Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand 9811514380, 9789811514388

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Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand Edited by Chosein Yamahata · Sueo Sudo Takashi Matsugi

Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand

Chosein Yamahata  •  Sueo Sudo Takashi Matsugi Editors

Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand

Editors Chosein Yamahata Graduate School of Policy Studies Aichi Gakuin University Nisshin, Japan

Sueo Sudo Faculty of Political Science Thammasat University Bangkok, Thailand

Takashi Matsugi Nagoya University Nagoya, Japan

ISBN 978-981-15-1438-8    ISBN 978-981-15-1439-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-­01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

To those who are working on transformations of all kinds to make societies freer, communities more prosperous and individuals more empowered. May your pursuit of just rights and good opportunities towards building an equal, stable and peaceful environment, particularly in India, Myanmar and Thailand, prevail and may it never cease. Chosein Yamahata Sueo Sudo Takashi Matsugi 10 December 2018

Foreword

There has never been a greater need for creative, interdisciplinary scholarship in the field of South Asian and Southeast Asian studies. The reasons for this are clear. Globalization has eroded geographical and regional boundaries, bringing with it the opportunities that come from advanced communication, information and transportation technologies. At the same time, globalization has brought challenges—climate change, pandemics, migration, financial market instability and international crime— that are truly transnational in nature and scope. The result, for scholars who wish to engage with the real issues that affect people’s lives and shape their communities, is a clarion call to abandon rigid disciplinary frameworks that are inadequate to the task of identifying problems, let alone interpreting data, predicting consequences and proposing solutions. What is required is methodological pluralism, flexible comparative research, multidimensional approaches and, above all, a willingness to build academic bridges. The call to broaden research frameworks has been accompanied by another, seemingly contradictory, imperative. Over the last decade, what has become increasingly obvious is that globalization and its consequences have intensified, rather than diminished, the need to pay attention to context, history and local knowledge in framing and understanding problems. Globalization has proven to be less of a homogenizing force than at first anticipated: communities, nations, states and regions are responding differently to its challenges. Therefore, alongside attention to transnational and transcultural processes, interconnectedness and interdependencies, vii

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there is a continuing need for highly specific, informed knowledge, with a focus on the particularistic nature of culture and context. Given these dual and overlapping concerns, the editors of this collection of chapters faced significant challenges. On the one hand, their goal was to encourage scholars from across a broad range of disciplines to address pressing empirical questions with sensitivity to the particularistic nature of problems. The questions asked are diverse in nature. For example: How does geography affect urban social resilience in India? What is the relationship between democratization and the treatment of religious and ethnic minorities in Myanmar? How do policies around political communication and social media influence people’s freedom in Thailand? On the other hand, the editors aimed to bring to the fore the commonalities that underpin issues around development, social cohesion, political stability, rights and equality, human security and environmental precariousness. The overarching ambition was to provoke innovative and flexible thinking about potential responses to problems common in India, Myanmar and Thailand—and by extension, further afield. The editors of this volume of collected chapters have been remarkably successful in their endeavour. The comparative aspect of this project, which is implicit rather than explicit, provides a space for illuminating dialogue between scholars from a diverse range of disciplines and area specializations. The result is a work which will contribute to building resilient, dynamic communities. In terms of scholarship, this work demonstrates that minute attention to temporal and spatial contexts can successfully be coupled with a comparative conceptual frame to produce a result that is fascinating and fruitful, lighting the way to new avenues for understanding problems and broader horizons for crafting solutions. The editors allow us to see existing problems through a new lens and to reassess our range of options for addressing the resulting picture which emerges. Readers now have a new set of frameworks, languages, concepts and theoretical apparatus to make sense of what they see, both in Asia and beyond. Sydney, Australia 24 January 2019

Catherine Renshaw

Acknowledgements

We are deeply grateful to the Science Research Promotion Fund 2016–2017 (Gakujyutsu Kenkyuu Shinkou Shikin), Daiko Foundation 2017–2018 (Daiko Zaidan), Heiwa Nakajima Foundation under Aid for Scientific Research with the Asian Region 2017–2018 (Heiwa Nakajima Zaidan, Ajia Chiiki Jyuuten Kenkyuu Josei) and Japan Society for Promotion of Science (JSPS KAKENHI) 2017–2020 Grant Number 17K02048 for generously providing the grants for our action research projects in interdisciplinary area studies. We thank the counterpart institutes and individuals working with us in promoting the Academic Diplomacy Project through the networks of the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF), Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC) and Euro-Asia Roundtable (EAR). Beyond this, so many debts have accrued over time that we have worked on the Academic Diplomacy Book Project Series to be a reality that will be continued after this book. Even without acknowledging the list of individuals for our heartfelt gratitude, we still have the privilege of working with such wonderful, dynamic, generous, academic and real-world communities.

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Acknowledgements

On behalf of the contributors and the participants, we express our greatest appreciation for those participating in this second book of the Academic Diplomacy Project. Chosein Yamahata Makiko Takeda Coordinators

26 December 2018

Contents

1 Crossing Borders in South and Southeast Asia: Assessing Existing Problems through a New Lens  1 Chosein Yamahata, Sueo Sudo, and Takashi Matsugi 2 Addressing Urban Poverty through Empowerment and Inclusion in India 15 Binayak Choudhury 3 Development Efforts towards Ecological Sustainability in Calcutta: Transformation of a Metropolis 31 Souvanic Roy 4 De facto State Religion as a Threat to Freedom of Religion and Belief: Case Study of Ethnic Chin Christians in Burma/Myanmar 47 Khen Suan Khai 5 Escalation of Ethno-Cultural Tensions in Southern Thailand in the Midst of Assimilation and Homogenisation 61 Takashi Tsukamoto

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6 The Rakhine (Arakan) Buddhists: A Little Known Minority in Myanmar 89 Donald M. Seekins 7 Promotion of Women’s Rights in ASEAN: Myanmar Women’s Organisations for Sustainable Unity in Diversity105 Makiko Takeda and Chosein Yamahata 8 Online Political Parody in Thailand: Political Communication under the Computer Crime Act (No.2) 2017141 Pimonpan Chainan 9 Japanese Development Assistance, Geopolitics, and “Connectivity” in the Mekong Region: Implications for Aid to Myanmar151 David M. Potter 10 Japan’s Mekong Policy and Myanmar: Complementing a Viable Strategic Partnership173 Sueo Sudo 11 Arch-Royalist Autocracy Unlimited: Civil-­Military Relations in Contemporary Thailand193 Paul Chambers 12 Basics of Human Security, Principles of Democracy and Reality of Transition: Implications for Myanmar219 Chosein Yamahata Index263

Notes on Contributors

Pimonpan Chainan  is a lecturer and an associate dean at the Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Thailand. Chainan is one of the key members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Paul Chambers  is a lecturer and advisor for International Affairs at the College of ASEAN Community Studies, Naresuan University, Thailand. He is a research fellow at both the German Institute of Global Area Studies (GIGA) in Hamburg, Germany, and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF) in Frankfurt, Germany. He is also editor of the Routledge (SCOPUS) journal Asian Affairs: An American Review. Binayak Choudhury  is a professor at the Department of Planning, The School of Planning and Architecture Bhopal, Bhopal, India. He is actively contributing to the activities of the Academic Diplomacy Project and activating necessary studies and enlarging the network as well as widening the opportunity to reach the ground in India. Khen Suan Khai  is a lecturer at the School of Social Innovation Mae Fah Luang University, Thailand. He currently chairs Mekong Program under Asian Research Center for International Development. Takashi Matsugi  is an emeritus professor at Nagoya University. His specialization in teaching and research covers econometrics, urban and rural economics and development studies. Matsugi was the chief editor of the POSDI working paper series initiated in 2003 and also one of the xiii

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facilitating patrons for the 1st Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF 1) organized in March 2009 in Nagoya. David M. Potter  is a professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, at Nanzan University. Potter is one of the key members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) since their launch. He teaches at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, as an adjunct professor. Catherine  Renshaw is a professor in the School of Law at Western Sydney University. She teaches public international law and international human rights law. Renshaw has a particular research focus on human rights and democratization in Southeast Asia. Her books include Human Rights and Participatory Politics in Southeast Asia (2019), Nonsense on Stilts? Rescuing Human Rights in Australia (2019) and Experts, Networks and International Law (2017). Her work on transitional justice in Myanmar include: ‘Myanmar’s Genocide and the Legacy of Forgetting,’ in the Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law (2020), ‘Poetry, Irrevocable Time and Myanmar’s Political Transition,’ in the International Journal of Transitional Justice (2020) and ‘Myanmar’s Transition without Justice,’ in the Journal of Contemporary Southeast Asian Studies (2020). Renshaw is a senior visiting fellow at the University of New South Wales, where she is involved in the Australia Myanmar Constitutional Democracy Project, and a senior visiting fellow at the PM Glynn Institute at Australian Catholic University, where she served as deputy head of the Thomas More Law School. Souvanic  Roy is a professor and former head at the Department of Architecture, Town and Regional Planning and a founder and director, School of Ecology, Infrastructure and Human Settlement Management Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology (IIEST), India. Roy is one of the core members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). Donald M. Seekins  is an emeritus professor of Southeast Asian Studies at Meio University, Okinawa, Japan, and Adjunct Professor of History at the University College of the University of Maryland. His most recently

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published works include State and Society in Modern Rangoon (2011) and the second edition of The Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar) (2017). Seekins lectures for occasional academic events in the Burma/ Myanmar Lecture Series organized at Aichi Gakuin University, Japan, and is a co-founder of the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) initiated in 2009. He has since been one of the active advisors of the Academic Diplomacy Project. Sueo Sudo  is a professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Thailand. Sudo is a foreign policy expert who teaches at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. He has also been teaching at the Graduate School of Policy Studies at Aichi Gakuin University as an adjunct professor since 2014. Sudo worked as a professor at Nanzan University and Saga University. He is a co-­founder of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR). Makiko Takeda  is an assistant professor at the Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. She has been the convener, founding member and Secretary of academic networks launched from Japan, ­including the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC), Euro-Asia Roundtable (EAR) and Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF) since 2014, while also coordinating the activities for the Academic Diplomacy Project with overseas counterparts. Takeda’s most recently published works include Women, Children and Social Transformation in Myanmar (2020), as the first book of the Academic Diplomacy Project. Takashi Tsukamoto  was an associate professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, and a director of the Thai APEC Study Center and Australian Studies Centre Thailand. Tsukamoto is one of the key members of the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR) and Thailand-India-Japan Conclave (TIJC). He currently works for Yamanashi Gakuin University as an associate professor and also teaches at the Master of Arts in Asia-­Pacific Studies (MAPS) at Thammasat University as an adjunct professor. Chosein  Yamahata is a professor at the Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Japan. Yamahata has been the coordina-

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tor of the Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) in bridging the interdisciplinary area studies to reach locals across different sectors through the promotion of “the soft power” of academia. He has since initiated a series of collaborative academic networks affiliated with the ADP. Yamahata is also a visiting professor at the Faculty of Mass Communication at Chiang Mai University, and teaches at the MAPS program of Thammasat University, Thailand. He is the series editor of the POSDI working paper series.

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 1.2 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 9.1

Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3

A conceptual framework of academic diplomacy and its functions 5 Identification of common issues and application of the academic diplomacy project 7 Waste recycling ecosystem in east Calcutta wetlands. (Source: CMWSA 1996) 35 Waste recycling region for Calcutta city. (Source: CMWSA 1996) 36 Eastward expansion of Calcutta 37 Urban sprawl, new settlements and fragile ecosystem. (Source: CMDA 1993) 39 Location of new town at Rajarhat. (Source: CMDA 1996) 40 A conceptual flow of activities by Myanmar’s EWOs in relation to sustainable development  133 Nai Sooklek 143 Pooyaima Gub Toongmamern 143 Japan’s assistance for ASEAN connectivity (Source: Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011. http:// www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/html/honbun/ b1/s3_2.html)160 Limited freedom to human security 225 Democratic transition for promoting peace, justice, development and freedom 247 A conceptual framework for human security promotion in Myanmar257

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 3.1 Table 5.1 Table 7.1 Table 7.2 Table 7.3 Table 7.4 Table 9.1 Table 9.2 Table 10.1 Table 10.2 Table 12.1 Table 12.2 Table 12.3 Table 12.4 Table 12.5

Urban poverty level in India (head count ratio) Access to basic amenities in urban India (census estimate) Access to basic amenities in urban India (NSS estimate) Poverty alleviation interventions Emission factors for pollutants recommended by Central Pollution Control Board and average actual concentration in Calcutta Religious backgrounds of representatives elected to National Assembly in 1933–1948 UDHR related to women’s rights The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) The comparison of human development and gender gaps among ASEAN countries Main organisations related to women’s issues in the ASEAN Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA, selected years Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA, 2013–2014, 2015–2016 Japan’s ODA to Mekong region ($ million) Institutionalization of subregional cooperation Asian LDCs with selected political indicators (2018) Myanmar and other conflict-prone Asian countries in comparison: fragility, democracy and human security aspects Human security checklist for Myanmar and other selected Asian countries Determinants of democratisation Determinants for success and failure of democratisation

24 25 26 27 42 72 107 108 111 117 164 165 188 189 223 230 233 238 240

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Table 12.6 Table 12.7 Table 12.8

Myanmar’s status on the main instruments of the international law of human rights and international humanitarian law Does Myanmar meet the determinants of democratisation? Possibilities towards human insecurity reduction in Myanmar

243 249 253

CHAPTER 1

Crossing Borders in South and Southeast Asia: Assessing Existing Problems through a New Lens Chosein Yamahata, Sueo Sudo, and Takashi Matsugi

Foundation of Academic Diplomacy From “humanity” to “global village”, these commonly-used catchphrases depict a positive image of the world. However, conflicts, natural disasters and accumulated grievances hinder such visions. They may originate as local issues, but have the potential to spill over into the regional environment and eventually escalate into global crises, spreading across continents and impacting many.  The same world is witnessing a continued global population increase at an average growth rate of 1.11 million per year, with its major portion of global increased population concentrated  in Africa, Asia and Latin America based on the World Population Prospects (UNDESA 2017). Poverty is one of such global issues affecting billions who live in fear of starC. Yamahata (*) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan S. Sudo Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand T. Matsugi Nagoya University, Nagoya, Japan © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_1

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vation and disease. The World Health Organization indicated the tipping point—100 million people fall into extreme poverty each year due to health expenses  (World Bank 2017). The number of fatalities caused by AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis altogether do not amount to the startling 9 million deaths per year  caused as a result of hunger and hunger related diseases (Mercy Corps 2019). In addition, according to the Hunger Map 2019 (World Food Programme 2019), one in nine of the world’s population is starving, while there are 821 million people who do not have enough to eat. The severity of this problem can be highlighted by the figure of the so-called ‘bottom billion’ that constitutes 20 percent of the 7.6 billion, meaning that a total of 1.9 billion people are living on less than 1.25 dollars per day. In fact, 1.9 billion is nearly 31 percent of the developing world’s total population (6.15 billion) and almost 45 percent of Asia’s total population (4.26 billion), while the figure is also equivalent to around 63 percent of the total population of China, India and Indonesia combined (3 billion). Therefore, the implication is that the close, continuous and speedy interconnected and interdependent nations of the globalising world face the ruthless reality of a serious hunger gap. Our world is thus divisive, filled with societies within which multiple layers of social, economic and political divisions exist. Alleviating poverty is a matter of developing societies afflicted by it on several levels. Methods of alleviating poverty include decreasing unemployment, reducing health risks, improving underdeveloped technological skills, providing housing and shelter, facilitating education and ensuring the sustainable use of natural resources. However, failure in these efforts or delays in poverty eradication missions will worsen inequality of all kinds. New vulnerabilities often surface or emerge as a result of rapid development in regions of developing countries due to the lack of proper distribution or the misallocation and mismanagement of resources and services. The inefficient delivery of lifeline services at local and national levels, scarcity of natural resources coupled with human errors in decision-making, political instability and extreme climate change can cause unpredictable human suffering, especially in the context of both man-made and natural disasters. All these scenarios depict the need for prevention, preparedness, policy planning and priority setting for this weaker segment of society. It becomes equally important to also facilitate programmes to promote participation as well as ensure protection for those who are situated at the bottom layer of each society, region and the world. A community should therefore be treated as a basic unit to identify a root cause, process and solution. In other words, a community can be

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understood and analysed as a receiver, evaluator and driver of any change in a given system towards transforming a society. The educational sector has traditionally played a significant role in social transformations. As such, new approaches must be adopted by universities and institutions to address societal challenges from grassroots levels. Poverty, hunger, inequalities and conflict are the most common crises of local, regional and global populations residing in different corners of the world. The causes, processes and impacts of such commonly identified crises that  pose a major challenge for peace, development and ecology, require research and analysis from local case-specific comparisons and policy perspectives for taking further lessons. Moreover, scientific and technological advancements as well as action research driven by ground surveys through local interactions and initiatives are extremely useful, in both conventional and innovative ways, to fully comprehend such issues. The fast-changing socioeconomic boundaries, ethno-religious barriers and politico-cultural influences call for more new and indigenous approaches. The key to the development of societies is the continuous application of knowledge across borders to induce the sustainable process of improving the society concerned. In most cases, this originates in the educational sector where the activities of individuals and groups of universities and research institutions are the main pillars in making, gaining, sharing and debating knowledge. The recognition and the influence of such institutions are dependent on their local socio-political settings as well as their related facilitating environments. Another important source of knowledge is traditional indigenous knowledge, deeply rooted and practised in the local communities throughout their ethno-cultural and historical backgrounds. It is crucially important to bridge these two sources of knowledge to function as a workable tool in tackling local problems with regional attention. This implies an urgent need to find the means for a new approach—a social innovation-driven academic approach that can integrate any applicable non-academic means as the new agenda of the educational sector. In other words, a diplomacy of academia that can offer new additions of knowledge through providing both challenges and opportunities in its wake. The Academic Diplomacy Project (ADP) was initiated in 2014 by forming the Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research (AUNFAIR), which was a follow-up academic forum of past academic activities, including the Burma Review and Challenges International Forum (BRACIF).

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Many techniques of diplomacy are very familiar to experienced negotiators in many fields, and over the past few years a sizeable literature on bargaining and negotiation has evolved, including those on cross-cultural elements (Cohen 1991). The dictionary definition of diplomacy is “the art and practice of conducting negotiations between nations,” and the “skill in handling affairs without arousing hostility”. Reaching back into antiquity, diplomacy involved mediation, a managing entity or an individual’s relationship with an “other”. It was only with the development of the modern state system dating from the sixteenth century that diplomacy took on its narrower current contemporary meaning: managing the foreign affairs of states at the governmental level. Today, both scholars and practitioners suggest this narrow interpretation has lost its utility. Moreover, global trends, international affairs and regional complexities have all caused many changes in the world that, in turn, expand the scope for diplomacy that goes beyond traditional western views. The concept of the state, the emergence of multinational (corporate, political and non-­ governmental) and sub-national (cities, states and provinces) actors, political and economic interdependence, and emergent cultural clashes have gradually changed and weakened. Subsequently, this has resulted in complicated analysis, while also paving the way for a more general definition of diplomacy and its application to be adopted. The ADP’s practical activities are designed to activate its engagements in action research projects with respect to any targeted communities of the case countries through the use of academic and non-academic networks. The ADP is a group of networked individuals belonging to different educational institutions and civil society organisations, as well as media persons and independent citizens working together. The ADP applies a peaceful academic means to solving critical problems, issues and challenges faced by communities, societies and nations, focusing on Asia. It aims to engage in (1) conducting surveys and scholastic investigations on the ground, (2) reaching out to locals and enabling their capacity promotion, (3) organising international and local academic gatherings where academic and non-academic sectors engage with each other to collaborate in making meaningful impacts, (4) publishing interim progress reports, as well as providing feedback meetings and outcome consultations and (5) activating public/international campaigns through academic functions to make positive transformations. Therefore, the ADP is being pursued through the designated programmes by collaborating with the voluntary sectors, media sectors and

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public sectors of the areas and regions under the umbrella of our studies. It especially focuses on the successful implementation of the following functions: absorbing, sharing, surveying, learning, innovating, empowering, disseminating, monitoring and activating. Essentially, academic diplomacy works towards benefitting the targeted populations, including students and citizens of different communities, regions and nations, even if it is done so on a small tangible scale (see Fig. 1.1). The common logic behind all study projects is applying academic diplomacy to the root causes to produce tangible impacts. In the process, academic diplomacy can be portrayed as a more neutral counterpart of traditional diplomacy, yielding different benefits, including access to a

Fig. 1.1  A conceptual framework of academic diplomacy and its functions

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broader target population and community. It has great potential to influence public opinion for courses of necessary actions with urgency and priority. Diplomacy has evolved in its applicability: private citizens, as well as city and state officials, have increasingly begun to use diplomacy as a means to negotiate with the corresponding entities, including foreign ones. Academic diplomacy is fundamentally different from the traditional diplomacy employed by politicians and dignitaries; its aim is to promote a broader understanding and awareness of a certain study and to transfer its benefits (knowledge, capacity, skill, approach, etc.) to the targeted populations, groups and communities. This requires the collaborative functioning of academic activities including conferences, seminars, publications and information dissemination, formal and semi-formal courses, surveys, media interactions, working and consultative community meetings and training workshops. Applications of academic diplomacy potentially guarantee long-term mutual benefits to the local communities and societies concerned. Since academia’s authority as well as its duty include examining and addressing the pressing societal issues of different countries, including India, Myanmar and Thailand, the original idea for forming the ADP originated in 2009, when a Myanmar studies academic event known as the BRACIF was organised. It was also partly encouraged by a working paper series devoted to Policy Studies Discussion  (POSDI) at Aichi Gakuin University  in Nagoya, Japan. As a follow-up to such past exercises, the ADP has initiated a few new programmes since 2014—the AUNFAIR on an annual basis, the Thailand-India-Japan Conclave on thematic issues and project basis, the Burma Studies Special Symposium (BS3 Meeting), the Burma Lecture Series and the Euro-Aunfair Roundtable—as platforms to promote country-specific interdisciplinary studies on a regular and consultative basis. By using the network of AUNFAIR under the ADP, there are 12 identified areas to focus in understanding and diagnosing poverty, hunger, inequality and conflict from multiple dimensions, while sharing opportunities about transferring information, knowledge, experiences and approaches of the process for the locals and ourselves. As shown in Fig. 1.2, the following 12 focuses are set to be pursued through an interdisciplinary approach of problem identification as well as policy analysis by the combined efforts of the non-academic sector and academia. The focuses of different study projects with respect to the issue of poverty include: (1) community harmony and local development, (2) development assistance and international development, and (3) human

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Fig. 1.2  Identification of common issues and application of the academic diplomacy project

security and social resilience. Under the issue of hunger, (1) human and environmental health, (2) ecosystem services and resource security, and (3) transboundary issues, impacts and challenges are included. Regarding the issue of inequality, (1) rule of law, (2) ethnic diversity, religious freedom and cultural rights, and (3) media and academic freedom as well as human rights are highlighted. Issues such as (1) peacebuilding and statebuilding, (2) geopolitical landscape and regional powers on borderlands and (3) universal values and international legal instruments are taken up in relation to the conflict issue. There are many functional and cause-effect linkages found among different case studies from India, Myanmar and Thailand. A total of four different volumes—(1) Rights and Security, (2) Social Transformation, (3) Multicultural and Ecological Communities and (4) Democracy in Bridging Divides—are being planned to compile the findings of the ADP to extend further studies, analysis, knowledge exchange and follow-up, with sub-­ national scale of study projects to be promoted as an extension of each volume.

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The characteristics of cases discussed in the chapters of this book have many commonalities that could be used for further applications of academic diplomacy to make a difference in many impactful ways through projects that are: • Applicable in different local realities; • Devoid of any political bias that especially may serve unjust authoritarian systems; • Prioritising the needs of the target beneficiary groups, promoting impartiality; • Multifaceted in their integration into existing academic structures and consolidated into the functions of non-state actors regarding their delivery, process and monitoring and evaluation; • Focused on long-term capacity building and empowerment with outlined objectives and phases; • Independently funded without any ideological, racial, commercial or religious affiliates; and • Endorsing the importance of the promotion of public relations, professional networking, local consultation and citizen participation. This book discusses the local challenges of India, Myanmar and Thailand, while new initiatives were also explored to apply the interdisciplinary nature of action research in tackling the problems, issues or crises affecting particular groups, communities and societies. A compilation of such action research projects and consequent processes has deepened our existing knowledge and provided new directions of targets to pursue. This book pinpoints communities as key drivers in initiating communications with external players as a means to promote capacity empowerment for the provision of social benefits and transformation. Furthermore, it covers topics such as urban poverty, social capital and sustainable development, majority-minority relations and identity, rights and security. The book also provides a clear grasp of the essence of academic diplomacy and its scholarship in exploring in-depth insights into different societal issues from local perspectives. It offers a valuable resource for students, ­community stakeholders, citizens, volunteers, donors and academics who are interested in seeing and contributing to meaningful sustainable social transformations on the ground.

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Empowering the Poor, Protecting Rights and Promoting Equality India, with its large population and developing economy, is challenged with limited resources. Thus, corruption and governance issues aggravate poverty. Chapter 2 examines ways to tackle urban poverty through empowerment and inclusion. Starting with the definition of urban poverty and breaking down poverty deprivation in terms of health, education, shelter, water supply and sanitation, the chapter provides a more holistic sensibility and reflects upon ‘capabilities’ such as health, education and nutrition. Furthermore, the approach to strategy and decision-making is enumerated as a two-pronged approach put forward to gauge the severity of urban poverty. The first aspect is to empower the poor in decision-­ making and the second is the inclusion of the poor in the provision of basic urban services. Chapter 3 underlines the fact that urban development in Calcutta is driven by a collection of disjointed sectoral projects with different gestation periods lacking knowledge of their ecological consequences, before recommending a reorientation of the planning strategy. It refers to a general trend that since metropolitan cities all over the world are engines of economic growth, in their transformation process—from small trading centres serving rural hinterland or places having specialised functions to primate cities with a diversified economic base—they affect and modify the ecosystems of the region. The chapter finds that the experience of metropolitan cities in India indicates lack of understanding at all concerned levels about the inevitable link between the carrying capacity of the supporting ecosystem and the pattern of metropolitan development. The discussion also sums up the changes in the basic life support system of the metropolis, the east Calcutta wetlands, as a result of market-driven urbanisation. It recommends a reorientation of the planning strategy to be based on the understanding of the regional ecosystem and integration of social and natural science for sustainable metropolitan living. Chapter 4 communicates a strong message on one of the major hurdles in Myanmar’s transition to democracy: ethnic inequality has been ­escalating as a result of the religious unification of successive military and quasi-­civilian administrations under the guise of nation building. The hurdle and consequent complications serve as a threat to ethnic equality and peace as they exacerbate continuous community tensions within the multiethnic and multi-religious groups residing in the country. The shocking

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highlights, discussed on the persecution, discrimination and the denial of basic rights faced by religious minorities and ethnic nationalities at the hands of state and non-state actors, have sent a clear wave of urgency to internal and international policy environments to prevent further occurrences. It is necessary to respect international treaties, universal norms and the national applications of these global legal provisions to identify the root causes of inhumane activities as well as initiate preventive diplomacy towards guaranteeing human security. Interviews in Chin State and other minority regions explain longstanding persecution and discrimination against both ethnic and religious minorities in promoting religious freedom. Another majority-minority relation from the nineteenth century to the early twentieth century is discussed to identify the root causes of the ethno-cultural minority problems in the south of Thailand, where the majority of residents are Muslim. Chapter 5’s explanation and analysis show that the state-led centralisation approach of integrating cultural minority groups has caused ethno-cultural tension in Southern Thailand to date. This is due to Thai ruling elites, like monarchs, incorporating minority ethno-cultural groups such as Malay-Muslims into the boundary of the Thai nation-state. Consequently, such demarcation created un-Thai identities or ‘Others’ within Thailand through the ruling elites defining major differences between most Thais and the newly incorporated ethno-­ cultural minorities. This chapter provides an in-depth analysis examining such centralisation under King Vajiravudh and cultural integration assimilation pursued by Phibun, focusing on their impacts in the deep south. The analytical findings indicate that the standardisation of Thai national culture transformed the perception and role of the Malay-Muslims from unproblematic outsiders into discordantly un-Thai elements within the Thai nation. By applying Benedict Anderson’s conception of the “imagined community”, the Thai elites were aware of the existence of “Others within”, who were ethno-culturally non-Thai in Thailand due to the promotion of cultural integration and assimilation. In addition to the much needed international attention to the urgency and the original causes of conflicts in different minority groups—an ­indigenous ethnic Chin Christian group in Myanmar and a Malay-Muslim one in Thailand—there is another study on the Buddhist Rakhines in Chap. 6 that contributes to raising awareness. The chapter explains how the group, despite being a majority of Rakhine’s population, clung to old identities and resisted assimilation by the Buddhist Burman (Bamar) national ethnic majority as well as refused to coexist peacefully with Muslim

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communities in Rakhine state. The degree of attention needed from both domestic administration and the international community on the issue is crucial, especially when the international authority is demanding that Myanmar’s military take responsibility for Rohingyas being forced out of the country through the process of ethnic cleansing by the security forces. There is also a strong message on the protection of fundamental rights and civic freedoms as a prerequisite for promoting much needed ‘equality’ in many respects, especially in societies where multiple divisions exist along the lines of ethnicity, religion, race, culture, economic strata and ideological differences. In this light, the protection and promotion of women’s rights in a regional perspective has been a major focal point in the book, in addition to the debate on the protection of minority rights. Chapter 7 emphasises that there is still significant progress to be made in terms of economic and political rights of women despite ASEAN taking regional initiatives on women’s issues in line with the established international norms and practices. The discussion explores the initiatives of ASEAN for women’s rights, women’s organisations for equality, unity and development in order to highlight the reality gap between international practices and ASEAN’s initiatives. An interesting and comparative highlight has been drawn to analyse three ethnic women’s organisations from Myanmar as case studies to learn about women’s participation, empowerment, protection and promotion of their rights, which can promote a collective ‘unity’ within ASEAN in which diversity is a given reality. Chapter 8 highlights how Thai society after the military coup in 2014 became a society  with  limited freedom of expression governed by the state’s dominant ideology. It argues that the forms of expression of anti-­ government  sentiment—the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), along with anti-monarchist expressions—have apparently been shut down over the last decade. The study analyses the way  post-­ coup Thailand has entered a tense political atmosphere, and the population has been under the control of the junta. Consequently, political communication on the internet has been in steep decline, resulting from the implementation of the Computer Crime Act (No. 2) 2017. This implies that people have been practising self-censorship as they have witnessed cases in which scholars, politicians and activists who voice strong criticism of the regime were prosecuted, and they fear that they will suffer  the same penalties if they violate the act. Furthermore, it examines political communication in the form of political parody and satirical comic strips in social media. The authors conclude that the 2014 coup marked

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Thailand’s major turning point in terms of free expression or disclosure of political identity, and this situation has polarised the country, allowing those who are loyal to  the NCPO to be able to express their thoughts freely or disclose their political standpoint in the public sphere. As a result, those who have adopted different standpoints from the NCPO have to stay silent, conceal their political standpoint, lay low or engage in indirect political expression.

Cooperation, Partnership and Human Security Other interesting research questions cover how new aid is strategic, how it relates to the concept of security, and how Japanese aid to Southeast Asia responds to these two issues. Chapter 9 discusses how Japan is proactively promoting an international cooperation strategy that combines the Official Development Assistance (ODA) policy and other policy tools, especially the security policy under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s policy for Southeast Asian countries, including Myanmar. In relation to Japan’s aid, another aspect of its active role in promoting a closer partnership with mainland ASEAN countries is assessed through its strategic initiatives within ASEAN and among other dialogue partners towards securing a strategic partnership. Chapter 10 makes a particularly important statement: the rise of China and its growing influence on multiple fronts in the member countries of ASEAN and the region as a whole is the decisive factor in explaining how, why and when Japan has constantly been refocusing on the Mekong region to attain closer economic cooperation as well as to achieve the institutionalisation of sub-regional cooperation. Chapter 11 provides an analysis of how civil-military relations in Thailand shared the causes and the strategies by which the military as an institution has been  achieving preeminent power in the contemporary political history of Thailand. These analytical findings are useful in understanding the mentality of the military and its approaches in other military-­ dominated political systems in gaining political power. The discussion includes the implications of the continued military involvement in politics as well as the prospects of Thailand’s military in the future. The explanation goes further by analysing the linkage between the monarch and military as Thailand’s parallel state, an asymmetrical alliance of power in which the military serves as the junior partner. This study projects that Thailand’s

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“monarchised military” is set to continue influencing the nation for more years to come. Myanmar’s situation of human insecurity and transitional process is examined from the basic concepts of human security and the principles of democracy in order to grasp the root causes of its reduction framework in Chap. 12. It highlights human rights as a natural and fundamental rights that every human being is entitled to, regardless of ethnicity, religion or other statuses. Since freedom is a vital element of human development, anything that hinders or denies the potential of human development is a violation of human rights and provocation of human insecurity. The study is initiated based on the hope that such inquiry would continue until it results in the implementation of sustainable measures to prevent human insecurity and eliminate it from countries such as Myanmar and other nation-states recognised as “weak states”. The chapter argues that in a country like Myanmar during its most critical juncture of transition, human security should not be neglected. Only by a democratic constitution can the goal of spreading human security across Myanmar become a lasting reality, for which the international community, starting from the agencies and offices of the UN, the regional bodies of Asia including ASEAN and geopolitical power-neighbours, as well as the donor community, should play the role of important watchdogs. The book makes the assumption that the major issues in Southeast Asia and around the globe are not fundamentally  different. Environmental, community, social development and human security issues are problems that all sectors of society need to assume a role in, especially academia. In summary, the book conveys that academia is taking the lead in developing a variety of applicable methods as a means of soft intervention in the form of action research projects to prevent the occurrence, possible re-­ occurrence and spill-over of social ills, human rights abuses, atrocities and global public ‘bads’ before these scenarios escalate to humanity-in-crisis situations. The collective as well as the representative message of this volume as the reflections received through different chapters on India, Myanmar and Thailand has illustrated methodological pluralism, flexible comparative research, multidimensional approaches and a willingness to build academic bridges for closing any divides. Therefore, the way in which “academic diplomacy crosses all borders” in safeguarding humanity, sustaining peace and respecting diversity through its good practices is a crucial one since it is our ‘moral responsibility to protect’ the affected populations.

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As Professor Catherine Renshaw has mentioned in the Foreword, academic diplomacy “...allows us to see existing problems through a new lens, and to reassess our range of options for addressing the resulting picture which emerges”. In sum, the contents of the book offer both multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary approaches to understanding South and Southeast Asian societies through action research-driven and academic diplomacy-tested informative knowledge as an extension to the existing literature on India, Myanmar and Thailand. It is also our expectation that this book could be useful to beginners, students and the interested general public as a source kit. The editors would like to express our greatest appreciation for those who contributed their work to this first book of the Academic Diplomacy Project. However, the views presented in each chapter are those of the contributors and theirs alone. It is the editors’ collective and humble hope that this volume adds to the knowledge and information of those who can nurture the content as needed for their own interests, course of study or work, and if necessary, carry it on for further modification and applications beneficial for many in a tangible way.

References Cohen R (1991) Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy, Volume 1990. United States Institute of Peace. Mercy Corps (2019) Quick facts: What you need to know about global hunger. ­https://www.mercycorps.org.uk/articles/quick-facts-what-you-need-knowabout-global-hunger. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (UNDESA) (2017) World Population Prospects: The 2017 Revision, Key Findings and Advance Tables. Working Paper No. ESA/WP/248. World Bank (2017, December 13) World Bank and WHO: Half the World Lacks Access to Essential Health Services, 100 Million Still Pushed into Extreme Poverty Because of Health Expenses. http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/ press-release/2017/12/13/world-bank-who-half-world-lacks-access-toessential-health-services-100-million-still-pushed-into-extreme-povertybecause-of-health-expenses. Accessed 20 January 2019. World Food Programme (WFP) (2019) Hunger Map 2019. United Nations.

CHAPTER 2

Addressing Urban Poverty through Empowerment and Inclusion in India Binayak Choudhury

Prologue Poverty in urban is more than merely a state of not having enough for survival. Poverty is perceived here as lack of access to and exclusion from various social and physical services, as well as an obstacle to participating in and contributing to urban living. Poverty here is defined not only as income poverty, but also as human deprivation in terms of health, education, shelter, water supply, and sanitation. Alleviation of poverty does not only address low income, but also ‘capabilities’, such as health, education, and nutrition, by stressing the interactions among these dimensions (Dreze J et al. 2002). Poverty also stands for vulnerability, voicelessness, and powerlessness. Poverty in urban areas is now more widespread than before and continues to be pervasive, intractable, and intolerable. The Indian urbanscape is marked by deprivation, destitution, and oppression. We must also not forget that the poor constitute highly differentiated groups, with diverse priorities. The dimension of poverty is endemic in urban areas. It may affect certain groups more than others because of the unique features from case to case. Urban poverty is also affected by low B. Choudhury (*) School of Planning and Architecture Bhopal, Bhopal, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_2

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levels of self-esteem and self-­determination among the poor. In India, poverty is not only multidimensional, but also engulfs the entire geography of the country (rural as well as urban across different Indian provinces), albeit, in different magnitudes. India is unique amongst the developing countries in having a long-term time series data (1951–2017) on consumption expenditure which is the basis of poverty estimates. This consumption expenditure is recorded through National Sample Survey (NSS) by Central Statistical Organisation (Datt 1998). The poor hesitate to communicate and exchange information because of their weak participation in civil society and weak civic engagement in the economic, social, cultural, and political processes. Poverty is fundamentally a national problem, and local government efforts to reduce poverty should be viewed within the broader national context. Two approaches have been put forward to assuage the severity of urban poverty; these are empowerment of the poor in decision making and the inclusion of the poor in the provision of basic urban services. But to be certain that these approaches deliver, we must ensure that both are executed in unison under the supervision of urban governance.

Facets of Urban Poverty Urban poor not only suffers from grossly inadequate but also inferior-­quality urban infrastructure and services. Any intervention in poverty alleviation must be comprehensive in recognizing the aforementioned multi-dimensional nature of poverty, and should be prioritized so that implementation is feasible in both fiscal and institutional terms. Such intervention should aim at raising the following capabilities (Bonfiglioli A 2003)— Economic capability: To enable poor people to earn an income, consume, and have assets and access to food, security, material wellbeing, and social status (since there is no or minimum access to land with insecure land rights); Human capability: To enable the deprived to have access to health, education, nutrition, clean water, and shelter; Political capability: To protect human rights and give voice to poor people to enable them to vent their anguish; Socio-cultural capability: To enable underprivileged people to protect their indigenous cultural identity and make them feel dignified as valued members of the community; and Protective capability: To enable people to withstand economic and external shocks and be more resilient to resist and recover after major crises.

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Urban poverty reduction is no longer a zero-sum game if vulnerability, risk, and exclusion from public services (i.e. health, education, sanitation, security, and law) define poverty. It is crucial, for instance, to overcome a simplistic and naïve perspective on the prospects for poverty reduction, participation, and empowerment of the poor while operating within the institutional power structures that accept or even generate that poverty. We must achieve poverty reduction by delivering demand-responsive investments in social and economic infrastructure and service, and improve the efficiency, responsiveness, and transparency of delivery systems through development of local planning, budgeting, and implementation procedures.

Urban Governance in Poverty Eradication Democratic local governance is increasingly seen as a precondition for poverty reduction strategies, although its links to poverty reduction are not always explicit. Local government is now a permanent statutory institution under the Indian Constitution, having a range of precise rights and obligations with functional autonomy and a formal mandate to provide a range of services to the people. It enables political participation of the underprivileged to work for pro-poor local development, respectful of local social identities. Furthermore, a government that is more knowledgeable about, close to, and hence more responsive to the needs of the people is expected to lead to better pro-poor policies and outcomes (Palnitkar 2009). Local government addresses a large number of key issues, such as the over-concentration of power, authority, and resources in higher-order government; the weak contact between government and local people, including civil society and the private sector; the low equity in the allocation of resources; the inadequate exchange of information; and the inefficiency of service delivery. Democratic local governance does not involve merely a simple transfer of power and a shift of responsibility from the state to the local; it is rather the vertical transfer of responsibilities and resources from state to local government, as well as the development of horizontal networks between local governments and local non-state actors. Local governments are considered to be preeminent institutions in eradicating poverty for the following reasons: • They have the closest proximity to the local populace, and are therefore more efficient in allocating resources;

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• They are able to ensure more efficient monitoring and assessment systems through closer oversight; • They can better ensure horizontal co-ordination of line departments and thus increase the scope for mutually reinforcing activities on the preconditions that District Planning Committee (DPC) is fully functional and there is transparent procurement and contract management. • They can ensure accountability in all forms: upward (accountability of local governments to higher-order governments); downward (accountability of local governments to their constituencies); horizontal (control of government institutions by other public agencies), and vertical (accountability demanded from below by citizens). • They are likely to ensure practices of cooperation, vigilance, adherence, and enforcement of rules with utmost integrity. • They can ensure cost recovery since they take care of services and maintenance costs which are demand-responsive, for which communities will be willing to pay. • They can convince various local stakeholders to share specific responsibilities in order to improve delivery of infrastructure identified in the local development plans. • They can more effectively operate and maintain infrastructure and services to benefit the poor in the longer term. And to enable them to undertake poverty reduction exercises, three conditions must be met: • adequate funds and functional and fiscal autonomy; • empowerment of the urban poor at every stage of development; and • inclusion of urban poor through equitable distribution of basic urban services.

Empowerment Vis-à-Vis Inclusion When the Swedish Nobel Committee selected Elinor Ostrom as the first ever female recipient of the Nobel in Economics this year, it was once more emphasized how collective decision making and self-determination of the community are indispensable for good governance. Empowerment and inclusion are the two terms that have entered the vocabulary of governance across the developing world. There has been a shift from representative democracy to participatory democracy. While the

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empowerment approach treats poor people as co-decision makers, with authority and control over decisions and resources devolved to the lowest appropriate level, inclusion of poor people and other traditionally excluded groups is crucial to ensure equity in the provision of various services. Empowerment is a multi-dimensional social process that helps people gain control over their own lives. It is a process that fosters power in people, for use in their own lives, their communities, and their society, by acting on issues that they define as important. It is multi-dimensional as it occurs within sociological, psychological, economic, and other dimensions. Empowerment also occurs at various levels, such as individual, group, and community, and is a social process, since it occurs in relation to others. However, an effort to sustain empowerment and inclusion requires reforming the institutional form so as to create space for people to debate issues and participate directly or indirectly in identifying the local problems, suggesting the solutions, setting the priorities, overseeing (association with) the implementation, ensuring the monitoring, and finally undertaking the evaluation. Empowerment is the process of increasing the capacity of individuals or groups to make choices and to transform those choices into desired actions and outcomes, and requires the removal of all institutional barriers that limit their choices. At the core of empowerment is the idea of power. The possibility of empowerment depends on two things. First, it requires that power can change. If power cannot change, if it is inherent in positions or people, then empowerment is not possible. Second, the concept of empowerment depends upon the idea that power can expand. This second point reflects our common experiences of power rather than how we think about power. Since power is created in relationships, power and power relationships can change. Empowerment is thus a process of change, where human relationships are redefined by giving power to those who are outside the ambit of the circle of power. Considering that power will be seen and understood differently by people who inhabit various positions in power structures, we may argue that the zero-sum conception of power is no longer valid, and that power can be shared through collaboration, sharing, and mutuality. Systematic and systemic inequality in the provision of urban services is deleterious as it will derail the urban growth process through political subversions or conflict. And thus there is the need for an inclusive approach in urban management. There are two interpretations of the inclusionary

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approach. While one interpretation is read through urban management, the other one is examined through urban economics. In urban ­management, the inclusive approach essentially means making the basic urban services available to the deprived and disadvantaged section of the society either free or at a very nominal charge. But such universalization of basic urban services cannot continue infinitely since no government can go on subsidizing the high cost of such a provision. On the other hand, from the point of view of urban economics, inclusion means eradication of urban poverty and narrowing down urban economic inequality. However, while the inclusive growth definition is in conformity with the absolute definition of pro-poor growth, it is not so with the relative definition. Under the absolute definition, growth is considered to be pro-poor as long as poor people benefit in absolute terms, as reflected in some established measures of poverty. In contrast, in the relative definition, growth is ‘pro-poor’ if and only if the incomes of poor people grow faster than the entire population as a whole, that is, if inequality declines. However, while absolute pro-poor growth can be the result of direct income redistribution schemes through various urban poverty alleviation schemes, for growth to be inclusive, productivity must be improved, and new employment opportunities created. By focusing on inequality, the relative definition could lead to sub-optimal outcomes for both poor and non-poor households. For example, an urban settlement attempting to achieve pro-poor growth under the relative definition would favour an outcome characterized by average income growth of two percent where the income of poor households grew by three percent, over an outcome where average growth was six percent but the incomes of poor households grew by only four percent. While the distributional pattern of growth favours poor households in the first scenario, both poor and non-poor households are better off in the second scenario. There is broad recognition that when poverty reduction is the objective, then the absolute definition of pro-poor growth is the most relevant. Under the absolute definition, the aim is to increase the rate of growth to achieve the greatest pace of poverty reduction. Urban managers must find ways to take out those entrapped in low-­ productivity activities and/or lacking the basic urban infrastructure and services. Inclusive growth focuses on the sustained pace and pattern of growth and adopts a long-term perspective. Inclusive growth (urban economy part) focuses on productive employment rather than income redistribution. Hence the focus is not only on employment growth but also on productivity growth.

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Institutionalizing Empowerment and Inclusion Sustaining poor people’s participation in urban societies with deeply entrenched norms of exclusion or in ethnically and culturally diverse urban societies with a history of conflict is a complex process that requires resources, facilitation, sustained vigilance, and experimentation. Participation can take different forms. At the local level, depending on the issue, participation may be direct or representative and/or information-­ based (sending information/data to decision makers). Participatory decision making is not always harmonious as priorities may be contested, so conflict resolution mechanisms need to be in place to manage disagreements through consensus. And thus there is the necessity of a more pluralist strategy to support local governance, by widening the array of institutional partners involved alongside local governments and by strengthening collaboration and accountability between them through synergies. The poor must be able to articulate their interests in the political realms so that local governments are more responsive to them. The empowerment approach to governance strengthens the capacity of the poor to participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their lives. We must ensure accountability of both elected representatives and municipal servants. While ‘vertical accountability’ encourages elected representatives to voice the interests and priorities of the people and keep the latter informed, ‘horizontal accountability’ encourages municipal staff to implement prioritized plans of local elected representatives and keep them informed. We must also ensure gender sensitivity in governance to increase women’s participation in politics—not only in formal political structures but also in civic engagement. It is also meant to strengthen gender awareness and capacities among both female and male politicians and municipal servants in order to ensure delivery of services on gender-specific needs. However, to carry out these exercises, local government needs guidance from higher-order governments. Informal institutions could, under certain conditions, be an effective route to empower the poor, but such institutions should not emerge only when formal institutions fail to perform. Thus, a major challenge is to build bridges between formal and informal institutions. Local governments should establish pro-active interactions with informal institutions,

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which are the building blocks of political action and form a broad tapestry of social, political, and economic communication. It is now broadly acknowledged that local social context and systems, including local norms and networks of civic engagement, profoundly affect the strength, responsiveness, and effectiveness of institutions. We must not forget that urban government may be formed through conventional electoral procedures, but it is sustained by allowing participation in decision making. We must acknowledge that it is high time to integrate the poor and the informal sector workers into the main city system (Hashim 2009).

Building Institutions The sustainability of poverty-reduction measures is rooted in the institutional arrangements and organizations that emerge from local social capital and express local social cohesion (although social capital and cohesion are difficult values to assess). Local social capital and local ‘livelihood strategies’ are important factors not only in reducing poverty but also in influencing the entire ‘policy’ process which will ultimately influence the sustainability of local livelihoods. But political reforms are not always conducive to good governance for poverty reduction; they must be accompanied by institutional development and capacity. Devolution of fund and functions to local governments must be preceded by a massive capacity building of urban institutions. Higher-order governments should also be sensitized to their new roles and responsibilities under the decentralization regime. There should not be any misleading dichotomy between ‘bottom-­up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches. As such, the focus on institutions comprises both institutional organizations and institutional arrangements. By institutional organizations we mean an appropriate and sustainable institutional architecture with specific levels of government within the respective sphere of governance, and by institutional arrangement we mean coherent institutional arrangements to define how decentralization can improve the involvement of each level of government in different tasks. But while doing so, we should not empower ephemeral organs that should be allowed to last the lifetime of a project. It is generally assumed that complete decentralization cannot be accomplished and is not even desirable. It should also be pointed out that some re-centralization might even be necessary to ensure that the needs of the poor are not ignored. Higher-order governments are sometimes better suited for assessing broader problems and trends and for acting as arbiters to solve certain local conflicts.

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There is no clear evidence of a linear relationship between democratic decentralization, local governance, and poverty reduction and between democracy and allocative efficiency. Furthermore, decentralization does not necessarily improve the political strength of the poor and other excluded groups, and it may leave them vulnerable to the control of local elites when the higher-order governments become less involved. In addition to this, decentralization has a tendency to create greater inequities among communities/regions with different levels of organizational capacity, providing local elites with opportunities to capture local political processes and to usurp influence and power. Nevertheless, urban local government is still considered as the appropriate institution of governance to alleviate poverty in urban areas (Mathur 2009). The importance of efficient co-ordination among different tiers of government must be stressed. We must be able to assess the progress of decentralization, identify present constraints and bottlenecks, and define the way forward. We must note that decentralization essentially involves setting up networks of different actors on the basis of three key principles: subsidiarity, by which all planning and implementing activities are the responsibility of the level closest to the grass-roots (a higher authority would act only if a lower authority cannot or does not act); complementarity, by which each institutional level will operate in its own areas of action according to its own responsibilities; equity, by which the rights over local resources of all local stakeholders are legally recognized and legitimized.

Epilogue Adequate diagnostics through participatory planning mechanisms (empowerment) allow for the identification of programmes and projects that have the highest impact on poverty reduction. Local governments must be able to select and prioritize policies based on their expected impact on achieving local poverty targets (inclusion). Finally, a set of appropriate indicators (measurable and tangible) to monitor and track the progress of governance and the reduction of poverty, in terms of both performance and process, has to be selected within the context of a sustainable, long-term development strategy.

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Urban Poverty Narratives in India Measurement of poverty (rural and urban) in India is carried out by the National Statistical Office of the Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Government of India. National Sample Survey (NSS) is conducted periodically (known as rounds) across the states of India to elicit the number of poor people, following rigorous statistical calculations. Erstwhile, the Planning Commission of India however has had several poverty estimates since the early 1960s based on NSS data. The majority of the urban poor are found to be living in slums and engaged in informal employment. However, contrary to the popular perception that large, million-plus Indian cities have higher concentrations of poverty, the fact remains that the majority of the poor are concentrated in medium-­ sized and small towns across India (More and Singh 2014). Although it is heartening to note that the proportion of poor people in urban India has declined (Table 2.1), it is a sad commentary that the absolute number of the urban poor is staggeringly high, accompanied by a growing inequality (Himanshu 2007; Lucci et al. 2016; Maringanti and Coelho 2012). Since the early 1970s, inequality (measured through Gini coefficient) in urban India has been on the rise contrary to the rural areas where it has stabilized. The depth and severity of urban poverty (measured through poverty gap and squared poverty gap respectively) are also matters of woe. The aforesaid poverty measure however is one-dimensional as it reflects only income poverty (measured from per capita consumption expenditure). Since the source as well as the impact of poverty is multidimensional, one must read income poverty along with the multidimensional nature of poverty (Panagariya and Mukim 2014). The lack of sufficient income to afford a food basket with the minimum calories alongside other basic non-food items does not show the cumulative deprivations of poverty. Table 2.2 reveals some aspects of the multidimensionality of poverty. Table 2.1  Urban poverty level in India (head count ratio) Year 1983 1987–1988 1993–1994 2004–2005 2009–2010 2011–2012 Head count ratio 43.6

38.7

32.6

Source: Based on NSS data for respective rounds

25.9

20.9

13.7

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Table 2.2  Access to basic amenities in urban India (census estimate) Census Percentage of urban households having year Concrete-­ Tap Electricity as Toilet roof house water a source of facility lighting within the premises 2001 2011

44.4 52.9

68.7 70.6

87.5 92.7

73.7 81.4

Drainage connection

77.8 81.8

Bathroom Cooking gas

70.4 77.5

48.0 65.0

Source: Census of India, 2001 and 2011

Although the inter-censal (2001–2011) period shows a marked improvement in the case of some civic amenities, one could discern the recent scenario (2011 census data being too old) from the NSS 76th round (July–December 2018), which is albeit based on sample survey (Table 2.3). From Table 2.3 (which indicates very recent scenario), it can be inferred that: (i) water availability within house is still a distant dream; (ii) two-­ fifths of the urban households do not have tenurial security of their houses; (iii) accessing loan from formal banking system is insignificant, suggesting the predominance of informal employment and the concomitant uncertainty in flow of income; (iv) the living environment is unhygienic; (v) the coverage under entitlement programmes is insignificant (Bhagat 2011). Several initiatives have been taken by the Government of India for alleviating urban poverty since the late 1970s. Some of the recent government initiatives (some still in vogue) are mapped below in Table 2.4. A series of schemes (some in mission mode) launched across urban India (MoHUA 2018), funded by the central government and all state (provincial) governments, started bearing fruit, which has been exemplified by different degrees of performance as is evident in the NSS and the census of India data (Tables 2.2 and 2.3). The inclusion and empowerment of the urban poor in the development trajectory of urban India aside, even members of the general public were not engaged in the development discourse of India’s urban settlements. This is hugely frustrating in view of the Constitution of India’s guaranteeing community participation in urban planning, development, and management. Although Section 243S of the Seventy-fourth Constitutional Amendment Act of 1992 provides for setting up ward(s) committees

75.0

Having exclusive bathroom

Source: NSS 76th round

40.9

Having piped water within dwelling units

77.6

Having toilet facility within the premises

Percentage of urban households

63.8

Having tenurial security of house 58.2

Having good-­ condition house 87.8

Who purchased house from own source

Table 2.3  Access to basic amenities in urban India (NSS estimate)

86.60

Using cooking gas

38.9

Suffering from severe mosquito problem

20.0

Having ration card

8.7

Suffering from water-borne diseases

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Source: Compiled by the author

Endowment and entitlement

Endowment and entitlement

 1.  Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission  2.  Urban Infrastructure Development Scheme for Small and Medium Towns  3.  Integrated Housing and Slum Development Programme  4.  Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana (Prime Minister Scheme for Housing for All)  5.  Smart City Mission  6.  Atal Mission for Rejuvenation and Urban Transformation  7.  Heritage City Development and Augmentation Yojana

Endowment and entitlement

Universal access to primary health care

Major Schemes across Sectors

Endowment and entitlement

Universal access to elementary education

Endowment

Legal status to street vendors

Alleviation of urban poverty through skill formation, upgradation, micro entrepreneurship and wage employment through modest physical asset creation Endowment and entitlement

Sarva Shiksha National National Urban Abhiyan 2004 Urban Health Livelihoods Mission 2013 Mission 2013

Endowment

Affordable housing

National The Street Housing and Vendor Act Urban 2014 Habitat Policy 2007

Adopted Approaches

National Urban Sanitation Policy 2007 Universal access to toilet

National Urban Transport Policy 2006

Thrust Areas Public transport, non-­ motorized transport

Name of the programme/ policy

Table 2.4  Poverty alleviation interventions

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across different wards of a statutory urban settlement, except two states (provinces) of the Indian Federal Union, ward committees do not exist in any other state of India. The ward committee is a constitutionally recognized ideal platform for community inclusion and empowerment where provision has been made for active participation of members of the general public (to be elected from their respective wards) in the development affairs of their respective wards, having representation of women and disadvantaged section of the society (scheduled castes and tribes). In the initial years of the enactment of the aforesaid act, states across India were found to be constituting ward(s) committee under the pressure of conformity legislation. Sadly enough however, while doing so, most of the states did not follow any democratic process and instead formed the ward(s) Committee with nominated members drawn from their respective wards/ NGOs/civil society organizations having affiliation to the ruling party. Not only this, even where (except the states of West Bengal and Kerala) the ward(s) committee was formed, it was relegated as a defunct institution (MoUD 2010). Community participation in urban planning, development, and management got another opportunity to flourish when the Area Sabha (polling-­booth-wise community organization) was required to be constituted across the statutory urban settlements in India under the country’s first flagship programme of urban development, known as Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM). Since accessing grants under JNNURM was made contingent upon the constitution of Area Sabhas, a large number of states enacted Nagar Raj Act around 2006–2007 in order to constitute Area Sabhas. Again, sadly enough, the Area Sabha faded into oblivion with the closure of JNNURM in 2014. The trinity of inclusion, empowerment, and entitlement lies in the centre of participatory planning. Collective ownership of responsibility and collective wisdom are the essential prerequisites of sustainable development, and therefore, it is needless to reiterate that such a trinity is the sine qua non for sustainable development. The principle of subsidiarity requires inclusion, the principle of democracy requires empowerment, and the principle of development requires entitlement. The Government of India is not found lacking in its effort to further the cause of participatory planning to address poverty through inclusion, empowerment, and entitlement. The responsibility now lies with the state governments in general and urban local self-governments in particular to cherish the goal of inclusive planning and do their bit with all diligence.

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References Bhagat R B (2011) Urbanisation and Access to Basic Amenities in India. Urban India 31 (1): 1–13. Bonfiglioli A (2003) Empowering the Poor: Local Governance for Poverty Reduction. United Nations Capital Development Fund, New York. Datt G (1998) Poverty in India and Indian States—An Update. International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, DC. Dreze J and Sen A (2002) India: Development and Participation. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Hashim S R (2009) Economic Development and Urban Poverty. India Urban Poverty Report 2009. Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India. Himanshu (2007) Recent Trends in Poverty and Inequality: Some Preliminary Results. Economic and Political Weekly XLII (6): 497–508. Lucci P et  al. (2016) Are We Underestimating Urban Poverty? Overseas Development Institute. Maringanti A and Coelho K (2012) Urban Poverty in India. Economic and Political Weekly XLVII (47–48): 39–43. Mathur O P (2009) Alleviating Urban Poverty: Income Growth, Distribution or Decentralization?. India Urban Poverty Report 2009. Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India. Ministry of Housing and Urban Affairs (MoHUA), Government of India (2018) Handbook of Urban Statistics. Government of India, New Delhi. Ministry of Urban Development (MoUD), Government of India (2010) Enhancing Public Participation through Effective Functioning of Area Sabha. More S and Singh N (2014) Poverty in India: Concept, Measurement and Status. https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62400. Palnitkar S (2009) The Millennium Development Goals and Role of Cities. India Urban Poverty Report 2009. Ministry of Housing and Urban Poverty Alleviation, Government of India. Panagariya A and Mukim M (2014) A Comprehensive Analysis of Poverty in India. Asian Development Bank.

CHAPTER 3

Development Efforts towards Ecological Sustainability in Calcutta: Transformation of a Metropolis Souvanic Roy

Introduction Metropolitan cities all over the world are engines of economic growth. In the course of their transformation from small trading centres serving the rural hinterland or places initially having a specialised function towards primate cities with diversified economic bases, they modify the traditional ecosystem of the region. The image of a metropolis in developing countries is mixed, with a set of complex issues such as severe overcrowding, unauthorised settlements, over-stressed infrastructure, loss of bio-­diversity, land filling, garbage disposal and water pollution. Calcutta is a glaring example of the exploitive nature of urbanisation. The site of old Calcutta, once dominated by marshes, tidal creeks, mangrove swamps and wetlands, was modified substantially by the colonial power and later on by the unregulated forces of urbanisation. In order to sustain Calcutta, the ecological constraints within which it has developed need to be understood and respected. This study attempts to provide a brief description of the S. Roy (*) Indian Institute of Engineering Science and Technology, Shibpur, India e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_3

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changes in the basic life support system of the metropolis, the east Calcutta wetlands, as a result of market-driven and unplanned urbanisation. It also identifies the ecological threats in the process and the reorientation of development strategy necessary for integrating social and natural science towards a sustainable metropolitan development. The chapter briefly outlines the concept of ecological planning that is applicable to the metropolis.

Foundation of the City, its Evolution and Impact on Regional Ecosystem In 1686, Job Charnock of the British East India Company sailed down the river Hugli and identified three villages, Sutanuti, Kalikata and Govindapur, on the east bank as locations for trading operations in Bengal. The riverine site was surrounded by salty marshes, tidal creeks, wetlands and mangrove forest with a rich preserve of bio-diversity. The first settlement started on the bank of the river, which provided firm land, but subsequent eastward expansion required reclamation, which was effected by creating a series of eastbound canals and reclaiming land through the process of borrowed earth. These canals, and the paths on both their banks, proved to be unhealthy and they were progressively covered up. Thus, Calcutta acquired a novel drainage system, with enormous (3 to 4 m in diameter) sewers, where dry weather flow depended on additional water being pumped into the system to flush out the suspended solid faecal matter, which would not otherwise travel down the inadequate slopes within the hydrological conditions. It acquired the characteristics of a combined system of water disposal, without the necessary climatic conditions to support it. This system, gifted by the colonial regime, has created a serious problem in managing the waste of the city. The landform of 1690 has changed radically over the three hundred years of growth. The natural vegetation of lush green tropical jungle has disappeared to make room for the great Maidan and the Fort. The abundant mangrove swamps have been drained off by excavating drainage channels around the city. There were numerous depressions, low-lying waterlogged areas, ponds, ditches, nullahs and tidal creeks even within city limit in the early days. Two tidal creeks were particularly prominent, namely, the Beliaghata creek and the Chitpur creek of which the former is now largely filled up. The Chitpur creek in part formed a segment of the

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so-called Maratha Ditch, and was partly filled up to construct the Circular Road. Most of the depressions have been filled up by continuous dumping of all the rubbish that a growing city generates. The riverside level is still the highest part of the city, sloping gradually away from the river towards the Salt Lake area, the original and natural backyard of the city. Calcutta’s entire drainage and sewerage network, as well as the disposal of its wastewater, depends on its natural eastward slope of the ground. The recurrent problem of waterlogging during the rains is also largely due to the fact that the river Hugli often flows at a level higher than many parts of eastern Calcutta. The problems and prospects of Calcutta continue to depend chiefly on the state of the Hugli River.

East Calcutta Wetlands—Life Support System of the Metropolis in the Process of Transformation The eastern bank of the river is fringed by a system of lowlands and wetlands. Fluvial action has been the chief cause of the creation of natural wetlands in this region. Generally, the depth of the wetlands is never more than 3 m, and most are much shallower. The wetlands of east Calcutta, which were initially more than 8000 ha in area, act as reservoirs for the drainage basin of the region, take the huge quantities of solid urban waste, liquid sewage (including toxic effluents) and polluted air generated by the metropolis and recycle them into clean air, fresh water, organic nutrients and a daily supply of fresh fish and green vegetables for Calcutta’s kitchens. In the process, they provide income and employment for the surrounding countryside. In 1865, the municipal authorities acquired about 2.59 km2 of land in this region for dumping the city’s garbage or solid waste. In 1990, the Calcutta Municipal Corporation was dumping 2600 tonnes of solid waste daily in east Calcutta (Chaudhuri 1990). The National Environmental Engineering Research Institute has estimated that the wastewater discharged by Calcutta carries another 2076 tonnes of suspended solids (Chaudhuri 1990). Using this source of productive wealth, the people of Calcutta have created a unique ecosystem. First, the solid waste is picked up by a population of several thousand rag-pickers. They remove all forms of non-organic materials for resale: metal objects, bottles, foil and rubber, cork, plastics, paper, cloth, wood and unburned coal. The pickers are usually children, earning around

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­ fteen rupees a day—an important supplementary income for families fi whose combined population may be as high as 15,000 (Calcutta Metropolitan Water Supply Sanitation Authority (CMWSA) 1996). The picked up organic garbage is reduced to humus over time. The entire area adjacent to and east of the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass has been enriched by this precious natural fertilizer. Once a garbage mound has reached its maximum height, its top is levelled by municipal bulldozers and, after about a year and a half, its top and fringes are cultivated. A survey in 1990 indicated that 800 ha of dump-top land alone were used for cultivation (CMWSA 1996). Pigs and other livestock are also raised on the dumps. Some 816 ha of land in this area are used for vegetable farming and other agriculture. Nearly 55,000 tonnes of fresh vegetables annually make their way to Calcutta’s markets from there (CMWSA 1996). Such farming dates back to 1928, when a private entrepreneur leased land here from the Corporation and rented it out to cultivators. About 20,000 people are engaged in agriculture in eastern Calcutta (Moitra 1997). The garbage farms absorb about 700 tonnes of picked up garbage daily (Ghosh 1995). This raises the ground level by approximately 6.35 mm a year, while producing vegetables, in one instance, twenty-one types on a single holding (Moitra 1997). In addition, the ultimate skill and ingenuity displayed in this region in the development of sewage has fed fisheries on 2500 ha of low-lying land, supplying 20 tonnes of fish daily and employing 1700 people (Ghosh 1995). The water from the sewage canals is taken through channels to shallow banked up tanks called bheris. The sewage water makes extremely rich fish food, and a whole discipline of informal skills has been developed to precisely judge the “sweetness” of the sewage, the depth of the water, its weed content and other factors. The farmers are also keenly alert to market demands and can accordingly raise everything from spawn and fingerlings to full grown carp, tilapia and other species. The fish is known to be free from all contamination. The shallow eutrophic lakes with multiple forms of plankton, algae and bacteria consume the organic refuse and breathe back vital oxygen into the city air. The abundant water hyacinth along the margins effectively removes the highly toxic chemicals and metallic residue from the water. The fisheries are also 99 percent effective in the treatment of pathogenic bacteria. The sewage entering a bheri contains up to 10 × 106 E coli cells ml−1. The water that leaves it only contains 10 to 100 cells ml−1 (CMWSA 1996).

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The local people who use this water for their daily needs are not more prone to waterborne diseases; in the 1984 dysentery epidemic, not a single case was reported from east Calcutta. The major components of the waste recycling ecosystem are indicated in Fig. 3.1 and the extent of the waste recycling region is identified in Fig. 3.2. Unfortunately, the value of this wetland has not been much appreciated, and Calcutta has marched eastward (Fig. 3.3). In the 1950s, a new town was conceived by reclaiming a large portion of Salt Lake to relieve the population pressure on Calcutta, known as Salt Lake City. The peopled area occupying the eastern Calcutta wetlands was given a definition by the Calcutta Improvement Trust by creating what is known as the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass, aggravating the drainage even further by separating the urban area and wetlands. Now there is pressure to reclaim more wetlands to allow urban expansion, irrespective of the fact that a reduction in the size of the natural drainage basin reduces the capacity of the city to drain itself. This is already proved by regular flooding of the city during monsoon periods, paralysing life and economic activity, affecting underground cables and causing epidemics. The bheris are dwindling (from 8163 ha in 1950 to 3265 ha in 1988) (CMWSA 1996), and their supply of fish to the city has become irregular. The disappearance of a sizeable part of the area is likely to cause ecological disaster and, if the entire

Fig. 3.1  Waste recycling ecosystem in east Calcutta wetlands. (Source: CMWSA 1996)

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Fig. 3.2  Waste recycling region for Calcutta city. (Source: CMWSA 1996)

system breaks down, Calcutta will face immense crises of drainage and conservancy, while 200,000 people will become impoverished. The wetlands also played a dominant role in maintaining climatic balance. They are known to produce and hold approximately 10 ml oxygen l−1 of water (Ghosh 1997). The vast stretches of marshland and water tracts in pre-reclamation days used to produce 99,000 l of oxygen min−1, but continued reclamation has reduced it to only 12,000 1 min−1 (Moitra 1997). The reclamation also had a devastating effect on the average wind speed, which has been reduced from 8  km  h−1 to 1.5  km  h−1 (Moitra 1997), creating discomfort in a hot, humid climate.

Metropolitan Planning and Development Efforts The first Development Plan for the Calcutta Metropolitan District was prepared in 1966 by the Government of West Bengal. They understood the ecological constraints of development and expansion of Calcutta and recommended a new growth pole (Kalyani–Bansberia) at 50 km north of Calcutta, where land had good bearing capacity and good ground water and could provide a counter-magnet to Calcutta (Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization (CMPO) 1966). Unfortunately, the plan was not followed up.

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Fig. 3.3  Eastward expansion of Calcutta

During the last quarter of a century, the Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) since its inception has carried out many infrastructure development initiatives oriented to implement three basic objectives, namely, to arrest the deterioration of civic infrastructure, encourage better use of the existing capacity to deliver urban services and provide for massive new growth. However, despite its success in the infrastructure development programme, the CMDA failed to prepare realistic, comprehensive and integrated development of the metropolis and the region. The perspective plan of 1976 abandoned the earlier bipolar approach and planned a series of growth centres along the linear corridor, which could relieve further eastward and westward expansion and retain the ecological balance (CMDA 1976). This was reiterated in the perspective plan of 1981 (CMDA 1981). Unfortunately, this plan has not been enacted. The West Bengal State Planning Board published a perspective plan for Calcutta 2011 and suggested two metro centres as ­counter-­magnets.

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The proposed centres were Uluberia-Bagnan on the west bank and Barasat-Barrackpore on the east bank (State Planning Board 1990). Uluberia-Bagnan appears to be unrealistic owing to drainage congestion and flooding. This conceptual plan has also not been followed up. As a result, the urban sprawl has begun to encroach on the fragile ecosystem to the east and south of Calcutta (Fig. 3.4). At present, the State Housing Board has initiated a new town at Rajarhat, to the northeast of Salt Lake City, with a projected population of 5 lakhs in an area of about 2500ha to absorb future metropolitan growth and establish a new business district complementary to the Central Business District (CBD) of Calcutta (Fig. 3.5). In the absence of a planned development effort elsewhere at present, the main focus of urban development activities in Calcutta (townships, commercial establishments like hotels, public and semi-public amenities, namely, Science city, large hospital, trade fair complex, film institute) is around the Eastern Metropolitan Bypass. The market-­driven urbanisation is likely to further intensify the adverse impact on the fragile ecosystem of the region, and will disturb the life support of the metropolis.

Ecological Threats—Summary Encroachment of Wetlands An area of 8000  ha of wetlands has been reduced to 3600  ha (Ghosh 1997) due to reclamation at different times for different purposes, from disposal of solid waste to extension of the city. The city of Calcutta is extending in the eastern and southern directions, as is the threat to the existence of these wetlands. In other parts of Calcutta’s metropolitan area urbanisation has caused hundreds of wetlands to be drained and reclaimed for building sites. New housing colonies in various parts of this region bear evidence of the same. Although the Calcutta metropolitan area still contains large tracts of lowlands submerged either temporarily or permanently, they are fast diminishing. Thus, natural drainage is disrupted, and basins are gradually being raised. The immediate problem arising out of this process is being felt through the creation of new drainage-congested areas. The adverse impact is also felt through air pollution, reduced wind speed and an increase in temperature.

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Fig. 3.4  Urban sprawl, new settlements and fragile ecosystem. (Source: CMDA 1993)

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Fig. 3.5  Location of new town at Rajarhat. (Source: CMDA 1996)

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Fall of Piezometric Surface There is a progressive decline in underground water level caused by sustained withdrawal of ground water by heavy duty tube wells. The southern part of Calcutta, which has lower value of groundwater transmissivity and therefore a lower potential for groundwater exploitation, is most reliant on it. In a general way, groundwater has been withdrawn in inner Calcutta, particularly the centre and south, in excess of its annual replenishment. According to the Central Ground Water Board report, published in 1993, the piezometric surface in central Calcutta has gone down by 5–9 m over a period of 34 years (from 1958 to 1992) on account of over-extraction of groundwater from the confined aquifer in excess of replenishment (CMWSA 1996). This poses hazards of land subsidence for the near future. It is therefore advisable not to increase, and indeed if possible to restrict, the tapping of groundwater within the limits of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation area. Destruction of Mangrove Ecosystem of Sundarbans The Sundarban Biosphere Reserve is the world’s largest mangrove ecosystem with a maximum bio-diversity area of about 10,000 km2 with forests and reclaimed land (CMWSA 1996). The area is just 30–40 km away from the southern periphery of the Calcutta Metropolitan area, and in between these areas, urbanisation has become rapid with the growth of a number of settlements. The rivulets have become silted, and investigation showed that due to considerable denudation of forest cover in the Sundarbans, saltwater has intruded into the land and also into the groundwater, causing an ecological imbalance in the area. Siltation and Blocking of the Canals and Waterways The centuries-old network of canals and waterways was in use until the end of World War II, after which they were neglected, became blocked with silt and were used as garbage dumps. This leads to waterlogging of streets for longer periods, with not just rainwater but the waste and refuse generated by millions of inhabitants. There are frequent outbreaks of infectious disease caused by waterborne germs and unhygienic lifestyle, with more and more neighbourhoods running into urban nightmares.

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Congestion of Open Space Apart from the loss of central open space due to developmental projects, the lungs of Calcutta are highly polluted by exhaust and the noise ­generated by traffic, taking away the tranquility of the open space. A rough calculation of pollution based on the volume of traffic, mode of traffic and mass emission factors recommended by the Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) was carried out, and this is shown in Table 3.1. Moitra (1997) has shown that the noise level fluctuates from very high levels of 85 dbA, along the peripheral roads, to 59 dbA in the middle of the central open space of the city’s Maidan. Extrapolation of the projected volume of traffic on the internal roads of the Maidan has shown that the noise level in the interior of the Maidan may go up to 65 dbA, which is 10  dbA higher than the permitted maximum for open spaces. The so-­ called lungs and peace centre of Calcutta is therefore likely to lose its ambience further in the coming years. Loss of Small Water Bodies Owing to Urban Expansion If we look at the pattern of land use changes in Calcutta, it is clearly visible that the small water bodies in particular are being lost rapidly due to urban expansion and real estate takeover. Their social (bathing, washing, congregation), economic (pisciculture and duckery) and environmental (drainage receptacle and microclimate modifier) role could be compared with that of the large and outstanding wetlands. The adverse social and environmental impact felt is significant. Recently a ban has been imposed on Table 3.1  Emission factors for pollutants recommended by Central Pollution Control Board and average actual concentration in Calcutta Pollutants

SPM NO Hydrocarbons CO

Permitted max, concentration in open space (μg m−3)

100 30 200 700

Average actual concentration (μg m−3) Day

Night

230 170 600 1300

50 100 300 900

Source: CPCB status report on “Pollutants level of Calcutta”, 1997 SPM: Suspended particulate matters, NOx: Oxides of nitrogen, CO: Carbon monoxide

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abuse and filling up of water bodies, but only after severe damage has been done. Need for Alternative Strategy The course of development of Calcutta indicates the lack of understanding at all concerned levels about the inevitable link between the carrying capacity of the supporting ecosystem and the pattern of metropolitan development. The urban development mode adopted in Calcutta is primarily a collection of compartmentalised sectoral projects that are often unrelated, with different gestation periods and devoid of any concern for their ecological consequences. Therefore, it becomes imperative that we reorient the development strategy in the twenty-first century to respond to the ecological reality and create a new ethos for sustainable city building. The strategy should include the following key features.

Responding to Ecological Imperatives for Urban Development Programmes The future of Calcutta depends on accepting the ecological imperatives. The land is soft, and it will not bear a generally high-rise city. Already, severe problems have arisen through the collapse of buildings, changes in the water table, increase of traffic volume and increase of temperature. Water is going to be increasingly scarce; therefore, recycling has to be seriously considered. In a congested low-rise city, it may be difficult to have a decentralised system based on appropriate technology, but the wetlands adjacent to the city can provide the recycling facilities, if they are judiciously conserved. The essential ecological and environmental features like the river and canal systems, the wetlands, the linear corridor and the ecosystem on which the city in future will survive should be subjected to the test of conservation for any urban development proposal.

Using the Concept of Urban Agriculture Urban agriculture is a new concept in the realm of conservation activities, and is generally understood as a package of diverse farming systems on urban land and linked with various urban processes. For example, some Chinese cities produce 90 percent of their own food needs within the city.

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The major objectives of urban agriculture include production of food and the creation of job opportunities, and it is precisely in this context that the Calcutta experience is rated highly for demonstrating an age-old tradition of using waste to grow food and sustain several thousand families at the city’s edge. Therefore, urban agriculture can solve a number of problems of the metropolis, and it has economic, nutritional, environmental improvement, and land and waste management potential.

Ensuring Participation of Urban Communities Dependent on Waste Recycling in the Process of Decision Making The call of sustainable development of human settlements made for the last three decades, and the “Istanbul declaration on human settlements and habitat agenda” and New Urban Agenda 2016, has made this the central issue. However, sustainability cannot be achieved in Calcutta without commensurate participation by the urban communities, particularly the population at risk and those who are dependent on waste recycling systems to earn their livelihood. Decentralisation of the decision-making process is one of the major prerequisites. Responsive participation can only be ensured through a plan of action and distribution of activities which is relevant at all levels. The present pattern of preparation of plans or megaprojects at the macro level, where broad decisions are taken without meaningful public participation, needs to be replaced by parallel exercises at all levels so that the levels are comprehensively taken care of.

Introducing the Concept of Ecological Planning as a Tool for Metropolitan Planning Planning as a profession has evolved out of an eclectic concept of built environment and it is devoid of any biophysical input. Understanding of ecosystems, and classification of the environmental status of land, water and air, and correlating them into an integrated planning paradigm to arrive at decision-making criteria has not yet become part of the planning tool. The biophysical input can create an ideal environmental information and management system, which is necessary to reorient current planning practice.

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Dicastri et  al. (1984) indicated the need to enlist a comprehensive inventory of resources, both natural and manmade, to have control over the consumption and monitoring of resources, and also over the monitoring of their impact. It is a new perspective that metropolitan planners have to learn, and success will be best achieved through the process of e­ cological planning. The process will structure appropriate responses to the ecological/environmental problems that affect metropolitan living by evolving a strategy combining social, natural, scientific and engineering aspects that would translate societal need into an ecological ethic and must be capable of working at different levels of settlements within the metropolis. Environmental management should focus on the ecological sciences; ensure interaction among the disciplines of planning, civil engineering, architecture, industrial technologies, pollution management, landscaping, law and economics and relate them to urban and regional land use planning management of natural resources and allocation and management of land. The precise structure of the ecological planning process was provided by McHarg (1969) in six steps: (i) ecological inventory (climate, geology, hydrology, physiography, soil, vegetation, wildlife), (ii) historic and cultural inventory, (iii) description of natural process, (iv) description of limiting factors (natural hazards, water regime, etc.), (v) attribution of relative values and (vi) arriving at land capability and suitability. The correlation between various natural resources can be obtained by laying the information over a series of spatially compatible maps. Basic environmental and use compatibility criteria can be evolved and spatially tested against the distribution of natural resources. Using this as a basis for attributing values and by establishing interrelationships among crucial elements that influence the planning process, land capability and land use suitability, spatial maps can be prepared for optimal uses and can be defended on scientific parameters. The approach provides the base for creating an inventory of spatial data and offers the opportunity for creative interaction with professionals dealing in biotic and abiotic fields. The process also accommodates varying perceptions, and a wider range of values leading to pragmatic decisions for evolving an optimum land use pattern.

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Conclusion Unlike in the past, metropolitan planning has a very meaningful and constructive role to play for the future of Calcutta. The development of the metropolis does not mean expansion of urban limits, ignoring the ecology, and it also does not mean just building satellite towns and new houses, or laying roads, flyovers and sewer lines. Rather, it means rationally directing the forces that govern people’s lives and setting new values for them. A new generation of metropolitan planning, and development activities, should emerge in the twenty-first century where ecology and economics will set the basis of the decision-making process.

References Calcutta Metropolitan Development Authority (CMDA) (1976) Development Perspective for Calcutta. CMDA (1981) Updated Development Perspective for Calcutta. CMDA (1993) Status Report of Fragile Ecosystem of Calcutta. CMDA (1996) Development Plan of New Town at Rajarhat. Calcutta Metropolitan Planning Organization (CMPO) (1966) Basic Development Plan for Calcutta Metropolitan Area. Calcutta Metropolitan Water Supply Sanitation Authority (CMWSA) (1996) Sustaining Calcutta, Present Status Report of the Urban Environment. Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) (1997) Status Report, Pollutants Level of Calcutta. Chaudhuri S (1990) Calcutta the Living City. Oxford University Press, North Carolina. Dicastri F, Baker F N G and Hadley M (1984) Ecology in Practice, Vol. II. Tycooly International Publishing Limited, Dublin, pp. 11–13. Ghosh S (1995) Ecology and Environment-Future Development Calcutta— Howrah Metropolis, In: Proc. Workshop Direction of Future Development of Calcutta–Howrah Metropolis. B.E. College, pp. 2–14. Ghosh D J (1997) Nature Conservation and Environmental Concern in Urban Planning and Development. In: Process Workshop, Urbanization Policy for West Bengal in Twenty First Century—Issue and Prospects. FOSET, Calcutta, pp. 119–120. McHarg L L (1969) Design with Nature. Falcon Press, Philadelphia, pp. 86–112. Moitra A K (1997) Ecological Imperatives for Future of Calcutta. Spatio Economic Development Record 4 (5): 34–44. State Planning Board, Govt. of West Bengal (1990) Perspective Plan for Calcutta—2011.

CHAPTER 4

De facto State Religion as a Threat to Freedom of Religion and Belief: Case Study of Ethnic Chin Christians in Burma/ Myanmar Khen Suan Khai Introduction The 2015 election ended more than 50 years of entirely military-­controlled government in Burma/Myanmar, yet the new government still faces a myriad of human rights challenges. While the world is focusing on political change in the country, the issue of Freedom of Religion or Belief remains one of the most pressing rights issues in Burma/Myanmar, which must be addressed urgently and meaningfully as an integral part of the national reconciliation effort. This chapter highlights the persecution, discrimination and denial of basic rights that many religious minorities and ethnic nationalities face at the hands of state and non-state actors. In particular, the chapter focuses on the pervasive and longstanding persecution and discrimination faced by Christians that have persisted, often unreported, for generations in Burma/Myanmar, with a case study of indigenous ethnic Chin Christians. K. S. Khai (*) Mae Fah Luang University, Chiang Rai, Thailand e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_4

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Located in the remote mountain ranges of northwestern Burma/ Myanmar, the Chin State is home to around 500,000 ethnic Chin (Department of Population 2016). Today the Chin are 90 percent Christian, in a country that is predominantly Buddhist, and Christianity is largely viewed as an integral part of the Chin identity. The Christian religion is deeply rooted in Chin society. Since the first Chin conversion in the late 1800s following the arrival of American Baptist missionaries in the Chin Hills, Christianity gradually became accepted by a large majority of the Chin population, who had practised traditional animism for centuries. Other powers, such as the surrounding Bengali, Indian or Burman, had never conquered the Chin, and, by extension, Islam, Hinduism and Buddhism had never reached them. A century later, Christianity has evolved into almost a second culture of the Chin people. Religions are systems of beliefs and practices, myths, rites and worship that have the effect of uniting members of a group, ensuring its existence and often even its ethnic identity. As noted above, this is particularly true for the Chin, as Christianity helped to unify them and create a shared common identity as ethnic Chin. Chin political identification with Christianity has arguably been at the root of extreme Burman nationalist resentment towards the Chin. Throughout successive state authorities, the denial of religious freedom in Burma/Myanmar today, particularly for minority groups like Chin Christians, is rooted in discrimination on the dual basis of ethnicity and religion. A brief exploration of two intertwined issues helps to contextualise violations of religious freedom facing Christian communities in Burma/Myanmar today: the enduring, constitutionally-­ entrenched power of the military, and the elevation of Buddhism as the de facto state religion. The chapter tracks the pattern of religious freedom violations perpetrated against the Chin people in Burma/Myanmar, including the way in which successive state authorities have attempted to force the Chin to assimilate, as part of a misguided effort to create a single national identity rooted in Buddhism, and to convert to Buddhism at the government’s “Border Areas National Races Youth Development Training Schools,” operated under the Ministry of Border Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture with the support of the national budget. This study draws on over fifty in-depth qualitative interviews, primarily covering incidents that took place between March 2004 and early 2016. Thirty-four of the interviews were conducted in Chin State.

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The Right to Freedom of Religion Under International Human Rights Law The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), together with the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), forms the so-called International Bill of Human Rights. Article 18 of the UDHR proclaims that Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching, practice, worship and observance.

The right to freedom of religion or belief is widely recognised as having customary international law status. It is guaranteed under Article 18 of the ICCPR, which has been described by the Human Rights Council (HRC), the monitoring body for the ICCPR, as “far-reaching and profound” (HRC 1993: 1). It is also given legal form in the various regional human rights instruments. In addition, since 1986 the UN Commission on Human Rights (now the UN Human Rights Council, HRC) has mandated a Special Rapporteur on religious intolerance, now known as the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief. The primary instruments upon which the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief bases his activities are Article 18 of the 1948 UDHR, Article 18 of the 1966 ICCPR, and the 1981 Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (hereinafter referred to as the 1981 Declaration on Religion), which further addresses the issue of religious discrimination. In June 2010, the HRC extended this mandate for a further three years in recognition of the ongoing need for the important contribution of the Special Rapporteur to the protection, promotion and universal implementation of the right to freedom of religion or belief (The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 2010). Both the HRC and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief have sought to clarify particular aspects of the right to religious freedom. The HRC has clarified that freedom of thought, conscience and religion (known as forum internum), that is, the right to choose a religion,

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is an absolute right and cannot be interfered with in any way. The Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief has noted: Special attention must be given to the forum internum component of freedom of religion or belief, which enjoys the status of an absolute guarantee under international human rights law. With regard to the freedom to manifest one’s religion or belief, both the positive and negative aspects of that freedom must be equally ensured, i.e. the freedom to express one’s conviction as well as the freedom not to be exposed to any pressure, especially from the State authorities or in State institutions, to practice religious or belief activities against one’s will.

Article 18.2 of the ICCPR proclaims, “No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.” (33) According to the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, “[A]ny form of coercion by State and non-State actors aimed at religious conversion is prohibited under international human rights law, and any such acts have to be dealt with within the remit of criminal and civil law.” The right to manifest one’s own religion or belief (known as forum externum, including, but not limited to, the construction of places of worship and religious symbols) is set out in full in Article 6 of the 1981 Declaration on Religion. Article 18.3 of ICCPR qualifies: “Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.” However, the HRC has noted that “limitations… must be directly related and proportionate to the specific need on which they are predicated. Restrictions may not be imposed for discriminatory purposes or applied in a discriminatory manner” (89). Under international human rights law, special attention is also given to the situation of children and minorities. Article 14 of the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC (to which Burma/Myanmar is a state party), sets out the right of the child to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, while Article 30 states: In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities or persons of indigenous origin exist, a child belonging to such a minority or who is indigenous shall not be denied the right, in community with other members

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of his or her group, to enjoy his or her own culture, to profess and practice his or her own religion, or to use his or her own language.

Article 1 of the 1992 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities proclaims: States shall protect the existence and the national or ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic identity of minorities within their respective territories and shall encourage conditions for the promotion of that identity. States shall adopt appropriate legislative and other measures to achieve those ends.

Article 8 of the 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples goes even further by stating: Indigenous peoples and individuals have the right not to be subjected to forced assimilation or destruction of their culture. States shall provide effective mechanisms for prevention of, and redress for any form of forced assimilation or integration.

Religions in Burma/Myanmar Theravada Buddhism is the main religion shared by the majority of ethnic Burmans, as well as the Shan, Arakanese/Rakhine and Mon ethnic nationality groups. However, the Shan, Arakanese/Rakhine and Mon manifest their religion in accordance with their own historic traditions, which differ slightly from the Burmans. Christianity is predominant among the Chin, Kachin and Naga ethnic groups. Christianity is also widely practised among the Karen and Karenni ethnic groups, although many Karen and Karenni are Buddhist and some Karens are Muslims. Islam is practised in the Arakan State, primarily by the ethnic minority Rohingya1 group, and in urban areas of the Rangoon, Irrawaddy, Magway and Mandalay regions by ethnic Burmans and Indians. According to official government statistics, Buddhism is professed by 87.9 percent of the population, followed by Christianity at 6.2 percent, Islam at 4.3 percent and others at 1.6 percent (Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture 2015). 1  The origins of the Rohingya people are disputed. The term Rohingya is self-identifying and rejected by the Burmese government and many people from Burma/Myanmar. However, the fact that they are an ethnic, linguistic and religious minority numbering between 725,000 and 800,000 people in three northern townships of Arakan State is indisputable.

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Situation of Freedom of Religion or Belief in Burma/Myanmar Since 1999, the US government has designated Burma/Myanmar as a “Country of Particular Concern” for particularly severe violations of religious freedom (United States Commission on International Religious Freedom 2018). Issues of religious freedom have been repeatedly raised with the authorities in Burma/Myanmar by successive Special Rapporteurs on freedom of religion or belief and the situation of human rights in Burma/Myanmar. In the new civilian government era, at least 100,000 Kachin, primarily Christians, remain internally displaced in camps due to ongoing conflicts with Burma/Myanmar Tatmadaw (military). The longstanding conflicts, although not religious in nature, have deeply affected Christian community groups like the Kachin Baptist Convention and others who have worked during the year to assist those displaced. It has been nearly a year since local relief groups and NGOs requested permission to contribute support to the IDPs and were turned down by the state government. In 2015, conditions remained grave for Rohingya Muslims, particularly those in Rakhine State and especially the approximately 140,000 confined in deplorable camps. On 22 October 2012, based exclusively on the Chin Human Rights Organization’s report findings (CHRO 2012), five Special Procedures Mandate Holders under the UN HRC wrote to former Burmese President Thein Sein alleging serious rights violations against Chin Christians under his government and the previous military regime. Sadly, many of the important issues raised in the letter remain unaddressed today. Therefore, as noted, the issue of Freedom of Religion or Belief remains one of the most pressing rights issues in Burma/ Myanmar, which must be addressed urgently and meaningfully as an integral part of the national reconciliation effort.

Elevation of Buddhism as the De facto State Religion Buddhism has been so much entwined with Burma/Myanmar’s culture, nationality and heritage that successive Burmese regimes have tended to use Buddhism—in a distorted and perverted form—for their political purposes, to be intolerant of other beliefs, and to distort Buddhism from a peaceful philosophy into a violent and nationalistic ideology. Following the military coup in 1962, successive military regimes viewed Christianity

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as a foreign religion, and therefore a threat to creating a homogenous national identity for citizens of the Union of Burma/Myanmar. Under successive military regimes in Burma/Myanmar, “Burmanisation,” an unwritten policy of forced assimilation in the name of ‘nation-building’, attempted to assimilate all ethnic nationalities into mainstream Burman culture, in order to create a single national identity, which is also known as the three Bs or “one race (Burman), one language (Burmese) and one religion (Buddhism)” policy. All three Constitutions of Burma/Myanmar have elevated “the special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union,” instead of the state’s neutrality in religious matters in a multi-religious, multi-ethnic plural society like Burma/Myanmar. In defence of Buddhism, the previous government led by Thein Sein allowed expressions of hatred and intolerance towards religious minorities and ethnic nationalities to continue unchecked, and shepherded the passage into law of four discriminatory “race and religion bills”2 in December 2014. Interlinked with Buddhism as the de facto state religion is the issue of institutionalised discrimination against Christians. Religion and ethnicity are denoted on National Registration Cards, which enables discrimination. Interlocutors consistently cited examples of Christian employees being overlooked for promotion within the civil service and other government sectors, in favour of Buddhists. Contributions are still reportedly being taken from Christian civil servants’ salaries for Buddhist activities, such as building a pagoda or organising Buddhist New Year (Thingyan) celebrations. Government workers dare not refuse, for fear of losing their jobs or other negative consequences. Within the education system, the practice of regarding Buddhism as the de facto state religion causes problems for Christian students. Students are still expected to pay homage to the Buddha or recite Buddhist scriptures in state schools. From around September—November all school children—regardless of their religious background—have to observe the Uposatha, known in Burmese as upoh nayh, or Buddhist Sabbath. When this falls on a weekday, school is substituted on Saturdays or Sundays. This interferes with the right to assemble for religious worship on Sundays. The government does not officially recognise degrees and other qualifications offered by Christian theological

2  Monogamy Law, Religious Conversion Law, Interfaith Marriage Law and Population Control Law.

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colleges and universities, even though they are held in high regard by the private and NGO sectors, and enjoy international recognition. Christian interlocutors described how many of the discriminatory policies and practices instituted by the successive military regimes continue today, and pointed to the Ministries of Religious Affairs & Culture, Border Affairs and the General Administration Department under the Ministry of Home Affairs, as well as the military itself, as key actors in religious freedom violations (Lambrecht 2000; Schreiber 2004;  Christian Solidarity Worldwide 2007; Richards et al. 2011).

Induced and Coerced Conversion of Chin Christians From the early 1990s onwards, the military increased their occupation of predominantly Christian Chin, Kachin and other ethnic areas, destroying Christian churches and crosses while simultaneously expanding Buddhist infrastructure such as monasteries and pagodas, at times with the use of forced labour exacted from Christians. Most of the deep-rooted institutionalised discriminations are on dual basis of ethnicity and religion. The overlap between racial and religious discrimination is a common phenomenon that is especially grave and often has very tragic consequences. Induced and coerced conversion of Chin Christians for decades included conversion for financial incentives, food rations and to secure job promotions. Chin Christians have also converted to Buddhism to avoid demands for forced labour and extortion from the Burma Army and local authorities. For some, conversion provides a sense of security, a means to try to avoid becoming the target of human rights abuses, and to ease economic hardship. Additionally, in early 1992, the military regime, the State Law and Order Restoration Council, established the Progress of the Border Areas & National Races Development Programme, under the military-run Ministry of Border Affairs (MoBA). The MoBA is responsible for implementation in accordance with instructions from a Central Committee headed by the President. The first Border Areas National Races Youth Development Training Schools—more commonly known by their Burmese acronym of Na Ta La—were opened under the programme in late 1999, which first exposed coerced conversion to Buddhism at the schools. According to 2016 statistics from the MoBA, there are 39 of these schools across the country, with more than half in Chin, Kachin and Naga areas. The successive government has described the Na Ta La schools as a key component of a “30-year master plan for the development

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of border areas and national races” (CEDAW 2007), the language used to assert that the government is actively promoting ethnic and religious minority rights as part of its obligations under the CRC (UNGA 2011: para. 100; CRC 2012). The government has also claimed that the schools facilitate cultural exchange between the diverse ethnic groups, and that students have the right to follow their chosen religion at the schools. There are ten Border Areas National Races Youth Development Training Schools in Chin State. However, there is very little publicly-­ available information about the Na Ta La schools’ programme. According to the 2016 statistics of the Ministry of Border Affairs, of more than 5000 trainees attending the thirty-nine schools across Burma, more than 1000 are Chin. Primary, secondary and tertiary education is provided under the Border Affairs Ministry, targeted at the country’s “national races” (primarily ethnic and religious minorities). Entry to the thirty-nine Na Ta La schools is either free of charge or much cheaper than attending the standard school system, and food and lodging is provided to the students. The fact that they are boarding schools is particularly attractive to Chin high-­ school students from remote rural villages, who would otherwise need to stay with relatives in town in order to complete their high-school education, as there are very few high-schools in remote areas. At the heart of the Na Ta La schools’ recruitment strategy is the powerful incentive of a guaranteed government position after graduation. The Ministries of Border Affairs and Religious Affairs and Culture work in close cooperation in the implementation of the programme. The 1993 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) decree The Development of Border Areas and National Races Law provided for “the promotion and propagation of the Sasana (Buddhism) in the development areas.” While the Department for the Promotion and the Propagation of the Sasana—and by extension, the Hill Regions Buddhist Mission—operates under the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture, the Na Ta La schools are under direct military command within the Ministry of Border Affairs. Monks and Buddhist laymen from the Hill Regions Buddhist Mission are involved in recruitment to the Na Ta La schools, and also teach at the schools in Chin State. Abject poverty is the main factor that has made Chin Christians particularly vulnerable to recruitment to the Na Ta La schools. Generally, Na Ta La is their only option to continue their education. Chin Christian Na Ta La attendees face forced coercion and other human rights violations at the schools. The authority has asserted that students are free to practise their

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own religion at the Na Ta La schools. None of the Na Ta La attendees were informed of the need to convert to Buddhism; for those who entered Na Ta La in 8th, 9th and 10th standard, the main inducement was the promise of free education and a guaranteed government position after graduation. Na Ta La attendees who attended the schools in various towns in Chin State at various times all had slightly different experiences of the curriculum and routine. The students were taught the usual subjects during normal lesson hours, but were also taught Buddhism either in the evenings or at weekends. Most attendees of Na Ta La schools interviewed by the author have recounted being forced to shave their heads and wear monks’ robe during summer school break. Before 2010, the most common—and the most recently reported—form of coercion was the threat of military conscription. Township Religious Affairs and Hill Regions Buddhist Mission have reported to the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture on how they have promoted and propagated Buddhism through coerced conversion of poor Chin Christian students into monkhood. This mission itself is carried out under one of the three main departments of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. One of the most pivotal among its four objectives is “the purification, perpetuation, promotion and propagation of the Theravada Buddhist Sasana.” The Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture is composed of three departments: department of religious affairs, department for promotion and propagation of Sasana (Buddhist Missionary Works in Borders and Hilly Regions (Hill Region Buddhist Mission)) and the International Theravada Buddhist Missionary University. The department for promotion and propagation of Sasana has been working closely with Hill Region Buddhist missionaries with the support of the state budget, recruiting poor ethnic children to Buddhist monastic schools in conjunction with the Na Ta La schools, which are in fact residential schools. On the other hand, Buddhist laymen missionaries (known locally as lu thatana pyu (Lu Ta Pyu)) are trained and paid by monks under the Hill Regions Buddhist Mission, to counterattack local Christians, especially pastors and missionaries. They are reportedly given financial rewards for converting to Buddhism themselves, and for converting others. There are also some reports that Lu Ta Pyu receive training to denigrate Christianity.

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Conclusion For decades, the Chin have suffered deep-rooted, institutionalised discrimination on the dual basis of their ethnicity and religion. Since the SLORC/State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) era, this has manifested as a pattern of widespread and systematic violations of their fundamental human rights, particularly religious freedom, perpetrated by state actors. Over a period of many years, religious freedom violations have often intersected with other serious human rights violations, such as forced labour, torture and other cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment. For example, worship services and religious gatherings have often been disrupted by Burma Army soldiers, who have taken worshippers for portering and subjected them to torture and other ill-treatment. A distorted version of Buddhism continues to be imposed by the authorities on the predominantly Christian Chin as a tool of oppression, and arguably as part of an unwritten policy of forced assimilation. Although the new civilian government has initiated some political changes in Burma/Myanmar, the right to religious freedom is still not meaningfully addressed as the policies of the Ministry of Border Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture are still the same as in the SLORC/SPDC era in terms of implementing the promotion and propagation of Buddhism within the state budget. The consequences of such human rights violations perpetrated against the Chin are far-reaching. There are an estimated 50,000 Chin refugees and asylum-seekers in Malaysia, 12,000 in Delhi and as many as 100,000 Chin living in Mizoram, northeast India, which borders the Chin State. Since the Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture is working solely for Buddhism as a state religion, it is the new government’s duty to review the role of this ministry as an integral part of reform. It would be a better choice to abolish the ministry if it continues to implicate itself in human rights violations not only against religious minorities like Chin Christians and Muslims, but also against monks and nuns for their perceived political activism. Moreover, the government should abolish the Education and Training Department under the Ministry of Border Affairs and reallocate the funding to the teaching of ethnic nationality languages within the national curriculum, under a properly-financed, restructured and decentralised Ministry of Education. Since international aid is flowing rapidly into Burma/Myanmar, it is vital to ensure that development projects are established and implemented according to the 2008 United Nations Development Group Guidelines

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on Indigenous Peoples’ Issues, in particular by fully adopting the principles of the UN Common Understanding on the Human Rights Based Approach. Thus, development aid can prioritise human development and grass-roots empowerment, as well as infrastructure development, instead of allowing some ministries like the Ministry of Border Affairs and Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture to promote and propagate one single religion in Burma/Myanmar in the guise of development.

References CEDAW (2007) Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Combined Second and Third Periodic Reports of States Parties: Myanmar. http://undocs.org/CEDAW/C/MMR/3. Accessed 8 January 2019. Christian Solidarity Worldwide (2007) Carrying the Cross: The Military Regime’s Campaign of Restriction, Discrimination and Persecution against Christians in Burma. Christian Solidarity Worldwide, London. CHRO (2012) Threats to Our Existence: Persecution of Ethnic Chin Christians in Burma. Chin Human Rights Organization, Ontario. http://www.chro.ca/ images/stories/files/PDF/EC_Threats_to_Our_Existence.pdf. Accessed 8 January 2019. CRC (2012) Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations: Myanmar. https://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno= CRC/C/MMR/CO/3-4&Lang=En. Accessed 8 January 2019. Department of Population (2016) The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census: Census Report Volume 2-C: The Union Report: Religion. Ministry of Labour, Immigration and Population, Nay Pyi Daw. Human Rights Committee (1993) General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. http://undocs.org/CCPR/C/21/ Rev.1/Add.4. Accessed 8 January 2019. Lambrecht C (2000) Destruction and Violation: Burma’s Border Development Policies. Mekong Region Watershed 5 (2), pp. 28–33. Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture (2015) Ministry of Religious Affairs and Culture. http://www.mora.gov.mm/mora_sasana1.aspx. Accessed 8 January 2019. Richards A, Parmar P and Sollom R (2011) Life Under the Junta: Evidence of Crimes Against Humanity in Burma’s Chin State. Physicians for Human Rights, Cambridge.

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Schreiber A (2004) Human Rights in Myanmar/Burma: The Church under Military Dictatorship. Pontifical Mission Society Human Rights Office, Rome. U.S.  Commission on International Religious Freedom (2018) The U.S Commission on International Religious Freedom Annual Report (2010–2018). https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/2018USCIRFAR.pdf. Accessed 8 January 2019. UNGA (2010) 14/11Freedom of Religion or Belief: Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Religion or Belief. https://spinternet.ohchr.org/_ Layouts/SpecialProceduresInternet/Download.aspx?SymbolNo=A%2FHRC% 2FRES%2F14%2F11&Lang=en. Accessed 8 January 8 2019. UNGA (2011) Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review: Myanmar. http://undocs.org/A/HRC/17/9. Accessed 8 January 2019.

CHAPTER 5

Escalation of Ethno-Cultural Tensions in Southern Thailand in the Midst of Assimilation and Homogenisation Takashi Tsukamoto

Introduction This chapter covers the period from the early twentieth century to World War II. It looks at how Thai ruling élites, monarchs (King Vajiravudh), and civilian and military officials (mainly Field Marshal Phibun Songkram) identified, recognised and depicted the Deep South as an un-Thai field. After the national boundary of Siam was established through the negotiation between European colonial powers and the Thai ruling élites in the early twentieth century, Muslims who were ethnically Malay became part of the Thai nation, and after the 1932 revolution which overthrew the absolute monarchy and introduced a new constitution, those Malays formally became Thai citizens. The Deep South loomed large in the creation of the un-Thai. The identification of the Deep South as un-Thai was an outcome of the determination of Siam’s boundary. The Deep South, once belonging to an independent kingdom of Patani, was incorporated into the territory of T. Tsukamoto (*) Yamanashi Gakuin University, Yamanashi, Japan © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_5

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Thailand in the early twentieth century. It was incorporated through negotiations between Thai ruling élites and colonial powers, notably the British, and later the Japanese. Through this ad hoc geographical arrangement, the Deep South emerged as an uncertain and unknown space for Thai ruling élites. In this chapter, I look at the historical transformation of the Deep South after the Siamese state’s centralisation. The chapter examines how ruling élites identified and defined the status of the Deep South within broader notions of Thai culture, Thai national identity and Thainess. In particular, it analyses how the Deep South and the Malay-Muslims became un-Thai in the eyes of the Siamese élites in the period of nation-building. I examine pre-1932 monarchical centralisation, particularly under Vajiravudh and cultural integration pursued by the post-1932 civilian and military governments, and their impact in the Deep South. I look at élites’ identification of the Deep South as un-Thai by examining the imagined community of the linguistic-cultural national Self (Anderson B R 1991). My analysis shows that the period this chapter covers was a period of the emergence of national consciousness among the Thai ruling élites not because they completed the construction of the Thai nation or nationhood then, but because they became aware of the existence of “Others within” who were ethnoculturally non-Thai within the geographical boundary of Thailand.

The Imagined Community of Thailand: Disintegration or Integration of Difference? In the reign of Chulalongkorn, the ruling élites’ efforts to establish the geo-body of Siam moved the Malay-Muslims inside the state’s boundary. Their successors’ attempts to create an imagined national community involved trying to linguistically and culturally transform the Malay-­ Muslims into Thais. For the purpose of establishing the imagined community, the élites attempted to erase the differences which separated the Malay-Muslims from the Thais. In the reign of Vajiravudh (1910–1925), Thai élites developed the goal of creating a Thai nation in which all Thai citizens would imagine themselves as Thai by speaking the Thai language.1 1  This goal of the imagined national community has not yet been achieved in contemporary Thailand. For example, the report of the National Reconciliation Council (NRC) published in May 2006, based on the Council’s investigation of the situation of the Deep South, responding to local demands, called for the recognition of the local Malay dialect as a

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This approach entailed a new effort to highlight the existence of “un-­ Thai” groups within the national community. Vajiravudh’s labelling of the Chinese as the “Jews of the Orient” (1914) and the “Clogs on Our Wheels” (1915) was the most explicit example of his efforts to highlight ethnic differences with the nation-state. The Chinese, for Vajiravudh, were enemies of Thailand who should be eradicated, as a distinct group. Kasian Tejapira (1997: 78) argues that Vajiravudh’s policies towards ethnic Chinese involved: the imagining of an “uncommunity” between Thais and the Chinese in Siam in which a Chino-Siamese or Sino-Thai ethnocultural identity is discursively impossible. However, whereas Furnivall inferred from his “plural society” assumption that colonial Burma was incapable of nationhood, King Vajiravudh concluded that the only way to hold the Siamese uncommunity together was to let it be dominated culturally and politically by the Thai race.

The same might be said for the case of the Deep South when Vajiravudh promulgated the Compulsory Primary Education Act in 1921. With this Act, all Malay-Muslims were required to attend Thai primary schools. The Act also promoted the Thai language by compelling children in the country to learn it inside and outside schools (for details, see below). By issuing this law, Vajiravudh emphasised the significance of the spread and development of primary schooling (for seven to fourteen-year-old children) everywhere in Thailand, and let investigators, appointed by provincial governors, to strictly control the primary education system (NA STh 2/173). Vajiravudh applied this act to a number of monthon,2 but the monthon Patani was the first on his list of the development of compulsory primary education (NA STh 2/173, pp.  20–27). Important elements of this act were: Article 7: If children reach fourteen years old (the final year of the primary school) and still cannot read and write in Thai, they have to continue to study in school for extra year(s) until they can read and write Thai reasonably;

­ working language”. By proposing the use of the local Malay dialect, authors of the NRC “ report consciously or unconsciously point out the incomplete or unsuccessful construction of the imagined community through the Thai language. 2  The act was not applied to every monthon in the country. The monthons where it applied were Patani, Nakhon Chaisri, Chanthaburi, Nakhon Sawan, Phitsanulok, Ayudhya and Nakhon Ratchasima.

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Article 11: Children do not have to come to school if their parents provide knowledge to their children. But these children have to take the examination to be held at each district (amphoe) once a year. If they do not pass it, their parents have to send their children to school; Article 28-2: A mosque should have not more than three Islamic teachers.

The Act had contradictory implications. On the one hand, it might be said that it aimed to lessen the difference between Thais and Malay-Muslims, by forcing the latter to learn Thai. This itself was problematic because, as Che Man (1990: 64) argues, to the Malay-Muslims, “it was crucial that their young children should not be exposed to education that would divert their attention from their teachings of Islam”. On the other hand, Vajiravudh did not generate an explicit imagined “un-community” as he did with the ethnic Chinese. Vajiravudh did not depict the Malay-Muslims as un-Thai. The Primary School Education Act required Malay-speaking Muslim children to read and write Thai “reasonably (pho somkhuan)”, but not perfectly or fluently, and it did not stipulate the abolition of the Malay language or Islam. In fact, Vajiravudh, from the very beginning of his reign, tried to establish himself as a protector of Malay-Muslims. He paid special attention to Malay-Muslims, who, he believed, needed to be loyal to him. When Vajiravud became king, he promised that he would provide Muslims with cultural freedom. In 1910 he met representatives of Muslims from the South and told them that3: All Muslim people have known that policies of the Siamese monarchy have supported Muslims throughout history. The monarchy has supported every religion, nationality and language. The monarchy helps people of all religions, nationalities and languages equally. I intend to be generous to Islam as I have been to other religions. All Muslim people believe that I have full capacity to make you happy. (As you had already experienced in the previous reign)

I believe that when necessary, Muslim people will help us to protect the country in the same way as you protect your own religion. This behaviour is the one you should follow. Because this is the way Mohammad, who sacrificed himself to protect his religion, instructed. That is why, I believe, 3  This document does not specify the place of this meeting. Yet it can be assumed that Vajiravudh met these representatives in Bangkok.

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people who devote themselves to the religion of Mohammad would follow his instruction (Vajiravudh (King) 1929: 157). Interestingly, Vajiravudh referred to Islamic teachings to seek loyalty from Malay-Muslims. For him, whether or not Malay-Muslims could be accepted as loyal “subjects” was not dependent upon their entry into the Thai nation or the religion of Buddhism. Vajiravudh required Malay-­ Muslims to be dependent upon only one element of the three sacred pillars of his official nationalism: loyalty to the monarchy. Vajiravudh’s policy, including the Primary School Education Act, was intended to integrate former multiple tributary states under the full patronage of the monarchy. Damrong, who was engaged in the provincial administration reform, endorsed this view. As Damrong (NA R7 SB 2.28/13) said: The provincial governor seems to believe that government policy aims to transform people in Patani into Thais. However, as a person who has implemented the policy, I will point out that the government does not have this kind of objective at all. The key object is to abolish the status of tributary states and to place them under the control of the monthon Patani in the same way as in the case of other monthons. As for the populace, whether they are Malays or Thais is not of any significance. The objective of the government is to give happiness to every person without considering which nationality they are and which language they speak. The reason I say this is because, in my opinion, there are many examples of other countries which tried to change the nation (chat) of the populace and which always generated resistance from the populace to the government. In Siam, our government and policies always do not aim to destroy their nations.

When Vajiravudh encountered local resistance movements among MalayMuslims after the implementation of the 1921 Primary School Education Act,4 he revised the Act and established new guidelines for ruling the Deep South (Kong prasan rachakan krom mahathai 1962: 8; Khajadphai 1976:

4  A famous example was the 1922 Namsai rebellion. The rebellion was inspired by the former charismatic raja of Patani, Tengku Abdul Kadir Qamaruddin. Abdul Kadir was imprisoned in Phitsanulok for two years and nine months and released and returned to Patani in 1904. In 1915, he left for Kelantan, where, with the assistance of the raja of Kelantan, he continued to provide inspiration for resistance movements against Thai rule (Surin 1982: 57; Che Man 1990: 64). In 1922, the former Malay nobility, whom the Thai government had deprived of their authority, and religious leaders ordered villagers of Namsai village in Mayo district not to pay taxes to the government (Che Man 1990: 64).

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318–319; Surin 1982: 68).5 The new guidelines can be summarised as follows: • Not to let the populace (phonlamuang) in the Deep South feel suppressed because of their religion, Islam. To be supportive of Islam. • Taxation collected from the populace should be lower than that in the Malay states under the British. • Government officers appointed to serve in the region need to be careful not to utilise power in an illegitimate way. They must not insult the population as if the populace were foreigners. • All official activities conducted by government officers must not disrupt the way the populace earn their livelihoods. • Government officers sent to the region must be honest and generous. None should be sent as punishment. These new guidelines gave the impression that the government was trying to create an amiable relationship between government officials and Malay-­ Muslims, granting the region a certain degree of autonomy. On this point, as Khajadphai (1976: 319) argues, the policies of Vajiravudh recognised that people in Pattani and other southern provinces had different social environs, and that the government needed to arrange a special administration to govern the region. Vajiravudh’s policies straddled two opposing aims: integrating and granting autonomy to the Malay-Muslim provinces. The aim of integration was clear. The new guidelines used the term phonlamueang (the population) to describe Malay-Muslims in the region, trying not to treat them as foreigners. It warned government officials that: If government officials insult the Malay population (phonlamueang chat khaek) as though they are foreigners, … they have to be penalised in the name of justice. Their wrongdoings [such as treating Malays as foreigners] should not be concealed in order to maintain their qualifications. Special attention has to be paid to deeds of government officials. (Kong prasan rachakan krom mahathai 1962: 8; Khajadphai 1976: 318)

The revised guidelines also proposed that the central government would arrange a special administrative entity in the Malay-Muslim provinces,  I have been unable to date the revision of this Act precisely, but it was between 1922 and 1923. 5

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granting them a certain degree of cultural and political autonomy. However, granting autonomy as part of integration generated a contradictory effect. Autonomy in the Malay-Muslim provinces did not lead to the integration of these provinces into the Thai national community. Instead, as Surin (1982: 69) argues, “it marked a beginning of a long and tortuous struggle to widen the sphere and deepen the level of autonomy for the Malay-Muslims of Patani based on specific ethnic differences”. Such differences became explicit when the ruling élites tried to transform the status of the Malay-Muslims from “subjects” of the monarchy of “Siam” to “citizens” of the “Thai” nation.

Thai National Culture: They Are Not Malay, but Thai The 1932 revolution transformed the relationship between the state and the people from one between monarchy and subjects to one of Thai nation and Thai citizens. As Clive Christie argues, the 1932 revolution had two features. One was a democratic revolution and the other was the culmination of a revolution in national awareness. The new notion of popular sovereignty transformed the status of the Malay-Muslims from the monarchy’s subjects to national citizens (Christie 1996: 176). Christie (1996: 176) describes the context of this transformation as follows: Normally, the key definition of citizenship is the right—often, indeed, obligation—of democratic participation; in the context of Siam in the 1930s, where the army and the bureaucracy were anxious to concentrate power in their hands, citizenship was primarily seen in terms of national integration. The results of this national revolution were an emphasis on Thai racial identity, for which the Buddhist religion and the monarchy now served as central symbols; an acceleration in the process of assimilation of outlying ethnic groups; and ever more state centralization.

The 1932 democratic transition in Siam thus had a contradictory effect on the Malay-Muslims: the notion of popular sovereignty should have allowed Malay-Muslims to be represented in the National Assembly; but as the government defined citizenship racially, members of non-Thai ethnic and non-Buddhist groups did not fit into the government’s racially defined category of Thai citizen. The nation-building efforts, carried out by Field Marshal Phibun Songkhram, who was Prime Minister twice from 1938 to 1944 and from 1948 to 1957, showed this contradictory aspect.

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After the 1932 revolution, civilian and military state officials, such as Phibun Songkhram, and his ideological architect, Luang Wichit Wathakan, conducted systematic measures to codify Thai culture. Phibun emphasised the importance of culture in the process of nation-building. As he argued: Nation-building has various meanings. It starts from people of the nation to build themselves as good citizens. To be good citizens, people need to have good culture, morality, cleanness, good living, and good livelihood. (Cited in Yukti 1994: 27)

Efforts made by Phibun and Wichit to codify Thai culture were epitomised by the ratthaniyom (state conventions), issued from 1938 to 1942. The state conventions were a series of cultural policies that “presented certain notions and forms of behaviour as being fundamental to the well-­ being of the Thai nation” (Barmé 1993: 144). According to Scot Barmé (1993: 145), the idea of the conventions was to help “the Thais take control of the country by becoming independent of ‘those people’ who exploited them, and to revive ‘Thai culture’ in order that the country could be recognised to be as progressive and great as it had been in the past”. The state conventions aimed to construct a new Thai culture that incorporated aspects of Western culture. The tenth convention, for example, forced people to wear Western-style clothes. Men had to wear jackets and trousers. Women had to wear hats and blouses that covered their shoulders (Piyanat 1991: 100). These rules became compulsory when the state conventions became legalised in two royal decrees of 1940 and 1941. The decree on “Prescribing Customs for the Thai People” defined common clothes, such as sarongs, as improper (Reynolds 2002: 6). In this sense, Phibun’s nation-building through cultural policies was not aimed at protecting Thai culture or its old traditions, but at transforming it so it could be comparable to foreign countries, particularly in the West (Yukti 1994: 28). The National Cultural Maintenance Act of 1941 stated that “Culture means qualities which show progress, orderliness, harmony, national development, and morality of people” (Suchip 1957: 160). Phibun’s aim was similar to that previously held by Chulalongkorn, who had tried to civilise Siam, by achieving equality with the West. Phibun’s primary preoccupation was also equality with the West. This applied to dress and deportment—as well as sovereignty—since Phibun

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and other ruling élites regarded unsightly dress and undisciplined social behaviour as “unprogressive” in the eyes of foreigners (Barmé 1993: 44). The ideas of chat (nation) and Thainess which Phibun constructed were rhetorically inclusionary. Nakharin Mektrairat (2002: 395) argues that Phibun’s definition of the “Thai” was far-ranging enough to include every individual in the land of Thailand. Phibun actually said that: The Thais used to be divided into different categories, such as Northern Thai, North-eastern Thai, Southern Thai and Islamic Thai. Such different divisions are now defunct because such divisions would be against the nature of Thailand, which is one and cannot be divided. They will all be called Thai, without distinction. (Thaemsuk 1976: 125)

Phibun was also receptive to the ethnic Chinese as long as they changed their nationality. As he said: The government will arrange a method to unite foreigners, including the Chinese, by easily altering their nationality so they become Thai. … This principle of altering the nationality can hardly be applied to other countries. In other countries, this principle would not have practical reality. (Pramuan khamprasai lae suntharapot khong nayok rathamontri 1938: 69; cited in Nakharin 2002: 369)6

However, although rhetorically chat became the supreme source of sovereignty and Phibun’s discourse of Thai nationalism was receptive to non-­ Thai ethnicities, his approach could not accommodate non-Thai ethnic groups who were not anxious to define themselves as Thai. By effect, if not by design, Phibun’s codification of national culture created a category of un-Thai people who could not participate in or identify with Phibun’s national culture. The state conventions were directed at these un-Thai people. Reynolds (2002: 5) argues that the fourth, sixth and eighth state conventions, issued from 1939 to 1940, sought loyalty of the citizens to national symbols like the national flag, the national anthem and the royal anthem and encouraged “the prosperity and well-being of Thai as against Chinese and ethnic minorities”. The ninth convention stated that good 6  Eiji Murashima (2001) argues that the cultural assimilation of the ethnic Chinese involved their forced Thai-fication. Yet, Phibun’s assimilation policy towards the ethnic Chinese was integrative since ethnic origin was not seen as a condition for becoming part of the Thai nation.

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citizens had to understand Thai (at least to be able to read and write it), effectively excluding citizens who did not understand the language. Little wonder that Malay-Muslims saw national unification as entailing abolition or denial of their Malayness (Piyanat 1991: 100–101). Once Thai national culture held legal force in the first half of the 1940s, whatever was considered to be a non-Thai cultural practice became a potential target for punishment and eradication. Police stationed in the Malay-Muslim provinces arrested Malay-Muslims who wore sarong (Piyanat 1991: 108), with arrestees sometimes made to do compulsory labour, such as carrying sand to temples (Piyanat 1991: 106).7 In 1941, Phibun also declared that Islamic law would no longer have effect in marriage and inheritance matters, replacing it with the Thai legal framework adopted all over the country (Piyanat 1991: 101). Most Muslims still felt reluctant to rely on Thai judges to decide such cases; some went to see To Imam (Muslim religious leaders) to finalise their cases; others, who were living close to the border with the Federation of Malay, went to religious courts in Malay states, such as Kelantan, Perlis, Saiburi and Tregganu (Chaloemkiat 2004: 35–36). Thus, although Phibun’s idea of the new Thai nation was rhetorically inclusionary to every ethnic group, it was inevitable that it would advantage the “Thai” over other ethnic groups. Anderson argues with reference to the convention which appeared on National Day 1939 announcing the change of the country’s name from Prathet Sayam (Siam) to Prathet Thai (Thailand): In spite of the potential advantage to the Thai of having as the name of the Old Monarchy’s realm (Siam) an appellation quite distinct from the name of any ethnic group, a Burma-style evolution of political consciousness, clearly differentiating ethnic group from modern nation, has still, in my view, not been fully achieved. There is no word for the Thai that prevents them from semantically monopolizing the nation. “Thailand,” the term for the contemporary state ruled from Bangkok—product of the opportunistic chauvinism of the Phibunsongkhram-Luang Wichit ideological duumvirate of the late 1930s—is symptomatic. (Anderson B R 1978: 212)8 7  Carrying sand to temples, for the purpose of making merit, was a Buddhist cultural practice, which had already become defunct by this time (Piyanat 1991: 106). 8  Anderson continues to argue that the government of Pridi Banomyon (1945–1947), by re-changing the name of the country from Thailand back to Siam, tried to break through the semantic monopoly of the Thai, and to semantically integrate non-Thai ethnic groups.

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The shift in policy was apparent when the government officially stopped calling the Malay-Muslims “khaek” or “Malayu” in 1945. The government issued a law promoting the term “Thai people believing in Islam” to designate Malay-Muslims and grouping them with Thai-speaking Muslims (Prayurasak 1996: 265). The government ignored the complex relationship between Malay identity and Islam. Prayurasak Chalayonadecha (1996: 263–264), who studies Thai-Muslim culture of recent decades, points out that in the eyes of many Muslims in the mid-twentieth century, the idea of being Thai had religious connotations. For them, Thai meant Buddhist. In fact, Phibun also explicitly favoured Buddhism. The 1942 National Culture Act stated in Article Five that the government could issue a royal decree if it found problems in terms of “orderliness in people’s behaviour to respect the Thai nation and Buddhism”. When Phibun issued a new law on the promotion of Buddhism as an important part of Thainess in 1941, he explained that “Thailand belongs to Thai people, and we should not let other religious people live [in Thailand]” (cited in Prayurasak 1996: 273). Phraya Rattanaphakdi, who became the governor of Pattani in 1947, also pointed out that Phibun’s religious and cultural policies badly affected the Malay-Muslims. As he argued: The Malay-Muslims felt that they were suppressed as they were not allowed to use the Malay language and Islam. They were forced to use Thai names, to speak Thai and to follow Thai tradition. [In the eyes of the Malay-­ Muslims,] the Thai government policies intended to transform the Malay-­ Muslims in Thailand into the Thai-Buddhists. (Phraya Rattanaphakdi 1966: 45–46)

Phibun’s assimilation in the Deep South forced the Malay-Muslims to transform themselves into Thais by prohibiting them from using the Malay language and adhering to Malay-Muslim culture. The alienation of the Malay-Muslims was also apparent in bureaucratic employment and political participation. A former mayor (nayok thesamontri) of Satun said that district officers (palad amphoe) in the Phibun period had to be Thai Buddhists. The Malay-Muslims were unable to take exams to be district officers (Piyanat 1991: 107). In terms of political participation by Malay-Muslim, as Table  5.1 shows, after Phibun became prime As Anderson (1978: 213) puts it, this was an attempt to create “a new nation that would not be the monopoly of the ethnic Thai”.

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Table 5.1  Religious backgrounds of representatives elected to National Assembly in 1933–1948 Year

Prime Minister

Pattani

Narathiwat

Yala

1933 1937 1938 1943 1946 1948

Phraya Phahol Phraya Phahol Phraya Phahol Phibun Songkhram Seni Pramoj Khuang Aphaiwong

Buddhist Muslim Muslim Buddhist Buddhist Buddhist

Buddhist Muslim Muslim Buddhist Buddhist × 2a Buddhist

Buddhist Muslim Muslim Buddhist Buddhist? Buddhist

Source: Surin Pitsuwan ‘Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-Muslims of Southern Thailand’ (PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 1982), p.  82; Ockey, James, ‘Elections and Political Integration in the Lower South of Thailand’ in Montesano, Michael J. and Patrick Jory (eds.), Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 127–132 In 1946, in Narathiwat two different elections took place; Buddhists were elected twice

a

minister in 1938, all representatives to the National Assembly elected from the three Malay-Muslim dominated provinces were Buddhists (Piyanat 1991: 102; Surin 1982: 82). James Ockey (2008: 133) observed that “Muslim voters may … have been so alienated by the Phibun government that many chose not to vote”. Indeed, turnout rates in the 1946 election in the Deep South were low: thirty-two per cent in Pattani, twenty per cent in Yala and eighteen per cent in Narathiwat. Furthermore, when the military coup of 8 November 1947 installed Khuang Aphaiwong, backed by Phibun, Khaung showed no interest in protecting Malay-­ Muslim culture or political and religious rights (Thanet 2008: 115), prompting Haji Sulong bin Abdul Kadir bin Muhammad Al-Fatani (Haji Sulong), a chairman of the Pattani Provincial Council for Islamic Affairs and a highly respected religious leader among the Malay-Muslims, to boycott the January 1948 election in the region (Thanet 2008: 115). Ibrahim Syukri, a local Malay nationalist, argued that Phibun’s national assimilation and cultural homogenisation policies amounted to an attempt to eradicate Malay-Muslim culture and tradition. Syukri (2005: 87) wrote after World War II that: [i]n 1939 Thai nationalism had begun to spread in the country of Siam, spurred by Lunag Phibunsongkhram, who at that time had become prime minister. … In 1940 a Siam cultural institute was established in Bangkok and was known by the name “Sapha Watthanatham,” the goal of which was

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the advancement of nationalism and the expansion of Siamese culture throughout the country. This cultural institute gradually issued directives in the form of compulsory rules for the public. One of the first directives which was issued compelled all people of Siam to wear western-style clothing, including hats for both men and women. At the meals it was necessary to use spoons and forks and to sit on chairs at a table. Malays in the districts of Patani, Yala, Narathiwat, and Setun felt this directive was aimed directly at them because they were forbidden to wear Malay clothing, use Malay names, speak the Malay language, and embrace the Islamic religion. … Among the requirements advancing Thai culture, it also was stated that Buddhism was the official religion, that Islam must be opposed, and that every effort which would advance Islam must be inhibited. Even worse, some Malay people in the district of Saiburi (Teluban) were forced to pray to an idol of the Buddha.

A former chairman of the Islamic Committee in Narathiwat, Rewat Rachamukda, provided a similar view when recalling the Phibun period. He said that: Phibun tried to change people’s attitudes, but failed. Because Phibun forced people to wear hats and trousers. The new attitude did not work because people did want to change. Then, people were segregated because people living in Bangkok were saying that they (the Malay-Muslims) were awful and separated (from the Thai). In this sense, Phibun made a mistake. Why did we have to hurry to change our clothes? Nowadays, which Muslims do not wear suits and trousers, except on those occasions when they go to mosques? … The goal of transforming culture encountered reactions. This meant that national culture must not to be legalised. We have to respect different cultures and religions. … Phibun standardised the culture, by transforming many religions to be one culture. The standardisation did not allow people to have freedom. It was a forced obligation. (Piyanat 1991: 105–106)9

As such reactions demonstrate, Phibun’s idea of the Thai nation might have rhetorically been inclusive, but the practice of incorporating Malay-­ Muslims into his national culture was exclusionary. In fact, the shift to nation-building policies did not help to incorporate Malay-Muslims under the Thai nation. Rather, the invention of the modern idea of the Thai nation created a new sense of “un-Thainess” to which Malay-Muslims were linked. On this point, Ruth McVey’s analysis on the Malay-Muslim South under the first Phibun régime is worth quoting: 9

 This statement was made in an interview conducted by Piyanat Bunnag on 7 May 1987.

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The identification of Thainess with Buddhism has also been reflected in the fact that both southern Buddhists and Muslims differentiate between ‘Thai’ and ‘Islam’. The criterion is religious, not linguistic: a Thai speaking Muslim belongs to the ‘Islam’ population. As long as people continued to think of themselves in the old way, as subjects of the Siamese king and not as citizens of the Thai nation, this was not a serious problem. The king, it was accepted, numbered various communities among his clients. People followed their chiefs, and these might accept a non-Muslim as overlord. No threat to religion or culture was seen in this; on the contrary, it was assumed the king would act as protector of those minorities who accepted his suzerainty. With the introduction of the modern idea of national identity, however, the distinction between ‘Thai’ and ‘Islam’ indicated both to Buddhists and to Muslims that the latter did not belong. In this way the spread of education and administration has exacerbated the problem of minority integration as well as performing its intended task of furthering it, by destroying workable old definitions and providing new ones which give no place to nonconforming groups. (McVey 1989: 38–39 emphasis added)

In fact, in order to obtain people’s loyalty, Phibun—and Wichit—used a similar rhetorical style to the Siamese monarchs before 1932 in calling for the people’s loyalty in terms of nation, religion and monarchy.10 However, the difference between the pre-1932 and the post-1932 periods was how that loyalty was to be defined. Siamese monarchs’ integration of the Deep South into the state transformed the status of Malay principalities from tributary states to administrative regions whose residents were subjects of the Siamese monarchy. These subjects’ loyalty was to the monarchy. Phibun promoted cultural assimilation of the people of the previous monarchical realm to create a unified nation. Malay-speaking Muslim citizens’ loyalty was judged in terms of their ability to adhere to Thai culture.

Thai-Muslims: Threat and Compromise Phibun’s attempt to eliminate the cultural habits and language of the Malay-Muslims and the consequent political alienation implanted an us-­ versus-­them mentality in which the Malay-Muslims felt that they were the “them” in Phibun’s national culture. They became culturally non-Thai as 10  Phibun called for people’s loyalty to the prime minister, without significantly altering Vajiravudh’s official ideology of nation, religion and monarchy. Phibun said that “[w]hen the country is in trouble, we cannot rely on anything as our mentor. Therefore, I want you to follow me: the prime minister” (cited in Surin 1982: 88; Yukti 1994: 28).

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a product of Phibun’s codification of the new “Thai” national culture through the state conventions and subsequent cultural laws. World War II also had an impact on the Malay-Muslim community in Thailand. In the Muslim-dominated Deep South during World War II, there was an acceleration of Malay nationalism and Islamic consciousness. The reasons for this were both geographical and religio-cultural. Geographically, the Malay-Muslim area in the Deep South of Thailand was enlarged. Under the Japanese occupation, the former tributary states of Siam, Kelantan, Kedah, Trangganu and Perlis rejoined the other Muslim dominated provinces of Thailand which the 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty had allocated in Thai territory. The redrawing of boundaries looked to many local people like the extension of Thai rule further down the Malay Peninsula. Yet, it also promoted “a renewal of ties” between Muslims residing in the peninsula and those in Thailand (Surin 1982: 94; Che Man 1990: 65). As a result, as Surin Pitsuwan (1982: 94, emphasis added) argues, “Once again their fate and destiny were joined. Thus Japanese occupation brought peril and prospect for future independence for the peoples in the region.” Tengku Mahmud Mahyiddin, the youngest son of the last raja of Patani and “the scion and symbol of Greater Patani’s Royal family” (Surin 1982: 94), joined the anti-Japanese struggle when he returned to Kelantan (Che Man 1990: 65). In British Malaya, the Chinese communists and Malay nationalists organised anti-Japanese resistance (Surin 1982: 94). Cheah Boon Kheng (2007: 52) observes that anti-Japanese sentiments among Malays contributed to the abolition of the pro-Japanese Malay nationalist party, Kesatuan Melayu Muda [the Young Malay Union], in 1942, because the Japanese did not want to galvanise “a premature flare-up of Malay nationalism”. The restoration of the four northern Malay states to Thailand in 1943 also enhanced Malay resentment against the Japanese. Now Malay nationalism in the Deep South of Thailand and in British Malaya was merged against a common enemy. The Patani leaders, who hoped for future independence of Patani, made contact with the British during the Japanese Occupation. Surin (1982: 95) observes that although the British government did not officially sanction such actions, the lower echelon of British military officers promised Tengku Mahyiddin that they would support the future independence of Patani. Surin also cites a report from Pridi Banomyong, a leader of the anti-Japanese Free Thai (seri thai) movement. In that report, the British promised the future independence of Patani with Tengku

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Mahyiddin as its ruler. The report said that “a group of British in New Delhi held a reception in honour of Mahyiddin with a toast: ‘Long Live the King of Patani’” (cited in Surin 1982: 95). The British also provided Tengku Mahyiddin with financial support. This financial support affirmed Tengku Mahyiddin’s religiously defined power base. Chaem Phromyong, then the Chularajamontri (the head of Islamic Affairs in Thailand), (1974: 23 cited in Surin 1982: 96 and Piyanat 1991: 103) said that: During World War II, [Tengku] Mahyiddin received a large amount of money from the British and sent the money to 3,000 Malays from southern Thailand who resided in Mecca. These Malays did not have access to financial sources at home [in Thailand]. This is owing to the economic breakdown in the war time period. … When these Malays returned home [to Thailand], they became Tok Guru (teachers of ponohs) and exercised their influence among the populace. They became the power base for [Tengku] Mahyiddin.

Another indigenous leader who made contact with the British was Tengku Abdul Jalal (Nai Adun Na Saiburi), a member of parliament of Narathiwat. On 12 January 1944, the Thai Buddhist governor of Pattani gave a speech to Malay leaders and Ulama. In his speech, he requested that they pay homage to the image of Buddha (Surin 1982: 98; Yegar 2002: 95). In response to the governor’s speech, Tengku Abdul Jalal sent a letter to Phibun to protest that the governor in Pattani insulted Islamic culture and the Muslim way of life by enforcing the National Culture Acts (Piyanat 1991: 103; Yegar 2002: 95–96).11 Tengku Abdul Jalal requested an immediate investigation. The secretary of the Prime Minister, Manun Jatikawanit, replied that the Ministry of Interior had investigated and affirmed that the governor’s attitude was appropriate, and had not damaged the area (see Piyanat 1991: 103–104). This incident, and Phibun’s state conventions in general, aroused resentment in the Deep South. As Moshe Yegar (2002: 91) puts it: [T]he decrees [the state conventions] themselves were enough to arouse opposition and enmity among the Malays of the south, and to strengthen 11   Phibun legalised the ratthaniyom (state conventions) into the National Cultural Maintenance Act in 1940 and the National Culture Acts in 1942 and 1943. These National Culture Acts established the National Cultural Council (see Reynolds 2002: 11).

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their religio-ethnic solidarity in the face of the external danger of an uncompromising, hostile regime. Perhaps the most serious assault on the religious sensitivities of the Malay Muslims was the attempt by Thai officials to project the superiority of Buddhism, which was the state religion, and turn it to a symbol of patriotism in the framework of the government schools. Although this policy was directed at all the ethnic minorities, not the Malay Muslims alone, the Muslims saw it as a direct threat to the foundations of their religion and ethnicity.

Under such circumstances, Tengku Abdul Jalal sent a letter to the Prime Minister Khuang Aphaiwong, the successor to Phibun. He insisted that the government should adjust its policy towards Malay-Muslims in order to ease local resentments towards the government and Thai officials. Receiving no reply, Tengku Abdul Jalal wrote to the British Colonial Office, explaining the hardship which Malay-Muslims in the Deep South had experienced. And he asked the British to help Malay-Muslims be freed from the Thai administration (Nanthawan 1977: 13; Piyanat 1991: 112). Some groups in the Deep South and Malays in Malaya supported Tengku Abdul Jalal’s request. Tengku Mahyiddin also requested support from the British for the future independence of Patani. After the Japanese surrendered in 1945, Malay-Muslim religious leaders institutionalised their struggles for self-government of the Malay-­ Muslim population residing in the Deep South of Thailand and northern parts of British Malaya. Two organisations emerged: the Patani People’s Movement (PPM) in Patani and Gabungan Melayu Patani Raya or the Association of Malays of Greater Patani (GAMPAR) in Malaya. Haji Sulong, one of the most influential and prominent religious leaders, established the PPM in 1947. GAMPAR was set up in Kelantan in March 1948. Tengku Ismail bin Tengku Nik was elected its chairman, but Tengku Mahyiddin and Tengku Abdul Jalal became influential figures in this organisation (Chichanok 2004; Che Man 1990: 66; ICG 2005: 6).12 Haji Sulong stated his goal in the so-called seven-point demand (Surin 1982: 152; Thanet 2008: 111). The Provincial Islamic Council of Patani drafted this demand and submitted it to Thamrong Nawasawat, then

12  While Chichanok (2004) identifies no official position Tengku Mahyiddin possessed in GAMPAR, Che Man (1990: 66) says that Tengku Mahyiddin became its president and Tengku Abdul Jalal its deputy president. But both agree that Tengku Mahyiddin and Tengku Abdul Jalal became influential supporters of the movement for local autonomy.

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Prime Minster, when its commission came to Pattani to investigate the situation in April 1947. The demands were straightforward: • The government of Siam should have a person of high rank possessing full power to govern the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Natathiwat and Satun, and this person should be a Muslim born within one of the provinces and elected by the populace. The person in this position should be retained without being replaced. • All of the taxes obtained within the four provinces should be spent only within the provinces. • The government should support education in the Malay medium up to fourth grade in parish schools within the four provinces. • Eighty per cent of government officials within the four provinces should be Muslims born within the provinces. • The government should use the Malay language within government offices alongside the Siamese language. • The government should allow the Islamic Council to establish laws pertaining to the customs and ceremonies of Islam with the agreement of the (above noted) high official. • The government should separate the religious courts from the civil courts in the four provinces and (give the former) full authority to conduct cases. These demands called for autonomous self-government, based on local traditions and religious practices. They implicitly repudiated the idea of Thai national identity, or at least implied it was irrelevant. The Malay language, Islam and Malay ethnicity were instead central to the vision of an autonomous Malay-Muslim community in Thailand.13 How did the government respond? After World War II, the Thai government tried to make concessions providing religious freedom in the  GAMPAR declared similar goals in its manifesto in 1948. The manifesto stated that:

13

1. to unite the four provinces of Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun as a Malay Islamic state and liberate its residents from oppression and exploitation; 2. to establish a state appropriate to Islamic traditions and practices to meet the demands of the Malay-Muslims; and 3. to improve the status and quality of life of the Malay-Muslims in the areas of humanity, justice, freedom and education without delay (Chichanok 2004; Che Man 1990: 66; ICG 2005: 6).

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South, and tried to promote communications between the government and Malay-Muslim leaders (Thanet 2008: 108–114). The Khuang government issued the Islamic Patronage Act in 1945. The Act aimed to restore relations between the government and the powerful ulama (Surin 1982: 103). Under this Act, Chaem Phromyong, a Muslim senator from Bangkok and a close associate of then Prime Minister Pridi Banomyong, was appointed as chularatchamontri (chief state councillor for Islamic affairs in Thailand), and made the king’s advisor in matters relating to Islam (Thanet 2008: 108; Article III of the Patronage of Islam Act of 1945).14 The Act aimed at “reform and reconciliation, [and] succeeded in establishing national Islamic institutions acceptable to both the government and Muslims” (Thanet 2008: 101).15 Even when Phibun returned to his second premiership in 1948, he initially made concessions to the Malay-Muslims, giving them religious freedom and showing his understanding of the significance of Islam in the Malay-speaking provinces. His concessions included: 1. In the four provinces, Fridays were recognised as a holiday, following Islamic custom. 2. Chularatchamontri performed administrative duties, and be appointed as an advisor to the government on Islamic issues. 3. Aid to be provided for construction of mosques. 14  Its role was changed to the government’s advisor in matters regarding Islam in 1947 (Thanet 2008: 109). 15  The 1945 Islamic Patronage Act is by no means free from criticisms. In terms of legal matters, dato yutitham (Islamic judges) were appointed by the Thai government and reinstated within the Thai Civil Court. They were also required to master the Thai language. On this Surin (1982: 139–140) argues that “the dato yutitham’s appointment … had been the prerogative of the highest government officials in the area and the appointees’ political persuasion had always been the decisive factor”. In terms of the institutions, the act formed a National Council for Islamic Affairs (NICA) headed by the chularathchamontri, which was an Islamic advisory committee to the Ministries of Interior and Education. The act also formed Provincial Councils for Islamic Affairs (PICA) at the provincial level. Again Surin (1982: 108–109) argues that the organisation of those Islamic institutions were centre-oriented and that “the new institutions served as symbols of further government interference into the community’s affairs” rather than implanting a sense of belonging among MalayMuslims. These institutions, whose roles were management and coordination of Muslims’ affairs, were required to receive advice and consent from the Ministry of the Interior. This means that “while appealing to be rendering patronage to the Muslims, in fact the bureaucracy gained more control over all the religious affairs of the Malay-Muslims in the South” (Surin 1982: 108).

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. Observance of Islamic law in terms of marriage and inheritance. 4 5. Acceptance of traditional Muslim clothes in government offices. 6. In primary education, examination of school pupils could be in the Malay language. 7. Equality in entry to the Thai army, navy and police (Nanthawan 1976: 220; NA M 020/2/5/4) However, the government, during and after World War II, still regarded Malay identity as a source of threat and a cause of separatism. Thus, the government still emphasised implanting Thai consciousness among the Malay-Muslim populace. On 15th January 1945, Thiang Janyawiset Bunyanit, who previously held the position of governor in Pattani, wrote a letter to the Minister of Interior, explaining the situation. He said that many religious leaders encouraged local Malay-Muslims to support a separate state: I know how Pattani people who believe in Islam feel all the time. I feel that these people, especially Hajis,16 do not want to be Thai. Hajis aim to separate Pattani from Thailand in a similar way used by Abdul Khandir in 1921. When the Japanese came to Thailand, many Muslims said [to the Japanese] that they were not Thai and that the Thais were Buddhists. Important Hajis in Pattani held a meeting in August 1944 in order to get Muslim people together to oppose Thai government officials. Whenever crises, such as the British attack on Thai territory, happened, those Hajis helped the British suppress Thai people. They wanted to be under the control of the British. (NA [2] SR 0201 38/6)

Thiang then explained that it was difficult to transform Pattani Muslims into Thais. As he put it: Eighty-five per cent of people in Pattani are Muslim and speak the Malay language. They do not want to speak Thai. Most of them cannot speak Thai. People think that they are Malay, not Thai. … All traditions, cultures and way of life are Khaek Malayu, not Thai. Even though the government has provided Pattani people with rights of freedom, in the same way as it did to other Thai people, the government has not helped Patani people feel Thai. (NA [2] SR 0201 38/6) 16  Haji means a Muslim who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca. Yet, this writer uses the term Haji as an important religious leader.

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In recognition of such problems and recognising the failings of previous policies towards the end of the second Phibun régime, government officials began to identify Muslims in the Deep South as Thai-Muslims (thai-­ islam). Before the second Phibun régime (1948–1957), Muslims in the southern provinces were called khaek, or Malayu. The state conventions and cultural laws issued under the first Phibun régime aimed to culturalise and ethnicise the Thai nation, which gave no place to citizens who were ethnically Malays and religiously Muslims. With the new idea of Thai-­ Muslims, the government tried to reconcile Islam with Thainess, while at the same time trying to eliminate the influence of Malaya and Malay ethnicity. In January 1954, the cabinet entrusted the deputy minister of the interior, Phao Sriyanond, to establish a project to improve the situation in the four provinces. After investigating the situation, Phao reported that: The government should establish a method to make the Thai-Muslims feel that they are Thai and owners of Thailand, together with other Thais in the country. We have to use a method of compromise because we have to [make them feel Thai] without religiously affecting their feelings. […] We have to reject public statements which say that Islam in Thailand is part of Islam in Malaya. (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6)

In order to make Muslims feel Thai, the government tried to bridge the distance between local Muslims and government officials. The National Intelligence Agency reported that “Thai-Muslims” did not understand how government officials governed the Muslim-dominated region due to the lack of communication between the two groups.17 The Agency reported that: [m]ost Muslims cannot contact government officials. They need to rely on translators when they talk to government officials. These translators sometime cheat Muslims, saying that the government officials are requesting money from Muslims. … That is why, Muslims cannot trust government officials. […] Government officials appointed to serve in the region do not understand customs and traditions of Muslims. Therefore, the Thai-Muslims misunderstand that government officials treat religion unequally, and eventually they hate these officials. […] The government tries to persuade the 17  The date of this report is not stated. Yet, the evaluation of the situation in the region by this agency was conducted around 1956/7.

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Thai-Muslims to trust and rely on the Thai administration system. The government should: (1) support Muslims to enter into the Thai administration; (2) support freedom of religion. Religious education at schools has to be established and approved by Muslim religious academics. Fridays should not be working days as Fridays are religiously important; (3) support the pilgrimage to Mecca. (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6)

Phraya Rattanapakdi, the former governor of Pattani, wrote a proposal to the National Intelligence Agency in October 1957, in which he suggested how the government could maintain the four provinces as a part of Thailand. Phraya Rattanapakdi recounted his experiences and encouraged government officials to show their understanding of local Muslims, while at the same time pointing to their child-like traits: I went to talk to Muslims in the southern region, and felt that they were lonely. They do not know who they can rely on. They can be comparable to children who do not receive affection from anyone. Even district chiefs and other senior government officials, such as police and governors, do not have any meaning for Muslims. Senior ministerial officials and the minister of interior are psychologically too far away to talk to. Even Chularajmontri is meaningless as he is not popular among Muslims in the south. […] Government officials did not show [enough] charisma to psychologically attract Muslims. Government officers should understand important customs and traditions of Muslims. Most Malays easily believe in anything and anyone. They can believe without reasons. Therefore, to govern the Malay area is easy. However, it will be difficult to take care of Malay people once they are incited in the wrong direction. They are selfish, only concerning themselves. Thus, government officials should know how to deal with and convince these selfish people. Government officials should monitor them and solve problems at the right times. (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6)

Phraya Rattanapakdi suggested that government officials should try to make Muslims feel affinity with the government and the Thai administration. He even suggested that government officials appointed to serve in the Muslim area should learn to speak Malay, to fill the communication gap between them and local residents (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6). Phraya Rattanapakdi, however, also pointed out negative characteristics of the “Malay” people living in the region, to which government officials had to pay special attention. At the élite level, there was an understanding that the government should compromise with Muslims in governing the

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region. As the above quotations show, the government tried to accommodate Muslim customs and tradition, but did not accept Malay ethnicity or ethnically oriented Malay ideology as part of the idea of being Thai. A cabinet meeting on 12th May 1954 discussed the possible negative influence from the Malay Federation, which was going to be independent. It suggested that the cabinet, at least, was also not especially committed to the notion of the Malays in the Deep South being in integral part of the Thai nation: The Malay Federation will be independent. We have to urgently examine the situation of the four provinces by following … the principle that: if the Thai-Muslims want to move to Malaya, we allow them to do so; but the land [of the four provinces] must continue to belong to Thailand. (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6)

At this time, the ongoing situation in the Malay Federation was a threat to the Thai government. They expected that there might be a number of Malay-Muslims moving to Malaya when the Malay Federation became independent. Thus, the government urgently tried to develop the four provinces of the Deep South. Phoa’s report, which I mentioned above, suggested that “the government urgently develop the area and the way of life of the populace to the level, which can be equivalent to that of the Malay Federation” (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6). The government was especially concerned with cross-border issues. On this point, the National Intelligence Agency strongly argued that: Many Malays who receive higher education and hold important bureaucratic positions are able to convince ignorant local people (chao phoen mueang ngo ngo) easily to rely on the administration of Malaya. Many Malays are mobilising young Muslims in Thailand to establish organisations in order to create connections with Muslims [in Malaya] and to exchange their knowledge mutually18. (NA [3] SR 0201.61/6)

The National Intelligence Agency used a very strong term, ignorance or stupidity (ngo), to describe local people who might have been sympathetic to the Malay side. 18  What is meant by knowledge is not clearly defined in this quotation. It might be any information about Muslims both inside and outside Thailand. It might also be information about the Malayan administration.

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The preoccupation of the ruling élites in the second Phibun régime was to maintain the national boundary. In their views, Malays who might galvanise Muslims in the Deep South to try to separate the four provinces from Thailand and to join the Federation of Malaya were a source of threat. In response, the government made concessions on the issues of religion, local culture and tradition. The élite’s coinage of the term Thai-­ Muslim (thai-islam) illustrates this point. Muslims in the four provinces were now considered Thai as long as they stayed within the boundary of Thailand, and were free of influence from the Federation of Malaya. In the eyes of élites, Islam was not a threat to Thai society; the ethnically mobilised notion of “Malay” was a threat since it might incite Muslims to break the national boundary.

Conclusion The geo-body of Siam demarcated by the monarchy did not lead to the construction of a single notion of the Thai national Self within the territory of Siam, even if rulers came to believe in a single Thai national Self. Instead, it incorporated foreign elements into the territory. The notion of the imagined community needs to be treated in the same fashion. Theoretically, the Andersonian imagined community should lead to the creation of the notion of the Thai national Self, in which élites encourage people residing the territory of Siam/Thailand to read and speak the vernacular language of Thai. Both the geo-body and the imagined community were established in the minds of Siamese élites. Yet, in their attempt to create a single national Self, ruling élites ironically drew attention to, and highlighted the presence of national Others, such as foreigners, khaek, and Malays, within the boundary of the nation-state. For élites, the Malay-Muslim became problematically un-Thai only as a result of state integration and assimilation. The Malay-Muslim south had been culturally, ethnically and linguistically non-Thai and foreign to Siam in the pre-reform period. But this had not been problematic in a period when the Siamese state neither demarcated its national boundary nor tried to centralise its administration and education systems. In this period, the Patani area was a quasi-independent tributary state. It belonged neither culturally nor territorially to the Siamese state. The monarchy’s administrative integration of provincial areas and Phibun’s standardisation of Thai national culture transformed the Malay-Muslims from unproblematic outsiders into discordantly un-Thai elements within the Thai nation.

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Chulalongkorn established the boundary of Siam, which incorporated the khaek within the territory of Siam. Phibun’s standardisation of national culture generated a notion of the “un-Thai”. In the early years of nation-­ building, which scholars see as marking the origin of the Thai nation, Thai ruling élites incorporated Malay-Muslims into Thai territorial and cultural space. As a result, not only the nation but also the Malay-Muslims as a national Other were created. Following the state’s identification of the Malay-Muslims as a non-­ conforming group, the Malay-Muslims turned to dissidence in the form of separatist struggles. In his second premiership, Phibun made concessions to the Malay-Muslims. In that period, it was recognised that the Malay-­ Muslims did not have to transform themselves into Thai-Buddhists. They could be considered Thai without converting to Buddhism. Yet, the government did not want Muslims to hold Malay ethnic consciousness. The élite’s idea of Thai-Muslim (thai-islam) represented both a concession in terms of religion and an attempt to erase non-Thai ethnicity. This chapter has examined the early period of the emergence of Thai national identity to the early twentieth century. It has pointed out that in this period, ruling élites came to recognise the non-Thai ethnicities and cultures that existed within the cultural and linguistic boundary of the Thai nation. Assimilating or integrating these groups as “Others within” the nation was a central part of national identity construction. It was the ruling élites’ efforts to establish Thai national identity that incited and developed ethno-cultural distrust and tension.

References Anderson B R (1978) Studies of the Thai State: The State of Thai Studies. In Ayal E B (ed.) The Study of Thailand. Ohio University Center for International Studies, Athens, OH, pp. 195–247. Anderson B R (1991) Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso, London. Barmé S (1993) Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of a Thai Identity. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Chaloemkiat Khunthongphet (2004) Hati sulong abdul kadir; kabot … rue wiraburut haeng si jangwat phak tai [Haji Sulong Abdul Kadir: Rebel … or Hero of the Four Southern Provinces]. Matichon, Bangkok. Cheah Boon Kheng (2007) The ‘Blackout Syndrome’ and the Ghosts of World War II: The War as a ‘Divisive Issue’ in Malaysia. In: David Koh Wee Hock

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(ed.) Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 47–59. Che Man W K (1990) Muslim Separatism: The Moros of Southern Philippines and the Malays of Southern Thailand. Oxford University Press and Ateneo de Manila University Press, Oxford, Singapore and Manila. Chichanok Rahimmula (2004) Sueksa khabuankan baenyaek dindaen lae kankokanrai nai jangwat chaidaen pakta [Studies of Separatist Movements and Insurgency in the Deep South]. In: Department of Politics and Administration at Faculty of Management Sciences, Prince of Songkhla University (ed.) Sathanakan lae thisathang kankae panha jangwat chaidaen phak tai nai yuk patirup [Situations and Direction: Solutions to Problems of the Deep South in the Reforming Period]. Conference on Regional Politics and Administration, Songkhla, pp 46–66. Christie J A (1996) Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism, and Separatism. I.B. Tauris, London and New York. Eiji Murashima (2001) Tai ni okeru kakyo kajin mondai [The Ethnic-Chinese Problem in Thailand]. Ajia Taihēyō Kenkyū 4: 33–47. Funston J (2008) Southern Thailand: The Dynamics of Conflict. The East-West Centre Washington, Washington. International Crisis Group (ICG) (2005, May 18) Southern Thailand: Insurgency, Not Jihad. Asia Report No. 98. Kasian Tejapira (1997) Imagined Uncommunity: The Lookjin Middle Class and Thai Official Nationalism. In: Chirot D and Ried A (eds.) Essential Outsiders: Chinese and Jews in the Modern Transformation of Southeast Asia and Central Europe. University of Washington Press, Seattle and London, pp. 75–98. Khajadphai Burusphath (1976) Thai Muslim. Praephitthaya, Bangkok. Kong prasan rachakan krom mahathai (1962) Lak rat prasat nayobai samrap bitibat rachakan nai monthon patani [The Government Policy of Administration in the Monthon Pattani]. In: Kan yud rachakan prajam sapda nai si jangwat pak tai, ekkasan an dap thi 4. Rong phim suan thong thin, Phranakhon. McVey R (1989) Identity and Rebellion Among Southern Thai Muslims. In: Forbes A D W (ed.) The Muslims of Thailand: Volume 2: Politics of the Malay Speaking South. Centre for South East Asian Studies, Gaya, Bihar, pp. 33–52. Nakharin Mektrairat (2002) Kwankhit khwamru lae Amnat kanmuang nai kanpatiwat samai 2475 [Ideas, Knowledge and Political Power in 1932 Revolution]. Fadiawkan, Bangkok. Nanthawan Haemindra (1976) The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part One). Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 2 (2): 197–225. Nanthawan Haemindra (1977) The Problem of the Thai-Muslims in the Four Southern Provinces of Thailand (Part Two). Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 8 (1): 85–105.

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Ockey J (2008) Elections and Political Integration in the Lower South of Thailand. In: Montesano M J (ed.) Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula. NUS Press, Singapore, pp. 124–154. Phraya Rattanaphakdi (1966) Prawat mueang pattani [History of Pattani]. Bangkok. Piyanat Bunnug (1991) Nayobai khong rat to chao thai muslim nai jangwat chaidaen phak thai: pho so. 2475–2516 [State Policies toward Thai-Muslim in the Deep South: 1932–1973. Chulalongkorn University Press, Bangkok. Prayurasak Chalayonadecha (1996) Muslim nai prathet thai [Muslims in Thailand]. Khrongkan hosamut klang islam, Bangkok. Reynolds C J (ed.) (2002) National Identity and Its Defenders: Thailand Today. Silkworm Books, Thailand. Suchip P (1957) Watthanatham withaya [Cultural Science]. Kong watthanatham samnakngan palat krasuang sueksa thikan, Phra Nakhorn. Surin Pitsuwan (1982) Islam and Malay Nationalism: A Case Study of the Malay-­ Muslims of Southern Thailand. Dissertation. Harvard University. Syukri I (2005) History of the Malay Kingdom of Patani (Sejarah Kerajaani Melayu Patani). (Bailey C and Miksic J N, Trans.) Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai. Thaemsuk Numnon (1976, June–September). Mueang thai yuk chua phunam [Thailand in the Period of Believing in its Leaders]. Warasanthammasat 6 (1): 120–147. Thanet Aphornsuvan (2008) Origin of Malay Muslim “Separatism” in Southern Thailand. In: Montesano M J and Jory P (eds.) Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula. NUS Press, Singapore, pp. 91–123. The Patronage of Islam Act of 1945 Vajiravudh (King) (1929) Phrarachadamrat nai phrabat somdet phramongkutklao chaoyuhua [Speeches of King Vajiravudh]. Bamrungnukulakit, Bangkok. Yegar M (2002) Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Western Burma/Myanmar. Lexington Books, Lanham, MD. Yukti Mukadawichit (1994) Kanmueang rueang watthanatham nai sangkhom thai pho so 2501–2537 [Politics of Cultural Issues in Thai Society]. Warasanthammasat 12 (3): 20–41.

National Archives NA STh 2/173, Prakat chai phrarachabanyat prathomsueksa [Accouncement of Primary Education Law] (3 September–3 October 1921) NA R7 SB, Prathan khwamhen nai raingan truat rachakan monthon pattani khong chao phraya phichaiyat [Giving Opinions to the Report Examining the Situation in Pattani Produced by Phraya Phichaiyat] (27 August 1927) NA M 020/2/5/4, Nayobai khong rathaban chu jon phon pho phibun songkharam [Government Policies in the Period of Phibun Songkhram] (1948)

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NA [2] SR 0201 38/6, Prapprung kan pokrong jangwat pattani, yala, narathiwat lae satun (ton 1) [Improvement of Administration in Pattani, Yala, Narathiwat and Satun Provinces (Part 1)] (2 February 1945–9 January 1948) NA [3] SR 0201.61/6, Kan pokrong 4 jangwat phak tai [Administration of 4 Provinces of the South] (16–25 October 1957)

CHAPTER 6

The Rakhine (Arakan) Buddhists: A Little Known Minority in Myanmar Donald M. Seekins

In this chapter, I wish to describe a little known but important religious majority/ethnic minority group in Myanmar, the Rakhine (Arakanese) Buddhists, who are described as the indigenous ethnic/racial group of Rakhine (Arakan) State in northwestern Myanmar. Unlike the officially stateless Muslim Rohingyas (described by the Burmese government as “Bengalis” or “Muslims living in Rakhine State”), the Rakhines are included in the official list of 135 ethnic groups, which was published by the Ne Win regime around the time of the Census of 1983. In the list, the Rakhines are cited as one of the country’s eight major ethnic groups, which is subdivided into seven smaller groups: the Rakhines, Kamans, Kwamwees, Maramargyis, Mros, Thets and Daingnets (Seekins 2017).1 In my description below, primary attention will be paid to the Rakhine Buddhists rather than the other (sub)groups, because in modern Burmese  The inaccuracy of Ne Win’s official classification system is evident from the inclusion of the Kamans as a subgroup in the Rakhine group, who are Muslim and apparently have origins in South Asia or even Persia. 1

D. M. Seekins (*) Southeast Asian Studies, Meio University, Okinawa, Japan © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_6

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history they have played an important role in the evolution of the Burmese state and its “legitimate” religious and ethnic constituents. Rakhine State was established in 1974 with the adoption of a new constitution in that year by the Ne Win socialist regime. The Rakhine Buddhists are important for several reasons. First, they constitute one of several non-Burman (non-Bamar) Buddhist ethnic minorities inside Myanmar, who, like the Mons and the Shans, established organized states and complex societies in the precolonial period. Indeed, the ancestors of the modern Rakhines were—again like the Mons and Shans—major opponents of Burman dynasties during the tumultuous fifteenth to eighteenth centuries. It was Rakhine rebel unrest along the border between their Burman-occupied country and British Bengal that led to the First Anglo-Burmese War in 1824–1826 (Hall 1964).2 In addition, the communal violence taking place inside Rakhine State today, which has led to the rapid exodus of an estimated 700,000 Muslim Rohingyas into neighbouring Bangladesh, has been attributed to the violence of Rakhine Buddhist “vigilantes” or “paramilitary” groups, as well as “ethnic cleansing” by the Burmese armed forces, the Tatmadaw (Beach 2018).3 From a critical Western perspective, the Rakhines are seen as collaborators with the Tatmadaw in massive human rights violations, sort of a Southeast Asian “Ku Klux Klan.” The reality, however, is much more complicated. At no point should a shared sense of unity based on Theravada Buddhism be assumed to have promoted harmony between the majority Burmans and the minority Rakhines. Ethnic and regional identities divide them, much as they have divided Burmans from their Mon and Shan co-­ religionists, who at times since Myanmar’s independence in 1948 have fought for their own independence from Burman control.4 However,

2  Conflict between British India and Burma was stoked by the presence of Rakhine rebels on British Indian soil and Burmese intrusions in hot pursuit. 3  It is estimated that some 6700 Rohingyas were killed by government forces and vigilantes after attacks on security outposts were carried out by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army in August 2017. These included women and children. A large number of rape victims have also been reported. 4  It should be kept in mind that following the power seizure by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)  in 1988 and the retirement of Shan warlord Khun Sa in 1996, Shan State, with a predominately Buddhist population, has endured what is probably the largest number of human rights abuses at the hands of the Tatmadaw inside Myanmar save for the Rohingyas.

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unlike the Mons and Shans, the Rakhines do not have a long history of insurgency against the central government in Rangoon.5

The Geography and Human Settlement of Rakhine State Rakhine State, which has an area of 36,778  square kilometres (14,200  square miles), is located along Myanmar’s remote northwest coast, which fronts the Bay of Bengal. According to the last official census held in 2014, its population numbered 3,188,807  in that year (MIP 2015). Although the state is bordered on the north by Myanmar’s Chin State, on the east by Magwe (Magway), Pegu (Bago) and Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) Regions and on the south by Irrawaddy Region, it is separated from the Irrawaddy (Ayeyarwady) River Valley of central Myanmar by a long strip of mountains and hills known as the Rakhine (Arakan) Yoma.6 In the north, the Naaf (or Naf) River separates Rakhine State from the southernmost part of the Chittagong District of Bangladesh, a narrow spit of land. The Kaladan River is the state’s longest, flowing down to the Bay of Bengal past the old Rakhine capital of Mrauk U (Myohaung). Because the Rakhine Yoma serves as a catchment for monsoon rains coming from the southwest Indian Ocean, Rakhine State has one of the rainiest climates in Myanmar, while regions east of the mountain range, located in a “rain shadow,” endure much drier, even semi-desert, conditions. Rakhine State is variously described as the “poorest” or “one of the poorest” states/regions in Myanmar: “over 69 percent of the population live in poverty” (The Economist 2017). The economy is based on agriculture (rice, coconuts, nipa palm and other tropical crops) and fisheries. There is very little industry, although this may change with the planned construction of the Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone in the central part of the state with foreign (mostly Chinese) investment.7 Although in past centuries Rakhine (State) was a vital stage for conflicts between the  Or Naypyidaw, which became the national capital in 2005.  Extending in roughly a north-south direction, the Rakhine Yoma forms a natural barrier between the interior of Myanmar and the littoral of the Bay of Bengal. Its highest elevations range between 1000 and 2000 metres. Seekins, Historical Dictionary, p. 78. 7  Kyaukphyu is already the site of the beginning of the two pipelines that carry oil and natural gas from Bay of Bengal across central Myanmar to the Chinese cities of Kunming and Nanning. See Seekins, Historical Dictionary, pp. 310–311. 5 6

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Rakhines, Myanmar, Mons, Indians, Portuguese and Dutch, a cockpit for precolonial and colonial wars, in more recent times it has been largely neglected both by the British colonialists (who annexed Rakhine in 1826) and by Myanmar’s postcolonial rulers. After the British occupied Rangoon and Lower Myanmar in the 1852 Second Anglo-Burmese War, it became a backwater. Even in the twenty-first century, connections between Rakhine and other parts of Myanmar by air, sea or land are rudimentary, which is reflected in the fact that while large numbers of foreign tourists visit the old Burman capital of Pagan in the central part of the country, very few manage to make it to see the equally impressive Shittaung Pagoda and other archaeological sites in Rakhine (Head 2018). Rakhine’s largest city is its capital Sittwe (Sittway), known during colonial times as Akyab, with a population of around 181,000 in 2006. Most of the state’s population of 3 million live in rural villages, usually divided by religion and ethnicity in the typical “plural society” configuration. The largest group are the (Rakhine) Buddhists, who according to the 2014 census constitute 56.2 per cent of the population. Muslims, who include not only Rohingyas but also a smaller population of Kamans, constitute 41.8 per cent, with much smaller percentages of Christians (1.4%), Hindus (0.5%) and animists (0.1%) (MoLIP 2016). Given the poverty of the state and its present lack of industry or other economic opportunities, it is not surprising that communal relations between the different religious/ethnic groups would become a zero-sum game in terms of land and other seriously limited resources. Thus, the fleeing of Rohingyas in past years (1978 and 1992) led to alleged “land-grabbing” by their Rakhine neighbours. One Burmese informant told me recently that because of Rakhine State’s poverty, a large number of Rakhine Buddhists migrate to Rangoon (Yangon) to find work, many of them in the manufacture of jewellery.8 Rohingyas have been not permitted to travel outside of Rakhine State (or outside designated areas inside Rakhine State) because they lack the citizenship papers needed to visit or settle in other parts of the country. However, the state’s rather unique history invests relations between Buddhists and Muslims, Rakhines and Rohingyas, with a special and conflict-­fraught complexity. One way of expressing this is to characterize Rakhine’s identity in two ways: as a “Buddha land” or as a “Border land” or Liminal Zone between Muslim South and Theravada Buddhist 8

 Comment of Burmese informant to author, November 5, 2017.

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Southeast Asia. These two identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive in a logical sense, but given long-standing tensions among Buddhists and between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine, they are seen as essentially conflicting.

Rakhine as a Buddha Land: Legend and History There is no historical evidence that Gotama Buddha (ca. 563–483 BCE) ever visited Myanmar or converted local rulers to his teachings. His earliest followers seem to have been confined almost entirely to modern northern India or Nepal. However, legends that have become central to the identity of Burmese Buddhists claim a miraculous or supernatural connection between the Enlightened One during his lifetime and their homeland. Probably the most famous is the legend of the Shwedagon Pagoda in Rangoon (Yangon), which is believed to contain eight hairs from the head of the Buddha given by him to Mon merchants travelling in India, which they enshrined at a location where the relics of three earlier Buddhas had been placed (thus, it is known as the “four relic pagoda”). Thanks to the patronage of a local Mon ruler, a stupa was built on the site, which over the centuries has become the most revered Buddhist holy place in Myanmar. A more recent legend tells of the Buddha’s journey to Mandalay Hill in central Myanmar, where he prophesized that a great Buddhist city would be built on the site 2400 years after his visit—a prophecy that motivated the penultimate monarch of the Konbaung Dynasty, King Mindon, to build Myanmar’s last royal capital in the shadow of Mandalay Hill in the 1850s (Seekins 2017; Strong 2004). Rakhine State also claims a direct connection with Gotama Buddha, through the highly revered Maha Muni (or Mahamuni) Buddha Image. It is said that during the Buddha’s lifetime, he travelled to Rakhine and visited the realm of King Candasuriya, ruler of a city-state known as Dhanyawaddy (“blessed with grain”) (Tun Shwe Khine 1996).9 Having embraced the Dhamma (Buddha’s teachings), the king requested that an exact image of the Buddha be made in order that he and his subjects could better remember and understand his teachings. An exact copy of the Buddha’s physical appearance, “which shall not vary from the exact size of 9  According to the Rakhine chronicles, this Dhanyawaddy was the third city that bore this name, and flourished between 580 BCE and 325 CE.  On the legend of the Maha Muni Buddha Image, see Tun Shwe Khine, Guide to Mahamuni (1996: 1–39).

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My [the Buddha’s] body even by the breadth of a hair,” was created by supernatural beings. After Gotama Buddha “breathed life upon the image,” “(It) became so lifelike that to the eyes of men, nats, sakra and brahman there appeared as if there were two Buddhas” (Tun Shwe Khine 1996: 35–36). The image was said to possess the power of speech, and advised the Rakhine king on how he could best defend his realm, but at some point in time it fell silent. Like the Emerald Buddha in Bangkok, which is enshrined in the royal palace complex in the centre of the capital of Thailand, the Maha Muni Image was viewed as having the power to protect the Rakhine kingdom from foreign invaders and ensure its prosperity. Other rulers sought to gain possession of the image, including King Anawrahta, the founder of the Pagan (Bagan) Dynasty, though he was unsuccessful in transporting it to his own capital. However, in 1784–1785, the Konbaung King Bodawpaya took advantage of endemic political stability inside Rakhine to invade the country, place it under his control and carry the Maha Muni Image back to Amarapura. It is now enshrined at a temple in the southern part of Mandalay and is a major destination for pilgrimage. The image was so large that the Burmans had to break it apart for transport across the Rakhine Yoma to their own country (Schober 1997).10 According to some Rakhine Buddhists, the real image never left their country and was hidden (or fell into a river during transport), while the Burmans (unknowingly?) brought a replica to what is now Mandalay (Schober 1997: 266). According to Juliane Schober, while the Burmans celebrated the capture (or looting) of the Maha Muni Buddha Image as a glorious triumph, for the Rakhines it was a national catastrophe. She quotes a colonial-era archaeologist as saying: Until the removal of the Candasara image the Mahamuni pagoda was the most sacred shrine in Indo-China; the entire religious history of Buddhistic Arakan centres around this “younger brother” of Gotama; the loss of this

10  Made of bronze, the Maha Muni Image is believed to be one of the earliest representations of the Buddha: its dimensions are 12 feet, 7 inches in height and 9 feet 6 inches around the waist, and except for its face, the statue is covered with a couple of inches of gold leaf given by devotees.

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relic sank deeper into the hearts of the people than the loss of their liberty and the extinction of their royal house.11

Like the Shwedagon Pagoda with its four relics, the Maha Muni Buddha Image provides devotees of the Enlightened One with a “presence,” a tangible, perceived reality, which they can honour and which is, or was, believed to have possessed supernatural powers. Although its new “owner,” the Burman king Bodawpaya, provided it with a magnificent pavilion which after several restorations can still be visited today, its loss in 1785 constitutes a tragedy that Rakhine Buddhists still identify with, leading some (perhaps from wishful thinking) to question whether the image in Mandalay is genuine.

Rakhine as Border Land Between Buddhists and Muslims A glance at a map of the region suggests that Rakhine State is a liminal zone, standing between the predominately Muslim world of modern Bangladesh and the (Theravada) Buddhist world of Myanmar and the other nations of Mainland Southeast Asia.12 According to historians such as D.G.E. Hall and Jacques Leider, the origins of the Rakhine monarchy are obscure, though traditional chronicles and archaeological findings indicate that an organized state based on Indo-Buddhist principles existed in modern Rakhine State as early as the fourth century CE, the so-called Candra Dynasty (Leider 2002). It seems to have been, along with Funan in southern Vietnam, one of the earliest examples of an “Indianized” state in Southeast Asia. In the early part of the first millennium CE, the region seems to have been mostly inhabited by peoples from South Asia, but by the eighth to ninth centuries CE it received migrants from Tibet and the interior of Myanmar who spoke a language similar to the Burmans, the modern Rakhines. In later centuries, the Rakhines demographically predominated. However, these Tibeto-Burman speakers were geographically 11  “Candasara” was the name specifically given to the Buddha Image. See Schober J (1997) Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Schober quotes Forchhammer, Report onf the Antiquities of Arakan, p. 7. 12  Liminal is defined as follows in the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary: “of, relating to, or being an intermediate state, phase or condition; IN BETWEEN, TRANSITIONAL.” The word is derived from the Latin, limen or threshold.

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isolated from their cousins in the Irrawaddy River Valley by the Rakhine Yoma, and pursued a largely independent development which included their assertion of a uniquely Buddhist identity through—as discussed above—the possession of the Maha Muni Buddha Image. The “golden age” of the Rakhine State was the Mrauk U or Mrohaung Dynasty, which was established in 1433 and lasted until Bodawpaya’s annexation in 1785. Although the Maha Muni Buddhist Image continued to receive royal patronage and popular veneration, the environment to the west of the Mrauk U state had changed radically: previously the site of Hindu and Buddhist states, neighbouring Bengal was now governed by Muslim rulers and in the seventeenth century became part of the Mughal Empire. Even before the Mughals annexed Bengal, Islamic influences brought from South Asia and the Middle East were a major cultural factor inside of Rakhine, as seen from inscriptions on coins from this period. Even Daw Aung San Suu Kyi wrote in her book My Country and People that the unique Rakhine custom of cross-cousin marriage had been adopted because of Muslim influence (Aung San Suu Kyi 1995). Along with the rest of the Indian Ocean, the Bay of Bengal was dominated by Muslim shipping during this period, a situation that would remain until the intrusion of first the Portuguese and then the Dutch in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. However, during the reign of King Man Pa (Burmese, Min Bin, r. 1531–1553), builder of the celebrated Shittaung Pagoda near his royal capital of Mrauk U and a ruler comparable to the Burman conqueror-king Bayinnaung (r. 1551–1581), Rakhine became a major naval power in the Bay of Bengal, carrying out extensive trade with neighbouring Islamic states and also running a profitable slave trade with the help of cooperative Portuguese freebooters based at the port of Dianga, near modern Chittagong. In Mrauk U, Muslims in the form of traders, mercenary soldiers (especially the Kamans) and royal advisors were numerous, and the slavers abducted thousands of unfortunate Muslim villagers who lived on the eastern shores of the Bay of Bengal. At the height of its power at the end of the sixteenth century, the Rakhine State invaded Myanmar proper and controlled territory extending from Dhaka (Dacca), now the capital of Bangladesh, to Moulmein (Mawlamyine) in present-day Mon State in Myanmar (Seekins 2017). In 1578, the Rakhine King Man Phalaung (Min Palaung) captured the prosperous port of Chittagong and it remained under Rakhine control until 1666, when it was occupied by the Mughals, meaning that for almost a century a large and cosmopolitan population of Muslims lived directly under the rule of

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Mrauk U. Brought to the Rakhine kingdom, some of the descendants of these people can probably be counted among the now stateless Rohingyas.13 Thus the Muslim view of Rakhine history, that followers of Islam in large numbers lived in and played an important role in the development of the region over the centuries, seems vindicated by modern scholarship. However, many, if not most, Burmese Buddhists refuse to accept the liminality or hybrid nature of Rakhine State’s identity, drawing a sharp and well-defined line along the Naaf River between “Buddhist” Myanmar and “Muslim” Bangladesh—a border that is not only artificial but has, along with unfavourable economic conditions, generated violent conflict.

Rakhine Under British Colonial Rule Rakhine was, along with Tenasserim (Tanintharyi), the first territory annexed by the British in India following the First Anglo-Burmese War. By the end of the eighteenth century, the British East India Company had already imposed effective control over Bengal, having established their headquarters at Calcutta (now Kolkata) in West Bengal a century before. From 1826 up to 1937, the year when Myanmar was administratively separated from India, India and Burma (fully annexed by the British in the 1885 Third Anglo-Burmese War) were part of the same administrative unit, the British Indian Empire ruled by the Viceroy of India. This meant not only that it was governed by mostly British administrators as part of an India-wide bureaucracy, with a host of Indian civil servants taking a subordinate role, but also that there were no barriers between Myanmar and India in terms of trade, customs and immigration. Up until the eve of World War II, Myanmar was a major destination for immigration by both Hindu and Muslim Indians; Indians living in East Bengal (now Bangladesh), a majority of whom were Muslims, found it exceedingly easy to migrate and settle in the British colonial “Arakan Division.” To the north and northeast of the Division lay the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Arakan Hill Tracts, while the Naaf River separated 13  “Later Arakan became home to a growing Muslim community. A majority of traders plying the seas of the Indian Ocean were Muslims, and Muslim missionaries contributed to the spread of the cult of the ‘pirs’ (Muslim saints) along the coasts of Arakan … More Muslims were found among the thousands of inhabitants of Bengal who were forcibly deported to Arakan. Those who became royal slaves were settled on the king’s lands. Among them were also artists, craftsmen, soldiers and highly educated people who found a welcome appointment at the court.” Leider, “Arakan’s Ascent,” p. 55.

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northern Arakan Division from Chittagong District, which lay directly to its west. British authority was exercised in northern Arakan Division at the district towns of Maungdaw and Buthidaung, which were each provided with a police station, post office and telegraph office, as well as a PWD (Public Works Department) Rest House. However, British Indian officials like their counterparts in Lower Myanmar did nothing to stem immigration of Bengalis from Chittagong and elsewhere.14 As many as one million Indians settled in Lower Myanmar (Rangoon, Pegu and the Irrawaddy Delta) during the colonial period, who along with Overseas Chinese, Europeans, kabya (“mixed blood” people, i.e. Eurasians), and indigenous peoples such as Burmans, Mons and Karens constituted a very cosmopolitan population. Most Indians living in Lower Myanmar travelled there by steamship, but immigrants to Rakhine only needed to traverse the Naaf River to settle on uncleared land, creating a second large concentration of South Asians. According to Lee Jones, between 1871 and 1911, the Muslim population of Akyab (Sittwe) District, where the divisional capital was located, tripled, while the Rakhine population grew only by about 20 per cent. Both in Lower Myanmar and Rakhine, indigenous Burmese perceived themselves “swamped” by a wave of (Muslim) immigrants whose relocation was encouraged by the British in order to solve regional labour shortages on plantations and factories (Jones 2017). Anti-Indian and anti-Muslim riots occurred during the 1930s. The Japanese invasion of Myanmar, which began with the “Christmas bombings” of Rangoon in late December 1941 and continued through until the middle of the following year as the invaders imposed their control over most of the country, ignited intense ethnic conflicts in Myanmar’s “plural society” as Burmese (or Burman) nationalists backed by their Japanese patrons sought to expel or eliminate foreigners, especially Indians. Some 500,000 mostly Indian refugees left Rangoon and adjacent areas in the early months of 1942 for Bengal and northeast India, an estimated 80,000 of them dying on their way because of starvation, disease, exposure to the elements or harsh treatment at the hands of Burmese. At

14  See the colonial-era map of Arakan Division in the Atlas of the Province of Burma. Rangoon: Commissioner of Settlements and Land Records, Myanmar, 1923, pp. 3, 4.

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the time, the Indian exodus from Myanmar was recognized as the largest such dislocation of refugees in history (Woods 2016).15 While ethnic violence breaking out in the Irrawaddy Delta between the Burma Independence Army and Karen fighters who had been loyal to the British is the most well-known example of such conflict, resulting in massacres of Karen villagers in Myaungmya District in what is now Irrawaddy Region in 1942, wartime Premier Ba Maw claimed in his memoirs, Breakthrough in Burma, that Rakhine-Muslim communal violence in Arakan was “in a way the worst that tore Myanmar during that early period of the war” (Ba Maw 1968: 203). The Muslims were armed by the retreating British and encouraged to cross the border back into Arakan to fight the Japanese, but preferred to target their old enemies the Rakhines, who like the Burmans in Lower Myanmar were supported by the Imperial Japanese Army. According to Ba Maw, Rakhine fighters were incensed by rumours that the Muslims had abducted 500 young virgin Rakhine women (Ba Maw 1968). As a result of this violence, many if not most Rakhine Buddhists fled the Bengal-Arakan border area in the northern part of the division—especially Maungdaw and Buthidaung Districts—and settled in the southern or central parts of the division, leaving the north with a majority of Muslims. This spatial segregation continues to this day. According to Jones, irregular Bengali Muslim forces also assisted the British in their “liberation” (or re-conquest) of Arakan from the Japanese in 1944–1945 (Ba Maw 1968; Jones 2017). After Myanmar became independent in 1948, a Muslim insurgency began in northern Arakan called the Mujahadin, or freedom fighters, who for a time sought to unite their region with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). However, the movement was largely suppressed by the 1950s by the Tatmadaw. Both Rakhines and Muslims (Rohingyas) were victims of British “divide and rule” policies and Japanese imperial ambitions before and during World War II. However, their victimization has continued under the postcolonial, military-dominated political system.

15  According to Woods (2016), the mass evacuation of civilians from Myanmar in 1942 was spontaneous, caused by widespread loss of confidence that the British could defend Myanmar. Most Indians feared retaliation at the hands of the Burmese.

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Postcolonial Rakhine Identity During the pre-war colonial period, prominent Rakhine leaders such as the “political monk” U Ottama and the politician Sir Paw Tun, who later became Myanmar’s prime minister, worked within the Burmese political mainstream, though the former opposed the British and the latter collaborated with them. But other community leaders, the most important of whom was U Aung Zan Wai, formed the Arakan National Congress (ANC) in 1938, whose major concern was to protect the Rakhines’ distinct language and culture. It held its first congress in 1940 and U Aung Zan Wai after the war became a member of the Executive Committee of the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL) led by Aung San. A more radical movement was organized by U Seinda, a member of the Sangha, who founded the Arakan Peoples’ Liberation Party (APLP) and demanded Arakan independence. The situation in Rakhine after the war was exceedingly complex, and the region became the site of insurgency not only by the Muslim Mujahadin in northern Rakhine, but Rakhine separatists led by U Seinda and “Red Flag” Communists commanded by Thakin Soe, whose guerrillas operated in the Rakhine Yoma and were a major headache for the central government until Soe was captured in 1970 (Smith 1999; Seekins 2017). During Myanmar’s parliamentary period (1948–1962, with a military-­ controlled interregnum during 1958–1960), both Muslim and Rakhine politicians could operate inside the relatively open political system, but Ne Win’s military regime, imposed on March 2, 1962, carried out a thorough-­ going “Burmanisation” of the state and society that affected both Muslims and Rakhines. Even before a Citizenship Law was decreed in 1982 which at best could be interpreted as relegating the Muslim Rohingyas to second-­ class citizenship, the Tatmadaw in 1978 had carried out “Operation Nagamin,” with the goal of identifying illegal immigrants in Rakhine State: this army clearance project caused panic among Rohingyas, and between 200,000 and 300,000 fled to Bangladesh. Such a policy should not have been a surprise, since during the 1960s, the Ne Win regime expelled some 300,000 Indians and Pakistanis from central Burma, especially urban areas, many of whom were prominent in local business, forcing them to repatriate to their ancestral homelands. In 1992, a second clearance operation was carried out by the State Law and Order Restoration Council regime in Rakhine State, with 280,000 Rohingyas seeking refuge in Bangladesh (Smith 1999).

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Rakhines and the Post-1988 Political Crisis In power for more than a quarter of a century (1962–1988), the Ne Win regime displayed all the characteristics of top-down army-state rule that have kept Myanmar internally divided both in the Burman heartland and in the ethnic minority regions; however, the situation became even worse after a new generation of military officers, Ne Win’s protégées, seized power on September 18, 1988, forming the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC, known after 1997 as the State Peace and Development Council, or SPDC). As a pro-democratic opposition formed under Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Burmese and international observers hoped that the country’s many ethnic groups could overcome their differences and carry out a unified struggle for fundamental change—especially an end to military rule. But this hope was never realized. Ethnic divisions have persisted, and in Rakhine State they became steadily worse as Rakhine Buddhist hostility towards the Rohingyas and their alienation from the Burman-controlled central government intensified. In the much applauded General Election of May 27, 1990, Daw Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won a landslide victory: 392 out of 485 seats contested in the unicameral People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw). However, the Arakan League for Democracy (ALD) won 11 out of 26 seats contested in Rakhine State, making it nationwide the third most successful party in the election.16 In the next election, held over 20 years later on November 7, 2010, the junta-­ supported Union Solidarity and Development Party won 129 and 259 seats contested in the upper and lower houses of the bicameral Union Parliament (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw), exclusive of military members, while the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party won a modest seven and nine seats, respectively. In what is considered the second truly “democratic” election in Myanmar’s recent history, the General Election of November 8, 2015, the National League for Democracy won 135 and 255 seats contested in the Union Parliament in the upper and lower houses, respectively; but the Arakan National Party (ANP) won 10 and 12 seats, as well as 22 seats in the Rakhine State legislature.17 The Arakan National Party had been formed in 2014 from the amalgamation of the 16  The second most successful party in 1990 was the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won 23 seats. Seekins, Historical Dictionary, p. 228. 17  Including an ethnic affairs minister in another state, the ANP won a total of 45 seats in the national and state/region legislatures. Ibid., p. 232.

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Arakan League for Democracy and the Rakhine State Development Party and has emerged as the most important political organization representing the Rakhine Buddhists. What these figures suggest is that in contrast to the Burman Buddhists, two-thirds of the country’s population, the much smaller community of Rakhine Buddhists has been reluctant to express their loyalty to either the NLD or Daw Suu Kyi—despite their cultural affinities to the Burmans (including both a common religion and closely related languages), the nationwide electoral popularity of the National League for Democracy and Daw Suu Kyi’s claim of a “national” constituency based on the fact that her father Aung San was leader of the anti-colonial independence movement.18 Although the Rakhines, like the Burmans, are Buddhist and harbour distinctly hostile attitudes towards the Muslim minority, they have chosen to take their own political path rather than merge with the NLD under Daw Suu Kyi’s leadership after 2015 as “state counsellor.” In around 2008–2009, The Arakan Army (AA) was founded as an insurgent group fighting the central government. It allied and trained with the newly insurgent Kachin Independence Army and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army, or Kokang Group, in northern Kachin State, but in 2015 began operations against the Tatmadaw and security forces in northern Rakhine State. Although its commander, Brigadier Tun Myat Naing, claimed it was 10,000 strong, a more believable figure is from 500 to 800 fighting men. During the November 2015 election, the AA claimed that it supported the Arakan National Party (Seekins 2017). Some observers, especially those connected with aid agencies of the Japanese government, see the key to ethnic conflict in economic development. By investing in Myanmar’s infrastructure and social services, foreign donors and private investors can help ease age-old ethnic and religious antagonisms and foster communal peace. However, much depends on the type of investment that is promoted. Large-scale projects such as the China-backed Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) can cause more harm than good since they tend to operate in a top-down manner, dispossessing local communities in order to “develop” the land they originally 18  Electoral results between 1990 and 2015 indicate that the largely Buddhist Shans have similar reservations about Daw Suu Kyi and the NLD; their most popular party in the 2015 election was the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, which won a total of 40 seats in the national and state legislatures, compared to the ANP’s 45. Ibid., p. 232.

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farmed or the waters they fished in and bringing in workers from other parts of the country, or even abroad. The natural environment is often ruined by industrial development. The result of such practices is the scattering of these communities, their marginalization and the growth of hostility against the central government, its domestic capitalist cronies and foreign donors. “Land-grabbing” is a pervasive problem in almost all parts of Myanmar, including areas where Burmans as well as minorities live. Since the population in and around Kyaukphyu is largely Rakhine, it is likely that with the SEZ’s implementation they will become victims as well. The Rakhines represent a small and little known, but important, piece of Myanmar’s ethnic puzzle. Notorious in the eyes of the outside world for their part in attacks on Muslim Rohingyas in 2012 and the “ethnic cleansing” of this stateless minority in that year and 2017, they resent both Daw Suu’s lack of interest in assisting them and the central government’s perceived intent to erase their identity and “Burmanise” them. Seeing themselves as caught between a wave of aggressive “demographic” expansion by Muslims from neighbouring Bangladesh and a regime that seems to care little for their interests, the Rakhines—with their distinct history and connection to the Buddhist religion—are yet another casualty of the army-state’s “divide and rule” policy that keeps Myanmar from experiencing genuine internal peace or development.

References Aung San Suu Kyi (1995) Freedom from Fear and Other Writings. 2nd edn. (Aris M, ed.). Penguin, London. Ba Maw (1968) Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939–1946. Yale University Press, New Haven. Beach H (2018, February 15) Will the Rohingyas Ever Return Home? The New York Times. www.nytimes.com. Accessed 15 February 2018. Hall D G E (1964) A History of South-East Asia. Macmillan, London. Head J (2018, February 8) Rakhine State: Hatred and Despair in Burma’s Restive Region. BBC News Asia. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-42899242. Accessed 2 June 2018. Jones L (2017, September 26) A Better Political Economy of the Rohingya Crisis. New Mandala. https://www.newmandala.org/better-political-economyrohingya-crisis/. Accessed 2 December 2018. Leider J P (2002) Arakan’s Ascent during the Mrauk U Period. In: Chutintaranond S and Baker C (eds.) Recalling Local Pasts: Autonomous History in Southeast Asia. Silkworm Books, Chiang Mai, pp. 53–88.

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MIP (2015) Census Report: The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census. Ministry of Immigration and Population, Naypyidaw. MoLIP (2016) The 2014 Myanmar Population and Housing Census: Report vol. 2-C. Department of Population; Ministry of Labour; Department of Immigration and Population, Naypyidaw, pp. 12–15. Schober J (1997) In the Presence of the Buddha: Ritual Veneration of the Burmese Mahamuni Image. In: Schober J (ed.) Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Seekins D M (2017) Historical Dictionary of Burma (Myanmar). 2nd edn. Rowman & Littlefield, Lanham, MD. Smith M (1999) Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. Revised edn. Zed Books, London. Strong J S (2004) Relics of the Buddha. Princeton University Press, Princeton. The Economist (2017, September 14). Aung San Suu Kyi’s Ideas About Curbing Attacks on Rohingyas Won’t Work. Tun Shwe Khine (1996) A Guide to Mahamuni. Rakhine Book Series, Yangon. Woods P (2016) Reporting the Retreat: War Correspondents in Burma, 1942. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

CHAPTER 7

Promotion of Women’s Rights in ASEAN: Myanmar Women’s Organisations for Sustainable Unity in Diversity Makiko Takeda and Chosein Yamahata

Introduction With the growing awareness of human rights worldwide after the Second World War, various international human rights laws and conventions have been developed largely led by the United Nations, including specific standards and norms for socially vulnerable people such as women, children, handicapped, and migrant workers. In accordance with such a global direction, many member states have gradually adopted, signed, and ratified these international instruments. However, while such instruments related to human rights have been in place around the world, serious human rights violations continue to persist, especially in developing countries, and there is sometimes a huge gap between the reality on the ground

M. Takeda (*) Faculty of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nagoya, Japan e-mail: [email protected] C. Yamahata Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_7

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and the universal standards and norms set by those international human rights laws, at the national level. In addition, this applies to not only the universal standards and norms, but also institutions, resolutions, recommendations, and initiatives at the regional level, which are only presented on paper in some countries, whereas they have functioned effectively in others. There are simply not enough viable scenarios to realise the effective protection of human rights, and in particular, the situation of women has been deteriorating in many countries. According to Conant (2014), there is a serious rollback of women’s rights not only in conflict areas such as Africa, the Middle East, and Afghanistan but also in the Arab Spring countries and in Southeast Asia. Global and universal norms such as the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), which was drawn up for the advancement of women’s rights, are often enforced with the help of regional organisations. Those initiatives by regional organisations are also supplemented by organisations responsible for women’s rights issues in each country. However, although the legislation related to human rights has been enacted and systematic human-rights initiatives have been undertaken internationally and regionally, in reality, there is still a long way to go to put an end to women’s rights violation from gender-­ based discriminatory society in the near future. Therefore, community-­ based women’s organisations (WOs), which are contributing to the protection and promotion of women’s rights, need to be empowered since those WOs are playing an important role in filling the gap left by international, regional, and national legal and administrative bodies, by engaging in grass-roots activities. Such a bottom-up approach by WOs is crucial since they integrate the promotion of women’s rights as an integral part of the process for sustainable development. This chapter aims to explore the initiatives of ASEAN for the advancement of women and its direction and highlights how the activities of community-­based WOs can contribute to sustainable unity and development by protecting and promoting women’s rights in the ASEAN region. First, some of the main international instruments in relation to women’s rights are reviewed, followed by an overview of the current situation of women in the ASEAN member states as well as the ASEAN’s initiatives and organisations responsible for promoting women’s issues. Second, a gap between global direction towards advancement of women and local

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realities as well as its causes are examined using the case of Myanmar. Third, the activities of three ethnic women’s organisations (EWOs) in Myanmar, which are recognised as some of the most active WOs in the ASEAN countries—Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO), and Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT)—are analysed to explain the relationship between sustainable unity and development and the three key components of their activities: “promotion of women’s participation”, “women’s empowerment”, and “protection and promotion of women’s rights”. Finally, the author argues that such women’s bottom-up approach might have a greater potential if WOs in each ASEAN country can monitor and facilitate their activities in an intra-ASEAN manner.

Women’s Rights as Guaranteed and Enshrined in Universal Treaties 1948 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a milestone document in the history of human rights for all people and all nations. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in Paris proclaimed it on 10 December 1948. It declared for the first time that fundamental human rights, which are outlined as a total of 30 articles, were to be protected universally (United Nations 1948). Some of the articles specifically addressed women’s rights, as shown in Table 7.1.

Table 7.1  UDHR related to women’s rights Article

Contents

1 2 7 16 21 23 25

Right to equality Freedom from discrimination Right to equality before the law Right to marriage and family Right to participate in government and in free election Right to desirable work, equal pay, and join trade unions Right to adequate living standard (care for motherhood/childhood)

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1979 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is the first international instrument to refer explicitly to human rights and to the equal rights of men and women; the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted it in 1979. The convention contains a preamble and 30 articles, as shown in Table  7.2. CEDAW defines what comprises discrimination against women and sets up normative standards and mechanisms to identify it. It also establishes an agenda for national action to end discrimination. CEDAW has been  ratified or acceded by 189 states, the most recently by South Sudan in 2015 (Jain 2005; United Nations Treaty Collection 2019). Table 7.2  The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) Art.

Contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18–22 23 24 25–30

Discrimination Policy measures HR and fundamental freedom Special measures Sex role stereotyping and prejudice Prostitution Political and public life Presentation Nationality Education Employment Health Economic and social benefits Rural women Law Marriage and family life Committee on EDAW State parties’ reporting procedure Effect on other treaties Commitment of states parties Administration of the convention

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1995 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) of 1995 was a visionary agenda for the empowerment of women. It was the outcome of the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, and 189 countries endorsed it. The BDPA concentrates on a total of 12 critical areas of concern for gender equality and women’s empowerment. They are poverty, education and training, health, violence, armed conflict, economy, power and decision-making, the institutional mechanism, human rights, media, environment, and the girl child. Much has been achieved since 1995, but progress has been unacceptably slow and uneven, particularly for the most marginalised girls and women. No country has achieved total equality for women and girls, and significant levels of inequality still continue to exist (UN Women 2014). 2000 Millennium Development Goals and 2015 Sustainable Development Goals The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are a set of eight international development goals established by all 189 UN member states in 2000 to try to make the world better by 2015. They include two goals that directly target the promotion and protection of women’s rights: goal 3, to promote gender equality and empower women; and goal 5, to improve maternal health. The subsequent 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) extend much further than the MDGs. These goals address the root causes of poverty and the universal need for development that works not only for people in developing countries but for all people. These goals aim to seek complete solutions rather than partial solutions, as do MDGs. SDGs also include gender equality as goal 5.

The Current Situation of Women and the Historical Background of Women’s Rights Promotion in ASEAN Member States Comparison of Human Development and a Gender Gap Among ASEAN Countries The human development concept was developed by Economist Mahbub ul Haq, who argued that a country’s success or individual’s well-being

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cannot be simply measured by national economic growth or individual income growth. He defined human development as a process of “enlarging people’s choices” with special emphasis on three dimensions: the freedom to have long and healthy life, to be educated, and to enjoy a decent standard of living (UNDP 1990). Human Development Index (HDI) is a summary measure of average achievement in the three key dimensions, which was first introduced in the Human Development Report 1990 (UNDP 1990). The health dimension is measured by life expectancy at birth, and the education dimension is measured by the mean of years of schooling for adults aged 25 years and more and the expected years of schooling for children of school entering age. The living standard dimension is assessed by gross national income (GNI) per capita. This composite index has been extensively used as indices of country’s well-being around the world. Depending on the scores of HDI, countries are divided into four different levels of human development: very high human development, high human development, medium human development, and low human development. Although there has been much progress in the status of women, gender inequality, which affects half of the world population, remains the biggest obstacle to human development. GII is a composite index introduced by UNDP in 2010 that captures inequality between men and women. GII measures gender inequality in three critical dimensions: reproductive health, empowerment, and labour market participation. The reproductive dimension consists of two indicators: the maternal mortality rate and adolescent fertility rate. The empowerment dimension is measured by female parliamentary representation and the secondary level of female educational attainment. The labour market participation dimension is measured by labour force participation rate of female and male populations (UNDP 2016). Table 7.3 presents some indicators which depict women’s situation in ASEAN countries. The six indicators used in Table  7.3 are HDI, GII, LFPRF (labour force participation rate of female), WIP (women in parliament), EGNIF 2011PPP$ (estimated gross national income per capita for female), and EGNIF-EGNIM% (the ratio of EGNIF to EGNI for male) (UNDP 2016; Inter-Parliamentary Union 2018). These indicators are chosen and calculated to identify gender disparity specifically in terms of economic and political aspects among ASEAN countries. From the HDI values of the ASEAN countries, Singapore and Brunei belong to the very high human development group, Malaysia and Thailand are in the high human development group, and the other six countries

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Table 7.3  The comparison of human development and gender gaps among ASEAN countries HDI rank

Country

HDI value

5 30 59 87 113 115 116 138 143 145

Singapore Brunei Malaysia Thailand Indonesia Vietnam Philippines Lao Cambodia Myanmar

0.925 0.865 0.789 0.740 0.689 0.683 0.682 0.586 0.563 0.556

GII rank

GII value

LFPRF (%)

WIP (%)

EGNIF EGNIF/ 2011 PPP$ EGNIM (%)

11

0.068 – 0.291 0.366 0.467 0.337 0.436 0.468 0.479 0.374

58.2 51.0 49.3 62.9 50.9 73.8 50.5 77.7 75.5 75.1

23.0 9.1 13.9 5.3 19.8 26.7 29.5 27.5 20.0 10.2

60,787 55,402 17,170 12,938 6668 4834 6845 4408 2650 4182

– 59 79 105 71 96 106 112 80

63.3 62.1 53.3 80.1 49.8 82.7 69.0 77.4 74.4 72.8

Sources: UNDP (2016), IPU (2018) LFPRF: labour force participation rate of female aged 15 and older, WIP: women in parliament, EGNIF: estimated GNI per capita for female, EGNIM: estimated GNI per capita for male

belong to the medium human development group. However, among the medium human development countries, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Philippines, at 0.6 or more, have higher HDI values than those of Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, indicating that there are some differences among medium human development countries. In fact, although Myanmar is presented in the medium human development group in the Human Development Report 2016, it had remained in the low human development group until 2015. Regarding the Gender Inequality Index (GII), although the value of Brunei is not available due to a lack of some indices, overall, the countries which have high HDI values, such as Singapore and Malaysia, seem to have less gender disparity than other countries. However, the GII values of Thailand and other medium human development countries are not correlated to their HDI values. For example, from the GII values, it is apparent that Vietnam and Myanmar have relatively smaller gender gaps than the rest of the medium human development countries. In the case of the women’s labour force participation rate (LFPRF), which is the economic indicator of the GII, regardless of the values of the GII and HDI, LFPRF is low in Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia, where the majority of population is Muslim, as well as in Philippines. The access to employment opportunities for women is not promoted in those countries despite the economic development and improvement of education and health care

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services, which consequently resulted in a decrease in adolescent fertility and childbirth rates. Due mainly to social and cultural norms, which considerably affect the stereotyped perception of gender roles of the people, women tend to have limited employment opportunities. As a result, they have no choice but to engage in household or informal work (Asian Development Bank 2013). The ratio of women in parliament (WIP), which is one indicator of women’s political participation, is also not correlated to the HDI value. Even in medium human development group, the ratios of WIP in Vietnam, Philippines, and Laos are higher than those of very high or high human development countries. The ratios of WIP are low in Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar, regardless of their HDI values. The advancement of women in terms of political aspects in those countries is not encouraged due to inequality caused by female gender role stereotyping based on Muslim religious practices and traditional and cultural norms. Such inequality inevitably contributes to women’s lower educational background and less vocational training than men, leading to women’s lower social and economic status in society. Another reason is the military regime in Thailand and Myanmar. The ratio of WIP in Thailand was much higher until 2013 (15.8%) (World Bank n.d.); however, it dropped dramatically after the military coup. In the case of Myanmar, although the ratio rose sharply to 10% following the 2015 election, it was much lower under the military and quasi-civilian government. Estimated GNI per capita for female (EGNIF) is roughly proportional to the HDI value because one of the indicators of the HDI value is the GNI per capita. In general, there is a big difference in the economic wealth of women among the ASEAN countries. Compared to the very high human development group, the lower countries of the medium development group, Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, have less than one-twelfth of EGNIF.  Comparing Singapore, which has the highest EGNIF, to Cambodia, which has the least EGNIF among ASEAN countries, it is apparent that Singapore has 23 times higher EGNIF than Cambodia. However, when it comes to the ratio of EGNIF to estimated GNI per capita for males (EGNIM), which shows economic aspect of gender equality, indicated as EGNIF/EGNIM (%) in the rightmost column in Table  7.3, considerable economic gender disparity exists in Singapore, Brunei, and Malaysia, which belong to the very high or high human development group, as well as in Indonesia, which has the highest HDI value among medium development group. As discussed earlier, Brunei, Malaysia,

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and Indonesia are all Muslim countries, and their LFPRF are also lower than other ASEAN countries. In Singapore, more than 20% of the population is either Muslim or Hindu, which is also predominantly a male-­ dominated religion. It can be argued that the economic status of women in those countries has not made much progress due mainly to the perceptions of gender role based on religious and cultural norms. Among the ASEAN countries, there are big differences in terms of the economic development and human development. Moreover, as overall economic development does not exactly reflect the human development of each country, it does not automatically result in the advancement of women’s status or a reduction of gender disparity. In particular, whether the issues of gender inequality in terms of economic and political aspects are properly addressed in the ASEAN context is highly questionable, based on the huge gender gaps in the high human development group. The economic and political status of women is largely influenced by the people’s perception of gender roles based on religious, cultural, and social norms as well as military regimes. Aung San Suu Kyi (2003), who is a Nobel laureate and the State Chancellor in Myanmar, states the importance of women’s social participation to build a democratic society as follows: Women have traditionally played the role of unifier and peacemaker within the family. They instill a nurturing sense of togetherness and mutual caring. They balance love and tenderness with discipline while nurturing growth and understanding. Women have the capacity for the compassion, self-­ sacrifice, courage and perseverance necessary to dissipate the darkness of intolerance and hate, suffering, and despair. Women have an innate talent for resolving differences and creating warmth and understanding within a framework of mutual respect and consideration. This ability should be used to address not only our individual, family and community needs, but also to contribute towards the process of reconciliation, which will make our country a democratic society that guarantees the fundamental rights of the people (p. 1–2).1

As in the statement above, promoting the participation of women who have an innate talent, and to respect diversity and foster harmony, has a 1  Aung San Suu Kyi (2003). A Foundation of Enduring Strength. In Burma—Women’s Voice Together, 1–2. Bangkok: Altsean Burma. Each woman’s role in a family can positively be applied to community harmony, societal peace, and even a constructive nation-building process.

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great potential to promote democratic society and peace. Therefore, women are very important human resources, and ASEAN countries should tackle the issues of advancement of women and women’s rights and build a society wherein women can actively participate. To make women able to contribute to society, there must be an approach adopted that can be acceptable to diverse societies such as those in ASEAN countries, while it is also necessary to respect universality of international human rights instruments. Therefore, it is important to improve the necessary domestic legislation and strengthen the functions of the relevant national organisations with the cooperation of international organisations, so that it brings not only the advancement of women in social, economic, and political aspects but also the development and peace in each nation and the ASEAN region as a whole. The Initiatives of ASEAN for the Advancement of Women  he Historical Background on Promotion of Women’s Rights in ASEAN T ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) was established on 8 August 1967 with the signing of the ASEAN Declaration by the founding members, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Then, Brunei Darussalam joined in 1984, Vietnam in 1995, Lao PDR and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999, making up the ten member states. ASEAN’s initial focus was mainly on economic cooperation, promoting foreign investments as well as political and security cooperation. ASEAN is also a largely male-centred organisation; therefore, women’s issues were not a primary a concern of ASEAN during its early years. Consequently, the early regional involvement of ASEAN in women’s rights and issues was minimal and limited to the ASEAN Women Leaders’ Conference, which was held in 1975, and the ASEAN Committee on Social Development’s establishment of the ASEAN Sub-Committee on Women (ASW) in 1976. The ASW was formed to facilitate and implement activities for effective women’s participation in all spheres at various levels of political, economic and social life, and later it was renamed the ASEAN Women’s Program (AWP) in 1981 (Center for Women, Peace and Security n.d.-a). However, women in ASEAN were regarded as disadvantaged and vulnerable members of society, incapable of autonomy and self-­ determination. In addition, ASEAN places emphasis on “strong families as the basic units of society”, which consequently served to reinforce stereotypes of female gender roles as wives and mothers. Therefore, ASEAN

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relegated women’s rights issues to social and developmental issues and did not focus on the promotion of women’s rights. Later the AWP was restructured into ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) in 2002 (Prasertsri et al. 2013; Center for Women, Peace and Security n.d.-a). Therefore, although there has been a committee on women’s issues since 1976, it was only after more than 20 years since its establishment that ASEAN began to include women’s human rights in its agenda. Women’s human rights issues finally gained momentum when Maria Corazon Sumulong Cojuangco-Aquino, who was elected as the president of the Philippines, became the first female president in Asia in 1986. Since then, ASEAN has embarked on a new chapter for the advancement of women in the region (Prasertsri et al. 2013). One of the most important milestones for women in ASEAN region was “The Declaration on the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region” (DAWA), which was adopted by all the six member states of ASEAN at that time, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, in 1988. The DAWA recognised the importance of women’s active participation and social integration as well as the necessity of meeting their needs and aspiration for the first time in the ASEAN region (Prasertsri et al. 2013). “The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region” (DEVAWA), which was drafted under the leadership of the ACW, was adopted at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on 30 June 2004, and the “ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children” (DATP) was also adopted at the 10th ASEAN Summit on 29 November 2004. DEVAWA was written based on “The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women”, which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1993 and CEDAW, and recognised that violence against women is a violation and an infringement of women’s rights and fundamental freedoms, hindering the full development of their potential. Therefore, it calls on the ASEAN member states to establish mechanisms, including amendment or improvement of existing domestic laws, for eliminating violence against women, which concentrates on giving services to fulfil the needs of survivors, taking appropriate responses against offenders and perpetuators, understanding the nature and causes of the violence and changing societal attitudes and behaviour (ASEAN 2012). DATP recognised the urgent need for a comprehensive regional approach in tackling human trafficking and, since the adoption of DATP, substantial regional cooperation against human trafficking has started in the ASEAN.

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With the increasing awareness of not only the rights of women and but also children who are marginalised in society, the “Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and Children” (DEWD) was adopted at the 17th ASEAN Summit on 28 October 2010 and, subsequently, “The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children in the ASEAN Region” (DEVAWCA) was adopted at the 23rd ASEAN Summit on 9 October 2013. While ASEAN predominantly adopted paternalistic and protective approaches to women and children in the provisions of the regional human rights instruments, DEWD takes a further more rights-­ based approach, calling for the member states to implement the appropriate measures for building the capacity of women and children and promoting the participation of women in decision-making and leadership. It was also the first ASEAN’s human rights instrument which includes the word “equality” in the provision (ASEAN 2010a). DEVAWCA focuses not only on the violence itself but also on its root causes, calling for the member states to take the necessary measures to eliminate violence against women as well as breaking down the wall of prejudice and practice based on the stereotypes of gender roles, which are responsible for gender-based violence and gender inequality. It was also the first declaration that states the important role civil society plays in eliminating violence against women and children (ASEAN 2013a).  he ASEAN’s Women’s Rights Mechanisms and the Issues T In the earlier section, the historical background of the ASEAN’s direction towards women’s issues is recounted by highlighting the regional women’s human rights instruments in ASEAN. In line with the global trend in developing women’s rights legislations with increased awareness towards women’s rights, there have also been some changes in the direction towards women’s rights in the ASEAN region whose primary focus was not human and women’s rights issues. In this section, to gain more insight into the ASEAN’s initiatives on women’s rights, some of the main ASEAN’s organisations to deal with women’s issues and their structures are described. The main functions and achievements are shown in Table 7.4. According to the ASEAN Charter which came into force in 2008, the ASEAN Summit is the highest and the ASEAN Coordinating Council is the second highest decision-making body of ASEAN. Under the ASEAN Coordinating Council, there are three ASEAN Community Council,

Main functions

Founded Type/ structures

2002 (1976) A sectoral body comprised of senior officials, who are responsible for ASEAN’s key regional priorities about women’s issues. ACW has an established working relationship with the ACWO. • Collaborating with and building the capacity of government officials • Developing policies and work plans, exchanging best practices and organising study visits • Publishing various reports • Monitoring the implementation of DAWA

ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW)

Name of organisation

2010 A consultative and inter-­ governmental body comprised of two representatives (women’s rights and children’s rights) from each MS. It has a strong mandate to engage with civil society.

ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC)

Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus)

(continued)

2008 An extensive alliance of women’s organisations with over 100 partners in 11 countries (ASEAN and East Timor). It engages with MS, ASEAN HR bodies and numerous civil society networks. • Working closely with and • Promoting WR and CR • Monitoring ACWC attending meetings of through the implementation activities ACW for consultation of international, ASEAN and • Submitting statements, • Serving as a regional other instruments proposal, etc. to ACWC forum for women to • Developing policies etc., and representatives engage with the raising awareness, education • Compiling and analysing strategies and • Encouraging member states to the NGO alternative programmes adopted by accede and ratify international reports to CEDAW member states HR instruments committee • Encouraging • Assisting member states in • Facilitating integration implementation of states the preparation of reports to of women’s issues in the women’s HR obligations treaty bodies and the creation of ASEAN HR under international implementation of mechanisms agreements concluding observations • Providing advocacy materials

1981 An ASEAN-accredited civil society organisation consisting of the national council of women’s organisations in each ASEAN member states (MS)a.

ASEAN Confederation of Women’s Organisation (ACWO)

Table 7.4  Main organisations related to women’s issues in the ASEAN

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• Convening workshops, seminars, training sessions, consultative meetings for sharing and raising awareness of women’s issues • Continuing and enhancing the implementation, monitoring, and reporting of CEDAW • Encouraging member states to consider removing their reservation to CEDAW, study optional protocols Main • Oversaw the creation of achievements ACWC •  Drafted DEVAWA • Made joint statements, commitments, and recommendations on the importance of HR instruments including CEDAW

ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW)

Name of organisation

Table 7.4  (continued)

ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC)

• Conducting workshop, consultation for members • Undertaking internal organisational strengthening activities to clarify its structure and membership • Building capacity of new members to work with ASEAN • Facilitating inclusion of minority groups

Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus)

• Developed regional •  Drafted DEVAWCA • Built collaborative strategies and • Establishment of feedback relationships with progressing the system from civil society ACWA, AICHR, and implementation of them • Obtained more funding from women’s CSOs together with ACW (e.g. MS on WR and CR issues • Expanded Women’s World Plan to CSOs’ network Operationalise DEVAWA • Lao government gave in 2006) appreciation for raising public awareness

• Initiating programmes of • Promoting research and activities to ACW for sharing experiences for appropriate actions effective implementation of • Submitting written CEDAW and CRC statements, • Encouraging member states recommendations, for collection and analysis of proposals and views on data, periodic reviews of policy matters, national legislations, policies, significant events, or etc. regional or international • Proposing appropriate concerns to the ASEAN measures, mechanisms, and Standing Committee strategies

ASEAN Confederation of Women’s Organisation (ACWO)

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a The organisations which belong to ACWO include the National Council of Women of Brunei Darussalam (NCWB), the Cambodia Women for Peace and Development (CWPD), Kongres Wanita Indonesia (KOWANI), Lao Women’s Union (LWU), National Council of Women’s Organization, Malaysia (NCWO), Myanmar Women’s Affairs Federation (MWAF), National Council of Women of the Philippines (NCWP), Singapore Council of Women’s Organization (SCWO), National Council of Women of Thailand (NCWT), and the Vietnam Women’s Union. ASEAN-accredited civil society organisations are not a part of the formal structure of ASEAN but perform functions and activities that are governmental or quasi-governmental in nature

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Political Security, Economic, and Sociocultural, which consist of one ministerial representative in each ASEAN member state. Under each Community Council, there are different ASEAN Sectoral Ministerial Bodies, each of which is comprised of ministers of all the member states from these specific sectors. Currently, women’s issues are under the control of the Sociocultural Community Council, who are responsible for ‘Social Welfare and Development’ Sectoral Ministerial Body, including the ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW) and ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC) (Prasertsri et al. 2013). ACW is the oldest and highest existing women’s body of ASEAN, which has dealt with women’s issues from the days of its predecessor, ASW. As shown in Table 7.4, ACW’s main functions include developing policies, work plans as well as enhancing their implementation, monitoring and reporting on international and regional instruments such as CEDAW and DAWA. At the ASEAN High-Level Meeting organised by ACW, joint statements were made to reaffirm the importance of the international or regional human rights instruments such as CEDAW, BDPA, MDGs, SDGs, DEVAWA, and so forth, and towards the implementation of ASEAN Vision 2020 and the purposes and principles of ASEAN Charter. The ACW also drafted DEVAWA and oversaw the creation of ACWC in 2010 (Center for Women, Peace and Security n.d.-a; Prasertsri et al. 2013). ASEAN Confederation of Women’s Organisation (ACWO) is an ASEAN-accredited civil society organisation. Working closely with ACW, ACWO is responsible for encouraging implementation of states women’s rights obligation and women’s participation in both national and regional progress. As an accredited organisation, ACWO has a mandate to submit written statements, recommendations, proposals, views on policy matters and regional or international concerns to the ASEAN Standing Committee (Center for Women, Peace and Security n.d.-a; Prasertsri et al. 2013). ACWC is a consultative and inter-governmental body, which was created under the supervision of ACW, focusing especially on the promotion and protection of women’s and children’s rights. ACWC deals with women’s and children’s issues in ASEAN by working cooperatively with the ASEAN Inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) and ACW, as well as the Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus), which is the alliance of women’s organisations. The main function of ACWC encompasses implementation of international/

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regional human rights instruments, assistance for preparing the reports to the treaty bodies such as CEDAW, development of policies, strategies, and measures, as well as raising awareness and capacity-building in relation to women’s and children’s issues. Since ACWC has a strong mandate to associate with civil society, it could reflect the actual situation of each country in the policies and work plans by encouraging ample inputs from civil society organisations. ACWC also drafted the DEVAWCA (Center for Women, Peace and Security n.d.-b). Women’s Caucus is an extensive alliance of women’s civil society organisations with over 100 partners in 11 countries, including ASEAN and East Timor. It was founded in 2008 by the Asia Pacific Forum on Women, Law, and Development (APWLD) and the International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific (IWRAW-AP) in order to create “people-­centred ASEAN”, and is still co-convened by the two organisations. Women’s Caucus actively monitors ACWC’s work and submits various documents, including statements and proposals to ACWC, as well as analyses the NGO’s alternative reports to CEDAW committee. To work as a watchdog of ASEAN’s human rights mechanisms, civil society, which is representative of the general public, must acquire the knowledge about ASEAN, engage with the related bodies, foster qualities and abilities of all the relevant stakeholders so that civil society has a positive impact on human rights issues and can make the voice of marginalised people heard. Therefore, the Women’s Caucus not only monitors ACWC and provides recommendation on the issues, but also promotes participation of women in women’s issues and women’s empowerment (Women’s Caucus 2014). However, while the ASEAN emphasises the economic integration and cooperation, the regional human rights bodies such as ACWC and AICHR have not developed sufficiently to function in each member state adequately. They are still at the premature stages of playing a crucial role to protect human rights in the region. Article 3 of the ACWC’s Terms of References (TOR) stipulates that ACWC should encourage “respects for the principles of ASEAN as embodies in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter”, which includes the principles of “sovereignty” and “non-interference” based on the ASEAN way (ASEAN 2008, 2010b). It is pointed out by international communities and civil society organisations that these principles are used by the member states to make an excuse or a defence to avoid fulfilling their human rights duties. Moreover, Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter also encompasses the principle of “respect for the different cultures, languages and religions”, which also gained much criticism

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since women’s rights violation and gender-based violence often arise from the patriarchal values and practices deeply rooted in cultural and religious norms (Prasertsri et al. 2013). Article 2 of the AICHR’s TOR also includes the same principles as ACWC (ASEAN 2009). In addition, in the case of the ASEAN Human Rights Declaration, human rights are subject to national laws; however, national laws are sometimes not compatible with international human rights standards and discriminate women and the other marginalised groups in society (ASEAN 2013b).

Women’s Rights: Global Direction and Local Reality in Myanmar Responding to the global direction to protect human rights, Myanmar has adopted various international human rights conventions and humanitarian laws. In the case of those relating to women’s rights, Myanmar was one of the first United Nations member states to adopt UDHR in December 1948, endorse BDPA in 1995, and ratify CEDAW in 1997, 20 years after its adoption by the United National General Assembly (UNGA). Needless to say, as a member state of the UN, Myanmar is responsible for working towards achieving MDGs and SDGs. In case of the regional instruments, after Myanmar joined ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar adopted all the women’s human rights instruments together with other ASEAN countries such as DEVAWA in 2004, DATP in 2004, DEWD in 2010, and DEVAWCA in 2013, as explained earlier. As well as the various international and regional human rights instruments, the Myanmar constitutions of 1947, 1974, and 2008 have all guaranteed equality for all people (Article 13 of 1947, Article 22 of 1974, Article 21 of 2008). However, serious human rights violations have been reported by the UN, international NGOs, academics, and CSOs from the period of military rule to the present day. In addition, a number of national laws have served to entrench gender and religious discrimination. For instance, the “race and religion protection laws” were proposed by a Buddhist nationalist organisation, and approved in 2015 by the former government, despite strong objections from civil society, and notwithstanding the guarantees against discrimination on grounds of sex, ethnicity, race, or religion in the 2008 constitution (Melinda Thet Tun 2017). According to the reports of a Special Rapporteur appointed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1991,

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­ agrant and large-scale human rights violations were occurring in Myanmar. fl However, the government dismissed the allegations as politically motivated and intended to interfere with Myanmar’s internal affairs and challenge its sovereignty (O’Shannassy 2000). Considerable discrepancy in opinion was also seen at the 1995 Beijing Women’s Forum. While the government delegation representative alleged that equal rights for women were fully respected and conferred by the state’s constitution and Myanmar Customary Law, Aung San Suu Kyi asserted in a keynote address that women’s political participation and representation, as well as their fundamental rights to free expression, association, and security of life, were denied (O’Shannassy 2000). In response to the growing international recognition of women’s rights, the government established the Myanmar National Committee for Women’s Affairs (MNCWA), which was responsible for implementing the “Myanmar National Plan for the Advancement of Women” (MNPAW). Since building an institutional mechanism to empower women is one of the 12 critical areas of concern in the BDPA, the MNCWA was set up as a display of the government’s commitment to the advancement of women. However, the MNCWA consisted of government officials and government-­ supported NGOs, including many women in low-ranking positions and a few in senior positions who were married to high-ranking officials in the military regime. As a result, the credibility of the committee was dubious, to say the least, since the views of these wealthy and privileged women are unlikely to reflect those of the majority of Myanmar’s women (Harriden 2012). Five areas of concern for government policy were identified by the MNCWA, based on the BDPA: education, health, violence, economy, and the girl child, and one more area, culture, not included in the BDPA, was added as the most relevant for the advancement of women in Myanmar. Later in 2000, two more areas were added: environment and the media. However, the rest of the four areas in the BDPA: poverty, armed conflict, power and decision-making, and human rights were officially ignored until the National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women 2013–2022 (NSPAW) was launched under the military-backed Thein Sein government in 2013 (MNCWA 2013). Moreover, the MNCWA’s report written in 1997 claimed that “violence against women is not an important issue in Burma and there is no racism, religion or gender discrimination”. The initial report submitted by the government to the CEDAW committee in 1999 also stated that “in

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Myanmar, women legally enjoy rights equal to those of men in the political, economic, administrative, judicial, and social spheres” (United Nations 1999). Both reports contradicted the various submissions of international human rights organisations, UN bodies, and minority ethnic women’s organisations. According to a report of a Mon women’s organisation, when a girl was raped by a Myanmar soldier, the MNCWA leader came and tried to settle the case out of court for approximately 210 dollars (WCRP 2004). The former governments attempted to appear as though it had made a concerted effort to promote and protect women’s rights. However, as is evident from the case of Burma’s Mon women’s organisation, it appears the government actually had no intention of tackling the issues sincerely. Therefore, many of their actions and national laws run counter to global trends. More recently, the old conflicts have erupted anew in Rakhine, Kachin, and Northern Shan States and become intensified between the Burmese army and ethnic armed organisations. These conflicts still continue even after the civilian government took over in 2016. A number of cold-­ blooded atrocities committed by the Burmese army on the civilians have been reported by many civil society and UN organisations. However, a government investigation commission led by the Vice-President, and the security forces’ own inquiries for the human rights violation in Rakhine State, cleared the Burmese military and security forces of wrongdoing, endorsing the lawfulness and appropriateness of the response (Human Rights Council 2018). In addition, the Burmese authorities (military) use various laws to arrest, charge, and imprison peaceful activists, journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders who expressed critical views on their actions. Two Reuter’s journalists who were investigating some alleged genocide against Rohingya people were jailed on charges of breaking the country’s Official Secrets Act. However, the de facto leader Aung San Suu Kyi said that the imprisonment of the two journalists had nothing to do with freedom of expression and they were not jailed since they were journalists (Faulconbridge 2018). Even though the current civilian government does not have enough constitutional power to control the actions of the Burmese military, Aung San Suu Kyi was severely criticised by ­international community because it was perceived that she does not try enough to prevent the unfolding events and fulfil her responsibility to protect civilian population (Human Rights Council 2018).

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Violation and Deprivation of Myanmar Women’s Rights Fundamental rights, including women’s rights, have long been violated in Myanmar. The endurance of intolerable pain among people, especially ethnic minorities and rural women, continues since good governance, which requires rule of law, does not exist. This absence has been compounded by failures of enforcement by the security and judicial sectors, which have contributed to the deprivation of women’s rights around the country. Furthermore, ordinary citizens lack awareness of how their rights are being violated and how to respond effectively, which aggravates an already appalling situation. This situation arises from inadequate education and poor access to information, as well as insufficient advocacy work by external actors. Limited press and media freedom, as well as the inconsistent political access allowed to local media, remain key issues for protecting human rights. In this section, the issues and causes of women’s rights violations in general, regardless of ethnicity, are explored. Then, cases of extreme rights violations, which commonly occur in ethnic areas, are revealed by referring to the report of the Shan WOs. Women’s rights organisations in rural, remote, and ethnic regions are the most active and devoted groups in Myanmar and they monitor, protect, and carry out advocacy, as they belong to the weakest segment of society. The Limited Political Space for Myanmar’s Women in Reality  ilitary Rule Influence M Although more women’s organisations are working not only to improve social and environmental sectors but also to protect and promote women’s rights at the grass-roots level, in reality Myanmar is far from sufficient in achieving gender equality, especially in terms of political space. A series of military dictatorships ruled Myanmar for about 50 years. MPs from the military-backed party constituted 58% and 52% of the total voted seats in the parliament after the 2010 election and 2012 by-election, respectively, forming a government (Altsean Burma 2012). The former president Thein Sein was also a retired general who was chosen by the army. Although the ratio dropped dramatically to 6% at the 2015 election, as explained earlier, the current 2008 constitution reserves another 25% of

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legislative seats for military members, and potential presidential candidates are required to have a “military vision”. The Burmese military has always been a male-dominated organisation, and the few women in the military are assigned only to medical and lower-level administrative duties (Harriden 2012). Therefore, women’s opportunities to obtain official positions of political power are severely restricted. Another important point to note is the prolonged government restrictions on civil society organisations including women’s organisations under the military regime. Most civil society organisations were prohibited or placed under strict government control, restricting their political activities (Asian Development Bank 2015). All men and women thus feared engaging in political activities because of the military’s brutal suppression of any political opposition (Harriden 2012). Women involved in opposition politics were often harassed, sexually abused, or detained for long periods (O’Shannassy 2000). This long military oppression deprived women of their abilities, confidence, and desire to participate in political life, which made them voiceless to protect their rights. Women in the national parliament have therefore been under-­ represented, and the percentage of women has almost always been less than 3% until the 2012 by-election, which resulted in a female representation of 4.4% (Global Justice Center 2013). At the 2015 election, a total of 67 female MPs were elected, which amounted to 10.2% of the total 657 seats (IPU 2018). Although some brave women started raising their voices, Myanmar still remained at the bottom of ASEAN nations in gender equality in national politics (Macgregor 2015) as we discussed in the section “The Current Situation of Women and the Historical Background of Women’s Rights Promotion in ASEAN Member States”. Even though there have been many positive steps towards democracy, there are still many challenges for women’s political voices. Many women lack sufficient experience in politics. They faced many dangerous consequences during the 1964–2010 periods due to authorities in Myanmar who saw them as threat to their authority and their system. Therefore, the families and friends of those women have so far generally viewed women’s involvement in politics as dangerous and unsupportable (Macgregor 2015). S ocial and Cultural Norms In Myanmar, women’s primary role is housework. They take responsibility for managing the welfare of the family. Their parents teach them to behave in a feminine manner and that to be considered “good women”, they are

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to respect the “son as Master and husband as God” (O’Shannassy 2000). Discrimination against women in employment, education, and political and private life is prevalent. Conversely, the concept of male dominance is well-accepted and even eagerly embraced by women because it is deeply ingrained that “to do the opposite would for many women entail a wretch” (Mi Khiang 1984). Religious beliefs can also constrain women’s participation in the public sphere. In Buddhist culture, women do not assume political leadership positions (Lahtaw and Raw 2012). Nuns are considered spiritually inferior to monks, and only men are believed capable of attaining Buddha-hood (Belak 2002). Therefore, rampant male chauvinism damages and restricts women as much as any written rules, and these unwritten rules will be difficult to change in the near future. Moreover, communities and families tend to impose restrictions on women’s travel, especially young women, due to the risk of rape or sexual harassment. Working in politics involves touring extensive areas, and as previously noted, women involved in opposition politics are often targeted for sexual aggression. Thus, women and their families are intimidated out of engaging in political activities (Minoletti 2014). However, in recent years, this seems to be declining, except in conflict areas. The public perception of women’s travel as objectionable has been reinforced by prolonged unsafe conditions and is deeply rooted in society and local frames of judgement. Therefore, one could argue that the restrictions on women’s travel are largely caused by cultural norms rather than actual danger. The impact of such social and cultural norms on women is significant and erects an invisible barrier to women’s participation in politics. Being excluded from politics for decades has eroded women’s confidence in their abilities. In addition, such a lack of experience negatively influences men’s perceptions of women’s capacities to perform political activities. As a result of traditional practice, women are discouraged by society from assuming any risky activities in political and national affairs alongside men. Women in Ethnic and Conflict Areas Women in ethnic and conflict areas experience more or less similar situations. They face the serious and constant danger of systematised rape and brutal repression by the Burmese military. The Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN) jointly

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­ ublished a seminal report in 2002 called “License to rape”, which revealed p 173 incidents of rape and other forms of sexual violence by Burmese military members involving 625 girls and women between 1996 and 2001. It reported evidence that rape, including gang rape, was officially condoned as a “strategic weapon of war” to terrorise and subjugate the Shan people. It became a part of their anti-insurgency activities and involves extreme forms of torture such as beating, mutilation, and suffocation. Twenty-five per cent of the cases resulted in death and bodies were sometimes deliberately displayed. Even though the women survived, the experience had huge impacts on their physical and mental health. In some cases, they were blamed by their families, partners, and communities and had to flee their homes, generally for Thailand. However, despite these disastrous consequences, except in one of 173 incidents, the perpetrators of the crimes were allowed to conduct such brutality against civilians with perfect impunity. The Thai government also does not recognise victims of these crimes as refugees, so these women are forced to work as illegal migrant workers and are vulnerable to exploitation and trafficking (SHRF and SWAN 2002). These atrocities are not relegated to history, as many cases have been reported by ethnic WOs and UN organisations even after the formation of the democratic government in 2016. According to Human Rights Council (2018), women and girls were systematically abducted, detained and raped in military and police compounds, often serving perpetrators as sex slaves before being killed in conflict-ravaged minority ethnic areas in Kachin, Northern Shan, and Rakhine States. Sometimes up to 40 women and girls were raped or gang-raped together. One survivor of sexual violence in Rakhine State said, “I was lucky, I was only raped by three men”, an observation that suggests such human rights abuse has become commonplace occurrences in these states.

The Necessity and Potential of Women for Sustainable Development It is obvious from the previous sections that women’s rights of all kinds, which are supposed to be guaranteed by international instruments such as UDHR, CEDAW, BDPA, MDGs, and SDGs and ASEAN’s regional instruments such as DEVAWA, DATP, DEWD, DEVAWCA, are systematically and brutally violated in Myanmar. Violence against ethnic and rural women in particular is perpetuated by the Burmese army even now and is one of the most despicable crimes against humanity. Even for urban

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women who are not often at risk of sexual and physical abuse, their political space is tremendously limited owing to the prolonged military oppression and social and cultural norms. As previously mentioned, women play the roles of unifiers and peacemakers as mothers, wives, or daughters and have an innate talent for promoting inclusiveness and respecting diversity. Without women’s presence and active participation in decision-making, it would be difficult to create a democratic society with the potential to bring about peace within the family, community, and even the country since the society in Myanmar has been broken into pieces by ethnic, religious, gender, and socio-economic differences. Patel (2013), referring to the reports of Global Gender Index (GGI), identified a correlation between the increased participation of women in decision-making processes and the development of societies in health, education, family care, social welfare, and the environment. These areas are crucial for constructing the foundation of a society that will serve future generations. The Brundtland Commission gives a clear definition of sustainable development as “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. Therefore, it could be argued that protecting and promoting women’s rights and eliminating gender inequality is essential and has great potential for sustainable development.

A Case Study of Ethnic Women’s Organisations The work of three representative ethnic WOs, The Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), The Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO), and Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), is examined in order to understand their accomplishments, strengths, challenges, and effects, p ­ articularly in relation to sustainable development. The SWAN, KWO, and KWAT are all members of an umbrella organisation, the Women’s League of Burma, which consists of 13 women’s organisations working together with other ethnic groups for peace-building and national reconciliation across ethnic boundaries. The Shan Women’s Action Network The Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), as mentioned in the earlier section with regard to its sensational report revealing violence against

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women by the Burmese army, was founded in 1999 by a group of Shan women active in the Thai-Burma border area. Ethnic women’s organisations in Myanmar, including SWAN, generally share some common characteristics. They were established to protect and support particularly children and women, who suffered from recurrent systematised rape and sexual abuse as well as other cold-blooded atrocities committed by the Burmese army. Therefore, their primary focus was on improving the health, social welfare, and social environment of these women. Their activities later expanded to include fostering an awareness of women’s rights and promoting women’s participation in community decision-making and the political process. SWAN supports those women in crises and empowers them by conducting various training and internship programmes and organising exchange meetings with not only local women but also women in different regions and countries. It also documents violence against women and publishes reports and other publications on gender and human rights issues. It is committed to working for gender equality and promoting women’s and children’s rights. SWAN is currently operating 16 schools (9 providing basic literacy skills and 7 nurseries) with the collaboration of the Shan community along the Thai-Burma border for those displaced children who cannot receive support from international aid agencies since they are not recognised as “refugees” in Thailand. Due to its never-ending pursuits, SWAN has achieved recognition internationally, and many prizes have been awarded to the organisation and its members. Nevertheless, SWAN faces many challenges such as lack of funds, trained human resources, and legal status in Thailand. In addition, after the report was published, it had to close its office and move once a year because of fear of raids. It finally had to refuse interview requests from the media and researchers in order to prioritise the interests of rape survivors (SWAN 2009). The Karen Women’s Organisation The Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO) was founded in 1949. It is a community-based organisation whose members consist of over 49,000 Karen women working in development and relief for refugees on the Thai-­ Burma border, internally displaced persons (IDPs), as well as women inside Myanmar. Like the Shan ethnic groups, the Karen people have experienced atrocities including sexual abuse, brutal political restrictions,

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economic exploitation, and cultural suppression by the Burmese army, which has aimed to defeat armed ethnic groups (such as the Karen National Liberation Army) since Burma’s independence in 1948. Since their foundation, they have extended their operations from the purely social welfare sphere to women’s rights protection and promotion as well as empowerment of women. They offer various trainings in capacity-­building; organise networking meetings with locals, other local and international organisations; and publish reports and other documents on human rights violations, especially violence against women. Therefore, KWO is well recognised locally and internationally. KWO started the Emerging Leaders School (ELS) for young women not only from KWO but also from other Karen organisations to provide opportunities to advance women’s critical thinking, public speaking, and presentation skills by teaching various topics, including women’s rights. Those graduates return to their communities and support them with their specific knowledge and skills (KWO 2011). Owing to their continued active work, in 2006, Naw Zipporah Sein, then General Secretary of KWO, was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for her accomplishments (KWO 2010). The work of KWO has had tremendously positive effects on sustainable community development. However, some challenges still remain. KWO has had trouble retaining some experienced staff because they need to return to their homes to support their families during resettlement. Another challenge lies in the lack of understanding of the Karen culture and environment by some international agencies, which sometimes results in their becoming obstacles. A lack of financial support and security challenges when travelling and working in Karen state also poses impediments to their work (KWO 2012). Kachin Women’s Association Thailand Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) was formed in 1999 by several Kachin women who recognised the urgent need to assist people fleeing their homes due to the conflict, and it is active in Thailand and on the China-Burma border. In Kachin State, the military regime has benefitted from large-scale extraction of natural resources such as timber, gold, and jade, along with hydroelectric power; however, those benefits have not been shared with the Kachin people. Moreover, the renewed conflict against the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) since 2011 has led to the displacement of over 120,000 people and is also fuelling drug production,

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resulting in rampant drug abuse among the Kachin communities (KWAT 2014a). At the beginning, the programmes that KWAT ran focused only on health and human-trafficking, but, since then, it has been expanded to include not only capacity-building and documentation of all abuses, particularly sexual violence perpetrated by the military, but also peace and reconciliation, along with political empowerment. KWAT saw the necessity of raising women’s political awareness, as well as building women’s confidence in engaging in political activities. Therefore, KWAT started educating women and young people on political issues such as democracy, election, human rights, and political systems. KWAT also runs a yearly internship programme for selected young leaders. Those graduates either work in their communities for KWAT, carry out further study in international universities, or work for relief organisations in IDP camps. KWAT has reached and empowered at least 35,000 community members through various programmes between 2007 and 2013. However, like other WOs, KWAT faces funding problems, having to look for new funding every year. Due to the lack of funding, KWAT is unable to pay full salaries to its staff and has difficulties in staff capacity building. Another challenge concerns communication, security, and travel, since KWAT operates in both Myanmar and Thailand. On top of all that, the management of these programmes is difficult since participants are from diverse backgrounds (KWAT 2014b).

Towards Sustainable Unity and Development Based on Myanmar EWOs All three EWOs have been very active and exerted tremendously positive effects on their communities. They focus especially on future generations, without which sustainable development cannot be enhanced. Their ceaseless work, which has only been possible with deadly struggles and endeavour, can be categorised into three areas: participation, empowerment, and rights protection and promotion. A conceptual flow of sustainable unity and development is created based on Myanmar EWOs’ work, as shown in Fig. 7.1. These Ethnic WOs promote women’s participation in community, regional, national, and even global affairs that lead to social integration, ­collective action, and coalition building, as well as finding support from

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Activities Participation • Networking & exchange meetings with women & local people • Networking meetings with other local/international organisations • Organising events with other local/international organisations

WOs

Social interaction

Empowerment • Provision of basic education • Running health/leadership/vocational/life skills training program & workshop • Provision of political empowerment, peace, reconciliation programs • Provision of ethnic language, literacy, cultural education & training

Capacity building

Rights protection & promotion • Organising projects & community events on human/women’s rights • Running emergency center for people in crisis situation • Publication of reports, newsletter, etc. on HR violation issues (info. Dissemination) • Documentation of women’s rights violation (prevention) • Website in several languages (int’l collaboration/tech. support, info. dissemination) • Attending & presenting at local/int’l conferences about women’s rights issues

Equality

Integration Collective actions Coalition building Support from external actors Economical Intellectual Political Cultural Social Organisational

Capacity building

Gender Ethnic Socio-economical Religious

Main effects

Enabling factors External monitoring Evaluation / Advocacy International networking & cooperation

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Sustainable/ development, Peace, unity

Community development/ Conflict transformation

Harmony Respecting diversity Contributory to own community

Fig. 7.1  A conceptual flow of activities by Myanmar’s EWOs in relation to sustainable development

external actors. They provide various capacity-building training opportunities and programmes to empower women and children, as well as protect and promote women’s rights in many different ways, which have been gradually redressing different kinds of inequality existing in the society. Their determination to move forward towards a democratic society in which basic human (women’s) rights are guaranteed, along with their skill as unifiers and peacemakers, has enabled them to overcome adversity and function as citizens of Myanmar. As seen in Fig.  7.1, this was possible because of their work promoting participation and empowering women as well as protecting and promoting women’s rights resulted in respecting diversity, creating communal harmony, and strengthening community solidarity to contribute to their communities and country. Using the conceptual flow (Fig. 7.1), it is possible to analyse the possible means, outcomes, enabling and obstructing factors, as well as the relationships among these factors and how they facilitate sustainable unity and development. Of those necessary factors, the protection and promotion of women’s rights are the top priority, since women cannot work effectively without these rights. If women’s rights are successfully protected and promoted, women have a great potential to develop communities and facilitate the reconciliation process through harmony and

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unification of different groups, which are vital for societies such as that of Myanmar, which has a long-standing history of conflicts due to ethnic, religious, and socio-economic causes. To realise the full potential of women for sustainable unity and development, further monitoring, evaluation, and cooperation, as well as greater advocacy by external actors, will be needed to ward off the challenges that EWOs face, particularly in terms of funding, security, cultural respect, and social and cultural norms deeply rooted in society. In other words, the enabling factors in Fig. 7.1 are still under-functioning, and a systematic coordination mechanism among different external actors, including those in ASEAN for long-term support, is necessary to promote Myanmar’s much-needed democracy.

Conclusion This chapter aimed to reveal the initiatives of ASEAN for the advancement of women and its direction, and highlights how the WOs can contribute to sustainable unity and development in the region. The main contribution was to spark a discussion on the subject of furthering women’s rights in the ASEAN landscape. It therefore encompasses the discussion on the importance of recognising the universal statute of women’s rights, ways of respecting advocacy and delivery measures promoted by all, especially, civil society organisations including WOs in the region, and a need to reinforce the existing laws to protect women’s rights in accordance with the established local, national, and regional frameworks. One of the salient features of this chapter is the extension of the discussion, which includes the efforts of so-called self-helped EWOs working constantly on the protection and promotion of women’s rights in Myanmar, even though the nation was struggling under the military rule. The main documents cited in the chapter consisted of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA) and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the Declaration on the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region (DAWA), the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region (DEVAWA), ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (DATP), Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and

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Children (DEWD), and the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children in the ASEAN Region (DEVAWCA). A set of basic indicators, including the Human Development Index (HDI), Gender Inequality Index (GII), Women in Parliament (WIP), Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR), and GNI per capita, based on national averages, was applied for grasping an intra-ASEAN comparative as well as the situation of women in general. In addition, the crucial roles of the regional mechanism, including the coordination as well as cooperation among its agency (regime) in ASEAN, have been highlighted through the functions of ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW), ASEAN Confederation of Women’s Organisation (ACWO), ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), and Southeast Asian Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus). These organisations effectively use the “Track 2 approach” to protect and promote women’s rights. The study also analysed the root causes of the violation of women’ rights that need serious and immediate attention since it has reached an alarming situation in many parts of the world. The reasons why violation of women’s rights persists are not due to the lack of provision of laws and regulations at international, regional, and national levels. Instead, the women’s rights violations in both conflict zones and non-conflict situations are in most cases caused by the insufficiency of ambitious enforcement mechanism. Moreover, the women in general and the victims in particular also lack open, constant, and powerful facilitation measures as well as support systems from watchdog organisations capable of providing legal assistance to make justice prevail in the end. The problem can simply be summarised in the phrase “lack of political will, courage and power” as in the case of Myanmar women’s struggle for their rights throughout the nation’s different political eras since 1960s. Myanmar does have national/domestic laws, guidelines, and efforts in principle to protect and promote women’s rights regardless of diversity such as ethnicity, religion, race, sociocultural practice, economic strata, and politico-ideological beliefs. In addition, Myanmar’s national programme is also strengthened within the ASEAN’s framework for the advancement of women, which is an integral part of the regional doctrine in accordance with international norms. Meanwhile, Myanmar’s national organs are obliged to protect all Myanmar women by respecting their rights as the State’s determines. Moreover, Myanmar’s current political administration is actively fulfilling its obligations through cooperation in

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the so-called Track 1 approach within the ASEAN community. However, it is still far from producing the intended effect on different ethnic lands, borderlands, and vast remote rural regions. The chapter explained such grounds of reality in Myanmar, as a case in point, to prove that the birth of self-helped ethnic women organisations (EWOs) are the most effective responsive answer to the protection and promotion of women’s rights within each ethnic boundary as well as across such boundaries. These organisations are actively working collaboratively on the issues that the government has been unable or unwilling to address. In other words, they are playing an essential role to fill the huge gap left by the state using “Track 3 approach”. The chapter has discussed three EWOs, namely, Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), Karen Women’s Organisation (KWO), and Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT) in terms of their visions, missions, accomplishments, and challenges. Their activities proved that EWOs can play a supplementary role to the national organisations as well as being a local watchdog on women’s rights in Myanmar. Their missions and practices should be facilitated further by both regional legal exchange mechanisms and international norms. Therefore, based on the findings discussed previously, it is recommendable to apply an approach that can integrate the promotion of women’s rights as an integral component of the sustainable unity and development of communities. As mentioned earlier, there is a correlation between increased participation of women in decision-making processes and the development of societies in the areas where it is important to build the foundation for supporting the future generation. Therefore, in order to increase the participation of women in decision-making processes, it is vital to ensure respect for women’s rights becomes a prerequisite condition in society. Not only the three EWOs discussed in this chapter, but also a number of organisations in Myanmar, including Women League of Burma (WLB), Gender Equality Network Myanmar (GEN), Women’s Education for Advancement and Empowerment (WEAVE), Women’s Organization Network of Myanmar (WON), are working for the promotion of women’s rights and gender equality, applying approaches that may differ from one to another. Similarly, the level of support they receive domestically and from external network also vary in degrees. Therefore, a generalisation about positive direct effects proven in the case studies by three EWOs towards a wider application of such effects in the whole ASEAN or in the region will be very difficult if women’s rights are the only target to accomplish. However, the EWO’s “Track 3 approach” towards sustainable community

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development can be useful/workable in building peaceful communities anywhere. The cases from Burma’s EWOs demonstrate such a possibility. The study promotes insight into the ground reality of women’s rights in ASEAN region for the purpose of ‘disseminating and activating functions’ of Academic Diplomacy which is the overarching concept of this book. It covers the issues of inequality which deprives ethnic diversity, religious freedom and cultural rights as well as important roles of universal values and international legal instruments. Further study about women’s rights from the aspects of ways to install a continuous circle of evaluation and monitoring through the cross-functional horizontal collaborations among governments, non-governmental institutions, and local CSOs could be instrumental in moving the situation forward. Moreover, it is also necessary to introduce a continuous circle of facilitation, standardisation, and legal exchange through vertical collaborations among global/ international regimes, regional or subregional commissions, and national alliance. Only by making a combined effort through these horizontal and vertical approaches, functional and long-term stability and continuity to improve the status of women in Asian countries can effectively be achieved. For the purpose of the intra-regional and inter-regional standardisation and facilitation framework, assessment and recommendation mechanism, advocacy training and educational measures, as well as documentation by (and in) the ASEAN community will be more crucially important than ever, since it generates a demonstration effect for the whole Asia, whereas each ASEAN country is also responsible for their individual promotion and protection of women’s rights. In addition, a national authority’s flexibility, as well as tolerance for guaranteeing the functions of international watchdogs, is necessary to integrate the universal norms/values into their developmental, educational, and legal practices designed for benefitting the bottommost communities. Acknowledgements  This work was supported by Heiwa Nakajima Foundation under Aid for Scientific Research with the Asian Region and Daiko Foundation.

References Altsean Burma (2012) By Election Special. http://www.altsean.org/Research/ Parliament%20 Watch/By-elections/By-elections.php. Accessed 4 January 2016. ASEAN (2008) The ASEAN Charter. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. ASEAN (2009) ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (Terms of Reference). ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta.

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ASEAN (2010a, October 28) Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and Children. ASEAN, Hanoi. http:// asean.org/?static_post=ha-noi-declaration-on-the-enhancement-of-welfareand-development-of-asean-women-and-children. Accessed 6 December 2017. ASEAN (2010b) Terms of Reference ASEAN Commission on the Protection and Promotion of the Rights of Women and Children. J ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. ASEAN (2012) The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region. https://asean.org/?static_post=declaration-on-theelimination-of-violence-against-women-in-the-asean-region-4. Accessed 23 December 2018. ASEAN (2013a) The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children in the ASEAN Region. https://www.ohchr. org/Documents/Issues/Women/WG/ASEANdeclarationVaW_violenceagainstchildren.pdf. Accessed 28 December 2018. ASEAN (2013b) ASEAN Human Rights Declaration. ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta. Asian Development Bank (2013) Gender Equality in the Labour Market in the Philippines. Asian Development Bank, Manila. Asian Development Bank (2015) Civil Society Briefs Myanmar. http://www.adb. org/sites/default/files/publication/154554/csb-myanmar.pdf. Accessed 4 January 2016. Aung San Suu Kyi. (2003). A Foundation of Enduring Strength. In Burma Women’s Voice Together, 1–2. Altsean Burma, Bangkok. Belak B (2002) Gathering Strength: Women from Burma on Their Rights. Images Asia, Chiang Mai. Center for Women, Peace and Security (n.d.-a) ASEAN Committee on Women. http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/regional/southeast-asia/asean-committee-onwomen/. Accessed 1 May 2018 Center for Women, Peace and Security (n.d.-b) ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children. http:// blogs.lse.ac.uk/vaw/regional/southeast-asia/commission-on-the-promotionand-protection-of-the-rights-of-women-and-children/. Accessed 1 May 2018. Conant E (2014, February 21) Rollback of Women’s Rights: Not Just in Afghanistan. National Geographic. Faulconbridge G (2018, December 22) Britain says Reuters Journalists Jailed in Myanmar are Innocent. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-journalists-britain/britain-says-reuters-journalists-jailed-in-myanmar-areinnocent-idUSKCN1OK1TH. Accessed 31 December 2018. Global Justice Center (2013) The Gender Gap and Women’s Political Power in Myanmar/Burma. http://www.globaljusticecenter.net/index.php/publications/advocacy-resources/103-the-gender-gap-and-women-s-political-powerin-myanmar-burma. Accessed 3 January 2017. Harriden J (2012) The Authority of Influence: Women and Power in Burmese History. NIAS Press, Copenhagen.

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Human Rights Council (2018, September 12) Report of the Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on Myanmar: Advance Edited Version A/ HRC/39/64. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/ FFM-Myanmar/A_HRC_39_64.pdf. Accessed 31 December 2018. IPU (2018) Women in National Parliaments. Inter-Parliamentary Union. http:// archive.ipu.org/wmn-e/classif.htm. Accessed 31 December 2018. Jain D (2005) Women, Development, and the UN. Indiana University Press, Indiana. KWAT (2014a, October 8) Silent Offensive: How Burma Army Strategies are Fuelling the Kachin Drug Crisis. Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, Chiang Mai KWAT (2014b) Kachin Women’s Association Thailand: Activity Report 2007–2013. Kachin Women’s Association Thailand, Chiang Mai. KWO (2010) Walking Amongst Sharp Knives—The Unsung Courage of Karen Women Village Chiefs in Conflict Areas of Eastern Burma. Karen Women Ogranization, Mae Hong Son. KWO (2011, November 25) Emerging Leaders’ School. https://karenwomen. org/category/education/emerging-leaders-school/. Accessed 4 January 2016. KWO (2012) KWO2011–2012 2YearUpdate. Karen Women Organization. Lahtaw Ja Nan and Raw Nang (2012) OPINION Myanmar’s Current Peace Process: A New Role for Women? The Center for Humanitarian Dialogue. Macgregor F (2015, December 1) Woman MPs Up, But Hluttaw Still 90% Male. Myanmar Times. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/ 17910-woman-mps-up-but-hluttaw-still-90-male.html. Accessed 4 January 2016. Melinda Thet Tun (2017, October 27) Making Better Laws for Myanmar. Frontier Myanmar. https://frontiermyanmar.net/en/making-better-laws-for-myanmar. Accessed 20 August 2018. Mi Mi Khiang (1984) The World of Burmese Women. Zed Books, London. Minoletti P (2014) Women’s Participation in the Substantial Governance of Myanmar. MDRI and The Asia Foundation, Yangon. MNCWA (2013) National Strategic Plan for the Advancement of Women 2013–2022. Myanmar National Committee for Women’s Affairs. Ministry of Social Welfare, Relief and Resettlement, Department of Social Welfare. O’Shannassy T (2000) Burma’s Excluded Majority: Women, Dictatorship and the Democracy Movement. CIIR, London. Patel G (2013) Gender Differences in Leadership Styles and the Impact within Corporate Boarder. Commonwealth Secretariat. Prasertsri D, Tran H, Somera N, and Singh S (2013) An ASEAN Handbook for Women’s Rights Activists. Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN, Chiang Mai. SHRF and SWAN (2002) License to Rape: The Burmese Military Regime’s Use of Sexual Violence in the Ongoing War in Shan State. The Shan Human Rights Foundation and the Shan Women’s Action Network, Chiang Mai. SWAN. (2009). SWAN: A Ten-Years Journey. Shan Women’s Action Network.

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UN Women (2014) The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action: Beijing +5 Political Declaration and Outcome. United Nations, New York. UNDP (1990) Human Development Report 1990. Oxford University Press, New York. UNDP (2016) Human Development Report 2016: Human Development for Everyone. UNDP, New York. United Nations (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights. http://www. un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/. Accessed 25 April 2018. United Nations (1999) Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, Initial Report of States Parties Myanmar. CEDAW/C/MMR/1. CEDAW. United Nations Treaty Collection (2019) Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women. https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&clang=_en. Accessed December 2019. WCRP (2004, March) The Plight of Women and Children in Burma. Issue No. 5. Women and Child Rights Project, Bangkok. Women’s Caucus (2014, February 5) A Look at ASEAN Declaration on Violence against Women and Violence Against Children. Southeast Asia Women’s Caucus on ASEAN. https://womenscaucusonasean.wordpress.com/2014/02/ 05/a-look-at-asean-declaration-on-violence-against-women-and-violenceagainst-children/. Accessed 28 December 2018. World Bank (n.d.) Proportion of Seats Held by Women in National Parliaments (%). https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SG.GEN.PARL.ZS?locations=TH. Accessed 4 January 2018.

CHAPTER 8

Online Political Parody in Thailand: Political Communication under the Computer Crime Act (No.2) 2017 Pimonpan Chainan

Introduction Thai society since the military coup in 2014 has become a society with limited freedom of expression and governed by the state’s dominant ideology. In the last decade, anti-government and anti-monarchist expressions have been shut out during the reign of the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO). It can be said that the 2014 coup marked Thailand’s major turning point in terms of free expression or disclosure of political identity, and this situation has polarised the country, allowing those on the side of the NCPO to be able to express their thoughts freely or disclose their political standpoint in the public sphere. Those adopting different standpoints from the NCPO have to stay silent, conceal their political standpoint, lay low, or give indirect political expression. One of the state’s apparatuses used for controlling its citizens’ political expression is known as the repressive state apparatus (RSA). In this case, it implements legislation on communication, especially on social media, P. Chainan (*) Faculty of Mass Communication, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_8

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which is generally considered a platform for the promotion of free speech, allowing individuals to communicate freely. During the NCPO’s reign, the second version (enacted on May 24, 2017) of the Computer Crimes Act (CCA), among other important passed laws, was a highly controversial piece of legislation as it encountered stiff opposition before it underwent three of the National Legislative Assembly’s meetings in late 2016. Three hundred thousand individuals signed a petition run by Change.org to slow down the passing of the CCA. The 2007 CCA was given an update in Section 14 to be implemented in the online world so that it becomes draconian legislation used for silencing and punishing “deserved content,” rather than following the original spirit of the law to control and punish wrongdoers in the “computer system.” The updated version of the CCA became a strong tool for the NCPO to limit online freedom of expression, especially in the critique of the government or anti-government expression. The updated version of Section 14 of the 2017 CCA is as follows: Section 14. Any person who commits any of the following crimes shall be liable to imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not exceeding one hundred thousand baht, or both: (1) dishonestly or deceitfully bringing into a computer system computer data which is distorted or forged, either in whole or in part, or computer data which is false, in such a manner likely to cause injury to the public but not constituting a crime of defamation under the Penal Code; (2) bringing into a computer system computer data which is false, in such a manner likely to cause damage to the maintenance of national security, public safety, national economic security, or infrastructure for the common good of the Nation, or to cause panic amongst the public; (3) bringing into a computer system whatever computer data which constitutes a crime concerning security of the Kingdom or crime concerning terrorism under the Penal Code; (4) bringing into a computer system whatever computer data with vulgar characteristics, when such computer data is capable of being accessed by the general public; (5) publishing or forwarding computer data, with the knowledge that it is the computer data under (1), (2), (3), or (4). (พระราชบัญญัติว่าด้วยการกระทําความผิดเกี่ยวกับคอมพิวเตอร์ (ฉบับที่ ๒) พ.ศ. ๒๕๖๐; “Computer Crimes Act (No. 2) 2017” 2017)

An atmosphere of being under the state’s surveillance of social media communication creates chilling effects under the legislation. Consequently, the citizens employ self-censorship and use indirect political communication. This leads to the emergence of various forms of indirect online p ­ olitical communication such as memes, political parodies, political satires, and

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Fig. 8.1  Nai Sooklek

Fig. 8.2  Pooyaima Gub Toongmamern

c­ artoons. These serve the same purpose of providing both a reflection and critique of the domination of the state. Historically, political cartoons have been utilised for a long time at both national and international levels. At domestic level, political cartoons have already been embedded in Thai newspapers. For example, cartoons typically take up one of the newspaper columns to implicitly publicise reflections and critiques of political issues for the people to follow and interpret. Notable domestic political cartoons include Cartoon Nai Sooklek by Prayoon Chanyavongs1 and Pooyaima Gub Toongmamern by Chai Rachawat as seen in Figs. 8.1 and 8.2 (ทีมข่าวหน้าสตรี ไทยรัฐ, 2562; มูลนิธปิ ระยูรจรรยาวงษ์, 2559). 1  Kana Yod Chai Nai Sooklek—a long feature reflecting contemporary domestic political affairs, unfolding using poetic language as found in traditional musical folk drama called Like (มูลนิธิประยูรจรรยาวงษ์, 2559).

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Political cartoons, in Thai history, were generally publicised in a newspaper, and their content required the editorial board’s approval and they were limited under the paper’s policy. In contrast, in the current situation, political cartoons run by individuals are free from such organisational influence since social media welcomes user-generated content. However, in the current political context, where the state exercises its power through the RSA, crucial questions arise about the situation of political cartoons in this context. Are these political cartoons still under the influence of the RSA and if yes to what extent? Do they employ the same form of presentation? What are their roles in the realm of online political communication? These questions reflect interesting academic issues which could be further developed in the body of knowledge on political communication through the sense of humour employed in political cartoons.

Political Cartoons and Political Communication Cartoons are considered a genre of art. Their dictionary definition is “a simple drawing showing the features of its subjects in a humorously exaggerated way, especially a satirical one in a newspaper or magazine.” Political cartoons, according to Goldberg, are defined as “the graphic expression of an opinion relating to current news, politics or social injustices that may arouse public interest. It is generally printed on the editorial page of a newspaper and sometimes amplified the view expressed in the accompanying editorial …it is an art of protest.” Other scholars define them as humorous but savage, functioning as an editorial “in satirical form and running commentaries intended as corrective measures to check social ills. They are focused on revealing mankind to itself, penetrate artificial armouries, expose hypocrisy, deflate pomposity, replace sham with truth; demands that political statement be accompanied with political action; draws attention to lack of political will; debunk and slowly destroy pretension through honesty” (as cited in Agba 2014). Given this point, political cartoons act as a medium of communication between the artist and the audience; thus, both the artist’s and audience’s political ideologies and attitude play a vital role in the communication. Mass media is one important source of political knowledge, and political cartoons, in like manner, function as a gatekeeper providing selective exposure for the audience. Their functions include (1) melting down the sphere of reference into a single portrayal, (2) simplifying complex reality into simplistic intelligibility, (3) using for propaganda and mobilisation,

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and (4) symbolising ideas which will be an endorsement of the audience’s existing perceptional/ideological frame (ธีระ ธัญไพบูลย์ 2541). Medhurst and DeSousa (1982 as cited in Mateus 2016) assert that there are four central roles of political cartoons: (1) providing entertainment—presenting amusement and jokes about personalities, (2) causing aggressive-reduction—providing the audience with a cathartic experience that helps reduce social frustration and avert conflict, (3) agenda-setting— satirically giving salience to certain relevant facts, events, or personalities that may help raise public awareness or influence the public agenda, and (4) framing—shaping and presenting issues in a way that persuades the audience to make certain interpretations based on the intended message (Greenberg 2008: 182). To achieve the above goals, a cartoonist employs the following methods: (1) using the cartoon as a means of portraying parody—containing a strong element of humour that reflects serious issues, (2) using the cartoon as a means of portraying satire, exploiting weaknesses and absurdities, (3) embedding a hyperbolic element or exaggeration in the cartoon to emphasise a specific idea, and (4) using analogies or symbolism for important elements (Kotzé 2007). At international level, political cartoons play a vital role in political communication by reflecting societal activities and being a means to indirectly give political expression in places where freedom of expression is limited. Political cartoons, in this sense, become a challenge to the authorities. Creators of political cartoons in many countries are prosecuted, most of all, for libel as the content usually refers to the authorities. Nonetheless, those prosecutions were not a common occurrence in the past as the risky or explicit content had to be filtered to a certain extent and gain approval from the print media organisations for whom the cartoonists worked. Today, the situation has changed as cartoonists tend to be independent individuals rather than working for or depending on an organisation. This removes the constraint on freedom of expression so that political cartoons today are able to explicitly convey political opinion more effectively. For more than three years in the Thai political context, the military rulers have been exercising their legislative power over communication, and it is obvious that they are attempting to take control over social media by blocking and filtering anti-government content. The CCA is not their only tool as the government has imposed several laws related to content creation and content creators with a heftier fine compared to before the coup. This has had a chilling effect on those authors and content creators,

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resulting in a relative lack of freedom of expression in terms of politics. The most renowned political cartoon in the Thai context is Khai Maew X2 (formerly known as Khai Maew). Due to the nature of social media that does not strictly require its creator to reveal their identity, it has managed to remain anonymous thus far and to become highly popular among the public as it has more than 450,000 followers. The public can get to know more about the creator solely through online interviews publicised in alternative online newspapers. However, the page has not been able to slip through the widely cast net of the government. After its successful establishment under the name Khai Maew with more than 400,000 followers at that time, it was shut down on the afternoon of January 18, 2018, and the page was down for over a month. Then, Khai Maew reappeared as Khai Maew X with the help of a fundraising auction of its painting of Somsak Jeamteerasakul, a well-known scholar who went into exile because of his extreme oppositional political standpoint to the rulers, conducted to directly help political prisoners (Chanrochanakit and Hanwong 2018; เพจ ‘ไข่แมว’ ปลิว, 2561). Khai Maew, a political cartoon that emerged out of frustration and political crisis, unfolds by using the layout of four comic strips without speech or thought balloons. The only texts in the cartoon are signs that help give contextual information, and the cartoon generally depicts contemporary political issues. A notable feature of Khai Maew is its use of the adaptation of scenes or gags from well-known manga, such as Dragon Ball Z and One Piece, or sometimes from movies. In terms of its components, the setting of Khai Maew refers to an imaginary world called “kala” land which literally means a land covered with “kala” or a coconut shell, and there are three main characters, namely, Jack Maew, designed to have characteristic features of former Prime Minister of Thailand  Thaksin Shinawatra who is often accused of being connected to the cause of political conflicts and the resistance; Uncle Khai, designed to have the personality traits of the NCPO’s leader, current Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha; and a child called Ta Sai who is designed to represent the innocent Thai citizens governed by the military government. Occasionally, there are guest appearances that represent celebrities, politicians, and internet influencers who get involved with social and political dramas ­ (Chanrochanakit and Hanwong 2018).

2

 https://th-th.facebook.com/cartooneggcatx/.

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Distinctive features of Khai Maew include not only the absence of speech or thought balloons that signify the absence of free speech in the country but also how this absence engages the audience to dig deeper and search for clues from news or other sources to find out more about what is going on in the strips. This, according to the creator, is the starting point for the audience to pay more attention to political issues. In the creator’s own words in the interview transcript in Prachathai, Khai Maew is explained as follows: I omit speech balloon from the cartoon because I do believe that everyone has their own belief so that they tend to have differing views and interpretations on the subjects. I do not want to force anything. The openness of the cartoon reflects inner cores of the audience, and sometimes if they do not intermediately get the gags, by human nature, they are driven by their eagerness to scroll through the comments or even scan through recent news. This, in fact, benefits them. By the way, the standout feature of the cartoon for me is the fact that it has no text because it lets the audience’s imagination and their experience be their guide. Texts of any sort would guide or force the audience’s interpretation. (เจนพสิษฐ์ ปู่ประเสริฐ, 2559)

Preliminary Findings This study employs content analysis to examine content that appeared on the Facebook page Khai Maew X after the declaration of the CCA and the first closure of the original Khai Maew. Data was collected from the Facebook page during the three-month period from February to April 2018, and the analysis covered a total of 42 posts. The analysis uses primary data derived from an in-depth interview with the organiser of the art exhibition entitled Khai Maew X: Kalaland, along with secondary data derived from a transcript of an interview with the page’s admin/author. The preliminary findings of the content analysis were categorised into three groups based on the number of likes (based on data accessed on June 15, 2019). The least liked post had 10,500 likes, and the most liked post had 48,273. There was one post that was not a painting but rather a manipulation of a real image with a total of 7950 likes, so it was not included in the analysis since it did not meet the criteria which selected merely paintings of political cartoons. The three groups are listed below. Group 1 consisted of seven posts with more than 30,000 likes. The seven posts shared typical idea of content reflecting the exercise of power

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through the RSA, authoritarian oppression subjugating the people, or momentous events or persons involved in events or hot news. Group 2 consisted of 13 posts with likes ranging from 20,000 to 30,000. The typical idea of content among these posts included satire on politicians, government officials, or the authorities’ behaviour as seen in news coverage, and pictures of people involved in the political arena portrayed in settings adapted from movies and comics. Group 3 consisted of 22 posts with likes ranging from 10,000 to 20,000. The typical idea of content among these posts included  pictures of political people such as government officials, former politicians, authorities, or celebrities involved in general activities or social events portrayed in settings adapted from movies and comics. The analysis revealed that there were four main techniques used in the political cartoons: (1) exaggeration: a method for depicting the content that makes it seem more than it really is in reality, (2) inversion: a method of storytelling accomplished by switching main characters with other persons or things in order to indirectly reflect or portray the issue using a subtler tone, (3) trivialisation: a method used for making the story seem less serious in order to reduce tension or simplify complicated subjects and portray them as a funny joke instead, and (4) comparison: a method of comparing different subjects in order to diversify or contrast the subject sharply with the opposites, who are often depicted badly. All in all, the prominent point of Khai Maew X is that as it is a silent political cartoon with no text, it is open to interpretation. This feature, according to its creator, helps engage the audience to pay attention and get involved in politics. In every post, there is a secret character hidden in the painting to symbolise the belief that there is a man pulling the strings to steer political activities in the Kalaland, the land covered by the imaginary huge shell trapping the people inside, so that the secret character should be blamed for all the mess that has occurred. Hence, this helps drive the audience to search for the gimmick.

Conclusion With the key feature of the social media system being how it does not strictly require a user to disclose their true identity, this indirectly allows relative autonomy to political communication; the degree of autonomy varies from country to country, depending on its laws and regulations in

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the media and political context. In the case of Thailand, the country is under a military regime. The law, rules, and regulations including the Computer Crimes Act (CCA) are imposed to not only filter anti-­ government expression but also to force citizens to employ self-­censorship. As a result, there is still no true (100 per cent) freedom of expression in terms of politics in Thai society under the regime. However, there is still some light at the end of the tunnel due to an opening in social media that allows subtle political communication to surface. Possible political communication in this context must be altered, adapted, or adjusted in order to avoid direct violent conflict and make the people realise that there is a sense of political injustice. Through social media, humour and symbolism are usually employed as a means of resistance and they are empowered by the system that allows for two-way communication: interaction through comments, shares, likes, or reactions—Love, Haha, Wow, Sad, or Angry. In other words, political cartoons on social media allow for interactions that are not normally allowed to be possible. As such, this can be seen as a form of counter-hegemonic  struggle against  the hegemony (Barker and Jane 2016: 157–158, 473–478).

References ทีมข่าวหน้าสตรีไทยรัฐ. (19 พฤษภาคม 2562). การผจญภัยใหม่ของ ชัย ราชวัตร ผมจะกลับมาเมื่อชาติต้องการ!! [New Adventure of Chai Rachawat, I will Return When the Nation Needs Me!!] ไทยรัฐ. สืบค้นจาก https://www.thairath.co.th/news/society/1570445. เพจ ‘ไข่แมว’ ปลิว [Page “Khai Maew” Gone]. (18 มกราคม 2561). ประชาไท. สืบค้นจาก https:// prachatai.com/journal/2018/01/75006. มูลนิธิประยูรจรรยาวงษ์. (2559). 103 ปี ชาตกาล ประยูร จรรยาวงษ์ [103 Years of Prayoon Chanyavongs]. สืบค้นจาก http://sooklek.com/. เจนพสิษฐ์ ปู่ประเสริฐ. (17 มิถุนายน 2559). เปิดใจ ‘ไข่แมว’ เพจการ์ตูนแซวการเมืองน้องใหม่ ในยุค คสช [Interview with “Khai Maew”—the Newcomer Political Cartoon Page in the NCPO’s Regime]. ประชาไท. สืบค้นจาก https://prachatai.com/journal/2016/06/66383. ธีระ ธัญไพบูลย์. (2541). การวิเคราะห์กระบวนการประตูข่าวสารการ์ตูนการเมืองในหนังสือพิมพ์รายวันภาษาไทย [An Analysis of Gatekeeping Process of Political Cartoons in Thai Daily Newspapers]. (นิเทศศาสตรมหาบัณฑิต วิทยานิพนธ์ปริญญามหาบัณฑิต), จุฬาลงกรณ์มหาวิทยาลัย, กรุงเทพฯ. สืบค้นจาก https:// dric.nrct.go.th/Search/SearchDetail/88983. พระราชบัญญัติว่าด้วยการกระทําความผิดเกี่ยวกับคอมพิวเตอร์ (ฉบับที่ ๒) พ.ศ. ๒๕๖๐ [Computer Crime Act (No.2) 2017]. สำ�นักพิมพ์คณะรัฐมนตรีและราชกิจจานุเบกษา. สืบค้นจาก http://www.ratchakitcha. soc.go.th/DATA/PDF/2560/A/010/24.PDF. Agba J U (2014) The Search for New Roles for Cartoon Art: Promoting Democracy in Nigeria through Innuendos of Political Communication. Journal

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of Mass Communication & Journalism 4 (2): 1–5. https://doi.org/ 10.4172/2165-7912.1000176. Barker C and Jane E A (2016) Cultural Studies: Theory and Practice. 5th edn. London: SAGE Publications. Chanrochanakit P and Hanwong L (2018) Khai Maew X: Kalaland. (Art Exhibition). Exhibited at Artist+Run November 7–22, 2018 (Unpublished). Computer Crimes Act (No. 2) 2017. (2017). https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/ Translation:Computer_Crimes_Act_(No._2)_2017#8. Greenberg J (2008) Framing and Temporality in Political Cartoons: A Critical Analysis of Visual News Discourse. Canadian Review of Sociology 39 (2): 181–198. Kotzé D (2007) Cartoons as a Medium of Political Communication. South African Journal for Communication Theory and Research 14 (2): 60–70. Mateus S. (2016) Political Cartoons as Communicative Weapons—The Hypothesis of the “Double Standard Thesis” in Three Portuguese Cartoons. Estudos em Comunicação. https://doi.org/10.20287/ec.n23.a09.

CHAPTER 9

Japanese Development Assistance, Geopolitics, and “Connectivity” in the Mekong Region: Implications for Aid to Myanmar David M. Potter

Introduction During the Cold War, Japanese aid was given with an eye to achieving foreign, economic, and international security policy goals, especially promotion of Japanese exports and support of the western alliance system. Such an approach was consistent with the outline of the Yoshida Doctrine, the de facto foreign policy grand strategy on the day (Pyle 2007). But Japanese aid officials carefully avoided using the term “strategic aid” (Orr 1989: 82) and, to the extent that security meant direct involvement in conflict, avoided that, too. Much has changed in the ensuing quarter century. Richard Samuels (2007), among others, has detailed the Japanese government’s search for a foreign policy grand strategy to replace the post-war Yoshida Doctrine D. M. Potter (*) Nanzan University, Aichi, Japan e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_9

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based on unequal alliance with United States, a commitment to a particular version of pacifism, and reliance on economic instruments of foreign policy. Japanese leaders now openly speak of strategy and security, especially since 2000. Prime Minister Abe’s formulation of a “proactive c­ ontribution to peace” is a culmination of a two-decade debate on this new grand strategy. Changes in defence policy have been most prominent, with increasingly permissive rules for Self-Defence Force dispatch to post-­ conflict situations, support for American military operations during the Koizumi administration (2001–2006) paving the way for upgrading the Japan Defence Agency to full ministry status in 2006, and enactment of a security law in 2015 to effect the Abe administration’s reinterpretation of Article 9 of the constitution allowing collective self-defence and support of “important friendly countries” in the event of hostilities deemed to threaten Japan’s national interest. In this context aid policy is changing as well. The research begins with this premise that the government of Japan is developing a grand strategy for “international cooperation,” a mix of official development assistance (ODA) and other policy tools, most notably security policy, that is currently a feature of the Abe administration’s “proactive contribution to peace.” The research asks how this new aid is strategic and how it understands the concept of security. Finally, what does Japanese aid to Southeast Asia tell us about these two points? This chapter addresses these questions in two ways. First, it clarifies what is meant by “strategic aid” by analysing the concept through three lenses: strategic thinking, organization, and allocation of aid. Second, it provides an analytical framework for measuring strategic aid, through which Japan’s aid to Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar, is analysed.

Geopolitics of Asia The geopolitics of Asia has transformed significantly in the twenty-first century. The main story is the rise of China economically, diplomatically, and militarily. Meanwhile, the strategic quadrilateral of Russia, China, Japan, and the United States has shifted towards a dualistic arrangement with Russia and China achieving rapprochement in the early 2000s, leading to greater economic and security cooperation, and the Japan-US alliance responding to that. But there is a concern as to whether and how long the United States can maintain its role as offshore balancer in Asia and thereby maintain regional security. These concerns have been highlighted by the election of Donald Trump to the presidency of the United States. Whether his administration will withdraw American military forces

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from Asia in favour of a “fortress America” isolationism or opt for a maritime-­based “offshore balancer” strategy like that recently advocated by John Mearscheimer and Stephen Walt (2016) remains to be seen. In the short term, Trump’s election is shaking the alliance system in the Asia-­ Pacific, which will no doubt encourage Chinese adventurism. As was the case in the twentieth century, there are no robust regional institutions that might limit security competition between these two poles. International arbitration, as seen recently with the dispute between the Philippines and China over territorial claims in the South China Sea, is limited if one party to a dispute does not accept rulings other parties regard as binding. ASEAN’s institutional and political weakness in dealing with territorial disputes, meddling by external powers, or resolving broader regional problems is well known. No other regional organization exists to supplement ASEAN-based frameworks. At the same time, however, the end of Asia’s cold war conflicts (at least in Southeast Asia; Taiwan and the Korean peninsula are still exceptions) and robust economic growth have facilitated greater economic and societal connectivity in the region. In the Asia-Pacific we can discern four nested games of this connectivity. The first is Eurasian connectivity, which has taken a major step with the inauguration of China’s ambitious One Belt One Road project of building land and maritime transportation infrastructure linking Asia, Europe, and Africa. Geopolitically, completion of this project will place China once again at the centre of world trade. Leverett and Wa (2017) argue that it is a key point of a Chinese grand strategy to consolidate Chinese regional hegemony. Nested within this intercontinental game, one finds ASEAN connectivity with its goals of linking the region’s economies, people, and societies. This is a more modest project consisting of providing physical infrastructure links among the member nations while removing economic and social barriers. Third, within this game, one finds Mekong connectivity. Finally, a new game of Indo-Pacific connectivity has been proposed by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, a proposal which has aroused some academic and policy interest elsewhere.

Analysing Strategic Aid How is Japanese aid adapting to this geopolitical environment? A grand strategy for foreign policy and the placement of foreign aid within it would entail three separate considerations: First, do foreign policy and aid decision-­ makers think in strategic terms? Second, is the policymaking

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apparatus organized to link objectives and instruments? Third, can we see a link between long-term goals and aid allocations? This section examines each in turn. Thinking Strategically Over time the Japanese government has applied deliberate strategic thinking that links security to aid policy. This is clearly observable in the three ODA charters adopted since 1992, which have progressively added clear diplomatic and political dimensions to basic aid policy. Since 2003 the charters have made explicit reference to the national interest. This trend is clearest in the way that changing post–Cold War conceptions of security have been reflected in basic aid policy. Human security, a nontraditional security concept that came of age in the post–Cold War 1990s, has become a cornerstone of the aid programme. Human security was an especially attractive concept for a Japanese government trying to solve the conundrum of developing a more active international role while retaining its identity as a peaceful nation. Human security has been endorsed by prime ministers representing the left and right ends of the Japanese political spectrum. In December 1998, Prime Minister Obuchi promulgated human security as a key concept of Japanese foreign policy. The concept was formally incorporated as a key component of the new ODA Charter adopted in August 2003 and remains in the revised Development Cooperation Charter of 2015. Human security has been criticized as being too ambiguous and broad-­ based to be analytically useful. For policymakers, on the other hand, the term’s utility comes from its ambiguity and flexibility. It is attractive to Japanese aid policymakers because it provides a way to make a contribution to the maintenance of international security without having to engage in the politically delicate tasks of constitutional reinterpretation or commitment to increased military spending. The issues identified in the human security agenda, moreover, are amenable to action through existing ODA programmes and provide an important link between development, post-­ conflict reconstruction, and peacebuilding (Amakasu and Potter 2016). The government of Koizumi Junichiro laid the foundations of strategic thinking more closely associated with traditional security concerns. The war on terror pursued since the September 11, 2001 multiple attacks on the United States, has accelerated a process of securitization of aid which has facilitated thinking about how aid can support security, a process not

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confined to Japan (Brown and Grävingholt 2016). The links between human security and civil conflict, terrorism, and piracy since the Koizumi era allow Japan to engage constructively in the maintenance of security in its more traditional aspects as well. As prime minister, Abe Shinzo has moved this concern with traditional security farther than any previous leader, culminating in a foreign policy grand strategy of “proactive contribution to peace,” a central point of what Christopher Hughes (2015) has dubbed “the Abe Doctrine.” The centrepiece of this new grand strategy is the National Security Strategy (NSS) produced in 2013. “The Strategy” first elaborates on Japan’s peaceful orientation to date and the policy of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation, examines its national interests, and identifies its national security objectives. Furthermore, “the Strategy identifies national security challenges Japan faces, taking into account the trends of the security environment surrounding Japan. Finally, the Strategy presents strategic approaches to be taken for national security, with diplomatic and defence policies at their core, based on the recognition that in order to overcome the challenges and achieve its objectives, Japan needs to effectively utilize its diverse resources and promote comprehensive measures, strengthen the domestic foundation for national security and seek deeper understanding both at home and abroad, and advance efforts at various levels in a multifaceted and coordinated manner” (Office of the Prime Minister 2013: 1). The Strategy specifies guidelines for all aspects of foreign policy related to national security, “including sea, outer space, cyberspace, official development assistance (ODA) and energy” (Office of the Prime Minister 2013: 2). The Strategy also ties ODA firmly to the concept of human security. In the section “Responding to Global Development and Global Issues and Realizing Human Security,” the Strategy states that “Japan has garnered high recognition by the international community, by its proactive contribution to global development in the world through utilizing ODA. Addressing development issues contributes to the enhancement of the global security environment, and it is necessary for Japan to strengthen its efforts as part of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” based on the principle of international cooperation” (Office of the Prime Minister 2013: 32–33). ODA, therefore, is, depending on one’s point of view, elevated or reduced to the level of an instrument of security policy. The new Development Cooperation Charter, adopted by the cabinet in February

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2015, is based firmly on the National Security Strategy (Ohashi 2015: 340). The Charter document begins with a precís of the current international environment, including security issues facing Japan, and then goes on to expand the scope of cooperation beyond ODA and expressly calls for linkages between aid and other policy instruments. The statement on basic policies gives priority to Japan’s role as a peaceful nation that provides aid for non-military purposes (a restatement of previous charter principles) and to human security. The second priority issue raised in the Charter is “sharing values and realizing a secure and peaceful society” in which peace, stability, and security are understood to be prerequisites of nation-building (Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter 2015). Organizing Strategically Reorganization of foreign and security policymaking apparatus has enhanced the government’s ability to use ODA to meet new security goals. An ongoing process of administrative reform has resulted in a shift in policy agenda setting away from the middle levels of ruling party and bureaucracy to the reformed Cabinet Office (Shinoda 2007). The second Abe administration (2012 to present) has taken advantage of that shift, enhancing cabinet policy control of foreign and security policy through the establishment of a National Security Council modelled on the American version (Hughes 2015). Aid has also undergone significant administrative reforms that have made it easier to link aid and security. In the case of human security, Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori proposed an International Commission on Human Security at the UN Millennium Summit in 2000, co-chaired by Professor Amartya Sen and former UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata. It also established the Human Security Trust Fund at the UN, the largest of the UN trust funds and until recently a completely Japanese operation. In 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs added a grassroots human security programme to its grant aid portfolio, distributed through embassies abroad mostly for small-scale social development projects. After 2003 the links between aid and traditional security concerns came to the fore, spurred in no small part by Japan’s contributions to reconstruction of Afghanistan and Iraq (Yasutomo 2014; Amakasu and Potter 2016) but also by concerns about how to enhance the foreign policy impact of an aid budget in long-term decline. Koizumi convened a number of advisory

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councils and committees to formulate both foreign policy and foreign aid strategies, in the process of which Abe played a key role as Chief Cabinet Secretary. The National Security Strategy and the 2015 International Cooperation Charter should be seen as the somewhat delayed result of this process. Aid administration has become more centralized as well. The Foreign Ministry now is authorized to set basic aid policy. JICA’s reorganization as an independent administrative agency in 2003 and concentration of loan, grant, and technical assistance administration under its auspices in 2008 have streamlined of the aid programme. Under the leadership of Ogata Sadako and Tanaka Akihiko human security and peacebuilding were major policy foci; the appointment of Kitaoka Shinichi, closely involved in the drafting of the NSS and the 2015 International Cooperation Charter, to the presidency of JICA in 2015 reinforces the link between aid and human security on the one hand, but also traditional security on the other. Allocating Strategically How aid donors distribute their assistance is a central question in the study of foreign aid. Typical studies divide independent variables between recipient need and donor diplomatic or economic advantage. The results, predictably, reveal that donor motives for giving aid are mixed. Let me narrow the field to issues of the latter. Assuming that aid is given with diplomatic or political advantage in mind, we would expect allocations to reflect the following three considerations: (1) hedging against rivals, (2) networking with allies, (3) courting neutrals. Strictly speaking, there is no overarching alliance system that encompasses Asia, and the United States is Japan’s sole formal ally. So let us relax strict definitions and see what we find. There are two measures of allocation: geographic and sectoral. The former focuses on countries or world regions and predominates in statistical analyses of aid allocation; the latter focuses on the content of aid.

Strategic Aid in Asia The most visible change in Japan’s aid allocations by country is away from China since 2003. The Koizumi cabinet decision to phase out loan aid to China by 2008 led to China dropping off the top ten list of Japanese aid: the Abe administration announced in October 2018 that it will terminate grant aid and technical assistance in 2019. Along with the graduation of

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South Korea from aid recipient status earlier, this means Northeast Asia is no longer a significant recipient of Japanese aid; rather, it should be seen as a source of potential and actual aid competition between new and old aid donors (Kim and Potter 2012). The shift elsewhere has been in two directions. One is Africa, where the process of deciding and implementing the MDGs solidified an international consensus on the need to focus development resources in sub-Saharan Africa. The other redirection is back towards Asia. Here the trends are harder to see if only the aggregate data are examined. Southeast Asia has always been central to Japanese aid distributions, so focus on geographical allocations alone does not reveal much that looks new. Moreover, since about 2004, net aid flows have been out of Southeast Asia back to Japan, as former loan aid repayments exceed new disbursements. Behind that, however, are some significant shifts. First, countries that historically have not received significant amounts of Japanese aid have been prominent among the top ten recipients. Afghanistan and Iraq are examples that are best explained by the securitization of aid (Amakasu and Potter 2016; Yasutomo 2014). Closer to home India and Vietnam have emerged as prominent recipients. The latest data from the OECD shows that, following a period from roughly 2000–2007, when the war on terror and efforts at peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction shifted attention to Afghanistan, Iraq, and Africa, Southeast and South Asian countries are back prominently among Japan’s top ten. Myanmar’s advance to major recipient status in 2013–2014 is remarkable. These ten, moreover, represent roughly two-thirds of all bilateral aid in a given year. This should be understood as the application of aid to the current Abe Doctrine foreign policy strategy of courting Japan’s “near abroad” as relations with close neighbours have soured (see Hughes 2015). ASEAN is of course the key regional organization in this distribution but there are interesting sub-patterns within allocations to its members. One is the development of strategic partnerships between ASEAN countries and Japan and the other is increased attention to maritime security. Strategic Partnerships Since 2003, Japan has pursued a framework of strategic partnership with ASEAN as a whole and with key members individually. Strategic partnerships thrive, of course, because of the ambiguity in the term “strategic,” which can mean all things to all parties. Typically, they involve commitments

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to promote deeper economic, political, diplomatic, cultural, and security cooperation and thus frame rather than narrowly define questions of foreign aid. Sudo (2015b) recently defined strategic partnerships as nonmilitary alignments of at least two states designed to reduce or eliminate the influence of an outside power. Similar to soft balancing, such partnerships use indirect tactics to counteract the influence of a hegemon. The hegemon here, as understood by the Abe administration, is China, inducing it to pursue concrete strategic partnership policies. This has included encouraging a multilateral, legally binding code of conduct governing the South China Sea; upgrading of relations with ASEAN littoral states, including use of ODA to enhance maritime security; and careful engagement of the United States in the region, a sensitive topic about which China tends to react negatively. In this sense, strategic partnerships have been most successful with the littoral states of Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Mekong Subregion Japan has been interested in the development of the Mekong River subregion for many years. Economic development of the subregion is cited expressly in the 2015 International Cooperation Charter as a priority in Japan’s aid to ASEAN. Both bilateral aid and Asian Development Bank aid are now supporting projects in the CLMV countries. Geographic contiguity and the integration of the Indochina countries and, belatedly, Myanmar provide an important spatial dimension to Japan’s attempts to foster “connectivity” (both within the region and with Japan), a key goal in the promotion of the Japan-Mekong Regional Partnership Program inaugurated in 2007 (Sudo 2015a: 220). An expression of the strategic dimensions of this is found in the 2011 White Paper on Japanese ODA (Fig. 9.1). The geopolitical geometry is unmistakable. Japanese efforts to develop the CLMV have a clear geographic focus and thrust, to wit, Japan and the Asian Development Bank (and the United States through its Lower Mekong Initiative) are concentrating on economic infrastructure development of the region laterally from East to West. Geographically, the development of the areas along the Mekong River also suggests the need to develop North-South connectivity, and early Japanese conceptions of Mekong development included connections with Yunnan, China. Since 2004, however, Japan has focused its aid efforts on the Lower Mekong precisely at the time China was emerging as a trade and aid rival in the

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Fig. 9.1  Japan’s assistance for ASEAN connectivity (Source: Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/ oda/white/2011/html/honbun/b1/s3_2.html)

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subregion and the Koizumi government was deciding to phase out ­infrastructure development aid to China itself. Emphasis on mainland Southeast Asia’s east-west connectivity has two potential payoffs. First, it mirrors Japan’s strategic understanding of the importance of Southeast Asian sea lanes. It may also provide an alternative to transport through the Malacca Strait, the geostrategic chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and East Asia (although a transport corridor ending in Central Vietnam does not solve the problem of an increasingly unstable South China Sea). Diplomatically, aid for east-west development has the advantage of courting neutrals like Myanmar, Cambodia, and Laos (actually more like Chinese client states) while hedging against rival China by diverting economic resources away from its borders.

Sectoral Allocations Maritime Aid The maritime dimension of Japanese security thinking cannot be overemphasized. Japan’s dependence on import of resources vital to maintaining an industrial economy is well known, and those resources must come across the water. A maritime country like Japan must be committed to the principle of free navigation since it cannot impose its will unilaterally. The importance of this can be seen in various recent iterations of security policy. Abe’s formulation of a Democratic Security Diamond (Abe 2012) including Japan, the United States, Australia, and India, which encompasses the Indian and Pacific Oceans and the waterways that connect them and which also consists of states that assert freedom of navigation, is a prime example. This principle was repeated in Abe’s speech “The Bounty of the Open Seas,” intended to be delivered in Djakarta in January 2013. In that speech the prime minister gave primacy of place to the need for Japan to strengthen its ties with maritime Asia. The principle of free navigation is spelled out in detail in the National Security Strategy. Paragraph 2 of the Fundamental Principles of National Security states that “[s]urrounded by the sea on all sides and blessed with an immense exclusive economic zone and an extensive coastline, Japan as a maritime state has achieved economic growth through maritime trade and development of marine resources, and has pursued ‘Open and Stable Seas’” (Office of the Prime Minister 2013: 2). It goes on to explain that “Japan will play a leading role, through close cooperation with other

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countries, in maintaining and developing “Open and Stable Seas,” which are upheld by maritime order based upon such fundamental principles as the rule of law, ensuring the freedom and safety of navigation and overflight, and peaceful settlement of disputes in accordance with relevant international law. More concretely, Japan will take necessary measures to address various threats in sea lanes of communication, including anti-­ piracy operations to ensure safe maritime transport and promote maritime security cooperation with other countries.” The Strategy specifically mentions sea lanes from the Persian Gulf, through the Indian Ocean, the Straits of Malacca, and the South China Sea as “critical to Japan due to its dependence on the maritime transport of natural and energy resources from the Middle East” (p.  17). The Strategy further noted that Japan would “provide assistance to those coastal states alongside the sea lanes of communication and other states in enhancing their maritime law enforcement capabilities, and strengthen cooperation with partners on the sea lanes who share strategic interests with Japan” (p. 17). Peacebuilding Peacebuilding as aid policy has developed particularly under JICA’s guidance since 2000 (Lam 2009; Amakasu and Potter 2016). JICA is the agency most committed to the linking human security, peacebuilding, and development, a repertoire it developed under the direction of Ogata Sadako. This can be seen in JICA’s development activities regarding conflict-­to-peace transitions in fragile states and conflict-affected countries. Since 2000, Japanese ODA at both the country level and the project level has adopted peacebuilding which aims to “prevent the occurrence and recurrence of conflicts, alleviate the various difficulties that people face during and immediately after conflicts, and subsequently achieve long-term stable development” (Japan’s Medium-Term Policy on Official Development Assistance). Peacebuilding avoids the enforcement of peace by military means, which is clearly a problem under the Constitution’s Article 9, and enables Japan to assume an active role in helping fragile states consolidate peace through aid provided by JICA and diplomatic initiative supplied by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This formula has been developed in Cambodia, East Timor, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, sub-­ Saharan Africa and most famously Afghanistan and Iraq (Lam 2009; Amakasu and Potter 2016).

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Japan’s aid for human security in Southeast Asia has tended to focus on the economic and social dimensions of the concept, notably poverty and economic crisis, rather than on its applicability to organized conflict (Soeya 2005; Lam 2006, 2009). Thus, it has tended to follow the freedom from want approach in human security rather than directly confronting issues of freedom from fear.

Mekong Connectivity Japan has been interested in the development of the Mekong River subregion for many years. Both bilateral aid and Asian Development Bank aid are now supporting projects in the CLMV countries. Geographic contiguity and the integration of the Indochina countries and, belatedly, Myanmar, provide an important spatial dimension to Japan’s attempts to foster “connectivity” (both within the region and with Japan), a key goal in the promotion of the Japan-Mekong Regional Partnership Program inaugurated in 2007 (Sudo 2015a: 220). The “geopolitical significance and economic weight” of the region is specifically mentioned in the New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation. According to a Ministry of Foreign Affairs evaluation (MOFA 2014), “‘Mekong connectivity’ means to connect the Mekong Region both physically and institutionally through infrastructure development, soft infrastructure development and institutional development. “This enhancement of connectivity aims at realizing the sustainable economic growth of the region.” JICA (2012: 27) outlines its understanding of Mekong connectivity this way: Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam have fallen behind in economic development, and are struggling with high poverty rates. Despite these problems, the region is attractive for investments because of its strong economic growth and political stability. With prospects for significant growth in the future, this region is expected to have a stronger relationship with Japan. JICA is implementing a broad range of projects to narrow the development gap within the region and to develop the region further. These projects are based on the Tokyo Strategy 2012 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation, which was announced at the April 2012 Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting as well as the Vision of the Vital Artery for East-West and Southern Economic Corridor, which is part of Japan’s support for ASEAN connectivity, and other initiatives.

This year it extended its commitment with the inauguration of the Japan-­Mekong Connectivity Initiative.

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Japan supports east-west connectivity that links the China Seas to the Indian Ocean and the Mekong countries. Emphasis on mainland Southeast Asia’s east-west connectivity has two potential payoffs. First, it mirrors Japan’s strategic understanding of the importance of Southeast Asian sea lanes. At the same time, the East-West Corridor and the Southern Corridor development projects neatly parallel the sea lanes of the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait. For a country like Japan on the East Asian littoral, this pair of corridors provides an alternative to transport through the Malacca Strait, the geostrategic chokepoint between the Indian Ocean and East Asia. Myanmar is the key link in continental ASEAN connectivity and therefore Mekong subregion connectivity.

Japan’s Aid to Myanmar As Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show, Myanmar is an important aid recipient for Japan again. It is so for a number of reasons. First, Myanmar and Japan have an old aid relationship that has its origins in Japanese war reparations (the Japanese embassy in Myanmar includes the Baluchaung Hydropower Plant in its public information on aid to the country). Prior to 1988, Japan was Myanmar’s preeminent bilateral aid donor (Seekins 2007). Second, although the diplomatic relationship has been difficult at times, especially after 1988, the Japanese government preferred engagement instead of ­isolation in its diplomatic interactions with the government of Myanmar. Hence, it provided modest amounts of humanitarian assistance throughTable 9.1  Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA, selected years

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

1994

2004

2009

2013

China India Indonesia Philippines Thailand Syria Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Egypt

China Iraq Vietnam Malaysia Philippines Sri Lanka Afghanistan Pakistan Kazakhstan Uzbekistan

Vietnam India Indonesia Turkey Afghanistan Thailand China Pakistan Tanzania Cambodia

Myanmar Vietnam Afghanistan Indonesia China Iraq India Philippines Bangladesh Kenya

Source: Amakasu and Potter (2016: 94)

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Table 9.2  Top ten recipients of Japan’s ODA, 2013–2014, 2015–2016

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Rank

2013–2014

2015–2016

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Myanmar Vietnam India Indonesia Afghanistan Iraq Thailand Bangladesh Philippines Sri Lanka

India Vietnam Bangladesh Iraq Indonesia Myanmar Philippines Afghanistan Thailand Pakistan

Source: OECD, aid at a glance. http:// www.oecd.org/dac/stats/aid-at-aglance.htm#donors

out the post-1988 period. Myanmar’s membership in ASEAN makes it one of Japan’s most important diplomatic regional partners. Third, Myanmar is seen as an economic opportunity for Japanese business, smarting from stagnant growth at home and restrained by international sanctions from a more active role in Myanmar. Finally, Myanmar is geopolitically important, facing on the Indian Ocean, as the western terminus of the Mekong subregion East-West Economic Corridor (sponsored by the Asian Development Bank [ADB] but financed largely by Japan), and located between India and China. It is therefore a key linchpin in evolving regional cooperation projects to promote ASEAN connectivity, Mekong connectivity, and Indo-Pacific connectivity. For its part, Myanmar has welcomed renewed Japanese investment and aid since 2012. Morris (2016: 4) argues that “Myanmar’s reforms were partly motivated by its desire to lessen its reliance on China, its largest trading partner and the source of large-scale external financing during a period when foreign flows from other sources were extremely limited. Myanmar’s opening has provided the opportunity for Japan and the United States to better engage it as a counterweight to China, an opportunity the Japanese government has been quick to grasp” (Morris 2016: 5; Seekins 2015). The reform process in Myanmar since 2011 has also opened up greater possibilities for ASEAN-India connectivity and implementation of India’s Look East policy (Osius and Mohan 2013). This last point is important. Japanese aid and investment at Dawei completes the western

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end of the East-West Economic Corridor, and Thai-Japanese cooperation in the development of Thilawa extends it northwest. Japanese Aid to Myanmar, 2012–2014 As noted above, it is important to look at the ODA Japan is actually providing to Myanmar. Japan has resumed its place as a major bilateral donor to Myanmar, providing 84 aid budget allocations covering 153 projects. Let us look at aid volume, an indicator of donor political commitment; by region within the recipient country; and by sector and aid modality. Looking at aid volume, Tables 9.1 and 9.2 show that Myanmar has jumped to the top ten of Japan’s bilateral aid recipients worldwide, achieving the status of top recipient in 2013. This of course was made possible by the lifting of sanctions following political reform in 2011 and 2012. However, it should be noted that Japanese bilateral aid is predominantly project based, so there can be a significant variation in annual allocations depending on formal agreement on specific projects (see Potter 1996). The 2014–2015 figure for Myanmar is $283 m., significantly down from the 2013–2014 figure, dropping Myanmar to the ninth place among Japanese aid recipients. Regional Allocations Regional allocations of Japanese aid in Myanmar from 2012 to 2015 show the following patterns. First, there is a significant concentration of projects in the area of Yangon and the Irrawaddy Delta. In fact, this constitutes a belt of aid projects that extends from the delta in the west to the Mon and Karen States in the east. This is the case across all aid modalities. Second, there is a concentration of projects in the Burman areas of the country. Some care must be taken with official statistics here because Japanese aid accounting classifies projects either as specific to a region or “nationwide.” The latter category includes transregional projects but also serves as a catchall for technical assistance and grant projects carried out by national government ministries. Thus, a fair amount of aid budgeted for “nationwide” projects is actually spent in Naypyidaw. Definite clustering of aid projects in the non-Burman areas can also be identified. Radiating out on axes from Naypyidaw, one finds clusters of aid in Rakhine State and Chin State to the west, and Kaya State, Karen State, and Mon State to the southeast, the latter being close to Yangon. There is

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also a clustering of projects in the southern part of Kachin State and the northern and most southern areas of Shan State in the northeast. These two states are interesting because the farther north one goes in the former and the farther east in the latter the Japanese aid projects peter out. We can attribute this to the continuation of fighting between the government and separatist movements in those areas. These regional configurations are related to aid modalities, that is whether the aid is loan aid, grant aid, technical assistance, or subsidies to NGOs. Loan aid is concentrated in the Burman core. Six of ten loan projects now in the pipeline, moreover, are located near Yangon. Given the scale of yen loan projects, this means that aid resources will favour that region. Ongoing commitments to the development of Dawei may change this pattern, but, as Dalpino (2016: 144) wrote recently, “Dawei will be a long-term effort: although some initial construction could begin this year, the entire facility could take as long as four decades to complete.” Technical assistance follows the pattern of loan aid, concentrating around the Yangon-Delta area and Naypyidaw. Grant aid and ODA-subsidized NGO projects are found in all areas of the country. A belt of projects runs from Yangon and the Delta to Kachin State and a good peppering in a diagonal from Chin and northern Rakhine States southeast through Naypyidaw to Kaya State. One also finds a north-­ south pattern that runs from Putao in Kachin State through the eastern half of the country south through Tenasserim. This is a key point. Grant aid and NGO aid is much more broadly distributed across the country. Within this pattern, however, grant aid still tends to cluster in the Burman areas of the country, while NGO aid extends to the peripheries. This pattern of aid modalities is related to sectoral distributions of Japanese aid to Myanmar since 2012. Japan’s basic policy on aid to Myanmar since 2011 highlights the twin issues of democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict. That said, Japan’s basic aid orientation in general is to support the development of economic productive sectors primarily through assistance for economic infrastructure development. The Japanese commitment to the construction of SEZs at Thilawa and Dawei are consistent with this overall orientation. Conversely, assistance for democratization and alleviation of ethnic conflict in Myanmar are problematic for Japan. “Nation-building” in the form of developing an economic base for national development assumes a centralized, competent state with a clear commitment to promoting the national weal and capable

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of carrying out development in the country’s periphery. These are problematic propositions in the Burmese case. In addition, Japan’s democracy assistance focuses on reforming state institutions, such as the courts and the police, rather than the development of a democratic and independent civil society. Thus, a values-based diplomacy and democracy assistance runs the risk of strengthening a still-authoritarian state while ignoring the concerns of ethnic minorities. Sectoral Allocations Concerning sectoral distributions of aid, loan aid reflects the preoccupation with the economic foundations of development. Thilawa, Dawei, and the Baluchaung Hydroplant 2 projects are representative cases. Debt relief also took up a substantial portion of loan aid in 2012 and 2013. Grant aid and technical assistance reflect a mix of social development and economic development concerns, the former focusing on social and community development projects in ethnic communities and the latter the preparatory phases of long-term transportation and production sector development. Grant aid also follows a well-developed pattern of providing assistance for facilities construction in social development fields, a pattern which tends to reinforce the physical presence of official institutions. Both types of aid therefore emphasize the official institutional development within the context of the Burmese state, assisting reform and institutionalization of nation-building as state-building. Subsidized NGO projects have a clearer social development and human security focus. These are typically small-scale projects that approach human security from the freedom from want perspective favoured by the Japanese government (see Amakasu and Potter 2016). As mentioned above, many of these projects are carried out in ethnic minority regions. Like grant aid partnerships with UNHCR and UNDP in IDP assistance, partnerships with NGOs in the provision of human security assistance afford the Japanese government a certain distance from communities when dealing with politically sensitive policy issues while at the same time promoting peacebuilding within the context of nation-building. They also reflect the Japanese emphasis on human security as freedom from want rather than freedom from fear.

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Conclusion Japanese foreign and security policy has evolved since the end of the Cold War, and with this so has foreign aid policy. Since 2000 the government has added security components to aid policy, initially in the form of human security but increasingly in the form of traditional security concerns. A string of hawkish prime ministers since Mori Yoshiro has aided this process. Prime Minister Abe and his advisors and political allies have not only thought strategically about aid but have moved to ensure that the institutional arrangements to support this thinking are in place. Aid to Southeast Asia reflects this change in strategic thinking. The current administration in Japan has pinned a great deal on its relationship with the ASEAN countries, ranking that relationship second only to the alliance with the United States. Relations with ASEAN are critical not only for Japan’s interests in the region; Southeast Asia is the geographic linchpin that either permits or blocks East Asia’s states and economies’ access to the Indian Ocean. ODA remains an important component of Japan’s foreign policy toolkit in its relations with the region. Aid, of course, has its limitations as a tool of foreign policy. The first and most obvious is the institutional weakness of ASEAN. ASEAN decision-making is cumbersome, time-consuming, and limited. While the ASEAN members may understand the necessity of cooperation with Japan on maritime security, for example, measures to actualize the cooperation through the ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership have been slow to develop and largely limited to creating a common understanding of the issues involved (Nguyen 2013). Japan’s hedging against growing Chinese influence in Southeast Asia and especially the South China Sea is muted by the ASEAN countries’ own strategies of hedging against China while trying not to antagonize it or forego economic advantages of growing trade ties (Kuik 2008; Ikenberry 2016). China has its own clients in the region willing to prevent a unified ASEAN foreign policy that does not meet Beijing’s approval. In the case of aid, moreover, there is evidence that recipients welcome aid from non-DAC donors like China because it expands recipients’ freedom of choice (Sato et al. 2011). The final document of the New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation welcomed Japan-US assistance in developing the Lower Mekong, for example, but also expressed support for Japan-China cooperation in the region and bilateral frameworks with other nontraditional donors. Thus, hedging can work both ways.

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Second, even when Japan has used its diplomacy to strengthen security in the region, it cannot be guaranteed a warm reception. Surveys of some 3500 ASEAN country residents, commissioned by the Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs and conducted in 2008 and 2014, revealed high evaluations of development assistance, somewhat less robust support for cooperation on maritime security and peacebuilding, and very limited support for a direct Japanese military role in security cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014), suggesting support for a restrained and civilian contribution to peace in the region. The current composition of Japan’s security assistance to Southeast Asia reflects not only Japan’s aid capabilities but also recipient states’ calculations of their own interests in receiving it. Myanmar demonstrates the possibilities and limitations of Japan’s geopolitical aid in Southeast Asia. Myanmar is critical to the completion of functional East-West linkages that make up Japan’s understanding of Mekong connectivity. It also serves as a counterweight to China’s economic influence in the region, including Myanmar. It should be noted in this regard, however, that Japan and Myanmar have not concluded a bilateral strategic partnership that would put development assistance on a clearer geopolitical footing. An examination of actual allocations of aid, however, demonstrates the need to build a stable, unified country if the country is to anchor the western end of the Mekong economic corridors. The division of aid into economic infrastructure and state institution development in the core areas and social development and relief in the ethnic minorities periphery demonstrates the scope of the problem. The concentration of grant aid in the eastern and south-eastern periphery can be seen as support for economic and social stability, which is vital if the transportation links that make up the physical aspects of broader regional connectivity are to be developed. Finally, ASEAN connectivity and Mekong connectivity are in Japan’s geopolitical interest but do not solve the problem that it is an extra-­ regional player with limited ability to hedge against a mainland rival with the advantage of proximity and contiguous territory in the ASEAN vicinity. Moreover, aid imperfectly substitutes for a direct, active role in the maintenance of Southeast Asian security and therefore Japan’s interest in maintaining an open regional framework that guarantees its access to the Indian Ocean and the resources that lie beyond.

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Acknowledgements  The author gratefully acknowledges support from 2016 and 2017 Nanzan University Pache 1-A-2 research grants during the conduct of the research reported here.

References Abe S (2012) Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond. Project Syndicate. www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-indiaby-shinzo-abe?barrier=true. Accessed 10 August 2016. Amakasu P and Potter D M (2016) Peacebuilding and the Human Securitization of Japan’s Foreign Aid. In: Brown S and Grävingholt J (eds.) The Securitization of Foreign Aid, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 85–112. Brown S and Grävingholt J (ed.) (2016) The Securitization of Foreign Aid. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Dalpino C (2016) Japan-Southeast Asia Relations: Incremental, But Groundbreaking Steps. Comparative Connections 18 (1): 139–146. Hughes C (2015) Japan’s Foreign and Security Policy Under the ‘Abe Doctrine’. Palgrave Macmillan, New York. Ikenberry G J (2016) Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia. Political Studies Quarterly 131 (1): 9–44. JICA (2012) JICA Annual Report 2012. Japan International Cooperation Agency, Tokyo. Kim H S and Potter D M (eds.) (2012) Foreign Aid Competition in Northeast Asia, Sterling, VA, Stylus/Kumarian. Kuik C (2008) The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China. Contemporary Southeast Asia 30 (2): 159–185. Lam P E (2006) Japan’s Human Security Role in Southeast Asia. Contemporary Southeast Asia 28 (1): 141–159. Lam P E (2009) Japan’s Peace-Building Diplomacy in Asia. Routledge, New York and London. Leverett F and Wa B (2017) The New Silk Road and China’s Evolving Grand Strategy. The China Journal 77: 110–132. Mearscheimer J and Walt S (2016) The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior Grand Strategy. Foreign Affairs, September/October, pp. 70–83. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2011) Japan’s Official Development Assistance White Paper 2011. http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/white/2011/html/honbun/b1/s3_2.html. Accessed 15 November 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2014) ASEAN Study. http://www.mofa. go.jp/press/release/press4e_000271.html. Accessed 2 September 2016. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2015) Cabinet Decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, 2015. mofa.go.jp. Accessed 29 August 2016.

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Morris S (2016) Responding to AIIB: U.S.  Leadership at the Multilateral Development Banks in a New Era. CGD Working Paper 091. Nguyen H S (2013) ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership in Southeast Asia: Maritime Security and Cooperation. In: Sukma R and Soeya Y (eds.) Beyond 2015: ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership for Democracy, Peace, and Prosperity in Southeast Asia, Japan Center for International Cooperation, Tokyo, pp. 214–227. Office of the Prime Minister (2013) National Security Strategy. Japan.kantei.go.jp. Accessed 2 September 2016. Ohashi M (2015) NGOs and Japan’s ODA: Critical Views and Advocacy. In: Kato H, Page J and Shimomura Y (eds.) Japan’s Development Assistance: Foreign Aid and the Post-2015 Agenda, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 327–343. Orr R (1989) The Rising Sum: What Makes Japan Give? The International Economy, September/October 80–84. Osius T with Mohan C R (2013) Enhancing India-ASEAN Connectivity. Rowman Littlefield, Lanham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, and Plymouth, UK. Potter D M (1996) Japan’s Foreign Aid to Thailand and the Philippines, New York, St. Martin’s Press. Pyle K (2007) Japan Rising. Public Affairs, New York. Samuels R (2007) Securing Japan. Cornell University Press, Ithaca. Sato J et  al. (2011) “Emerging Donors” from a Recipient Perspective: An Institutional Analysis of Foreign Aid to Cambodia. World Development 39 (12): 2091–2104. Seekins D (2007) Burma and Japan Since 1940. Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Copenhagen. Seekins D (2015) Japan’s Development Ambitions for Myanmar: ‘Economics Before Politics’. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 34 (2): 113–138. Shinoda T (2007) Koizumi Diplomacy. University of Washington Press, Seattle. Soeya Y (2005) Midoru pawaa gaikou. Keiso Shobo, Tokyo. Sudo S (2015a) Japan’s ASEAN Policy: in Search of Proactive Multilateralism. ISEAS, Singapore Sudo S (2015b) Japan’s New Strategy Towards ASEAN Relations. Paper presented at the Asian Universities Forum on Advances in Research, Aichi Gakuin University, Nagoya, 2 November 2015. Yasutomo D (2014) Japan’s Civil-Military Diplomacy. Routledge, New  York and London.

CHAPTER 10

Japan’s Mekong Policy and Myanmar: Complementing a Viable Strategic Partnership Sueo Sudo

Embarking on Japan’s Subregional Policy The Fukuda Doctrine and Indochina Policy (1977–1993) The first indication of Tokyo’s aspiration to engage in subregion-building diplomacy can be found in the 1977 Fukuda Doctrine, in which former Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda emphasized three pillars of Japan’s diplomacy toward Southeast Asia: first, Japan rejects the military role, being committed to peace, which contributes to peace and prosperity in Southeast Asia and international community; second, Japan is a true friend with Southeast Asian countries, which promotes “heart-to-heart” understanding on an equal basis, covering not only political and economic areas but also social and cultural areas; and third, Japan supports the building of peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia by cooperating with ASEAN and its member countries in their own efforts to strengthen their solidarity and resilience, while aiming at fostering a relationship based on S. Sudo (*) Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_10

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mutual understanding with the nations of Indochina (Sudo 1992: 178). The third principle was critically important simply because it augurs well for Japan’s political role in mainland Southeast Asia. However, the outbreak of the Cambodian Conflict in 1978 hampered Japan’s aspiration. Tokyo was forced to give up its bridge-building approach and stand against pro-Soviet Vietnam and the Cambodian government in Phnom Penh. Subsequently, the Tokyo government withheld its official aid to Hanoi after the invasion of Cambodia in late 1978 and formally suspended aid after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979. Thus, Japan’s relations with three socialist regimes in Indochina were stagnated during the “New Cold War” period, even though Tokyo maintained its dialogue channels with those countries (Ikeda 2016). As such, the outbreak of the Cambodian conflict rendered a shock wave that eventually diminished the possibility of Japan’s bridging role and ASEAN’s expansion of membership. Since Hanoi’s intervention, ASEAN and Japan had mutually engaged in resolving the conflict. ASEAN’s efforts, especially Indonesia’s mediating role, were successful in softening Hanoi’s regional policies. Japan’s role, on the other hand, was largely a provision of policy ideas with the help of Thailand. In fact, Thai Prime Minister Chatichai asked Japan to consider hosting peace talks on Cambodia when he visited Tokyo in early April 1990. He suggested that Tokyo could encourage contacts between Prince Sihanouk and the Phnom Penh government under Hun Sen. Citing Vietnam’s withdrawal of its troops, he also called on Tokyo to resume economic aid to Hanoi. Despite expected difficulties, however, the Japanese foreign ministry accepted the proposal and took swift steps toward effecting the Tokyo meeting (Sudo 2015: 130–133). A few months later, the Japanese government held a Tokyo Meeting on Cambodia, by inviting concerned parties (from the Coalition Prince Shihanouk and Son Sann, the Phnom Penh government Hun Sen, Khmer Rouge representative Khieu Samphan and Thai Deputy Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyudh) to Tokyo. The major achievements were threefold: (1) the modality of the Tokyo talks as agreed upon in preparatory meetings in Thailand was a meeting between two opposing groups; (2) the different tracks of peace efforts were synchronized for the first time in Tokyo; (3) it detected a shift in the US administration’s stand on its role in the efforts to restore Cambodian peace (Kato 2002: 35–69; Tanino 2015). After the Paris agreement in October 1991, furthermore, Tokyo was committed to two major policy objectives: convening an international

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conference on Indochina development and sending Japanese personnel to Cambodia as part of the UN peace-keeping operation (PKO). The first objective was realized in June 1992, when Tokyo held an international conference on the reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC), with the result that 15 countries and international organizations agreed to contribute $880 million to war-torn Cambodia and to establish an international committee as a coordinating body for the reconstruction of Cambodia (Dobson 2003). In a similar vein, after covering much official as well as private groundwork, Japan finally decided to resume its Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Vietnam in November 1992. Together with its reconstruction funds, this resumption of ODA would significantly expand Japan’s role in directing economic development of the Indochinese countries. Furthermore, the second ICORC meeting held in Paris in September 1993 gained momentum toward speeding up the reconstruction program with special emphasis on agricultural rehabilitation, improvement of the transport network and funding for basic education. The second objective was harder to put into practice due to domestic political difficulties. Nevertheless, by adopting the United Nations PKO Cooperation Bill on June 12, 1992, Japan for the first time rid itself of a taboo regarding the dispatch of armed forces overseas. This resulted in the appointment of Yasushi Akashi, a veteran Japanese diplomat, to head the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). In September, Japanese Self Defence Forces officials were dispatched to Cambodia to assist in the UN peace process. Japan’s operation involved around 600 personnel from the Engineer Corps, who were assigned to restoring roads and bridges far from areas of danger. Despite the loss of two officials and associated pressure to withdraw earlier from Cambodia, Japan’s mission was fulfilled in September 1993 with rather favorable results (Akashi 1995). Post-Cambodian Conflict Development and Myanmar (1994–2002) Recognizing the critical role Japan could play in assisting Cambodian development, Prime Minister Miyazawa proposed Japan’s positive assistance toward Indochinese countries in 1993 (MOFA 1993). Accordingly, the Japanese Foreign Ministry (MOFA) held the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina (FCDI) in February 1995. The purpose of the

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Forum was to attract international attention in support of the economic recovery of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. In March 1996, the “Task Force for Strategies for Development of the Great Mekong Area” was formed by private sector specialists to present a comprehensive plan aimed primarily at infrastructural development for the Greater Mekong Area, which was comprised of nations on the Indochinese Peninsula. The task force published its report in August of the same year (Shimabayashi 2012: 70–72). Japan’s main focus was on Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam (CLV) due to the fact that Myanmar was not ready for regional engagement. For instance, ever since hosting the “Ministerial Meeting of the Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina” in Tokyo in February 1995, MOFA conducted major projects, including, first, a Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina; second, a Task Force for Strategies for Development of the Greater Mekong Area; third, a Seminar held in Indochina; and fourth, Japan’s Cooperation to the Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI). In order to further contribute to the Indochina subregion development, MOFA has been extending various bilateral assistances to the new members of ASEAN. Of note, Japan actively cooperates with ASEAN in their efforts to promote the IAI by assisting ASEAN new member countries. After Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN in 1995, however, MOFA changed its orientation from Indochina to the Mekong area by incorporating ASEAN’s Mekong development initiative and the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) initiative. As for cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat, the following projects are being carried out or are under consideration in cooperation with the ASEAN Secretariat to assist CLMV (Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam) countries by utilizing the Japan-ASEAN General Exchange Fund (JAGEF). More specifically, they are (1) provision of IT equipment to Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the CLMV, (2) the attachment program at the ASEAN Secretariat for Junior Diplomats of CLMV, (3) the human capacity-building workshop for Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) personnel of the CLMV, (4) the HRD Workshop for non-MFA personnel of the CLMV, (5) the workshop to formulate a work-plan for the integration of CLMV into ASEAN (MOFA 2001). In competition with MOFA, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) vigorously stepped up the Working Group on Economic

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Cooperation in Indochina in March 1995, and agreed to provide CLMV officials and specialists with opportunities for training and workshops in order to obtain the necessary knowledge and skills to become ASEAN members, and also to conduct joint research and studies for drawing development plans in various industrial sectors. The completed policy initiatives by MOFA and METI were hindered soon by the unexpected pace of realizing the ASEAN 10. While recognizing MOFA’s inclination toward the GMS, METI, on its part, came up with ASEAN-METI Economic and Industrial Cooperation (AMEICC) in November 1998. AMEICC’s main function is to help the CLMV countries tackle the ASEAN divisive issues and also to enhance the competitiveness of ASEAN economies by promoting regional integration and upgrading main industries, not only to new members of ASEAN but also to original members hit by the financial crisis. When Cambodia joined ASEAN in 1999, ASEAN had come to realize that the issue of narrowing the development gap between ASEAN 6 and the new comers was a critical task for the association. Immediately after ASEAN formed a task force on the IAI in February 2001, the Japanese government offered its assistance through the Japan General Exchange Fund. As a positive step forward, therefore, Japan dispatched a joint mission with ADB to the countries concerned (CLMV and Thailand) in July 2001. Based on the findings of the mission, Japan put priority on the East-­ West Corridor project (Maulamyaing-Mukdahan-Da Nang) and the second East-West Corridor project (Ho Chi Minh City-Phnom Penh-Bangkok). In a similar vein, Japan extended its assistance program to CLMV countries with other ASEAN member countries (Singapore, Thailand and the Philippines). For instance, there is a joint program for building human resources of developing countries, the cost of which is borne by Japan and Singapore on a 50–50 basis. It is called “Japan-­ Singapore Partnership Program for the 21st Century.” Every year, nearly 20 training courses are offered, accepting trainees from neighboring countries (Shiraishi 2007: 67–92).

Toward Japan-Mekong Partnership 2003–2011 The year 2003 marked a milestone for ASEAN’s history because of its ambitious declaration for a community. In realizing three communities, the Bali Concord II clearly underscored the importance of narrowing the development gap between ASEAN6 and four late comers.

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Japan-CLV Partnership (2003–2006) Soon after the ASEAN summit, Japan and ASEAN had a commemorative summit in Tokyo and adopted an ambitious new concept, entitled “New Concept of Mekong Region Development.” The Mekong region, in which all the new member countries of ASEAN are located, is pivotal for furthering ASEAN’s integration. The region possesses potential for economic growth and is essential for the stability and prosperity of the whole of Asia, as it is adjacent to other ASEAN countries, China and India. Recent progress also spotlights the Mekong region: ASEAN is placing even more emphasis on the cooperation for the region, as shown in the IAI, and is undertaking the process of economic integration involving the region. With the above in mind, Japan, in close consultation with ASEAN countries, cooperated for the Mekong region development in line with the following three visions: (1) Reinforcing regional integration; (2) Attaining sustainable economic growth; (3) Harmonizing with the environment (MOFA 2003). Based on the aforementioned visions, Japan aims to expand the dimensions of its cooperation for the Mekong region development through an integrated approach of economic cooperation and trade-investment facilitation measures: (1) Expanding Approaches; (2) Expanding Actors; (3) Expanding Areas of Cooperation. In light of the visions and the expanded dimensions of cooperation, Japan will take concrete actions as summarized in the following three pillars: (1) Enhancing Economic Cooperation; (2) Promoting Trade and Investment; (3) Strengthening Consultation and Coordination (Yomiuri Shimbun, December 6, 2003). In order to involve directly with the Mekong subregion, Japan initiated the first Summit meeting of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam in Vientiane, Laos, in November 2004. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi asserted his commitment to encourage Japan’s initiative for the Mekong Region Development, whose expected target was to reach $1.5 billion support over three years. Therefore, Japan was interested in broader cooperation with the whole mainland Southeast Asia; Prime Minister Koizumi expressed his motion to cooperate with the CLV countries within the framework of Japan’s initiative for the Mekong Region Development. In the joint press release of CLV and Japan summit, Prime Minister Koizumi expressed Japan’s intention to cooperate for the development and prosperity of the subregion, and to work at narrowing the economic gap between the new and old members of ASEAN. In a sense, Japanese ­foreign

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minister and the CLV countries urged for any possibility to cooperate in initiated programs to meet Prime Minister Koizumi’s intention (MOFA 2004). Japan-CLMV Partnership (2007–2011) In January 2007, the Japan-Mekong Region Partnership Program was adopted with special emphasis on three goals: expansion of ODA to the Mekong region; bilateral investment agreements with Cambodia and Laos; and the Japan–Mekong region ministerial meeting (Shiraishi 2010; Thuzar 2014). More specifically, Japan promised the following commitments: Regarding the Mekong region as a priority area, Japan would expand its ODA to CLV countries as well as to the region as a whole for the next three years. In addition, out of Japan’s new assistance totaling $52 million for promotion of the Japan-ASEAN economic partnership, approximately $40 million would be allocated to CLV. Of this, approximately $20 million was to be used to assist the CLV “Development Triangle”; and in order to substantially expand joint assistance projects for the Mekong region, Japan would consult more closely with the rest of the ASEAN countries (MOFA 2007). Since April 2007, Japan has been implementing the Japan-Mekong Region Partnership Program, which rests upon the following three priority areas: (1) integrating economies of the region and beyond, (2) expanding trade and investment between Japan and the region and (3) pursuing universal values and common goals of the region. Furthermore, at the Japan-Mekong Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, held in January 2008  in Tokyo, approximately $20 million was declared for improving efficiency of logistics in the East-West Economic Corridor. At the first meeting, the document 63 was signed for cooperation in the Development Triangle, in addition to which a further $20 million was declared for supporting the streamlining of logistics in the East-West Economic Corridor. Japan agreed to reinforce ties with ADB, which is engaged in a range of regional cooperation activities in the Asian region, and to create new schemes to support sustainable development by promoting investment and energy conservation (MOFA 2008). In November 2009, the first Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting was held, where six leaders shared the recognition of giving priority to the following areas and of establishing a new partnership for a thriving common future: Comprehensive Development in the Mekong Region,

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Environment, Climate Change/Overcoming Vulnerability, and Expansion of Cooperation and Exchanges and establishing “A New Partnership for the Common Flourishing Future.” Emphasizing that the Mekong region was a significant region that held the key to an open and transparent East Asian Community initiative in terms of redressing intraregional gaps, Japan has continued to expand the policy to include its ODA to CLV respectively as well as to the Mekong region as a whole. Japan committed more than 500 billion yen of ODA in the next three years for the Mekong region to further flourish (MOFA 2009; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 8, 2009). In October 2010, the second Summit was held in Hanoi. While welcoming the significant progress of the implementation of the “Tokyo Declaration” and “Mekong-Japan Action Plan 63,” Prime Minister Noda reiterated that Japan will continue its commitment to join hands with the Mekong region countries to work toward the goals set at the First Mekong-­ Japan Summit, and also highly appraised the self-help efforts made by the Mekong region countries. Especially noteworthy was the adoption of the “Mekong-Japan Economic and Industrial Cooperation Initiative (MJ-CI) Action Plan” which focuses on hard infrastructure, trade facilitation/ logistics, enhancement of small and medium enterprises, supporting industries, entrepreneurship, the service sector and a new industrial sector based on recommendations from the business community. It is expected that the MJ-CI Action Plan will promote business activities and narrow the development gap through resolving the “missing links” in the region under the “Action Plan 63.” In addition, the leaders welcomed the outcome of the Mekong-Japan International Conference on the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC) and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), co-hosted by Japan and Thailand in Bangkok in September 2010 and the workshop on the improvement of EWEC in Tokyo, in which participants stressed the importance of addressing both soft and hard infrastructure in order to make full use of the Economic Corridors and increase connectivity in the region (MOFA 2010). The Fourth Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting was held in Bali, Indonesia, on July 21, 2011. Reviewing Japan-ASEAN cooperation, foreign ministers considered both the “Tokyo Declaration” and “Action Plan 63” as guidelines for the successful establishment of the “New Partnership for the Common Flourishing Future” between Japan and the Mekong region countries. Major results of the partnership noted, were the progress of the implementation of the Master Plan on ASEAN

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Connectivity, the importance of the positive synergy of the Mekong-Japan cooperation and enhancing ASEAN Connectivity, and the success of the “Green Mekong Forum,” which was co-hosted by Japan and Thailand. Japan’s new initiative the “Disaster Management Network for the ASEAN Region,” a comprehensive approach including the development of a regional information-sharing network through satellites, the dispatching of experts and the conducting of training in Japan, was also noted, together with Japan’s efforts in public-private cooperation in the Mekong region, such as the “Forum for the Promotion of Public-Private Cooperation in the Mekong Region,” which was held in Tokyo on December 14, 2010 (MOFA 2011).

Strategizing the Partnership 2012–2015 Tokyo Strategy 2012 At a critical juncture, the Fourth Japan-Mekong Summit was held in 2012. The leaders adopted the “Tokyo Strategy for Mekong-Japan Cooperation,” charting a development course for Mekong-Japan cooperation for over next three years (2013–2015) (MOFA 2012). At a press conference held shortly after the summit, Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, who chaired the summit, said the meeting identified three cooperation pillars for Mekong-Japan cooperation in 2013–2015: strengthening connectivity within the GMS, promoting trade and investment cooperation, and increasing cooperation in the environment and human security. Noda said Japan would commit ¥600 billion (about $7.35 billion) in ODA to GMS countries in 2013–2015 and support these countries in meeting millennium development goals. He pledged to mobilize financial resources worth ¥2.3 trillion ($28.2 billion) to carry out 57 infrastructure projects in the GMS countries (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, April 22, 2012). At the joint news conference, the five Mekong leaders expressed their appreciation for Japan’s support. “Japan’s role in the Mekong region is expanding and the support is helping us grow into a harmonious and competitive area,” Cambodia’s Hun Sen said. Cooperation with Japan “is the foundation to developing an open, peaceful, and prosperous Mekong region, which will lead to the promotion of integration,” he said. The Mekong region was known to be rich in natural resources, and many

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Japanese firms were eyeing potentially lucrative investment opportunities. As Myanmar was pushing for democracy, development in the region was expected to advance rapidly. Experts, however, pointed out that economic disparities would remain a serious problem, especially in the area around the borders of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. This imbalance caused concern, especially as ASEAN was pressing for the creation of a single market by 2015. On December 14, the Fifth Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting was held and the leaders adopted the mid-term review of the “Tokyo Strategy 2012.” At the outset, Prime Minister Abe stated that the approximately ¥600 billion in ODA support covering a three-year period from that fiscal year was progressing steadily as pledged at the previous Mekong-Japan Summit, and that a total of ¥200 billion in support for the Mekong region was scheduled to be pledged or signed at a series of meetings held during this period. The Mekong countries’ leaders expressed gratitude for the cooperation extended by Japan thus far, and stated that emphasis should be placed on challenges such as Mekong connectivity and narrowing development gaps, toward building the ASEAN Community in 2015. They expressed strong expectations of continued support from Japan. Regarding the improvement of the investment environment in the Mekong region, Prime Minister Abe welcomed the development of legal frameworks concerning investment between Japan and all the Mekong countries, including the Japan-Myanmar Investment Agreement signed most recently, and said that via those frameworks, the government of Japan wanted to continue to cooperate on improvement of the investment environment in the future. In response, the Mekong countries’ leaders expressed strong expectations of investment in the Mekong region by Japanese companies, in order to bring about further economic development in the Mekong region (MOFA 2013a). Regarding the promotion of people-to-people exchanges between Japan and the Mekong region, Prime Minister Abe said Japan decided on measures to ease visa requirements for all Mekong countries this year. He welcomed the increase in the number of tourists from countries such as Thailand and Vietnam, partly thanks to those measures. The leaders shared the view that they will continue to work to promote people-to-people exchanges in the future, including through the conclusion of aviation agreements between Japan and Cambodia and Laos. Also, the leaders confirmed cooperation between Japan and the Mekong region countries in areas including youth exchange, cultural exchange, the promotion of

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public-­ private cooperation, healthcare, the environment and climate change, and disaster risk reduction (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, December 15, 2013). Regarding the development and the future direction of the Mekong-­ Japan cooperation, Prime Minister Abe explained at the sixth summit in 2014 that Japan was working diligently on the three pillars of the Mekong-­ Japan cooperation, which were “Enhancing Mekong Connectivity,” “Developing Together” and “Ensuring Human Security and Environmental Sustainability,” and of the ¥600 billion of support pledged in the “Tokyo Strategy 2012,” more than ¥500 billion had already been implemented (MOFA 2014a; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 13, 2014). In a similar vein, Prime Minister Abe started in 2014 a second revision of the ODA Charter in order to open up for a more strategic use of ODA and to contribute more actively to securing peace and stability in the international community. In February 2015 the new revised charter, which had also been renamed to the Development Cooperation Charter, was adopted. A major change to the revised charter was that Japanese aid could be allocated to foreign militaries involved in development cooperation of non-military purposes such as disaster relief or welfare, which were to be decided case by case. Consideration for human rights and democracy in recipient countries has arguably been given a more comprehensive function in the new charter as compared to the previous one by being mentioned as the first principle among eight “Principles for securing the appropriateness of development cooperation” (MOFA 2015a). New Tokyo Strategy 2015 Japan announced a new three-year Mekong aid plan at the Japan-Mekong Summit to promote stability and growth in the region, and counter China’s growing political and economic clout in Southeast Asia (MOFA 2015b). “Japan committed about ¥750 billion in official development assistance over the next three years,” Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said at a news conference attended by the leaders of the five countries that make up the area. “Japan is a partner for the development of the Mekong region, which has future potential.” The aid, announced at the annual summit, was part of what Abe said was a new strategy to strengthen ties with the Mekong and achieve “quality growth.” The New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation replaces the ¥600 billion aid plan Tokyo announced in 2012. It set out four pillars

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to deepen Japanese cooperation with the five countries, which have a ­combined population of some 240 million in a region that generates a gross domestic product of about $664 billion. The four pillars were: industrial infrastructure development, industrial human resources, sustainable development and policy coordination with “various stakeholders.” Japan hoped to guide the region to quality growth by helping the five nations deal with such issues as disaster risk reduction, climate change and water resource management (MOFA 2015c; Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 5, 2015).

Consolidating Bilateral Partnerships Through Strategic ODA Upon becoming prime minister in December 2012, Abe vigorously initiated two major policy innovations (Swenson-Wright 2013; Yachi 2014). First was the revision of the National Defence Program Guideline (NDPG). Its interim report was submitted in July 2013. According to the report, the new NDPG had several remarkable characteristics: it was the first NDPG developed under a new document, the “National Security Strategy”; it contained several key phrases such as “proactive contribution to peace,” “Dynamic Joint Defence Force,” and “Seamless response to various situations including so-called ‘grey-zone’ situations”; and it gave serious consideration to the two most important factors in the strategic environment in the Asia-Pacific region, China’s rise and the United States’ rebalancing toward the region (Ministry of Defence 2013). Second was the revision of ODA guidelines. Its interim report, which came out in June 2014, stressed the importance of the strategic use of Japan’s ODA (MOFA 2014b). Foreign Ministry officials said that based on Prime Minister Abe’s policy of proactively contributing to peace, Japan would assist countries that share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law as it deploys ODA strategically as a diplomatic tool. This revision was obviously influenced by the renowned Japan-US alliance. In fact, the Japan-US 2 + 2 joint statement in October 2013 cogently stated that both countries welcomed the strategic use of ODA by Japan such as providing coastal patrol vessels and training for maritime safety to regional partners and recognized the importance of such endeavors in promoting regional peace and stability (MOFA 2013b). Based on these domestic reforms, Abe has vigorously pursued his strategic diplomacy toward ASEAN (Yachi 2013). Three initiatives are worth

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mentioning here. First is the announcement of five principles in Indonesia. In January 2013, Prime Minister Abe’s trip to Southeast Asia renewed Japan’s engagement with ASEAN (Peng and Yang 2013: 145–182). During his stay in Jakarta, Abe revealed five goals that Japan would strive to achieve in partnership with the ASEAN countries: to protect and promote universal values such as freedom, democracy and basic human rights; to ensure the seas are governed by laws and rules; to deepen economic integration by promoting trade, investment and flows of people and services; to strengthen cultural ties; and to expand youth exchanges. This so-called Abe Principles underscore a new turning point for ASEAN-Japan ties, which had long been defined by the Fukuda Doctrine laid out in 1977. Although Abe’s official visits were unfortunately cut short, these principles underscored Japan’s desire to advance its profile both economically and politically. Accordingly, many Southeast Asian countries welcome this renewed Japanese engagement as they seek to diversify their economic, political and security partnerships in the face of a rising China. The second is the 40th anniversary summit held in Tokyo. ASEAN’s welcoming of Japan as a political player in the region was manifested throughout the year 2013, particularly as the summit commemorated ASEAN-Japan’s 40 years of relationship in Tokyo in December. Due to Abe’s preparedness, visiting all ten ASEAN countries in 2013, the second commemorative summit yielded two substantial agreements. One noticeable outcome of the summit was that leaders of Japan and ASEAN agreed to adopt a vision statement on ASEAN-Japan friendship and cooperation and a plan of action to implement the vision statement in order to encourage the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership to continue developing in the coming decades. At the Summit, Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung affirmed Hanoi’s consistent policy of attaching great importance to the ASEAN-Japan strategic partnership and suggested that Japan and ASEAN continue to strengthen and deepen their relations while cooperating to solve common issues in the region and around the world (MOFA 2013c). Third is Abe’s attendance at Shangri-la dialogue in Singapore in May 2014. The speech, the first by a Japanese prime minister at the forum, came amid a recent spike in regional tensions as China deployed an oil rig on Vietnam’s continental shelf. Abe expressed hope that a code of conduct would soon be put in place in the South China Sea, adding that Japan was studying the possibility of providing patrol ships to Vietnam (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, May 31, 2014). Abe was trying to bolster Japan’s defense

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capabilities as part of restructuring the country’s security architecture to better address China’s growing assertiveness and North Korea’s missile and nuclear development programs. At the same time, he was strengthening bilateral ties not just with Japan’s traditional ally the United States, but also with Southeast Asian countries and Australia to counterbalance the rise of China. Given the steady progress toward a new diplomacy, together with the initiation of rebalancing by the US, time was ripe for the second time Prime Minister Abe to embark on a strategic diplomacy (Pajon 2013; Koga 2014). Focusing on the South China Sea problem, Abe attempted to hedge against China by carefully orchestrating both bilateral relations with the ASEAN countries and strategic ODA. The new, enhanced security cooperation promoted by Japan encompassed intensified defense diplomacy, larger security-oriented ODA and the launching of a brand-­ new military assistance program. Let us see a Vietnam case here. Japan-Vietnam Relations: Extensive Strategic Partnership As a contestant for the South China Sea issue, Vietnam had begun to seek external support from dialogue partners, including Japan (Hosokawa 2014: 25–36). Visiting Hanoi in January 2013, therefore, Abe stressed that Japan would continue to play an active role in maintaining regional peace and prosperity of this region and that Vietnam was an important partner for Japan with shared regional challenges and a mutually complementary economic relationship. The two leaders shared the recognition that both sides would further advance their “strategic partnership,” strengthen their cooperation, and work together to ensure peace and stability and achieve prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. The two leaders shared the perception that both sides would oppose changing the status quo with force in the South China Sea and that the rule of law, including related international laws, was essential (MOFA 2013d; Asahi Shimbum, January 17, 2013). At the invitation of Vietnamese Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh, Japanese Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida paid an official visit to Vietnam in July 2014 with the aim of promoting deeper and wider Vietnam-Japan strategic partnership. On August 1, both ministers held the sixth meeting of the Vietnam-Japan Cooperation Committee in Hanoi with the participation of representatives from ministries and sectors of the two countries. At the meeting, Foreign Minister Minh affirmed that Vietnam considers

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Japan as one of its top strategic partners while Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida emphasized Japan’s determination to boost the strategic partnership with Vietnam. In particular, Japan agreed to provide six used vessels and related equipment through a total of 500 million yen non-project grant aid for the enhancement of maritime law-enforcement capabilities of Vietnam (MOFA 2014c). The two sides discussed and agreed on measures to boost bilateral ties in a comprehensive, effective and sustainable manner in the future by maintaining regular exchange of visits and meetings between the two countries’ senior leaders, promoting the role of existing dialogue mechanisms and intensifying connection between the two sides’ ministries and localities. The two ministers reached a consensus on effectively implementing agreements signed by high-level officials. Japanese Foreign Minister Kishida also affirmed that Japan continues to consider Vietnam as a leading partner in ODA, focusing on supporting growth, enhancing competitiveness, improving the market economy mechanism, training human resources and preventing natural disasters, including the signing of a diplomatic note of exchange on a nonrefundable aid package worth $4.86 million to ensure maritime safety and a $3.43 million grant for a human resources development scholarship program in 2014 (Yomiuri Shimbun, August 2, 2014). In October 2014, furthermore, Japan-Vietnam summit was held and both countries agreed to promote cooperation in a wide range of fields under the extensive strategic partnership. Prime Minister Dung welcomed Japan’s efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region, and Japan’s proactive contribution to peace. Abe also promised that in addition to the provision of six used vessels, Japan would discuss the provision of new patrol vessels (MOFA 2014d).

Conclusion As a result of Japan’s active pursuit of subregional cooperation, we could witness the following effects: (1) closer economic cooperation, (2) institutionalization of subregional cooperation. First, since its launch in 2007, the Japan-Mekong cooperation mechanism has proved to be successful. As Table  10.1 amply suggests, Mekong subregion countries are Japan’s ODA priorities. The Japan-Mekong Partnership focused on improving infrastructure, strengthening regional links, promoting trade and investment, accelerating poverty reduction and epidemic control and protecting

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Table 10.1  Japan’s ODA to Mekong region ($ million)

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016

Mekong region

ASEAN

1189 725 612 739 800 782 763 865 842 1459 1123 1234 2009 4052 2120 1547 2706

3126 (23.1%) 2108 (21.4%) 1747 (20.9%) 1488 (16.7%) 897 (10.0%) 1968 (14.9%) 703 (6.2%) 612 (7.9%) −356 (–) 881 (9.3%) 901 (8.1%) −169 (–) 406 (3.8%) 2476 (21.3%) 806 (8.6%) 3533 (27.1%) 3720 (25.7%)

Source: MOFA, Japan’s ODA, various issues

the environment. These efforts were aimed at narrowing development gaps between ASEAN members and contributing to the establishment of the ASEAN community. Especially, Japan has provided ODA to Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam to help them develop infrastructure. Japan has given 20 million USD to these countries to develop soft infrastructure—the East-West Economic Corridor and the Ho Chi Minh City-Phnompenh-Bangkok Corridor. Japan gave 500 billion Japanese yen to support the Mekong subregion from 2009 to 2012 and increased ODA for Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. In the 2013–2015 period, Japan gave approximately about 600 billion Japanese yen to help Mekong countries implement their Action Plans. The two sides have deployed the Mekong-Japan Industrial and Economic Cooperation Initiative and the Green Mekong Initiative which focused on water resource management, sustainable forest management, disaster prevention and control and urban environment improvement. Second, the institutionalization of subregional cooperation has been remarkably promoted, as Table 10.2 implies. Joint coordination between MOFA and METI contributes to undertaking specific policies, to wit, three-year strategies.

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Table 10.2  Institutionalization of subregional cooperation MOFA 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

METI

1st CLV 2nd CLV

Summit

Major agreements

(#) 1st CLV 2nd CLV

New concept

3rd CLV

Japan-Mekong partnership Tokyo declaration Action plan 63 Green Mekong MJ-CI action plan

3rd CLV 1st Mekong 2nd

1st Mekong

1st Mekong

2010

3rd

2nd

2nd

2011 2012

4th 5th

3rd 4th

3rd 4th

2013 2014 2015

6th 7th 8th

5th 6th 7th

5th 6th 7th

2016

9th

8th

8th

Development triangle

Tokyo strategy Action plan

New Tokyo strategy Action plan

Source: by the author # Tokyo Summit 30th Anniversary

With the announcement of Japan-ASEAN strategic partnership in 2005, we can see the beginning of Japan’s dynamic diplomacy in close collaboration with ASEAN.  Abe’s attempts symbolize a new phase in Japan-ASEAN relations, long centered on the Fukuda Doctrine. To make it viable, Japan needs to undertake two measures. First, it critically requires Japan to improve the quality of trust by resolving the historical issues. Second, Japan should pay due attention to ASEAN centrality and neutrality. In fact, ASEAN is still trying to preserve its strategic autonomy by engaging the important regional players without tying its hand to one ally. Nevertheless, Abe’s attempts, combining economic assistance and security cooperation, were received positively by ASEAN as a whole. Depending upon China’s reaction, Japan and ASEAN could strengthen their strategic partnership to effectively cope with the changing security environment in East Asia.

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References Akashi Y (1995) Nintai to kibo [Endurance and Hope]. Asahishimbunsha, Tokyo. Dobson H (2003) Japan and United Nations Peacekeeping. Routledge Cruzon, London. Fan Peng F and Hao Yang A (2013) Nihon-ASEAN yukokyoryoku 40shunen [Forty Years of Japan-ASEAN Friendship and Cooperation]. Mondai to kenkyu 42 (4): 145–182. Hosokawa D (2014) Betonamu no keizai to anzenhosho [Vietnam’s Economy and Security], Kokusaimondai, No. 634, September: 25–36. Ikeda T (2016) Gekido no ajiagaiko totomoni [Together with Transforming Asian Diplomacy]. Chuokoronsha, Tokyo. Kato K (2002) Kambojia funso to nihon gaiko [Cambodian Conflict and Japanese Diplomacy]. Kokusaishogaku ronshu 13: 35–69. Koga K (2014) Japan’s ‘Strategic Diplomacy’: Leveraging on ASEAN in 2014. RSIS Commentaries, January 2. Ministry of Defence, Japan, Boeiryoku noarikata Kento nikansuru Chukan Hokoku, July 26, 2013. Ministry of Defence, Tokyo. MOFA (1993) A New Dimension in Cooperation. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2001) Japan’s Cooperation for the Mekong Subregion Development, November 2001. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2003) New Concept of Mekong Region Development. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2004) Joint Press Release of Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam (CLV) and Japan Summit, November 30, 2004. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2007) Mekong Partnership Program, January 2007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2008) Chair’s Statement, Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Tokyo, January 2008. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2009) Tokyo Declaration of the First Meeting between the Heads of the Governments of Japan and the Mekong Region Countries: Establishment of a New Partnership for the Common Flourishing Future, November 7, 2009. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2010) Joint Statement of the Second Mekong-Japan Summit, Hanoi, Vietnam, October 29, 2010. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2011) Chairman’s Statement of the Fourth Mekong-Japan Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, July 21, 2011. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2012) Tokyo Strategy 2012 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation, April 21, 2012. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2013a) The Fifth Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting, December 14, 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo.

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MOFA (2013b) Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee, October 3, 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2013c) Joint Statement of the ASEAN-Japan Commemorative Summit. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2013d) Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s Visit to Vietnam (Overview), January 17, 2013. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2014a) The Sixth Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting, November 12, 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2014b) ODA Taiko minaoshi nikansuru yukenshakondankai hokokusho. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2014c) Minister for Foreign Affairs Fumio Kishida’s Visit to Vietnam, August 2, 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2014d) Japan-Vietnam Summit Meeting, October 16, 2014. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2015a) Cabinet decision on the Development Cooperation Charter, February 10, 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2015b) The Seventh Mekong-Japan Summit Meeting, July 4, 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. MOFA (2015c) New Tokyo Strategy 2015 for Mekong-Japan Cooperation (MJC2015), July 4, 2015. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tokyo. Pajon, C (2013) Japan and the South China Sea: Forging Strategic Partnership in a Divided Region. Asie Visions 60, January. Shimabayashi T (2012) Indoshina sogokaihatsu foramu nitaisuru aratana ichizuke [A New Perspective of]. Tonanajia, 41, May: 70–72. Shiraishi M (2007) Mekon saburijon no jikken [An Experiment of Mekong Subregion]. In: Yamamoto T and Amako S (eds.) Aratana chiikikeisei [New Regional Formation]. Iwanamishoten, Tokyo, pp. 67–92. Shiraishi M (2010) Japan and the Reconstruction of Indochina. In: Faure G (ed.) New Dynamics between China and Japan in Asia. World Scientific, Singapore, pp. 125–161. Sudo S (1992) The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Sudo S (2015) Japan’s ASEAN Policy: In Search of Proactive Multilateralism. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Swenson-Wright J (2013) Is Japan Truly ‘Back’? Prospects for a More Proactive Security Policy. Chatham House Briefing Paper, June. Tanino S (2015) Ajia gaiko [Asia Diplomacy]. Iwanamishoten, Tokyo. Thuzar M (2014) ASEAN-Japan Strategic Partnership and Regional Integration. In: Shiraishi T and Kojima T (eds.) ASEAN-Japan Relations. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, pp. 73–95.

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Yachi S (2013) Behind the New Abe Diplomacy: An Interview with Cabinet Advisor Yachi Shotaro (Part One). http://www.nippon.com/en/currents/d00089/. Yachi S (2014) More Proactive Contribution to Peace Changes Japan’s Diplomacy: Abe Administration’s Policy toward Asia and the United States. Discuss Japan, No. 20.

CHAPTER 11

Arch-Royalist Autocracy Unlimited: Civil-­ Military Relations in Contemporary Thailand Paul Chambers

Introduction Thailand is a country under military and monarchical tutelage. In 2019, it had not experienced elections in five years because of direct junta control. Thailand is in fact the most recent (and currently the only) country in the world to be directly ruled by a military junta. The 2014 military coup gave way to military repression, complete armed forces administration over the country, the remaking of law and governance through decrees to give the military enhanced power, and eventually the enactment of a new constitution which guaranteed the military enormous influence (albeit indirect) for years to come. In fact, the military has, from the 1932 overthrow of absolute monarchy until 2019, dominated Thailand for 58 of the last 87 years, either alone or in alliance with a monarch. When elected civilian governments have existed, they have been weak and have tended to be overthrown by military putsches. Indeed, the Thai military has instigated over 35 coups and attempted coups since 1932. This vicious cycle of elected government followed by coup followed by military rule followed by new elections has helped to keep democracy weak while the military (as endorsed by monarchy) has remained strong. How and why have the P. Chambers (*) Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_11

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armed forces historically achieved such preeminent power? What has been the relationship between Thailand’s military and monarchy? How has military power over Thailand manifested itself since the 2014 coup? What does continuing military involvement say about the contemporary state of Thai politics? What is the future of Thailand’s military? To answer these questions, this chapter looks at the transformation of the armed forces, evolving first as absolute monarchy’s tool, through the military’s monopolization of power, then as ally of monarchy once again. Though military and monarchy resurrected a cooperative relationship in 1957, since 1980 the monarchy has had the upper hand and military clout has persevered because of the armed forces’ role as the guardian of monarchy—itself conceptualized as a shadowy, monarch-led parallel state. The linchpin of this parallel state is the linkage between the monarch and military, an asymmetrical alliance of power, with the latter as junior partner. The chapter argues that Thailand’s military, as the agent of a monarchical parallel state, has managed to remain predominant in Thai society with the result that democratization has failed to progress. When elected governments have pressed the limits of power in terms of what the parallel state has been willing to accept, then they have been overthrown. Indeed royalist coups overthrew Prime Ministers Thaksin Shinawatra and Yingluck Shinawatra in 2006 and 2014 respectively. Since 2014, the military has directly administered Thailand, ensuring royal power amidst the end of one reign (in 2016) and the beginning of another. Through direct rule or astride weak democracy, Thailand’s military has continued to exert great power as a part of a monarchy-led parallel state which has so far undercut any moves toward greater democratization. As a result, Thai democracy has remained still-born or limited at best. Thailand’s “monarchized military” looks set to continue lording over the country into the future. In terms of organization, following this introduction, the chapter first looks at the history and evolution of Thai military power. Second, it examines Thailand’s monarch-led parallel state and monarchized military, which have come to dominate the country. Third, the chapter looks at the current ruling junta and how it has maintained itself in power while nullifying democracy. Finally, the chapter concludes by scrutinizing what might be the future of Thailand’s politically influential military.

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History of Thai Civil-Military Relations One of Thailand’s most enduring political legacies has been the prevalence of autocracy. Absolute monarchs held complete control over the country from antiquity until 1932. Security officials employed by the crown behaved as autocrats in their relations with the common people. In 1852, the Chakri dynasty created a permanent standing army which guarded the palace and incrementally consolidated, by force, Bangkok’s monarchical rule across the feudal principalities which today embody Thailand. In 1887, King Chulalongkorn linked the army and navy together under a Defense Department (Krom Kalahom). The success of this arrangement led to the evolution of an asymmetrical power-sharing relationship between the palace and military, though the absolute monarchy had to endure three coup attempts (Greene 1999: 51–52). The evolution of this palace-military power nexus helped to prevent civilian control from sustaining itself during Thailand’s later political history. The military was crucial to guaranteeing control by the absolute monarchy over the country (Isarapakdi 1989: 67). By 1930, the monarchy was beset with twin crises: economic depression and growing dissatisfaction of businesspeople and civil servants about state policy (Wilson 1962: 173; Barme 1993: 66). The chaos was resolved in 1932 when the armed forces ousted the absolute monarch though the king was allowed to remain as mostly a figurehead. In 1932 a military coup group overthrew the absolute monarchy and the armed forces came to monopolize political power (Wilson 1962: 171). Over the next decade, elected government amounted to a mere formality as power was informally concentrated in the military alone (Samudavanija 1982: 12). However, following World War II, the sway of the military— like the monarch—was on the wane. However, a 1947 military coup, rationalized partly to purge Thailand of communist influences, and in which the palace “played a role” (Chaiching 2010: 166), re-established a form of power-sharing between the palace and military. Other than force of arms and support from the palace, the coup group solidified its control thanks partly to acquiescence from the United States, which feared political instability in Southeast Asia (Venkataramani 1992: 267–270). After 1947, enhanced US backing was essential in entrenching the armed forces as a dominant political actor (Fineman 1997: 3).

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The palace-military power-sharing arrangement after 1947 was mostly dominated by the monarch. Only from 1951 to 1957 were the armed forces the principal actor. During this time, the military was divided into roughly three factions. Following a 1957 coup led by Gen. Sarit Thanarat, in which the palace was also “involved” (Chaiching 2010: 171–172), a pro-royalist armed forces clique came to overshadow the armed forces. Sarit elevated the power of the monarch (Chaloemtiarana 2007: 51–54, 181). Yet the dictator’s death in 1963 left a power vacuum which allowed the palace’s influence to expand dramatically. Sarit’s military protégés continued to dominate Thailand but the palace towered over them in political authority (Handley 2006: 156). In October 1973, the palace’s switch of support to a different military clique forced the dictatorship from power and installed a democratic regime (Morell and Samudavanija 1981: 147). From 1973–1976, the palace and military shared power behind the veneer of elected governance, though the palace became more influential than ever before (Morell and Samudavanija 1981: 147). In 1976, the palace backed a military coup which put a halt to Thailand’s fledgling democracy and re-established control by the palace and military—without elected civilians. By 1980, the palace had suggested Gen. Prem Tinsulanond’s promotion to be Prime Minister. From 1980 to 1988, Prem dominated the armed forces while a weakly institutionalized, civilian Lower House was permitted to exist (Neher 1992: 594). In 1988, Prem stood aside and allowed an elected Prime Minister to assume the premiership. Prem joined the King’s Privy Council but continued to exercise influence over the military. Growing dissatisfaction with the civilian government by both the armed forces and the palace eventually led to a monarch-endorsed coup in 1991 (Phongpaichit and Baker 1995: 354). Eventually, the armed forces manipulated elections such that an Army Commander became Prime Minister and it appeared that the military would further extend its power. However, mass civilian protests in May 1992 attempted to force the military from power. As the armed forces sought to repress the demonstrations, soldiers killed numerous protestors, and the king, despite holding a “preference for the military,” reluctantly intervened to ease the military premier out of office (Maisrikrod 1992: 32–33; Handley 2006: 360). From 1947 to 1992, the palace-military asymmetrical partnership dominated Thailand. The palace succeeded in dominating the military because Thailand’s king successfully balanced competing military factions to remain paramount. Such juggling exacerbated the vicious cycle of coups, military

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governments, counter-coups, and civilian governments (Rajchagool 2008). The favor shown by the palace toward the armed forces was illustrated in his continuing endorsement of military governments. This support allowed for all five political decision-making areas to be generally overseen by the armed forces though the palace remained in charge. One overriding legacy during this period influenced the status of civilian control: a tradition of military involvement in politics with such influence dependent upon the palace’s backing. When the palace supported democratic actors, the military held back. But if the palace was threatened, the army would intervene to save its own power. Thailand’s post-1992 period saw some continuing military intrusions into political affairs. Indeed, military influence remained in the Senate until 2000 with military appointees serving as 55.2% (1992–1996) and 18.2% (1996–2000) of the Upper House (Chambers 2013: 226, 238). However, the 1990s also witnessed the incremental blossoming of civilian control. This was due to five factors. First, the “Black May” massacre tainted the image of the military—making it lose an enormous amount of public respect and political capital, from Thais in general, the international community and most importantly the king. Second, Suchinda was succeeded by advocates of civilian control. Suchinda’s immediate successor, appointed PM Anand Panyarachun (with support from the king) dismissed three key army officers loyal to Suchinda. Moreover, Anand streamlined the state enterprise boards, decreasing military influence on them (Murray 1996: 190–194). Then, a new election in September 1992 brought reform-minded, civilian Chuan Leekpai to office as Prime Minister. Third, two Army commanders in the 1993–2002 period (Gen. Wimol Wongwanich and Gen. Surayudh Chulanond) directed the military to undergo reforms and a restructuring. Actually, both Wimol and Surayudh were close to Gen. Prem Tinsulanond, who became Privy Council Chair in 1998 (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005: 133). Fourth, Prem’s Privy Council backed elected civilian control in Thailand rather than military rule, if only to keep any potential military adventurism against the palace at bay. Indeed, Prem’s powerful position as chief advisor to the king (and continuing networks of influence in the military) led him to be dubbed the “surrogate strongman” of Thai politics after Suchinda’s downfall in 1992 (Samudavanija 1997: 56). Evidence of such strength appeared in

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November 1997.1 Fifth, the financial crisis of 1997 gave the military less of a reason to compete for a higher budget given the country’s economic hard times. Moreover, Chuan in his second term (1997–2001) took the post of Defense Minister as well as PM, pushing the military toward various reforms. By 1998, however, continuing economic malaise in Thailand had made Chuan increasingly unpopular. Though at the time Prem and Surayudh dominated Thailand’s security forces, their unchallenged control ended in 2001 when civilian Thaksin Shinawatra was elected Prime Minister. On January 6, 2001, telecommunications tycoon and ex-police colonel Thaksin Shinawatra, together with his political party Thai Rak Thai, won the general election by a landslide and he formed a coalition government which was to last an entire four-year term, something which had never occurred in Thailand. Thaksin’s victory brought to the premiership a person intent on personally achieving control over Thailand’s military and police. Thaksin was re-elected by an even greater landslide in 2005. During this period, the armed forces saw their power dissipate. Gone were the days when they could sit on the Senate or dominate the executive branch. Indeed, if anyone was manipulating the procedures of political competition it was Thaksin, the elected civilian. Indeed, Thaksin’s clout in 2001 was such that he was able to exert overriding authority throughout parliament and courts, and even compete with Gen. Prem in terms of political influence. Thaksin saw to it that a great many top seats on the state monitoring agencies (e.g. Constitutional Court, Election Commission) were filled by his own loyalists. As for the military, Thaksin used a policy of appeasement, appointing 55 army generals to be advisors to the Prime Minister. Thirty more were later added (McCargo and Pathmanand 2005: 151). Ultimately, whatever power the military had over procedures of political competition derived from its association with Thaksin. Under Thaksin, civilian control of the military perhaps grew to its highest levels in Thai history. Thaksin made use of the new constitution which buttressed the powers of political parties and Prime Ministers against corrupt and nondemocratic forces. He also utilized his enormous financial 1  Prem reportedly interfered in parliamentary politics by influencing 12 members of the Prajakorn Thai party to defect from the ruling coalition and join the opposition, thus enabling Democrat Chuan Leekpai to form a coalition government again (McCargo 2005: 510).

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resources to market himself or buy off potential enemies. His landslide electoral victories, enormous popularity among the masses, and ability to successfully joust against Gen. Prem allowed Thaksin to monopolize the political space once dominated by the armed forces. Yet Thaksinocracy could not continue. Thai society became polarized between Thaksin loyalists and opponents (led by the palace, but including businesspeople, civil libertarians, the parliamentary opposition [Democrats], and disaffected soldiers). Citing disorder and lack of unity, Gen. Sonthi Boonyaratklin, then Army Commander, led a coup against Thaksin, voiding the 1997 Constitution, and established a military government in Thailand—the first in 15 years. Sonthi’s military junta was called the Council for Democratic Reform (CDR), the name of which was later changed to CNS (Council for National Security). Though Sonthi had been a compromise candidate to become Army head, he had actually been supported by Prem (Pathmanand 2008: 126). The 2006 coup was directed by arch-royalist supporters in the armed forces (Pathmanand 2008: 129). Sonthi appointed as interim PM the anti-Thaksin Prem stalwart Gen. Surayudh Chulanond. Surayudh and his cabinet of 26 administered the country, with two ministers coming from the military. Meanwhile, a National Legislative Assembly (NLA) was appointed to draw up a new constitution. The NLA was composed of 242 persons, including 76 (or 31.4%) active/retired military or police personnel (author’s own calculations based upon parliamentary data). The 2007 Constitution which the NLA eventually produced created greater influence for the armed forces within the Senate, allowing for a half-appointed (74 members), half-elected (76 members) Upper House. Following senatorial elections in early 2008, 15.3% of the entire 76 directly elected/74 appointed Senate was now composed of retired military officials. Among the 74 appointed Senators, 14 were ex-soldiers for a 9.3% military reserved domain (author’s own calculations based upon parliamentary data). As a result of the putsch, political parties, demonstrations, and related activities were banned by the junta until July 2007. From 2006 until 2008, except at the local level, elected civilian control was nonexistent in Thailand. The military-endorsed constitution of 2007 allowed for a popular referendum on the charter. Yet soldiers were said to be attempting to influence rural Thais to vote for it. Martial law was lifted only little by little from provinces considered to be pro-Thaksin in time for a new election, which was held in December 2007. Yet there were allegations of covert

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military involvement in seeking to influence the election’s outcome. The purported plan involved using state-run media to attack and discredit the pro-Thaksin People’s Power Party—in the name of national security (The Nation October 26, 2007a). Another alleged plot entailed military lobbying of political parties in a bid to prevent People’s Power from forming a government after the election (The Nation November 3, 2007b). Following the electoral victory of Thaksin’s People’s Power Party (PPP) in the 2007 election, Thaksin ally Samak Sundaravej was selected as Prime Minister. Yet upon the inauguration of the Samak government in February 2008, the palace, Privy Council, and military leadership became increasingly determined to oust him. In March, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) Yellow Shirts were again demonstrating against the government. By late August, the PAD occupied Government House. However, the military refused to carry out Samak’s order to clear Government House of the demonstrators and restore order (Reuters 2008). By October, Thailand’s judiciary had dismissed Samak from office, and his successor, Prime Minister Somchai Wongsawat, never succeeded getting Thailand’s political storm under control. Eventually, in December the Constitutional Court ruled to dissolve the PPP party, causing the Somchai administration to collapse, and facilitating the rise to office of an anti-Thaksin government, cobbled together through the influence of the palace, Privy Council, and arch-Royalist military officers (Rojanaphruk 2008). A triumvirate of pro-Prem soldiers was apparently instrumental in this oblique intervention: Army Chief Anupong Paochinda, retired Gen. Prawit Wongsawat, and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Prayuth Chanucha. These three “Queen’s Musketeers” led two army factions: “Queen’s Guard,” representing the 21st Regiment, and “Eastern Tigers,” representing the Army’s Second Infantry Division. From late 2008 until mid-2011, a government sympathetic to the palace was in office. Throughout the period of the Democrat-led government, arch-royalists sought to consolidate control over the country while Thaksin used Red Shirt demonstrations in an attempt to force the dissolution of the Lower House. As such, the Democrat party-led coalition government allowed the arch-royalist Queen’s Guard faction (which was dominating the military) to have full control over top positions. Prawit became Defense Minister, Anupong remained Army Commander and Prayuth was his Deputy (Prayuth succeeded Anupong in 2010). Also, the Democrats sought to manipulate the top officers of the police (generally more sympathetic to Thaksin) to diminish Thaksin’s influence with the

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police. To this end, the new Prime Minister (Abhisit Vechachiwa) vetoed the elevation of Priewpan Damapong (brother of Thaksin’s ex-wife Pojaman) to become Police Chief in 2009, appointing instead Wichien Poteposree, considered to be more loyal to the palace (Nanuam August 5, 2009). Meanwhile, in early 2009, the Red Shirts expanded their membership and increasingly demonstrated against Abhisit’s government. Two massive Red Shirts-led demonstrations in 2009 and 2010 contributed to the destabilization of the government. On May 19, 2010, the army repressed the second protest, leaving over 90 dead and over 2000 injured (Associated Press 2012). After May 19, Abhisit’s government became increasingly unpopular. In the July 2011 general election, the pro-Thaksin Puea Thai Party won a landslide victory and Abhisit’s government was nudged from office. With a popular mandate, Thaksin’s younger sister Yingluck now became Prime Minister. Yingluck’s 2011–2014 government was never able to exert control over the Thai military. Beginning in 2011, the new administration at first sought a policy of simply building cooperation with the armed forces— especially given that the senior brass were solidly opposed to Yingluck’s brother Thaksin. Thus, during the 2011 military reshuffle, Yingluck agreed to almost every appointment favored by Army Chief Prayuth Chan-­ocha (Nanuam October 6, 2011). By 2013, Yingluck, who was suspicious of the military, came to rely on police to provide security for her government against anti-Shinawatra demonstrators. In addition, police were given an enhanced role in Yingluck’s southern counter-insurgency policy (The Nation September 23, 2011). She also distanced herself from Army Commander Prayuth. In October 2013, however, anti-government demonstrations began to swell in Bangkok. The principal protest group—the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)—was headed by anti-Thaksin Democrat Suthep Thaugsuban. Suthep possessed close connections with Prawit, Anupong, and Prayuth, given that he had worked with them as Deputy Prime Minister during the 2008–2011 Abhisit administration. According to Suthep, he and Prayuth had colluded to oust pro-Thaksin governments since 2010 (Suksamran 2014). By December Yingluck had, under pressure, dissolved her government and called new elections. But the PDRC demonstrations and occupations of various government facilities continued into 2014. Prayuth, who had stated at the initial stages of the protests that the military would remain neutral, slowly changed his position on the

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matter. Indeed, in March 2014, the Army Commander proclaimed: “I can’t promise if there will be another coup or not…but every coup is meant to end a crisis (Bangkok Post March 1, 2014b).” At the same time, it was reported that armed soldiers were providing protection for PDRC rallies. These guards included active-duty and retired navy and army officials as well as individuals who had received training from professional soldiers (Bangkok Post February 22, 2014a; Pollard 2014). Such covert military involvement further destabilized the political situation—facilitating the establishment of an environment conducive to carrying out a coup. In early May 2014, Yingluck was forced from office by Thailand’s Constitutional Court and a Deputy Prime Minister officially replaced her. Yet on May 20, with demonstrations having persisted for half a year and scores of deaths and even more injuries, Prayuth declared martial law under the authority of the 1914 Martial Law Act. The application of this law effectively gave the Army Commander legal though temporary control over Thailand. According to Prayuth, martial law was necessary to stop the violence and allow the army to bring peace back to Thailand (Phoonphongphiphat 2014). Then on May 22 Prayuth simply staged a putsch which ousted Thai democracy.

Parallel State and Monarchized Military The history of civil-military relations in Thailand demonstrates that monarchy and military have traditionally possessed enormous power, while curtailing advances in democratization. At least since 1980, Thailand’s monarchy has acted as a “parallel state,” succeeding in dominating parliament, the military, and other formal institutions. The inertia of such dominance has compelled these institutions to oscillate around monarchy. Yet what is a parallel state? Drawing partly on the work of Briscoe (2008: 6–8, 12–16), a parallel state is itself not an actual “state.” It is instead defined as a shadowy network that is connected to the state and possesses formal political, social, and economic authority as well as informal clout, prerogatives, and interests outside those of civilian leaders—who must acquiesce to the autonomy of the informal power structure because the parallel state is insulated from and can exert influence over them. The linchpin of a parallel state is the informal structure’s influence over “experts in violence”—such as the military—to maximize the informal

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structure’s interests. Parallel states are almost always found in political cultures characterized by neo-patrimonialism, and their origins tend to derive from traditional, entrenched authoritarian institutions that have survived across history as the most powerful and omnipresent institution (or have succeeded in resurrecting such clout), amidst the weaknesses of other institutions. Such institutions tend to be closely connected to national identity and state formation. This power corresponds with enormous extractive capacities, often derived through political patronage networks that formal state actors would be unable to (or too afraid to) oppose. The existence of parallel states moreover tends to correlate with stalled democratization or ousted democracy, given that the parallel state sometimes undermines, corrodes, captures, or overthrows democracies for its own interests. Transactions between elected civilians and the informal structure, based upon context and institutional interest, determine the political equilibrium—which invariably favors the parallel state. Furthermore, where militaries cannot by themselves rule for long because of insufficient institutional legitimacy and where elected civilian governance is weak, this has resulted in vicious interchanges between military rule and weak democratic rule. Such situations have benefited parallel states because they are entrenched actors associated with national identity that can control militaries and sway civilians. Ultimately, parallel states can indirectly influence the extent to which the formal state delivers public goods, as well as for whom and for what purposes. At the same time, parallel states can establish an “accommodation” whereby they perpetuate their own power by allowing (leaders of) the military or elected civilian regimes to formally rule. Examples of such states include the Sicilian mafia, Afghanistan warlords, the Rwandan Hutu tribe, and the Thai monarchy. The essence of Thailand’s parallel state is an asymmetrical nexus centered upon a powerful, neo-patrimonial monarch, primarily linked to the military but also including the Privy Council, and, to a lesser extent, civilian bureaucrats, judges, and the urban middle and upper class, all of whom cooperate to sustain a palace-centered political order (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2016: 429–430).2 This order offers military guardianship for 2  The concept of “parallel state” differs substantially from McCargo’s “network monarchy” and Merieau’s “deep state.” “Parallel state” prioritizes the asymmetrical connections primarily between a dominant partner—monarchy—and two junior partners—military and Privy Council, while other associated actors are more peripheral. “Network monarchy” is a monarch-led arrangement across a coterie of arch-royalist elites, though it “never achieved the conditions of domination” and had to work “primarily through the elected parliament”

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the monarch and legitimacy for the military, thus extending the broad interests of the monarch, military, and Privy Council. This institutional grouping engages in vigorous transactions with elected governments, when they exist. It also works handily with military regimes. Thus, it is a highly influential, informal power structure, embedded in Thai society, economy, and bureaucracy. Hence, the notion of a “parallel state” does not refer to a “type of state” but a type of political domination. The parallel state consists of a certain set of political actors (bureaucratic, military, and royalist elites such as the members of the Privy Council), controlling and employing the coercive, bureaucratic, and extractive capacities of the state—although elected governments could be “formally” in charge, defining the terms of the “citizenship agreement” or state acceptance. The monarchy’s institutional influence is politically, economically, and culturally pervasive in Thailand (McCargo 2005). Constitutionally, the monarch is considered to be above politics, but he has nevertheless engaged in it both publicly and privately. This has given the parallel state several mechanisms of control over Thai society. First, the king commands state coercive capacity operators as he is the nominal head of Thailand’s armed forces. Moreover, the monarchy is the only institution that has succeeded in uniting Thailand’s traditionally factionalized military. Second, the king’s endorsement is necessary for all constitutions and the formation of all laws (including military and police reshuffles). Third, the king endorses all governments (including those derived from military takeover). Not since 1977 has a successful coup occurred without the king’s endorsement. Fourth, the monarch can grant royal pardons for anyone at any time. Fifth, in terms of extractive capacity, through the king’s Crown Property Bureau, he controls vast holdings and investments worth around US$30 billion (Reuters 2017). Such enormous dividends have allowed the king substantial influence in the economy. Sixth, the monarch can make royal speeches, the interpretation of which can affect public policy. Seventh, undergirding all monarchical power are lèse majesté regulations long enshrined as Article 112 in the Criminal Code, which can land a person in jail for years for ambiguous insults to the king, queen, heir-­apparent, or regent. (McCargo 2005: 499–501). Merieau’s monarch-centered “deep state” is much more institutionalized and inclusive of civilian elites than either network monarchy or parallel state, with arch-royalist judges (backed by other multiple deep state actors) working as a “surrogate king” (see Merieau 2016: 445–466).

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In Thailand, the military’s linkage to the monarchy-led parallel state is often so close that it may as well be referred to as a “monarchized military” since it depends upon the monarchy in terms of ideology, rituals and processes which greatly enhance its legitimacy as a political actor. The monarchy in turn relies upon the guardianship of successive factions within the military, especially the army. “Monarchized military” can be viewed as a “social construct” which utilizes discursive symbols such as songs, emblems, flags, decorations, erudition, ideology and various royal projects that connect kingship with the armed forces (Chambers and Waitoolkiat 2016: 428). As the junior partner in the “parallel state,” Thailand’s military holds a monopoly of force through enormous coercive capacities and acts as guardian of the monarchy, factors which have facilitated its repeated (palace-­endorsed) interventions in democratic politics. The monarchy has appeared to welcome the continuing pivotal role of the military, if only to preserve monarchical primacy. Meanwhile, urban, middle, and upper class perceptions that civilian politicians are corrupt and self-interested have been beneficial to the popularity of the monarchy, Privy Council, and military. The origins and evolution of Thailand’s parallel state have not been smooth. After 1932, absolute monarchy was overthrown and monarchical influence only returned—as a junior partner to the military—in 1957. Only in 1980, when arch-royalist army General Prem Tinsulanonda was appointed Premier, did the monarchy become the senior partner of parallel statehood. Indeed, with Prem’s assistance (through his control over the military), monarchical influence soared higher than it had been since 1932. Though Thailand did not revert to monarchical absolutism, after 1980 the palace became the country’s most powerful institution and remains so today, though it continues to rely on military guardianship, a relationship that is assured because the military obtains its legitimacy from the monarchy. Prem’s 1988 elevation to the Privy Council secured that body as a key nexus (led by a retired military man) between monarchy and the armed forces. When, in 2006, the parallel state perceived that monarchical primacy was not being maintained by the elected government, it endorsed the overthrow of democracy. A similar situation occurred in 2014. Since that year, Thailand has been under military authoritarianism as endorsed by the monarchy.

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Thailand Under Military Rule Since 2014 Following the latest coup, Prayuth and other senior brass established a military junta, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), which today operates alongside an appointed Prime Minister—who is also Prayuth. Prayuth’s Deputy is Retd. Gen. Prawit Wongsuwan. Paralleling the move to junta-ruled Thailand, military courts have come to prevail over civilian courts in terms of legal jurisprudence. Thailand was administered under the Martial Law Act of 1914. Section 6 of that law required civilians to comply with military authorities. On July 22, 2014, an interim constitution (Thailand’s 19th) was enacted. It enshrined the junta’s executive powers on a massive scale. Section 44 stated that whenever the junta leader believed it was necessary to deal with “any act,” he could issue “any order…regardless of the legislative, executive or judicial force of that order.” The said order would be considered “legal, constitutional and conclusive (Section 44 Kingdom of Thailand 2014).” On March 20, 2015, the junta ended the application of the Martial Law Act, instead using the new Section 44. Also, according to Section 47, all acts issued by the junta were and would be “deemed to be legal, constitutional and conclusive (Section 47 Kingdom of Thailand 2014).” Moreover, Article 48 exempted all junta members or all persons ordered by junta members or connected to junta members from any legal punishments or liabilities, representing a complete amnesty for the coup-makers. Finally, Sections, 6, 10, 28, 30 and 32 allowed the junta to basically choose most of the appointed members of new political institutions which would oversee the writing of a new constitution and prepare Thailand for a new democracy (Kingdom of Thailand 2014). These junta-created institutions were the National Legislative Assembly (NLA), a National Reform Council (NRC), and a Constitutional Drafting Committee (CDC). The first body contained 220 members, including 9 police, 80 active-duty military officers and 32 retired soldiers (author’s own calculations based upon parliamentary data). The NLA acted as an apparent legislature for the junta, through its rubber-stamped junta decisions. Indeed, the NLA selected Prayuth as Prime Minister in August 2014. The 250-member NRC, meanwhile, was responsible for putting forward general recommendations for a new constitution. NRC membership consisted of security officials, ex-politicians, bureaucrats, businesspeople, and academics (National Reform Council). Finally, a 36-member Constitutional Drafting Committee was actually charged with putting

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together a draft constitution. Members of CDC included conservative academics, civilian bureaucrats and five military officers. In September 2015, a new draft constitution was rejected by the NRC. Most NRC members rejecting it were military and police. It was alleged by many that the junta itself had ordered security officials who were members of the NRC to vote down the charter so that the military could remain in power longer. Following the constitutional draft’s rejection, the junta replaced the NRC with a newly appointed National Reform Steering Assembly (NRSA), which was half-filled with military appointees. A new CDC was appointed as well. The CDC formulated a new constitution (Thailand’s 20th) which was passed by referendum in 2016 and endorsed by the king in 2017. In 2017 the NRSA was disbanded but the CDC remained to sort out organic laws for the country. Since the 2014 putsch, Thailand’s military regime has been able to sustain itself in power for multiple reasons. First, junta leader Prayuth has been able to count on the fact that most soldiers are united behind him, allowing him to crush any dissent among civilians. Second, civilians themselves are much more divided about military rule than is the military itself. Third, the revered palace endorsed the 2014 coup and the junta, as did the Prem-led Privy Council, other top aristocrats and the entire judiciary. This palace-led parallel state needed the NCPO junta to ensure stability at the twilight of the reign of King Rama IX and the dawn of his successor King Rama X in 2016. Since 2016, as Rama X strengthens his hold on power, junta power has helped him to consolidate his rule. Fourth, the junta leadership has committed itself to a roadmap toward democracy which would take place in the near future, a promise which has made governance by a military regime easier to swallow for some Thais. Fifth, the Thai military regime has received legitimacy and assistance from key countries in the international community—most notably China. For example, in 2015 the Thai junta tentatively agreed to pay US$1.06 billion for three Chinese-­ made submarines (Nanuam June 26, 2015). China is also working with Thailand to enhance military cooperation in terms of more exchanges of military officers, greater provision of Chinese military education for Thai soldiers, a larger Chinese role in the development of Thailand’s defense industry and joint intelligence cooperation (The Nation April 25, 2015). Besides China, the United States, since 2017 under the administration of President Donald Trump, reached out to military-led Thailand. Previous US President Barrack Obama had distanced the United States from Thailand following Prayuth’s 2014 coup. Among the signals from Trump

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of a resurrection of close ties, the United States in 2017 hosted Prayuth in the White House and approved the sale of four Black Hawk helicopters and Harpoon missiles (Searight 2017). Sixth, Thailand’s military regime benefits from a historical legacy and political culture of strong authoritarianism and general popular acceptance of a powerful monarchy and military in Thai society. Seventh, the Thai military has succeeded in persuading anti-Thaksin elites and members of the mostly urban middle class that the current crises in Thailand today necessitate military intervention in order to restore order. These crises include the need to quell border problems between Thailand and Cambodia; to prosecute counter-insurgency; and most importantly, to forcibly end the political and economic instability deriving from the country’s political divide over Thaksin and Yingluck Shinawatra. Since 2014, junta leaders have been informally promoting the establishment of a pro-military political party which will eventually compete in the next general election. This proxy party is called the Pracharat Party. As the election looks set to finally occur in 2019, backers of Prayuth are aiming to maintain him in power as Prime Minister through the vehicle of Pracharat, a tactic that Thai juntas have attempted on previous occasions (Montesano 2019).

The Post-2014 Dearth of Democracy in Thailand Since 2014, military rule has cast shadow upon Thai democracy. Though Thailand has in the past experienced elected civilian rule, it has always been limited and fleeting. Such democracies tended to be defective and existed in 1946–1947; 1975–1976, 1988–1991, 1992–2006; and 2008– 2014. Democracy during these periods was highly defective given that it persistently suffered from intervention by nondemocratic forces. In addition, political rights, civil liberties, and horizontal accountability suffered from serious deficits. Perhaps most grave was the fact that elected governments lacked the effective power to govern, given the domination of the military or military and monarchy together. The continuing return of authoritarian governance (via coup endorsed by the palace) prevented democracy from ever becoming consolidated. Overshadowed by a monarch-­led parallel state since 1980, the military has either directly ruled or elected civilian governments that have been weak. The assessment below of the quality of Thai democracy since 2014 derives from Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy (Merkel 2004).

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This conception differentiates five dimensions of democracy: (A) electoral regime, (B) political rights, (C) civil rights, (D) horizontal accountability, and (E) the effective power to govern. Positive scores in these dimensions place a polity among embedded democracies. Negative scores constitute a defective democracy. Negative scores in all regimes negate democracy. In the case of Thailand, based upon these five dimensions, the 2014 coup ended Thailand’s 2008–2014 defective democracy. In place of democracy came military dictatorship. Electoral Regime Though Thailand’s coup occurred in 2014, elections were not held at the national level again until March 24, 2019 (and no elections have since 2014 been held at the local level). When Thailand returned to electoral governance in 2019, Thailand’s 2017 constitution and accompanying organic laws had established modifications to the electoral system. First, under a new mixed member apportionment (MMA) electoral system for 500 seats nationwide, voters had a single fused vote which selected 1 out of 350 seats in plurality voting, with their vote simultaneously going to their candidate’s party (representing a proportion of 150 party list seats) (Sirivunnabood 2017). It had been speculated that MMA will work to the benefit of smaller parties, making it difficult for larger ones, such as pro-Thaksin parties, to achieve a Lower House majority of seats (Hicken 2016). As for the Senate’s 250 members (previously elected and half-elected), at least during its first five years of existence, 244 were to be selected by a junta-­appointed committee. The remaining six Senators would include the country’s six senior-most security officials. Furthermore, prior to election, each political party nominated three names, which could include unelected persons. This potentially allowed junta leaders or military personnel to be selected as Prime Minister. From one of these nominees, according to the Constitution (Sections 159, 272), the junta-appointed Senate (250 persons) joined with the elected Lower House (500 persons) in selecting the Prime Minister: 376 out of the 750 was enough for an approval. But since the junta controlled the 250 Senators, it would only need 126 members of the elected Lower House to achieve victory.

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Political Rights In the aftermath of the coup, political rights suffered almost immediately. First, the NCPO increased the pace of prosecutions of lèse-majesté cases, a move which saw the growth of political prisoners in Thailand. In addition, the junta enacted severe restrictions on freedom of expression, assembly, and association. While political parties were not dissolved, they were forbidden from any activities. Political demonstrations of five or more people were banned. The NCPO placed extensive restrictions on the media, closing press outlets that criticized its actions, blocking multiple internet websites and detaining members of the media. In 2015, the junta approved the Cyber Security Act. Section 35 authorized the Cyber Security Committee to access information on personal computers, cell phones, and other electronic devices without a court order. In 2017, Reporters without Borders dropped Thailand six points to 142 out of 179 in terms of press freedom (Reporters without Borders 2017). The junta furthermore canceled or monitored academic lectures and threatened participants with detention. To legitimize its actions, the NCPO enacted a 2014 constitution which included the wide-ranging Section 44. This Section stated that whenever the junta leader believed it was necessary to deal with “any act,” he could issue “any order…regardless of the legislative, executive or judicial force of that order.” The said order was considered “legal, constitutional and conclusive (Kingdom of Thailand 2014).” Through the use of Section 44, the NCPO has issued numerous decrees which impinge upon political rights. When democracy eventually comes back to Thailand, a higher degree of political rights will likely also return. However, it is likely that large numbers of lèse-majesté cases will continue to be prosecuted. In addition, protecting the monarch will likely persist as an excuse for maintaining several restrictions on and monitoring of both the media and academics by security agencies. Civil Liberties and Rule of Law Under post-2014 military rule, many Thais were detained by the military for “attitude adjustment,” and they could be held for trial for seven days, though this period could be renewed again and again. There have been allegations of torture (beatings, death threats, mock executions and attempted asphyxiation); warrantless arrests on ambiguous grounds; and

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forced, temporary disappearances. Detainees were only allowed to return home after agreeing in writing that they would not leave Thailand without the military’s permission and that they would not participate in any political activities. Violating the agreement could result in imprisonment. In addition, the junta has diluted the powers of the Human Rights Commission (Human Rights Watch 2017). Meanwhile, in the Deep South of Thailand, following the coup, the military retook direct control over the counter-insurgency, a move which has paralleled the rumored increase in state human rights violations. Finally, Section 44 of the junta-­ imposed constitution gives total impunity to the junta, even when they violate human rights. Since the coup, military courts have become the leading judicial bodies of Thailand. Trials in these courts were often held in secret, were subject to few appeals, and were biased, given that they were not independent of senior military officials. They were specifically used to try individuals accused of lèse-majesté. Though in 2016 it was announced that there would be less use of military courts, such courts have continued to hear a huge backlog of civilian cases (Freedom House 2017). Other courts and monitoring agencies demonstrated a persistent political bias against the Shinawatra clan. In 2017, the Constitutional Court ruled against ex-Prime Minister Yingluck and her Commerce Minister in a case involving allegations of corruption in her government’s rice-pledging scheme. In late 2014, the judiciary was quick to convict relatives of a member of the palace’s ex-wife, in what appeared to illustrate his political sway over the Thai justice system. Horizontal Accountability Since the 2014 coup, the armed forces have become the leading political actor, answerable only to the monarch, the Privy Council, or its particular preferences, which are hardly unified. The NCPO dominates the appointed cabinet, appointed National Legislative Assembly and all other state councils or agencies. When Thailand returns to democracy, the junta-appointed judiciary— particularly the Constitutional Court—will enjoy enormous powers as will the junta-appointed Senate. With regard to the Upper House, the latter can vote with the 500-member Lower House to select a Prime Minister if the Lower House cannot reach an accord on the matter. In addition, the Senate jointly deliberates with the Lower House on any bills related to

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national reform. Finally, the Senate can veto, at joint meetings of both Houses, any bill on amnesty (Sapsomboon 2018; Part 3 Kingdom of Thailand 2017). Ultimately, these powerful, arch-royalist institutions will be able to check the power of a much more fluid elected Lower House (which will select the Prime Minister). Effective Power to Govern Since the 2014 coup, no elected civilian government has had the effective power to govern because there has been no democracy. Only the junta has such control, though its decisions are subject to the preferences of the palace. As a result, it is the monarch-led parallel state which controls the extent of elected civilian rule. When elected rule returns to Thailand, it will once again be of the tutelary variety. First, the power of elected Prime Ministers will be conditional upon the absolute authority of the monarch. Second, even after the military permits a return to civilian rule, junta and military leaders can remain influential across Thailand’s future democracy through a new National Strategy Committee (NSC) overseeing a National 20-Year Strategy for the years 2018–2037, which broadly aims to address reconciliation, reform and national security issues(Audjarint 2017). But, according to Democrat politician Sathit Pitutecha, “The committee is coded in the draft as though to provide an extension of [military] power (Sattaburuth 2017).” This is because the 35-member Committee is dominated by junta appointees. All government agencies and officials (including elected officials) must adhere to the legally binding Strategy (in terms of policies, budgets, and missions). Elected governments must report their progress in adhering to the 20-Year Plan four times a year to the Senate. Otherwise the junta-appointed Senate can order the National Anti-Corruption Commission to prosecute them, which can lead to elected/unelected officials (or whole governments) being removed by the Constitutional Court (Chanwanpen 2017).

Conclusion and Future In 2019, with Thailand still under dictatorship, political space remains monopolized by monarchy and military while democracy has been completely denied. The armed forces act as a monarchized military, in the service of the palace-led parallel state.

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At the beginning of this chapter, five questions were asked. How and why has the armed forces historically achieved such preeminent power? What has been the relationship between Thailand’s military and monarchy? How has military power over Thailand manifested itself since the 2014 coup? What does continuing military involvement say about the contemporary state of Thai politics? What is the future of Thailand’s military? In answer to the first question, the armed forces have evolved to become a pivotal actor across Thailand’s political landscape because of their possession of force, Thailand’s legacy of authoritarianism, the continuing inability of civilians to unite against military influence, and most importantly (since 1980) the legitimacy which the armed forces has accrued as the guardian and vehicle of the monarch-led parallel state. In answer to the second question, the relationship between monarchy and military has enabled the persistence of this post-1980 parallel state: an asymmetrical alliance between the king and armed forces with the latter as junior partner. Third, the post-2014 military junta has succeeded in maintaining itself in power primarily by sheer force, maintaining united control over the army while civilians remain divided, the enactment of decrees as well as constitutions, the use of propaganda, backing from key countries in the international community, and most prominently the endorsement of the palace. Fourth, continuing military involvement in Thai politics tells us that authoritarian institutions—monarchy and military—will likely remain dominant in Thailand at least in the near future and that the contemporary state of Thai politics will allow little more than a resumption of highly defective democracy following the next election. In answer to the final question, the future of Thailand’s military allows for four scenarios. First, at least for now at the end of 2019, Thailand’s military continues to exercise very substantial power given that the NCPO junta, under its leader Gen. Prayuth, held a March 2019 election after which the junta-created and pro-military political party Palang Pracharat, heading up a coalition, was formed in July to lead an extremely defective democracy under Prime Minister Prayuth. Senior soldiers could continue holding enormous power in this “civilian” government, entrenching the military’s domination over the facade democracy for years to come and rationalizing its power as the protector of Thailand’s royal parallel state. Second, it is possible that there could be a counter-coup which overthrows this Prayuth government and replaces it with another army faction led by current Army Chief Gen. Apirat Kongsompong (Thailand’s government leadership predominantly belongs to another army faction). However, any

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counter-putsch would not change the dynamic of regime: Thailand would at least in the short term remain a military dictatorship. Third and finally, there is the scenario of demilitarization. Such a situation would involve the drastic downscaling of military influence in Thai politics and its conversion into a smaller force which cannot threaten democracy. Yet this is unlikely because the monarchy needs a strong military as a guardian to guarantee the palace-led parallel state’s dominance over the country. For the military to weaken and democracy to blossom in Thailand, the parallel state will have to diminish its reliance on military intervention and instead give its enduring support to democratic institutions. At the same time, civilians will have to ardently unite together in favor of democracy while military officials become less united. To achieve such cohesion, it will be necessary that the image of the junta and military become tarnished in a way that brings Thai once and for all together in favor of a transition to democracy. While current problems in the economy are to some extent tainting public perceptions of the junta, what is worrisome is that the armed forces may respond to any future anti-junta demonstration by firing their weapons into the crowd, a replay of the 1992 repression. In such an eventuality, it is only carnage and the self-sacrifice of protestors which allows for the opening of political space, a tragic outcome. But for democracy to sustain itself over time, elected civilians will have to find ways to make the monarchy and the armed forces value the persistence of pluralism rather than support future military coups. But until that time, Thai politics looks set to remain turbulent, overshadowed by a palace-led parallel state as enforced by a continuing series of military interventions into the future.

References Associated Press (2012, May 19) Thousands Mark ‘Red Shirt’ Crackdown in Bangkok. http://newsok.com/article/feed/384077. Accessed 8 June 2017. Audjarint W (2017, January 5) Prayut Spells Out New Structures for Reform. The Nation. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/national/30303445. Accessed 15 March 2017. Bangkok Post (2014a, February 22) Imprisoned in their Palace. http://www. bangkokpost.com/lite/crimes/396369/imprisoned-in-their-palace. Accessed 17 April 2016. Bangkok Post (2014b, March 1) City’s Shutdown’ to End as Army Chief Hints of Special Method. http://www.bangkokpost.com/print/397649/. Accessed 12 September 2018.

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Barme S (1993) Luang Wichit Wathakan and the Creation of Thai Identity. ISEAS, Singapore. Briscoe I (2008) The Proliferation of the Parallel State. Madrid: Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, Working Paper 71. Chaiching N (2010) The Monarchy and the Royalist Movement. In: Isager L and Ivarsson S (eds.) Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand. NIAS, Copenhagen, pp. 147–178. Chaloemtiarana T (2007) Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism. Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Ithaca. Chambers P (2013) A Short History of Military Influence in Thailand. In: Chambers, P (ed.) Knights of the Realm: Thailand’s Military and Police, Then and Now. White Lotus Press, Bangkok. Chambers P and Waitoolkiat N (2016) The Resilience of Monarchised Military in Thailand. Journal of Contemporary Asia. Special Issue, 23 March, 46(3): 425– 444. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00472336.2016.116 1060?src=recsys. Accessed 24 March 2016. Chanwanpen K (2017, April 20) NLA Debates 20-year National Strategy and Reforms Bills. The Nation. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/news/ national/30312818. Accessed 21 March 2018. Fineman D (1997) A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand, 1947–1958. University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Freedom House (2017) Thailand. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedomworld/2017/thailand. Accessed 1 December 2017. Greene S L W (1999) Absolute Dreams: Thai Government Under Rama VI, 1910– 1925. White Lotus, Bangkok. Handley P (2006) The King Never Smiles. Yale University Press, New Haven. Hicken A (2016, February 9) The Effects of Thailand’s Proposed Electoral System. Thai Data Points (Blog) and Bangkok Pundit (Blog). http://www. thaidatapoints.com/project-updates/theeffectsofthailandsproposedelectoralsystembyallenhickenandbangkokpundit. Accessed 8 March 2016. Human Rights Watch (2017, August 23) Thailand: Don’t Weaken Human Rights Commission. https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/08/23/thailand-dontweaken-rights-commission. Accessed 2 December 2017. Isarapakdi V (1989) The Man in Khaki—Debaser or Developer? The Thai Military in Politics, with Particular Reference to the 1976–1986 Period, Dissertation. Tufts University, Boston Kingdom of Thailand (2014, July 22) Constitution (Interim). Constituteproject. org (Translated by Prakorn Nilprapunt). https://www.constituteproject.org/ constitution/Thailand_2014.pdf?lang=en. Accessed 1 September 2015. Kingdom of Thailand (2017) Constitution (Unofficial Translation), 6 April. www. constitutionalcourt.or.th/occ_en/download/article_20170410173022.pdf. Accessed 7 June 2017.

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Maisrikrod S (1992) Thailand’s Two General Elections in 1992. ISEAS, Singapore. McCargo D (2005) Network Monarchy and Legitimacy Crises in Thailand. The Pacific Review 18 (4): 499–519. McCargo D and Pathmanand U (2005) The Thaksinization of Thailand. NIAS Press, Copenhagen. Merieau E (2016, February 29) Thailand’s Deep State, Royal Power and the Constitutional Court: 1997–2015. Journal of Contemporary Asia 46 (3): 445– 466 https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472336.2016.115 1917. Accessed 5 November 2016. Merkel W (2004) Embedded and Defective Democracies. Democratization 11 (5): 33–58. Montesano M (2019, January 9) An Election 50 Years Ago May Hold Lessons for Thailand in 2019. Today. https://www.todayonline.com/commentary/election-50-years-ago-may-hold-lessons-thailand-2019. Accessed 10 January 2019. Morell D and Samudavanija C (1981) Political Conflict in Thailand: Reform, Reaction, Revolution. Oelgeschlager, Gunn, and Hain, Publishers, Cambridge, MA. Murray D (1996) Angels and Devils. White Orchid Press, Bangkok. Nanuam W (2009, August 5) Wichien Takes Top Police Job. Bangkok Post. Nanuam W (2011, October 6) Tigers of the East Secure a Roaring Hurrah. Bangkok Post. http://teakdoor.com/1896172-post10.html. Accessed 8 October 2013. Nanuam W (2015, June 26) Chinese Win Bid to Supply Subs to Navy. Bangkok Post. Neher C (1992) Political Succession in Thailand. Asian Survey 32 (7): 585–605. https://doi.org/10.2307/2644943. Pathmanand U (2008) A Different Coup d’État. Journal of Contemporary Asia 38 (1): 124–142. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00472330701651994. Accessed 4 December 2008. Phongpaichit P and Baker C (1995) Thailand: Economy and Politics. Oxford University. Phoonphongphiphat A (2014, May 20) Thailand’s Army Declares Martial Law, Says not a Coup. Reuters. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/05/20/ukthailand-protests-martial-idUKKBN0DZ1YU20140520. Accessed 5 June 2014. Pollard J (2014, February 25) Who are Thailand’s Popcorn Warriors. Andalou Agency. http://www.aa.com.tr/en/world/292691%2D%2Dwho-are-thailands-popcorn-warriors. Accessed 27 February 2014. Rajchagool C (2008, October 2) Interviewed by Chambers P. Reporters without Borders (2017) Thailand: Gagged by ‘Peace and Order’. https://rsf.org/en/thailand. Accessed 3 November 2017. Reuters (2008, September 2) Thai Army Chief Balks at Protest Crackdown. B92. http://www.b92.net/eng/news/world.php?yyyy=2008&mm=09&dd=02&nav_ id=53175. Accessed 5 September 2011.

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CHAPTER 12

Basics of Human Security, Principles of Democracy and Reality of Transition: Implications for Myanmar Chosein Yamahata

Introduction The concern for human insecurity has been an unfailing companion of mankind since the dawn of civilisation. Throughout history, as the forms of human insecurity diversified, the measures to face them also evolved to include both passive and active measures. Paradoxically, much of human intellectual capacity utilised to invent weapons to ensure human security have been equally efficient, if not more so, in creating human insecurity. During the recent centuries and decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency to resort to violent means to destroy threats as a means for reducing or eliminating the risks of human insecurity. However, over this time, the scope of human insecurity had steadily grown to encompass hunger, homelessness, unemployment, illiteracy and disease. Before the end of the last millennium, the inquiry into human insecurity began on a serious note, as it became the subject of intense debate in academia due to the practical dimension necessary to focus on g ­ uaranteeing

C. Yamahata (*) Graduate School of Policy Studies, Aichi Gakuin University, Nisshin, Japan © The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5_12

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the benefits towards the needy peoples and societies on the ground. It is noteworthy to highlight the importance of the applied academic works on the subject as, “promoting human security today requires an enhanced exchange of best experiences, practices and initiatives in the fields of research, training, mobilisation and policy formulation” (Burgess et  al. 2007: 114). This study was initiated based on the premise that such inquiry and research would continue until it results in the evolution and implementation of concrete and sustainable measures to prevent human insecurity in countries in transition, such as Myanmar. The chapter discusses a number of aspects including the foundation and threats of human security, causes of human insecurity and the principles of democracy in building democratic institutions and enabling a democratic transition with respect to human security promotion.

The Foundation of Human Security: The Link between Human Rights and Human Development Unlike the traditional security dialogue that focuses on the defence of the state from external threats, human security “prizes people over states”, “reconciliation over revenge”, “diplomacy over deterrence” and “multilateral engagement over coercive unilateralism”. This approach to security therefore neglects the pressing need for preventive diplomacy as well as other measures required to promote human security globally. The narrow concept of human security focuses on the protection from violent threats to individuals, or what the former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan referred to as, “the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence”. In other words, it guarantees the “freedom from fear” as a fundamental human right (Eldering 2010: 18). The broad concept of human security includes the protection from threats to survival such as, hunger, disease and natural disasters, which cause more deaths than war, genocide and terrorism combined (Human Security Centre 2005). Therefore, this implies the necessity for meeting basic material needs that guarantee people the “freedom from want” achieved by human development measures. To understand both the “narrow” and “broad” approaches of human security, it is essential to tackle security as a protection from extreme vulnerabilities, such as conflict, global poverty, disease, malnutrition and ecological devastation. These important issues are

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­ iscussed in various annual reports including the World Development d Report, World Development Indicators, Human Security Report and Human Development Report, where descriptions and analyses of the progress and limitations of human security efforts around the world are presented. Therefore, the concept of human security encompasses the definitions of human rights and human development. Human rights is understood as the natural and fundamental rights that every human being is entitled to, regardless of ethnicity, religion or other statuses. It acknowledges physical, moral, social and other aspects necessary to guarantee the most basic human dignity. This requires favourable and secure political, economic and social conditions (Piechowiak 1999). In other words, a secure environment, or human security, is a prerequisite for enjoying human rights (Benedek 2008). The 1994 Human Development Report further expands on this concept by defining human security as “the protection of the vital core of all human lives from critical and pervasive environmental, economic, food, health, personal, community and political threats” (UNDP 1994: 383). These threats directly hinder human rights and hence the wellbeing and livelihoods of individuals; thus human security cannot be ensured without the acknowledgement of human rights. Hindering and denying “the potential of human development is a violation of human rights and provokes human insecurity” (Benedek 2008). Human development is a process of change that enables people to realise their full potential. It is a process of expanding people’s choices that requires “building up” the people, their confidence, skills, assets and the freedom necessary to achieve this goal (UNDP 1990). The most critical of these wide-ranging choices include being able to live a long and healthy life, being educated, having access to the resources needed for a decent standard of living, enjoying human rights and personal self-respect. In other words, development must enable people to have these choices. Although human happiness cannot be guaranteed and the choices people make are their own concern, the process of development should, at least, create a conducive environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop their full potential and provide a reasonable chance to lead productive lives in accordance with their needs and interests. Hence, while development might be coordinated by governments and official aid agencies in their provision of institutions, infrastructure, services and support, the people themselves must achieve it. A true development, therefore, is driven by people, not imposed on them (Seers 1969; Baster 1972).

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Human freedom, therefore, is a vital element of human development. In addition, if the scales of human development fail to balance the formation and employment of humans, human potential will mostly be wasted, and human frustration may result (UNDP 1995). The Human Development Reports from past years and, specifically, the Human Security Reports of 2003 and 2005, reveal that a positive correlation exists between human development and human security. Without a basic level of human security guaranteed, no society can expect to initiate or sustain the process leading to the perceivable improvement of human development. The major indications from Table 12.1, where the choice of countries is based on the LDCs (only from Asia) criteria, highlight six observations. Firstly, free countries, like the largest democracy in the world, India, and the newly independent country of this millennium, Timor-Leste, show evidence of freedom affecting their economic health and human development, while keeping their nations free from corruption and state fragility. Secondly, communist single-party states like China and Vietnam enjoy stable economic status and good human development, which contribute to reasonable state stability at the price of liberty and civic freedoms. Thirdly, the middle ground countries, which consist of the rest on the list, except Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, North Korea and Pakistan, portray a fair achievement in protecting the freedom of citizens in terms of political rights and civil liberty on the one hand and making state-building relatively free from the danger of becoming a failed state with the worst corruption scenario on the other hand. The next observation is that Cambodia, which is a constitutional monarchy with a parliamentary republic system, and Laos, a communist country, which tightly controls civic freedoms, yet do not have the worst status in terms of corruption and state fragility aspects. Another remarkable observation is that Bangladesh, Myanmar and Pakistan are being evaluated under a partly free category with similar levels of economic and human development. However, they  are facing the  dangers of state fragility over corruption, which, in turn, may cause severe human insecurity issues. Therefore, the implication is that without sufficient and efficient state capacity, the means to ensure human security is difficult to accomplish. Nevertheless, building state capacity should not come at the expense of freedom, as accumulated inequalities and limitations to freedom will only contribute to causing conflict in the future.

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Table 12.1  Asian LDCs with selected political indicators (2018) Country (HDI and status) LDCs Afghanistan (0.498; Low) Bangladesh (0.608; Medium) Cambodia (0.582; Medium) Laos (0.601; Medium) Myanmar (0.578; Medium) Nepal (0.574; Medium) Timor-Leste (0.625; Medium) Others China (0.752; High) India (0.640; Medium) Indonesia (0.694; Medium) North Korea (na) Pakistan (0.562; Medium) Philippines (0.699; Medium) Sri Lanka (0.77; High)

Political system

Corruption perceptions index: rank

State fragility: rank

Freedom status

Political rights

Civil liberty

Presidential Republic Parliamentary Republic

177th

9th

Not free

5/7

6/7

143rd

32nd

Partly free

4/7

4/7

Constitutional Monarchy

161st

53rd

Not free

6/7

5/7

Communist State Parliamentary Republic

135th

60th

Not free

7/7

6/7

130th

22nd

Partly free

5/7

5/7

Federal Parliamentary Republic Semi-­ Presidential Republic

122nd

39th

Partly free

3/7

4/7

91st

38th

Free

2/7

3/7

Communist State Federal Parliamentary Republic Presidential Republic

77th

89th

Not free

7/7

6/7

81st

72nd

Free

2/7

3/7

96th

91st

Partly free

2/7

4/7

Communist State Federal Parliamentary Republic Presidential Republic

171st

28th

Not free

7/7

7/7

117th

20th

Partly free

4/7

5/7

111th

47th

Partly free

3/7

3/7

Presidential Republic

91st

50th

Partly free

3/7

4/7 (continued)

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Table 12.1  (continued) Country (HDI and status)

Political system

Corruption perceptions index: rank

State fragility: rank

Freedom status

Political rights

Civil liberty

Thailand (0.755; High) Vietnam (0.694; Medium)

Constitutional Monarchy Communist State

96th

77th

6/7

5/7

107th

107th

Partly free Not free

7/7

5/7

Source: https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2017; https:// www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf; http:// hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf; http://hdr.undp. org/sites/default/files/2018_human_development_statistical_update.pdf; https://www.cia.gov/library/ publications/the-world-factbook/fields/2128.html; https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world2018-table-country-scores

Human development, thus, concerns not only the formulation of human capabilities, such as improved health or knowledge, but also the use of these capabilities, be it for work, leisure or political and cultural activities. Another perspective is that people must be free to exercise their choices in properly functioning markets, and they must have a decisive voice in shaping their political frameworks. In an attempt to address development that is sustainable, especially in a developing nation like Myanmar, the hurdles are many: poverty, corruption, poor economies, low per capita income, poor technology, inadequate funds and struggles with insecurities of varying nature (i.e. financial, social, physical etc.). Human security creates an environment that protects human rights and offers the tools necessary to facilitate human development. The interaction between human rights, human security and human development is necessary for the well-being of people everywhere across all social spectrums, from being able to vote freely to having access to adequate healthcare. Figure 12.1 illustrates that human security may be achieved progressively at higher levels through a three-pronged process. The interaction between human rights and human security extends to human development, as can be understood from the figure. Human security can be approached through three different motivations: the fear-driven conflict prevention approach  to guarantee  safety, want-driven human development approach to foster equity and liberty-driven human rights approach  to ensure rights. Each strives to secure safety, equity and

want-driven

Threats from lawlessness/ suppression

Liberty-driven

Threats from injustice/ underdevelopment

Fig. 12.1  Limited freedom to human security

Transitioning states with limited freedom

Threats from violence/disruption

Fear-driven

Rights

Equity

Safety

Reinforce

Reinforce

Strengthen

Rule of law and universal values promoting political security

Human wellbeing and quality of life Promoting food, health, economic and environmental security

Peace and reconciliation; preventive diplomacy promoting personal and community security

Strengthen

Human security

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rights respectively, all fundamental aspects of human security. Therefore, it is noteworthy to review the  approaches of human development promotion from a human security perspective to: • refocus on poverty and equity issues through human development concentration; • re-approach satisfying basic human needs, including fundamental rights by means of human rights promotion; • reconsider strategies for a peaceful human environment having cultural diversity and community harmony by introducing initiatives for preventive diplomacy.

Threats to Human Security: The Persistence of State-Based Violence Despite efforts to ensure human rights, human security and human development, they are not always rewarded by peace and freedom; violent conflicts still continue to plague many developing countries today. Over the past dozen years, the global security climate has changed dramatically. Civil wars, genocides and international crises have all declined sharply. International wars represent a very small amount of armed conflicts and have been in steady decline for a much longer period. Military coups have also become less frequent, resulting in fewer deaths per conflict per year. State-based conflicts are a direct threat to human security, not only creating violence, but also worsening existing conditions of inequality, poverty and corruption. According to the Collier-Hoeffler model, the causes of conflict in the developing world can be simply divided into “greed” or “grievance”. The proxy measures that fall under greed are dependent on primary commodity exports, the proportion of young males in the population and the average schooling taken. Therefore, in a society dependent on primary commodity exports, where young men have little employment opportunities, they would be more motivated to participate as combatants in armed conflict as the rewards of joining are greater than other employment options. However, conflicts impede economic growth and give rise to higher levels of poverty, thereby increasing the economy’s dependence on conflict-inducing natural resources (Hewitt et al. 2010). In other words, natural resources also:

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foster recurring cycles of armed conflict because they provide a revenue base for belligerents, increase claims for secession, and perpetuate state fragility through incentives for corruption and mismanagement. (Wennmann 2011: 265–279)

This is known as the conflict trap and is perpetuated to a large extent through greed or the “resource curse”. As for the “grievance” part of the model, the theory argues that people enter into conflict over issues of political repression, or for ethnic, religious or economic reasons. The power of the concerned state has an influence on why conflicts start, the reasons they are able to continue and the difficulties in ending conflicts. The inability of some states in the developing world to exercise basic control has led to the emergence of “local polities and alternative forms and structures of power and authority” that give rise to conflict. Identity-related reasons of conflict such as ethnicity and religion can be understood within colonial administrations. In developing countries, ethnic identities were often highly politicised for executing the colonial purposes of “divide and rule” that favoured some groups over others. This gave rise to unprecedented attitudes towards different identity groups in the concerned countries, as some of their people were given more economic advantages or political power than was guaranteed to others. The political and social implications from “divide and rule” had caused tensions between groups, which motivated large-scale violence in some cases, as can be learnt from the 1994 genocide in Rwanda (Jackson and Beswick 2011). However, the Collier-Hoeffler model quantifies such accumulated identity-based hatred as grievance variables. Its proxies “measure heterogeneity and do not capture hatred or the kind of ethnic and religious discrimination and propaganda that might generate hatred” (Nathan 2005). Additionally, such grievances should be taken into account beyond the national level. The measurements used to determine grievances, such as “the Gini coefficients of land and income inequality for the national population” is insufficient to explain the “inequality and deprivation experienced” at a subnational level or in communities where rebels could have emerged (ibid). Restricting conflict analyses to national indicators fails to address the marginalisation of certain groups of civilians, which motivates rebellion. In addition to greed and grievance, feasibility is also another factor in the emergence and development of civil wars. The hypothesis proposes

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that civil wars are more likely to occur “where rebellion is materially feasible” (Collier et al. 2008). The fragility of the state as well as and its military and financial capabilities affect the organisation of the opposition. For example, funding has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War. Since there are no external funds anymore, those involved in conflicts have to rely on the exploitation of domestic opportunities to finance their activities; this could be the state, natural resources, or a range of criminal and shadow trade networks (Jackson and Beswick 2011). The lack of external funds also means that foreign countries do not have any national interests to pursue or motivation to halt the conflict as they did during the Cold War. This change in history explains the outbreak and continuance of many conflicts in the developing world as there are few direct external influences. However, indirect external influences, mainly through the UN in the form of development aid, international legal instruments and peacekeeping operations have put efforts into ending conflicts. Myanmar is a deeply divided society, plagued by prolonged civil war since its independence from British colonial rule in 1948 (South 2009). The various ethnic groups entered into conflict to achieve ethnic rights, self-determination and autonomy that have been long neglected by systemic political suppression, socio-economic exclusion, growing militarisation and human rights abuses by successive Burmese-majority governments with military dominance in the nation’s politico-­administrative powers for decades. The ongoing violent armed conflicts were financially sustained due to the regional black-market trade, exploitation of natural resources and the taxation of informal cross-border trade. The situation worsened after the 1988 coup d’état, when the military regime consolidated its power by incentivising certain ethnic armed organisation groups to accept ceasefire agreements by allowing illicit trade, as well as by providing them with more business deals. This counterinsurgency strategy by the military regime extended as far as instigating inter-­group rivalries that only empowered itself (Ballentine and Nitzschke 2003). Although ceasefire agreements and the lucrative business deals that came with them have benefitted some ethnic groups, there remains an absence of serious negotiations of settlement that grants effective power-­sharing arrangements. This can be characterised as “negative peace”, as ceasefire agreements were reached to consolidate power for the military regime and to fulfil the economic self-interests of some of the leaders of ethnic armed groups. Although violence had been suppressed as a result of the ceasefire agreements, they were not made to achieve a genuine

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national reconciliation that would guarantee a sustainable “positive peace” (Diez et al. 2011). It should also be noted that the historic Panglong Agreement (PA) of 1947 was made with the intent to meet the requirement set by the British rulers that would allow Myanmar to exist as an independent nation; there were no real measures or commitments stated in the agreement that would live up to the demands of the ethnic groups (Harding and Oo 2017). For example, the agreement only included the Shan, Kachin and Chin groups, despite Myanmar being home to 135 recognised ethnic groups (Seekins 2017). Essentially, the Panglong Agreement of 1947 was too broad; there were legal constraints and political challenges that restricted it from fulfilling its purpose and function to ensure peace between all ethnic groups in Myanmar, ten years after the Panglong Agreement was inked. Therefore, as long as the political and ethnic grievances of all ethnic groups are not properly addressed in a legally binding and enforceable fashion, there will be no guarantee of “positive peace”, and Myanmar will remain vulnerable and stuck in a conflict trap. Greed and grievance are characteristics that civilians of countries in the developing world share. Without legitimate state structures that address issues of greed and grievance, developing countries will continue to stay underdeveloped, giving its civilians no other choice but to harbour levels of greed and/or grievances that provide reasons for them to enter into conflict. Additionally, the weakness of the state can be a factor in providing conditions for conflict to arise. Transitional states in the developing world are thus prone to conflict as well as the self-inducing nature of the conflict trap. Table 12.2 analyses the relationship between conflict, democracy and fragility in the selected Asian countries, which are characterised with continued armed conflicts. The fragility of a state represented by the fragile state index (FSI) is determined by conflict, displaced people and state legitimacy measured by a total of 12 factors. The level of democracy of the nations in a comparative outlook is represented by the use of the democracy index (DEI) calculated on five major areas: electoral process and pluralism, civil liberties, the functioning of government, political participation and political culture. A higher FSI directly implies higher fragility as shown in the cases of Myanmar, Pakistan and Afghanistan, labelled under the category of “alert” countries compared to others—the Philippines, India and Thailand. If the level of democracy is interpreted based on the DEI,

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Table 12.2  Myanmar and other conflict-prone Asian countries in comparison: fragility, democracy and human security aspects Countries in continued armed conflicts in 2017

Fragile State Index a (2018)

Democracy Index b (2017)

Principles of human security c present 1 Primacy of human rights 2 Political legitimacy 3 Multilateralism 4 Bottom-up approach 5 Regional focus

Afghanistan 2001– India (CPI-M)–1967 (Jammu-Kashmir)–1989

106.6 ‘High Alert’ 76.3 ‘Elevated Warning’

2.55 ‘Authoritarian’ 7.23 ‘Flawed Democracy’

Political legitimacy

Myanmar 1948– Pakistan 2001– (Balochistan) 2005– Philippines (NPA)–1969 (Mindanao)–1991

96.1 ‘Alert’ 96.3 ‘Alert’

3.83 ‘Authoritarian’ 4.26 ‘Hybrid’

85.5 ‘High Warning’

6.71 ‘Flawed Democracy’

75.9 ‘Elevated Warning’

4.63 ‘Hybrid’

Thailand (South)–2004

Primacy of human rights Political legitimacy Multilateralism Bottom-up approach Regional focus Political legitimacy Multilateralism Political legitimacy Multilateralism Political legitimacy Multilateralism Bottom-up approach Regional focus Primacy of human rights Multilateralism Bottom-up approach Regional focus

Source: https://fundforpeace.org/fsi/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/951181805-Fragile-States-IndexAnnual-Report-2018.pdf; https://www.eiu.com/topic/democracy-index. Kaldor (2007) a Fragile state index is estimated based on the following 12 indicators—security apparatus; factionalised elites; group grievance; economic decline; uneven development; human flight and brain drain; state legitimacy; public services; human rights and rule of law; demographic pressures; refugees and IDPs; and external intervention, which are all given a value from 0 to 10, with 0 being the most stable and 10 being the most unstable. The sum of these 12 indicators creates a total value range of 0 to 120. Accordingly, countries are categorised into four main groups: sustainable, stable, warning and alert. Each of these four groups is further split into three different subgroups, with the exception of sustainable. Alert consists of the levels alert, high alert and very high alert, while warning consists of the levels low warning, warning and high warning. Stable is comprised of less stable, stable and more stable, while sustainable is only grouped into two subgroups, sustainable and very sustainable b Democracy index is calculated based on five categories such as electoral process and pluralism; civil liberties; the functioning of government; political participation; and political culture. The values for this index range from 0 to 10, with 0 to 3.99 being categorised as authoritarian regimes, 4 to 5.99 being hybrid regimes, 6 to 7.99 being flawed democracies and 8 to 10 being full democracies c Principles in this column are adopted from Kaldor (2007)

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which the indicators show that the higher the value, the more democratic the political system is. The relatively more fragile cases, including Myanmar, are evaluated as an “authoritarian” system with the exception of Pakistan, which, as a “hybrid”, is similar to Thailand, while both the Philippines and India are categorised as a “flawed democracy”. Many unstable socio-economic conditions and lack of political freedoms worsen a weak or failing state as well as a weak civil society. These include the economy’s total dependence on primary exports, joblessness among the general public especially the young workforce, spread of violence and crimes, spread of illegal economies, declining growth rates and tax revenues, erosion of legitimacy, spread of corruption and power abuses, violations of human rights and the neglect of equality in ethno-religious and gender terms, spread of arms and growing paramilitary and extremist groups, and the overuse of lethal force by the state’s  security sector. Therefore, the concept of human security favouring the security of persons and communities is important to promote especially in authoritarian states. The implication is that promoting a prevention strategy is the only practical approach for generating stability with innovative and local measures to protect civilians as well as encouraging democratic transition by empowering local participation through bottom-up approaches in those countries. With a human security approach, the key target should be to diffuse conflicts/political violence and to address the sources of insecurity. To achieve this target, the application of five principles of human security (primacy of human rights, political legitimacy, multilateralism, bottom-up approach and regional focus), as both the means and assessment policy tools to improve a “weak” state’s situation, is crucial in democratising the system. In addition, monitoring the process in accordance with the established international laws and universal norms is key to strengthening human security policies. Such application is very crucial in cases like Afghanistan, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Philippines, where the average annual fatality caused by conflict-related activities reaches more than 100 lives and/or has a serious impact on the area, including the destruction of infrastructure or environment and human security in the forms of displacement, sexual violence, food insecurity and impacted mental health (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2011).

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Human Insecurity Beyond Physical Violence The previous section defined conflict as one of the major causes of human insecurity. However, the causes of human insecurity extend beyond physical violence and the related crises that arise from it. Human security puts a priority on guaranteeing a free and decent life and, therefore, anything that threatens it is a cause of human insecurity (Gasper 2010). Based on the selected countries of Asia and Africa with respect to the key sources of human insecurity, the findings are explained as fatalities from political violence, core human rights abuses and political instability (Yamahata 2007). As of 2014, about 650,300 people were displaced in Myanmar (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2016: 15). Ensuring that such threats to human security are prevented and eliminated is a vital responsibility of the state. It holds the capacity to provide and allocate certain needs to its population in a way that the market does not. Therefore, a free, fair and legitimate government that recognises diversity as well as the inequalities that come with it is a necessary structure in tackling human insecurity. The concept of human security, thus “transforms, rather than replaces the national security discourse and is not an alternative to state security” (Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy 2007: 67). The state, as the responsible actor, must work towards guaranteeing “freedom from fear” and “freedom from want”. In order to achieve this, it is important that the state is not only democratic, but also stable. Table 12.3 summarises the causes of human insecurity that transcend the physical violence indicator. Myanmar together with the other five countries focused in the Table 12.2 are reviewed from a ten-criteria checklist in comparison with other selected Asian countries that have overcome armed conflicts or do not have them. They include Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos, Nepal, North Korea, Sri Lanka, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, which are currently free from violent armed conflicts. Four main criteria groups, namely, conflict and peacebuilding with three indicators, humanitarian crises with four indicators, human rights and gender inequality with two indicators, are set in the checklist for the analysis. Timor-­ Leste stands out as the country where conflict, sociopolitical crises and other humanitarian crises including food shortage, refugee and IDPs, human rights violations and gender inequality are non-existent. Vietnam, with the exception of having refugee issues and human rights violations, is the second case where the causes of human insecurity are not an issue. Thailand shows a similar trend of having the least causes of generating human insecurity problem, but is clearly contrasted with Vietnam by having conflicts, sociopolitical crises and human rights violations. Other Asian

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Table 12.3  Human security checklist for Myanmar and other selected Asian countries Asian countries that overcome conflict, Conflict and and/or with conflict-affected situation peacebuilding 1 Afghanistan Bangladesh Cambodia China India Indonesia Laos Myanmar Nepal North Korea Pakistan Philippines Sri Lanka Thailand Timor-Leste Vietnam

2

+

+

+

+ + +

+ + + + + + + + + + + + +

Humanitarian crises

HRa Gender

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

+

+

+ +

+ + + + + + + + +

+

+ + + + + +

na +

na +

+

+

+ +

+ +

+

+ +

+ + +

+ + + + +

+

+

+ + + + + + +

+ + + na + na + +

+ na na

+

+

Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau (2011) +: Implies positive to the criteria/indicator of the checklist. na: Not available 1: Countries with armed conflict; 2: Countries with sociopolitical crises; 3: Countries with peace process or negotiations finalised or at an explanatory phase; 4: Countries facing food crisis; 5: Countries where at least one in every 1000 people is internally displaced; 6: Countries of origin where at least one in every 1000 people is a refugee; 7: Countries included in the United Nations Consolidated Appeal Process 2010 (CAP) and countries that have submitted flash appeals during 2009 through the United Nations system; 8: Countries with serious human rights violations according to the Human Rights Index of the Escola de Cultura de Pau; 9: Countries with serious gender inequality according to the Gender Equity Index (GEI); 10: Countries where the Gender Equity Index (GEI) has worsened as compared with 2004 a Human rights

communist countries, including Cambodia, Laos and China, are portrayed as having fewer causes to create human insecurity. The contrasting reality is that Myanmar together with Afghanistan, India, Pakistan and the Philippines each have the most root causes of human insecurity. The implications are that the integration of the much-­ needed principles of human security (shown in Table 12.2) in any socio-­ economic and politico-administrative policy mainstreams are the necessary viable means to counter the root causes of human insecurity in each society. The administration of Myanmar faces many pressing challenges, of which the most crucial one is lacking the strength—power and capacity—

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to provide human security. In fact, its military has been feeding on the ongoing internal armed conflicts with many ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Although ceasefire agreements had been reached with ten EAOs, post-conflict sociopolitical crises followed due to the lack of a transparent and tangible process of transitional justice for those ethnic populations that have been suffering from grievances inflicted by the military. Such problems include demands for self-determination and self-government, identity issues, opposition to the political, economic, social or ideological system of the state and its internal and international policies that produce a struggle to take control of resources or territory. Post-conflict rehabilitation and the subsequent peace process require the signing of a peace agreement starting with a genuine, unconditional nationwide ceasefire agreement, which must fairly acknowledge the terms of all parties involved. The government has been unable to fulfil its end of the bargain due to the nature of its current political system, a hybrid regime greatly constrained by the military’s influence in all branches of the nation’s power. Despite holding elections in 2010 and 2015, the Myanmar government continues to have its military deeply embedded in its political system: the military occupies a quarter of its parliament as well as controls the Ministries of Home, Defence and Border Affairs. Military autonomy continues to be enabled by the current Constitution of 2008, which guarantees the military involvement in all of the nation’s levels of legislative bodies by controlling a quarter of the non-elected block, while the constitution provides the military with blanket impunity. Myanmar’s lack of democratic institutions has sustained conflict and fostered an environment that does not guarantee human security.

Building Democratic Institutions By strengthening democratic institutions, an environment that respects human rights, ensures human security and promotes human development can be built. Although international actors play significant roles in attempting to stop and prevent conflicts, their effects are not long term; armed conflict may be halted but the structures that caused and perpetuated it remain in society without active change from its internal actors. In order to prevent conflict, such changes should focus on strengthening democratic institutions, as they are necessary aspects in “bringing marginalised groups and actors into a legitimate political process” (Piccone 2017: 1–9). Naturally, it is a bottom-up process that requires participation of many

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diverse individuals, and hence incentivises political participation and contestation. It also allows power-sharing, especially where reconciliation is a struggle to achieve in divided societies. Strong, fair and legitimate democratic institutions are necessary where greed and grievances influence politics (Kaldor 2007). The term “democracy” derives from a combination of the Greek words—demos, or people, and kratos, or rule, to form demokratia, or rule by the people (Wood 2004). While understanding that there are different kinds of democracy across time and space, from a full-scale tyranny on one end to a fully fledged democracy on the other, it is important to appreciate the higher degree of awareness of the human need for freedom and the value of moral and political authority. The fundamental core of democracy rests on the principles of human equality and human rights. It presupposes that all citizens, regardless of social status, economic wealth, religious belief, ethnic background or political power, stand as equals at the ballot box. However, holding free and fair elections is not the only condition necessary for a democracy, as many hybrid regimes fulfil this criteria but fail to fulfil other components of good governance, such as civilian control of the military and police, establishing a democratic political culture, absence of intervention by foreign powers, market economy and the rule of law and peace, all of which create a favourable environment for democracy to flourish. According to Diamond (2009), the “thin” conception of democracy is defined as a system for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by competitive, regular, free and fair elections. Holding elections, however, does not automatically make a government democratic. The “thick” side of democracy refers to a liberal democracy which requires the right to “speak, publish, assemble and organise that are necessary” to political participation and contestation (Huntington 1991: 5–13). Diamond details this concept by listing the following conditions: Substantial individual freedom of belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition and internet access[;] freedom of ethnic, religious, racial, and other minority groups (as well as historically excluded majorities) to participate their religion and culture and to participate equally in political and social life[;] the right of all adult citizens to vote and to run for office[;] genuine openness and competition in the electoral arena, enabling any group that adheres to constitutional principles to form a party and contest for office[;] legal equality of all citizens

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under a rule of law, in which the laws are clear, publicly known, universal, stable, and non-retroactive[;] an independent judiciary to neutrally and consistently apply the law and protect individual and group rights[;] thus, due process of law and freedom of individuals from torture, terror and unjustified detention, exile, or interference in their personal lives—by the state or non-state actors[;] institutional checks on power of elected officials, by an independent legislature, court system, and other autonomous agencies[;] real pluralism in sources of information and forms of organisation independent of the state[;] and thus, a vibrant civil society[;] control over the military and state security apparatus by civilians who are ultimately accountable to the people through elections. (Diamond 2009: 28)

The components of democracy that are listed above also guarantee human security, on top of an equal, free and politically legitimate system of government. Its fair nature allows for diversity to flourish, power to be kept in check and opinions to be freely expressed. Although democracy is commonly defined as a government by the people, Lijphart explains that it is also a government for the people—that is, government in accordance with the people’s preferences. Furthermore, he asserts that there are many different ways of successfully running a democracy. For example, while a majoritarian democracy is most appropriate for homogenous societies, consensus democracy is more suitable for plural societies (Lijphart 1984). In Myanmar’s case, as with many other countries that are divided by conflict, reaching a consensus in the political arena is the first step to reconciliation. This process is one that requires a legitimate political system that advocates and nurtures fair power-sharing. With democracy, political solutions to resolve complex issues of accumulated greed and grievances can be tackled peacefully. The widely accepted argument links peace and development as two sides of the same coin. This implies that equitable development helps build security, while war is “development in reverse”. It continues to stress that building inclusive democracies, and creating development strategies, are highly effective long-term security policies for a divided nation like Myanmar. Without active efforts to institutionalise a power-sharing principle, the ongoing internal conflict is only going to continue. Additionally, the military’s on-and-off strategies for extending its control to capitalise the socio-­ religious and ethno-cultural division-driven community violence, as well as the related armed conflicts to take its gains, will worsen the personal/ citizen security situation of the general public. Such aimed advantage-­

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taking tactics include (1) prioritising a security and strategic agenda over peacebuilding and sociopolitical reform drives, (2) deciding the timing of military operations and taking territorial advances over promoting activities for investing in local/regional stability-making through guaranteeing human rights measures, (3) ensuring its involvement in protecting resource security driven by business interests over local ecological, human security and human developmental needs. These efforts are interpreted to be a part of a wider counterinsurgency strategy to consolidate military power in the turbulent border areas (Beehner 2018). The scenario outlined explains why the domination of the military in Myanmar’s political and national affairs is concentrated through all branches of the nation’s power distribution and bureaucracy. This imbalance is the lone source of a dark-shadowing on Myanmar’s democratic transition and a roadblock for developing democracy and development in transition in many ways. The military in previous administrations has been heavily involved in Myanmar’s legislative and executive branches; despite recent political liberalization, such military influence has been granted by the provisions of the 2008 Constitution. In addition, the military also has powerful leverage in the bureaucratic decision-making by having appointed top administrative positions in its hierarchy. The negative impacts of all this fall on Myanmar’s civilian populations; especially, its ethnic minorities face much delay in getting their chance to enjoy the full and fundamental rights of civic freedoms and human security during this democratic transition. In addition, the military’s monopoly in all sectors, especially in Myanmar’s economic affairs including resource export and extraction activities, have affected the nation’s economic liberalisation and business environment in negative ways. Therefore, the amending of the national constitution or writing a new democratic and inclusive constitution is required in order to make the military a professional institution that is prevented from being involved in economic and political activities in the nation’s politico-administrative and economic operations. The legitimate government of Myanmar must invest its political capital and legislative process in fulfilling this need, while  making it the first and foremost responsibility that the government is accountable for. It has the legal authority as well as moral responsibility to ensure human security effectively during its transition towards a genuine democracy.

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Trends in Democratic Transition and Myanmar’s Currents Many countries across different continents have marched towards transforming their country to a democracy. Some have emerged triumphant without many casualties, while others have experienced either a troubled process of change or its apparent failure. One of the common motives of transition has originated in the accumulated combination of freedom deficits, including economic insecurity, human poverty and lack of political rights, suffered continuously by the majority of the citizens of those countries. In some cases, governments act as the initiators of necessary change, while in others, change was brought about through civil society–led mass movements. There are also exceptional cases where external interventions were responsible for regime transitions, despite it being a rare occurrence (Table  12.4). In this section, today’s transition in Myanmar will be reviewed with respect to general trends to understand its consequential issues such as equality and diversity. In the development of every existing democracy, there are certain prerequisites to sustain its survival, which can be categorised into structure, institution and agency. According to Dahl (1988), the structural conditions of democracy are divided into those that are essential and favourable. Usually observed in large quantitative studies, the favourable conditions of a market economy are explained by the modernisation theory, a market-­ economy-­driven development that enables industrialisation, urbanisation, wealth and education of the concerned population, according to Lijphart

Table 12.4  Determinants of democratisation Structure

Institution

Agency

Essential

• Representative democracy • Free, fair and frequent elections • Freedom of expression • Alternate sources of information • Associational autonomy • Inclusive citizenship

• Existence of civil society • Influence of external actors

Civilian control of the military and police Democratic political culture Absence of intervention by foreign powers Favourable Market economy Cultural homogeneity Rule of law Peace

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(1984) and other scholars. As for cultural homogeneity, past studies have shown that democracy is easier to foster in societies with a homogeneous population, since there would be less instances of misunderstandings as opposed to a heterogeneous one (Huntington 1991). A rule of law is also a crucial condition for democracy, as without it, there is no guarantee of fair practice or application of laws (Wood 2004). Lastly, societies with a history of conflict are likely to fall back into conflict due to the conflict trap, unable to build peace (Hewitt et al. 2010). The institutional conditions of democracy fundamentally concerns the concept of political freedom. A representative democracy through free, fair and frequent elections ensures that the elected officials are those with the authority to be in the government. Citizens should also have the right to freely express their opinions as well as associate with each other in organisations that are not controlled by the government. The government should also allow other unbiased sources of information available to the general public. All of the above points should be guaranteed to all citizens of a state to be effective (Wood 2004). According to the political agents theory, democratisation is an output of actions of strategic agents, not just of structural or institutional conditions (Kugler and Feng 1999). The existence of civil society is a crucial determinant of democratic transition as they are the participants of public policy making (Kipgen 2016). Besides civil society, decisions of or between a ruling party and its opposition could also bring about change in its regime or policies that determine it. Finally, according to the demonstration effects, the success of democracy in one country can encourage others to democratise (Huntington 1991). As shown in Table 12.5, most cases of successful transitions have demonstrated five common features, of which the first and foremost element is regarding the administration’s good economic management with the right choice of policies targeted to benefit people. Other equally influential factors include (1) creating a legal environment to enforce the rule of law in the country, (2) ensuring to hold internationally respected elections on a regular basis, (3) facilitating for the matured growth of civil society organisations for engaging in national affairs and (4) nurturing a society where citizens play the role of netizens by using information technology and media, including social media, in affecting the administration, legislators and judiciary towards practising good governance. On the other hand, transitional countries facing a troubled process can be understood by three common factors, including (1) failure or lack of

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Table 12.5  Determinants for success and failure of democratisation Country

Status of transition

Determinants for success

Bangladesh Democratising • Nonviolent mass mobilisations Brazil Democratised Cambodia Democracy in • Establishment of a fair and impartial legal system retreat • Decentralisation of power Egypt Struggling Hungary Democratised • The presence of positive neighbourhood influence to Indonesia Democratised pressure internal reformers Libya Struggling • Utilising economic crises to Mali Struggling their advantage Mexico Democratised • Power of elections Myanmar Struggling • Socially inclusive growth: Nigeria Struggling increasing spending on poor Philippines Democratised and middle class on Poland Democratised conditions of keeping kids in Republic of Democratised school, etc. Korea Romania Democratised • Utilising universal provision of social and economic rights Rwanda Democratising • Building capacity of the South Struggling judiciary, parliaments and Africa civil society Sri Lanka Struggling • The utilisation of information Thailand Military-led technology and social media regime by citizens in combating Ukraine Democratised corruption and bolstering the law

Determinants for failure • Nonviolent mass mobilisations that was not properly done • Failure to establish a fair and impartial legal system • The presence of bad neighbourhood influence to influence internal reformers • Economic and social policies benefitted outsiders and domestic elites only • Lawlessness • Need to address regional needs • Need to deliver better for the disadvantaged • Repressive law system

political will, courage and/or opportunity in establishing the rule of law and lack of openness and inclusiveness in economic and development planning, (2) restriction of the peaceful mobilisation of civil society organisations towards nation building and (3) inability or weakness in terms of international, political, economic and military relations, creating dependence on influential neighbours. For Myanmar’s current transition towards democracy, peace and development to become an independent and responsible member of the global and regional communities, there are three barriers. The first barrier arises from a dysfunctional hybrid democracy. This works in a semi-functional fashion in its general outlook but is also

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ineffective in tackling key issues such as building peace, applying the rule of law, providing security and promoting ethnic equality. Freedom House analyses the nation’s democratic transition as it appears uncertain under the  current governing party, National League for Democracy (NLD), since it failed to uphold fundamental human rights or bring security to areas affected by militant insurgencies and the army’s offensives against them (Freedom House 2018). Another related argument is that external actors seeking to think and work politically should move beyond standard peace-building and development packages based on strengthening the state and should adopt more conflict and context-sensitive approaches. South (2018) recommended effective state-building to focus on governance structures and service delivery functions established by ethnic armed organisations, which are under-resourced but enjoy significant political legitimacy. The second barrier concerns the fact that the military has retained significant influence over politics since the military-drafted 2008 Constitution that guarantees dominant and permanent roles to the military officials. This also gives them impunity for any wrongdoings, including atrocities committed in the past, and portrays the military as the guardian of the constitution. The third barrier is the accumulated negligence by all post-1962 governments in fulfilling international obligations by respecting universal norms, international legal instruments, protecting human rights and implementing humanitarian treaties. Political changes in Myanmar were neither due to higher levels of socio-­ economic status of the people nor related to the emergence of civil society groups, as have been indicated above. Instead, Myanmar’s democratisation was an output of multiple  actions.  Since  the original nature of the starting point in the nation’s transition was a top-down fashion of “transformation” adopted by the previous military administration, the question of the trajectory of the ongoing transition arises: is the transitional government a semi-strategic cooperation between the military and the NLD?

Strengthening Transition: Universal Values and International Instruments The United Nations (UN) has established codes of conduct together with ethical and political norms to contribute to peace between peoples and nations since the aftermath of the Second World War in order to avoid

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wars, armed or social conflicts and occurrence of genocides. Starting from the establishment of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948 to present day, the member states of the UN have been building and adding new extensions to the UDHR, including economic, social and cultural rights, along with the rights to development, environment, self-­ determination of peoples, peace-building conventions and protocols on children, women and indigenous peoples. However, many parts of the world have been witnessing various forms of atrocities and serious violations of human rights and human insecurity due to the lack of political commitment towards protecting people first, for which a starting point is respecting those international treaties and norms. Although most governments have signed international treaties and have agreed to comply with the terms, they are not always prepared to put them into practice and, hence, continue to violate human rights. Therefore, each member state’s international obligation to enforce the agreed universal values is one of the most basic and important barometers for measuring the quality of good governance of the state and its positive effects in promoting human security. Table 12.6 shows the international human rights standards that Myanmar has ratified by listing her human rights index, the status of total non-ratification, total human rights violations as well as total humanitarian law violations. The Human Rights Index  (HRIN), shown in the table, measures the degree of lack of protection or noncompliance with the obligations of states in regard to human rights and the International Humanitarian Law covering 195 countries. The HRIN, comprised of 22 indicators, is divided into three dimensions: the non-ratification of the main instruments of International Law of Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law; the violation of the International Law of Human Rights; and violation of the International Humanitarian Law (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2011: 206). Regarding the first dimension based on the analysis by the source stated above, Myanmar’s status of non-ratification is shown in six out of the eight main international instruments of human rights and international ­humanitarian law. Myanmar’s noncompliance towards these six main international instruments specifically include (1) the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966); (2) the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966); (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966); (4) the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishments (1984); (5) the Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions

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Table 12.6  Myanmar’s status on the main instruments of the international law of human rights and international humanitarian law International major instrument

Myanmar

Human Rights Index 2010 Civil rights ESCR Racism Women Torture Child Protocol II ICC Total non-ratification Death penalty Executions Disappearances Death under custody Torture Arbitrary detention Unfair trials Impunity Political prisoners HR defenders Discrimination Journalists Total HR violations Child soldiers IV Convention Total IHL violations

7.042 • •  •  •  •  •  6 • 

•  •  •  •  •  •  21 •  •  4

Source: Escola de Cultura de Pau (2011)  •  Implies non-ratification, violations of HR or IHL

r­elating to the protection of victims of ­non-international armed conflict (1977); and (6) the Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court (2002). With respect to the second dimension, a total of 12 categories of violations are included for the evaluation but divided into two considerations. The first one is about those related to political and civil rights, while the other refers to those that point to the existence of people or groups of people in a vulnerable situation, such as political prisoners and/or prisoners conscience, human rights defenders, NGO representatives, trade unions, members of political parties and/or lawyers, exploited minors, journalists or

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any person or group of people who may be subjected to discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation or country of origin. According to the analysis by the aforementioned source, Myanmar’s situation in this dimension is regarded to be a systematic violation of human rights in 7 areas out of the 12 categories. The explanations for such systematic violations for which Myanmar is analysed based on the available data are as follows: (1) extra-judicial executions; (2) torture or other inhumane cruel and degrading treatment or punishment; (3) arbitrary arrest; (4) unfair trials or no trials at all; (5) political prisoners and/or prisoners of conscience; (6) the harassment and abuse of human rights workers, NGOs representatives, trade unions, members of political parties and/or lawyers; and (7) discriminatory practices as well as abuse and exploitation of minors. Concerning the third dimension, Myanmar is known for child soldiers that are originally recruited by the regular forces or by other armed groups/organisations opposing the military, while the nation is also categorised as a country where the International Humanitarian Law has been violated. The first indicators of a total of two applied in this dimension analyses whether the regular armed forces of the state or other armed organisations originally recruit child soldiers. The other indicator is about whether the country violated any of the provisions in the IV Geneva Convention (Escola de Cultura de Pau 2011). The humanitarian brief on Myanmar issued by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OHCHA) highlighted Myanmar’s natural disaster-prone situations in trends including the Cyclone Nargis of 2008, the devastating floods of 2015 and the monsoon seasonal floods of 2018, which cost peoples’ lives, displaced population and destroyed socio-­ economic lifelines. The 2008 Cyclone Nargis killed 140,000 people, while the 2015 floods and landslides killed 172 people and affected nine million, including 1.7 million persons who became temporarily displaced populations. The 2018 heavy monsoon rain affected 268,000 people ­ across Myanmar, with the loss of 16 lives. These data show that Myanmar has been experiencing serious natural disasters every few years and is one of the most disaster-prone countries in Asia. The nation ranks as the third most risky out of 187 countries in the Global Climate Risk Index while Myanmar ranks 12th out of 191 countries in the Index of Risk Management. The OCHA warns that Myanmar is the fourth highest in terms of its exposure to natural hazards (OCHA 2018). The risk scenarios for 2018 described in the report on conflicts, human rights and peace-building highlight the repercussions of the Rohingya ­crisis for the democratic transition and peace process in Myanmar along

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with four other risky scenarios: the escalating violence and rising instability in Cameroon, the reinforcement of the armed group ISIS in the Philippines, the dismantling of the post-peace agreement framework in Tajikistan and the impact of high levels of violence on children connected to the armed conflicts raging in North African and the Middle East countries. The report stresses several important analytical points with respect to the Rohingya crisis. These points include the powerful military continuing to play a role in the politics of Myanmar, the civilian authorities’ inability to control and exercise authority over the military, the elected administration’s inability to follow the international calls to end the unprecedented military operations causing atrocities, human rights violations and the exodus of refugees/IDPs, the continued militarisation in Rakhine and other ethnic regions, and the need to address the grievances of different ethnic minorities across Myanmar. Moreover, all these factors combined threaten Myanmar’s democratic transition and peacebuilding in both the immediate future and the long term (Aspa J M R et al. 2018: 139, 143). It is noteworthy to cite what the OCHA (2018) described as the very shaky nature of the humanitarian situations of Myanmar in its Humanitarian Brief issued in September 2018: (1) the nation is one of the most disaster-prone countries in the world and is regularly hit by floods, cyclones and earthquakes as over 268,000 people in 2018 have been displaced by monsoon seasonal floods; (2) more than 725,000 Rohingya refugees have fled to Bangladesh since the security operations and related attacks in August 2017, which generated a new refugee crisis; (3) up to 600,000 Rohingya remaining in Rakhine State continue to face serious hardships and are in need of humanitarian assistance due to displacement, restriction on the freedom of mobility, lack of essential services and other deprivations; (4) more than 128,000 Muslims, of whom more than 98 per cent are stateless people, remain confined in camps and camp-­ like settings with overcrowded shelters and limited access to healthcare, education and livelihoods since the violence of 2012; (5) in Kachin and Shan States, 107,000 people remain displaced as a result of the armed conflict that restarted in 2011, and by 2018, 28,000 civilians had fled from the conflict as IDPs; (6) humanitarian access in the country has deteriorated significantly in recent years and is severe in northern Rakhine with some exceptional cases witnessed by the UN staff, but most international NGO staff still lack access to the area where they used to perform humanitarian activities. There are 40,000 displaced people in the area controlled

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by the EAO, who cannot be accessed by the UN to deliver humanitarian assistance (OCHA 2018). The summary of the Agenda items 14, 117 and 132 issued at the occasion of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly Security Council emphasises the follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit. It states that in the 2005 World Summit Outcome (General Assembly resolution 60/1): member States agreed that each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that the international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability… everything possible must be done to help countries [by the UN] to avert atrocity crimes, including improving systems for early warning and moving more quickly from warning to early action. (UN General Assembly Security Council 2018)

The report outlines a threefold strategy for strengthening early action: first, by reviewing and, where necessary, strengthening existing preventive capacities; second, by continuing to promote accountability for atrocity prevention; and third, by innovating through significantly expanding civilian action, atrocity prevention and drawing upon all available resources to meet the most pressing challenges: [Because] it costs far more to pick up the pieces after a crisis, than it does to prevent the crisis. Effective atrocity prevention must therefore be situated within the larger efforts of the international community to prevent crisis and suffering. The conditions in which atrocities occur should never even arise… [So far,] despite progress in implementing the principle of the responsibility to protect, the international community continues to fall short where it matters most: the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and the protection of vulnerable populations. (Ibid.)

Therefore, starting from the current administration leading Myanmar’s democratic transition, the state has the sole responsibility to acknowledge its ratified international legal instruments and respect other international norms, which a global community of nations, under the umbrella of the UN, has established for ensuring the promotion of peace, justice, development, and freedom (see Fig. 12.2 below).

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Equality

Justice

Development Freedom

Rights

Peace

Security

Democratic institutions and culture strengthened by transition Fig. 12.2  Democratic transition for promoting peace, justice, development and freedom

From Challenging Scenarios to Ways Forward To guarantee human security for the populations residing in Myanmar, all the factors discussed so far are necessary to be treated as the root causes in some contexts, while others as interim effects in order to comprehensively (holistically) promote human security as a promising reality in the current transition. To this end, it is recommended to break down Myanmar’s recent realities on her course of transition into three prongs as follows: • Reviewing whether Myanmar meets the determinants of democratisation or not and determining what the preventing factors against its system are • Listing the striking challenges that generate human insecurity as well as lack of freedoms or the suppression of legal rights affecting her society and communities

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• Foreseeing whether there are any additional and unpredictable nature of potential disturbances that can destroy Myanmar’s delicate path towards democratic transition Table 12.7 discusses Myanmar’s democratisation from three aspects— structure, institution and agency in order to understand how the process of democratisation satisfies the common determinants. By looking into the determinants from a structural viewpoint, one of the main factors under serious concern is the lack of civilian control over the military/security forces while the military controls key civilian bureaucracy and ministries. Another determinant is the absence of the rule of law in Myanmar since the military stays above the law: not everyone is equal before the law; also, people are not equally entitled to the protection of the law without discrimination. Additional undemocratic practices include Myanmar’s ongoing involvement in the longest civil war in the world, as only 10 out of 22 minority ethnic armed organisations could sign the ceasefire agreement with the military (NCA). Under the institutional dimension, there are three major determinants, which show the downgrading in the quality of democracy. The first is that about a quarter of the unelected elements, formed by military officials appointed on a rotational basis by the recommendation of the Commander-­in-­Chief of the military, are a part of Myanmar’s legislative bodies at both national and local levels. The second factor is related to Myanmar’s quality of freedom that has been rated by Freedom House in 2018 as “partly free”. Both political rights and civil liberties are still rated 5 out of 7 in its evaluative scores as it is the collective reflection of inadequacy in guaranteeing political pluralism, religious freedom, academic freedom, free and independent media and an independent judiciary. One of the most crucial, controversial and highly criticised aspects, especially by the international community, is the lack of measures towards inclusive citizenship, as Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, which contrasted much from the original contents of the 1948 Union Citizenship Act. From an agency perspective, the existence of a civil society and the rising importance and effectiveness of CSOs in national affairs including democratising local development, peacebuilding, political participation in state-building and other socio-ecological activities are positively contributing to Myanmar’s democratisation moving forward. The influence of external actors, in the course of democratisation in Myanmar, is significant in the areas of respecting international instruments for the protection of

Absence of intervention by foreign powers

Democratic political culture

Freedom of expression

Free, fair and frequent elections

Representative democracy

Civilian control of the military and police

According to Article 17(b) of the 2008 Constitution, the military is given the power “undertake responsibilities of the defence, security, border administration”. Although democracy was practised until 1962, decades of long dictatorship have prohibited the practice of democratic political culture. No democratic movements have been thus far oppressed by foreign powers.

Institution

Structure Existence of civil society

Agency

According to Freedom House, Influence of Myanmar is ranked 32/100, external actors progressing from the “not free” status to “partly free”.

Myanmar held a free parliamentary election in 2015. The first free and fair election was held in 1990.

Elected officials of the winning party, NLD holds the majority of parliamentary seats. However, a quarter of the officials are appointed by the military.

Table 12.7  Does Myanmar meet the determinants of democratisation?

(continued)

Since Myanmar chaired ASEAN in 2014, it has pursued active foreign policy and friendly regional relations, including balancing with geopolitical powers.

Civil societies have always existed in Myanmar. They operated underground during the decades of citizenship. Currently, Burma’s civil societies are now active in national affairs.

Peace

Rule of law

Cultural homogeneity

Inclusive citizenship Guaranteed to all recognised ethnic groups. The 1982 Citizenship Law differentiated the contents of the 1948 Union Citizenship Act requiring membership in a national race.

Alternate sources of Although very limited, news information networks such as the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), Radio Free Asia, Irrawaddy, Asia Pacific Media, etc. have existed throughout Myanmar’s democratic struggle till date. Associational Citizens are allowed to associate autonomy with civil societies and other groups that are not controlled by the government.

Market economy

Myanmar has had a market economy since the failures of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”. It is currently undertaking reforms to further improve its market economy. Myanmar is home to 135 officially recognised ethnic groups/ national races plus Lack of independent judicial power. Justice institutions are being supported by external factor to strengthen the rule of law. Myanmar has been plagued by the world’s longest ongoing civil war due to ethnic politics.

Institution

Structure

Table 12.7  (continued) Agency

Concern about the international community’s criticisms, the UN’s establishment of a COI into suspected crimes which fall under jurisdiction of the ICC. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights recommended since 2010, again in 2011 and 2018.

Myanmar wants warmer relations with Western democracies.

Former and current military leaders feared spontaneous mass uprisings like the Arab Spring, which introduced the initial transformation of the top-down nature.

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human rights, prevention of atrocious security operations, promotion of human security, creation of mutually observable environment for bringing peace in all armed conflict-prone ethnic lands, guaranteeing civic freedoms including media, academic and religious, restoration of the culture of peace and the rule of law and developing a much-needed democratic constitution. It is worthwhile to cite the UN’s position in enabling democracy worldwide as stated in the General Assembly resolution issued in 2007 after its member states recommitted themselves to protecting and promoting human rights, the rule of law and democracy, recognising that they are interlinked and mutually reinforcing and that they belong to the universal and indivisible core values and principles of the UN.  The resolution highlights: … the triple challenge of building or restoring democracies, preserving democracies, as well as improving the quality of democracies [are what we are facing in the twenty-first century] … [In responding such challenge] … it is more important than ever to find an effective and acceptable universal framework for conducting such support [as democracy assistance] … It commits the [UN] to principled, coherent and consistent action in support of democracy. (UN 2007)

By drawing lessons from the organisation’s experience and after identifying its comparative advantage, the UN formulated the UN framework for democracy based on universal principles, norms and standards in order to set seven guiding principles for effective assistance. The UN also stresses the important fact that democracy is ultimately a political process even though UN democracy assistance is often technical in nature. Accordingly, eight areas for the UN’s democracy assistance are outlined as: (1) provide political facilitation, (2) encourage popular participation and support free and fair elections, (3) foster the development of a culture of democracy, (4) support political pluralism, (5) advance transparency and accountability arrangements, (6) promote the rule of law, (7) encourage responsive and inclusive governance, and (8) support a strong and vibrant civil society. (Ibid.)

Moreover, the international community led by the UN holds any state accountable for any violations of the International Law of Human Rights and the International Humanitarian Law committed against members of

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its society, which constitutes the threats against the three pillars of the UN’s work as well as the goodwill-driven engagements of the community of nations—peace and security, development and human rights. Once a country deviates from its international obligation to legally fulfil internationally agreed norms and international law–driven treaties in protecting human rights and security of its citizens, the responsibility of the international community becomes unavoidable to prevent any risky scenarios, before it becomes too late and the situation escalates towards the level of humanitarian crises costing lives. Table 12.8 summarises Myanmar’s sources of human insecurity and possible approaches towards its reduction. Based on the information ­contained in this table, it is apparent that there could be eight negative scenarios, which are foreseeable for considering preparing towards prevention before each scenario results in devastation or human insecurity. These include (1) neo-colonial scenario; (2) minority armed struggle scenario; (3) Islamist terrorism scenario; (4) economic stagnation scenario; (5) army factionalism scenario; (6) Buddhist militant scenario; (7) natural disaster scenario; and (8) regional war scenario. The listed scenarios are arranged in the order of relative importance or probability in the shortand medium term and are seen as major barriers to further democratisation of Myanmar towards a developmental state. The list suggests that Myanmar’s major obstacles to development and democracy are externally based, in the form of interventions by neighbouring regional powers (especially China) in the Burmese political system either directly (sales of weapons, technology, etc.) or indirectly (investment in infrastructure and megastructure). Because political power in Myanmar is concentrated in the military elite (“army-state”), it is relatively easy for China or other foreign states, including the immediate neighbours as well as the distant economic powerhouses, to “buy” the elite and its politico-business alliance and distort the much-needed and long-overdue democratic transition process inside Myanmar. It is worth mentioning that the Chinese government and corporate leaders seem to be little concerned about how their aid and investment engagements in Third World countries such as Myanmar, Sri Lanka or Kenya affect the environments, societies, cultures or politics of the recipient countries and communities. The “minority armed struggle” scenario sees no end to fighting between the military and major minority/ethnic armed organisations, as the replacement of a highly centralised “army-state” by a genuinely federal

Potential scenarios likely to worsen human insecurity Neo-colonial scenario Ethnic/minority armed struggle scenario Islamist terrorism scenario Economic stagnation scenario Military factionalism scenario Buddhist militant scenario Natural disaster scenario Regional war/ conflict scenario

Issues threatening transition to democracy

1. Lack of rule of law guaranteeing all political and civic freedoms—belief, opinion, discussion, speech, publication, broadcast, assembly, demonstration, petition and the internet 2. Lack of an independent judiciary, institutional checks by an independent legislature, court system and other autonomous agencies 3. Lack of legal equality of citizens under a rule of law—clear, publicly known, universal, stable and non-retroactive 4. Lack of equality in terms of minority rights, religious freedom and cultural identity including language rights of all ethnic and religious groups 5. Lack of guarantees for freedom of expression, form and join organizations 6. Weak in real pluralism in sources of information and assistance for justice forms of organization independent of the state 7. Lack of flourishing democratic peace over communal violence/tension and conflicts 8. Restriction on eligibility for public office 9. Lack of civilian control over the military and state security apparatus 10. Legitimacy crisis of domination of the military’s involvement in politicoadministrative, legislative, judiciary functions as well as monopolistic business operations

Relevant human rights norms a

The right of people to work (Art 6 ICESCR) Conditions of employment (Art 7, ICESCR) Health and food Art 11 para 1 ICESCR: ‘right of security everyone to an adequate standard of living…including adequate food, clothing and housing’ Art 12 para 1: ‘highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ Environmental Indirectly enshrined in several legal security provisions such as Art 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or in Art 11 and 12 of ICESCR. Personal security Right to life (Art 6 ICCPR) Freedom from torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Art 7 ICCPR) Freedom from slavery and servitude (Art 8 ICCPR) Right to liberty and security of person (including prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention) (Art 9 ICCPR) Persons deprived of liberty shall be treated with humanity (Art 10 ICCPR)

Economic security

Elements of human security

Table 12.8  Possibilities towards human insecurity reduction in Myanmar

Majority rule, minority rights Civil-military relations Political parties Citizen responsibilities A free press Federalism Rule of law Human rights Executive power Legislative power An independent judiciary Constitutionalism Freedom of speech Government accountability Free, fair and frequent elections Freedom of religion Rights of women and girls Governing by coalitions and compromise Role of nongovernmental organisations Education on democracy

Factors to strengthen democracy

(continued)

Constitutional Legal Politicoadministrative Institutional Infrastructural Environmental Economic Ecological Ethno-cultural Multilingual Psychological Physical Developmental Social Communal International

Means for promoting human development b

Potential scenarios likely to worsen human insecurity Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art 18 ICCPR) Right to hold opinions and freedom of expression (Art 19 ICCPR) Right of peaceful assembly (Art 21 ICCPR) Freedom of association (Art 22 ICCPR) The Rule of Law (Preamble para 3 Universal Declaration of Human Rights) Equality before the law (Art 26 ICCPR) Political participation (Art 25 ICCPR)

Community security

Political security

Relevant human rights norms a

Elements of human security

Factors to strengthen democracy

a

ICCPR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; ICESPR, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights The information in this column is adopted from Table 2.2 in Zwitter (2011) b The information in this column is derived from Table 6 in Saha and Yamahata (2008)

Issues threatening transition to democracy

Table 12.8  (continued) Means for promoting human development b

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system has not yet taken place. Under the 2008 Constitution, the military reserves itself to secure the authority to operate freely in ethnic minority areas, especially near the country’s borders. That is the root cause of the prolonged civil war in Myanmar, with multiple ethnic armed conflicts, which originated 75 years ago at the time of the Japanese invasion following Myanmar’s independence struggle against the British colonial rule in 1941. The possibility of a large-scale Islamist terrorist movement (or movements), most probably externally based, cannot be discounted as listed in the perceived “Islamist terrorism” scenario. At present, it is highly unlikely that the refugees now living precariously in Bangladesh will be repatriated, creating a situation disturbingly tense and sensitive. Under the “economic stagnation” scenario, the benefits of development and foreign investment flow exclusively to the elites, leaving the great majority of the population, even in central Myanmar, in the same, if not worse, conditions they were in during the State Law and Order Restoration Council/State Peace and Development Council (SLORC/ SPDC) periods since late 1980s. This scenario envisions unrest occurring primarily because of poor economic planning and management rather than foreign investment, while the trends in the global economic landscape affecting the standards of living inside Myanmar remain. The other scenarios are self-explanatory. In summary, the political situation in Myanmar after the 2011 changeover to the 2008 constitutional system remains very fragile. Moreover, the 2008 Constitution seems to resemble the Dyarchy Scheme of the British colonialists in 1923 and the Government of Burma Act of 1935, as the army-state resembles the twenty-first-century counterpart of the British colonial state. Although there still remain numerous challenges that hinder Myanmar from progressing to constitutional reform, the demands for amendments to include the ethnic minorities’ end of the bargain—specific terms for federalism, the reformation of the structure of the current government and its allocation of power—are primary concerns that surround all stakeholders involved in Myanmar’s transition to peace. In addition, it is also crucial not to neglect the importance of maintaining ethnic identity through the multilingual education system and recognising mother tongue as a language right in relation to educational and occupational equal opportunities. The substance of equality starting from language rights to teach and learn in each ethnic group’s own language empowers the ethnic minorities. Reform measures to facilitate such multilingual and

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multicultural educational rights in the legislative bodies as well as enacting new educational laws are therefore fundamentals in making Myanmar’s transition towards any meaningful progress in rebuilding “equality” among ethno-culturally diverse nationality groups to national reconciliation. Moreover, national integration must include a system of genuine federalism in the ethnic minority regions, which also requires basic constitutional revision. Myanmar’s traditional cultures seem more conducive to fostering popular resistance and rebellion than those of East Asia, where strong states since ancient monarchic times have created an inflexible cultural ­orthodoxy. There is always a question of whether the created “populism” could become an alternative to liberal democracy in Myanmar—probably a populism based on the military sector “Us” versus other non-military segments “Them”, based on a Buddhist “Us” versus a non-Buddhist “Them”; based on a majority Burmese “Us” versus a minority “Them”; or based on an ultranationalist “Us” versus a liberal democrat “Them”. To prevent any of those potential (created) division-driven political disaster and societal disorder, Myanmar needs not just charismatic civilian politicians but also modern leaders in the change of political systems who can guarantee good governance centred on the establishment of independent and responsible branches of power in Myanmar’s future. The main causes of human insecurity can be summarised in Fig. 12.3; it also shows possibility towards its possible reduction feasibility as shown in the figure, such as the lack of disaster preparedness, unstable peace, human rights violations, poverty and social inequality, food insecurity and poor governance. The effects of such accumulated threats give rise to fatal natural disasters and/or violent armed conflict, subsequently leading to widespread political emergencies, such as food crises, epidemics and forced displacement. The figure shows a conceptual framework of a six-pronged approach: the negative inferences of human insecurity can be directed towards positive foundational steps, including the reduction of sufferings and grievances to counter-measures against escalation, and conflict management to ceasefire as the peacebuilding steps. The measures and steps listed under the fifth prong are the foundation for respecting international norms as well as for local reconciliation among the concerned parties to guarantee justice, aiming towards a durable rebuilding process. The implementation of this framework with different local contexts can give the authority, facilitator and all stakeholders a true window of opportunity in generating human security in the long run for the needy communities.

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Fig. 12.3  A conceptual framework for human security promotion in Myanmar

This study concludes by creating a conceptual framework to promote human security in Myanmar through the prevention and promotion approaches in parallel towards studying policy rationalisation. However, it needs further research in order to identify the ways to materialise the applicable variations of the framework to overcome different scenarios and obstacles.

Conclusion: Human Security by Democratic Transition Although the state is a sovereign entity, it also has a responsibility to respect and abide by international norms and instruments that guarantee human rights. From human rights violations related to food insecurity, the state must ensure the protection of its citizens by following the universal code of conduct. International agreements regulating global peace and security, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC) and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, are to be followed; setting international standards become the “new diplomacy” of human security (McRae 2001). These are tools to make sure that states meet their responsibilities to protect its citizens in accordance with universal values and international norms enshrined through the international treaties and UN provisions. The administration of Myanmar, led by the NLD, has clearly set three targets to democratise Myanmar through the promotion of a genuine

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transition. The first one is that building peace over various conflicts driven by the accumulation of grievances implies the need for installing “equality” in ethno-cultural, socio-religious, multilingual and economic, politico-­ administrative terms. Another is making a democratic constitution by amending the 2008 Constitution, which implies legal guarantees of the division of the rights, roles and responsibilities of the state and citizens based on “equality”. The other is restoring the “rule of law” in general, starting from managing the state’s affairs domestically to respecting international norms, applying universal values and fulfilling global obligations, which are very much dependent on a successful writing/revising of the “equality-driven” democratic constitution by amending the current undemocratic constitution. Only through a democratic constitution can the goal of spreading human security across Myanmar become a lasting reality, for which the international community, starting from the agencies and good offices of the UN, the regional bodies of Asia, including ASEAN, and geopolitical neighbours as well as the donor community, shall play the role of important watchdogs in both enabling and monitoring ways. In summary, for a country like Myanmar during her most important stage of transition, these factors should not be diluted. Only after the government ensures the provision of the basic level of human security can the process of human development  be promoted, sustained and accelerated for all populations. Therefore, the government at all levels must maximise the utilisation of constitutional and legislative provisions to enable good governance. The process can empower a country like Myanmar if the state fulfils international obligations  regarding the implementation of  ratified international conventions, protocols, treaties and universal values. In particular, the international community and other regional countries should not camouflage her pressing need to address issues of human insecurity, which is imposing an unbearable burden on its population of diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds. Neither the “principle of non-­ interference” nor its “sovereignty” should be used as a pretext to overlook, neglect or bypass Myanmar’s human rights urgency from their agenda. The promotion and protection of human security is a top priority for a weak, fragile or a transition nation like Myanmar in order to strengthen her transition process to develop a more democratic, irreversible, peaceful and stable country, which in its current state, is in shambles.

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Index1

A Absolute monarchs, 195 Absolute monarchy, 61 Absorbing, 5 Academic bridges, 13 Academic Diplomacy Project, 3, 14 Activating, 4, 5 Adolescent fertility rate, 110 Afghanistan, 174 Africa, 153, 158, 162 Agency, 238, 248 Aid, 151–154, 156–170, 221, 228, 252 “Alert” countries, 229 Alienation, 71, 74 Allocative efficiency, 23 Anti-government, 11 Anti-government demonstrations, 201 Anti-government expression, 142, 149 Anti-monarchist expressions, 11 Arab Spring, 106 Arch-royalist supporters, 199

Armed conflicts, 109, 123, 226, 228, 229, 232, 234, 236, 245, 255 Army factionalism scenario, 252 Article 9, 152, 162 ASEAN, 105–137, 153, 158, 159, 163–165, 169, 170, 173, 174, 176–180, 182, 184–186, 188, 189, 258 ASEAN Commission on the Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Women and Children (ACWC), 120, 135 ASEAN Committee on Women (ACW), 115, 120, 135 ASEAN Connectivity, 180–181 ASEAN Declaration Against Trafficking in Persons Particularly Women and Children (DATP), 134 Asian Development Bank aid, 159, 163 Asian University Network Forum on Advances in Research, 3 Asia-Pacific, 153

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s) 2020 C. Yamahata et al. (eds.), Rights and Security in India, Myanmar, and Thailand, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-1439-5

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INDEX

Asia-Pacific region, 184 Assimilation, 67, 69n6, 71, 72, 84 Asymmetrical alliance of power, 12 Atrocity prevention, 246 Attribution of relative values, 45 Audience, 144, 145, 147, 148 Aung San Suu Kyi, 113, 113n1, 123, 124 Australia, 186 Authorities, 145, 148 Autocracy, 195 Autonomous Malay-Muslim community, 78 Autonomy, 66, 67, 77n12, 114, 148, 228, 234 B Bangladesh, 90, 91, 95–97, 99, 100, 103 Bargaining and negotiation, 4 The Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (BDPA), 109, 134 Belief, 147, 148 Bengalis, 89, 98 Border Areas National Races Youth Development Training Schools, 48, 54, 55 Borderlands, 7, 92 The bottom billion, 2 Brunei, 110–112, 114, 115 Buddha land, 92 Buddhism, 48, 51–57 Buddhist militant scenario, 252 Buddhist Rakhines, 10 Buddhists, 89–103 Burma/Myanmar, 47, 48, 51–53, 51n1, 57 Burmanisation, 100 Burma Review and Challenges International Forum, 3 Burmese government, 89 Burmese military, 124, 126, 127

C Calcutta, 31–46 Calcutta wetlands, 32–36 Cambodia, 174–179, 181, 182, 188 Canals, 32, 34, 41 Capabilities, 9, 15, 16 Carrying capacity, 9 Celebrities, 146, 148 Challenge, 145 Characters, 146, 148 Children, 105, 110, 116, 120, 130, 133 Chin, 47–58 China, 152, 153, 157, 159, 162, 164, 165, 169, 170, 178, 183–186, 189, 222, 232, 252 China’s rise, 184 Chin Christians, 10 Chinese, 63, 64, 69, 69n6, 75 Chinese grand strategy, 153 Chinese regional hegemony, 153 Christian, 47, 48, 52–55, 57 Christmas bombings, 98 Citizens, 61, 62, 67–69, 74, 81 Citizenship Law, 100 Civic freedoms, 11, 222, 237, 251 Civilian action, 246 Civilian control, 195, 197–199 Civil liberty, 222 Civil-military relations, 12, 202 Civil rights, 209 Civil society, 16, 17, 168, 231, 236, 238–241, 248, 251 Civil society organisations, 4 Civil wars, 226 Climate, 36, 45 Climate change, 183, 184 Climatic conditions, 32 Collective ‘unity,’ 11 Collier-Hoeffler model, 226, 227 Communal violence, 90, 99 Communication gap, 82 Communists, 100

 INDEX 

Community, 2, 6, 8–11, 13, 106, 113, 113n1, 124, 129–133, 136, 137 Community-based women’s organisations (WOs), 106 Community harmony, 6, 226 Complementarity, 23 Computer Crimes Act (CCA), 142, 149 Conflict, 3, 6, 7, 220, 222, 224, 226–229, 231, 232, 234, 236, 239, 241, 245, 251, 256 Conflict trap, 227, 229 Congestion of open space, 42 Constitutional Court, 198, 200, 202, 212 Constitution of 2008, 234 Contamination, 34 Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishments, 242 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), 106, 108–109, 134 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 242 Convention on the Rights of the Child, CRC, 50 Cooperative relationship, 194 Counter-hegemonic, 149 Counter magnet, 36 Country of Particular Concern, 52 Cross-cultural elements, 4 CSOs, 248 Cultural assimilation, 74 Cultural diversity, 226 Cultural integration assimilation, 10 Cultural laws, 75, 81 Cultural rights, 7 Culture of peace, 251 Customary international law, 49 Cyclone Nargis of 2008, 244

265

D Daingnets, 89 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 96, 101 Decentralization, 22, 23 Decision-making, 2, 9, 237 Declaration on the Advancement of Women in the ASEAN Region (DAWA), 134 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women and Violence Against Children in the ASEAN Region (DEVAWCA), 135 The Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women in the ASEAN Region (DEVAWA), 134 Defective democracy, 209, 213 Demand-responsive investments, 17 Democracy, 23, 183–185, 220, 229, 235–240, 248, 251, 252, 256 Democracy and fragility, 229 Democracy assistance, 251 Democratic constitution, 251, 258 Democratic institutions, 220, 234 Democratic local governance, 17 Democratic society, 113, 114, 129, 133 Democratic transition, 220, 231, 237, 239, 241, 245, 246, 248, 252 Democratising local development, 248 Democratization, 167 Deprivation, 15 Description of limiting factors, 45 Description of natural process, 45 Destitution, 15 Determinants of democratisation, 247 Development, 152, 154–156, 158, 159, 161–164, 166–168, 170, 175–184, 186–188, 221, 222, 224, 227, 236–238, 240–242, 251, 252, 255 Development assistance, 6 Development of horizontal networks, 17

266 

INDEX

Development Plan, 36 Diplomacy over deterrence, 220 Disaster-preparedness, 256 Disaster relief, 183 Disaster risk reduction, 183, 184 Discrimination, 10, 47–49, 53, 54 Discriminatory policies and practices, 54 Disease, 2 Disintegration, 62–67 Disseminating, 5 Divided society, 228 Divisions, 2, 11 Donor community, 13, 258 Dual basis, 48, 54, 57 Dyarchy Scheme of the British colonialists in 1923, 255 E East Asia, 161, 164, 169 Eastern Tigers, 200 Ecological and environmental features, 43 Ecological consequences, 9, 43 Ecological imperatives, 43 Ecological inventory, 45 Ecological planning, 32, 44–45 Ecological threats, 32 Ecology and economics, 46 Economic capability, 16 Economic cooperation, 12 Economic development, 175, 182 Economic powerhouses, 252 Economic stagnation, 252, 255 Economic stagnation scenario, 252 Economy, 109, 123 Ecosystem, 7, 9 Ecosystem services, 7 Education, 53, 55 Educational laws, 256 Education and training, 109 Effective power to govern, 208, 209, 212

Efficiency, 17 Electoral regime, 209 Embedded democracy, 208 Emergent cultural clashes, 4 Empowering, 5 Empowerment of the poor, 16, 17 Encroachment of wetlands, 38 Engineer Corps, 175 Entrenched norms of exclusion, 21 Environment, 96, 103, 109, 123, 129–131, 178, 182–184, 188, 189, 221, 224, 226, 231, 234, 235, 237, 239, 242, 251 Epidemics, 256 Equality, 109, 112, 116, 122, 125, 126, 130, 136, 231, 235, 238, 241, 255, 258 “Equality-driven” democratic constitution, 258 Equitable distribution, 18 Equity, 23, 224, 226 Essential services, 245 Estimated GNI per capita for female (EGNIF), 112 Ethnic, 47, 48, 50, 51, 51n1, 53–57 Ethnically mobilised, 84 Ethnic and rural women, 128 Ethnic armed organisations (EAOs), 234 Ethnic cleansing, 90, 103, 246 Ethnic consciousness, 85 Ethnic diversity, 7 Ethnic identity, 255 Ethnic minorities, 69, 77, 245, 255 Ethnic nationalities, 10 Ethnic rights, 228 Ethnic women’s organisations (EWOs), 107 Ethno-cultural minorities, 10 Ethno-cultural tension, 10, 61–85 Ethno-religious barriers, 3 Exaggeration, 145, 148 Expansion of urban limit, 46

 INDEX 

Experts in violence, 202 External powers, 153 Extraction activities, 237 F Facilitating environments, 3 Family, 113, 113n1, 126, 129 Feasibility, 227, 256 Female educational attainment, 110 Female parliamentary representation, 110 Field Marshal Phibun Songkram, 61 First Anglo-Burmese War, 90, 97 Fiscal autonomy, 18 Fledgling democracy, 196 Flexible comparative research, 13 Food crises, 256 Food insecurity, 231, 256, 257 Forced displacement, 256 Foreign investment, 255 Foreign policy, 151, 153–156, 158, 169 Fragile state index (FSI), 229 Freedom, 11, 13 Freedom from fear, 163, 168, 220, 232 Freedom from want, 220, 232 Freedom House, 241, 248 Freedom of expression, 141, 142, 145, 146, 149 Free expression, 12 Fukuda Doctrine, 173–175, 185, 189 Fundamental rights, 221, 226, 237 G Gender-based discriminatory society, 106 Gender equality, 109 Gender gaps, 111, 113 Gender inequality, 110, 113, 116, 129, 232

267

Gender Inequality Index (GII), 111, 135 Gender-sensitivity in governance, 21 General Administrative Department (GAD), 54 Genocides, 226, 242 Genre, 144 Genuine transition, 257–258 Geopolitical landscape, 7 Geopolitical power-neighbours, 13, 258 Girls, 109, 128 Globalising world, 2 Global issues, 1 Global public ‘bads,’ 13 Global trends, 4 GNI per capita, 112, 135 Golden age, 96 Good governance, 235, 239, 242, 256 Goodwill-driven engagements, 252 Gotama Buddha, 93 Governance, 9 Government, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 149 Government of Burma Act of 1935, 255 Grand strategy, 151–153, 155 Grassroots, 106, 125 Greater democratization, 194 Great Mekong Area, 176 Greed, 226, 227, 229, 235, 236 Greed and grievance, 229 Green Mekong Initiative, 188 Grievance, 226, 227, 229 Guardian of monarchy, 194 H Handicapped, 105 Hanoi Declaration on the Enhancement of Welfare and Development of ASEAN Women and Children (DEWD), 135

268 

INDEX

Health, 109–111, 123, 128–130, 132 High-rise city, 43 Hindu, 113 Historic and cultural inventory, 45 Homogenisation, 72 Horizontal accountability, 21, 208, 209 Human and environmental health, 7 Human capability, 16 Human deprivation, 15 Human development, 13, 109–113, 220–222, 224, 226, 234 Human Development Index (HDI), 110, 135 Human Development Report, 110, 111, 221 Human freedom, 222 Human insecurity, 13, 219–222, 232, 233, 242, 247, 252, 256, 258 Humanitarian assistance, 245 Humanitarian crises, 232, 252 Humanitarian treaties, 241 Humanity-in-crisis situations, 13 Human rights, 7, 13, 47, 49, 50, 52, 54, 55, 57, 105–109, 114–116, 120–125, 130–132, 183–185, 221, 224, 226, 228, 231, 232, 234, 235, 237, 241–244, 251, 252, 256–258 Human Rights Index, 242 Human rights promotion, 226 Human rights violations, 90 Human security, 6–7, 10, 13, 154–157, 163, 168, 169, 219–222, 224, 226, 231–234, 236, 237, 242, 247, 251, 256–258 Human Security Report, 221 Human settlements, 44 Human trafficking, 115 Humor, 144, 145, 149 Hunger, 3, 6, 7

Hunger gap, 2 Hybrid democracy, 240 I Identities, 8, 12, 90, 93 Identity-based hatred, 227 Image manipulation, 147 Imagination, 147 Imagined community, 62, 63n1, 84 Inclusion, 16, 18–23 Income poverty, 15 Independent citizens, 4 India, 2, 6–9, 13, 14 Indian Ocean, 161, 162, 164, 165, 169, 170 Indian urbanscape, 15 Indigenous, 47, 50, 89, 98 Indigenous knowledge, 3 Indigenous peoples and individuals, 51 Indirectly, 145, 148 Indochina, 173–177 Indonesia, 111, 112, 114, 115 Indo-Pacific connectivity, 153, 165 Industrial development, 103 Inequalities, 3, 19 Informal institutions, 21 Infrastructure, 17, 18, 153, 159, 163, 167, 170, 180, 181, 184, 187, 188 Innate talent, 113, 129 Innovating, 5 Institution, 237, 238, 248 Institutional checks, 236 Institutionalisation of sub-regional cooperation, 12 Institutionalized discrimination, 57 Institutional mechanism, 109, 123 Integrated planning paradigm, 44 Integration, 62, 66, 67, 74, 84 Interdisciplinary approach, 6 Interim constitution (Thailand’s 19th), 206

 INDEX 

International affairs, 4 International arbitration, 153 International Bill of Human Rights, 49 International community, 13, 155, 173, 183, 197, 207, 213, 246, 248, 251, 258 International Cooperation Charter, 157, 159 International cooperation strategy, 12 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 49 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 242 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 49, 242 International Criminal Court (ICC), 257 International crises, 226 International development, 6 International development goals, 109 International Humanitarian Law, 242, 244, 251 International human rights laws, 50, 105 International instruments, 105, 106, 128 International law-driven treaties, 252 International Law of Human Rights, 242, 251 International legal instruments, 7, 228, 241, 246 Internationally agreed norms, 252 International obligations, 241, 242, 252 International standards, 257 International treaties, 10, 242, 257 Internet influencers, 146 Interpretations, 145, 147, 148 Intolerable, 15 Intractable, 15

269

Investment, 165, 252, 255 Islamic consciousness, 75 Islamist terrorism scenario, 252 J Jack Maew, 146 Japan, 152, 155–159, 161–170, 173–189 Japan-ASEAN General Exchange Fund (JAGEF), 176 Japanese aid, 151–154, 157, 158, 165–167 Japanese occupation, 75 Japan-Mekong Regional Partnership Program, 159, 163 Japan’s strategic initiatives, 12 Japan-United States alliance, 152 Japan-US alliance, 184 JICA, 157, 162, 163 K Kachin, 51, 52, 54 Kachin Women’s Association Thailand (KWAT), 107, 129, 131–132, 136 Kamans, 89, 89n1, 92, 96 Karen, 51 Karen Women organization (KWO), 107, 129–131, 136 Karenni, 51 Kedah, 75 Kelantan, 65n4, 70, 75, 77 Khai Maew, 146–148 Khai Maew X, 146–148 King Chulalongkorn, 195 King Vajiravudh, 61, 63 Korean peninsula, 153 Kwamwees, 89 Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 102

270 

INDEX

L Labour Force Participation Rate (LFPR), 135 Land capability and suitability, 45 Land-grabbing, 92, 103 Language rights, 255 Laos, 176, 178, 179, 182, 188 Largest democracy, 222 LDCs, 222 Learning, 5 Legislative power, 145 Legitimate government, 232, 237 “Legitimate” religious and ethnic constituents, 90 Liminal Zone, 92 Livelihood strategies, 22 Loan aid, 157, 158, 167, 168 Local development, 6 Local governance, 17, 21 Local social capital, 22 Local social cohesion, 22 Local stakeholders, 18, 23 Local traditions, 78 Loss of bio-diversity, 31 Loyalists, 198, 199 M Maha Muni Buddha, 93n9, 94–96 Majority-minority relations, 8 Malay, 61–85, 62n1, 65n4, 78n13, 79n15 Malay Federation, 83 Malay nationalism, 75 Malay Peninsula, 75 Malay principalities, 74 Malay-Muslims, 10, 62–67, 70, 71, 73, 74, 77, 78n13, 79, 79n15, 80, 83–85 Malaysia, 110–112, 114, 115 Mangrove ecosystem, 41 Maramargyis, 89

Marginalization, 103 Maritime safety, 184, 187 Martial law, 199 Mass civilian protests, 196 Maternal mortality rate, 110 Media, 109, 123, 125, 130 Media and academic freedom, 7 Media persons, 4 Mekong, 173–189 Mekong connectivity, 153, 163–165, 170 Mekong-Japan Economic and Industrial Cooperation Initiative (MJ-CI) Action Plan, 180 The Mekong Japan Industrial and Economic Cooperation Initiative, 188 Mekong-Japan International Conference on the East-West Economic Corridor (EWEC), 180 Message, 145 Methodological pluralism, 13 Metropolitan cities, 9, 31 Metropolitan planning, 44–46 Middle East, 162 Migrant workers, 105, 128 Military, 152, 154, 156, 159, 162, 170 coups, 72, 226 dictatorship, 209, 214 elite (“army-state”), 252 regimes, 113 repression, 193 rulers, 145 Military-controlled government, 47 Military-dominated political systems, 12 Military-endorsed constitution of 2007, 199 Minority armed struggle, 252 Minority armed struggle scenario, 252 Mizoram, 57

 INDEX 

Mobility, 245 Monarch-endorsed coup in 1991, 196 Monarchized military, 13, 194 Monarch-led parallel state, 194, 208, 212, 213 Monitoring, 5, 8 Monopolization of power, 194 Monopolize, 195, 199 Mons, 90–92, 98 Moral responsibility to protect, 13 Mros, 89 Multidimensional, 16 Multidimensional approaches, 13 Multilateral engagement over coercive unilateralism, 220 Multilingual and multicultural educational rights, 255–256 Muslims, 89, 92, 95–100, 97n13, 103, 112, 113 Muslim South, 92 Mutual understanding, 174 Myanmar, 6–14, 89–103, 90n4, 91n6, 91n7, 98n14, 99n15, 105–137, 151–170, 173–189, 219–258 My Country and People, 96 N Naga, 51, 54 Nai Sooklek, 143, 143n1 Na Ta La, 54–56 Nation, 61–63, 65, 67–71, 69n6, 71n8, 73, 74, 74n10, 81, 83–85 National community, 62, 62n1, 67 National Cultural Maintenance Act of 1941, 68 National culture, 69, 70, 73, 74, 84 National Culture Acts, 76, 76n11 National Environmental Engineering Research Institute, 33 National integration, 256 National Intelligence Agency, 81–83

271

National League for Democracy (NLD), 101 National reconciliation, 229, 256 National security, 155 National Security Strategy, 155–157, 161 Nation-building, 68, 156 Natural disaster scenario, 252 Natural vegetation, 32 Negative peace, 228 Neo-colonial scenario, 252 Neo-patrimonialism, 203 New constitution, 61 Ne Win, 89, 89n1, 100, 101 News, 144, 147, 148 Newspaper, 143, 144 NGO, 167, 168 1932 democratic transition, 67 1932 revolution, 61, 67, 68 Non-academic sector, 6 Non-Burman (non-Bamar) Buddhist ethnic minorities, 90 Non-military purposes, 183 Non-refundable aid package, 187 Non-state actors, 47 Nontraditional security, 154 Norms, 105, 106, 112, 113, 122, 126–127, 129, 134–137 Northeast Asia, 158 North Korea, 186 O ODA policy, 12 Official development assistance (ODA), 152, 155 One Belt One Road project, 153 Online, 142, 144, 146 Operation Nagamin, 100 Oppression, 15 Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 257

272 

INDEX

Organic garbage, 34 Ostrom, Elinor, 18 Others within, 62, 85 Ousted democracy, 203 Over-concentration of power, 17 Overcrowding, 31 Overseas Development Assistance (ODA), 175 Over stressed infrastructure, 31 P Palace-military asymmetrical partnership, 196 Palace-military power-sharing arrangement, 196 Panglong Agreement (PA) of 1947, 229 Parallel states, 203 Participation, 16, 17, 21, 22 Participatory democracy, 18 Patani, 61, 63, 63n2, 65, 65n4, 67, 73, 75, 77, 80, 84 Peace, 113n1, 114, 129, 132, 173–175, 183, 184, 186, 187, 226, 229, 234–236, 239–241, 245, 251, 252, 255, 257, 258 Peacebuilding, 154, 157, 158, 162–163, 168, 170, 232, 237, 244, 248, 256 Peacebuilding and statebuilding, 7 Peacemaker, 113 Perception, 186 Perlis, 70, 75 Pervasive, 15 Petition, 142 Philippines, 111, 112, 114, 115 Physical violence, 232 Piracy, 155, 162 Plural society, 92, 98 Policy analysis, 6 Policy rationalisation, 257

Political activities, 126, 127, 132 Political and economic interdependence, 4 Political authority, 196 Political capability, 16 Political capital, 197 Political cartoon, 143–149 Political communication, 11, 142, 144–148 Political dramas, 146 Political emergencies, 256 Political equilibrium, 203 Political ideologies, 144 Political knowledge, 144 Political monk, 100 Political parody, 11 Political rights, 208–210 Politicians, 146, 148 Politico-cultural influences, 3 Poorest, 91 Poor governance, 256 Pooyaima Gub Toongmamern, 143 Positive peace, 229 Post-conflict reconstruction, 154, 158 Post-conflict rehabilitation, 234 Poverty, 1, 3, 15–28, 109, 123, 220, 224, 226, 238, 256 Poverty eradication, 17–18 Poverty reduction, 17, 18, 20, 23, 187 Poverty reduction strategies, 17 Power and decision-making, 109, 123 Powerlessness, 15 Power-sharing, 195, 196 Power vacuum, 196 Preeminent power, 194, 213 Prevention strategy, 231 Preventive capacities, 246 Preventive diplomacy, 10, 226 Primary School Education Act, 64, 65 Principle of non-interference, 258 Principles of democracy, 13 Prizes people over states, 220

 INDEX 

Problem identification, 6 Productive wealth, 33 Promote accountability, 246 Pro-poor local development, 17 Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflict, 242–243 Proxy measures, 226 Public agenda, 145 Q Queen’s Guard, 200 R Rag-pickers, 33 Rakhine (Arakanese) Buddhists, 89 Rakhines, 89, 90, 92, 94, 95, 99–103 Rakhine Yoma, 91, 91n6, 94, 96, 100 Rangoon, 91–93, 98, 98n14 Rangoon (Yangon), 92, 93 Rape, 127, 130 Rapprochement, 152 Reconciliation over revenge, 220 Red Shirt demonstrations, 200 Refugees, 128, 130, 245, 255 Regime transitions, 238 Regional bodies of Asia, 13 Regional complexities, 4 Regional initiatives, 11 Regional peace and stability, 184 Regional powers, 7, 252 Regional problems, 153 Regional tensions, 185 Regional war scenario, 252 Religious freedom, 7, 10, 78, 79 Religious freedom violations, 48, 54, 57 Religious majority/ethnic minority group, 89

273

Religious minorities, 10 Religious practices, 78 Representative democracy, 18, 239 Resilience, 173 Resource curse, 227 Resource export, 237 Resources at the higher order government, 17 Resource security, 7 Responsibility of the international community, 252 Responsibility to respect, 257 Responsive and inclusive governance, 251 Responsiveness, 17, 22 Rights, 8, 10, 11, 13 Right to freedom of religion or belief, 49 Right to freedom of thought, 49 Rise of China, 152 Rohingya, 244, 245 Rome Statute, 243 Root-causes, 233, 247 Rule of law, 7, 210–211, 235, 236, 239–241, 248, 251, 258 Russia, 152 S Sanctions, 165, 166 Satellite towns, 46 Satire, 142, 145, 148 Section 44, 206, 210, 211 Security, 8, 11–13, 151–159, 161–163, 168–170, 220–222, 224, 226, 231, 232, 236, 241, 245, 247, 248, 251, 252, 257 Security cooperation, 152, 159, 162, 170 Self-censorship, 11 Self-defense, 152 Self-Defense Force, 152

274 

INDEX

Self-determination, 16, 114, 228, 234, 242 Self-esteem, 16 Sewage fed fisheries, 34 Sexual harassment, 127 Shallow eutrophic lakes, 34 Shans, 90, 91, 102n18 Shan Women’s Action Network (SWAN), 107, 127, 129–130, 136 Sharing, 3, 5, 6 Shwedagon Pagoda, 93, 95 Siam, 61–63, 65, 67, 68, 70, 70n8, 72, 75, 78, 84 Siltation and blocking, 41 Singapore, 110–112, 114, 115, 177, 185 Single national identity, 48, 53 Social capital, 8 Social inequality, 256 Socialist regimes, 174 Social media, 141, 142, 144, 145, 148 Social resilience, 7 Socio-cultural capability, 16 Socioeconomic boundaries, 3 Socio-economic conditions, 231 Socio-political settings, 3 Soft-intervention, 13 Solidarity, 173 Solid waste, 33, 38 Southeast Asia, 106, 120, 152, 153, 158, 161, 163, 164, 169, 170, 173, 178, 183, 185 Southeast Asian Women’s Caucus on ASEAN (Women’s Caucus), 135 Southern Economic Corridor (SEC), 180 Southern Thailand, 76 South Korea, 158 Sovereignty, 258 Spatially compatible maps, 45 Stalled democratization, 203 Starvation, 1–2

State building, 168 State Conventions, 68, 69, 75, 76, 76n11, 81 State fragility, 222, 227 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 55, 57 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 57 Strategic aid, 151–157 Strategic partnership, 12, 185–187, 189 Structure, 232, 238, 248, 255 Struggle, 149 Subjects, 144, 147, 148 Subregion-building diplomacy, 173 Subsidiarity, 23 Sundarban, 41 Surrogate strongman, 197 Surveying, 5 Sustainable, 220, 224, 229 Sustainable development, 8, 44 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 109, 134 Sustainable unity and development, 106, 132–134, 136 Sustained vigilance, 21 Symbolization, 149 T Taiwan, 153 Tatmadaw, 90, 90n4, 99, 100, 102 Territorial disputes, 153 Terrorism, 155 Thailand, 6–8, 10–14, 61–85, 62n1, 70n8, 83n18, 107, 110–112, 114, 115, 128–132, 136, 141–149, 174, 177, 180–182, 193–214 Thai National Culture, 67–74 Thai national identity, 62, 78, 85 Thai national Self, 84

 INDEX 

Thai primary schools, 63 Thai ruling élites, 61, 62, 85 Thaksinocracy, 199 Theravada, 51, 56 Theravada Buddhist Southeast Asia, 92–93 Thets, 89 “Thick” side of democracy, 235 “Thin” conception of democracy, 235 Three pillars of Japan’s diplomacy, 173 Trade and Investment, 178 Traditional ecosystem, 31 Traditional security dialogue, 220 Trangganu, 75 Transboundary issues, impacts and challenges, 7 Transformation, 31, 33–36, 194 Transforming culture, 73 Transition, 9, 13 Transitional countries, 239 Transitional process, 13 Transparency, 251 Transparency of delivery systems, 17 Two-pronged approach, 9 2006 coup, 199 2014 military coup, 193 U Unauthorized settlements, 31 UN Commission on Human Rights, 49 UNDP, 168 UN General Assembly Security Council, 246 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), 107, 108 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 168 United Nations (UN), 156 United States, 152, 154, 157, 159, 161, 165, 169, 174, 184, 186 United States administration, 174

275

Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 107–108, 134, 242 Universalization, 20 Universal norms, 241 Universal standards and norms, 106 Universal values, 7, 242, 257, 258 UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 244 UN peace-keeping operation (PKO), 175 Unstable peace, 256 Un-Thai, 61–64, 69, 84 Urban, 15–22 economics, 20 expansion, 35, 42–43 governance, 16 management, 19 poverty, 8, 9 Urbanisation, 31, 41 V Vertical transfer of responsibilities and resources, 17 Vicious cycle, 193, 196 Vietnam, 111, 112, 114, 174–176, 178, 182, 185–188 Violations, 231, 232, 242, 243, 245, 251, 256, 257 Violence, 109, 115, 116, 122, 123, 128–132 Voicelessness, 15 Vulnerability, 15, 17 Vulnerable, 105, 114, 128 W War on terror, 154, 158 Waterways, 41 Weak civic engagement, 16 Weak state, 13

276 

INDEX

Welfare, 183 Wetlands, 31, 33, 35, 38, 42, 43 Women, 105–116, 120–123, 125–137 Women in Parliament (WIP), 135 Women’s rights, 11 World Development Indicators, 221

World Development Report, 221 World Health Organization, 2 Y Yellow Shirts, 200 Yoshida Doctrine, 151