing the breakthrough may be gleaned from the experience of the Stalingrad operation and the operations along the middle course of the Don, in winter conditions (tables I/4.5 and I/4.6). In analyzing the figures given, one should note that the tank (mechanized) corps’ average daily pace of advance varied, on the average, within 25-35 kilometers, while the operational plan called for rages of advance of 40-60 and even 80 kilometers per day (4th Guards Kantemirovka Tank Corps). As a result of the lack of correspondence with the planned rates of advance, the majority of

corps did not fulfill the operational plan according to schedule. However, the rate of the tank (mechanized) corps’ advance, based on the figures given, does not represent the maximum. Given more precise coordination and support from the other combat arms, these figures may be increased significantly. In the examples given the reasons for the lack of correspondence of the tank (mechanized) corps’ planned rate of advance may be as follows:

•the incomplete employment of the tank (mechanized) corps’ maneuver qualities; bringing them in to complete the breakthrough, attacking secondary objectives in their operational area, when there is the possibility of bypassing them, which led to a loss of speed and prolonged fighting; •halts to put the corps in order and get equipment replacements, the length of which were obviously not due to necessity (5th Guards and 1st tank corps); •insufficiently vigorous and decisive actions due to the absence of communications with neighbors, higher headquarters and, therefore, a lack of clarity in the situation; •heavy enemy air activity as a result of the insufficient air cover of the tank (mechanized) corps; •the obviously inflated pace of advance in planning, as a result of the lack of precision of data about the enemy’s defense and his operational reserves, as a well as the result of a poor consideration of the capabilities of the tank and mechanized corps; •the excessive elongation of the supply routes, which made the materiel supply of the corps more difficult.

From this arises the conclusion—in assigning the corps tasks for operating in the depth, it is necessary in each specific case to, first of all, issue from the corps’ role in the given operation in connection with the command’s overall plan, and thus from the goal which the corps must achieve and, secondly, from the corps’ practical capabilities, which must be determined in each specific case by:

•the presence of transportable supplies of fuels and lubricants and ammunition and the possibility of delivering or replenishing them through captured materials during the operation; •the cohesiveness of the tank corps, its training and the limits of the rank and file’s endurance; •the necessity of carrying out periodic repairs and the preventive inspection of the equipment; •the tank corps’ viability as a combat organism.

In the practice of the operations conducted the actions of the tank (mechanized) corps were mostly planned 3-4 days out, although actually during the course of the operation some of them operated uninterruptedly over 14-15 days, and even up to 22 days (see tables I/4.5 and I/4.6). By the close of the operation, the tank corps were so worn out that their restoration and refitting to their authorized strength, as a full-bodied combat entity, proved to be an extremely difficult and prolonged process. Experience showed that a corps has the capability to conduct uninterrupted combat operations throughout 2-3 days and, following a ½-1 day break for inspecting and repairing equipment, for another 2-3 days. Following 5-7 days of intensive combat, to which it is necessary to add another 2-3 days of intensive work by

the rank and file preceding the commitment into the breach, the corps must be taken out of the fighting to restore its equipment and supplies to authorized levels. If these conditions are carried out, one can avoid prolonged “major repairs” of the tank (mechanized) corps. The tank formations’ supply equipment guarantees the delivery of supplies to a distance of up to 150 kilometers from the supply station. Given the supply station’s distance of 60-80 kilometers from the front line and the corps’ operations to a depth of up to 80 kilometers, supply can be covered by the corps’ transport equipment. When operating to a great depth, it is necessary to reinforce the corps’ rear organs with additional transport equipment, or to add an additional chain of supply.

Table I/4.5 The Pace and Depth of the Tank (Mechanized) Corps’ Advance During the Stalingrad Operation

* The 1st Tank Corps carried out a flanking maneuver from Peschanaya to Lipovskii.

Table I/4.6 The Pace and Depth of the Tank (Mechanized) Corps’ Advance During Operations Along the Middle Don

50-70 kilometers should be considered the normal gap between the tank (mechanized) corps and the main forces advancing from the front.

Intermediate and jumping-off positions, jumping-off lines

The commitment of the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach begins, as a rule, from the jumping-off line, from where, following the successful breakthrough by the combined-arms formations, the corps moves through the breach thus formed. In practice, the tank (mechanized) corps did not always have jumping-off positions and often began their operations immediately from the intermediate position (see tables I/4.5 and I/4.6). Experience showed that when the intermediate position is located at a short remove from the front line (less than 20 kilometers), it is not expedient to designate a jumping-off line, because:

•in operating from an intermediate position a great degree of secrecy is assured, and thus of surprise; •it is not profitable to carry out a march up to 15 kilometers, because more time is spent bringing up the columns than in the actual march; •a prolonged stay in the jumping-off position in direct proximity to the front line will demand additional measures for supporting the corps, particularly as regards air cover; in those conditions when the accomplishment of the breakthrough is prolonged, the corps will be

forced to await an undefined amount of time for the completion of the breakthrough.

If the corps begins to move into the breach from the intermediate position, it is necessary to designate a jumping-off line, which is simultaneously a traffic control line before the entry into the breach. In the jumping-off position the corps emerges from under the cover of night and occupies a position, awaiting the completion of the breakthrough by the combined-arms formations. In those cases, when the breakthrough is prolonged due to the stubbornness of the defense, the tank corps, as was noted earlier, may be delayed for quite a long period of time in the jumping-off position. In some cases, and given the intermediate position’s small remove from the front line, the jumping-off position may also be designated when the corps will have to overcome some sort of natural obstacle before entering the neck of the breakthrough, after which it is necessary to put the corps in order. For example, before entering the breach, the 4th Guards Kantemirovka and 25th tank corps had to cross the Don. A jumping-off position was designated for concentrating the corps following the crossing. Usually the distance of the jumping-off position from the front line was, on the average, no more than ten kilometers (see tables I/4.5 and I/4.6). As a rule, the corps makes a halt along the jumping-off line only for bringing up its columns and aligning them before entering the breach. In some cases, the jumping-off line turn into a jumping-off position, when the corps’ units, due to the slowing of the pace of advance of the troops carrying out the breakthrough, are forced to delay in anticipation of completing the breakthrough. Of course, all of these exceptions are undesirable, but in practice they have arisen and may arise and thus it is necessary to take them into account. It follows that the jumping-off line must be chosen and prepared so

that in case of necessity it can also serve as the jumping-off position. In designating a jumping-off position, it is necessary to calculate the time, so that the corps’ units are located there as little time as possible; but because this is very difficult to carry out in practice, it is more expedient, if the situation allows, to began to begin the commitment into the breach directly from the intermediate position. In practice, in the operations under study, the tank (mechanized) corps were in their jumping-off positions for up to half a day. However, the 5th Guards Tank Corps, for example, was moved up on 8 November 1942 to the area of the jumping-off positions; that is, 11 days before the start of the operation. Naturally, the corps’ location was discovered by the enemy, and during 8-9 November he carried out deliberate artillery and mortar fire against the corps’ units, while also carrying out air raids almost daily. As a result, the corps lost about 250 men killed and wounded during this time. It follows that the employment of the tank corps was no surprise and the enemy, judging from the tank corps’ location in this area, was able to learn beforehand of the offensive under preparation and the direction of the main attack. One should normally consider that the corps in the jumping-off position should concentrate during the night before the beginning of the breakthrough. In this case, should the breakthrough stretch out a bit, the corps’ units will be in the jumping-off position for only a few hours, which was actually the case in the operations under study. Besides this, the examples shown once again confirm the conclusions to the effect that in all cases when the situation allows, we should avoid designating jumping-off positions, particularly for major formations (a corps) and mobile groups. We should begin the movement into the breach directly from the intermediate position, employing the jumping-off line for deploying and regulating the movement of the columns entering the breach.

The width of the commitment zone into the breach

Depending on the terrain conditions and the command’s plan, the experience of the operations conducted offers norms for the width of the zone for committing the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach, which were shown in tables I/4.5 and I/4.6. The minimal width of the breakthrough front should be such that the enemy cannot close it, using his immediate reserves, and that the breach formed as the result of the breakthrough, cannot be enfiladed by enemy artillery fire from the flanks. According to the width and the type of terrain, the corps’ commitment zone into the breach should enable movement in dispersed formation, in order to avoid losses from enemy aircraft and to guarantee freedom of maneuver and the capability of deploying the corps. The broader the breakthrough front, the deeper one can wage a secured offensive and the quicker the tank corps can get into the enemy’s operational depth and have an immediate effect on the course of the offensive operation. One should take into account that in normal conditions the corps should have a commitment zone into the breach 6-8 kilometers wide; because the data indicates that the corps’ maneuverability during the commitment into the breach along a 5-6 kilometer zone is somewhat restricted. Besides this, it is necessary to have a zone 35 kilometers toward the flanks, in order to be safe from the enemy’s mortar and observable artillery fire. It follows that in committing a separately operating corps into the breach, the width of the breakthrough zone should normally be 12-18 kilometers. During the commitment into the breach over broken terrain, which makes the conduct of observable artillery fire more difficult, as well

as when the terrain conditions do not enable us to support the normal width of the breakthrough front, the commitment into the breach may be carried out along a narrower front. However, in this case the corps’ formations must be deeply echeloned, which, first of all, will make it more difficult to maneuver the corps and require and require more powerful air and artillery support in committing the corps into the breach.

Pre-battle and battle formations

In the operations under study in encircling the Germans’ Stalingrad group of forces, the 1st Tank Corps was committed into the breach into two columns in two echelons. The 1st Guards Don Tank Corps moved by four routes and also in two echelons. The 3rd Guards Stalingrad Mechanized Corps moved by three columns in a single echelon. During the offensive along the middle Don, the 4th Guards Kantemirovka and 25th tank corps were committed into the breach in two echelons along three routes, while the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was committed in a single echelon along three routes, while one brigade, which was advancing in the center, constituted the reserve. Thus the type of formation depended each time on the specific situation (the presence of routes, the terrain conditions) and the command’s plan. As a rule, the tank formations were located in the first echelon. The motorized infantry in the tank corps was in the second echelon under the cover of the tank formations; the motorized infantry of the mechanized corps advanced behind the tank regiments.

The majority of the mechanized corps’ commanders held their corps’ tank regiments in their hands as a reserve and committed them into the fighting after the most favorable axis of the attack had been determined. The tank (mechanized) brigades of the corps’ first echelons were reinforced, in the first instance, with anti-tank artillery, which following immediately behind these brigades’ tanks, or along their external flank. In all instances the desire to avoid dispersing the anti-tank artillery was noted, and to keep it concentrated, so that it could quickly be thrown along any axis where the enemy’s tanks threatened. In those corps that had howitzer artillery attached to them, it moved immediately behind the tanks along with the motorized infantry brigade, being attached to it, or being subordinated to the corps commander. As a rule, guards mortar units were resubordinated to the brigades on the basis of one battalion per brigade. Thus, as concerns the organization of the tank (mechanized) corps’ combat formations, one can make the following overall conclusions.

1. Given a broad breakthrough front and the presence of a sufficient number of routes in the commitment zone for the breakthrough, the corps may be organized into a single echelon, but for this each brigade must have a separate route. In this case, it’s more expedient to move the tank formations along the flanks and the motorized infantry in the center. In a mechanized corps there should be tank regiments ahead of the motorized infantry, while the corps’ tank regiments should be held along the flanks of the combat formation or behind the mechanized brigades, using them as a means of attacking from the depth.

A single-echelon formation in committing a group of corps into the breach is more expedient for the corps following in the first echelon of this mobile group.

2. Experience has shown that the most flexible and maneuverable combat formation is one organized into two echelons. At the same time, we should have tank brigades (mechanized brigades with tank regiments ahead of them) and artillery in the first echelon. The tank corps’ second echelon should have a motorized rifle brigade, while in the mechanized brigade it is more expedient to move the corps tank regiments (a brigade) along the turning flank and by flank marches echeloned behind the mechanized brigades.

3. In the operations under review, individual corps were committed into the breach in three echelons. One should take into account the fact that such a formation was forced upon us and that it may be employed in rare situations: given the absence of routes and the small width of the breakthrough front, along broken terrain, and while committing the corps into the breach in the second (third) echelon of the mobile group.

4. In all the possible variants for forming the corps, it is necessary to include artillery with the first echelon and move it under cover of the tanks. It is necessary to have a large part of the anti-tank artillery along the open flank (flanks), as, for example, in the 5th Tank Army’s tank corps, and to employ it compactly and not break it up among the units.

5. Depending on the situation, following the commitment of the

corps into the breach, when it is necessary to seize some sort of line in order to enable the corps to concentrate or deploy, it may prove profitable to have in the first echelon motorized infantry, reinforced with artillery and tanks. In practice, mobile groups (essentially forward detachments) were created, as, for example, in the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps during the Stalingrad operation. These, evidently, did not play a major role in the mechanized corps’ operations, because the corps had to complete the breakthrough on its own. However, in principle, they were designated for seizing individual strong points and crossings ahead of the major forces along the axis of the tank corps’ axis of movement and were formed as early as the operation’s preparatory period. The formation of mobile groups by the 4th Guards Mechanized Corps is worthy of attention. However, it should be emphasized that the actions of these mobile groups may be successful only after the corps overcomes the tactical depth of the defense. They may be employed for seizing individual strong points in the enemy’s rear, crossings and lines favorable for deploying the corps. A classical example of a mobile group’s (forward detachment’s) actions is the case of seizing a crossing over the Don in the Kalach area by units of the 1st Guards Don Tank Corps. Finally, mobile groups may be widely employed while pursing the retreating enemy, when a small but mobile group may, while moving significantly faster than the main forces, preempt the enemy in seizing defiles along his path of retreat and delay his retreating columns for a certain time.

6. All of the variants for organizing the tank (mechanized) corps are only provisional, because they remain in effect while overcoming the depth of the tactical defense until the deployment for battle. Subsequently, the combat formations may change each time in

accordance with the specific situation. Therefore, the requirement that the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense be overcome as quickly as possible, the rapidity of deployment and ease of maneuver and, in some cases, the capability of reorganizing the march order in progress, should be the foundation for organizing the combat formation of the tank (mechanized) corps into the breach.

Combat security

Before the beginning of the movement from the jumping-off (intermediate) position to the breakthrough, the corps commander must know the following:

•whether or not the zone for committing the corps into the breach, where the enemy’s strong points remain, has been cleared of the enemy; •whether or not the route and bypasses around the enemy’s remaining nests of resistance have been prepared and regulated for the movement of the corps’ columns in the zone for commitment into the breakthrough; •where the enemy is concentrating his forces for a flank attack and from which areas his artillery is keeping under fire the corps’ area of movement.

The commander of the tank (mechanized) corps will receive this data, while at the command post of the combined-arms

commander, along the sector of which his corps must enter the breakthrough. However, experience has shown that this is still insufficient. It’s still necessary to control the flow of reports and information and check them out on the spot, in order not to end up in the kind of situation the 4th Guards Kantemirovka and 25th Guards tank corps found themselves in, when they unexpectedly ran into a minefield and were delayed for a day while being committed into the breach, waiting for passages to be cleared. The headquarters and the corps’ combat security organs must control the sector for committing into the breach and the movement routes. The practice of the operations conducted shows that the majority of corps detached ahead of the main forces a reconnaissance party, behind which the detachments for supporting the movement of the columns followed and behind them the security organs. All of these combat support organs began their movement into the breach almost simultaneously with the main forces and advanced at a small distance from them. The overall depth of all the combat support organs was approximately 1.5-4 kilometers. In the 4th Guards Kantemirovka Tank Corps the overall depth of the support organs reached approximately 17-20 kilometers, while the first-echelon brigades sent out forward detachments. However, in this instance they moved at a small remove from the main forces. Naturally, such a remove of the combat support organs could not guarantee that the corps commander would have time to undertake a maneuver with his main forces’ columns, in case of necessity, because the latter moved in the tail of the combat support organs. Aside from this, the timely control and preparation of the corps’ zone for commitment into the breach were not achieved. Taking into account the above-listed considerations, one can construct the following plan for the combat support of the corps during its commitment into the breach.

1. The reconnaissance organs, which are tasked with observing the actions of the infantry, reconnoitering routes and systematically informing the corps’ headquarters of the situation, advance immediately behind the attacking infantry as far as the planned line for bypassing the infantry, from line to line along the axis of movement. For this purpose, officers from the corps’ headquarters must move with the reconnaissance organs. 2. The forward detachments, which have elements of the movement security service at the head of the column, following at a small distance. The commander of the forward detachment must control his route’s degree of preparation as far as the line where the tanks bypass the infantry and, if necessary, organize traffic control of the detours around individual enemy centers of resistance, employing the equipment of the movement security detachments and, if necessary, to detach column masters for accompanying the columns along the bypasses. It is recommended to additionally attach small amounts of traffic control equipment to the forward detachment, so that the movement security detachments can conserve their equipment for work following the passage of the depth of the enemy’s tactical defense. 3. All of the combat support organs advance behind the infantry and reach the line for bypassing the infantry before the main forces begin their movement from the jumping-off positions. Thus before the beginning of the main forces’ movement, the routes must be under control and regulated and the corps headquarters must have information about the situation, aside from that of the combinedarms headquarters, as well as from its officers and staff.

Upon beginning the movement into the breakthrough, the tank corps commander must receive data about the enemy uninterruptedly and sufficiently full. Data about the enemy located at a distance of more than a day’s march by the corps is to be

systematically transmitted by our aviation and the headquarters organizing the operation, without waiting for special requests. The corps must organize with its own resources the reconnaissance of the enemy located up to a half day’s march away. Reconnaissance organs, which have been detached for this purpose, bypass the infantry along the designated line, taking advantage of any open breach in the enemy’s defense on its own initiative and carrying out reconnaissance up to 25-30 kilometers in front of the main forces. As the tank corps passes through its own infantry, additional reconnaissance organs must move to the flanks. With its arrival in the depth of the enemy’s defense, the tank corps must have, as a rule, all-round reconnaissance. While operating in depth, the task of establishing communications with neighbors and the troops attacking from the front is also entrusted to both tactical and operational reconnaissance. The latter is extremely important, as it will allow us to maintain uninterrupted cooperation and will help the corps commander become more quickly oriented in the situation. The actions of the tactical reconnaissance organs in the depth will be somewhat different from those in normal conditions. First of all, the situation will often arise when the reconnaissance organs will be able to operate at a great remove from the main forces and thus the commander of the reconnaissance organ will be granted greater initiative in the methods for carrying out his assigned tasks. Secondly, the main intelligence targets will be the enemy’s columns, thus it follows that the actions of the reconnaissance organs will be the most mobile, daring and vigorous. In these cases, data on the enemy will most likely be acquired in fighting. Sometimes the forward detachment’s tasks—the seizure and holding of a line until the arrival of the main forces—may be entrusted to reinforced reconnaissance organs. The actions of the reconnaissance organs must be closely tied to the

activities of aerial reconnaissance. It is necessary to supply the ground reconnaissance organs with sufficiently powerful radio equipment, recognition signals and communications with aviation for communications with the corps’ headquarters and aviation, as well as mobile communications equipment. Movement security detachments follow immediately behind the reconnaissance along the tank formations’ movement routes. They begin their work in full only when the tank corps passes the attacking infantry. As a rule, the commanders of the column’s lead formations moving along a given route must dispatch security detachments. The remaining formations have prepared detachments at the head of the column and employ them when changing the direction of their movement or when deploying. Reconnoitering the terrain must also be entrusted to movement security detachments. As opposed to the reconnaissance organs, the movement security detachments and the forward detachments cross the line of bypassing the infantry on the signal of the brigade commanders, or upon an overall signal from the corps’ headquarters. Under normal conditions, the forward detachment will pass the line for bypassing the infantry before the beginning of the corps’ movement from the jumping-off positions, so that at the moment the corps bypasses the infantry the forward detachments will have seized their assigned line or crossing and thus secured the main forces’ freedom of movement. The earlier in the day the corps’ movement into the breach begins, the greater will be the depth of the intermediate concentration area. In the operations under consideration, the corps began their movement in winter conditions approximately at 1100 and during the operation’s first day covered an average distance of 25-40 kilometers from the jumping-off positions. Thus, in normal conditions the intermediate area will be designated at a depth of 35-50 kilometers. At the same time, the main criterion will be not

the distance, but the profitability of reaching this area according to tactical and topographical considerations. At night, before dawn of the following day, the corps will be putting itself in order and be occupied with the organization of the subsequent movement. It follows that the corps will be located in the intermediate area for a certain time. Thus the task of the forward detachments on the first day of the operation is the seizure of lines securing the concentration of the main forces and the movement from dawn on the following day. The march security organs, upon passing the line of their attacking infantry, also follow as part of the main forces, although not deployed. Upon reaching the depth of the enemy’s defense, they reach their normal distance from their main forces. Security, in actions within the depth of the enemy’s defense, must be all-round. It is expedient that the commander have a small reserve, designated, if necessary, for reinforcing the security organs along individual axes. The reconnaissance reserve must also be sufficiently strong. Such a formula for organizing the combat security organs and the movement through the breach of the breakthrough (by no means a rote formula) is typical for corps operating as part of the first echelon of the mobile group for developing the breakthrough, or along an independent axis. Corps of the second (third) echelon of the mobile group may limit themselves to only immediate security during the commitment into the breakthrough. All of these combat security organs, which have been previously outfitted, follow within the column and in readiness to act upon deployment or a change in the axis of movement. If the mobile group, upon arriving in the operational depth, continues its movement in its previous formation, then the second (third)-echelon corps dispatch a reconnaissance and a strong security detachment to the flanks.

The time for movement into the breakthrough

The beginning of the corps’ movement, in normal conditions of committing into the breach, must be strictly in conformity with the specific situation and coordinated with the actions of the combinedarms formations carrying out the breakthrough. The corps’ formations, as a rule, must reach the line of the attacking infantry, when the infantry overcomes the entire depth of the enemy’s main defensive zone and reaches the area of his artillery positions. However, in the practice of the operations under study, in the majority of cases we were not able to achieve such a situation in which the breakthrough development corps could begin their combat activities only in the operational depth. The corps, to one degree or another, had to take part directly in the breakthrough or in clearing the commitment zone of powerful enemy centers of resistance. In all these cases, despite the eventual success, this led to a reduction in the pace of the breakthrough’s development and a weakening of the attack in the operational depth, as was the case, for example, with the 4th Guards Kantemirovka and 25th tank corps during their commitment into the breakthrough in the area of the middle Don. The army (front) commander establishes the time for the beginning of the movement into the breach, although this time is more likely the moment of readiness to begin the movement, because it is impossible to determine beforehand at what speed the troops carrying out the breakthrough will advance. In order to exactly determine the moment to begin the movement, the commander of the mobile group (corps) and the formation commanders must be located, at the beginning of the offensive, at

the command posts of the combined-arms formation commanders, in order to be constantly on top of the situation and to correctly determine the moment to begin the movement into the breach. Knowing the situation along the breakthrough sector, it is not difficult to calculate how much time will be required by the corps’ formations to overcome the distance from the jumping-off (intermediate) position to the line of passing the infantry. In these conditions, when the units in the jumping-off (intermediate) position are in combat readiness and their routes of movement have been regulated and prepared beforehand, they may begin their movement by signal. However, in certain cases, when the enemy is demoralized, is retreating, not putting up resistance, or is running away in panic, the commitment into the breach may be begun before the infantry completely breaks through the enemy’s main defense zone. The activities of the tank (mechanized) corps in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense begin, as experience has shown, usually from the second day of the operation (if the corps has not been drawn in to complete the breakthrough). In order to begin operating at dawn of the next day, the corps must put itself in order and bring up its lagging units; in other words, to concentrate in some intermediate assembly area. The distance of this area must be chosen in such a way that the main part of the corps’ formations reaches the intermediate area before the onset of darkness and that there be time to put itself in order. Such a halt, as the operations under study have shown, is necessary for those corps that have, to one degree or another, taken part in completing the breakthrough. However, in those cases when the commitment of the tank corps into the breach has been carried out in normal conditions and the corps’ formations have not been involved in the fighting and the enemy is falling back, without putting up resistance, the corps may continue operations, having made a short halt only for carrying out necessary materiel-technical measures (inspecting equipment). Actions in the defensive depth in the operations under study varied,

depending upon the developing situation. For example, the 1st Guards Don Tank Corps, upon entering the breakthrough on 19 November 1942 in the area of farm no. 2, advanced as far as the line of the Don, fighting to destroy the enemy’s individual strong points, primarily in the inhabited locales. Its actions resembled a march, with the elimination of strong points on the move, and flanking maneuvers by its formations. At this stage the corps’ activities resembled an offensive battle only in capturing Perelazovskii, when it was necessary to deploy all of the corps’ forces. With its arrival at the line of the Don, the corps encountered a powerful defense along the line “Ten Years of October”—Victory of October State Farm. Essentially, this was a fight for bridgehead positions. Both in the fighting to capture Perelazovskii and in breaking through the bridgehead positions, the corps’ actions resembled an attack on an enemy that had gone over to the defensive and this attack began, following a short preparation —from the march. The 13th (4th Guards Stalingrad) Mechanized Corps, having reached on 20 November the operational depth on the operation’s second day, was supposed to repel the enemy’s tank and infantry counterattacks in the direction of Kashary and to secure the right flank. Thus the corps’ actions along the right flank took on the character of meeting engagements. Only following the defeat of this enemy group of forces did the advance of the corps’ combat formations and the enemy’s general withdrawal begin. With its arrival at the line of the Chervlennaya River, the corps was engaged in offensive fighting against the enemy’s powerfully fortified defense, while its independent attempts to break the defense were unsuccessful. The 4th (3rd Guards Stalingrad) Mechanized Corps, which was vigorously advancing and destroying the enemy’s individual strong points from the march, on 22 November reached the line of the Stalingrad—Rychkovskii railroad. The corps’ actions resembled

offensive battles against the enemy’s fortified defense. In the operation along the middle Don, the 4th Guards Kantemirovka Tank Corps, having entered the breakthrough with the mission of securing the Southwestern Front’s right flank, fought during 17-19 December to eliminate individual enemy strong points and to capture Kantemirovka, while it was engaged in defensive fighting during 19-22 December, repelling enemy counterattacks and securing the actions of the tank corps developing the Southwestern Front’s breakthrough. On 22 December the corps, having carried out a march and captured the Voloshino area, went over to the defensive. The 2nd Guards Tatsinskaya and 25th tank corps, upon arriving in the operational depth of the enemy’s defense, were primarily engaged in meeting engagements to eliminate the enemy’s strong points. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps had to deploy to wage offensive battles along the lines Grekhov—Novyi Astakhov and Man’kovo—Berezov—Selivanovka. By the time of the corps’ arrival at the line of the Tatsinskaya— Morozovskii railroad, the enemy had brought up his reserves and launched a counterattack. Thus the 25th Tank and 1st Guards Mechanized corps were forced to wage defensive battles until the infantry’s arrival, while the 2nd Guards Tatsinskaya Tank Corps was engaged in defensive fighting while surrounded and trying to break out of the encirclement. Without examining in detail the actions of each corps, but rather basing ourselves on the examples given above, one may make the following conclusions:

1. The actions of a tank (mechanized) corps in developing the breakthrough will take on the most varied forms, depending on the specific situation;

•a maneuver-march to reach a particular area, for the purpose of creating the prerequisites for the operational encirclement of some enemy group of forces or for closing with the enemy; •meeting engagements with operational reserves arriving from the depth, or with the enemy’s retreating groups of forces; •an attack against an enemy who has gone over to the defensive, for the purpose of delaying the tank corps’ movement; •the pursuit of the retreating enemy; •the defense of a line while encircled.

At the same time, it is necessary to emphasize that to employ a tank (mechanized) corps to attack an enemy who has gone over to the defensive along a previously prepared line is not expedient, as experience has shown. Such a defense must be bypassed. There are usually opportunities for a flanking maneuver in conditions of developing the breakthrough. The defense must be short in duration —only until the arrival of the combined-arms formations, after which the tank (mechanized) corps should be employed as an attack means along other axes.

2. A feature of the tank (mechanized) corps’ activities in the operational depth of the enemy defense will be the short duration of the fighting. Thus the command and control of the tank (mechanized) corps and the organization of its combat formation must be particularly flexible while operating in the depth of the enemy’s defense. The combat formation must allow for regrouping on the march; its

echelons must possess relative independence; the reinforcements must be distributed in accordance with this. In conditions of maneuver and short-duration fighting, the corps commander must have in his hands a sufficiently strong reserve; both a tank reserve for attacking along the decisive axis, and an anti-tank one for repelling counterattacks and securing the maneuver of the corps’ formations.

3. The corps’ activities will unfold in conditions of the rear organs’ lack of security, especially in cases involving a large space between the main forces attacking from the front; thus measures for securing communications must be foreseen. Such measures may be:

•the organization of mobile security for the rear organs along the threatened flank; •leaving behind garrisons in individual areas for defending the rear; •reinforcing transport units with combat elements (tanks, armored cars, anti-air and motorized rifle elements, and, if necessary, sappers).

4. The chief goal of the tank (mechanized) corps will usually be to vigorously break up the enemy’s group of forces, and to surround and destroy it in detail. Thus the actions of the corps’ formations should be vigorous and bold; even small units should not be afraid of deeply penetrating into the enemy’s position and infiltrating into his combat formations in order to demoralize his rear area and command and control.

5. Maneuver and the striving to defeat the enemy in detail should be at the heart of the actions by the corps’ main units. Thus secondary targets and individual enemy strong points in the corps’ area of operations should be bypassed and left in the rear. In necessary instances, they are blocked by individual garrisons until the arrival of the combined-arms formations. The arriving reserves are to be destroyed in detail. For this, the corps will often have to cover itself with part of its forces against one enemy group of forces, and with all its forces launch a powerful and rapid attack against another. Then the first group may be destroyed. A flanking maneuver and attacks from the flank and rear against the target of attack must be at the basis of its actions. The destruction of the enemy in detail must be achieved in conditions of the corps’ close and precise cooperation with the aviation and airborne landings, as well as with other corps operating along the given axis. The pursuit of the enemy should be conducted to his complete destruction. The corps may halt the pursuit only on orders of the front (army) command.

1A chart for the artillery support of the 1st Guards Don Tank Corps was published in the Sbornik po Izucheniyu Opyta Voiny General’nogo Shtaba , no. 6. 2The T-34 was the standard Soviet medium tank during the Second World War. The most common model weighed 26.5 tons and carried a four-man crew. It was armed with a 76mm gun and two 7.62mm machine guns. A later model was armed with an 85mm gun. 3The T-70 was a light tank during the Second World War and was often used for reconnaissance purposes. The standard model weighed 9.2 tons and carried a two-man crew. It was armed with a

45mm gun and one 7.62mm machine gun.

Part II

The Soviet Counteroffensive Along the Middle Don: Execution

The following took part in drawing up the materials for Sbornik no. 9: Lieutenant General A.I. Bogolyubov, Lieutenant General of Engineer Troops I.P. Galitskii, Lieutenant General, professor and doctor of military sciences A.I. Gotovtsev, Lieutenant General of Aviation N.A. Zhuravlev, Lieutenant General of Engineer Troops K.S. Nazarov, General Lieutenant General of Artillery F.A. Samsonov, Major General of Engineer Troops Ye.V. Aleksandrov, Major General S.S. Bronevskii, Major General K.F. Vasil’chenko, Major General of Artillery V.G. Guleiko, Major General P.N. Kalinovskii, Major General S.G. Timokhin, Major General of Tank Troops and candidate of military sciences A.I. Shtromberg, and Major General P.S. Shadilov. Colonels: S.A. Vladimirov, K.N. Vakhterov, A.F. Goncharov, A.T. Yerisov, G.G. Klein, L.A. Lisitsyn, M.V. Lyushkovskii, M.R. Mazalov, V.F. Mernov, I.L. Okunev, G.Ya. Sapozhkov, M.F. Sochilov, M.V. Savin, A.G. Serebryakov, A.N. Trofimov, G.M. Chumakov, Ye.S. Chalik, I.N. Kharuk, and A.I. Yanchinskii. Captain First Class N.Yu. Ozarovskii. Lieutenant Colonels: V.M. Kravtsov, V.N. Larionov, I.V. Petrunin, N.G. Pavlenko, and V.I. Sidorov. Majors: R.S. Gusakov, A.M. Rapoport, P.I. Razdorov, and N.A. Fokin.

Editor is Major General P.P. Vechnyi.

1

The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense on the Don by the Southwestern Front’s Forces and the Troops’ Activities in the Operational Depth The Southwestern Front’s offensive operation on the Don in December 1942¹ may be broken up into three major stages: 1) the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense; 2) the pursuit, and; 3) the completion of the operation and the consolidation of the success. The first stage embraces the 16-18 December period. During these days the front’s forces, following fierce fighting, crushed the enemy’s resistance and, having broken through his defensive zone, achieved operational freedom. The second stage began on 18-19 December, while carrying out the first stage’s tasks and was completed by approximately 25-27 December. During this period the complete defeat of the Italian Eighth and Romanian Third armies was accomplished and the front’s forces basically reached the security lines called for in the plan. The events of the third stage unfolded during the last days of December and concluded in the first days of January 1943. They were distinguished by extremely bitter fighting with the enemy’s newly-arrived reserves and concluded with the fulfillment of all the tasks laid down for the troops of the Southwestern Front. This article has as its goal to show the overall course of the operation and its results, and the first two stages of the operation will be primarily highlighted: the breakthrough of the enemy’s

defense and the pursuit. The recitation of the front’s combat operations during the concluding stage is not illuminated and is presented in the form of a brief, generalized result.

The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense

The offensive by the troops of the Voronezh Front’s left wing and the Southwestern Front, despite the thick fog, which covered the entire battlefield on the morning of 16 December, began at the designated time with an artillery preparation. At 0800 the first massed fire onslaught with all guns was carried out against the enemy’s combat order. The 90-minute artillery preparation concluded with a second powerful onslaught by all weapons against the forward edge of the enemy’s defense, after which the infantry attacked.

Map 1 The Development of the Soviet Forces’ Counteroffensive in the Stalingrad Area.

Fierce fighting began for the breakthrough of the main zone of the enemy’s defense, which became especially bitter along the axes of the main attacks.

The 1st Guards Army’s breakthrough toward Boguchar

By dawn on 16 December the 1st Guards Army’s main forces had been concentrated along the front Derezovka—Zhuravka. Three quarters of the army’s rifle divisions and all of its tank corps were located along this narrow 18-kilometer sector along the Don’s left bank and its Osetrovka bend. At 0930, following the artillery preparation, the infantry attacked. The fighting immediately became fierce. Despite the enormous losses inflicted upon the enemy by our artillery during the artillery preparation, a portion of the firing points nevertheless remained unsuppressed and the enemy opened a powerful fire against our attacking forces’ combat formations. Simultaneously, the ItalianGerman units launched numerous counterattacks with tanks, while attempting to throw our infantry back to its jumping-off position. The 41st and 44th guards rifle divisions, which were attacking in the center of the army’s shock group, encountered especially powerful resistance. During the middle of the day units of the 195th Rifle Division managed to break through the first line of the enemy’s defense and

reach the northern slopes of heights 158.1 and 155, as well as the western slopes of height 197. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, having encountered the enemy’s particularly heavy fire resistance from heights 197 and 217.2, as well as from the woods north of Solontsy, hardly advanced along its right flank and center. The offensive developed somewhat more successfully along its left flank. Here the 1st Rifle Division, while advancing against heavy enemy fire, overcame the abatis in the wooded area and penetrated several hundred meters into the enemy’s defense in the direction of Svinyukha and height 196. Due to the fact that the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along the axis of the main attack was prolonged and that the situation demanded the rapid arrival of the mobile formations into the rear of his Tormosin group of forces, the command decided to assist the rifle formations in breaking through the enemy’s defense and commit units of the tank corps’ into the fighting. At 1100 the 25th and 18th tank corps began carrying out their assigned mission. Within half an hour the 6th Army’s 17th Tank Corps issued from its jumping-off position. The forward units of these tank corps, upon arriving at height 197 and the northern slopes of height 217.2, encountered minefields. Having no opportunity to bypass them, the tank corps were forced to halt further attacks and begin making passages. By the close of the day units of the 195th Rifle Division had advanced to height 204.1 along the right flank and continued to fight along the approaches to Krasno-Orekhovoe. By this time units of the 1st Rifle Division had driven the enemy out of Svinyukha and Filonovo and had blockaded Solontsy. It was not possible to fully consolidate this success, as somewhat later the enemy launched a counterattack with two infantry regiments and tanks and drove our elements out of Filonovo, and they were forced to fall back to the area of height 196.

Thus as a result of the first day of the operation’s fighting, units of the 1st Guards Army, despite the stubborn resistance by Italian and German forces, were able to deeply penetrate the defense along a number of sectors, to seriously disrupt the enemy’s fire system and inflict serious losses in men and materiel, but were unable to break through the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense throughout its entire depth, as called for by the plan. The tasks assigned by the command for the first day of the operation to the rifle formations and tank corps were not carried out in full, which may be explained by the following reasons.

Map 2 The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense Along the Axis of the 1st Guards and 6th Armies’ Main Attacks, 16-18 December 1942.

As a result of the fog during the artillery preparation, the enemy’s fire system was not completely suppressed, thus the infantry was not able to break through the defense in the area of height 197 and was thus not able to secure the tank corps’ commitment into the battle. Due to the fact that by the start of the operation the breakthrough tank regiments had not arrived with the army, the infantry attack was carried out without tank support. This was also one of the reasons that had a negative effect on the course of the infantry’s combat activities on the first day of the operation. Due to the unfavorable meteorological conditions, our aviation was not able to take part in the air preparation for the attack, which also affected the ground forces’ combat activities. Due to terrain conditions, the commitment of the success development echelon into the fighting was limited to a narrow bridgehead along the Osetrovka bend. Insufficiently deep reconnaissance by infantry and tank units of the forward edge of the enemy’s defense and the absence of coordination in the actions of the infantry and tank reconnaissance organs resulted in a situation in which the tank corps’ units unexpectedly ran into the enemy’s minefield and were forced to try and carve out passages in it and look for ways around the minefields during the battle. Such were the main reasons that prevented us from accomplishing the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense on the operation’s first day.

The front and army commanders demanded that the troops make passages through the enemy’s minefields, without ceasing the attack by forward units, in order to finally crush the enemy’s resistance through a vigorous attack on 17 December by the main forces of the rifle and tank formations, and carry out the first day’s assignment. During the night of 16-17 December the army’s rifle formations and the tank corps’ motorized rifle brigades drove the enemy out of a number of strong points, occupied Krasno-Orekhovoe and Solontsy and, while repelling enemy counterattacks, advanced along the right flank as far as the Bogucharka State Farm with their forward detachments. In the center the enemy still continued to put up stubborn resistance in the areas of heights 197 and 217.2. The 25th Tank Corps, having completed the job of clearing passages in the minefields during the night, attacked the enemy garrison on height 197 at 0600 on 17 December and, upon crushing its resistance, launched a vigorous attack toward Gadyuch’e. The Italian-German troops, relying on the Gadyuch’e, Filonovo and Pereshchepnoe strong points, which had been configured for defense, sought to delay our units through numerous counterattacks by their second echelons during the first half of the day. However, the resistance by the Italian 3rd Division “Ravenna” was crushed and it began to fall back to the south under the blows of our forces, opening up the flank and rear of the Germans’ 298th Infantry Division. Attempting to restore the situation, the Italian command committed pick units of “Blackshirts” into the fighting, but without success. During the second half of the day the rifle units, in conjunction with the tank corps, having cleared height 197 of the remnants of the enemy, captured the Italian forces’ powerful centers of resistance on height 217.2 and in Gadyuch’e and Filonovo and continued to vigorously advance on the enemy’s heels in the direction of

Tverdokhlebova andBoguchar. By the close of the day the formations of the army’s shock group had reached height 138 and the southern outskirts of Tverdokhlebova along the right flank and were fighting for Vervekovka in the center, and had captured Pereshchepnoe along the left flank and were fighting for Ol’khovyi and Grushevo. The tank corps were also successfully advancing and by the close of the day the 25th Tank Corps had reached Tverdokhlebova, units of the 18th Tank Corps were fighting for Vervekovka alongside the 44th Guards Rifle Division, and the 24th Tank Corps, which was in the second echelon, crossed the Don River on 17 December in the Verkhnii Mamon area and was rapidly advancing toward the Bogucharka River. The enemy, relying on the inhabited locales located along the river, was putting up stubborn resistance along this line. In order to delay our units during the retreat, the enemy blew up the bridge over the Bogucharka River, which at this time had not yet frozen over. Fighting broke out for the crossing. A bridge was laid down by night under enemy fire and air attack and at 0400 on 18 December the 25th Tank Corps, with its forward units in the Barsuki area, began to cross over to the southern bank of the Bogucharka. The 24th Tank Corps crossed after it. At dawn on 18 December fierce fighting began along the army’s entire front. The army’s right-flank formations, while repelling counterattacks by the enemy’s reserves committed into the battle and supported by tanks and aviation, forced the Bogucharka River and reached the southern bank, having seized Dantsevka, Krasnodar and Raskovka by the middle of the day. Now that the enemy’s last defensive line was behind us, the pace of the troops’ advance began to rapidly increase.

Units of the 4th Guards Rifle Corps advanced almost without halting and by the close of the day had reached the line Popovka—Barsuki. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, while developing the previous day’s success, was attacking toward Boguchar. The enemy, having thrown in tanks and infantry (on motor vehicles) into the Boguchar area, was putting up stubborn resistance and repeatedly launching counterattacks. At the same time, the 6th Guards Rifle Corps’ formations advanced insistently and by the middle of the day had occupied Vervekovka and Lofitskoe along the right flank and launched an attack toward the town of Boguchar. Following the forcing of the Bogucharka River, the tank corps achieved operational freedom. Particularly great success was achieved on this day by the 25th Tank Corps, which by the close of the day had already arrived in the Setrakovskii area, having thus covered more than 70 kilometers on that day. By this time the 24th Tank Corps reached the Dmitrovka area, having advanced more than 20 kilometers. Simultaneous with the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along the axis of the main attack, the rifle formations along the secondary axis were also able to achieve success. By the close of the operation’s third day the 38th Guards Rifle Division captured Krasnogorovka, Abrosimovo and Monastyrshchina; the 153rd Rifle Division occupied Mrykhin, Meshcheryakov, Batal’shchikov, Biryukov, Gromtsanskii, and Tikhonovskoi. Under the blows of our rifle formations from the front and our tank units from the flanks and rear, the demoralized Italian units lost the capability for organized resistance and began a disorderly retreat to the south and southwest. Units of the German 298th Division, which were stubbornly resisting in Boguchar, also suffered a defeat in bitter street fighting on 18 December, and on the night of 18-19 December began a hurried

withdrawal to the south. At night units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps occupied Boguchar and Poltavka. Thus the 1st Guards Army, following three days of bitter fighting, broke through the enemy’s powerful defensive zone and completely crushed the Italian-German forces’ stubborn resistance along the Boguchar axis. In order to avoid encirclement, the enemy was forced to begin a hasty retreat along the army’s entire front. By the close of the offensive’s third day, the army’s rifle formations had penetrated into the enemy’s position to a depth of up to 35 kilometers along the right flank and more than 20 kilometers in the center. By this time the 24th Tank Corps was fighting at a depth of up to 40 kilometers and the 25th Tank Corps up to 90 kilometers.

The 3rd Guards Army’s attack on Kruzhilin

The offensive by the 3rd Guards Army’s forces began simultaneously with that of the 1st Guards Army. Because of the heavy fog, the artillery preparation, just as along the 1st Guards Army’s breakthrough sector, did not yield the expected results. Also, due to poor visibility along the army’s right flank (in the 197th Rifle Division’s attack zone), the artillery preparation was conducted for 50 minutes, instead of the called-for 90. All of this lead to a situation in which a significant number of the enemy’s firing points remained unsuppressed. When units of the 14th Rifle Corps, which were attacking along the axis of the main attack, went over to the attack, they were met with powerful artillery and mortar fire from the forward edge and the defensive depth. Especially intensive fire came from heights 168, 157.2 and 155.6, which were powerful forward strong points, as well as from the inhabited locales of Astakhov, Sviridov and Krasnokutskaya. The fighting was intense

throughout the entire day and ended along the main attack sector with an insignificant advance by our forces in the direction of Astakhov and Dulenskii and their arrival at the northeastern outskirts of Sviridov. As before, height 168, the poultry farm and height 155.6 remained in enemy hands. The infantry attack’s lack of success prevented us from committing the success development echelon (1st Guards Mechanized Corps). The offensive developed more successfully along the army’s right flank. By the close of the day units of the 197th Rifle Division had completely cleared Verkhnii Kalininskii of the enemy and had consolidated along the northern slopes of heights 204.2 and 215.9 and along the southern outskirts of Verkhnii Kalininskii. As early as the operation’s first day the troops’ incomplete provisioning with fuel and ammunition began to make itself felt, which interfered with fully utilizing the breakthrough tanks’ shock power and the entire might of our artillery for suppressing the defense’s fire system. The army commander demanded that the troops take into account the offensive’s first-day mistakes and, upon replenishing their supplies of fuel and ammunition during the night, to once again attack on the morning of 17 December, with the previous day’s missions. 30 minutes (from 0745 to 0815) were to be allotted to the artillery preparation. On the morning of 17 December, just as during the previous evening, the most intense fighting unfolded along the axis of the main attack. The units of the Germans’ 294th and 62nd infantry divisions, which were defending here, managed to bring up their reserves and the 14th Rifle Corps was not able to break through the enemy’s defense before the middle of the day.

Therefore the army commander decided, without waiting for the rifle formations to break through the front, to commit the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps into the battle, ordering it to break through the enemy’s defense with its own forces and to develop the success to the northwest. At 1300 the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps entered the fighting along the line excluding height 98.8—excluding Dulenskii. Despite the enemy’s stubbornness, the corps’ units threw him out of his strong points along the forward edge of the defense in a vigorous tank attack and, while developing the success, began to rapidly advance. As a result of the fighting during the second half of the day and the night of 17-18 December, the corps occupied Astakhov and Il’in. By dawn on 18 December part of the corps was fighting for Kon’kov and Bokovskaya. Taking advantage of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ success, the 14th Guards Rifle Division threw the enemy out of Dulenskii by the close of 17 December, while the 159th and 203rd rifle divisions were fighting for Sviridov and Krasnokutskaya. The situation along the army’s flanks on the 197th and 50th Guards rifle divisions’ front remained unchanged. On 18 December the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and units of the 14th Rifle Corps continued to attack and by the close of the day captured Kon’kov, Bokovskaya and Staryi Zemtsov. The last fortified line of the enemy’s defensive zone had been sundered. On this day units of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and the 266th Rifle Division, which were attacking toward Kruzhilin from the south, occupied Krivoshlykov, Belavin and Vislogubov, without encountering serious resistance. The army’s left-flank divisions, in carrying out their previous task, continued to fight along the line of the Chir River. Thus by the close of the offensive’s third day the army, having made a fighting advance along the axis of the main attack of 15-20

kilometers, completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s defensive zone. The army’s forces began the pursuit of the retreating units of the German 294th and 62nd divisions and the Romanian 7th and 11th divisions, striving to complete their encirclement and destruction in the Kruzhilin area.

Map 3 The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense Along the Axis of the 3rd Guards Army’s Main Attack (16-18 December 1942).

Combat activities along the 5th Tank Army’s front

Upon encountering the enemy’s stubborn resistance along the entire front during 16-18 December, the 5th Tank Army’s forces were able to penetrate the enemy’s defense only along individual sectors. Despite the insignificant advance, the army’s active operations not only tied down the enemy’s forces along its front, but also inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel.

The offensive by the Voronezh Front’s left wing

In the December offensive operation the Voronezh Front was entrusted with the mission of operationally securing the Southwestern Front’s right flank. In order to carry out this mission, the commander of the Voronezh Front created along the front’s left wing a shock group as part of the 6th Army, which was to attack in close cooperation with the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards Army and cover it from the west against possible enemy counterblows. The 6th Army’s offensive began simultaneously with that of the Southwestern Front’s forces. By taking advantage of the bridgeheads captured the previous evening along the right bank of the Don, the army’s main forces crossed over to the opposite bank under cover of artillery fire and, breaking into the forward edge of

the enemy’s defense, began to advance. Despite the stubborn defense and multiple counterattacks by the Italian infantry, supported by tanks and aviation, the army’s formations captured the following by 1200: the 15th Rifle Corps—heights 191.1, 162.3, Derezovka, and height 204.1; the 127th Rifle Division—the eastern outskirts of Novaya Kalitva and heights 197.1 and 199.5. The breakthrough of the enemy’s first line of defense to a depth of 2-3 kilometers gave us reason to commit the success development echelon into the fighting. However, the 17th Tank Corps, which was located in the Osetrovka bend, was not able to develop the success of the first-echelon units because of a delay before height 197. The situation was made still more difficult by the fact that the main forces of the infantry support tank units (the 82nd and 212th tank regiments and the 115th Tank Brigade) were also located in the Osetrovka bend and were not able to support the army’s shock group in time. At night the army’s forces consolidated along the lines reached and were putting themselves in order and from the morning of 17 December once again attacked. By this time the 17th Tank Corps’ motorized brigade, along with the 25th Tank Corps’ motorized brigade, captured Krasno-Orekhovoe and by dawn had moved into the breach. On the morning of 17 December the crossing of all the divisional artillery and the anti-tank artillery regiments over to the right bank of the Don had been completed. The Italian and German units, relying on the heavily fortified rear line Ivanovka—Tsapkovo—Orobinskii—Dubovikovka, continued to put up stubborn resistance, which was particularly powerful along the Novaya Kalitva—Ivanovka sector. By the close of the day the first-echelon divisions, in conjunction with the infantry support tanks, occupied the enemy’s Tsapkovo and Orobinskii strong points.

The 17th Tank Corps captured Dubovikovka. On 18 December the army’s forces along the axis of the main attack continued to successfully advance. By the morning of 18 December the 17th Tank Corps broke into Pisarevka, following bitter fighting and, having left behind a part of its motorized brigade to clear it of the enemy, moved a single brigade toward Taly, where in the evening stubborn fighting broke out that lasted all night. The corps’ remaining forces vigorously advanced in the direction of Kantemirovka, and by 0030 on 19 December had reached Kramarevka. During three days of fighting the Italian 5th Division’s defensive zone was broken through and the 6th Army’s units, having made a fighting advance of 20-25 kilometers, achieved operational freedom. By this time the 17th Tank Corps was already operating to a depth of up to 45 kilometers. Thus the 6th Army successfully carried out its mission of securing from the west the Southwestern Front’s shock group. At 0100 on 19 December the 6th Army was transferred to the Southwestern Front.

Results of the operation’s first stage

As a result of three days of bitter fighting by the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts’ forces, the enemy’s heavily fortified defensive zone along the axes of the main attacks had been penetrated. The Italian, Romanian and German forces began a disorderly withdrawal to the south and southwest under the blows of our forces. The enemy’s losses were enormous. During these days the Southwestern Front alone killed up to 17,000 enemy soldiers and officers and captured more than 4,000, while also capturing a large amount of materiel.

By the close of 18 December the breakthrough front along the Boguchar axis had reached 60 kilometers and 20 kilometers along the Bokovskaya axis. The depth of our forces’ penetration into enemy territory was more than 40 kilometers along the right flank and 15 kilometers in the center. The successful completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense may be explained, first of all, by the secrecy of the operation’s preparation, the surprise of the attack and the concentration of superior forces along the breakthrough sectors. The command’s and troops’ insistence on achieving the assigned mission, the timely account of shortcomings in organizing the breakthrough on the operation’s first day, the coordinated activities of the combat arms, and their skillful maneuver on the battlefield should be noted. The chief reason for the lowering of the breakthrough’s pace was the infantry’s lack of success on the first day of the operation and the tank corps’ delay in the Osetrovka bend. These circumstances enabled the enemy to win time for bringing up his reserves and weapons to the breakthrough sectors, which made the attacking troops’ actions in the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense more difficult on the operation’s second and third days. The stubborn and prolonged fighting along the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank armies’ front may be explained by the fact that the enemy’s densest group of forces, the overwhelming majority of which was German, was located opposite the Southwestern Front’s left wing. One of its main missions was to delay the 3rd Guards Army’s advance at all costs and thus secure the operations by the Tormosin and Kotel’nikovo groups of forces to link up with General Paulus’s² encircled forces around Stalingrad. The subsequent development of the tank corps’ attack toward Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii and the successful actions against the enemy’s Kruzhilin group of forces foiled the German command’s

plans.

The Troops’ Activities in the Depth of the Operational Defense and the Pursuit of the Enemy

As a result of the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone along the Boguchar and Bokovskaya axes and the defeat of a number of his formations, the panicked retreat of the ItalianRomanian and German forces began. Favorable conditions arose for launching new crushing attacks. The German command, while attempting to delay our forces’ successful offensive, began to hurriedly throw against the breakthrough front its operational reserves from the deep rear and neighboring fronts. By this time the intensive movement of trains from Rossosh’ to the south and along the Likhaya—Millerovo and Likhaya—Morozovskii lines had been noted. New units were discovered opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ front: the Italian 3rd Alpine Division, the German 385th and 387th infantry divisions, and the German 27th Panzer Division. The German 306th Infantry Division had arrived along the Bokovskaya axis, while the concentration of new units was also noted along the Chernyshkovskii axis. All of this data confirmed the enemy’s desire to halt our further attack at any cost. In taking into account these circumstances, the commander of the Southwestern Front warned the troops in special instructions of the necessity for more decisive and bold actions to develop the success and for the immediate and vigorous pursuit of the enemy in order not to miss the favorable moment for completely defeating him. The commanders of the first-echelon formations were ordered not to get bogged down in prolonged fighting with the enemy’s resisting

groups, but to bypass them, leaving behind very limited forces for blockading and eliminating these groups. Particular attention was paid that their combat activities were uninterrupted and did not cease at night. The front commander’s directive demanded the creation of mobile groups and reinforced forward detachments on vehicles for the purpose of seizing the enemy forces’ retreat routes. A particularly responsible task was entrusted to the tank and mechanized formations. They were, by means of a vigorous advance into the enemy’s deep rear, to seize his most important railroad junctions, cut his communications, tie down or defeat the enemy’s arriving reserves, and to secure for the front’s rifle formations conditions for completing the full defeat of all enemy forces in the area of the Don’s middle course.

The pursuit of the Italian Eighth Army’s main forces and their destruction

On 19 December the 1st Guards Army, while pursuing the retreating enemy, reached the line Byk—Chikun—Poltavka—D’yachenkovo, with detachments on vehicles in the van, reinforced by tanks, antitank weapons and 76mm guns. The tank corps, while vigorously advancing, left the infantry far behind and penetrated deeply into the enemy rear. On 19 December the 24th Tank Corps was approaching the Man’kovo—Kalitvenskaya area, with forward detachments on the move toward Sheptukhovka and Kudinovka. On the morning of 19 December the 25th Tank Corps occupied Setrakovskii. The 18th Tank Corps, while working in close operational contact

with units of the 1st Guards Army and pursuing the enemy’s retreating groups, was making a fighting advance toward Verkhnyakovskii and Meshkov, with the immediate objective of seizing the latter town together with the 153rd Rifle Division. By this time the Italian-German forces, having suffered a defeat in the Boguchar area, were hurriedly retreating to the south. Simultaneously, the Italian divisions, which had earlier been defending along the Don River along the sector from Podkolodnoe to Migulinskaya, were falling back to the southwest. In evaluating the favorable situation that had arisen, the front commander assigned the 1st Guards Army the task of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Boguchar—Migulinskaya group of forces. In order to carry out this task, the army commander decided to continue the pursuit of the enemy with the 4th Guards Rifle Corps in the general direction of Millerovo, and with the forces of the 6th Guards Corps, in conjunction with the 18th Tank Corps and 153rd Rifle Division, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Boguchar— Migulinskaya group of forces. The 24th and 25th tank corps received orders to continue a vigorous pursuit of the enemy along their previous axes and as quickly as possible reach the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii areas.

The 24th Tank Corps’ Tatsinskaya raid

The 24th Tank Corps, while crushing the resistance of the ItalianGerman forces, reached the Degtevo area by 20 December. On 22 December the corps had already captured Bol’shinka, and on the morning of 23 December captured Skosyrskaya, following stubborn fighting. At 0200 on 24 December the corps’ units left Skosyrskaya

and by 0600 on 24 December occupied a jumping-off position along the approaches to Tatsinskaya. At 0730, following a salvo by guards mortar units, the tank corps attacked from three sides simultaneously with all its brigades. By 0800 the railroad, paved road and other roads southeast of Tatsinskaya had been cut, and at 0900 the corps’ units broke into the Germans’ southern airfield, destroying the flight and ground crews running around in panic. At 1100 they also seized the railroad station, where our tank troops destroyed a train with 50 enemy planes and a fuel train. The Germans, while trying to throw our units out of the occupied areas, moved tanks and automatic riflemen toward Tatsinskaya. All of their attacks were beaten back. By 1700 the tank corps had completely occupied Tatsinskaya and organized a perimeter defense, with the task of holding it until the arrival of the attacking rifle units. The 24th Tank Corps’ arrival in the Tatsinskaya area had important operational significance. The corps cut the single railroad on which the German forces concentrated in the Tormosin were based, and also cut off the enemy’s escape route from the Tormosin area to the west.

The 25th Tank Corps’ attack against the enemy rear

The 25th Tank Corps was vigorously advancing simultaneously with the 24th Tank Corps. The corps, while destroying enemy groups of forces encountered along its route, broke into Kashary at 1900 on 19 December, having utterly routed its garrison numbering about 1,000 men.

At the same time a large column of enemy infantry with artillery and auto transport was approaching the inhabited locale of Kashary from the southeast, which deployed and entered the fighting, seeking to break through Kashary toward Millerovo. As a result of the fighting, which continued until dawn on 20 December, the enemy was routed and his remnants scattered to the northeast. On the night of 20-21 December the corps’ units began their further advance in the general direction of Morozovskii. As the corps neared Morozovskii the enemy’s resistance increased. On 21 December the corps’ units had to wage a continuous battle in the areas of FominoSvechnikovo, Pervomaiskoe and Tverdokhlebovka, and the Gusarovskii State Farm. During 22-24 December the corps’ units were fighting in the Uryupin area with powerful enemy detachments and his reserves that had been brought up from Morozovskii. Due to the resulting situation, the 25th Tank Corps’ units went over to a temporary defense in expectation of the arrival of our rifle formations. The 25th Tank Corps’ actions in the enemy rear facilitated the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ successful offensive.

The encirclement and elimination of the enemy’s Boguchar— Migulinskaya Group of Forces

At the same time that the 24th and 25th tank corps, while pursuing the enemy, were operating in his deep rear and were vigorously advancing to the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii areas, the army’s rifle formations were rapidly advancing behind the tank corps, uninterruptedly pursuing the enemy’s retreating groups day and night and enveloping the Italian-German units from the west and

east. By the middle of the day on 21 December the 1st Guards Rifle Corps had reached the line Novo-Markovka—Man’kovo-Kalitvenskaya, with its forward detachments on the approaches to Chertkovo and Sheptukhovka. The 6th Guards Rifle Corps, having defeated the enemy in the Radchenskoe area, had by the close of 20 December reached the areas of Sokhrannaya, Zherebtsovskii, Khlebnyi and Popovka, and by the close of the following day had captured the line Setrakovskii— Arbuzovka—Pozdnyakov—Makarov. On 20 December the 153rd Rifle Division, along with two of the 18th Tank Corps’ brigades, occupied Meshkov, and on 21 December, while advancing to the west with part of its forces, made contact with units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps. In this manner was completed the complete encirclement of the main forces of the enemy’s Boguchar—Migulinskaya group of forces, numbering about 20,000 men. In order to help the 6th Guards Rifle Corps, the army commander detached from his reserve the 35th Rifle Division, which by the close of 21 December had consolidated along the line Malaya Lozovka— Alekseevo-Lozovskaya, with the mission of preventing the breakthrough of individual enemy groups to the southwest. Intensive fighting began to eliminate the encircled enemy group of forces. Suffering heavy losses from our artillery fire and aviation and squeezed from all sides and seeing the hopelessness of their situation, the Italian soldiers began to surrender in entire groups. As a result of the 21-22 December fighting, the 1st Guards Army’s units that took part in the encirclement took in prisoners alone more than 14,000 enemy soldiers and officers. By 23 December a large part of the encircled enemy had been either destroyed or captured.

However, the remnants of SS units and the 298th Infantry Division, as well as the Italian “Blackshirts,” which had been squeezed from all sides in a small sector, nevertheless continued to resist stubbornly. Having organized a perimeter defense in the Arbuzovka area, this enemy group, which numbered up to 6,000 men, launched several unsuccessful counterattacks on 23 December, while trying to break through to the southwest. By 0800 on 24 December the 6th Guards Rifle Corps’ units had completely finished eliminating the encircled remnants of the Italian-German forces. Thus the main Italian-German group of forces, which had been falling back opposite the 1st Guards Army’s center and left flank, was defeated and only a small part of them managed to infiltrate to the west and southwest.

The completion of the pursuit and the arrival of the 1st Guards Army’s formations at the security line

At the same time that the 6th Guards Rifle Corps’ units were battling the encircled enemy group of forces in the Arbuzovka area, the 4th Guards Rifle Corps was continuing to pursue the enemy. Particularly stubborn fighting unfolded for the heavily fortified Gartmashevka and Chertkovo centers of resistance. Having encircled by 22 December the enemy garrisons and having left behind a part of its forces to blockade them, the corps’ main forces had fought to the line Krizskoe—Mikhailovo-Aleksandrovskii by 24 December. Following the elimination of the encircled enemy, on 27 December units of the 6th Guards Rifle Corps reached the Millerovo area and began fighting to take the town. The 18th Tank Corps, following the completion of the enemy’s

encirclement in the Arbuzovka area, received orders to reach the Verkhnii Chirskii area and cut the enemy’s route of retreat from Veshchenskaya. While rapidly moving to the east, the corps’ units reached Verkhnii Chirskii at 0200 on 22 December, where bitter fighting broke out. The remnants of the Italian 2nd Infantry Division and the Romanian 7th Infantry Division, having put up stubborn resistance, were defeated as a result of an 8-hour battle. The tank corps seized up to 2,500 men in prisoners alone in Verkhnii Chirskii. Anchored on the Verkhnii Chirskii and Il’ichevka area and having cut all the roads, the 18th Tank Corps continued to destroy the enemy’s retreating units. By the morning of 24 December the corps reached the Millerovo area. With the 1st Guards Army’s arrival at the line Krizskoe—Millerovo the second stage of the operation came to an end. Despite the difficult winter conditions and its lengthening communications and a shortage of auto transport, the infantry advanced 100-120 kilometers in six days of fighting, with an average daily pursuit pace of 16-20 kilometers.

The development of the 3rd Guards Army’s offensive

During the day of 19 December the 197th Rifle Division, which was attacking toward Kruzhilin from the north, met in this area units of the 14th Rifle and 1st Guards Mechanized corps, which were advancing on Kruzhilin from the south. Thus by the close of the operation’s fourth day the army, having captured the Kruzhilin area, had completed its immediate task. On 18 December and the night of 18-19 December the enemy managed to pull out a significant portion of its forces from the

Kruzhilin pocket and consolidate with rearguards along the southern bank of the Chir River. At the same time the Italian-Romanian forces continued to fall back to the south and southwest. The front commander, who was attentively following the development of combat operations along the 3rd Guards Army’s front, in conversations on 19 December ordered the army commander to immediately turn the army’s main forces to the south and organize an unremitting pursuit, while uninterruptedly augmenting the force of the attack against the retreating enemy. Simultaneously with this, the 3rd Guards Army was required to immediately reach the Morozovskii area, primarily with mobile forces and, in conjunction with the 24th and 25th tank corps, launch an attack into the rear of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces. At this time this group, in connection with the continuing advance of Manstein’s group from the Kotel’nikovo area to the northeast, represented a serious danger to the front’s left wing. In accordance with the front commander’s instructions, the army commander decided on the following: the main forces were to attack in the general direction of Morozovskii and by the close of 20 December were to reach the line Red Dawn State Farm—Ponomarev —Nizhnii Solinsk, while pushing the 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade to the Novyi Astakhov—Astakhovskii area. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was to also head toward Morozovskii with the mission of capturing the town and to be ready, in conjunction with the 24th and 25th tank corps, to launch an attack into the rear of the enemy’s Tormosin group of forces. The commander of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, while preparing to attack with his main forces from the Karginskaya area to the south, moved on the night of 19-20 December the 17th Tank Regiment from Astakhov to the Red Dawn State Farm, with the mission of reaching the communications of the Romanian-German forces falling back from the Kruzhilin area. The regiment, as the

result of a bold night march, cut the enemy’s route of retreat in the area of the Red Dawn State Farm and, following a battle, defeated a large enemy group of forces falling back from Kruzhilin, while killing about 10,000 soldiers and officers, which to a significant extent facilitated the successful pursuit of the enemy along the army’s right flank. As a result of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ vigorous movement, by the close of the day its 1st Brigade captured Popovka, killing and capturing here more than 2,000 men; the 3rd Brigade continued to advance toward Grekov, while the 2nd Brigade was fighting in the Bokovskaya area. Taking advantage of the mechanized corps’ success, the right-flank rifle divisions advanced rapidly and by the close of the day reached the area Red Dawn State Farm—Ponomarev. The divisions operating along the Bokovskaya axis captured Kon’kov, Yevlant’evskii and Sviridov, along with the mechanized corps’ second 2nd Brigade, after three days of heavy fighting and continued to attack to the southwest. On the remaining sector of the army’s left flank our units’ situation did not undergo significant changes. The Romanian-German units continued to stubbornly hold their positions, repelling all attempts by the 203rd and 50th Guards rifle divisions to attack to the west. On 21 December and the following days the offensive along the army’s right flank and in the center developed, as before, more successfully than on the left. A favorable situation was developing for launching an attack against the rear of the enemy’s Chernyshevskaya group of forces. On the basis of the front commander’s instructions, the army commander assigned this task to the 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and two rifle divisions, which were attacking along the army’s

center. By the morning of 21 December the right-flank divisions were to reach the line Nikol’skaya—Il’inka—Pokrovka, consolidate there and secure the offensive by the army’s remaining formations from the west. Following bitter fighting with the German 306th Infantry Division south of Grekov, units of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps defeated the division and, while pursuing the enemy to the south, by the morning of 23 December captured the line Stepano-Savchenskii— Sloboda Selivanovskaya. By the evening of the same day the corps’ forward units were already in the Milyutinskaya area. The 22nd Independent Motorized Rifle Brigade, while carrying out in conjunction with other units the task of encircling the enemy’s Chernyshevskaya group of forces, reached the Pervomaiskii area on 23 December, while its forward detachments occupied Kuznetsov, while at the same time the 266th Rifle Division captured the inhabited locales of Platov, Malakhov, Talovka, and Dmitrievskii. The enemy’s Chernyshevskaya group of forces was thus half encircled. On 20 December the right-flank divisions began to attack from the line Popovka—Shalaevskii—Ponomarev in the direction of Kashary and Rossosh’. The division, while bypassing the enemy’s centers of resistance, by the close of 24 December reached the eastern bank of the Kalitva River and occupied Nikol’skaya, Yefremovo-Stepanovka, Il’inka, and Pokrovka, where they began to consolidate the security line. By 24 December the situation along the army’s front had changed. The enemy, seeing that an extremely unfavorable situation had arisen in the Chernyshevskaya area, which threatened him with encirclement, began to hurriedly pull back his forces from this sector, while simultaneously holding off with all its forces the attack by the 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 266th Rifle Division, which were moving into his rear. Having begun the pursuit of the retreating enemy, the army’s left-flank formations occupied the

following locales during the second half of the day: Rubashkin, Petrovskii and Paramonov, and, in conjunction with the 5th Tank Army’s 346th Rifle Division, Chernyshevskaya. By this time all signs indicated that the enemy had concentrated significant forces along the line Skosyrskaya—Chernyshkovskii and was preparing to halt our forces’ further offensive along the line of the Bystraya River. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, which had been halted by the enemy along the line of the Gnilaya River, was given the order to outflank the enemy defending in the Milyutinskaya area and to capture Morozovskii on 25 December. On the morning of 25 December, following a regrouping, the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps attacked, threw the enemy out of his fortifications and captured the inhabited locales of Milyutinskaya and Yudin from the march and, while developing the success, reached the line Uryupin—Nagornaya—Mikhailovka with its main forces. The 266th and 203rd rifle divisions, which lagged significantly lagged behind the corps, advanced by a forced march in the direction of Skosyrskaya, while the left-flank divisions, continuing to pursue the remnants of the Romanian 14th Division, reached the line Sloboda Selivanovskaya—Devyatyi—Ust’-Gryaznovskii on 25 December and by the close of 26 December reached the Gnilaya River. Throughout 26 December and during the following days the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps was engaged in extremely heavy fighting along the line reached. The army’s left-flank divisions continued to advance and by 27 December had reached the line Skosyrskaya— Prishib. Attempts to advance further were repelled by the enemy’s organized defense. In this way the operation’s second stage—the pursuit of the retreating enemy along the 3rd Guards Army’s front—ended by 25-

27 December. The enemy, with the assistance of arriving reserves, had managed to consolidate along the heights along the northern bank of the Bystraya River and temporarily delay our units’ further advance. During the 19-26 December period the army’s units, while pursuing the enemy, made a fighting advance along the right flank and center of about 100-120 kilometers and about 80-90 kilometers along the left flank. The average daily offensive pace of the rifle formations was 15-17 kilometers. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps’ pace of advance was a little higher and reached, on the average, 20 kilometers.

Combat operation’s along the front’s flanks

On the front’s right flank from 19 December the 6th Army’s forces continued to carry out their assigned task. On this day the 127th Rifle Division, following bitter street fighting, captured Novaya Kalitva, where a large amount of equipment and prisoners were taken. The 17th Tank Corps advanced vigorously and by the morning of 19 December its tank brigades reached Kantemirovka, and at 1200 broke into the town. In the fighting for Kantemirovka the corps killed more than 1,000 Italian soldiers and officers and captured more than 1,500 men. Besides this, a large amount of equipment was captured. With its arrival in the Kantemirovka area the corps secured the 6th Army’s successful offensive and covered the right flank of the Southwestern Front’s 1st Guards Army against possible enemy counterblows from the west. Simultaneous with this, the enemy’s

very important rear communications were cut, as well as the nearby Rossosh’—Millerovo lateral railroad. Upon turning over the Kantemirovka area to the rifle units, the 17th Tank Corps, while continuing to attack to the south, occupied Voloshino on 22 December and on 25 December blockaded Millerovo from the west with its main forces, thus fulfilling its mission. Beginning on 21 December, the fighting along the army’s entire front was characterized by the enemy’s constantly growing resistance. The German command, while striving to not only halt the 6th Army’s further advance, but to launch counterblows in the direction of Kantemirovka and Pisarevka, was continuously bringing up new units here. Employing powerful counterattacks against the 6th Army’s right flank, the enemy managed to halt the 127th Rifle Division’s offensive along the line Novaya Kalitva—Ivanovka. Along the axis of the main attack, the 15th Rifle Corps’ units, while crushing the resistance by the remnants of the Italian 5th Division and the enemy’s newly-arrived units, reached the line Serobabin— Kas’kovka—Markovka, where the 6th Army went over to the defensive, covering the 1st Guards Army’s flank and rear from the west. On the front’s left flank the 5th Tank Army, while encountering the enemy’s stubborn resistance, was engaged as before in intensive offensive fighting in the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense. This may be explained by the fact that the German command continued to bring up reserves from the depth to the 5th Tank Army’s front and to strengthen with them primarily the Chernyshkovskii and Tormosin axes.

Results of the operation’s second stage

The operation’s second stage ended approximately by 25-27 December. By this time the forces of the 6th and 1st Guards armies and the 3rd Guards Army’s right-flank formations had basically reached the lines called for in the plan and were continuing to fight to consolidate the success. Part of the 1st Guards Army’s forces was fighting to destroy the blockaded enemy groups in the Gartmashevka and Chertkovo areas. Along the 3rd Guards Army’s left flank and the 5th Tank Army’s right flank there was bitter fighting with the enemy’s newly-arrived reserves. The Southwestern Front’s significant successes had been achieved in conditions of a difficult winter situation, the extensive lengthening of communications and a noticeable shortage of auto transportation. All of this, despite the troops’ efforts, could not but affect the lowering of the pace of the pursuit, influenced the character of combat operations, and caused a number of additional difficulties. The main ones were as follows:

1) The lagging behind the attacking troops of the reinforcement artillery on mechanical tow, due to a shortage of fuel amongst the troops. Because of this, we had to carry out the task of artillery support and fire accompaniment of the attacking troops chiefly with horse-drawn artillery and organic mortar elements. The attacking units’ shortage of artillery weapons in fighting the enemy in the operational depth of his defense weakened the tank and rifle formations’ firing power and breakthrough capability, slowed down their rate of advance and led to excessive losses in men and materiel. Guards mortar units rendered great assistance to the troops, particularly while overcoming strong points and in

eliminating the enemy’s encircled groups of forces.

2) The absence of motorized and ski units often forced the tank formations to halt in order to hold their captured lines until the infantry’s arrival. This circumstance led to the scattering of the tank corps’ forces for fighting along a broad front and guarding communications and to a significant degree restricted their maneuver capabilities, weakened their shock strength, and told on the lowering of the pace of the pursuit. The significant lagging of the infantry behind the tanks disrupted these combat arms’ cooperation while fighting in the depth of the enemy’s defense and made the successful actions of both arms more difficult. As a result, a number of the enemy’s strong points and defensive lines had to be occupied in fighting twice, first by tanks and then by the infantry.

3) If during the preparatory period our intelligence—air, land and agent—was able to comparatively fully define the enemy’s defensive system, weapons and strength, then during the fighting, with the vigorous development of the operation, our intelligence did not always furnish the command with the necessary information about the enemy fully and in a timely manner. The troops often ran into large and small enemy groups unexpectedly and were drawn into fighting with them, not knowing the extent of the enemy’s defense and his forces. As a result, the troops waged prolonged battles with the enemy’s rearguards at the same time that major enemy groups of forces slipped out of encirclement and fell back to favorable natural lines.

4) The enemy’s aviation exerted a certain influence on the mobility

and maneuverability of the tank and mechanized formations, due to the absence of reliable cover for the mobile formations by our aviation and the shortage of anti-aircraft weapons.

5) The significant lagging behind of the armies’ headquarters from the attacking troops and the insufficiently well-managed communications made the operational control of the troops extremely difficult. The armies’ headquarters could not always receive the necessary information from the troops on time about the situation at the front and to issue instructions corresponding to the changed situation.

6) The work of the rear services during the pursuit became even more complicated due to our rapidly lengthening communications. As the attacking troops advanced the task of supplying the troops with fuel, ammunition and food grew into a problem of supreme importance, which determined the outcome of the operation as a whole. Despite the great efforts of the command and rear officers, the troops experienced shortages in ammunition and fuel. This was significantly reflected in the pace of their advance. All of the above-listed difficulties and shortages that had to be overcome by the Southwestern Front’s forces during the pursuit period limited the units’ mobility and maneuverability and prevented them from realizing their planned offensive pace. This circumstance enabled the enemy to withdraw part of his forces out of the way of our forces’ attacks. What is more, the enemy was able to bring up to the Morozovskii axis new units from other sectors of the front and with their aid consolidate along the northern bank of the Bystraya River and hold onto, aside from Tatsinskaya station, the single communications artery for his Tormosin group of forces— the Oblivskaya—Likhaya railroad.

A new and responsible task now arose for the front’s forces, in particular for the 3rd Guards Army—to crush the enemy’s stubborn defense along the line of the Bystraya River, in order to complete the defeat of his Morozovskii—Tormosin group of forces. The struggle to carry out this task comprised the main part of the operation’s third stage. Due to a shortage of space it is not possible, even briefly, to describe the course of combat operations at the concluding stage of the Southwestern Front’s offensive operation. It should be noted that during the concluding stage of the Southwestern Front’s December operation a second and very important task facing the Southwestern Front was resolved. The enemy’s Tormosin salient was eliminated. Through the joint actions of the Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, the enemy, who was attempting to link up with the group of forces encircled around Stalingrad, was defeated and thrown back far to the west. The distance separating the Stalingrad group of forces from the Germans’ remaining forces was about 200 kilometers by the beginning of January and the defeated German units continued to hurriedly fall back to the Severskii Donets River under the blows of our forces.

Result and Conclusions

As a result of the Southwestern Front’s December operation the enemy suffered heavy losses in men and materiel and was forced to begin a hurried withdrawal of his forces behind the Severskii Donets River, in order to avoid a second major encirclement to the east of this river.

The Southwestern Front’s success in the December operation can be explained by the following:

1. The Red Army’s supreme high command, in spite of the difficult situation that had arisen in the south during the second half of 1942, was able to preserve its strategic reserves and accumulate a sufficient amount of materiel resources to conduct active offensive operations on a large scale.

2. The Southwestern Front command, given a relatively small superiority of forces over the enemy, was able to create an overwhelming superiority of forces along the axes of the main attacks, thus securing the breakthrough of the enemy’s heavilyfortified defensive zone and the broad operational development of the success achieved.

3. The front command was able to preserve in deep secrecy its plan and the place and axis of the main attacks. The secret concentration and skillful regrouping of forces and our active reconnaissance actions along secondary axes disoriented the enemy. Although the German command knew of the forthcoming offensive, the latter’s strength and scope proved to be completely unexpected for him.

4. The correct choice of the axes of the main attacks (the presence of Italian forces along the right flank and the hurriedly created defensive line along the left flank) and the time of the offensive (all of the enemy’s attention at this time was focused on helping the encircled German forces around Stalingrad) facilitated the operation’s success.

5. In planning the operation, a great deal of attention was devoted to covering the flanks of the front’s shock groups. As a result, the enemy’s attempts to launch an attack against the base of the breakthrough from the west were not successful. The right-flank 6th Army repelled all of the enemy’s attacks and while firmly holding the captured line, secured the 1st Guards Army’s fulfillment of its assigned tasks. The same is true of the 5th Tank Army, which tied down significant enemy forces along its front.

6. The method of the operation’s conduct influenced greatly its course and results. The concentric envelopment of the enemy’s main group of forces, with subsequent splitting blows against the enemy’s combat formations, led to the breakup and encirclement of his isolated units and formations. The attacks by the front’s mobile formations against the enemy’s rear and communications demoralized his forces, disrupted command and communications between them, deprived him of the capability of organizing resistance, and enabled us to destroy him in detail.

7. Throughout the entire operation the Southwestern Front’s forces did not surrender the initiative. This was achieved thanks to skillful troop leadership both during the operation and during its conduct.

8. The rifle units and formations were models of persistence, stalwartness and vigor in carrying out their assigned tasks. The actions of the 1st Guards Army’s rifle formations in pursuing, encircling and destroying the enemy’s 20,000-man group of forces in the Arbuzovka area serve as confirmation of this.

The enemy, despite the fact that he was far better furnished with auto transport, did not manage to pull out his main forces from the path of our forces’ attack. A large part of them was encircled and destroyed, or captured.

9. The infantry support artillery facilitated to a great extent the success of the rifle units. While continuously accompanying our units pursuing the enemy, our horse-drawn artillery supported them with fire and wheels. The guards mortar units rendered invaluable service to the attacking troops.

10. It is particularly necessary to note the vigor of the pursuit of the enemy by the tank corps, which displayed great maneuverability, boldness and initiative in combat operations in the enemy’s operational depth. Operating at a great remove from friendly forces, they would appear suddenly along the enemy’s most important communications and, cutting off his routes of retreat, successfully defeat the retreating Italian-German forces. The 24th Tank Corps’ brilliant raid and its seizure of Tatsinskaya, the skillful organization of a perimeter defense of the town, the heroic battles waged in complete encirclement, and the skillfully managed withdrawal from the encirclement on 28 December, in spite of the enemy’s quantitatively superior forces, are examples of stamina, fortitude and skill. The 17th Tank Regiment’s raid in the enemy rear and the tank troops’ defeat of the 10,000-man group of Italian-Romanian forces in the area of the Red Dawn State Farm are also an indicator of the tank units’ great maneuverability, boldness and bravery. The Red Army’s tank troops can learn from the examples of the Southwestern Front’s tank forces. Such are the main reasons for the success of the Southwestern Front’s December offensive.

The Southwestern Front’s December operation continued for 15 days. Despite the winter conditions, the great lengthening of communications and difficulties in the realm of the troops’ materiel supply, the average daily rate of advance by the rifle formations was 10-13 kilometers. The tank corps’ rate of advance was significantly higher, although on the whole the offensive pace was slower than had been planned, as a result of which the operation’s duration proved to be significantly greater than had been planned. The experience of the Southwestern Front’s December operation allows us to come to several general conclusions concerning the conduct of offensive operations.

1. The breakthrough of the modern defense, even given its limited depth, requires that the attacker create along the breakthrough sectors such a superiority of suppression weapons and such a density of them as to enable the attacker to quickly destroy the enemy’s main centers of resistance and to enable the infantry to seize them before the enemy can recover from the blow inflicted on him and bring up his reserves.

2. The main combat arm guaranteeing the development of the success in the modern offensive operation is the tank and mechanized formations. Their strength is in their massed employment, which enables them to launch attacks of great power. Their scattering in the operational depth and distraction by secondary tasks (the holding of captured lines, guarding communications, etc.) lead to a reduction in the pace of their advance and failure to secure the conditions for the tank troops to carry out those missions for which this combat arm is designated. From this follows the conclusion that fronts and armies must be saturated with a sufficient amount of motorized infantry, which will take upon itself all the tasks of securing and consolidating the tank

formations’ success. Without motorized infantry, all of the possibilities inherent in the nature of this combat arm cannot be derived from the tank formations.

3. The success of the offensive operation depends, to a significant degree, on the reliable support of the troops from the air. This will ensure great freedom of maneuver to the troops, which is one of the decisive conditions for success in the modern operation and which will spare the ground forces excessive losses in men and materiel. In preparing for the operation and during its conduct, it is necessary to strive to employ aviation in a centralized manner and try to achieve superiority in the air along the decisive axes, in the decisive moments of the operation.

4. Of all the control problems, the most important is the organization of cooperation between the combat arms during the operation. As the war’s experience shows, in the majority of cases during the first stage of the offensive operation—during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, when the headquarters are in their proper place and connected with each other by already prepared communications means, and when the commanders of their headquarters have sufficient time in order to agree beforehand on coordinating the troops’ actions—cooperation is organized satisfactorily. In the dynamic nature of battle, when new tasks arise, when flexible control is necessary and the directing of troops to the solution of the most important of them, a lack of coordination often arises in the actions of various combat arms. This is explained by the headquarters’ insufficient efficiency in coordinating the actions of the combat arms while fighting in the enemy’s defensive depth,

particularly during the pursuit period, as well as the insufficiently skillful employment of all the capabilities inherent in modern communications means, particularly in radio communications, for the timely transmission of the commander’s decisions to his subordinates.

5. Flexibility of control and the coordination of the combat arms’ actions during a vigorously developing operation require that the command posts be moved near the troops. The success of troop coordination depends to a significant degree on the precise work of the communications service and the flexible maneuver of communications reserves during the operation.

6. The correct calculation of materiel demands and foreseeing the possible demands that will arise at this or that stage of the operation, comprise the basis for the planning of the troops’ materiel supply. It is also necessary to calculate the required amount of transport, in order to deliver everything necessary for the battle to the troops in time and in sufficient quantities. Obviously, the more difficult the conditions in the theater of military activities and the larger the dirt road section of the military road is in its scope, the more transportation will be required for the complete and timely supply of the troops with combat equipment. The motorization of the rear must correspond to the degree that the troops have been reinforced with equipment: aviation, tanks, artillery, and mortar formations, and others, because in proportion to their growth the demand for fuel, ammunition and other types of supply increases. Such are some overall conclusions that may be derived from the experience of the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s troops in December 1942.

The experience accumulated by the Southwestern Front’s forces during the operation and its lessons will serve for the Red Army as a significant source for enriching its knowledge in the area of operational art and the tactics of maneuver. This rich experience must serve as a mighty stimulant for all the more destructive blows against the hated enemy.

1In the article “The Planning and Preparation of the Southwest Front’s Offensive Operation in December, 1942,” which appeared in Sbornik no. 8, the following were highlighted in detail: the general situation preceding the operation, the character of the enemy’s defense, the correlation of forces, and the sides’ plans, as well as problems concerning the planning of the operation and troop training. 2Editor’s note. Friedrich Paulus (1890-1957) joined the imperial German army in 1910 and fought in the First World War. Following the war, he remained in the army and rose to the position of deputy chief of the General Staff. In January 1942 he was appointed commander of the Sixth Army, which was surrounded and destroyed at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942-43. He collaborated with the Soviets in captivity and returned to East Germany in 1953.

2

Aviation Activities in the December Operation along the Middle Don

Preparing the Operation

In the December operation along the middle Don the operations of the Southwestern Front’s forces and the Voronezh Front’s left flank were supported by the aviation of the 17th and 2nd air armies, while the 17th Air Army supported the Southwestern Front’s offensive by the 1st and 3rd guards and 5th Tank armies and the 2nd Air Army supported the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army. Due to the intensive combat work during the period preceding the December operation, the 2nd and 17th air armies consisted of a small number of under strength air units and formations; the 2nd Air Army had only three air divisions (the 205th Fighter Division, 227th Assault Air Division, and 208th Night Bomber Division) with a very small number of planes. The 205th Fighter Division was particularly under strength, consisting of only 29 planes. Such a number of fighters did not only not guarantee the reliable cover of the ground forces during the operation, but was insufficient for securing the normal work of the available assault aircraft;¹ thus the 867th Fighter Regiment (27 Yak-1 aircraft²) was operationally subordinated to the commander of the 2nd Air Army before the start of the operation from the recently formed 3rd Mixed Air Corps.

The 17th Air Army consisted of the following: the 1st Mixed Air Corps, the 282nd Fighter Division, along with two attached assault air regiments, the 221st Bomber Division, and the 262nd Night Bomber Division, for a total of 302 planes. In order to reinforce the 17th Air Army, which was to support the offensive by three armies, the 3rd Mixed Air Corps was operationally subordinated to it. The corps’ units were formed, but by the start of the operation only the assault air division and part of the bomber divisions had been concentrated at the airfields listed in the plan for the operation. The fighter division (82 planes) and part of the bombers (14 planes) completed their concentration only on the operation’s third or fourth day. Thanks to the reinforcements, by the start of the operation; that is by 16 December 1942, the air armies had the number of aircraft listed in Table II/2.1.

Table II/2.1 Strength of Soviet Air Armies, 16 December 1942

Despite the great deal of work carried out by the air units to restore out-of-order planes during the preparatory period (3-15 December), there were nevertheless by the start of the operation a large number of planes out of order (144 planes). There was an especially high percentage of outof-order planes among the fighters (32 percent) and assault aircraft (24 percent). It’s understandable that the planes available for supporting an offensive by four armies along a front of about 400 kilometers was obviously insufficient. Before the start of the operation and during its conduct the Germans’ Fourth Air Fleet, numbering up to 1,000 planes was based opposite the Southwestern, Don and Stalingrad fronts. Units of the air fleet’s VIII Air Corps, which consisted of the 27th Bomber Squadron (Millerovo), the 76th Bomber Squadron (Tatsinskaya, Morozovskii), the 1st Dive Bomber Squadron (Morozovskii), the 1st Fighter Squadron, and several detachments of long-range reconnaissance planes, were operating in the Southwestern Front’s offensive zone and that of the Voronezh Front’s left wing. Besides this, several groups from the 77th and 55th bomber squadrons, which had evidently arrived from other sectors of the front, had been noted. Before the start of the operation the enemy air force was based at the following airfields: 80-100 He-111³ bombers at Millerovo; 80100 Ju-88⁴ aircraft at Tatsinskaya; 90-100 Ju-87⁵ aircraft at Morozovskii; 70-90 Me-109⁶ and Me-110⁷ fighters at Morozovskii, Chernyshkovskii and Bokovskaya, and; 50-60 FW-189⁸ and He-126⁹ reconnaissance aircraft at Shalaevskii and Skosyrskaya. The enemy periodically based 10-15 Me-109s and Me-110s at the forward airfields in Oravskii, Kashary, Nikolaev, Fedorovskii, the Lamp State Farm, and Verkhnii Maksai. In all, the Southwestern Front was faced with about 450-500 enemy

planes, of which there were 250-300 bombers, 150-160 fighters, 5060 reconnaissance-aerial spotters, and 30-50 transport planes. It’s important to note that due to the developing difficult situation of the enemy’s Sixth Army around Stalingrad, his main air group was located at the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii airfields; that is, along the Southwestern Front’s left flank. This basing scheme enabled the enemy to maneuver his aviation along the sectors of the front, depending upon the developing situation and at the same time was created favorable conditions for our air operations against his airfields. Therefore, before the start of the operation there were the following (Table II/2.2) number of our planes and those of the enemy in the zone of the planned offensive.

Table II/2.2 Comparison of Soviet and German Air Strength in Zone of the Planned Offensive, December 1942

Type of Aircraft

17th and 2nd Air ArmiesEnemy

Fighters Assault Air Bombers Reconnaissance Total

166 219 224 23 632

150-160 – 250-300 50-60 450-520

It is clear from Table II/2.2 that the quantitative correlation of the forces based in the offensive zone was almost equal. Our air force’s slight superiority in bomber and assault aircraft was the result of a large number of U-2¹⁰ night bombers among them (more than 100 planes). During the operation, following the concentration of all of the 3rd Mixed Air Corps’ aircraft on the 17th Air Army’s airfields, our aviation had a 1 ½ superiority in fighter aircraft. Taking account of the fact that even before the start of the operation the enemy had begun to widely employ his bomber aviation for transporting ammunition and food to its troops encircled in the Stalingrad area, as well as the offensive by his Kotel’nikovo group of forces, as a result of which he could not transfer his aviation from the south, one could expect a more favorable correlation of forces in the air. This was fully confirmed during the operation. Of the overall number of observed sorties by the enemy’s Fourth Air Fleet during 16-31 December 1942, only 35 percent were noted in the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts’ operational zone. It follows that no more than 350-400 enemy aircraft were operating in our troops’ offensive zone. Thus the actual correlation of forces in the air during the operation was 1:1.5 in our favor. During the conduct of the offensive operation the command of the air armies was basically given the following tasks:

•before the start of the offensive—to cover the most important groups of our forces in their jumping-off positions for the offensive; to destroy the enemy’s aviation on the ground, as well as his headquarters, reserves and troops moving up to the front line; to wear out the enemy’s forces along the forward edge through night actions, especially in the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ zones;

•upon the beginning of the offensive—to assist all of the attacking armies’ ground forces in breaking through the enemy’s defensive zone and in their operations in depth; •upon the commitment of the mobile groups into the breach—to cover them from the air and cooperate with them in developing the success.

In accordance with these tasks and for the purpose of realizing the closest cooperation of our aviation with the ground forces on the battlefield, the commanders of the air armies, in preparing for the operation, detached a large part of their air formations for the direct support of the ground armies’ offensive. For example, the 17th Air Army’s 3rd Mixed Air Corps was to operate in the 1st Guards Army’s zone, the 1st Mixed Air Corps in the 3rd Guards Army’s sector, and the 282nd Fighter Division in the 5th Tank Army’s sector; the 2nd Air Army’s 205th Fighter and 227th Assault Air divisions were detached for directly supporting the 6th Army’s offensive. Three air divisions (the 221st Bomber and the 262nd and 208th night bomber divisions) remained at the disposal of the air army commanders and were assigned the following tasks:

•the 17th Air Army’s 221st Bomber Division was to do battle with the enemy’s aviation on the Tatsinskaya, Morozovskii, Millerovo, and Glubokaya airfields; to foil the movements of the enemy’s forces along the Millerovo—Likhaya—Morozovskii rail line; to destroy the enemy’s retreating forces facing the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank armies’ fronts, and also to prevent the arrival of enemy reserves to the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii areas; •the 17th Air Army’s 262nd Night Bomber Division was to wear out the enemy’s troops through night actions along the 1st and 3rd

guards armies’ offensive front and destroy the enemy’s planes on the ground; •the 2nd Air Army’s 208th Night Bomber Division was to foil the enemy’s movement along the Rossosh’—Kantemirovka railroad and destroy the enemy’s planes on the Yevstratovskii and Urazovo airfields.

Thus the decision to employ our aviation in this operation called for the distribution of the efforts by the main mass of aircraft along four axes, located along a front about 400 kilometers in length. It is necessary to note that in such a decision the saturation of the various axes along the front was almost equal; for example, the 2nd Air Army’s 205th and 227th assault air divisions, which had been detached to support the 6th Army, had 115 planes, while the 3rd Mixed Air Corps supporting the 1st Guards Army, had 127 planes at the start of the operation, the 1st Mixed Air Corps operating in the 3rd Guards Army’s zone had 151 planes, and the 282nd Fighter Division, supporting the 5th Tank Army, had 46 planes. Worthy of attention is the saturation with aviation of the 1st Guards Army, which was to operate along one of the most important axes. This is explained by the fact that the 3rd Mixed Air Corps, which disposed of the largest number of planes (215 aircraft) and which had been detached to support it, had not been able to concentrate its fighters on its designated airfields by the start of the operation. Naturally, the absence of the 3rd Mixed Air Corps’ fighters at the beginning of the operation excluded the possibility not only of covering the ground forces, but also made the employment of assault air and bombers more difficult. In order to cover the 3rd Mixed Air Corps’ assault air and bomber combat activities until the arrival of its fighter regiments, a fighter regiment from the 1st Mixed Air Corps, consisting of 14 Yak-7s,¹¹ was operationally subordinated to the corps commander before the start of the operation, although

this number was also insufficient. It is quite understandable that the available planes along any of the front’s axes was obviously insufficient for supporting the offensive, and thus the 17th Air Army command called for its aviation to be based in such a way that it would be possible for the air formations to carry out their combat work not only in the zone of the army to which they were attached, but also along the sectors of the neighboring combined-arms formations. The air basing plan was drawn up to take into account maximally moving forward the air units’ and formations’ airfields to the ground forces they were supporting, as well as their capability to rapidly concentrate planes from various axes along the required sectors of the front. Given the great length of the offensive front, the presence of a limited amount of units servicing our aviation (airfield service battalions), it was very difficult to do this. Communications created particular problems for basing our aviation; due to a shortage of such equipment, the air units and formations were forced to base in areas having permanent wire communications, very often in unfavorable conditions for conducting combat. It is necessary to note that such a basing scheme enabled the air army commanders to concentrate a comparatively large number of aviation along the front’s necessary axes, without rebasing; for example, the 2nd Air Army’s and 1st Mixed Air Corps’ air formations could operate along the axes of the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ main attacks; the 1st Mixed Air Corps and the 282nd Air Division in the 1st Guards Army’s zone, and the 282nd and 288th fighter divisions in front of the 5th Tank Army. By the start of the operation not all of the air units had been concentrated at the airfields according to plan; for example, the 2nd Air Army’s 867th Fighter Regiment could not rebase to the “Progress” airfield (15 kilometers northeast of Verkhnii Mamon) designated for it, as the latter had not been prepared by the start of

the operation. Units of the 17th Air Army’s 3rd Mixed Air Corps, as has been shown, were not able to complete their concentration by the start of the operation. Despite the difficulties in aviation basing, as well as the indicated shortcomings in carrying out the planned concentration, the basing of the main mass of aviation was moved significantly closer to the troops. The remove of our combat aviation’s airfields from the ground forces’ activities did not exceed 20-40 kilometers for fighters and night bombers, 40-50 kilometers for assault aircraft, and 80120 kilometers for bombers. It’s important to note that in concentrating our aviation the joint basing of fighters and assault aircraft (the 1st Mixed Air Corps and the 282nd Fighter Division) was planned on a number of airfields, which made the organization of cooperation between them during the operation easier. For the purpose of guaranteeing the timely preparation of the airfields needed for rebasing aviation, special reconnaissance commands were detached from the airfield construction units during the operation. These commands were to follow behind the ground forces’ second echelons and reconnoiter the airfields abandoned by the enemy and areas suitable for the construction of landing sites and airfields. The assignments for the formations cooperating with the ground forces were issued by the commanders of the air armies and refined in detail by the command of the ground armies. Besides this, the commanders of the air corps and divisions took a direct part in compiling plans for the aviation’s cooperation with the ground forces. The control of aviation formations supporting the ground forces was organized in the following manner: the 2nd Air Army organized an auxiliary control post (VPU) in the immediate vicinity of the 6th

Army commander’s command post (in the area of Verkhnyaya Gnilusha), to where an operational group headed by the deputy commander of the air army was dispatched, with the mission of exercising control over the aviation formations detached for direct support of the ground forces (205th Fighter and 227th Assault Air divisions). It was planned that the auxiliary control post would have wire and radio communications with the air formations. However, by the beginning of the operation the radio set that had been allocated for this work had not yet arrived at the auxiliary control post and the wire communications set up with the air divisions proved to be so unreliable that they could not guarantee control over the air formations. As a result of this, the 2nd Air Army command, which was located in Buturlinovka, was forced to exercise direct control over the aviation formations detached for the support of the ground forces, having communications with the 6th Army only through the auxiliary control post. It is completely clear that such an organization of control would not guarantee the timely rendering of assistance to the ground forces during the operation. Control was organized significantly better in the 17th Air Army. By the start of the operation an auxiliary control post had been organized for the commander of the 17th Air Army in the area of the Southwestern Front commander’s command post (the town of Kalach). There was an operational group at the auxiliary control post, which had wire and radio communications with the air army staff and with the 3rd Mixed Air Corps, which consisted of the chief of staff, the assistant chief of the operational section, two officers from the operational section, the deputy chief of the reconnaissance section, and the deputy chief for communications. The air corps and division commanders, having direct communications with their units and the headquarters of the 17th Air Army, were located directly at the ground forces’ command posts, from where they guided their units’ combat activities. In some cases officers from the air headquarters were detached to the rifle, tank and mechanized corps operating along the main axes and

supplied with radio sets, through which they exercised coordination. The commander of the air army exercised control of the air formations, with the exception of the 3rd Mixed Air Corps, through his headquarters. Such an organization of control enabled us to sufficiently rapidly react to all the changes in a highly dynamic combat situation and direct our aviation’s efforts where they were most needed.

Air Actions During the Preparatory Phase

The preparatory phase of the Southwestern Front’s offensive operation lasted throughout 3-15 December 1942. During this period the 2nd and 17th air armies received the following missions:

•to carry out reconnaissance in the interests of the forthcoming operation, to photograph the enemy’s defensive zone along the right bank of the Don; to uncover the origin and direction of transport of his operational reserves to the front; •to foil the rail shipment of the enemy’s troops and supplies along the Kantemirovka—Likhaya and Likhaya—Oblivskaya sectors; •to destroy the enemy’s air force on the Millerovo, Starobel’sk, Kamensk, Skosyrskaya, Tatsinskaya, and Chernyshkovskii airfields; •to cover the concentration of friendly ground forces in the areas of Osetrovo, Bychok, Zamost’e, Pogorelaya, and Oblivskaya; •to cooperate with the 5th Tank Army’s ground forces in their conduct of a local operation;

•to prevent the arrival of the enemy’s reserves to the front line.

Taking into account the small number of available planes during the preparatory phase, as well as the unfavorable meteorological conditions, the assigned tasks should be recognized as excessive. Actually, our aviation was only able to most fully carry out reconnaissance tasks and cover the concentration of our ground forces. Such missions as the foiling of rail movements and the destruction of the enemy’s aviation on the ground, although they were reflected in the decisions by the air army commanders, could nevertheless not be completely carried out due to a shortage of forces. The enemy air force was not active before the start of the operation. In the 1st Guards and 6th armies’ sectors the Germans limited themselves to carrying out air reconnaissance of our troop concentration areas and our airfields; only a few small railroad stations located along the Talovaya—Kalach stretch of railroad were subjected to air attacks. The enemy air force, striving to put the railroad out of action for a prolonged period, sometimes carried out quite intensive raids on our railroad stations. The enemy very rarely carried out attacks against concentrations of our ground forces. On the front’s left flank, in the 3rd Guards and 5th Tank armies’ zones, the enemy air force was more active. Here the enemy’s reconnaissance planes penetrated to a depth of up to 150-200 kilometers; his fighters were constantly covering his forces in the Nizhne-Chirskaya and Tormosin areas and the Likhaya—Morozovskii —Oblivskaya railroad, and his bombers were especially active against our forces in the areas of Surovikino and Sviridovskii (12 kilometers southeast of Surovikino). The enemy air force was most active against our forces in this area during 8 and 10-12 December 1942, carrying out 200-300 sorties each day.

Our air activity in the interests of the forthcoming operation began only from 8 December 1942. Before this time the poor meteorological conditions excluded the ability to conduct flying assignments; the enemy air force was also idle during this period. During 8-15 December, despite the unfavorable meteorological conditions, the 2nd and 17th air armies carried out 1,263 sorties, of which:

Reconnoitering the enemy’s forces—212; Attacks on railroads and trains—38; Attacks on enemy airfields—124; Covering friendly forces and accompanying assault aircraft and bombers—465; Attacks on enemy forces on the battlefield—424 sorties, (including 230 at night).

From this data it is clear that our aviation’s efforts were concentrated on covering our ground forces from the air and on activities against the enemy’s forces on the battlefield. The accomplishment of these tasks was mainly realized opposite the left-flank armies (5th Tank and 3rd Guards), where our ground forces were most engaged and where the enemy air force was especially active. The main mass of sorties (1,151) was carried out by the 17th Air Army, which, while cooperating with the Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army in conducting its local operation, inflicted significant losses on the enemy’s forces. According to data from the 17th Air

Army’s headquarters, during 8-15 December 366 sorties were carried out by assault aircraft and bombers against enemy troops, which destroyed and put out of action about 40 tanks, 13 field and 34 antiaircraft guns, up to 300 motor vehicles, 60 other vehicles, a munitions dump, and a large number of enemy personnel. Besides this, our fighters conducted 62 air battles in which 27 enemy planes were shot down. On the front’s right flank (opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies) our aviation’s combat activity was limited: our fighters, through air patrols and duty on their airfields, covered the concentration of our forces in the following areas Kazinka—Ol’khovatka (18 kilometers west of Verkhnii Mamon); Verkhnyaya Gnilusha—Nizhnii Mamon; Zamost’e—Pogorelov (8-12 kilometers south of Petropavlovka); our night bombers exhausted the enemy’s forces along the axes of our forces’ main attacks in the Orobinskii—Dubovikovka area (15-30 kilometers east of Novaya Kalitva). During the operation’s preparatory phase the 2nd and 17th air armies’ air reconnaissance completely uncovered the enemy’s defensive system and photographed the main defensive zone along the right bank of the Don and Chir rivers along the sector from Rossosh’ to Nizhne-Chirskaya; the scale of the photographed terrain reached 12-15 kilometers in depth. Besides this, the aerial photographing of the areas for the concentration of the enemy’s reserves and airfields was carried out in Kantemirovka, Chertkovo, Millerovo, Tatsinskaya, and Morozovskii. Our aerial reconnaissance uncovered the absence of the enemy’s major operational reserves opposite the front of our forces’ forthcoming offensive and established that the enemy had no previously prepared defensive lines in the operational depth. It is necessary to note that the quality of our aerial reconnaissance was very good and the ground command disposed of authoritative data for making decisions for the breakthrough of the enemy’s defensive zone.

A well-organized reconnaissance of the enemy’s air basing system enabled us to launch several powerful attacks against his aircraft on the Millerovo, Tatsinskaya and Chernyshkovskii airfields when a large number of aircraft was concentrated on these airfields. During the preparatory phase of the operation strikes against the enemy airfields and air battles destroyed about 120 enemy planes, which enabled us to establish air superiority in the first days of the operation. Of the tasks assigned to our aviation by the front command for the preparatory phase, the one involving combating the enemy’s rail movements was fulfilled least of all. Only 38 sorties were carried out in pursuit of this important task, and these mostly at night. It’s quite understandable that given such forces, it was impossible to foil the rail movements even given the crews’ most successful actions.

Air Actions During the Operation

Throughout the entire operation (16-31 December 1942) the meteorological situation was extremely unfavorable for air operations. Throughout the operation the 17th Air Army enjoyed only ten flying days and seven nights, while the 2nd Air Army enjoyed only six days and eight nights. The weather was especially bad during the operation’s first period; for example, prolonged morning fog interfered with flying until 19 December, and during 20-24 December low clouds and snowfall added to the fog, which completely excluded the possibility of flying. Thus throughout the entire operation and particularly during the period of the ground forces’ most intense fighting (16-24 December), our aviation’s combat activity was restricted and limited to an extreme extent by the difficult meteorological conditions.

Air activity during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defensive zone

During the night of 15-16 December, as well as during the artillery preparation and attack by the 6th, 1st and 3rd guards armies’ forces against the forward edge of the enemy’s defense, our aviation was not active due to the heavy fog. The ground forces, following the artillery preparation, attacked at 0930 on 16 December without aviation support and without being molested by the enemy’s air force. However, the ground forces, upon encountering heavy fire resistance and the enemy’s frequent counterattacks, did not enjoy success. Only the 6th Army broke through the enemy defense along the axis of its main attack and by the close of the day advanced 2-3 kilometers. The 1st Guards Army was able to break through the first line of the enemy’s defense only along individual sectors, while the 3rd Guards Army advanced only a few hundred meters even along the axis of its main attack. In the middle of the day the weather improved a little in the 6th and 1st Guards armies’ zone, which enabled our aviation to begin combat activities. The most intensive air activity took place in the 1st Guards Army’s offensive zone. Here the 3rd Mixed Air Corps fell upon the enemy’s combat formations and during a short period of time the assault aircraft alone carried out 106 sorties. Air strikes were launched for the purpose of suppressing the enemy’s fire and his centers of resistance along the axis of our ground forces’ main attack in the areas of Gadyuch’e and Filonovo, as well as an attack on his upcoming reserves in the areas of Tverdokhlebovka, Radchenskoe and Boguchar. Assault air attacks against the enemy’s troops on the

battlefield and by bombers against his upcoming reserves destroyed or put out of action up to ten tanks, 45 motor vehicles and suppressed the fire of several enemy artillery batteries, which was very helpful to the 1st Guards Army’s attacking forces. Air assistance to the 6th and 3rd Guards armies’ ground forces throughout the offensive’s first day was insignificant. The 2nd Air Army, which was supporting the 6th Army’s forces, carried out only 68 sorties, of which 50 were conducted against enemy troop concentrations in the areas of Ivanovka and Tverdokhlebovka, and to suppress his artillery on the battlefield in the Novaya Kalitva— Derezovka—Krasno-Orekhovoe area, nine sorties for covering our forces, and nine sorties for reconnaissance purposes. In the 3rd Guards Army’s zone the 1st Mixed Air Corps carried out only 31 sorties for covering the ground forces and 19 assault air sorties against the enemy’s forces in the Bokovskaya—Vislogubov— Kruzhilin area. The low intensity of air activity along the 6th and 3rd Guards armies’ sectors can be explained not only by the poor meteorological conditions, but also by slipshod control work, particularly in the 2nd Air Army. One may judge just how unfavorable the situation was in this regard if only by the fact that the 17th Tank Corps remained the entire day without fighter protection, while the 867th Fighter Regiment, which had been detached for this purpose, was idle due to the fact that the regiment’s designated “Progress” airfield was not ready. The enemy’s air force was not active on the first day of our offensive, because of the fog and low cloud cover in its main basing areas. Throughout the day only individual reconnaissance flights by single enemy planes were noted, and there was only one case in which a group of bombers (up to 15 planes) tried to attack the 1st Guards Army’s forces, but were scattered by our fighter aviation. Only 61 enemy air sorties were noted throughout the day; our fighters were in three air battles, in which a single Me-109 was shot

down. Despite the poor meteorological conditions, particularly in the enemy air force’s basing area, the 221st Bomber Division carried out a strike against the Tatsinskaya and Morozovskii airfields, where, according to the crews’ observations, up to 15 enemy planes (Ju-88 and Ju-52¹²) were destroyed. During the subsequent days the ground forces’ offensive was more successful. Despite the enemy’s bitter resistance, his main defensive lines along the axis of our forces’ main attacks had been penetrated by the forces of the 6th and 1st Guards armies by the close of 17 December 1942, and on 18 December the enemy’s defensive zone was also broken through in the 3rd Guards Army’s defensive zone. On 19 December the pursuit of the enemy along the entire front began. During this period the 2nd and 17th air armies rendered significant assistance to the ground forces. It should be noted that if on the first day of the offensive our aviation could conduct operations without encountering resistance from enemy planes as a result of the unfavorable meteorological conditions in its basing area, then in the subsequent days the enemy’s aviation resistance grew significantly. Our aviation had to deal not only with the enemy’s planes based opposite the Southwestern Front, but also with a number of fighter elements brought up by the enemy from the south. The most intensive enemy air activity was noted on 17 December. On this day our forces registered 517 enemy sorties, which was almost equal to the number of our sorties (577). While enjoying equality in the air, the enemy air force put up strong resistance to our aviation, as a result of which a part of the assault air aviation in the 2nd Air Army and 3rd Mixed Air Corps could not exert itself to the maximum because of the absence of fighter cover; besides this, individual groups of assault aircraft and bombers, upon encountering powerful resistance in the air, would return to their

airfields, having failed to carry out their combat assignment. During the operation’s subsequent days the enemy’s air activity declined sharply with each day; for example, on 18 December 343 sorties were noted and only 273 on 19 December. As was the case during the operation’s preparatory phase, the enemy’s most intensive air activity was observed opposite the front’s left-flank armies (3rd Guards and 5th Tank). This was explained by the enemy’s desire to hold at all costs his defensive line located in the immediate vicinity of the Sixth Army, which had been surrounded by our forces in the Stalingrad area. With the loss of the Chir River line, the enemy would lose the hope of creating a northern group of forces for rendering assistance to Paulus’s forces, which were encircled at Stalingrad; this would significantly worsen the conditions for supplying them by air. Beginning on 17 December through the 20 December, the enemy’s fighter aviation covered his ground forces, while his bomber aviation, in groups of 5-20 planes, uninterruptedly bombed our attacking forces. The enemy air force operated less intensively opposite the 6th and 1st Guards armies, but during the period of the decisive stages of the ground forces’ battle the enemy concentrated a large number of planes along narrow sectors of the front, and then his activity against our attacking troops became very strong; for example, during the second half of 17 December the enemy’s bombers, in groups of 2-10 planes and under fighter cover, put up powerful resistance to the 6th Army’s attacking troops on the battlefield; on 18 December, as soon as the threat of the 1st Guards Army’s forcing of the Bogucharka River arose, the enemy’s planes began to uninterruptedly bomb our forces on the battlefield and in the immediate rear, preventing us from laying down crossings over the river.

Thus our aviation’s combat activity unfolded in conditions of powerful resistance by the enemy air force, which demanded reliable fighter cover for the activities of assault aircraft and bombers. The weak quantitative strength of our fighter aviation, as well as the absence of fighter formations (units) at the disposal of the commander of the 17th Air Army, so that he could reinforce individual sectors of the front, made it possible for the enemy air force to attempt to achieve air superiority along the necessary axis. Such was the case on 18 December in the 1st Guards Army’s offensive zone, where, due to the absence of a sufficient number of fighters and the extreme necessity of covering the ground forces from uninterrupted attacks by the enemy’s bombers in the Tverdokhlebovka area (20 kilometers south of Verkhnii Mamon), the commander of the 3rd Mixed Air Corps was forced to employ his assault aircraft (Il-2s) for covering the battlefield. The assault aircraft detached for covering the ground forces patrolled at heights of 1,000-1,500 meters and at first coped quite well with driving off groups of enemy bombers attempting to attack our forces. However, within two hours following the beginning of our assault air patrols, the enemy threw his fighters into the area covered by our assault aircraft. In the resulting air battles with the enemy’s fighters our assault aircraft suffered heavy losses (eight Il-2s). For the purpose of achieving air superiority (aside from our fighters’ battles with enemy aircraft over the battlefield while covering the ground forces), the 221st Bomber and the 262nd and 208th night bomber divisions, which were at the disposal of the commanders of the air armies, carried out 59 sorties (of these, 21 were at night) against the following enemy airfields: Millerovo, Tatsinskaya, Morozovskii, and Yevstratovskii. According to the crews, up to 40 enemy planes were destroyed at these airfields. Besides this, during 16-20 December our fighters conducted 45 air battles, in which 33 enemy planes were shot down. Despite the powerful resistance by enemy aircraft and the poor

meteorological conditions, that excluded flying for a significant part of the day, our aviation worked intensively. During the first five days of the ground forces’ offensive, 1,660 sorties were carried out during the day and 407 at night, which comes to about five sorties per combat-ready aircraft. Worthy of attention is the great difference in the quantity of sorties carried out along various armies’ sectors, given a comparatively small difference in the number of aircraft; for example, only 313 sorties were conducted in the 1st Guards Army’s zone, while 731 sorties were carried out in the 3rd Guards Army’s sector. It should be noted that during 16-20 December 6-10 sorties per combat-ready plane were conducted by the 1st Mixed Air Corps and the 282nd Fighter Division, when the 3rd Mixed Air Corps carried out an average of 2.5 sorties. Such a lack of intensity in the 3rd Mixed Air Corps was explained by the lack of fighters for covering the assault aircraft and bombers, the shortage of refueling equipment on the airfields, and the absence of fuel on some days. Besides this, in the fighter units that arrived during the operation this situation became even worse as a result of a shortage of technical personnel. In light of the unfavorable meteorological conditions and the limited number of planes, our aviation was only partially able to carry out its missions during the breakthrough of the defensive zone. However, the most important of the tasks—supporting the ground forces during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense—was accomplished quite satisfactorily by our aviation. Carrying out the main mass of its sorties (more than 1,200) against enemy troops on the battlefield, our aviation greatly assisted the ground forces. There were many outstanding examples when our aviation’s actions foiled the enemy’s intentions and thus secured the successful offensive by our ground forces. At 0700 on 20 December information arrived at the 5th Tank Army’s command post about the accumulation of enemy troops in the

Verkhne-Aksenovskii—Nizhne-Solonovskii area (20-30 kilometers southwest of Nizhne-Chirskaya).The two Yak-7 planes sent out by the commander of the 282nd Fighter Division for reconnaissance established the presence in this area of up to 70 tanks, 30 motor vehicles and a large number of enemy infantry. From 0800 to 1400 signals from the 5th Tank Army’s command post summoned to this area five groups of assault aircraft, in groups of 4-5 planes, covered by 4-7 Yak-7b¹³ planes, which launched effective strikes. From 1500 to 1530; that is, immediately before the beginning of the attack by our ground forces from the Sysoikin area, a strike was launched by a more powerful group of assault aircraft and fighters. As a result of our planes’ attacks coordinated as to time and place, the attack by our ground forces was successful and the inhabited locale of NizhneSolonovskii was taken with small losses. On 20 December in the gullies south of Novaya Mel’nitsa (four kilometers west of Novaya Kalitva) the enemy concentrated up to a regiment of infantry for counterattacking our forces. Thanks to the uninterrupted attacks by small groups of the 2nd Air Army’s assault aircraft over two hours, the enemy’s infantry suffered heavy losses and was scattered. The counterattack was foiled. It is necessary to note that the presence of the air formations’ commanders at the command posts of the commanders of the combined-arms formations guaranteed the aviation’s very satisfactory cooperation with the ground forces on the battlefield. A shortcoming in this cooperation was the poor designation of their position by the ground forces, as a result of which the air crews were forced to identify their forces from the air prior to their attack. Instances were observed when individual groups of planes, lacking the ability to recognize friendly troops, would attack secondary targets 10-15 kilometers from our forces, so as to avoid striking our troops. Our aviation’s most intensive activity throughout occurred in the 3rd Guards Army’s zone. Despite powerful resistance by enemy aircraft

along this sector, the 1st Mixed Air Corps’ fighters reliably covered the army’s shock groups throughout the entire period, while the assault aircraft rendered great assistance to the attacking troops along the axis of the main attack. Overall, during the 16-20 December period 381 fighter sorties were conducted for cover purposes, and 332 assault air sorties for attacking enemy troops on the battlefield. Our aviation’s activities on the battlefield destroyed and put out of action up to 30 tanks, 50 guns, two ammunition dumps, many motor vehicles, other vehicles and enemy personnel. The fighters carried out 25 air battles, in which 21 enemy planes were shot down. During the operation’s first stage our aviation was not able to fully paralyze the communications and control of the enemy’s forces, disrupt the work of his rear and prevent the arrival of his reserves through its own night and day operations. These missions were carried out with limited forces, mainly by the air divisions at the disposal of the commander of the 17th Air Army (221st Bomber Division and part of the 262nd Night Bomber Division), which, aside from operations against enemy airfields, launched several episodic strikes against the Glubokaya and Millerovo railway stations and the enemy’s reserves in the areas of Millerovo, Kamenka and Kashary. The shortage of air power during the offensive was sorely felt; for example, on 18 December aerial reconnaissance uncovered the intensive movement of enemy trains with troops and freight along the Rossosh’—Mitrofanovka, Kantemirovka—Kamensk and Belokalitvenskaya—Chernyshkovskii railroad sectors. However, the overall aviation shortage prevented us from launching a powerful strike to disrupt the enemy rail movements. The absence of aviation for operating against rail movements enabled the enemy during this time to transfer two fresh infantry divisions to the sector of the Voronezh Front’s 6th Army, and also to bring up reserves opposite the Southwestern Front’s left flank and temporarily halt the 5th Tank Army’s offensive.

The night bombers operated most intensely during the operation and took advantage of literally every opportunity offered by the weather for its activity. They carried out, on the average, 3-4 sorties each night of flying weather, and on the night of 16-17 December a group of planes from the 370th Night Bomber Regiment (16 U-2 aircraft), which were operating in the 1st Guards Army’s zone, carried out 88 sorties; that is, 5-6 sorties per plane. The great intensity and high effectiveness of the U-2s’ activities (according to the ground troops) was achieved through the proper organization of their combat work in the 370th Night Bomber Regiment. As a rule, they operated from landing strips 5-15 kilometers from the forward edge. The regimental commander, after receiving his mission from the commander of the 17th Air Army, would fly to the forward strips and, having refined the tasks on the spot with the commanders of the combined-arms formations, assigned tasks to the flight crews. On dark nights a post was set up at each landing strip, equipped with rockets (torches) and direct telephone communications established with the strip. The flight crew knew the post’s location exactly by the terrain and also the distance and direction of the post to the target. The takeoff of each plane was immediately communicated to the post, which upon receiving news of the takeoff, would begin to relay signals helping the plane find the post. Directing the plane to its target from the post was carried out according to course and time. The next plane was authorized to take off once the post relayed the news about the first plane’s return flight. It is necessary to note that poorly organized communications during the preparatory period between the 2nd Air Army’s auxiliary control post and the air formations supporting the 6th Army was powerfully reflected in the effectiveness on the air force’s combat activities during the first days of the offensive. In reality, the auxiliary control

post changed from being a control organ for the formations into a relay station for the 2nd Air Army’s headquarters on the ground situation. In practice, this led to the untimely issuing of tasks to the units and, consequently, to the planes’ delayed takeoff for the battlefield. For example, on the operation’s second day the enemy air force, having discovered our tank units in the Verkhnii Mamon area, began to bomb them heavily. Due to the absence of communications, no measures were taken for the timely covering of our forces, although there were fighters for this purpose. Also, for this same reason the air units and formations had a poor knowledge of the changes on the ground, as a result of which each day combat activity began with a reconnaissance of the ground forces’ situation.

Air activity during the pursuit phase

During the first days of the pursuit (21-24 December) our aviation was not active because of the unfavorable meteorological conditions (fog, snowfall and the low cloud cover). The exception was 21 December, when 52 sorties were conducted for reconnaissance purposes and attacking the enemy’s retreating forces. Thus before 25 December our forces operated without help from friendly aviation, as well as enemy action from the air. The enemy air force, having suffered significant losses in the first stage of the operation and having moved its bases to the rear airfields, reduced its activity; it carried out no more than 200-250 sorties per day, operating mainly against our tank and mechanized forces in the following areas: Millerovo, Skosyrskaya, Tatsinskaya, Morozovskii, Milyutinskaya, and Chernyshkovskii. On some days enemy air activity against the mobile forces was sufficiently strong.

Beginning on 25 December and continuing until the end of the operation, our aviation was intensely engaged, day and night. Its most important tasks during this period were, as before, supporting the ground forces on the battlefield and covering them from the air. However, these tasks were carried out by our aviation, mainly in the interests of the combined-arms formations. By the close of 24 December, the tank and mechanized forces that had rushed forward were fighting with the enemy’s units in the areas of Millerovo, Milyutinskaya and Tatsinskaya; that is, they were 200-250 kilometers from our airfields. As a result of the great gap between our airfields and the mobile forces, as well as the murkiness of the situation in the operational areas, our tank and mechanized corps were forced to operate without aid from our aviation. Our air activities against the enemy forces during the pursuit phase were less intense than during the operation’s first stage; of the 2,750 sorties carried out during the ten days of the pursuit (21-31 December), only 830 were conducted against the enemy’s forces. The main targets of attack were concentrations of enemy forces in centers of resistance and his retreating columns. It should be noted that the aviation’s cooperation with the ground forces on the battlefield during the pursuit was poorly carried out. This was explained by the absence of reliable communications between the combined-arms and air formations, the ground forces’ poor designation of their position and the substandard work of the air representatives at the ground forces’ command posts. Quite often the aviation’s activities transpired without tactical communications with the ground forces. The enemy, following our forces’ breakthrough of his defense, began to intensively transfer significant forces from the areas of Rossosh’ and Voroshilovgrad to the Tatsinskaya—Morozovskii area. On 25 December our reconnaissance established the enemy’s intensive railroad movement along the Ostrogozhsk—Valuiki and Likhaya—Tatsinskaya sectors.

From this time the 2nd and 17th air armies began to operate day and night to disrupt these rail shipments, while our aviation operated most intensively during the 25-28 December period. During this period more than 450 sorties were carried out (of these, more than 70 percent were at night) against the railroad stations and stages and trains along the Rossosh’—Podgornoe, Ostrogozhsk —Valuiki and Likhaya—Tatsinskaya sectors. Although our air activities did not manage to completely disrupt the enemy’s rail movement, his troop transfers were foiled to a significant degree, which reflected favorably on the actions of our forces. During the operation a great deal of work was carried out in preparing the airfield network on territory freed from the Germans. Reconnaissance teams from the airfield-construction units, which were moving behind the attacking troops’ second echelons, located 62 sites suitable for building airfields, while the airfield-construction units investigated 35 airfield sectors and fully prepared 20 airfields for our aviation. This enabled us to begin from 26 December 1942 rebasing our air units and formations to new airfield centers located in the immediate vicinity of our ground forces.

Conclusions

Despite the poor meteorological conditions and the shortage of planes, the 2nd and 17th air armies’ planes, thanks to their intensive combat activity on flying days, rendered a great deal of assistance to the ground forces, both during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defensive zone, but also in operations in the defensive depth and in reaching the Likhaya—Tatsinskaya—Morozovskii rail line. Throughout the entire operation, our aviation carried out uninterrupted reconnaissance of the battlefield and the immediate

approaches to it, covered our ground forces, destroyed enemy troops on the battlefield, launched repeated strikes against the enemy’s airfields, and disrupted the transport of his operational reserves. During the period 16-31 December 1942 our aviation carried out 4,824 sorties, while the distribution of flights was as follows:

Table II/2.3 Distribution of Soviet Aviation Sorties, 16-31 December 1942

It is evident from the table that the main mass of sorties was carried out to attack the enemy’s ground forces and to cover our troops. These were the most important missions throughout the entire operation and the activities of the 17th and 2nd air armies were directed specifically at their resolution. While operating in difficult meteorological conditions throughout almost all of the operation, against the resistance of the enemy’s anti-aircraft artillery and fighters, our aviation inflicted heavy losses on the enemy in equipment and personnel. According to data from the 17th and 2nd air armies’ headquarters, during the operation about 100 tanks were destroyed or put out of action, as were 150 guns of various calibers, 30 armored vehicles, 15 fuel and ammunition dumps, a large number of vehicles, and enemy personnel. Besides this, our fighters carried out more than 200 air battles, in which we shot down 95 enemy planes and damaged 14. Due to the small number of planes, our aviation could not carry out all of its tasks in the interests of the operation along a four-army front, and thus such important tasks as the destruction of the enemy’s planes on the ground, the disruption of his railroad work, etc., were carried out rarely and with small forces. Increasing aviation activity for accomplishing these tasks could have been achieved by decreasing the intensity of operations against the enemy’s troops on the battlefield, which was impossible. It is necessary to note that thanks to the well-organized aerial reconnaissance, air operations conducted against targets outside the battlefield were sufficiently effective; for example, according to data from the air armies’ headquarters, during the 3-31 December 1942 period the 417 sorties carried out against airfields destroyed about 180 enemy planes. The comparatively small (in offensive conditions) superiority over the enemy in planes and the concentration of the enemy’s main air

efforts along our attacking units’ left flank created difficult conditions for combat activities. This required the constant cover of our ground forces and the escort of assault aircraft and bombers, given the obviously unfavorable correlation between the fighters and the other kinds of planes (by the start of the operation there were more than four times as many assault aircraft and bombers as fighters). In these conditions the decision by the 17th Air Army command to support the left-flank armies (3rd Guards and 5th Tank) with formations having a high proportion of fighters was the most correct. This secured the more reliable cover of the left-flank armies’ ground forces. The presence of the commanders of the air formations at the combined-arms commanders’ command posts facilitated to a significant degree the successful actions of our aviation on the battlefield while breaking through the enemy’s defensive zone. Thanks to this measure, the 17th Air Army’s cooperation with the ground forces operating along the main axes during the first part of the operation was basically satisfactory. A major shortcoming in the aviation’s cooperation with the ground forces throughout the entire operation was the ground forces’ poor designation of their position, which undoubtedly lowered the effectiveness of our aviation’s combat activities. The present operation shows what a great influence timely organized communications with the air formations (units) has on combat activity, particularly radio. The sufficiently effective control system worked out by the 2nd Air Army’s headquarters for our aviation’s cooperation with the ground forces was disrupted only because by the start of the operation the radio set had not arrived at the air army’s auxiliary control post. Among the shortcomings in our aviation’s activities during the operation are the following:

1. Our aviation’s poor maneuvering between the various sectors of the front as a result of the almost equal distribution of all aircraft between the four attacking armies. In reality, our air formations throughout the entire operation were active only in the zones of those armies to which they had been attached for support, while the 17th Air Army’s organization of control and the basing of our air formations allowed for operations in the zones of neighboring armies. This opportunity was not fully employed, as a result of which the enemy, in the majority of cases, by concentrating the main efforts of his air force along narrow sectors of the front, was often able to achieve equality and sometimes a superiority of force in the air.

2. Our aviation’s extremely poor cooperation with the mobile forces during the latter’s’ actions in the enemy’s operational rear. Our aviation operated without tactical communications with the mobile forces, which enabled the enemy air force to launch strikes against our ground forces with complete impunity.

3. There was insufficient purposefulness in air operations to disrupt the enemy’s rail shipments. These air operations were carried out simultaneously along several axes, as, for example, our air activities against the Rossosh’—Podgornoe, Ostrogozhsk—Valuiki and Likhaya —Tatsinskaya railroads during 25-28 December 1942. It’s quite understandable that operations by a limited number of planes against three rail lines did not yield the necessary results.

1Editor’s note. This refers to the Il-2 (“Sturmovik”) ground attack aircraft. The Il-2 was designed by Sergei Vladimirovich Il’yushin and first appeared in 1941. It carried a crew of two and had a top speed

of 414 kilometers per hour. Its armament consisted of two 23mm cannons, two 7.62mm machine guns and one 12.7mm machine gun, and it could carry up to 600 kilograms of bombs. 2Editor’s note. The Yak-1 was designed by Aleksandr Sergeevich Yakovlev (1906-89) and appeared in 1940. It was a single-seat fighter with a top speed of 592 kilometers per hour. It carried a single 20mm cannon and a 12.7mm machine gun. 3Editor’s note. The He-111 was a twin-engine aircraft used by the Germans during the Second World War as a transport plane and a bomber, among other applications. It appeared in the mid-1930s and contained a five-man crew. The aircraft’s top speed was 440 kilometers per hour and it had a range of 2,300 kilometers. Its armament consisted of up to seven 7.92mm machine guns, one 20mm cannon, and one 13mm machine gun. It could carry up to 2,000 kilograms of bombs. 4Editor’s note. The Ju-88 was a twin-engine aircraft used by the Germans during the Second World War, primarily as a bomber. It appeared in 1939 and contained a four-man crew. The aircraft’s top speed was 510 kilometers per hour and had a range of 2,430 kilometers. It carried five 7.92mm machine guns and could carry up to 2,400 kilograms of bombs. 5Editor’s note. The Ju-87 (“Stuka”) was a two-man dive bomber that appeared in 1935. It had a maximum speed of 390 kilometers per hour and carried three 7.92mm machine guns and one 250-kilogram bomb under the fuselage and four 50-kilogram bombs under the wings. 6Editor’s note. The Me-109 (Bf-109), which first appeared in 1937, was the standard German fighter plane throughout the war. This single-seat fighter had a top speed of 640 kilometers per hour. Its armament consisted of two 13mm machine guns, three 20mm cannons, and it could carry up to 250 kilograms in bombs.

7Editor’s note. The Me-110 (correctly known as the Bf-110) was a twin-engine fighter that first appeared in 1937. It carried a crew of two and had a maximum speed of 560 kilometers per hour. Its armament consisted of two 20mm cannons and five 7.92mm machine guns. 8Editor’s note. The Fw-189 was a twin-engine reconnaissance aircraft. Carrying a crew of two, it first appeared in 1941. Its top speed was 357 kilometers per hour, and it was armed with four 7.92mm machine guns and could carry four 50-kilogram bombs. 9Editor’s note. The Hs-126 was a two-seat reconnaissance plane that appeared in 1937. It had a maximum speed of 356 kilometers per hour, carried two 7.92mm machine guns, and could carry up to 150 kilograms of bombs. 10 Editor’s note. The U-2 (designated Po-2 from 1944) was designed by Nikolai Nikolaevich Polikarpov (1892-1944) and appeared in 1929. It was a single-seat all-purpose aircraft, which was used by the Soviets for reconnaissance and bombing missions. It had a crew of one, a top speed of 152 kilometers per hour, a single 7.62mm machine gun, and could carry six 50-kg bombs. 11 Editor’s note. The Yak-7 was a heavy fighter developed from the Yak-1, by the same Yakovlev design bureau. This single-seat aircraft first appeared in 1942. It had a maximum speed of 495 kilometers per hour and was armed with one 20mm cannon and two 7.62mm machine guns. 12 Editor’s note. The Ju-52 first appeared in 1930 and was used as a transport aircraft and medium bomber during the Second World War. The plane had a crew of two and a top speed of 195 kilometers per hour. Its armament consisted of one 13mm and two 7.92mm machine guns, and it could carry up to 500 kilograms of bombs. 13 Editor’s note. The Yak-7b was a single-seat fighter that first

appeared in 1942. It had a crew of one and a maximum speed of 570 kilometers per hour. It was armed with one 20mm cannon and two 12.7mm machine guns.

Part III

The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh’ Offensive Operation (13-27 January 1943)

“The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk-Rossosh’ Offensive Operation” was written by Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Morozov.

Introduction The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation is a component part of the Soviet army’s general offensive, carried out in the winter of 1943 according to the plan by the Supreme High Command. During this offensive, which lasted from January to the end of March, the Soviet army eliminated the enemy’s encircled Stalingrad group of forces, defeated his Caucasian group of forces, and also the German-Fascist troops operating along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes and in the eastern part of the Donbass, and broke the blockade of Leningrad. As a result of the Soviet forces’ offensive in the winter of 1943, favorable conditions were created for conducting offensive operations in the summer and fall of 1943. The Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation was conducted during 13-27 January 1943 by the forces of the Voronezh Front’s center and left wing. The 40th combined-arms, 3rd Tank and 2nd Air armies, took part in it, as well as the 18th Independent Rifle and 7th Cavalry corps. The operation was conducted in two stages. During the first stage, which lasted from 13-15 January, the front’s forces broke through the enemy’s prepared defense along the right bank of the Don along three axes and created the necessary conditions for encircling the numerically superior enemy group of forces defending between Voronezh and Kantemirovka. The second stage lasted from 16-27 January. During 16-18 January the front’s forces developed a vigorous offensive for the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy group of forces. As a result of this offensive more than 13 enemy divisions were encircled in the area of Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh’. By the time the encirclement of

the enemy group of forces was completed, the front’s forces had captured about 52,000 enemy soldiers and officers. During 19-27 January the final elimination of the divided units of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces took place. During this period the number of prisoners increased another 34,000 men and by the end of the operation numbered more than 86,000 soldiers and officers. The operation ended with the arrival of the front’s left-wing forces at the Oskol River along the Gorodishche—Volokonovka—Valuiki— Urazovo sector. During the operation the Hungarian Second Army and the remnants of the Italian Eighth Army were completely destroyed. Freed was the important Liski—Kantemirovka railroad sector, which was necessary for organizing the supply of the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts’ forces for developing their offensive along the Khar’kov axis and in the Donbass. The results of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation immediately led to a radical change in the correlation of forces in the Voronezh Front’s zone in favor of the Soviet forces. Having destroyed the enemy forces defending along the Don south of Voronezh, and having deeply enveloped the German Second Army from the south, the front’s forces created the decisive prerequisites for carrying out a new offensive operation for the purpose of defeating, in conjunction with the Bryansk Front, this army’s main forces and for a subsequent offensive along the Khar’kov axis. The instructive experience of this operation is very interesting. The Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation, which was carried out in winter conditions, was conducted with the decisive goal of encircling and destroying a major enemy group of forces with the forces of a single front. The encirclement of this group of forces was accomplished simultaneously with its splitting up and destruction in detail. The final elimination of the split-up units of the enemy’s group of forces occurred during the preparation of the front’s new offensive operations along the Voronezh—Kastornoe and Khar’kov

axes. Characteristic of the operation is the skillful creation of the necessary superiority in men and materiel along the decisive axes, despite the absence of an overall superiority in men over the enemy and an insignificant superiority in artillery and tanks. This was achieved through the bold weakening of secondary axes and the decisive transfer of part of our forces from the front’s left wing to the right one. A major regrouping of forces was carried out rapidly along snow-covered roads and in heavy frosts. An instructive aspect of the operation also consists of the correctly organized and skillfully realized operational security, chiefly by securing the outer flanks of the front’s main shock groups and in carrying out measures to achieve surprise. The employment of a reinforced cavalry corps for attacking along an independent axis as one of the front’s shock groups is of significant interest. Finally, characteristic of the operation was the high offensive pace, which was achieved under difficult winter conditions and without roads, which required from the front’s forces the great exertion of moral and physical efforts in carrying out their assigned combat tasks.

1

The Situation by the Start of the Operation’s Preparation

The Overall Situation Along the Southern Wing of the SovietGerman Front at the End of December 1942

As a result of the defeat of the main group of German-Fascist forces around Stalingrad, the situation along the Soviet-German front in the winter of 1942-43 decisively changed in favor of the Soviet armed forces. The strategic initiative was ripped from the hands of the Hitlerite command. Favorable conditions were created for the growth of the Soviet forces’ strategic counteroffensive at Stalingrad into a general offensive along a broad front and a decisive turning point in the Great Patriotic War began. The Soviet army began the massive eviction of the enemy from the territory of the Soviet Union. By the close of 1942 the situation of the Soviet forces operating along the southern wing of the Soviet-German front was as follows. The Voronezh Front was defending a 380-kilometer sector of the front from the Yelets—Kastornoe railroad to Novaya Kalitva. The Southwestern and Stalingrad fronts, following the completion of the encirclement of the enemy’s Stalingrad group of forces, the defeat of his Kotel’nikovo group of forces, and then that of the Italian-German forces along the middle course of the Don, continued

to attack along an enormous 670-kilometer front, having by this time reached the line Novaya Kalitva—Millerovo—Tormosin— Zimovniki—Priyutnoe. The Don Front’s forces were preparing an operation for the purpose of eliminating the German-Fascist group of forces encircled in the Stalingrad area. The Trans-Caucasus Front continued to tie down the North Caucasus German-Fascist group of forces through its active operations and was preparing to assume the offensive. The Hitlerite command, following the defeat of its forces around Stalingrad, was adopting all measures to stabilize the front along the middle course of the Don. Troops which had been removed from other sectors of the Soviet-German front and Western Europe were continually being dispatched here. Simultaneously, the German-Fascist command continued to strengthen its defense along the Don River and Voronezh area, striving to maintain his position here at all costs. The great significance that the Hitlerite command attached to the Voronezh axis may be explained by the fact that this axis connected the central group of German-Fascist forces, which was defending along the Moscow strategic direction, with the southern group operating along the Stalingrad and Caucasus directions. Thus, following the defeat of the German-Fascist forces around Stalingrad and along the middle course of the Don, an offensive by the enemy along the Voronezh axis was unlikely. The GermanFascist command along this axis disposed of the least combatcapable troops compared to the other sectors of the Soviet-German front. The political-morale condition of the Hitlerite troops had been reduced. The initiative in operations was firmly in the hands of the Soviet command.

All of this taken together favored the unfolding of the Soviet troops’ offensive operations simultaneously along several axes along the entire southern wing of the Soviet-German front, including along the Voronezh axis.

The Situation along the Voronezh Front at the End of December 1942

The Operational Situation and Disposition of the Front’s Forces

Having halted the offensive by the German-Fascist forces along the Voronezh axis in June 1942, the active offensive operations by the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts’ forces during four months (JulyOctober) prevented the enemy from removing any kind of significant numbers of troops from this sector of the front for dispatch to Stalingrad. Having gone over to the defensive along the front Kozinka— Khvoshchevatka, and then along the Voronezh River and along the left bank of the Don as far as Novaya Kalitva, the Voronezh Front’s forces preserved and widened bridgeheads along the right bank of the Don in the areas of 1st Storozhevoe and Shchuch’e. By the end of December the Voronezh Front (Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov,¹ commander, Lieutenant General F.F. Kuznetsov,² member of the military council, and Major General M.I. Kazakov,³ chief of staff) included three combined-arms (38th, 60th and 40th) armies, one air army (2nd) and an independent rifle corps (18th). In all, the front numbered 18 rifle divisions and five rifle brigades, which under the conditions of the 380-kilometer front from Kozinka to Novaya

Kalitva, yielded an average operational density of more than 18 kilometers per division.⁴ A rifle division’s average strength was about 7,000 men. The 2nd Air Army included 177 planes, including 56 fighters, ten assault aircraft, 91 night bombers, and 20 reconnaissance aircraft and other special planes. The front’s tank forces, which consisted of nine independent tank brigades and one independent heavy tank regiment, disposed of 447 tanks of various types. The 38th Army, which consisted of five rifle divisions and two rifle brigades, defended a 70-kilometer front from Kozinka to Khvoshchevatka. The 60th Army defended a 70-kilometer front from Khvoshchevatka to Gremyach’e. The army included six rifle divisions and one rifle brigade. The 40th Army was defending a 130kilometer front from Gremyach’e to Vladimirovka. The 18th Independent Rifle Corps, which consisted of two rifle divisions, was defending a broad 110-kilometer front from Vladimirovka to Novaya Kalitva. Two rifle brigades and a rifle division were in the front reserve, of which one brigade was in the Pavlovsk area in the 18th Rifle Corps’ area, while the remainder had been concentrated behind the boundary between the 60th and 40th armies in the areas of Novaya Usman’ and Kriushi. To the right of the Voronezh Front the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army was defending in the area between the Kshen’ River and the Yelets— Kastornoe railroad; to the left the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army was consolidating along the line Novaya Kalitva—Markovka (NovoMarkovka).

The Disposition of the Enemy’s Forces and a Description of his

Defense

Defending along the sector from Kozinka to Novaya Kalitva opposite the Voronezh Front’s forces were part of the German Second Army’s forces (XIII and VII army corps), the Hungarian Second Army (III, IV and VII army corps) and the Italian Eighth Army’s Alpine Corps. All of these forces were part of Army Group B, which was covering the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. In all, 20 infantry and one panzer divisions and a single panzer detachment were operating opposite the Voronezh Front. The enemy forces’ average operational density was 18.5 kilometers per division. The enemy’s infantry divisions, which were 70-90 percent up to strength, had the following: German divisions numbered more than 11,000 men, the Hungarian divisions an average of 12,000 men, and the Italian divisions from 10,000 to 16,000 men. The enemy group of forces’ panzer troops number overall about 200 combat vehicles (light tanks, Pz-IVs⁵ and assault guns). The enemy’s air force operating opposite the Voronezh Front had about 300 planes, including 200 bombers, 80 fighters and 20 reconnaissance aircraft, which were based on airfields in the areas of Kastornoe, Staryi Oskol, Alekseevka, Rossosh’, Urazovo, Kursk, and Khar’kov. The enemy’s main air assets were concentrated against the Voronezh Front’s left wing. At the end of December the enemy forces opposite the Voronezh Front and the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army were operating in the following group of forces. Overall, defending opposite the 38th and 60th armies along a 136kilometer front from Kozinka to the mouth of the Voronezh River were seven infantry divisions from the German Second Army’s XIII and VII army corps.⁶ The densest enemy group of forces was in the

Voronezh area, where along a 35-kilometer sector of front in the area between the Don and Voronezh rivers there were more than three divisions, with a defensive density of up to ten kilometers per division. The German command had concentrated in reserve along the Voronezh axis, behind the boundary between the German Second and Hungarian Second armies, the 700th Independent Panzer Detachment, which included up to 100 tanks and assault guns. The Hungarian Second Army⁷ was defending opposite the 40th Army and the 18th Independent Rifle Corps along a 185-kilometer front from Ust’e to Verkhnii Korabut along the right bank of the Don. The German 168th Infantry Division had been concentrated in this army’s sector in the area northwest of Kamenka, while one of its regiments had been dispatched to the area of our Storozhevoe bridgehead. The average operational density of the enemy forces in this area was about 17 kilometers per division. The Italian Alpine Corps, consisting of three divisions,⁸ was defending along a 70-kilometer front from Verkhnii Korabut to Novaya Kalitva opposite the 18th Rifle Corps’ left-flank division, with an average operational density of more than 23 kilometers per division. Facing the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army along the sector between Novaya Kalitva and the Liski—Kantemirovka railroad were German and Italian formations that had suffered heavy losses during the Soviet forces’ December offensive, and which numbered about five divisions and a panzer division,⁹ which were grouped under the control of the German XXIV Panzer Corps. South of the sector occupied by the XXIV Tank Corps, as far as Millerovo, there was a gap in the enemy front of more than 100 kilometers, to which the enemy was hurriedly dispatching the 19th Panzer Division from the Kupyansk area.

The disposition of the enemy’s forces had been discovered fully and exactly by the Voronezh Front’s headquarters. The front headquarters was unaware only of the renaming of the former Hungarian Panzer Brigade to a panzer division and its rearmament with German Pz-IV tanks. Besides this, the combat and numerical strength of the enemy’s formations was defined incorrectly (2-3 times less than was the case for certain formations). As early as the summer of 1942 the Hitlerite command began creating a solid defense along the right bank of the Don and north of Voronezh and uninterruptedly improved it over the course of nearly six months. This defensive work assumed a particularly large scale at the end of December 1942, employing the strength of a large number of worker battalions, which had been sent from Hungary and Germany. The tactical zone of the enemy’s defense opposite the Voronezh Front included main and second defensive zones. The depth of the enemy defense’s main zone reached 6-8 kilometers. The main zone consisted of strong points on heights and in inhabited locales, connected by communications trenches and trenches. The enemy’s defense was most developed opposite the Storozhevoe and Shchuch’e bridgeheads. The enemy’s first trench ran along the high and steep right bank of the Don and was outfitted with movable platforms for machine guns and riflemen. There were continuous wire obstacles and minefields in front of this trench. The entire main zone was saturated with a large number of earth and timber machine gun, mortar and artillery firing points. As was mentioned above, strong points and centers of resistance had been outfitted along heights and in inhabited locales along the forward edge and in depth, in which all 37mm and 50mm artillery pieces, and some 75mm ones, were located in earth and timber pillboxes and prepared for firing over open sights. The second defensive zone, consisting of one, and in places two,

broken trenches, foxholes and individual strong points, outfitted on the commanding heights and in inhabited locales, had been prepared at a remove of 12-20 kilometers from the forward edge along the line Nikol’skoe—Ostrogozhsk—Pukhovo—Kramorev and then along the railroad as far as the town of Rossosh’. An intermediary position had been prepared northeast of Rossosh’ along the line Verkhnii Korabut—Andreevka—Sergeevka—Saprina. The enemy’s defense opposite the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army was less developed. Here the enemy had only a single main defensive zone, which he had managed to create following the retreat to the line excluding Novaya Kalitva—Vysochinov, under attack by the 6th Army’s forces. The enemy had no previously prepared defensive lines and positions in the operational depth. On the whole, the enemy facing the Voronezh Front at the end of December 1942, despite an approximate equality in the number of rifle formations,¹⁰ was superior to the Voronezh Front’s forces in men by a factor of 2, 2.5 in machine guns, more than 1.5 in anti-tank guns, and 1.8 in planes. While disposing of an approximately equal amount of artillery and mortars, the enemy had 2.2 times fewer tanks. The enemy’s group of forces was organized defensively. Almost all of his forces were equally disposed along the front in a single echelon. The enemy had only two divisions in the operational reserve, located behind the second defensive zone in the Kamenka area. The second zone was not occupied by troops along the remaining sectors. The German-Fascist command directed all of its efforts toward making, as far as possible, the line of the Don impregnable, and against which, in his opinion, the pressure of the Soviet troops must

break while attacking. For this reason, the German-Fascist command, having expended all of its men and materiel in order to occupy a defensive line along the Don River as densely as possible, lacked the men and materiel for forming sufficient operational reserves in the sector of the Voronezh Front’s forthcoming offensive. The weakest link in the enemy’s defense was the sector facing the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, where the 6th Army’s favorable operational situation and the absence of a previously prepared enemy defensive line created favorable prerequisites for launching from here a deep enveloping attack against the flank and rear of the enemy group of forces defending opposite the Voronezh Front.

A Short Description of the Area of Combat Activities

The Voronezh Front’s combat activities in the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ operation unfolded in the southwestern part of the Voronezh Oblast’, in the area between the Don River in the east and the Oskol River in the west. The importance of the area was determined, first of all, by the fact that the shortest routes to Kursk and Khar’kov run through here. There was a developed rail network in this area. Of particular importance were the Liski—Kantemirovka and Staryi Oskol—Valuiki railroads and the Liski—Alekseevka— Valuiki railroad sector that connected these lateral routes, the rapid freeing up of which would play an important role while the Supreme High Command was planning to unleash an offensive by the entire left wing of the Soviet front for the purpose of rapidly liberating the Khar’kov industrial area, the Donbass and the northern Caucasus. These railroads were also very important for the enemy, particularly the Staryi Oskol—Valuiki line, which linked Army Group B’s forces with the troops of his Donbass group of forces. Our troops’ seizure of this railroad would have significantly complicated the enemy’s

maneuver capabilities along the front. The railroad network in the Voronezh Front’s sector was very insufficiently developed. The front’s right-wing forces were based on the railroad running from Rtishchevo through Tambov, Michurinsk and Gryazi to Liski. The Voronezh Front’s center and left-wing forces disposed of only a single line, running from Povorino to Liski, for their supply. The forces of the entire Southwestern Front were forced to use this railroad, because the single Povorino—Ilovlinskaya railroad running in the front’s sector was more than 200 kilometers from the front line. Besides this, there were almost no good dirt roads running from this lateral railroad toward the front. The limited number of railroads created major difficulties in carrying out operational shipments and in organizing the troops’ materiel supply, both during the operation’s preparatory period and during its conduct. The terrain in the Voronezh Front’s offensive sector is, for the most part, broken, with a large number of heights and gullies. There are insignificant wooded areas only along the banks of the Don and in the areas northwest of Ostrogozhsk, northeast of Alekseevka and north of Valuiki. Only small groves are encountered along the rest of the territory. The small number of rivers and small streams, which flow through the area, were not a barrier for attacking troops in winter. The Don River was a serious natural line in the front’s offensive sector. The river was, on the average, 300 meters wide here and reaches 400-500 meters along some sectors. At the beginning of January 1943 the Don River was covered with ice 25-30 centimeters thick. The ice was not sturdy and only infantry and light loads could cross. The front’s engineering troops were required to carry out a great deal of work during the preparatory period for building bridges and strengthening the existing ice crossings for concentrating combat equipment to the Storozhevoe and Shchuch’e bridgeheads.

The river’s right bank along its entire length in the front’s offensive zone commands the left bank, rising along some sectors to 100 meters. This circumstance enabled the enemy to view our troops’ positions to a significant depth and facilitated the creation of a system of flanking fire along the river’s open channel and along the slopes of his bank. The presence of two bridgeheads (the Storozhevoe bridgehead, ten kilometers in width and eight kilometers in depth, and the Shchuch’e bridgehead, eight kilometers in width and from two to eight in depth) in the offensive sector along the right bank of the Don enabled us to deploy the front’s shock groups on them, thus avoiding the necessity of overcoming the river across the ice. There are a large number of inhabited locales in the area under study. Many of them are linked to each other and stretch along for several kilometers, which in winter conditions made it easier for the enemy to organize a defense. The towns and major district centers had stone structures. A large part of the inhabited locales located in the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense had been fortified and transformed by him into strong points and centers of resistance. On the whole, the terrain in the Voronezh Front’s offensive sector was favorable for the organization of the enemy’s defense. The meteorological conditions during the operation’s preparation and conduct were distinguished by a thaw at the end of December and in the first half of January, and by heavy frosts (up to -30 degrees Celsius) in the second half of January, and plentiful snowfalls with frequent blizzards (the depth of the snow cover reached a meter). The day was 7.5-8 hours long. All of this taken together created major difficulties for the front’s attacking forces and also limited the aviation’s activities.

1Editor’s note. Filipp Ivanovich Golikov (1900-80) joined the Red Army in 1918 and served in its political organs before taking up command assignments, including that of chief of the army’s Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU). During the Great Patriotic War he headed the Soviet military mission in Great Britain and the United States. He also commanded a number of armies and fronts , before being assigned to various posts in the army’s administrative apparatus, including that of head of the armed forces’ Main Political Directorate. 2Editor’s note. Fedor Fedotovich Kuznetsov (1904-79) joined the Red Army in 1938 as a political worker. During the Great Patriotic War he served in the central military-political apparatus and then as a member of the military council of the 60th Army and Voronezh Front. From 1943 until 1969 Kuznetsov occupied a number of political and other administrative posts in the armed forces’ central apparatus. 3Editor’s note. Mikhail Il’ich Kazakov (1901-79) joined the Red Army in 1920 and served in its political organs during the civil war, making the switch to staff work after the war. During the Great Patriotic War he served as an army and front chief of staff, while also serving as deputy commander of several fronts and an army commander. Following the war, Kazakov served as chief of several military districts and occupied posts in the central military apparatus. 4Two rifle brigades are counted as one division. 5Editor’s note. The Pz-IV was the premier German medium tank during the Second World War. It first appeared in the late 1930s and contained a crew of five. Later versions mounted a 75mm gun and two 7.92mm machine guns. 6The 68th, 340th, 377th, 57th, 75th, and 323rd infantry divisions and a regiment apiece from the 82nd, 88th and 383rd infantry divisions.

7The Hungarian Second Army included the III Army Corps (9th, 6th and 20th infantry divisions), IV Army Corps (7th, 13th and 10th infantry divisions), the VII Army Corps (12th, 19th and 23rd infantry divisions), and the 1st Panzer Division. 82nd and 4th Mountain Rifle and 156th Infantry divisions. 9The German 385th and 387th infantry divisions, the Italian 3rd Mountain Rifle and 5th Infantry divisions, the German 27th Panzer Division, and the “Fegelein” divisional group, which united separate police and security units. 10 20 enemy infantry divisions against the Voronezh Front’s 18 rifle divisions and five rifle brigades.

Part A

Preparing the Operation

2

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command’s Instructions and the Decisions by the Front Commander and the Army Commanders

The Instructions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command

At the end of 1942 the Stavka of the Supreme High Command made the decision to defeat the German-Fascist forces operating along the Voronezh—Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The Stavka planned to resolve this task through the method of consecutively launching attacks. It was first planned to defeat the enemy forces defending in the area of Ostrogozhsk and Rossosh’ and then to conduct an operation to defeat the enemy’s forces operating opposite the left wing of the Bryansk Front and the Voronezh Front’s right wing in the area of Voronezh and Kastornoe. It was subsequently planned to develop the offensive directly on Kursk and Khar’kov. In accordance with this overall plan, on 21 December the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, comrade Stalin, personally instructed the commander of the Voronezh Front to prepare and conduct an operation by the forces of the front’s center and left wing for the purpose of defeating the enemy’s forces along the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka and to liberate from the enemy the Liski—Kantemirovka railroad sector, so as to subsequently employ this railroad for supplying the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts’ forces for the development of their offensive along the Khar’kov and Donbass axes.¹

The plan by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command for the Voronezh Front’s offensive operation came down to the following. It was planned to break through the enemy’s front along three sectors with three shock groups, concentrated on the bridgeheads in the areas of 1st Storozhevoe and Shchuch’e, as well as in the area northwest of Kantemirovka and, while developing the offensive along concentric axes toward Alekseevka, Ostrogozhsk and Karpenkovo, to encircle and destroy his Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. Upon the arrival of part of these forces at the Oskol River, it was planned to organize the reliable cover of the liberated sector of the railroad, as well as to cut the enemy’s rail communications along the Kastornoe—Voroshilovgrad railroad. The main attacks were to be launched against the flanks of the enemy group of forces with the front’s center and left-wing forces. The securing of the operation from the south and from the direction of the Donbass was to be entrusted to the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, which was to attack along its right flank toward Pokrovskoe. It was planned to begin the operation on 12 January 1943.

Map 4 The Soviet Forces’ Offensive Along the Upper Don, JanuaryFebruary 1943.

In order to carry out the assigned mission, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command reinforced the Voronezh Front, transferring from its reserve the 3rd Tank Army² (Major General P.S. Rybalko,³ commander), the 4th Tank Corps (Major General of Tank Troops A.G. Kravchenko, commander), 7th Cavalry Corps (Major General S.V. Sokolov, commander), the 111th, 183rd and 322nd rifle divisions, 8th Breakthrough Artillery Division, 9th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, the 4th Rocket Artillery Division, and the 4th, 6th and 8th ski rifle brigades. The Stavka, in transferring the 3rd Tank Army to the front, ordered it to the zone of the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, between Novaya Kalitva and Kantemirovka, for the purpose of launching a deep enveloping attack from here against the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk —Rossosh’ group of forces. For this reason, a new boundary line was established between the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts, which ran through Verkhnyaya Gnilusha, Kantemirovka, Markovka, NovoBelaya, Lozno-Aleksandrovka, and Pokrovskoe (all locales, except for Verkhnyaya Gnilusha, Kantemirovka and Lozno-Aleksandrovka were inside the Voronezh Front). Stavka of the Supreme High Command representatives—General G.K. Zhukov⁴ and Colonel General A.M. Vasilevskii—were sent to the Voronezh Front to lead the preparation and conduct of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation.⁵ The Stavka based the idea of the Voronezh Front’s offensive operation on a profound and all-round analysis of the situation. The Stavka decided to carry out the defeat of the enemy forces

opposing the Voronezh Front by stages, first by defeating the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces defending opposite the Voronezh Front’s center and left wing, and then the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The launching of an attack first against the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces was conditioned by the fact, first of all, that this attack by the Voronezh Front would adjoin directly the attack by the Southwestern Front’s continuing to the west. Secondly, this attack would be directed against the enemy’s less combat-capable troops, represented chiefly by Hungarian and Italian formations. And, finally, with the defeat of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, our forces would deeply turn his Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces from the south, thus creating favorable conditions for its subsequent encirclement, and would also have the opportunity to subsequently develop the offensive directly on Khar’kov. In assigning the Voronezh Front the mission of defeating the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, the Stavka indicated the means for achieving this goal—the conduct of an operation to encircle and destroy the enemy. A characteristic feature of the idea for the planned operation was the fact that the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense was to be accomplished by the forces of a single front simultaneously along three axes for the purpose of breaking up the enemy’s defensive front, the encirclement of his main group of forces and its destruction in detail. Along each of the axes it was planned to create shock groups capable of independently accomplishing the breakthrough of the enemy’s prepared defense, and then to rapidly develop the offensive along concentric axes for the purpose of encircling, splitting up and completely destroying the numerically superior enemy group of forces. A favorable side to such a method of operation in the given conditions was the fact that it would enable us to split up a major enemy group of forces into two isolated parts simultaneously with the encirclement, which would make its destruction significantly

easier. The launching of attacks along three axes would significantly ease the achievement of surprise. And, finally, the choice of such a method would enable our command to make it significantly harder for the enemy to employ his reserves. In order to create several shock groups, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command reinforced the Voronezh Front with its reserves, by transferring to it, in all, eight rifle formations, three tank and one cavalry corps, three artillery divisions, and one independent tank brigade. The men and materiel detached by the Stavka to reinforce the Voronezh Front were sufficient for the resolution of the mission assigned to it. The task of the front commander was to skillfully employ the front’s men and materiel for achieving the assigned mission’s goal.

The Decision by the Voronezh Front Commander

In accordance with the operation’s general idea, the content of which was laid out above, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General F.I. Golikov, decided to launch three attacks against the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, reaching the front 1st Storozhevoe—Rep’evka—Budennoe—Valuiki —Pokrovskoe by the close of the operation’s fifth or sixth day. The main attacks were to be made from the Storozhevoe bridgehead and from the area northwest of Kantemirovka in the general direction of Alekseevka. The operational formation of the front’s forces was to consist of first-echelon troops, a mobile group and a reserve. It was decided to create three groups for launching the attacks: northern, central and southern.

The northern group—the 40th Army—consisted of five rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, an independent tank corps, and reinforcements, was to attack with its main forces from the Storozhevoe bridgehead in the general direction of Boldyrevka, Krasnoe and Alekseevka, where it was to link up with troops from the front’s southern group and complete the encirclement of the enemy’s entire Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. Besides this, it was planned to launch an attack with part of the 40th Army’s forces in the direction of Kalinin and Ostrogozhsk, where it was to link up with the 18th Rifle Corps’ right-flank formations. The offensive by the 40th Army’s main forces was to be secured from the north by an attack by the 4th Tank Corps, which had been transferred to the 40th Army, in the direction of Boldyrevka and Rep’evka and its arrival in the latter area by the close of the operation’s second day. It was planned to have a southern group—the 3rd Tank Army and the 7th Cavalry Corps—consisting of two tank corps, three rifle divisions, a single rifle brigade, two cavalry divisions, three ski-rifle brigades, and reinforcement weapons. The 3rd Tank Army was to launch a deep enveloping attack from the area northwest of Kantemirovka to the north and northwest towards the troops of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, and by the close of the operation’s fourth day link up with them in the areas of Kamenka, Ostrogozhsk and Alekseevka. For the purpose of supporting the operation from the south and capturing a line securing the conduct of the following operation, the front’s mobile group—the 7th Cavalry Corps, with a single tank brigade and three ski-rifle brigades attached to it—was to enter the breach from behind the 3rd Tank Army’s left flank and attack in the general direction of Roven’ki and Valuiki, and by the close of the fourth day cut the Kastornoe—Kupyansk railroad along the Valuiki— Urazovo sector.

The central group—the 18th Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions, one rifle brigade and reinforcement weapons—was to launch an attack from the Shchuch’e bridgehead to the west, southwest and south toward the 40th and 3rd Tank armies and by the close of the offensive’s fourth day link up with them in the areas of Ostrogozhsk and Kamenka. In the front reserve along each of the axes where an attack was to be launched, it was planned to have a rifle division apiece: the 322nd Rifle Division was to be located behind the 40th Army’s shock group, the 183rd Rifle Division behind the 18th Rifle Corps’ shock group, and the 111th Rifle Division behind the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group. Thus, in all, the front commander decided to bring into the offensive operation 15 rifle divisions, three rifle and three ski-rifle brigades, one cavalry and three tank corps, nine independent tank brigades, and one tank regiment; that is, 65 percent of the rifle formations and 90 percent of the tanks. It was planned to leave eight rifle divisions and two rifle and two tank brigades to defend along the Voronezh—Kastornoe axis. The depth of the front operation was planned at 140 kilometers and the average offensive pace at 15-23 kilometers per day for the rifle formations and 35 kilometers per day for the tank corps. In the course of the offensive’s first day it was planned to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense to a depth of 8-12 kilometers. During the subsequent 4-5 days of the operation the front’s forces were to develop the offensive for the purpose of encircling, breaking up and completely destroying the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, reaching by the close of the operation the line 1st Storozhevoe—Rep’evka—Budennoe—Valuiki —Pokrovskoe, thus guaranteeing the conduct of subsequent operations.

The creation of the shock groups was to be achieved by involving in the offensive all the forces of the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, the arriving men and materiel from the Stavka reserve, as well as at the expense of the 38th and 60th armies, from which rifle, tank and artillery units and formations were to be transferred. Given the front’s 450-kilometer wide offensive zone, the offensive was to unfold in a 250-kilometer zone from 1st Storozhevoe to Yasinovatoe. It was planned to accomplish the breakthrough of the enemy defense along three independent sectors: by the 40th Army along a 10-kilometer sector; by the 18th Rifle Corps along an 8kilometer sector, and by the 3rd Tank Army along a 16-kilometer sector. Thus the overall width of the breakthrough sectors comprised 34 kilometers, or 14 percent of the overall offensive front and 8 percent of the width of the Voronezh Front’s overall width. In accordance with the decision adopted by the front commander, the following tasks were assigned in the directives to the armies and the 18th Rifle Corps. The 40th Army (Major General of Artillery K.S. Moskalenko,⁶ commander, Major General Z.Z. Rogoznyi, chief of staff, Major General K.V. Krainyukov, member of the military council), with its operational formation in two echelons, was to launch its main attack from the Storozhevoe bridgehead in the general direction of Boldyrevka, Krasnoe and Alekseevka and, in conjunction with the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, encircle and destroy the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The army was to defeat the enemy’s 20th and 7th infantry divisions and by the close of the operation’s first day capture the line 1st Storozhevoe— Boldyrevka—Devitsa, and by the close of the fourth or fifth day the line 1st Storozhevoe—Kas’yanov—the Bykovskii State Farm—Prudki —Ilovskoe. The 4th Tank Corps was to launch an attack in the direction of Boldyrevka, Prilepy and Rep’evka and by the close of the second day of the operation capture the Rep’evka—Butyrki— Serdyuki area, thus securing the right flank of the army’s shock

group. It was ordered to pay particular attention to the timely widening of the breakthrough toward the flanks and to firmly secure the flanks of the shock group. The overall depth of the army’s mission was 75 kilometers. By the close of the operation the army’s offensive front was to increase to up to 100 kilometers. The 3rd Tank Army (Major General P.S.Rybalko, commander, Major General of Tank Troops D.D. Bakhmet’ev, chief of staff, and Major General of Tank Troops S.I. Mel’nikov, member of the military council) received orders to launch its main attack in the direction of Aleksandrovka and Alekseevka and, in conjunction with the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps, encircle and destroy the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. It was ordered to organize the army’s operational formation in two echelons: three rifle divisions and one rifle and three tank brigades in the first echelon; two tank corps in the second echelon. On the offensive’s first day the army was to break through the enemy’s defense along the front Pasekovo—Yasnovatyi, defeat the German XXIV Panzer Corps’ formations and by the close of the day take the line Solontsy—Shramovka—Kulikovka, while the mobile forces were to reach the area Rossosh’—Lizinovka—Dolzhik and Novoselkova—Aleksandrovka. The army, while developing a vigorous offensive with its tank corps in along the Rossosh’—Kamenka, Ol’khovatka—Ostrogozhsk and Khar’kovskaya—Alekseevka axes, was to link up with the forces of the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps by the close of the offensive’s fourth day, thus completing the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The army’s rifle divisions were to attack behind the tank corps. In order to secure the army’s right flank, part of the shock group’s forces were ordered to develop the offensive in the direction of

Il’yushevka and Bereznyagi, rolling up the enemy’s defense west of Novaya Kalitva to the north. The overall depth of the army’s task was 140 kilometers, while the offensive front by the close of the operation was to increase up to 100 kilometers. On the operation’s first day the troops were to advance as follows: 15 kilometers for the rifle troops and 35-50 kilometers for the tank corps. As is clear from these figures, the planned pace of the 3rd Tank Army’s forces was quite high and demanded of the troops a great deal of physical and moral exertion. It should be noted that the tank corps’ planned offensive pace on the first day was too high. Taking into account the fact that the tank corps would have to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense while operating in difficult conditions and along poor and snow-covered roads, they would not be able to develop an offensive pace of 35-50 kilometers on the operation’s first day. This was confirmed by the actual course of combat activities, when the tank corps’ offensive pace was equal to 12-23 kilometers. The 18th Rifle Corps (Major General P.M. Zykov, commander, Colonel P.I. Kochetkov, chief of staff), with its combat formation in two echelons, was to launch its main attack from the Shchuch’e bridgehead in the direction of Petrovskaya, Kamenka and Karpenkovo. By the close of the first day of the offensive, the corps was to defeat the Hungarian 12th Infantry Division and capture the line height 159.6—Yekaterinovka—height 177. Upon the commitment of its second echelon on the morning of the offensive’s second day, the corps was to defeat the enemy’s reserves and by the close of the fourth day capture the line Sredne-Voskresenskoe— Karpenkovo—Dan’kovskii. It was ordered to create a shock group from the 270th Rifle Division in the area south of Pavlovsk for launching a supporting attack. This division was to launch its attack on the morning of the operation’s third day in the general direction of Saprina, for the purpose of encircling and destroying, in

conjunction with the 3rd Tank Army’s 180th Rifle Division and the 6th Army’s 127th and 160th rifle divisions, the enemy’s forces operating along the sector from Belogor’e to Pasekovo. The overall depth of the 18th Rifle Corps’ mission was 50 kilometers. By the close of the operation its offensive front was to grow to 80 kilometers. The 7th Cavalry Corps, which comprised the front’s mobile group, received orders, following the capture of the Solontsy—Shramovka —Kulikovka line, to enter the breach from behind the 3rd Tank Army’s left flank and by the morning of the offensive’s second day capture the area Volokonsk—Novo-Belaya—Pantyukhina. Subsequently, while supporting the 3rd Tank Army’s operations from the south and southwest, the corps was to attack in the general direction of Roven’ki and Valuiki and consecutively capture the following areas: Berezhnoi—Roven’ki—Nagol’naya by the close of the second day; Veidelevka—Yaropol’tsy—Orlov by the close of the third day, and; Valuiki—Urazovo by the close of the fourth day. The corps was to consolidate on this line. The overall depth of the 7th Cavalry Corps’ mission was to be 140 kilometers. The average daily advance of the corps’ formations was thus to be 35 kilometers. The Voronezh Front’s 38th and 60th armies were to carry out their previous task—to securely defend their previous line. Simultaneously, they received instructions on carrying out a number of measures for operational concealment and deceiving the enemy. The Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, which was operating to the left, was to launch an attack with its 15th Rifle Corps from the area southwest of Kantemirovka in the direction of Kamenka, Belolutsk and Pokrovskoe. By the close of the first day the army was to capture the line Novobelen’kaya—Novo-Rossosh’—KaravanSolodkii, and by the close of the sixth day consolidate along the line Pokrovskoe—Tarasovka—Shelkunov—Gaidukovka.

The 6th Army’s 127th and 160th rifle divisions, which were left in the 3rd Tank Army’s sector along the Novaya Kalitva—Fisenkovo sector on the orders of Stavka representative Colonel General A.M. Vasilevskii, during the operation’s first day were to tie down the opposing enemy units with artillery-mortar and infantry-weapon fire and to attack on the morning of the operation’s second day. The control of the 127th and 160th rifle divisions’ actions was entrusted to the deputy commander of the 6th Army.⁷

The Decisions by the Commanders of the 40th Army and 3rd Tank Army and the Commander of the 18th Rifle Corps

In accordance with the orders issued, the commanders of the 40th and 3rd Tank armies and the commander of the 18th Rifle Corps made the following decisions. The commander of the 40th Army decided on the operation’s first day to break through the enemy’s defense with his first-echelon forces—the 141st (minus a regiment), 25th Guards, 340th and 107th rifle divisions and the 116th, 150th and 86th independent tank brigades—along the 10-kilometer height 187—Devitsa sector and by the close of the day reach the line 1st Storozhevoe—Boldyrevka —Devitsa. It was planned to commit the army’s second echelon—the 305th Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade—into the fighting on the morning of the offensive’s second day: the 305th Rifle Division for developing the success in the direction of Krasnoe and Alekseevka, and the 253rd Rifle Brigade to the northwest for securing the right flank of the army’s shock group. In order to secure the army’s right flank, it was also planned to

employ the right-flank formations of the army’s first echelon, which, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone, were to develop the offensive, in conjunction with the 253rd Rifle Brigade, to the northwest and west: the 141st Rifle Division on Mastyugino, bypassing the enemy’s strong center of resistance at 1st Storozhevoe, the 253rd Rifle Brigade on Plotava, and the 25th Guards Rifle Division on Rep’evka. By the close of the operation’s fourth or fifth day the army’s forces were to reach the line 1st Storozhevoe—Kas’yanov—Bykovskii State Farm—Prudki—Ilovskoe. For the purpose of widening the breach toward the left flank, the 107th Rifle Division, together with the 86th Independent Tank Brigade, which had been attached to it, received orders to attack in the direction of Kalinin and Ostrogozhsk and by the close of the offensive’s third or fourth day reach the latter area, where it was to link up with the 18th Rifle Corps’ right-flank formations and the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps. The rifle divisions’ breakthrough sectors were planned at 3-4 kilometers in width. The planned offensive pace was as follows: 9-13 kilometers on the first day, 16-22 kilometers on the second, 15-18 kilometers on the third, and 19-22 kilometers on the fourth and fifth days. It was decided to securely hold the following lines along the remainder of the army’s front: the 47-kilometer Kremenchug— Anoshkino sector with the forces of a single rifle regiment and the 141st Rifle Division’s training and machine gun battalions; the 28kilometer Donishche—Podlesnyi sector with the forces of the army’s screening detachment and the 107th and 25th Guards rifle divisions’ training battalions. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army decided to break through the enemy’s defense along the 16-kilometer Pasekovo—Yasinovatyi

sector and by the close of the operation’s first day capture the line Solontsy—Shramovka—Kulikovka with his rifle formations and the line Rossosh’—Nerovnovka with his mobile troops. By the close of the offensive’s fourth day the army’s tank formation were to capture the line Alekseevka—Ostrogozhsk—Kamenka, where they were to link up with the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ forces, thus completing the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. Designated for the army’s first echelon were the 180th, 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions, the 37th Rifle Brigade and the 173rd and 179th independent tank brigades. Besides this, the 12th Tank Corps’ 97th Tank Brigade was to be included with the first echelon during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. The army’s second echelon⁸ was to consist of the 12th and 15th tank corps, reinforced with army artillery and special units (to the tune of an anti-tank artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment and an engineering battalion per corps). It was planned to commit the army’s second echelon, which was to essentially carry out the role of a mobile group, into the fighting on the operation’s first day, with the mission of developing the offensive for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy group of forces. The 12th Tank Corps was to attack with part of its forces (one motorized rifle brigade) in the direction of Podgornoe and Kamenka, while its main forces attacked toward Ol’khovatka and Ostrogozhsk and by the close of the operation’s fourth day link up with the 18th Rifle Corps and the 40th Army’s 107th Rifle Division. The 15th Tank Corps was to develop a vigorous offensive in the general direction of Khar’kovskaya, Varvarovka and Alekseevka and by the close of the fourth day link up with the 40th Army’s main forces, thus completing the encirclement of the enemy’s entire Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces. In order to secure the shock group’s right flank, it was planned to

employ the 180th Rifle Division and the 37th Rifle and 173rd Tank brigades, which were to roll up the enemy’s defense to the north and, in conjunction with the 18th Rifle Corps’ 270th Rifle Division and the 6th Army’s 127th and 160th rifle divisions, to encircle and destroy the enemy forces defending along the front from Belogor’e to Pasekovo. Following the completion of this task, the 37th Rifle Brigade was to rapidly move to the west and by the close of the operation’s fifth or sixth day occupy the line Peschanka—excluding Pokrovskoe. The 37th Rifle Brigade, reinforced with a battalion of rocket artillery, was to tie down the enemy along the Fisenkovo—excluding Pasekovo sector with a single rifle battalion, while its main forces were to enter the breach in the 180th Rifle Division’s sector, after which it was to subordinate the 173rd Tank Brigade to itself and capture Mitrofanovka by the close of the operation’s first day. The 180th Rifle Division, along with the 173rd Tank Brigade, a howitzer regiment and two battalions of rocket artillery, received orders to break through the enemy’s defense along the Pasekovo— excluding the Red Hammer State Farm sector, allow the 12th Tank Corps’ combat formations to pass through its ranks and, taking advantage of the latter’s success, capture Mikhailovka, and by the end of the day Vasil’evka, having dispatched a forward detachment toward Sofievka. The 48th Guards Rifle Division, along with the 12th Tank Corps’ 97th Tank Brigade, a howitzer regiment and a regiment of rocket artillery, was to break through the enemy’s defense along the sector Red Hammer State Farm—Vysochanov, allow the 12th and 15th tank corps’ formations to pass through its ranks and, taking advantage of their success, capture the line Mikhailovka—Zlatopol’, and by the close of the day reach the line Shramovka—Aleksandrovsk; it was ordered to have a forward detachment in Alinovka. The 184th Rifle Division, along with the 179th Independent Tank

Brigade and a howitzer regiment, was ordered to break through the enemy’s defense along the sector Vysochanov—Yasinovatyi and, upon letting the 15th Tank Corps’ formations through its ranks, to take advantage of the latter’s success for capturing Kulikovka and to subsequently reach the line of heights 206 and 204 (south of Aleksandrovka). It was ordered to detach one rifle regiment, reinforced by a tank battalion, in order to secure the left flank of the army’s shock group. The 12th Tank Corps, reinforced with an anti-tank artillery regiment, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and an engineering battalion, received orders to enter the breach along the boundary of the 180th and 48th Guards rifle divisions and develop the success in the general direction of Mikhailovka, Shramovka and Ol’khovatka. Upon reaching the Shramovka area, the corps was to detach two brigades for operations in the direction of Rossosh’ and Podgornoe and by the close of the operation’s first day to capture the following: the right group the Rossosh’ area and the left group the Dolzhik area, cutting off the enemy’s path of retreat to the west. The 15th Tank Corps, with an anti-tank artillery regiment, an antiaircraft artillery regiment and an engineering battalion, was ordered to enter the breach along the boundary between the 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions and, developing the offensive in the direction of Kulikovka, Novoselkova and Nerovnovka, capture the Novoselkova—Aleksandrovka area by the close of the operation’s first day. The commander of the 18th Rifle Corps decided to break through the defense of the enemy’s 12th Infantry Division with his firstechelon forces—the 129th Rifle Brigade, the 309th and 219th rifle divisions, the 96th Tank Brigade, the 262nd Heavy Tank Regiment, and a company from the 192nd Tank Brigade—along the 8kilometer height 160—Pereezzhee sector and by the close of the offensive’s first day capture the line of height 159.6—Yekaterinovka —height 177. Subsequently, upon committing its second echelon,—

the 161st Rifle Division with the 192nd Tank Brigade—on the morning of the operation’s second day the corps was to develop the offensive with the 129th Rifle Brigade and the 309th Rifle Division and the 262nd Tank Regiment in the direction of Pukhovo and Ostrogozhsk, and with the 219th Rifle Division and the 96th Tank Brigade in the direction of Yekaterinovka and Saguny. By the close of the offensive’s fourth day the corps’ formations were to capture the following areas: the 129th Rifle Brigade and the 309th Rifle Division Sredne-Voskresenskoe, the 161st Rifle Division Karpenkovo, and the 219th Rifle Division Dan’kovskii and Lykovo. On the offensive’s first day the corps’ formations were to advance 910 kilometers, 7-10 kilometers on the second day, 11-22 kilometers on the third day, and 10-15 kilometers on the fourth day. It was decided to securely hold along the remainder of the corps’ front the following lines: the 28-kilometer Podlesnyi—Svoboda— Nizhnii Ikorets sector with the forces of the 169th Reserve Rifle Regiment’s training battalion, the 40th Army’s junior lieutenant’s courses, the 192nd Tank Brigade’s motorized battalion, and a battalion of armored trains; the 128-kilometer Nikolaevka—Novaya Kalitva sector with the forces of a regiment from the 270th Rifle Division, eight training battalions and a screening detachment. The 270th Rifle Division (minus one regiment), which was designated for launching a supporting attack on Saprina, was to concentrate along the latter sector in the area south of Pavlovsk. The tasks for the corps’ formations were laid out in combat order no. 003, issued by the corps commander at 0200 on 9 January. Thus the decisions by the front and army commanders fully corresponded to the instructions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and the conditions of the situation. The necessary groups of forces were to be created through the decisive concentration of men and materiel along each of the axes

by boldly weakening the secondary sectors. Of all the forces slated to take part in the offensive, it was planned to concentrate up to 90 percent of the infantry, 90 percent of the artillery, and 100 percent of the tanks along the three breakthrough sectors, which totaled 34 kilometers and which comprised 14 percent of the entire offensive front. The front was to deploy for the offensive in a single operational echelon, having along each axis a division each in reserve; each shock group consisted of two echelons. Besides this, the front’s mobile group, consisting of cavalry, ski-rifle and tank formations, was to operate along the southern axis. The leading role in carrying out the maneuver to encircle the enemy was to be reserved for the 3rd Tank and 40th armies. However, the 18th Rifle Corps was to play a major role in the front operation. The corps, through its decisive activities, was supposed to tie down the opposing enemy forces, including his operational reserve, in order to enable the 40th and 3rd Tank armies to fully carry out their maneuver to encircle the enemy group of forces. As a result of the linking up of the 40th Army’s main forces and the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps in the Alekseevka area on the operation’s fourth day, it was planned to encircle 15 enemy divisions. Simultaneous with the encirclement, the entire enemy group of forces was to be broken up into a number of mutually isolated groups. It was planned to cut off eight enemy divisions, which were defending south of the Shchuch’e bridgehead, from the main forces of the enemy’s group of forces being encircled as a result of the attacks by 18th Rifle Corps’ main forces and those of the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps, which were attacking on Kamenka. In turn, it was planned to cut off from these eight divisions about five enemy divisions defending along the sector between Belogor’e and Pasekovo with an attack by the 18th Rifle Corps’ 270th Rifle Division from the area south of Pavlovsk toward Saprina, and an attack by the 3rd Tank Army’s right-flank rifle formations through Rossosh’ toward Bereznyagi, and to then destroy them. Two enemy divisions defending the sector

between our bridgeheads were also to be cut off from the remaining forces of the enemy group of forces being cut off and were to be encircled as a result of the linkup in Ostrogozhsk of the 40th Army’s left-flank units and the 18th Rifle Corps’ right-flank units. Such a decision, which called for the encirclement of the enemy’s entire group of forces simultaneously with its splitting up and destruction, speaks to the creative mastery of the Stalingrad operation’s experience and represented the further development of the theory and practice of conducting operations to encircle and destroy the enemy. It was planned to employ the 7th Cavalry Corps (the front’s mobile group) and the 4th Independent Tank Corps (the 40th Army’s mobile group) for operations along the outer flanks of the front’s main groups. As a result of the 7th Cavalry and 4th Tank corps’ actions, not only would the encirclement and destruction of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces be secured, but with the arrival of these formations at their designated lines favorable conditions would be created for conducting the front’s succeeding offensive operations. Such a decision by the front commander corresponded to the situation and flowed from additional instructions by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, comrade Stalin, which he issued to the front commander in confirming the plan for the operation. Comrade Stalin focused the front commander’s attention on the necessity of the 7th Cavalry Corps’ bold and decisive actions for the purpose of rapidly seizing the Valuiki railroad junction. As a result of our forces seizing this junction, the enemy would be deprived of the capability of maneuvering men and materiel along the Kastornoe—Voroshilovgrad railroad. Aside from this, the front commander was ordered to pay particular attention to securing the operation from the north against the enemy group of forces defending in the Voronezh area.

1See Colonel General M.I. Kazakov’s manuscript, “Nastupatel’nye Operatsii Voisk Voronezhskogo Fronta Zimoi 1942/43 g.,” p. 16. Arkhiv VIU, inv. no. 5101. 2According to Stavka directive no. 991172 of 22 December 1942, the 3rd Tank Army was transferred to the Voronezh Front in the following strength: 12th and 15th tank corps, 179th Independent Tank Brigade, 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions, two anti-tank artillery regiments, three anti-aircraft artillery regiments, and one regiment of rocket artillery. 3Editor’s note. Pavel Semyonovich Rybalko (1894-1948) joined the Russian imperial army in 1915 and the Red Army in 1919. During the interwar period he served mainly in the cavalry and intelligence branches. During the Great Patriotic War he served in the General Staff apparatus and the tank troops, becoming commander of the 3rd Tank Army in 1943. Following the war, Rybalko commanded the Red Army’s armored forces. 4Editor’s note. Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov (1896-1974) joined the Russian imperial army in 1915 and the Red Army in 1918. The forces under his command defeated the Japanese in Mongolia in 1939. During the Great Patriotic War he served as chief of the General Staff and commanded a number of fronts . In 1942 he was appointed deputy supreme commander-in-chief and also served as a Stavka representative to a number of fronts . Following the war, Zhukov fell afoul of Stalin and was relegated to the command of second-tier military districts. Following Stalin’s death his star was again in the ascendant and during 1955-57 he served as defense minister until his removal by Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev in 1957. 5Colonel General Vasilevskii was with the front’s forces throughout the entire operation, and Gen. Zhukov only during its preparatory phase. 6Editor’s note. Kirill Semyonovich Moskalenko (1902-85) joined the

Red Army in 1920 and fought in the civil war. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a motorized anti-tank artillery brigade, a rifle corps and a number of armies. Following the war, he held a number of positions in the central military apparatus. 7Subsequently, on 17 January these divisions were transferred to the Voronezh Front and subordinated to the 3rd Tank Army. 8In the army’s documents it was referred to as the success development echelon.

3

The Plan for the Tank Troops’ Combat Employment By the start of the preparation for the offensive operation, the Voronezh Front’s tank forces had three tank corps, ten independent tank brigades, an independent heavy tank regiment, two independent tank battalions, two independent motorized sleigh battalions, three independent armored train battalions, and an independent tank company.¹ The distribution of tank forces, which was carried out according to the front commander’s decision, is shown in Table III/3.1.

Table III/3.1 The Distribution of Tank Formations and Units Among the Voronezh Front’s Armies in the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ Operation

* Not counting the 4th Tank Corps’ 219 tanks, as this corps did not take part in the fighting due to its late arrival at the front. **Including 112 heavy KV² tanks, 405 medium T-34s, 87 medium M3S³ tanks, 263 light T-60⁴ and T-70 tanks, and 29 M3L⁵ light tanks.

As can be seen from the table, of the 896 tanks available with the front for conducting the offensive operation, 797 were to take part in the operation, of which 544 were to be concentrated along the front’s left flank, in the offensive sector of the southern shock group. 99 tanks were left to support the defense in the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors. The employment of tank forces in the offensive operation was planned in accordance with comrade Stalin’s order no. 325 of 16 October 1942 on the operational-tactical designation of tank units and formations and the means of their employment in the battle and operation. Independent tank brigades and a heavy tank regiment were detached to the rifle formations as direct infantry-support tanks for breaking through the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense. As was pointed out above, it was planned to employ the 4th Independent Tank Corps, which was being transferred to the 40th Army, to secure the right flank of the front’s northern shock group. However, as a result of the corps’ late arrival at the front this decision was not carried out. In the 3rd Tank Army its second echelon (12th and 15th tank corps) was entrusted with the task, as the army mobile group, with completing the encirclement of the enemy group of forces.

In accordance with the distribution of the tank units and formations among the armies, the following densities for saturating the infantry’s combat formations with tanks were to be created. See Table III/3.2.

Table III/3.2 Tank Densities Along the Breakthrough Sectors of the Front’s Shock Groups

* This takes into account the 7th Cavalry Corps’ 65 tanks, which were to be committed into the breach along the 3rd Tank Army’s left flank.

Table III/3.2 shows that the greatest density of infantry-support tanks was created within the 18th Rifle Corps (15 tanks per kilometer of breakthrough front). This was due to the fact that the enemy’s defense in the corps’ offensive zone was strongly developed in the engineering sense and was densely saturated with men and equipment. The smallest density of infantry-support tanks (10.1 tanks per kilometer of front) was created along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector, which is explained by the lesser development of the enemy’s defense along this sector of the front (the depth of the entire tactical defense was limited to the depth of the main zone). Besides this, it was taken into account that the 3rd Tank Army disposed of a powerful second echelon, which would be committed into the fighting on the first day of the offensive for completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone. The average tactical density of tanks in this army reached 34 armored units per kilometer of breakthrough front. However, due to the fact that the 15th Tank Corps’ 113th and 195th tank brigades, which numbered 130 tanks, had not arrived in their intermediate position areas by the start of the operation, the army at first had a somewhat lower tank density that had been planned. The actual tank density along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector was about 26 tanks per kilometer of breakthrough front. The employment of the independent tank brigades and the heavy tank regiment in the armies and the 18th Rifle Corps was planned by the army commanders and the corps commander in the following manner.

In the 40th Army all three tank brigades were attached to the army’s first-echelon rifle divisions. The right-flank 141st Rifle Division of the army’s first-echelon shock group and the second-echelon rifle formations did not have tank reinforcements. In the 18th Rifle Division the tank units were distributed between the rifle divisions of both the corps’ echelons. Two independent tank (173rd and 179th) brigades and the 12th Tank Corps’ 97th Tank Brigade were included in the first echelon of the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group. This was to ensure a tank density along the 16-kilometer breakthrough front of somewhat more than ten tanks per kilometer of front. As has been noted, the army’s second echelon, which was to carry out the role of an army mobile group, was to consist of the 12th and 15th tank corps. The army commander decided to commit the tank corps into the fighting in the middle of the first day of the offensive, after the rifle formations, along with their attached tank brigades, carried out their immediate task—breaking through the enemy’s defense to a depth of about three kilometers. It was planned to commit the 12th Tank Corps into the fighting along two routes along a 6-kilometer sector, and the 15th Tank Corps (minus two tank brigades) along a single route three kilometers wide. Thus it was planned to complete the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone with the commitment of the tank corps into the fighting. Following the completion of the breakthrough, they were to break free of the rifle divisions and vigorously develop the offensive toward Karpenkovo and Alekseevka.

1The composition of the tank troops takes into account the tank formations and units being transferred to the front from the Stavka reserve.

2The KV was a series of Soviet heavy tanks produced during the Second World War. The entry here probably refers to the KV-1, which first appeared in 1939. This model weighed 45 tons and had a crew of five. It was armed with a 76mm gun and 3-4 7.62mm machine guns. 3The M3S was the Soviet designation of the US-made Stuart tank, which the Soviets received through Lend-Lease. The tank weighed 16.2 tons and carried a crew of four and was armed with a 37mm gun and five 7.62mm machine guns. 4The T-60 was a light tank that appeared early in the war. It weighed 5.8-6.4 tons and carried a crew of two. It was armed with a 20mm gun and a 7.62mm machine gun. 5The M3L is the Soviet designation for the US-mad Lee tank which the Soviets received through Lend-Lease. The M3L weighed 27.9 tons and carried a crew of 6-7 men. It was armed with a 75mm and a 37mm guns, and had four 7.62mm machine guns.

4

The Organization of the Artillery Offensive In the forthcoming operation the Voronezh Front’s artillery was to support the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense along three axes, to prevent the enemy’s counterattacks and counterblows against the flanks of the shock groups, especially against the right flank of the front’s northern group of forces, to support the defeat of the enemy’s operational reserves, to assist the mobile forces in pursuing and developing the maneuver to encircle and split up the enemy forces, and, finally, to secure the destruction of the encircle enemy. The requirements for organizing the artillery offensive were contained in a directive letter from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command no. 03 of 10 January 1942, on organizing the artillery offensive. The most important question in organizing the artillery offensive was bringing about the massing of artillery equipment along the breakthrough sectors. The creation of a decisive superiority in artillery over the enemy along the breakthrough sectors was achieved as the result of reinforcing the front with artillery equipment from the High Command Reserve (the Stavka transferred to the front the 8th Breakthrough Artillery Division and the 4th Rocket Artillery Division), as well as through internal regroupings of the front’s and armies’ artillery equipment.

Of all the 4,379 guns and mortars (76mm and higher) available to the front, 3,135 guns and mortars took part in the offensive, or 70 percent of all the artillery, which yielded an average artillery density along the front from 1st Storozhevoe to Yasinovatyi of up to 12.5 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. 2,664 guns and mortars were concentrated along the three breakthrough sectors totaling 34 kilometers, or 84 percent of all the artillery in the front’s offensive sector. Such a massing of artillery enabled us to raise the average density to 78 guns and mortars per kilometer of front along the breakthrough sectors. The artillery density along the 40th Army’s breakthrough sector was 108 guns and mortars per kilometer of front, 90 in the 18th Rifle Corps, and 53 guns and mortars in the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector. At the same time, the artillery densities in the 38th and 60th armies’ defensive zones were correspondingly only 6.6 and 11.7 guns and mortars per kilometer of defensive front. The distribution of artillery among the armies taking part in the offensive is shown in Table III/4.1.

Table III/4.1 The Distribution of Artillery Among the Armies in the Voronezh Front’s Offensive Sector

* Taking into account the 322nd Rifle Division’s (front reserve) artillery.

* Counting the artillery of the 6th Army’s 160th and 127th rifle divisions, in which there were 110 guns and 196 mortars.

* Besides this, there were 1,244 guns and mortars of 76mm and higher in the 38th and 60th armies. Not counted are the 183rd and 111th rifle divisions (260 tubes), which had not arrived at the front by the start of the operation. ** The front’s offensive sector from 1st Storozhevoe to Yasinovatyi.

Of the overall amount of artillery brought in for the breakthrough, anti-tank artillery accounted for 12.5 percent, mortars 51.5 percent, and 76mm guns 23 percent, 152mm guns 12.5 percent, and 203mm guns 0.5 percent. The figures listed show that a large percent of the artillery park was made up of light artillery systems and mortars (about 87 percent) and only 13 percent of the overall figure involved 122mm or higher artillery. Of course, such a small percentage of large-caliber artillery would make the destruction and suppression of the enemy’s defensive structures more difficult. In order to carry out the artillery’s tasks, the following artillery groups were created. In the rifle divisions infantry-support groups for the rifle regiments were created, as were groups of guns slated for firing over open sights. The rifle divisions’ artillery regiments formed the rifle regiments’ infantry-support groups, as well as the artillery of the howitzer, mortar and anti-tank artillery regiments from the High Command Reserve. These groups were sufficiently strong in their composition, having from four to eight battalions each. For example, the infantrysupport group in the 40th Army’s 340th Rifle Division had the following number of guns and mortars of various calibers. See Table III/4.2.

Aside from the control of the rifle regiments’ infantry-support groups, the division artillery commanders were also entrusted with the control of those guns designated for firing over open sights. All of the rifle regiments, the rifle divisions’ independent anti-tank battalions, and a part of the artillery batteries from divisional artillery and High Command Reserve artillery were employed for this purpose. For example, in the 40th Army 249 guns were detached for firing over open sights, which accounted for 20 percent of the overall amount of artillery brought in for the breakthrough, and which yielded a density of 25 guns per kilometer of breakthrough front. The artillery batteries firing over open sights were to fire upon targets unearthed by our reconnaissance along the forward edge of the enemy’s defense.

Table III/4.2 The Composition of the Infantry-Support Groups in the 340th Rifle Division

In Table III/4.3, cited below, the number of guns by caliber and detached for firing over open sights in the 40th Army’s first-echelon rifle divisions is shown.

Table III/4.3 The Number of Guns Detached for Firing Over Open Sights in the 40th Army’s Divisions

In the 18th Rifle Corps 172 guns (65 45mm, 40 76mm regimental guns and 67 76mm divisional guns) were detached for firing over open sights, or 22 guns per kilometer of breakthrough front, which comprised 21 percent of the overall amount of artillery brought in for the breakthrough. Army artillery groups¹ consisted of cannon artillery regiments from the High Command Reserve and high-powered howitzer regiments. The most powerful was the 40th Army’s artillery group, which had three cannon artillery regiments and two battalions of high-powered artillery (11 battalions in all). The composition of the army (corps) artillery groups is shown in Table III/4.4. Besides this, there was rocket artillery at the disposal of the 3rd Tank and 40th armies’ and 18th Rifle Corps’ artillery commanders. There was a division (two brigades) of rocket artillery, four independent regiments and one independent battalion of rocket artillery at the disposal of the 40th Army’s artillery commander.

Table III/4.4 The Composition of the Army (Corps) Long-Range Artillery Groups

The commander of the 3rd Tank Army’s artillery disposed of a brigade and two regiments of rocket artillery. The 18th Rifle Corps’ artillery commander disposed of a brigade and a battalion of rocket artillery. Two mortar groups, numbering 40 120mm mortars each, were created in the front by employing the front’s reserve artillery regiment and by taking mortars from formations along secondary axes. During the artillery preparation for the attack these mortar groups were employed for reinforcing the infantry-support groups along the axes of the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ main attack. Artillery anti-tank reserves were created in the rifle divisions by employing the organic weapons of the independent anti-tank battalions. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army disposed of an artillery-anti-tank reserve consisting of an anti-tank artillery regiment from the High Command Reserve. An artillery-anti-tank reserve was not created in the 40th Army, while in the 18th Rifle Corps it consisted only of the 161st Rifle Division’s anti-tank battalion. In view of the necessity of breaking through the enemy’s defense along three separate sectors and as a result of the various degrees of the enemy’s defensive development, a unified plan-graph was not drawn up for the artillery offensive. Plan-graphs for the artillery offensive were drawn up in the armies. Along the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ breakthrough sectors, where the defense was most dense and saturated with weapons, it was planned for the artillery preparation for the attack to last 120 minutes. In the 40th Army the artillery preparation for the attack consisted of three fire onslaughts, with an overall length of 25 minutes, and two periods of aimed fire for suppression and destruction lasting 95

minutes. The artillery support for the attack was to be accomplished by the successive concentration of fire. The artillery preparation for the attack along the 18th Rifle Corps’ breakthrough sector was to consist of three fire onslaughts lasting 20 minutes overall, and two periods of aimed fire for suppression and destruction lasting 100 minutes. It was also planned to employ the successive concentration of fire in the corps to support the attack. Along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector, where the enemy’s defense was less strong, a 20-minute artillery support for the attack was planned. Subsequently, the support for the infantry and tank attack was to be accomplished by the successive concentration of fire. The planned expenditure of munitions for the artillery support of the attack varied from 0.5 to 1.5 combat loads for various types of guns and mortars. On the whole, the combat distribution of the artillery secured comparatively high artillery densities along the selected axes and the simultaneous preservation of the necessary artillery densities along the remaining sectors of the front (in the 38th and 60th armies’ zones). The largest in size were the rifle regiments’ infantry-support groups. It should be noted that the excessive number of infantry-support groups in the 40th Army (up to eight battalions) made their control significantly more difficult, which later manifested itself in combat. The absence of divisional artillery groups was one of the shortcomings in the combat distribution of the artillery. In this fashion, the commanders of the rifle divisions were deprived of the necessary weapons for rapidly influencing the course of the battle

along the decisive sectors. The necessity of having such groups was particularly due to the fact that the rifle formations of each of the front’s shock groups, following the breakthrough of the main zone of the enemy’s defense, were to operate along individual and separate axes, lacking tactical coordination with each other. The absence of divisional artillery groups was immediately and sharply felt during the combat actions of the operation’s second stage. Typical of the organization of the artillery offensive was the detachment of a sufficiently large amount of artillery for firing over open sights, which fully justified itself during the course of the operation. One should note as a particular feature in the combat employment of mortars the creation of two front mortar groups, which were used during the artillery preparation of the attack to reinforce infantrysupport groups of the rifle divisions attacking along the axes of the main attacks. The artillery offensive was organized with a consideration for the specifics of the forthcoming breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along each of the axes. At the same time, it should be noted that in planning the artillery offensive a certain underestimation of the enemy’s defense along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector was committed. Despite the fact that the enemy’s defense along this axis had been prepared for a significantly lesser period and had not been greatly developed in depth, it could have proved to be sufficiently strong due to the fact that the enemy had the capability of moving up all of his available weapons closer to the forward edge. Thus the planned organization of the artillery preparation of the attack along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector, which consisted of two 10-minute fire onslaughts, could not guarantee success in rapidly breaking through the enemy’s defense. As the course of combat operations subsequently showed, the situation forced us to increase the length of the artillery preparation for the attack.

1In front documents they were referred to as army long-range artillery groups (ADD).

5

The Organization of the Air Offensive In accordance with the plan for the combat employment of the 2nd Air Army (Major General of Aviation K.N. Smirnov,¹ commander), which was confirmed by the commander of the Voronezh Front on 29 December 1942, the following tasks were entrusted to our aviation in the offensive operation. During the offensive’s preparatory stage, the aviation was to do the following: carry out uninterrupted aerial reconnaissance; cover the concentration areas of the front’s shock groups; to launch strikes with night bombers to destroy the enemy’s aircraft on his airfields in the areas of Urazovo, Ilovskoe and Yevstratovskoe; to disrupt rail movement along the Staryi Oskol—Valuiki and Ostrogozhsk— Valuiki sections through night attacks by individual planes, and; to disrupt the enemy’s troop control by launching strikes against his headquarters and communications centers. During the artillery preparation for the attack it was planned to launch attacks by assault aviation against the enemy’s divisional and corps reserves. During the offensive, the aviation was to render uninterrupted support to the infantry and tanks through assault air actions during their breakthrough of the enemy’s defense; to cover the mobile forces in their jumping-off areas, during their commitment into the fighting, and during their actions in the operational depth; to launch strikes against enemy reserves and also against his retreating units; to continue to launch strikes against enemy airfields and railroad

sectors; to launch strikes, in conjunction with the ground forces, against the enemy’s encircled groups of forces, and; to continue conducting aerial reconnaissance. By the start of the offensive operation the 2nd Air Army consisted of the 205th and 269th fighter and the 227th and 291st assault air divisions, the 208th Night Bomber Division, and the 50th Fire Direction Reconnaissance Regiment. The overall number of planes in the army that could be brought in to take part in the offensive operation was 208 planes, which included: 51 fighters, 57 assault aircraft, eight bombers, 80 night bombers, and 12 reconnaissance planes. By the start of the operation the correlation of forces in the air was approximately 1 ½ times in the enemy’s favor. Moreover, the enemy had a significant superiority in bomber aircraft (up to 200 enemy bombers versus the 2nd Air Army’s eight). Thus the comparatively limited number of aircraft and the large number of tasks entrusted to the 2nd Air Army demanded a great deal of exertion from the air force in combat, the skillful employment of available forces, and a high degree of skill on the part of the rank and file, as well as the maximum closeness of the airfields to the front line. By the start of the operation the 2nd Air Army’s planes had been rebased to airfields located on an average of 30-50 kilometers from the front line. According to the plan for the aviation’s combat employment, it was divided into two groups: a northern and a southern one. The northern group, consisting of the 269th Fighter and 291st Assault Air divisions (a total of 64 aircraft) was based at airfields in the Kashirskoe—Masal’skoe—Vereiskii—Steppe State Farm area. The group was designated for supporting the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps. The southern group, consisting of the 205th Fighter and 227th Assault Air divisions and two night bomber regiments operationally

subordinated to it (78 planes), was based at airfields in the areas of Rudaeva, Titarevka, and the Molotov and Red October state farms. The group was to support the 3rd Tank Army’s and 7th Cavalry Corps’ combat operations. Left directly subordinated to the commander of the 2nd Air Army was the 208th Night Bomber Division (minus two regiments). Two auxiliary command posts (VPU) were organized for the purpose of the closest possible cooperation between the front’s shock groups and the 2nd Air Army’s headquarters, which were located together with the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ command posts. Control over the northern and southern groups’ combat activities was to be carried out by the deputy commanders of the 2nd Air Army, who were to be at the auxiliary control posts with several staff officers and the necessary communications equipment. A communications officer from the 2nd Air Army’s headquarters was also detached to the 18th Rifle Corps’ command post. The issuing of combat assignments to the aviation during the first two days was carried out by the 2nd Air Army commander on a front scale. During the subsequent days the assignments to the air groups were to be issued directly by the commanders of the combined-arms armies through representatives, who were located at these groups’ auxiliary control posts. The commander of the air army was to coordinate the combat activities of both groups through his headquarters, depending upon the development of the ground forces’ combat activities. The communications of the aviation groups’ auxiliary control posts with the air army’s headquarters was to be carried out through the command post of the front’s headquarters. The summoning of aviation to the battlefield and the alteration of combat assignments were to take place through the corresponding group’s auxiliary control posts, which had direct communications with the divisions. Such a method for summoning aviation directly from the airfields sped up the planes’ appearance

over their targets. During the preparatory stage of the operation the aviation carried out its assigned tasks in accordance with the plan for the 2nd Air Army’s combat employment. However, the intensity of the aviation’s combat activities during this period was comparatively minor, not exceeding 300 sorties and could not, therefore, have serious operational results.

1Editor’s note. Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov (1899-1981) joined the Red Army in 1918 and soon transferred to its air wing. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded an air division and several air armies. Following the war, Smirnov commanded the air forces of a military district and that of the Airborne Troops.

6

Engineer Support for the Operation Engineering support for the operation in winter conditions of the offensive would take on a particularly important significance. The Voronezh Front’s engineering troops had to carry out the engineering reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain and offer engineering support for the regrouping and concentration of the troops, carry out the engineering preparation of the jumping-off position for the offensive and, finally, render engineering support for the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and our troops’ activities during the operation. In order to resolve the tasks for the engineering support of the operation, the Voronezh Front was reinforced with the 60th Engineer-Sapper and 4th Engineer-Mine brigades, as well as with a number of special engineer units and elements. The average saturation of engineer troops, taking into account troop sappers, reached a little more than three sapper companies per kilometer of breakthrough front. During the operation’s preparatory phase, it was planned to direct the engineer troops’ main efforts to conducting uninterrupted engineering reconnaissance, to carrying out work connected with the engineering outfitting of the jumping-off area, mainly for removing the enormous number of mines left by the enemy and our forces during the defensive fighting along the Don in the summer of 1942 (along the Storozhevoe bridgehead alone there were about 150 minefields, with an overall amount of 34,000 mines of all types), as well as carrying out work to built bridges, crossings and

the approaches to them. Particular attention was paid to maintaining the existing roads in working order, which, in conditions of a snowy winter, demanded a great amount of effort from the engineer troops and the road exploitation units. It was planned to carry out the following measures in order to carry out the tasks of engineering support during the operation. Mobile obstacle detachments were to be created in each rifle division and tank corps with organic sapper units and battalions from the engineer-sapper and engineer-mine brigades. Storm groups were to be created in the rifle divisions on the basis of three groups per division (divisional sappers were to be included in these groups). It was planned to accomplish the outfitting of divisional routes and routes for the tank corps with divisional sappers and battalions of engineer-mine and engineer-sapper brigades. The laying down of army (corps) routes was to be carried out with the forces of the army (corps) engineering battalions.¹ It was planned to lay down front roads and to build bridges and crossings with the forces of the 38th Defense Construction Directorate and two pontoon battalions. The engineering forces and equipment were distributed in the following manner for resolving all tasks of engineering support. The 40th Army was reinforced with four battalions from the 4th Engineer Brigade, a battalion from the 60th Engineer-Sapper Brigade, and two pontoon-bridge battalions, which overall amounted to 21 sapper companies. The 18th Rifle Company was to be reinforced with two battalions from the 60th Engineer-Sapper Brigade and one battalion from the 4th Engineer Brigade—nine sapper companies in all. The 3rd Tank Army was to be reinforced with only two battalions from the 60th Engineer-Sapper Brigade—six sapper companies. Two engineer battalions, three pontoon-bridge battalions, a light crossing park,

and a number of special engineer units and elements² were left at the disposal of the chief of the front’s engineering troops, for carrying out front measures. The average densities for saturating the front’s forces with engineer troops along the shock groups’ breakthrough sectors are shown in Table III/6.1. The limited number of engineer troops within the front’s shock groups demanded their maximum exertion and great skill in carrying out their missions in the area of engineering support for the offensive operation, all the more so as the two engineer brigades with the front had only just been formed and their rank and file would have to master their specialties directly during the course of the operation. In accordance with the plan for engineer support, the following works were carried out during the preparatory phase. See Table III/6.2. From Table III/6.2 it is clear that the 40th Army’s jumping-off area required the greatest efforts from the engineering troops. This is explained by the fact that one of the front’s main groups of forces was to deploy there and that the very character of the terrain along the Storozhevoe bridgehead called for a greater volume of tasks regarding engineer support.

Table III/6.1 Densities of Engineering Troops Along the Breakthrough Sectors of the Front’s Groups of Forces (in Sapper Companies)

Table III/6.2 The Volume of Chief Work for the Engineering Outfitting of the Jumping-Off Area in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation

A great deal of work was carried out for making passages in the minefields and our and the enemy’s wire obstacles. Aside from the work mentioned, the troops had to quickly carry out a great deal of work for building and maintaining the roads and crossings over the Don River in good condition and in keeping clear the approaches to the Don’s steep right bank along the Storozhevoe bridgehead. Pile bridges with a capacity of 60 tons were built for crossing tanks and heavy artillery over the Don, and ice crossings for crossing loads up to six tons were built. In all, two 40-ton and seven 60-ton bridges (including three bridges along the Storozhevoe bridgehead and four along the Shchuch’e bridgehead) were built, as well as three crossings over the ice. Aside from this, a number of false crossings and bridges were constructed.

1This included the 14th Engineer Battalion in the 40th Army, the 102nd Engineer-Mine Battalion in the 18th Rifle Corps, and the 182nd Motorized Engineer Battalion in the 3rd Tank Army. 2A battalion of minelayers, a separate park of engineer vehicles, a hydro company, a concealment company, a water supply company, and a defensive construction directorate.

7

Operational Support for the Operation In preparing for the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, a great deal of attention was devoted to problems of operational support for the forthcoming operation. In this regard, intelligence of all types occupied a very important place among the remaining measures for operational support, as well as securing the flanks and measures for achieving offensive surprise.

Intelligence

Throughout the operation’s preparatory period, intelligence’s main efforts were directed at determining in greater detail the enemy’s dispositions and his entire defense system, determining the enemy air force’s airfield basing system, and also the detailed study of the terrain in the zone of the forthcoming offensive. A reconnaissance in force was carried out for the purpose of determining in greater detail the enemy’s defense and the disposition of his forces and weapons along the breakthrough sectors. A reconnaissance in force was carried out in the 40th Army on 12 January by the forward battalions of the 107th and 25th Guards rifle divisions. The 25th Guards Rifle Division’s battalions had been

reinforced with tanks from the 116th Tank Brigade (one tank company per battalion). The actions of the forward battalions were supported by the fire from four artillery regiments, two batteries of high-power artillery, and two battalions of M-13¹ rocket artillery. Besides this, these battalions’ attack was supported by our assault aircraft. As a result of the battle by the forward battalions and the 107th and 25th rifle divisions’ main forces, which were committed to develop their success, not only was our knowledge of the enemy’s defensive system and dispositions in his main zone made more accurate, but also as a result of the penetration by our forces into the enemy’s defense along a 6-kilometer front to a depth of up to 3.5 kilometers, favorable conditions were created for the army’s attack.² In the 18th Rifle Corps’ offensive sector along the Shchuch’e bridgehead, a reconnaissance in force was conducted by a rifle battalion from the 309th Rifle Division, with the support of two artillery battalions. As a result of this battalion’s battle conducted on 9 January, aside from determining the enemy’s dispositions and the character of his defense in the main sector opposite the Shchuch’e bridgehead, we managed to additionally establish the location of up to ten enemy artillery firing positions. In the 3rd Tank Army’s attack zone a reconnaissance in force was conducted on 8 January. For this a reinforced battalion from each first-echelon division was detached. The front command paid a great deal of attention to artillery and engineering reconnaissance. As the further course of the offensive showed, artillery reconnaissance located and discovered more than 60 percent of the enemy’s entire artillery. Engineer reconnaissance’s main efforts were directed to uncovering the enemy’s mine obstacles, as well as additional reconnaissance of the terrain, chiefly the Don River. It should be noted that

engineering reconnaissance was not conducted in sufficient detail. An example of this is the circumstance that during the attack against the forward edge of the enemy’s defense in the 3rd Tank Army’s offensive zone, eight tanks from the 173rd Tank Brigade were knocked out in minefields that had not been discovered in time either by engineer or tank reconnaissance. Aerial reconnaissance held a major place in the resolution of tasks laid before our intelligence during the operation’s preparatory phase. Its efforts were directed mainly an uncovering the system and character of the enemy’s defense, in reconnoitering the basing areas of his aircraft, uncovering his reserves and their movements by rail and over surfaced and dirt roads. Throughout the preparatory phase our aviation carried out about 100 reconnaissance sorties. Besides the uninterrupted observation of his troop movements and dispositions, our aviation photographed the main sectors of the enemy’s defense along the main axes. The terrain photographed covered 1,280 square kilometers. Aerial reconnaissance established the appearance of up to an infantry division in the Kamenka area. During combat operations it was established that this was the 26th Infantry Division, which had been transferred by the enemy from the Orel axis. As a result of the active activity by all forms of intelligence, by the start of the operation the headquarters of the Voronezh Front disposed of sufficiently full data about the enemy’s dispositions and the character of his defense. The front headquarters’ good knowledge of the opposing enemy was one of the favorable conditions that facilitated, in the final analysis, the achievement of success in the operation.

Securing the Flanks and Boundaries

As was noted above, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, in confirming the plan for the front’s offensive operation, demanded that the front commander pay particular attention to securing the operation from the north from the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces and from the south from his Donbass group of forces. In putting the high command’s instructions into practice, the front commander concentrated in the area opposite the inhabited locale of 1st Storozhevoe a destruction brigade, an army battalion of anti-tank rifles and the 305th Rifle Division’s training battalion to secure the right flank of the northern shock group during the operation’s preparatory phase. These forces were to be in readiness to repel a possible counterattack by the enemy’s tanks and infantry. The location of the front reserve’s 322nd Rifle Division in the Davydovka area, closer to the right flank of the 40th Army’s shock group, also pursued the goal of securing the operation from the north. During the offensive the securing of the entire front operation from the north was entrusted to the 4th Tank Corps, which, as was mentioned earlier, was to reach the Rep’evka area on the operation’s second day. Aside from this, the secure retention of their line by the 38th and 60th armies’ forces and the tying down of the opposing enemy forces through active defensive operations was to facilitate the successful resolution of the mission to secure the entire offensive operation from the north. The direct securing of the 40th Army’s right flank was entrusted to its right-flank formations (two rifle divisions and a reinforced rifle brigade). These formations were ordered to develop the offensive to the northwest and west upon the beginning of the breakthrough, for the purpose of reaching the line 1st Storozhevoe—Rep’evka. The 40th Army’s right-flank formations were to consolidate along this line, forming an outer encirclement ring and repelling all possible counterattacks by the enemy’s fresh forces that he might bring up to the area of operations. The left flank of the 40th Army’s shock group was to be secured by the 107th Rifle Division’s attack on Ostrogozhsk.

The securing of the central shock group’s flanks was to be achieved by an offensive by the right-flank and left-flank formations of this group of forces along the right bank of the Don for the purpose of widening the breakthrough and rolling up the enemy’s defense. From the south the operation as a whole was to be secured by an offensive by the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, which according to instructions from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, was to launch an attack along its right flank in the general direction of Pokrovskoe. The troops of this army’s shock group in their jumpingoff position were almost completely adjacent to the forces of the Voronezh Front’s southern shock group. The left flank of the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group was supposed to be directly supported from the south by an offensive by the 7th Cavalry Corps in the direction of Roven’ki and Valuiki. This corps, which consisted of two cavalry divisions and a reinforced independent tank brigade, an antitank, an artillery and a mortar regiments, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, and a battalion of rocket artillery, while attacking at a pace of 35 kilometers per day, was supposed to reach the Oskol River by the close of the operation’s fourth day and there form an outer encirclement front around the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces, thus firmly securing from the west and south the front’s operations to eliminate this group of forces. The right flank of the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group was to be secured by the attack of its right-flank formations (one rifle division, one rifle and one tank brigades) to the north and northeast, as well as an attack on the operation’s second day by the 6th Army’s rifle divisions operating along the Novaya Kalitva—Fisenkovo sector.

Ensuring Surprise

In order to ensure offensive surprise, the Voronezh Front command employed a scrupulously worked-out system of measures. The main ones were: the scrupulous disguising of all work conducted to prepare the operation, as well as the conduct of special measures for operational masking and misleading the enemy. Disguising the work for preparing the operation was achieved by limiting the number of people taking part in drawing up the operational plan, carrying out work for preparing the jumping-off area for the offensive along a broad front (along the Voronezh Front’ s entire 450-kilometer sector), carrying out rapid internal regroupings and concentrations of forces only at night, tight discipline in the use of technical communications equipment, and the conduct of an uninterrupted and active struggle against the enemy’s aerial reconnaissance. The chief goal in misleading the enemy was to disguise from him the true axis of the main attacks, the breakthrough sectors and the front’s main groups of forces, so as to achieve surprise in the operation. Besides this, by organizing various masking measures in the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors and the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ secondary sectors, it was hoped to create the impression in the enemy’s mind of an offensive being prepared along the Voronezh axis, as well as to disguise the severe weakening of the front’s above-listed sectors. In accordance with this goal, the front staff drew up a special masking plan for deceiving the enemy. The main measures carried out during the operation’s preparatory period, according to the plan, were as follows. The concentration of artillery along secondary sectors was widely shown. This was achieved by employing roving guns and mortars of all calibers, including 152mm and 203mm guns. Similar measures were carried out not only with individual guns or mortars, but along certain sectors, for example in the areas of Pavlovsk, Novaya Kalitva and Liski, opposite Korotoyak, along the boundary between the 38th and 60th armies and the 40th and 60th armies, by entire battalions

of rocket artillery, batteries of heavy artillery and regiments of 120mm mortars. Besides this, the false concentration of artillery was shown in the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors by outfitting false firing positions, the registering of individual guns, and the conduct of reconnaissance. The engineer troops outfitted several false crossings over the Don River. False radio networks for the front’s armies’ and tank formations’ headquarters were deployed. The radio stations of formations that had moved to another sector of the front, were left at their previous sites and actively continued to transmit. The false delivery and arrival of new forces by rail and on the march was carried out in the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors, as well as to the areas of Liski and Pavlovsk stations (in the 18th Rifle Corps’ sector). This was achieved by repeated daytime transfers of reserve regiments, the divisions’ second echelons, army reserves, and other elements to the front line and their return trip at night. The actual movements of the troops during the daylight hours during the front’s overall regrouping were employed very effectively for this purpose. Many formations, whose route ran not far from the false concentration areas, marched during the daylight hours. While passing through the false concentration areas, they would halt for rest or to bivouac. Their further march to their true concentration areas was carried out only under cover of darkness. The approach of ski units to the forward line was widely demonstrated. In the 60th Army’s area measures pointing to the preparation of an attack along the Voronezh axis were carried out. On the whole, all of the measures carried out for operational masking and deceiving the enemy yielded positive results. Gen. Stomm, the commander of the Hungarian III Army Corps, who was later captured, testified that the Hungarian command, although it expected an offensive by Soviet forces, was mistaken as to its scale. For example, the forces of our group in the area of the Storozhevoe bridgehead were estimated by the enemy command at two rifle divisions, one rifle and one tank brigade; that is, 2.5-3 times less

than in reality. The concentration of tank and cavalry corps in the Kantemirovka area was not discovered by the enemy. The Italian forces’ command knew even less about the offensive being prepared. As a result of carrying out all of these measures for achieving operational surprise, we were able to hide the operational idea from the enemy, as well as the axis of the main attacks and the true disposition of our men and materiel gathered for the breakthrough. As the further course of the operation showed, the enemy’s main attention was fixed on the front’s secondary sectors. During the operation’s preparatory period, the enemy did not remove a single division either from the Voronezh axis or from the 18th Rifle Corps’ defensive sector. The enemy command believed that the front’s forces would most likely attack from the Liski and Pavlovsk areas, and thus the Army Group B command concentrated Gen. Kramer’s special designation corps—its only reserve—namely along this sector in the Kamenka—Karpenkovo area. The enemy also expected possible offensive operations by our forces in the Voronezh area. The achievement of operational surprise in the offensive was an important condition that facilitated the operation’s success.

Anti-Aircraft Defense

The anti-aircraft defense of the shock groups’ forces by fighter aviation was carried out according to the front’s plan. As was already shown above, the 2nd Air Army had two fighter divisions (51 combat-ready planes). The presence of fighter aviation in both the northern and southern aviation groups (one division in each group) made the cover of the front’s three shock groups easier throughout

the entire operation. Our fighter aviation carried out only 80 sorties while conducting the anti-aircraft defense of the troops during their regroupings and concentration. In repelling three strikes by enemy bombers against Buturlinovka station, where the 3rd Tank Army’s tank formations were unloading, our aviation carried out seven group air battles, during the course of which three enemy planes were shot down. The presence of anti-aircraft artillery with the front and its distribution among the armies is shown in Table III/7.1.

Table III/7.1 The Distribution of Anti-Aircraft Artillery by the Start of the Offensive Operation

As the table shows, the front’s shortage of anti-aircraft weapons allowed us to employ them only for covering the troops of the shock groups. However, even in this instance it was difficult to create the necessary densities of anti-aircraft artillery fire for cover purposes. The availability of antiaircraft weaponry enabled us to create the following densities of anti-aircraft fire: about two guns per kilometer in the 40th Army; 0.5 guns in the 18th Rifle Corps, and; no more than 0.3 guns per kilometer in the 3rd Tank Army. The anti-aircraft artillery was united into the following groups for resolving its assigned tasks. The 5th Anti-Aircraft Division’s anti-aircraft artillery regiments and the 322nd Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion from the High Command Reserve were organized into the 40th Army’s antiaircraft artillery group, which covered the army’s shock group along the Storozhevoe bridgehead. The army anti-aircraft artillery regiments, which had been attached to the 18th Rifle Corps, were also organized into an anti-aircraft artillery group, which covered the troops along the Shchuch’e bridgehead. The anti-aircraft group’s anti-aircraft artillery regiments in the 3rd Tank Army were attached to the tank corps at the beginning of the operation and moved in their combat formations.

Anti-Tank Defense

In organizing our anti-tank defense, attention was mainly paid to the detachment of anti-tank artillery reserves and mobile obstacle detachments and their corresponding placement in the operational formation of the front’s shock groups. One should note the absence of an anti-tank artillery reserve at the

disposal of the 40th Army’s commander as a shortcoming in the organization of anti-tank defense. Thus, during the preparatory period of the offensive, the Voronezh Front’s command and staff devoted the necessary attention to questions of operational support for the operation. Along with this, particular attention was paid to the securing of the shock groups’ external flanks, as well as carrying out measures for achieving surprise. A peculiarity in carrying out reconnaissance in force with the forces of the forward battalions was the fact that, in comparison with preceding offensive operations, these battalions were reinforced with tanks and their offensive was supported by massed artillery fire and air actions. During the war’s succeeding operations, a reconnaissance in force by forward battalions was further developed and became a common phenomenon as one of the major operational measures conducted by the front or army commands along a broad front of the forthcoming operation.

1The M-13 was a 132-caliber variant of the Soviet multiple rocket launcher, mounted on trucks. This weapon was first employed in 1941 and popularly known as “Katyusha.” These weapons were organized into guards mortar units. 2These battalions’ activities are described in detail below.

8

Organizing Control and Communications The specifics of the forthcoming operation, which was to be carried out with the decisive aim of encircling and destroying the enemy in winter conditions, made increased demands on troop control. During the operation’s preparatory period the chief method of troop control was the personal interaction of the commander and the leading officers of the front’s headquarters with the subordinate troops. After the operational plan was reported to its executors, the front and army commands’ main attention and that of their staffs was concentrated on checking the troops’ training for carrying out their combat tasks and rendering all-round assistance on the ground. Of particular concern for the command were questions of organizing coordination among the troops. The fundamentals of organizing coordination were laid out in the operational part of the plan for the offensive operation and in individual operational directives from the front commander. However, the main work in organizing the troops’ coordination was carried out directly in the headquarters of both attacking armies and the 18th Rifle Corps. Responsible officers from the front’s headquarters were dispatched to the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ command posts and to that of the 18th Rifle Corps to assist in organizing coordination and control of the preparations for the operation, as well as to the mobile formations of the front’s southern shock group—to the

headquarters of the 12th and 15th tank and 7th Cavalry corps. For the purpose of ensuring the closest coordination between the 2nd Air Army’s planes with the forces of the front’s shock groups, two auxiliary control posts for the aviation groups were created at the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ headquarters, which were headed by the air army commander’s deputies. All coordination questions between the combined-arms and formations, tanks, attached artillery, engineer troops, and aviation were scrupulously worked out on site. One of the most important tasks of troop control during the operation’s preparatory period was also the control of internal front regroupings of forces and the concentration of new men and materiel arriving at the front from the Stavka reserve. This control consisted of drawing up a detailed plan for the regrouping and concentration of the troops and exercising precise and uninterrupted control over its fulfillment. All of the headquarters were moved up closer to the front line before the start of the operation. On 9 January the command post of the front’s headquarters was moved from Anna to Bobrov. The front’s command post was located 60 kilometers from the 40th Army’s breakthrough sector, 25 kilometers from the 18th Rifle Corps’ breakthrough sector, and 180 kilometers from the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector. A reserve command post was organized in Nizhnii Kislyai and a second echelon in Anna. The great remove of the front’s command post from the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector required the organization of a front auxiliary control post (VPU), which was deployed in Taly, at a distance of 30 kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector. The 40th Army’s command post was deployed in Pochepskoe, at a distance of 17 kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector. The

18th Rifle Corps’ command post was deployed in Dukhovoe, at a distance of six kilometers from the corps’ breakthrough sector. The 3rd Tank Army’s command post was in Korotovka, at a distance of 11 kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector. The 2nd Air Army’s command post was deployed in Kozlovka, and that of the 7th Cavalry Corps in Raskovka. With the development of the offensive, it was planned to move the 40th Army’s command post to Ostrogozhsk and the command post of the 3rd Tank Army to Rossosh’. It was planned to shift the 18th Rifle Corps’ command post in the direction of the movement of the 309th Rifle Division’s command post. In preparing the operation, the front’s armies’ and formations’ headquarters devoted a great deal of attention to questions of organizing communications. The exploitation servicing of all communications lines was improved. New and restored communications lines, involving one to three wires, were built along a number of sectors up to 125 kilometers in length. The front’s and armies’ wire communications in the jumping-off position for the offensive were broadly developed along the line of the command and observation posts. At the same time, bypass lines were planned only for the right-wing armies and the 40th Army. Due to the fact that the 3rd Tank Army was to be committed in the neighboring front’s zone, wire communications were organized with it along a single line. The absence of bypass communications lines with the 3rd Tank Army and 18th Rifle Corps significantly lowered the stability of wire communications with them. There were incidents of breakdowns in the work of the front headquarters’ wire communications with the 3rd Tank Army’s headquarters during the operation. As a result of the fact that there was a shortage of exploitation units among the communications troops, civilian specialists from the People’s Commissariat of Communications were brought in to service a number of permanent lines.

The front commander demanded that the chiefs of staff at all levels devote particular attention to the broad usage of radio equipment. Reference was made to the necessity of eliminating individual cases of underestimating radio communications. For the purpose of securing reliable radio communications with the 40th and 3rd Tank armies and the 18th Rifle Corps, radio communications was organized not only by network, but also by radio headings. Communications through mobile equipment was broadly employed during both the preparatory stage and during the course of the operation. By the beginning of the offensive operation, the front’s forces were supplied with the following kinds of mobile communications equipment. See Table III/8.1.

Table III/8.1 The Quantitative and Qualitative Composition of Mobile Communications Equipment Among the Voronezh Front’s Armies by the Start of the Operation

The presence of the front’s auxiliary control post, which was deployed in the 3rd Tank Army’s offensive zone, was supposed to facilitate the more flexible and uninterrupted control over the troops. The deployment of the 2nd Air Army’s auxiliary control posts with the headquarters of the 40th and 3rd Tank armies was a correct measure, directed at guaranteeing the closer cooperation of the ground forces with the aviation and the centralized control of the latter. Despite the great amount of work carried out in preparing our communications, by the start of the operation it was not sufficiently developed, particularly the 3rd Tank Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ wire communications.

9

The Combat Training of the Troops and Staffs By the start of the preparation for the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation the rank and file of the front’s shock groups varied, both in its strength and according to its accumulated combat experience. Among the front’s troops were four rifle brigades (253rd, 129th, 104th, and 37th), staffed by cadets from infantry schools, of which three were part of the front’s shock groups and one was in the front commander’s reserve. These brigades’ combat qualities were quite high. The majority of the front’s formations had almost no experience in waging offensive battles. This required a differentiated approach to the troops’ combat and political training and enormous organizational work for knocking together the units and elements for the forthcoming offensive. The basis of the troops’ training were the requirements of the orders by the People’s Commissar of Defense nos. 306 and 325, as well as the rich experience acquired by Soviet troops in the fighting around Stalingrad. Order no. 306 of 8 October 1942 made changes in combat formations. The requirements of this order were reflected in the Infantry Combat Manual (BUP-42), which was confirmed in November 1942. Order no. 325 of 16 October 1942 laid out principled instructions on the combat employment of tank units and formations in the battle and operation.

6-8 hours per day were devoted to combat training for the forthcoming operation. Heavy frosts, which went down to -20 degrees Celsius, as well as the necessity of observing concealment in the concentration areas significantly limited our capability to carry out training in the field. Thus troop training primarily was conducted in the woods and in inhabited locales. In training the staffs, attention was chiefly paid to working out problems of control in the offensive battle and the organization of cooperation between the combat arms. Before the start of the operation, the 3rd Tank Army had a threemonth time frame during which it formed and knocked its units and elements together. From October 1942 the army’s chief task had been to train the troops for active offensive operations in winter conditions, with the independent breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense and the development of the offensive in his operational depth. The army’s entire combat troop training was subordinated to this task. The tank troops’ fire training was conducted in accordance with the USSR People’s Commissariat of Defense’s order no. 0728 of 19 September 1942, on inculcating firing on the move into the tank troops’ combat training. In this order it was emphasized that firing from tanks on the move must be the chief means of our tanks’ fire against the enemy, particularly against his personnel. The plan for the army’s combat training called for teaching firing from a tank on the move at a speed of up to 1520 kilometers per hour. Elements of the motorized rifle brigades and rifle divisions were trained to carry out marches to a distance of up to 50 kilometers and short bounds of 5-7 kilometers. A great deal of attention was devoted to training for actions at the platoon-company level and the organization of cooperation between the tanks, infantry and artillery at the tank company-rifle battalion-artillery battalion level. The working out of themes for tactical training ended with exercises with rifle and motorized rifle formations and units along with tank brigades.

Lengthy marches, carried out by the army from the off-loading areas to its concentration areas were a good school for the 3rd Tank Army’s tank troops, especially for the new intake. During the marches the tank crews accumulated practical experience in driving their vehicles in conditions approaching those of combat, which to a significant degree facilitated the tank troops’ successful resolution of their subsequent combat assignments. A great deal of work was carried out for the combat training of artillery units and formations and artillery headquarters at all levels. This training was conducted in accordance with the demands of the Stavka of the High Command’s directive letter of 10 January 1942 on the artillery offensive, as well as on the basis of accumulated combat experience in conducting the artillery offensive during the Soviet troops’ counteroffensive around Stalingrad. Thus the main questions of the troops’ training were worked out during the preparatory period of the offensive. By the close of this stage of the operation the troops, headquarters and commanders were ready to carry out their assigned combat tasks in winter offensive conditions.

10

Materiel Support for the Operation In the forthcoming operation the front’s rear services were faced with very responsible tasks, which issued from the missions entrusted to the front’s forces. In accordance with the front commander’s decision, it was planned to accumulate during the course of the preparatory phase 3-3.5 combat loads of munitions, five refills of fuels and lubricants, and also to create a 10-day reserve of food and forage. In order to accumulate such an amount of materiel, it was necessary to carry out a great deal of work, because the provisioning of the troops by the start of the preparatory phase of the operation amounted to the following: 1-2 combat loads for munitions and 0.3-2.2 refills of fuels and lubricants (for various types of fuel). Rear-area organization by the start of the offensive operation was as follows. The front was based on three railroad sectors: (excluding Rtishchevo—Tambov—Michurinsk—Gryazi; Gryazi—Oborona— excluding Povorino; Tambov—Oblovka—excluding Balashov. Besides this, the front could employ two pairs of trains per day along the Povorino—Talovaya rail sector and the Talovaya—Kalach branch line. The remaining capacity of these railroads had been turned over to the Southwestern Front by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. Because of the fact that the main part of the centralized transports arrived from the north through Ryazhsk and Kochetovka, the front’s regulating station No. 9 was switched from Tambov station to

Kochetovka station. Front regulating station No. 10 was deployed at Borisoglebsk station for supplying the front’s left-wing forces. Thus the presence of two regulating stations within the front, which were deployed along two outgoing lines—to Michurinsk and Povorino—guaranteed normal conditions for basing the front, given its comparatively broad operational sector. The 40th Army was based along the excluding Talovaya—Liski and Pridacha—Liski railroad sectors, as well as the Grafskaya—Anna branch line. The 40th Army’s army field base No. 24 was located at Khrenovoe station. The 40th Army’s army field depots were deployed along the excluding Talovaya—Ikorets rail sector. Branch army field depots for supplying the shock group’s forces were deployed in the area of Davydovka station. Materiel-technical equipment was delivered by special trains at night to Davydovka and Kolodeznaya stations, which were the final unloading stations. The 18th Rifle Corps was based jointly with the 40th Army on the front’s Talovaya—Bobrov rail sector, and also used the narrowgauge Buturlinovka—Malyi Kislyai branch line for delivering freight. Depots, which had been designated for supporting the corps’ shock group, were deployed by the front at Bobrov station. Branches of these depots were moved up to Losevo and Shestakovo to support the corps’ left flank. The 3rd Tank Army was based on the Talovaya—Kalach branch line, having a single supply station at Buturlinovka station. The army base’s forward section was deployed on the ground in the Tsapkovo, Taly and Kantemirovka areas. The 7th Cavalry Corps received all its materiel from the 3rd Tank Army’s army depots. Upon the development of the operation, it was planned to realize the delivery of materiel to the corps with the front’s auto transport. During the operation three auto columns (20 vehicles in each column) with munitions, fuel and food were

dispatched to the 7th Cavalry Corps. Thus railroad delivery for all three of the front’s shock groups was to be carried out chiefly along the Povorino—Talovaya railroad sector, which was used jointly with the Southwestern Front. The delivery of freight along the Grafskaya—Pridacha—Liski sector was possible only at night, due to the conditions of the situation. The organization of the operational rear in the jumping-off position was characterized by the maximum closeness of the rear units and establishments to the troops. Front rear units and establishments were located in the army rear area, and the army ones in the troop rear area. Given an overall army rear depth of up to 180 kilometers and a front one of more than 550 kilometers, the distance of the rear establishments from the front line was as follows: 180 kilometers for the front regulating stations and 110 kilometers for the front depots closest to the troops. The available amount of military-automobile roads, as well as the troop routes for delivery and evacuation was able to guarantee the planned delivery of materiel to the troops and the evacuation of wounded and equipment. The troops of the front’s southern group, where the distance for delivery over the roads from the army field base was 150 kilometers in the jumping-off position were in a more difficult situation, and with the development of the offensive and the arrival of the 3rd Tank Army’s and 7th Cavalry Corps’ formations in the areas of Alekseevka and Valuiki, this distance would almost double. It should be noted that the road units’ usual tasks of maintaining and servicing the dirt roads in good condition for our auto transport in winter conditions was made more difficult by the necessity of continually clearing these roads of snow drifts, which were particularly bountiful in the winter of 1942-43. For example, during the 1-5 January time period more than 1,000 kilometers of road were cleared of snow, more than 500 kilometers of snow walls and

barriers built, and 10,000 individual shields and more than 3,500 road signs put up. The local population was conscripted to carry out this work. The 40th Army had three road battalions for servicing the army military-automobile roads;¹ the 18th Rifle Corps had two battalions,² and; the 3rd Tank Army had one four-company militaryroad detachment and a road construction battalion.³ Three militaryroad detachments and a road construction battalion were detached for servicing the front’s dirt road communications, which fully guaranteed the normal exploitation of the dirt roads in the jumpingoff position and which could prove to be insufficient with the operation’s development. The provisioning of the front and armies with transportation equipment by the start of the operation was insufficient. The situation was particularly difficult in the 3rd Tank Army. The army had overall 272 motor vehicles and 88 tank trucks for transporting materiel.⁴ A significant number of vehicles required major and ongoing repairs. Besides this, a great expenditure of fuels and lubricants occurred due to the wear on the vehicles. The army did not have horse-drawn army transport, which at that time was a not unimportant means of delivery. There was a great shortage of troop automobile and horse-drawn transport. The horse park, due to being underfed, could not handle the average loading norms, particularly when carrying out forced marches. In order to eliminate this bottleneck, the 3rd Tank Army command was forced to conscript a part of the auto transport of the tank corps’ motorized rifle battalions for delivering materiel during the operation’s preparatory period. Medical support for the operation was organized as follows. The front’s hospital base was deployed along two evacuation lines. The first echelon of the front’s hospital base was in the Bobrov area and the second echelon in the Novokhopersk and Tambov areas. The evacuation of sick and wounded from the front’s first-echelon

hospital base in Bobrov was to be carried out by the front’s and 40th Army’s medical mobile units. The chief of the front’s rear services disposed of the 13th Independent Medical Aviation Squadron (nine aircraft), which could be employed both for the evacuation of wounded and for the delivery of medical supplies and bottled blood to the front hospitals. The 40th Army’s hospital base was deployed in a single echelon in the area of Davydovka station, at a remove of 20-25 kilometers from the front line. The reserve of the 40th Army’s hospital base was in the Verkhnii Ikorets—Il’ich area at a distance of 45 kilometers from the front line. The divisional medical-sanitary battalions were folded up and were to be deployed only along the Don’s right bank. Before their deployment, the evacuation of the sick and wounded from the regimental medical aid stations was to be carried out with divisional resources directly to the first-line army hospitals. The evacuation of wounded from the army hospitals was to be carried out by temporary military-medical trains and medical mobile units. First-line surgical field mobile hospitals were deployed for the medical support of the 18th Rifle Corps in Nizhnii Kislyai and Vorontsovka, at a distance of 30 kilometers from the front line, as well as several front hospitals in the area of Bobrov station. The 3rd Tank Army’s hospital base was deployed in two echelons. The first echelon was deployed in Vorontsovka, Verkhnyaya Gnilusha and Tsapkovo; that is, along three axes; the second echelon was deployed in the area of Buturlinovka station, at a distance of 150 kilometers from the front line. The evacuation of wounded from the 3rd Tank Army’s hospitals was entrusted to the front clearing station’s operational group, which was to carry out the evacuation of the sick and wounded with the front’s medical mobile units along the Buturlinovka—Talovaya—Novokhopersk—Povorino road to the front’s hospital base in Borisoglebsk. While organizing medical support, particular attention was paid to

preventing frostbite among the wounded and sick, for which measures were adopted for quickly removing the wounded from the battlefield and a network of heating and feeding posts was deployed by the field hospitals’ forces along the evacuation routes. As a result of adopting measures for accumulating materiel supplies, the front’s provisioning with munitions before the start of the operation was as follows: 2.4-3.2 combat loads for infantry weapons; 1.3-3.0 combat loads of mines; 5.0 combat loads of antitank artillery (45mm) shells; 2.6-4.2 combat loads for guns ranging from 76mm to 122mm; 5.0 combat loads for guns ranging from 152mm to 203mm, and; 2.3-9.0 combat loads for anti-aircraft artillery. If a sufficient supply of ammunition had been created out of the overall amount of the front’s munitions in the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps among the troops and in army depots,⁵ which enabled us to begin the operation on time; in the 3rd Tank Army a very difficult situation with ammunition supply and other types of supplies was arising by the start of the operation. The army’s materiel provisioning by the start of the operation is shown in Table III/10.1. The table very starkly shows that in the materiel sense, the 3rd Tank Army’s forces were very insufficiently supplied by the start of the operation. Thus it should be noted that by the beginning of the offensive operation its preparation in the materiel sense had not been fully completed. If the necessary supply of materiel had been created in the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps, then the supplies created with the 3rd Tank Army’s troops and in its army were obviously insufficient. This served as one of the reasons for moving the start of the offensive from 12 to 14 January. However, by this time the situation with the 3rd Tank Army’s materiel provisioning had

improved insignificantly. The army was forced to enter the operation with a limited amount of materiel, which would create additional difficulties for its troops while resolving their assigned tasks. Taking into account this circumstance, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command authorized the Voronezh Front to use part of the materiel located with the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army for supplying the 3rd Tank Army.

Table III/10.1 The 3rd Tank Army’s Materiel Supplies by the Start of the Operation

1The 162nd and 204th road construction and 26th Road Exploitation battalions. 2The 205th and 211th road construction battalions. 3The 44th Military-Road Detachment and the 209th Road Construction Battalion. 4Of this number, 82 motor vehicles were undergoing repair by the start of the operation. 5By the start of the offensive there were with the 18th Rifle Corps the troops and depots three combat loads of munitions, three refills of fuels and lubricants and a ten day’s supply of food and forage.

11

Political Support for the Operation In organizing political support, a number of features were taken into account of the situation in which the offensive operation was prepared and in which it was to be conducted. It was necessary to take into account the fact that the front’s offensive operation was to be conducted to encircle and destroy a numerically superior enemy, and that the operation was supposed to develop in difficult winter conditions and at a high rate of speed. All of this had to put increased demands on the troops. In organizing the party-political work, the troops’ composition and their morale-political condition was taken into account. The rank and file which was brought in for the offensive had diverse combat experience. A large part of the rank and file was to take part in offensive operations for the first time. By the beginning of the operation’s preparation, all of the front’s rank and file was seized by the great deal of enthusiasm, which reigned among the troops as a result of the successful conclusion of the counteroffensive around Stalingrad. The front’s soldiers, officers and generals, just like the entire Soviet people, once again were convinced of the strength and indestructible nature of the Soviet Army and believed in the genius of the strategic leadership by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and in the strength of Soviet military equipment. All of the party-political work during the operation’s preparatory stage was directed at securing the fulfillment of comrade Stalin’s order no. 345 of 7 November 1942. In this order, comrade Stalin

pointed out to the Soviet people and its army that “we can and must clear the Soviet land of the Hitlerite filth.”¹ Comrade Stalin demanded of the Soviet army that it strengthen in every way its iron troop discipline, very strict order and unity of command, and to persistently prepare a crushing blow against the enemy. Upon the successful resolution of these tasks, it was noted in the order, “depends the defeat of the German-Fascist army and the cleansing of the Soviet land of the Hitlerite aggressors!”² The fulfillment of this order, as well as the propaganda of the Soviet army’s combat successes and experience of the Soviet army around Stalingrad, was to be the chief content of party-political work during the preparatory stage of the operation. “Emulate the heroic soldiers of Stalingrad!”—such was the slogan that ran through all aspects of the troops’ combat and political training. The commanders, political organs and party organizations of the Voronezh Front correctly understood their task and carried out a great deal of work for the political support of the forthcoming offensive. The plan for the political support for the operation being prepared was drawn up by the front’s political administration in accordance with combat tasks and called for measures of an organizational nature, as well as measures in regard to propagandizing and agitation work. The plan foresaw, first of all, the organizational strengthening of the company party and Komsomol organizations.³ By the start of combat activities the number of communists and Komsomol members in the front’s rifle units accounted for about 35 percent of the rank and file (including 15 percent communists). The percentage of communists and Komsomol members among the front’s officers was even higher and in various formations varied from 50-80

percent. The creation and staffing of company party and Komsomol organizations was chiefly carried out by accepting new members and candidate members into the party and the Komsomol from amongst the best soldiers and commanders. Throughout December the front’s party organizations admitted about 6,000 men as members and candidate members, including almost 2,000 as party members. Besides this, the strengthening of company party organizations was carried out through the redistribution of communists among the line subunits, as well as through the transfer of communists from rear units and establishments to line subunits. Particular attention was devoted during the positioning of partypolitical forces to bringing up the political organs to authorized strength and creating a reserve of political workers. A great deal of work was also carried out in training reserves of party organizers and Komsomol organizers in the companies. A group of workers, numbering 56 men, was dispatched by the front’s political administration to these armies’ formations and units to render direct assistance to the commanders, political organs and party organizations in the 3rd Tank and 40th armies in organizing party-political work throughout the entire preparatory period and conduct of the offensive operation. The 40th Army’s political section dispatched 75 political workers to the troops. A great deal of attention was devoted to the training of non-official agitators. In the area of propaganda and agitation work, the main task during the preparatory period was bringing to the consciousness of each soldier Stalin’s demand to be ready to inflict a crushing blow against the enemy. Political agitation was subordinated to supporting the successful carrying out of the command’s combat orders, inculcating among the soldiers and officers an offensive élan and hatred for the enemy, the strengthening of faith in the inevitability of our victory, and the rallying of the rank and file around the Communist Party.

In all of the front’s armies, which were getting ready for the offensive operation, two-day seminars were carried out for the chiefs of the political sections and deputy formation commanders for political affairs, during which the question of tasks and measures for the political support of the forthcoming operation was discussed. A great deal of work was done in publishing various sorts of leaflets, appeals and guidebooks. Throughout the preceding two months before the offensive the front’s military council and political administration put out 17 various leaflets and appeals, with an overall run of 1,084,000 copies and 12 guidebooks with a circulation of 330,000 copies. Three special issues of the front newspaper, For the Honor of the Motherland, were published in connection with the forthcoming offensive. A particularly important place in agitation work was devoted to inculcating a feeling of hatred for the enemy among the rank and file. The forms of agitation work for inculcating a feeling of hatred for the enemy varied. For example, in the 40th Army a specially organized exhibition was devoted to this task. This exhibition was visited by the army’s agitators and propagandists, who widely and skillfully employed the exhibition’s materials in their everyday work, just as they had the previously-issued leaflets, guidebooks and appeals. Propaganda work among the troops was strengthened. All of the best forces from the armies’ and formations’ political sections were allotted for servicing the units and formations with the best qualified lectures and reports. The front and army press played a major role in preparing the soldiers and officers for the forthcoming offensive. The combat task laid down by comrade Stalin that “we can and must clear the Soviet land of the Hitlerite filth” was widely propagandized in both in daily front and army newspapers, and in company combat leaflets. The idea that the fulfillment of the holy objective of the Soviet people—

the cleansing of their native land of the German-Fascist aggressors —depends on their tenacity and firmness, on the combat skill and valor, and on their readiness to carry out their obligation to the Motherland, was hammered into the consciousness of the soldiers and officers. The 40th Army’s newspaper, For Victory, devoted a great deal of space to the propaganda of combat skill. From issue to issue, the paper carried materials which taught the soldiers the art of the attack. The paper carried a special section under the rubric of “Advice from an Old Soldier,” in which the newspaper passed on combat experience to young soldiers who had not yet been in battle. In their work on preparing the troops for offensive operations, the commanders, party organizations and political organs paid serious attention to the study and popularization of the combat experience accumulated by the Soviet army during the time of the counteroffensive around Stalingrad. An article under the title of “Vertical Maneuver in Battle,” which, due to its popularity, was published twice by the 2nd Air Army’s newspaper, Wings of Victory, may serve as an example of this. In this article, which became the subject of broad discussion and study, fighter pilot and Guards Major Kleshov, based on an analysis of the construction features of the enemy “Messerschmitt” aircraft and personal combat experience, recommended the most expedient methods of waging combat against the enemy in conditions unfavorable to him. A great deal of attention was paid to securing aerial reconnaissance’s successful activities in party-political work in the 2nd Air Army’s formations and units. The 2nd Air Army’s army newspaper widely popularized the experience of the best aerial scouts. The agitators, having studied the combat experience of the best scout crews, related discussions of these crews’ pre-flight preparation, about their choice of route and about their precautionary measures against the enemy’s fighters and antiaircraft fire. The agitators called upon crews to skillfully employ the experience of the masters of aerial reconnaissance.

During the regrouping and concentration period, an enormous amount of party-political work was carried out by the command element, party organizations and political organs for securing marches. In the 3rd Tank Army individual and group discussions with crew members, political information and meetings were the most widespread and effective forms of work on the march. The commanders demanded from the tank crews the preservation and correct exploitation of combat equipment and weaponry, and the crews’ full combat readiness. All of the 3rd Tank Army’s partypolitical work among the troops during the march was directed at securing the fulfillment of these tasks. The themes of discussions conducted with the tank troops were: “How to drive combat vehicles in winter conditions over broken terrain,” “Masking and secrecy in the approach are the condition for the successful completion of the combat task” and “Observation during the march,” etc. The commanders and political workers organized an exchange of experience on these questions during discussions. Veteran mechanicdrivers and the commanders of combat vehicles related their experience to the young tank troops. With the arrival of the army’s tank units to their concentration area, the center of party-political work’s gravity was shifted to supporting carrying out the command’s orders and putting the equipment in order and training the crews for the forthcoming combat operations. Immediately before the beginning of the fighting, combat leaflets were issued in the platoon, which told about the heroic feats of the unit’s tank troops and which offered advice on how to behave in battle. Taking into account the fact that the success of the offensive operation depends, to a significant degree, on the correct materiel support of the troops and the precise work of all of the rear-area units, the front political administration dispatched its representatives to all levels of the rear services. The representatives of the front political administration were at railroad stations where the unloading of arriving troops and equipment was carried out, as

well as at the front and army supply bases. Party-political work during the preparatory stage was concluded by all-round meetings before the battle, which were one of the best forms of mobilizing the moral forces of the soldiers and officers prior to launching a decisive attack against the enemy. As a result of all of the party-political work, which was carried out by the commanders, political organs and party organizations throughout the operation’s preparatory stage, the Voronezh Front’s forces were full of determination to carry out the order by the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, comrade Stalin, to inflict a crushing blow on the enemy. The front’s entire rank and file was eager to fight. The numerous examples of mass heroism and personal bravery, displayed by the front’s soldiers and officers during the offensive, were a clear confirmation of the high political-moral condition of the Voronezh Front’s forces.

1I. Stalin, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuza , 5th ed., 1948, p. 81. 2Ibid , p. 81 3Editor’s note. The Komsomol ( Kommunisticheskii Soyuz Molodezhi ), was the communist party’s youth auxiliary.

12

The Regrouping of Troops and the Correlation of Forces by the Beginning of the Operation

The Regrouping of Troops

One of the most difficult tasks of the operation’s preparatory phase was the rapid and disguised conduct of internal front regroupings and the timely arrival of the formations and units arriving from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command reserve at their jumping-off areas. In all, it was necessary to regroup within the front eight rifle formations and six tank brigades, as well as to move to their jumping-off areas one cavalry and three tank corps, five rifle divisions, one tank and three ski-rifle brigades, and three artillery divisions, which were newly arriving at the front. Table III/12.1 below shows the distribution of formations and units detached by the front and arriving from the Stavka reserve, between the front’s shock groups of forces. As can be seen from the table, the front’s southern shock group was to be created almost completely from those forces arriving from the Stavka reserve, and only partially from the front’s reserves. The northern and central groups of forces were to be created from almost all of the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ forces, part of the forces transferred from the 38th and 60th armies, and also from the front’s reserves.

The regrouping was to embrace all of the front’s armies and was to be carried out in secret, in a short time frame, and over significant distances. Up to 40 percent of the formations and units had to carry out a march between 100-175 kilometers. The regrouping was to begin on 26 December and conclude on 4 January. It was planned to march an average of 30 kilometers per day. Taking into account the fact that the troops could march only at night, and then along snow-covered roads, the conduct of these regroupings demanded a great deal of physical exertion from the troops and from the headquarters the precise organization of the marches and control over the accomplishment of the regrouping plan. Despite all the difficulties, the front’s internal regroupings were completed on time, and as early as the first days of January the front’s forces began to conduct combat training in the new concentration areas. A great deal of work was accomplished by the front headquarters in organizing the reception and arrival of units and formations from the Stavka reserve. The 3rd Tank Army, which was to be transferred by rail from the Western Front’s sector, was to unload at the Buturlinovka, Talovaya and Kalach stations and to make its own way to the Kantemirovka area, for which it had to cover about 250 kilometers along difficult wintry roads. The 7th Cavalry Corps was to be transported from the Bryansk Front’s sector as far as Anna station, from where it was to complete a nearly 300-kilometer march to the area east of Kantemirovka. The 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades, attached to the 7th Cavalry Corps, were to move from their unloading area— Khrenovoe station—to their concentration area about 250 kilometers away. The 322nd Rifle Division was to unload at Tresvyatskaya station and complete an 80-kilometer march to the Trasorukovo. The 111th Rifle Division was to move about 250

kilometers from Talovaya station to the area north of Kantemirovka.

Table III/12.1 The Distribution of Formations and Units Taking Part in the Offensive Between the Front’s Shock Groups

Note. The table does not show the formations and units of the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps that were slated to complete their regrouping within the army and corps.

Due to reasons independent of the front, the concentration of the forces arriving from the Stavka reserve was prolonged. The 4th Tank Corps was able to begin loading only on 10 January and only on 17 January did it concentrate in the 40th Army’s operational sector. The 3rd Tank Army’s formations were very late in concentrating. The 15th Tank Corps was still unloading as late as 11 January. Only two of its brigades (88th Tank and 55th Motorized Rifle), which had unloaded by 7 January at the Kalach station, had concentrated on 11 January in the southeastern part of Kantemirovka. The corps’ remaining forces (113th and 195th tank brigades) were en route along the railroad and had only partially begun to unload. By 11 January of the 15th Tank Corps’ 183 tanks only 56 had concentrated in their jumping-off area. The 3rd Tank Army’s 179th Independent Tank Brigade finished unloading at Kalach station and on 11 January had only one tank and one motorized rifle battalions in the concentration area on 11 January. By this time the army’s remaining formations had basically completed concentrating and had relieved the 6th Army’s units in their offensive zone. On 9 January the 7th Cavalry Corps unloaded at Anna station and on 11 January was completing its march to the Titarevka—Rudaeva area (east of Kantemirovka). The 183rd and 111th rifle divisions, the 9th AntiAircraft Division, and the 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades were completing their loading in echelons on 10 January and were en route by rail along the Moscow station—Rtishchevo station sector, as a result of which they were unable to arrive at the front by the start of the operation. Thus, despite the short regrouping times, the comparatively limited number of roads and winter conditions, the main portion of the formations designated for forming the shock

groups arrived at its planned areas on time. However, the failure of part of the Stavka reserve’s forces to the front, chiefly those formations which were designated for employment in the 40th Army’s and front’s mobile groups (the 4th Tank Corps and the skirifle brigades), as well as in the front reserve (111th and 183rd rifle divisions) made the situation considerably more difficult and was one of the reasons that forced the front commander to decide to change the start of the operation from 12 to 14 January. This decision was confirmed by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.

The Disposition of the Front’s Forces and Those of the Enemy by the Start of the Operation

In all, by the start of the operation the front contained 23 rifle divisions,¹ one cavalry corps, two tank corps, ten independent tank brigades, and one independent tank regiment. Besides this, two rifle divisions (183rd and 111th), one tank corps (4th) and three ski-rifle brigades, which had not yet arrived at the front by the start of the operation, were en route. As a result of the completed regroupings and the concentration of the reserves arriving from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the disposition of the Voronezh Front’s forces by the start of the operation was as follows. The 40th and 3rd Tank armies and the 18th Rifle Corps were deployed in an area from Kremenchug to Kholodnyi. Of the overall number of the front’s forces, there were operating along this sector 15 rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, one cavalry and two tank corps, eight independent tank brigades, one

independent tank regiment, and more than 50 artillery regiments,² or 65 percent of all the front’s rifle formations and 90 percent of the tank formations. The front’s operational formation consisted of the first-echelon troops, a mobile group and a reserve. The first-echelon forces (40th Army, 18th Rifle Corps, and 3rd Tank Army) were in three groups of forces, the actions of which were united by a single operational idea. The 40th Army was deployed along an 84-kilometer sector from Kremenchug to Staroe Pokrovskoe. The army’s main forces were grouped along the Storozhevoe bridgehead along the 10-kilometer height 187—Devitsa breakthrough sector. The formation of the army’s shock group was in two echelons. Four rifle divisions and three tank brigades were to operate in the first echelon.³ One rifle division and one rifle brigade were in the second echelon.⁴ The 18th Rifle Corps deployed along the left bank of the Don along a 154-kilometer front from Staroe Pokrovskoe to Novaya Kalitva. The corps’ shock group was concentrated along the Shchuch’e bridgehead. In order to break through the enemy’s defense along an 8-kilometer sector from height 160.7 to Pereezzhee, the corps deployed in its first echelon two rifle divisions, one rifle and one tank brigades and a tank regiment.⁵ The corps’ second echelon consisted of one rifle division and one tank brigade.⁶ The 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ remaining 230-kilometer front, excluding the breakthrough sectors, was defended by special units and elements with an average defensive density of up to ten kilometers for each battalion. The 3rd Tank Army deployed along a 25-kilometer sector from Fisenkovo to Yasinovatyi.⁷ The army’s main group of forces was concentrated along a 16-kilometer breakthrough front from Pasekovo to Yasinovatyi. The army had in its first echelon along the breakthrough sector three rifle divisions and three tank brigades.

Besides this, the 37th Rifle Brigade was deployed in the army’s first echelon along the front from Fisenkovo to Pasekovo. The army’s second echelon consisted of two tank corps. The army’s tank reserve was formed from two of the 15th Tank Corps’ tank brigades, which were late arriving in their jumping-off areas for the offensive. A mobile group had concentrated in the 3rd Tank Army’s attack sector, consisting of the 7th Cavalry Corps and the 201st Independent Tank Brigade attached to it. By the start of the operation the front reserve consisted only of the 322nd Rifle Division, which was located behind the 40th Army’s shock group, and the 104th Rifle Brigade, which was concentrated in the 60th Army’s sector. Thus six rifle divisions and a rifle brigade were deployed along the 10-kilometer breakthrough sector of the front’s northern shock group, which yielded an operational density of 1.5 kilometers of front per division.⁸ Three rifle divisions and one rifle brigade were deployed along the 8-kilometer breakthrough sector of the front’s central shock group, which yielded an operational density of 2.3 kilometers per division. Three rifle divisions and two tank corps were concentrated along the axis of the 3rd Tank Army’s main attack (a 16-kilometer front). The rifle forces’ operational density was not high here, comprising more than five kilometers per division. Thus 12 rifle divisions and two rifle brigades were deployed along three breakthrough sectors having an overall width of 34 kilometers, as well as 2,644 guns and mortars and 677 tanks, which comprised, accordingly, 82 percent, 84 percent and 100 percent of all the men and materiel operating along the front’s offensive sector. Such a concentration of men and materiel along the breakthrough sectors, which had been accomplished by weakening all of the secondary sectors and axes, testified to the fact that the Soviet command,

having made a thorough evaluation of the situation in the sector of the front’s forthcoming offensive, was able to undertake a bold and justified risk. From the moment the front received orders to prepare and conduct the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation and to the start of the offensive; that is, from 21 December 1942 to 12 January 1943, a number of changes had taken place in the disposition of the enemy’s forces. Due to the change in the boundary line between the Southwestern and Voronezh fronts, the latter’s operational sector increased by 70 kilometers, and thus the enemy group of forces opposite the Voronezh Front increased by five divisions and one divisional group. Besides this, the German-Fascist command, not particularly believing in the resilience of its satellites’ forces—the Hungarian Second Army and the remnants of the Italian Eighth Army—defending along the Don south of Voronezh, had reinforced the most important sectors of the front with German units. The 700th Independent Tank Detachment, numbering up to 100 tanks and assault guns, had been shifted to the Storozhevoe bridgehead. A regiment from the 88th Infantry Division, which had been removed from the Voronezh axis, was concentrating in the Ostrogozhsk area. The Italian 5th Infantry Division, which was defending the sector between Novaya Kalitva and Kashcheevo, having been defeated in the December fighting, had been pulled into the reserve and concentrated in the Roven’ki area, while the 3rd Mountain Rifle Division, which remained along this sector, was given a defensive zone between the German 385th and 387th infantry divisions. The enemy concentrated in the area south of Kamenka the German 26th Infantry Division, which had been transferred there from the German Second Army’s sector. This division and the German 168th Infantry Division and the Hungarian 1st Panzer Division, which had been in this area earlier, formed a special designation corps, Army Group B’s sole operational reserve. Thus the overall number of enemy formations defending opposite the Voronezh Front increased by six divisions and one divisional

group during the period from 12 December 1942 to 12 January 1943 and by the start of the operation comprised 28 divisions.⁹ The average operational density of the enemy’s forces increased to 17 kilometers of front per division. The enemy forces facing the Voronezh Front were located in two major groups of forces. A large part of his Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces—the German Second Army—(the remaining forces of this group were defending opposite the Bryansk Front’s left wing) were defending along the 136-kilometer front Kozinka—Gremyach’e opposite the 38th and 60th armies. These forces consisted of seven infantry divisions, which numbered about 74,000 men, 3,000 machine guns, about 250 mortars, and more than 700 guns (including 300 anti-tank guns). The enemy group of forces operating along the 310-kilometer front from Gremyach’e to Kashcheevo consisted of 21.5 divisions, including 6.5 German, ten Hungarian and five Italian. The average operational density here reached 16 kilometers of front per division. This group of forces numbered more than 260,000 soldiers and officers, about 8,400 machine guns, more than 800 mortars, more than 900 guns (including 100 anti-tank guns), and more than 300 tanks. Thus changes in the disposition of the enemy forces were only of a local type. The increase in the number of divisions came about as the result of widening the operational zones. The enemy continued to maintain major forces in the Voronezh area. The German-Fascist command did not transfer any forces from the depth, except for the 26th Infantry Division.

The Correlation of Men and Materiel by the Start of the Operation

The creation of the necessary superiority in men and materiel over

the enemy was linked with significant difficulties due to the fact that the Voronezh Front had an unfavorable overall correlation of forces along its entire operational zone. As was noted above, facing the enemy’s 28 divisions, with an average strength of 11-12,000 men, by the start of the operation the Voronezh Front had 23 rifle divisions, the average strength of which was not more than 7,000 men, and five rifle brigades. The correlation of men and materiel by various indices along the front’s entire sector is shown in Table III/12.2.¹⁰

Table III/12.2 The Correlation of Men and Materiel in the Voronezh Front’s Sector by the Start of the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ Operation

From this table it is clear that the front, while enjoying a certain advantage over the enemy in artillery and tanks, was inferior to him in rifle formations and planes. In these conditions the creation of the necessary superiority along the axes chosen for the offensive was made more difficult. As has already been noted, in accordance with the decision adopted, the commander of the Voronezh Front concentrated his main forces in the center and along the front’s left wing (along the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ breakthrough sectors). All of the Stavka reserves for the front were concentrated there, as well as a number of formations and units transferred there from the front’s right wing. However, even in this case the front did not manage to significantly change the correlation of forces in its favor. It remained approximately the same as along the entire operational zone, comprising 1.3:1 in infantry in favor of the enemy and 1:2 in favor of our troops in artillery and tanks. See Table III/12.3.

Table III/12.3 The Correlation of Men and Materiel in the Front’s Offensive Sector (in the 40th Army’s, 18th Rifle Corps’ and 3rd Tank Army’s Sectors)

The front commander, in shifting part of his forces from the front’s right wing to the center and left wing, also took into account the circumstance that the front, following the defeat of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, would have to carry out an operation to defeat his Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. In foreseeing this, the forces that were left in the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors along the Voronezh axis during the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ operation were able to support the tying down of the enemy’s powerful Voronezh—Kastornoe group of enemy forces and which, upon the completion of this operation, would make it easier to quickly create shock groups in the 38th and 60th armies’ zones without complex front-level regroupings. By the start of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation there were eight rifle divisions and two rifle brigades in these armies’ zones against seven GermanFascist divisions. However, lacking the necessary superiority in forces over the enemy, either along the front’s entire width and along the zone of the forthcoming offensive, the front commander was able to skillfully group the available men and materiel and achieve a decisive superiority over the enemy along the selected axes, where the superiority in men and materiel was expressed, on the average, as follows: 1½ in divisions, almost four times in artillery, and two times in tanks. The correlation of men and materiel along each of the three axes, where a breakthrough of the enemy’s defense was being organized, is shown in Table III/12.4. The decisive concentration of men and materiel along the chosen axes, which enabled us to create the necessary operational densities for a breakthrough and a superiority over the enemy throughout the entire depth of his operational formation, also enabled us to enjoy high tactical densities along the breakthrough sectors and a significant superiority over the enemy during the breakthrough of his main defense zone. See Table III/12.5.

At the same time, along the remaining sectors of the front, for the defense of which small forces had been allocated, the enemy was several times superior to the Voronezh Front’s opposing forces. For example, along the 40th Army’s weakened sectors stretching 74 kilometers, there were about 50 men, two machine guns, 1.5 mortars of all calibers, and 0.6 guns per kilometer of front. The same density was present along the 18th Rifle Corps’ secondary sectors (156 kilometers), where there were 85 men, four machine guns, two mortars, and 0.5 guns per kilometer of front. The enemy opposite these sectors had, overall, nine full-strength divisions. Besides this, his reserves were stationed here, consisting of two infantry and one panzer division. Along the 3rd Tank Army’s 46-kilometer secondary sector (Novaya Kalitva—Pasekovo) our forces and those of the enemy were almost equal—2½ enemy divisions against the Soviet forces’ two divisions and one rifle brigade. Table III/12.5 shows that thanks to the superiority in men and materiel achieved, favorable prerequisites were created along the breakthrough sectors for the successful breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. This correlation of forces was also maintained during the operation’s development, as is clear from Table III/12.4. Thus, having concentrated a superior number of men and materiel along the chosen axes, the front commander could begin the offensive operation, having a superiority over the enemy, both during the breakthrough of the defense and during the development of the offensive in the operational depth. The presence of a favorable correlation of forces was, as will be seen below, one of the main factors in achieving the success of the offensive.

Table III/12.4 The Correlation of Men and Materiel along the Attack Axes of the Front’s Shock Groups

141st Rifle Division (minus a rifle regiment), 25th Guards Rifle Division, 340th, 322nd, 107th, and 305th rifle divisions, and the 253rd Rifle Brigade. 220th Infantry Division (minus an infantry regiment), a regiment from the 7th Infantry Division, the 168th Infantry Division, and a regiment from the 88th Infantry Division. 3129th Rifle Brigade, 309th, 219th and 161st rifle divisions. 412th and 26th infantry divisions, 1st Panzer Division. 5180th Rifle Division, 48th Guards Rifle Division, 184th Rifle Division, 37th Rifle Brigade, and 7th Cavalry Corps. 6“Group Fegelein,” 27th Panzer Division and 25th Infantry Division.

Table III/12.5 Tactical Densities and the Correlation of Men and Materiel Along the Armies’ Breakthrough Sectors During the Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Main Defensive Zone

As is clear, the operation’s nearly three-week preparatory period was filled with very intensive work by the front’s command, headquarters, troops and political apparatus for the all-round preparation and support for the operation. During this time all of the main questions for organizing and supporting the operation in the operational, political and materiel-technical senses were successfully resolved. Along with this, as has already been mentioned, by 12 January; that is, by the deadline established by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the concentration of all forces designated for the offensive according to the operational plan, had not been completed. Aside from this, the necessary supplies of materiel, which could have fully supported the successful conduct of the operation, had not been created among the troops and in the army depots of the southern shock group. Taking this into account, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command authorized the commander of the Voronezh Front to postpone the beginning of the offensive by two days; that is, to begin the operation not on 12 January, but on 14 January. However, this deadline proved to be insufficient so as to cope with the completion of the operation’s preparation. The front was not able during this time to substantially alter the situation regarding the 3rd Tank Army’s materiel support. The late-arriving formations and units were also unable to concentrate in their jumping-off areas for the offensive. The supreme command, taking into account the overall situation along the southern sector of the Soviet-German front, which was characterized by the successful offensive by the forces of the Southern¹¹ and Southwestern fronts along the Rostov and Voroshilovgrad axes and the Don Front’s offensive for the purpose of eliminating the enemy’s Stalingrad group of forces, was not able to further postpone the beginning of the Voronezh Front’s offensive and ordered it to begin the operation on January 14.

Simultaneously, the Stavka, as was noted above, authorized the Voronezh Front to use part of the materiel supplies from the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army.

1In reaching this figure, the 160th and 127th rifle divisions, which were transferred from the 6th Army on 17 January, are counted. 2Counting the rifle divisions’ artillery regiments. 3The 141st, 25th Guards, 340th, and 107th rifle divisions, and the 116th, 150th and 86th independent tank brigades. 4The 305th Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade. 5The 129th Rifle Brigade, the 309th and 219th rifle divisions, the 262nd Tank Regiment, and the 96th Tank Brigade. 6The 161st Rifle Division and the 192nd Tank Brigade. 7The sector of the front from Novaya Kalitva to Fisenkovo was occupied by the 6th Army’s 127th and 160th rifle divisions. 8In calculating these figures, the 322nd Rifle Division (the front reserve) was counted, while a rifle brigade is considered to be 0.5 of a division. 9The “Fegelein” divisional group is counted as a division and the independent panzer detachment as 0.5 of a division. 10 The data listed in Table III/12.2 (as well as in the following tables) on our forces was taken from the returns on the combat and numerical composition of the Voronezh Front’s forces as of 10 January 1943. The data on the enemy was compiled from materials from the Voronezh Front’s headquarters and refined with captured

documents from the German-Fascist army’s general staff. 11 On 1 January 1943 the Stalingrad Front was renamed the Southern Front.

Part B

The Conduct of the Operation The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation was conducted in two stages. During the first stage, which lasted three days (13-15 January), the front’s forces carried out the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along three axes and created the necessary conditions for the development of the operation to encircle and destroy his Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The second stage involved the encirclement and destruction of the enemy group of forces. This stage lasted 12 days (16-27 January). During this stage’s first three days (16-18 January) the front’s forces carried out a maneuver to encircle and split up the enemy group of forces, forming internal and external encirclement fronts. During the subsequent ten days (19-27 January) the final elimination of the enemy’s encircled forces took place. During this time the 40th Army regrouped for conducting the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation and began carrying it out on 24 January, while the 3rd Tank Army and 18th Rifle Corps were completing their regrouping for the conduct of the Khar’kov offensive operation, by moving to the Oskol River.

13

The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Tactical Defense (The First Stage of the Operation, 13-15 January) Due to the fact that the forward battalions’ successful actions, which were carried out on 12 January along the Storozhevoe bridgehead, had created a favorable situation for the immediate attack by the main forces of the 40th Army’s shock group, the offensive along this axis began on 13 January; that is, one day earlier than the rest of the front’s forces. On the morning of 14 January the offensive unfolded along all three axes. On this day the Southwestern Front’s neighboring 6th Army went over to the attack. By the close of 15 January the front’s northern and southern shock groups—the 40th and 3rd Tank armies —had completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s entire tactical depth, while the 18th Rifle Corps, having broken through the main defensive zone on 14 January, reached the second defensive zone on 15 January, where it entered into fighting with the enemy’s operational reserves. The successful accomplishment of the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense by the forces of the 40th and 3rd Tank armies and the diversion of the greater part of the German-Fascist command’s operational reserve to the 18th Rifle Corps’ offensive sector created highly favorable conditions for conducting a maneuver to encircle and split up the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces and to subsequently destroy it in detail, which was accomplished by the front’s forces during the course of the operation’s next stage.

A detailed description of the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ and 18th Rifle Corps’ battles for the purpose of breaking through the enemy’s defense and their results are given below.

Map 5 Overall Course of the Voronezh Front’s Combat Operations in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation.

THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE TACTICAL DEPTH OF THE ENEMY’S DEFENSE IN THE 40TH ARMY’S OFFENSIVE ZONE

(13-15 January)

The Breakthrough of the Main Defensive Zone

The Forward Battalion’s Actions along the Storozhevoe Bridgehead on 12 January

The successful actions of the forward battalions, which were carried out on 12 January along the Storozhevoe bridgehead, preceded the offensive by the main forces of the 40th Army’s shock group, planned for 14 January. These actions were carried out for the purpose of refining the true outline of the forward edge of the enemy defense’s main zone and for seizing the enemy’s individual important strong points along the forward edge of his defense, the capture of which would create favorable attack conditions for the troops of the army’s shock group. As was shown above, two rifle battalions from the 25th Guards Rifle

Division and two rifle battalions from the 107th Rifle Division were detached for carrying out the reconnaissance in force. The 25th Guards Rifle Division’s forward battalions received orders to capture the grove two kilometers north of Uryvo-Pokrovskoe. The 107th Rifle Division’s battalions were to seize the central and northwestern parts of the village of Uryvo-Pokrovskoe, the grove 500 meters to the west, and the village of Goldaevka. The resolution of these tasks would significantly improve our observation of the depth of the enemy’s defense, would remove the difficulties involved in overcoming a deep gully running to the north from Uryvo-Pokrovskoe, would enable us to move our forces out of the low-lying area, and would also make it easier to seize the enemy’s powerful strong point, which had been outfitted on height 160. Before the beginning of the forward battalions’ attack, our intelligence had established that the northwestern and central parts of the village of Uryvo-Pokrovskoe were being defended by a battalion of the 4th Infantry Regiment/Hungarian 7th Infantry Division; another battalion from the same regiment was defending in the grove to the north of this inhabited locale; the village of Goldaevka was defended by a battalion of the same division’s 35th Infantry Regiment; the grove to the west of Goldaevka was occupied by a march battalion that had arrived to reinforce the 7th Infantry Division; elements of the German 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment were concentrated in the Dovgalevka area. The offensive by the 25th Guards and 107th rifle divisions’ forward battalions was supported by the fire of four artillery regiments, two batteries of high-powered artillery, and two battalions of M-13 rocket artillery, as well as assault aviation. Besides this, the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s battalions were reinforced with tanks to the tune of one tank company per battalion. On the night of 11-12 January the 107th Rifle Division’s sappers laid a large number of

explosives under the enemy’s wire obstacles. All of the explosives were simultaneously detonated before the forward battalions’ attack and passages were created in the wire obstacles for the attacking infantry. At 1200 on 12 January, following an hour-long artillery preparation, which concluded with a 10-minute fire onslaught and a salvo by two battalions of M-13 rocket artillery, the 107th Rifle Division’s forward battalions began their attack. At the same time, the 291st Assault Air Division, in groups of 4-6 planes each, operated against the enemy’s positions with bombing and strafing attacks in front of the Storozhevoe bridgehead. The forward battalions, having rapidly overcome the distance separating them from the enemy’s forward trench, began fighting in Goldaevka and along the southern slopes of height 160. Throughout the entire day there was fighting for this inhabited locale and the height. By the close of the day they had been taken and more than 300 prisoners captured. No less successful was the attack by the 35th Guards Rifle Division’s forward battalions. Upon going over to the attack at 1400 in the direction of the grove north of Uryvo-Pokrovskoe, the division’s battalions, with tanks from the 116th Tank Brigade, captured the center of resistance that had been fitted out in the area of the grove north of Uryvo-Pokrovskoe, following a two-hour battle. A major role in eliminating this center of resistance was played by the planes of the 291st Assault Air Division, which in the course of 40 minutes launched uninterrupted strikes against the enemy’s personnel and equipment located in the grove. The main forces of the 107th and 25th Guards rifle divisions were committed into the fighting during 12 January to develop and consolidate the forward battalions’ success. Thus, as a result of the forward battalions’ battle, the enemy’s defensive system in front of the Storozhevoe bridgehead was disrupted. Our forces penetrated into the enemy’s defense along a 6-kilometer front to a depth of 3-3.5 kilometers. The enemy was

forced to move the 700th Independent Tank Detachment from Ostrogozhsk to the Storozhevoe bridgehead and subordinate it to the commander of the 7th Infantry Division. The situation that arose in the area of the Storozhevoe bridgehead as a result of the forward battalion’s success demanded the immediate commitment of the 40th Army’s main forces into the fighting. The front commander made the correct decision that corresponded to the situation at hand—he decided to take advantage of the 107th and 25th Guards rifle divisions’ success and ordered the commander of the 40th Army to go over to the attack with his main forces not on 14 January, but on the morning of 13 January. On the night of 12-13 January units of the 40th Army’s first echelon occupied their jumping-off positions and prepared for the attack. The 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps were to begin their offensive on 14 January, as had been planned. Colonel General A.M. Vasilevskii, who arrived at the Storozhevoe bridgehead on 12 January, issued a number of instructions on organizing the battle and the troops’ actions during the breakthrough.

The Attack by the Army’s Shock Group on 13 January and the Completion of the Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Main Defensive Zone

According to the operational plan for 13 January, the 40th Army’s forces had the mission of breaking through the enemy’s defense facing the Storozhevoe bridgehead to a depth of up to ten kilometers and by the close of the day reaching the line: height 176.3 (two kilometers southwest of 1st Storozhevoe)—Boldyrevka— Peskovatka—Kalinin—southern outskirts of Devitsa.

By the start of the attack by the main forces of the army’s shock group the front line along the Storozhevoe bridgehead had changed as a result of the forward battalions’ successful combat actions. There arose the necessity of making amendments to the plan for the artillery offensive. Instead of suppressing the enemy’s centers of resistance along the forward edge of his defense, which had already been eliminated by our forces, the artillery received new targets in the depth of the enemy’s defense. At dawn on 13 January, following a powerful artillery preparation, the forces of the 40th Army’s first echelon went over to the attack from the line reached by the forward battalions in the fighting on 12 January. In the first hours of fighting success was evident in the center and along the left flank of the army’s shock group. The 340th Rifle Division quickly cleaned the enemy out of the inhabited locale of Uryvo-Pokrovksoe and began to develop the offensive toward Boldyrevka. In this area fighting broke out between the 150th Tank Brigade, which had been attached to the 340th Rifle Division, and the German 700th Panzer Detachment, which consisted of up to 60 tanks and 40 assault guns and which had been committed into the fighting in order to reestablish the defense. Despite repeated counterattacks, the enemy was not successful. Having lost 14 tanks and about 200 men captured, including the commander and chief of staff of the 700th Panzer Detachment, the enemy was forced to abandon Boldyrevka. With the capture of Boldyrevka and height 178, the road from Ostrogozhsk to Voronezh was cut. The enemy was deprived of the capability to employ this convenient road for maneuvering his forces along the front. While engaged in heavy fighting, the 340th Rifle Division advanced seven kilometers that day. The 107th Rifle Division, in accordance with the operational plan, began to widen the breach in the direction of the left flank. While outflanking the enemy’s strong point in Devitsa from the northwest with its main forces, the division attacked the village from the front with part of its forces. The enemy, unable to withstand the

107th Rifle Division’s pressure, began to fall back on Kalinin and Peskovatka, pursued by the 86th Tank Brigade. Units of the 107th Rifle Division captured about 200 Hungarian soldiers and officers in the fighting for Devitsa. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, upon encountering the enemy’s stubborn resistance, was unsuccessful during the first half of the day. During the second half of 13 January, employing the success of its neighbor to the left—the 340th Rifle Division—the 25th Rifle Division resumed the offensive and began to advance to the northwest. While outflanking the right flank of the enemy’s 20th Infantry Division, the division began fighting for Dovgalevka and height 186, where it ran into resistance from the German 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment, which had been committed into the fighting by the enemy from his reserve. An intense battle for these enemy strong points continued throughout the entire second half of 13 January and into the night of 13-14 January. Only by the morning of 14 January did the division capture the inhabited locale and height. The division advanced seven kilometers in the day’s bitter fighting. The 141st Rifle Division, taking advantage of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s success, reached the gully one kilometer southwest of 1st Storozhevoe in stubborn fighting, having advanced its left flank up to four kilometers that day. Thus by the close of 13 January significant tactical successes had been achieved in the area of the Storozhevoe bridgehead. The firstechelon troops of the 40th Army’s shock group had broken through the enemy’s main defensive zone along a 10-kilometer front, advancing up to ten kilometers into the depth. Upon reaching the line of height 176.3 (two kilometers southwest of 1st Storozhevoe) —Dovgalevka—Boldyrevka—Devitsa, the army’s forces had almost completely carried out their task for the offensive’s first day. Only the 107th Rifle Division, which was supposed to have reached the line Peskovatka—Kalinin failed to carry out its assignment for that

day and advanced only four kilometers, thus not completing the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone in its area. During the day’s fighting along the Storozhevoe axis the enemy expended all of his tactical reserves—the 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment and the 700th Independent Panzer Detachment. Seeking to restore the situation along this axis, the enemy began to transfer a part of his operational reserve here from the Kamenka area to the south: another of the 168th Infantry Division’s regiments and a regiment from the 88th Infantry Division, which somewhat earlier had been transferred to the Alekseevka area from the Voronezh axis. The diversion of part of the enemy’s reserves to the north of Ostrogozhsk made it easier for the 18th Rifle Corps to break through the enemy’s defense opposite the Shchuch’e bridgehead, which began on 14 January. The 40th Army’s first successes raised the combat spirits of the Voronezh Front’s forces even higher and strengthened their confidence in victory over the enemy.

COMPLETING THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE ENEMY’S TACTICAL DEFENSE ZONE

The Commitment of the Army’s Second Echelon into the Fighting on 14 January and the Arrival of the Army’s Forces along the Axis of the Main Attack at the Enemy’s Second Defensive Zone

Following the defeat of the enemy in the main defensive zone, the next mission of the army’s attacking troops was to deny the enemy the ability to occupy the second defensive zone. The army’s forces, by augmenting the pace of the attack by the commitment of the

second echelon into the fighting, were to not only prevent the enemy’s defeated and retreating units from settling into the second zone, but to overcome the latter on the march before it could be occupied by the enemy’s reserves brought up from the depth. On the morning of 14 January the 40th Army’s shock group continued to develop the offensive. The 141st Rifle Division, with the assistance of two battalions committed into the fighting from the 253rd Rifle Brigade’s second echelon, and supporting the right flank of the army’s shock group, was attacking to the north. This division’s attack, directed at the flank and rear of the enemy’s 20th Infantry Division, forced the latter to begin withdrawing. As a result of the skillful combination of an attack by part of the forces from the front and a flanking maneuver by the 141st Rifle Division’s main forces from the south, 1st Storozhevoe, the enemy’s powerful center of resistance, was occupied. By the close of the day units of the 141st Rifle Division had begun fighting for Arkhangel’skoe. The division advanced eight kilometers during the day. The 253rd Rifle Brigade, which had been committed into the fighting on the morning of 14 January along the boundary of the 141st and 25th Guards rifle divisions, assisted the 141st Rifle Division with two battalions in capturing the enemy’s center of resistance in 1st Storozhevoe, and with another two battalions, along with the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s right-flank units and the 116th Tank Brigade, was fighting for Mastyugino. By the close of the day the brigade, having made a fighting advance of up to eight kilometers, had begun fighting for Os’kino. The army’s main forces were reliably securing the 141st Rifle Division’s and the 253rd Rifle Brigade’s position from the north. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, which was attacking to the west, made a fighting advance of five kilometers and by the close of 14

January had captured Mastyugino and was continuing to fight to the west of this place. The 340th Rifle Division, having overcome the opposing enemy’s resistance, began to slowly advance to the southwest. The 305th Rifle Division, which was located in the army’s second echelon, was committed into the fighting on the morning of 14 January between the 340th and 107th rifle divisions. The army commander’s decision to commit his second echelon along another axis, different from the one called for by the operational plan, was correct and in accordance with the demands of the situation. The 305th Rifle Division was committed along the axis where we enjoyed the greatest success. Augmenting the force of the attack, by the close of the day the 305th Rifle Division’s left flank had reached the enemy’s second defensive zone in the Prilepy area. In the day’s fighting the division advanced five kilometers along its right flank and 12 kilometers along the left. For the purpose of widening the breakthrough toward the flank and destroying the enemy in the areas of Korotoyak and Ostrogozhsk, the 107th Rifle Division, as had been foreseen by the operational plan, continued to attack to the south. By the close of the day the division had thrown back the remnants of the 7th Infantry Division to the Potudan’ River and captured the river’s high right bank in the area of Mostishch on the heels of the enemy. Along its right flank, the division, together with the neighboring 305th Rifle Division, reached the second line of the enemy’s defense in the Prilepy area. During the day the division made a fighting advance of 5-10 kilometers. Thus on 14 January; that is, on the operation’s second day, the army commander committed into the fighting his second echelon—the 253rd Rifle Brigade and the 305th Rifle Division. The 253rd Rifle Brigade was committed to widen the breakthrough toward the flank, while the 305th Rifle Division was committed to develop the

offensive along the axis of the army’s main attack. By the close of the second day of the offensive, the enemy transferred from his reserve the entire 68th Infantry Division to the 40th Army’s attack sector, occupying a sector of the enemy’s second defensive line with part of its forces. By the close of 14 January the 40th Army’s offensive front had been widened to 50 kilometers, while the depth of the troops’ advance reached up to 17 kilometers. However, the army’s forces had failed to carry out their mission of capturing the second defensive line from the march. It was only along the axis of its main attack that the army reached the second defensive line and began fighting to capture it.

The Fight with the Enemy’s Operational Reserves and the Capture of the Second Defensive Line on 15 January

The situation that had arisen by the close of 14 January in the army’s offensive zone required from the troops a further increase in the pace of the offensive, so as to not only complete the breakthrough of the entire tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, but to also more quickly get across the enemy’s lines of retreat and, in conjunction with the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps, conclude the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, as called for in the operational plan. On the morning of 15 January the 40th Army resumed its attack for the purpose of breaking through the second line of the enemy’s defense. The army’s right-flank formations—the 141st Rifle Division and 253rd Rifle Brigade—while attacking in the directions of Yablochnoe and Rossoshki, secured the actions of the army’s main forces from

the north. By the close of the day these formations, having made a fighting advance of ten kilometers, reached the line Maslov Log— Yablochnoe—height 209. Facing them were the retreating elements of the Hungarian 6th, 20th and part of the 7th infantry divisions and the remains of the German 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment. The German-Fascist command, fearing that a further advance by the 40th Army’s right-flank forces to the northwest would create the real threat of their getting into the rear of the German Second Army’s formations, which were defending in the Voronezh area, as early as 15 January began to remove part of its forces from the right bank of the Don in the Voronezh area for the purpose of employing them against the 40th Army’s attacking forces. For example, during 15 January a regiment from the German 57th Infantry Division was moved to the Vyaznovatka area (50 kilometers west of Voronezh) by rail. The 25th Guards and the 305th rifle divisions, attacking in the direction of Rep’evka and Krasnoe, overcame the enemy’s resistance along the second defensive line and in the day’s fighting advanced up to 20 kilometers. By the close of the day the division had captured the line Skoritskoe—Fabritskii, and the 305th Rifle Division the line Komsomolets—Svistovka—Bogoslavka. The enemy did not put up much resistance along these divisions’ attack front and was falling back with his main forces to the northwest and south. Here only small and isolated groups from the defeated Hungarian 20th and 7th infantry divisions were operating. In order to strengthen his group of forces along the axis of the main attack, the army commander committed the 340th Rifle Division into the space between the 305th and 107th rifle divisions for an attack in the general direction of Lesnoe-Ukolovo. Having overcome the resistance of the Hungarian 7th Division’s retreating elements along the enemy’s second defensive line, the 340th Rifle Division reached the line Zaversh’e—Ternovoe. The division was

counterattacked along this line by fresh enemy reserves—the 168th Infantry Division and a regiment from the 88th Infantry Division— which had been moved here from the Ostrogozhsk area. Bitter fighting raged along the approaches to these inhabited locales. During the day the division repelled a number of powerful enemy counterattacks and by the close of the day, being squeezed along its right flank, consolidated along the line height 193—Ternovoe. Following the repulse of the enemy’s counterattacks, the commander of the 340th Rifle Division moved up the 150th Tank Brigade in the direction of Lesnoe-Ukolovo. The brigade managed to break through the enemy’s combat formation and by the close of the day capture Lesnoe-Ukolovo and organize a perimeter defense. The 107th Rifle Division, while attacking to the south, encountered resistance by the Hungarian 13th Infantry Division along the line of the Potudan’ River. Following heavy fighting, with the enemy counterattacking the division’s attacking units from the Ternovoe and Korotoyak areas, the division reached the following line: the fork in the road five kilometers northeast of Ternovoe and Averino. In the day’s fighting the division advanced only 2-6 kilometers. The division failed to achieve its mission for the day—to reach the Ostrogozhsk area and capture the town. As a result of the fighting on 15 January, the 40th Army’s forces completed the breakthrough of the entire tactical depth of the enemy’s defense. The army’s offensive front increased to 100 kilometers, while the depth of the troops’ advance reached 20 kilometers along the right flank, up to 35 kilometers in the center, and 16 kilometers along the left flank. Conditions had been created for the development of the offensive to encircle and split up the enemy group of forces in conjunction with the 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps. At the same time, in resolving these subsequent tasks, the army’s forces had to overcome certain difficulties that flowed from the following. By this time the density of the attacking forces had fallen to 17

kilometers per division. The army’s formations and units were attacking along a broad front, with poorly covered boundaries and exposed flanks. The absence of reserves at the disposal of the army commander and the 107th Rifle Division’s failure to carry out its assignment (the arrival in the Ostrogozhsk area on the offensive’s third day), significantly complicated the situation in the zone of the army’s offensive. Besides this, it was necessary to devote more attention to the securing of the shock group from the north, where the army’s forces that had been designated for creating the external front would have to fight the enemy’s formations and units being transferred from the Voronezh area.

THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE TACTICAL DEPTH OF THE ENEMY’S DEFENSE IN THE 3RD TANK ARMY’S OFFENSIVE SECTOR

(14-15 January)

The Breakthrough of the Main Defensive Line on 14 January

At 1050 on 14 January the artillery offensive began in the 3rd Tank Army’s sector. The artillery preparation for the attack continued for 1 ½ hours.¹ The thick fog made it difficult to observe the results of the artillery’s fire, as a result of which the firing points along the forward edge were not completely suppressed. At 1220 the first echelon of the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group began attacking the main line of the enemy’s defense. The enemy put up stubborn resistance to the attacking infantry and direct infantry-

support tanks. The enemy’s aviation, which attacked our combat formations, also slowed the advance of our rifle and tank formations. The 180th Rifle Division attacked the enemy along the sector Pasekovo—excluding Red Hammer State Farm. As a result of the fact that the 173rd Tank Brigade’s tanks, which had been attached to the division, encountered a deep gully along their route, which had not been discovered in time by either tank or engineering reconnaissance, the tank brigade was not able to render the necessary support to the division’s units. Seven of the brigade’s tanks got stuck in the gully, which required other tanks to evacuate them. The tank attack’s surprise had been lost. For an hour the 180th Rifle Division unsuccessfully attempted to break through the first position of the enemy’s defense. Having suffered heavy losses from enemy fire, the division was halted by the enemy in front of the forward edge of his defense. The 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions, which were attacking along the front Red Hammer State Farm—Yasinovatyi, fared just as unsuccessfully. The fighting was intense and prolonged. Following a 3-hour battle, the rifle divisions, along with their attached tank brigades, overcame the enemy’s stubborn resistance along several sectors, penetrated into the main defensive zone to a depth of 1-3 kilometers and were fighting along the line west of Pasekovo—Red Hammer State Farm —branch of the Kruten’kii State Farm. It was not long after the start of the attack that it became obvious to the army commander that the rifle divisions could not accomplish the rapid breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive line and that this would mean a delay in the commitment of the tank corps into the breakthrough for developing the offensive for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy’s group of forces. In order to carry out the breakthrough of the main zone of the enemy’s defense as quickly as possible, the commander of the 3rd Tank Army decided to commit his second echelon—the tank corps—

into the battle. At 1340 on 14 January the 12th and 15th tank corps began to move out of their jumping-off area. The 12th Tank Corps advanced in two columns: the right column, consisting of the 30th Tank and 13th Motorized Rifle brigades and the 1172nd Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, and the left column, consisting of the 106th Tank Brigade. The 15th Tank Corps, consisting of the 88th Tank and 52nd Motorized Rifle brigades and the 368th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, moved in one column. At the moment of the commitment of the army’s second echelon into the battle, the 195th and 113th tank brigades and a regiment from the 111th Rifle Division were located in the reserve of the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, and were concentrated in the Kantemirovka area. Upon entering the battle, the tank corps attacked toward Mikhailovka, Zlatopol’ and Zhilin. With the commitment of the tank corps into the battle, the situation in the 3rd Tank Army’s attack zone changed radically in our favor. The enemy began to retreat to the north and northwest, seeking to break free of our forces. He managed to do this in the 180th Rifle Division’s attack sector, where the 12th Tank Corps’ 30th Tank Brigade was operating insufficiently decisively. The 15th Tank Corps attacked significantly better and as a result of a vigorous attack reached the Zhilin area, where it utterly defeated the headquarters of the German XXIV Panzer Corps. Among those killed was the corps commander. By the close of 14 January the tank corps had advanced into the enemy position to a depth of 12-23 kilometers and seized Zlatopol’ and Zhilin and broke free of the infantry by 6-9 kilometers. The army’s rifle formations, taking advantage of and consolidating the tank corps’ success, advanced two kilometers that day along the right flank and up to 14 kilometers along the left flank, and reached the line Pasekovo—Kulikovka. Thus as a result of the intense fighting on 14 January, the 3rd Tank Army, upon committing its second echelon into the battle, broke

through the enemy’s main defensive line only along the 10kilometer sector Red Hammer State Farm—Yasinovatyi. The assignment for the first day of fighting—to break through the enemy’s defense along the 16-kilometer sector Pasekovo— Yasinovatyi and reach the line Solontsy—Shramovka—Kulikovka— was not carried out. As a result of the fact that the tank corps were forced to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive line, committing for this purpose not only their forward detachments, but their main forces as well, they were unable to carry out their daily tasks—to reach the line Rossosh’—Lizinovka— Aleksandrovka. The offensive pace of the tank corps was two times less than planned. Also influencing the reduction in the tank corps’ offensive pace was the fact that they attacked along difficult terrain for them, while expending a great amount of fuel. The necessary supplies were not delivered to the tank corps on time and they sat idle all the night of 14-15 January, in expectation of the delivery of ammunition and fuel. One should note among the shortcomings in the 3rd Tank Army’s combat actions the insufficiently intense waging of artillery and machine gun fire by the tanks on the march during the attack, the lagging behind of accompaniment guns from the infantry, the insufficient employment of mortar elements for suppressing the enemy’s firing points and, finally, the delay of the attacking rifle elements’ first echelons in the enemy trenches to clear them out, instead of vigorously surging forward, and preventing the enemy from withdrawing his main forces under the cover of small rearguards. It should be noted that the offensive by the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army, which also began on the morning of 14 January, to a certain degree facilitated the success of the 3rd Tank Army’s offensive. The 6th Army’s 15th Rifle Corps attacked the enemy at 0930, following a 1-hour artillery preparation, along the front Kashcheev—Markovka (Novo-Markovka). By the close of the day the army managed to penetrate into the enemy’s defense along its right

flank to a depth of up to six kilometers. The 6th Army’s offensive made it easier for the 3rd Tank Army’s forces to carry out their mission of breaking through the enemy’s defense. The enemy was not only unable to remove part of his forces from the 6th Army’s front and transfer them to the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector, but was forced to commit into the fighting against the 6th Army almost the entire 27th Panzer Division, which was in the XXIV Panzer Corps’ reserve. Besides this, the German-Fascist command was forced to turn the 320th Infantry Division, which was being sent from France to the Rostov axis, toward the 6th Army’s offensive sector.

The Development of the Breakthrough. The commitment of the 7th Cavalry Corps into the Breakthrough

(15 January)

The situation that had developed in the Voronezh Front’s offensive sector by 15 January was favorable for the 3rd Tank Army’s forces carrying out their assigned tasks. The enemy had no fresh forces in the army’s attack zone. The enemy had begun to commit piecemeal his operational reserves against the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ attacking shock groups, as well as against the 6th Army. There were no longer any defensive zones or lines in the depth of the enemy’s defense along the axis of the 3rd Tank Army’s attack. The army had the capability of fully developing the offensive for the purpose of rapidly reaching the Karpenkovo and Alekseevka areas and linking up with the forces of the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps.

On the morning of 15 January the 3rd Tank Army launched its attack to the north and northwest. Throughout the entire day of 15 January the enemy put up powerful resistance only along the 3rd Tank Army’s right flank in the Mitrofanovka area, where the 180th Rifle Division and the 37th Rifle Brigade, which had been committed into the fighting along the latter’s axis of attack, were attacking. The enemy waged rearguard actions along the remainder of the army’s front, striving to pull out its main forces and thus avoid a defeat. The 12th Tank Corps bypassed from the west the stubbornly defending enemy center of resistance in the Mitrofanovka area and, having defeated several enemy columns retreating along its path, reached the town of Rossosh’ from the south with its main forces by the close of the day. The corps’ left-flank 106th Tank Brigade, which comprised its forward detachment, broke into Rossosh’ by means of a flanking maneuver from the direction of Arkhipovka and began fighting in the western part of town, which was being defended by units of “Group Fegelein,” which had retreated there. With the arrival of the 12th Tank Corps’ units at Rossosh’, the enemy defending opposite the 127th and 160th rifle divisions, began a disorderly withdrawal away from these divisions’ front. During the day the 12th Tank Corps advanced 35 kilometers to the north. The 15th Tank Corps, which was attacking in the general direction of Alekseevka, reached Yeremovka with its forward units on 15 January and cut the Rossosh’—Roven’ki paved road, thus cutting off the enemy’s path of retreat from the Rossosh’ area to the southwest. The corps’ main forces reached the Novoselovka—Aleksandrovka area. It was in this area that the corps’ units captured a retreating enemy column numbering about 400 men. The corps advanced 20 kilometers that day. The army’s rifle formations, while consolidating the tank corps’ success, advanced six kilometers that day along the right flank and

up to 20 kilometers along the army’s left flank. By the close of the day the 37th Rifle Brigade and the 180th and 48th Guards rifle divisions were fighting along the line Valentinovka—Vasil’evka— Alinovka. The 184th Rifle Division, which had changed the axis of its attack to the west, by this time had reached the line Kuplevakha— Krivonosovka and continued to attack along a broad front. The 179th Tank Brigade, which was operating as part of the division, was transferred to the 15th Tank Corps on 15 January by the army commander’s order, and was to reinforce the army’s group of forces attacking toward Alekseevka. The army’s offensive during 15 January was to be secured from the south by the 7th Cavalry Corps, which as early as 1700 on 14 January began to move from its jumping-off position for the commitment into the breakthrough in the 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions’ sector. The corps was to move along two routes: the 11th Cavalry Division along the route Pasyukov—Volokonsk, and the 83rd Cavalry Division, along with the 201st Tank Brigade, along the route Vysochanov—Bondarevo. By the morning of 15 January the corps had reached the Volokonsk— Novo-Belaya—Bondarevo area and effectively covered the troops of the 3rd Tank Army’s shock group from the south. Thus during the second day of the offensive the 3rd Tank Army operated in a more organized and energetic fashion. The tank corps, replenished with fuel and ammunition, set about pursuing the retreating enemy columns and by the close of the day its main forces had advanced 20-35 kilometers. The gap between the tank corps and the rifle troops was 15-25 kilometers during the day. The rifle formations also successfully operated during the day, particularly the 184th Rifle Division, which made a fighting advance of 20 kilometers that day. However, the lagging behind of the army’s right-flank formations—the 37th Rifle Brigade and 180th Rifle Division—which was caused by the enemy’s stubborn resistance in the Mitrofanovka center of resistance, rendered the advance of the army’s main group of forces significantly more difficult. The situation demanded the rapid elimination of this enemy group. By the close of 15 January the 3rd Tank Army’s offensive front had

widened to 60 kilometers. The depth of the rifle formations’ advance increased to 10-40 kilometers, and that of the army’s tank corps to 40-50 kilometers. Extremely favorable conditions had been created for developing the offensive for the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy group’s main forces in conjunction with the 40th Army and the 18th Rifle Corps.

THE 18TH RIFLE CORPS’ ATTACK FROM THE SHCHUCH’E BRIDGEHEAD DURING 14-15 JANUARY

The attack’s artillery preparation, which began at 0830, continued for two hours. The fire onslaught by artillery and mortars proved to be unexpected for the enemy. Throughout the entire period of the attack’s artillery preparation, the enemy did not wage return artillery or mortar fire. The depth of our artillery fire’s suppression of the enemy defense reached 3-4 kilometers. From the testimony of enemy officers who were subsequently captured, it became known that our artillery fire during the artillery preparation of the attack caused the enemy defending along the first position a great loss of life and equipment and disorganized his troop control. During the artillery preparation, our assault air, operating in several groups, launched strikes against the enemy’s strong points built by him in the areas of Mikhailovskii, Petrovskaya and Yekaterinovka. At 1030 the attack on the forward edge of the enemy’s defense began. The corps’ rifle units, attacking alongside the 262nd Independent Tank Regiment’s and the 96th Tank Brigade’s tanks, quickly broke through the first position of the 12th Infantry Division’s defensive line. The enemy’s attempted counterattacks with his regimental reserves, to slow down the advance of the corps’ units, were unsuccessful. By 1200 the 129th Rifle Brigade, which was operating along the

right flank of the corps’ shock group, had captured the first position’s third trench, which ran at a depth of two kilometers from the forward edge of the defense. Following the breakthrough of the first position, the brigade, along with an attached company of tanks, changed the axis of its attack to the west. While rolling up the combat formations of the enemy’s 12th Infantry Division by attacking along the Shchuch’e—Nikol’skii road, by the end of the day the brigade had reached the area of height 159.6. In a day of fighting the brigade advanced eight kilometers. The mission for the day was fulfilled. While attacking in the center of the corps’ combat formation and throwing back the enemy to the southwest, the 309th Rifle Division, along with the 262nd Tank Regiment, repelled a counterattack by a battalion of infantry with tanks, which had been brought up from the Petrovskaya area, and by the close of the day had captured the strong point in the area of the March 8th Collective Farm. The division’s right-flank units were fighting for Mikhailovskii. Thus in a day of fighting the division broke through the enemy’s main defensive zone and advanced up to eight kilometers into the depth. However, the division did not fully achieve its mission for the day— to reach the line Mikhailovskii—Yekaterinovka. The attack by the 219th Rifle Division developed less successfully. While attacking height 175.4 from the northeast and east, the infantry had difficulty covering the area from the jumping-off position to the enemy’s first trench. The heavy ice cover on the height’s slopes, the undestroyed barbed wire obstacles, and fire from the enemy’s firing points that had survived the artillery preparation all delayed the offensive by the division’s units. Only its right flank advanced, taking advantage of the neighboring 309th Rifle Division’s success. The Hungarian 12th Infantry Division’s 48th Infantry Regiment, which was defending in the area of heights 175.4 and 173, continued to put up stubborn resistance against the 219th Rifle Division’s units, despite the fact that the rest of the division’s front had been broken through and that the corps’ units had deeply

penetrated into this division’s defense. Knowing of the success of the neighboring division and that of his right flank, the commander of the 219th Rifle Division did not exhibit initiative and did not employ the 309th Rifle Division’s attack sector, and did not regroup his men and materiel to its right flank in order to outflank the enemy’s center of resistance on height 175.4. Nor did the corps commander adopt decisive measures for rendering assistance to the 219th Rifle Division with part of the 309th Rifle Division’s men and materiel for an attack against the flank and rear of the stubbornly defending Hungarian 48th Infantry Regiment. Thus, just as the division commander, the corps commander failed to regroup the 219th Rifle Division’s main forces to the 309th Rifle Division’s attack sector for outflanking height 175.4 from the northwest. The division’s units were pinned down in front of the height and suffered unjustified losses. Only direct interference by the front commander changed the situation in the corps’ offensive sector. The front commander ordered the corps to develop the success achieved in the 129th Rifle Brigade’s and 309th Rifle Division’s attack sector and to immediately pull the 219th Rifle Division back to the southern outskirts of Shchuch’e, put it in order and commit it into the fighting along the 309th Rifle Division’s breakthrough sector in the direction of Yekaterinovka, for the purpose of getting into the rear of the enemy’s 19th Infantry Division. By 1400 the 219th Rifle Division’s regrouping was completed and it began to attack along the new axis. Upon coming into contact with the enemy, the division’s units were counterattacked by an infantry battalion from the Hungarian 12th Infantry Division from the direction of the March 8th Collective Farm. The enemy’s counterattacking battalion came under fire from a battalion of rocket artillery and was almost completely destroyed. The few surviving scores of Hungarian soldiers fell back in disorder to the south. The commander of the Hungarian 48th Infantry Regiment, having determined that the 219th Rifle Division’s units, which were

outflanking him, had already appeared in the regiment’s rear, ordered a withdrawal to the south in the direction of the sheep farm and the Il’ich’s Testament Collective Farm. But at the same time, on orders of the 18th Rifle Corps commander, the 309th Rifle Division’s training battalion attacked from the woods south of Nikolaevka, with the task of cutting off the enemy’s path of retreat. Convinced of the uselessness of further resistance, the commander of the 48th Infantry Regiment ordered his men to put down their arms and, hoisting a white flag, personally led his regiment through Nikolaevka to Dukhovoe to the corps’ commander’s command post. Having crushed the enemy’s resistance, the 219th Rifle Division began to advance to the southwest and by the close of the day had reached the line excluding the March 8th Collective Farm—the sheep farm. The 309th Rifle Division’s training battalion occupied height 175.4. Throughout 14 January the aviation supporting the corps operated in individual groups of assault aircraft against the enemy’s artillery and mortar batteries in the areas of Kolomeitsevo, Petrovskaya and Yekaterinovka, and against the combat formations of the enemy infantry in the 309th Rifle Division’s sector. Thus as a result of the offensive’s first day, the 18th Rifle Corps’ shock group broke through the enemy’s main defensive zone and reached the line of height 159.6—the March 8th Collective Farm— the sheep farm. The corps’ units advanced to a depth of 4-8 kilometers. However, the corps failed to fully carry out its first-day assignment for the attack. At the same time, the situation demanded not only the complete and timely fulfillment of the tasks assigned to the corps, but also an increase in the attack’s pace, because the front’s main groups of forces—the 40th and 3rd Tank armies—were successfully developing the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. It was necessary to divert the enemy’s operational reserves to the corps’ attack sector and thus secure the operation’s successful development along the axes of the front’s main attacks.

On the evening of 14 January the corps’ commander’s combat order demanded that the troops not break off the fighting at night and that by the morning of 15 January they fully carry out the attack’s first-day task, to capture the line Mikhailovskii—Petrovskaya— Yekaterinovka—the Il’ich’s Testament Collective Farm. Simultaneously, the corps commander made the decision to commit his second echelon into the fighting on the morning of 15 January, for the purpose of augmenting his efforts along the main axis. In accordance with this, the corps’ second echelon—the 161st Rifle Division with the 192nd Tank Brigade—was ordered to move to the Shchuch’e area and on the morning of 15 January, while attacking along the boundary of the 309th and 219th rifle divisions, to develop the attack foreseen in the operational plan in the direction of the March 8th Collective Farm, Volch’e and Kamenka. On the night of 14-15 January the enemy command tried to put its defeated units in order and reestablish his defense. The enemy was hanging on to every village and every structure. On the evening of 14 January a strong wind sprang up and did not cease the entire night, while the temperature fell to -25 degrees Celsius. In these conditions the corps’ units undertook night fighting and by the morning of 15 January had achieved the following results. The 129th Rifle Brigade, having completely captured height 159.6, reached the inhabited locale of Nikol’skii and had begun fighting for the latter. The 309th Rifle Division captured the inhabited locales of Mikhailovskii and Petrovskaya and was attacking in the direction of Kolomeitsevo. The 219th Rifle Division reached the line the March 8th Collective Farm—the Il’ich’s Testament Collective Farm. The 161st Rifle Division, with the 192nd Tank Brigade, reached the area of the March 8th Collective Farm and was ready to attack along the boundary between the 309th and 219th rifle divisions.

As a result of the night fighting, the corps had accomplished its assignment for the operation’s first day, having advanced to a depth of 10-12 kilometers, while widening the breakthrough front to 16 kilometers. The corps’ fulfillment of its assigned task facilitated the overall success of the operation. The corps’ subsequent activities underscored even more its important role in the front operation. In analyzing the corps’ actions during the attack’s first day, it is necessary to note that in the actions of the rifle regiments and battalions we see a tendency to launch head-on attacks against strong points and fortified inhabited locales, which led to excessive losses and slowed down the pace of the attack. It was only during the second half of the day, and particularly at night, that a flanking maneuver against the strong points and inhabited locales defended by the enemy began to be employed more boldly and broadly. The actions of the 219th Rifle Division are illustrative of this. Having failed to achieve success in frontal attacks on height 175.4, the division was transferred on orders of the front commander, to the 309th Rifle Division’s attack sector. Despite the fact that the 219th Rifle Division was already in contact with the enemy, this maneuver was carried out rapidly and with great success. The division, which was now attacking along a new axis, completely defeated an enemy infantry regiment in a few hours and advanced more than six kilometers. At the same time that the front’s flank shock groups—the 40th and 3rd Tank armies—were developing the offensive, enveloping the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces from the north and south, the 18th Rifle Corps continued to attack in order to break up this group of forces into isolated units and destroy them in detail in conjunction with the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ forces. On 15 January the corps’ formations, in accordance with their assigned tasks, were to develop the offensive in the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense.

Having completed carrying out the operation’s first-day task at night, on the morning of 15 January the corps attacked along a broad front along three axes. The corps’ right-flank formations—the 129th Rifle Brigade and the 309th Rifle Division—attacked to the west toward Ostrogozhsk, in which area they were to link up with the 40th Army’s left-flank formations and thus cut off the Hungarian 13th and 10th infantry divisions from the rest of the enemy’s forces. The 161st Rifle Division, which had been committed into the fighting along the axis of the corps’ main attack along with the 192nd Tank Brigade, developed the attack toward Kamenka and Karpenkovo, with the task of linking up with the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps in the Karpenkovo area. The left-flank 219th Rifle Division changed the direction of its attack to the south, toward Marki and Saguny, rolling up the defense of the Hungarian 19th and 23rd infantry divisions along the right bank of the Don. Throughout 15 January the 129th Rifle Brigade was fighting to capture the enemy’s strong points in Zaluzhnoe and Lyski. The brigade commander, underestimating the enemy’s forces in the Zaluzhnoe—Lyski area, decided to capture these strong points with an infantry frontal attack without sufficient artillery preparation. Nor was cooperation organized with a battalion of the 309th Rifle Division, which was defending along the left bank of the Don in the area of the railroad bridge north of Zaluzhnoe. This battalion received orders from the corps commander to capture Lyski and hold the inhabited locale until the arrival of the 129th Rifle Brigade’s elements. At 1300 the 129th Rifle Brigade’s rifle battalions attacked Zaluzhnoe and Lyski. Upon encountering the enemy’s strong resistance from the eastern outskirts of these inhabited locales, the battalions were forced to hit the dirt. A battalion from the 309th Rifle Division, which began its attack over the Don toward Lyski from the north, without cooperating with the 129th Rifle Brigade’s elements, also failed to achieve success. In order to capture as quickly as possible

the inhabited locales of Zaluzhnoe and Lyski, the front commander ordered a company from the 40th Army’s junior lieutenant’s course to be thrown into the 129th Rifle Brigade’s attack zone in order to eliminate the stubbornly resisting enemy. The company was given the task of launching an attack from the western outskirts of Svoboda in the direction of Melogor’e Station into the flank and rear of the enemy’s strong points. During the second half of the day the commander of the 129th Rifle Brigade, having organized the cooperation of his battalions with the 309th Rifle Division’s battalion and the company of cadets, repeated the attack on Zaluzhnoe and Lyski, following a fire onslaught from our artillery and a battalion of armored trains. As a result of heavy fighting, the enemy elements in these strong points were defeated by 0300. The brigade gained freedom of maneuver for the further attack on Ostrogozhsk. By 1200 the 309th Rifle Division, which was attacking south of the 129th Rifle Brigade, had eliminated the enemy’s strong point in Kolomeitsevo and, having taken up the pursuit of the remnants of the Hungarian 12th Infantry Division’s defeated units, had reached along its right flank the eastern outskirts of Pukhovo, which was a powerful enemy strong point in his second line of defense, while the division’s left flank penetrated into the second line from the march and captured the inhabited locale of Yasenovo, which was located at a depth of five kilometers from the forward edge. By the morning of 16 January the division’s units captured Pukhovo, without ceasing to fight at night. No fresh enemy forces were noted in the 309th Rifle Division’s zone throughout 15 January. During this time the division’s units advanced 12-15 kilometers. On the morning of 15 January the 161st Rifle Division and the 192nd Tank Brigade were committed into the fighting along the boundary between the 309th and 219th rifle divisions. The division had a two-echelon combat formation. Two regiments and the tank brigade attacked in the first echelon; a rifle regiment constituted the

second echelon. The 1240th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment was left as the artillery-anti-tank reserve. The 161st Rifle Division, which deployed northwest of height 198, began its attack and came into contact with the retreating and dispersed elements of the Hungarian 12th and 19th infantry divisions in the area of the 2nd Five-Year Plan Collective Farm and began to develop the attack toward Krutets and Volch’e. At 1700 the division’s units, while pushing the enemy aside, reached these inhabited locales, where they encountered powerful resistance by a regiment from the German 26th Infantry Division, which had been brought up from the reserve and which had occupied the second defensive zone along the Krutets—Volch’e sector. Fierce fighting by the division’s units to take these strong points in the second zone of the enemy’s defense was not successful before the end of the day. Following a series of unsuccessful attacks, the division commander decided to consolidate along the line reached and during the night and bring up his second echelon and lagging artillery and resume the attack on the enemy’s strong points on the morning of 16 January. The 219th Rifle Division, which was attacking to the south, captured Yekaterinovka by 1500 on 15 January and by the close of the day reached the line height 198—Svoboda. Throughout the day the enemy put up stubborn resistance to the division’s units. The division’s attempts to seize Verkhnie Marki and Marki at night were unsuccessful. During the fighting on 15 January the 219th Rifle Division advanced six kilometers. Thus by the close of 15 January the depth of the units’ advance reached 15-25 kilometers, while the corps’ offensive front increased to 50 kilometers. All of the corps’ available forces had been committed into the fighting. The enemy in the corps’ sector had begun to thrown in his reserves as early as the attack’s second day. Having occupied a sector of the second defensive zone with part of the 26th Infantry Division’s forces, the German-Fascist command managed to somewhat slow the corps’ offensive pace along the axis of its main attack. All of the enemy’s 26th Infantry Division and his

1st Panzer Division were moving up to the Volch’e—Krutets area. In these conditions, the front commander, who was intently following the development of the situation in the corps’ sector, demanded from the corps’ units an even more energetic and relentless attack to divert upon itself and tie down as many enemy forces as possible in the interests of the successful development of the offensive by the 40th and 3rd Tank armies. By the close of 15 January the Voronezh Front’s troops had broken through the enemy’s defense along all three axes. In the 40th and 3rd Tank armies the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense had been completed along these armies’ entire offensive sector. The 18th Rifle Corps had been unable to completely overcome the enemy’s resistance along the second defensive zone. The enemy managed to occupy it with his reserves and delay the advance of the corps’ units. The attraction of the enemy’s reserves to the 18th Rifle Corps’ breakthrough sector aided the front’s flank shock groups in successfully carrying out their assigned tasks. In three days of fierce fighting the front’s northern shock group widened the breakthrough along the front to 100 kilometers and had advanced into the enemy’s position to a depth of up to 35 kilometers along the axis of its main attack. By the close of 15 January our forces’ front along this axis ran along the line southeastern outskirts of Borshchevo—southern outskirts of Yablochnoe—height 209—Fabritskii—Komsomolets—Svistovka— Bogoslavka—height 193—northern outskirts of Ternovoe—Averino. The 40th Army’s forces got the opportunity to ceaselessly develop the offensive to the southwest for the purpose of rapidly linking up with the 3rd Tank Army’s forces and completing the encirclement of the enemy group of forces in the Alekseevka area, to which point 40 kilometers remained. Simultaneously, the army was able to develop almost unopposed the offensive to the northwest and west. The front’s central shock group, having widened the breakthrough

along the front to 50 kilometers and increased the depth of the advance to 25 kilometers, reached by the close of 15 January the line Zaluzhnoe—Lyski—Pukhovo—Yasenovo—excluding Krutets— excluding Volch’e—height 198—Svoboda—Kolybel’ka. Upon reaching this line, the corps had the opportunity to develop attacks toward the flanks, rolling up the enemy’s defense along the right bank of the Don. In order to successfully develop the attack along the axis of its main attack, in the 161st Rifle Division’s zone, the corps had to crush the resistance by the enemy’s operational reserves and, upon arriving in the Karpenkovo area, carry out its assigned task—linking up there with the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps. During the course of two days of bitter fighting, the southern shock group widened the breakthrough along the front to 60 kilometers and advanced to the northwest and west with its rifle forces to a depth of 10-40 kilometers, and with its mobile formations to a depth of 40-50 kilometers. By the close of 15 January our troops’ front along this axis ran along the line Valentinovka—Vasil’evka— Alinovka—Kuplevakha—Krivonosovka—Volokonsk—Novo-Belaya. Upon their arrival at this line, the army’s forces could begin carrying out their next task—to vigorously develop the offensive to the north and northwest for both a linkup with the 18th Rifle Corps and the 40th Army in the areas of Karpenkovo and Alekseevka, and to the west, along with the 7th Cavalry Corps, in order to form an external front. By this time the 6th Army, attacking to the south, had reached the front Solenyi—Kamenka—Markovka (Novo-Markovka). During the 13-15 January fighting the front’s forces defeated the Hungarian 20th, 7th and 12th infantry divisions defending in the main zone and the Germans’ “Fegelein” divisional group. The German-Fascist command, while attempting to delay the

offensive by the front’s shock groups, committed into the battle for the main defensive zone its tactical reserves—700th Panzer Detachment and a regiment from the 168th Infantry Division— against the 40th Army’s forces. These reserves were completely routed by our forces. Upon our forces’ arrival at the second zone and the fighting to capture it, the enemy began to commit his operational reserves into the fighting: the 168th Infantry Division and a regiment from the 88th Infantry Division against the 40th Army, and the 26th Infantry Division against the 18th Rifle Corps. The battle against these reserves had not ceased by the close of the operation’s first stage and still demanded great efforts on our part during the offensive’s subsequent days. Thus, following the completion of the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, the front’s forces faced the task of developing a vigorous attack to encircle and split up the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The operational situation for the successful accomplishment of this task was quite favorable for the front’s forces. The enemy’s reserves had been, for the most part, committed against the 18th Rifle Corps. The front’s flank shock groups—the 40th and 3rd Tank armies—which were enveloping the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces from the north and south, had numerous opportunities to uninterruptedly develop the offensive in the general direction of Alekseevka and to complete the encirclement of the enemy’s main forces in the Alekseevka area. There were no fresh enemy reserves or prepared defensive lines along the attack axes of these groups of forces. The 18th Rifle Corps had to defeat the enemy’s reserves and, upon subsequently reaching the Karpenkovo area, to link up there with the 3rd Tank Army’s units. The corps’ successful accomplishment of this task had great significance for eliminating the encircled enemy group of forces as quickly as possible.

One should first of all consider as a feature of the situation in which the Voronezh Front’s forces sought to break through the enemy’s defense the circumstance that the breakthrough of the enemy’s prepared defense was to be carried out in winter conditions, with a significant snow cover and in frosts going down to -25 Celsius. A great exertion of moral and physical strength was demanded from the attacking troops in carrying out their assigned tasks. As early as the offensive’s second day, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone, the offensive by the troops of the front’s shock groups was developing along several divergent axes. The rifle formations were forced to attack along a broad front. During the first stage of the battle night fighting was widely practiced, as a result of which the attacking formations and units completed carrying out their daytime tasks. In rendering aid to the attacking troops, the 2nd Air Army carried out 207 sorties during 13-15 January. During this time our fighter aviation shot down four enemy planes in air battles. Troop control during this stage’s fighting was accomplished from command and observation posts. An auxiliary control post was deployed along the attack axis of the front’s southern shock group, at which there was located an operational group from the front’s headquarters, headed by the deputy front commander, Major General Kozlov.² The communications organized in the jumping-off position generally worked without pause. There were only individual incidents of the wire communications’ disruption. On the offensive’s first day the limited amount of mobile communications equipment brought about a heavy overload of this communications means. During the operation’s subsequent days the mobile equipment was forced to work with great intensity. This particularly applied to motorized sleighs, which in conditions of severe blizzards and snowfalls were often the only possible means of delivering correspondence and communications officers.

1According to the plan for the artillery offensive, it was planned to carry out a 20-minute artillery preparation for the attack. However, on the eve of the operation, due to the reception of new intelligence data as to the enemy’s defense and dispositions, the decision was made to change the length of the artillery preparation of the attack. 2Editor’s note. Dmitrii Timofeevich Kozlov (1896-1967) joined the Russian imperial army in 1915 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded the Caucasus and Crimean fronts, and was an army commander and deputy front commander on the Soviet-German front and during the war with Japan. Following the war, Kozlov served as a military district commander.

14

The Encirclement and Destruction of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossoh’ Enemy Group of Forces (The Second Stage of the Operation, 16-27 January)

THE ENCIRCLEMENT AND SPLITTING UP OF THE ENEMY’S GROUP OF FORCES

(16-18 January)

Having completed the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense, the 40th and 3rd Tank armies, according to the front commander’s instructions, began to develop the offensive for the purpose of rapidly encircling and destroying the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The 18th Rifle Corps, in accordance with the task assigned to it by the front commander, while continuing to widen the breakthrough toward the flanks along the axis of its main attack, reached the second zone of the enemy’s defense along the Krutets—Volch’e sector, where it entered into fighting with the enemy’s operational reserves. The front’s combat activities during 16-18 January developed along the following main lines. The 40th Army’s main forces and the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps, while developing the offensive at an

increasing pace in the general direction of Alekseevka, reached the Ilovskoe—Alekseevka area by the close of 18 January and thus completed the encirclement of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. During this period the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps, which was attacking from Rossosh’ through Podgornoe toward Kamenka, reached the Karpenkovo area, where it established communications with the 18th Rifle Corps, which, having overcome the resistance of the enemy’s reserves along his second defensive line, reached the Kirichenkovo area (eight kilometers northeast of Karpenkovo) with its main forces. Simultaneous with the development of the offensive along the main axes, the front’s shock groups continued to widen the breakthrough along the flanks. On 17 January the 40th Army’s left-flank 107th Rifle Division reached the town of Ostrogozhsk, where it linked up with the 18th Rifle Corps’ 309th Rifle Division and 129th Rifle Brigade, which had arrived there during 17-18 January. This completed the planned encirclement of the enemy’s forces defending along the sector of the front between the Storozhevoe and Shchuch’e bridgeheads. At the moment the internal encirclement front was formed, the external encirclement front was also created. The formation of this front occurred simultaneously with the development of the offensive for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy group of forces. In the north and northwest the task of forming the external front was carried out by the 40th Army’s right-flank formations, which, while continuing to attack along their designated axes during 16-18 January, by the close of 18 January had reached the line Kostenki— Karaeshnik and created an external encirclement front along this line. In the southwest the external encirclement front was formed as a result of the 7th Cavalry Corps’ vigorous offensive from Roven’ki to

Valuiki and its consolidation along the front Valuiki—Urazovo by the morning of 19 January. A detailed description of the combat activities of the front’s shock groups during 16-18 January is given below.

The 40th Army’s Offensive

The main task of the 40th Army’s forces, following the completion of the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, was its rapid arrival in the Alekseevka area and the linkup with the 3rd Tank Army and in the Ostrogozhsk area and a linkup with the 18th Rifle Corps. The attacking troops had to overcome a distance of about 40 kilometers to Alekseevka and no more than 15 kilometers to Ostrogozhsk. The 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade, which were securing the army’s shock group from the north, continued to attack to the northwest and by the close of 16 January had captured the line Borshchevo—Yablochnoe—Novo-Soldatka—Krasnolip’e. During the day’s fighting these formations advanced no more than 3-5 kilometers, which may be explained by the significantly stiffened enemy resistance along this axis. The enemy command, which was threatened with the arrival of our forces in the flank and rear of the German Second Army, continued to remove a part of its forces from the Voronezh—Kastornoe axis and began to transfer them to the south for employment against the 40th Army’s attacking right-flank formations. By the close of 16 January, aside from the 57th Infantry Division’s regiment that had already been removed from the forward edge of the defense, a regiment was removed from the 68th Infantry Division, which was defending opposite our 38th Army’s right flank, as well as a regiment from the 57th Infantry Division, which was defending around Voronezh. All of these forces, along

with the retreated remnants of the Hungarian III Army Corps, the German 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment and the 700th Panzer Detachment, were organized into “Group Siebert.” The command of the group was entrusted to the commander of the German 57th Infantry Division, Gen. Siebert. This group was assigned the task of delaying the further advance by the 40th Army’s attacking forces by means of incessant counterattacks. During the following days of the operation, the fighting along this sector of the front became especially bitter. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, which was continuing to attack to the west, captured the important crossroads of Rep’evka, without encountering enemy resistance, and by the close of the day reached the Potudan’ River along the sector Verkhnyaya Mel’nitsa— Nizhnyaya Mel’nitsa. The division advanced as much as 17 kilometers during the day. The 305th Rifle Division, having changed its axis of attack to the south and having overcome resistance by the 168th Infantry Division’s elements, reached the line Krasnoe—Lesnoe-Ukolovo by the close of the day. Following a 30-minute artillery preparation, the 340th Rifle Division resumed its attack in the general direction of Ostrogozhsk. Following a bitter battle with the German 168th Infantry Division’s main forces, the enemy’s resistance was crushed and by the close of the day the division reached the line excluding Lesnoe-Ukolovo— Berezovo, with its front facing southeast. In a day of stubborn fighting the division’s units advanced 7-12 kilometers, which was less than the planned pace. The 107th Rifle Division, while rolling up the Hungarian 13th Infantry Division’s combat formations, continued to advance toward Ostrogozhsk. By the close of the day the division’s left-flank regiment was one kilometer west of Korotoyak, while its main forces had reached the fork in the road two kilometers north of

Ostrogozhsk. In a day of intense fighting with units of the German 168th and Hungarian 13th infantry divisions, which were withdrawing to Ostrogozhsk, the 107th Rifle Division advanced 12 kilometers. As is clear from this, the 40th Army’s forces, although they had achieved new successes, nevertheless were attacking with insufficient energy. The offensive pace achieved would not guarantee achievement of the tasks assigned to the army. For this reason, on the night of 16-17 January the front commander demanded in his instructions to the army’s troops that they attack more energetically for the purpose of rapidly reaching Alekseevka, to where the 3rd Tank Army’s mobile formations were successfully advancing from the south. During 17-18 January the 40th Army’s forces continued to carry out their assigned tasks. The army’s right-flank formations—the 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade—while securing from the north the actions of the army’s main forces to encircle the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces, where engaged in intense fighting with the enemy’s “Group Siebert.” By the close of 18 January the 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade, having repelled all of “Group Siebert’s” counterattacks, advanced to the line Kostenki—Rossoshki —excluding Istobnoe, along which they consolidated securely, thus forming the external encirclement front. By this time the enemy had facing the army’s right-flank forces “Group Siebert,” consisting of the Hungarian 9th Infantry Division, the remnants of the Hungarian 6th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 323rd, two regiments from the 57th, and a regiment from the 68th German infantry divisions, the remnants of the 700th Panzer Detachment, a regiment from the German 168th Infantry Division, the 242nd Assault Gun Battalion, the 272nd Anti-Aircraft Battalion, and the 188th Ski Battalion. All of the group’s subsequent counterattacks were unsuccessful.

Due to the enemy’s powerful counterattacks that had begun against the army’s right flank, a decision by the army commander on 17 January turned the 25th Guards Rifle Division to the north. Having left a rifle regiment with the 116th Tank Brigade (consisting of nine tanks) along the line Rossosh’—Krest’yanskii, the division attacked in the general direction of Istobnoe and by the close of the day captured this locale with one regiment, while its other regiment occupied Karaeshnik and Osadchee in fighting. Throughout 18 January, the division, having consolidated with its left-flank regiment along the line reached, continued to attack with its remaining forces to the west along the front Istobnoe—Karaeshnik and by the close of 18 January its right flank had reached the eastern outskirts of the inhabited locale of Klyuchi. The 305th Rifle Division, while attacking to the southwest, had by the close of 17 January reached with two regiments the front Prudki —Podserednoe, while the other regiment, which was attacking from Lesnoe-Ukolovo in the direction of Shinkin, reached the inhabited locales of Verkhnyaya Ol’shevka and Nizhnyaya Ol’shevka. While approaching these locales, the division’s left-flank regiment was counterattacked by the enemy with up to a regiment of infantry, with tanks. Having repulsed the enemy counterattack, the regiment consolidated along the line reached, along which throughout the following day it fought with elements from the enemy’s 168th Infantry Division. The 305th Rifle Division, having organized a defense along a broad front along the sector Bykovskii State Farm— Podserednoe, was fighting with its main forces throughout 18 January for Ilovskoe. In the Podserednoe—Ilovskoe area the division came into fire liaison with the 15th Tank Corps, which by this time had reached Alekseevka (the small corridor between these inhabited locales was enfiladed by our artillery fire). The 340th Rifle Division, not having encountered enemy resistance, by the close of 17 January reached the Ol’shanka River along the sector Khokhol-Trostyanka—Vereten’e. At dawn on 18 January the division was turned toward Ostrogozhsk, and by 0700 had reached

the western and southwestern outskirts of the town, where together with the 107th Rifle Division’s units, which had arrived at the town from the north, blockaded the enemy garrison. On 17 January two of the 107th Rifle Division’s regiments reached Ostrogozhsk and made an attempt to seize the town from the march, but were unsuccessful. The division’s left-flank regiment, in conjunction with Colonel Dashkevich’s¹ group, which by this time had crossed over the Don, captured the town of Korotoyak. The seizure of this enemy strong point eased the army’s subsequent fight for Ostrogozhsk. Upon entering the town of Korotoyak, the soldiers saw the ruins of a once-blooming Soviet town, in which not a single structure remained intact. Understanding the troops’ mood, the deputy commander of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s training battalion, Captain Slomin, addressed the soldiers with these words: “You see, comrades, the ruins of this town. It has been destroyed by the German-Fascist troops. They have transformed our Kiev, Rostov, Khar’kov, Minsk and hundreds other towns and villages into such ruins. Hitler planned to turn our entire country into such ruins…” Walking up to a German motor vehicle filled with property stolen from the population and having shown the soldiers the children’s clothes with dried blood on them, he said: “Here are the trophies of the Hiterlite marauding army…” A new wave of hatred for the enemy arose in the hearts of the guards troops in reply to the officer’s words. Here, on the battlefield, they swore to ruthlessly revenge themselves on the enemy for his evil deeds and to even more energetically strive to gain final victory over the GermanFascist invaders. On 18 January the 107th Rifle Division continued to fight to capture Ostrogozhsk in conjunction with the 340th Rifle Division and the 18th Rifle Corps’ 129th Rifle Brigade and 309th Rifle Division, which had arrived from the east. However, all attempts during 18 January by our units to crush the resistance of the German 168th Infantry

Division and the remnants of the Hungarian 13th and 10th infantry divisions, which had fallen back into the town, were unsuccessful. On the morning of 17 January the 4th Tank Corps, which had been subordinated to the 40th Army, had concentrated in the Ust’Muravlyanki area (15 kilometers east of Rep’evka). On the morning of 17 January the 322nd Rifle Division (the front commander’s reserve), which was advancing behind the 40th Army’s shock group, was in the area Mastyugino—Novyi Ivanovskii—Uryvo-Pokrovskoe. Thus by the close of 18 January the 40th Army’s forces, having reached with part of their forces the area Podserednoe—Ilovskoe, had basically completed the envelopment of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces from the north. Upon reaching this area, they established fire liaison with the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps. With the arrival of the 107th and 340th rifle divisions at Ostrogozhsk and their linkup with the 18th Rifle Corps’ 129th Rifle Brigade and 309th Rifle Division, the planned encirclement of the defeated Hungarian 13th and 10th infantry divisions was completed. Along with these divisions, the main forces of the German 168th Division, which had unsuccessfully attempted to delay the 40th Army’s left-flank formations with its counterattacks, were also encircled. In analyzing the situation that had arisen by the close of 18 January along the 40th Army’s front, it should be noted that the army commander and the front commander allowed the front operational plan to be disrupted without any justification. The 340th Rifle Division, in opposition to this plan, had been turned toward Ostrogozhsk instead of being used to reinforce the army’s main axis, along which the 305th Rifle Division alone was operating. As a result, by the close of 18 January the enemy still had an 8-kilometer corridor between Ilovskoe and Alekseevka, which was enfiladed only by artillery fire. In the Podserednoe—Ilovskoe area the 40th Army had only a part of the 305th Rifle Division’s forces. This circumstance told negatively on our forces’ subsequent activities in this area and prevented us from completely completing the encirclement and

afforded the enemy the opportunity to pull out a part of his forces from the encirclement.

The 18th Rifle Corps’ Offensive

Throughout 16 January units of the 18th Rifle Corps continued to attack, carrying out their previously assigned tasks. Along all of the corps’ attack axes the enemy put up fierce resistance. The heaviest fighting on this day broke out in the center of the corps’ attack sector, where the 161st Rifle Division was operating. Throughout the day the enemy repeatedly counterattacked the division’s units with the forces of the German 26th Infantry Division, with support from the tanks of the Hungarian 1st Panzer Division. An attack against the enemy’s strong points of Volch’e and Krutets throughout the day was not successful. Only as a result of a nighttime attack by the division’s units were we able to crush the enemy’s resistance in Volch’e and capture this inhabited locale. During the attack the headquarters of the Hungarian VII Army Corps was routed. The fight to capture the enemy’s strong point in Krutets continued throughout the following day. By the close of the day the corps’ units, having advanced 3-10 kilometers, were fighting along the line Melogor’e Station—Pukhovo Station—Kovalevo—Melakhino—Shcherbakovo—excluding Krutets —Volch’e—northern outskirts of Verkhnie Marki and Marki—height 191. While continuing to develop the offensive and pursing the defeated enemy, the 18th Rifle Corps achieved new successes during 17-18 January. The 129th Rifle Brigade, having captured the inhabited locales of

Divnogor’e and Krinitsa during the night, by the close of 17 January had reached the Tikhaya Sosna River along the sector from Peskov to Sredne-Voskresenskoe. Hitting and pursuing the units of the Hungarian 10th Infantry Division, which were falling back on Ostrogozhsk, the brigade crossed over to the left bank of the Tikhaya Sosna River on the night of 17-18 January and captured Rybnoe, from which it proceeded to organize reconnaissance toward Ostrogozhsk. By the close of the day the brigade had reached the eastern outskirts of the town. By this time the 309th Rifle Division, which was attacking to the south, captured the inhabited locales of Blizhnee Stoyanovo and Petrenkovo, thus cutting the enemy’s retreat route from Ostrogozhsk to the south. The division, having left part of its forces in the Petrenkovo area, reached with its main forces the southeastern outskirts of Ostrogozhsk, where it established communications with units of the 40th Army’s 107th and 340th rifle divisions, which were blockading the town from the north and west. The routed Hungarian divisions, the control of which the enemy’s command had lost, were retreating to the west and southwest, covered by rearguards, abandoning their wounded and equipment and surrendering in entire elements. Only units of the Hungarian 13th and 10th and German 168th infantry divisions, which had fallen back to Ostrogozhsk under the attacks of our forces, continued to put up stubborn resistance. Blockaded in the town, they were not able to break out of it, as the single exit from the town along the southwestern outskirts was enfiladed by our units’ fire. During these days the attack by the 161st Rifle Division developed successfully. While operating along the main axis of the corps’ attack, it was engaged in heavy fighting with the German 26th Infantry Division and the Hungarian 1st Panzer Division, which had entered the battle. Following stubborn fighting, on 17 January the division’s units occupied Rybal’chino and began fighting for Bol’shoe Yevdakovo and Kamenka. The division, while pushing the enemy to

the southwest toward the attack by the 3rd Tank Army’s tank units arriving from the south, threw the enemy out of Kamenka and by the close of 18 January reached the line Mikhnovo—Kirichenkovo, eight kilometers from Karpenkovo, where at that time units of the 12th Tank Corps were already fighting. The left-flank 219th Rifle Division, having overcome the enemy’s resistance along the line Verkhnie Marki—Marki, by the close of 17 January had reached the front Vyselki—Yudino, and on the next day, 18 January, occupied Saguny, having advanced another 12 kilometers. The 270th Rifle Division operated less successfully. It was supposed to launch an attack on the morning of 16 January from the area five kilometers south of Pavlovsk in the direction of Saprina, with the task, in conjunction with the 3rd Tank Army’s 180th Rifle Division, of encircling and destroying units of the Italian 156th Infantry and 4th Mountain Rifle divisions, which were defending between Pavlovsk and Staraya Kalitva. The 270th Rifle Division, having gone over to the offensive on the morning of 17 January along a 3-kilometer sector Basovka—Ukrainskaya Builovka with the forces of two rifle regiments, did not achieve success throughout 17 January. The division’s units were met by the enemy’s powerful organized fire. The reasons for the 270th Rifle Division’s lack of success are that the jumping-off position for the infantry attack was located 600-700 meters from the enemy’s forward edge and that the division’s immediate neighbors did not attack, which enabled the enemy to concentrate his artillery and mortar fire on its attacking regiments. Besides this, a large part of the 270th Rifle Division’s artillery and mortars fired on non-observed targets, because aside from individual sectors of the first trench, which had been dug along the raised right bank, the depth of the enemy’s defense could not be observed from our observation posts and targets in the enemy’s position were not uncovered. As a result, the conduct of the artillery preparation for the attack in the division’s attack sector was not very

effective. Only on 18 January, after the Italian divisions, began to fall back from the right bank of the Don at night under threat of encirclement, did the 270th Rifle Division, which went over to the pursuit of the retreating enemy, advance 6-8 kilometers that day and occupied the inhabited locales of Sirotovka, Saprina and Arkhangel’skoe. Despite the enemy’s hurried retreat, the division pursued with extreme caution and did not undertake decisive actions along a single axis for the purpose of defeating the retreating enemy. Thus by the close of 18 January the 18th Rifle Corps had fully carried out its assigned task. Having broken through the enemy’s defense and made a fighting advance of 35 kilometers along the axis of its main attack, the corps established fire coordination with the 3rd Tank Army’s right flank in the area north of Karpenkovo. The corps split up the enemy’s entire Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group into two isolated parts with a powerful attack: the Ostrogozhsk— Alekseevka and Rossosh’ groups. Simultaneously, as a result of the linkup of the corps’ right-flank units with the 40th Army’s forces in the Ostrogozhsk area, the enemy forces, consisting of two Hungarian divisions, were cut off from the Ostrogozhsk—Alekseevka group and for the most part destroyed. The remnants of these divisions, together with the retreated units of the German 168th Infantry Division, were blockaded in Ostrogozhsk. By the close of 18 January the corps’ offensive front had increased to 80 kilometers. The corps now faced the next task of completing the destruction, in conjunction with the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ forces, of the enemy’s encircled troops.

The 3rd Tank Army’s Offensive

The development of the offensive for the purpose of encircling and

splitting up the enemy group of forces by the 3rd Tank Army’s forces developed in more favorable conditions than was the case in the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps. The army’s attacking forces were faced only by enemy formations and units that had been defeated during the breakthrough of the main defense zone. The army’s tank corps, upon achieving operational freedom, had the opportunity of uninterruptedly advancing into the rear of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. 16 January, the third day of the offensive, was marked by new successes along the 3rd Tank Army’s’ front. The enemy’s resistance along the army’s right flank in the Mitrofanovka area was crushed. The freed-up forces of the rifle formations could be dispatched in column formation to Rossosh’ for consolidating the success of the tank corps, which, having developed a vigorous offensive against the enemy’s rear, had reached the line Podgornoe—Postoyalyi— Mar’evka. The army’s combat activities during this day developed in the following manner. The army’s rifle formations’ most intense and decisive battles took place, as before, along the right flank, where the enemy, while holding Mitrofanovka, was trying to flank the army’s shock group as it moved to the north, toward Rossosh’. In order to destroy as quickly as possible the enemy’s Mitrofanovka group, which consisted of units of the German 387th and Italian 3rd divisions, a special group was detached from the 3rd Tank Army, consisting of the 37th Rifle Brigade, 180th Rifle Division and the 173rd Tank Brigade, reinforced with two cannon and two howitzer artillery regiments and two battalions of rocket artillery. The southern air group was to support the actions of this group. The commander of the 3rd Tank Army, along with a group of headquarters officers, left for the Mitrofanovka area to control the group’s actions. The fighting with the enemy’s Mitrofanovka group of forces

continued throughout the entire first half of 16 January, by the close of which the enemy’s resistance was broken and our units captured Mitrofanovka. The remnants of the defeated enemy group fell back to the north, trying to reach the positions of the Italian Alpine Corps in the area east of Rossosh’. The 37th Rifle Brigade and the 180th Rifle Division, having organized their combat formations in columns, set out to pursue the enemy along parallel routes in the directions of Kolbinskoe and Rossosh’. By the close of the day the 37th Rifle Brigade, having turned its attack front to the east, was along the line Yevdokievka—Shevchenko, blocking the escape route to the west of the enemy that had begun to pull back his forces facing the 160th Rifle Division. This division, having established the enemy’s retreat, also took up the pursuit and by the close of the day had reached Krinichnaya. By the close of the day the 180th Rifle Division reached the Chernaya Kalitva River south of Rossosh’. The army’s tank corps, operating apart from the rifle troops, advanced 30 kilometers during the day. On the morning of 16 January the 12th Tank Corps was tied down in fighting inside the town of Rossosh’. The corps was operating indecisively at first, and then with only part of its forces, as a result of which it was not able to capture the eastern part of the town, although it lost more than five hours in unsuccessful attacks. It was only after the 48th Guards Rifle Division, and then the 180th Rifle Division, arrived at Rossosh’, that the enemy’s resistance in Rossosh’ was broken and the city fully occupied by our forces. The remnants of “Group Fegelein’s” elements, which had been defending Rossosh’, fell back to the east. The 12th Tank Corps, upon achieving freedom of maneuver, broke free of the rifle troops and by the close of the day, while attacking in the directions of Podgornoe and Postoyalyi, captured these inhabited locales. The arrival of the 12th Tank Corps’ main forces in the Podgornoe—Postoyalyi area in the deep rear of the Italian Alpine Corps, as well as the appearance in the latter’s area of the remnants of the defeated German divisions, which were falling back behind the Chernaya Kalitva River from the south, sharply lowered the morale of the Italian soldiers, among whom there appeared

confusion and panic. The 15th Tank Corps reached the Marchekovo area as the result of a vigorous lunge during the first part of the day, and a subsequent attack from this area toward Ol’khovatka led to the latter’s capture by 1400 and the capture of up to 2,000 enemy soldiers. In continuing the offensive toward Alekseevka, by the close of 16 January the corps reached the line Kudeshovka—Mar’evka. By this time the distance between the corps’ units and the army’s rifle forces was about 25 kilometers. During the day the 48th Guards and 184th rifle divisions advanced in march columns behind the tank units of the army’s mobile group, consolidating the success achieved by them. By the close of the day the 48th Guards Rifle Division was en route along the road from Rossosh’ to Ol’khovatka, while the 184th Rifle Division’s march columns reached Yeremovka. As early as the morning of 16 January, the 7th Cavalry Corps, which was securing the actions of the army’s shock group, reached the area Staraya-Raigorodka—Roven’ki—Nagol’naya. The corps’ units were faced by elements of the Italian 5th Infantry Division. Thus the deep envelopment from the south of the entire Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, which had begun as early as 15 January, developed successfully throughout 16 January. The 3rd Tank Army’s mobile group, operating in the enemy forces’ deep rear, strove toward a linkup with the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ forces. The tank corps’ offensive was developing at a pace of 30 kilometers per day. However, it should be noted that the 12th Tank Corps, which was delayed a significant amount of time in Rossosh’, lowered its offensive pace. Neither the army or front commanders took timely measures for organizing the immediate pursuit of the enemy by units of the 12th Tank Corps and allowed the corps’ units to be drawn into prolonged fighting for the town, which was completely at odds with the situation.

The subsequent successfully developing offensive by the tank corps and its growing speed was creating realistic prerequisites for completing the encirclement of the enemy’s entire Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces as well as for cutting off from it and encircling the Italian Alpine Corps’ divisions and the defeated units of the German XXIV Panzer Corps and two Hungarian divisions (19th and 23rd), which were falling back into its sector. Taking into account the overall course of the operation and the successful elimination of the enemy in Mitrofanovka, Rossosh’ and Ol’khovatka, the front commander on 16 January confirmed the necessity of unflinchingly carrying out the established operational plan. In his instructions, the front commander particularly emphasized the importance of the 15th Tank Corps capturing Alekseevka and the arrival of one of the 12th Tank Corps’ columns in the Kamenka—Karpenkovo—Tristenki area, and the other in the Tatarino—Krivaya Polyana area. The 12th Tank Corps was also ordered to seize Verkhnyaya Ol’shevka and Nizhnyaya Ol’shevka with its forward detachments. For the purpose of interfering with the retreat of the enemy’s forces to the west from the Belogor’e—Staraya Kalitva—Krinichnaya line, the front commander ordered the commander of the 3rd Tank Army to cut the enemy’s route of retreat, for which he was ordered to occupy the most important road junctions: the Rainovskoe passing track, Rossosh’, Sotnitskii, and Podgornoe. Simultaneously, the army commander was informed of the possible employment of the 40th Army’s 4th Tank Corps for an attack on Alekseevka from the north. On this day a directive from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command transferred the 127th and 160th rifle divisions of the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army to the Voronezh Front. The front commander decided to include them with the 3rd Tank Army. In accordance with additional instructions received from the front commander, during 17-18 January, the 3rd Tank Army continued to

attack for the purpose of reaching the areas of Karpenkovo, Tatarino and Alekseevka. The 12th Tank Corps, upon reaching the Podgornoe—Postoyalyi area on 16 January, halted there for a day in order to replenish its ammunition and fuel and to put its units in order, and it was only by the close of 17 January that it began to move on Karpenkovo with its 30th and 97th tank and 13th Motorized Rifle brigades, and on Tatarino with its 106th Tank Brigade. The rapid capture of these places had great significance, because through them ran the main roads along which the Hungarian 19th and 23rd divisions, which had been defending south of the Shchuch’e bridgehead, had begun to withdraw. On 17 January the 15th Tank Corps, while continuing to attack along the Ol’khovatka—Alekseevka road, routed several retreating enemy columns, while its forward detachments reached Garbuzovo and its main forces reached the Shelyakino area. The 48th Guards Rifle Division was attacking along this axis, as was the corps’ 179th Tank Brigade, which was approaching Ol’khovatka. By this time the 184th Rifle Division, which was covering the left flank of the army’s shock group, had reached the line Aleksandrovka—Aidar. During 17 January the army’s right-flank rifle formations were involved in eliminating the enemy group of forces that was resisting our forces southeast of Rossosh’. The army’s 127th and 160th rifle divisions, while attacking along the right bank of the Don River, captured the line Staraya Kalitva—excluding Shevchenko. The 37th Rifle Brigade was fighting along the line Shevchenko—Morozovka, with its front facing northeast. The 180th Rifle Division, along with the 173rd Tank Brigade, was attacking from the Rossosh’ area eastward toward Annovka. Thus by 17 January our forces were encircling and trying to destroy in the Shevchenko—Staraya Kalitva—Rossosh’ area a group of enemy forces consisting of four divisions (German 385th and 387th

and Hungarian 3rd and Italian 4th) This group disposed of only one escape route to the north. But here the enemy was coming under attack by the 18th Rifle Corps’ formations, which were attacking from the Shchuch’e bridgehead. The situation of the Italian Alpine Corps’ remaining divisions was no better. As early as 16 January the Italian 2nd and 156th divisions, which had lost contact with their command, began a disorderly withdrawal from their defensive line, while striving to break out of the encirclement in the directions of Podgornoe and Sotnitskii. The Italian divisions were already unable to carry out the corps commander’s orders for a withdrawal. The 12th Tank Corps had cut all the retreat routes and was attacking in detail the enemy columns trying to break through to the east. The Alpine Corps commander, in issuing orders for a retreat, calculated that the German XXIV Panzer Corps’ formations, which had fallen back to the north, would take up defensive positions along the left bank of the Chernaya Kalitva River along the sector Ol’khovatka—Rossosh’ and thus cover from the south the retreat by the Italian corps’ divisions to the west. However, the situation developed otherwise. The German divisions were unable to break contact with our forces and were themselves surrounded: at first in the area southeast of Rossosh’, and then east of the town. While attempting to break out of the encirclement that had formed in the Annovka—Yevstratovskii—Staraya Kalitva area, the XXIV Panzer Corps’ formations hurriedly streamed to the northwest, getting mixed up with units of the Italian divisions falling back to the west. General Pascolini, the commander of the 156th Infantry Division, who was later taken prisoner, testified to the following:

The order of movement for the retreat as specified in the corps commander’s instructions was actually disrupted. Everything was mixed up. Traffic jams arose and crisscrossing occurred. I don’t know where it was, but the 2nd Division, and after it the 156th, lost track

of the road. At one point a German unit (I don’t know where it came from) blocked my path and I was forced to open fire on this German unit in order to finally continue our disorderly movement. After 19 January I lost contact with the corps headquarters and received neither orders nor instructions from the higher command. There was absolute chaos and disorganization along the railroad line in the Podgornoe area. The rail line was crammed with German rear elements and supply trains.

At 2250 on 17 January the commander of the 3rd Tank Army, in individual combat instructions, ordered the 12th and 15th tank corps to finish carrying out the task assigned for 17 January and, continue to attack to the north, to establish direct contact with the 40th Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ forces in the areas of Alekseevka and Karpenkovo, thus completing the enemy’s encirclement. The troops were ordered to leave small elements along their path and in the major inhabited locales and to organize patrols along the road junctions. The army’s right-flank rifle formations—the 160th and 127th rifle divisions, the 37th Rifle Brigade, and the 180th Rifle Division—were to destroy the group of enemy forces, consisting of units of the German 385th and 387th and Italian 3rd divisions, which continued to put up resistance southeast of Rossosh’. The 48th Guards Rifle Division was, upon reaching Varvarovka, to leave a small garrison there, and with its main forces move in the direction of Artemenkov and Nikitovka and by the close of the day occupy the line Arnautovo—Nikitovka. The 184th Rifle Division was to continue moving in the direction of Nikolaevka and Podgornoe (20 kilometers northeast of Valuiki), securing the advance by the formations of the army’s mobile group for the purpose of completing the encirclement of the enemy from

the west. The 195th and 113th tank brigades, located in the army commander’s reserve, were ordered to concentrate in Rossosh’. During 18 January the army’s combat activities unfolded in the following manner. The 15th Tank Corps, vigorously advancing along the road to Alekseevka, reached Alekseevka during the night of 17-18 January and began fighting to capture it. By 0900 the corps’ units broke into the southern and southwestern quarters of Alekseevka and then blockaded the enemy’s forces defending in this inhabited locale from the south, east and west. By this time the 40th Army’s 305th Rifle Division was fighting in the Ilovskoe (eight kilometers north of Alekseevka) area. Upon reaching Alekseevka and capturing an important road junction along the retreat routes of the main forces of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, the 15th Tank Corps was close to accomplishing its task of completing the encirclement of the enemy group of forces. The enemy had at his disposal only the 8-kilometer corridor between Alekseevka and Ilovskoe, through which he still had the opportunity of slipping out of the encirclement. However, this corridor was enfiladed by our forces’ artillery fire from the south and north. Throughout the day the 12th Tank Corps was involved in bitter fighting with units of the German 26th Infantry Division, which were falling back to the area of Tatarino and Karpenkovo, under attack by the 18th Rifle Corps. In the evening the 12th Tank Corps’ main forces began fighting for Karpenkovo; the left-flank 106th Tank Brigade captured Tatarino, and at the same time the 18th Rifle Corps’ 161st Rifle Division was fighting along the line Mikhnovo— Kirichenkovo, eight kilometers northeast of Karpenkovo. Following the capture of Varvarovka, the 48th Guards Rifle Division deployed with two regiments facing northeast along its outskirts, while another regiment took up the defense of individual strong points along the 15th Tank Corps’ route of march along the sector

Ol’khovatka—Varvarovka. The 179th Tank Brigade also reached the Ol’khovatka area. The 184th Rifle Division, having completed a 20kilometer march from the Alekseevka—Aidar area, reached the Nikolaevka area, where it was in readiness for operations to the northeast, in case of the encircled enemy’s breakthrough through the 48th Guards Rifle Division’s combat formations. In order to secure the left flank of the 3rd Tank Army’s attacking group of forces, the army commander moved up the 111th Rifle Division, which had been transferred to the army from the front commander’s reserve, to the Roven’ki area as a screen. On this day the army’s right-flank formations, along with the 18th Rifle Corps’ 270th Rifle Division, had basically completed the encirclement of the enemy forces east of Rossosh’. Units of the Italian 4th and 3rd mountain rifle and German 385th and 387th infantry divisions, plus the remnants of “Group Fegelein” were encircled, accounting for a total of four divisions. The 180th Rifle Division, having bypassed the encircled enemy group of forces from the north, reached the area of the inhabited locale of Babki at the same time that the left flank units of the 18th Rifle Corps’ 270th Rifle Division reached the line Arkhangel’skoe—Nizhnee Kievskoe, while from the south units of the 127th and 160th rifle divisions reached the line Staraya Kalitva—Yevstratovskii. Thus on 18 January the 3rd Tank Army’s mobile group reached the line Karpenkovo—Tatarino—Alekseevka. Simultaneously, the main forces of the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps were approaching this line from the north. It should be noted that the tank corps that reached this line were very weak. The 12th Tank Corps was able to concentrate 44 tanks in the Tatarino—Karpenkovo area, while only 20 tanks from the 15th Tank Corps reached the Alekseevka area. The remaining tanks were either damaged or had gotten stuck on the roads due to the snowdrifts, and also as a result of technical problems and a lack of fuel.

With the arrival of the mobile group in the areas of Karpenkovo and Alekseevka the 3rd Tank Army completed the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces and had essentially carried out its assigned task. During the 15-18 January fighting the mobile group’s tank and mechanized units attacked at an average daily pace of 20-30 kilometers. By the close of 18 January the depth of the advance by the 15th Tank Corps’, the army’s mobile group, had increased to 140 kilometers. A new task arose for the 3rd Tank Army’s forces—the final elimination of the enemy’s encircled forces in conjunction with the 40th Army and 18th Rifle Corps.

The 7th Cavalry Corps’ Offensive

The 7th Cavalry Corps, which was attacking along the front’s left flank, continued to successfully carry out its assigned task. After the corps’ main forces reached the Staraya Raigorodka— Roven’ki—Nagol’naya area on 16 January, the commander of the Voronezh Front assigned the 7th Cavalry Corps its next task—to capture Valuiki as quickly as possible. The corps commander decided to seize the Valuiki railroad junction with the forces of the 11th Cavalry Division and 201st Tank Brigade. The 83rd Cavalry Division was to secure the actions of the corps’ main forces from the south with an attack on Urazovo. Even before the start of the operation, the 7th Cavalry Corps covered 280 kilometers in six days, without rest, from the unloading station to the jumping-off position; during the operation it made a fighting advance of another 100 kilometers. Taking into account the extreme exhaustion of men and horses, the corps commander

decided to call a day’s rest and at the same time to employ it for preparing an attack on Valuiki and Urazovo. On 17 January the corps rested in the Roven’ki—Nagol’naya area. Throughout 17 January the enemy’s air force carried out mass strikes against the corps’ rest area. Only with the onset of darkness did the corps depart in the direction of Veidelevka along two routes, in order to reach the Veidelevka—Druzhnyi—Blagodatnyi area by the morning of 18 January. The corps’ units completed a 50-kilometer march at night without encountering enemy resistance. At 0500 on 18 January the 201st Tank Brigade reached the Veidelevka—Bryanskie Lipyagi area and the 11th and 83rd cavalry divisions the Druzhnyi—Blagodatnyi —Shevtsov area. By this time there was only enough fuel in the tanks’ engines for another 25-30 kilometers. The brigade’s rear organs had seriously fallen behind the main forces. The latter circumstance forced the brigade to mark time for half a day in this area and with the aid of tanks, dispatched to the rear organs, to deliver the necessary amount of fuel. At 0200 on 19 January the 201st Tank Brigade, along with a landing force of three dismounted squadrons, and with the 208th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, as the corps’ forward detachment, left the Veidelevka area. By 0410 it had occupied its jumping-off position in the area of height 153.5. By this time the 11th Cavalry Division’s cavalry regiments had occupied their jumping-off positions in the Maslovka area and the woods north of Valuiki. Thanks to the fact that the occupation of the jumping-off position had been accomplished quickly and during a heavy snowfall, the enemy did not manage to discover the corps’ units and the subsequent attack on Valuiki was carried out as a surprise to him. The town of Valuiki was defended by two regiments from the Italian 5th Infantry Division and the German 387th Infantry Division’s elements that had fallen back here, as well as by two construction battalions. All of these units were united into one group. The group was reinforced by two panzer companies, an artillery regiment and an anti-aircraft battalion.

The approaches to Valuiki from the east were covered by enemy fire from buildings that had been configured for defense along the town’s outskirts. An anti-tank ditch barred the approach to the town’s southern outskirts. Continuous wire obstacles were along the northeast and southeast outskirts of the town. Earth and timber pillboxes had been built along the streets. Disposing of all this data, which had been received from troop and human intelligence, the commander of the 7th Cavalry Corps decided to capture Valuiki and Urazovo by a vigorous attack from the march. In order to prevent the enemy from bringing up fresh forces and evacuating property from the town, the corps commander, having established communications with a partisan detachment operating in the Valuiki area, ordered the latter to blow up the rail bed along the Valuiki—Urazovo and Valuiki— Volokonovka sectors. The partisans successfully carried out this task and the enemy was not able to haul away food and other materiel in the town. At 0500 on 19 January, following a short fire onslaught, the corps’ units began the attack on the town. The 201st Tank Brigade, attacking Valuiki from the southeast, organized its combat formation in two echelons. The first echelon, consisting of the 296th Tank Battalion with three squadrons of dismounted cavalry men and two batteries from the 288th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment, had the task of capturing the eastern part of the town and reaching the Valui River. The second echelon consisted of the 295th Tank Battalion and a company of automatic riflemen, a motorized rifle battalion and the 288th Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment (minus two batteries). While consolidating the first echelon’s success following its arrival at the Valui River, the 295th Tank Battalion was to take up defensive positions in the southern part of Valuiki. The motorized rifle battalion (minus the company of automatic riflemen), with a sapper platoon, while attacking behind the 296th Tank Battalion, was to reach the crossings and support the tanks’ forcing of the Valui River.

The attack by the first echelon of tanks, with a landing party of dismounted cavalry men, in the direction of the southeastern outskirts of Valuiki and the railroad station was successful and was developed in a timely manner by the 295th Tank Battalion. Operating in small groups, the landing party began to clear house after house of the enemy’s automatic riflemen and machine gunners. With its arrival at the railroad station, the first tank echelon and dismounted cavalry men came under heavy artillery and tank fire by the enemy, who was holding positions near the station and rail crossing. The tanks and motorized infantry bypassed the station two kilometers to the south and, upon seizing a crossing over the Valui River, broke into the southeastern outskirts of the town. At the same time the 11th Cavalry Division launched an attack with its 256th and 250th cavalry regiments from the north and captured the northern part of the town and cut off the enemy’s route of retreat to Volokonovka. By 1200 on 19 January the town had been completely occupied by the corps’ units. The remaining pockets of resistance were eliminated by the tank troops of the 201st Tank Brigade, which reached the Valui River by 1400, where they consolidated. The brigade’s 296th Tank Battalion concentrated along the eastern outskirts of Pushkarka in the brigade reserve. In the fighting for Valuiki our forces killed up to 2,000 men and captured 3,000 enemy soldiers and officers. Food depots and other military prizes were captured in the town. Simultaneous with the attack on Valuiki, fighting broke out for Urazovo. At 0800 on 19 January the 83rd Cavalry Division attacked the enemy defending Urazovo. Because the division lacked reinforcements the fighting became prolonged. The dismounted cavalry men gradually cleared out, street by street, the enemy who had holed up in the town’s buildings. Only as a result of a 32-hour unbroken battle did our units fully capture Urazovo by 1600 on 20 January, while on the next day they captured a nearby enemy airfield with 15 planes.

Following the capture of Valuiki, the corps commander detached a forward detachment, consisting of the 256th Cavalry Regiment, reinforced with a company of tanks from the 201st Tank Brigade, an artillery battery, and a squadron of DShK² anti-aircraft machine guns to seize Volokonovka station. The forward detachment was given the mission of seizing Volokonovka by the morning of 22 January and holding it until the arrival of the corps’ main forces. In carrying out this assignment, the forward detachment broke into Volokonovka on the night of 20-21 January and, having destroyed seven tanks, killed 500 enemy soldiers and captured up to 1,000 men, captured the inhabited locale, and then organized its perimeter defense. In the succeeding days the entire 201st Tank Brigade concentrated in this area. A mission of major operational significance was accomplished with the arrival of the 7th Cavalry Corps and the 201st Tank Brigade to the line Volokonovka—Valuiki—Urazovo and the capture of these locales. As a result of the rapid capture of Valuiki and Urazovo stations the enemy was deprived of the capability of maneuvering his forces along the Kastornoe—Valuiki railroad sector and bringing up reserves from Starobel’sk and Kupyansk. At the same time, with the corps’ arrival at this line there was formed the external encirclement front, which was removed from the internal encirclement front in the Alekseevka area by up to 75 kilometers. This created favorable conditions for the front’s forces to completely eliminate the surrounded forces of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. The 7th Cavalry Corps, for its skillfully conducted combat operations in difficult winter conditions, for skill in maneuvering in the enemy’s deep operational rear, and for bravery and valor by the entire rank and file manifested in the fighting of 15-19 January, was renamed the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps by the People’s Commissar of Defense’s order no. 30 of 19 January 1943.

During the offensive’s development by the forces of the Voronezh Front’s shock groups for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ groups of forces, the Voronezh Front’s 38th and 60th armies continued to defend their previous lines. At the same time, the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army continued to successfully develop the offensive to the west. The army’s rightflank troops, having completed the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and having begun to pursue the enemy, reached the front Nikolaevka—excluding Belolutsk—excluding Novo-Pskov by the close of 18 January. Thus in adding up the results of the Voronezh Front’s combat activities during 16-18 January, it is necessary to note the following. On 18 January the front’s shock groups successfully completed the encirclement and splitting of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. As a result of actions by the main flanking groups— the 40th and 3rd Tank armies—an internal encirclement front was formed around almost the enemy’s entire Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, which ran along the line Ostrogozhsk—Verkhnyaya Ol’shevka—Nizhnyaya Ol’shevka—Ilovskoe—Alekseevka—Tatarino —Karpenkovo—Goncharovka—Podgornoe—Igolkin—Morozovka— Staraya Kalitva—Arkhangel’skoe—Sirotovka—Belogor’e—Saguny— Kirichenkovo—Mikhnovo—Blizhnee Stoyanovo. The overall territory of the encirclement area was approximately 2,500 square kilometers. The internal encirclement front formed by our forces was more than 300 kilometers long and was not continuous. The front’s limited number of rifle formations did not allow us to do that. Thus our forces that had encircled the enemy occupied only the most important road junctions and inhabited locales, which were located along the enemy’s most likely withdrawal routes. As regards our forces along the internal encirclement front, we had overall 11 rifle divisions, two rifle brigades and two tank corps, which accounted on average for more than 20 kilometers of front per division.

By this time the enemy had in his encircled group of forces about 13 divisions, including the remnants of the Hungarian 13th and 10th divisions, two regiments of German 168th and a regiment from the 88th infantry divisions, the Hungarian 1st Panzer and German 26th Infantry divisions, the remnants of the Hungarian 19th and 23rd divisions, the Italian corps’ 156th, 2nd and 4th divisions, the remnants of the German XXIV Panzer Corps’ 385th and 387th infantry and 3rd mountain rifle divisions. Only three divisions from the Hungarian III Army Corps escaped encirclement, as well as the remnants of the 700th Panzer Detachment and the 168th Infantry Division’s 429th Infantry Regiment, which had been thrown back to the north by the 40th Army’s forces and were fighting in the confines of “Group Siebert” along the external encirclement front, as well as the 27th Panzer Division, which was attacked by the 6th Army’s right-flank formations and which was being destroyed by its forces. The Italian 5th Infantry Division, which had escaped encirclement, was destroyed by units of the 7th Cavalry Corps. The encircled enemy group of forces was split up into two large isolated parts by the attacks of the 18th Rifle Corps’ main forces toward Kamenka and the 3rd Tank Army’s 12th Tank Corps toward Karpenkovo. The first of these (the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group), which consisted of the units of five divisions—the Hungarian 13th and 10th infantry and 1st Panzer and the German 168th and 26th infantry divisions—was encircled in the Ostrogozhsk—Ilovskoe— Alekseevka—Tatarino—Karpenkovo—excluding Kamenka area. Three of this group’s divisions (Hungarian 13th and 10th and German 168th) were blockaded by our forces in Ostrogozhsk, where an independent encirclement pocket had formed. A second major enemy group (the Rossosh’ group), which numbered eight divisions —the Hungarian 19th and 23rd infantry divisions, three divisions from the Italian Alpine Corps, and the defeated units of three of the German XXIV Panzer Corps’ divisions—were squeezed in the Saguny —Podgornoe—Rossosh’—Staraya Kalitva—Belogor’e area. At the moment the front’s forces finished encircling the enemy

about 52,000 men had been captured. The enemy’s losses in killed and wounded were the same figure. During the 13-18 January fighting our forces captured 170 tanks, 1,700 guns, 2,800 machine guns, 4,000 mortars, 6,000 motor vehicles, 1,500 horses, 55,000 rifles, about ten million rifle rounds, 600,000 shells, and more than 150 various supply depots. By this time; that is, by 19 January, part of the 40th and 3rd Tank armies’ and 7th Cavalry Corps’ forces had created an external encirclement front. This front was also not continuous. The 40th Army formed the external front with the forces of two rifle divisions and a rifle brigade. This front was 40-55 kilometers distant from the enemy’s encircled Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh group and ran along the line Kostenki—Rossoshki—Istobnoe—Karaeshnik— Krest’yanskii. Besides this, part of the 305th Rifle Division’s forces formed an external front along the line Krest’yanskii—Prudki— Khmelevoe. The 7th Cavalry Corps, having successfully carried out its mission to seize the Valuiki railroad junction, had by the morning of 19 January created an external front along the left bank of the Oskol River along the Valuiki—Urazovo sector. This front’s distance from the encircled enemy groups reached 75 kilometers in relation to the Ostrogozhsk—Alekseevka group and 120 kilometers in relation to the Rossosh’ group. The 3rd Tank Army had along its external front the 111th Rifle Division, which was located 50 kilometers from the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces in the Roven’ki area. Thus, by the moment of the completion of the enemy group’s encirclement, our forces had about five divisions along the external front, which amounted to no more than 25 percent of the front’s forces taking part in the operation to encircle and destroy the enemy.

Such a distribution of forces between the internal and external fronts should be considered correct, when the overwhelming part of the troops were directed toward the rapid completion of the encirclement of the enemy’s group of forces and its destruction. It would have secured the destruction of the enemy’s forces in the shortest possible time and thus enabled us to free up the front’s forces for conducting new offensive operations. During the first three days of the operation’s second stage (16-18 January) our forces advanced 20-35 kilometers in the 40th Army’s offensive sector and up to 90 kilometers in the 3rd Tank Army’s offensive sector. The rifle forces’ average daily rate of advance reached 11 kilometers in the 40th Army and 13-17 kilometers in the 3rd Tank Army. During the development of the offensive on Karpenkovo and Alekseevka the 3rd Tank Army’s mobile group advanced 85-105 kilometers in four days (15-18 January); that is, it attacked at an average daily pace of 21-26 kilometers. The Voronezh Front’s combat activities unfolded in specific conditions during the development of the offensive for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. During the operation’s development, the offensive by the shock groups’ forces was conducted along separate axes. In the majority of cases the rifle formations attacked along broad zones and with open flanks. This required that the formations’ commanders and headquarters devote particular attention to securing the boundaries and flanks, and also to manifest reasonable initiative in resolving combat assignments that arose in conditions of a rapidly changing situation. The constantly increasing offensive front, the variety of missions

carried out by the troops, and, finally, the presence of certain difficulties in maintaining uninterrupted communications, due to a shortage of equipment, all made troop control significantly more difficult in conditions of high-maneuver combat activities during the first three days of the operation’s second stage. Despite this, the front’s and armies’ command and staffs retained a firm hold on the troops during the offensive and realized the operational plan. The main task of the commanders and their staffs in troop control during this period was the conduct of various measures for the purpose of securing the non-stop offensive of the front’s troops in order to complete the encirclement of the enemy’s group of forces as rapidly as possible. In the front headquarters’ brief combat orders and the front commander’s instructions, which were transmitted to the troops through communications officers and by telegraph, the troops were instructed as to the necessity of maintaining high rates of attack, which was one of the main factors facilitating the successful completion of the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. It is necessary to note that during these days wire communications and communications by mobile means worked at a high level of intensity. The troops’ significant advance brought about a great lengthening of the wire communications lines. It should also be pointed out that the absence of the necessary numbers of auto transport told on the work of the communications construction units, which were unable to build communications lines in time behind the rapidly moving army headquarters. This was most seriously reflected in the organization of communications in the armies and the corps, where the armies’ significant advance in depth caused us to fully expend our communications equipment in a single position, without preserving at the disposal of the armies’ communications chiefs sufficient reserves of men and materiel. As a result, during the movement of the formations’ headquarters wire communications was, as a rule, disrupted with the majority of these and was restored only after the communications lines were removed from the first location. This was especially felt in the 3rd Tank Army

and the 18th Rifle Corps. During this period the air force’s main efforts were directed at combating the enemy’s reserves and at aiding the ground forces in encircling the enemy forces. During this time the air force carried out a total of 545 sorties. Four enemy planes were shot down in air battles. Characteristic of the employment of the tank forces was the use of tank brigades as the rifle formations’ forward detachments. The seizure of several enemy strong points in his operational depth was carried out by tank brigades attacking from the march. For example, the 192nd Tank Brigade, along with a landing party of infantry and comprising the forward detachment of the 18th Rifle Corps’ 161st Rifle Division, captured Volch’e in a vigorous attack on the night of 15-16 January, where it organized a perimeter defense. The enemy, who made an attempt to counterattack Volch’e with large infantry and tank forces, did not achieve success. The 192nd Tank Brigade, along with two battalions from the 161st Rifle Division, was able to repel during the day fierce attacks by an enemy more than three times as strong. The 3rd Tank Army’s tank corps during this period successfully carried out their combat missions at distances reaching 25 kilometers from the army’s rifle forces. Due to the limited number of engineer troops with the front and the large volume of engineer tasks, their work in the development of the offensive to encircle and break up the enemy group of forces unfolded with great intensity. The shortage of engineer troops was especially sharply felt in carrying out various road works and in mine clearing. As a result, almost all the available engineer units were put to work clearing the roads of snow, and on clearing minefields that had already been crossed by our attacking units. For example, as early as 15 January there remained in the 40th Army’s attacking units only the 49th Engineer-Sapper Battalion and regimental sappers, only regimental sappers in the 18th Rifle Corps, and the 46th Engineer-Sapper Battalion in the 3rd Tank Army. The latter

circumstance created significant difficulties for the attacking troops in overcoming various types of destruction along the roads carried out by the enemy, which thus exerted an influence on the lowering of the pace of the advance. By the moment the encirclement of the enemy group of forces was completed the front’s engineer troops had repaired 50 kilometers of roads, cleared snow from about 200 kilometers of various routes, made more than 5,000 linear meters of passages in minefields, blocked off about 50,000 linear meters of minefields, built a significant number of bridges and ice crossings, and carried out a series of other works for the engineer support of the operation. The work of the rear organs, both during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and in developing the offensive, unfolded with great difficulties. Particularly difficult was the problem of the materiel support for the troops of the 3rd Tank Army, which, as has already been shown, was forced to begin the operation without having completed its materiel preparation. The absence of the necessary supplies of materiel at the army depots and the shortage of transport equipment often resulted in a situation in which the troops, having arrived in the depth of the enemy’s position and fully having the capability of augmenting the pace of the offensive, were force to stand idle for long periods of time in expectation of the delivery of ammunition and fuel. For example, the tank corps of the army’s mobile group stood idle all night of 14-15 January along the lines achieved, awaiting the delivery of the necessary ammunition and fuel. One of the main factors that predetermined the success of the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense in the times called for and the development of the offensive for the purpose of encircling and splitting up the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces was the purposeful and uninterrupted party-political work among the troops during the offensive.

With the beginning of the troops’ attack the main efforts in our party-political work were directed toward strengthening a high level of morale and supporting a high offensive pace. Commanders and political workers at all levels informed the rank and file about the success of their units and those of their neighbors and about the heroic feats of individual soldiers and officers. They, along with the party and Komsomol organizations, continued to work, on the basis of actual materials, to inculcate a feeling of hatred for the enemy. A great deal of attention was devoted to elucidating new tasks that were assigned to the troops during the offensive, as well as passing on reports from the Soviet Information Bureau to the rank and file. During the offensive battles the forms of party-political work varied, depending upon the concrete situation. A fiery combat call, uttered by the commander or agitator in the heat of battle, or a communist’s inspiring word directed to the troops often had decisive importance in the offensive. One of the examples of such a form of political support may be seen in the battle of the 40th Army’s 141st Rifle Division for Arkhangel’skoe. During the fighting for this inhabited locale, comrade agitator Yershov, saw how the Kazakh communist comrade Manzhikaev sacrificed himself in order to destroy an enemy gun that was interfering with our infantry’s advance. The agitator wrote in the pamphlet “Pass Along the Line: Comrade Manzhikaev died the death of a hero. He sacrificed himself for the sake of our lives. We will take this village and rout the enemy. We will avenge the death of our comrade.” The agitator’s call reached into the consciousness of each soldier. The heroic death of the communist inspired the soldiers. When the command rang out the subunit decisively attacked the enemy. The enemy was thrown out of Arkhangel’skoe. There were many other such examples. Tens and hundreds of such unnoticed agitators were operating everywhere there was fighting. With their appeals they helped the commanders lead their troops into the attack and inspired the soldiers to heroic feats by their personal examples, singled out for praise the outstanding soldiers, bucked up the weak and indecisive, and covered cowards with contempt. The

commanders, political workers, party organizers and Komsomol organizers guided all of this work by communists and non-party types on the battlefield. The brief word of a commander or political worker, uttered over the body of a dead hero, exerted a strong influence on the soldiers during the battle. During the offensive one of the forms of agitation work was the issuing of special reviews of combat activities by elements and individual soldiers and officers. Agitators acquainted the entire rank and file of the 253rd Rifle Brigade, which was attacking along the right flank of the 40th Army’s shock group, with these reviews, which were first employed here. The reviews were greeted with great interest. To perform a heroic feat and be noted by a review became a matter of soldierly honor. During the offensive fighting the party organizations supported the realization of the communists’ vanguard role. The question of the communists’ role during the offensive was discussed both at party meetings and during brief gatherings of communists held in quiet moments. During these gatherings the communists discussed the results of the completed battle and planned concrete measures for supporting the fulfillment of the combat order. During the offensive a form of party-political work such as word-ofmouth transmission from soldier to soldier and from subunit to subunit information about the combat feats of both individual soldiers and entire elements was broadly employed and justified itself in practice. The army press played an enormous mobilizing and organizing role during the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and particularly during the development of the maneuver by the front’s forces to encircle and break up the enemy’s group of forces. The struggle to achieve high rates of advance and highlighting the heroes of the offensive battles was the main link that the newspaper

sought to reach. For example, as early as the offensive’s first day, the 40th Army’s newspaper, For Victory, skillfully showed the work of agitators in the battle, the vanguard role of communists and Komsomol members, and the heroism of the soldiers and officers. The press was working so that the feats being achieved by the soldiers and officers and the manifestation of reasonable initiative became the heritage of the broad masses. Showing an agitator and his work in battle on the newspaper’s pages was of enormous help to hundreds of other agitators, making the experience of the forward ones the heritage of all. During the offensive the newspaper was a counselor to the soldier in his difficult and hard work. With articles such as “The Actions of Ski Units in the Enemy’s Rear,” “Close Cooperation in Battle,” “The Section Commander’s Place in Battle,” the newspaper helped the soldiers and sergeants acquire the skill of waging combat, passing on the experience of the skillful and brave. In this fashion the newspaper fulfilled its role as a collective organizer and propagandist.

THE COMPLETION OF THE DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY’S BROKEN-UP GROUP OF FORCES

(19-27 January)

The final elimination of the enemy’s broken-up Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces, which was carried out during 19-27 January, unfolded in the following order. The battle to destroy the enemy forces in Ostrogozhsk and the area to the northeast of Alekseevka took place during 19-24 January. Troops from all three of the front’s shock groups took part in the

fighting. Simultaneous with the elimination of the enemy forces, as early as 20 January the 40th Army was regrouping its forces for conducting the subsequent Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. The battle to eliminate the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces took place during 19-27 January. The elimination of the enemy group of forces was carried out by the combined efforts of the 3rd Tank Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ forces simultaneously with their regrouping for the Voronezh Front’s subsequent Khar’kov offensive operation. At first the southern part of the Rossosh’ group of enemy forces, consisting of about four divisions, was cut off. 20 By January these forces had basically been destroyed in the area east of Rossosh’. During 21-23 January the remaining forces of the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces were eliminated in the Podgornoe area. During 24-27 January the destruction of the remnants of the enemy’s Rossosh’ group that had broken out of the encirclement and reached the area east of Valuiki was completed.

The Elimination of the Enemy’s Encircled Forces in Ostrogozhsk and in the Area Northeast of Alekseevka

(19-24 January)

By the morning of 19 January the following correlation of men and materiel had arisen along various axes of the 40th Army’s attack sector. Facing the army’s right flank (141st Rifle Division, 253rd Rifle Brigade, and a regiment from the 25th Guards Rifle Division) along a 35-kilometer front Kostenki—Rossoshki—Istobnoe was, as indicated earlier, the enemy’s “Group Siebert,” which by this time included overall up to three divisions. The correlation of forces along this axis

was approximately equal. In the town of Ostrogozhsk the 107th, 340th and 309th rifle divisions and the 129th Rifle Brigade³ were blockading the main forces of the German 168th Infantry Division and the remnants of the Hungarian 13th and 10th divisions, which overall amounted to four regiments. Our forces in this area significantly outnumbered the enemy. The correlation of forces was shaping up less than favorably for us in the Ilovskoe—Alekseevka area. Here only a part of the 305th Rifle Division’s forces was operating, as well as the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps, in which there were only 20 tanks. The enemy in this area, being half encircled, was striving at all costs to extricate the German 26th and 168th infantry divisions and the Hungarian 1st Panzer Division, as well as the remnants of isolated elements being gathered up from the routed Hungarian divisions, through the asyet-open space between Ilovskoe and Alekseevka. As early as the evening of 18 January almost all of the 1st Panzer Division had reached the woods northeast of Alekseevka, while the 26th Infantry Division began to move there from the Tatarino area. At the same time the 168th Infantry Division’s elements had fallen back on Ilovskoe. Taking into account the fact of our superiority in forces over the enemy in the Ostrogozhsk area, as well as the necessity of reinforcing the front’s group of forces in the Ilovskoe—Alekseevka area, the front commander ordered the commander of the 40th Army to regroup the 340th and 309th rifle divisions to the Ilovskoe —Alekseevka area. Simultaneously, the front commander issued instructions to the commander of the 3rd Tank Army for the dispatch to Alekseevka of the 48th Guards Rifle Division and the 37th Rifle Brigade to reinforce the 15th Tank Corps. The 107th Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade were heavily reinforced with artillery for the

purpose of eliminating as quickly as possible the enemy forces blockaded in Ostrogozhsk.

Combat Activities on19-20 January

The fighting for Ostrogozhsk, which continued throughout 17-18 January, resumed with new vigor on the morning of 19 January. As was indicated earlier, the 107th Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade were left to capture the town. The 10th Breakthrough Artillery Division, consisting of two cannon artillery regiments, two howitzer regiments, two anti-tank artillery regiments, two highpowered artillery battalions, and two artillery regiments from the 107th and 340th rifle divisions, were brought in to support the storming of the town. The overall number of artillery amounted to 257 guns and 176 mortars.⁴ Of this number, 82 guns were employed for firing over open sights. On the morning of 19 January our forces began the storm of Ostrogozhsk. The 107th Rifle Division, while attacking the town from the northwest, captured a grove along its northern outskirts and by the close of the day had thrown the enemy out of Novaya Sotnya and two of its regiments had begun fighting along the western outskirts of Ostrogozhsk. The 340th Rifle Division, while marching with its main forces to the Ilovskoe area, was assisting the 107th Rifle Division’s attack on the town with a single battalion. Upon attacking the town from the west, the 340th Rifle Division’s battalion was counterattacked by the enemy, who was striving to break out of Ostrogozhsk. Having gone over to the defense, the division’s battalion repelled all of the enemy forces’ attempts to break through the encirclement to the west. The 129th Rifle Brigade, which attacked the town from the

northeast, was involved in heavy fighting throughout the day along the town’s outskirts. By the close of 19 January our forces were not able to capture the town. On the morning of 20 January the fighting for the town broke out with renewed force and became especially bitter. By 1500 the 107th Rifle Division’s and the 129th Rifle Brigade’s units, following stubborn fighting inside the town, completely cleared Ostrogozhsk of the enemy. A large part of the Ostrogozhsk garrison was either captured or killed in the fighting for the town. In taking Ostrogozhsk, our forces captured a large number of prisoners, enormous supplies of ammunition and equipage, and different types of military equipment. However, it should be noted that individual enemy groups nevertheless managed to break through to the southwest and retreat to the woods northeast of Alekseevka and thus reinforce the enemy forces in this area. The breakthrough of part of the enemy forces out of Ostrogozhsk was the result of the failure of the 309th Rifle Division to carry out its assigned task. The division was to have taken Osinovka and Zasosinsk as early as the night of 18-19 January and prevent the enemy’s retreat from Ostrogozhsk to the south and southwest. However, the 309th Rifle Division’s units attacked indecisively, fearing to come under attack by the enemy trying to break out of Ostrogozhsk. The 309th Rifle Division hardly moved throughout the day. Its main forces were located in the Blizhnee Stoyanovo area. Only one of the division’s regiments, which had been regrouped beforehand to its left flank, reached Nizhnyaya Ol’shevka by 1600 and was able to begin the attack on Gumnyi, although it was unsuccessful. Simultaneous with the fighting in Ostrogozhsk, fierce fighting broke out along the army’s right flank in the Semidesyatskoe—Sinie Lipyagi—Istobnoe area, where units of the 253rd Rifle Brigade and the 25th Guards Rifle Division were operating. These forces had to repel numerous counterattacks by “Group Siebert”. Having worn out “Group Siebert” in stubborn defensive fighting, the

253rd Rifle Brigade and the 25th Guards Rifle Division resumed their attack and once again advanced to the north and west from eight to 15 kilometers. By the close of 20 January the 253rd Rifle Brigade was fighting along the line excluding Rossoshki—Semidesyatskoe— Skupoi, while the 25th Guards Rifle Division was on the line Dolgii— Ostryanka—Rogovato-Pogoreloe—Gorodishche. Throughout the subsequent days of the operation, the front line along the army’s right flank did not change significantly. Our forces, having repelled all of the enemy’s counterattacks, firmly consolidated along the line reached, which subsequently became the jumping-off point for the deployment of the front’s shock groups in carrying out the new Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. Thus, during the 19-20 January fighting the 40th Army’s forces resolved two major tasks—they eliminated the enemy forces in Ostrogozhsk and bled white “Group Siebert,” which was forced to call off its counterattacks along the external encirclement front and began a retreat. The fulfillment of these tasks was very important for the development of the subsequent activities of the entire Voronezh Front. The arrival of the 40th Army’s right-flank forces at the line indicated above would create favorable prerequisites for the launching of an attack from there to the north for the purpose of encircling and defeating, in conjunction with the Bryansk Front, the German Second Army’s main forces defending in the Voronezh—Kastornoe area. On 20 January General A.M. Vasilevskii, who was with the Voronezh Front’s forces as a representative of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, issued instructions to the commanders of the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts to prepare for and conduct a new offensive operation. The Voronezh Front’s 38th, 60th and 40th armies and the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army were to take part in this operation. The Voronezh Front was to concentrate its main forces along the front

Kostenki—Rogovato-Pogoreloe; that is, along the line occupied by the 40th Army’s right-flank formations. In accordance with General Vasilevskii’s instructions, the 40th and 60th armies’ shock groups were to deploy along this sector. The front commander decided to include in these groups of forces the armies’ and front’s reserves remaining during the course of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, as well as those forces that would be freed up as the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces was eliminated. As early as 20 January the Voronezh Front’s forces began to regroup for the new offensive operation. This regrouping continued until 24 January and was conducted simultaneously with the fighting to eliminate the enemy forces in the Alekseevka area.

Combat Activities During 21-24 January

The fighting for Ostrogozhsk had not yet managed to die down before bitter fighting began in the area northeast of Alekseevka. The 40th Army’s 305th, 340th and 309th rifle divisions took part in these battles, as well as units of the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps. By the close of 20 January the situation of our forces in the Alekseevka area was as follows. Two of the 305th Rifle Division’s regiments were fighting to capture Ilovskoe, repelling fierce enemy counterattacks along the line Kazatskoe—Podserednoe—Ilovskoe. The division’s third regiment was fighting along the eastern edge of the woods north of Shinkin. The 304th Rifle Division had reached the line Repen’ka— Kolovatovka and was continuing to attack to the southwest, combing through the wooded area, where the scattered elements of the enemy’s 168th Infantry Division, which had broken out of Ostrogozhsk, were concentrating. The 309th Rifle Division, which

had been subordinated to the 40th Army, was on the march that day, having reached the Dal’nie Polubyanki area. Following heavy fighting in Alekseevka, the 15th Tank Corps, having brought up its artillery and rear organs, defeated the enemy defending in the town and organized a perimeter defense of this inhabited locale. 3,000 enemy soldiers and officers were captured in Alekseevka. The extended character of the fighting that unfolded in the Alekseevka—Ilovskoe area from 18 January was caused by the initial shortage of our forces along this axis. At the same time as the encirclement of the enemy was accomplished he numbered more than a division in strength, while our forces had in Alekseevka only about two regiments from the 305th Rifle Division and two weakened brigades from the 15th Tank Corps. One could only hold the enemy with such forces, all the more so as the conditions for attacking the enemy, who had consolidated in the woods, were extremely unfavorable for the tank corps’ brigades. Of the 48th Rifle Division’s and 37th Rifle Brigade’s forces that had been dispatched to Alekseevka to assist the 15th Tank Corps, only a battalion from the 37th Rifle Brigade arrived at its destination. These formations’ remaining forces were forced to disperse along the Ol’khovatka— Alekseevka road, occupying along the road the most important inhabited locales, through which ran the paths of retreat for the enemy forces trying to break out of the Podgornoe area. It was only with the arrival of the 340th and then the 309th rifle divisions that the elimination of the enemy forces moved at a faster pace. Squeezed in the wooded area, the enemy forces made desperate attempts to break out between Alekseevka and Ilovskoe toward Budennoe and Novyi Oskol. For this purpose, the enemy, while striving to widen the narrow corridor, made his fiercest counterattacks against the 305th Rifle Division’s units in the areas of Ilovskoe, Podserednoe and Kazatskoe. All attempts by the 305th Rifle Division’s units to capture Ilovskoe and link up with the 15th Tank Corps in Alekseevka throughout 21 January were unsuccessful. On the evening of 21 January the front commander, in order to

more rapidly eliminate the enemy forces concentrated in the woods northeast of Alekseevka, demanded that the commander of the 3rd Tank Army launch an attack from the south on Podserednoe and from there, in conjunction with the 305th Rifle Division’s units, attack Ilovksoe and capture it, while preventing the enemy’s retreat to the west. In describing the combat activities of 21 January, the bold actions of the 25th Guards and 305th rifle divisions’ forward detachments should be noted. These detachment, which began to move toward the Oskol River as early as 20 January, were supposed to get across the likely path of retreat of the scattered enemy groups that were trying to break out of the encirclement and to deny them the opportunity to consolidate along the river’s right bank. The 25th Guards Rifle Division’s forward detachment, which consisted of seven tanks from the 116th Tank Brigade, with a landing party of infantry on tanks and sleighs, while operating from the Gorodishche area, occupied Golofeevka station and the inhabited locale of Kazachek as the result of a surprise attack. The attack on Golofeevka was so unexpected that the enemy had no time to dispatch from the station or destroy the freight cars that had accumulated there. Upon forcing the Oskol River, the forward detachment captured the inhabited locale of Shmarnoe, but could not manage to advance further on Staryi Oskol. On that same day the 305th Rifle Division’s forward detachment occupied Verkhososensk and, upon consolidating there, cut the enemy’s path of retreat to Novyi Oskol. On the morning of 22 January our forces, while carrying out the necessary regroupings and organizing cooperation, went over to the attack. The attacks against the enemy group of forces were to be launched from four directions: units of the 340th Rifle Division attacked from the north, the 309th Rifle Division from the east, while units of the 15th Tank Corps and 305th Rifle Division operated from the south and west. Intensive fighting continued throughout 22 January. The encircled enemy forces, disposing of a sufficient amount of ammunition and food,⁵ resisted fiercely. By the close of

the day there were no significant changes in our troops’ situation in this area. On 23 January the fighting resumed with renewed force. Part of the 340th Rifle Division’s forces, in conjunction with a regiment from the 305th Rifle Division, which was operating in the Shinkin area, launched an attack from the north along the Tikhaya Sosna River and broke through to Koltunovka and, following a fierce battle, captured it. In this area units of the 340th Rifle Division linked up with the 15th Tank Corps. Simultaneously, the 305th Rifle Division’s units attacking from the west crushed the enemy’s resistance in Ilovskoe and were advancing to the south. At the same time the 219th Rifle Division’s lead regiment and the 37th Rifle Brigade’s elements, which had come up to reinforce the 15th Tank Corps, occupied Il’inka. On this day the enemy made his last attempt to extricate his forces through Il’inka, but once again suffered a defeat. At this his organized resistance ceased. Having abandoned all his equipment and heavy weapons, units of the enemy’s 26th and 168th infantry and 1st Panzer divisions began to attempt to break out of the encirclement in scattered groups, but they were unable to carry this out. Throughout 24 January our forces completed the destruction of the enemy’ main forces in the woods north of Alekseevka. In all, about 9,000 soldiers and officers were captured in this area. Approximately the same number were killed in the course of the fighting. Some enemy units (numbering about 12,000 men) managed to break through to Budennoe and then fall back to the Oskol River. As a result of the combat activities of 19-24 January, our forces defeated the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Alekseevka group of forces. The units and formations that were freed up after these battles could be employed for carrying out new tasks.

The Elimination of the Enemy Forces in the Areas East of Rossosh’ and Podgornoe and East of Valuiki

(19-27 January)

Simultaneous with the destruction of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk— Alekseevka group of forces and the regrouping of the 40th Army’s forces for carrying out the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, the 3rd Tank Army’s and the 18th Rifle Corps’ forces fought to eliminate the enemy’s Rossosh’ group. The destruction of this group’s forces took place during the regrouping of the front’s left-wing forces, which had begun on 21 January, for conducting a new offensive operation along the Khar’kov axis.

Combat Activities on 19-20 January

On the morning of 19 January the situation of the 18th Rifle Corps’ and 3rd Tank Army’s formations, which had encircled the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces and had begun to destroy it, was as follows. The 161st Rifle Division reached the line Degtyarnyi—Karpenkovo— Kodintsovo and continued to advance to the southwest. By the close of 19 January the division was to reach the line Tatarino—Novyi Stroi—Saprina (the offensive sector was about 20 kilometers wide and the depth of the assignment was 25 kilometers). Besides this, the division was ordered to leave a company each in the inhabited locales of Kamenka, Karpenkovo and Ol’khov Log, in order to cut the escape routes of the enemy’s scattered groups, which were attempting to break out of the encirclement. The 219th Rifle Division took up the pursuit of the enemy to the southwest from the line reached on 18 January, with the task of

reaching the line Stepanovka—northern part of Podgornoe (the width of the offensive sector was about eight kilometers and the depth of the assignment was 20 kilometers) by the close of 19 January. The division was also to leave behind a reinforced rifle company each in the inhabited locales of Saguny station, Goncharovka and Podgornoe to cut the enemy’s path of retreat. The 270th Rifle Division, which failed to receive additional instructions from the corps commander, due to the absence of communications, operated according to the division commander’s initiative, continuing to pursue the Italian units falling back before the division in the general direction of Podgornoe. The 127th and 160th rifle divisions, upon reaching the line Staraya Kalitva—Yevstratovskii on 18 January, continued to attack toward the north. The 180th Rifle Division, along with the 173rd Tank Brigade, was fighting with the enemy groups falling back to the north in the Igolkin area, with its front facing to the east. By this time the reserve of the 3rd Tank Army’s commander—the 113th and 195th tank brigades—was concentrated in the Postoyalyi area. The 12th Tank Corps, having completed the elimination of the enemy forces in the Karpenkovo area, moved a part of its forces up to the Goncharovka area, with its front facing east, toward the enemy groups attempting to break out of the encirclement. Thus, in all, by the morning of 19 January we had six rifle divisions and three tank brigades operating against the enemy’s encircled Rossosh’ group of forces, which numbered about eight divisions. The correlation of forces was approximately equal. By this time the 3rd Tank Army’s remaining formations, which were not tied down in fighting with the encircled forces of the enemy’s

Rossosh’ group of forces, were carrying out the following tasks. The 48th Guards Rifle Division and the 179th Independent Tank Brigade, occupying the inhabited locales with individual elements along the road from Ol’khovatka to Varvarovka, was marching with its main forces to the Alekseevka area. The 37th Rifle Brigade, which had been dispatched by the army commander to reinforce the 15th Tank Corps, was marching to this area as well. The 184th Rifle Division, which had moved up to the Makeevka area, was putting itself in order, with the subsequent mission of attacking to the west and reaching the Oskol River. The 111th Rifle Division was continuing to concentrate in the Roven’ki area. During 19 January our forces, while continuing to squeeze the encirclement ring around the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces, threw back its main forces to the Podgornoe area. The 219th Rifle Division, which was attacking from the north, reached the line Goncharovka—northern outskirts of Podgornoe. The 270th Rifle Division’s right flank advanced to the Sergeevka area. The 127th and 160th rifle divisions, in conjunction with the 180th Rifle Division, were fighting throughout the day to destroy the encircled enemy forces in the Annovka area. The 180th Rifle Division attacked toward Pidiono-Tal’novka and reached these forces’ route of retreat to the north. The 127th and 160th rifle divisions took up the pursuit to the north, destroying and capturing the retreating enemy. By the close of the day a large part of the enemy forces, consisting of the Italian 3rd and 4th mountain rifle and German 385th and 387th infantry divisions, had either been destroyed or captured. Individual enemy groups, which had managed to break out to the north through Pidiono-Tal’novka before the 180th Rifle Division arrived there, were subsequently destroyed by our forces in the Vakulovka area. Following the battle to destroy the enemy in the Annovka area, the 127th and 160th rifle divisions were dispatched to the Ol’khovatka area, with the mission of subsequently moving up to the Oskol River in order to occupy a jumping-off position for

the front’s new offensive operation along the Khar’kov axis. Throughout 20 January combat operations to destroy the enemy forces continued. On this day the most intensive fighting was waged by the 180th Rifle Division, the units of which had to repel the attempt by the enemy’s forces to break out of the Vakulovka— Komarov area in the direction of Rossosh’. Having suffered a defeat in its attempt to break out through the 180th Rifle Division’s combat formations, the enemy troops streamed to the Podgornoe area. The enemy units being pursued by the 270th Rifle Division fell back to this area as well. By the close of 20 January the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces had been squeezed by a dense ring of our units along a comparatively small territory, the bounds of which did not exceed 150 square kilometers. In the north, along the line Stepanovka—northern outskirts of Podgornoe, were operating units of the 219th Rifle Division, while units of the 270th Rifle Division had reached Podgornoe from the east; the 180th and 160th rifle divisions from the south were along the line Sotnitskii—Plotnitskii, while the 113th and 195th tank brigades had deployed from the east in the area south of Postoyalyi. Despite the hopelessness of his situation, the enemy forces continued to offer resistance, making unsuccessful attempts to break out of the encirclement.

Combat Operations During 21-27 January

The concluding battles to eliminate the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces during 21-27 January unfolded in an unusual situation. On 21 January, in accordance with the decision made by the commander of the Voronezh Front to regroup his forces for the

conduct of the Khar’kov offensive operation, the movement began of the troops of the 3rd Tank Army and 18th Rifle Corps to the Oskol River into their jumping-off positions for the offensive. Due to the fact that the final elimination of the enemy’s Rossosh’ group of forces in the Podgornoe area had not been completed and that individual scattered enemy groups were still to be found throughout the enormous Alekseevka—Karpenkovo—Rossosh’— Varvarovka area, it was decided to destroy the enemy forces en route, during the course of the regrouping, without disrupting its plan. All the formations were assigned such march routes to their new areas as would take them through areas where the retreating enemy might try to concentrate. The majority of the 3rd Tank Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ formations, while regrouping, got into fighting in a number of places along the roads and in inhabited locales with disorganized enemy groups, destroying and capturing them. The most bitter fighting to destroy the Rossosh’ group of enemy forces unfolded in the Podgornoe area during 21-23 January. The 18th Rifle Corps was ordered to move out to the line Nizhnyaya Ol’shevka—Alekseevka by the close of 21 January, destroying along the way the defeated groups of demoralized enemy forces. By the close of 22 January the corps was to concentrate along the line Khmelevoe—Budennoe, and then to move to the Oskol River. The 3rd Tank Army, having turned over the 180th Rifle Division and the 37th Rifle Brigade to the 18th Rifle Corps, was to move up to the Oskol River along a front from Peschanka to Urazovo. One rifle division was to move up to the line excluding Urazovo—excluding Pokrovskoe to secure the boundary with the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army. Having suffered a reverse in its attempt to break out through Vakulovka to Rossosh’, the enemy group of forces on 21 January made its latest attempt to break out of the encirclement. Bypassing Rossosh’ from the north, a large enemy column streamed toward

Novaya Postoyalovka. But this attempt by the enemy was also stillborn. The enemy was first pinned down by the 113th and 195th tank brigades, and then attacked in the flank by the 160th Rifle Division, just arrived from the south, and in the rear by units of the 180th Rifle Division. The 180th Rifle Division first cut off a part of this group of forces in the Sotnitskii area and destroyed it. By the close of the day almost the entire enemy column had been routed. About 5,000 captured soldiers and offices were taken in the fighting, and 1,500 motor vehicles. The remnants of the enemy column ran away in the direction of Podgornoe. The enemy, having accumulated large forces in the Podgornoe area, made a third attempt to break out of the encirclement, this time in the Postoyalyi area. The enemy column, consisting of about 10,000 men, headed for the Postoyalyi area, thus creating a serious threat to the 3rd Tank Army’s formations, which were regrouping along the Oskol River. The army commander decided to leave the 180th Rifle Division and the 173rd Tank Brigade in the Novaya Postoyalovka area and move the 160th Rifle Division and the 113th and 195th tank brigades to Postoyalyi to intercept the enemy columns. As a result of these measures and bold actions by our forces, this enemy column was also scattered and partially destroyed. Only its individual groups were able to break through to the Ol’khovatka— Alekseevka road. Following the elimination of the enemy’s attempts to break out of the encirclement, the 180th Rifle Division turned its attack front to the west, combing through the areas along its path of march. The division began its march from the Postoyalyi area to the Babkino— Nizhnyaya Pokrovka (25 kilometers northwest of Alekseevka) area, having been subordinated to the 18th Rifle Corps. The 160th Rifle Division launched an attack from the Postoyalyi area to the east toward Podgornoe and, in conjunction with the 127th Rifle Division attacking from the south and the 219th Rifle Division operating in the north, destroyed the last enemy group in the Podgornoe area on

23 January. With the elimination of the enemy in Podgornoe, the enemy’s Rossosh’ group ceased to exist. The remnants of this group, which had escaped destruction in the areas east and north of Rossosh’, tried to infiltrate in small groups to the southwest and northwest. The blizzard that raged and the resulting sharp worsening of the roads rendered the combat operations of the 3rd Tank Army’s and 18th Rifle Corps’ formations more difficult. By 23 January up to 10,000 enemy soldiers and officers had collected in the Lymarev area. This enemy group came about from the individual scattered enemy groups that had come out of the woods and which had earlier broken out of the Podgornoe area to the west. This group sought to break through our forces’ combat formations in the Varvarovka and Shelyakino area and fall back to the west, to the Oskol River. The 48th Guards Rifle Division, which was occupying the inhabited locales along the road between Varvarovka and Ol’khovatka with individual elements, barred the way to the enemy’s further advance to the west and southwest. Bitter fighting raged in this area during 23-24 January. Demoralized by the previous fighting, the enemy group, despite its numerical superiority, refrained from trying to break through the 48th Rifle Division’s combat formation. The group’s command made the decision to break out through Shelyakino to Nikolaevka, bypassing the 48th Rifle Division’s right flank and then turn toward Malakeevka, Nikitovka and Volokonovka. In the unequal battle that broke out on 23 January, the enemy managed to push back the 48th Rifle Division’s elements and by the close of the day extricate its columns, consisting mainly of troops from the Italian Alpine Corps, out of the encirclement. Moving from the Lymarev—Shelyakino area, the enemy column streamed to the southwest. However, the enemy’s hopes for rescue were premature, because by this time units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps were already along the line of the Oskol River along a front from Volokonovka to Urazovo.

It should be noted that having reached Nikolaevka (25 kilometers southwest of Shelyakino), the enemy had reached the rear area of the 184th Rifle Division, which had regrouped to the Valuiki area. The resulting situation required the turn of some of the 3rd Tank Army’s formations, which were moving to the Valuiki area, to the breakthrough area. In particular, the 160th Rifle Division was moved up to the line Khar’kovskaya—Dranovka. In order to manage the troops’ operations to eliminate the remnants of the enemy group of forces, on 24 January an operational group was created from the 3rd Tank Army’s headquarters. With the creation of the operational group, troop control of those forces involved in destroying the enemy groups was improved, and the combat operations themselves took on a more forceful character. In the meantime, the enemy columns turned from the Nikolaevka area along the road to Nikitovka and partially to Valuiki. On 25 January the main part of these forces had gathered in the area south of Zhukov, while the remainder were strung out along the entire march route and had partially reached the area northwest of Veidelevka. While pursuing the enemy, the 48th Guards Rifle Corps preempted his arrival at the Nikitovka—Livenka road. The 179th Tank Brigade, while pursuing the enemy column’s main forces along the Shelyakino—Varvarovka parallel road, turned sharply from Varvarovka to the southwest toward Malakeevka. Having routed the enemy’s rearguard units and forced their remnants to turn toward Valuiki toward the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps’ attack, the brigade cleared the Malakeevka—Nikolaevka road, after which it concentrated in the Aidar area. During 25-26 January the 48th Guards Rifle Division completed the elimination of the enemy forces that had broken though in the woods west of Nikitovka, killing and capturing more than 5,000 enemy soldiers and officers. By 27 January the remnants of the

Italian forces trying to break through to Valuiki had also been eliminated by units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps. In the course of 27 January alone the remnants of the Italian 3rd, 4th and 156th divisions surrendered, together with division’s commanders and headquarters. The Italian Alpine Corps had ceased to exist. At this the destruction of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces came to an end. As a result of the completion of the battle to destroy the broken-up units of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, the Voronezh Front completely carried out the mission assigned to it by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. The front’s freed-up forces could be employed for carrying out new offensive operations. As was already noted above, beginning on 20 January the preparation for the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation had begun along the front’s right flank. However, no less favorable conditions for developing the offensive had arisen along the front’s left wing. The drastic change in the correlation of forces in favor of the Voronezh Front that had arisen by this time, due to the defeat of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces (the final elimination of which was close to completion), and the absence of any kind of major enemy forces, either along the line of the Oskol River or along the line of the Severskii Donets River offered broad opportunities for developing a vigorous offensive by the front’s forces to the west, in the direction of Khar’kov. Thus the question arose of preparing an operation along the Khar’kov axis, which would have to be conducted immediately following the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation in order to develop the results of the front’s January offensive into a success of strategic significance. On 20 January the representative of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, General Vasilevskii, and the commander of the Voronezh Front drew up an appreciation of the front’s subsequent activities.

On 21 January these ideas were presented to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, comrade Stalin, for confirmation. These ideas called for the deployment at the end of January, following the completion of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, of four of the front’s armies—the 60th, 40th, 69th⁶ and 3rd Tank armies—along the line of the Oskol River for an offensive along the Khar’kov axis and the launching of their attacks along converging axes toward Khar’kov. It was planned to assign the 38th Army the task of developing the offensive along the Oboyan’ axis, in order to secure the operation from the area of Kursk. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, have agreed in principle to the conduct of the Voronezh Front’s Khar’kov offensive operation, ordered the front commander to employ his right-flank 60th Army not along the Khar’kov axis, but to aim its attack toward Kursk, for the purpose of capturing this important railroad junction.

THE RESULTS OF THE OSTROGOZHSK—ROSSOSH’ OPERATION AND SOME BRIEF CONCLUSIONS

The Voronezh Front’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation lasted 15 days. During this time our forces advanced 140 kilometers, reached the Oskol River and completely carried out the mission assigned to them by the Supreme High Command by surrounding and destroying a major enemy group of forces defending along the Don between Voronezh and Kantemirovka. The Voronezh Front’s combat successes were noted on 25 January 1943 in the Supreme High Command’s order expressing thanks to the front’s command and forces. During the operation a territory of 22,500 square kilometers was

liberated from the enemy. The towns and important road junctions of Ostrogozhsk, Rossosh’, Korotoyak, Alekseevka, Valuiki, and many other inhabited locales in the Voronezh Oblast’ were liberated. The Liski—Kantemirovka and Liski—Valuiki lateral railroads ran along the liberated territory, which could be used, following their restoration, for delivering supplies and for the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts’ operational troop movements while they developed the offensive along the Khar’kov axis and in the Donbass. During the operation the front’s forces defeated the Hungarian Second Army, the Italian Alpine Corps and the German XXIV Panzer Corps and a large part of Army Group B’s operational reserves—Gen. Kramer’s German special designation corps. In all, more than 15 enemy divisions⁷ were completely routed. Besides this, six enemy divisions suffered a heavy defeat.⁸ In the 13-27 January fighting the front’s forces captured more than 86,000 enemy soldiers and officers. Our forces captured a lot of military equipment and an enormous amount of enemy property and equipage. Besides this, a significant amount of military equipment was destroyed. The results of the operation led to a sharp change in the correlation of forces along the Voronezh Front’s sector in favor of the Soviet forces. Having defeated the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces and arrived at the line Kostenki—Semidesyatskoe— Rogatovo-Pogoreloe—Gorodishche, the front’s forces created favorable conditions for launching a new offensive operation, in conjunction with the Bryansk Front’s forces, for the purpose of encircling and destroying the German Second Army’s main forces, which were defending along the Voronezh—Kastornoe axis. Our forces’ capture of the important railroad junction of Valuiki and their arrival at the Kastornoe—Voroshilovgrad lateral railroad along a significant stretch deprived the enemy of the ability to employ that railroad for maneuvering forces along the front from Army Group B to Army Group Don. Simultaneously, the arrival of our forces at the

line of this railroad created favorable conditions for the Soviet command to conduct an offensive operation along the Khar’kov axis. The Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, which was one of the links in the chain of offensive operations during the winter campaign of the Great Patriotic War’s second period, was prepared and conducted in conditions of a strategic and operational situation favorable for the Soviet forces. Following the defeat of the Hitlerite forces around Stalingrad, the Soviet army unleashed a general offensive along a broad front. In the first days of January the Trans-Caucasus and Southern (formerly Stalingrad) fronts began an operation to defeat the enemy’s entire north Caucasus group of forces; the Southwestern Front’s forces continued to successfully develop the offensive along the Voroshilovgrad axis and were approaching the Severskii Donets River along a broad front; on 10 January the Don Front’s forces unleashed a successful offensive for the purpose of eliminating the enemy’s encircled Stalingrad group of forces. Along the Soviet-German front’s right wing on 12 January the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts’ offensive operation began to break through the blockade of Leningrad. The Soviet forces’ crushing attacks in the Northern Caucasus, along the Rostov and Voroshilovgrad axes, and around Leningrad tied down the German-Fascist army’s forces, distracted to themselves the Hitlerite command’s reserves, deprived him of the opportunity to reinforce his Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, and thus created very favorable conditions for the Voronezh Front’s conduct of the offensive operation. In its turn, the Voronezh Front’s offensive prevented the enemy from removing any kind of forces from the Voronezh axis in order to reinforce his forces that had come under attack by the Southern and Southwestern fronts. The success of the Voronezh Front’s offensive, which was carried out in operational and strategic cooperation with the Soviet forces’

offensive along other sectors of the Soviet-German front, was achieved, first of all, thanks to the wise leadership of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. During the operation’s preparatory period the Stavka, having realistically evaluated the situation and the correlation of forces in the Voronezh Front’s operational zone, reinforced it significantly from its own reserves. In assigning the front’s forces the mission of conducting an offensive operation with the decisive goal of encircling and destroying a numerically superior enemy group of forces, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command defined the overall idea of the operation, selected the axes of the main attacks and the front’s operational formation. On the instructions of the Stavka, the most important measures for the all-round support of the offensive operation were carried out. Representatives from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command were at the Voronezh Front during the preparation and conduct of the operation. The direct instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief and the assistance of the Stavka representatives enabled the front commander to draw up an operational plan, based upon the scrupulous weighing of all elements of the situation enabling us, given the skillful employment of all the men and materiel gathered for the offensive, to successfully resolve the important tasks assigned to the front for the defeat of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces, the arrival of the front’s forces at the Oskol River, and the creation of favorable conditions for the conduct of subsequent offensive operations along the Voronezh—Kastornoe and Khar’kov axes. The Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation is witness to the further growth of the Soviet command’s military skill. In his order of 23 February 1943, comrade Stalin pointed out that “It should not be taken as an accident the fact that the Red Army command is not only liberating the Soviet land from the enemy, but

is not allowing the enemy to escape from our land alive, by carrying out major operations for the encirclement and elimination of the enemy armies that may serve as a model of military art. This is without a doubt a sign of our commanders’ maturity.”⁹ The Soviet command’s great military skill may be most easily traced in the skillful planning of the operation. The planning of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, which was based on a scrupulous weighing of the situation and the creative mastery of the very instructive experience of the offensive operations around Stalingrad, testifies to the further development of the theory and practice of conducting operations to encircle and destroy the enemy. At the heart of the operation lay the idea of encircling the enemy group of forces along with the simultaneous breaking up and destruction of his forces in detail. This idea also called for the creation of an external encirclement front, located at a significant distance from the internal front. One should also note as an instructive instance in the operational idea the correct distribution of forces between the internal and external encirclement fronts. Following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, it was planned to dispatch a large part of these forces to resolve the task of encircling and destroying the enemy forces, and a small one for the creation of the external front. Such a distribution of forces between the internal and external fronts in operations involving the enemy’s encirclement and destruction was a characteristic feature of the majority of the subsequent operations of the Great Patriotic War, and it fully corresponds to modern demands. The plan worked out by the front, which was in accordance with the overall idea of the offensive operation, was fulfilled during the operation almost without significant changes. The successful realization of the operational plan was achieved thanks to the correct choice of the axes of the main attacks, the massed employment of the front’s available men and materiel, the creation

of a decisive superiority over the enemy along the chosen axes, the precise organization of operational cooperation between the front’s separately operating shock groups, and the strict centralization of troop control along with the commanders’ broad initiative at all levels. The encirclement and destruction of a major enemy group of forces by the forces of a single front was first realized during the war. This was a new phenomenon in the area of operational art in the Great Patriotic War. In the operation under study the simultaneous breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along three sectors was employed for the purpose of breaking up the enemy’s defensive front and the creation of the necessary conditions for carrying out a maneuver to encircle the enemy group of forces. The breakthrough of the main defensive zone was accomplished by the rifle formations, reinforced with individual tank brigades, which operated as direction infantrysupport tanks. The divisions’ breakthrough sectors were as follows: 3-4 kilometers in the 40th Army, 2-3 kilometers in the 18th Rifle Corps, and 5-6 kilometers in the 3rd Tank Army. According to the operational idea for encircling and destroying the enemy, particularly attention was to be paid to the simultaneity of breaking through the enemy’s defense along all three axes in the deadlines established for the operation. A delay in breaking through the enemy’s front on any one of these axes could make significantly more difficult the conduct of the entire front operation. Thus the Soviet command devoted a great deal of attention to the organization of the breakthrough of the tactical depth of the enemy’s defense while preparing for the operation. During the operation, when it became clearly obvious that the first-echelon rifle divisions of the front’s southern shock group could not break through the enemy’s defense on time, the front commander was forced to change his decision on the employment of the tank corps and committed them into the fight for the breakthrough of enemy’s the main defensive zone. The necessity of employing the tank corps

for breaking through the main defensive zone alongside the rifle formations was caused by the insufficient density of infantry and artillery along the 3rd Tank Army’s breakthrough sector. The launching of attacks simultaneously along three axes in a 250kilometer attack zone deprived the enemy command of freedom of maneuver and the capability of purposefully employing his limited reserves, and also forced the enemy to commit these reserves into the fighting in detail. Despite the fact that as early as 15 January the enemy began to commit his reserves (the 168th Infantry Division against the 40th Army’s left flank and the 26th Infantry Division and 1st Panzer Division against the main forces of the 18th Rifle Corps’ shock group) into the fighting, he was not able to decisively change the correlation of forces along these axes in his favor and prevent the front’s forces from successfully carrying out their assigned tasks. The simultaneous launching of attacks along three sectors, far removed from each other, by the forces of a single front was a characteristic feature of this operation and was first accomplished during the course of the Great Patriotic War. A characteristic feature in the development of tactics was the conduct of a reconnaissance in force by forward battalions. The 40th Army’s forward battalions carrying out the reconnaissance in force were reinforced by tanks and supported by massed artillery fire and air power. The forward battalions’ successful activities were developed in a timely manner by the commitment of the main forces of the army’s first-echelon divisions, as a result of which favorable conditions were created for the army’s going over to the offensive. An instructive aspect of the operation is the concentration of superior numbers of men and materiel and their massed employment along the decisive axes. By the start of the offensive operation the Voronezh Front’s forces did not have an overall superiority in forces, but thanks to skillful maneuver the Soviet

command was able to quickly, in a short period, in difficult winter conditions, and without the enemy’s knowledge, to achieve the necessary superiority in men and materiel over the enemy along the selected axes by boldly weakening the secondary sectors and axes. Of the overall amount of men and materiel gathered for the offensive along a 250-kilometer front, 82 percent of the infantry, 84 percent of the artillery and mortars and 100 percent of the tanks were concentrated along the 34 kilometers of the three breakthrough sectors, which accounted for 14 percent of the entire offensive front. This enabled us to create along the shock axes a 1.5 superiority over the enemy in infantry, four times in artillery, and two times in tanks, when at the same time our forces along the front’s entire offensive sector were inferior to the enemy by a factor of almost 1.5 in infantry and planes and had only a 2:1 superiority in artillery and tanks. The decisive concentration of men and materiel along the shock axes was one of the main factors that influenced the successful completion of the operation. All of the front’s forces gathered for the offensive were deployed in a single echelon. The 40th Army’s organization and the 18th Rifle Corps’ combat formation consisted of two echelons, in each of which there were rifle and tank formations. Besides this, a rifle division from the front commander’s reserve was located behind the 40th Army’s shock group, which, on the whole, increased the depth of the operational formation of the front’s forces along this axis. The rifle divisions and brigades organized their combat formation in one or two echelons. The rifle regiments attacked in two echelons. The front’s southern shock group had the deepest operational formation. This group’s formation consisted of the 3rd Tank Army’s two echelons and the 7th Cavalry Corps behind them, the latter of which constituted the front’s mobile group. A characteristic feature of the 3rd Tank Army’s organizational structure was the presence in it of rifle divisions and tank corps. This army, much as the 5th Tank Army in the Stalingrad operation, had in its first-echelon rifle divisions reinforced by individual tank brigades; in the army’s second

echelon there were only tank corps, designated for developing the breakthrough. The army’s reserve consisted of two tank brigades. The overall depth of the southern shock group’s formation reached 25 kilometers by the start of the operation. The deep formation of the front’s shock groups guaranteed the consecutive augmentation of the first attacks’ force and enabled us to develop them at a high speed to the planned depth. In accordance with the plan adopted, the depth of the Ostrogozhsk —Rossosh’ operation did not exceed 140 kilometers. The front’s cavalry and tank formations reached this depth on the offensive’s fifth day, while advancing an average of about 30 kilometers per day. The rifle formations attacked at the following average pace: 12 kilometers per day in the 40th Army, nine kilometers in the 18th Rifle Corps, and 17 kilometers in the 3rd Tank Army. The offensive pace achieved by the front’s forces was sufficiently high for operations during a winter campaign in the second period of the Great Patriotic War and completely corresponded to the operation’s idea and plan. An offensive operation conducted with the decisive goal of encircling and destroying the enemy must always be conducted at a rapid pace. The necessity for this issues from the fact that the encirclement of the enemy group of forces must be completed before the arrival of the enemy’s reserves, the appearance of which may result in a change in the correlation of men and materiel in favor of the enemy along the attack axes of the front’s shock groups and result in the foiling of the encirclement operation. The success of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation was secured to a significant extent thanks to the front’s high offensive pace, which demanded from the troops extremely high moral and physical exertion during the conduct of the operation. Such rates of advance as were achieved in the offensive’s winter conditions speak to the Soviet troop’s good combat training and their high level of morale. Table III/14.1 shows the offensive pace of the front’s forces along various axes by each day of the operation.

Table III/14.1 The Offensive Pace of the Voronezh Front’s Forces in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh Operation (in kilometers)

Characteristic of the operation under study is the troops’ high degree of maneuver. In this sense, particularly illustrative are the activities of the 3rd Tank Army’s tank corps, the 7th Cavalry Corps and the 40th Army’s rifle formations (25th Guards, 340th and 305th rifle divisions). In the operation under study, a reinforced rifle corps attacked along a separate axis for the first time in the Great Patriotic War. In the front operation the 18th Rifle Corps, while operating along an independent axis, performed the role of one of the front’s shock groups, attacking between the two main groups and at a significant distance from each of them. According to the idea of the operation, the corps was to be entrusted with the task of launching a powerful attack to split into pieces the enemy group designated for defeat, against which the maneuver of the front’s main forces—the 40th and 3rd Guards armies—was directed. Besides this, the corps was to draw upon itself the main forces of Army Group B’s operational reserve, which lay along the axis of its attack, in order to make it more difficult for the enemy to employ them against the front’s enveloping shock groups. During the breakthrough of the enemy’s main defensive zone the 18th Rifle Corps defeated the Hungarian VII Army Corps. Subsequently, while developing the offensive on Karpenkovo, the corps repelled counterattacks by the enemy’s 26th Infantry and 1st Panzer divisions, which had been committed from the reserve, and, having penetrated up to 50 kilometers into his position, linked up with the 3rd Tank Army’s right-flank forces. As a result of this, a major group of forces, consisting of eight enemy divisions, was cut off from the remainder of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. While attacking simultaneously with its right-flank formations toward Ostrogozhsk, the corps encircled, in conjunction with the 40th Army’s left-flank forces, three enemy divisions. At the concluding stage of the operation, the 18th Rifle Corps took an active part in eliminating the split-up units of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of

forces. Also of interest are the actions by the corps’ units along the secondary axes. As a result of the skillfully organized defense along a broad 150-kilometer front, the corps’ units managed to tie down six full-bodied enemy divisions. A characteristic feature of the operation is also the elimination of the encircled enemy group of forces. A large part of the Ostrogozhsk —Rossosh’ group of forces was destroyed and captured during 1318 January; that is, at a time when the front’s forces, having broken through the enemy’s defense, were developing the offensive for the purpose of encircling and destroying this group of forces. The final elimination of the split-up units of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ group of forces occurred during 19-27 January in somewhat unusual circumstances. The favorable situation that had arisen by the completion of the encirclement of the enemy group of forces in the Voronezh Front’s operational zone enabled the Stavka of the Supreme High Command to assign the Voronezh Front its latest tasks, which issued from the Stavka’s overall idea for defeating the German-Fascist forces along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The Stavka of the Supreme High Command ordered the front commander to quickly carry out the preparation for the Voronezh— Kastornoe and Khar’kov operations during the concluding phase of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation. Thus the final elimination of the encircled troops of the enemy group of forces was to be accomplished by the same troops that had already regrouped to their new axes. This demanded great mobility from the troops and particularly flexible troop command and control from the command and staffs. It should be noted as a shortcoming of the operation that the Voronezh Front was unable to fully cope with its task of eliminating the remnants of the enemy’s encircled group of forces. As has already been noted, a certain part of the encircled troops (overall, up to 12,000 men) managed to break out of the encirclement and thus avoid capture by our forces. This was due to the fact that the 40th Army commander and the front commander did not take measures in time to reinforce the troops operating along the 40th Army’s main attack axis.

One of the factors facilitating the operation’s success in encircling and destroying the enemy was the scrupulously drawn up and skillfully accomplished operational support for the offensive operation. The command and headquarters’ main attention in this matter was concentrated on the conduct of various measures for achieving the offensive’s operational surprise and the securing of the shock groups’ external flanks during the operation. One should particularly view the actions of the 7th Cavalry Corps, which successfully secured the entire front operation from the south. This corps fully coped with its assigned task. While attacking in the general direction of Roven’ki and Valuiki at an average speed of 30 kilometers per day, in conditions of heavy snowdrifts and heavy enemy air activity, the corps captured the important rail junction of Valuiki on the operation’s sixth day and consolidated along the Volokonovka—Urazovo sector. The corps, while operating along the external encirclement front at a distance of 75 kilometers from the internal front, reliably secured the actions of the front’s forces in completely eliminating the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. In planning for the employment of aviation and the combat arms in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, the front command was guided by the instructions of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, as expressed in its orders and directives in 1942. Documents such as directive no. 03 of 10 January on the organization of the artillery offensive, order no 0728 of 19 September on inculcating the practice of tanks firing on the march into the tank troops’ practice, order no. 325 of 16 October on the combat employment of tank units and formations, and order no. 0171 of 4 March on employing our planes to their maximum practical range and flight time were the basis for planning the combat employment of our artillery, tanks and aviation. The plans that worked out by the front command for the combat employment of the combat arms and aviation in the offensive operation were put into practice during the operation almost without significant changes.

Our aviation rendered significant assistance to the ground forces during the operation. However, due to the fact that during the operation there were many days when we could not fly, our aviation was not able to fully take advantage of its entire resource of sorties. Instead of 700 sorties per day, the 2nd Air Army carried out each day an average of little more than 100 sorties. Thus a number of tasks for suppressing and destroying the enemy, which had been entrusted to our aviation, had to be resolved by the artillery. Our artillery successfully coped with the tasks assigned to it in supporting the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and supporting and accompanying our troops in the depths of the enemy’s defense. Characteristic of our artillery’s actions in the offensive was the employment of a large number of guns for firing over open sights. Artillery maneuver occupied a special pace during the offensive in the depth of the enemy’s defense. The battle for Ostrogozhsk may serve as a shining example of this, which about nine artillery regiments were brought in to give artillery support for the storm of the town. Engineer troops played a major role in the operation. Despite the limited number of engineer forces in the front, the large volume of engineer work, and the winter conditions of the offensive, they successfully carried out their assigned tasks, both during the operation’s preparatory period and during combat operations. In noting the factors that predetermined the operation’s success, one should point out; in particular, the purposeful and uninterrupted party-political work carried out among the troops by the commanders, political organs, and the party and Komsomol organizations. At the basis of this work, which was carried out under the slogan “Emulating Stalingrad’s heroic soldiers,” lay the demands of the Supreme High Command’s order no. 345 of 7 November 1942. Party-political work was multi-faceted both during the operation’s preparatory period and during the offensive’s various stages. The flexibility of the forms of party-political work and its

uninterrupted nature enabled us to encompass the front’s entire rank and file, inculcating it with a high degree of offensive élan, hatred for the enemy, and the striving to carry out the task assigned to the Voronezh Front by comrade Stalin as quickly as possible. Examples of the soldiers’ and officers’ mass heroism and personal valor, which were manifested during the offensive, were a shining testimony to the effectiveness of party-political work among the front’s troops. The Voronezh Front’s forces, who for the first time acquired experience in conducting offensive combat in this operation and who were covered with the glory of victory, were full of determination for further military operations to defeat the enemy and were ready to multiply the Soviet army’s military feats. The Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation, which was conducted for the decisive purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy in difficult winter conditions, with a deep snow cover and heavy frosts, was a shining testimony to the fact that Soviet forces during the Great Patriotic War could successfully carry out their assigned tasks in any conditions or situation. The war showed that such an operation had become a common phenomenon for the Soviet army.

1Colonel Dashkevich’s group consisted of various special elements, which were defending along a broad front along the sector Ivanovskii—Podlesnyi. 2Editor’s note. This refers to the Red Army’s 12.7 caliber anti-aircraft machine gun. 3The front headquarters’ combat order no. 0031 of 19 January 1943, the 129th Rifle Brigade and the 309th Rifle Division were to be transferred to the 40th Army as of 21 January. 4In arriving at this figure, the 107th Rifle Division’s and 129th Rifle

Brigade’s guns and mortars (76mm and greater) are included. 5The Hungarian Second Army’s depots were located in the woods northeast of Alekseevka. 6The 69th Army was to be formed on the basis of the 18th Rifle Corps. 7The Hungarian 20th, 7th, 10th, 13th, 12th, 19th, and 23rd divisions, the Italian 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 156th divisions, and the German 385th and 387th infantry divisions, the German “Group Fegelein” and the 700th Independent Panzer Detachment. 8The German 168th, 26th and 57th infantry, the Hungarian 6th and 9th infantry, and the Hungarian 1st Panzer divisions. 9I. Stalin, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuza , 5th ed., 1948, p. 93.

Part IV

The Voronezh-Kastornoe Operation by the Voronezh Front and Bryansk Front’s Left Wing (24 January-17 February 1943)

Major General (ret.) D.I. Rybin, Colonel N.G. Pavlenko, and lieutenant colonels V.P. Morozov and N.Ya. Bubnov, and Colonel A.D. Kharitonov took part in the compilation of the article “The Voronezh–Kastornoe Operation by the Voronezh Front and the Bryansk Front’s Left Wing” and preparing it for publication.

1

Introduction The Voronezh—Kastornoe offensive by the Voronezh Front and the left wing of the Bryansk Front was conducted during 24 January-17 February 1943. The operation is a component part of the Soviet army’s general offensive, which was conducted according to the plan by and under the leadership of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command in the winter of 1942-43, following the rout of the German-Fascist forces around Stalingrad. The Bryansk Front’s 13th combined arms and 15th Air armies and the Voronezh Front’s 38th, 60th and 40th armies and the 2nd Air Army took part in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. The goal of the operation was to encircle and destroy a major enemy group of forces, consisting of ten divisions from the German Second Army and the Hungarian Second Army’s III Army Corps, the liberation from the enemy of the operationally important area of Voronezh and Kastornoe and the creation of the necessary conditions for the subsequent development of the offensive on Kursk and Khar’kov. The Soviet troops’ combat actions in defeating the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces unfolded in the following order. Throughout the first five days of the operation (24-28 January) the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts’ forces broke through the enemy’s defense, developed the offensive in depth and, upon linking up in the Kastornoe area, cut the communications of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces.

Throughout the operation’s next five days (29 January-2 February) the Voronezh Front’s 38th and 40th armies fought the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, which was attempting to break out of the encirclement in the areas south of Kastornoe, Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol and, simultaneously, while developing the offensive to the west, advanced to the Tim and Oskol rivers. Throughout this entire time, the 60th Army was regrouping from the Nizhnyaya Veduga area to the west of Kastornoe for a subsequent offensive along the railroad to Kursk, while the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army was developing the offensive with all its forces in the general direction of Maloarkhangel’sk. During 3-17 February there was fighting with the remnants of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, which was trying to break out of encirclement. This fighting was waged during the pursuit of the enemy by the greater part of the 38th Army’s forces in the direction of Oboyan’. During this time the Voronezh Front’s main forces were carrying out a new offensive operation along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. As a result of the operation, the Voronezh—Kastornoe group of German-Fascist forces was routed, the enemy’s Voronezh salient was eliminated, and the cities of Voronezh, Staryi Oskol, Tim, Oboyan’ and many other major inhabited locales in the Voronezh and Kursk oblasts were liberated from the Hitlerite invaders. With the rout of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, the necessary conditions were created for the conduct of a new offensive operation along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, which was successfully conducted by the Voronezh Front’s forces during 2-16 February 1943. The experience of organizing and conducting the Voronezh— Kastornoe offensive operation is of significant interest. The operation was conducted by part of the forces of two fronts in winter for the purpose of encircling and destroying a major enemy

group of forces. During it the most decisive form of conducting an operation was employed—the launching of a series of attacks along concentric axes for the purpose of breaking up the enemy’s defensive front, and the encirclement, splitting up, and destruction of his groups of forces in detail. The preparation of the offensive operation by the Voronezh Front was carried out in a limited amount of time, during the concluding phase of the front’s preceding Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation. Characteristic of the operation is the fact that it was ending during the course of the newly-begun offensive operation by the front’s main forces along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, which required particularly flexible troop command and control by the Voronezh Front’s and 38th and 40th armies’ command and headquarters. During the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation the complex regrouping of two combined-arms armies (38th and 60th) was carried out, with their mutual crisscrossing during its conduct, as well as the regrouping of the 40th Army’s forces from the Kastornoe area to the Belgorod—Khar’kov axis. Worthy of attention in the operation is the maneuver of a combined-arms army (13th), when the army’s main forces were turned 90 degrees during the course of the offensive. The operation offers one of the first examples of employing tank forces as the combined-arms armies’ mobile groups, with the task of developing the offensive along the main axis and encircling the enemy’s main group of forces.

2

Operational Preparation

The Situation by the Start of the Operational Preparation

The Operational Situation along the Voronezh Front’s Sector and that of the Bryansk Front’s Left Wing by 20 January 1943

As a result of the Soviet forces’ successful realization of the counteroffensive around Stalingrad, the situation along the SovietGerman front by the beginning of 1943 had changed decisively in our favor. The strategic initiative had finally been torn from the Hitlerite command’s hands. While successfully defeating the enemy forces surrounded in the Stalingrad area, in January 1943, the Soviet army unleashed a general offensive. The forces along the southern wing of the Soviet front developed an offensive for the purpose of defeating the fascist troops of army groups B, Don and A, which were operating along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, in the Donbass, and in the Northern Caucasus. By 20 January the Bryansk Front’s forces (3rd, 48th and 13th combined-arms and 15th Air armies) continued to defend the line Bol’shie Golubochki—Novosil’—Gremyachaya—excluding Kozinka. Along the front’s left wing, in the 100-kilometer zone from

Sidorovka to Kozinka, the 13th Army, consisting of seven rifle divisions (143rd, 74th, 148th, 307th, 132nd, 15th, and 8th), was operating. Since July 1942 this army’s forces had been hanging over the enemy group of forces, which was defending in the Voronezh— Kastornoe area, threatening to launch an attack against this group of forces from the north. On 13 January the Voronezh Front’s left-wing and center forces began the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation, while the right-wing forces continued to defend the line Kozinka—Ozerki— Ol’khovatka—Podgornoe—Voronezh, and then along the Voronezh River to its mouth. At the moment the instructions from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command were received; that is, by 20 January 1943, the Voronezh Front consisted of the 38th, 60th and 40th combinedarms armies, the 3rd Tank Army, 2nd Air Army, the 18th Independent Rifle, 4th Tank, and 6th Guards Cavalry corps. Having completed the encirclement of the main forces of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh group of forces by 19 January, the front’s forces occupied the following positions. The 38th Army, consisting of the 240th, 167th and 237th rifle divisions and the 248th Rifle Brigade, continued to defend the 55kilometer sector from Kozinka to Ol’khovatka. The 60th Army, consisting of the 100th, 121st, 206th, 232nd, and 303rd rifle divisions and the 104th Rifle Brigade, was defending along the 60-kilometer front Ol’khovatka—Voronezh—Kremenchug. The 40th Army, consisting of five rifle divisions and a rifle brigade, had reached the line Kostenki—Ostryanka—Zmievka—NovoUkolovo with the forces of its right-flank 141st and 25th Guards rifle divisions and the 253rd Rifle Brigade; its 107th Rifle Division was in Ostrogozhsk, while the 305th and 340th rifle divisions, along with

the 18th Rifle Corps’ 309th Rifle Division and the 3rd Tank Army’s 15th Tank Corps, where fighting to destroy the enemy’s surrounded forces in the area northeast of Alekseevka. The length of the 40th Army’s front reached 170 kilometers. The arrival of the 40th Army’s forces at the line Kostenki—Zmievka created favorable prerequisites for the launching of attacks from here against the flank of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The 3rd Tank Army and the 18th Rifle Corps were completing the elimination of the enemy’s encircled Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces in the areas north of Rossosh’ and northeast of Alekseevka with part of their forces, while with their main forces they had begun moving toward the Oskol River, while at the same time destroying along their route of advance the enemy’s uncoordinated and demoralized troops trying to break out of the encirclement. The 6th Guards Cavalry Corps, having successfully carried out its mission of capturing Valuiki, was defending along the sector Volokonovka—Valuiki—Urazovo. In the front commander’s reserve along the Voronezh—Kastornoe axis were the 4th Tank Corps, which was concentrated in the Rep’evka area, the 322nd Rifle Division, concentrated in the Platava area, as well as three ski-rifle brigades, which were moving from the area of Davydovka station to the 40th Army’s sector. In all, among the Soviet forces operating against the Voronezh salient (along a 300-kilometer front from Sidorovka to Zmievka) there were 17 rifle divisions and three rifle brigades, which yielded an average operational density of more than 16 kilometers per division.¹ The rifle divisions’ strength averaged 5,000-6,000 men and the rifle brigades 3,000 men. The rifle divisions contained, on the average, 4,000-5,000 rifles, 500 automatic rifles, 100 light and 50 heavy machine guns, 100-180 mortars of all calibers, and 75 guns, including 25 anti-tank guns.

The 2nd Air Army numbered 200 combat aircraft, while the 15th Air Army counted 413 planes. The Voronezh—Kastornoe area was defended by the forces of the German Second Army and the remnants of the Hungarian Second Army’s III Army Corps, which had been defeated in the course of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation. By 20 January the enemy forces operating in this area occupied the following positions. The German Second Army’s 45th, 383rd and 82nd infantry divisions faced the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army along the line Vnukovo— excluding Kozinka. The German 68th (minus one regiment), 340th and 377th infantry divisions faced the Voronezh Front’s 38th Army along the Kozinka— Ol’khovatka sector. The German 88th, 75th and 323rd (minus one regiment) infantry divisions were defending against the 60th Army along the front Ol’khovatka—Ust’e. “Group Siebert,” consisting of the 9th and remnants of the 6th Hungarian infantry divisions, a regiment from the 323rd Infantry Division, two regiments from the German 57th Infantry Division, the remnants of a regiment from the 168th Infantry Division, a regiment from the 68th Infantry Division, and the 188th Ski Battalion—in all, about three divisions—was facing the 40th Army along the front excluding Ust’e—Semidesyatskoe—Sinie Lipyagi—Gorodishche. Thus the enemy forces operating along the Voronezh salient numbered about 12 divisions, which given the 300-kilometer length of the front, yielded an average operational density of 25 kilometers per division. Due to the fact that in December 1942 and the beginning of January

1943 several divisions from the German Second Army had been transferred for operations against the Southwestern Front’s forces in the Ostrogozhsk area, the enemy essentially had no operational reserves in the Voronezh—Kastornoe area. Garrisons of an infantry regiment each were located in the cities of Orel, Kursk, Oboyan’, Shchigry, Kastornoe, and Staryi Oskol. The overall strength of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces reached 125,000 soldiers and officers. The enemy’s infantry divisions numbered 10,000 men on the average; infantry battalions numbered 400-500 men and infantry companies 120-150 men. Each enemy infantry division had on the average 4,500-5,000 rifles, 300350 automatic rifles, 80 heavy and 350 light machine guns, 35 mortars, and 50 field and 40 anti-tank guns. In all, the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces had more than 1,000 heavy and 3,500 light machine guns, about 1,000 mortars (81mm and higher), 1,100 guns (including 500 anti-tank), and 65 tanks. The enemy along the Voronezh axis had 300 planes, including 80 fighters, 200 bombers and 20 reconnaissance aircraft. As a result of the arrival of the 40th Army’s forces at the line Kostenki—Rogovato-Pogoreloe—Zmievka during the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ operation, a salient was formed facing east. The base of this salient ran along the Kshen’ and Oskol rivers and was 130 kilometers wide, while the depth of the salient (from the line of the Kshen’ and Oskol rivers as far as Voronezh) reached 100 kilometers. The northern and eastern sectors of this salient had been fortified by the enemy since July 1942; that is, for more than six months. The enemy’s defense along these sectors consisted of a developed system of strong points and centers of resistance, connected with each other by 2-3 lines of trenches, a large number of pillboxes, overhead covers, shelters for infantry, and other engineer structures. The depth of the enemy’s defensive zone along these sectors varied from 4-5 to 6-8 kilometers.

The hilly terrain, which was cut by gullies, became lower toward our lines, thus offering the enemy good observation and the capability of keeping all the approaches to his positions under fire. The terrain opposite the enemy’s forward edge and along the most important axes in the depth of his defense was mined and strengthened with wire obstacles to 2-3 rows of wire. The southern sector of the Voronezh salient (along the front from Rudkino to Gorodishche) was formed as the result of the enemy’s hurried retreat to this line during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation and had not been prepared in the engineering sense. Here the enemy had only managed to configure the inhabited locales, individual heights, groves and road junctions for defense and to organize a fire system. The enemy had prepared two defensive lines in the depth: the first was along the Olym River and then along the Kastornoe— Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol rail line; the second was along the Tim and Oskol rivers. It should be noted that in light of the absence of the enemy’s operational reserves, these defensive lines were not occupied by troops and could be employed for defense only by troops withdrawing to them.

A Short Description of the Area of Combat Activities

The combat activities of the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ forces in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation unfolded in the western part of the Voronezh and northeastern part of the Kursk oblasts. The operational significance of this area was determined by the location here of the major oblast center and railroad junction of Voronezh. The Kastornoe—Staryi Oskol and Voronezh—Kastornoe—

Kursk railroads run through here, the liberation of which was very important for the development of further offensive operations by Soviet forces along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The winter of 1942-43 was cold. The average daily temperature during the second half of January varied from -14 to -18 degrees Celsius, while on certain days temperatures reached -28 degrees Celsius. The snow cover reached 25-35 centimeters. Major snowfalls and blizzards were noted in January, which rendered our troops’ actions more difficult. The terrain in the Voronezh—Kastornoe area is a slightly hilly and open plain, with a large number of heights and gullies, all of which aided the enemy in organizing a defense and rendered our forces’ offensive activities more difficult. The Olym, Kshen’ and Tim rivers are 20-50 meters wide, with sheer banks in places. By the end of January the rivers were covered by ice to a thickness of 30-50 centimeters and were no barrier to operations by all combat arms. There are a large number of inhabited locales In the area under study, a significant part of which had been fortified by the enemy and had been transformed into strong points and centers of resistance. There were insufficient paved and graded dirt roads. Due to the deep snow cover and blizzards, the existing roads were difficult of passage along individual sectors not only for auto transport, but for tanks as well; great efforts were required from the troops to maintain them in operating condition. The operational situation of the Hitlerite forces operating along the Kursk axis in the Voronezh area was extremely unfavorable. Our forces outflanked the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces from the north and south; the Bryansk Front’s forces and the

Voronezh Front’s 38th Army hung over the group of forces from the north, while the 40th Army outflanked it from the south. The enemy was firmly tied down by the 60th Army’s forces from the east. The absence of the enemy’s operational reserves and the lack of defensive preparations along the southern sector of the Voronezh salient were favorable to the Soviet command in organizing an offensive against the German Second Army. The German-Fascist forces’ morale-combat qualities, following the defeat of their main group of forces around Stalingrad and the subsequent defeats along the Don, the Caucasus and around Leningrad, had declined. At the same time, our forces’ morale condition and their combat qualities were extremely high. As a result of the defeat of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, the overall correlation of men and materiel in the Voronezh area had significantly changed in favor of the Soviet forces by the start of the preparation for the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. Thus favorable conditions had arisen for the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts for carrying out an offensive operation with the decisive goal of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. At the same time, the wintry time of year in which the operation was to be conducted, demanded the especially scrupulous preparation of the operation from the command, staffs and troops.

Instructions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command

In order to maximally employ the successes achieved by Soviet troops in the counteroffensive around Stalingrad, the Stavka made the decision to go over to a general offensive as early as December

1942. One of the important tasks called for by the plan for this offensive was the defeat of the German-Fascist forces’ large Voronezh group of forces (Army Group B), which covered the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The Stavka planned to resolve this task by conducting a series of consecutive front operations and operations by a group of fronts (Bryansk, Voronezh and Southwestern) along these axes. At first, it was planned to conduct an operation to defeat the enemy group of forces defending in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ area facing the center and left wing of the Voronezh Front, and then an operation to encircle and destroy the enemy forces operating in the area of Voronezh and Kastornoe facing the left wing of the Bryansk Front and the Voronezh Front’s right wing. It was planned to subsequently develop the offensive directly on Kursk and Khar’kov. In accordance with the plan by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command for defeating the enemy forces along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, on 13 January the Voronezh Front began to carry out the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation. While unremittingly following the course of events and taking into account the favorable situation for our troops that had arisen in the Voronezh area as a result of the first days of the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ operation, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command on 20 January 1943 issued concrete instructions to the commanders of the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts to prepare and conduct the Voronezh—Kastornoe offensive operation. The Stavka’s overall plan consisted in launching attacks along converging axes from the north and south against the German Second Army’s flanks and to encircle and destroy its main forces, liberate the operationally important Voronezh—Kastornoe area and

thus create the necessary conditions for the subsequent development of the offensive on Kursk and Khar’kov. The Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and the Voronezh Front’s 40th, 60th and 38th armies were to take part in this operation. The start of the offensive was planned for 24-26 January 1943. The main attacks in the general direction of Kastornoe were to be launched as follows: the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army from the north, from the area south of Navesnoe, and by the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army from the south, from the Rogovato-Pogoreloe area. Attacks by the 38th Army from the area of 2nd Terbuny and the 60th Army from the area northwest of Yablochnoe in the general direction of Nizhnyaya Veduga were simultaneously planned. The planned breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along four axes was to lead to the encirclement and splitting up of the enemy’s group of forces and its destruction in detail. The Stavka ordered the reinforcement of the armies designated for participation in the operation through internal regroupings of the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ forces. The Stavka did not detach any additional men and materiel from its reserve for the conduct of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. The operational design fully corresponded to the developing situation and would enable the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ forces to quickly carry out their assigned task—to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces and create the necessary conditions for the subsequent development of the offensive to the west.

The Front Commanders’ Decisions

In accordance with the overall design of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel General F.I. Golikov, decided to accomplish the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along three sectors and, while developing the offensive along concentric axes toward Kastornoe and Nizhnyaya Veduga, to encircle and destroy in conjunction with the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army the German-Fascist Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The front was to launch its main attack from the RogovatoPogoreloe area in the general direction of Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe with the forces of the 40th Army, which was to link up in the Kastornoe area with the forces of the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and conclude the encirclement of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The axis selected for launching the main attack would bring the 40th Army’s forces by the shortest route to Kastornoe and would be the best way to secure the achievement of the operation’s goal. Besides this, the 40th Army flanked the enemy’s entire Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. Finally, the sector of the enemy’s defense chosen for the breakthrough was the most weakly prepared from the engineering point of view. The 38th Army was to launch the second attack from the Terbuny area, with its main forces toward Nizhnyaya Veduga and one division on Kastornoe. The 60th Army was to launch a third attack from the area northwest of Yablochnoe, with its main forces toward Nizhnyaya Veduga and one division on Latnoe. The securing of the entire operation was to be entrusted to the 40th Army’s left-flank formations, which were to develop the offensive in the direction of Terekhovo and Yastrebovka. The commander of the Bryansk Front, Lieutenant General M.A.

Reiter,² decided to launch the 13th Army’s attack in the area between the Kshen’ and Olym rivers and, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, to develop the offensive with the army’s first-echelon forces on Kastornoe, where it was to link up with the Voronezh Front’s forces and, in conjunction with them, complete the encirclement of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The 13th Army’s second echelon was to develop the offensive to the line of the Tim River for the purpose of creating an external encirclement front. The axis chosen for the attack would secure for the 13th Army’s forces the shortest route to the Kastornoe area into the rear of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. As was the case with the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army, the 13th Army flanked the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. Besides this, the terrain between the Kshen’ and Ilym rivers would enable us to employ all the combat arms. The commander of the Bryansk Front decided to bring in nine rifle divisions, two tank brigades and three independent tank regiments to take part in the operation, which would be transferred to the 13th Army, as well as the 15th Air Army’s entire air park. Besides this, it was planned to concentrate the 6th Guards and 137th rifle divisions and the 19th Tank Corps in the front reserve in the 13th Army’s operational zone. Thus the 13th Army was to concentrate 11 rifle divisions, a tank corps, two tank brigades, and three independent tank regiments; that is, more than 50 percent of the front’s entire force, in its 47kilometer sector for the operation. It was decided to leave ten rifle divisions to defend the remaining 200-kilometer sector of front, which would yield an average operational density of 20 kilometers per rifle division. The Voronezh Front’s 40th Army and the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army were to play the decisive role in the Voronezh—Kastornoe

operation, and they were to be entrusted with the task of encircling the enemy’s entire Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. These armies were to create the external encirclement front. It follows that the success of the operation as a whole depended upon the results of the 13th and 40th armies’ actions. The enemy’s Voronezh— Kastornoe group of forces was to be split up into several isolated parts by the 38th and 60th armies’ attacks. The composition of the armies slated to take part in the operation, these armies’ shock groups, as well as the width of the breakthrough zones, are shown in Table IV/2.1.

Table IV/2.1 The Composition of the Armies, the Armies’ Shock Groups, and the Width of the Breakthrough Sectors

* Sectors for the 60th and 40th armies are indicated along which their main forces were to concentrate. ** Not counting the 6th Guards and 137th rifle divisions and the 19th Tank Corps, which were concentrated in the 13th Army’s sector in the Bryansk Front commander’s reserve.

From Table IV/2.1 it is clear that, overall, 27 rifle divisions, seven rifle brigades, all of the High Command Reserve artillery, two tank corps, eight independent tank brigades, three independent tank regiments, and two independent tank battalions were to be gathered for carrying out the offensive operation. In all, it was planned to concentrate 72 percent of the infantry, 90 percent of the artillery and 100 percent of the tank troops along the main axes. It was planned to leave only seven rifle divisions, three rifle brigades, a destruction brigade, and one composite training brigade, with all of its organic artillery, along the 167-kilometer secondary sectors of the Voronezh salient, which would yield an average operational density of about 20 kilometers per division along these sectors of the front. In accordance with the instructions from the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, the shock groups for the forthcoming operation were to be created by means of internal regroupings of the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ forces, and that this task was carried out in difficult winter conditions and in maximum compressed time. The beginning of the offensive was determined as follows: 24 January for the 40th Army, 25 January for the 60th Army, and 26 January for the 38th and 13th armies. The 40th Army’s attack was planned to take place earlier than the others, which would give us the opportunity to create the impression among the enemy not of

the beginning of a new operation, but of continuing the previous offensive, which was supposed to distract the enemy’s attention from the attacks being prepared from the north by the forces of the 13th and 38th armies. In accordance with the front commanders’ decisions, the armies received the following tasks. The Bryansk Front’s 38th Army was to break through the enemy’s defense along an 18-kilometer sector between the Kshen’ and Olym rivers and, while developing the attack on Kastornoe, cut the Kursk —Voronezh railroad west of Kastornoe; following the linkup here with the Voronezh Front’s forces and the completion of the encirclement of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, the army was to assist the Voronezh Front’s forces with part of its forces in destroying this group of forces, while its main forces, having turned to the west, were to attack in the general direction of Kolpny. The army’s shock group was to be created consisting of seven rifle divisions (148th, 307th, 132nd and 8th rifle divisions in the first echelon, and the 280th, 211th and 81st rifle divisions in the second echelon). The army was ordered to have a mobile group consisting of the 129th Tank Brigade, two motorized sleigh battalions, one mortar and one anti-tank artillery regiments. The Voronezh Front’s 38th Army was to break through the enemy’s defense with its main forces along the 14-kilometers Kozinka— Ozerki sector and, while attacking in the general direction of Nizhnyaya Veduga, in conjunction with the 60th Army, which was to attack toward Nizhnyaya Veduga from the south, encircle and destroy the enemy’s forces defending in the Voronezh area. The army’s right-flank division was to attack toward Kastornoe, cooperating with the 13th Army’s left-flank units. In order to accomplish these tasks, a shock group was to be created in the army consisting of two rifle divisions (240th and 167th), one destruction³

and one tank brigades and two independent tank battalions. The 237th Rifle Division and 248th Rifle Brigade were to continue an active defense along the remaining 46-kilometer front, preventing the enemy from removing forces from the sectors of the front not under attack. The 60th Army’s shock group, consisting of the 141st, 322nd, 232nd, and 303rd rifle divisions, the 253rd Rifle Brigade, a destruction brigade and three tank brigades, was to attack along the 22-kilometer sector Rudkino—Semidesyatskoe, launching an attack with its main forces toward Nizhnyaya Veduga, toward the 38th Army’s forces attacking toward Nizhnyaya Veduga from the north, for the purpose of encircling and destroying, in conjunction with the latter, the enemy forces defending the eastern part of the Voronezh salient along the sector from Kozinka to Semidesyatskoe. In order to secure the actions of the army’s main group of forces, part of its forces were ordered to attack toward Latnoe. Along the remaining 72-kilometer front, the army was to continue an active defense, holding its previous lines with the forces of the 121st and 100th rifle divisions, the 104th Rifle Brigade, a composite training brigade, and the 8th Destruction Brigade. The 40th Army received orders to attack along its entire 50kilometer front excluding Semidesyatskoe—excluding Gorodishche and, while launching its main attack in the general direction of Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces in conjunction with the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army. Simultaneously, the army was to attack with part of its forces in the direction of Staryi Oskol and Yastrebovka, for the purpose of securing the main forces from the west. On the operation’s fourth day the army was to reach the line Lachinovo—Yastrebovka—Saltykovo. The 4th Tank Corps, which was to be operationally subordinated to the 40th Army, was to launch an attack in the direction of Gorshechnoe and by 1600 on the first day of the operation its main

forces were to capture Gorshechnoe and take Kastornoe with a reinforced forward detachment by the close of that day. On the operation’s second day the corps was to capture Nizhnedevitsk station with its main forces, from where it was to launch an attack on Nizhnyaya Veduga with the task of assisting the 60th Army in defeating the enemy’s Voronezh group of forces. The front commanders ordered their armies to organize their operational formation in two echelons, except for the 38th Army, which was to attack in one echelon. On the whole, the front commanders’ decisions corresponded to the instructions by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command and the situation that had arisen. However, insufficient decisiveness was manifested in concentrating men and materiel along the Voronezh Front’s main attack axis. All the opportunities for doing so were not employed. The Voronezh Front commander, while preparing the offensive operation to encircle and destroy the enemy, did not adopt the necessary measures for creating reserves and their movement to the axis of the front’s main attack; that is, to the 40th Army’s sector. At the same time, the situation in the Voronezh—Kastornoe area would have enabled the front commander to pull one or two rifle divisions into the front reserve from formations defending along the Don and Voronezh rivers in the 60th Army’s sector. The absence of front reserves in the 40th Army’s sector is one of the prime shortcomings in the decision by the Voronezh Front commander, which influenced the course of the operation to a significant degree. One should also see as a serious shortcoming in the Voronezh Front commander’s decision the employment of the 4th Tank Corps. Having transferred the 4th Tank Corps to the 40th Army; that is, to the axis of the main attack, the front commander at the same time ordered that only a part of the corps’ forces (the forward detachment) be dispatched to Kastornoe. Its main forces were to operate in the direction of Nizhnedevitsk and Nizhnyaya Veduga. Besides this, the task assigned to the 4th Tank Corps’ forward

detachment to reach the Kastornoe area by the close of the first day of the operation was obviously unrealistic, which was confirmed during the course of the operation.

The Army Commanders’ Decisions

In accordance with the instructions from the front commanders and the situation, the army commanders adopted the following decisions on the conduct of the offensive operation. The commander of the 13th Army, Lieutenant General N.I. Pukhov,⁴ decided to launch his main attack in the direction of Volovchik and Kastornoe and by the close of the operation’s third day reach the line of the railroad along the sector from Lachinovo to Kastornoe with his first-echelon units, linking up in this area with the forces of the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army. It was planned to accomplish the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along an 18-kilometer front with the forces of four (148th, 307th, 132nd, and 8th) rifle divisions, a tank brigade and three tank regiments. The width of the first-echelon divisions’ breakthrough sectors was 4-6 kilometers. The defense of the 23-kilometer sector from the Olym River to excluding Kozinka was entrusted to the 15th Rifle Division, which was to hold one rifle regiment along the indicated sector; following the breakthrough of the first line, it was planned to employ the division’s main forces to roll up the enemy’s defense facing the army’s left flank. The first echelon of the army’s shock group was entrusted with the task of breaking through the tactical zone of the enemy’s defense and supporting the commitment of the army’s mobile group into the battle. Following the completion of this task, the 307th, 132nd and

8th rifle divisions were to develop the offensive in the general direction of Kastornoe for the purpose of encircling the German Second Army’s main forces in conjunction with the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army, while the 148th Rifle Division, following the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, was to turn to the west and develop the success to the west, with the task of securing the 13th Army’s shock group against possible enemy counterattacks from the west. By the close of 26 January the army’s first-echelon formations were to capture the line: Turchanovo—Alekseevka—Bol’shaya Ivanovka; by the close of 27 January the line Nizhne-Bol’shoe—Naberezhnoe —Uritskoe, and by the close of 28 January the line Lachinovo— Kastornoe. Three rifle divisions (280th, 211th and 81st) were allocated to the army’s second echelon and received orders, upon the arrival of the first-echelon divisions in the area Volochik—Nizhne-Bol’shoe— Vysshee-Bol’shoe, to develop, in conjunction with the 148th Rifle Division, the offensive to the west and southwest and by the close of the offensive’s second or third day to reach the line of the railroad with its main forces along the sector from Mikhailovka to Marmyzhi station, creating an actively operating external encirclement front along this line. A mobile group, consisting of the 129th Tank Brigade, two motorized sleigh battalions, one mortar and one anti-tank artillery regiments, led by the deputy army commander, Major General Glukhov,⁵ was created in the army to develop the success in the direction of Kastornoe. It was planned to commit the mobile group into the first-echelon’s rifle divisions’ battle to capture the line Volovchik—Lipovchik; that is, following their breakthrough of the enemy’s tactical defense zone to a depth of 16 kilometers. The mobile group’s assignment was to reach Kastornoe in an energetic thrust, link up with the forces of the

Voronezh Front’s 40th Army and thus complete the encirclement of the enemy’s entire Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. A feature of the decision by the commander of the 13th Army is at the same time that the mobile group was given the task of developing the offensive toward Kastornoe, the army’s second echelon was to attack to the west to accomplish the task of creating an external encirclement front. It should be noted that in the decision by the commander of the 13th Army, measures for destroying the encircled enemy were not foreseen, which was one of the decision’s serious shortcomings. The commander of the 38th Army, Lieutenant General N.Ye. Chibisov,⁶ decided to create a shock group for the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, consisting of the 240th and 167th rifle divisions, the 180th Independent Tank Brigade, and the 14th Independent Tank Battalion. The 150th Independent Tank Battalion, an engineer battalion and army courses for junior lieutenants were detached for the army reserve. It was decided to accomplish the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along the 14-kilometer sector Kozinka—Ozerki. By the close of the offensive’s first day the army’s forces were to capture the line Olymchik—height 226. The 206th Rifle Division was to attack toward Golosnovka with the task of capturing the line Golosnovka— Il’inovka by the close of the day and to secure the left flank of the army’s shock group. By the close of 27 January the forces of the army’s shock group were to capture the line Matveevka—Makhovatka—Dolgoe, and by the close of 28 January reach the line Volzhanchik—Staraya Veduga— Zemlyansk. According to the operational plan, the 240th Rifle Division and the 7th Destruction Brigade, following the capture of the line Volzhanchik—Milavka, were to attack toward Kastornoe, where they

were to link up with the 13th and 40th armies’ forces. The 167th Rifle Division was to develop the offensive toward Nizhnyaya Veduga toward the 60th Army’s formations. The 237th Rifle Division and the 248th Rifle Brigade were to defend the 38-kilometer front from Khrushchovo to Kulyashovka. The breakthrough sectors for the 240th and 167th rifle divisions were seven kilometers for each division. The depth of the task for the offensive’s first day was planned as follows: eight kilometers for the 240th Rifle Division, 11 kilometers for the 167th Rifle Division, and five kilometers for the 206th Rifle Division. The commander of the 60th Army, Major General I.D. Chernyakhovskii,⁷ decided to tie down the enemy through active operations along the front Novo-Zhivotinnoe—Podgornoe—the eastern outskirts of Voronezh—Kremenchug and, while securely holding this line, attack along the army’s left flank in the direction of Nizhnyaya Veduga and, in conjunction with the 38th Army, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s group of forces in the area of the city of Voronezh. It was decided to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along a 22-kilometer front, against the backdrop of the army’s overall front of 94 kilometers. The army’s shock group was to be created out of the 141st, 322nd, 232nd, and 303rd rifle divisions, the 253rd Rifle Brigade, and the 150th, 14th and 86th tank brigades. The army’s remaining forces (a composite training brigade, the 121st Rifle Division, 8th Destruction Brigade, 100th Rifle Division, and the 104th Rifle Brigade) were detached for conducting an active defense along the 72-kilometer front Novo-Zhivotinnoe— Kremenchug. The first-echelon formations of the army’s shock group were to attack in the general direction of Nizhnyaya Veduga, destroy the opposing enemy and by the close of the first day of the operation capture the line excluding Khrushchovo—Nikol’skoe—Verkhnee

Nikol’skoe—Rossoshka. During 26-27 January the forces of the army’s shock group were to consecutively capture the following lines: Ust’e—Khokhol—Verkhnee Turovo; Petino—Latnoe—the southern part of Nizhnyaya Veduga—Andreevka. The 303rd Rifle Division, which comprised the army’s second echelon, was to advance in the direction of Kochatovka and Nikol’skoe and be ready to develop the success of the 322nd and 232nd rifle divisions. The offensive zones were defined as follows: ten kilometers for the 141st Rifle Division, four kilometers for the 322nd Rifle Division, and five kilometers for the 232nd Rifle Division, and three kilometers for the 253rd Rifle Brigade. The depth of the first day’s task in the offensive was planned at 10-24 kilometers. On the whole, the 60th Army’s shock group was, while attacking from the south toward Nizhnyaya Veduga, to link up with the 38th Army’s forces, to complete the encirclement of the enemy forces operating immediately in the area of the city of Voronezh, and to thus cut off a significant part of it from the enemy’s Voronezh— Kastornoe group of forces, and to subsequently attack into the flank and rear of the encircled enemy forces in conjunction with the 38th Army and to destroy them. The commander of the 40th Army, Lieutenant General K.S. Moskalenko, decided to attack along the entire 50-kilometer front from Semidesyatskoe to 2nd Gorodishche, launching its main attack in the direction of Dmitrievka, Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe, and by the close of the operation’s fourth day the army’s rifle formations were to reach the line Lachinovo—Nizhnyaya Graivoronka— Platonovka—Yastrebovka—Aleksandrovka. It was decided to organize the army’s operational order into two echelons: the first echelon would consist of five rifle divisions and one rifle brigade, while the second echelon would consist of one rifle division and three ski-rifle brigades. The 4th Tank Corps would constitute the

army’s mobile group. The army’s first echelon (129th Rifle Brigade, 183rd, 25th Guards, 309th, 107th, and 340th rifle divisions, 192nd and 96th tank brigades) was assigned the task of defeating the opposing enemy and to consecutively capture the following lines: Petrovka—Boloto— Kotovo—Vypolzovo on 24 January (the depth of the assignment was 20-25 kilometers); Vyaznovatka—Gorshechnoe—VerkhneAtamanskoe on 25 January (the depth of the assignment was 10-15 kilometers); Rogachikha—Lozovka—Nazarovka—Luk’yanovka on 26 January (the depth of the assignment was 10-15 kilometers); on 27 January the 25th Guards, 309th, 107th and 340th rifle divisions were to reach the front Lachinovo—Nizhnyaya Graivoronka— Platonovka—Yastrebovka—Aleksandrovka (the depth of the assignment was 15-20 kilometers), while the 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade, along with the 4th Tank Corps, was to reach the Kastornoe area. Upon occupying its jumping-off position along the line 2nd Rogovatoe—Shatalovka, the 4th Tank Corps was ordered to launch an attack in the direction of Arkhangel’skoe and Gorshechnoe and by the close of the offensive’s first day its main forces were to take Gorshechnoe, while at the same time a reinforced forward detachment was to capture Kastornoe. On 25 January the 4th Tank Corps was to occupy Nizhnedevitsk station with its main forces, from where it would launch an attack on Nizhnyaya Veduga, with the task of assisting the 60th Army in defeating the enemy’s group of forces in the Voronezh area. In order to encircle the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, the commander of the 40th Army detached only part of his army’s forces—the 4th Tank Corps, the 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade. The remaining four first-echelon divisions were assigned the task of developing the offensive to the northwest and west.

The army’s second echelon—the 305th Rifle Division—was ordered to begin by 24 January to move out of the Ilovskoe—Afanas’evka area to the 2nd Rogovatoe—Rogovato-Pogoreloe area. The division was basically not given a definite combat assignment. The 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades received orders to be ready to operate with the 340th Rifle Division from the Soldatskoe—2nd Gorodishche area from the morning of the operation’s second day to capture Staryi Oskol. The 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade was ordered to leave on 25 January for the 2nd Rogovatoe area. A detachment consisting of a reinforced rifle battalion from the 25th Guards Rifle Division was to be detached to secure the army’s left flank and which was to occupy the area of Golofeevka station and hold it until the arrival of units from the 18th Rifle Corps’ right flank at the line of the Oskol River. Each of the army’s first-echelon divisions had an offensive sector of 6-12 kilometers. The 309th and 107th rifle divisions, which were located in the center of the army’s operational formation, were assigned the narrowest attack zones (six and eight kilometers), while the 183rd Rifle Division received a 7-kilometer sector. The army’s flank formations’ attack sectors were defined as follows: 11 kilometers for the 129th Rifle Division and 12 kilometers for the 340th Rifle Division. The army’s first-echelon rifle formations were assigned tasks to a depth of 18-24 kilometers for the first day of the offensive. The 4th Tank Corps was assigned the deepest task—35 kilometers for the main forces and 75 kilometers for the corps’ forward detachment. As can be seen from this description, all of the Voronezh Front’s formations were to break through the enemy’s defense along quite broad sectors. For example, each of the 38th Army’s rifle divisions was to try to break through the enemy’s prepared defense along a sector up to seven kilometers in breadth; in the 60th and 40th armies, which were to attack the hurriedly-occupied enemy defense,

the attack zones of the first-echelon divisions were defined as follows: 4-8 kilometers along the axis of the main attack and 9-12 kilometers along the remaining axes. Of course, such broad attack sectors forced the division commanders to disperse their efforts and made it difficult to create powerful second echelons and reserves. It is not difficult to notice that characteristic of all the army commanders’ decisions was the poorly expressed desire not only to encircle the enemy, but to destroy him as well. A characteristic feature of the Voronezh Front’s army commanders’ decisions was that second echelons were either completely lacking (38th Army) or were extremely weak (40th and 60th armies). At the same time, the armies had complete freedom to create more powerful second echelons. The commanders of the 38th and 60th armies could have pulled into the reserve no less than a division each at the expense of secondary axes. The least successful disposition of forces was in the 40th Army, which was to carry out the main mission in the front. According to the front commander’s decision, the army was to attack along its entire 50-kilometer sector, while concentrating its efforts in the center. During the course of developing the offensive, the army’s forces would have to attempt to encircle the enemy and create an external encirclement front. A more powerful second echelon was necessary to accomplish these tasks. However, the army’s second echelon contained only the 305th Rifle Division and three poorly-trained and formed ski-rifle brigades, the rank and file of which did not know how to ski. Of course, these forces were insufficient to simultaneously develop the offensive on Kastornoe and along the external front. Another serious shortcoming should be noted in the 40th Army commander’s decision. The army commander did not allot sufficient forces for consolidating the success of the mobile group, which was to attack toward Kastornoe. According to the operational plan, the army’s right-flank rifle formations were to consolidate the 4th Tank Corps’ success. However, neither the 129th Rifle Brigade nor the

183rd Rifle Division were able to carry out this task, because they attacked along the army’s flank and their success was directly dependent on the success of the 60th Army, whose shock group was to attack toward Nizhnyaya Veduga. It would have been more expedient to try to develop the 4th Tank Corps’ success and consolidate it with the army’s second-echelon forces. However, this echelon’s main forces were aimed at capturing Staryi Oskol. Thus the decision by the commander of the 40th Army had serious shortcomings. The front commander did not eliminate them, which had a negative effect on the development of the offensive along the Kastornoe axis.

The Organization of the Artillery Offensive

In the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation the artillery had to support the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, to repel his counterattacks and to support the encirclement and destruction of the enemy group of forces. In order to accomplish these tasks, three artillery divisions, four howitzer and two artillery regiments from the High Command Artillery Reserve, 15 mortar regiments, 11 anti-tank artillery regiments, and one division, five brigades, six regiments and three independent battalions of rocket artillery were to be brought in.⁸ The distribution of artillery units and formations among the armies is shown in Table IV/2.2.

Table IV/2.2 The Distribution of Artillery Units and Formations Among the Armies Taking Part in the Voronezh—Kastornoe

Operation

As is clear from Table IV/2.2, the greatest number of artillery reinforcements was in the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army, as well as in the Voronezh Front’s 40th and 60th armies. There were an equal number of artillery weapons in the 60th and 40th armies, which cannot be recognized as well-founded. The 40th Army, which was to launch the main attack, should have been significantly more reinforced. The necessity of this was confirmed during the operation, when on 29 January the front commander was forced to transfer the 10th Artillery Division from the 60th Army to the 40th. In all, in the four armies taking part in the offensive operation there were, counting divisional artillery, about 4,100 guns and mortars (76mm and greater). Of this number, 3,664 guns and mortars, or about 90 percent of the total, were to be brought in for the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense. The average artillery densities along the armies’ breakthrough sectors were as follows: 92 guns and mortars in the 13th Army; 50 guns and mortars in the 38th and 60th armies, and 40 gun and mortars per kilometer of front in the 40th Army. The data on artillery densities in the armies shows that within the Voronezh Front the necessary massing of artillery along the axis of the front’s main attack—in the 40th Army’s sector—was not carried out. Planning for the artillery offensive in both the Voronezh (the commander of the front’s artillery was Major General of Artillery Varentsev) and Bryansk (the commander of the front’s artillery was Major General of Artillery Gusakov) fronts was carried out in the armies. In the 13th Army the rifle divisions were reinforced on average with three artillery and mortar regiments for creating infantry-support artillery groups. Only the 148th Rifle Division, operating along the right flank of the army’s shock group, was reinforced with two

regiments. Two groups of long-range artillery (ADD) were created in the army: army artillery group no. 1, consisting of two cannon artillery regiments from the 5th Artillery Division and the 19th Guards Artillery Regiment from the High Command Artillery Reserve, and army artillery group no. 2, consisting of two cannon artillery regiments from the 12th Artillery Division. Aside from the long-range artillery groups, an army rocket artillery group was created in the army, consisting of the 5th Rocket Artillery Division, the 6th and 65th rocket artillery regiments, and the 280th Independent Rocket Artillery Battalion. The commanders of the 5th and 12th artillery divisions, who were subordinated directly to the 13th Army’s artillery commander, were appointed commanders of the army artillery groups. A serious shortcoming in the organization of the artillery offensive was the fact that the commander of the Bryansk Front did not bring in for the artillery offensive the artillery from the formations and units located in the front reserve in the 13th Army’s sector. Bringing in this artillery would have increased the artillery density along the 13th Army’s breakthrough sector to 110-120 guns and mortars per kilometer of front. The plan for the 13th Army’s artillery offensive called for a 65minute artillery preparation of the attack, of which 30 minutes were set aside for three fire onslaughts and 35 minutes for aimed fire. The suppression of the main targets in the enemy’s defense was planned to a depth of 7-8 kilometers. It was planned to support and accompany the infantry and tank attack by the consecutive concentration of fire. Only 128 guns were allotted along the 18-kilometer front for firing over open sights, which yielded a density of seven guns per

kilometer of front. In accordance with instructions of the 13th Army’s artillery commander, registration was to be conducted by using adjusted guns during 22-24 January. However, a registration plan was not compiled at the army level, as a result of which individual artillery units conducted registration as they saw fit. This actually disrupted the established regime of the army artillery’s combat activity, which made the effective conduct of measures for operational disguise more difficult. A unified front plan for the artillery offensive was not drawn up in the Voronezh Front. All the planning for the artillery offensive was conducted in the armies on the basis of the front commander’s instructions, the essence of which was as follows. In distributing the artillery in the armies, no less than two artillery (mortar) regiments were allotted to the group for supporting the rifle regiments. It was ordered that the High Command Reserve artillery be employed not only for suppressing the enemy’s artillery and personnel, but also for destroying the most important engineering structures. Targets were to be distributed in such a way that an artillery battalion would be assigned to suppress no more than 1-2 enemy batteries. The necessity of broadly employing 45mm and 76mm guns for firing over open sights was indicated. Besides this, in planning the artillery offensive, the artillery’s tasks for each division were to be determined for the entire first day of the battle. The length of the artillery preparation of the attack was to be as follows: 90 minutes in the 38th Army, 100 minutes in the 60th Army, and 30 minutes in the 40th Army. It was necessary to raise the amount of ammunition in the army to an average of up to two combat loads for the main calibers. Worthy of attention in these instructions is the sharp difference in the length of the artillery preparation for the attack, which was determined by the front commander for each army. This difference

was chiefly conditioned by the different degree of engineering outfitting of the enemy’s defense. In the 38th Army the 90-minute artillery preparation for the attack was supposed to include four fire onslaughts with an overall length of 25 minutes, and a 65-minute destruction period. The support of the attack was not planned. With the beginning of the infantry and tank attack, the artillery was to switch its fire from the forward edge to the immediate depth of the enemy’s defense. 120 guns were to be moved up for firing over open sights, which yielded a density of about nine guns per kilometer of front. In the 100-minute artillery preparation of the attack in the 60th Army, 65 minutes were to be allocated to waging aimed fire and 35 minutes for four fire onslaughts. All of the 45mm and 76mm regimental guns and up to 85 percent of the divisional artillery’s guns were to be brought in for firing over open sights. The support for the attack and accompaniment of the infantry and tanks while fighting in the depth was essentially not planned. The artillery was supposed to fire upon the infantry’s request or at the initiative of the artillery commanders themselves. In the 40th Army the 30-minute artillery preparation for the attack consisted of fire onslaughts. 200 45mm and 76mm guns were set aside in the army for firing over open sights. In all the armies the main mass of artillery reinforcement weapons had been transferred to the rifle divisions for creating infantrysupport groups. Each division, on the average, received 2-3 artillery regiments. Army artillery groups were created in the 40th and 60th armies, with a strength of two regiments in each. By the beginning of the offensive operation the troops in all armies had from 1.2 to 1.4 combat loads of ammunition, which was clearly

insufficient. Thus the planning of the artillery offensive was carried out independently in all the armies. The artillery preparation of the attack was planned most scrupulously. Questions of the artillery support for the attack and the accompaniment of the infantry and tanks while fighting in the depth of the enemy’s defense, were very inadequately thought out, which negatively showed in the course of the offensive.

Planning the Employment of Tanks

It was planned to bring in one tank corps (4th), eight independent (129th, 118th, 180th, 150th, 86th, 14th, 96th, and 192nd) tank brigades, three (42nd, 43rd and 193rd) independent tank regiments, and two (14th and 150th) independent tank battalions, totaling 640 tanks, for combat in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. The tank formations and units were to be distributed in the following manner, according to the decision of the front commanders. See Table IV/2.3.

Table IV/2.3 The Distribution of Tank Formations and Units Among the Armies

In accordance with the distribution of tank formations and units among the armies along the breakthrough sectors, the following tank densities were to be created (see Table IV/2.4):

Table IV/2.4 Tank Densities Along the Breakthrough Sectors

* Shown are the sectors along which the tanks deployed.

In planning the combat employment of the tank troops, the front commanders paid attention, first of all, to reinforcing the armies designated for launching the main attacks against the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. Thus the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army received the most tank reinforcements. Up to 77 percent of all the tank troops designated to take part in the operation were concentrated in these armies. The greatest density of tanks was achieved in these armies. As was already shown above, mobile groups were to be created in the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army. For this purpose, the 4th Tank Corps was operationally subordinated to the 40th Army and its forward units were supposed to seize Kastornoe as early as the first day of the operation. Because the enemy’s defense along the 40th Army’s sector was the most weakly developed, it was decided to employ the 4th Tank Corps for the offensive alongside the first-echelon rifle formations. Thus the 309th and 107th rifle divisions, along whose sectors it was decided to employ the tank corps, did not receive any reinforcement tanks, despite the fact that they would be attacking along the 40th Army’s main attack axis. The 129th Tank Brigade was to be allotted to the 13th Army’s mobile group. The independent tank brigades, regiments and battalions, which were part of the armies, were ordered to be attached to the firstechelon rifle formations and to be used as direct infantry-support tanks.

Organizing the Air Offensive

Aviation support for the operation was entrusted to the Bryansk Front’s 15th Air Army and the Voronezh Front’s 2nd Air Army. Our aviation’s main task consisted of launching strikes against the enemy’s main defensive targets, reserves, railroad junctions, stations and trains, and troop concentrations and thus assist the forces of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts in encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. By the start of the operation the 15th Air Army (commander, Major General of Aviation Pyatykhin⁹) included the 3rd Bomber Corps (113 Pe-2 planes¹⁰), the 284th Bomber Division (15 SB¹¹ and 57 Po-2 bombers), the 286th Fighter Division (53 fighters), the 255th and 299th assault air divisions (119 assault aircraft), the 178th Bomber Regiment (nine Pe-2s), and the 32nd Air Reconnaissance Regiment (11 Pe-2s). Thus, in all, the 15th Air Army numbered 407 combat-ready aircraft. By the start of the operation the army had 579 fliers. In order to provide air support for the 13th Army’s offensive in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, it was planned to employ only part of the air army’s aircraft park, while reserving a significant part of the sorties for supporting the 13th Army’s offensive when its main forces turned from Kastornoe to the west. The 15th Air Army was assigned the following tasks. During the offensive’s preparatory period, our aviation was to carry out the following: launching air strikes to prevent the enemy’s railroad shipments along the Orel—Kursk sector; to destroy the railroad stations of Okhochevka and Raskhovets; to wear out the enemy’s forces, and; to prevent the enemy’s approach from the west to the line Studenoe—Mikhailovka—Raskhovets.

Before the infantry and tank attack, the aviation was supposed to launch a massive strike against the enemy’s defensive targets in the main zone, suppress the enemy’s artillery, and to destroy his communications centers and command posts. During the offensive, our aviation was supposed to support the 13th Army’s forces, upon the demand of the army commander and the commanders of the rifle divisions, to prevent enemy counterattacks from the depth, to hinder his retreat to the west, and to cover the offensive by the army’s shock group against enemy air attacks. The 2nd Air Army (commander, Major General of Aviation K.N. Smirnov¹²), was supposed to take part in the operation with only part of its forces. The army’s northern aviation group, consisting of the 269th Fighter and 291st Assault Air divisions, as well as the 208th Night Bomber Division—in all, about 120 planes—was to support the attack by the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces. The 2nd Air Army’s remaining forces were to be employed for air support of the front’s left wing, which was to complete the elimination of the enemy’s surrounded Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces and regroup for an offensive along the Khar’kov axis. The Voronezh Front’s 2nd Air Army was ordered to do the following: to launch strikes against the railroad stations of Latnaya, Kurbatovo, Nizhnedevitsk, and Kastornoe, against enemy garrisons in Kastornoe, Staryi Oskol and Gorshechnoe; to hinder the withdrawal of the enemy forces to the west along railroads and surfaced roads, and; to cover the ground forces against enemy air attacks. It follows that the 2nd Air Army’s main task in supporting the 38th, 60th and 40th armies in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation came down to hindering the enemy from withdrawing his men and materiel and thus support these armies’ forces in encircling and eliminating the enemy group of forces. A major shortcoming in planning the combat employment of our aviation was that the detaching of air assets for the direct support of our infantry and

tanks on the battlefield was not foreseen for the Voronezh Front’s 38th, 60th and 40th armies.

Operational Support

In the concrete conditions in which the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation was prepared and to be conducted, problems of intelligence and securing the offensive’s surprise acquired great importance among the remaining elements of operational support. The organization of anti-tank and anti-aircraft defense, due to the insignificant number of enemy tanks and his aviation’s low level of activity, did not present great difficulties.

Intelligence

During the operation’s preparatory period, the headquarters of the armies, combat arms and formations uninterruptedly studied the enemy’s defensive system, his group of forces, the presence of reserves, and their capabilities and intentions. Particular attention was devoted to determining the boundaries between enemy units and formations, his fire system, and the presence and type of various kinds of obstacles and obstructions. The chief methods of conducting intelligence of the enemy were searching in small groups, reconnaissance in force and the uninterrupted observation of the enemy. The armies’ and formations’ headquarters drew up detailed plans for carrying out intelligence of the enemy, men and equipment were assigned for carrying out searches and reconnaissance in force, while concrete tasks were defined for

carrying out reconnaissance of the enemy for each combat arm. The most attention was devoted to organizing and conducting searches and reconnaissance in force along the axes of the armies’ main attacks. Besides observation and individual searches by small groups of scouts, during 21-24 January the army commanders carried out a reconnaissance in force along their armies’ breakthrough sectors, with the simultaneous organization of the active operation’s of scouts along the entire front. A reconnaissance in force was conducted by forces ranging from a reinforced rifle company to a battalion, supported by mortar and artillery fire. In the 13th Army’s sector a reconnaissance in force was conducted in the direction of height 224; in the direction of height 229 and Nikol’skoe in the 38th Army’s sector, and; in the direction of Parnishnyi in the 60th Army’s sector. Reconnaissance in force enabled us to very fully uncover the enemy’s defensive system along a significantly wide sector of the front. Despite the unfavorable meteorological conditions, which made the full employment of aerial reconnaissance means more difficult, particularly the aerial photography of the depth of the enemy’s defense, by the start of the operation we had sufficiently complete data in all the armies as to the character of the enemy’s defense, his group of forces and the presence of engineering obstacles and obstructions. On the basis of engineer and troop reconnaissance, detailed maps and diagrams of the enemy’s defense were drawn up, noting obstructions and obstacles, observation and command posts, and his fire system. By means of aerial photography and agent intelligence, intermediate defensive lines and the locations of headquarters, communications centers and rear establishments were refined and noted on maps.

These detailed maps and diagrams were sent out to the troops along with brief descriptions of the character of the enemy’s defense. However, it is necessary to note that alongside a sufficiently complete definition of the system and character of the enemy’s defense, the fire system in the main zone of his defense was insufficiently uncovered by our intelligence organs. For example, in the 13th Army our artillery reconnaissance did not manage to full establish the firing positions of the enemy’s artillery and mortar batteries, which was the result of the late arrival of instrumental reconnaissance equipment and poor meteorological conditions. The 12th Independent Reconnaissance Artillery Battalion of the 13th Army’s 12th Artillery Division was able in four days to refine the coordinates of only three artillery and two enemy mortar batteries. In the Voronezh Front’s armies there was instrumental reconnaissance equipment only in the 60th Army, where the 10th Artillery Division was located. Due to the unfavorable meteorological conditions, air reconnaissance was also conducted insufficiently. As a result of the fact that our intelligence was not able to fully uncover the enemy’s fire systems, the planning of the artillery offensive was made significantly more difficult. In the final analysis, this led to a situation in which by the start of the infantry and tank attack the enemy’s defense had not been fully suppressed.

Measures for securing a surprise attack

For the purpose of hiding from the enemy the preparation of the offensive operation, aside from the conduct of regroupings and the concentration of forces only at night, the armies were also ordered

to increase the conduct of defensive works and observation of the enemy along the entire front. The front commanders also demanded that troop discipline be increased, the conduct of telephone and telegraph communications be restricted, and that the masking of the units and formation’s locations be improved. The troops’ arrival in their jumping-off positions was to be carried out in 1-2 days before the start of the operation. For example, in the 13th Army the first-echelon rifle divisions left for their jumping-off positions for the offensive only a day before the start of the operation, relieving the defending 307th Rifle Division. Aside from these measures, the Voronezh Front conducted operational deception for the purpose of disorienting the enemy as to our command’s true intentions. The plan for operational deception called for the false concentration of troops along the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors, the preparation of an offensive on Voronezh, as well as from Bol’shaya Vereika along the 38th Army’s left flank. Dummy tanks and guns were displayed along the sectors designated for showing a false concentration of forces, while troop movement night and day was denoted. Tactical exercises by units and formations were conducted in the area northeast of Voronezh. The movement of guns of various calibers, up to heavy guns, was widely practiced. Reinforced commander reconnaissance was widely employed along the 38th and 60th armies’ sectors, as well as reconnaissance in force. Besides this, in accordance with the plan for operational deception, our fighter aviation carried out reinforced patrolling over the area of the false concentration and unloading of troops, while false radio stations for the front and armies’ headquarters were also deployed. The radio sets of those formations that had left for the breakthrough sector, as a rule, continued to work in their previous locations. As a result of carrying out all these measures for securing

operational surprise, we managed to fool the enemy into not changing his group of forces at all, while continuing to hold major forces opposite our troops operating along secondary sectors, particularly in the Voronezh area.

Securing the flanks and boundaries

In light of the fact that it was planned to carry out the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense along four isolated sectors along the Voronezh salient, the securing of the armies’ shock groups’ flanks acquired particular significance. The main method of securing the shock groups’ flanks was rolling up the enemy’s defense for the purpose of widening the breakthrough toward the flanks and preventing the enemy’s counterattacks. In the 13th Army the 74th Rifle Division was designated for rolling up the enemy’s defense toward the right flank. The left flank of the army’s shock group would be secured by the 15th Rifle Division, which was supposed to roll up the enemy’s defense opposite the army’s left flank and widen the breakthrough in the direction of Uritskoe. Besides this, the 6th Guards Rifle Division (the front reserve) was located behind the boundary of the 13th and 48th armies. In the 38th Army the securing of the shock group’s left flank was entrusted to the 206th Rifle Division, which received orders to attack in the direction of Golosnovka and Zemlyansk. In order to secure the right flank of the 60th Army’s shock group from the direction of Voronezh, the 141st Rifle Division was ordered to attack in the direction of Latnoe.

It was planned to maneuver artillery and engineering troops along all likely axes where enemy counterattacks in the flank of the armies’ shock groups were possible. In order to support the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, the 13th and 40th armies were to attack with part of their forces to the northwest and west and reach the line Mikhailovka—Marmyzhi— Yastrebovka. All of these planned measures were supposed to firmly secure the flanks of the shock groups and facilitate the successful accomplishment of the assigned tasks.

Anti-aircraft defense

As was mentioned above, the enemy along the Voronezh—Kursk axis had about 300 planes, based on airfield in the Shchigry, Kshen’, Kastornoe, Staryi Oskol, and Kursk areas. Almost all of the enemy’s airfields were connected with each other by railroad, which made it easier to supply his aviation units with everything necessary for waging combat. The Bryansk and Voronezh fronts disposed of the following antiaircraft means for organizing the anti-aircraft defense of the forces taking part in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. The Bryansk Front’s 15th Air Army, which was to operate completely in the 13th Army’s sector, had 80 fighters. The northern aviation group of the Voronezh Front’s 2nd Air Army, which was to support the front’s activities in the Voronezh— Kastornoe operation had a single fighter division, numbering, in all, 30 fighters.

There were two anti-aircraft artillery divisions, one anti-aircraft artillery regiment and two independent anti-aircraft battalions for organizing the anti-aircraft cover in all four armies. This equipment was distributed in the following manner. The 13th Army was reinforced with the 16th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division (44 anti-aircraft guns and 82 anti-aircraft machine guns) and the 615th Independent Anti-Aircraft Artillery Battalion, which were organized into an army anti-aircraft artillery group. The 40th Army had the 5th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Division, which consisted of four regiments (80 anti-aircraft machine guns and 24 anti-aircraft guns) and the 322nd Independent Anti-Aircraft Battalion (12 anti-aircraft guns). The 60th Army had only the 235th Anti-Aircraft Artillery Regiment, which included 20 antiaircraft machine guns. The 38th Army had no anti-aircraft equipment from the High Command Reserve at all. The main mass of anti-aircraft weapons was to be brought in for covering the armies’ second echelons, reserves and rear targets. Thus both fronts disposed of a comparatively small amount of weapons for organizing the troops’ anti-aircraft defense. However, taking into account that the enemy air forces was comparatively inactive, due to the insignificant number of planes and the restricted flying weather, these weapons, along with the troop anti-aircraft weapons, were sufficient for covering the troops and the most important rear targets.

Anti-tank defense

The enemy had only 65 tanks along the Voronezh salient, of which up to 50 were operating in the 13th Army’s future offensive zone. Thus there was no great reason for creating special anti-tank artillery reserves in the Voronezh Front’s armies. An anti-tank artillery reserve, consisting of two anti-tank artillery regiments (874th and 563rd) was created in the 13th Army.¹³ According to the army commander’s decision, this reserve was to be located in two places, along the flanks of the army’s shock group, ready to maneuver for the purpose of repelling the enemy’s tank counterattacks and to advance during the offensive behind the army’s shock group. Such, in general, were the measures for operationally supporting the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation.

Engineer Support for the Operation

Engineering support for the operation became particularly important in winter conditions. The Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ engineer troops had to carry out tasks involving engineer reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain, carry out the engineer preparation for the offensive’s jumping-off position, support the engineering regrouping of the troops, the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense, and the troops’ operations during the operation. In planning the operation’s engineering support, particular attention was paid to the timely creation of passages in our minefields and the enemy’s obstacles along the forward edge; to the scrupulous working out of problems connected with accompanying our forces with sappers during the offensive, particularly the artillery and tanks; to consolidating the lines achieved; to preparing to clear

mines from major inhabited locales and towns captured by us during the operation, and; to the preparation of routes for the troops during the offensive. In order to carry out the engineering support task, the troops were reinforced with the following engineer and sapper elements. The 13th Army received two sapper, seven engineer-mine and three pontoon battalions and one masking company; the 38th Army had attached to it an engineer battalion and one engineer-mine company. The 60th Army received two engineer-mine and one pontoon battalions. The 40th Army received one sapper, four engineer-mine and two pontoon battalions. The engineering troops’ densities along the armies’ breakthrough sectors were as follows: 3.8 sapper companies in the 13th Army, 1.4 sapper companies in the 38th Army, 2.5 sapper companies in the 60th Army, and 1.5 sapper companies in the 40th Army per kilometer of front. The data here show that the density of engineering troops along the breakthrough sectors was far from sufficient. This required their maximum application of force in carrying out tasks involving the engineer support for the operation. Thanks to the skillful employment of the engineer troops’ available forces and their intensive work, such important tasks as the preparation of roads for supporting regroupings, the construction of command and observation posts, mine clearing, camouflage work, and other tasks were successfully resolved by the engineer troops during the operation’s preparatory phase. The conduct of measures for the engineering support of regroupings during the offensive’s preparatory phase enabled us to secretly concentrate the armies’ shock groups along the breakthrough sectors.

The engineer troops carried out the following work to support the breakthrough. In the 13th Army’s sector 248 passages were made in our minefields, 98 passages in the enemy’s minefields and 211 in his wire obstacles. In the 38th Army 63 passages were cleared in our and the enemy’s minefields. In the 60th Army’s zone sappers cleared 72 passages in the enemy’s minefields and 61 in his wire obstacles. The data here show that, on the average, there were two passages for each rifle company, which enabled our forces to overcome the enemy’s obstacles.

The Organization of Troop Control and Communications

The conditions in which troop control was to be accomplished during the operation’s preparatory period were different in the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts. The Bryansk Front prepared the offensive operation in the most favorable conditions: its forces were defending and there was sufficient time to prepare the operation, both at the front level and in the 13th Army. The commander and headquarters of the Voronezh Front had to conduct troop control in more complex conditions. During the preparatory period of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, the Voronezh Front was completing the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation and, besides, had begun preparing for the Khar’kov offensive operation. The resolution of all these tasks demanded particularly flexible control of the subordinate troops on the part of the command and headquarters of the front and armies. Following the adoption of the decision and the relaying of their tasks to the troops, the problem of the strict control of the course of preparing the troops for carrying out their tasks assumed particular

significance. The fronts’ and armies’ commands’, as well as their staffs’ main attention was focused on this. During the preparatory period for the operation the personal interaction of the front and army commanders and the leading front and army staff officers was widely practiced with the subordinate troops. Due to the fact that the attacks by our four armies against the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces were to be launched along different sectors and at different times, a particular concern of the commanders was the problem of organizing the troops’ coordination. In order to bring about the closest cooperation between the air force and the shock groups’ troops, representatives from the 2nd Air Army were dispatched to all the Voronezh Front’s army headquarters and officers from the Bryansk Front’s 15th Air Army were dispatched to the 13th Army’s headquarters and the headquarters of all the firstechelon rifle divisions. However, it should be noted that the 15th Air Army’s representatives detached to the rifle divisions were mostly riflemen radio operators and thus were unable to render any real help to the commanders of the rifle divisions, because they themselves were not very competent in matters of employing aviation; besides, the majority of them did not have radio sets. One of the important tasks of troop control during the operation’s preparatory period was the control of intra-front troop regroupings, which, despite the limited schedules and difficult conditions were, for the most part, completed on time, and all the armies were able to begin the offensive at the times established by the front commander. It was planned to carry out troop control in the Voronezh Front from the front’s command post, which was located in Bobrov, at a distance of 90 kilometers from the 60th Army’s breakthrough sector,

120 kilometers from the 40th Army’s breakthrough sector, and more than 150 kilometers from the 38th Army’s breakthrough sector. Troop control in the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army was to be accomplished from the front’s auxiliary command post, which was deployed in Navesnoe, at a distance of 15 kilometers from the breakthrough sector. It was ordered to deploy command posts as follows: in the 13th Army in Muravlevka, 15 kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector; in the 38th Army in Burdino, six kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector; in the 60th Army in Yablochnoe, 12 kilometers from the army’s breakthrough sector, and; in the 40th Army, in Skoritskoe, 34 kilometers from the front line. Thus the armies’ command posts, with the exception of the 40th Army, were close to the front line. The great 34-kilometer distance of the 40th Army’s command post from the troops did nothing to support the maintenance of reliable communications and uninterrupted troop control from the very beginning of the operation. The army commanders’ observation posts were outfitted at the command posts of the commanders of those divisions operating along the axes of the main attack. The latter circumstance should not be considered correct. The army commanders, while located at the divisional command posts, not only restricted the division commanders’ activities, but often undermined them. Besides this, the division commanders and their headquarters were not able to normally employ their communications equipment for controlling the battle of their subordinate units, as well as for communications with their neighbors, because the divisions’ communications equipment was also used, in a number of cases, by the army commanders and officers located there. Among the shortcomings in organizing troop control, one must note the lack of seriousness in constructing the 13th Army’s command post in Muravlevka. The command post’s communications center was not located in overhead covers. The army’s headquarters was

bunched up. Headquarters officers did not have the opportunity to rest in their free time, because no places had been built for this purpose, although there were a sufficient number of good houses in Muravlevka. During the operation’s preparatory period the communications troops were supposed to guarantee the uninterrupted communications of the front’s forces during regrouping and while occupying the jumping-off position, and carry out all necessary measures for supporting unbroken communications of the front’s troops during the offensive operation. In order to secure reliable wire communications in the jumping-off position for the offensive, permanent telephone-telegraph communications lines were reestablished. The headquarters of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts had wire communications, as a rule, with the armies along two lines. A particular concern of the fronts’ and armies’ headquarters was putting the restored communications lines into a normal technical condition. As a result of carrying out all the necessary measures, by the beginning of the offensive the wire communications network had been broadly developed and reached the divisions’ headquarters and as far as the forward edge in the 13th Army. In order to secure unbroken troop control during the offensive, the laying down of wire communications was planned by the armies’ headquarters along the main axes. In those armies operating along the fronts’ main axes (13th and 40th armies), wire communications had been organized along two double-wire axes. For example, in the 13th Army wire communications was organized along two axes: the first through Kazinka and Sapron, with a capacity of two wires, for supporting the 8th and 15th rifle divisions and the 12th Artillery Division; the second through Gatishche, Volovo and Kastornoe, which also had a

capacity of two wires. A second axis was designated for communications with the 132nd, 81st and 307th rifle divisions. A telephone-construction company was to be detached for each axis. Wire communications was organized by one axis each in the 38th and 60th armies. The laying down of wire communications lines was planned throughout the entire depth of the offensive operation. The organization of wire communications along two axes in the 13th and 40th armies may be explained by the fact that these armies had the largest number of rifle formations and were supposed to attack along wider sectors in comparison with other armies. It was planned to employ wire communications equipment in the fronts’ and armies’ headquarters in two conditions. Taking into account the deep snow cover and the unfavorable meteorological conditions, which made the establishment of wire communications more difficult, particular attention was devoted to the organization of radio communications. In accordance with the requirements of Stavka directive no. 170526 of 24 June 1942, on employing radio communications in organizing troop control, the chiefs of staff at all levels were ordered to widely use radio equipment, particularly during an operation. Radio communications with the formations was organized by radio networks. Besides this, special artillery and tank radio networks were operating. In order to organize reliable communications at the regiment-battalion level, the units were allotted a significant amount of low-power radio sets. A great deal of attention was devoted to organizing radio orientation for planes. During the troop concentration period, the radio sets worked only on receive. The radio sets’ transmission work was authorized in the artillery upon the beginning of the artillery offensive, and in the

tank and rifle formations at the beginning of the attack. For ensuring the army headquarters’ uninterrupted communications with the formations, radio sets in the divisions were set up on sleighs, thanks to which they did not lag behind the attacking units. Great importance was attached to Po-2 communications aircraft, with the help of which the front’s and armies’ headquarters had the full capability to maintain unbroken communications with the formations, especially during the operation. It should be noted here that radio communications with the mobile groups was not sufficiently thought through in the armies. In the 13th Army only one radio set and an insignificant amount of mobile communications equipment was allotted to the mobile group. As a result, the commander of the mobile group, Major General Glukhov, often lost communications with the group’s units and with the army’s headquarters. The loss of communications with the mobile group also occurred in the 40th Army. The army’s headquarters sometimes lacked communications with the 4th Tank Corps for entire days and did not know the situation in its area of operations. The significant remove of the Voronezh Front’s headquarters from the troops of the main group of forces and that of the 40th Army’s headquarters from the first-echelon troops complicated the maintenance of uninterrupted communications and often led to breaks in its work.

The Troops’ and Headquarters’ Combat Training

From July 1942 through January 1943 all four armies, slated for carrying out the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, were on the defensive. During this period systematic combat and political

training was conducted with the troops. In January 1943 the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army received combat experience in conducting offensive fighting during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation. The basis of the troops’ combat training was the demands of the People’s Commissar of Defense’s orders no. 306 of 8 October 1942 and no. 325 of 16 October 1942. Order no. 306 made changes to the combat organization. The requirements of this order were reflected in the Infantry Combat Manual (BUP-42), which was confirmed in November 1942. Order no. 325 laid out the main principled instructions on the employment of tank units and formations in the battle and operation. The main thrust in training the troops was on working out problems of breaking through the enemy’s defense and the battle in depth, the storming and destruction of pillboxes, overcoming obstacles, and the battle in strong points and inhabited locales in winter conditions and in deep snow cover. A great deal of attention was devoted to teaching activities as a platoon, company and battalion and the organization of cooperation among tanks, infantry and artillery at the tank company-rifle battalion-artillery battalion level. A great deal of work was carried out in training staffs. This work consisted of the staffs working out problems of planning the army offensive operation, the organization of cooperation between the combat arms, and troop control during the offensive. As an example, one may point to the work carried out in this area by the Bryansk Front. In the course of preparing for the forthcoming offensive, a series of lectures was read in the front’s and armies’ headquarters on organizing and planning the army offensive operation, taking into account the experience of the Soviet army’s offensive operations in the winter campaign of 1941-42. An entire series of problems connected with operational preparation was

worked out through the method of group exercises, especially the compiling of a plan for regrouping forces, the planning of the army offensive operation, the engineer support for the operation in winter conditions, the organization of communications in the offensive operation, and others. At the conclusion of the theoretical training, the headquarters of the Bryansk Front conducted three war games, during which the following themes were worked out:

•The 13th Army’s offensive operation in the general direction of Livny, Kolpny, Zolotukhino, and Kursk (a one-stage war game involving communications equipment); •The 13th Army’s offensive operation in the general direction of Livny, Volovo and Kastornoe in the area between the Kshen’ and Olym rivers (map exercise); •the 13th Army’s offensive operation in the area between the Kshen’ and Olym rivers in the general direction of Kastornoe (a two-stage war game with communications equipment).

These war games were supposed to train the command and staffs for the forthcoming offensive along one of the likely axes and had extremely great significance for knocking together and training the staffs. During these games essentially all the problems of planning, organizing and supporting the operation were worked out with the command and headquarters of the 13th Army and with the formation commanders and their staffs.

Rear Area Organization and the Operation’s Materiel Support

The organization of the rear of the fronts and armies taking part in the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation was as follows by the start of the operation. The Voronezh Front was based on four rail sectors: excluding Rtishchevo—Tambov—Michurinsk—Gryazi; Gryazi—Oborona— excluding Povorino; Povorino—Talovaya—Bobrov—Liski, and; Tambov—excluding Balashov. Front regulating stations were deployed in the towns of Michurinsk and Borisoglebsk. Front depots for the main types of supply were located as follows: an artillery depot in Borozdinovka, a food depot in Anna, and a depot of fuels and lubricants in Liski. It was planned to move the front depots to the areas of Usman’, Ramon’, Grafskoe, Otrozhka, Talovaya, and Bobrov during the operation. The Bryansk Front’s 13th Army was based on the Yefremov—Yelets —Dolgorukovo and Yelets—Izmalkovo—Dolgoe—Livny railroad sectors. The army’s supply station was located in the area of the Yelets railroad station. The Livny, Dolgorukovo and Kazaki stations were unloading stations. Army depots were deployed in the following areas: in Rozhdestvo for artillery, in the area of Kazaki station for fuels and lubricants, and a food depot in the town of Yelets. The 38th Army was based on the Lipetsk—excluding Yelets and excluding Yelets—excluding Dolgorukovo railroad sectors. The army’s supply station was located in the area of the Novodmitrievka railroad station. Patriarshaya, Izvaly, Ulusarka, and Khitrovo stations were designated as unloading stations. Army depots were located as follows: in the Khitrovo station area for artillery, in Sentsovo for fuels and lubricants, and a food depot in the area of Dolgorukovo station. It was planned to relocate the army depots during the operation as follows: the artillery depot to the area of Dolgorukovo station, the fuel and lubricants depot to the area of Svechinskaya

station, and the food depot to Bol’she-Kolodez’ (on the ground). The 60th Army was based on the following railroad sectors: Gryazi— Grafskaya; Grafskaya—Ramon’; Grafskaya—Kolodeznaya. The army’s supply stations were located at Gryazi station. The following were designated as unloading stations: Tresvyatskaya for the army’s rightflank forces and Kolodeznaya station for the army’s shock group. Army depots were located as follows: an artillery depot and a depot for fuel and lubricants in the area of Belyaevo station, and a food depot in the area of Kolodeznaya station. The 40th Army was based on the front’s Talovaya—Liski railroad sector and the Kolodeznaya—Liski independent sector. The army’s supply station was deployed in the area of Khrenovoe station. Davydovka and Liski stations were unloading stations. Army depots for the main types of supply were deployed in the area of the Davydovka railroad station. Thus the delivery of freight to the Voronezh Front’s forces was carried out along four railroad sectors. The armies received 2-3 independent sectors apiece for their basing. The presence of such a number of railroad delivery and evacuation routes made it possible to organize the planned delivery of materiel supplies necessary for conducting the operation and the evacuation of wounded and equipment to the rear. The situation was significantly worse with dirt roads. Despite the efforts of the troops and the local population, which tried each day to clear the roads of snow, they remained difficult of passage. The distance of the rear establishments from the front line was as follows: 150-210 kilometers for front regulating stations, 90-180 kilometers for front depots, 60-130 kilometers for the armies’ supply stations, 20-70 kilometers for the armies’ depots, and 20-100 kilometers for unloading stations.

The provisioning of the front, armies and divisions with delivery equipment was insufficient. For example, the 13th Army required 1,150 motor vehicles, but had only 400 on hand. The 60th Army had only 130 motor trucks and 120 two-horse vehicles for organizing deliveries. Nor did the divisions dispose of the necessary amount of transport, which delayed the movement of ammunition from the army depots. For example, the 13th Army’s 307th Rifle Division could only move 150-200 tons with its available transport, including horse-drawn, or an average of one third of its required supply. There were 39 hospitals for the troop’s medical service in the Voronezh Front’s 38th, 60th and 40th armies. Front evacuation posts had been deployed in Gryazi and Talovaya at a remove of 90120 kilometers from the front line. The armies were ordered to carry out the evacuation of the sick and wounded by mobile teams to the front hospitals: to Lipetsk and Tambov in the 38th and 60th armies, and to Novokhopersk in the 40th Army; these hospitals’ distance from the front reached 80-240 kilometers. A wing of planes each was attached to the armies for the transport of stored blood to the field hospitals. An evacuation post, evacuation hospital, a forward field evacuation post, a field-surgical hospital, two field therapy hospitals, two hospitals for lightly wounded, and two infection hospitals were detached for the medical support of the 13th Army. In all, 5,575 cots were deployed. The front headquarters was planning to detach 60 medical vehicles to the 13th Army for the evacuation of the wounded. However, due to the fact that fuel was not released for these vehicles, they could not be employed for the evacuation of the sick and wounded. As a result, the army’s medical automobile transport did not work during the first two days of the operation and the divisional medical assistance posts were overloaded with wounded. In organizing medical support, particular attention was devoted to preventing the wounded and sick from getting frostbite. For this, during the offensive the armies were ordered to deploy bandagingheating posts every ten kilometers along the main dirt roads.

As a result of the great shortage of auto transport and the poor road conditions, the accumulation of the necessary supplies unfolded with great difficulties. Thus despite the intensive work by all levels of the rear services, the provisioning of the front with ammunition was insufficient. By the start of the operation the armies’ shock groups had the following: 1.2-1.5 combat loads of ammunition for firearms, 1.0-1.5 combat loads for 82mm and 120mm mortars, 1.51.9 combat loads for 45mm shells, 1.2-1.7 combat loads for 76mm and 122mm artillery shells, and 0.5-1.1 combat loads for 152mm guns. By the start of the operation there were only 1.3-2.0 refills of fuel and lubricants. Thus the operation’s materiel preparation had not been completely finished. The troops of the armies’ shock groups were insufficiently supplied with ammunition and fuel. In planning the expenditure of ammunition, on the average, up to 0.5 combat loads and 0.5 of a refill of fuel per day from available stocks of these supplies would suffice for only the first 3-4 days of the operation. Further support of the troops depended upon the timely delivery of materiel supplies from the front depots during the operation.

Political Support for the Operation

While preparing for the operation, a great deal of attention was devoted to party-political work. On the basis of instructions by the Communist Party, the commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations explained to the rank and file the goals of the Great Patriotic War, the significance of the Soviet army’s victory around Stalingrad and

the labor feats of the Soviet people in the rear for the cause of defeated the enemy, raised the political consciousness of the troops, inculcated in them a feeling of Soviet patriotism and hatred for the Hitlerite aggressors, and strengthened the discipline and moral spirit of the soldiers and officers. One of the most important tasks of party-political work was inculcating into the consciousness of each soldier and officer the demands of the order by the people’s commissar of defense, no. 345, of 7 November 1942, in which it was stated: “The enemy has already felt the Red Army’s capability of resistance on his own hide. He will further find out the force of the Red Army’s crushing blows… We can and must clear the Soviet land of the Hitlerite filth.”¹⁴ The nature of the party-political work was to a significant degree predetermined by the fact that the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation was prepared as an operation to encircle and destroy the enemy in difficult winter conditions, which required the great exertion of physical and moral forces from the rank and file. The lack of uniformity in the rank and file’s combat experience was also taken into account in organizing party-political work. While the 40th Army had acquired significant combat experience in offensive operations during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, the forces of the 13th, 38th and 60th armies did not have this experience and were taking part in an offensive for the first time. During the preparation for the offensive, the party-political organs chiefly carried out measures for the organizational strengthening of the company party and Komsomol organizations. This strengthening was carried out by reinforcing the line elements with communists, particularly those in which the party organizations were not numerous, as well as by accepting the best soldiers and commanders into the party and Komsomol. Measures were adopted for filling out the party organs to authorized

strength. A great deal of work was carried out to train reserves of company party and Komsomol organizers, as well as non-authorized agitators. All of the agitation and propaganda work was carried out under the slogan of “Emulate the heroic soldiers of Stalingrad” and was subordinated to securing the timely preparation for the operation, the successful fulfillment of the command’s combat orders, the inculcation among the soldiers and officers an offensive élan and hatred for the enemy, the strengthening of the belief in the inevitability of our final victory, and the rallying of the rank and file around the Communist Party. Leaflets and front, army and division newspapers, which called upon the rank and file to carry out its sacred obligation to cleanse the Soviet land of the German-Fascist aggressors, played a great role in propaganda and agitation work. Particular attention was paid to the propaganda and popularization of the combat experience acquired by the Soviet army during the counteroffensive around Stalingrad, as well as that of the Voronezh Front’s forces in the recently-completed Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation. All means of agitation and propaganda work were employed for this. The formations that took part in the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation and which were transferred from the 40th Army to the 60th Army, played a major role in popularizing combat experience. The enormous work, which was carried out by the commanders, political organs and party and Komsomol organizations during the preparatory period for the operation, enabled us to mobilize all of the rank and file designated for conducting the Voronezh— Kastornoe operation and carrying out our combat assignments. The troops were full of determination to inflict a crushing blow on the enemy.

Regrouping Forces and Occupying the Jumping-Off Position

In accordance with the decisions made by the front commanders on conducting the operation, it was necessary to carry out intra-front regroupings of all of the Bryansk Front’s armies and almost all of the Voronezh Front’s armies. In the Bryansk Front it was necessary to regroup five rifle divisions, two artillery divisions, a tank corps, three tank regiments, and also a number of other units; in the Voronezh Front it was necessary to regroup five rifle divisions, three rifle, three ski-rifle and three tank brigades. Table IV/2.5 shows which rifle and tank formations and units were transferred to the armies for creating shock groups.

Table IV/2.5 Intra- Front Troop Regroupings During the Preparatory Period of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation

Besides the intra-front regroupings, there were significant regroupings within the armies. For example, in the 60th Army two rifle divisions and one rifle brigade were shifted from the right flank to the left. Similar regroupings were carried out in the other armies. The regrouping of many formations took place over great distances. For example, the Bryansk Front’s 5th Artillery Division carried out a 200-kilometer march, the Voronezh Front’s 14th Tank Brigade moved 160 kilometers, and the 60th Army’s rifle formations moved 60-80 kilometers. The units’ and formations’ average daily pace reached 20-25 kilometers. The majority of formations were regrouped during 16-23 January. The 40th Army’s forces carried out their regrouping during 19-23 January. It should be noted that the conduct of the regroupings was made more difficult by the conditions of the roads, which were constantly being covered with snow, the sharp frosts, which reached -25 degrees Celsius, and the shortage of towing equipment in the artillery units and formations. We had to carry out work uninterruptedly to clear the roads, while the artillery had to be moved over several trips. Despite the difficulties indicated all of the regroupings were completed on time and the armies’ forces occupied their jumpingoff positions in accordance with the decisions adopted. The 13th Army, having turned over to the 48th Army the Sidorovka —Yasnaya Polyana sector of the front, along with the 143rd and 74th rifle divisions occupying it, was to operate along the 47kilometer front excluding Yasnaya Polyana—excluding Kozinka. The army’s shock group was concentrated along an 18-kilometer front between the Kshen’ and Olym rivers. The 148th, 307th, 132nd,

and 8th rifle divisions, a tank brigade and three tank regiments were in the first echelon; the 280th, 211th and 81st rifle divisions were in the second echelon. The army’s mobile group consisted of the 129th Tank Brigade. Units of the 15th Rifle Division were defending the 25-kilometer sector Olym River—Kozinka. The Bryansk Front’s reserve—the 6th Guards and 137th rifle divisions and the 19th Tank Corps—was concentrated in the 13th Army’s sector. The average operational density along the army’s main attack axis was 2.5 kilometers per division, and 92 guns and mortars and 14 tanks per kilometer of front. The troops’ tactical density reached seven kilometers per battalion along the secondary axis. The 38th Army, while continuing to operate in its previous zone along a 14-kilometer sector of front from Kozinka to Ozerki, had the 240th and 167th rifle divisions, a tank brigade and one tank battalion in its first echelon. The army’s reserve contained the 206th Rifle Division (minus a regiment), junior lieutenants’ courses, a tank battalion and other elements. On the 46-kilometer remainder of the front from Ozerki to the Don River the 237th Rifle Division, 248th Rifle Brigade and a regiment from the 206th Rifle Division were operating. The average densities along the breakthrough sector were: up to five kilometers per division, about 50 guns and mortars and seven tanks per kilometer of front. The tactical density along the secondary axis amounted on an average to three kilometers per battalion. The 60th Army, having received the 22-kilometer sector of the front from Kostenki to Semidesyatskoe from the 40th Army, along with the 141st Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade, was operating along a 94-kilometer front.

The army’s main group of forces deployed along a 12-kilometer front. The 322nd and 232nd rifle divisions, the 253rd Rifle Brigade, and the 150th, 14th and 116th tank brigades were in the first echelon. The 303rd Rifle Division was in the second echelon. The 121st, 100th and 141st rifle divisions, and the 104th Rifle Brigade, a composite training brigade, and the 8th and 14th destruction brigades occupied the remaining 82 kilometers of front. The average density along the breakthrough sector was 3.5 kilometers per division and about 50 guns and mortars and four tanks per kilometer of front. The density was on the average more than 20 kilometers per division along the secondary axis. The 40th Army was operating along the 50-kilometer stretch from Semidesyatskoe to 2nd Gorodishche. Five rifle divisions (183rd, 25th Guards, 309th, 107th, and 340th), the 129th Rifle Brigade and the 192nd and 96th tank brigades were deployed in the first echelon. The 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades and the 305th Rifle Division, which was moving up from the Ilovskoe—Afanas’evka area to the army’s sector, were in the second echelon. According to the army commander’s decision, the 4th Tank Corps, which comprised the army’s mobile group, was to attack along with the 309th and 107th rifle divisions and then develop the attack in the direction of Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe. By the start of the offensive the corps had occupied its jumping-off position in these divisions’ sectors. The army’s main forces were concentrating along the 30-kilometer sector Stryukov—Znamenka. Four rifle divisions and all the tank troops were in the first echelon along this sector. The average operational density along this axis reached about six kilometers per division, up to 40 guns and mortars and a little more than eight tanks per kilometer of front. The arrival of the army’s shock groups from the concentration areas to their jumping-off positions for the offensive was carried out

exclusively at night and during 1-2 days before the start of the offensive. Units of the 13th and 38th armies’ first echelons in their jumping-off positions were located in trenches, communications trenches and overhead covers, which had been prepared by our forces during the defensive period, while the second echelons were in the immediate inhabited locales. Our troops’ first trench was 300500 (up to 800) meters from the enemy’s forward edge. In view of the extreme shortage of time, trenches for the jumpingoff position had not been prepared in the 60th and 40th armies’ sectors. Thus the troops were predominantly quartered in the inhabited locales closest to the enemy and during the artillery preparation period moved to their jumping-off position at a distance of 300-350 meters from the enemy. The greatest troop density was created along the 13th Army’s breakthrough sector. Significantly smaller densities were along the Voronezh Front’s armies’ breakthrough sectors. This difference in densities was due not only to the fact that the Bryansk Front’s main forces had been concentrated in the 13th Army’s sector, but also to the character of the enemy’s defense along various sectors of the Voronezh salient. The 13th Army was to break through the enemy’s prepared defense, which he had been improving for more than six months. There was a completely different situation for accomplishing a breakthrough in the sectors of the forthcoming offensive by the Voronezh Front’s 40th and 60th armies. The line from which the forces of the 40th Army and the 60th Army’s left flank were to launch their attacks had been seized by the Voronezh Front’s forces during 17-20 January. The Voronezh Front’s offensive on Kastornoe was planned for 24 January. Thus the enemy only had 3-6 days in order to prepare a defense along this line.

As was mentioned above, our forces along the Voronezh salient enjoyed a significant overall superiority in men and materiel over the enemy. Following the regroupings, we managed to achieve an even greater superiority in men and materiel over the enemy along the axes of the armies’ main attacks. Table IV/2.6 gives an idea of the correlation of men and materiel along the armies’ breakthrough sectors.

Table IV/2.6 The Correlation of Men and Materiel Along the Armies’ Breakthrough Sectors by the Start of the Voronezh— Kastornoe Operation

The necessary superiority along the decisive axes was achieved by weakening the secondary sectors. At the same time, it should be noted that in the developing situation we could have left fewer forces along the 38th and 60th armies’ secondary sectors than was done by the army commanders. Each of these armies had the opportunity to remove at least a division each from the secondary axes and create from them powerful army reserves. By the close of the preparatory period, except for measures regarding the troops’ materiel supply, the measures for preparing the operation were basically completed. In the Voronezh Front’s armies the reserves of materiel supplies (ammunition and fuel) that had been created would suffice for only 3-4 days of the offensive. The Bryansk Front’s 13th Army had also not succeeded in completing its materiel preparation for the operation. By this time the necessary reserves of materiel supplies among the army’s troops had still not been created. Because of this, on 24 January the commander of the Bryansk Front approached the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I.V. Stalin, with a request to move the start of the 13th Army’s offensive to 27 January. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief ordered the commander of the Bryansk Front to begin the offensive on 26 January. In his directive no. 30028 of 25 January 1943 to the commander of the Bryansk Front, I.V. Stalin ordered the following: “It is forbidden to put off the operation to 27.1. I oblige you to begin the operation on the morning of 26 January. I. Stalin.” Thus the offensive by the armies taking part in the operation was to begin in the following order: the 40th Army’s forces would attack first on the morning of 24 January, with the 38th and 60th armies attacking on 25 January, and the 13th Army on 26 January.

1In calculating this, two rifle brigades are counted as one rifle division. 2Editor’s note. Maks Andreevich Reiter (1886-1950), a Latvian by nationality, joined the Russian imperial army in 1906 and the Red Army in 1919. During the Great Patriotic War he served in various positions at the front level and also commanded a military district. Following the war, Reiter served in the army’s military-academic apparatus. 3The destruction brigades, as part of the Voronezh Front’s armies, had an average strength of 1-1,300 men, 20-40 guns and 12 mortars. 4Editor’s note. Nikolai Pavlovich Pukhov (1895-1958) joined the Russian imperial army in 1916 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a rifle division, and from 1942 to the end of the war he commanded the 13th Army. Following the war, Pukhov commanded an army and several military districts. 5Editor’s note. Mikhail Ivanovich Glukhov (1893-1947) joined the Russian imperial army in 1914 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he served at various levels, including deputy commander of the 13th Army. He also commanded an infantry division and a rifle corps. Following the war, Glukhov served in the Soviet occupation forces in Germany. 6Editor’s note. Nikandr Yevlampievich Chibisov (1892-1959) joined the Russian imperial army in 1913 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a military district, an army and a front , befor his appointment as chief of the Frunze Military Academy. Following the war, Chibisov served as deputy commander of a military district. 7Editor’s note. Ivan Danilovich Chernyakhovskii (1906-45) joined the

Red Army in 1924. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a tank division, a rifle division and a tank corps, before being appointed to command the 60th Army in 1942. In 1944 Chernyakhovskii was appointed commander of the Third Belorussian Front, where he served until his death during the East Prussian operation. 8Not counting the rifle formations’ artillery. 9Editor’s note. Ivan Gavrilovich Pyatykhin (1904-71) joined the Red Army in 1922 and fought in the Far East. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded the 15th Air Army during 1942-43, when he was appointed air force commander of a military district. Following the war, Pyatykhin continued to command the air assets of various military districts and was deputy commander of an air army until his retirement in 1948. 10 Editor’s note. The Pe-2 was a two-engine bomber designed by Vladimir Mikhailovich Petlyakov (1891-1942), which first appeared in 1941. The Pe-2 carried a crew of three and was armed with four 7.62mm machine guns and could carry up to 1,600 kilograms of bombs. 11 Editor’s note. The SB (ANT-40) was a twin-engine high-speed bomber, which first appeared in 1936. The plane carried a crew of three and was armed with four 7.62mm machine guns. It could carry as much as six 100-kilogram bombs in its bomb bay and two 250kilogram bombs under its wings. 12 Konstantin Nikolaevich Smirnov (1899-1981 ) joined the Red Army in 1918 and completed flight school in 1921. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded an air division, corps and air army. Following the war, he served in the central military apparatus until his retirement in 1951. 13 In the army this reserve was called the army anti-tank group.

14 I. Stalin, O Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voine Sovetskogo Soyuza , 5th ed., pp. 80-81.

3

The Conduct of the Operation

The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense and the Arrival of the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts’ Forces in the Kastornoe Area (24-28 January)

The 40th Army’s Attack along the Southern Sector of the Voronezh Salient

As was shown earlier, the 40th Army was supposed to attack on the morning of 24 January. However, on that day a strong blizzard began in the morning, the temperature reached -20 degrees Celsius, the roads were covered with snow, and visibility was sharply reduced. Hoping that the blizzard would subside somewhat, the beginning of the artillery bombardments was shifted to 1200. However, the blizzard did not let up and it was decided to begin the artillery preparation of the attack, despite the weather, at 1230 on 24 January. The artillery preparation began at the designated time in the 40th Army’s attack zone, but, as might be expected, proved to be of little effectiveness. The artillery’s and mortars’ insufficient density, the limited amount of ammunition, and the unfavorable meteorological conditions that hindered observation, prevented us from achieving the necessary results: the majority of enemy guns were not

suppressed and his infantry suffered only insignificant losses. Due to the poor weather, the 2nd Air Army did not engage in combat during the day. At 1300, following a 1 ½ hour artillery preparation, the 40th Army’s infantry and tanks went over to the attack. The enemy opened a powerful artillery, mortar and machine gun fire on our troops. From the very beginning the fighting along the army’s front became prolonged and bitter. While overcoming the enemy’s stubborn resistance and repelling his counterattacks, the army’s rifle formations throughout the day of 24 January made only small progress in the center of the offensive zone, along the Bocharov—Staro-Nikolaevskaya sector. The 4th Tank Corps achieved somewhat more success. Attacking simultaneously with the infantry, the corps crushed the resistance of the German 68th Infantry Division and began to advance on NovoMelovoe and Staro-Melovoe, and not Arkhangel’skoe, as had been planned. The corps commander calculated that he could more rapidly reach Gorshechnoe through these inhabited locales and thus carry out his assigned mission. The corps attacked in extremely difficult conditions. The tanks were able to move only along the roads, which in places were covered with snow. The inhabited locales located along the road junctions had been configured for perimeter defense and were stubbornly held by the enemy. In trying to bypass the enemy’s strong points off the roads, the tanks would get stuck in the deep snow and have to be pulled out, thus using up a large amount of fuel to no purpose. Despite these difficulties, in the first two hours of fighting the 4th Tank Corps broke through the enemy’s defense to a depth of 6-8 kilometers and by 1500 its first echelon (two tank brigades) reached the area Lebyazh’e—height 231.

Without being able to bypass the enemy’s centers of resistance in Staro-Melovoe and Novo-Melovoe, because of the deep snow, the corps commander decided to attack them frontally with the forces of his 45th and 102nd tank brigades. The tank elements were committed, one after the other, while suffering heavy losses. The 45th and 102nd tank brigades lost up to 30 tanks in this battle. Only with the onset of darkness did the corps capture the inhabited locales of Novo-Melovoe and Staro-Melovoe, destroying up to two companies of enemy infantry and a battalion of artillery. Only small remnants of the enemy fell back to Nizhnee Gniloe, where a tank company from the 102nd Tank Brigade was dispatched to reconnoiter. In the village the company ran into an anti-tank ambush and suffered heavy losses. Only one tank returned out of the entire company. On the night of 24-25 January the 4th Tank Corps concentrated in Novo-Melovoe and Staro-Melovoe and put itself in order and prepared to resume the attack on the morning of 25 January.

Map 6 The Overall Course of Military Operations by the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts in the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation.

Thus the 4th Tank Corps advanced no more than 16 kilometers that day, instead of the planned 35 kilometers. The corps’ rate of attack was more than two times lower than called for by the plan. The 40th Army’s rifle formations attacked even less successfully that day. The 309th Rifle Division, despite the fact that it attacked behind the 4th Tank Brigade, advanced only 5-6 kilometers in a day of fighting and reached the line Pasechnaya—Logvinovka. The division’s insignificant advance may chiefly be explained by its poorly organized cooperation with the 4th Tank Corps. Neither the division commander nor the army commander took the necessary measures so as to take timely advantage of the arrival of the 4th Tank Corps at Novo-Melovoe and move the division’s units to this area. The poor control of the division led to a situation in which its units, while faced with only individual elements of the German 68th Infantry Division, fell behind the 4th Tank Corps’ tank brigades and failed to achieve their assigned task. Nor did the formations attacking along the army’s left flank accomplish their mission. The 107th and 340th rifle divisions reached their jumping-off position for the offensive only on the morning of 24 January and thus they lacked sufficient time to prepare for the attack and to organize cooperation. As a result, the attack against the forward edge of the enemy’s defense was unsuccessful. Throughout the day these formations waged a fire battle with the enemy in their jumping-off positions. Only with the onset of darkness did the 107th Rifle Division manage to capture Staro-Nikolaevskaya.

The 129th Rifle Brigade, which was attacking along the army’s right flank in the direction of Myzdryanka, encountered fierce enemy resistance and was not able to advance. Its elements hit the dirt in their jumping-off position for the offensive and throughout the day waged a fire battle with the enemy. The 183rd Rifle Division and the 192nd Tank Brigade (21 T-34 tanks) also encountered powerful enemy resistance at the start of the attack. Having beaten off an enemy counterattack from Sinie Lipyagi, by the close of the day the division had advanced, with great difficulty, 2-3 kilometers and reached the line Bocharov— excluding height 236. The 25th Guards Rifle Division and the 96th Tank Brigade, upon encountering the enemy’s fire resistance, attacked indecisively and by the close of the day had advanced 3-4 kilometers and reached the front height 236—Frolov. On the evening of 24 January the 305th Rifle Division began to move out of the Ilovskoe—Afanas’evka area to Raskhovetskoe. The 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades concentrated in the Priluzhnyi— Kas’yanov and Rep’evka—Butyrki—Serdyuki areas. Thus the 40th Army’s forces failed to carry out their tasks for the offensive’s first day. The 4th Tank Corps, which was supposed to occupy Gorshechnoe with its main forces on 24 January, only captured Novo-Melovoe and Staro-Melovoe. In the center of the army’s offensive zone, along the axis of its main attack, the 183rd, 25th Guards and 309th rifle divisions advanced only 3-6 kilometers, while the formations attacking along the army’s flanks—the 129th Rifle Brigade, the 107th Rifle Division’s left-flank units, and the 340th Rifle Division—were fighting throughout 24 January in their jumping-off positions. The reasons for the 40th Army not carrying out its assignments, as was noted in the division commanders’ reports and that of the army

commander to the front commander, were, aside from the difficult meteorological conditions, as follows: the ineffective 30-minute artillery preparation of the attack and, as a result of this, the stubborn resistance by the unsuppressed enemy, as well as the poorly organized artillery support of the attack and the accompaniment of the infantry and tanks in the depth of the enemy’s defense. Besides this, the poorly organized cooperation with the tanks, particularly with the 4th Tank Corps, had a significant influence on the 40th Army’s lack of success. For example, due to the poorly organized cooperation, the 25th Guards and 309th rifle divisions were unable to take advantage of the 4th Tank Corps’ success, while the latter, in turn, did not receive any support from the rifle formations. As a result of the major shortcomings revealed on the first day in the operations of the 40th Army’s formations, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the army commander to eliminate the existing shortcomings in the organization of the troops’ combat operations, to organize cooperation and demand more decisive actions from his subordinate troops. The army commander was instructed on the necessity of more firmly controlling his subordinate formations.

The Liberation of Voronezh by the 60th Army’s Forces

According to the operational plan, on the morning of 25 January the 60th Army was to go over to the attack along its left flank, while continuing to wage an active defense along the remainder of its front. However, with the onset of darkness on 24 January reconnaissance by units of the 121st and 100th rifle divisions, which were defending along the northern and eastern outskirts of Voronezh, established that the enemy, having left behind small

elements in the city, had begun to pull back the main forces of the 75th and 323rd rifle divisions out of Voronezh and behind the Don River. Upon receiving this data, the commander of the 60th Army ordered the 121st and 100th rifle divisions and the 8th Destruction Brigade to immediately attack and seize Voronezh. In carrying out the assigned task, these formations attacked on the night of 24-25 January, defeated the enemy’s covering units and by dawn on 25 January completely liberated Voronezh from the German-Fascist invaders. The army’s formations, while pursuing the enemy’s retreating elements, reached the eastern bank of the Don River. The enemy, retreating from Voronezh, organized a defense along the river bank with powerful rearguards, and thus our troops’ attempts to force the Don River over the ice on 25 January were unsuccessful. The enemy’s unexpected and hurried retreat spoke to the fact that the enemy command had decided to begin withdrawing its forces from the Voronezh salient to the west. This assumption was also supported by data from our air force, which as early as the second half of 24 January was observing the increased movement of auto transport and rail trains along the roads from Voronezh to Kastornoe. Upon evaluating the situation that had arisen by the close of 24 January, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the 40th Army to continue a decisive offensive along the entire front and during 25 January the 4th Tank Corps was to reach the Kastornoe area and cut the enemy’s chief path of retreat to the west from the Voronezh area. Simultaneously, the army’s rifle formations were to move to the line Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol. The front commander, in his instructions to the commander of the 40th Army, demanded that he speed up the offensive pace of the army’s troops: “The enemy’s retreat to the west must be cut off by the 40th Army on 25

January along the line Kastornoe—Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol. On 25 January the 40th Army must begin the encirclement of the entire enemy group of forces.” The 60th Army was given the task of attacking according to plan on the morning of 25 January with its shock group, which had been concentrated along the army’s left flank in the direction of Nizhnyaya Veduga, while along the remainder of the front along the Don River it was to conduct active operations to prevent the enemy from regrouping and retreating. Should the enemy fall back, we were to immediately take up the pursuit with all the army’s forces. On the morning of 25 January the 38th Army was to conduct a reconnaissance with its forward battalions along the shock group’s sector, with the task of establishing the enemy’s retreat opposite the army, and should these battalions’ actions prove successful, to go over to a general offensive. The Voronezh Front’s aviation received orders to strike railroad junctions, stations, trains and auto columns and to paralyze the enemy’s movement and hinder his retreat. It follows that on 25 January the offensive by three of the Voronezh Front’s armies was to essentially begin.

The Offensive by the Voronezh Front’s Forces on 25 January

On the morning of 25 January the 40th Army resumed the offensive. An important role in this offensive was accorded the 4th Tank Corps, which on this day, upon capturing Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe, was to cut the main retreat routes of the enemy group of forces to the west.

The commander of the 4th Tank Corps, who was located in NovoMelovoe on the night of 24-25 January, received information from our intelligence that the enemy had prepared a powerful defense in the inhabited locale of Nizhnee Gniloe, which was located along the corps’ path of operations. Therefore, the corps commander decided to attack Gorshechnoe not through Nizhnee Gniloe, but along the road through the inhabited locale of Boloto, where the enemy’s defense was significantly weaker. According to the decision by the commander of the 4th Tank Corps, the 69th and 45th tank brigades, along with a party of automatic riflemen, were to operate in the first echelon with the task of launching an attack through Boloto on Gorshechnoe and to capture them from the march. The 102nd Tank (which included only 12 tanks following the first day’s fighting) and a motorized rifle brigades were in the corps’ second echelon. The 4th Tank Corps, upon taking up the offensive on the morning of 25 January, attacked the enemy in the inhabited locale of Boloto, destroyed the enemy’s elements there and began to rapidly move on Gorshechnoe along the road through Verkhnie Borki. Our tanks’ approach to Gorshechnoe from Boloto caught the enemy off guard, which enabled us to rapidly crush his defense along the southern outskirts of Gorshechnoe and break into this inhabited locale from the march. Having routed the enemy garrison, the corps’ units completely cleared Gorshechnoe during the second half of the day. In the developing situation the 4th Tank Corps had to develop its success and vigorously move on Kastornoe. However, the corps’ formations lacked fuel for a subsequent attack on that day. The fuel tankers that had been dispatched to the corps had bogged down in the snow on the roads. In order to organize the advance of the fuel tankers, a great deal of work was required to clear the roads, for which neither the corps nor the army were ready. Thus due to the absence of fuel, the task of capturing Kastornoe on 25 January remained unfulfilled.

Due to the arrival of the 4th Tank Corps in Gorshechnoe favorable conditions had been created for the successful offensive by the 40th Army’s rifle formations. On this day they advanced 6-18 kilometers. The 129th Rifle Brigade, upon renewing its offensive on the morning of 25 January, encountered heavy enemy resistance. While advancing into the depth of the enemy’s defense in stubborn fighting, the brigade’s left-flank units came under heavy flanking fire from the enemy’s machine guns and artillery from Sinie Lipyagi and hit the dirt. In the middle of the day the brigade repulsed an enemy counterattack by up to a battalion of infantry and, upon renewing the offensive, by the close of the day its right flank had reached the line Plotnitskii—height 229, having advanced its right flank 12 kilometers that day and its left four kilometers. The 183rd Rifle Division, which began its offensive simultaneously with the 129th Rifle Brigade, encountered the enemy’s growing fire resistance near the inhabited locale of Sinie Lipyagi and was delayed. Stubborn fighting broke out for Sinie Lipyagi. Upon crushing the enemy’s resistance, during the second half of the day the division began to outflank Sinie Lipyagi from the west. By the close of the day the division had made a fighting advance to the line height 214—Novaya Derevnya—Khvoshchevatovka and had begun fighting west and northwest of Sinie Lipyagi. Despite our troops’ outflanking of the inhabited locale from the east and west, units of the enemy’s 57th Infantry Division, which were defending Sinie Lipyagi, continued to put up stubborn resistance. As a result, the 129th Rifle Brigade’s and 183rd Rifle Division’s main forces, as well as up to four artillery regiments from our side, were drawn into the fighting for Sinie Lipyagi, where only a part of the enemy’s 57th Infantry Division was located. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, while continuing from the morning of 25 January to develop the offensive behind the 4th Tank Corps, reached Staro-Melovoe and Novo-Melovoe in the middle of the day and by the close of the day captured Nizhnee Gniloe, where it routed

up to a battalion of infantry from the enemy’s 68th Infantry Division. Small enemy groups fell back to the north. In a day of fighting the 25th Guards Rifle Division, while taking advantage of the 4th Tank Corps’ success, advanced 18 kilometers. The 309th Rifle Division, while also taking advantage of the 4th Tank Corps’ success and encountering only insignificant resistance from small enemy groups, reached by the end of the day the line Mokrets—Terekhovo, having advanced 16 kilometers into the depth that day. Upon going over to the offensive, the 107th and 340th rifle divisions captured the line Arkhangel’skoe—Dmitrievka—Ternovaya— Soldatskoe. The detachment that had been allotted to secure the army’s left flank—a rifle battalion from the 25th Guards Rifle Division and seven tanks from the 116th Tank Brigade—occupied the inhabited locale of Kazachek, where it repelled an enemy infantry and tank counterattack from the direction of Korostovo. The 305th Rifle Division was on the move to Novo-Ukolovo and Staro-Ukolovo. Throughout 25 January the 2nd Air Army (83 planes were flying), which was supporting the 40th Army’s forces, carried out 134 sorties (of these, 26 were at night) and shot down three enemy planes. By the close of the day the 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades were moving to the Rogovato-Pogoreloe—Shatalovka area. Thus during 25 January the 40th Army advanced 12 kilometers along its right flank; 15-18 kilometers in the center and ten kilometers along the left flank. In a day of fighting the army’s units defeated up to two infantry regiments from the German 57th and 68th infantry divisions. The remnants of the German 68th Infantry Division were falling back to the north and northwest, toward Staryi Oskol.

The capture of Gorshechnoe by the 4th Tank Corps and Nizhnee Gniloe by the 25th Guards Rifle Division had great significance for the further development of the offensive on Kastornoe. It was necessary to immediately employ the line achieved to commit the army’s second echelon along this axis for the purpose of developing the offensive into the depth, although the commander of the 40th Army did not do this. In this situation the consolidation of the lines seized, particularly of such major inhabited locales as Gorshechnoe and Nizhnee Gniloe, as well as the movement of at least part of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s forces to Gorshechnoe, would be of major significance. The accomplishment of these measures would enable us to establish close contact with the 4th Tank Corps, to deliver fuel that it so desperately needed, and to support our troops’ successful fight against the counterattacking enemy to hold these inhabited locales. But this was not done, as a result of which the situation along this sector of the front sharply worsened on 26 January. As a result of the significant lagging of the 183rd Rifle Division, the gap between it and the 25th Guards Rifle Division reached six kilometers. Neither of these divisions had the strength or equipment to fill this space and secure its flanks. All of this, taken together, shows that the successes achieved by the 40th Army during 25 January were not consolidated. At 1000 on 25 January, following an hour-long artillery preparation, the 60th Army’s shock group attacked. The artillery preparation for the attack did not yield the anticipated results and the enemy’s defense was not fully suppressed. Thus the attacking forces encountered the enemy’s powerful artillery and machine gun fire. The fighting throughout the day was waged, for the most part, for the strong points along the forward edge of the enemy’s defense. Some strong points were surrounded by units of the 322nd and 232nd rifle divisions during the second part of the day, but the enemy continued to resist in encirclement. By the close of the day units of the 322nd and 232nd rifle divisions had penetrated only 2-3

kilometers into the enemy defense and were continuing to fight the encircled enemy in the inhabited locales of Pereryvnyi, Parnishnyi, and Kochatovka. The 141st Rifle Division was fighting for the Khmelevoi Woods and the 253rd Rifle Brigade for Semidesyatskoe. As a result of the poor organization of coordination between the infantry, tanks and artillery, the tank brigades operating as direct infantry-support tanks suffered heavy losses on the first day of fighting. For example, the 150th Tank Brigade, which was attacking with units of the 322nd Rifle Division, lost more than half of its tanks and failed to carry out its combat assignment. Therefore, the army commander decided to transfer the remaining battle-worthy tanks to the 116th Tank Brigade and to pull the 150th Tank Brigade back to the Novo-Soldatki area for restoration. Thus on 25 January the 60th Army’s shock group did not carry out its tasks. This may be explained to a significant degree by the poorly organized coordination between the tanks and the infantry, the low effectiveness of the artillery preparation for the attack, the overestimation of the enemy’s forces, and the absence of the units’ and formations’ proper maneuver on the battlefield in developing the offensive in depth. Almost all the first-echelon forces of the army’s shock group (two rifle divisions and a rifle brigade) were pulled into the fighting against two regiments from the 168th and 57th infantry divisions defending in the strong points. The formation commanders, in failing to figure out the tactics of the enemy, who was trying to tie down as many of our forces as possible through the stubborn defense of the strong points, fed almost all of their forces into the fighting for these strong points and failed to take the proper measures for bypassing them and developing the offensive into the depth. According to the operational plan, the 38th Army’s shock group was

to have attacked on 26 January. Due to the beginning of the enemy’s withdrawal from the Voronezh area, the army received orders to begin its attack on 25 January with its forward battalions and, in case of their successful actions, to go over to the offensive with its main forces. The preparation of the forward battalions for the battle was completed only by 1600. At 1630, following a 30minute artillery preparation, the forward battalions of the 240th and 167th rifle divisions went over to the attack with the mission of taking the enemy’s strong points on heights 229 and 236. The enemy put up fierce resistance and these two battalions were not able to penetrate the enemy’s defense. Then the division commanders committed a few more battalions into the fighting from their first echelons. It was only at dawn on 26 January that elements of the 240th Rifle Division captured the northern slopes of height 229.0, while the 167th Rifle Division captured height 236 and occupied Lobanovka and the dairy farm. Thus on 25 January three of the Voronezh Front’s armies were already attacking, while the 40th Army achieved the greatest results on this day. According to aerial reconnaissance data, on 25 January the movement of the enemy’s auto columns was noted along the roads from Voronezh to Kastornoe, and intensive movement along the railroads and the departure of trains for the west. Captured German officers testified that on 25 January their command issued an order to the troops to begin a general withdrawal to the west on 26 January, under the cover of powerful screening forces and rearguards, while putting up maximum resistance along all favorable lines, along the roads and in inhabited locales. Throughout 25 January the enemy pulled a regiment from the 57th and a regiment (still another regiment was subsequently pulled out) from the 323rd infantry divisions and dispatched them along the Voronezh—Nizhnedevitsk road, in order to employ these regiments against the 40th Army’s attacking troops. The enemy’s main forces,

which were defending the eastern sector of the Voronezh salient, were getting ready to fall back to the line Semiluki—Golosnovka. In this situation the front commander should have more decisively exerted an influence on the development of events and ordered the commander of the 40th Army to commit the army’s second echelon into the fighting in the direction of Nizhnee Gniloe, Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe, in order to develop the success achieved in a timely manner. It was also becoming necessary to create a front reserve by using the 60th Army’s 303rd and 100th rifle divisions. It would have been expedient to pull all of these reserves into the 40th Army’s offensive sector. However, such measures were not adopted, which as will be shown below, made the encirclement much more difficult and prevented us from completely destroying the enemy’s Voronezh —Kastornoe group of forces.

The Breakthrough of the Enemy’s Defense by the Forces of the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army. The Development of the Offensive by the Voronezh Front’s 38th, 60th and 40th Armies

At 0808 on 26 January the rocket artillery of the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army fired a salvo against the enemy’s position. This salvo served as a signal to launch the artillery offensive. Within seven minutes the artillery opened up a heavy fire. The first fire onslaught against the forward edge of the enemy’s defense lasted ten minutes. Following the fire onslaught came aimed fire for destruction. The infantry, which was being covered by artillery fire and was overcoming the deep snow, began to gather in the jumping-off position for the attack. The sappers, together with the soldiers of the forward elements, widened passages in the wire obstacles. Guns, while firing over open sights, shot up the enemy’s firing points.

At 0855 the 15th Air Army’s assault aviation arrived at the front. Planes, in groups of 5-9 vehicles, dropped bombs on the forward edge of the enemy’s defense for ten minutes, strafed his batteries and shot up his personnel with machine guns. During this time the tanks, with automatic riflemen on board, began to pass through the infantry’s ranks. At 0915, with the end of the final fire onslaught and a repeat salvo from the guards mortars along the forward edge of the enemy’s defense, the infantry and tanks along the entire front of the 13th Army’s shock group went over to the attack. However, the artillery preparation of the attack proved to be insufficiently effective. The enemy’s defense was not completely suppressed. The enemy immediately opened fire on our infantry with machine guns and automatic rifles and on our tanks with antitank guns. The enemy put up the strongest resistance along the shock group’s flanks, where, relying on the powerful strong points of Lomigory, Mishino, Sapron, Borki, and Aleshki, he held up our forces’ advance. By 1500, following intense fighting, the enemy’s defense along the front between Mishino and the Olym River was penetrated. By the close of the day the 307th Rifle Division captured Alekseevka and continued to attack toward Volovo, the 132nd Rifle Division was fighting for Zakharovka, the 8th Rifle Division captured Gremuchii and was fighting for Aleksandrovka, and the 15th Rifle Division occupied Sapron with two regiments, while the other continued to defend along the sector Afrosimovka—Soldatskoe. Along the right flank of the army’s shock group, the 148th Rifle Division, while attacking the enemy’s strong point in Lomigory, was unsuccessful and suffered heavy losses. Throughout 26 January the 15th Air Army carried out a total of 200 sorties. Throughout the day the enemy’s air force carried out 18 reconnaissance sorties and six planes bombed Verkhov’e. The enemy

lost two planes in air battles with our fighter aviation. Thus by the close of 26 January the enemy’s defense in the army’s offensive zone had been broken through to a depth of 6-7 kilometers, which corresponded to the mission for the first day of the offensive. In order to take advantage of the developing success, the commander of the Voronezh Front ordered the continuation of the offensive at night, to prevent the enemy from consolidating along the previously planned defensive line of Volovchik—Volovo— Lipovchik—Bol’shovka. Simultaneously, the front commander decided to bring up his reserve—Gen. Novosel’skii’s group (19th Tank Corps, 6th Guards and 137th rifle divisions)—to the breakthrough sector for subsequent operations, depending on the situation. On the morning of 26 January the 38th Army, following an artillery preparation, resumed the offensive begun the previous evening, but encountered strong enemy resistance along the entire front. Fierce fighting continued until 1300. By this time units of the 240th Rifle Division had managed to capture the strong points on height 229 and in Nikol’skoe, while the 167th Rifle Division seized Mikhailovka and Bolynovka. During the second part of the day the enemy’s resistance opposite 240th and 167th rifle divisions began to weaken and the enemy began to fall back to the south. By the close of 26 January the forces of the army’s shock group had reached the line Berezovka—Olymchik—Golosnovka and had begun fighting for these inhabited locales. A rifle regiment from the 206th Rifle Regiment, which was attacking along the left flank of the army’s shock group, was fighting throughout the day for Ivanovka, where the enemy was continuing to put up stubborn resistance. The 237th Rifle Division and 248th Rifle Brigade, while continuing to defend their former line, received instructions from the army

commander to be ready to go over to the offensive in the direction of Zemlyansk and Perlevka. As a result of the day’s fighting, the enemy’s defense in the zone of the 38th Army’s shock group had been penetrated to a depth of up to eight kilometers, which was somewhat less than had been called for in the operational plan. The 60th Army’s shock group, having resumed its attack on the morning of 26 January, was engaged in heavy fighting throughout the day for the enemy’s strong points in Ivanovka, Prokudinskoe, Pereryvnyi, Parnishnyi, Kochatovka, and Semidesyatskoe. As a result of outflanking Semidesyatskoe from the northeast, the 253rd Rifle Brigade captured this powerful strong point by the close of the day. The remaining strong points were eliminated by our forces as a result of night fighting. By dawn on 27 January the army’s shock group had reached the line Ivanovka—Medvezhinskii. In these battles the enemy lost up to 1,500 soldiers and officers in killed alone, while small enemy groups fell back to the northwest. However, the army’s shock group advanced only 5-8 kilometers on 26 January and did not carry out its assigned tasks. The army’s insignificant rate of advance may be explained only by the fact that the shock group’s formations, instead of bypassing the enemy’s strong points, at first tried to attack them head on. The army’s shock group, which enjoyed a superiority over the enemy, could have achieved greater results with more decisive actions and could have fulfilled its assigned task. Attempts by the 60th Army’s center and right-flank forces to cross the Don River were unsuccessful. The 40th Army received orders from the commander of the Voronezh Front for 26 January to continue its decisive offensive. Due to the lagging behind of the 60th Army’s left flank, the attack axis of the army’s right-flank forces was changed somewhat: instead of an attack to the northwest, the right-flank formations were ordered to

attack directly to the north. For this purpose, the 129th Rifle Brigade received orders to attack in the direction of Verkhnee Nikol’skoe and Nizhnee Turovo, while the 183rd Rifle Division was to attack in the direction of Glotovo and Vyaznovatka. On the morning of 26 January the 40th Army resumed its offensive along the entire front. The 129th Rifle Brigade, while blocking Sinie Lipyagi from the east with part of its forces, began to attack toward Glazovo, as opposed to the assigned task of attacking toward Verkhnee Nikol’skoe. By 1200 the brigade had left for the Krasnaya Polyana—Kolesnikovo area, where it was counterattacked from the area of Verkhnee Nikol’skoe by two enemy infantry battalions, supported by artillery. The counterattack was repulsed. The enemy, having suffered heavy losses, fell back to Verkhnee Nikol’skoe. At 1600 the brigade was once again counterattacked by the enemy, numbering up to two companies, from the northern outskirts of Sinie Lipyagi. By 1700 this counterattack had also been beaten off. In repelling the enemy’s uninterrupted counterattacks, the brigade remained along the line Krasnaya Polyana—Kolesnikovo—Zlotykh until the end of the day, with more than a regiment from the 57th Infantry Division opposite its left flank in Sinie Lipyagi, and a powerful enemy garrison in Verkhnee Nikol’skoe opposite its right flank. The 183rd Rifle Division, having begun its attack on the morning of 26 January from the line Novaya Derevnya—Khvoshchevatovka, was counterattacked by the enemy with up to two battalions and artillery from Sinie Lipyagi in the direction of Novaya Derevnya. The division was forced to turn part of its forces to the east in order to repulse the attack. The fighting in the Novaya Derevnya area and on height 214 lasted until the second half of the day. Subsequently, upon repelling the counterattacks and blocking Sinie Lipyagi from the west, the division’s left flank occupied the Khvoshchevatovka State Farm by the end of the day. Throughout 26 January the division, while repelling enemy counterattacks, barely advanced. At

the same time, the situation along the 40th Army’s right flank enabled us to encircle and destroy, through the joint efforts of the 129th Rifle Brigade and 183rd Rifle Division, up to 1 ½ regiments from the enemy’s 57th Infantry Division, which were in Sinie Lipyagi. However, neither the formation commanders nor the army commander took measures to encircle and destroy these enemy units. The enemy, taking advantage of our units’ indecisive actions in this area, attacked in turn either units of the 129th Rifle Brigade or the 183rd Rifle Division’s right-flank units. All of this made the situation along the army’s right flank extremely difficult. Nor did the fighting of 26 January bring success to the remainder of the 40th Army’s forces. The 4th Tank Corps, while awaiting the arrival of fuel, was in the Gorshechnoe area. In the morning the 25th Guards Rifle Division moved out toward Gorshechnoe, but was counterattacked by the enemy in strength of more than an infantry regiment, supported by artillery and mortars, from the Konchanskii area toward Nizhnee Gniloe and Berezovo. Because the division’s units were stretched from Berezovo to Boloto (along a front of more than 12 kilometers) and the line they seized the evening before had not been consolidated, the division, following a battle with the counterattacking enemy that lasted several hours, was forced to abandon Nizhnee Gniloe and fall back to the line BerezovoKolodez’—Boloto. The division’s attempts in the evening to once again capture Nizhnee Gniloe were unsuccessful. As was later learned, the 25th Guards Rifle Division was counterattacked by the forces of two regiments from the 323rd Infantry Division, which had arrived in the Vyaznovatka area on this day, having been moved up from the line of the Don river. The 309th Rifle Division, not encountering enemy resistance, was developing the offensive to the northwest and by the close of the day had reached the line Rovenka—Staroe Rogovoe—Novoe Kladovoe. The 107th Rifle Division captured the line Bocharokva—

Kotovo—Ozerki. The 340th Rifle Division occupied Chernikovo, Vypolzovo and Gotov’e in light fighting. Small enemy groups operating opposite the division were falling back on Staryi Oskol. The Voronezh and Bryansk fronts’ aviation launched assault air and bombing strikes against the enemy’s railroad stations, auto columns and railroad trains, paralyzing his movement and retreat to the west. Throughout 26 January the 2nd Air Army carried out only 98 sorties, while during the same time the 15th Air Army carried out 200 sorties. Aerial reconnaissance data confirmed the increased movement of auto transport along the dirt roads from Voronezh to Kastornoe and the continuing loading of troops onto trains. Ski units and elements could have played a major role in the developing situation, if they had bypassed the enemy’s strong points and cut his communications. However, the rank and file of all three ski-rifle brigades, which were at the disposal of the 40th Army commander, had not been trained for operations on skis. Therefore the commander of the 40th Army raised the question with the commander of the Voronezh Front of employing these brigades in the fighting without skis, and received permission. According to the decision by the commander of the 40th Army, it was planned to employ the ski-rifle brigades for capturing Staryi Oskol. In summing up the brief results of the day’s fighting, it should be noted that on 26 January all four armies slated for taking part in the Voronezh— Kastornoe operation were attacking. On this day the armies were assigned decisive tasks to a significant depth. However, these tasks were not carried out completely. Throughout 26 January the 13th and 38th armies broke through the enemy’s defense and advanced up to eight kilometers in depth, but were unable to develop this success. The 60th Army’s shock group, having eliminated several of the enemy’s strong points, advanced only 5-8 kilometers. The 40th Army’s left-flank formations (309th,

107th and 340th rifle divisions), which advanced ten kilometers in the day’s fighting, achieved the greatest success. The 40th Army’s right-flank formations continued to fight along their previous lines. By the close of 26 January the width of the corridor that the enemy could use to pull out his forces was 60 kilometers. In this situation the enemy command, employing rail and auto transport, sought to pull out to the west the maximum amount of its forces located in the Voronezh area. Our forces’ active operations along almost all axes made more difficult the withdrawal of the main forces of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces to the west. The developing situation demanded an increase in the offensive pace, bold decisions at all levels of command and the troops’ vigorous actions. However, on 26 January the commander of the Voronezh Front did not undertake any measures to strengthen his shock group operating along the axis of the front’s main attack in the 40th Army’s offensive zone. The disposition of the army’s forces did not correspond to the assigned missions and the conditions of the situation. The 4th Tank Corps was in Gorshechnoe in expectation of fuel, the 25th Guards Rifle Division, which had been counterattacked by the enemy’s arriving units, had fallen back 3-5 kilometers, and the 183rd Rifle Division was standing in place. Moreover, according to the army commander’s decision, all three ski-rifle brigades had been dispatched, not for developing the offensive on Kastornoe or somewhat west of this inhabited locale, but for seizing Staryi Oskol. The 305th Rifle Division, which during nearly three days had been moving up from the Ilovskoe area to Novo-Ukolovo and StaroUkolovo, was concentrating too slowly, although it had to cover only 30-35 kilometers. Of course, such an attitude by the command of the 40th Army and the Voronezh Front toward the development of the offensive along the main axis promised nothing good for the subsequent days of the operation. Repeated demands to “decisively advance” alone could not significantly change the situation in the

40th Army’s offensive zone. For 27 January the front commanders assigned their armies the task of continuing the offensive with all their forces and completing the encirclement of the enemy group of forces. The troops were ordered to avoid head-on attacks against the enemy’s strong points and, while bypassing their flanks and rear, advance decisively. Particular attention was devoted to supplying the 4th Tank Corps with fuel. The necessary measures were adopted for delivering fuel supplies to the Gorshechnoe area by Po-2 aircraft. It should be noted that this measure by the command of the Voronezh Front should and could have been carried out significantly earlier.

The Development of the Offensive and the Capture of Kastornoe (27-28 January)

The German-Fascist command, while striving to avoid the encirclement of its Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, decided to hold back the 13th and 40th armies’ offensive at all costs and to prevent their linking up in the Kastornoe area. For this purpose the enemy was moving two regiments from the 323rd Infantry Division and a regiment from the 57th Infantry Division, which had earlier been removed from the line of the Don River, to the area east of Gorshechnoe against the 40th Army’s forces. The 323rd Infantry Division’s ski battalion and other units were moving up to the Kastornoe area. In the 13th Army’s offensive zone the enemy was especially stubbornly holding his strong points in the areas of Lomigory and Mishino, the elimination of which had great significance for securing the flank of the 13th Army’s shock group.

On the morning of 27 January this army’s forces attacked the enemy along the entire front. The commander of the 148th Rifle Division, despite instructions to outflank the enemy, continued frontal attacks throughout the first part of the day. The division suffered heavy losses in head-on attacks on Lomigory and Mishino. It was only after a new categorical order by the commander of the 13th Army that the division commander decided to envelop Mishino from the east. The attack was crowned with success and on the night of 27-28 January the enemy, having abandoned Lomigory and Mishino, began to hurriedly fall back to the south. Following unsuccessful head-on attacks, units of the 307th and 132nd rifle divisions bypassed the enemy strong point in Zakharovka from the west and east and forced the German-Fascist troops to fall back to the south. While pursuing the enemy during the second half of the day, our units reached the defensive line Volovchik—Volovo— Lipovchik, which covered the way to Kastornoe from the north, where they encountered stubborn enemy resistance. In order to capture this line, the army commander decided to commit the 129th Tank Brigade into the battle. The brigade was given the assignment of attacking from the Alekseevka—Zakharovka line toward Volovo and subsequently developing the offensive on Kastornoe. In carrying out its combat assignment, the 129th Tank Brigade passed through the 307th Rifle Division’s units and began to move on Volovo. The deep snow cover and strikes by the enemy’s air force made the tank brigade’s movement very difficult. Despite this, the 129th Tank Brigade, having overcome the enemy’s resistance, broke into Volovo. During the second half of the day units of the 307th and 132nd rifle divisions and the 129th Tank Brigade captured the Volovchik—Volovo—Lipovchik defensive line. While continuing the attack, by the end of the day the 129th Tank Brigade occupied Nizhne-Bol’shoe, while its forward detachment

had reached Kulikovka, where it routed an automobile column of 200 vehicles and killed up to 250 enemy soldiers and officers. During the day the 8th Rifle Division captured Malye Borki (southern). One of the 15th Rifle Division’s regiments continued to defend along its previous line, while its main forces occupied Malye Borki (northern) and continued to advance on Uritskoe. By the close of the day the army’s second-echelon rifle divisions (81st, 211th and 280th) had advance to the Turchanovo—Zamaraika —Kshen’ line in readiness to develop the attack to the west. Thus by the close of 27 January the 13th Army had overcome the enemy’s defense to a depth of 20 kilometers, broadened the breakthrough to 25 kilometers along the front and, having routed the main forces of the German 82nd Infantry Division, created an immediate threat to Kastornoe from the north. During 26-27 January the 15th Air Army, which was supporting the 13th Army, carried out 457 sorties, including 63 by night bombers, 105 by day bombers, 180 sorties by assault aircraft, and 109 by fighters. In the nine air battles fought over these two days we shot down eight enemy planes and lost seven of our own. Due to the start of the general withdrawal of the enemy group’s forces, the 38th Army went over to the attack along the entire front. According to the operational plan, the army was to launch its main attack toward Nizhnyaya Veduga, while moving upon Kastornoe with only part of its forces. However, due to the enemy’s withdrawal to the southwest, an attack by the main forces on Nizhnyaya Veduga was no longer capable of achieving its main goal—the splitting up of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. Therefore, the front commander ordered the 38th Army’s main forces (240th, 167th and 206th rifle divisions and the 180th Tank Brigade) to

attack Kastornoe on 27 January. Such a decision in the developing situation was completely correct. The turning of the 38th Army’s main forces toward Kastornoe would strengthen our group of forces along the axes of the fronts’ main attacks. In accordance with the front commander’s decision, the 38th Army’s shock group, while throwing back and destroying the enemy’s rear guards, advanced up to 15 kilometers during the day’s fighting. On this day the army’s remaining forces went over to the offensive. By the close of 27 January the 38th Army’s 240th Rifle Division, upon reaching the line of horse farm no. 107—Malaya Troitskaya, received orders to develop the offensive at night toward Kastornoe. By the close of the day the 107th Rifle Division had occupied Verkhopol’e, Rezvyi Kolodez’ and Malinovka. The 180th Tank Brigade, having captured Semenovka, received orders to develop the attack on Kastornoe. The 206th Rifle Division was fighting for Malopokrovka and Il’inovka, but, upon encountering the enemy’s stubborn resistance, was unable to capture them. The 237th Rifle Division captured Fedorovka, Chibisovskaya and Gremyachee and was continuing to attack toward Vereika. The 248th Rifle Brigade reached the line height 229—Sivirtsevo-Kaver’ya. During 27 January the 60th Army enjoyed little success. The enemy, while continuing to fall back from the Voronezh salient, was putting up stubborn resistance with his rearguards along the army’s entire front. While attempting to go over to the offensive, the 60th Army’s right-flank forces were met with heavy enemy fire from the right bank of the Don River. Only the composite training brigade managed on 27 January to throw the enemy back and reach the line Repnoe—Russkaya Gvozdevka. During 27 January the army’s shock group only advanced 4-6 kilometers and reached the line Rudkino—Nikol’skoe—Krasnyi. The slow advance by the army’s shock group may be explained, first of all, by the fact that in attacking inhabited locales, the troops, as

before, instead of outflanking them and attacking the enemy’s flanks and rear, strove to make head-on attacks, which led to a failure to carry out the assigned tasks and excessive losses. Throughout 27 January the 40th Army continued attacking. The arrival of the 4th Tank Corps in the Kastornoe area, or to the west across the enemy’s path of retreat, and the vigorous advance of the 40th Army’s rifle formations, was becoming particularly important in conditions of the 13th and 38th armies’ developing offensive. At dawn on 27 January the 4th Tank Corps, having received fuel on 26 January, which was delivered to it by planes that safely landed on the roads, attacked from the Gorshechnoe area in the direction of Kastornoe. By the close of the day the corps’ forward detachment (a tank brigade with automatic riflemen mounted) broke into Kastornaya Novaya station, having reached the southern approaches to Kastornoe. By the close of the day the corps’ main forces were approaching the Bychek area. With the arrival of the 4th Tank Corps in the areas of Bykovo, Bychek and Kastornaya Novaya station, the enemy’s withdrawal routes to the southwest were cut. Individual groups and columns of the enemy, which tried to break through these areas to the west on 27 January, were met with fire from our tanks and fell back in disorder to Olym and Shirokii. The 40th Army’s 129th Rifle Brigade and 183rd Rifle Division, covered by part of their forces against Sinie Lipyagi, where the encircled units of the 57th Infantry Division continued to defend, reached the line Glazovo—Pershino—Reshetovka with their main forces, while overcoming the enemy’s resistance. The insignificant result achieved by the army’s right-flank formations during 27 January may be explained, for the most part, by the artillery’s lagging behind. For example, in the 183rd Rifle Division the 4th

Anti-Tank Artillery Regiment was located in the Pervomaiskoe area by the close of 27 January, and the 623rd Artillery Regiment was two kilometers northeast of Lebyazh’e (15 kilometers from its division’s main forces). As a result of the dispersal of the 129th Rifle Brigade’s and 183rd Rifle Division’s forces (the development of the offensive to the northwest and the fighting to destroy the enemy in Sinie Lipyagi), and the artillery’s lagging behind, these formations’ fighting on 27 January was not very successful. The garrison in Sinie LIpyagi, consisting of up to 1 ½ infantry regiments and artillery from the 57th Infantry Division, continued to stubbornly resist. All of its attempts to break through to the north on that day, as before, were beaten back. However, the enemy tied down here two battalions from the 129th Rifle Brigade, a regiment from the 189th Rifle Division, part of the 192nd Tank Brigade’s tanks, and up to four regiments of artillery. Bitter fighting with the enemy garrison in Sinie Lipyagi continued all day. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, which had abandoned Nizhnee Gniloe on 26 January, recaptured it on 27 January and by the close of the day reached Gorshechnoe, astride all the roads crossing here. On 27 January one of the 309th Rifle Division’s rifle regiments advanced up to 20 kilometers into the depth and reached the Bogatyrevo area. The division’s main forces, encountering the enemy’s fire resistance, by the end of the day had occupied the line Ryndino—Zhukovo; that is, they had advanced only 6-8 kilometers that day. Once again, the absence of maneuver and the desire for head-on attacks led to a situation in which the division’s main forces were unable to develop the success of their rifle regiment. During 27 January the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade reached the line Kaplino—Neznamovo—Ignatovka, striving to encircle Staryi Oskol, where units of the German 26th Infantry Division and the remnants of other enemy units were

defending. The 8th Ski-Rifle Brigade, while operating along the army’s left flank, occupied Kobylin and Novikovo, reaching the Oskol River. The 305th Rifle Division was marching from Novo-Ukolovo to the Soldatskoe area. The 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade was concentrating in Khoroshilovo. The 303rd Rifle Division, which had been transferred to the 40th Army from the 60th Army, reached the area five kilometers southwest of Nizhnedevitsk. On this day the 18th Rifle Corps reached the line Volokonovka— Chernyanka—Novyi Oskol. As a result, with the arrival by the close of 27 January of the 13th Army’s forces in the Kulikovka area, of the 38th Army’s in the Semenovka area, and of the 40th Army’s in the Kastornaya Novaya area, favorable conditions had been created for the encirclement of the enemy forces operating to the east of Kastornoe. On 28 January the 13th Army continued to carry out its task to encircle the enemy, as well as to begin to develop the offensive to the west, for the purpose of creating the external encirclement front. The 129th Tank Brigade, while attacking toward Kastornoe, routed a large enemy automobile column in the Yegor’evskaya area. More than 400 soldiers and officers were killed and 1,300 men captured. 125 motor vehicles were left on the road. Subsequently, having crushed the enemy’s resistance in Nikol’skoe-Klyuchevskaya, the brigade reached the western outskirts of Kastornoe. At the same time the 13th Army’s 118th Tank Brigade reached Kastornoe from the north, and the 38th Army’s 180th Tank Brigade from the east, while a tank brigade and motorized infantry from the 40th Army’s 4th Tank Corps reached the town’s southern outskirts from Kastornaya Novaya station.

At 1430, following a bitter fight lasting two hours, our tanks and motorized infantry broke into Kastornoe and began fighting in the town. Before long rifle units from the 13th and 38th armies, which had broken into the town behind the tanks, began to arrive toward Kastornoe. The stubborn fighting for Kastornoe continued throughout the second half of the day and all night of 28-29 January. Despite the enemy’s bitter resistance, by the morning of 29 January a large part of the town was in the hands of the Soviet forces. During the second half of 28 January the remnants of the 82nd Infantry Division tried to break through to the west north of Kastornoe, but were attacked by units of the 307th Rifle Division and destroyed. The enemy lost up to 700 men killed, while up to 900 soldiers and officers, along with the division headquarters, were captured. The Soviet forces captured a large number of motor vehicles with supplies. By the close of 28 January units of the 307th Rifle Division reached the area Sergeevka—Voznesensk, while units of the 8th Rifle Division occupied Naberezhnoe. In the second half of the day two regiments of the 15th Rifle Division, following a bitter fight, routed up to two enemy battalions in Uritskoe and occupied it. The 132nd Rifle Division concentrated in Volovo. According to the 13th Army commander’s decision, these two divisions were designated for developing the offensive to the west. At this time, while part of the shock group’s (13th Army) firstechelon forces was fighting for Kastornoe, on the morning of 28 January the army’s second echelon (81st, 211th and 280th rifle divisions) began an attack from the line of the Kshen’ River to the west. Throughout the day the 15th Air Army’s planes, which were supporting the army’s forces, carried out 194 sorties, shooting down eight planes and destroying 15 on the enemy’s airfields.

The enemy, who had succeeded in occupying his previously prepared defensive line along the left bank of the Kshen’ River with units from the 383rd Infantry Division, which had been defending opposite the 38th Army, tried to put up resistance to the 13th Army’s forces along this line. The enemy air force sought to interfere with our forces’ offensive to the west. During the day 125 enemy air sorties were noted. By the close of the day units of the 81st, 211th and 280th rifle divisions had crossed the Kshen’ River over the ice and at night began to develop the offensive toward the Tim River. Behind them the 148th and 15th rifle divisions began to move toward the west. On 28 January the 38th Army’s offensive also developed successfully. The 180th Tank Brigade and the forward detachments of the 240th and 167th rifle divisions linked up during the second half of the day in Kastornoe with units of the 13th Army and the forward detachment of the 40th Army’s 4th Tank Corps and together with them fought for the remainder of the day to clear the enemy out of the town. These two rifle divisions’ main forces, while pursuing and destroying the enemy’s retreating groups, occupied Znamya, Arkhangel’skoe and Uspenka by the close of 28 January and in the evening began to enter Kastornoe behind the forward detachments fighting in the town. The 206th Rifle Division reached the line Milavka—Akulovo—Makhovatka, while the 237th Rifle Division and the 248th Rifle Brigade captured the major inhabited areas of Zemlyansk and Perlevka. One cannot help but note that such a concentration of the forces of three armies on Kastornoe was by that time no longer required by the situation. It would have been more expedient to change the attack axis of the 13th and 40th armies’ main forces a little to the west of Kastornoe, so as to more deeply envelop the enemy group of forces and cut off its escape route. On 28 January the 60th Army’s forces began attacking along the entire front. Due to the enemy’s unfavorable situation in the area of

Voronezh and Kastornoe, his resistance opposite the army’s front weakened considerably from this day. While pursuing the enemy, by the close of 28 January the 60th Army’s forces reached the line Privol’e—Latnoe—Devitsa—Bogdanovka—Mikhnevka—height 189 —height 205—southern part of Nizhnee Turovo and had begun fighting for the southern outskirts of Vyaznovatka. According to the front commander’s orders, the 303rd and 100th rifle divisions were transferred from the 60th Army to the 40th Army. This decision by the front commander was correct, although somewhat late. The situation insistently demanded that it be done significantly earlier. By the close of the day the 303rd Rifle Division had concentrated in the Konchanskii—Pershino area, while the 100th Rifle Division reached the area Kamenka-Verkhovskoe area, from where it was to move to Semidesyatskoe. On 28 January the 60th Army made a fighting advance of 10-12 kilometers. The 40th Army’s offensive on 28 January developed in the following manner. As was noted earlier, during the second half of the day the 4th Tank Corps’ forward detachment, along with the 13th and 38th armies’ forces, broke into Kastornoe and began fighting in the town. In the middle of the day the corps’ main forces reached the area of Lachinovo station and, following a brief fight, occupied it by the close of the day, cutting the enemy’s escape route to the west. Units of the 129th Rifle Brigade attacking on Nizhnedevitsk, and units of the 183rd Rifle Division attacking on Yasenki, were met with powerful machine gun and artillery fire and were therefore unable to advance here. By the close of 28 January the 129th Rifle Brigade captured the inhabited locales of Tovarnaya and Novoselovka in fighting and at night was fighting along the southern outskirts of Nizhnedevitsk. Upon occupying Dubratnoe and the copse to the west, the 183rd Rifle Division began to attack toward Yasenki.

The 25th Guards Rifle Division received orders to advance as quickly as possible with its main forces behind the 4th Tank Corps. Upon not encountering any particular enemy resistance, two of the division’s rifle regiments reached the line Prostornoe—Bykovo, while one regiment was located in Gorshechnoe and was repelling the enemy’s attempts to break through at Gorshechnoe to the west. By the close of 28 January the gap between the 183rd Rifle Division’s left flank and the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s right flank reached 15-18 kilometers. Thus northeast of Gorshechnoe there was an empty space, occupied by no one, through which the enemy could carry out the withdrawal of his forces to the southwest. On 28 January units of the 309th Rifle Division, while not encountering enemy resistance, reached the front Sokolovka— Yefrosinovka, while at that time units of the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade were fighting in the area of Staryi Oskol. By the close of the day units of the 8th Ski-Rifle Brigade occupied Verkhnee-Atamanskoe and Kotenevka, having routed up to a battalion from the 26th Infantry Division. Thus, with the arrival of the 13th and 38th armies’ and 4th Tank Corps’ forces in the Kastornoe area, and that of the 40th Army’s rifle formations along the line Gorshechnoe—Bykovo—Yefrosinovka, the main escape routes of the German-Fascist Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces had been cut. At this time the 13th Army’s main forces had begun to develop the offensive to the west. However, by this time a continuous encirclement had not yet been created. Nor had measures been taken to split up and destroy the enemy group of forces. Between Kastornoe and Bykovo; that is, between the 4th Tank Corps in the Kastornoe—Lachinovo area, and the 25th Guards Rifle Division, operating along the line Prostornoe— Bykovo, there was a 25-kilometer gap unoccupied by our forces. The same kind of gap remained between Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol. By the close of 28 January only the 25th Guards Rifle Division was

operating along the 50-kilometer front between Kastornoe and Staryi Oskol, with its units in Gorshechnoe and along the line Prostornoe—Bykovo. The 309th Rifle Division, having arrived at the line Sokolovka—Yefrosinovka could only have covered one of these spaces, but it was necessary to turn it to the east toward the area south of Kastornoe. Finally, these spaces could have been filled by the second echelon at the disposal of the 40th Army’s commander (305th Infantry Division and 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade). However, the army commander did not use either his second echelon or the 309th Rifle Division for this purpose. Thus by the close of 28 January the least favorable disposition of our forces was, as before, in the 40th Army, all the forces of which were located in four isolated groups: the main forces of the 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade were operating along the 15-kilometer front Nizhnedevitsk—excluding Somovka; the 309th Rifle Division was concentrating behind them; the 4th Tank Corps was operating in the area of Kastornoe and Lachinovo; in the center, the 25th Guards and 309th rifle divisions were along the 40kilometer front Gorshechnoe—Bykovo—Yefrosinovka and, finally; the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades in the Staryi Oskol area. The 305th Rifle Division and the 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade were also headed here. The 40th Army’s dispositions did not correspond to the tasks of completely encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh— Kastornoe group of forces, although all the conditions for doing so were present. With the arrival of the 303rd and 100th rifle divisions with the army, it disposed of sufficient men and materiel for carrying out this task. The arrival of the 303rd and 305th rifle divisions and the 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade to the front Yasenki— Prostornoe—Lachinovo would have enabled us to create a reliable internal encirclement front. The 4th Tank Corps then could have been freed up in order to move it up to the Tim River. However, this was not done.

From the intelligence data available in the front and army, it was known that the main forces of the enemy’s retreating troops were concentrating in the areas of Verkhnee Turovo, Nizhnedevitsk station and Vyaznovatka, from where they could move through one or the other space. Thus the enemy still had enormous gates at his disposal, to which he was streaming, trying to avoid defeat. In noting the shortcomings in the 40th Army’s actions, one cannot help but note a certain passivity on the part of the 13th Army, which turned its main forces to the west and essentially did not fight the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The 38th Army also operated with insufficient decisiveness to split up and destroy the enemy’s group of forces. All of this, in the final analysis, made the 40th Army’s conduct of combat significantly more difficult.

Combat Activities in the Area South of Kastornoe and the Arrival of the Voronezh Front’s Forces at the Line of the Tim and Oskol Rivers for the Subsequent Offensive on Kursk and Khar’kov (29 January-1 February)

The Situation by the Close of 28 January and the Decision to Conduct the Khar’kov Operation to Destroy the Enemy’s Voronezh —Kastornoe Group of Forces

By the close of 28 January the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces— 38th, 60th and 40th armies—continued to fight the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, the main retreat routes of which had been cut by our forces in the area west of Kastornoe as a result of the linkup in this area of the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army.

On 27 January the Voronezh Front’s left-wing forces—3rd Tank Army and 18th Rifle Corps—completely finished the Ostrogozhsk— Rossosh’ offensive operation and were moving to their jumping-off areas for carrying out a new offensive operation along the Khar’kov axis. By the close of 28 January the 18th Rifle Corps’ and 3rd Tank Army’s main forces had reached the Oskol River along the sector from Chernyanka to Valuiki. At the same time there were up to eight infantry divisions from the Germans’ VII and XIII army corps and two Hungarian infantry divisions in the enemy group of forces operating in the area southeast of Kastornoe. A large part of the Voronezh Front’s rightwing armies was involved in battling this enemy group of forces. It was quite clear that the battle with this group of forces would require significant efforts on the part of our forces and significantly more time than the front command had calculated. In the zone from the 13th Army’s right boundary line (from the Kshen’ River in the Yasnaya Polyana area) and including up to Staryi Oskol, opposite four of the 13th Army’s rifle divisions and three of the 40th Army’s rifle divisions and two ski-rifle brigades along a 120-kilometer front, there were operating part of the German 383rd Infantry Division’s forces and the remnants of the German 82nd Infantry Division, which were retreating to the west under the blows of the 13th Army’s forces from the line of the Kshen’ River, as well as the German 26th Infantry Division, which had suffered heavy losses during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation. Nor did the enemy have any reserves in his immediate depth along this axis. The 4th Panzer Division, which was being transferred by the GermanFascist command from the Orel axis, had only just begun to concentrate in the Kursk area. Insignificant enemy forces continued to operate opposite the Voronezh Front’s left wing, chiefly the remnants of the enemy’s defeated Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, that had broken out of the encirclement and had fallen back to the western bank of

the Oskol River, as well as the forward elements of the arriving SS Panzer Corps. This corps, which had arrived from France, was concentrating in the Khar’kov area. At first the German-Fascist command proposed to employ this corps for launching a counterblow from the area east of Khar’kov toward Valuiki, for the purpose of delaying the Soviet forces’ further advance, inflicting upon them the heaviest losses possible and winning time for preparing a defense along the Oskol and Severskii Donets rivers. However, the Hitlerite command did not manage to carry out this plan. The Soviet forces’ rapid advance to the Oskol River during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation and the creation there of the real threat of their arrival in the Khar’kov area forced the enemy to leave the SS Panzer Corps for defending this important strategic objective. Thus the German-Fascist command hurriedly moved the panzer corps’ units to the Oskol River as they arrived to occupy defensive positions along its right bank. By 28 January there were two regiments from the German 168th Infantry Division, which had suffered heavy losses during the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation, units of the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division, which had been transferred by rail from Smolensk and which was unloading in the Volchansk area, and the remnants of the German 298th Infantry Division along the 150kilometer front from Chernyanka to Kupyansk. Aside from these forces, which were operating in the first line, the enemy had two divisions from the SS Panzer Corps (the “Adolf Hitler” Panzer Division was arriving in Chuguev and the Das Reich SS Division was concentrating in Khar’kov) in the depth of his position along the Khar’kov axis, as well as various composite detachments from the remnants of the defeated Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces. Thus by 28 January the operational situation along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes was very favorable for the Soviet forces. The enemy had extremely insignificant forces along these axes. In all, there were operating in the first line no more than five enemy divisions along the 330-kilometer front from Nikol’skoe (on the Kshen’ River) to

Kupyansk, while three divisions were concentrating in the operational reserve. It was necessary to take advantage of this favorable situation as quickly as possible, in order to further develop the offensive on Khar’kov and Kursk, before the enemy could concentrate major forces in the Khar’kov area. It should be noted that as early as 21 January, during the course of the concluding battles to destroy the encircled troops of the enemy’s Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ group of forces, General A.M. Vasilevskii, who was with the Voronezh Front as a representative of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command, and the front commander, Colonel General F.I. Golikov, presented their ideas to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I.V. Stalin, on the plan for the further operations by the Voronezh Front’s forces following the completion of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation. In accordance with the ideas presented, it was planned by 30 January to deploy all of the front’s forces (except the 38th Army) along the line of the Oskol River from Staryi Oskol to Urazovo and to launch three attacks along converging axes on Khar’kov. It was planned to employ the 38th Army, following the completion of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, for securing the front’s main forces against Kursk. The Supreme Commander-in-Chief, I.V. Stalin, having agreed in principle to the conduct of this operation, also made significant changes to the plan presented. The commander of the Voronezh Front was ordered to launch an attack with the front’s right-wing forces on Kursk and capture it simultaneously with an attack by the front’s left-wing and center forces along the Khar’kov axis. This attack was to secure the operations of the front’s main forces along the Khar’kov axis.

Moreover, this attack was supposed to play a quite important role in the Stavka’s plan for developing the general strategic offensive. At the same time the Voronezh Front’s main forces and the Southwestern Front’s right-wing forces were being dispatched for liberating the Khar’kov industrial area, the Voronezh Front’s rightwing forces and those of the Bryansk Front’s left wing were to secure the deployment of the recreated Central Front along the line Fatezh—L’gov for its subsequent operations to the northwest. In order to carry out this assignment, the Voronezh Front’s rightwing forces had first of all to capture Kursk. The Bryansk Front’s leftwing forces were to develop the offensive in the general direction of Maloarkhangel’sk.

Map 7 Thoughts of the Stavka Representative and the Commander of the Voronezh Front on the Conduct of the Khar’kov Operation.

A Stavka directive of 27 January established a new boundary line between the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts: Dobroe—Vodop’yanovo —Dolgorukovo—Volovo—Kuz’modem’yanskoe—Isakovo—Kosorzha —Zolotukhino—Fatezh—Dmitiev-L’govskii (all locales, except for Dobroe, were for the Bryansk Front). Having received the Stavka’s confirmation for the submitted plan for the front’s operations along the Khar’kov axis and the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s supplementary instructions, the Voronezh Front command began the immediate preparation of the Khar’kov offensive operation, which was to be carried out by all of the front’s forces along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The final draft of the plan for the Khar’kov offensive operation, which was drawn up in accordance with the instructions of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, consisted of the following. The Voronezh Front’s center and left-wing forces—40th, 69th¹ and 3rd Tank armies—were to deploy along the 180-kilometer front Teplyi Kolodez’ (20 kilometers west of Staryi Oskol)—Urazovo and launch three attacks along converging axes at Khar’kov. During 2831 January the 40th Army was to finish carrying out the tasks entrusted to it for destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces and by 1 February be ready to launch an attack through Belgorod on Khar’kov from the front Teplyi Kolodez’— Chernyanka. The 60th Army, which had the task of moving up to the Tim River and launching an attack in the general direction of Kursk, for the purpose of securing the operations of the front’s main forces from

the north and capturing Kursk, was to operate along the front’s right wing. The 38th Army was to complete the destruction of the Voronezh— Kastornoe group of forces and, upon deploying along the line Sukhaya Kshen’—excluding Teplyi Kolodez’, go over to the offensive in the general direction of Ivnya. The beginning of the Voronezh Front’s offensive in the Khar’kov operation was set for 1-2 February. Thus the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces, which were tied down in fighting the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, were faced with quite complex tasks. They had to complete the destruction of this group of forces as quickly as possible and by the beginning of February be ready to resolve new tasks along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The timely and successful resolution of the task of eliminating the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces was supposed to create the necessary conditions for conducting the Khar’kov operation. In accordance with the overall plan for the conduct of the new offensive operation, the commander of the Voronezh Front assigned the front’s right-wing armies the following tasks. The 38th Army, consisting of the 240th, 167th, 206th, 237th, and 232nd rifle divisions and the 253rd Rifle Brigade (the latter two were being transferred from the 60th Army), was ordered to attack in the direction of Gorshechnoe and Yastrebovka and, in operating in conjunction with the 40th Army’s forces, was to destroy the enemy’s forces and by the close of 1 February reach the line Sukhaya Kshen’—Teplyi Kolodez’. From this line the army’s forces were to attack toward Ivnya. Consequently, the 38th Army was to destroy, in conjunction with the 40th Army, the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe

group of forces, while simultaneously moving up to its indicated line for participation in the new operation. Units of the 40th Army were supposed to be there before the arrival of the 38th Army’s forces at the new sector Bystrets—Yastrebovka—Kazatskaya Steppe State Farm. The 60th Army, consisting of the 121st, 141st and 322nd rifle divisions, the 248th and 104th rifle and 86th Tank and 16th Destruction brigades,² was given the task of launching an attack in the general direction of Nizhnedevitsk station. Before 31 January the army was to clear the Nizhnedevitsk station—Vyaznovatka— Nizhnyaya Veduga area of the enemy and, passing through Kastornoe, by the close of 2 February reach the line of the Tim River. The army was to attack from this line in the general direction of Kursk. Simultaneously, the army commander was ordered to transfer the 232nd Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade to the 38th Army following their arrival in the area of Nizhnedevitsk station. As is clear from the tasks assigned to the 60th and 38th armies, these armies’ forces had to carry out a mutual crossing movement, which, as is known, was not foreseen by the plan for the Voronezh— Kastornoe operation. The 38th Army had to shift from the north to the southwest and the 60th Army from the southeast to the northwest. The conduct of such a complex maneuver during the course of an offensive operation arose due to the situation and was extremely necessary. As was already shown above, instead of an offensive on Nizhnyaya Veduga, the 38th Army’s main forces had been turned toward Kastornoe, toward a linkup with the 40th Army. As a result of this, the 60th Army, which was east of the 40th and 38th armies, began to fall behind them. By this time there arose a significant and completely uncovered gap between the 38th and 13th armies; that is, between the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts. The 60th Army had to move through the 38th Army’s zone in order to fill this space, so that subsequently, in accordance with the decision for the Khar’kov

operation, it could attack toward Kursk. The Voronezh Front commander categorically demanded that the commander of the 40th Army prevent the retreat of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces to the west, for which he was ordered to close the open spaces and by the close of 29 January the army’s right-flank formations (303rd and 183rd rifle divisions) were to capture the line Olym—Alisovo station. Before the arrival of these divisions at the indicated line, the 25th Guards Rifle Division was to leave one regiment in Gorshechnoe and occupy the line Bykovo— Bychek with two regiments facing east. At this time the 4th Tank Corps’ main forces were supposed to occupy the line Krasnaya Dolina—Kastornoe and along this line block the enemy’s retreat to the west. By the close of the day the 309th Rifle Division’s main forces were supposed to occupy the line Prilepy—Yastrebovka. The 107th and 340th rifle divisions were ordered to occupy Staryi Oskol on 29 January and by the close of the day reach the line Saltykovo— Monakovo. It was planned to bring the 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades up to the Bobrovo-Dvorskoe—Istobnoe area and direct the 4th SkiRifle Brigade to the operational area of the 25th Guards Rifle Division. At this time the 40th Army included the 25th Guards, 183rd, 309th, 107th, 340th, 305th, 303rd, and 100th rifle divisions, the 129th Rifle and 4th, 6th and 8th ski-rifle brigades. The 4th Tank Corps remained operationally subordinated to the commander of the 40th Army. The front commander’s instructions to the commander of the 40th Army concluded with the warning: “If the 40th Army’s allows the encircled enemy to break through its zone to the west, it will foil the front’s operation. The encircled enemy group of forces must be held and destroyed.” Thus the most responsible and difficult task was to be entrusted to the 40th Army on 29 January as well.

As can be seen from the above, the front commander, while not having completed the operation, was switching the main efforts of the front’s forces to the resolution of new tasks—the offensive on Kursk and Khar’kov. Up to 31 January, all of the main forces of the front’s right wing (38th, 60th and 40th armies) inclusively, were left for destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. In the course of three days, these forces were to destroy the enemy south of Kastornoe and by 1 February completely freed up for an offensive along new axes. There were significantly important shortcomings in the front commander’s decision to destroy the enemy group of forces. These shortcomings mainly sprang from the fact that the front commander, as before, underestimated the strength and capabilities of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, as a result of which the tasks assigned to the 40th and 38th armies were once again unrealistic. The front commander believed, without sufficient basis, that the forces of the 38th Army and part of the 40th Army’s forces would be able to destroy this group of forces within two to three days and on 1 February would reach their indicated lines for the subsequent offensive on Oboyan’ and Khar’kov. Besides this, the decision did not foresee appropriate measures for preventing a possible enemy breakout through Gorshechnoe to the west and southwest. Instead of reliably covering the existing spaces and splitting up the enemy group of forces, the main efforts were essentially directed at pushing back the enemy forces. Leaving behind a single rifle regiment from the 25th Guards Rifle Division, which had been weakened in the preceding fighting, to defend the Gorshechnoe area, and the movement of this division’s main forces to the line Bykovo—Bychek, did not block the enemy’s escape route. It also would have been more expedient to employ the 303rd Rifle Division for organizing a solid defense of such an

important road junction as Gorshechnoe. We should have brought up the army’s other formations to the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s operating area and to the north. However, none of this was foreseen either in the decisions by the front commander or in the subsequent measures by the commander of the 40th Army. Aside from this, it would have been expedient to resubordinate the 4th Tank Corps to the commander of the 38th Army. This corps, lacking fuel and essentially located within the 38th Army, was actually operating along the most passive sector of the front.

Combat Activities in the Area South of Kastornoe (29-30 January)

On 29 January the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces set about destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, while the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army was completing its arrival at the line of the Tim River along the front Yevlanova—Novo-Alekseevskoe. By 1600 the 38th Army’s right flank, in conjunction with the 13th Army and the 40th Army’s 4th Tank Corps, had completely cleared the town of Kastornoe of the enemy and was continuing to develop the offensive to the southwest. By the close of the day units of the 38th Army’s 240th and 167th rifle divisions reached the line Nikol’skoe-Klyuchevskaya— Olekhovskoe Tovarishchestvo. The 206th Rifle Division occupied Dolgushi and was continuing to attack toward Ploskoe, while the 237th Rifle Division, having routed the enemy garrison encircled in Staraya Veduga, completely liberated this inhabited locale and was developing the success toward Orekhovo. Elements of the 248th Rifle Divisions had begun fighting for Nizhnyaya Veduga. By the

close of 30 January the 38th Army’s 240th and 167th rifle divisions reached the line Matveevka—Verkhnyaya Graivoronka—Nazarovka. The army’s left-flank formations—206th and 237th rifle divisions and the 248th Rifle Brigade—were at the same time fighting the enemy’s rearguards, which were covering their forces’ retreat through Nizhnedevitsk station in the direction of Gorshechnoe. Having destroyed the enemy in the major inhabited locales of Orekhovo and Nizhnyaya Veduga, the 38th Army’s forces captured them. By the close of 30 January units of the 206th Rifle Division reached the line Kotovka—Lozovka, while the 237th Rifle Division occupied the inhabited locales of Redkodubie and Petrovka and had begun fighting for Nizhnedevitsk station. During the day the 248th Rifle Brigade continued to fight in Nizhnyaya Veduga. Throughout 29 January units of the 60th Army’s shock group fought to destroy the enemy garrisons in the inhabited locales of Khokhol, Kurbatovo and Verkhnee Turovo. By the close of the day our forces had completed blockaded the enemy in these inhabited locales in stubborn fighting, having inflicted heavy losses on him. On 30 January the 60th Army’s formations continued fighting to destroy the enemy encircled in these inhabited locales and were simultaneously regrouping, moving up to their designated areas. By the close of the day units of the 121st Rifle Division and the 248th Rifle Brigade (the latter was transferred from the 38th Army on 30 January), having defeated the enemy in Nizhnyaya Veduga, reached the line Gnilusha—Izbishche; the 322nd Rifle Division, having cleared the enemy out of Verkhnee Turovo, captured Andreevka, while the 232nd Rifle Division captured Protochnyi and Afonino. Following the elimination of the enemy in the inhabited locale of Khokhol, the 141st Rifle Division concentrated in Nizhnee Turovo, and the 104th Rifle Brigade in the Luzhenka area. The 60th Army’s combat activities in destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces concluded with its arrival in these areas. In accordance with the front commander’s directive of

28 January, the army was to begin attacking through Kastornoe to the line of the Tim River, in order to prepare the offensive along the Kursk axis. On 31 January the 60th Army’s forces set about carrying out their combat assignment. The army moved along three routes, running north of Kastornoe from east to west through the 38th Army’s sector. Because by this time the 38th Army’s forces were already located southwest of Kastornoe, they did not interfere with the 60th Army’s shift. However, the troop rear organs were moving behind the 38th Army’s forces along the roads leading to the southwest, while the delivery of ammunition, fuel and food to the troops through army automobile and horse-drawn transport was also being carried out. In a number of places the columns of the 38th and 60th armies’ rear units got mixed up. In order to avoid the creation of possible “traffic jams” and other disorders, joint officers posts and traffic control stations were organized in these places, which were able to pass both armies’ columns through without particularly interfering with each other. The influence of the poor flying weather, which rendered the enemy’s air activity against the columns of the regrouping armies more difficult, had a certain effect on the successful accomplishment of the 38th and 60th armies’ maneuver. On 29 January stubborn fighting with the enemy continued in the areas of Sinie Lipyagi, Vyaznovatka, Nizhnedevitsk, Yasenki, and Gorshechnoe along the 40th Army’s front. In the second half of the day our forces captured Sinie Lipyagi, following heavy fighting. The enemy was putting up fierce resistance along the Nizhnedevitsk— Yasenki sector and the 40th Army’s forces were not able to capture these inhabited locales during 29 January. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, having left behind a regiment in Gorshechnoe, reached with its main forces the line Gologuzovka— Alekseevka. The 4th Tank Corps, following the liberation of

Kastornoe, occupied the sector Nikol’skie Dvoriki—Olekhovskoe Tovarishchestvo, with its front facing east, and, along with units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division, fought all day against the enemy attempting to break through our forces’ positions to the west. Units of the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade did not manage to capture Staryi Oskol on this day. On 30 January the 40th Army’s right-flank formations continued to fight the enemy along the front Vyaznovatka—Gorshechnoe— Kastornoe. The 253rd Rifle Brigade, which had surrounded a large enemy garrison in Vyaznovatka the previous evening, along with units of the 232nd and part of the 303rd rifle divisions, eliminated it on 30 January, following heavy fighting, and by the close of the day reached the northern outskirts of this inhabited locale. The 303rd Rifle Division, which had encircled Nizhnedevitsk, together with units of the 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade, eliminated the enemy garrison there on 30 January and by the close of the day had completely occupied this inhabited locale. In this fighting, the enemy lost more than 3,000 German and Hungarian soldiers and officers killed and captured. The 129th Rifle Brigade, following the rout of the enemy in Nizhnedevitsk, reached the area Gusevka—height 237 by the end of the day. On 30 January the 183rd Rifle Division’s main forces, along with the 192nd Tank Brigade, were engaged in intense fighting for Yasenki. During the day the enemy twice counterattacked from Kuchugury and Kulevka with up to a regiment of infantry and forced the 183rd Rifle Division on the defensive along the line Dubratnoe—Somovka. On the morning of 30 January two of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiments reached the line Prostornoe—Bocharovka, with their front facing east, and throughout the day were engaged in heavy fighting and were subjected to heavy enemy attacks from Vasil’evka and Alisovo station. The 25th Guards Rifle Division’s third

regiment was attacked by superior enemy forces in Gorshechnoe and, after abandoning the inhabited locale, was engaged in stubborn fighting with the enemy trying to break through to the west and southwest of Gorshechnoe. The enemy’s group of forces, which consisted of the remnants of the routed German 340th, 323rd, 88th, 377th, 68th, 57th, 75th, and 168th and Hungarian 6th and 9th infantry divisions, made an attempt with part of its forces to attack through Gorshechnoe toward Staryi Oskol and link up there with the stubbornly defending garrison (units of the German 26th Infantry Division), while the remaining forces began trying to break out through Bocharovka and Prostornoe to the west. On 30 January the enemy did not manage to break through to Staryi Oskol and further on to the west. However, due to the enemy’s activity, the situation of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s units was becoming more and more difficult. All of the division’s regiments had been drawn into the fighting and the division commander had no reserves. A gap, which was not covered by our forces, developed between the inhabited locales of Gorshechnoe and Prostornoe. Nor had the Somovka—Gorshechnoe sector been occupied by our forces and the enemy was able to withdraw his forces without molestation through this space to Staryi Oskol. The 40th Army’s left-flank forces—the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade—continued to fight unsuccessfully all day for Staryi Oskol. The enemy garrison, which numbered up to three infantry regiments, with artillery, had organized the solid defense of the town and, while putting up stubborn resistance to our forces, covered all the roads leading from the town to the west. The army’s 305th and 100th rifle divisions were moving up to their jumping-off areas for the offensive along the Khar’kov axis. By the

close of 30 January the 305th Rifle Division reached the NizhneChufichevo—Monakovo area, and the 100th Rifle Division reached Shatalovka. The 4th Tank Corps remained along the line Kastornoe —Krasnaya Dolina, awaiting the delivery of fuel. Thus by the close of 30 January the Voronezh Front’s forces had not been able to securely close the Somovka—Gorshechnoe— Prostornoe sector. Due to this, there arose the real threat of the enemy group of forces breaking out to the west and southwest, where there were only units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division along the 30-kilometer front of Somovka—Gorshechnoe—Bocharovka. In the developing situation, the commander of the Voronezh Front once again demanded that the commander of the 40th Army prevent the enemy from breaking out to the west and to capture Staryi Oskol on 31 January. At the same time, he ordered the reinforcement of the 25th Guards Rifle Division with the 4th SkiRifle Brigade and a tank brigade from the 4th Tank Corps; the corps was ordered to move its main forces from the Kastornoe area to the Teplyi Kolodez’—Saltykovo area. It is not hard to see that the measures adopted by the front command were not sufficiently decisive. More concrete measures were needed from the front in order to prevent the breakthrough of the enemy’s forces to the west and southwest. The commander of the 40th Army, while striving to close off the Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol axis more securely, decided to remove two of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiments from the line Bocharovka—Prostornoe and move them back to the area southwest of Gorshechnoe. The 38th Army’s 206th Rifle Division was to be moved up to the line occupied by the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s units. It was decided to move the 303rd Rifle Division from the Nizhnedevitsk area to the Staroe Rogovoe—Zales’e area.

It should be noted that in this situation neither the reinforcement of the 25th Guards Rifle Division with two brigades, nor the movement of the 303rd Rifle Division to the Staroe Rogovoe—Zales’e area could guarantee the secure closing of the axis of the enemy’s retreat from Gorshechnoe to Staryi Oskol. The regrouping of the 303rd Rifle Division to the Zales’e area was late, because on 30 January the enemy pushed back the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiment out of Gorshechnoe and was trying to break out through Gerosimovo to Staryi Oskol. In the developing situation more decisive and bold actions were demanded from the troops and commanders at all levels, directed at preventing the enemy’s arrival along the Staryi Oskol axis and destroying him in detail. However, once again the front and 40th Army command confined themselves to half-measures. The front commander did not venture to employ the 38th Army’s 240th and 167th rifle divisions, which were north of Bykovo, for preventing the enemy’s retreat to the west. As the subsequent course of events showed, all of these shortcomings in the decisions led to a situation in which the German-Fascist command was able to withdraw a part of its forces through the existing gaps in our forces’ positions to the west and southwest.

Combat Activities in the Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol Areas (31 January-1 February)

Throughout 31 January the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces continued to battle the enemy group of forces east of Gorshechnoe and the enemy garrison in the town of Staryi Oskol. The 38th Army’s main forces were fighting the enemy’s forces south of Kastornoe, while part of its forces was moving toward the town of

Tim. By the close of the day units of the 206th Rifle Division, while advancing to the southwest, reached Bykovo, where they were subjected to counterattacks by the enemy falling back on Yastrebovka. The division was forced to deploy along the line Bykovo—Gologuzovka, with its front facing to the southeast, and to repel counterattacks by the enemy attempting to break out to the west. Units of the 237th Rifle Division captured Shirokii and Vasil’evka and were advancing on Gorshechnoe. On 31 January the 232nd Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade were pulled out of the fighting and concentrated in the Olym area. By the close of the day the 240th and 167th rifle divisions, while throwing back the enemy’s rearguards, reached the line Bystrets—Golovishcha. Actually, on this day only a third of the army’s forces—the 237th and 206th rifle divisions—were engaged with the enemy group of forces east of Gorshechnoe. Part of the army’s main forces was moving toward the Tim River, while part was preparing to march. The 40th Army’s forces were in an even more unfavorable disposition on 31 January. The 129th Rifle Brigade and the 183rd Rifle Division were fighting the enemy along the line Gusevka—Yasenki. The 303rd Rifle Division, having cleared the enemy out of Nizhnedevitsk, was moving to the Staroe Rogovoe—Zales’e area throughout 31 January. By the close of the day the division reached this area and became involved in fighting with the enemy, who, taking advantage of the space along the Somovka—Gorshechnoe sector, which was not occupied by our forces, broke through out of Gorshechnoe and was moving on Staryi Oskol. The 25th Guards Rifle Division, which, on orders of the 40th Army commander, turned over the Bykovo— Bychek sector to the 38th Army’s 206th Rifle Division on the night of 30-31 January, along with the 4th Tank Corps’ newly-arrived 102nd Tank Brigade and the 4th Ski-Rifle Brigade, consolidated along the

line Klyuch—southern slopes of height 236 and throughout the day was engaged in heavy fighting with superior enemy forces that were trying to break out of Gorshechnoe to Staryi Oskol. Following stubborn fighting and the onset of darkness, the enemy managed to throw back the division’s right-flank regiment to the Bogoroditskoe area and began to withdraw the remnants of the 88th Infantry Division’s units through Gerosimovo to Staryi Oskol. Due to the start of the enemy’s march to the southwest, the commander of the 40th Army ordered the 303rd Rifle Division to capture Gerosimovo and prevent the enemy’s withdrawal. However, as a result of indecisive actions the 303rd Rifle Division was unable to carry out this task. The enemy continued to pull out his units through Gerosimovo. At the same time that the 25th Guards Rifle Division was engaged in an unequal fight with the enemy’s group of forces trying to break out, the 107th and 340th rifle divisions and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade continued their unsuccessful battle with units of the enemy’s 26th Infantry Division in the town of Staryi Oskol. The 4th Tank Corps’ main forces, which received orders to concentrate in the area Teplyi Kolodez’—Saltykovo on 2 February, remained in the Kastornoe—Krasnaya Dolina area, due to a lack of fuel. The frequent absences of fuel within the 4th Tank Corps’ units are testimony to the poor work of the rear organs during the operation. The 309th Rifle Division, which was not facing the enemy, reached the Gushchino—Strokino—Panki area; the 305th Rifle Division was concentrating in the area Staryi Oskol State Farm—Kutuzovo, while the 100th Rifle Division reached the Troitskaya—Baklanovka area by the close of the day. In view of the dispersion of the 40th Army’s forces along a very wide front (Kastornoe—Gushchino—Troitskaya), the army commander

was already unable, as early as 31 January, to render real assistance to the 25th Guards Rifle Division. Only the front commander could help the division’s units at the expense of the 38th Army’s forces, which were operating north of Yastrebovka. But the latter undertook no measures to impede the enemy’s withdrawal from the Gorshechnoe area. A characteristic example of this are the tasks assigned to the armies for 1 February. The 38th Army was ordered to occupy the town of Tim with the 240th and 167th rifle divisions, to pull the 206th Rifle Division out of the fighting in the Bykovo area and move it up to the front Yastrebovka—Teplyi Kolodez’ by the close of 1 February. It was ordered to immediately begin the movement of the 232nd Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade to this line. The commander of the 38th Army was ordered to launch an attack with the forces of the 237th Rifle Division and the 180th Tank Brigade from the Vasil’evka—Shirokii area along the railroad to Gorshechnoe, in order to assist the 40th Army in destroying the enemy group of forces south of Kastornoe. On 1 February the 40th Army was assigned the task of completing the elimination of the encircled enemy group of forces, to capture the town of Staryi Oskol and by the close of 2 February to move the army’s main forces to the deployment line Kladovoe—Melovoe— Ivanovka—Peschanoe—Maloe Gorodishche (30-35 kilometers southwest of Staryi Oskol). Thus the front commander assumed that on 1 February the elimination of the enemy’s forces in the Gorshechnoe area would be completed and that all three armies would have the opportunity to begin a new offensive operation with their main forces on 2 February. However, as a result of an incorrect evaluation of the situation, these assumptions by the front commander were once again unrealistic. East of Gorshechnoe was an enemy group of forces numbering 30,000-35,000 men. By the close of 31 January the following units were battling it: the 38th Army’s 206th and 237th

rifle divisions and the 40th Army’s 183rd, 303rd and 25th Guards rifle divisions and the 129th Rifle Brigade. In all, five rifle divisions and one rifle brigade were tied down in fighting. The front commander, instead of unifying all of these formations under a unified command; that is, to entrust the control of operations to destroy the enemy’s group of forces to the commander of the 40th or 38th armies, made the decision to continue to carry out this assignment with part of both armies’ forces. Moreover, the 38th Army had only the 237th Rifle Division and the 180th Tank Brigade left to assist the 40th Army. It was ordered to remove the 206th Rifle Division, which was in the Bykovo area along the enemy’s likely escape routes, and to also dispatch it to the Yastrebovka—Teplyi Kolodez’ area. At the same time, both army commanders were assigned the task of moving the armies’ main forces to the line Tim —Puzachi—Kladovoe—Ivanovka—Maloe Gorodishche (the 38th Army on 1 February and the 40th Army on 2 February). The attention of both armies’ command and headquarters was being dissipated between the movement of their troops to the deployment line for the offensive along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, and destroying the enemy’s group of forces east of Gorshechnoe. And because of the fact that the movement and preparation of the troops for the new offensive operation was already the most important task, little attention was paid to fighting the enemy group of forces east of Gorshechnoe. Of course, such a decision could not secure the rapid destruction of the enemy group of forces. Besides, it excluded the possibility of a more rapid movement of these armies’ main forces for an offensive along new axes. The absence of a unified command for the troops completing the encirclement and destruction of the enemy and the insufficiently flexible control of forces in the 38th and 40th armies led to a situation in which by the close of 31 January the disposition of these armies’ forces little corresponded to the idea of completely destroying the German-Fascist troops east of Gorshechnoe.

During 1 February a large part of the 38th and 40th armies’ formations did not carry out their assigned tasks. The 38th Army’s 240th and 167th rifle divisions did not capture the town of Tim, having by this time only reached the line Korov’i Verkhi —Puzachi. The 206th Rifle Division, which was tied down in fighting with the enemy in the Bykovo—Bogatyrevo area, did not reach the line Yastrebovka—Teplyi Kolodez’. The 232nd Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade, which did not receive from army headquarters the order to move to the new area, remained in their previous location—Olym—Krutaya Gora—throughout 1 February. The 237th Rifle Division, along with the 180th Tank Brigade, which had been weakened by the preceding fighting, was unable to overcome the enemy’s resistance and throughout 1 February was fighting for Alisovo. On 1 February the 40th Army’s right-flank forces, together with the 38th Army’s units, were to eliminate the enemy group of forces in the Gorshechnoe area, while its left-flank formations were to capture the town of Staryi Oskol. But the army’s forces failed to carry out any of these tasks. Throughout the day the army’s 129th Rifle Brigade and 183rd Rifle Division were engaged in stubborn fighting in the Gusevka—Yasenki area. During the second half of the day one of the 183rd Rifle Division’s regiments began attacking Gorshechnoe, in order to assist units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division, which were operating in the Bogoroditskoe area. A regiment from the 25th Guards Rifle Division, together with the 4th Tank Corps’ 102nd Tank Brigade, was fighting the entire day in the Bogoroditskoe area, while the other two regiments were holding off superior enemy forces east of the line Klyuch—height 228— Ryndino. The 303rd Rifle Division continued to wage stubborn battles along

the road west of Staroe Rogovoe, Zales’e and Novoe Kladovoe with the enemy, who was trying to break out of Gorshechnoe to Staryi Oskol. The 107th and 340th rifle divisions were waging unsuccessful battles for the fourth day to capture the town of Staryi Oskol. By the close of the day the 309th and 305th rifle divisions reached the line Kladovoe—Yushkovo—Bobrovo-Dvorskoe—excluding Melovoe—Bogoslovka—Volkovo, while the 100th Rifle Division, which was marching to the army’s left flank, had reached by the close of the day the line Orlik—Russkaya Kholan’. The 4th Tank Army’s main forces remained in the area of Krasnaya Dolina on 1 February, in expectation of fuel. Thus during 29 January-1 February the Voronezh Front’s right-wing forces were unable to carry out their assigned tasks to destroy the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. This group of forces continued to tie down significant forces from the 38th and 40th armies and, to a certain degree, exerted an influence on the development of subsequent events along the Khar’kov axis. The 40th Army, in particular, was unable on 2 February to begin the offensive simultaneously with the front’s left-wing forces and attacked only on 3 February, and then with only part of its forces. During the entire first half of February the 38th Army was forced to do battle with the remnants of the Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces falling back on Oboyan’.

Combat Activities to Destroy the Enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe Group of Forces (2-17 February)

By the close of 1 February part of the Voronezh Front’s forces continued to fight the enemy group of forces in the Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol areas, while the main forces occupied their jumping-off positions for the offensive on Kursk and Khar’kov. The 60th Army’s main forces reached the line Srednii Raskhovets— Aleksandrovka. Two of the 38th Army’s rifle divisions (240th and 167th) reached the front Korovenka—Puzachi, while the army’s remaining forces, together with the 40th Army’s forces, were fighting the enemy group of forces in the Gorshechnoe area. Three of the 40th Army’s rifle divisions (309th, 305th and 100th) reached their jumping-off positions for the offensive along the Khar’kov axis (along the front Bobrovo-Dvorskoe—Russkaya Kholan’), while the army’s remaining forces, in conjunction with the 38th Army, continued the fight against the remnants of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces in the areas of Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol. The front’s left-wing forces—the 69th and 3rd Tank armies— deployed along a front from Russkaya Kholan’ to Kupyansk and were ready to attack along the Khar’kov axis from the morning of 2 February. The Bryansk Front’s 13th Army, which was operating to the right of the Voronezh Front’s forces, reached the line Pokrovka—Krasnaya Polyana and continued to develop the offensive in the general direction of Kolpny and Maloarkhangel’sk, with the task of reaching the front Maloarkhangel’sk—Verkhnee Smorodnoe. By the close of 1 February the enemy forces operating along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes and facing the Bryansk Front’s left wing and the Voronezh Front, were grouped as follows.

The German Second Army, which had been routed during the first nine days of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, occupied the sector from the Orel—Yelets railroad to the Staryi Oskol area with the remnants of its forces. It held three divisions (299th, 45th and 383rd) of the LV Army Corps opposite the Bryansk Front’s 48th and 13th armies. The remnants of the army’s ten divisions, consisting of the German XIII and VII army corps and the Hungarian III Army Corps, continued to fight in encirclement in the areas of Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol. The retreating units of the 82nd Infantry Division, the forward units of 4th Panzer Division newly arrived in the Kursk area, as well as the 395th Assault Battalion and various construction formations were operating along the 80-kilometer sector from Isakovo to the Staryi Oskol—Oboyan’ railroad, facing the 60th Army’s forces and two of the 38th Army’s rifle divisions that had moved up to the area of the town of Tim. The enemy’s defense along this sector lacked a continuous front and consisted of individual centers of resistance, which covered the most important roads and inhabited locales. The enemy forces that were operating opposite the 40th, 69th and 3rd Tank armies’ front in the sector from the Staryi Oskol—Oboyan’ railroad to Kupyansk and which were directly covering the Khar’kov axis, had been unified into army group Lanz.³ By 2 February this group included the remnants of the Hungarian Second Army’s defeated divisions, the Italian Alpine Corps and the German XXIV Panzer Corps, the Grossdeutschland Motorized Division, and the 298th and 320th infantry divisions. The SS Panzer Corps divisions, which were arriving in the Khar’kov area, were to be subordinated to the command of Group Lanz. In all, Group Lanz numbered about 50,000 soldiers and officers against 150,000 Soviet troops. Despite the obvious shortage of forces in Army Group B, the army group command, in its directive of 31 January, assigned its forces the task of delaying the Soviet forces’ further advance to the west along the line of the Oskol and Seim rivers and thus covering the

flanks of army groups Center and Don. In this connection, army group Lanz was ordered to defend the Khar’kov—Belgorod area, while preventing the Soviet forces from outflanking the northern flank of Army Group Don, which was operating in the Donbass. The German Second Army, which was operating along the Kursk axis, was entrusted with the task of covering the southern flank of Army Group Center and slowing the Soviet troops’ advance to the Kursk area, or at least along the Seim River—Kursk—Verkhov’e line, while securing for as long as possible railroad communications along the Belgorod—Orel sector. Moreover, with this directive the command of Army Group B assigned the VII Army Corps, which united all the troops encircled in the Gorshechnoe area, the task of launching an attack from this area in the general direction of Kursk, from which the 4th Panzer Division was to launch a meeting attack. The German-Fascist command decided to carry out the withdrawal of its main forces from the Gorshechnoe area to the west and southwest on the night of 1-2 February. The enemy’s formations, having suffered significant losses in the preceding battles, were organized into three independent groups. The first group included units of the 57th, 68th and 323rd infantry divisions, with an overall strength of 6,000-8,000 men. This group, which was led by General Seibert, received orders to try and break out from Gorshechnoe to Bogatyrevo. The second group, which consisted of the remnants of the German 75th, 340th and 377th and Hungarian 6th and 9th infantry divisions (numbering 8,000-10,000 men), under the commander of General Bruchmann, was to attempt to break out through Ryndino and Stepanovka to Shlyakhovaya. And, finally, the third group, which was led by Gen. Gollwitzer,⁴ included the remnants of the German 88th and 26th infantry divisions and the headquarters of the VII Army Corps. This group received orders to try to break out of Gorshechnoe through Staryi

Oskol to Manturovo. Its strength was 6,000-7,000 men. Thus the overall strength of the retreating enemy group of forces was 20,000-25,000 soldiers and officers. The enemy did not create a unified command for this group and each group attempted to break through independently along its own axis. At this time only two of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiments and the 4th Tank Corps’ 102nd Tank Brigade lay along the enemy’s path of retreat, a 16-kilometer sector between Bogatyrevo and Staroe Rogovoe. On the evening of 1 February the enemy began to push back units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division. Without permission from the army commander, the division commander, Major General Shiforenko, issued orders to pull back the division’s main forces to the line Znamenskoe—Kamenka. These actions made it even easier for the enemy to leave Gorshechnoe. On 2 February the 40th Army’s 129th Rifle Brigade and 183rd Rifle Division continued to fight throughout the day the enemy’s rearguards along the line Gusevka—Yasenki—eastern outskirts of Gorshechnoe. All day the 303rd Rifle Division continued to fight west of Staroe Rogovoe and Novoe Kladovoe with units of the 88th Infantry Division, which were retreating from the Gorshechnoe area and part of which managed to break through to Staryi Oskol and link up with its garrison. One of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiments was near Bogoroditskoe, with the other two regiments in the Znamenskoe area. On the morning of 2 February, the 340th Rifle Division, which had left a reinforced battalion in the Staryi Oskol area along the sector Gumnyi—Kazatskaya, began moving to the southwest and by the close of the day had reached the Melovoe area. The 107th Rifle Division and the 6th Ski-Rifle Brigade were in the Staryi Oskol area. On 2 February the 309th Rifle Division remained in the Kladovoe—

Sergievka area and was putting itself in order. The 305th Rifle Division occupied the line Yur’evka—Ivanovka, while the 100th Rifle Division reached the front Peschanoe—Yablonovo. The 4th Tank Corps’ 102nd Tank Brigade was operating jointly with units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division. Following the division’s withdrawal to the Znamenskoe area, the 102nd Tank Brigade left the division’s combat formation and concentrated in Bogatyrevo. By the close of the day the 4th Tank Corps’ 45th Tank Brigade reached the Bykovo area. The corps’ remaining forces (69th Tank Brigade and a motorized rifle brigade) continued to remain in the Krasnaya Dolina area, due to a shortage of fuel. Two of the 38th Army’s rifle divisions (206th and 237th) were fighting to destroy the enemy trying to break out to the west. The 232nd Rifle Division and the 253rd Rifle Brigade moved to the Zhernovets—Nazarovka area and only two of the army’s rifle divisions (240th and 167th) reached the front Korovenka—excluding 2nd Vygornoe and began fighting for the town of Tim. By this time the 60th Army’s forces that were not tied down with fighting the enemy reached the eastern bank of the Tim River along the front Novye Saviny—Pokrovskoe—Lunevka and began to attack along the Kursk axis, while on the morning of 2 February the front’s left-wing forces began an offensive along the Khar’kov axis. Throughout 3-4 February the Voronezh Front, while continuing to fight with part of its forces against the enemy group of forces trying to break through to the west, continued to attack with its main forces along new axes. As was shown earlier, on 2 February the enemy began to try and break out of Gorshechnoe and Staryi Oskol in three groups to the west and southwest. Siebert’s group insistently sought to break through in the direction of Bogatyrevo. By the close of 4 February, having occupied height

231, Mar’ino and Troitskoe, this group was engaged in stubborn fighting with the 206th Rifle Division, which was occupying the line Bogatyrevo—Bykovo. Bruchmann’s group occupied Otrada, Stepanovka and Beketovo and unsuccessfully attacked two of the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s regiments occupying the line Znamenskoe—Nizhnyaya Leshenka, while trying to outflank them from the north and south. The group’s rearguards were fighting in the Gorshechnoe area with units of the 237th Rifle Division and a regiment from the 25th Guards Rifle Division. A flank detachment from Bruchmann’s group was occupying Zales’e and Staroe Rogovoe. Gollwitzer’s group, having left a powerful rearguard in Staryi Oskol against the 40th Army’s 107th Rifle Division, and while holding off the 303rd Rifle Division with a flank detachment in the Kaplino area, streamed along the road to Manturovo and by the close of 4 February the lead units of its main forces reached the Krasnyi Khutor area without resistance. In order to prevent the further breakout of the units of Siebert’s and Bruchmann’s groups to the northwest and west, the commander of the 38th Army concentrated by the close of 4 February the 232nd Rifle Division (transferred from Verkhnyaya Graivoronka) in the Yefrosinovka area and the 253rd Rifle Brigade in the Sokolovka area. Aside from these formations, the 237th Rifle Division, which was to be relieved on the night of 4-5 February along its line of Timofeevka —eastern outskirts of Gorshechnoe by units of the 129th Rifle Brigade, which had been moved up there from the Kulevka—Yasenki area, was supposed to concentrate in Verkhnie Apochki. Throughout this period the 240th and 167th rifle divisions continued to attack in the directions of Tim and Manturovo. On 4 February the 240th Rifle Division attacked the town of Tim during the day and began fighting along its eastern outskirts. The

enemy’s 395th Assault Battalion twice counterattacked in the direction of Korovenka, but was unsuccessful. Having beaten off the counterattacks, by the close of the day the division’s units broke into Tim and began to clear the enemy out of the town. The 167th Rifle Division, having occupied Pogozhee and Kus’kino, was fighting for Rogovaya and Puzachi. These locales were occupied by our units only on the night of 4-5 February. Four of the 40th Army’s rifle divisions (309th, 340th, 305th, and 100th) were successfully attacking in the general direction of Belgorod. The 40th Army’s 25th Guards, 303rd and 107th rifle divisions continued fighting the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. Thus by the close of 4 February 4 the 38th Army’s 206th Rifle Division and 129th Rifle Brigade and the 40th Army’s 25th Guards, 107th and 303rd rifle divisions; that is, four rifle divisions and a rifle brigade, were directly participating in the battles with the retreating enemy groups. In conditions in which the Voronezh Front’s main forces, including the 60th Army and part of the 40th Army, were successfully developing the offensive along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes, the rapid defeat of the enemy forces in the Gorshechnoe—Bykovo— Staryi Oskol area and the movement of the 38th Army’s forces to the west took on particular importance. However, as subsequent events showed, the front command did not take the necessary measures to rapidly defeat this enemy group of forces. On the morning of 5 February the Siebert group’s main forces, covered by a rearguard in the northern part of Gorshechnoe, counterattacked elements of the 206th Rifle Division’s right flank and pushed them out of Bogatyrevo to the north. By the close of the

day this group, while covering itself with part of its forces along the line height 242—west of Mar’ino, had occupied Verkhnyaya Kleshenka and Belgorodka and had begun moving on Verkhnie Apochki, where it was halted by a rifle regiment from the 237th Rifle Division. The enemy’s attempts to bypass Verkhnie Apochki from the north were beaten off by the 253rd Rifle Brigade, which was occupying Mochaki and Sokolovka. Stubborn fighting by a regiment of the 237th Rifle Division and 253rd Rifle Brigade in the Verkhnie Apochki—Mar’ino area continued all night. The enemy, having occupied Borkalovka, was unable to advance further to the northwest. By this time the 129th Rifle Brigade and a composite training brigade had pushed group Siebert’s rearguard out of Gorshechnoe and captured this inhabited locale. Bruchmann’s group managed to break out through the 25th Guards Rifle Division’s units and throw them back from the Znamenskoe— Nizhnyaya Leshenka area to the Baranovo—Nikol’skoe area. During the second half of 5 February this group occupied Nizhnyaya Leshenka and Znamenskoe and began to advance on Shlyakhovaya. By the close of the day the enemy, not encountering any resistance from our forces, captured Srednie Apochki, Shlyakhovaya and height 218. The group’s further advance was halted by two of the 232nd Rifle Division’s regiments, which had been hurriedly transferred, on orders of the army commander, to the line Golovishcha—Srednee Dorozhnoe. Following unsuccessful attacks in the directions of Golovishcha and Srednee Dorozhnoe, Bruchmann’s group tried to break through to Yastrebovka. However, the enemy was also unsuccessful along this axis as well. He was thrown back to his jumping-off position as a result of active operations by the units of the 25th Guards and 232nd rifle divisions. The commander of the 40th Army, in order to rapidly defeat Bruchmann’s group and destroy its rearguard in the Zales’e—Staroe Rogovoe area, moved into this area two of the 303rd Rifle Division’s

regiments, which by the close of 5 February reached the line Gerosimovo—Beketovo. By this time one of the 303rd Rifle Division’s regiments, which had been left in the area of Kaplino and Staryi Oskol, as well as the entire 107th Rifle Division, had cleared both inhabited locales of Group Gollwitzer’s rearguards. On the night of 5-6 February the 303rd and 107th rifle divisions, on instructions from the army commander, had begun moving to the southwest for the purpose of linking up with the army’s main forces, which were attacking toward Belgorod. Group Gollwitzer’s main forces, which had reached the Krasnyi Khutor area the previous evening, continued throughout February to fall back unopposed on Tim and by the close of the day, occupied Kruglyi Les, heights 251 and 231, and Krasnaya Zarya and were on the southeast approaches to Manturovo and the town of Tim. In this situation the commander of the 38th Army was forced to move across the enemy’s path of retreat part of the 240th and 167th rifle divisions’ forces, which were successfully advancing to the west and which had reached Stanovoe and Manturovo. By the close of 5 February two of the 167th Rifle Division’s regiments reached the front Ostanino—Yekaterinovka and one of the 240th Rifle Division’s regiments reached the line of heights 255 and 256. Thus despite the fact that during 3-5 February the enemy managed to break out of the Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol area and advance on an average of 20 kilometers to the west, his situation remained very difficult. Pressed by our units from the east, on 5 February the enemy’s retreating and isolated groups encountered the organized resistance of the 38th Army’s units along their path of retreat. However, the absence of proper command and control of our forces by the front command and the commanders of the 38th and 40th armies prevented us from completing the destruction of the enemy forces. The enemy continued to move his troops to the west during the following days. It was only on the evening of 5 February that the commander of the

Voronezh Front entrusted the task of destroying the enemy’s groups that had broken through to the 38th Army’s forces alone. He demanded of the 38th Army commander the most decisive actions and the employment of all the army’s forces for carrying out the assigned tasks, in order to prevent the enemy’s breakout in the Tim —Manturovo area and to eliminate his forces during 6-7 February. In carrying out the front commander’s instructions, the commander of the 38th Army assigned his forces the following tasks. The 240th Rifle Division, while holding the town of Tim, was to hinder the enemy’s arrival to the town from the southeast. While covering the line Yekaterinovka—Ostanino, the 167th Rifle Division received orders to prevent the enemy from breaking out toward Manturovo. The 232nd Rifle Division, while repelling attacks by Group Bruchmann along the line Srednee Dorozhnoe—Golovishcha, was to defeat its main forces and not let it escape to the west. The 237th Rifle Division was ordered to prevent the enemy from retreating along the road through Yefrosinovka and Rep’evka to Tim, while stubbornly holding the line Verkhnie Apochki—Sennoe. The army’s remaining formations—the 253rd Rifle Brigade, 206th and 129th rifle divisions and a composite training brigade—received orders to pursue the retreating enemy on Degtyarnaya and Shlyakhovaya. The 40th Army’s 25th Guards Rifle Division received orders from the army commander to assist the 38th Army’s forces in destroying the enemy in the Baranovo—Nikol’skoe area, and only afterwards to begin moving on Skorodnoe (40 kilometers south of Manturovo). In evaluating the 38th Army commander’s decision, it is necessary to note that it, like the decision by the front commander, did not secure the accomplishment of the main task—the most rapid defeat of the enemy group of forces west of Gorshechnoe. Not one of the 38th Army’s formations was given sufficiently decisive tasks. Two rifle divisions (237th and 232nd), which were defending, were to

repel the enemy’s attempts to break out to the west, while one rifle division (206th) and three rifle brigades received orders to pursue the enemy (actually, pushing back his rearguards) from the east. Units of the 40th Army’s 25th Guards Rifle Division, while assisting the 38th Army in destroying the enemy group of forces, were covering the line Baranovo—Nikol’skoe. The army commander continued to limit himself to defensive measures and did not strive for more energetic, bolder and decisive actions, although the situation was favorable for this. The entire enemy group of forces was surrounded by our forces. There were sufficient men and materiel to simultaneously and decisively attack the enemy from all sides. Combat operations to defeat the enemy group of forces during 6-7 February unfolded in the following manner. During these days there was a continuous wind. The roads were covered with snow; visibility was extremely limited, while the artillery tanks and supply columns fell behind. All of this made the conduct of combat operations significantly more difficult. On the morning of 6 February the enemy, taking advantage of a snowfall and the poor visibility, attacked the 38th Army’s formations that were blocking his path of retreat and began to break through to the west by all three groups simultaneously. Throughout 6 February the 237th Rifle Division repelled attacks by Siebert’s group along the sector Verkhnie Apochki—Chepelki. The 232nd Rifle Division, having successfully repelled an attack by Bruchmann’s group, held on to the line Srednee Dorozhnoe— Golovishcha all day. The 25th Guards Rifle Division remained in the Baranovo—Nikol’skoe area and repelled, along with the 232nd Rifle Division, the enemy’s attempts to break out toward Yastrebovka. The 167th Rifle Division was involved in stubborn fighting with Gollwitzer’s group along the line Ostanino—Repetskaya Plota. With the onset of darkness, Siebert’s group managed to break through the 237th Rifle Division’s position, throw its units back to

the line Degtyarnaya—Yefrosinovka, and during the night occupy Chepelki and Verkhnie Apochki. During this night Bruchmann’s group, upon pressing the 232nd Rifle Division back to Zaoskol’e, occupied Golovishcha and Srednee Dorozhnoe. Group Gollwitzer’s attempts to throw the 167th Rifle Division out of the Repetskaya Plota—Ostanino area and break through to Manturovo were unsuccessful and the fighting here continued until the morning of 8 February. Along the other sectors of the front, by the close of 6 February the 38th Army’s forces, while throwing back and destroying the enemy’s rearguards, captured the following: the 253rd Rifle Brigade— Verkhnyaya Kleshenka and height 236; the 206th Rifle Division— Bogatyrevo and Borovka, and; the 129th Rifle Brigade and the composite training brigade—Andreevka and Bogdanovka. Thus on 6 February not one of the enemy’s groups had managed to break through to Tim and Manturovo. At the same time, throughout this day the 38th Army’s forces were unable to fully carry out their assigned tasks and the 237th and 232nd rifle divisions were thrown back to the west by the enemy. The 167th Rifle Division was holding its area with difficulty, while the army’s remaining formations only pushed the enemy’s rearguards back a little to the west. On the morning of 7 February, despite the continuing snow storm, the enemy persistently tried to break through to the west. Siebert’s and Bruchmann’s groups, having pushed back units of the 237th and 232nd rifle divisions, had by the close of the day occupied Yefrosinovka, Rogoztsy, Bezlepkino, Zaoskol’e, Repets, Stuzhen’, and the eastern part of Yastrebovka. Throughout the entire day Gollwitzer’s group continued its unsuccessful attempts to break through to Manturovo through the 167th Rifle Division’s position and was fighting along the line Repetskaya Plota—Ostanino.

On 7 February our forces pursuing the enemy, as was the case the previous evening, were pushing back the enemy’s covering units but were unable to attack his main forces. By the close of 7 February the situation of the 38th Army’s forces was as follows. The 240th Rifle Division was occupying Tim and Stanovoe, having organized a defense with one regiment east of the town along heights 256 and 255. The 237th Rifle Division, which had abandoned Yefrosinovka and Degtyarnaya on 7 February, had by the close of the day fallen back to the line Petrovka—Dubinovka, where it blocked the enemy’s further advance along the road to Rep’evka. Following its retreat from Zaoskol’e, Stuzhen’ and Yastrebovka, in the evening the 232nd Rifle Division occupied Kuliga and Razbiraevka with one regiment and the western part of Yastrebovka and Bol’shie Butyrki with two regiments. The 167th Rifle Division, while repelling the enemy’s attacks, was holding its previous position. On 7 February the 40th Army’s 25th Guards Rifle Division was on the march from the Baranovo area to the area of Teplyi Kolodez’ and Saltykovo, from where it was to advance toward Belgorod behind the army’s remaining formations, which were developing the offensive along the Khar’kov axis. The 253rd Rifle Brigade occupied Borkalovka; the 206th Rifle Division captured Srednie Apochki and Nizhnyaya Kleshevka, while the 129th Rifle Brigade and the composite training brigade occupied Znamenskoe and Kamenka. Thus in two days of fighting the enemy managed to push back the 237th and 232nd rifle divisions to the west and once again advance 15-30 kilometers to the west. In evaluating the situation by the close of 7 February, the commander of the 38th Army considered it likely that on 7 February the enemy would continue to try to break through with his main forces to Tim and Manturovo. This assumption was confirmed by prisoners, who testified that the German troops had been ordered to break out of the encirclement to the west at all costs.

Based upon this, the 167th, 232nd, 237th, and 240th rifle divisions were ordered to prevent the enemy’s further breakthrough to Tim and Manturovo, while holding their present lines. On 8 February, as on the previous evening, the snowstorm continued. The troops’ movement even along the roads was made much more difficult and observation was extremely restricted. In the first half of the day units of the 237th Rifle Division were attacked along the line Petrovka—Dubinovka and, following stubborn fighting, began to fall back to the area height 250— Rep’evka—height 241. By the close of the day the 237th Rifle Division had been forced, under enemy pressure, to began a further withdrawal to the north to the line excluding Korov’i Verkhi— Belovskie Dvory—Teplyi, where it established contact with units of the 240th Rifle Division occupying heights 255 and 256. Siebert’s group, having occupied Rep’evka and Pogozhee by the close of the day, was attempting to break through to the town of Tim, but upon encountering resistance by the 240th Rifle Division, did not achieve success. While blocking group Bruchmann’s retreat to Tim along the sector Pokrovka—Bol’shie Butyrki—Razbiraevka, the 232nd Rifle Division was fighting along this line until the second half of the day. Under the pressure of superior enemy forces, the enemy was subsequently forced to fall back to the line Yekaterinovka—Prilepy. During this time the 167th Rifle Division was engaged in a stubborn fight with Gollwitzer’s group along the front Krasnaya Narezka—Ostanino—Repetskaya Plota. The enemy’s subsequent attempts to break through to Manturovo were repelled by these divisions’ units. Thus although on 8 February the enemy’s intentions to break through to Tim and Manturovo did not enjoy success, nevertheless on that day he managed once again to push back units of the 237th and 232nd rifle divisions and advance somewhat to the west.

As a result of the fighting with the enemy’s rearguards, the 38th Army’s remaining formations occupied by the close of the day: 253rd Rifle Brigade—Verkhnie Apochki; 129th Rifle Brigade— Dubrava and Golovishcha; 206th Rifle Division—the road junction near Shlyakhovaya, and; the composite training brigade—Nikol’skoe. At the same time the 38th Army was fighting the enemy’s Voronezh —Kastornoe group of forces, which was attempting to break out through Tim and Manturovo toward Oboyan’, the front’s neighboring armies achieved new successes. By the close of 8 February the 60th Army’s forces, which had advanced up to 80 kilometers from the line of the Tim River to the west, captured the enemy’s important center of resistance and the major railroad junction of Kursk. By this time the 40th Army’s forces, having advanced up to 90 kilometers along the Khar’kov axis, began fighting for Belgorod and on 9 February completely cleared it of the enemy. In this situation it was not yet too late for all of the 38th Army’s formations to decisively attack the enemy from the northwest (240th and 237th rifle divisions), the west (232nd and 167th rifle divisions) and from the east (the army’s remaining forces) and eliminate it. However, this was not done, which made the further fight with the enemy’s group of forces significantly more difficult. On the morning of 9 February Siebert’s group began an attack from the Rep’evka—Pogozhee area in the direction of the town of Tim, but, upon encountering stubborn resistance by the 240th Rifle Division’s units, it was unable to break through to the town and turned its units to the south. During the second half of the day this group reached Zalomovka and continued to move on Kus’kino. Siebert’s group, which was moving to the south, was getting into the rear of the 232nd Rifle Division, which at this time was fighting along the line Yekaterinovka—Prilepy, having deployed its front to

the east. Because of this, the commander of the 38th Army ordered the 237th Rifle Division to launch an attack from the Belovskie Dvory—Teplyi area in the direction of Pogozhee and Kus’kino. In carrying out the assigned task, the units of the 237th Rifle Division attacked and by the close of the day had begun fighting with Group Siebert’s powerful rearguard in the Pogozhee area. Bruchmann’s group, which had begun its attack from the line Savilovka—Bol’shie Butyrki in the direction of Yekaterinovka, by the close of the day had thrown back units of the 232nd Rifle Division to the north, on the line Krasnyi—Prilepy. At this time, Group Gollwitzer, which was attacking in the general direction of Manturovo, pushed back slightly the left flank of the 167th Rifle Division to the southwest. The commander of the 167th Rifle Division, in view of his left flank’s retreat from Repetskaya Plota to the southwest, and that of the 232nd Rifle Division to the north, and fearing encirclement as a result, concentrated the division in the Ostanino area during the second half of the day, after which he began to pull it back to the area Repets—Bol’shie Butyrki—height 226. As soon as these divisions abandoned Yekaterinovka, Repetskaya Plota and Lobovskie Dvory, Group Gollwitzer streamed toward Manturovo and in the evening occupied this inhabited locale. By the close of the day Group Bruchmann occupied Yekaterinovka and Repetskaya Plota, while Group Siebert had concentrated in the Kus’kino—Rogovaya—Puzachi area. The abandonment by the 232nd and 167th rifle divisions of the Yekaterinovka—Repetskaya Plota—Ostanino area enabled the enemy to withdraw all three groups without molestation in a single direction through Manturovo on Solntsevo, because there were no longer any of our troops here. At the same time, the withdrawal of the 232nd and 167th rifle divisions from the path of the enemy’s

retreat facilitated the unification of the enemy’s groups. The decisions by the division commanders testify to the division commanders’ fears of getting encircled, to the absence of decisiveness and initiative, and to the absence of proper command and control of these formations on the part of the commander of the 38th Army. The commander of the 38th Army and his staff, which were located on 9 February in Alekseevka, at a distance of 40 kilometers from the forward units, did not have wire communications with their troops. Radio communications worked with great breaks. Thus, troop control was lost and each formation operated independently. The responsibility for the escape of all three groups from the encirclement on February 9 lies completely with both the commanders of the 232nd and 167th rifle divisions and with the commander of the 38th Army. The division commanders did not manifest the necessary decisiveness and stubbornness and withdrew on their own initiative their forces from the enemy’s withdrawal routes, while the army commander, who lacked communications with them, was unable take measures to put things in order and organize troop command and control, and let the entire course of military operations develop on its own. As before, the remaining formations of the 38th Army, which were pursuing the enemy from the east, operated indecisively on this day. They limited themselves to only small fights with the enemy’s rearguards and did not strive to tie down his main forces in fighting. By the close of the day they reached the following: 253rd Rifle Brigade—Yefrosinovka; 129th Rifle Brigade—Razbiraevka; 206th Rifle Division—Stuzhen’, and; the composite training brigade— Yastrebovka. In evaluating the actions of the 38th Army’s commander, one can see that he calculated on blocking the enemy’s retreat on Tim and Manturovo with part of his army’s forces, while the remaining formations would pursue and destroy him along the retreat routes.

During the course of five days the 38th Army’s plan of operations was not crowned with success. Each day the enemy’s main forces pushed back the 237th and 232nd rifle divisions and advanced, while the 38th Army’s main forces, which were pursuing the enemy, were delayed along the roads by his insignificant rearguards. The commander of the 38th Army could not decide on adopting more decisive actions and attack the enemy with all his forces from various axes. As a result of the 38th Army’s indecisive actions, the enemy, whose main forces had broken contact with the army’s formations by 18-20 kilometers, no longer faced Soviet forces on 9 February. The division commanders and the commander of the 38th Army explained their caution by heavy snowfalls and the deep snow cover on the roads, which caused the artillery, tanks and supply trains to lag behind and which created difficulties in delivering ammunition. For example, in his combat report of 9 February, the commander of the 38th Army reported:

The three-day blizzard has completely halted movement along the roads. A large part of the artillery has fallen behind and the supply of the troops with ammunition, food and forage has almost completely stopped. All of the army’s available means, including transport and the local population, have been mobilized to clear the roads. It’s imperative to help the army with snow-clearing equipment. There are no rifle rounds and 76mm shells for the divisional artillery.

However, it should be noted that the enemy was in even worse condition. He had abandoned all his artillery and vehicles on the roads and was suffering serious shortages in ammunition. Thus it should be recognized that it was not the difficult meteorological

conditions that were the main reasons that enabled the enemy to unite and break free of our forces, but the absence of bold maneuver, the absence of command and control on the part of the army commander, and the indecisive actions of the formation commanders—the commander of the 232nd Rifle Division, Colonel Ulitin, and the commander of the 167th Rifle Division, Colonel I.I. Mel’nikov. On 9 February the commander of the Voronezh Front acquainted by wire the commander of the 38th Army with the overall situation and informed him that the 60th Army had occupied Kursk and the 40th Army Belgorod. He categorically demanded that the army commander more rapidly complete the destruction of the enemy’s retreating forces. However, the decision by the commander of the 38th Army (the army’s combat order No. 2 of 9 February) did not fully comply with the front commander’s demands. The order assigned the following tasks to the army’s forces. During 10 February the 240th Rifle Division was to turn over the defense of Tim to the 129th Rifle Brigade and on 11 February reach the Solntsevo area, preventing the enemy’s further retreat on Oboyan’. The division was ordered to send a forward detachment, consisting of a reinforced rifle battalion, to the Maksimovo area to secure the division’s arrival at the line Gridasovo—Solntsevo and to cover it against possible enemy attacks from the north and northwest. The 237th Rifle Division, along with the 96th Tank Brigade, was ordered to attack at dawn on 10 February from the line Pogozhee— Lisii Kolodez’ in the general direction of Manturovo, with the task of capturing it by the end of the day and thus cutting off the enemy’s path of retreat on Solntsevo. On the night of 9-10 February the 129th Rifle Brigade was to move

out of Razbiraevka to Tim and by the close of the day relieve the 240th Rifle Division. The 253rd Rifle Brigade was to attack to the west at dawn on 10 February, with the immediate task of reaching the Prilepy area and by the close of the day to capture Borzenovka and Nechaevo (south of Manturovo). The 232nd Rifle Division received orders to capture Repetskaya Plota by the close of 10 February, while the 167th Rifle Division was to capture Ostanino. The composite training brigade continued to remain in the army commander’s reserve. The 180th and 14th tank brigades were concentrating in Yastrebovka for materiel refurbishment. All of the 38th Army’s remaining formations were to pursue the retreating enemy on 10 February. From the tasks assigned to the troops, it is clear that the 38th Army commander intended to cut off the enemy’s path of retreat on Oboyan’ by maneuvering the 240th Rifle Division from Tim to Solntsevo, while the remaining forces would continue to pursue him to the west. However, in calculating the time, the 240th Rifle Division would be late by a whole day in carrying out its task, because the enemy, who had occupied Manturovo on 9 February, would already be in Solntsevo as early as 10 February. The 240th Rifle Division’s forward detachment, which was moved to the Maksimovo area on 10 February, due to its small numbers, could not have delayed the enemy before the arrival of the division’s main forces at Solntsevo. In the developing situation it would have been more correct to dispatch the 240th Rifle Division to Solntsevo immediately, without awaiting its relief by the 129th Rifle Brigade, because by this time the enemy was no longer threatening Tim. In this case, the division, having occupied Solntsevo on 10 February, would have blocked the retreat of all three of the enemy groups on Oboyan’. At worst, the 240th Rifle Division could have won a day of

time if it had been relieved on the night of 9-10 February by units of the 237th Rifle Division, which were located near Tim, and by the close of 10 February reach the Solntsevo area. However, as a result of the incorrect evaluation of the situation, a poor knowledge of our troops’ situation and the lack of control over them, the army commander continued to act indecisively. The snowstorm ended on 10 February. The remnants of the German and Hungarian divisions, while covering themselves with rearguards and screens, retreated unmolested along the Manturovo—Solntsevo road. In front was the Gollwitzer group, followed by Siebert’s group and then Bruchmann’s group. The enemy air force dropped ammunition and food, which the troops especially needed, to the retreating German forces along the road. Individual groups of enemy planes launched strikes against our units along the roads and in the inhabited locales, trying to delay their advance. The Voronezh Front’s aviation had been thrown into supporting the front’s main forces, which were attacking along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. Thus it was unable to hinder the enemy’s organized retreat. By the close of the day the Gollwitzer group reached the Subbotino —Belyi area; Siebert’s group concentrated in the Kolodezek— Grebennoi—Svinets area, and; Bruchmann’s group was in the Manturovo area. The enemy forces continued to retreat unmolested to the west. The 38th Army’s actions on 10 February were particularly distinguished by passivity. The 240th Rifle Division remained all day in Tim, waiting for the 129th Rifle Brigade, which did not arrive in town until the close of the day and did not relieve the division. This brigade was delayed by individual enemy elements in the Petrovka area. Only during the latter half of the day, having kicked the enemy out of this area, did the brigade depart for Tim and by the close of the day it began to arrive in individual groups in Rep’evka. By the close of the day the forward detachment that had been dispatched by the 240th Rifle Division, reached Leshchinnaya Plota, without

having encountered the enemy. The 237th Rifle Division fought all day with the enemy’s rearguards to capture the inhabited local of Pogozhee, but due to a shortage of bullets and shells and the tanks lagging behind, it was unable to capture it completely. By the close of the day the 253rd Rifle Brigade, while pursuing and destroying small enemy groups, reached the Lisii Kolodez’ area; the 232nd and 167th rifle divisions remained in their previous areas, where they were putting themselves in order. By the close of the day the 206th Rifle Division, having occupied and cleared Pokrovka of small enemy groups, reached the area Krutye Verkhi—Aleksandrovka—height 248, where it seized part of the artillery and vehicles abandoned by the enemy. On 10 February it became clear to the army commander that the 240th Rifle Division, which was in Tim, would not be able to cut off the enemy’s path of retreat near Solntsevo, because the enemy’s retreating forces had already reached Subbotino. For this reason, the commander of the 38th Army ordered the 86th Tank Brigade, which was operating with the 237th Rifle Division, to concentrate by the close of 10 February in Tim, from which on 11 February it was to launch a vigorous attack on Solntsevo. This measure, which was correct in its idea, could not be carried out, because the tank brigade only had enough fuel for it to concentrate in Tim. Thus the decision to employ the 86th Tank Brigade for an attack on Tim was cancelled: it was to attack along with the 240th Rifle Division, after the necessary fuel was delivered. Seeing that the enemy was slipping away, the army commander once again demanded that the 240th Rifle Division and the 86th Tank Brigade make a forced march on 11 February through Leshchinnaya Plota and reach the Solntsevo area, where it was to attack and destroy the enemy and on 12 February pursue his remnants retreating on Oboyan’. The army’s remaining formations were ordered to reach on 11 February the line Leshchinnaya Plota— Svinets—Krivetskoe—Arkhangel’skoe—Chapkino, and on 12 February the line Maksimovo—Solntsevo—Mar’ino—Zhuravka.

The enemy, who was stretched out along a single road, fell back on Solntsevo on 11-12 February, while trying to reach the Oboyan’ area as quickly as possible. On 11 February the 38th Army’s forces had no major collisions with the enemy. Gollwitzer’s and Siebert’s groups continued to fall back on Oboyan’ and by the close of the day were west of Solntsevo. The 240th Rifle Division, which left Tim on the night of 11-12 February, occupied the towns of Belyi and Subbotino in the second half of the day and cut off the retreat route to Solntsevo only for the Bruchmann group. This enemy group was almost completely destroyed in a stubborn nighttime battle. The small and uncoordinated enemy elements scattered and his artillery and vehicles were abandoned on the roads or seized by our units. At the same time, Gollwitzer’s and Siebert’s groups reached the areas of Pselets and Oboyan’, but the 240th Rifle Division was unable to cut off their path of retreat. By the close of 12 February the 237th Rifle Division, while pursuing and destroying small enemy screens, reached the Manturovo— Svinets area and, in conjunction with the 240th Rifle Division, took part in eliminating Bruchmann’s group in the Subbotino area. By the close of 12 February the 253rd Rifle Brigade reached the Il’inka area, the 232nd Rifle Division reached Krivetskoe, the 232nd Rifle Division reached the Lapukhinka—Arkhangel’skoe area, and the 206th Rifle Division occupied Troitskoe and Ukolovo. The 129th Rifle Brigade, which relieved the 240th Rifle Division in the Tim—Stanovoe area, was subordinated to the 60th Army and was moving to Kursk. The 86th Tank Brigade remained in Tim all of 12 February, due to the absence of fuel. The composite training brigade was in the army reserve and by the close of 12 February had concentrated in the Repetskaya Plota—Ostanino area. During the movement to the west of the 38th Army’s formations on

11-12 February, the divisional artillery fell behind, there was a shortage of ammunition among the troops, and the delivery of bullets, shells and fuel took place irregularly. The enemy’s combat aviation, which had increased its activity, launched strikes against our troops and rear organs. By the close of 12 February the remnants of the enemy’s Voronezh —Kastornoe group of forces reached the following: Gollwitzer’s group—Oboyan’, and Siebert’s group—Pselets. In this situation the commander of the 38th Army ordered his forces to encircle and destroy the enemy garrison in Oboyan’, with the idea of subsequently developing the offensive to the west in the general direction of Sudzha and Sumy (100 kilometers southwest of Oboyan’). On the morning of 12 February the 38th Army’s forces set out to carry out their assigned tasks and, following a two-day march, by the close of 14 February reached the front Solntsevo—Spartak— Zhuravka—Aleksandrovskii. In these two days the remnants of Gollwitzer’s and Siebert’s groups, which had concentrated in Oboyan’, put themselves in order and were preparing to defend the town. On the morning of 15 February the 38th Army’s forces continued to move on Oboyan’ and by the close of the day, having reached the line Vyshnyaya Kotova—Nagol’noe—Verkhnyaya Ol’shanka—Veselyi —Kochetovka, were 15-20 kilometers from the town. On 16 February the 240th Rifle Division, while moving from Vyshnyaya Kotova and covering the army’s right flank, occupied Kuliga and Rudavets and had begun fighting for Pushkarnoe. The 86th Tank Brigade, which was operating with it, remained in Solntsevo the entire day due to the absence of fuel. By the close of 16 February the 253rd Rifle Brigade occupied the inhabited locales

of Bobryshevo and Krivtsovo and had sent a reconnaissance detachment to Oboyan’. The 237th Rifle Division, having occupied Zorino and Snobilov, had begun fighting the enemy defending Afanas’evo and Goryanino. At the same time the 40th Army’s 303rd Rifle Division, which was operating ahead of the 38th Army while securing its own army’s flank, was fighting the enemy south of Oboyan’ for the inhabited locales of Semenovka and Nizhnee Solotino. By the close of 16 February the 38th Army’s left-flank formations reached the following areas: 167th Rifle Division—Verkhopen’e, and the 206th Rifle Division—Krasnyi Pochinok and Korovino. Thus by the close of 16 February the town of Oboyan’ was already half-surrounded from the north, east and south by the forces of three rifle divisions and a rifle brigade. By this time the enemy garrison in Oboyan’ numbered up to 10,000 infantry, with artillery and consisted of the remnants of the Gollwitzer and Siebert groups, which had broken out through Solntsevo, and an infantry regiment that had been sent here from the reserve. The enemy had already made engineering preparations for a stubborn defense of the town of Oboyan’ and the adjacent inhabited locales. By the time indicated the front’s left-wing forces—40th, 69th and 3rd Tank armies—had reached Khar’kov and, following two days of stubborn fighting with the SS Panzer Corps’ units, by 1200 had completely liberated this major Ukrainian political and industrial center and set out to pursue the German-Fascist forces along the Poltava and Sumy axes. Following the liberation of Kursk, the 60th Army’s forces continued to successfully develop the offensive along the L’gov axis. The commander of the 38th Army decided to capture Oboyan’ by a simultaneous attack from three sides. The 240th Rifle Division was

to attack from the north, the 253rd Rifle Brigade and the 237th Rifle Division from the east, and the 303rd Rifle Division from the south. The attack was planned for 18 February. During the day preceding the attack the army commander intended to concentrate the 86th Tank Brigade in the Oboyan’ area, bring up his artillery and delivery ammunition and fuel. Major General Terent’ev, the deputy army commander, and Major Kremnin, the chief of the army staff’s operational section, were dispatched to control combat operations to capture the town of Oboyan’. It should be noted that this decision by the 38th Army commander did not correspond to the real situation that had arisen, which demanded immediate and decisive actions to cut the enemy’s path of retreat. Simultaneously with the launching of attacks against the enemy forces in the town, it was necessary to call for detaching part of our forces for cutting off the enemy’s path of retreat from the town to the west. On 17 February the enemy, having discovered our preparations for the attack on Oboyan’ and fearing the garrison’s complete encirclement, left powerful screens along the town’s outskirts and blew up the bridge over the Psel River and part of the town’s buildings and began a hurried retreat from Oboyan’ to the west on the night of 17-18 February. The 38th Army’s forces, upon clearing the enemy out of Oboyan’, went over to pursuing the retreating enemy on 18 February. The 38th Army’s combat operations against the remnants of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, which lasted 2-17 February 1943, unfolded in difficult winter conditions. Snow storms, which raged several days, covered the roads and made the troops’ advance very difficult. The divisions’ and brigades’ artillery, auto transport and other vehicles fell behind the troops, while the rifle units were short of shells, fuel and bullets. Due to the snow cover and a shortage of fuel, the tank brigades were forced to stand idle for entire days.

In these conditions the 38th Army’s forces, while pursuing and destroying the remnants of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces, advanced 130 kilometers in a 15-day offensive. During this period the army’s forces inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel on the enemy. Of the 20,000-25,000-man enemy group of forces that broke out of the Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol area, only an insignificant part of it managed to make it to Oboyan’. During the night of 17-18 February the forces of this enemy group ran away from Oboyan’ to the west. The 38th Army’s extended battles to destroy the enemy’s Voronezh —Kastornoe group of forces can be explained foremost by shortcomings in troop control. Up until 6 February the forces of the 38th Army and part of the 40th Army’s rifle divisions were destroying the enemy group of forces trying to break out. But despite our superiority in strength, the enemy had not been destroyed by this time, because there was lacking an overall plan for these armies’ actions and coordination between the formations taking part in the destruction of the enemy forces. Serious shortcomings in troop control were present after 6 February as well, when the destruction of the enemy was entrusted to the 38th Army alone. It is known that during this period a part of this army’s divisions was located along the enemy’s path of retreat, while the army’s remaining forces conducted the pursuit. As a result of frequent breakdowns in the army headquarters’ communications with the divisions, in a number of instances the latter operated without the necessary coordination between them. Due to the artillery and tanks falling behind, the main burden of fighting the retreating enemy was on the infantry alone. As the entire course of combat operations showed, the enemy was not once attacked by the 38th Army’s main forces throughout the entire period. Only a part of the army’s forces operated along his path of retreat, primarily carrying out passive tasks. Significant

forces of the army were tied down by the actions of the enemy rearguards, which tried to secure the retreat of the enemy’s main forces to the west. During the most intense period of fighting, 4-10 February, there were two rifle divisions in Tim that were not employed to cut the retreat of the enemy group of forces. The indecisive actions of the army command and those of the formation commanders and the pushing out of the enemy, which sprang from the absence of firm control and halfway decisions by the commander of the 38th Army, enabled the enemy to slip out of the encirclement in the Gorshechnoe—Staryi Oskol area and also in the area of Oboyan’ and thus save part of his forces from complete defeat.

The Results of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Offensive Operation and Some Brief Conclusions

The Voronezh—Kastornoe offensive operation, which was conducted during January-February 1943, lasted 25 days. During this time a major German-Fascist group of forces, which was operating along the Voronezh—Kursk axis was defeated, the enemy’s Voronezh salient was eliminated, and a large part of the Voronezh and Kursk oblasts, including the cities of Voronezh, Kastornoe, Staryi Oskol, Tim, Oboyan’, and many other inhabited locales, was liberated from the Hitlerite aggressors. During the operation the main forces of the German Second Army and the Hungarian Second Army’s III Army Corps were routed. In all, during the period of operations our forces defeated more than 11 enemy divisions, including nine German and two Hungarian infantry

divisions.⁵ Our troops captured tens of trains and depots with ammunition and food, as well as a large amount of other military equipment. With the elimination of the Voronezh salient and the defeat of the enemy group of forces defending it, the necessary conditions were created for conducting the Soviet forces’ next major offensive operation along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The Voronezh—Kastornoe operation is an example of organizing and conducting an operation for encircling and destroying a major enemy group of forces by part of two fronts’ forces. It was the second (after the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ operation) in a system of consecutive operations carried out along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes during the Soviet army’s general offensive. The Voronezh—Kastornoe operation was prepared and began during the course of the preceding Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ offensive operation and concluded during the preparation and conduct of the next consecutive operation along these axes—the Voronezh Front’s Khar’kov operation. The operation was conducted in conditions of a harsh and snowy winter, which required a great deal of physical and moral intensity from the command, staffs and troops in resolving the combat tasks entrusted to the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command. The idea of this operation consisted of launching a series of attacks along converging axes for the purpose of breaking up the enemy’s defensive front and encircling and destroying his group of forces in detail. The favorable contours of the front line and our troops’ flanking position vis a vis the enemy, and our two-three-fold superiority in men and materiel over the enemy favored the realization of such a

plan. In this situation the powerful attacks by the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army in the general direction of Kastornoe were supposed to result in the cutting of the enemy’s path of retreat to the west, to the completion of the encirclement and destruction of all the enemy’s forces located to the east of Kastornoe. At the same time, attacks by the Voronezh Front’s 38th and 60th armies toward Nizhnyaya Veduga were to split up the group being encircled into parts, thus creating favorable conditions for its complete destruction. The absence of any kind of enemy forces that could have delayed the movement of our forces to the west for the creation of an external front eased considerably the fulfillment of our tasks for encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The successful resolution of this task in short order would have enabled us to free up the maximum amount of men and materiel for the subsequent development of the offensive along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. Thus the objective prerequisites favored the successful conduct of the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, which pursued decisive ends. Nonetheless, we did not manage to completely encircle and destroy the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces. The troops of the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts got across the enemy’s path of retreat, but were unable to create a reliable external encirclement front, as a result of which they were unable to conclude the complete encirclement and destruction of the enemy group of forces. The enemy managed to break out of the encirclement and withdraw part of his forces to the west. The fighting to destroy the escaping enemy forces became prolonged and drew in significant amounts of the Voronezh Front’s men and materiel, which were so necessary for developing the offensive along the Kursk and Khar’kov axes. The main reasons hindering our forces from completely destroying

the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces were the serious mistakes made in planning and conducting the operation. An overall shortcoming of the planning of the offensive by the Voronezh Front and the Bryansk Front’s left flank was the not-wellfounded distribution of forces designated for creating the internal and external encirclement fronts. According to the operational plan, the main forces of the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army were to attack along the external front and arrive at the Tim River. Essentially, only the 307th Rifle Division and the 129th Tank Brigade were to be directed to the Kastornoe area to link up with the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army and to create an internal encirclement front. The 132nd and 8th rifle divisions, attacking along the left flank of the army’s shock group, were to secure the boundary with the 38th Army after the breakthrough of the enemy’s defense and fill the gap between the 13th and 38th armies’ shock groups, the width of which reached 30 kilometers. The 40th Army detached only the 4th Tank Corps, 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade for creating the internal encirclement front. The main forces of the army’s first echelon (four rifle divisions), as well as the army’s second echelon, were directed to form the external encirclement front. At the same time, it should be noted that the 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade, while operating along the army’s right flank, were to secure the shock group’s flank and, as a result, were no longer able to more or less successfully carry out their main task. Besides, it is necessary to take into account the fact that on the operation’s second day the 4th Tank Corps’ main forces were supposed to attack through Nizhnedevitsk toward Nizhnyaya Veduga; that is, not to the place where the encirclement ring was supposed to close around the enemy group of forces. On the operation’s first day only the 4th Tank Corps’ reinforced forward detachment was moving to the Kastornoe area. Only units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division could reach the sector from Kastornoe to Gorshechnoe, the length of

which reached 40 kilometers, in order to complete the encirclement and form a continuous internal front. As a result, 1-2 rifle divisions and a tank brigade from the Bryansk Front’s 13th Army and part of the 4th Tank Corps and a rifle division from the Voronezh Front’s 40th Army could be employed for creating an internal encirclement front more than 70 kilometers long. Of course, these forces were obviously insufficient not only for creating a continuous internal encirclement front and the destruction of the enemy being encircled, but also for preventing a withdrawal by his individual units and formations. At the same time, significantly more forces were detached for the formation of an external front than were required by the conditions of the situation and the idea of the operation under preparation. In this situation, the attacks by the 38th and 60th armies toward Nizhnyaya Veduga, which were calculated to split up the enemy group of forces, were already unable to achieve their goal and led only to pushing the enemy out. In any offensive operation, and all the more so in an operation conducted for the purpose of encircling and destroying the enemy, the group of forces must correspond to that goal which it is necessary to accomplish as a result of conducting the operation. In the operation under study, neither the commander of the Voronezh Front nor the front’s army commanders devoted enough attention to the creation of powerful second echelons and reserves. The main requirements of Soviet military art for the operational formation of the troops were not fully observed. The front commander did not dispose of either the combined-arms or tank reserves that could have been employed for developing the success along the main axis for the purpose of completing the encirclement and destruction of the enemy as rapidly as possible. There were also no second echelons in the 40th Army, which was to launch the

front’s main attack. The absence of second echelons and reserves in the front was one of the critical shortcomings in the decision by the commander of the Voronezh Front. The absence of powerful second echelons and reserves made more difficult the augmentation of the attack’s strength during the operation and the creation of a decisive superiority in men and materiel over the enemy along the axis of the main attack, despite the fact that all the possibilities for this existed in the front. It is known that the successful accomplishment of the encirclement and destruction of an enemy group of forces is achieved not so much by an overall superiority of forces so much as by the creation of a decisive superiority in men and materiel along the axis of the main attack, the vigor of operations, and the decisiveness and skill of maneuver. One of the typical features of the many operations carried out by the Soviet army to encircle and destroy the enemy is the fact that the overall superiority of our forces over the enemy was, as a rule, insignificant. However, along the axes of the main (basic) attacks our command, by means of bold and decisive maneuver, has created shock groups that did not lose their superiority over the enemy in men and materiel right up to the achievement of the operation’s final goal. These groups of forces were in a condition to vigorously develop attacks in depth, decisively get into the flank and rear of the enemy group of forces being encircled, and to completely destroy or capture his forces. An analysis of the correlation of men and materiel along the breakthrough sectors of the Voronezh Front’s armies before the start of the operation shows that the distribution of men and materiel and the densities created were approximately the same and, in the 40th Army, which was to launch the front’s main attack, even somewhat less than in the armies operating along the other axes.

As a result of this, despite the relatively high degree of concentration of men and materiel along the axis of the 40th Army’s main attack, which reached 83 percent of the army’s available strength, from the very beginning the army’s forces were placed in a very unfavorable situation. Thus the idea of fully encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces was not properly reflected in the groups of forces created in the front and in the armies. The men and materiel that had been detached directly for the encirclement and destruction of the Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces failed to guarantee the augmentation of efforts along the axis of the main attack and the rapid encirclement and destruction of the enemy group of forces. The mistakes and miscalculations made in planning were not corrected in time during the operation. Quite the opposite, they became more acute during the conduct of the operation, complicating the battle with the enemy group of forces. Instead of employing our superiority in men and materiel and advantage in our operational situation, immediately after our forces’ meeting in the Kastornoe area and immediately throwing ourselves on the encircled enemy with the greater part of our forces, splitting up his group of forces and destroying it in detail, the Voronezh Front command and that of the 40th Army immediately directed this army’s main forces to the west to their jumping-off positions for the new offensive operation. We began to pay less attention to the fight with the encircled group of forces. The efforts of the two armies’ forces, which had been left to destroy the enemy, were not unified in time and aimed at carrying out this task as rapidly as possible. The fight with the encircled group of forces was waged indecisively and basically came down to pushing his main forces back from the front and cutting off his paths of retreat with small forces.

The incorrect perception by the front’s and armies’ commanders of the enemy’s capabilities and intentions burdened the evaluation of the situation for a long time, created an incorrect impression of our troops’ successes and restrained them from taking decisive measures directed at strengthening the troops of the internal encirclement front. The main enemy group of forces fell back on Gorshechnoe extremely slowly under the blows of the 38th and 60th armies’ forces and our aviation. This circumstance offered the opportunity to the commanders of the Voronezh Front and 40th Army to correct the errors committed in planning the operation and to direct the necessary forces of the 40th Army to Gorshechnoe and Kastornoe for the purpose of creating a continuous internal encirclement front. However, this, as the further course of operations showed, was not done during the course of an extended period (24 January-2 February). At the most decisive moment, the 40th Army’s forces were scattered along a broad front. The 183rd Rifle Division and the 129th Rifle Brigade, which were designated for developing the success along the main axis, were drawn into extended fighting with the enemy for the strong points of Sinie Lipyagi, Nizhnedevitsk and Yasenki. The army’s left-flank formations, which were supposed to reach the external front, were pulled into extended fighting for Staryi Oskol. Only units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division got across the enemy’s path of retreat, occupying a broad 40-kilometer front with large gaps in it. The underestimation of the enemy forces’ capabilities led to a situation in which as early as 29 January the enemy threw our units out of Gorshechnoe, and on 2 February begun to extricate his formations from the encirclement to the west and southwest. Throughout this period the enemy forces emerging from the encirclement slowly but stubbornly continued to advance to the west and southwest, in spite of the fact that significant forces from the Voronezh Front had been committed to destroy them.

By the end of January, when our forces had gotten across the enemy’s main retreat routes, a very favorable situation arose for the encirclement and destruction of the enemy’s main forces located in the Voronezh salient. However, neither the front command nor that of the 38th and 40th armies employed the opportunities at their disposal for decisively defeating the enemy. The operation to encircle and destroy the enemy group of forces was conducted with insufficient decisiveness, both on the part of the front commander, as well as on the part of the commanders of the 40th and 38th armies, and without fully employing the forces allotted for this. Even those small reserves that the 40th Army had were not employed quite correctly. They were dispatched not for the most rapid completion of the encirclement and destruction of the enemy group of forces, but for the development of the offensive along the external front, which completely failed to correspond to the developing situation. The actions of our forces were uncoordinated. Attacks along axes where we were trying to split up the enemy group of forces were carried out at different times, and were not supported by massive attacks by artillery, tanks and aviation. The directions of the enemy’s likely egress from the encirclement were not covered in time by powerful reserves, antitank weapons and obstacles. All of this was a result of the fact that the commander of the Voronezh Front did not manifest the necessary energy in organizing control over the troops completing the encirclement of the enemy. At the same time, as early as 28-29 January; that is on the operation’s fifth day, the developing situation insistently demanded the creation of a unified command of the forces operating along the internal encirclement front. A unified command was established only on 5 February (on the operation’s tenth-eleventh day); that is, when part of the enemy’s forces had managed to break out of the encirclement and the destruction of the enemy’s retreating troops was entrusted to the 38th Army alone.

The absence of reserves with the front commander and their shortage among the Voronezh Front’s army commanders had a negative effect on the offensive pace of our forces. At the same time the 38th and 13th armies’ offensive on Kastornoe was developing at an average rate of 13-15 kilometers per day, while in the 40th Army the average offensive pace for the first three days of the operation did not exceed six kilometers per day, while the 4th Tank Corps covered the 75-kilometer distance to Kastornoe in five days. The front and army headquarters also made a number of mistakes in troop control during the course of the offensive. These mistakes were committed both during the completion of the encirclement of the enemy’s Voronezh—Kastornoe group of forces and during the 38th Army’s struggle with the enemy group of forces emerging from the encirclement. As was already noted above, the decisive condition for the successful accomplishment of the task to destroy the encircled enemy should have been the immediate unification of all forces dedicated to the destruction of the enemy group of forces under a single command, which was not done because the command and control of the 38th and 40th armies, which were operating along the internal encirclement front, had not been organized. At the same time, as early as the final days of January the situation demanded the immediate subordination of the 40th Army’s formations, which were operating to create a continuous internal encirclement front, to the commander of the 38th Army, for the purpose of organizing tighter coordination with the army’s main forces and the subordination of all actions to the interests of destroying the enemy forces as quickly as possible. The resubordination of the 4th Tank Corps to the commander of the 38th Army acquired particular significance. This corps, which reached Kastornoe only by the close of the operation’s fifth day, had been significantly weakened in the previous fighting and was out of fuel. Not having communications with the 40th Army and not subordinated to the commander of the 38th Army, the corps was essentially idle for an extended period of time.

In the subsequent extended fighting with the remnants of the enemy group of forces exiting the encirclement, a major shortcoming in the leadership of our forces was the equal dispersal of our forces across the enemy’s paths of retreat. Up to 6 February the 38th and 40th armies’ forces participated in the destruction of the enemy. However, despite our forces’ superiority over the enemy, we were not able to fully rout him, as a result of the absence of coordination in the actions of these armies’ units and formations and the equal distribution of forces along the entire encirclement front. After the destruction of the enemy group of forces had been entrusted to the 38th Army alone, these shortcomings were not eliminated. This army’s forces operated along the enemy’s paths of retreat with only part of its strength, while the remaining forces were fighting his rearguards. As a result of the loss of troop control by the army headquarters, the formations, not knowing the overall situation, operated independently, indecisively and not always correctly. The slowness of the advance and the indecisive actions of the Voronezh Front’s forces, particularly those of the 38th Army, can also be explained aside from all the other enumerated reasons, by the great distance of the armies’ staffs from the troops (20-40 kilometers) and the absence of communications with them and, as a result, the poor control over the battle. Typical of the artillery’s actions was its employment predominantly as part of the rifle units and elements, which while attacking in conditions of a harsh winter and given the necessity of battling for strong points fitted out in inhabited locales, was completely correct. Tank units and formations were employed predominantly for the direct support of the infantry. The unfavorable meteorological conditions and the stubborn resistance by the enemy occupying strong points, to a significant degree made for a low offensive pace by the tank formations.

In the 40th Army the 4th Tank Corps was employed as the army’s mobile group, which was designated for getting into the operational depth, for linking up with the 13th Army’s forces in the Kastornoe area, and for completing the encirclement of the enemy group of forces. However, the first successes achieved by the corps were not taken advantage of and consolidated by the troops, and the tanks, having broken free of their infantry, reached the operational depth and, left without fuel, failed to carry out their tasks. Throughout the entire Voronezh—Kastornoe operation, the tank units and formations often operated without cooperating with the infantry and without sufficient artillery support and air cover. In the air force’s actions we can note the absence of cooperation between the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts’ aviation, which excluded the coordination of massed strikes against the enemy’s group of forces. Besides this, the insufficient number of planes in the Voronezh Front’s 2nd Air Army and the difficult meteorological conditions rendered support for the armies’ shock groups and particular the activities of the 4th Tank Corps in the depth of the enemy’s defense, to a certain degree more difficult. The equipment limits in both air armies excluded the opportunity of uninterruptedly supporting the infantry and tank attack and the opportunity of constantly acting against the enemy. Our fighter aviation’s lateness, due to the fact that prepping of the planes for their sorties demanded a lot more time than at other times of the year, often resulted in a situation in which the enemy bombers launched strikes unmolested against our forces. As an overall phenomenon, it is necessary to note the poor organization of cooperation between our aviation and ground forces. It is also necessary to point out the poor work of the front’s and armies’ rear organs for supplying the troops with fuel and ammunition as one of the operation’s serious shortcomings. The absence of the necessary amount of ammunition and fuel with the troops made the conduct of combat operations even more difficult

and significantly reduced combat results. Despite the shortcomings noted above in the actions of the fronts’ and armies’ command and headquarters, the Voronezh—Kastornoe operation was a brilliant testimony to the high morale and combat qualities of the Soviet forces, who in the difficult conditions of winter manifested mass heroism and personal valor in carrying out their combat assignments. The critical evaluation of the experience of this operation and a number of other operations, as a result of which we did not manage to completely eliminate the encircled enemy group of forces, will enable the Soviet army’s generals and officers to discover in a timely manner the operational shortcomings and mistakes and, therefore, strive to achieve their assigned tasks as quickly as possible and with the smallest expenditure of men and materiel.

1The 69th Army was formed on the basis of the 18th Rifle Corps. 2The 248th Rifle Division was to be transferred from the 38th Army and the 16th Destruction Brigade from the 40th Army. 3Editor’s note. This group was commanded by General Karl Hubert Lanz (1896-1982). Lanz joined the imperial German army in 1914 and served in the follow-on Reichswehr . He commanded a division in the initial invasion of the Soviet Union. He was also involved in the anti-Hitler movement in the army and was transferred to the Balkans in 1943. Lanz was convicted of war crimes in 1948, but released in 1951. 4Editor’s note. This was probably General Friedrich Gollwitzer (18891977). 5German 26th, 82nd, 68th, 377th, 88th, 75th, 323rd, 340th, and

57th, and Hungarian 6th and 9th infantry divisions.

Part V

The Voroshilovgrad Operation

1

The Fighting for Voroshilovgrad The Red Army’s successes in the broadly unfolding offensive were achieved thanks to the skillful employment of tactical maneuver. To maneuver skillfully on the battlefield means to attack the enemy in his weakest and most vulnerable areas, to launch flank attacks against him, to outflank and envelop his groups of forces, to get into his rear, and to rapidly shift one’s own units and formations and hit the enemy where he doesn’t expect it. In this sense, the 3rd Guards Army’s combat actions in taking Voroshilovgrad are of significant interest and may serve as an instructive example. This article has as its purpose to show the most characteristic moments of partial regroupings, the skill of maneuvering on the battlefield and the vigor of individual units’ attacks and to thus assist the Red Army’s officer corps to absorb positive combat experience and to employ it in further fighting to defeat the fascist aggressors.

The situation

Following the December rout of the Italian Eighth Army and the

remnants of the Romanian Third Army, as well as the German groups of forces in the area of the Don’s middle course and southwest of Stalingrad, the Southwestern Front’s forces continued their successful offensive toward the Donets basin. The front’s 3rd Guards Army, which had the task of reaching the Ordzhonikidze— Stalino area in the beginning of February 1943, successfully forced the Severskii Donets River along the Kruzhilovka—Davydo-Nikol’skii sector and began a stubborn battle on the approaches to Voroshilovgrad. The enemy tried to delay our offensive through uninterrupted counterattacks by major infantry units, supported by tanks and aviation. By 4 February the army was fighting along the front Podgornoe (20 kilometers east of Voroshilovgrad)—Lysyi—Novo-Annovka—Krasnoe —Popovka—Samsonov—Malyi Sukhodol—Popovka (eastern) and then along the left bank of the Severskii Donets as far as Kalitvenskaya. To the right units of the 1st Guards Army were attacking; to the left, the 5th Tank Army. The 3rd Guards Army was to launch its main attack to the southwest toward Stalino, where it was to link up with the 1st Guards Army. The length of the 3rd Guards Army’s front reached 100 kilometers, while the front along the army’s right wing was directed toward the west, the center to the south, and the left wing to the southwest. Such a configuration of the front arose as the result of the forcing of the Severskii Donets and the rapid advance of the army’s right-wing forces to the west. The enemy had created three defensive lines for covering Voroshilovgrad. The first of these ran through Podgornoe (20 kilometers east of Voroshilovgrad), Ogul’chanskii, Lysyi, Belo-Skelevatyi, Nizhnii Gabun,

Verkhnii Gabun, Orlovka, and Samsonov. The second defensive line was created along the Luganchik River (a tributary of the Severskii Donets), and the third directly along the outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. The city had been carefully prepared not only for perimeter defense from the direction of the outskirts, but also for stubborn fighting within. The vigor of our forces’ offensive, as well as the winter conditions, had kept the enemy from creating continuous defensive lines and the defense mainly consisted of individual strong points and centers of resistance, chiefly constructed in the inhabited locales. There were outfitted field earth and timber pillboxes in the spaces between the strong points and on the commanding heights, which enabled him to create a continuous screen of fire from infantry weapons in opposite the defensive front. Thus the approaches to Voroshilovgrad were outfitted to a sufficient degree and were covered by reliable garrisons, while the uninterrupted arrival of reserves from the depth instilled the hope in the enemy that he would not only hold Voroshilovgrad, but would throw our units back behind the Severskii Donets River. In the developing situation the 3rd Guards Army had to wage intensive fighting, despite the fact that its units had been somewhat weakened by the preceding uninterrupted fighting; this was particularly true of the mobile combat arms. The correlation of forces on 9 February was as follows: 1.8:1 in battalions; 2.7:1 in guns; 5:1 in mortars; 2:1 in heavy machine guns, and; 1:1 in light machine guns in our favor.

The 3rd Guards Army’s plan

In the developing situation it was important for the 3rd Guards Army, without losing time straightening out its front line, to capture Voroshilovgrad as quickly as possible, because the enemy’s retention of the city would created a threatening situation for the subsequent offensive. On 4 February the formation commanders were issued the following orders: the 59th Guards Rifle Division, having covered itself with part of its forces along the Novaya Kievka—Skubrii sector, was to attack with its main forces at dawn on 5 February along the front Naplavnaya Dacha—Bolotnennoe in the general direction of height 175, launching an attack from height 158.6 toward Voroshilovka and, in conjunction with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 279th Rifle Division, encircle and destroy the enemy in the Voroshilovka—Valeevka—Novo-Svetlovka area; the division was to subsequently attack toward the eastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad, tying its actions with those of the 1st Guards Army’s 58th Rifle Division. the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, along with the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, while covering itself along the line height 175.8—height 181.4—height 172.6, was to attack with its main forces on the morning of 5 February in the general direction through Pavlovka toward height 151.3 and Voroshilovka, with the immediate task of closing, in conjunction with the 59th Guards Rifle Division, the encirclement ring and to destroy the enemy in the NovoSvetlovka area; the corps was to then attack toward the southern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad and by the close of 5 February capture the city in conjunction with the 59th Guards Rifle Division and the 279th Rifle Division attacking to the left. The 279th Rifle Division, while operating south of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, was to attack from the front Lysyi—Orlovka to the west. Upon capturing the line Novo-Annovka—excluding Krasnoe, the division was, in conjunction with part of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps’ forces, to develop the success to the northwest and launch an attack on Voroshilovgrad from the south and southwest, with the task, along with the 58th Rifle Division (1st Guards Army), the 59th

Guards Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, upon encircling and destroying by the close of 5 February the Germans’ Voroshilovgrad group of forces, to capture Voroshilovgrad. Thus the overall plan for the rout of the enemy group of forces and the capture of Voroshilovgrad consisted of launching an enveloping, concentric attack. The 14th and 61st guards rifle divisions (14th Rifle Corps), with their arrival at the front Georgievskoe—Orekhovka—Semeikino, were supposed to secure the actions of the army’s shock group from the southwest. The troops along the army’s central sector (General Pushkin’s group), which were operating along the front Samsonov— Podgornoe (along the Severskii Donets), received orders to capture Samsonov, Vodyanoi, Malyi Sukhodol, Belen’kii farm and, upon destroying the enemy units facing them and developing the offensive to the south. Major General Monakhov’s group was supposed to capture Kamensk and then attack toward Pleshakovo station. The 8th Cavalry Corps, which had been concentrated in the Ulyashkin—Verkhnyaya Staraya Stanitsa, at the disposal of the army commander, was ordered to be ready to develop the success of the army’s central sector troops in the general direction of Yasnyi. The 243rd Rifle Division was moving up to the front and concentrating in the area Mosty—Sadki—Zelenovka, while the 229th Rifle Brigade was to concentrate in the area of Plotina and Dubovoi. Both of these formations constituted the army commander’s reserve. Thus in the developing situation, when, on one hand, the troops along the army’s central sector had been drawn into heavy fighting with the enemy and, on the other hand, rapidity of action was of prime importance, we could not think of any kind of significant, even if necessary, regroupings. Only the insignificant castling of the

59th Guards Rifle Division to the Naplavnaya Dacha—Bolotnennoe area was carried out for winning the flank in the Nikolaevka area. Everywhere else, the 3rd Guards Army’s forces were forced to operate in that group of forces that had arisen as the result of intensive fighting for a bridgehead along the right bank of the Severskii Donets River.

Actions of the army’s right wing

From the Greki area the 279th Rifle Division concentrated along the line excluding Lysyi—Belo-Skelevatyi and on the night of 4-5 February carried out a night attack and by 0400 captured NovoAnnovka, and by the close of the day, in conjunction with units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, Gusinovka and Komissarovka were occupied. 18 kilometers remained to Voroshilovgrad. The division commander decided to continue the attack on Voroshilovgrad only at night for a surprise attack on the city. On the evening of 5 February the division’s units began to move, and by 1200 on 6 February, while pushing aside the enemy’s covering units, reached the southeastern outskirts of the city and occupied the airfield. Intensive fighting broke out for the city. Simultaneously with this, the division’s leftflank units occupied Rozzalinovka, Petrovka and Vasil’evka following a bitter fight. At noon on 6 February the forward units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps reached the southern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. During the second half of 6 February the enemy launched several attacks against the 279th Rifle Division’s flanks—from the eastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad and from the Znamenka area. There was

the danger of encirclement. While securely occupying Rozzalinovka, Petrovka and Vasil’evka with his main forces, the division commander occupied heights 142.2, 175.9 and 198 with part of his forces, with orders to secure the division against possible attacks from the south and east. Throughout 7-9 February units of the 279th Rifle Division, along with elements of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps that had been attached to it, were involved in bitter fighting along the southern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad, repelling the enemy’s uninterrupted counterattacks. Due to the fact that units of the 59th Guards Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were being delayed by the heavy fighting unfolding along the line of the Luganchik River, and that the 279th Rifle Division was forced to fight apart from the army’s main forces, the army commander decided to dispatch the 8th Cavalry Corps toward Voroshilovgrad and to reinforce the 279th Rifle Division with the 243rd Rifle Division’s 912th Rifle Regiment. The 8th Cavalry Corps concentrated in the Thaelmann area by the close of 9 February and throughout the following day, along with the 279th Rifle Division, undertook a series of unsuccessful attacks on Voroshilovgrad from the south and southwest. On 10 February the corps received orders to break free of the enemy in the Voroshilovgrad area and operate to the southwest toward Debal’tsevo. The 243rd Rifle Division’s 912th Rifle Regiment, which was advancing toward Voroshilovgrad from Novo-Annovka through height 198, reached the city and on the night of 9-10 February was subordinated to the commander of the 279th Rifle Division and, throughout 10-11 February both were engaged in bitter fighting for Voroshilovgrad. Only on 10 February did the 59th Guards Rifle Division, following six

days of bitter fighting in the Nikolaevka—Lobachevo—Sukhodol area, manage to break through to Voroshilovgrad and reach its eastern outskirts. Throughout 11 February the 59th Guards Rifle Division, together with units of the 279th Rifle Division, made several attacks on Voroshilovgrad. The fighting along the city’s outskirts was becoming intense. The enemy, while throwing the arriving units of the 335th Infantry Division and march battalions, was attempting to hold the town at all costs; there was fighting for each street and each building. Our units successfully repelled the enemy’s counterattacks and were slowly advancing. By 12 February, as a result of the bitter fighting along the city’s outskirts, a difficult situation had arisen for the enemy; the enemy began to lose his resilience and his counterattacks were weakening noticeably. An energetic attack on Voroshilovgrad from the north as early as these days might have led to the capture of the town. However, units of the 1st Guards Army’s 58th Rifle Division, which was operating along a broad front (up to 70 kilometers, and its 412th Rifle Regiment, which was supposed to launch an attack from the north, was operating along a 45-kilometer front), were unable to render the necessary help to the 3rd Guards Army’s right flank. By the close of 11 February our units were in the following situation: to the north small detachments from the 58th Rifle Division’s 412th Rifle Regiment were operating in the Zemlyanoi—Metallist State Farm—Staraya Vergunka area with a partisan detachment; the 59th Guards Rifle Division was fighting along the sector from the Parovoznik State Farm to Kamenolomnya. The 279th Rifle Division, along with attached elements from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 243rd Rifle Division’s 912th Rifle Regiment, was fighting along the southeastern, southern and southwestern outskirts of the city.

By the close of 11 February the 8th Cavalry Corps had reached the Illiriya area. There was fighting, which is described below, along the army’s remaining sectors. From the experience of the fighting along the secondary approaches to Voroshilovgrad, one can make the following conclusions:

•the 279th Rifle Division’s initial success in capturing the NovoAnnovka—Gusinovka—Komissarovka area was achieved exclusively thanks to a surprise and energetic night attack; •the 279th Rifle Division commander’s decision to continue the offensive toward Voroshilovgrad only at night corresponded to the situation, because the division’s movement during the day over open terrain could have opened it up for attack by the enemy’s air force and ground forces; •the change in the 8th Cavalry Corps’ task should be considered correct, because we could not allow the corps to get bogged down in extended fighting for the city; •due to the success achieved by the 279th Rifle Division, it should not have been reinforced by just one regiment from the 243rd Rifle Division; rather the entire 243rd Rifle Division should have been dispatched to the Voroshilovgrad area. The course of the fighting for the city shows that the detachment of a single regiment did not measurably influence the 279th Rifle Division’s subsequent actions; •the delay of the 59th Guards Rifle Division and units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps along the intermediate line of the Luganchik River led to a disruption in the schedule for capturing Voroshilovgrad, that had been laid out by the army commander; •due to the 8th Cavalry Corps’ arrival in the Illiriya area, the breakthrough of the 279th Rifle Division, followed by the 59th

Guards Rifle Division, toward Voroshilovgrad and their activities along the city’s outskirts created favorable conditions for the decisive storming of the city.

The 8th Cavalry Corps’ actions

According to the 3rd Guards Army commander’s initial decision, the 8th Cavalry Corps was directed to the south in the general direction of Yasnyi. However, due to the fact that the 59th Guards Rifle Division and units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were delayed along the line of the Luganchik River, and the 279th Rifle Division was isolated from the army’s main forces, the 8th Cavalry Corps was given the immediate assignment, together with the 279th Rifle Division, of capturing Voroshilovgrad and subsequently operating against the enemy’s rear through an attack toward Debal’tsevo.¹ Having begun moving into the breakthrough on 7 February, the corps became bogged down in fighting for Belo-Skelevatyi and Orlovka and was unable to break free of the enemy, having needlessly lost 1 ½ days in the fighting for these locales. Only by the close of 9 February did the corps manage to concentrate to the south of Voroshilovgrad, in the Thaelmann area. All of the corps’ attempts, along with the 279th and 59th Guards rifle divisions, to capture the city suffered failure. During the night of 9-10 February the corps was supposed to reach the Yekaterinovka area, in order to attack Voroshilovgrad from the west on the morning of 10 February, in conjunction with the 59th Guards Rifle Division attacking from the east, and the 279th Rifle Division attacking from the south.

However, the corps was delayed in reaching the Yekaterinovka area and began to move on the morning of 10 February, and then with only two divisions (112th and 55th), because the third division (21st) continued to fight along the southern outskirts of the city. Upon arriving at the Davydovka State Farm, the corps’ units were unexpectedly counterattacked by the enemy up to an infantry regiment (from the 335th Infantry Division) in strength, supported by tanks and aviation. The enemy counterattack was beaten off, but time had been lost and, the enemy, having brought up units of the 335th Infantry Division, was able to take up the defense in the area of the Davydovka State Farm and along the heights to the north. Further attempts by the corps’ units to break through to Yekaterinvoka were unsuccessful and it was forced to fall back to the area of Thaelmann and Vasil’evka. On the evening of 10 February a new order was received, in which the corps was instructed to break free of the enemy in the Voroshilovgrad area and, while attacking to the southwest, by the close of 11 February seize Voroshilovskii, and Debal’tsevo by the close of the following day. In carrying out this order and making a fighting advance along the indicated axis, by 11 February the corps had reached the Illiriya area and on 13-14 February reached Debal’tsevo, where intensive fighting broke out with the enemy’s arriving units. In studying the 8th Cavalry Corps’ actions, the following should be noted:

•the corps’ movement into the enemy’s deep rear had an immediate effect on the successful outcome of the struggle for Voroshilovgrad, because with the arrival of the corps’ units in the Debal’tsevo area the enemy’s most important communications were cut; •as early as the second day of the fighting for Voroshilovgrad, the

corps’ mission was changed, because the initial dispatch of the corps to the south did not correspond to the situation. At the same time, the change of decision shows the command’s flexibility in employing the combat means at its disposal; •the movement of the cavalry corps on Voroshilovgrad and the distraction of part of its forces for the fight for the city led only to a loss of time, men and materiel. Changing the corps’ mission to the Debal’tsevo area against the enemy’s communications was the most correct decision.

The fighting along the army’s center

There were combat activities along the line Podgornoe— Ogul’chanskii—Lysyi—Popovka—Samsonov at the same time as the fighting along the outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. The enemy was occupying Podgornoe, Khryashchevka, Ogul’chanskii, and Lysyi with powerful garrison, with earth and timber field-type pillboxes between them. By 4 February the inhabited locales of Belo-Skelevatyi and Orlovka were in our hands and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps’ units, which were occupying the Engels Collective Farm, Krasnoe and Semeikino, were able to communicate with the rear along a narrow corridor between Novo-Annovka and Popovka. From Popovka the front turned sharply to the east and was held by enemy garrisons in Samsonov, Vodyanoi, Malyi Sukhodol, Khutor Belen’kii, and Popovka (eastern). Our troops’ disposition opposite this line was as follows: units of the 59th Guards Rifle Division along the line Novaya Kievka—the upper

reaches of the Sukhodol ravine; the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade along the line from the latter point to the south, from height 161.5 to height 181.4; units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps occupied the area to the east and southeast of Lysyi; the 14th Rifle Corps’ 14th and 61st guards rifle divisions and the 169th Tank Brigade were operating in the area of heights 207, 202.8 and 206.9; units of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps and General Pushkin’s group were located along the army’s central sector. On the night of 4-5 February the right-flank 59th Guards Rifle Division’s main forces were concentrating in the Naplavnaya Dacha —Bolotnennoe area, having left behind along the Podgornoe— Skubrii line insignificant covering units, which throughout 5 February made several unsuccessful attacks on Podgornoe and Khryashchevka. On 6 February, due to the occupation of height 123.6 and Sukhodol by the 59th Guards Rifle Division’s right-flank units, the covering units captured the strong points of Podgornoe and Khryashchevka, destroying a significant part of their garrisons. The surviving groups of Germans hurriedly fell back on Lobachevo, Voroshilovka and Valeevka. While pursuing the retreating enemy, the division’s covering units on this day linked up with the main forces and were subsequently fighting along the line of the Luganchik River. The enemy, while striving to delay our forces’ offensive along the Voroshilovgrad axis, went over to the attack on the morning of 5 February, launching attacks simultaneously along the right flank from height 164.5 (four kilometers southwest of Ogul’chanskii) toward height 181.4, and along the central sector of the front along the Vodotok ravine toward Lipovyi, from Vodyanoi to Voroshilov, and from Malyi Sukhodol toward Bol’shoi Sukhodol. While operating toward height 181.4, the enemy managed to push back the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade’s left flank and capture the height, although his further advance was delayed.

Along the central sector our units, following an intense battle, were forced to fall back on Lipovyi. The enemy managed to temporarily occupy Voroshilov and penetrate to Bol’shoi Sukhodol in small groups. The enemy’s advance was halted by energetic counterattacks. Voroshilov was once again occupied by our forces and the groups of German automatic riflemen that had penetrated to Bol’shoi Sukhodol were destroyed. Thus the enemy’s attempt to cut off our forces, which were operating in the Lysyi—Popovka area, with a concentric attack was unsuccessful. On 6 February the enemy undertook a new counterattack against the 61st Guards Rifle Division’s units from Popovka toward heights 206.9 and 218.3, in the direction of Orlovka. This counterattack was also repelled. On 7 February there followed a second and more powerful counterattack by units of the SS Das Reich Division, supported by 40 tanks, from Samsonov toward height 218.3, and from Popovka toward Orlovka. Following an intensive battle, and at the cost of heavy casualties, the enemy managed to break through our front and capture Orlovka, Belo-Skelevatyi, Nizhnii Gabun, and Verkhnii Gabun. These are the units the 8th Cavalry Corps got into a fight with, when it was moving to the Voroshilovgrad area on 7 February. Due to the enemy’s capture of height 181.4, Orlovka, Verkhnii Gabun, Nizhnii Gabun, and Belo-Skelevatyi, as well as his stubborn resistance in the Lysyi—Novo-Svetlovka area, units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps were tied down in fighting and were unable to develop their attack on Voroshilovgrad along with the 279th Rifle Division. In order to destroy the enemy that had occupied height 181.4, the 243rd Rifle Division was dispatched toward Ogul’chanskii, and the 229th Independent Rifle Brigade toward Belo-Skelevatyi.

On 6 February the 243rd Rifle Division, having captured Ogul’chanskii, destroyed the enemy occupying height 181.4, and by the close of 8 February had begun fighting for Voroshilovka, Valeevka and Novo-Svetlovka along the line of the Luganchik River. The division’s 912th Rifle Regiment, as was mentioned above, moved out on the night of 8-9 February toward Voroshilovgrad to reinforce the 279th Rifle Division, where it arrived on the night of 910 February. On 7 February two battalions of the 229th Independent Rifle Brigade became involved in fighting for Belo-Skelevatyi and Orlovka, while two battalions were concentrated in the area of Nizhni Gabun, which by this time had been occupied by units of the 8th Cavalry Corps. The brigade, along with other units, was fighting for Belo-Skelevatyi and Orlovka until 11 February inclusively. Along the army’s left wing, General Monakhov’s group was fighting for Kamensk until 11 February, but was unsuccessful. On 7 February, following the turnover of their combat sector to units of the 5th Tank Army, the 60th and 203rd rifle divisions were concentrated in the area of Malyi Sukhodol. Subsequently, a new group for General Monakhov was created out of the 60th Rifle Division and the 229th Independent Rifle Brigade, which received orders to relieve units of the 1st Guards Army’s 58th Rifle Division to the north and northwest of Voroshilovgrad. By the close of 11 February the 60th Rifle Division and units of the 229th Rifle Brigade were moving up along the army’s right flank to the Nikolaevka—Sukhodol area. The study of the combat operations along the first defensive line allows us to single out the following characteristic features. The enemy defensive front was cut by a narrow corridor, along which ran the communications routes of our forces, which had moved to the west from the Luganchik River. By 4 February this corps was five kilometers wide along its narrowest point—the NovoAnnovka—Popovka sector; on 5 February, due to our forces’ seizure

of Novo-Annovka, the corridor’s width increased to eight kilometers (between Lysyi and Popovka). On 7 February, due to the enemy’s seizure of Orlovka and Belo-Skelevatyi, the corridor’s width actually shrank to three kilometers; it was along this corridor that supplies went to our forces operating in the area Voroshilovgrad—Engels Collective Farm—Krasnoe, as well as the 8th Cavalry Corps’ forces up to 12 February. The seizure of the Sukhodol, Podgornoe and Khryashchevka strong points by our forces was supported by the arrival of the 59th Guards Rifle Division’s units to height 123.6; that is, in the immediate rear of the enemy grouped in this area. Fearing encirclement, the enemy tried to fall back from the strong points mentioned, but he was unsuccessful and a large part of his forces was destroyed here. The enemy’s attempt to cut off our forces from their rear by a concentric attack was eliminated by our forces’ energetic counterattacks and the timely commitment of the second echelon (243rd Rifle Division) and the reserve (229th Rifle Brigade).

The fighting along the line of the Luganchik River

During 5-11 February the fighting along this line developed in the following manner. On 5 February the 59th Guards Rifle Division began an attack from the woods south of Naplavnaya Dacha and Bolotnennoe toward Nikolaevka, height 116 and Sukhodol. By the close of 6 February the division’s units managed to break through the enemy’s defense and capture height 123.6 and, on the following day, BurchakMikhailovka was occupied following intensive fighting. Throughout 8 February the division was fighting for Nikolaevka and Lobachevo. On

9 February the division’s energetic attack captured this inhabited locale and on 10 February it reached the eastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad, where it began fighting for the town. During 8-12 February the 243rd Rifle Division, which had been moved up from the second echelon, was engaged in intensive fighting for the Voroshilovka, Valeevka and Novo-Svetlovka strong points. According to the army commander’s decision, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps was to attack from the Lysyi—height 207 area toward the southeastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. On 5 February the corps successfully aided the 279th Rifle Division’s units to capture Komissarovka and Pavlovka. During the following days, due to the enemy’s counterattacks, the corps’ units had been drawn into the fighting for Novo-Svetlovka, Lysyi and Belo-Skelevatyi and were unable to carry out their original mission. Until the close of 11 February the corps was engaged in extended fighting in the area of the inhabited locales listed above. One can make the following conclusions on the basis of the fighting along the line of the Luganchik River. The 59th Guards Rifle Division was pulled into head-on attacks on Nikolaevkaa and height 116; in this situation it would have been better for the division commander to have launched his attack north of Nikolaevka to outflank it from the west. Without sufficient justification (as was the case with the 59th Guards Rifle Division), two of the 243rd Rifle Division’s regiments launched head-on attacks on Voroshilovka, Valeevka and Novo-Svetlovka, instead of outflanking Voroshilovka from the north and attacking this locale and Valeevka from the west. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps acted with insufficient decisiveness and initiative. Although there was an opportunity, part of its forces was

not detached for outflanking Novo-Svetlovka from the south. A joint attack by units of the 243rd Rifle Division from the north and units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps from the south could have brought about the defeat of the enemy’s units occupying the line of the Luganchik River even before 11 February.

The situation on 12 February and the decision by the commander of the 3rd Guards Army

By 12 February the following situation had arisen along the army’s front. The 59th Guards and 279th rifle divisions, along with attached units from the 2nd Guards Tank Corps, were involved in stubborn street fighting along the outskirts of Voroshilovgrad. The enemy continued to stubbornly defend in the city center and along the northern outskirts, but the strength of his resistance was falling noticeably. The 8th Cavalry Corps, while operating against the enemy’s rear in the Illiriya area, cut the enemy’s southwestern communications and thus deprived the enemy of the capability of transferring reinforcements to Voroshilovgrad. Intensive fighting was going on along the line of the Luganchik River, in the Lysyi—Popovka—Orlovka—Belo-Skelevatyi area, and also along the army’s left wing along the sector Samsonov— Popovka (along the western bank of the Severskii Donets River). On the right, the 1st Guards Army’s right flank had advanced significantly but its left-flank 58th Rifle Division, as before, had not advanced.

To the left, the 5th Tank Army was successfully developing the offensive to the southwest. In this situation the commander of the 3rd Guards Army decided to go over to a decisive offensive on the morning of 12 February with all of the army’s forces to capture Voroshilovgrad and to subsequently carry out the army’s main task of reaching the Stalino —Ordzhonikidze area.

The German forces’ defeat along the approaches to Voroshilovgrad

Along the line of the Luganchik River units of the 243rd Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps went over to the offensive on the morning of 12 February. The 243rd Rifle Division launched an attack with its main forces to outflank Voroshilovka from the north and then to the south to outflank Voroshilovka and Valeevka. Units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps launched an attack to outflank NovoSvetlovka from the south and then to the north to outflank it from the west. Thanks to this concentric attack, the enemy’s resistance was rapidly crushed, the Voroshilovka, Valeevka and Novo-Svetlovka strong points were encircled and the enemy garrisons within them were, for the most part, destroyed. In pursuing the retreating and uncoordinated enemy groups, by the close of 14 February our units reached the following: the 243rd Rifle Division the Davydovka State Farm and units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps the Georgievskoe area. East of the line of the Luganchik River combat operations developed in the following manner. By dawn on 12 February the 5th Guards

Motorized Rifle Brigade seized Lysyi, having almost completely destroyed the German garrison there. After this, the brigade attacked toward Belo-Skelevatyi, launching its attack along the northwestern outskirts. At 0500 on 12 February our units, which were operating in this area (the 14th Guards Rifle Division’s training battalion, the 61st Guards Rifle Division’s 558th Rifle Regiment, and two battalions from the 229th Rifle Brigade), went over to a decisive offensive. Resistance by the enemy garrisons in Belo-Skelevatyi and Orlovka was crushed and the enemy was almost completely destroyed. Simultaneous with this, Popovka was seized by units of the 14th Guards Rifle Division, and units of the 14th Rifle Corps, while rapidly advancing to the southwest, had reached the following by the close of 14 February: the 14th Guards Rifle Division to the Lutugino area, the 61st Guards Rifle Division to the line Glafirovka—the Karl Liebknecht State Farm, and the 50th Guards Rifle Division to the area Pervozvanovka—Andreevka. The 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, having turned over its sector to units of the 226th Rifle Division, by the close of 14 February had reached the inhabited locale (named after Voroshilov) and units of the 2nd Guards Tank Corps the area to the north of Kutserbovka; the 226th and 203rd rifle divisions remained along the line Samsonov— Popovka (eastern). General Monakhov’s group, while attacking north of Voroshilovgrad, by the close of 14 February occupied Liman, Tsvetnye Peski and Krasnyi, following stubborn fighting. Thus during 12-14 February the German-Fascist forces, which had delayed along the lines northeast of Voroshilovgrad, had been defeated and their surviving groups were hurriedly falling back to the west and southwest.

The bold maneuver by units of the 243rd Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps along the line of the Luganchik River led to the destruction of the enemy’s forces, while our units had the opportunity to almost uninterruptedly move from this line to the southwest. One should also note the well organized attacks by units of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade, which led to successful results in seizing the enemy-held inhabited locales of Lysyi and BeloSkelevatyi.

The storming and seizure of Voroshilovgrad

Simultaneous with the rout of the German-Fascist troops defending southeast of Voroshilovgrad, there was intensive fighting going on along the city’s outskirts. During this fight we were preparing for the general simultaneous storming of the city, which had been set for the morning of 14 February. Storming groups were created in the regiments; the artillery and mortars were brought up closer to the troops, and a significant part of them directly into the infantry’s ranks; the sappers were creating passages through the minefields along the sectors designated for the decisive attacks. At dawn on 14 February our forces went over to a general attack on the city. The 59th Guards Rifle Division, having broken through the enemy’s defense in the southeastern part of Voroshilovgrad, broke into the city center on the heels of the enemy. The attack by the 243rd Rifle Division, with the 243rd Rifle Division’s attached 912th Rifle Regiment and elements of the 2nd Tank Corps also developed successfully.

By the close of 14 February the city was completely in our hands, and small and uncoordinated enemy groups were running away in panic to the west and northwest. Thus the success of our forces in seizing Voroshilovgrad was decided by a general energetic storming and the arrival of the army’s units across the enemy’s communications southwest of the city. In this regard, the 8th Cavalry Corps’ movement into the enemy’s deep rear in the Debal’tsevo area played a major role.

Results and conclusions

1. The 3rd Guards Army’s combat operations were of a maneuver character; the following may serve as examples of this: the 279th Rifle Division’s seizure of Novo-Annovka and its rapid movement to Voroshilovgrad; the maneuver by the 59th Guards Rifle Division’s main forces from the Novaya Kievka area to the Naplavnaya Dacha— Bolotnennoe area; the movement of the 243rd Rifle Division’s 912th Rifle Regiment to the Voroshilovgrad area; the double envelopment by units of the 249th Rifle Division and the 2nd Guards Tank Corps of the enemy’s units along the Luganchik River; the movement of the 8th Cavalry Corps into the enemy’s deep rear, and; the maneuver by General Monakhov’s group.

2. The troops’ advance along individual axes cannot be the same in conditions of rapidly developing maneuver operations and the attacker’s concentration of forces, particularly of his mobile formations. The army’s mobile formations and shock groups, as a rule, will have higher rates of advance, which is confirmed by the experience of the 3rd Guards Army’s combat operations.

During the course of ten days the 3rd Guards Army’s combat operations unfolded simultaneously in several areas, which were not connected by the overall front line and even echeloned in depth. Such a development of combat operations is one of the characteristic features of modern maneuver operations.

3. The overall plan of the decision to capture Voroshilovgrad was built upon bold maneuver and a concentric attack, which ensured mobility and high speed in the development of combat operations.

4. The 279th Rifle Division’s successful actions in the course of nine days apart from the main forces and its fight against the numerically superior enemy forces may serve as a positive example of persistence, good command and control and supplying the battle with everything necessary on the part of the command and officer corps.

5. The 8th Cavalry Corps’ movement into the enemy’s deep rear significantly facilitated the rout of the Germans’ Voroshilovgrad group of forces and the seizure of Voroshilovgrad.

6. The successful storming of Voroshilovgrad was secured by the movement of the army’s main forces to the south and southwest of the city and the movement of General Monakhov’s group to the area north of the city, as well as the scrupulous preparation of the combat elements and their coordination in the fight for a major inhabited locale.

1The activities of the 8th Cavalry Corps in this operation are described in detail in the article “The Activities of the 8th Cavalry Corps Against the Enemy’s Communications.” Sbornik Materialov po Izucheniyu Opyta Voiny , no. 7, pp. 83-94.

Part VI

Documents ¹

Map 8 The Soviet Forces’ Offensive in Ukraine. The Repulse of the Enemy’s Counteroffensive. January-March 1943.

1. Stavka VGK¹ Directive No. 170697 to the Commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts and the Stavka Representative on the Confirmation of the Plan for Operation “Saturn”

²

3 December 1942

1. The plan for operation “Saturn” of 2 December of this year is confirmed.

2. The operation’s readiness; that is, the completion of the operation’s preparation—the delivery of ammunition and the putting of the troops and aviation in complete combat readiness—is timed for 9 December.

3. The occupation of the jumping-off area is to take place on the night of 9-10 December. The operation is to begin on 10 December.

4. The control of both fronts’ aviation is to be entrusted to Lieutenant General of Aviation Falaleev. ³

5. The coordination of both fronts’ activities in preparing the operation and conducting it is to be entrusted to Colonel General of Artillery comrade Voronov. ⁴

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin

2. Stavka VGK Order on the Formation of the 3rd Guards Army

⁵

5 December 1942, 0420 hrs

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. To form within the Southwestern Front the 3rd Guards Army, including within it: the 14th Rifle Corps, 50th Guards Rifle Division, the 159th Rifle Division, 197th Rifle Division, 278th Rifle Division, and the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps.

2. Appoint Lieutenant General comrade Dmitrii Danilovich Lelyushenko commander of the 3rd Guards Army and relieve him from the post of commander of the 1st Guards Army.

3. Appoint Major General comrade Ivan Pavlovich Krupennikov chief of staff of the 3rd Guards Army and relieve him from the post of chief of staff of the 1st Guards Army.

4. The headquarters of the 1st Guards Army is to be renamed the headquarters of the 3rd Guards Army.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin A. Vasilevskii

3. Stavka VGK Order on the Formation of the 1st Guards Army

⁶

5 December 1942

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. The 1st Guards Army is to include: the 4th and 6th guards rifle corps, the 153rd Rifle Division and the 18th Tank Corps.

2. Appoint Lieutenant General Vasilii Ivanovich Kuznetsov commander of the 1st Guards Army and relieve him from the post of deputy commander of the Southwestern Front.

3. Appoint Major General Ivan Timofeevich Shlyomin ⁷ chief of staff of the 1st Guards Army.

4. Employ the headquarters of the 4th Reserve Army as the headquarters of the 1st Guards Army and rename it the headquarters of the 1st Guards Army. Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin

A. Vasilevskii

4. Stavka VGK Directive to the Commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts and the Stavka Representative on the Change of Plan for Operation “Saturn”

⁸

13 December 1942, 2210 hrs

First. Operation “Saturn,” with our arrival along the line Kamensk— Rostov, was conceived in a military situation favorable to us, when the Germans did not yet have reserves in the Bokovskii—Morozovskii —Nizhne-Chirskaya area, when the tank army⁹ was successfully attacking toward Morozovskii, and when it was assumed that an attack from the north would be supported by a simultaneous attack from the east toward Likhaya. At the same time, it was assumed that the 2nd Guards Army would be shifted to the Kalach area and employed for developing the success toward Rostov and Taganrog. In such a situation, operation “Saturn” was fully justified. Second. Subsequently, however, the situation changed, and not in our favor. Romanenko¹⁰ and Lelyushenko¹¹ are defending and cannot move forward, because during this time the enemy has been able to bring up from the west a number of infantry divisions and tank formations, which are holding them. It follows that an attack from the north will not meet with direct support from the east from Romanenko, in view of the fact that an offensive toward Kamensk and Rostov cannot have success. I don’t even mention the fact that the 2nd Guards Army cannot be used for operation “Saturn,” because it is working along another front. Third. In light of all of this, it is necessary to alter operation “Saturn.”

The alteration consists of directing the main attack not to the south, but to the southeast, toward Nizhnii Astakhov and arriving at Morozovskii, in order to grasp the enemy’s Bokovskii—Morozovskii group of forces in a pincer movement, to stroll through its rear and eliminate it with a simultaneous attack from the east with Romanenko’s and Lelyushenko’s forces, and from the northwest with Kuznetsov’s¹² forces and the mobile forces attached to him. Filippov’s¹³ task in this will be to help Kuznetsov eliminate the Italians, reach the Bogucharka River in the Kremenovka area and create a serious screen against a possible enemy attack from the west. Fourth. The breakthrough is to be accomplished in the same areas as conceived for operation “Saturn.” Following the breakthrough, the attack is to be turned to the southeast toward Nizhnii Astakhov and Morozovskii and fall upon the rear of the enemy facing Romanenko and Lelyushenko. The operation is to begin on 16 December. The operation’s name is “Little Saturn.” Fifth. You can now do without the 6th Mechanized Corps, all the more so because the tank regiments have arrived to you. Thus the 6th Mechanized Corps is to be transferred to the Stalingrad Front for employment against the enemy’s Kotel’nikovskii group of forces. In exchange for the 6th Mechanized Corps, you may receive one of Filippov’s tank corps, either the 25th or 17th.

Vasil’ev¹⁴

5. Stavka VGK Directive No. 170711 to the Commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts and the Stavka Representative¹⁵ on the Resubordination of the 6th Army and the Change in the Boundary Line Between the Fronts

¹⁶

18 December 1942, 2400 hrs

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders: As of 0300 on 19 December 1942, the 6th Army, consisting of: the army headquarters, headquarters of the 15th Rifle Corps; the 127th, 267th, 172nd, 350th, and 106th rifle divisions; the 106th Rifle Brigade, 8th Artillery Division from the High Command Reserve; the 45th and 87th guards mortar regiments; an anti-aircraft artillery regiment; the 17th Tank Corps, 115th Tank Brigade, 82nd and 212th tank regiments, and 42nd Sapper Brigade; an independent army battalion of anti-tank rifles; a destruction brigade, communications units, and the army’s rear organs are to be transferred to the Southwestern Front from the Voronezh Front. As of 0300 on 19 December 1942 the boundary line between the Voronezh and Southwestern fronts is to be established along the line (500,000 map): Rtishchevo—Povorino—Novokhopersk— Buturlinovka—Verkhnyaya Gnilusha—Novaya Kalitva—Krinichnaya —Markovka. All locales, with the exception of Novokhopersk, are for the Southwestern Front. Confirm receipt and report on execution.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin A. Vasilevskii

6. Stavka VGK Directive No. 170715 to the Commanders of the Stalingrad and Southwestern Fronts, the 5th Shock and 5th Tank Armies, and the Stavka Representative¹⁷ on Resubordinating the 5th Shock Army and the Change in the Boundary Line Between the Fronts

¹⁸

26 December 1942, 0300 hrs

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders:

1. The 5th Shock Army, consisting of the 315th and 258th rifle divisions, the 4th Guards Rifle Division, and the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps, is to be subordinated as of 1200 on 26 December 1942, from the Stalingrad Front to the Southwestern Front.

2. Lieutenant General M.M. Popov ¹⁹ is appointed deputy commander of the Southwestern Front for controlling the activities of the 5th Tank and 5th Shock armies and is relieved from the post of commander of the 5th Shock Army and deputy commander of the Stalingrad Front.

3. Appoint Lieutenant General V.D. Tsvetaev ²⁰ commander of the 5th Shock Army and relieve him as deputy commander of the same army.

4. Include the 23rd Tank Corps in the 5th Tank Army.

5. The Southwestern Front’s main task along its left wing is to be elimination of the enemy in the area south of Surovikino and in the Chernyshkovskii area, and the capture of the Tormosin—Oblivskaya —Chernyshkovskii area.

6. Establish the boundary line between the Stalingrad and Southwestern fronts from Kalach (Stalingrad) to the south along the Don River.

7. Report on execution.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin A. Vasilevskii

7. Record of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief’s and his Deputy’s Direct Wire Conversation with the Commander of the Southwestern Front

²¹

28 December 1942

Colonel General Fedorov²² speaking. Vasil’ev and Konstantinov²³ speaking. We have a few questions for you.

1. If Romanenko is working poorly, we can replace him with Lieutenant General Popov, your deputy, so that he can command the 5th Tank Army, while at the same time remaining your deputy.

2. Mikhailov is thinking of dispatching tomorrow, or the day after tomorrow at the latest, a mechanized corps and one or two divisions over the Verkhne-Kurmoyarskaya crossing for an attack on Tormosin. Can you put forward some kind of force by that time toward Tormosin to meet this mechanized corps?

3. Romanenko reports that the 2nd and 23rd tank corps are supposedly sitting without fuel. Is this true? I checked with the GABTU ²⁴ and they told me that this cannot be the case, because both corps took with them two refills of fuel when they were being

unloaded with you. By the way, Mikhailov told me that you can get as much fuel as you want in the Kachalinskaya area.

How’s Badanov²⁵ doing? That’s all. Fedorov. Here’s my report.

1. Throughout the entire period of the two operations Romanenko has more often than not misunderstood the overall situation and often acts against the overall design, while striving, at best, to achieve local successes at the expense of larger ones. Besides this, Romanenko organizes the battle poorly and is, moreover, undisciplined, reporting obviously exaggerated data about the enemy, and confuses us, evidently with the intention of getting this or that reinforcement. I consider it dangerous to have such a commander and request that you replace him. You can, without a doubt, entrust the command of the 5th Tank Army to Popov.

2. I planned to shift the 8th Cavalry Corps, reinforced with artillery, tanks and guards mortar units, to Tormosin toward comrade Mikhailov’s group. This is a rather weak group, but I would like to move the 5th Mechanized Corps, following the capture of Chernyshkovskii, to Morozovskii from the rear; that is, from the south and then attack with it to the west. Thus only the 8th Cavalry Corps, with reinforcements, remains for Tormosin. Tsvetaev has the 3rd Cavalry Corps, which I had planned to employ for outflanking the Nizhne-Chirskaya group of forces from the east and crossing the corps over the Don River in the Suvorovskii area, which will reinforce comrade Mikhailov’s turning group. I have also decided to launch an attack with this corps along the front Tormosin—VerkhneAksenovskii toward the 8th Cavalry Corps. The 4th Guards Rifle

Division will also be crossing with the 3rd Cavalry Corps. As soon as they have crossed, Tsvetaev and Romanenko’s left flank will also begin attacking from the front.

3. I received two reports from Romanenko and his staff. The first report is that the 2nd Tank Corps is supplied with fuel and the 23rd is not supplied. Romanenko made his second report, that the 2nd Tank Corps had no fuel, after I ordered the corps to immediately move to the Milyutinskaya area. I sent a telegram to Romanenko with a warning that if the order was not carried out then Romanenko would immediately be put on trial. I ordered Popov to exactly carry out the order. Romanenko has fuel at his base and I reported to him how much fuel he has and reported this to Popov. I believe that the 2nd Tank Corps has fuel and that the 23rd Tank Corps is standing without fuel, although it could quickly be supplied with fuel, which I immediately ordered to be done. I calculate that this will be done by the morning of 28 December, following which I planned to move the 23rd Tank Corps to the area south of Milyutinskaya for a deeper attacking against the enemy.

4. Badanov sent me eight telegrams today. I sent him ten telegrams and now he’s fighting in Tatsinskaya behind a perimeter defense and is at his command post along the northwestern outskirts of Tatsinskaya. The corps has 39 T-34 tanks and 15 T-70 tanks. The enemy opposite him is operating from the Marinovskii area, according to Badanov’s report, with the forces of the 98th Infantry Division, plus tanks. Another group is operating from Bobovnya and Kovylkin. These retreating units are trying to break through. To the north of Tatsinskaya the enemy is located in the Skosyrskaya— Kryukov—Novo-Mar’evka—Verkhne-Oblivskii area. I believe these are also the enemy’s retreating troops, which broke away from the threat of encirclement and reached that area. Badanov reports that

the enemy is located 10-15 kilometers north of Tatsinskaya, although he informs us that that there are small groups of the enemy around all of Tatsinskaya. Today a communications officer arrived from Badanov, who left him on 26.12, at the headquarters of the 1st Guards Army. He reported that there is a shortage of ammunition, diesel oil and lubricants, as well as 300 tons of first and second class (captured) gasoline. The communications officer confirmed that the captured planes have been destroyed, besides which I have two communications about this from Badanov. In his last report, Badanov requested permission to leave Tatsinskaya. According to his report, he was subjected to heavy air bombardment throughout the entire day. I have taken the following measures to defeat the enemy in the Tatsinskaya—Skosyrskaya area and to cut off his paths of retreat: a) Pavlov ²⁶ and Russiyanov ²⁷ must move by the shortest route by forced march to Tatsinskaya and I have issued ordered for this by the most varied means and believe that the orders have been received, although I have no word on their departure; b) at 1200 on 27.12 the 3rd Guards Army’s 266th Rifle Division’s lead elements were passing through Kachalin, with the task of destroying the enemy in Skosyrskaya, occupying Skosyrskaya and then moving on Kryukov and Mikhailov. The 203rd Rifle Division is following immediately behind the 266th Rifle Division. I have a report that the 266th Rifle Division has begun to carry out its mission. The 14th Rifle Corps has been moved by me to the front previously occupied by Russiyanov and Pavlov, with the task of reaching the railroad and blocking the enemy’s path of retreat. To be sure, this sector of the front is weak right now and the enemy may try to break through here, but I calculate that the success by Romanenko’s right flank, as well as the capture of the Skosyrskaya area and the retention of the Tatsinskaya area, and even, given the successful movement of the forces designated by me to the Tatsinskaya area, following the enemy’s defeat here, I have in mind

arriving at the Severskii Donets along the front Ust’Belokalitvenskaya—Konstantinovskaya; c) I ordered that the 18th Tank Corps in the Millerovo area be immediately relieved by infantry and at 0800 on 28.12 to move the corps through Bol’shanka to Skosyrskaya, where it, while making a forced march, can arrive by the close of 28 December and take part in the fighting here. Depending on the situation, it’s possible that I will use the corps between the Kalitva and Bystraya rivers against the enemy’s flank and rear, of course, securing myself from the west. For two days now I have had the 197th and 278th rifle division’s from Lelyushenko’s army along the Kalitva River along the sector Nikol’skaya—Il’inka, and which have organized a defense, are carrying out reconnaissance to the west and southwest, and which are destroying or capturing individual enemy groups and detachments in the rear, which are still wandering along the roads and in the inhabited locales. Sometimes these detachments reach up to 4,000 men, with artillery and tanks, and we have to fight them; d) our night aviation is now working in the Tatsinskaya area and from the morning of 28.12 all of the front’s aviation will try to destroy the enemy in the Tatsinskaya—Skosyrskaya area. e) right now the following supplies are being dropped by parachute from 14 “Douglases” ²⁸ on Tatsinskaya: 3.2 tons of diesel oil, 1.2 tons of lubricants, 535 rounds of 76mm shells, 750 rounds of 45mm shells, 18,000 rifle rounds, and 560 hand grenades. I believe that the measures taken are sufficient to defeat the enemy in the Tatsinskaya —Skosyrskaya area and to hold it. The task is to carry out these measures rapidly and in a coordinated fashion, which is what I and the front headquarters, as well as the army headquarters, are working on all the time. I demanded from Badanov that he try to hold on in Tatsinskaya, but nevertheless informed him that only in extreme circumstances could he decide otherwise. It’s possible that I’m mistaken, but I believe in Badanov and will uninterruptedly work to keep his spirits up.

Allow me a few words about the enemy along the entire front. Everything that was facing the front before; that is, about 17 divisions, may be considered to have been completely destroyed and all weapons and supplies seized by us. We have captured more than 60,000 men and no less than this killed, which is why the pitiful remnants of these former units, with rare exception, are putting up almost no resistance. The enemy opposite the front’s forces continues to stubbornly defend along the front Oblivskaya— Verkhne-Chirskii. Today prisoners from the 11th Panzer and 8th Luftwaffe Field divisions, which were earlier facing Romanenko, have already been captured in the Morozovskii area. This means that the enemy’s troops facing Romanenko are now weaker. Enemy units, which have crossed the Don River from the Kotel’nikovo area and then moved out through Tormosin to the front Chernyshkovskii— Morozovskii—Skosyrskaya and fell back on Tatskinskaya with part of their forces, are putting up the greatest resistance to Lelyushenko’s forces and our mobile formations. These enemy forces are trying to occupy this line and take cover behind it, in order to hinder the further vigorous attack by our mobile formations and thus secure the possibility of their forces’ withdrawal. Maybe the enemy, in favorable conditions for him, will attempt to hold this entire long salient, so as to later attempt to rescue through it his encircled group of forces. However, he will not be able to do this and all forces will be applied toward creating a powerful group of mobile forces and to cut off the entire salient and at the same time try to create a group of forces for “Big Saturn.” Along the remainder of the front the largest and relatively fresh enemy group of forces is facing Kharitonov,²⁹ particularly in the Staraya Kalitva—Mitrofanovka— Rossosh’ area. Here there are five whole infantry divisions and one panzer division, of which one of them is an Italian infantry division. There is up to an enemy infantry division in the Millerovo area. Air reconnaissance daily notes the unloading of troops in the following areas: Rossosh’, Starobel’sk, Voroshilovgrad, Chebotovka, Kamensk,

Likhaya, and Zverevo. On 27 December a large number of trains were discovered in the following locales: Valuiki and Kupyansk, and particularly in Bataisk, with the greater part of the trains moving through Bataisk to Novocherkassk. It is difficult to judge for sure about the enemy’s intentions, although he is evidently preparing his main line along the line Severskii Donets—Derkul River. The enemy, of course, is forced to plug the enormous 350-kilometer gap made by our forces with something, although he will undoubtedly attempt to create striking forces and launch counterattacks. It would be very good if we could continue our operations without a significant pause and could continue to attack the unready enemy, although for this it is necessary to immediately dispatch reinforcements here, because those forces that are present are occupied with wrapping up “Little Saturn,” while additional forces are needed for “Big Saturn,” as I have reported. As concerns the enemy’s air force, its power had been greatly weakened, because during the November operation a minimum of 250 planes were destroyed. About 150 planes were destroyed in operations against his airfields during the preparatory period for “Saturn,” and more than 400 enemy planes destroyed during the conduct of “Little Saturn.” Now the enemy’s air force is based in Rostov, Novocherkassk, Voroshilovgrad, Valuiki, Urazovo, Rossosh’, and Staryi Oskol. Part of the front’s air force is working daily against the enemy’s airfields, including at night. I request that Golovanov’s³⁰ aviation attempt to destroy the distant rail junctions and enemy aviation on his distant airfields. That’s all for me.

Vasil’ev, Konstantinov.

1. Your first task is to prevent Badanov’s defeat and direct Pavlov and Russiyanov to help him as soon as possible. You acted correctly in allowing Badanov to abandon Tatsinskaya as a last resort.

2. Your meeting attack on Tormosin with only the forces of the 8th Cavalry Corps should be strengthened with some sort of infantry unit. As concerns the 3rd Guards Cavalry Corps and one guards rifle division, which are being dispatched through Suvorovskii to Tormosin, this is very apt.

3. We have already transferred the 2nd and 23rd tank corps to you in order to transform “Little Saturn” into “Big Saturn.” Within a week you’ll receive another two tank corps along your right flank and three or four rifle divisions. We’ll help you with aviation.

4. Receive the Stavka order. It is addressed to commander of the Southwest Front Vatutin, deputy commander of the Southwestern Front Popov, and Lieutenant General Romanenko.

Stavka VGK Order No. 00495

28 December 1942

1. Lieutenant General P.L. Romanenko is relieved of his position as commander of the 5th Tank Army and placed at the disposal of the Defense Commissariat.

2. Lieutenant General M.M. Popov is appointed commander of the

5th Tank Army, while remaining as deputy commander of the Southwestern Front.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin G. Zhukov

We have our doubts as to the 18th Tank Corps, which you want to send to the Skosyrskaya area. We believe that it would be better to keep it in the Millerovo—Verkhne-Tarasovka area along with the 17th Tank Corps. In general, you should bear in mind that it is better to unleash the tank corps for long distances in pairs, and not singly, in order to avoid Badanov’s situation. It’s another matter with a mechanized corps, which has tanks and infantry and which can operate without any particular fear. What do you say to that? Fedorov. I report. In deciding the question of sending the 18th Tank Corps, I proceeded from the necessity of safely carrying out the task of defeating the enemy in the Skosyrskaya—Tatsinskaya area and rescuing Badanov. At the same time, the 18th Tank Corps will be going through an area occupied by us on its way to the Skosyrskaya area and will be cooperating in the Skosyrskaya area with two rifle divisions, and them with Pavlov, Russiyanov and Badanov. Vasil’ev, Konstantinov. Where is the 18th Tank Corps now? Fedorov. I report: the 18th Tank Corps is now located immediately east of Millerovo, in the Loktev—Novo-Spasovka—Olenevka area, with its headquarters in Orekhovka. Vasil’ev, Konstantinov. We advise you to keep the 18th Tank Corps in

the Millerovo area for joint operations with the 17th Tank Corps. Otherwise, you will weaken the Millerovo—Tarasovka area and render “Big Saturn” impossible. That’s all. Fedorov. Yes sir, it will be done. I will leave the 18th Tank Corps in the Millerovo area and will find something or other to send to the Skosyrskaya area. That’s all for me. Vasil’ev, Konstantinov. Alright. Therefore, aside from the 2nd and 23rd tank corps received by you; you will receive another two tank corps: the 3rd and 10th. What else do you have to say? Fedorov. I have no more questions and will set about to immediately carry out your instructions. All the best. Vasil’ev, Konstantinov. Remember Badanov, don’t forget Badanov and rescue him at all costs. All the best. Vasil’ev, Konstantinov Fedorov. I understand. I will take absolutely all measures and we’ll rescue Badanov. All the best. Fedorov, Ivanov³¹

8. Report by the Commander of the Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Decision for the Further Development of Operation “Big Saturn”

³²

8 January 1943

I am reporting for your affirmation of my decision for the further conduct of the operation.

1. The enemy along the Morozovskii and Shakhty axes is completing the withdrawal of his defeated forces behind the Northern Donets. ³³ A withdrawal by the enemy’s forces from the Northern Caucasus has begun. Along the remainder of the front, the enemy, while continuing the fight for individual centers of resistance along the sector Chertkovo—Millerovo, is attempting to hold the line of the Kalitva River to the southeast of Millerovo and is simultaneously bringing up troops to the Novo-Markovka—Voroshilovgrad area.

2. Proceeding from the main goal planned for “Big Saturn,” while also taking into account my neighbors’ actions, I have decided on the following:

Until the arrival of new equipment to the front, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s units north of the Severskii Donets River and

east of the Derkul River, as well as in the Kamensk—Krasnyi Sulin— Ust’-Belokalitvenskaya area, to occupy this area and by the close of 14 January to reach the front Derkul River—Kruzhilova— Mikhailovka—Anikin—Krasnyi Sulin. To assist comrade Filippov with a simultaneous offensive by the 6th Army in the direction of Vysochinov and Belolutskaya. For which:

1. The 3rd Guards Army, additionally reinforced with the 2nd and 23rd tank corps and the 346th Rifle Division, is to launch its main attack with the forces of the 59th and 60th guards rifle divisions, the 266th Rifle Division, the 94th Rifle Brigade, and the 23rd and 24th tank corps, along with the main mass of High Command Reserve artillery, along the front Sharpaevka—Gusynka toward the front Verkhnyaya Tarasovka—Glubokii, and then in the direction of Gundorovskaya and Krasnyi Sulin. A secondary attack is to be launched by comrade Badanov’s group, consisting of the 2nd Guards Tank and 1st Guards Mechanized corps, the 14th Guards Rifle Division, 203rd Rifle Division, and the 22nd Motorized Rifle Brigade, along with reinforcement artillery, from the front Ol’khovii—Pogorelov in the direction of Kamensk and Likhaya. The army, while encircling and destroying the enemy, is to capture the Kamensk area and by 14 January reach the front Kruzhilovka— Mikhailovka—Anikin. The army’s mobile formations, reinforced by rifle divisions, are to reach the Krasnyi Sulin—Zverevo—Likhaya area, destroying the enemy south of Kamensk in conjunction with the 5th Tank and 5th Shock armies. The army is to have the 14th Rifle Corps in its second echelon.

2. The 5th Tank Army (minus the 346th Rifle Division), along with the 25th Tank Corps, is to launch an attack in the direction of the railroad toward Likhaya station, and with part of its forces toward Krasnyi Sulin, rolling up the enemy front along the southern bank of the Severskii Donets, and by the close of 14 January reach the front Anikin—Krasnyi Sulin.

3. During the first stage the 6th Army is to operate without two rifle divisions, which were left on comrade Konstantinov’s orders along the Novaya Kalitva line. I plan to reinforce the 6th Army with the 57th Guards Rifle Division (from the 1st Guards Army), three antitank artillery regiments, one artillery regiment, one howitzer regiment, and the 4th Guards Tank Corps. The 6th Army will go over to the offensive simultaneously with Filippov, with the immediate task of reaching the line Aidar River— Novo-Pskov and the subsequent task of reaching the front Tarasovka—Mostki and securing the Valuiki—Starobel’sk railroad, while I have selected the Svatovo—Kupyansk axis for the 6th Army’s subsequent advance.

4. Before 14 January of this year the 1st Guards Army is to consecutively destroy the enemy’s encircled groups of forces in the Chertkovo—Gartmashevka—Millerovo—Strel’tsovka area and reach the Derkul River in full strength.

B. There will simultaneously take place the concentration of newlyarriving rifle divisions and tank corps, which I will distribute in the following manner: I am including four rifle division and two tank corps (3rd and 10th) with the 1st Guards Army and three rifle divisions and one rifle brigade with the 3rd Guards Army.

I will organize the operation, with the participation of the new formations, in the following manner: through concentric attacks by the main forces of the 1st Guards Army along the front Kirovo— Novoderkul in the direction of Yevsug, Novoaidar and Rodakovo in the rear of Voroshilovgrad, and by the 3rd Guards Army along the front Gundorovskoe—Anikin in the direction of Lutugino and Rodakovo station in the rear of Voroshilovgrad, to encircle and destroy the enemy’s Voroshilovgrad group of forces, thus accomplishing a breakthrough along a broad front. Simultaneously, the 6th and 5th Tank armies are to launch supporting attacks, which in conjunction with the 1st and 3rd guards armies’ supporting attacks, are to broaden the breakthrough front and achieve the encirclement and destruction of additional enemy forces, and which are supporting attacks. At the same time, the 5th Tank Army, during its advance is to launch a number of attacks to the south, cutting off the enemy’s Caucasus group of forces. Following the encirclement of the enemy’s Voroshilovgrad group of forces, the mobile formations, operating in pairs and reinforced with the most mobile rifle formations, are to vigorously develop the success to the west and southwest and capture the entire Donbass, reach the front Kupyansk—Slavyansk—Volnovakha, completely cutting off the enemy’s Caucasus group of forces. At the same time, it is believed that Filippov’s left flank will reach the Valuiki— Dvurechnoe area, while Ivanov’s³⁴ right flank will reach the Volnovakha—Mariupol’—Taganrog area. If Ivanov cannot reach this area, then part of the Southwestern Front’s forces will be turned toward Taganrog. As soon as good flying weather sets in, a map of the decision and timetable will be delivered by special courier. The above plan is being reported by me for coordination with comrade Konstantinov and comrade Mikhailov,³⁵ who have agreed to it. I request your affirmation of the decision laid out above.

Fedorov Fomin³⁶ Ivanov

9. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30017 to the Stavka Representative³⁷ and the Commanders of the Southwestern and Voronezh Fronts on the Resubordination of Two Rifle Divisions

³⁸

17 January 1943, 0005 hrs

The Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders that the 127th and 160th rifle divisions be removed from the Southwestern Front’s 6th Army to the Voronezh Front as of 1000 on 17 January 1943.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command Vasil’ev

10. Report No. 00107 by the Stavka Representative and the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Course of the Ostrogozhsk—Rossosh’ Operation and the Preparation for the Voronezh— Kastornoe Operation

³⁹

18 January 1943

We report that the offensive operation by the Voronezh Front to defeat the Hungarian—Italian—German group of forces south of Voronezh and the freeing up of the Liski—Kantemirovka railroad is being carried out according to plan, without problems. Two encirclement rings around the enemy have been created: the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army have linked up in the tactical zone of his defense in the Kamenka area, and the 40th Army’s and 3rd Tank Army’s shock groups have linked up in the operational zone in the Alekseevka area. The elimination of the enemy encircled east of the Rossosh’— Podgornoe area (up to five infantry divisions) and the destruction of individual groups in the Kamenka—Tatarinov area will require another two to three days. Of the forces designated for the current operation, three rifle divisions, three ski brigades and the 4th Tank Corps remain uninvolved. We find it possible in the next few days, upon the completion of this operation, to begin a new operation to destroy the enemy’s Voronezh group of forces (six German and up to two Hungarian

divisions). The task of this operation should be the defeat and capture of the enemy’s Voronezh group of forces and the freeing up of the Yelets— Valuiki railroad and our forces’ arrival at the line Sovetskii— Yefrosinovka—Yastrebovka—Aleksandrovka—Prokudino— Zavalishcheno—Russkaya Khopan’—Kholki—Solonets Polyana— Ol’khovatka. For this operation, we find it expedient to bring in the front’s following forces:

1. 38th Army. Bring in for the attack two rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, a destruction brigade, and a tank brigade, reinforced with four artillery regiments and five battalions of M-30 guards mortars. Direction of the attack: Nizhnyaya Vereika, Perlevka, Nizhnyaya Veduga, with the remainder of the army’s front to be held by two rifle divisions.

2. 60th Army. The army will participate in the operation with all its strength. The main attack will be made by four rifle divisions, one rifle brigade and four tank brigades, reinforced by one artillery division and a division of M-30 guards mortars. The main attack is to be launched from the Semidesyatskoe area in the direction of Khokhol and Semiluki, with the task of completing the tactical encirclement, in conjunction with the 38th Army, of the enemy in the area of the Voronezh bridgehead.

3. 40th Army. The army will participate in the operation with all its strength of six rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, two tank corps, three ski brigades, and four independent tank brigades, reinforced by one

artillery division and a division of guards mortars. The main attack is to be launched from the Istobnoe—Rep’evka area toward Gorshechnoe, with the task of carrying out the operational encirclement of the enemy in the Kastornoe—Gorshechnoe area in conjunction with the Bryansk Front’s forces. A supporting attack is to be launched toward Staryi Oskol with the forces of a rifle division and three ski brigades.

4. The 18th Rifle Corps is taking part in the operation with a strength of four rifle divisions, a rifle brigade, and two tank regiments, reinforced with four artillery regiments. The main attack is to be launched in the direction of Chernyanka and Novyi Oskol from the Bol’shoe Bykovo area, with the task of cutting the railroad and preventing the arrival of the enemy’s operational reserves from the south.

5. Upon arriving at the line Belomestnoe—Kupyansk—Stolbishche, the 3rd Tank Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, a tank corps, an independent tank brigade, and the 7th Cavalry Corps, is to secure the operation against possible enemy counterblows from the Pogromets—Kolpakovo—Sukhareva—1st Dvulichnoe—Pokrovskoe.

6. We consider it possible to complete preparations for the operation by the evening of 22.1.1943.

7. The following are needed to carry out the operation: a) that the Bryansk Front’s forces launch a simultaneous attack in

the general direction of Volovo and Lachitovo; b) to remove a tank corps and an independent tank brigade from the 3rd Tank Army to reinforce the 40th Army; c) to reinforce the Voronezh Front’s forces with an artillery division, two regiments of M-13 guards mortars, two tank breakthrough regiments with KV tanks for the 38th Army, and 90 tanks to bring the tank brigades up to strength (including 40 T-34s).

8. We have ammunition and fuel for the start of the operation and are attaching additional requests for the shortages in other areas.

9. We have begun preparing for the operation and request your confirmation.

Mikhailov Golikov Kuznetsov⁴⁰

11. Report by the Commander of the Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Decision to Clarify the Operational Plan for the Encirclement and Destruction of the Enemy’s Donbass Group of Forces

⁴¹

20 January 1943, 0730 hrs

By 22 January 1943 I fully expect to reach the front Pokrovskoe— Tarasovka—Starobel’sk—Aidar River—Severskii Donets and capture the Kamensk—Likhaya—Zverevo—Krasnyi Sulin area. To the right, units have captured the Valuiki—Urazovo area. For this reason, I have made the following amendments to the plan for the Southwestern Front’s subsequent operations.

1. I will launch an attack with a powerful and mobile group, consisting of the 3rd, 10th and 18th tank corps, three rifle divisions, three anti-tank artillery regiments, three howitzer regiments, and an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, subsequently reinforced by three ski brigades arriving by railroad, from the front Tarasovka (30 kilometers northeast of Svatovo)—Starobel’sk in the general direction of the front Kramatorskaya—Artemovsk, and then on to Stalino, Volnovakha and Mariupol’, with the task of cutting off the entire territory of the Donbass, encircling and destroying the enemy’s forces, capturing his entire equipment park and other materials on this territory, without giving the enemy an opportunity to evacuate anything.

A small force will be dispatched in the direction of Starobel’sk, Debal’tsevo and Makeevka. This group will be headed by my deputy, Lieutenant General Popov, who will use for a staff part of the front headquarters’ personnel and the headquarters of the 4th Guards Tank Corps, which I will reinforce with radio communications equipment. By 24.1.1943 the tank corps will be concentrated in the Tarasovka— Starobel’sk area. By this time three refills of fuel and three combat loads of ammunition will have been delivered for the corps. The arrival of the rifle divisions and ski brigades is being delayed. However, I plan to transfer two new rifle divisions to the Starobel’sk area by 25.1.1943 by employing auto transport. The start of the operation is approximately 26-27 January 1943. The arrival in the Mariupol’ area will be accomplished in the course of seven days according to the following plan: a) to the Severskii Donets River on the first day; b) to the Kramatorskaya—Konstantinovka—Nikitovka—Debal’tsevo area on the third day; c) to the Kurakovka—Stalino—Makeevka area on the fourth day; d) to the Volnovakha area on the fifth day; e) to Mariupol’ on the seventh day. The mobile group’s operations will be supported by the front’s main forces. The operations of the front’s main forces will be pegged to the plan laid out above.

2. The second most important role falls to the 3rd Guards Army, which will launch an attack from the area southwest of Kamensk on Stalino and with its mobile group, consisting of the 23rd and 2nd tank corps, the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and the 1st Mechanized Corps, will reach the front Debal’tsevo—Makeevka—Stalino on the third or fourth day of the operation, where it will link up with Popov’s mobile group, having encircled and destroyed all of the enemy’s forces in the Donbass.

3. The 5th Tank Army will launch an attack from the area west of Krasnyi Sulin toward Volnovakha and with part of its forces on Taganrog.

4. The 6th Army is launching an attack on Kupyansk and with part of its forces on Izyum.

5. The Voroshilovgrad area will be encircled by two of the 1st Guards Army’s left-flank divisions and two of the 3rd Guards Army’s rightflank divisions.

6. As a result of these actions, the armies’ rifle divisions will reach the following: a) 6th Army—the front Dvurechnaya—Savintsy on the operation’s seventh day; b) 1st Guards Army—the front excluding Savintsy—Barvenkovo— Levshino on the operation’s eighth day;

c) 3rd Guards Army—the front Levshino—Krasnoarmeiskoe— Kurakovka on the operation’s ninth day; d) 5th Tank Army—the front Kurakovka—Volnovakha on the operation’s ninth day. Thus the operation must be completed by 5.2.1943. This will enable us to carry out yet another operation before the end of winter and reach a more favorable line, namely: Akhtyrka—Poltava— Perevolochna—Dnepropetrovsk—Zaporozh’e—Melitopol’, and under favorable conditions even seize the Kakhovka—Kherson—Perekop— Genichesk area and cut off the Crimea. However, this operation must be closely linked to the operations of the neighboring fronts, particularly with the Voronezh Front. I have the following remaining in reserve: 1st Guards Tank Corps, 4th Guards Tank Corps, and 25th Tank Corps—all without equipment. I will fit out the 1st Guards Tank Corps with tanks arriving in packets. There are not enough tanks for the 4th Guards Tank and 25th Tank corps. I request the following: 1. To affirm the plan elucidated above (preparatory work is preliminarily carried out on it). 2. To give me tanks sufficient for fully fitting out two tank corps. 3. To give me an additional three regiments of M-13 guards mortars and a division of guards mortars. 4. To indicate boundary lines with the neighboring fronts to a great depth. 5. It would be nice to receive one fresh cavalry corps.

6. To appoint Major General Shlyomin as commander of the 5th Tank Army, in place of comrade Popov.

Fedorov Fomin

12. Report by the Stavka Representative and the Commander of the Voronezh Front No. 00179/op to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Plan for the Operation to Liberate Khar’kov

⁴²

21 January 1943, 1800 hrs

1. In carrying out your instructions, the Voronezh Front’s left-wing forces (3rd Tank Army and 18th Rifle Corps), following the complete elimination of the enemy’s group of forces encircled in the area to the west of the Liski—Rossosh’ railroad, will arrive by 25 January with their main forces at the line Novyi Oskol—Valuiki—Pokrovskoe. The 3rd Tank Army, consisting of two tank corps (12th and 15th), an independent tank brigade, five rifle divisions (48th Guards, 62nd Guards and the 160th, 111th and 184th rifle divisions), and the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps (two divisions and a tank brigade) will be ready to launch an attack on Khar’kov by 28 January. Another rifle division will arrive somewhat later to the army.

2. We consider it expedient that the 3rd Tank Army launch its main attack in the direction of Valuiki, Ol’khovatka, Pechenegi, Chuguev, and Merefa, with the task of outflanking and taking Khar’kov from the southwest. The main attack is to be launched by the forces of two tank corps, four rifle divisions and one independent tank brigade according to the following plan: on the first day the mobile units are to reach the line of Ol’khovatka; Pechenegi on the second day; the Rogan’—Vvedenskii line on the third day; Merefa on the fourth day, and; capture Khar’kov from the southwest on the fifth or

sixth day. The army’s rifle divisions will arrive at Khar’kov (approximately) on the eighth or ninth day. The task of securing the operation from the south will be entrusted to the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps from the line Urazovo— Dvurechnaya—Shevchenkovo—Andreevka—Alekseevskoe— Bespalovka station. The 18th Rifle Corps, consisting of three rifle divisions and two rifle brigades will be ready from 28 January to attack from the front Chernyanka—excluding Valuiki for the purpose of supporting the 3rd Tank Army from the right. The direction of its attack will be Volokonovka, Volchansk, Nepokrytoe, and Khar’kov.

3. Following the completion of the Voronezh operation, the front’s right-wing armies (60th and 40th), consisting of 11 eleven rifle divisions, two rifle brigades, three ski brigades, the 4th Tank Corps, and three independent tank brigades, will be ready to attack toward Belgorod and Khar’kov with their main forces from the line of the Oskol River, on 30 January. Following the full completion of the Voronezh operation, the 38th Army, consisting of four rifle divisions, will subsequently be employed for supporting the 60th and 40th armies’ attack from the Kursk area.

4. The attack by the front’s right-wing mobile group is to be launched in the direction of Staryi Oskol, Bobrovo-Dvorskoe, Belgorod, Udy, and the northwestern and western outskirts of Khar’kov. The mobile group consists of the following: 4th Tank Corps, a northern group of three tank brigades, and three ski brigades.

The main attack by the 60th and 40th armies’ rifle divisions (in all, ten rifle divisions and one rifle brigade) is to be launched from the front Yastrebovka—Kazachek in the general direction of Belgorod and Khar’kov, with the idea of reaching the northwestern outskirts of Khar’kov on the ninth or tenth day. With the arrival of the 60th and 40th armies’ rifle divisions at the line Mar’ino—Aleksandrovskii—Alekseevka, the 38th Army will be deployed for an attack in the direction of Ivnya, for the purpose of supporting the front’s operation from the Kursk area.

5. The overall goal of the forthcoming operation is to capture the Belgorod—Khar’kov area and on the fifteenth-twentieth day of the operation to reach the line Medvenskoe—Rakitnoe—Graivoron— Bogodukhov—Valki—Vlasovka station for further operations toward Poltava.

6. The following are necessary: a) to establish the Voronezh Front’s boundary with that of the Bryansk Front along the line Zadonsk—Kastornoe—Teplyi Kolodez’—Oboyan’—Volozhba; of these locales, the first two are for the Voronezh Front and the remainder for the Bryansk Front, inclusively; the boundary line with the Southwestern Front is to be Verkhnii Mamon—Pokrovskoe—Kupyansk—Shevchenkovo—Zmiev —Poltava (all locales for the Southwestern Front). b) to simultaneously launch an attack with the Bryansk Front’s left wing in the general direction of Kursk and arriving at the line Kursk —Oboyan’; c) to reinforce the Voronezh Front with one artillery division and one division of guards mortars;

d) due to the fact that the 100 tanks allotted to the front are arriving “piecemeal” as replacements only for the 3rd Tank Army, we request that you release another 100 tanks “piecemeal” to the front for building up the independent tank brigades.

7. We request that you study and affirm this plan.

Mikhailov Filippov Fedorov Il’in⁴³

13. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30022 to the Stavka Representative and the Commander of the Voronezh Front on the Confirmation of the Plan for the Operation to Liberate Khar’kov

⁴⁴

23 January 1943, 0030 hrs

1. As concerns the part relating to Khar’kov, the operational plan presented by you is confirmed by the Stavka of the Supreme High Command.

2. This operation is to hereafter known as “Star.”

3. The start of the operation is 28.01, according to the plan presented.

Vasil’ev

14. Combat Report No. 0028 by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Situation in the Front’s Zone by the Start of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Offensive Operation

⁴⁵

24 January 1943, 2400 hrs

1. During preceding day the front’s forces regrouped and eliminated the remnants of the encircled enemy; at 1300 on 24.1 units of the 40th Army attacked. 38th Army. The army’s forces were defending their previous positions and regrouping. 60th Army. The army’s forces were fortifying their positions and regrouping; along the left flank they repulsed enemy counterattacks and reconnaissance searches. At 0200 on 24.1 units of the 141st Rifle Division repulsed an enemy counterattack in the area of the Khmelevoi Woods area by up to two battalions of infantry. During the night elements of the division repulsed the enemy’s reconnaissance in the area of the bend of the Don River southeast of Yunevka. Elements of the 253rd Rifle Brigade were fighting to take Prokudino. 40th Army. The army’s forces regrouped and were battling to finally eliminate the encircled enemy group; since 1300 on 24.1 they’ve been attacking, advancing to the north and northwest. Units of the 129th Rifle Brigade (with the 6th Destruction Brigade), 183rd Rifle Division, 25th Guards Rifle Division, and the 309th Rifle Division, upon attacking at 1300, captured Kamennyi Buerak and

Frolov, while their forward units are fighting along the line southern outskirts of Semidesyatskoe—Skupoi—northern outskirts of Bocharov—northern outskirts of Frolov—Pasechnaya—Logvinovka. Prisoners from the 57th Infantry Division’s 199th Infantry Regiment have been captured in the area of height 236.2. Units of the 4th Tank Corps, having passed the line Lebyazh’e— northern slopes of height 231.9 (five kilometers northwest of Lebyazh’e), continued attacking to the northwest. Units of the 305th and 340th rifle divisions finally eliminated the encircled enemy in the area Ilovskoe—Podserednoe—the woods northeast of Alekseevka, completely clearing the enemy out of Podserednoe. The garrison in Koltunovka has been routed and 2,000 prisoners taken, 300 horses, 250 motor vehicles, more than 300 other vehicles, and dumps with ammunition and food captured, and more than 200 enemy soldiers and officers killed. 18th Rifle Corps. The corps’ units eliminated small groups of the enemy in individual locales and continued attacking to the west. 3rd Tank Army. Units of the army continued marching to their designated areas and repulsed attempts by the encircled enemy to break out in the direction of Makeevka. According to preliminary data, during 23-24.1 1,050 prisoners were taken in the Shelyakino—Osadchii area. 6th Guards Cavalry Corps. Units of the corps turned over their defensive zone in Valuiki and Urazovo to units of the 184th Rifle Division.

2. During the night the enemy along the 60th Army’s left flank launched a counterattack in strength of up to two battalions of

infantry, supported by artillery and mortars, and carried out reconnaissance; the enemy put up powerful fire resistance in the 40th Army’s attack zone, while falling back to new lines. The enemy encircled in the Shelyakino—Osadchii area continued his attempts to break out of the encirclement in the direction of Makeevka.

3. On 25.1.1943 the 38th Army’s forces are to continue to regroup and units of the 60th and 40th armies are to continue to attack according to plan; units of the 18th Rifle Corps and the 3rd Tank Army are to continue to move to the west, eliminating the encircled enemy units remaining in the rear.

Filippov Fedotov⁴⁶ Il’in

15. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30027 to the Commander of the Bryansk Front on the Timetable for the Start of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Offensive Operation

⁴⁷

Copy to A.M. Vasilevskii, F.I. Golikov

25 January 1943, 0650 hrs The operation cannot be postponed until 27 January. I oblige you to begin the operation on the morning of 26 January.

I. Stalin Transmitted over the telephone by comrade Stalin Bokov⁴⁸

16. Report by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Beginning of the Offensive for the Purpose of Encircling and Destroying the Enemy’s Voronezh Group of Forces

⁴⁹

26 January 1943

I can report that the Voronezh Front’s forces, in carrying out your order,⁵⁰ went over to the offensive, following a regrouping, from the Novo-Soldatka—Istobnoe—Rogovato-Pogoreloe area to the northwest, and from the Soldatskoe—2nd Terbuny area to the south, with the task of encircling and destroying the enemy’s Voronezh group of forces, consisting of six German and one Hungarian divisions. Over two days the forces of the 40th Army and the left wing of the 60th Army advanced 25-40 kilometers, liberated up to 60 inhabited locales in the Voronezh Oblast’ and entered the confines of the Kursk Oblast’. Among the locales taken are the station and district center of Gorshechnoe and such major inhabited locales as Nizhnee Gniloe, Staro-Melovoe, Arkhangel’skoe, Dmitrievka, Soldatskoe, 1st Gorodishche, 2nd Gorodishche, and Rogovoe. Along the 38th Army’s sector our forces broke through the enemy’s defense from the line of the Don River. The enemy is resisting our attacking troops from the north and south. The amount of prisoners and captured equipment is being calculated. The successful advance of our forces and the elimination of the

enemy’s individual encircled units are continuing along other sectors of the front. During 24-26 January the 18th Rifle Corps’ and 3rd Tank Army’s infantry advanced 45-50 kilometers and liberated a large number of inhabited locales, including the district centers of Budennoe and Nikitovka, and the major inhabited locales of Nikolaevka, Polatovka station and the inhabited locales of Polatovka, Bol’shoe Bykovo, Borovoe, Bolotovo, Novo-Puzino, Foshchevatoe, and Valui. Up to 1,760 prisoners were taken during this period. Our forces’ offensive is developing successfully.

Filippov Il’in

17. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30030 to the Commanders of the Bryansk and Voronezh Fronts and the Stavka Representative on Refining Their Tasks in the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation

⁵¹

26 January 1943, 2200 hrs

Due to the enemy’s retreat from the Voronezh area and our forces’ successful advance in the direction of Kastornoe, the Stavka of the Supreme High Command orders the following:

1. To establish from 2000 on 27 January 1943 the following boundary line between the Bryansk and Voronezh fronts: Dobroe— Vodop’yanovo—Dolgorukovo—Aleshki—Volovo—Koz’moden’yansk —Gremyachka—Isakovo—Kosorzha—Zolotukhino—Fatezh— Dmitriev-L’govskii; all locales, with the exception of Dobroe are within the Bryansk Front.

2. The Bryansk Front’s left-wing units are to attack the enemy’s rear and defeat him in the Studenoe—Kolpny—Maloarkhangel’sk— Droskov area and, while attacking in the direction of Kolpny and Maloarkhangel’sk, reach the front Pokrovskoe—Maloarkhangel’sk— Verkhnee Smorodnoe.

3. The Voronezh Front’s right-wing units are to attack in the general

direction of Kastornoe and Kursk, with the mission of destroying the opposing enemy, capturing the Kursk area, and reaching the line Sergeevskoe—Drenevo—Anokhino.

4. Confirm receipt and report on execution.

Stavka of the Supreme High Command I. Stalin G. Zhukov

18. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30032 to the Commanders of the Voronezh and Bryansk Fronts and the Stavka Representative on Changing the Date for Activating the New Boundary Line Between the Fronts

⁵²

27 January 1943, 1520 hrs

The date established on 26 January by order of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command for introducing the new boundary line between the Voronezh and Bryansk fronts is to take effect from 2000 on 31 January 1943, and not from 27 January. On the instructions of the Stavka of the Supreme High Command

G. Zhukov

19. Combat Report No. 0033 by the Representative of the Stavka VGK and the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Course of the Voronezh—Kastornoe Operation

⁵³

28 January 1943

1The front’s right-wing forces are successfully developing the offensive begun in the Voronezh area on 25.1.1943. Having broken through the enemy’s defense along the Terbuny— Kastornoe axis, our forces have advanced 40-50 kilometers along individual axes, liberated a large number of inhabited locales, including the town of Zemlyansk, Kastornoe station, Yuzhnoe, Uritskoe, Naberezhnaya, Semiluki, and the other major inhabited locales of Troitskoe, Verkhopol’e, Russkaya Gvozdevka, Latnoe, Nikol’skoe, Khokhol, Nizhnee Gniloe, and the station and inhabited locale of Gorshechnoe; German garrisons have been encircled in the towns of Nizhnedevitsk and Staryi Oskol. In all, during this period, up to 5,000 prisoners have been taken along the Voronezh sector, according to incomplete data. Captured equipment includes 5,000 rifles, 150 machine guns, and 150 guns, up to 200 motor vehicles, more than 150 motorcycles, 20 tractors, and six tanks, about 400,000 small arms rounds, up to 10,000 shells, 22 mortars, 60 horses, and two railroad trains.

2. The front’s center and left-wing forces continued their offensive simultaneously. By the morning of 27.1 the left-wing and center

forces along the entire front reached the line of the Valuiki—Staryi Oskol railroad and on the morning of 28.1 were fighting along the eastern outskirts of the town of Novyi Oskol and Chernyanka.

3. During 26-27 January the elimination of the remnants of the Italian VIII Alpine Corps was completed. In attempting to break out, the Italian units were completely encircled by units of the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps in the Valuiki area, captured and partially destroyed. More than 4,000 men were killed and 6,000 captured in the two days’ fighting, including the commanders of the 3rd, 4th and 156th infantry divisions, generals Ummerta, Batisti and Pascalini, as well as their staffs.

Deputy USSR People’s Commissar of Defense, Gen. Vasilevskii Commander of the Voronezh Front, Colonel General Golikov Member of the Voronezh Front military council, Lieutenant General Kuznetsov Chief of the Voronezh Front staff, Kazakov

20. Combat Report No. 030 by the Commander of the Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Front’s Forces Going Over to the Offensive

⁵⁴

30 January 1943 2400 hrs

1. At 0850, following an artillery onslaught, the Southwestern Front’s forces went over to the offensive. While overcoming along the entire front stubborn resistance by the enemy, who has centers of resistance along the path of the troops’ movement and in the inhabited locales, the front’s forces inflicted heavy losses on the enemy, pushed him back along all sectors and broke through his front along the axis of the main attack, advancing 15 kilometers along the main axis. The enemy, having thrown two new assault battalions in, counterattacked with infantry and tanks along some sectors. Particularly fierce enemy attacks took place along the 3rd Guards Army’s sector.

2. Throughout the day the 6th Army continued to attack, advancing along the right flank and in the center. Along the army’s left flank in the Nizhnyaya Duvanka—Svatovo area, the enemy held up the offensive with fire and counterattacks by infantry, tanks and assault guns. The army’s units occupied [inhabited locales] and reached the Korzhovka—Man’kovka—Osinovka—2nd Lipovka—1st Lipovka— Sarikovka—Arapovka—Yasinovka—Tarasovka—Varvarovka line, bypassing Verkhnyaya Duvanka from the north and south, Lebedevka—Aleksandrovka—Novo-Aleksandrovka, broke into Verkhnyaya Duvanka, cleared the enemy out of the southern outskirts of Novo-Krasnoe, broke into the northern and eastern outskirts of Nizhnyaya Duvanka, captured Preobrazhennoe and Goncharovka, and advanced. Throughout the day the enemy air force operated against the 6th Army in small groups.

The roads, especially along the army’s right flank, are covered with snow and difficult to navigate for wheeled transport.

3. Lieutenant General Popov’s group, in conjunction with the 6th Army and 1st Guards Army, attacked. The 3rd Tank Corps, while overcoming the lack of roads, attacked in two columns and by the close of the day the first column captured Verkhnyaya Duvanka and with a smaller part of its forces was fighting for Nizhnyaya Duvanka. The 57th Guards Rifle Division broke into the southeastern outskirts of Svatovo, tying down the enemy along the line Melovatka—NovoNikol’skoe. The 52nd Guards Rifle Division, having driven out up to a regiment of enemy infantry and 20 tanks, captured Novo-Aleksandrovka, Kaban’e and Belosvitovka. Part of the 10th Tank Corps’ forces assisted the 35th Guards Rifle Division’s attack and advanced behind the infantry to the NovoKrasnyanki area; it did not enter the breach. Throughout the day the 18th Tank Corps was fighting the enemy’s infantry and tanks and, having repulsed several counterattacks and inflicted a defeat on the enemy, captured the inhabited locales of Smolyaninova, Aleksandrovka, Purdovka, Zamulovka, Voevodovka, and Metelkin; by evening part of the corps’ forces were fighting for the bridge over the Severskii Donets near Proletarsk, while continuing to attack toward the Severskii Donets River. The 38th Guards Rifle Division captured Krymskaya, destroying up to a battalion of enemy infantry.

4. The 1st Guards Army, in conjunction with the Lieutenant General Popov’s group of forces, continued to attack along its right flank throughout the day, blocking Novo-Astrakhan’, while it regrouped along the left flank and attacked with part of its forces. The 4th Guards Rifle Corps, along with part of the 41st Guards Rifle Division’s forces, blocked Novo-Astrakhan’, and with its remaining forces continued attacking and captured Bunchuzhna, Peschana and Zhitlovka. Units of the 6th Rifle Corps, having regrouped, captured the major inhabited locales along the right bank of the Severskii Donets River —Krymskaya, Slavyanoserbsk and Zheltoe, having repulsed all of the enemy’s attempts to retrieve the situation along this sector.

5. Throughout the day units of the 3rd Guards Army were engaged in offensive fighting along the right wing and in the center, and along the left flank tied down the opposing enemy with active operations. The 59th Guards Rifle Division, having broken through the forward edge of the enemy’s defense along the sector Kruzhilovka—the unnamed lake (four kilometers west of Nizhnii Grachinskii), repulsed several enemy infantry attacks up to 1-2 companies in strength, supported by 8-13 tanks, and by the close of the day reached the line eastern outskirts of Makarov Yar—0.5 kilometers east of Khoroshilov—the western slopes of height 162 and continued to attack, bypassing the strong points from the north and south. The 14th Rifle Corps reached the line height 153 (two kilometers northeast of Ivanovka)—height 160, captured Davydo-Nikol’skii and by the close of the day was fighting to capture Ivanovka. The 266th Rifle Division was fighting unsuccessfully to capture Bol’shoi Sukhodol, having encountered and repulsed an enemy

counterattack, up to a regiment in strength, from the direction of Malyi Sukhodol and Belen’kii farm. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps forced the Severskii Donets River east of Kruzhilovka and by the close of the day reached the area 0.5 kilometers east of Il’evka, beaten off a counterattack by 63 enemy tanks and during the night of 30-31.1 is continuing to carry out its assigned task. The 1st Mechanized Corps entered the breach at 1430 and by the close of the day captured Petrovka and is fighting for Shirokii and Voroshilovsk. The 2nd Tank Corps reached the northern outskirts of Ivanovka and is continuing at night to carry out its assigned task. Throughout the day the 23rd Tank Corps was in the second echelon and by the evening had concentrated in the Davydo-Nikol’skii area, with the task of cutting the railroad through night fighting along the Krasnodonskaya—Verkhnii Duvannyi sector by the morning of 31.1. Comrade Monahkov’s group (60th Guards and 203rd rifle divisions) tied the enemy down with active operations along the sector Nizhnii Vishnevetskii—Kalitvenskaya. The attack was unsuccessful and throughout the entire day the enemy repulsed the attack by Monakhov’s forces by repeated counterattacks involving up to a battalion, supported by 10-18 tanks and 4-6 bombers. With such counterattacks, the enemy held up the entire army’s attack, throwing in reserves against the 3rd Guards Army’s right flank and trying to halt the offensive by our forces. According to by no means complete data, the enemy has suffered significant losses. Captured were three 105mm guns, three 75mm self-propelled guns and two small-caliber guns, 30 vehicles, five motor vehicles, and two ammunition dumps. Killed were no less than 1,500 enemy soldiers and officers, with 28 tanks, 22 guns, 32

machine guns, four mortars, and 15 motor vehicles destroyed. Four enemy planes were shot down. Our losses are seven tanks.

6. At 0850 on 30.1.1943 the 5th Tank Army attacked. In a number of areas the army’s units reached the right bank of the Severskii Donets River, having advanced along some sectors up to two kilometers, overcame stubborn resistance, and repulsed a number of enemy infantry and tank counterattacks. Ten tanks and armored cars were knocked out or burned, with up to 500 enemy soldiers and officers killed. During the day the army’s aviation destroyed 60 motor vehicles, six tanks, nine vehicles with goods, and killed up to 400 soldiers and officers. Three enemy planes were shot down in air battles.

7. An additional report will be made about the 17th Air Army’s activities.

8. The front’s forces continue to carry out their assigned task.

Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Vatutin Member of the Southwestern Front military council, Lieutenant General Zheltov Chief of the Southwestern Front staff, Lieutenant General Ivanov

21. Combat Report by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Completion of the Encirclement of the Enemy’s Group of Forces in the Area of Staryi Oskol and Gorshechnoe

⁵⁵

4 February 1943, 2200 hrs

On 29 January 1943 a large enemy group of forces, numbering overall up to 20,000 men, was encircled by the forces of the Voronezh Front in the area of Staryi Oskol and Gorshechnoe. Over the last several days this group of forces has been broken up and subjected to destruction by our units. As a result of the fighting, about 5,000 of its numbers have been killed and 8,050 men captured. All of the encircled forces’ attempts to break through our forces’ ring have failed. According to the testimony of the captured (along with his staff) commander of the Hungarian III Army Corps, Major General Stomm, 5,000 soldiers and officers remained in the encirclement ring. The group’s rear organs, supply trains and auto transport have been destroyed. The encircled forces are very short of ammunition and food. There are a large number suffering frostbite. The captured equipment is being calculated. During the offensive by our forces west of Voronezh from 24 January-4 February, the Voronezh Front’s forces alone captured 22,000 enemy soldiers and officers.

Filippov Fedotov Fedorov

22. Combat Report No. 0048 by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Fighting to Capture Kursk and Belgorod

⁵⁶

8 February 1943, 2400 hrs

1. On 8.2 the front’s main forces continued to attack to the west and southwest, were fighting to capture the cities of Kursk and Belgorod, and were repulsing enemy counterattacks along some sectors, and with part of their forces were destroying the enemy’s encircled group of forces in the Sennoe—Chepelki—Verkhnie Apochki and Pokrovka—Krutye Verkhi—Mochagi areas. At 1500 on 8.2.1943 Kursk was occupied by our forces. 60th Army. On 8.2.1943 the army’s forces were engaged in intensive fighting to capture the city of Kursk. The enemy put up stubborn resistance with the remnants of the 82nd and 340th infantry divisions and the newly-arrived 4th Panzer Division from Orel (19 tanks), counterattacking our units from the Kursk area in strength up to a regiment of infantry. By 1500 the army’s forces captured Kursk. The army’s units captured a number of inhabited locales, including Medvenskoe, Znamenka and Kochegurovka, having cut the Kursk— Oboyan’ surfaced road. In order to hinder the escape from encirclement by the enemy, which broke through the 38th Army’s position, a battalion from the 104th Rifle Brigade was moved to the Ploskoe area, with its front

facing to the east. The enemy groups that had broken through were approaching Afanas’evka. 38th Army. During the day the army’s units were engaged in stubborn fighting with the enemy’s encircled groups in the Sennoe —Chepelki—Verkhnie Apochki and Pokrovka—Krutye Verkhi— Mochagi areas. Part of an enemy infantry column and supply trains tried to turn from the Staryi Oskol—Tim road in the Ostanino area, while his main forces were trying to break through to Tim. 40th Army. The army’s right-wing forces were engaged in stubborn fighting for Belgorod, while the left-flank units were conducting a successful offensive to the southwest. The enemy in the Belgoroad area put up stubborn resistance along the leftwing and hindered the advanced of our troops through individual centers of resistance. Throughout 8.2 the army’s units captured a number of inhabited locales, including Bolokhovets, Arkhangel’skoe, Pokrovka, NovoTroevka, Neklyudovo, Bol’shoe Gorodishche, 2nd Tseplyaevka, and Repnoe and are fighting in the northern and northwestern part of Belgorod and for Nikol’skoe and Kupino. The 4th Tank Corps was hindering the encircled enemy group of forces from breaking out toward Yastrebovka, beating off all of the enemy’s attacks and inflicting losses of up to 400 soldiers and officers killed. According to additional information, units of the 309th Rifle Division in the Korocha area captured 200 enemy soldiers and officers, 13 guns, four tanks, 12,000 shells, 35 motor vehicles, 500 rifles, and a food depot. The enemy left up to 350 corpses on the battlefield.

69th Army. The army’s forces, while overcoming the stubborn resistance of the enemy’s SS units, continued to attack in the general direction of Volchansk. The enemy along the army’s right wing put up resistance with individual groups of infantry, while on the left flank he undertook numerous infantry counterattacks, supported by tanks. During the first half of the day the army’s units captured the inhabited locales of Ternovaya, Belyanka, Chernoe, Babyshkino, and Volkov and were engaged in stubborn offensive fighting with the enemy’s infantry and tanks along the line Zakharovka—Ivannovka— Blagodatnoe. During the 1-5.2 fighting the army’s units captured 1,500 soldiers and officers and captured the following equipment: 56 machine guns, 88 trucks, 43 guns, two radio sets, six motorcycles, three armored cars, an ammunition dump, and 90 tons of flour. 3rd Tank Army. The army’s forces continued to wage offensive battles, overcoming the enemy’s stubborn resistance in the Prikolotnoe—Podserednoe area. The enemy along the army’s left flank put up stubborn resistance, while launching counterattacks. The enemy along the left flank fell back partially to the west. The army’s rifle divisions were fighting in the areas of Gogino, Prikolotnoe, Velikii Burluk, the southern and eastern outskirts of Pechenegi, and Skripka. Tank formations: the 15th Tank Corps’ 52nd Motorized Rifle Brigade is fighting in Pechenegi and the 12th Tank Corps in Malinovka. The 6th Guards Cavalry Corps’ main forces, concentrated in the Petrovskoe—1st Prishib area, captured Andreevka and Chervonyi Donets. The 2nd Air Army destroyed a concentration of enemy tanks and

personnel in the Prikolotnoe—Volkov—Belyi Kolodez’—NovoAleksandrovka area. 38 combat sorties were carried out. Seven tanks and five motor vehicles were destroyed. Up to a battalion of enemy infantry was scattered and partially destroyed.

2. Throughout 8.2.1943 the enemy’s encircled group of forces in the area east of Ostanino continued to put up stubborn resistance and sought to break out through counterattacks in the direction of Tim and Nechaevo. Along the 3rd Tank Army’s right wing the enemy launched numerous counterattacks with infantry and tanks. Along the remainder of the front he was putting up resistance in individual defensive centers. Units of the enemy’s 4th Panzer Division were resisting in the Kursk area.

3. On 9.2.1943 the front’s forces are to continue attacking to the west and southwest, simultaneously destroying the encircled enemy group of forces in the Ostanino area and his motor-mechanized group in the Prikolotnoe area.

Filippov Fedotov Petrov⁵⁷

23. Report No. 01583 by the Commander of Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Plan for the Operation to Defeat the Enemy’s Donbass Group of Forces

⁵⁸

9 February 1943, 2310 hrs

I report.

1. According to the available information, the enemy has begun withdrawing from the Rostov—Shakhty area to the west and northwest. Feeling a fatal threat from Popov’s group, the enemy has now concentrated his main forces against Popov’s group and the center of Kuznetsov’s army, on the one hand, and is stubbornly resisting Lelyushenko’s army. Units of the enemy’s 6th, 7th, 11th, 19th, 27th, and 3rd panzer divisions have been noted along the front Konstantinovka—Artemovsk—named after Kaganovich. The enemy is evidently bringing up to two infantry divisions to the Konstantinovka and Barvenkovo area. Additionally, units of the enemy’s 23rd Panzer Division and the 335th and 302nd infantry divisions, newly arrived from France, have been noted opposite Lelyushenko’s army in the Krasnodon area.

2. In these conditions, I have decided to try and envelop and cut the enemy’s communications west of Stalino, continuing all the time to move my right flank to the west and southwest and to

simultaneously prepare as quickly as possible a powerful mobile group for a deeper attack from the Krasnopavlovka—Lozovaya area in the direction of Pavlograd, Sinel’nikovo, Zaporozh’e, and Melitopol’, for the purpose of cutting the enemy off from the crossings over the Dnepr River and preventing his withdrawal to the west. At the same time, we will try to reach the Poltava— Kremenchug—Dnepropetrovsk area and will definitely try to seize a bridgehead along the western bank of the Dnepr River along the front Kremenchug—Krivoi Rog—Kakhovka. Along the left flank, upon the arrival of the mobile group in the Melitopol’ area, it is to be rapidly reinforced in order to vigorously reach the lower course of the Dnepr River and seize a bridgehead in the Crimea south of Perekop and Chongar. For this: a) Popov’s group, along with the 1st Guards Army, is to capture Krasnoarmeiskoe, Konstantinovka and Artemovsk by the close of 11.02.1943 and clear the enemy out of Slavnyansk. Subsequently, Popov’s forces, following their regrouping closer to Krasnoarmeiskoe, are to envelop the Stalino area from the west and seize Volnovakha with part of their forces. At the same time, the left flank of Kuznetsov’s army is to launch an attack on Stalino through Gorlovka toward Makeevka, while part of Lelyushenko’s army is to strike toward Stalino from the east. Popov’s group is to subsequently take Mariupol’. Popov’s group has already been reinforced with a tank brigade (9th) and a ski brigade. On 10.02 another tank brigade (13th) will join it, and on 12.02.1943 two more ski brigades will arrive and possibly reinforcements of 152 tanks. Five rifle divisions from Kuznetsov’s army, plus reinforcements, will

take part in the fighting along with Popov’s group; b) Kharitonov’s 6th Army, which is already fighting along the line of the Khar’kov—Lozovaya railroad, is to reach the line of the Orel River by the close of 11.02.1943 and capture Lozovaya, and then it will attack in the general direction of Krasnograd, in order to reach the Poltava—Kremenchug—Dnepropetrovsk area. The 6th Army will be reinforced with no less than two divisions from those divisions arriving by rail, and one High Command Reserve artillery division; c) by 11.02.1943 the 1st Army, along with Popov’s group, is to capture the areas of Slavyansk, Konstantinovka and Artemovsk and to push part of its forces to the front excluding Lozovaya— Krasnoarmeiskoe. A smaller part of its forces, along with Popov’s group and the 3rd Guards Army, is to subsequently capture the Stalino area. The remaining forces are to vigorously arrive at the front Dnepropetrovsk—Zaporozh’e—Vasil’evka and capture a bridgehead on the right bank of the Dnepr River; d) by the morning of 10.02.1943 Lelyushenko’s 3rd Guards Army is to capture the Voroshilovgrad area and then vigorously attack in the direction of Chistyakovo and Volnovakha, while part of its forces take part in capturing the Stalino area. The army will subsequently move to the west, depending upon the situation; e) the 5th Tank Army (consisting of five very small divisions) will pursue the enemy in the direction of Kamensk and Kuibyshevo and it is later planned to pull it back into the front reserve; f) the mobile group, newly created by me, must play the main role and consists of the following: the 1st Guards Tank Corps, 25th Tank Corps, 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, four anti-tank artillery regiments, an antiaircraft division, and the 1st Guards Army’s 4th Guards Rifle Corps— which have exhibited a high degree of mobility and great resilience on the march. I am placing General Kharitonov in command of this group and temporarily appointing his deputy, Major General Firsov, ⁵⁹ in command of the 6th Army.

The group will be concentrated approximately by the close of 16.02.1943 in the area Krasnopavlovka—Lozovaya, with the task of attacking in the direction of Pavlograd, Sinel’nikovo, Zaporozh’e, and Melitopol’. The start of this group’s offensive is 17.02.1943. It will reach the Melitopol’ area on approximately 22.02.1943; g) the arriving seven rifle divisions will move by forced march to the front’s right flank, while the two lead divisions will be assigned to the 6th Army; h) during the operation no less than three tank corps and one cavalry corps (8th) will be pulled into the front reserve in the Kupyansk area for their rapid refitting.

I request the following:

1. Confirm the operational plan.

2. Aside from the reinforcements released by you to the front (one High Command Reserve artillery division, one anti-aircraft division, a fighter air corps, and bombers), give the front an additional three regiments of M-13 guards mortar regiments.

3. Release tanks sufficient to reinforce three tank corps.

Fedorov

Fomin Ivanov

24. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30044 to the Commander of the Southwestern Front on the Task of Preventing the Enemy’s Donbass Group From Retreating Behind the Dnepr

⁶⁰

11 February 1943, 0405 hrs

Instead of the operational plan presented by you,⁶¹ it would be better to adopt another plan—with limited but more attainable tasks for the moment. It should be remembered that Khar’kov has not yet been taken by our forces. Upon the capture of Khar’kov, the plan should, of course, be expanded. I suggest not breaking up the 6th Army and not creating Firsov’s group, but rather preserving the 6th Army in its present state, strengthening it with several rifle divisions, one or two tank formations and the cavalry corps arriving to you. The 6th Army should be assigned to securely occupy Sinel’nikovo and then Zaporozh’e, so as to prevent the enemy forces from withdrawing to the western bank of the Dnepr through Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh’e. Other tasks, such as a movement on Kremenchug, should not be assigned to the 6th Army for the time being. As concerns the tasks of Popov’s group and the 1st Guards Army, they should remain according to your plan.

The front’s overall task for the immediate future is to try and prevent the enemy from withdrawing toward Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh’e and take all measures to press the enemy’s Donets group of forces into the Crimea, plug up the passages through Perekop and the Sivash and thus isolate it from the enemy’s remaining forces in Ukraine. The operation is to be begun as soon as possible. Send your decision to the General Staff for its consideration.

Vasil’ev

25. Order by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Commander of the 69th Army to Capture the City of Khar’kov by the Morning of 12.2.1943

⁶²

12 February 1943

The troops of the army entrusted to you were idle throughout 11.2.1943 against the enemy’s rearguards 10-12 kilometers from Khar’kov. Such conduct is criminal; that is, it leads to failure to carry out your combat assignment and enables the enemy to withdraw his main forces unmolested. You personally failed to take measures and did not secure the occupation of Khar’kov by the close of 11.2.1943. I order the following:

1. To capture Khar’kov by the morning of 12.2.1943.

2. Report on those responsible for failing to carry out the assignment for 11.2.1943 and on measures taken against them.

Filippov

Fedotov

26. Combat Report No. 044 by the Commander of the Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Continuation of the Offensive by the Front’s Forces

⁶³

14 February 1943, 0200 hrs

1. The enemy along the front’s right flank, having concentrated in the Yefremovka—Taranovka area up to an infantry division, presumably units of the 33rd and 298th infantry divisions, and 2530 tanks, was holding the line and attempting to carry out a reconnaissance in force in the direction of Novo-Beretskii and Alekseevka. The enemy’s attempts to counterattack from the direction of Zanki station were beaten off with heavy losses for him. Throughout the day the remnants of the 320th Infantry Division (400-500 soldiers and officers) encircled in Liman tried to break out several times in the direction of Zmiev. All of the enemy’s attempts to break out of the encirclement were beaten off. The battle is going on to completely destroy the enemy. As a result of the fighting in the Balakleya area, the path from Ol’khovatka to Balakleya, Verbovka and Andreevka is strewn with enemy corpses, destroyed equipment, horses, and vehicles. The enemy in the center, while holding his previous position, sought to drive our units out of Krasnoarmeiskoe, Kramatorskaya and Slavyansk by repeated and fierce counterattacks involving infantry and tanks. All the counterattacks were beaten off.

The enemy facing the 3rd Guards Army, while putting up stubborn resistance, continues to hold Voroshilovgrad, Semeikino, Samsonov, Vodyanoi, and Malyi Sukhodol and was trying to restrain the offensive by units of the 3rd Guards Army with fire and counterattacks. Along the front’s left flank, the enemy, while covering himself with rearguard units, continued to fall back with his main forces to the west.

2. Throughout 13.2.1943 the 6th Army, while holding its former position, was preparing to renew the offensive, while part of its forces continued to destroy the remnants of the defeated 320th Infantry Division in the Liman area. By the close of 13.2.1943 the army, having cleared the enemy out of the entire area from Savintsy to Liman, is continuing to eliminate the encircled enemy group of forces numbering up to 600 men, with tanks and field artillery; its main forces are holding the previous line in the Liman area, repelling actions by the enemy’s reconnaissance groups.

3. Throughout 13.2.1943, comrade Popov’s group of forces was engaged in fierce fighting with the enemy’s tanks and infantry, repelling his numerous attacks. By the close of the day the group’s units occupied the following: •the 57th Rifle Division is continuing to fight along the northern and northwestern outskirts of Slavyansk, pushing the enemy toward the center of town; •the 3rd Tank Corps, while repelling numerous enemy infantry and

tank attacks from the direction of Krasnogorka, Veselyi and Petrovka, is continuing to hold Kramatorskaya; •throughout the day the 10th Tank Corps was fighting in the area of height 198 (five kilometers north of Bylbasovka) against infantry and 30 tanks in the 3rd Aleksandrovka—Shebel’kovka—Sergeevka area, and with the enemy’s infantry and 20 tanks attempting to attack to the north and west and to threaten the communications of comrade Popov’s group; •throughout the day the 4th Guards Tank Corps and the 9th Tank Brigade, while firmly holding Krasnoarmeiskoe, repelled several fierce counterattacks by enemy infantry and tanks in the direction of Grishino, Zverevo No. 2 and Novo-Ekonomicheskoe. A group of tanks and three assault guns broke through from Novo-Ekonomicheskoe toward the northern outskirts of Krasnoarmeiskoe. Fighting is going on to destroy the enemy that has broken through. The enemy, in strength of more than a battalion, having bypassed Chunishevo station from the east, captured Novo-Pavlovka and Chunishino station. In capturing Krasnoarmeiskoe, the corps’ units killed up to 2,000 enemy soldiers and officers. Ten trains with equipment and 20 guns were captured, as was a train with 20 tanks and several depots. During 11-12.2.1943 the 3rd Guards Army shot down six enemy planes. During the fighting on 12.2.1943 the corps killed up to 1,200 Germans and 300 Italians and captured 200 men and 600 motor vehicles. The situation of the remaining units of comrade Popov’s group has not changed significantly.

4. The 1st Guards Army on the right flank captured Orel’ka and Yur’evka in night fighting and throughout 13.2.1943 was consolidating along its new line, while holding Lozovaya and Barvenkovo. In the center the army, while repelling numerous counterattacks by the enemy’s infantry and tanks, continued to fighting fiercely for Slavyansk. During the night of 12-13.2.1943 units of the 41st Guards Rifle Division, abandoned Bylbasovka and fell back to its northern outskirts under pressure from numerous enemy counterattacks. The army’s units, having renewed the attack along the left flank in the direction of Artemovsk, encountered stubborn enemy resistance and, having repelled several counterattacks by infantry and tanks, captured the heavily fortified strong point of Berestovaya. At the same time they destroyed up to a battalion of enemy infantry. In the day’s fighting the army’s units killed 650 soldiers and officers and knocked out eight tanks.

5. Throughout 13.2.1943 the 3rd Guards Army, while covering its left flank along the line excluding Vodyanoi—excluding Malyi Sukhodol—excluding Popovka, and then along the left bank of the Severskii Donets River as far as Nizhni Vishnevetskii, continued fierce offensive fighting along its right flank against the enemy motorized infantry and tanks in the areas of Krasnyi Yar—Chkalov State Farm and the eastern and southeastern outskirts of Voroshilovgrad and Debal’tsevo. During the fighting the armies occupied the inhabited locales of Popovka, Andrianopol’, Sofievka, Gorodishche, and Chernukhino and by 1700 were fighting to capture Krasnyi Yar, the Chkalov State Farm and Voroshilovgrad, west of Rozalinovka, west of Petrovka and west of Znamenka.

The 8th Cavalry Corps, while continuing to carry out its assignment, captured Andrianopol’, Sofievka, Gorodishche, and Chernukhino and at 1300 was fighting along the eastern outskirts of Debal’tsevo. The 2nd Guards Tank Corps, while marching to the Krivorozh’e— Bryanskii area, was by the end of the day fighting in the Uspenka— Kutserbovka area. While the 14th Rifle Corps was continuing to move behind the 8th Cavalry Corps, the 14th Guards Rifle Division’s forward units reached Lutugino and Uspenka; At 1000 the 61st Guards Rifle Division reached Glafirovka; At 1600 the 50th Guards Rifle Division captured Pervozvanovka, Suvorovka, Orekhovka and Mikhailo-Lazarevka, and continued to move on Makedonovka. During the first part of the day the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps, while moving on Parizhskaya Kommuna, passed through Georgievskoe and began fighting with the enemy in the Uspenka area. As a result of daytime fighting, the 203rd Rifle Division captured Gundarevskaya, Bol’shaya Kamenskaya and Makar’evo. According to far from complete data, the army’s units killed more than 450 soldiers and officers in the day’s fighting, and destroyed five tanks, four guns, and 20 enemy planes at the Voroshilovgrad airfield.

6. By the close of 13.2.1943, the 5th Tank Army, while destroying the enemy’ rearguard units along the entire front, captured Kamensk, Malaya Kamenka, Kosonogovo, Podskel’nyi, Popovka, the Severo-Donetskaya passing track, Fedortsovo, Verkhne-Goveinyi, the

Lavrov passing track, Likhaya station, Likhaya (north and south), Chicherin Rudinko, Komissarovskii, Tatsin, the Zamchalovo passing track, Yasnyi, Zverevo, Maloe Zverevo, Russko-Prokhorovskii, and Vladimirskaya, having advanced 12-30 kilometers in the day’s fighting. The army, having reached the line Malaya Kamenka—Likhoi— Zverevo, completely cleared the Stalingrad—Likhaya railroad and the Millerovo—Rostov railroad along the Kamensk—Zverevo sector.

7. The 17th Air Army assisted the front’s offensive with bombing and assault air attacks, bombed the Gorlovka airfield, theDebal’tsevo rail junction and a train unloading troops at Chunishino station (south of Krasnoarmeiskoe), carried out reconnaissance, and covered our troops. According to incomplete data, the air army carried out 121 sorties, of which 27 were at night. Destroyed or damaged were 18 planes, one tank, 20 motor vehicles with freight, nine horses and wagons, and three rail cars, while up to a company of enemy infantry was scattered and partially destroyed. A direct hit on the Debal’tsevo depot was noted, as well as a powerful explosion in Gorlovka. Four air battles were carried out, with four enemy planes shot down and two knocked out. On 12.2.1943 an Fw-189 was shot down in an air battle.

Commander of the Southwestern Front, Colonel General Vatutin Member of the Southwestern Front military council, Lieutenant General Zheltov Chief of the Southwestern Front staff, Lieutenant General Ivanov

27. Instructions by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Commander of the 38th Army on the Inadmissibility of Failing to Carry Out Orders

⁶⁴

Copy: to the deputy commander of the Voronezh Front, Lieutenant General Kozlov⁶⁵

14 February 1943, 1700 hrs

1. If your army’s failure during the next two days to further carry out my combat orders continues and the breakdown in command and control is not eliminated, then I will raise the matter of removing you from command before the Stavka .

2. Lieutenant General Kozlov is to root out those responsible for failing to carry the front’s orders and combat instructions and order no. 4 to the army on time and is to remove those among the formation commanders maliciously responsible from their positions.

Golikov Pilipenko

28. Combat Report No. 0054 by the Commander of the Voronezh Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Course of the Offensive by the Front’s Units Along the Khar’kov and Other Axes

⁶⁶

16 February 1943, 2400 hrs

1. On 16.2.1943 the front’s forces, having concentrated their main efforts on capturing Khar’kov, continued simultaneously to wage offensive battles for Oboyan’, Graivoron and Bogodukhov. As a result of five days of intensive fighting and having routed the enemy’s pick SS units by an attack from the west, east and southeast, our forces captured the city of Khar’kov during the first half of the day. 60th Army. During the night of 15-16.2 the army’s forces put their units in order and prepared to continue the offensive; during the day they continued the offensive in the direction of L’gov. The enemy put up stubborn fire resistance to our units’ attack. Up to 1600 on 16.2 the army’s units, which beating off counterattacks by the enemy’s infantry, supported by tanks, continued fighting along their previous positions. 38th Army. The army’s forward units, while destroying uncoordinated small groups of enemy infantry, continued to move to the southwest. By the close of 15.2 the army’s main forces were approaching the

line Kotovo—Bobryshevo—Belenikhino. Later information on the units’ situation has not been received. 40th Army. The army’s main forces, in conjunction with units from the 69th Army and 5th Tank Army, were engaged in street fighting in the western and northwestern part of the city of Khar’kov and, having reached the center of the city, continued to clear it of small enemy groups. In the first half of the day units of the 25th Guards Rifle Division, the 305th, 340th, 183rd, and 100th rifle divisions, and the 5th Guards Stalingrad Tank Corps captured the western and northern part of the city. The enemy put up stubborn resistance with SS Units, while attempting to fall back in the direction of Poltava and Lyubotin. Part of the army’s forces (303rd, 107th and 309th rifle divisions) was fighting for Oboyan’, Graivoron and Bogodukhov along their previous positions. 69th Army. During the first half of the day the army’s forces, while overcoming stubborn fire resistance along the approaches to the city of Khar’kov, were engaged in street fighting in the eastern part of the city and captured it. The enemy put up stubborn fire resistance along the approaches to the city of Khar’kov, and at dawn began to fall back on Khar’kov in small groups, and then in the direction of Poltava and Lyubotin. Upon capturing the eastern part of the city, the army’s forces concentrated in the areas of the Rudnev platform, Khalturin village, Levada station, Shevchenko village, and Voroshilov village. 3rd Tank Army. The army’s main forces, in conjunction with units of the 40th and 69th armies, were fighting to capture the southeastern part of the city of Khar’kov, and with part of its forces (12th Tank Corps and 111th Rifle Division) was destroying the enemy in the

Vasishchevo—Borovoe area, hindering the enemy group of forces that was trying to withdraw from Zmiev from breaking through to the city of Khar’kov. During the first half of the day the army’s forces, having broken into the southeastern part of the city, completely captured it. Having left the 62nd Guards Rifle Division as a garrison in the city of Khar’kov, the army’s units moved to the line Pesochin—Korotich— Berezovoe—Yuzhnyi. During 16.2 the 6th Guards Cavalry Corps was moving from the Bol’shaya Gomol’sha area in the direction of Sokolovo and Mirgorod. The situation of the corps’ units is being clarified.

2. The enemy along the front’s right wing and with his garrisons in Oboyan’, Graivoron and Bogodukhov put up stubborn resistance to our attacking units. The defeated SS units in the Khar’kov area tried to break through to the west and southwest.

3. On 17.2.1943 the front’s left-wing forces are to continue their attack; along the right wing they are to advance within the confines of their new boundary lines: the 60th Army toward L’gov; the 38th Army will advance to attack in the direction of Sumy; the 69th Army on Akhtyrka, and; the 3rd Tank Army on Poltava.

Filippov Fedotov Petrov

29. The Commander of the Southwestern Front’s Report No. 128 to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Plan for the Operation to Defeat the Enemy Group of Forces in the Donbass and the Seizure of a Bridgehead Along the Dnepr River

⁶⁷

17 February 1943, 1125 hrs

In carrying out your no. 30044 of 11.02.1943, I have assigned the front’s forces the following tasks:

1. 6th Army. a) The army is to attack with the forces of the 15th Rifle Corps (350th, 172nd and 6th rifle divisions), the 267th Rifle Division and the 106th Rifle Brigade to the west and, as Khar’kov has been taken by our forces, the 6th Army’s forces listed above are to capture the Krasnograd—Poltava—Kremenchug area by 23.02.1943 and reach the front Poltava—Kremenchug, while part of its forces are to observe the northern bank of the Dnepr River; b) the 1st Guards Tank Corps, 25th Tank Corps, 4th Guards Rifle Corps, three battalions of guards mortars, three anti-tank artillery regiments, two howitzer regiments, a corps artillery regiment, and six anti-aircraft regiments are to capture Pavlograd by the close of 18.02.1943, the Sinel’nikovo area by the close of 19.02.1943, and capture Zaporozh’e by the close of 20.02.1943. Later, while holding Pavlograd, Sinel’nikovo and Zaporozh’e, part of

the army’s forces are to capture Bol’shoi Tokmak and the railroad station of Fedorovka, and absolutely preventing the enemy’s withdrawal across the Dnepr River through Dnepropetrovsk, Zaporozh’e and Nikopol’. Part of the army’s forces is to seize a bridgehead along the western bank of the Dnepr River in the Zaporozh’e area and to the north. Under favorable conditions, Melitopol’ should also be seized. This group of the 6th Army’s forces will be supported by almost all of the front’s air assets and reinforced by yet another rifle division during the course of the fighting.

2. Popov’s group. The group’s main forces are to be gathered in the Krasnoarmeiskoe —Krasnoarmeiskii Rudnik—Dobropol’e area. Under no conditions is the enemy to be allowed to break through and retreat to the west along the front Slavyansk—Stalino. The group, in conjunction with units of the 1st and 3rd guards armies, is to encircle and destroy the enemy’s main forces (up to seven panzer divisions and several infantry divisions) in the Konstantinovka—Stalino—Artemovsk area. Part of the force is to seize Volnovakha by no later than 19.02.1943. In case the enemy begins to pull back his main forces south of Stalino, under no conditions is he to be allowed to fall back behind the Dnepr River through Zaporozh’e, for which we have to launch flank attacks from the north and through a parallel pursuit press the enemy to the sea, cutting off his path of retreat to Zaporozh’e. Popov’s group has already taken on two independent tank brigades and three ski brigades.

3. The 1st Guards Army, minus the 4th Guards Rifle Corps, consists of six rifle divisions (57th, 195th, 52nd, and 78th rifle divisions and the 44th and 58th guards rifle divisions), with reinforcements. a) the forces of four rifle divisions are to pin the enemy down along the front Slavyansk—Krymskaya, and by the close of 18.02.1943 are to take Slavyansk; b) the remaining two rifle divisions are to move by forced marches in the direction of Barvenkovo, Lozovaya Gubinikha, and Petrikovka, 30 kilometers northwest of Dnepropetrovsk. The divisions are to arrive in the Petrikovka area by 25.02.1943. Afterwards, the remaining divisions of the 1st Guards Army are to move up behind these two rifle divisions, as soon as they are freed up from the Slavyansk—Krymskaya front. The entire 1st Guards Army will be concentrated to the Shul’govka— Kolkhozovka—Chaplinka—Petrikovka by approximately 1 March 1943. At the same time, the 1st Guards Army will be reinforced at the expense of the 3rd Guards Army and the additionally arriving divisions, in order to raise its strength to 12 rifle divisions, reinforced by a High Command Reserve artillery division and eight mortar regiments (formed on the basis of the 300 mortars released by you earlier). The army will be reinforced with the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which will be concentrated by approximately 1 March 1943, and at least one tank corps. Following its concentration, the army is to force the Dnepr in conjunction with the front’s other forces, carry out the mission of seizing a bridgehead along the western bank of the Dnepr River, about which I will report in detail below. I do not exclude the possibility that during the army’s movement from Slavyansk to the west it will be necessary to make turns to the

south for launching flanking attacks against the enemy, in case he manages to break out through the Slavyansk—Konstantinovka front.

4. The 3rd Guards Army, while launching an attack in the direction of Debal’tsevo and Stalino, in conjunction with Lieutenant General Popov’s group and the 1st Guards Army, is to encircle and destroy the enemy in the Donbass area. By the close of 18.02.1943 the army is to reach the front Debal’tsevo—Chistyakovo; by the close of 22.02.1943 it is to capture the Stalino area; it is subsequently to vigorously develop the offensive in the direction of Zaporozh’e, while not letting the enemy break contact and carry out an orderly withdrawal. Upon reaching the line Debal’tsevo—Chistyakovo, two tank corps, minus their equipment, are to be removed from the 3rd Guards Army and sent to the front reserve.

5. The 5th Tank Army, consisting of five rifle divisions and one tank corps, is to vigorously continue the offensive in the direction of Roven’ki, Donetsko-Amvrosievka and by the close of 20.02.1943 is to reach the front Ilovaisk—Kuteinikovo—Tsibulyanovka. The army is to subsequently vigorously attack along the front Orekhov—Bol’shoi Tokmak, and if the boundary line with the Southern Front should be shifted to the north, then the 5th Tank Army will be gradually pulled back into the front reserve for outfitting and castled to the main axis.

6. The front’s air force will primarily support the 6th Army and

Popov’s group. I am reporting the following on seizing a bridgehead along the western bank of the Dnepr River: this task is extremely important and must be accomplished quickly now and at all costs, in order to crush the enemy’s intentions and plan to organize a defensive front along the western bank of the Dnepr River. Right now the enemy still lacks the troops for occupying a line along the Dnepr River, although he is carrying out entrenching work with engineer forces and the local population and, according to the available data, he is shifting his troops by plan from the Northern Caucasus to the Zaporozh’e area. He is bringing up troops from the Crimea here by rail to the Zaporozh’e area. In carrying out the operation to seize a bridgehead, the troops must reach the front Kremenchug—Krivoi Rog—Kherson and, under favorable conditions, the front Kirovograd—Nikolaev. In any case, the air base in the Kirovograd area must be seized. The accomplishment of this task is to be entrusted to the 1st Guards Army, in the composition cited above, which will be concentrated in the Shul’govka—Petrikovka—Chaplinka area with the mission of forcing the Dnepr River along the Verkhne-Dneprovsk— Dneprodzerzhinsk sector, after which it is to develop the success in the direction of Krivoi Rog, and part of its forces toward Dnepropetrovsk and Zaporozh’e. Another powerful attack is to be launched by the mobile formations and the 4th Guards Rifle Corps and, should they arrive in time, Lelyushenko’s units are to launch an attack from the Zaporozh’e— Nikopol’ sector toward Krivoi Rog, while part of its forces attacks toward Dnepropetrovsk. The 1st Guards Cavalry Corps will be employed along the 1st Guards

Army’s axis. The 6th Army will be reinforced by three divisions, which will have to force the Dnepr River opposite the Mishen’ka area (40 kilometers southeast of Kremenchug) for operations in the direction of Krivoi Rog. Particular attention should be paid to engineer, air and artillery support. I am reporting the plan for seizing a bridgehead to you now, because a great deal of preparatory work is required for it, in particular, much time will be spent concentrating troops, and it is necessary to begin right now, in order to complete all our preparations by 1 March 1943 and thus begin our work in the first days of the month. By this time the flood time may have already begun, although the engineer troops and our troops will have to be prepared in order to cope with forcing the river at flood stage, because the enemy cannot be granted a respite. Air-landing formations could play a major role in the operation to seize a bridgehead. Unfortunately, the seven rifle divisions and the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, which are arriving by railroad, are late. I request the following: 1. To confirm the decision laid out above for Kharitonov’s actions and the proposal for carrying out the operation to seize a bridgehead. 2. If possible, give the Southwestern Front air-landing formations. 3. Speed up the arrival of the trains with the newly-arriving formations for the Southwestern Front. 4. Speed up the delivery of tanks to the Southwestern Front for

outfitting the tank army.

Fedorov Fomin Ivanov

30. Stavka VGK Directive No. 30048 to the Commander of the Southwestern Front on the Operation to Prevent the Enemy’s Retreat Behind the Dnepr

⁶⁸

17 February 1943

I approve your operational plan which was received today by the Stavka.⁶⁹ At the same time, I request that you take into account my comments on the 6th Army’s tasks, which were uttered during a telephone conversation with you on the question of operation “Leap.”

Vasil’ev

31. Combat Report No. 049 by the Headquarters of the Southwestern Front to the Supreme Commander-in-Chief on the Course of the Offensive

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18 February 1943, 2400 hrs

1. The enemy along the front’s right flank, while covering himself with rearguard units, continued to slowly fall back to the west. The enemy along the front’s central sector, in its previous composition and disposition, continued to put up stubborn resistance to our troops’ offensive, particularly along the line Belogorovka—Kamyshevakha—Orekhovo—Krasnogorovka— Petroven’ki—Khoroshee—Cherkasskoe—Sudokhol and in the Debal’tsevo area. The enemy along the left flank continued to fall back to the west, while conducting rearguard battles.

2. Throughout 18.2.1943, the 6th Army continued to develop the offensive in the southwestern direction. By 1000 on 18.2.1943 the army’s units captured Ryabukhino, Semenovka, Sharlaevka, Pisarevka, Andreevka (Kokhanovka), Dmitrovka (Skotova), and Znamenka and continued to fight for Okhochae, Lozovaya (seven kilometers west of Yefremovka) and Par-Shlyakhovaya, with its forward units near height 201 (southwest of Ryabukhino), in Andreevka (Kokhanovka) and along the western outskirts of Orlovshchina. The situation of the army’s units by the close of the day is being clarified.

New data on the situation of the 106th Rifle Brigade and the 267th Rifle Division has not been received.

3. Throughout 18.2.1943 comrade Popov’s group of forces continued to be involved in fierce fighting with the enemy’s motorized infantry and tanks, firmly holding on to Kramatorskaya, Krasnoarmeiskii Rudnik, and Krasnoarmeiskoe. One of the 10th Tank Corps’ brigades captured Verevka, while another brigade is fighting for Krivorozh’e (west of Krasnoarmeiskii Rudnik). The situation of the remaining units remains unchanged. The 18th Tank Corps captured Mikhailovka and Larovka and cleared the enemy from the Cherkasskoe—Oktyabr’skii road. The 57th Guards Rifle Division captured Andreevka and linked up with the 3rd Tank Corps’ forward detachments and is moving to the Kramatorskaya area. The situation of the remaining units remains unchanged.

4. During 18.2.1943 the 1st Guards Army, having repulsed several small enemy counterattacks, was consolidating along the line reached and conducting reconnaissance, while along the left flank it was regrouping and relieving units for carrying out its subsequent task. The 4th Guards Rifle Corps (35th, 41st Guards and 244th rifle divisions) has been subordinated to the 6th Army.

5. During 18.2.1943 the 3rd Guards Army, while overcoming the enemy’s stubborn resistance, continued to develop the offensive to

the southwest, encircling and destroying the remnants of the enemy’s Voroshilovgrad group of forces. During the fighting, the army’s units along the left flank occupied up to 25 inhabited locales, having advanced up to ten kilometers that day, and by the close of 18.2.1943 were fighting along the line Kirpichnyi—Petroven’ki—Cherkasskoe—Sukhodol—Sabovka— Veselaya Tarasovka (all locales inclusive)—Sbornaya station—the Kalinin State Farm—Ushakovka—Vodino—Uspenka—Kruglik— Krasnaya Polyana—Kolpakovo—Shchetovo station—Fominovka. The 7th Guards Cavalry Corps continues to be involved in fierce fighting along the eastern outskirts of Debal’tsevo. A detachment (12 tanks and 120 men) for linking up with the 7th Guards Cavalry Corps was fighting in the Fedorovka area (northwest of Ivanovka) during the night of 18.2.1943.

6. Throughout 18.2.1943 the 5th Tank Army continued to develop the offensive, pushing the enemy toward the Mius River. By the close of the day the army’s units reached the line Verkhnii Nagol’chik—Nizhnii Nagol’chik—D’yakovo—Novaya Nadezhda— Zhelobok and continue to attack in the direction of Dmitrievka and Kuibyshevo. In the day’s fighting the army’s units advanced 10-15 kilometers and occupied up to 15 inhabited locales. Three enemy tanks were knocked out in the fighting for D’yakovo.

7. The 17th Air Army bombed the railroad junction and enemy troops in the area of Artemovsk and Kaganovich in night actions. 34 sorties were carried out. Six hits were recorded against station buildings and two direct hits on the railroad bed. Throughout

18.2.1943 the army’s units were not engaged in combat, due to the unfavorable meteorological conditions.

Fedorov and Fomin are with the 3rd Guards Army. Chief of the Southwestern Front staff, Lieutenant General Ivanov

1Editor’s note. All documents cited here are taken from the series Velikaya Otechestvennaya , volumes 5(2), 5(3) and 15-4(3), edited by V.A. Zolotarev. Moscow: “Terrra,” 1996-1999). Entries will appear by volume and page number. 1Editor’s note. VGK stands for Verkhovnoe Glavnokomandovanie , or Supreme High Command. 2Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):459. 3Editor’s note. This refers to Lieutenant General of Aviation Fedor Yakovlevich Falaleev, one of the Stavka representatives in the area. 4Editor’s note. This refers Colonel General of Artillery Nikolai Nikolaevich Voronov, one of the Stavka representatives in the area. 5Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):460. 6Ibid , 460-61. 7Editor’s note. Ivan Timofeevich Shlyomin (1898-1969) joined the Russian imperial army in 1917 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he served as chief of staff of an army and a front , and later held a series of army commands. Following the war, Shlyomin served in a variety of staff and teaching positions.

8Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):466-67. 9Editor’s note. This refers to the Southwestern Front’s 5th Tank Army. 10 Editor’s note. This refers to Lieutenant General Prokofii Longvinovich Romanenko, the commander of the 5th Tank Army. 11 Editor’s note. This refers to Major General Dmitrii Danilovich Lelyushenko, the commander of the 3rd Guards Army. 12 Editor’s note. This refers to Lieutenant General Vasilii Ivanovich Kuznetsov, the commander of the 1st Guards Army. 13 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Lieutenant General Filipp Ivanovich Golikov, the commander of the Voronezh Front. 14 Editor’s note. This was Stalin’s code name. 15 Editor’s note. This was Colonel General N. N. Voronov. 16 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):467-68. 17 Editor’s note. This was Colonel General Aleksandr Mikhailovich Vasilevskii, the Red Army’s chief of staff. 18 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):469. 19 Editor’s note. Markian Mikhailovich Popov (1902-69) joined the Red Army in 1920 and gradually rose through the ranks, despite a severe drinking problem. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a number of fronts and armies, but never remained in the same command for long. Following the war, Popov commanded a number of military districts and served in the central army apparatus. 20 Editor’s note. Vyacheslav Dmitrievich Tsvetaev (1893-1950)

joined the Russian imperial army in 1914 and the Red Army in 1918. During the Great Patriotic War he commanded a number of armies and served as a deputy front commander. Following the war, Tsvetaev served in the army’s military-educational apparatus. 21 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(2):470-74. 22 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Colonel General Nikolai Fedorovich Vatutin, the commander of the Southwestern Front. 23 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Marshal Georgii Konstantinovich Zhukov, the deputy supreme commander-in-chief. 24 Editor’s note. This is the Glavnoe Avto-Bronetankovoe Upravlenie (Main Auto-Armored Tank Directorate). 25 Editor’s note. This refers to Major General Vasilii Mikhailovich Badanov, the commander of the 24th Tank Corps (renamed the 2nd Guards Tank Corps on 26 December 1942). 26 Editor’s note. This refers to Major General P.P. Pavlov, the commander of the 25th Tank Corps. 27 Editor’s note. This refers to Major General I.N. Russiyanov, the commander of the 1st Guards Mechanized Corps. 28 Editor’s note. This is a reference to U.S.-made C-47 aircraft, which the Soviet Union received through Lend-Lease. 29 Editor’s note. Fedor Mikhailovich Kharitonov (1899-1943) joined the Red Army in 1919. During the Great Patriotic War he served primarily as an army commander along the southwestern direction. He later died of illness. 30 Editor’s note. This refers to Major General of Aviation Aleksandr Yevgen’evich Golovanov, the commander of the Red Army’s LongRange Aviation.

31 Editor’s note. Major General Semyon Pavlovich Ivanov (1907-93) joined the Red Army in 1926 and held a number of command and staff positions. During the Great Patriotic War he served in a number of staff assignments at the army and front level, along the SovietGerman front and in Manchuria. Following the war, Ivanov served as chief of staff of several military districts and chief of the General Staff Academy. 32 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):187-88. 33 Editor’s note. This mistake was in the original and should read Severskii Donets. 34 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Colonel General Andrei Ivanovich Yeremenko, commander of the Southern Front. 35 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Colonel General A.M. Vasilevskii. 36 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Lieutenant General Aleksei Sergeevich Zheltov, a member of the Southwestern Front’s military council. 37 Editor’s note. This was Colonel General A.M. Vasilevskii. 38 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):31. 39 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):72-73. 40 Editor’s note. This was Lieutenant General Fedor Fedotovich Kuznetsov, a member of the Voronezh Front’s military council. 41 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):189-90. 42 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):274-75. 43 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Major General Mikhail

Il’ich Kazakov, chief of staff of the Voronezh Front. 44 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):33. 45 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):79-90. 46 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Lieutenant General F.F. Kuznetsov. 47 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):22 48 Editor’s note. This was Lieutenant General Fedor Yefimovich Bokov, the deputy chief of the General Staff for organizational questions. 49 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):80-81. 50 Editor’s note. This is a reference to Stavka directive No. 30022, of 23 January 1943. See no. 13. 51 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):40. 52 Ibid , 41. 53 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):84. 54 Ibid , 198-99. 55 Ibid , 87-88. 56 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):90-92. 57 Editor’s note. This was the code name for Major General A.D. Pilipenko, chief of staff of the Voronezh Front. 58 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):277-78. 59 Editor’s note. This was Major General P.A. Firsov, deputy

commander of the 6th Army. 60 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):74 61 Editor’s note. See document no. 23. 62 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):93. 63 Ibid , 206-08. 64 Ibid , 93. 65 Editor’s note. This was Lieutenant General Dmitrii Timofeevich Kozlov, deputy commander of the Voronezh Front. 66 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):95-96. 67 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 5(3):280-82. 68 Ibid , 76. 69 Editor’s note. See document no. 29. 70 Velikaya Otechestvennaya , 15-4(3):214-15.