Rising India and Indian Communities in East Asia 9789812308009

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Rising India and

Indian Communities 1n East Asia

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued almost 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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Rising India and

Indian Communities East Asia •

1n

EDITED BY

K. Kesavapany. A. Mani. P. Ramasamy

I5EI5 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES

Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2008 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2008 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the authors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Rising India and Indian communities in East Asia / edited by K. Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. Ramasamy. 1. India—Relations—East Asia. 2. East Asia—Relations—India. 3. India—Relations—Southeast Asia. 4. Southeast Asia—Relations—India. 5. India—Foreign economic relations—East Asia. 6. East Asia—Foreign economic relations—India. 7. Indians (Asian people)—East Asia—History. 8. Indians (Asian people)—Southeast Asia—History. I. Kesavapany, K. II. Mani, A. III. Ramasamy, P. (Palanisamy), 1949DS450 E37R59 2008 ISBN 9978-981-230-868-9 (soft cover) ISBN 9978-981-230-799-6 (hard cover) ISBN 9978-981-230-800-9 (PDF) Typeset by International Typesetters Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Utopia Press Pte Ltd

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CONTENTS

List of Tables

ix

List of Figures

xiii

Preface

xv

The Editors

xvii

The Contributors

xix

REGIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES 1

India and Indians in East Asia: An Overview Wang Gungwu

3

2

Indians and the Colonial Diaspora Marina Carter

12

3

The Movement of Indians in East Asia: Contemporary and Historical Encounters Amarjit Kaur

27

4

Community Formations among Indians in East Asia A. Mani

49

5

India and Southeast Asia in the Context of India’s Rise Kripa Sridharan

71

v

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vi

Contents

6

India’s Engagement with East Asia Pradeep K. Kapur

7

India’s Economic Engagement with East Asia: Trends and Prospects Nagesh Kumar

107

8

Brand India and East Asia Faizal Yahya

130

9

Japan-India Relations: A Time for Sea Change? Takio Yamada

146

Indian Interactions in East Asia Arun Mahizhnan

157

10

87

COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES Brunei Darussalam 11

A Century of Contributions by Indians in Negara Brunei Darussalam A. Mani

171

China 12

China: Indians’ New-found Land Ji Ping

195

13

Blue-collar Indians: Imperceptible Yet Important in Hong Kong James Joseph Keezhangatte

207

Indonesia 14

Indians in a Rapidly Transforming Indonesia A. Mani

229

Japan 15

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Indians in Tokyo and Its Vicinity Masako Azuma

255

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Contents

16

The Indian Community in Kobe: Diasporic Identity and Network Yuki Tsubakitani and Masakazu Tanaka

vii

269

Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam 17

Rising India and Indians in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam Sudhir Devare

287

Korea 18

Indians in Korea Narayanan Kannan

301

Malaysia 19

A Critical Review of Indian Economic Performance and Priorities for Action R. Thillainathan

319

20

Politics of Indian Representation in Malaysia P. Ramasamy

355

21

Indians in Malaysia: Towards Vision 2020 S. Nagarajan

375

22

Tamil School Education in Malaysia: Challenges and Prospects in the New Millennium K. Arumugam

399

23

Socio-economic Self-help among Indians in Malaysia K. Anbalakan

422

24

Ethnic Clashes, Squatters and Historicity in Malaysia Andrew Willford

436

25

Indian Hindu Resurgence in Malaysia Carl Vadivella Belle

456

Myanmar 26. Indians in Myanmar Thet Lwin

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485

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viii

Contents

Philippines 27

The Indian Community in Metro Manila: Continuities, Changes, and the Effects of Rising India Lorraine Carlos Salazar

499

28

Contemporary Indian Communities in Western Visayas Joefe Santarita

525

Singapore 29

From Mandalas to Microchips: The Indian Imprint on the Construction of Singapore Asad-ul Iqbal Latif

549

30

Demographics, Incomes and Developmental Issues amongst Indians in Singapore G. Shantakumar and Pundarik Mukhopadhaya

568

31

The Role of the Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) in Uplifting the Educational Performance of Indian Students S. Vivakanandan

602

32

Singapore’s New Indians: Attracting Indian Foreign Talent to Singapore Arunajeet Kaur

619

33

The Changing Indian Performing Arts Scene in Singapore Uma Rajan

635

Taiwan 34

Towards a Dynamic Economic Partnership: India-Taiwan Relations Update Fu-Kuo Liu

651

Thailand 35 Index

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Indians in Thailand Srisurang Poolthupya

669 687

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LIST OF TABLES

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4

The Indian Population in Burma, 1872–1931 Malaya: Population by Racial Group, 1911–47 Singapore: Size of Foreign Labour Force, 1970–2000 Malaysia: Migrant Workers by Country of Origin, 1998–2004

34 37 42 44

4.1

Diversity of Human Flows from the Indian Sub-continent to East Asia Settlement of Indians in East Asia, 2005

56

4.2 7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

68

India’s Trade with East Asian Countries Percentage Share of India’s Trade with East Asian Countries FDI Inflows Received by India from the East Asian Countries, 2000–05 India’s Outward Direct Investment (Approved) to East Asian Countries 2002–03 to 2004–05

119 120 121

Indian Population in Brunei Darussalam, 1911–2001 Total Population by Racial Groups in Brunei Darussalam, 1960–2001 Arrivals from South Asia, Brunei Darussalam, 2002 Foreign-born South Asian Population by Year of Arrival, Country of Birth and Gender, 2001

173 174

123

175 176

13.1 13.2

Indian Domestic Workers in Hong Kong Wage for Household Work

214 217

14.1 14.2 14.3

Ethnic Groups in Medan, 1930 Ethnic Groups in Medan, 2000 Ethnic Groups in Jakarta, 2000

232 232 235

ix

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x

List of Tables

14.4

Distribution of Hindus in Jakarta, 2000

236

15.1

Socio-economic Background of Indian Migrants and their Status in Japan

259

16.1 16.2 16.3 16.4 16.5 16.6 16.7 16.8

Gender Sex and Marriage Status Age Regional Origin Religion Nationality Place of Birth Generations Frequency of Visits to India

280 280 280 281 281 281 281 282

18.1

Korean Investment in India during the Period 1991–2004

309

19.1 19.2 19.3 19.4

Growth and Sectoral Composition of GDP, 1970–2005 Malaysia: Employment by Occupations, 1970–2000 Employment by Major Occupational Group, 2000–05 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of Labour Force, Various Years Changes in Occupational Profile of Individual Ethnic Groups vs Malaysian Workforce, 1970–2000 Employment by Occupation of Indians: Share and Composition (%), 2000–05 Changes in Occupational Profile of Indians vs Malaysian Workforce, 2000–05 Indian Share of Registered Professionals Indian Share of Registered Professionals, 2000 & 2005 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of the Labour Force by Gender and Ethnicity, 2000 Percentage Distribution of Educational Attainment of the Labour Force by Gender & Ethnicity, 2004 Percentage Distribution of Labour Force by Highest Certificate Obtained, Gender & Ethnicity, 2004 Mean Monthly Household Income by Ethnic Group Ratio of Mean Monthly Household Income (at Current Prices) by Ethnic & Income Groups (1995 & 1999) Incidence of Poverty & Hardcore Poverty by Ethnic Group, 1999 & 2004

322 322 323 324

19.5 19.6a 19.6b 19.7 19.8 19.9 19.10 19.11 19.12 19.13 19.14

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326 326 328 329 330 332 332 333 334 334 335

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List of Tables

21.1

xi

Distribution of Indians in the Rural and Urban Areas of Peninsular Malaysia The Ethnic Composition of the Malaysian Civil Service, 2005

378

Vital Statistics on Tamil Schools in 2000 UPSR Results Comparison Between Different Medium Schools The Relative Progress for Period 1998–2004 Number of 7As Achievers in UPSR Assessment Examination 1999–2005 Allocations for Tamil Schools under Malaysia Plans 1990–2010

400 405

23.1

Distribution of Households by Income and Race in Peninsular Malaysia, 1970

423

26.1 26.2

Hindu Population by State/Division Land Holding by Size of Holding in Myanmar: 1993 and 2003

490 491

27.1

Indians in Metro Manila

502

28.1 28.2 28.3

Indian Population in Western Visayas Population of People of Indian Origin in Western Visayas Commercial Establishments in Bacolod City and Negros Occidental Commercial Establishments in Iloilo City and Panay

532 532 534

Key Indicators of Singapore’s Main Ethnic Populations, 1980–2005 Selected Demographic and Social Indicators, Resident Indian Population, 1980–2005 Indian Population in Singapore, 1871–2005 Resident Population and Growth Rates by Ethnic Group, 1980–2005 The Economically Active Population, 1957–2005 Age-Sex-Special Economic Activity Rates for Indians, 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2005 Unemployment Rates (%) by Sex, 1957–95 Occupational Distribution (%) of Working Persons, 1990–2005

569

21.2 22.1 22.2 22.3 22.4 22.5

28.4 30.1 30.2 30.3 30.4 30.5 30.6 30.7 30.8

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383

405 405 408

534

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30.9 30.10 30.11 30.12 30.13 30.14 30.15 30.16 30.17 30.18 30.19 31.1 31.2 31.3 31.4

List of Tables

Distribution (%) of Working Persons by Industry, 1990–2005, Selected Years Median Incomes (S$ per month) of Working Persons, 1972–2005 Income Distribution in Decile Groups — Indians and Other Ethnic Groups, 1990–2005 Changes in Social Welfare of Indians and Other Ethnic Groups, 1990–2005 Highest Qualification Attained, 1990–2005 Working Persons (15+) by Highest Qualification Attained by Sex, 1995 and 2005 Enrolment at Different Faculties (National University of Singapore), 1970 and 1980 Local and Foreign University Enrolment, 1990 Census Distribution of University Graduates by Major Field of Study, 1990, 1995 and 2005 Distribution (%) of Aged Population by Ethnic Group and Educational Achievements, 2000 Educational Attainment for Selected Age Groups, 1990 Census Percentage of PSLE Pupils Who Passed Mathematics Percentage of PSLE Pupils Eligible for Secondary Schools Percentage of GCE ‘O’ Level Pupils with at Least 5 O-Level Passes Progress of Indian Children after SINDA Intervention by Subject and Level

577 578 582 583 587 587 590 590 592 593 594 606 606 607 611

34.1

Taiwan’s Future Export to India: Growth Rate

654

35.1

Number of Tourist Arrivals to Thailand by Nationality (2001–04) Foreign Investment Net Applications and Applications Approved by BOI by Major Countries (2003–05) Number of Arrivals and Departures Classified by Nationalities

671

35.2 35.3

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671 671

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LIST OF FIGURES

3.1 3.2 3.3

Indian Migration Flows Burma and Malaya: Comparative Flows of Indian Immigrants, 1910–35 Malaysia: Expatriates by Country of Origin, 2006

32 32

7.1

India’s GDP Growth Rates, 1951–2006

109

12.1

The Main Locations of the Indians in China

200

15.1 15.2

Indian Population in Japan Distribution of Indians by Region, Japan

256 257

16.1

Fluctuations in ICCJ Membership

271

18.1 18.2 18.3 18.4

Asia and the Location of Korea in Asia Per Capita GNP, North and South Korea, 1953–90 The Silk Road Project The Korean Alphabet

303 304 305 306

28.1 28.2

528 536

28.3

Western Visayas, Central Philippines Mr Mohan Singh, Assistant Priest of Iloilo Sikh Temple with a Family of Sikh Adherents Informants and Mr Mohan Singh in the Iloilo Sikh Temple

31.1 31.2

Total Enrolment in SINDA’s Tuition Programmes Volunteers Recruited 1997–2006

609 612

45

537

xiii

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PREFACE

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) published a major work, Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by the late Professor K.S. Sandhu and Professor A. Mani in the early 1990s. That study provided an extensive treatment of Indians in various Southeast Asian countries. In the past decade, the economic rise of India; the migration of skilled Indian personnel across international borders; the changing perception of India in relation to its global role; and, more importantly, the slow transformation of its foreign policy have posed new scholarly and academic challenges for scholars of international political economy, in general, and ethnic studies, in particular. ISEAS decided to take up the intellectual challenge of understanding the relationship between the rise of India and Indian communities in East Asia. It organized a two-day conference on the topic, “Rise of India and Indians in East Asia”, in October 2006. The conference also received support from the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). The conference sought to answer several questions: what does “rising India” mean? How are members of the Indian communities in East Asia responding to the rise? How is India tapping into the energies of these Indians, such as by organizing the annual Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Overseas Indian Day)? Will India pay greater attention to people of Indian origin? Will Indians in East Asia, in turn, identify themselves with their ancestral land, or will they view the identification as jeopardizing their links with the countries where they have settled? The present volume, which contains thirty-five chapters, is the product of that conference. Like the volume published in the early 1990s, the study of Indians in East Asia adopts a country-based perspective. However, unlike the earlier volume, the country study of Indians in East Asia is interwoven into the phenomenon of India’s rise. This is not a study of India’s relations with overseas Indians, of the transformation of India’s foreign policy, or of India’s emergence as a great xv

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Preface

power. It is the study of Indian communities in East Asia in the context of a rising India. The term “Indian communities” refers to both those Indians who migrated and settled in different national settings during the colonial period, and those who have arrived, more recently, as skilled migrants. The chapters in this volume are organized under the broad categories of regional and historical perspectives, and country perspectives. The book focuses on three major themes. The first theme, a continuation from the earlier volume, examines the contemporary position of Indians in the East Asian region. The aim of this section is to identify the challenges, problems and successes of Indians in the region in the previous five decades. Related to this theme is the examination of community formations, integration and efforts to form social movements, including self-help groups, amongst Indians in countries such as Singapore, Malaysia, Myanmar and Indonesia. The second theme examines the phenomenon of “new Indians”, which includes the arrival of thousands of people from the sub-continent in the countries of East Asia. The phenomenon includes the migration of professionals, businessmen, domestic workers, plantation workers, and those employed in the construction sector. The third theme looks at the impact of a rising India on settled Indian communities as well as the “new Indians” — recently arrived professionals — in the East Asian region. In spite of the thematic focus, the study takes into account the situation on the ground, where the existing Indian communities, the “new Indians” or a “rising India” did not develop a unified framework to relate to one another and did not coordinate their relations under the umbrella of diaspora management. Individuals and groups in the sub-continent responded to opportunities in Southeast Asia and beyond not as parts of a diaspora coordinated from South Asia. This feature of their migration allowed individuals and groups to assimilate or integrate themselves into various parts of Southeast Asia with ease. As the nation-states of East Asia largely determined the outcome for individuals and groups, the nation-state is used as the demarcation for most chapters of this book, while allowing for a few overview chapters that address partial regional approaches to the study of Indians in East Asia. K. Kesavapany, A. Mani and P. Ramasamy Singapore

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THE EDITORS

K. Kesavapany is the Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and a career diplomat. A. Mani is Professor of Asia Pacific Studies at the Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University, Japan. Some of his major publications are Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, co-edited with K.S. Sandhu (1993), Campaigning for a Gracious Society in Brunei Darussalam (1992), Determinants of Educational Aspiration among Indonesian Youth (1984), The Changing Status of Tamil Language in Singapore’s Development (1997), and The Limits of the Nation-State in the Asia Pacific, edited with Kazuichi Sakamoto (2004). P. Ramasamy is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Before joining ISEAS in April 2006, he served as Professor of Political Economy, National University of Malaysia and Visiting Professor at University of Kassel, Germany. To date, he has published a number of books mainly on the subject of plantation labour, labour, and globalization.

xvii

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THE CONTRIBUTORS

K. Anbalakan is Senior Lecturer in history at the School of Humanities, Universiti Sains Malaysia, Pulau Pinang. His research areas are: Indian nationalism, social, political and economic history of Malaysia, identity construction among Malaysian Indians, and ethnic studies. Some of the articles published are: The New Economic Policy and Further Marginalisation of the Indians (2005), The Role of Indians in the Malaysian Constitutional Struggle, 1946–1948: A Reassessment (1999), Literacy in Mother-Tongue for the Linguistic Minorities: The Case of the Indians in Malaysia (1996), and Politik Pemisahan dan Pembentukan Pakistan (1994). K. Arumugam is an activist with various non-governmental organizations in advancing issues affecting the Indian Malaysians. He holds degrees in engineering and law from the University of Malaya. His work in nongovernmental organizations include the following: Coordinator of Group of Concerned Citizens, Secretariat Member of Suaram, Trustee of CHILD, Secretary-General of Tamil Foundation, and Partner of Child Development Initiative (CDI). Masako Azuma is a doctoral student at Waseda University, Japan. Her postgraduate work is on Sikhs and Sikh temples in Japan. Carl Vadivella Belle is an independent scholar specializing in Indian studies in Malaysia and Singapore. He formerly held the position of Multifaith Chaplain at the Religious Centre, Flinders University of Australia. He completed his doctorate dissertation, Thaipusam in Malaysia: A Hindu Festival Misunderstood?, at Deakin University in 2004. For several years he was the Australian Correspondent for the journal Hinduism Today, and has written on religion and politics for other journals. His book, An Australian Spiritual xix

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Contributors

Journey, exploring his interest in Hindu culture and society, was published in Kuala Lumpur, in 1992. Marina Carter is Research Fellow at the Centre for South Asian Studies, University of Edinburgh. Her principal research interests include labour migration, Indian Ocean, and South Asian Diaspora. Relevant publications include the following monographs: Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British Empire (1996), Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874 (1995), and Lakshmi’s Legacy: Testimonies of Indian Women in 19th Century Mauritius (1994). Co-authored publications include Coolitude: An Anthology of the Indian Labour Diaspora, with K. Torabully (2002) and Across the Kalapani: The Bihari Presence in Mauritius (2000). Sudhir Devare is currently Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. He is also an Associate Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. He is a former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, India. His book India and Southeast Asia: Towards Security Convergence (2005) was published in Singapore and New Delhi. Ji Ping is Research Fellow at the Chinese Association for International Understanding (CAFIU), and the China Center for Contemporary World Studies (CCCWS). His publications include Researches on Contemporary Indian Religions, co-authored (1997), Indian Merchant, co-authored (1998), Guide to the World States (Nepal) (2002), Wings of Fire, (translated) (2003), and Guiding Soul, Dialogue on the Purpose of Life, editor (2006). Narayanan Kannan is currently Visiting Professor at Korea Ocean Research and Development Institute, Republic of Korea. He was Associate Professor, Institute of Marine Sciences, Christian-Albrechts University, Kiel, Germany, and Monbusho Fellow, Ehime University, Japan. He is the Director of Tamil Heritage Foundation, an internet based Digital Archiving Project with its offices in India, Germany, Switzerland, and Korea. Pradeep K. Kapur is the Deputy Director General, Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA). Prior to this he was a career diplomat of the Indian Foreign Service and has worked in diverse areas including being the Ambassador to Cambodia, during which he sought the restoration of Ta Prohm Temple monument at Angkor. Among his many publications are included “ICT Initiatives in India-Current Status and Future Trends” (2001), “Leadership

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in International Environment” (1999), “Indomania: Cinema in the Indian Context” (1995), “SAARC-ASEAN Cooperation in the Cultural Arena” (2005), and “Indian Links with the Mekong Countries” (2006). Amarjit Kaur is Professor of Economic History at the University of New England, Armidale, New South Wales, Australia. She is also President of the Malaysia and Singapore Society of Australia (MASSA). She is Corresponding Editor for Modern Asian Studies (Cambridge) and the International Review of Social History (Leiden). Kaur’s research interests are in Malaysian and Southeast Asian economic history, labour history, migration, the Indian Diaspora and the politics of human rights issues in Asia. Her current research centres on the governance of migration and security issues and border-management strategies of major states in the region. Her recent books include Wage Labour in Southeast Asia since 1840: Globalisation, the International Division of Labour and Labour Transformations (2004), Women Workers in Industrialising Asia: Costed, Not Valued, editor (2004), and Mobility, Labour Migration and Border Controls in Asia, edited with Ian Metcalfe (2006). Arunajeet Kaur is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. She works on the Sikh and Indian Diaspora in Southeast Asia. James Joseph Keezhangatte is Honorary Lecturer and Fieldwork Supervisor at the Department of Social Work and Social Administration, University of Hong Kong. The title of his recently completed Ph.D. thesis is Transnational Migration, Resilience and Family Relationships: Indian Household Workers in Hong Kong. A forthcoming publication is entitled Leaders, Followers, Neither: Transnational Indian Migrant Women Household Workers in Hong Kong and their Parents and Siblings in India. Nagesh Kumar is Director-General of RIS (Research and Information System for Developing Countries, www.ris.org.in), a New Delhi-based policy research institution devoted to international economic and development issues. His recent books include: Globalization and the Quality of Foreign Direct Investment (2002), Protecting Foreign Investment: Implications of a WTO Regime and Policy Options, with Carlos Correa (2003), Reforms, Labour Markets and Social Security in India, co-editor with Ramgopal Agarwala and Michelle Riboud (2004), and Towards an Asian Economic Community: Vision of a New Asia, editor, (2005). He is co-editor of South Asia Economic Journal (Sage) and writes a column “Trading Ideas” in the Financial Express (New Delhi).

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Contributors

Asad-ul Iqbal Latif is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. A journalist for twenty-five years before joining ISEAS, his areas of research include Singapore’s political and strategic relations with China, India and the United States. He was a Jefferson Fellow at the East-West Center in Hawaii and is now a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at Harvard University, where he is doing research at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs. His latest book is Between Rising Powers: China, Singapore and India (2007). Fu-Kuo Liu is currently Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan. His research covers Asia Pacific security, regionalism and national security of Taiwan. Currently, he is working on a project on “health security in the Asia Pacific” and TaiwanIndia cooperation. Thet Lwin is an Executive Member of the Myanmar Academy of Arts and Science, Ministry of Education. He retired as Professor and Head of the Department of Statistics, Yangon Institute of Economics, and served the community as President of Hindu Central board from 2001 to 2002. Arun Mahizhnan is Deputy Director of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), Singapore. His research interests include issues relating to information communication technology (ICT) and mass media, development of Singapore as an Information Society, and arts and cultural developments in Singapore. He has edited books and contributed articles on the above topics. He has also co-authored major policy-oriented reports such as “Future of Broadcasting”, “Singapore as a Renaissance City”, “Developing Creative Industries in Singapore”, and “Partnership among Public, Private and People Sectors in Developing the Arts and Culture”. His co-authored/co-edited books include Broadcast Media in ASEAN (2002), Singapore: Re-Engineering Success (1998), a book on the future of Singapore, and Selves: State of the Arts in Singapore (2001). Pundarik Mukhopadhaya is currently Senior Lecturer at the Department of Economics, Macquarie University, Australia. His research interest is income distribution analysis, welfare economics, poverty, and related fields. His theoretical research is published in Advances in Econometrics, Journal of Income Inequality, Journal of Income Distribution, and Researches on Income Inequality. His empirical research on Southeast Asia is widely published — in Developing Economies, Journal of Asian Economics, Asian Journal of Economics,

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to name a few. He was also invited to contribute in UNESCO and World Bank research projects on welfare economics. S. Nagarajan is Research Director at the Educational, Welfare and Research Foundation Malaysia (EWRF), a non-profit organization working towards empowering less privileged Malaysians. His earlier research focused on the displacements of plantation communities in an industrializing Malaysia and the ethnic violence in southern Petaling Jaya, which is the subject of a forthcoming publication, Tamil Marginalisation in Malaysia: Historical Processes and Present-day Resistance. His current research interests include ethnic minorities’ responses to state-sponsored Islamization in Malaysia. Srisurang Poolthupya is an Emeritus Professor since 1998 and has been conferred many honours including Kiratyacharya Award as the Most Eminent Professor in humanities (1997) and the Knight’s Grand Cordon (Special Class) of the Most Exalted Order of the White Elephant (1997). She is Fellow of the Royal Institute from 1996–present and Chairperson of the Academy of Arts there from May 2006. Uma Rajan is currently the Executive Director of Man Fut Tong Nursing Home, Singapore. She was formerly the Director of Social Health Service and Director of Elderly Care Department, Ministry of Health Singapore. To date she has conducted about forty-eight research projects both individually and jointly on children and has published more than 120 research papers on community health at the community, national, regional and international levels. She is the advisor to many health related organizations in Singapore as well cultural organizations such as the National Arts Council of Singapore. She is the recipient of many awards both in the medical, community and cultural realms. Lorraine Carlos Salazar is with McKinsey & Company. At the time of writing this paper she was Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Her main research interests are on comparative political economy issues in Southeast Asia, focusing on politics of market reform, local politics, and contemporary developments in the region, and specifically Malaysia and the Philippines. Her recently published book is Getting a Dial Tone: Telecommunications Liberalisation in Malaysia and the Philippines (2007).

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Contributors

Joefe Santarita is currently Assistant Professor of Asian Studies at the Asian Center, University of the Philippines-Diliman. His interest revolves on the realms of maritime history, fisheries, social science and South Asian regional social forces, and dynamism in Southeast Asia. Currently, he is doing the appraisal and revitalization of the South Asian Studies program in the Philippines as well as a project on situating the Philippines in India’s Look East diplomatic radar. G. Shantakumar is presently Consultant Demographer and Statistician, after retiring as Associate Professor at the National University of Singapore. Specialties include demography, social gerontology, economics of ageing, manpower studies, higher education, applied statistics, market research, community studies, women development, ASEAN demography (especially of Singapore and Malaysia), health database development, population forecasting, evaluation of statistical data systems, survey designs (including questionnaires), designing high level statistical analysis and demography courses for non-quantitative officers, and in-house training of research functionary staff. Published papers on Singapore and Malaysian demography, created demographic databases for thirty-seven countries and areas for WHO/WPRO (2003, 2005), programme evaluation for Indian community self-help programmes (of SINDA), macro socio-economic analyses for Malay community (for MENDAKI and AMP). Kripa Sridharan is Head of Research, Asia (World-Check), Infosight, Singapore, and Adjunct Associate Professor in South Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore. She has authored a book entitled The ASEAN Region in India’s Foreign Policy (1996) and has co-edited Human Rights Perspectives (1999). She is Associate Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. She is also an Associate of the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS). Masakazu Tanaka is Professor in Social Anthropology, at the Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University, Japan. His research interests include religion, gender and sexuality, and South Asia. His publications include Patrons, Devotees and Goddesses: Ritual and Power among the Tamil Fishermen of Sri Lanka (1997), Living with Sakti: Gender, Sexuality and Religion in South Asia, edited with Mustache Tatiana (1999), “CD Hindu Temple Disputes in South India (1876–1924)” (2003), “Religion in Everyday Life”, in The Oxford India Companion to Sociology and Anthropology, edited by Veena Das, “Defying Blessings of the Goddess and the Community: Disputes

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over Sati (Widow Burning) in Contemporary India”, in Three Mountains and Seven Rivers: Prof. Musashi Tachikawa’s Felicitation Volume, edited by Shoun Hino and Toshiro Wada (2004), and “Hindu Priests under Secular Government: A Case Study of the Nataraja Temple at Chidambaram, South India”, in The State in India Past and Present, edited by Masaaki Kimura and Akio Tanabe (2005). R. Thillainathan is Executive Director of Genting Berhad and was its Chief Operating Officer from 2002 to 2006. He is Fellow of the Institute of Bankers, Malaysia. He is currently also a director in Petronas Dagangan Berhad and of Bursa Malaysia Berhad, member of the Tax Review Panel of the Ministry of Finance (since 2005) and a member of the Taxation Committee in the Malaysian International Chamber of Commerce & Industry Malaysia (since 1987). Yuki Tsubakitani studied Cultural Anthropology in 1997 and 2000 at Kyoto University and in Anthropology and Development at the London School of Economics in 1999. She worked for the Japan Foundation from 2000 to 2003. S. Vivakanandan served as the Chief Executive Officer, Singapore Indian Development Association (SINDA) from May 1998 to May 2007. Under his leadership, SINDA was awarded the Best Volunteer Management System Award in 2002. SINDA was also awarded the e-Society Excellence Award in 2005. He has a Masters Degree from University of Sydney, Australia, and a Bachelor of Arts (Honours) from the National University of Singapore. He is also on the administrative committees of voluntary Indian organizations in Singapore. Wang Gungwu is Professor at the National University of Singapore and Chairman of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Professor Wang was Vice-Chancellor of The University of Hong Kong from 1986 to 1995. He is the former Director of East Asian Institute and later it’s Chairman. He is also Emeritus Professor, Australian National University, Canberra. He is also member of Editorial Board or Advisory Editor of many international journals, including Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, The China Journal, The China Quarterly, Modern Asian Studies, Japanese Journal of Political Science, China Studies, Pacific Affairs, The Pacific Review, China: An International Journal, Journal of Chinese Overseas, Contemporary Southeast Asia, The Round Table, Asian Studies Review, and Journal of the Malaysian Branch, Royal Asiatic Society.

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Andrew Willford is Associate Professor of Anthropology and Asian Studies at Cornell University. He is also Associate Director of the Southeast Asia Program. Recent publications include: Cage of Freedom: Tamil Identity and the Ethnic Fetish in Malaysia (2006), “The ‘Already Surmounted’ yet ‘Secretly Familiar’: Malaysian Identity as Symptom” (2006), “‘Weapons of the Meek’: Ecstatic Ritualism and Strategic Ecumenism among Tamil-Hindus in Malaysia” (2002), “Possession and Displacement in Kuala Lumpur’s Ethnic Landscape” (2003), and Spirited Politics: Religion and Public Life in Contemporary Southeast Asia, co-edited with Kenneth George (2005). Faizal Yahya is Assistant Professor in the South Asian Studies Programme, National University of Singapore (NUS). Prior to his appointment at the NUS, he was working for the Singapore Ministries of the Environment and Foreign Affairs. His research interests include economic ties between South and East Asia/Southeast Asia, especially India and Singapore, current and future trends in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) especially the movement of human capital, business networks and infrastructure development. Takio Yamada is currently political minister, Embassy of Japan in New Delhi. He joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs after graduating from the Faculty of Law, Kyoto University in 1983. He received a M.A. degree (philosophy, politics and economics) from the University of Oxford. Before assuming his current post in April 2006, he served as Assistant Director, Northeast Asia Division; Deputy Director, International Agreements Division; Deputy Director, Japan-U.S. Security Treaty Division; Counselor, Embassy of Japan in London; Director, Prevention of Terrorism Division; Director, Southwest Asia Division; and Director, Regional Policy Division.

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REGIONAL AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVES

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1 INDIA AND INDIANS IN EAST ASIA: AN OVERVIEW Wang Gungwu INTRODUCTION Indians have been trading with East and Southeast Asia since ancient times. From the 1860s down to the early twentieth century, the traders were joined by large numbers of labourers who went out, or were sent out, largely to work in the plantations in British territories. But, since the end of World War II and following the decolonization of the British Empire, this movement of people changed course. Thus for more than thirty years, India had little obvious interest in the two regions. Instead, the focus of the Indian government was mainly on the Middle East and the Western World. India’s long period of colonial rule was mainly responsible for the country’s preoccupation with the West. Following political independence, India’s foreign policy orientations continued to be influenced by its ties with Britain and the West. Although India made early attempts to turn to the East, as first demonstrated at the non-aligned conference at Bandung, Indonesia, in the 1950s, such initiatives were complicated by its wars with China and Pakistan. At the same time, the Cold War resulted in ideological blocs and this eventually forced India to turn to the Soviet Union for strategic and defence reasons. Taken together, these factors distracted the Indian government from identifying strongly with Asia. There were contacts, but they were never 3

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sustained in a consistent manner. India simply lacked long-term strategic thinking about Asia, and this prevented India from seriously engaging with several parts of Asia, especially in its relations with Southeast Asia. Moreover, during this same period, Indian leaders never had any consistent policy towards its diaspora. It would seem that the diaspora was simply not important to them. Furthermore, the diaspora was not in those places that mattered for Indian security concerns. It was in Southeast Asia, the Caribbean and South Africa, quite different from the regions of strategic interests like the Soviet Union and Western Europe. Thus, India did not have comparable reasons to look at the diaspora in the way that China looked at theirs in Southeast Asia.

INDIA AND CHINA IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE China provides an interesting contrast to India. Its policies towards the diaspora in theory covered all people of Chinese descent everywhere but the region of greatest concern was Southeast Asia where the bulk of its diaspora was concentrated. China has had a keen interest in cultivating ties with its diaspora since the end of the nineteenth century. Thus it developed a clear policy leading to the establishment of administrative machinery to deal with “Overseas Chinese affairs” that paid special attention to the millions who lived in Southeast Asia. That machinery was particularly efficient where the diaspora was not too far away. At various stages, Chinese politicians like Sun Yat-sen and his nationalist successors and later those who led the communist movement relied on the diaspora to obtain financial and other forms of help. It was these links that sustained the strong ties between the diaspora and the Chinese government. The cultivation of such ties with the diaspora had its benefits, but also contributed to tensions in Southeast Asia, especially between the Overseas Chinese and the local governments. The argument that the Chinese diaspora in Southeast Asia served the interests of China did not go well in the region where there were large settled Chinese populations. Although the vast majority of the Chinese in Southeast Asia had nothing to do with China, perceptions of their misplaced loyalties and ties contributed to uneasy relations with governments in Southeast Asia. The comparison and contrast with China would explain why it took India so long to refocus on Asia. India’s interest in Asia was revitalized in the last ten years because of the extraordinary performance of China’s economy. There has been a growing realization in the Indian policy circles that China has relied on its diaspora during difficult periods in its history. They also realize that the Chinese from the outside have invested much in China. Due to the

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economic success of its diaspora, there is great encouragement on Chinese in China to do well and emulate the success of its diaspora. This would explain to some extent why, in the aftermath of Mao’s death, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping changed the course of China’s modernization programme. Having seen how the coming together of overseas Chinese and those in China could have successful results, Indian leaders are taking new interest in their overseas diaspora, paying special attention to those with skills and talents. In essence, it is the example of China’s success with its diaspora that has spurred Indian leaders to focus on the 20 million overseas Indians. Over the last ten years or so, the Indian government has adopted numerous initiatives to lure back successful overseas Indians to invest in India. The very fact that China progressed so rapidly in the last few decades has surprised the Chinese themselves. For Indian policymakers, China’s economic success is a challenge. They are probably wondering why, without any major disruptions or a damaging revolution, India is lagging behind China. There is a great interest now to do something so that they would not be left behind. It would be difficult to make a direct comparison between China and India on their respective developmental paths. In India, the Nehru power system ended with the death of Indira Gandhi. It was this system that was largely responsible for creating an impasse in the Indian development/ modernization trajectory until 1990. The inertia of the bureaucracy inherited from the British was a drag on the Indian modernization programme. It provided bureaucratic or management continuity for India in the postindependence period, but stifled imaginative ideas or thinking. Although the revolution in China damaged certain positive elements of continuity, it nonetheless contributed immensely to China’s modernization by breaking the power structure of the landed gentry or the old-fashioned mandarins who dominated the bureaucracy. It was the dismantling of this elitist and moribund bureaucracy that provided Deng Xiaoping a chance to start afresh with deep economic reforms and inspire the people in general to respond so readily and positively. India took a different route and did not create the mechanisms to challenge the dominance of the Indian Revenue Service (IRS), Indian Civil Service (ICS) and other satellite formations, each with built-in controls and limitations. As a result, an imaginative and creative reconstruction of the management structure that could be more appropriate to the emergence of a new India was not feasible. It could even be said that there were signs of stagnation in the old system, features that prevented the rise of new ideas and plans about the future of India. For example, it took almost twenty years for a generation of economists to move beyond the entrenched ideas of Keynesian

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economics to allow alternative analyses to be applied to Indian conditions. In a nutshell, the bureaucracy, the nature of politics and the dominance of an economic orthodoxy held back India’s leap into the global mainstream of modernization.

MIGRATION In terms of migration, there were definite differences between China and India. The nature of the politics among Chinese diaspora and the lingering suspicion in Southeast Asian countries of their links with mainland China led many countries in the region to develop policies that did not welcome new Chinese migrants once the decolonization process was set in motion. The perception that the Chinese diaspora was somehow linked with the communists in the People’s Republic of China led to strong attitudes against the immigration of Chinese. Although some countries in the Southeast region did accept Chinese from Hong Kong and Taiwan as investors, notably in Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, the Chinese were not welcomed as immigrants. Historically, Chinese merchants traded regionally and their main focus was Southeast Asia at least until the 1950s. Until the 1980s, most Chinese economic activity was still centred on the Southeast Asian region. During the last two decades, the flow of Chinese investors to Southeast Asia has reduced in proportion as more enterprising investors from Taiwan and Hong Kong, and lately a resurgent mainland China, have fanned out globally in search of better opportunities. The flow of Indian migration had from the start been very wide, in some areas as wide if not wider than the Chinese. Thus today there are about eighteen to twenty-one million Indians spread from Malaysia to Fiji and the West Indies, to Mauritius and East and South Africa. The number of Chinese overseas is still larger at around thirty to thirty-five million, but the actual figures are difficult to calculate because many of them have become assimilated and do not necessarily identify themselves as Chinese. Historically there have been differences in the phenomenon of assimilation. For example, the requirement to become Muslim following intermarriages in the Malay world seemed to have deterred large-scale assimilation. Most Chinese were reluctant to be converted to Islam. In the Philippines, the Spanish colonial government was uncompromising in forcing Chinese to become Catholic if they wanted to settle and own land and this led to the rise of a sizeable assimilated community of Chinese descent. Many Chinese men left their wives and children behind in China and married local Filipino

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women, converted to Catholicism and produced stable mestizo families. In Thailand, new policies in the twentieth century required all Chinese to learn Thai and adopt Thai names or face discrimination. The Buddhism practised there was not a barrier to assimilation. For Indians, it was very different. Indian migration to Southeast Asia was fairly continuous over a long period of time, but their numbers were never large in most parts of the region. The bulk of the Indians arriving as labourers during the colonial period were concentrated in Malaya and Burma. Unlike the Chinese, Indian migrants were perceived as no threat to local interests. No alarm was raised about their presence and nobody really noticed them much. The well-educated young Indians who later went to the West did so without much publicity until their remarkable success in IT and financial business. For example, some Americans only woke up to the presence of Indians in their country as a result of an incident linked to the beginnings of outsourcing. When an Indian group won the tender for operating a parking system in Washington D.C. by outsourcing it to villages in Tamil Nadu, India, Americans took notice of them. They were surprised that this Indian group could take up the tender at a low cost simply by using computers in Tamil Nadu to manage the actual operation of the parking system. Unlike the Chinese, the Indians did not undergo any assimilation process in the countries of their adoption. On the whole, Indians remained more Indian and distinct than Chinese. For example, in Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad and Malaysia, they remained staunchly Indian. There was some inter-marriage, but on the whole, Indians seem to have withstood better the pressure to assimilate. One of the reasons why the requirement to assimilate was not strong on Indians was because, unlike the Chinese, they were not considered a threat in the countries of their adoption.

RISE OF INDIA What is the meaning of “rise of India”? Politically, India might only exert a mild influence. However, economically and especially in the development of the software industry, India is expected to have a great impact. Indians will have the edge over others for the next decade or so. Their creative ideas, their mastery of the English language and the globalized structures have given them an advantage in the development of the software industry that is linked to the provision of services in the information industry, communications, financial and networking services. No other Asian group has mastered the intricacies and development of the software industry like the Indians. While Indians dominate in the software industry, they lag behind Japan,

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Korea, China and Taiwan in manufacturing. India has its share of large manufacturing establishments such as Tata and Birla, but they are small in comparison to other multinational corporations. Lack of encouragement from the Indian government is obvious insofar as the Indian manufacturing sector is concerned. The Indian bureaucracy is mainly responsible for the lag in the development of the manufacturing sector. While Indians cannot compete with China when it comes to manufacturing, the Chinese also recognize that they cannot excel in the development of the software industry as the Indians have. The rise of India might also give further importance to the spread of Indian culture globally. Although the Indian diaspora is smaller than the Chinese, the cultural products they brought from India have been attractive in many Asian countries. Today many have learnt to enjoy and appreciate their culture, for example, Indian music, dance and their films, have become very popular everywhere. It is widely recognized that Indian music and dance are among the best in the world. With the rise of India, its films, music and dance will add a powerful dimension to the diaspora’s influence wherever they live.

INDIAN COMMUNITIES The number of Indians in Southeast Asia is small in comparison with the Chinese. It is the large presence of Chinese and their high economic profile that renders them suspect in the eyes of the governments of Southeast Asia. Indians are largely marginalized partly because they are small in number and they pose no threat to anyone. In the Indian communities, those that are marginalized are those who are poor and illiterate. Those working in the plantations and agricultural sectors are still poor and have low educational achievements. However, those South Asians who have acquired education have done well. Man for man, per capita, Indians have done much better than the Chinese. Those educated have taken advantage of their skills and talents and have moved ahead. Those in the depressed groups, in the lower end of the caste or social hierarchy and those without access to education, however, have not seen the benefits of progress. Indians are hardworking people, but if they are not talented enough or not socially adjusted due to their caste system, they might not have many options. Indians are marginalized not because they are perceived as threats, but because they have been forgotten by society in general, even by some of their leaders. Unlike the Indians, the early Chinese migrants did not come to Southeast Asia as groups of people to stay together forever. They came basically as

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individuals without family connections. Because of their large numbers, they were considered a threat. In order to survive, they often moved about and adapted themselves to different situations. Being highly individualistic and enterprising, many made money. It was very competitive and those who went into business and were not smart enough could also be very poor. The Chinese mobility was not related to their caste or educational background. It was a question of individual response to differing situations and looking for the best way they could survive and prosper. For most Chinese abroad, the attitude was that the smart ones would make it whereas the not so smart would not. That is the norm, the way the world works once you leave your home country to become a migrant. India has done very little to make a difference in the lives of Indians overseas as compared to the way China tried to protect its diaspora during the first half of the twentieth century. Partly because India consists of so many diverse communities, there has never been any overarching organization to influence the diaspora the way China tried to influence its diaspora communities. Unlike India, China is a unitary state. It always tries to present a consistent policy to deal with the diaspora globally. India is messy and untidy, but this helps its image. Because of the amorphous nature of the government, the country is not considered a threat to anyone. The perception of a united and strong China gaining ground arouses the sense of threat and can even appear alarming. It was only during the time of civil wars when China was fragmented and poverty-stricken that it was not considered a threat. So this is the paradox that China and the Chinese face, but it does not apply to India and the Indians in East Asia.

FUTURE TRENDS The perception of China as a threat goes back a long way and was largely in the Western imagination and often even smacks of paranoia. The West has used that perception for its own purposes even when there was not the slightest basis for fear. There were civil wars in China and the Chinese were killing one another right up to 1949. When China was fragmented and fought civil wars during the century from the 1850s to 1949, there was really nothing to be afraid of. If we look at Chinese migration, it was mainly confined to Southeast Asia. Yet, despite the geographical limits to Chinese migration, there was anti-Chinese bashing in the United States and elsewhere where the Europeans had built their colonies. The state of California came out with a virulent anti-Chinese policy. And it was this exaggerated fear of Chinese that gave rise to the notion of “Yellow Peril”. That notion of

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“Yellow Peril” was invoked to contain Chinese labour migration in countries like the United States, Canada and Australia. Ironically, opposition to Chinese labour emanated from trade unions that were more anti-Chinese than capitalist employers who were often more ready to accept the flow of Chinese labour on the grounds of lower costs. Anti-Chinese opposition came from places where there existed powerful trade unions. This opposition was not necessarily racist, though race was also a factor. Very often, it was an expression of the interests of white workers who wanted to maintain their bargaining position against the capitalists. For trade unions, the coming of Chinese or others was usually interpreted as moves to weaken the established place of labour vis-à-vis the employers. The prospect of Chinese labour taking on jobs at lower rates was perceived as helping employers, who were quick to use low wage strategies to keep costs down, to bypass the trade unions. Such a development always gave trade unions cause for alarm and occasionally ended with violent acts against Chinese labour in general. In the United States, the Democrats have had a tradition of being more anti-Chinese than the Republicans, as part of the practice of protecting jobs and wage rates for Americans, in short, labour protectionism. In this regard, it would be difficult to say who is progressive and who is not. In the case of the United Kingdom, Margaret Thatcher fought and defeated the entrenched coalmine workers to try and make British industry more competitive. By checking the power of trade unionism, Thatcher helped to revive sagging British industrial performance. By doing so, British businessmen and entrepreneurs benefited from Thatcher’s industrial relations policies. Here, it would be difficult to argue that trade unionism was progressive because it had become an obstacle to the growth and expansion of the economy. As Mao Zedong suggested, if you are always more left than everyone else, the chances are that you will go full circle and become a “rightist”. When Deng Xiaoping launched China’s modernization drive, those who supported Mao’s extreme left political line came to be seen as conservative, even reactionary. They were the former revolutionaries who were saying “we don’t want change”.

CONCLUSION An Asia in which both China and India are rising faces many challenges. One of them concerns the policies these two countries will now make towards their people who have moved overseas, including those who have settled outside for generations. This can be taken together with the attitudes that the Chinese and Indian overseas are likely to have towards countries that

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are no longer so poor that both their Chinese and Indian ancestors had chosen to stay away permanently. Where Southeast Asia is concerned, the position of India and those of Indian descent will never be as acute as that of China and those of Chinese descent. Because of this, Indians will have more room to manoeuvre while Chinese will have to be more sensitive and careful for a long time to come. The added advantage that Indians will have because their people are more evenly spread globally and much more proficient in a truly internationalized English language, should also be taken into account. It would be interesting to see if the two sets of diaspora will learn from each other’s advantages and weaknesses. It would indeed be a great pity if either group should think each is exceptional and that nothing could be gained from studying the other’s rich historical experiences.

Note The chapter is based on the discussion Professor Wang Gungwu had with the editors of the volume on 23 October 2006.

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2 INDIANS AND THE COLONIAL DIASPORA Marina Carter INTRODUCTION Indian migration in the colonial period is chiefly identified with the massive exportation of labour throughout the British Empire, in the hundred years after the abolition of slavery. The figures, in order of numerical importance, are approximately as follows: Ceylon, 2,321,000; Malaya 1,911,000; Burma 1,164,000; Mauritius 455,000; British Guiana 239,000; Trinidad 150,000; Natal 153,000; French Caribbean 79,000; Reunion 75,000; Fiji 61,000; East Africa 39,500, Jamaica 39,000; Dutch Guiana 35,000; other BWI 11,000.1 Of these, by far the largest number were plantation labourers, and it is they, the migrant “coolies”, who have come to typify the colonial Indian labour diaspora. Less well known are the Indian slaves, lascars and convicts who criss-crossed the seas in the service of the Dutch and French, as well as British men and women in this and the preceding two centuries. These labour flows, moreover, were accompanied by significant migration of capital, and of service personnel. For example, it is estimated that approximately 5 per cent or around 1.5 million individuals left India during the nineteenth century to engage in commerce.2 While these migrations have resulted in the establishment of settled populations of Indian origin around the world, it is worth remembering that this was chiefly a circular migration since three quarters of all those who left, returned to India [some twenty four out of thirty million]. The term diaspora, itself, seems oddly inappropriate to describe a movement of people so heterogeneous — spanning as it does, 12

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life histories as diverse as that of slaves at the Dutch Cape, mutineer sepoys in the Andamans, sugar workers in Fiji, Gujarati merchants in East Africa, taxi drivers in the Gulf States, and IT consultants in the United States. This chapter explores the historiography of one facet of this broader diaspora — that of colonial Indian labour and suggests some general themes and linkages spanning the historical and contemporary migration streams.

THE INDIAN SLAVE DIASPORA The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the slave diaspora which serves as a metaphor for the fragmentation, and regionalization, of the historiography of colonial Indian migration. The Dutch Indian Ocean slave trade was “urban-centered, drawing captive labour from three interlocking and overlapping circuits or subregions”, ‘Greater South Africa’, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Most slaves were acquired through purchase from local suppliers so that the trade itself was grafted onto pre-existing traditions of slavery and dependency within the subcontinent.3 The South Asian trade, stresses Arasaratnam, was largely fuelled by the destitute selling themselves or by conquest in war or kidnapping, so that a combination of food crises and political instability offered favourable conditions for slave traders.4 It has been estimated that the Dutch exported between 26,000 to 38,000 Indian slaves to their settlements on Batavia, Ceylon, Malacca and the Cape during the eighteenth century.5 South African historians have calculated that more than a quarter of the approximately 63,000 slaves imported to the Cape alone between 1652 and 1808 were from India, so this figure may have to be revised upwards.6 Research in the Cape archives has also revealed that almost half of the slaves had been recruited from northern India.7 In the eighteenth century, the French settlement and development of the southwest Indian Ocean Mascarene islands produced a more intensive mobilization of slave labour. It has been estimated that some 20,800 slaves of Indian origin were transported to the Mascarenes over the course of the eighteenth century. Allen’s more recent figures demonstrate that between 15,000 and 18,000 Indian slaves were shipped to Mauritius and Reunion between 1770–1810 alone.8 It is a matter of regret that outside a sprinkling of regional studies and one or two review articles, the Indian slave trade around the Indian Ocean between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries has attracted little attention from historians. A deeper understanding of the mobilization, transportation and role of Indian slaves is likely to yield further clues to the spatial mobility of Indians in the early colonial period, and to new

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understandings of the diversity and origins of early Indian populations in a number of Indian Ocean rim states.9 Certainly, the present trend in the literature to treat the contemporaneous migrations of subaltern Indians as separate and distinct, acts as a brake on investigation of the interactions between these groups. This is particularly important in the Indian Ocean where, unlike the Atlantic world, Europeans were, at least initially, “colonizers without a strong cultural impact”.10 And even their direct interventions in the creation of labour migration streams were considerably diluted, in the Indian Ocean context, by the admixture of a strong dose of Indian mercantile activity.11

THE INDIAN CONVICT DIASPORA As Indrani Chatterjee has shown in her path-breaking study on slavery in India, in a single lifetime, a slave could inhabit numerous roles. Her story of Komaree is that of a woman who occupies the positions of concubine, wife, trader, mother and slave-holder.12 Similarly, her in-depth study of Dean Mahomed, which reveals how a boy sold into slavery as a result of famine could seamlessly cross into the category of sepoy and later become absorbed into European society, presents an unusual, but by no means unique trajectory.13 Conversely, as examples from the diaspora demonstrate, sepoys or lascars might all too easily find themselves sold as slaves once they strayed beyond the relative comfort zone of an East India Company ship, or barracks, while it was not an uncommon practice for Indian convicts to be transported as slaves.14 A brief foray into the world of the convict transportee further underscores the remarkable socio-economic fluidity of the migrant Indian, even in the case of these penal settlers. Around 80,000 Indian convicts were shipped to work in newer colonial acquisitions across the Indian Ocean, mostly in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, notably to Benkulu (1787–1825), Penang (Prince of Wales Island) (1790–1860), Malacca and Singapore (1825–60), the Burmese provinces of Arakan and Tenasserim (1828–62), to the Andamans after the 1857 rebellion, and to Mauritius (1815–37).15 Yang has remarked on the tendency of convicts in Southeast Asia to characterize themselves as Company ke naukar (servants of the company), thereby opting to “define themselves as workers, as men who were engaged in the service of the East India Company rather than as bandwars (prisoners)”. As he points out, this could suggest something akin to a sepoy — that is, a person in the long-distance service of the British East India Company army, or a migrant labourer.16 That this was considered an honourable

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occupation is apparent from the evidence of early indentured labourers who were invariably informed that they were being recruited into the “company’s service”. To give one example, Maunick, a sepoy formerly of the “Indre ka pultun (52d N.I.)” who was recruited to serve as an indentured labourer for Mauritius, commented that he had decided to migrate in the belief that he was continuing in the service of the British “sahib log ka kotee” [government or company work]. The misleading notices posted by British Indian emigration officials in the pay of the overseas colonies at major Indian ports strengthened this impression. In 1852, for example, the Emigration Agent of Mauritius at Madras circulated a notice in the Tamil and Telegu languages which asserted that recruits could earn good pay, and be well fed, housed and clothed at Mauritius, thereby being able to save all the wages earned over five years, with a free return passage at the end of that time. The notice concluded: “These are the advantages that a kind Government secures to all those who are desirous to proceed to the Mauritius, and emigrants are strongly advised to select this colony rather than the foreign settlement of Bourbon where the Honourable Company cannot look after their interests.”17 Whilst the indenture on a sugar estate may not have been exactly what such sepoys or privileged servants were anticipating, for the convicts in Southeast Asia, their self-elevation to “company employees” was not necessarily unrealistic. The frontier economies to which they migrated had great need of their services; they soon became “vital members of the workforce in the rising outposts of the British Empire in Southeast Asia”.18 Recent research has revealed the extent to which convicts were aware of conditions prevailing in the various settlements. For example, Anderson describes one incident wherein a group of convicts withdrew a petition to have their sentences commuted to transportation upon learning that their destination was Burma rather than Singapore. This knowledge was enhanced by “frequent shipping links between Southeast Asia and the Indian mainland”, and “prodigious letter writing” between convicts and their families.19 Furthermore, in Southeast Asia, as in Mauritius, many stayed on beyond the terms of their transportation and blended into the plural societies to which they had been sent. Thus the descendants of convicts are undoubtedly represented in the Jawi Pekan, or Indo-Malay community, in modern Malaysia. These findings serve to underscore points of comparison between the various streams of subaltern Indian migration. Path-breaking research on the migrant Indian convicts serves, above all, to demonstrate the facility with which convicts could interact with and integrate into coexisting communities of non-convict Indians.20

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INDENTURED MIGRATION New understandings and insights into the lives of Indian slaves and convicts have been derived from a closer study of self-projected identities of migrants. Of course, the success of such projections in the wider society was dependent to a great extent on changing local economic realities. Thus, for most types of labour migrant, positive evaluations of host societies were generally related to appreciations of their “value” vis-à-vis locally obtainable labour. In frontier type situations, when local labour was scarce or applied with difficulty to cash crop production, the virtues and productivity of externally sourced workers was highlighted. As Kale has noted, in the context of indentured migration in the Caribbean, “Indian working men were extolled for their docility, industriousness and respect for the sanctity of contracts … Once Indian workers were on the plantations, and with time, planters’ and administrators’ praises were leavened with distaste and dissatisfaction.”21 Anderson has also charted the emerging doubts about “the productivity of convict workers” which coincided with the mass arrival of indentured labour on Mauritius, and led to the collapse of the transportation system within only a few years of the arrival of the new recruits.22 Conversely, in Burma, the demand for Indian convicts remained high long after more developed settlements in Singapore and Mauritius had ceased to request them. Where colonial economies could acquire so-called “free” Indian labour, at acceptably low rates of pay, their importation was undeniably more attractive, avoiding as it did the anxieties of employing former criminals and — for the ex slave plantation colonies — the stigma of importing a servile workforce. Colonial presses played a large part in the circulation of such favourable or negative stereotypes. Thus, the Singapore Free Press’ campaign to end the Indian convict system, claiming that “the very dregs of the population” were transported there, helped to play a part in the cessation of that particular migration stream.23 Such stereotypes often bore little resemblance to unfolding realities, as for example, the assertion of a British Indian official that Indian labour migration was more popular than that of the Chinese because “A Chinaman’s idea is to serve till he has saved sufficient to start himself as an independent rival to the planter. The Indian coolie’s aspirations…seldom rise beyond his being a well-paid coolie servant, and nothing more.”24 Nonetheless, the salient point that unfavourable experiments with unsuitable Chinese labour contrasted with satisfactory results obtained from imported Indian workers, certainly went a long way towards explaining the preference shown by employers for one migration

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stream over another. Stereotyping could also be extended to migrants from specific regions within India, producing marked differences in recruiting patterns, which led, for example, to a concentration of North Indians in migration to Fiji, as compared with, say, a more significant migration of South Indians to the French colony of Reunion. The meaningless and fundamentally mendacious character of such assertions did not detract from their power within specific historical conditions. The force of negative stereotyping is most evident in the realm of gender. While the male overseas Indian labourer was generally considered — by British officials — to have been bettered by his migration, especially in the New World where his deliverance from the “intolerable yoke and curse of caste”, that is, his exposure to Western ways, lifted him from a condition of oriental subservience to a more manly demeanour, the woman migrant became “a rudderless vessel” exposed to the worst male excesses.25 Significantly, the Indian nationalist movement chose to emphasize and build, one-sidedly, only upon the negative stereotypes engendered about the overseas labour migrant. Gopal Krishna Gokhale enshrined and refined an enduring misconception of the “coolie” migrant as “simple, ignorant, illiterate, resourceless”, chillingly replicating a racist and misogynist colonial discourse with the claim that “very few respectable women can be got to go these long distances”. The real purpose of the anti-indenture rant becomes clear with these lines: “Wherever the system exists, there the Indians are only known as coolies, no matter what their position might be.”26 The negative connotations of the “coolie trade” have remained remarkably persistent and continue to inform current perceptions of and divisions within the South Asian diaspora for whom neither the reclamation of the “white convict” heritage by modern-day Australians, nor the “negritude” movement in the French Caribbean has evoked any significant parallel discourse. The stereotype of the Fijian “girmit”, tricked into migrating, and despairing at the brutality and violence of plantation life, generated by “autobiographical” accounts circulated during the nationalist period, remains a powerful popular symbol of the indentured Indian. Certainly, the penal sanctions enshrined in indenture contracts, the fixed low wages, and poor living standards on plantations — conditions that endured well into the twentieth century in the sugar colonies — invest the image of the downtrodden “coolie” with undeniable force. At the same time, the circulatory movements characteristic of inter-Asian migrations reveal a degree of subaltern agency which had been overlooked in earlier studies.27 In some Indian Ocean states, traditional distinctions between “indentured” and “kangany” migration are belied by high rates of circularity and kin or

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village-based regroupment, while recent research incorporating the more distant migrations of Indian labour to the Caribbean and Pacific has also stressed that “most indentured emigrants (like free immigrants from Europe) voluntarily chose to endure temporary hardships in hope of a better life. It is that frame of mind that separates them from the involuntary recruitment and permanent legal coercion of slavery.”28

COLONIAL INDIAN LABOUR MIGRANTS: REWRITING SUBALTERN AGENCY INTO GLOBAL CAPITALISM The influence of imperial/nationalist rhetoric over modern Indian historiography is exemplified, paradoxically, in some of the work of the so-called subaltern school. Ghosh, for example, unintentionally parodies the discourse of nineteenth century reformers in his assessment of “evil and unscrupulous” labour recruiters engaging in multiple fraud to lure adivasi labour at the behest of home-grown and distant capitalists. The emphasis, in this and similar studies, is on a capital-driven labour mobilization with little room for manoeuvre or manipulation on the part of the subalterns. He quotes from a contemporary source to the effect that “every proprietor [in western Bengal] is collecting husbandmen from the hills [Santal Parganas] to improve his lowlands” and discredits the notion of traditions of long distance migration to focus on deception theory as a primary explanation for the nineteenth century tribal migration streams.29 Yet some of the very sources he cites, provide ample evidence of semi-independent recruitment networks among adivasis.30 In similar vein, studies of migrant workers in India have stressed the exploitative role of the sardar/kangany recruiter. Thus Tanika Sarkar focuses on the highly personalized oppression of the sardar rooted in “patronage functions, his caste and kinship connections” while Dipesh Chakrabarty denies to the jute worker even an incipient stirring of class interest, asserting that he “remained prisoner of pre-capitalist culture; the class identity of worker could never be distilled out of the pre-capitalist identities that arose from the relationships he had been born into”.31 Conversely, Subho Basu’s research on factory workers in Calcutta reinforces the evidence of migratory networks existing for and by themselves, while de Haan’s complementary study argues for a subtler understanding of the sardar’s function and a greater role for “selectivity” on the part of migrants themselves.32 A number of micro-level studies have also shed significant light on the development of migratory traditions within a particular region, and across categories of military and labour recruitment. Yang’s work on

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Saran district in Bihar, for example, highlights a major tradition of sepoy recruitment which fed into various types of subsequent migration, including seasonal work and overseas indenture. He concludes that the rural migrant displayed considerable skill and sophistication in his migratory choices: “Whether he moved, where he went, and what he did all testify to his capacity to operate under some degree of risk and uncertainty in order to create a safe investment.”33 Most significantly, Yamin’s detailed study of the district of Ratnagiri in Maharashtra demonstrates the development of a tradition of military service for local native rulers, which was later translated into enlistments for the British army, and into the recruitment of migrants to the overseas colonies. The coastal location of the district helped to foster traditions of service as lascars which in turn helped to sponsor migratory traditions associated with particular families. Interestingly, she has uncovered continuities into the modern period, providing case studies of Muslim families with links to South Africa as recently as the 1970s. She found little evidence for the role of intermediary contractors in these migratory trends, placing emphasis instead on forms of chain migration.34 The importance of these studies is the suggestion that micro-level traditions of migration help to determine the take-up of a wide variety of migratory options. Thus, where opportunities were available, it was possible for individuals, kin and village groups to develop familiarity with a range of destinations and types of labour. Rather than separating the migration to various destinations according to sometimes misleading categories, that is, “kangany”, “sirdari”, or “arkati ”-led recruitment streams, therefore, it is worth considering links between particular regions and broader trends of overseas migration, rather as studies of Mirpuri migration to the UK and Hyderabadi migration to a number of destinations have demonstrated for the modern period.35 In the same way, historical studies of Indian settlement in a particular colony can serve the broader use of illuminating aspects of migratory trends which apply across a range of destinations. Thus Peebles’ reappraisal of the role of the kangany for the “plantation Tamils” in Sri Lanka bears striking similarities to the experience of sirdari recruitment in Mauritius and the Caribbean. As he points out, “since one in eight plantation Tamils was a kangany, the possibility of becoming a kangany was a real one for labourers. Anyone who could return to India and bring back labourers or who was chosen to supervise others became a kangany and had a substantially higher income.” Further, his analysis of the ambivalent attitude of the planters towards the kanganies, and the ambiguity of their own position vis-à-vis plantation management and the labourers in their gangs, is directly applicable

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to the role of the sirdar in the indentured-labour colonies. 36 Increasing documentary evidence of contacts between families in distant locations, such as the Caribbean, with India, and the perusal of letters written by overseas labourers underscores further the commonality of first-generation migrants’ self-perceptions and ambitions. Most pioneer settlers regarded themselves as transients, who would return to India after a period of service abroad, and therefore had a keen interest in establishing and maintaining networks of contact with families at home, in order to keep abreast of developments. Such networks were kept alive by the employment of literate Indians as scribes, via the remittance system, and through the circulation of returning migrants and recruiters.37

THE SOUTH ASIAN DIASPORA: REDRAWING THE BOUNDARIES OF A FRAGMENTED HISTORY The preceding discussion has sought to draw together the threads of research into categories of colonial labour migrant that have traditionally been divided by custom and practice in the historiography, and to highlight continuities between them. This section makes a brief appraisal of the Indian mercantile diaspora and the modern migration flows of South Asians across categories and destinations to suggest further links and cross-fertilizations for what has been and remains an extremely fragmented history. Recent studies of the wide dispersal and commercial significance of the South Asian trade diaspora have made great strides towards the re-visualization of world history through less Eurocentric eyes.38 Markovits’ account of Sindhi migration, however, stresses that the life-histories of these merchants suggest circular movements rather than a “diaspora”, a term which, he feels, is not compatible with “transiency” and “sojourning”. Nevertheless Markovits’ work serves to inform the diaspora debate, arguing, for example, that the habitual division of South Asians overseas into Hindu and Muslim diasporas is less relevant than boundaries rooted in regional identifications. As he explains: “region and locality were much more important in structuring migrants’ identities than religion, which has been given so much prominence in the existing literature. … Migrants from Gujarat, whether they were Hindus, Muslims or Jains, had more in common with each other in their experience of migration than Gujarati Hindus had with Bhojpuri Hindus or Gujarati Muslims with Bhojpuri Muslims.”39 Françoise Vergès’ work provides further pointers for a reassessment of the formation and characteristics of the new diaspora communities. She draws attention to a somewhat understudied

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phenomenon: links between labour and merchant networks, and emphasizes the fluid character of diasporic identities: the regime of indentured work fostered new networks, new maps of memories and identities. … The identities of diasporic groups (Bohra and Karana in Madagascar, Zarabs and Sinwa in Réunion and Mauritius) were in tune with local and regional transformations. Identities were never fixed. The change of occupation and status through generations accounted for the transformation of identities, as well as for whether or not members married outside the group. Colonial and then postcolonial laws also affected their identities.40

Parallels with the nineteenth century labour diaspora are also evident in the modern-day migrations of South Asian workers to the new labour markets of the Persian Gulf. As Karen Leonard’s work reveals, they share in common structured, selective recruitment, a skewed sex ratio — for example male foreign workers in Kuwait outnumber females 225 to 100 — and of course the lure of higher monetary payments than are attainable at home.41 Jain’s study of Indian migrants in Saudi Arabia, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, stresses that most workers are young, unmarried, poorly educated and under-employed. Like the first generation indentured labourers, they view the migration as transitory, intending to stay for a few years, but many remigrate.42 Subject as they are, however, to the stringent citizenship laws of the Gulf, they are unlikely ever to become citizens, although a number of Indian women have married locals. By contrast the professional and business Indian diaspora to the United States and elsewhere has created small enclave communities of extraordinary wealth and importance relative to their size. Studies which attempt to group the disparate elements associated with this dispersal of South Asians across the globe, have been primarily concerned with issues of identity and of identification. Religion and caste have traditionally been seen as powerful identifying features of important segments of the Indian diaspora, but a more inclusive marker is what Singh terms “its collective imagining of India — of emotions, links, traditions, feelings and attachments that together continue to nourish a psychological appeal among successive generations of emigrants for the ‘mother’ country”. Singh suggests that this imagining is capable of “fostering a powerful transnationalism that can articulate the predicament of overseas Indian communities”. He finds its echo in events as diverse as “creative sites for ethnic mobilisation in Trinidad, a cultural renaissance in South Africa, a redefinition of identities in Mauritius,

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and new departures for the votaries of Hindutva in Europe and North America”.43 Shukla draws upon recent research highlighting transformations in South Asian culture in diaspora communities in Trinidad, South Africa and Mauritius, to emphasize the value of theoretical concepts like “hybridity” in defining these societies.44

CONCLUSION The classification of a South Asian in both the colonial and the contemporary period still has much to do with the routes and temporality of the diasporic movement but as this chapter has shown, diversity and agency are key features of migrations past and present. Developing parallels between the experiences of slaves, sepoys, lascars and coolies are strongly suggestive of the need to adopt a more comparative approach to the study of the mobilization of Indian labour and settlement overseas in the colonial period. It has been well said that while colonialism was usually dominant, it was not necessarily hegemonic, and while much has been made of recent declarations in the United Kingdom that “chicken tikka masala” is now the British national dish, D.M. Singh has pointed out, in the case of Australia, in the early years of the nineteenth century, “People wore Bengal cottons and clothes; and Bengal rice, flour and salted meat fed the convicts, marines and free settlers for months on end. Bengal rum, reputed to be more potent than the Jamaican, became Australia’s first national drink, as well as an occasional national currency.”45 This suggests a need to look back upon the colonial period with a different gaze. The built heritage of the Indian convict in Singapore: Government House, the Mariamman Temple, and Singapore’s St. Andrew’s Cathedral — “entirely built with convict labour and one of the finest specimens of ecclesiastical architecture which I had seen in the East” — according to F.J. Mouat, serves as just one example of many, which can reclaim for the lowly immigrant worker a new meaning and importance.46 Finally, as the work of Markovits among others has demonstrated, simply because a migratory network — like that of Indian merchants — operated outside the purview or interest of the colonial state, does not mean that it should be ignored: the knowledge colonial administrators had of economic and social realities could be very partial. The result is that what does not figure in colonial discourse is deemed unimportant or even non-existent. As the British did not produce a coherent discourse on Indian merchant diasporas, about which they knew little and cared even less, except in

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very specific contexts, these diasporas have been almost obliterated from the historical record.47

Similarly, the search for subaltern aspirations, agendas and agency, generally absent from the colonial discourse, can offer an important new dimension to our understanding of historical diasporas.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

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S. Bose, A Hundred Horizons: The Indian Ocean in the Age of Global Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), pp. 76–77. Claude Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750–1947: Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005), pp. 17–18. M. Vink, “The World’s Oldest Trade: Dutch Slavery and Slave Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century”, Journal of World History 14, no. 2 (June 2003): 131–77. S. Arasaratnam, “Slave Trade in the Indian Ocean in the Seventeenth Century”, in Mariners, Merchants and Oceans: Studies in Maritime History, edited by K.S. Mathew (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995), pp. 195–208. R.B. Allen, “Carrying away the Unfortunate: The Exportation of Slaves from India during the late Eighteenth Century”, in Le Monde Créole: Peuplement, Sociétés et Condition Humaine, XVIIe-XXe siècles, edited by J. Weber (Paris: Les Indes Savantes, 2005). R. Shell, Children of Bondage: A Social History of the Slave Society at the Cape of Good Hope, 1652–1838 (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 2001). A survey of 3,283 slaves at the Cape found 36 per cent to be from India: chiefly from Bengal [including Bihar and Orissa] — 498, while 378 were from the Malabar coast — chiefly Goa, Bombay and Surat, and 271 from the several port towns along the Coromandel coast. E.S. Reddy, “India and South Africa”, Occasional Papers Series No. 1, The University of Durban-Westville, Durban. 1991. J.M. Filliot, La Traite des Esclaves vers les Mascareignes au XVIIIe Siècle (Paris, 1974), p. 69; R.B. Allen, “Carrying away the Unfortunate”, op. cit. M. Carter, “Slavery and Unfree Labour in the Indian Ocean”, History Compass 4, no. 5 (2006): 800–13. G. Oostindie, “Dutch Attitudes Towards Colonial Empires, Indigenous Cultures, and Slaves”, Eighteenth-Century Studies 31, no. 3 (Spring 1998). For the involvement of banians in the African slave trade, see P. Machado, “A Forgotten Corner of the Indian Ocean: Gujarati Merchants, Portuguese India and the Mozambique Slave Trade, c. 1730–1830”, Slavery and Abolition 24, no. 2 (2003): 17–32, and for the activities of Indian merchants in the Indian slave trade see Arasaratnam (1995), op. cit., pp. 201–03.

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24 12

13

14

15

16

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18 19

20

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22 23

24

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I. Chatterjee, Gender, Slavery and Law in Colonial India (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). ———, “A Slave’s Quest for Selfhood in 18th Century Hindustan”, IESHR xxxvii no. 1 (2000). C. Bates and M. Carter, “Enslaved Lives, Enslaving Labels: Reinterpreting the Colonial Indian Labour Diaspora”, in S. Banerjee, A. McGuinness & S. Mckay, eds, Routing Diasporas (Indiana University Press, 21st Century studies, forthcoming, 2008–09). C. Anderson, “Sepoys, Servants and Settlers: Convict Transportation in the Indian Ocean, 1787–1945”, in Cultures of Confinement: A History of the Prison in Global Perspective, edited by Ian Brown and Frank Dikotter (London: Hurst, 2007). A. Yang, “Indian Convict Workers in Southeast Asia in the Late Eighteenth and Early Nineteenth Centuries”, Journal of World History 24, no. 2 (2003): 183. In the Straits Settlements, convicts reportedly called themselves kumpaee ke naukur, or (East India) Company servants, C. Anderson, Legible Bodies: Race, Criminality and Colonialism in South Asia (Oxford: Berg, 2004), pp. 105–06. M. Carter and Khal Torabully, Coolitude: An Anthology of Indian Labour Diaspora (London: Anthem Press, 2002). Yang, Indian Convict Workers, op. cit., p. 199. C. Anderson, “The Politics of Convict Space: Indian Penal Settlements and the Andaman Islands”, in Isolation: Places and Practices of Exclusion, edited by Alison Bashford and Carolyn Strange (London: Routledge, 2003), p. 44. ———, Convicts in the Indian Ocean: Transportation from South Asia to Mauritius, 1815–1853 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000). See also Rajesh Rai, “Sepoys, Convicts and the ‘Bazaar’ Contingent: The Emergence and Exclusion of ‘Hindustani’ Pioneers at the Singapore Frontier”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, no. 1 (2004): 1–19. M. Kale, Fragments of Empire: Capital, Slavery, and Indian Indentured Labor Migration in the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: Univ. Penn. Press, 1998), pp. 144–45. C. Anderson, Sepoys, Servants and Settlers, op. cit. C.M. Turnbull, A History of Singapore, 1819–1988 (Oxford: OUP, 1996), p. 55, quoted in Anderson, “Sepoys, Servants and Settlers”, op. cit. IOLR Report on Colonial Emigration from the Bengal Presidency, 1883, p. 6. Friend of India of 23 September 1852; B.V. Lal, “Veil of Dishonour: Sexual Jealousy and Suicide on Fiji Plantations”, Journal of Pacific History 20, no. 3 (1985): 135–55. M. Carter and Khal Torabully, Coolitude, op. cit., ch. 2. Patrick Peebles, Plantation Tamils of Ceylon (Leicester: University of Leicester Press, 2001); M. Roberts, “Indian Immigrant Plantation Workers”, Indian Economic and Social History Review 26, no. 3 (1989). Kaur’s chapter in this

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29

30

31

32

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36 37

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volume provides a useful overview of colonial trans-Asian Indian labour migration. M. Carter, Servants, Sirdars and Settlers: Indians in Mauritius, 1834–1874 (New Delhi: OUP, 1994); M. Carter, Voices from Indenture: Experiences of Indian Migrants in the British Empire (Leicester University Press, 1996); D. Northrup, “Free and Unfree Labor Migration, 1600–1900: An Introduction”, Journal of World History 24, no. 2 (2003): 125–30. K. Ghosh, “A Market for Aboriginality: Primitivism and Race Classification in the Indentured Labour Market of Colonial India”, in Subaltern Studies No. 10 Writings on South Asian History and Society, edited by G. Bhadra et al. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 38–48. C. Bates and M. Carter, “Tribal Migration in India and Beyond”, in The World of the Rural Labourer in Colonial India, edited by G. Prakash (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1992). T. Sarkar, Bengal 1928–1934 The Politics of Protest (New Delhi: OUP, 1987), pp. 65–66; D. Chakrabarty, Rethinking Working-class History: Bengal 1890–1940 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 218. S. Basu, Does Class Matter?: Colonial Capital and Workers’ Resistance in Bengal, 1890–1937 (New Delhi, OUP India, 2004); Arjan de Haan, Unsettled Settlers: Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta (Calcutta: K.P. Bagchi, 1996), pp. 63, 81–115. A.A. Yang, “Peasants on the Move: A Study of Internal Migration in India”, Journal of Interdisciplinary History 10, no. 1 (Summer 1979): 37–58. G. Yamin, “The Character and Origins of Labour Migration from Ratnagiri District, 1840–1920”, South Asia Research 9, no. 1 (May 1989): 36–50. See, for example the articles by Leonard and others in Community, Empire and Migration: South Asians in Diaspora, edited by C. Bates. (London: Palgrave, 2001). P. Peebles, The Plantation Tamils of Ceylon (Leicester: LUP, 2001), pp. 34–38. B. Samaroo, “The Indian Connection” in India in the Caibbean, edited by D. Dabydeen, pp. 43–60, Hansib, 1987; Chew, E.C.T. and E. Lee, A History of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 244–46. S. Levi, The Indian Diaspora in Central Asia and Its Trade 1550–1900 (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 2002). C. Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, 1750–1947. Traders of Sind from Bukhara to Panama (CUP, 2000), pp. 4–6. F. Vergès, “Writing on Water: Peripheries, Flows, Capital, and Struggles in the Indian Ocean”, Positions: East Asia Cultures Critique 11, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 241–57. The chapters by Salazar, Devare and Mani among others in this volume offer valuable comparative insights into the integration of Indian minorities across a range of East Asian states. K. Leonard, “South Asians in the Indian Ocean World: Language, Policing, and Gender Practices in Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates”, Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East 25, no. 3 (2005): 677–86.

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26 42

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46

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P.C. Jain, “Culture and Economy in an ‘Incipient’ Diaspora: Indians in the Persian Gulf region”, in Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora, by B. Parekh, G. Singh, and S. Vertevoc (London: Routledge, 2003) pp. 103–22. Introduction, by G. Singh, in Parekh, Singh, and Vertevoc, Culture and Economy, op. cit., p. 4. S. Shukla, “Locations for South Asian Diasporas”, Annual Review of Anthropology 30 (2001): 551–72. D.M. Singh, “Indians in Australia” in Asia Annual, edited by M. Singh, pp. 150– 51 (Kolkata: Shipra, 2003). Mouat, “On Prison Ethics and Prison Labour”, p. 232, quoted in C. Anderson, “Sepoys, Servants and Settlers”, op. cit.; Yang, “Indian Convict Workers”, op. cit. Latif ’s chapter in this volume provides further information about convict labour in Singapore. C. Markovits, The Global World of Indian Merchants, op. cit., p. 29.

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3 THE MOVEMENT OF INDIANS IN EAST ASIA: CONTEMPORARY AND HISTORICAL ENCOUNTERS Amarjit Kaur In recent years qualitative and quantitative changes in Indian migration have gained the increasing attention of researchers, policymakers and organizations such as the World Bank (WB), the International Labour Office (ILO) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM). This movement of Indians comprises a variety of flows — transient professionals or knowledge workers, skilled permanent migrants, students, unskilled workers and business streams — and the destinations have also broadened. Skilled Indian migration to North America, Europe, Australasia and East Asia is also taking place within regional blocs and policy frameworks have been established to facilitate these migrant flows. In view of the fact that structural relationships facilitating migration have become well-established, most governments today exert greater control over migration through national policies, and bilateral/multilateral agreements. The Indian government, for example, actively encourages emigration as a key instrument to promote national development. The expectation is that both remittances and the experiences and knowledge gained abroad will be used to further India’s own development programmes. Additionally, the Indian government is also relying on the expansion and greater role of transnational networks that link the migrants to both India and the destination countries. 27

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Yet this contemporary movement/migration of Indians in East Asia remains little understood principally because of its recent nature and scarce data. Moreover, the Indian government’s recent initiatives in mobilizing transnational Indian communities to engage in “Rising” India’s development plans also needs to be understood in the context of the colonial era economic structures and historical encounters. Against this backdrop, this chapter first identifies the major significant patterns of Indian movement into East Asia in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and examines the contexts of this movement. This will form the basis for making an assessment of contemporary patterns and the larger chronology of migration flows, and the relevance of diasporic organizations, insofar as it can be established. The second part of the chapter focuses on current Indian movement to East Asia and policy initiatives in destination states. The chapter also discusses the role of the Indian government in promoting cooperation with Indian diasporic communities.

INTRODUCTION The Beginnings Prior to the sixteenth century, Indian migratory movements within the Asian region were relatively small-scale in nature and limited in geographic scope. There was significant mercantile or religious travel involving Indians in the region which predated the arrival of European commercial interests. Indian traders were also prominent in Southeast Asia’s leading regional entrepôts and, although trade was small in volume, it was a source for the transmission of ideas, new products and technologies, and migrants. The Indians (like the Chinese) came from a country with a long history of manufacturing, a monetized economy, and sophisticated commerce. Gujerati and Chulia merchants had been trading with Southeast Asia, exchanging Indian-made textiles for Southeast Asian spices, in a trading network that linked the ports of the Indian sub-continent with others on the eastern shore of the Bay of Bengal, in Burma, Thailand, and the Malay States. Indian political institutions, specifically HinduBuddhist traditions of kingship, were introduced into Southeast Asia by the seventh century A.D., and Indian culture was the dominant external influence in the region in the form of Hindu-Buddhist religious-cultural systems. Significant emigration of Indians to Southeast Asia dates from the late nineteenth century and was consistent with imperial-led globalization and

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the greater integration of Southeast Asia into the international economy. Colonialism also led to the first phase of mass Indian migration and laid the frameworks for a nascent Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, particularly in the British territories of Malaya (Malaysia and Singapore) and Burma (Myanmar). But Indian migrants were a heterogeneous group, divided along lines of class, religion, language group and residential location based on occupational category. Moreover, movement to these territories was essentially an internal movement within the British Empire, and the labour contracts encouraged circulatory movement reinforced by specific legislative provisions, particularly for migration to Malaysia and Singapore. Colonial policies, which were predicated on ethnic differentiation, discouraged permanent settlement and the establishment of a settled diaspora. The ending of empire and the rise of the Malaysian and Singapore nation states in fact put pressure on Indians to make the final transition from sojourning to settlement (Kaur 2006a).

The “New” Globalization and International Migration since 1970 The newly-independent states — Singapore and Malaysia, in common with Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines — embraced the “new” globalization and trade liberalization strategies that emphasized the making of comparative advantage through specific trade policies. These policies were not dependent on natural resource endowment, but rather the creation of low-cost manufacturing advantage. Hence Malaysia and Singapore, traditionally labour-shortage countries, once again turned to migration for labour force growth. The demand for bigger migration programmes for skilled and unskilled labour has thus led to a second “new” phase in Indian migration to these countries. This new phase has coincided with rising India and its role in providing both skilled professionals and outsourcing services. The contemporary economic encounter with India is also premised on cultural identity activities and defining and conceptualizing diasporas within the framework of the Indian community circumstances and settings. The Indian government, on its part, is also focusing on ongoing cooperation with East Asian states in many different fields; membership of the ASEAN and East Asia Summit; free trade agreements; and supporting capacity building and network formation among diaspora associations so as to enhance their ability to undertake investment and development initiatives in India.

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THE MOVEMENT OF INDIANS IN EAST ASIA: HISTORICAL ENCOUNTERS Political and Economic Change in Southeast Asia, 1880s–1940s The expansion of world trade over the period 1840 to 1914, consistent with European industrialization and Western political and economic advances, established the contexts for specific political and economic structures — trade, commercial networks, capital and labour flows — and social and cultural encounters in Southeast Asia. The imperial drive was politically driven by an agenda of competitive state-building overseas and six major Southeast Asian states emerged as colonies, protectorates, or as part of the informal empire of European powers. These were Burma, Malaya (including Singapore), Indonesia, Indochina, the Philippines and Thailand. Economic structures included the spread of the international economy (the demand and expansion of primary products such as tin, rubber and rice, provision of shipping and merchant services); the establishment of Singapore and other colonial ports (which became important outlets for the region’s exports and also functioned as a source of capital); the role of European and Asian (particularly Chinese) enterprise; colonial economic development policies; and the employment of large numbers of migrant workers (to overcome labour shortages). During the colonial period, the region could broadly be divided into “labour-scarce” and “labour-surplus” countries. Malaya was representative of the former while Burma fitted somewhere in a continuum between the two. The colonial administrations sourced labour from within Asia, and principally from China and India. Indians went mainly to Malaya and Burma, the two British colonies in Southeast Asia (Kaur 2004a). Their movement to these countries must thus be viewed through the lens of the larger economic and colonial structures and how this led to the creation of nascent Indian diasporas there.

Indians in Burma and Malaya The acquisition of Burma enabled Britain to secure the eastern defences of India and the territory was administratively and politically governed as part of India. The export demand for Burma’s rice and the rapid expansion of its rice industry coincided with the disruption of rice supplies from Carolina during the American Civil War, the growth in steam navigation,

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and the opening of the Suez Canal, which led to falling transport costs. Burma became the world’s largest rice producer, rice cultivation took on an “industrial” character, and increased production was facilitated by the recruitment of Indian migrant workers. Indian labour was also hired for a myriad of factory and other urban and port occupations, and Burma’s great reliance on Indian migrant labour thus shaped its economic and communal structures. Malaya, on the other hand, was regarded as a strategic gateway to the Pacific. It was administered from Britain and the British preserved the myth that they governed the Malay States on behalf of the Malay rulers. Malaya emerged as the world’s largest exporter of tin and rubber and migrant Chinese and Indian labour played a major role in the production of these commodities. While Chinese dominated the mining labour force, the large-scale entry of Indian labour was associated with the development of the rubber industry. The recruitment of Indian labour involved two separate political entities and necessitated a certain degree of control and regulation by the Indian colonial government (India Office). Nevertheless, there were similarities between Malaya and Burma as well, namely, in the origins of the Indian migrants, methods of recruitment, duration of contracts and labour circulation. The principal Indian migration flows by sea to Burma and Malaya are shown in Figure 3.1. Indian labour migration was consistent with the international division of labour, and involved two other groups in the migratory process: the private labour brokers and other intermediaries who organized travel arrangements and employment, and state officials. Particular labour regimes that relied on the use of sanctions to enforce wage labour agreements, or coercion through intermediaries, were also developed (Kaur 2004a).The causes and circumstances of Indian labour migration to these territories need not detain us here. Suffice it to say that the majority of migrants from India were impoverished, and pushed into migration due to agrarian over-population and pressure on land, exactions by the state, natural calamities and landlord exploitation (see, for example, Kondapi 1951; Sandhu 1969). In both countries unskilled Tamil and Telegu migrants from South India dominated the migrant labour flows. The comparative flows of Indian immigrants to Burma and Malaya for the period 1910–35 are shown in Figure 3.2. As shown in Figure 3.2, Indian emigrant flows to Burma greatly exceeded emigrant flows to Malaya. Burma’s proximity to India and the fact that it was governed as part of India were responsible for the greater number of

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Figure 3.1 Indian Migration Flows

Source: Wage Labour in Southeast Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

Figure 3.2 Burma and Malaya: Comparative Flows of Indian Immigrants, 1910–35 (selected years) 40,000 35,000 30,000 25,000 20,000 15,000 10,000 5,000 0

1910

1915

1920 Burma

1925 Malaya

1930

1935

Source: Based on K.S. Sandhu, Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 157.

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Indians migrating to Burma (Kaur 2006b). Conversely, this proximity was an impediment to greater settlement in Burma.

The Rice Industry and Indians in Burma Three main groups were involved in rice production in Burma: Burmese cultivators, who also processed some of the rice; Indian financiers, field workers and rice mill workers; and European firms, which dominated the processing of rice and its export (Adas 1974). In the mid-1870s Indians were encouraged to migrate both as agriculturalists and as labourers. A substantial number from East Bengal went as agriculturalists to Arakan province. The labour migrants, comprising mainly Tamils and Telegus, were from the poverty-stricken areas of South India and did not have the means to move to Burma. They thus had to rely on intermediaries, namely the recruiting agent (who acted on behalf of the labour contractor); and the labour contractor, known as maistry, in the Telegu districts of South India. The maistry system gradually evolved into a multi-tiered recruitment mechanism and authority system, and abuse and exploitation were enshrined at every level (Kondapi 1951, p. 46). Apart from the maistry recruitment system, shipping companies such as, for example, the British Indian Steam Navigation Company, also acted as labour recruiters, deploying a network of middlemen/intermediaries stationed at port towns in South India. A large proportion of migrants were either free or voluntary workers who paid their own passages or obtained loans from village moneylenders or recruiting agents. Nevertheless, these workers could only obtain employment at their destination through the maistry. Though technically free workers, they became indebted to the maistry, and the maistry system “both curtailed and restricted” the workers’ ability to negotiate better working and living conditions (Satyanarayana 2002, p. 102). The rice production cycle determined the seasonal character of most Indians’ employment. Although some of these workers made a return trip to India annually, they normally worked for a minimum of three years in Burma (Pillai 1947, p. 101). Indians comprised between 4.9 to 6.9 per cent of Burma’s population in the period 1872–1931 as shown in Table 3.1. They were largely concentrated in Lower Burma where they comprised around 11 per cent of the population in 1921 and 1931 (Kaur 2006b). Unregulated Indian migration also meant that there was virtually no supervision of Indian workers’ labour standards in Burma (Kaur 2006a).

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Table 3.1 The Indian Population in Burma, 1872–1931 Census Year

Total Population

Indian Population

Indian % of Population

1872 1881 1891 1901 1911 1921 1931

2,747,148 3,736,771 8,098,014 10,490,624 12,115,217 13,212,192 14,667,146

136,504 243,123 420,830 568,263 743,288 887,077 1,017,825

4.9 6.5 5.1 5.4 6.1 6.7 6.9

Source: James Baxter, Report on Indian Immigration (Rangoon: Government Printer, 1941), p. 5.

Burma’s proximity to India, the preference for male migrants, the varied occupations of the Indians, and seasonality of employment, impacted on Indian sex ratios in Burma. According to Kondapi, the sex ratio varied from 8.2 males to 1 female to as high as 250 males to 1 female, and Indian birth rates in Burma were thus low (1951: 92). The Indian financiers and business groups rarely took their wives with them and, like the labourers, were predominantly a circulatory group. Thus the rotating labour regime and diversity of the Indian business groups worked against the formation of an Indian diaspora in Burma during the colonial period. The Burmese also viewed Indians as interlopers and political activity was further inflamed by the local effects of the world depression. In the 1940s the struggle for independence brought old rivalries and ethnic conflicts into the open, culminating in violence and upheaval and tension increased between the Indian Muslim minority (Rohingyas) in Rakhine (Arakan) and the local Rakhine population. Subsequently, under Burma’s 1982 Citizenship Law, the Rohingyas were declared stateless and faced religious persecution from the military regime. In the 1990s, there was an exodus of the Rohingyas from Rahkine province. Though many returned after UNCHR intervention, others chose not to do so (Human Rights Watch 2000). Thus although the Rohingyas constituted an Indian community, they are in fact caught in a dilemma. The partition of India also meant that they lie “outside” the definition of an Indian diaspora.

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The Rubber Industry and Indians in Malaya Malaya became the largest producer of tin and rubber during the colonial period and both these industries were dependent on Chinese and Indian migrant labour. Specific contract labour systems that relied on the use of sanctions to enforce labour agreements, or coercion through intermediaries, were developed to retain the migrant labour force. Nevertheless, since the demand for migrant labour was tied to world demand for export commodities, colonial authorities largely viewed migrant workers as sojourners, to be repatriated when the demand for their services no longer existed, and particularly during economic downturns. Migrant workers thus, but not always, returned to their countries of origin, following periods of employment in Malaya. This was certainly the case for most (South) Indian migrants, whose encounter in Malaya was shaped by the larger structure of British imperialism in India. It is useful to compare the Chinese and Indian situation in the making of their respective communities in Malaya. Chinese and Indian migrant workers were hired under essentially different recruitment systems, which impacted not only on their physical and economic mobility within Malaya, but more importantly on labour circulation and the creation of their respective diasporas in Malaya. Generally, Chinese migration to Malaya was facilitated either through informal channels or under the “credit-ticket” system. Apart from labour brokers and shipowners, lodging housekeepers also sponsored Chinese migration, keeping the migrants in “depots”, before releasing them to potential employers. Mining was organized through the communal kongsi which was based on bonds of brotherhood and partnership in economic activity. Employment through contractors was also common, particularly after the abolition of indenture for Chinese workers in 1914. Workers moved around when tin deposits were depleted in one area or sought employment in other urban occupations. Most mining areas also evolved into townships and Chinese were thus mainly urbanbased (Kaur 1985). Compared to Indian migration, Chinese migration was more speculative, and Chinese were also found in a much wider range of occupations, the majority of which were not bound to the “boom-bust” cycle, which characterized commodity production (Lim 1967; Wong 1965; Yip 1969; Kaur 2004a, ch. 3). Indians were recruited mainly for the plantation sector and also for work on government undertakings (public works construction and maintenance, ports), first under the indenture system and then under kangany-assisted recruitment (see Sandhu 1969). In the first four decades of the twentieth

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century, Indians comprised between 70 to 80 per cent of the plantation labour force (Kaur 2004a, ch. 4). The Malayan government established a centralised semi-official body known as the Indian Immigration Committee (IIC) in 1907 to facilitate and supervise the importation of South Indian labour. The IIC’s activities were strengthened in 1908 when a Tamil Immigration Fund (later, the Indian Immigration Fund), was instituted with the backing of all employers to provide free passages for labourers to Malaya. All employers of Indian labour were charged a quarterly levy to cover the travel and related costs of free Indian labour migration to Malaya (Kaur 2004a, ch. 4). These arrangements meant that Indian workers’ movement was largely directed by, and was also more reliant on, state machinery. Inevitably, Indian labour was confined to the low-wage state and plantation sectors and had little job and residential mobility. Indian workers were also caught up in the labour circulation practice of contract labour which deterred settlement. Although the dispersed plantations were more permanent entities compared to mining areas, workers were a “captive” community on the rural frontier. There were often no other settlements nearby and the plantation served as the “boundary of existence” for workers. The employer provided basic accommodation that was contingent upon remaining employed, and carrying out employment tasks. Termination of employment meant eviction, destitution and then repatriation. In these circumstances, few Indians were emboldened to move to urban areas. It is interesting to note that about 250,000 indentured labourers came to Malaya between 1844 and 1910, (Sandhu 1969, p. 81). Large numbers left upon completion of their contracts and mortality rates were also high (Kaur 2004a and 2006a). The peak of kangany-assisted recruitment occurred in the 1910s, when about 50,000 to 80,000 Indian workers arrived per annum. Kangany-assisted recruitment began to decline in the late 1920s, consistent with the global economic downturn, was suspended during the Great Depression, and was formally abolished in 1938. The Indian plantation labour force comprised predominantly single adult males. Married men were discouraged from emigrating because they could not bring their families since wages were low; the norm of payment was a single person wage; working conditions were harsh; and accommodation was available for single men only. Nevertheless, there was a small stream of women migrants during the period and approximately one in ten Indian migrants was female. Women’s work was also considered less important than men’s and this had an impact on the gender division of labour on the plantations, with differential wage scales and women paid lower wages than men (Kaur 2004a, ch. 4).

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Nevertheless, the internal dynamics of the relationship between India and Malaya meant that the Indian government began to focus on the gender imbalance among emigrants from the 1920s and its concerns were embodied in subsequent legislation. The most important legislation was the Indian Emigration Act of 1922 and the Indian Emigration Rules of 1923 which stipulated the recruitment of at least one female emigrant for every 1.5 males (Ramasamy 1994, p. 27). The kangany-assisted recruitment system also led to the emigration of families. Increased female recruitment and the migration of families are reflected in the census statistics for 1901, 1911, 1921, 1931 and 1947. The proportion of Indian women in these census years for every 1,000 Indian men was: 171 in 1901; 308 in 1911; 406 in 1921; 482 in 1931 and 637 in 1947 (Ramachandran 1994, p. 32). These statistics also explain the increasing trend towards permanent settlement by Indian labour by the 1930s. With increased female migration, more children also arrived in Malaya, and by the 1920s women accounted for 30 per cent of all arrivals from India. More children were also born in Malaya and raised locally, contributing to the transition towards greater permanent Indian settlement in Malaya. As shown in Table 3.2 below, Indians comprised between 10 to 14 per cent of the population between 1911 and 1947. While the Indian population represented some of the pluralism of the sub-continent, the character of the migration process with its emphasis on recruitment from South India gave this population a degree of homogeneity. Table 3.2 Malaya: Population by Racial Group, 1911–47 (Numbers in Thousands, Percentages as a Proportion of Total Population) Malaysians1

Chinese

Indians2

Year

No.

%

No.

%

No.

%

1911 1921 1931 1947

1,438 1,651 1,962 2,544

54 49 45 43

917 1,175 1,709 2,615

34 35 39 45

267 472 624 600

10 14 14 10

Notes: 1. “Malaysians” include Malays and Indonesians. 2. Includes Pakistanis after 1947. 3. Excludes ‘other’ races. Source: Malaya: Census Reports 1911–1947.

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Approximately 80 per cent of Indians were Tamil and about 10 per cent belonged to an allied Dravidian culture. Moreover, about 70 per cent were Hindu, though the Hindu faith did not provide cohesion in the belief structure and cultural/religious practices. But the statistics above mask the realities of the situation. Although there was a predominantly South Indian component, the South Indians were confined to separate isolated lives on the dispersed plantation frontier. They had no access to English education, were kept apart from the modernizing urban areas and, until the 1930s had little contact with urban Indians.

A Viable Indian Diaspora? The British constructed the concept of Indian identity as a corollary to the articulation of a Malay/Malayan identity and Malay aspirations. This was consistent with their divide-and-rule policy; their treatment of immigrant workers as transients; and was manifested in the population census reports that identified, differentiated and classified the diverse groups on the basis of ethnicity and place of origin. Indian society in Malaya was also vertically divided along various lines. Linguistic and regional affiliations existed and there were also religious divisions (Hindu, Muslim, Sikh) as well as the horizontal lines of caste differences. By 1957 almost 65 per cent of the Indians were locally born, a proportion that was bound to increase as immigration had virtually ceased. Upon independence most Indians also took up Malayan citizenship, although a large number of illiterate Indians missed out. There was a small Indian middle class, comprising mainly professionals. But the Malayan Indians were essentially fragmented along cultural and regional lines (Kaur 2006b). There was also little inspiration from India, which was itself undergoing momentous changes.

THE FACE OF INDIA’S DIASPORA: IDENTITY REFASHIONING One of the most significant changes in East Asia since the 1980s has been the long-term growth performance of some of the leading economies in the region. Moreover, as Singapore and Malaysia moved up the development ladder, their development objectives became increasingly dependent on foreign labour intakes. The increased internationalization of capital, growing intra-firm linkages and the demands of the knowledge-based economy requiring professional and highly skilled technical workers, coupled with the need to maintain international competitiveness, are adding to this process.

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Additionally, the redistribution and reorganization of production tasks which earlier led to the export of labour-intensive manufacturing to East Asia, is now also evident in the relocation of higher-end production and services as well as outsourcing to cheaper cost locations. This is happening on a much wider scale than before when foreign experts went routinely as expatriates to take up top-level positions. These states thus face the dual challenge of rising structural unemployment due to economic restructuring on the one hand and the need to provide knowledge workers on the other. Hence these states initiated new migration programmes which have led to a second new phase in immigration to these countries. In the wider AsiaPacific region, Australia has also emerged as a major destination country for skilled migrants. The movement of natural persons or presence of service providers for temporary stay for the purpose of work expanded dramatically in the 1990s. Of the service providers, skilled migrants or professionals are in great demand and are at the high-end of the labour market. Importantly, a hierarchy of countries has emerged in terms of desirable work and residency opportunities for knowledge workers. Both Singapore and Australia have liberalized their immigration policies for the admission of professionals/knowledge workers and skilled migrants in order to compete in the skilled labour market. In contrast, Malaysia, which has a continuing demand for the services of less-skilled workers, has adopted an immigration policy overshadowed by the politics of race. While it promotes a somewhat attractive admission policy for professionals, its policy for lessskilled migrants is effected through memoranda of understanding initiatives, and increasingly policy shifts are made in response to market demand and border protection issues.

Rising India in the Global Economy The new developments in the region are consistent with India positioning itself to become an invaluable player in the global economy. In the early 1980s the decline in commodity prices and the increase in petroleum prices resulted in India experiencing a series of economic problems. Subsequently, under International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank directives, India initiated a substantial shift in economic policy, leading to a relaxation of industrial regulations and implementation of trade liberalization strategies. In 1991 further reforms were implemented, followed by a substantial dismantling of industrial trade and exchange controls (Clark and Roy 1997, p. 54). In the late 1990s, the boom in long-distance fibre optic–infrastructure enabled American companies to outsource code-cutting work to India in the lead-up

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to the YK2 meltdown of the world’s computers. Subsequently, multinational companies began outsourcing sophisticated work to India. India was well-poised to capitalize on the technology because it had a huge pool of well-educated workers. India’s software engineers, government streamlining and an effective workforce and a mentality shift also led to a programme of reaching out to Indian diasporas across the globe to involve overseas Indians (including those in Singapore and Malaysia) in India’s development policies. Concurrently, the Indian middle class in Malaysia and Singapore is important to India because of its engagement in two or more societies. The governments of these states are also keen to have new investment opportunities in India, and have become leading investors in India. The following section explores how immigration policies in these two states are being used to recruit Indian knowledge workers (and less-skilled workers) and forge backward linkages in India, either at the state level or through the private sector.

THE MOVEMENT OF INDIANS TO SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA Singapore Cultural encounters with India have expanded rapidly in recent years and there is an intense economic synergy between Singapore and India, as exemplified by the following trading relationship: India and Singapore are mutually important economic partners. Singapore is not just India’s most important trading partner amongst the ASEAN countries, but also significant as India’s gateway to ASEAN and China. Singapore has maintained its position since last year as India’s largest export partner. India’s exports to Singapore grew by 80.01 per cent to reach US$3.82 billion in 2004–05, up from US$2.12 billion in the previous year. Singapore has also climbed up one position from last year to now become the largest source of imports from ASEAN. India’s imports from Singapore were worth US$2.58 billion having grown by 23.94 per cent since last year. (“Bridge Singapore” 2006).

Singapore also looks to India as a significant source for upgrading its human resources. A Committee on Singapore Talent and Recruitment (STAR) was formed in 1998, headed by the ministers for trade and industry and manpower and comprising top level officials from government and political

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leaders. It plays an advisory role to the Ministry of Manpower, providing feedback, helping to monitor trends and proposing certain ideas. The Ministry of Finance, moreover, gives tax incentives to companies to claim double tax deductions for costs incurred in recruiting foreign talent and relocating this talent to Singapore. The Singapore government’s immigration policy is highly flexible in relation to the recruitment of Indian knowledge workers and also for lessskilled workers. As Gaur notes, there is a historic and market compatibility between Singapore and India, specifically with respect to labour: With its vast pool of high quality, technically qualified and Englishspeaking labour force, India can meet Singapore’s needs. India’s 250 universities, 1,500 research institutions, and more than 10,000 institutes of higher learning churn out more than 500,000 engineers and technical trained graduates every year. Indian labour is culturally and socially compatible, adaptive and internationally competitive, a crucial factor if Singapore is to maintain competitiveness in its transition to a fully developed economy… (2006, p. 201).

The bias towards skilled transitory labour, exemplified by the current Pass regime is reflected in chapter 9 of the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) signed in 2004 between Singapore and India. With respect to migrant labour, the CECA in effect recognizes in legislative form the historical and market synergy between the two countries. Chapter 9 also contains special provisions for the following: • • • •

Business Visitors (a five-year multiple journey visa) Short Term Service Suppliers (renewable 90-day visas) Professionals (long-term temporary entry) and importantly Spouses and Dependants, who “… shall not be barred … from taking up employment in a category other than that of managers, executives, or specialists. …”

The spirit of the CECA in relation to Indian skilled labour is clear in Article 9.3: “General Principles for Grant of Temporary Entry”, where “Each Party will process expeditiously applications for temporary entry … including requests for further extensions…” and “Neither party shall require labour market testing, economic needs testing or other procedures of similar effects as a condition for temporary entry. …” The list of targeted professionals is slanted toward the four key sectors of information and communications, banking and finance, healthcare, and education, with 127 professional occupations listed (Gaur 2006, pp. 202–03).

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Under Article 7.11 of the agreement, mutual recognition arrangements between professional associations of each country are actively encouraged. Institutional arrangements already in place include “Contact Singapore” offices in Chennai and Bangalore, the signing of memoranda of understanding (MoU) between Institutes of Higher Learning (IHL) in India and Singapore and the signing of a MoU between India’s National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASCOM) and Singapore Information Technology Federation (SITF) (Economic Linkages between Singapore and India: The IT Connection, p. 67). Moreover, trade between Singapore and India grew by 40 per cent in 2006. While statistics on the “foreign” Indian population are hard to come by, it is estimated that Singapore’s foreign workforce increased from 3.2 per cent in 1980 to about 30 per cent in 2000 as shown in Table 3.3 below. Table 3.3 Singapore: Size of Foreign Labour Force, 1970–2000 Year

Total Labour Force

Foreign Workers

Percentage of Total Labour Force

1970 1980 1990 1995 2000

650,892 1,077,090 1,480,000 1,690,000 2,000,000

20,828 119,483 200,000 350,000 600,000*

3.2 7.4 13.5 20.7 30.0

Source: S. Gaur, “Indian Professional Workers in Singapore”, in Mobility, Labour Migration and Border Controls in Asia, edited by A. Kaur and I. Metcalfe (Basingstoke, 2006), p. 198.

Of these foreign workers, it is estimated that 110,000 highly skilled and better-educated employment pass holders were in the manufacturing, commercial, and business sectors. The remaining 49,000 comprised less-skilled work permit holders, including about 130,000 domestic workers, 210,000 construction workers, and about 150,000 employees in the manufacturing, marine and service industries (Gaur 2006, pp. 197–98). Singapore in turn is an attractive destination for Indian professionals due to its proximity to India, a favourable socio-cultural environment, excellent infrastructure for housing and education facilities, and its low taxation regime. The state is not averse to using its multi-racial society policy,

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that rests on a structured model of “CMIO” (Chinese, Malay, Indian and Others) to increase the Indian proportion of the population. Concurrently, the “foreign” Indians are also utilizing this policy for their own ends, using Singapore as a springboard to countries like Australia and New Zealand (personal communication). Indian migrants in Singapore are employed in two distinct categories. The first includes various labour-intensive sectors such as construction and shipping where labour is employed on two-year work permits. These contract workers are expected to return home after a contractual period, unless they have acquired further training or obtained trade certificates in Singapore’s vocational and technical institutes. The training enables them to be reclassified as skilled workers who can subsequently continue to work in the country over the longer term. The second category comprises skilled workers who work mainly in tertiary institutions and in the engineering, information technology, business, banking and financial sectors. The majority are professionals who have tertiary qualifications and are employed as senior executives in local and multinational companies, or are engaged in high-tech research work, or manage their own firms in the information communications technology (ICT), engineering and accountancy sectors. These professional migrants are encouraged to take up permanent residency (and ultimately citizenship), depending on the skill requirements of the country. Both categories of Indian workers have contributed and contribute to the expansion of the Singapore economy due to their technical proficiency, cost-effectiveness, productivity and their ability to assimilate into Singapore society. They also serve as a visible and successful group in Singapore.

The Movement of Indians to Malaysia Despite rapid industrialization and the petroleum boom, Malaysia’s prosperity is still heavily dependent on export earnings from commodities. At the same time services are increasingly driving the economy and the state’s objective is to strengthen its position as a regional and global services hub and develop as a knowledge-based economy. India has emerged as a major source of health professionals, academics for institutes of higher learning (particularly those set up under twinning arrangements with foreign universities) and skilled professional workers in the information technology sector. Concurrently, Indian workers have been recruited principally for outsourcing operations and the booming restaurant trade. In March 2005 the Indian and Malaysian governments took the first steps towards a formal agreement (MoU) on

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manpower recruitment on a contract basis from India (The Star, “Labour Offer”, 11 March 2005). With respect to labour recruitment, the Malaysian state’s migration goals and recruitment policies continue to be shaped by the political, social and cultural contexts of the migrants, bilateral agreements and the lobbying power of various employer groups in Malaysia. The Immigration Department oversees, and the Immigration Act 1959/1963 provides the basis for immigration regulations and procedures in the country. The department comes under the authority of the Ministry of Home Affairs. The regulations governing the recruitment of foreign workers are skill-based and are administrated separately for skilled and less-skilled workers. Skilled workers are referred to as pegawai dagang or expatriates (the professional, technical and kindred group), while unskilled workers are pekerja asing or foreign contract workers. There are thus two types of employment-related work permits or work visas, namely, an employment or work pass (Pas Penggajian) for expatriates; and a “work permit” or contract worker pass (Pas Lawatan Kerja Sementara) or a Visit pass for the temporary (contract) employment of semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Statistics on Foreign Indian workers are provided in Table 3.4. Table 3.4 Malaysia: Migrant Workers by Country of Origin, 1998–2004 (%)

Indonesia Nepal Bangladesh India Myanmar Philippines Thailand Pakistan Others Total

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Jan–July 2004

53.3 0.1 37.1 3.6 1.3 2.7 0.7 1.0 0.2 100.0

65.7 0.1 27.0 3.2 0.9 1.8 0.5 0.6 0.2 100.0

69.4 0.1 24.6 3.0 0.5 1.2 0.4 0.5 0.3 100.0

68.4 7.3 17.1 4.0 1.0 1.0 0.4 0.4 0.4 100.0

64.7 9.7 9.7 4.6 3.3 0.8 2.4 0.2 4.6 100.0

63.8 9.7 8.4 5.6 4.3 0.6 0.9 0.2 6.5 100.0

66.5 9.2 8.0 4.5 4.2 1.1 1.0 0.1 5.4 100.0

Source: Malaysia: Department of Immigration.

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Figure 3.3 Malaysia: Expatriates by Country of Origin, 2006 (%)

India: 20.8%

Japan: 11.2%

China: 10.7%

Total Other Countries: 57.3%

Indian dominance in the skilled professionals category is shown in Figure 3.3. As shown above, the overall percentage of foreign Indians is small. But, as in Singapore, Indian professionals play a premier role in the ICT industry, the higher education sector, and the engineering and medical fields. Unlike Singapore, however, permanent residency is not offered in Malaysia. Hence the preference by Indian professionals for employment in Singapore. Malaysia is also competing with Singapore to be the preferred intraAsia hub for India, based on its “cost-efficiency increasing port facilities and connectivity” (Star, 29 January 2007) and is pursuing investment opportunities in infrastructure development in India. Concurrently, successful Indian entrepreneurs in Malaysia have formed associations such as the Indian Entrepreneurs and Professionals to “unite successful Indian business people, … [raise] Indian equity … and assist young professionals [to] establish new businesses” (NST, 29 January 2007). The mood is euphoric. Apart from cultural associations and “Bollystan” diasporic-consciousness, the Malaysian Indian entrepreneurs are being influenced by similar activities being conducted by the global IndUS Entrepreneurs (TiE) that have been created in the United States for the advancement of entrepreneurship among Indians. These are some of the new actors assisting India’s and Indians’ development around the globe. Their new-found confidence is linked to rising India, India’s growing role in the world economy and the country’s efforts to involve Indians in these

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strategies. In February 2008, Malaysia and India agreed to finalize a bilateral agreement (Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA)) by March 2009. The CECA will cover financial services, telecommunications, temporary movement of persons, ICT, biotechnology, etc. (The Economic Times, 6 February 2008). The Indian government has also formulated policies aimed at developing links with wealthy and successful overseas Indians/Indian communities. It has inaugurated the celebration of Parvasi Bhartiya Divas — Day of the Persons of Indian Origin (PIO) and Non-resident Indians (NRI). In 2003, for example, the president of the Malaysian Indian Congress, Datuk Seri Samy Vellu, was awarded the Indian Diaspora Award. This action was criticized by some Malaysian Indians for its neglect of the poorer Indian overseas community in Malaysia (See letters, Far Eastern Economic Review, 27 February 2003). On the whole, the Indian government’s dual citizenship policy for non-resident Indians is restrictive and confined largely to Indians residing in affluent Western countries. Nevertheless, many middle-class Indians in Malaysia, like their counterparts in Singapore, have joined the Global Organization for the People of Indian Origin (GOPIO) which promotes the pooling of resources among PIOs. Both countries’ contribution to remittances plays a small role in the total amount of remittances from the Indian diaspora. Nevertheless, India was Malaysia’s “ninth largest trading partner, ninth largest export destination and seventeenth largest import source in 2006” (AFP, 7 February 2008).

Indians in East Asia: Prospect and Retrospect The declining importance of East Asia’s Indian minorities since the mid1950s has been arrested by the current demand and migration of Indian professionals worldwide. Although the ICT sector has been the driving force for the export of Indian professionals, Indians are also in great demand for the higher education and health sectors. For the Indian government, remittances are a major benefit of Indian overseas migration. In 2004 India received more remittances from migrant workers than any other country: US$23 billion compared to US$17 billion sent to Mexico (Migration News 12, no. 2, April 2005). In the wider Asia-Pacific region, the East Asian countries will increasingly encounter competition for Indian professionals from Australia in its drive to overcome its skill shortages arising for structural and demographic reasons. Moreover, transnational Indian diasporic networks have become an important resource associated with Indian migration. Malaysia and Singapore have strengthened social, religious and cultural bonds with

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India, consistent with the Indian government’s policy of developing links with wealthy and successful overseas Indian communities. Nevertheless, it appears that foreign direct investment from emigrants is the desired interaction, while links with professional and working communities are of lesser importance.

References Adas, Michael. The Burma Delta: Economic Development and Social Change on an Asian Rice Frontier, 1852–1941. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974. Baxter, James. Report on Indian Immigration. Rangoon: Government Printer, 1941. Bridge Singapore. “India and Singapore”, available at: (accessed 30 August 2006). Clark, C. and K.C. Roy. Comparing Development Patterns in Asia. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997. Gaur, Seema. “Indian Professional Workers in Singapore”. In Mobility, Labour Migration and Border Controls in Asia, edited by A. Kaur and I. Metcalfe Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, pp. 193–210. Government of Malaysia. Malaysia:Economic Report 2006/7. Kuala Lumpur: Ministry of Finance, 2006. Human Rights Watch. Living in Limbo: Burmese Rohingyas in Malaysia 12, no. 4 (August 2000), (accessed January 2006). Kaur, A. Bridge and Barrier: Transport and Communications in Colonial Malaya. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985. ———. “Tappers and Weeders: South Indian Plantation Workers in Malaysia, 1880–1970”. In Across the Kala Pani, edited by Lance Brennan and Brij. V. Lal. South Asia XXI (Special Volume 1998): 73–102. ———. Wage Labour in Southeast Asia: Globalisation, the International Division of Labour and Labour Transformations. Basingstoke: Palgrave, Macmillan, 2004a. ———. “Crossing Borders: Race, Migration and Borders in Southeast Asia”. International Journal on Multicultural Societies (IJMS) 6, no. 2 (December 2004b): 111–32. . ———. “Indian Labour, Labour Standards, and Workers’ Health in Burma and Malaya, 1900–1940”. Modern Asian Studies 40, Part 2 (May 2006a): 393– 444. ———. “Malaysia”. In Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora. Singapore: Editions Didier Millet in association with the National University of Singapore, 2006b. Kondapi, C. Indians Overseas, 1838–1949. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1951. Lim Chong-Yah. Economic Development of Modern Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1967.

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Parmer, Norman J. Colonial Labour Policy and Administration: A History of Labour in the Rubber Plantation Industry in Malaya. Locust Valley, New York: J.J. Augustin for the Association for Asian Studies, 1960. Pillai, P.P. Labour in South East Asia. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 1947. Ramasamy, P. Plantation Labour: Unions, Capital and the State. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1994. Ramachandran Selvakumaran. Indian Plantation Labour in Malaya. Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul Majeed & Co. for Institute of Social Analysis (INSAN), 1994. Sandhu, K.S. Indians in Malaya: Some Aspects of their Immigration and Settlement. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969. Satyanarayana, Adapa, “‘Birds of Passage’: Migration of South Indian Laborers to Southeast Asia”. Critical Asian Studies 34, no. 1 (March 2002): 89–115. The Star. “Good Chance to be Intra-Asia Hub”. The Star, 29 January 2007. New Straits Times. “KliE Aims to Nuture More Million-ringgit Firms”. New Straits Times, 29 January 2007. Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement. “Chapter 9: Movement of Natural Persons”, available at . MTI. “Economic Linkages between Singapore and India: The IT Connection”, p. 67, available at .

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4 COMMUNITY FORMATIONS AMONG INDIANS IN EAST ASIA A. Mani INDIAN ARRIVAL AND SETTLEMENT IN EAST ASIA East Asia, for purposes of this chapter, is defined as including Southeast Asia, China, Hong Kong, Korean Peninsula and Japan. The association between the Indian sub-continent and East Asia is historical. People of the Indian sub-continent have arrived in Southeast Asia since the pre-Christian era. Such contacts, through inter-marriage and cultural assimilation, gave rise to a number of city-states, since extinct, and an indigenous civilization which bears the stamp of Indian influence. However, despite the great antiquity of the Indian overseas migration to mainland Southeast Asia and the debt of Southeast Asian cultures to ancient India, there were seldom large numbers of Indians in Southeast Asia in the pre-Western colonial period. Nearly all the estimated two million Indians present in Southeast Asia are either themselves immigrants or descendants of recent immigrants. The period of modern Indian immigration dates from the entry of Western nations into Southeast Asia for trade and colonization. Only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, following the consolidation of Western powers and the opening up of India and Southeast Asia for economic restructuring, that large numbers of Indians arrived. The countries and regions to the east of Southeast Asia had not attracted large numbers of Indians except during the colonial period. Indian soldiers and traders had travelled to China and Japan during the colonial period. Three major cities that attracted sizeable number of Indians

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were Hong Kong, Shanghai and Nagoya. Post-colonial exodus ended all presence of Indians in Shanghai and other cities in mainland China, while Indian traders flourished in Hong Kong, Nagoya and Tokyo. It was in the aftermath of China’s economic liberalization that Indians have once again begun to stay in China. Southeast Asia in the last 200 years has been colonized by Netherlands, Portugal, France, Spain, Britain, United States and Japan. Each of these colonizing nations has either used as well as benefited the Indians in Southeast Asia. As Spanish influence was unable to reach the Indian sub-continent, there was no direct transfer of Indians to the Philippines during the colonial era. As all other Western nations like Netherlands, Portugal, France and Britain had at one time or another been colonial masters in the Indian sub-continent, the transfer of Indians from the respective colonized areas in India to various parts of Southeast Asia took place. Britain, which came to occupy large portions of the Indian subcontinent, also extended its influence to the present-day countries of Burma (Myanmar), Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam and Singapore. In the case of Malaysia, the Malay Peninsula (including Singapore) witnessed a large transfer of migrant Indians. Beginning with the acquisition of Penang Island in 1786, Britain gradually extended its influence into the mainland and finally, by 1909, was in control of the whole of Malaya. The ensuing political stability, coupled with active official encouragement, led to a large flow of capital into Malayan development projects, particularly large-scale commercial agriculture. Beginning with the cultivation of crops such as spices and pepper in the 1820s, sugar cane in the 1830s, and coffee in the 1870s, plantation agriculture reached its peak with the “rubber rush” of the early years of the twentieth century. Attracted by the fortunes promised by rubber, millions of British pounds were invested in the Malayan countryside and thousands of hectares of land were snapped up by companies and individuals. Similarly motivated efforts were later extended to oil palm and tea. At about the same time, the Malayan government, in addition to providing loans at low rates of interest, easy terms with respect to alienation of land and taxes on new enterprises, and promoting research and experimentation, launched an ambitious programme of municipal, port, communication, drainage, road, and railway construction to facilitate the economic development of the country in general, and agriculture in particular. Few labour-saving mechanical appliances were available or suited to local conditions in nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Malaya. Involving mainly simple repetitive tasks, it called almost exclusively for unskilled

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workers. With the Malays proving to be unmotivated, the Chinese finding other better remunerative occupations, African and European labour alike impracticable, and the Javanese being both difficult and expensive to acquire, the Indians became indispensable. Among the people of the Indian sub-continent, the South Indian peasant, particularly the untouchable or lower caste Madrasi, was considered the most satisfactory type of labourer, especially for light, simple and repetitive tasks. He was described as malleable, worked well under supervision, and was easily manageable. Lacking ambitiousness and self-reliance, he was the most amenable to the comparatively lowly paid and rather regimented life of estates and government departments. He had fewer qualms or religious susceptibilities and cost less to feed and maintain. Acclimatization to Malayan conditions was comparatively easier for him as South India was not totally different from Malaya. Moreover he had already adjusted to a low standard of living, was accustomed to British rule, and was well-behaved and docile. Overall, these features of the South Indian worker made him almost the ideal labourer for the capitalist enterprises that required intensive labour inputs. Many of the British government officials and planters, moreover, came to Malaya from Ceylon (Sri Lanka), where they had worked with Tamil labour. Many of the planters also had some knowledge of Tamil or had English-speaking subordinates, thereby facilitating direct contact and control. Although the low standard of living of the South Indian peasant tended to promote his emigration, social institutions and customs often militated against it. At the same time, wages in Malaya were seldom more than two-thirds of those prevailing in Sri Lanka or Myanmar, both of which also recruited labour from South India. Since a large supply of cheap labour was imperative for the economic development of the country, the Malayan government, together with the planters and other employers, slowly overcame the disadvantages during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Conditions of service were generally improved and wages rose to compete with those of Myanmar and Sri Lanka. A steamship subsidy was inaugurated in 1887, and two decades later a semi-official body known as the Indian Immigration Committee was constituted by the government to encourage and supervise the importation of South Indian labour. The Indian government was persuaded to withdraw most of its restrictions on the migration of its subjects to Malaya. Migration depots and camps were established in South India and Malaya to facilitate recruitment, shipping and dispersal, and a propaganda campaign aimed at stimulating immigration was mounted in both Malaya and India. As a result, there developed a steady flow of labourers from South India to Malaya.

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The vast majority of Indian labour migrants came under the category of assisted labour, unassisted labour being significant only after the early 1930s, when government assistance was curtailed and finally abolished following the Indian government’s ban in 1938 on all assisted emigration of unskilled labour. Unassisted labour migration too was disrupted during World War II. Despite the efforts of the Malayan authorities, its resumption was not allowed by an independent India keen on political and social reform both at home and abroad, regarding labour emigration as an insult to the status of the Indian nation. Compared with labour migrants, non-labour Indians as professional and commercial migrants were fewer. Their influence, however, in terms of political, economic and social has often overshadowed that of the labour migrants. Initially arriving in Malaya through the Malayan government and private recruitment or encouragement, substantial numbers of Englisheducated Indians later began to move to Malaya on their own to take up posts such as junior government officials or plantation assistants. Other Indians arrived as farmers and camp-followers while a number of North Indians, particularly Sikhs, found their niches in the ranks of the military, police, and guards (watchmen) at private establishments. More enterprising than any of the foregoing were the petty contractors, merchants, moneylenders, bankers and shopkeepers. Prominent among them were Hindu and Muslim traders from the Coromandel and Malabar coasts, textile merchants from the Sind and the Punjab, and Chettiar moneylenders from present-day Tamil Nadu. The great bulk of the flow of Indians to Malaya was of an ephemeral character, with approximately 4.2 million entering and 3 million leaving Malaya between 1786 and 1957. Much of the 1.2 million net immigration during this period, however, were wiped out by disease, exhaustion, and malnutrition. The Indian population of Malaya in 1957 numbered only 820,270, of which 62.1 per cent were local born. This migration was predominantly a South Indian Hindu labour — chiefly Tamil — movement. Finally, it was a movement of male adults, females seldom averaging more than a quarter of the total arrivals. The story of modern Indian migration into Burma followed the British annexation of the “Burma Delta” (maritime province of Bago) in 1852. Rangoon, being the focal point of sea-borne migration as well as the seat of provincial government, attracted a large number of Indian migrants over the next three-quarters of a century. Indian dominance in the pre-war Burmese economy was very significant. In the classification of urban population by race in 1931, Indians formed

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49.6 per cent of the population of large industrial towns and 18.5 per cent in the remaining towns. When the Indo-Burman population was added to the group, the Indians formed 53.8 per cent and 22.7 per cent of the population of large industrial towns and remaining towns respectively. However, the Indian population in Burma at its peak formed only 6.9 per cent of the total population in 1931. In terms of occupational distribution, Indians occupied fairly large percentages of non-agricultural occupations. Indians were predominant or visible in clerical, managerial, crafts, unskilled, and public sector occupations. This dominance led to racial riots between Indians and Bamans. With the large Indian community concentrated in urban areas, the interaction and integration with the host community became problematic. The sections of towns lived in by Indians became “pockets of Indians”. Most Indian migrants came to Burma with high hopes of accumulating enough to return home in the shortest time, and the majority were single males who sent their earnings home regularly. World War II and the independence of Myanmar in 1948 ended the Indian dominance of the Burmese economy. Many Indians fled Myanmar with the collapse of the British civil administration just before the Japanese arrived. Even though many returned to Myanmar after the war, the pre-war population figures were never reached. While in 1931 Indians formed 30.4 per cent of the urban population, in 1953 only 9.8 per cent of the urban population were Indians. The economic nationalism pursued by Burmese governments, ended all economic participation of Indians except as petty traders. The absolute number of Indians living in Myanmar had shrunk greatly deal by the end of the 1960s. The 1973 census showed that the Indians, Pakistanis, and Bangladeshis who still retained their respective citizenship formed only 0.5 per cent of the total population. By ethnicity, people of Indian origins formed only 2.2 per cent of the population of Myanmar in 1973. They numbered about 609,000 with 27 per cent as Buddhists, 3.3 per cent Christians, 20.0 per cent Hindus, and 49 per cent Muslims. The Indians or people of Indian origin who remained in Myanmar after the exodus in 1962–64 consist of four important groupings: (1) Farmers from Bihar who settled in Zeyawaddy and Kayaukta-ka township. (2) Tamil migrants and their descendants who lived mostly in Yangon. (3) Migrants from Bangladesh who originally settled in Arakan (or Rakhine) and later spread to other parts.

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(4) Gurkhas or Nepalese who lived as farmers in the Mandalay and PyimQo-Lwin areas. One other area of British influence that attracted Indians was the presentday East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, and the nation of Brunei Darussalam, in Borneo Island. In all three areas, large-scale migration and settlement of Indians was absent. Most migrated as businessmen or to work in the public works departments. Indonesia having been ruled by the Netherlands did not attract massive migration of Indian labour, except in the case of present-day North Sumatra. Moreover, the Netherlands’ involvement in Sri Lanka came to end long before labour migration began. The last census of Indonesia that gave an ethnic breakdown was done in 1930. There were 30,000 Indians in Indonesia in that year with 20 per cent residing in Sumatra while Java and Madura had 5.5 per cent. About 49.0 per cent of the Indians in that year were born in Indonesia. As elsewhere in Southeast Asia, the population was predominantly male. Though attempts were made by planters in North Sumatra to recruit Tamil labour directly from India, Britain did not allow it. As a result, the Dutch planters had to recruit Javanese labour. Though Indians are found all over Indonesia, Medan and its environs have today about 30,000 Indians while Jakarta has about 10,000 Indians. Smaller numbers of Indians are found in all the major cities in Indonesia. In the case of Indo-Chinese countries, many Indians from the French colony of Pondichery (in Tamil Nadu), migrated to engage in trade at Saigon, Cambodia and Laos. Many Tamils served in the French army, while many Sindhis entered these countries as merchants. Though attempts were made to bring Tamil labour migrants for plantation agriculture, the distance did not encourage massive migration and settlement. The presence of Portugal in Goa might have encouraged a few Indians to come to Southeast Asia. As Malacca was captured by the Netherlands and later by the British, the Portuguese link being of any use in the migration of Indians to Southeast Asia ended prematurely. The Indian population of Thailand has been estimate to be about 60,000. Their arrival in modern times followed the expansion of Western commercial enterprises in Bangkok. Many of them arrived via Malaya and Singapore to do trading in the major cities of Thailand. Beginning with the Bohras from Bombay, and Tamils from Pondichery and Karikal (French colonies in India), they were followed later by Sindhi merchants, Punjabi watchmen and Uttar Pradeshis. The Indian population in Bangkok received a boost when India gained independence and when the Americans withdrew from Vietnam. The

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former were refugees from Pakistan who joined their relatives in Thailand, while the latter were merchants who left Vietnam and Cambodia in the wake of communist regimes. The migration and settlement of Indians in the Philippines is recent. Though 500 sepoys from Madras were sent as a British expeditionary force to Manila in 1762–64, the British non-involvement in the Philippines did not encourage any movement of Indians. Beginning from the early decades of this century, Sindhi merchants followed by Sikhs arrived in Manila for trading purposes. The post-war division of India into Pakistan and India made most Sindhis and Sikhs migrate as refugees. This caused the predominantly male migrants to bring over their surviving family and kin group members. By the 1980s, it was estimated that there were 10,000 Indians in the Philippines.

NATURE OF INDIANS The term “Indian” as used in this chapter refers to all people who originate from the Indian sub-continent, which includes all the present countries known as Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal and Bhutan. The term “Indian” is used loosely as a cultural label on people from the Indian sub-continent as sharing similarities in terms of cultural traits. Indians themselves may not accept this general classification, but in most Southeast Asian countries the term is used loosely. The human flow from the Indian sub-continent was diverse in content, purpose and destination in Southeast Asia. It was diverse in terms of the linguistic, regional, class, caste and religious divides. The purpose of each of those groups in being part of the human flow was also manifold. Though there may be minor variations, the overall pattern can be observed among Indians across Southeast Asia and to some extent to countries further east. The pattern of origin and destination is elaborated in Table 4.1. In terms of size and content the human flow from the Indian subcontinent was more directed to regions in Southeast Asia that needed unskilled labour. These were mainly southern Burma, Malaya, Singapore and North Sumatra. Thus, Malaysia and Singapore have today sizeable Indian population who are demographically significant. In all other parts of Southeast Asia, Indians are found in smaller numbers playing important roles in selective economic niches, either in the commercial sector or as professionals. Within Southeast Asia, they have, until independence, functioned as communities in plural societies rather than as people with a shared

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Tamil Hindu & Telugu Hindus

Tamil Muslims & Malayali Muslims

Hindu

Sindhi Hindus

Pustu Hindus & Muslims Punjabi Hindus & Sikhs

Punjabi Hindus & Sikhs Ceylon Tamils

Malayali Hindus

South India

South India

Bihar

Sindh (Pakistan)

North West Frontier Punjab (India)

Punjab (Pakistan) Sri Lanka

South India

Source: Compiled by the author.

Tamil Hindu

Linguistic & Religious Affiliations

South India

Region India

Burma, Malaya, Indonesia, Singapore, Philippines

Middle Caste

Malaya, Singapore

Middle Caste, landowners with English education Middle Caste, with English Education

Malaya, Singapore

Thailand, North Sumatra, Philippines

Middle Caste, Peasants

Middle Caste

All major cities in Southeast Asia, Japan, Hong Kong, coastal cities of China. Northern Thailand, Northern Burma

Myanmar, Malaya, Singapore, North Sumatra Burma, Malaya, Brunei, Singapore, North Sumatra, Thailand, Vietnam, North Borneo Burma, Malaya, Singapore, North Sumatra, Thailand, Vietnam, North Borneo Burma, Thailand

Destinations in Southeast Asia

Middle Caste, Traders

Middle Caste, Weavers, Traders, Religious specialists Middle Caste, Peasants

Untouchable Caste, and Landless Peasants Middle Caste, Traders, Artisans

Class & Caste Status

Economic Niche in Southeast Asia

Government employees, Clerks, Teachers, etc. Government employees, Clerks, Teachers, etc.

Soldiers in the British Army. Watchmen in Western firms. Policemen and workers in Sindhi firms.

Petty Traders.

Wholesale Traders in textile, European goods, and later Japanese goods.

Dairy Farmers, Watchmen.

Petty Traders, Small Restaurant owners, Religious specialists.

Labourers in Rubber & Oil Palm Plantation. Public Works. Petty Traders, Craftsman, Artisans, Public works, Money lenders, Bankers.

Table 4.1 Diversity of Human Flows from the Indian Sub-continent to East Asia

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consciousness of belonging to a nation. The Indian independence movement in India appealed to the trading and professional Indians residing in urban areas of Southeast Asia. The labouring masses being illiterate were more influenced by reformist and socialist movements in the Indian sub-continent. These movements addressed the issues faced by Indian labour and often ran counter to the concerns of middle classes in the urban areas. In Burma, Malaya and Singapore there was a class divide between the urban Indians and those who were unskilled labour employed in public works and plantations. While the former used English in the communication with each other and advanced a cosmopolitan concept of “Indianness”, the latter were Tamil based and espoused a Tamil identity, in which linguistic affinity as Tamils overrode concerns of religious diversity. They were often attracted by the Dravidian self-respect movement in South India than by the Ghandhian independence movement. Thus, South Indians all over Southeast Asia were divided between the Dravidian movement which emphasized self-respect for oppressed castes and classes and the Indian independence movement which advanced the removal of the British from India. The only period where this diversity was overcome by a sense of unity was during the Japanese Occupation of Southeast Asia. Subhas Chandra Bose was able to establish a Provisional Government of Free India from July 1943 to August 1945, with its headquarters in Singapore. All Indians in Southeast Asia were united in forcing the British out of India. The shortlived unity was ended with the end of World War II. The independence of Southeast Asian nations began to give way to the previously existing divides where Indians interacted with others as communities rather than as people originating from a common entity.

LOCALIZATION AND RECREATING NEWER IDENTITIES All over Southeast Asia, the Indians who have migrated in the recent past have been affected by the nation-building processes in the post-war years. The issue of citizenship has made the present-day Indians remain in the respective countries and become localized communities. Though they function as communities for religious and kinship purposes, their economic and social integration into the wider national network of their respective societies is increasing. The localization process has involved interlinking with the processes of the respective nations, while inventing strategies to cope with being communities of Indians in Southeast Asia. Newer identities of being an

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Indian in Southeast Asia are being evolved in the context of the respective policies of the nation states. In Myanmar, there is an active policy of encouraging all Indians, at least the non-Muslims, to assimilate with the local communities. In Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines, governments have left alone the Indian communities to eventually assimilate into the indigenous communities that each Indian community finds itself in. In the case of Singapore and Malaysia, state policies exist to allow the expression of Indianness at the national level. In the case of Brunei Darussalam, the state with its Melayu-Islamic-Beraja (Malay Islamic Monarchy) concept offers little opportunity for assimilation into the national milieu. Despite the different policies with regard to ethnic integration in Southeast Asian countries, the internal dynamics within the each Indian community also plays an important role in the degree to which they become localized and create newer identities. Size of the Indian population and the size of each community within the Indian population of a particular country are of paramount importance. The issue of whether the dominant members of the community are first-generation migrants is also another factor. In the case of first-generation migrants, the chances for their close association with their natal areas in South Asia are greater than for those Indians who are descendants of earlier migrants. In considering the localization and identity creation processes, the nation states will be used here as the larger framework within which the configurations of the Indian communities appear to have undergone change, eventually leading to the creation of newer identities. Myanmar and Brunei Darussalam represent the extremes of this model. In the case of Myanmar, Indians had to overcome their historical hatred of their dominance in the economy and culturally attempt to assimilate by learning the Bamar language and customs. Myanmar may be the only country in which Indians had to demonstrate visibly that they are prepared to assimilate. Brunei Darussalam represents the other extreme where the state ideology is narrow enough to keep out all other ethnic groups including Indians. Even though a few Indians have become “Brunei Malays” by the process of “Masok Melayu” (becoming Malay), Indians as an ethnic group, even if they are Muslims, can never integrate nor assimilate. Any processes amongst them is simply adapting to the local conditions by having voluntary organizations to meet community level needs (see Mani, 1992). In the case of the Philippines and Thailand, the size of the Indian population, and the economic niches in which present-day Indians are located have influenced the creation of newer identities. Most of the Indians

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in Thailand and the Philippines have their origins in the former areas of Punjab and Sindh in Pakistan. As people exposed to an acute sense of ethnicity of being non-Muslims in their natal areas, the Sikhs and Sindhis in Thailand and the Philippines are very conscious of their ethnicity. The former practice Sikhism and the latter are staunch Hindus. Ethnicity is consciously maintained through close kinship ties, where marriages are largely arranged with huge transfers of capital in the form of dowry. They are both regional and international in their kinship and economic network. In Bangkok and Manila, both groups have established religious centres to maintain their identities in societies that are seen to be rather easy to assimilate. The Sikhs as well as Sindhis celebrate their festivals elaborately and give importance in being seen as participating in community organizations. Religious specialists are employed on a permanent basis to maintain the core tenets of their religious practices. These religious specialists, priests and preachers, are brought from India or are drawn from those who regularly travel from India to Southeast Asia. The major factor for the retention of ethnic identity in the two communities of Indians has been their economic status in terms of the host societies in which they find themselves in. In Bangkok and Manila, the Sikhs and Sindhis are successful business communities that engage in wholesale and retail trade. Starting as textile merchants, they have become sports goods specialists, electronic goods manufacturers and sellers, bankers, and businessman whose wealth is made not only in their host societies but also in other countries. Their retention of ethnic identity has allowed them to establish contacts with others of similar ethnic affiliation elsewhere in the world. In both countries, ethnic identity creation in the capital cities has significant effects on Indians living in other cities. Many Indian businessmen, living in the provincial cities of Thailand and the Philippines, traders in the capital cities rely on wholesale. Similarity language and religious affinities obtain for them easy business credit and trust. Thus, in Bangkok and Manila, the Kalistan movement in the Indian sub-continent (claiming an independent country for Sikhs), was intensely supported. Most Sikhs tried to assert their identity by growing their hair longer and wearing turbans. In both business communities, the male children, after their primary schooling in Thailand and the Philippines, are sent to India for secondary school education. This is assumed to teach them to be independent and absorb certain Indian values that are supposed to be useful in business. Most male children are discouraged from studying at the universities, and

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are employed in the father’s or relatives firms after high school. These males know the cultural norms and languages of the host societies, but are not too absorbed in the society’s values to neglect their family businesses. Most of their marriages are arranged, and the bride who may be highly literate and tertiary educated will be from another business family, in another city in Southeast Asia or from elsewhere. Marriages are arranged to strengthen businesses. Thus, there is always a circulation of new members and people with varied experiences to keep these communities economically buoyant. In both Thailand and the Philippines, labour migration was lesser in number. There is no trace of Indian labour migration in the Philippines, while in Thailand, the Tamil labour migrants who came to southern Thailand and to Bangkok have disappeared through total assimilation. The only evidence left of Tamil Hindu migrants to Bangkok area, is the Sri Mariamman Temple in Bangkok’s Silom Road. Except for the priest who is brought on contract from Tamil Nadu, the management of the temple is in the hands of those whose grandfathers arrived from Tamil Nadu and married indigenous women from Thailand’s minority groups (see Mani, 1992). Inter-ethnic marriage has fully assimilated the Tamils into Thai society. Even the Navarathiri (nine nights devoted to Mother Goddess) festival, for which the temple is well known, has assumed a syncretic form where Thai, Chinese and Tamil religious elements are integrated to such an extent that except for the deity, everything else will appear to be different to an Indian religious specialist. Even the temple grounds are filled with Thai and Chinese religious deities. For the Tamil Muslims in Bangkok, assimilation has not occurred. As gem merchants who trade in Thai gemstones, their linkages to Singapore, Malaysia, South India and the Middle-East has kept them a distinct community. Though older migrants have married Thai Muslims and have imbibed Thai cultural values, the community is kept alive by the trading group. This group, since 1985, has formed the Bangkok Tamil Muslim Association to operate a mosque with a Tamil preacher. By creating a social organization, they have tried to retain their Tamil Muslim identity in a city which they fear will easily absorb them into its culture. In both Thailand and the Philippines, Indians have been allowed to use their ethnic cultural names instead of changing their name for official purposes. Until recently, most Chinese in Thailand did not use their ethnic cultural names in public. In Indonesia, Indian communities have been allowed to retain their cultural identities except in the area of education. Except in Jakarta, all

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Indian communities in Indonesia have allowed their children to attend their schooling in the Indonesian language. In the last decade, Indian children in Jakarta are beginning to attend international schools. The processes observed in Thailand and the Philippines for the North Indian communities are applicable to Indonesian Indians of North Indian origins. For Tamils in Indonesia, Indonesian society has made them integrate and assimilate and in this process, create newer identities which makes them feel as part of the Indonesian society. As Indians in Jakarta and other major cities in Java arrived as trading groups, community maintenance and recreation has been useful for trade. The early concentration of Indians at Pasar Baru, an area in Jakarta, with worship sites, a school and a sizeable resident community facilitated the reinforcement of Indianness. For the Sindhis, being a trading community that maintained contacts with other members of the community on a global and regional basis meant a need to maintain a Sindhi identity. It was fairly easy, given their economic status. For the early settled Sikhs, their religion requiring the Sunday congregation and religious tenets helped them to a certain extent, to maintain a separate identity that was intertwined with religion, language, and a way of life that differed from other Indonesians in Jakarta. Indians in North Sumatra, in the environs of Medan, present a different picture from the North Indian communities found in Jakarta. While the Jakarta Sikhs are generally from the Punjab areas absorbed into Pakistan, the Medan Sikhs come from the present-day Punjab in India. While Tamils were largely Hindus, many were also Muslims. A few thousand Tamils have converted to Christianity and Buddhism while in North Sumatra. Most Punjabis are still dairy farmers, while a few have become successful businessmen. The Tamils belong to a diversified class structure with most being middle class, with a few becoming extremely rich as industrialists, construction firm owners and businessmen. Many who are economically depressed have converted to Christianity and Buddhism. While the former have moved closer to the Bataks, who form the majority of the Christians in North Sumatra, the latter have moved closer to the ethnic Chinese in Medan. The Tamil Muslims who migrated as petty traders have married Malay and other indigenous Sumatran women. As Tamils and Sikhs are in sizeable numbers in Medan, they have also had a long history of community organizations. The Tamils, despite their religious and class cleavages, are viewed by others as one single community. As religious switching from being Hindu to Christian or Buddhist and back is easily done, language provides a common bridge.

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For Tamil Hindus, Tamil Christians and Sikhs, their religions have provided them centres for community organizations. Tamil Hindus and Sikhs have continued to attach great importance to their religious festivals. The Tamils, like other Southeast Asian Tamils have highlighted some of their festivals as public events. Many Medan Indonesians recognize them as Indians by these festivals. Though since the 1970s the Tamil community leaders have banned all public demonstration of such festivals, they are still carried out within the precincts of the temples. The Sikh community, being smaller, has fewer Sikh temples to hold their Sunday congregations and celebrate their festivals. The Muslim groups include the Tamils and Urdu speakers from northern India. The Urdu-speaking Muslims largely migrated as males and in smaller numbers. Very early on they married indigenous women. The children of these marriages have come to form a distinct ethnic group that tries to maintain its distinctiveness from other Indonesians. Their assimilation into Malays is progressing rapidly. Only the wealthy traders among them are expected to keep their ethnic identity owing to their trade links with Penang and India. The Tamil Muslims have also undergone a similar assimilation process like North Indian Muslims. Though “Malayization” (becoming Malays) is progressing rapidly, the presence of Tamil Hindus has provided them a link to a Tamil identity for some time to come. Indian communities in Indonesia, whether they are in Medan or Jakarta, have largely been able to maintain their identity vis-a-vis other Indonesian groups. In both cities, Indian communities form another group of people in terms of ethnicity. In Medan, for instance, the ethnic groups indigenous to the area (Malays, Karo Bataks, Simalungan Bataks) make up a small proportion of the city’s population, where Javanese have always formed the majority. Similarly, Jakarta is a city of migrants. As the capital of Indonesia, it has become representative of all the sukubangsas (ethnic groups) of the nation. In these milieu, Indian communities, being small in number, do not pose any threat and are treated like all others. Except for the Sikhs, the outer appearance does not segregate most Indians from Indonesians. As most Indonesian Tamils are extremely fluent in Indonesian, they merge into the wider population. Malaysia and Singapore represent examples of pluralistic societies that have evolved to become nations. In Malaysia, while the trade union movement tried to forge joint action between Indians and Chinese, the political process towards independence has made Indians as an identifiable ethnic group with political representation in the ruling coalition party, the Barisan Nasional (National Front). Despite this political representation,

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social scientists have commented that the vast majority of the Indian community is at the political periphery of the larger Malaysian society (Chandra Muzaffar, 1993). Indian society in West Malaysia has evolved from being internally diverse and divided. But the experiences of the past still determine the way it has evolved to be part of the Malaysian scene today. The rural plantation Tamils still form the disadvantaged class of poor people in Malaysia. Problems of poverty and ethnic segregation in national medium schools still confine them to Tamil-medium schooling and consequently lower-income jobs. As argued elsewhere in this volume, in Malaysia, the Tamil school education has revived and strengthened owing to the pro-Islamic policies pursued in public schools. Many middle-class parents have opted to send their children to Tamil schools, and in urban environments this has helped transform the Tamil school. Urban Indians also include communities of Muslims along linguistic affinities, Indian Christians, Sikhs, and Sindhis, Malayalees, Telegus and many others. As Malaysia still remains a plural society, the Indian communities have various organizations to cater to the social needs of their members. The Dravidian movement-based organizations still use caste as a mobilization technique to bring together all Adi Dravidas (ex-untouchables) for social action. All Indian groups have integrated in the way they have used Malay language for inter-ethnic communication, and adapted some of the Malay food and customs. Otherwise, except in economic participation, most Indian communities have developed their own network with newspapers, kinship ties, religious groups and even political loyalties. Most Indians are not sympathetic to Malay aspirations and political assertion. The only area where assimilation has been taking place is the ambiguous identity of the Indian Muslims in Malaysia. Indian Muslims themselves have deep intraethnic cleavages along regional, linguistic and caste lines. But their shared religion with Malays has led to assimilation of Indians into the Malay community. Though the use of the “bumiputra” (sons of the soil) status has excluded a large number of Indian Muslims as non-Malays, the process of assimilation still applies to those who use Malay fluently and practise Malay customs (Nagata 1992). Singapore, in contrast to other Southeast Asian nations, is a country made up of migrants. Since the post-war period, Indian working classes have played an important role in the trade union movement as well as in the political parties. By the 1950s, Indians were well entrenched as part of the nation-building process in Singapore. Tamil was given an official language status, and Indians were promised equal participation with the promotion of meritocracy.

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Public housing, national educational policy and economic growth have made Indians a part of the Singapore scene. Most Indians are bilingual and interact increasingly more with other Singaporeans than themselves. As elsewhere in the region, they operate as distinct communities for reasons of religion, linguistic affinity and kinship ties. With the increased pace of the nation-building processes, most caste and regional organizations orientated to India have disappeared and instead, most are orientated to the social needs of the respective communities in Singapore. Some of these are based on language affinities or religious groupings and very often are kin-centred organizations. As in Malaysia, assimilation is greater between sections of the Indian Muslim communities and the Malays in Singapore. Among inter-ethnic marriages, more than fifty per cent of the Muslim inter-ethnic marriages were between Indians and Malays. According to the Women’s Charter, about 10 per cent of marriages were between Indian grooms and Chinese brides.

ADJUSTMENT AND NEWER IDENTITIES Most Indians in Southeast Asia have become citizens of their respective countries. This has meant for most of them, distancing themselves from the natal areas of the Indian sub-continent from which their forefathers arrived. Adjustment has involved going through the national schooling process in each of the countries. Except for the wealthy trading groups, most Indian families send their children to their national schools. Through the school system, Indian Southeast Asians have become Thai, Filipino, Indonesian, Malaysian and Singapore citizens. They have become fluent in languages of the respective school systems, thus enabling them to work together with other citizens. In the case of Malaysia, an exception has been made to allow the continuation of Tamil schooling. Even here, the curriculum is written for the Malaysian environment. As Tamil schools in Malaysia were formerly located in the rubber/oil palm plantations, Tamil education was described as an agent of social reproduction (Marimuthu 1992) of the lower classes. But by the 1990s, Tamil schools in Malaysia have become the saviour of education for Tamils. Tamil as a school language is encouraged in Singapore’s schools for Indian students. This has led to the retention of cultural identity and cultural ballast for Tamils in Singapore. In North Sumatra, the learning of Tamil has been allowed for religious purposes and is taught in schools operated by Tamils. Elsewhere in Southeast Asia, literacy in Indian languages has diminished rapidly with each passing generation.

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Indians who are second generation in Southeast Asia have created newer identities suited to the conditions in each of the Southeast Asian countries. This is pronounced in Malaysia and Singapore. As Indians in these two nations are politically identifiable, their identities are often publicly viewed as acceptable. Tamil language, publicly held religious festivals, mass media, food and customs have all assumed newer interpretations to suit the environment. In both Malaysia and Singapore, ethnic identity is expressed by the promotion of the Tamil language in education, mass media, and government. Both countries have radio broadcasts in Tamil where Tamil can be heard for almost twenty-one hours daily. Similarly, daily news and programmes are telecast at certain hours on national television. Daily Tamil newspapers are widely distributed in both countries. Outside the governmental support for the language, private sector promotes Indian cinema at the theatres and through videotapes. Except for the cinema films from India, the rest of the productions in the Tamil language are done by Malaysian or Singaporean Tamils. In both countries, some religious festivals have become public festivals and have become symbols of ethnic identity for the participants. In Singapore and Malaysia, Deepavali (Festival of lights) is celebrated by all Hindus, and is considered a festival of all Indians. Both countries have declared the day as national holidays. With the Tamil Hindu religion in Malaysia and Singapore, and to a minimum extent in North Sumatra, Thaipusam (Prayers in the month of Thai), and Theemithi (Walking over fire) have become dominant festivals recognized by all Malaysians, Singaporeans, the governments, and tourist promotion agencies. Thaipusam is celebrated as a street event, where devotees travel from one temple or a spot to a Murugan temple in Singapore, Kuala Lumpur (Batu Caves), Penang and many major towns in Malaysia. Prominent government representatives visit the temple to gain political goodwill on these festive days. Another festival that has gained prominence for Tamil Hindus is the Pangunni Uthiram (an astrological event in the Tamil month of Pangunni) at Maran Temple in Pahang, Malaysia. Hindu devotees from all over Malaysia and Singapore travel to this rural temple to fulfil their religious vows to Lord Murugan. The above festivals in Tamil Nadu would be just one of the many festivals observed by Hindus. These festivals have been advanced over all other temple festivals in Malaysia, Singapore and North Sumatra. In fact, the extent of Tamil Hinduism in Southeast Asia is symbolized in the worship of Mariamman (Mother Goddess) or Murugan (God of Tamil, youth, bravery, etc). From Kota Kinabalu to Medan, and from Bangkok to Jakarta, Tamils

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have built temples to these two deities. The worship of Siva or Vishnu as in Tamil Nadu is downplayed in the development of Tamil Hinduism in Southeast Asia. The number of participants and devotees promoting these festivals has been reported as increasing annually. With increased wealth among Indians in Southeast Asia, there is an increase in temple building activities. In all the cities of Southeast Asia, in all the major town of Malaysia and the various housing estates in Singapore, Indians are rebuilding their temples and mosques with architects and temple builders from India. Many Hindu temples, mosques and churches are also hiring the services of religious specialists and Brahmin priests from the Indian sub-continent. A process of Sanskritization within Hinduism has been said to be taking place, where Brahmin priests are being used as priests for temples of Mariamman, Murugan and other deities. In South India, nonBrahmin priests will usually be the religious specialists in these temples. It is in the area of marriage and kinship that the greatest transformation is occurring among Indians in Southeast Asia. The trend for North Indian trading groups is to be caste orientated in spouse selection, but this pattern is changing in recent years as youths among Sindhi and Sikh communities attending similar educational institutions in places like Jakarta are intermarrying. As for the majority of the Indian communities, caste is giving way to class within the common religious-linguistic community. Caste in the case of arranged marriages, however, is still a factor. Parents are careful about marrying their children to spouses from mid-level castes if they are non-Adi Dravidas. But in Malaysia, Singapore and North Sumatra, where Indians mean South Indian Tamils (as compared to Ceylon or Jaffna Tamils), the current norm is love marriages. With Indians being similarly schooled and employed, love marriages are increasing. The majority of these marriages are inter-caste rather than intra-caste marriages. Parents are increasingly compromising as they are convinced that their children are at least not marrying out of race and religion. Inter-religious marriages are also increasing, though these are not widely reported in the official statistics. By preserving the Tamil language, reinvention of the Hindu religious festivals and practices, and the increasing intra-ethnic assimilation, a new type of Indian Southeast Asian is being born. It is possible that they will soon become another segment in the ethnic mosaic of Southeast Asia. They will be dissimilar from the Indians in the Indian sub-continent in their outlook and cultural practices. There may be some broadly shared values, like the speakers of the English language across the world, but they will be unique only to Southeast Asia.

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“NEW WAVE” OF HUMAN FLOW AND CONCLUSION Southeast Asia has had more economic opportunities than the countries in the Indian sub-continent today. All major cities in India and other South Asian countries are well connected by air travel to all major cities in East Asia. Singapore, Kuala Lumpur and Bangkok have become the hub centres through which Indian travellers and tourists go to other destinations in East Asia. Countries like Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia have organized events to attract more tourists from India. Table 4.2 provides the contrast between established Indian communities and the newer migrants who have arrived during the last decade. People of Indian origins (PIOs) and stateless Indians would be those who have been long established in the East Asian ethnic mosaic. The non-resident Indians (NRIs) are those who have arrived in search of the new economic opportunities that have attracted them to East Asia. The table classifies countries in East Asia into three groups. Malaysia and Myanmar, which have experienced large-scale migration and settlement of Indians in the past, have slightly more than four million Indians between them. The second group of countries accounts for a total of 557,600 Indians, with each of the countries having slightly more than a thousand Indians. The second group includes Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, Brunei Darussalam, Philippines, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore in ascending order. The third group of countries includes the East Asian countries where Indians have not settled to form communities. These include Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and China (mainland), which have less than a few hundred Indians each. Vietnam was an exception in the presocialist days when Ho Chi Min City (Saigon) had a sizeable community of Indians. As countries that experienced socialist economies, they have not been able to retain large numbers of PIOs from the past. Community formations are weak in these countries among Indians. Increasing numbers of unskilled Bangladeshis, Tamils and Sri Lankans have become a common sight in Malaysia and Singapore. These numbers have increased tremendously with the opening of India to the world economy. Though engineers and computer professionals from the Indian sub-continent are in great need in Singapore and Malaysia, unskilled labour migration is seen as more important to the economic growth of both countries. Many labour migrants sell or mortgage their meagre properties to pay the labour recruitment agencies to find employment in Malaysia and Singapore. While Tamil and Bangladeshi males come to work in the construction industry, Sri Lankan females have arrived to work as domestic workers.

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7,600 300 305 50,500 55,000 10,000 125 1,615,000 2,502,000 38,000 307,000 2,700 1,800 85,000 330

500 150 5 28,500 5,000 1,000 107 15,000 2,000 2,000 90,000 200 1,800 15,000 320

Non Resident Indians (NRIs) 100 150 300 22,000 50,000 9,000 18 1,600,000 2,500,000 24,000 217,000 2,500 — 70,000 0

People of Indian Origins (PIOs) 100 0 — — 0 — NA 50,000 400,000 12,000 — — — 0 10

Stateless

2.3 Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible 7.3 5.0 Negligible 9.71 Negligible Negligible Negligible Negligible

Percentage of the country’s population

Note: (*) My own estimation of the population of Brunei and Indonesia are different. Source: Sanjay Chaturvedi. “Diaspora in India’s Geopolitical Visions: Linkages, Categories, and Contestations”. Asian Affairs: An American Review 32, no. 3 (2005): 141–68.

Brunei Darussalam* Cambodia China Hong Kong Indonesia* Japan Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore South Korea Taiwan Thailand Vietnam

Country

Total Size of Indians

Table 4.2 Settlement of Indians in East Asia, 2005

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The “new wave” of human flow from the Indian sub-continent is undergoing a similar adjustment process like the earlier waves. However, immigration laws now are stricter and highly selective in allowing only the highly-trained and skilled to settle down permanently in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines. Unlike the “older wave” of Indians who came as assisted migrants in the first half of the twentieth century, the “new wave” Indians pay a great sum of money and take risks to come to East Asia as labour migrants. The “new wave” Indians are a recent phenomenon, and as such their impact on the settled Indian communities is rather limited at this point in time. As more “highly-trained” and skilled Indian migrants settle permanently in Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, newer processes may begin, but that may be within the ethnic framework already established in Southeast Asia.

Select References Arasaratnam, Sinnappah. “Malaysian Indians: The Formation of Incipient Society”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 190–210. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. Bachtiar, Harsja W. “Indians in Indonesia: A Component of Indonesian National Integration”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 131–50. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. Chandra Muzaffar. “Political Marginalization in Malaysia”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 211–36. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. Chaturvedi Sanjay, “Diaspora in India’s Geopolitical Visions: Linkages, Categories, and Contestations”. Asian Affairs: An American Review 32, no. 3 (2005): 141–68. Mani, A. “A Community in Transition: Indians in Brunei Darussalam”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 1–30. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. ———. “Indians in North Sumatra”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 46–97. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. ———. “Indians in Jakarta”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 98–130. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. ———. “Indians in Singapore Society”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 789–810. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993.

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———. “Indians in Thailand”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 911–50. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. ———. “Indians in Indonesia”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 31–45. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993. Marimuthu, T. “The Plantation School As an Agent of Social Reproduction”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 465–83. Singapore: ISEAS/Times Academic Press, 1993.

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5 INDIA AND SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE CONTEXT OF INDIA’S RISE Kripa Sridharan INTRODUCTION: CONTEXTUALISING INDIA’S RISE For a brief period in the late 1940s and early 1950s, India showed a robust interest in drawing close to its Southeast Asian neighbours. But this trend did not last very long. Despite their geographical proximity, India and the regional states drifted apart in subsequent years. India declined to renew and leverage its historical links with the region and after the early 1950s, its external policy remained firmly oriented towards the West and the Soviet Union. As Professor Wang Gungwu in his introductory remarks in this book points out, an Indian policy towards this region was conspicuous by its absence notwithstanding India’s long historical links with Southeast Asia and the presence of Indian diaspora. India’s interactions with Southeast Asia gradually grew feeble because of its domestic preoccupations. The principal focus of its attention turned to national development and economic self-sufficiency. More effort was expended in getting its house in order leaving it with little energy to pursue a proactive external policy. The Sino-Indian border war of 1962 accentuated this further and made New Delhi more inward looking. India was content with its leadership role in the non-aligned movement and did not show much inclination for a wider Asian presence. All this changed dramatically when 71

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India embarked on its economic reforms which coincided with the end of the Cold War. In the last sixteen years since reforms began, India has made impressive strides and is now perceived as a potential economic powerhouse. Nothing exemplifies this better than the “rising India” label pinned on it by the international community. Is India really on the rise? This is an intriguing question since the country still ranks abysmally low (127 out of 177) in the Human Development Index. Interestingly, Indian leaders themselves are cautious in their assessment of their country. This is for two reasons — one real and the other political. They are well aware that even though India has been notching up impressive economic growth figures, it still faces daunting human and physical infrastructural challenges. More than 300 million of its people are mired in poverty, it has the world’s second largest HIV population, and 54 per cent of its female population is illiterate. It is energy deficient, has poor roads, ports and airports, and has vast urban slums. These realities are cause for concern and caution. Therefore it is not surprising that Sonia Gandhi1 and Manmohan Singh never fail to remind their audience that “India rising” is only a tiny part of the Indian story since the fruits of economic growth have barely touched the vast majority of the country’s people. The other reason for their pessimism is the experience of the previous Indian government which rashly talked about “India shining” only to go down in defeat in the 2004 election. It is said that for much of India’s population the “shine” was nowhere in sight which naturally led some to dismiss the claim as presumptuous. It was this bit of painful reality that made Sonia Gandhi’s party campaign against the incumbent government’s slogan and win the election. Naturally, the new government promised to work for the common man so that India truly begins shining for all. Even now, not much has been accomplished on this score despite a slew of policies put in place by the present government. Given this, it would be politically suicidal to trumpet India’s rise when ground realities are still grim. Therefore, the “rising India” slogan is downplayed by the current political leadership although Indians themselves are upbeat about their country’s prospects.2 The outsiders, of course, are even more optimistic.3 These contending views, in one sense, contextualize the phenomenon called “rising India”. Without claiming too much, it can be said that something is certainly stirring within India which is substantially different from what the country has experienced so far. Howsoever it is interpreted, there is no denying the fact that India is the topic of conversation everywhere. To that extent, the “rising India” label is not merely a hype shorn of substance. Apart from the economic growth figures, the rise is

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also reflected in India’s approach to the world and the world’s reaction to it, notwithstanding the avowed circumspection of the ruling class.

FOREIGN POLICY REDIRECTION The change in India’s outward orientation began in the early 1990s when India revamped its domestic economic policies and shortly thereafter announced its Look East policy. Significantly, it first chose Southeast Asia as the region to market its external push. Its proactive stance could merely be glimpsed then but with time it has grown more pronounced. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh summed up the trajectory of this policy in the following words: In our view the present level of India-ASEAN co-operation is a realization of a policy choice we made almost a decade-and-a-half ago when we embarked upon our Look East policy. It was our belief at that stage that there was potential for mutually beneficial interaction which had not even been recognised, leave alone utilized. I am happy to say that the situation is quite the opposite now; both sides are very conscious of the potential and there is a healthy impatience at the pace at which we are able to utilize it.4

The exact reasoning that went into this diversification of focus is still hidden in the archives of the government of India but it is possible to identify at least three drivers of the new policy. The first was the realization that the economies of East and Southeast Asia were no longer the commodity-producers of old and that they had surpassed India in industrialization. A simple measure of this was the fact that while in 1990, manufacturing contributed only a quarter of India’s GDP, in East Asia the corresponding contribution was around 50 per cent. This shift was reflected in the structure of employment and trade as well. India, from being a role model, had become a candidate seeking proper instruction. The second factor was security. The disappearance of the USSR as India’s most important guarantor of security meant that its vulnerabilities vis-a-vis China had increased. It needed a counterpoise and looked to the countries to its southeast, which also felt the same way, albeit for different reasons, for support. Unlike in the past, there is now a more congruent view on security related issues between the two sides. Third, and perhaps less importantly, there is the Indian diaspora which India sought to leverage. There are around 6.7 million Indians (the size of

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the Indian diaspora worldwide is 25 million, spread across 110 countries) and people of Indian origin living in the countries of Southeast Asia. However, the community is not that large or influential. Even in Malaysia and Singapore, because of the wealth and occupation patterns of the Indians, those who can make a significant contribution to trade and investment is small. Perhaps, as ties between India and Southeast Asia grow, it is possible to conceive of a role for the Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia that resembles the roles played by the Indians in Western Europe, the United States and the Middle East. But that will take time. In what follows, the broad features of India’s relationship with Southeast Asia will be examined primarily in terms of the shifts in perceptions and policies. The growing linkages between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in the context of China’s growing interactions with the region will be discussed. Finally, the diaspora factor and its impact on India’s policy will be explained. The Look East policy was obviously a region-specific initiative. In some ways India was copying the label made famous by Willy Brandt with his ostpolitik.5 Closer to home, Mahathir Mohamad had also launched such a policy in the 1980s although the rationale was different.6 So it is not altogether novel that India in 1991 should have adopted this approach to revive its links with countries in the ASEAN region. In the fifteen years since the adoption of the Look East policy, India has managed to become a permanent fixture in the radar screens of Southeast Asia. This fundamental transformation resulted out of certain internal developments in India.

ECONOMIC STIMULUS In more than one way, 1991 marked a break from the past. India’s domestic economic priorities underwent a radical change as did its politics. The long run of the Gandhi family at the helm of politics was broken. The Congress Party had been reduced to a shadow of its former self and was leading a minority government. The Prime Minister was Narasimha Rao, an old party faithful but without the usual loyalty to the Gandhi family. He was a pragmatist who recognized that ideology was of not much use in foreign and economic policies. All these changes, occurring more or less simultaneously had an impact that resulted, amongst other things, in the Look East policy. An even more remarkable shift was in New Delhi and its sudden appreciation of the relevance of the wider Asia-Pacific region. When “citystates” and smaller nations like Singapore, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Korea

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began to outperform other developing economies in the 1960s and 1970s, India did not take much note, assuming that the dynamics of trade-dependent small economies were quite different from those of a “continental” economy like itself. This complacent view was shaken by China’s growth performance in the framework of a more open, trade-oriented and liberalized economy in the 1980s. India also realized that if it continued to remain trapped in a moderate growth syndrome, China would emerge as Asia’s undisputed leader. Thus, the urge to step up economic growth through increased trade and foreign investment, the need to “engage” the faster growing economies of the world, particularly Asia, drove India’s economic liberalization programme in the 1990s. When the world began to predict the dawn of an “Asia-Pacific” century and East and Southeast Asia were beginning to be regarded as the “new engines” of global economic growth, India could hardly afford to ignore the lessons of these countries’ “outward orientation”. So since 1991, albeit at a pace slower than what many expected, it has begun to integrate itself into the world economy. The result is that today the Indian economy is amongst the most open in the world and it is perceived as a global player. As Prime Minister Manmohan Singh observed in February 2005: Over the past decade and more, the debate in this country on the nature of our interaction with the world, with our wider Asian neighbourhood and with Major Powers, has also been shaped by the sweeping changes in our economic policy. The initiatives we took in the early 1990s towards economic liberalization have not only altered the nature of our interaction with the world, but have also shaped global perceptions of India. Indeed, they have shaped more than mere perceptions. They have also altered the manner in which other nations, big and small, relate with us.7

In short, India is now open for doing serious business with, not least because of the lowered tariffs and the easier inbound investment rules. Its technically skilled and talented professionals and its IT companies have perhaps been the single most important factor in transforming India’s image with consequence for its external relations. The fact that India has been the second fastest growing economy — after China — for the last few years has also helped. India and China are mentioned in the same breath now. A decade ago, this was unthinkable. An important consequence of this has been that while 15 years ago, it was India pushing its Look East policy, now it is Southeast Asia which is also pushing its Look West stance. The mutually compatible

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and complementary interests are at last beginning to register. Southeast Asian states see very clearly that although their 500 million strong domestic markets is enough in terms of scale, for continued expansion they need access to the rest of the world. India is important in this context as also in the context of China’s rise. A glance at the two-way economic interactions can be instructive at this juncture. Economic ties between India and ASEAN countries have steadily expanded although they lag behind China’s interactions with ASEAN. In the first half of 2005 China-ASEAN bilateral trade rose to US$59.76 billion and foreign investment by China into ASEAN amounted to US$226 million in 2004.8 In comparison, ASEAN-India trade in 2005 was US$15 billion. No doubt, this is a great improvement from the 1993–94 figures of US$2.5 billion but still rather meagre. ASEAN is India’s fifth most important market in terms of exports and fourth in terms of imports. But clearly more efforts are needed if trade is to reach the targeted level of US$30 billion by 2007. As against this, India is aware that China is aiming for a US$100 billion in trade with ASEAN countries in the years ahead. India’s trade is largely concentrated in a few countries within the region. Besides, diverse strategies are required to deal with a regional grouping that consists of countries with different levels of economic development. ASEAN’s external partners have to be cognizant of the variations in the economic profile of the member countries and pitch their policies accordingly. India is aware of this challenge and has therefore been encouraging trade with the less developed economies of the region by extending a line of assistance along with offers of technical cooperation. But China has been more proactive in reaching out to the poorer ASEAN states by providing them with loans, and very often writing them off. In sum, India is seeking to provide some competition to China in this area but these are yet to acquire the impact and force of the Chinese initiatives. In 2003 a Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Cooperation between India and ASEAN was signed. A proposal for an ASEANIndia FTA to be effective within a ten-year timeframe was made in 2004. Currently, serious negotiations are taking place to make this proposal a reality. But progress has not been all that smooth between the two sides because of divergent views over the negative list. Palm oil, which forms 20 per cent of India’s imports from ASEAN, is a bone of contention since Malaysia, which is the largest exporter of palm oil, wants cuts in duties which New Delhi is reluctant to concede. Even though both India and ASEAN recognize the necessity of closer trade ties, the issue remains contentious.

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POLITICAL AND SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS In India-Southeast Asian relationship, the economic imperative runs in tandem with the geo-political strand. India has to build its relations with the region in order, to the extent possible, to check China’s influence there. Moreover, countries in the region are talking in terms of community-building by deepening and broadening their integration which given their generally amicable relations is not impossible to achieve. The fact that there have been no violent military conflicts in the region is also not lost on India, which has had four wars with Pakistan and one small intervention each in Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Therefore it desires to be a part of the stable environment prevailing in its adjacent region where its presence is now being valued. The question that needs asking in this overall context is whether the India-ASEAN engagement can be taken for granted and whether it will lead to bigger and better outcomes? Much as one would like to believe so, it is necessary to be cautious. This is primarily because the region continues to be a focus of competing attention from the major powers. China’s engagement of ASEAN as part of its broader Asian strategy has become particularly noteworthy. This in turn has led the United States and its ally Japan to ponder the implications of Beijing’s activist role in the region. Southeast Asian states themselves are not entirely sanguine about the benefits of a unipolar Chinese presence in the region. As Prime Minster Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore admitted: “ASEAN countries all welcome closer ties with China. However, they also want to enhance relations with other important partners … ASEAN does not want to be exclusively dependent on China, and does not want to choose sides between China and the US, or China and Japan. This is why ASEAN favours an open framework for Asian regional cooperation.”9 Publicly, ASEAN insists that it does not regard China as a threat. But worries are expressed in private and this has led to the demand for the United States to maintain its presence in the region. India now figures in this calculus as well. It is widely recognized that China’s multilateral linkages in East and Southeast Asia are wider than India’s. The ASEAN platform allows Beijing to project a credible image of itself as a responsible rising power. China has also shown its willingness to be flexible and tailor its economic policies by paying heed to the larger interest of the region. Towards this end it has also initiated groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue and the Bao Forum. China is perceived as a driving force in all these forums. It bears emphasis that as far as an image makeover is concerned, Beijing has made substantial gains.

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As mentioned earlier, India has also kept up with regional level initiatives and inter alia, acceded to and endorsed regional security regimes like the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). Clearly, Southeast Asia now has two suitors. It was perhaps to this that Singapore’s then Trade and Industry Minister George Yeo was responding in his speech to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in Washington: “In the coming years, the growth of the Chinese and Indian economies will bring prosperity to Southeast Asia”; but “both China and India are also nuclear powers and will one day have blue water navies. It is, therefore, more comfortable for all of us in Southeast Asia if the US is also in the region.”10 One consequence of this quickening pace of trans-regional relations has been the birth of a new multilateral forum, the East Asia Summit (EAS), centered on ASEAN. India perceives this as a community-building initiative and an integral part of the evolving regional architecture.11 The summit’s longterm strategic goals seem inchoate, though not its immediate aim, which is to harness the strength of these two rising Asian powers; to have them inside the tent rather than out. China has not been particularly pleased about India’s inclusion in the summit and by extension, in the wider region. This goes against Beijing’s policy of confining India to South Asia. Fortunately for India some ASEAN states favoured a counterpoise and therefore championed India’s case for inclusion. They are convinced that India has a critical role to play in East Asia which is no longer an arena where only three powers — the United States, China and Japan — count.12 India is aware that China does not want to share the Asian stage equally with it, or for that matter with Japan. With Japan desiring a more pro-active Asian role, one must expect another twist in the story of Southeast Asia’s engagement with the world. There will be four major powers active in the region making the foreign policy choices of ASEAN states that much more complex. The politics surrounding the first East Asian Summit clearly provided a glimpse of this complexity.13 With India now emphasizing security considerations as much as the economic ones, the dilemmas for Southeast Asia could be further accentuated as it is forced to deal with sometimes mutually conflicting pressures. Managing the presence of extra-regional actors without losing complete control over regional affairs has been a regional preoccupation. ASEAN states know that the presence of extra-regional actors cannot be avoided and therefore the best option, from the region’s point of view, has always been to ensure that no one single power becomes a dominant entity within the region. But this is easier said than done.

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Apart from these strategic power plays, India-ASEAN interactions now also include third-level considerations like terrorism, sea-lanes safety, maritime security and so on. In the wake of 9/11 and especially after Southeast Asia was designated as the second front of terrorism, this dimension has assumed importance in India-ASEAN relations. 14 The determination to pool available capacities for tackling the threat of terrorism is reflected in the Joint Declaration on Cooperation in Combating International Terrorism and other Transnational Crimes that India and ASEAN have signed. India has been working bilaterally with some ASEAN countries on counter terrorism and maritime security. There is now a move to make them more broad-based and multilateral. ASEAN is keen to get Indian cooperation in combating the menace of piracy in the Malacca Straits. Indonesia was particularly interested in the joint patrolling of the seas and in working towards an institutional arrangement to coordinate these moves.15 The two countries are also in the process of initiating an “annual India-Indonesia Strategic Dialogue at the senior officials’ level …”16 India and Singapore are also parties to a defence cooperation agreement that envisages joint air, land and naval exercises to be conducted by the two sides. The agreement also covers joint cooperation in defence production, personnel exchanges for military education and intelligence exchanges.17 Singapore’s Defence Minister, Rear-Admiral (NS) Teo Chee Hean spoke of the inadequacy of individual state action against sea-borne threats and pointed out the need for collaborative efforts to tackle such threats.18 India has thus become an important partner in Southeast Asia’s maritime security strategy. In February 2006 an agreement for defence cooperation and security dialogue was also signed between India and the Philippines.19 There was a time when security inter-dependency between India and the ASEAN states barely existed but now there is a pronounced movement in the opposite direction. In September 2007 India invited Singapore, Australia, Japan and the United State for major joint naval exercises off the Andaman islands. In February 2008 India called for an alliance of navies to strengthen maritime security in the Indian Ocean region and the Straits of Malacca.

THE DIASPORA ANGLE The third dimension of India’s Look East policy is people-centric. The people of Indian origin who have made Southeast Asia their homes are an inevitable part of the India-Southeast Asia story. Of the estimated 6.7 million people of Indian origin in the region, one-third live in Malaysia and Singapore, 50,0000

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in Indonesia, 85,000 in Thailand and 38,000 in the Philippines. Myanmar has a sizeable number estimated around 2 million. The rest are scattered over the remaining Southeast Asian countries. The numbers are not that large allowing for only a narrow scope for leveraging the diaspora but they are considered important. Of late, India has become visibly proactive in linking up with its diaspora. The government strongly feels that the well-being of the overseas Indians deserves mainstream attention. It perceives the links with overseas Indians in terms of a symbiotic relationship. The recently established Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs attests to this new-found enthusiasm for seeking out the diaspora. The ministry aims to tap into this valuable human resource for India’s economic growth.20 After decades of neglect and indifference, the Indian government is wooing its diaspora. It is worth noting that India’s policies and perceptions of overseas Indians have not been consistent or uniform through the years. Three major phases can be identified in India’s approach towards the people of Indian origin who left its shores to settle in foreign lands: In the initial part of the first phase India displayed a great degree of concern for its people who resided abroad. India’s interest in the well-being of Indians resident in Southeast Asia, for instance, was particularly palpable in the immediate aftermath of its independence. Their moral and financial contribution for the independence movement was largely responsible in triggering India’s interest in them. At the same time, India was also reticent about cultivating too close a link with the migrants. New Delhi made it amply clear that once the members of these communities became foreign nationals, it was unwise for India to champion their cause against the policies of their adopted countries. India was acutely aware of the adverse conditions in which some of these communities lived and was keen to see that they received fair treatment. This was one of the reasons that prompted India to maintain the link with the Commonwealth. The connection was perceived as useful for negotiating with those Commonwealth countries which had a sizeable Indian presence. But its diaspora policy lacked a clear thrust. While eager to help the overseas Indians it was also hesitant to pursue their cause too vigorously. India seemed to be following an ambivalent approach on this issue. While it was keen to respect the sovereign rights of host states it could not be impervious to the Indian communities’ problems. It sought to bolster the legal status of its people abroad through diplomatic bargaining and negotiations.21 Unfortunately, its efforts neither befriended it to the foreign governments who resented interference, nor the settlers who felt that India was not doing enough. A good case in point was Burma where this predicament came to

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the fore in the early 1950s. Following this experience India tried to adopt a more even-handed approach and began advising overseas Indians to identify closely with the countries of their adoption. India’s stand disappointed the diaspora but generated a fair amount of diplomatic goodwill for India. This was in sharp contrast to the policy pursued by China towards overseas Chinese and the hostility it bred in the region. In sum, towards the end of the first phase India came to the conclusion that in order to keep bilateral relations on an even keel, New Delhi had to be detached in its attitude towards the overseas Indians and let them, more or less, fend for themselves. This attitude took a different form in the second phase because of the change in the profile of Indians who began settling abroad in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the people who left India around this period belonged to the upper end of the skills ladder. They left home in search of better prospects and the United States and United Kingdom were the chosen destinations. The quest for higher education led them there but subsequently these countries became their permanent homes. Not only were these people blamed for causing a brain drain but also for being ungrateful to the country where they had received subsidized education in the best tertiary institutions. They were, therefore, treated with disdain. To some extent, the derision felt for such people was justified but the government failed to acknowledge that it was lack of opportunities in India which drove some of them to migrate permanently. The official attitude towards this group of people was indifference verging on hostility. Apart from the professionally qualified people who left India, there was yet another group that was also on the move around this time. Belonging to the lower end of the skills ladder, this group was attracted by the opportunities in the oil-rich Gulf countries where there was a huge demand for construction workers. Although India benefited from their remittances (in the 1980s these remittances were instrumental in stabilizing the balance of payment situation in India) the government made little or no effort to engage them or help them in any way. However, in the early 1980s a slight change in attitude occurred at the official level. There was a flickering interest in tapping the investment potential of wealthy overseas Indians who had made a mark in the business or manufacturing sector in their adopted homes. This was the time when Indian-born British businessmen like Swaraj Paul were persuaded to invest in India. But the initiative failed because investors were put off by India’s inflexible policy regime. However, all this changed in 1991 when India embarked on its economic reforms. The change in India’s domestic economic policy led to an

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attitudinal transformation. Overseas Indians now began to be seen as an asset and they were welcomed with open arms. The non-resident Indians or NRIs as they came to be called, were plied with benefits not seen before. Even Indian foreign policy began to exert itself in the direction of those countries and regions where a sizeable number of Indians resided. One strand of the Look East policy reflected this new trend. It was hoped that the Indian diaspora would eventually do the same for the country’s investment and growth that the overseas Chinese had done for China. Even though these expectations are yet to be realized, the tenor of the relationship between India and overseas Indians has completely altered now. Derision and indifference have given way to respect and admiration. Change in perception has also resulted in policy reorientation. Initiatives like the Persons of Indian Origin or the PIO card scheme, the decision to issue dual citizenship (Overseas Citizenship of India), the creation of a dedicated ministry for overseas Indian affairs and annual events like the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas are prominent examples of this reorientation. On their past, the NRIs, who used to be sarcastically called the “Never Returning Indians”, have welcomed these initiatives and have begun repaying their dues back to the country both in terms of financial investments and social service. The government is now very keen to attract talented professionals to contribute their expertise to the country via the newly created Council of Scientific and Industrial Research. Some of these policy initiatives have occurred because of NRI pressure for an enabling environment to boost investments. Given that NRI remittances (US$21.7 billion) are nearly four times more than Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),22 their clout is now considerable which no government can ignore. This was made amply clear when the present government announced that it proposed to tax NRI remittances by requiring banks to deduct 10 per cent tax at the source before paying interest on the NRI accounts. There was speculation that this was meant as a punishment to the NRIs who had been vociferous in their support for the Bharatiya Janata party-led National Democratic Alliance government. It seemed that the Congress Party elites and the finance minister were displaying their proverbial anti-NRI stance in proposing the scheme. But no sooner that the measure was announced there was an outcry from the NRI community who complained to the Prime Minister, Ministers of Finance and Foreign Affairs as well as the newly created Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs urging the withdrawal of this proposal. They eventually succeeded in convincing the Government that this would not only adversely affect NRI remittances, but would also prevent them from investing in future

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projects in India…. The government … realized that at a time when it was targeting an increase in FDI, any such development could have disastrous consequences. It relented and finally bowed before the clout of the NRI community by withdrawing the remittance tax on their deposits as proposed in the Budget.23

India’s wooing of overseas Indians is regarded as opportunistic by some people. It is felt that while India has become more assertive in registering its displeasure about the treatment meted out to professional Indians abroad, it is quite content to leave the underprivileged settlers to their fate. For instance, in March 2003 some Indian IT professionals working in Kuala Lumpur were subjected to brutal treatment by the Malaysian police when their employment permits were being checked.24 India took strong objections to the incident and demanded an immediate probe and apology. It even threatened to take retaliatory measures. Feelings were soothed only after Malaysia proffered an apology which was probably motivated by the desire not to offend a potential powerhouse.25 India is certainly more protective of expatriate Indians but it is understandably wary of taking up the cause of the weaker sections of the Indian community. India’s hesitation, however, is natural. Not only would any interference put it at odds with the host government, it might also expose the limits of its influence to bring about any material change in the status of ethnic Indians. The Fijian experience can be instructive here. The Fijian Indian community was adversely affected by the coups of 1999 and 2000. But India’s efforts to orchestrate an international condemnation of Fiji failed miserably. Instead, the interim Fijian government blamed India for its interference and ordered the closure of the Indian High Commission in Suva. Even though India’s international stature has improved considerably since then and it is not as powerless as before, still, one should not overestimate its capacity to influence foreign governments’ policies towards the minorities. There are limits to what it can do which only reinforces the reality that “rising India” is only a work in progress, not an accomplished fact. Given its myriad domestic challenges it cannot be otherwise and therefore it is unrealistic to expect that it can influence events in other countries on behalf of its people. Mercifully, people of Indian origin are not placed in onerous situations everywhere. Many of them have done extremely well in the countries of their adoption and India takes pride in their achievements. They are also equally gratified to see India’s rising international profile which has spurred them to renew their linkages with India. This point was recently reiterated by India’s Minister of State for External Affairs E. Ahamed, who

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added that a “substantive section of people in the ASEAN countries and in India want governments to build on our shared heritage. This includes multitudes of people of Indian origin who have settled in ASEAN countries over the last one thousand years.”26

CONCLUSION This chapter began by contextualizing the “India rising” phenomenon and highlighting its different dimensions. All things considered, the economic part of the Indian story is certainly on the rise but not the social side. Despite its poor social indicators, it is India’s economic potential that is attracting the world’s attention. This finds a resonance in India’s external relations. Following its economic liberalization measures in 1991 India reoriented its foreign policy. The chapter has dwelt on the economic, politicosecurity and diaspora dimensions of its external policy, particularly in the ASEAN region. While marked progress has been made in the three areas, there are still gaps in India’s eastward push. A free trade agreement with ASEAN, though mutually beneficial, has to cross several hurdles before becoming a reality. In the security realm there is greater inter-dependency than before between India and the ASEAN states but India has to contend with a stronger Chinese presence in the region. Ties with the diaspora have significantly improved but India’s ability to protect the interests of the people of Indian origin is significantly limited. Notwithstanding these constraints India is convinced that the mass of global activity has shifted to Asia and as one of the emerging powers it must stay engaged with the region.

Notes 1

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Addressing a leadership summit in New Delhi on the theme “India: The Next Global Superpower”, Sonia Gandhi said that GDP growth alone will not lead to India’s pre-eminence. Its international status will be determined more by its ability to secure for its weaker sections a decent life through better employment opportunities, improved literacy and primary healthcare, Hindustan Times, 17 November 2006. Similar sentiments were expressed by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in his New Year’s Day message, “PIB Press Release New Delhi: Government of India”, 31 December 2006, . In a poll conducted in January 2007, 61 per cent of the people surveyed confidently said that India would be a developed country by 2020, Hindustan Times (Business & World), 1 January 2007. See Farid Zakaria, “India Rising”, Newsweek, 6 March 2006.

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“Prime Minister’s Opening Statement to the Media at the End of his Visit to Malaysia”, on board Air India One, 14 December 2005 . This policy’s main aim was to overcome the effects of the division of Germany and Europe by acknowledging this as a reality and taking incremental steps to augment ties with the East European states in the spirit of détente. This was an initiative that emphasized the benefits of learning from the Japanese experience of nation-building. It was launched in 1982 by Prime Minister Mahathir urging Malaysians to emulate the work ethics and success achieved by Japan and South Korea. Speech by Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh at India Today Conclave, New Delhi, 25 February 2005, . “China-ASEAN Trade Soars 25 per cent in first half of 2005”, 30 September 2005, . Prime Minister Lee’s speech at the Central Party School, Beijing, Straits Times, 26 October 2005. K.P. Nayar, “Why Washington Listens When Singapore Talks About India”, . See the Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs E. Ahamed’s reply to a parliamentary question on the East Asia Summit, 22 February 2006, . Singapore’s Deputy Prime Minister Professor Jayakumar observed that India has a central role in East Asia, Straits Times, 8 January, 2007. Mohan Malik, “The East Asia Summit: More Discord Than Accord”, 20 December 2005, YaleGlobal, . On shared concerns about terrorist threats and India’s keenness to work with ASEAN to combat them, see the text of the Statement by Shri Yashwant Sinha, External Affairs Minister of India at the ASEAN–India PMC(10+1), 1 August 2002, in Brunei, . Ajay Bhutani, “Indonesia Seeks India’s Cooperation to Counter Terrorism”, Hindu, 28 November 2004. “Joint Declaration Between the Republic of India and the Republic of Indonesia”, 23 November 2005, . Vivek Raghuvanshi, “India-Singapore Seal Defence Accord”, . “Emerging Security Threats: Challenges for Singapore and Southeast Asia”, speech at the Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, 14 October 2003, . Times of India, 4 February 2006. The Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs, Annual Report 2005 (New Delhi: Government of India), .

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86 21

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Charles Heimsath and Surjit Mansingh, A Diplomatic History of Modern India (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1971), p. 302. Economic Times, 18 November 2005. Rana Ganguly, “The Growing Clout of the Diaspora”, Asian Analysis (Australian National University), December 2004, . Significantly, the plight of unskilled labourers is also of concern now. President Abdul Kalam raised the issue of their exploitation and lack of legal recourse for them in his lecture to the Indian Law Institute, Newindian Express, 25 November 2006. . See the Minister’s speech to ASEAN Diplomats in New Delhi, 21 September 2006, .

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6 INDIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH EAST ASIA Pradeep K. Kapur India has been engaged with East Asia throughout its history. The depth of this engagement has been very profound. Even if we look only at the last two thousand years, it becomes clear how intensely it has been engaged with the East Asian region. The relationship between India and East Asia is therefore a very unique one in the annals of world history. The main themes of the narrative that follows are the historical background of the engagements, their scope and content, their current status and the future possibilities.

THE UNIQUENESS OF INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH EAST ASIA There are probably no other historic examples where the depth, scale and intensity of the interactions and relations have reached the order of magnitude that existed between India and Southeast Asia. What is even more remarkable is that we are not talking of a colonial power relationship, where it was easier for the colonial power to impose its will over the country/countries which it ruled. The concomitant “ruler-ruled” relationship had its own paradigms, which was obviously in favour of the ruling power, and disadvantageous or even deleterious or incapacitating for the subjugated country. Occasionally, between immediate neighbours, the nature of interaction can be very intense and broad-ranging. If the countries do not share common borders, whether they are land borders, or riparian, or even maritime borders, 87

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the intensity of these interactions is lessened, and these can also be limited to areas of overlapping or shared interests or constrained by issues of common concern. In the case of India and the East Asian countries, though the common border with India, whether land or maritime, was limited to just a few of these countries, the spectrum of relationship was extremely wide and broadranging. This historical relationship has been continuously studied and analysed by scholars from all over the world, but the true extent and nature of engagements are still not fully explored or understood. New facts keep emerging, and new insights are unravelled as more and more original manuscripts, and other important sources, such as inscriptions are discovered. Even today, there are hundreds of inscriptions, in Sanskrit, Pali, or ancient Khmer, just in one country, Cambodia, which still need to be translated. Thereafter, these could be made available to a wider cross-section of the scholarly community for further study and research. This would perhaps lead to a better understanding and appreciation of the multi-dimensional nature of the very robust and very active interactions which have been continuing between India and East Asia through the ages.

SOME OBSERVATIONS FROM PERSONAL EXPERIENCES As the Ambassador of India to Cambodia from 2001–05, and as the Director in the South East Asia Division of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs in the early 1990s, I had the opportunity to travel and understand to some extent the historical basis, and the present continuum, of our engagements with this important region of the world. Today, if a visitor lands up in Phnom Penh directly, without first visiting the temples of the Angkor Wat area, it is very difficult for the visitor to realize the extent of India’s engagement with Cambodia. This would be conveyed even to those Indians visiting Cambodia, who happened to seek advice or suggestions from the Indian Embassy. Further, while giving them some details of these temples and their importance in our shared history, it would also be conveyed that sufficient time was needed for a worthwhile visit, extending over three-four days, and reading some books or background material on the Internet, would add value to the visit. Those who were able to adjust their programmes accordingly, would invariably express their sense of satisfaction and gratitude, due to their better understanding of the context of India’s engagement and bilateral relations with the country.

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Conveying this to the government representatives and political leaders from India was not an easy task. Constrained for time, they would wish to get down to official business directly in Phnom Penh. However, with persistence, and sometimes by organizing initial meetings and interactions in the Siem Reap area, where these temples are located, it would become possible for them to visit these grand monuments. Thereafter, it would be very easy for these leaders to agree to proposals/projects, or joint initiatives or collaborations, to enhance the level of the bilateral engagement. In order to be able to respond to the queries of many of these important visitors, the author had to constantly work hard to improve his own understanding of India’s engagements. In the process, he learnt more about India, while working in Cambodia. Travelling through the other countries of the region, including Laos, Vietnam, Myanmar, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia, he gained deeper knowledge about the nature, content and depth of India’s engagements with the region.

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE OF ENGAGEMENTS In the case of the Indochina countries, the work done by the French scholars, particularly those from the Ecole Francaise d’Extreme Orient (EFEO) is indeed exceptional and outstanding. The doyen of these scholars was undoubtedly Professor George Coedes, acknowledged as the “father” of Indochinese studies. His works are even today looked upon as being “seminal”, and even masterpieces. This rich legacy was carried on by the successive scholars. Further, it was due to the efforts made by those eminent scholars and archaeologists, that the Museums at Da Nang, Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and elsewhere (including Paris) were established, which have preserved for posterity, the sculptures and carvings of Shiva, Parvati, Vishnu, Lakshmi, Brahma, Saraswati, Ganesha, Buddha, Avalokiteshwara Prajnaparamita, Indra, Krishna, Rama, Lakhsman, Sita, and other important protagonists of the Ramayana, and of the epic Mahabharata. Apsaras, Devas, Asuras, and deities from the pantheon of Buddhist and Hindu gods and goddesses and their avatars impress us by their powerful presence. Rightly the Western scholars have designated Indochina as l’Inde d’outre-mer, or as “India beyond India”. Scholars from India and from a host of other countries have supplemented the efforts of these pioneering scholars. What emerges from these studies is that the engagements were very substantial and nothing comparable has happened in any other region, in the history of the world. For example, both Buddhist and Hindu influences

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co-existed in Cambodia for twelve centuries, before this country finally adopted Theravada Buddhism. Both these influences reached the region of East Asia from different parts of India. These influences have been important factors which have contributed towards historical evolution, and the current state of society in the region.

CONTENT OF THE ENGAGEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND EAST ASIA The broad contours of the traditional construct of the engagement between India and East Asia reflect in the following areas: • • • • • •

economic, trade and commerce people-to-people interactions cross-migration of people at different levels of society marriages between the ruling dynasties from the two sides free flow of ideas, philosophies, languages and cultures, leading to insemination and cross-fertilization understanding and adapting to each other’s traditions and customs and absorbing, and in some cases indigenizing it to suit the local situations.

Through intensive and extensive interactions in all these different ways, India was able to project its “soft” power relationship with the different countries of East Asia, while at the same time absorbing new ideas in the process of reverse osmosis.

THE MAJOR ROLE PLAYERS The major role players in these interactions were enterprising adventurers, sea-farers, traders, businessman, princes, courtiers, priests, preachers, rishis, munis, teachers, architects, scholars, sculptors and other professionals. Just to understand the impact of this mind boggling multi-dimensional array of interactions, some examples are given below.

Impact on Languages Deep influence of Sanskrit and Pali can still be seen in the currently spoken and used languages in many of the countries. The names of many of the cities and some of the countries, such as Singapore, even today are Sanskrit in origin. Further, many cities in India

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and cities in Southeast Asia have had similar names such as Kurukshetra, Vijaynagar, Amaravati, Ratnagiri, Pandurangapura. Names of not only the kings, political leaders and high-ranking people, but also of common men and women, are of Sanskrit origin. No one is surprised to meet a Sita or a Ratna Devi or a Pushpa Devi throughout Southeast Asia.1 According to scholarly estimates, more than 70 per cent of the words in Khmer have Sanskrit or Pali roots. Similar correspondence exists between Thai, Lao, Bhasa, etc. and Sanskrit.

Temple Architecture The Pagan temples of Myanmar, Champa and Hoi An temples of Vietnam, Wat Phu and Luang Prabang temples of Lao, Angkor and Sambor Prei Kuk temples of Cambodia, Borobudur, Prambanan, and the Bali temples of Indonesia, the Buddhist temples in China, Korea and Japan, Ayuthaya, Sukhothai and the Khmer temples of Thailand, are just some examples of the cross-cultural influences in the field of architecture and temple design which reveal the shared wisdom in the architectural skills between India and East Asia.

The Spice Route and the Silk Route The primary purpose of the Spice Route and the Silk Route was trade. This trade was carried on in various commodities between India and the other countries of Asia. There used to be caravans which would move from one country to another buying and selling various items and goods. Over the course of time, many of the traders from India settled in the East Asian countries, and East Asian traders settled in Kashmir, Goa, Kerala, and other parts of India. These were not simply trade relations. Along the trade routes went on exchanges of ideas, cultures, and lifestyles.

IMPACT OF COLONIALISM The spread of Islam and Christianity was followed by the colonial enterprise launched by the Western countries such as Britain, France, Spain, Portugal and the Netherlands. This led to a significant diminishing of ties between India and East Asia. However, it must be mentioned that the links were not entirely snapped. Since the British were ruling over India and also over Myanmar, Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei, some of these countries were directly administered from India. Similarly, there were links between the

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French colonies of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, and the French territories in India.

THE ASIAN RELATIONS CONFERENCE OF 1947 The end of the colonial era heralded the blossoming afresh of ties between India and East Asia. At a time when most of the Asian countries were still under the yoke of colonialism, India decided to organize the Asian Relations Conference (ARC) in March-April 1947. Organize this conference, when India had still not attained its own independence, was indeed a very bold and important initiative. The objective was to foster and lay the basis for cooperation among Asian countries. More than thirty Asian nations started the process of “re-engaging” with each other in an active manner, after almost two centuries of colonial rule. The Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), under the able guidance and leadership of the visionary Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, was at the core of this initiative. Speaking on this historic occasion, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru spelt out his vision of regional cooperation, as early as March 1947, thus: All countries of Asia have to meet together on an equal basis in a common task and endeavour. It is fitting that India should play her part in this new phase of Asian development. Apart from the fact that India herself is emerging into freedom and independence, she is the natural centre and focal point of the many forces at work in Asia. Geography is a compelling factor, and geographically she is so situated as to be the meeting point of western and northern, and eastern and south-east Asia. Because of this, the history of India is a long history of her relations with the other countries of Asia. … Far too long have we of Asia been petitioners in western courts and chancelleries. That story must now belong to the past. We propose to stand on our own legs and to cooperate with all others who are prepared to cooperate with us.2

THE NEHRUVIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN “EASTERN FEDERATION” The roots of India’s renewed engagements with East Asia, can be traced back to the Nehruvian era. In fact, Nehru cherished the dream of an “Eastern Federation” much before the independence of India. In the late 1930s, Nehru wrote:

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If there are to be federations… there should be an Eastern Federation … Such an Eastern Federation must inevitably consist of China and India, Burma and Ceylon, and Nepal and Afghanistan should be included. So should Malaya. There is no reason why Siam and Iran should not also join, as well as some other nations. That would be a powerful combination of free nations joining together for their own good as well as for the world’s good. Power would not be material power, but something else also, which they have represented through these long ages.3

In 1944, again with a sense of clairvoyance and foresight, Nehru wrote in his book, The Discovery of India: The Pacific is likely to take the place of the Atlantic in the future as the nerve centre of the world. Though not directly a Pacific state, India will also develop as the centre of economic and political activity in the Indian Ocean area, in South-East Asia, right up to the Middle East. Her position gives an economic and strategic importance in a part of the world which is going to develop in the future… India will have to play a very great part in security problems of Asia and the Indian Ocean, more especially of the Middle East and South-East Asia. India is the pivot around which these problems will have to be considered.4

ENLARGING THE SCOPE OF ENGAGEMENT The Delhi Asian Relations Conference had proposed that the scope of the conference be increased to include the struggling countries of Africa, leading to the Bandung Conference of 1955. Thus the seeds for the NonAligned Movement were sown at the Asian Relations Conference. In 1949, India organized the Special Conference on Indonesia, to support the efforts for Indonesia’s independence from Dutch rule. India also supported the independence movements in Malaya, Brunei and other countries. These efforts led to intensification of the interactions between India and some of these countries, both in the bilateral context, and in the multilateral fora. In the early fifties, India was the Chairman of the International Control Commission (ICC) for the countries of Indochina, with Poland and Canada as its members. In this capacity, links with Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos were revived. With the onset of the Cold War, and India’s policy of Non-Alignment, there were some further change and evolution.5 The wars with Pakistan, and with China, diminished India’s interest and engagement with East Asia. The

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difficulties faced by the Indian economy and its relations with Cambodia and Vietnam aggravated the situation. At this point of time, the six original member states of ASEAN (Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines) were at loggerheads with Vietnam, as Vietnam had supported the anti-Pol Pot forces, and was helping to sustain them in Cambodia. It was unfortunate that the Pol Pot representatives continued to occupy the UN seat for Cambodia, till the early 1990s. It was only later that collective wisdom ensured that this seat was given to the representatives of the Cambodian government. India’s decision to continue to support the antiPol Pot regime was vindicated by the subsequent international strictures about the violent and inhuman regime. The end of the Cold War, and the resolution of the Cambodian issue, led to a substantive re-engagement of India with East Asia. As almost all other nations of the world, India had to re-orient and readjust its foreign policy after the international system was fundamentally transformed between 1989 and 1991, marking the end of the Cold War era. The toppling of the Berlin Wall, the reunification of Germany, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union were successive political earthquakes whose global aftershocks rumble even today. Whether the world became uni-polar after the end of the cold war would remain debatable. It is, however, certain that India was relieved from the constraints of the bi-polar world, enjoying freedom to foster multi lateral relations.6

Thus we see that in the macro-perspective, India’s engagements with this region have continued through the ages, with only brief periods of disruption.

EVOLUTION OF INDIA-ASEAN RELATIONS When the first meeting took place in Bangkok in 1962 to formulate the proposal of South East Asian cooperation, India was one of the active participants, with the Indian delegation led by Dinesh Singh, the then Deputy Foreign Minister. However, the war with China in 1962, and that with Pakistan in 1965, distracted the focus from its continuing participation as an initial member. Thus when ASEAN was formed in 1967, India was conspicuously absent from the proceedings.7 In 1984, there were some efforts to revive the relationship. Narasimha Rao was on his way to Bangkok to participate in the ASEAN meeting. It is understood that at Calcutta, he received a message that his mother was

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unwell and he had to return home. Thus India’s participation again fell through.

INDIA’S “LOOK EAST” POLICY In the early nineties, the Indian government took a strategic decision to intensify its engagements with the Southeast Asian countries. Thus the seeds of the famous “Look East” policy were sown. In 1992, India entered into a Sectoral Dialogue Partnership with ASEAN. The areas of shared interest included trade, investment, science and technology, human resource development, tourism, and transport and infrastructure. The scope of the engagements was further enhanced in 1996, when India became a Dialogue Partner with ASEAN. The membership of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996 added the strategic and security component to this ever increasing scale of engagement. This relationship got a significant boost when India became a summit partner of the ASEAN in 2002. This historic occasion took place in Phnom Penh in November 2002, when it was decided to enhance the scope and content of India’s relations with ASEAN. This relationship is supplemented by meetings of foreign ministers, ministers of trade and industry, and senior officials periodically, and sustained by a structure of annual summits. India signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) at the India-ASEAN Summit at Bali in October 2003. The TAC has become the benchmark for norms of inter-state conduct in the region and has been signed by all the major countries including India, China, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. India and ASEAN have agreed on a roadmap of “Partnership for Peace, Progress and Shared Prosperity” over the next fifteen years. This would take forward the India-ASEAN cooperation in diverse areas such as energy, agriculture, health, science and technology, culture, tourism, and entertainment. The Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) programme draws together India and the five ASEAN Mekong countries: Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam. 8 This was launched in 2000 and focuses on cooperation in culture, tourism, human resource development, education, transport and communication. Similarly, India is engaged with some of the Southeast Asian countries, along with some countries from the South Asia region under the BIMSTEC initiative (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation). These include Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand besides India. The BIMSTEC focuses on trade, investment, technology, transport and communication, energy, tourism and fisheries. India also supports

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the “Initiative for ASEAN Integration” (IAI) that envisages an accelerated integration of the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) within ASEAN. India is committed to deepening its economic integration with ASEAN. The India-ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement signed in 2003 envisages the full implementation of a Free Trade Area in goods, services and investments, between 2011 and 2016. Connectivity by air, rail, road, sea and inland waterways is the key to closer multi-faceted ties with ASEAN. In the immediate future, the focus is on improving air connectivity. As a result of a more liberal air services policy for ASEAN countries, air connectivity between India and the ASEAN region has improved considerably. Myanmar and the northeast region of India provide the geographical contiguity for overland connectivity between India and ASEAN. India is involved in many infrastructure projects in Myanmar. A few years ago, the Tamu-Kaleymo-Kalewa road was upgraded. The proposal for the India-Myanmar-Thailand Highway project from Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in Thailand via Myanmar is under consideration. The India-ASEAN Car Rally was organized in November-December 2004. This was for the first time in history that the representatives of India and the ASEAN had jointly traversed the region from India through Myanmar, Thailand, Lao PDR, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, in such large numbers. About sixty cars and 240 participants took part in this important event. This rally also drew attention, in a dramatic manner, to the geographical contiguity of India and ASEAN, and promoted greater awareness of the potential for trade, tourism and people-to-people contacts between India and ASEAN. In the sector of railways, India is assisting in the upgradation of the Mandalay-Yangon railway sector. A feasibility study has also been undertaken for building the missing link of about 200 kilometres between Jiribam in Manipur and Kalay in Myanmar, that may ultimately lead to a Delhi-Hanoi rail link. Other infrastructure projects are also being discussed such/as the development of the Dawei deep-sea port in Myanmar, with a road link to Kanchanburi in Thailand, the Kaladan multi-modal transport project, and the Tamanthi hydel project. By the time the India-ASEAN FTA is fully operational, some of these projects would already have been completed, to facilitate higher levels of trade, economic interaction, and people-to-people movement between India and ASEAN. India is an active participant in the ARF. Maritime security and the protection of sea lanes of communication, energy security, the long shorelines, dependence on sea-borne trade, island territories, the Exclusive Economics

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Zones and the fishing industry, are all significant factors for enlarging and intensifying security cooperation. From a geo-political perspective, the strategic horizons of Southeast Asian countries converge with those of India in the eastern Indian Ocean. India has common maritime boundaries with Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia. The main sea-lanes of communication from the Indian Ocean to the Malacca Straits pass through the territorial waters of these countries. Therefore, the extent of strategic cooperation is expected to increase even further in the days ahead.

THE FIFTH INDIA-ASEAN SUMMIT The Fifth India-ASEAN Summit was held in the Philippines on 14 January 2007. The summit was held in a friendly and positive atmosphere. The ASEAN side acknowledged that India was one of their more active dialogue partners. These interactions demonstrate the substantive nature and qualitatively new dimensions of the relationship. ASEAN leaders acknowledged India’s cultural and religious influence in the region, and in other parts of the world. They also expressed appreciation for India’s contribution to the ASEAN Development Fund and the ASEANIndia Cooperation Fund to support various projects and other activities. India’s leadership in the pharmaceutical industry, bio-technology, and traditional medicines and its advancements in the field of film production were recognized. It was felt that ASEAN can greatly benefit in these areas through technology transfer. India offered to institutionalize the training course for diplomats from ASEAN countries. India also offered to establish an ASEAN-India Science and Technology Fund for collaborative research. India’s trade with ASEAN has risen from US$2.4 billion in 1990, to US$23 billion in 2005. IndiaASEAN trade recorded an impressive growth of 30 per cent in 2005–06. This is expected to surpass US$30 billion in 2007. In his statement at the Fifth India-ASEAN Summit, the India Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, said. It is always a pleasure to be with friends. With ASEAN countries, we have special bonds of kinship as well as age-old cultural linkages…. The age old India-ASEAN linkages have been about our peoples mingling and interacting with each other. This dimension has been given a renewed thrust with the impressive growth of connectivity and the ever increasing flows of tourism between India and ASEAN. This should, I believe, remain a priority area of cooperation and, in fact, be given even further impetus. We would, in this context, be launching special tourism campaigns in ASEAN countries during the course of

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this year. We would also be happy to facilitate similar campaigns in India from ASEAN countries…. I would like to offer our young friends from ASEAN countries an invitation to visit India. We will host 10 students from each of the 10 member countries of ASEAN on a trip of the sights and sounds of modern and ancient India…. I have always been struck by the warmth and friendship that all of you bear for my country and me. I am personally committed to the deepening of the India-ASEAN relationship. I look forward to working closely with all of you for the shared vision of well being and prosperity for the peoples of our countries.9

RECENT INITIATIVES IN INDIA-ASEAN ENGAGEMENT Some of the initiatives undertaken recently for enhancing the interactions between India and ASEAN are: • •

• • • • • • •

Entrepreneurship Development Centres have been established by India in Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. A similar centre is being established in Myanmar. India had, at the Third India-ASEAN Summit, announced concessional lines of credit of up to US$200 million for eligible ASEAN member countries. Proposals amounting to US$187.5 million are presently being processed with regard to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. The projects being considered are in the areas of power generation and water resources development. A Technology Summit, jointly organized by India and ASEAN, was held in New Delhi in November 2006. IT Industry Forum in New Delhi in April 2007. Centres for English Language Training in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV) are being set up. A proposal to provide satellite connectivity between India and CLMV countries for tele-medicine and tele-education applications is under discussion with the ASEAN side. A training course for ASEAN diplomats was conducted by the Foreign Service Institute in New Delhi in August–September 2006. A proposal for holding Education Fairs in ASEAN countries is presently under consideration by the ASEAN side. Training courses in IT are conducted regularly for ASEAN countries. Two training courses were conducted in January–February 2006. A

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Workshop on Information Security and a Seminar on e-Learning were held in August and November 2006 respectively. A trade mission of twenty-six ASEAN SME entrepreneurs visited India in August 2006. ASEAN media personnel have visited India in November 2006 and January 2007. India has invested considerable resources for the development of cross border infrastructure. A feasibility report by RITES on an IndiaMyanmar rail link has been completed. Discussions are being held for the finalization of decisions relating to financing of the proposed IndiaMyanmar-Thailand trilateral highway. Also, under consideration are cross-border roads connecting Mizoram and Myanmar. The first meeting of the ASEAN-India Working Group on Health and Pharmaceuticals was held in New Delhi in June 2005. The first ASEAN-India Consultations on Agriculture were held in Mandalay in July 2005. This was followed by another round of consultations in Bohol (Philippines) in August 2006. The third meeting of the ASEAN-India Working Group on Transport & Infrastructure was held in Chiang Mai (Thailand) in May 2006. The first meeting of the ASEAN-India Tourism Working Group was held in Chiang Mai (Thailand) in July 2006. The first meeting at the ministerial level was held in January 2007 in Singapore. The Fifth Meeting of the ASEAN-India Working Group on Science and Technology was held in New Delhi in November 2005. Cooperation in science and technology is fairly extensive. Projects implemented/under implementation are in the areas of advanced materials, biotechnology, science and technology policy management, marine science and food science and technology.

BILATERAL INITIATIVES AND POSSIBILITIES Brunei: There is a potential for construction projects by Indian PSU’s in Brunei, and for the sourcing of LNG from Brunei. Cambodia: Cambodia is the major recipient of economic assistance from India in ASEAN. India has assisted Cambodia in the restoration of the famous Angkor Wat temples, and in the rehabilitation of irrigation works. Cambodia has also received food items and support for the conduct of the general elections. India has contributed a sum of US$1 million to the Khmer Rouge War Crimes Tribunal.

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Indonesia: Indonesia is India’s third largest trading partner in ASEAN, with significant investments by Indians in Indonesia. There are regular defence exchanges including joint naval exercises. There is a collaborative Telemetry Tracking Station which was established in Indonesia by Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO). The two countries signed a “New Strategic Partnership” in November 2005. India has been extending significant relief assistance to Indonesia, after the tsunami disaster, and similarly after the earthquakes in northern Sumatra in March 2005 and in Java in 2006. Lao PDR : Laos has been the recipient of significant amounts of assistance as grants and aid under Lines of Credit for transmission lines, irrigation projects, National Data Centre and other projects. Malaysia: Malaysia is India’s second largest trading partner in ASEAN. It is also home to one of the largest Indian diaspora in the world numbering about 1.8 million. There is collaboration in the space satellite industry, highway construction sector and in India’s airport construction sector. A number of cultural events are planned to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of establishment of diplomatic relations. Philippines: A number of Indian IT companies have established a presence in Philippines. Both the countries are working closely to promote the Doha Development Agenda. Singapore: Singapore is India’s largest trading partner in ASEAN and the ninth largest investor in India. It has played a leading role in promoting India’s partnership with ASEAN and the East Asia Summit. The economic cooperation between the two countries is expanding under the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), and so is bilateral defence cooperation. Thailand: A Framework Agreement on Establishing a FTA (2003), and an Early Harvest Scheme covering eighty-two items have been signed between the two countries. Thailand is also supportive of India’s enhanced participation with East Asia and both work together in the ACD (Asian Cooperation Dialogue). Vietnam: Vietnam is supportive of enhanced participation by India in the East Asian Region. There is significant cooperation between the two

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countries in the field of defence. It is also the recipient of credit lines offered by India.

THE ENLARGEMENT OF INDIA’S ‘LOOK EAST’ POLICY The principal objective of the “Look East” policy, when it was conceived in the early 1990s was enhancing the engagement with ASEAN. This policy has gradually evolved to include the Far Eastern and Pacific regions, and facilitated closer links with China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, and the Pacific island states. India is continuing to seek political and economic convergence with this most dynamic region which is emerging as an economic powerhouse of the world economy. The resurgence of Asia in political and economic terms has been further propelled by recent trends of globalization.10

THE FIRST EAST ASIA SUMMIT India participated in the first “East Asia Summit” (EAS) held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. The summit was a historic event which marked the beginning of a process that could define the future architecture of the region. India believes that the long-term goal of the EAS should be the creation of a prosperous community of nations built on shared values and interests. India has therefore proposed the establishment of the “Asian Economic Community” which would be the driver of growth and economic integration in the entire region. India’s trade with the EAS countries has increased from US$8 billion in 1990, to US$67 billion in 2005. At the same time there has been an increase in FDI flows, both from India to the region and from the region to India.

THE SECOND EAST ASIA SUMMIT The Second East Asia Summit was held in Cebu (Philippines) on 15 January 2007. A Declaration on “East Asia Energy Security” was issued. The EAS leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the eradication of poverty in East Asia, agreed to strengthen regional educational cooperation, and recognised the need to sustain economic growth and stability in the region. They also agreed to forge closer cooperation for pandemics like avian influenza, and for national disaster management.

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INDIA’S INCREASING ECONOMIC PROFILE The last decade of the twentieth century saw the economic crisis of 1991 and the aftermath of miraculous recovery. The architect of this recovery was the then finance minister, Manmohan Singh. On 24 July 1991 he observed: As we enter the last decade of the 20th century, India stands at the crossroads. The decisions we take and do not take, at this juncture, will determine the shape of things to come for quite some time.11 The liberalization of the Indian economy and the freeing of foreign exchange restrictions made possible the flowering of many new enterprises, especially in the IT sector. By the time of the 1994–95 budget, India had reserves of nearly US$13 billion in foreign currency assets, compared to US$1 billion at the time of the crisis of 1991. The current level of reserves with US$185 billion (9 February 2007) at the command of the Indian economy speaks for itself. India’s economic profile, both within the EAS region and globally, has been increasing significantly. Indian industry is establishing an unprecedented global presence, the likes of which have not been witnessed earlier. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh mentioned in January 2007 at Cebu: Today India is very different from the India of 1991. It is now a vibrant market place. Our entrepreneurs are aggressively investing overseas. India has also emerged as a productive and profitable investment destination. We have a US$700 billion economy that is growing at 7–8% every year. In the first half of the current year, economic growth reached 9.1%.

INDIA’S RELATIONS WITH CHINA, JAPAN, AND SOUTH KOREA China: China is India’s largest neighbors and developing friendly cooperation with China is one of the priorities of Indian foreign policy. There have been frequent high level visits between the two countries. This has helped in the process of building mutual trust and understanding. Further, the relations have diversified across a wide range of areas. The relations have reached a level of maturity and the two sides are trying to build upon existing commonalities and identify newer areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. At the same time, effort is being made to address the differences, including over the boundary question, in a proactive and mutually acceptable

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manner, without allowing it to affect the comprehensive development of the bilateral relationship. The positive trends are most vividly manifest in the rapidly increasing trade and economic relations. Trade turnover crossed US$25 billion in 2006, which was an increase of 34 per cent from 2005. Indian industry is looking with confidence at the opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation with China. Chinese firms are investing in India, and so are Indian firms investing in China. A Joint Study Group that had been set up to examine the potential complementarities between the two countries has recommended an IndiaChina Regional Trading Arrangement. People-to-people contacts, tourism, cultural and other cooperation are increasing steadily. Both the countries are looking at their relationship in a larger regional and global perspective, as they constitute more than one third of the world’s population and are among the largest and fastest growing economies of the world. There is increasing cooperation within the framework of the UN, the WTO, with the G-8, and trilaterally with Russia. The visit of Chinese President Hu Jintao to India in November 2006 marked the high point of the India-China Friendship Year in 2006. Both countries decided to upgrade India-China relations to a qualitatively new level and to further substantiate and reinforce their “Strategic and Cooperative Partnership” which was established in April 2005. They agreed to pursue a “ten-pronged strategy” of ensuring comprehensive development of bilateral relations; consolidating commercial and economic exchanges; expanding all-round mutually beneficial cooperation; instilling mutual trust and confidence through defence cooperation; seeking early settlement of outstanding issues; promoting trans-border connectivity and cooperation; boosting cooperation in science and technology; revitalizing cultural ties; nurturing people-to-people exchanges; and expanding cooperation at the regional and international level. On 14 February 2007, India and China launched the “India-China Year of Friendship through Tourism”, with a joint logo and a monthly action plan till January 2008. The Chinese language version of the “Incredible India” website, and India’s tourism literature in Chinese language was released on this occasion. Participation in travel and tourism fairs, organizing of road shows, and holding of cultural and food festivals, are being undertaken to provide a perspective on culture, traditions and culinary delights to the people of the two countries. They are also cooperating in various fields: industry, finance, agriculture, water resources, energy, environment, media, transportation, infrastructure, information technology, health, education, and youth affairs.

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This reflects the consensus between the two sides that there is more than just a bilateral dimension to their relations. This has now acquired a long-term, global and strategic perspective with the growing influence of the two countries on the regional and global stage. These relations should not be viewed with the old mindset of “balance of power” or “conflict of interest”. While some degree of healthy competition between the two countries is inevitable, particularly in the economic field, there is growing realization that there is enough space and opportunity in the region and beyond for both countries to grow as friends and partners, and not as adversaries or rivals. Asia has a promising future for dynamic growth, and it is natural that China and India should be two important players in Asia’s quest for peace, prosperity and stability. Japan: As the world’s second largest economy, Japan plays a key role in Asia and the world. Both India and Japan have agreed to give a new strategic orientation to their “Global Partnership in the New Asian Era”. They have adopted a concrete eight-fold initiative to strengthen it. They will be key players in Asia in the coming decades, with a broad convergence of long-term interests and shared concerns. Economic partnership constitutes an important dimension in their relations and a joint study group has been set up to explore how to upgrade the framework for comprehensive economic cooperation, including the feasibility of an India-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement. The two countries are making efforts to encourage large-scale Japanese investment in infrastructure projects in India. The MOU for setting up the Delhi-Mumbai Industrial Corridor to promote high quality physical and social infrastructure was signed in December 2006. They are stepping up cooperation in the field of science and technology as well as security and defence. Various initiatives are being taken in the field of culture and academics. People-to-people contacts are being strengthened to raise mutual awareness in both countries. South Korea: South Korea is an important partner for India. India–South Korea relations are friendly and cooperative and have steadily developed, since diplomatic relations were established just over three decades ago. India and South Korea have decided to establish a “Long-Term Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity” in order to fully utilize the substantial potential and opportunities for deepening mutually beneficial cooperation. A study group has also been set up to see how to energize the economic relationship including the feasibility of a comprehensive economic cooperation agreement.

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South Korean companies are seeking markets in India. They have made significant investments in India, and have a good understanding of the local market dynamics. They also envisage India as a global manufacturing hub for other markets in Asia and elsewhere. Similarly, Indian companies are also buying into South Korean companies as they seek to become globally competitive.

CONCLUSION India’s participation in the East Asia Summits is a tangible result of the significantly accelerated engagement with the ASEAN and other East Asian countries over the past decade. Growing multi-faceted cooperation, economic integration, as well as improved connectivity between India and its eastern neighbourhood make India a natural partner. This has the potential of changing strategic equations in Asia and the world, and facilitating the emergence of Asia as a new pole of growth and influence. An open and fast growing India has much to offer, and will help to create opportunities for mutually beneficial growth and prosperity. The proposed Asian Economic Community, which could bring together the larger Asian economies of ASEAN, China, India, Japan and South Korea, could constitute a new driver of growth at the global level. An integrated market from the Himalayas to the Pacific Ocean linked by efficient road, rail, air, and shipping services can be envisaged. A community of nations, roughly the size of the European Union in terms of income, is expected to crystallize. Bigger than NAFTA in terms of trade, it would bring together half the world’s population, with foreign exchange reserves exceeding those of the EU and NAFTA put together. Such a grouping would constitute an “arc of advantage” across which there would be large-scale movement of people, capital, ideas, and creativity. It could be an anchor of stability and development for Asia and the world. If this comes about, and progress is made in collaborative projects, it may become possible in the not so distant future for tourists, pilgrims, workers and businessmen to ride a train from Delhi to Singapore or a bus from Kolkatta to Bangkok. The developing preferential and free trading arrangements among India and the East Asian countries and groupings could evolve into a broader regional trade and investment architecture that would provide additional benefits, stronger synergies and deeper complementarities. India’s policy towards ASEAN and other countries of East Asia will continue to seek greater political and economic convergence; promotion of

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regional economic integration; emphasis on South-South cooperation; focus on security and strategic collaboration; fostering of societal links through educational exchanges and cultural cooperation; and enhancement of peopleto-people contacts and engagements.12

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12

Many examples of names of Sanskrit origin could be listed here: Suryavarman, Jayavarman, Mahendravarman, Dharanindravarman, Jayendravarman, Bhavavarman, Chitrasena, etc. Even the former king, Norodom Sihanouk’s full name, in its original and in its Sanskrit form, would be as follows: “Preah Bat Preah Reach Samdech Norodom Sihanouk” ( priya pada priya raja samudayaka narottama sihanuka). Similarly the name of the current king in its English form is: “Preah Bat Preah Borom Neath Samdech Norodom Sihamoni” ( priya pada priya parama natha samudayaka narottama sihamani ). The other family members even today have names such as Norodom Ranariddh, (narottama ranariddha), Norodom Buppha Devi, (narottama pushpa devi ), Rattna Devi, Sita Devi, etc. This is also true of the dynasties in Thailand and other countries. Surjit Mansingh, ed., Nehru’s Foreign Policy, Fifty Years On (New Delhi: Mosaic Books, 2003), pp. 152–53 (reprint, 1998 first edition). Jawaharlal Nehru, The Unity of India: Collected Writings, 1937–1940, (London, 1941), p. 327, cited by Tan Chung “Nehru’s Dreams of an Eastern Federation”, in Nehru’s Foreign Policy, Fifty Years On, edited by Surjit Mansingh (New Delhi: Mosaic Books, 2003) (reprint, 1998 first edition). Cited by Ranjit Gupta, India’s ‘Look East’ Policy, in Indian Foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Atish Sinha and Madhup Mohta (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), p. 351. Raymond L. Garthoff, A Journey through the Cold War: A Memoir of Containment and Coexistence (Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001). Devin T. Hagerty, ed., South Asia (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2005). Frederic Grare, Amitabh Mattoo, eds., India and ASEAN: The Politics of India’s Look East Policy (New Delhi: Manohar, 2001). Pradeep Kapur, “The Mekong as the Life Line of Cambodia”, in Sachchidanand Sahai, ed., The South East Asian Review 31 (2006), Special Issue on India and the Mekong Countries. Extracts from Indian Prime Minister’s Address at the Fifth India ASEAN Summit, Cebu, the Philippines, January 2007. Pankaj Kumar Jha, “Reassessing India’s Look East Policy”, World Focus, Annual Number 2003, p. 15ff. Ajay Ahuja, ed., Manmohan Singh, CEO, India Inc (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2004), p. 40. S.P.M. Tripathi, India and ASEAN 10 (New Delhi: Jnanada Prakashan, 2000).

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7 INDIA’S ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH EAST ASIA: TRENDS AND PROSPECTS Nagesh Kumar INTRODUCTION The Indian economic performance in the recent years has been attracting widespread attention. With over 8 per cent growth sustained over the past few years and robust outlook for the future, India is emerging as a growth driver for the Asian and the world economy. With the reforms undertaken since 1991, Indian economy has deepened her economic integration with the world economy and trade and international investments now occupy a far more important place in the economy than ever. Alongside the global economic integration, India has also taken a keen interest in regional economic integration in South Asia and East Asia. It is an active member of SAARC and BIMSTEC, among other initiatives for regional integration in South Asia. It has also adopted a Look East policy to guide its foreign economic relations to deepen her engagement with ASEAN and East Asian countries, and is articulating a vision of broader pan-Asian economic integration. This chapter briefly overviews the macroeconomic performance of Indian economy and the emerging patterns of its global economic integration. It also discusses India’s approach to regional economic integration in South Asia. It makes some comments on the relevance and potential of recent approaches towards regional cooperation in South Asia such as SAFTA and some proposals for making them more effective. The structure of the chapter 107

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is as follows: Section 2 takes stock of the macroeconomic performance of the Indian economy, its outlook and global economic integration against the background of reforms undertaken since 1991. Section 3 overviews India’s approach to regional economic cooperation in Asia with particular reference to South Asia. Section 4 presents some indicators of India’s growing integration with East Asia. Section 5 makes some concluding remarks.

MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE, OUTLOOK AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION The recent performance of Indian economy is attracting a lot of attention worldwide for its dynamism and long-term prospects. There has been a progressive acceleration in the growth performance of the Indian economy over the past five decades. In the first thirty years of independence, India’s growth rate averaged 3.5 per cent which was derisively called “Hindu rate of growth”. Since 1980, however, there has been a marked acceleration in growth rates and average annual real growth rate of GDP over the 1980s, 1990s and first three years of the new millennium has been close to 6 per cent. There has been a further acceleration in the growth trajectory since 2003 and the average growth rate over the past three years has been higher than 8 per cent per annum (see Figure 7.1). Another aspect of India’s recent growth performance has been that volatility of growth has come down substantially from the pre-1980s period (Kelkar 2004). The Indian economy has developed a remarkable resilience to external and internal shocks as has been demonstrated over the past decade when it survived the effects of East Asian crisis, slow down of the world economy towards the end of the 1990s, and the oil price shocks without much disruption. Furthermore, as the growth rate of population has declined over time from 2.3 per cent to 1.6 per cent, per capita GDP has been rising much faster than before. A higher growth rate of GDP produces an even greater acceleration in per capita income. The average rate of per capita income therefore has moved up from just 1.2 per cent during the first three decades in the post-Independence period to nearly 4 per cent during the 1990s and to 6.6 per cent in the last few years. With these rates of growth, the Indian economy in terms of GDP in current prices is projected at US$850 billion in 2006 with a per capita GDP of US$750 (IMF 2006). Among other aspects of macroeconomic performance is the relative stability. In a developing country like India, inflationary pressures could have severe consequences for the poor, apart from its adverse impact on

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Figure 7.1 India’s GDP Growth Rates, 1951–2006 12 10 8 6 4 2 5 19 0–5 52 1 19 –53 5 19 4–5 56 5 19 –57 58 19 –59 60 19 –61 62 19 –63 64 19 –65 66 19 –67 6 19 8–6 70 9 19 –7 72 1 19 –73 7 19 4–7 76 5 19 –77 78 19 –79 8 19 0–8 82 1 19 –83 84 19 –85 8 19 6–8 88 6 19 –89 90 19 –91 9 19 2–9 94 3 19 –9 96 5 19 –97 98 20 –99 00 20 –01 02 20 –03 04 20 –05 06 –0 7

0

19

–2 –4 6

Source: Based on data from Economic Surveys, Ministry of Finance, Government of India, various years.

the competitiveness of the economy. There has been a steady decline in the rate of inflation (measured in terms of the growth in consumer price index) currently around 4–5 per cent. India has also achieved relative stability in the real exchange rates even under a managed floating regime. Poverty alleviation has been one of the most important challenges faced by the Indian policymakers. There has been an ongoing academic debate on the poverty numbers in the latest NSS Round conducted in 1999–2000 on the measurement issues and consistency with the earlier numbers. However, no one will question the fact that the proportion of population below poverty line has gone down. Going by the head count ratio, the population under poverty line declined from about 44 per cent in 1983 to 26 per cent in 1999–2000 a period covered by the fifty-fifth round of National Sample Survey (NSS). Notwithstanding such a reduction in the proportion of the people in poverty, India still has about 250 million people considered as poor, a major challenge before the policymakers. The Indian economy has witnessed a major structural transformation in terms of the distribution of GDP across sectors, from one in which agriculture accounted for about 40 per cent of the GDP in 1980 to one dominated by

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services accounting for over 56 per cent by 2002, while the share of agriculture has gone down to under 25 per cent. Rising growth rates of the service sectors means that services account for an even higher proportion of growth. Perhaps the most impressive aspect of India’s economic performance during the last decade relates to the external sector. From a situation of crisis in 1991 with the current account deficit as high as 3.1 per cent of GDP, there has been a remarkable turnaround with current account surplus since 2001/02, reaching 1.8 per cent of GDP by 2003/04. Since 2004/05, however, a sharp rise in oil imports bill has again led the current account balance turning negative to the tune of 1.3 per cent of GDP. Growing inflows of capital have enabled the country build comfortable foreign exchange reserves of over US$160 billion at present. This transformation took place with higher growth rate of exports of merchandise and invisibles of 11.5 per cent during 1990-91 to 2002-03 compared to that of imports (little over 8 per cent). The export growth over the past three years has been over 20 per cent although import growth has been higher due to booming oil prices.

Optimistic Growth Outlook over Medium Term India’s potential to sustain rapid growth rates in the future is widely annotated. Goldman Sachs’ BRICs study (2003) has remarked that “India has the potential to show the fastest growth over the next 30 and 50 years” (Wilson and Purshothaman 2003). They have estimated its per capita growth rate to be above 5 per cent (or over 6.5 per cent in gross GDP) over the next thirty years. Another study projects India’s growth rate to 2025 at 7 per cent “with more upside potential than downside risks” ((Rodrik and Subramanian 2004b). In sustaining high growth rates, India will also be able to benefit from the demographic transition that will see a rising proportion of working age population in the coming years. This has implications for the savings rate and productivity which should rise with a consequent rise in the growth rate. In contrast the proportion of working age population in many developed countries such as Japan and also in emerging economies such as China will be declining.

ECONOMIC REFORMS AND GLOBAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION Since 1991, a major effort has been undertaken with respect trade and investment liberalization as a part of the package of reforms that seek to enhance the integration of the Indian economy with the world economy.

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Peak tariff rates have come down from 150 per cent in the early 1990s to just 12.5 per cent by 2006. The quantitative restrictions on imports have been phased out and the bulk of the tariff lines (nearly 70 per cent) have been bound under WTO. Most sectors of the economy are today open to FDI and in most manufacturing sectors, foreign investors can retain up to 100 per cent ownership although sectoral limits apply in service sectors. The economic reforms undertaken since 1991 have led to a lot of industrial restructuring in the country with a focus on competitiveness and global economic integration.1 The growing economic integration of the Indian economy is reflected in terms of different indicators. Exports and imports of goods have grown much faster (about 10 per cent on average during the 1990–2002 and currently at around 25 per cent) than the economy, hence the proportion of international trade has gone up by 250 per cent in the past two decades (that is, from 14 per cent in 1985 to 35 per cent by 2004/05) more in tune with the ratio in large economies such as the United States or Japan. An important and more dynamic aspect of India’s integration with the world economy is through growing trade in services. India has emerged as a hub for outsourcing of IT software and other business services such as business process outsourcing (BPO) and now R&D and design services. India is attracting attention of major multinational enterprises (MNEs) around the world wishing to make it a sourcing base for knowledgebased services to tap the availability of high quality low-cost trained human resources besides scientific and technological infrastructure. Another aspect of growing global integration is through FDI — inward and outward. India is currently attracting magnitudes of FDI inflows of the order of US$6–7 billion (over US$6.6 billion in 2005) per annum in fresh equity compared to about US$200 million per annum in the early 1990s. Yet, India’s record in attracting foreign investment may be considered somewhat less impressive compared to other countries like China. It has been argued, however, that differences are overplayed because of under-reporting of FDI inflows by India by not following the internationally agreed definition that should add reinvested earnings and inter-corporate borrowings to FDI inflows. The figures of FDI inflows in China are believed to be over-estimates of the real FDI inflows in view of round-tripping of Chinese capital. Taking into account these differences and also normalizing FDI flows by the size of respective economies, the difference may not appear as dramatic as it does from the reported figure.2 There are indications that with the highly liberal FDI policy regime, large and growing domestic market, among other advantages, India is attracting increasing attention of MNEs. According to A.T. Kearney’s FDI Confidence Index, global investors upgraded India from fifteenth to sixth

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most attractive FDI destination worldwide in 2003, to third in 2004, and to second place in 2005 only after China. In terms of their Offshore Location Attractiveness Index, India remained at the top by a wide margin in 2005 as it did earlier.3 Therefore, the investment climate in the country is steadily improving. India’s science and technology (S&T) infrastructure coupled with the relative abundance of the country in qualified but cheap R&D manpower has begun to attract MNEs to it for setting up global or home-base augmenting R&D centres. In the past five years, nearly 100 MNEs have set up R&D centres in India. FDI inflows are not the only channels of integrating Indian economy with the global production chains. A number of Indian firms that have been able to build up technological and entrepreneurial capability are seeking to internationalize their operations with a combination of overseas acquisitions and green-field investments. Indian companies have reportedly invested nearly US$10 billion in the last six years in 4,000 projects. Among developing countries, India has emerged as a significant source of outward investments with its ranking among the sources of FDI improving and is noted for “its potential to be a large outward investor”.4 There has been growing interest in the emergence of a number of India’s home-grown enterprises on the international scene over the past few years on the strength of their own technological capability. One such area of strength is pharmaceuticals where several Indian pharmaceutical companies have been able to build substantial process development capability, helping India emerge as the world’s most competitive supplier of a large number of life-saving generic drugs. Nearly a third of India’s production of pharmaceuticals is exported. India now has the highest number of U.S. FDA-approved pharma plants (77) outside the United States. Almost all of the export effort is undertaken by domestic enterprises which have built up their own technological and industrial capability, brand names, and overseas presence in several countries. Automotives is another area where Indian enterprises are making their presence felt with companies like Tata Motors putting in the market home-grown but world-class vehicles in the market. India’s emergence as a competitive producer of IT software is widely recognized. The top exporters of IT software from India are all domestic companies such as TCS, Infosys, Wipro, among others. India exported software worth US$23.6 billion in 2005/06. In terms of international standards of benchmarking in the industry, viz. SEI-Capability Maturity Models, Indian dominance in high levels of maturity (that is, Levels 4

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and 5) is overwhelming among non-U.S. companies. Indian companies have presence in many countries. TCS for instance, has overseas offices in over fifty companies. India exports IT and IT-enabled services to over 133 countries and the Indian firms are training people in IT in fifty-five countries. A single Indian firm — NIIT — for example today runs 100 training centres in China. These achievements become all the more striking when considered against the fact that it has been achieved almost entirely by local firms.5

Challenges Notwithstanding the optimistic picture that comes out of the performance of macroeconomic indicators, no one should under-estimate the challenges that the country faces. There are still 260 million people waiting to be lifted out of poverty. India has to find jobs for more than thirty million jobless people. Infrastructure gaps are becoming bottlenecks for sustaining growth momentum. Inequities between regions are widening. For instance, southern and western states are growing faster leaving northern and eastern states. To address these challenges, India needs massive investments, for instance, for addressing the inadequacies of physical and social infrastructure. Billions of dollars are being invested in building and upgrading highways but more resources are needed. The government has estimated that US$ 350 billion are needed to be invested in infrastructure over next five years.

INDIA’S APPROACH TO REGIONAL ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN ASIA India has always actively participated in the schemes of regional economic integration. India has been a founder member of the Bangkok Agreement that happens to be one of the first preferential trade agreements, signed in 1975 combining some of the Asian countries including South Korea, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Lao PDR and since 2000 also China. India has also been an active member of the Asian Clearing Union since its inception in the mid-1970s. India has been participating in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) formed in 1985. SAARC adopted the SAARC Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA) in 1995 as an arrangement for exchange of tariff preferences between the member countries of the grouping. India has exchanged tariff concessions with its partners under SAPTA. However, the process of trade liberalization under

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SAPTA has been very slow due to the positive list approach being adopted and impact has been minimal due to small product coverage, shallow depth of concessions and inability to address non-tariff barriers. SAPTA’s transition to SAFTA projected to happen by 1999 did not happen for another decade. SAARC adopted SAFTA Treaty at the Islamabad Summit in 2004 that has come into force from July 2006 after ratification by all the seven member countries. Slow progress of trade liberalization within the SAARC framework prompted India to explore bilateral FTAs with neighbouring countries. India signed a Trade and Transit Treaty with Nepal in 1996, giving the Himalayan nation a non-reciprocal free access to the Indian market. Bhutan had already been enjoying a similar treatment. A bilateral free trade agreement was signed with Sri Lanka in 1998 which became effective from April 2000. The success of this FTA has prompted Sri Lanka and India to consider expanding the scope of the FTA to cover investments and services in a comprehensive economic partnership agreement (CEPA). Regional economic integration in South Asia is desirable as it has the potential to exploit their considerable synergies and complementarities for their mutual advantage. The economic interdependence and prosperity that it will generate also has the potential of fostering lasting peace in the region. SAFTA could create great market access opportunities for other South Asian countries by giving duty-free access to the much larger market of India. For India, which constitutes about 70 per cent of the combined SAARC market, the gain in terms of market access arising from SAFTA may not be substantial, however. A country of India’s size and aspirations has to look beyond its immediate neighbourhood to seek economic opportunities while consolidating the South Asian economic integration. It was with this objective perhaps that India adopted the Look East policy in 1991.

Look East Policy and India’s Economic Engagement with East Asia India’s Look East Policy adopted in 1991 has involved increasing engagement with ASEAN and other East Asian countries. With rapid growth sustained over the past decade East Asia was emerging as the most dynamic region in the world. Besides geographical contiguity, India had shared centuries-old cultural bonds with the region. The economic structures of East Asia with substantial hardware and manufacturing prowess and India’s emerging strengths in services and software seemed complementary.

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India–ASEAN Engagement Strengthening the economic engagement with ASEAN countries was the immediate priority under the Look East policy. India had deep age-old civilizational links with a number of ASEAN countries. With the entry of Myanmar, ASEAN also became a contiguous neighbour of India besides sharing maritime boundaries with Thailand and Indonesia. India’s geographical contiguity with ASEAN was highlighted vividly by the ASEAN–India Car Rally organized in November 2004. ASEAN also seemed to be like a bridge for India’s economic dealings with the East Asian countries given its vibrant economic relationship with the northeast countries of Japan and South Korea. As a part of the Look East policy, India started to engage ASEAN and became its sectoral dialogue partner in 1992. The partnership with ASEAN evolved steadily to full dialogue partnership in 1995, participation in ASEAN Regional Forum since 1996 and an annual summit-level interaction since 2002. In 2003, India signed a Framework Agreement for Comprehensive Economic Cooperation involving an FTA to be implemented over a ten-year period. At the ASEAN–India Summit of 2004, the leaders adopted a long-term vision document of ASEAN–India partnership spelling out the priorities based on a document prepared by think-tanks of the countries.6 India’s Framework Agreement with ASEAN is usefully complemented by bilateral and sub-regional attempts towards economic cooperation including bilateral agreements with Thailand and Singapore. Similar arrangements are being studied with Malaysia and Indonesia. There are also sub-regional initiatives such as BIMSTEC and Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC). Within the framework of BIMSTEC a Framework Agreement for FTA was signed in Phuket in February 2004 at the Ministerial Meeting of the grouping combining initially Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Thailand, Sri Lanka and now Bhutan and Nepal as well. BIMSTEC is therefore a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. As a result of the conscious policy of engagement of ASEAN by India and in view of the complementarities between their economies, their mutual trade has increased from US$7 billion in 2000 to US$23 billion in 2005. ASEAN countries’ share in India’s trade has increased from 7.7 per cent to nearly 10 per cent over the 2000–05 period. It is important to note that ASEAN’s share in India’s imports at 10.5 per cent is higher than in India’s exports at 8.7 per cent. ASEAN countries have emerged as important sources of FDI inflows to India. In 2005 FDI approvals totalling nearly US$15 billion, accounting

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for 7.6 per cent of total FDI approved in 2005 originated in ASEAN countries. ASEAN countries have also seen a significant proportion of Indian outward investments. In 2005, they accounted for US$331.6 million of Indian outward FDI approvals, accounting for nearly 12 per cent of all approvals. The service sectors of India and ASEAN are also expanding their mutual linkages and trade. India is increasingly playing a role in two-way flow in education services, among others. Many Indian students study in the rest of Asia, while Indian schools (two are already operating in Singapore) and universities are venturing into Southeast Asia. India is also expanding collaboration with Malaysia beyond just medical education. India’s world class technical and management institutions are being recognized in the rest of Asia as well. Its media and entertainment industry is influencing audiences in Asia as well as the rest of the world, and “Bollywood” is now a global brand.7 The Look East policy is not confined to engagement with ASEAN alone. In the recent years the focus of India’s economic engagement started to move beyond ASEAN to the Northeast Asian countries viz. China, Japan and South Korea.

ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT WITH NORTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES India-Japan Japan had already established itself as an important trade partner by 1990 accounting for nearly 8 per cent of India’s trade and as a source of technology and investment. However, in the late 1990s, India-Japan trade and investment relations tended to stagnate. However, the trend was reversed since 2000 with the visit of the prime minister of Japan to India. In 2000–05, the India-Japan two-way trade has increased from US$3.78 billion to US$6.78 billion. Japan is again emerging as one of the most important sources of FDI in India. Japanese companies are beginning to incorporate India in their regional production networks. For instance, Toyota is sourcing engines from its Indian plant for Southeast Asian markets. The visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to India in April 2005 further boosted the bilateral relations. The two countries agreed to set up a strategic partnership and study the feasibility of an FTA or a comprehensive economic partnership arrangement besides cooperating in the formation of an Asian Economic Community, among other proposals. Following the

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completion of the feasibility study, the two countries are now moving towards negotiating an economic partnership arrangement. They have also been coordinating regarding the reform of the United Nations Security Council as a part of G-4.

India-China India has engaged China at a high level since Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to India in January 2002. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China in July 2003. During this visit a Joint Study Group was appointed to examine the feasibility of an India-China FTA. The Joint Study Group found a case for a China-India regional trading arrangement and recommended further detailed examination by a joint task force. This report was accepted by the two governments during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005. During this visit, China and India also launched a strategic partnership. The complementarity of the two economies is evident from the rapid rate at which the bilateral trade has grown. Between 1995 and 2005, the bilateral trade turnover has grown nearly twenty times from just US$1 billion to nearly US$20 billion to make China as the second largest trade partner of India. India and China economic relations also cover growing and wide-ranging investment links, and cooperation between state-owned oil companies in third country bids, among other initiatives. In particular, while Indian IT companies like TCS and Infosys are setting up major global sourcing bases in China, Chinese IT companies like Huawei are setting up large R&D bases in India.

India-South Korea India-South Korea economic engagement has emerged to be equally vibrant. There has been high-level engagement. President Roh of Korea visited India in late 2004 and Indian President Kalam visited Korea in April 2006. During the visit of President Roh, a Joint Study Group was set up to examine the feasibility of an India-Korea FTA. On the basis of the recommendation of the Joint Study Group, a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Arrangement (CECA) is currently under negotiation. Over the past decade, some of the Korean enterprises have emerged as leading players in consumer durables markets in India with some like Hyundai beginning to use India as a global production hub. The India-Korea trade has also grown rapidly from US$1.4 billion to US$4.6

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billion over 2000–05. Korea has emerged as the fifth largest source of FDI for India. Some Indian companies have also invested in South Korea as Tata Motors that has acquired Daewoo’s commercial vehicles plant. Korean companies like Samsung have also set up software development and R&D bases in India. To sum up the above discussion, India is evolving FTAs/CECAs with ASEAN (besides bilateral arrangements with individual ASEAN countries such as Singapore and Thailand), negotiating one with South Korea and studying such arrangements with China and Japan. Therefore, India is very much a part of the growing East Asian web of FTAs. As a part of the Look East policy, India had also tried, unsuccessfully though, to seek membership in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the mid-1990s and may be able to join it in 2007 when it reopens the membership. As a result of these engagements, East Asia comprising ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries has emerged as India’s largest trading partner ahead of the EU and the North America (see Tables 7.1 and 7.2). It has also become an important source of FDI as well an increasingly attractive destination for Indian companies’ operations (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4).8 India sees this growing engagement with East Asian countries as building blocs of a broader Asian grouping and has articulated a vision of an Asian Economic Community as an “arc of advantage” for peace and shared prosperity in Asia bringing together different sub-regions of Asia in a phased manner.9 The formation of an Asian Economic Community could thus be viewed as the culmination of India’s Look East policy.

INDIA-EAST ASIA INTEGRATION AND THE ASIAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY The East Asian Crisis of 1997 also highlighted the importance of regional economic cooperation. The ASEAN countries expedited the programme of implementation of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and moved on to further deepen economic integration. The crisis also led to the launch of several regional initiatives such as the Chiang Mai Initiative which involves ASEAN+3 (Japan, China, and South Korea) countries. Besides this, ASEAN’s policy of engaging key Asian countries, namely, Japan, China, India and South Korea as dialogue partners have provided much needed cohesion in the Asian region as is clear from the numerous schemes of regional and bilateral free trade arrangements that are at different levels of implementation. China, Japan, India, and South Korea are all engaged in negotiations for free trade arrangements with ASEAN.

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Table 7.1 India’s Trade with East Asian Countries (Values in Million US$) India’s Export To:

1990

1995

2000

ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

760 1,656 18 164 545 0 183 21 3,347 17,813

2,372 2,130 283 394 1,821 1 351 58 7,411 30,538

2,749 1,767 7,58 457 2,608 1 405 64 8,810 42,626

India’s Imports From:

1990

1995

2000

ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

1,624 1,801 31 325 158 0 757 60 4,756 23,991

2,485 2,234 811 717 242 1 945 62 7,498 34,487

4,382 2,016 1,449 989 844 0 1,068 84 10,829 50,336

8,463 2,921 6,073 3,103 1,656 1 3,333 100 25,650 99,835

14,628 3,876 9,831 3,545 3,085 1 5,793 105 40,863 139,405

1990

1995

2000

2004

2005

2,384 3,457 49 489 703 0 940 82 8,103 41,804

4,857 4,365 1,094 1,111 2,063 2 1,296 120 14,908 65,025

7,131 3,783 2,207 1,446 3,452 1 1,473 147 19,640 92,962

15,915 4,832 10,252 4,016 5,210 3 3,994 188 44,410 175,221

23,323 6,779 18,722 4,589 7,261 4 6,721 199 67,598 239,497

India’s Total Trade With: ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

2004 7,452 1,911 4,178 913 3,554 2 661 88 18,760 75,385 2004

2005 8,695 2,903 8,891 1,044 4,176 4 928 95 26,735 100,092 2005

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (2006), CD-ROM.

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Table 7.2 Percentage Share of India’s Trade with East Asian Countries (Values in Million US$) Percentage Share India’s Export To:

1990

1995

2000

2004

2005

ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

4.3 9.3 0.1 0.9 3.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 18.8 100

7.8 7.0 0.9 1.3 6.0 0.0 1.1 0.2 24.3 100

6.4 4.1 1.8 1.1 6.1 0.0 1.0 0.1 20.7 100

9.9 2.5 5.5 1.2 4.7 0.0 0.9 0.1 24.9 100

8.7 2.9 8.9 1.0 4.2 0.0 0.9 0.1 26.7 100

Percentage Share India’s Imports From:

1990

1995

2000

2004

2005

ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

6.8 7.5 0.1 1.4 0.7 0.0 3.2 0.3 19.8 100

7.2 6.5 2.4 2.1 0.7 0.0 2.7 0.2 21.7 100

8.7 4.0 2.9 2.0 1.7 0.0 2.1 0.2 21.5 100

8.5 2.9 6.1 3.1 1.7 0.0 3.3 0.1 25.7 100

10.5 2.8 7.1 2.5 2.2 0.0 4.2 0.1 29.3 100

Percentage Share India’s Total Trade With:

1990

1995

2000

2004

2005

ASEAN Japan China Korea Hong Kong SAR Macao SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

5.7 8.3 0.1 1.2 1.7 0.0 2.2 0.2 19.4 100

7.5 6.7 1.7 1.7 3.2 0.0 2.0 0.2 22.9 100

7.7 4.1 2.4 1.6 3.7 0.0 1.6 0.2 21.1 100

9.1 2.8 5.9 2.3 3.0 0.0 2.3 0.1 25.3 100

9.7 2.8 7.8 1.9 3.0 0.0 2.8 0.1 28.2 100

Source: Direction of Trade Statistics (2006), CD-ROM.

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ASEAN Japan China Korea(South) Hong Kong SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

1,881 9,965 0 203 254 633 0 12,937 167,778

(Jan–Dec)

(Jan–Dec)

6,207 9,857 1 762 578 408 1 17,813 123,537

2001

2000

4,079 19,805 0 1,814 355 884 7 26,943 181,956

(Jan–Dec)

2002

4,024 4,344 3 1,129 124 915 0 10,538 116,172

(Jan–Dec)

2003

Amount in Rs Million

3,348 5,337 21 1,227 1,105 849 5 11,893 172,665

(Jan–Dec)

2004

Table 7.3 FDI Inflows Received by India from the East Asian Countries, 2000–05 (Amount in Rs. Million and share in percentage)

14,664 7,450 81 2,943 1,232 261 5 26,636 192,991

(Jan–Dec)

2005

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5.0 8.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 0.3

1.1 5.9 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.4

2.2 10.9 0.0 1.0 0.2 0.5

(Jan–Dec)

(Jan–Dec)

(Jan–Dec) 3.5 3.7 0.0 1.0 0.1 0.8

(Jan–Dec)

2003

1.9 3.1 0.0 0.7 0.6 0.5

(Jan–Dec)

2004

7.6 3.9 0.0 1.5 0.6 0.1

(Jan–Dec)

2005

Note: The country specific amount includes the Inflows Received through SIA/FIPB route, acquisition of existing shares and RBI’s automatic route only. a ASEAN group here doesn’t include the figures for countries: Brunei, Cambodia and Laos due to unavailability of data. Source: SIA Newsletter (Various Issues), Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion, Ministry of Commerce and Industry, available at .

ASEAN Japan China Korea(South) Hong Kong SAR Australia

2002

2001

Percentage Share

(continued)

2000

Table 7.3

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Table 7.4 India’s Outward Direct Investment (Approved) to East Asian Countries, 2002–03 to 2004–05 (Amount in Million US$ and share in percentage) Amount in Million US$

ASEANb Japan China South Korea Hong Kong SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

2002–03

2003–04

2004–05

55.5 0.4 29.6 n.a. 14.8 95.0 0.6 195.8 1,472.1

49.1 0.0 26.6 n.a. 16.2 92.9 0.0 184.8 1,450.9

331.6 n.a. 15.1 1.6 73.6 158.8 0.0 580.7 2,804.1

Percentage Share

ASEAN Japan China South Korea Hong Kong SAR Australia New Zealand East Asian Countries World

2002–03

2003–04

2004–05

3.8 0.0 2.0 n.a. 1.0 6.5 0.0 13.3 100.0

3.4 0.0 1.8 n.a. 1.1 6.4 0.0 12.7 100.0

11.8 n.a. 0.5 0.1 2.6 5.7 0.0 20.7 100.0

Note: n.a. refers to data not available a These outgoing investment refers to investment in joint ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries b ASEAN group here does not include countries of Brunei and Laos due to unavailability of data Source: Ministry of Finance (Website), available at: , accessed on 30 August 2006.

However, it can be argued that the sub-regional or bilateral attempts at regional co-operation that have been initiated such as those under the framework of ASEAN and SAARC or the dialogue partners, while desirable, are unlikely to exploit the full potential of the regional economic

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integration in Asia and hence are sub-optimal. This is because the extent of complementarities are limited at the sub-regional levels because of similar factor endowments and economic structures within a neighbourhood. It is clear from the fact that trade of ASEAN or SAARC countries with the East Asian countries is much larger than their intra-subregional trade. It is for this reason that the success achieved so far from the sub-regional or bilateral attempts at cooperation have so far been meagre. At the broader Asian level, on the other hand, the diversities in the levels of economic development and capabilities are quite wide, thus providing for more extensive and mutually beneficial linkages. Hence, Asia needs an overarching Asia-wide scheme of economic integration to fully exploit the full potential of efficiency-seeking industrial restructuring or to exploit the synergies that exist in the region. It was in this context that RIS developed the proposal of an Asian Economic Community as an approach towards pan-Asian economic integration. Keeping in mind the experiences of regional economic integration from other regions, a practical approach to regionalization in Asia had to be a phased one. ASEAN has helped to bring together four major economies of Asia as its annual summit-level dialogues partners, viz. Japan, China, South Korea and India. ASEAN and these four dialogue partners, namely, Japan, Asean, China, India and Korea (JACIK) countries are all engaged in evolving FTAs between their different pairs. Through this complex web of FTAs a virtual JACIK FTA is emerging. Hence a vision for the Asian economic integration is to begin by coalescing these multiple FTAs between JACIK countries into an overarching regional trading arrangement. A broader overarching framework alone will allow optimal utilization of Asia’s resources and synergies for their mutual common benefit by creating a seamless market. Combining fourteen of the largest and fastest growing economies of Asia with vast complementarities, JACIK could be a potential third pole of the world economy. JACIK countries combine between them a population of three billion or a half of the world population, and a GNP of over $7.2 trillion, comparable to that of EU in 2000. In terms of purchasing power parity, the JACIK grouping will have the gross national income of US$13 trillion, much larger than either NAFTA or EU. JACIK’s exports will add up to US$1.37 trillion compared to US$1.2 trillion of NAFTA. The combined official reserves of the JACIK economies at US$2 trillion in 2004 are much larger than those of the US and the EU put together. Therefore, the region would have sufficiently large market and financial resources to support and sustain expedited development of the region’s economies. RIS studies conducted in computable general equilibrium (CGE) model framework have shown that a trade liberalization in the framework of an FTA

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in JACIK could produce efficiency gains worth US$210 billion representing more than 3 per cent of combined GDP of JACIK economies. What is more, all the JACIK countries benefit from integration. Interestingly the welfare of even the rest of the world also improves by US$109 billion, suggesting that Asian economic integration will be Pareto optimal. Similar findings have been reached by an ADB study which suggested that regional integration could promote Asian economic convergence, raising average growth rates and benefiting poorer countries. In particular, greater regional integration will propagate commercial linkages and transfer the stimulus of Asia’s rapid growth economies, particularly China and India, to their neighbours. The Asian economic integration increases trade and incomes for the rest of the world. Hence it is a win-win for the region and the world. The idea of an Asian Economic Community as a roadmap for broader regional cooperation in Asia was first presented and discussed by RIS at its High Level Conference on Asian Economic Community at New Delhi in March 2003. The proposal of an Asian Economic Community was first officially made by the Prime Minister of India at the Bali Summit of ASEAN in October 2003. Subsequently the concept has been further refined and Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh has championed the vision of an Asian Economic Community at various forums. He has argued that an Asian Economic Community as an approach to pan-Asian economic cooperation and integration could serve as “an arc of advantage, peace and shared prosperity in Asia” across which there will be large-scale movement of people, capital, ideas and creativity. Subsequently a number of Asian leaders have endorsed the vision of an Asian Economic Community including Prime Minister Koizumi of Japan during his visit to India in April 2005. Asia had lacked a forum for dialogue for giving effect to such a broader cooperation. The first East Asia Summit (EAS) held in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005 provided the region a forum for such a dialogue. The summit was attended by the leaders of ASEAN-10, Japan, China, South Korea and India and also of Australia and New Zealand. Combining all the JACIK economies and also Australia and New Zealand at a single forum, EAS is widely believed to be a forum for pursuing a scheme of broader regional economic integration in Asia. The East Asia Summit provides an opportunity for Asia to take the initial first step in the long journey towards broader regional economic integration in Asia by first building an East Asian Community (EAC) which could be later expanded into an Asian Economic Community (AEC) with the inclusion of other Asian countries. Besides trade and investment cooperation, the EAC could provide a framework for monetary and financial cooperation, cooperation for energy security, development of

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transport infrastructure and connectivity, and for harnessing the fruits of new core technologies for addressing the digital divide and nutritional and health related issues as well as global governance, peace and security. There is some debate on whether ASEAN+3 is a better forum for evolving a broader scheme of economic integration in Asia than EAS. However, the research has shown that EAS has the greater potential to generate welfare gains for all the partners than ASEAN+3.10 Furthermore, EAS will be able to benefit from the dynamism and other strengths of India, Australia and New Zealand for mutual benefit. India with a US$850 billion economy growing at 8–9 per cent per annum, a 300 million-strong middle class is emerging as the third largest economy in the world. Its software and services dominated economy complements well with hardware and manufacturing driven economies of other East Asian countries. With booming demand for infrastructure investments that are projected to be over US$350 billion, India can provide a huge market for East Asian investors and underutilized construction and engineering capacities. India is increasingly getting integrated with East Asian production chains especially in more critical knowledge-based segments such as R&D and product design. As discussed above, India is very much a part of the growing web of FTAs linking the East Asian countries. With its excellent trading and transport links and emerging preferential trading arrangements with South Asian countries, GCC and other West Asian countries, India could act as a bridge for East Asia for the markets in South, West and Central Asian countries. Finally it can be argued that an EAS based grouping will be more balanced than an ASEAN+3 based community and less susceptible to domination by any particular large country.

CONCLUDING REMARKS The Indian economy has emerged as one of the largest and dynamic economies of the world in the recent period with robust macro-fundamentals and economic outlook for the future. It has adopted reforms to deepen her integration with the global economy. While all different parameters of socioeconomic development indicate rapid strides made by the country, challenges faced by the country of addressing poverty, unemployment, inequalities and infrastructure development are enormous. India has also attached a high priority to regional cooperation in Asia, for which it is attempting to deepen its integration with South Asian countries through several bilateral and regional initiatives. India is also pursuing a Look East policy under which it is deepening its integration with ASEAN and Northeast Asian countries that it hopes to evolve into a broader Asian

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Economic Community as a broader pan-Asian grouping over time. The East Asia Summit, as a new forum covering all the major economies of Asia, provides a useful regional platform to take initiatives to launch the formation of a broader Asian community which could be gradually expanded to evolve into a truly pan-Asian grouping. This broader community could be an engine of growth for not only the participating countries in Asia but also has the potential to enhance the welfare of the rest of the world by unleashing the synergies of Asian countries for trade creation. India and East Asian countries need to deepen their ongoing cooperation further and cooperate in shaping the evolution of the broader Asian community with an integrated or seamless Asian market, and build a third pole of the world economy after NAFTA and the EU.

Notes 1

2

3

4 5

6 7 8

9

10

See Kumar (2000) for an analysis of socio-economic implications of reforms including patterns of industrial restructuring. For detailed account of India’s performance with respect to FDI and its impact on overall economic development and other aspects see Kumar (2005a). See A.T. Kearney, FDI Confidence Index 2005; and A.T. Kearney, Making Offshore Decisions 2005, at . UNCTAD 2005. For detailed analysis of India’s performance in software and the underlying factors see Kumar (2001), Joseph (2002) and Kumar and Joseph (2004); as updated from . See RIS (2004). Asher and Sen (2005). See Asher and Sen (2005) and Kumar (2005) for a more detailed analysis of the India-East Asia economic integration. See Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh’s speech at the Third ASEAN-India Business Summit, 21 October 2004. Also see RIS (2003). See Kumar 2005b, RIS DP# 100.

References Aggarwal, A. “Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries: The Indian Pharmaceutical Industry”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 80. New Delhi: RIS, 2004. Ahluwalia, I.J. “Productivity and Growth in Indian Manufacturing”. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1991. Asher, M.G, and S. Srivastava. “India and the Asian Economic Community”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 51. New Delhi: RIS, 2003.

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Asher M.G. and Rahul Sen. “India-East Asia Integration: A Win-win for Asia”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 91. New Delhi: RIS, 2005. Balakrishnan, P. and J. Pushpangadan. “Manufacturing Industry: A Fresh Look”. Economic and Political Weekly (October 1994): 2028–35. Guruswamy, Mohan and Ronald Joseph Abraham. “Redefining Poverty: A New Poverty Line for India”, Centre for Policy Alternatives, February 2006. IMF. World Economic Outlook 2006, April 2006 . Joseph, K.J. “Growth of ICT and ICT for Development: Realities of the Myths of Indian Experience”. Discussion Paper no. 2002/78, WIDER-UNU, August 2002 . Joseph, K.J. and C. Veeramani. “India’s External Sector after Economic Liberalisation”. In Economic Liberalisation in India, Japanese & Indian Perspectives, edited by K.V. Kesavan. New Delhi: ICSSR and Manak, 2001. Kumar, Nagesh, ed. Indian Economy under Reforms: An assessment of Economic and Social Impact. New Delhi: Bookwell, 2000. ———. “Indian Software Industry Development: International and National Perspective”, Economic and Political Weekly 36 (10 November 2001). ———. “Towards an Asian Economic Community: Vision of Closer Economic Cooperation in Asia”, RIS Discussion Paper no. 32. New Delhi: RIS, 2002a . ———. “Towards an Asian Community: The Relevance of India”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 34. New Delhi: RIS, 2002b. ———. “Liberalization, Foreign Direct Investment Flows and Economic Development: The Indian Experience in the 1990s”. Economic and Political Weekly, (2 April 2005a). ———. “Towards a broader Asian Community: Agenda for the East Asia Summit”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 100. New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2005b, . Kumar, Nagesh and K.J. Joseph. “National Innovation Systems and India’s IT Capability: Are there any Lessons for ASEAN New Comers?”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 72. New Delhi: RIS, 2004. Kumar, Nagesh and J. Pradhan. “Determinants of Outward Foreign Direct Investment From A Developing Country: The Case of Indian Manufacturing Firms”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 44. New Delhi: RIS, 2003. Mahendra Dev, S. “Poverty, Income Distribution, Employment under Reforms”. In Indian Economy under Reforms: An Assessment of Economic and Social Impact, edited by Kumar. New Delhi: Bookwell, 2000. RIS. “South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2001/02”. New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2002. ———. “Towards an Asian Economic Community”. Policy Brief no. 1. New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2003. ———. “South Asia Development and Cooperation Report 2004”. New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2004.

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———. “Towards an Employment-Oriented Export Strategy: Some Explorations”. New Delhi: Research and Information System for Developing Countries, 2006. Rodrik, D. and A. Subramanian. “From Hindu Growth to Productivity Surge: The Mystery of the Indian Growth Transition”. IMF Working Paper, WP/04/77, Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2004a. ———. “Why India can Grow at 7 Percent a Year or More: Projections and Reflections”. IMF Working Paper no. WP/04/118. Washington D.C.: IMF, 2004b. Sen, Abhijit and Himanshu. “Poverty and Inequality in India-I”. Economic and Political Weekly 39, no. 38 (2004): 4247–63. Singh, Neelam. “Strategic Approach to Strengthening the International Competitiveness in Knowledge Based Industries: The Case of Indian Automotive Industry”. RIS Discussion Paper no. 82. New Delhi: RIS, 2004. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2005. New York: United Nations, 2005. Unel, B. “Productivity Trends in India’s Manufacturing Sectors in the Last Two Decades”. IMF Working Paper, WP/03/22. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 2003. Wilson, D., R. Purushothaman. “Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050”. Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper no. 99, 2003. World Bank. “Trade Blocs”. The World Bank Policy Research Report. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

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8 BRAND INDIA AND EAST ASIA Faizal Yahya The surging Indian economy has sustained growth of 6 to 8 per cent over the last few years and all things Indian seems to be in current vogue. Is India finally shaking the perception of a developing country that is more famous for social inequality and religious strife rather than fashion apparel and “Bollywood” films? Is India’s image undergoing a rebranding process into something more positive and dynamic as what has happened to China? Given the myriad of images and complexities of Indian society, could India be marketed as a single brand by the government? What are the precedents if any, for a country to be labelled as a brand? Some time back, David Ogilvy, one of the founders of famed advertising firm Ogilvy and Mather (O&M) managed to portray Puerto Rico as a “tropical paradise”. In the tourism industry, Singapore managed to market a “Surprising Singapore” campaign but these two initiatives were conducted on small nations.1 According to Ian Batey, in the 1970s, Singapore managed to brand itself as “the most surprising tropical island on earth”, leveraging on its multi-racial character.2 Academics like Michel Girard and Wally Olins had opposed the branding of states because to them, a country has its own peculiar nature and substance other than those of a corporation.3 Arguably there is a link between successful global brands and the place where they originate. Simon Anholt has argued that the place of origin or country the brand is from has a certain image and the product identifies strongly with that image.4 Similar to manufacturer’s brands, a place brand evokes certain values and emotional constructs in the consumers’ minds about the likely values of any product originating from that country.5 Country 130

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names could amount to brand names and assist consumers in the evaluation of products before making their purchase decisions. According to Kotler and Gertner, they are responsible for associations that may add and to or subtract from the perceived value of a product.6 Country images are commonly used as shortcuts for information processing and consumer decisions. A country brand could also provide an umbrella brand over all products which may promote sub-brands in the marketplace. Martin Roll argued that country branding could be divided into three main categories. They are: export branding,7 generic country branding8 and internal branding.9 10 This chapter aims to discuss the branding of India as a tool to facilitate “India rising” as an emerging economic power and how this would impact on East Asia. The potential for India to enhance trade and economic ties with the East Asian region is good because of its proximity to the region and India’s strong links with the East Asian countries. Nonetheless, the process of branding India in East Asia could be challenging because a preconceived notion of India has already been formed among consumers in East Asia that conjures images of poverty, conflict and under-development. Despite this, India should pursue the “country branding” path because the strategic use of a country to promote branding is an enabler for its products and services. For example, brands out of Italy are instantly associated with art and design, making it easier for brands like Bulgari or Armani to gain global acceptance and recognition.11 In this regard, historically “made in India” products for various reasons were labelled as low cost and of poor quality. Recognizing this negative image, Indian Finance Minister P. Chidambaram once mentioned to a well-known senior advertising executive, “When I say India, I want them to think of software, not elephants.”12

EAST ASIAN MARKET The branding of India-made goods and services also comes at a critical juncture of India’s engagement with the East Asian region through its “Look East” policy. However, the branding of India in East Asia is complicated by the close historical and cultural ties that India has had with the region. In this context, the perception of India has been associated with images of spirituality, poverty, cultural mystic and economic malaise especially in the manufacturing sector. Improving a negative image can be a difficult task, especially when it comes to managing how the media presents a country’s problems.13 While Indian brands represent a wide range of goods and services, they also have the potential to match and overtake established global brands. Another strategy in rebranding is through mergers and acquisitions (M&A)

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because establishing a new brand is a daunting task. Moreover, intellectual property rights (IPR) play an important role and companies have to invest huge sums to protect their specific brand.14 A senior executive of Unilever India remarked that, “The Brand idea is the starting point which defines the philosophy, the ethos and the culture of the brand, which must then be reflected and manifested in each and every facet of the brand.”15 Jairam Ramesh, an economist and member of the Indian Rajya Sabha, added that brand India is a cluster of heterogenous brands that have five main characteristics. Foremost, brand India is multi-layered in terms of caste, religion, region and income. India is also a brand in transition that has various attributes but has its own unique philosophy.16 During his visit to India, well- known futurist writer, Kenichi Ohmae, opined that brand India is aggregative and said to Indian authorities that they should not build brand India because it was associated with too many negative images such as poverty, ethnic and religious strife.17 Brand India is comprised of a large number of sub-brands that are already quite established. Furthermore, it is an evolving brand that has gone from inward- and insular-looking to outward-looking that reflected the economic reform and liberalization process that the Indian economy had undergone.18

BRAND EQUITY Alternatively might an umbrella brand India impede other known brands from India such as Indian information technology (IT) companies like Wipro, Infosys, Tata and Satyam? IT companies such as Infosys Systems Limited and Satyam Computer Services have already made forays into China and Southeast Asian countries. To leverage on the positive image of these Indian companies would involve changing consumer perceptions and possibly the re-branding of India as a dynamic manufacturing and services hub by improving India’s brand equity. Brand equity is the worth of a specific brand as an asset in which the marketer is trying to build.19 In competitive markets like East Asia, managing brand name assets has become a major concern for firms. Branding in terms of brand equity has become a key issue among Indian companies as they foray into intensely competitive markets occupied by global companies and Indian companies would have to spend more on marketing to popularize and spruce up their various brands.20 Another rebranding strategy by Dodd and Louviere is to have brand equity leveraged by brand extension in introducing new products under the same brand name.21 However, brand extensions could fail because of inappropriate assumptions and market failure to respond to branded

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products.22 Nonetheless, business guru Michael Porter believed that Indian brands could go a long way compared to Chinese brands based on several reasons. These included the depth of India’s human resource pool including its diaspora in IT, pharmaceuticals, finance and other economic sectors. India has a crop of established companies such as Infosys, Bajaj, Mittal Steel and Jet Airways that are expanding globally.23 Moreover, Indian products are not only being marketed in India by creative Indian advertising companies but are aired by “Bollywood” actors and Indian sporting stars to an equally appreciative Indian diaspora of twenty-three million overseas. Advertising plays a central role compared to other forms of marketing techniques for brand building or enhancement.24 However, Reynolds, et al. argued that promoting different brands through the process of brand persuasion in advertising will be difficult because of several challenges.25 Among these challenges are the effect of brand name especially if the brand has been known and identified with certain products or services; brand attributes in terms of objective features and subjective perceptions; brand price; and individual consumer differences. Swaif, et al. opined that differences among consumers could be attributed to variables in tastes, preferences and perceptions.26

BUILDING BRAND INDIA The Indian federal government has allocated sizeable funding for a highpowered committee headed by the retired Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India Chairman Narayan Vaghul to explore ways to make Indian brands more acceptable overseas. India’s image as a regulated economy for over four decades has not made it attractive to foreign investors and desirable as a potential economic partner. The “made in India” label was in the past synonymous with shoddy goods due to lack of standardization and tardiness.27 Indian companies had also neglected marketing the intangibles and brand assets of their companies and need to catch up with economies like the United States, Spain and Australia in this regard.28 A new organization called the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF), which is a public–private partnership of the Ministry of Commerce and the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), was established to promote brand India. The Ministry of Finance has entrusted the IBEF to organize and manage India’s representation and image projection at international events like the 38th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors of the Asian Development Bank (ADB).29 According to IBEF Chief Executive Officer Ajay Khanna, IBEF has managed to create a buzz about brand India globally.30 The best example was through IBEF’s

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presentation on India at the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) meeting at Davos, Switzerland in January 2006. The IBEF with the support of the Indian government launched the “India Everywhere” campaign at the 35th World Economic Forum (WEF) meeting in Davos, Switzerland. Davos was a strategic platform because it gave India the opportunity to talk to the world’s leading decision-makers at one place. The theme of the WEF Summit was “Creating a New Agenda for Asian Integration”. Executing an effective marketing campaign at Davos was felt throughout 2006 and beyond for India in the form of increased investments, more visits to India by opinion leaders and a greater share of voice for India in the world’s media.31 How did the IBEF and Indian delegation accomplish this? Indian business and government leaders started planning for the WEF meeting in 2003 and spent US$6 million putting together a campaign theme called “India. The Time is Now”. It was felt that the time was right to launch a major campaign to encourage the perceptions of the global business community that did view India as an economy equitable to China.32 The main message that India was trying to deliver was that “India is in” and less explicitly, “its time for the world’s decision-makers to stop being obsessed about China and take a closer look at India”, the other emerging Asian economic heavyweight.33 While the IBEF took the lead in promoting brand India, it was supported by a 150-member delegation, three cabinet ministers and forty-one chief executives at a cost of approximately US$5 million.34 Why the massive marketing blitz at Davos? Besides the charm offensive to woo foreign investors, Ajay Khanna, the chief executive of IBEF, explained that, “in the last two years we felt there was too much about China, and India wasn’t being heard. This year we decided to make a major effort to give India a voice.”35 Within the confines of the WEF meetings themselves about sixty sessions were about India or had an Indian speaker.36 The “India Everywhere” campaign to market brand India was the first of three global marketing blitzes. According to Ajay Khanna, conceptually, “India Everywhere” succeeded in winning the hearts and minds of the delegates and Harvard Business School is even doing a case study on the project to be taught to its MBA students.37 The second marketing blitz on India took place at the Hanover Fair Exhibition in Germany in April 2006. Based on country themes there were 310 companies participating at the exhibition. In 2005, India had booked 6,000 square metres of space but in 2006, brand India had spread itself over 11,500 square metres.38 It was the largest partner country exhibition at Hanover. According to Indian Commerce Minister Kamal Nath, while the Hanover exhibition in terms of Indian participation maybe only 10 per

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cent of Davos, it had scored a political coup. To capture maximum media exposure, the India Pavilion was inaugurated by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and German Chancellor Angela Merkel. This was followed by the Indo-German Business Summit organized by the IBEF where the heads of states addressed the CEOs from Germany and India, leading to the signing of several multi-million dollar deals of German investment in India. The guests were then treated to vignettes of brand India on film at a reception hosted by IBEF. Moreover, for the first time in two decades, India had decided to showcase its manufacturing sector in a big way. After fifteen years of single-minded devotion to promoting the IT sector, India is now looking towards expanding its manufacturing strengths.39 For Indian manufacturers the Hanover Fair provided them with the largest exposure under one roof because it attracted over 5,900 corporate participants from all over the world. It is also an ideal setting for discussions on joint ventures and collaborations.

BRANDING INDIA IN EAST ASIA The third leg of the “India Everywhere” campaign took place at the WEF’s two-day East Asia Summit in Tokyo, Japan in June 2006. East Asia is an important region for brand India and the Indian delegation was led by the Commerce and Industry Minister Kamal Nath.40 India’s further integration into East Asia comes at a significant time because of Japan’s economic recovery and the growth of the Chinese economy. At the India–Japan summit organized by the CII, IBEF and the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), Minister Kamal Nath said that from 2006 to 2011, India will be generating investment opportunities worth in total US$500 billion including infrastructure projects worth US$250 billion, and manufacturing another US$130 billion.41 To sustain the promotion of brand India the IBEF will act as a resource centre on India for global investors, world media and international policymakers. The IBEF will also identify existing global opportunities where they can launch strategic marketing initiatives to build ‘brand India’.42 Brand building in goods and services for Indian owned companies in the East Asian region could involve several strategies and these included acquiring an existing brand, reviving a defunct brand and building a brand organically. Brand power is here to stay and brands still holds enormous sway because they play to perceptions, emotions and rational factors.43 However, brand promotion is expensive and it was estimated that approximately US$100 million would be needed to launch a new consumer

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product but there are only thirty-two companies in India with a net worth of US$1 billion.44 Among the thirty-two billion-dollar companies are names like Wipro and Reliance industries. For example, the Wipro brand stretches across a range of soaps, computer hardware and software, and electrical lighting.45 The chairman of Reliance Industries, Mukesh Ambani, emphasized that a nation’s brand is a powerful tool for value creation and global leadership in the age of globalization and competition. Concurring, the chairman of the Aditya Birla group added that India’s intellectual capital is a great platform for the process of building brand India. India has an abundance of human capital in the scientific and professional fields that will add to the positive image of brand India.46 However, Birla also noted that the impediments of India to build a strong brand are many. In 2002, a survey of Asian brands placed only Wipro of India among the top ten Asian bands. The other Indian brands that were ranked included Tata Corporate (15) and Hindustan Lever Limited (19). What are the other likely Indian brands that could emerge to be globally recognized? One approach towards creating more brand equity for Indian companies in the hospitality industry for example, would be through alliances with a reputable international brand. In this context, the Hilton International hotel chain has tied up with Indian hotels like the Oberoi, Mumbai and Trident as well as the East India hotels (EIH).47 India’s President Abdul Kalam said that, “We can win if we think we can win and act tenaciously with our clear goals in India to excel in a competitive new world and create India Brand.”48 President Kalam believes that Indian companies should aim to become multinationals and create brand institutions.49 Product or service differentiation was a key method of business strategy and could be used to plant ideas into consumers’ minds.50

INDIAN BRANDS IN EAST ASIA East Asia is India’s biggest trading partner and trade with the ASEAN region alone surpassed more than US$15 billion at the end of 2005. India’s trade with China has reached US$10 billion at the end of 2005. India is expanding its trade links beyond China and ASEAN to include Taiwan and South Korea.51 The trade federations like the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII) have a crucial role to play in the promotion of brand India. The CII with its overseas set-up in East Asia such as in Singapore, is in the process of re-imaging India as a rising global player. The CII had helped to establish and manage the India Brand Equity Foundation (IBEF) aimed at building a positive perception of India.52 The CII believes that brands are important and hold sway because they play on emotions and perceptions.53 This is

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important because of the choice available in the marketplace and branding makes decision-making easier. Has India’s positive branding efforts made a difference to perceptions of India in the East Asia region? Indian brands abroad need to work on consumer perceptions if they are to expand overseas.54 To overcome negative perceptions, the Indian government and Indian business community should collaborate on a joint effort for “India brand imaging” with ASEAN countries.55 Indian External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee had emphasized the importance of refurbishing India’s image for the benefit of ASEAN’s trade and industry sectors that often viewed India as an uncompetitive economic giant.56 The India brand is also difficult to promote because India is a paradox between the mystic and exotic at one end to a modernizing India with a large resource pool of skilled workers at the other end. Which version of India should be promoted to the East Asian market? Another fundamental problem is that India has not been active in the past in protecting and patenting its rich products and services. For example, yoga and ayurveda are popular overseas but India has not gained by their popularity. In contrast, the Chinese government have claimed and managed to capitalize on Chinese medicine and in the process increase the positive image of brand China. Could yoga or ayurveda do the same for brand India?

RISING INDIA AND BRANDING As Indian companies, whether majority-owned or based in India, gain confidence and expand overseas through joint ventures or takeover of other companies, this will influence the recognition and equity of the India brand. The rise of India Incorporated (India Inc.) could be seen in the same vein as the rise of Japan Incorporated and then China Incorporated, which stirred much unease among the established economic and political power centres in the developed countries.57 Noted political scientist Francine Frankel from the University of Pennsylvania said that India has shaken off the feeling of being subordinate to the West. India’s inferiority complex was manifested through the dominance of foreign capital and locals having to make excuses why India has lagged behind. Will a rising India promote brand India? According to the head of investment banking at DSP Merrill Lynch in Mumbai, Amit Chandra, the rise of India Inc expanding overseas has been the manifestation of pent-up desires over a couple of decades.58 From 2001 to end 2002, Indian companies acquired 120 foreign firms at a cost of US$1.6 billion. In 2003, Indian firms took over more than seventy-five foreign companies and among the most publicized included South

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Korean company Daewoo’s truck plant in Korea and Reliance Infocomm’s purchase of Flag International, a U.S. telecommunications company.59 In 2004, Indian Incorporated (India Inc.) acquired 60 firms but by the first half of 2005, India Inc. had already acquired forty-two to the recorded value of US$948 million.60 India Inc continued its buying spree spurred by several economic conditions. These included the quest for globalization, robust conditions and an urge to offer cost competitive products.61 However, there is a perceptible difference between the acquisition objective of Chinese firms and that of Indian firms. Economic analysts argued that Chinese firms acquired Western brands like Maytag (manufacturer of home appliances) with the long-term strategy towards transferring production to low-cost Chinese factories while at the same time tapping distribution and sales networks in the United States.62 Since the 1991 economic liberalization and reforms, a handful of Indian multinational corporatives (MNCs) and a host of miniMNCs like Bharat Forge and Videsh Sanchar Nigam Limited (VSNL) had caught the eye of global investors. India’s mergers and acquisitions (M&A) strategy of foreign companies started in the information technology (IT) and related services sector.63 For example, Tata Engineering has raised its stake in Tata Precision Industries Pte Ltd in Singapore.64 The Tata Group through Tata Motors also bought over Daewoo Commercial Vehicle unit (DWCV) for US$102 million in March 2004.65 DWCV produces heavy duty trucks in the 200–400 horse power range and has over 93 models in cargo, dump mixer and the tractor category. DWCV was the second largest commercial vehicle manufacturer in South Korea with a market share of about 26 per cent. The possible acquisition of DWCV was to assist Tata Motors in its efforts to make the “truck of the future”; the first prototype is likely to be ready by the end of 2006. Apart from Tata Motors, another major Indian automotive Mahindra & Mahindra Limited (M&M) also jumped into the acquisition bandwagon. M&M had signed a joint venture agreement with Jiangling Motor Corporation Group (JMCG) of China in December 2004 to acquire an 80 per cent stake in the latter’s subsidiary Jiangling Tractor Company.66 Another Tata acquisition in East Asia was by Tata Steel buying over NatSteel Limited of Singapore. Tata Steel acquired Singapore-based NatSteel Limited for US$486.4 million. NatSteel has a capacity of two million tonnes and has plants in China, Thailand, Vietnam, the Philippines and Australia.67 NatSteel also has a 26 per cent stake in Southern Steel Berhad of Malaysia a 1.3 million tonnes steel producer. The motivation for Tata Steel to acquire NatSteel was to use the latter as a beachhead investment in high growth areas of East Asia especially in China, where it has three plants, namely, Southern

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NatSteel (Xiamen) company, Wuxi Jingyang Metal Products and Changzhou Wujin NatSteel Company Limited.68 However, in contrast to the route taken by Asian Paints, Tata Steel will spin off NatSteel’s entire steel business into a wholly-owned subsidiary called NatSteel Asia Private Limited. Nonetheless, with the construction and infrastructure boom in China, Tata Steel is well placed after the acquisition of NatSteel to profit from the increasing demand for steel in China and the East Asian region as a whole. Indian companies were also promoting their brands in the two-wheeler market overseas. While, in terms of competitive pricing, Indian bikes are not as cheap as Chinese bikes but they have a niche because they are of better quality and not as expensive as Japanese bikes. Indian bike manufacturer’s such as Bajaj Auto Limited (BAL) and TVS are not dependent on foreign companies for technology and product development. Indian two-wheeler manufacturers not only produced but were able to innovate and improve their own technology and designs. For example, in the 250 cc range, Indian companies are proving their capabilities in designing, production techniques and cost competitiveness. Since its break-up with Suzuki, TVS has managed to maintain possession of proprietory technology for two-wheeler models like the Victor and Star. On the other hand, BAL has developed the DTSi Technology bike and Pulsar models on its own.69 In late 2002, BAL was looking at the Southeast Asian market and in particular Indonesia and Vietnam.70 BAL has established a manufacturing plant in Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia which will act as a hub for the company’s ASEAN operations.71 For Indian two-wheeler exporters, the establishment of operations abroad in Southeast Asia is recognition that BAL has become a more established brand and that the ASEAN region is an important export market. Indian bikes in the 100 to 180 cc range are targeting the Indonesian market with three million unit sales in this range, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam, that make up another one million unit sales.72 BAL’s Executive Director Sanjiv Bajaj commented that, India is obviously our most important market, but the world outside India sells four times as many bikes, so obviously we’re out there because it’s a bigger market outside … we pick markets that have a large size and the potential to grow and where we would have a competitive edge or a niche … outside China and India, that’s Southeast Asia now.

TVS has also established a US$50 million plant in Indonesia with an initial capacity for 120,000 bike units. Moreover, TVS has established two wholly-owned subsidiaries in Singapore and the Netherlands to become the

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investment vehicle for their Indonesian venture.73 From Indonesia, TVS hopes to expand their product range at a later date into nearby markets Vietnam, Thailand and Myanmar. BAL and TVS have put on hold their plans to enter the Chinese market because of the fragmented nature of the local market. Sanjiv Bajaj explained that “after we establish a strong foothold in the Southeast Asian markets, we will consider entering China.”74 In the four-wheel export market, Tata Motors Limited and Mahindra and Mahindra have led the way into East Asia. Tata Motors is looking towards assembling pick-up trucks in Thailand with a local firm and have had a long presence in Southeast Asia. Mahindra and Mahindra has entered into a joint venture with China’s Jiangling Motors for tractors and plans to assemble pick-up trucks in Malaysia through distribution partner, USF-HICOM (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd, a unit of DRB-Hicom Berhad.75 USF-HICOM starting distributing diesel and petrol variants of Mahindra’s Scorpio SUV in Malaysia in 2005.

FASHION AND BOLLYWOOD The garment and fashion industry in India is set to make waves in the international fashion scene riding on the back of India as a major textile exporter. The textile industry is India’s largest export, more than even the IT industry. The Indian government is conscious that the industry will play a large role in promoting the “made in India” brand. India has a rich heritage in the textile industry and produces some good products in a wide range of colours76 India’s Textiles Minister Syed Shaznawaz Hussain commented that exporters now need to focus on establishing the “made in India” brand.77 In 2004, India exported some US$12.5 billion worth of textiles accounting for 27 per cent of total exports from India.78 With the end of textile quotas under the Multi Fibre Agreement (MFA) India’s share of the world’s US$400 billion annual textile market is set to increase. India has already spent some US$700 million on new textile mills to gear up for when the quotas ended at the end of 2005.79 How would India promote its fashion industry in East Asia? One way would be to use famous “Bollywood” stars because Indian movies, particularly Hindi and Tamil movies, are popular in East Asia. In the case of popular celebrities, Bollywood actors would have persona relevant schemas that they acquired over time. Misra and Beatty argued that this cognitive representation of the person in terms of their abilities like physical appearance and public characterization becomes a set of abstracted attributes that could be linked to specific products in marketing.80 By 2005, India exported some US$15 billion in textiles and aims to increase this to US$50 billion by 2010.

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In addition, Indian textile producers will spend some US$2.5 billion to expand their mills’ production capacity.81 Indian-produced cloth such as the khadi, a symbol of India’s independence, has been transformed into chic and stylish fashion garments by Indian designers. Coupled with the increasing acceptability of Indian garments such as the salwar kameez popularized by Bollywood films and glamorous Bollywood actors, brand India in the fashion industry is expanding its influence globally. Another factor boosting the image of Indian-made clothes is a crop of Indian fashion designers that are becoming more famous and they include, Manish Malhotra, Hemant Trivedi and Ritu Beri. Ritu Beri has her own boutiques in India as well as in London and was last in Singapore for the “Celebrate India” week in April 2006.82

BRAND INDIA AND DIASPORA Could the Indian diaspora promote the Indian brand in East Asia? How could the Indian diaspora promote brand India in East Asia? The initial steps to be taken is that India needs leadership and vigorous action to connect and play a role in the transformation of its widespread diaspora found in 110 countries numbering some twenty-three million and growing at 10 per cent annually. The cultivation of the Indian diaspora involves winning over their support and commitments to promote the India brand. All too often, the Indian diaspora have complained of a lack of basic infrastructure in India and bureaucratic delays.83 The twenty-three million Indian diaspora have great potential to use their networks to build brand India, especially with their intellectual and financial capacity.84 For example, in the United States, Indian professionals working in the IT field especially in Silicon Valley, California have established links to India and the phenomenon of brain-drain has given way to brain circulation.85 Minister Mentor (MM) Lee of Singapore commented to an audience of Indian diaspora at a conference on Legacies of Leadership in Dubai organized by Citibank, “you’ve got links in America, in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and soon China, the Middle East”.86 In sync with the growing phenomenon of Indian human talent overseas, the outflow foreign direct investment (FDI) by Indian companies are increasing as Indian companies become more confident in the process of transforming into multinational corporations.87

CONCLUSION The equity of brand India will likely rise in East Asia with the increasing prominence of Indian-made goods and services in the region. Perceptions of

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shoddy made-in-India goods will change to expectations of reliability and excellence within specific market niches such as in two-wheelers. Excellence in Indian services and products especially in IT is likely to raise brand India to new heights in East Asia. Despite the diversity prevailing in India, the advertising of India lead by the IBEF at the WEF meeting in Davos, Hanover Fair and Tokyo WEF meeting illustrated that it is possible to showcase India as a brand. Sub-brands of India such as those of well-known firms like Tata, Infosys, Satyam and Reliance could assist in the rise of the Indian brand. In turn, the phenomenon “India rising” especially with a sustained economic growth rate of 7–8 per cent is likely to strengthen these Indian sub-brands. The increasing numbers of Indian diaspora in East Asia especially in the ASEAN region indicated that Indian-made goods and services will have a sustained consumer base among them. Moreover, the increasing acceptance of Bollywood films in East Asia suggests that brand India is undergoing a positive transformation with “India rising” among consumers in the region.

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G.S. Murari, “Can India be a Brand?”, Business Line, 24 February 2005. Ian Batey, “Asian Branding: A Great Way to Fly” (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2002), pp. 151–52. Wally Olins, “Branding the Nation: The Historical Context”, in Destination Branding: Creating the Unique Destination Proposition, edited by Nigel Morgan, Anne Prichard and Roger Price (Elsevier, 2004), p. 18. Simon Anholt, “Nation-brands and the Value of Provenance”, in Destination Branding, ibid., p. 26. Ibid. Philip Kotler and David Gertner, “Country as Brand, Product and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective”, in Destination Branding, op. cit. In export branding the product’s country of origin acts as a “rule of thumb” for consumers that could enhance the reputation of the product and export demand. In generic country branding, the key is to find a single message that would encapsulate the country and differentiate it from its neighbours. Internal country branding deals with the ability of the state to retain workers by increasing their morale and eventually their productivity. Martin Roll, Asian Brand Strategy: How Asia Builds Strong Brands, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), p. 57. Ibid, pp. 57–71. Philip Kotler and David Gertner, “Country as Brand, Product and Beyond: A Place Marketing and Brand Management Perspective”, in Destination Branding, op. cit.

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R. Sukumar, “Indians Understand the Importance of Brands”, Business Today, 27 February 2005. Kotler and Gertner, op. cit. “New Brand Day”, Hindustan Times, 25 May 2005. G.S. Murari, “Can India be a brand?”, Business Line, 24 February 2005. Jairam Ramesh, “Defining Brand India”, Business Line, 24 February 2005. Ibid. Ibid. In theory, the value of a brand is the capital worth of the premium it achieves over an equivalent generic product. The premium is derived from factors that included; higher prices paid by customers, greater volume sales, market share and the amount of marketing expenditure required. “Brand Equity: Is it a Myth or Reality”, Forbes Magazine, 3 October 2000. Khozem Merchant, “Branding — Marketing Gets Higher Priority as Relationship with Clients Deepens”, Financial Times, 6 March 2002. Colleen Collins — Dodd, Jordan J. Louviere, “Brand Equity and Retailer Acceptance of Brand Extensions”, Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services 6 (1990): 1. Ibid., p. 2. Peter Gumbel, “Looking Eastward”, Time Europe, 6 February 2006. Irene M. Herremans, John K. Ryans Jr. and Raj Aggarwal, “Linking Advertising and Brand Value”, Business Horizons, May–June 2000, p. 21. Thomas J. Reynolds, Charles E. Gengler and Daniel J. Howard, “A Means–End Analysis of Brand Persuasion through Advertising”, International Journal of Research in Marketing 12 (1995): 259. Joffre Swaif, Tulin Erdem, Jordan Louviere and Chris Dubelaar, “The Equalization Price: A Measure of Consumer-perceived brand equity”, International Journal of Research in Marketing 10 (1993): p. 27. “Can Indian Brands Make Brand India’ Global?”, Financial Express, 20 August 2005. David Haigh and M. Unni Krishnan, “How India Inc can Leverage Bands”, Business Line, 27 January 2005. “Dr Rakesh Mohan to Address Advantage India in Istanbul”, Hindustan Times, 3 May 2005. “Can Indian Brands Make ‘Brand India’ Global?”, Financial Express, 20 August 2005. Aditya Raj Das, “Bullish about Brand India”, Deccan Herald, 26 February 2006. Ibid. Peter Gumbel, “Looking Eastward”, Time Europe, 6 February 2006. Mark Landler, “India Everywhere in the Alps”, New York Times, 26 January 2006. Ibid. “It’s India Everywhere at Davos”, The Times of India, 26 January 2006 and “India Everywhere”, Business Line, 4 February 2006.

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Das, “Bullish about Brand India”, op. cit. “Its India Everywhere in Hanover This Time Around”, FICCI News, 25 April 2006. Ibid. Anil Sasi, “Selling the India Story in Tokyo”, Business Line, 15 June 2006. Ibid. Das, “Bullish about Brand India”, op. cit. “All Set to Scale the Heights”, Business Line, 17 February 2005. “New Brand Day”, Hindustan Times, 25 May 2005. Ibid. Mukesh D. Ambani, “Building Brand India. Break the Rules”, Ad Asia, 2003. “Indian Brands Are Forming Alliances with International Hotels to Create Global Presence”, Express Hotelier & Caterer, 18 July 2005. “Think Big, President Tells Industry”, Indo-Asian News Service, 14 November 2004. “Think Big, Create Brand India: Kalam”, Business Line, 15 November 2004. Shailesh Dobhal, “Don’t Blow Away Your Culture”, Business Today, 7 November 2004. Saurabh Shukla, “Storming the Eastern Front”, India Today, 4 July 2005. Karl West, “Brand India Believes Out-sourcing Can be a Two-way Operation”, The Herald, 9 November 2004. “All Set to Scale the Heights”, Business Line, 17 February 2005. Sankar Radhakrishnan, “Indian Brands Abroad have to Work on Perception”, Business Line, 21 May 2002. “India Unveils Plan to Boost Relations with ASEAN”, Xinhua News Agency, 14 March 1996. Ibid. Anand Giridharas, “India’s Mini-Multinationals Make Waves in Western Markets”, International Herald Tribune, 2 September 2005. Ibid. Raju Bist, “India’s Great Global Takeover Game”, Asia Times, 22 June 2004. Aruni Mukherjee, “”India, China … Tortoise, Hare?”, Asia Times, 18 August 2005. “India Inc Embarks on a Merger and Acquisition Spree”, Free Press Journal, 29 December 2004. Nand Giridharas, “India’s Mini-Multinationals Make Waves in Western Markets”, International Herald Tribune, 2 September 2005. Bist, “India’s Great Global Takeover Game”, op. cit. “Tata Engg Raises Stake in Singapore Joint Venture”, Business Line, 7 December 2002. “Tata’s Buy Daewoo Unit”, The Korea Herald, 29 March 2004. “India Inc Embarks on a Merger and Acquisition Spree”, Free Press Journal, 29 December 2004.

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N. Ramakrishnan, “IFC may Fund Tata Steel’s NatSteel Buy”, Business Line, 11 December 2004. “Tata Steel completes NatSteel Acquisition”, Business Line, 15 February 2005. Ravi Krishnan, “Zip Zap Zoom”, Financial Express, 23 July 2005. “Kawasaki to Source Small Bikes from Bajaj Auto”, Business Line, 27 November 2002. Krishnan, “Zip Zap Zoom”, op. cit. “Bajaj, TVS Slam Brakes on China Entry, Target S Asia”, Economic Times, 15 May 2005. “TVS Plans to Enter Indonesia”, Economic Times, 31 May 2005. “Bajaj, TVS Slam Brakes on China entry, target S Asia”, Economic Times, 15 May 2005. Francis Fernandez, “Mahindra Keen to Assemble Pick-up Trucks in Malaysia”, Business Times, 14 June 2006. Shailesh Dobhal, “Don’t Blow Away Your Culture”, Business Today, 7 November 2004. “Exporters Need to Establish Made in India Brand: Minister”, Asia Pulse, 21 July 2003. Yogi Aggarwal, “India Textile Exports Set to Soar in 2005 as Quotas Expire”, Business Times, 16 February 2004. “Indian Textiles Firms Gird up to Gace Quota-Free World”, Straits Times, 20 December 2004. Shekhar Misra and Sharon E. Beatty, “Celebrity Spokesperson and Brand Congruence: An Assessment of Recall and Affect”, Journal of Business Research, 21 (1990): 161. “India Reeling in Overseas Orders from Retailers”, Straits Times, 27 May 2005. Indian High Commission, Singapore. Dinesh C. Sharma, “India Reaches out to Ots Émigrés”, Bangkok Post, 15 January 2003. “Indian Diaspora Should Promote Brand India”, Hindustan Times, 13 January 2005. “Silicon Valley Indians Building Networks back Home”, International Herald Tribune, 5 June 2002. Leslie Koh, “Overseas Indians can Spur India’s Rise: MM Lee”, Straits Times, 18 November 2005. “India has Asked the Developed …”, Press Trust of India, 4 February 2005.

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9 JAPAN-INDIA RELATIONS: A TIME FOR SEA CHANGE? Takio Yamada In his book, Towards a Beautiful Country, published in July 2006, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has devoted three pages to Japan-India relations. 1 Recognizing the enormous potential of emerging India, he states in the book that, “it is of crucial importance to Japan’s national interest that we will further strengthen our ties with India” and that “it will not be surprising if in another ten years’ time, Japan-India relations overtake Japan-U.S. and Japan-China relations.” He further proposes that Japan and India, together with the United States and Australia, should hold a strategic dialogue to discuss how they can contribute and cooperate towards sharing universal values such as freedom and democracy with other countries. These ideas are reflected in Prime Minister Abe’s first press conference after his inauguration, and in his policy speech in parliament. It is unprecedented for a Japanese prime minister to express such strong enthusiasm towards improving Japan’s relationship with India, even before assuming office. His statement reflects Japan’s growing interest and expectations towards India, which has taken major strides towards development in the recent years. At the same time, there has been a rising interest in India as well, in consolidating the relationship with Japan. It is well known that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh himself, with his experience of receiving rapid and generous assistance from Japan while dealing with the 1991 financial crisis as the finance minister, is extremely passionate about strengthening India’s ties with Japan. Moreover, with the new government led by Mr Abe, whom an 146

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Indian newspaper has described as an “Indophile”,2 Indians are now looking forward to a closer and deeper relationship with Japan.3 The expectations have further heightened in light of the successful visit by the Indian Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh to Japan in December 2006. During this visit, the two leaders confirmed their commitment to establish a “strategic and global partnership” between the two countries, and agreed to strengthen their bilateral relationship in all areas including political, defence and security cooperation, comprehensive economic partnership, and people-to-people exchange. These trends suggest that the Japan-India relationship may witness a sea change in the near future. This chapter aims to examine the process and background of this rapidly growing bilateral relationship, and will attempt to identify the issues that the two countries need to overcome in order to establish a true strategic partnership.

JAPAN-INDIA RELATIONS IN RETROSPECT Japan and India have not only enjoyed significant historical and cultural ties — through Buddhist channels among others — in the past, but have also influenced each other greatly in modern times. Okakura-Tenshin, a legendary figure in classical Japanese Art, visited India in the early twentieth century, and nurtured close relationships with the great Indian poet, Rabindranath Tagore, the first Asian Nobel laureate in literature, as well as with Swami Vivekananda, the famous spiritual leader of India. Tagore himself visited Japan five times between 1916 and 1929. On the political side, Japan’s victory in its war against Russia during 1904–05, encouraged the Indian people, who were at that time under colonial rule. Among those was Prime Minister Nehru, who was still a teenager at that time.4 It is well known to the Japanese public that Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army collaborated with the Japanese forces during World War II, and that Justice Radha Binod Pal raised dissenting opinions at the International Military Tribunal of the Far East. Close ties between Japan and India continued in the days following the World War II, with Prime Minister Kishi (Prime Minister Abe’s grandfather) visiting India in 1957, the subsequent visit of Prime Minister Nehru to Japan in the same year, the visit of the Crown Prince of Japan (the present reigning emperor) to India in 1960, and Prime Minister Ikeda’s visit to India in 1961. However, after this period, Japan-India relations suffered a period of estrangement. Between the 1960s and early 1980s, high-level interactions between the two countries were rather infrequent. In fact, the next Japanese

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prime minister’s visit to India after 1961 was that of Mr Nakasone’s, which was as late as in 1984, marking an interval of twenty-three years. Similarly, after Pime Minister Indira Gandhi’s visit to Japan in 1969, a premier-level visit to Japan from India occurred only after a long gap of thirteen years, when PM Indira Gandhi visited Japan again in 1982. What accounted for the lull in the Japan-India relationship during these years?

OBSTACLES OF JAPAN-INDIA RELATIONS There were three main obstacles during this period. One was the “Cold War Equation”. As the Cold War exacerbated in the 60s, it became a logical consequence that Japan, which chose to join the Western bloc through its alliance with the United States, and India, which maintained its non-alliance policy while tilting towards the Soviet-Eastern block, especially after it broke away from China in the wake of the Indochina war, estranged themselves from each other. The disparate positions of Japan and India were a major determinant in creating a political gulf between the two. Secondly, different economic policies of the two countries also contributed to the estrangement. Japan, under the blessings of the Western market economy, achieved a miraculous economic growth in the 1960s, and eventually became the world’s second-largest economy. India, on the other hand, chose the path of a socialist economy based on the principle of self-sufficiency. This decision not only severely restrained India’s economic development, but also made its market less attractive to the developed nations, including Japan. It is well known that the economic development in East Asia was facilitated by the expansion of trade and investment relations between Japan and the so-called newly industrialized economies (NIEs), ASEAN and China, in the late 1970s and 1980s onwards. Japan-India economic relations, however, remained low-key during this period. One of the main reasons of this sluggish pace of investment by Japanese firms in the Indian market was because India failed to break away from its original path, and lagged behind in its reforms process. Thirdly, the nuclear issue divided the two countries. India’s nuclear test in 1974 was a huge shock for Japan, the only victim of nuclear bombing, which was striving to play a leading role in securing an effective nonproliferation treaty (NPT) regime. India announced that the testing was for peaceful purposes, but such an explanation was not sufficient to dispel Japan’s misgivings. Undoubtedly, their disagreement on the nuclear policy, which lies at the core of security policies, was a major obstacle in Japan-India relations.

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1990S: INDICATIONS OF IMPROVED RELATIONS AND SETBACKS The Cold War came to an end after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. India was compelled to make major shifts in every aspect of its political, security and economic policies. The new choice for India in politics and security was to improve its relations with the Western countries, including the United States. Consequently, the Japan-India relationship was released from its first obstacle, which emanated from the Cold War hostilities. Besides, in the economic sphere, India’s major shift to the path of economic liberalization after the 1991 financial crisis, removed the differences between Japan and India in their economic policies, which was the second obstacle. Moreover, Japan expeditiously announced a US$150 million emergency assistance at the time of India’s financial crisis, and left a strong impression on the Indian side about the significance of an economic partnership with Japan. With India’s policy changes, Japan-India relations began to show indications of improvement, with an increased number of interactions and visits at the head of government level. Prime Minister Kaifu visited India in 1990 as a Japanese premier, for the first time in six years. India reciprocated in 1992 through Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Japan. The year 1992 was also the fortieth anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic ties between the two countries. Such movements nurtured the growing interest towards India among the Japanese public, and created a “mini Indian boom”. However, the two countries were yet to reconcile their nuclear policy, the third difference, which had unfortunately sharpened during this period. India silently accelerated its original development of nuclear capabilities, partly due to the diminishing influence of Russia’s nuclear umbrella after the end of the Cold War. On the other hand, the international society adopted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, and urged India to sign the treaty. Japan, as the only victim of nuclear bombing, played a leading role in this international movement. The bilateral relationship took a dramatic downturn after India’s nuclear test in 1998. This incident decisively estranged India from the international non-proliferation regime. Japan, on its part, implemented the so-called “economic measures”, in collaboration with countries such as the United States, and suspended new economic assistance towards India.5 In addition, with Japan’s strong efforts, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1172, which denounced both India and Pakistan’s nuclear testing, 6 and the G-8 Foreign Minister’s Meeting subsequently issued a statement on this incident. These developments consequently ebbed incentives among

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Japanese firms to invest in India. As a result, the Japan-India relations, which projected symptoms of improvement in the 1990s, were suddenly thrown into a limbo.

GLOBAL PARTNERSHIP IN THE 21ST CENTURY However, the chilly days of Japan-India relations this time around were shortlived. Two years after India’s nuclear tests, Prime Minister Mori visited India in August 2000, and the two heads of government agreed to develop a “Global Partnership in the 21st Century”. In October 2001, the Japanese government announced suspension of its “economic measures” towards India.7 This was due to the heightening necessity to cooperate with India in the fight against terrorism, in the aftermath of 9/11. In December of the same year, Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Japan. In January 2003, Foreign Minister Kawaguchi visited India and announced Japan’s economic assistance of a scale of 110 billion yen. From this year onwards, India surpassed China to become the largest recipient of Japanese Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Moreover, in April 2005, Prime Minister Koizumi visited India and, jointly with his Indian counterpart, announced an “Eight-fold Initiative”, imparting a strategic orientation to the global partnership. Why have Japan-India relations, which stagnated for a long time during the Cold War, shown such a rapid progress after the year 2000? There are three main reasons for this: First of all, India has emerged as a rapidly growing economy, and has begun to project an unprecedented presence in the international arena. While India’s image in the Cold War era was that of a high-ranking official within a labour union, today it is joining the executive board of the international society. Ever since India chose to liberalize its economy in the early 1990s, it has enjoyed an average economic growth of 6 per cent, which has even risen up to 8 per cent in recent years. By the middle of the twenty-first century, India is bound to become a new economic giant. This perception is now broadly shared among the Japanese public. For example, in YomiuriShinbun’s opinion poll conducted in Japan in July 2006, 20 per cent of the people chose India as the most important country in the future of the world economy, ranking it in third place after China and the United States (Japan was ranked fourth). Considering that only 1 per cent of the people supported India with the same question in an opinion poll held ten years ago, there has been a dramatic change in the Japanese public’s perception towards India, within just ten years.8

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Secondly, India shifted its pro-Soviet path of the Cold War, and though it maintains an “omni-directional diplomacy”, it has clearly narrowed its gap between the United States and other western countries. This has enabled a natural cooperation between Japan and India in political and security matters. It is a historical irony that the United States agreed to initiate a strategic dialogue with India only after its nuclear testing in 1998, with an attempt to ease the acute tension. This helped the two countries narrow their differences. In addition, President Clinton visited India only less than two years after the nuclear testing. This was the first time in twenty-two years for a U.S. President to visit India. Furthermore, after 9/11, India promptly announced its cooperation with the United States in the fight against terrorism. In response, the United States positioned India as “a growing world power with which we have common strategic interests” in its White House Strategic Report in 2002.9 Along with these movements, political and security cooperation between Japan and India gradually began to grow. The coast guards of the two countries, in particular, have established a close relationship through joint exercises and other interactions. Moreover, defence personnel of the two countries have recently been exchanging visits at a rate that was unimaginable in the past. Thirdly, as Asia emerges as the most vibrant region in the world with the rapid economic growth of China and India, and with the nascent movements towards a regional integration, Japan and India have started to recognize each other as partners to create a new Asian order. In the governmental interactions before the First East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005, Japan approached the ASEAN countries, the coordinators of the summit, to include India as an original member. This was a symbolic movement of a Japan-India partnership within the context of an Asian regional cooperation.

TOWARDS A TRUE STRATEGIC PARTERNERSHIP As discussed above, Japan and India have been improving and strengthening their relationship in recent years. However, considering its enormous potential, the level of bilateral cooperation has still not reached a sufficient level. In the economic sphere, while India is the largest recipient of Japanese ODA, bilateral trade in 2005 was merely US$6.5 billion, lagging far behind Indo-U.S. trade (US$26.8 billion) and Indo-China trade (US$17.6 billion).10 In addition, in the political and security sphere, the number of bilateral dialogues and visits has been stepped up, but the two

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countries have yet to accumulate a decent number of concrete cooperative ventures. On the other hand, there are signs of major changes that would lead to a true strategic partnership. When Prime Minister Koizumi visited India in 2005, Japan and India agreed on the “Eight-fold Initiative”. These initiatives provide a comprehensive platform to invigorate the bilateral relationship in all fields, including economic, security, science and technology and culture. As argued at the beginning of this chapter, Japan and India, led by their leaders’ strong passion for consolidating Japan-India relationship, are set to bolster the achievements of the Koizumi-Manmohan Singh era, and develop them even further. The economic sphere, in particular, is showing promising developments. For example, during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in December 2005, the two countries agreed to initiate talks on a bilateral Economic Partnership Agreement/Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA/CEPA) in early 2007. This agreement will not only promote Japan-India economic relations, but also serve as a milestone for the future economic integration of Asia. In ODA, various important projects, including infrastructure schemes such as the freight corridor project, are being implemented and are under discussion.11 At the business level, the number of Japanese firms in India has grown from 298 in April 2005 to 351 in June 2006.12 In addition, it is estimated that in the next five years, Japanese firms are planning FDIs in India worth more than US$3 billion.13 Moreover, in a research conducted by JETRO, India was ranked as one of the most popular investment destinations in many business categories among Japanese firms. In the same survey, 63.8 per cent of the Japanese firms in India replied that their year-on-year operating earning is estimated to improve in 2006, whereas the same figures for ASEAN (48.7 per cent) and China (58.0 per cent) are much lower.14 Even more significant is the growth in portfolio investment. Japanese portfolio investment in India expanded from 37.8 billion yen (accounting for 9.1 per cent of the entire overseas portfolio investment in India) in the first quarter of 2005, to 91.7 billion yen (19 per cent share) in the first quarter of 2006.15 These figures clearly indicate the positive attitude of the Japanese firms towards the Indian market. What is required is to facilitate such movements and to invigorate concrete economic activities. Towards these means, both governments must make efforts to expeditiously conclude the economic partnership negotiation, and to further improve the effectiveness and efficiency of Japanese ODA. Moreover, both governments must collaborate with the industry and promote deregulation, improve infrastructure, and utilize Special Economic Zones

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(SEZs) in India, in order to equip the country with better investment environment. The foundations of Japan-India relationship have been strengthened in the political and security sphere as well, through bilateral dialogues and visits. During 2006 alone, there has been an unprecedented number of visits, with the chief of joint staff and all three chiefs of the ground self-defence force, maritime self-defence force and air self-defence force from the Japanese side, and Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and the chiefs of navy and air force from the Indian side. The challenge here onwards is to ensure concrete cooperation to build upon this foundation. Japan and India share various challenges and interests, such as the safety of navigation in the Indian Ocean sea-lanes, the fight against terrorism, energy security, and disaster prevention. In fact, cooperation has been initiated in several fields, including the partnership of coast guards, and the cooperation in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami.16 However, these remain merely as single-loaded initiatives. What the two countries need to do is, to expand these concrete measures in both quality and volume. Japan-India cooperation in the context of Asian regional cooperation is another extremely important field in order to secure prosperity, stability and peace in the region. Today, Asia is witnessing the world’s most dynamic economic development, and the countries in the region are building closer economic partnerships with each other. On the other hand, there still remain a number of challenges in the area of political system and principle, with the immense diversity of the region. It therefore becomes even more vital for Japan and India, who share universal values such as freedom, democracy, rule of law and human rights, to closely cooperate in regional frameworks such as the East Asia Summit. Asia already enjoys multi-layered regional frameworks, but a Japan-U.S.-India-Australia quadrilateral strategic dialogue — an idea put forward by Prime Minister Abe — may prove to be a new important framework that provides a stage for dialogue among countries that share universal values.

THE LAST OBSTACLE The final issue to discuss in this article is the differences between Japan and India over their nuclear policies, the third obstacle that has estranged the two countries from each other. The first obstacle — “Cold War Equation”, and the second obstacle — different economic policies, are now irrelevant and part of history. The remaining is this third obstacle.

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On the nuclear issue, the “Indo-U.S. Civilian Nuclear Cooperation Deal” is poised to alter the entire international environment surrounding India. This deal aims to open up a path for India — a non-member of the NPT — for receiving international civilian nuclear cooperation, provided that India makes certain commitments, including the acceptance of a safeguard agreement with the IAEA. Through this deal, India is trying to shift its standpoint from a “target” to a “partner” of the international non-proliferation regime. Japan, however, has not yet made its position clear on this deal. It is carefully studying the possible effects that might be brought upon the credibility of the international non-proliferation regime once India’s “special status” is formally recognized. India and the United States claim that, by accommodating India as a “partner” of the international non-proliferation regime through this deal, the regime itself will be strengthened. However, India has not yet clarified how it intends to contribute to the international non-proliferation regime as its partner. The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) members, including Japan, seek a convincing explanation on this matter from the Indian side, through bilateral and multilateral discussions. In addition to the above, Japan and India need to deepen their dialogue on this issue. In May last year, the two countries held director general-level talks on disarmament and non-proliferation. This is a significant progress, but there is need for further interaction. There are currently a number of uncertainties attached to the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, such as, the outcomes of the future negotiations on a safeguard agreement between India and the IAEA, and a bilateral civilian nuclear cooperation agreement between India and the United States, and the Japanese government is maintaining a cautious attitude towards this deal. On the other hand, if the nuclear deal is appropriately dealt with, and if India proves to be a real “partner” of the international non-proliferation regime, this would signal a possibility of cooperation between Japan and India on the nuclear issue, which has been an enduring obstacle between the two countries. In other words, the results of the Indo-U.S. nuclear deal will have an extremely important implication for the future development of the Japan-India strategic partnership.

A TIME FOR SEA CHANGE Having put forward the arguments above, it would not be an overstatement to conclude that the Japan-India relationship is witnessing a time for sea change.17

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Of course, there is no denying that there are still many challenges to be addressed in the bilateral relationship, in order for it to evolve into a true strategic partnership. In the field of economy, India and Japan need to firmly implement the agreements reached during Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit, including the early conclusion of EPA/CEPA negotiations, a rapid improvement of the investment environment in India with initiatives such as the establishment of SEZs (Special Economic Zones), and an implementation of the Freight Corridor Project with the assistance of Japanese ODA. Similarly, in the field of politics, defence and security, the two countries need to develop concrete cooperation on the basis of recent increase of bilateral exchanges. Moreover, it will be an extremely important agenda for Japan and India to reconcile their positions within the process of reviewing the NSG guideline apropos the Indo-U.S. deal on civilian nuclear cooperation. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Japan-India relationship has undergone a remarkable shift. In 1957, exactly fifty years ago, the then Prime Minister Kishi, grandfather of Prime Minister Abe, visited India, and then Prime Minister Nehru reciprocated by visiting Japan. The strong personal ties between the two leaders were a symbol of the close relationship between the two countries in the 1950s, which some people call the “Golden Era of Japan-India Relationship”. As exactly half a century has passed since his grandfather’s visit to India, Prime Minister Abe is expected to visit India in 2007. Following the successful visit by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Japan in December 2006, the reunion in India between of the two leaders may become a historical meeting signalling the arrival of a “New Golden Era of Japan-India Relationship”.

Notes 1

2

3

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Shinzo Abe, “Utsukushii Kunihe” [Towards a Beautiful Country.] Bunshun Shinsho, July 2006, pp. 158–60. C. Raja Mohan, “Rising Hopes from the Rising Sun”, Indian Express, 20 November 2006, p. 9. According to an article in Hindustan Times, 21 October 2006, p. 8, Japan is ranked as the third most important country after the United States and the United Kingdom in the “Relevance for India Index” (RX), which was formulated by the Indian government for internal usage. Besides Japan, Russia and China are also placed third, and sixth respectively. Tomoji Muto (Former Japanese Consul General in Mumbai), who was the interpreter to Prime Minister Kishi upon his visit to India, writes: “Prime Minister Nehru, in his impromptu speech, recalled that he was encouraged in witnessing Japan’s victory over Russia, and developed a strong interest towards

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Japan.”, Tomoji Muto, “Indo Shiroku” [Personal Notes of India], Shanti Shuppan (Shanti Press), November 2003, pp. 143–44. See statements by then Chief Cabinet Secretary Muraoka on 13 and 14 May 1998. In addition to the “economic measures”, the Japanese government tentatively recalled the Japanese ambassador to India. Japan was a co-sponsor of Resolution 1172 along with Sweden, Costa Rica, and Slovenia. See the statement by the chief cabinet secretary on 26 October 2001. See Yomiuri-Shinbun, 11 August 2006, p.11, and 19 September 1996, pp. 10– 11. See “National Security Strategy 2002” (September 2002), Whitehouse. Statistics released by the Department of Commerce and Industry, India. India has been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA since Japan’s fiscal year 2002. Statistics by the Embassy of Japan, New Delhi. Based on unclassified information gathered by the Embassy of Japan, New Delhi. “Zai Asia Nikkei-Seizogyo no Keiheijittai: ASEAN Indo Hen (2005)” [Business Survey of Japanese Firms in Asia — ASEAN and India (2005)], JETRO. RBI Bulletin, Reserve Bank of India (RBI). In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami on December 2004, Japan, the United States, Australia and India immediately launched a Core Group, and worked closely in providing assistance to the affected areas. It was reported that, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, on his return from Japan last December, mentioned to the Indian media that “Prime Minister Abe himself said that he looks upon India-Japan relationship as the most important bilateral relationship for Japan. That’s the measure of the transformation that I expect will take place as a result of my visit”, The Hindu, 17 December 2006, p. 1.

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10 INDIAN INTERACTIONS IN EAST ASIA Arun Mahizhnan INTRODUCTION Professor Wang Gungwu’s comments in this volume not only provide a brilliant overview of the historical perspective of the Indian diaspora but also set the tone for a comparative basis in dealing with this phenomenon by frequently referring to China and the historiography of the Chinese diaspora. In the context of East Asia, one can hardly discuss India, Indian civilization or Indian diaspora without inevitably being compared with China, Chinese civilisation or Chinese diaspora. There are useful parallels and divergences in their distinct but inter-connected histories that are valuable to bear in mind in thinking of the future of the Indian diaspora in East Asia. This chapters focuses on a few aspects of the Indian character that can both enrich and be enriched by its interaction with the East Asian cultures. It suggests a few ways in which Indians could contribute to a better life for others, a few ways in which Indians could better their own life and also a few ways in which Indians could calibrate their Indian-ness.

WHAT INDIANS CAN CONTRIBUTE Many papers in this volume address the growth and impact of India’s economic and political power. It would be helpful to introduce another dimension to the discussion of India and East Asia. It is what Harvard political scientist Joseph Nye had christened as “soft power”. He defines soft power as 157

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the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. When you can get others to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Hard power, the ability to coerce, grows out of a country’s military and economic might. Soft power arises from the attractiveness of a country’s culture, political ideals, and policies.1

Though there is voluminous literature on India’s impact on Southeast Asia in the past, not much has been written about the current implications of the soft power India has wielded over the centuries across Southeast Asia. It is an area of study that should be encouraged as it holds many valuable lessons for India’s future role in this region as well as on the global stage. Let us touch on the past briefly and suggest some future opportunities relating to Indian soft power. In all of Southeast Asia, no other country’s culture or civilization has had as extensive or as deep or as long an effect as India’s. And even more remarkably, such effect has been achieved mostly through peaceful means instead of military might or commercial cunning. The Indian influence in Southeast Asia predates European influence by at least a 1,000 years and the effect is persistent even today. While there is much debate about whether the Indian ideas were merely adopted passively or adapted with much circumspection and selectivity, there is little doubt about the extent of their influence in Southeast Asia. Amitav Acharya, in his (forthcoming) paper on “The ‘Indianization of Southeast Asia’ Revisited: Initiative, Adaptation and Transformation in Classical Civilizations” states that this process “probably counts as the single most extensive case of pacific spread of ideas in the history of civilization: the transmission of Indian religious and political ideas to Southeast Asia during the pre-colonial period”. This is an extraordinary achievement by any measure. But what were the factors that enabled such a projection of Indian soft power and are those factors still available to India? At the risk of oversimplification, it could be argued that ancient India offered exceptionally attractive political, social and cultural value systems that won over both the elite and the masses in these countries. In some cases, it was the superior statecraft as in Kautilya’s Arthasastra. In some cases, it was an extensive and sophisticated legal system as in Manu’s Manusmrti. Or, in some cases, the sheer imagination and story telling power as in Mahabharata and Ramayana, as well as the compelling social values embedded in them. There are many more such examples of Indian ideas that have spread across Southeast Asia, contributing to the “Indianization” of Southeast Asia. The question now is:

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Is India (and Indians, by extension) still capable of capturing the imagination of non-Indian societies with the power of ideas instead of missiles or merchandise? There are some indications that modern-day Indian ideas are still potent. Let us take a few examples. The idea of non-violence, as both a political principle and a social code of conduct was invented and propagated by Gandhi to great effect. Martin Luther King in the United States and Nelson Mandela in South Africa embraced and practiced this philosophy. The idea of non-alignment in international relations was shaped and spearheaded by Jawaharlal Nehru and though assessments vary on the efficacy of nonalignment as a political strategy, it is still alive today and followed by a good number of countries. Though the idea of democracy was not invented by India, among Asian nations, it is at the forefront of defining and defending democracy. To be sure, India has often failed to live up to its democratic ideals and often displays the tendencies of a neo-feudalistic state. Yet, there is no denying that democracy is at the core of its Constitution as well as its idealism, and that for the rest of Asia, it is a working model. Moving away from politics, Indian academics have attained exalted positions in the best universities of the world through fresh and bold ideas in a range of disciplines. Indian writers continue to claim the attention of the world, not to mention prestigious book prizes. Indian art, music and dance have captured the imagination of the elite around the world. Indian fashion is now making waves on the ramps of international haute couture shows. Even Indian cinema has travelled well beyond the diasporic circles to the mainstream West as well as the Middle East and the East. In the world of spiritual well-being and non-material lifestyle, no other group of philosophers or preachers have attained the apostolic status as have Indian gurus. And this is not just marketing genius though there is some of it. But, above all, the single most significant factor that distinguishes India from most of its Asian neighbours is perhaps the very obsession with ideas and idealism as opposed to the down-to-earth philosophy of materialism and pragmatism. And this is also perhaps its greatest strength and greatest weakness. As Amartya Sen has amply demonstrated in his book, The Argumentative Indian,2 India and Indians at large have a great propensity to debate ideas for their own sake and this intellectual ferment has become part of the Indian character. Sen holds that “the simultaneous flourishing of many different convictions and viewpoints in India has drawn substantially on the acceptance … of heterodoxy and dialogue”.3 Thus, the “argumentative Indian” is a product of this heterodoxy that has evolved over thousands of years.

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This relentless engagement with the realm of ideas would be a major factor in how India and Indians will be perceived by the rest of the world in the future. India’s and Indians’ capacity for idea generation will probably put them in a better position vis-a-vis the rest of the world, especially in East Asia, than India’s economic or military power. For many countries, this position will be less threatening and more conducive to cooperative engagements with it. Nye has pointed out that in this age of information, those with the better story to tell often win. Shashi Tharoor, a UN undersecretary-general, himself an Indian national, argues that India is the “land of the better story”, in his article on India and its soft power.4 Citing numerous example of how Indians and Indian cultural products have captivated audiences across the globe, he says India has an “extraordinary ability to tell stories that are more persuasive and attractive than its rivals”. However, soft power can also be manifested or projected by state policy and official assistance. Amit Gupta, an academic at the U.S. Air Force War College, has suggested a number of ways through which India can project its soft power.5 For example, he makes a case for using education as soft power. He points out that though India has approximately 226 universities, 428 engineering colleges and more than 100 medical colleges, the number of foreign students studying in India is small. He cites a newspaper report that stated that in 2003 it was just 8,145.6 While not all of India’s educational institutions will be an “attraction” to the world outside, there is little doubt that the likes of the Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) which have gained a world-class reputation, will be a tremendous incentive for seeking Indian education. Furthermore, those seeking education from India do not even have to go there, thanks to information technology (IT) which Indians themselves excel in. Distance learning, though not a new concept, has been taken to new heights through virtual classrooms that have obviated the need for travel. Gupta thus argues that India is in an advantageous position to provide high quality education to many other nations that could benefit from Indian scholarship and educational innovation. America and Europe have learnt that those who received good education in their countries carry with them a residual sense of gratitude and affection that form a reservoir of goodwill around the globe which they can draw from. India has the potential to build such a reservoir. Another of Gupta’s suggestions for soft power projection focuses on what he calls the medical connection.7 He suggests that India should expand and exploit its capacity to provide medical care as well as to produce vital drugs such as anti-AIDS and anti-bird flu medicines that would be far less

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costly than the case in much of the developed world. He believes that when a country provides such critical services as education and medical care, few would say no to it.

WHAT INDIANS CAN LEARN In as much as Indians have a reputation for generating ideas, equally, they seem to have a notoriety for disorganization. While they may draw some comfort from the chaos theory, the chaos in the daily life of Indians is neither edifying nor enriching. Interestingly, even outside India, certainly among the long-established Indian diaspora in Southeast Asia, this capacity to organize, consolidate and build on is woefully under-developed. It has become a truism that Indians work better with others than among themselves. There are many theories about why this phenomenon exists among Indians. One possibility is that the idea of “closure” is less pronounced in the mental make-up of Indians, leading to prolonged debate and discord. The “Argumentative Indian” seems far too obsessed with the idea of arguing, exploring numerous possibilities, analysing all their pros and cons, and far less interested in coming to a closure on which is the best idea so he can accomplish the mission at hand. It seems the mission is more an excuse to think than a reason to act. There is also the general observation that India is extraordinarily underdeveloped in terms of infrastructure while China is extraordinarily competent in building it. The usual explanation given, at least by Indians, is that India is a democracy and things take time to sort out. While there is much truth in this statement, it does not appear to be the whole truth. There is a sneaking suspicion whether, apart from democracy, corruption and disorganization play a major role in their under-achievement. It is, perhaps, worth reflecting on what is weak or marginalized in the Indian mental make-up. For those Indians living long in East Asia, not only with the Chinese, but also with the Japanese and the Koreans, both of whom have come under tremendous Sinic civilizational influence much as Southeast Asia had come under Indian influence, the question, if not the conclusion, of Indian disorganization is inescapable. The consistent and copious achievements of these East Asian countries in organizing their resources and achieving material goods are clearly valuable lessons. It has been said that their work ethics and discipline are also central to their achievements. However, it can be argued that idea generation too requires hard work and discipline. But there is still the lingering doubt if the material world does not seem to engage the Indian mind as much as it should.

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Regardless of what indeed are the causes of Indian woes, there is no escape from the fact that the potency of Indian soft power will be diminished by the negative perceptions of India. As Nye himself points out that while India has much soft power potential, it “still faces challenges of poverty with 260 million people surviving on less than one [US] dollar a day, inequality tied to a caste system, and corruption and inefficiency in the provision of public services”.8 However, he fortells that despite its problems, “it is a safe bet that India’s hard and soft powers are likely to rise in the coming times. If India can combine the two successfully, it will be a ‘smart power’.” Tharoor adds that it is not enough to attend to basic problems such as poverty and hunger. He argues that India’s “democracy, thriving free media, contentious NGOs, energetic human rights groups, and the repeated spectacle of our remarkable general elections, have all made of India a rare example of the successful management of diversity in the developing world” and these should be preserved as precious assets of the country.9

WHAT INDIANS NEED TO CALIBRATE, NOT CELEBRATE The final point of this chapter is something that Indians need to be judicious about in their celebration of being Indian. The Indian diaspora spread around the world is said to number about twenty million today.10 In East Asia, they have been settled for more than two centuries. These Indian settlers’ history and trajectories of life and growth more closely resemble those of the early migrants to Africa and the Caribbean than those of the latter-day migrants to America and Europe, as has been discussed elsewhere in this book. However, there is ongoing debate about how Indian are Indians in these far-flung lands of their adopted homes. It has been said that once you are Indian, you are always Indian. This is shorthand for saying that even if you had migrated and put out roots in other lands and in fact become the citizen of another country and no longer think like Indians, eat like Indians and live like Indians, you are still Indian and don’t you ever forget that! Indian commentators like Pavan Varma argue that “many foreigners don’t fully realize how much India continues to be part of Indians.”11 He says that Indians living abroad are “well-adjusted split personalities: English or American in their work environment, irrepressibly Indian in the privacy of their homes”. He even claims that Indians who have lived abroad for generations will continue to consider India ‘home’; a desire to return to their “roots is a pervasive sentiment”. This argument may hold true for recent immigrants but not for many who have settled in their host

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countries many generations ago. And this misperception indeed is problematic for the diasporic Indian. The notion that all Indians abroad are the same is both inaccurate and unhelpful. For those living the diaspora life for long, it is a common occurrence to be asked by a visiting Indian national first, “Where are you from?” and when you say, “I’m from Singapore”, to be immediately followed by, “But I mean where are you originally from?” And, just in case you think you could get away by replying, “Yes, my forefathers are from India”, you will be sadly mistaken. The inquisitor knows that already and what he is really after is to find out exactly which village your ancestors came from so he can fix you within the template he carries in his head — a template that has a matrix of caste, state, language, status, etc. To some extent, this is both a search for affinity as well as for identity. It is only natural that when people interact with people of the same feather, the tendency is to flock together. However, in the case of identity, especially in the context of Southeast Asia where the building of national identities have been a relatively short, confusing and, unfortunately in some cases, a very painful process, identity is a very sensitive subject. In building the bondage of Indian diaspora, there is need for much caution and circumspection as to not only whom to include in the diaspora but how to include them. Interestingly, in the recently published The Encyclopaedia of the Indian Diaspora,12 a pioneering work of its kind, the editors point out that they have not included the Jaffna Tamils because they consider themselves to have a distinctive history and cultural heritage in Sri Lanka. Even in Singapore, for decades, Jaffna Tamils, or Ceylon Tamils as they are called there, marked themselves in their identity card as Ceylonese and not as Indians. But this is, perhaps, not so much due to their derision of the Tamil Nadu Tamils with whom they did not want be confused, but more because of simplistic and naive definitions of identity that some countries have drawn up. However, our concerns should go deeper than intra-Indian squabbles. Young nation states have huge anxieties about building national identities, especially when they have to forge them out of a complex and deep mix of ethnic, cultural and prenational identities that are already very strong. Thus, for example, Singapore has been struggling for the past forty-five years to define the Singaporean identity. There was a time when the government tried to pressure-cook a Singaporean identity within a very short time after independence, whereby every citizen would become a full-fledged “Singaporean” to the exclusion of other natural identities — in other words, an unhyphenated and unqualified identity. Thus, most Singaporeans, especially the Chinese and the Indians had to quickly disavow their inherent and inherited identities for something that

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was not even clear, much less solid. This led to the sorry spectacle of a fair bit of China- and India-bashing by some earnest political and community leaders just to prove they were loyal to this new land of birth or adoption. However, just when Singaporeans were beginning to get the hang of being a total Singaporean, the leaders changed the rules once again. They discovered that the unhyphenated identity did not work quite the way they had imagined and it was time to declare the hyphenated identity legitimate. So Singaporeans became Chinese-Singaporeans, Malay-Singaporeans and Indian-Singaporeans, almost overnight. Just in case any one thinks Singaporeans have come to the end of the “identity road”, watch this space. The main point to be made in the context of the Indian diaspora is that Indian nationals seem to think that overseas Indians are actually Indians at heart and that they should be loyal to India and helpful to India and defend India when necessary. They seem not to make the distinction between India the political state, and India the cultural and spiritual “home” for the nonnationals. Singaporean-Indians and Malaysian-Indians, no matter how much they might struggle with their new and young identities cannot and should not identify with India, the political state. Though Indian-Singaporeans no longer have to be too self-conscious about expressing a great respect or fondness for things Indian, they cannot be nor can they be expected to be, loyal to the Indian nation. On the other hand, this may not be so in certain other countries such as the United States, which allow dual nationalities. While diaspora is meaningful only when connections are made and common interests are identified, there is need for much reflection and circumspection as to how the diaspora members are identified and engaged. In sum, Indians in East Asia have much to offer this region, much to learn from this region, and in doing both they need to acknowledge and respect the fact that “we Indians” are not the same. As they say, there are Indians and Indians.

Notes 1

2

3 4

5

Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy”, Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 2 (2004): 255. Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian: Writings on Indian Culture, History and Identity (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005). Ibid., p. ix. Shashi Tharoor, “The Land of the Better Story: India and Soft Power”, in Global Asia 2 no. 1 (2007). Amit Gupta, “India’s Soft Power”, Indian Foreign Affairs Journal 1, no. 1 (2006).

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Indian Interactions in East Asia 6 7 8

9 10 11

12

165

Ibid, p. 51. Ibid, p. 55. Joseph Nye, Springing Tiger . Op. cit., p. 76. Gupta, op. cit., p. 52. Pavan K. Varma, Being Indian (New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2004), p. 201. Brij V. Lal, ed., The Encyclopedia of the Indian Diaspora (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2006), p. 15.

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COUNTRY PERSPECTIVES

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BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

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11 A CENTURY OF CONTRIBUTIONS BY INDIANS IN NEGARA BRUNEI DARUSSALAM A. Mani POPULATION The number of Indians in Brunei Darussalam has been growing steadily since 1906, when Britain extended its protection over the shrinking sultanate. In that year a Pathan and a Sikh were seconded from Malaya for police duty in Brunei town. With British protection, began the continued arrival and presence of Indians in one of the smallest states of Southeast Asia (Mani 1993). By logical extension, 2006 could have been celebrated as the first centennial of their contributions to the continued development of the state. Given the ideological foundations of the contemporary state, such historical memories are subdued and forgotten. The century long participation and contributions of Indians in modern Brunei did not arise as a result of close economic relations between India and Brunei Darussalam. The economic linkages between India and Brunei have been indirect rather than direct. Much of the imports from India are through Singapore than in any direct sense. Thus in 2005 Brunei’s imports from India were only US$16.398 million out of the total imports of US$1.5506 billion (B$2.481 billion). While the direct imports were less than one per cent, there was the growing export of oil from Brunei to India. The term “Indian” in twentieth century Brunei has generally been used to describe all persons who originated from largely contemporary India, 171

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but including other countries and regions identified as part of the scholarly defined area termed as South Asia. In some instances, depending on the British demographers’ policies in Malaya, the Nepalese and Ceylonese were separated and grouped under “Others”. In 1971, for instance, Nepalese were grouped with other races by the census takers (Report on the Census of Population 1972, p. xii). Since 1991, Brunei census takers have defined all Indians as “Others”. Thus, in the 1991 and 2001 censuses, Indians are no more listed as “Indians” but as “Others” as Brunei Darussalam braces itself as a homogenous state dominated by Malays in an Islamic state. The only exceptions being that “Chinese” are still accounted for in all official publications and censuses. Of course, this does not mean the 100 years of contributions by Indians to Brunei Darussalam since 1906 has diminished or ended. Similarly, Brunei’s exports to India accounted for only US$198.77 million out of a total export of B$10.397 billion (US$6.4981 billion). India’s energy needs accounted for the favourable balance of trade for Brunei. Just as India has not made any direct investments in Brunei, the Brunei Investment Agency, which manages Brunei’s foreign investment, has made no direct investments in India. Thus, the continued presence and contribution of Indians in Brunei is not as a consequence of close economic ties between the Indian sub-continent and Brunei Darussalam. The bilateral political relations of Brunei with India have been steadily growing. In the last decade Brunei has also witnessed attempts by Pakistan and Bangladesh to establish diplomatic ties. The ties with India appear to be steadily increasing, as India has become a dialogue partner with all the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Bilateral diplomatic relations were established in 1984, when Brunei gained independence, and resident diplomatic missions were exchanged in 1993. The bilateral relations became firmed when Sultan Hassanal Bolkiah paid a state visit to India in September 1992. The bilateral political relations began to have an economic basis with the signing of Air Services Agreement in November 1995 paving the way for direct flights by Royal Brunei Airlines (RBA) to Kolkata. In 2006, RBA flew to Chennai, with further plans to link with all the lucrative air routes to the Indian sub-continent. The expansion of RBA routes to India coming at a time when ever changing airfares abound has not deterred the goal of linking with India. A joint committee for annual bilateral consultations between the two foreign ministries and an agreement in the space field was signed in August 1997. This allowed for the setting up of an Indian telemetry, tracking and command (TTC) centre in Brunei as part of India’s space programme for its geo-synchronous launch vehicles (GSLV). The fifth

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meeting of India-Brunei Joint Committee Meeting was held in New Delhi on 28 May 2005. Brunei Darussalam had supported India becoming a full dialogue partner of ASEAN. As evident from Table 11.1, Brunei’s Indian population has steadily grown from less than 66 persons in 1911 to slightly more than 10,000 persons in 2001. The term “Indian” in this chapter includes all persons from the Indian sub-continent as well as those of Indian origins from Southeast Asian countries, especially Malaysia and Singapore. A number of Indians who migrated to Australia and New Zealand from South Asia and Southeast Asia also work in Brunei Darussalam. Thus, all “Indians” do not come from India, even though a large number can be accounted for as coming from contemporary India. The argument that the number, if not the percentage, of Indians in Brunei Darussalam has steadily increased is borne out by other estimations. Table 11.1 Indian Population in Brunei Darussalam, 1911–2001 Year

Number

Percentage of Indians in Total Population

1911 1921 1931 1947 1960 1971 1981 1991 2001

66* 38 377 454 2,877* 2,162– 5,919+ 8,000e 17,755e

0.3 0.2 1.3 1.1 3.4 1.6 3.1 3.2 3.5

* Includes persons listed in ‘Others’ category. The number of Indians may be less than stated. – Excludes Nepalese who were grouped under ‘Others’ category. + Includes Nepalese e Estimates Source: Mani (1993): 3; Estimates for 1991 and 2001 based on fieldwork carried out in August 2006. In 2006, Indian High Commission estimated its citizens to number about 7,500 in Brunei Darussalam.

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Table 11.2 Total Population by Racial Groups in Brunei Darussalam, 1960–2001 Year

1960

1971

1981

1991

2001

Total Malays Other Indigenous Chinese Others (Includes Indians)

83,877 45,135 14,068 21,795 2,879

136,256 89,268 8,552 31,925 6,511

192,832 125,717 15,175 39,461 12,479

260,482 174,319 15,665 40,621 29,877

332,844 222,101 11,699 37,056 61,988

Source: Census figures for respective years. Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2003 (27th Edition). Dept of Statistics, Dept of Economic Planning and Dev (JPKE), Prime Minister’s Office, BD, Table 1.3, p. 7.

As indicated in Table 11.2, the total number of Malays and Others (which includes Indians) has risen consistently over the last five censuses, while that of “Other Indigenous people” and Chinese have experienced a steady fall in numbers and percentage. Besides many “indigenous groups” becoming Malays through inter-marrying and conversion to Islam, some are also migrating to Sarawak, as the national boundaries created in the colonial era have not considered ethnic homelands as contiguous territories, with the consequence of many ethnic groups in Brunei straddling across current national boundaries. Amongst Chinese, there is a steady trend towards migration out of Brunei Darussalam, while economic developments in Malaysia have tended to discourage more of them from coming to work as compared to before. Currently, Brunei draws upon a larger pool of migrant workers who get listed under others. Since the 1980s, workers from the Philippines, Thailand, Myanmar and Indonesia have begun to arrive in greater number to work in Brunei. Whereas about thirty years ago, workers from Malaysia and Singapore would have dominated the labour force in Brunei, now the Malaysian percentage has reduced to about 40 per cent of the workforce from Southeast Asia, with Indonesia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand contributing the rest. As illustrated in Table 11.3, the composition of Indians arriving in 2002 gives some indications of the purposes for which they come to Brunei. Among the 9,684 persons who arrived in Brunei, 58 per cent were from India, while Nepal and Bangladesh contributed 22 per cent and 11 per cent respectively. As usual the enumerators of Brunei’s statistics categorized a quarter of the arrivals under “other reasons”, reflecting the problems of statistical collation done. Among those who arrived for employment, 64 per cent came from

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Table 11.3 Arrivals from South Asia, Brunei Darussalam, 2002 Region All arrivals South Asia India Nepal Bangladesh Pakistan Sri Lanka Southeast Asia Northeast Asia Europe Australasia North America Others

Total

Employment

Business

Tourist

Transit

Others

337,258 9,684 58.01% 21.66% 10.69% 5.17% 4.47% 101,313 18,295 16,223 11,896 4,142 173,034

66,754 3,414 64.20% 15.67% 11.07% 4.19% 4.87% 25,249 257 2,515 1,190 248 34,100

50,822 2,043 48.80% 23.30% 2.35% 23.74% 1.81% 16,214 4,117 3,637 1,443 1,297 26,263

79,428 965 58.13% 20.21% 5.91% 9.12% 6.63% 17,331 9,504 5,173 3,373 1,331 79,428

30,122 949 11.91% 2.85% 0.32% 84.83% 0.09% 8,044 928 2,388 3,232 230 15,385

109,132 7,861 25.17% 11.00% 7.00% 54.75% 2.08% 39,337 3,579 4,507 2,605 1,036 55,876

Notes: Australasia includes Australia and New Zealand; North America includes United States and Canada; Northeast Asia includes Japan, China and Taiwan; CLMV countries are Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam. Source: Computed from Table 10.16, Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2004, pp. 150–51.

India, followed by Nepal (16 per cent) and Bangladesh (11 per cent). Citizens of India were again dominant among those who came for business (49 per cent) and tourism (58 per cent), followed by those from Nepal. According to 1981 census, Indians in Brunei were predominantly from India and Nepal, including those born in Brunei, Malaysia, United Kingdom, Singapore, Hong Kong and other countries (Mani 1993, p. 14). The 2001 census however provides detailed information only for those from South Asia. It is possible, however, to project from interview data among contemporary Indians in Brunei that probably 12 per cent of them are born in Brunei, while Malaysia and Singapore provide 5 per cent and 3 per cent of the Indians in Brunei. Hong Kong may yet provide another 4 per cent of the Indians in Brunei. Table 11.4 provides an account of the South Asian born population by year of arrival, country of birth and gender for 2001. The table also shows temporary residents, under which category most “Indians” are accounted for. Compared to 1981 figures, it is evident that the number of Indians has increased tremendously from 5,919 to 13,687 in 2001. Postulating that “Indians” from South Asia formed only 77 per cent of all Indians in Brunei,

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6,083 2,739 471 275 4,107 12 13,687

India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka Bangladesh Maldives & Others Total

13.0 31.0 28.0 54.0 2.0 58.0 —

Female 17.1 5.1 20.8 14.2 2.7 0.0 10.4

(%)

Before 1991

22.5 36.8 34.0 30.5 12.1 0.0 22.7

(%)

1991–95

47.6 42.7 30.8 49.8 51.5 100.0 47.3

(%)

1996–2000

12.8 15.4 14.4 5.5 33.7 0.0 19.6

(%)

2001

Note: Female Gender Ratio: Number of Females per 100 males. Source: Computed from Table 2.15, pp. 159–63. Summary Tables of the Population Census, Negara Brunei Darussalam, 2001. Department of Statistics, Department of Economic Planning and Development, Prime Minister’s Office, Brunei Darussalam, 2004.

T

Country of Birth

Total

Table 11.4 Foreign-born South Asian Population by Year of Arrival, Country of Birth and Gender, 2001

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it is possible to conclude that the total figure of all Indians including those born in Brunei as well as outside South Asia can be projected as being 17,775 persons. This represents 231 per cent increase in the total population of Indians in Brunei Darussalam between 1981 and 2001. Table 11.4 also shows the length of stay in Brunei as well as the ratio in terms of number of females to 100 males. It is evident that those born in India form the largest population of 6,083 persons, followed by Bangladesh with 4,107 persons and Nepal with 2,739 people. More persons from India have lived in Brunei for more than ten years than any other groups from South Asia. Most persons from Bangladesh, forming almost 85 per cent, have arrived in Brunei only after 1996. They replaced the departing Thai labourers after the Amedeo Corporation collapse in 1997, and are paid the lowest wages in Brunei. The lack of families among workers from Bangladesh is indicated by the female gender ratio of only 2 females per 100 males amongst them. Overall, the female gender ratio is low for those from India, indicating that most of the Indians are males without families. It is among those who are professionals, business owners, army and police officers and investors that we find family formations in Brunei. The lack of adequate number of females has led to inter-ethnic marriages, especially among those Indians who are citizens or permanent residents.

ECONOMIC POSITION In the hundred years from 1906 to 2006, Indians have been continuously engaged in a range of economic activities that have help develop Brunei Darussalam. As before, they are still found in the security sector, services sector, sales sector and in the professional sector like medicine, engineering, management and teaching. As in 1981, one can postulate that almost 80 per cent of the Indians are economically active. Most of them work as employees. Almost all Indians are literate in an Indian language and they learn Malay rapidly upon arrival in Brunei. English language is the common medium of communication between educated Indians belonging to different linguistic groups. In the absence of English, Malay performs the bridging role. As all Indians who have arrived in Brunei have done so for economic gain, except for dependants, unemployment is hardly a talked about issue. But the nature of the economic opportunities afforded to different linguistic groups among Indians and their period of entry to Brunei does create certain stereotypes in economic profile of the various Indian communities. Tamils from India form the predominant economic community in Brunei Darussalam. While the majority are from Tamil Nadu, there are

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also Tamils from Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Singapore and many other countries. Tamil Muslims from Tamil Nadu have played a historical role in operating restaurants in Bandar Seri Begawan. They are also found in piece-cloth trade as well as in other sales. In the last ten years, Tamil Muslims have expanded into operating mini-marts or small-scale supermarkets that sell all the needs of their clientele. Such shops have spread to almost every kampung in the Brunei-Muara District and are well patronized by Brunei Malays and others. The provision of range of goods added to their valued service has helped them to displace ethnic Chinese as shopkeepers in all kampungs in the Brunei-Muara District. Their service is considered so valuable that customers can often call their shops by handphone and expect their goods to be packed and waiting with an attendant who will place it in the car without the Malay customer having to get out of the car. The stiff competition in service has also led to the lowering of prices in Brunei as shopkeepers have learned to expand their profits by sales volume than marked-up prices. The “Mustapha Model” in Singapore enthralls almost all business shop owners in the mini supermarket business. Most of them felt that their businesses have expanded by the services they provide together with lowered price and generating profits through sales volume. The network of Tamil Muslim mini-marts has fuelled the shift of wholesale Indian traders to shift from textiles to foodstuff industries. The mini-marts together with the restaurants have brought almost 3,000 Tamil Muslims and other Tamils to Brunei. Some of the business owners have more than a few outlets. Very few of them are operators of just one business outlet. There are about 200 such entrepreneurs who play the critical role of providing sales and service in the restaurant and mini-mart businesses. These businesses in turn have brought others to work in their establishments. Each small restaurant or mini-mart employs about ten to twelve employees, where the male employees would form the majority with all of them hailing from the township or village of the owner in Tamil Nadu. In addition one or two Indonesian or Filipino females together with one or two Bruneian females help man the establishment. As the Bruneian Government insists on employing Bruneians, all establishments employ Bruneian females who work regular hours while the others work about twenty hours a day. Life for shop workers from Tamil Nadu is not easy except that they are able to remit their incomes to their families back home. Most workers earn about B$300 (US$207) a month, which converts to about 6,000 Indian rupees a month. If they work for more than ten years, this amount will increase to B$600 (US$414) for a few. As described by one of my respondents Jalaludin from Tamil Nadu,

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We are just floating in the river, going downstream, trying to catch on to something and improve our lives. For most of us there is no hope as our life in Brunei does not allow us to think of an alternate life.

As Brunei labour laws require a deposit of B$1,800 (US$1,240) for guarantee of repatriation of workers, most shop workers borrow this money as well as their travel expenses to Brunei. They only get a day off when the Islamic calendar requires that the business or shop be closed for the day. Very often, if they fall ill, they will have to incur their own medical expenses. All the twenty workers interviewed reported that they cannot afford to get sick in Brunei. As employers want a healthy bunch of employees, most shop workers do not last long in Brunei. Moreover, even the workers want to be self-employed in Tamil Nadu after accumulating some capital or they try and use the accumulated capital to move to the Gulf States where salaries are higher. The employers, for most of them, are also held in check, as they are concerned about their prestige in their natal villages and attempt their best to treat their employees fairly. Both employees and employers appear to respond to loss of prestige in their natal villages by playing their roles adequately in Brunei. According to Brunei labour laws, all workers have to leave Brunei after two years and return to their home country before being re-hired. Another large group of migrant workers from the Indian sub-continent are the Urdu/Hindi speaking migrants from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar provinces. They number about 2,000 persons and are predominantly males and Muslims. They perform the role of service workers in tailoring, laundry, hairdressers for males (barbers) and cooks in bakeries. They are not visible to the average visitor to Brunei but they play a crucial role in the services industry of Brunei. They are largely conversant in Urdu/Hindi and Malay that they learn after arriving for work in Brunei. The majority of them work in businesses operated by an earlier migrant. They too lead the same lifestyle as that of Tamil Muslim workers. The significant role played by these workers has kept the cost of living in Brunei lower than elsewhere. A haircut in Brunei, for example, has been kept as low as B$4 (US$2.45) since the 1980s. The third significant economic activity of Indians in Brunei is the provision of security to the state. These are provided by Gurkhas in both Bandar Seri Begawan and near the oil fields of Seria in the Belait District. Though only ten Nepalese had become permanent citizens in 1981, the vast majority are temporary residents. By 2001, the gender ratio for Nepalese has

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improved to 31 females for every 100 males, indicating that more families have been formed. There are also businessmen amongst them operating businesses to meet the needs of the Gurkha camps. The group of professionals among Indians has always had a significant presence in Brunei Darussalam. They form about 8 to 10 per cent of the economically active Indian population. They are found in banking, technical, insurance, health care and teaching professions. Multinational bankers like the Citigroup have brought Indian expertise from their own Indian diaspora. Technical personnel are found more in the private sector than in the public sector. For many decades Brunei’s public works department used to be manned by Ceylon Tamils and Tamils from Malaysia and Singapore. Their number has now been replaced entirely by Bruneian citizens since 2000. At the peak of the Amedeo Corporation efforts to build Brunei’s infrastructure in the 1990s, Indian construction companies employed thousands of technical personnel for the construction of roads, bridges and buildings. The most famous construction company operated by Indians is the Oman-based construction company known as Galfar. The company arrived as a subsidiary of the Oman-based parent company in 1987 at the invitation of the Brunei government when Brunei began to build its infrastructure as an independent country. From 1990, the company began to attract large contracts from the public sector. From 1991 to 1996, Galfar became the best among all the construction companies in Brunei. It received the best contractor award for every year for six years from 1991 to 1996. As it became clear that Galfar was the only premier construction company in Brunei, the award was ended after the six years. At the peak of Galfar’s construction projects, this company alone employed 1,000 Indians in its various projects besides an equal number of Thai workers. Besides Galfar, a number of Malaysian Indians also had formed smaller construction companies. There are also construction companies operated by Indians in the oil town of Seria. The Amedeo Corporation collapse together with Bruneiasation policy of the Public Works Department reduced the number of Indians in the construction sector. Galfar, for instance, now employs only 600 Indians amongst its 850 workers. Of these, 80 are engineers. The Amedeo Corporation collapse caused the repatriation of about 20,000 workers of whom the majority were Thais. In the case of Indian workers, there appears to have been no significant repatriation. The retrenched Indian workers and technical personnel, owing to their high education status just went into other sectors [Interview with Mohinder Singh]. For many technically adept Indians, developments in India and the Gulf States are attractive. Compared to Brunei’s GDP of 2 to 4 per cent, the GDP

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of the city of Chennai (in India) alone is 25 per cent. Developments and opportunities elsewhere are always an attractive option for Brunei’s Indians technical talent to move. Indians have played an important role in the healthcare industry of Brunei Darussalam. Despite the expansion in the number of medical professionals in Brunei, one out of every six doctor is an Indian, forming a total of 80 to 100 medical doctors. A few of the doctors have established their own private clinics to cater to their clientele. The education sector has also had a historical presence of Indians from Kerala, Tamil Nadu and West Malaysia. Even though Brunei currently attracts teachers from Pakistan, Bangladesh and elsewhere in the Indian sub-continent, the South Indian presence in the education sector of Brunei continues. Despite the education sector being the target of Bruneiasation policy, the continuous expansion of education in Brunei has continued to attract Indians from Malaysia and South Asia to come in significant numbers. The sector in which Indians have figured prominently in Brunei is in being innovative entrepreneurs. About ten to twenty Indians in Brunei have brought about a sense of rising confidence to the business community. It is this class of entrepreneurs who are being admired and closely watched both within the community and by others. There are still established businessmen like Mohinder Singh, eighty years old in 2006, who through his sixty years of stay in Brunei has risen to become the community elderperson and a successful entrepreneur. Beginning with his Glamour Sports Company in Seria in 1949, today with his son Manmohan Singh operates one of the largest outlets of carpets and sports goods in Brunei and Sabah. There are also a few established Sindhi businesses like the three Punjabi brothers who had started business in 1967, and later went their own ways as their family members increased. Though they specialized in wholesale textiles, challenge of cheaper textiles from China forced them to seek alternate businesses. Today Chandru Punjabi has become an entrepreneur in wholesale importing and distribution of processed foodstuffs. One of the leading entrepreneurs amongst Indians in Brunei is Ramesh Jiwatram Bhawani. Leaving Bombay at the age of seventeen, he arrived in Bandar Seri Begawan (BSB) in 1981 to work for Mohinder Singh’s Mohan’s Carpets store. After working for five years, he decided to start his own business. His business philosophy has always been to avoid buying anything on credit and to be sincere to his customers. When Amedeo Corporation brought Thai labour into Brunei, he seized the opportunity of selling what Thai workers needed. He established three shops in BSB and sold 60,000 to 65,000 watches a month alone to Thai workers. His business on any

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one day had a turnover of B$17,000 (US$11,725) during the peak years of Amedeo Corporation. When the corporation collapsed following the Asian financial crisis, his business dropped to B$700 (US$483) a day. While other businessmen were cautious about expanding their businesses, he bought a large shop at Serusop (a business complex) and gave confidence to other Indian businessmen. Today, together with his brother Ramesh J.B., runs the Galleria YMRM selling every possible aesthetic and branded goods that the average Bruneian would like to have. The emporium built on Tenku Link on the way to the airport is an exclusive building housing also the Mustapha Superstore, which follows the model of Mustapha Store in Singapore to sell all goods under one roof. With an annual turnover of B$3.5 million (US$2.41 million), and with no creditors, Ramesh is able to offer the cheapest price in BSB for any good that a person needs. He has planned to expand into establishing manufacturing industries in Brunei as well as to expand into the Gulf market. Nazir Ahmad of Nazmi Textiles is another illustrious entrepreneur among Brunei’s Indians. The 43-year-old entrepreneur arrived from Mayiladuthurai (Tamil Nadu) in 1978 to work in a textile shop. In Tamil Nadu, his area was well known only for agriculture and textile trading was new to him. In 1992, he began his own shop with the help of Bruneians. Currently he has nine outlets for the Nazmi Textiles with one of the outlets in Dubai City. He is the leading textile retailer in Brunei. He has become a permanent resident of Brunei and wants to dedicate his business and life to Brunei. He has served in the Sultan’s Birthday Celebrations Committee since 1996, and carries out philanthropic support for orphans and the poor in all the areas where he has a shop. In 2002, he was elected as the president of the 100-member strong Brunei Darussalam Indian Chamber of Commerce. He has been able to achieve greater recognition for the chamber as well as Indian businessmen in Brunei Darussalam. Owing to his efforts, the chamber obtained its own building (personal donation by Nazir) and the flight of Royal Brunei Airlines to Chennai from November 2006. Jayakumar V. is the managing director of JPRI Group of companies in Bandar Seri Begawan. He arrived in Brunei at the age of twenty-four in 1980 from Chennai, Tamil Nadu. According to him, he came with nothing except the spirit to make it good in life. Passing through Singapore and Malaysia, he found Brunei a friendlier place to become an entrepreneur. He ran a tuckshop owned by a Bruneian for workers constructing the Istana at that time. After three years, he decided to try on his own. His Brunei Malay boss assured him of all the possible help and gave one of his old cars for free. He invested everything that he earned into his business in Brunei

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Darussalam. He has now eight business outlets that include toys and gift shops, spice outlets, a chain of mini-marts and restaurants. He has also become an importer and wholesale distributor in Brunei Darussalam. Using the network of Tamil Muslim mini-marts all over Brunei-Muara District, he has popularized Indian products like Gold Standard Cooking Oil and Amul ice cream, which have become popular. The last six years have been difficult years to make profit like before, but the business acumen he has learnt has allowed him to sustain his business and his workers. Of the total ninety-five staff, seventy of them are from Tamil Nadu. The Bruneians are also employed to support the government policy of inducting them into the private sector. He has spent over six months investing his time in packaging the products from India so that poor packaging does not ruin the good qualities of Indian products. He also has ambition to move into manufacturing so that he can be a part of the industrialization effort in Brunei. He has also extended his investments into the hotel business in Chennai as well as set up the Rajiv Charitable Trust (named after his son) to run a home for the aged. Haji Mohammed Yunus of Bismi Trading is yet another successful entrepreneur who has achieved greatness as an entrepreneur in Brunei. Known as the man who brings knowledge to people, he runs the most extensive chain of bookshops selling all types of books and stationery in Brunei Darussalam. He arrived from Thiruvaroor District, Tamil Nadu, in 1974 to work in the Star Trading Company in Brunei Town. In 1978, he started the first Bismi bookstore, being careful to use the term bismi, a term used by all Muslims in Brunei before they do anything. As the term needed no advertisement, his shop came to be viewed as good luck by all parents and Bruneians to buy educational materials. The firm has also ventured into office equipment and computer accessories. The 51-year-old Haji Mohamad Yunus has now eight outlets with a warehouse to his achievements in Brunei. Having understood the role of information technology for the future, he is restructuring his company to venture into computers and information technology. Instead of running business outlets where customers come to buy, he is proactive in identifying the needs of government offices and businesses and create a need for his products. Bismi enterprises have about seventy staff, with twenty-five of them coming from Tamil Nadu, namely from the townships of Kollapuram, Theetacheri, Nagapatinam, Thiruvaroor, Kumbakonam and Neyvaeli. They range from twenty-five to fifty-five years of age and are on two-year contracts. The rest of the employees are Bruneians. Haji Yunus is also the Deputy President of the Indian Chamber of Commerce and amongst his many philanthropic contributions he has

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built the picturesque Aysha Mosque at Kollapuram, Tamil Nadu, at a cost of Rupees 2,579,000 (US$64,475) in 2006. Haji Zubair, who set up the largest supermarket in Brunei Darussalam in 2000, is another well-known Indian. His supermarket, known as the Teghuraya, is located at Jalan Muara’s Delima Jaya Complex. As the most comprehensive supermarket and multi-purpose emporium in BSB, his business attracts most customers in Brunei. As his business became the anchor business in the area, many other Indian businessmen also set up shop in the complex. As a consequence, Delima Jaya Complex has come to be termed as Brunei’s “Little India”, where the majority of the shop owners are Muslims from Tamil Nadu serving Bruneian customers.

SOCIETY AND IDENTITY Indians have always been treated as sojourners by Brunei since the 1930s. Their number and extent of participation have varied with the economic opportunities in Brunei as well as the state’s stringent policy of offering citizenship or permanent residence to a select few. There has been a change in the last few years, however, in the Bruneian attitudes towards foreigners who can contribute to their economic development. The high level of education and the regional awareness that the Bruneian governing elite have gained in the last two decades, have given them a sense of confidence to welcome foreign business elites to become permanent residents of Brunei. As long as a temporary resident can furnish enough capital for a property or business, Brunei has welcomed them to contribute to Brunei by granting them permanent residence. Even the stringent Malay language requirement for long-term permanent residents has been lowered to allow permanent residents to aspire for Brunei citizens. There is no doubt that Brunei’s elites are being influenced by the pace of change towards potential entrepreneurs and investors in Singapore and elsewhere. Almost 85 per cent of the Indians in Brunei are temporary residents having arrived for work in the government sector, the oil fields of Seria, and the various businesses. Thus except for about 15 per cent of the Indians who are mostly permanent residents, the rest of them would leave Brunei after a two-year stint or may stay longer. As indicated in Table 11.4, about 10 per cent have stayed in Brunei since 1991 and before, while the rest have been in Brunei only after 1991. The Amedeo Corporation led development years from 1991 to 2000 had brought 70 per cent of them with about 20 per cent having arrived only in 2001. Including the citizens, permanent residents and temporary residents, it can be postulated that there are about 25 per cent of

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the Indian population that has developed a sense of permanency in Brunei. The rest of the transitory population hinges on to the activities of this permanent group to develop a sense of community and identity in Brunei. The elementary forms of group identity among Indians have been along linguistic, religious and nationality lines. It is along these lines that newer Indians arrive in Brunei for work in the private sector. Those employed as professionals in the public sector come as individuals based on their merit. Even among professionals in the public sector, friendship and mutual help develops along linguistic and religious lines after arrival. Where the group is large like that of Tamil Muslims or Uttar Pradesh/Bihar Muslims, group identities are often developed along village, district and township origins. In terms of linguistic affiliation, more of the Indians in Brunei are Tamil-speaking as they come from Sri Lanka, Tamil Nadu, Singapore and Malaysia. Tamil is widely spoken in Brunei and Tamil cultural sources in terms of movies over Malaysian television channels, movie videos, and magazines are widely available. Other linguistic groups among Indians are the Malayalam, Punjabi, Nepali, Sindhi, Urdu, Hindi and Bengali speakers. Except for Punjabi, Sindhi and Nepali speakers all other groups are also divided along religious lines. While the hundred odd Punjabi speakers in Brunei are followers of Sikhism, the twenty Sindhi families and all the Gurkhas in Bandar Seri Begawan and Seria are Hindus. There are no Sikh temples (Gurudwaras) in Brunei. Sunday prayers and religious gatherings are held at homes and are not attended by all Sikhs. The ten Sikh families engaged in business meet more often. The Sindhis are better knit, and as they share their religion with the Nepalese, the two Durga temples within the Gurkha camps offer them a place of worship at Bandar Seri Begawan and Seria. The Sindhis also have private gatherings as most of them are related to each other. The Nepalese have their army chaplains who are in effect priests who officiate in the temples. The two Durga temples are provided for the Gurkha camps under the terms of arrangements from colonial days. They are more like temporary structures that will be moved if the camps go. Tamil, Malayalam and Bengali speakers who share the Hindu faith also attend the Durga temples within the Gurkha cantonments. Each linguistic group has evolved unique festivals followed by them. All Tamil Hindus thus follow Thaipusam, a major festival in Singapore and Malaysia. Malayalamspeaking Hindus celebrate the “Onam” festival. All Hindus in Brunei celebrate Deepavali as all Bruneians know about it owing to Malaysian television advertisements during the Deepavali week. In the last two decades, many bhajan (devotional singing) groups and followers of religious groups have been formed among Hindus. Thus Sherdi Baba and Sai Baba have groups

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in Bandar Seri Begawan and Seria for weekly hymns and religion discourses. Ayappan Swamy followers as well as the New Year celebrations within each linguistic group also exist. The two Durga temples have become the focal point for all Hindu religious activities as prosiletization work in a religion other than Sunni Islam is not welcome in Brunei. Bali Hindus from Indonesia too join these groups. The Tamil Muslims from Uttar Pradesh, and Bengali Muslims attend the mosques in various parts of Brunei. Christians among Indians are also able to attend the Protestant and Catholic churches that have existed since the colonial days. While the Indian Muslims interact with Brunei Malays, the Catholics and Christians interact largely with Filipinos and others in their churches. There are four formal social organizations among Indians that are recognized by the Brunei government as voluntary organizations. These are the Belait Indian Association, Bandar Seri Begawan Indian Association, the Hindu Welfare Board and the Brunei Darussalam Indian Chamber of Commerce. The Belait Indian Association, begun in the pre-war colonial days has its own building and is well patronized by Indians living in Seria and Kuala Belait. As some of the Indians have been living since the 1930s, their descendants take an active part in the association’s activities. While celebrating Brunei’s national events, they also celebrate India’s Independence Day. Recently, there have been some attempts to form a society for Bangladeshi citizens in the Seria town. Most of the citizens and permanent residents are Tamil speaking, and have covered the physical landscape with mango and Neem trees, not indigenous to the Belait District. The Belait Indian Association has continued to promote social, cultural and sports activities among the community. The Bandar Seri Begawan Indian Association (BSBIA) has its origins in 1938 (Mani 1993, p. 24). As BSB has a transitory Indian community, developments in the BSB Indian Association have been dependent on the strength of the members who form its administrative committee. In 2006, the BSBIA had 350 members with about 1,000 persons turning up for Indian Independence Day activities. Onam Festival, besides Deepavali is a major festival celebrated by the association. The organization also informs its members of news from the Indian High Commission as well conduct medical talks and blood donation campaigns among its members. The BSBIA has attempted to attract representation of all Indians into its executive committee with members drawn from various linguistic and religious affiliations. The Hindu Welfare Board (HWA), though catering to welfare needs of all Hindus in Brunei, is located at Kuala Belait, indicating the long settled Hindu

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community’s needs in the Belait District. Begun as the Hindu Cremation Board in 1962, it was officially registered in 1970 as the Hindu Welfare Board. One of its major functions has been to facilitate Hindus who die in Brunei to be cremated. In 2005 alone, there were thirteen Hindu cremations in Brunei. The cremation is done on a land provided by the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company. The HWB’s crematorium is vital for the Hindus and Sikhs as well Chinese Buddhists. The board also gives scholarships to poor Hindu children in Brunei. Hindu religious classes have been conducted during the past six years in BSB and recently in Belait. These are to educate Hindu children about their religion. The language used in the rituals has been Tamil, and the HWB actively celebrates the Tamil Hindu New Year, Ponggal, and Thaipusam. It also administers the temple pass given to individuals to enter the Durga temples in the Gurkha cantonments. The board also administers a burial ground in the Kuala Belait area. Yoga classes are also conducted. Another burial ground is administered by the BSBIA at BSB. The board charges an annual membership fee of B$24 (US$16.55) to members with B$300 (US$207) for life membership. Cremation and attendant rituals are provided at no cost to members, while a fee is collected from nonmembers. The majority of the Hindu population are labourers while the rest are the medical professionals, and Belait area Hindus who form smaller groups. The Hindus from Myanmar and Bali are also able to benefit from the HWB. The Indian Chamber of Commerce led by Nazmi Textiles owner Nazir Ahmad has become the most well-known organization in Brunei. Nazir Ahmad’s close association with members of the royalty and prominent Bruneians has given a high profile to the organization. As most of its members are Muslims, they conduct prayers at the cemetery of the royal family (Makam Di-Raja) during the Muslim fasting month of Ramadan. They also participate in delegations to meet the Sultan on his birthdays and every national event. They are also negotiating with the Brunei Chamber of Commerce to play a more meaningful role in developing commercial and economic ties between Brunei Darussalam and India. Due to their efforts, Royal Brunei Airlines provides weekly flights to Chennai from Bandar Seri Begawan. The Chamber of Commerce as well as prominent businessmen erect arches across major roads to support the events associated with the Sultan and Brunei.

CONCLUSION Among Southeast Asian countries, Brunei Darussalam is the only country where a majority of the Indians are transitory with low gender ratio. Almost

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75 per cent of the Indians in Brunei are sojourners staying anywhere from two years to twenty or thirty years before they return home. As a consequence a community of Indians has been slow in evolving. The transitory nature of a community formed predominantly of males and lack of families has not allowed associated cultural forms to develop. At the cursory level, only the business groups among Tamil Muslims share any similarities with the larger Brunei Malay society. But the Malay Islamic Monarchy (Melayu Islam Beraja, MIB) concept can also shut them out from closer interactions such as marriage and kinship. All other Indians only interact with Brunei Malays and others in a socially segmented manner. Like all other sojourners, Indians meet Brunei Malays at their work sites. Despite the challenges and opportunities faced by Indians in Brunei Darussalam, most Indians in Brunei feel that the country is indeed an abode of peace compared to what they have left behind. Many of the problems of poor governance and corruption are felt to be much lower than the societies that they came from. While most Indians will eventually depart with their earnings, Brunei Darussalam has become a home to about 25 per cent of the Indians. Long-term residents like Mohinder Singh and Chandru Punjabi feel that Bruneians at one time used to call them “menkali” or “bengalee” which are derogatory remarks. Such behaviour has largely disappeared as Bruneians got educated and became wealthier. Most Indians feel that Brunei has different meanings to the different levels at which Indians find themselves in Brunei Darussalam. Respondents of this study proposed four levels of interpretation for purposes of summarizing the experience of Brunei among Indians. The first level would be the ten to twenty highly successful entrepreneurial Indians. For them Brunei has been the most fortunate place, where hard and dedicated work has brought them wealth and distinction. These are the risen Indians, who feel confident in staying and doing business in Brunei. Brunei Darussalam, in keeping with the regional tempo to encourage entrepreneurs, has conferred them permanent residency and made them feel wanted for Brunei’s future. Brunei Darussalam has been more secular in its approach to retaining successful entrepreneurs than requiring them to become Muslims before granting permanent residence or citizenship. The second level of Indians would consist of the shop keepers, restaurant owners and mini-mart operators. It will also include other professionals in the private sectors. They are successful owing to the good services that they provide for Bruneians, and some have become highly successful entrepreneurs with some of them obtaining permanent residence.

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At the third level would be those who have come to work as teachers, doctors and other professionals in the public sector. They will work as long as their contracts are renewed. These individuals work for many contracts and appear to be contented with a raise of few hundred dollars in their salaries. But their positions are always temporary as Bruneiazation is an ongoing process to replace them once adequate numbers of Bruneians are ready. These professionals may be training the very Bruneians who will displace them. This has happened in the Public Works Department where all Indian engineers have been replaced by Brunei Malays. Those who are teachers and lecturers, unless they possess special talent will not be able to stay long in Brunei Darussalam. This group may be easily identified as the intellectuals, but their continued stay in Brunei remains bleak. Amongst them may be identified persons like University of Brunei’s Associate Professor Dr Haji B.A. Hussainmiya, a Tamil speaking Malay from Sri Lanka, who has contributed much to the writing of the royal history of Brunei. In recent decades many of these professionals have been following a route to permanent migration in New Zealand, Australia and Canada. Many of them use their stay in Brunei to accumulate adequate experience and wealth in order to migrate to a developed country. Most who tried have been successful and have set the model for more to try this route in leaving Brunei as successful emigrants. The fourth level would be those Indians who work as labourers in shops, construction sites, washermen, barbers and cleaners. As their levels of income are low, they are always replaceable by lower paid groups from other countries like Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam and Bangladesh. But their number may not reduce as some of the services they provide are associated with Islamic religion. Thus Tamil Muslim restaurant workers, labourers in shops and mini-marts, barbers and washermen may always be Indians from Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, unless India booms as a manufacturing nation. It will be some time before this may happen, and if India becomes a manufacturing nation, then Bangladeshis may move into these positions just as Indonesian maids replaced the Filipinas as they moved out into the services sector of Brunei. While the first level of Indians including some of those in the second level represent the dynamic elements of the Indian community in Brunei, the rest may not feel the same. The Indians in the fourth level have high levels of insecurity and do not have the mindset to be part of anything in Brunei in the longer term. At all levels, the initial drive and dream to excel in Brunei appears to be shortlived. Once the migrants have met the initial demands of ensuring their families’ financial security, they tend to become attuned to enjoy their extra income on material goods and personal happiness. Those who

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become wealthy and manage to get the permanent residency, tend to enter a “comfort zone” in which they strife less. Insecurity that drove them to arrive in Brunei and excel, is seen as non-existent even though most Indians are on temporary residence permits. As cited by entrepreneur Vijayakumar, even workers become less frugal and slower after the initial four years, or by the third contract, when they have built a small house back home and overcome the loans they incurred. Indians as sojourners and as a community have contributed to Brunei Darussalam for a hundred year since 1906. Economic growth and opportunities in India will determine the numbers who will arrive in Brunei. A small community has been able to evolve in the last two decades that is confident of itself. As Brunei Darussalam faces up to the challenge of globalization, more people from the Indian sub-continent may be needed to contribute in the new sectors of information technology, specialized knowledge and commerce.

Notes The author is grateful to the following for interviews during fieldworks in Brunei Darussalam, August 2006: Mr Mahi Pal Singh (M.P. Singh), First Secretary, High Commission of India, Brunei Darussalam; Mr Mohinder Singh, Mohan Carpets’ Palace; Mr Ramesh J.B., Galleria YMRM; Mr Haji Munaf, Operations Manager, Bismi Trading; Mr Nazir Ahmad, Nazmi Textiles, President of the BSB Indian Chamber of Commerce; Mr V. Vijayakumar, JPRI Group; Mr T. Mohan, General Manager, Galfar Pembinaan dan Perusahaan (B) Sdn Bhd; Mr Chandru Punjabi; Mr Rajendran, Treasurer, Belait Indian Association; Mr Salim bin Abdul Karim, Former President, Belait Indian Association; Mr Sujita Ghosh, Deputy President, BSB Indian Association; Dr Sundarapandey, President, Hindu Welfare Board; twenty restaurant workers and construction workers; representatives of the Nepalese, Uttar Pradesh and Bangladeshi migrants; Academics at the University of Brunei Darussalam; and, other shop owners, bus drivers and many casual acquaintances that are too numerous to be cited here.

References Mani, A. “A Community in Transition: Indians in Negara Brunei Darussalam”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 1–30. Singapore: Times Academic Press and ISEAS, 1993. Bandar Seri Begawan Indian Association. Wijaya Merdeka Brunei: Commemorative Issue on Brunei’s Independence. Bandar Seri Begawan Indian Association, 1984.

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Department of Statistics. Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2003 (27th Edition). Brunei Darussalam: Department of Economic Planning and Development (JPKE), Prime Minister’s Office, 2003. ———. Brunei Darussalam Statistical Yearbook 2004. Brunei Darussalam: Department of Economic Planning and Development (JPKE), Prime Minister’s Office, 2005. ———. Summary Tables of the Population Census, Negara Brunei Darussalam, 2001. Brunei Darussalam: Department of Economic Planning and Development (JPKE), Prime Minister’s Office, 2004. Galfar Company Profile. Galfar Pembinaan dan Perusahaan (B) Sdn Bhd, 2001. BSB Indian Association. Souvenir Magazine for Independence Day Celebration 2005. Bandar Seri Begawan: 2005.

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CHINA

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12 CHINA: INDIANS’ NEW-FOUND LAND Ji Ping The cultural relations between India and China can be traced back to very early times. There are numerous references to China in Sanskrit texts, but their chronology is vague. The Mahabharata refers to China several times. Also, the Arthasastra and the Manusmriti mention China. In early Indian literature, China is invariably shown to be connected with India by a land route across the country of the Kiratas in the mountainous regions of the north. While in China, the Chinese, always proud of their civilization, looked upon the outside world with condescension. They called the tribes living to their north “Hun slaves”, and tribes living to the north-west “barbarians”, while the Japanese were referred to as “dwarf pirates”. But their attitude toward India was different. India was known to them by a number of names, not one of which was contemptuous. It was called Sen Du, the Kingdom of the Hindus, or Xi Yu, the Western Land; to Buddhists, it was Fu Guo, the land of the Buddha. In a sense, both India and China have been destinations for their respective scholars, monks and travellers. This historical contacts include Indian scholar Kumarjeeva, who came to China to supervise the translation of several thousand Buddhist sutras and later died in China in 413 A.D., and Chinese monk Hsuan-Tsang, who spent seventeen years in India in the mid-seventh century. Those symbolic figures indicated that there had been frequent personal exchanges between China and India. Even after the decline of Buddhism 195

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in both countries, Indian scholars and monks kept coming to China in an unbroken stream. India has been manifesting its internationalism till 1960s. Thanks to some historical reasons, Indians formed their large communities in Shanghai, Lhasa and Canton. For example, there were 2,341 Indians in Shanghai in 1935. They mainly worked there as policemen in the British concession.1 There was also a Shanghai India Business Association (SHIBA). Shanghai was the place where Indian communities loved to converge. There were hundreds of Indians in Shanghai until 1949. The forebears of J.R.D. Tata had a cotton export business in Shanghai from 1904. The company managed several local cotton mills. Apart from traders, Sikh policemen, known locally as Hong Tou A-San (a reference to their red turbans) were a common sight in the British concession area, which had a small gurdwara and a Parsi Agyari (Fire Temple) as well.

THE REFRESHING OF SINO-INDIA RELATIONS Both India and China have consistently viewed their bilateral relations in a positive spirit. As Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao noted that, “during the past 2,200 years, about 99.9 per cent of the time, we have devoted to friendly cooperation between our two countries.”2 Indeed, the friendship between the two countries has stretched for such a long time whereas conflicts between them lasted for only a few years, namely the 1962 border conflict. Indian memories of China, however, have been shaped by the events of 1962. With the escalation of the diplomatic stand-off in the 1960s, however, India unilaterally announced to withdraw their consulate generals in Shanghai and Lhasa on 8 December 1962. Since then the number of Indians in China decreased dramatically. As for the largest Indian community in China, the number of Indians in Shanghai reduced from 128 in 1958 to three in 1972, and none in 1993.3 But the relations between India and China have gradually improved in the 1980s and 1990s. The then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to China in 1988 marked the resumption of political dialogue at the highest level. Both sides decided to set up a Joint Working Group (JWG) to discuss the boundary question. Since then, a new chapter has been opened in Sino-Indian relations. The two countries signed the Agreement on Border Peace and Tranquility in 1993 when the then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao visited China, and the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures (CBM) in the military field along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in the India-China Border Areas in 1996 when the then Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India. The two sides agreed to work

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towards a constructive and cooperative relationship towards the Twentyfirst century. The negative fallout or damage caused by the Indian nuclear test in May 1998 was, however, quickly controlled. A year later, both sides stated that they were not a threat to each other and agreed on the need for a bilateral security dialogue. The new millennium has witnessed an even more rapid development of Sino-Indian bilateral relations. President of India, Sri K.R. Narayanan, Deputy Chairperson of Rajya Sabha, Dr Najma Heptulla and Indian Primer Minister, Sri A.B. Vajpayee visited China in 2000, 2001 and 2003 respectively; Chairman of the Standing Committee of the Chinese National Peoples Congress Li Peng, Premier Zhu Rongji, Premier Wen Jiabao as well as President Hu Jintao visited India in 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006 respectively. The Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation (PRCC) was signed in 2003, and the Political Guiding Principles (PGP) for the Settlement of the Boundary Question was formulated in 2005. Apart from that, both countries jointly commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations in 2000, the fiftieth anniversary of setting up the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence in 2004, and jointly celebrated the Sino-Indian Friendship Year in 2006. The Sino-India relations is not hundred per cent satisfactory with the ghost of the 1962 war still wandering. There are three main problems between China and India. The first is the border dispute. It is under negotiation, but apparently it will take a long time to make both sides happy. The second is the Tibet issue in which the Indian government has for the first time in 2003 recognized the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of China’s territory, but the wording is still ambiguous. India is very reluctant to declare that “Tibet is an inseparable part of China’s territory”. The third one is China-Pakistan relations. According to a widely held belief within the Indian government, China is also continuing to use its military relations with Pakistan to constrain India’s emergence as a regional power. It seems the channels of Indian emigration to China are partly blocked by the mistrust or hostile psychology rather than by the high Himalayan Mountains.

LOOKING EAST: THE ELEPHANT COMES TO DANCE WITH THE DRAGON India and China officially resumed trade ties in 1978. In 1984, the two countries signed the Most-Favoured Nation Agreement, and a joint group on

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economic relations and trade, science and technology (JEG) was established in 1988. Murasoli Maran, the then Indian commerce and industry minister led a delegation to China in February 2000. During his visit, India and China signed an agreement on issues relating to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and agreed on facilitating exchange of visits between business communities, establishing business representative offices in each others’ territory, organizing exhibitions and trade fairs and encouraging greater participation in them, etc. Both sides also agreed on the need to improve direct banking, shipping and air services between the two countries. During Premier Wen’s visit to India, the two countries announced the Five-Year Plan for Comprehensive Economic and Trade Cooperation (CETC), launched the joint feasibility studies on regional trade arrangements between them and initiated the Pact of Mutual Investment Promotion and Protection (PMIPP). All those efforts really gave big pushes to the economic engagement between China and India. Bilateral trade has recorded rapid growth from US$265 million in 1991 to US$18.7 billion in 2005, and is targeted to hit US$30 billion by 2010. Moreover, a section of the traditional Silk Road at Nathu La pass on the border between China’s Tibet and India’s Sikkim was re-opened in July 2006. It is the first direct trade link since the 1962 border conflict. Now China has already replaced Japan in 2003 as India’s leading trade partner in this region and is expected to replace the United States as India’s most important trade partner in another three years, while India has already become China’s largest trade partner in South Asia. With intensive political and economic interactions between China and India, there are more and more Indian businessmen arriving in China. In a sense, those companies and businessmen are attracted by the opportunities China offers. Its high-volume, low-cost investment environment, connectivity to global markets and productive labour force and the presence on Chinese shores of larger numbers of multinational clients have lured a small but steady stream of Indian investors in diverse sectors, including information technology (IT), pharmaceuticals, banking, wind-farm equipment, auto components and tyre manufacturing. Some of them established joint ventures, such as Ranbaxy Limited, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories, Aurobindo Pharma, NIIT and APTECH, while others set up wholly-owned ventures, such as Orissa Industries Ltd., Infosys and Essel Packaging. Some of them, like Tata Exports, Torrent Group, Lupin laboratories, Kanoria Chemicals and Industries, as well as State Bank of India established their Representative Offices (RO) in China. By the end of 2005, there were 142 Indian economic ventures in mainland China as registered in the Embassy of India in Beijing.4 Among them, 59 were in Guangdong province, 47 in Shanghai, 17 in Beijing, the rest in

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Jiangsu Province, Liaoning Province, Shandong Province and so on. They could be divided into several categories: firstly, sectors for manufacturing (54), such as Jindal Stainless Ltd in Guangdong Province, Larsen & Toubro Ltd in Beijing and Reliance Industries Ltd in Shanghai; secondly, general trades (46), such as Tata South East Asia Ltd in Shanghai, August International Trade Co in Beijing, Business Links in Tianjin; thirdly, sectors for IT training (12), such as Infosys Technologies Ltd in Beijing, NIIT China Ltd and Tata Information Techonology Co Ltd in Shanghai; fourthly, sectors for representative offices (12), such as FICCI representative office in Beijing, CII representative office in Shanghai and Bank of India in Guangdong. The rest are for various other business purposes, like pharmaceuticals, marblestone and diamond processing, etc. Apparently, there are more and more Indian companies, joint ventures and offices setting up in China, particularly in east China, like Air India, Canara Bank, Darbar Auto Spare Parts Co ICICI Bank and Satyam Computer Services Ltd, etc.5 Besides these, the service industry has also followed up. There are eleven Indian food restaurants in Shanghai, such as Red Chilli, Bombay Bistro, Hazara; and six in Beijing, such as Tandoor Indian Cuisine, the Taj Pavilion and Mirch Masala; and five in Guangdong, such as Jewel of India and Maharaja Indian Kabab Corner. Others are in Sichuan and Zhuhai, such as Indian Kitchen.

THE RETURN OF INDIANS For all its vast geographical spread across the world’s major countries, the new Indian communities6 are probably the least represented in China. According to Indian embassy estimates, the community numbered only about 4,000 in 2005, located mainly in Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangdong (particularly in Shenzhen city), Liaoning, Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces. (See Figure 12.1.) For a considerable long period of time since China initiated reforms and opening up in 1978, the focus of the state investment has been gradually shifted to the eastern coastal areas. Since 1980, China has established special economic zones (SEZs) in Guangdong Province. In 1984, China further opened fourteen coastal cities, including Tianjin, Shanghai and Guangzhou — to overseas investment. Then, beginning in 1985, the state decided to expand the open coastal areas, extending the open economic zones of the Yangtze River Delta, Pearl River Delta, Bohai Bay Economic Rim into an open coastal belt, in which Shanghai, Shenzhen (a boomtown in

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Figure 12.1 The Main Locations of the Indians in China

Source: A sketch map by the author.

Guangdong Province) and Beijing play leading roles in the region respectively. In this way, a chain of opened-up cities extended from North to South, and an economic belt was brought into being. According to the survey conducted by Fortune magazine in 2005, Shanghai, Beijing, Shenzhen were ranked the top three cities in China and represent China’s dynamic economy. Currently, the new Indian communities are mainly located in the abovementioned areas. Most of them are working as business executives or professionals in multinationals or Indian companies whose numbers are increasing. Some are engaged in trade while others are working as teachers in international schools or as chefs in Indian restaurants. There are twenty Indian students studying in China under the government scholar exchange scheme, nine in Shanghai, seven in Beijing, and two each in Guangdong Provinces. Besides this, there are about 700 self-sponsored Indian students enrolled in Chinese universities to pursue international medical degree courses in 2005.

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With the increasing number of Indians in China, the Indian Community in Beijing (ICB) came into existence on 12 December 1999. A similar organization was also established in Shanghai in the meantime. As Sujan R. Chinoy, former Consul General of the Consulate General in Shanghai, observed, “Unthinkable a decade ago, but possible now given the presence of an ever-growing Indian community in East China in recent years, a mélange of entrepreneurs, professionals employed by Indian and global multinational corporations, service personnel and now, hundreds of medical students. More than 50 Indian companies have a business presence in Shanghai”.7 Apart from Information Technology giants like Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Infosys, Wipro, Satyam, NIIT and Aptech, other big names of Indian industry such as Larsen & Toubro, Reliance, Raymonds, Sundaram Fasteners, Dr Reddy’s Laboratories, and Ranbaxy are also present in east China. An enterprising gentleman from Goa based in Macao, has set a blazing pace for Indian cuisine by opening more than 18 restaurants of his chain “Indian Kitchen”, mostly in east China. Some hotels have sought to revive the prestige of yesteryear by having an imposing and turbaned Indian at the entrance. An increasing number of tourists from India find Shanghai a great destination for business and pleasure, a task facilitated by several flights a week operated by Air India and China Eastern Airlines. An Indian traveller even surprisingly found “a burly sardar complete with flaming red turban shimmered into (my) vision”, when she arrived in Wenzhou Dynasty Hotel and discovered the Sikh hotel doorman. She further explained, “Were I to be in 19th century Shanghai, the appearance of the said gentleman would have caused not a second thought.… The mutual animosity that followed the Sino-Indian border war led to Indian faces in Chinese cities becoming notable only for their absence.”8 Given the thaw in bilateral relations that the new century has ushered in after a long frosty winter, big cities like Shanghai and Beijing are once again thronging with visitors from south of the Himalayas. According to the China National Tourism Administration, in 2004 China had 390,000 visitors from India, 44 per cent up from that in 2003, even though the number is not big enough,9 it is already the largest increase of visitors from a foreign country.

MAKING SENSE OF CHINDIA On a global scale, of all the significant economies in the world, China and India have been the fastest growing for the past decade. While China was under economic reform, the Indian government also set out on a series of reforms in the 1980s. In 1991, a further round of liberalization saw the end

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of public sector monopoly in many areas, and the automatic approval of foreign direct investment. Since then, the economy has posted an excellent average growth rate of 6 per cent. The GDP growth rate in 2004–05 was as high as 8.3 per cent. Now most economists figure China and India possess the fundamentals to keep growing in the 7 per cent–8 per cent range for decades. That possibly paved the way for a full economic cooperation between China and India. When Premier Wen visited India in 2005, he declared that China and India will be “two pagodas” of economic power in the twenty-first century. He said: “Co-operation is just like two pagodas — one hardware and one software,” referring to India’s computer software skills and China’s growing dominance in computer hardware. “Combined, we can take the leading position in the world. When that particular day comes, it will signify the advent of the Asian Century of the IT industry.” As for Indians, emulating China’s economic success is obviously the aim for reformists in India. Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of India and father of India’s economic reforms, has challenged planners to “transform” Mumbai over the next five years so that “people will forget about Shanghai”. Since economic interest in India has been focusing on the blossoming relationship between the two countries, India has sent more visitors to China, the majority of whom were tourists and businessmen to outsource contracts and attract trade and inward investment from China’s coastal areas. So what exactly has changed? The perception within the Indian business community about China has also undergone a dramatic transformation over the past few years. The fears about the Chinese dragon invading India with cheap manufactured goods are not only fast receding, but more and more Indian companies have been venturing onto Chinese turf. Pharmaceutical giant Ranbaxy was the first Indian company to enter into a joint venture in China as far back as 1993. The company’s sales and marketing force now covers more than 2,000 hospitals in twenty-five provinces in China. It intends to extend this coverage to 4,000 hospitals in twenty-seven provinces by 2007.10 However, some analysts argue that the meaty Chinese domestic market remains an imposing Great Wall that so far only a few Indian firms have been able to scale.11 Pallavi Aiyar, the Beijing correspondent of The Hindu, observed that, “even the much-hyped synergies between India’s software prowess and China’s hardware might have failed to materialize.” Despite predictions that Indian companies could come to account for up to 40 per cent of the US$30 billion domestic Chinese market for software, none of the India’s IT heavyweights, such as TCS, Wipro, Infosys and Satyam, have been able to make a dent in this market. Indian companies have

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found barriers like language and culture more challenging to overcome than expected. Besides this, there are still some unfavourable aspects of the bilateral relations. B. Raman, former additional secretary of the Cabinet Secretariat of the Indian government, concluded in his essay on India-China relations: “India and China have still miles to go before they can celebrate.”12 But India is learning fast and has partly overcome the so-called “China threat” syndrome. India, as a response to fear of encirclement, should boost economic ties with China and learn to play mahjong with the Chinese. The expansion of commercial ties is likely to end the long-standing ignorance of each other’s culture, and encourage greater flow of people across the border. Jairam Ramesh, member of the Indian Parliament and advisor to two prime ministers, even created a new word Chindia (China + India). He intends to specifically focus on the long-term scenario that may emerge between India and China as their economies develop to complement and compete with each other. He argues: “Indian business has developed a great deal of self-confidence vis-à-vis China. Corporate morale was low five years ago but today the picture is completely different.”13 C. Raja Mohan, strategic affairs editor of The Hindu, in his examination of the reworking of India’s relations with China, pointed out that “the political challenge for India is not to stop Chinese economic presence in the sub-continent but to increase its own commercial integration with its neighbours.”14 India has its own advantages under circumstances of globalization. The colonial period left foundations for India to grow and operate an effective economy. Property rights, free trade, fixed exchange rates, a uniform currency system, uniform weights and measures, open capital markets, as well as a modern legal system, are all beneficial to growth. What is more, the country is capitalizing on its large number of well-educated people skilled in English to become a major exporter of software services and software workers. What makes the two giants especially powerful is that they complement each other’s strengths. An accelerating trend is that technical and managerial skills in both China and India are becoming more important than cheap assembly labour. China will stay dominant in mass manufacturing, and is one of the few nations building multi-billion-dollar electronics and heavy industrial plants. India is a rising power in software, design, services, and precision industry. India’s long-term potential may be even higher. Due to its one-child policy, China’s working-age population will peak at 955 million in 2020 and then shrink steadily.15 China then will have to provide for a graying population that has limited retirement benefits. India instead, has nearly 500 million people under nineteen years of age and higher fertility

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rates. By mid-century, India is expected to have 1.6 billion people — and 220 million more workers than China. China and India are natural business partners to each other rather than competitors. Historically India and China have a number of similarities. Both are ancient civilizations. Both have led the world at its richest point at different times. Now both have kicked off their re-entry into modernity in the middle of the last century. India and China accounted for more than 50 per cent of world gross domestic product in the eighteenth century and there is no doubt there such glory will return again. Trade synergies will emerge over the next few years as India and China continue to exert their muscle. From an entrepreneurial standpoint, Indian businessmen and corporations are already looking at China and at cooperation at the enterprise level. The increasing number of business leaders and corporations that have already established bases in China and are looking forward to grow and leverage the advantages that China offers could prove that. Economic compatibilities exist with Indian companies in the IT, pharmaceutical, and auto-component manufacturing industries, who have already set up plants in China. And China could look at India among other markets for glass, ceramics, electronic components, plastics, and other materials. There are definite synergies around India’s software and China’s hardware capabilities — and both countries need to look not only at joining forces and increasing their strength in the global economy but at the captive market of 2.5 billion consumers they share. Both governments need to look at their natural economic compatibility and their growing influence on the world economy and use this advantage to create a sustainable economy and start the process of creating wealth for the poor that still poses a challenge for both countries. As Jawaharlal Nehru University Sinologist Professor Swaran Singh predicted, the China-India relations can today be described as shifting from politics-driven economics to economics-driven politics that portends their strong strategic partnership in the making.16

CONCLUSION When monks of Nalanda heard of Hsuan-Tsang’s plan to return to China, they begged him to remain, saying: “China is a country of mlecchas, of unimportant barbarians, who despise the religious and the Faith. The mind of the people is narrow, and their coarseness profound, hence neither saints nor sages go there. The climate is cold and the country rugged, so you must think again.”17 Indeed, that concern and commitment remain as relevant

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today as they were in Hsuan-Tsang’s world in the seventh century. But Buddhism is no longer the only vehicle of Sino-Indian relations. Economic benefits brought them together. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Professor Amartya Sen noted, India and China learned a lot from each other in the first millennium, but the significance of that epistemic process has not dried up even at the beginning of the third millennium.18 Actually, the new millennium witnesses a very good beginning of cooperation. The Indian communities in China enjoy their stay in China, and the friendship with the local Chinese community is growing up. They support each other in their various traditional ways.19 A full cooperation in all areas will be the likely pattern of future IndiaChina relations. That will bring more and more Indians to China. The Indian communities in China in the twenty-first century will be different from that in the previous century both in terms of numbers and configuration. It is the natural results of globalization and the great sense of “Chindia”. They will contribute both to China and India’s economic and social development. After all, both China and India are developing countries; there are many similarities too, of problems like poverty, agriculture and rural development, etc., to learn from each other. On the other hand, some unwanted hindrances like protectionism and deficit of mutual trust20 in the process of the forming of new Indian communities should also not be neglected.

Notes 1

2

3 4 5 6

7 8 9

10 11 12

“Shanghai Di Fang Zi”, Records of Foreign Affairs in Shanghai, Section 2, Chapter 2, Vol. II. Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao met with Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes on 21 April 2003, Beijing. Ibid. “Indian Companies in China”, . Statistics from Indian Consulate General in Shanghai, as on 4 April 2006. Hereafter, I would rather call them “New Indian communities” rather than “Indian diaspora”, because they have not settled down for long, and are still at the initiate stage of forming a traditional diaspora. “The Saga of Shanghai”, Frontline 22, no. 13 (1 July 2005). “The Return of the Hong Tou A-San”, The Hindu, 3 May 2006. The number is just one-fourth of that from Singapore, let alone say South Korea, that there are 15,000 visitors come to China per day. Business Line, 12 May 2005. Asia Times Online, on 16 September 2006. “India-China: Hype and Reality”, .

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14

15 16

17

18

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Jairam Ramesh, Making Sense of Chindia (New Delhi: India Research Press, 2005), p. 18. Michael C. Ruppert, Crossing the Rubicon (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), p. 56. “China, A Demographic Time Bomb”, . “China-India Economic Engagement: Building Mutual Confidence”, CSH Occasional Paper, no. 10 (New Delhi, 2005), p. 19. Quoted in Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), Vol. I, pp. 209–10. Quoted in Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005), p. 190. Shenzhen Daily Newspaper covered a story on 28 May 2006, a Chinese worker financially supported Mr Vishal, an Indian job hunter who used up his money and led a vagrant life in Shenzhen, the Indian community in the city reciprocally donated US$2,625 for the benefit of local impoverished children in a food festival and Fun Fair, which was the largest ever gather-together of the Indian community in Shenzhen. There was an opinion poll done by rediff.com before Chinese President Hu Jintao’s visit to India in November 2006. None of the first 50 readers expressed their trust towards China on the message board. Some even said, it is time to declare war against China, some suggested India should encourage terrorism in China .

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13 BLUE-COLLAR INDIANS: IMPERCEPTIBLE YET IMPORTANT IN HONG KONG James Joseph Keezhangatte INTRODUCTION The entrepreneurial success of some Indians in Hong Kong is a fabulous story (Das 1990; Kwok and Narain 2003; Vaid 1972; White 1994). On the occasion of the 58th Republic Day of India in 2007, B.K. Gupta, ConsulGeneral of India in Hong Kong noted with pride the considerable and consistent contributions made by the Indian community in Hong Kong in the fields of business, trade, education and social services. He acknowledged that the commitment displayed by the community fostered a deepening of bilateral relations between India and Hong Kong. He added that the Hong KongIndia bilateral trade reached US$7.03 billion between January and November 2006, signalling a healthy growth curve (Gupta 2007). Given the strong ties between India and Hong Kong, it is appropriate to link this deepening of relationship to the emerging conceptualization of “rising India”. Discussions on the rise of India crossed over from private to the public domain in 2003 with Business Week leading the analysis (Manjeet, Engardio and Steve 2003). Initial opinions and analysis in 2003 on the rise of India focused mainly on technological and software advancement spurred on by professionals with Indian and foreign capital. Subsequent discussions on the rise of India have highlighted how technologies are influencing the lives of ordinary Indians similar to the ITC’s e-commerce “e-chaupal” technology 207

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initiative linking producers to markets to secure higher prices (Manjeet 2005). Farmers in Sehore District of Madhya Pradesh are already seeing their incomes rise. In what ways are Indians in Hong Kong connected to the rise of India? The Indian community in Hong Kong consists of the professional, business, working class as well as the transient migrants. Information available on each of these groups varies. Data on transient Indian migrants in Hong Kong is particularly scarce. Staff from the Hong Kong Immigration Department through personal communication with the researcher pointed to increasing numbers of Indians who overstayed their tourist or work visa or entered Hong Kong illegally.1 In 2003 there were 76 Indians who overstayed their visas. This number rose to 106 in 2004. A steady growth was observed in 2005 when the number rose to167. This trend has continued to climb with no signs of decline. For the first half of 2006 (January to June) there were already 128 Indians overstaying their visas (Wu 2006).2 The Immigration Department was unable to provide any specific reasons for this phenomenon and this trend requires further investigation. Stories of Indians seeking shelter at the Khalsa Diwan (Sikh Temple) Hong Kong and others reporting to Recognizance Reporting Office, Ma Tau Kok, Hong Kong were examples of migration fraud. Indians were brought or sent to Hong Kong on promises of Hong Kong identity cards, jobs and good salaries either in Hong Kong or elsewhere after collecting payments in India.3 Indians narrated stories of being cheated and abandoned by their agents in Hong Kong. Others were recruited as “couriers”, “mules” or “carriers”4 who commute between India and Hong Kong carrying goods for their agents. Khalsa Diwan responded to the basic needs of these less fortunate visitors to Hong Kong with basic necessities and assistance to return to India. Migrant women sex workers are another group of transient Indians who enter Hong Kong to peddle their services. It has been pointed out that the estimated number of 200,000 sex workers in Hong Kong from across the region is an underrated figure (Chan, Ho and Lo 2002). With scarcely any data available on Indian sex workers in Hong Kong, it is difficult to ascertain whether they work at night clubs or brothels. However, the researcher has observed some of these women walking the streets in Tsim Sha Tsui tourist district, soliciting customers near Chung King Mansion and Mirador Mansion which are two popular destinations for visitors from South Asia and Africa. These streetwalkers appear to be marginalized even in the sex industry. They are thus doubly marginalized. Elaborate research is required for a meaningful discussion about these above groups of transient Indians.

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This chapter is organized in the following format. A brief historical overview of Indians in Hong Kong is presented at the outset. Their achievements are noted. This is followed by a brief overview of Indian domestic workers. Stories of Indian domestic workers are presented to illustrate their diminished or enhanced lives. Indian restaurant workers are introduced next. Scarcity of data has made the section on restaurant workers shorter than domestic workers. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the issues of Indian domestic workers and restaurant workers in Hong Kong.

NOTE ON SOURCE OF DATA AND METHODOLOGY The researcher has relied on both primary and secondary data to construct the contents of this section. Secondary data has been the principal source to write up the overview of the Indian community permanently residing in Hong Kong. Data for composing the life stories of transient Indian domestic workers was drawn from interviews conducted for the researcher’s doctoral programme (Keezhangatte 2006, 2007). Additional fieldwork was carried out in Hong Kong to collect data on Indian restaurant workers. For this purpose in-depth interviews were carried out with both restaurant workers as well as managers. Interviews were conducted with managers of some of the oldest Indian restaurants in Hong Kong to collect data on how they have recruited and retained Indian staff. Accurate statistics on Indian restaurant workers do not exist.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF INDIANS IN HONG KONG Members of the Indian Diaspora have made Hong Kong their home for more than a century-and-a-half. It is recorded that when a British naval force landed in Hong Kong in January 1841 and hoisted the Union Jack at Possession Point, about 2,700 Indian soldiers and four Indian merchants bore witness to that historic event (Das 1990). The earliest demographic accounts of Indians in Hong Kong appear in the population statistics of 1845. When Samuel Fearon, Hong Kong’s first Registrar General, enumerated the colony’s early population in June 1845, the 362 Indians listed did not include Indian members of the army. This compared to 595 Europeans and 22,860 Chinese… Besides the unknown number of Indian military,

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the largest groups of Indians in Hong Kong were Parsi merchants and their assistants, and Muslims who had arrived as workers on ships. There were also about 60 Indians in the service of European officers as orderlies, cooks, and bearers, most of whom had been with their employers in India. (White 1994, p. 33).

The 2001 Census listed 18,543 Indians which was 5.4 per cent of the ethnic minorities in Hong Kong (Census and Statistics Department, 2002). Besides India, Indians have entered Hong Kong from Burma (Das 1990). Hong Kong was also host to a number of Indians who left China after the events of 1949 there. Three communities from undivided India that have left an indelible mark on Hong Kong are the Parsis, Punjabis and the Sindhis. Christine Dobbin who has traced the affinity between British merchants and Parsi brokers has shown that the Parsis had established vibrant trade links between India and China through Hong Kong (Dobbin 1996). It may be recalled that Parsis originally came from the Pars Province located in the south-western part of Iran and settled close to Mumbai due to conquest and religious conversion in Iran in the seventh century A.D. (White 1994).

Parsis: A Dominant Community of Yesterday Though Parsis formed a dominant community in Hong Kong when the territory was ceded to the British in 1841, they are now a small community numbering around 170 people (Thapan 2002; White 1994). Thapan, who reviewed the history of Parsis in Hong Kong, observed that while their trade with China in opium and cotton had grown significantly, their presence in Hong Kong and trade with China gradually declined after the World War II. With the abolition of opium trade and better prospects of trade in cotton and cotton products from Bombay, the Parsis gradually moved from Hong Kong to Bombay (Thapan 2002). Perhaps one of the most lasting and impressive remnant of the philanthropy of the Parsi community is the University of Hong Kong in Pokfulam Road located on Hong Kong Island. It is a hope that thousands of students and visitors who pass through the Main Building learn about its history and take inspiration from the benevolent example of Sir H.N. Mody, the Indian Parsi businessman who made a large contribution towards the founding of the University in 1910. A bust of Sir Mody was erected prominently at the stairway leading to Loke Yew Hall in the Main Building of the University of Hong Kong in 2001. The plaque below the

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bust reads: “Sir Hormusjee N. Mody (1838–1911) Major Donor Towards the Founding of the University of Hong Kong.” As Hong Kong strives to become a knowledge-based economy with higher education as its backbone, this visionary can hardly be brushed aside. The University has a daunting task of communicating its history to the students when many are unaware of “the persistence, foresight and generosity of a Parsi” (White 1994, p. 222). The date 16 March is observed as the University Foundation Day every year but the name of Sir Mody is rarely mentioned.

Sindhis and the Sikhs Sindhis and Sikhs are numerically larger among the Indian communities. Sindhis in Hong Kong who constitute the backbone of the Indian business world, began to build up their fortunes after the World War II (Thapan 2002; White 1994). There are close to 7,500 Sindhis and 8,000 Sikhs living in Hong Kong. Sindhis entered Hong Kong in large numbers after the partition of India in 1947 when Sindh became part of Pakistan. Sikhs have been in Hong Kong since 1841 and it is often pointed out that “many Sikh families have more legitimate claim to being Hong Kong people than Chinese residents” (Ma 2007). The Khalsa Diwan (Sikh Temple) which was established in 1901 in Wan Chai is the heart of the Sikh community. The Sikh Temple functions as an inclusive place of worship. Before the construction of the Hindu Temple in Happy Valley in 1952, Hindus and Sikhs worshipped together (White 1994). Visitors to the Sikh Temple, irrespective of their gender, race, religion or nationality are received and invited to participate in worship and share in the community meal. With a view to sharing the message of Sikhism with the Chinese community, the management of the Khalsa Diwan published a book on Sikhism in Chinese and English in 2005. Students visiting the Sikh Temple are briefed about the Sikh religion and culture in Chinese and English and receive a copy of the book. The Sindhis constructed the Hindu Temple at Happy Valley with their contributions and through donations on a land donated by the government. The temple welcomes worshippers from India, Nepal and across the globe. However, Chinese visitors to the Hindu Temple, who are not familiar with the Hindu religion and culture, while overwhelmed by the devotion and display of piety, have little support in the form of user-friendly literature or guides to illuminate them on the roles that various deities play in a Hindu’s life. Image building and public relations can contribute to better integration with the host community, as discussions on race relations have gained momentum with

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the introduction of the Race Discrimination Bill in the Legislative Council in December 2006 (Hui and Shamdasani 2006). The Sindhis in Hong Kong have earned for themselves the reputation of a successful business community. In the 1990s Sindhis along with other members of the Indian community controlled nine per cent (US$10 billion) of Hong Kong’s export trade (White 1994). Even if trade volumes may decline, Sindhis and other Indian businesses in Hong Kong continue to be important players. Hong Kong Sindhis are often accused of their single-mindedness in the pursuit of acquiring wealth and flaunting it. Some cynically comment that the wealth of Sindhis is only a decade old (Ibid.). Nevertheless, their contributions to charitable and socially useful and productive endeavours are noteworthy. The Harilelas in Hong Kong are renowned for their business success as well as their contributions to charity. This writer has also been a beneficiary of their generous financial support through a scholarship from the Harilela Foundation to study in the United Kingdom. More recently the Harilela Foundation has been sponsoring the vocational training of young people of Filipino, Thai, Nepali, Indian and Pakistani origins, thus helping them to find employment in Hong Kong and integrate into the society. As a conclusion to this brief discussion on the historical overview of Indians in Hong, the concept of “Chindia” which is gaining considerable importance in the public domain is introduced and examined in relation to Hong Kong Indians’ business ties to India and/or China.

Hong Kong Indians and Chindia Discussions on the rise of India is often juxtaposed with the rise of China. The concept of “Chindia” was first introduced by Jairam Ramesh and later popularized by Business Week (Bob 2007; Ramesh 2005). “Chindia is a handy semantic shortcut that refers to 21st century China and India together, and their surging economies and related synergies, in particular” (Walker 2007). European and American analysts across the Atlantic are tracking the “Chindia-connection” (Bauer 2006). While India and China being “old friends, recent enemies and now partners in the Asian century” are synergized and coming together, are Hong Kong Indians poised to ride high on this new wave (Ramesh 2005 p. 50)? Additional research is required to put together a complete picture of the trade relationship of Hong Kong Indian’s businesses in China and India. The geographical proximity of Hong Kong to factories in southern China has boosted opportunities for Hong Kong Indians to open up offices in southern China for trade.

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Stories about Hong Kong Indians making large investments and building factories in southern China are yet to make headlines. In India, National Association of Software and Service Companies (NASSCOM) has identified Tata Consultancy Services (TCS), Infosys and Wipro as the engines that generate the momentum and synergy for the rise of India in technology sectors (Mehta 2002). Hong Kong Indians are yet to be perceived as key players fuelling the rise of India through their large investments. In conclusion it may be pointed out that Indians arriving in Hong Kong have been successful and visible business people and have contributed to the development of the territory. Visible marks of their contributions abound. However, they are yet to become dominant players either in China or India. In the next section members of the working class who are less visible are introduced.

INDIAN DOMESTIC WORKERS Historical evidence indicates that Indian domestic workers have been part of the Hong Kong milieu since the last century as they continue to be today. In the 1845 enumeration of the colony’s population by Samuel Fearon, the presence of domestic workers was acknowledged. The census of 1931 listed thirty-four Indians as domestic servants, nearly all of whom worked for Indian families (White 1994, p. 35). In Vaid’s study on the Indian community in Hong Kong, he indicated that he had data on thirty-four persons who worked as domestic and personal servants in the territory (1972).

Recent Developments The Indian migrant women domestic workers constitute the fourth largest group of domestic workers in Hong Kong after Filipina, Indonesian and Thai domestic workers. According to statistics released by the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, on 31 March 2005 there were a total of 219,633 domestic workers of whom 1,276 were from India5 (Tse 2005a). The overall growth in domestic worker population in Hong Kong has been significant. However, Table 13.1 below paints a different picture. Their numbers remained constant with minor fluctuations. Indian domestic workers in Hong Kong are mostly employed by Indians (Keezhangatte and Enos 2000). Culinary, cultural, linguistic similarities and prior working relationships in India have resulted in this arrangement. In responding to a special request by the researcher, the Hong Kong Security Bureau released a

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Table 13.1 Indian Domestic Workers in Hong Kong

Year 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005*

Total population of domestic workers in Hong Kong

Number of Indian domestic workers

Percentage of Indian domestic workers

84,619 101,182 120,604 141,362 157,026 164,299 170,971 180,604 193,700 216,790 235,274 237,104 216,863 218,430 219,633

886 963 1,027 1,145 1,228 1,204 1,157 1,192 1,244 1,364 1,407 1,372 1,269 1,294 1,276

1.04 0.95 0.85 0.80 0.78 0.73 0.67 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.59 0.58

* Figures are valid up to March 2005. Source: Security Bureau, Hong Kong (Tse 2005a).

breakdown of statistics on Indian domestic workers to Hong Kong by gender for June 2005. In June 2005 there were a total of 1,273 Indian domestic workers of whom 931 (73 per cent) were female and 342 (27 per cent) were male (Tse 2005b). Some baseline information on Indian domestic workers in Hong Kong can be gleaned from a preliminary survey on Indian domestic workers conducted by Keezhangtte and Enos (2000) on behalf of the Indian Domestic Workers Association6 and financed by Home Affairs Bureau of Hong Kong. The survey, gathered data from 212 domestic workers using a snowball sampling technique and it was limited to the views of the domestic workers and excluded the employers’ views.7 An objective of the survey was to explore the working and living conditions of Indian domestic workers. According to the survey, 203 (95.8 per cent) workers came to Hong Kong to work with Indian employers. With regard to hiring procedures, about 90 (42.5 per cent) domestic workers stated that they were hired directly by the employers’ family in India. This is an indication of direct

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hiring practices adopted by Indian employers in Hong Kong. Employment agencies were not involved in recruitment as they were not permitted to offer overseas placement services to employers or employees in India (Raghuram 2005). A major finding of the survey pointed to significant levels of underpayment of Indian domestic workers. Comparisons are usually made with domestic workers from the Philippines in the territory who are more educated and more conscious of their rights (Constable 1997). Long hours of work, inadequate living arrangement and insufficient provision of food were other findings of the study. Importantly, this was also an important issue for discussion by the local Hong Kong media. A brief highlight of the discussion of the exploitation of Indian domestic workers by their Indian employers is presented below. It may be noted that in some situations the feudalistic attitudes of some Indian employers have erased the hopes of some Indian domestic workers for minimum wages which could result in a better quality of life and opportunities for themselves and their families in India.

Diminished Lives and Opportunities In May 1995 stories on Indian domestic workers appeared in the South China Morning Post highlighting the exploitative working conditions of Indian migrant domestic workers in Hong Kong (Das, Sudhaman and Dhirani 1995; Delfino 1995; Moir 1995a, 1995b).8 The public received the message that the Indian employers exploited their co-ethnic domestic workers. Hong Kong is not an exception to such practices among Indians. Lessinger (1990) reported similar stories of exploitation of Indians by fellow Indians in the Indian-run newsstands business in New York City. According to her, in these arrangements “… economic relations are exploitative, working conditions harsh, and social mobility illusory” (ibid., p. 85). Thus the situation in Hong Kong reflected similar scenarios elsewhere. Views expressed in the “Letters to the Editor” column of the same English Daily in May 1995 indicated a polarization of views among the Indian community in Hong Kong. There were some members of the Indian community in Hong Kong who held the view that it was acceptable to pay less than the minimum wages to Indian domestic workers in Hong Kong because “they are not really worth it” and “because they are not as clean” (Moir 1995b). But not all Indians exploit their Indian domestic workers and not all Indians endorsed such views. Others pointed out “… these maids leave everything behind to work in a foreign land and earn a better living for their families. They prefer Indian employers because they are often unable

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to speak any other language and because they hope they would feel more comfortable in an Indian household” (Das, et al. 1995). Thus through the Hong Kong media an image of the exploited and underpaid Indian domestic worker emerged in the public domain. In 1999, similar issues concerning Indian domestic workers surfaced again in the media for similar reasons mentioned earlier (Barma 1999; Daswani 1999; Kwok 1999). However, on this occasion there were louder voices from the Indian employers’ community that strongly condemned the exploitation of Indian domestic workers. One advocate for the rights of domestic workers even implied that the working conditions of some Indian domestic workers in Hong Kong resembled those of slaves (Barma 1999). Denial of the rights of Indian domestic workers was once again flagged in the year 2000 (Kwok 2000). In general the mood had shifted towards payment of minimum wages and provision of weekly holidays.

Alka’s Story An extreme case of exploitation that the researcher encountered was that of Alka.9 Alka claimed that she was not paid any wages in Hong Kong for two years by her Indian employers. With support from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) she approached the Labour Relations Office in Hong Kong and submitted a claim for HK$108,000 (US$13,882) as unpaid wages. Her employer who admitted to non-payment of wages agreed to settle for HK$78,000.00 after deducting various “expenses” incurred on her behalf. A jubilant Alka was however rejected by other Indian employers who refused to hire her after hearing her story. She returned to India with her money. The media in Hong Kong has consistently highlighted the issue of Indian domestic workers as victims who are subjected to exploitation by their co-ethnics. This, however, is only one side of the story. Taking up domestic work in Hong Kong has enhanced the living conditions of many Indians and their families in India. In the next section the opportunities associated with domestic work in Hong Kong are presented.

Enhanced Lives In India paid domestic work is unregulated and there are no uniform wages. Salaries of domestic workers in India in Table 13.2 were computed by a resident in Bangalore city in South India (Sharma 2003). With minor variations that are likely to exist between employers, these salaries are representative of remuneration offered for paid household work in major

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Table 13.2 Wage for Household Work India (Based on a report from Bangalore 2001)

Hong Kong

Hours worked each day

Monthly wage (Rs. 100 = HK$16.48)

Minimum monthly wage

2 hours 4 hours Full-time Hourly

Rs. 750.00 (US$16.1810) Rs. 1,500.00 (US$32.36) Rs. 3000.00 (US$64.73) Rs. 14.00 (US$0.30)

HK$3,400.0011 [Rs.19,720 @ 5.80] (US$432.46)

Source: Kalpana Sharma, Indiatogether.org, 2003 and Hong Kong Labour Department.

cities in India. In Hong Kong where paid household work is regulated, the minimum wage is adjusted periodically by the government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.12 A comparison of wages for a person employed in paid domestic work in India and Hong Kong is presented in Table 13.2. It is clear that an Indian domestic worker in Hong Kong has the potential to earn a wage which is more than six times for the same kind of work in India. This opportunity to earn a significantly higher income could impact changes in the lives of domestic workers as well as those depending on them (Keezhangatte 2004). The impact of careful saving and cautious investment are illustrated through the story of Natasha, who is a domestic worker in Hong Kong.

Natasha’s Story Natasha is the oldest member in her family and is 49 years old. She is single. She helped all her younger siblings (two brothers and two sisters) to study and find employment. She worked for thirteen years in Mumbai and six-and-a-half years in Singapore, before moving to Hong Kong where she has worked for fourteen years and continues to do so.13 Working in Mumbai, Singapore and Hong Kong helped Natasha to own properties, bank balances and jewellery. She has a house in a chawl 14 in Mumbai. She also built a house on a plot of land that she purchased in Mangalore in South India. During her conversations with the researcher she described her assets thus:

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I have a little bit of this [money] for myself, the money which I specially send and this is with the brother of my ex-employer. He is taking care of the money. The money was saved when I was working in Singapore. From that time little by little they are taking care of my money. It is 6.5 lakh 15 (US$14,025) now. With interest and everything, it is 6.5 lakh. That is the amount. I had around two lakh and 40,000 [rupees] (US$5,178) in my Mangalore account. But I used some of it to buy a piece of land. I have some [more] money that has been saved up through cumulative interest. My original deposit is only 80,000 rupees (US$1,726). This is a very old deposit. I sent this money from Hong Kong. This money is in the Citibank. Now the amount has grown to about 3 lakh (US$6,473). It is 3 lakh and something I think (Natasha 2003).

The discussion thus far has focused on Indian domestic workers who have been part of Hong Kong milieu since 1845. In the next section Indian restaurant workers in Hong Kong are introduced.

INDIAN RESTAURANT WORKERS In dynamic economies like Hong Kong, market conditions can dictate whether business establishments start, stay or shut operations. Sources in the industry have noted that that there were 110 Indian restaurants in Hong Kong (Invest Hong Kong 2006). But Indian restaurant managers responded more cautiously to these statistics. Nevertheless, they concurred that new Indian restaurants were opening up thereby providing wider choices. In the recent past, the industry has made concerted efforts to woo Chinese customers to Indian restaurants. Hong Kong is riding on the waves of a culinary fusion (Vittachi 2006). Having enlisted the services of Indian showbiz idol in Hong Kong Kiu Bo Bo (Gill Mohindepaul Singh)16 a marketing campaign in Cantonese was launched in early 2006 to market Indian cuisine in Hong Kong. In this section the focus will be on Indian restaurant workers. It will begin with a review of labour importation policies that facilitated the entry of Indians to work in the restaurant industry. The story of Rohan is included to illustrate the challenges that Indian restaurant workers contend with. Hospitality industry professionals from around the world enter Hong Kong to work as “chef ” or “professionals in food and beverage” under the general employment policy (Immigration Department of HKSAR 2006). Indians in the hospitality industry have entered Hong Kong through this

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route in the past and continue to do so. Those who enter Hong Kong under the general employment policy can claim permanent resident status after working continuously in the territory for seven years. Permission is also granted to relocate their spouses and unmarried dependant children under the age of eighteen to Hong Kong (Immigration Department of HKSAR 2006). With growing pressure from employers to import more labour force into Hong Kong, in May 1989 a scheme for the importation of up to 3,000 technicians, craftsmen and supervisors was approved by the government (Economic Development and Labour Bereau 2003). Under this scheme which came to be known as the General Labour Importation Scheme (GLIS), imported labour began to be classified according to trade and applications for their importation were vetted more carefully. For the hospitality sector, workers were recruited under the categories of “junior cooks”, “waiter/ waitress” and “food processing worker” from outside Hong Kong (Education and Manpower Branch 1995). The conditions governing the employment of these workers were laid down in their employment contracts. Staff from the Immigration Department and Labour Department have pointed out to the researcher that workers who entered Hong Kong under the labour importation scheme had to leave the territory at the completion of their contract. These workers have worked shoulder-to-shoulder with other Indians who have migrated to Hong Kong and are permanent residents in the territory. In January 1996 GLIS was terminated and beginning in February 1996 the Supplementary Labour Scheme (SLS) was introduced (Labour Department of HKSAR 2006). Under the SLS it was pointed out that “certain categories of jobs were excluded because of plentiful supply in the local labour market”. Among other trades “junior cook, waiter/waitress, food processing worker” were included in the “black list”. Nevertheless, employers who were dissatisfied with local restaurant workers have successfully applied and imported workers from India to work in Indian restaurants as junior cooks. They could only be hired on contract for two years and were barred from claiming permanent resident status in Hong Kong even if they worked in Hong Kong for more than seven years (Information Services Department of HKSAR 2003). It is an anomaly in Hong Kong that labour importation policies have created distinctions among restaurant workers, causing rivalry and distrust. One consequence of this is that associations or unions have not sprouted among Indian restaurant workers. Lack of reliable statistics on Indian restaurant workers in Hong Kong is a limitation. Indian restaurant managers have reported that Indians are hired by Malaysian, Thai, Indonesian as well as Chinese restaurants in

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Hong Kong. According to one Indian restaurant manager, there are approximately 500 Indians who work in this industry. Rohan’s story is introduced below to highlight the challenges that Indian restaurant workers contend with.

Rohan’s Story Rohan came to Hong Kong in 2001. He is 27 years old and is single. He entered Hong Kong on a tourist visa on the invitation of his relatives. Unable to secure a job he decided to go to China. In China he teamed up with a friend who taught him the basics of Indian cooking and introduced him to the owner of a small Indian restaurant. His employer applied for work permit on his behalf. He was paid 6,500 yuan per month. Rohan also learned to speak Mandarin. In China, Rohan decided to start a small Indian food outlet and applied for a licence. According to him his new enterprise proved successful and enabled him to open five more outlets but during the post dull SARS period he was forced to close five outlets. In 2005 his relatives in Hong Kong informed him about employment opportunities in Hong Kong. He applied for the job and was selected. He was offered a two-year contract. His employment contract included passage to Hong Kong, free accommodation and food while on duty. For six days of the week he works two shifts of five hours each with an hour of rest in between. Though he was offered a salary of HK$11,500 (US$1,463), he was told that his actual salary would be HK$8,000 (US$1,018). Even though his salary was transferred to his account by autopay, he was expected to return HK$3,500 (US$445) to the company every month. His could only accept or reject the offer. According to him, his monthly expenditure amounts to only HK$2,000 (US$254) and he saves HK$6,000 (US$763) per month. Saving is critical to Rohan who has never seen that much money per month. He would like to continue working in Hong Kong. Similar to Rohan’s experience, stories of “show salary”17 as well as “actual salary” are common among imported workers. The prevailing salary range for a cook is between HK$12,000 to HK$13,000 (US$1,542–$1,670), junior cook is between HK$9,000 to HK$10,000 (US$1,157–$1,285) and dishwasher at HK$6,000 to HK$7,000 (US$771–900). Everyone in the industry agree that restaurant workers’ income is directly linked to their family and social life both in India and Hong Kong. Some restaurant workers who are permanent residents in Hong Kong pointed out that they

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decided to leave their families in India due to unaffordable costs of living in Hong Kong. Expenditures on housing as well as education of children in Hong Kong were two areas of concern that they raised. In addition leisure, social activities and career mobility of restaurant workers are other important issues. In conclusion to this section it may be pointed out that for Indian restaurant workers, income, leisure and social activity and stunted careers are important issues. All these issues require more detailed investigation.

PERCEPTIBLE SUCCESS OF IMPERCEPTIBLE INDIANS More than a century before Ravenstein postulated that major causes of migration are economic (Ravenstein 1885, 1889). Migration of Indians to Hong Kong has not deviated from this postulation. As noted in the first part Indians in Hong Kong have experienced astounding success. Indian domestic and restaurant workers also strived for economic success. Like others they also migrated to Hong Kong in search of better opportunities for themselves and for their families. Success need not only be counted by accumulation of wealth. Some may see Alka’s migration to Hong Kong as a failure since she was unable to stay and work for as long as she wanted. Yet in another way her story can be read as a success in the fight against exploitation that exists between class structures. Natasha’s story is hardly a story of entrepreneurial success. However, it is rare to come across a more enterprising domestic worker than Natasha. In the Indian community that prides itself in professional and entrepreneurial successes; domestic workers like Natasha are eclipsed. However, Natasha’s success though insignificant and irrelevant in Hong Kong, is Herculean for her family in India. Her siblings and their family members and extended family members draw inspiration from her success. Rohan is a restaurant worker now. However, Rohan’s story illustrates that there are entrepreneurs in every generation of migrants. While some have found success, others are yet to bloom. His initial business ventures in China may have suffered setbacks but his entrepreneurial instinct was not vanquished. Success for Rohan is not far away.

CONCLUSION This chapter strove to provide some visibility to Indian domestic workers and restaurant workers who are less prominent than their more successful

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co-ethnics. As already indicated due to scarcity of data domestic workers and restaurant workers have not received similar treatment. Issues of restaurant workers remain largely unexplored. This group of workers in Hong Kong deserve more attention in the future. Domestic workers who toil away in the private spaces of their co-ethnics can also count their successes. Their success may come from fighting for their dignity or saving up for themselves and their family members. Success certainly is a continuous process and every generation and class can count their success whether perceptible or imperceptible.

Notes 1

2

3

4 5

6 7

8

9

A report appearing in South China Morning Post a daily in Hong Kong in early 2003 exposed how syndicates were smuggling Indians and Pakistanis to Hong Kong. Tourists from India and Pakistan arriving in China were smuggled to Hong Kong in suitcases (Kui 2003). It has not been possible to compute the percentage of overstayers in relation to the Indian population in Hong Kong as population statistics for the years mentioned here do not exist. Preliminary interviews with some of those Indians who have overstayed their visas has revealed that on their arrival in Hong Kong their agents provided them with fake Hong Kong identity cards and were sent off to work in recycling factories sorting imported plastic or computer waste in the New Territories in Hong Kong. This is the most commonly used term among them. The figures for other nationalities are the following: there are 119,087 (Philippines), 92,020 (Indonesia), 4,813 (Thailand), 873 (Sri Lanka), 1,395 (Nepal), 39 (Pakistan), 25 (Myanmar), 31 (Malaysia), 40 (Bangladesh), 3 (Singapore) 31 (others) (Tse 2005a). It was formed and registered in July 1999. The researchers acknowledged in their report the limitations of their sample. Their data collection was limited to those domestic workers who were granted holidays by their employers thus implying that the actual situation of Indian domestic workers could be worse than those discussed in the report. Anita, whose story that appeared in 1995 did not receive any salary in Hong Kong. She was only given HK$50 (US$6.42) or HK$60 (US$7.71) when she had to go out. The minimum wage for domestic work in 1995 was HK$3,750.00 (US$482) (Moir 1995b). One of the stories described the nonpayment of wages to a male Indian domestic worker by an Indian diplomat (Moir 1995a). Pseudonyms have been used to protect the identity of research participants. For a detailed description of Alka’s story see Keezhangatte (2006, 2007).

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11 12

13

14

15

16

17

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Exchange rates are likely to fluctuate. Rates quoted are applicable for telegraphic transfer in September 2006. This the current minimum wage valid for August 2006. Domestic workers are the only group of workers in Hong Kong who are protected by a minimum wage. A detailed description of Natasha’s story can be found in the recently completed study by Keezhangatte (2006, 2007). A chawl refers to indigenously organized and closely built-up, low-rise housing units with communal amenities in urban areas like Mumbai. In India a lakh is a unit of measurement commonly used instead of million. One lakh rupees is one hundred thousand rupees. One million rupees is ten lakh. The equivalent of one lakh rupees would be HK$16,791.41 (US$2,158 @ 7.78) for September 2006. For more details on Kiu Bo Bo see . “Show salary” is the sum of money that the employer has to show to the Immigration Department in Hong Kong computed on the basis of prevailing markets which the employer proposes to pay the worker. This sum is deposited into the account of the workers by the employer at the end of every month as narrated by Rohan.

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Dobbin, C. Asian Entrepreneurial Minorities: Conjoint Communities in the Making of the World-Economy, 1570–1940. London: Routledge Curzon, 1996. Economic Development and Labour Bereau. “LegCo Panel on Manpower: Review of the Policy on Foreign Domestic Helpers”. Hong Kong: Economic Development and Laobur Bureau (Labour Branch), 2003. Education and Manpower Branch. General Labour Importation Scheme: A Review Report and the Way Forward. Hong Kong: Education and Manpower Branch, 1995. Gupta, B.K. “Message”. South China Morning Post, 26 January 2007, p. C11. Hui, P., and R. Shamdasani. “Race Bill is ‘no Panacea for Prejudice’”. South China Morning Post, 3 December 2006. Immigration Department of HKSAR. “Public Services”. 28 June 2006, (accessed 1 July 2006). Information Services Department of HKSAR. “Report of the Task Force on Population Policy”. 26 February 2003, (accessed 1 August 2006). Invest Hong Kong. Insight: Your Guide to Hong Kong Life, Business & Investment. Hong Kong: InvestHK, 2006. Keezhangatte, J.J. “Indian Household Workers in Hong Kong: Emerging Themes on Migration and Social Relationships”. E-Journal on Hong Kong Cultural and Social Studies 3 (2004). ———. Transnational Migration, Resilience and Family Relationships: Indian Household Workers in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: The University of Hong Kong, 2006. ———. Indian Household Workers in Hong Kong: Resilience and Transnational Family Relationships. Saarbruecken: VDM Verlag Dr Miiller, 2007. Keezhangatte, J.J., and A. Enos. Sahakarmi: Living and Working Conditions of Indian Domestic Workers in Hong Kong — A Preliminary Survey. Hong Kong: Indian Domestic Workers Association, 2000. Kui, L. “Illegal Immigrants Smuggled into Hong Kong by Suitcase”. South China Morning Post, 5 February 2003, p. 1. Kwok, S. and K. Narain. Co-prosperity in Cross-culturalism: Indians in Hong Kong: First edition. Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 2003. Kwok, Y. “Hidden from Sight: A Documentary Sheds Light on Hong Kong’s Indians”. Asiaweek 25 (13 August 1999): 38–39. ———. “Indian Maids ‘denied rights’”. South China Morning Post, 27 February 2000, p. 4. Labour Department of HKSAR. Importation of Labour: Supplementary Labour Scheme”. 2006 (accessed 1 July 2006). Lessinger, J. “Asian Indians in New York: Dreams and Despair in the Newsstand Business”. In The Portable Lower East Side, Special Issue on Asians in New York, edited by P. Kwong, vol. 7, pp. 73–87. New York, 1990.

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Ma, S. “Sikh Community Steeped in History”. South China Morning Post, 26 January 2007, p. C11. Manjeet, K. “Asking the Right Questions”. Business Week (22 August 2005): 64–66. Manjeet, K., P. Engardio, and H. Steve. “The Rise of India”. Business Week (August 2003): 66–76. Mehta, S., ed. Indian IT Industry: Learning from China. New Delhi: NASSCOM, 2002. Moir, J. “Indian Diplomat Accused by Domestic”. South China Morning Post, 14 May 1995a, pp. 1–2. ———. “Indian Maid Tells of Gross Mistreatment: Ethnic Community Refuse to Acknowledge there is a Problem”. South China Morning Post, 7 May 1995b. Raghuram, P. “Global Maid Trade: Indian Domestic Workers in the Global Market”. In Asian Women as Transnational Domestic Workers, edited by S. Huang, B.S.A. Yeoh & N.A. Rahman, pp. 146–71. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005. Ramesh, J. Making Sense of Chindia: Reflections on China and India. New Delhi: India Research Press, 2005. Ravenstein, E.G. “The Laws of Migration”. Journal of the Statistical Society of London 48, no. 2 (1885): 167–235. ———. “The Laws of Migration”. Journal of the Royal Statistical Society 52, no. 2 (1889): 241–305. Sharma, K. “In the Name of Servitude”. (accessed 18 May 2005). Thapan, A.R. Sindhi Diaspora in Manila, Hong Kong and Jakarta. Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2002. Tse, S. “FDH Population”. Hong Kong: Security Bureau, Government Secretariat, 2005a. ———. “Gender Distribution of Indian Foreign Domestic Helpers”. Hong Kong: Security Bureau, Government Secretariat, 2005b. Vaid, K.N. The Overseas Indian Community in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Centre of Asian Studies University of Hong Kong, 1972. Vittachi, N. “Curry Wars!”. Discovery — Air India Inflight Magazine (August 2006): 58. Walker, N. “Giants Share New Frontier of Economic Opportunity”. South China Morning Post, 26 January 2007, p. C11. White, B.-S. Turbans and Traders: Hong Kong’s Indian Communities. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994. Wu, K.Y. “Statistics on Indian Overstayers in Hong Kong”. Hong Kong: Immigration Department Hong Kong, 2006.

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INDONESIA

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14 INDIANS IN A RAPIDLY TRANSFORMING INDONESIA A. Mani INTRODUCTION The political, social and economic fabric of Indonesia has undergone rapid transformation since 1998. The transition to democracy under four presidents, a vociferous demand for more voice and freedom, rising expectations, an Islamic resurgence and the tumultuous economic adjustment have all affected people living in Indonesia in a variety of ways. The apparent social stability experienced until the onset of 1997 financial crisis had created expanding opportunities for many people in Indonesia. Indians living in Indonesia were no exception to the transformation experienced by all people in Indonesia. Twenty-first century Indonesia is home to various groups of people from the Indian sub-continent. Indians are predominantly found in North Sumatra and Jakarta (Mani 1993a, 1993b). As their migration and settlement have been described earlier (Sandhu and Mani 1993), this chapter will discuss the contemporary position of Indians in Indonesia. The first section of the chapter comments on the population and settlement patterns observed among Indians in the last two decades. The second section highlights the processes among different communities of Indians in Indonesia. The third section examines the economic profile of the Indians. The section would also comment on the meteoric rise and fall of Marimuthu Senivasan, the most prominent Indian in the last two decades of twentieth century Indonesia. The subsequent section examines the social processes among the Indians and their struggle to retain 229

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their identities in a rapidly changing Indonesia. The concluding section highlights the trends among Indians in Indonesia.

POPULATION AND SETTLEMENT The social profile of Indians in Indonesia has seen a sea change in the last two decades. Prior to the 1980s, Indians were largely to be found in two regions of Indonesia. There were the Tamils and Sikhs settled largely in North Sumatra Province, and the business community of Sindhis and Sikhs found in Jakarta and in a few other cities in Java. In present-day Indonesia, such categorization of Indians is too simplistic to account for the changes that have taken place in the composition and settlement of Indians. There are still the established businesses of Indians in Jakarta and the communities of Sikhs and Tamils in North Sumatra. What is new is the migration of Indians from North Sumatra as well as the migration of Indians from India to Jakarta, the metropolis of Indonesia. Jakarta has become a microcosm of the Indian society in Indonesia. Indians living in Jakarta have links to their natal areas within Indonesia as well as outside Indonesia. There is often the constant movement between Jakarta and the regions or cities that they had arrived from. Indians in Jakarta, can be described as belonging to three categories. The first group is the descendants of Indians who arrived in colonial Indonesia. They feel at home in Indonesia and generally do not know their origins in the Indian sub-continent. They continue to preserve what their forefathers imparted to them while integrating themselves into the Indonesian social landscape. The second group of Indians is the businessmen, who came to Indonesia both during the pre-war and post-war years and made their life good. They too have come to feel confident about being in Indonesia, with their children incorporating more aspects of Indonesian identity. The third group comprises those who arrived as investors and professionals from India and elsewhere in the region. The investors, arriving later than other Asians like the Japanese and Koreans, realize they may not be on a level-playing ground in expecting their businesses to take off immediately. They accept the ground rules for business engagement as a given and are preparing the ground for themselves by staying on in Indonesia. The professionals come with specialist skills that Indonesia needs. They range from ICT professionals, financiers, bankers, hedge-fund operators, insurance experts and business consultants. All the Indians are infused with high levels of confidence that they can succeed in Indonesia. Unlike in other parts of Southeast Asia where Indian

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migrants include a larger and visible presence of labourers, Indonesia has seen only three groups of Indians. The newer migrants, especially the investors and professionals, are highly respected due to their high status and income. Indonesians view them as being extremely clever people. Until the early 1990s, however, Indonesia had disputes with India as it viewed India as a competitor for Indonesia’s aspirations of becoming a member of the United Nations Security Council, and renaming the Indian Ocean as Indonesian Ocean. After the mid-1990s, such discussions ended, as India became a knowledge outsourcing centre while Indonesia became mired in recession. There is much dispute about the population of Indians in Indonesia. Fieldwork done among Indians in Jakarta in July 2006 has indicated that the total population of people of Indian origins in Indonesia can be estimated as being not more than 100,000 persons. Indonesian Population Census for 2000, however, lists the total population of Indians in Indonesia to be 34,685 persons. Of these, 22,047 or 64 per cent were in North Sumatra, while Jakarta had 3,632 people or 11 per cent. Other regions that had large number of Indians included South Sumatra with 1,245 (4 per cent), East Java with 1,164 (3 per cent), West Kalimantan with 1,150 (3 per cent), and West Java with 1,033 persons (3 per cent). The remaining were spread throughout Indonesia. The religious distribution of Indians includes 40 per cent Hindus, 30 per cent Muslims, 17 per cent Buddhists, 6 per cent Protestants, 5 per cent Catholics and 2 per cent other religions (Population Census, 2000). These official figures appear to suggest that the population of Indians, since 1930 — the last time ethnic identification of people in Indonesia was undertaken — has largely remained unchanged. Reported official figures for Indians in Indonesia needs to be used cautiously as ethnographic fieldwork shows a larger population of Indians in Indonesia. The largest concentration of Indians are still found in North Sumatra especially concentrated in Medan but also living in the municipalities of Binjai, Sibolga, Tanjung Balai, Pematang Siantar and Tebing Tinggi. Most informants interviewed during the fieldwork reported that there are 60,000 Tamils and 20,000 Punjabi Sikhs in North Sumatra. The Sindhi Directory of Indonesia lists about 1,580 entries. Including those who do not want to be listed in the directory, it can be projected that there are at least 5,000 Sindhis in Indonesia, largely concentrated in Jakarta but also found in many cities in Java, including a few families in most major cities in Indonesia. Most of these have been long-term residents and often are the third generation descendants in Indonesia. The expatriate Indians are the recent migrants of professionals. They are largely found in Jakarta and number around 300 families with a total population of 2,000 individuals.

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Tables 14.1 and 14.2 give an indication of the ethnic diversity of Indonesian society in Medan as well as the reasons for Indians to retain their identity in North Sumatra. The tables show the ethnic communities found Table 14.1 Ethnic Groups in Medan, 1930

Indonesian Javanese Minangkabau Malay Mandaling Batak Toba Batak Sundanese Betavi (Jakarta) Others European Chinese Other Asians Total

Number

Percentage

41,270 19,069 5,590 5,408 4,688 820 1,209 1,118 3,368 4,293 27,287 3,734 76,584

53.9 46.2 13.5 13.1 11.4 2.0 2.9 2.7 8.2 5.6 35.6 4.9 100.0

Source: 1930 Population census of the Dutch East Indies.

Table 14.2 Ethnic Groups in Medan, 2000

Jawa Batak/Tapanuli Toba Mandaling/Angkola Manda Nias/Kono Niha Karo Melayu Ankola Others Total

Number

Percentage

606,696 280,032 85,726 176,933 13,159 78,129 123,298 1,371 538,760 1,904,104

31.9 14.7 4.5 9.3 0.7 4.1 6.5 0.1 28.2 100.0

Source: Computed from Table 10.9. Population by Regency/ Municipality & Ethnicity, pp. 75. Population of Sumatera Utara: Results of the 2000 Population Census, Series L2.2.2. Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia.

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in Medan city in 1930 and 2000. The question of ethnic group identity was not asked in population accounting between 1930 and 2000. The association with ethnicity was avoided as Indonesia strove to create a united nation. By the 2000 census, it was felt that ethnic affiliation would not be divisive anymore. In 1930, there were 30,000 people listed as British Indians (Mani 1993a, p. 49). Since then, many Indians, especially Tamils in the smaller townships have married indigenous women with the subsequent absorption of their offsprings into local communities. Even in North Sumatra, the Tamil Muslims have been largely assimilated through their marriage to non-Indian women. An examination of ethnic groups in Medan between 1930 and 2000 shows that Indians, especially Tamils and Sikhs have become established and well recognized ethnic groups. In 1930, Indonesians formed almost 54 per cent of the city’s population with Chinese, Europeans and Indians forming distinguishable minorities. In 2000, while the Indonesian share had increased to 72 per cent, the others category, which included Chinese, Indians and much smaller ethnic groups, still formed 28 per cent of Medan’s population. Just as the total population increased by 2,486 per cent between 1930 and 2000, there was also perceivable change in the composition of the various ethnic groups. In 1930, the total population of those who had arrived from Java accounted for 52 per cent of the total Indonesian population and included Javanese, Sundanese and Betavi. By 2000, the migrants from Java accounted for only 32 per cent of the entire population, with a proportionate increase of North Sumatran indigenous groups migrating to Medan. Various Batak groups including those from the Nias Island had increased to form the new ethnic groups. The proportion of Malays, like those groups from Java, also reduced to 6.5 per cent in 2000 as compared with 13 per cent in 1930. In this ethnically diverse milieu, Indians did not have a dominant group into which they had to assimilate into except participating in the national schemes to become Indonesian citizens. The schooling system has allowed Indians to join the national milieu while keeping their religion and ethnic identities intact. Thus, 21,329 people in North Sumatra reported themselves as Hindus in the year 2000, with Medan alone reporting 12,888 Hindus followed by 915 in Binjai and 551 in Pemantang Siantar. These figures are far smaller than the numbers reported by respondents from Medan and its surrounding areas. As the migration of Bali Hindus to North Sumatra is hardly a social phenomenon in Indonesia, it can be postulated that these Hindus are indeed people of Indian origins. In Indonesia, Sikhism is not given a religious category and they are classified as being part of Hinduism. This again leads to specific identification of Tamil Hindus and Sikhs. As noted

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in earlier research, a substantial number of Tamils are also Muslims, Catholics, Protestants and Buddhists in North Sumatra (Mani 1993a). A similar pattern of ethnic diversity is also present in Jakarta. As shown in Table 14.3, the native population of the Jakarta region, the Betavi, forms about 28 per cent of the population while the other groups include the Javanese, Sundanese, Chinese, Bataks, Minangkabau, Malays and others. Indians are listed under “others”, which category includes many other migrant groups both from within Indonesia as well as elsewhere. The distribution of “others” in the Jakarta population enumeration shows that the largest concentration of Indians may be located in North Jakarta. But everywhere in Jakarta, Indians live among people of wide variations in ethnicity. While there are Muslims and Christians among Indians in Jakarta, the vast majority of Indians can be described as Hindus and Sikhs. There are also followers of Bahai faith and Jainism amongst Indians in Jakarta. As all of them are placed under the category of Hindus in the 2000 census, an examination of Hindus in the population of Jakarta would add weight to the number of Indians reported by residents in Jakarta. But then, in recent decades, thousands of Balinese too have migrated to Jakarta. As shown in Table 14.4, there were 28,508 Hindus residing in Jakarta in 2000. The earlier settled areas of north and west Jakarta have the largest concentrations of Hindus. As these areas became commercial areas with highrise office buildings, Hindus have also settled in other parts. A 1982 field survey (Mani 1993b, p. 199) estimated that there were 6,000 Indians in Jakarta. This number has since increased with newer migrants to Jakarta. Respondents postulate the current total population of Indians to be about 19,000. Amongst these the Sindhis outnumber all other Indian groups. The Sindhi Directory published annually by the Sindhu Loka (Sindhi Trust of Indonesia) lists about 1,570 businesses and families. The total number of Sindhis would probably amount to about 5,000 people including those who do not want to be listed in the directory. The number of Sikhs has increased to about 400 families and includes the migrant families from Medan. Thus, Sikhs may number about 2,000 people which may further increase with migration. Some respondents report that there might be 500 Sikh families in Jakarta. Tamils from Medan are said to number about 1,500 people with about 250 families. The expatriate families are reported to be 2,000 families with a population of 8,000 persons. Of these, there are 300 Tamil expatriate families of an estimated population of about 1,200. Thus, it can be estimated that the Indian population of Jakarta is between 16,000 and 19,000 persons.

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1,773,112 2,345,466 872,092 1,900,141 1,433,896 8,324,707

South Jakarta Jakarta Central Jakarta West Jakarta North Jakarta Total

38.9 37.8 29.0 29.4 37.5 35.2

Jawa 33.1 27.5 31.2 29.1 17.1 27.6

Betavi 12.4 14.6 17.1 15.7 18.1 15.3

Sunda/ Priangan 0.7 1.1 6.0 13.1 8.5 5.5

Chinese 2.8 5.3 2.7 2.8 3.3 3.6

Batak/ Tapanuli 3.7 4.1 4.0 2.1 1.8 3.2

Minangkabau 0.8 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0

Malay

0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 1.1 0.6

Palembang Malay

7.0 7.9 8.3 6.1 12.0 8.0

Others

Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia.

Source: Computed from Table 10.6: p. 51. Population of D.K.I. Jakarta, Results of the 2000 Population Census, Series L2.2.10. Badan

Total

Municipality

Table 14.3 Ethnic Groups in Jakarta, 2000

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Table 14.4 Distribution of Hindus in Jakarta, 2000

South Jakarta East Jakarta Central Jakarta West Jakarta North Jakarta Total

Number

Percentage

4,450 5,171 4,172 8,366 6,349 28,508

15.6 18.1 14.6 29.3 22.4 100.0

Source: Computed from Table 6.6, p. 27. Population of D.K.I. Jakarta, Results of the 2000 Population Census, Series L2.2.10. Badan Pusat Statistik, Jakarta, Indonesia.

RISING EXPECTATIONS Most Indians in Indonesia are confident about their status and future owing to the social and political processes within Indonesia and the region. The economic recession with subsequent recovery and the democratization of Indonesia has given greater confidence to Indians in Indonesia. It has removed the fear of arbitrariness that was associated with Indonesian officials, and most long-term residents have developed stronger links with government officials. Another process that has brought about perceptional changes is the rising image of India in the Southeast Asian media. In the last two decades, Indians living in Indonesia, especially Jakarta and Medan have not experienced the tumultuous political protests against India that happened in front of Indian consulates in Jakarta and Medan in the 1970s. The burning of the Indian embassy in Jakarta over the Sondhi affair is no more discussed by Indians. The improved political relations between India and Indonesia together with India’s rise as a knowledge powerhouse has made Indians confident of their abilities and future. Devoid of labour migrants from South Asia, almost all the Indians arriving for work are highly educated professionals working in a range of professions. Since the recession, their role and visibility has risen. The increasing number of technology related tours and exhibitions in Jakarta by Indian firms has also impressed Indonesian industrialists that India is a technologically developed country. Indian multinational firms have also begun to arrive and have raised the level of confidence for sustained

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presence in Indonesia, instead of having to be cautious. Indonesia, on its part, has become more aggressive in attracting investments and industries from India. The effect of these processes may not be so evident in North Sumatra, owing to lack of rapid economic and social change. However, there is the increased internal migration process of Indians in North Sumatra migrating to Jakarta to visit relatives and to find employment. Once a Tamil or a Sikh family has established a presence in Jakarta, more of the family members tend to migrate to Jakarta. Residence in Jakarta exposes them to globalization processes that in turn helps them to plan for economic progress, education for their children and become competitive in their everyday life. Indian businesses that used to be concentrated around the Pasar Baru area in central Jakarta are now dispersed. As Jakarta has developed many new shopping malls, many of the businesses have set up outlets in them while maintaining the Pasar Baru place as a shop cum main administration office. Similarly, many business families do not stay in Pasar Baru. They have moved away from the crowded city centre and stay in the residential areas of Jakarta. Medan Sikhs have settled in larger numbers in south Jakarta where vast tracts of land for housing are still available. Expensive housing in central Jakarta has made many migrants from Medan seek housing either in south Jakarta or east Jakarta. As traffic is heavy during peak hours, these new residents spend longer travelling time during peak hours unless the toll roads are used to travel between different areas of Jakarta. A one-hour journey to work in central Jakarta can take about three hours during peak hours. Many working Indians from Medan leave as early as five o’clock in the morning for work in downtown Jakarta.

ECONOMIC POSITION Formerly, Indians could be found in specific areas of economic activity. The early identification of Sindhis with textile business, Sikhs with sports goods business, Medan Tamils with agriculture, construction firms or petty businesses, and Medan Sikhs with cattle growing, animal husbandry and sports business does not provide the overall framework for understanding the economic position of Indians in Indonesia. Added to this changing framework is the phenomenal increase of non-resident Indians and the arrival of investors from India.

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The current generation of Sindhis and Sikhs are generally the children of their migrant fathers who came as employees in earlier Sindhi firms before they established their own businesses. As citizens of Indonesia, most Sindhis and Jakarta Sikhs are slowly diversifying their economic base while continuing their family businesses. Instead of mainly doing wholesale textile trade, many Sindhis have ventured into manufacturing textiles, carpets, garments, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. This shift has become necessary as cheaper garments and textiles from China have brought down profits in the textile trade. Education has become a new area for business in the Sindhi community. The Sindhu House, set up as a trust for supporting orphans and widows among the Sindhis, has become totally transformed as an education provider, and in the last eight years, to become the headquarters of the Gandhi Sewa Loka (Gandhi Service Centre). While the newly constructed two-storey building is still a centre for community activities, it has become a not-forprofit education provider to all Indians and other migrant professionals in Jakarta. In the wake of Indonesia’s attempt to close all forms of foreign education in the 1960s, four educational institutions of Indians were allowed to function as schools catering to foreigners, largely citizens of India, in Indonesia. The Gandhi School at Pasar Baru in Jakarta and the Khalsa School at Medan were amongst them. The other two schools were the Nehru School in Bandung, and the Saraswathi School in Surabaya. Except for the Khalsa School operated by the Sikh Gurudwara in Medan, the Sindhi community began all other schools. Though the Gandhi School at Pasar Baru was begun as the effort of the Bombay Merchant’s Association for Sindhis, the link was discontinued, as the Bombay Merchant’s Association could not function owing to antiIndian sentiments in the 1960s as well as the nation-building policies of Indonesia. The Gandhi School was run as a separate institution for many years unaccountable to the Sindhi community trust except to a few people on its management board. From the mid-1990s, however, members of the Sindhi community felt that the school had to remain as a property of the Gandhi Sewa Loka and not be allowed to be converted into private property. Led by Suresh Vaswani and Shyam Methani, the school was recovered as community property after a long-drawn legal conflict that ended with the decision of the Privy Council of Indonesia. On 1 April 1993, the school at Pasar Baru became the property of the Trust. With careful management the Gandhi Group of schools have become a US$25 million business with five schools. The Gandhi Memorial International School (GMIS) at Kemayoran District in central Jakarta has over 1,860 students from fifty countries. It uses

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English and teaches elementary, junior high and senior high students. It trains students for the international baccalaureate diplomas and has state-of-the-art classrooms and equipment. It employs 140 teachers from India and Indonesia to provide superior education. Most of the children are Sindhis, Sikhs and children of expatriate Indians in Jakarta. The former Gandhi School at Pasar Baru has become the Gandhi Institute of Business and Technology offering twinning programmes with overseas universities. The Gandhi Sewa Loka also operates the Sekolah Gandhi Nasional and the Mahatma Gandhi School. The two schools conduct their curriculum in Indonesian with a large percentage of the time also allocated to teaching in English. Both the schools are well attended by Chinese Indonesians. The fees at the last two schools are much lower. In 2007, the Trust will be expanding to Bali when it begins the GMIS Bali Branch. The trust does not borrow any money for its operation from banks or the Sindhi community. The funds from the education business are in turn used to support various community projects, like the operation of a free bus service from Pasar Baru to the Shiv Mandir at Pluit on Fridays for devotees, and many other charitable activities for poorer Indonesians. Providing education has become big business for other Sindhis too. The former principal of the Gandhi School at Pasar Baru, for instance, has begun his own school in Bali, attracting children of the elites from both the Sindhi community and Indonesians. Two of the eight trustees of the Gandhi Sewa Loka have also started another school. The Universal School which operates in an area adjoining the Gandhi International School, is unable to attract the children of diverse nationalities. Similarly, the Texmaco School, with about 250 students, was started when Texmaco Jaya Group of Companies employed thousands of expatriates from India. Just as the parent company, the school is also struggling to survive. Other prominent Sindhis in business include Ram Barwani of K. Haloomal & Co. (carpet factory), Jawahar Punjabi (chain of Luxury 22), Jamu Punjabi (MD films), Ram Punjabi (films), Nico J. Horan (fashion industry), Gopi Samtani (Rapi films) and Ram Suraya (Suraya films). As in the 1980s, the Indonesian film industry has attracted Sindhi investments. Textile is no longer the foundation of Sindhi business enterprises in Indonesia. Haresh Lakshamana, who heads the firm Century 21, is the biggest importer of films in Indonesia. The Sikh community has grown from forty families in 1950 to almost 400 families in 2006. The increase is largely due to the migration of Sikhs from Medan. Wholesale and retail trading of sports goods is still the mainstay of Sikh businesses in Jakarta and all over Indonesia. The Khalsa School in Medan, even though it has since been closed, was instrumental in providing

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English language education for many Sikhs and Tamils in Medan. Most Sikh youths who had completed their education have been able to obtain jobs in multinational companies and move to Jakarta. Most Sikhs who have migrated to Jakarta are still employees, but there is always the search for business opportunities to become self-employed or employers. Many have been successful in their effort to set up sports goods retail outlets and move on to other businesses. While most of the original Sikh families in Jakarta are still closely associated with the sports goods business, some are venturing into other businesses. Some Sikhs have become successful in operating coastal shipping in Indonesia. Most Tamil migrants from Medan to Jakarta came with the rise of Texmaco Jaya under the entrepreneurial leadership of Srinivasan Marimuthu (referred as Senivasan in Indonesian press). The vast majority of South Indian expatriates who arrived in Indonesia were also recruited to work in Texmaco Jaya. However, there were also other Tamils from Medan who moved to Jakarta as they ran successful construction companies with large construction tenders in Java, Kalimantan and Sumatra. These companies too, were instrumental in bringing some of the 250 Tamil families that trace their origins to North Sumatra. Most Tamils are in some way still associated with the companies that they came to work for. Often friendships among Tamils and Sikhs have also allowed for some Tamils to work in companies operated by Sikhs from Medan. The next largest and most prominent group among Indian are the professionals and investment companies. Some of the professionals came to Jakarta to work in Indian-owned investment companies. Indian professionals are found in manufacturing industries associated with textiles, carpets, garments, pharmaceuticals and chemicals. These professionals have high technical abilities as they were engaged in similar work in India or elsewhere. There are also professionals involved in the prospecting and operation of coal mines, palm oil plantations, steel factories and oil drilling. There are also professionals involved in setting up pharmaceutical companies. Some professionals, after working for a few years, have ventured to set up their own consultancies that facilitate the entry of other Indian companies and investors into Indonesia. Among the prominent Indian businesses that have arrived in Indonesia to invest are the Aditha Birla Group, L.N. Mittal in Surabaya, the EWSR Group from Chennai, and J.K. Files with a plant in Surabaya, and P.T. Pokok. Recently TVS, Bajaj, and the Pangor Group have also set up operations in Indonesia. Home-grown Indian businesses are in the entertainment industry led by Ram Punjabi and garment factories operated by Mirpuri and Mehtani.

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While Mirpuri has expanded his factories to Andhra Pradesh in India, Mehtani has set up factories in Kampuchea. Indian businessmen and investors in large-scale industries appear to have developed a new mindset. Formerly, most of the investors were cautious, expecting reliable profit in a given time. The new investors, on the other hand, appear to be willing to invest and stay in Indonesia. They plan to make everything in Indonesia and export to the rest of Southeast Asia. In this, they are willing to compete with Japanese and other investors instead of waiting to find a niche market. Thus, the TVS group from Tamil Nadu, for instance, is number three in making scooters in India. In Indonesia, they are willing to compete with Japanese motorbikes and wait for the market to pick up for their motorbikes. Any discussion of the economic role of Indians in Indonesia cannot help but comment on the rise and fall of Srinivasan Marimuthu, the entrepreneur and industrialist of Indonesia. The Texmaco Jaya group is the anchor business of Srinivasan, a Medan Tamil, begun in 1960. Travelling from Medan to Java to become a trader in batik textiles, he rose to become one of the top ten industrialists of Indonesia. He ventured into manufacturing with his first handloom factory with about seventy looms at Pekalongan, near Semarang. Beginning with a batik-weaving factory, he acquired the latest textile technology from India and Japan and established large-scale factories in Java. In 1982, his sales turnover was US$250 million. His group became the two non-Chinese groups among the top twenty industrial groups even as late as 1996. Srinivasan was a man of great vision and ambition, and nationalistic in wanting to make Indonesia a great manufacturing and industrial nation. Indonesian political leadership loved him for his nationalist outlook, while he became the icon of all Indians in Indonesia. At its peak, the Texmaco Jaya group had 70,000 employees with 700 expatriate experts. He is credited for giving employment to 40 per cent of the employable Medan Tamils in his industries. Politically, he was influential and even served as the honorary parliamentary member in the Indonesian Parliament. It is said that he hardly went to the parliament, as he did not want to adorn the special hat of Turkish origin. His political influence extended beyond Suharto’s presidency, to all the presidents of Indonesia. His ambition and vision made him expand from textiles to engineering and automobiles. In this expansion, he is described as having come into conflict with established Chinese companies distributing Japanese products. He also wanted to produce a thousand trucks for the Indonesian army and another 500 buses for export. His attempt to produce a cheaper car for Indonesia was seen as a dangerous omen by car importers and Japanese car assemblies. He acquired

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land worth 2,000 hectares in Subang and 500 hectares in Karawang to have his engineering and automobile industries. His first obstacle arose with the economic recession in 1997, as his loans based on American dollar borrowings increased while his assets remained the same. While restructuring of the loans was allowed for other industrialists, Srinivasan’s attempts were delayed causing him more loss. Even though he had the necessary infrastructure for mass production for automobiles, banks used their instruments to disallow any production. Some commentators have remarked that Srinivasan in expanding too much, had over-borrowed from the banks. Had he not ventured into iron and steel, he might have survived as other industrialists. He was over-committed when Indonesia was hit by the financial crisis. The bank lines of credit were cut while all his past borrowings were frozen in the heavy machinery he had bought. In the final stages, he was seen as being reluctant to enter into any arrangements by which he could keep the textile industries while giving up the engineering and automobile sectors. One of the presidents of Indonesia is reported to have suggested a compromise whereby Srinivasan’s group could retain 49 per cent of the shares while distributing the rest to his creditors. Srinivasan appears to have refused as he felt he was being singled out for punishment unlike other industrialists. Eventually, he had to give up for political reasons. Even though he was a leading industrialist of Indonesia, he had no personal bank accounts and is described by all as a generous man. His Texmaco Jaya Group still operates the textile industries while the engineering sector has been repossessed by his creditors. Press reports in June 2006 have raised doubts on the manner in which the Indonesian Finance Ministry had treated him as compared to other industrialists. Srinivasan is still preparing a comeback as the ardent Indonesian industrialist. The economic dynamism apparent among Indians in Jakarta is not visible in North Sumatra. Most accounts describe the Indian communities in Medan and North Sumatra as living a contented life devoid of the rapid change seen amongst Indians in Jakarta. There is a section among the Tamil community in Medan that is still mired in poverty.

SOCIAL ORGANIZATIONS AND IDENTITY FORMATION Social life among Indians is conditioned by economic orientation, nationality, language, religion and geographical location. The Sindhi and Sikh residents having businesses in the Pasar Baru area interact every day at the Sikh Gurudwara in Jakarta. As Sindhis have traditionally been followers of the

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Sikh Gurus, the Pasar Baru Sikh Gurudwara was the focal point for both communities until the Kalistan movement sought purification of Sikh religious practices in the diaspora. Even though the Sikhs are numerically fewer compared to the population of Sindhis in Jakarta, Sindhis still patronize the Pasar Baru Gurudwara in greater numbers on Sundays and are still its largest benefactors whenever funds are needed. As told by Gulraj Singh, one of the most influential leaders among Jakarta Sikhs, the schism that developed during the 1970s and early 1980s between Sindhi and Sikh religious practices, has left a gulf between them. As will be discussed later, the Sindhis have moved on to form many religious organizations. The Pasar Baru Gurudwara, in appreciation of the Sindhi community, still allows the practice of aarathi (showing of burning camphor to divinity) at its Sunday prayer gatherings. The pictures of Sindhi saints and Hindu divinities, however, have long disappeared from the walls of the gurudwara. Before the arrival of Medan Sikhs in large numbers, Jakarta had two gurudwaras. The older gurudwara was at Tanjung Priok (Jakarta’s Port) while the Sindhi and Sikh business communities built the Pasar Baru Gurudwara later. The former now caters to Sikhs in north Jakarta, while the latter caters to the business community in central Jakarta. Begun by ten Sikh families working at Tanjung Priok in 1924, the gurudwara slowly evolved until a temple of stone was built in 1933. As the Tanjung Priok port needed more land due to containerization, the gurudwara was given monetary compensation to be relocated. They bought the present land in 1996 and started building the new temple in 1998. As it cost a 1,000 billion rupiah, the trusteeship of the four founding families sought the help of other Sikhs in Jakarta and the Southeast Asian region. Mohinder Singh, eighty-year-old trustee of the gurudwara who has been associated with the temple since 1940, still continues as the chairman. The incoming Medan Sikhs in Jakarta have built two new gurudwaras in the last two decades. These are generally led by Medan Sikhs in Jakarta. Balwant Singh, a successful entrepreneur from Medan, donated his land to establish a gurudwara at Ciputat in South Jakarta. As approval for religious buildings are given after a lengthy process, Balwant Singh’s leadership was crucial in obtaining the permit for building the temple. The forth gurudwara built at Tanggerang, East Jakarta, is led by Santok Singh and Major Kumar, who have become successful through their business of operating coastal ships. The gurudwara has not received the approval and operates as a private building. Both places of worship appear to be contesting for leadership among Medan Sikhs in Jakarta. Thus Jakarta has four gurudwaras in different parts of the Jakarta region. While the Pasar Baru and Tanjung Priok gurudwaras

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have a longer history and have resolved leadership struggles through a fixed trusteeship system, the newer gurudwaras are contesting each other as the members of the congregation come from among the migrants from Medan and all are closely related by kinship. The conflicts among Medan Sikhs in Jakarta often have their origins in Medan, where the Sikh community has lost its Khalsa English School, with very little hope of reviving it. The gurudwara in Medan is still the focal point of the Sikh community in Medan. While community leaders like Gulraj Singh wish to have a single gurudwara for all Sikhs in Jakarta, the struggle for social eminence in the community has led to leadership struggles within the Sikh community in both Jakarta and Medan. In migrating to Jakarta, the Medan Sikhs tried initially to integrate themselves with one of the two older temples. As the established families at Pasar Baru Gurudwara and Tanjong Priok Gurudwara blocked their aspirations, Medan Sikhs moved on to establish two more gurudwaras. The continuing conflict as to which of the two newer gurudwaras will cater to all the Medan Sikhs has caused deep divisions amongst them. The Sindhis, being numerous in number, have many religious institutions to cater to their religious and social needs. It is estimated by the interviewer’s respondents that there are at least twenty spiritual groups among Sindhis in Indonesia. The membership overlaps and is fluid depending on the spiritual power emanated by visiting gurus from India. Some of these spiritual groups are well endowed with wealthy patrons, which includes Chinese as well. These spiritual groups may be bhajan groups (devotional singing groups) or centred on a spiritual teacher in India, who may or may not visit Indonesia. In Jakarta, the Sindhis besides being attracted to the Sikh gurudwaras at Pasar Baru and Tanjung Priok are also participants in a number of temples. The oldest is the Shiv Mandir (Shiva Temple) at Pluit, founded in 1954. It has become a comprehensive Hindu temple accommodating all the religious needs of Hindus in Jakarta. The temple is an important gathering place for devout Hindus on Fridays. During the fieldwork, the author witnessed a congregation of 400 devotees who turned up as family units to sing hymns, offer aarathi and prayers to Lord Shiva. The cosmopolitan culture of the Sindhis appears to have democratized prayers at the Shiv Mandir with both men and women offering aarathi, hymns and prayers without the priest. The sanctum-centorum too was accessible to all. Since the authors’ last observation of the temple site in 1982, much has changed in the temple complex too. The deity or the spiritual guru of every potential Hindu group in Jakarta has been allocated a shrine within the temple complex with Lord Shiva placed in the sanctum centorum. Lord Murugan, Amman, Balaji (Perumal), Ayappan — all South Indian deities have been given their shrines to reflect

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the growing expatriate community of South Indian professionals in Jakarta. All the major saints of Sindhis, besides Guru Nanak, Sai Baba, Sri Ram, Lord Krishna, Hanuman and the Garuda (vehicle of Lord Vishnu) have also been added to the temple complex. The cosmopolitan outlook of Sindhis in their religious practices has created within the Shiv Mandir temple complex the most integrated religious structure among Indians in Indonesia. The panchang (an annual calendar of religious events) of the Shiv Mandir reflected all the festivals followed by the various Hindu groups in Jakarta. Thaipusam, Deepavali and any other Hindu festivals that appeals to groups of Hindus in Jakarta have been given a place in the temple calendar. Other religious institutions include Anand Pur Durbar, which has attracted some of the richest benefactors among the Sindhis in Jakarta, and has built a temple at the cost of US$1 million in 2002. The Sadhu Vaswani Centre in Jakarta was built at a cost of US$500,000. The Radha Soami Satsang of Beas has set up a centre at Cibubur on the outskirts of Jakarta. Another important temple is the Devi Mandir at Kemayoran. Started by a devotee in 1982, as a family shrine the temple has become another gathering point for devotees. Though the temple is dedicated to Durga or Kali, all other gods and saints too have found their place in the temple complex catering to the cosmopolitan religious needs. As noted before, while some Sindhis patronize a particular guru or a temple, most groups of pious devotees are fluid and drift about patronizing each temple on a particular day of the week. Each temple has its own auspicious events during the week, and the various religious centres have reached an understanding to promote each other. The Yayasan Pendidikan Satya Sai Baba Indonesia (Satya Sai Baba Foundation, Indonesia) is an example where followers of Sai Baba have built a network across Indonesia. Beginning with the donation by Mohan Mirpuri of his property in Pasar Baru to Sai Baba movement in the 1980s, the foundation has grown to engage in not only prayer groups, but to implement the wishes of Sai Baba to do community service (sewa). Charitable welfare to the poor, blood donation and providing a humanistic education has become the foundation’s major projects across Indonesia. The events of the Sai Baba Mandir at Pasar Baru as well its foundation are attended by not only Sindhis, but also by Chinese, Bali Hindus and other Indians in Jakarta. Foremost among the newer religious institutions that have risen up for Jakarta Indians is the Kaliamman (Durga Amman) Temple at Tangerang. The temple is located largely among Muslims and Christians near the Sedane River at Tangerang. When the local authorities objected to the temple as the locality had hardly any Hindus except for its founder, the entire kampong of Muslims

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and Christians carried out a signature campaign to have the temple retained in its present location and the authorities left it alone. Samy, an illiterate and poor wanderer from Medan, gives away most of the money donated by devotees to the poor and sick in the kampong. At every major festival in the Tamil Hindu Calendar, he gives away sarongs and rice to all the poor who turn up. In Medan too, he returns often to feed the poor. During Deepavali, he distributes rice to 2,000 people in Medan. His temple has become a focal point for Medan Tamils staying in Jakarta, and all the major festivals of the temple are well attended by Medan Tamils as Samy uses Bahasa Indonesia as well as Tamil. Known as Pundit Samin, Samy plans to establish permanent income for the temple by buying land in the kampong and building cheap kampong houses for rent to support his foundation and the temple. He is able to attract patrons among rich Tamils and Sindhi businessmen in Jakarta to donate towards his temple building activity and charitable work. Other religious gatherings include the Bahai faith, which is cosmopolitan in attracting Sindhis as well as others. The followers of Jainism number about forty families in Jakarta. The familial culture of the Jain families keeps them as ardent followers of their saints and strict vegetarianism. The dynamism seen in the religious scene at Jakarta is not reflected at Medan. Many of the temples continue the religious events observed in Tamil Hindu temples, while a few are experiencing declining number of devotees owing to migration to Medan and Jakarta. The Thandayuthapani Temple at Medan, established by Nattukottai Chettiar business houses before the war, for instance, is only left with two trustees. As one of the trustee has moved to Jakarta, the temple is on the verge of following the path taken by Nattukottai Chettiar operated Thandayutha Pani temples in Ho Chih Minh City, or as in the case of the Mariamman Temple in Bangkok, where trusteeship has been passed on to local residents. The trustee of the Medan Thandayuthapani Temple hopes that Nattukottai Chettiars in Malaysia or Singapore would extend help to maintain the temple. The schism that developed amongst Medan Tamil Hindus in the 1980s is still evident. The popular Hindu festivals like Thaipusam and Themithi are still banned at Medan. The group that championed for the ban of these popular festivals is still in control, and is still advancing the synchronization of Tamil Hindu practices with that of Parisada Hindu Dharma Indonesia (PHDI). It has been observed, however, that the Mahasivarathiri festival celebrated in 1995 reunited the divided Tamil community, when all members of the community participated in this ceremony in one of the two temples (Vignato 2004) either at the Sri Mariamman Temple or at the Sri Thandayuthapani Temple. While it is possible that the schism in the Medan

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Tamil community may be healing with the passage of time, the differences in the approach to Tamil Hinduism in Medan and by extension, to Jakarta, is still a festering problem. Pundit Samin’s temple in Jakarta has become a symbol for those Medan Tamils non-aligned to the PHDI group. Pandit Samin has been able to organize Thaipusam and other festivals that are now extinct in Medan. The Tamil president of the PHDI group, for instance, as one of the chief opponents to sacrifices and public religious processions in Tamil Hinduism, has explained that the “truly religious” practice “consisted of abisegam (washing and anointing the deity), vision of god, mantra chanting and meditating” (Silvia Vignato 2004, p. 243). Thus, processions like kavadicarrying Thaipusam, and fire-walking ceremonies still remain banned in Medan while Pandit Samin has carried these out at his Jakarta temple. As pointed out by Silvio Vignato, Karo Hindus in North Sumatra also carry out sacrificial rites despite such bans for Tamil Hindus. There are many secular organizations that Indians in Jakarta participate in. These include the India Club, Indonesia Tamil Mandram, the Economic Council of Indonesia and India (ECII), Atma Jyoti, Yayasan Pendidikan Satya Sai Baba Indonesia, Indian Women’s Association and the Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre. Some of the organizations are very visible in their activities by publishing a website, newsletters and in organizing high profile public events. The ECII has become an organization in which all the leading joint venture companies have become members to represent problems of joint ventures to the Indonesian government. With a current membership of seventy-six companies, they have become an important organ for expressing their voice on matters that affect Indian companies investing in Indonesia. The ECII is planning to join the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce in order to increase its representation to both the government and Indonesian private sector. As told by M. Arumugam, joint secretary of ECII, Indian joint-venture companies are not in competition with local companies. Indian joint-venture companies are playing a complementary role, and with a new mindset to staying in Indonesia rather than just looking for quick profit. This has made ECII’s mission a longer-term goal than an organization of Indian businesses in Indonesia. Members of ECII are confident that they can make everything in Indonesia for export to Southeast Asia. In this respect, they are in competition with the Japanese rather than Indonesian companies. India Club is a social club for the expatriate Indian families in Jakarta. It provides a platform for members and their families to interact with each other by organizing cultural events like Holi and Deepavali. It has grown in

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number and scale over the years. As the programmes are planned to be of common taste, English and Hindi are used in communicating with members. India Club has become a unifying ground for all the professionals in Jakarta and functions more like a club for expatriate Indians. The Indonesia Tamil Mandram begun by Sundar Raman also caters to expatriates who are Tamils. Having been in Jakarta with Texmaco Jaya Group, he felt that Tamils in Jakarta and Indonesia need to preserve their uniqueness. As head of Trisakti Group of Consultants, he advises Indian companies investing in Indonesia as well as run the voluntary association to cater to the 200 Tamil expatriate families in Jakarta. He has organized weekend classes to teach Tamil to Tamil families from Medan as well as celebrate Tamil language related events by inviting leading film composers and others to Jakarta. Having served as an executive member in India Club, he feels that an organization for Tamils is useful in promoting Tamil language. Atma Jyoti is a cultural organization promoted by Medan Tamils in Jakarta. It has become a centre where Medan Tamil youths get to know each other by organizing cultural shows featuring Tamil songs and dances from Tamil films. Medan Tamil families use its events for social gatherings in Jakarta. Yayasan Pendidikan Satya Sai Baba Indonesia was formed in 2000 to spread human values education to all Indonesians. Though it was started of as an education body under the Satya Sai Baba Foundation in Indonesia, it has since then become more of a promoter of human values to schools all over Indonesia. The Middle and Senior Education Department (Departmen Pendidikan Menenga dan Tinggi) has allowed the Foundation to conduct seminars for the 2,000 teachers in its system and have identified one school (SMU22) as a model school for teaching all the children. As the curriculum is centered on human values, it is spreading steadily among all Indonesian schools. Its director Pritamdas feels that as the name of Satya Sai Baba is not at all mentioned anywhere in the curriculum it is being accepted by all Muslims in the Indonesian school system. Humanity and values associated with human well-being are considered more important than spreading the name of Sai Baba (see also Leo Howe 2004). Indian Women’s Association, having been begun in 1975, has a history of thirty-three years. The Association has become an avenue for social interaction among women. Initially based as an extension of the Indian Embassy in Jakarta, the organization has assumed a higher public profile from 1993, with Mrs Gopi Punjabi becoming its President with the wife of the Indian Ambassador serving as its Patron. It works closely with charitable institutions serving Indonesians while catering to the social needs of Indian women in

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Jakarta. As its activities are largely conducted in English, it has been able to attract the attention of the international community in Jakarta. The Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre (JNCC) in Jakarta is supported by the Indian Embassy to promote Indian culture in Indonesia. With its full time director, the centre organizes classes for those wanting to learn dances and music of India. The JNCC, with a branch in Bali, has been successful in attracting a large number of Indonesians wanting to learn Indian culture.

CONCLUSION In Indonesia, Indians live in a society that is characterized by diversity. Both in Jakarta as well as in Medan, the two cities in which Indians form sizable communities, the ethnic diversity of the indigenous population allows them to maintain their identities. In both cities immigration of Indonesians from other parts of Sumatra or Java has occurred. The Javanese remain the most numerous Indonesian ethnic group in both cities. The ethnic groups that come from adjoining areas to Medan city — the Malays and various Batak groups — make up only a smaller proportion of the city. In fact, the ethnic groups subsumed under “Others” account for almost 28 per cent of the population in the city. Similarly, in Jakarta, the Betawi, indigenous to the area, make up only a third of the population. While the Javanese and other ethnic groups from Sunda dominate Jakarta, there is a fair representation of ethnic groups from Sumatra. These circumstances have helped the Indians maintain their identity as separate communities. This has not hindered their acceptance among other Indonesians. In most details of their daily life they follow local customs, eating Malay, Batak and Javanese dishes as often as Tamil food, and wearing attire that makes them blend into the Indonesian social milieu. Indian customs have taken on ceremonial connotations. The best Tamil or Punjabi dishes, sarees, and ornaments are reserved for social gatherings or life-cycle rituals. The Tamils attend Indonesian schools and are as fluent in the language as other literate Indonesians. All that distinguishes them, in general, is their allegiance to Tamil Hinduism. In Jakarta, the most cosmopolitan city in Indonesia, Indian communities exist with a range of possible identities. The early concentration of Indians at Pasar Baru, with worship sites, a school, and sizeable resident communities of Sikhs and Sindhis facilitated the reinforcement of Indian-ness. The Sindhis, being a trading community with global and regional links, have found it easier to preserve their shared identity. For the early settled Sikhs, their religion which drew its inspiration from events in Punjab, identity maintenance was intertwined

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with religion and language. The older Sikhs in Jakarta still exhibit the tenets of their religion by having the turban. The Medan Sikhs, while holding onto their religion, have become like Medan Tamils in their affiliation to other Indonesians. The new Indians who have arrived as professionals and investors are varied in their degree of assimilation into Indonesian society. For those who have stayed longer, the various socio-religious organizations among Indians have allowed them the cultural cushion to induct themselves into Indonesian society. Most of them having easily learnt spoken Indonesian, are in different stages of cultural assimilation. For the new Indians, just as the older communities, Jakarta’s emphasis of a national culture is not antithetical to their own broadly perceived Indian culture. All conversations with them eventually leads to the conclusion that they are extremely comfortable in the Indonesia they experience in Jakarta. Medan Tamils and Medan Sikhs share similar perceptions about their natal area in Sumatra. The Medan Sikhs feel that they have left behind a community with many divisions, whereas in Jakarta they are treated respectably. The Tamils in Jakarta feel that Tamils are leading a laid-back life in Medan where they are oblivious to the vast changes taking place in the world. While there are many poor Tamils in Medan, in Jakarta they lead a better life despite the competitiveness. Retention of identity is a continuing concern among long-residing communities of Indians. Sindhis, Sikhs and Tamils are concerned about the declining literacy in their respective languages amongst their children. As compared to the 1980s and before, most Sindhi and Sikh parents are no more sending their children off to India for their education. At that time it was assumed that an education in India helped to preserve their identities in terms of language, cultural traits and religion. With the rise of Gandhi International School in Jakarta, all parents are sending their children for an international baccalaureate English education. This has in turn lessened the insularity experienced by Indian communities in the past. Indians are aware that the many love marriages taking place amongst former students are signs of changing boundaries of community structures. Marriage across ethnic groups has become an acceptable phenomenon despite parental conservativeness. As most families have about two children, many parents are willing to let them choose their vocation instead of forcing them to enter the family business. Gulraj Singh, a prominent leader of the Sikh community, has his two sons and a daughter in the United States, and none of them have expressed interest in entering the family business begun by their grandfather, Pritam Singh. All the three children have become professionals

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with advanced tertiary education. Mohinder Singh, a community elder in Tanjung Priok, is extremely happy that at least one of his sons has joined him to continue the family business in sports goods. Education and migration is transforming the socio-economic basis of the long resident Indian communities in Jakarta. While there are attempts to teach Sindhi, Punjabi and Tamil to the young, these efforts are not seen to produce the desired results. Cinematic films from India dominate the family scene in all the communities, for whom videos of Hindi and Tamil films have an attentive audience. Indian culture is appreciated and followed by viewing all the videos easily available in Jakarta and Medan. The Internet has allowed further links to those aspects of Indian culture that are needed by Indians in Indonesia. Within each community amongst Indians there is the struggle for community leadership and eminence. The Sikhs and Tamils express this in their struggle for dominance of religious institutions. The Sindhis, owing to their global orientations, have many institutions catering to their community. However, the efforts of the Sindhi community leaders such as Suresh Vaswani and Shyam R. Jethnani using education to promote all Indians, is highly appreciated by all Indians. Indonesia has been a “melting pot” of Indians who had gone there earlier. For many Indians who were Muslims or single men, assimilation had been rapid. Groups of people can be found in all cities of Indonesia whose fathers were migrants from India. Marriage with indigenous Indonesian women was always a possibility for those Indians who were poor and living in suburban areas. Thus, Pandit Samin from Medan, the founder of the Tamil Hindu Durga Temple in Jakarta, is married to a Medan woman who is an indigenous Muslim. In Jakarta, the migration of “new Indians” has created a model for long-resident Indian community groups to emulate. The participation of new Indians in the socio-religious institutions in Jakarta was allowing for newer Indian cultural elements to be injected into an otherwise diverse bunch of communities that represented a continuum of integration with indigenous communities.

Note The author is grateful to the following for interviews during fieldwork in Indonesia, July 2006: T.S. Tirumurthi, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of India; Drs Sadhu Suppiah; Mr Sundar Raman, PT Jaya Sakti Indonesia; Mr M. Arumugam, Joint Secretary, ECII; Mr Rakesh Jain, India Club; Mr Shyam R. Jethnani; Mr Suresh G. Vaswani; Mr Kasi Visvanathan, Trustee of Medan Sri Thandayuthapani Temple;

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Mr Balbir Singh, Secretary of Pasar Baru Gurudwara; Mr Jaya Prakash; Mr Gulraj Singh; Mr Mohinder Singh; Mr Kishen L. Pareek; Management of Shiv Mandir; Mr Arup Kumar Dutta, Director of Jawaharlal Nehru Cultural Centre, Jakarta; Mrs Aparna Narang, Vice President of Indian Women’s Association; Mrs Ram Punjabi, President of Indian Women’s Association; Mr A.P. Singh, Principal of Ghandi International School; Mr Balwan Singh Rahal (BEN); Pandit Samin of Durga Temple, Jakarta; Mr Pritam Das Kishoredas, Prsident, Sathya Sai Education trust, Indonesia; and Mr & Mrs Deepak Fatehchand.

References Anita Raina, Thapan. Sindhi Diaspora in Manila, Hong Kong and Jakarta. Manila: Ateneo De Manila University Press, 2002. Leo Howe. “Hinduism, Identity and Social Conflict: The Sai Baba Movement in Bali”. In Hinduism in Modern Indonesia, edited by Martin Ramstedt, pp. 264–80. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Mani A. “Indians in North Sumatra”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 46–97. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993a. ———. “Indians in Jakarta”. In Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, pp. 99–129. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993b. Silvio Vignato. “Old Gods for the New World: The Ritual Struggle of the Tamil and the Karo within Hinduism in North Sumatra”. In Hinduism in Modern Indonesia, edited by Martin Ramstedt, pp. 242–54. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004. Yadav Somvir. “Cultural and Religious Interaction between Modern India and Indonesia”. In Hinduism in Modern Indonesia, edited by Martin Ramstedt, pp. 255–63. London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004.

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JAPAN

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15 INDIANS IN TOKYO AND ITS VICINITY Masako Azuma INTRODUCTION “Rising India” paints a country of more than one billion people, with rapid economic development, and well-known for IT and biotechnology. Many IT engineers have moved from India to other countries including Japan. In Japan Indians who work in IT industry have increased since 1990s and many of them tend to stay on. They are the embodiment of “rising India” in a globalizing world. However, during the author’s interaction with them for this research, some aspects were noticed, which cannot be explained with “rising India”. They maintained their own religious practices, connection with their home town/village, meals, and dress in Japan. They have formed their own community, which help them keep their own lifestyle and identity. Members of the community are not only IT engineers, but also workers at farms, factories, and restaurants. The term “rising India” is a reminder that India is in the process of becoming an advanced country. Yet, that represents only a certain part of India or Indians. From the life of people coming from India to Japan, we can find other characteristics of Indians. This chapter focuses on their communities in Tokyo. Descriptions about them are based on interviews and participant observations of some aspects of their life. The subject of South Asian diaspora is closely related to “rising India”. Shukla (2001) has noted that the term “South Asia” faces problematic 255

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duality consisting of global and local, nation and transnational community. These topics connect with the complexity of the South Asian diaspora, consisting of differences in religion, background of migration, and experience of social life (Shukla 2001). In Japan, too, people from India and the other countries of South Asia experience the same situation. We can see multiple formations of their communities, which derive from their complexity. The category “South Asia” gives us opportunity to think about the other aspects of “rising India”. Figures 15.1 and 15.2 show the recent increase of Indians in Japan. Since the 1990s, the number of Indians living in Japan has been rapidly increasing (Figure 15.1). In the prefectural change of the Indian population, almost every prefecture shows growth. Especially in Tokyo and its vicinity, this trend is all the more apparent. The industrial midland areas also display similar tendencies (Figure 15.2). Hyogo Prefecture, especially Kobe city, was well known for having the largest community of Indian immigrants prior to 1990. While their community maintained a certain scale of population in Hyogo, the number of Indian residents in Tokyo has been increasing sharply since 1990. Why do many Indians go to Tokyo? The possible reasons behind this trend are explored in sections 2 and 3. In the following two sections, their social life and their position in Japanese society will be discussed. Lastly, the chapter will touch on “rising India”. Figure 15.1 Indian Population in Japan 18,000 16,000 population

14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000

population

6,000 4,000 2,000 0

1985

1990

1995 year

2000

2005

Source: Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, 1986–99 editions, by Ministry of Justice, Japan, and 1989–2006 editions, by Japan Immigration Association.

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Population

1985

1990

1995 Year

2000

2005

Tokyo

Midland

Hyogo

Other

Source: Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, 1986–99 editions, by Ministry of Justice, Japan, and 1989–2006 editions, by Japan Immigration Association.

0

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

10,000

12,000

14,000

16,000

18,000

Figure 15.2 Distribution of Indians by Region, Japan

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THE NEW INFLUX OF INDIANS AND THEIR COMPOSITION There are two distinct features of Indians living in Tokyo and its vicinity. First, the majority of them are in their mid-twenties to early forties in age. Females are mainly in their early twenties to the early thirties. Children under the age of five have also been increasing. This indicates Indian family migration to Japan. The second feature has to do with a rapid increase of the newcomers. One of the characteristics of Indian newcomers is that they are comparatively low wage workers such as cooks and workers in electronics industry. Therefore, we can find diversity among Indian immigrants in Japan in terms of their occupation, place of birth, religion, and language. What are the reasons for the influx of Indians in Tokyo in recent years? Since the 1980s, India has liberalized its economy gradually. A comprehensive economic liberalization took place in the 1990s. As a consequence, some Japanese enterprises built their factories in India. The automobile corporations like Suzuki not only constructed their plants, but also sent Indians to Japan for technical training, which contributed to the increasing number of Indian workers in Japan. Along with them, unskilled Indian workers have also come and lived around Tokyo. The lack of labour force in Japan also accelerated this trend. Another cause of Indian influx is the need to develop IT industry in Tokyo. Because of the recent globalization, Tokyo has an important function as the centre of multinational corporations. The enhancement of the IT industry is considered essential for Tokyo to play a role as a global city. Japan has become a market for Indian engineers seeking to expand the information industry. Indians in and around Tokyo consist of various social and economic classes: traders, business-elites, IT engineers, proprietors and cooks of Indian restaurants, and unskilled labourers in factories. The linkages amongst them are negligible, reflecting their diverse social background in India. It is uncommon to observe information exchange amongst them about their jobs and kinship. Those Indians living in Tokyo are from many parts of India and their languages are various: Gujarati, Hindi, Kannada, Punjabi, Tamil, etc. They also have different religions: Christianity, Hinduism, Jainism, Islam, and Sikhism. They are also not in particular occupations or settlements in Japan, except for the Jains (see section 4). Although there is no close link between their attributes and occupations, there is some correspondence between their occupations and settlement in

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Japan. Many workers of IT enterprises reside in Edogawa ward, Tokyo, while jewellery merchants (most of them are Jains) live in Taito ward, Tokyo and Kofu city, Yamanashi. The variance in their occupations tend to lead to the dispersion of their settlement, contributing to the fact that there is no ethnic enclave among Indians living in Tokyo.

ECONOMIC PROFILE OF INDIANS IN AND AROUND TOKYO This section focuses on the economic situation of people from India living in and around Tokyo. Their economic backgrounds are diverse, depending on their occupation, family composition, education, job skills, etc. Yet, from their economic profile we can also find common traits . As mentioned in section 2, the majority of the people from India are males. As long as they are single, they do not have much responsibility to feed their family in India. In fact, many of them buy their own land and house in India or save for themselves and use the rest for their own personal use, such as enjoying, sightseeing and shopping in Japan. Table 15.1 Socio-economic Background of Indian Migrants and their Status in Japan Occupation and Monthly Income in India

Occupation and Monthly Income in Japan

Respondent A: Arrived in1998; Male, 40 years old; Family in India: 2 daughters, 2 sons, brother and sister-in-law, 1 nephew, 1 niece

Cook and Restaurant Manager: 2,000 Rs

Cook: 9,200 Rs

Respondent B: Arrived in 2002; Male, 31 years old; Family in India: mother, father and 1 sister

Cook: 1,200 Rs

Cook: 9,200 Rs

Respondent C: Arrived in 2001; Male, 25 years old; Family in India: mother, father, grandmother, grandfather

IT Engineer: 3,700 Rs

IT Engineer: 16,000 Rs

Background

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Table 15.1

(continued )

Occupation and Monthly Income in India

Occupation and Monthly Income in Japan

Respondent D: Arrived in 2003; Male, 26 years old; Family in India: Mother, father

Manager of Petrol Station: 1,500 Rs

Factory Worker: 20,000 Rs

Respondent E: Arrived in 1993; Male, 30 years old; Wife in Japan; Mother and Father in India

Farmer: 4,000 Rs

Factory Worker: 10,000 Rs

Background

Source: Compiled from author’s field-work data.

On the other hand, if they are married and have left their wife and children in India, they need to send money to them. The remittances tend to be used for family expenses, buying new land and the house. Financing their children’s education is also another purpose of their remittances. It should be noted that there are some Indian families whose remittances to their homeland tend to be small, as these families have to pay their rent in Japan. If their partners are Japanese and they plan for permanent stay in Japan, they can purchase land and house in Japan. Differences in the family composition leads to various economic outcomes among people from India. However, they have common usages for their earnings. One is remittance from Japan to India. Another is the purchase of land and house in India. Working in Japan allows them to have much higher income, which enables them to purchase new land and house in India. These commonalities indicate that they are not planning to stay in Japan permanently. Except for the cases where their partner is Japanese, the majority of newcomers tend to return to India within ten years.

GATHERING PLACES FOR THE INDIANS IN TOKYO This section explains about different kinds of gathering places of the people from India living in and around Tokyo. These are the places where they create their niche in Japan. Each of them participates in not just one group but several groups. In Tokyo and its surrounding communities, there are many such places in which they make their networks that relate Indian residents in Japan.

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There are about 100 halal food shops in Japan, and many of them are in and around Tokyo. In the shops we can see not only halal food but also spices, incenses, newspapers, magazines, DVD, VHS from India and other countries of South Asia, as well as international phonecards. The halal food shops are full of goods imported from South Asia. Many shopkeepers and salesclerks are from Pakistan, Sri Lanka, India, and Bangladesh. Because of their long residence in Japan, they know well about what the neighborhoods need. The customers come there not only to buy the goods, but also to exchange useful information for their life in Japan. The shopkeepers play an important role in disseminating useful information among customers. The shops have become centres of communities and neighbourhoods. The language that sales clerks and shopkeepers speak affects the composition of the community. At a shop, in Kanagawa prefecture, for example, the shopkeeper and sales clerks are from Sri Lanka. They speak Tamil, Singhalese, and Japanese. In the shop, regular customers come to the shop to enjoy talking with the shopkeeper and exchange information with the sales clerks, because they are from Sri Lanka or Tamil Nadu, India. At another store, the shopkeeper speaks Urdu, Hindi, and Japanese. Thus, regular customers consist of people from North India, Pakistan, and Nepal. At these shops, a common language is one of the important aspects for community membership. Another commonality they share is the fact that the majority of the customers are from South Asia and that they are anxious to get the knowledge about Japan and Japanese from the shops. The halal food stores, therefore, have become gathering places for people from South Asia. Their shared characteristics such as language, South Asian customs, and residence in Japan are of significance in the halal food shops. These enable those stores to become a centre for community interaction. V lived in Saitama prefecture. His room had been provided by his employer. He could use his room as he liked. His friends and relatives: B, T, G, A, and M often gathered in his room to enjoy conversations, with meals and tea. They would watch videos of their relatives’ marriage ceremonies and children’s birthday parties in India. B, V, and T were from the same village. T was the younger brother of V. M was the uncle of V and T. G, A, and M came from the same village. B visited V on all his free days. When B lost his job and room, he went to see V. During his search for new work, B stayed with V. T also visited V every weekend. G, A, and M often go to V’s room on their free days. In Japan they were all unskilled labourers. If one of them had trouble with their job, they consulted each other. When B had to get a new job,

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others tried to find one for him. Their meetings can thus be seen as one of community gatherings, which people from India have. This community was based on members’ relationships: relatives and friends. In this group they could exchange their information about their jobs. V was the focal point in this community as he had stayed in Japan for a longer period. And he could call his friends and relatives to his room. However, when he returned to India, other members could not come together as before. This is not to say that they had no community any more. Now, on their holidays, each of them would visit different places. As they had participated in some other groups based on members’ commonality or relationships, they joined other groups. Approximately, 1,000 Indian residents, mostly IT engineers, live in Edogawa ward, Tokyo. In 2000, they founded the community organization known as the “Indian Community of Edogawa” (ICE). Though it was founded to support Indians who live in Edogawa, it now includes some Indians who live outside of Edogawa. ICE holds some annual events and the information concerning the events are disseminated through its mailing lists, which its members can also use to exchange information. Those who have gone back to India can still be members. They report news from India to the ICE members in Japan. In turn, they can know the current situation of ICE and its members in India. Application for admission to ICE has to be done by e-mail with an introduction by one of the members. The main way to communicate with other members is the mailing list. These suggest that it is necessary to be able to have access to the Internet for involvement in ICE. The common language of ICE is English, because its members are from different areas of India. Thus English is indispensable to participate in ICE. From the ICE members who often use the mailing list in English, we can see their similarity of economic and educational levels. Around 250 Indians live in Okachi-machi, Taito ward, Tokyo. Most of them are Jains who work as jewellery merchants. Since they have annual religious events, one of the oldest Jain families in Okachi-machi built a temple in 2000. Now religious events and worship are regularly held there. Information about events are spread easily in Okachi-machi, because the area in which Jain residents live is not large. Compared to the ICE, the size of the community is small. But they also hope to make a “formal” organization such as ICE. Indian newcomers who come and live in Okachi-machi are mainly the relatives of Jain jewellery merchants who have already lived there for some years. The Indians in Okachi-machi have their close ties to help each other. A Japanese working at one of the oldest Indian companies in Okachi-machi

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reported that “if someone has trouble, the person comes here (his company). This is like a ‘sanctuary’ for Indians in Okachi-machi.” Thus Indian society in Okachi-machi is based on members’ relatives and friends. These are some of the community level groupings of people from India in and around Tokyo to help them cope with life. Members of each group share commonalities in customs, languages, place of residence, religion, or their occupation. And they have relationships with relatives, friends, and neighbours who can support each other. In this chapter, these Indian groups are termed “communities”. Each community is not fixed and classified strictly. Some characteristics shared in one community can be found in another community. The flow of the people between these groups is fluid and variable. People from India tend to participate in a number of groups at the same time. That is why if they lose or leave one community, they are still able to link with other people from India or South Asia in Japan. Thus migrants meeting in the home of a member, do not disappear when the member leaves for India. The remaining members join some other groups. Jewellery merchants and their families in Okachi-machi also have connections with Indians in Kofu, Yamanashi prefecture, and Kobe, Hyogo prefecture. In those cities, there are similar type of communities sharing a common religion and occupation. The Indian communities in and around Tokyo should not be seen as just groups of their societies. The point to note is what characteristics and relationships are shared in these groups. Such an observation can provide a better explanation of the people from India living in Tokyo and its vicinity.

THE CASE OF THE SIKH COMMUNITY IN SOCIAL COHESION This section focuses on one temple called the Tokyo Guru Nanak Darbar, the temple where Sikhs in and around Tokyo gather. It explains how Sikhs have become a religious community in Tokyo. Sikhs who work in medium- and small-sized companies as unskilled workers tend to have their hair cut short when they begin working in Japan. On the other hand, Sikhs who are IT engineers tend to keep their hair long and wear a turban. The companies employing Sikhs as unskilled workers are unfamiliar with their custom of having a beard and turban. However, IT companies generally let the Sikhs have discretion in choosing their mode of dressing.

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The change of appearance, however, is not a sign of release from being a Sikh in India. The change in their appearance is a strategy to facilitate their life in Japan. They regard their short hair as temporary and limited to Japan so that they can live in Japanese society. The Tokyo Guru Nanak Darbar — a Tokyo gurudwara — was built in 1999 when the 300th anniversary of Khalsa 1 was celebrated by Sikh communities all over the world. To commemorate the anniversary, Sikhs around Tokyo gathered at a Sikh-run restaurant and had a service there. With this as a turning point, they began to prepare to build the gurudwara in Tokyo. Within a short period they were able to purchase a room in a building for use as the gurudwara. The Tokyo gurudwara is in the basement of an office building. It is unlike the typical gurudwara found at Kobe. The Kobe gurudwara is in a residential area. The building was a private house but was remodelled to be used as the gurudwara. On the wall of the building, there is a sign of “Guru Nanak Darbar” and Kanda, a symbol of Sikhism. A flag called the Nishan-sahib is on the roof. These decorations are typical marks of the gurudwara. The gurudwara is open for twenty-four hours every day. However, the Tokyo gurudwara is open only once a month when service is held. The Nishan-sahib of the Tokyo gurudwara is displayed in front of the entrance of the office block only during the service. When the gurudwara is closed after the worship, the Nishan is stored inside the room. At the entrance of the Tokyo gurudwara, a box is put on a chair. Inside the box, scarfs are prepared for the members to cover their head. Every one is required to cover their head with a cloth inside the temple. People who have a beard with their turban can come in as they are. Thus, Sikhs who remove their turban in Japan use these scarfs at the Tokyo Gurdwara. As I mentioned earlier, many Sikhs in Japan do not wear turbans. Thus, they substitute scarfs for turbans. The Tokyo gurudwara has no committee or director. It does not even have rules on who and how they commit to the management. The structure of space in the gurudwara and practice there are described below. These are the devices for creating a Sikh society in Tokyo. The posters hung on the wall in the Tokyo gurudwara, hints at how it is managed. Some posters, on a wall at the entrance, are written by active members in Tokyo about the history of Sikhism. However, they were not necessarily active members of the gurudwara management in their home village. It is assumed that they became active in Tokyo not only for themselves, but also for others who are interested in Sikhism. As they are involved in the

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activities, they find their own role as Sikhs in Tokyo. The posters are usually written in Punjabi. Pictures of the Gurus of Sikhism are found at the Tokyo gurudwara. These pictures are usually sold at souvenir shops in front of a large gurudwara. In India, the Bazar print is used as the object of worship in Sikh daily life at home, school, car, store, etc. In fact, we see more Sikh Bazar prints outside the gurudwara than inside it. For the Sikhs in Tokyo, the Bazar prints inside the gurudwara function as one of the devices to change “a room” into a religious space. Other terms regarded as essential for the service at the gurudwara include the following: Guru Granth — Scripture for Sikhism; Palki — Rack for Guru Granth; Chandwa — Canopy; Chour — a fan to wave on top of the Guru Granth; Rumala — Cloth to wrap and decorate the Guru Granth. All these are brought from India. Sikhs in Tokyo use them as they do in India during their religious gatherings. In the Tokyo gurudwara, before and after praying everyone drinks chai — sweet milk tea. While having chai together, people who come to the gurudwara talk about their jobs and life in Japan. Conversation with a cup of chai is often seen in India throughout the day. Chai gives opportunities to have friendship among the members of religious community. During the service at the Tokyo gurudwara, Sikhs practise Kirtan,2 Karah parshad,3 Langar 4 as they do in India. These practices are characteristics of Sikhism. During the service some members play the tabla and harmonium which are typical instruments for Sikh religious music. The rest of the participants sing the hymns to the accompaniment of these instruments. Everyone can join the Kirtan, because the hymns consist of easy words and refrains. For the Langar, people cook vegetarian dishes. At the Langar, many participants do Seva — service for everyone. They serve food for others and wash their plates. Kirtan, Kara parshad, and Langar are essential rituals in Sikhism. The visitors to the Tokyo gurudwara can share in the experience of the Sikhs in Japan. The relatives of the Sikhs in India occasionally visit the Tokyo gurudwara. The visitors and Sikhs living in Tokyo enjoy talking about their home and Japan. The relatives remind them who they are and where they come from. In this sense, the gurudwara functions as a transnational5 space between India and Japan. The above paragraphs have described the devices used at the Tokyo gurudwara, Each of which functions to change a room into a religious space and community. The devices have enabled the Tokyo gurudwara to

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become a religious community to connect the Sikhs living in and around Tokyo.

TRENDS AMONG INDIANS IN TOKYO Among the many recent trends, the Indian schools in Tokyo merit attention. The Indian International School was founded in Koto ward, Tokyo, in August, 2004. It was the first Indian school ever established in Japan. Then another school was begun in 2006 in the same ward. There is also a plan to open a third school at Yokohama with financial assistance from Yokohama City. The growing number of IT engineers and their families has lead to the creation of these schools. The parents want the schools to provide their children with an English education and Indian cultural environment. Not only IT engineers, but also the long-term residents are interested in the schools. Other international schools for foreign students are expensive and cannot teach Indian culture. R, who has worked in Okachimachi for more than twenty years said, “For me the Indian school was too late, because my son already has spent some years at an international school. If my son were younger, I would have sent him to the Indian school. In Okachi-machi more and more families now want their children to go to the Indian schools, because we want to keep our culture for our children.” The longer-term resident Indians also expect the Indian schools to provide the children with opportunities to learn their ancestral culture. These Indian schools are reflective of the increasing community of Indians in and around Tokyo — the schools are not only for children of IT engineers but children from all Indian homes are able to enrol in these schools. As the families come from all parts of India, the Indian schools are able to provide the space for connecting different Indian communities in and around Tokyo.

CONCLUSION As we have seen, there are many different kinds of Indian communities in Japan, which are based on members’ attributes such as language, religion, occupation, and residence. Yet each community is not completely separated but is fluid and variable. Some include members from other South Asian countries — Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bangladesh, because of the shared connections in

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terms of language, religion, and customs. We cannot help but to think about the coherence and multiplicity of “South Asian” (Shukla 2001). At Indian schools, for example, they may seem to represent their nation-state. Yet, a closer look at the schools reveals the diversity as in “South Asia”. From their communities, we can know that their societies consist of diversity and coherence that is typical of South Asia. In their communities, as in schools and the gurudwara, they try to reproduce their own culture and hand it down to their children. And yet, if there is a continuing influx of Indians to Japan, there is a possibility that the transnational or translocal phenomenon may become more visible in the near future. This is different from the simplified image of “rising India” in globalization. That is to say, people from India living in Tokyo have experienced both globalization and localization through their own experiences in the localized creation of their community in Japan.

Notes 1 2 3

4

5

The Sikh brotherhood instituted by Guru Gobind Singh (Grewal 1990). The singing of hymns from the sacred scriptures of the Sikhs (Grewa 1990). Parshad (the gift of God to his devotees) prepared in an iron bowl (karah). Made of flour, sugar and ghee in equal proportions. Shared at the end of Sikh gatherings to symbolize casteless equality and brotherhood. (Cole and Sambi 1978). The kitchen attached to a gurudwara from which food is served to all regardless of caste or creed (Grewal 1990). From the definitions of “transnational” or “transnationalism”, we can see the Tokyo gurudwara as transnational space.

References Cole, W. Owen and Piara Singh Sambhi. The Sikhs. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978. Grewal, J.S. The Sikhs of the Punjab. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990. Higuchi, N. and K. Tanno, “International Migration and Transborder Culture: The Case of Muslims in Japan”. Social Sciences Research no. 13. Japan: University of Tokushima, 2000. Japan Immigration Association. Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, Edition 1989, 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006.

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Ministry of Justice. Statistics on the Foreigners Registered in Japan, Edition 1986, 1988, 1998, 1999. Sawa, M. and T. Minamino. “Globalization and Indian Community in Japan”. Modern South Asia 6, edited by S. Akita and T. Mizushima. Japan: University of Tokyo Press, 2003. Shukla, S. “Locations For South Asian Diasporas”. Annual Review of Anthropology 30 (2001): 551–72.

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16 THE INDIAN COMMUNITY IN KOBE: DIASPORIC IDENTITY AND NETWORK Yuki Tsubakitani and Masakazu Tanaka INTRODUCTION This chapter, while focusing on links to a wider transnational network, analyses a community of Indians in Kobe, Japan.1 Here, the term “Indians in Kobe” will be used to denote the group of affluent Indians who identify themselves as part of an established Indian community that is centred around Indian organizations in Kobe and Osaka.2 The ethnic Indians included may well be outnumbered by those excluded — so-called “new immigrants” who mainly work for IT industries, and lower classes Indians, some working for Indian restaurants. “Indians in Kobe” is simply a short way of referring to those Indians engaged in the activities of the long-established Indian organizations.

OUTLINE OF THE INDIAN COMMUNITY IN KOBE History Around 1885, in the two major open ports of Kobe and Yokohama, merchants who were predominantly engaged in the cotton and silk textile trade comprised the first Indian communities in Japan. Hardly any Indian migrants came to perform manual labour and the earliest business migrants were exclusively men. 269

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More Indians entered Japan during WWI, when Japanese products were sought to fill gaps in demand that war-torn Europe could not meet. Following the Great Kanto Earthquake in 1923, most of the Indians in Yokohama relocated to Kobe, and the city hosted the largest migrant Indian population in Japan. When the Pacific War broke out, many Indian trading companies fled Japan and Japan–India trade was disrupted until 1948. The economic prosperity of post-war Japan tempted Indian textile merchants to the country once more. In general, post-war Indian merchants have shifted towards importing from India and business interests have diversified into real estate management and trading in electronics, automobiles, sundries, and other goods besides textiles. From the inter-war period until the 1970s, Kobe maintained the largest population of Indian people in Japan. Even so, since the 1980s, its numerical predominance has been waning because of the rapid flow of new migrants into other parts of Japan.

COMPOSITION OF THE COMMUNITY It is difficult to accurately specify the population of the Indian community in Kobe.3 In 1998, The Indian Chamber of Commerce Japan, its office located in the textile trade quarter of Osaka, had 280 members (from 119 companies) stationed in Osaka and Kobe. Meanwhile, in 1998, the India Club had seventy-four families on the rolls and in 1999, the Indian Social Society had fifty-seven corporate members.4 These two organizations located in Kobe, are major clubs for Indians. Since the membership of these organizations to some extent overlap, it can be inferred that the community consists of about 300 households. There are no comprehensive statistics detailing the ethnic composition of the Indian community in Kobe. Tominaga’s research conducted in 1989 found that the largest ethnic group in the Kobe–Osaka area is most likely made up of Sindhi-Hindus (about 130 households), followed by Hindus from Punjab (100), Jains5 from Gujarat (40), Punjabi Sikhs (25), and small numbers of other groups (Tominaga 1995). A number of ethnic organizations have come into being. There are two social clubs for Indians in Kobe: “The India Club” was founded in 1913,6 and the Indian Social Society (ISS) was established in the early 1930s by Sindhi trading companies. The ISS was set up because the India Club prohibited the consumption of alcohol and meat, customs which were favoured by Sindhis. Still today, the ISS is primarily an organization for Sindhis, while Gujaratis prefer the India Club. Even so, twenty-four members, mostly Punjabi, belong

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to both clubs. The two clubs hold joint functions on special occasions such as Deepavali and India Republic Day. Besides the social clubs, temples offer communal space for Indians. There are four Indian temples in Kobe: Guru Nanak Darbar (Sikh);7 Bhagwan Mahavir Swami Jain Temple; the Hindu temple in the ISS;8 and Radha Soami Satsang Beas. In the realm of business, The Indian Chamber of Commerce Japan (ICCJ) was established in 1937. During the inter-war period, a total of 177 companies were listed as members. Between 1958 and 1997, ICCJ membership has seen ups and downs as shown in Figure 16.1. In recent years, the membership has remained at around 130 companies. The ICCJ office is located in central Osaka, close to the business offices of most of its members. It must be noted, however, that most of the Gujarati Jains who deal with gemstones in Kobe do not belong to ICCJ. According to the type of business, the members are classified as follows (ICCJ Trade Directory 1998): thirty-eight companies specialize in textiles (some also deal with sundries); forty deal in textiles and electronics or automobiles or both; fifteen specialize in electronics and two in automobiles (including car parts); eight deal with gemstones; ten are concerned with food and catering; six are real estate agents; two are insurance companies; three are banks; and one is an airline (Air India). The rest do not specify their business interests. Figure 16.1 Fluctuations in ICCJ Membership 250

Persons

200 150 100 50

0 199

0 198

0 197

195 8 196 0

0

Source: ICCJ Annual Report(s), 1958–98.

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CONSTRUCTING LIVING SPACE AND DIASPORIC IDENTITY Closed Nature of Indian Community in Kobe One of the striking features of the Indian community in Kobe is its inward orientation. Except for contact with office employees and domestic helpers, few Indians in Kobe have established close connections with Japanese individuals. In the few marriages between Indian men and Japanese women, severe objections by the groom’s family were reported. In these cases, rather than attempting to bring Japanese influence to the community, the Japanese wives tried to adapt to the life of the Indian community by following the same lifestyle as other Indian wives. Not only the Japanese wives, but even Indian wives have to learn the traditional way of Indians, when they get married to Indians in Kobe. Some wives admit that they had not been familiar with Indian tradition until they married and moved to Kobe. A Sindhi woman in her thirties told me that when she was in Hong Kong, she had known neither the Sindhi language nor how to cook Indian food. After her marriage, she fell in with the domestic culture of her parents-in-law and learned the language and how to prepare the appropriate food. These days, with her child, she listens to Indian music, which she previously did not like. She feels that in Kobe, she should behave as others Indians do. Unlike Korean and Chinese minorities, whose history in Japan was deeply rooted in Japanese colonial domination, affluent Indians are not particularly stigmatized as aliens, even if they stay closed. One informant stated, “I think it is because we are so wealthy and fulfilled that we do not feel the need to interact with Japanese people around us. Because of our wealth, we can preserve our unique lifestyle apart from Japanese society.”

WOMEN’S CAREER It becomes clear that they are not affluent enough to maintain the Indian traditional way of life, when we focus on Indian women’s situation in Japan. A second-generation Sikh man said that Indians in Kobe tend to think that women should stay home and take care of the family. Japan’s high cost of living and wage levels may make a virtue of this necessity: because they cannot afford — as they could in India — full-time domestic servants, the women are occupied with housekeeping and childcare. Furthermore, few companies in Japan are willing to hire an Indian.9 The most common paying occupation for Indian women in Kobe is English

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teaching, but the Japanese do not usually consider Indians to be native speakers. Above all, the homogeneity of the community, with its narrow range of expectations, may be the largest restraint on a woman making a career. A Sindhi woman, previously employed as a doctor in Indonesia, upon marriage moved to Kobe and tried to get a job as an English teacher. Finally, after numerous interviews with various companies, she was offered employment. However, she pleaded, “Don’t tell other Indians that I got a job. They say women shouldn’t work late at night.”

EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS ACTIVITIES For education, almost all the children attend the international school in Kobe, after which the majority go on to college in the United States. An old man recalled, “I used to think it was frightening to send our children to the U.S., but now I think I was wrong.” The trend has definitely changed: as one of the middle-aged fathers commented, “We cannot say no to our kids when every other family agrees to send their kids to America.” Against this, some parents prefer to have their kids educated in India. A Sindhi man with five daughters sent the first three to be educated in the United States. The two youngest girls were sent to a boarding school in India because “They won’t understand India unless they study there.” Members of this largely polyglot group also preserve their mother tongues: a second-generation woman told me that her Bombay-resident mother-inlaw once commented, “It is nice that you can speak Sindhi language while living in Japan.” Religion is considered to be a personal matter. Many Hindus have an altar at home, and regularly practise their religion. The great majority of Jains in Kobe live close to their temple so that they can visit it and pray every morning. Many children accompany their parents to attend services at temples. As they grow older, some spontaneously deepen their religious devotion, while others lose interest.

GLOBAL MARRIAGE NETWORK The inward and sometimes conservative nature of the Indian community in Kobe does not mean that they remain closed to the outside world. Rather, they keep extensive relationships with fellow Indians all over the world. In the diasporic space of the Indian merchant class, more women than

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men migrate out of India. Here, the focus will be on their marriage system, one of the major motors of migration. Most adult Indians in Kobe have found themselves with a spouse in an arranged marriage. This custom is still going strong among the current younger generation with higher education. The marriage network of the Indian diaspora spreads over a vast area that transcends national boundaries. Sub-groups with the same regional and religious affiliations, such as Sindhi, Gujarati Jains and Punjabi Sikhs, form the basis of the global networks of ex-patriot Indians and marriage between different sub-groups is rare. Because of the difficulty of finding a spouse judged to be suitable within the small community in Kobe most families seek overseas for candidate spouses. When travelling overseas for business or leisure, people often exchange information concerning young people of marriageable age. In the global network, India functions as the centre of information exchange. Many weddings are held in India and invitations go out to hundreds of relatives who may live in various parts of the world. These occasions provide opportunities for matchmaking activities. Even if the candidate is not present at the wedding, information about him or her will be disseminated to different parts of the globe. If there is interest, photos are sent, and horoscopes are prepared for dispatch to a Brahman astrologer in India. The parents are also expected to inquire into the prospective partner’s background before any meeting of the young couple. If all goes well, the couple will eventually meet several times either in India or in the country of their residence before they finally decide whether or not they will accept the arrangement. A survey in the current research found that of twenty-nine women brought up in Kobe, the largest number — five Sindhis, one Gujarati, and one Marwari — married into families resident in India. Four Sindhis and two Punjabis went to North America. Other Sindhi women went to Hong Kong, Spain, Dubai, Ghana, and Argentina. The highest proportion of Sikh women may have married to grooms in Thailand, where there is a large Sikh community. The great majority of women marrying grooms in Kobe come from India. Several informants estimated that as many as two hundred Sindhi brides have come from Bombay (Mumbai). Other women hail from Delhi, Bangalore, Madras (Chennai), Indonesia, Hong Kong, Panama, Singapore, Kuwait, and other places. Most wives who came as brides to Kobe admit that they felt some degree of initial loneliness and homesickness. Many assert, however, that they had little hesitation in coming to Japan, and that they experienced little inconvenience in beginning a new life in a distant country. One Punjabi woman recalled how excited she was to come to Japan, “Japan is clean and

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the people are kind. My husband is a well-educated, good person, and he promised to let me visit my family in India frequently.” Many women agreed that acquisition of a driving licence and culinary skills are essential before starting life in Japan. In Japan, with its extremely high labour costs, women cannot rely on drivers, maids, and cooks. Thus, even if they have to stay at home, doing house chores and looking after children, they should be more active than their counterparts in India. Adherence to what is perceived as an unchangeable Indian way of life seems to be a strategy for the survival in the diasporic world. Most Indian women who grow up in Japan marry away to a distant place with little knowledge about what life is like in the new place of residence. Similarly, men customarily accept brides from other countries, including India. With such high mobility of people across national borders, maintenance of similar rules and customs in everyday life would facilitate harmonious relations between newly married couples and allow incomers to soon get along with in-laws and others in the local community. Despite whatever radical cultural changes may have taken place in the country of origin, if expatriates in a diaspora establish and sustain their own standards, it would make it easier to survive in destinations within the diaspora. This is especially true for Indians in Japan, where the community is so much smaller than some other diasporic communities, such as populations of Indians in Britain. This small scale both makes it difficult for its members to locally find suitable spouses of a similar class, ethnicity and religion within their local community and encourages them to activate and strengthen wider ties.

MOBILITY OF INDIANS FROM KOBE Indians do not necessarily stay in Kobe permanently. In recent years the number of Indians, at least among the merchant class, leaving Kobe has exceeded new arrivals. Comparison of the member list of the Indian Social Society 1984, showed twenty-nine names who are not current members of the society. A Sindhi informant aged 62 — one of the oldest Indians in Kobe, knew of the whereabouts of most of these ex-members: eleven people have returned to India and others are known to currently reside in Dubai, Singapore, Hong Kong, Manila, Indonesia, Africa, and North America. For Indians, Kobe has serious disadvantages as a place to live in. Although the excellent infrastructure of the city ensures the comforts of life, many complain about the high cost of living and labour costs. Elderly people prefer to move back to India, both because it is their homeland and because they can afford to employ servants to look after them in their old age. As a 27-year-old

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Sindhi woman put it, “Even if our business does not go well in Japan, we can still have a rich life in another country.” Some people have left Japan owing to declining business, but it is almost impossible for them to cover their tracks. Via networks in the global diaspora, people in Kobe are constantly informed of where their ex-neighbours are and how they are doing.

INDIANS IN KOBE AND THEIR RELATION WITH INDIA Widening Emotional Distance from India About half a century has passed since the peak inflow of Indian merchants came looking for opportunities in the rapidly expanding Japanese economy. Many men of the second-generation are already playing central roles in the family business. After long years of diasporic experience, what does India mean for Indians in Kobe? A questionnaire form was filled out by forty-three Indians and their background data are reported in Tables 16.1 to 16.8 in the Appendix. Table 16.8 shows responses to a 1999 questionnaire item concerning frequency of visits to India. About a half of the respondents said that they visit India more than once a year. While the men often make business trips to India, it is not unusual for women to leave their spouses in Kobe and spend several months in India, at which time their mother or daughter-in-law will take care of the household. It appears, however, that both second-generation and first-generation Indians visit India less and less frequently. Some have not been there for years. One reason is that, as they get older, many have either lost touch with their families and friends in India, or their intimates are no longer there following death or translocation. Another is that, for their children, especially married daughters in distant countries, Kobe is now the home to which they want to return. As time goes on, the locus of family reunions has shifted. One middle-aged man confessed: “To be honest, I don’t feel like going to India now that my mother has passed away. I still have a sister in India, but now I visit her only once in three years.” He prefers annual visits to the United States to see his daughters living there. When asked whether they wish to return to live in India in the future, most people of the first generation replied in the negative. Men are not able to leave Japan as long as they are responsible for the local interests of the family business. Most women prefer to remain in their established life in Kobe, among their many friends and relatives: they know it would be difficult to build up similar human relations even in their home country.

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The frequency of visits to India by individuals of the younger generation varies greatly. In addition, the pull of India may change during a person's life-course. Some men start visiting India every year after taking wives from India. Some women stop staying in India for many months every year, as their children go to school. The Indian community in Japan has become a group apart from native “Indians in India”. Some men, both of the first and second generations, claim that they would not be able to function in the business environment in India. A Sindhi says that he is too used to the “clean” rules of Japanese commerce to survive in the rough-and-tumble world of Indian business. Many people raised in Japan admit that they would not be able to live in India. As a second-generation Sikh puts it, Having been here [in Japan] since childhood, I don't think I can live in India. Of course, when I visit, I feel comfortable there and come back to Japan feeling refreshed. But that’s because I only stay for a week or two. After all, we are treated as guests in India.

A Jain of the second-generation claims, “People often ask me ‘Are you going back to India?’ But I correct them by saying that I don't go back to India, I just go there.” For those young people, although India is perceived as the place where their culture originated, it does not appeal to them as an ideal homeland to go back to. In other words, as a Sikh man observed, India is their country but not their home.

ENDURING TIES WITH INDIA While Indians in Kobe feel distant from India, their motherland still influences aspects of their life. For a start, ties with India are crucial to religious practice. All the altars and statuary in their temples were sent from India. On special occasions, such as Guru Nanak’s birthday, the Sikhs invite musicians from India, which, in effect, assures the legitimacy of the temples and rituals. Rites of passage provide other occasions to reiterate the bond with India. At the birth of a child, people in Kobe ask a Brahman in India to give the newborn a religious name and to cast a horoscope. Weddings, of course, are the occasions when expatriot Indians tend to experience the strongest attachment to their mother country. Most people, whether or not their spouse-to-be is from India or elsewhere, travel to India to prepare for and undergo their wedding. Meanwhile, the weddings of relatives and friends also motivate people to visit India.

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Finally, death completes the connection with the motherland: the ashes of the dead are brought to India and floated on the Ganges. While the emotional attachment to India of expatriate Indians in Kobe could well be waning, because of continuous interaction via telecommunications and the Internet, frequent contact with people from India, and the use of products from India, the life world of expatriates has constant and active links with mother India.

CONCLUSION This chapter has argued that Indians in Kobe have developed a distinctive identity and life world, which is grounded neither in the contemporary circumstances of the place of their cultural origins nor in the host culture that surrounds their current residence. Despite long-term residence in Japan and the determination of many of them to remain there, they have not shown any inclination towards cultural integration into Japanese society. On the other hand, their integration into a transnational network of other Indian expatriates whose residence is spread over the globe, gives them experiences that are different from labour migrants or ethnic groups associated with relocation during the course of Japanese colonial history. While their psychological distance to the actual territory of “India” is ever widening, Indians in Kobe continually use ideas of India as a frame of reference as they create an Indian living environment and life world. This environment influences younger women, who have not experienced the life in India, and enables them to adapt to similar environments elsewhere. Even though most expatriate Indian children undergo Western-style education, they tend not to adopt Western cultural value systems. The majority of the younger generation still comply with the tradition of arranged marriages in matches that pair them with a person of the same ethnic group. Women, after a couple of rendezvous with the betrothed, will bravely leave their hometown for matrimony in an unfamiliar country. People in the Indian community in Kobe have built up diasporic networks of family and acquaintances which support continuous communications across borders. The Indian community in Kobe can be characterized as follows. Firstly, the community maintains high geographic mobility: with people constantly entering and leaving the community, for marriage and in pursuit of better prospects elsewhere, local group membership is not stable. Secondly, Kobe is a space where the distinction between “Indians Overseas” and “Indians from India” becomes vague. While, the community welcomes newcomers from India and other countries as brides or seekers of business

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opportunities, other members leave the community to start a new life elsewhere, including India. The majority of brides come from India to marry men of the second, third, or even fourth generation. This undermines any simple category of generations, a concept that has been central to migrant studies. The diasporic living space and identity constructed by Indians in Kobe do not have roots in any actual territory, rather, they are mobile or transferable to anywhere in the world. Membership of the networks in this diaspora is determined more by the sense of being Indian and belonging to an ethnic group that originated in India than by current relationship to a spatial location. An openness to trans-territorial mobility coupled with a sealing out of local influence and different ethnicity, religion, and class is a distinct feature of the Indian diaspora.

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APPENDIX OF SURVEY DATA Table 16.1 Gender Sex and Marriage Status

Male Female Total

Married

Single

Total

21 12 33

7 3 10

28 15 43

Table 16.2 Age

10s 20s 30s 40s 50s 60s 70s Total

Male

Female

Total

4 3 10 4 4 3 0 28

2 6 3 2 0 1 1 15

6 9 13 6 4 4 1 43

Table 16.3 Regional Origin

Sindhi Punjabi Gujarati Kannadigh Rajasthani Assamese Marathi Total

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M

F

Total

12 9 4 1 1 1 1 28

8 4 3 0 0 0 0 15

20 11 7 1 1 1 1 43

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Table 16.4 Religion Hindu Sikh Jain Soka Gakkai No answer Total

Table 16.5 Nationality 27 7 6 1 2 43

Indian Thai Indonesian Singaporean No answer Total

37 1 1 1 3 43

Table 16.6 Place of Birth India Bombay (Mumbai) Sind Kobe Osaka Bangkok Indonesia Delhi Hong Kong No answer Total

9 8 6 11 1 2 2 1 1 2 43

Table 16.7 Generations

1st generation 2nd generation 3rd generation Wife of 1st gen.10 Wife of 2nd gen. Wife of 3rd gen. Short stay Unknown11 Total

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Sindhi

Punjabi

Gujarati

8 6 1 1 2 1

1 3 3 1 4

2 2 3

Others

4 1 20

12

7

4

Total 11 11 7 2 6 1 4 1 43

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More than once/year Once a year Once in 2 years Once in 3 years Once in 4–5 years Irregular Never No answer Total

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4 9

1 1 1

2

1 gen.

2 2 1 2 11

2 2

2, 3 gen.

Sindhi

2 2

1 gen.

1 10

1

2

1 5

2, 3 gen.

Punjabi

1

2

1 gen.

6

1

1 1 2

2, 3gen.

Gujarati

Table 16.8 Frequency of Visits to India12

4

1

1 2

1 gen.

0

2, 3 gen.

Others

5 13 2 3 3 6 1 9 43

Total

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Notes The substantial part of this chapter was written by Tsubakitani, on her own data. It was rewritten and edited later, and presented by Tanaka at the Rising India Conference in October 2006, who had planned to update it. This plan was, however, discarded because of time constraint. Therefore, the primary authorship goes to Tsubakitani, but due to the subsequent involvement, Tanaka remains the co-author. 1 This chapter is based on an anthropological research conducted between November 1997–June 1998, and October–December 1999 by Tsubakitani. Interviews were conducted at Indian organizations, places of worship, and the offices and households of Indian people. 2 Although the Indian community has two centres — Osaka for business activities, and Kobe for social life — “Indians in Kobe” recognizes that the great majority still reside in Kobe. Most members of the group feel attached to Kobe rather than to Osaka. 3 The Indian community in Kobe excludes some Indian nationals, and some members hold passports other than Indian. Official statistics, which classify foreign residents in Kobe by their nationalities, consequently do not present a true picture. 4 See Tables from 16.1 to 16.7 for details. 5 According to one of our informants, there is only one Hindu family from Gujarat. The rest are all Jains who deal with gems, especially pearls. Few of them are members of the ICCJ. 6 The forerunner of the India Club was the “Oriental Club” founded in 1904 (Tominaga 1994). 7 Not only Sikhs, but also Sindhi Hindu devotees of Guru Nanak, the founder of Sikh religion, are parishioners of the Sikh temple. 8 The same club room is also used by the followers of Sri Sathya Sai Baba for services on Thursdays and Sundays. 9 Most recently, some women have started careers in foreign-affiliated companies. 10 Women who arrived in Japan after marriage are classified as first generation. 11 Born in Kobe, but uncertain of the generation. 12 Wives are classified in the same generation as the husband except those born in Japan.

References (Japanese) Kanatani, Kumao. “Kobe to Indo-jin” [Kobe and Indians]. Nichi-in Bunka 2 (1961): 22–33. Kansai Nichi-in Bunka Kyokai. ———. “Sengo no Kobe to Indo-jin” [Post-war Kobe and Indians]. Nichi-in Bunka 3 (1964): 19–35. Kansai Nichi-in Bunka Kyokai.

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Tominaga, Chizuko. Indo-jin imin-shakai no rekishi to genjo — Yokohama/Tokyo/Kobe/ Okinawa [The History and Present Situations of Indian Migrant Communities — Yokohama/Tokyo/Kobe/Okinawa], pp. 289–95. Japan: Nichi-in Bunka, 1994. ———. Nihon no Indo-jin imin — Rekishi to Genjo [Indian Migrants in Japan — History and Present Situations]. Ajiken World Trend 8 (December 1995/January 1996): 13–15. (English) The Indian Chamber of Commerce. Annual Report. Japan: The Indian Chamber of Commerce Japan, 1958–1997. ———. Directory. Japan: The Indian Chamber of Commerce Japan, 1998.

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CAMBODIA, LAOS AND VIETNAM

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17 RISING INDIA AND INDIANS IN CAMBODIA, LAOS AND VIETNAM Sudhir Devare INTRODUCTION Among the countries of Southeast Asia, the three Indochina countries have the least number of Indians. Interestingly these countries were exposed to the Indian culture as early as the beginning of the Christian era, though their contact with India had declined after the thirteenth century. Today, the situation of the Indian communities in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos presents a contrasting study. While these countries and India have enjoyed close political relations throughout the period of their independence and extended to each other the fullest diplomatic support in their respective needy hours, the size of the Indian communities or their influence in all three countries is very small. Ironically, during the colonial period the Indian communities were sizeable. After the communist victory in 1975 in Vietnam and the reunification of North and South Vietnam when India-Vietnam relations began to strengthen further, there was an exodus of Indians from Vietnam and Laos. Very few of them returned to resume their business or professional activity. In Cambodia, a large number of Indians left after the coup in 1971 and did not return even when India recognized the Cambodian regime in 1980 after the Vietnamese occupation. There are two groups of Indians in these countries. Those from the pre1975 days and the other from the post-1975 period. The former are now very 287

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few. Today the Indian presence in Indochina countries has little to do with the Indian communities which lived there in the nineteenth and twentieth century French period. The Indians one sees and meets in Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia are those who have come here in the last ten to fifteen years or even more recently. They are mostly connected with the emerging India and seem to represent the enterprise and energy that young Indian businessmen and professionals are showing everywhere to explore new areas and markets.

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND As we speak of the Indian communities in today’s Vietnam, Cambodia or Laos, it will be instructive to briefly look at the historical background of India’s presence in these countries as Indochina is one of the regions where the Indian civilization had reached as early as the first century A.D. The Indianization of Southeast Asia, referred to by Western scholars as “Farther India”1 was a saga which lasted for more than a millennium in which Indian religion, art, architecture, dance forms, literature, etc., left an indelible imprint. In the kingdoms of Champa (central and south Vietnam), Funan (Cambodia), parts of Laos and Thailand during the Dvaravati and Lopburi period, the fusion between the Indian and local cultures was clearly evident. Indian Brahmins and Kshatriyas are said to have married local princesses. The concept of devaraja (Godking) and the structure of administration derived from it formed the ruling pattern in these countries. The temples of Angkor Wat in Cambodia, the wats (temples) of Laos and the monuments in Vietnam bear witness to the rich backdrop of the Indianization of this region in ancient times. While the early Indian immigrants contributed immensely to every aspect of the society in these countries, the ones who came from India in the nineteenth century were mainly driven by their colonial experience and difficult economic circumstances in India. Many of them were from the French colonies such as Pondicherry, Mahe and Karaikal, and were middle or low-ranking civil servants. There were petty traders, moneylenders and brokers, textile merchants, barbers, tailors etc. A majority of them were from South India though there were also Sindhi and Gujarati businessmen. Among them, there were both Hindus and Muslims. Many of the latter married local women in Vietnam or Laos and had large families and chose to stay on throughout the turbulent times. The Chettiar community of moneylenders exercised considerable influence (though not always goodwill) over the local population. The Chettiars also built impressive temples in Saigon (now Ho Chi Minh City). Now there are hardly any Chettiar businessmen left in Vietnam or Laos.

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According to the census of 1937,2 there were some 6,000 “Asiatic foreigners”; 3,000 of whom lived in Cambodia, 2,000 in Cochin China (South Vietnam) and the rest in north Vietnam and Laos. The numbers mentioned by Indians3 about the Indian population in pre-1975 years broadly tallies with the above though there were some estimates of a much higher figure for Saigon and about 2,000 for Laos. Why and how most of them left their adopted homes is an unfortunate story. In Saigon, following the communist victory, a number of Indian properties were seized. There was a general fear about the communist regime. Till then there was free enterprise. Very few of the confiscated properties were released and compensation cases went on for years. Foreigners were discouraged from staying on. Those who left could not come back easily due to visa restrictions. In contrast to the Indians, some other nationalities, like the Koreans came back. In Laos, Indian businessmen were not directly asked to leave. However, the compensation offered for the seized properties was very low — sixteen per cent of the assets’ value. Furthermore, there were restrictions on remittances abroad. As a result the Indians found it difficult to keep their families in India or elsewhere while continuing to live in Laos. In Cambodia, on the other hand, the situation after the coup in 1971 became unstable which made Indians to leave. There are sordid stories of those who remained. Several tried to flee the country when the Khmer Rouge took over. Those who were wealthy could fly to Bangkok. However, the ones who tried to go by buses, cars, etc. were stopped at the border and sent back to be eliminated by the Pol Pot.

Contemporary Position Vietnam As stated above, in the modern times Indians came to Vietnam around the end of the nineteenth century. There were four to five types of Indians: officials from the French colonies in India; business communities like the Chettiyars and Muslims from South India; unskilled workers from South India; Sindhi and Gujarati merchants from Bombay and Sikhs as security guards. According to Dr Ton Nu Quynh Tran,4 Director, Centre for Urban and Development Studies, Ho Chi Minh City who has conducted research for many years on the Indian community in Vietnam, there were about 1,000 Indians in Saigon in the 1950s. Of them, about 400 were from the French colonies in India and the others from Bombay. Those from Bombay were mainly Sindhi and Gujarati textile merchants who owned many shops in Saigon. The Indians from Bombay had formed an association of merchants.

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These people also opened shops in Vientiane, Phnom Penh, etc. The Chettiars were engaged in moneylending, renting of buildings, vehicles, boats etc. They could not extract much money when the regime changed in the 1950s. Many of them married local Vietnamese women even though they had wives in India. They started going back since the early 1960s as the political situation in Vietnam became more unstable and violence increased. Another group of Indians who came from South India was that of Muslims. They built many mosques in the 1930s. Even today, a number of Indian Muslims live around these mosques in the centre of the city. There was another group of Indians, namely, the Sikhs who came mainly as security guards. They built a gurudwara (temple) in Saigon. After 1975, when most of them left there was no one to take care of it. Today the premises of the gurudwara is an office dealing with pharmaceuticals. The population through the 1950s and 1960s would have been around 3,000–4,000 persons. They lived through the political turmoil that took place in Vietnam. The Indian government’s policy towards South or North Vietnam did have some effect on their welfare; for example, when India invited in 1970 Madame Nguyen Thi Binh, the Foreign Minister of the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, there were demonstrations against the Indian consulate in South Vietnam and Indian shops and properties were attacked. However, it can be said that generally, the local authorities did not come in the way of the Indians’ business or other activities. After 1975, however, there was an exodus from Saigon. Various reasons are mentioned for this unfortunate development. According to an Indian businessman, Indian traders were doing well in the non-communist regime controlled by the Americans. They were in money exchange, importexport, textiles, etc. When the communists took over in 1975, there was a great sense of insecurity especially about their properties. Following nationalization, private properties were seized without any clear indication of their return or payment of compensation. Several Indians wished to leave, for whom the Indian government arranged Air India flights. Except for many Indian Muslims who managed to stay on, a large number of Indian families left. Of those who left, very few returned later on. The number of Indian professionals and businessmen who came in the last decade is not comparable to those who left earlier. Today, there are very few, just about 100 families of Indians from pre-1975 days remaining in Vietnam. Many of these are of Indian-Vietnamese origin as a number of Indians had married Vietnamese women. A number of accounts of the travails of the Indian population can still be heard from members of the Indian community in Ho Chi Minh City.

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The Indian community had several properties, in Saigon as well as in other towns like Danang, Dalat, Hue, etc. Today in Saigon there are 5–6 Hindu temples which are places of practising worship. After the communist takeover, these temples were closed and their premises were used as warehouses, party workers’ camp, etc., till the early 1990s. The oldest temple of Subramanyam Swami, the Mariamman Temple and the Thandayuthapani Temple are centrally located, beautiful buildings. They have become important and impressive landmarks on the cultural map of Ho Chi Minh visited by Indians and Vietnamese, and foreign tourists. According to the priest of the Mariamman Temple,5 it was mainly due to the intervention of a Vietnamese trading company that the Mariamman Temple, (and other temples as well) was handed over to the Indians for religious practice. Today a Ho Chi Minh City government committee (Religious Department) administers the temple. It was interesting to see that local Vietnamese (who are mainly Buddhists) far outnumber the Indians as devotees. The priests and their sons do not know any Indian language now nor do they have any links with India. Yet they seemed to follow Sanskrit or Tamil texts in the worship at the temples. As in the case of the temples, so also with the Indian mosques, the Indian traditions appear to be kept up. Jamia Muslim Mosque in the heart of Ho Chi Minh stands out for its Indian architecture and size. The elderly Imam of the mosque proudly said that this mosque is the “property of India”. A brief reference to another community, which is strictly not Indian but has an age-old connection with India, namely the Chams. Their number would be around 300,000. They were originally from the Kingdom of Champa which flourished in central and southern Vietnam centuries ago. The Chams are mostly Muslims, but there are also Hindus. There are two types among them; one is Bani Chams who worship both Koran as well as Hindu scriptures, the other is Balamom Chams who follow Brahmanical Hindu practices including ancestral worship. Both celebrate the Karte (Kartik) festival on 21 October which broadly coincides with the Deepavali festival in India. In Ho Chi Minh City, there is also a place which commemorates Mahatma Gandhi for whom the Vietnamese have high respect. The works of Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru and Rabindranath Tagore are being taught in the Vietnamese schools. The Indian Vietnamese from the pre-1975 period are generally happy that their economic conditions and quality of life has improved substantially since the Vietnam government adopted the Doi Moi (economic reforms) programme. They recall their plight when there was no adequate electricity

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or water supply, no proper roads or telecommunications and proudly express satisfaction that their government is now following open, market-oriented policies which would make Vietnam the next economic “tiger”. The India-Vietnam friendly relationship, which goes back to the days of Ho Chi Minh and Jawaharlal Nehru, has given an impetus to the growing economic and technical cooperation between the two countries, especially in the past decade or so. This has resulted in an increasing number of Indian professionals, entrepreneurs, businessmen coming to Vietnam and staying mainly in the cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh. In Hanoi, there are about 100 Indians working in representative firms of Indian pharmaceutical companies, Vietnam-India joint ventures, sugar industry, foreign-owned tea companies, trading companies as well as in middle-and senior-level managerial posts in the World Bank, UN bodies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) etc. About forty per cent of these Indians are engineers. In Ho Chi Minh City, the Indian community has grown to over 450 in a short span of time. A few Indian investment projects like the Oil Natural Gas Corporation oil and gas exploration project offshore of Vung Tan (100 kilometres east of Ho Chi Minh City) are in operation which employ Indian engineers and technicians. Some major Indian companies like Godrej, the Nagrjuna Group, KCP Group have investments in Vietnam. Being a major pharmaceutical exporter in Vietnam, India has twenty representative offices in the country. Ranbaxy, a leading Indian company, has set up a production unit. Besides, Indian software companies like APTECH, NIIT, Tata Infotech have set up IT training centres in Ho Chi Minh City. There are also many Indian restaurants. The Indian business community in Vietnam has established an Indian Chamber of Commerce (INCHAM) since 1999. There is no other Indian association in Vietnam. The president of the chamber, who represents a leading Indian pharmaceutical company, and the vice-president, who runs Indian restaurants in Ho Chi Minh City, told the author that the picture of the Indian presence had changed drastically in the last ten years or so when reputed Indian companies started coming to Vietnam for investment.6 Companies like the Godrej steel products or the Nagarjuna sugar factory were doing well. The latter had also opened a management school where training was provided in English as well as in Vietnamese. In the past, India had provided to the Vietnamese technical and training facilities in rice cultivation (India had helped set up a Rice Institute in Vietnam) and corn cultivation which the Vietnamese continue to appreciate. According to the office bearers of INCHAM, Indian companies interested in investing in or doing business with Vietnam have to be thoroughly competitive as the

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Vietnamese Government does not allow import of technology which is more than five years old and as a result, goods produced in Vietnam are modern and competitive. Indian immigration to Vietnam in the last decade or so has been mainly of professionals from a number of fields. It is no more restricted to a few parts of India as was the case in the late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Today there are Indian managers, technocrats, engineers, businessmen from several states of India. If Indian investments were to increase in different sectors in Vietnam for which there seemed considerable scope, the number of Indian professionals would correspondingly increase. Indian labour or blue-collar workers are however, unlikely to come to Vietnam in any sizeable number as the wages in Vietnam are still low and not attractive enough especially compared with the neighbouring countries like Thailand or Malaysia.

Cambodia In Cambodia too, there was a sizeable Indian community before 1975. There were large numbers of Sindhi and Gujaratis besides persons from South India in services. Most of the businessmen left in the wake of the turmoil that followed the coup against King Sihanouk in 1971. After the Khmer Rouge victory in 1975, a number of Indian nationals had taken refuge in the French embassy from where they, along with other foreigners, were evacuated to Thailand. The Khmer Rouge had made it known that foreigners had no place in Cambodia. A number of Indians suffered atrocities of the Pol Pot rule. By the end of the 1970s there were practically no Indians left in Cambodia. It was around the mid-1990s that Indian business representatives and professionals began coming back to Cambodia as political conditions gradually improved. Today, Indians in Cambodia are mainly in pharmaceuticals, garments, IT and water and irrigation related field. Nearly fifty per cent of Cambodia’s budget is met through aid from abroad and there are a number of finance agencies including micro-finance organizations present in the country in which a few Indians are working. Through such micro-credit companies the influence of moneylenders is gradually reducing in the countryside of Cambodia. There are also several NGOs active in Cambodia where a number Indians are present. Textile merchants from India are now only a handful and one textile shop could be located in the Olympic market of Phnom Penh. According to the Indian shopkeeper who hails from Gorakhpur, Uttar Pradesh in India, well-placed Cambodians and their wives visit the shop for quality textiles including some varieties from India. For them, such textiles were more important than even gold. The number of Gorakhpuris who sell items

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such as mosquito nets and also provide various services in the countryside of Cambodia is sizeable. Indian pharmaceutical companies have found in Cambodia a good market, even though it is relatively very small and highly competitive especially vis-a-vis French and Chinese products. Nearly forty per cent of market share is now with Indian companies which number close to thirty-five or more. They are gearing themselves to the ASEAN code on drugs which is to come in practice in Cambodia from 2008. Indians also see good prospects in the area of healthcare which is currently lacking in Cambodia. An Indian hospital is currently having discussions with the Cambodian authorities to set up a hospital in Cambodia. Doctors from India have organized eye-care camps in the countryside. Healthcare training centres with Indian help are also under discussion. In the field of water supply and irrigation, Indian companies are actively engaged. Mobile diesel pumps provided by the Kirloskars, an Indian company, helped to mitigate the drought problem. The same company has offered assistance in the mining sector. One Indian company has supplied 6,000 water hand-pumps. WAPCOS, an Indian public sector consultancy organization is engaged in an irrigation project at Siem Reap. Indian companies are also looking for investments in sugar plantation. A large investment in Cambodia is a garment production unit of a company owned by a Sindhi businessman from Indonesia. An Indian IT company, NIIT, has opened kiosks at five to six places where Internet facilities are available. Indian assistance in restoring the Angkor temple, Ta Phrom, has been made available by stationing on a long-term basis a team of experts from the Archaeological Survey of India which had made major renovation to the main Angkor Wat temple in the 1990s. The Entrepreneurial Development Centre, recently set up with the Indian government’s assistance, is another facility where Cambodian and Indian technicians and management experts are working together to provide training to the Cambodians. The story of an Indian family from Orissa which has made Cambodia their home and which is engaged in educating Cambodians at the university level is instructive of the keen interest of young Cambodians to receive higher education and the respect which the Cambodians have for Indians as teachers. Curiously, the age-old tradition of accepting teachers from India seems to continue even today. Indian companies in Cambodia, as indeed in Vietnam and Laos, find the Chinese economic thrust in the region a major challenge. So far they have found it difficult to remain competitive.

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India and Cambodia have enjoyed traditional friendship. The two have close political relations. The Indian community in Cambodia has set up an Indian social-cultural organization which has nearly 200 members. They hold Indian cultural events for which they also invite artists from India. There are no Indian temples of worship in Cambodia. This is no doubt ironical in the country of Angkor Wat and Bayon.

Laos As in the neighbouring Vietnam and Cambodia, Indians came to Laos too in search of business opportunities in textiles, jewellry, forest products, etc. A number of them had moved from North Vietnam in the 1950s after the French defeat in Vietnam. Two figures were mentioned about the likely number of Indians in Laos in the 1950s and 1960 — 4,000 or 2,000. There were Sindhi and Gujarati businessmen and Indian Muslims mainly from Tamil Nadu. After Pathet Lao’s victory in 1975 and the formation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, most Indians gradually left Laos. An Indian businessman in Vientiane pointed out that they were not asked by the authorities to leave, but the restrictive conditions including nationalization of private properties with very little compensation (sixteen per cent of the assets’ value) made it very difficult for the Indians to stay on. According to one Indian who now runs a jewellry shop and a restaurant, the authorities did not allow any remittance; as a result he could not support his children’s education in India and therefore returned to India. He returned to Laos in the 1990s and later on his sons who had studied in India and the Caribbean also joined him. Unlike them, however, not many returned to resume their business. Some of the Muslim jewellers had stayed on and their shops are still prominent. These businessmen are in close touch with developments in Tamil Nadu in India where their families hold large properties. Today, there are about 150 Indians in Vientiane. There are a few families in the towns of Savannakhet, Pakse, and Champasak. In the Morning Market of Vientiane, which is the main trading centre, there are hardly any shops of Indians. The number of Pakistani textile shopkeepers is relatively much bigger. There are also a few Bangladeshi traders in this market. There is an assortment of Indians in the country. The Kirloskars, a leading water pump company from India, have three service centres. They supplied a large quantity of pumps over the past seven to eight years. Their contribution to the enhanced rice production as well as for flood control is much acknowledged in Laos. There are only a couple of Indian pharmaceutical companies represented

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in the country. The pharmaceutical companies stationed in Vietnam or Cambodia find the Laos market too small. The Thakrals, a large business house of Singapore have an office in Vientiane. Three Indian army officers work on deputation with the Lao government providing English language training. An Indian engineer works in a senior position in the Lao Telecom. He stressed the close ties between Laos and Thailand in practically every field including business. Electric power which will be generated in Laos in large quantity will be bought mainly by Thailand. For Indians in Laos (or Cambodia) too, Thailand is usually the entry point. There is no Indian association in Laos. There are no temples. There is a mosque at which South Asian Muslims worship. The Entrepreneurial Development Centre set up with the Indian government’s assistance in 2004 has proven to be very popular with the Laotians. The Government of India has provided computers, modules of training programmes and an advisor on deputation. A number of Laotians are already beginning to start small business units after completing their training course. Indian businessmen are nowadays coming to Laos in increasing numbers to explore the market for wood and forestry products, minerals, gems and jewels, pharmaceuticals, and IT. Birlas, a leading business group from India, has taken on a long lease more than 50,000 hectares for eucalyptus cultivation in southern Laos. It is planned that the pulp will be used in a rayon plant to be set up in Laos with an estimated investment of US$300 million over the next few years. There is considerable goodwill for India in Laos. Political relations have continued to be excellent. This should augur well for better business prospects between India and Laos.

INDIA’S RISE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE INDIAN COMMUNITIES IN VIETNAM, CAMBODIA AND LAOS As described above, the number of Indians in Indochina countries from the pre-1975 days is greatly reduced now. Despite close understanding and cordial political relations between India and these countries throughout the past five decades, the effect on the level of economic and commercial activity or the strength of Indians in those countries was small. Against this background, the changing picture of India which is now a rapidly emerging economy is beginning to have an impact, albeit still limited, in this region. The Indian missions in these countries work closely with Indian business organizations promoting trade and commerce, and are trying to translate into action the priority which India has attached to economic

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cooperation with the CLMV countries (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). The Indian industry’s competitiveness in quality and price in IT, pharmaceuticals, sugar, engineering goods, etc., and services like healthcare, education, finance, training in SMEs, etc., is finding ready acceptability and market. India’s emphasis on the knowledge-based fields is well respected. Indian investments in small measure in some of these fields are beginning to be made in these countries. As the Indian economy grows further, more investments from India would be expected by these countries which will create better opportunities for trade and business. Today, these countries receive financial support and foreign direct investment from everywhere. China’s rapidly growing economic presence looms large in all these countries. Unless India is competitive in this regard, the political goodwill that exists for India will not last long. Tourism from India can bring an important dimension of cooperation between India and this region. As of now, there is little traffic of Indian tourists who currently seem to travel in large numbers all over the world. Given the attractive destinations in Indochina for Indian tourists, there is a considerable potential for the promotion of tourism. Cities in Vietnam like Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City, or Angkor Wat in Cambodia or Luang Prabang in Laos can also equal the popularity that exists for many other Southeast or East Asian places among Indian tourists. Rising India would expectedly interact very closely with these countries in India’s extended neighbourhood, thereby reviving the age-old links that characterized the contacts between the two since ancient times.

Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

George Coedes, “Introduction”, in The Indianized States of Southeast Asia (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1968), p. xvi. Nayan Chanda, “Indians in Indochina” from the book entitled, Indian Communities in Southeast Asia, edited by K.S. Sandhu and A. Mani, first published by ISEAS in 1993, p. 32. During the author’s meetings with members of the Indian communities in Ho Chi Minh City, Phnom Penh and Vientiane in October 2006. Author’s interview with Dr Ton Nu Quynh Tran, Director, Centre for Urban and Development Studies, Ho Chi Minh City, in October 2006. Author’s meeting with the chief priest of the Mariamman Temple in Ho Chi Minh City in October 2006. Author’s meeting with the president and vice-president of the Vietnam-India Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Ho Chi Minh City in October 2006.

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KOREA

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18 INDIANS IN KOREA Narayanan Kannan KOREA, ESSENTIAL BACKGROUND Korea is located in Eastern Asia, bordering Russia, China and Japan between the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan. Korea was an independent kingdom for much of the past millennia. Following its victory in the Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan occupied Korea; five years later it formally annexed the entire peninsula. After World War II, a Republic of Korea (ROK) was set up in the southern half of the Korean Peninsula while a communist-style government was installed in the north (the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea — DPRK). During the Korean War (1950–53), U.S. troops and UN forces fought alongside soldiers from the ROK to defend South Korea from DPRK attacks, supported by China and the Soviet Union. An armistice was signed in 1953, splitting the peninsula along a demilitarized zone at about the 38th parallel. Thereafter, South Korea achieved rapid economic growth with per capita income rising to roughly fourteen times the level of North Korea. In 1993, Kim Yo’ng-sam became South Korea’ first civilian president following thirty-two years of military rule. South Korea today is a fully functioning modern democracy. In June 2000, a historic first North-South summit took place between the South’s President Kim Dae-jung and the North’s leader Kim Jong Il. The population of ROK, according to July 2006 estimation, is 48.8 million and DPRK is 22.7 million (2004 survey).1 Since the early 1960s, the Republic of Korea has achieved rapid economic growth, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as the “Miracle on the Han 301

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River” and emerged as one of the leading industrial and trading powers, which have turned it into a major factor of political and economic stability of Asia. An outward-oriented economic development strategy, which used exports as the engine of growth, contributed greatly to the radical economic transformation of South Korea. The areas of strongest development have been shipbuilding, semiconductors and consumer electronics, the automobiles, textiles and steel. Today ROK’s GDP per capita is comparable to the economies of the European Union. From 1962 to 2004, South Korea’s Gross National Income (GNI) increased from US$2.3 billion to US$777 billion in 2004, with its per capita GNI increasing to about US$14,162 last year. South Korea is today the eleventh-largest economy in the world. The country is now focusing on knowledge based economic development model with emphasis on biotechnology, nano-technology, IT, environmental technology, etc. Moderate inflation, low unemployment and an export surplus characterize the South Korean economy today.2 North Korea’s (DPRK) overall economic performance remains unimpressive (see Figure 18.2). Agricultural production has fallen sharply and famine is possible. While there is some evidence of growth in the non-farm sector, North Korea’s economic performance will be marginal at best without more decisive DPRK actions to implement a free market economic strategy. While continued donor largess is needed to keep the economy afloat, IMF and World Bank advice and assistance is also needed to move the DPRK economy in the right direction.4 Relations between India and DPRK have been generally characterized by friendship, cooperation and understanding. As members of the Non-Aligned Movement, there is a commonality of views between the two on many international issues, for example, disarmament, South-South cooperation, etc. Both sides continue to work closely at international fora and support each other on various issues of bilateral and international interests. However, bilateral trade between India and DPRK has declined during the recent past mainly due to the latter’s inability to carry on foreign trade due to financial crunch. India’s export to DPRK has fallen from US$170 million in 2001–02 to US$115.35 million in 2003–04. India’s import from DPRK also fell from US$19 million in 2001–02 to US$1.07 million in 2003–04. In 2002–03, India’s exports to DPRK stood at US$157.86 million and goods worth US$4.66 million were imported from DPRK. The Indian presence in DPRK is minimal, according to the embassy of India in DPRK. Only two persons from India and one person of Indian origin have been working in UN missions in Pyongyang. Hence, this chapter will focus more on the ROK where Indian presence is visible and the bilateral trade is extremely healthy.5

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Figure 18.1 Asia and the Location of Korea in Asia

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