Stalin's War on Japan: The Red Army's 'Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation', 1945 1526785943, 9781526785947

Citation preview

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page i - Press

Stalin’s War on Japan

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page ii - Press

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page iii - Press

Stalin’s War on Japan The Red Army’s Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, 1945 Charles Stephenson

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page iv - Press

First published in Great Britain in 2021 by P E N & S W O R D MI LI T A R Y An imprint of Pen & Sword Books Ltd Yorkshire – Philadelphia Copyright # Charles Stephenson, 2021 ISBN 978-1-52678-594-7 The right of Charles Stephenson to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by her in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing. Typeset by Concept, Huddersfield, West Yorkshire, HD4 5JL. Printed and bound in England by TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall.

Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Aviation, Atlas, Family History, Fiction, Maritime, Military, Discovery, Politics, History, Archaeology, Select, Wharncliffe Local History, Wharncliffe True Crime, Military Classics, Wharncliffe Transport, Leo Cooper, The Praetorian Press, Remember When, White Owl, Seaforth Publishing and Frontline Publishing. For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact PEN & SWORD BOOKS LTD 47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk or PEN & SWORD BOOKS 1950 Lawrence Rd, Havertown, PA 19083, USA E-mail: [email protected] Website: www.penandswordbooks.com

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page v - Press

Dedication For George Carbery 19 December 1932–4 August 2020 ‘Everyone must leave something behind when he dies, my grandfather said. [. . .] Something your hand touched some way so your soul has somewhere to go when you die, and when people look at that tree or that flower you planted, you’re there. [Ray Bradbury]

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page vi - Press

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page vii - Press

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1. ‘How many divisions has the Pope?’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2. Manchukuo: an Army with a State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

3. The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

31

4. ‘. . . at the crossroads of destiny’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

5. The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

51

6. The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

7. The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

81

8. ‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

9. The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State, and an Empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 10. Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’ . . . . . . . . . 135 11. ‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

stalin’s war on japan - prelim page viii - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Introduction On the 8th [August 1945], following in the steps of the ‘Fascist jackal,’ Mussolini, in 1940, Stalin, scenting ‘easy meat,’ declared war on Japan, and the next day the Russians crossed the Manchurian border.1 The massive attack launched by the Soviet Union’s Red Army on the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, which commenced a little after midnight local time on 9 August 1945, took most of the world, and particularly the Japanese, by surprise. It was intended to. Prior knowledge of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation was greatly restricted, and known only within the very highest government and military levels of the three senior members of the United Nations: the USSR, the US and the UK.2 That Soviet intervention in the war with Japan had been sought, by the US in particular, and agreed upon in principle during the 1943 Tehran Conference, was also a closely kept secret. That the decision had been confirmed, with Stalin’s specific postwar goals accepted and agreed, at Yalta in February 1945 likewise. The lack of knowledge that Stalin’s war on Japan was undertaken as a matter of high policy, and in agreement with his then allies, led many to consider it merely opportunistic; J.F.C. Fuller, cited above, is an example, albeit perhaps an extreme if eminently quotable one. What this work seeks to do is advance a narrative on the political background and context to the operation, which constituted the final campaign of the Second World, or Great Patriotic, War, and examine its conduct and legacy. This it does in some detail, but it is not a military treatise and does not attempt to offer blow-by-blow accounts of every battle, nor comprehensive lists of each and every unit engaged. There are excellent studies in English that do that, authored by David M. Glantz, and those who seek such detail need look no further.3 I would also add that this is not meant to be an academic work. There are no theoretical frameworks within which the tale is constructed, nor any new or startling conclusions. It does, however, attempt the destruction of a few myths attached to the Red Army. Though targeted at the general reader rather than the professional historian, I have been careful to correctly attribute all sources used. A word about rendering place-names into English; a text dealing with Russians fighting Japanese in China and Korea has to somehow negotiate

stalin’s war on japan - Press

2

Stalin’s War on Japan

transliterary minefields. What was known by one name to the Japanese was likely called something else by the Russians, and vice versa. Equally, there might well have been an entirely different name in Chinese or Korean. This, in turn, is further complicated by the fact that the system for romanising the Chinese language changed in the 1950s. Then the old Wade-Giles system was superseded by the current Hanyu Pinyin method under which, to take an obvious example, the Chinese capital formerly rendered as ‘Peking’ became ‘Beijing’. Additional difficulties revolve around the fact that whilst the major cities, towns and geographical features have endured whatever they may have been called, many villages and the like have not. So whilst an attempt has been made to offer renditions which register on Google Maps, this has not always been possible. In every case I have tried to stick with what seems to be the most sensible version, although mentioning some of the other possibilities, and I trust that this will meet with general approval. All translations are, in any event, mine. I owe grateful thanks to Sarah Cook, who carried out an expert job in copyediting this work and thus greatly improved it. And finally, it gives me immense pleasure to thank a couple of stalwarts who have, as always, greatly helped in putting together this work: Charles Blackwood and Michael Perratt. Charles once again drew the excellent maps, the difficulties of so doing being made apparent in the preceding paragraph, and reconstructed, from multiple and contradictory sources, a representation of a heavy-artillery bunker. Michael applied the acid test to a volume of this sort: is it intelligible and accessible to the interested lay reader? Happily, he thought so. Needless to say, however, any errors found within are mine and mine alone.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 1

‘How many divisions has the Pope?’ They were discussing the Pope. ‘Let’s make him our ally,’ proposed Churchill. All right, smiled Stalin [. . .] ‘How many divisions has the Pope? If he tells us . . . let him become our ally.’1 In deciding to enter the war against Japan, the Soviet government took into account, first of all, that imperialist Japan in the Second World War was an ally of fascist Germany and provided the latter with constant assistance in its war against the USSR [. . .] thus the war against imperialist Japan was a logical continuation of the Great Patriotic War for the Soviet Union.2 When the ‘Big Three’ – Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin – met at Yalta for the Argonaut Conference from 4 to 11 February 1945, the defeat of Nazi Germany was plainly imminent. American, British, Canadian and French armies were advancing on Germany’s western border and had defeated the Ardennes counteroffensive (‘The Battle of the Bulge’). Situated along the Rhine, from north to south, were the 21st Army Group (Canadian First Army and British Second Army), the 12th Army Group (US First Army, US Third Army, US Ninth Army, and US Fifteenth Army) and the 6th Army Group (US Seventh Army and French First Army). Along with their integrated Tactical Air Forces, they were poised before the supposedly impregnable West Wall (‘Siegfried Line’) ready to invade Germany itself. In Eastern Europe several massive Red Army Fronts (more or less equivalent to reinforced Anglo-American army groups) were only around 130km from Vienna, 190km from Prague and some 70km from Berlin. Though there was still some fearsome fighting to come, for Hitler, who on 16 January had moved into his bunker, from which he was fated never to emerge, the end was most definitely nigh. This was far from the case with respect to the other member of the Axis. Though the Imperial Japanese Navy had ceased to be a factor in the war’s outcome, and the American unrestricted submarine campaign had imposed a virtual blockade on Japan itself, the Japanese Army was considered a formidable military force. Roosevelt wanted Soviet assistance in defeating it. At a bilateral meeting on 8 February 1945, with Averell Harriman, the US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and Vyacheslav Molotov, the People’s

stalin’s war on japan - Press

East Asia and Japan. The shaded portions show Japanese (or Japanese-controlled) territory. (# Charles Blackwood)

Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Soviet foreign minister), in attendance, Roosevelt discussed the matter with Stalin.3 The President said that with the fall of Manila4 the war in the Pacific was entering into a new phase and that we hoped to establish bases on the Bonins and on the islands near Formosa. He said the time had come to make plans for additional bombing of Japan. He hoped that it would not be necessary actually to invade the Japanese islands and would do so only if absolutely necessary. The Japanese had 4,000,000 men in their army and he hoped by intensive bombing to be able to destroy Japan and its army and thus save American lives.5 He was, of course, acting on the advice of the joint chiefs of staff, who had sent him a pre-conference memorandum on the matter outlining the ‘basic principles in working toward USSR entry into the war against Japan’. First among these was ‘Russia’s entry at as early a date as possible consistent with

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘How many divisions has the Pope?’

5

her ability to engage in offensive operations is necessary to provide maximum assistance to our Pacific operations.’6 Stalin, who ‘held most of the military cards at Yalta’ and knew it, was naturally enough receptive to Roosevelt’s blandishments:7 he had publicly denounced Japan as an ‘aggressor nation’ on 6 November 1944.8 Indeed, he had agreed in principle to join the war against Japan, following Allied victory over Germany, as far back as the Tehran Conference in 1943.9 The exact details concerning this deal were not finalised, however. Now, at Yalta, they would be and the ‘Agreement Regarding Entry of the Soviet Union into the War Against Japan’ was formalised and signed on 11 February 1945. It gave Stalin all he asked for; in return, the Soviet Union would enter the war against Japan ‘two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated’.10 Article 1 stipulated that ‘The status quo in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People’s Republic) shall be preserved.’ This reinforced the existing situation whereby the ‘People’s Republic’ was a Soviet satellite state, and had been since 1924.11 Given that the territory had been Chinese until 1911, this recognition at least provided diplomatic protection against future claims from the former ruler. The rest of the agreement dealt largely with territory either occupied by, or under the rule of, Japan. In the main it sought to revoke the 1905 Treaty of Portsmouth, brokered by an earlier Roosevelt (Theodore), which formally ended the 1904–05 Russo-Japanese War.12 This was explicit: Article 2 began by stating that ‘The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored.’13 The ‘right’ that involved the largest territorial transfer related to ‘the southern part of Sakhalin [Karafuto] as well as all the islands adjacent to it’. These were to be ‘returned to the Soviet Union’. Arguably lesser ‘rights’ concerned the ‘commercial port of Dairen [Dalny, Dalniy, Dalian]’ and ‘the lease of Port Arthur [Lushun, Lushunkou]’. These were located on China’s Liaodong (Liaotung) Peninsula, leases to which Russia had extorted with the signing of the ‘Convention for the Lease of the Liaotung Peninsula’ in 1898, and had subsequently lost.14 Article 5 of the Treaty of Portsmouth had transferred and assigned these leases to Japan, and now Stalin wanted them reassigned. There was an olive branch inasmuch as Dairen was to be ‘internationalized’ with the ‘pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union . . . being safeguarded’. As for Port Arthur, the lease was to be merely ‘restored’.15 The railways in the area, the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the SouthManchurian Railroad, were to be ‘jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company, it being understood that the pre-eminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded’. China was, though, to ‘retain full sovereignty in Manchuria’.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

6

Stalin’s War on Japan

The final article, Article 3, of the agreement stated that ‘The Kuril [Kurile] islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.’ Though the British and Americans raised no objections to this at the time, it later became hugely controversial. Stalin is recorded as pointing out that, in respect of the agreement, he only wanted to have returned to Russia ‘what the Japanese have taken from my country’, to which Roosevelt replied ‘That seems like a very reasonable suggestion from our ally. They only want to get back that which has been taken from them.’16 The controversy largely arose because the Kurils didn’t fall into that category, their ownership having been settled in the Treaties of Shimoda and Saint Petersburg in 1855 and 1875 respectively.17 The arguments are convoluted, however, and definitely outside the scope of this work.18 The final paragraphs of the document acknowledged that the Chinese government would have to be squared in relation to ‘Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above’ via the ‘concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek’. This seemed to be taken for granted; Roosevelt would ‘take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin’. This was no doubt a reflection of reality, given that Chiang’s regime was dependent on American support for its survival. The point was, though, reiterated: ‘the claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated’. There was though, perhaps, a sweetener for China: ‘The Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the national government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.’ China, though, was to learn nothing of these matters at the time. Fearing security leaks, Roosevelt kept the agreement from Chiang and his regime.19 Indeed, it was a closely guarded secret overall. Churchill, upon discovering that copies of the document were circulating, fired off a strongly worded memo to his Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden: ‘I am shocked to see that there have been eight copies of this secret document.’ He wanted to know how many copies there were altogether and stated they should not be circulated at all unless ‘in a locked box’. Nobody, including the Dominions, should see it who was not already ‘cognisant of it’.20 The reasoning behind this veil of secrecy was obvious. If the Japanese authorities got word of what was afoot then they would reinforce their already heavily fortified border regions with the Soviet Union. Moreover, they might launch an offensive with a view to blocking or damaging the vital TransSiberian Railway. Any such operation could have disastrous effects on the build-up for the planned offensive. Although of much lesser import in the practical sense, there was also a diplomatic problem: the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941 was in force. Under the terms of this, both

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘How many divisions has the Pope?’

7

parties undertook ‘to maintain peaceful and friendly relations’ and each agreed to ‘mutually respect the territorial integrity and inviolability’ of the other. The treaty was valid for five years, after which it would automatically renew unless one of the ‘Contracting Parties denounces the Pact one year before the expiration of the term’.21 This ‘scrap of paper’ was, of course, only of utility for so long as both parties found it to be so. It would have no bearing when viewed through the prism of Soviet realpolitik, particularly given that there was only one perspective that mattered: that of Stalin, the ‘unchallengeable individual locus of state authority’.22 Despite being almost affectionately referred to as ‘Uncle Joe’23 by Roosevelt and Churchill, that he was in reality a bloodthirsty tyrant who, according to one of his recent biographers, believed ‘the solution to every human problem was death’ is indisputable.24 That he created a statesponsored system of mass terror and mass murder in order to perpetuate his rule is equally so. Yet he was no mere thuggish despot. One who observed him at close quarters during the wartime conferences was Britain’s Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke, Churchill’s primary military adviser.25 Not a man easily impressed, particularly by politicians, Brooke noted in 1942 that ‘Stalin is a realist if ever there was one, facts only count with him, plans, hypotheses, future possibilities mean little to him, but he is ready to face facts even when unpleasant’.26 As is well known, Stalin’s realism was often moral-free cynicism, as in his apocryphal question: ‘how many divisions has the Pope?’ Nevertheless he had other qualities too. As Brooke later recorded: I rapidly grew to appreciate the fact that he had a military brain of the very highest calibre. Never once in any of his statements did he make any strategic error, nor did he ever fail to appreciate all the implications of a situation with a quick and unerring eye. In this respect he stood out when compared with his two colleagues [Churchill and Roosevelt].27 That Stalin was driven by geopolitical interests and knew what he wanted beforehand, and then got it all, is evident. What he did not do, though, is spring these demands unexpectedly. He had, for example, told Roosevelt’s adviser Harry Hopkins in 1941 that Vladivostok, because of its position, was vulnerable; it ‘could be cut off by Japan at any time’.28 He had reiterated this point to Ambassador Harriman on 14 December 1944, going on to argue that Southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands should be returned to the Soviet Union because of it: ‘The USSR is entitled to protection for its communications to this important port. All outlets to the Pacific Ocean are now held or blocked by the enemy.’29 He also stated that he wished to secure the lease for the ports of Dairen and Port Arthur again, as well as obtain the lease for the Chinese Eastern Railway and the Southern Manchurian Railway. Finally, he wanted recognition of the status quo in Outer Mongolia.30

stalin’s war on japan - Press

8

Stalin’s War on Japan

These were, of course, what he asked for, and got, some three months later at Yalta. Given that he’d clearly raised the points well beforehand, it is then doubtful that Jukes’ comment that he ‘deceived his allies into cajoling him into a war that he was all along determined to enter when the time was ripe’ is fair.31 No cajolery was necessary. The Americans got what they wanted, and had been seeking for some time, as well. To reiterate, the defeat of Japan was not immediately foreseeable at Yalta, and an invasion of the Japanese home islands was envisaged as being necessary to achieve it. Indeed, ‘Olympic’, the preliminary assault on the southern island of Kyushu was slated for 1 December 1945, and ‘Coronet’, the subsequent landing on Honshu, was scheduled for 1 March 1946.32 Knowing that these potential (and at that time far in the future) operations would be difficult and dangerous, in September 1943 the US joint chiefs of staff had highlighted the ‘great importance to the United States of Russia’s full participation in the war against Japan after the defeat of Germany’. This, they said, was ‘essential to the prompt and crushing defeat of Japan at far less cost to the United States and Great Britain’.33 Three months later they restated this point in a paper dealing with operations to be undertaken against Japan in 1944: ‘every effort should be exerted to bring the USSR into the war against Japan at the earliest practicable date . . .’34 The rationale for this involvement was made quite clear in a report of July 1944: A Russian drive into Manchuria coincident with or prior to our invasion of Kyushu would prevent any appreciable movement of Japanese forces . . . and would necessitate retention of all Japanese forces on the Asiatic mainland. Such action . . . would facilitate our invasion of Kyushu and our ultimate invasion of the heart of Japan.35 This view was shared by General MacArthur, the senior army field commander in the Pacific Theatre. A member of the War Department Operations Division discussed the matter with him and submitted his report on 13 February 1945. In terms of the invasion, it declared, MacArthur was ‘apprehensive as to the possibility of the movement of the bulk of the Manchurian army and other Japanese forces from China to the defense of the homeland. He emphatically stated that we must not invade Japan proper unless [the] Russian army is previously committed to action in Manchuria. He said this was essential . . .’36 The accuracy of the rendition of MacArthur’s views is confirmed by a contemporaneous note made by Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, who visited him at Manila on 28 February. This records that the general: felt that we should secure the commitment of the Russians to active and vigorous prosecution of a campaign against the Japanese in Manchukuo of such proportions as to pin down a very large part of the Japanese army;

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘How many divisions has the Pope?’

9

that once this campaign was engaged we should then launch an attack on the home islands . . . our strength should be reserved for use in the Japanese mainland, on the plains of Tokyo, and that this could not be done without the assurance that the Japanese would be heavily engaged by the Russians in Manchuria.37 Indeed, the Department of Defense later acknowledged that the terms agreed at Yalta were ‘essentially the same as those outlined by Marshal Stalin to Ambassador Harriman’.38 Admiral Leahy, Roosevelt’s chief of staff and chairman of the joint chiefs of staff, explained it thus in his memoirs: ‘I personally . . . did not feel that Russian participation in the Japanese war was necessary. The Army did. Roosevelt sided with the Army.’39 This point has perhaps been laboured somewhat, but if so it is in furtherance of refuting the oft-made claim that Roosevelt ‘failed’ at Yalta and was bamboozled by Stalin into giving away far too much. This might well have been the case as regards Eastern Europe, which is a completely different subject for argument, but it was not so as regards the Far East and the war against Japan. As has been shown, Stalin had made quite clear beforehand what he wanted. Roosevelt was happy enough to accede and, in return, he too got what he wanted. There was, of course, another facet to the matter, one exemplified by the response to questions put by Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew on 12 May. Grew had composed a memo to both the Secretary of War (Stimson) and the Secretary of the Navy (Forrestal) concerning the Russian entry into the war against Japan. He enquired, amongst other things, whether the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific War at the earliest possible moment was ‘of such vital interest to the United States as to preclude any attempt . . . to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?’ Also queried was whether or not ‘the Yalta decision’ be ‘reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?’40 Stimson’s reply was forthright: Russian entry into the war against Japan will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States . . . while the USSR will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States . . . such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision . . . Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives. The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of US military action short of war . . . Russia is militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto,

stalin’s war on japan - Press

10

Stalin’s War on Japan

Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would be possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas.41 Only in the Kurils is the United States in a position to circumvent Russian initiative. If the United States were to occupy these islands to forestall Russian designs, it would be at the direct expense of the campaign to defeat Japan and would involve an unacceptable cost in American lives.42 Put simply, Russia could do more or less what it liked and the United States was in a very weak position to prevent it. Should it make the attempt, then Stimson warned that the Russians were in a position to wait until Japan’s military power had been destroyed by American efforts. They could then ‘seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date’.43 Forrestal concurred with these views.44 What this advice boiled down to was that the US would be wise to make a virtue of necessity, stay on good terms with the Soviet Union and encourage Stalin to enter the war sooner rather than later. In fact, and in pursuit of this politico-strategic aim, practical measures had already been initiated. This involved the US Navy in what was termed Project Hula: the supply of some 150 ships to the Soviet Navy, and the training of around 12,000 Soviet Navy personnel in their maintenance and use, between April and September 1945.45 The Soviet Union was a recipient of huge quantities of lend-lease equipment and goods from the US over the course of the war, all of which greatly boosted the Soviet war effort.46 Over and above what might be termed the ‘normal’ transfer of materiel, Stalin requested in October 1944 that additional supplies and equipment be provided in order to build up a stockpile of reserves for future operations against Japan. A list of these extra requirements was submitted through the United States Military Mission, located in the US Embassy in Moscow and headed by Major General John R. Deane. Deane submitted this list to the joint chiefs of staff in Washington who, via the Joint Logistics Committee, approved it with the caveat that it must have no adverse effect on existing or anticipated operations in Europe or the Pacific. This logistics build-up was to be termed Operation Milestone. However, even whilst the Logistics Committee was considering Milestone, a further list was submitted by the Soviet Navy on 5 December 1944 via Rear Admiral Clarence E. Olsen, the US Navy representative to the Moscow Military Mission. Pertaining to the naval sphere, this new set of requirements was in addition to naval materiel already specified. To avoid confusion, Olsen negotiated with his Soviet counterparts, reconciled the two lists and submitted them as one combined document to Washington on 20 December.47 These requests were agreed, and Admiral Ernest J. King, who was both commander in chief (COMINCH) of the US Fleet and chief of naval

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘How many divisions has the Pope?’

11

operations (CNO),48 discussed the matter with his opposite number on the Soviet side, Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai Kuznetsov (People’s Commissar for the Soviet Navy) at Yalta. The Russian was informed that the site for the transfer of the ships, and the training facility for the personnel who would man them, was to be the appropriately named Cold Bay, a remote location on the extreme south-west tip of the Alaskan Peninsula that enjoyed more than a metre of rain annually, endured persistent heavy fogs and, on average, saw sixteen cloudy days every month. With no civilian population to complicate security, what went on there could remain clandestine. The secret was in fact kept and Project Hula, ‘the largest and most ambitious transfer program of World War II’, was a great success. All the warships transferred were minor, with nothing more potent than escort-type, anti-submarine vessels. These included twenty-eight patrol frigates (roughly equivalent to British River-Class corvettes) and thirty-two submarine chasers (used mostly by the Coast Guard in US service). A number of mine-warfare vessels also made the transition: twenty-four steel-hulled, ocean-going fleet minesweepers and thirty-one wood-hulled auxiliary motor minesweepers. Four floating workshops (informally known as repair barges) were also included. Most useful, in terms of the rationale behind the project, were thirty large landing craft infantry (LCI(L) in US naval terminology). Able to transport and put ashore some 200 troops apiece, these landing craft were obviously essential for the amphibious operations which, given the territories Stalin wanted to acquire from Japan, would likely be necessary. Indeed, the Soviet Navy, although massively overshadowed by its land-based counterpart in every sense, had experience in relatively small-scale amphibious operations (Soviet doctrine classed river crossings as such). But it had never possessed specialised amphibious ships, which had meant improvisation using whatever vessels could be collected for the purpose.49 Now, thanks to the United States, that situation had been at least partially rectified.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 2

Manchukuo: an Army with a State Where some states have an army, the Prussian Army has a state.1 Japan is not the Prussia of the East . . . but merely the Italy of the east.2 The term Manchuria is generally accepted3 as referring to an area of northeastern China encompassing the provinces of Heilongjiang4 (Heilungkiang), Jilin5 (Kirin, Chilin) and Liaoning6 (Fengtian, Fengtien). Some 1.5 million sq. km in area, it is bordered to the south by Korea, the Liaodong (Liaotung) Gulf and China, to the east and north by the Soviet Far Eastern province and Siberia, and to the west by both Outer and Inner Mongolia. Japan’s influence in the area really took off in 1905, replacing that of Russia following the outcome of the Russo-Japanese War, with the acquisition of railway concessions in southern Manchuria, particularly the Liaodong Peninsula. The territory was dubbed the Kwantung Leased Zone and was guarded by a Japanese military force, the Kwantung Garrison headquartered at Port Arthur. This force was redesignated as the Kwantung Army (Kantogun, Kanto-gun) in 1919, and reported directly to the high command in Tokyo.7 The main agent of colonisation in the leased zone was the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), ‘Japan’s East India Company’.8 The SMR, backed by the Japanese government, was able to extort from a weak and divided China all types of extra-territorial privileges. These included legal and administrative rights to land pertaining to the railway, the South Manchuria Railway Zone.9 Further, it opened and operated coal mines, constructed harbour facilities and warehouses, built hotels for travellers and developed the agricultural and industrial areas which it served. So successful was this expansion that by the mid-1920s, through a process of incremental, piecemeal, empire-building, Japan was deeply entrenched in southern Manchuria and able to exercise large-scale economic and political influence.10 There was, though, a further actor in northern China generally, and Manchuria in particular, in the shape of the Chinese general Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), one of the most successful of his kind during the Warlord Era (1916–28).11 An anti-Communist, Chang’s regime in Manchuria was underpinned by his control of a large armed force, the Fengtian Army. It was generally supported by the Japanese inasmuch as it kept Manchuria virtually independent from the Chinese nationalist government (Kuomintang) under

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chinese provinces and Manchuria/Manchukuo. (# Charles Blackwood)

Chiang Kai-shek, which had established itself at Nanking (Nanjing, Nankin) in 1927.12 Some members of the officer corps of the Kwantung Army had begun to develop a geo-strategic policy of their own, one which was separate from that of the Tokyo government. Basically stated, it sought to distance, and ultimately separate entirely, Manchuria from Chinese control using military methods – in other words, by conquest. The politicians in Tokyo sought

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

15

much the same ends, but cautiously and by way of diplomacy, albeit backed by armed force.13 That this project as a whole was in peril became clear in May 1928 when Chang’s army was beaten by a Nationalist force led by Chiang. The latter was engaged in a military campaign, the Northern Expedition, to unify China under his leadership and was clearly having some success.14 Chang’s failure led to his assassination by officers of the Kwantung Army, headed by Colonel Komoto Daisaku, in the Huanggutun Incident of 4 June 1928.15 Chang’s son, Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), replaced him, but forswore his father’s policy of quasi-independence and pledged allegiance to the Kuomintang and Chiang. ‘This arrangement’, according to Chinese writer Hollington Tong (Tung Hsien-kuang), ‘was not at all to the liking of the Japanese.’16 The younger Chang did, though, adopt the strongly antiCommunist attitude of his father. Given that the Soviet Union had inherited Imperial Russian interests in the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway), and that he believed funds raised from this enterprise were being used to promote Communism in China, then there was a clear, ideological potential for conflict. In addition, there was a Nationalist side to the matter: Japanese and Soviet/Russian control of the Manchurian railways rankled both Chang and Chiang.17 Talks regarding a more equitable approach to ownership, begun in March 1929, proved abortive. Chiang’s treatment of the Chinese Communists had not, as his official biographer put it, ‘served to improve the relationship of the two countries’. To Chiang, Communism constituted ‘a Red imperialism more dangerous than White imperialism because it was more difficult to cope with’. Indeed, and from the Nationalist point of view, the imperialistic urge manifested itself in Soviet attempts to tighten their hold on the railway.18 To counter this, the Nationalists decided to seize control using Chang’s army, which in turn provoked a Soviet military response: activation on 6 August of the Special Far Eastern Army under the command of General Vasily Blyukher (Blucher). His combined arms offensive, using armour and aircraft, began on the night of 17 November in temperatures of –208C. His forces moved swiftly, encircled the enemy positions and cut their lines of communications. On 22 December the Chinese signed the Khabarovsk Protocol, which restored peace and the status quo.19 This brief campaign demonstrated two things: that the Red Army was proficient in fighting a modern war, and that the Chinese military forces were currently incapable of doing likewise. These factors influenced the thinking of Kwantung Army officers; their contempt for Chinese capabilities was reinforced, but they were both impressed and alarmed by the evident abilities of the Red Army.20 Despite the latter factor, or perhaps to an extent because of it, the plotting in respect of taking over the whole of Manchuria intensified.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

16

Stalin’s War on Japan

Coox details the clandestine conspiratorial process whereby the senior echelons of the Kwantung Army, which at the time numbered no more than 10,400 in terms of military manpower, decided to manufacture an outrage which would force them to take action against Chinese ‘saboteurs’.21 This, the eponymous ‘Mukden Incident,’ duly occurred on 18 September 1931 with an explosion on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway near Mukden (Shenyang). The Kwantung Army was pre-authorised to launch localised retaliatory actions in defence of Japanese property or interests, but Lieutenant General Honjo Shigeru, the commander of the army, went way beyond that.22 He ordered his forces to take all the cities along the 1,175km length of the railway. Reinforcements from Korea were also mobilised, and by 25 September these had secured control in Liaoning and Kirin provinces (and thus rail communications with Korea), whilst the army high command in Tokyo was ‘struggling to apply the brakes’.23 There was some opposition from Chinese forces but in the main they offered little or no resistance and withdrew. This was in accordance with a proclamation to the nation by Chiang on 22 September; in the face of aggression, China would maintain a ‘dignified calm’ and appeal to the League of Nations and the United States (not a member of the League) for assistance.24 Needless to say, these appeals proved useless and the Kwantung Army, which was soon being reinforced from Japan, continued its operations.25 That it was engaged in more than simple military conquest became apparent when it began establishing local, self-governing, administrations in areas it occupied. These were fronted by local people. The culmination of the entire campaign came following a conference at Shenyang on 16–17 February 1932 when the formation of a new state was announced. It would be called Manchukuo (the Manchu State), and its Declaration of Independence was published on 18 February.26 Chiang’s government, being unable and indeed unwilling to resist the Kwantung Army militarily, was obliged to come to terms with it. The 1933 Tanggu Truce gave Japan control of Jehol province and created a demilitarised zone between the Great Wall and the Peking-Tientsin region. It thus brought into being a buffer region between Manchukuo and China.27 Voltaire is supposed to have quipped vis-a`-vis Prussia that ‘where some states have an army, the Prussian Army has a state’.28 The thrust of this proposition may not have been really sustainable with regards to Prussia, but it certainly applied to the Kwantung Army and Manchukuo. In area the new state was somewhere over a million sq. km and by 1933 it had grown to encompass the city of Chengde (Jehol, Rehe), now in Hebei (Hopeh) province. Also included was an area in eastern Inner Mongolia (the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region), incorporating the cities of Hulunbuir (Hulun

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

17

Buir), Hinggan, Tongliao and Chifeng (Ulankhad). Fenby characterises the whole affair thus: ‘The Kwantung officers had staged the biggest land grab since the First World War.’29 The Manchu State became the Manchu Empire, or Manchutikuo, with the appointment of the former child-emperor of China, Puyi (Pu Yi), as the titular ruler in 1934.30 Whatever it might have been called, the creation of a dependent state was not a spontaneous action conjured up from nowhere. Rather it was the culmination, at least in part, of an idea mooted since at least the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. The notion was formalised in 1907 when the army adopted the policy of Northern Expansion (hokushinron).31 This expansionist policy, seeking the occupation and colonisation of Manchuria and indeed Siberia, may be likened to the German concept of Lebensraum, although lacking the overt racial connotations.32 Field Marshal Yamagata Aritomo, the architect of the modern Japanese Army and two-times prime minister of the country, argued in 1915 that ‘Manchuria is Japan’s lifeline so we must secure for our nationals assurance that they may settle there and pursue their occupations peacefully’.33 His phrase ‘Manchuria is Japan’s life-line’ resonated. By the 1930s it had become commonplace and formed part of the claim that the area was rightfully Japan’s due to the amount of blood spilled there during the Russo-Japanese War. The soil of Manchuria, it was claimed, had been ‘watered by the blood of Japanese patriots’.34 Other than China, the Soviet Union was most threatened by the creation of Manchukuo. It now had an aggressively militaristic and expansionist state directly bordering one of its strategically vital regions, the Maritime Province (Primorskaya Krai). Described in 1914 by Nansen as ‘the most important country [sic] of the Russian East’ forming ‘the borderland on the Sea of Japan’, it included the port city of Vladivostok.35 That Japan had designs on that part of the world, which had only become Russian territory in the middle of the nineteenth century (and was also known as Outer Manchuria), had been made obvious during her share of the so-called Siberian Intervention of 1918–22.36 Perceiving that Russia’s fragmentation could be used to advantage in terms of imperial ambition, including in Outer Mongolia, Japan had sent a very large contingent, far outnumbering all other allied deployments, and her forces were the last to leave.37 Faced with this problem the Soviet Union, which was heavily preoccupied with internal matters such as forced agricultural collectivisation, five-year plans for industrialisation and, of course, party purges, adopted a dual strategy. On the political front a concessionary approach was espoused, probably the most high-profile being the sale, after much haggling, of the Chinese Eastern Railway to Manchukuo in 1935.38 The Soviet government ignored Chinese protests concerning their joint ownership, claiming China’s interest had ended with the establishment of Manchukuo.39

stalin’s war on japan - Press

18

Stalin’s War on Japan

There was also a military response. This involved the deployment of Red Army forces to the Far East, and the initiation of a programme of large-scale fortification along border areas.40 The military build-up was significant. According to a 1938 report submitted by Joseph E. Davies, the US Ambassador in Moscow, the USSR was maintaining ‘a complete and self-sufficient army, variously estimated at from 350,000 to 450,000 men’ in Siberia. It was also ‘reported to be the fixed policy of this government constantly to maintain in this region two Soviet soldiers for every one Japanese soldier in Manchukuo’.41 Coox provides, and indeed tabulates, evidence that this 2:1 ratio was maintained, and progressively exceeded, over the period 1934 to 1939. The relative proportion in aircraft was even more unequal, rising to approximately 5:1 in 1939. With respect to armoured vehicles, it was around 10:1 in the same year.42 Notwithstanding Soviet numerical superiority, the Japanese factions dedicated to the Northern Expansion option continued their arguments for it. One such was General Araki Sadao, the army minister 1931–34, to whom is attributed the statement that ‘If the Soviet does not cease to annoy us, I shall have to purge Siberia as one cleans a room of flies.’43 A convinced proponent of the belief that war against the Soviet Union was Japan’s national mission, his demand that Japan initiate a preventive conflict was widely publicised in 1933 by Soviet writers.44 He also argued for the occupation of Outer Mongolia, expanding on that point in particular three years later: If Outer Mongolia be combined with Japan and Manchukuo, Soviet territories in the Far East will fall into a very dangerous condition and it is possible that the influence of the Soviet Union in the Far East might be removed without fighting. Therefore, the army aims to extend JapaneseManchurian power into Outer Mongolia by all means at hand . . .45 Quite how the occupation of Outer Mongolia, which the Soviet Union viewed as an ideological and strategic ally and was determined to defend, would be achieved without fighting was not a point he addressed.46 The same year General Itagaki Seishiro, the Kwantung Army’s chief of staff, opined that ‘Japan is destined sooner or later to clash with the Soviet Union.’47 Japan’s expansionist ambitions and tendencies were well known outside Asia. William Dodd, US Ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1937, noted a discussion held in December 1933 with his British counterpart Sir Eric Phipps on the subject of ‘disarmament problems’. In the course of this talk, he informed Phipps that ‘Japan, according to certain diplomatic information, is apt to attack Vladivostok next April or May’. Sir Eric, he went on to record, was not, however, ‘disposed to accept the Japanese danger’.48 Sir Eric’s disposition proved to be correct, and whilst the situation in relation to the Japanese danger was dynamic, it did not necessarily move in

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

19

expected ways. One significant directional change occurred in December 1936 following the Sian Incident, named for the city of Sian (Xi’an), the capital of Shensi (Shaanxi, Shanxi) province in Northwest China, where it occurred. Though the details behind, and of, the Sian Incident are murky and still much disputed, the bare bones are simply related. Chang Hsueh-liang kidnapped Chiang Kai-shek, held him captive for two weeks (12–26 December) and only agreed to release him when he agreed to end his campaign against Chinese Communists. Instead of being in conflict, the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) would form an alliance against the Japanese: the Second United Front.49 Quite how much, if indeed any, involvement Stalin had in the matter is unclear, but it is the case that after the formation of the Front both China and the Soviet Union began to ‘stand their ground’ against Japan.50 The most obvious, and certainly most portentous, manifestation of this came in the shape of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident of 7–9 July 1937. Precipitated by an initially trivial incident between Japan’s North China Garrison Army51 based at Tientsin (Tianjin) and China’s 29th Route Army, it swiftly grew into a massive conflict because the Chinese were indeed prepared to ‘stand their ground’. In Mitter’s apt phraseology: ‘Although neither side knew it, the Second World War in Asia had begun.’52 The Japanese planned on swiftly resolving what they termed the China Incident, and the Kwantung Army initially deployed more than 90,000 of its troops to this end.53 It proved, however, to be an apparently bottomless quagmire, as Chiang traded space in China’s vast interior for time. When the capital, Nanking, was taken in December 1937, the Japanese believed Chiang would have to come to terms and end the war,54 but he had a different plan and the Chinese government relocated, ultimately to Chungking (Chongqing), some 1,100km distant from Nanking, in south-west China, from where the struggle continued.55 There was a natural corollary. With one unquantifiable and seemingly unending conflict in process in China, the chances of Japan initiating a simultaneous campaign against the Soviet Union lessened. That was at least the opinion of Maxim Litvinov, the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs (Soviet foreign minister), as related to Joseph E. Davies in 1938: He [Litvinov] said that Japan has approximately a million men in China, including 300,000 in Manchukuo, and that the Chinese were putting up a remarkable fight and causing Japan much trouble. He indicated he did not anticipate any aggressive action from Japan against the Soviet Union.56 Indeed, some three months later Davies reported his impression ‘that the attitude of Russian diplomacy is definitely hardening toward Japan and [is] more aggressive than last summer’.57 This attitude was not, though, backed by military power, or at least not any more. This claim can be justified by noting

stalin’s war on japan - Press

20

Stalin’s War on Japan

that this diplomatic ‘hardening’ manifested itself in the very midst of the period when Stalin was busy decapitating his armed forces, an episode retrospectively, though accurately, dubbed the Great Terror. During the course of this purge, three Marshals of the Soviet Union (Tukhachevskii, Blyukher and Yegorov) out of five in total, plus thirteen out of fifteen generals, fifty out of fifty-seven lieutenant generals, and 154 out of 186 major generals were denounced as traitors. Found guilty of working for Nazi Germany, and coordinating a so-called ‘military-fascist plot’, they were subsequently executed. The Navy, proportionally, fared even worse: eight out of nine admirals were shot or otherwise murdered.58 Despite this orgy of self-harm, that the Red Army in the east was still prepared to fight, and was capable of doing so, is evidenced by its performance in a number of border conflicts with both the Kwantung Army and the forces in Korea. The frontiers between Manchukuo and the Soviet Union were ill-defined; Coox quotes one Japanese officer exclaiming that portions were as difficult to demarcate as the South Pole.59 This caused a multitude of disputes over the period 1932–45; Soviet sources list 1,850, whilst the Japanese claimed ‘over 1,600’.60 Recent Soviet scholarship enumerates two as being particularly noteworthy: the actions at Lake Khasan (29 July–11 August 1938) and on the Khalkhin Gol river (11 May–16 September 1939).61 Lake Khasan is located in an area where the borders of Manchukuo (now China), Korea (now North Korea) and the Soviet Union (now Russia) converge. The dispute arose over whether the demarcation line between the USSR and Korea ran along the lake (Japan’s claim) or along a line of elevated ground, the Changkufeng Heights, a few kilometres to the west (the Soviet claim). There was fierce fighting, but militarily the matter was contained and ended in stalemate before being resolved diplomatically.62 Of much greater significance, and certainly of scale, was the clash over the Mongolian-Manchukuo border at the Khalkhin Gol (Halha river); this was dubbed the Nomonhan Incident by the Japanese after the name of a nearby village. The dispute arose over whether the border lay along the course of the river, which the Japanese claimed, or some 15–20km to the east of it, as the Soviets and Mongolians claimed. The area in contention, on the sparsely populated plateau of Hulun Buir, contained no great strategic prizes for either side. It has been described as ‘a zone of flatland pasture and desert much like a trackless sea’.63 There is still dispute about which side started it.64 There is, though, no argument that it began in May 1939 with what may be considered typical, small-scale skirmishing over an area of largely worthless territory. Rather than dying away, as per many previous incidents of much the same nature, this dispute escalated, with both sides reinforcing strongly during June. Accompanying the Soviet reinforcements was a then unknown officer who had

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

21

survived the Great Terror: Komkor 65 Georgy Zhukov. There is also scholarly disputation as to certain aspects of the resultant conflict. Indeed, one author claims that Komatsubara Michitaro, the commander of the 23rd Division, the core component of the Japanese force, had been compromised by the Soviets and was acting as their agent.66 During July the Japanese made several attempts to assault and break through the Soviet defensive lines. These efforts failed, although at considerable cost to both sides. Meanwhile Zhukov, who had been appointed to command the Soviet-Mongolian forces, combined as the 1st Army Group, built up his resources and planned a decisive counterattack for mid-late August. His logistical difficulties were compounded by the fact that all the necessary materiel had to be trucked over ‘country roads’ from the nearest railhead, which was at least 650km distant. He calculated that this would require 3,500 lorries and 1,400 tankers (tank trucks), but had only 1,724 of the former and 912 of the latter at hand. A further 1,250 lorries and 375 tankers were sent to him, but didn’t arrive until after 14 August. He was, though, able to keep to his timetable by reassigning gun-towing vehicles to the effort. This obviously immobilised much of his artillery, but he believed that the defences as they stood were adequate to counter any attack.67 Sources differ as to numbers, but by the middle of August Zhukov’s 1st Army Group numbered between 57,000 and 65,000 Soviet-Mongolian officers and men in three divisions and five armoured brigades. Equipmentwise, they deployed more than 500 pieces of artillery, about 500 tanks and around 400 wheeled armoured vehicles, plus around 500 aircraft.68 The Japanese-Manchukuo forces consisted of the 6th Army, which had been formed early in August, the core component of which was the 23rd Division. Elements of four other divisions, plus various supporting detachments, were also present. Though sources differ, Coox tabulates some 58,925 personnel in total.69 The 6th Army was, though, at a disadvantage. Compared to its foe, it was deficient in terms of artillery, and particularly so as regards anti-tank weapons, as well as being outnumbered in relation to tanks and aircraft. Compounding these matters was the way it fought and expected to fight: its tactical doctrine. Humphreys notes that the 1909 Infantry Field Manual, which naturally reflected recent experience in the Russo-Japanese War, ‘set the tone’ for the army’s approach to combat: ‘Infantry attack with small arms fire followed by a bayonet charge was the doctrine in which army tactics centred.’ The key to success with these tactics lay in the determination of the soldiers: ‘No matter how powerful the enemy, we must resolve to prevail with our spiritual superiority as a matter of course.’70 This belief, that the spiritual sphere could overcome the material, endured. A 1944 classified US War

stalin’s war on japan - Press

22

Stalin’s War on Japan

Department report, based on intelligence gained during actual combat, noted that ‘the Japanese seem to feel that there is some mystic virtue in the attack’. Getting to close quarters with the enemy was the ultimate objective, so that ‘the assumed Japanese superiority in close combat can be realized to the utmost’. It also noted that despite their combat experience, the Japanese Army ‘continued to violate certain fundamental principles of accepted tactics and technique’. Their persistence in ‘such violations’ was, it concluded, ‘based primarily upon their failure to credit the enemy with good judgment and equal military efficiency’.71 There is a sense in which this over-reliance on infantry infused with ‘Japanese Spirit’ was in fact making a virtue out of a necessity, because efforts towards reform were hampered by several factors. The Japanese Army missed, as it were, the First World War so had no first-hand knowledge of the military developments that evolved during it.72 Nevertheless, there was no shortage of experience amongst the former combatants upon which to draw, and studies of British, French and German operations during the conflict yielded much information on new weapons, such as tanks and aircraft, and improved methods and tactics. General Ugaki Kazushige, war minister from 1924 to 1927, is particularly associated with attempts at modernisation in respect of these, and of removing at least some of the ‘stone head’ generals who opposed such ideas. However, other than with respect to the adoption of aircraft, he was largely unsuccessful in getting his reforms accepted and adopted.73 There were problems in practical terms. Japan’s industrial and economic foundations were simply insufficient for the large-scale production of equipment such as heavy tanks, self-propelled artillery, heavy artillery and the like.74 Officer students at the army’s staff college were told in 1928 that ‘if we were to arm the army with modern weapons, it would be of about thirteen divisions’.75 Some ten years later the matter was stated, although not to a Japanese audience, even more bluntly: Japan belongs to the group of economically weak military states. Japan is not the Prussia of the East, as she has often been termed, but merely the Italy of the east. She is short of raw materials and her industries are relatively weak. As the military strength of a country is determined in the last resort by economic factors owing to the demands of modern war technique, an economically weak state can never be a first-class military power.76 Despite Ugaki’s attempted clear-out of ‘stone heads’, the Imperial Japanese Army perforce retained its infantry-centred bias. There was also an institutionalised taboo that proscribed any suggestions this might be, to utilise modern jargon, in any way sub-optimal. Indeed, given that armies and their

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

23

ways of fighting are inextricably linked to the societies from whence they originate, this is unsurprising.77 Coox sums it up admirably: Battles fought during the Chinese conflict and the Pacific War are eerily reminiscent of the wars of 1894–95 and 1904–05. What was effective against the Ching and Romanov dynasties ought to be similarly effective against the foes of the mid-twentieth century.78 Unfortunately for the Imperial Army generally, and the Kwantung Army in particular, it was to discover on 20 August 1939 that what ought to be theoretically effective was, in practice, definitely not so. On that date Zhukov launched a deep penetration offensive along a 30km front.79 The Manchurian steppe was ideal terrain for it, allowing sweeping manoeuvres and envelopments, and the Soviet plan exploited this. Zhukov had 498 tanks and 346 armoured cars at his disposal, and whilst the Japanese centre was attacked and fixed in place, powerful armoured elements swept around their northern and southern flanks.80 Five days later, near the village of Nomonhan, after which the Japanese named the battle, these forces joined hands. The Japanese 23rd Infantry Division and its subsidiary formations were trapped. The following day the Japanese attempted to break in through the encircling forces to relieve the surrounded division. The endeavour failed, as did the 23rd Division’s efforts to break out of the trap the day after that. The encircled force refused to surrender, however, and so was reduced by largescale bombardment and air attack, with the Soviets’ advantage in heavy artillery enabling them to pound the Japanese positions unmercifully. By 31 August the 23rd Division had been destroyed as a fighting force. Zhukov and the Soviet-Mongolian 1st Army Group had, to quote Coox, ‘achieved precisely what they had set out to do – no more, no less’.81 In pitting his highly mechanised army against an infantry-centric opponent, who had no answer to such tactics, Zhukov had applied the principles of deep operations to accomplish a stunning success.82 He had, in fact, achieved that acme of military excellence: a modern-day Cannae.83 The Kwantung Army did not take the defeat as being the end of the matter: far from it. Instead they sought to reinforce the 6th Army and mount a counter operation. However, the conflict was officially terminated on 6 September, when a ‘rigid and stern’ message was received from Tokyo, to the effect that offensive operations were to be suspended.84 Greater events were in chain on the other side of the globe, chief among them being the German invasion of Poland on 1 September. Whilst this signalled the beginning of the Second World War in Europe, it was the diplomatic manoeuvrings immediately preceding it that profoundly disconcerted and shocked the Japanese government. Stalin had been secretly negotiating with both the Germans and the British/French. Success with the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

24

Stalin’s War on Japan

former was announced on 23 August with the signing in Moscow of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact. At a stroke European Great Power politics were fundamentally realigned; the Soviet Union no longer acted as a potential check on German ambitions, but now supported them.85 This news had a ‘devastating effect on Japan’.86 It was also a breach of the Anti-Comintern Pact; Japan had entered into this anti-Communist, and thus implicitly anti-Soviet, pact with Germany in November 1936.87 Though largely symbolic, it nevertheless contained an undisclosed ‘Secret Additional Protocol’, the second article of which stated: ‘For the duration of the present agreement the High Contracting States will conclude no political treaties with the USSR contrary to the spirit of this agreement without mutual consent.’88 The Japanese government, perhaps understandably, came to the conclusion that Germany’s deal with the Soviet Union was indeed ‘contrary to the spirit’ of the agreement as well as ‘a cruel blow’ and a ‘great betrayal’. Already ‘demoralised by the defeat at Nomonhan’ and the interminable campaign in the Chinese interior, the Molotov–Ribbentrop agreement was the final straw and so, ‘after one of the most disastrous months in Japan’s modern history’, Japan’s government resigned on 30 August.89 The new administration was, perhaps ironically, headed by a military man: General Abe Nobuyuki. Though unpopular, and unable to solve Japan’s economic and international problems, he recognised that the current situation meant the danger Soviet power posed to Japan’s interests had increased.90 His regime adopted a three-pronged policy: winning the war in China, avoiding any entanglement in respect of the war in Europe, and improving relations with the Soviet Union.91 It therefore undertook to resolve the Nomonhan Incident, and did so on 15–16 September through the conclusion of an armistice agreement.92 Senior Kwantung Army officers ‘wept with fury’ when told to stand down but ultimately, if reluctantly, they obeyed.93 It can be argued then that the Soviet victory at Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan was a contributory factor in adjusting, and realigning, Japan’s foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. The culmination of this came with the SovietJapanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941. The military repercussions should have been even more profound. Yet although the high command realised that the army was relatively weak whilst it retained its infantry-centred doctrine, it could, as discussed, do little about it.94 Having said that, it did initiate certain improvements. The anti-tank capability of the infantry was upgraded and a new medium tank was developed to supersede the lighter models that were not designed to fight an equivalently armed enemy. The unfamiliarity of infantry-oriented commanders in respect of employing armour on the battlefield was addressed, and new combined arms formations were created. These performed well in campaigns in the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

25

Philippines and Malaya in 1942, but never developed in terms of equipment, organisation or doctrine to the levels seen in other armies.95 Indeed, and despite the experience at Nomonhan, the army continued to overestimate the extent to which its forces could cope with mechanised enemies with materiel superiority. This was entirely in accord with an ongoing, ingrained disposition to deride and despise the fighting abilities of opponents. As Coox puts it, ‘the Japanese Army could not or would not comprehend or estimate realistically the scale of modern Great Power foes, who operated more rationally, more systematically and more massively than the Japanese’.96 If the Imperial Army was backward in terms of conventional warfare, the same cannot be said in respect of the unconventional. The existence and history of the infamous Unit 731 at Pingfan near Harbin, and its affiliated units in Manchukuo and elsewhere, are now well known and extensively documented.97 With a staff of more than 10,000, including many of Japan’s top medical scientists, the development of techniques in biological and, rather less publicised, chemical warfare between 1933 and 1945 were extensive.98 Nor were they confined to laboratory testing. On 7 July 1939 the Kwantung Army mobilised elements of Unit 731 to Khalkhin Gol, and at the end of August they ‘treated’ a tributary watercourse, used by the Soviets as a water source, with cholera, typhoid and shigella. Despite knowing from previous experience that this was an ineffective way of disseminating these agents, the operation was carried out as a means of testing biological weapons in a combat situation. According to testimony quoted in an account published under the aegis of the Surgeon General of the US Army, ‘22 or 23 18-liter oil drums’ of these pathogens were poured into the river. The contents were ‘cultured in a vegetable gelatin. We opened the lids, and poured the jelly-like contents of the cans into the river. We carried the cans back with us so we wouldn’t leave any evidence.’99 Whilst there are no records of any Soviet casualties (and there probably weren’t any given that the pathogens lost their virulence almost immediately upon contact with water), sources differ as to the effects on Japanese personnel. Keiichi states that ‘at least one’ Japanese soldier became infected and later died of typhoid, when he spilled the contents of a drum onto himself.100 Harris claims ‘at least 1,300’ Japanese casualties, of whom ‘at least 40’ died.101 On the other hand, Coox, whom Harris acknowledges as the ‘recognized authority’ on the Nomonhan Incident, weighs the evidence and dismisses the matter as fiction which originated in tales composed by ‘several Japanese leftist writers’.102 Whatever the truth of the matter in relation to Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan, there is no doubt that the Japanese did indeed use biological and chemical weapons in their campaign in China. Russian scholars also assert that the Kwantung Army integrated such methodologies into their plans for a massive invasion of the Soviet Union in

stalin’s war on japan - Press

26

Stalin’s War on Japan

the second half of 1941.103 At the time of the Nomonhan Incident the army had a strength of more than eight divisions, but this was consistently built upon so that by the beginning of 1941 it comprised thirteen divisions numbering some 350,000 men.104 The prompt for firming up invasion plans came on 22 June 1941 when Hitler abrogated the Molotov–Ribbentrop NonAggression Pact by invading the Soviet Union along a 3,200km front. This act, Operation Barbarossa, thus inaugurated what is termed in Russian as the Great Patriotic War. Seeing great advantages accruing from Germany’s initial successes in the campaign, Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo proposed, and the government accepted, further increases in the size of the Kwantung Army. During July and August two further divisions, along with ‘more than one hundred smaller ground units and an equal number of air units’, were despatched to Manchukuo. This build-up was euphemistically termed ‘Kwantung Army Special Manoeuvres’ and its ultimate effect was to double that army’s troop strength to 700,000 men, and the number of aircraft of various types to 600. The formation of new divisions in Korea was also authorised.105 Unfortunately for those who thought that Northern Expansion (hokushinron) was a policy whose time had come, the Soviet Union neither succumbed to the hammer blows being inflicted on it in the west, nor completely denuded itself of forces in the east. So how successful this ‘Japanese Barbarossa’ might have been was never put to the test. Moreover, and as history records, when Japan entered the Second World War it did so in accord with the precepts of Southern Expansion (nanshin-ron).106 Indeed, at around the same time as Japan’s Fourteenth Army was exploiting its successful landing in the Philippines, and her Twenty-fifth Army was doing the same in Malaya, Zhukov was utilising some of the techniques he had first employed at Khalkhin Gol in thwarting the German attempt on Moscow. With Japan’s war zones far away to the south, Manchukuo became a backwater and the Kwantung Army, the only major overseas command not engaged in hostilities or on a war footing, little more than a strategic reserve. Despite the initial set of stunning victories and territorial gains achieved by Japanese arms, both naval and military, the war – and the campaign against the United States in particular – soon turned sour when it became necessary to defend those gains. Though many Kwantung Army units involved in the early round of conquests were initially returned, ongoing operations in places such as New Guinea, Burma and the perpetual sucking pit of China found the army being progressively stripped of front-line units and equipment. It concentrated particularly upon training and the development of defensive fortifications, while maintaining the status quo along the borders.107 However, the war situation, to borrow a phrase, ‘developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’. The state of affairs at the time of the Yalta Conference

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

27

in February 1945 has already been described, and for Japan it most definitely did not improve. The denunciation of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945 by Molotov was surely a sign of the way the wind was blowing in that regard.108 Indeed, the unconditional surrender of Germany on 7–8 May, signed in Berlin in the presence of Marshal Zhukov on the latter date, started the clock ticking on Stalin’s commitment to enter the war against Japan ‘two or three months’ later. The fearsome Battle of Okinawa was raging when Germany surrendered, and that island was considered the final stepping-stone on the road to the invasion of Japan proper. In fact, on 6 April 1945, as part of the preparations for that invasion, the US Army had established a command integrating all US Army and US Army Air Force units in the Pacific under one commander: General Douglas MacArthur.109 As has already been noted, MacArthur had opined in February 1945 that the invasion could not be successfully carried out ‘without the assurance that the Japanese would be heavily engaged by the Russians in Manchuria’.110 That opinion, which was accepted and agreed by the US Army’s chief of staff General George C. Marshall and the War Department in Washington, did not change.111 This is unsurprising given the intelligence estimates on Japanese strength. At the final ‘Big Three’ conference of the war, appropriately codenamed Terminal and held at Potsdam between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the Combined Intelligence Committee, which was responsible for collecting and disseminating military intelligence for the use of the combined chiefs of staff and the combined staff planners, submitted a report.112 This pointed out that ‘the ground component of the Japanese armed forces remains Japan’s greatest military asset’ and that in respect of Korea, Manchuria and North China they ‘now total over 1,200,000 men (24 active divisions and 5 depot divisions)’. This number was forecast to grow: In anticipation of a possible Soviet entry into the war, these forces will be further increased by withdrawals from Central and South China, and we believe they might have about 1,500,000 men, including more than 40 divisions, in this area by the end of the year.113 This appraisal wasn’t too far off the mark if some 300,000 Manchukuoan troops – ‘of questionable combat value, but capable of guarding lines of communications and performing service duties’ – are included.114 Postwar research revealed that by 1945 the purely Japanese Kwantung Army consisted of 713,000 personnel divided into thirty-one infantry divisions, plus nine independent infantry brigades, two tank brigades and one special purpose brigade. Equipment-wise, these forces possessed 1,155 light tanks, 5,360 guns and 1,800 aircraft.115 This later research did, however, reveal something that contemporary intelligence was unable to address: the quality of that army.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

28

Stalin’s War on Japan

Though in terms of figures it appeared impressive, the policy of redeployment to active theatres of its best units and equipment had left it a hollow shell. The replacements, although they made up the numbers, largely consisted of ‘militia, draft levies, reservists, and cannibalized smaller units’.116 At the time of the Potsdam Conference the Red Army had already transferred a massive amount of men, materiel and equipment to the Far East. Planning for the invasion of Manchukuo and the other Japanese territories had begun in March 1945 with the logistical build-up starting the following month. This intensified from May and continued to grow. In June and July between twenty-two and thirty trains traversed the 9,000–12,000km route along the Trans-Siberian railway daily.117 According to Glantz, by the end of July the redeployment was ‘virtually complete’.118 The campaign was scheduled to begin on 15 August if what Stalin told Truman was correct; the President recorded that on 17 July the Soviet leader informed him that ‘He’ll be in the Jap War on August 15th. Fini Japs when that comes about.’119 There was, of course, a further military factor to enter into the equation in respect of the final conquest of Japan, one that only came to fruition during the conference. On 16 July the world’s first nuclear detonation occurred at Alamogordo, New Mexico; it was the culmination (thus far) of the Manhattan Project. This new weapon was, potentially, a massive game-changer for whoever wielded it. As Churchill, who had been informed of the successful test, phrased it: ‘A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin.’120 The ‘question’ needs to be viewed in the context of Churchill’s understanding, as expressed in a memo of 23 July, concerning the Soviet entry into the Japanese war: ‘It is quite clear that the United States did not at the present time desire Russian participation . . .’121 This was a major policy change. Truman’s diary entry for 25 July records his decision regarding the atomic bomb: it was to be used ‘against Japan between now and August 10th’.122 Though Stalin was not informed about the proposed operational deployment, the ‘intricate question’ had been answered on 24 July; that the US possessed a ‘new weapon of unusual destructive force’ was ‘casually mentioned’ to him by Truman. According to the President’s account, the Soviet leader showed ‘no special interest’, merely remarking that ‘he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘‘good use of it against the Japanese’’ ’.123 Stalin’s apparent disinterest was taken by all who witnessed it as evidence that he had no knowledge of this ‘weapon of unusual destructive force’ and therefore did not understand the significance of what he had heard. For example, Antony Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, later wrote that ‘Churchill and I, who were covertly watching, had some doubts whether Stalin had taken it in.’124 In fact, Stalin, whom Truman had acknowledged as being ‘smart as hell’, was very far from not having ‘taken it in’.125 Rather he had determined beforehand that should Truman mention the matter he would

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Manchukuo: an Army with a State

29

‘pretend not to understand’.126 He had both inside knowledge of the Manhattan Project via espionage, and presided over a similar enterprise.127 Zhukov later recorded: on returning to his quarters after this meeting Stalin, in my presence, told Molotov about his conversation with Truman. The latter reacted almost immediately. ‘Let them. We’ll have to speed things up.’ I realized that they were talking about research on the atomic bomb.128 According to Hasegawa, Truman’s ‘half-truth’ concerning the atomic bomb ‘piqued Stalin’s suspicion’. No doubt! Moreover, and if that is so, then it must have been greatly exacerbated by the release of the Potsdam Declaration (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender)129 on 26 July without any prior notification to the Soviet Union at all. Released jointly by the USA, the British Empire and China, this ultimatum (‘a big scare-bomb directed against us’ according to Sato Naotake, Japan’s ambassador in Moscow130) was sprung on the unsuspecting Soviets by Truman, with the direct input of James Byrnes, his recently appointed Secretary of State.131 Only after the Declaration had been released to the press and public did Byrnes forward a copy to Molotov, who straightaway asked for the announcement to be postponed. It was, of course, too late for that.132 The major policy change that Churchill had mentioned on 23 July now became clearer to Stalin and his regime; the US, it appeared, was seeking to secure Japan’s surrender before the Soviet Union could enter the war. That this might well happen sooner rather than later became vividly apparent on 6 August, just four days after the end of the Potsdam Conference, when the first atomic bomb detonated over Hiroshima. Stalin called the bombing a ‘superbarbarity’ but was under no illusions that it represented a step-change in warfare. This had huge political ramifications. The Soviet Union’s leading nuclear physicist, Igor Kurchatov, was told that he must ‘Provide us with atomic weapons in the shortest possible time. You know that Hiroshima has shaken the whole world. The equilibrium has been destroyed. Provide the bomb – it will remove a great danger from us.’133 Stalin believed that the weapon had been used in order to ‘blackmail’ the Soviet Union, rather than to defeat a Japan which was ‘already doomed’.134 Fearing further attacks, aware that he no longer ‘held most of the military cards’, and that Japanese resistance might well collapse under such bombardment, Stalin ordered the Red Army to begin its offensive early on 9 August, a mere three days after Hiroshima.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 3

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan The Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation: ‘a series of deep strikes that [would] cut the Kwantung Army into pieces’.1 To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.2 The build-up of forces for the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation was carried out in accordance with the Russian/Soviet concept of maskirovka: the totality of measures taken to deceive an enemy.3 This deception extended to many of the troops detailed to take part in the operation, who believed they were going home when they boarded trains in the west. Indeed, as Senyavskay puts it, the Soviet command had a difficult problem in preparing the warweary soldiers, who ‘dreamed of a speedy return to their families and friends’, for a new military campaign which was yet still secret.4 This was admitted even in the official history: It took considerable effort to overcome the ‘peaceful’ mood of the soldiers. The long bloody war with fascist Germany has just ended and the natural desire of the soldiers to return to a peaceful life was felt. A considerable difficulty was the fact that all ideological preparations for the war had to be carried out discreetly. In addition, the troops were significantly replenished with newly drafted youth and it was necessary to prepare them for the upcoming battles.5 A new, and for the Red Army unique, command structure was put in place to oversee the campaign; there had been no Soviet theatre commanders equivalent to Eisenhower or MacArthur. However, it was recognised in July 1945 that such a set-up was now necessary given the vast and varied areas involved and the requirement for coordination of operations over them.6 The man chosen to head the Far East Command was Marshal of the Soviet Union Aleksandr Vasilevsky, a former chief of the general staff of the Soviet armed forces, who was picked, according to Glantz, because of previous ‘excellent service’ as the coordinator of major successful operations in the west.7 These operations had included the coordination, along with Zhukov, of Soviet forces at the pivotal Battle of Kursk in July and August 1943.8 Now he was to

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet operational plan utilising concentric attacks and ’deep battle’ techniques to dismember the Kwantung Army. (# Charles Blackwood)

direct three separate Fronts: the Trans-Baikal Front under Marshal Rodion Malinovsky, the First Far Eastern Front commanded by Marshal Kirill Meretskov and the Second Far Eastern Front headed by General Maxim Purkayev. These were all hard-bitten, experienced commanders who had achieved notable victories against the armies of Nazi Germany and her allies. Though Soviet sources differ somewhat as to numbers, together they would command between 1,577,725 and 1,747,465 men (and women9) equipped with between 26,137 and 29,835 artillery pieces (including the fearsome Katyusha multiple rocket launchers), between 5,250 and 5,556 tanks and assault guns, plus between 3,446 and 5,171 aircraft.10 In naval terms the Far East Command could also call upon the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the riverine Amur Flotilla.11

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

33

Of the three Fronts, Malinovsky’s was the largest. Deployed along the Outer Mongolian (Mongolian People’s Republic) border, although no closer than 20km to prevent detection,12 the Trans-Baikal Front would attack eastward into Manchukuo along a total frontage of some 2,300km. Its front echelon formations, assigned to spearhead the attack, comprised three armies: the 17th Army under Lieutenant General Aleksei Danilov, the 39th Army led by Colonel General Ivan lyudnikov and the 6th Guards Tank Army commanded by Colonel General Andrei Kravchenko.13 The latter force was assigned an ‘exceptionally large role’ in defeating the enemy.14 Echeloned behind the 6th Guards Tank Army was Colonel General Ivan Managarov’s 53rd Army. The ultimate objective of these four armies was central Manchukuo, an area on the Manchurian Plain wherein lay the important cities and communication hubs of Changchun (the capital of Manchukuo), Mukden (Shenyang, Fengtian), Harbin and Kirin (Jilin).15 The axis of this attack was intended to bypass strongly fortified areas, particularly that around Hailar to the north, but would involve crossing both an area of desert and a forbidding mountain range.16 As support to this central thrust, two other major forces would also advance. To the south a cavalry-mechanised group, encompassing a substantial Mongolian Army contribution of four cavalry divisions, an armoured brigade and a tank regiment, would cross the interior of Inner Mongolia securing the right flank of the main advance.17 The left (northern) flank would be secured by the 36th Army attacking across the Argun river towards the fortress area of Hailar. An integral tactical air force, the 12th Air Army under Marshal Sergei Khudyakov, was attached to the Trans-Baikal Front.18 The offensive schedule was ambitious, particularly given the topography along the axis of the main advance by the 17th Army, the 39th Army, the 6th Guards Tank Army and the 53rd Army. The plan specified the armoured forces of the Tank Army reaching Lubei by day five of the operation. This necessitated first crossing a north-eastern portion of the Gobi Desert and then traversing the Greater Khingan [Hsingan] mountain range, an advance of at least 70km per day. The combined-arms units were expected to make 23km per day.19 Such feats were not considered achievable by the defenders, neither Japanese nor Manchukuoan. According to the later account of the Red Army’s General Issa Pliyev, the Japanese believed that even passing a caravan across the Gobi was difficult. He quotes a high-ranking Manchukuoan posing the no doubt rhetorical question ‘What commander would dare to lead an army through the terrible sands?’20 Even given the fact that Soviet-era memoirs have to be approached with some care given the ‘ideological filter’ imposed on their content,21 Pliyev was correct in this instance: an attack from that quarter

stalin’s war on japan - Press

34

Stalin’s War on Japan

was not expected. As the commander of the Soviet-Mongolian CavalryMechanised Group, the force that would have the greatest distance of desert to cross, he had ultimate responsibility for ensuring the success of that particular operation. The cavalry-mechanised group concept was a uniquely Soviet affair that teamed horsed cavalry, or at least mounted infantry, with mechanised forces. Such formations had been used with success in the west, where Pliyev had amassed his expertise, by exploiting their mobility over difficult terrain.22 His instructions from Vasilevsky tasked him with conducting an operation across the Gobi Desert and Khingan Mountains, and mounting a ‘vigorous offensive on the axis Kalgan-Peking [Zhangjiakou-Beijing] . . . as far as the Gulf of Liaodong . . . to secure the front’s forces against attacks from the south’.23 In order to successfully achieve this goal, which involved progressing a distance of over 500km in thirteen days at most, it was calculated that the average rate of advance would need to be around 45km per day.24 The 36th Army’s assault, in conjunction with a left flank detachment of the 39th Army, was to be of an entirely different kind. The city of Hailar straddled an ancient route which passed through the Greater Khingan range to its east, and was a major waypoint on the Harbin-Manchouli [Manzhouli], formerly Chinese Eastern, Railway. Given its obvious importance as an invasion route, the area had been strongly fortified with substantial permanent works, grouped into five separate areas, on the hills to the north-west and south-west of Hailar. Together these comprised the Hailar fortified region. Constructed in 1934–37 by Chinese slave-labour, this had been designated a ‘special category’ fortress, protected with ferro-concrete up to 3m thick, and was only one of two such complexes in Manchukuo.25 Taking into consideration the nature of the task, the army commander, General Alexander Luchinsky, was allocated extra engineering resources. These included the 68th Engineer Brigade and several motorised pontoon-bridge battalions.26 The latter were required because before coming to grips with the fortifications, the Argun river had to be crossed. Compounding that problem was the surrounding floodplain, which had effectively created a swamp some 12km wide in parts.27 In order to carry out the mission, Luchinsky proposed a two-pronged assault. A group of five rifle divisions and one tank brigade would launch the main attack on his left flank, with the primary mission of crossing the Argun before advancing to penetrate and isolate the northern portion of the Hailar fortified region. This would fix that portion of the enemy and prevent any withdrawal eastwards, particularly with reference to preventing any destruction of the railway tunnels through the main Khingan Pass.28 Simultaneously, a separate operational group29 of two rifle divisions and two artillery machine gun brigades30 would carry out a similar mission on the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

35

army’s right flank against the southern sector of the fortifications. The distance between these two formations would be some 100km. This latter group would first have to break through a series of lesser fortifications, designated the Manchouli-Chalainor fortified region. However, if maskirovka had been effective, these were not expected to be alert or fully manned. This thrust would be aided by one from the south made by the 94th Rifle Corps, temporarily detached from the 39th Army.31 Luchinsky was expected to have captured the Hailar region by the tenth day of operations.32 The 36th Army would then advance into central Manchukuo towards Qiqihar, the location of the Kwantung Army’s chemical weapons facility – the now infamous but then secret Unit 516.33 Meeting the Trans-Baikal Front on the Manchurian Plain, having advanced from the east, would be the forward elements of Meretskov’s First Far Eastern Front. However, whilst Malinovsky’s command was intent on largely bypassing areas that featured strong enemy defences (the Hailar fortified region excepted), the First Far Eastern Front was tasked with striking from the Maritime Province (Primorskaya Krai) directly into a zone that had been heavily fortified, albeit on a much shorter frontage. These defences were, naturally enough, sited on those approaches into eastern Manchukuo which the Kwantung Army considered feasible as axes of attack. Even then they were not considered particularly good avenues for that purpose, although they were flanked by ground considered impenetrable except by infantry and only then with difficulty.34 A Japanese account of the highlands of eastern Manchuria stated that they ‘form a rugged upland barrier between the central lowlands and the Siberian maritime province’. Attaining a width of some 350km at their centre, where they were ‘high, steep, and rugged’, they were flanked by zones which were ‘penetrated by broad valleys’. The lowlands in the area ‘are covered with vast stretches of marshland’. Rainfall in the region was greater than in any other area of Manchuria, and in the periods March–April and July–August this ensured that ‘wheeled vehicles will mire almost everywhere off the established roads’. The account went on to state, however, that ‘there were no paved roads in eastern Manchuria’ and that even dirt roads were few. The most important of these ran north-south, but there were two ‘major tactical roads’ that extended from Mudanjiang [Mutanchiang], ‘one to Tungning eastward to the border, the other north-east to Hulin, also near the border’.35 The commanders, and many of the units, of each Red Army Front were assigned to positions in the light of their previous fighting experience. Thus Meretskov described the topography he was faced with from that perspective: take some of the Mannerheim line fortifications, add Karelian forests (only denser), the impassability of the Arctic, the swamps of the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

36

Stalin’s War on Japan

Novgorod region, and the eastern climate, and you will get the area west of Lake Khanka . . .36 Not all the officers and formations under his command shared such experiences, however; out of the four armies under his direct authority only one, the 5th Army, had seen action in the west.37 The other three – the 1st Army,38 the 25th Army and the 35th Army39 – had remained in the Far East throughout the Great Patriotic War, although their commanders – Colonel General Afanasy Beloborodov, Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov and Colonel General Nikanor Zakhvatayev respectively – were all veterans of that conflict. The 5th Army commander, Colonel General Nikolai Krylov, was similarly experienced, as was Colonel General Ivan Sokolov of the 9th Air Army. Nevertheless, Meretskov was to complain that ‘some Far Eastern officers’ attempted to convince him that the Front could not count on the successful use of heavy military equipment, primarily tanks, due to the difficult terrain. And it was difficult. Aside from the natural boundary formed by the Amur and Ussuri rivers, almost one-third of the border’s total length, beginning at the Amur and extending almost as far south as Tungan, consisted of a ‘vast expanse of swamps and marshlands’. These were deemed sufficiently ‘formidable to deter an enemy from undertaking major military operations’.40 Meretskov found it necessary to point out, by recounting his experience of fighting with mechanised forces in similarly difficult areas such as Novgorod, Karelia and the Arctic, that they were mistaken. Training exercises were held with tank units and formations in order to prove that they could, with sufficient military engineering input, including the use of pontoons, bridging equipment and amphibious vehicles, cross the water barriers and overcome the difficulties. The Amur Flotilla (Amur Military Flotilla), which had about 200 warships of various classes and was under the command of Rear Admiral Neon Antonov, was tasked with supporting the assault across the Amur and Ussuri rivers and maintaining control of them. This was vital in terms of logistical support of the ground forces and of transporting men and equipment to their required positions. Gunfire support would also be provided as necessary.41 Extensive practice manoeuvres were undertaken and Meretskov later recounted that: Where the tanks and crews were carefully trained, where they studied the area well and provided engineering training, everything went fine. And where they prepared poorly, the tanks advanced very slowly and even lagged behind the infantry. In these cases, the teaching had to be started again.42 Since the success of the entire Strategic Offensive Operation was predicated on surprise and speed, the latter being achieved by the employment of

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

37

mechanised and mobile forces sweeping on to seize objectives deep in the rear, it was necessary to avoid protracted siege-type operations. The essence of the plan was not to fight, but rather to encircle enemy forces in order to effectively dismember them, thus effecting a fatal paralysis of their capability from the start. This would preclude the staging of any effective resistance at all. The most important, indeed decisive, factor in this was that of time combined with coordination.43 Zakharov phrased it thus: ‘The simultaneous delivery of a number of powerful Front and army strikes, unified by a single strategic design, allowed the defeat of the enemy in a relatively short period.’44 Therefore heavily fortified zones would be bypassed by the initial striking forces, and their reduction left for follow-up units to complete. This, of course, sounds relatively simple in principle, but would be difficult in practice given that the fortified zones were obviously designed so that they could not be easily bypassed. The Kwantung Army had begun fortifying Manchukuo’s eastern border with the Soviet Union soon after the establishment of the state, the first works being constructed near Suifenhe (Suifenho, Sui-fen-ho), a waypoint on the Eastern Chinese Railway that was close to the border with the Soviet Union. According to Matsumoto, there were three grades or categories of fortification: the first consisted of barbed-wire entanglements for minor defence positions; the second were ‘resistance nests consisting of concrete pillboxes’, whilst the third grade, dubbed ‘strongpoints’, comprised several ‘resistance nests’ grouped together.45 Construction of these defences was an ongoing project and fortifications of all types were constructed over a distance of some 160km from the heights east of Pamientung to the area south of Tungan City, with strongpoints at Panchiehho and Miaoling. Unlike the earlier fortifications, such as those around Suifenho, the newer positions were sited back from the border to a maximum distance of 55km, an area delineated to the west by a single-track railway line that ran parallel to the frontier. Given the likely invasion routes, these works had expanded by 1944 to form two distinct groups separated by a forested mountain area approximately 70km in length. This was deemed unsuitable for large-scale military operations, but vulnerable to small-scale border incursions.46 The Kwantung Army considered one point on the Ussuri river, around the town of Hutou (Hutouzhen, Koto, Kotou), to be of particular importance. This was because it was located between an impassable swamp region located ‘considerably to the rear of the border’ and the border itself. This made an enemy incursion ‘very likely’.47 From 1933 onwards, therefore, the Kwantung Army constructed the ‘special category’ Hutou fortified region to cover this vulnerable area. Situated on the high ground above the western bank of the Ussuri river, around 50km north of its confluence with the Sungacha (Songacha) river, it had great strategic significance as it directly overlooked

stalin’s war on japan - Press

38

Stalin’s War on Japan

the Khabarovsk-Vladivostok Far Eastern Railway where it crossed a bridge over the Malinovka river north of Iman (Dalnerechensk). Being only some 7.5km distant, this vital point was well within range of two Type 7 300mm howitzers installed in the fortress for the purpose of interdicting that crucial communication artery.48 Aware that the railway was vulnerable, the Soviets rerouted it some 17km eastward. It now passed across another bridge constructed over the Bolshaya Ussurka river. The counter to this was the deployment of longer-range ordnance: Japan’s sole example of a large-calibre railway gun, the 240mm Type 90, arrived in 1941.49 An even larger, if less mobile, weapon arrived the following year in the shape of a prototype coastal artillery howitzer dating from 1926. This huge 410mm calibre artillery piece was emplaced in a purpose-built, domed, ferro-concrete structure built in 1944, the design of which severely limited its traverse. This wasn’t considered detrimental given its primary purpose, and attempts to conceal its presence meant that it was never test-fired.50 In addition to super-heavy ordnance, there were close to seventy other artillery installations, including mortars, at Hutou, plus about thirty antiaircraft weapons. Constructed across a frontage of approximately 8km, and to a depth of 6km, the fortifications were largely subterranean and thus hidden, with vital points protected by 3m of ferro-concrete. These included communication systems, barracks, water supplies and power generation. The only visible works above ground were the various entrances and exits, observation posts and the mutually supporting artillery and machine-gun bunkers.51 Manchukuo’s eastern border fortifications have inevitably been compared with France’s famous Maginot Line. Such contrasts are valid, inasmuch as both systems were constructed with similar outcomes in mind: that of delaying and canalising an invading force whilst interdicting its communications, so allowing time for field formations to the rear to concentrate and counterattack. Zakhvatayev’s 35th Army formed the right, northern, flank of the First Far Eastern Front with the task of getting past and through the Hutou defences. On its left, and separated from it by the expanse of Lake Khanka, the 1st Army under Beloborodov and the 5th Army under Krylov would drive eastwards through the defences on the north-south line Linkou-Jiangdong. This was to be the main thrust, and the two armies concerned were augmented with Lieutenant General Ivan Vasiliev’s 10th Mechanised Corps, which could deploy 250 tanks and self-propelled guns.52 On the left flank of this main effort, the 25th Army under the command of Chistyakov would strike west and south-west. The westerly attack would sever communications between the Kwantung Army and the Japanese 34th Army in northern Korea, whilst that to the south-westward would be against that enemy army with the object of invading Korea across the Tumen

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

39

(Tuman, Duman) river. In support of operations into the Korean peninsula, Meretskov could call upon the Pacific Fleet under Admiral Ivan Yumashev.53 Operating to the north, on the right flank of the First Far Eastern Front, was the Second Far Eastern Front under General Maxim Purkayev. The smallest of the three Fronts, it had as its core two combined-arms armies: the 2nd Army54 under Lieutenant General Makar Terekhin and the 15th Army commanded by Lieutenant General Stepan Mamonov. Also attached was the 5th Rifle Corps under Major General Ivan Pashkov. Aviation was provided by the 10th Air Army under Colonel General Pavel Zhigarev. These component parts of Purkayev’s command were dispersed over three separate sectors for the assault, each with its own axis of advance. Deployed on the left flank was the 5th Rifle Corps, which would attack south-westwards from the area between Bikin and Jabarovsk across the Ussuri. Bypassing the Jahoe (Rahoe) fortified region, its objective was to link up with elements of the First Far Eastern Front’s 35th Army around the Boli (Poli) area. Some 250km to the west of the 5th Rifle Corps, the 15th Army would strike across the Amur river, overcome the fortified areas lining the border and advance along the Sungari river in the direction of Harbin. Support along that river would be provided by detachments of the Amur Flotilla. Once its objective was reached, it would link up with elements of the First Far Eastern Front’s 1st Army. The right flank of the Second Far Eastern Front, although separated by some 300km from the 15th Army in the centre, was formed by the 2nd Army under the command of Lieutenant General Makar Terekhin. Tasked with a supporting role, it was to deploy across the Amur river one day after the main offensive began, and then strike south-westward through the Lesser Khingan Mountains towards Qiqihar.55 This would involve overcoming the fortified areas in the Aigun and Sunwu regions before advancing to link up with the 36th Army of the Trans-Baikal Front advancing from the west. Close cooperation with units of the Amur Flotilla was essential in securing effective river crossings and, in common with the other two Fronts, Purkayev’s command faced profound difficulties in terms of terrain; it had to advance both through riverine marshland and cross the Lesser Khingan Mountains.56 Even further detached geographically, and forming a separate operational group under Purkayev’s overall command, was the 16th Army led by Major General Leonty Cheremisov in northern Sakhalin. The task allotted to this force, when ordered, was to attack across the 50th Parallel into the Japanese portion of the island (Karafuto) in conjunction with the Northern Pacific Flotilla commanded by Vice Admiral Vladimir Andreev.57 The spearhead of 16th Army consisted of Major General Anatoli Diakonov’s 56th Rifle Corps, whilst providing aerial support, with some 1,500 combat aircraft between them, were the aviation components of the Pacific Fleet and the Northern

stalin’s war on japan - Press

40

Stalin’s War on Japan

Pacific Flotilla under Lieutenant General Petr Lemeshko and Major General Georgii Dziuba respectively.58 The topography of Sakhalin imposed an arduous task on 16th Army. The only feasible route south across the 50th Parallel followed the valley of the Poronay (Poronai) river, which was flanked by heavily forested mountains plus numerous swamps and bogs.59 Naturally enough, this was where the Japanese had constructed the Koton (Haramitog, Kharamitog, Pobedino) fortified region, with strong, tactically unflankable defences. Here, carefully concealed, there were, according to later Soviet accounts, some 17 concrete pillboxes, 31 artillery and 108 machine gun earth and timber pillboxes, 28 artillery and 18 mortar or grenadier positions, and around 150 bunkers layered across an area some 12km wide and around 16km deep.60 On the other hand, Japan’s lack of sea command allowed operational outflanking via amphibious operations conducted by the Northern Pacific Flotilla. Though it possessed no specialised landing ships, the flotilla could deploy 9 submarines, a Uragan-Class guard-ship (basically a large torpedoboat), 5 minesweepers and 24 small torpedo boats, plus several detachments of patrol boats and minesweepers. These would be used initially to land the 2nd Battalion of the 113th Rifle Brigade and 365th Separate Marine Battalion, both stationed at Sovetskaya Gavan, at the port town of Esutora (Uglegorsk) on the west coast of Sakhalin, and thus interdict communications along the coastal road. A second force, utilising the main body of the Rifle Brigade and Marines, was subsequently to be landed at the port of Maoka (Kholmsk) with a view to cutting off Japanese forces to the north and taking the whole of the southern portion of the island.61 Operations against the Kurils were also envisaged but would only commence when ordered by the Front or theatre commander. This would be dependent upon the progress of the other operations: when, in other words, ‘the defeat of Japanese troops in Manchuria and on Sakhalin Island created favourable conditions for the liberation of the Kuril Islands’.62 Forces from the Kamchatka Defence Region, supported by naval units from the Petropavlovsk Naval Base, would carry out amphibious assaults which would, initially at least, involve some sixty ships. The preliminary landing force allocated would consist of two regiments of the 101st Rifle Division, a Marine battalion and a howitzer artillery regiment, plus supporting units totalling some 8,824 personnel in all. Airborne support was assigned to the 128th Air Division and the 2nd Separate Naval Aviation Bomber Regiment. As Zhumatiy puts it, in comparison with the main operations in Manchuria, the forces allocated for the Kuril operation were ‘insignificant’.63 The forces allocated, albeit provisionally, may indeed have been insignificant, but the geo-strategic implications of the Soviet occupation of the Kurils were weighty. Whilst ownership of the Kurils had been granted to Stalin at

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

41

Yalta, possession of the southernmost of them brought Soviet forces within sight of the northern shores of Hokkaido, the northernmost and second largest island of those comprising Japan’s homeland (naichi). Of even greater portent was the embryonic proposal for Soviet forces to invade Hokkaido. Indeed, Admiral Yumashev, the commander of the Pacific Fleet, drew up a plan for a landing at the port of Rumoi on Hokkaido’s west coast and submitted it for approval on 19 August.64 That, however, lay in the future, and did not form part of the original plan under consideration. It does, though, perhaps demonstrate the inherent flexibility within the overall structure of the plan. The plan for the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation was, of course, drawn up in complete secrecy and known to only a select few. It was not the brainchild of any one individual, but rather the product of a collective decision-making process. Vasilevsky described it thus: The preliminary draft . . . was drawn up by the Commander-in-Chief in a narrow circle of people. These were usually a few members of the Politburo and the State Defence Committee . . . This work would often take several days [and] in the course of it the Commander-in-Chief would normally confer with commanders and members of military councils of the respective fronts. [. . .] The Central Committee, Politburo, and army leadership always relied on collective decision-making.65 The ultimate arbiter of the plan was, of course, the State Defence Committee, the extraordinary supreme state organ of the Soviet Union during the Great Patriotic War.66 Roberts describes it as ‘a sort of war cabinet chaired by Stalin’ and ‘a political body charged with directing and controlling all aspects of the Soviet war effort’.67 In fact, and to all intents and purposes, it was Stalin: ‘At the pinnacle of the Soviet system stood Stalin [. . .] No other war leader exercised as close and detailed control over all aspects of the war effort . . .’68 As approved, the plan was both audacious and ambitious; all in all, the offensive into Manchukuo was to be conducted across active fronts amounting to some 2,700km. Together there would be nine major coordinated strikes aiming to penetrate to a maximum depth of around 800km.69 The object of the exercise, as the commander of the First Far Eastern Front, Marshal Kirill Meretskov, later put it, was to ‘cut the Kwantung Army into pieces’.70 The rate of advance that was expected was punishing, particularly with respect to the Trans-Baikal Front, which has already been mentioned. Against exceptionally difficult terrain and well-prepared permanent defences, the First Far Eastern Front was assigned an average rate of advance of 8–10km per day over a period of 15–18 days.71 The Second Far Eastern Front was expected to average a daily offensive rate of 13km.72

stalin’s war on japan - Press

42

Stalin’s War on Japan

Glantz describes the Red Army ‘tailoring’ its units to suit their combat mission.73 This was undoubtedly the case. Mention has already been made of Meretskov’s previous experience on the Karelian Front. His counterpart, Malinovsky, had formerly commanded the Second Ukrainian Front, which had experience in successfully conducting large-scale military operations in the Carpathians and had manoeuvred and fought through the Transylvanian Alps.74 In a similar manner, both the 5th Army and the 39th Army had amassed great experience in breaking through fortified areas in East Prussia, whilst the 53rd Army and the 6th Guards Tank Army had served under Malinovsky in the west, so were well acquainted with operations in rugged terrain.75 Although time was relatively short, and turned out to be even shorter than anticipated, intensive training was carried out for, as Rotmistrov points out, ‘the troops based in the Far East did not have combat experience, and those arriving from the West did not know the enemy and the conditions of the theatre of operations’.76 The forces that were redeployed did not necessarily bring their equipment with them.77 Most of the armoured and mechanised forces were re-equipped with tanks and self-propelled guns upon arrival; Rotmistrov states 67 per cent of such equipment was new.78 Interestingly enough, one of the 6th Guards Tank Army’s formations, the 9th Mechanised Corps, was equipped with American M4A2 Sherman tanks, known as Emchas by their crews, supplied under Lend-Lease.79 All other armoured units were equipped with T-34-85 tanks. In terms of self-propelled artillery, the light, medium, and heavy units were provided with SU-76, SU-100 and ISU-122 (gun) and ISU-152 (howitzer) respectively.80 These provided mobile fire support for divisions, corps (mechanised and tank) and armies, as required.81 Indeed, the offensive as a whole was grounded in the large-scale deployment of armoured and mechanised formations, the bulk of them concentrated on the axes of attack.82 Separate tank divisions, brigades and regiments were to be used as the spearhead units of corps and armies, combined as necessary with infantry, artillery and engineering detachments. Again these were ‘tailored’ according to context. For example, the First Far Eastern Front, which faced permanent defensive works, deployed tank and self-propelled artillery brigades to directly support the infantry. Conversely, the Second Far Eastern Front had to cross the Amur and Ussuri before assaulting enemy defences, so used a different mix of forces; separate tank brigades and regiments were not attached to infantry divisions, but were used rather as mobile groups to be deployed only after a breakthrough had been achieved.83 Artillery, over and above organic complements, was allocated according to expected requirements. The largest artillery contingent, over 3,300 pieces, was assigned to the First Far Eastern Front’s 5th Army to assist in breaking through the permanent defences that it faced. This complement included

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan

43

three High-Power Howitzer Artillery Brigades,84 with a total of sixty-six B-4 203mm howitzers on tracked carriages. The 35th Army, tasked with getting past and through the ‘special category’ Hutou fortified region, was assigned a lesser scale of artillery support: a single brigade,85 with a total of twenty-four B-4 howitzers, was attached.86 The average density of artillery in the areas designated for breaking through was 87.5 guns and mortars per kilometre of front.87 Each Front possessed aviation support in the shape of an attached air army. Such formations had first been created in 1942 in order to make central management of aviation possible, although the combat strength of an air army was variable and determined by the role assigned to it. Initially, in the west, an air army typically consisted of two or three fighter divisions, one or two bomber divisions and one or two assault aviation divisions, plus several separate air regiments. Over the course of the war their strength was steadily increased. Indeed, towards the end of the conflict, and as the Red Army approached Berlin, it was not unusual for an air army to have 2,500–3,000 aircraft.88 Each air army commander was directly subordinate to the commander of the Front to which it was assigned operationally, although for the Manchurian Operation they reported administratively to the commander of aviation in the Far East, Chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander Novikov.89 Though all the air force commanders had gained significant experience in Europe, the vast size of the Manchurian theatre, with its three widely separated Fronts and broad axes of attack, required new thinking. Given that the Trans-Baikal Front formed the primary striking force of the operation, the 12th Air Army was assigned the strongest aviation component. This included the theatre strategic reserve, which reinforcement doubled its fighter strength and tripled it in terms of bombers. The primary task of the latter was paralysing the railways and roads, thus preventing any movement of enemy forces, and tactical battlefield support as required. The 9th Air Army’s main focus was to be on the tactical support of the First Far Eastern Front in respect of thrusting through fortified areas, whilst the 10th Air Army would similarly support the Second Far Eastern Front whilst it forced the Amur river and attacked along the Sungari.90 Indeed, and even taking into account the varying mission profiles, all the air armies had a fairly common set of overall objectives. These can be basically enumerated as: the gaining of air supremacy in order to prevent the enemy from harassing Soviet ground forces; interdiction of railways and roads to prevent the movement of enemy reserves; the destruction of command and control centres to paralyse a coordinated response; plus reconnaissance, logistical assistance and tactical support.91 Efficient interaction between the air and ground forces had been well developed during the course of the war against Germany and it continued in the Far East. The headquarters of the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

44

Stalin’s War on Japan

air armies maintained close contact with their terrestrial counterparts, and there were well developed systems to ensure smooth interaction with lower formations, chiefly via the use of what the western Allies dubbed air liaison officers.92 The immense preparations, including the construction of networks of airfields that were required in order to assemble these air armies close to the borders of Manchukuo, involved the implementation of appropriate maskirovka techniques on a large scale. These included ensuring aircraft only flew in small groups, the maintenance of radio silence, plus the careful camouflage and dispersal of equipment. As Khorobrykh points out, this methodology ‘kept the enemy unaware of the true plans of the Soviet command’.93 Implementation of these ‘true plans’ had, as already pointed out, been roughly scheduled for the middle of August; the Hiroshima attack changed that.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 4

‘. . . at the crossroads of destiny’ Our country is literally standing at the crossroads of destiny. If we were to continue the war under the present circumstances the citizens would die with the satisfaction of having truly served their country loyally and patriotically, but the country itself would be on the verge of ruin. Although it is possible to remain loyal to the great and just aims of the Greater East Asia War to the very end, it is meaningless to insist on them to the extent of destroying the state. We should protect the survival of our country even by enduring every kind of sacrifice.1 Japan’s ambassador to Moscow, Sato Naotake, had been impatiently awaiting Molotov’s return from Potsdam. This anxiety was prompted by his belief that Japan was ‘standing at the crossroads of destiny’ and on the brink of national extinction. His immediate superior, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, was of an essentially similar opinion, and on 12 July had instructed the ambassador to approach Molotov immediately to deliver an urgent missive from the Emperor of Japan himself. The import of this message was that Japan requested the Soviet Union accept a high-ranking Japanese envoy, Prince Konoe, as the Emperor’s personal representative in an effort to promote Soviet mediation as a means of terminating the war.2 There was a caveat: as long as the Allies demanded unconditional surrender, Japan would fight to the last man.3 Indeed, it was in accordance with that principle that the Japanese government had decided to ignore the Potsdam Declaration, and Prime Minister Suzuki Kantaro, who hoped that Stalin would prove a ‘decent fellow’,4 had publicly announced that it would do so.5 Ambassador Sato, perhaps through proximity, was a tad more sceptical than his Premier about Stalin. In a letter to his friend and former colleague Goro Morishima of 8 June 1945 he had argued: The Soviet Union may suddenly renounce its neutrality6 at an appropriate moment, and the Red Army may attack the Kwantung Army in Manchuria. Resistance might have been possible earlier, but it is unrealistic now.7 Now, some two months later, Sato was shortly to discover that the ‘appropriate moment’ was indeed nigh. On the afternoon of 7 August Stalin and

stalin’s war on japan - Press

46

Stalin’s War on Japan

General Aleksei Antonov, chief of the general staff, ordered Vasilevsky to commence the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation at midnight two days hence.8 Molotov had refused to meet the ambassador before departing for Potsdam and, although he and Stalin returned on the evening of 5 August, he then declined any appointment until 17:00 hours on 8 August. By that time Sato was somewhat harassed; he had been informed the day before that ‘the situation is becoming so acute that we must have a clarification of the Soviet attitude as soon as possible’.9 As is now generally known, the Americans were able to decipher these diplomatic messages, and so were well aware of the ongoing manoeuvres within Japanese government circles.10 It is possible that the Soviets also had similar abilities and knowledge.11 In any event, the acuteness described was no doubt related to Truman’s statement of the previous day, which had announced that the United States had detonated an atomic bomb over Hiroshima. The President went on to warn that if Japan’s leaders ‘do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth’.12 Although neither Sato nor Togo could have known it, clarification of the Soviet attitude was indeed to be forthcoming at the scheduled meeting. Nor could they have discerned the significance of its timing: as Collie points out, ‘someone had done the arithmetic with time zones’.13 When the ambassador arrived at the designated time, Molotov interrupted Sato’s salutations and handed him a document, the operative words of which were: ‘the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan’.14 Stalin, disappointing Suzuki’s hopes, had not turned out to be a ‘decent fellow’ after all. Indeed, and because of time zone arithmetic, the Soviet attack commenced almost simultaneously with the Declaration of War. It wasn’t until around four hours later that the Japanese government finally received word of it.15 Some eight hours after that, at 11:02 Tokyo time on the morning of 9 August, a second atomic bomb detonated above Nagasaki.16 The various fortified zones that had been constructed at strategic points along the borders of Manchukuo have been discussed, as has the weakened state of the once fearsome Kwantung Army. There was, though, some potential for strengthening the latter via the impressment of elements of the c. 1.5 million Japanese civilian Manchukuoan colonisers. Indeed, beset by the shortfall in army numbers, many male settlers had been forced into uniform in the summer of 1945 in a process variously described as ‘uprooting conscription’17 or ‘bottom-scraping mobilization’.18 The latter seems the most apt, given that ‘the physically infirm, the over-age, civil servants, colonists, and students’ were drafted. Barshay points out that in August 1945 ‘the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘. . . at the crossroads of destiny’

47

Manchukuo. The Japanese forces and their dispositions. (# Charles Blackwood)

Kwantung Army was made up of teenagers and men in their thirties, or even forties’. He quotes a Japanese source (Kurihara Toshio) who claimed that the training and weapons these conscripts received were essentially ‘medieval’: carving knives issued in lieu of bayonets, and beer bottles for manufacturing Molotov cocktails. Rifles were in short supply, and those that were available dated from before the First World War. As a substitute for effective anti-tank

stalin’s war on japan - Press

48

Stalin’s War on Japan

guns, soldiers were expected to crawl underneath advancing tanks before detonating explosives strapped to their chests.19 On paper, and as discussed in Chapter 2, the strength of the Kwantung Army on the eve of the Soviet invasion appeared impressive, totalling as it did some 713,000 personnel under the overall command of General Yamada Otozo. A career cavalry officer, he had little combat experience, despite his first taste being as long ago as 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War. His next involvement in war fighting came between January and December 1938 when he commanded Japan’s 3rd Army engaged in China, then as head of the Central China Expeditionary Army until September 1939. Apart from that brief period, he was mainly involved in staff duties until his appointment in July 1944 to command the Kwantung Army. The holder of this position also became Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Manchutikuo and, in fact, the supreme authority in that state.20 In May 1945 the boundaries of the military sub-divisions into which Manchukuo was divided for defensive purposes were altered, with forces assigned to each as appropriate. The south-central and western areas came under the Third Area Army commanded by General Ushiroku Jun. Equivalent to a western army group or Soviet Front, this unit contained two armies, the 30th and 44th, plus two separate divisions and two separate brigades. In terms of manpower, these forces amounted to nine infantry divisions, plus the two separate brigades, totalling 180,971 men. At a conference held in Dairen on 4 June the task assigned to Third Area Army in the event of a Soviet attack was defined as being to ‘exhaust’ the invading force by carrying out harassing operations whilst avoiding a major engagement. It was then to withdraw south-eastwards towards Tonghua near the Korean border and ‘destroy the enemy from prepared positions’ in that area.21 Responsibility for eastern Manchukuo was given to First Area Army, under General Kita Seiichi, which contained the Third Army and the Fifth Army, of three divisions each, plus four separate infantry divisions and an independent brigade, totalling 222,157 personnel overall. The operational plan, disseminated to the First Area Army by Kwantung Army HQ in April 1945, specified that the work of destroying an invading enemy was to be carried out via utilisation of the border fortifications. The main force would meanwhile remain to the rear.22 The north-central and north-western zone was assigned to the Fourth Army. Comprising three divisions and four independent brigades, and headed by Lieutenant General Uemura Mikio, it numbered 95,464 personnel. Despite being the smallest of the Kwantung Army’s three major subordinate commands, the Fourth Army had the longest border with the Soviet Union to contend with. There were two axes upon which attacks might be expected: an assault across the Amur in the north or from the west through the Grand

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘. . . at the crossroads of destiny’

49

Khingan range. An attack across the river was to be defeated by obstructing the amphibious crossing, then defending along the road and railway routes south. An advance from the west was to be checked around Hailar, where there were substantial fortifications, with a further defence line in the mountains to the east.23 From September 1944 the Kwantung Army had begun to take responsibility for northern Korea, with which Manchukuo had a long land border. It was then at the instigation of Yamada, and to fulfil a defensive role on the peninsula, that the Thirty-Fourth Army, under Lieutenant General Kushibuchi Senichi, was created in June 1945. Formed around two divisions with supporting units, it was only on 2–3 August that the army actually got operational control of the main formations and much of the support for them never arrived. Moreover, there were serious shortages of weapons, particularly artillery, and the quality of personnel was generally low, with most having no combat experience at all. The army was formed with the object of thwarting any Soviet advance along the east coast of the Korean peninsula by occupying the area around Hamhung in order to block the route to Seoul and Pyongyang. The Seventeenth Area Army in Korea, commanded by Lieutenant General Ko¯zuki Yoshio and numbering seven divisions in total strength, was also assigned to Yamada’s command, but not until 10 August.24 Mention has been made of the possibility that the Soviet Union was reading Japanese diplomatic traffic. It may also have cracked army ciphers. If so, then it had knowledge that, as one British historian put it with, of course, the inestimable benefit of hindsight, ‘at this time the ‘‘cream’’ of the Japanese army in Manchuria consisted of skimmed milk’.25 If the Soviets did know, then the sheer scale of the resources devoted to the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation tends to conjure unbidden the cliche´ concerning sledgehammers and nuts. What we can be more certain of is that the Japanese had no idea of the weight or timing of the attack; the techniques of maskirovka had worked extremely well. Marshal Malinovsky’s order to begin was worded as follows: The reconnaissance and advance detachments march at 00:05 on 9. 8. 45. The main forces cross the border at 04:30. Aviation operates from 05.30 . . . Report every four hours. The first report at six o’clock . . .26 The offensive, when it opened, took the Japanese completely by surprise.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 5

The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’ At 4.30 the regiments, divisions, and corps went on the offensive. This ‘iron stream’ will now stop at nothing until the complete defeat of the Kwantung Army!1 The Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group began its attack at midnight local time with the advance of powerful armoured forces. A reinforced battalion of the Soviet 27th Motorised Rifle Brigade and the 7th Motorised Armoured Brigade of the Mongolian People’s Army swept into the Gobi Desert in two columns some 200km apart. The Mongolians knew the terrain well and were familiar with the location of enemy border guards. The task of these advanced units was to swiftly overcome and destroy enemy border outposts before they could warn their higher command of what was afoot. As the Group’s commander, Colonel General Pliyev was to phrase it: ‘The success of the offensive . . . was largely dependent on how quickly our troops could deal with the enemy border guard . . .’2 Events developed favourably. Accordingly, the first echelon of the main body of the Group crossed the border at 03:00 hours, the second following an hour later, by which time the forward detachments were racing ahead. Indeed, Red Army doctrine stipulated that a forward, or advanced, detachment, constructed around a reinforced tank brigade (with self-propelled artillery and infantry support), should operate well ahead of a main force. The strength of the tank brigade could vary, but it generally had between forty and sixty-five tanks and one or more regiments of self-propelled artillery, each regiment containing about twenty assault guns. The function of these detachments was not to engage in sustained combat but to cause confusion and dislocation by driving into enemy rear areas and to seize and hold important points, such as bridges and the like, until the main force arrived.3 The first prisoners to be interrogated reported that they had been overwhelmed by the sudden attack, particularly when tanks appeared out of the night. Pliyev described ‘a dazzling sea of lights’ breaking the darkness as the force, comprising thousands of tanks and other vehicles with their headlights on, raced forward. He compared it to a ‘fiery river, breaking free of its banks,

stalin’s war on japan - Press

52

Stalin’s War on Japan

Initial moves: the Trans-Baikal Front. (# Charles Blackwood)

and roaring into the depths of Manchuria’. Surprise, one of the most important Principles of War since the time of Sun Tzu, had been achieved. Rapidity of movement, another crucial ingredient for success, was also being accomplished.4 The greatest difficulties were the terrain and the heat: ‘The sun burns the body and soul . . . the air is as hot as if from a blast furnace.’5

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’

53

Even on the first day, the debilitating effect of the desert temperature was exacerbated by a shortage of water. According to Pliyev, the initial water holes that his command had counted on capturing proved to be less bountiful than had been expected. It proved necessary to double-filter the ‘slurry’ obtained before it was in any way usable.6 This, of course, was time-consuming and, given that the entire operational plan was predicated on speed, then much depended on the forward detachments capturing viable water sources to sustain the advance. Pliyev voiced a fear that if the enemy poisoned these then the situation could turn to tragedy.7 Despite the difficulties of terrain and heat, by the evening of 9 August the mechanised units heading the two columns had penetrated some 70km into the Gobi Desert. The horsed formations following were only some 10km behind them. Enemy cavalry units had been spotted by early morning reconnaissance conducted by the 12th Air Army, but rather than concentrating to attack they dispersed and moved out of the path of the advance. Just as the two columns of Pliyev’s command were widely separated, so were all the formations of the Trans-Baikal Front. Some 150km to the north of the left-hand column, Danilov’s 17th Army simultaneously advanced into Inner Mongolia in two columns spearheaded by the 70th and 82nd Reinforced Tank Battalions. By nightfall these advanced units had matched the advance of the Cavalry-Mechanised Group, with the columns of the main body some 20km in their rear.8 Both these forces were essentially playing a supporting role to the main hammer of the entire operation to their north. Colonel General Andrei Kravchenko’s reinforced 6th Guards Tank Army had, as already pointed out, been assigned an ‘exceptionally large role’ in the campaign.9 The core of this force consisted of a single tank corps (5th Guards), two mechanised corps (7th and 9th Guards) and two self-propelled artillery brigades (208th and 231st). Also attached were four separate tank battalions (1st–4th) equipped with eighty-eight BT-5 and BT-7 light tanks, two infantry divisions (36th and 57th Motorised Rifle Divisions), plus towed artillery, anti-aircraft artillery, engineer and reconnaissance units, and a specialised amphibious special purpose battalion. In total, the army could deploy 826 tanks, 193 SU-100 and SU-76 self-propelled guns, 188 other armoured vehicles, 945 field guns and mortars, 43 multiple rocket launchers, 165 anti-aircraft guns, 6,489 vehicles and 948 motorcycles.10 The motorised infantry divisions, which, unlike the rest of the army, had long experience in the region, formed the advance guard. Numbering some 20,000 men all told, their mission was to race ahead of the main body in two columns around 70km apart, with the objective of securing and holding the mountain passes, the intention being to preserve the tank and mechanised

stalin’s war on japan - Press

54

Stalin’s War on Japan

corps for subsequent operations in Manchukuo itself. Following these advance elements came the two mechanised corps (7th and 9th, to the north and south respectively), in several columns. The 5th Tank Corps, deployed into multiple columns, likewise advanced immediately behind the 9th Mechanised Corps. The original plan had stipulated that the northern advance would only be in two columns, but the terrain was such that this methodology was swiftly altered so that the advance took place along six or eight parallel routes, forming a front 15–20km wide. There was to be no necessity to deploy from column to battle formation for either of the two main groupings; the advanced units swept aside any small enemy units that got in the way. As with the cavalry-mechanised group, the main problems to overcome became the climate and the terrain. An account of the advance of the 7th Mechanised Corps details how they set off at approximately 04:30 hours on 9 August. No enemy were encountered and, as a result of pushing on hard, the corps exceeded the planned rate of advance, achieving 130km as against a planned penetration of 100km over the first 24-hour period. This was achieved despite the difficult conditions. As the combat history of the corps (quoted in Nebolsin & Zavizion (2017)) puts it, the weather was calm but suffocatingly hot with the sun burning mercilessly. Even the tracked vehicles had difficulty traversing dunes in the sandy desert, and the efforts created a huge blanket of dust. One unnamed participant relates how ‘hot sand climbed into my nose’ and ‘clogged my eyes’. The troops became unbearably thirsty and quickly consumed their personal water supplies which, because the ‘rare wells’ that were encountered had been ‘poisoned by the enemy’, could not be replenished.11 The 9th Mechanised Corps forming the southern arm of the advance suffered much the same problems. Indeed, they might have been worse off in one sense as they were equipped with American Sherman tanks, which had more limited mobility and higher fuel consumption than the Soviet T-34. The ground, at least initially, was also somewhat different, being a plain ‘covered with withered vegetation’. According to an account penned by battalion commander Dmitry Loza, under this thin layer of grass, however, was ‘dry sand’ as ‘fine as ash’. More than two Sherman tanks in line ahead passing over such terrain quickly uncovered the fine sand, causing following vehicles to bog down. It took the combined efforts of a further two tanks – ‘connected in series by tow cables and moving at slow speed’ – to recover the stranded tank. Given the need for rapidity, this was obviously a situation to be avoided, and to do so the force was compelled to spread out.12 Even so, the Shermans found it slow going as the ground changed to terrain categorised as a ‘dry quagmire’, a ‘mixture of fine pebbles and almost powder-like, crumbly sand’. Even when movement was possible the clouds of dust thus raised necessitated the widening and spreading of the formations to avoid the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’

55

potential for collisions. The daytime heat also became a problem, as detailed by Loza: The temperature was 40 Centigrade . . . The Shermans’ armor was like a burning skillet. It was impossible to touch the turret and hull with a bare hand. The motors began to overheat. We were forced to make a short halt, during which we cleaned dust from the radiators and topped off the coolant levels.13 It is worth mentioning that riding atop each of these ‘burning skillets’ were around eight to ten infantrymen (desantniki), whose sufferings in such conditions were immense.14 However, as Stalin is supposed to have once said, ‘It takes a very brave man not to be a hero in the Soviet army.’ Loza also mentions the problems discovered in respect of the wells; he remarked that the retreating Japanese ‘had destroyed all water sources’ which were ‘filled with dirt and possibly poisoned’.15 Nevertheless, and despite all the problems, by noon on 10 August, a full day earlier than specified, the western slopes of the Grand Khingan Range had been reached. Here there was an operational pause whilst ‘we waited for the results of the reconnaissance of the passes’.16 The three units of the Trans-Baikal Front already mentioned (the SovietMongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group, the 17th Army and the 6th Guards Tank Army) were advancing into areas where the enemy wasn’t expected to be encountered in force. The same can’t be said for the other two major components of that Front, Lyudnikov’s 39th Army and Luchinsky’s 36th Army. The former was tasked with both advancing eastwards on the left flank of the 6th Tank Army with two infantry corps, thus bypassing the ‘special category’ defensive works that comprised the Hailar fortified region, whilst also sending a detached group, consisting of the 94th Rifle Corps, against the rear of that region.17 The eastwards advance of the 39th Army began with the 5th Guards Rifle Corps and 113th Rifle Corps moving abreast on a 45km front. The organic armour of both corps, the 206th and 44th Tank Brigades, led the attack, which was itself spearheaded by the 61st Tank Division. This forward loaded, armour-heavy approach – the ‘iron stream’ – was adopted in the name of speed, and it took some risks. For example, the heavy artillery units were compelled to lag well behind. The technique, though, conferred other advantages. As Glantz explained it: Forward detachments operated in great number at every level with great effect. They perpetuated the momentum of initial assaults, created a momentum of their own, and imparted that momentum to army and front operations as a whole.18

stalin’s war on japan - Press

56

Stalin’s War on Japan

The political officer (Member of the Military Council19) to Lyudnikov’s command, Colonel Vasily Boyko, described his impression of the initial advance of these armoured forces, as observed from a hilltop on the Mongolian side of the border: At one moment everyone . . . literally gasped at a miracle: the sky turned upside down. Thousands of lights – stars – flickered below, amongst the foothills of the Khingans. These were the rear signal lights of our tanks and vehicles . . .20 The terrain to be traversed by the 39th Army as it approached the Khingan range was, as with the forces further south, largely desert with salt-marsh lowlands. The latter caused difficulties for vehicles, necessitating the creation of embankments by the military engineers to allow passage of heavy armour where necessary. This naturally slowed progress. The intense heat was also a problem, causing troubles amongst men, horses and machines. Nevertheless, an evaluation by the high command after 24 hours revealed that the spearheads, whilst overcoming the resistance of small enemy units, had managed an advance of some 100km. It was, though, considered unrealistic to expect this pace to be maintained, given the conditions. A decision was therefore taken to reduce the pace to 40–50km per day, and allow the troops a lengthy halt during the hottest period. The medical department was required to take additional measures to protect soldiers from sunstroke, and to treat patients so afflicted in the field.21 The advanced detachments – the ‘armoured fist’ of the 39th Army, as their commander termed the 262 tanks and 133 self-propelled guns in the first echelon22 – reached the Khingan foothills the next day and reported back that the ground there was harder, albeit steeper, which facilitated forward movement. The area also contained streams and rivers containing water of good quality, which alleviated to some extent the hardships already mentioned.23 One water course, however, constituted a barrier: a tributary of the Khalkha river (Khalkhin Gol), near the scene of the 1939 battle. The army was well equipped to deal with such an obstacle through having a dedicated combat engineer formation, the 32nd Engineer Brigade, attached. Each of the corps had one of the brigade’s battalions at the forefront of the advance: the 228th Engineer Battalion with the 94th Rifle Corps, the 203rd Engineer Battalion with the 113th Rifle Corps and the 230th Engineer Battalion with the 5th Guards Rifle Corps. There were two battalions in reserve, one dedicated to throwing pontoon bridges across rivers.24 It swiftly constructed seven bridges, three that were able to support 35-tonnes and one that could handle a 45-tonne load.25 This progress came at a cost. The main body of the 39th Army, and particularly those parts that depended on wheeled transport, could not keep up

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’

57

and the invasion forces became strung out. Given that the logistics support vehicles, including the fuel tankers, were amongst those left well in the rear, and that the heat and difficult terrain had significantly increased fuel consumption, there was clearly potential for the advance to stall. This was remedied by stripping back the strength of the advanced detachments to just the self-propelled guns, and then providing them with all the available fuel. The likelihood of encountering resistance in strength to the west of the mountains was considered small, and this proved a practical solution.26 Having said that, the enemy were now aware of what was coming. Soviet reconnaissance aircraft reported on the morning of 11 August that Japanese troop movements had been observed around Hailar, Arshun and Solun. Boyko also reports that enemy aircraft made attempts to bomb the 61st Tank Division.27 By the evening of 11 August the advanced units were in the mountains and had begun to secure the routes through them. Some, indeed, drove on through to the eastern side of the range. There was, though, still a huge amount of engineering work required to make these routes passable for the bulk of the forces. Nevertheless Lyudnikov reported to Malinovsky that night that passage through the mountains would be forced the following day (12 August).28 The 94th Rifle Corps, acting separately against the rear of the Hailar fortified region, had also made substantial progress. By the end of the second day of operations the corps were separated from the main body of the 39th Army by some 200km, although airborne liaison officers maintained contact between the formations.29 Tipped with armoured units, the two divisions making up the 94th Rifle Corps had advanced more than 40km on 10 August against slight resistance from Japanese and Manchukuoan units. They had also secured the necessary river crossing points some 100km to the south-west of the region.30 By the evening of 11 August the forward detachments of the corps had reached the southern outskirts of Hailar town, with the main body some way in their rear. There they were halted, not by enemy action but rather by order of the army command, since the corps’ efforts were no longer required on that axis of operations.31 Indeed, further advances by the 94th Rifle Corps had been rendered unnecessary due to the success of operations by Luchinsky’s 36th Army, and particularly its advanced detachment. The operations of the 36th Army were of a very different order from those conducted by the other forces of the Trans-Baikal Front. Attacking from an area some 100–120km distant from the left flank of the 39th Army, on the northern side of the salient of Manchukuoan territory containing Hulun (Dalai) Lake, the 36th Army was itself separated. There were two distinct axes of attack, commencing around 100km apart before converging on Hailar.32 The main body, consisting of two rifle corps (the 2nd and 86th, comprising five reinforced divisions), was concentrated on the left, northern, flank. The

stalin’s war on japan - Press

58

Stalin’s War on Japan

southern thrust was the responsibility of an operational group consisting of two rifle divisions (the 293rd and 298th) and two fortified regions (the 31st and 32nd) under Lieutenant General Sergey Fomenko.33 Both formations had two significant obstacles to overcome before the advance proper could begin: first approaching, and then crossing, the rainswollen Argun river, which delineated the Russia-Manchukuo border. Indeed, whereas a lack of water was to bedevil those forces advancing further south, there was a superabundance of the substance in the northern regions. As the geographer Robert Burnett Hall had noted in a 1930 study of the region: In the last days of June and early July, the heavy rains begin. This is a time of violent storms. Often it pours continuously for several days. The rivers flood. The roads become quagmires. This lasts through August.34 Whilst the Argun itself was too deep to ford, the surrounding floodplain, much of it virtually swamp given the time of year, extended to distances of between 4 and 12km on both sides. It followed then that there would have to be significant engineering work performed, particularly on constructing roadways fit to take heavy armour and bridging units through the floodplains on the Russian side of the river, before progress on the main attack could be made.35 Therefore the attached 68th Engineer Brigade was reinforced with three pontoon bridge battalions, one motorised pontoon bridge battalion (with thirty assault boats), and a large amphibious vehicle battalion (with thirty DUKW amphibious trucks).36 Before approaching and crossing operations could take place, however, it was necessary to secure bridgeheads on the Manchukuoan side of the waterway. To that end at 02:00 hours on 9 August, with the area shrouded in a thick fog, five battalion-strength infantry assault detachments, each drawn from the divisions forming the 2nd and 86th Rifle Corps, began crossing the Argun in boats and DUKWs. Once across the river, they fanned out and secured areas to a depth of some 1 or 2km on the south bank, overwhelming small enemy detachments in the process. Simultaneously the engineers began the construction of roadways through the swampy ground to enable the heavy bridging equipment to be brought forward. These roads were complete by 02:00 hours, and by 03:00 hours the first pontoon bridge, able to support 30 tonnes and thus a T-34 tank or self-propelled gun, was in place. Four further pontoon bridges and a pontoon ferry were brought into play by about 04:30 hours, and shortly after that a 60-tonne bridge was usable. By 06:00 the main body had started to cross, and by 13:00 hours the fighting elements of both corps were over the river.37 As with the other armies, the spearhead role was assigned to an armoured formation, in this case one based around the 205th Tank Brigade.38

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’

59

Commanded by Major General Vasily Burmasov, it crossed the Argun immediately after the infantry sent to secure the far bank. Burmasov was tasked with driving south-east and capturing crossing points across a further watercourse on the way to Hailar, the Mo-erh Ko-erh Ho (Mozr-Gol Moerh Gol), by nightfall on 9 August. These crossing points were then to be secured pending the arrival of the following forces. This portion of the mission had been achieved by 20:00 hours and, upon reporting that back, further orders were issued: the advanced detachment was to conduct an overnight attack towards Hailar with the object of entering the town early the next morning.39 This was advancing into an area known to be defended, and the route to the town contained a substantial obstacle in the shape of the Hailar river.40 Burmasov directed his force along the road to Hailar town whilst also throwing out reconnaissance units to the east. One of these reported that the bridge over the Hailar river carrying the HarbinManzhouli railway (constructed during the period of the Chinese Eastern Railway) was intact and only lightly defended by a platoon-sized unit. This was to the north of the direct route, but Burmasov immediately saw its potential and ordered the reconnaissance unit to carry out an immediate attack. This succeeded in capturing the bridge, whereupon he stopped the direct approach and redirected his force across the railway bridge. This manoeuvre allowed the attack on Hailar town to develop from an unexpected direction, and bypassed the defensive zone constructed across the road.41 Leaving one battalion of his infantry to cover his northern flank, Burmasov ordered a nocturnal attack on the town. This only partially succeeded because of heavy Japanese artillery fire from the adjacent fortifications and because the advanced detachment lacked sufficient infantry to force the matter. The Japanese launched two major counterattacks in an attempt to dislodge the attackers, although these were driven off at the cost of some casualties. This, as Radzievsky argues, was a consequence of the fact that Burmasov’s command had been acting in isolation up to 100km ahead of the main forces of the army for about 24 hours without any assistance, including air support.42 Help was on the way, though. It arrived at midnight on 10 August in the shape of the 3rd Battalion of the 9th Rifle Regiment, part of the 86th Rifle Corps. From then on, further elements of the main body came up to take over the capture of Hailar town and the reduction of the now largely redundant fortified region to its north. Once freed from the taking of Hailar and its environs, the advanced detachment struck eastwards to the Khingan Mountains. It had made a considerable contribution. As Radzievsky put it: it should be emphasised that the capture by the Advanced Detachment of a part of the city, and the crossing of the river, and keeping them until the approach of the main army forces, created the most favourable

stalin’s war on japan - Press

60

Stalin’s War on Japan

conditions for the 36th Army to rapidly gain the enemy’s Hailar fortified area.43 As has already been mentioned, the success occasioned by Burmasov’s detachment in particular, and by the 36th Army in general, allowed the redirecting of the 94th Rifle Corps of 39th Army onto an eastward axis. Indeed, the rapid occupation and neutralisation of Hailar, which the Japanese considered an important rail and communication centre,44 was a significant step in the operational strategy of cutting the Kwantung Army into pieces. It also rendered less important the attack by Fomenko’s operational group forming the southern pincer of the advance. Because this group was attacking into the teeth of the permanent defences constituting the Manchouli-Chalainor fortified region, it was given substantial artillery support. Indeed, unlike its northern counterpart, its advance would be preceded by an artillery barrage delivered by the 1146th HighPower Howitzer Artillery Regiment, plus seven artillery battalions. These would provide a ten-minute shoot but, to ensure surprise, only after the assault across the Argun had been completed.45 Surprise was achieved, and Fomenko’s advance ejected the enemy from their positions and forced them into a retreat towards Hailar whilst suffering ‘heavy losses’.46 Over the first two days of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation it can be said that the Trans-Baikal Front had, to adopt modern terminology, exceeded expectations. It had put into practice principles of speed and surprise by utilising fast-moving, armour-heavy, forward detachments to head up the ‘iron stream’ as it moved into action. These detachments had prevailed against an unprepared and unsuspecting enemy where fighting occurred, and had managed to cross formidable terrain elsewhere. Chief Marshal of Armoured Forces Pavel Rotmistrov was to later argue that the ‘higher quality of the military equipment of the Soviet troops’ was a ‘decisive factor’ in the rapid breakthrough, which is surely correct.47 But what had also been evidenced was initiative and improvisation at all levels of command. Risks, justifiable but risks all the same, had also been taken. They had paid off, and after only two or three days Marshal Rodion Malinovsky’s Front was poised to begin the next stage of the operation.

In jocular mood – the Big Three at Yalta. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 1 - Press

The Soviet High Command, Far East Command.

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 2 - Press

The Soviet High Command, Trans-Baikal Front.

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 3 - Press

The Soviet High Command, First Far Eastern Front.

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 4 - Press

The Soviet High Command, Second Far Eastern Front.

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 5 - Press

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 6 - Press

General Yamada Otozo, commander of the Kwantung Army and effective ruler of Manchukuo. (Author’s collection)

Emperor Puyi, the puppet ruler of Manchukuo (Manchutikuo). (Author’s collection)

Major Pyotr Chelyshev, deputy commander of the 6th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade of the 6th Guards Tank Army, capturing Puyi at Shenyang airport as he tried to flee to Japan. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 7 - Press

T-34-85 tanks and wheeled transport traversing the Greater Khingan Mountains of Inner Mongolia. (Author’s collection)

An ISU-152 heavy assault gun crossing a river. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 8 - Press

Engineers repairing a well in the Gobi desert. (Author’s collection)

M4 A2 Emcha tanks of the 9th Guards Mechanised Corps being welcomed as liberators. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 9 - Press

A smashed observation post in the Hailar fortified region. (Author’s collection)

Soldiers of the Mongolian People’s Army, part of the Soviet-Mongolian CavalryMechanised Group. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 10 - Press

The Type 90 240mm railway gun in 1929 after commissioning . . .

. . . and in 1945 following its destruction to prevent capture. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 11 - Press

Destroyed defences in the Hutou fortified region. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 12 - Press

A Japanese armoured train. (Author’s collection)

The 410mm coastal artillery howitzer in its domed ferroconcrete structure. (# Charles Blackwood)

An armoured boat (‘river tank’) as deployed by the Amur Flotilla. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 13 - Press

Troops debarking from a monitor on the Sungari river. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 14 - Press

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 15 - Press

The monitor Sun Yat-Sen. (Author’s collection)

T-34-85 tanks of the Second Far Eastern Front. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 16 - Press

A T-34-85 crossing a river on Sakhalin. (Author’s collection)

Combat engineers, the unsung heroes of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, creating a roadway on Sakhalin. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 17 - Press

Troops debarking at Chongjin, Korea. (Author’s collection) Naval infantry aboard a landing craft (LCI(L)). Marine Anna Yurchenko is in the foreground holding a PPSh-41 submachine gun. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 18 - Press

The landing beach on Shumshu with the wreck of the Mariupol. (Author’s collection) The wrecks of two LCI landing craft on the beach. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 19 - Press

A highly stylised rendition of Colonel Sueo Ikeda leading the 11th Tank Regiment into battle on Shumshu. (Author’s collection) A posed shot of the Shumshu invaders deploying a Degtyarev PTRD-41 anti-tank rifle. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 20 - Press

A crowd watches tanks entering Harbin. (Author’s collection)

A cheering throng greets the Red Army at Dalian. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 21 - Press

Elements of the 25th Army marching into Pyongyang. (Author’s collection) Marines of the Pacific Fleet raise the flag above Port Arthur (Lushun). (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 22 - Press

A Soviet SU-76 self-propelled gun. According to Marshal Rokossovsky ‘the troops were especially fond of the SU-76’. (Author’s collection)

‘Stalin’s Sledgehammer’, the 203mm M1931 (B-4) high-power heavy howitzer. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 23 - Press

A Guards mortar unit reloading a Katyusha multiple rocket launcher. (Author’s collection) Officers of the 88th Separate Rifle Brigade of the Second Far Eastern Front. Captain Kim Il Sung is seated second right in the front row. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - plate section - p. 24 - Press

Major General Vasily Burmasov, who brilliantly commanded the advanced detachment during operations on Hailar. (Author’s collection)

Radio Operator Anatoly Kuzmin took part in an assault through a swamp, wading through chest-high mud during an attack by the First Far Eastern Front. (Author’s collection)

Medic Mariya Tsukanova, the only female soldier awarded the title (posthumously) of Hero of the Soviet Union during the course of the Manchurian Operation. (Author’s collection)

Major Pyotr Shutov was made a Hero of the Soviet Union for his actions during the landing on Shumshu Island. (Author’s collection)

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 6

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics The hour of retribution was approaching. For the adventurism of their aggressive strategy of the 1930s, the Japanese military had to pay in 1945.1 The period of monsoon rains, coinciding with the hostilities, caused a sharp rise in river levels and created swamps on their floodplains. Overcoming these floodplains often became a more difficult task than crossing the rivers themselves.2 We used Suvorov’s tactics: ‘Where the goat passes, so too a person will pass.’ We just added: ‘Where a person passes, there the equipment will pass.’ And, as you see, has passed’.3 The four armies constituting Marshal Kirill Meretskov’s Front would all advance at the same time, the main thrust being that by the 1st and 5th Armies arrayed side-by-side on narrow offensive lines. The operational methodology was to inflict a ‘crushing blow on a narrow front with an expansion of the breakthrough towards the flanks’.4 Directly to the rear of the 5th Army was the 10th Mechanised Corps with its 250 tanks and self-propelled guns.5 This comprised the Front’s breakout formation.6 Red Army doctrine specified that a mechanised corps was to enter the battle only after the main enemy defences had been overcome. As a formation, it differed from a tank corps inasmuch as it had a larger complement of infantry, and other troops as necessary. It was strengthened in relation to a motorised rifle corps, however, owing to the inclusion of a tank regiment within its component brigades, the object being to increase its striking power and independence. It was, though, as with a tank corps, light in respect of artillery.7 Before the mechanised corps could be unleashed, the two armies would have to bypass or overcome some of the strongest defensive areas constructed by the Japanese in Manchukuo. In the case of the 1st Army, this was the Mishan fortified region. Major General Konstantin Kazakov, the commander of the 1st Army’s artillery, had detected weaknesses in those defences and, having served in the west throughout the Great Patriotic War, and been

stalin’s war on japan - Press

62

Stalin’s War on Japan

Initial moves: the First Far Eastern front. (# Charles Blackwood)

involved in many of the greatest battles there, he knew what he was about.8 Upon his appointment following the capitulation of Germany, he had scrutinised the enemy positions opposite the 1st Army. He noted two things; firstly, that the defensive positions directly opposite the border had little depth (‘the distance from the front to the rear did not exceed 10km, and in some cases even less’), and secondly that they had been constructed too far forward, their first-line bunkers being easily observable. Other shortcomings, which were revealed during the assault, revolved around the individual strongpoints

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

63

having been constructed to a standard pattern: they ‘were surrounded by a circular anti-tank ditch and barbed wire . . . so the assault group could immediately determine the boundaries of each strongpoint, its flanks and, consequently, the approximate location of minefields, and other obstacles’. Kazakov attributed these shortcomings to two factors: the ‘poor training of the Japanese specialists who planned, approved, and built them’ and ‘the operational views and intentions of the Japanese military’. The latter, in his view, had constructed them whilst ‘planning an aggressive war against the USSR’ so failed to ‘allow for the possibility of their own defence . . . these fortified areas were to serve as advanced bridgeheads . . .’ Therefore, he opined, ‘infantry trenches, artillery and machine-gun pillboxes, even the concrete positions of heavy and super-heavy artillery, were pushed close to the Soviet border . . . because . . . it was thought that their fire would support Japanese infantry through our territory to the greatest possible depth’. Because they had been so designed, ‘most of the fortifications did not have permanent large garrisons . . .’ He also noted that Japanese perspectives had changed ‘under the influence of defeats inflicted by Soviet troops on fascist Germany’ but that there ‘was no time for a fundamental remake of the defences’.9 Whatever Kazakov’s opinions of the Japanese defences, the 1st Army, which was well supplied with artillery,10 was to ruthlessly exploit their deficiencies. However, and in accordance with the timeless military principle, the main thrust of the 1st Army was dedicated to bypassing them entirely, leaving them to be dealt with later.11 This is a simple matter to enunciate but rather more difficult to put into practice, especially given the nature of the ground involved. Colonel General Afanasy Beloborodov, the army commander, was familiar with it because, as he stated later, ‘The features of the terrain on which the troops were to advance were generally known to us, the old Far Easterners, since the taiga was the same on both sides of the border.’12 He described it thus: The mountains were covered by a continuous virgin forest. Mighty oak, cedar, pine, linden, birch, twined vines and wild grapes, interspersed with prickly shrubs and bushes which filled all the gaps between the trees. Hanging from branches and carpeting the ground were finger-long spikes, hard and sharp, like a sewing needle. These prickly barriers could, literally, tear the clothes off inexperienced people in a few minutes and pierce the soles of boots. The going was difficult even for experienced infantry. And below, at the foot of the mountains, stretched narrow forested valleys for many kilometres. Rivers and streams flowed through them, creating swampland that proved impassable even to a vehicle as powerful and manoeuvrable as a T-34 tank. Marshes were not confined to the low land, but could also be encountered on hills. Climbing them

stalin’s war on japan - Press

64

Stalin’s War on Japan

involved being bogged down, knee deep, in weak, squishy soil. These are the features of the local mountain taiga.13 As already discussed, the Front commander, Marshal Kirill Meretskov, had enforced a rigorous training regime in order to overcome conditions such as these, whereby ‘the troops discovered how to move quickly in taiga and swampy terrain, gained the ability to make long off-road marches, learned how to construct roads, force water barriers, and overcome mountains and forests’.14 He and his command had also evolved techniques in respect of how all this was to be rapidly achieved. The physical difficulty of moving largescale forces through around 30km of mountainous, heavily forested and swampy terrain was firstly addressed by the combat engineers, under the overall command of Colonel General Arkady Khrenov, Meretskov’s deputy, chief engineer and long-time colleague. Having extensive and successful experience in the west, he had been deployed to the theatre in early May with, as Meretskov put it, ‘the most difficult tasks to solve’.15 He started by improving the communications on the Soviet side of the border so that the forces making up the Front could move into position: ‘seven new roads with a total length of 850km were laid . . . over 2,000km of road was repaired. Other work was carried out: bridges were built, repaired and strengthened . . .’16 The engineering solution as adopted by the 1st Army was described by Beloborodov. In order to create roads for the army to pass through the taiga in columns, advanced groups were formed. These consisted of three to five tanks, a platoon of combat engineers and one or two companies of machine gunners. The tanks were used as battering rams to push over trees which the engineers then cleared away for further use as and when, whilst the machine gunners were deployed to protect the work parties from enemy interference. Further engineering groups immediately to their rear then improved the path as they advanced by removing tree stumps and, in wet areas, building causeways and bridges as required, whilst a third wave would ‘corduroy’ these roadways with tree-trunks where that was necessary. This process of improvement and widening would continue, allowing artillery and logistical units – wheeled vehicles with ammunition, fuel and food – passage along the route.17 Accordingly, extra engineering resources were allocated to the 1st Army: these included the 12th Combat Engineer Brigade (in addition to the organic 27th Combat Engineer Brigade), two pontoon bridge battalions, two fleets of engineering vehicles, a field water supply company and a hydraulic engineering company.18 Even with these additional resources and an evolved methodology for crossing the taiga, problems still remained. These extemporised roads would have to be utilised by ‘six rifle divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery division, more than 400 tanks and self-propelled guns, heavy artillery brigades . . . and

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

65

thousands of cargo vehicles’.19 Beloborodov noted that the armour-heavy advanced detachments that would have to first pass along the roads would leave them barely usable for following elements, whilst a rifle division, with its artillery and motor vehicles stretched out for many kilometres, would quickly destroy it. There were ten rifle divisions in the 1st Army.20 The solution adopted was to construct more roads, which in turn led to operational change. The 1st Army would trade depth for width; it would advance along seven or eight separate routes, ‘two or three per division, three or four per corps’, spread across a frontage of 20–25km.21 The planned rate of advance was 8–10km per day. There were pros and cons to this, as was recognised and debated. The matter was, however, put to the test at 01:00 hours on 9 August when the forward detachments moved into action. There had been a slight delay due to the weather, as heavy thunderstorms had broken out late on 8 August. As well as preventing the prearranged artillery barrage on the enemy fortified zones, which had been planned in coordination with the use of powerful searchlights,22 this would also, as the ‘the old Far Easterners’ well knew, cause the streams and rivers to burst their banks and flood the roads. Should the advance be delayed until the morning? Beloborodov says he telephoned the Front commander, whilst according to Meretskov’s account he was at the 1st Army’s command post anyway. In any event it was decided and decreed that the operation should commence, lack of artillery notwithstanding.23 The advance through the taiga proved even more arduous and difficult than had been anticipated, particularly given the weather, but progress at the rate of 500–700m per hour was achieved. This was despite nearly 30 per cent of the way having to be corduroyed. Indeed, the enormity of the task was such that more and more resources were directed to it until more than two-thirds of the personnel moving forward became engaged in the work.24 As the advanced groups moved into the forest and began battering and building their way through it, five machine-gun and artillery-machine-gun battalions of the 112th Fortified Region and the 6th Field Fortified Region struck north-westwards. Reinforced with artillery, anti-tank guns and a mortar regiment, and with tactical command of the Separate Detachment of Armoured Boats under Captain Lieutenant Ilya Hvorostyanov on Lake Khanka,25 they came under the direct command of Lieutenant General Alexander Maximov, Beloborodov’s deputy. The ‘Maximov Group’ was tasked with preventing any enemy counterattack from the Mishan area against the 1st Army’s communications, particularly via a crossing of the lake, by seizing the heights directly across the border and organising a defensive position there.26 In fact, Maximov exceeded his initial instruction. Having liquidated several lightly manned border posts, elements of the 112th Fortified Region moved

stalin’s war on japan - Press

66

Stalin’s War on Japan

on into the defended section, discovering as they went the weaknesses described earlier. Further deficiencies were also noted. The capture of the first bunkers revealed a lack of mutual support and poor use of terrain; ‘the Japanese, as a rule, built bunkers on the tops of the hills, which helped to quickly find them’.27 Perceiving that his command could successfully break into the fortified zone, Maximov sought permission from the army commander to push on and do so. Knowing that the Group was relatively weak, Beloborodov did not immediately agree, but consulted with his staff before deciding that Maximov should indeed take advantage and attack with ‘all his might’.28 By the evening of 9 August, some 18 hours after commencing their initial movements, the 6th Field Fortified Region, with the 112th Fortified Region on its right flank, had penetrated the enemy defences to a maximum depth of about 9km.29 As there was now a realistic possibility of achieving a breakthrough, the Maximov Group was reinforced with men and anti-tank guns and continued to make progress during the morning of 10 August, supported by artillery and air strikes.30 The enemy offered stubborn resistance, and so the Red Army discovered what their western Allies had long known: that Japanese troops in bunkers resisted to the end and, even when surrounded, responded with fire to offers of surrender.31 The Group also discovered another ‘interesting detail’ about the permanent defences: ‘although many of the captured bunkers were built to house artillery, there was none in them – only machine-guns, sometimes two or three in a bunker’.32 This, as Beloborodov wrote, confirmed that the Kwantung Army had decided to use the Mishan defence zone merely as a cover, behind which their main forces, utilising the missing artillery, were organised across the Mulinhe river, some 35km to the west, for a subsequent counterattack.33 By late afternoon on 10 August advance elements of the 112th Fortified Region, consisting of two machine-gun companies, had penetrated as far as Erzhenbay at the very rear of the defence zone. This traditionally walled town34 guarded the railway and parallel road that led into the centre of Manchukuo via Mishan, and had been heavily fortified with an anti-tank ditch, wire obstacles and eleven strongpoints. The latter were reinforced concrete structures cleverly disguised as houses and the like, their embrasures closed with shutters of the appropriate type and colour.35 The attackers, reinforced with anti-tank and mortar units, broke through the outer defences and a street battle ensued. Despite fierce resistance, with the Japanese fighting for every house, by 20:00 hours the battle had been won. Thus, on the second day of the operation, the Maximov Group, a very small force in the general scheme of things, had broken the Japanese front at one of its strongest points and severed one of their main communications arteries. In Beloborodov’s words: ‘the way to Mishan, and the city of Erzhenbai standing on it, were in our

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

67

hands’.36 Fighting continued at other points, but by the evening of 11 August the Group had penetrated the Mishan fortified region, leaving several wide corridors in their wake. The region as a whole, which covered an area of some 800 sq. km, was far from being conquered, but it had now been rendered totally irrelevant.37 Whilst the Maximov Group had been engaged in circumventing and overcoming manmade obstacles, the rest of the 1st Army had been similarly engaged with their natural equivalents. The road-cutting operation led to the forces behind the advanced detachments being strung out in long columns in their wake. This queue had, though, been carefully planned tactically, so that once passage through the taiga had been achieved the next stage of the operation could immediately commence.38 The first 24 hours of the operation saw these multiple columns advance in terrible weather through the forested mountains, successfully crossing several swamps and the Shitouhe river, to a distance of some 5–6km.39 This was roughly on schedule. The advanced detachment of the 300th Rifle Division, part of the 26th Rifle Corps on the left flank of the advance, had been tasked with a 5km initial penetration of the region on the first day.40 Some eight hours later, on the morning of 10 August, the advanced elements began to emerge on the western edge of the taiga and a rejigging of forces took place, the tank brigades in each column being pushed to the fore. By late morning the advance had broken through to open country. Accordingly, the advanced detachments of the 59th and 26th Rifle Corps and the 75th and 257th Tank Brigades, with the 335th, 338th and 339th Guards Heavy Self-propelled Artillery Regiments, powered ahead in the general direction of Bamiantongzhen and Linkou. One of their objectives was to secure crossings over the Muleng (Mulinkhe, Mu-leng Ho) river.41 Given that the Kwantung Army considered the taiga impassable, the sudden emergence of powerful armoured forces from within its depths caught them off guard.42 However, on the evening of 10 August, some 50km to the south-east of Linkou, the 257th Tank Brigade encountered resistance.43 This was tackled where appropriate by assault groups specifically assigned to deal with defensive structures and fieldworks. These were based around platoons of combat engineers equipped with flamethrowers, infantry, mortar and light artillery troops, plus a pair of the formidable ISU-152 assault guns.44 The Japanese had no real answer to these c. 45-tonne vehicles, each armed with a 152.4mm gun/howitzer and having frontal armour of 90–120mm.45 With no anti-tank gun that could penetrate them, or indeed most Soviet armour, recourse was had to ‘suicide bombers’.46 However, as a postwar study put it in respect of such tactics: ‘Japanese attempts to stop Soviet tanks with suicide squads, although heroic, were futile. Their lack of adequate antitank defenses left them at the mercy of Soviet tanks’.47

stalin’s war on japan - Press

68

Stalin’s War on Japan

Despite the weather, the advance also had support from Colonel General Ivan Sokolov’s 9th Air Army. This consisted of one corps of long-range bombers (two divisions), one separate bomber division, two assault (groundattack) divisions and three fighter divisions, plus reconnaissance, communication and transport aviation regiments. In total, the 9th Air Army could deploy 1,196 aircraft.48 The assault and fighter aircraft, flying from airfields located some 25–30km inside the Soviet Union,49 worked in close coordination with the ground forces, supporting infantry and tanks over the entire tactical zone. Indeed, the unexpected successes of the ground forces fundamentally changed the situation as regards planned aviation support, but adaptation to these new circumstances was prompt.50 All these factors contributed to rapid success. As Glantz was to phrase it, ‘the 1st Red Banner Army’s forces overcame the heavily forested zone west of the border and captured Pamientung [Bamiantongzhen] and crossings over the Muleng [Muling, Muren] river within the astonishingly brief period of 50 hours’.51 The successes of the 1st Army notwithstanding, the main efforts of the 9th Air Army were initially to be concentrated in the 5th Army’s zone. Indeed, of the 3,514 sorties scheduled for the first day, more than 2,200 were to be in support of that formation.52 Deployed immediately to the south of the 1st Army, and forming the other section of the main thrust, the 5th Army under Colonel General Nikolai Krylov had travelled from East Prussia, arriving during the second half of May.53 In eastern Germany, as part of Vasilevsky’s 3rd Belorussian Front, they had participated in the 1945 East Prussian Offensive, including the gruelling Battle of Ko¨nigsberg.54 It was a force then that had vast experience of attacking and defeating an enemy ensconced behind strong fortifications.55 Krylov had commanded the 5th Army since October 1943 and had extensive experience in the west, particularly during Operation Bagration – the codename for the Soviet 1944 Belorussian Strategic Offensive Operation.56 Meretskov informed him on arrival that he, and the 5th Army, had been picked specifically for a ‘most difficult task . . . you come to us not by chance!’57 This ‘most difficult task’ was breaking through the defences of what the Soviets termed the Border fortified region or area, known to the Japanese as the Suifenho fortified region. This defensive zone had been constructed to cover an obvious east-west invasion route along the line of the North Manchuria Railway (Chinese Eastern Railway). With a frontage of around 40km, and anywhere up to 30–55km deep, its left flank rested in the supposedly impassable stretch of taiga that extended some 60km northwards as far as the Mishan fortified area. The right, southern, flank blended into the Dunninsky fortified area, which would be dealt with by the 25th Army under Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov.58

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

69

Five main resistance nodes within the zone had been identified: Volyn, Northeastern, Eastern, South and Xiaosuyfinsky, the last being 30–35km in the rear. All had extensive, c. 15m-deep subterranean networks under ferroconcrete, housing shelters, warehouses, power plants and communication passages to the various artillery and machine-gun bunkers. These surface installations, each protected by up to 1.5m of ferro-concrete, had interlocking fields of fire and were mutually supporting; the maximum distance between machine-gun bunkers was 350m, whilst the artillery installations were no more than 700m apart. The passageways to the latter were furnished with narrow gauge railway tracks for ammunition supply.59 A number of these ‘bunker ensembles’, also termed resistance nodes or nests, and strongpoints were identified via surveillance from the Soviet side of the border, aerial reconnaissance being strictly prohibited.60 Krylov, disguised in a private soldier’s uniform, insisted on conducting much of this personally.61 Two strongpoints in particular, located high up on hills, were identified as being particularly important. Designated ‘Camel’ and ‘Sharp’,62 they were the key positions of the Volyn resistance node.63 ‘Camel’ and ‘Sharp’ constituted formidable obstacles. Each of these heights was surrounded by a walled ditch, with deep anti-tank ditches further out and rows of anti-infantry barbed wires on metal stakes. Minefields abounded. Within these defences the bunkers were provided with dozens of firing points, both for machine guns and for artillery.64 These works were only the most forbidding of those that blocked the route along which the 5th Army was tasked with advancing on a 12km front.65 The target set for Krylov, in terms of time and distance, was for an advance of 10km per day, on average, over four days. By the eighth day the target was 60–80km, when the Mulinhe river should have been reached.66 The object of the exercise was to create a corridor through which the 10th Mechanised Corps would eventually pass and exploit the breakthrough into central Manchukuo. Overcoming the readily apparent difficulties of achieving that rate of advance required heavy reinforcement of 5th Army. Constructed around a core of four rifle corps,67 an additional five tank brigades, six Guards selfpropelled artillery regiments, one tank destroyer brigade and one separate tank destroyer regiment were added for the operation. Artillery in the nonself-propelled category amounted to fourteen brigades’-worth, three of which were of the ‘High-Power’ variety. This force was further augmented by one regiment and two battalions of ‘Special-Power’ siege guns that had been used during the Battle of Ko¨nigsberg.68 Three Guards mortar brigades, plus six Guards mortar regiments equipped with ‘Katyusha’ multiple rocket launchers, and five mortar brigades with tubular weapons completed the formidable artillery complement available to Krylov. All in all, though sources differ slightly, he had at his disposal 600–700 tanks and self-propelled

stalin’s war on japan - Press

70

Stalin’s War on Japan

artillery vehicles, nearly 3,000 guns and mortars, plus 432 rocket launchers.69 In addition, and as already mentioned, the main efforts of the 9th Air Army were initially to be concentrated in the 5th Army’s zone of advance. The first echelon force density was computed as being approximately one infantry division, 200–260 guns and mortars of 76mm calibre and above, plus 30–40 tanks and assault guns per kilometre of front.70 This massive weight of armaments meant that the 5th Army would be able to ‘crush the Japanese defenses by sheer weight of tank and artillery firepower’.71 Stalin is said to have coined the saying that ‘artillery is the god of war’,72 and Red Army doctrine certainly applied it – its practice of utilising massive artillery barrages prior to attacking an enemy position became familiar in the west. This pattern was reflected in the five-part artillery plan for the 5th Army’s assault, with its particular emphasis on the destruction of the enemy’s permanent defences.73 Krylov, however, as his biographer put it, ‘reflected’ on the matter and concluded that since it would be impossible to count on the destruction of all the Japanese pillboxes and bunkers using artillery, and that any such attempt would forfeit the element of surprise, there was a better way.74 Engineer and infantry assault groups were created and trained.75 For the latter purpose, dummy fortifications that closely resembled enemy positions were constructed. Here the assault groups, which were made up of combat engineers (including flamethrower troops), infantry, light artillery and mortar squads, plus a pair of ISU-152 assault guns, practised neutralising enemy bunkers via infiltration and surprise nocturnal attacks.76 Rather than the hammer, Krylov would wield the sickle. He had, though, first to convince his superiors, in particular Marshal Meretskov, of the merits of his case. According to Ilya Dragan, writing in 1988, he had some difficulty with this, the Front commander being unconvinced that attacking a strongly fortified area using such methods would succeed. He feared that the attackers would become hopelessly entangled in the multiple anti-personnel obstacles surrounding the Japanese works. Instead, he suggested, the artillery bombardment should be ‘small but powerful’ and accompanied by searchlight illumination as ‘Marshal Zhukov did on the Oder’.77 Krylov remained determined, however, and eventually convinced Meretskov, after arguing that if the tactics proved a failure then the artillery barrage could still go ahead.78 Thus, at 01:00 hours on 9 August the assault groups, minus the assault guns which had bogged down, moved forward in the midst of the torrential thunderstorm already noted.79 They advanced by compass bearing, laying telephone cables as they went. The training exercises Krylov initiated had established an important point as regards timing: it would take at least 2 hours for the clandestine assault groups to reach the ‘Camel’ and ‘Sharp’ strongpoints.80 In practice, that timing proved realistic. Reports telephoned back at

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

71

03:15 hours reported that the assault groups had reached, and were infiltrating, the resistance nests undetected. By 03:30 hours the first enemy bunker had been put out of action. Other followed. Many resisted fiercely, but the engineers and infantry, with explosives, flamethrowers, smoke bombs and grenades, ‘smoked the enemy from the pillboxes’. By 04:30 hours word reached Krylov that the groups had taken control of ‘Camel’ and were moving forward. Similar reports followed pertaining to ‘Sharp’, and at 08:30 hours Krylov ordered his main forces to advance.81 This movement was greatly facilitated by the early capture by an assault group of three tunnels, constructed in the days of the Chinese Eastern Railway, which were between 1 and 3km inside the Manchukuo border. Because they provided an obvious avenue through the rugged terrain, and were indeed sitting astride one of the planned lines for the offensive, they were naturally well protected with bunkers and other defences, plus, according to Khrenov, they were rigged for demolition. Khrenov also states that an armoured train took part in the attempt to capture them intact.82 The attempt was successful, the attackers gaining the rear of the Japanese positions and destroying them As a result, all three tunnels were captured in good repair by 06:00 hours on 9 August.83 By noon on 9 August the advanced battalions had penetrated some 4–5km into the fortified zone, and by 15:00 hours a tank brigade and assault gun regiment, complete with a contingent of tank-riding infantry, were rushing forward towards the Xiaosuyfinsky resistance node, supported by the 9th Air Army. In fact, all the advanced detachments moved forward rapidly, with the result that by the end of 9 August, 23 hours after the attack began, the 5th Army spearheads were up to 30km beyond their start lines. The targets set for day three of the operation had been achieved on day one. Despite encountering resistance, this pace was maintained and on 11 August the advanced detachments reached the Mulinkhe river, some 60–80km from the Soviet border. To quote Dragan: ‘three days after the start of the offensive, the 5th Army reached the milestone which, according to the [original] plan, they would not achieve until the eighth day’.84 Krylov’s plan had worked, and worked far better than even its author could have expected. The rapid forcing of the Border fortified region, combined with the 1st Army’s successes, and the utter dislocation this caused to the Kwantung Army, meant that he characterised the 5th Army’s movements from then on as having assumed the character of a ‘pursuit’.85 Indeed, with the inestimable benefit of hindsight it is possible to argue that the original plan of crushing the defences by sheer weight could not have succeeded, or at least not in anything like the timescale that was actually achieved.86 Covering the right flank of the First Far Eastern Front’s main thrust by the 1st and 5th Armies was the 35th Army commanded by Lieutenant General

stalin’s war on japan - Press

72

Stalin’s War on Japan

Nikanor Zakhvatayev. From May 1944 to January 1945 Zakhvatayev had been commander of the 1st Shock Army in the Baltic region, so had plenty of experience of fighting over difficult terrain.87 Deployed to the north of Lake Khanka on a frontage of some 215km, the 35th Army’s advance would be divergent. Its mission was to isolate and secure the Hutou and Mishan fortified regions and advance on the cities of Bolizhen (Boli) and Linkou. Two of its three component divisions would advance westwards across terrain the Japanese deemed impassable, whilst the third, separated from them by some 60–100km, assaulted the ‘special category’ Hutou fortified region before moving west to link up with the other two. Unlike the similarly considered mountainous taiga tackled by the 1st Army, the topographical difficulties faced by Zakhvatayev’s command were largely aquatic and of the riverine and wetland variety. The rivers were the Ussuri and Songacha (Sungacha), the latter being a tributary of the former and the only outflow of Lake Khanka. To the west, beyond the Songacha, lay a vast open area of wetland, dotted with forest-covered ‘islands’ formed by low hills.88 The reason why this most unpromising and difficult area for a mechanised advance had been chosen was straightforward: it allowed the Soviets to get two divisions plus armoured support past the Hutou fortified region then, from behind, attack, isolate and destroy it. The Mishan fortified region was also to be assaulted. Zakhvatayev had also to push forces forward in the direction of Mishan and Harbin, thus covering the advance of the 1st Army operating to the south.89 Three rifle divisions (the 66th, 264th and 363rd) were the core formations of the 35th Army, reinforced with two brigades of artillery (one of which was of High-Power howitzers),90 a mortar brigade and a regiment of ‘Katyushas’. Two tank brigades and a tank destroyer brigade of SU-100 self-propelled guns were also attached, as were a separate engineer battalion, a fortified region and a field fortified region. In total, the army deployed 166–205 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 955 artillery pieces.91 The commander of the 363rd Rifle Division, Colonel Savva Pechenenko, recollected the training regime put in place to deal with the unfavourable terrain: ‘In June–July 1945 . . . exercises were conducted . . . in an area similar to the area of upcoming operations. During these, the personnel of the units and formations mastered methods of forcing water barriers with improvised means and overcoming the swampy terrain.’92 Pechenenko’s command, which was stationed on the left flank of the 35th Army with an attack frontage of some 6km, was to act in conjunction with the 66th Rifle Division immediately to its right. Provided with dedicated artillery support, its first-day objectives were a group of four fortified villages around 8–10km west of the Songacha. Arrayed on a north-south axis, these

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

73

were named Tacho, Little Huankang, Little Nangan and Tayangan, the last being on the shore of Lake Khanka.93 Advancing alongside and over a similar width of front, the 66th Rifle Division would assist the 363rd Rifle Division as necessary, but its chief aim was to reach, and then sever, the Hulin-Mishan railway line and road. The attack by these two divisions was designated as the main thrust. The third division, in conjunction with the 109th Fortified and 8th Field Fortified Regions, with the ‘High Power’ artillery in support, would simultaneously assault the Hutou fortifications. The artillery plan provided for the supporting bombardment there to last 8–10 hours. On the other hand, the bombardment in support of the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions was to be much briefer, a mere 15 minutes, whereupon it would switch to supporting the attack across the wetlands and ‘escorting’ the offensive as it went.94 The artillery commenced firing at 01:30 hours on the morning of 9 August, by which time advanced parties on both axes of assault had secured bridgeheads across the Songacha in the south and the Ussuri to the north. In the former region battalion-strength infantry units from the two divisions swiftly followed to reinforce the bridgeheads. There was no opposition as the combat engineers then made preparations to allow further forces to cross. Using two pontoon bridges (of 12- and 30-tonne capacity) and four pontoon ferries, elements of the first echelon crossed the 40–60m-wide river and concentrated on the west bank. By 08:00 hours they had moved forward some 2km and secured the area. This was all accomplished in torrential rain, with the troops having to wade through chest-high ‘viscous slush’ carrying machine guns and mortars with them. One of them, radio operator Anatoly Kuzmin, aged 19, later recalled that many of his comrades ‘threw away all their things, keeping only their weapons and helmets’.95 As a history of the Red Army’s engineers put it in respect of the Manchurian Operation in general: The period of monsoon rains, coinciding with the hostilities, caused a sharp rise in river levels and created swamps on their floodplains. Overcoming these floodplains often became a more difficult task than crossing the rivers themselves.96 Fortunately, no enemy resistance was encountered during this passage.97 The first detachments, two infantry battalions, exited the wetland between 11:00 and 12:00 hours after struggling through around 5km of bog, and moved on the first of the fortified villages, Little Hunangan, mounting an attack at 13:00 hours.98 Surrounded by a 1m-thick earthen rampart, with an anti-tank ditch and barbed wire obstacles further out, there were five machine-gun bunkers connected by trenches and tunnels defending the place. There was a further machine-gun nest atop a 36m-tall watchtower, and eliminating this was a

stalin’s war on japan - Press

74

Stalin’s War on Japan

priority. The whole site was defended by a company-strength Japanese unit.99 The opening 15-minute bombardment had had little or no effect on any of these defences, against which the lightly armed infantry could not prevail.100 Kuzmin radioed back for artillery support from across the river, which was provided, but this again proved to be of no avail against the well-protected defenders.101 Direct fire support was not available given that tanks and heavy armoured vehicles got hopelessly bogged in the morass through which the infantry had only advanced with difficulty. The engineers were working on that problem, constructing roads and causeways, but it was a tortuous process that would take several hours at least.102 The tactical problem was solved only when four 76mm guns were dragged by soldiers (and caterpillar tractors, according to Kuzmin) through the swamp and deployed for direct fire at about 15:00 hours. Further artillery followed, but it was only after several hours of bombardment that the village was taken; by 19:00 hours ‘the strongpoint was in our hands’.103 The delay occasioned by the difficulties at Little Hunangan notwithstanding, the 35th Army’s main thrust had made significant progress by the evening of 9 August. To the south resistance had been lighter and more easily overcome and both Little Nangan and Tayangan had been taken. The advanced regiments of the 66th Rifle Division, having advanced some 7km through the morass, were close to the village of Tacho at roughly the same time as Little Hunangan fell. The 125th Tank Brigade had also managed to get ten tanks across the river and through the swamp as far as Little Hunangan, but the vast majority of the armour, and all the wheeled vehicles, were still grappling with the difficulties of getting forward at all.104 Having disposed of the fortified villages, which constituted the main fixed line of defence, both divisions continued to move forward throughout the next day. By that time several tanks and assault guns had managed to traverse the swamp and spearheaded the advance towards Mishan and the railway. The Japanese forces, such as they were, retreated, but the Soviet advance was rendered difficult owing to waterlogged terrain to both front and rear; the majority of the armoured vehicles, all heavy equipment (such as artillery) and all the wheeled transport remained stuck near the Songacha river. Indeed, Zakhvatayev withdrew one of his two tank brigades and sent it into reserve.105 He then attempted to mitigate the problem by utilising a similar method to Beloborodov with the 1st Army: he threw men at it.106 Such redeployment obviously involved a reduction in terms of numbers at the cutting edge, where in any event the forward elements were beginning to suffer a fuel shortage. Supply was extemporised on 9 August by hand-carrying small cans forward. This was improved upon the following day by loading some 16 tonnes of fueldrums onto bridging pontoons, and then using caterpillar tractors to tow them through the swamp.107 Despite these measures, fuel shortages seriously

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

75

hampered the tanks and self-propelled guns of the advanced detachments; at about noon on 11 August these had to shut down. Enough fuel for just four tanks and six assault guns was brought forward over the next several hours, which allowed the advance to continue, albeit against minimal enemy resistance. At 13:00 hours on 12 August, having advanced some 30–35km from their jumping-off points, these reduced detachments reached and captured Mishan.108 The Hulin-Mishan railway line and road had been cut. Whilst the main thrust had been fighting through the wetlands, the right flank of the 35th Army – the 264th Rifle Division, plus the 109th Fortified and 8th Field Fortified Regions – had assaulted across the Ussuri river. The objective, as stated, was the isolation of the Hutou fortified region before an advance to link up with the main thrust. Indeed, given that speed was of the essence, the intent was not to get involved in a protracted fight over the fortified region but rather for the main force to bypass it and leave units behind to isolate it. The task of reducing the area in detail could then be undertaken afterwards as necessary. As with the main thrust, the initial assault was preceded by a short 15-minute artillery bombardment of the Manchukuo side of the Ussuri.109 Immediately this lifted, the guns switched to heavy shelling of the Hutou fortifications to the rear. The Japanese responded in kind, a reaction which included utilising their Type 7 300mm howitzers and the 410mm coastal artillery howitzer to fire on the Soviet railway and, in the latter case, the bridge across the Bolshaya Ussurka river. This was, of course, a waste of time in operational terms. Nevertheless around a hundred rounds of monster ordnance were fired at the bridge, which damaged it but failed to bring it down. Given that the huge rounded structure housing the howitzer was some 24m in diameter and about 15m high, it is unsurprising that it was a major target for counter-battery fire. Accordingly, it eventually received thirty-six direct hits from twenty-four 203mm howitzers, comprising the attackers’ Artillery Destruction Group,110 which pierced the 2.8m-thick dome and put the weapon out of action.111 An aerial assault was also carried out by forty-nine Ilyushin Il-4 medium bombers, escorted by fifty fighters, which bombarded positions in the fortified area for 2 hours.112 The Type 90 railway gun also fired on enemy positions, but was destroyed before it could be captured during the Soviet advance.113 The 264th Rifle Division, plus elements from the two Fortified Regions, had successfully crossed to the western bank of the Ussuri by 11:00 hours on 9 August. By the end of that day the division (less one regiment) and the 8th Field Fortified Region had moved forward and cut the Hutou-Hulin railway and associated road.114 The remaining regiment, along with the 109th Fortified Region and the combat engineer assault groups, meanwhile contained the fortified area and began systematically reducing it. The town of

stalin’s war on japan - Press

76

Stalin’s War on Japan

Hutou had fallen to the advancing 264th Division by the night of 10 August, and Hulin was taken two days later.115 The left, southern, flank of the First Far Eastern Front was formed by the 25th Army commanded by Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov, a former corps commander in that army who had been transferred to the west. He had gained significant experience as the commander of the 6th Guards Army,116 leading it at the Battle of Kursk, during offensive operations near Leningrad and Novgorod, and in Operation Bagration.117 The decision concerning his transfer back to, and command of, the 25th Army was personally conveyed by no less a figure than Stalin, who also consented to him assigning officers of his choice from the 6th Guards Army to his new command.118 The task Chistyakov and the 25th Army were set to perform was, in a similar vein to that of the 35th Army, designated as auxiliary to the First Far Eastern Front’s main attack. It was nevertheless operationally important and ambitious in scope, comprising two axes of advance. The northern would advance westwards to cover the 5th Army’s left flank by isolating the Tungning fortified region and seizing the city of the same name. It would then move forward to take the city of Wangqing (Wangching), possession of which would cut Japanese railway communications between Korea and Manchukuo. The left flank, in furtherance of the operational objective of dismembering the Kwantung Army, would move south-west and into northern Korea. Doing so would further disrupt Japanese road and railway communications and prevent enemy forces in Korea from moving north.119 It would also act in conjunction with the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the object being to take control of the main ports on the east coast of the Korean peninsula, severing the sea lanes of communication with Japan.120 Chistyakov put the main weight of his force into the thrust westwards, utilising the 39th Rifle Corps. This consisted of three rifle divisions (the 40th, 384th and 386th) and the 259th Tank Brigade. The southern attack was assigned to an operational group under the command of Major General Grigoriy Shanin. The core component of his force was the 393rd Rifle Division, but also assigned were the 7th, 106th, 107th, 108th, 110th, 111th and 113th Fortified Regions.121 Four of these would fill the space between the left flank of the main thrust and the right flank of the operational group, and mount attacks on enemy border positions. The 108th and 113th Fortified Regions would deploy on the left flank of the 383rd Rifle Division and advance against the Japanese fortifications across the Tuman (Duman, Tumen) river, which, along with its tributary, the Hunchun, partly delineated the border between Manchukuo, Korea and Russia.122 In total, and including the Fortified Regions, the 25th Army could deploy 1,669 guns and mortars, and 121 tanks and self-propelled guns.123

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

77

Despite this substantial artillery component, which included a battalion of ‘Special-Power’ siege guns for dealing with permanent defences,124 Chistyakov decided to pursue infiltration tactics in a similar manner to those of the 5th Army. He had the same difficulties persuading Meretskov but, as Krylov had done, he eventually prevailed.125 Assault detachments were formed, composed in the main from border guard units that were familiar with the area, and reinforced with combat engineers. Each was 1,000-strong and armed with machine guns, grenades, Finnish knives126 and wire-cutters. The detachments underwent intensive training on mock-ups of the enemy bunkers that were ‘exactly the same as those of the Japanese’.127 The terrain over which the 25th Army would have to advance was essentially similar to that further to the north. Chistyakov characterised it as mainly rocky slopes and taiga-covered hills. He noted that the undergrowth, apart from being thorn-filled, was so tall and dense that daylight was entirely shut out in places. The whole area was infested with mosquitoes and encephalitis ticks, against which he ordered strict precautions, and the roads were ‘very poor’, with settlements rare.128 At midnight on 8 August, in torrential rain, Chistyakov ordered the assault detachments forward to clear passages through the wire on the Soviet side of the border, but not to cross the border until ordered. According to his account, the command to do so from Meretskov came at much the same time: the attack was to begin at 00:10 hours on 9 August.129 By 01:00 all the detachments had successfully crossed the border, got through the wire and minefields, and began attacking enemy strongpoints and disordering their communications. Upon receiving reports of these successes at 02:00 hours, Chistyakov immediately ordered one battalion from each of the rifle divisions to move forward in support.130 As was happening elsewhere, the Japanese were taken completely by surprise; given no time to recover, they were isolated in their fortifications, which were then attacked. By the early morning of 9 August the attackers were some 4–6km deep into the fortified area.131 By noon the way was clear to advance the right flank main force, the 39th Rifle Corps spearheaded by the 259th Tank Brigade, towards the town of Dongning some 15–20km beyond the furthest point of advance. Chistyakov had gone forward to observe from the front line. He noted that the town, through which ran the railway to Tuman, was only lightly defended, and ordered the 259th Tank Brigade to storm the place ‘cavalry style’ at high speed. There would be no preliminary artillery or aviation bombardment and infantry elements of the 39th Rifle Corps would follow the tanks.132 Attack aircraft were ordered to wait until the armour was 3–5km outside Dongning, and then overfly the town but not attack it. Chistyakov related how he observed the tanks enter the place and that shooting broke out, although only of short duration. Dongning had not

stalin’s war on japan - Press

78

Stalin’s War on Japan

fallen, however, and enemy resistance began to increase until it became necessary to engage in a street battle. Nevertheless, success in terms of breaching the Tungning fortified area had been achieved: ‘The troops and the border garrisons, who fought directly on the state border line, were defeated. Their remnants were surrounded or scattered along forests and roads.’133 Dealing with these ‘remnants’ was the 384th Rifle Division, which had been detached from the assault. The report from the 25th Army for 9 August stated that: ‘our troops, having broken the enemy’s strong resistance, broken the Japanese reinforced concrete defensive line and advanced 15km . . . thus ended the first day of the offensive’.134 The 7th, 106th, 107th, 110th and 111th Fortified Regions to the south had also made progress in engaging the Japanese positions opposite them, whilst Shanin’s operational group on the far left flank assaulted into northern Korea. The attack had involved a surprise descent on the bridge across the Tumangan river, which was captured intact, and infiltration of the border fortified areas. Several small towns were captured. At the same time the northern Korean ports of Sonbong (Unggi, Yuki), Najin (Rashin, Racin), and Chongjin (Seishin) came under heavy air attack – 616 sorties on 9 and 10 August – from the aviation component of the Pacific Fleet.135 The first two ports were only some 30–40km distant from the border, whilst Chongjin was located around 110km further south. The prospects of rapid success in Korea, and indeed the attainments of the 25th Army as a whole, caused Meretskov to shift the weight of the First Far Eastern Front’s attack on 10 August. He discerned that there was a real possibility of completely isolating enemy forces in Korea and Manchukuo from each other, and of advancing armoured forces onto the Manchurian plain via the left flank of his Front. Accordingly at 17:00 hours on 10 August he subordinated the 17th Rifle Corps, which was advancing on the left flank of the 5th Army, to the 25th Army. The following day he further reinforced Chistyakov, and demonstrated his conviction of where the vital attack route now lay by committing part of the Front reserve, the 88th Rifle Corps, to the 25th Army. Moreover, he ordered the Front’s breakout formation, the 10th Mechanised Corps, to move south to the 25th Army’s operational zone, where the leading units had now advanced up to 45km and were approaching the strategically important city of Wangqing.136 The advance into Korea quickened early on the morning of 12 August when ships of the Vladivostok-based Pacific Fleet approached the coast near Sonbong at dawn. Headed by the frigates EK-7 and EK-9, ex-US Navy ships transferred to the Soviet Fleet under Project Hula,137 this flotilla also included a minesweeper, eight torpedo boats and two patrol boats under the command of Rear Admiral Nikolai Ivanovsky. At 06:00 hours a reconnaissance group of 139 men landed from the torpedo boats and discovered that

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics

79

the garrison, which intelligence had indicated was around 1,000-strong, was nowhere to be seen. The planned bomber strike and the sea-to-shore bombardment by the frigates and minesweeper were called off, and the landing force, the reinforced 75th Battalion of the 13th Marine Brigade, numbering 783 men, landed without opposition.138 Three hours later, at 09:00 hours, leading elements of Shanin’s operational group, in the shape of the 393rd Rifle Division (less one infantry regiment), arrived, the infantry by lorry. Having passed through a corridor cut through the border defensive zone by the 113th Fortified Region, their journey had taken about 3 hours and was unopposed.139 The divisional commander left one of his battalions to garrison Sonbong and hurried the rest of his command south towards Najin, a distance of some 18km. Around 5km north-east of the town they encountered a Japanese unit defending a pass through the hills, and deployed to fight. The enemy force was actually a rear-guard covering the withdrawal of Japanese forces from Najin to Chongjin.140 They had, though, already been outflanked. Between 09:00 and 11:00 hours a force led by the frigate EK-5,141 consisting of two minesweepers, four submarine chasers, four patrol and two torpedo boats under the command of Captain E. Poltavsky, had put ashore a landing force at Najin. It was soon established that there were no Japanese in the city, although it was learned from local residents that about a regiment of their infantry remained in the hills nearby. There were also small units, amounting to some 200 officers and men, equipped with heavy machine guns located on two islands, Taecho-do and Socho-do, in the entrance to Najin Bay. These fired at the invaders, but proved to be only of nuisance value.142 The successful amphibious operations against Sonbong and Najin, combined with the rapid advance of Shanin’s operational group, rapidly paved the way for exploitation using similar methods at Chongjin, which was an important industrial centre and the home of a Japanese naval base. In all of its operations, Marshal Kirill Meretskov’s First Far Eastern Front had successfully employed techniques suited to the conduct of deep operations in terrain largely considered impassable by the defenders. This feat, as Colonel General Chistyakov was to soon inform a defeated opponent, had largely been achieved by utilising ‘Suvorov’s tactics’.143 This was a simplistic interpretation, no doubt, but the results meant that in just two or three days the theoretically powerful fortified areas on Manchukuo’s eastern frontier had been rendered useless one way or another. As was the case with the TransBaikal Front attacking from the west, the way was now open for exploitation of these early successes.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 7

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars In the first three days . . . the [Second] Far Eastern Front, in conjunction with ships of the Amur Flotilla, successfully crossed the Amur and Ussuri and completely liberated the entire right bank from the Japanese . . . The seizure of large bridgeheads at the mouth of the Sungari and in the area of Blagoveshchensk created favourable conditions for the advance to Harbin . . . whilst the Amur Flotilla supported the 15th Army advancing along the Sungari.1 General Maxim Purkayev’s Second Far Eastern Front featured a wide dispersion of forces, as already noted, with each component assigned its own operational mission and axis of advance. Purkayev had extensive experience in the west, having been both an army and a Front commander in that theatre, but he had been an ‘easterner’ since April 1942 when he took up the command of what was then the Far Eastern Front. His appointment to head the Second Far Eastern Front dated from 5 August 1945.2 Though commanding the smallest of the three Fronts involved in the Manchurian operation, Purkayev could nevertheless field some 337,096 men over a total frontage of 2,130km.3 The Front contained three armies (the 2nd, 15th and 16th) and an operational group consisting of the 5th Rifle Corps. The active sections of this vast line were, however, only some 520km long and offensive action would be taken selectively in only a few areas, the designated main thrust being that by the 15th Army along the course of the Sungari (Songhua, Sunggari) river.4 The object of the exercise was to fix those Japanese forces in the north of Manchukuo, and thus prevent them from being transferred south. The commander of the 15th Army , Lieutenant General Stepan Mamonov, had spent the war in the east, so he knew the terrain well.5 It was, by any standards, forbidding. The Sungari rises in the area bordering Korea and flows eastward through the city of Harbin, where it is joined by a tributary, the Hulan, before flowing eastward and then north-eastward. It passes between the southern end of the Lesser Khingan (Xiao Hinggan) Range and the northern extremity of the Changbai Mountains, a gap of some 150km,

stalin’s war on japan - Press

82

Stalin’s War on Japan

Initial moves: the Second Far Eastern Front. (# Charles Blackwood)

before emerging into the ‘flat and marshy terrain’ of the Amur river valley, where it joins that river. It is navigable by ships weighing up to 1,000 tonnes as far as Harbin, although it is frozen from late November until March. Maximum flow is reached in the summer, as a consequence of thawing mountain snows and heavy rainfall. This combination causes frequent flooding, leading to great devastation of the surrounding areas, including the few rudimentary roads.6 Mamonov’s ultimate target was the city of Harbin, which lay approximately 250–300km upstream. There, if all went as expected, the 15th Army would join forces with the First Far Eastern Front. He would, though, first have to get his army across the Amur river, which formed the border between the Soviet Union and Manchukuo. The course of the Sungari was an obvious invasion route, and so permanent fortifications had been constructed at various places along its length. These would have to be overcome if the advance were to progress from Tongjiang to Fujin, and then on to Jiamusi (Kiamusze) and Harbin.7 Supporting this difficult riverine operation were formations of the Amur Flotilla, led by Rear Admiral Neon Antonov. Appointed on 23 June 1945,

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars

83

Antonov had previously led the Onega Military Flotilla during the Soviet– Finnish (Continuation) War of 1941–44 and thus had extensive combat experience.8 The Amur Flotilla was a significant force, with around 200 warships of various types. These had been augmented by mobilising over a hundred non-military shipping vessels, which were modified as per requirements, together with their crews. The latter had received appropriate training before the start of hostilities.9 Organisationally, the flotilla was divided into four numbered brigades and several separate units. The latter included the previously mentioned separate detachment of armoured boats on Lake Khanka. Based at Khabarovsk, at the confluence of the Amur and Ussuri rivers, where the commander and his headquarters were located, the flotilla had a network of minor bases on the Amur river and its tributaries. In operational terms, and for the duration of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, it was mainly subordinated to Purkayev’s Second Far Eastern Front. Two of its four brigades – the 1st and 2nd under Captain V.A. Krinov and Captain L.B. Tankevich respectively – were specifically assigned to the Sungari operation. This force included six monitors, four gunboats, twelve armoured boats (dubbed ‘river tanks’ because they were fitted with one or two tank turrets10) and ten patrol boats.11 The core of the 15th Army consisted of three rifle divisions, the 34th, 361st and 388th. Also attached were the 4th and 102nd Fortified Regions. The requirement to tackle permanent fortifications meant a large artillery component: five gun, two mortar, one howitzer, two anti-tank and two Guards mortar (Katyusha) regiments, totalling 1,433 guns/howitzers and mortars.12 In addition, Colonel General Pavel Zhigarev’s 10th Air Army committed nearly 500 aircraft, 45 per cent of its entire force, to support the advance.13 Conversely, and because the terrain was largely unsuitable for armour, only three tank brigades (the 165th, 171st and 203rd) and one brigade and two regiments of tank destroyers (the 21st, 1632nd and 1633rd respectively), with a total of 164 tanks and self-propelled guns, were attached.14 At 01:00 hours on 9 August the Amur Flotilla’s 1st Brigade, under cover of a dark night and torrential rain, crossed the Amur. It entered the Sungari and landed a battalion of infantry on Tatar Island, some 10km upstream from where it joins the Amur. There was little or no opposition and by 08:00 hours the place was secured, as were several of the nearby large islands. The main object of this operation was to ensure that the Japanese Sungarian Flotilla, ordinarily based at Fujin and Jiamusi, could not pass and get into the Amur to disrupt operations there.15 With the mouth of the Sungari safeguarded, the task of ferrying the 15th Army commenced. On the right flank of the assault the 34th Rifle Division began to concentrate on the left bank of the Sungari,16 while on the left

stalin’s war on japan - Press

84

Stalin’s War on Japan

flank the 388th Rifle Division moved to the south bank of the Amur southwest of Khabarovsk, both these forces being supported by the 2nd Brigade. Meanwhile the 1st Brigade continued its work throughout the night and into the next day, landing elements of the 361st Rifle Division and the 171st Tank Brigade between the mouth of the Sungari and Tatar Island. There were some fierce, though relatively small-scale, firefights with Japanese defensive positions in the sectors of all three divisions but the Soviets prevailed at all points.17 The initial focus of operations was Tongjiang in the 361st Division’s sector. It was located around 4km from the confluence of the rivers, and reconnaissance and intelligence had established that many Japanese forces based along the south bank of the Amur had withdrawn there. By midnight on 9 August three reinforced battalions had been landed, and this ferrying operation continued at maximum speed. By the evening of 10 August ships, barges and pontoons had delivered the main forces and rear echelons of the division to the right bank of the Amur. The attack on Tongjiang had not waited for them. The morning of 10 August had seen armoured ships of the 1st Brigade approach the port, whilst leading elements of the 361st Rifle Division drove south through difficult conditions. The roads were flooded and movement on them was rendered very difficult. Under these conditions it was the vessels of the Amur Flotilla that perforce fulfilled the role of advanced detachments.18 Sources differ slightly on what happened next. Strong opposition had been expected, but according to Zakharov et al. (1973), the Japanese garrison had decamped to Fujin and the vessels were met ‘with white and red flags by the inhabitants of the city’.19 In contrast, Vnotchenko says that the force approaching by land met with fierce resistance, occasioning a ‘two-hour bloody battle’. The Soviets won this battle, with the result that most of the garrison were killed, whilst some surrendered and the rest fled.20 It seems possible that both accounts are correct: that the Japanese countered the attack on land but not that via the river. In any event, the fall of Tongjiang was an important Soviet gain; with the mouth of the Sungari secure, the 15th Army was able to concentrate unhindered, its lines of communication impeded only by the difficult terrain. There was, though, no time to be resting on laurels. Within three hours of the taking of Tongjiang, Mamonov, at the direction of the Front commander, updated his orders to the 361st Rifle Division, the 171st Tank Brigade and the 1st Brigade of the Amur Flotilla. They were to advance on Fujin, smash the fortified zone defending it and take possession of the place by 11:00 hours the following day. This was, by any standards, a bold undertaking. It would involve the terrestrial element traversing around 60km of flooded ground, extemporising coordination with the riverine element in order to achieve

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars

85

a successful amphibious operation and reducing a heavily fortified area, all within some 22 hours.21 The fortified area, the earliest works of which dated from 1938, was about 30km wide and 12km deep. Divided into two zones, one encompassing the city itself and the other on high ground to the east, it contained 156 pillboxes and bunkers of various construction surrounded by some 50km of anti-tank ditches. The permanent garrison was estimated to be in the region of 1,200, although these had been strengthened by the forces which had withdrawn from Tongjiang and the border areas. For this mission, the ships of the 1st Brigade were split into two groups. The first group, the reconnaissance detachment, was based around the old but capable monitor Sun Yat-sen with a battalion of infantry aboard, plus three ‘river tanks’ carrying an assault company and six minesweepers. Its task was to reconnoitre the area and put ashore the troops in order for them to act in conjunction with the advancing land force. Covering the reconnaissance force during this operation was the second detachment, which comprised two monitors, Lenin and Red East, plus three armoured boats.22 Aboard Lenin was a second infantry battalion. Those men on the various ships received only an hour of training in how to rapidly disembark and in what order so as to be combat-ready when they hit the shore. A further two battalions of infantry and an assault company rode, literally, with the 171st Tank Brigade, which had already departed by 16:30 hours when the first river-borne detachment left. The second followed some three hours later. The distance to Fujin by water was computed to be slightly less than 70km, but what was not known was whether the river had been mined, or if the aids to navigation had survived. In fact, no mines had been laid and the buoys and signs remained in place, which, of course, greatly facilitated the short voyage. At 22:00 hours on 10 August the reconnaissance detachment reached a position some 37km north of Fuchin, where there was a village on the right bank. There the rifle battalion disembarked from Sun Yat-sen, whilst the armoured boats continued on towards Fujin. They were able to ascertain the channel was mine-free but in the darkness they could not gain any information on Japanese defences at or around the town. It worked the other way, too: the defenders were unaware of the armoured boats. They returned safely and reported their findings to Oganezov. He decided that the battalion which had gone ashore should rendezvous with the force advancing overland and attack Fujin from the north-east on the morning of 11 August. Simultaneously, the river-borne force would conduct an amphibious assault, thus conducting a two-pronged strike. The water-borne attack developed at 07:00 hours when the armoured boats of the 1st Brigade approached Fujin at c. 20 knots. The three monitors, which

stalin’s war on japan - Press

86

Stalin’s War on Japan

could only manage half that speed, followed. Some 20 minutes later the boats were alongside the waterfront, where they were met with artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire, as all the Japanese weapons located along the promenade and in the vicinity of the city joined in. Though heavy, this fire was ineffective; none of the Japanese weapons was over 75mm calibre, which meant they failed to penetrate the decks and sides of the armoured vessels. Gunfire from the monitors, combined with Katyusha rockets from the armoured boats, was successful, however, in silencing the waterside defences; according to Soviet sources, they destroyed over twenty gun and mortar emplacements and killed a large number of the enemy. The artillery battle lasted approximately an hour, at the end of which the infantry and assault teams landed and secured a bridgehead. During the course of the landing the 10th Air Army provided cover in the shape of one or two pairs of Yak-9 aircraft. However, once it became apparent that enemy aircraft would not attempt to interfere, air support was withdrawn. On the ground it soon became apparent that, even with the efficient artillery support of the flotilla called down by liaison teams, the infantry were not strong enough to take the town. Indeed, and despite being reinforced with naval personnel, they survived counterattacks by Japanese and Manchukuoan infantry only with difficulty. The cavalry, as it were, arrived at about 09:00 hours in the shape of the leading elements of the 171st Tank Brigade and their tank riders, plus the rifle battalion put ashore the previous evening. These reinforcements, particularly the arrival of the armour, to which the enemy had no real answer, turned the battle round. The defenders withdrew from Fujin itself into its ‘citadel’, a fortified camp in the south-western sector of the city, and to the second fortified zone some 6–8km to the east (dubbed ‘Mount Vakhulishan’ by Soviet sources).23 Despite capturing the city, the Soviets’ repeated attempts to take the fortified camp failed. The available forces, even with the several tanks that had reached Fujin, were simply not strong enough to overcome the defences. They did, though, hold their own against battalion-strength counterattacks launched during the afternoon and evening of 11 August. Renewed assaults on 12 August, with heavy artillery support from the three monitors, also failed to overcome the enemy. It was only when the main forces of the 361st Infantry Division and the 171st Tank Brigade arrived, after struggling for two days through flooded terrain, that the Soviets were able to prevail. Around noon on 13 August Fujin’s fortified zone finally fell, although the Japanese still retained control of Mount Vakhulishan. Fujin was an important gain, giving the Soviet forces command of the river to that point, and the headquarters of both the 15th Army and the Amur Flotilla arrived there by ship on the same day. Mamonov and Antonov

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars

87

ordered an immediate advance (both overland and by water) on Jiamusi, some 150km distant, with the objective of taking it by 15 August. Harbin, the ultimate goal, lay some 380km beyond. From now on, the main efforts of the Amur Flotilla were aimed at assisting the 15th Army in its advance along the Sungari.24 The flotilla’s 3rd Brigade, which had as its core the two 1905–07 Buryatclass gunboats Proletarian and Mongol, remained in support of the 5th Rifle Corps’ operational group.25 Under Mamonov’s deputy, Major General Ivan Pashkov, the group was formed around two rifle divisions, the 35th and 390th, plus the 172nd Tank Brigade. Also attached were two separate artillery regiments, an anti-tank artillery brigade and two anti-aircraft artillery divisions.26 Pashkov’s mission was to assault south-westwards across the Ussuri from around the Bikin area, pass through enemy defences at Raohe (Jaoho) opposite and advance through mountainous terrain some 300km to Bolizhen (Boli) via Baoqing (Paoching). At Bolizhen, if all went to schedule, it would link up with the First Far Eastern Front’s 35th Army advancing from the east.27 At 01:00 hours on 9 August assault units and reconnaissance detachments successfully crossed the Ussuri under the cover of a 30–60 minute artillery barrage and secured a bridgehead to the north of Raohe. Reinforcing this lodgement took some time given the limited means available: the carrying capacity of one ferry (three bridging pontoons fixed together) was 60 tonnes. This meant a maximum load of two T-34 or six T-26 tanks. Permutations on this theme allowed one T-34 tank and two T-26 tanks, or one T-34 tank and three loaded ZIS-5 3-tonne (payload) trucks. Given that the maximum speed of these extemporised transports was 10kph, and that the current in the overspilled river was 6kph, then a trip across and back which had been estimated as taking 1.5–2.5 hours frequently took around twice as long. Indeed, it was two to three days before the 172nd Tank Brigade, which was allocated only four ferries instead of the planned fourteen, was across in its entirety.28 These difficulties, combined with the paucity of decent roads on the enemy side of the river, meant that around 75 per cent of the engineer support allocated to the 5th Rifle Corps was involved in the crossing operations and road building. The remainder were utilised for breaking through the fortified zones. This was quickly achieved, meaning that on 11 August advanced elements commenced their drive on Baoqing. Indeed, by the time the rear elements of the 172nd Tank Brigade had crossed the river, the combat units were up to 150–200km ahead and, given the poor state of the roads, they could not be easily caught up.29 Once through the fortified zones there was no enemy resistance; the advance was made arduous only by the dire road conditions, meaning Baoqing was not reached until 14 August.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

88

Stalin’s War on Japan

Some 400km to the west the 2nd Army,30 attacking from the area around Blagoveshchensk and under the command of Lieutenant General Makar Terekhin, was experiencing similar problems. Terekhin was an easterner, appointed to the command of the 2nd Army in March 1941, and had no recent combat experience. He had last fought in the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–1940 as commander of a tank corps, and before that at Khalkhin-Gol.31 The plan tasked the 2nd Army with launching twin attacks by two operational groups. The main thrust – by two rifle divisions (the 3rd and 12th), plus two tank brigades (the 73rd and 74th) – would cross the Amur at Konstantinovka, some 85km downstream of Blagoveshchensk, before moving southwards towards the Sunwu fortified zone.32 Having reduced this, it would develop the offensive towards Bei’an and, ultimately, Qiqihar. The auxiliary thrust by the 396th Rifle Division, the 368th Mountain Rifle Regiment and the 258th Tank Brigade would assault across the river from Blagoveshchensk directly at Heihe on the opposite bank. It would then move to defeat the fortified area at Aihuizhen,33 some 20km to the south, once the city was taken. It would then advance via Nenjiang towards Qiqihar.34 Allocated to support the 2nd Army, particularly given the need to reduce fortified areas, were five gun/howitzer artillery regiments and two mortar regiments, plus one Katyusha and a tank destroyer regiment.35 The amphibious portion of the assault was given to the 4th (See-Bureisk) Brigade of the Amur Flotilla, based at Malaya Sazanka on the Zeya river,36 under Captain Maxim Voronkov.37 Subordinated to it for the attack was the separate Sretensk Division, based at Sretensk on the Shilka river.38 The operations of the 2nd Army were not synchronised with those of the other formations in the Second Far Eastern Front, nor with those of the other Fronts. Indeed, it was only on 10 August that Purkayev directed that the attack should begin the next day. This meant bringing the main forces forward some 20–80km from bases where, in accordance with the precepts of maskirovka, they had remained concealed from the enemy. Not that the 2nd Army and the Amur Flotilla had been entirely quiescent: detachments of troops had conducted reconnaissance and seized islands on the Amur, whilst Heihe had been brought under fire from both artillery on the opposite bank and ships on the river.39 Well aware that it would take time to transport his army across the river, Terekhin created forward detachments to spearhead the operation. For the main thrust he assigned this task to a battalion of the 74th Tank Brigade, plus the 1628th Tank Destroyer Regiment deploying SU-100 self-propelled guns, a rifle company and an artillery regiment. The auxiliary thrust was given a battalion of the 258th Tank Brigade, a rifle battalion and a mortar regiment.40 Even before these could be concentrated, and on receiving intelligence to the effect that the Japanese were withdrawing southwards, Terekhin launched an

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars

89

amphibious attack on Heihe using the troops that were available. With the assistance of the Amur Flotilla, these landed at 12:00 hours on 10 August, to meet minimal and unorganised resistance. By the end of the day Heihe was in Soviet hands.41 Whilst securing such a major bridgehead, plus its shipping, was obviously an important gain, a significant disadvantage had accrued to the 2nd Army. In attacking late and conducting pre-assault bombardments, any element of surprise had been lost. This allowed the Japanese to prepare and put into action their plan for defending against an invasion via Heihe. As originally drawn up, this would involve garrison units along the river disrupting the crossing but, as noted above, this part was abandoned. What wasn’t forsaken, however, was the reinforcement of positions further south. The Kwantung Army had calculated that any advance would have to pass along the lines of railways and roads through the mountains. These manoeuvres would be checked at the fortified zones specifically constructed to thwart such an approach.42 This could only mean heavy fighting, a situation exacerbated by the slow rate at which the 2nd Army was built up (the process was only completed on 16 August). Meanwhile units that had landed were committed to battle piecemeal. The advanced detachments reached the enemy fortified areas on 12 August, and broke through the forward works at Sunwu the next day.43 The continuing bad weather and poor state of the roads made movement extremely difficult, however, and the struggle to defeat the fortified areas, where the enemy showed ‘fierce resistance’ and repeatedly attempted counterattacks, continued through 14 and 15 August.44 As reinforcements arrived to relieve them, the mechanised advanced detachments, with heavy engineering support, bypassed the fortified zones and continued along their axes of advance.45 Many of the problems that afflicted the 2nd Army’s operations also applied to the 16th Army under Major General Leonty Cheremisov. This was even further detached from the other forces in the Front, being deployed in northern Sakhalin. Though both Cheremisov and his command had remained in the east throughout the Great Patriotic War, the 16th Army’s primary component, the 56th Rifle Corps, was commanded by a westerner, Major General Anatoli Diakonov, who was appointed in March 1945.46 Sakhalin had much in common with several of the Manchukuoan border areas already described. It was dreadful terrain for mechanised warfare, exacerbated by the fact that the only feasible invasion route south from the border at the 50th Parallel was along the course of the Poronai (Poronay) river. This was more or less in the centre of the island, flowed southward and was bounded to east and west by forested mountain ranges and countless swamps and bogs.47 Naturally enough, it was across this potential invasion route that both sides had constructed strong fortification networks, the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

90

Stalin’s War on Japan

collective name for the Japanese works being the Koton, or Haramitog to the Japanese, fortified region.48 They were constructed in three interlinked layers, their western flanks anchored in the mountain range and their eastern in the wooded and swampy river valley.49 Occupying a frontage of some 12km, and with a depth of up to 30km, the permanent defences contained over 350 bunkers, pillboxes, artillery positions and similar, protected by an extensive network of infantry trenches, anti-tank ditches, minefields and barbed wire.50 All were rendered difficult to locate by virtue of being constructed in heavy forest and brush. Whilst enough of this had been cleared so as to deliver defensive fire efficiently, sufficient remained to effectively obscure them from an attacker.51 These were the defences that the 16th Army would be forced to confront without, as per the 2nd Army, any advantage accruing from surprise; the order to start the offensive was given on 10 August and it began the next day at 07:45 hours.52 If the advantage of surprise had been lost, there was at least something in the way of compensation as the Soviets outflanked the defences along the 50th Parallel by way of amphibious landings to their rear. Conducting such operations was the task of the Northern Pacific Flotilla commanded by Vice Admiral Vladimir Andreev.53 The Northern Pacific Flotilla’s amphibious warfare capabilities, although miniscule in comparison to that of their allies,54 was nevertheless of consequence. Indeed, the flotilla was ordered by Admiral Ivan Yumashev, commander of the Pacific Fleet, to initiate attacks on both south Sakhalin and the Kurils on 10 August. The targets on Sakhalin were the ports of Shakhtyorsk, Uglegorsk, Korsakov and Kholmsk, which were known to the Japanese as Toro, Esutoru, Otomari and Maoka respectively. Taking and holding these ports would isolate the Japanese garrison on the island and get behind those forces fighting on the border.55 Whilst the amphibious operations were being organised, the aviation component of the flotilla, commanded by Major General Georgi Dziuba, attacked and reconnoitred the ports in question on a daily basis, starting on 10 August.56 This surveillance revealed that the harbours at Shakhtyorsk and Uglegorsk were unprotected by either coastal artillery or airfields, and nor was there any sign of army or naval units in their vicinity. The inference drawn, according to Gelfond, was that the Japanese didn’t consider the Northern Pacific Flotilla capable of carrying out amphibious operations.57 Clandestine investigations by torpedo boat on the night of 13 August, conducted in person by the landing commander, Lieutenant Colonel Karam Tavkhutdinov of the 365th Marine Battalion, largely confirmed the information.58 Assault from the sea was a practical proposition. Meanwhile, at the 50th Parallel the frontal attack had run into trouble owing to a combination of weather, terrain and the strength of the Japanese

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars

91

defences. Indeed, it had turned into an infantry slog with a distinct resemblance to battles of an earlier era. An account of the fighting on 12 August by a member of the 9th Rifle Company of the 165th Rifle Regiment gives a flavour of the conditions. The company was approaching a small river around 10km south of the 50th Parallel when they came under powerful machine-gun fire from: a large number of bunkers, located on the south side of the river in a checkerboard pattern. Our soldiers lay down and began to dig in. When the 3rd Infantry Battalion arrived and took up battle formation the tanks went for a breakthrough. However, they did not achieve the necessary result – since 8 August there have been heavy rains and the rivers had overflowed their banks. Tanks could advance only along the road . . . when two tanks were damaged, the attack stopped [. . .] After a rare artillery bombardment (the ammunition had run out and the transport was stuck in traffic jams), the infantry launched an attack . . . they reached the river, but there was no possibility to advance further . . . with 30–40 metres of ground in front of the bunkers swept by continuous enemy fire. Tankers and artillerymen could not help, it only remained to rely on the ‘Mosinka’ (Mosin’s rifle), grenades and ingenuity.59 This ‘ingenuity’ consisted of filling sandbags with sand and pebbles from the bottom of the river then crawling forward, pushing the bags ahead, towards the nearest bunker. When soldiers died, others took their place. The object of the exercise was to block the bunker embrasures with the sandbags to suppress defensive fire, and then capture the work. This endeavour eventually succeeded and the position was held despite repeated Japanese counterattacks. Soviet casualties were heavy, amounting to some 50 per cent of those involved.60 The infantry also suffered mightily from the presence of ‘cuckoos’: the term used by the Red Army for snipers, their rifles fitted with telescopic sights.61 Working in teams of two, and wearing camouflaged clothing, they concealed themselves in the abundant foliage with the aim of picking off officers in particular. The latter responded by covering their epaulets with grass and the like. Degteryov records how the fight against the ‘cuckoos’ was waged by specially assigned fighters armed with light machine guns, as well as Soviet snipers.62 Whilst it was certain that the 16th Army must eventually prevail, particularly so with amphibious support, what was less definite was that it would do so quickly. So whilst Vnotchenko’s claim that ‘the results of the first days of the offensive clearly showed the ability of the Soviet Army to defeat in a short time the army of Japanese imperialists in Manchuria’ is certainly valid, it

stalin’s war on japan - Press

92

Stalin’s War on Japan

cannot be said to apply to Sakhalin.63 What had become clear during those early days, and by 14–15 August at the latest, was that the great defensive carapace erected at gigantic cost and effort around Manchukuo had been comprehensively pierced on all fronts. The Kwantung Army, under attack everywhere, was unable to defend anywhere. It now lay exposed to further blows from an enemy it simply could not deal with. The opening phase of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation had proven to be a brilliant success. Now was the time to exploit it, with time becoming the operative word.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 8

‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’1 On 15 August the commander and all personnel of the Area Army Headquarters heard the broadcast of the Imperial Rescript announcing the end of hostilities. They were so stunned that they stood speechless, weeping bitterly at the thought that their negligence of duty as subjects of the Emperor had caused defeat, for which they justly deserved death.2 By 15 August the mechanised forces of the three Soviet Fronts were moving from the periphery into the Manchurian Plain and, though in much smaller numbers, into northern Korea. The second stage of the operation, as Vnotchenko phrased it, was under way.3 In operational terms events had moved extremely rapidly since 9 August. The same might be said to have applied at the grand strategic, political, level. Japan’s six-member Supreme War Council (the ‘Big Six’4), an inner cabinet and effectively the executive arm of government since 5 May 1945, had at the time of its formation adopted a policy of ending the war via a Soviet-mediated negotiated settlement short of unconditional surrender.5 In order to persuade Stalin to act as a mediator, Japan was prepared to offer concessions to the Soviet Union in Manchuria, southern Sakhalin, Korea and the northern Kurils. As Hasegawa argues, given that there was increasing friction between the Soviet Union and the western Allies over territories occupied by the Red Army in Eastern Europe, particularly Poland, this policy was not ‘totally unrealistic’.6 It did, though, obviously depend on Soviet neutrality; as one of the first documents the ‘Big Six’ had drawn up in May put it: ‘Soviet entry into the war will deal a death blow to the Empire.’7 Now, in August, that ‘death blow’ had been duly delivered, the policy was in the dust and the Supreme War Council, indeed Japan, had a stark choice: fight to the death, which likely meant ‘a rain of ruin from the air’,8 followed by military occupation (probably by both the US and Soviet Union), with the distinct prospect of national extinction – or accept the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation. At least with the latter the preservation of Japan as a national polity was outlined, but the future status of the Emperor and imperial system was not.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

94

Stalin’s War on Japan

The Supreme War Council met at 11:00 hours (Tokyo time) on 9 August to discuss the Soviet entry into the war. The machinations behind the scenes need not concern us here; suffice to say that Hasegawa provides compelling evidence that it was the Soviet attack, rather than the Hiroshima bomb, which convinced many (but not all) of the leadership that acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation was the only way out.9 Prime Minister Admiral Suzuki opened the meeting by proposing that, in view of both the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, there was little choice but to accept the terms on offer.10 This was met with what has been described as ‘an oppressive silence’ that lasted several minutes until it was broken by Admiral Yonai, the navy minister. He argued that the Potsdam terms could be accepted as they were or with conditions, the latter centring on the preservation of the imperial house, but also encompassing how war crimes were dealt with (Japanese self-prosecution), disarmament (self-disarmament) and occupation (no occupation). General Anami, the army minister, opposed the whole idea entirely. He argued that it was not known if the Americans would continue to use atomic weapons, and that the military situation in Manchukuo was unclear. Japan should fight on. It might reasonably be thought that news of the atomic bombing of Nagasaki at 11:02 hours, which reached the meeting 30 minutes after the event, would have weakened his case somewhat. Seemingly this was not so; the Nagasaki bomb reportedly ‘had little impact on the substance of the discussion’. This may have been due to the ongoing devastation of Japan’s urban areas by incendiary attacks.11 As one authority on the subject later put it: ‘That Japanese cities would burn was no secret.’12 Foreign Minister Togo, aware that he, they and the entire Japanese people had been ‘standing at the crossroads of destiny’ before either the Soviet attack or the atomic bombings, argued for acceptance of the terms as laid down in the Potsdam Proclamation. He allowed one condition: a guarantee of the Emperor’s position. Going beyond this, he argued, would be tantamount to rejection, with all that entailed. Indeed, he directly asked the chiefs of staff, General Umezu and Admiral Toyoda, what Japan’s prospects amounted to if the Americans did reject Japan’s conditions. They had to admit that victory was no longer likely, but that it would be possible to repulse any invasion of the homeland. Achieving this would damage the morale of the Americans, and they would then accept terms favourable to Japan. Umezu and Toyoda would, however, accept the Proclamation with the four conditions outlined by Yonai. Togo continued to argue his case; when the meeting adjourned at 13:00 hours disagreement no longer revolved around accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation or not, but whether offering such acceptance should include four conditions or just one. Since attaching four conditions to any supposed acceptance offer was, effectively, opting to continue to fight, then nothing had been resolved.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’

95

The proceedings of the Supreme War Council were secret, or ostensibly so. On this occasion, however, they were disseminated, causing those who advocated peace or war to gather behind their respective leaders. The situation was volatile in the extreme, particularly given the Japanese political tradition of assassinating those perceived to be insufficiently patriotic.13 Again, the various intrigues and behind the scenes manoeuvrings vis-a`-vis hawks and doves will be skated over, but boiled down to the basics there was only one person who could resolve the impasse: Emperor Hirohito himself. The Emperor’s prerogatives were, though, severely constrained in practice by, amongst other things, the bureaucratic inertia of the system and the sheer complexity of the governmental decision-making process, with its everpresent conflict between civil-military and naval-army viewpoints. Hirohito, in league with his closest adviser Kido Koichi, ‘one of the grayer eminences of Showa politics until 1945’,14 had by this time become convinced of the need for peace at almost any price. This, however, could not be openly stated; there was a very real possibility of a coup by junior army officers should they perceive signs of ‘weakness’ amongst the leadership that ‘advised’ the Emperor. Following a full cabinet meeting that afternoon, during which General Anami revealed that army Intelligence had ascertained that the Americans possessed a hundred atomic bombs and the next target was Tokyo,15 Prime Minister Suzuki went to the Imperial Palace to report its inconclusive16 results to Kido.17 The latter informed Suzuki that the Emperor had consented to hold an Imperial conference that night which, according to Hasegawa, was the first time that the prime minister received a clear signal that Hirohito supported the ‘one condition’ acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation. The subsequent conference, according to Kido’s diary, ‘was held in the presence of His Majesty in the room attached to the library from [11:50 hours on 9 August to 02:20 hours on 10 August].’18 The attendees comprised the six members of the Supreme War Council, plus Baron Hiranuma Kiichiro (president of the privy council), General Hasunuma Shigeru (the Emperor’s chief aide-de-camp) and four high-ranking officials. As is well known, it ended with Hirohito enunciating his ‘sacred decision’ at around 02:00 hours: he supported accepting the Potsdam Proclamation with only one condition. This was swiftly translated into documentary form and sent to the Japanese minister in Switzerland, who then asked the Swiss Political Department to advise the government of the United States of America of its contents via Max Grassli, the charge´ d’affaires ad interim based in the Swiss legation in Washington DC. The operative portion stated that: The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms enumerated in the joint declaration which was issued at Potsdam . . . with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.19

stalin’s war on japan - Press

96

Stalin’s War on Japan

This message clearly denoted that the end of the war was at least coming into sight. Whilst the US government was considering its response, Secretary of State James Byrnes looked ahead. He tasked a committee, which had been set up in 1944 to deal with postwar questions, with formulating a plan for joint Soviet-American occupation of Korea.20 In a decision that was to prove of some consequence, on the night of 10 August the task was delegated to two army colonels, Charles H. Bonesteel and Dean Rusk. There are two versions of what happened, both by Rusk. His second account put it thus: Using a National Geographic map, we looked just north of Seoul for a convenient dividing line but could not find a natural geographical line. We saw instead the thirty-eighth parallel and decided to recommend that.21 Korea had long been an area of interest, and a source of potential conflict, between Japan and Imperial Russia. In 1896 and 1903 they had engaged in secret negotiations about dividing the peninsula, coincidentally along the 38th or 39th Parallels.22 Russian interest at that time mainly centred around obtaining ice-free ports, and if the Russian political system had changed since then, the geo-strategical situation hadn’t. The Americans recognised this. A State Department paper of October 1943 offered the following analysis: Korea may appear to offer a tempting opportunity . . . to strengthen enormously the economic resources of the Soviet Far East, to acquire ice-free ports, and to occupy a dominating strategic position in relation to both China and Japan . . . A Soviet occupation of Korea would create an entirely new strategic situation in the Far East, and its repercussions within China and Japan might be far-reaching.23 Rusk and Bonesteel’s scheme passed up the chain of command to emerge unscathed. On 14 August it was signed off by Truman as part of General Order No. 1, the relevant portion of which stated that Japanese forces north of the parallel would surrender to the Soviets, whilst those to the south would do so to the Americans.24 The General Order was promulgated on 15 August, a copy being sent to Stalin, who replied the next day ‘I have nothing against the substance of the order.’25 Rusk later recalled his surprise that the Soviets accepted the 38th Parallel, given that there was little or no chance of any US forces landing on the Korean peninsula at that time: ‘I thought they might insist upon a line further south in view of our respective military positions in the area.’26 However, in what most scholars have, surely correctly, portrayed as an attempt at achieving reciprocal generosity from Truman, Stalin suggested that the order be amended so as to include ‘the northern half of the island of Hokkaido . . . into the region of surrender . . . to Soviet forces’.27 This northern portion, he stated, should be demarcated by a line drawn ‘from

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’

97

the town of Kushiro on the eastern coast . . . to the town of Rumoe (Rumoi) on the western coast . . .’, with both towns included in the occupation area. He went on to point out that ‘Russian public opinion would be gravely offended’ if Russian troops had no occupation area in ‘Japan proper’. He also noted that the order made no mention of the Kurils, and asked that these be included in the area where Soviet forces would take the Japanese surrender. Russian ‘public opinion’ was, of course, whatever Stalin said it was, but his suggestion made perfect sense in the geo-strategic context. Possession of northern Hokkaido would ‘anchor’ the Kuril chain, thus enhancing the security of Soviet sea lines of communication between Vladivostok and the Pacific. For it to be effective, however, such possession would have to be permanent or, at least, very long term because the Soviet dictator perceived a revived Japan in the foreseeable future.28 On this occasion, however, Stalin’s political adroitness failed him. Apart from agreeing in respect of the Kurils, and amending the order to that effect, Truman was having none of it. The President replied that ‘it is my intention and arrangements have been made for the surrender of Japanese forces on all the islands of Japan proper, Hokkaido, Honshu, Shikoku and Kyushu, to General MacArthur’. The latter, he informed Stalin, ‘will employ Allied

Stalin’s territorial ambition, showing his proposed occupation zone in northern Hokkaido. (# Charles Blackwood)

stalin’s war on japan - Press

98

Stalin’s War on Japan

token forces, which of course, includes Soviet forces, in so much of a temporary occupation of Japan proper as he considers it necessary to occupy in order to accomplish our Allied surrender terms’.29 The discussions within Truman’s administration as regards how to respond to Stalin’s suggestion were either not recorded or, if they were, haven’t survived.30 That the wording of the reply had been most carefully considered is, though, self-evident: the Soviet leader would have been unlikely to have missed the implication behind the words ‘temporary occupation’, for example. This episode was, of course, emblematic of a series of profound differences that were emerging between the US and the USSR, and that would peak later. However, if cracks were appearing in the wartime alliance, they were as nothing compared to those fracturing the Japanese regime. We must go back a little. Whilst they waited for the American and Allied reply to their 10 August message, preliminary skirmishing in what Hasegawa has dubbed the ‘battle for the phonographs’ began.31 Even without knowing what the response might be, Kido had concluded on 11 August that the only effective way to impose surrender, certainly on sections of the Japanese military, was for the Emperor himself to directly order it via a widely broadcast Imperial Rescript. Hirohito agreed to record such an order, basically reprising the ‘sacred decision’ he had made to the Imperial Conference, onto a phonographic disk which would then be broadcast over the airwaves by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation.32 This was, of course, kept secret; that Japan had even conditionally accepted the Potsdam Proclamation was anathema to, in particular, hard-line Imperial Army officers. The official answer from the United States, known as the Byrnes Note from the signature it bore, came in the early afternoon of 12 August.33 With regard to the ‘prerogatives’ of the Emperor it had this to say: From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. [. . .] The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people.34 Foreign Minister Togo, his deputy Matsumoto Shunichi and the chief cabinet secretary (effectively deputy prime minister) Sakomizu Hisatsune were the first to consider it. That it failed to address concerns about the status of the Emperor was obvious. It was equally obvious to them that Japan had no choice but to accept it as it was or fight on, although there was a third possibility: that whilst the government, and even the Emperor, might order a surrender, the armed forces, particularly the army, might not accept that

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’

99

order. This was a very real possibility. General Anami opined that the Byrnes Note was unacceptable, and the army general staff drew up a document for presentation to the Supreme War Council. This argued that the conditions in the note should be resolutely rejected, and that the war should go on ‘even at the risk of the extinction of the empire’.35 Some in the military, particularly at junior officer level, had a different idea about thwarting acceptance, and plans for a military coup were set afoot. Led by staff officers, the main protagonists were Colonel Arao Okikatsu, Lieutenant Colonel Shiizaki Jiro, Lieutenant Colonel Takeshita Masahiko, Lieutenant Colonel Ida Masataka, and Major Hatanaka Kenji, all based at the army ministry. Their basic aim was to isolate the Emperor from his unworthy and treacherous advisers, whereupon the monarch would agree to continue the war.36 From 12 to 14 August the plotters attempted to gather support, even attempting to recruit Anami, who was Takeshita’s brother-in-law, into their circle. The war minister’s position was ambiguous: he neither endorsed nor denounced the plot at that time. The Americans were impatient. On the morning of 14 August B-29s flew over Tokyo and dropped leaflets containing the text of both the 10 August message accepting the Potsdam Proclamation with its single condition and the reply, the Byrnes Note. Kido, considering that this might well act as a spur to the military in overthrowing the government, proposed to Hirohito the convening of a combined conference of the Supreme War Council and the cabinet, to reiterate and enforce the decision on acceptance. The Emperor agreed. The incipient insurrection became full blown, and segued into the ‘battle of the phonographs’ after Hirohito recorded his decision to accept the Byrnes Note, and thus order Japan’s surrender. This process began at 23:00 hours on 14 August and was completed shortly before midnight. Two identical disks containing the Emperor’s speech, the ‘Imperial Rescript on the Termination of the Greater East Asia War,’ were made and placed in a safe in the Empress’s office.37 Shortly before, and after all the members of the hastily summoned Supreme War Council and cabinet, crucially including Anami, had signed a copy of the text, telegrams were sent to Japanese diplomats in neutral states for onward transmission to the Allies informing them of Japan’s wish to surrender. The coup d’e´tat began shortly afterwards. Hatanaka shot and killed the commander of the Imperial Guard, Lieutenant General Mori Takeshi, for refusing his support, then forged the dead man’s signature on an order to the Guard to occupy and isolate the Imperial Palace. This they did, allowing the coup leaders to enter the complex at about 01:00 hours and begin searching for the phonographs and Kido. Their intention was, of course, to destroy both. They found neither. That the order to the Imperial Guard had been

stalin’s war on japan - Press

100

Stalin’s War on Japan

forged was soon revealed, and it quickly became evident that the plot was doomed by the failure of any senior officers, above all Anami, to support it. The latter had informed his brother-in-law Takeshita, who had met him at 01:30 hours in hope of enlisting his aid, that ‘As a Japanese soldier, I must obey my Emperor.’ That deference had taken the form of ordering the army leaders to obey as well. At about 05:30 hours, after writing a cryptic note, Anami committed ritual suicide.38 The ‘battle of the phonographs’ had been lost; the coup had failed.39 Accordingly, at noon on 15 August 1945 the voice of the Emperor was heard for the first time by the overwhelming majority of Japanese when one of the disks was played by the state broadcaster. It is said that although almost the entire population listened, many did not fully understand it owing to the archaic and formal language used. There was some attempt at justification in it, for example the claim that Japan had gone to war in an attempt to ensure the ‘stabilisation of East Asia’ and that it had been ‘far from our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement’. The term ‘surrender’ was not used at any point. Indeed, the entire speech was a masterwork in understatement, perhaps particularly the phrase that ‘the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest’.40 It was 18:00 hours in Washington when Grassli brought Japan’s message of surrender to Byrnes, although the Secretary of State already knew what it contained thanks to American abilities to read Japanese communications. An hour later President Truman held a press conference in his office. He stood and told the assembly of the message he had received, and that he deemed it ‘a full acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration which specifies the unconditional surrender of Japan . . . there is no qualification’. He went on to state that arrangements for the formal signing of the surrender terms were being made, that these would be received by General Douglas MacArthur, who had been appointed supreme Allied commander, and that ‘Meantime, the Allied armed forces have been ordered to suspend offensive action.’41 He later wrote in his memoirs, after quoting his speech, that ‘The guns were silenced. The war was over.’ But the war was not over, and the guns were far from silent, so far as the Red Army and those Japanese forces facing it were concerned. The Soviet statement was in a totally different vein: the announcement made by the Japanese Emperor . . . is only a general declaration of unconditional surrender. An order to cease hostilities has not yet been issued, and the Japanese armed forces continue to resist. Consequently, their actual surrender has not yet occurred. They can only

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan’s advantage’

101

be considered to have surrendered when the Japanese Emperor orders them to cease hostilities, this order is executed in practice, and they lay down their arms. In view of this, the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union in the Far East will continue their offensive operations against Japan.42 Not only would operations continue, but they were intensified. Colonel General Issa Pliyev, commanding the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group, which had crossed the Gobi Desert and advanced further than any other formation, recorded the practical effect of the statement. Marshal Rodion Malinovsky issued directives to the forces of the Trans-Baikal Front on 15 August, ordering that the onslaught on the enemy be increased in order to ‘take control of operational-strategic points in the shortest possible time’.43 That time, during which Pliyev’s group would have to advance some 300km through mountainous terrain, and likely fight several battles, was specified as 18 August.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 9

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire The lightning war waged by the Soviet Army made impossible from the start the efficient conduct of [Kwantung] Army operations under single control. At the time the war ended, units under the direct or indirect control of the Army were in a chaotic condition, divided as they were by wedges driven by the enemy into this vast defensive area.1 Suicide bombers, like snakes, crawled from all sides towards the tanks and grenades rained down like hail.2 The Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group, having crossed the Gobi Desert in two columns some 200km apart, had arrived at Duolun (Dolonnor) when the order to intensify the operation arrived. Pliyev decided, in the interests of speed, to lead the left-hand column from the front; his main HQ would remain at Duolun whilst he and ‘a task force of officers’ would head up the advanced group through the mountains.3 The offensive resumed on the morning of 16 August in heavy rain which, whilst welcome after the sweltering heat of the desert, was severe enough to carry away bridges and cause landslides. Pliyev records that in a difficult river crossing, they were assisted by ‘a crowd of thousands of Chinese with long thick ropes [who] appeared on the opposite bank’. This was categorised as ‘Russian-Chinese friendship on the chariot of victory!’ by an unnamed wit.4 This ‘friendship’ was remarked on later by Japanese officers: Most Manchurian and Korean civilians assumed an indifferent attitude toward the Japanese when the invasion began. When the Soviet Army marched into their towns, however, they welcomed it by displaying red flags at their houses, and were generally hostile to the Japanese.5 The advance continued all that day and night against only occasional minor resistance until, at 05:00 hours on 17 August, Pliyev called a halt at a village. They had covered 80km through difficult mountainous conditions. As they awaited the arrival of the main force, Pliyev received news that the other column had advanced about 60km and was thus closing on its objective: the city of Zhangjiakou (Kalgan). The city of Chengde (Rehe), the target of

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The second stage: the advance into central Manchukuo and Korea. (# Charles Blackwood)

the left-hand column, was further away and formed an important strategic node through which passed the main railway and highway connecting the Kwantung Army with Japanese forces in China. The column reached the outskirts of Zhangjiakou on the morning of 18 August where, for the first time, strong resistance was encountered from a fortified zone to the northwest of the city. This was despite the fact that the order to cease fire and surrender had been transmitted from Tokyo that day. Previous communications relating to surrender had been, though, confusing and contradictory. Imperial General Headquarters in Tokyo had issued a series of orders between 15 and 17 August, the general thrust of which was that the Kwantung Army should cease offensive operations, but continue with those that were

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

105

defensive. Given the situation on the ground, this effectively meant that the fighting continued. Only on 18 August was an unequivocal order to ‘suspend all operational tasks and stop all hostilities’ promulgated.6 At 15:30 hours that afternoon the commander in chief of the Kwantung Army informed the Soviet command by radio that he was ready to fulfil all the conditions of surrender.7 Difficulties arose because the offensive had, as it was designed to do, dismembered that army. As one of the Soviet histories put it: ‘The Japanese command in the very first days of the fighting lost centralised command and control. It threw scattered units and formations into battle . . .’8 The Japanese agreed: ‘The lightning war waged by the Soviet Army made impossible from the start the efficient conduct of [Kwantung] Army operations under single control.’9 This fragmentation meant the various component parts were often isolated communication-wise. There was, however, to be no fighting at Chengde. On the morning of 19 August Pliyev split his force in order to approach the place from several directions and cut the railway line to the south. In doing so, a train heading for Beijing, which contained the governor of the city and his officials who were fleeing the place, was intercepted.10 The Japanese garrison remained, but capitulated once they realised they were effectively surrounded. Pliyev recorded that 8,136 soldiers and officers surrendered at Chengde along with large reserves of food and munitions.11 The capture of the city was of great operational and strategic importance. It opened the way to Beijing and the Bohai Sea, and severed communications between Japanese formations operating in northern China and Manchukuo. Pliyev sent elements of the column south towards the Chinese capital, and these reached the town of Gubeikou at about noon on 20 August. Situated in one of the passes through the Great Wall, which marked the border between Manchukuo and China, the town was garrisoned by Japanese units. These also surrendered on the approach of the Soviet force, which then sped on towards Beijing some 100km distant. This area of China, although not the former, and future, capital itself, was under the control of Chinese Communist armed forces designated the Eighth Route Army, or 8th Chinese People’s Revolutionary Army, who made common cause with the invaders.12 Chiang Kai-Shek was aware that any Japanese capitulation to the Communists in northern China would result in the latter occupying the areas affected, from where they would be impossible to easily remove. He had therefore, in his capacity as Generalissimo of all Chinese armed forces, commanded the Eighth Route Army not to accept any such surrender. The Japanese were ordered only to surrender to Nationalist forces, with promises of dire punishment if they didn’t.13 Furthermore, the Soviet Union and China had signed the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance (as had been

stalin’s war on japan - Press

106

Stalin’s War on Japan

mooted at Yalta) only on 14 August, and this had promised mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and mutual non-interference in internal affairs. The Soviets had also agreed that ‘in the spirit’ of the treaty, ‘moral support and aid in military supplies and other material resources’ would be entirely given to ‘the National Government as the central government of China’.14 Here then loomed a political and military imbroglio of potentially colossal proportions. It was, though, one from which the Soviet Union was swiftly extricated when Malinovsky sent an order forbidding Pliyev’s forces from crossing the border. As the latter put it, our formations were halfway from Chengde to Beijing, needing ‘only one ‘‘leap’’ to the Chinese capital’. He goes on to note that ‘I had to suspend the offensive and move north beyond the Great Wall.’15 No such complications attended the other operations of the Trans-Baikal Front. The main problem they now faced was logistical, in particular relating to fuel. This most particularly affected the 6th Guards Tank Army, which fielded just over 1,000 tanks and self-propelled guns.16 The problem had been greatly exacerbated by the conditions through which these vehicles had had to travel, which resulted in them using more than double their normal requirements.17 The wheeled transport simply couldn’t keep up: by the time the Khingan Mountains had been negotiated, compounded by the dreadful roads and weather, its ‘tail’ extended back up to 700km. Recourse was had to an air-lift of this vital substance; Malinovsky deployed two air transport divisions of the 12th Air Army, amounting to some 400 aircraft, to deliver the fuel. Given the limited capacity and range of the aircraft involved, combined with the terrible weather, and despite them flying some 160–170 sorties per day with cargo compartments ‘packed tight with fuel drums’, they could only deliver around 940 tonnes.18 This proved insufficient, and the advance halted for almost two days (12–13 August) at Lubei whilst a stock was built up.19 General Kravchenko found a solution. Immobilising the main force, he allocated all available fuel to brigade-strength forward detachments which on 15 August raced ahead along two axes that became separated by some 100km. Elements of the 7th Mechanised Corps moved south-east towards Changchun, whilst those of the 9th Guards Mechanised Corps and the 5th Guards Tank Corps headed further south towards Shenyang (Mukden). The rest would follow as and when the fuel situation allowed; given the lack of opposition on the ground, this proved an effective tactic.20 The advance on Shenyang reached Tongliao on the morning of 19 August to discover that the torrential rain had rendered the roads beyond impassable even to tracked vehicles: ‘The several days of pouring rain had turned the broad central Manchurian plain into a kind of artificial lake.’21 An answer was found in the decision to advance along the railway line, which was largely

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

107

built on an embankment. To string out a long line of tanks and wheeled vehicles in single file would have been a hazardous venture against an organised enemy. They were, though, no longer dealing with such, although there were elements that had either not received the surrender order or had chosen to disregard it. An incident that has much of the flavour of the latter was recorded by Dmitry Loza, whose Shermans of the 9th Mechanised Corps were echeloned behind the 5th Tank Corps’ T-34s. It involved an air strike on the advancing armour, and the Japanese tactics were somewhat novel to those whose last such encounter had involved the Luftwaffe. Six aircraft attacked his unit at 17:00 hours on 19 August: The first aircraft raced toward the battalion’s lead tank at low altitude. And at full speed, it ploughed into the tank’s hull. Pieces of the fuselage flew off in all directions. The airplane’s engine buried itself under the tank’s tracks. Tongues of flame licked around the Sherman’s hull. The driver-mechanic, Guards Sergeant Nikolay Zuev, received numerous cuts and bruises. It appears that the desantniki had already dismounted, and those on the other tanks, as can be imagined, swiftly followed suit. In any event, this ‘kamikaze’ attack was over in minutes, resulting in the loss of six aircraft for ‘one truck burned, a gouged turret on the lead Sherman, and one driver-mechanic disabled’. Losa records that what really surprised them were ‘female corpses in the cockpits of two of the aircraft’. He decided that, ‘in all likelihood, these were fiance´es of the kamikaze pilots, who had decided to share the dismal fate of their selected ones’.22 Other authors have noted several similar attacks, but not the presence of women in the aircraft.23 The journey itself was more injurious to the Emchas than enemy action. They were following the T-34s which, because of their greater width, were able to straddle the rails on both sides. The American tanks were narrower, so had to drive with one track between the rails and the other on the gravel ballast. This meant that the vehicles leaned significantly to one side and vibrated ‘as though they were in convulsions’. After 24 hours of such treatment there was much damage to the suspension and distress to both crews and desantniki.24 Although advancing in single file along the railway proved viable, there was a significant obstacle to overcome in the shape of the Liao river some 30km to the north-west of Shenyang. This had broken its banks and the only crossing was the 1,200m-long railway bridge. As a single T-34 moved onto the structure, however, it began to bend and swing ominously at the concentration of weight in a small area. The tank quickly reversed course. Major Gavriil Zavizion suggested a solution: send the tanks across on railway flat-cars. Two

stalin’s war on japan - Press

108

Stalin’s War on Japan

of these, plus two locomotives, were requisitioned from a nearby station along with their Chinese crews, and a tank loaded onto each. These crossed the bridge safely and continued on into Shenyang. The sudden and unexpected appearance at the station of the flatcar-mounted tanks, each carrying eight machine-gunners, ‘stunned the Japanese, who did not have time to get out of the city. They all surrendered without firing a shot.’25 In fact, Shenyang had formally been surrendered the day before when, in a potentially hazardous and certainly daring operation, a 225-strong detachment formed from the personnel of the 6th Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade (part of the 5th Guards Tank Corps) under the command of Major Pyotr Chelyshev had been airlifted to its main airfield. This operation, and several more like it, was undertaken pursuant to an order from Vasilevsky to all Fronts on 18 August after he’d received the offer of surrender from the commander of the Kwantung Army: Due to the fact that the resistance of the Japanese is broken, and the difficult condition of the roads impedes the rapid advance of the main forces, it is necessary to immediately take over the operations with specially formed, fast-moving and well-equipped detachments to immediately capture the cities of Changchun, Mukden [Shenyang], Jirin [Jilin] and Harbin. These same units, or similar ones, should also be used for further missions without regard to their isolation from the main forces.26 The instructions to increase the speed of the operation had come directly from Stalin himself. In his biography of Marshal Vasilevsky, Kulichkin records a telephone conversation on 15 August between Vasilevsky and the dictator. During the course of this, the latter is informed that the Japanese have ‘lost command and control and cannot organise strong resistance’ and their forces have been ‘split into several parts’. Vasilevsky adds that ‘even a miracle cannot save the Japanese from total defeat’ and that the ‘most important thing is not to lose the pace of the offensive’. Stalin’s reply, as recorded, is brusque: ‘Good. Only we need to increase the pace. What proposals will be made in this regard?’ Vasilevsky responds that ‘airborne assault forces’ will be used against the larger cities of ‘Harbin, Chunchun, Jirin, Mukden’ and that ‘advanced mobile units in all the combined arms armies’ and Kravchenko’s command will conduct operations ‘more vigorously’.27 These ‘advanced mobile units’ consisted of tanks and assault guns, all with full complements of desantniki.28 Stalin’s reasoning was straightforward. Everlastingly suspicious almost to the point of paranoia, and perhaps beyond, he knew that his writ would only run for certain where there was a Red Army presence, and preferably a substantial one. He also knew exactly what he wanted from the operation, and feared that the Americans might at least attempt to thwart him in it (as they

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

109

would in respect of Hokkaido). One doesn’t have to entirely agree with Hasegawa’s overall thesis, but the validity of his statement that ‘Stalin and Truman were engaged in an intense tug of war to gain an advantage in the postwar Far East’ seems entirely valid.29 In any event, the Soviet dictator, who was well aware that political power did indeed grow out of the barrel of a gun, certainly saw it in those terms. If these were matters of stratospherically high politics, then there was also a lowlier variety in play. Glantz highlights this: ‘The landings were as much political as military in their aims, for they sought to reinforce Japanese intentions to surrender, hasten disarmament of the sometime recalcitrant Japanese troops, and establish an immediate Soviet presence . . .’30 The Shenyang landing also threw up ‘an interesting curiosity’.31 Waiting at the airfield for evacuation to Japan was none other than the recently abdicated Manchukuoan Emperor Puyi.32 The aircraft carrying Chelyshev’s force, escorted by fighters, landed without opposition at 13:15 hours and took him captive. This tiny unit, the very survival of which depended on it being unopposed, secured the airfield and also freed a number of Allied personnel at the Hoten prisoner-of-war camp nearby.33 Further reinforcements were airlifted in later that day. These were headed by the commander of the 6th Guards Tank Army, General Kravchenko, who received the formal surrender of the city.34 Also captured at Shenyang station were around a dozen further flat-cars loaded with Japanese military equipment. The prisoners were directed to unload these and they were sent back to fetch the remainder of the tanks. That this somewhat novel way of handling armoured forces in the field was considered more efficient than having them manoeuvre under their own power, and would also save a great deal of precious fuel, was quickly demonstrated. Kravchenko ordered the 5th Tank Corps to utilise the same method to rapidly advance on Dairen (Dalny, Dalniy, Dalian) and Port Arthur (Lushun, Lushunkou) on the Liaodong (Liaotung) Peninsula. They arrived on 24 August, although these places had surrendered to air-landed forces two days earlier.35 This was, no doubt, much to the relief of Stalin, as these were amongst the main locations where he most feared American intervention. Indeed, on the day of the landing he had told Vasilevsky to ‘keep in mind’ the fact that any delay could mean ‘Truman will order General MacArthur to land his naval assault forces’.36 There were other Soviet forces also heading towards these, at least in Stalin’s mind, sensitive spots. On 15 August Managarov’s 53rd Army had moved from its second echelon position behind the 6th Guards Tank Army to advance on its right flank. It thus occupied the gap between the tank army and Danilov’s 17th Army. The problems suffered by all three armies were essentially similar, and they overcame them in much the same fashion.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

110

Stalin’s War on Japan

Their advanced detachments pushed well ahead against minimal opposition, although the 17th Army had to fight a short engagement on 17 August against enemy units around Chifeng (Ulankhad) before taking the city.37 Without the advantage of being able to advance along a railway line as the 6th Guards Tank Army had done, the advance of the 17th and 53rd Armies was somewhat retarded. However, by 1 September they had achieved their objectives and were on the shore of the Bohai Sea.38 The rapid advances of the forces already considered were rendered possible because they invaded after crossing areas that the Kwantung Army had considered impassable. Thus the Manchukuoan border regions facing them were only lightly defended, if at all. Those deployed to the north of the 6th Guards Tank Army did not have this advantage and, as has been discussed, were forced to fight their way through, or bypass, strong defensive positions. Whilst this was successfully accomplished, it did mean that when Lyudnikov’s 39th Army advanced, it was compelled to detach significant forces to protect its lines of communication from intact Japanese units. Counterbalancing this was the return of the 94th Rifle Corps, which had been sent as a detached group against the rear of the Hailar fortified region in support of the 36th Army, but whose services had not been required. Although there were several fierce counterattacks by Kwantung Army formations, which were successfully beaten off, the greatest problem in advancing was the terrain and the concomitant logistical difficulties. Lyudnikov records that the efforts to maintain some sort of reasonable road surface at times led to the Guards mortar units dismounting their rocket-launching racks and laying them in the mud. Tanks were used as tractors to help tow heavy artillery, and even the dedicated tractors had to be doubled up and more to keep the guns moving. This all, of course, consumed a vast amount of fuel, which was difficult to bring forward because of the state of the roads, so airsupply was essential. All this naturally slowed down the main forces.39 Nevertheless, the city of Taonan, some 300km beyond the army’s start line, was reached on 16 August, and the following day the advance on Changchun began against minimal resistance.40 The eastward advance of Luchinsky’s 36th Army towards its ultimate objective of Qiqihar, where it was planned to join forces with the 2nd Army driving from the north, also necessitated leaving substantial enemy forces bypassed in the fortified zones around Hailar. There were also Kwantung Army formations defending the pass through the Khingan Mountains to Boketuzhen (Pokotu). It took two days, from 15 to 17 August, for the 2nd Rifle Corps to force its way through in atrocious weather and capture the town, along with around 8,500 enemy personnel. Advanced detachments moved on immediately and the next day, 18 August, the town of Zalantun (Chalantun) fell to them, along with another 1,000 or so prisoners.41

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

111

Vasilevsky’s order of that day, to move forward to the main objectives with all speed, resulted in Luchinsky putting a rifle regiment into lorries. These were despatched the 160km or so to Qiqihar, where they arrived the next day, receiving a warm welcome from the inhabitants, who displayed banners, threw flowers at the troops and ‘rendered all possible help to their liberators’. Some 6,000 prisoners were also taken. Resistance in the Hailar fortified region ceased on 18 August as well, when nearly 4,000 officers and men surrendered.42 Qiqihar fell before units of the 2nd Army of the Second Far Eastern Front arrived on the scene. As per Luchinsky and the 36th Army, Terekhin was obliged to detail large, artillery-heavy formations to deal with the defenders of the Sunwu and Aihuizhen fortified zones and contain their attempts at launching repeated counterattacks on his somewhat tenuous communications. The defenders were also pummelled from the air by Zhigarev’s 10th Air Army, whilst two advanced detachments moved south along totally inadequate roads towards Nenjiang and Bei’an. These were reached and secured on 20 and 21 August respectively. Both were around 270km from Heihe, which meant that the twin spearheads of the 2nd Army had advanced about halfway to Qiqihar. By that time enemy forces in the fortified areas had begun to surrender, with the final capitulation taking place on the day Nenjiang fell. The bag, in terms of prisoners, amounted to some 22,581 officers and men.43 The final move on to Qiqihar took place following the Kwantung Army’s general surrender, so was unopposed. The Second Far Eastern Front’s other main attack also continued to struggle against dreadful conditions terrain-wise. Thus, forward movement along a single road parallel to the southern bank of the Sungari, from Fujin towards Jiamusi, was rendered painfully slow. It was further retarded by enemy resistance, particularly south of the town of Jinshanzhen. However, and unlike Soviet advances facing essentially similar predicaments elsewhere, the 15th Army had the option of outflanking such difficulties via the Amur Flotilla. This option was exercised; at 05:35 hours on 14 August the Flotilla’s 1st Brigade departed Fujin and proceeded up the Sungari with two reinforced rifle battalions aboard. The object of the exercise was to launch amphibious attacks and capture two riverbank villages, Wanlihecun and Chesheng, which were around 85km and 70km respectively downstream from Jiamusi. Both were found to be clear of enemy forces, so the ships moved on until in the early afternoon they approached Huachuan, a village approximately 40km east of Jiamusi. Here there was an enemy presence, so both battalions landed. Opposition was described only as ‘slight’, allowing the invaders to quickly take possession of the place and thus get behind the enemy opposing the land advance.44

stalin’s war on japan - Press

112

Stalin’s War on Japan

Despite this, the advance was still stalling, so recourse was had to direct action. On 15 August the Amur Flotilla’s 2nd Brigade, carrying a rifle regiment, passed Huachuan and advanced directly on Jiamusi. Anticipating such a move, the Japanese had attempted to block the navigable channel with floating logs, rafts and barges. These methods proved unsuccessful: ‘such obstacles were overcome relatively easily and without significant loss of time’.45 If these passive defences failed, then so did an attempt at an active response. A Japanese armoured boat attempted an interception just as the lead vessels approached the city at about 22:00 hours.46 A short battle ensued, with the Soviet ‘river tanks’ coming out on top; eight of the enemy crew were killed or wounded, whilst the ship and its captain, Lieutenant Commander Tso, were captured.47 This turned out to be a most valuable trophy, as she contained a set of river navigation charts that were recovered intact.48 Some authors also mention that the railway bridge across the river was demolished, but that the ships managed to find a passage through the fallen trusses and assorted wreckage.49 An attempt to destroy the city also, or at least parts of it, was in progress; there were numerous and large fires burning.50 The main landing took place at 06:30 hours on 16 August and soon captured the dock area. Fighting was fierce, however, with the city full of ‘suicide bombers’, and only after reinforcements arrived by river and overland was it secured the next day at about 10:00 hours. A brigade of Manchukuoan troops surrendered more or less intact, whilst Japanese forces retreated along the river bank towards the city of Yilan, some 100km distant.51 Vessels of the Amur Flotilla, with contingents of troops onboard, wasted no time in conducting a waterborne pursuit, their intention being to harry the retreating troops and occupy Yilan if possible.52 Having voyaged some 30km upstream, the flotilla’s reconnaissance detachment, comprising the monitor Sun Yat-sen and three armoured boats, was machine-gunned by a 400-strong Japanese unit at the village of Aoqizhen (Aotsiya). They responded by bombarding the enemy positions and putting a landing force ashore. After a short fight the garrison surrendered, delivering 365 prisoners, 20 machine guns, 600 rifles and miscellaneous military equipment into Soviet hands.53 Later that day, 17 August, the reconnaissance detachment encountered a large body of Japanese near the village of Hongkelizhen (Honghedao), which was around 30km downstream of Yilan. Observation disclosed that the road on the southern shore was crowded with retreating Japanese infantry and artillery. Action on the part of the vessels was prevented, though, when the Japanese artillery deployed their guns to fire on the vessels. Grossly outgunned, the ships retreated until reinforcement arrived at about 16:00 hours in the shape of the two monitors Lenin and Red East, plus three armoured boats and several minesweepers. An artillery duel ensued, during the course of

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

113

which the Japanese mistakenly thought they’d destroyed Sun Yat-sen, but the flotilla was unable to prevent the enemy troops withdrawing.54 The ships moved on and at 08:00 hours on 18 August the 2nd Brigade appeared off Yilan. An artillery duel took place, during the course of which fire from the flotilla suppressed most of the land-based ordnance, the ‘river tanks’ fitted with Katyusha rockets being ‘especially distinguished’ in this regard.55 The Soviets also caught and sank an enemy armoured boat which had attempted to flee upriver, sank several barges at their moorings and successfully landed a rifle regiment from the monitors Lenin, Far East Komsomolets and Sverdlov. The Japanese capitulated, however, before a battle for the city could develop, with between 1,780 and 3,900 officers and men surrendering.56 The ultimate target, Harbin, was still around 300km distant and at 20:00 hours eight armoured boats were despatched up-river towards it. They did not expect to meet resistance; a two-aircraft airlift of 120 troops, led by General G.A. Shelakhov, had landed at Harbin airfield earlier that day on the orders of Marshal Meretskov, the commander of the First Far Eastern Front. They were met by senior Japanese officers and ‘cease-fire negotiations were opened immediately’.57 Accordingly, the populations of towns and villages along the river bank ‘gathered in droves on the embankments, waving red flags’ when they spotted the Soviet ships passing. A similar reception was accorded them upon their arrival at Harbin at 08:00 hours on 20 August.58 Major General Pashkov’s operational group, centred on the 5th Rifle Corps and advancing on the left flank of the Second Far Eastern Front, was approximately halfway to its operational goal following the occupation of Baoqing on 14 August. This had been achieved by the advanced detachment; given the horrendous state of the roads, the main force was trailing up to 150–200km in the rear. Resistance, though, had been slight following the breakthrough at Raohe, and Pashkov ordered the detachment to keep going through the mountains towards Bolizhen.59 It arrived on 19 August to connect with the 66th Rifle Division of the 35th Army, which had occupied the city on 17 October.60 Following the difficult struggle through the wetlands, and the capture of Mishan on 12 August, advanced detachments of the 35th Army’s main force (the 66th and 363rd Rifle Divisions) had continued to advance against minimal opposition. Such was not the case to their rear, where the 1056th Rifle Regiment (of the 264th Rifle Division) and the 109th Fortified Region, heavily reinforced with engineers and artillery, continued to reduce the now-isolated Hutou fortified area.61 Since the garrison refused to capitulate even when their situation was hopeless, destroying the defences became a matter of eliminating individual structures. This was a slow but certain process, given the attackers’ deployment of a dedicated artillery destruction group, air supremacy and

stalin’s war on japan - Press

114

Stalin’s War on Japan

assault formations well trained in the necessary techniques. These included pouring kerosene or gasoline into the ventilation shafts of subterranean complexes, sometime in considerable quantities. In one instance 2 tonnes (around 2,600 litres) of gasoline were recorded as being decanted into a single installation prior to applying a source of ignition.62 Despite gruesome, systematic and inevitable obliteration, those manning the defences continued to ignore orders to surrender. Indeed, when, on 18 August, a Japanese prisoner was sent forward under a flag of truce to inform the surviving garrison that the war was officially over, he was hacked to death by a sword-wielding officer. Such recalcitrance could have only one end: around 3,000 defenders were blasted and burned to death before a small number of survivors finally gave up.63 The formations involved in advancing to the south of the fortified area had their own problems, largely revolving around the immense difficulties of supply from across the Songacha floodplains. They had nevertheless continued to move towards Linkou and Bolizhen. With the Hutou fortress region isolated, and the vital Hulin-Mishan railway line cut, enemy resistance was slight and advanced detachments of the 66th Rifle Division reached Bolizhen on 15 August, with the main force arriving, as already noted, two days later. The 363rd Division reached Jixi on 17 August and finally Linkou on 19 August, there uniting with elements of the 1st Army already in occupation. Linkou had fallen to the 1st Army’s north-westerly advance from Bamiantongzhen at 07:00 hours on 13 August when the 75th Tank Brigade arrived. Japanese units had evacuated beforehand, so there was no battle for possession, but they had laid waste to the place and left behind squads of ‘suicide bombers’.64 The tank brigade had subsequently been redeployed to the south where, in conjunction with the 5th Army on its left, the 1st Army had become engaged in a major struggle for the strategically important city of Mudanjiang (Mutankiang). Located on the west bank of the Mudan river some 110km west of the Manchukuo-Soviet border, Mudanjiang was a major communication hub on ‘the most important east-west arteries in eastern Manchuria’.65 Consequently, and once having broken through the border defences, the 1st and 5th Armies developed a converging offensive on the place.66 Both armies had progressed some 80km into Manchukuo by the night of 11 August, and were thus well on the way to the city. Despite the rapidity of the advance preventing any large-scale coherent response, there was enough time for units to move to defensive positions, and the first clashes took place to the north-east and east of the city on 12 August involving the forward detachments of the 1st Army and the 5th Army respectively. The approaches to Mudanjiang from the north-east, from the 1st Army’s sector, were mountainous and difficult terrain which was advantageous for the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The advance on, and battles for, Mudanjiang – the only large-scale fighting of the operation. (# Charles Blackwood)

defence. There were only two routes that crossed the mountains from northeast to south-west: ‘railroad and dirt’.67 Beloborodov assigned the 59th Rifle Corps, advancing from Linkou, to the railway whilst the 26th Rifle Corps, advancing from Muleng, struggled along the road. These two forces were to rendezvous at Hualin, some 10km north-east of Mudanjiang, with its vital road and railway bridges across the Mudan river. Once these had been captured, the advance would be finally clear of ‘the mountain gorges’ and into ‘the river valley’ which would allow the deployment of both corps’ main forces.68 The advanced detachments had to fight their way to the destination through small but determined enemy units which resisted fiercely. For example, at 09:00 hours on 12 August the spearhead of the 26th Rifle Corps, formed by the 257th Tank Brigade under Colonel Georgy Anishchik, encountered ‘organized Japanese artillery and machine-gun fire’ from a stronghold constructed on an ‘unnamed height’ sited in a mountain pass. The road, such as it was, had also been mined.69 There was a sharp fight lasting for over an hour, with the attackers losing six tanks before they fought their way around and through the defences. For the 1st Army it was the costliest encounter since the start of hostilities.70 Wounded personnel were left under guard to be picked up by following forces as and when they arrived, whilst the reduced spearhead pushed on. It reached the town of Chaihezhen, located around 10km north of Hualin, that

stalin’s war on japan - Press

116

Stalin’s War on Japan

afternoon. There they found a Kwantung Army base, complete with fuel supplies, which they raided. By chance, a train carrying a Japanese infantry battalion to Mudanjiang appeared and the tanks opened fire, quickly disabling the locomotive; the surviving passengers were taken prisoner.71 The movement of the battalion was in accordance with Japanese intentions that were already known to Soviet intelligence; they were building up strength at, and to the east of, Mudanjiang in the hope of checking the Soviet advance there.72 It was nightfall by the time the brigade headed south towards Hualin, travelling along the river bank on flooded, swampy roads which slowed progress considerably. Consequently it wasn’t until the morning of 13 August that Hualin was approached and the railway station to the south occupied at 05:00 hours. The brigade was now less than 2km from the Mudan bridges. The tanks were, however, expected, and preparations had been made to receive them. As the tanks rushed towards their target, both bridges were brought down with explosives and collapsed into the river. At the same time Japanese artillery and ‘dozens of machine guns’ opened fire whilst several hundred ‘soldiers in green jackets got out of roadside ditches, and camouflaged ‘‘fox holes’’ and, bent over under the weight of mines and explosives strapped to them, ran to the tanks’. These suicide bombers were mowed down by the tank machine guns, such that the ground ‘was covered with hundreds of corpses’, but more and more kept appearing ‘from burrows and narrow crevices’ and attempted to throw themselves under the vehicles. According to Beloborodov’s account, the Japanese had also laid mines, which disabled two tanks. After ordering these to be towed clear of the battlefield for repair, and recovering all the dead and wounded, Anishchik, having decided that progress was impossible, ordered his force to pull back towards Hualin station. After regrouping and replenishing fuel and ammunition, Anishchik led another attempt. A fierce 3-hour battle ensued, during which the brigade was reduced to seven operational tanks, whilst attempts to clear the mines were thwarted by suicide bombers. Consequently, at 18:00 hours the brigade again retreated, forming a defensive perimeter to the south of the station. Whilst there, two more troop-trains from the north appeared; both were fired at and destroyed, but the position could not be held against developing Japanese assaults from Hualin.73 Under cover of darkness, the enemy surrounded the station and began to close in on the armoured vehicles. The fight became a close-quarter affair: ‘suicide bombers, like snakes, crawled from all sides towards the tanks and grenades rained down like hail’.74 In the early hours of 14 August Anishchik decided his position was untenable and ordered a further retreat. The force broke through the enemy encirclement and moved north along the railway for

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

117

about a kilometre. There it reached a defensible position on the north bank of a deep, steep-sided gully, at the bottom of which a stream flowed to the Mudan. This was bridged by the railway and at about 06:00 hours there appeared yet another Japanese train, transporting heavy artillery, as it slowed down to negotiate a crossing. The tanks immediately engaged, exploding the boiler of the locomotive and derailing it. The rest of the train followed suit, the cars tumbling away from the line. This was the fourth train wrecked by the 257th Tank Brigade, and Vnotchenko reckoned that, with its destruction, the total loss inflicted on the Kwantung Army in that context amounted to about 900 personnel, 6 steam locomotives, 143 railway wagons, 24 artillery pieces, 30 vehicles, 24 artillery tractors and up to 100 machine guns.75 The tactical setback at Hualin could only be remedied when further 1st Army forces arrived.76 However, the engagement, which was obviously on a much larger scale than the previous one in the mountain pass, proved educational for both sides. The defenders were part of the Kwantung Army’s recently created 135th Division, the chief of staff of which, Colonel Inouye Toshisuke, later recounted the experience from the Japanese perspective. Although his account differs from those produced by Soviet authors in some minor details, it essentially confirms the main points. Inouye mentions that the ‘enemy armoured force’ which attacked on the morning of 13 August was equipped with ‘about ten’ of the ‘much vaunted T-34 tank’ plus ‘about ten artillery pieces’ (SU-76 self-propelled guns). Curiously, he also says that there were no infantry present, although these might not have been readily observable once they’d dismounted from the armoured vehicles. He gives an account of the initial combat: At about 10:00 hours, the enemy began attacking with a column of about ten tanks . . . our left sector battalion . . . counterattacked with closequarter combat squads hidden on both sides of the road, and succeeded in disabling the leading tank. Although this momentarily slowed down the speed of the enemy’s initial advance, he continued to push on. Our close-quarter teams next attacked the rear tanks, which then abandoned the attack . . . According to Inouye, attempts to repair the disabled tank failed and it was abandoned, whilst the self-propelled guns ‘began firing on our positions sporadically’. This fire was returned, and directed particularly at the Soviet tanks which were being repaired ‘on a spot exposed to us’. This, though, had little or no effect: ‘even though the enemy tanks were hit, since the projectiles were not armor-piercing, the actual damage was practically nil’. In fact, even if the Japanese had used armour-piercing projectiles, it is doubtful that the effect would have been radically different.77

stalin’s war on japan - Press

118

Stalin’s War on Japan

Inouye also shared information regarding the ‘close-quarter combat squads’ which the Soviets dubbed suicide bombers: ‘In close-quarter fighting a minimum of 1 kilogram of explosive charge is required to render a T-34 tank inoperative. Any less amount is totally ineffective.’ This seems absurdly optimistic and is probably a typographic error; other accounts state that a 15kg charge was required, which seems far more plausible.78 In any event, the postwar study in respect of such tactics, concluding that though heroic they were futile, has already been cited.79 Colonel Inouye also opined that because Japanese artillery was unable to damage the Soviet tanks whilst they were being repaired, even though this was occurring within sight of the gunners, the behaviour of the enemy was ‘arrogant and insolent in the face of our impotence’. This seems an unlikely scenario, to say the least. The artillery fire might not have been able to do much damage to the tanks, but that could hardly apply to the repair teams. More credible is his relating that ‘Some of the tanks crews were observed to consist of female as well as male soldiers.’80 None of the Soviet sources mention this, but given that the female contribution to the Red Army’s successes was not generally celebrated after the war, then this is perhaps unsurprising.81 Reinforcements for the 257th Tank Brigade arrived on the morning of 14 August in the shape of two battalions of SU-76 self-propelled guns, totalling about twenty-five. Anishchik immediately launched an attack on Hualin station following their arrival, whereupon the Japanese withdrew after a short fight.82 Soviet air power, which was unopposed, was also making itself felt. Inouye states that from the morning of 13 August and thereafter, ‘enemy aircraft, most of which were fighters, were very active in the sky above the combat zone. There was not a single friendly plane.’83 The pressure on the defenders at Hualin could only increase as further reinforcements arrived. Indeed, the 75th Tank Brigade, the advanced detachment of the 59th Rifle Corps, was only some 35km away to the north-east and approaching against minimal opposition.84 According to the Japanese account, it was continued attacks by the Soviet forces on 14 and 15 August that led to the order to withdraw across the river, and redeploy to the northwest of Mudanjiang, being issued at 12:00 hours on the latter date.85 This hard-fought battle produced an important gain for the Soviets.86 Beloborodov reckoned that it was the capture of Hualin station that created the necessary conditions for the 1st Army’s advance on Mudanjiang.87 With the destruction of the bridges, however, this could only be accomplished by advancing to an alternative river crossing at Yeh-ho (Ehe to the Soviets, and now the Tielingzhen district of the city), which was the site of the Kwantung Army’s Fifth Army Headquarters.88 Also moving on Mudanjiang, but along the road from Mulingzhen (Muleng), a town some 60km to the east, was the 5th Army spearheaded by its

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

119

advanced detachment. Formed from elements assigned to the 65th Rifle Corps, the 76th Tank Brigade, reinforced with a regiment of heavy assault guns, plus two infantry battalions in lorries, was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel V.P. Chaplygin.89 This powerful unit had been created on 11 August by order of General Krylov, commander of the 5th Army, at the behest of Marshal Meretskov, the Front commander. He wanted Mudanjiang, which was a key point in respect of getting into ‘the depths of Manchuria’, taken as swiftly as possible.90 On the morning of 12 August Chaplygin’s command had almost reached the village of Daimagoucun, some 30km from Mulingzhen. There they ran into entrenched enemy positions based on adjacent high ground, particularly that north of the road (called Mount Hsiaotushan by the Japanese). Significant artillery and mortar fire was encountered, the former being enhanced by guns mounted on a pair of armoured trains operating on the line of the former Chinese Eastern Railway, now dubbed the Trans-Manchurian Railway (the eastern tunnels of which had been captured by the 5th Army on the first day of the offensive).91 Soviet intelligence reported that the enemy was there in strength, the formation identified being the 124th Infantry Division. The heavy fire halted the 76th Tank Brigade’s advance and forced it to adopt a defensive posture against several counterattacks. These were successfully repulsed. The commander of the 65th Rifle Corps, Major General G.N. Perekrestov, reacted by sending forward reinforcements: two rifle regiments and all the divisional and corps artillery. He also reported the matter to Krylov. The latter was concerned that, even with the reinforcements, the Japanese would be too strong to overcome. He was reassured by his subordinate, who asked for air support in dealing with the armoured trains in particular, but Krylov took the precaution of ordering up all the army-level artillery as well. He also sent extra tanks and assault guns to reinforce the 76th Tank Brigade.92 Colonel Kashiwada Akiji, operations officer of the Japanese Fifth Army (the parent formation of the 124th Division), recounted subsequent events. His narrative supplies an excellent account of the tactics used by the Red Army in that situation, particularly their deployment of the ‘God of War’. He relates how ‘advance armored units’ were pushed far in advance whilst ‘fierce infantry and artillery attacks’ were made on Japanese positions on both sides of the road. The infantry: adopted extremely cautious tactics. They attacked only after devastating artillery shelling and if the attack proved ineffective they repeated the same procedure. Eventually, our positions in this sector were thoroughly demolished and even the configuration of the mountain was changed and all vegetation thereon was blasted away by the shells.93

stalin’s war on japan - Press

120

Stalin’s War on Japan

He goes on to add that by the evening of 13 August all the Japanese positions had been ‘overwhelmed’, and that the guns had been destroyed along with almost all those manning them, including the commanding officers. Those units of the 124th Division that survived this engagement: occupied the forests north and south of the road and tried to interfere with the enemy’s rear under cover of night or by ambushing passing units. However, deprived of all heavy guns and running out of ammunition and other materiel, the survivors of the division’s main force were compelled to withdraw.94 Whilst the infantry and artillery had been overwhelming the enemy at Daimagoucun, Chaplygin’s reinforced brigade, as mentioned by Kashiwada, had punched its way through the centre of the Japanese position on the night of 12 August and sped on along the road to Mudanjiang. After travelling some 15km it came up against a second defence line at the village of Modaoshizhen and immediately engaged in a nocturnal battle. However, after losing two or three tanks, and with his men undoubtedly approaching exhaustion, Chaplygin decided to pull back and regroup for a renewed assault the next morning. He was, of course, aware that reinforcements were moving along the road to his rear, despite enemy attempts to interdict the route with artillery. A Japanese close-quarter attack on the brigade’s laager area during the hours of darkness ‘struck terror into the enemy’s heart’, according to a Japanese source. The psychological aspect of these tactics was later commented upon by Meretskov. He was of the opinion that the Japanese hoped to ‘undermine the moral stamina and offensive spirit of the Soviet troops’ rather than inflict any real damage.95 If this was indeed the case then on this occasion it failed. The same Japanese source acknowledged that the attack resumed the next morning and by noon on 13 August the defences had been ‘penetrated’.96 Even if it hadn’t been the case previously, then it now became obvious to the Soviets that the Japanese would fight hard to retain Mudanjiang. Part of this effort involved interdicting the 5–7km wide ‘corridor’ astride the line of the Trans-Manchurian Railway along which they were advancing. On 13 August Japanese forces on both flanks took advantage of ‘the mountainous and inaccessible terrain’ to launch repeated infantry counterattacks in an effort to sever this line of communication. These were all repulsed, and the endeavour largely devolved onto artillery and mortar batteries which had been dragged and carried into position: ‘up to 9–10 artillery and 7–9 mortar batteries fired on the narrow corridor’.97 Countering these tactics involved deploying significant quantities of both infantry and artillery. In respect of the latter, a Japanese officer described how one prominence ‘instantly became a bald mountain’ when it was subject to ‘a surprise attack from enemy rocket guns’ (presumably Katyusha rockets)

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

121

on 14 August.98 Deploying such firepower in that way had consequences. It inevitably followed that whatever was used in protecting the line of communication had to be deducted from the advance. This involved a diversion of force from the object of the exercise, Mudanjiang, the defences of which were being constantly strengthened. The closer the 5th Army came, the more the Japanese resistance increased: ‘on 13 and 14 August the enemy repeatedly launched counterattacks and widely used mine-explosive barriers’. Kwantung Army units in and around the city itself were heavily reinforced, and by 14 August they amounted to ‘more than four infantry divisions’.99 Whilst these would be no match in any sense of the word for the two Soviet armies that were converging on them, the latter had problems with concentrating their much superior strength at the decisive point. Their lines of communication stretched back to the Manchukuo-Soviet border over, for the most part, extremely difficult terrain and, as already noted, the 5th Army had to fight to keep its lines open. Mudanjiang was well defended on its eastern approaches, with permanent defences featuring ferro-concrete bunkers. These were fronted by anti-tank ditches, 3m deep and 5m wide, and minefields, as well as extensive barbedwire entanglements.100 Though the attackers had already demonstrated that they could deal with Japanese fortified zones, however strong in theory, there was also the question of the city beyond. Fighting in built-up areas, urban warfare, was a time-consuming and inevitably costly business, a fact well known to both Meretskov and Krylov, who had had extensive experience of it in the war against Germany. Despite the several disadvantages outlined above, both the 1st and the 5th Armies managed to reinforce their advanced detachments sufficiently to allow them to move on the city. Those of the 1st Army were obliged to advance along waterlogged roads on the east bank of the river following the destruction of the bridges at Hualin, there being insufficient men and materiel available to carry out an opposed river crossing. Their advance on 14–15 August was fiercely contested, suffering ‘continuous counterattacks by large infantry forces and enemy tanks’. Also participating were the by now ubiquitous ‘suicide bombers’ in their hundreds. The advance of the 5th Army was likewise resisted, although by being able to manoeuvre on better ground in greater force, they had moved forward further. On 15 August they were at Yeh-ho on the east bank of the Mudan, where the fighting became urban and even hand-to-hand on occasion.101 Stalin’s direction to Vasilevsky regarding the speeding up of operations came on the same date, as already noted, and Meretskov in turn complied with this by rejigging the Front’s campaign plan. At 16:45 hours Krylov was informed of a change of priority: the 5th Army, with the exception of elements of Perekrestov’s 65th Rifle Corps, was to bypass Mudanjiang.102

stalin’s war on japan - Press

122

Stalin’s War on Japan

Its objective now was Ning’an (Ninan), some 20km to the south. After crossing the Mudan there, strong advanced detachments were to be sent in the direction of Jilin and Chanchung. The taking of Mudanjiang was to be left to the 1st Army.103 By the morning of 16 August the 1st Army’s forward units had advanced, under extremely difficult conditions, to within 4–5km of the city’s outskirts. They were on both banks of the river; the combat engineers had extemporised rafts and the like to successfully transport Major General Nikolai Svirs’ 22nd Rifle Division across during the hours of darkness. The Mudan’s strong current rendered this a troublesome operation without the added nocturnal complication, and it had proved impossible to carry across the division’s heavy equipment, such as tanks and artillery.104 Mudanjiang’s defences on the west bank were reckoned to be weaker than those at Yeh-ho, which were protecting the bridge across the Mudan, and Svirs was confident that his command could get through them and into the city despite the lack of artillery preparation and armour.105 This led Beloborodov, who was now commanding in person from the front, and his senior commanders to indulge in a bout of lateral thinking. The attack on Mudanjiang was planned for the morning of 16 August at 09:00 hours with the main strike being on Yeh-ho to capture the bridges. By that time the regular river fog would have cleared, allowing the artillery on the east side of the Mudan to conduct aimed fire and air strikes to be launched.106 However, at a conference in the early hours of 16 August the 1st Army’s deputy chief of staff, General Yevgeny Yusternik, ‘convincingly’ argued for cancelling this preparatory bombardment altogether. The army commander agreed that this reordering of the usual tactics would prove beneficial. If the 22nd Rifle Division did break through to the city from the north and start a street battle, they would be behind the enemy defending the bridge; that would be the time to introduce both artillery and attack aircraft.107 Soviet sources differ slightly as to timing, but according to Beloborodov the attacks went in at 07:00 hours, an earlier start being precluded by the fact that Svirs’ command had only got into a jumping-off position an hour before. The assault along the eastern bank of the river, spearheaded by Anishchik’s command and the recently arrived 77th Tank Brigade under Colonel I.F. Morozov, resulted in an ‘intense’ struggle as they cut a path through the Japanese defences. These north-facing works had been hastily created, with construction commencing on 12 August, and consisted of a series of fire and communication trenches and little more: ‘barbed wire entanglement, and anti-tank ditches were entirely lacking’. A ‘large number’ of 15kg aircraft bombs were used as substitutes for anti-tank mines and the allocated artillery component was weak. As Colonel Kashiwada Akiji put it, this all amounted to ‘an extremely poor showing against an enemy mechanized force’.108

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

123

Progress through these defences was slow but sure, and was aided when the artillery started firing at about 08:00 hours: ‘The eastern part of the town and enemy pillboxes on hills were clouded with smoke, and huge explosions indicated that Katyusha rockets had fallen into ammunition depots.’109 Air strikes began at about the same time. Shortly afterwards a report received at the army commander’s HQ indicated that the road and railway bridges had been reached by the forward detachments. Ten minutes after that a follow-up report related that both bridges had been brought down. This wasn’t, however, the disaster it might have been for two reasons: firstly, the fortuitous arrival of ‘a senior lieutenant from the 13th Warsaw Pontoon-Bridge Battalion’, along with his ten lorries carrying pontoons, ensured ‘a pleasant surprise’. He and his cargo were immediately despatched to construct a crossing at the site of the destroyed structures.110 Secondly, having seen the bridges go down, both tank brigades had instantly moved south and west, curling around the outside of the river bend, in an attempt to secure the city’s southern crossings over the Mudan.111 In this they were successful. Beloborodov termed it ‘the second major combat success on the morning of 16 August’.112 The first had been the accomplishment of Svirs’ 22nd Rifle Division in taking the defenders by surprise and, without any heavy weapons support, driving hard into the city. By 09:00 hours the railway station was in Soviet hands and an hour later Svirs reported that fighting was ongoing in the northern and north-western suburbs whilst one battalion was driving towards the city centre. The enemy, he went on, were ‘setting fire to their military depots’. Beloborodov claimed that the success of the 22nd Infantry Division ‘created a turning point in the battle for Mudanjiang’.113 Vnotchenko agreed; he claimed that the advance of Svirs’ division ‘predetermined the outcome of the battle’.114 That may be so, but the Japanese did not give up easily and from the start ‘the street fighting took on a fierce character’. Using parts of the railway system within the city to transfer troops, they resisted the 22nd Rifle Division by setting up machine-gun positions within buildings sited at strategic points. Without armour and artillery, the infantry were unable to dislodge them: ‘it was not possible to smoke machine-gunners from these buildings with light mortars’.115 Heavy support, in the shape of the 77th and 257th Tank Brigades, was attempting to enter the city from the south after securing the bridges on that axis. They had to come that way because the pontoon bridge constructed on the east side of the city became unusable. The structures it replaced were covered by strong defence points on the enemy side, and the density of their machine-gun fire made the river ‘boil with fountains from bullets’.116 Attempts to interdict the southern route, and even recapture the crossings, were continuous and fierce, involving the use of suicide bombers, anti-tank

stalin’s war on japan - Press

124

Stalin’s War on Japan

artillery and a Japanese armoured train mounting four heavy guns.117 The tanks defended the bridges whilst reinforcements got across, with the action breaking up into separate mini-battles.118 The attackers eventually prevailed, forcing the Japanese back towards the city centre, whilst they ‘continued to resist, waging stubborn street battles for every quarter, street and house’.119 The Soviet units were, though, trained and prepared for urban warfare. They operated in infantry assault groups reinforced by combat engineers, the latter including flamethrower detachments and, when available, assault guns and tanks.120 Although the fighting raged well into the afternoon, it had become obvious to the defenders that the city was lost and they began to withdraw. According to Kashiwada, the Fifth Army command directed some of its units to occupy rear-guard positions on the heights west of Mudanjiang, while its main force retreated towards Hengdaohezizhen (Heng-tao-ho-tzu) under bombardment from the air.121 Their destination was about 65km to the north-west, and the ‘enemy planes’ were relentless. The commander of the 1st Army recalled that from an observation post to the west of Mudanjiang both the railway and highway to Harbin were clearly visible. He recorded what he saw: ‘all the way to the horizon, which was already being touched by the setting sun, both roads were a chain of huge, smoking, fires. It was enemy military equipment, vehicles, and tractors burning.’122 Later that evening, at 22:00 hours on 16 August, Beloborodov sent a report to Marshal Meretskov stating that the 1st Army had captured the city and the railway junction, and that about 150 large depots full of military equipment, ammunition, fuel and food had been seized.123 The estimated Japanese losses during the fighting (as opposed to surrendered or captured afterwards) amounted to about 20,000 men killed, wounded or missing out of a total strength of some 60,000. In terms of materiel destroyed, the Kwantung Army lost about sixty field guns, four 100mm guns, two 150mm guns, sixteen 150mm howitzers, two 240mm howitzers and two 300mm howitzers. Four light armoured cars, 600 trucks and 6,000 horses were also destroyed or abandoned. Japanese estimates of the harm inflicted on the attackers amounted to 7,000–8,000 casualties and more than 300 tanks destroyed or disabled.124 This is difficult to verify one way or the other. Statistical research published in 2001 calculated that the total deaths inflicted on personnel of the First Far Eastern Front during the whole Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation amounted to 6,324, whilst the figure for wounded and sick was given as 14,745. At 21,069 in total, the First Far Eastern Front’s casualty figures are much higher than those of the other two Fronts, greater even than them combined.125 The reason why is plain: the First Far Eastern Front did more fighting. Indeed, combat for Mudanjiang over the period 12–16 August encompassed

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

125

the only large-scale pitched battles of the entire Manchurian operation. These occurred principally because the Kwantung Army’s Fifth Army had forces in the region and was able to deploy them, at least to a sufficient extent to fight defensively. Despite their logistical difficulties, compounded by the deeply unfavourable terrain over which they were forced to manoeuvre, both Soviet armies involved shattered their opponents in no uncertain terms. They did so using mechanised warfare techniques developed and honed in the war in the west, during which, to quote Churchill, the Red Army ‘tore the guts out of the German military machine’.126 The main force of the 5th Army, the 72nd Rifle Corps, was some 10km north of Ning’an when Mudanjiang fell, and battling with Japanese units attempting to prevent it crossing the river and reaching the town. The Mudan here flowed east-west, with Ning’an on the north bank, meaning the town could only be reached via the pair of bridges, one road and one rail, on its south side. Both were toppled into the river to prevent their use, severing the last road connection between eastern Manchukuo and Korea, and leaving Krylov with no choice but to extemporise a crossing. On the night of 17 August this was successfully achieved, at least to the extent of getting across the water a rifle regiment which advanced on the town. The garrison initially retreated, but counterattacked and tried to take it back in the afternoon of 18 August, without success.127 By that date the campaign was winding down as already discussed, but the 5th Army’s advanced detachments, led by the 210th and 218th Tank Brigades, continued to advance ‘energetically’ towards Jilin.128 The 1st Army did not immediately pursue the retreating Japanese formations along the road to Hengdaohezizhen and beyond, leaving their harassment to Sokolov’s 9th Air Army. Rather, it paused for a day in order to regroup, replenish and indeed rest the forward combat units. During this period a ‘strong army mobile group’ was created with the intention of advancing on and capturing Harbin, some 350km to the north-west. Beloborodov used tried and tested units and commanders, forming the group around Anishchik and Morozov; their combined 77th and 257th Tank Brigades would field sixtyfour tanks once brought up to strength. Two battalions, totalling about twenty SU-76 self-propelled guns, were added, as were about thirty SU-100 tank destroyers, a mortar brigade and seven rifle battalions. To overall command he appointed the conqueror of the Mishan defence zone, Lieutenant General Alexander Maximov.129 This new ‘Maximov Group’ went on the offensive on 18 August, advancing along the line of the railway, and reached Hengdaohezizhen that night. Opposition was minimal; according to Beloborodov, the defeat at Mudanjiang had broken the enemy ‘morally’, and the main obstacle was once again dreadful mountainous terrain.130 Shangzhi, some 150km east of Harbin, had

stalin’s war on japan - Press

126

Stalin’s War on Japan

been reached on 19 August when the Kwantung Army began surrendering en masse. The ultimate target, Harbin, had capitulated to General Shelakhov and his small air-landed detachment on 18 August, as already mentioned, but Meretskov wanted boots – and tank tracks – on the ground there urgently. Given the state of the roads, due to damage caused by both the rain and Japanese forces retreating along them, the ‘Maximov Group’ found itself struggling to comply. The lateral-thinking Yusternik was with Maximov, however, and he came up with much the same solution as was used by the 6th Guards Tank Army in respect of getting to Shenyang and beyond; they commandeered the necessary rolling stock and utilised the railway. The tanks were offloaded at the old Harbin station, on the south-eastern outskirts of the city, on the morning of 20 August and entered the city.131 There they joined forces with Shelakhov and his 120 men, plus the forward elements of the Amur Flotilla which arrived the same morning. The final advance of the 5th Army on Jilin was likewise in pursuit of reinforcing a small unit which had been air-landed there on 18–19 August.132 Similarly, it effected a junction with elements of another Soviet force, in this case detachments of the 25th Army which had arrived there on 20 August.133 At the outset of the campaign the First Far Eastern Front’s breakout and exploitation formation, the 10th Mechanised Corps, had been deployed to the rear of the 5th Army ready to be unleashed after the capture of Mudanjiang. This formation would then race westwards to rendezvous with the advancing Trans-Baikal Front.134 Meretskov realised in the first two days, however, that the capture of the city was going to be a fiercely contested business and so rejigged the plan. The corps was instead ordered to operate along with the 25th Army, and had started to deploy to that effect on 11 August.135 The advance of the 25th Army’s main body south-westwards towards Wangqing (Wangching) via Laoheishanzhen proved increasingly difficult, not because of enemy action but rather because of the complications occasioned in endeavouring to manoeuvre large mechanised forces through mountainous terrain on inadequate roads. Indeed, Chistyakov was attempting to progress the advance by the 39th Rifle Corps plus the 10th Mechanised Corps along the same route at the same time, but at several chokepoints this devolved down to a single road. Enemy passive defence took the form of attempting to render these routes impassable as they retreated along them. As the army commander put it: ‘bridges everywhere were blown up, many sections of roads were mined, roadblocks were erected . . . and every now and then there were wetlands, through which roads had to be constructed’.136 Overcoming these matters required significant engineering support. Fortunately for the attackers, active attempts to disrupt them in this difficult undertaking took the form of attacks by the ubiquitous ‘suicide bombers’ which were of little more than nuisance value. Any determined resistance

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

127

along the lines of that encountered by the 5th Army on the road to Mudanjiang would have been very difficult to surmount. Further, had the Kwantung Army possessed a functioning air force with which to strike at the lengthy columns strung out along the route, then the story might have been completely different. Instead, the 9th Air Army ruled the skies, whilst the Japanese ‘did not dare to enter the struggle for air supremacy’.137 By nightfall on 14 August the 259th Tank Brigade (the advanced detachment of the 39th Rifle Corps) along with the 72nd Mechanised Brigade (the forward element of the 10th Mechanised Corps) were within about 30km of Wangqing and moving forward. They encountered heavy resistance some 10km north-east of the town at 12:00 hours the following day and, having broken through after ‘persistent fighting’, occupied Wangqing at 17:00 hours. This was deemed an important gain; it further severed Japanese communication routes between northern Korea and Manchukuo and added to the ongoing dismemberment of the Kwantung Army.138 The Soviet forces pushed on towards the city of Yanji some 130km to the south-west. On 16 August they came up against a Japanese force blocking a mountain pass and were forced to fight their way through. Success was achieved the following day, at a cost to the defenders of some 600 dead and around 2,000 taken captive.139 Yanji, the location of the HQ of the Kwantung Army’s Third Army, capitulated on 17 August, along with the rest of the army. Indeed, the Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku, surrendered to Chistyakov in person after the latter headed the small team which air-landed there on that date. Murakami, who had served as Japan’s military attache´ in Moscow for several years, spoke Russian and it was during their conversation that Chistyakov enlightened him as to the 25th Army’s methodology vis-a`-vis the use of ‘Suvorov’s tactics’.140 What he didn’t tell him was that, owing to the unavoidable stringing out of forces, the 25th Army’s rear elements were still some 200km to the east. Those portions of the 10th Mechanised Corps that were to hand, however, were despatched the next day towards Dunhua and, beyond that, Jilin.141 As already noted above, they arrived there on 20 August where they came together with the 1st Army detachments. The southern arm of the 25th Army’s offensive, undertaken by Major General Grigoriy Shanin’s operational group based around the 393rd Rifle Division, operating in conjunction with the Pacific Fleet, had taken the Korean ports of Sonbong and Najin on 12 August. These quick successes, and the methodologies involved in gaining them, presaged an attack on Chongjin some 100km to the south. However, following the capture of the first Korean ports Meretskov decided not to proceed with the amphibious attack on Chongjin; in cancelling the operation he also withdrew the principal landing force allocated to it, the 335th Rifle Division. His rationale

stalin’s war on japan - Press

128

Stalin’s War on Japan

remains unclear and his memoirs are silent on the issue, as are Vasilevsky’s. The latter became involved when Admiral Yumashev, commander of the Pacific Fleet, approached him directly and obtained his sanction to proceed with the operation, but using naval resources only.142 The execution was, however, bungled and could easily have turned to disaster. As has been shown, during the course of the Great Patriotic War the Red Army had developed into a highly efficient war-fighting organisation, one which had, perforce, learned its business the hard way. The Soviet Navy by contrast had little combat experience, and although it had carried out amphibious operations, these had been on a comparatively small scale.143 In other words, the harsh lessons that led to British and American proficiency in the practice, at least as it pertained in the European theatre, had passed it by. This was particularly so in the case of assaulting and seizing a major port; they had not undergone a ‘Dieppe’ and thus knew not the lessons learned.144 Chief amongst these was that taking a defended port from the sea was not a practical operation of war; amphibious assaults after Dieppe generally went in over beaches. One of the failures identified in 1942 related to intelligence. This was also the case in respect of Chongjin: ‘There was no information about the enemy. There was nothing known even about the defences of the port, whether there were coastal batteries or forts.’145 The command arrangements for the operation were faulty as well. Overall control was vested in Yumashev, who remained at Vladivostok some 200km distant, and he appointed no local commander to coordinate and control matters on the spot. One advantage the Pacific Fleet did possess was a large air component, and this was used to reconnoitre the port and environs. Despite these efforts, however, it proved impossible to determine what defences were in place or the size of the enemy garrison. Scrutiny from the sea failed to clarify the situation. Torpedo boats sent to scout the harbour on 12 August reported that whilst there were no Japanese warships there, they could not determine the extent of the land-based defences, nor if there were any enemy forces there at all.146 Faced with this informational void, Yumashev decided to land a small force and follow it up as necessary. Accordingly, a company from the 390th Machine-Gun Battalion of the 13th Marine Brigade left Vladivostok at 07:00 hours on the morning of 13 August aboard six torpedo boats. This 181-strong detachment was led by Colonel A.Z. Denisin, the head of the Pacific Fleet’s intelligence section. The purpose of the mission was to conduct a battle reconnaissance in order to ascertain the strength and intentions of the enemy. Then, if conditions were favourable, the company would seize a bridgehead in the port and hold it until reinforcements arrived. The six boats, with a further four as escort, came under fire from defences located on the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

129

Komalsan peninsula (Cape Kolokoltsev to the Soviets), a promontory forming the east side of the harbour,147 as they approached Chongjin. The flotilla returned fire and laid a smokescreen, under cover of which at 13:40 hours the landing party was put ashore onto the quay at the fishing-boat harbour, overcoming slight opposition.148 This small group spread out whilst patrols moved north along the banks of the Susong river, which reached the sea just west of the harbour in question, towards the city proper. Denisin, meanwhile, radioed to Vladivostok that, despite being opposed, his force had landed at and secured the fishing harbour. Whilst this was considered good news, nobody at Pacific Fleet knew where that harbour actually was.149 Nevertheless, reinforcements were despatched to support the initial landing, although it would be many hours before they could arrive. There were, in fact, significant Japanese forces in and around the city, and it appears that the sheer improbability of the landing caught them off balance, allowing the invaders to take at least partial control of the port area and move some way inland. Once the defenders did realise what had happened, however, they moved to counterattack and quickly pushed to the waterfront. This split the Soviet marines into two groups, and their difficulties were compounded by the fact that neither group contained air-liaison personnel. Close support from the aviation arm of the Pacific Fleet was therefore impossible. At around 18:30 hours reinforcements arrived in the shape of a further ninety marines delivered by torpedo boat. These got ashore, but were unable to link up with either of the groups already there, so formed a third separate detachment in the harbour area. Overnight, the situation of these three units became desperate, with ammunition running short and casualties mounting. They managed to hold on, however, and a degree of relief arrived on the morning of 14 August with the landing of a marine battalion numbering some 710 personnel. This force got ashore, but was unable initially to liaise with those already there. They did, however, move forward from the harbour area, pushing the Japanese back about 2km. The latter regrouped and reinforced and then, with artillery assistance, including the guns of an armoured train, forced the Soviets back towards the sea. Fighting went on overnight, with the attackers being confined to a shallow zone around a kilometre deep, and about twice that wide, along the waterfront. There at least they had gunfire support from the vessels in the harbour area. Further help was also on the way from Vladivostok in the shape of a convoy of six frigates, two minesweepers, four submarine chasers and nine infantry landing craft. Aboard these ships were the 13th Marine Brigade, amounting to some 3,000 personnel. Also aboard was Lieutenant General Sergey Kabanov, commander of the Pacific Fleet’s coastal defences, to take command of the

stalin’s war on japan - Press

130

Stalin’s War on Japan

operation, plus seven T-26 tanks that he deemed ‘low-powered’.150 This force was landed into the harbour lodgement at 04:00 hours on 15 August. Fierce fighting followed, and only some 8 hours later was the perimeter expanded into the urban area to the north, with assistance from naval gunfire, which also destroyed the armoured train into the bargain. On the negative side, the sudden ingress of ships into the harbour began setting off aircraftlaid mines, deployed as part of the Americans’ Operation Starvation.151 Three ships were damaged by the detonation of either Mark 25 or Mark 26 mines.152 The Soviets were not aware of this at that time, of course, as ‘information about the minefields was only received from the American command on 21 August’.153 Two more ships were badly damaged by these mines the following day during operations to land more forces. These included three SU-76 selfpropelled guns; the Pacific Fleet did not have the capacity to transport and land heavy armoured vehicles, such as T-34 tanks and assault guns, leaving light vehicles as the only option.154 The fighting continued all through 16 August, the marines pushing north into the city and north-east onto the Komalsan peninsula, where the enemy stubbornly held one of the heights. According to Kabanov, the struggle for this position, as well as for mastery of the peninsula as a whole, was decided by the three SU-76s.155 Yumashev and the Pacific Fleet Command, having realised that they had severely underestimated the difficulties of the operation, put together and despatched two further convoys with reinforcements. By then, however, enemy resistance was slacking. It ceased altogether when forward detachments of Shanin’s operational group, having advanced overland from Najin, arrived on the scene on the night of 16/17 August; by 11:30 hours on the 17th they had advanced to the waterfront. The Soviets estimated that during the course of the fighting the Japanese lost over 3,000 officers and men killed, wounded or, eventually, captured.156 The Chongjin Soviet War Cemetery contains the graves of 352 Soviet personnel, 188 named and 164 unknown, who perished during the battles.157 Among the named Soviet casualties is 20-year-old Maria Tsukanova, the only female awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union during the course of the Manchurian Operation. She was wounded and captured on 14 August, and the Japanese tortured her for information on the invaders before killing her.158 This was a relatively modest ‘butcher’s bill’ given that in executing the assault on Chongjin the Pacific Fleet in general, and Admiral Yumashev in particular, contravened just about every principle of amphibious warfare apart from surprise.159 As the writers of the history of the Soviet Pacific Fleet understated it: ‘The landing operation suffered from a number of significant drawbacks, the main one being the excessive time taken in landing troops.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

131

The build-up of forces was slow, which put those already ashore in an extremely difficult position.’160 If Yumashev can be said to have been lucky with regards to the outcome of the Chongjin operation, then it can also be stated that he at least learned from it. There were two further Korean ports above the 38th Parallel that the Soviet high command wanted to establish a presence in as soon as possible: Songjin (since 1950 named Kimchaek) and Wonsan (Genzan). These, respectively, were around 180km and 375km south of Chongjin by sea. Kabanov, who had made his HQ at Chongjin and been appointed commander of the newly formed South Naval Defensive Area of the Pacific Fleet, was ordered to organise and execute the operation for occupying these two ports on the morning of 19 August.161 He had received what he termed ‘new good maps of North Korea’ by that time, study of which revealed that the nearest target was a village and unlikely to have ‘any operational tactical significance’. Given this information, he despatched a company of machine-gunners reinforced with light artillery and mortars, a total of about 300 troops, aboard the patrol ship Blizzard and six torpedo boats. Screened by a curtain of fog, these approached Songjin at 18:00 hours on 19 August and landed without incident. It was just a fishing village with a small harbour protected by a pier, and the last Japanese had left that morning. The population ‘soon filled the streets . . . welcoming the Soviet sailors’. Leaving behind a force to garrison the place, and two torpedo boats for their use, the flotilla returned to Chongjin.162 The situation at Wonsan was known to be very different in more ways than one. It had been an important naval base until the Americans destroyed the navy that used it. According to Soviet intelligence, it was defended by six coastal defence batteries with heavy guns up to 280mm calibre, minefields and a large garrison estimated to be about 6,000 strong. Attempting an amphibious assault was deemed out of the question: the Pacific Fleet simply did not have the resources.163 At 02:00 hours on 20 August Kabanov received an order from Yumashev; he was to organise and convey a battalion of marines to Wonsan and occupy the place by 09:00 hours on 21 August. A single battalion was deemed sufficient as the Japanese forces in Korea had been ordered to surrender on 19 August. Thus the expedition was a seaborne version of the air-landing operations previously mentioned, and would have a similar conclusion - or so it was hoped. Kabanov knew that, despite the surrender order, the Japanese might well still resist and so he increased the size of the force. All in all, around 2,000 troops were sent in a destroyer, a frigate, two minesweepers and six torpedo boats under the overall command of Captain A.F. Studenichnikov. Having left Chongjin at 12:00 hours on 20 August, the torpedo boats arrived at their destination at 09:00 hours the next morning. They went

stalin’s war on japan - Press

132

Stalin’s War on Japan

entirely unopposed and discharged their complement of marines, who secured the wharf area.164 The rest of the vessels arrived 3 hours later, by which time a crowd estimated to be some 5,000 strong had gathered to meet ‘the Soviet sailors with red flags in their hands’.165 It was not just flags: one of the sailors described seeing a member of the crowd carrying ‘an old, timeyellowed, portrait of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin’.166 The landing party fanned out, encountering as they went large groups of well-armed soldiers who more or less ignored the invaders – and vice versa – until two Japanese officers appeared waving a white flag. They were not there to surrender, however, but merely to convey a message to the senior Soviet officer that Wonsan would not capitulate until such time as an instruction from higher authority was received. Neither would the Japanese naval and military commanders meet with Studenichnikov, a mere captain being deemed far too junior to parley with a rear admiral and a colonel. The captain, who had full authority as Kabanov’s appointed delegate, demanded that the commanders appear on his flagship and eventually this was conceded, although not until the morning of 22 August. Meanwhile, Japanese troops had begun peacefully to surround the harbour area. The Soviet sailors and marines, in an equally serene manner, took up defensive positions. As Kabanov wrote: ‘An incomprehensible situation arose – neither peace nor war. The enemy has numerical superiority, but he neither fights nor wants to capitulate.’ Unsurprisingly, he continued, ‘the night passed in suspense’.167 Vladimir Uspensky, a naval radio operator, agreed: Perhaps none of the landing force slept that night. The Japanese did not sleep either. On three sides they surrounded the port, where the marines were entrenched. For each of our fighters, there were ten to fifteen enemy soldiers, for each machine gun two dozen enemy machine guns. There was no doubt that the Japanese could throw the landing into the sea with one blow. [. . .] People’s nerves were stretched to the limit. Any random shot fired during those hours, and hundreds of machine guns would have immediately opened up on both sides. To stop them would have been beyond any human power. But the shot did not sound. The Samurai, not having received an order, remained in place. And our fighters withstood the strain.168 This surreal situation was alleviated when Rear Admiral Hori Yugoro and Colonel Tado went aboard the frigate EK-3 and met with Studenichnikov on the morning of 22 August. They tried to bargain, but the Soviet captain threatened them with an immediate large-scale air strike and the commencement of hostilities at the port, unless they surrendered unconditionally. The last part was obviously an empty threat, but the Japanese signed anyway. The surrender of the garrison began that evening and ended four days later on

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, its State and an Empire

133

26 August. The Soviets acquired more than 7,000 officers and men as prisoners, plus all their military equipment.169 By that time air-landed detachments had arrived at the cities of Pyongyang and, further north, Kanggye (Kange) on 24 August. With this move, albeit applying a degree of geographical licence, Chistyakov claimed that ‘the troops of the 25th Army, on the orders of Marshal Meretskov, reached the 38th Parallel’.170

stalin’s war on japan - Press

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 10

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’ Russia has been like a giant with his nostrils pinched.1 We are going into battle to finish off the fascist Beast of the East.2 Following Lieutenant Colonel Karam Tavkhutdinov’s nocturnal investigation of 13 August (see Chapter 7), the initial elements of the amphibious assault on Shakhtyorsk (Toro), on the west coast of Sakhalin, went in at 05:00 hours on 16 August.3 The landing as a whole was under the overall command of Captain A.I. Leonov, with Tavkhutdinov in charge of the marines, and had been planned to take place in four stages, the first being a 140-strong reconnaissance detachment. Conveyed to the target in four patrol boats and their escort, the guard ship Zarnitsa, they debarked onto a wharf and adjacent sandbar and swiftly secured the area. Resistance was slight. The only defenders in the immediate vicinity surrendered quickly and by 06:00 hours the port was deemed secure. This success was radioed to the second wave waiting at Sovetskaya Gavan, some 120km distant across the Gulf of Tartary. This left immediately with the 365th Separate Marine Battalion embarked on fourteen torpedo boats. Meanwhile, the reconnaissance group secured the village some 3km to the east of the port, fighting along the way with a company-strength Japanese unit equipped with six heavy machine guns. Resistance was heavy but reinforcements were on the way; at 10:00 hours the second wave landed safely. The village of Shakhtyorsk was occupied by 12:00 hours, the Japanese retreating to the north-east. The technique of assaulting in separate waves or echelons (the third such, comprising the 2nd Battalion of the 113th Rifle Brigade, arrived at 19:00 hours, whilst the fourth, carrying artillery and heavy equipment, was scheduled for 17 August), with the resultant slow build-up of force, very much echoed the dubious methodology used at Chongjin. Having said that, the landing did indeed incorporate lessons learned in Korea inasmuch as it was only a preliminary move; the ultimate target was actually the much larger port city of Uglegorsk (Esutoru) some 10km to the south. Despite, as already related, airborne reconnaissance indicating that Uglegorsk was undefended with respect to seaborne attack, there was no

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Operations against southern Sakhalin (Karafuto) and the Kurils. (# Charles Blackwood)

reliable intelligence in respect of the defences and enemy strength there. This mirrored the experience at Chongjin, when calamity had only narrowly been avoided. To avoid a repetition, Vice Admiral Andreev and the command of the Northern Pacific Flotilla determined on landing and building up their forces away from their main objective, then moving overland to attack it in conjunction with seaborne attacks. Shakhtyorsk also appeared unprotected, and even if it wasn’t then the scale of defence was likely to be small in comparison with that of the port to its south. Therefore it would be an easier target – and so it indeed proved. The Soviet advance to the south was opposed at several small villages along the route. Another lesson from Korea had been learned: there were air liaison personnel with the invasion forces so the Northern Pacific Flotilla’s considerable aviation component was brought to bear. Also in support were the two 102mm guns of the Zarnitsa. By the morning of 17 August the combined landing forces were approaching and surrounding Uglegorsk, although the perennial fog and low cloud

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’

137

that afflicts Sakhalin precluded any air support. Nevertheless Tavkhutdinov ordered a two-pronged assault at 07:00 hours, which quickly broke into the urban area, turning into a series of street battles. Aviation support resumed at 08:00 hours when the weather cleared, and ‘precise bombing’ of enemy positions was undertaken. A third front in the battle was opened between 09:30 and 10:30 hours when two or three patrol boats landed a ninety-strong machine gun company at the harbour. Being unfamiliar with the navigation hazards, two of them ‘bent their propellers’ and had to be towed back to Sovetskaya Gavan for repair.4 In any event, Japanese resistance in the town and port ceased soon after the landing of the machine gun company. The capture of Shakhtyorsk and Uglegorsk created a ‘significant bridgehead’ that effectively severed enemy communications on the western coast of Sakhalin, as well as providing the Northern Pacific Flotilla with a naval base for future operations. It also afforded a foundation for the development of offensive action which would threaten the encirclement of Japanese forces engaged in the bitter and protracted struggle near the 50th Parallel. There, forward units of Major General Anatoli Diakonov’s 56th Rifle Corps, of the 16th Army, had continued to advance on 11–12 August into the Koton fortifications just south of the parallel, although progress was tortuous. Indeed, by 13 August operations had come almost to a standstill and it had been recognised that a new approach was required. This was the responsibility of Major General Ivan Baturov, whose 79th Rifle Division was leading the offensive. There was, however, no easy way forward and tactical outflanking, as opposed to that of the operational variety encompassed by amphibious landings, was problematical in the extreme. Assault groups were created around squads of infantry, combat engineers and artillery troops with 45mm antitank guns, each supported by two T-34 tanks. To back up these units, all the available artillery was concentrated under a single command so as to bring down concentrated and coordinated bombardment as and when required. The infantry would advance, clearing ‘suicide bombers’ and ‘cuckoos’ as they went, whilst combat engineers destroyed or cleared anti-tank obstacles and minefields. Any pillboxes and the like encountered would be dealt with by the tanks, which would advance to engage them with direct fire through their embrasures, or by the anti-tank gunners. The artillery, which was largely confined to deploying along the road due to the swampy ground on each side of it, would supply indirect fire as necessary. Baturov intended attacking on the morning of 16 August, but his plan was disrupted by a Japanese infantry counterattack which, although made in strength, failed in the face of Soviet firepower. Having seen off the counterattack, the 79th Rifle Division counterpunched, launching assaults all along the front. These frontal attacks were complemented by nocturnal flanking

stalin’s war on japan - Press

138

Stalin’s War on Japan

manoeuvres whereby infantry units, dragging and carrying their equipment along with them, waded through the swamps in waist-deep water. Their sudden appearance in the rear of their defences caught the Japanese by surprise; they believed that traversing such terrain, particularly at night, was impossible.5 The fighting in respect of the frontal attacks was both confusing – the Japanese used Soviet radio frequencies to give counterfeit orders to units attacking them – and brutal, especially for the attacking infantry (and, no doubt, the defenders). Each Soviet rifleman carried 500–600 rounds of ammunition, plus four grenades and two mortar bombs, whilst a submachinegunner hefted 800 rounds weighing some 30kg. Units that had been at the front since the beginning of the operation suffered most. Getting rations to forward elements was difficult and they went hungry on some days, having to forage for ‘trophy rice’ in overrun Japanese positions. Given that sleep was only possible in fits and starts on the bare ground, always in the cold and often in pouring rain, it is unsurprising that some cracked under the strain: There were cases when some soldiers raved, crying out for their mother. One of the machine gunners had to be led literally by the arms – he was on the verge of insanity, and raved all the way, sobbing and shuddering at the slightest noise.6 Dreadful though the conditions were, the offensive produced results. By the evening of 16 August the assault groups had cleared a ‘corridor’ through the main defences allowing the follow-up forces to pass through. There were, though, still abundant active positions on both flanks, as well as numerous strongpoints ahead. Both these factors precluded any general advance by the 79th Rifle Division, or indeed by the 56th Rifle Corps and the 16th Army as a whole. Operations to eradicate the remaining enemy positions continued until the Japanese commander decided to seek terms. The final capitulation came on 19 August, bringing with it some 3,000 prisoners.7 Having broken through the main defences, Baturov organised an advanced detachment around the reinforced 214th Tank Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel Abdul Timirgaleev and sent it south towards the ultimate objective of Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk (Toyohara). Given the distance involved, some 360km, the Northern Pacific Flotilla organised a further amphibious assault on the port of Kholmsk (Maoka) in order to expedite the capture and occupation of south Sakhalin. Kholmsk was situated almost due west of the capital, and separated from it by a mountain range, but the road journey from the port was only around 100km. Replicating previous methodology to a degree, the attack was to be in five waves or echelons. These would land the troops of the combined marine battalion and infantry of the 113th Rifle Brigade directly onto the wharves of

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’

139

Kholmsk’s southern harbour, there being a second around a kilometre to the north, and support them via ship-to-shore bombardment. The entire operation as planned was covered by significant air support. In fact, the formidable Sakhalin weather put paid to aviation, as the approach on the morning of 20 August was made in thick fog. Whilst this preserved security, it caused some confusion when one of the boats got separated, entered the northern harbour in error and ran aground. Notwithstanding this glitch, the rest of the first wave moored in the correct harbour and disembarked the assault troops at 07:30 hours without incident.8 These quickly fanned out and secured the immediate area whilst the ships offered artillery support as required. Within 40 minutes the harbour area and several adjacent buildings had been captured. In a departure from previous practice the second and third waves followed quickly, which ensured a rapid build-up of forces on the shore. By 12:00 hours the port area had been secured and the marines began advancing eastwards into the city, whilst the infantry advanced on their flanks. The Japanese were caught by surprise, and resistance was at first insignificant but it steadily grew as two enemy infantry battalions, about 1,000 strong in total, supported by artillery, mortars and machine-guns, fought back. The fog, as stated, precluded Soviet aviation support and also interfered with bombardment from the water, visibility being down to 50–60m on occasion. Despite these hindrances, the attackers prevailed and by 14:00 hours the Japanese had begun to retreat eastwards along the railway and road, leaving some 300 dead in their wake. The 113th Rifle Brigade pursued them through the mountains for 20–25km as far as the villages of Chaplanovo (Chaplakovo, Futamata) and Pyatirechye (Osaka), where the defenders, occupying heights on the passes, made a stand. This brought the Soviet advance to a halt. Heavy fighting continued for three days, supported by Soviet air strikes when the weather allowed, and only on the night of 23 August were the enemy at Chaplanovo finally defeated. By that time the Northern Pacific Flotilla command had decided to once again demonstrate its newly learned expertise in amphibious warfare by landing at Korsakov (Otomari). Three battalions of marines, amounting to some 1,600 officers and men, including those withdrawn from the land operation, left Kholmsk aboard a minelayer, eight minesweepers, four patrol boats and six torpedo boats at 05:30 hours on 23 August for the 250km sea voyage. The Sakhalin weather intervened again with a fierce storm and the flotilla, after battling the elements all day and night, was forced to seek refuge in the port of Nevelsk (Honto), situated about 40km south of their departure point, on the morning of 24 August. The inhabitants, civilian and military, surrendered at the appearance of the vessels. The storm abated that evening and at 20:00 hours, leaving a company of sailors as garrison, the ships left Nevelsk. They arrived off Korsakov at 06:00 hours on 25 August and began offloading

stalin’s war on japan - Press

140

Stalin’s War on Japan

the marines. The timing was fortuitous inasmuch as it coincided with the arrival of forward elements of the 113th Rifle Brigade in the eastern outskirts of the city. By 10:00 hours Korsakov was occupied, and its garrison of 3,400 officers and men had surrendered. Shortly afterwards the 214th Tank Brigade under Abdul Timirgaleev arrived at Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. By noon what the Soviets termed the ‘liberation of South Sakhalin from the Japanese invaders’ was complete and for some 18,000 Japanese officers and men the war was over. That did not, however, apply to the Soviet forces that had landed at Kholmsk and Korsakov. Whilst the marines were en voyage from the former to the latter, and the 135th Rifle Brigade had been making a similar journey overland, orders for a further mission had been drafted on the instructions of Stalin himself, who had become seriously perturbed. The irritant was the failure to include the Kuril Islands in those areas that would surrender to Soviet forces in President Truman’s General Order No. 1, as promulgated on 15 August, which had aggravated his innate suspicion in respect of American intentions. This was so much so that Vasilevsky was instructed to organise landings on the Kurils so that, as with Port Arthur, Soviet occupation took a physical form in terms of boots on the ground.9 Despite the subsequent rectification of the omission by Truman (see Chapter 8), the mistrust endured, as did the directive in respect of occupying the islands.10 Where Stalin drew back, however, was in relation to Hokkaido. The order to Vasilevsky, referred to above, had charged him with preparing an operation ‘to occupy the northern half of Hokkaido from Kushiro to Rumoi and the southern part of the Kuril Islands’, which he in turn passed down to Meretskov for implementation.11 Truman’s somewhat peremptory rejection of his demand for a portion of Hokkaido undoubtedly annoyed the Soviet dictator; he wrote back to the President exclaiming that ‘my colleagues and I did not expect such an answer’.12 What he did not do, though, was pursue the matter in either the epistolary (and therefore diplomatic/political) or military sense.13 Although scholars have debated the rationale behind Stalin’s ‘retreat’,14 viewed in the context of his stated geo-strategic goal of securing the Soviet Union’s sea-lines of communication vis-a`-vis the Pacific, then it becomes comprehensible. Churchill had once referred to the Soviet Union’s difficulties in that regard, albeit elsewhere, as equating to that of a ‘giant with his nostrils pinched’.15 As a glance at the map will demonstrate, possession of the Kurils would go a long way to them being ‘unpinched’ in the Far East, and so their acquisition was crucial. Much the same applied to the occupation of southern Sakhalin; the Soviet Union would then control the northern side of the La Pe´rouse (or Soya) Strait connecting the Sea of Japan on the west with the Sea of Okhotsk on the east. The strait’s other shore, a mere 43km distant

stalin’s war on japan - Press

The landing on Shumshu. (# Charles Blackwood)

at the narrowest point, was formed by the northern coast of Hokkaido, possession of which would have undeniably reinforced the security of communications and so was eminently desirable. But the price of any unilateral action in that regard would involve a massive and public breach with the Americans, the consequences of which could not be readily calculated. Given that Stalin’s claim to the Kurils was based entirely on the agreement reached at Yalta, which Truman honoured, then his decision not to completely shatter relations with the US can be located in the realm of strategic self-interest. Giving concrete form to that agreement, the flotilla that had departed Korsakov arrived off the west coast of the island of Iturup (Etorofu) at 03:15 hours on 28 August. The landing, which took place using small boats, went unopposed and was met only by Japanese officers who indicated that they wished to surrender the garrison of some 13,500 men. In fact, the occupation of the southern Kuril Islands, comprising Iturup, Kunashir (Kunashiri), Shikotan and the islets of the Habomai group, was carried out peacefully, albeit slowly, the Habomai islets being taken over only on 5 September.16 This was in vivid contrast to that which pertained in respect of the attack on the northern islands, or rather one of them in particular: Shumshu. Shumshu is the northernmost island in the Kuril chain, separated from Cape Lopatka, the southernmost tip of the Kamchatka Peninsula, by the 11km-wide First Kuril Strait. Only some 388 sq. km in area and roughly oval in shape (20km by 13km), Shumshu’s proximity to Soviet territory ensured that it, like its close neighbour to the south across the narrow Second Kuril Strait, the much larger (2,053 sq. km) Paramushir, was strongly defended. The

stalin’s war on japan - Press

142

Stalin’s War on Japan

garrison on Shumshu was in the region of 8,500 strong, whilst that of the larger island numbered about 14,500.17 Given that the strait between the two islands is only about 2.5km across at its narrowest point, then these garrisons were mutually supportive. As Slavinsky puts it: ‘Shumshu and Paramushir with their naval bases located opposite each other on both sides of the Second Kuril Strait . . . were, in essence, a single key position . . .’; however, taking the first predetermined the success of the capture of subsequent islands.18 There were a number of airfields on the islands, but very few aircraft; these had been withdrawn earlier to the Japanese main islands in preparation for the expected ‘final battle’ with the Americans.19 What the Japanese did have on Shumshu, though, was a tank force in the shape of the 11th Tank Regiment commanded by Colonel Sueo Ikeda. This comprised thirty-nine medium tanks, nineteen Type-97 Chi-Ha and twenty Type-97 ShinHoTo Chi-Ha (improved Type-97), and twenty-five Type-95 Ha-Go light tanks.20 Both Shumshu and Paramushir had been equipped with permanent defensive works both along the coast and inland. On Shumshu these encompassed thirty-four bunkers and twenty-four pillboxes within several powerful strongpoints that featured around 100 guns of varying calibres up to 100mm. There were around 300 prepared firing points for both heavy and light machine guns. Most of Shumshu’s coast is bordered by cliffs, so the strongest defences were obviously concentrated on areas deemed vulnerable to amphibious assault. Indeed, a battery had been installed in the wreck of the Soviet tanker Mariupol, which had become stranded on the beach between Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari on the north-east of the island in 1943. Although the island is fairly flat, it possesses several hills, their sides almost bare of trees, and on these heights were further strongpoints. This small island had 120km of roads, meaning that terrestrial communication between various points was relatively easy; in addition, the garrison had constructed many dummy installations to fool reconnaissance efforts.21 All in all, Shumshu was no easy target in respect of amphibious warfare, which was in any event characterised by the commander-in-chief of its foremost practitioner, as being ‘the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare’.22 Indeed, contemporary American doctrine prescribed, amongst other things, preliminary preparation of the target by air and naval gunfire followed by air bombardment and naval gunfire in close support of any landing.23 These bombardments, aerial and naval, could in practice assume colossal proportions. For example, before the landing on Iwo Jima on 19 February 1945 the US Navy deployed Task Force 54 to provide gunfire support. Based around six battleships and four heavy cruisers, deploying main batteries totalling sixty-six guns between 305mm and 356mm calibre and thirty-eight of 203mm calibre, this force bombarded the island, which

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’

143

was only 21 sq. km in area, for three days in conjunction with massive air attacks. In fact, even that had been deemed, and eventually proved, insufficient in destroying the defences.24 The Soviet Pacific Fleet had nothing even remotely comparable to Task Force 54. Its largest vessels were the cruisers Kaganovich and Kalinin, each with main batteries of nine 180mm guns, but neither of them was operational in 1945. The next largest vessels were destroyers.25 Nor, as already discussed, did the fleet have experience of amphibious warfare techniques other than what had been gained in operations already described. Even that was virtually discarded in respect of attacking Shumshu; charge of the operation was vested in the commander of the Kamchatka defensive region, Major General Alexey Gnechko, headquartered at PetropavlovskKamchatsky. His orders, handed down the chain of command from Moscow to Vasilevsky, and then on via Purkayev and Yumashev, instructed him to take possession of the islands of Shumshu and Paramushir, subsequently followed by Onekotan. The commander of the Petropavlovsk naval base, Captain Dmitry Ponomarev, was to select the landing points on the islands, whilst the landing force commander was named as Major General Porfiry Dyakov. The latter’s command, the 101st Rifle Division (less one of its three regiments), along with a battalion of marines, was to constitute the amphibious assault force. The order was sent at 07:40 hours on 15 August and Gnechko’s plan detailing how he intended to carry it into effect was expected back at Second Far Eastern Front’s HQ by 16:00 hours the same day.26 This was asking a lot. The three main commanders were all ‘easterners’ and had no recent combat experience in general, and in amphibious warfare in particular. Nor had any of the forces under their command; thus far they had been engaged only in coastal defence duties. Further, there was insufficient shipping available in the area to efficiently transport and support a force of nearly 3,000 officers and men (and their equipment, 205 artillery pieces and mortars) some 270km by sea and then land them on a hostile coast. In addition, Gnechko was expected to put together and submit a plan for achieving the objectives of the mission in just a few hours.27 There were, though, two factors on the positive side of the equation, the first being Soviet air superiority as embodied in the 128th Mixed Aviation Division and a Naval Aviation Regiment (seventy-eight aircraft in total).28 Equipped with Bell P-63 Kingcobra fighters and Douglas A-20 Havoc and North American B-25 Mitchell medium attack and bomber aircraft (supplied by the US under Lend-Lease), these offered powerful support. Also included were six Beriev MBR-2 flying boats. Deploying this support successfully was a different matter: ‘There were very peculiar climatic conditions in the Far East and Sakhalin; almost every airfield had its own special

stalin’s war on japan - Press

144

Stalin’s War on Japan

microclimate. In the coastal zone, frequent outbursts of moist sea air, forming a curtain of thick fog, caused a lot of trouble.’29 The second factor was the possibility, expressed in Purkayev’s order, that the invasion force would be simply exploiting an already favourable situation: the capitulation of Japan. If so, then it wouldn’t have to fight, which would mean that the shambolic way it was assembled and despatched was irrelevant. To quote Slavinsky: ‘the Soviet command hoped that the northern Kuril Islands would be occupied by the troops of the Kamchatka Defensive Region with little opposition from the enemy, who were supposedly depressed and demoralised by the Japanese government’s surrender decision [announced on 15 August]’.30 Gnechko had been forced to ask for a 24-hour delay, which was granted, and the invasion flotilla, sixty-four ships in total, left PetropavlovskKamchatsky at around 05:00 hours on 17 August.31 Just about anything that was at hand and capable of putting to sea seems to have been included in the task force. It included two NKVD32 border patrol ships, four minesweepers, a minelayer, a submarine, seventeen merchant vessels and sixteen large landing craft infantry, which had been transferred to the Soviet fleet under the auspices of Operation Hula (see Chapter 1). The task force was divided into four groups: transport and landing,33 escort,34 minesweeping35 and fire support.36 There were only three vessels in this latter group, the NKVD ships Kirov and Dzerzhinsky and the minelayer Okhotsk, which together could field only six 102mm guns (the patrol ships), plus three 130mm and two 76.2mm guns (Okhotsk). This paucity of firepower was largely responsible for the selection of the landing area: the beach where the Mariupol lay between Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari. This came under the guns of Coastal Battery No. 945 at Cape Lopatka, directly across the First Kuril Strait. Constructed in 1943, this installation had four 130mm guns in individual armoured turrets which were easily capable of firing across the strait in direct support.37 The landing force was itself split into four sections to be delivered separately: an advanced detachment, the first and second echelons of the main force, and a group that would conduct a diversionary attack at Nakagawa Wan, the only bay on the south-eastern part of the island and close to the base at Kataoka. There was flexibility in the plan inasmuch as where the second echelon would be landed, and when, depended upon the success or otherwise of those forces preceding it.38 It was also the case that intelligence on Japanese defences was poor.39 The heterogeneous nature of the expedition meant a slow voyage, as some of the merchant vessels could only make 5 or 6 knots, and strict radio silence was enforced throughout. Communication by semaphore became problematic when at 23:35 hours a thick fog descended. The ships thereafter were led by the radar-equipped minesweeper T-525, which switched on her stern

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’

145

lights to provide a marker for the rest to follow. The diversionary attack was cancelled due to the fog, the risk of running onto rocks being considered too great.40 The fog worked both ways. Whilst it allowed the invasion flotilla to proceed undetected, it also precluded the possibility of air support. In any event, the first landing craft approached the beach at 04:22 hours on 18 August still hidden in the murk, but were forced to halt some 100–150m from shore in water up to 2m deep; they had been overloaded which prevented them getting closer in. The troops of the advanced detachment had then to wade, heavily burdened, to dry land. This went on undisturbed until personnel on one of the landing craft opened fire; this, spreading to the other ships, alerted the defenders, who replied with ‘promiscuous’ machine-gun fire.41 Nevertheless, by 05:00 hours, and having suffered only ‘insignificant’ losses, the advanced detachment was ashore and its main force, under Major Pyotr Shutov, was moving off the beach into the interior of the island. Two groups of marines moved left and right to deal with enemy positions on the capes flanking the landing ground. They managed to destroy several firing points, but were too few to overcome the stronger resistance nests protecting the gun positions. A series of hills inland formed the initial objective of the advance. Close artillery support had been rendered virtually impossible; the need to wade ashore through deep water had ensured that the radio sets had been well soaked and now, apart from a single unit of the twenty-two brought ashore, they failed to work. Direct fire from the three support ships, plus fire from Battery No. 945 at Cape Lopatka, was directed onto visible enemy positions, including the lighthouse on Cape Kokutan which burst into flames, providing ‘a good guide in the fog for the ships approaching with the first echelon’.42 The guns mounted on the Mariupol were also relatively easy to silence, but the bunkers containing the majority of Japanese artillery were effectively invisible and continued to fire unimpeded.43 At 05:30 hours this fire was turned onto the next wave of landing craft, which were packed with men and supplies. Five received direct hits, with two bursting into flames, immediately causing their cargoes of ammunition to begin exploding. Some of those that weren’t burning were rendered immobile and thus even easier targets. The troops evacuated into the sea, and the lucky ones scrambled on to the pair of barges that had accompanied the expedition. By whatever means available they headed for the beach. By 09:00 hours all those that were going to make it had done so, but they were armed only with their personal weapons. Coordination broke down, and the commander of the first echelon, Colonel K.D. Merkuryev, was stuck aboard a damaged ship and could not land, so the junior officers ashore rallied their troops and followed the advanced detachment. This left the enemy installations on either side

stalin’s war on japan - Press

146

Stalin’s War on Japan

of the beach intact, leaving the beachhead vulnerable; just as the last of the first echelon were clearing the beach, the vessels carrying the second arrived. The initial advance inland from the beachhead, leaving the enemy batteries on the flanks intact, was later criticised as ‘a tactical mistake’ made by the advanced detachment and, implicitly, its commander Major Shutov.44 This judgement is surely in error. It seems improbable that Shutov knew in any detail about the Anzio campaign of January 1944, although it is possible that he had at least heard of it. On that occasion a large Allied force was landed over the beaches in an effort that was intended to culminate in the capture of Rome. Having achieved tactical surprise, the Allied commander, Major General John P. Lucas, then chose to consolidate and build up his forces in the beachhead before advancing inland against minimal opposition. He thus gifted time to the enemy, who took full advantage so that when the advance began there were sufficient hostile forces to stall the effort.45 As Churchill, who was a chief proponent of the operation, famously put it: ‘it is a root principle to push out and join issue with the enemy . . . I hoped we were hurling a wild cat onto the shore, but all we had got was a stranded whale’.46 Although Anzio was on a totally different scale from the attack on Shumshu, the lessons were nevertheless clear and Shutov, whether knowingly or not, applied them. It followed that the inevitable enemy counterattacks were met by a ‘wild cat’ some 4–5km ahead, rather than a ‘whale’ stranded on a shallow, disorganised beachhead extending only a few hundred metres inland. Be that as it may, the Japanese artillery on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari played hell with the second echelon: a patrol boat and four landing craft were lost, whilst eight more were seriously damaged.47 For a second time that morning Soviet troops were forced to extemporise means of getting to dry land, but on this occasion the commander of the echelon, Colonel P.A. Artyushen, and his HQ managed to also land (from a torpedo boat).48 It took until 13:00 hours to get the second echelon disembarked, by which time its forward units had joined those forces advancing on the high ground to the south-west. Artyushen had by then assumed command of all forces ashore, which were now numerous but still lacking heavy weapons; only four 45mm anti-tank guns had been landed.49 Unsurprisingly, the Japanese counterattacked as soon as possible, with the advanced forward units under Shutov bearing the brunt. In a reversal of the combat situations previously encountered throughout the duration of the war with Japan, Soviet infantry now faced several Japanese tank attacks. One of these was led in person by the commander of the 11th Tank Regiment, Colonel Sueo Ikeda, waving a samurai sword and Japanese flag from the turret, according to some accounts.50 Fortunately for the Soviets, these were feeble machines, certainly in comparison to the T-34, and although they were certainly capable of causing problems for unsupported infantry, they proved

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East’

147

vulnerable to Degtyarev PTRD-41 anti-tank rifles and RPG-43 anti-tank grenades.51 The tank-led attacks were repelled, with Colonel Sueo perishing in the process, and despite being pushed back somewhat, the Soviets endured.52 For heroism in this difficult combat situation, during which he was wounded three times, Shutov was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union with the Order of Lenin and the Golden Star medal.53 The weather cleared sufficiently in the late morning to allow Soviet air strikes, in groups of eight to sixteen aircraft, to take place that afternoon. These were principally directed at the Kataoka and Kashiwabar naval bases, preventing the transfer of Japanese reinforcements from Paramushir. It remained sufficiently cloudy, though, to prevent any close battlefield support. There the situation, as Zakharov et al. phrased it, ‘remained tense’.54 The thinning fog also allowed seven Japanese aircraft to appear at 10:30 hours, and these attempted to strike at the shipping congregated off the landing beach. Their first efforts were aimed at the Kirov but were unsuccessful and they were driven off by anti-aircraft fire. A second attempt at 12:00 hours was devoted to an attack on the minesweeper T-525. This also failed, with two of the attackers brought down by gunfire.55 It was clear by nightfall on 18 August that the Soviet landing had succeeded to the extent that it wasn’t going to be thrown back into the sea. The invasion force now occupied a beachhead some 4km wide by about 5km deep, and was capable of defending it against anything the Japanese could immediately muster despite the majority of the artillery still being stuck offshore. At least some of this would be transported ashore overnight, and Gnechko at Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky ordered that sufficient be landed to resume the offensive, and that the island be occupied by the end of 19 August. He also despatched a number of self-propelled barges and kungas (shallow-draft boats used for fishing or transport) to aid the unloading, although they couldn’t arrive until next morning. In order to eliminate further artillery attacks on shipping, the Japanese strongpoints on Cape Kokutan and Cape Kotomari were attacked and destroyed during the hours of darkness by assault groups formed for the purpose.56 The renewed assault on the morning of 19 August was called off when Japanese officers approached Soviet units under flags of truce. Simultaneously, radio broadcasts were made stating that the Japanese armed forces were surrendering unconditionally from 16:00 hours that day and a written note confirming the end of military operations was handed to the Soviet commander. Negotiations between representatives of both sides followed, and at 18:00 hours Japanese officers formally surrendered the garrisons of Shumshu, Paramushir and Onekotan.57 The battle for Shumshu, the last battle of the Second World War, seemed to be over. There was, however, a postscript.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

148

Stalin’s War on Japan

Arrangements were made for the 128th Mixed Aviation Division to transfer aircraft to, and take control of, the airfield near Kataoka, whilst naval forces would occupy the base there. At 01:30 hours on 20 August orders were issued for six vessels, headed by Kirov, Dzerzhinsky and Okhotsk, to proceed to Kataoka and embark troops for transfer to Paramushir and Onekotan. These set out at 06:00 hours to meet a Japanese pilot who would navigate them through the narrow Second Kuril Strait to the base. When he failed to appear at the rendezvous, the flotilla moved at 08:00 hours into the strait un-piloted and headed for their destination. Ten minutes later batteries on both sides of the narrow waterway opened a heavy fire on the Soviet ships. They responded in kind but were forced to lay a smokescreen and withdraw under its cover; Kirov and Okhotsk were both hit and damaged, the latter suffering two killed and thirteen wounded, but they remained under control. One enemy battery was destroyed by the 130mm guns of the minelayer, but the Japanese attack further intensified when an aircraft appeared and launched a torpedo. Okhotsk evaded this attack and all six vessels returned to the First Kuril Strait, arriving there at 11:15 hours.58 This breach of the surrender agreement provoked a response: the land forces launched an offensive at 13:00 hours, in conjunction with air strikes. The bases at Kataoka and Kashiwabar were hit by sixty-one aircraft which dropped more than 200 bombs, and the troops pushed forward some 5–6km before the Japanese commander, Lieutenant General Tsutsumi Fusaki, intervened to assure the Soviets that the Japanese would, in fact, lay down their arms. Recalcitrance in actually doing so, however, continued until at 19:00 hours on 21 August Tsutsumi was handed an ultimatum demanding that he immediately order an unconditional surrender. His reply 3 hours later confirmed this and at 14:00 hours on 22 August the Japanese forces began actually laying aside their weapons.59 If nothing else, the operations to capture Shumshu provide a case study in how not to conduct amphibious warfare. Perhaps unsurprisingly, Soviet casualties exceeded those of their enemy: 1,567 dead and wounded, compared to 1,018. Roughly a third of the Soviet casualties perished (516), with the majority probably occurring during the chaotic landing phase, although since that figure doesn’t include those who later died of their wounds, it could be greater. The equivalent Japanese figure was 256.60 With the fall of Shumshu the concluding battle of the Second World War was finally over. The rest of the northern Kurils were occupied peacefully, and with that the ‘fascist Beast of the East’ had indeed been put down and Russia’s nostrils ‘unpinched’ accordingly.

stalin’s war on japan - Press

Chapter 11

‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’ The Red Army came to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressors. Such an event is unprecedented in the history of China; its influence is immeasurable.1 One of the greatest mistakes that was ever made was to permit the Soviet Union to come down into China at Port Arthur, Dairen and other places of that sort.2 The formalities were observed on 2 September aboard the battleship Missouri in Tokyo Bay. The ‘Japanese Instrument of Surrender’ was signed by Japan’s foreign minister on behalf of the Emperor and the Japanese government, and by the chief of the army general staff on behalf of Imperial General Headquarters. General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, supreme commander of the Allied powers, then signed, followed by nine other senior Allied officers. The fourth signature was that of Lieutenant General Kuzma Derevyanko on behalf of the Soviet Union.3 Derevyanko had been appointed as representative of the high command of the Soviet Forces in the Far East to MacArthur’s HQ and was to serve as a member of the Allied Council for Japan during the occupation. His appointment was probably based on the fact that he was one of the few senior Red Army officers fluent in both English and Japanese.4 The four-member Allied Council (the US, USSR, China and British Commonwealth (encompassing Australia, New Zealand, India and the UK) as set up in 1946 was supposed to give guidance and advice to the supreme commander, who was both chair and US delegate.5 That the man dubbed the ‘American Caesar’6 would take even the slightest notice of any such body was a vain hope. Recently elevated to five-star rank (18 December 1944), Douglas MacArthur was well known for demonstrating autocratic propensities, and was moreover convinced of his own infallibility. He ignored even the US government when it suited him.7 What this meant in practice was that the Soviet Union (along with everyone else) was totally excluded from any say in postwar Japan, just as it had been from having an occupation zone there by the rejection of its northern Hokkaido proposal. Notwithstanding this, Stalin had basically achieved everything he had set out to achieve by declaring war on 9 August 1945. His

stalin’s war on japan - Press

150

Stalin’s War on Japan

victory speech of 2 September, which was couched in patriotic terms, set this out plainly: Japan commenced her aggression against our country as far back as 1904, during the Russo-Japanese War . . . As we know, in the war against Japan, Russia was defeated. Japan took advantage of the defeat of Tsarist Russia to seize from Russia the southern part of Sakhalin and establish herself on the Kuril Islands, thereby putting the lock on all our country’s outlets to the ocean in the East, which meant also all outlets to the ports of Soviet Kamchatka and Soviet Chukotka.8 It was obvious that Japan was aiming to deprive Russia of the whole of her Far East [. . .] the defeat of the Russian troops in 1904 during the Russo-Japanese War left bitter memories in the minds of our people. [. . .] We of the older generation waited for this day for forty years, and now this day has arrived. Today Japan admitted defeat and signed an act of unconditional surrender. This means that the southern part of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands revert to the Soviet Union and henceforth will serve not as a barrier between the Soviet Union and the ocean and as a base for Japanese attack upon our Far East but as a direct means of communication between the Soviet Union and the ocean and a base for the defence of our country against Japanese aggression.9 There was, of course, no mention of the diplomatic failure relating to northern Hokkaido. Nor did Stalin refer to Korea or, except in passing, to China, yet the success of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation was to have profound consequences for both, albeit in different ways. In terms of Korea, as with southern Sakhalin and the Kurils, Stalin pursued an essentially Tsarist aim: the maintenance of a balance of power on the peninsula to prevent any single power gaining complete control over it.10 This was much in accordance with his European policy of establishing buffer zones, consisting of ‘friendly’ (for which read Soviet-dominated) states, on the borders of the Soviet Union. Where Tsar Nicholas II failed miserably (Korea became a protectorate of Japan in 1905 and was formally annexed in 191011), Stalin had now succeeded. Having said that, the transition from north Korea as the Soviet occupation zone to North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic, was convoluted and the end result by no means preordained.12 What sped it along somewhat was, perhaps paradoxically, the fact that Soviet knowledge of Korea and its people was poor. There was no local Communist party organisation as such, and no Korean Communist ‘enjoyed any standing in Kremlin circles before 1945’.13 In remedying the latter deficiency, at least in part, recourse was had to the personnel of the 88th Separate Rifle Brigade attached to the Second Far Eastern Front.14 Formed at the end of July 1942, the brigade was also dubbed

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’

151

‘international’ because it contained personnel of Chinese and Korean origin whose function was to perform clandestine and subversive missions in Manchukuo and Korea. It included four infantry battalions plus a battalion of machine-gunners, supported by mortar, combat engineering and anti-tank rifle companies. The members were trained in parachuting, radio operating and hand-to-hand combat. In overall command of the brigade was the Chinese Communist Zhou Baozhong, one of the leaders of the anti-Japanese partisan movement in Manchukuo.15 The brigade’s 1st Battalion incorporated the Korean contingent – about sixty personnel, of whom at least ten have been identified as rising to high office in the North Korean regime.16 The commander of the 1st Battalion rose highest of all following his arrival in Pyongyang, via Vladivostok and Wonsan, in late September 1945.17 Known then, via transliteration of his name into Chinese, as Captain Jin Zhi-cheng, history records him as Kim Il Sung.18 Moscow used him to maintain a compliant government in the north of the peninsula and shored up the military strength of his regime.19 The situation in China was very different. As noted, and Manchuria excepted, Japanese army units there were to surrender to Chinese forces under the command of Chiang Kai-shek rather than to those controlled by Mao Zedong. There were, though, substantial areas of China not under Chiang’s control and where his government had no presence, nor any easy means of establishing one. As President Truman put it in his memoirs: The problem of communism in China differed considerably from political problems elsewhere. Chiang Kai-shek was not confronted by a militant political minority scattered throughout the population but by a rival government that controlled a definite portion of the territory, with about one fourth of the total population.20 In an effort to assist Chiang, and enable him to offset the advantage the Communists enjoyed in large areas of the country, the American 10th Air Force airlifted Nationalist troops to strategic points throughout China, with elements arriving in Beijing by 9 September.21 What the Americans couldn’t do, though, was get Nationalist forces into Manchuria. Indeed, Chiang’s armies, whether under their own steam or with US assistance, could only enter the region at all with Soviet acquiescence. In a similar manner, the Communists could only organise there if the Red Army allowed them to, and that was far from being a foregone conclusion; the nature of the relationship between Mao and Stalin, and thus the Soviet government and the Chinese Communist Party, was complex and hardly frictionless.22 Nevertheless, in moves that ‘radically affected the outcome of the [Chinese] civil war’, Stalin, after much vacillating, eventually allowed massive transfers of captured Japanese weapons and equipment to Communist forces.23 According

stalin’s war on japan - Press

152

Stalin’s War on Japan

to Vasilevsky, the booty taken from the Kwantung Army amounted to 3,700 guns, mortars and grenade launchers, 600 tanks, 861 aircraft, about 1,200 machine guns, plus the contents of almost 680 military depots and the ships of the Sungaria Flotilla.24 These were all handed over, as was a ‘significant’ amount of Soviet weaponry.25 The Communist grouping that received these resources was initially called the Northeast People’s Autonomous Army, and later, from January 1946, the Northeast United Democratic Army, commanded by Marshal Lin Biao.26 Formed from elements of Communist armed forces that covertly, although with the Soviets turning a blind eye, moved into Manchuria, and augmented by former members of Manchukuo’s army, it quickly reached a strength in excess of 100,000 men.27 Many of the senior posts in Lin’s command went to former members of the 88th Brigade.28 Chiang Kai-shek was well aware that Manchuria was being infiltrated by the Communists and, given that he had to reclaim it in order to underscore his credibility as leader of China, he was understandably anxious to get his own forces into the region.29 The difficulty was how. Attempts to land the lead elements of a 30,000-strong Nationalist army from American transports at Dalian on the Liaodong peninsula in October were prevented by the Soviet occupation force, which argued that allowing such an operation would transgress the Sino-Soviet Treaty.30 A further attempt at Huludao, a coastal city on the Bohai Sea, was also rebuffed; the Communists were already in control and refused to allow the disembarkation of what they termed ‘puppet troops’. The commander of the flotilla, Vice Admiral Daniel E. Barbey, was well aware that his government’s policy was to assist the Nationalists but not to the extent of armed involvement with the Communists. He withdrew to try again at Yingkou, some 100km to the east on the northern shore of the Bohai Sea, but found the Communists in possession there as well.31 A vastly experienced practitioner of amphibious warfare, Barbey reckoned that carrying out an opposed landing was achievable, but that doing so would ‘definitely identify us as active participants in the trouble now brewing’.32 Unwilling to breach US policy, he backed away. The Nationalist force was eventually disembarked at Qinhuangdao, about 150km south of Huludao, which was under the control of elements of the US Marine Corps. The route from Qinhuangdao, which is south of the Great Wall, into Manchuria, however, was lengthy and would require the use of the railways via Beijing.33 These were vulnerable. As Barbey put it: ‘Although the Marine-guarded trains were getting through to Peking and Tientsin [Tianjin] . . . the larger cities were actually islands in the Communist sea.’34 When Chiang eventually did get his armies into Manchuria, following the Soviet withdrawal in May 1946, they occupied several of these ‘islands’ whilst Lin’s command largely retained control of the ‘sea’. The subsequent struggle

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’

153

was complex and far from one-sided, but the Nationalists were eventually to fight, and lose, one of the decisive campaigns of the Chinese Civil War in Manchuria: the Liaoning-Shenyang campaign.35 The question as to how much, if at all, the Soviet occupation forces in Manchuria contributed to the eventual success of the Communists there is impossible to answer and still the subject of scholarly disputation.36 That there was some transference of weapons, and that this obviously helped, seems indisputable, but probably more important was allowing Lin Biao to build up strength whilst denying access to Chiang’s army.37 Mao stated that in driving out the ‘aggressors’ the help given by the Soviet Army to the Chinese people was ‘unprecedented’ and its influence ‘immeasurable’.38 This can perhaps be dismissed as hyperbole, but since the Communist successes in Manchuria proved ultimately significant, then it seems probable that the Soviet contribution was, to some degree, important. Perhaps the question is best approached from the other direction, as it were: would the Communists have triumphed no matter what the Soviets did in Manchuria before they left? The answer to that is almost certainly yes.39 If that is the case, then unlike the creation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, which owed its very existence to the Soviet Union, the advent of the People’s Republic of China came about irrespective of direct Soviet support or lack thereof.40 That, though, was not how many, particularly American, politicians saw it at the time. To them, Communism, principally the Chinese and Soviet variety which included North Korea, appeared a monolithic bloc. In terms of US Republicans: ‘Nothing could alter their belief in the greatness of Chiang Kai-shek, or their conviction that the Chinese Communists were Russian puppets.’ As might be expected, much the same applied to the Chinese Nationalists. Foreign Minister George Yeh believed that the Chinese Communists were ‘thorough Marxists and tools of Moscow’.41 Even Dean Acheson, Truman’s secretary of state from 1949 to 1953, thought so too: ‘The heart of China is in Communist hands. The Communist leaders have forsworn their Chinese heritage and have publicly announced their subservience to a foreign power, Russia, which during the last 50 years, under czars and Communists alike, has been most assiduous in its efforts to extend its control in the Far East.’42 Viewed from that perspective, American eagerness for the Soviet Union to enter the war against Japan, as evidenced and negotiated at the Yalta Conference (see Chapter 1), became contentious and suspicious. On what he termed ‘Roosevelt’s cynical submission to Russian imperialism’, the infamous Senator Joe McCarthy put it thus in June 1951: Suppose, and this is a reasonable supposition, we had not implored Russia to enter the war in the Far East, had not equipped her army, had

stalin’s war on japan - Press

154

Stalin’s War on Japan

not given her the right to take Manchuria – where would the sudden collapse of Japan on the 10th of August, 1945,43 have found the Russians? Certainly not established in force throughout Manchuria and the northern provinces of China. [. . .] The situation in the Far East – then and today – would have in that case looked something like this: the surrender of the Japanese Kwantung army in Manchuria would have been made to the Americans and Chinese. The Americans would have held Manchuria – and all Korea for the Koreans – until the armies of the Republic of China would have been moved unimpeded there to take over.44 Leaving aside the obvious, and grotesque, distortions made to suit his narrative, McCarthy touched on a point still under scholarly, and indeed popular, debate: the significance of the Soviet attack in terms of Japan’s decision to surrender. This intertwines with the related question concerning the American use of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. There are basically two schools of thought: those who conclude that the Soviet invasion of Manchukuo was decisive in the Japanese surrender decision, and those who consider the nuclear attacks, particularly the first, were the more important. There are, of course, many variations of opinion within these strands, and the literature on and around the question is both vast and, in the main, stimulating. There is naturally no consensus. There never will be; Emperor Horohito failed – and was never compelled – to detail the processes which led him to command his people and armed forces that ‘enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable’ was the only option.45 So much for the grand-strategic and high-political fronts. At the lower operational and tactical levels, the successes of the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation exceeded the expectations of those who planned and executed it. The difficulties inherent in Manchukuoan topography, in terms of getting highly mechanised, armoured forces into positions where they could come to grips with an infantry-centric opponent, have been related in some detail, as have the methods used in surmounting them. Traversing terrain that their opponents considered impassable, and doing so along multiple axes of advance simultaneously, provided an immense initial shock to the Japanese. Preventing any recovery from that shock, by maintaining multiple thrusts despite all logistical impediments, demonstrated high-level proficiency: as General Omar Bradley is credited with aphorising, ‘amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics’.46 In fact, and as has hopefully been demonstrated, the Red Army that invaded Manchukuo utilised the operational and tactical expertise that it had developed, then relearned and finally deployed against Germany in the west, to rapid and lethal effect in dismembering its opponent. In skilfully deploying

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’

155

deep battle/deep operation techniques, this was an army that was very far from being the ‘Russian steamroller’ of myth. Indeed, although usually used in relation to the Tsarist army and applicable to 1914, the term reappears in, mainly, German literature about the struggle on their ‘Eastern Front’ and is essentially disparaging.47 The US Army, which might have been expected to know better, also referred to ‘the ‘‘steamroller attack’’ of World War II’, albeit long after the event.48 The meaning, as explained by Kipp a` propos the earlier setting, relates to huge forces that ‘would mobilize slowly, but, like a steamroller, their momentum would carry all before them’.49 In the context of the Second World War, Glantz notes that ‘Westerners seem to think that only geography, climate, and sheer numbers negated German military skill and competency on the eastern front, a view that relegates Soviet military accomplishments to oblivion’.50 That this was not so, and that the leaders, both senior and junior, of the formations which undertook the attack on Manchukuo and elsewhere in 1945 demonstrated initiative and innovation at all levels, has hopefully been demonstrated. The actions of Major General Vasily Burmasov around Hailar, those of Lieutenant General Alexander Maximov with respect to the Mishan fortified area, and Colonel General Nikolai Krylov’s wielding the ‘sickle’ rather than the ‘hammer’ on the 5th Army’s front are examples from the initial stage of the operation. Subsequent operations, such as the exploits of Colonel Georgy Anishchik around Hualin and Major General Nikolai Svirs in respect of crossing the Mudan river to approach and take Mudanjiang, exemplify the point. There were, of course, many other instances, including those related to amphibious operations both riverine (brown-water) and littoral (green-water). The former were, as per the operations of the Amur Flotilla, carried out in accordance with essentially similar experience gained in the west during the struggles for and around, amongst other places, Kiev, Stalingrad and Belgrade.51 Indeed, during the course of the Great Patriotic War Soviet forces carried out some 114 amphibious operations of one kind or another.52 By definition, given the terrestrial nature of the war in the west, most of these were brown-water rather than green-water operations, although there were exceptions relating to the Black Sea.53 This lack of experience did not, though, deter the mounting of similar operations in the east: Zhukovsky details a total of seven landings from the sea carried out by the Pacific Fleet and Northern Pacific Flotilla during operations against Japan.54 Five of these (Sonbong, Najin, Chongjin, Songjin and Wonsan) took place in Korea and three (Shakhtyorsk/Uglegorsk, Kholmsk and Korsakov) on Sakhalin. He doesn’t count the unopposed landing at Iturup in the southern Kurils, nor the much-opposed version conducted by forces from the Kamchatka

stalin’s war on japan - Press

156

Stalin’s War on Japan

Defensive Region and Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky naval base in respect of Shumshu in the northern Kurils. Whichever command might have conducted them, they all proceeded in apparent ignorance of most of the rules pertaining to amphibious operations, or at least as set down in 1944 by US forces who by then possessed vast experience.55 Having said that, the one element of amphibious doctrine they did get right was surprise and, as has been recorded, all the operations were ultimately, if quite remarkably, successful, which was down to individual commanders rather than operational and tactical pre-planning.56 As an example, the actions of Major Pyotr Shutov during the Shumshu operation likely saved the landing force from disaster when the inevitable counterattack materialised.57 It is interesting to observe that by the 1960s the postwar Soviet Fleet had adopted and adapted American doctrine in respect of amphibious operations.58 But if the Soviet Navy had rather a lot to learn from its American counterpart, this was definitely not the case vis-a`-vis the Red Army. Indeed, it is an interesting, if entirely academic, exercise to compare the Soviet operations in Manchuria in 1945 with the current nine US ‘Principles of War’.59 Interesting or not, as that may be, ‘war’, as Clausewitz is often quoted as saying, ‘is the continuation of politics by other means’. That war is indeed an instrument of policy was a philosophy that Stalin certainly understood and subscribed to.60 In terms of his war against Japan, the final campaign of the Second World War, it meant achievement of virtually all his political ends. Indeed, despite the colossal damage suffered during the course of that conflict, the Soviet Union emerged from the chaos with, alongside its then ally the United States, superpower ranking. There is, as the historian Michael Bess has written, a ‘moral awkwardness’ in terms of the wartime alliance between the western democracies and the Soviet Union under Stalin, ‘a regime that was in many ways equally as vicious as Hitler’s’.61 This is neither a modern (George Orwell published Animal Farm in August 194562) nor a solely western view (Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin was delivered on 25 February 1956 and reported in foreign media the next day.63). The vice president of Yugoslavia, Milovan Djilas, also published a highly critical work after travelling to Moscow in 1948 to negotiate with Stalin, with whom Yugoslavia was then allied.64 Thoroughly disillusioned with the encounter, his book relating this, and earlier meetings, titled (in English translation) Conversations with Stalin, appeared in 1962. His conclusions were clear-sighted: Every crime was possible to Stalin, for there was not one he hadn’t committed . . . in him was joined the criminal senselessness of a Caligula with the refinement of a Borgia and brutality of a Tsar Ivan the Terrible. [. . .] but he transformed backward Russia into an industrial power and an

stalin’s war on japan - Press

‘The heart of China is in Communist hands’

157

empire that is ever more resolutely and implacably aspiring to world mastery. Viewed from the standpoint of success and political adroitness, Stalin is hardly surpassed by any statesman of his time.65 Therein is encapsulated the ‘moral awkwardness’ that accrued from adopting the ancient maxim that ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ as high policy. In the current context it was perhaps best expressed by Churchill when he said that ‘If Hitler invaded Hell I would make at least a favourable reference to the Devil in the House of Commons.’66 Roosevelt and Churchill, most particularly the former, believed that Stalin’s aid was needed in defeating Japan, and this was reflecting the considered views of both the US chiefs of staff and General Douglas MacArthur (see Chapter 1), although the latter later denied it.67 In fact, and as already discussed, the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan was not a matter that Stalin needed American ‘permission’ for anyway. As Stimson had phrased it: ‘Russia is militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto, Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would be possible for the US military forces to occupy these areas.’68 In other words, and to reiterate the point made earlier, the US would be wise to make a virtue out of a necessity and stay on good terms with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Stalin abided by the terms agreed at Yalta, at least in respect of the Far East, because they provided diplomatic cover for getting what he wanted anyway. As is well known, though, those ‘good terms’, if they were ever really achieved, certainly didn’t last and the Cold War is generally accepted to have been well under way by 1947–48.69 Although both the Soviet dictator and the state he ruled are now long gone, the ongoing legacy of Stalin’s war on Japan remains. As the successor state to the USSR, Russia (or the Russian Federation) inherited the Far Eastern territories taken from Japan in 1945, including the Kuril Islands. Also inherited was the dispute with Japan over their southern section: Iturup, Kunashir, Shikotan and the Habomai Islands. The Japanese position, as outlined in a government pamphlet on the dispute, is that the ‘four islands70 are inherent territories of Japan, having been handed down from generation to generation by the Japanese people, without ever being territories of other countries’.71 The Soviet view initially was that the Japanese claim did not exist; the matter had been settled at Yalta for all time. This attitude softened with the advent of Gorbachev, and discussions took place.72 The Russian state continues this approach, and talks on the matter revive from time to time, although the question remains as yet unsettled.73 The dispute is, though, capable of peaceful resolution. That may not be the case with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea). Highly militaristic and possessing nuclear weapons, plus

stalin’s war on japan - Press

158

Stalin’s War on Japan

ballistic missiles likely capable of delivering them, its ruling family are the descendants of the former member of the 88th Rifle Brigade whom Stalin sent to create a regime above the 38th Parallel. Kim Jong-un (the current leader in 2020) is the grandson of Kim Il-sung. For how long the People’s Republic of China, its only ally and upon which it depends for trade74 and aid, will be prepared to sustain this ‘rogue state’, with which it shares a 1,420km border, remains unknown. China, which has largely taken the place of the Soviet Union in the superpower stakes, is the only state that has any leverage and could possibly intervene. Yet it is unlikely to tolerate the overthrow of North Korea’s ruling clique if that leads to reunification with the Republic of Korea (South Korea), a close American ally with whom it would not want to share a lengthy frontier. Famously classified as a member of the ‘axis of evil’ by US President George W. Bush in 2002,75 North Korea is said to be the last state which still adheres to Stalinist principles.76 Whatever the truth may be in that, it certainly resembles the Stalinist regime as Churchill perceived it in 1939, as ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma’.77 The need to unpack that exceedingly well-wrapped riddle is, probably, ‘Uncle Joe’s’ most significant gift to posterity.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes Introduction 1. Fuller (1954), p. 394. 2. Osmanczyk & Mango (2004), p. 2445. 3. Glantz (1983, 2003).

Chapter 1: ‘How many divisions has the Pope?’ 1. Montefiore (2004), p. 491: an account of the Yalta Conference. Leahy has this question being put at the later Potsdam Conference: Leahy (1950), p. 476. There are other versions. 2. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 528. 3. Charles Bohlen and Vladimir Pavlov, interpreters for Roosevelt and Stalin respectively, were also in attendance. Bohlen’s minutes of the meeting form the official record in English. 4. The announcement that the Filipino capital had fallen was shockingly premature. Convinced the Japanese would abandon Manila, as he had done in 1942, General Douglas MacArthur proclaimed the city taken on 6 February, twenty-eight days after forces under his command had landed on the island of Luzon. In fact, whilst the army under General Yamashita Tomoyuki (‘The Tiger of Malaya’) had decided not to defend the city and withdrawn, Vice Admiral Iwabuchi Sanji disobeyed orders and had his command of around 20,000 fight to the death. The battle went on until 3 March and resulted in large-scale devastation and more than 100,000 civilian deaths: Scott (2018). 5. US Department of State (1955), p. 766. 6. Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President. Top Secret [Washington], 23 January 1945: Memorandum for the President. In US Department of State, (1955), p. 396. 7. According to Buhite, the agreements reached at Yalta ‘simply reflected a realistic assessment of conditions’: Buhite (1986), p. 130. 8. ‘One cannot regard as an accident such distasteful facts as the Pearl Harbor ‘‘incident’’, the loss of the Philippines and other Pacific Islands, the loss of Hong Kong and Singapore, when Japan, as the aggressor nation, proved to be better prepared for war than Great Britain and the United States of America, which pursued a policy of peace’: J.V. Stalin, Speech at Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People’s Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations, 6 November 1944. Available at: https://www. marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1944/11/06.htm. 9. Geoffrey Jukes, ‘Translator’s Note’, in Slavinsky (2004), p. x. 10. US Department of State (1955), p. 984. 11. Ballis (1956), pp. 293–328. 12. Trani (1969). 13. Churchill supported this. At a bilateral meeting with Stalin on 10 February he had stated that he was ‘in favour of Russia’s losses of 30 or 40 years ago being made good’: quoted in Gilbert (1989), p. 1205. 14. Kowner (2017), p. 465.

stalin's war on japan - Press

160

Notes (pp. 5–7)

15. According to Leahy’s recollection, ‘The Soviet [sic] wanted to obtain Port Arthur under a long-term lease. Dairen was to be a free port’: Leahy (1950), p. 364. 16. Leahy (1950), p. 372. 17. Stephan (1975), p. 93. 18. For book-length treatments of the matter, see Stephan (1975) and Rees (1985). See also Elleman, Nichols & Ouimet (1998/1999), pp. 489–504. 19. DeConde (1978), p. 199. The Kwantung Army’s intelligence unit, the Special Duty Agency (Tokumu Kikan), had succeeded in cracking the cyphers used by the Kuomintang (KMT). Chinese practices were inimical to cipher security. Upon receiving an order from Chiang, the recipient commander would repeat it to subordinates right through the military structure. This meant that the decipherment of low-level, and less secure, ciphers directly compromised higher-level versions. According to Hisashi, the Japanese averaged a 70–80 per cent success rate in reading Chinese messages throughout the war: Hisashi Takahashi (1991), pp. 208–9. The Americans, who had in turn broken Japanese cyphers, were aware of this. To quote Tuchman, ‘Chinese security, already a sieve, now had large holes in it . . .’: Tuchman (1970), p. 493. See also Kotani (2009), p. 20. 20. Personal minute from Churchill to Eden, 10 March 1945. Quoted in Gilbert (1989), p. 1207, n. 1. 21. The translated text of the Neutrality Pact can be found at the Avalon Project, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp. 22. Service (2005), p. 370. 23. The nickname was seemingly popular. See, for example, ‘The Ballad of the Taxi Driver’s Cap’ in Henderson (1947), p. 13: ‘O Hitler’s a non-smoker And Churchill smokes cigars And they’re both as keen as mustard On imperialistic wars. But your uncle Joe’s a worker And a very decent chap Because he smokes a pipe and wears a taxi-driver’s cap.’ 24. Montefiore (2004), p. 4. 25. Brooke was Chief of the Imperial General Staff (professional head of the British Army) and Chairman of the British Chiefs of Staff. 26. Diary entry for 13 August 1942, Moscow, in Danchev & Todman (2015), loc. 17203. For a summary of his career and attributes, see Fraser (1983), pp. 525–39. 27. Postwar reflection on an entry of 28 November 1943 (at the Tehran Conference), in Danchev & Todman (2015), loc. 11190. 28. Sherwood (1950), p. 339. 29. As a glance at the map will reveal, the sea lines of communication between Vladivostok, which lies on the western shore of the Sea of Japan, and the Pacific are greatly constricted. In order to enter or exit the Sea of Japan one of three straits must be traversed. From south to north these comprise the Korea Strait between the south-eastern tip of the Korean peninsula and Kyushu; the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido; and the La Pe´rouse (Soya) Strait between the southern tip of Sakhalin (Karafuto) and Hokkaido. The La Pe´rouse Strait separates the Sea of Japan from the Sea of Okhotsk, exit or entry to which vis-a`-vis the Pacific also necessitates passing through one of the several straits through the Kuril Islands chain. The rationale behind Stalin’s wish to acquire southern Sakhalin and the Kurils is obvious. Russia did have direct access to the Pacific via the icefree Petropavlovsk-Kamchatskiy seaport on the Kamchatka Peninsula, but a combination of

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 7–11)

30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41.

42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48.

49.

161

physical isolation, absence of any rail link or communications and underdeveloped infrastructure rendered it almost useless as a naval base. Harriman to Roosevelt, 15 December 1944, quoted in Hasegawa (2005), p. 32. Geoffrey Jukes, ‘Translator’s Note’ in Slavinsky (2004), p. xii. MacArthur’s General Staff (1966), p. 395. Instructions to General John R. Deane, Chief of the United States Military Mission in the US Embassy in Moscow, 18 September 1943. Quoted in US Department of Defense (1955), p. 21. Memo by Joint Chiefs of Staff, ‘Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944’, 3 December 1943. Quoted in US Department of Defense (1955), p. 27. Report by Joint Planning Staff, ‘Operations against Japan Subsequent to Formosa’, 30 June 1944. Quoted in US Department of Defense (1955), p. 28. Colonel Paul L. Freeman Jr, War Department Operations Division, ‘Summary of an Hour and a Half Conversation with General MacArthur.’ Letter to General Marshall, 13 February 1945. Quoted in US Department of Defense (1955), p. 51, n. 14. Millis & Duffield (1956), p. 31. US Department of Defense (1955), p. 46. Leahy (1950), p. 373. Memo. Acting Secretary Grew for Secretary Stimson, 12 May 1945. Quoted in US Department of Defense (1955), p. 69. Korea, which Japan had annexed in 1910, was not referred to in the Yalta Agreement. For the relationship with Japan, see Dudden (2005). Its fate had been mentioned in the 1943 Cairo Declaration, which recorded the outcome of the 27 November 1943 Cairo Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill and Chiang. The Declaration stated that ‘all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and The Pescadores, shall be restored’ and that ‘Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.’ In addition, the ‘three great powers’ were ‘mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea’ and were ‘determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent’: US Department of State (1961), pp. 448–9. Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, 21 May 1945. Quoted in US Department of State (1969b), pp. 876–7. Secretary of War (Stimson) to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington, 21 May 1945. Quoted in US Department of State (1969b), p. 877. US Department of Defense (1955), p. 71. ‘US Navy Combatant Ships Transferred to the USSR Under Project HULA, May– September 1945.’ Appendix to Russell (1997), pp. 39–40. See, for example, Weeks (2004). Russell (1997), p. 8. This section of the work is based on Russell unless otherwise stated. King was the only individual to hold both these positions. As one of his biographers put it: ‘It made King the most powerful naval officer in the history of the United States. As COMINCH, King was directly responsible to the President and was the principal naval advisor to the President on the conduct of the war. King’s duties as CNO would be the preparation, readiness, and logistical support of the operating forces, as well as the coordination and direction of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department. [. . .] King’s authority was absolute and uncontested by any other naval officer. Never before had an American naval officer exercised the authority and responsibility delegated to King by the President of the United States, and never again would one do so’: Buell (1995), p. 179. Boose (2008), p. 146, n. 1.

stalin's war on japan - Press

162

Notes (pp. 13–16) Chapter 2: ‘How many divisions has the Pope?’

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

9. 10. 11.

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

An oft-quoted, and possibly apocryphal, aphorism attributed to Voltaire. Werner (1939), p. 325. Mainly by the West and Japan. See Elliott (2000), pp. 604–7. Named for the Heilong (Amur) river that delineates the border between China and Russia. Which borders (North) Korea and Russia. The Yalu river runs along its border with (North) Korea. Coox (1990a), p. 7. According to the journalist Upton Close: Close (1934), p. 178. ‘Upton Close’ (real name Josef Wellington Hall) was an American journalist who had spent long periods in East Asia, was considered an expert on the region, and became known as an American radio personality in the late 1930s and 1940s. See Davidann (2007), p. 135. Royama (1930), pp. 1018–34. Yoshihisa Tak Matsusaka (2001). This came about through a series of weak governments in the capital, Peking (Beijing), which were unable to command or control the military governors, the provincial representatives of that government. Unrestrained by higher authority, many of these governors then began treating their provinces as personal fiefdoms. Propped up only by their ability to field armed forces, they taxed the provincial populations mercilessly in order to pay their troops and to purchase weapons for their armies. Several of these ‘warlords’ might combine to wage war in furtherance of more power. In 1920, 1922 and 1924 major conflicts took place between these cliques. ‘Warlordism’ was a curse that rendered China weak – ‘more of a geographical expression than a country’ – and kept her poor; see McCord (1993). The ‘geographical expression’ term is from Mitter (2013), loc. 734. For an account of this period, the ‘Nanking Decade’ (1927–1937,) see Zarrow (2005), pp. 230–70. For a detailed examination of this, see Humphreys (1995), pp. 147–70. Kwong Chi Man (2017). Mizuno (2013), p. 169. Tong (1937), p. 239. Built in Czarist times, the railway was jointly Russian and Chinese owned. Under agreements between China and Russia there would be no interference with traffic. See Patrikeeff (2015), pp. 81–101. Tong (1937), p. 283. For accounts of the campaign see Jowett (2017), ch. 4, and Walker (2017). For this achievement, Blyukher became the first recipient of the Order of the Red Star the following year. He was murdered during Stalin’s purge of the army in 1938: Montefiore (2004), p. 292. For a biographical account, see Sokolov (2000), pp. 3–81. Coox (1990a), p. 23. Coox (1990a), pp. 17–29. That the army and the government were at loggerheads was no secret. The US Minister in China, Nelson T. Johnson, wrote to the Secretary of State, Henry L. Stimson, on 12 September 1931 quoting a report he had received from Manchuria two days earlier. ‘There is good reason to believe that internal Japanese politics are more responsible for the present threatening aspect of Sino-Japanese relations than anything that the Chinese have done or left undone with respect to the case. It is my opinion that relations between the Japanese Army and the Japanese Foreign Office (representing non-Army elements in the Government) are as much strained just now as relations between China and Japan . . .’: US Department of State (1945), p. 4.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 16–19)

163

23. Coox (1990a), p. 40. 24. Keiji Furuya (1981), p. 333; US Department of State (1945), p. 184. 25. Japan left the League of Nations following the League’s acceptance of the critical 1932 Lytton Commission Report into the Japanese takeover. A copy of the report is in the UK National Archives: FO 262/1802. Lytton Commission Report, 1932. 26. UK National Archives: FO 262/1802. Lytton Commission Report, 1932, p. 100. 27. Kitamura Minoru & Lin Siyun (2014), p. 23. 28. An oft-quoted, and possibly apocryphal, saying attributed to Voltaire. 29. Fenby (2013), p. 234. 30. The life of Puyi formed the subject of The Last Emperor, the multiple Academy Awardwinning 1987 motion picture directed by Bernardo Bertolucci. For accounts of his life see Pu Yi (1964); Brackman (1975); Behr (1987); Lamont-Brown (1999). 31. In opposition to the Navy’s preference for southern expansion (nanshin-ron). See Yutaro Shiba (2003), p. 528; Kitaoka Shinichi (1978), pp. 1–9. See also Frei (1991), p. 66. 32. Manchukuo was depicted in Japanese propaganda as a multi-ethnic state, comprising Japanese, Manchus, Koreans, Chinese and Mongols, rather than a state ‘cleansed of inferior breeds’. Wakabayashi (2017), p. xl: ‘Iris Chang Reassessed: A Polemical Introduction to the Second Edition’. 33. Hackett (1971), p. 284. 34. Wilson (1999), p. 186. Japan had indeed suffered large-scale casualties during the war. For example, during the Battle of Mukden (20 February–10 March 1905) the Japanese forces suffered more than 75,000 casualties: 15,892 killed and 59,612 wounded – more than a quarter of those engaged. Connaughton (1991), p. 235. The siege of Port Arthur had cost Japan 57,780 killed or wounded: Warner (1975), p. 447. 35. Nansen (1914), p. 333. For a biography of Nansen, see Huntford (1997). 36. The dispatch of Japanese forces to the Russian Maritime Provinces, part of a joint allied effort. See Dunscomb (2011). 37. Terayuki Hara (2015), pp. 55–68; Dunscomb (2011), pp. 67–8; Dickinson (1999), p. 183. 38. Hasegawa (2005), p. 12. 39. Joseph C. Grew, Ambassador in Japan, to Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, 30 June 1933. In US Department of State (1933), p. 369. 40. Coox (1990a), p. 78. 41. ‘Brief on the Facts’: A Survey of the USSR, Moscow, 6 June 1938. Final Summary and Report on the Soviet Union Prior to Departure: Davies (1941), p. 266. For details of Davies’ tenure in Moscow see Dunn (1998), pp. 59–94. 42. ‘Table 7.1. Build-up of Japanese and Soviet Far Eastern Forces, 1931–39’ in Coox (1990a), p. 84. 43. Close (1934), p. 219. 44. Via an article he authored entitled, in English, ‘Japan’s Mission in the Showa Era’, the era in question being the reign of Emperor Showa (Hirohito), from 25 December 1926. Translated into Russian, this appeared in Tanin & Iohan (1933), pp. 252–62. 45. Boister & Cryer (2008), p. 457. 46. Bridges (2019). 47. Shimada Toshihiko (1983), p. 196. Itagaki was Chief of the Intelligence Section of the Kwantung Army from 1931, and helped plan the 1931 Mukden Incident. He became Vice Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army from 1934 and then Chief of Staff in 1936. See Itagaki Seishiro at ‘The International Military Tribunal for the Far East’ Digital Collection. 48. Diary entry, 10 December 1933. Quoted in Dodd & Dodd (1943), p. 76. 49. See Tien-Wei Wu (1976); Tsang (2015). See also Mitter (2013), locs 1279–1317. The First United Front had been formed in 1924 with the object of ending warlordism. Chiang

stalin's war on japan - Press

164

50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72.

73. 74.

75.

Notes (pp. 19–22)

Kai-shek, however, turned on the Communists in 1927 whilst the Northern Expedition was still ongoing. The result was civil war. For the ‘Northern Expedition and the KMT-CCP Split’, see Hsu (2000), pp. 523–30. Young (2014), pp. 168–9. See also Young (2003), p. 330. In 1901, following the suppression of the so-called Boxer Rebellion (Yihetuan Movement, Boxer War, Boxer Uprising), China had been forced to concede that nations with legations in Peking could station guards along the railway connecting the capital with Tientsin. By July 1937 Japan’s contingent, the North China Garrison Army (Kahoku chuton gun), was estimated to number between 7,000 and 15,000. Lanxin Xiang (2003). Mitter (2013), loc. 1367. See also Crowley (1963), pp. 277–91. Mitter (2013), loc. 1598. Wakabayashi (2017). See Danielson (2005), pp. 173–221. Memorandum of Conversation Between People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs, M. Litvinov, and Joseph E. Davies, American Ambassador, in the Embassy, 23 March 1938: Davies (1941), p. 190. Joseph E. Davies, Journal Entry, Moscow, 4 June 1938: Davies (1941), p. 216. The two best, certainly most informative, works on the subject are undoubtedly Conquest (2008) and Whitewood (2015). Coox (1990a), p. 92. Coox (1990a), p. 99. Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (2012), p. 176. Coox (1990a), pp. 120–41. See also Doerr (1990), pp. 184–99, and Hiroaki Kuromiya (2016), pp. 99–109. Coox (1990a), p. 142; Lumet (2004), p. 335. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based upon Coox’s work. Hiroaki Kuromiya (2015), pp. 50–3. Corps Commander, a rank equivalent to that of lieutenant general. Lured into a ‘honey trap’ when in 1929 he was appointed as Japan’s military attache´ in Moscow: Hiroaki Kuromiya (2011), pp. 659–77. Zhukov (1971), p. 155. Krivosheev (1997), p. 52. See also Bellamy & Lahnstein (1990), p. 24. Coox (1990a), p. 916. Humphreys (1995), pp. 15–16. US War Department (1944), pp. 85–6. Other than the campaign against Germany’s Kiautschou Protectorate in China. See Stephenson (2017). Japan’s army had largely modelled itself on its Prussian counterpart. Indeed, it has been argued that it was a Prussian officer, Jacob Meckel, ‘who left the deepest and longest-lasting impression’. Meckel had gained combat experience during the FrancoPrussian War of 1870–71 and passed this on during his tenure (1885–8) as a professor at the Army Staff College and as an adviser to the General Staff. It was his influence that is often credited with the victory at Port Arthur in 1894. See Kerst (1970), pp. 54–5; Bargen (2006), pp. 49–50. Humphreys (1995), pp. 79–83. For details of the reforms and the opposition to them, see Macgregor (2016), pp. 46–7. The Army (and Navy) depended for aircraft production on civilian enterprises: the ‘Mitsubishi, Nakajima, Hitachi, Kawasaki, Tachikawa, and Nihon Kokusai Koku Kogyu plants’: Coox (2010), p. 7. Quoted in Humphreys (1995), pp. 101–2.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 22–4)

165

76. Werner (1939), p. 325. Werner was a pseudonym of Alexander Schifrin, a Russian who was exiled to Germany (1923–33) and subsequently lived in France (1933–39) and the United States (1940–51). His papers are held at the Princeton University Library, Department of Rare Books and Special Collections. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library. Available at: http://dla.library.upenn.edu/dla/pacscl/detail.html?id=PACSCL_PRIN_MUDD_ MC139USNjP. 77. For the conservative (and militaristic) nature of Japanese governments see Morris-Suzuki (2012). 78. For a thorough discussion of this matter see Coox (2010), pp. 34–8. 79. The organisation of large armoured and air force formations, plus reinforced, mechanised, infantry and cavalry divisions, formed the basis for combined arms formations necessary for deep operations. Gayvoronsky et al (1987), pp. 145–6. See also Simpkin & Erickson (1987), and Turner (1988). Marshal Mikhail Katukov argued that whilst many western authors attribute the concept of deep battle to Germany’s Heinz Guderian, the idea had been put forward and substantiated long before by Soviet commanders, mainly Tukhachevskii. Guderian, he claims, only ‘studied and summarized our experience’: Katukov (1974), p. 27. 80. Drea (1981), p. 9. 81. Coox (1990a), p. 841. 82. The Japanese were greatly outnumbered in terms of tanks and since ‘they lacked a functional combined-arms capability the Japanese armour units were not used to advantage’: Rottman & Akira Takizawa (2008), p. 5. 83. The Battle of Cannae, which took place on 2 August 216 BC in Apulia, south-east Italy, was the archetypal battle of encirclement. Many later generals aspired to recreate Hannibal’s great victory, perhaps chief amongst them being Generalfeldmarschall Alfred von Schlieffen. Although there is scholarly dispute as to whether there actually was a codified ‘Schlieffen Plan’ for the defeat of France in the early twentieth century, there is copious evidence that Schlieffen was influenced by Cannae and its result: see, for example, Zuber (2002), p. 219, and Echevarria (2000), p. 177. Indeed, he wrote a historical study on the subject in 1909, arguing that ‘The battle of extermination may be fought today according to the plan as elaborated by Hannibal in long forgotten times. The hostile front is not the aim of the principle [sic] attack . . . the essential thing is to crush the flanks . . . the extermination is completed by an attack against the rear of the enemy’: Schlieffen (1931), p. 4. The Cannae ideal continued to impinge on the minds of commanders. During his campaign to recapture eastern Libya, Rommel wrote to his wife, informing her that he was planning an encirclement battle: ‘It’s going to be a Cannae, modern style’: Rommel & Liddell Hart (1953), p. 116. On the other side of the hill, Eisenhower claimed that: ‘Every ground commander seeks the battle of annihilation; so far as conditions permit, he tries to duplicate in modern war the classic example of Cannae’: Eisenhower (1948), p. 325. The list could go on, but in its long-term influence, the 2,000-year-old battle is probably unique. ‘Hannibal’s genius’, according to Fuller, ‘was able to achieve what it did because of the Roman outlook on war’: Fuller (2003a), p. 126. The same might be said vis-a`-vis Zhukov and the Japanese. 84. Coox (1990a), pp. 870–1. 85. For a thorough treatment of the ‘Treaty of Non-Aggression between Germany and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics’ and the events surrounding it see Moorhouse (2014). 86. Nish (2002), p. 133. 87. Kershaw (2000), p. 27. 88. Toynbee (1951), pp. 4–5. 89. Nish (2002), p. 134. 90. Shillony (2001), p. 18. 91. Hata Ikuhiku (1976), p. 177; Hosoya Chihiro (1980), p. 18.

stalin's war on japan - Press

166 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100.

101. 102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112.

113. 114.

115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124.

Notes (pp. 24–8) Tobe Ryochi (2019), p. 210. Coox (1990a), pp. 870–1. Coox (1990a), pp. 1009–32. Rottman & Akira Takizawa (2008), p. 59. For the development of Japanese armour, see Zaloga (2007). Coox (1990b), pp. 240–1. A Google search brings up, literally, millions of hits. Tsuneishi Keiichi (2005), p. 1. Harris (2003), p. 486. Tsuneishi Keiichi (2005), p. 5. See also Yang Yan-Jun & Tam Yue-Him (2018), p. 173. The latter work contains a photograph (on page 30) of members of Unit 731 (including Ishii Shiro, the mastermind behind the entire biological warfare enterprise) at the battlefield on 12 July 1939. For an account of Ishii and his work, see Port (2014). Harris (2003), p. 486. Coox (1990a), pp. 1020–1; Harris (2003), p. 484. Koshkin (2012), pp. 21–2. US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1954), p. 9. US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1954), p. 12; Coox (1990a), pp. 1041–5. The term meant operations against Malaya, Thailand, Burma, the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, and so war with the US, the British Empire and the Netherlands. US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1954), p. 35. Slavinsky (2004), p. 154. MacArthur’s General Staff (1966), p. 67. Millis & Duffield (1956), p. 31. See, for example, Marshall’s remarks to MacArthur and the President in June 1945, quoted in Feis (1971), pp. 13–14. The membership of the ‘Big Three’ had already changed, and was still changing. Roosevelt had died on 12 April 1945, whereupon Harry Truman became President. Churchill attended whilst the votes of a general election held on 5 July 1945 were still being counted. The results were announced on 26 July, and he was out of power. His wartime deputy, Clement Attlee, took over. Of the original members, only Stalin remained. Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee, ‘Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945)’, in Secretary of the Combined Chiefs Of Staff (1945), p. 16. Report by the Combined Intelligence Committee, ‘Estimate of the Enemy Situation (as of 6 July 1945)’, in Secretary of the Combined Chiefs Of Staff (1945), p. 14. These included a contingent of anti-Communist ‘White Russians’. Named the Asano Brigade after its Japanese adviser, Colonel Asano Takashi, the unit was based near Harbin. For a brief history of the Asano Brigade, see Stephan (1978), pp. 196–9. Glantz (1983), p. 28. Glantz (1983), p. 28. Zakharov (1972), p. 71. Glantz (1983), p. 4. Entry in Truman’s Diary, ‘Potsdam, 17 July 1945.’ Quoted in Roberts (2019), p. 139. Churchill (1956), p. 509. Prime Minister’s personal minute (to Eden, Foreign Secretary), 23 July 1945. Quoted in Gilbert (1990), p. 90. Entry in Truman’s Diary, Potsdam, 25 July 1945. Quoted in Roberts (2019), p. 139. Truman (1965), p. 458. Avon (1965), p. 548.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 28–9) 125. 126. 127. 128. 129.

167

Entry in Truman’s Diary, Potsdam, 17 July 1945. Quoted in Roberts (2019), p. 139. Montefiore (2004), p. 508. Schwartz (1996), p. 104. For Soviet atomic espionage, see West (2004). Zhukov (1985), p. 449. Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender. Issued at Potsdam, 26 July 1945 (available online at: https://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/e/etc/c06.html): 1. We, the President of the United States, the President of the National Government of the Republic of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war. 2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist. 3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland. 4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason. 5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay. 6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world. 7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth. 8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine. 9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives. 10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

stalin's war on japan - Press

168

130.

131. 132. 133. 134.

Notes (pp. 29–33) 11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted. 12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government. 13. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction. The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo), Moscow, 27 July 1945. Quoted (in translation) in: US Department of State (1960), p. 1292. Hasegawa (2011), p. 9. Byrnes (1947), p. 207. Chace (1996), p. 142. Montefiore (2004), p. 513. For Stalin’s fears and distrust of the US, see Levering (2016), pp. 26–7.

Chapter 3: The Soviet (Deep) Battle Plan 1. Meretskov (1968), p. 425. 2. Giles (1910), p. 17. 3. These include, but are not limited to, disinformation, misdirection, deception, propaganda and camouflage. For a thorough account of the technique in practice see Glantz (1989). 4. Senyavskaya (2013), p. 166. Professor Elena S. Senyavskaya is the leading researcher of the Institute of Russian History of the Russian Academy of Sciences. 5. Minasyan, Bogdanov & Dolgiy (1984), p. 483. 6. Achkasov et al. (1980), pp. 193–4. 7. Glantz (1983), p. 3. 8. See Zamulin & Britton (2017). 9. About 800,000 women, many in all-female units, served in the Red Army during the Second World War, more than half of them in combat roles on the front line. Mass mobilisation of women began in 1942/3, primarily to compensate for the 6.5 million male casualties suffered by the Red Army up to that time. It was, according to Senyavskaya, ‘cruel necessity’ rather than ideology that provided the impetus. Senyavskaya (1999), p. 146. Though there is a substantial body of work on the subject in the Russian language (http://journal-s.org/ index.php/vmno/article/view/5236), there is comparatively little in English. One of the most useful works in the former category is Petrakova (2013), a dissertation in the library of the Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University. See also Senyavskaya (1999). In English, one of the best comparative studies is undoubtedly Campbell (1993), pp. 301–23. See also Pennington (2010), Markwick & Charon Cardona (2012), Alexievich, Pevear & Volokhonsky (2017), Myles (1981) and Reese (2011). According to Pennington (p. 781), of the 222,000 women who undertook military training, more than 6,000 did so on mortars, 15,000 with automatic weapons or submachine guns, and nearly 100,000 were trained to become snipers. 10. Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 197. See also Vnotchenko (1971), p. 66. 11. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970). 12. Luchinsky (1971), p. 68.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 33–4)

169

13. 6th Guards Order of Red Banner Tank Army. The ‘Guards’ designation was awarded to units and formations considered to have distinguished themselves in battle. Basically a resurrection of the system behind the pre-revolution Imperial Guards, the Soviet version was implemented in September 1941. See Repyev (1963). See also http://www.lonesentry. com/articles/redarmyguards/. 14. Rotmistrov (1963), pp. 537–8. 15. The master-plan for the invasion of Manchukuo is set out in Zakharov (1968). The relevant portion includes a detailed, fold-out map between pages 88 and 89. Unless otherwise stated, all references to the planning for the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation are taken from this work. 16. Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 198. 17. The Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Army contribution totalled about 16,000 troops, 128 guns and mortars, and 32 light tanks. Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 193. 18. ‘Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945 (Facts and Figures)’ (1965). Organisational information is also given in Zakharov (1968), pp. 382–404. 19. Pavel Rotmistrov, appointed Chief Marshal of Armoured Forces in 1962, gives the planned rates of advance for the various formations: Rotmistrov (1963), pp. 535–9. 20. Pliyev (1965), p. 80. 21. For example, Vasilevsky later recounted how his own memoirs were sent to the Institute of Marxism-Leninism for review. They returned with certain portions ‘eradicated’ under the pretexts of ‘undesirability’ and ‘secrecy’: Daines (2015), p. 440. 22. Soviet Military Encyclopedia Vol. 2 (1976), pp. 337–8. 23. Bellamy (2009), p. 679. 24. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 539. 25. US Army Japanese Research Division (1956), p. 21. See also Glantz (2003), pp. 127–8. Many of the works still exist, and now form part of the ‘World Anti-Fascist War Hailar Memorial Park’: https://www.trip.com/travel-guide/chenbaerhuqi/world-anti-fascist-warmemorial-hailar-82208/#:~:targetText=World%20Anti%2DFascist%20War%20Memorial %20is%20located%20to%20the%20northwest,above%20ground%20and%20below% 20ground. 26. Sidorov (1978), pp. 97–101. The Military History Journal, often abbreviated to VIZH, is a monthly magazine published by the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation and before that by the USSR. 27. Luchinsky (1971), p. 68. 28. Luchinsky (1971), p. 72. 29. According to Red Army doctrine, an ‘operational group’ was a temporary force designated for operations or missions along a separate axis from the main Front or army forces. 30. These brigades were component parts of Red Army units dubbed Fortified Regions, formations unique to the Red Army. They originated during the period following Soviet victory in the Battle of Stalingrad (23 August 1942–2 February 1943). As the battlefront moved westwards, it left behind units that had been constituted to create and defend fortified regions and which were accordingly well equipped with artillery, heavy machine guns and the like. Rather than leave these static forces in place, they were reconstituted into units that were included in offensive operations using the weaponry that had formerly been deployed defensively. Possessing only limited manpower and mobility but able to deploy massive firepower, in an offensive situation they were employed to protect the flanks of an attacking force and to consolidate ground. Their component parts were designated as ‘Machine Gun-Artillery’ Battalions and Brigades, and these were assigned to attacking formations as required. Somewhat confusingly, these formations were further divided into Fortified Regions and Field Fortified Regions, the difference being that the latter were

stalin's war on japan - Press

170

31. 32. 33. 34. 35.

36. 37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44. 45.

46.

47.

48. 49.

50.

51. 52. 53.

Notes (pp. 35–9)

equipped with more artillery than the former. See Beloborodov (1982), p. 209, n. 22. For the origins of this ‘solution that has never been repeated’, see Vinogradov (1968), pp. 5–6. Vinogradov’s book is a rare account of one of these formations in action. Lyudnikov (1965), pp. 68–78. Achkasov et al. (1980), pp. 198–202. Harris (2002), p. 334. Glantz (1983), p. 23. Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: The First Area Army in Eastern Manchuria: Military Geography of Eastern Manchuria’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 27–8, 29. Meretskov (1968), pp. 421–2. Officially titled 5th Red Banner Army. The Order of the Red Banner of the USSR, as well as being awarded to individuals, was conferred on military units, warships, formations and associations. See http://mondvor.narod.ru/ORBan.html and http://www.lonesentry.com/ articles/redarmyguards/. 1st Red Banner Army. 35th Red Banner Army. Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: The First Area Army in Eastern Manchuria: Military Geography of Eastern Manchuria’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 31. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1982), p. 86. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 392. Meretskov (1968), p. 417. Zakharov (1968), p. 82. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 269–70. Zakharov (1968), pp. 10–11. As students of modern fortification will have noted, the parallels with both contemporary German practice and terminology (Widerstandsnest and Stu¨tzpunkten) are close. See Zaloga (2009), p. 12. Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: The First Area Army in Eastern Manchuria: Military Geography of Eastern Manchuria’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 29. Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: The First Area Army in Eastern Manchuria: Military Geography of Eastern Manchuria’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 31. Drea, ‘The 35th Army’s Capture of the Hutou Fortress: Reduction of a Fortified Region’, in Glantz (2003), p. 130. The barrel had been purchased from the French makers Schneider in 1930, whilst the railway carriages and auxiliary equipment were of Japanese manufacture. With an effective range of some 50km, it had served as a coastal defence gun before being redeployed to Manchukuo. See Japanese Self Defence Ground Force Fuji School (1980), p. 95, and Lepage (2017), p. 157. See also Marriott & Forty (2017), p. 166. Drea says that the ‘locomotive gun’ arrived in 1943. Drea, ‘The 35th Army’s Capture of the Hutou Fortress: Reduction of a Fortified Region’, in Glantz (2003), p. 130. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F, Chapter X, ‘The Fifth [Japanese] Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 161. For information and graphical details, see ‘The Japanese Center of Researching Kotou Fortress’ http://ww3.tiki.ne.jp/~jcn-o/book.htm. See also Zaloga (2010), p. 10. Drea, ‘The 35th Army’s Capture of the Hutou Fortress: Reduction of a Fortified Region’, in Glantz (2003), p. 129. See also http://ww3.tiki.ne.jp/~jcn-o/kotou-top.htm. Zakharov (1968), p. 402; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 75. Meretskov (1968), p. 424.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 39–43) 54. 55. 56. 57. 58.

59. 60.

61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85.

171

2nd Red Banner Army. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 537. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 236–8; Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 235. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), pp. 145–53; Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 96–8; Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 584. See also Bagrov (1959). The total force available comprised 665 fighters, 400 attack/bomber aircraft, 157 torpedobombers and 266 reconnaissance aircraft. Ivanov (1973), p. 267. Chapter 7 of Ivanov’s book, ‘Pacific Pilots in the Rout of Japan’, deals with the operations from a naval-aviation perspective. Glantz (2003), p. 232. Bagrov (1959), p. 17. See also Office of the General Staff for the Study of Military Experience (1947), pp. 71–84. There is a museum dedicated to the offensive, the Museum of the South Sakhalin Offensive Operation, situated at 37 Lenin Street, Smirnykh, Sakhalin Region 694350. https://smir-museum.shl.muzkult.ru/about. Zakharov et al. (1973), (1973), pp. 221–9. See also Chernyshev (2015b), pp. 79–82. Zhumatiy (2011), p. 96. Zhumatiy (2011), p. 96. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Wilson Center) has in its digital archive a copy of Yumashev’s telegram seeking approval for the operation: ‘Ivan Stepanovich Yumashev, The plan of operation for a Soviet invasion of the island of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. 19.8.45.’ Available at: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 122335. According to the historian Richard B. Frank, who has studied the matter, the plan was viable. He concludes that ‘The chances of Soviet success appeared to be very good.’ Frank (2001), p. 323. Vasilevsky (1978), p. 98. Gorkov (2002). Roberts (2006), p. 95. Roberts (2013), p. 11. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 535. Meretskov (1968), p. 425. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 536. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 537. Glantz (2003), p. 34. For an account of the Red Army campaign in that region, see Scho¨nherr (2017). Rotmistrov (1963), p. 544. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 546. ‘The formations of the 6th Guards Tank Army completed their rail journey from Czechoslovakia to Mongolia at the end of June 1945 [. . .] The army’s forces had arrived in the Far East without combat vehicles or transport. They were to receive this equipment in their new operational area’: Gebhardt (1996), pp. xvii, 111. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 545. From the first letter and number of the designation M4 (four), in Russian ‘M chetyrye’. Gebhardt (1996), p. xvii. Kazakov (1986), p. 303. Soviet Military Encyclopedia Vol. 7 (1976), p. 674; Popov (1977), pp. 27–31. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 537. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 538. The 107th, 119th and 223rd. The 224th.

stalin's war on japan - Press

172

Notes (pp. 43–6)

86. Kazakov (1986), pp. 285–6; Zakharov (1968), p. 401. For information on the howitzer and its background, see Bakursky, Solomonov & Fedoseev (2012), pp. 36–7. According to Kazakov, 5th Army also deployed eight 305mm artillery pieces, and 35th Army four of the same. His source is given as the ‘Central Archive of the USSR Ministry of Defence, f. 220, op. 320, d. 1, ll. 6–7’. Given that, according to all other available sources, the only weapon of that calibre used by the Red Army was the 305mm Br-18 Howitzer, of which only three were made and which was in any event not a field piece, then this seems mistaken. It may be that he is referring to Br-5 280mm mortars, which were mounted on the same carriage as the B-4 203mm howitzer: see Kazakov (1986), pp. 285–6. See also Bakursky, Solomonov & Fedoseev (2012), p. 36. 87. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 541. 88. Pankin (1986), p. 49. For a general history, see Wagner & Fetser (1973). 89. Meretskov (1968), p. 424; Khorobrykh (1989), p. 256. 90. Khorobrykh (1989), p. 258. 91. Khorobrykh (1989), p. 257; Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 338–44. 92. Khorobrykh (1989), p. 258. 93. Khorobrykh (1989), p. 259.

Chapter 4: ‘. . . at the crossroads of destiny’ 1. The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Sato) to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs (Togo), 20 July 1945. Quoted (in translation) in US Department of State (1960), p. 1254. 2. Yoshitake Oka (1983), p. 213. 3. Hasegawa (2005), pp. 120–6. 4. Matsumoto Shigeharu (1986), p. 161. 5. ‘I believe the Joint Proclamation by the three countries is nothing but a rehash of the Cairo Declaration. As for the government, it does not find any important value in it, and there is no other recourse but to ignore it entirely and resolutely fight for the successful conclusion of this war.’ Press Conference Statement by Prime Minister Suzuki, Tokyo, 28 July 1945. Quoted (in translation) in US Department of State (1960), p. 1293. 6. Molotov had formally, and unilaterally, terminated the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 5 April 1945, though the USSR remained neutral. 7. Quoted in Dobrinskaya (2018), p. 19. 8. Shtemenko (1989), p. 246. 9. Togo to Sato, 7 August 1945. Quoted in Toland (2003), p. 795. 10. For example, see Smith (2000). 11. It is claimed that from the autumn of 1941 a group led by NKVD cryptanalyst Sergei Tolstoy was able to solve the PURPLE cipher machine used by the Japanese Foreign Ministry. However, as Bauer put it in 2007, ‘a technically complete picture of Soviet cryptanalysis is still lacking’: Bauer (2007), p. 476. See also Kahn (1998), pp. 1–24. 12. Truman (1945): Statement by the President Announcing the Use of the A-Bomb at Hiroshima, 6 August 1945. 13. Collie (2011), p. 117. 14. ‘On Aug. 8, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Molotoff [sic] received the Japanese Ambassador, Mr Sato, and gave him, on behalf of the Soviet Government, the following for transmission to the Japanese Government: ‘‘After the defeat and capitulation of Hitlerite Germany, Japan became the only great power that still stood for the continuation of the war.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 46–51)

173

‘‘The demand of the three powers, the United States, Great Britain and China, on July 26 for the unconditional surrender of the Japanese armed forces was rejected by Japan, and thus the proposal of the Japanese Government to the Soviet Union on mediation in the war in the Far East loses all basis. ‘‘Taking into consideration the refusal of Japan to capitulate, the Allies submitted to the Soviet Government a proposal to join the war against Japanese aggression and thus shorten the duration of the war, reduce the number of victims and facilitate the speedy restoration of universal peace. ‘‘Loyal to its Allied duty, the Soviet Government has accepted the proposals of the Allies and has joined in the declaration of the Allied powers of July 26. ‘‘The Soviet Government considers that this policy is the only means able to bring peace nearer, free the people from further sacrifice and suffering and give the Japanese people the possibility of avoiding the dangers and destruction suffered by Germany after her refusal to capitulate unconditionally. ‘‘In view of the above, the Soviet Government declares that from tomorrow, that is from Aug. 9, the Soviet Government will consider itself to be at war with Japan.’’

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22.

23. 24.

25. 26.

Source: ‘Soviet Declaration of War on Japan’ at The Avalon Project, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s4.asp. Molotov’s brief account of the meeting, as recollected by him some thirty-seven years later, can be found in Chuev (2002), p. 39. Slavinsky (2004), pp. 153–4. US Army Corps of Engineers, Manhattan District (1946), p. 9. Mayumi Itoh (2010), p. xi. Barshay (2013), p. 30. Barshay (2013), p. 31. There is very little information on Yamada in English. This brief account of his life and career is taken from Umemoto Shuzo (1983). Lieutenant Colonel Masahiko Kuwa, ‘Monograph 155-A, Chapter I, Third Area Army and Thirtieth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), pp. 1–4. Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: The First Area Army in Eastern Manchuria: Military Geography of Eastern Manchuria’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 34–5. Colonel Kenjiro Kaneko, ‘Monograph 155-K, Chapter XI, The Fourth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), pp. 174–5. Colonel Hiroshi Ogi, ‘Monograph 155-O, Chapter XV, The Thirty-Fourth Army Headquarters’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), pp. 237–40, 242. Fuller (2003b), p. 625, n. 1. Lyudnikov (1969), p. 169.

Chapter 5: The Trans-Baikal Front: the ‘iron stream’ 1. Boyko (1990), p. 69. 2. Pliyev (1965), p. 43. Unless otherwise stated, Pliyev is the source for sections on the operations of the Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group. 3. For the evolution of Soviet armoured doctrine during the Great Patriotic War, see Katukov (1974). A tank brigade commander during the war, Mikhail Katukov became a Marshal of the Armoured Forces of the Soviet Union in the 1950s.

stalin's war on japan - Press

174

Notes (pp. 52–8)

4. ‘Rapidity is the essence of war: take advantage of the enemy’s unreadiness, make your way by unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots’: Giles (1910), pp. 122–3. 5. Pliyev (1965), p. 53. 6. Pliyev (1965), p. 52. 7. Pliyev (1965), p. 52. 8. Zakharov (1968), p. 86. 9. Rotmistrov (1963), pp. 537–8. 10. Probably the most comprehensive work on the 6th Guards Tank Army, especially during the Manchurian campaign, is by Igor Nebolsin and Yuri Zavizion; this work has been collated from a large number of sources, both primary and secondary. Nebolsin & Zavizion (2017). Unless otherwise stated, it is the source for sections on that army’s operations. 11. There is no evidence that the desert oases had been poisoned as such, which would have required a degree of preparation to achieve. Several accounts do, though, mention that the wells and water holes had been partially filled with sand, resulting in the contents becoming the ‘slurry’ mentioned by Pliyev (1965). 12. Gebhardt (1996), p. 129. This translation of Loza (2001) appeared, rather curiously, before the Russian edition of the book. 13. Gebhardt (1996), p. 131. 14. The practice of carrying infantry into battle on tanks and self-propelled guns (tank desant) was developed from the Red Army’s lack of anything resembling a tracked armoured personnel carrier which could keep up with the heavy armour. Infantry so deployed rode atop the tank or gun, clutching hand-holds on the turret and/or hull. Whilst generally successful, it was an extremely costly tactic in terms of casualties. US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (1996), p. III–2. For an autobiographical account (in Russian), see Bessonov (2008). For an account in English see Bessonov (2003). 15. Gebhardt (1996), p. 128. 16. Gebhardt (1996), p. 133. 17. Lyudnikov (1965), pp. 68–78. 18. Glantz (1983), p. 160. 19. In theory, Red Army formations were commanded by Military Councils (Soviets), with all orders being issued by them. In practice, since October 1942 the commanding officer actually commanded following a decree ‘On the Establishment of Complete Unity of Command and the Abolition of the Institute of Military Commissars in the Red Army’ being put into effect. Under this the notion of joint or collective leadership was abolished. Political officers were appointed to the council, but their functions were limited to propaganda and morale-boosting work. See Kalinchuk (2014), pp. 75–81. 20. Boyko (1990), p. 70. 21. Boyko (1990), p. 75. 22. Lyudnikov (1969), pp. 167, 168. 23. Boyko (1990), p. 79. 24. Lyudnikov (1969), p. 168, and (1967), pp. 51–2. 25. Boyko (1990), p. 79. 26. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 116–17. 27. Boyko (1990), p. 80. 28. Boyko (1990), p. 80. 29. Lyudnikov (1969), p. 173. 30. Lyudnikov (1967), pp. 58–9. 31. Lyudnikov (1967), p. 69. 32. Radzievsky (1977), p. 102. 33. Luchinsky (1971), p. 70; Sidorov (1978), p. 98.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 58–61)

175

34. Hall (1930), p. 280. 35. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 178–9; Sidorov (1978), pp. 98–9. 36. Sidorov (1978), p. 97. Under the terms of the Ottawa, or Fourth, Protocol between the USSR, the US, the UK and Canada, signed on 17 April 1945, the US had agreed to ship 500 ‘Jeeps (Amphibian)’ and 1,000 ‘Trucks, 2½-ton Amphibian 666 cargo DUKW’ to the Soviet Union by 30 June 1945. US Department of State (1948), p. 142. For the amphibious jeep, see Zaloga (2005), pp. 17–18. For Soviet use and development of amphibious vehicles, see Prochko (2009), pp. 16–22. 37. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 178–179. Sidorov (1978). pp. 98–99. 38. According to Radzievsky (1977), p. 103, the Advanced Detachment comprised: 205th Tank Brigade (Lieutenant Colonel N.A. Kurnosov) 152nd Rifle Regiment (truck-mounted) 791st Self-Propelled Artillery Battalion (SU-76 guns) 158th Anti-tank (Tank Destroyer) Battalion (SU-100 guns) 97th Light Artillery Regiment 465th Anti-aircraft Artillery Regiment 1st Company of the 124th Combat Engineer Battalion. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 178–9, adds two mortar battalions (1st Battalion, 176th Mortar Regiment, and 1st Battalion, 32nd Guards Mortar Regiment) to the total. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

44. 45. 46. 47.

Radzievsky (1977), p. 103. Actually the upstream portion of the Argun. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 179. Radzievsky (1977), p. 103. Radzievsky (1977), p. 103. Perhaps curiously, Burmasov had no experience of armoured warfare against Germany. He had fought at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, then had remained in the Far East throughout the Great Patriotic War, becoming deputy commander of the 86th Rifle Corps in 1944. For his skilful leadership of the advanced detachment and the successes it achieved he was awarded the Order of Suvorov 2nd Degree. This was a decoration given to commanders of corps, divisions and brigades, their deputies and chiefs of staff, for basically achieving excellent results. See http://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/ussr_4361.htm. For a brief biography of Burmasov, see Vozhakina (2006), pp. 99–100. Colonel Kenjiro Kaneko, ‘Monograph 155-K, Chapter XI, The Fourth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), p. 174. Sidorov (1975), pp. 15–17; Zakharov (1968), pp. 399–400. Colonel Kenjiro Kaneko, ‘Monograph 155-K, Chapter XI, The Fourth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), p. 184. Rotmistrov (1963), p. 534.

Chapter 6: The First Far Eastern Front: Suvorov’s Tactics 1. Kazakov (1986), p. 294. 2. Tsirlin et al. (1970), p. 350. 3. Colonel General Ivan Chistyakov’s explanation to Lieutenant General Murakami Keisaku of how the Red Army had manoeuvred heavy equipment through ‘impassable’ terrain. Chistyakov (1985), p. 274. 4. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 425. 5. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 95. 6. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426. 7. Radzievsky (1976), p. 4.

stalin's war on japan - Press

176

Notes (pp. 62–7)

8. For Kazakov, see: https://w.histrf.ru/articles/article/show/kazakov_konstantin_pietrovich_ marshal_artillierii. 9. Kazakov (1986), pp. 293–4. 10. Three regiments of self-propelled guns (335th Guards, 338th Guards and 339th Guards); three brigades of towed artillery (213th, 216th and 217th); two mortar regiments (33rd and 54th Guards, the latter deploying Katyusha multiple rocket launchers) and one mortar brigade (52nd), plus a tank destroyer brigade (60th): Zakharov (1968), p. 401. 11. ‘the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities’: Giles (1910), p. 18. 12. Beloborodov (1982), p. 60. ‘The word taiga originates from northern Russia, where it was originally used to describe the dense woodlands of spruce . . . found in cool, wet climates. In the 20th century, the term came to include all cool, northern coniferous forests . . . Some researchers also refer to the coniferous forest of the mountains of warm temperate regions as taiga’: Day (2006), p. 1. 13. Beloborodov (1982), pp. 60–1. 14. Timofeev (1978), p. 52; Meretskov (1968), p. 417. 15. Meretskov (1968), p. 418. Khrenov (1982), p. 331. 16. Khrenov (1982), pp. 335–6. 17. Beloborodov (1982), p. 63; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 205. 18. Khrenov (1982), p. 337. For a general account of military engineers in the Soviet Army of the time, see Malinovsky (2005). 19. Beloborodov (1982), p. 61. This is an underestimation. The army was built around two rifle corps (the 26th and 59th), plus a further six rifle divisions (the 22nd, 39th, 59th, 231st, 300th, and 365th). Armour additional to the organic elements of these formations included three tank brigades (the 75th, 77th and 257th) and four further regiments, the latter comprising the 48th Separate Tank Regiment and three self-propelled artillery regiments of assault guns (the 335th Guards, 338th Guards and 339th Guards): Zakharov (1968), p. 401. 20. Beloborodov (1982), p. 63. 21. Beloborodov (1982), p. 64; Meretskov (1968), p. 429. 22. ‘using the combat experience of the Berlin operation, we planned to attack the enemy in the dead of night using searchlights to blind him’: Meretskov (1968), p. 434. See below for the 5th Army and a similar technique. 23. Beloborodov (1982), p. 83; Meretskov (1968), p. 434. 24. Beloborodov (1982), p. 95. 25. Hvorostyanov’s detachment, based at the village of Turiy Rog (Voronezh) on the northwestern shore of Lake Khanka, was part of the Amur Flotilla. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 128. See also Zolotarev & Kozlov (2005), p. 689. 26. Beloborodov (1982), p. 84. 27. Kazakov (1986), p. 297. 28. Beloborodov (1982), p. 90. 29. Beloborodov (1982), pp. 90–1. 30. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 205. 31. Beloborodov (1982), p. 90. 32. Beloborodov (1982), p. 94. 33. Beloborodov (1982), p. 94. The Mulinhe river is a tributary of the Ussuri. 34. ‘Cities in China have long been surrounded by thick mud walls; a high-explosive fragmentation shell from a 76-mm gun penetrated them with difficulty and only after several hits’: Kazakov (1986), p. 298. 35. Kazakov (1986), p. 298. 36. Beloborodov (1982), p. 93.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 67–70) 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55.

56.

57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68.

69. 70. 71. 72.

177

Kazakov (1986), p. 298. For the march order, see Vnotchenko (1971), p. 206. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 207. Timofeev (1978), p. 50. Various Authors (1973), p. 323; Timofeev (1978), p. 55. Timofeev (1978), p. 52. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 216. Khrenov (1982), p. 340. See Solyankin et al. (2005). Various Authors (1973), p. 323; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 216. US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. II. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 215. The bombers flew from airfields further back, some 60–200km beyond the ManchukuoSoviet border: Vnotchenko (1971), p. 217. The weather conditions were a potential problem: ‘There were very peculiar climatic conditions in the Far East and Sakhalin; almost every airfield had its own special microclimate. In the coastal zone, frequent outbursts of moist sea air, forming a curtain of thick fog, caused a lot of trouble’: Krasovsky (1968), p. 337. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 216–17. Glantz (2003), pp. 57–8. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 216. Dragan (1988), p. 276. Available at: http://militera.lib.ru/bio/jzl_krylov/index.html. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 425. For an account of the campaign in English, see Buttar (2012). ‘The units of the 3rd Belorussian Front had to fulfil a very difficult task: to overcome a powerful system of field and long-term defensive structures and take control of the city. The solution to this problem required significant and specially trained forces’: Nikiforov (2005), p. 239. Dragan (1988), p. 318. It was a decisive and crushing victory for the Red Army which inflicted massive losses on its enemy, annihilating twenty-eight out of thirty-four divisions and shattering their front line. See Buchner (2004). Dragan (1988), p. 278. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426; Dragan (1988), p. 279. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 434; Dragan (1988), p. 279. Dragan (1988), p. 278. Because of their resemblance to a two-humped Bactrian camel and a pointed hat respectively: Dragan (1988), p. 279. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 207. Dragan (1988), p. 279. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 426. The 17th, 45th, 65th and 72nd, containing twelve infantry divisions in total. Equipped with the 210mm gun M 1939 (Br-17). See Bellamy (1986), pp. 122–3. See also https://topwar.ru/146413-artillerija-krupnyj-kalibr-br-17-pushka-210-mm-obrazca-1939goda.html. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), pp. 426–7; Zakharov (1968), p. 401. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 429; Dragan (1988), p. 281. Glantz (2003), p. 14. The ‘exact quote’ according to Suldin is ‘Artillery – the god of modern warfare’: Suldin (2019), p. 41.

stalin's war on japan - Press

178

Notes (pp. 70–1)

73. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 434. 74. Dragan (1988), p. 279. The Soviets lacked data on the number and positions of the Japanese fortifications. For example, one map sent from the Front to 5th Army HQ showed three or four structures in one place, whereas direct observation revealed far more. Moreover, it was impossible to see what lay further back or on the reverse side of hills: Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 434. 75. The composition of Red Army assault engineer combat units had been settled, after much trial and practice, in 1943. It was, of course, variable dependent upon the task at hand: Nikiforov (2005), p. 57. 76. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 435; Dragan (1988), p 278; Timofeev (1978), p. 52. 77. As part of the final drive on Berlin by the Red Army, Zhukov’s 1st Belorussian Front attacked across the Oder river in the early hours of 16 April 1945. The offensive began with a massive bombardment by thousands of artillery pieces and Katyushas. Incorporated into Zhukov’s battle plan was the use of 143 searchlights, manned by female soldiers. These would, in theory, illuminate the battlefield for the Red Army and dazzle the enemy. In practice, the technique proved problematical. Le Tissier (2009), pp. 138, 159–60. 78. Dragan (1988), pp. 281–2; Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 435. 79. Which would in any event have negated the use of searchlights. 80. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 438. 81. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 438. Dragan (1988), p. 285. 82. Khrenov (1982), pp. 337, 339. Zakharov (1968), p. 401 states that an armoured train was assigned to the 5th Army, though he gives no information on its usage. Given the different Manchukuoan and Soviet gauges, it seems unlikely that it could have got close to the tunnels. For information on Soviet armoured trains, see Koenig (2001), pp. 144–61, and Amirkhanov (2005). Unfortunately, neither work mentions the Manchurian Strategic Operation. 83. Khrenov (1982), pp. 337–9; Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 438; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 209. 84. Dragan (1988), p. 286. 85. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 441. 86. An example to illustrate this point might be instructive. As the 5th Army pushed through the fortified region, it left a reinforced rifle regiment from each division in its wake. Their task was to deal with those bunkers, particularly at the ‘Camel’ and ‘Sharp’ strongpoints, which had been bypassed and so remained in enemy hands. A company from the 852nd Rifle Regiment, strengthened with a platoon of combat engineers and an ISU-152 assault gun, was detailed to attack a particularly difficult example: a two-storey structure topped with an armoured cupola. Several direct hits from the ISU failed to penetrate the cupola, so recourse was had to more labour-intensive methods. The engineers climbed atop the bunker, which was largely subterranean and covered with a thick layer of earth, and detonated a 250kg charge. This effort failed as well. A second attempt with double the amount of explosive was tried, but again without result. Only after a further three 500kg charges had been detonated did the bunker crack, creating a hole through which the attackers engaged the occupiers in the upper storey. Those below continued to resist, however, and had to be disposed of with a further explosive charge. Despite the unsoundness of extrapolating from a single example, it does seem evident that no amount of medium or long-range artillery fire would have been sufficient to destroy or disable that particular structure and others like it. In fact, it took three days of fighting before the ‘stubborn resistance of the enemy’ was broken and the remaining bunkers at ‘Camel’ and ‘Sharp’ were destroyed: Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 440.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 72–6) 87. 88. 89. 90. 91.

179

Fedor of the Moscow State School (College) of Brass [Wind Instrument] Art (2015). Meretskov (1968), p. 428. Pechenenko (1978), p. 42. Twenty-four B-4 203mm howitzers on tracked carriages. The 125th and 209th Tank Brigades; the 62nd Tank Destroyer Brigade; the 215th Artillery Brigade; the 224th High-Power Howitzer Artillery Brigade; the 54th Mortar Brigade; the 67th Guards Mortar Regiment; and the 280th Separate Engineer Battalion. Five battalions of anti-aircraft guns were also attached to the 35th Army, as were four armoured trains: Zakharov (1968), p. 401. Vnotchenko gives the lower figure pertaining to tanks and self-propelled guns: Vnotchenko (1971), p. 94, n. 2. 92. Pechenenko (1978), p. 49. 93. Pechenenko (1975), p. 40. 94. Pechenenko (1978), p. 42; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 107. 95. Quoted in Semashkin (2010), p. 3. See also http://korolev.msk.ru/kaliningradka/2010_ 07403-1.html. 96. Tsirlin et al. (1970), p. 350. 97. Pechenenko (1978), p. 45. 98. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 204. 99. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘The Fifth [Japanese] Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 173. 100. Pechenenko (1978), p. 46; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 204. 101. Semashkin (2010), p. 3. 102. One engineering and two infantry battalions were deployed solely to this task. Three engineering and three infantry battalions were performing the same work behind the 66th Division: Vnotchenko (1971), p. 203. 103. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 204; Pechenenko (1978), p. 46; Semashkin (2010), p. 3. Anatoly Andreyevich Kuzmin survived the war and was demobilised in 1950. 104. Pechenenko (1975), p. 41. 105. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 214. 106. Pechenenko (1975), p. 47. 107. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 214. 108. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 214. 109. Pechenenko (1975), p. 46. 110. ‘The breaching of a fortified zone cannot be accomplished without first destroying its permanent fortifications, and this calls for the employment of powerful guns and mortars . . . It is advisable, therefore, to form artillery destruction groups out of 152mm and 203mm howitzers. Destruction groups should be independent corps groups. Army destruction groups are formed in exceptional cases only’: Samsonov (1946), p. 31. 111. Sidorov (1975), p. 20; Nemychenkov (2019), p. 332. For details of the fortifications in general, see the section entitled ‘Japanese fortified areas in Manchuria’, in Runov (2014). 112. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 204. 113. Japanese Self Defence Ground Force Fuji School (1980), p. 95. 114. Pechenenko (1975), p. 46; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 204. 115. Pechenenko (1975), p. 48; Meretskov (1968), p. 435. 116. Not to be confused with 6th Guards Tank Army. 117. Beloborodov (1963), pp. 151, 155, 163. 118. Chistyakov (1985), pp. 247–8. 119. Chistyakov (1985), p. 256. 120. Meretskov (1968), p. 424; Chistyakov (1985), p. 252; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 94. 121. Zakharov (1968), p. 401.

stalin's war on japan - Press

180 122. 123. 124. 125. 126.

127. 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138.

139. 140. 141. 142.

143.

Notes (pp. 76–9) Vnotchenko (1971), p. 94. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 94, n. 3. Zakharov (1968), p. 401. Chistyakov (1985), p. 259. A Finnish knife, or ‘Finc’, was similar to the American Bowie knife. It gained the reputation of being a ‘typical criminal weapon’. See https://steel-knife.ru/wp-content/cache/ wp-rocket/steel-knife.ru/finka/pravda-o-russkoj-finke/index.html_gzip. Chistyakov (1985), p. 258. Chistyakov (1985), p. 256. Chistyakov (1985), p. 261. Chistyakov (1985), pp. 262–3. Chistyakov (1985), p. 266. Chistyakov (1985), p. 267. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 221–2. Chistyakov (1985), pp. 267–8. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 177. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 222–3. See also Chapter 9. Formerly the Tacoma-class frigates Sandusky (PF-54) and Allentown (PF-52) respectively. Russell (1997), pp. 39–40. Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 179–80. See also Gelfond (1958), pp. 74, 76; and Chernyshev (2015b), pp. 63–4. The latter offers a modern treatment of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, though uses much the same sources as Zakharov et al. (1973) and Gelfond (1958). Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 176; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 223. Chistyakov (1985), p. 276. Formerly the Tacoma-class San Pedro (PF-37). Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 81; Gelfond (1958), p. 77; Chernyshev (2015b), p. 64. What proved to be much more than a nuisance was what can perhaps be best termed a ‘friendlyfire’ incident that occurred during operations to clear the islands. On the morning of 14 August the minesweeper T-279, formerly USS Palisade (AM-270) of the Admirableclass, was attempting to land infantry when she was damaged by exploding mines. Two crew members were killed and twenty seriously injured, whilst the ship lost speed and her steering failed. She did, though, stay afloat (Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 181). These were not Japanese mines: they had been laid by the US Air Force as part of the aptly named Operation Starvation: ‘The Air Force mining campaign against Japan which earned such high praise from the Navy was carried out by the Marianas-based B-29s of General LeMay’s XXI Bomber Command . . . It began in late March 1945 and lasted, with some interruptions, until the war ended five months later’: Sallager (1974), p. 1. The Soviet Navy was indignant at the mining of Korean waters; on 5 August a demarcation line, running north-south through the Sea of Japan at a distance of 150–190km west of the Japanese mainland, had been agreed with the US (Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 172). Zakharov et al. (1973) argued that ‘Mine installations in this area [the north Korean ports] did not have any significance in accelerating the defeat of Japan . . . but they significantly impeded the actions of the Soviet Pacific Fleet . . . information about the minefields was only received from the American command on 21 August’: Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 182. Generalissimo Alexander Suvorov (1729–1800), Russian military leader and national hero, is famed for fighting and winning sixty battles. He is credited with the remark that ‘where a deer can pass, a Russian can pass too’: Zolotarev (1994), p. 149. For a life of Suvorov in English, see Longworth (1965).

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 81–8)

181

Chapter 7: The Second Far Eastern Front: River Wars 1. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 147. 2. Beloborodov (1963), pp. 16, 49, 75, 99, 150, 153, 185, 187, 192, 366, 431, 453, 458, 470, 471, 515, 522. 3. Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 195. 4. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 96. 5. Beloborodov (1963), pp. 185, 482. 6. https://www.britannica.com/place/Sungari-River. 7. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 97. 8. Beloborodov (1963), 185, 200, 543; Zolotarev & Kozlov (2005), p. 688. 9. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 202; see also Zolotarev & Kozlov (2005), p. 688. 10. There were two types: Project 1124 – a 41–48 tonne boat with two T-34 or T-28 tank turrets and two anti-aircraft machine guns; and Project 1125 – a 27–36 tonne boat with one T-34 or T-28 turret and four anti-aircraft machine guns. They could also be fitted to carry a rack of Katyusha rockets. See Chernikov (2013). 11. Zolotarev & Kozlov (2005), p. 690; Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 201. Chernyshev (2015b), p. 101. 12. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 109; Zakharov (1968), p. 403. 13. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 117, n. 1. 14. Zakharov (1968), p. 403. Sidorov (1975), p. 15. 15. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 204; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 230. 16. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 147. 17. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), pp. 143–5. 18. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 147. 19. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 204. 20. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 230. 21. Unless otherwise stated, sources for the Fujin operation are Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), pp. 145–51; Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 207–11; Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 233–5; Chernyshev (2015b), pp. 107–10; Grechko (2015), pp. 235–7. 22. Dating from Tsarist times, although upgraded, the eight Shkval (Squall)-class monitors (Dzerzhinsky, Lenin, Far East Komsomolets, Kirov, Red East, Sverdlov and Sun Yat-sen) had in 1945 a main armament of eight 120mm guns in four twin turrets. Displacing 976 tonnes, they were 71m in length and 12.8m wide, but with a draft of only 1.45m. They were equipped with anti-aircraft and machine gun outfits, and the crews consisted of some 150 officers and men. With 76mm of main belt armour, and 19mm on the upper deck, they were reasonably well protected: Chernikov (2007). 23. Grechko (2015), p. 236, for example. 24. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 147. 25. Gelfond (1958), p. 151; Basova (1988), p. 454. 26. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 109–10. 27. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 236–8; Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 235. 28. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 231–2. 29. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 232. 30. 2nd Red Banner Army. 31. Beloborodov (1963), pp. 25, 185, 471. 32. Some 100km wide, and 10–40km deep, the Soviets calculated it had 134 long-term defensive structures, including 77 pillboxes and 52 bunkers: Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 216. 33. With a front of around 85km and a depth of 10–20km, the zone possessed some 136 pillboxes and 80 bunkers: Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 216.

stalin's war on japan - Press

182 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54.

55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63.

Notes (pp. 88–93)

Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 236–8. Zakharov (1968), p. 403. The Zeya is one of the largest tributaries of the Amur, joining it near Blagoveshchensk. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 202; Chernyshev (2015b), pp. 114–15, (2015a), p. 121. The confluence of the Shilka and Argun (Ergun, Ergune), around 800km upstream from Blagoveshchensk, forms the Amur. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 237. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 237–8. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 217. Se also Novikov-Daursky (2010). Colonel Kenjiro Kaneko, ‘The Defense Plan’, a section in ‘Monograph 155-K, Chapter XI: The Fourth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), p. 174. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 237–8. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 238–9. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 238–9. Beloborodov (1963), pp. 25, 482, 483. For Diakanov, see Vozhakina (2006), pp. 185–6. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 289. For the geography of Sakhalin Island, see https://www. britannica.com/place/Sakhalin-Island. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 289. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 290. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 220. The best recent description of this fortified zone, complete with drawings of individual positions, maps and modern photographs, is undoubtedly Samarin (2007). Vnotchenko (1971), p. 291. Gelfond (1958), p. 110; Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), pp. 145–53; Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 96–8; Achkasov et al. (1980), p. 584. See also Bagrov (1959). During the first hour of Operation Iceberg, the invasion of Okinawa on 1 April 1945, more than 16,000 troops and their equipment were successfully landed by Task Force 51 commanded by Rear Admiral Kelly Turner: Appleman et al. (1947), p. 72. Gelfond (1958), p. 111. Aircraft available to the Pacific Fleet and the Northern Pacific Flotilla, under Lieutenant General Petr Lemeshko and Major General Georgi Dziuba respectively, amounted to 665 fighters, 400 attack/bomber aircraft, 157 torpedo bombers and 266 reconnaissance aircraft: Ivanov (1973), p. 267. Gelfond (1958), p. 112. Gelfond (1958), p. 112. See also Bagrov (1959), p. 33. Degteryov (2019), pp. 77–8. For general information on the fighting, see also The Museum of the South Sakhalin Offensive Operation, available at: http://sakhalin-museums.ru/ museum/muzey_smirnykh/about/#tab Degteryov (2019), p. 78. The term originates from the Soviet–Finnish War of 1939–40: Kulypin (1941), p. 57. Degteryov (2019), p. 37. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 240–1.

Chapter 8: ‘The war situation has developed . . .’ 1. From Emperor Hirohito’s ‘Imperial Rescript’ broadcast on 15 August 1945 announcing Japan’s surrender: McNelly (1967), pp. 169–70. 2. Lieutenant Colonel Genichiro Arinuma, Major Kyoji Takasugi & Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-A: Kwantung Army Operations in Manchuria (9–15 August 1945)’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 71.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 93–5)

183

3. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 242. 4. The members of the Council in August 1945 were Prime Minister Admiral Suzuki Kantaro, Foreign Minister Togo Shigenori, Minister of the Navy Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, Minister of War General Anami Korechika, Chief of the Army General Staff General Umezu Yoshijiro and Chief of the Navy General Staff Admiral Toyoda Soemu. 5. For the creation of this body and its aim of finding a way to end the war, see Hasegawa (2005), p. 72. 6. Hasegawa (2005), p. 145. There is an enormous amount of literature on the end of the AsiaPacific War. This section, dealing with the Japanese decision to surrender, is unless otherwise stated derived from the following sources: Sadao Asada (2007), pp. 24–58; Brooks (1968); Butow (1954); David & Yuma (2018), pp. 132–5; Craig (1967); Frank (2001); Hasegawa (2005); Noriko Kawamura (2015); Large (1992), pp. 102–31. 7. Quoted in Hasegawa (2005), p. 73. 8. Bombardment by atomic bombs. Truman’s 6 August statement on the bombing of Hiroshima had stated: ‘It was to spare the Japanese people from utter destruction that the ultimatum of July 26 was issued at Potsdam. Their leaders promptly rejected that ultimatum. If they do not now accept our terms they may expect a rain of ruin from the air, the like of which has never been seen on this earth.’ Available at: https://millercenter.org/ the-presidency/presidential-speeches/august-6-1945-statement-president-announcing-usebomb. 9. Hasegawa (2005), pp. 198–9. 10. Hasegawa (2005), p. 203. 11. Although the atomic bomb represented a quantum leap in capability, Japan’s cities had been under a sustained attack since March 1945. Major General Curtis LeMay’s nocturnal strategic campaign, using the B-29 bombers of XXI Bomber Command (later Twentieth Air Force) stationed in the Marianas Islands, laid waste to sixty-six Japanese cities in urban fire-bombing attacks which, according to one account, were ‘more devastating by far than the two atomic attacks’. For example, the night attack of 25/26 May on Tokyo incinerated nearly 45 sq. km of the city, including the Imperial Palace: Coox (1998), pp. 333, 362. 12. Bradley (1999), p. 32. 13. Assassination was an occupational hazard for Japanese politicians and others thought to be too ‘moderate’ until after the end of the Second World War. See, for example, Ozaki Yukio (2001). 14. Spaulding (1986), p. 117. Kido Takayoshi was Kido Koichi’s great-uncle. Showa is the Japanese term for the period of Hirohito’s reign. 15. The source of this information was First Lieutenant Marcus McDilda, a pilot who had been rescued from the sea after his aircraft ditched. He offered his captors this false tale in an effort to prevent his further torture and execution, and it was believed. It also saved his life. See Drea (1992), p. 224. See also Craig (1967), pp. 490–1. 16. Inconclusive because, constitutionally, it was necessary for any decisions reached to be unanimous. This, of course, was what gave the military and naval members an effective veto, and the ability to collapse any government merely by resigning from it. 17. Following the 25/26 May incendiary attack on Tokyo, the Imperial household lived in a subterranean complex in the palace grounds. 18. Quoted in Cohen & Yuma (2018), p. 133. 19. The message added that ‘the Japanese Minister . . . begs the Government of the United States to forward its answer through the intermediary of Switzerland. Similar requests are being transmitted to the Governments of Great Britain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics through the intermediary of Sweden, as well as to the Government of China through the intermediary of Switzerland. The Chinese Minister at Berne has already been

stalin's war on japan - Press

184

20.

21.

22.

23. 24. 25.

26. 27. 28.

29. 30. 31.

Notes (pp. 96–8)

informed of the foregoing through the channel of the Swiss Political Department.’ Message from Max Grassli, Charge´ d’Affaires ad interim of Switzerland, to James Byrnes, US Secretary of State, 10 August 1945. Quoted in US Department of State (1969a), pp. 668–9. Grassli was a diplomat based in the Swiss legation at Washington DC and in that role passed official communiques back and forth between the US and Japanese governments. In November 1944 the US Secretaries of State, War and the Navy agreed to appoint a committee to ‘coordinate the views of the three Departments in matters of common interest’ concerning the political-military issues involved in the occupation of the Axis powers following the end of the Second World War. Thus arose the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC). See Rogers (2007), pp. 174–5. Rusk, D. as told to Richard Rusk & Papp (1990), p. 124. His first rendition of the tale appears in a memorandum dated 12 July 1950, with him reporting as an ‘eye-witness’ to the birth of the 38th Parallel. See US Department of State (1969a), p. 1039. This version contains no mention of the National Geographic map, but did state: ‘We recommended the 38th parallel even though it was further north than could be realistically reached by US forces in the event of Soviet disagreement, but we did so because we felt it important to include the capital of Korea in the area of responsibility of American troops. The 38th parallel became a part of the Army’s recommendation to the Department of State and that line was subsequently agreed internationally.’ For Russian and Japanese dialogue on dividing Korea, see Soon Sung Cho (1967), pp. 49–50. Following the Russo-Japanese War, a rapprochement between the two states had taken place with the ‘Secret Convention’ signed at St Petersburg on 30 July 1907, whereby Russia acknowledged Japanese ‘special interests’ in Korea and Japan recognised Russian ‘special interests’ over Outer Mongolia (present-day Mongolia). This convention was the first of three such over the period 1907–12 whereby the two powers defined their respective spheres of influence in, and fixed the status quo regarding, northeast Asia, including Korea, Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. Korea had been a virtual Japanese protectorate since 1905 and was annexed on 22 August 1910. For an analysis of these matters, see Price (1933). Stueck (1995), p. 3. https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1945v07/d390. Personal and Secret from Premier J.V. Stalin to the President, H. Truman, 16 August 1945. Quoted in: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (2001), p. 266. (Originally published in Moscow by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in 1957.) US Department of State (1969a), p. 1039. For studies on Stalin and the division of Korea, see Barry (2012), pp. 33–55; Chong-Sik Lee (1985), pp. 67–74; Shen Zhihua (2012), pp. 30–2; Stueck (1995), pp. 1–27. Hasegawa (2005), pp. 188–9. The possibility of a Soviet invasion of Hokkaido had been mooted on 26–27 June 1945 during discussions on the forthcoming war against Japan. At a meeting in the Kremlin attended by senior politicians and soldiers, it was proposed by Marshal Kirill Meretskov and opposed by Molotov and Zhukov, the latter arguing that it would be a gamble whilst the former stated that it would be regarded by the Allies as a violation of the Yalta Agreements. Stalin asked Zhukov what forces would be required, the reply being four combined-arms armies plus aircraft. Stalin did not summarise the meeting, but limited himself to stating that the Soviet command should be prepared for the forthcoming war with Japan. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 126–7. Truman to Stalin, 17 August 1945. Quoted in Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR (2001), p. 267. Hasegawa (2005), p. 269. Hasegawa (2005), p. 227.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 98–101)

185

32. Noriko Kawamura (2015), p. 169. 33. It was dated 11 August owing to Washington and Tokyo being on different sides of the International Date Line. It was sent ‘on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China’. 34. The Secretary of State to the Swiss Charge´ (Gra¨ssli), Washington, 11 August 1945. Quoted in US Department of State (1969a). Available at: https://history.state.gov/historical documents/frus1945v06/d412. The full text read: Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your note of August 10, and in reply to inform you that the President of the United States has directed me to send to you for transmission by your Government to the Japanese Government the following message on behalf of the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and China: ‘With regard to the Japanese Government’s message accepting the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation but containing the statement, ‘‘with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a sovereign ruler,’’ our position is as follows: ‘From the moment of surrender the authority of the Emperor and the Japanese Government to rule the state shall be subject to the Supreme Commander of the Allied powers who will take such steps as he deems proper to effectuate the surrender terms. ‘The Emperor will be required to authorize and ensure the signature by the Government of Japan and the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters of the surrender terms necessary to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, and shall issue his commands to all the Japanese military, naval and air authorities and to all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations and to surrender their arms, and to issue such other orders as the Supreme Commander may require to give effect to the surrender terms. ‘Immediately upon the surrender the Japanese Government shall transport prisoners of war and civilian internees to places of safety, as directed, where they can quickly be placed aboard Allied transports. ‘The ultimate form of government of Japan shall, in accordance with the Potsdam Proclamation, be established by the freely expressed will of the Japanese people. ‘The armed forces of the Allied Powers will remain in Japan until the purposes set forth in the Potsdam Proclamation are achieved.’ James F. Byrnes Secretary of State. 35. 36. 37. 38.

39. 40. 41. 42. 43.

Quoted in Hasegawa (2005), p. 229. Drea (2003), p. 213. Hasegawa (2005), p. 245. In translation, the note read: ‘Believing firmly that our sacred land shall never perish, I – with my death – humbly apologise to the Emperor for the great crime.’ It is unknown to what ‘crime’ he was specifically referring. Shiizaki and Hatanaka also killed themselves later that morning. McNelly (1967), pp. 169–70. The official translation into English can be found online at: https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/jewel-voice-broadcast. Geselbracht (2019), pp. 240–1. Quoted in Vnotchenko (1971), p. 244. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 245; Pliyev (1965), p. 117.

stalin's war on japan - Press

186

Notes (pp. 103–9) Chapter 9: The Second Stage: Dissolution of an Army, . . .

1. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 215–16. 2. Beloborodov (1982), p. 130. 3. Pliyev (1965), p. 118. 4. Pliyev (1965), p. 119. 5. Lieutenant Colonel Genichiro Arinuma, Major Kyoji Takasugi and Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-A: Kwantung Army Operations in Manchuria (9–15 August 1945)’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 78–9. 6. Lieutenant Colonel Genichiro Arinuma, Major Kyoji Takasugi and Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-A: Kwantung Army Operations in Manchuria (9–15 August 1945)’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 21–2; Hasegawa (2005), p. 252. 7. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 279–80. 8. Minasyan, Bogdanov & Dolgiy (1984), p. 485. 9. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 215–16. 10. Pliyev (1965), p. 129. 11. Pliyev (1965), p. 137. 12. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 282. Chiang Kai-shek’s government was based at Chongqing, the ‘provisional’ capital. Zarrow (2005), p. 313. 13. Gillin & Etter (1983), p. 501. 14. US Department of State (1967), p. 117. 15. Pliyev (1965), p. 140. For a discussion around the Red Army allowing the Chinese Communists access to former Japanese weapons and ammunition, see Tanner (2015), pp. 142–5. 16. ‘Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945 (Facts and Figures)’ (1965), p. 67; Zakharov (1968), p. 398; Nebolsin & Zavizion (2017). 17. Gebhardt (1996), p. 139. 18. Gebhardt (1996), p. 140. 19. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 194. The fuel was carried in Lisunov Li-2 transport aircraft, a licencebuilt version of the Douglas DC-3 (known to the British as the Dakota). See Gordon & Komissarov (2006). For details of the operation, see Sukhomlin (1972), pp. 85–91. 20. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 195. 21. Gebhardt (1996), p. 143; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 280. 22. Gebhardt (1996), pp. 145–6. 23. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 195. 24. Gebhardt (1996), p. 147. 25. Nebolsin & Zavizion (2017), online version. 26. Quoted in Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 279–80. 27. Kulichkin (1995), p. 582. 28. Vasilevsky (1978), p. 532. 29. Hasegawa (2005), p. 3. 30. Glantz (1994), pp. 320–1. 31. The term, used to describe him in his later years, is from Cavendish (2009). 32. Vasilevsky (1978), p. 532; Behr (1987), pp. 263, 265. 33. The camp and the Japanese garrison had already surrendered on 17 August to a six-man American team who had parachuted in as part of ‘Operation Cardinal’ at 21:30 hours the previous evening. This was an effort by the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) to protect

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 109–15)

34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46.

47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65.

66. 67. 68. 69. 70.

187

the approximately 1,600 Allied personnel incarcerated at the camp. See Streifer (2011), pp. 75–9; Clemens (1998), pp. 71–106; Holmes (2010). Volkov (1986), p. 101; Kostylev (1975), p. 84. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 280–1. Alexandrov (2004), p. 306. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 247. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 283. Lyudnikov (1967), pp. 59–60. Lyudnikov (1965), pp. 68–78. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 281; Luchinsky (1971), p. 72. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 281–2; Luchinsky (1971), p. 73. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 268. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), pp. 153–4; Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 211. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 154. The Manchukuo River Defence Force (dubbed the Sungarian Flotilla in Soviet sources) was Japanese commanded but with a large Chinese complement. It remained tied up at Harbin during the conflict, mainly due to a mutiny occasioned by the Soviet invasion, which saw the crews kill many of their Japanese officers. See Eckert (2016), p. 314. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 154. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 212. Shirokorad (2008), p. 383; Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 212. Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 154. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 235–6; Bagrov & Sungorkin (1970), p. 156. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 212. Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 212–13; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 266. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 213; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 267; Shirokorad (2008), pp. 384–5. Astashenkov & Tolubko (1967), p. 260. Shirokorad (2008), p. 385; Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 214; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 267. Shirokorad and Zakharov et al. give the smaller total. Colonel Kenjiro Kaneko, ‘Termination of Hostilities’ section in ‘Monograph 155-K, Chapter XI: The Fourth Army’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1950), p. 186; Beloborodov (1982), p. 160. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 214. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 236. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 267. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 213–14. Tsirlin et al. (1970), c. 347. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 285–6. Beloborodov (1982), p. 130, (1969), pp. 49–50. Lieutenant Colonel Genichiro Arinuma, Major Kyoji Takasugi and Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: First Area Army Operations on Eastern Front’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 61. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 213. Beloborodov (1982), p. 124. Beloborodov (1982), p. 125. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 218; Beloborodov (1982), pp. 125–6. Beloborodov (1982), p. 126. The 257th Tank Brigade comprised twenty-five T-34 tanks and a battery of twelve SU-76 self-propelled guns, plus a company of machine gunners and a platoon of combat engineers: Vnotchenko (1971), p. 216. Due to its low ground pressure, the SU-76 was able to manoeuvre through difficult, particularly swampy, terrain more

stalin's war on japan - Press

188

71. 72.

73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

78. 79. 80.

81. 82. 83.

84. 85.

86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96.

Notes (pp. 116–20)

easily than could medium tanks and other self-propelled guns. Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky made special mention of them in his memoirs: ‘the troops were especially fond of the SU-76. These light, mobile vehicles kept up everywhere to support the infantry.’ Quoted in Mernikov (2015), p. 358. Beloborodov (1982), p. 127. Beloborodov (1982), p. 125. Lieutenant Colonel Genichiro Arinuma, Major Kyoji Takasugi and Colonel Hiroshi Matsumoto, ‘Monograph 154-B: First Area Army Operations on Eastern Front’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 67. Beloborodov (1982), p. 128; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 218. Beloborodov (1982), p. 130. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 219. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 220. In 1941 the German Army discovered that early models of the T-34 were largely impervious to the anti-tank guns they were equipped with at that time. Only when their capability was upgraded to the 75mm Pak 40 was the situation stabilised. The standard Japanese antiarmour weapon in 1945 was the Type 1 47mm anti-tank gun. See Finkel (2011), pp. 138–9; Hogg (1997), pp. 43–4. Colonel Masashi Tanaka, ‘Monograph 154-H, Chapter XVII, The 126th Division’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 269. See Chapter 6. Colonel Toshisuke Inouye, ‘Monograph 154-I, Chapter XVIII, The 135th Division’s Preparations’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 292–3. See Alexievich, Pevear & Volokhonsky (2017), p. xxiv. Beloborodov (1982), p. 131. Colonel Toshisuke Inouye, ‘Monograph 154-I, Chapter XVIII, The 135th Division’s Preparations’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 293. For details of the 9th Air Army’s operations in support of the battle for Mudanjiang, see Kozhevnikov (1977), pp. 235–6. Beloborodov (1982), p. 132. Colonel Toshisuke Inouye, ‘Monograph 154-I, Chapter XVIII, The 135th Division’s Preparations’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 296. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 224. Beloborodov (1982), p. 132. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 181. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 220; Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 442. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 220, 258. See Chapter 6. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 440; Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 220–1; Dragan (1988), pp. 288–90. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 197–8. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 198. Meretskov (1968), p. 437. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 204–5.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 120–5)

189

97. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 224. See also Dragan (1988), p. 290. 98. Colonel Toyoharu Iwasaki, ‘Monograph 154-G, Chapter XVI, The 124th Division’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 239. 99. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 224–5. 100. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 258; Beloborodov (1982), p. 138. 101. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 253–4. 102. Beloborodov says that Perekrestov left only a pontoon-bridge battalion: Beloborodov (1982), p. 150. 103. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 255; Beloborodov (1982), p. 154; Dragan (1988), p. 290. 104. Beloborodov (1982), p. 144; Vnotchenko (1971), p. 256. 105. Beloborodov (1982), p. 144. 106. Beloborodov (1982), p. 147. 107. Beloborodov (1982), p. 145. 108. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), pp. 203–4. 109. Beloborodov (1982), p. 147. 110. Beloborodov (1982), p. 148. 111. It was assumed by the Soviets that these had been spared to provide a line of retreat for the Japanese forces on the east side of the river: Beloborodov (1982), p. 155. 112. Beloborodov (1982), p. 149. 113. Beloborodov (1982), p. 149. 114. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 259. 115. Beloborodov (1982), p. 152. 116. Beloborodov (1982), p. 148. 117. Possibly the Type 94 dating from 1934. See Zaloga (2008), p. 23. 118. Beloborodov (1982), p. 155. 119. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 259. 120. Timofeev (1978), p. 55. 121. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 212. 122. Beloborodov (1982), p. 156. 123. Beloborodov (1982), p. 156. 124. Colonel Akiji Kashiwada, ‘Monograph 154-F’, in US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East (1965), p. 215. 125. Trans-Baikal Front: 2,228 dead; 6,155 sick and wounded: total = 8,383. Second Far Eastern Front: 2,449 dead; 3,134 sick and wounded: total = 5,583. Krivosheeva (2001), pp. 309–10. 126. ‘I shall take occasion to repeat to-morrow in the House of Commons what I have said before, that it is the Russian Army that tore the guts out of the German military machine . . .’ Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Marshal Stalin, 27 September 1944. Quoted in Churchill (1956), p. 184. ‘Total Wehrmacht losses to 30 April 1945 amounted to 11,135,500 including 6,035,000 wounded. Of these, almost 9,000,000 fell in the East. German armed forces’ losses to war’s end numbered 13,488,000 men (75% of the mobilized forces and 46% of the 1939 male population of Germany). Of these, 10,758,000 fell or were taken prisoner in the East. Today, the stark inscription ‘‘died in the East’’ that is carved on countless thousands of headstones in scores of German cemeteries bears mute witness to the carnage in the East, where the will and strength of the Wehrmacht perished’: Glantz & House (2015), p. 284. 127. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 448. 128. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 450.

stalin's war on japan - Press

190 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144.

145. 146. 147. 148.

149.

150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

155. 156. 157. 158.

Notes (pp. 125–30) Beloborodov (1982), p. 158. Beloborodov (1982), p. 159. Beloborodov (1982), p. 163. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 451. Chistyakov (1985), p. 272. Krylov, Alekseev & Dragan (1970), p. 429. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 222. Chistyakov (1985), p. 271. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 225; Chistyakov (1985), pp. 271–2. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 261; Chistyakov (1985), p. 273. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 262. Chistyakov (1985), pp. 273–4. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 263. Kabanov (1977), p. 330. Atwater (1995). The Dieppe Raid was a British/Canadian amphibious assault on the German-occupied French port of that name, which took place on 19 August 1942. One of the objects of the exercise was to establish if it were possible to seize a major port from the sea. Disaster ensued, with casualties (killed, wounded, missing or taken prisoner) amounting to around 60 per cent, largely Canadian. One of the proponents of the operation, Admiral Mountbatten, later justified it by arguing that the lessons learned meant that ‘The successful landing in Normandy [Operation Overlord in 1944] was won on the beaches of Dieppe’: quoted in Zuehlke (2012), p. 369. See also UK National Archives. ADM 205/174. ‘Raid on Dieppe (19 Aug 1942): Battle Summary No 33.’ Kabanov (1977), p. 332. Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 184–5. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (2004), p. 44. Unless otherwise stated, this section is based on Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 185–90; Zolotarev & Kozlov (2005), pp. 708–12; Uspensky (1964), pp. 42–104; Leonov (1957), pp. 111–24. See also Terentyev (2003). There were three harbours within the port of Chongjin, one for naval forces, one for the fishing fleet, and, closest to the Komalsan peninsula, one associated with the Mitsubishi Iron works. Kabanov (1977), p. 341. Kabanov (1977), p. 333. See Chapter 6. The Mark 25 mine (magnetic, acoustic or pressure triggered) contained a charge of 578kg, whilst the Mark 26 magnetic mine was smaller at 211–236kg: Campbell (1985), p. 168. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 182. The T-26 tank weighed about 10 tonnes and, although obsolete, was fast and capable of functioning as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle. The SU-76 was only slightly heavier, and was incorporated into most rifle divisions: Grechko (2015), p. 665. Kabanov (1977), p. 337. Chistyakov (1985), p. 276; Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 197. See https://www.tracesofwar.com/sights/92032/Chongjin-Russian-War-Cemetery.htm; http://www.pobeda1945.su/burial/997. ‘In the battle for Seisin [Chongjin], Maria Tsukanova was wounded and captured. The Japanese mocked her, cut her with a knife and gouged out her eyes. The corpse of the heroine was discovered by our soldiers and buried. M.N. Tsukanova was posthumously awarded the title Hero of the Soviet Union’: Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 191. See also Maistrenko (2011), p. 61.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 130–40)

191

159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168.

See for example: https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_02.pdf. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 197. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 197; Kabanov (1977), p. 339. Kabanov (1977), p. 340. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 198. Kabanov (1977), pp. 353–4. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 199. Uspensky (1964), p. 124. Kabanov (1977), p. 355. Uspensky (1964), p. 130. ‘Samurai’ was the term used by the Soviet soldiery for the Japanese. 169. Kabanov (1977), pp. 355–6. 170. Chistyakov (1985), p. 276.

Chapter 10: Unpinched: Finishing off ‘the fascist Beast of the East 1. Gilbert (1990), p. 75. 2. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 244. 3. Unless otherwise stated, the sources for the Shakhtyorsk landing are Zakharov et al. (1973), pp. 222–5; Bagrov (1959), pp. 71–2; Gelfond (1958), pp. 112, 115–21; Chernyshev (2015b), p. 101. 4. Sources differ as to what time the landing occurred, although all agree it was between 09:30 and 10:30 hours. They also differ on the number of torpedo boats used, although all say that two were damaged in the process. 5. Vysokov et al. (2008), p. 449. 6. Degteryov (2019), p. 28. 7. Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 293–4. 8. The southern harbour had four 250m berths with 7m of water alongside, plus cranes. United States Hydrographic Office (1947), pp. 181–3. 9. Cherevko (2003), p. 310. Hasegawa puts the date of the order as ‘issued on or before August 17, before he received Truman’s answer’: Hasegawa (2005), p. 358, n. 46. 10. Post-Soviet Russian scholars argue that unless the Kurils were occupied by the time the Japanese surrendered, then it was possible that US forces would take them over. See, for example, Vysokov et al. (2008), p. 451. 11. Translated text of order by Aleksandr Vasilevsky to the commander of the 1st Far Eastern Front, 18 August 1945, is available at: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 122332. Quoted in part in Hasegawa (2005), p. 271. 12. Stalin to Truman, 22 August 1945. Quoted in Hasegawa (2005), p. 272. 13. We can, I think, discount General MacArthur’s reminiscences on the subject which, if correct, would mean that the Soviets threatened to invade Hokkaido even after the US occupation of Japan had become a fact: ‘The Russians commenced to make trouble from the very beginning. They demanded that their troops should occupy Hokkaido, the northern island of Japan, and thus divide the country in two. Their forces were not to be under the control of the supreme commander, but entirely independent of his authority. I refused point blank. General Derevyanko became almost abusive and threatened that the Soviet Union would see to it that I would be dismissed as supreme commander. He went so far as to say Russian forces would move in whether I approved or not. I told him that if a single Soviet soldier entered Japan without my authority, I would at once throw the entire Russian Mission, including himself, into jail. He listened and stared as though he could not believe his own ears, and then said politely enough, ‘‘By God, I believe you would.’’ He turned and left, and I heard nothing more of it’: MacArthur (2001), pp. 296–7. As was said in the case of

stalin's war on japan - Press

192

14. 15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

20. 21. 22.

23. 24.

Notes (pp. 140–3)

another supreme commander and ‘great man’ of the Second World War: ‘To the ordinary fallibility of memory there has to be added, in the case of Mountbatten, a great man’s well attested habit of improving the historical record’: Kyle (2011), p. 136. According to Adrian Smith, Mountbatten was ‘ruthless . . . in challenging or silencing anyone prepared to question his skilfully tailored version of events’: Smith (2010), p. 307. Truman believed that MacArthur was ‘a supreme egoist who regarded himself as something of a god’: quoted in Pearlman (2008), p. 115. See, for example, Hasegawa (2005), p. 273. On 18 July 1945, whilst both men were at the Potsdam Conference, Churchill attended a private dinner with Stalin. The only others present were their respective interpreters, Arthur Birse and Vladimir Pavlov. Birse later recounted the conversation for Churchill’s memoirs. The talk turned to maritime matters and the Prime Minister said ‘it was his policy to welcome Russia as a great power on the sea’. Referring to the narrow seaways to and from the Black Sea and the Baltic, he opined that ‘Russia had been like a giant with his nostrils pinched’. Churchill repeated the phrase in a conversation with his personal doctor, Charles Wilson, the next day: ‘I told Stalin Russia has been like a giant with his nostrils pinched. I was thinking of the narrows from the Baltic and the Black Sea. If they want to be a sea power, why not?’ As Wilson, later Lord Moran, said: ‘When the P.M. coins a phrase that he finds pleasing, he keeps repeating it.’ Unsurprisingly, it appeared in Churchill’s own account of the dinner: Gilbert (1990), p. 75; Moran (1966), p. 299; Churchill (1956), p. 505. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 249. Unless otherwise stated, the sources for this section are Vnotchenko (1971), pp. 295–303; Zhumatiy (2011), Appendix 17: ‘Kuril Landing Operation’); Chernyshev (2015b), pp. 84–94; Bagrov (1959), pp. 72–80. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 76, 82. Marshal of Aviation Stepan Krasovsky, postwar chief of the Air Force in the Far East, visited the Kurils and noted several interesting features pertaining to aviation in his memoirs: ‘In winter, the Japanese did not base their aircraft on the Kuril Islands. With the onset of warm days, air units flew here from Hokkaido and other islands of the archipelago and conducted studies. I must say that the size of the airfields did not inspire any confidence. In addition, take-off was carried out only towards the sea, and the landing approach was above the water. It was necessary to have outstanding flying skills. Neither concrete nor metal slabs, which were used to construct the runways at airfields in the European part of the country, in the Kuril Islands did not stand the test: they were deformed. The Japanese found an original solution to the problem. They built wooden runways and taxiways without a single iron nail. It turned out that this was very practical, especially in winter, when temperature fluctuations are inevitable’: Krasovsky (1968), p. 338. Rottman & Akira Takizawa (2008), pp. 57–8. See also Zaloga (2007). Slavinsky (1993), pp. 76–7. Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief United States Fleet (COMINCH) and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), in his ‘Third Official Report to the Secretary of the Navy’, dated 8 December 1945: ‘The outstanding development of this war, in the field of joint undertakings, was the perfection of amphibious operations, the most difficult of all operations in modern warfare. Our success in all such operations, from Normandy to Okinawa, involved huge quantities of specialized equipment, exhaustive study and planning, and thorough training, as well as complete integration of all forces, under unified command.’ Quoted in Marshall, Arnold & King (1947), p. 658. Frank & Shaw (1968), p. 666. Arkansas (BB-33) main battery: twelve 12-inch (305mm) guns; New York (BB-34) main battery: ten 14-inch (356mm) guns; Texas (BB-35) main battery: ten 14-inch (356mm) guns;

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 143–7)

25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33.

34. 35. 36.

37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57.

193

Nevada (BB-36) main battery: ten 14-inch (356mm) guns; Idaho (BB-42) main battery: twelve 14-inch (356mm) guns; Tennessee (BB-43) main battery: twelve 14-inch (356mm) guns; Pensacola (CA-24) main battery: ten 8-inch (203mm) guns; Salt Lake City (CA-25) main battery: ten 8-inch (203mm) guns; Chester (CA-27) main battery: nine 8-inch (203mm) guns; Tuscaloosa (CA-37) main battery: nine 8-inch (203mm) guns. One of the best accounts of the battle remains Morison (1961), pp. 3–78. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 169. Slavinsky (1993), p. 74. It is also quoted in Vnotchenko (1971), p. 297. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 79–80. Vnotchenko (1971), p. 298. Krasovsky (1968), p. 338. Slavinsky (1993), p. 81. Slavinsky (1993), p. 83. The People’s Commissariat for Internal Affairs, a forerunner of the KGB. See Butler (2015). The cargo vessels Pugachev, Chapaev, Kokkinaki, Uritsky, Menzhinsky, Turkmen, Burevestnik, Dalnevostochnik, Krasnoe Znamia, Moskalvo, Refrigerator ship No. 2, General Panfilov, Maxim Gorky and Volkhov; two hydrographic ships, Poliarnyi and Lebed; Landing Craft Infantry Nos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50; two self-propelled barges and four small launches. Eight MO-4 submarine hunter/small patrol ships. T-7 Veha, T-155, T-156 and T-525. NKVD border patrol ships Kirov and Dzerzhinsky, plus the mine-layer Okhotsk. The composition of the invasion flotilla can be found in Bagrov (1959), p. 42, and Slavinsky (1993), p. 86. Kalinin & Vorobiev (2005), p. 141. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 84–5. Slavinsky (1993), p. 89. Slavinsky (1993), p. 90. Slavinsky (1993), p. 91. Slavinsky (1993), p. 93. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 93–4. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 244; Slavinsky (1993), p. 95. For an account of the Anzio Campaign, see Clark (2007). Churchill (1954), p. 380. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 243. Slavinsky (1993), p. 95. Slavinsky (1993), p. 95. A highly stylised depiction of this can be found online at: https://s00.yaplakal.com/pics/ pics_original/5/3/5/14091535.jpg. See Novikva (1987), pp. 254–5, 427; Yurievich & Petrovich (2017), p. 120. A diorama at the Victory Museum in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk depicts a Soviet sailor wading ashore at Shumshu with one of these fearsome anti-tank rifles across his shoulders: https://souzveche.ru/ articles/community/38914/. For a colourful account of these actions, see Samarin (2014), pp. 46–9. http://www.podvignaroda.ru/?#id=150037051&tab=navDetailDocument. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 243. Slavinsky (1993), p. 97. Slavinsky (1993), p. 98. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 247; Slavinsky (1993), p. 99.

stalin's war on japan - Press

194

Notes (pp. 148–52)

58. Zakharov et al. (1973), p. 248. 59. Slavinsky (1993), pp. 100–1. 60. Slavinsky (1993), p. 102.

Chapter 11: The heart of China is in Communist hands 1. Mao Zedong, writing in August 1945. Efimov (1985), p. 96. Also quoted in Vasilevsky (1978). 2. General MacArthur, quoted in US Senate (1951), p. 3591. 3. https://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured-documents/japanese-surrender-document. 4. Derevyanko (1971), p. 13. 5. Eiji Takemae (2002), p. 100. 6. The title was coined by William Manchester: Manchester (1978). 7. See, for example, Schonberger (1989), p. 48. 8. A north-eastern province bordering Kamchatka to the south and the Bering Strait and Bering Sea to the east. The strait marks the border between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. 9. http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945/1945-09-02a.html. 10. Weathersby (1993), p. 9. The process is described in detail on pp. 9–23. 11. Dudden (2005). 12. Lankov (2004), p. 7. 13. Lankov (2004), p. 10. 14. Konstantinova (2015). 15. Ledovsky (1999), p. 9. 16. Zhihua & Tagirova (2015), p. 126. 17. Lankov (2004), p. 70. 18. Lankov (2004), p. 67. 19. Weathersby (1993), p. 27. 20. Geselbracht (2019), p. 466. 21. Whiting (1974), p. 42. They would not necessarily have been welcomed by the inhabitants. The Chinese Nationalist Army units that moved into northern French Indochina to take the Japanese surrender have been described as afflicting Tonkin (roughly what became North Vietnam) ‘like an invasion of locusts, looting Hanoi and surrounding regions’: Hammer (1954), p. 134. General Sir William Slim noted the same characteristic in Chinese forces under his command in Burma: ‘They would steal anything that came near them: stores, rations, lorries, railway trains, even the notice boards from our head-quarters. It was no good getting fussed about this or even finding it extraordinary. After all, if I had belonged to an army that had campaigning for four or five years without any supply, transport, or medical organisation worth the name and had only kept myself alive by collecting things from other people, I should either have had much the same ideas on property or have been dead’: Slim (1957), p. 72. 22. For a detailed account of the matter, see Goncharov, Lewis & Xue Litai (1993). 23. Goncharov, Lewis & Xue Litai (1993), p. 8. 24. Another source states the Soviets captured a total of 300,000 rifles, 4,836 machine guns, 1,226 pieces of artillery, 369 tanks, 2,300 motor vehicles and 925 aircraft: Tang Tsou (1963), p. 331. 25. Vasilevsky (1978), p. 535. 26. Tanner (2013), p. 97. 27. Following the Communist victory in the civil war, Lin Biao went on to become Defence Minister and, in 1966, Mao’s ‘personally anointed successor’. However, following his death

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 152–4)

28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

38. 39.

40.

41. 42.

43. 44.

195

in an aeroplane crash some five years later, he was denounced as an ‘unprincipled conspirator’ and airbrushed from Chinese official history. Teiwes & Sun (1996), p. 1. Ledovsky (1999), p. 9. Fenby (2004), p. 452. Spector (2008), p. 65. Whiting (1974), p. 43. See Barbey (1969), pp. 338–40. Spector (2008), p. 65. Barbey (1969), p. 338. Tanner (2015), pp. 3–4. See also Cheng (2005), pp. 72–114. For a recent discussion, see Samokhin (2007), pp. 61–6. According to Cheng: ‘Contrary to the view that the Communists had no weapons problem because of the Japanese arms transferred to them by the Soviets . . . civil war records show that in late 1945, they were equivalent only to an ill-armed militia.’ One brigade was noted as averaging ‘one rifle for every two men’ and a division, which had intended to refit with Japanese arms, was ‘disappointed to find almost no suitable weapons when it arrived’: Cheng (2005), p. 83. In a similar vein, Samokhin quotes Zhou Enlai (then Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC)’s Central Committee and later the first Premier of the People’s Republic of China) stating on 16 January 1946 that: ‘The partisan and regular units of the CPC are quite combat-ready, but the lack of artillery and other weapons does not allow them to hold their positions’: Samokhin (2007), p. 62. Mao Zedong writing in August 1945. Efimov (1985), p. 96. Also quoted in Vasilevsky (1978), p. 535. Major General David G. Barr, the Director of the Joint United States Military Advisory Group in China, reported on 16 November 1948 that the Chinese Nationalists’ ‘military debacles in my opinion can all be attributed to the world’s worst leadership and many other morale-destroying factors that led to a complete loss of will to fight. The complete ineptness of high military leaders and the widespread corruption and dishonesty throughout the Armed Forces, could, in some measure, have been controlled and directed had the above authority and facilities been available.’ Quoted in US Department of State (1967), p. 358. Samokhin concludes that ‘military assistance was not provided either on behalf of the Soviet state officially or secretly through the military command in the Far East’: Samokhin (2007), p. 65. Lyman P. Van Slyke in the Introduction to US Department of State (1967). Dean Acheson, letter of transmittal of The China White Paper to the President from the Department of State, 30 July 1949, in US Department of State (1967), p. xvi. Originally published separately as ‘A Summary of American-Chinese Relations’. See Acheson (1969), p. 302. Presumably referring to the Japanese government communicating that they were ready to accept the terms enumerated in the Potsdam Declaration. McCarthy (1952b), pp. 30, 53. This book was derived from one of his speeches: ‘America’s Retreat From Victory: the Story of Gen. George C. Marshall’, 14 June 1951, in McCarthy (1952a), pp. 215–308. The ‘Red Scare’ and McCarthyism in general were greatly exacerbated by the Soviet Union’s atomic bomb test (29 August 1949) and the outbreak of the Korean War (25 June 1950). See Holloway (1994); Hastings (1987); Walker (2011). In reading McCarthy at this distance in time one is irresistibly reminded of Benjamin Disraeli’s quip directed at his political opponent, William Gladstone: ‘A sophistical rhetorician, inebriated with the exuberance of his own verbosity, and gifted with an egotistical imagination that can at all times command an interminable and inconsistent series of arguments to malign an opponent and to glorify himself.’ From a speech given at a

stalin's war on japan - Press

196

45.

46. 47. 48. 49. 50.

51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56.

57. 58. 59.

Notes (pp. 154–6)

testimonial dinner at Knightsbridge, London, on 27 July 1878. Quoted in O’Kell (2013), p. 491. From Hirohito’s surrender speech: McNelly (1967), pp. 169–70. The official translation into English can be found online at: https://www.atomicheritage.org/key-documents/ jewel-voice-broadcast. Shirreff (2012), p. 376. See, for example, Kurowski (2004), p. 393; Fey (2003), p. 70; Kleinfeld & Tambs (1979), p. 241. US Army, Headquarters Department of the Army (1984), pp. 2–5. Kipp (1988), p. 1. Glantz (1983), p. xiii. He goes on to add: ‘Our view of the war in the east derives from the German experiences of 1941 and 1942, when blitzkrieg exploited the benefits of surprise against a desperate and crudely fashioned Soviet defense. It is the view of a Guderian, a Mellenthin, a Balck, and a Manstein, all heroes of Western military history, but heroes whose operational and tactical successes partially blinded them to strategic realities. By 1943–44, their ‘‘glorious’’ experiences had ceased. As their operational feats dried up after 1942, the Germans had to settle for tactical victories set against a background of strategic disasters. Yet the views of the 1941 conquerors, their early impressions generalized to characterize the nature of the entire war in the east, remain the accepted views. The successors to these men, the Schoeners, the Heinricis, the defenders of 1944 and 1945, those who presided over impending disaster, wrote no memoirs of widespread notoriety, for their experiences were neither memorable nor glorious. Their impressions and those of countless field grade officers who faced the realities of 1944–45 are all but lost.’ Grau (2016), pp. 73–98. Cliff (1971), p. 92. See, for example, the operations in November 1943 as detailed in Kuznetsov (2011). See Zhukovsky (2006), p. 546: Appendix 8. See US War Department (1944a), p. 6: ‘General doctrines which are particularly applicable to amphibious operations’. The Soviet naval strategist and writer Rear Admiral Kazimir Stalbo wrote in 1970 about Soviet amphibious operations throughout the war: ‘we had to resort to using warships, and poorly suited ships and boats. However, even with these forces and equipment the fleets successfully penetrated the enemy’s defense and landed forces, although they were limited with respect to personnel and as a rule without artillery and tanks. The lack of specialized landing ships often led to considerable losses of landing forces and made weather conditions of special significance’: quoted in Cliff (1971), p. 94. US Army doctrine specified that ‘Assault waves land, breach obstacles, and reorganize without delaying bold and rapid advance’: US War Department (1944a), p. 5. Cliff (1971), p. 95. There are no universally accepted Principles of War as such because different states, military organisations and cultures have codified them (if they have done so at all) according to circumstance: the needs of time and place. Having said that, those principles that have evolved, however they may be articulated, represent an attempt to grapple with fundamental truths and serve as basic guidelines in relation to the practice of the art or science of military affairs. Indeed, many writers have argued that, however expressed, the Principles of War are essentially timeless: that there is Nothing New under the Sun Tzu (Olivier (2013), pp. 55–9). There have been many attempts at writing them down. The first, and perhaps the most famous, was the treatise by Sun Tzu known as The Art of War which dates from around 500 years BCE. The somewhat more recent works by Clausewitz, Jomini and others have also been well studied. Current thinking, certainly in western militaries, has decocted

stalin's war on japan - Press

Notes (pp. 156–7)

197

all the various theories, wisdom and experiences into a few general principles (doctrine). For example, the United States military has nine whilst the British have ten. Current US doctrine, and the ruling principles underlying it, has been tabulated as follows (as defined in the Army Field Manual FM-3 Military Operations. Available at: http://www.wpi.edu/ academics/military/prinwar.html): PRINCIPLE Mass Objective Offensive Surprise Economy of force Maneuver Unity of command Security Simplicity

60.

61. 62. 63. 64.

65. 66. 67.

68. 69.

DEFINITION Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time. Direct every military operation towards a clearly defined, decisive and attainable objective. Seize, retain and exploit the initiative. Strike the enemy at a time, at a place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts. Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power. For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander. Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage. Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding.

There are no doubt many others, and it may be an interesting, if entirely academic, diversion to take whichever rendition most appeals and compare it with the conduct of the Red Army during the Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation. We know he had almost certainly read Clausewitz in the Russian translation because in 1944 he had his work severely criticised as being part of ‘the inimical tradition of PrussoGerman militarism . . .’: Heuser (2002), p. 143. Bess (2008), p. 166. https://www.bl.uk/20th-century-literature/articles/an-introduction-to-animal-farm. https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/115995.pdf?v=3c22b71b65bcbbe9fdfadead9419c995. Djilas was a writer and leading Yugoslav politician who, until his expulsion from the Communist party in 1954, was a vice president of Yugoslavia and one of Tito’s closest aides. Imprisoned by the Yugoslavian government from 1957 to 1961, he was sent back inside in 1962 because of the publication of Conversations with Stalin. See Muravchik (1983), pp. 323–46. Djilas (1962), pp. 187–8, 190. Churchill (1952), p. 299. ‘Neither directly nor indirectly did I have the slightest connection with the Yalta conference. My views on the advisability of Soviet Russia entering the war at that late date were never solicited . . . the imminent collapse of Japan was clearly apparent several months before Yalta when we seized the Philippines. [. . .] Had my views been requested . . . I would most emphatically have recommended against bringing the Soviet [Union] into the Pacific War at that late date. To have made vital concessions for such a purpose would have seemed fantastic.’ Statement by General MacArthur, 23 March 1955, quoted by Harlan Hagan, ‘Extension of Remarks of Hon. Harlan Hagan of California in the House of Representatives, Monday, March 28, 1955’, in United States Congress (1955), p. A2380. Secretary of War Stimson to the Acting Secretary of State, Washington DC, 21 May 1945. Quoted in US Department of State (1969b), pp. 876–7. Leffler & Westad (2010).

stalin's war on japan - Press

198

Notes (pp. 157–8)

70. Habomai is actually an archipelago but for the sake of convenience is considered as one island. 71. Available at: https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/russia/territory/pamphlet.pdf. 72. Williams (2007), p. 75. 73. https://www.redalyc.org/comocitar.oa?id=76727454009. 74. China is said to supply 90 per cent of North Korea’s oil. Bechtol (2018), p. 89. 75. https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-before-joint-session-the-congressthe-state-the-union-22. 76. Some scholars disagree: ‘Applying the word ‘‘Stalinism’’ to North Korea nowadays . . . is misleading’: Lankov (2006), p. 97. 77. From Churchill’s radio broadcast of 1 October 1939. Quoted in Gilbert (1991), p. 48.

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography Soviet/Russian Sources Achkasov, V.I. (Editor-in-Chief) et al. (1980). The History of the Second World War 1939–1945. Vol. Eleven: The Defeat of Militaristic Japan: The End of World War II (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Ачкасов, В.И. и другие (главный редактор). (1980). История второй мировой войны 1939–1945, Том 11. Поражение милитаристской Японии. Окончание второй мировой войны (Москва: Воениздат)] Alexandrov, A.A. (2004). The Great Victory in the Far East August 1945: from Transbaikalia to Korea (Moscow: Veche) [Александров, А.А. (2004). Великая победа на Дальнем Востоке: август 1945 года: от Забайкалья до Кореи (Москва: Вече)] Amirkhanov, L.I. (2005). Railway Ironclads (Moscow: Island) [Амирханов, Л.И. (2005). Броненосцы железных дорог (Москва: Остров)] Astashenkov, Engineer Colonel P.T & Tolubko, Colonel General V.F (eds). (1967). Soviet Missile Forces (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Асташенков, Инженер-полковник П.Т и генерал-полковника Толубко, В.Ф (редактор). (1967). Советские ракетные войска (Москва: Военное Издательство)] Bagrov, I.N. (1959). The South-Sakhalin and Kuril Operations: August 1945 (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Багров, В.Н. (1959). Южно-Сахалинская И Курильская Операции: Август 1945 (Москва: Военное Издательство)] Bagrov, I.N. & Sungorkin, N.F. (1970). The Red Banner Amur Flotilla (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Багров, В.Н. и Сунгоркин, Н.Ф. (1970). Краснознаменная Амурская флотилия (Москва: Воениздат)] Bagrov, I.N. & Sungorkin, N.F. (1982). Battle Glory of the Amur: An Essay on the History of the Red Banner Amur Flotilla (Khabarovsk: Khabarovsk Publishing House) [Багров, И.Н. и Сунгоркиным, Н.Ф. (1982). Боевая слава Амура: очерк истории Краснознаменной Амурской флотилии (Хабаровск: Хабаровский издательский дом)] Bakursky, V.A., Solomonov, B.V. & Fedoseev, S.L. (2012). Arms of Victory (Moscow: Rosman Press) [Бакурский, В.А., Соломонов, Б.В., Федосеев, С.Л. (2012). Оружие Победы (Москва: Росмэн Пресс)] Basova, A.V. (General Editor). (1988). The Soviet Navy in Combat (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Басова, А.В. (Под общей редакцией). (1988). Боевой путь Советского Военно-Морского Флота (Москва: Воениздат)] Beloborodov, General A.P. (General Editor). (1963). Military Personnel of the Soviet State in The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Белобородова, Генерала А.П. (Общей Редакцией). (1963). Военные кадры Советского государства в Великой Отечественной войне 1941–1945 (Москва: Воениздат)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

200

Stalin’s War on Japan

Beloborodov, A.P. (1969). Through Fire and Taiga (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Белобородов, А.П. (1969). Сквозь огонь и тайгу (Москва: Воениздат)] Beloborodov, A.P. (1982). Breakthrough on Harbin (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Белобородов, А.П. (1982). Прорыв на Харбин (Москва: Воениздат)] Bessonov, E. (2008). Tank Desant: 3800 km on an Armoured Tank (Moscow: Eksmo) [Бессонов, Е. (2008). Танковый десант. 3800 км на броне танка (Москва: Эксмо)] Boyko, V.R. (1990). Greater Khingan – Port Arthur (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Бойко, В.Р. (1990). Большой Хинган – Порт-Артур (Москва: Воениздат)] ‘Campaign of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Far East in 1945 (Facts and Figures)’, Military History Journal, August 1965, Table 6 [Кампания Советских Вооружённых Сил на Дальнем Востоке в 1945 г. (Факты и цифры) в Военно-исторический журнал, августейший 1965, Таблица 6] Cherevko, K.E. (2003). Hammer and Sickle versus Samurai Sword (Moscow: Veche) [Черевко, К.Е. (2003). Серп и молот против самурайского меча (Москва: Вече)] Chernikov, I.I. (2007). An Encyclopaedia of Monitors: The Defenders of Russia’s River Borders (St Petersburg: Shipbuilding) [Черников, И.И. (2007). Энциклопедия мониторов: Защитники речных границ России (Санкт-Петербург: Судостроение)] Chernikov, I. (2013). Stalin’s Armoured Boats: River Tanks of the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Eksmo) [Черников, И. (2013). Бронекатера Сталина: «Речные танки» Великой Отечественной (Москва: Эксмо)] Chernyshev, A. (2015a). Heroic Ships of the Great Patriotic War: Guards and Red Banner (Moscow: Eksmo) [Чернышев, А. (2015a). Героические корабли Великой Отечественной. Гвардейские и Краснознаменные (Москва: Эксмо)] Chernyshev, A. (2015b). Triumph of the Pacific Fleet of the USSR: Revenge for Tsushima (Moscow: Eksmo) [Чернышев, А. (2015b). Триумф Тихоокеанского флота СССР: Реванш за Цусиму (Москва: Эксмо)] Chistyakov, I.M. (1985). Serving the Fatherland (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Чистяков, И.М. (1985). Служим Отчизне (Москва: Воениздат)] Chuev, F. (2002). Molotov: The Half (or Semi) Powerful Ruler (Moscow: Olma-Press), p. 39 [Чуев, Ф. (2002). Молотов Полудержавный властелин (Москва: Олма Пресс), с. 39] Daines, V. (2015). Knights of the Order of Victory: Marshal Vasilevsky (Moscow: Veche) [Дайнес, Владимир. (2015). Кавалеры ордена ‘Победа’: Маршал Василевский (Москва: Вече)] Degteryov, N.M. (2019). The 165th Infantry Regiment in the Battles for the Liberation of Southern Sakhalin in August 1945: Documents and Memories (South Sakhalin: Searching For Russia) [Дегтерёв, Николай Михайлович. (2019). 165-й стрелковый полк В боях за освобождение юга Сахалина в августе 1945 года (в документах и воспоминаниях) (Южно-Сахалинск: Поисковоедвижениероссии)] Derevyanko, V.K. (1971). Soldier, General, Diplomat (Dnepropetrovsk: Promin) [Деревянко, В.К. (1971). Солдат, генерал, дипломат (Днепропетровск: Промінь)] Dragan, I.G. (1988). Nikolay Krylov (Moscow: Young Guard) [Драган, И.Г. (1988). Николай Крылов (Москва: Молодая гвардия)] Fedor, V. of the Moscow State School (College) of Brass [Wind Instrument] Art. ‘My greatgrandfather Nikanor Dmitrievich Zakhvatayev (1898–1963)’ (available at: https://nsportal. ru/ap/library/drugoe/2015/06/02/moy-praded-zahvataev-nikanor-dmitrievich) [Фёдор, В. Москвы «Государственное училище (колледж) духового искусства». ‘Мой прадед Захватаев Никанор Дмитриевич (1898–1963)’] Gayvoronsky, F.F. et al. (eds). (1987). The Evolution of Military Art: Stages, Trends, Principles (Moscow: Military Publishing House)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

201

[Гайворонский, Ф.Ф. и другие (редакторы). (1987). Эволюция военного искусства: этапы, тенденции, принципы (Москва: Воениздат)] Gelfond, G.M. (1958). The Soviet Fleet in the War with Japan (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Гельфонд, Г.М. (1958). Советский флот в войне с Японией (Москва: Воениздат)] Gorkov, Y. (2002). State Defence Committee Decrees 1941–1945: Statistics and Documents (Moscow: Olma Press) [Горьков, Ю. (2002). Государственный Комитет Обороны Постановляет 1941–1945: Цифры, документы (Москва: Олма Пресс)] Grechko, A.A. (Chair of the Main Editorial Commission). (2015). The Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 in Twelve Volumes. Vol. Eleven: Victory Policy and Strategy: Strategic Leadership of the Country and the Armed Forces of the USSR During the War (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Гречко, А.А. (Главная редакционная комиссия председатель). (2015). Великая Отечественная Война 1941–1945 Годов. В Двенадцати Томах. Том одиннадцатый. Политика и стратегия победы: стратегическое руководство страной и Вооруженными Силами СССР в годы войны (Москва: Воениздат)] Hisashi Takahashi. (1991). ‘A Case Study: Japanese Intelligence Estimates of China and the Chinese, 1931–1945’, in Hitchcock, Lt. Col. W.T. USAF (ed.), Proceedings of the Thirteenth Military History Symposium U.S. Air Force Academy Colorado Springs, Colorado, October 12–14, 1988 (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History) Ivanov, P.N. (1973). Wings Over the Sea (Moscow: Military Publishing) [Иванов, Н.П. (1973). Крылья над морем (Москва: Воениздат)] Kabanov, S.I. (1977). Battlefield-Shore (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Кабанов, С.И. (1977). Поле боя-берег (Москва: Воениздат)] Kalinchuk, L.V. (2014). ‘The Military Councils of Fronts and Armies during the Great Patriotic War’, Military Academic Magazine, 2014, 2 [Калинчук, Леонид Владимирович. (2014). ‘Военные Советы Фронтов И Армий В Годы Великой Отечественной Войны’ в Военный Академический Журнал, Номер, 2014, 2] Kalinin, V.I. & Vorobiev, S.A. (2005). ‘Steel and Concrete against the Mikado: Coastal Defence and Fortified Areas of the Land Border in the Far East of the USSR 1932–1945’, in V.I. Kalinin (ed.). Historical and Fortification Collection: Issue 2 (Vladivostok: Dalnauka) [Калинин, В.И. и Воробьев, С.А. (2005). Сталь и бетон против Микадо. Береговая оборона и укреп-ленные районы сухопутной границы на Даль-нем Востоке СССР. 1932–1945 гг в В.И. Калинин (редактор). Историко-фортификационный сборник: Выпуск 2 (Владивосток: Дальнаука)] Katukov, M.E. (1974). Spearhead of the Attack (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Катуков, М.Е. (1974). На острие главного удара (Москва: Воениздат)] Kazakov, K.P., Marshal of Artillery (1986). The Offensive Barrage (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Казаков, Константин Петрович (Маршал Артиллерии). (1986). Огневой Вал Наступления (Москва: Воениздат)] Khorobrykh, A.M. (1989). Chief Marshal of Aviation A.A. Novikov (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Хоробрых, A.M. (1989). Главный маршал авиации А.А. Новиков (Москва: Воениздат)] Khrenov, A.F. (1982). Bridges to Victory (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Хренов, А.Ф. (1982). Мосты к победе (Москва: Воениздат)] Konstantinova, G.D. (2015). Special International: The 88th Separate Rifle Brigade of the Far Eastern Front (Khabarovsk: Far Eastern Publishing Centre) [Константинова, Г.Д. (2015). Особая интернациональная: 88 отдельная стрелковая бригада Дальневосточного фронта (Хабаровск: Дальневосточный издательский центр)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

202

Stalin’s War on Japan

Koshkin, A.A. (2012). ‘Kantokuen’ – ‘Barbarossa’ in Japanese: Why Japan did not attack the USSR (Moscow: Veche) [Кошкин, А.А. (2012). ‘Кантокуэн’ – ‘Барбаросса’ по японски: Почему Япония не напала на СССР (Москва: Вече)] Kostylev, Major General V. (1975). ‘The Formation and Development of Airborne Forces’, The Military Historical Journal, September 1975 [Костылев, Генерал-майор В. (1975). Становление И Развитие Воздушно-Десантных Воискp в Военно Исторический Журнал, сентябрь 1975] Kozhevnikov, M.N. (1977). The Command and Staff of the Soviet Army Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Moscow: Nauka) [Кожевников, М.Н. (1977). Командование и штаб ВВС Советской Армии в Великой Отечественной войне 1941–1945 (Москва: Наука)] Krasovsky, S.A. (1968). A Life in Aviation (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Красовский, С.А. (1968). Жизнь в авиации (Москва: Воениздат)] Krivosheeva, Colonel General G.F. (ed.). (2001). Russia and the USSR in 20th Century Wars: Losses in the Armed Forces: Statistical Research (Moscow: Olma-Press) [Кривошеева, генерал-полковника Г.Ф. (редактор). (2001). Россия и СССР в войнах ХХ века: потери вооруженных сил: статистическое исследование (Москва: Олма-Пресс)] Krylov, N.I., Alekseev, N.I., & Dragan, I.G. (1970). Toward Victory: The Combat Path of the 5th Army, October 1941–August 1945 (Moscow: Nauka) [Крылов, Н.И., Алексеев, Н.И., Драган, Навстречу, И.Г. (1970). Победе: Боевой Путь 5-Й Армии Октябрь 1941 Г. Август 1945 Г. (Москва: Наука)] Kulichkin, S. (1995). The General Staff believes . . . (Moscow: Patriot) [Куличкин, С. (1995). Генштаб полагает . . . (Москва: Патриот)] Kulypin, I. (1941). ‘Meeting with the Cuckoos’ in Fights in Finland: Memoirs of Participants. Part I (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Кулыпин, И. (1941). Встреча с «кукушками» в Бои в Финляндии: Воспоминания участников Часть I (Москва: Воениздат)] Kuznetsov, A. (2011). A Great Landing: The Kerch-Eltigen Operation (Moscow: Veche) [Кузнецов, А. (2011). Большой десант. Керченско-Эльтигенская операция (Москва: Вече)] Lankov, A.N. (2004). DPRK Yesterday and Today: The Informal History of North Korea (Moscow: East-West Publishing House) [Ланьков, А.Н. (2004). КНДР вчера и сегодня: неформальная история Северной Кореи (Москва: Восток-Запад Издательство)] Ledovsky, A.M. (1999). The USSR and Stalin in the Fate of China: Documents and Testimonies of the Participants in the Events, 1937–1952 (Moscow: NIM) [Ледовский, А.М. (1999). СССР и Сталин в судьбах Китая: Документы и свидетельства участника событий, 1937–1952 (Москва: НИМ)] Leonov, V.N. (1957). Face to Face (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Леонов, В.Н. (1957). Лицом к лицу (Москва: Воениздат)] Loza, D.F. (2001). The Tale of Sherman Tanks (Moscow: Island) [Лоза, Д.Ф. (2001). Сказ О Танках «Шерман» (Москва: Остров)] Luchinsky, Army General A. (1971). ‘Transbaikal Soldiers on the Hills of Manchuria’, Military History Journal, August 1971 [Лучинский, генерал армии А. (1971). ‘Забайкальцы на сопках Маньчжурии’ в Военноисторический журнал, августейший 1971] Lyudnikov, I.I. (1965). ‘The 39th Army in the Khingan-Mukden Operation’, Military History Journal, October 1965 [Людников, И.И. (1965). ‘39-я армия в Хингано-Мукденской операции’ в Военноисторический журнал, октября 1965] Lyudnikov, I.I. (1967). Across the Great Khingans (Moscow: Military Publishing House), pp. 51–2

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

203

[Людников, И.И. (1967). Через Большой Хинган (Москва: Воениздат), cc. 51–2] Lyudnikov, I.I. (1969). The Long Road of Life (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Людников, И.И. (1969). Дорога длиною в жизнь (Москва: Воениздат)] Maistrenko, V.A. (2011). We Won!: Meetings with the Heroes of the Great War (Krasnoyarsk: RASTER) [Майстренко, В.А. (2011). Мы победили!: Встречи с героями великой войны (Красноярск: РАСТР)] Malinovsky, G.V. (General Editor N.I. Serdov). (2005). The Engineering Brigades of the Red Army 1941–1945 (Moscow: Patriot Publishing House) [Малиновский, Г.В. (Под общей редакцией Сердцева, Н.И.). (2005). Бригады инженерных войск Красной Армии 1941–1945 (Москва: Издательство Патриот)] Meretskov, K.A. (1968). In The Service of The People (Moscow: Politizdat) [Мерецков, К.А. (1968). На службе народу (Москва: Политиздат)] Mernikov, A.G. (2015). Victory Against the Wehrmacht (Minsk: Harvest) [Мерников, А.Г. (2015). Армия Победы против Вермахта (Минск: Харвест)] Minasyan, M.M., Bogdanov, P.P., Dolgiy, M.S. (eds). (1984). The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941–1945: A Brief History (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Минасян, М.М., Богданов, П.П., Долгий М.С. (редакторы). (1984). Великая Отечественная война Советского Союза 1941–1945: Краткая история (Москва: Воениздат)] Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation. (2012). The Great Patriotic War 1941–1945: Vol. II: The Origins and the Beginning of the War (Moscow: Kuchkovo) [Министерство Обороны Российской Федерации. (2012). Великая Отечественная Война 1941–1945 Годов: Том Второй Происхождение И Начало Войны (Москва, Кучково)] Nebolsin, I. & Zavizion, Y. (2017). Via Gobi and Khingan (Moscow: Yauza) (Unpaginated online version at: http://maxima-library.org/new-books-2/b/391291?format=read.) [Небольсин, И. и Завизион, Ю. (2017). Виа Гоби и Хинган (Москва: Яуза)] Nemychenkov, V.I. (2019). The Glory and Honour of Russia: Essays on the Fatherland (St Petersburg: Aleteia) [Немыченков, В.И. (2019). Слава и честь земли РУсской: Очерки Отечество люби я (СанктПетербург: Алетейя)] Nikiforov, N. (2005). Red Army Assault Brigades: Battles for the Soviet Motherland (Moscow: Veche) [Никифоров, Н. (2005). Штурмовые бригады Красной Армии: в боях за Советскую Родину (Москва: Вече)] Novikov-Daursky, G.S. (2010). The Far East in the Second World War: Materials of the regional scientific-practical conference ‘Far Easterners at the front and in the rear’ (October 2010). (Blagoveshchensk: Amur Regional Museum of Local Lore, 2011). Electronic version: Editor-in-Chief of the Amur Seasons portal Andrey Kovalenko (available at: http: //xn--80afg3aiou.xn--p1ai/sources/history/gpw/gpw-x=089.php) [Дальневосточники во второй мировой войне. (2010). Материалы региональной научнопрактической конференции «Дальневосточники на фронте и в тылу» (октябрь 2010 г.). Изд.: Амурский областной краеведческий музей им. Г.С. Новикова-Даурского. Благовещенск, 2011. Электронная версия - Главный редактор портала "Амурские сезоны" Коваленко Андрей.] Novikva, V.N. (Chief Editor). (1987). Weapons of Victory (Moscow: Mechanical Engineering) [Новиква, В.Н. (1987). (главный редактор). Оружие Победы (Москва: Машиностроение)] Office of the General Staff for the Study of Military Experience. (1947). ‘Breakthrough of the Koton (Haramitog) Japanese Fortified Area on Sakhalin’, in The Collection of Tactical Materials on the Experience of World War II, No. 21 (July–August 1946) (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Управление Генерального Штаба По Изучению Военного Опыта. (1947). ‘Прорыв Котонского (Харамитогского) Укрепленного Района Японцев На О Сахалин’ В Сборник Тактических

stalin's war on japan - Press

204

Stalin’s War on Japan

Материалов По Опыту Отечественной Войны, Но 21 (июль–август 1946) (Москва: Воениздат)] Pankin, Colonel General of Aviation V.E. (1986). ‘The Evolution of the Organisational Structure of the Air Force: Methods of Organising Command and Cooperation During the Great Patriotic War,’ in A.N. Efimov, Marshal of Aviation (ed.). The role of the Air Force in the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945 (Based on the materials of the IX Military Scientific Conference of the Air Force) (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defence, Air Force) [Панькин, Генерал-полковник авиации В.Е. (1986). ‘Эволюция организационной структуры ВВС, способов и методов организации управления и взаимодействия в годы Великой Отечественной войны’ в Ефимов, Маршал авиации А.Н., Роль Военно-воздушных Сил в Великой Отечественной войне 1941–1945 (По материалам IX военно-научной конференции ВВС) (Москва: Министерство обороны СССР, Военно-воздушные силы)] Pechenenko, S. (1975). ‘The 363rd Rifle Division in Combat on the Mishan Axis’, Military History Journal, July 1975 [Печененко, С. (1975). ‘363-я стрелковая дивизия в боях на мишаньском направлении’ в Военно Исторический Журнал, Июль 1975] Pechenenko, S. (1978). ‘Army Offensive Operations in the Conditions of the Far Eastern Theatre of Operations’, Military History Journal, August 1978 [Печененко, С. (1978). Армейская наступательная операция в условиях Дальневосточного театра военных действийв Военно Исторический Журнал, Август 1978] Petrakova, V.I. (2013). Women’s Rifle Formations in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War (1941–1945), 2013 dissertation in the library of the Faculty of History, Lomonosov Moscow State University, 119991, Moscow, GSP-1, Lomonosovsky Prospekt, 27 [Петракова, В.I. (2013). Женские Стрелковые Формирования В Ссср В Годы Великой Отечественной Войны (1941–1945)] Pliyev, I.A. (1965). Through the Gobi and Khingan (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Плиев, И.А. (1965). Через Гоби и Хинган (Москва: Воениздат)] Popov, N. (1977). ‘The Development of Self-Propelled Artillery’, Military History Journal, January 1977 [Попов, Н. (1977). ‘Развитие самоходной артиллерии’ в Военно-исторический журнал, январь 1977] Prochko, E. (2009). ‘Large Amphibious Vehicles’. Equipment and Armament Magazine, March 2009, 3 [Прочко, Е. (2009). ‘Большой Автомобиль Водоплавающий’ во Техника и вооружение Журнал, март 2009, 3] Radzievsky, A.I. (Chief Editor). (1976). Tactics in Combat: Examples (Divisions) (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defence) [Радзиевского, А.И. (главный редактор). (1976). Тактика в боевых примерах (дивизия) (Москва: Министерства обороны СССР)] Radzievsky, A.I. (ed.). (1977). Army Operations (Moscow: Military Publishing) [Радзиевского, А.И. (ред.). (1977). Армейские операции (Москва: Воениздат)] Repyev, O.M. (1963). Guards Military Units in the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Репьев, О.М. (1963). Гвардейские воинские части в Великой Отечественной войне (Москва: Воениздат)] Rotmistrov, Chief Marshal of Armoured Forces P.A. (ed.). (1963). The History of Military Art, Vol. 2 (Moscow: Military Publishing House), p. 528 [Ротмистров, П.А. Главного Маршала Бронетанковых Войск (Редактор). (1963). История Военного Искусства, Том 2 (Москва: Военное Издательство), стр. 528] Runov, V. (2014). Fortified Areas and Defensive Lines of the Second World War (Moscow: Eksmo) [Рунов, В. (2014). Все укрепрайоны и оборонительные линии Второй Мировой (Москва: Эксмо)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

205

Samarin, I.A. (2007). Steel and Concrete in Karafuto: Permanent Works in the Japanese Defence System of South Sakhalin during the Second World War (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk: Sakhalin Publishing House) [Самарин, И.А. (2007). Сталь и бетон Карафуто. Долговременные огневые точки в системе японской обороны Южного Сахалина в годы второй мировой войны (Ю́ жно-Сахали́ нск: Сахалинское книжное издательство)] Samarin, I. (2014). ‘The Conduct of Operations to Free the Northern Kurils’, Rodina, 2014, 9 [Самарин, И. (2014). ‘Провести операцию по освобождению северной части Курильской гряды’ в журнал Родина, 2014, 9] Samokhin, A.V. (2007). ‘Soviet Military Assistance to the CCP (1945–1946)’, Russia and the APR (Asia-Pacific Region), 2007, 3 [Самохин, А.В. (2007). ‘Советская Военная Помощь Кпк (1945–1946 гг)’, в Россия и АТР, 2007, 3] Semashkin, V. (2010). ‘Liberating Manchuria’, Time and We Magazine, Tuesday, 6 July 2010 [Семашкин, В. (2010). ‘Освобождая Манчжурию’ в Время И Мы журнал, вторник, 6 июля 2010 г] Senyavskaya, E.S. (1999). The Psychology of War in the 20th Century: The Historical Experience of Russia (Moscow: Rosspan), p. 146 [Сенявская, Е.С. (1999). Психология Войны В ХX Веке: Исторический Опыт России (Москва: Росспэн), cc. 146] Senyavskaya, E.S. (2013). ‘The Far Eastern Campaign of 1945 in the Consciousness of the Soviet Military’, Bulletin of MGIMO-University, 2013, 4(31) [Сенявская, Е.С. (2013). ‘Дальневосточная Кампания 1945 Года в Сознании Советских Военнослужащих’ в Вестник МГИМО-Университета, 2013, 4(31)] Shirokorad, A.B. (2008). Japan: Unfinished Rivalry (Moscow: Veche) [Широкорад, А.Б. (2008). Япония: Незавершенное соперничество (Москва: Вече)] Shtemenko, S.M. (1989). The General Staff During the War (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Штеменко, С.М. (1989). Генеральный Штаб В Годы Войны (Москва: Воениздат)] Sidorov, V. (1975). ‘The Combat Use of Artillery’, Military History Journal, September 1975 [Сидоров, В. (1975). Боевое применение артиллерии в Военно-исторический журнал, сентябрь 1975] Sidorov, V. (1978). ‘Engineering Support of the Offensive of the 36th Army in the Manchurian Operation’, Military History Journal, April 1978 [Сидоров, В. (1978). ‘Инженерное обеспечение наступления 36-Й Армии В Маньчжурской Операции’ в Военно-исторический журнал, Апрель 1978] Slavinsky, B.N. (1993). Soviet Occupation of the Kuril Islands (August–September 1945): Documentary Research (Moscow: Lotos LLP) [Славинский, Б.Н. (1993). Советская оккупация Курильских островов (август–сентябрь 1945 года): Документальное исследование (Москва: ТОО Лотос)] Sokolov, B. (2000). Exterminated Marshals (Smolensk: Rusich) [Соколов, Б. (2000). Истребленные маршалы (Смоленск: Русич)] Solyankin, A.G. et al. (2005). Soviet Heavy Self-Propelled Artillery 1941–45: The ISU-152 Self Propelled Gun (Moscow: Exprint) [Солянкин, А.Г. и другие. (2005). Советские тяжелые самоходные артиллерийские установки 1941–45: Самоходная установка ИСУ-152 (Москва: Экспринт)] Soviet Military Encyclopedia Vol. 2. (1976). (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Советская Военная Энцикопедия Том 2. (1976). (Москва: Воениздат)] Soviet Military Encyclopedia Vol. 7. (1976). (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Советская Военная Энцикопедия Том 7. (1976). (Москва: Воениздат)] Sukhomlin, I. (1972). ‘Features of the Interaction between 6th Guards Tank Army and Aviation in the Manchurian Operation’, Military History Journal, April 1972

stalin's war on japan - Press

206

Stalin’s War on Japan

[Сухомлин, И. (1972). Особенности взаимодействия 6-й гвардейской танковой армии с авиацией в Маньчжурской операции в Военно-исторический журнал, апреля 1972] Suldin, A. (2019). The Entire History of the Great Patriotic War: The Complete Chronicle of Victory (Moscow: AST Publishing House) [Сульдин, А. (2019). Вся История Великой Отечественной Войны: Полная Хроника Победы (Москва: Издательство АСТ)] Tanin, O. & Iohan, E. (1933). The Military and Fascist Movement in Japan (Moscow: Partizdat) [Танин, О. и Иоган, Е. (1933). Военно-фашистское движение в Японии (Москва: Партиздат)] Terentyev, P. (2003). ‘In the Seisin Landing’, in Shcheklein, Rear Admiral V.V. & Malteeva, E.I. (eds). The Voices of Pacific Fleet Veterans (St Petersburg: Norint) (Available at: https: //flot.com/publications/books/shelf/tofvets/12.htm?print=Y) [Терентьев, П. (2003). ‘В сейсинском десанте’ in контр-адмирал’ в В.В. Щеклейн и Мальтеева, Э.И. (Редакторы). Голоса ветеранов Тихоокеанского флота (Санкт-Петербург: Норинт, 2003)] Timofeev, Lieutenant Colonel V. (1978). ‘The 300th Rifle Division in Combat towards Mudanjiang’, Military History Journal, August 1978 [Тимофеев, Подполковник В. (1978). ‘300-Я Стрелковая Дивизия В Боях На Муданьцзянском Направлении’ в Военно Исторический Журнал, Август 1978] Tsirlin, A.D. et al. (1970). Military Engineers in Battles for the Soviet Motherland (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Цирлин, АД и другие. (1970). Инженерные войска в боях за Советскую Родину (Москва: Воениздат)] Uspensky, V.D. (1964). Through the Eyes of a Sailor (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Успенский, В.Д. (1964). Глазами матроса (Москва: Воениздат)] Various Authors. (1973). Soviet Tank Forces 1941–1945 (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Коллектив авторов. (1973). Советские танковые войска 1941–1945 (Москва: Воениздат)] Vasilevsky, A.M. (1978). A Life’s Work (Moscow: Politizdat) [Василевский, А.М. (1978). Дело Всей Жизни (Москва: Политиздат)] Vinogradov, I.N. (1968). Defence-Assault-Victory: The Military Pathway of the 159th Field Fortified Region during the Great Patriotic War (Moscow: Nauka) [Виноградов, И.Н. (1968). Оборона-штурм-победа: Боевой путь 159-го полевого укрепрайона в годы Великой Отечественной войны (Москва: Наука)] Vnotchenko, L.N. (1971). Victory in the Far East (Moscow: Military Publishing House) [Внотченко, Л.Н. (1971). Победа на Дальнем Востоке (Москва: Воениздат)] Volkov, Colonel General of Aviation A. (1986). ‘The Use of Aviation to Perform Airborne Missions: The Significance of the Experience of War for the Present’, in Air Marshal A.N. Efimov (Introduction). The role of the Air Force in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945: Based on materials from the IX Military Scientific Conference of the Air Force (Moscow: USSR Ministry of Defence, Air Force) [Волков, Генерал-полковник авиации А.Н. (1986). ‘Применение авиации для выполнения транспортно-десантных задач. Значение опыта войны для современности’ в Маршал авиации А.Н. Ефимов (Вступительное слово), Роль Военно-воздушных Сил в Великой Отечественной войне 1941–1945: По материалам IX военно-научной конференции ВВС (Москва: Министерство обороны СССР, Военно-воздушные силы)] Vozhakina, Colonel General M.G. (ed.). (2006). World War II Commanders: Military Biographical Dictionary, Vol. 1 (Moscow: Kuchkovo) [Вожакина, Генерал-Полковника М.Г. (ред). (2006). Великая Отечественная Комкоры. Военный биографический словарь, Том 1 (Москва: Кучково)] Vysokov, M.S. et al. (2008). The History of Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from Ancient Times to the Beginning of the XXI Century (Yuzhno-Sakhalinsky: Sakhalin State University) [Высоков, М.С. и другие. (2008). История Сахалина И Курильских Островов С Древнейших Времен До Начала XXI Столетия (Южно-Сахалинский: Сахалинского государственного университета)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

207

Yurievich, I.V. & Petrovich, Z.A. (2017). Military Equipment: The Complete Encyclopaedia (Moscow: Eksmo) [Юрьевич, И.В. и Петрович, З.А. (2017). Военная техника. Полная энциклопедия (Москва: Эксмо)] Zakharov, Marshal of the Soviet Union M.V. (ed.). (1968). Finale: A Historical Memoir and Essay on the Defeat of Imperialist Japan in 1945 (Leningrad: Nauka) [Захарова, Маршала Советского Союза М.В. (Редактор). (1968). Финал: Историко-мемуарный очерк о разгроме мпериалистической Японии в 1945 году (Ленинград: Наука)] Zakharov, S.E. et al. (1973). The Red Banner Pacific Fleet (Moscow: Military Publishing) [Захаров, С.Е. и другие. (1973). Краснознаменный Тихоокеанский Флот (Москва: Воениздат)] Zhihua, S. & Tagirova, A. (2015). ‘The 88th Brigade and Soviet-Sino-Korean Trilateral Relations: a study of the United anti-fascist Front During the War Against Japan’, Problems of the Far East, 2015, 5 [Чжихуа, Ш. и Тагирова, А. (2015). ‘88-я бригада и советско-китайско-корейские трехсторонние отношения-взгляд на объединенный антифашистский фронт во время войны против Японии в Проблемы Дальнего Востока, 2015, 5 г] Zhukovsky, M. (2006). The Course of Honour and Glory: The Navy of the USSR/Russia in Wars and Conflicts of the Second Half of the XX Century (Moscow: Kuchkovo Field) [Жуковский, M. (2006). Курсом Чести И Славы: ВМФ СССР/России В Войнах И Конфликтах Второй Половины XX Века (Москва: Кучково поле)] Zhumatiy, V. (2011). Naval Landing Operations of the USSR Armed Forces: Marines in the Pre-War Period and During the Great Patriotic War, 1918–1945 (Moscow: CJSC Publishing Center/ Centerpolygraph) [Жуматий, Владимир. (2011). Морские десантные операции Вооруженных сил СССР. Морская пехота в довоенный период и в годы Великой Отечественной войны. 1918–1945 (Москва: ЗАО Издательство Центрполиграф)] Zolotarev, V.A. (1994). Apostles of the Russian Army (Moscow: Chronicle Publishing House) [Золотарев, В.А. (1994). Апостолы армии Российской (Москва: Изд-во Летопись)] Zolotarev, V.A. & Kozlov, I.A. (2005). Three Centuries of the Russian Navy: Vol. Four 1941–1945 (St Petersburg: Polygon) [Золотарев, В.А. и Козлов, И.А. (2005). Три Столетия Российского Флота: Том четвертый 1941–1945 (Санкт-Петербург: Полигон)]

English Language Sources Acheson, D. (1969). Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York: W.W. Norton) Alexievich, S, Pevear, R. (trans.) & Volokhonsky, L. (trans.). (2017). The Unwomanly Face of War: An Oral History of Women in World War II (London: Random House) Appleman, R.E. et al. (1947). The United States Army in World War II: The War in the Pacific: Okinawa: The Last Battle (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, United States Army) Atwater, C.B. Jr (1995). Soviet Amphibious Operations in the Black Sea, 1941–1943. Available at: https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/1995/ACB.htm Avalon Project, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library. Website. Available at: https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/s1.asp Avon, Earl of. (1965). The Eden Memoirs: The Reckoning (London: Cassell) Ballis, W.B. (1956). ‘The Political Evolution of a Soviet Satellite: The Mongolian People’s Republic’, Western Political Quarterly, June 1956, 9(2) Barbey, D.E. (1969). MacArthur’ Amphibious Navy: Seventh Amphibious Force Operations 1943–1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) Bargen, D.G. (2006). Suicidal Honor: General Nogi and the Writings of Mori Ogai and Natsume Soseki (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press)

stalin's war on japan - Press

208

Stalin’s War on Japan

Barry, M.P. (2012). ‘The US and the 1945 Division of Korea: Mismanaging the Big Decisions’, International Journal on World Peace, December 2012, XXIX(4) Barshay, A.E. (2013). The Gods Left First: The Captivity and Repatriation of Japanese POWs in Northeast Asia, 1945–1956 (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press) Bauer, F.L. (2007). Decrypted Secrets: Methods and Maxims of Cryptology (Berlin: Springer Verlag) Bechtol, B.E. Jr. (2018). ‘North Korean Illicit Activities and Sanctions: A National Security Dilemma’, Cornell International Law Journal, Winter 2018, 51(1) Behr, E. (1987). The Last Emperor (New York: Bantam Books) Bellamy, C. (1986). Red God of War: Soviet Artillery and Rocket Forces (London: Brassey’s) Bellamy, C. (2009). Absolute War: Soviet Russia in the Second World War: A Modern History (London: Pan) Bellamy, C.D. & Lahnstein, J.S. (1990). ‘The New Soviet Defensive Policy: Khalkhin Gol 1939 As Case Study’, Parameters: Journal of the US Army War College Quarterly, March 1990, 20(1) Bess, M. (2008). Choices Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II (New York: Vintage Books) Bessonov, E. (2003). Tank Rider: Into the Reich with the Red Army (London: Greenhill Books) Boister, N. & Cryer, R. (eds). (2008). Documents on the Tokyo International Military Tribunal: Charter, Indictment and Judgments (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Boose, Colonel (retd) D.W. Jr. (2008). Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press/US Army Combined Arms Center) Brackman, A.C. (1975). The Last Emperor (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons) Bradley, F.J. (1999). No Strategic Targets Left (Nashville, TN: Turner) Bridges, B. (2019). ‘‘‘An Ambiguous Area’’: Mongolia in Soviet-Japanese relations in the mid1930s.’ Published online by Cambridge University Press, 6 August 2019. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0026749X1800015X Brooks, L. (1968). Behind Japan’s Surrender: The Secret Struggle That Ended an Empire (New York: McGraw-Hill) Buchner, A. (2004). ‘Ostfront’ 1944: The German Defensive Battles on the Russian Front 1944 (Atglen, PA: Schiffer) Buell, T.B. (1995). Master of Sea Power: A Biography of Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) Buhite, R.D. (1986). Decisions at Yalta: An Appraisal of Summit Diplomacy (Wilmington, DC: Scholarly Resources) Butler, R. (2015). Stalin’s Secret Police: A History of the CHEKA, OGPU, NKVD, SMERSH & KGB: 1917–1991 (London: Amber Books) Butow, R.J.C. (1954). Japan’s Decision to Surrender (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) Buttar, P. (2012). Battleground Prussia: The Assault on Germany’s Eastern Front 1944–45 (Oxford: Osprey) Byrnes, J.F. (1947). Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper & Brothers) Campbell, D’A. (1993). ‘Women in Combat: The World War II Experience in the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and the Soviet Union’, Journal of Military History, April 1993, 57(2) Campbell, J. (1985). Naval Weapons of World War Two (London: Conway Maritime Press) Cavendish, R. (2009). ‘Pu Yi, Last Emperor of China, is Pardoned’, History Today, December 2009, 59(12) Chace, J. (1996). ‘After Hiroshima: Sharing the Atom Bomb’, Foreign Affairs, January–February 1996, 75(1) Cheng, V.S.C. (2005). ‘Imagining China’s Madrid in Manchuria: The Communist Military Strategy at the Onset of the Chinese Civil War, 1945–1946’, Modern China, January 2005, 31(1) Chong-Sik Lee. (1985). ‘Why Did Stalin Accept the 38th Parallel?’ Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, 1985, 4(4)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

209

Churchill, W.S. (1952). The Second World War Vol. III: The Grand Alliance (London: Reprint Society) Churchill, W.S. (1954). Closing the Ring: The Second World War Vol. V (London: Reprint Society) Churchill, W.S. (1956). Triumph and Tragedy: The Second World War Vol. VI (London: Reprint Society) Clark, L. (2007). Anzio: The Friction of War – Italy and the Battle for Rome 1944 (London: Headline Review) Clemens, P. (1998). ‘Operation ‘‘Cardinal’’: the OSS in Manchuria, August 1945’, Intelligence and National Security, 1998, 13(4) Cliff, D.K. (1971). ‘Soviet Naval Infantry: A New Capability’, Naval War College Review, June 1971, 23(10) Close, U. (Josef Wellington Hall). (1934). Challenge: Behind the Face of Japan (New York: Farrar & Rhinehart) Cohen, D. & Yuma, T. (2018). The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal: Law, History, and Jurisprudence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Collie, C. (2011). Nagasaki: The Massacre of the Innocent and the Unknowing (London: Portobello Books) Connaughton, R. (1991). The War of the Rising Sun and Tumbling Bear: A Military History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–5 (London: Routledge) Conquest, R. (2008). The Great Terror: A Reassessment (London: Pimlico) Coox, A.D. (1990a). Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) Coox, A.D. (1990b). ‘Flawed Perception and its Effect Upon Operational Thinking: the case of the Japanese Army, 1937–41’, in Handel, M. (ed.). Intelligence and Military Operations (Abingdon: Routledge) Coox, A.D. (1998). ‘Strategic Bombing in the Pacific 1942–1945’, in Hall, R.C. (ed.). Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office) Coox, A.D. (2010). ‘The Effectiveness of the Japanese Military Establishment in the Second World War’, in Millett, A.R. & Murray, W. (eds.). Military Effectiveness Vol. III: the Second World War (New York: Cambridge University Press) Craig, W. (1967). The Fall of Japan (New York: Dial Press) Crowley, J.B. (1963). ‘A Reconsideration of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident’, Journal of Asian Studies, May 1963, 22(3) Danchev, A. & Todman, D. (eds.). (2015). War Diaries 1939–1945: Field Marshall Lord Alanbrooke (London: Weidenfield & Nicolson, Kindle edition) Danielson, E.N. (2005). ‘Revisiting Chongqing: China’s Second World War Temporary National Capital’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch, 2005, 45 Davidann, J.T. (2007). Cultural Diplomacy in US–Japanese Relations, 1919–1941 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) Davies, J.E. (1941). Mission to Moscow (New York: Simon & Schuster) Day, T. (2006). Taiga (New York: Chelsea House) DeConde, A. (1978). A History of American Foreign Policy Vol. II: Global Power (1900 to the Present) (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons) Dickinson, F.R. (1999). War and National Reinvention: Japan in the Great War, 1914–1919 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center) Djilas, M. (1962). Conversations with Stalin, trans. Petrovich, M.B. (Orlando, FL: Harcourt Brace & Company) Dobrinskaya, O.A. (2018). ‘Sato Naotake: the way of a diplomat’, in Streltsov, D.V. & Grishachev, S.V. (eds), Russian Japanology Review, Vol. 1 (Moscow) Dodd, W.E. Jr & M. (eds). (1943). Ambassador Dodd’s Diary 1933–1938 (London: Victor Gollancz)

stalin's war on japan - Press

210

Stalin’s War on Japan

Doerr, P.W. (1990). ‘The Changkufeng/Lake Khasan incident of 1938: British intelligence on Soviet and Japanese military performance’, Intelligence and National Security Journal, 1990, 5(3) Drea, E.J. (1981). Nomonhan: Japanese-Soviet Tactical Combat, 1939 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute: The Leavenworth Papers) Drea, E.J. (1992). MacArthur’s ULTRA: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942–1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas) Drea, E.J. (2003). In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press) Dudden, A. (2005). Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press) Dunn, D.J. (1998). Caught between Roosevelt and Stalin: America’s Ambassadors to Moscow (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky) Dunscomb, P.E. (2011). Japan’s Siberian Intervention, 1918–1922: ‘A Great Disobedience Against the People’ (Lanham, MD: Lexington) Echevarria, A.J. (2000). German Military Thinkers Before The Great War (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press) Eckert, C.J. (2016). Park Chung Hee and Modern Korea: The Roots of Militarism 1866–1945 (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press) Efimov, D. (1985). World War Two and the Destinies of Asian and African Peoples (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House) Eiji Takemae. (2002). The Allied Occupation of Japan, trans. Ricketts, R. & Swann, S. (New York: Continuum) Eisenhower, D.D. (1948). Crusade In Europe (Garden City, NY: Doubleday) Elleman, B.A, Nichols, M.R. & Ouimet, M.J. (1998/1999). ‘A Historical Reevaluation of America’s Role in the Kuril Islands Dispute’, Pacific Affairs, Winter 1998/1999, 71(4) Elliott, M.C. (2000). ‘The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies’, Journal of Asian Studies, August 2000, 59(3) Feis, H. (1971). The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) Fenby, J. (2004). Chiang Kai Shek: China’s Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost (New York: Carroll & Graf) Fenby, J. (2013). The Penguin History of Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power 1850 to the Present (London: Penguin) Fey, W. (2003). Armor Battles of the Waffen SS: 1943–45, trans. Henschler, H. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books) Finkel, M. (2011). On Flexibility: Recovery from Technological and Doctrinal Surprise on the Battlefield, trans. Tlamim, M.(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) Frank, B.M. & Shaw, H.I. Jr. (1968). History of US Marine Corps Operations in World War II Vol. V: Victory and Occupation (Washington DC: Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, US Marine Corps) Frank, R.B. (2001). Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire (New York: Penguin) Fraser, D. (1983). Alanbrooke (Feltham: Hamlyn) Frei, H.P. (1991). Japan’s Southward Advance and Australia: From the Sixteenth Century to World War II (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press) Fuller, J.F.C. (2003a). The Decisive Battles of the Western World and their Influence on History Vol. I: From the Earliest Times to the Battle of Lepanto (London: BCA, 2003a) Fuller, J.F.C. (2003b). Decisive Battles of the Western World and Their Influence upon History Vol. III: From the American Civil War to the end of the Second World War (London: BCA) Fuller, Major General J.F.C. (1954). The Second World War 1939–45: A Strategical and Tactical History (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode) Furuya Keiji. (1981). Chiang Kai-Shek: His Life and Times (New York: St John’s University. English abridged edition by Chun-ming Chang)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

211

Gebhardt, J.F. (ed. and trans.). (1996). Commanding the Red Army’s Sherman Tanks: The World War II Memoirs of Hero of the Soviet Union Dmitriy Loza (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press) Geselbracht, R.H. (ed.). (2019). The Memoirs of Harry S. Truman: A Reader’s Edition (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press) Gilbert, M. (1989). Road to Victory: Winston S. Churchill 1941–1945 (London: Heinemann Minerva) Gilbert, M. (1990). Never Despair: Winston S. Churchill 1945–1965 (London: Minerva) Gilbert, M. (1991). Finest Hour: Winston S. Churchill 1939–1941 (London: Minerva) Giles, L. (trans.). (1910). Sun Tzu on The Art of War (London: Luzac & Co.) Gillin, D.G. & Etter, C. (1983). ‘Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945–1949’, Journal of Asian Studies, May 1983, 42(3) Glantz, D.M. (1983). August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute: The Leavenworth Papers) Glantz, D.M. (1989). Soviet Military Deception in the Second World War (New York: Frank Cass) Glantz, D.M. (1994). The History of Soviet Airborne Forces (Ilford: Frank Cass) Glantz, D.M. (2003). Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945: ‘August Storm’ (London: Frank Cass) Glantz, D.M. & House, J.M. (2015). When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas) Goncharov, S.N., Lewis, J.W. & Xue Litai. (1993). Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) Gordon, Y., Komissarov, S. & D. (2006). Lisunov Li-2: The Soviet DC-3 (Hinckley: Midland Publishing) Grau, L.W. (2016). ‘River Flotillas in Support of Defensive Ground Operations: The Soviet Experience’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2016, 29(1) Hackett, R.F. (1971). Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) Hall, R.B. (1930). ‘The Geography of Manchuria’, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, November 1930, 152 (China) Hammer, E.J. (1954). The Struggle for Indochina (Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press) Harris, S.H. (2002). Factories of Death: Japanese Biological Warfare, 1932–1945, and the American Cover-up (New York: Routledge) Harris, S.H. (2003). ‘Japanese Biomedical Experimentation During the World-War-II Era’, in Beam, T.E. & Sparacino, L.R. (eds). Military Medical Ethics Vol. 2 (Washington DC: Office of the Surgeon General) Hasegawa, T. (2005). Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan (Cambridge, MA: Belknap/Harvard University Press) Hasegawa, T. ‘Soviet policy toward Japan during World War II’, Cahiers du monde russe, 15 November 2011. Available at: https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.9333 Hastings, M. (1987). The Korean War (New York: Simon & Schuster) Hata Ikuhiku. (1976). ‘The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935–1939’, in Morley, J.W. (ed.). Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR 1935–1940: Selected Translations from Taiheiyo senso e no michi, kaisen gaiko shi (New York: Columbia University Press) Henderson, H. (1947). Ballads of World War II (Glasgow: Caledonian Press) Heuser, B. (2002). Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico) Hiroaki Kuromiya. (2011). ‘The Mystery of Nomonhan, 1939’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, December 2011, 24(4) Hiroaki Kuromiya. (2015). ‘New Questions on the Battle of Khalkhin Gol (Nomonhan)’, Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, 2015, 19 Hiroaki Kuromiya. (2016). ‘The Battle of Lake Khasan Reconsidered’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2016, 29(1)

stalin's war on japan - Press

212

Stalin’s War on Japan

Hogg, I. (1997). German Artillery of World War Two (London: Greenhill) Holloway, D. (1994). Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939–1956 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) Holmes, L.G. (2010). Guests of the Emperor: The Secret History of Japan’s Mukden POW Camp (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) Hosoya Chihiro (1980). ‘The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact’, in Morley, J. (ed.) The Fateful Choice: Japan’s Advance into Southeast Asia 1939–1941 (New York) Hsu, I.C.Y. (2000). The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford University Press) Humphreys, L.A. (1995). The Way of the Heavenly Sword: The Japanese Army in the 1920s (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) Huntford, R. (1997). Nansen: The Explorer as Hero (London: Duckworth) Jowett, P.S. (2017). The Bitter Peace: Conflict in China 1928–37 (Stroud: Amberley) Kahn, D. (1998). ‘Soviet Comint in the Cold War’, Cryptologia, 1998, 22(1) Kershaw, I. (2000). Hitler 1936–1945: Nemesis (London: AllenLane) Kipp, Dr J.W. (1988). Mass, Mobility, and the Red Army’s Road to Operational Art, 1918–1936 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office) Kitamura Minoru & Lin Siyun. (2014). The Reluctant Combatant: Japan and the Second SinoJapanese War, trans. Prener, C. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America) Kleinfeld, G.R. & Tambs, L.A. (1979). Hitler’s Spanish Legion: The Blue Division in Russia. (Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press) Koenig, A.R. (2001). ‘Glass-Jawed Goliaths: Red Army Artillery Armored Trains in World War II’, Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 2001, 14(4) Kotani, K. (2009). Japanese Intelligence in World War II, trans. Kotani, C. (Oxford: Osprey) Kowner, R. (2017). Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield) Krivosheev, Colonel General G.F. (ed.). (1997). Soviet Casualties and Combat Losses in the Twentieth Century (London: Greenhill Books) Kurowski, F. (2004). Panzer Aces II: Battles Stories of German Tank Commanders of WWII, trans. Johnston, D. (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books) Kwong Chi Man. (2017). War and Geopolitics in Interwar Manchuria: Manchuria under Zhang Zuolin and the Fengtian Clique during the Northern Expedition (Leiden: Brill) Kyle, K. (2011). Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. Taurus) Lamont-Brown, R. (1999). Tutor to the Dragon Emperor: The Life of Sir Reginald Fleming Johnson at the Court of the Last Emperor (Stroud, UK: Sutton) Lankov, A. (2006). ‘The Natural Death of North Korean Stalinism’, Asia Policy, January 2006, 1 Lanxin Xiang. (2003). The Origins of the Boxer War: A Multinational Study (London: Routledge) Large, S.S. (1992). Emperor Hirohito and Showa Japan: A Political Biography (London: Routledge) Leahy, Fleet Admiral W.D. (1950). I Was There: The Personal Story of the Chief of Staff to Presidents Roosevelt and Truman Based on His Notes and Diaries Made at the Time (London: Victor Gollancz) Leffler, M.P. & Westad, O.A. (eds). (2010). The Cambridge History of the Cold War Vol. 1: Origins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) Lepage, J-D.G.G. (2017). Military Trains and Railways: An Illustrated History (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co.) Le Tissier, T. (2009). Zhukov at the Oder: the Decisive Battle for Berlin (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole) Levering, R.B. (2016). The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell) Longworth, P. (1965). The Art of Victory: The Life and Achievements of Generalissimo Suvorov 1729–1800 (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston) MacArthur, General of the Army D. (2001). Reminiscences (Annapolis, MD: Bluejacket Books) MacArthur’s General Staff. (1966). Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific, Vol. I (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

213

McCarthy, J. (1952a). Major Speeches and Debates of Senator Joe McCarthy Delivered in the United States Senate 1950–1951 (Washington DC: Government Printing Office) McCarthy, Senator J.R. (1952b). America’s Retreat From Victory: The Story of George Catlett Marshall (New York: Devin-Adair). McCord, E.A. (1993). The Power of the Gun: The Emergence of Modern Chinese Warlordism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press) Macgregor, D. (2016). Margin of Victory: Five Battles That Changed the Face of Modern War (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press) McNelly, T. (ed.). (1967). Sources in Modern East Asian History and Politics (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts) Manchester, W. (1978). American Caesar: Douglas Macarthur, 1880–1964 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown) Markwick, R.D. & Charon Cardona, E. (2012). Soviet Women on the Frontline in the Second World War (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan) Marriott, L. & Forty, J. (2017). Heavyweights: The Military Use of Massive Weapons (New York: Chartwell) Marshall, G.C., Arnold, H.H. & King, E.J. (1947). The War Reports of General Marshall, General Arnold and Admiral King (Philadelphia, PA: J.B. Lippincott) Matsusaka, Y.T. (2001). The Making of Japanese Manchuria, 1904–1932 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center) Mayumi Itoh. (2010). Japanese War Orphans in Manchuria: Forgotten Victims of World War II (New York: Palgrave Macmillan) Millis, W. (ed.) with the collaboration of Duffield, B.S. (1956). The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. (2001). Correspondence Between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidents of the USA and the Prime Ministers of Great Britain During the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945: Vol. 2. Correspondence with Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman (August 1941–December 1945) (Honolulu, HI: University Press of the Pacific) Mitter, R. (2013). China’s War with Japan, 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London: Allen Lane, Kindle edition) Mizuno, H. (2013). ‘Japan’s Way Out of the Crisis of the 1930s as a Strategy for Overcoming Modernity’, in Konrad, H. & Maderthaner, W. (eds), Routes Into the Abyss: Coping with Crises in the 1930s (New York: Berghahn) Montefiore, S.S. (2004). Stalin: The Court of the Red Tsar (London: Phoenix) Moorhouse, R. (2014). The Devils’ Alliance: Hitler’s Pact with Stalin, 1939–1941 (London: Bodley Head) Moran, Lord. (1966). Winston Churchill: The Struggle for Survival (London: Constable) Morison, S.E. (1961). History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. 14: Victory in the Pacific, 1945 (Boston, MA: Little, Brown & Company) Morris-Suzuki, T. (2012). Showa: An Inside History of Hirohito’s Japan (London: Bloomsbury) Muravchik, J. (1983). ‘The Intellectual Odyssey of Milovan Djilas’, World Affairs, Spring 1983, 145(4) Myles, B. (1981). Night Witches: The Untold Story of Soviet Women in Combat (London: Presidio) Nansen, F. (1914). Through Siberia: The Land of the Future, trans. Chater, A.G. (London: Heinemann) National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. (2004). Coasts of Korea and China (Bethesda, MD: National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) Nish, I. (2002). Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period (Westport, CT: Praeger) Noriko Kawamura. (2015). Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press) O’Kell, R. (2013). Disraeli: the Romance of Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto Press)

stalin's war on japan - Press

214

Stalin’s War on Japan

Olivier, Commander J.P. (2013). ‘Nothing New Under the Sun Tzu: Timeless Principles of the Operational Art of War’, Canadian Military Journal, Winter 2013, 14(1) Osmanczyk, E.J. & Mango, A. (ed.). (2004). Encyclopedia of the United Nations and International Agreements (Abingdon: Taylor & Francis) Ozaki Yukio. (2001). The Autobiography of Ozaki Yukio: The Struggle for Constitutional Government in Japan, trans. Fujiko Hara (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press) Patrikeeff, F. (2015). ‘Railway as Political Catalyst: the Chinese Eastern Railway and the 1929 Sino-Soviet Conflict’, in Elleman, B.A. & Kotkin, S. (eds), Manchurian Railways and the Opening of China: An International History (Abingdon: Routledge) Pearlman, M.D. (2008). Truman and MacArthur: Policy, Politics, and the Hunger for Honor and Renown (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press) Pennington, R. (2010). ‘Offensive Women: Women in Combat in the Red Army in the Second World War’, Journal of Military History, July 2010, 74 Port, K.L. (2014). Deciphering the History of Japanese War Atrocities: The Story of Doctor and General Shiro Ishii (Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press) Price, E.B. (1933). The Russo-Japanese Treaties of 1907–1916 concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins Press) Pu Yi, A-G. (1964). From Emperor to Citizen: The Autobiography of Aisin-Gioro Pu Yi, trans. Jenner, W.J.F. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press) Rees, D. (1985). The Soviet Seizure of the Kuriles (New York: Praeger) Reese, R.R. (2011). Why Stalin’s Soldiers Fought: The Red Army’s Military Effectiveness in World War II (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas) Roberts, G. (2006). Stalin’s Wars: From World War to Cold War, 1939–1953 (Yale University Press) Roberts, G. (2013). Victory at Stalingrad: The Battle That Changed History (Abingdon: Routledge) Roberts, P. (ed.). (2019). The Cold War: Interpreting Conflict through Primary Documents Vol. I 1917–1957 (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO) Rogers, K. (2007). ‘The Interagency Process in Reconstruction of Post-World War II Japan’, in Cerami, J.R. & Boggs, J.W. (eds). The Interagency and Counterinsurgency Warfare: Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Roles (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College) Rommel, E. & Liddell Hart, B.H. (ed.). (1953). The Rommel Papers (New York: Harcourt, Brace) Rottman, G.L. & Akira Takizawa. (2008). World War II Japanese Tank Tactics (Oxford: Osprey Publishing) Royama, M. (1930). ‘The South Manchuria Railway Zone and the Nature of Its Administration’, Pacific Affairs, November 1930, 3(11) Rusk, D. as told to Rusk, R., Papp, D.S. (ed.). (1990). As I Saw It (New York: W.W. Norton) Russell, R.A. (1997). Project Hula: Secret Soviet-American Cooperation in the War Against Japan (Washington DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy) Sadao Asada. (2007). ‘The Shock of the Atomic Bomb and Japan’s Decision to Surrender – A Reconsideration’, in Maddox, R.J. (ed.). Hiroshima in History: The Myths of Revisionism (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press) Sallager, F.M. (1974). ‘Lessons From an Aerial Mining Campaign (Operation ‘‘Starvation’’): A Report [R-1322-PR] prepared for United States Air Force Project RAND’ (Santa Monica, CA: RAND) Samsonov, Major General F. (1946). ‘Soviet Artillery Groups’, Field Artillery Journal, January 1946, 36(1) von Schlieffen, General Fieldmarshal Count A. (1931). Cannae (Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School Press. Authorised translation) Schonberger, H.B. (1989). Aftermath of War: Americans and the Remaking of Japan, 1945–1952 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

215

Scho¨nherr, K. (2017). ‘The Withdrawal Battles in Romania and Transylvania in the Summer and Autumn of 1944’, in Frieser, K-H. (ed.). Germany and the Second World War Volume VIII: The Eastern Front 1943–1944: The War in the East and on the Neighbouring Fronts, trans. Smerin, B. & Wilson, B. (Oxford: Clarendon Press) Schwartz, M.I. (1996). ‘The Russian-A(merican) Bomb: The Role of Espionage in the Soviet Atomic Bomb Project’, Journal of Undergraduate Sciences, Summer 1996, 3 Scott, J.M. (2018). Rampage: MacArthur, Yamashita, and the Battle of Manila (New York: Norton) Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (1945). Terminal Conference, July 1945: Papers and Minutes of Meetings (Washington DC: Secretary of the Combined Chiefs of Staff) Seishiro, I. at ‘The International Military Tribunal for the Far East’ Digital Collection. Available at: https://imtfe.law.virginia.edu/contributors-334 Service, R. (2005). Stalin: A Biography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press) Shen Zhihua. (2012). Mao, Stalin and the Korean War: Trilateral Communist Relations in the 1950s, trans. Silver, N. (Abingdon: Routledge) Sherwood, R.E. (1950). Roosevelt and Hopkins: An Intimate History (New York: Grosset & Dunlap) Shillony, B-A. (2001). Politics and Culture in Wartime Japan (Oxford: Clarendon Press) Shimada Toshihiko. (1983). ‘Designs on North China, 1933–1937’, in Morley, J.W. (ed.). The Road to the Pacific War: The China Quagmire: Japan’s Expansion on the Asian Continent, 1933–1941: Selected Translations from Taiheiyo senso e no michi: kaisen gaiko shi (New York: Columbia University Press) Shirreff, General Sir R. (2012). ‘Conducting Joint Operations’, in Lindley-French, J. & Boyer, Y. (eds). The Oxford Handbook of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Simpkin, R., in association with Erickson, J. (1987). Deep Battle: The Brainchild of Marshal Tukhachevskii (London: Brassey’s) Slavinsky, B. (2004). The Japanese-Soviet Neutrality Pact: A Diplomatic History, 1941–1945, trans. Jukes, G. (London: Routledge Curzon) Slim, Field-Marshal Sir W. (1957). Defeat into Victory (London: Reprint Society) Smith, A. (2010). Mountbatten: Apprentice War Lord (London: I.B. Taurus) Smith, M. (2000). The Emperor’s Codes: the Breaking of Japan’s Secret Ciphers (New York: Arcade Publishing) Soon Sung Cho. (1967). Korea in World Politics 1940–1950: An Evaluation of American Responsibility (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press) Spaulding, R.M. (1986). A review of ‘The Diary of Kido Takayoshi, Vol. II: 1871–1874’, Monumenta Nipponica, Spring 1986, 41(1) Spector, R. (2008). In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House) Stalin, J.V. (1944). Speech at Celebration Meeting of the Moscow Soviet of Working People’s Deputies and Moscow Party and Public Organizations, 6 November 1944. Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/stalin/works/1944/11/06.htm Stephan, J.J. (1975). The Kuril Islands: Russo-Japanese Frontiers in the Pacific (London: Oxford University Press) Stephan, J.J. (1978). The Russian Fascists: Tragedy and Farce in Exile, 1925–1945 (New York: Harper & Row) Stephenson, C. (2017). The Siege of Tsingtau: The German-Japanese War 1914 (Barnsley: Pen & Sword) Streifer, B. (2011). ‘Operation Cardinal: ‘‘. . . So You Must Be a Spy’’’, American Intelligence Journal, 2011, 29(2) Stueck, W. (1995). ‘The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Division of Korea: A Comparative Approach’, Journal of American-East Asian Relations, Spring 1995, 4(1) Tang Tsou. (1963). America’s Failure in China 1941–50 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press) Tanner, H.M. (2013). The Battle for Manchuria and the Fate of China: Siping, 1946 (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press)

stalin's war on japan - Press

216

Stalin’s War on Japan

Tanner, H.M. (2015). Where Chiang Kai-shek Lost China: The Liao-Shen Campaign, 1948 (Bloomington, IA: Indiana University Press) Teiwes, F.C. & Sun, W. (1996). The Tragedy of Lin Biao: Riding the Tiger During the Cultural Revolution (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai’i Press) Terayuki Hara. (2015). ‘Japan Moves North: The Japanese Occupation of Northern Sakhalin (1920s)’, in Kotkin, S. & Wolff, D. (eds). Rediscovering Russia in Asia: Siberia and the Russian Far East (Abingdon: Routledge) Tien-Wei Wu. (1976). The Sian Incident: A Pivotal Point in Modern Chinese History (Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press) Tobe Ryochi. (2019). ‘Japan’s Policy Towards the Soviet Union, 1931–1941: The JapaneseSoviet Non-Aggression Pact’, in Streltsov, D.V. & Shimotomai Nobuo (eds). A History of Russo-Japanese Relations: Over Two Centuries of Cooperation and Competition (Leiden: Brill) Toland, J. (2003). The Rising Sun: The Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire (New York: Modern Library Paperback) Tong, H.K. (1937). Chiang Kai-Shek: Soldier and Statesman Vol. I (Shanghai: China Publishing) Toynbee, A.J. (ed.). (1951). Documents on International Affairs 1939–1946, Vol. I: March– September 1939 (Oxford: Oxford University Press) Trani, E.P. (1969). The Treaty of Portsmouth: An Adventure in American Diplomacy (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky) Truman, H.S. (1945). Public Papers of, 1945. Available at: https://originalsources.com/ Document.aspx?DocID=1QEEEXFQT3AS28V Truman, H.S. (1965). Memoirs: Year of Decisions Vol. One (New York: Signet) Tsang, S. (2015). ‘Chiang Kai-shek’s ‘‘secret deal’’ at Xian and the start of the Sino-Japanese War.’ Published online by Palgrave Communications: 20 Jan 2015. Available at: https://www. nature.com/articles/palcomms20143.pdf Tsuneishi Keiichi. (2005). ‘Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program’, trans. Junkerman, J., Asia-Pacific Journal, November 2005, 3(11) Tuchman, B.W. (1970). Stilwell and the American Experience in China 1911–1945 (New York: Macmillan) Turner, F. (1988). The Genesis of the Soviet ‘Deep Operation’: The Stalin-Era Doctrine for LargeScale Offensive Maneuver Warfare (Durham, NC: Duke University PhD Thesis, 1988). Available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/34105523_The_genesis_of_the_Soviet_ Deep_Operation_the_Stalin-era_doctrine_for_large-scale_offensive_maneuver_warfare UK National Archives. ADM 205/174. ‘Raid on Dieppe (19 Aug 1942): Battle Summary No. 33’ UK National Archives. FO 262/1802. Lytton Commission Report, 1932 US Army Corps of Engineers, Manhattan District. (1946). The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Washington, DC: War Department) US Army, Headquarters Department of the Army. (1984). Field Manual No. 100-2-1: The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Washington DC: Headquarters Department of the Army) US Army Japanese Research Division. (1956). Small Wars and Border Problems: Japanese Studies on Manchuria, Vol. XI, Pt 2 (Tokyo: Military History Section, US Army Forces Far East) US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East. (1950). Japanese Monograph No. 155: Record of Operations against Soviet Russia on Northern and Western Fronts of Manchuria, and in Northern Korea (August 1945) (Tokyo: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army) US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East. (1954). Japanese Monograph No. 77: Japanese Preparations For Operations In Manchuria (Prior To 1943) (Tokyo: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army) US Army Military History Section Headquarters, Army Forces Far East. (1965). Japanese Monograph No. 154: Record of Operations against Soviet Russia, Eastern Front (August 1945) (Tokyo: Office of the Chief of Military History, Department of the Army)

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

217

US Congress. (1955). Congressional Record: Proceedings and Debates of the United States Congress – Appendix, April 1 1955 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of Defense. (1955). The Entry of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan: Military Plans, 1941–1945 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1945). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1931: Vol. III. The Far East (Washington DC: Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1948). Soviet Supply Protocols (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1955). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945 (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1960). Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 1945, Vol. II (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1961). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1967). The China White Paper August 1949: Vol. I (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press) US Department of State. (1969a). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The British Commonwealth, The Far East, Vol. VI (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Department of State. (1969b). Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1945, The Far East, China, Vol. VII (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Hydrographic Office. (1947). Sailing Directions for the Southeast Coast of Siberia and Korea: From Sakhalinskiy Zaliv (Sakhalin Gulf) to the Yalu River including Sakhalin (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US Marine Corps Intelligence Activity. (1996). Soviet/Russian Armor and Artillery Design Practices: 1945–1995 MCIA-1141-001-96 (Quantico, VA: US Marine Corps) US Senate. (1951). Military Situation in the Far East: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Eighty-Second Congress, First Session to Conduct an Inquiry into the Military Situation in the Far East and the Facts Surrounding the Relief of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur from his Assignments in that Area. Part 4. (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) US War Department. (1944a). Field Manual 31-5, Landing Operations on Hostile Shores (Washington DC: United States Government Printing Office) US War Department. (1944b). Technical Manual TM-E 30-480: Handbook on Japanese Military Forces (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office) Wagner, R. (ed.) & Fetser, L. (trans.). (1973). The Soviet Air Force in World War II: The Official History: Originally Published by the Ministry of Defence of the USSR (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co.) Wakabayashi, B.T. (ed.). (2017). The Nanking Atrocity, 1937–1938: Complicating the Picture (New York: Berghahn) Walker, M.M. (2017). The 1929 Sino-Soviet War: The War Nobody Knew (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas) Walker, W.T. (2011). McCarthyism and the Red Scare: A Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO) Warner, D. & P. (1975). The Tide at Sunrise: A History of the Russo-Japanese War 1904–1905 (London: Angus & Robertson) Weathersby, K. (1993). Soviet Aims in Korea and the Origins of The Korean War, 1945–1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center For Scholars) Weeks, A.L. (2004). Russia’s Life-Saver: Lend-Lease Aid to the USSR in World War II (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books)

stalin's war on japan - Press

218

Stalin’s War on Japan

Werner, Max. (1939). The Military Strength of the Powers, trans. Fitzgerald, E. (London: Victor Gollancz) West, N. (2004). Mortal Crimes: The Greatest Theft in History: The Soviet Penetration of the Manhattan Project (New York: Enigma) Whitewood, P. (2015). The Red Army and the Great Terror: Stalin’s Purge of the Soviet Military (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas) Whiting, K.R. (1974). The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: Air University Institute for Professional Development) Williams, B. (2007). Resolving the Russo-Japanese Territorial Dispute: Hokkaido-Sakhalin Relations (Abingdon: Routledge) Wilson, S. (1999). ‘The Russo-Japanese War and Japan: Politics, Nationalism and Historical Memory’, in Wells, D. & Wilson, S. (eds.), The Russo-Japanese War in Cultural Perspective, 1904–05 (Houndsmills: Macmillan) Yang Yan-Jun & Tam Yue-Him. (2018). Unit 731: Laboratory of the Devil, Auschwitz of the East: Japanese Biological Warfare in China 1933–1945 (Stroud: Fonthill Media) Yoshitake Oka. (1983). Konoe Fumimaro: A Political Biography, trans. Shumpei Okamoto & Murray, P. (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press) Young, L. (2003). ‘Japan’s Wartime Empire in China’, in Chickering, R. & Forster, S. (eds). The Shadows of Total War: Europe, East Asia, and the United States, 1919–1939 (New York: Cambridge University Press) Young, L. (2014). ‘Japan at War: History-Writing on the Crisis of the 1930s’, in Martel, G. (ed.). Origins of the Second World War Reconsidered: AJP Taylor and the Historians (Abingdon: Routledge) Yumashev, I.S. ‘The plan of operation for a Soviet invasion of the island of Hokkaido and the Kurile Islands. 19.8.45.’ Available at: https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/ 122335 Zakharov, Marshal M.V. (1972). Finale, trans. Skvirsky, D. (Moscow: Progress Publishers) Zaloga, S.J. (2005). Jeeps 1941–45 (Oxford: Osprey Publishing) Zaloga, S.J. (2007). Japanese Tanks 1939–45 (Oxford: Osprey) Zaloga, S.J. (2008). Armored Trains (Oxford: Osprey Publishing) Zaloga, S.J. (2009). The Atlantic Wall (2): Belgium, The Netherlands, Denmark and Norway (Oxford: Osprey) Zaloga, S.J. (2010). Defense of Japan 1945 (Oxford: Osprey) Zamulin, V. & Britton, S. (trans. and ed.). (2017). The Battle of Kursk: Controversial and Neglected Aspects (Solihull: Helion) Zarrow, P. (2005). China in War and Revolution 1895–1949 (Abingdon: Routledge) Zhukov, G.K. (1971). The Memoirs of Marshal Zhukov (London: Jonathan Cape) Zhukov G. (1985). Marshal of the Soviet Union: Reminiscences and Reflections Vol. 2, trans. Schneierson, V. (Moscow: Progress Publishers) Zuber, T. (2002). Inventing the Schlieffen Plan (New York: Oxford University Press) Zuehlke, M. (2012). Tragedy at Dieppe: Operation Jubilee, August 19, 1942 (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre)

Sources in Other Languages Japanese Self Defence Ground Force Fuji School. (1980). A History of Japanese Artillery: Self Defence Force Artillery Past, Present, and Future (Tokyo: Hara Shobo) [陸上自衛隊富士学校特科会編, 日本砲兵史: 自衛隊砲兵過去現在未来 (東京: 原書房, 1980)] Kerst, G. (1970). Jacob Meckel: Sein Leben und sein Wirken in Deutschland und Japan (Go¨ttingen: Musterschmidt) Kitaoka Shinichi. (1978). The Japanese Army and Continental Policy: 1906–1918 (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press) [北岡伸, 日本陸軍と大陸政策: 1906–1918 (東京: 東京大学出版会 1978)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

Bibliography

219

Lumet, A. (2004). Le Pacte: Les Relations russo-japonaises a` l’e´preuve des incidents de frontie`re (Paris: Publibook) Matsumoto Shigeharu (1986). A Testimony to Showa History (Tokyo: Mainichi Shinbunsha, 1986) [松本重治, 昭和史への一証言 聞き手 (東京; 毎日新聞社, 1986)] Umemoto Shuzo. (1983). Four Seasons of the Shogun: General Yamada Otozo, the last Commander of the Kwantung Army (Tokyo: Mitsuto) [楳本 捨三, 将軍の四季-最後の関東軍総司令官山田乙三大将 (東京: 光人, 1983)] Yutaro Shiba. (2003). Japan in Asia (Tokyo: Bunshun) [司馬遼太郎, アジアの中の日本』文藝春秋 (東京, 文藝春秋, 2003)]

stalin's war on japan - Press

stalin's war on japan - Press

Index Abe Nobuyuki, General, 24 Acheson, Dean, 153 Anami Korechika, General, Minister of War, 94, 95, 99, 100 Andreev, Vice Admiral Vladimir, Northern Pacific Flotilla commander, 39, 90, 136 Anishchik, Colonel Georgy, 115, 116, 118, 122, 125, 155 Antonov, General Aleksei, Chief of the General Staff, 46 Antonov, Rear Admiral Neon, Amur Military Flotilla commander, 36, 82, 83 86 Araki Sadao, General, 18 Arao Okikatsu, Colonel, 99 Barbey, Daniel E., Vice Admiral, 152 Baturov, Major General Ivan, 137, 138 Beloborodov, Colonel General Afanasy, 1st Army commander, 36, 38, 63, 64, 65, 66, 74 Harbin, advance on, 125–6 Mudanjiang, battles for, 115, 118, 122–4 Blyukher (Blucher), General (later Marshal) Vasily, 15, 20 Bonesteel, Charles H., 96 Boyko, Colonel Vasily, 56, 57 Burmasov, Major General Vasily, 59, 60, 155 Byrnes, James, 29, 96 ‘Byrnes Note’, 98–9 Chang Hsueh-liang (Zhang Xueliang), 15, 19 Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), 14–15 Chaplygin, Lieutenant Colonel V.P., 119, 120 Chelyshev, Major Pyotr, 108, 109 Chiang Kai-Shek, Generalissimo, Communists, relations with, 15, 151–3

Sian (Xi’an) incident, and, 19 surrender of Japanese forces to, 105–6, 151 Marco Polo Bridge Incident, and, 19 Northern Expedition, and, 15 Second World War, and, 19 Tanggu Truce, and, 16 Yalta Agreement, and, 6 Chinese Eastern Railway, 15, 17, 34, 59, 68, 71, 119 Chistyakov, Colonel General Ivan, 25th Army commander, 36, 38, 68, 76, 78 Advance becomes main thrust, 126 Korea, reaches 38th Parallel, 133 Tactics, proposes departure from plan, 77 Success of ‘Suvorov’s tactics’, 79, 127 Churchill, Winston, 3, 6, 7, 28, 125, 146, 157 Dairen (Dalny, Dalniy, Dalian), 5, 7, 48, 110 Danilov, Lieutenant General Aleksei, 17th Army commander, 33, 53, 109 Davies, Joseph E., 18, 19 Deane, Major General John R., 10 Denisin, Colonel A.Z., 128, 129 Diakonov, Major General Anatoli, 39, 89, 137 Dodd, William, 18 Dyakov, Major General Porfiry, 143 Dziuba, Major General Georgii, 40 Eden, Anthony, British Foreign Secretary, 6, 28 Fomenko, Lieutenant General Sergey, 58, 60 Forrestal, James, Secretary of the Navy, 8, 9, 10 Gnechko, Major General Alexey, 143, 144, 147

stalin's war on japan - Press

222

Stalin’s War on Japan

Goro Morishima, 45 Grassli, Max, 95 Grew, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C., 9 Harriman, Averell, US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 3, 7, 9 Hasunuma Shigeru, General, 95 Hatanaka Kenji, Major, 99 Hiranuma Kiichiro, 95 Hirohito, Japanese Emperor, 95, 98, 99 Honjo Shigeru, Lieutenant General, 16 Hopkins, Harry, 7 Hori Yugoro, Rear Admiral, 132 Hvorostyanov, Captain Lieutenant Ilya, 65 Ida Masataka, Lieutenant Colonel, 99 Inouye Toshisuke, Colonel, 117, 118 Itagaki Seishiro, General, 18 Ivanovsky, Rear Admiral Nikolai, 78 Kabanov, Lieutenant General Sergey, 129, 130, 131, 132 Kashiwada Akiji, Colonel, 119, 120, 122, 124 Kazakov, Major General Konstantin, 61, 63 Khrenov, Colonel General Arkady, 64, 71 Khudyakov, Marshal Sergei, 12th Air Army commander, 33 Kido Koichi, Imperial adviser, 95, 98, 99 King, Admiral Ernest J., 10 Kita Seiichi, General, First Area Army commander, 48 Komatsubara Michitaro, General, 21 Komoto Daisaku, Colonel, 15 Korea, 38th Parallel, US-Soviet line of demarcation, 96 Soviet forces reach, 133 North Korea (Democratic People’s Republic), creation of, 150–1, 153 ‘Axis of evil’, member of, 158 Captain Jin Zhi-cheng (Kim Il Sung), and, 151 Soviet invasion of, 38, 78, 93 Amphibious operations on east coast of, 78–9, 131–3, 156 Kozuki Yoshio, Lieutenant General, Seventeenth Area Army commander, 49

Kravchenko, Colonel General Andrei, 6th Guards Tank Army commander, 33, 53, 106, 108, 109 Krinov, Captain V.A., 83 Krylov, Colonel General Nikolai, 5th Army commander, 36, 38, 68, 125, 155 Mudanjiang, battles for, 119, 121 Reconnoitres objectives personally, 69 Tactics, proposes departure from plan, 70 Success of, 71 Kurchatov, Igor, 29 Kuril (Kurile) Islands, Amphibious operations against, 40, 90, 141, 155 Shumshu invasion, 141–8 Bargaining counters, potential as, 93 General Order No. 1, and, 97, 140 Geo-political/strategic importance of to the Soviet Union, 7, 10, 40–1, 97, 140 Japan, Soviet/Russian post-war dispute with, 157 Stalin’s victory speech, mentioned, 150 Yalta Agreement, and, 6, 7 Kushibuchi Senichi, Lieutenant General, Thirty-Fourth Army commander, 49 Kuzmin, Radio Operator Anatoly, 73, 74 Kuznetsov, Admiral of the Fleet Nikolai, 11 Kwantung Army, Chang Tso-lin (Zhang Zuolin), support of then assassination by, 14–15 Conscription of Japanese colonists into, 47 Creation of, 13 Expansionist aims of officer corps, 18 Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan, battles with Red Army, 20–4 Unit 731 and biological warfare, deployed at, 25–6 Lake Khasan, battles with Red Army, 20 Manchukuo, independent policy of officers regarding, 14 Declaration of Independence, 16, 17 Defensive zones (military sub-divisions) allocation of forces, 48–9 Kita Seiichi, General, First Area Army commander, 48

stalin's war on japan - Press

Index Uemura Mikio, Lieutenant General, Fourth Army commander, 48 Ushiroku Jun, General, Third Area Army commander, 48 Mukden Incident, 16 Offensive operations, ordered to cease, 104–5 Permanent defences, constructed by, 35, 37 Reinforced, 26 Sino-Soviet conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway, and, 15 Strategic Reserve, utilised as, 26 Strength of, 27, 48 Suicide bombers, as substitute for effective anti-tank weapons, 47–8 Surrender, ordered, 105, 108 Equipment captured, 152 Tanggu Truce, and, 16 Unit 516, chemical warfare facility, 5 Under attack everywhere, unable to defend anywhere, 92 Yamada Otozo, General, last commander of, 48 Kwantung Garrison, 13 Kwantung Leased Zone, 13 Leahy, Admiral William D., 9 Lemeshko, Lieutenant General Petr, 40 Lend-lease (US aid to the Soviet Union), 10, 42, 58, 143 Project Hula, 10–11, 78, 144 Leonov, Captain A.I., 135 Lin Biao, Marshal, 152, 153 Litvinov, Maxim, 19 Loza, Major Dmitry, 54, 55, 107 Luchinsky, Lieutenant General Alexander, 36th Army commander, 34, 35, 111 Lyudnikov, Colonel General Ivan, 39th Army commander, 33, 57, 110 MacArthur, General Douglas, 8, 27, 97, 100, 149, 157 McCarthy, Senator Joe, 153–4 Malinovsky, Marshal Rodion, Trans-Baikal Front commander, 32, 33, 35, 42, 49, 57, 60, 101, 106

223

Mamonov, Lieutenant General Stepan, 15th Army commander, 39, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87 Managarov, Colonel General Ivan, 53rd Army commander, 33, 109 Manchukuo (The Manchu State) (Formally Manchutikuo (the Manchu Empire) after 1934), Area, 16 Climate, 58 Declaration of Independence from China, 16, 17 Defensive zones, allocation of forces, 48–9 Frontiers ‘ill defined’, 20 Puyi (Pu Yi), appointed emperor of, 17 Abdication and capture of, 109 Soviet Union, threatened by creation of, 17 Mao Zedong, 151, 153 Marshall, General George C., 27 Matsumoto Shunichi, 98 Maximov, Lieutenant General Alexander, 65–6, 125, 126, 155 Meretskov, Marshal Kirill, First Far Eastern Front commander, 32, 41, 42, 61, 65, 68, 79 Background, 35–6, 42 Tactical changes to attacks, approves, 70, 77 Assault, shifts weight of, 78 Harbin, and capture of, 113, 126 Korea, operations against, and, 39, 127, 133 Kuril Islands, operations against, and, 140 Mudanjiang, battles for, and, 119, 120–1, 124, 126 Training regime, enforces, 36, 64 Merkuryev, Colonel K.D., 145 Molotov, Vyacheslav, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs (Soviet foreign minister), Japan, Soviet Declaration of War handed to Ambassador Sato, 46 Mediation, US-Japan, and, 45–6 Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, 23–4, 26 Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact, denunciation of, 27 Potsdam, Conference and Declaration, 29

stalin's war on japan - Press

224

Stalin’s War on Japan

Yalta Conference, and, 3 Mongolia, Inner, 16, 53 Mongolian People’s Republic (OuterMongolia), 5, 6, 7, 13, 16, 17, 18, 21, 33 Soviet-Mongolian 1st Army Group, 21, 23 Soviet-Mongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group, 34, 51, 55, 101, 103 Mori Takeshi, Lieutenant General, 99 Morozov, Colonel I.F., 122, 125 Murakami Keisaku, Lieutenant General, 127 Novikov, Chief Marshal of Aviation Alexander, 43 Olsen, Rear Admiral Clarence E., 10 Pacific Fleet (Soviet), 32, 141, Amphibious operations, and, 39, 41, 76, 78, 90, 127, 128–31 Northern Pacific Flotilla, 39, 40, 137, 155 Amphibious operations, and, 88, 90, 136–9, 155 Pashkov, Major General Ivan, 5th Rifle Corps commander, 39, 87, 113 Pechenenko, Colonel Savva, 72 Perekrestov, Major General G.N., 119, 121 Phipps, Sir Eric, 18 Pliyev, Colonel General Issa, SovietMongolian Cavalry-Mechanised Group commander, 33–4, 51, 52, 53, 101, 103, 105, 106 Poltavsky, Captain E., 79 Ponomarev, Captain Dmitry, 143 Port Arthur (Lushun, Lushunkou), 6, 7, 13, 109, 140 Potsdam Conference, 27, 28, 29 Potsdam Declaration/Proclamation (Proclamation Defining Terms for Japanese Surrender), 29, 45 Japanese government, and acceptance of, 93–100 Purkayev, General Maxim, Second Far Eastern Front commander, 32, 39, 81, 83, 88, 143, 144 Red Army (Formally the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army), Churchill on, 125

Deep Battle (Deep Operations), concept and use of, 23, 37, 79, 154–5 Female combatants, 32, 118, 130 Great Terror, and, 20 Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan, battle of, 20–4 Lake Khasan, battle of, 20 Manchurian Strategic Offensive Operation, Command structure, 31–2 Materiel for, 32 Maskirovka, in relation to, 31, 35, 44, 49, 88 Operational plan, 33–5 Order of Battle, First Far Eastern Front, 1st (Red Banner) Army, 36, 38, 39, 61–8, 71, 72, 74, 126, 155 Mudanjiang, battles for, and, 114–18, 121, 122–5 5th (Red Banner) Army, 36, 38, 42, 61, 68–71, 76 Jilin and Chanchung, advance on, 122, 125, 126 Mudanjiang, battles for, and, 114, 118–21 9th Air Army, 36, 43, 68, 70, 71, 125, 127 10th Mechanised Corps, 38, 61, 69, 78, 126, 127 25th Army, 36, 38, 68, 76–8, 126–7 Korea, advance into, 78–9, 127, 133 35th (Red Banner) Army, 36, 38, 39, 43, 71–6, 87, 113–14 Amur Military Flotilla, 32, 36, 155 Order of Battle, Second Far Eastern Front, 2nd (Red Banner) Army, 39, 88–9, 110–11 5th Rifle Corps, 39, 81, 87, 113 10th Air Army, 39, 43, 83, 86, 111 15th Army, 39, 81–7, 111 16th Army (Sakhalin), 39, 40, 89–91, 137–8 Amur Military Flotilla, 32, 39, 81–113, 126, 155 Order of Battle, Trans-Baikal Front, 6th (Guards Red Banner) Tank Army, 33, 42, 53, 55, 106, 109, 110, 126

stalin's war on japan - Press

Index 12th Air Army, 33, 43, 53, 106 17th Army, 33, 53, 55, 109–10 36th Army, 33, 34–5, 39, 55, 57–60, 110 39th Army, 33, 35, 42, 55–7, 110 53rd Army, 33, 42, 110 Soviet-Mongolian CavalryMechanised Group, 33, 34, 51–3, 101, 103–6 Order to commence, 29 Redeployment for, 28 Special Far Eastern Army, 15 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 7, 157 Yalta Conference, and, 3 Requests Soviet assistance to defeat Japan, 3, 4, 5 Agrees Stalin’s territorial claims, 6, 9 Senator McCarthy’s assertions regarding, 153 Roosevelt, Theodore, 5 Rusk, Dean, 96 Russo-Japanese War, 5, 13, 17, 21, 48, 150 Sakhalin Island (Karafuto), Bargaining counter, potential as, 93 Geo-political/strategic importance of to the Soviet Union, 7, 140, 150 Japanese defences on (Koton/Haramitog fortified region), 90 Soviet attack on Japanese portion: Amphibious operations against, 40, 90, 135–40, 155 Forces allocated to, 39, 89 Offensive across the 50th Parallel, 137–8 Topography and climatic conditions of, 40, 89, 143 Yalta Agreement, and, 5, 7 Sakomizu Hisatsune, 98 Sato Naotake, 29, 45, 46 Shanin, Major General Grigoriy, 76, 78, 79, 127, 130 Shelakhov, General G.A., 113, 126 Shiizaki Jiro, Lieutenant Colonel, 99 Shutov, Major Pyotr, 145, 146, 147, 156 Sokolov, Colonel General Ivan, 9th Air Army commander, 36, 68, 125 South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR), 5, 13, 16

225

Stalin, Joseph, Atomic Bomb, US possession and use of, and, 28–9 Chistyakov, Colonel General Ivan, appoints to command of 25th Army, 76 Djilas, Milovan, on, 156–7 Germany, unconditional surrender of, and, 27 ‘Great Terror,’ and, 20 Hokkaido, Soviet occupation zone on, 96, 97–8, 140, 149 Korea, and, Agrees demarcation line at the 38th Parallel, 96 Democratic People’s Republic, formation of, 150, 158 Kuril Islands, and, 40, 140, 141 Lend Lease equipment, and, 10, 11 Manchurian Offensive, and, Orders early commencement of, 29 Orders increase in pace of, 108, 121 Mao Zedong, relations with, 151 Allows weapons transfer to Communist forces of, 151–2 Mediation, US-Japan, and, 45, 46, 93 Molotov–Ribbentrop Non-Aggression Pact, and, 23–4 Red Army, and, 55 ‘Artillery is the god of war’, 70 Second United Front, and, 19 State Defence Committee, and, 41 Truman, Harry S., and, Hokkaido, Soviet occupation zone, and, 97–8 Informed by Stalin of when the Soviet attack on Japan will begin, 28 Stalin’s response to General Order No. 1, and, 96 Mentions ‘new weapon of unusual destructive force’ to Stalin, 28 Rivalry with, 109 Victory Speech, 150 Yalta Conference, and, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 157 Field-Marshal Brooke’s assessment of, 7 Stimson, Henry L., Secretary of War, 9, 10, 157 Studenichnikov, Captain A.F., 131, 132 Sueo Ikeda, Colonel, 142, 146, 147

stalin's war on japan - Press

226

Stalin’s War on Japan

Suzuki Kantaro, Japanese Prime Minister, 45, 46, 94, 95 Svirs, Major General Nikolai, 122, 123, 155 Tado, Colonel, 132 Takeshita Masahiko, Lieutenant Colonel, 99, 100 Tankevich, Captain L.B., 83 Tavkhutdinov, Lieutenant Colonel Karam, 90, 135, 137 Terekhin, Lieutenant General Makar, 2nd Army commander, 39, 88 Timirgaleev, Lieutenant Colonel Abdul, 138, 140 Togo Shigenori, Japanese Foreign Minister, 45, 46, 94, 98 Toyoda Soemu, Admiral, Chief of the Navy General Staff, 94 Truman, Harry S., Atomic bomb, and, 28–9, 46 Chinese Communism, and, 151 General Order No. 1, issues, 96 Hokkaido, rejects Stalin’s proposal for Soviet occupation zone on, 97–8, 140 Kurils, and, 140, 141 Japan’s surrender, announces, 100 Potsdam Conference, and, 28 Stalin, tug of war with, 109 Tsukanova, Mariya, 130 Tsutsumi Fusaki, Lieutenant General, 148 Uemura Mikio, Lieutenant General, Fourth Army commander, 48 Ugaki Kazushige, General, 22 Umezu Yoshijiro, General, Chief of the Army General Staff, 94

Ushiroku Jun, General, Third Area Army commander, 48 Uspensky, naval radio operator Vladimir, 132 Vasilevsky, Marshal Aleksandr, Far East Theatre Commander, 31, 34, 41, 46, 108, 110, 121, 140, 143, 152 Vasiliev, Lieutenant General Ivan, 10th Mechanised Corps commander, 38 Yamada Otozo, General, 48, 49 Yamagata Aritomo, Field Marshal, 17 Yonai Mitsumasa, Admiral, Minister of the Navy, 94 Yumashev, Admiral Ivan, Pacific Fleet commander, 39 Amphibious warfare, and, 41, 90, 128, 130, 131, 143 Yusternik, General Yevgeny, 122, 126 Zakhvatayev, Colonel General Nikanor, 35th Army commander, 36, 38, 72, 74 Zhang Xueliang (Chang Hsueh-liang), 15, 19 Zhang Zuolin (Chang Tso-lin), 14–15 Zhigarev, Colonel General Pavel, 10th Air Army commander, 39, 83, 111 Zhou Baozhong, 151 Zhukov, General, later Marshal, Georgy, 26, 27, 31, 70 Atomic bomb, and Stalin’s reaction to it, 29 Khalkhin Gol/Nomonhan, and, 21, 23