Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy (Politik und Religion) 3658337753, 9783658337759

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Politik und Religion

Maria Toropova Editor

Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy

Politik und Religion Reihe herausgegeben von Antonius Liedhegener, Zentrum für Religion, Wirtschaft und Politik, Universität Luzern, Luzern, Schweiz Ines-Jacqueline Werkner, Institut für Interdisziplinäre Forschung, FEST, Heidelberg, Baden-Württemberg, Deutschland

In allen Gesellschaften spielte der Zusammenhang von Politik und Religion eine wichtige, häufig eine zentrale Rolle. Auch die Entwicklung der modernen westlichen Gesellschaften ist ohne die politische Auseinandersetzung mit traditionellen wie neuen religiösen Ordnungskonzepten und Wertvorstellungen sowie deren sozialen Trägern nicht denkbar. Im weltweiten Maßstab wie speziell im Blick auf liberale Demokratien haben religiöse Orientierungen und Identitäten ganz erheblich an gesellschaftlichem und politischem Einfluss gewonnen. Die Buchreihe „Politik und Religion“ trägt diesem grundlegenden Trend der Gegenwart Rechnung. Bereits seit 2000 stellt sie für die Politikwissenschaft und benachbarte Sozialwissenschaften im deutschsprachigen Raum ein Publikationsforum bereit, das relevante Forschungsergebnisse zum Zusammenhang von Politik und Religion der wissenschaftlichen Öffentlichkeit vorstellt und Forschungsarbeiten auf diesem Gebiet fördert. Die Reihe ist offen für verschiedene disziplinäre und interdisziplinäre, theoretisch-methodologische, empirische und interkulturell-vergleichende Ansätze und publiziert Arbeiten, die sich systematisch und umfassend mit politikwissenschaftlich ergiebigen Fragestellungen zum Verhältnis von Politik und Religion befassen. Die wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit „Politik und Religion“ soll damit in ihrer ganzen Breite dokumentiert werden, ohne dass die Herausgeber dabei mit den jeweilig bezogenen Positionen übereinstimmen müssen.

Weitere Bände in der Reihe https://link.springer.com/bookseries/12407

Maria Toropova Editor

Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy

Editor Maria Toropova Interdisciplinary Research Institute in Heidelberg (FEST e. V.) Heidelberg, Germany

ISSN 2510-4748 ISSN 2510-4756 (electronic) Politik und Religion ISBN 978-3-658-33775-9 ISBN 978-3-658-33776-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Responsible Editor: Jan Treibel This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Contents

Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy: An Introduction . . . Maria Toropova

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Strategies of Implementing Religious Influence on Foreign Policy Religious Soft Power and the Foreign Policy of Donald Trump . . . . . . . . Jeffrey Haynes

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The Role of Religion in the Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy . . . . . . Jörg Baudner

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Constructing Russian Foreign Policy: Interdependencies Between the State and the Russian Orthodox Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maria Toropova

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The Role of Religion in Foreign Policy in the European Context—Examples and Reports Empowerment of Grassroots. Northern Ireland, Brexit and the Churches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Nicole Schramm

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The Orthodox Factor in the Foreign Policy of Post-Communist Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Cristian Vasile

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Religions for Peace (RfP) and Global and European Interfaith Politics: Different Faiths, Common Actions – in Foreign Policy? . . . . . . Peter Bender

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Religious Impact on Foreign Policy in Non-European Countries—Examples and Reports Managing the Buddha at N¯aland¯a. China, India, and the Control of Tibetan Buddhism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Greg C. Bruno Foreign Policy Change and the Salience of Religion in Brazil . . . . . . . . . Claudia Zilla

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The Role of Islam in the Egyptian Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Alexey Khlebnikov and Natalia Berenkova

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Between Religious Identity and Pragmatic Strategy: The Iranian Attitude towards the “Shia Crescent” Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Polina Vasilenko

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Evolution of the Sunni Political Islam in Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dmitriy Frolovskiy and Kirill Semenov

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Synthesis: Common Trends and Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Maria Toropova

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Editor and Contributors

About the Editor Maria Toropova is a PhD student at the University of Frankfurt, and a researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Institute in Heidelberg (FEST e. V, 2019/2020). She graduated from Kazan Federal University (2011, International Relations, diploma with distinction), and the University of Heidelberg (2013, Political Science, M.A.) Her primary research interest revolves around the impact of the Russian Orthodox Church on Russian foreign policy.

Contributors Dr. Jörg Baudner is a lecturer at the University of Osnabrück. He has received a MSc from the London School of Economics and Political Science and a PhD from the University of Birmingham. His main interests are European policies, TurkeyEU relations and politics and religion. He has published in international journals such as the Journal of Common Market Studies and Comparative European Studies and is currently working at the intersection of different levels of policymaking (“multi-level politics”) in a comparison of the Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkey) and early Christian democratic parties. Dr. Peter Bender is a political scientist and Catholic theologian who has been involved with religion and international politics for over 20 years. After his studies in political science, theology and economics in Freiburg i. Br., including stays abroad in Bordeaux, Los Angeles, at the United Nations in New York, in Washington DC, Guadalajara and São Paulo, he worked in the European Parliament in Brussels, as a university lecturer for relations between Europe and

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the Muslim world and as a religious policy advisor to the SPD party executive in Berlin. He analyzed the potential of religions as foreign policy partners for peace in a study for the ifa/Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen and was one of the delegates for Religions for Peace (RfP) Germany at the interreligious RfP World Assembly in Lindau. Dr. Natalia Berenkova is an assistant professor, researcher and lecturer at the Institute of International Relations and World History at Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod. At present, she is also an expert of Russian International Affairs Council. Her PhD thesis was devoted to investigating Shia activism in Lebanon and its impact on international relations in the Middle East in 1967–2013. Greg C. Bruno is an award-winning writer, editor, author, and digital storyteller whose work has appeared in a number of US and international print and online publications, including The New York Times, the Council on Foreign Relations, Foreign Affairs, The Guardian, and Forbes. In 2017, he completed his studies at the London School of Economics and Political Science, earning an MSc in the comparative anthropology of China. His first book—“Blessings from Beijing: Inside China’s Soft-Power War on Tibet”—was published in 2018 by the University Press of New Hampshire. Dmitriy Frolovskiy is a political analyst and consultant. He is a contributor to the Carnegie Moscow Center, the European Union Institute for Security Studies, and many other outlets. He is currently a private consultant on policy and strategy in the Middle East, and he has also written extensively about Russia’s foreign policy towards the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Prof. Dr. Jeffrey Haynes is emeritus professor of politics at London Metropolitan University. His areas of expertise are religion and international relations, religion and politics, democracy and democratization, development studies, and comparative politics and globalization. His publications include more than 40 books, including Faith-Based Organizations at the United Nations (2014) and the Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics (2016, second ed.). Alexey Khlebnikov is a strategic risk consultant and an expert on the Middle East at the Russian International Affairs Council. He also works as a consultant to various entities and institutions in the US, Middle East, Europe and Russia. He received his Master’s degree in Global Public Policy from the Hubert H. Humphrey School of Public Affairs at the University of Minnesota and both Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Middle East studies from Lobachevsky State University

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in Nizhni Novgorod. He was an Edmund Muskie fellow (2012–2014) in the US, a research fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) in 2013, at Tel Aviv University in 2011 and CEU in 2012. His PhD thesis is devoted to the reasons for the Arab Spring’s failure in Egypt and Syria. Nicole Schramm is a PhD candidate in theology at the University of Münster. Her thesis is dedicated to investigating the Catholic Church’s impact on peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. She was an employee in the pastoral service at the St. Regina parish in Drensteinfurt (2018–2020). Kirill Semenov is an independent analyst with a long record of professional study of political and military issues in the Middle East, with a strong focus on the conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. He is also a non-resident expert with the Russian International Affairs Council. Dr. Cristian Vasile is a senior researcher at the “Nicolae Iorga” Institute of History in Bucharest. He works with Research Program Romania and Europe in the XXth Century. His fields of interest are the history of the communist regime in Romania, religion and politics, the history of political, religious, and cultural elites of communist Romania and the politics of remembrance in post-communist Eastern Europe. Polina Vasilenko is an independent analyst and a non-resident expert of the Russian International Affairs Council. She is also an author of the telegram channel dedicated to analyzing the Middle East countries, with a primary focus on Iran, Lebanon, Iraq and the Gulf States. She graduated from National Research University Higher School of Economics (Moscow, Russia) in 2017 with a BA degree in history. Dr. Claudia Zilla is Senior Fellow at the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP), German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin. She joined the SWP in 2005 and was Head of the Americas SWP Research Division from 2012 to 2019. In 2014/2015, she was a Fritz Thyssen Fellow at the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs of the Harvard University, Cambridge, MA. She studied Political Science, Sociology and Psychology at the University of Heidelberg, Germany, from which she also obtained her PhD. In her research, she focuses –among other subjects—on democracy, religion and politics, populism and foreign policy in South America.

Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy: An Introduction Maria Toropova

Religion has always been an important factor in politics. Although the thesis that religion can affect the way in which a state acts not only domestically but also internationally is no longer questionable, there remains little consensus on the questions of how and to what extent a religious institution may have an impact on the foreign policy of different countries (Warner & Walker, 2011; Sandal & Fox, 2013). The constantly-changing character and intensity of the interaction between religion and politics invites us to look closer at the religious impact on foreign policy-making. After centuries of religious wars, the factor of faith in foreign policy was marginalized in the late-19th and greater part of the 20th century, when many European states perceived themselves as the avant-garde of secularism (Perchoc, 2020, p. 1). However, this is no longer valid. The phenomenon termed as the “global resurgence of religion” was followed by two simultaneous processes, namely the development of post-secular consciousness as well as the growth of the political salience of religion around the globe (Bettiza, 2019, p. 6). Desecularizing discourses could not explain new challenges and global political trends. Discussions and assumptions about the role of religion beyond the sphere of the individual sacred experience have been an intellectual challenge for many researchers and scholars in the humanities. The focus of political science was initially on thinking about the role of religion in domestic politics. Questions such as how religiosity affects the consolidation of society, its electoral preferences, and its understanding of ethics have been primarily explored. First and foremost, Christian religiosity was analyzed, but during the 20th century this M. Toropova (B) Oslo, Norway E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_1

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interest of study began to expand. From the second half of the 20th century, the focus of analysis began to shift towards studying different religious paradigms and their frequent antagonism, as well as how these processes affect international politics and relations between countries. The Middle East has been the subject of increasing global attention. Since the start of the Six-Day War (1967), the nature of the confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians has changed (Toft et al., 2011). The new status of Jerusalem—which has come under Israeli control—and the beginning of Palestinian use of suicide bombers (shahids) against Israel have accentuated the religious dimension of the confrontation. The next milestone was the regime change in Iran during the revolution of 1979, when Iran underwent a rapid transformation to the theocratic state under the control of Shiite clergy (Curanovi´c, 2012, p. 1). This conversion of Iran towards an Islamic republic also marked the escalation of the competition between Shia and Sunni Islamic worlds. The Afghanistan war followed by the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from the country marked the growing presence of the Islamic jihad issue in international politics. Since 1990, religious influence has begun to be primarily investigated in relation to conflicts. The ambivalence of the religious impact—i.e. both the peace-making role of religion and its potential for violence—has received increasing scholarly interest since the beginning of the 21st century (Appleby, 2000; Oberdorfer & Waldmann, 2008; Hasenclever, 2015). Huntington’s article “Clash of Civilizations”—first published in the Foreign Affairs journal in 1993—proclaimed the return of the religious problematics regarding global order and marked the reactualization of this field of research for the domain of international relations (Wilhelm, 2006, p. 265). The exacerbation of the antagonism of religious worldviews as well as violent acts in the name of religion culminated with the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 in the United States, which brought the question of religious foreign policy implications in the 21st century to a new level. Classical subjects of international relations faced a new reality, whereby organized non-state institutions with major transnational networks of recourses, human capital and a strong religious component in their ideology seriously challenged states. The 9/11 attacks proved that radical religious organizations such as Al-Qaeda had gained more power and significantly more enforcement mechanisms than some states. At the same time, governments all over the globe were in the search of a new language in the dialogue with religions. George W. Bush stressed several times that the war that America proclaimed after 9/11 was not against Islam but rather against terror. For example, at the Joint Session of Congress and the American People several days after the attacks occurred, President Bush (2001) stated: “The terrorists are traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect, to hijack Islam itself. The enemy of America

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is not our many Muslim friends; it is not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of terrorists, and every government that supports them”. It was not only America that was in the process of adapting to the new reality and elaborating the new language with religious institutions. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia was also looking for a new modus vivendi with its religious actors. After struggling through the period of political and economic turbulence, a “parade of sovereignties”, Chechen wars and a series of jihadi terrorist attacks in different Russian cities, the early years of the 21st century were marked by the Russian political elite striving to reformulate Russia’s foreign policy priorities and regain its old-new place in the international arena. In this context, the religious factor also multiplied in its importance in Russia (Curanovi´c, 2012; Richters, 2013). Transformational processes have affected many regions. At the start of the 21st century, the Middle East has retained its geostrategic importance, but at the same time it has become an “explosive knot”, becoming an area of military and political instability and regularly-emerging conflicts, including confessional ones. The elimination of Saddam Hussein’s secular regime in Iraq, Hamas’ coming to rule in the Gaza Strip, and the growing popularity of Shiite Hezbollah in Lebanon have added tensions to the already-existing conflicts in the region (Dobaev & Gontarenko, 2018). At the turn of the century, the Asian region was also not stable. Since the early-1960s, the rivalry between India and China has been intense even during the best periods in the relations between the two countries. For example, in 1998–1999, during India’s nuclear tests, Indian politicians did not hesitate to call China the main enemy (Timokhin, 2020) and the unresolved border dispute as a main reason to conduct the tests (Zhihao, 2015). The 2008 Tibetan uprisings against China had a strong religious background and once again signaled the presence of salient tensions in the region (BBC News, 2008). New realities demand new answers. Within the last 30 years, the role of religion in relation to foreign policy has evolved from being a barely-explored field of research to one of the most topical issues of the day. If previously religion was considered predominantly as a sort of atavism, a cultural anachronism, nowadays cooperation between the state and religious actors in several countries of the world has either already been institutionalized or is on the way towards institutionalization (Bettiza, 2019, p. 1). This transition has been succinctly summed up by Monica Duffy Toft et al. (2011): “Whether governments around the world like it or not, this resurgence of religion has meant that they would now have to reckon with religion in a way that they did not forty, fifty, or sixty years ago”. This reaffirms the thesis that religion has become an important factor in both domestic and foreign politics, although there remains little scholarly agreement on how exactly a religious institution can have an impact on foreign policy (Haynes, 2016;

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Sandal & Fox, 2013). The ever-changing nature and intensity of interaction between religion and politics in the post-secular world necessitate taking a closer look at the religious impact on foreign policy decision-making. After the end of the East-West conflict—which was ideologically polarized—the world was in search of a new settlement of the political order. Technological progress in the field of media, information and communication technologies created new instruments for non-state actors—including religious actors—to expand their networks and strengthen their own narratives in society more efficiently (Wilhelm, 2006, p. 266). Religion also became a solid mobilizing force again. With the increase in religiosity in post-secular times, as well as with the digitalization of the media presence of religious institutions, sermons can reach many more people nowadays than in the past. However, at the same time, a dangerous space has been created for the political instrumentalization of religion (Rittberger & Hasenclever, 2000). Furthermore, one could observe the systematic shift related to this issue, i.e. religion is increasingly becoming the subject of foreign policy rather than the object. This crucially affects the behavior of the classical subjects of international relations towards religious actors. Accordingly, in 2013 the Office of the FaithBased Community Initiatives was set up in the US Department of State (Bettiza, 2019, p. 1). The same trend can be observed on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean. The cooperation between religious and secular official institutions—which we have only been able to observe in Western Europe in the last few years—earlier reached its peak in Eastern Europe with the revival of Orthodox Christianity and its subsequent integration into the state apparatus, e.g. the establishment of the working group uniting the Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These examples of the integration of religious institutions into the foreign agenda-making process have made it more important than ever before to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms of religious influence. In the Middle East, religious organizations are not only a significant part of the political elite, but they have also managed to come to power in certain countries of the region (Dobaev & Gontarenko, 2018). However, does institutional cooperation perform the role as the ultimate indicator of the religious impact on foreign policy? Scholars state that there are necessary conditions that enable a religious institution to have a say concerning the state’s external agenda, among them i) to achieve a greater prominence of a religious institution in society, ii) to have access to the ear of the potential decision-makers, as well as iii) institutional accessibility to non-state actors, both secular and religious (Haynes, 2008; Sandal & Fox, 2013; Haynes, 2016; Sandal, 2016). Since religion has been considered as an actor with

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ever-decreasing importance for decades, it seems interesting to rethink and compare the role of major religious actors for foreign policy in the countries that have different models of relations to them and different political constellations. For this purpose, the central research question of this book (in recognition of the complexity of the issue) is: How and by what means are religious actors able to influence foreign policy agenda-setting and its implementation? Many of the authors of this book refer to the framework developed by Warner and Walker (2011). In this volume, their systematization of factors enabling religious actors to influence foreign policy becomes sort of a navigational system for the analysis. Starting from their theoretical outline, the authors analyze the set of mechanisms that allow specific religious institutions to influence the foreign policy decisions of the countries in which they are active. Warner and Walker (2011) provided a framework extracted from the main theories in the field of international relations to explore religion’s potential avenues of influence on foreign policy. They mapped the key sectors in which a state’s foreign policy was formulated and they also problematized religious manifestations that seemed to be significant in those arenas. Warner and Walker (2011) developed a framework that explains the mechanisms of religious influence on foreign policy consistent with classical foreign policy theories of realism, liberalism, institutionalism and constructivism. In doing so, they address four specific categories: 1) power, the geopolitical position of the state; 2) interests, the representation of public opinion, interest group engagement, and political parties; 3) institutions, the overall institutional structure of a state; and 4) ideas/culture, its cultural heritage. In addition, the influences on foreign policy on the part of the representatives of each category are considered. The postulated categories are based on theoretical arguments from (1) realist, (2 and 3) liberal-institutionalist, and (4) constructivist theories. Pointing at the classical theories, Warner and Walker tend to explain the different aspects of the religious influence on foreign policy action. The realist, liberal, and institutionalist schools derive from the rationalist scientific tradition, which reckons with the purposeful actions of actors in the material world, while constructivist foreign policy theory works with reference back to the psychological environment in terms of individual as well as collective patterns of perception and the resulting role behavior (Wilhelm, 2006, p. 36 f.). The realist approach to foreign policy is characterized by an orientation towards the most powerful group or state (in terms of both resources and control), skepticism towards all other foreign policy goals that are not in the state’s interest, a tendency to question the ability of state foreign policy to overcome power politics, along with acceptance that politics almost always underlies power realities. Based on this assumption, the religious factor can be explained for the

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formation of foreign policy from the realist perspective in several ways. First, the emergence of a society’s religious identity reflects the sense of belonging that is characteristic of human nature (Sandal & Fox, 2013, p. 36), which is particularly relevant to group formation. Second, it often results in the power of religion to mobilize in the political sphere, which plays a relevant role in the external pursuit of national interests. Although realists reject the primacy of the moral order for foreign policy action, the importance of religious influence on foreign policy is recognized through its connotation to national interests. Thomas Christensen (1996, p. 11) asserts that “the ability of state leaders to mobilize their nation’s human and material resources behind security policy initiatives” is particularly relevant for the efficient achievement of national interests. Legitimizing a country’s foreign policy course through religious statements, sermons, or symbolic actions are some of the necessary conditions for maximizing opportunities to advance national interests (Delgado, 2015, p. 34). Third, the use of religion as a “source of legitimacy” for foreign policy action is consistent with the realism approach because such use of religion maximizes power. It creates free space to increase one’s power by strengthening control not only over one’s own fellow citizens but also potentially over the citizens of another countries. Strengthening one’s geopolitical position through the formation of religion-based alliances is also very relevant for maintaining one’s position of power. Liberalism contributes to the understanding of foreign policy by showing how individuals and the ideas that they represent, social forces, and political institutions (primarily democratic and representative institutions) can have a direct impact on foreign policy and thereby international relations. According to Moravcsik (1997, p. 518), the state is “a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors”. The presence of the mechanisms of representation of opinions of domestic actors and transmission of their ideas within available structures is in the focus of a liberal perspective (Warner & Walker, 2011, p. 123). The relevance of religious institutions as representatives of civil society should not be underestimated in this context. The position of religion substantially differs depending on the society. If religion is understood not only as a private matter of individuals, there are some civil society implications. First and foremost, the formation of representative faith communities is important. If a religious institution consolidates and represents a significant number of adherents and their interests and demands, it is unfavorable for the state to disregard them. Moreover, faith communities also shape the environment in which they operate (Bremer & Toropova, 2019, p. 157 f.). Despite the fact that religious institutions have no mechanisms of coercion, their soft power

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potential should not be underestimated. According to Nye (2004), soft power postulates an alternative strategy for achieving goals, which extends beyond military, economic, or diplomatic influence but relies on persuasion and encouragement rooted in shared norms, values and ideas. Warner and Walker (2011, p. 123 f.) argue that the public opinion for the same issue within one society may differ between the different religious groups, although their positions should be supported through institutional channels to consolidate public opinion so that it has foreign policy impact. Accordingly, from an institutionalist perspective, religious influence on foreign policy is possible through constructing appropriate structures that make the religious voice more clearly audible in the political sphere. The religious-political framework of each individual state is constituted depending on the authority of the religious institution. The religious socialization of society and the presence of religion in the public sphere as well as the model of its interaction with the state play a major role for the capacity of religion to influence foreign policy (Sandal & Fox, 2013, p. 131). In contrast to rationalist assumptions, constructivism deals with questions about how individuals construct particular conceptions of the world and how these conceptions influence policy (Sandal & Fox, 2013, p. 147). Constructivist foreign policy theory assumes that each actor in international relations constructs its own political environment based on certain conceptions and perceptions. Actors’ actions—including those of shaping foreign policy—are always embedded in social and intersubjective structures (such as ideology, culture, or religion) (Rittberger & Hasenclever, 2000, p. 39; Ulbert, 2005, p. 8). The formation of shared religious narratives shapes people’s ideas about themselves, but also about others (Sandal & Fox, 2013, p. 148). Warner and Walker (2011, p. 120) also refer to this logic, while stating that religion is very often perceived as a part of culture and highlighting that constructivist theorists such as Wendt (1992) and Finnemore (1996) argue that culture (and therefore religion as well) is a source of state’s identity. Following this logic, since religion shapes identity, it also shapes the state’s interests, as Hopf (1998, p. 175) clearly articulated: “The identity of a state implies its preferences and consequent actions”. Thus, even in secular states, there is a space for religiously-shaped ideas. Political constructions can emerge from religious narrative and can even reach a comparable level of validity for the society as classical religious dogmas, if they are broadly shared by the public. A necessary condition here is to convince individuals that these political constructions are consistent with established religious tradition and collective identity. In the constructivist understanding of the world, the rhetorical power of the political elite is not limitless; rather, it should convince the population that its actions are appropriate and coherent (Rittberger & Hasenclever, 2000, p. 40). These scientific

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theoretical considerations also have empirical applicability, namely with the help of the constructivist approach, the relevance of factors of the non-material world such as identity, norms, worldviews, values and ideas (Ulbert, 2005, p. 3) can be translated into the political process and have an impact on it. Even though Warner and Walker (2011) provide the starting framework for the analysis, they tend to conclude that the religious impact on foreign policy in general and the potential of this approach in particular has not yet been fully exploited. The purpose of this book is to bring together the expertise of an international team of scholars in developing a comprehensive overview of the religious impact on foreign policy. This volume includes eleven contributions by the scholars on various dimensions of religion and foreign policy. The group of authors is very diverse and includes experts from different career stages, professional background and disciplines, nationalities, focuses of expertise, gender and multiple geographical locations such as Germany, the United Kingdom, Canada, Czech Republic, Romania, Norway and Russia. It has been a great privilege to work with this interdisciplinary group of experts. It should be noted that in order to answer the question concerning how and through which mechanisms and strategies religious actors are able to influence foreign policy setting and making, pure confessional juxtaposition has been intentionally avoided. Therefore, the book has been deliberately structured not based on grouping actors in respect of their religious affiliation. This book was inspired by the idea of identifying what dynamics are occurring in this area and whether there are any discernible trends. In this regard, it seems logical to start it with the analysis of various strategies employed by religious actors in states with different confessional orientations and different models of religious-secular relations. These examples clearly delineate the contours of strategies that allow religious actors to influence foreign policy, such as soft power, role conceptions and their calibration in relation to national interests, as well as the construction of values-oriented foreign policy. The first three articles outline different vectors by which religious factors may be reflected in foreign policy. One may also find references to these strategies in the other chapters, since the examples illustrate the different forms of their implementation. The dependent variable of this book’s analysis is foreign policy and its manifestations in the form of specific political decisions and their implications. Of course, there are some political contexts in which foreign policy is implemented. For instance, these frameworks may be regional. Therefore, the second chapter of this volume examines the European context of religious actors’ participation in foreign policy. Again, the focus is not on confessional affiliation but rather the actions of different actors—of which one is transnational—at different levels. The analysis of impact at the micro and macro levels appears

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to be important because “religious communities have spilled over the confines not only of the private and the local but also over the borders of the souvereign states” (Toft et al., 2011). Furthermore, the research interest of this book is not limited by the European context. Taking into consideration that there are events and phenomena with a decisive impact on regional and global development, the third chapter provides an international outlook on how the activities of religious actors can influence foreign policy. Recognizing the complexity of the issue and the countries’ specificities, this volume provides the examples and reports from different regions and different denominations, highlighting common trends. Accordingly, the first part of the book is devoted to exploring religious actors’ different strategies of shaping a state’s foreign policy. Each strategy reflects one of the theoretical approaches based on the categories formulated by Warner and Walker. This part of the book evokes the discussion of how religion relates to soft power, a state’s interests, the construction of a state’s value system and its importance for foreign policy agenda-setting. Case studies illustrate each of those strategies of implementing religious influence on the foreign policy of the respective states. In his article, Jeffrey Haynes examines the evolution of the notion of religious soft power in the US and sets it in the context of the presidency of Donald Trump and the country’s foreign policy. This contribution aims to offer an applied account of soft power and analyzes how the Christian Right—which is particularly active in the US’s policy of international religious freedom—is encouraging key foreign policy-makers to incorporate religious beliefs into American foreign policy. Jörg Baudner addresses the Turkish case, placing the emphasis on the issue of role conceptions while analyzing religious impact on the Turkish foreign policy. Being torn between secular and religious groups of its population, Turkey found itself in the challenging process of formulating its foreign policy priorities and state’s interest in the context of the conditional offer and negotiation process in respect of EU accession as well as the “Arab Spring” movements. Maria Toropova analyzes the role of the Russian Orthodox Church in the modern Russian foreign policy agenda while raising the research question of whether the Kremlin decided to incorporate the Church’s vision of Russian faith, values and mission in the modern world in its foreign policy and what consequences this process may have for both parties. In the focus of her investigation are the Church’s conception of traditional values—which affected Russia’s relations with Western countries—as well as the Orthodox appeal to protect Christians in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and its implications for Russian political decisions in respect of the Syrian conflict. Differing in their political systems, geopolitical interests, demographic constellations, cultural and historic backgrounds, these countries are united upon one particular issue: they are officially secular but

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in each one religion plays an important role and systematically affects foreign policy. The exploration of the different strategies is followed by investigating concrete examples of practical implications of the religious factor in foreign policy in Europe. The second chapter’s case selection should cover numerous issues that could help to explain the religious factor in European affairs, namely investigating particular matters of foreign policy in a post-conflict zone, an Orthodox country as well as the impact of the interfaith organization in the European foreign policy agenda. Nicole Schramm investigates the role of the church in Northern Ireland on the eve of Brexit. Acknowledging the significant role of religion in the public sector due to institutional involvement, high religious practice and source of identification in times of conflict and beyond, she challenges its influence in respect of Brexit negotiations and compares the levels of influences on foreign policy that religious actors may exert. In his article, Cristian Vasile outlines the role of the Romanian Orthodox Church in shaping Romanian post-communist governments and their diplomacies, with the main focus on the religious freedom issue. He analyzes the efforts of both the EU and the US to contribute to religious freedom in post-communist Romania, and the Romanian Orthodox Church’s reactions and attempts to influence Romanian diplomacy and other governmental decisionmakers in accordance with the Orthodox worldview. Peter Bender presents the foreign policy-related activities of the global interfaith organization Religions for Peace (RfP) and analyzes the phenomenon of “global interfaith politics”, while setting the article’s research focus on RfP’s international and European actions since 2015, particularly the policy recommendations of the organization’s European Assembly 2015 in Castel Gandolfo, the strategic follow-up to the World Assembly 2019 in Lindau, and RfP’s spiritual and practical reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic. The third part of the book examines the religious impact on foreign policy in non-European countries with heterogeneous societies and multiple religious actors. Of special research interest are countries with non-democratic regimes within a period of turbulence, as well as countries with acute or frozen conflicts. Using the recent pan-Asian revival in India of an ancient Buddhist teaching university called N¯aland¯a as a case study, Greg C. Bruno traces the contours of the Chinese-Indian-Tibetan politico-religious triangle, and compares the actions that China and India undergo in respect of religion in general, and Tibetans’ brand of Buddhism in particular. Analyzing the re-establishment of an institution of Buddhist learning that disappeared from the historic record in the 13th century, the article raises a discussion about the religious impact on one of East Asia’s most contested and vulnerable geopolitical situations. Claudia Zilla evokes the

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integration of faith-based considerations in policy-making in Brazil under Jair Bolsonaro’s presidency. In the focus of her article are the mechanisms through which religion achieves political salience, namely ideological convergence between political-right and religious-conservative stances, personal union between religious and political roles, actors’ cooperation within personal networks with ideological affinity and common interests. Placing those mechanisms in the context of Brazilian political milieu, she analyzes the political turn to the moralization of politics and traces this turn back to religious input. Alexey Khlebnikov and Natalia Berenkova examine the question of religious influence on foreign policy in Egypt, where Islam remains a very important part of Egyptian national identity despite recent continuous changes in the state’s political life, and the way in which religious ideas and secularism are exploited in framing foreign policy. The analysis has been conducted at several levels, including the broad set of factors that hold geopolitical interest of the country and ideological paradigms to the role of institutions and non-state actors, all under the rule of the two successive Egyptian governments that followed the Arab Uprisings. Polina Vasilenko reflects on the religion and foreign politics in contemporary Iran, from the turning point when the Islamic revolution took place in 1979 to the present day, with an emphasis on the Shia factor in foreign policy strategy. The article explores the perspective of the development of Iranian foreign policy thought, including a strategic appeal to the entire Muslim community to spread the idea of a world Islamic revolution but also trying to reach local Shiite minorities within the framework of the “Shia Crescent” concept and beyond. Culminating this section is the article written by Dmitriy Frolovskiy and Kirill Semenov investigating the complicated legacies of the Sunni political Islam in Syria. Placing the relations between the religious (predominantly radical religious) actors and the Syrian political field in the context of an autocratic regime and current civil war in the country, the authors deal with the puzzle of the actors involved and dynamic alliances explaining the interdependencies between the Syrian Sunni Islam and current political agenda.

References Appleby, R. S. (2000). The Ambivalence of the sacred. Religion, violence, and reconciliation. Rowman & Littlefield. BBC News. (2008). Tibet protester deadline passes. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/ 7299965.stm. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Bettiza, G. (2019). Finding Faith in Foreign Policy Religion and American Diplomacy in a Postsecular World. Oxford University Press.

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Bremer, T., & Toropova, M. (2019). Die Rolle von Zivilgesellschaft in stabilen Autokratien am Beispiel der Russischen Orthodoxen Kirche. In I.-J. Werkner & M. Dembinski (Eds.), Gerechter Frieden jenseits des demokratischen Rechtsstaates (pp. 151–174). Springer VS. Bush, G. W. (2001). President george W. Bush’s address to a joint session of congress and the American people, United states capitol, Washington, D.C. https://georgewbush-whi tehouse.archives.gov/infocus/ramadan/islam.html. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Christensen, T. J. (1996). Useful adversaries: Grand strategy, domestic mobilization and sino-American conflict 1947–1958. Princeton University Press. Curanovi´c, A. (2012). The religious factor in Russia’s foreign policy. Routledge. Delgado, M. (2015). A constructivist analysis of religion’s role in foreign policy: The cases of Israel, Iran and Saudi Arabia under the leaderships of Menachem Begin, Ayatollah Khomeini and Fahd bin Abdulaziz. PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science. http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/3379/. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Dobaev, I., & Gontarenko, N. (2018). Padikalizaci iclamckogo dvieni na Blinem i Cpednem Boctoke: vyzovy, picki i ygpozy dl nacionalno bezopacnocti Poccicko Fedepacii. https://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/radikalizats iya-islamskogo-dvizheniya-na-blizhnem-i-srednem-vostoke-vyzovy-riski-i-ugrozy-dlyanatsionalnoy-bezopasnosti-rossiyskoy-1. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Finnemore, M. (1996). Norms, culture, and world politics. International Organization, 50(2), 325–347. Hasenclever, A. (2015). Den Himmel trifft keine Schuld. Halbierte Religion als Eskalationsund Gewaltursache. In Bock, V., Frühbauer, J., Küppers, A., & Sturm, C. (Eds.), Christliche Friedensethik vor den Herausforderungen des 21. Jahrhunderts, (pp. 87–111). Nomos. Haynes, J. (2008). Religion and Foreign Policy Making in the USA, India and Iran: Towards a Research Agenda. Third World Quarterly, 29(1), 143–165 Haynes, J. (Ed.). (2016). Routledge Handbook of Religion and Politics (2nd ed.). Routledge. Hopf, T. (1998). The promise of constructivism in international relations theory. International Security, 23(1), 171–200. Huntington, S. P. (1993). The clash of civilizations? Foreign Affairs, 72(3), 22–49. Nye, J. (2004). Soft power. Perseus Books. Moravcsik, A. (1997). Taking preferences seriously: A liberal theory of international politics. International Organization, 51(4), 513–553. Oberdorfer, B., & Waldmann, P. (2008). Die Ambivalenz des Religiösen. Religionen als Friedensstifter und Gewalterzeuger. Rombach Verlag. Perchoc, P. (2020). Religion and the EU’s external policies. Increasing engagement. https:// www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2020/646173/EPRS_IDA(2020)646 173_EN.pdf. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Richters, K. (2013). The post-soviet Russian orthodox church: Politics, culture and greater Russia. Routledge. Rittberger, V., & Hasenclever, A. (2000). Religionen in Konflikten—Religiöser Glaube als Quelle von Gewalt und Frieden. In K. G. Ballestrem, V. Gerhardt, H. Ottmann, & M. P. Thompson (Eds.), Politisches Denken Jahrbuch 2000 (pp. 35–60). J. B. Metzler. Sandal, N. A. (2016). Religion and foreign policy. In J. Haynes (Ed.), Routledge handbook of religion and politics (2nd ed.). (pp. 284–298). Routledge. Sandal, N. A., & Fox, J. (2013). Religion in international relations theory. Interactions and possibilities. Routledge.

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Timokhin, A. (2020). Konflikt Indii i Kita necet dl Poccii bolxie picki. https://vz.ru/world/2020/4/17/1034846.html. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., & Shah, T. S. (2011). God’s Century: Resurgent religion and global politics. W.W. Norton. Ulbert, C. (2005). Konstruktivistische Analysen der internationalen Politik: Von den Höhen der Theorie in die methodischen Niederungen der Empirie. Papier für die Tagung der Sektion Internationale Politik der DVPW. https://www.polsoz.fu-berlin.de/polwiss/forschung/ international/atasp/Publikationen/4_artikel_papiere/68/ulbert_ka.pdf. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Warner, C. M., & Walker, S. G. (2011). Thinking about the role of religion. A framework for analysis. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7, 113–135. Wendt, A. (1992). Anarchy is what states make of it. International Organization, 46(3), 391–425. Wilhelm, A. (2006). Außenpolitik: Grundlagen, Strukturen und Prozesse. Oldenbourg. Zhihao, C. (2015). Kitacko-indickie otnoxeni konca XX - naqala XXI v.v. PhD thesis. The Diplomatic Academy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. http://cheloveknauka.com/kitaysko-indiyskie-otnosheniya-kontsa-xx-nachala-xxi-vv#ixzz6i8aMq55U. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020.

Strategies of Implementing Religious Influence on Foreign Policy

Religious Soft Power and the Foreign Policy of Donald Trump Jeffrey Haynes

This chapter examines the issue of religious soft power in the USA in the context of the presidency of Donald Trump and the country’s foreign policy. The Christian Right and Trump are close allies and the former seeks to influence his administration’s policies both at home and abroad. In foreign policy, the Christian Right is particularly active in the USA’s policy of international religious freedom, encouraging key foreign policy-makers such as the former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to focus their policies according to the Christian Right’s religious tenets and beliefs. This chapter aims to offer an applied account of soft power—namely in terms of the influence that religious actor A is able to exert on government B to achieve the objectives of the former—in the context of the idea that cultural—including religious—actors may seek to influence foreign policy by encouraging policy-makers to incorporate religious beliefs, norms and values into foreign policy. 1

Defining religion is problematic. Listing seventeen different definitions, Marty concludes that ‘scholars will never agree on the definition of religion’. However, he notes five phenomena that ‘help describe what we’re talking about’. Religion focuses our ‘ultimate concern’, builds community, appeals to myth and symbol, is enforced through rites and ceremonies, and demands certain behaviour from its adherents (Marty, 2000, pp. 11–14). This suggests that the concept of religion can usefully be approached as (1) a body of ideas and outlooks, namely theology and ethical code; (2) a type of formal organisation, namely an ecclesiastical ‘church’; and (3) a social group, namely faith-based organisations. Religion can affect the world in two basic ways: by what it says and does. The former relates to doctrine or theology, the latter to religion’s importance as a social phenomenon and mark of identity, manifested in various modes of institutionalisation.

J. Haynes (B) Colchester, United Kingdom E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_2

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Religious Resurgence and Post-Secularism

It is widely agreed that religion has significance in international relations, with some observers noting a recent widespread religious resurgence (Fox & Sandler, 2004; Norris & Ingelhart, 2004; Thomas, 2005; Haynes, 2008).1 However, there is less agreement about just how religion affects outcomes in international relations. A useful starting point is to examine religion’s “soft power” following major changes in “the structure of world affairs and global interactions. […] Both in terms of actual operations and the ways that those operations are conceived and understood by analysts, the old systems of relationships are passing rapidly” (Voll, 2006, p. 12). Soft power is the ability to persuade or encourage someone to do something, and it does not involve threat or coercion. Some religious transnational networks are influential; for example, extremist Islamist actors, such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda, whose soft power “enhances [their] strength” (Voll, 2006, p. 15; also see Nye, 2004a). In addition, as Fox and Sandler (2004, p. 168) note, religion can also affect international outcomes via “its significant influence on domestic politics. It is a motivating force that guides many policy makers”. It can do this in three ways: mobilising religious believers to lobby policy-makers, cultivating public opinion more widely to change policy, and encouraging people to vote in a certain way in an election due to their religious beliefs. However, during most of the twentieth century, religion had a very minor role in international relations. It was only after the Cold War ended and the Soviet Union imploded that we began to see increasing numbers of examples of religious involvement in international relations. Self-identified religious actors came to the fore from the early-1990s, as seen in conflicts involving Iraq and the West and the disintegration of Yugoslavia. Such was the overall impact of these conflicts— coupled with the effects of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the USA— that many observers viewed the post-Cold War world as an unexpected “postsecular” environment. Before we go further, a few terms need defining. Secularism is the state or quality of being secular, the end result of a process of secularization, whereby religion becomes less publicly important. For decades, secularism was a term strongly associated with “rational” Western social science. In this context, “secular” implied a profound lack of reference to or concern with a transcendent order, involving a divine being or beings, such as God or gods. Over time, the notion of secularism became normatively associated in Western social science both with universalist pretensions and with a claim to superiority over each and every set of religious ideas, irrespective of origin, content, philosophy, or approach. During the twentieth century, secularism developed into an ideology, characterized by

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domination, marginalization, and often belittling religious ideas. After World War II, leaders of “modernizing” governments—especially in the developing world— widely expressed the view that reducing the public importance of religion was essential to secure generalized social, political, and economic “progress,” marked by measurable steps toward “modernization” and “development.” Inexorably, the idea of the secular characterized normatively desirable attributes such as tolerance, common sense, justice, rational argument, public interest, and public authority. “Religion” was pejoratively regarded as the antithesis of secularism. However, today it is often claimed that things have changed and that we now inhabit a “post-secular” international environment. According to Geoghegan (2000, p. 205 f., emphasis added), “secularism is a complex and multifaceted process which emerged out of the European wars of religion in the sixteenth century, postsecularism is a heuristic and political device to address aspects of that process. Postsecularism is a contested concept that lends itself to ambiguity. It could suggest a deeply antagonistic stance toward secularism, involving the call for a resurgent religiosity, where “post” really implies “pre”—a dismantling of the secular culture of the past few centuries”. A focus on “post-secularism” in international relations has developed, involving growing numbers of monographs, book chapters, journal articles, and conference papers that collectively testify to renewed interest in the role of religion in post-secular international relations. Many scholars also point to a “resurgent,” “returning,” or “rejuvenated” religion, a fundamental component of a no-longer-secular or “post-secular” global environment (Haynes, 2013; Micklethwait & Wooldridge, 2009; Toft et al., 2011). However, the analytical and conceptual problem is that the expression “post-secular”—rather like the earlier term of postmodern—is both vague and hotly debated. Alternatively, as Geoghegan (2000, p. 205) states, the post-secular is a “contested concept that lends itself to ambiguity”. What might characterize post-secular international relations? It is difficult to argue persuasively that we live in an age characterized by a “dismantling of the secular culture of the past few centuries.” One starting point to assess whether international relations is becoming “less secular” (or even “more religious”) is to gauge whether state foreign policies are becoming more attuned to religious issues. This is the case because despite all of the important changes of the past few decades—such as the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the communist counter-challenge to liberal democracy/capitalism, the sustained impact of globalization, and the rise of China—very few countries officially have a leading role of religion in their foreign policies. Among them, we could take account of two very different theocracies—Iran and Saudi Arabia—and

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also include the United States since the presidency of George W. Bush (2001– 2009), Israel—especially concerning the contested issue of control of Jerusalem— and India during the rule of the Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata party (1996– 2004 and 2014 to present). Each of these countries has had governments that in recent years—albeit intermittently—appear to take religion “seriously” in their foreign policies (Haynes, 2008; Warner and Walker, 2011). Nonetheless, this does not imply a discernible trend in this regard that might suggest that governments in general are ditching traditional and embedded secular national interest concerns such as national security, protection of trade and territory, or seeking to dissuade potential enemies from embarking on conflict with them for religious concerns. If states are not widely engaged in international relations with more religionfocused policies, then evidence of post-secularism—and by extension the growing importance of religious globalism—might be seen in the growing array of transnational non-state actors. The past few decades have seen the increased importance of various moral and ethical concerns in international relations, often captured under the catch-all rubric of “human rights” or “justice.” During the course of the twentieth century, the rise and fall of two extremist secular ideologies—fascism and communism, both of which led to extreme tyranny and the deaths of millions of people at the hands of the state—fatally shook the perceived moral superiority of secular thinking and ideas over religious ones. Clearly, religion did not have a monopoly on conflict and repression, and by the end of the Cold War the certainty of a superior secular world order was severely shaken. The demise of optimism about the perceived “superiority” of rational secular values gave way to growing willingness to accept that maybe “religion” might have something to tell us about how to run international relations better after all, namely ideas and values stemming from religious beliefs might conceivably assist in states’ developing cooperation and undermining chances of conflict while helping to provide an ethical framework for improved international collaboration. In this way, “religion” began its public international rehabilitation, and although the September 11, 2001 attacks rather set things back in this regard, they did not prove fatal. In summary, after the Cold War, religious norms and values began to reassert themselves, seeking to regain moral and ethical salience in a significantly changed context for international relations. Religious resurgence and its corollary of post-secularism characterize international relations in various, often imprecise ways. Two of the world faiths in particular—Christianity and Islam—now have regular involvement in international affairs in various ways (Haynes, 2013). For example, in nominally Christian—although actually increasingly secular—Western Europe, Muslim immigrant communities seek to assert themselves publicly, gaining confidence in

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the fact that they are pushing with the tide, in a changing environment in which religion—following years of marginalization—is making something of a public comeback in the context of the flowering of civil society. On the other hand, Christianity provided the framework for the recent controversial debate about the abortive European constitution while also apparently providing a role model—in the specifically politicized guise of Christian democracy—for the electoral ascendant Justice and Development Party in Muslim-majority Turkey2 (Haynes, 2012). At the same time, it is not correct to talk of a single Christian globalism or an Islamic globalism for the simple reason that within each of these faiths there are various approaches to understanding how and why the world works as it does, as well as what the faiths can do about it.

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States, Soft Power and International Relations

“Soft power” is notable across many political, economic, and military areas […] taking precedence over traditional, material “hard power” (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 1999, p. ix). “The basic concept of power is the ability to influence others to get them to do what you want. There are three major ways to do that: one is to threaten them with sticks; the second is to pay them with carrots; the third is to attract them or co-opt them, so that they want what you want. If you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks” (Nye, 2004b). What of states and religious soft power? It is widely—and correctly—observed that most states do not guide their foreign policies according to religious ideas. States are said to be guided by national interest concerns, focusing on diplomatic, economic, and security goals. On the other hand, it is also noted that some states such as Iran3 and Saudi Arabia—which are often described as theocratic states— take religious considerations into account when “doing” foreign policy. Other states such as Israel and the USA are also thought to take religious considerations into account in their foreign policies. In Israel, the issue is related to the question of what is the “correct” territorial makeup of the state of Israel. Some religious actors in Israel assert that the country’s territorial boundaries should be those that they believe comprise the biblical entity of Israel. This would imply a significantly 2

Read more on Turkey in “The Role of Religion in the Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy” by Jörg Baudner. 3 Read more on Iran in “Between Religious Identity and Pragmatic Strategy: The Iranian Attitude towards the “Shia Crescent” Countries” by Polina Vasilenko.

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larger territory than the country currently officially occupies and of course it is a key source of dispute with both the Palestinians and the international community. For its part, since the 1990s the USA has focused foreign policy on “international religious freedom”, a topic strongly encouraged by a number of religious actors, most consistently including the Christian Right. Gagné (2019) defines the Christian Right “as a religious coalition with political aims that is mainly comprised of evangelicals and conservative Catholics and Protestants”. Many among the Christian Right are ethnically “White”, largely descended from north-west European Protestants who historically migrated to the USA. Regarding Trump’s electoral support base among the Christian Right, this mainly comprises White Protestant (Evangelical) conservatives and White Catholic conservatives, most of whom vote Republican for ideological and cultural reasons (Miller, 2019). The Christian Right is not a party, movement or organization. It is a loose partnership of individuals and groups united in the view that America’s Christian foundations are undermined by secularization and that it is crucial to reverse this trend to return to the founding values of America, both at home and internationally. Lacking organizational unity, the Christian Right does not have a collective view of which tactics and strategy are necessary to achieve a re-Christianization of America and an increased role of Christianity in international relations. We shall return to this issue later in the chapter. How might religious actors influence foreign policy? Why should foreign policy-makers be influenced by religious figures? To answer these questions, a starting point is to think of the importance of norms and identity in international relations (Katzenstein, 1996). Rejecting both neorealism and neoliberalism— which are not associated with the concept of soft power and because their focus is on the physical capabilities of states and institutions—Katzenstein suggests that explaining apparently inconsistent or irrational foreign and national security policies can depend on factoring in influential norms, collective identities, and cultures of the relevant societies from which the policies emerge. Haas’ (2001) concept of epistemic communities is also useful in this context. Epistemic communities—including those energized by religion—can serve as significant conduits for policy-makers compared with traditional political interest groups because their knowledge is “politically untainted and thus more likely to ‘work’” (Haas, 2001, p. 11, 580). The quotations at the start of this section both indicate that “soft power” refers to the capability of an entity—usually, but not necessarily, a state—to influence what others do through persuasion, rather than force or threats. Soft power co-opts people, but it does not coerce them. Soft power influences people by appealing to them rather than forcing them to comply (Nye, 1990). Soft power covers certain

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attributes, including, culture, values, and ideas, collectively representing different—but not necessarily lesser—forms of influence compared with “hard” power. The latter implies more direct, forceful measures typically involving (the threat or use) of armed force and/or economic coercion. In short, soft power is neither “sticks nor carrots” but a “third way” of achieving objectives. It goes beyond simple influence—which can rest on hard power threats (both military and/or diplomatic), as well as (financial) payments—to involve persuasion and encouragement rooted in shared norms, values and beliefs. Exercising soft power relies on (1) persuasion and the ability to convince by argument, and (2) the ability to attract. “If I am persuaded to go along with your purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place—in short, if my behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction—soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency—not force, not money—to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values, and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values” (Nye, 2004c, emphasis added). In sum, hard power is the ability to force people to do things irrespective of whether or not they agree with them. Soft power moulds preferences to encourage people to want to do things. Nye (2004a, p. 98) virtually neglects religion, merely noting that “for centuries, organized religious movements have possessed soft power”. Since 9/11, the “war on terror” has been characterized by competing conceptions of soft power vying for supremacy, with religious values central to the debate. Informed by “Christian values”, US foreign policy-makers were not able to convince all Muslims that US objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq in particular and in relation to the Muslim world more generally were not simply self-serving (Shlapentokh et al., 2005). Post 9/11, both “extremist” and “moderate” Islamist ideas and movements have competed for the support of ordinary Muslims by offering differing soft power visions. Analysts have discussed the impact of various Islamist transnational extremist networks, agreeing that such movements—notably al-Qaeda and Islamic State—intermittently have greater impact on the world stage and receive more international attention than that received by most small and “weak” states (Casanova, 2005; Haynes, 2005; Voll, 2006; Appleby, 2006). Of course, relevant literature does not begin and end with Islam. Other religious entities—including the Roman Catholic Church, Protestant evangelical churches (often conservative and American-based or rooted), and Judaism—are also significant transnational religious in international relations (Norris & Inglehart, 2004; Thomas, 2005; Casanova, 2005; Voll, 2006; Haynes, 2020a). Drawing on soft power norms, values and beliefs, they encourage followers to act in certain ways and not others.

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3

Evolution of the Politics Of International Religious Freedom in the USA

3.1

Clinton, Bush, Obama and the Politics of International Religious Freedom

As an integral human right, religious freedom has long been a focus of US foreign policy (Bettiza, 2019). While foreign policy may be less of a core issue for many Americans compared with domestic concerns, many support the US’s longrunning foreign policy goal of improving “international religious freedom” (IRF). President Bill Clinton signed the IRF Act into law in 1998, making freedom of religion and conscience a core objective of US foreign policy. IRF established an office and an annual international religious freedom report that grades countries on their observation of religious rights. The act was lobbied for by a coalition of conservative Christians, Jews, Catholics, mainline Protestants, Tibetan Buddhists and others (Haynes, 2008). Bob (2019, p. 16) argues that rights discourses gain traction in human rights debates due to their “great utility in political conflict”. Rights themselves are not the essential objectives over which opposing groups compete. “Instead, they fight over a wide range of substantive demands and hope that using rights-oriented discourses could reinforce their political interests” (Bob, 2019, p. 16). Evidence for Bob’s claim is provided by the IRF, which came about due to the impact of a religious/secular coalition of civil society groups united in their advocacy of what they saw as a fundamental human right (Haynes, 2008). The religious component of the coalition comprised an inter-faith alliance, which—while its members came from different religious and ideological positions—shared a common goal to further religious freedom around the world via United States foreign policy. Hertzke (2006) observes that Christian “evangelicals” were the most important component of this new human rights movement, which helped to create a new architecture for human rights monitoring and advocacy in American foreign policy. He refers to an “unlikely alliance” in this respect, highlighting that the new human rights movement had diverse membership. To maximize influence, it was essential to develop broad alliances involving not only various religious groups (for example, the Jewish community and mainline Christian organizations) but also a range of secular entities (such as student bodies on college campuses and traditional secular human rights organizations) (Green et al., 2003). The general willingness to build coalitions among various groups with differing ideological positions represents a significant change in the activism of Christian conservatives during the Clinton presidency compared with the 1980s and the era of the

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Moral Majority.4 The power of the resulting coalition was evidenced by the strong influence on firmly placing human rights issues on the Clinton presidency’s foreign policy agenda. Christian conservatives managed to do this by successfully translating their religiously-rooted support for certain international human rights causes into a more generic humanitarian language that sundry religious and nonreligious felt that they were able to support. Following the Clinton presidency, the expansion of the Christian Right agenda beyond domestic culture-wars issues to include US foreign policy was encouraged by President George W. Bush, who was sympathetic to the views of the Christian Right (Bettiza, 2019; Haynes, 2008). To do this successfully, the Christian Right used soft power to encourage Bush to adopt their preferred foreign policy in relation to international human freedom (Haynes, 2008). The belief that the USA was centrally involved in an international struggle between good and evil was a key issue encouraging Christian conservatives’ involvement in human rights issues in foreign policy during both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. During the Cold War, the struggle had been contoured by the ideological battle between the USA and the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, attention switched to various global human issues, including defense of religious freedom, including for Christians in Sudan, protection of victims of trafficked for sex and into sweatshops, and the North Korean government’s egregious suppression of its own citizens’ human rights, including religious freedom. These concerns provided the context and content of three acts passed during the presidencies of Clinton and Bush: • The Trafficking Victims Protection Act (2000): The aim was to remove international crime syndicates that dispatch children and women—mainly from the global south—into prostitution and sweatshops. • The Sudan Peace Act (2002): Christian conservatives promoted this law, outraged by the Sudanese government’s attacks on southern Sudanese Christians and animists. The law and its accompanying sanctions were influential in helping to create the road map for Sudan’s 2003 ceasefire and the eventual peace treaty in 2004. • The North Korea Human Rights Act (2004): Christian conservatives and Korean Americans especially lobbied for this bill. The aim was not only to 4

Jerry Falwell—a Baptist minister from Lynchburg, Virginia—formed the Moral Majority in 1979 (Fea, 2018, pp. 58–60). Falwell’s aim was to “train, mobilize, and electrify the Religious Right” in preparation to fight a “holy war” for the moral soul of America. The Moral Majority played a major role in electing Ronald Reagan as President in 1980 and helped to shaped a vision for the Christian Right that remains strong today.

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focus US attempts to help North Korean defectors, but also to focus attention on the country’s egregious human rights violations and nuclear weapons program. These issues do not conform with then-prevalent culture-war stereotypes, and the diverse coalition partners who worked on these issues was testament to the fact that what was going on was more than simply conventional interest group politics salient only to narrow segments of the population. In addition, this human rights movement did not emerge only as a partisan echo chamber for the moralistic foreign policy rhetoric later used by the George W. Bush administration; for example, in relation to the war in Iraq (Davis, 2006). Collectively, these issues reflected the ability of religious actors to influence foreign policy by their exercise of soft power: successive US administration adopted the policies because they believed it was the right thing to do as they reflected essential US values, derived from the country’s Christian foundations and beliefs. Previous administrations found it possible “to defend religious freedom while also standing up for rights that the Trump administration refuses to consider as fundamental, such as women’s rights and LGBTQ rights or economic and cultural rights” (Fea, 2018). For example, although the Bush administration had what many would regard as a “problematic record on many human rights principles” (Schmitt, 2019), it focused attention and resources on seeking to improve women’s rights in Afghanistan. It also strongly introduced an important HIV/AIDS program: the President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR), widely considered to have been a major success. After Bush, the Obama administration sought to globalize rights for LGBTQ communities, while also strongly supporting females’ rights (Cooper, 2015). Despite such policies, the Obama presidency saw a fragmentation of a previously broad-based civil society coalition pushing US governments to protect human rights internationally. A leading Christian Right organization—the National Associated of Evangelicals (NAE)—had been the most prominent Christian entity advocating US support of international religious freedom and human rights in the 1990s and early-2000s, employing their “religio-moral persuasion”— namely religious soft power—to good effect (Sider & Borelli, 2018).

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3.2

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Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom

During the Trump presidency (2017-2021), protection of religious freedom increasingly focused on the persecution of Christians in Communist and Muslimmajority countries, especially in the Arab Middle East. The Trump administration’s commitment to “international religious freedom”—especially the protection of Christians to freely practice their faith—was underlined by strong support from senior administration figures, notably Vice-President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. To underline the Trump administration’s support for international religious freedom, the President appointed former Kansas Governor Sam Brownback in January 2018 as Ambassador at Large for International Religious Freedom. This was significant as Brownback was key architect of the 1998 IRF Act and thus strongly committed to the US support for international religious freedom (Hertzke, 2006). Brownback reports [ed] directly to Pompeo. The State Department is responsible for the USA’s international human rights and religious freedom policies. In addition, there is a non-State Department body, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF). The State Department controls: • The Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF),5 established by Bill Clinton in the context of IRFA in 1998. • The Office of Religion and Global Affairs (RGA), established by Barack Obama in 2013. • Ministerial to Advance Religious Freedom, an annual event established by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in July 2018. • The Commission on Unalienable Rights, established by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo in July 2019. Another entity—USCIRF—is “an independent, bipartisan federal government entity”, separate from the IRF. Both the IRF and USCIRF were established under the auspices of IRFA in 1998. Both release annual reports on international religious freedom for different purposes. The IRF’s report documents religious freedom violations in every country in the world, whereas USCIRF’s annual report—by statute—recommends that countries should be designated as “countries of particular concern” for consideration by the Executive Branch. USCIRF 5

The IRF is an independent non-governmental institution and it primarily reflects the involvement of the Christian Right in international religious freedom issues.

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Commissioners—of which there are nine—are appointed by both the President and the leadership of both political parties in the Senate and the House of Representatives. The USCIRF is chaired by Tony Perkins, “president of the Family Research Council, a religious public policy organization that provides research and advocacy on issues related to religious freedom, since 2003.”6 The USCIRF annually reports on what it sees as the effectiveness of the State Department’s efforts to promote international religious freedom. In this respect, USCIRF functions as a watchdog on the State Department’s vigor in pursuing this fundamental goal of US foreign policy.7 Until 2017, there was another stand-alone entity in the State Department concerned with religious issues, the Office of Religion and Global Affairs (RGA) (Bettiza, 2019). Trump’s then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson announced in August 2017 that the RGA was being absorbed into the IRF. According to Shaun Casey—head of RGA (2013–2017)—widespread “[e]ngagement with religious actors and communities has dissolved from the global, inclusive, strategy of the previous administration to an almost exclusively conservative Christian, primarily Protestant, engagement” (Casey, 2017). During the tenure of Mike Pompeo at the State Department, two new initiatives were announced, the first in 2018 and the second a year later. Pompeo first announced an annual “Ministerial on Religious Freedom” to take place each July to provide a showcase for some of the more egregious denials of religious freedom internationally, while highlighting the Trump administration’s concern for this issue. Second, in July 2019, Pompeo announced the creation of the Commission on Unalienable Rights, which some saw as an attempt to reformulate human rights in accordance with Christian conservative understandings.

4

The Commission on Unalienable Rights: Enhancing Human Rights?

Under Pompeo’s direction, the State Department’s thinking about religious freedom and human rights focuses [d] on two interrelated questions: What are human rights? How should their understanding inform US foreign policy? The first question raises the issue of which human rights are fundamental. Some suggest that 6

United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/ about-uscirf/commissioners. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. 7 For more information on USCIRF, read Haynes (2020b) “Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom”.

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human rights are a modern concoction, only enshrined in international comprehension since the United Nations (UN) promulgated the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, to which all UN member states must formally adhere (Haynes, 2019). Some argue that the UDHR features both essential and non-essential rights, and that they are unjustifiably given similar status. The soft power of the Christian Right was used to try to pressurize foreign policy-makers to make judgements about which rights were more “essential” than others. What are “essential” and “non-essential” rights? Who gets to define what is essential and what is not in relation to human rights? The Christian Right contends that “essential” human rights derive from “natural law”, rooted in Christian understandings, which mainly derive from material in the New Testament of the bible (Ward and Coleman Flowers, 2019). The Commission on Unalienable Rights was established to investigate the issue, chaired by Professor Mary Ann Glendon, a distinguished Catholic scholar and US Ambassador to the Holy See during the George W. Bush presidency.8 Critics of the Commission on Unalienable Rights note that several of its nine members are from professional backgrounds strongly rooted in religious freedom issues, such as Gary Bauer, former Senior VicePresident of Focus on the Family and President of the Family Research Council, and Johnnie Moore, who serves on the President’s Evangelical Advisory Board (see above). Critics claim that “most” Commission members are known for their “opposition to LGBTQ and reproductive rights” (Schmitt, 2019). Only one-third of the nine commissioners are women and only two are “people of color”. LGBTQ, immigrant, indigenous, and disabled communities do not seem to be represented (Schmitt, 2019). In other words, such people’s views were said to be in accord with those of the Christian Right, and they would likely try to use their influence to urge foreign policy-makers to “list” rights in order of importance, with “desirable” rights assessed by their accord with the views of the Christian Right. According to Pompeo, the Commission’s purpose i was to “provide fresh thinking about human rights discourse where such discourse has departed from our nation’s founding principles of natural law and natural rights” (Morello, 2019). While the Commission i was an advisory rather than policy-making body, its remit alarmsed some due to the fear “that the emphasis on natural law would mean a departure from the strong antidiscrimination policy platform of the Obama administration” (Schmitt, 2019). The Commission met for the first time in October 8

According to the Los Angeles Times, Glendon is a “conservative Catholic […] who refused to accept an award from Notre Dame [University] because it invited President Obama to speak at its commencement” (Rutten, 2010) https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar31-la-oe-rutten31-2010mar31-story.html. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020.

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2019, and its report was published shortly before the Trump administration left office in January 2021. While Pompeo and the State Department’s statements gave little to go on, commentators speculated that “natural law” and the antiquated use of “unalienable” and not the more common “inalienable” suggest Christian—especially Catholic— considerations. The US Declaration of Independence (1776) refers to “unalienable rights” that people “are endowed by their Creator”, and it is possible that this why the Commission’s remit is to look at “unalienable” rights to invoke this original, Christian-informed meaning. With this in mind, it is not inconceivable that the Trump administration would contend “that abortion and possibly other forms of family planning violate ‘human rights’” and place greater emphasis on this aspect of “religious rights and freedoms as a matter of international human rights law” (Posner, 2019). The implication is that Christian Right soft power approaches to international religious freedom would exclude9 some rights from US foreign policy while strongly advocating for others. While this speculation was useful, the issue was resolved when the Biden administration took office in January 2021. The Commission on Unalienable Rights was promptly disbanded and its report shelved.

5

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the concept of soft power—introduced and developed by Nye (1990) in an attempt to explain why certain (secular) outcomes occur in international relations—and explained how the concept can usefully be extended to include the influence of certain religious actors in relation to a country’s foreign policy. With the USA during the presidency of Donald Trump as a case study, the chapter has explained how religious soft power can be used. The aim was to seek to extend the use of the term soft power—from influence that government A exercises over government B to achieve the former’s objectives—to the notion that some religious actors are successful in trying to influence state foreign policy by encouraging policy-makers to consider their religious beliefs, norms and values. The chapter suggested that when religious actors are able to “get the ear” of key policy-makers, they can have a major influence on policy formation and execution, whereby it helps if they share religious convictions and beliefs. We saw this in relation to “international religious freedom”, which the Christian Right

9

Primarily excluded are gender-equality and same-sex marriage rights.

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regards as the most important human right, especially for Christians in nonChristian countries—in particular in the Middle East10 —while downplaying the important of other human rights such as the right to equality for all.

References Appleby, R. S. (2006). Building sustainable peace: The roles of local and transnational religious actors. Paper presented at the conference on “The New Religious Pluralism in World Politics”, 16–17 March, Berkley Center for Religion Georgetown University Arquilla, J., & Ronfeldt, D. (1999). The Emergence of Noopolitik: Toward an American Information Strategy. RAND. Bettiza, G. (2019). Finding faith in foreign policy. Religion and American diplomacy in a postsecular world. Oxford University Press. Bob, C. (2019). Rights as weapons instruments of conflict, tools of power. Princeton University Press. Casanova, J. (2005). Catholic and Muslim politics in comparative perspective. Taiwan Journal of Democracy, 1(2), 89–108. Casey, S. (2017). How the state department has sidelined religion’s role in diplomacy. Religion & Politics. https://religionandpolitics.org/2017/09/05/how-the-state-department-hassidelined-religions-role-in-diplomacy/. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Cooper, M. (2015). The theology of emergency: Welfare reform, US foreign aid and the faith-based initiative. Theory, Culture and Society, 32(2), 53–77. Davis, J. (2006). Presidential policies and the road to the Second Iraq War. Ashgate. Fea, J. (2018). Believe Me: The evangelical road to Donald Trump. William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Fox, J., & Sandler, S. (2004). Bringing religion into international relations. Palgrave Macmillan. Gagné, A. (2019). The Christian right’s efforts to transform society. The conversation. https:// theconversation.com/the-christian-rights-efforts-to-transform-society-120878. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Geoghegan, V. (2000). Religious narrative, post-secularism and utopia. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 3(2–3), 205–224. Green, J. C., Rozell, M. J., & Wilcox, C. (Eds.). (2003). The Christian right in American politics: Marching to the millennium. Georgetown University Press. Haas, P. (2001). Policy knowledge: Epistemic communities. In N. J. Smelser & P. B. Baltes (Eds.), International encyclopedia of the social & behavioral sciences (Vol. 17, pp. 11578– 11586). Elsevier Science Ltd. 10

More details on US policy regarding the persecution of Christians in Muslim-majority countries in the Middle East can be read at Haynes (2020b) “Trump and the Politics of International Religious Freedom”. The position of the Russian Orthodox Church in respect of the persecution of Christians and its political implications on Russian foreign policy can be read in “Constructing Russian Foreign Policy: Interdependencies between the State and the Russian Orthodox Church” by Maria Toropova.

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Haynes, J. (2005). Al-Qaeda: Ideology and action. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8(2), 177–191. Haynes, J. (2008). Religion and a human rights culture in America. The Review of Faith & International Affairs, 6(2), 73–82. Haynes, J. 2012. Religion and democracy: The case of the AKP in Turkey. Religion, Politics, Society & the State, 73–88. Haynes, J. (2013). Introduction to religion and international relations (2nd ed.). Pearson. Haynes, J. (2019). From Huntington to Trump. Thirty years of the clash of civilizations. Lexington Books. Haynes, J. (2020a). Religion, conflict and post-secular politics. Routledge. Haynes, J. (2020b). Trump and the politics of international religious freedom. Religions, 11(8). https://doi.org/10.3390/rel11080385. Hertzke, A. (2006). Freeing God’s children: The unlikely alliance for global human rights. Rowman and Littlefield. Katzenstein, P. (1996). The culture of national security: Norms and identity in world politics. Columbia University Press. Marty, M., & Moore, J. (2000). Politics, religion and the common good: Advancing a distinctly American conversation about religion’s role in our shared life. Josey-Bass Publishers. Micklethwait, J., & Wooldridge, A. (2009). God is back. How the global revival of faith is changing the world. Penguin Publishing Group Miller, D. (2019). The mystery of evangelical Trump support? Constellations, 26, 43–58. Morello, C. (2019). State department launches panel focused on human rights and natural law. The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/ state-department-to-name-panel-focused-on-human-rights-and-natural-law/2019/07/06/ 3bfe001e-9f54-11e9-b27f-ed2942f73d70_story.html. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2004). Sacred and secular. Religion and politics worldwide. Cambridge University Press. Nye, J. (1990). Bound to lead: The changing nature of American power. Basic Books. Nye, J. (2004a). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Public Affairs. Nye, J. (2004b). Soft power: The means to success in world politics. Edited transcript, 13 April 2004. Carnegie Council. (Nye discussing Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics with J. Myers). https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20040413-softpower-the-means-to-success-in-world-politics. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Nye, J. (2004c). The benefits of soft power. Harvard Business School Working Knowledge. https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Posner, E. (2019). The human rights wars heat up! Blog. http://ericposner.com/the-humanrights-wars-heat-up/. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Rutten, T. (2010). A troubling order for the Catholic Church. Los Angeles Times. https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-mar-31-la-oe-rutten31-2010ma r31-story.html. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Schmitt, A. (2019). 5 Questions about the commission on unalienable rights. Center for American Progress. https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/news/2019/10/31/ 476632/5-questions-commission-unalienable-rights/. Accessed: 2 Jan. 2021. Shlapentokh, V., Woods, J., & Shirav, E. (Eds.). (2005). America. Ashgate. Sider, R. J., & Borelli, J. (Eds.). (2018). Catholics and Evangelicals for the common good. Cascade Books.

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Thomas, S. (2005). The global transformation of religion and the transformation of international relations. The struggle for the soul of the twenty-first century. Palgrave Macmillan. Toft, M. D., Philpott, D., & Shah, T. S. (2011). God’s Century: Resurgent religion and global politics. W.W. Norton. United States Commission on International Religious Freedom. https://www.uscirf.gov/ about-uscirf/commissioners. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Voll, J. (2006). Trans-state Muslim movements in an era of soft power. Paper presented at the conference on ‘The New Religious Pluralism in World Politics’, 16–17 March, Berkley Center for Religion Georgetown University Ward, J. K., & Coleman Flowers, C. (2019). How the Trump administration’s efforts to redefine human rights threaten economic, racial and social justice. HRLR Online. http://hrlr.law.col umbia.edu/files/2019/11/Kamuf-Ward-and-Coleman-Flowers_Final.pdf. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Warner, C. M., & Walker, S. G. (2011). Thinking about the role of religion. A framework for analysis. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7, 113–135.

The Role of Religion in the Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy Jörg Baudner

What determines the role of religion in foreign policy? Can religious belief be the cause of foreign policy change, or how does religion relate to foreign policy? This chapter will address these questions in analyzing the Turkish case, which plays a particular role in any analysis of the relation between religion and foreign policy. On the one hand, there is no institutionalized independent position for organized religion since the Turkish nation-state building brought religion under state control and the oversight of the Directorate for Religious Affairs (Diyanet I¸sleri Ba¸skanlı˘gı). On the other hand, the struggle over the role of religion in society and the conception of Turkish identity and its cultural attributes has dominated Turkish domestic and international politics in the last three decades. The dynamic setting of Turkey’s foreign policies is based on profound cleavages in domestic and international politics. In international politics, Turkey has been regarded as being located between the Christian-European and the MuslimArabic world, or—as Huntington put it—as a “torn country” between the Islamic and Western civilization (Huntington, 1993). In domestic politics, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s nation-state-building anchored Turkey in “the West” through a social engineering project that aimed to change the values and lifestyle of the population and made Turkey one of the most “assertive” secular states in the world (Kuru, 2009; Stepan, 2000). With the rise of the Islamic National Order parties since the 1970s and the Constitutional Court’s ban of the Welfare Party—which ended its short term in government in 1997—Turkish society has been split between a religious and secular part. The division of Turkish society regarded both the role of religion in public (Kuru, 2009; Stepan, 2000) and the differences between J. Baudner (B) Osnabrück, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_3

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secular (“progressive”) and religious (“social conservative”) values and lifestyles (Carko˘glu & Toprak, 2007; Çinar, 2018; Çinar & Sayin, 2014; Hale & Özbudun, 2010; Özbudun, 2014; Toprak, 2005). This essay will analyze the role of religion in the evolution of Turkey’s foreign policy role concept as determined by two conditions, the (i) ascent to power of religious-oriented policy-makers with significantly different views on foreign policy compared with the secular foreign policy establishment and (ii) significant changes at the international level, marked by the conditional offer (1999) and start of EU accession negotiations (2005) and the “Arab Spring” movements (after 2010). Foreign policy role concepts are a well-established conceptualization of foreign policy analysis, linking foreign policy-making to the norms and values in a given society. This essay will emphasize a two-level game perspective (Putnam, 1993) on role conceptions. When national norms and identities themselves are contested, role conceptions reflect domestic conflict. Accordingly, office-holders advance a foreign policy role concept with a view to the international and domestic context. A foreign policy role concept must be sustainable in the international context; however, it may even be more crucial that it contributes to improving the office-holders’ domestic position. The essay will claim that in the Turkish case—possibly counterintuitively— religion has not directly inspired foreign policy as a system of ideas or principled beliefs concerning principles of (social) justice or theological positions on war and peace. In the first instance, religion has been an identity marker in Turkish social conflict. This holds true not only for religious political actors but also for secular actors in their adamant rejection of a public role for religion and devaluation of a religious lifestyle (Çinar, 2018; Çinar & Sayin, 2014; Hale & Özbudun, 2010; Özbudun, 2014). As an identity marker, religion became an important element in the (discursive) construction of a foreign policy role concept, which—on its part— has been directed at the national arena and the religious-secular conflict. This essay claims that we can distinguish two different role concepts in the evolution of the AKP’s1 foreign policy. While this is not to deny gradual developments that cannot be outlined in detail for reasons of space, this notwithstanding, domestic conflicts and crises coincided twice with seminal international developments, the offer of EU accession talks around the turn of the century and the dawning of the “Arab Spring” around 2010. In both cases, it led to a simultaneous recalibration of domestic policies and a shift in Turkey’s foreign policy role concept. The essay will argue that the AKP government started out with a foreign policy role concept that came close to the ideal type of a civilian power. It aimed at a 1

Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi).

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Turkish role as a mediator in international politics based on Turkey’s position as a European and Muslim country and encompassed the priority of economic development and cooperation with neighboring states. During this first phase spanning from about 2002 to 2010, religion was downplayed in domestic policies; however, the recognition of Turkey’s Muslim identity in the international arena was also expected to increase the recognition of religion within Turkey. This role concept encountered difficulties when EU member states rejected Turkey’s mediating role from within the EU and the state elite refused the recognition of a public role for religion and a religious lifestyle. In the wake of the conflict with the secular state elite in 2007–2010 and the dawning of the Arab Spring, the AKP government started to conceive Turkey’s role as a (multi-)regional power. It built on a portrayal of Turkey’s soft power as a model of an economically-successful Muslim country that has overcome secular veto powers and is therefore well suited to represent Muslim states in the international arena. In contrast to the earlier role model, it entailed the use of confrontation and the threat of military power in the pursuit of a regional leader role. The domestic complement was a discourse that declared Turkey a civilization in its own right. It called for the liberation from the restrictions that secular elites had imposed on the religious majority in Muslim states and Turkey to stop it from taking up a major role in world politics. Although the gap between the role conception of a regional leader and Turkey’s actual role enactment widened, the public discourse has been kept in recent years to delegitimize the secular opposition. The essay will proceed as follows. It will first outline an analytical framework by contrasting two ideal types of foreign policy role concepts. These will be given as points of reference for the options of Turkey’s foreign policy and they will be operationalized through observable forms of “role enactment” in the aspects of military/non-military means, cooperation/conflict and the position in international organizations. The second section will analyze the incoming AKP government’s shift in Turkey’s foreign policy role concept towards the role of a mediator or civilian power, as well as its limitations. The third section will outline a second shift in the aftermath of the secular-religious conflict in 2007–2010 and with a view to the upcoming Arab Spring towards the foreign policy role concept of a regional power, as well as its limitations. The essay will conclude that to date Turkish policy-makers have neither succeeded in identifying a sustainable foreign policy role concept nor pacifying the religious-secular conflict.

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1

Foreign Policy Role Concepts

1.1

The Conception of Foreign Policy Role Concepts

Roles are social positions constituted by ego and alter expectations regarding the purpose of an actor in an organized group (Harnisch, 2011, p. 8). In international relations literature, Holsti (1970) established the concept of national role conceptions in foreign policy analysis, defining it as “the policy makers’ own definition of the general kind of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state. It is their ‘image’ of the appropriate orientations or functions of their state towards, or in, the external environment” (Holsti, 1970, p. 245 f.). Thus, the foreign policy of a given state reflects the perception of international relations along with the values and norms to which its leaders feel committed and intend to promote. Role conceptions have been described as the empirical bridge between structure and agency, since “national role conceptions provide long-standing guidelines or standards for behavior” and incorporate the manner in which “foreign policy is both purposeful and shaped by institutional context” (Aggestam, 2018, p. 81). The analysis of foreign policy role concepts seeks to illuminate the cognitive mind maps with which policy-makers interpret their political “realities” (Aggestam, 2018, p. 84). Thus, foreign policy role concepts are based on policy principles that are entrenched in a national security culture: “National role conception is one of the few conceptual tools we have for the study of how society and culture serve as a context for a nation’s foreign policy. It allows one to bridge the conceptual gap between the general beliefs held in a society and the beliefs of foreign policy decision makers” (Hudson, 1995, p. 26). Wallace (1991, p. 65) has called this the “grand strategy” definition of foreign policy, claiming “that foreign policy is about national identity itself: about the core elements of sovereignty it seeks to defend, the values it stands for and seeks to promote abroad” (Wallace, 1991, p. 65). Therefore, foreign policy role concepts stress continuity and “default options”. Holsti (1970, p. 243) argued that during “acute international conflict […] self-defined national role conceptions take precedence over externally derived role prescriptions”. Many scholars have highlighted foreign policy role concepts’ link to the domestic political arena: “the state survival is rarely at stake but the government’s domestic standing frequently is, so it is possible that domestic generated roles will have greater force than roles dictated by power considerations” (Barnett, 1993, p. 278). Moreover, when the national identity is strongly contested, officeholders might use foreign policy role concepts to influence society because foreign

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policy provides a coherent narrative of society, its nature and place in the world. The “outlining of a sense of national mission and purpose” serves as a medium to build, consolidate, break or rebuild domestic power relations (Kirdis, 2015, p. 179). Two foreign policy role concepts have received major attention in the international relations literature: the roles of a civilian power and a regional power. It will be argued that both roles as ideal types in the Weberian sense mark the range of options for Turkey as a state that stands between Europe and Asia and between Christian- and Muslim-dominated cultures.

1.2

Civilian Power as a Foreign Power Role Concept

‘Civilian power’ has been conceptionalized as a new form of foreign policy that Germany and Japan developed for themselves and which largely departs from the use of military power and the isolated pursuit of national interests. Germany and Japan became prototypes of the modern trading state and shifted “the emphasis of international relations to enhancing prosperity” (Maull, 1990). First restricted by Allied Forces’ obligations, Germany and Japan subsequently deliberately chose not to fully utilize the military potential stemming from their population size and rapid economic growth. Both states renounced nuclear weapons and strongly limited military expenditure in relation to a swiftly-growing GDP. Until today, Germany’s military expenditure has reached only half the percentage of the national GDP of other European states. Moreover, Germany and Japan gave up national sovereignty, preferring close integration into and reliance on the protective shield of NATO (and ultimately the US). In addition—and reflecting their (then-) geographic position at the margin of the “Western community”—they also became very active within the UN, contributing to large parts of the UN budget and promoting disarmament and peaceful conflict resolutions, and turned into salient donors in development cooperation. Three elements constitute civilian power: (i) the acceptance of the necessity of cooperation with others in the pursuit of international objectives, (ii) the focus on non-military, primarily economic means to secure national goals, with military power left as a residual instrument, and (iii) the willingness to develop supranational structures “and a determined insistence on integrating itself into multilateral structures”, which consequently implies relinquishing national sovereignty (Maull, 1990). In the domestic context, this process brought about a redefinition of the national identity of former “military nations”, wherein “national aspirations were re-channeled towards economic achievements” (Maull, 1990,

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p. 92). The concept of civilian power itself relates foreign policy to domestic politics. The double meaning of the word “civilian” reflects the aim of “civilizing” international relations as well as strengthening the civilian prerogative over the military by demilitarizing (or even “desecuritizing”) the very concept of foreign policy. Thomas Berger (1996) highlighted that the “new” Japanese and German foreign and security policies implied the intention of a recalibration of militarist societies that had emerged in German nation-state building and during the Meiji restoration in Japan. Both post-war Christian democrats in Germany and liberals in Japan kept the military under strict civilian control. They were determined to prevent the military from playing the kind of political role that it had played prior to 1945, as they “were deeply suspicious of the armed forces and blamed them for the failure of party democracy in the 1930s” (Berger, 1996, p. 331).

1.3

Regional Power as a Foreign Power Role Concept

In the last two decades, the concept of regional power has been analyzed in relation to a specific international context, namely an increasingly multi-polar world in which the United States is the only remaining superpower but is losing influence to a number of medium-sized powers. The initial definition of regional power by economic and military resources (capability) was supplemented by the focus on a state’s ability to use these resources to “convince a sufficient number of states in the region to rally around its regional project” (influence) and the recognition by other states in the region (perception). Among the criteria for economic regional powers, Robert Kappel (2011, p. 275) has listed the notions that they influence the monetary and credit policies of their neighboring countries, contribute significantly to world trade and regional economic growth and aim at playing a core role in regional economic development and cooperation. Other empirical studies have focused on the state’s political capability to establish regional cooperation and institutions and to act as a representative of other states in international organizations (Nolte, 2010). If we consider the dimensions given for civilian power, regional power can be defined by (i) the articulation of a common regional identity or project and its influence on the establishment of regional governance structures, (ii) the usage of military, economic and ideational resources, and (iii) the claim to represent other states of the region in international organizations. Both Brazil and South Africa—arguably the most common examples of regional powers—have claimed leadership in their respective regions and risen to occupy leading roles in MERCOSUR and SDAC, respectively. For instance, South Africa has achieved

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an overarching status in the regional economy, while renouncing some military options, including the development or proliferation of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it claimed to be a model for the development of African states, as well as a representative of the interests of African and other underdeveloped and debtridden states in international organizations (Nolte, 2010). While there is little systematic work on the domestic dimension of regional power, there is some evidence that internal coherence is one of the domestic aims of the regional power role concept rather than one of its preconditions. In the case of South Africa, the ambition to represent the “disadvantaged” African states on a global scale has cemented the domestic alliance of the governing party, in particular by pacifying the more radical (left-wing) part (Flemes, 2007). In a strongly institutionalized regional context, the differences between civilian and regional power seem to be blurred as both claim to rely on economic and “soft power” rather than military capacity. However, there are major differences concerning the military’s role and the character of “soft power”. Military capability constitutes an essential part of the resources of a regional power, whereas it is rather counter-productive for a civilian power. For regional powers, “soft power” comprises the aim to shape the regional environment through exerting pressure and supporting transnational social actors, while civilian powers aim to use skillful diplomacy to strengthen trans- or supranational institutions. For instance, despite its participation in international military missions, Germany rather kept the civilian power role model in its regional environment based on “carefully building and sustaining policy coalitions based on common positions hammered out through patient diplomacy […] assuming a disproportionate share of the collective burden” (Maull, 2018, p. 104).

2

The Rise of the AKP and of a New Foreign Policy Role Concept

2.1

Turkey’s Traditional Foreign Policy Role Concept: Defensive Nationalism

For decades, Turkey’s foreign policy role concept was determined by its nationstate building history. Turkey was a latecomer in entering the stage of European nation-states after the downfall of the Ottoman Empire. The military and strategic skills of nation-state builder Mustafa Kemal Atatürk prevented a coalition of Western European powers from dividing the largest part of the Turkish territory as determined in the Treaty of Sevres (1920). Although never ratified, it became

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a national “founding myth” and perpetuated the notion of being surrounded by a world of enemies. Consequently, Turkey’s foreign policy became characterized by a “defensive nationalism” (Önis, 2012) that focused on (perceived) threats to the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of Turkey. Turkey’s national security culture was strongly influenced by the military establishment and characterized by the allpervasive fear of a loss of territory and “a deep sense of suspicion and a tendency to shy away from co-operation” (Kiri¸sci, 2006, p. 33). The aim of catching up with the West became an integral part of the modern Turkish national identity and for Kemalists this implied a secularization of Turkish society. However, Turkey’s foreign policy primarily focused on military means to prepare for attacks on its sovereignty. This foreign policy role concept persisted despite some attempts (in particular by then-Prime Minister Turgut Özal in the late-1980s) to extend beyond it. As late as the 1990s, a leading figure in Turkish diplomacy claimed that Turkey should be prepared to lead “two and a half wars” against Greece, Syria and the Kurdish PKK (Kiri¸sci, 2006, p. 15). In the international context of the Cold War, Turkey allied with the West, whereby NATO membership and close military cooperation with the US and Israel in arms procurement served to satisfy Turkey’s security concerns. However, membership in international organizations was instrumental and did not stop hostile relations with Greece within NATO. The strong focus on national security had a domestic complement in the role of the military to protect the secular and unitary character of the Turkish state, most visibly in the military dominance in the National Security Council (see Tab. 1). Before the AKP’s ascent to government, Turkey’s military expenditures as a percentage of GDP were the highest within NATO (see also Tab. 2).

2.2

Religious-Secular Conflict in Turkey

The AKP (Justice and Development Party) came to power in the aftermath of two seminal crises towards the turn of the century. The political crisis in 1997 was triggered by the so-called “postmodern coup” of the military against the Welfare Party demanding measures to secure Turkey’s secular character. The Constitutional Court’s ban of the Welfare Party was followed by the repression of Islamic organizations and economic actors in what was euphemistically called the “February 28th process”. The subsequent economic crisis 1999–2001 culminated in negotiations for two IMF rescue packages and the near breakdown of the banking sector in 2001. Against the background of the double domestic economic and

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43

Tab. 1 Different ideal types of foreign policy role concepts Ideal types

“Defensive nationalism”

“Civilian power”

“Regional power”

Foreign policy role concept

Defending the state against internal and external threats

Making the state a mediator and “facilitator of cooperation”

Making the state a leader country and own model of state and economic development

Confrontation vs. cooperation

Defensive confrontation

Skillful diplomacy for Mix of confrontation problem-solving and cooperation in pursuit of regional project

Military vs. non-military means

Focus on military strength

Priority of economic development

Economic and military strength, “soft power”

Relation to international organizations

Limited support for international organizations as a protective shield

Principled support for international organizations as the base of cooperation

Conditional support for intern; organizations as a “battleground”; claim of role as “representative” of other states

Relationship with domestic policies

Military as guardian of national security

Reduced influence of Obtaining hegemonic the military; inclusion position by combining of economic actors elements

Source: Own compilation

political crisis, the EU’s conditional offer in 1999 of starting accession negotiations with Turkey was met with enthusiasm by the Turkish public. Moreover, the Islamic movement in Turkey caught the opportunity to align with EU positions that regarded the military’s veto power in Turkey as undemocratic. As the longtime leader of the Islamic movement, Erbakan, put it: “We became Europeans to prevent going back to military dictatorship” (quoted in Zaman, October 9, 1997). After a split in the Islamic movement, a number of ambitious moderate politicians around Abdullah Gül and Recep Tayyip Erdo˘gan founded the AKP in 2001. Its commitment to EU accession increased the AKP’s electoral consent and provided it with a parliamentary majority in the elections of 2002, which thoroughly transformed the party system. The AKP declared itself liberal-conservative, fostered the candidacy of politicians of former competing parties and persistently argued that the politicization

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Tab. 2 Military expenditures in selected states (in percentage of GDP) Year

UK

France

US

Germany

Greece

Turkey

2000

2.4

2.5

3.1

1.5

3.6

3.7

2001

2.4

2.5

3.1

1.5

3.4

3.7

2002

2.5

2.5

3.4

1.5

3.2

3.9

2003

2.5

2.6

3.8

1.4

2.6

3.4

2004

2.5

2.6

4

1.4

2.7

2.8

2005

2.4

2.5

4.1

1.4

2.9

2.5

2006

2.4

2.4

4

1.3

2.9

2.5

2007

2.4

2.3

4

1.3

2.7

2.3

2008

2.5

2.3

4.3

1.3

3

2.3

Source: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (S˙IPR˙I). http://milexdata.sipri.org/. Accessed: 15 Nov. 2013

of religion would be dangerous (Toprak, 2005; Önis, 2012). Rather than aiming at the “conquest” of state institutions, in 2002–2006 the AKP government shifted state authority upwards to the European Union, sideways to independent agencies and downwards to local authorities. Several indicators demonstrate that a religious party’s “behavioral moderation” also turned into “ideological moderation”. A comprehensive analysis of secular and religious newspapers in 1996–2004 found that religious actors’ support for liberal democracy converged on similar values as secular support: “in a nutshell these show that religious elite values changed significantly” (Somer, 2011, p. 522). Moreover, political rights and civil liberties considerably improved during the AKP’s first years in government, as indicated by Turkey’s repeated upgrading by Freedom House from 5.0 to 3.0 in civil liberties and from 4.0 to 3.0 in political rights between 2002 and 2005. In its first years in government, the AKP government adopted a universal rights framework in its religious policies. It aimed at the recognition of the role of religion in public and a religious, social conservative lifestyle. A large part of the population regarded the headscarf ban at Turkish universities as a symbol for the secular elite’s rejection of both. The AKP’s legal experts started to draw arguments exclusively from the Western democratic literature. Moreover, the AKP’s program defined “secularism as a principle that protects both the right to religious belief and the practice and the right of non-believers to organize their life according to an ethics of their choice” (Toprak, 2005, p. 41). “Such an embracement of liberal-democratic discourse was unprecedented in Islamist policies in Turkey and elsewhere” (Çinar & Sayin, 2014, p. 374). The AKP’s strategy had an impact

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45

on the preferences of its electorate. The Çarko˘glu-Toprak survey (2007, p. 81) demonstrated a significant decrease in the number of supporters of a Shari’a-based government from 26.7% in 1996 to 8.9% in 2006, which strongly contradicts the claim of a temporary and ephemeral moderation of religious actors.

2.3

Towards a New Foreign Policy Role Concept: Religion as a Base for a Civilizational Dialogue

Turkey’s EU accession negotiations required an alignment with EU external relations and the principle of peaceful conflict resolution. However, the AKP leadership engaged in a comprehensive foreign policy activism with the ambition to assign Turkey a role as a mediator between the EU and Muslim states, in a role that significantly extended beyond “simple” EU membership. It also implied that Turkey’s role in other regional organizations was clearly connected to Turkey’s rapprochement with the EU. Ahmet Davuto˘glu—long-time architect of the AKP’s foreign policy—argued that “if Turkey does not have a solid stance in Asia, it would have very limited chances with the EU” (Önis and Yilmaz, 2009, p. 9). Moreover, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, Western states’ initiatives were eager to include (Western-oriented) Muslim countries and promised to convey a more important position to Turkey. Thus, it was the very identity as a Muslim country that enabled Turkey to reach out to other non-Muslim countries. Accordingly, then-Foreign Minister Gül stated that Turkey’s EU membership would promote “the harmony of a Muslim society with predominantly Christian societies” and then-Prime Minister Erdo˘gan emphasized that the EU would “gain a bridge between the EU and the 1.5 billion-strong Islamic world” (Kilinc, 2009, p. 62). At the same time, the AKP leadership conceived universal norms as prior to the religious denomination and Erdo˘gan stated in a lecture on the Turkish model that “Turkey is the best example of how a nation that has embraced the faith of Islam can support democracy based on secularism and implement advanced democratic norms”’ (Kilinc, 2009, p. 7). The cooperation of the EU with the Organization of the Islamic Conference resulted in the “Alliance of Civilizations” initiative taken up by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who invited Turkey to take up co-sponsorship together with Spain and found broad positive resonance in Turkey. While the AKP government downplayed the role of religion in the domestic context, “by making its identity an asset for the resolution of global problems” (Kilinc, 2009, p. 68), the AKP government aimed for the recognition of religious values. Moreover, the role that it carved out for Turkey in the international arena came close to the role concept of civilian power. Its major components were to

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prioritize the benefit of economic cooperation (while downplaying the importance of the military), lend international organizations principled support and aim for a stronger Turkish role in them. At the domestic level, this foreign policy role concept played to a liberal electorate with its support for an opening of the economy and accession to the EU, as well as a religious electorate by seeking to enhance links to Muslim countries (Baudner, 2012). Therefore, it helped to cement the coalition between Europhile liberals and religious conservative globalists, as well as between the export-oriented, traditional pro-European secular economic elite and an “Islamic bourgeoisie” mainly based on SMEs in Anatolia that strongly benefited from the increased trade with neighboring states such as Syria (Önis, 2012). Building on reforms after the 1999–2001 crisis, the AKP’s economic policies led to a period of continuous growth and stability, with an average growth rate of 6% in 2002–2006 (Acemo˘glu & Üçer, 2015), It also triggered a sharp rise in foreign direct investment (FDI) from $1.1 billion in 2001 to an average of $20 billion between 2006 and 2008. Greek-Turkish trade boomed from 300 million US$ in 1999 to over 1.8 billion US$ in 2004 (Kiri¸sci, 2006, p. 21). By contrast, Turkey’s military expenditure strongly decreased as a percentage of GDP from 3.9% in 2002 to 2.1% in 2007, falling back behind Greece, France and the UK in relative terms (see Tab. 2). Given Turkey’s geostrategic position, diplomacy and economic cooperation were mutually reinforcing to bolster hitherto-limited trade relations. Turkey’s ambition to become a key player in regional energy politics and an “energy hub” further strengthened the emphasis on the mutual gains of economic cooperation. Therefore, it has even been argued that Turkey would develop into a “trading state” (Kiri¸sci, 2009). Moreover, the AKP government carried out a number of diplomatic activities to pacify old conflicts with neighbor states. Relations with Greece considerably improved after the AKP government strongly pushed for the approval of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s plan for a unified Cyprus. It significantly improved the difficult relations with Armenia, strained by the memories of the deportation of Armenians in 1915. It even came to an arrangement with the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, perceived as a major threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity after the military defeat of Saddam Hussein. The change was particularly striking in the relations with Syria, whereby trade between the two countries increased by almost 50% in the course of a decade and was expected to further grow after a free trade agreement was signed in 2004. After a number of high-level visits in 2003 and 2004, it was stated that “never have Syrian-Turkish relations been so good since Syria gained its independence” (Kiri¸sci, 2006, p. 76).

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47

It has become commonplace to attribute much of the change in Turkish foreign policy to the influence of Ahmet Davuto˘glu, Turkey’s foreign minister since May 2009. Based on the insight that “a comprehensive civilizational dialogue is needed for a globally legitimate order”, in his academic work Davuto˘glu had called for Turkey to move from its traditional “threat assessment approach” towards an “active engagement in regional political systems in the Middle East, Asia, the Balkans and Transcaucasia”. More recently, Turkish foreign policy analysts have argued that the often-quoted “no-problems-with-neighbors” principle was only one aspect of Davuto˘glu’s multifaceted approach (Kardas, 2012). However, in the first years of the AKP government, its emphasis was clearly on becoming a “problem solver” and contributing to “global and regional peace” (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp. 110–120). Turkey’s most salient success was the non-permanent seat in the UN Security Council in 2009–2010, which was acquired with the support of many African countries. Moreover, Turkey aimed to build a reputation as a “facilitator of cooperation” it and repeatedly mediated in conflicts between Pakistan and Afghanistan, Syria and Israel, and Hamas and Israel (Çinar, 2018). The AKP foreign policy obtained the approval of 65% of the Turkish electorate regardless of political orientation (Kirdis, 2015, p. 186).

2.4

The Limitations of the Quest for the Recognition of Religion

After the first years of the AKP in government, basic parts of its foreign policy role conception and its quest for a recognition of religion were placed in doubt. Turkey’s EU accession process was derailed by changes in the German and French governments and the intricate “Cyprus problem”, which had been exacerbated by the ill-advised acceptance of the Republic of Cyprus as an EU member before obtaining its consent to the Annan plan for a re-unification of Cyprus. Turkey’s ongoing blockade of Greek Cyprus vessels and goods brought Turkey into an infringement of EU agreements. The incoming French president Sarkozy— who had led his presidential campaign on the rejection of Turkey’s bid for EU accession—could use it as a justification to veto the opening of further chapters that “would determine Turkey’s accession” (Tarhan, 2016). Public statements by French and German governments—now led by conservative and Christian democratic parties—explicitly rejected Turkey’s role conception as a “mediator between civilizations” from within the EU, exactly because Turkey was a Muslim

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state (Yilmaz, 2009). For instance, one of the leading German Christian democratic politicians, Günther Öttinger, stated that Turkey’s accession “would be asking too much of the Occident, our cultural community” (Spiegel, 2006). At the domestic level, the cautious promotion of religious policies met the fierce resistance of the Kemalist state elite. President Sezer vetoed even moderate proposals of the AKP government, such as the proposal for state funding of a very limited number of religious schools (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, pp. 68–70). In 2007, the AKP government took issue with the secular veto positions by using its majority in parliament to elect Gül as President. It also attempted to abolish the headscarf ban, which had become the symbol for the devaluation of a religious lifestyle and the categorical rejection of a public role for religion. Both attempts triggered an intense secular mobilization and sharp reactions by the secular state elite. The military issued a pronounced warning against the election of Gül as President, which was then declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court (on the basis of a highly contested bylaw). The Constitutional Court’s annulment of the parliament’s constitutional amendment concerning the headscarf ban—“No one shall be deprived of his/her right to higher education for any reason not specified by the law”—on June 5, 2008 provoked the Court’s president to state that the court’s majority had violated article 148 regarding constitutional amendments and disregarded parliament and people’s sovereignty (Kuru, 2009, p. 186). The following closure case—in which the AKP only escaped a party ban by the margin of one vote—has been described as expression of an “authoritarian understanding of secularism without any parallel in any Western democracy” (Hale & Özbudun, 2010, p. 75). The state elite’s exercise of its veto power led the AKP to adopt a populist framing of the religious-secular conflict based on the discourse of a social division between the “black and the white Turks”, which portrayed the AKP as the representative of a disenfranchised majority of Turkish society. The secular state elite’s intransigence fostered the perception of a “culture war with seemingly stronger forces on the other side” (Acemo˘glu & Üçer, 2015, p. 19) and lent credibility to the populist discourse of a mass-elite dichotomy lamenting that “in our own homeland we were treated like a pariah” (Çinar & Sayin, 2014, p. 337). The government started to use political power to act against oppositional media and the judiciary transformed inquiries into alleged military coup preparations into baseless accusations. Moreover, Erdo˘gan used the religious-secular conflict to portray himself as the embodiment of the disrespected part of the population to bolster his ambition for personalistic rule (Özbudun, 2014). The elections in 2011 developed the cult around Erdo˘gan and led many observers to conclude that 2011

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49

marked the authoritarian turn of the AKP (Çinar, 2018; Çinar & Sayin, 2014; Özbudun, 2014).

3

The Regional Power Role Concept

3.1

Turkey and the Arab Spring

The shift in Turkey’s national foreign policy role concept has often been linked to the Arab revolutions that started in Tunisia in December 2010. Islamist parties that—to different degrees—considered the example of the AKP as a role model for a modern Islamic party won the elections in Tunisia (October 2011), Morocco (November 2011) and Egypt (May 2012). However, the Turkish reaction to Israel’s raid of an aid ship infringing the Gaza blockade in May 2010 marked a clear break in Turkey’s foreign policy role concept even before these events. The Turkish government renounced the position of a mediator in the conflict between Arab states and Israel to play to the tribunes of the “Arab masses” when it expelled the Israeli ambassador and accused Israel of committing “an act of state terrorism and savagery”. Moreover, when Cypriot and Israeli authorities signed an exclusive economic zone agreement establishing their maritime borders in 2011, Ankara announced the freezing of all contacts with the EU Council of Ministers during the six months of Cyprus’ presidency in 2012. At the same time, a new public discourse emerged concerning Ankara’s new approach in the Middle East, which has often been described as “Neo-Ottoman” due to its explicit references to the past. For instance, Davuto˘glu stated that “people in these regions are waiting in great expectation from Turkey. Reunification between 2011 and 2013 with our brothers in those territories we have lost between 1911 and 1923 […] would mean a rise not only of Turkey but the Middle East” (Çinar, 2018, p. 188). Turkey lifted visa requirements for Moroccan and Tunisian nationals in 2007 and for Jordanian, Lebanese and Syrian nationals in 2009. Moreover, it established a common free trade area with Syria, Jordan and Lebanon as a first step to a customs and political union as an “aggressive policy to increase Turkey’s economic engagement in the Middle East”. Kemal Kiri¸sci (2012, p. 259) concluded in 2012 that Davuto˘glu’s aspiration for “an integrated Middle East where people and goods can move freely “from Kars to the Atlantic” was “actually reminiscent of the vision of the founding fathers of the EU”. The replacement of the paradigm of cooperation with the quest for a regional leader role became particularly visible in the Syrian conflict after 2011. After Syria’s president Assad had committed massive human rights violations in his

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struggle against the opposition, Erdo˘gan publicly called for Assad’s resignation. Moreover, in a drastic reversal of the earlier rapprochement to Syria and its previous stance as a “sovereign-state defender”, Turkey started to back the Free Syrian Army (FSA), including radical Islamist groups, and openly called for regime change. With the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt, Turkey’s vision seemed to be coming to fruition. This vision no longer aimed at becoming a trading state but rather a regional power with manifold economic, military and soft power resources “aiming to transform itself and its region by way of creating a new body politic” in a “post-Westphalien order” (Mis & Aslan, 2014, p. 26). After a decade in government, the AKP could point at an impressive economic record. Turkey’s economic position had become central for the Middle East and North Africa, with its economy producing half the equivalent of the region’s entire output and Turkey’s FDI increasing from $ 890 million in 2001 to $ 5318 million in 2009. Although trade with the EU remained the largest and most technologically advanced part of Turkish trade volume, its share fell from a peak of 56% of overall trade in 1999 to about 41% in 2008 (Kiri¸sci, 2012, p. 321). Economic cooperation was increasingly accompanied by military threats and the Turkish government asserted its military presence in the Mediterranean Sea and flexed its muscles in the conflict with Syria. However, the AKP government’s core claim was about Turkey’s new “soft power”, in reference to a concept that characterizes “influence other than coercion”, particularly the attraction of values and policies (Nye, 2004). The emerging discourse on the “New Turkey” linked its “soft power” to a religious identity. In his so-called “Arab spring tour” in summer 2011, Erdo˘gan explicitly encouraged the new political forces in the Arab states to follow the Turkish model (Kirdis, 2015), whereas in its first years in government the AKP had stressed that it did not want to be a model for anyone (Altuni¸sik, 2005, p. 56). When Erdo˘gan’s Cairo speech—in which he recommended secularism as a neutral platform that would not compromise Islam—was rebuked by the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, it encouraged the AKP leadership to sharpen its discourse. Turkey no longer lent principled supported to international organizations but rather “criticized the international order on open forums and called for a revision of its international architecture” (Kirdis, 2015). The “New Turkey” would “reject the universality of the modern Western civilization”, struggle against the “global liberal tutelage” and strive for a “post-western global order” (for an AKP-near view, see Mis & Aslan, 2014). However, the pronounced claim of regional leadership soon undermined its preconditions, the supportive role expectations of neighboring states. A Turkish

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51

study in 2013 demonstrated that the support for Turkey’s foreign policy had declined in every single state of the Middle East. While Turkey had ranked first in positive perceptions in 2011 and 2012 (with 78 and 69% of respondents), it fell to fourth place in 2013 (with 59%), and the number of respondents who agreed that Turkey engages in sectarian foreign policy increased within a year from 28% in 2012 to 39% in 2013 (Akgün & Gündogar, 2014). Moreover, the Arab Spring did not bring Islamic parties into government but rather led to a secular backlash. The Mursi government elected in Egypt in 2012 was toppled in 2013. It was replaced by the government of the then-Commander-in-Chief of the Egyptian Armed Forces, Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, who erected an even a more repressive secular regime than that of Mubarak. In Tunisia, the Islamic Ennahda party temporarily resigned from the government after the assassination of two secular politicians in 2013 and entered a long-time coalition with a secular party dominated by former followers of long-time president Ben Ali. This notwithstanding, Turkish “leaders made clear their perception of Turkey as destined to play leading roles in the region, even framing it in highly idealistic and cultural terms” (Kardas, 2013, p. 62). Accordingly, the Turkish government increased the number of university scholarships and the Turkish Directorate for Religious Affairs, Diyanet, strongly promoted the education of African Imams. Moreover, in the course of the increasingly disastrous Syrian civil war,2 the Turkish government accepted and initially welcomed Syrian refugees. Although the opposition accused the AKP of a calculus of electoral gains, expecting Syrian refugees to vote for the AKP, it seems more convincing that the AKP government was led by its role conception of a regional power in a post-Westphalian order, which entailed a religious duty to come to the rescue of “Muslim brothers”. However, the unexpected enduring presence of more than 3.5 million refugees and its strain on Turkish (“black”) labor markets and the capacity of local administrations led to increasing criticism of Turkey’s foreign policy among the population. Moreover, Turkey’s position in Syria was strongly constrained by the Russian intervention. Russia as a global power teamed up with Iran—a country with its own ambitions as a regional power in the Middle East—to back Assad’s regime and harshly demonstrated that the role expectations of states involved in the region strongly differed from Turkey’s role conception. Turkey had to bow to Russian pressure after it had shot down a Russian airplane in November 2015 and it had to find an arrangement with Assad while maintaining its occupation of a limited border area within Syria. 2

Read more on Syria in “Evolution of the Sunni Political Islam in Syria” by Dmitriy Frolovskiy and Kirill Semenov.

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3.2

J. Baudner

The Domestic Usage of “Regional Power”: Religion as Divisive Identity

The foreign policy role concept of a regional power had a distinct domestic complement as it was directed against an (allegedly) alienated westernizing elite that “had discarded and regarded with disdain the Islamic roots of Turkey” (Çinar, 2018). Çinar observed that the AKP’s Fourth Congress in 2012 replaced “conservative democracy with the civilizational discourse as the AKP’s new ideological outlook”, which “aimed to redefine Turkey as a Muslim nation” that is “supposedly freed from the contaminating effects of the hundreds of years of westernization” (Çinar, 2018, p. 177; Çinar & Sayin, 2014). The discourse on the “New Turkey” as a civilization in its own right combined religious with nationalist references. Erdo˘gan started to highlight that “Turkey has values with deep roots shaped by faith and morality” and made increasing references to “our national values”, “historical values”, “our civilization” and “values that our nation represents” (Özbudun, 2014, p. 162). The populist dichotomy of a mass-elite cleavage was transferred to the international level, in which an allegedly hostile international environment was said to block Turkey’s rise to power and leadership in the “strive against the global liberal tutelage” (Mis & Altan, 2014, p. 8). Already in the 2011 general elections victory speech, Erdo˘gan claimed that the AKP’s victory was a “victory for the oppressed”, for Sarajevo, Beirut, the West Bank and Gaza (Kirdis, 2015, p. 187). The shift in foreign policy and its reference to the domestic audience were strengthened by the politicization of the Foreign Ministry after Davuto˘glu had replaced Gül as Foreign Minister in 2009, and new departments were established under the Turkish prime ministry such as the Office of Public Diplomacy. Its director stated that “Turkish foreign policy after 2011 was the product of visionary people that wanted to make decisions beyond classical diplomacy” (quoted in Gülen, 2019, p. 20). The AKP government’s quest was no longer for the recognition of religion but rather for religion’s dominance in public and the domination of religious over secular values and lifestyles (see Tab. 3). In 2012, Erdo˘gan announced the reopening of Imam Hatip schools with the aim “to raise a pious generation”, and he rhetorically asked “Is there anything wrong with pursuing a policy ordered by religion?” (Özbdudun, 2014, p. 15). The “construction of a new social objectivity” around “common ethical–political principles” was given as the “advanced leg of the AK Party’s aim of democracy” (Mis & Aslan, 2014: 28). The government increased the hours of religious education in school and promoted a steep rise in the Diyanet’s budget and numbers of employees. Moreover, in the AKP’s campaign, the ban on alcohol in public became the functional equivalent to the

The Role of Religion in the Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy

53

Tab. 3 Different foreign policy role conceptions in Turkey 2002–2010

Since 2010

Foreign policy role concept Turkey as a mediator between states and “culture”

Turkey as a (multi) regional power

Confrontation vs. cooperation

Cooperation between sovereign nation-states

Cooperation and confrontation in the pursuit of leadership in a post-Westphalian regional order

Military vs. non-military means

Strong priority for economic Economic, military and “soft aims of a “trading state” power”

Relation with international organizations

Principled support for international organizations

Revisionist approach to international organizations

Role of religion in domestic Quest for recognition of a Quest for dominance of arena role for religion in public and religious values and lifestyle of religious values and as part of Turkey’s identity lifestyle Role of religion in international arena

Turkey as a Muslim and European state acts as mediator and facilitator of cooperation in civilizational dialogue

Turkey as a model for modern Muslim states leads the re-building of a Muslim identity against Western universalism

Source: Own compilation

headscarf ban in the secular social engineering project: a symbol for the backward and morally deficient character of a divergent lifestyle. “The aim of such policies seems not to be Islamisation per se but the ghettoization of the secular way of life, to make it less publicly visible” (Özbudun, 2014, p. 157). However, the gap between foreign policy role conception and role enactment widened and the public discourse increasingly diverged from the practice of foreign policy. A 2015 survey found that 42.6% of Turks viewed Israel but only 22.1% viewed Syria as the greatest threat to Turkey. Thus, “domestic audiences believe that the key threats to the Turkish state are the USA and Israel, despite this clearly being incorrect” (McLean, 2015, p. 10). Moreover, the lacking recognition of Turkey as a regional leader and Turkey’s descent into autocratic rule (Çinar, 2018; Özbudun, 2014)—accelerated by the failed military coup in July 2016—confirmed the substantial criticism leveled at two “essentialist” claims in

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the foreign policy role concept of the “New Turkey”: first, that the return to a religious identity was in itself proof of full democratization; and second, that both its geographic position and history would “in itself” prepare Turkey for a leader position in an environment of Muslim states. Turkey’s aggressive positions in the conflicts over Syria, Libya, NagornoKarabakh and the oil fields between Turkey and Greece in recent years did not fail to raise nationalist feelings in huge parts of the Turkish public despite the growing discontent with Turkey’s current economic crisis. However, these political and military interventions not only made the Turkish government dependent on the decisions by Russian leader Vladimir Putin and led to multiple conflicts with the European Union, but they also did not entail any vision for a regional order. Thus, to date Turkey’s political system has neither succeeded to produce an “overlapping consensus” in Turkish society on the role of religion in society nor to determine a sustainable vision of Turkey’s place in the international realm.

4

Conclusion

Religious-secular conflict has pervaded Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy in the last two decades. This essay has stressed the difference between two role conceptions of an (initially moderate) Islamic party that corresponded with two different positions towards religion: the quest for recognition and the quest for dominance of a public role for religion and religious values and lifestyle. The choice of a foreign policy role concept that highlighted international cooperation for economic development (while downplaying the position of the military) and stressed Turkey’s role as a mediator between Christian and Muslim states corresponded with the quest for the recognition of religion. By contrast, the choice of a role concept that portrayed Turkey as a regional leader spearheading the revival of a Muslim identity to overcome secular elites corresponded with an increasingly authoritarian strategy to assign religion and a religious lifestyle a dominant role in the public sphere. In addition, both role concepts met considerable resistance, Turkey’s role as mediator was rebuked by influential EU member states and the Kemalist state elite’s refusal to recognize religious values and lifestyles. The enactment of a regional leader role failed as the role conception could not link to the role expectations in the region and Turkey had to bow to the pressure of Russia’s global power. The role conception of a regional power persisted in the AKP’s public discourse, not least due to its function to delegitimize a secular opposition. However, in recent years the dire economic repercussions of overambitious foreign policies

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and authoritarian domestic policies started to show. Once the opposition shifted to a strategy that reached out to religious voters (as Emre Imamo˘glu did in his campaign to become mayor of Istanbul in 2019), the strive for a dominant role for religion in public to mask Erdo˘gan’s authoritarian one-man rule has been losing its legitimacy and appeal to a majority of Turkish voters in the domestic realm.

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Constructing Russian Foreign Policy: Interdependencies Between the State and the Russian Orthodox Church Maria Toropova

The renaissance of religions—which could only be observed in Europe in a limited way—reaches its peak in Russia with the revival of the Russian Orthodox Church and its following omnipresence in the socio-political context of the country. Having started as a pioneer of the new era, the Church came to be one of the main pillars of Putin’s Russia. This paper attempts to analyze the evolution of the Church’s factor in Russian foreign policy, while answering the research question of whether the Russian government decided to incorporate the Church’s vision of Russian faith and mission in the modern world into its foreign policy setting and what consequences this process had for both parties. The Orthodox notion of “traditional values” as well as the debate on the necessity of protecting Christians in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) —both initiated by the Russian Orthodox Church—are welcomed by the government and to greater or lesser extent integrated in the state’s foreign policy agenda. To examine these issues, I look at the evolution of the foreign policy cases of Putin’s Russia especially on the Russian relationship with the West and Russian policy on Syria. This article’s argument is conducted from the constructivist’s position.

1

From Church Revival to Church Reboot: The Evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church in Post-Soviet Russia

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia found itself in a unique situation: on the one hand, Russia performed as a “legal successor to the Union of M. Toropova (B) Oslo, Norway E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_4

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Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)” (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 2020), but on the other hand the country was deeply disappointed in the Soviet ideology and underwent an identity crisis. This was aggravated not only by the sudden emergence of borders and nationalist rhetoric in a once unified space, but also by a significant loss of Russia’s status in the international arena. The euphoria of the early-1990s inspired by the democratization and the growing political pluralism, business and social reforms was replaced in less than a decade by the anxiety regarding preservation of independence and territorial integrity of the country. Based on deregulation, the privatization of key enterprises and industries and the economic crises, the young democratic government was lambasted at the end of the 1990s. In 2005, Putin’s statement in which he addressed the first post-Soviet years and called the disintegration of the USSR “major geopolitical disaster” became world famous. However, it was only part of his Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation: “Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself. Individual savings were depreciated, and old ideals destroyed. Many institutions were disbanded or reformed carelessly” (Putin, 2005a). In the domain of foreign policy, the democratic forces were also increasingly criticized at that time for failing to defend the country’s national interests at the international level. Disappointment with the democratic government as well as Russia’s choice of a liberal political course taken by the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union reached another peak with the start of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation against the former Yugoslavia in 1999 and Russia’s inability to influence this decision in any significant way. The Allied Force Operation exacerbated the debate about national security, political ethics and cultural spaces. Huntington’s (1998) “Clash of civilizations” had already been published, revised and enlarged many times, and contributed to a great extent to the discussion about the intrinsic civilizational antagonism and geopolitical competition between the East and West. The economic situation of the late-1990s did not allow Russia to somehow counteract NATO’s expansion to the East. Western interference in the Balkan conflicts and the further proclamation of Kosovo’s independence provoked a discussion about the external destabilization of the global Orthodox space and caused great concern in Russia (Narochnitskaya, 2002). Sovereignty became a key word in the Russian political vocabulary for almost two decades ahead. Natalia Narochnitskaya commented on the NATO Allied Force Operation: “Serbs and Serbia, as the forefront of the Orthodox world,

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the borders of which run along the Drina River, are the object […] of brutal military actions. Their goal is not to be overlooked: to divide Orthodox Slavs, destroy their will to create a common, Slavic state, reduce their role in the international arena and take the post-Byzantine space into the possession of the Atlantic civilization […]. The joining of Hungarians, Poles and Czechs to NATO not only disturbed the strategic military symmetry and made the North Atlantic Treaty even more anti-Russian, but also exerted a clear, negative influence on Orthodox Slavdom” (Narochnitskaya, 2000 trsl. in Curanovi´c, 2012, p. 156). Yugoslavia’s destiny along with the disastrous economic situation of the first post-Soviet decade significantly contributed to the demoralization of the Russian nation. According to Brakel (2016), the collapses of multi-ethnic empires may be very ambivalent in their effects and consequences, but in any case they are disruptive changes that bring with them nationalistic aspirations, evoke questions of self-determination of ethnic minorities and majorities, and create new borders, whereby freedom is accompanied by the loss of certainties as well as revisionist aspirations (Brakel, 2016, p. 107). In the aforementioned Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation from 2005, Putin characterized the first years of the post-Soviet state as follows: “The objectively difficult processes going on in Russia are increasingly becoming the subject of heated ideological discussions. And they are all connected with talk about freedom and democracy. Sometimes you can hear that since the Russian people have been silent for centuries, they are not used to or do not need freedom. And for that reason, it is claimed our citizens need constant supervision. […] Terrorist intervention and the Khasavyurt capitulation that followed damaged the country’s integrity. […] That was precisely the period when the significant developments took place in Russia. Our society was generating not only the energy of self-preservation, but also the will for a new and free life. In those difficult years, the people of Russia had to both uphold their state sovereignty and make an unerring choice in selecting a new vector of development in the thousand years of their history. They had to accomplish the most difficult task: how to safeguard their own values, not to squander undeniable achievements, and confirm the viability of Russian democracy” (Putin, 2005a). Economic and political dynamics of the turbulent transition period were accordingly reflected in the social processes. On the one hand, the decline of the Soviet rule also marked the end of the persecution of religion and religious institutions. The Constitution of the Russian Federation dated in 1993 guaranteed freedom of consciousness, without prioritizing any religious institutions or favoring believers in comparison with atheists (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993).

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The Russian Orthodox Church was no longer persecuted (but it has not received any privileges either). On the other hand, during the first half of the 1990s, the religious landscape in Russia became an extremely competitive field with a significant number of different actors (Lamoreaux & Flake, 2018, p. 2). The Russian Orthodox Church was influenced by this rival constellation. Once there was no more Soviet control over the Church, it started to act more expansively. The laity gained the opportunity to actively participate in the Church’s life. The Russian Orthodox Church started its interaction with the emerging civil society and was involved in charity as well as social work (Chapnin, 2015). One could observe an interesting paradox: despite the fact that Russian society was and is extremely pluralistic, the post-Soviet era of absolute religious pluralism proved to be very short. The “free market” of religions only lasted until 1997, when the Federal Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations essentially ranked religious institutions and granted the Russian Orthodox Church its prioritized place in its preamble. Regardless of the constitutional religious impartiality mentioned above, in this law’s enacting clause the “special contribution” of the Russian Orthodox Church to the country’s history and the establishment and development of its spirituality and culture was recognized (Federal Law No.125-FZ, 1997). The emergence of the 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations is rooted in the abundance of sects that were extremely proactive in their proselytizing activities, as they were in fierce competition against each other. The lack of institutional memory could not guarantee a structured and transparent framework for the activities of religious institutions: referring to the constitutional principle of freedom of conscience, they were left to their own devices and operated in conditions of increasing social turbulence. Such activities soon started to provoke questions and disturb both religious institutions that had been established on the Russian soil before the era of Soviet militant atheism began and the secular authorities. Surprisingly, both were in agreement with each other in their distrust of the foreign denominations that flourished during the challenging years of Yeltsin’s reign (Lamoreaux & Flake, 2018, p. 2). The 1997 Law on Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations marked the line between traditional and non-traditional religions for Russia and therefore became the initial starting point for the formulation of the traditional values narrative, and subsequently its foreign policy implications (Federal Law No.125-FZ, 1997). The order in which traditional Russian religious institutions were listed in the preamble became an important feature of this document, highlighting the prioritized rank and cultural dominance of the Russian Orthodox Church. Despite the fact that the preamble is only the introductory part to the normative act, it sets the tone of the whole document and highlights its symbolic accents. The sequence

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laid down in the 1997 law has remained in place for more than two decades to come. It essentially formed the Russian scene of religious associations and institutions. Although the counter effect undermining minority religious groups was not immediate, the 1997 law marked the Russian Orthodox Church’s transformation to the first dialogue partner for the Russian state as well as the primus (inter parus?) among the religious institutions of the post-Soviet Russia (Halbach, 2019, p. 10). It was possible since all discussions about the Russian special way, national distinctiveness and collective identity referred to the Russian Orthodoxy at some point.

1.1

Finding a National Idea: Russian Collective Identity as a Source of the Post-Soviet Repositioning

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Church managed to step out of the shadow of party rule to begin restoring its relations with the state and develop new forms of these relations that would meet the demands of the time (Stricker, 2011). As Russia underwent not only an economic crisis but also one of identity at that time, the Russian Orthodox Church became one of the most important sources of integration and consolidation for the nation. Russia ranked the formulation of “national idea” high in its list of priorities (Orlov, 2010). In this process, the state decided to appeal to an institution whose position has been radically changed after the collapse of the USSR, to the Russian Orthodox Church (Agadjanian, 2017; Stoeckl, 2016). First and foremost, the Russian Orthodox Church was and still is considered the main pillar of the country’s cultural distinctiveness as well as its protector, both within Russia and abroad. Second, the Russian Orthodox Church was not ideologically discredited during the Soviet regime (Bremer & Toropova, 2019, p. 162). The Church did not officially support the Soviet ideology and therefore it bore no reputational costs when that ideology failed. Moreover, since the Church was not publicly compromised by this failure, it was able to become an active producer of meaningful messages for post-Soviet Russia. Those messages are rooted in the Gospel, and therefore they are not subject to revision, which is what makes them—from the Church’s perspective—timeless and valid regardless of who is in power and what the governing regime looks like. The cultural code is a product of the mythological and religious worldview, i.e. of the most profound forms of systematization of human experience. In the times of pagan polytheism in ancient Russia, the communities and their interrelations with nature formed the framework for social interactions and basic modes of human activity (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 8). Monotheistic religion constructs a picture of the world on other bases. It points to the sacred origin that

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defines the course of all spheres of life. The Christian worldview primarily conveys dogmas about the Creator united in three hypostases: God the Father, God the Son and God the Holy Spirit, as well as the unity of all human souls with their spiritual origin. This unity is symbolized by the Church and the belief in the Godman, Christ, who was destined by God the Father to live an earthly life for the salvation of humankind by his martyrdom and the miracle of the resurrection, as well as in his Second Coming and the Last Judgement. Every image of the world has a structure: a system of basic concepts and symbols that define the motives and sense of human behavior. The intrinsic code of Christianity is defined by the Bible, especially its second part, the Gospels (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 9). From the Russian religious thinker’s perspective, the “archetypal foundations of sociality, culture, spirituality” of Russian civilization—which define the “system of ideals, goals and values” of the life of Russians—are established by Orthodoxy (Kozin, 2002, p. 194). The “Byzantine choice” of Prince Vladimir the Great and the Orthodox baptism of Russia in 988 became crucial for the country’s civilizational self-determination (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 9). It is important to note that even if one considers the Orthodox baptism of Russia as a step dictated by a political conjuncture, it provided effective solutions to the challenge of that time, as a basis for the unification of the space and ethnicity. In addition to the formation of an ethnicity, the competition over territory and fraternal strife, several processes of synthesis were simultaneously going on, namely of three economic and technological complexes (agriculture, animal husbandry, trade) and three centers of culture and civilization: Northwest (Novgorod), South (Kiev) and Northeast (Vladimir-Suzdal Land, future Moscow) (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 10). An invention of the unifying idea was necessary for the development of the space and its statehood. Orthodoxy became an optimal choice, as it combines the ideals of collective salvation,1 the principles of Sobornost’2 (conciliarity, assembly principle) and fraternal all-union (absolute unity), as well as fidelity to

1

In life, a person can only be saved in the community. What is important is traditional justice “in accordance with custom, conscience and inner truth” (Lossky 1991, p. 40). The idea of collective salvation implies, first, the responsibility of each for each and each for all, and, second, the ability to subordinate personal interests to community interests and “to find the true meaning of personal being in the realisation of public ideals” (Kozin, 2002, p. 249). Self-sacrifice on behalf of one’s neighbor is seen as the highest virtue in Orthodoxy: “Greater love has no one than this: to lay down one’s life for one’s friends” (Gospel of John 15:13) at https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=John%2015%3A13&versio n=NIV. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. 2 “Sobor” means “council” in Russian. Another possible translation is “cathedral”.

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the notion of common co-creation.3 These principles are also recognized in the twenty-first century in a declaration of the World Council of the Russian People: “A society of solidarity is the social ideal of the Russian civilization. It is based not upon conflict or competition, but upon the mutual aid and cooperation of all its members, of the various social, ethnic, religious and political groups. Russian history is permeated with this drive toward solidarity, and it is revealed in the principle of Sobornost’, the symphony of state and Church, the experience of a parish, a working team, a circle of Cossacks, in a council, [and in] a commune. Conflicts between people and power or between science and religion are not typical for our country” (Declaration of the 17th World Russian People’s Council, 2013 trsl. in Agadjanian, 2017, p. 49). At the same year as this declaration was announced, Putin delivered his speech at the Valdai Club, when he addressed the challenges that Russia faced while daring to follow its own path: “Russia is experiencing not only the objective pressure of globalization on its national identity but also the consequences of the two national catastrophes of the twentieth century, when we twice lived through the dismantling of the state. As a result, we received a terrible blow to the nation’s cultural and spiritual code. We faced the disruption of tradition, the disruption of a continuous history. We faced the demoralization of society, the deficit of trust and responsibility” (Putin, 2013 trsl. in Agadjanian, 2017, p. 53). Modern Russia is obviously determined to protect its distinctiveness and national identity, and the main partner of the state in this process is the Russian Orthodox Church.

1.2

Modern Symphony as Framework for the Church-State Relations

The transition from unregulated pluralism to “managed pluralism” occurred in the early years of Putin’s presidency (Lamoreaux & Flake, 2018, p. 2). Political parties, markets, media and even civil society began to exist in the context of a newly-emerging system whose main focus was on preserving and strengthening the country’s sovereignty. It is important to stress that the development of the Church went hand in hand with the development of the country’s political course. There was certainly an exchange of views between the parties, but both the Church 3

In essence, it is a new interpretation of the evolution in comparison to Social Darwinism, which is about the competition or/and the suppression of the weak, whether common cocreation is linked to the principles of “solidarity” and “all-union” (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 13).

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and the state could not avoid being affected by the global influences. Moreover, it is difficult to overestimate their importance to each other, especially in a transition period. Although the Russian constitution provides for religious impartiality (The Constitution of the Russian Federation, 1993), the Russian Orthodox Church strives to arrange its relations with the state in accordance with the ideals of a model of church-state relations known as symphony (or Symphonia). Most highly appreciated in Orthodoxy, the symphony model presupposes active and equal interactions and dialogue between the church and state (Belyakova, 2010), thus falling into the focus of this article. As President Putin came to power in 2000, he announced that the Russian political revitalization in the twenty-first century should be accompanied with ethical reorientation and a search for an ideological compass (Kaiser, 2004; Scherrer, 2008; Stricker, 2011). He stressed the unique role of the Russian Orthodox Church in this process and would later describe Russia as “the largest Orthodox power” (Putin, 2005b). The political will to appeal to the Orthodox ethics results in the institutionalization of the statechurch cooperation. The Russian Orthodox Church strives to arrange its relations with the state according to the ideals of the symphony model, which is quite in line with current state interests. Symphony is an original Byzantine concept, which is accepted as an ideal model of church-state relations in the Orthodox tradition and presupposes active interdependencies between the church and state (Nikolaou, 2011, p. 126; Traut, 2011, p. 62). In 2009, His Holiness Patriarch Kirill delivered the following message to President Medvedev: “We do understand the impossibility to literally restore the symphony-concept in the realities of twentyfirst century. But we, the Church, do recognize the need to be inspired in the church-state relations by the ideals of Symphonia, so that our thoughts and our actions are derived respectively” (Patriarch Kirill, 2009). However, in 2000 the Russian Orthodox Church released a document titled “The Basis of the Social Concept”, also known as the Social Doctrine. This is a liberal document in itself, written in a language that is understandable for the conservative majority of society. The relationship between the Church and state should be founded on the principles of cooperation and mutual non-interference. The Doctrine prescribes the following: “The Church remains loyal to the state, but God’s commandment to fulfil the task of salvation in any situation and under any circumstances is above this loyalty. If the authority forces Orthodox believers to apostatize from Christ and His Church and to commit sinful and spiritually harmful actions, the Church should refuse to obey the state” (The Basis of the Social Concept, 2000, III.6. Church and State). While acknowledging the different nature of the Church and state, both parties decided in favor of increasing cooperation between them. Since 2000, the focus of the Church has shifted from

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grassroots actions and direct lay involvement in the Church’s life towards the macro-strategy of the Church’s re-establishment in the country’s socio-political context. In order to preserve the status of ethical compass for the national majority but avoid nationalistic rhetoric, a narrative of traditional values was elaborated in the document titled “The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights”, released in 2008. In contrast to the Social Doctrine, it is a conservative document questioning Western Christian ethics and its approach towards human dignity.

2

Morality as a New Ideological Compass: Traditional Values vs. Liberal Dictate

One of the central arguments of the article on the influence of the Church on state foreign policy is the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is the architect of the contemporary Russian conception of morality. The Church’s vision of morality and ethics became one key in the process of Russia’s self-understanding and “reinventing” after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Church proved itself to be the partner for the state that helped Russia to define its role and mission in a changing world. The mechanisms that have reinforced the relevance of the Russian Orthodox Church in Putin’s Russia along with narrative of “traditional values” and its foreign policy implications are discussed below. Guided by the constructivist thesis that rational arguments cannot always explain foreign policy decisions, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) argue that rational choice models are not valid for the full range of possible motivations of the key actors responsible for policy decisions. Risk and reward calculations do not always dominate, and sometimes the norms and ideas of the actors and their perceptions of each other become the decisive aspect (Stoeckl, 2016, p. 133). Norms do not come out of thin air; rather, they “are actively built by agents having strong notions about appropriate or desirable behavior in their community” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 286). The same authors introduce the term “norm protagonist”. They are supposed to “create” norms by calling attention to issues that have not yet been “named, interpreted and dramatised” (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 910). According to Stoeckl (2016), the cognitive frames—in most cases, opposing the rival ones—are built by norm protagonists, who consequently reconstruct a public perception in respect of what may be considered as appropriate and what is not (Stoeckl, 2016, p. 133). Norm protagonists are most often associated with apologists of progressive, liberal thought, but in the context of post-secularity this is not an imperative. On

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the contrary, the traditionalist camp raises the question of revising the acceptable range of values perceived as standard in modernity. In the case where the role of traditionalist protagonists is played by the Church, the situation is especially interesting because the worldview of the Church is based on the Holy Scriptures and therefore it is rigid to change. Moreover, the primary competence of the Church is the salvation of the human soul and thus it lies in the divine sphere of competences and not the earthly one. Nevertheless, given that churches exist in the real world, they cannot avoid interacting with the surrounding reality and the lack of answers to the challenges relevant for humanity makes them less relevant for modernity (Elsner, 2018). Thus, religious institutions must respond to these challenges at least, or act proactively and offer some conceptual framework anticipating the challenges of modernity. In order to fully understand the mechanisms of formation of the “traditional values” narrative—which has largely determined the vector of development of Russian foreign policy thought over the last two decades—it is first of all necessary to understand what is meant by traditional values. Although there is no official definition or list concerning which values are traditional and which are not, there is the list of basic values of the World Council of the Russian People. It was adopted in 2011 as the basis values characteristic for national identity (World Council of the Russian People, 2011). According to this, basic values are: (1) faith, (2) justice, (3) peace, (4) freedom, (5) unity, (6) morality, (7) dignity, (8) honesty, (9) patriotism, (10) solidarity, (11) mercy, (12) family, (13) culture and national tradition, (14) welfare of humanity (15) diligence, (16) self-restraint and self-sacrifice. As is characteristic for Russian civilizational code, the focus is on the primacy of collective well-being. Love for the fatherland and the people, culture, national dignity, and the willingness to serve one’s neighbor and the motherland are glorified. The Russian Orthodox Church sees Christian values as crucial not only for spirit guiding but also for shaping Russian society and even the entire state. Furthermore, adherence to Christian dogmas is seen by the Church as a prerequisite for the survival of all humanity. The Church sees itself as the bearer of true Christian values and accordingly as the force that can and should counteract the imposition of liberal norms. At the same time, the Church does not consider the total boycott of liberal principles as an appropriate strategy. The Russian Orthodox Church welcomes the creation of liberal economic and political institutions and thus the peaceful co-existence of liberal and traditionalist paradigms when liberal values are not imposed and thus do not contradict traditional Christian morality (Elsner, 2018, p. 327). However, in the context of this article’s research question, it is important to analyze the antagonism of liberal and traditionalist paradigms. It should be noted that liberal values are often understood as so-called

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Western values. Patriarch Kirill emphasizes that Orthodox theology does not deny or belittle the absolute dignity of the human being. However, the Church cannot agree that modern liberal values are exclusively anthropocentric, ignoring such a category as sin and urging man to release his sinful side. The Russian Orthodox Church confronts anthropocentrism with theocentrism, arguing that human nature is weak and imperfect and that only a person who trusts God is truly able to do good (Elsner, 2018, p. 328). Individual freedom of conscience is also questioned because—according to the Church—freedom without moral responsibility leads to the absolute arbitrariness of moral decisions (Metropolitan Kirill, 2006). Another point of criticism of supposedly decadent liberal values is the Western dominance of the entire discourse. Russian Orthodoxy denies the imposition of a Western model of values under the aegis of its universalism. “Globalisation, in the context of the domination of the Western political and economic model, is targeted at the destruction of the historically formed spiritual and moral roots of various peoples and leads in the end to the colonisation of many countries through the use of the newest technologies. Today’s weapon of mass destruction is the cult of vices, the promotion of immoral sects, and an opiate of diffused ‘universal values’” (Statement of the Forum of Orthodox Women, 2014 trsl. in Agadjanian, 2017, p. 49). Metropolitan Hilarion—Head of the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate (DECR) —holds a similar opinion: “We have several doubts, that the declaration to obligatory protect the ‘universal values’ could serve to the maintenance and consolidation of peace. In fact, there is no common understanding of what the universal values are. Moreover, it is even harder to decide, who should protect these values and by what means. Some states have already empowered themselves with the right to forcibly promote their own values in any region of the world without someone else’s authorization. Unfortunately, the notorious experience of using this concept to justify interference in the internal affairs of independent countries already exists. We believe that the Church tradition should not accept or reject theoretical constructions such as ‘the responsibility to protect’, but rather evaluate the fruits of their implementation. As Holy Scripture says, ‘by their fruits you shall know them’ (Matthew 7.16)” (Metropolitan Hilarion, 2012a). The Russian Orthodox Church prefers to stick to the position articulated in the Basis of the Social Concept, namely: “From the Christian perspective, the conception of moral justice in international relations should be based on the following basic principles: love of one’s neighbours, people and Fatherland; understanding of the needs of other nations; conviction that it is impossible to serve one’s country by immoral means” (The Basis of the Social Concept, 2000, VIII.3. War and Peace). Accordingly, justice should not only be conceived and respected at an individual level, but also at an international one,

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whereby justice of the international relations system is considered one of the basic values. This correlates with the state’s vision of international relations: the world should be multipolar, and the foreign policy hegemony of a great power is undesirable (The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2000; The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2008; Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013; Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). In this, Russia is considered as the last outpost of traditional European values (Stoeckl, 2017). In the aforementioned declaration of the World Council of the Russian People of 2013, the following was attributed to Russia: “the main guarantor of the multipolar world […] It is Russia that has every reason to remain the global stronghold of traditional family values, resisting the prophecy of immorality and the legalization of a growing number of sinful activities” (Declaration of the 17th World Russian People’s Council, 2013). The perception of foreign policy competition as a battle line of traditional and supposedly decadent liberal values was transferred from a religious setting to the political. Therefore, President Putin has increasingly tended to include respective rhetorical arguments in his official statements (Agadjanian, 2017, p. 52). In his speech at the meeting of the Valdai Club in 2013, Putin declared: “We see how many Euro-Atlantic countries have de facto chosen the path of cutting ties with their roots, including their Christian values, which are at the foundation of western civilisation. They reject moral foundations and all traditional identities—national, cultural, religious, and even sexual. Their policy places large families and samesex partnerships, the belief in God and the belief in Satan on the same level. On the extreme end of political correctness, they seriously discuss the registration of parties who openly intend to propagate paedo- philia. People in many countries of Europe are ashamed to speak about their religious affiliation […] And these countries are aggressively trying to impose this model upon everybody, the entire world. I am certain that this is a direct path to degradation and primitivisation, to a deep demographic and moral crisis” (Putin, 2013 trsl. in Agadjanian, 2017, p. 53).

3

Orthodox Appeal to Protect Christians and Russian Foreign Policy in Syria

The evocation of the discussion about morality, justice, values, civilizational identity and symphony tradition results in the similar vision of international threats, power constellations and measures to be undertaken. For instance, the idea of protecting Christian populations in MENA resounds with the Russia’s readiness to

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protect civilians from terrorism both in Russia and abroad and to restore justice. According to the Orthodox Christian perspective, conducting war is “a sinful act that is a result of the fallen nature of humanity” (Preble, 2014). War should be avoided, but sometimes it is inevitable, as stated in the Social Doctrine of the Russian Orthodox Church. “While recognizing war as evil, the Church does not prohibit her children from participating in hostilities if at stake is the security of their neighbors and the restoration of trampled justice. Then war is considered to be necessary though undesirable but means” (The Basis of the Social Concept, 2000, VIII.2. War and Peace). Accordingly, there are defined circumstances (the restoration of justice and the protection of innocent lives being two of them) that could legitimize the waging of war according to the Orthodox worldview. In the Syrian conflict, Christians had become one of the most vulnerable ethnoreligious groups. The leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church spoke about this problem on various occasions, several years before Russia decided to commence its military operation in Syria. The Russian Orthodox Church has long-standing historical relations with the Middle East. With the beginning of a series of attempts in the region to overthrow the existing regimes, with the social crises that were often close (and in case of Syria resulted later) to the civil war, the Moscow Patriarchate has officially declared its support and solidarity with Christians persecuted in the MENA region since 2011 (Sovgira, 2017, p. 152). The idea of protecting Christians is Metropolitan Hilarion’s “favorite child”. This issue has been voiced at all occasions—at the Russian State Duma, at the UN, at the World Council of Churches, etc., it would not be an exaggeration to say—at all platforms, both ecclesiastical and political. This was happening long before the decision of the country’s leadership to return to the Middle East by political and—even more so—military means. In November 2011, Patriarch Kirill made a priestly visit to Syria and Lebanon, marked by signs of support for Christians, including very generous ones. For example, Patriarch Kirill donated 50,000 dollars to the Balamand Theological Institute (Press-service of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, 2011). A few days later, on November 30, 2011, the Department for External Church Relations of the Moscow Patriarchate organized an international conference entitled “Religious Freedom: The Problem of Discrimination and Christian Persecution” (Communique, 2011). The most acute phase of the persecution of Eastern Christians was the period from 2011 to 2014, when the media regularly reported on the murders and kidnappings of clerics and laypeople, the destruction of churches and shrines and the shelling of Christian neighborhoods and villages. During these years, the Moscow Patriarchate was active in raising awareness regarding the necessity to defend Christians in MENA, i.e. in the form of statements and participation at international events voicing this

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issue. Thus, on October 25, 2012, Metropolitan Hilarion of Volokolamsk—Chairman of the DECR—spoke in defense of Christians in the Third Committee of the 67th session of the UN General Assembly with his report “Countering discrimination against Christians in the world as a contribution to the concept of human rights”: “Every 5 min a Christian is killed for his or her faith—such figures were cited by Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) representative Massimo Introvigne. More than 100 million Christians are persecuted today, claims the human rights organization Open Doors. These figures should not only make the international community think and talk about the problem of discrimination against Christians but also take decisive action to protect them […] There is a radicalization of part of the religious majority and this has the effect of changing the social climate, especially when radical forces gain the levers of state governance, including the ability to change the law” (Metropolitan Hilarion, 2012b). Speaking about Syria, Metropolitan Hilarion explicitly stated that it was with the outbreak of war in the country that Christians began to be persecuted. In parallel with ecumenical contacts, the Church also developed interaction with the Russian state on this issue. In his article “The presence of the Russian Orthodox Church in the Arab countries”, Gusterin (2013) reflects on this as follows: “In recent years, visits of the highest hierarchs of the Orthodox Churches of the Middle East to Russia have become frequent. One of the reasons for these visits is that in the face of rising fundamentalism and the resulting increase in persecution of Christians, the autocephalous Orthodox and ancient Eastern Orthodox churches in the Middle East are counting on the support of the Russian Orthodox Church in a revived Russia. Christians in Arab countries see Russia and the Russian Orthodox Church as their defenders in the current political constellation”. Two conclusions may be traced from this quotation: • First, the Eastern Churches have hopes for a “revived Russia”. What does this mean? Having recovered from the devastation and decline of the 1990s, Russia has gradually grown in strength and power, including in its foreign policy. In addition, Russian foreign policy is built around a certain axis of values: multipolarity, justice, opposition to the aggressive domination of international relations by the West and its imposition of a certain standard of value, protection of Russian sovereignty and national security. • Second, the Russian Church is perceived as inseparably linked to the state. The values that Russia upholds in the international arena are rooted in Orthodox ethics. The ideas formulated by the Church—in particular, the necessity to protect Christians—and the narrative of traditional values shape Russian foreign policy identity.

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Since the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s third presidential term, Russia has become one of the main global security agenda-makers, with a clear focus on multipolarity and articulated geopolitical interests (Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, 2013; Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016). In the MENA region, Russia acts as an external actor with a wide scope of diplomatic and military tools. The launch of an air operation against ISIS4 positions in Syria on September 30, 2015 refers ethically to the proclaimed readiness of the Russian state to protect its own security and citizens by preventing terrorist threats even beyond its borders. It also correlates with the Orthodox notion of the urgent necessity to protect Christians in the MENA region from radical Islamist persecution and physical annihilation. The international reaction to Russia’s entry into the conflict on the side of President Assad has been controversial. Konstantin Kosachev—Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council—stated that “Russia’s image in today’s world is obviously not favorable and is negative rather than positive”, which may be explained by historical processes, and the independence of Russian actions on many issues of world politics, discrediting Russia as a global competitor (Kosachev, 2013, p. 5). The Primate of the Russian Orthodox Church almost immediately commented on Russia’s decision: “The Russian Orthodox Church has repeatedly appealed to the leadership of Russia, other countries and international organizations not to remain indifferent to the suffering of civilians in Syria and other countries of the region. We know not by hearsay, but from personal communication with religious leaders in the Middle East, about the catastrophic situation in which people have been targeted by extremists and terrorists. Unfortunately, the political process has not brought any visible improvements to the innocent people, so they need military protection. The Russian Federation has taken a responsible decision to use its armed forces to protect the Syrian people from the scourge of terrorists. We hope that decision will bring peace and justice to this ancient land. Wishing peace to the people of Syria, Iraq and other countries in the Middle East, we pray that a brutal local conflict will not turn into a major war, that the use of force will not lead to civilian deaths and that all Russian military personnel will return home alive” (Patriarch Kirill, 2015). The speed with which the Patriarch Kirill reacted with a public statement to the foreign policy decision of the Russian government was remarkable. In comparison, when the scandal over the unauthorized performance of the punk band Pussy Riot in the Cathedral of Christ the Savior broke out, Patriarch Kirill—from whom everyone expected a judgment on the band members—remained silent for almost a month. Not only the Primate of the Russian 4

A terrorist organization banned in Russia.

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Orthodox Church but also those who work in his orbit almost immediately voiced their opinion regarding the start of the military operation in Syria. In the days of the first Russian bombing raids on ISIS positions in Syria, the world media spread the news that the Russian Orthodox Church called Russia’s participation in the fighting in Syria a “holy war”. According to Sergey Chapnin (2015), the media inaccurately quoted Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin, who said in fact: “The fight against terrorism, for a just peace, for the dignity of people who are challenged by terror is a very moral, it is, if you like, a holy fight, and today our country is probably the most active force in the world that opposes terror” (BBC, 2015). Despite the inaccurate interpretation in the press, both quotes clearly show the attitude of the Russian Orthodox Church to Russian participation in resolving the Syrian conflict and maintaining the Syrian statehood. The Russian Orthodox Church also again called upon the international community to maximize all possible efforts to stop all forms of discrimination against Christians in the Middle East and certain African states. The representatives of the Russian Orthodox Church expressed their “call to action” to protect Christians in the MENA region, not only within Russia. One could observe the unprecedented cooperation between the Russian Orthodox and the Roman Catholic Churches in respect of this issue. The deep concern about the secularization of the West and the disastrous situation of the MENA Christians was expressed in the Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia on February 12, 2016. Both primates “call upon the international community to act urgently in order to prevent the further expulsion of Christians from the Middle East” (Joint Declaration of Pope Francis and Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia, 2016). The necessity to unify peace efforts was explicitly stressed in this Joint Declaration. Symbolically, the historical meeting of the Church Primates was held in Havana, only two days after Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev referred to the Cuban Crisis of 1962 and warned against “sliding to a new Cold war” (BBC, 2016) in his speech at the Security Conference in Munich. Despite the fact that the Russian Orthodox Church is addressing the international community with appeals to protect civilians persecuted for their faith, it is obvious that the Church primarily considers Russia’s presence in Syria as crucial for the protection of the Arab republic’s Christians and Muslims from terrorists. This view was also expressed in 2019 by the Chairman of the Synodal Department for Relations with Society and the Media of the Moscow Patriarchate, Vladimir Legoyda, at the XVI Annual Meeting of the Valdai Club in Sochi, dedicated to the Middle East issues in the context of Russian politics: “The region, which for centuries has developed mechanisms of interaction between people of different

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faiths, has never known such persecution against Christians. […] In the twentyfirst century, we have witnessed the mass expulsion of Christians from the region, and here we must admit that the disruption of the inter-religious equilibrium in the Middle East threatens not only the region, but the entire system of international relations and global politics. […] We [the Russian Orthodox Church] regard Russia’s presence in Syria as a protection for Christians and Muslims, who are now in the hostage of the pseudo-religious terrorism” (TASS, 2019).

4

Conclusion

Actors who are in a position to establish their worldview as a norm need to have serious reputational capital and resources. Moreover, if we are talking about the Russian Orthodox Church acting as a norm creator and protagonist, it needs to address the phenomena of modernity in a comprehensive way, not only offering a response to private challenges but anticipating the social ones and creating a certain semantic framework providing the answers and solutions. The results of such work are not immediately visible, as it takes time to transfer a certain agenda from the religious to the political field, root it in and popularize it. It is difficult to overestimate the transition following the collapse of the Soviet Union, given that it was not only a question of revising borders and the appearance of new independent states on the map, but a complex systemic change, including a change of the worldview’s paradigm in Russia. Today, almost 30 years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, 21st-century Russia is often called “Putin’s Russia”. In his feature article “Putin’s Long State”, speaking of personified political epochs in Russian history, Vladislav Surkov puts forward the following thesis: “Created by people, in Gumilev’s words, of the ‘long will’, these big political machines, replacing each other, repairing and adapting on the fly, have ensured that the Russian world has been stubbornly moving upwards for century after century. Putin’s big political machine is just gaining momentum and setting itself up for a long, difficult and interesting job. Its full power is far ahead, so that Russia will still be Putin’s state many years from now, just as modern France still calls itself de Gaulle’s Fifth Republic, Turkey (with its current anti-Kemalism) still draws on the Six Arrows ideology of Ataturk, and the United States still refers to the images and values of the semi-legendary ‘Founding Fathers’” (Surkov, 2019). To be considered a politician of the “long will”, it is impossible to limit oneself to tactical policy decisions, while in contrast a comprehensive vision of the country’s development must be formulated based on not only the political strategy but also a normative value system. A coherent long-term strategy for state development is

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easier to implement if that state is united behind a strong leader with a common mission and worldview. Indeed, in Putin’s Russia, one of the major sources of unifying ideas is the Russian Orthodox Church. Traditional morality has become the keynote of the Russian Orthodox Church in recent years, which has been successfully incorporated into the political agenda. Why did the traditional values’ discourse become the narrative that could determine the country’s development for a solid period of time? There are several reasons: • First, this narrative not only reflects Orthodox ethics: the narrative of traditional values refers to both Islam and Judaism and thus appeals to the absolute majority of the Russian population. It is often argued that the moral values to which—for example—Russian Muslims refer are much closer to Orthodox values than the ethics of quite a few non-Orthodox Christian denominations, which adapted too much to the goals and norms of modernity (Lepechin, 2018, p. 2). Therefore, the core values developed by Russian religious thinkers not only result from the monastic and church communities’ understanding of life, but from coping with the co-existence of different Eurasian peoples, their communities, beliefs and cultures. In the process of overcoming feudal fragmentation and political consolidation of the country, the Orthodox faith, cult practice, Russian work and family traditions—thanks to the commonality of language—laid the foundation for the national and cultural commonality of several peoples of Russia: not only those who professed Orthodoxy, but also those who adhered to other denominations traditional for Russia, such as Islam, Buddhism, and Judaism (Halbach, 2019, p. 10 ff.). Finally, Orthodox Christianity also sees Russia as a community of communities (Chupina & Sherpaev 2015, p. 14). According to Soloviev, Russia is a great collective creature (Chupina & Sherpayev, 2015, p. 16). • Second, by creating a common “value space” for broad groups of people of different ethnic and confessional affiliations, the Russian Orthodox Church also avoids the nationalist charge. Strengthening Russia’s social solidarity is a crucial aspect that has enabled the narrative of traditional values to move from exclusively religious to political discourse. Social connection factors are extremely important for Russia, given that they are the true guarantors of its integrity and thereby its sovereignty. In a multinational and multiconfessional country, National Unity Day is a holiday marked with the participation of religious leaders in official political events, unifying statements and symbolic meetings, whereby it is unsurprising that unifying narrative found so much political support.

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Russia has often been accused of having imperial ambitions, although this accusation is only based on the Western perception and definition of the Empire. The geopolitical position of Russia, and its previous experience in internal rather than external colonization makes this accusation questionable. The current Orthodox component of the “distinctiveness” concept in the Russian foreign policy discourse is not simply the result of the appropriately-placed ideological emphasis. Paradoxically, private Orthodoxy and intrinsic Orthodox ideals rooted in the Gospel are bound up with yet another global form of the Orthodox self-expression, which frames the Russian sense of self-understanding in general and the selfpositioning in the system of international relations. If we consider Orthodoxy to be the backbone of the country’s core identity, it is important to take into account the evolution of the Russian Orthodox Church. Bearing in mind that the Russian Orthodox Church is a multinational church, it is understandable why the Church has distanced itself from the notion of a titular nation and speaks of a mission, not for a specific people but a mission for humanity. Emphasizing the importance of sovereignty, the Russian concept of multipolarity resonates with such Orthodox concepts as Sobornost’, which is inscribed in the Russian cultural DNA. There are serious reasons to believe that the current position of the Russian Orthodox Church is to place its own interests higher than those of the state, but to calibrate the position with constant respect to the changing security situation in the country and abroad as well as Russia’s attitude towards those changes. The Church is not only dealing (within its authorities and competencies) with the same topics and regions as the state, as sometimes the Church anticipates the state’s activities and foreign policy direction, as in the case of Syria. Maintaining the balance between individual pastoral care and active political engagement is a fine art that the Russian Orthodox Church plays in modern Russia. Upon first glance, the Church is in the best period of its history for decades. From a persecuted institution, the Russian Orthodox Church has become the most prosperous Orthodox Church in the world, observing never-ending queues to its shrines and the pupils who are being taught the basics of its dogma in public schools (Lamoreaux & Flake, 2018, p. 2). However, the hidden danger of the current trend is that the increasing transfer of the Orthodox narrative to the public field undermines its deep potential, which has for centuries been a unique resource of the nation’s mobilization and maintenance of national distinctness even in the time of the hardest challenges. The triumphalism of the Moscow Patriarchate and its visible domination over the religious domain in Russia due to the “golden age” in its relationship with the state escalates the civil distrust and promotes arguments about the Church’s cooptation.

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Thus, it seems that today the Orthodoxy in Russia exists at least in three dimensions: private, civil and intrinsic cultural ones. The balance between them has not yet been found, and a bias towards one of the dimensions would mean the deformation of all of them. For instance, the successful realization of the cooperative strategy with the state by the Moscow Patriarchate undermines a foundation of its success. The symbolic curtsies toward the state strengthen the criticism of the Church’s alleged obedience to it. The Church’s cooptation by the state would mean the demolition of the notion of Sobornost’ and the following collapse of the whole Orthodox worldview. In this case the state would not be able to consider the Church as a main pillar of the civilizational identity any longer, so the instrumentalization of the Church is also not in the state’s long-term interest. Nevertheless, these potential risks hidden in the seemingly harmonic sound of the propagated symphony exacerbate the need for the Russian Orthodox Church to elaborate a new language in its dialogue not only with the Russian state but also with Orthodox laity to avoid possible traps of state favoritism and bring the Church to a new level of sustainable and successful development.

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Lossky, N. (1991). Иcтopия pyccкoй филocoфии. M: Coвeтcкий пиcaтeль. Metropolitan Kirill. (2006). Mитpoпoлит Киpилл – „Кoмcoмoльcкoй пpaвдe“: „Пoнятиe дeмoкpaтии имeeт нpaвcтвeннoe измepeниe, и oнa coчeтaeмa c тpaдициeй“. The Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations. https://mospat.ru/arc hive/2006/07/32354/. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Metropolitan Hilarion. (2012a). Oтвeты Пpeдceдaтeля Oтдeлa внeшниx цepкoвныxcвязe˘и Mocкoвcкoгo Пaтpиapxaтa митpoпoлитa Boлoкoлaмcкoгo нa вoпpocы Гe˘идeльбepгcкoгo yнивepcитeтa. In „Perfekter Zusammenklang? – Die Verflechtungen von Staat und Russisch-Orthodoxer Kirche im Bereich des Friedensengagements“, 2013, Maria Toropova, Unveröffentlichte Masterarbeit, Anhang, Universität Heidelberg Metropolitan Hilarion. (2012b). Пpoтивoдeйcтвиe диcкpиминaции xpиcтиaн в миpe кaк вклaд в paзвитиe кoнцeпции пpaв чeлoвeкa. Bыcтyплeниe пpeдceдaтeля OBЦC митpoпoлитa Boлoкoлaмcкoгo Илapиoнa нa зaceдaнии III Кoмитeтa OOH (HьюЙopк, 23 oктябpя 2012 гoдa). Patriarchia.ru. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/2547007. html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Narochnitskaya, N. (2000). Poccия и миpoвoй вocтoчный вoпpoc. Pravoslavie.ru. https:// pravoslavie.ru/5098.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Narochnitskaya, N. (2002). Poccия и pyccкиe в миpoвo˘и иcтopии. M: Meждyнapoдныe oтнoшeния. Nikolaou, T. (2011). Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche aus orthodoxer Sicht. In B. Kämper, H.-W. Thönnes (Hrsg.), Essener Gespräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche. Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche in der Orthodoxie (S. 125–138, 151–170). Aschendorf. Orlov, I. (2010). Haциoнaльнaя идeя Poccии кaк мexaнизм дyxoвнoй мoбилизaции и цивилизaциoннoй идeнтичнocти. Mиp и Пoлитикa, 7, 79–85. Patriarch Kirill. (2009). Apxипacтыpи — yчacтники Пoмecтнoгo Coбopa пpиcyтcтвoвaли нa пpиeмe в Гeopгиeвcкoм зaлe Бoльшoгo кpeмлeвcкoгo двopцa. Patriarchia.ru. http:// www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/548365.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Patriarch Kirill. (2015). Пaтpиapx Киpилл пpoкoммeнтиpoвaл yчacтиe PФ в вoeннoй oпepaции в Cиpии. Poccийcкaя Гaзeтa. https://rg.ru/2015/09/30/patriarh-site-anons. html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Preble, P.-M. (2014). Praying for peace. Huffpost. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/prayingfor-peace_b_5661462. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Press-service of the Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia. (2011). Пpeдcтoятeль Pyccкoй Пpaвocлaвнoй Цepкви пoceтил Уcпeнcкий Бaлaмaндcкий мoнacтыpь в Ливaнe. Patriarchia.ru. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/1678901.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Putin, V. (2005a). Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation. President of Russia. The Kremlin. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22931. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Putin, V. (2005b). Зaключитeльнoe cлoвo нa вcтpeчe c члeнaми Cвящeннoгo Кинoтa. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/23165. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Putin, V. (2013). Bыcтyплeниe Bлaдимиpa Пyтинa нa зaceдaнии клyбa “Baлдaй”. Poccийcкaя гaзeтa. http://www.rg.ru/2013/09/19/stenogramma-site.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Scherrer, J. (2008). Kirche und Identität im postsowjetischen Russland. Ost-West Europäische Perspektiven, 1, 119–126.

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Sovgira, Y. (2017). Oб ocoбeннocтяx пoлoжeния xpиcтиaнcкиx oбщин paзныx кoнфeccи˘и в Cиpии в 2011–2016 гг. Communicology, 5(2), 134–143. https://dx.doi.org/10.21453/ 2311-3065-2017-5-2-134-143 Statement of the Forum of Orthodox Women. (2014). Зaявлeниe yчacтникoв III Фopyмa пpaвocлaвныx жeнщин. Patriarchia.ru. http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/3664449.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Stoeckl, K. (2016). The Russian Orthodox Church as moral norm entrepreneur. Religion, State and Society, 44(2), 132–151. https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2016.1194010 Stoeckl, K. (2017). Analyse: Russland als Verteidiger traditioneller Werte? Eine Idee und ihre Grenzen. http://www.bpb.de/internatio-nales/europa/russland/analysen/249067/ana lyse-russland-als-vertei-diger-traditioneller-werte-eine-idee-und-ihre-grenzen. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Stricker, G. (2011). Zum Verhältnis von Kirche und Staat in der Orthodoxie. In B.Kämper, H.-W. Thönnes (Hrsg.), Essener Gespräche zum Thema Staat und Kirche. Das Verhältnis von Staat und Kirche in der Orthodoxie (S. 7–124). Aschendorf. Surkov, V. (2019). Дoлгoe гocyдapcтвo Пyтинa. O тoм, чтo здecь вooбщe пpoиcxoдит. Heзaвиcимaя гaзeтa. https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-11/5_7503_surkov.html. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. TASS. (2019). PПЦ cчитaeт Poccию зaщитoй xpиcтиaн и мycyльмaн в Cиpии. https://tass. ru/obschestvo/6954108. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Basis of the Social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church. (2000). The Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations. https://mospat.ru/en/%20d ocuments/social-concepts/. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Constitution of the Russian Federation. (1993). http://www.constitution.ru/en/1000300001.htm. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Constitution of the Russian Federation. (2020). Hoвый тeкcт Кoнcтитyции PФ c пoпpaвкaми 2020. Гocyдapcтвeннaя Дyмa Фeдepaльнoгo coбpaния Poccийcкoй Фeдepaции. http://duma.gov.ru/news/48953/. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. (2008). President of Russia. The Kremlin. http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/4116. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation. (2000). https://fas.org/nuke/guide/rus sia/doctrine/econcept.htm. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. The Russian Orthodox Church’s basic teaching on human dignity, freedom and rights. (2008). The Russian Orthodox Church. Department for External Church Relations. https://mos pat.ru/en/documents/dignity-freedom-rights/. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020. Traut, T. (2011). Der Staat im Denken der Russisch-Orthodoxen Kirche. In S.W. Fuchs, S. Garling (Hrsg.), Religion in Diktatur und Demokratie. Zur Bedeutung religiöser Werte, Praktiken und Institutionen in politischen Transformationsprozessen (S. 59–78). Lit. World Council of the Russian People. (2011). Бaзиcныe цeннocти – ocнoвa oбщeнaциoнaльнoй идeнтичнocти. https://vrns.ru/documents/68/1031. Accessed: 20 Dec. 2020.

The Role of Religion in Foreign Policy in the European Context—Examples and Reports

Empowerment of Grassroots. Northern Ireland, Brexit and the Churches Nicole Schramm

“We (the participants in the multi-party negotiations) are committed to partnership, equality and mutual respect as the basis of relationships within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between these islands” (Belfast Agreement, 1998, p. 2). Twenty years on, the promises of the Belfast Agreement are at risk, and the islands of Ireland and Great Britain are facing a completely new grain of division as well as a border question once again. In 1998, the Belfast Agreement—also referred to as the Good Friday Agreement—settled a conflict on the political stage of Northern Ireland. The two conflicting parties of loyalists and republicans, as well as British and Irish, or unionists and nationalists officially accepted their continuing diversity, as well as manifesting the ‘principle of consent’ regarding the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. This aims at the main point of contention and their ideological positions regarding the British border and the constitutional status of Northern Ireland.1 Following the Good Friday Agreement (Belfast Agreement, 1998, p. 4), Northern Ireland settled into an amicable relation with the Republic of Ireland just as much as the United Kingdom by governing its own interests and catering for its own needs as the prime source of authority of all devolved responsibilities. In addition, hard border controls were 1

The roots of the conflict in the North of Ireland date back several centuries. For further information, consult the works of Rafferty (1994) or the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN) web service of the Ulster University, www.cain.ulster.ac.uk. The deep-rooted conflict resulted not only from the historic plantation of Ulster in the seventeenth century and partition in 1921 but it also took on new dimensions throughout the late-1960s and the ongoing civil rights issues. The latter period is commonly referred to as ‘The Troubles’.

N. Schramm (B) Münster, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_5

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abandoned, and border areas were able to develop relations across the national boundaries. The Belfast Agreement is one of the key events within the Northern Ireland peace process and it majorly participated in ending most acts of violence of the conflict, in particular those associated with paramilitary groups and police forces. At the time of the United Kingdom European membership referendum—commonly referred to as the EU or Brexit referendum—in June 2016, the border question was ignored at Westminster and in other parts of Great Britain. For the Northern Irish population, this was a fateful situation to be in, and having lived in decades of conflict, it was also very threatening to the peace process and reconciliation. The Brexit campaign, the result of the referendum and the lengthy negotiation process are not only crucial at an international level, but also for the Irish nation, which is governed by two constitutional entities. The North of Ireland—with most of it being part of the United Kingdom—was a place of conflict for most of the twentieth century, with religion being inaccurately cited as the reason. The dynamics are in fact socio-political with religious and historic dimensions. Sectarian violence, a systematic deprivation of Catholic communities, paramilitary activity and police violence caused thousands of deaths up until the early-2000s.2 The challenges faced by society are complex and affecting all areas of public life.

1

Churches as Mediators in the Past

The religious dimension and connotations of the conflict called upon the Christian Churches’ actions ever since. Moreover, in an uncertain situation, people are looking for orientation and still-standing pillars of society. Religion stepped into the vacuum left by politics throughout the Troubles and worked as an identity marker, community shield and organizer of public life for the alienated. Parish life and denominational schools served as a reliable presence and provided safety in times of conflict. Religious structures were for the benefit of civic society and thus a discourse partner for the various conflicting parties. Regarding the Church leaders in Ireland, in particular the Catholic clergy enabled backchannel communication and ‘safe spots’ for bi- and multilateral talks in terms of conflict resolution. Unfolding the peculiarity and influence of backchannel communication is tedious and only verifiable by various personal testimonies. Brewer et al. 2

A comprehensive study of victims has been published by McKittrick et al. (1999), who deliver a unique work on names, time scales and information of three decades of conflict.

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(2011, 2013) offer an insight into the extent of backchannels and their undisputable impact on building mutual trust and further understanding and negotiations that led to the Belfast Agreement. Nonetheless, there have been open and public talks, amicable guidance, and discourse between clergymen and local politicians. One prominent example of church membership intertwining with political actions happened in Derry. Edward Daly (2011, p. 180)—Bishop emeritus of Derry—reminisces on the leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party John Hume’s political efforts: “John [Hume] had been enormously inspired and influenced by his European experience. He often spoke about the European Union being a powerful example of conflict resolution and respect for diversity […]. […]. He was centrally involved in the talks that ultimately resulted in the signing of the Good Friday Agreement on 10 April 1998. […] it could not have taken place without the efforts and political wisdom and nous of John Hume. I believed that much of John’s political success came […] from his understanding of community, of what a community needs, a profound Christian understanding of how a community should address its problems and differences added to the influence of Catholic social teaching.”

1.1

The Belfast Agreement

Only towards the late-1990s public multi-party talks developed, which enabled political leaders and parties to take on responsibilities that had previously been neglected. In 1998, multi-party negotiations, backchannel communication and civic engagement accumulated in an agreement among the Northern Irish participants, the Government of the United Kingdom and the Irish Government. The Belfast Agreement (1998, p. 2) declares the support of all participants and organizes forms of government and cooperation. In a conflict-torn country with bombs going off left, right and center, a political agreement was a mind-blowing development and a long-awaited political culmination of preceding events such as ceasefires, backchannel communication and others. People who had scrutinized each other for years were now willing to work together to sustain peace in their communities. The gradual growth of mutual understanding and trust led to ceasefires, gradually to equality and set out the conditions for peacebuilding. Enabling conflict resolution and putting conditions in place for a society’s development towards solidarity and cohesion goes in line with the European idea. In addition, the common membership of Ireland and the United Kingdom provided a framework and a common goal to resolve parts of the political conflict. Not only after achieving the Belfast Agreement but also throughout the Troubles,

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the EU gave funds to stabilize the Northern Irish economy as well as creating spaces of discourse for conflict resolution and reconciliation. In 1984, the Political Affairs Committee of the European Parliament approached the conflict by the Haagerup Report (1984). The report suggests and emphasizes the importance of Irish-British relations to create undertakings and projects that “must be carried out in conformity with and in the context of the comprehensive Irish-British understanding, which remains the core of and the clue to, any lasting improvement of the situation in Northern Ireland” (Haagerup, 1984, p. 75). Further, the report refers to the grown all-Ireland structures that are not only found within important institutions, e.g. churches and trade unions, but also in leisure, e.g. sport clubs (Haagerup, 1984, p. 60). The peace process concluded for the first time in the Belfast Agreement depended on the EU membership and all of the privileges that arose for the Northern Irish infrastructure, education, and public funding. The historic example of the Belfast Agreement shows that any conflict resolution in Northern Ireland is a multi-party process and asks for cooperation, mutual understanding, and solidarity with one another. Regarding Brexit and the connected issues, one is looking at the same kind of multi-layered pool of participants in the discussions and resolution matters. Twenty years on, Brexit places the main issue of the conflict back into focus. Facing the border between the Republic of Ireland and its non-EU counterpart as part of the United Kingdom jeopardizes the achievements of two decades of conflict resolution, social reconstruction, and peacebuilding. Now and then, the churches act in public spheres and try to give guidance.

1.2

Religion in Ireland

Catholicism plays a significant role in the public sector, especially through institutional involvement, high religious practice and through providing an ideological resource for identification (Mitchell, 2013). On the island of Ireland, the statechurch relation is cooperative in many ways. In the particular field of education, the Catholic Church holds a special place by being in charge of 90% Irish primary education in the Republic (Department of Education & Skills, 2019, table 1) and 45% in the North (Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, 2019, table 1b). In case of the Republic, the numbers of Catholic-maintained schools are slightly declining at the secondary level, whereas the numbers in the North are increasing compared with the primary level. Therefore, the institution is deeply implemented in most families’ lives up until today. Throughout history, the role of the Catholic Church was strong, and it served as an identity marker. “This is not to say

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that Catholics in Northern Ireland share an unproblematic conscience collective. Rather, especially in the context of social division, repeated participation can reinforce not only feelings of belonging, but also of shared values” (Mitchell, 2013, p. 12). Religion has a deep impact on Irish society in conflict and beyond, their identity development and peacebuilding. The majority of Irish people consider themselves as Christians, whereby only in the last decade has a decline in proportion and total numbers been recorded (Central Statistics Office, 2017). Northern Irish statistics show the same proportion confessing to Christianity, albeit with a significant difference in proportion between Catholics (45%) and Protestant denominations (48%), which have consequences regarding education and upbringing (Northern Ireland Statistics & Research Agency, 2012). The vast majority of Christian churches on the island of Ireland are organized on an all-island basis. The Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference (ICBC) is presided by the Archbishop of Armagh, Eamon Martin, whose diocese’s territory lies in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Another Catholic spokesman and title holder is Bishop Noel Treanor of Down and Connor, which includes Belfast as the largest city in the North and a former trouble spot. Bishop Treanor also acts as the vice-president of the Commission of the Bishops’ Conference of the European Union (COMECE). COMECE (2020) describes its essential mission to monitor, communicate, maintain dialogue, inform and raise awareness and deal with social and ethical problems throughout the EU inspired by pastoral experience. These structures show that the Catholic Church has a strong national and international network. For this reason and the fact that the Protestant church is deeply divided and fractured, the main focus will lie upon the Catholic Church’s engagement. The Catholic Church’s structure and most other churches’ organization show the wished-for insignificance of the border, besides the fact that the parishes and communities were well established before the partition in 1921. From another perspective, it is arguable whether an all-island structure serves to benefit the Irish nation with its individual needs. Particularly during the Troubles, the all-Ireland structure struggled to satisfy the needs of the northern dioceses, which are obviously the minority in the ICBC. Rafferty (1994, p. 268) points out: “The dissatisfaction of the lower clergy at the failure of the hierarchy to be more outspoken against state injustice in Northern Ireland was to remain an abiding feature of the ecclesiastical situation well into the 1980s. By then some 43 percent of priests expressed unhappiness at what was perceived to be the hierarchy’s failure to take a resolute stand […]”. Nonetheless, all-island bodies have prevailed and therefore as an ecumenical body the Irish Council of Churches (ICC) was established on an all-island basis among the Protestant and Orthodox churches. In 1973, a forum between the ICC’s churches and the Catholic Church—named the

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Irish Inter-Church Meeting (IICM)—was formed to enable discussion on common issues and goals.

1.3

A suspended assembly

At the political level, Northern Ireland is supposed to be governed by the Northern Ireland Assembly. For most of the Brexit negotiations, the Assembly was suspended. The suspension came into effect in January 2017 and lasted for three years while the UK government at Westminster passed legislation and amended several bills, such as legalizing same-sex marriage or liberalize abortion in Northern Ireland. This shows that the lockdown of the Assembly at Stormont not only concluded in a direct rule of Westminster but also no say in the negotiation involving Brexit due to no sovereign parliament acting out the power of the Northern Irish people, whose majority voted to remain in the 2016 referendum. One must emphasize that the referendum’s result shows how divided the electorate truly is. The electorate is split down the middle, with 55% voting to remain and 45% voting to leave the EU (The Electoral Office for Northern Ireland, 2016). The last Assembly election suggests the same diversity within the electorate. With an almost even number of seats (Russel, 2017), the two diverse parties Sinn Fein and Democratic Unionists Party represent the contrary ideals in the Northern Irish population. All over, the Northern Irish society is split into two communities, which is also represented within its institutions (political parties and churches). What influence may churches take in this fateful situation of (post-)Brexit negotiations and post-Brexit relationships of no local assembly’s voice? Facing the outcome of the referendum concluding in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland leaving the EU considerably changes the Belfast Agreement conditions. Therefore, the United Kingdom jeopardizes the amicable relation with the Republic of Ireland and the EU. In particular, the Nationalist community of Northern Ireland is deeply affected by impending Brexit consequences. For the first time in decades, the questions of constitutional status and belonging have become more topical again. Regarding the British border, the Nationalist communities stress psychological, historical, political, and economic reasons. Traditionally, the Nationalist community strongly associates with the Republic of Ireland and the election’s result suggests that those also voted to remain in the EU. By remaining in the EU, a soft border would remain, whereas a hard border revives memories linked to the partition in 1921. Colum Eastwood—leader of the Social Democratic and Labour Party—refers to the border question as a

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crucial one that jeopardizes the stability of peace in the North of Ireland: “The re-emergence of a physical border between north and south with customs check would unravel the progress we have on north/south partnership to pre-Good Friday level” (Manley, 2016). Especially the right of dual citizenship given by the Belfast Agreement (1998, p. 3) starts to falter and raise another constitutional issue that is yet to be dealt with. Given that the majority of the Northern Irish electorate voted to remain in the EU, the emphasis of this analysis will lie upon statements and strategies that focus on the impact of Brexit on the border issue and the two communities in the North. The polls, the result and preliminary analysis (Garry, 2017, p. 2) suggest that remain voters stem from Nationalist communities that mostly associate with Christian values and derive from a Catholic background. Thus, Brexit is not only a question of belonging within the EU, but it is also based within the former conflict issue of being a Unionist or Nationalist. This is another reason why the emphasis lies upon statements and actions of Catholic clergy and their influence on domestic and foreign policies, political processes, and decision-makers, as well as their actions within ecumenical church commissions speaking on an all-island basis.

2

Placing the Churches in the Public Spheres

Taking the framework of Warner and Walker (2011) into consideration, the Catholic Church’s impact is evident on three of the four given sectors, i.e. Ideas/ Culture, Institutions, and Interests. It is yet to be analyzed and proven whether the Church’s and churches’ action have an impact on domestic and foreign policies as expected. Looking at the conditions that enable the churches to influence the political agenda and moreover foreign policies, the moment of Brexit meets the following situation in the case of Northern Ireland: a vacuum left by local politics (the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly), a recently-emerging border question that ties in with historic conflict matters, long-term cooperation between states and the Catholic Church in the educational sector and a religious society. Analyzing against the background of the conflict, it must be considered what analyzes have shown before: the Catholic Church followed a rather passive statement strategy throughout the years of conflict (Schramm, 2015). Claire Mitchell (2003, p. 16) judges even more firmly: “Whilst the churches in Northern Ireland have in fact generally sought to mediate rather than exacerbate political tensions,

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they are primarily interested in the maintenance of their own power and authority”. “Throughout the conflict, the main concern of all the churches was to locate themselves in the political mainstream of their respective communities, providing comfort, support and often political empathy for their members” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 40). Indeed, not only in the height of the Troubles but also after the Belfast Agreement, Mitchell’s analysis is shattering: “The Catholic Church’s tendency to provide political guidance in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement of 1998 is less prominent than during the eras of civil rights demonstrations and the hunger strikes. But it is by no means absent. […] In summary, the Catholic Church is less politicized than at the height of the Troubles, when priests joined civil rights protests and visited the hunger strikers” (Mitchell, 2006, p. 46 f.). Considering their statement strategy and the unshakeable condemnation of violence, there might have not been much more to say than welcoming the peace process unfolding new dimensions. The extent of the political influence of the Catholic Church in cooperation with its ecumenical counterparts in the Brexit question is to be analyzed in the following.

2.1

Northern Ireland and its Place in the EU

Shortly before the referendum in 2016, the Northern Bishops of the ICBC encouraged especially younger voters to participate in the election to have their say on Northern Ireland’s place in Europe. This pro-European direction is reinforced by emphasizing “the links between the core values of Catholic social teaching and the founding vision of the European Union” (Irish Catholic Bishops, 2016). In fact, “in Northern Ireland, the support of the European Union in the quest for peace and reconciliation has been evident in many ways, including the creation of important spaces for dialogue, financial support for the work of peace and reconciliation, freedom of movement of people, and the development of infrastructure to support new relationships across the island of Ireland and with the UK” (Bishops, 2016). The Northern Bishops are increasingly highlighting the connection between Christian and European values. The courageous pledge for European policies and the encouragement to show continuous support for Members of the European Parliament so that they can “contribute to social justice, social cohesion and equality” (Bishops, 2016) is trend-setting for further statements and actions of Catholic Bishops. However, the lack of statements and comments on the Brexit campaign suggests a lacking awareness of the political atmosphere throughout the UK. Even though the Northern Irish electorate voted to remain, the overwhelming result of the English electorate (Electoral Commission, 2019) forced the Union and

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Northern Ireland into the ongoing Brexit dilemma. The number of English leave voters overall exceeded the remain voters by just under 2 million voters; therefore, since the EU membership is such a divisive issue, the remain voters in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland did not have an impact on the outcome of the referendum in 2016. The result leaves all parties in uncertainty, which prompted Bishop Noel Treanor to address the autumn plenary assembly of the 27 Bishops’ conference of COMECE. His two main concerns where young people who “feel disenfranchised” and “Brexit’s potential impact on the peace process” (MacDonald, 2016). At that time, the Brexit date was not set and the uncertainty about when and to what extent Brexit would affect Europe, the UK and Ireland was overwhelming. The process of negotiations and the actual signing of the Brexit withdrawal agreement in January 2020 provides a transition period for a singular trade deal. The withdrawal agreement avoids a physical border on the island “and keeps the region de facto in the EU’s single market for goods, so that Northern Ireland continues to apply EU rules as they relate to customs and to trade, production and the regulation of goods. […] However, this comes with problems. As the Northern Ireland—Republic of Ireland land border becomes, in effect, internal to the EU, then the Northern Ireland—Great Britain border in the Irish Sea is where the UK-EU trade frictions will be felt” (Menon, 2020, p. 25).

2.2

Pastoral Challenges Faced by the Irish Council of Churches and Irish Inter-Church Meeting

In September 2018, with a potential Brexit in March 2019, the IICM discussed the pastoral dimension of Brexit and the apprehension of an impending Irish border. The meeting concluded in a consultation paper that focused on three dimensions, namely the local, regional, and international level (Brady, 2018). Facing current circumstances and acknowledging the necessity, the ICC and IICM self-legitimate themselves by taking a stance and care in this discussion. “Having adjusted to the creation of two distinct political jurisdictions on the island almost a century ago our Churches should be confident of overcoming whatever stresses lie ahead, and we believe that as part of civil society we have a role to play in supporting our members in what is likely to be a protracted period of some difficulty” (Milne, 2018, p. 3). Even within the commission, the stances are very divisive, “so there will often be disagreement within churches about specific policies and proposals” (McDowell, 2018, p. 7). Therefore, the churches collected common values and reached out to one another in this challenging time. This also includes admitting

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errors and a lack of cooperation regarding past times (McDowell, 2018, p. 7). With the upcoming Brexit, the ICC and IICM point out key values that are not only part of the European idea but also arise from living up to the gospel. As shared values, McDowell (2018) cites the examples of common good and social justice, dignity and worth of each individual, seeking reconciliation, and challenging division. Their aims are to secure social justice and the dignity of each individual, to always seek reconciliation rather than challenging division, keep up the support at the local level to people facing new circumstances and strengthen the churches as a community of faith and hope (McDowell, 2018). The churches unfold a strategy at the local, regional and international level. Even though past experiences might help with judging situations and developing guidelines for the impending Brexit, this is new to all participants and it challenges people at all levels, whereby those in charge are just as affected as the ordinary people.

2.3

Common Strategy

At the local level, the focus lies on resourcing local churches and building community resilience. Both have one thing in common: empowerment of grassroot activities, first through the professionalization of church leaders in a political debate (i.e. collecting and disseminating information and enable people to act out the gospel in the Brexit process (McDowell, 2018), and second by empowering people at the local level to inform themselves and engage in a controversial discussion within their communities could lead to a resilient civic society. “Parishes and congregations are often well positioned to engage young people through links to schools, youth clubs and through organizations such as Youth Link NI” (McDowell, 2018, p. 11). The regional impacts are difficult to distinguish from local ones, because they still affect personally but on a wider scale (i.e. the economy, cross-border cooperation, identity, leadership vacuum, all-Ireland institutions), while the protagonists act out at a regional and even international level. The advantages that the churches are willing to bring into the discussion are their international network (Churches Together in Britain and Ireland) and ongoing dialogue with other regional commissions, like their Welsh counterpart Cytûn. The wide-ranging access to different political views of their members offers an opportunity for church representatives. “In engaging with politicians and policy makers the churches are seeking not to represent a particular view on Brexit, but to represent the varied concerns of their people. […] Churches could have a positive role in influencing the tone of the Brexit debate by modelling forms of discussion in which both differences and

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commonalities are explored in a constructive manner” (McDowell, 2018, p. 14). Furthermore, “the possibility of tensions within churches arising from different approaches to the challenges within the different jurisdictions, and competing views of the ‘national interest’” (McDowell, 2018, p. 14) may be a possible effect within the churches as all-Ireland institutions. Membership of the EU is seen as a common base for many international network activities, such as Churches Together in Britain and Ireland (CTBI). The common background of membership serves as reliable ground for developing ideas and modelling conversation on a wider scale (McDowell, 2018). A significant point to evaluate the influence of the churches on foreign policy-making would be their own twofold aim by engaging with politicians and policy-makers “to represent the views and concerns of church members […]” (McDowell, 2018, p. 15). A respectful dialogue between church leaders and politicians and policy-makers would give the churches room to define “the values arising from their faith that are pertinent to the Brexit debate and process, and formulating them in a way that is coherent and relevant to the wider public and policy makers” (McDowell, 2018, p. 15). At the international level, the churches benefit from international relationships that enable them to share information from the EU at the local level to represent their people at the European level, not only the dialogue at COMECE but also “initiating a conference or workshop between churches and religious associations or communities in Northern Ireland in line with Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty” (McDowell, 2018, p. 18). All of these explanations suggest actions at different levels and involve church representatives just as much as grassroot activity. More specifically, they focus on the empowerment of civic society with the information provided by the churches through their regional and international network. Bishop Treanor (2018, p. 21) emphasizes in the conclusion of the report: “As members of the EU our governments and their representatives shared and pursued many common interests. Our shared EU membership and framework provided a genetic context for the achievement of peace in Northern Ireland and on the island of Ireland”. The conditions are changing, which calls upon “key civil society actors, Christians and the Churches by dint of their discipleship of the Risen Christ have a vocation to act as leavens for critical discernment and facilitators of courageous and prophetic leadership” (Treanor, 2018, p. 22). Treanor (2018, p. 22) believes that the churches serve as an “anteroom to politics”, which facilitates a broad number of people to push for the common good. The paper concludes with examples of church and faith-based engagements to create spaces for conversations related to divisive issues regarding Brexit or others. The paper sets the common theme for all following statements on behalf of individual church leaders

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but also joint statements on behalf of the most common Christian churches on the island. Three arguments are continuously recurrent: first, leaving the EU threatens the growing mutual respect, understanding and friendship across the divided communities and the island; second, to avoid growing controversy, society needs access to information to promote opinion formatting; and third, all participants need “to weigh their words carefully, to respect the integrity of those who conscientiously differ from them and to speak with grace” (Church Leaders’ Group, 2018).

2.4

Demands, Mediation and Empowerment

The suggestions made by the church leaders focus on grassroot activities that nourish from the gospel. The upcoming changes will challenge and alter the relationship with one’s nearest neighbors. Hence, the churches’ appeal goes out to all discourse participants for a respectful tone. Facing the suspension of the Northern Ireland Assembly, civic society’s engagement must be professionalized and supported. Bishop Treanor (2019) highlights the uncertainty that (Northern) Irish people are facing: “Is the political vacuum serving slowly, passively and imperceptibly the opposite of peace, and if so, must Christians and citizens of good will make their voices heard in the coming year in this vital matter?”. In addition to the encouragement of individuals, the churches seek dialogue with local politicians. “Against the background of the current political vacuum and the uncertainty engendered by Brexit, it is heartening and prophetic that the four Church leads and the Irish Council of Churches have set in train over the coming months a series of encounters involving politicians, civic leaders and citizens to foster discussion about the immediate and longer-term future of our society” (Treanor, 2019). Church representatives repeatedly exhort elected politicians to think about the impact that Brexit will have on people on the ground, especially in border communities. Catholic Archbishop Eamon Martin assured in an interview (MacDonald, 2019): “Along with my fellow church leaders I have been having meetings with business people, community people, educationalists, people involved in health alongside local Members of the Legislative Assembly and political leaders. This is a time for us to talk with each other and not to talk at each other about Brexit. It does appear that we need to get our act together to ensure that there is peace and reconciliation and all those things that we have worked so hard to achieve in recent years”. Honesty, certainty, and respect are key demands of the Church of England Bishops that issued a statement shortly after the British Prime Minister suspended

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parliament in 2019. In their open letter, they identify—among other concerns— “the ease with which lies can be told and misrepresentation encouraged: leaders must be honest about the costs of political choices, especially for those most vulnerable. The levels of fear, uncertainty and marginalization in society […]. The Irish border is not a mere political totem […]: respect for the concerns on both sides of the border is essential […]” (Church of England, 2019). The unity among the vast majority of churchmen is undisputable. All outspoken demands and all measurements that have already been put into place show overlap with the framework Warner and Walker (2011) suggested. Nonetheless, it is debatable whether a call for respect, mutual understanding and cohesion is all that it needs to form foreign policies and influence politics to a greater extent. In the rapid dynamics of the Brexit process, it is yet to be decided how the UK will come to an arrangement with the EU and what situation to deal with it the (Northern) Irish population will be left with.

3

Nourishing the Ongoing Process

Considering that the Belfast Agreement only initiated a peace process and did not settle the conflict, twenty years on only marks a stage development and milestone achievements, but not a settlement. The Brexit dilemma takes the underlying conflict to another level, paired with economic instability and uncertainty for future generations. These young people and the so-called future generations started learning how to overcome sectarian violence and inequality by working on a society in peace. While the ongoing process gave Northern Ireland a perspective, Brexit has brought the ideological and political division back to the surface and made it a prominent issue in political and personal debates. The Catholic Church’s stance on the Brexit debate shows that it fully supports the peace process initiated by the Belfast Agreement, which is under no circumstances to be put at risk. The predominant themes—ranging from the Summer 2016 General Meeting of the Irish Catholic Bishop’s Conference (2016) until the Brexit date in 2020 are—the links between the core values of Catholic social teaching and the founding vision of the EU, the remarkable achievement of the EU in the North of Ireland (infrastructure funding, peace-making projects, support of the Belfast Agreement (McDowell, 2018, p. 13)), full commitment to the protection of the dignity of human life at all stages (Irish Catholic Bishops, 2016) and therefore a contribution to social justice, social cohesion and equality.

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A valuable contribution is highlighted by the ICC and IICM: “This care and support will not be limited to active church members, but will also be expressed through many community engagement projects” (McDowell, 2018, p. 10). Only this approach will overcome segregation. This underlines an ongoing shift in the churches’ leadership and their will to empower and professionalize grassroot engagement. Similar to their actions in the peace process, the churches find themselves in a passive but supervising role. In their analysis on the Catholic Church’s impact in political spaces, Brewer et al. (2011, p. 176) judge as follows: “What was missing therefore was leadership of peace movement inside the churches that could be projected outwards into society generally. […] that bishops, moderators, and presidents saw themselves as committee chairs rather than prophetic leaders, seeking consensus rather than setting the pace for change”. In addition, clear statements and a valuable opposition of politicians or political statements are rare and always worded with the greatest caution. In fact, public messages are mostly directed at common voters and only in exceptions are they directed at decision-makers and policy-makers. Catholic Bishops impose the responsibility to the voters: “[…] we encourage everyone to exercise their right to vote and also to take the opportunity ‘on the doorsteps’ to encourage all political parties to return to the Stormont Assembly as soon as possible” (Irish Catholic Bishops, 2019). The “call on all political leaders to promote dialogue as the only way to resolve differences” (Bishops, 2019) is merely a side note. Nonetheless, the Catholic Bishops take a stance on all current political matters (such as abortion law, welfare reform, housing and homelessness) prior to a general election but emphasize the citizens’ participation, fruitful dialogue, and conscientious reflection (Bishops, 2019). Particularly on matters of life, e.g. abortion law, the Bishops tend to be more guiding and firm: “Any human law that removes the right to life is an unjust law and must be resisted by every person, every voter, every political representative. For Catholic politicians this is not only a matter of protecting the human right to life but also a fundamental matter of Catholic faith” (Bishops, 2019). In general, the appeal from church leaders goes out to the individuals to fulfill their actions within the democratic process.

3.1

Overcoming Boundaries—Creating Cohesion

Taking the democratic vote serious and welcoming the latest settlements from late 2019, COMECE (2020) issues the following appeal: “We invite all people of good will to pray and work for the common good and make sure that Brexit will not succeed in shattering the fraternal relations between brothers and sister

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on both shores of the sea. It might be a long and challenging process, but it could also be an opportunity to trigger new dynamics between European peoples and rebuild a sense of community in Europe.” Not only the statement on Brexit but all efforts of the Catholic Church and other churches in cooperation aim for empowered and encouraged citizens. This guarantees that (political) issues can be dealt with at the most immediate level, i.e. citizens and local politicians being capable to deal with their country’s very own issues at the local level. The principle of subsidiarity is constitutive to Catholic social teaching,3 the Maastricht Treaty (1992, Art. 3b) and it is the base for devolved governance in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Subsidiarity goes along with solidarity and the empowerment of communities. These communities must enter respectful dialogues, develop mutual understanding and work for the common good of all community members. To face this challenge, the churches are willing to provide valid information, create spaces for dialogue, and actively address local needs. This shows that the churches see their responsibilities more at the grassroot rather than the policy-making level. Nonetheless the Churches in Ireland reach out to policy makers to remind them “’of their responsibility to govern for all by protecting common good” (McDowell, 2018, p. 15). The enabling and facilitating measurements are agreed and concretized at a local level where the individuals are affected. It is all about actions that promote changes and development in communities. Hence, international networking of church leaders helps to provide information to the local communities, which equips “to participate fully in political processes” (McDowell, 2018, p. 18). Against the background of the Troubles and the ongoing peace process, dialogue among the local communities can be fruitful and shape Northern Ireland’s future. Suggested actions and mechanisms would work in two directions: first, by ensuring the full participation of individuals in political processes by engaging with local politicians or their democratic vote; and second, shared economic concerns that are faced during an ongoing Brexit will bring communities together, albeit if mutual understanding, respect for one another, solidarity, and cohesion increase. For this purpose, valid information needs to be shared among all participants, safe spaces need to be created and mediation needs to be available in cases of insurmountable issues. Churches could step in to assist at this grassroot level. Questions, doubts, and concerns that develop from these dialogues would be tied back to church leaders that are still associating at the EU level. Post-Brexit, the ICC continue their work and a vivid

3

For further insight, consult papal encyclicals like Quadragesimo anno or the Pastoral Constitution on the Church and the Modern World Gaudium et spes.

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exchange with their European counterparts within the Conference of European Churches (CEC), just as much as the Catholic Church within COMECE.

3.2

Finding the Balance

Brewer et al. (2011) help to qualify the suggestions and actions of the churches. Their lengthy and far-reaching study on religion, civil society, and peace in Northern Ireland takes up and explains patterns. Legitimately, the current situation can be compared with the times of conflict. Their analysis of the contributions to the political peace process shows how restrained and rather selective the political activity was during times of conflict. In an interview in 2006 with Cahal Cardinal Daly—former Primate of Ireland—Brewer et al. (2011, p. 91) disclose: “The church is not involved in politics and it’s very dangerous for the church to be seen as if it were in [a] political party or a pressure group or whatever. The church encourages its members to work for peace, but the work of peace is a complicated issue, it requires a great deal of skills, which are not necessarily the skills of a pastor of souls. If asked to craft a blueprint for a future without violence, that is not the pastor’s role”. Even though the dominant motive at times of conflict was ‘to end violence’, the given direction of how and to what extend churchmen are to engage in political processes is leading the way up until today. “Cautionary political statements in public, matched by frenetic activity in private, was a strategy that the churches on all sides adopted to deal with the tension between maintaining peace commitments and the interpersonal obligations of the religious consensus to desensitize politics. This means that the distinction between official and unofficial, and public and private, peace-making becomes critical to understanding the contribution of the churches to Northern Ireland’s political peace process […]. […] Societies where politics has become violent require one or both of two things of the churches’ peace-making: overt intervention in politics to implement political change as a way of ending violence; and the desensitization of politics as a way to break the spiral of politically motivated violence” (Brewer et al., 2011, p. 93). It might be the fear of encouraging greater division by taking a clear stance on political issues. Cohesion, empowerment of the electorate, individual opinion forming, and retention of power among one’s own might be the driving motives. Of course, Brexit has not brought back the politically-motivated violence of the Troubles but the division that led to it back in the day is still part of civic society. For this very reason, it calls upon the churches’ actions to overcome boundaries and take a clear stance for the most vulnerable and deprived. Brexit could cause economic instability for many, especially if Northern Ireland become a (trading)

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space somewhere between the EU and UK (Menon, 2020, p. 27). Thus, it is questionable whether the churches’ actions influence policy-makers on a wider scale. The strongly interwoven dependencies of public and private actions, the history and the past, church leadership and grassroots show that the impact of religion in the case of Northern Ireland has been and still is particular. Even though the churches in Ireland have all access to significant arenas (culture, interests, institutions, power and agents) of foreign policy-making (Warner & Walker, 2011), their emphasis lies upon the empowerment of grassroot action. The church leaders are aiming for confident and mature citizens to engage in democratic processes. With this strategy, the church leaders across the denominations are avoiding bringing more division upon the communities and within their own congregation. The demonstrated influence of religion on policy-making must be evaluated against the background of the Troubles, with its religious dimension. In this ongoing period of making and sustaining peace, religion still works as an identity marker, and therefore the churches act carefully and in a rather discreet manner. Every action within the Brexit process, and every stance on the Irish border question will have a consequence within the ongoing peace process. All measures can only be assessed and seen against this background. In their framework and typology for analyzing religion in peace-making, Brewer et al. (2011, p. 121) suggest that the churches’ key contributions lie in the sphere of active and passive peacemaking in the social process. This goes in line with the observations throughout the Brexit campaign and negotiations. It is the proclamation of the desirability of peace and common goals, the denouncing of the disrespectful tone of debates and the continuous call upon the individuals to act out the gospel. Brewer et al. (2011, p. 122) conclude: “Relationship-building and restoration through the social peace process is part of the conditioning for political talks, opening up an opportunity for political talks to take place and succeed […]”. Taking into consideration that this judgement has been made by Brewer et al. (2011) a decade ago, the strategy of the churches has not adapted to the latest quality of diversion regarding Brexit.

4

Conclusion

Pope Francis (2018) addressed the ICBC after the World Meeting of Families in 2018: “There is another thing that I always say, but it bears repeating. What is the first duty of the bishop? I say it to everyone: it is prayer.” Pope Francis remarks this priority against the background of a troubled nation, not only by politics but also ecclesiastical tragedies. He (Pope Francis, 2018) continues: “Finally, in the spirit of ecclesial communion, I ask you to continue to foster unity and fraternity

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among yourselves—this is very important—and, together with the leaders of other Christian communities, to work and pray fervently for reconciliation and peace among all the members of the Irish family.” A similar appeal by Pope Francis was made to the Irish people a few days prior. Even while addressing authorities and representatives of civil society, his discreet call for peace and reconciliation dominates: “We can give thanks for the two decades of peace that followed this historic agreement, while expressing firm hope that the peace process will overcome every remaining obstacle and help give birth to a future of harmony, reconciliation and mutual trust” (Pope Francis, 2018). Throughout the hierarchy, the common theme is to discreetly encourage people to make the most out of the circumstances, engage in peace-making, overcome boundaries and raise mutual understanding. Intervening is clearly not the hierarchy’s job. The plea for cohesion, solidarity, and mutual understanding have been—and remain—the reliable tools used by the churches to exert an influence on political processes. Churches and connected religious communities within the churches are to provide the necessary information, the spaces to elaborate strategies that suit specific communities, and mediation wherever it might be needed along the way. The Irish situation is influenced by multi-layered issues of past and present and especially the individual’s identification with the institutions and religiosity has dramatically changed throughout the last two decades due to the Troubles and the systematic sexual abuse by clerics. Nonetheless, with the omnipresence of church delegations in cities, towns, and neighborhoods as well as the educational sector, the churches develop strategies of low threshold and at the grassroot level to empower and shape individuals’ engagement in policy-making and peace-making.

References Brady, N. (2018). Background and context. In Irish council of churches & Irish inter-church meeting (Eds.), Consultation Paper: Brexit and the Irish Churches—Pastoral Dimensions, 5–6. https://www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/Brexit-Report-copy.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020. Brewer, J. D., Higgins, G. I., & Teeney, G. (2011). Religion, civil society, and peace in Northern Ireland. Oxford Unity Press. Brewer, J. D., Mitchell, D., & Leavey, G. (2013). Ex-combatants, religion, and peace in Northern Ireland. The role of religion in transitional justice.. Palgrave Macmillian. Central Statistics Office. (2017). Census of population 2016. https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesa ndpublications/ep/p-cp8iter/p8iter/p8rrc/. Accessed: 29 Apr. 2020. Church Leaders’ Group. (2018). Joint statement. https://www.catholicbishops.ie/2018/11/22/ brexit-church-leaders-joint-statement/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020.

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Church of England Bishops. (2019). Open letter on Brexit. https://www.churchofengland.org/ more/media-centre/news/bishops-issue-open-letter-brexit. Accessed: 20 Apr. 2020. Council of the European Communities. (1992) Treaty on European Union. https://europa.eu/ european-union/sites/default/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020. Daly, E. (2011). A troubled see. Memoirs of a Derry bishop. Four Courts Press. Department of Education and Skills. (2019). Statistical bulletin. Enrolments September 2019—Preliminary results. https://www.education.ie/en/Publications/Statistics/Data-onIndividual-Schools/enrolments/statistical-bulletin-enrolments-september-2019-prelim inary-results.pdf. Accessed: 30 Apr. 2020. Haagerup, N. J. (1984). Report drawn up on behalf of the political affairs committee on the situation in Northern Ireland. https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/issues/europe/docs/haagerup84.pdf. Accessed: 25 May 2020. Garry, J. (2017). The EU referendum vote in Northern Ireland: Implications for our understanding of citizens’ political views and behaviour. https://www.qub.ac.uk/brexit/Brexit filestore/Filetoupload,728121,en.pdf. Accessed: 17 Jul. 2020. Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference. (2016). Statement from Northern Bishops on the UK referendum on EU membership. https://www.catholicbishops.ie/2016/06/08/statement-fromnorthern-bishops-on-the-uk-referendum-on-eu-membership/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020. Irish Catholic Bishops’ Conference. (2019). Statement from the Bishops in Northern Ireland to voters ahead of the Westminster general election. https://www.catholicbishops.ie/ 2019/12/05/message-from-the-bishops-in-northern-ireland-to-voters-ahead-of-the-wes tminster-general-election-2/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020. MacDonald, S. (2016). “Uncertainty reigns in Ireland” over Brexit, European bishops told. https://www.catholicireland.net/uncertainty-reigns-ireland-brexit-europeanbishops-told/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020. MacDonald, S. (2019). Primate appeals to politicians to work together as Brexit looms. https://www.catholicireland.net/primate-appeals-politicians-work-together-bre xit-looms/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020. Manley, J. (2016). Custom checks after Brexit would ‘devastate’ cross-border trade. The Irish News. http://www.irishnews.com/news/2016/03/02/news/custom-checks-after-bre xit-would-devastate-cross-border-trade-436361/. Accessed: 14 Apr. 2020. McDowell, P. (2018). Meeting report. In Irish Council of Churches & Irish Inter-Church Meeting, (Ed.), Consultation paper: Brexit and the Irish Churches—Pastoral Dimensions, 7–19. https://www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/Brexit-Report-copy.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020. McKittrick, D., Kelters, S., Feeney, B. & Thornton C. (1999). Lost lives. The stories of the men, women and children who died as a result of the Northern Ireland troubles. Mainstream Publishing. Menon, A. (2020). What would no deal mean? In UK in a changing Europe. https://ukandeu. ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/UKICE-What-would-no-deal-mean.pdf. Accessed: 8 Nov. 2020. Milne, K. (2018). Introduction. In Irish Ccouncil of churches & Irish inter-church meeting (Eds.), Consultation paper: Brexit and the Irish churches—Pastoral dimensions, 3. https:// www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/Brexit-Report-copy.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020.

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Mitchell, C. (2003). Catholicism in Northern Ireland and the politics of conflict. (IBIS working paper no.33). University College Dublin. Mitchell, C. (2006). Religion, identity and politics in Northern Ireland: Boundaries of belonging and belief . Ashgate. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. (2012). Census 2011. https://www.nisra. gov.uk/sites/nisra.gov.uk/files/publications/2011-census-results-key-statistics-statisticsbulletin-11-december-2012.pdf. Accessed: 26 Nov. 2020. Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency. (2019). Annual enrolments at schools and in funded pre-school education in Northern Ireland. https://www.education-ni.gov. uk/sites/default/files/publications/education/Revised%203rd%20March%202020%20-% 20Annual%20enrolments%20at%20schools%20and%20in%20pre-school%20....pdf. Accessed: 30 Apr. 2020. Pope Francis. (2018). Apostolic visit of His holiness Pope Francis to Ireland. World meeting of families, 25–26 August 2018. https://www.dublindiocese.ie/pope-francis-speeches-inireland/. Accessed: 25 Apr. 2020. Rafferty, O. P. (1994). Catholicism in Ulster. 1603–1983. An interpretative history. Gill & Macmillan. Russel, R. (2017). Election report: Northern Ireland assembly election, 02 March 2017. http:// www.niassembly.gov.uk/globalassets/documents/raise/publications/2017-2022/2017/gen eral/2217.pdf. Accessed: 30 Apr. 2020. Schramm, N. (2015). Irische Nation und katholische Kirche: ihr Verhältnis in den Stellungnahmen irischer Kirchenvertreter (1968–1983). Westfälische Wilhelms Universität Münster. The Belfast Agreement. (1998). https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl oads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136652/agreement.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020. The Catholic Church in the European Union. Our mission. www.comece.eu/site/en/ourmis sion. Accessed: 31 Mar. 2020. The Catholic Church in the European Union. (2020). Statement of the COMECE presidency on Brexit. http://www.comece.eu/dl/qKOtJKJKKONLJqx4KJK/Statement_20200201_-_ Brexit_EN.pdf. Accessed: 20 Apr. 2020. The Electoral Commission. (2019). https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-areand-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-refere ndum/results-and-turnout-eu-referendum. Accessed: 25 Sep. 2020. The Electoral Office for Northern Ireland. (2016). Result declaration. https://www.eoni.org. uk/getmedia/e9eeb347-7706-464f-b0f3-50a9d7ff1ab3/EU-REFERENDUM-2016-NOR THERN-IRELAND-COUNT-TOTALS-DECLARATION_1. Accessed: 25 Aug. 2018. Treanor, N. (2018). Conclusion. In Irish Council of churches & Irish inter-church meeting (Eds.), Consultation paper: Brexit and the Irish churches—Pastoral dimensions,, (pp. 21–22). https://www.irishchurches.org/cmsfiles/Brexit-Report-copy.pdf. Accessed: 2 Apr. 2020. Treanor, N. (2019). The 2019 world peace day message: “Good Politics is at the service of peace”. https://www.catholicbishops.ie/2019/01/01/new-years-peace-message-from-bishopnoel-treanor/. Accessed: 5 Apr. 2020. Warner, C. M., & Walker, S. G. (2011). Thinking about the role of religion. A framework for analysis. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7, 113–135.

The Orthodox Factor in the Foreign Policy of Post-Communist Romania Cristian Vasile

This chapter outlines the role played by the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) in shaping the direction taken by Romania’s post-communist governments in foreign policy issues. Different definitions of concepts such as religious freedom are discussed: the Orthodox interpretation, on the one hand, and that of the United States and the European Union, on the other. We shall examine efforts made by both the EU and USA to promote religious freedom in Romania and the reactions of the Romanian Orthodox Church and its attempts to influence Romanian diplomacy and other government decision-makers. The chapter further addresses a number of issues relating to Romania’s international relations such as the Gojdu Affair,1 the restitution of ecclesiastical properties, coming to terms with Romania’s traumatic (fascist and communist) past, Romania’s accession to the

1

Emanuil Gojdu was a successful lawyer in the nineteenth century Habsburg AustroHungarian empire. He remained a Romanian patriot and financially supported many young Orthodox Romanians by paying their tuition. (Sigmirean & Pavel, 2003). Gojdu left a sizeable legacy, which is managed by a foundation. One of the foundation’s projects was the construction of the so called Gojdu udvar (Gojdu Courtyard—seven buildings in historic Budapest) in Budapest in 1900–1901, which today is valued at billions of euros. In the early 1950s, the buildings were nationalized by the Hungarian communist authorities. In 1999, Gojdu Courtyard was privatized, leading to protests from the ROC. Representatives of the Romanian Orthodox Church hoped that the Romanian state would be able to convince Hungary to revoke the decision of privatization or pay the equivalent in compensation (the market price); several Romanian sources estimated its value at about three billion euros (Golea, 2015). The ROC was planning to use this money to fund fellowships for young Orthodox students.

C. Vasile (B) Bukarest, Romania E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_6

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EU and the decriminalization of homosexuality. Using a variety of source materials (memoirs, diplomatic diaries, official communiqués, secondary literature), we shall try to determine to what extent the interests of the Romanian Orthodox Church had an influence on decision-makers and Romanian diplomacy while center-left and center-right government coalitions were in power during the postcommunist period. We shall also briefly examine the similarities in the reactions of the ROC and Polish Catholic Church to European integration. The centrality of Orthodoxy to the Romanian national identity and the Orthodox Church’s privileged position in the post-1989 ideological void resembles the situation of the Catholic Church in post-communist Poland (Stan, 2013, p. 153). In Romanian historical accounts, political scientist Dorina Maria N˘astase was one of the first (in 2004–2005, long before Kaczinsky’s illiberal regime) to draw parallels between these two Churches, which were usually treated as opposites in Western European political analyses. The Polish Catholic Church has long enjoyed a positive image, particularly because of its contribution to the fall of communism in Poland in the late 1980s. N˘astase’s study tried to go beyond the clichés in order to identify connections and parallels based on the similar reaction of these two majority Churches to secular modernity and to the requirements imposed by the European Union (N˘astase, 2005, p. 242). The rejection of the extension of human rights and the rights of minorities by the two Churches during the post-communist period probably has its roots in the interwar. As M.B.B. Biskupski recently wrote, by 1926 the Polish nationalists had begun a process of “religification” which emphasized the intrinsic role of Catholicism in “Polonism”. Moreover, in the early 1930s they called for the creation of a Catholic state and this provided a source of additional ammunition for the denunciation of minorities (Biskupski, 2020, p. 52). In this chapter, I shall re-create the direction taken in the early 1930s by prominent intellectuals such as Nae Ionescu. The latter—who, by the mid 1930s, was also a fascist ideologue—was rediscovered by Romanian Orthodox theologians and clergy after 1989. As a result, in the post-communist period, many Orthodox began to believe that the diplomatic policy of an (Orthodox) state should be rooted in Christian orthodoxy.

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Romanian Orthodox Church and its Ecclesiastical Diplomacy during Communism

In order to discuss in greater depth the extent to which the Orthodox Church had an impact on Romanian post-communist foreign affairs, it is necessary to first examine the role played by the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) within the

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World Council of Churches as of 1961 and the way in which its membership in this body reflected the internal and foreign policy interests of the communist authorities in Bucharest. Finnish historian Kaisamari Hintikka had the opportunity to study documents related to the activities of the ROC within the World Council of Churches (WCC), most of them historical sources preserved in the archives of the ROC’s Holy Synod. These archives were inaccessible to Romanian historians; even Hintikka appears to have had trouble gaining access to all of the archived materials. As she wrote in the introduction to her book, some of the documents were missing from the files which she was allowed to see. She was told that these documents had been destroyed or had disappeared (Hintikka, 2000, p. 17). The Romanian Orthodox Church would not have been able to join the World Council of Churches in 1961 and have access to the West if the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate had not taken the initiative to become a member of this ecumenical organization and the Romanian communist authorities had not given their consent. From the time of its admission to the WCC until the fall of the communist regime in 1989, the leadership of the ROC worked to remain in line with the official ideology of the atheistic Romanian Communist Party leadership; in 1961, for example, the issue of the suppression of several Orthodox monasteries and the elimination of monasticism by expelling several thousands of monks and nuns from the cloisters was approached with extreme caution by Romanian Patriarch Justinian Marina during talks in Bucharest with Reverend Francis H. House, high dignitary of the WCC (Leustean, 2009, pp. 163–166). Moreover, the patriarch intimated that the government was somehow justified in its efforts to reduce the scope of monastic life in communist Romania and that the Western mass media coverage on the violations of religious freedom in Romania was deceptive and “false” (Hintikka, 2000, p. 39 f.). Beginning in 1961, the actions of the Romanian Orthodox Church within the WCC were clearly conditioned by the foreign and internal policy of communist Romania. However, communist Romania’s diplomatic offensive during the mid-1960s (together with the release of political prisoners) allowed the ROC to extend its ecclesiastical relations with the Geneva-based ecumenical organization, while the distancing of the Romanian communists from the Soviet Union (especially after 1963) gave the ROC a certain degree of autonomy over other Orthodox Churches, also members of the WCC, in areas controlled by the USSR. In fact, the Orthodox Churches ceased to be a unified group after the conference of the World Council of Churches in Montreal in July 1963. In the years that followed, the ROC was no longer perceived as part of the Orthodox group, but as a mediator between the Orthodox Churches and the remaining members of the WCC. As Kaisamari Hintikka rightly observed, the privileged position of the

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ROC as intermediary coincided with the role of mediator played by Ceau¸sescu’s Romania during the international political crises of the 1970s. After 1963, the decision of communist leader Gheorghiu-Dej and later of Nicolae Ceau¸sescu2 to instrumentalize the deep-rooted, national anti-Russian sentiment and distrust of ethnic and religious minorities further promoted the collaboration of the Orthodox Church with state authorities. For decades, the Orthodox hierarch, Bishop Antonie Pl˘am˘adeal˘a3 (metropolitan as of 1982), was responsible for the ROC’s diplomatic policy. In late August 1976, at a colloquium organized by the WCC on the church-state relationship, he emphasized that the ROC considered itself the keeper of national traditions and defender of the identity of the Romanian people. Therefore, the relationship between the ROC and the Romanian national communist state seemed to have been a mutually beneficial one. In fact, Kaisamari Hintikka suggested that the full commitment of the Romanian Orthodox Church to the ecumenical movement perfectly supported the image that the state was trying to create abroad, and that this positive image of the Romanian state was furthered by the reputation of trustworthiness that the ROC established for the state within the WCC (Hintikka, 2000, p. 139). This reputation was further strengthened by the position Father Professor Ion Bria held within the leadership of the WCC (as from 1973) and by the role that the well-known Romanian theologian played in this international ecumenical body. The communist state suppressed the hierarchy of the ROC but made use of the credibility held by Orthodox prelates abroad to spread the message that religious freedom existed in communist Romania. The ROC benefited from this arrangement because the state authorities harassed and persecuted minority religious groups (mainly Greek Catholics, Roman Catholics, neo-protestants, and evangelicals) whom the church considered a moral and religious threat. The ROC was one of the few Orthodox members of the WCC that did not send observers to the sessions of the Second Vatican Council, despite the fact that even the Russian Orthodox Patriarchate participated in the most important ecclesiastical event of the Catholic world. In general, in the period between 1948 and 1960, the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the ROC sought the approval of the Russian 2

Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej was secretary-general of the Romanian Communist Party/Romanian Workers Party from 1945 to 1965 (except for a brief period of time between 1954 and 1955). Dej’s successor Nicolae Ceau¸sescu was secretary-general of the Romanian Communist Party from 1965 to 1989. 3 Antonie Pl˘ am˘adeal˘a—a political prisoner in the mid-1950s—was bishop-vicar (episcop vicar) of the Romanian Orthodox Patriarchate in Bucharest (1970–1979) and responsible for ROC’s external affairs. He was bishop of Buz˘au from 1979 to 1982. In 1982, Antonie was appointed metropolitan of Transylvania (P˘acurariu, 2002, p. 366).

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Orthodox Church. One could say that interchurch relations reflected the political reality of that time, in the sense that the Romanian Workers’ Party (the future Romanian Communist Party/RCP) followed the “suggestions” of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, at least until 1963/1965. Beginning in the early 1960s, it became clear that the so-called “Greek Catholic4 issue” was at the heart of the differences between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Holy See; this issue arose when Greek Catholic underground communities did not “return” to Orthodoxy after the simulacrum of religious unification in 1948. This “union” was in fact only a Soviet-type suppression of the Romanian Uniate Church. Greek Catholicism was introduced by the Jesuits after 1697 with the conversion of a part of the Romanian population in Transylvania (Stan & Turcescu, 2011, p. 135). Predictably, the Romanian communist government—applying Stalinistic policies5 —was not willing to denounce the forced unification of the religions in 1948. Moreover, until 1989, it accepted only the Orthodox historic perspective regarding the bilateral Orthodox-Greek Catholic relations. Beginning in 1963/1964, the nationalism of the communist party became tightly intertwined with that of the Orthodox Church. The Department of Religious Denominations and the ecclesiastical diplomacy of the ROC found common ground in matters relating to the Greek Catholic issue, while the Holy See raised this issue during the negotiations held in the 1970s and 1980s between Romanian officials and representatives of the Vatican (Bozgan, 2004, pp. 192–213). In the 1970s and 1980s, the Ceau¸sescu regime returned to the nationalist themes of the interwar period and even rehabilitated the pro-Nazi marshal Ion Antonescu (Friling et al., 2005, p. 353). In the 1980s, the Ceausescu regime tolerated the 4

The Greek Catholic Church is also called Uniate/United with Rome. A number of historians used the terms Uniate and Uniatism in a derogatory way. 5 Romanian American political scientist and historian Vladimir Tismaneanu defined national Stalinism as “a political variety within Leninism, different from what is usually called national Communism; national Stalinism systematically opposed any form of liberalization, let alone democratization. Reactionary and self-centered, it valued autarky and exclusiveness. It adhered to a militaristic vision both domestically and internationally. National Stalinism clung to a number of presumably universal laws of socialist revolution and treated any deviation from these as a betrayal of class principles.” (Tismaneanu, 2012). There are obvious differences between the political regime in Romania and other communist regimes and especially the Prague Spring in Czechoslovakia, a period in which the country had a truly liberal and reform-oriented regime. Among other things, the Prague Spring led to the re-establishment of the Greek Catholic Church in Slovakia in 1968, while the Ceau¸sescu regime refused to reconsider the decision made in 1948 to suppress Greek Catholics. (Coraniˇc, 2010, pp. 192– 202.). On the contrary, the Ceau¸sescu regime intensified the collection of surveillance data on underground Greek Catholics.

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publication of anti-Semitic materials by ultranationalist writer Corneliu Vadim Tudor (Tudor, 1980, 1983). However, Tudor was ultimately rebuked following negative reactions from the West and Israel. After 1989, he proclaimed himself a protector of the Orthodox Church and was accepted as such by the Church.

1.1

The Orthodox Church, Nationalism, and Anti-Semitism

To the surprise of many anti-communist and liberal intellectuals, the Orthodox Church did not support the suppression of the Department of Religious Denominations in the post-1989 period. Among other things, this institution had been responsible for passing foreign policy directives on Orthodox ecclesiastical diplomacy prior to 1989 (Bozgan, 2004, pp. 192–213). The special relationship between the ROC and the state was maintained even after the anti-communist revolution in December of 1989; moreover, in the post-communist period, the Orthodox Church managed to impose some of its own views over religious denominations and states (the Vatican, for example). For instance, the hierarchy of the ROC headed off any discussions of the possibility of strengthening relations with the Holy See or signing a new Concordat by re-printing all of the existing ecclesiastical literature denouncing the 1929 Concordat between interwar Romania and the Vatican (Runcan, 2000). Several major events took place internally and externally after 1989 that had significant repercussions for the direction taken by Romania in international politics, especially on a regional level. On the one hand, the rebirth of the Greek Catholic Church and the support it was given by the Holy See through the agency of the Apostolic Nuncio in Bucharest and other diplomatic channels seemed to undermine the weight and influence of the Romanian Orthodox Church in post-communist society. Greek Catholic believers, particularly those living in Transylvania and Banat, began to re-claim their church buildings and parishes which had gone over to the Orthodox Church after 1948 due to brutal state intervention. On the other hand, interethnic conflicts between Romanians and Hungarians in February/March of 1990 had a severe impact on Transylvania. Several influential Orthodox leaders singled out not only Hungary and the Hungarian minority population as scapegoats, but also the re-claiming of the churches from the Orthodox Church by Greek Catholic communities. Both Roman Catholic Hungarians and Greek Catholic Romanians had dogmatic links with the Vatican and recognized the pope as their spiritual leader. For some reason, Greek Catholics were thought to be supporters of the Hungarian cause.

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At the same time, Orthodox episcopal centers began to publish propagandist books and pamphlets expounding upon the dangers posed by Hungarian Catholics, especially since the interwar period, as well as the negative consequences of the Concordat signed by Romania and the Vatican in 1929. Their agenda was quite clear: after 1989, Romanian diplomacy no longer needed to have an agreement with the Holy See or make concessions when the Vatican pleaded for the restitution of the religious properties that had once belonged to the Greek Catholic Church. This same sentiment also played a role in politics, discouraging Romania from closer involvement with the countries of the Visegrád Group, in which Hungary played a prominent role. A number of observers suggested that the hierarchy of the ROC succeeded in imposing an anti-Catholic and nationalist stance on Romanian diplomacy in the early 1990s6 ; even more precise would be an Orthodoxist nationalist viewpoint. I define Orthodoxism as an exaggerated expression of the Orthodox faith, also by influential politicians, which at the same time discriminates against other religious beliefs and organizations supported by the state. It was state favoritism that elevated the ROC to its privileged position among the country’s other religious denominations. Backed by state diplomats, the ROC preferred to talk directly with representatives of the Holy See in order to persuade the Roman Catholic Church to reject Greek Catholic proselytism and Uniate claims regarding the restitution of ecclesiastical properties. Although the Vatican continued to support the spiritual revival of the Greek Catholic Church, at the Balamand conference in 1993, the Holy See declared Uniatism to be a method of religious union of the past (Communiqué, 1993). The state supported the ROC in its attempts to minimize foreign “proselytism” and adopted laws that contradicted EU legislation but prevented the restitution of ecclesiastical properties (in the case of Greek Catholic claims) (Stan, 2013, p. 152). Prior to 1944, a significant percentage of Orthodox clergy supported nationalist, extreme right/fascist political parties, such as the Legionary Movement/Iron Guard and PNC (National Christian Party) (Schmitt, 2017, pp. 98–116). According to the Final Report of the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania, “The Romanian Orthodox Church itself had strong anti-Semitic leanings, both in its senior hierarchy and among local clergy. Patriarch Miron Cristea7 did not speak out against anti-Semitism. To the contrary, he demonized 6

In general, few Romanian foreign ministers have enjoyed a significant level of autonomy from the government party or ruling coalition of parties. The latter relied on the “Orthodox vote” or on what they perceived (sometimes erroneusly) to be a disciplined Orthodox electorate. 7 Miron Cristea served as Orthodox primate metropolitan of Romania (1919–1925) and as patriarch of the Romanian Orthodox Church from 1925 to 1939 (Leustean, 2009, pp. 40–44).

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the Jews and called for their departure from Romania.” (Friling et al., 2005, p. 19). Moreover, just before his death, even Patriarch Teoctist Ar˘apa¸su (1986–2007) admitted that he was a sympathizer of the Iron Guard. (Buzil˘a, 2009, p. 23 f). It is important to point out that President Ion Iliescu, in office from 1990 to 1996 and 2000 to 2004, and Patriarch Teoctist had known each other for many years before 1989. (Vasile, 2017, p. 249). They met during the 1970s in Ia¸si (Jassy, Moldavia) where they both were dignitaries. Iliescu was the chief secretary of the communist party for Jassy County, while Teoctist was the Orthodox metropolitan of Moldavia. In 1990, Teoctist was able to retain his position as patriarch even after various clergy contested his leadership. He returned to his office in part due to the support of Iliescu’s administration. On May 20, 1990, Iliescu was elected Romania’s first post-communist president. Beginning in 1990, the interests of the Orthodox hierarchy coincided with those of the post-communist political elite. Both the representatives of the ROC and the post-1989 political elite who supported Ion Iliescu and the National Salvation Front8 saw the revival of the Greek Catholic Church in Transylvania with reservation or dismay. Prior to 1948, many Romanian Greek Catholics in Transylvania were members of the National Peasant Party (NPP), the political party that most strongly defied communist rule during the post-war period. In the 1940s, the NPP was headed by Iuliu Maniu, who did not hide his Greek Catholic identity (Stan, 1997, pp. 433–505). One of Maniu’s spiritual sons, Corneliu Coposu, also a Greek Catholic, was elected president of the NPP (the National Peasant Party added Christian Democrat to its title) following its rebirth after the anti-communist revolution in 1989. Due to his democratic allegiance and anti-communist stance, C. Coposu became Iliescu’s nemesis (among other things, Iliescu had led the Romanian communist Agitprop in the years prior to 1989) (Coposu, 2014); moreover, the Orthodox hierarchy did not trust Coposu and his party (the ROC believed that the NPP and Coposu would support the Greek Catholic claims for restitution). It is important to note that the Orthodox patriarch Teoctist rejected Coposu’s anti-communist standpoint; Teoctist remained faithful to the communist regime of Nicolae Ceau¸sescu until the end. After December 1989, this pro-communist allegiance was no longer sustainable and Teoctist sought to reinvent himself with the help of Ion Iliescu (who claimed that he was a dissident and tried to cover up his career as head of Agitprop) (Iliescu, 2004). The interests of the Orthodox leadership coincided with those of the main postcommunist political players. An important issue was the way in which the records from the recent past and historical records were being examined in general. These 8

which would become the Social Democratic Party.

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were the times of a politics of fear, a politics of oblivion; a fear generated by an unsustainable past. The Iliescu administration showed no empathy for the Greek Catholic cause and blocked every attempt to return the church buildings confiscated in 1948 to the Greek Catholics, even though this lead to a deterioration of diplomatic relations with the Vatican. This tense situation made a papal visit to Romania by Pope John Paul II inconceivable prior to 1996. It was only in 1997 that the center right government made a serious attempt to establish peace between the Orthodox and Greek Catholics through the efforts of Minister for Foreign Affairs Adrian Severin in order to lay the foundation for a papal visit to the country. Severin’s efforts failed in 1997. However, his successor and Romanian ambassador to the Vatican Teodor Baconsky (Baconschi) intensified negotiations with Holy See diplomats and finally, after two years, managed to bring the Roman pontiff John Paul II to Romania. Between 1992 and 1996, Iliescu’s Social Democratic Party (FDSN, later PDSR9 ) formed the so-called Red Quadrilater (Patrulaterul ro¸su), a coalition of four parties that brought together ultranationalists (PUNR, PRM10 ) and former communists (PSM11 ). Influential members of these parties (including neocommunists) pursued nationalist, anti-Semitic and Orthodox agendas. They were mainly supported by Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor (president of the PRM) who assumed strong anti-Semitic stances after December 1989 and posed as a staunch defender of the hierarchy of the ROC and especially of Patriarch Teoctist. Prior to 1989, Tudor was one of the main writers who praised Communist dictator Nicolae Ceau¸sescu in his works. ROC officials never censured him for his extremist views or refused his political support. On the contrary, a number of clergy collaborated in Tudor’s major political publication, the weekly magazine România Mare (Voicu, 2000, pp. 113–133). In September 1994, seven Romanian members of parliament (six senators and one deputy) addressed a letter to the US Senate in which they criticized the nomination of Alfred H. Moses (who was also president of the American Jewish Committee) to the post of US ambassador to Romania. This letter, which sought the rejection of the nomination, was signed also by two Orthodox clergymen, Senator Simeon Tatu (abbot of the historic Plumbuita Monastery near Bucharest) and Deputy Fr. Emil Roman (influential priest and theologian from Arad County, Western Romania). Patriarch Teoctist did not condemn the initiative of the priests, even though the ROC had previously urged its clergy to avoid partisan involvement. After 1986, many diplomatic representatives 9

PDSR—Party of Romanian Social Democracy. After 2001 PSD (Social Democratic Party). PUNR—Party of Romanian National Unity. PRM—Greater Romania Party. 11 PSM—Socialist Party of Labor. 10

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from the West did not want to have anything to do with Teoctist, especially those from the U.S. Embassy in Bucharest. Firstly, U.S. diplomats perceived Teoctist as an ecclesiastical ally of the Ceau¸sescu regime.12 Secondly, USA supported religious freedom, mainly for minority Churches, including neo-Protestants and Greek Catholics. These were the same religious denominations that had engaged in fierce conflicts with the hierarchy of the ROC in the early 1990s. For most members of the Orthodox Holy Synod, the religious freedom claimed by minority Churches represented an undesirable proselytism which should be punished. This made it difficult to establish bilateral contacts between the Orthodox Patriarchate and U.S. diplomats in Bucharest. Alfred H. Moses first paid a visit to Patriarch Teoctist on July 10, 1996. Moses was the first U.S. ambassador to visit the Romanian patriarch in the ten years he had held the ecclesiastical office. In his memoirs, Moses wrote that, “He knew I was Jewish. This aspect, plus the fact that I was American, directed his comments to topics that he thought I liked about hearing— freedom, justice, tolerance, and so on.[…] When I told him that two of the seven [Romanian] senators who signed the letter to Senator [Jesse] Helms13 asking him to vote against my confirmation [as U.S. ambassador to Bucharest] were Orthodox priests, he expressed surprise and stated that the implied anti-Semitism was contrary to Church doctrine, and that the clergy had been ordered to abstain from political activities.14 As far as I know, no one in the [Orthodox] Church had been disciplined for political activity, including the two priests who signed the letter.” (Moses, 2018, p. 220).

1.2

The Question of the ROC, the Americans and the Jehovah’s Witnesses

The official support of the U.S. government for various Protestant Churches and the Jehovah’s Witnesses called forth distrust and defiance on the part of the 12

In addition to expressing praise for Ceau¸sescu, Teoctist did nothing to stop the demolition of Orthodox church buildings in Bucharest in the late 1980s. Afterwards, he kept up the pretense while on official visits abroad that religious freedom existed in communist Romania. In January 1990, angry anti-communist Orthodox theology students forced Teoctist to resign. However, the Iliescu regime reinstated him as patriarch in April 1990. (Vasile, 2017, p. 249). 13 Jesse Alexander Helms, Jr. (1921–2008). Helms served as the chair of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (1994–2000). 14 Following the 1992 elections, the leadership of the ROC recommended that its clergy abstain from partisan politics. However, the Orthodox Holy Synod did not punish the Orthodox priests who did not follow this recommendation.

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Orthodox Church in post-communist Romania. The hierarchy of the ROC tried to influence the Romanian government both to maintain the status of the Jehovah’s Witnesses as a mere religious association and to keep the group from being recognized by the state as an official religious denomination. It also sought to stop the proliferation of neo-protestants (evangelicals). Moreover, a number of Orthodox high clergy advised various post-1989 governments to resist US and EU diplomatic pressure to support religious freedom and pass non-discriminatory policies. The clergy had considerable leverage because, according to the polls, almost 90% of the population had confidence in the Church (the Orthodox Church), with the ROC allegedly leading the polls as the most appreciated institution while the parliament and political parties were at the bottom of the heap (Vasile, 2016, p. 600). As of the early 1990s, Social Democratic leader Viorel Hrebenciuc— general secretary of the Romanian government and president of the Romanian Council for National Minorities—took on the role of interface between Iliescu’s party and the hierarchy of the ROC (Stef˘ ¸ anescu, 1995, p. 298). On various occasions, U.S. diplomats used official visits to Romania to deliver clear messages on issues of religious freedom; predictably, they based their demands on the Western (U.S.) definition of the term religious freedom. According to Alfred H. Moses, in the spring of 1996, the U.S. Embassy in Romania assumed that the underlying aim of Hillary Clinton’s tour of Central Europe was to attract the ethnic vote in the United States in advance of the 1996 presidential election (Moses, 2018, p. 367). In late June of 1996, the U.S. Embassy learned that U.S.-based Jehovah’s Witnesses were planning to hold an international conference in Bucharest in July, shortly after Hillary Clinton’s visit. Among the sites being considered for Hillary Clinton’s tour of Bucharest was Kretzulescu Orthodox church near Revolution Square. However, just before Clinton’s visit, clergy and laymen of the Romanian Orthodox Church issued derogatory statements in response to the announcement for the conference, denouncing Jehovah’s Witnesses as “criminals and anti-Christians” (Moses, 2018, p. 367). The U.S. Embassy was not asked to help with the conference, but the embassy’s representatives assumed that the conference would take place despite opposition from the ROC (Moses, 2018, p. 368). The Romanian Department of Religious Denominations had authorized the conference a year before. However, in late June of 1996, the secretary-general of the Romanian government, Viorel Hrebenciuc, announced that the conference had been cancelled by Romanian authorities. The pretext given for the cancellation was a lack of hotel rooms and other facilities that would be necessary to accommodate the visitors, but no one believed this. Moses suggested that the real reason for the cancellation was that a few days prior to the announcement, Patriarch Teoctist had issued a clerical letter condemning the conference of the Jehovah’s

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Witnesses (Moses, 2018, p. 368). The ROC had succeeded in convincing government authorities that the Jehovah’s Witnesses posed a threat to the moral order of the country and embodied a grave danger for the Orthodox Church. Furthermore, a week before Hillary Clinton was set to arrive in Bucharest, Ambassador Moses and members of Clinton’s team visited the Orthodox church near Revolution Square [the Kretzulescu Church] where the First Lady was to hold a speech. The Americans discovered posters hung up by the Orthodox Church denouncing the Jehovah’s Witnesses in defamatory language. They canceled Hillary Clinton’s visit to the church in order to avoid becoming involved in the dispute over the conference. (Moses, 2018, p. 310). The press became aware of the incident and asked many questions. The journalists mainly wanted to know why the First Lady was not going to visit the Orthodox Church in Revolution Square. Without criticizing the ROC or the Romanian government, the response of the U.S. Embassy emphasized the importance of the free exercise of religion (Moses, 2018, p. 314) and stated that the treatment of the Jehovah’s Witnesses was unacceptable.

1.3

The Greek Catholic Issue

In the discussion about state-funded, external ecclesiastical representation, a number of Greek Catholics have accused both the Romanian government and its diplomacy of supporting only the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) while discriminating against minority religious denominations.15 One example was the support given to the Orthodox Patriarchate in the early 2000s for the establishment of an Office of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Brussels in close

15

Personal conversation with N.D., a political scientist based in Bucharest, in the summer of 2010.

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proximity to the institutions of the European Union.16 A few open-minded Romanian diplomats tried to change the public’s opinion of this discrimination by making symbolic gestures towards Greek Catholics and other minority Churches. For example, Orthodox theologian and diplomat Teodor Baconsky (Baconschi), Romanian ambassador to France (September 2007 to December 2009) used to attend religious services at the Greek Catholic Church in Paris. However, as he attended services wearing a sweater instead of a suit, this led some members of the Uniate community to believe that Baconschi was making the point that he was not at the Greek Catholic parish in his official capacity but as a private person.17 Despite its reluctance to grant rights to religious minorities (mainly Greek Catholics, neo-Protestants, and evangelicals), when compared with other Orthodox Churches of the former Soviet bloc and Eastern Europe, the Romanian Orthodox Church was probably the Church that put the most effort into establishing relations with the Vatican during the first decade of the post-communist period. A number of pro-Western Orthodox theologians and intellectuals (such as Teodor Baconschi and Andrei Ple¸su) played a significant role in this process. In particular, beginning in 1996, both public intellectuals close to the Orthodox Church and political decision-makers of the new center right government actively worked to improve relations with the Holy See; these efforts would culminate in an official visit by Pope John Paul II to Romania (May 7–9, 1999). However, the evidence shows that the high clergy of the Romanian Orthodox Church insisted upon a number of conditions, most importantly that Pope John Paul II was not to visit the town of Blaj, the center of Greek Catholicism in Romania (Vasile, 2016, p. 598). After 1948, Teoctist—back then only an Orthodox vicar—acted as messenger for the communist powers in their dealings with the arrested Greek Catholic bishops. Together with Patriarch Justinian (patriarch from 1948 to 1977), he had been given the task of converting the Blaj bishops to Orthodoxy, which 16

The ecclesiastical diplomatic office of the ROC is not officially affiliated with the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is made up of only clergymen. Its current director is Father Sorin Selaru, ¸ who has held the position of cultural advisor to Patriarch Daniel. The main purpose of this office is to monitor the policies and activities of the European institutions in areas of interest to the Romanian Orthodox Church. The office has carried out Europe-wide studies and analyses of issues of importance for the ROC. For example, in 2013, the office prepared a study on the teaching of religion in the public school systems of the member states of the European Union. One of its objectives was to demonstrate that the ROC is not the only Church within the EU that supports the integration of religious studies in the pre-university public educational system. (Selaru ¸ & Vâlcu, 2012). The office has refrained from publicly taking a stance on controversial issues relating to human rights or the rights of ethnic and religious minorities. 17 Personal conversation with B.M., a historian based in Cluj, in the autumn of 2007.

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involved forcing them to abjure the Catholic faith and the pope. The two Orthodox hierarchs failed in their mission (Vasile, 2016, p. 248 f.). Fifty years later, a papal visit to Blaj would have embarrassed Teoctist for obvious reasons: the Holy Father inevitably would have praised the heroism shown by Greek Catholic bishops and their staunch loyalty to their faith. This would have been intolerable for Teoctist. Romanian government officials accepted the conditions put forth by the Orthodox Church and tried to convince both the representatives of the Holy See and Romanian Greek Catholics to accept the Orthodox terms. The Orthodox Church also wanted to have a say in the symbolic representation of historical religious events during the visit of Pope John Paul II. In May 1999, the Catholic Church (Latin and Byzantine (Greek Catholic)) in Romania commemorated the 45th anniversary of Vladimir Ghika’s death (on 16 May 1954) and his martydom in the horrific communist prison of Jilava. Vladimir Ghika (1873–1954) was an Orthodox intellectual from an old Romanian princely family who converted to Catholicism and became a reputed member of the Roman Catholic clergy. Ghika was well known for his charitable work. He was able to celebrate both rites of the Catholic Church (Latin and Byzantine/Greek Catholic) due to a papal decision from the 1920s. Ghika’s conversion in 1902 came as a tremendous shock to representatives of the ROC. In preparation for the pope’s visit in 1999, historians planned and prepared an anniversary exhibition in honor of Msgr. Ghika which John Paul II could visit at the headquarters of the Romanian presidency while meeting with President Emil Constantinescu. However, just before the pontifical visit to Romania, the pro-Orthodox lobby convinced state authorities to cancel the planned exhibition dedicated to Monsignor Vladimir Ghika at Cotroceni Palace (official residence of the President of Romania). The cancellation of this exhibition was intended to spare Orthodox sensibilities (Vasile, 2016, p. 598).

1.4

The Final Report of the Commission on the Holocaust in Romania

In matters of domestic and foreign policy, the Romanian Orthodox Church got along much better with left-wing post-communist governments (primarily with Iliescu’s Social Democratic Party/PSD, at one time the Romanian Communist Party) than with center-right political parties. One of the contributing factors was that, in general, these parties did not support nationalist and Orthodox ideas and frequently formed government coalitions with the political party of the Hungarian

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minority (UDMR18 ); one of the leaders of the UDMR—Hunor Kelemen—was even appointed Minister of Culture in 2009.19 A number of Orthodox groups were extremely critical of this and particularly of Mihai R˘azvan Ungureanu, Undersecretary of State at the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1998–2001), Minister of Foreign Affairs (2004–2007), and Prime Minister (2012). This criticism was mainly rooted in Ungureanu’s inability to defend Orthodox interests during the Gojdu affair, but also targeted his alleged cosmopolitanism and support of transitional justice, which would affect how the ROC was viewed historically. Among other things, M.R. Ungureanu endorsed and strongly supported the Task Force for International Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remembrance and Research (later the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance/IHRA). The IHRA is an intergovernmental organization created in 1998 by Göran Persson, at that time the prime minister of Sweden. IHRA members must support the Stockholm Declaration and the implementation of national policies and programs in support of Holocaust education, remembrance, and research. Member countries are encouraged to develop multilateral partnerships and to share best practices. The main purpose of the IHRA is to engender support among political and social leaders for the need for Holocaust education, remembrance and research both on a national and international level (Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About IHRA). It was difficult to introduce Holocaust studies in Romania, particularly in the period prior to 2004, mainly because Romania’s involvement in the Holocaust was ignored for a long time. (Friling et al., 2005) This was a particularly sensitive issue for the Romanian Orthodox Church as well, mainly because of the Orthodox clergy’s support of Fascist movements such as the Iron Guard (Legion of the Archangel Michael) (Schmitt, 2016) and the pro-Nazi regime of Marshal Ion Antonescu (1940–1944) (Popa, 2017, pp. 41–71). After several blunders relating to the history of the Holocaust, Ion Iliescu was forced to establish the International Commission on the Holocaust in Romania on October 22, 2003, during his third term as president of Romania (2000–2004). 18

UDMR—Uniunea Democrat˘a Maghiar˘a din România/The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania—represented the Hungarian minority in the Romanian parliament as of 1990; its electoral score was usually around 7–8%. 19 The Department for Religious Denominations (Secretariatul de Stat pentru Culte) was part of and subordinate to the Ministry of Culture from 2000 to 2009. As of 1990, the undersecretary for religious denominations was traditionally an Orthodox Christian or very close to Orthodoxy in his or her views. However, in 2009, the Orthodox lobby secured the independence of the department following the appointment of Hunor Kelemen (a Hungarian Catholic) to the post of minister. The ROC believed that the department was thus in a better position to represent Orthodox interests. (Vasile, 2016, p. 584).

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From the very beginning, the Commission was conceived as an independent research body, free of influence and political interference (Friling et al., 2005, p. 7). The Commission’s aim was to research the facts and to determine the truth about the Holocaust in Romania during World War II as well as the events preceding this tragedy. Its final report also examined the history of the interwar and wartime Romanian Orthodox Church and shed a critical light on eminent prelates, priests, and theologians including—as mentioned above—Patriarch Miron Cristea (in office from 1920 to 1939) (Friling et al., 2005, p. 19). M.R. Ungureanu helped disseminate the final report and also endorsed a follow-up report about the Pogrom of Jassy, which was instigated against the Moldavian Jews (Voicu, 2006, pp. 17–19). As a result, he was attacked by proxies of radical nationalist and Orthodox circles such as Victor Roncea, a foreign affairs journalist turned Orthodox political commentator who acted as the defender of the ROC hierarchy and especially of Patriarch Teoctist (in office from 1986 to 2007). Roncea pursued a far-right agenda duplicating that of the fascist interwar Legionary Movement (Roncea, 2011). ROC representatives neither contradicted nor condemned Roncea. The Holocaust issue was the only one in which the interests of the state diverged from those of Romanian Orthodox circles. However, beginning in 2004, even though the hierarchy of the ROC avoided contradicting the official position of the Romanian government on the Holocaust, it did not allow independent researchers to study the materials in the archives of the Holy Synod, fearing that the historians would document the interwar and wartime anti-Semitism of its clergy (Popa, 2017).

2

Romanian Orthodox Church and Romania’s International Relations

2.1

The Gojdu Affair

The attacks against Ungureanu intensified after October 2005 when the foreign minister signed an agreement together with his Hungarian counterpart to resolve the issue of the Emanoil Gojdu (Gozhdu) Foundation. The Gojdu Foundation was established in the nineteenth century and sponsored grants and fellowships for young Orthodox Romanians (Carp, 2009, p. 71). As specified in Gojdu’s will, the Orthodox metropolitan of Transylvania and all Romanian Orthodox bishops in Transylvania and Hungary were members of the foundation’s board of trustees. The communist government of Hungary nationalized the patrimony of the Gojdu

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Foundation in 1952, discontinuing the activities of the foundation both in Romania and in Hungary. In 1996, upon the initiative of the Orthodox hierarchs from the Metropolitanate of Transylvania and the Metropolitanate of Banat (institutions empowered to manage the activities and patrimony) and with the support of Metropolitan Antonie Pl˘am˘adeal˘a, the Gojdu Foundation resumed its activities. In October 2005, Foreign Minister Mihai R˘azvan Ungureanu signed an agreement with the Hungarian government to establish a Romanian–Hungarian public foundation ‘Gojdu’ under Hungarian law that would be supported financially by the two governments based on the patrimony left by Emanoil Gojdu. Orthodox critics argued that by concluding this agreement, Romania was practically ceding the patrimony of the Gojdu Foundation to the Hungarian state without receiving any form of compensation in return (Golea, 2015). Following almost three years of debates, the agreement was rejected in 2008 by a Romanian Senate that was highly influenced by the Orthodox lobby. The Orthodox lobby was made up of high clergy with strong ties to politicians from almost all major political parties,20 political journalists and commentators from the major Romanian newspapers, radio and television stations, and, last but not least, politically active Orthodox theologians. All of them tried to convince the leaders of the major political parties (Social Democrats, Liberal Democrats, and National Liberals) that they would lose in the next elections if they did not support Orthodox interests. Moreover, the major journals defended the Orthodox position in the Gojdu Affair. The Orthodox high clergy hoped to receive and use at least a part of the sum collected by the Hungarian government for the privatization of the Gojdu courtyard in 1999. In the end, the ROC was not successful in spite of having the support of the Sibiu-based Orthodox Gojdu Foundation.

2.2

Romania’s Accession to the EU and the Decriminalization of Homosexuality

After 1989, the center-right parties were more cautious in supporting the Orthodox high clergy unreservedly. Politically, the center-right parties paid a high price after the ban on homosexuality was lifted in 2000, which alienated a significant part of the Orthodox Church clergy. The legalization of homosexuality was a requirement for accession to the EU that was meant to introduce more equality (Stan & Turcescu, 2011, p. 149). On June 21, 1995, all political parties agreed 20

Except perhaps for the USR/Uniunea Salva¸ti România/Save Romania Union (a liberal progressive political party that emerged after 2016).

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to support the Romanian strategy for admission to the EU by signing the Snagov Declaration, which stated, “The national strategic objective of Romania’s accession to the European Union is a crucial point of solidarity and convergence of the country’s political and social forces.” (Papadimitriou & Phinnemore, 2008, p. 74). The ROC immediately endorsed the Snagov Declaration, a contradictory move as the Orthodox high clergy did not release an official statement on the necessity of adopting the new laws that would align Romania to EU standards prior to its admission. ROC announced its position on homosexuality only after foreign representatives and diplomats in Bucharest urged the Romanian government and parliament to amend Article 200 of the Penal Code which criminalized homosexual relations. Finally, after heated debates and tireless Orthodox attempts to block the decriminalization, Article 200 was repealed by the Romanian parliament in 2000. However, the hierarchy of the ROC did not openly support anti-European political forces. After 2013, Euroscepticism began to emerge in Orthodox circles during internal debates over the legalization of same-sex marriages. In response to this, between 2015 and 2018, the ROC actively supported what was known as the Coalition for Family (CFF), which proposed an amendment to the Romanian constitution that would explicitly define marriage as a union only between a man and a woman. This legislative proposal was also intended to send a clear message to other countries, an explicit rejection of the trend visible in the US and EU favoring same sex marriages. ROC tried to avoid any comparisons between its support for the Coalition for Family and the Russian Orthodox Church and Vladimir Putin’s condemnation of homosexuality and same sex marriages. However, the CFF initiative was rejected at the referendum on October 6 and 7, 2018, also because many Romanians feared that Romania would follow the lead of Putin’s Russia with regard to family policies.21 Instead, in order to defend the condemnation of homosexuality and same sex marriages/partnerships, some Orthodox theologians began to endorse the Polish Catholic Church’s position as legitimate and drew parallels to it. However, the representatives of the ROC did not publicly discuss the fact that, particularly after the PiS22 came to power in 2015, the focus of the Polish Church shifted from defending Catholicism/Christianity against Muslims or Protestants to defending it against the European Union (Ramet, 2020, p. 265).

21

Read more on Russia in “Constructing Russian Foreign Policy: Interdependencies between the State and the Russian Orthodox Church” by Maria Toropova. 22 PiS—Prawo i Sprawiedliwo´sc ´ (Law and Justice Party in Poland).

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Concluding Remarks

At first glance, Romania appears to be similar to Poland both in terms of its church-state relations (Stan & Turcescu, p. 149) and in the influence the dominant Church holds in foreign policy issues. One obvious difference is that the dominant religious denomination in Poland is the Roman Catholic Church. Both Churches sought to impose a religious identity on the country’s diplomacy, although the ROC tried to avoid being perceived as an anti-EU ecclesiastical organization. In the early 1930s, the well-known Romanian religious philosopher, essayist and journalist Nae Ionescu defined the Romanian spirit through Orthodoxy. Ionescu often claimed that to be Romanian meant to be Christian Orthodox (Ionescu, 1990, pp. 194–215). During the interwar period, several Romanian foreign ministers gave the hierarchy of the ROC access to confidential information on the negotiations with the Vatican in order to establish a common standpoint for the country’s diplomatic position towards the Holy See and international ecclesiastical affairs. During the post-communist period, several influential prelates of the Orthodox Church tried to shape Romanian foreign policy to conform to the viewpoints of Nae Ionescu and to ensure that they had the same access to sensitive information as they had enjoyed during the interwar period. The interwar model was favored even by the former communists who took power after 1989. In 2008, Ion Iliescu recalled that in September of 1991, his colleagues from the Social Democratic Party (then National Salvation Front, FSN) had offered the position of prime minister to the Orthodox Metropolitan of Moldova and Bukovina, His Beatitude Daniel (Ciobotea), the current Patriarch of Romania. Iliescu’s colleagues proposed this directly to Metropolitan Daniel after Petre Roman (a former associate of Iliescu) was removed from his position as the head of the government. The proposed appointment of Metropolitan Daniel came at a time of severe social instability caused by the raid on the capital by the Jiu Valley miners. On the one hand, Iliescu and his associates believed that, politically, the appointment of a prime minister from among the hierarchy of the Romanian Orthodox Church would be a practical solution, given that over 80% of Romanians were of the Christian Orthodox faith. On the other hand, a precedent existed for the appointment of Metropolitan Daniel: Patriarch Miron Cristea had been prime minister of Romania from February 1938 to March 1939. Another reason why the FSN leadership and Iliescu wanted the Metropolitan of Moldova to become the prime minister was because the spiritual leaders of this Metropolitanate have traditionally acceded to the patriarchy (Patriarhul Daniel, 2008) The proposal to appoint Metropolitan Daniel as the head of the Romanian cabinet was ultimately abandoned, but it is significant that many post-1989 politicians ignored

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the fact that their interwar model (Miron Cristea’s government, February 1938– March 1939) had adopted an anti-Semitic legislation and had taken significant steps towards Nazi Germany. Apparently, this type of model undermined Romania’s chances of being admitted to the EU. Other than religious minorities and some intellectual critics, very few institutions and people have dared to challenge the Orthodox Church’s influence on foreign policy issues. However, the two truth commissions established by the Romanian presidents I. Iliescu and Traian B˘asescu (in 2003, the International Commission for the Study of the Holocaust and in 2006, the Presidential Commission for the Analysis of the Communist Dictatorship/PCACDR) did not gloss over controversial issues in their final reports (Cesereanu, 2008, p. 270), such as the collaboration of Orthodox officials with pro-Nazi regimes and the Communist Party (and its political police, the Securitate). In their final reports, the commissions indirectly disavowed both the collaboration of the ROC with authoritarian political regimes throughout the twentieth century and its controversial involvement in Romania’s international relations. The PCACDR report included a symbolic discussion of the separation of the Orthodox Church and the state and challenged the mainstream historical discourse regarding recent ecclesiastical history. Faced with these kinds of reports and historical materials, many Orthodox theologians became resigned. It is likely that one of them was Teodor Baconschi (former Romanian ambassador to the Vatican) who became one of the most important political advisers of President B˘asescu in late 2006. PCACDR’s final report was released online on December 18, 2006, but was only published by Humanitas, one of the most prestigious publishing houses in Romania, in November of 2007. The Orthodox lobby was concerned that the report would broadcast an inappropriate message abroad (the editors of the report were also planning to publish it in other languages). Both the editors of the report and President B˘asescu suggested that the Final Report on Communist Dictatorship was a step that needed to be taken prior to Romania’s admission to the EU on January 1, 2007, and thus an official state document. Therefore, high representatives of the Orthodox Church attempted to influence and change the final contents of the report. Beginning in late 2006, Teodor Baconschi held a more powerful position within the hierarchy of the Romanian presidency than the editors of the report. In mid-June 2007, at a meeting of the editorial board of the final report, Baconschi suggested that the editors revise the final version of the manuscript to focus on the sacrifices made by lower Orthodox clergy during the communist period and to reduce the allegedly excessive heroization of the Orthodox clergy who had challenged the pro-communist hierarchy (the Orthodox nuns of Vladimire¸sti

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Convent, for instance). According to T. Baconschi, the leadership of the Romanian Orthodox Church strongly disagreed with the final report; the Faculty of Theology of the Orthodox Church in Bucharest even published an extremely critical review of the report in the Theological Historical Yearbook (Gabor, 2006, p. 185) and many Orthodox intellectuals and clergy pressured the Romanian presidency to reject the report (including Victor Roncea, a foreign affairs journalist who is associated with far-right groups and who fiercely criticized Foreign Minister Mihai R˘azvan Ungureanu over the Gojdu Affair). Therefore, Baconschi asked commission members to find a solution that would mitigate the tense climate, adding that it would not be of any benefit if the hierarchs of the Romanian Orthodox Church were to make derogatory statements about the Presidential Report. However, the editors of PCACDR’s final report only changed a few words and added a few references (Tismaneanu et al., 2007, p. 278). It appeared as though the Orthodox lobby had failed. However, when the manuscript of the final report was ready to be printed in the autumn of 2007, representatives of the Romanian presidency sent a statement to the publishing house insisting that it be included in the report as a preface. The preface informed readers that only the presidential address to parliament condemning the communist regime was recognized in its entirety by President Traian B˘asescu, while the report23 merely constituted an open access work prepared by a number of political scientists, scholars and historians. The preface then pointed out that this report was only the theoretical basis for future historical studies and investigations that would be carried out with the objective of bringing to light other information and nuances in order to fully understand the communist past (Tismaneanu et al., 2007, p. 2). Once again, the lobby of the ROC had demonstrated its political impact and influence. Even the U.S. ambassador to Romania, Alfred H. Moses, recognized the necessity of cooperating with the Orthodox Church and especially with the Romanian patriarch, despite the controversies he had had with the representatives of the ROC. Recalling the events of July 4, 1997, Moses wrote in his memoirs, “Patriarch Teoctist remained a friend and even came to one of our July Fourth receptions, a first for the patriarch of the Romanian [Orthodox] Church. For an ambassador in Romania, having the national church on your side was a definite plus.” (Moses, 2018, p. 237).

23

In the preface, the report was never described as the “final” report, probably to please the hierarchy of the ROC and to send a message of encouragement. Afterwards, the Romanian Patriarchate put together a team of Orthodox historians who drafted a counter-report in 2009 that was praised by Orthodox and radical right-wing groups.

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In the post-communist period, Orthodoxy was a source of identity and legitimacy24 for Romanian domestic and foreign policy, particularly during those times when left-wing administrations were in office. This is not necessarily a paradox. Iliescu’s “Social Democrats” never supported the separation of church and state. The FSN and PSD (Iliescu’s parties) were pseudo-Social Democratic political groups that were closer to conservative (and even reactionary) parties in their ideology and were backed by people living in rural areas and small towns who described themselves as religious. These people identified as Christian Orthodox even though not all of them had attended religious services at Orthodox churches prior to 1989 (Vinea, 2003, pp. 264–266).

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24

I used Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker’s definition of these concepts (Warner & Walker, 2011, p. 114).

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Iliescu, I. (2004). The great shock at the end of a short century: Ion Iliescu in dialogue with Vladimir Tismaneanu on communism, post-communism and democracy. East European Monographs. Ionescu, N. (1990). Roza vânturilor. Editura Roza vânturilor. Leustean, L. N. (2009). Orthodoxy and the cold War: Religion and political power in Romania, 1947–1965. Palgrave Macmillan. Moses, A. H. (2018). Bucharest diary: Romania’s journey from darkness to light. Brookings Institution Press. N˘astase, D. (2005). Secularizare s¸i religie în integrarea european˘a. Bisericile majoritare esteuropene împotriva statului laic vest-european? In R. Carp (Ed.), Un suflet pentru Europa. Dimensiunea religioas˘a a unui proiect politic (pp. 235–251). Editura Funda¸tiei Anastasia. Papadimitriou, D., & Phinnemore, D. (2008). Romania and the European Union: From marginalisation to membership. Routledge. Patriarhul, D. (2008). Patriarhul Daniel trebuia sa fie premier. Ziare.com. http://www.ziare. com/ion-iliescu/petre-roman/patriarhul-daniel-trebuia-sa-fie-premier-240720. Accessed: 9 Jun. 2020. P˘acurariu, M. (2002). Dic¸tionarul teologilor români. Editura Enciclopedic˘a. Popa, I. (2017). The Romanian Orthodox church and the holocaust. Indiana University Press. Ramet, S. P. (2020). The Catholic church in polish history: From 966 to Present. Palgrave Macmillan. Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. About IHRA. https://www.mae.ro/en/node/36166# null. Accessed: 25 May 2020. Roncea, V. (2011). O dezbatere necesar˘a: P˘arintele Justin, Petru Vod˘a, Mi¸scarea Legionar˘a s¸i România. Ziari¸sti la Por¸tile Raiului. Ziaristionline.ro. http://www.ziaristionline.ro/2011/ 02/22/roncea-ro-o-dezbatere-necesara-parintele-justin-petru-voda-miscarea-legionarasi-romania-ziaristi-la-portile-raiului/. Accessed: 8 Oct. 2020. Runcan, N. (2000). Concordatul Vaticanului cu România: considerat, ii istorico-juridice. Ex Ponto. Schmitt, O. J. (2016). Capitan Codreanu: Aufstieg und Fall des rumänischen Faschistenführers. Paul Zsolnay Verlag. Schmitt, O. J. (2017). Corneliu Zelea Codreanu. Ascensiunea s¸i c˘aderea „C˘apitanului“, trsl. W. Tauwinkl. Editura Humanitas. Selaru, ¸ S., & Vâlcu, G. (2012). Studiul Religiei în s¸colile publice din statele membre ale Uniunii Europene. http://www.orthodoxero.eu/media/Documente/Religia%20in% 20Uniunea%20Europeana.pdf. Accessed: 8 Oct. 2020. Sigmirean, P., & Pavel, A. (Eds.). (2003). Emanuil Gojdu - Bicentenar. Editura Academiei Române. Stan, A. (1997). Iuliu Maniu. Na¸tionalism s¸i democra¸tie. Biografia unui mare român. Editura Saeculum I.O. Stan, L., & Turcescu, L. (2011). Church, state, and democracy in expanding Europe. Oxford University Press. Stan, L. (2013). Transitional justice in post-communist Romania: The politics of memory. Cambridge University Press. Stef˘ ¸ anescu, D. (1995). Cinci ani din istoria României. O cronologie a evenimentelor, decembrie 1989-decembrie 1994. Editura Ma¸sina de Scris.

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Religions for Peace (RfP) and Global and European Interfaith Politics: Different Faiths, Common Actions – in Foreign Policy? Peter Bender “Guided by the principles of my own religious tradition, and respectful of religious differences, I commit myself to principled multi-religious cooperation for Peace. I will work as a partner with sincere believers of other religions and men and women of good will on matters of deeply held and widely shared moral concerns”. (Statement of Commitment to Multi-Religious Cooperation, Religions for Peace (RfP) 10th World Assembly, Lindau, August 2019)

1

Religions for Peace: Emergence of a Global Interfaith Actor

“No peace among nations without peace among religions. No peace among religions without dialogue between the religions. No dialogue between the religions without fundamental research into the religions”.1 With this famous (indirect) appeal for global interreligious dialogue and world peace, the Swiss theologian Hans Küng from the University of Tübingen in South West Germany started his “Project for a global ethic” (Projekt Weltethos) in 1990, during the last years of the Cold War. His initiative—which also encompassed foreign policy and international economics (Küng, 2000)—can be seen as a preemptive anti-thesis to the notorious “Clash of Civilizations” widely debated in politics, foreign policy, 1

Source Quote: Foundation for a Global Ethic. https://www.global-ethic.org/the-global-ethicproject/. Accessed: 19 Jul. 2020.

P. Bender (B) Kassel, Germany © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_7

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academia and the media, a controversial and frequently-misinterpreted international relations concept sketched in the 1993 essay and (later) book of the US political scientist Samuel Huntington from Harvard (Huntington, 1998). Some years previously, in 1986, Pope John Paul II had already made a strong symbolic gesture against religious hatred with his multi-religious peace prayer together with other religious leaders in Assisi (Pontificial Commission ‘Iustitia et Pax’, 1987), a powerful common action whose historic significance and iconic pictures inspired many interfaith movements and activists across the entire world for the years to come. Religion has never been truly away from the post-1945 foreign policy agenda, despite the economic and secular ideological cleavage shaping the bipolar Cold War world. However, religion prominently returned in the 1990s and early-2000s, mostly due to violence and terrorism committed in the name of religion, and due to socio-economic, cultural and ethnic conflicts—both domestic and international—associated with religious affiliations and fundamental beliefs. Consequently, most foreign policy practitioners, researchers and analysts viewed religion as a source or driver of conflicts2 rather than a potential partner for peace. However, soon scholars and diplomats also recognized the positive importance of religions for peace and stability, realized their specific competences for peace-building, trust and reconciliation and valued their credibility and outreach to people (Auswärtiges Amt, 2007; Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), 2015; Ferrara, 2014; Weingardt, 2010). Some foreign ministries and international governmental organizations started building up in-house expertise on religions and actively engaged with religious communities on foreign policy, peace-building and development issues (Bender, 2017, pp. 17–81)3 . This comparatively new development mostly starting in the mid-1990s—especially in the United Nations, the European Union, and the United States—and has intensified since the early-2000s, depending on the country and individual government approaches, leading to an emerging indirect involvement of religious communities in foreign policy, beyond—albeit still prevalent—classical lobbying and advocacy work. This article will present and analyze the role and foreign policy-related activities of Religions for Peace (RfP), a global interfaith organization and a distinct major international interreligious actor that is often overlooked in foreign policy research. Accordingly, the guiding research questions will be: What are the positions of RfP on global issues? Which topics of foreign policy are particularly dealt with by RfP assemblies? What is the 2

An overview of religion-related international conflicts is provided in Röhrich (2004). Overview of seven states and eight international organizations, as well as twelve partner countries.

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potential for RfP as an emerging foreign policy actor and how can the cooperation with international organizations and national foreign ministries be improved? After a brief historical overview, the research focus will be on RfP’s international and European actions since 2015, when dialogue and cooperation with the United Nations and e.g. the German Foreign Office was intensified—more precisely, strategically conceptualized—and new foreign policy topics like the abolition of nuclear weapons, migration, refugees, climate change, cooperation with diplomats and international NGOs appeared more prominently and systematically on RfP’s global and regional agenda. Religions and religious communities and faith-based institutions themselves play an important role in international relations. Like large or well-connected countries, multinational corporations or large NGOs, they can be seen as “global players” (Werkner & Hidalgo, 2014). This is obvious for the Catholic Church, with the special role of the Vatican (Ring-Eifel, 2004) as a state and the Holy See as an entity of the law of nations with formal embassies/diplomatic representations around the globe, but also for other religions and denominations, faith-based charities, religious-based development NGOs, and Freedom of Religion or Belief (FoRB) movements,4 which contribute to global governance (Baumgart-Ochse, 2014). However, international interfaith organizations like RfP are less known in the realm of world politics, even to foreign policy experts, politicians, practitioners and diplomats. This is surprising given that several of these interfaith organizations are global in scale and mandate, have been active for decades, deal with precise foreign policy topics, regularly speak out and publish on global issues, and aim at collaborating with international organizations5 and national governments, sometimes at the highest level. RfP is a distinct global interreligious actor, but not the only one. Some of these international interfaith organizations see themselves directly inspired by the United Nations (such as the United Religions Initiative (URI) in San Francisco), they have their origin in a parliament-like representation of peoples of different faiths (such as the Parliament of World’s Religions (CPWR) in Chicago), closely follow and specifically address a certain international political body (such as the G20 Interfaith Forum), are respected international conflict mediators (such as the Comunità di Sant’Egidio in Rome or the Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers in Helsinki) or are supported and were co-founded by several governments (such as the KAICIID institute in 4

For example, such as the International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty (IADRL) in Bern, Switzerland, documentation of IADRL’s cooperation with UN and other international organizations (Olteanu, Ed. 2014, 2015). 5 On the European Union and interfaith dialogue, see Bender (2013).

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Vienna). Others are spin-offs or even formally part of international governmental organizations, such as the World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD) (from the World Bank in Washington DC) or the United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC) (to the United Nations in New York). RfP is a leading worldwide interfaith movement linking grassroots activities with global politics focused on peace. Founded in 1970 in Kyoto, Japan, with the then-name of World Conference on Religions and Peace (WCRP), RfP’s interfaith work started during the Cold War and under the impression of the horrifying atrocities of the war in Vietnam (Gebhardt, 2014, pp. 195–199). Striving together for global peace as men and women of different faiths from different countries of the world has been the motivation and impetus from the origins of the organization. Consequently, RfP wanted to cooperate with the United Nations (UN) and has ever since maintained a very close relationship with the world organization. The RfP secretariat was established directly next to the UN headquarters in New York and RfP was formally registered as an accredited NGO at the UN. It has consultative status as NGO at the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) and the specialized organizations UNESCO and UNICEF (Gebhardt, 2014, p. 199). It is also active in the Committee of Religious NGOs at the UN (Badri & Breitmeier, 2014, p. 71). Over the 50 years of its existence, RfP has emerged as a global interfaith actor, dealing with foreign policy issues through global assemblies, regional cooperation, national networks and local actions. RfP can influence foreign policy and international relations through declarations, press releases, the establishment of national interreligious councils (IRCs), conflict mediation and facilitation, formal involvement in peace and negotiation processes, invitations of political representatives to its events, personal lobbying and international networks, advocacy, and project-based cooperation with UN specialized organizations (e.g. for UNFPA Karam (Ed.) (2012)), foreign ministries and NGOs.

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Global Assemblies, National Networks, Local Actions: How Religions for Peace Works

RfP is actively engaging in interfaith cooperation at the global, continental, national and local level, with a national presence in some 90 countries on all five continents.6 While at all these levels foreign and development policy-related 6

For more details about the history, organization and conflict resolution activities of RfP, see Gebhardt (2014).

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actions are undertaken—such as thematic conferences and public discussions, multi-religious peace prayers related to global issues, international solidarity events, and advocacy initiatives—and in general interfaith grassroots work is especially important, the focus in this article will be placed on the activities of RfP International, RfP Europe/European Council of Religious Leaders (ECRL) and the World Assemblies, mostly at global or European level, given that they hold particular interest to foreign policy-makers and researchers. Moreover, these RfP institutions can be adequate partners for foreign ministries and other foreign policy actors. While these partnerships are recently emerging and differ from country to country depending on the national context and diplomatic approaches, it remains to be seen how patterns of cooperation will develop and which forms of common foreign policy-related engagement might eventually evolve from the current beginnings. The governance and organization of RfP are defined in the RfP International Standing Rules (Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace, 2019a, pp. 55–66). The highest governance body of RfP is the World Assembly, which meets approximately every five years. Between the World Assemblies, RfP is governed by a World Council of senior religious leaders and experts (particularly through a standing Executive Committee of the World Council), and the global work is organized by the International Secretariat. Basic principles of RfP’s organization are representativity and subsidiarity. There are two types of RfP membership: institutional and individual. RfP comprises four levels of organization: local affiliates (local units), national affiliates (national chapters), regional affiliates (covering a world region, e.g. a continent or sub-continent) and RfP International. Officers of RfP include up to 30 Honorary Presidents, up to 60 Presidents, a Treasurer and a Secretary General. The World Council comprises the Presidents, Treasurer, Secretary General, representatives of the International Youth Committee and the Women’s Coordinating Committee, and a Moderator of each regional affiliate (continent/sub-continent). The six world regions are North America, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Middle East/North Africa, Africa, and Asia (including Oceania). National IRCs—or RfP National Chapters, as they are also called—are self-led and considered to be the drivers and engines of interfaith dialogue and cooperation in the respective countries. The Secretary General of RfP International is Prof. Azza Karam, a Muslim UN diplomat born in Cairo (Egypt) and a scholar on Religion and Development at the Vrije Universiteit of Amsterdam. At the European level, the President and Moderator of the ECRL is Revd. Dr. Thomas Wipf, a Protestant minister from Zurich (Switzerland). The ECRL

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secretariat is located at the University of Winchester’s Centre for Religion, Reconciliation and Peace (CRRP) in the United Kingdom.7 RfP Germany was founded in 1988 in Mainz, and the President of RfP Germany is Dr. Franz Brendle, a Catholic theologian from Stuttgart. In this article, examples from the work of RfP International, RfP Europe, ECRL and RfP Germany will be presented. Key milestones of RfP’s development and actions are the World Assemblies, convened every 5–6 years by RfP International, bringing together religious leaders, experts, interfaith grassroots activists, as well as guests including leading politicians, diplomats, civil society, trustees and other stakeholders. An overview of the ten World Assemblies and their key foreign policy-related actions and outcomes is provided in Table 1. This overview illustrates that the RfP World Assemblies have continuously dealt with foreign policy and global peace issues; for example, by inviting religious leaders and stakeholders from (international) conflict zones and engaging them in conflict mediation and peace-building sessions (so-called private Track II Peace Consultations) during the gatherings. Conflict zones and countries covered include the Balkans, West Africa, the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Myanmar/Bangladesh, North and South Korea, Central African Republic, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace, 2019a, pp. 28–32). At the World Assemblies, RfP has reacted to the current political agenda, covered peace/religion-related foreign policy topics, kept staying in close contact with foreign policy actors (e.g. government officials or representatives of the UN, the European Union or the African Union) and stakeholders, and tried to implement the conclusions of the global meetings with specific peace projects and foreign policy actions, such as co-facilitating peace talks and conflict transformation (Gebhardt, 2014, pp. 205–207). As a regional example of formulating specific foreign policy recommendations, the declaration of the RfP European Assembly in Castel Gandolfo 2015 as well as the Assembly in Lindau in 2019 will be presented in further detail.

2.1

RfP European Assembly Castel Gandolfo 2015: Challenges of Migration, Refugee Crisis and Integration

Amidst the international refugee crisis that hit Europe in fall 2015, RfP Europe gathered for the RfP European Assembly in Castel Gandolfo, Italy, the village 7

For more details about the origins, history and activities of ECRL, see Affolderbach (2020, pp. 71–87).

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Tab. 1 Religions for Peace World Assemblies 1970–2019 RfP World Assembly

Place, Year

Participants

Countries

Selected Foreign Policy-Related Outcomes/Actions

1

Kyoto (Japan), 1970

300

39

Multi-religious fact-finding mission to Vietnam

2

Leuven (Belgium), 1974

400

53

Vietnamese Boat People’s Project

3

Princeton (USA), 1979

350

48

Nuclear disarmament delegations to Washington, Moscow and Beijing

4

Nairobi (Kenya), 1984

600

60

Multi-religious efforts to end apartheid in South Africa

5

Melbourne (Australia), 1989

650

61

Global Action Partnership with UNICEF

6

Riva del Garda (Italy), 1994

850

63

IRCs for reconciliation and mediation of civil wars in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sierra Leone and Liberia

7

Amman (Jordan), 1999

1200

70

Advancing conflict resolution in fifteen states ‘Hope for African Children’ program in ten African countries

8

Kyoto (Japan), 2006

800

100

Negotiations among representatives from Iraq, Israel and Palestine, North and South Korea, Sudan and Sri Lanka (continued)

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Tab. 1 (continued) RfP World Assembly 9

10

Place, Year

Participants

Countries

Selected Foreign Policy-Related Outcomes/Actions

Vienna (Austria), 2013

800

141

Counter terrorism programs Partnership on refugees with UNHCR and UNICEF Paris Summit Global Climate Change Campaign

Lindau (Germany), 2019

900

125

Peace Charter for Forgiveness and Reconciliation Interfaith Rainforest Initiative/Faiths for Forest Declaration Partnership with International Campaign to abolish Nuclear Weapons

Source: Own compilation from Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace (2019a, pp. 50–54) (For detailed RfP activities, see Gebhardt (2014, pp. 203–208). For more on the Bosnia and Herzegovina case, see Weingardt (2010, pp. 193–196))

of the Pope’s summer residence, on October 28–November 1, 2015. Hosted by the Christian Focolare Movement, 290 representatives from 28 countries and ten different religious communities and faith traditions discussed the challenges of migration, refugee crisis and integration in a pluralist, democratic Europe. The title of the assembly—“Welcoming each other: from Fear to Trust”—sent a strong message against xenophobia, anti-Semitism, islamophobia and social exclusion (Religions for Peace Europe, 2016). Political keynote speakers included an expert from the European Commission in Brussels and Ireland’s ambassador to the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). The assembly’s theme was dealt with in three sub-topics: “inner peace”, “freedom of expression” and “protecting the most vulnerable”.8 The RfP Europe assembly

8

For a full report on the RfP European Assembly at Castel Gandolfo, see Religions for Peace Europe (2016). The document names as most vulnerable groups religious and ethnic

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adopted specific and detailed foreign policy-related recommendations, addressing European political decision-makers, particularly the EU institutions of the European Council, European Commission and European Parliament. Invoking inspiration by religious values of peace, love and hope, as well as expressing a deep commitment to Europe’s fundamental political principles of freedom, justice, equality and solidarity, the European interfaith meeting called upon international policy-makers: • “To substantially engage in foreign policy dialogue with other major international powers such as the United States, Russia, Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other actors involved to overcome civil wars, violence and ethnic and religious cleansing in Africa, Asia and the Middle East, thus ending the main reasons for refugees to flee their countries of origin • To further develop the UN conventions and international agreements on limiting arms trade and proliferation and to create a clear legal base in European Union primary law to prohibit all arms exports from EU member states to outside EU/NATO areas or outside UN mandated interventions and to monitor this at European and national level • To reform the EU laws on refugees and asylum-seekers and to adapt them to better respond to the current crisis and to uphold the fundamental right of asylum in Europe • To substantially increase the participation of religious leaders and faith community members in the search for appropriate responses to the critical issues Europe is facing today • To substantially increase the EU’s and EU member states’ funding for the UNHCR, ECHO and other organizations, including faith-based charities, helping immigrants and refugees in Europe and in the host countries of the affected regions, notably in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan • To significantly increase funding for intercultural and interfaith dialogue initiatives and projects, for example within the framework of the EU Structural and Social Funds, and to further expand and improve existing EU programmes to support the integration of immigrants and Europeans with a migration background • To increase the EU funding for fighting youth unemployment in Europe, with a particular focus on less-favoured young people in danger of being discriminated against because of their ethnic or religious background minorities, marginalized people and communities, migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, among others.

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• To increase financial support of the EU and EU member states for projects and initiatives combating discrimination, xenophobia, anti-Semitism, islamophobia and religious hatred at European, national, regional and local level in order to help people to turn fear into trust, to foster open mindedness towards people from different countries and diverse ethnic and religious backgrounds, and to respect the human dignity of each person”. (Religions for Peace Europe, 2016, p. 27 f.) The Castel Gandolfo European Assembly demonstrated that RfP is not only able to unite religious leaders and interfaith activists from different traditions (e.g. Buddhists, Catholic, Orthodox, Protestant Christians, Hindus, Jews, Muslims, Shintoists, Sikhs, Taoists, Zoroastrians) and countries even during a controversial international crisis, but also that they can rally behind a common cause and lead spiritual interfaith reflections to clearly-formulated, concrete and up-to-date foreign policy recommendations. RfP Europe took up the task of presenting the assembly’s recommendations to EU policy-makers in Brussels, and national RfP chapters were encouraged to urge the implementation of political recommendations through advocacy work in their countries and start corresponding activities in their own religious communities and national interfaith contexts. The importance of RfP and other interfaith organizations for foreign policy and diplomacy has been recognized by international organizations and foreign ministries; for example, representatives from RfP and the ECRL have been invited to meetings (co-)hosted by foreign ministries of Germany or Italy, e.g. at the “Responsibility of Religions for Peace” (“Friedensverantwortung der Religionen”) conference in 2017 in Berlin, or at an experts’ workshop and a public symposium on “Interreligious Dialogue and Foreign Policy” in 2018 in Bologna. Diplomats and officials have participated in RfP conferences and other international interfaith meetings, e.g. from the foreign ministries of the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Switzerland and Italy.

2.2

RfP Lindau World Assembly 2019: Going Green, Meeting Foreign Policy

When German Federal President Dr. Frank-Walter Steinmeier addressed the more than 900 delegates at the 10th RfP World Assembly 2019 “Caring for our Common Future—Advancing Shared Well-Being” in Lindau, this was a special highlight in the history of RfP’s global gatherings. As a foreign minister four years ago, the Social Democrat Steinmeier had initiated the new approach of

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German foreign policy towards religions, namely engaging with religious communities as partners for peace, establishing a “Religion and Foreign Policy” unit in the Foreign Office, and convening a network and a large conference called “Responsibility of Religions for Peace” (“Friedensverantwortung der Religionen”) in Berlin in 2017 with more than 100 international religious leaders and faithbased activists.9 In order to prepare and implement the Lindau World Assembly 2019, the Foreign Office supported the foundation of a new organization called “Ring for Peace”, based in Lindau and dedicated to peace dialogue of world religions and civil society. Together with RfP International, Ring for Peace served as co-organizer of the World Assembly. The Lindau World Assembly was more interactive, inclusive, action-oriented than other previous meetings. While previous assemblies placed more emphasis on lecture-style talks, the Lindau program included more dialogue sessions, smaller workshops, thematic exchanges with more discussions, inspiring shorter lightning talks,10 and a gallery displaying best-practice examples of interfaith cooperation, particularly in the areas of reconciliation, health care and education. Moreover, written thematic input for the assembly from RfP national chapters was already systematically collected ahead of the gathering. The environment, education, gender equality, the role of women and youth in religion and peace-building were prominent topics at Lindau, which were repeatedly emphasized on several occasions.11 At the Agora Market of Ideas—an open space tent area in front of the conference center—the Lindau Assembly liaised with locals, passers-by, and tourists in the town with information stands from RfP Germany, faith-based charities and civil society NGOs such as peace movements and disarmament initiatives. Foreign policy was also present in a new format as part of the official conference program called “Meet Diplomats for Coffee”, where informal encounters brought the assembly’s delegates together with ambassadors and foreign policy practitioners (Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace, 2019a, p. 36 f.). The Lindau World Assembly adopted the “Peace Charter for Forgiveness and Reconciliation”,12 decided to become a full partner of the International Campaign 9

Documentation of the Berlin 2017 conference is provided in Auswärtiges Amt (2017); for the Foreign Office and interfaith dialogue, see Kreft (2015). 10 Concise presentations and motivating statements focused on concrete actions and examples by leaders, activists and experts. 11 RfP Germany dedicated its 101/2019 newsletter to the Lindau World Assembly, see detailed reports in RfP Deutschland (2019). 12 An interfaith document elaborated by experts and interfaith leaders from Birmingham (United Kingdom) and later presented to and endorsed by highest religious and political leaders; see Boehle (2019).

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to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), endorsed the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and approved a strategic partnership with the Interfaith Rainforest Initiative together with the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). In a moving ceremony, after over 20 years the outgoing RfP Secretary General Bill Vendley handed over the office to his newly-elected successor, Professor Azza Karam, the first woman and the first Muslim to serve as RfP’s Chief Executive. At the Lindau World Assembly, the participants solemnly reaffirmed their commitment to “multi-religious cooperation for peace”.13 Even long-time participants of several previous RfP World Assemblies and interfaith activists with decades of experience praised the special atmosphere and dynamics of the gathering in the small island town in Lake Constance, and they hailed the Lindau spirit as a transformational moment in interfaith collaboration for peace.

2.3

Advancing Shared Well-Being? Lindau Goals and Further Foreign Policy Topics for International Interfaith Engagement

RfP and the German Foreign Office both want the Lindau Assembly to have a lasting impact for international interreligious work for peace and the collaboration of diplomacy and religions. Moreover, interfaith cooperation at the national level shall be enhanced and strengthened in the future. The vision and the Lindau goals of advancing shared well-being globally shall be put into practice through common interfaith actions and foreign policy initiatives to be elaborated in further working groups and follow-up events. As a first step, a detailed and methodological manual (Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace, 2019b) identifying issues of common concern, providing useful examples and suggesting collaborative actions was handed out to delegates at Lindau. At a Lindau follow-up working meeting titled “Multi-Religious & Multi-Stakeholder Partnership for Peace & Development” with 250 religious leaders, experts, diplomats and stakeholders in December 2019 in New York, the new RfP Secretary General Professor Azza Karam offers a precise and structured overview of the UN activities and a frank, personal and passionate assessment of foreign policy developments and global events relevant for religious communities and interfaith cooperation (Bender, 2020b). In its “2020–2025 Strategy Plan” adopted pursuant to the consultations at the December

13

Lindau Pledge, read and solemnly spoken by the assembly’s participants in plenary session, see text at the beginning of this article.

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2019 New York meeting, RfP identifies six strategic goals to advance interfaith cooperation for peace: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Peaceful, just and inclusive societies Gender equality Environment Freedom of thought, conscience and religion Interreligious education Global partnerships

While all of these goals offer opportunities for RfP’s cooperation with governments, foreign ministries and civil society and can relate to foreign policy, goal 6 concerning global partnerships holds particular interest for future research and could envisage strategic partnerships with certain foreign policy actors. The UN and its specialized organizations, the EU, the African Union, foreign ministries with experience, interest and expertise in religion, other large interfaith organizations (such as the G20 Interfaith Forum), international faith-based charities and global NGOs are obvious natural partners. Whether and how the current initial patterns of cooperation will develop into medium- and long-term structural and strategic partnerships remains to be seen, but there is strong potential for a differentiated, peace-focused and UN SDG-related cooperation (Bender, 2017, pp. 89–92). At the occasion of the G20 Finance Ministers meeting in July 2020, RfP joined more than 200 other faith-based, interfaith and non-denominational NGOs calling for a debt standstill for developing countries, more aid, new processes to prevent financial crises and measures that confront tax evasion and corruption.14 This intervention shows that RfP is strongly committed to assessing and influencing the foreign policy agenda and speaking out on behalf of the poor and most vulnerable, reaching out to like-minded partners and even going beyond the ambitious Lindau strategic goals. To have a stronger impact, the cooperation between RfP and the G20 Interfaith Forum could be further enhanced.

14

Source: RfP Press Release Religions for Peace to the G20: Debt Relief Cannot Wait, 22 July 2020, RfP Website https://rfp.org/rfp-to-g20-debt-relief-cannot-wait/. Accessed: 24 Jul. 2020.

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International Interfaith Engagement in Times of a Global Pandemic: Spiritual, Practical and Virtual Resources

With the international outbreak of the unprecedented COVID-19 global pandemic disease at the beginning of 2020, global public health suddenly became a key concern for foreign policy.15 At the same time, religious communities and interfaith organizations were paralyzed by the prohibition of gatherings, encounters, religious services and rituals.16 Their believers and followers were shocked by deaths, suffering and isolation through social distancing measures. RfP International reacted quickly and strongly to the spiritual and practical challenges (Bender, 2020a).17 This reaction included online gatherings and prayers, statements, advice, resources, projects, and cooperation with international organizations (e.g. UNICEF, OSCE), national governments (e.g. Mauritius) and civil society NGOs. In a compassionate and engaged message on March 13, 2020 “Standing Together in Spirit and with Actions: Religions for Peace Statement about the Coronavirus (COVID-19)”,18 RfP called for global solidarity and active service for the suffering and most vulnerable, according to the teachings and traditions of the different religions to overcome the crisis. RfP strongly advised to follow the recommendations for safety and hygiene of the World Health Organization (WHO), scientific experts and public authorities. On April 1, 2020, about 200 RfP leaders and activists across the entire world gathered for a moving and inspiring “Global Interfaith Moment of Hope & Solidarity in the time of COVID-19” online video meeting, closing with a common interfaith commitment to prayer, action, hope, solidarity and consolation. RfP set up a “Multi-Religious Humanitarian Fund” to finance and support interfaith projects dedicated to care for humanitarian needs during the COVID-19 crisis. On a special online platform— the RfP COVID-19 hub19 —RfP informed about interfaith projects, initiatives, 15

Two entire issues of Germany’s leading foreign policy magazine Internationale Politik IP had COVID-19 as their cover topic, also featuring several articles inside: “Kampf gegen Corona” 3 May/June 2020 and “Gute Besserung” 4 July/August 2020. 16 COVID-19 related restrictions for religions in different countries are presented in Consorti (2020). 17 For more details on RfP’s and others’ interfaith actions against COVID-19, see Bender (2020a). 18 Religions for Peace (RfP). https://rfp.org/standing-together-in-spirit-and-with-actions-rel igions-for-peace-statement-about-the-coronavirus-covid-19/, further details at https://rfp.org/ statement-by-religions-for-peace-on-coronavirus-crisis/ All accessed: 25 Jul. 2020. 19 Religions for Peace (RfP). https://rfp.org/multi-religious-covid-19-hub/. Accessed: 25 Jul. 2020.

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material, practical hints, contacts and resources for the fight against the pandemic. Moreover, on April 8, 2020 the ECRL issued a declaration “Now more than ever, we stand together” on the COVID-19 pandemic, encouraging “everyone to follow government advice and policies which will help reduce the transmission of the virus and save lives”. In this declaration, the ECRL expressed their “admiration for the doctors, nursing staff and countless helpers working tirelessly to help others, regardless of their own wellbeing” and prayed for “their safety and their strength as they continue their extraordinary efforts”. Very importantly, in terms of theology, practical advice and spiritual counseling, in the same document the ECRL stressed the positive role of science and offered comfort: “Belief in both religion and science is not antithetical; and we offer our sincere gratitude to the scientific community who are at the forefront of the global fight against the virus. As a community of religious leaders we strongly reject and condemn any claims that the current crisis is some form of divine punishment or retribution”. Furthermore, the European interfaith body thanked “the politicians who have responded with the calmness and decisiveness this drastic situation requires” and urged governments “to ensure this global problem receives a truly global response”. Finally, the ECRL expressed the hope that the pandemic will ultimately serve to bring mankind “closer together in understanding, in love, and in global solidarity”.20 National RfP chapters were also active; for example, RfP France put a multilingual interfaith prayer for political leaders in the COVID-19 crisis on their website, while RfP China donated 20,000 face masks to RfP Germany, which were distributed free of charge to refugee shelters and charities in several cities in Germany by local RfP groups, in cooperation with local governments, local religious communities and civil society (Bender, 2020a, p. 4). These RfP and ECRL actions and statements21 were particularly important at a time when 20

European Council of Religious Leaders (ECRL). https://ecrl.eu/now-more-than-ever-westand-together/ Accessed: 27 Jul. 2020. 21 Other important interfaith and ecumenical statements on COVID-19 include World Council of Churches (2020) Coping with Covid19 https://www.oikoumene.org/en/resour ces/documents/covid-19; KAICIID (2020) IPDC calls for multireligious cooperation in the Arab World to overcome COVID-19 Crisis, https://www.kaiciid.org/news-events/news/ipdccalls-multireligious-cooperation-arab-world-overcome-covid-19-crisis; Network of religious and traditional peacemakers (2020) ‘Six ways RTA can take action to prevent the spread’ https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/six-ways-for-religious-and-traditional-actors-to-takeaction-to-prevent-spread-of-covid-19-in-their-cfbclidommunities/?=IwAR3gDdBBiGdql Uy0EQ2PEtbrUDalAbC_IgmbQWN6DR8X7CjKfKSQW1nYK5g and World Economic Forum (2020) ‘Love your neighbour: Islam, Judaism and Christianity come together over COVID-19’, 9 April 2020, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2020/04/religions-covid-19coronavirus-collaboration/. All accessed: 8 Dec. 2020.

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some religious leaders and faith-based organizations were still reluctant, ignorant or even hostile towards public health policies and government-imposed restrictions aiming at containing the pandemic. Offering online and offline spiritual and practical resources to believers and all in need nationally and internationally proved to be an important interfaith action together with international organizations, expressing truly global and interreligious solidarity and showing a commitment to international cooperation even in a time when foreign travel connections have been cancelled, diplomatic tensions heightened and borders closed. With an increased online interest in religion (Bentzen, 2020), religious communities—driven to going digital by the pandemic—may even use the internet and virtual encounters more intensively in the future to foster and enhance interfaith dialogue and cooperation, whereby they could therefore reach out to younger generations who were missed out by previous communication activities.22 However, generally depressing people across the entire globe, the COVID-19 pandemic could also lead to further disillusionment with political idealism, progressive politics, international relations and religious hopes. It could raise new spiritual doubts and theological questions of theodicy (Mattingly, 2020), reinforce tendencies of increased secularization in (Western) Europe and North America, and provoke a further erosion of mainstream Catholicism, Protestantism, Orthodox Christianity and Judaism. In foreign policy, isolationism, nationalism and hawkish realism could gain more support when borders are closed, national governments take the lead, parliaments are sidelined, and international organizations seem to fail or at best be irrelevant to confront the pandemic’s threats. In religion, extremist and fundamentalist groups in all religions and doomsday-loving chiliastic sects might attract more believers and create new conflicts between nations and between religious communities. The relations between (a potentially more secular) Europe and North America on one side and (a potentially more religious) Africa, Asia and Middle East on the other could become even more tense and complicated (Bacot, 2013). Therefore, cooperation between European and US foreign policy institutions on one side and religions on the other could become more difficult likewise interfaith collaboration for peace. These increased difficulties for interfaith engagement and multilateral peace politics could arise precisely at a time in human history when this global and interreligious cooperation is needed the most.

22

See article on KAICIID website with reference to a study undertaken by researchers in Barcelona https://www.kaiciid.org/de/news-events/features/religi%C3%B6se-gemeinsch aften-nutzen-w%C3%A4hrend-der-covid-19-pandemie-das-internet-um. Accessed: 23 Jul. 2020.

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Future Perspectives for Religions for Peace: From Common Interreligious Actions to Global Interfaith Politics?

The COVID-19 pandemic’s political, economic and social impact on the world order has frequently been compared with other historic watersheds such as the two world wars and the Great Depression in the 20th century. Whether this new normalcy will lead to new isolationism, new nationalism, new authoritarianism, new conflicts and new violence in world politics23 or whether it will trigger a global digital green New Deal,24 an ecological, technological and solidaritybased transformation of the world economy remains to be seen. The future of the current liberal foreign policy framework is unclear. In any case, the post-1945 paradigm of multilateral cooperation and the post-Cold War paradigms of free movement, free trade and globalization are substantially challenged both theoretically and practically.25 Global diplomacy, international organizations and foreign policy need personal encounters, cross-border travel, the dynamics of conferences, and the spirit of large gatherings, as do interfaith dialogue and cooperation. The World Assembly in Lindau has shown how important and mobilizing such a meeting can be. However, now the COVID-19 pandemic is drastically limiting and impeding all of these instruments of peaceful and cooperative international relations, globally and ultimately for a longer period of time. Virtual diplomacy by video meetings may be a necessary and helpful interim quick-fix, but it certainly cannot substitute face-to-face meetings and real-world personal relations between politicians and nations,26 let alone between faith leaders and religions. Nevertheless, foreign policy and RfP will have to cope with these restrictions and the ongoing global crisis and thus they should build up digital trust.

23

Discussed by De Weck (2020). Frequently used at the moment in international political discussions, Green New Deal or Green Deal are terms for concepts and actions to make the world economy more equitable, just, ecological and sustainable, referring to US president Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s socalled New Deal policy in the 1930s to end the Great Depression. or alluding to the Green Deal program of the European Commission announced in 2019 to modernize and preserve the European Union’s social and economic model and to make it more eco-friendly, socially inclusive and to prevent climate change. 25 COVID-19’s impact on foreign policy and international relations is reflected in Gardini (2020). 26 For the example of the European Union, see Rudolph (2020). 24

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RfP is a movement, community, and mission, with interfaith understanding, dialogue, engagement and common actions for peace as its purpose. It is an international entity with a truly global perspective, open to cooperating with politics, businesses, academia, science, civil society, charities, foundations and religious communities. RfP is not (yet) a formal foreign policy actor, but its existence, spirit, activities and - above all - its engaged people, religious leaders, experts and grassroots activists with a global vision, are relevant for foreign policy actors, international organizations, national governments and civil society NGOs. RfP’s concept of positive peace means advancing shared well-being, honoring human dignity, promoting inclusiveness, harmony, solidarity, sustainability, and a striving for the common good (Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace, 2019b, pp. 22–25). In foreign policy terms, it is a universal global vision beyond the logic of mere peaceful coexistence like in security concepts during the Cold War. It also goes further than simply the absence of violence, a superficially formal rule of law, military détente, economic development or foreign policy strategies; rather, can it also be understood in a spiritual way as an option for the poor, discriminated, deprived and most vulnerable, for the earth. The concept of positive peace can be seen as enlarging the opción para los pobres (option for the poor) of the Catholic theology of liberation and similar provisions of other religious traditions, towards a peaceful, inclusive, just and sustainable transformation of the world. The global networks, the differentiated outreach from high-level leaders to grassroots-level activists in very diverse social and cultural contexts, the multifaith spiritual added value in credibility and convening and mediating power as well as the close ties to the UN system give RfP strong potential as an emerging foreign policy partner and actor. The positions of RfP on global issues correspond to the international political agenda. The foreign policy-related topics particularly dealt with by RfP World Assemblies address urgent needs and current political challenges for international policy-makers. The already-existing cooperation with international organizations and national foreign ministries can be improved by structural and institutionalized dialogue, more common projects, stable and professional national interfaith institutions and multi-religious expertise in foreign ministries, while principally respecting the distinct spheres and autonomy of politics and religion, both domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, foreign policy can recognize the added value not only of cooperation with faith-based partner organizations, but also with multi-religious organizations, given that interfaith dialogue in itself is diplomacy par excellence. Interfaith engagement is not a panacea for the world’s problems. The UN, international organizations and national governments are foremost responsible for and in charge of tackling mankind’s political, economic, social and environmental challenges. Foreign policy should

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be aware of the pitfalls, fragility and eventual setbacks in interfaith collaboration, while religions should be aware of the complexity of foreign policy and the seduction of power. However, inspired by RfP’s motto “Different Faiths— Common Actions” and the Lindau commitment on multi-religious cooperation for peace, an “Alliance of Religions” of men and women of good will could facilitate an “Alliance of Peace” of interfaith leaders and foreign policy-makers striving together for global positive peace. Foreign policy and the world’s religions both have a specific responsibility for peace, respectively. However, these responsibilities are often interwoven. This interconnectedness of religion and foreign policy encourages reformulating Hans Küng’s (negative) dictum “No peace among nations without peace among religions!” in positive statements. In a foreign policy context, along the lines of RfP’s Lindau concept of positive peace and following the German Foreign Office’s responsibility of religions for peace approach of the Berlin 2017 interfaith conference, it could read: “Achieving peace among nations with the help of peace among religions. Advancing peace among religions through common interreligious actions. Aligning interreligious actions with globally shared responsibilities, concerns and peace policies”. Such a set of international, national and local political and interreligious actions, linked to each other and addressing foreign policy challenges, could be called “global interfaith politics”, with diplomacy and religions collaborating for positive peace.

References Affolderbach, M. (2020). The benefit of inter-religious co-operation. Examples of European and global transformation processes. In K. Bieberstein, J. Bründel, J. Kügler, T. Laubach (Weißer) & K. Lindner (Eds.), Bamberger Theologische Studien (Vol. 39). University of Bamberg Press. Auswärtiges Amt. (2017). Friedensverantwortung der Religionen. Dokumentation Berliner Treffen 21.–23. Mai 2017. Auswärtiges Amt Abteilung Kultur und Kommunikation. Auswärtiges Amt., (Ed.), (2007). Weltmacht Religion – Vom Einfluss der Religionen auf die internationale Politik. 18. Forum Globale Fragen. Berlin, 8–9 November 2007. Berlin. Bacot, J.-P. (2013). Une Europe sans religion dans un monde religieux. Les éditions du cerf. Badri, F., & Breitmeier, H. (2014). Der transnationale interreligiöse Dialog und die Einhaltung der globalen Norm der Religionsfreiheit. In I.-J. Werkner & O. Hidalgo (Eds.), Religionen – Global Player in der internationalen Politik? (pp. 57–85). Book series Politik und Religion. Springer VS. Baumgart-Ochse, C. (2014). Religiöse Akteure als Beiträger zu Global Governance. In I.-J. Werkner & O. Hidalgo (Eds.), Religionen – Global Player in der internationalen Politik?, (pp. 15–32). Book series Politik und Religion. Springer VS.

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Bender, P. (2020a). Religions for Peace – Religionen für den Frieden. Religionen beten und handeln gemeinsam gegen COVID-19. https://www.forum-weltkirche.de/hefte/ 2020/heft-5/2020-frieden-und-zusammenhalt/meldungen-5/2020/religions-for-peace-rel igionen-fuer-den-frieden/. Accessed: 8 Dec. 2020. Bender, P. (2020b). RfP-Lindau-Folgetreffen in New York. RfP/Deutschland Religions for Peace Informationen, 102, 31–33. Bender, P. (2017). Religionen als Partner für Frieden in der Welt – Potenziale für die Außenpolitik. Book series ifa-Edition Kultur und Außenpolitik, Stuttgart: ifa/Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen. https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/handle/document/55547. Accessed: 10 Dec. 2020. Bender, P. (2013). Die Rolle der EU im internationalen interreligiösen Dialog – Forum, Förderer, Facilitator. In I.-J. Werkner & A. Liedhegener (Eds.), Europäische Religionspolitik. Religiöse Identitätsbezüge, rechtliche Regelungen und politische Ausgestaltung (pp. 295–305). Book series Politik und Religion. Springer VS. Bentzen, J. (2020). COVID-19 is intensifying religion globally. Religion and diplomacy. Blog 15 June 2020. https://religionanddiplomacy.org.uk/2020/06/15/covid-19-is-spreading-rel igiosity/. Accessed: 21 Jun. 2020. Boehle, J. (2019). Peace charter for forgiveness and reconciliation. Progress and Outreach Report. Birmingham. http://www.charterforforgiveness.org. Accessed: 8 Dec. 2020. Consorti, P., (Ed.), (2020). Law, Religion and Covid-19 Emergency. E-Book DiReSoM Paper 1, Pisa, May 2020. DiReSoM.net. https://diresom.net/2020/05/07/diresom-papers1-ebook-law-religion-and-covid-19-emergency/. Accessed: 8 Dec. 2020. Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). (2015). Religion and foreign policy initiative. New York. De Weck, R. (2020). Demokratie versus Autokratie. Internationale Politik, 4, 96–101. Ferrara, P. (2014). Global religions and international relations. A diplomatic perspective. Palgrave MacMillan. Gardini, G. L., (Ed.), (2020). The world before and after Covid-19. Intellectual reflections on politics, diplomacy and international relations. European Institute of International Studies Press. Gebhardt, G. (2014). Interreligiöse Zusammenarbeit in Konfliktsituationen. Die Tätigkeit von „Religionen für den Frieden“ (RfP). In I.-J. Werkner & O. Hidalgo (Eds.), Religionen – Global Player in der internationalen Politik? (pp. 195–213). Book series Politik und Religion. Springer VS. Huntington, S. P. (1998). Kampf der Kulturen. Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert (7th edition). Siedler. Karam, A., (Ed.), (2012). Religion, development and the United Nations. A Report of the Social science Research Council. The Social Science Research Council. Kreft, H. (2015). Interreligiöser Dialog und Diplomatie. Die Bedeutung des Dialogs mit der islamischen Welt in der deutschen Außenpolitik. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 2, 197–207. Küng, H. (2000). Weltethos für Weltpolitik und Weltwirtschaft. Piper. Mattingly, T. (2020). The ancient question that will not go away. Where is god in the coronavirus crisis? Getreligion.org. https://www.getreligion.org/getreligion/2020/4/17/ Ancient-question-that-will-not-go-away-Where-is-God-in-the-coronavirus-crisis. Accessed: 2 May 2020.

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Olteanu, L., (Ed.), (2014). Worldwide human rights & religious liberty. History of liberty and respect for differences (Vol. II). International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty (IADRL). Olteanu, L., (Ed.), (2015). Agents and ambassadors for peace. Protecting freedom of religion and freedom of expression against violence in the name of religion (Vol. III). International Association for the Defence of Religious Liberty. Pontificial Commission ‘Iustitia et Pax’. (1987). Assisi. World Day of Prayer for Peace. 27 October 1986. Vatican City. Religions for Peace Europe. (2016). RfP European Assembly 2015 Castel Gandolfo Report. RfP/Deutschland Religions for Peace Informationen, 94, 21–29. Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace. (2019a). 10th World Assembly Handbook. Foundation Peace Dialogue of the World Religions and Civil Society. Religions for Peace, Ring for Peace. (2019b). 10th World Assembly Workbook. Foundation Peace Dialogue of the World Religions and Civil Society. Religions for Peace Deutschland. (2019). Religions for Peace Informationen 101. Religions for Peace Deutschland. Ring-Eifel, L. (2004). Weltmacht Vatikan. Päpste machen Politik. Pattloch. Röhrich, W. (2004). Die Macht der Religionen. Glaubenskonflikte in der Weltpolitik. Beck. Rudolph, R. (2020). Die Grenzen der Video-Diplomatie. Internationale Politik, 4, 42–44. Weingardt, M. A. (2010). Religion. Macht. Frieden. Das Friedenspotenzial von Religionen in politischen Gewaltkonflikten. bpb Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Werkner , I-J. & Hidalgo, O. (Eds.). (2014). Religionen—Global Player in der internationalen Politik? Springer VS.

Websites Comunità di Sant’Egidio: https://www.santegidio.org European Council of Religious Leaders (ECRL): https://ecrl.eu/ Foundation for a Global Ethic/Stiftung Weltethos: https://www.weltethos.org/ German Foreign Office, Unit Religion and Foreign Policy/Auswärtiges Amt, Referat Religion und Außenpolitik: https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/de/aussenpolitik/themen/kultur dialog/religion-aussenpolitik/212814 Global Interfaith Youth Network: https://rfp.org/movement/global-interfaith-youth-network/ Global Women of Faith Network: https://rfp.org/movement/global-women-of-faith-network/ G20 Interfaith Forum: https://www.g20interfaith.org/ King Abdullah Bin Abdulaziz International Centre for Interreligious and Intercultural Dialogue (KAICIID): https://www.kaiciid.org/ Network for Religious and Traditional Peacemakers: https://www.peacemakersnetwork.org/ Parliament of World’s Religions (CPWR): https://parliamentofreligions.org/ Religions for Peace (RfP) International: https://rfp.org/ Religions for Peace (RfP) Deutschland: http://www.religionsforpeace.de/ Religions for Peace (RfP) Germany: https://religionsforpeace-deutschland.de/ United Nations Alliance of Civilizations (UNAOC): https://www.unaoc.org/ United Religions Initiative (URI): https://uri.org/ World Faiths Development Dialogue (WFDD): https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/wfdd

Religious Impact on Foreign Policy in Non-European Countries—Examples and Reports

Managing the Buddha at Naland ¯ a. ¯ China, India, and the Control of Tibetan Buddhism Greg C. Bruno

In March 2006, in an address to the Bihar State Legislative Assembly, the former president of India, APJ Abdul Kalam, called on his compatriots to support a bold initiative, namely the pan-Asian revival of the ancient N¯aland¯a University, the world’s first international institute of higher learning (N¯aland¯a, 2010; Najar, 2014). Built in the fifth century, at its peak N¯aland¯a educated over 10,000 students (Najar, 2014; Rongxi, 1996) from across Asia, including China, Korea, Mongolia, Tibet, and Turkey (N¯aland¯a, 2010). For some years prior to its destruction in the twelfth century, N¯aland¯a had served as a regional educational anchor, teaching some of Asia’s most important philosophers, including the doctrinal founders of the Tibetan brand of Mahayana Buddhism (Gyatso, 2008; Mani, 2008). India’s proposal to revive N¯aland¯a is most often viewed through the lens of Asian cultural and educational diplomacy (Pinkney, 2015; Sen, 2015). Over the last decade, regional support has been initiated through the East Asia Summit, and the school’s resurgence and rebuilding has garnered significant financial and pedagogical support from India’s neighbors, most notably China, which pledged $1 million for the construction of a library on the new campus (Zhang, 2011). Amartya Sen—the Harvard scholar who served as the school’s first board chairman—has called the project a critical piece of soft power in a region not known for seeing eye-to-eye on “political outlook and practice” (Sen, 2012, p. 20). While N¯aland¯a may indeed be an educational vehicle for transnational cooperation, as many have suggested (Pinkney, 2015; Sen, 2015; Shekhar, 2007), it can also be viewed as an opportunity for transnational Buddhist diplomacy, and by extension a medium to engage more directly with the foundational roots of Tibetan G. C. Bruno (B) Prague, Czech Republic E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_8

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Buddhism (Angelskår, 2013; Zhang, 2012). It is therefore my contention that the discourse surrounding Sino-Indian cooperation at N¯aland¯a—where the historic building blocks of Tibetan Buddhism were first laid—can serve as a means to compare the varying approaches adopted by India and China concerning the control of Tibetans’ contemporary religiosity. In the seven decades since the Chinese Communist Party forcibly annexed the Tibetan plateau (Shakya, 2000), the so-called Tibet question—which asks to what degree the Tibetan ethnic minority should manage and control its own affairs within the Chinese system (Goldstein, 1995; Pirie, 2013)—has been a key point of contention for East Asian governments. Versions of this question (and answers) have been especially important for China, India, and the Tibetan diaspora in India and Nepal (Bruno, 2018). However, in pondering this contemporary political question, the cultural-religious aspect of Tibetan sovereignty has received comparatively less attention. Moreover, the Tibetan interpretation of Buddhism— as far as it was considered consequential to the resolution of the Tibet question itself—has historically been viewed as an ancillary issue (Bruno, 2018). Nonetheless, recent moves by China and India suggest that historical ambivalence toward Tibetan Buddhism is shifting, and governmental interests are becoming more politicized. The Indian-led, partially Chinese-funded revival of N¯aland¯a is one place to examine this shift (Angelskår, 2013; Zhang, 2012). Why did China agree to help fund the rebuilding of an ancient center of Buddhist learning in rural India? Why is India partnering with the world’s largest atheist government to build a pan-Asian educational institution where the seeds of Tibetan Buddhism were first sewn? Moreover, what impact—if any—is the N¯aland¯a revival project having on the autonomy of the Tibetan religious field itself? This paper will consider how China and India have—separately but with eyes on the other—sought to manage Tibetan Buddhism for political gain. Drawing on Michel Foucault’s concept of power and managed “governmentality”, the discussion will ask how Tibetan Buddhism “has been created and resisted by actors who have sought to control, monopolize, co-opt, convert, or destroy” its most basic elements for national gain (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011, p. 9). My analysis is derived from a qualitative comparison of each side’s relationship with religion in general and Tibetan Buddhism in particular, and it draws on Foucauldian discourse theory to frame the relationship between the state and the governed (Arribas-Ayllon & Walkerdine, 2008). India and China have long histories of interacting with Tibetan Buddhism for political and cultural reasons (Bruno, 2018). I suggest that an examination of the discourse surrounding the N¯aland¯a project can therefore offer unique insights into where these relationships are heading, as well as where they may intersect.

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For China, the art of managing faith—which Pierre Bourdieu termed the “religious field” (Bourdieu, 1990)—has traditionally centered on how to balance ethnic or minority belief systems within the context of patriotic nationalism, removing the political from the equation. By participating in the N¯aland¯a project, China signaled—intentionally or otherwise—a willingness to accept Tibetans’ conception of a “religious field” for identity and cultural continuity (but only if that faith was de-politicized or politicized to meet China’s expectations). India has assumed a less restrictive approach to managing Tibetan religion. However, India’s management of a faith that was born in India and has since returned—following the arrival of Tibetan refugees in India in 1959—is not absent, nor is it entirely altruistic; rather, India’s interest in Tibetan Buddhism is deeply nationalistic, and political (Huber, 2008). As Anand (2011) has argued, New Delhi engages in a dangerous normalization of “minority” politicization, a Hindu nationalist project that—in his view—has implications for all of India’s ethnic groups, including Tibetans. India’s willingness to “use” the ethnic “other” for political gain can be seen in moves to engage Tibetan Buddhist leaders as props in New Delhi’s political confrontations with Beijing, especially over contested borders (Miglani & Wilkes, 2017). N¯aland¯a’s revival has hints of similar motivations. This paper will examine how China and India have influenced Tibetans’ religious affairs, largely for their own political gain. There is much that differs between these two approaches towards managing Tibetans’ dominant faith, but there are also surprising overlaps. As Eire (2016) notes, when a state asserts pressure on the social space of its citizens, the product can have some degree of control over the creator. I theorize that in seeking new ways to “manage” Tibetan Buddhism within their borders—and in China’s case, beyond them (Bruno, 2018)—China and India have historically navigated a dichotomy between manipulation and accommodation, a tension that is evident in the discourse surrounding N¯aland¯a. What follows is an attempt to shed light on the ribbons of influence, control, accommodation, and manipulation that India and China apply separately to the Tibetan “religious field”. In the first section, I offer a theoretical framework on which to hang my observations. Section two offers a brief overview of the historical sociology of “religion” in India and China. Sections three and four present a separate treatment of the political and cultural associations that India and China have adopted towards Tibetan Buddhism, before section five brings these two approaches together through the lens of the new N¯aland¯a University. Finally, section six offers brief concluding analysis. While the majority of this paper is drawn from observations and analysis gleaned from a contemporary literature

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review, it also includes observations from fieldwork.1 Politics—rather than religion—pushed me to examine the question of religious diplomacy and mediation in the Tibetan religious space.

1

Theoretical Framework

Max Weber somewhat controversially held that the only universal societal trait of which he was aware was the ubiquity of “religion” (Weber, 1993, p. xxxvii). However, what Weber spent decades trying to understand is how “religion” has been defined and—more importantly—used in the organization and control of its participants. For Weber, religion is synonymous with control: he viewed early forms of faith as “magic”, the very purpose of which was for the powerful to coopt the weak (Weber, 1993). Working in the same era as Weber, Durkheim developed a different view of “religion’s” allure. For him, religion was a framework on which individuals hung collective solidarity, for altruistic and selfless reasons. To Durkheim, the control was voluntary, a compass with which to guide rather than a hammer with which to bludgeon (Thompson, 1982, p. 129). However, Durkheim agreed with Weber where it matters most for the argument presented here, namely that religions influence societies and governments in mutual—if often conflicting—ways (Swidler, 1993, p. xi). For the politician who sees it as government’s—and not the church’s—role to guide human destiny, religion can be a poisoned chalice. Religion operates in the gray space between the governed and ungoverned, which the Chinese might call “minjian” (Erie, 2016). Left unrestrained, organized faith can even pose a threat to state power (Feuchtwang, 2002, p. 107; Swidler, 1993). Thus, proper management of the “religious field” is seen as one of leadership’s greatest legitimizing opportunities, but an equally powerful threat. Along with morality and law, modern religion is a key element of what gives meaning to the social condition (Ellwood, 1918, p. 336). Moreover, it is a tool by which “the group controls the life of the individual for the good of the larger life of the group” (Ellwood, 1918, p. 339). Put differently, as Weber 1

This paper draws on fieldwork conducted in 2017, as well as the author’s decades of personal experience. Beginning in early 1997 and continuing until today, Greg C. Bruno has spent months living with, studying among, and writing about Tibetan refugees, first as a student, and then as a journalist and author. He has also lived in China. Between 1998 and 1999, he brought his understanding of contemporary political issues to the classroom, teaching Chinese undergraduate students English in rural Shandong. His first non-fiction book—which explores China’s policies related to Tibetan refugees—was published in April 2018 by the University Press of New England (Bruno, 2018).

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noted, religion is an essential component of power (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011). Ensuring religion’s stability while working simultaneously to constrain it is a key concern for the modern nation-state (Weber, 1993). In short, governments need religion, even when they do not. As Parsons explains, the most effective approach for those in positions of political authority is to “rely upon established sources of legitimization” rather than seeking to create new ones (Parsons, 1963, p. L). Historically, China and India—in separate ways—positioned their relationship with Tibetan Buddhism along the lines that Parsons suggests. Like it or not, neither China nor India benefits from the complete isolation and marginalization of a religion that has—for different reasons—been a cause of political concern at various points throughout history; rather, maintaining stability while ensuring control is a double-edged sword that both states have sought to wield. As I will discuss in the following sections, this tug of engagement is a well-established governmental dichotomy between accommodation and manipulation (Erie, 2016). The question that this raises is one of process: How have political actors in China and India engaged with the “religious field” of Tibetan Buddhism? Moreover, how do we assess or compare the tools of governance that the two states have applied? Here, the later writings of Foucault offer a window through which to analyze and test this question. For Foucault, the main function of government rests in providing for “the welfare and protections of a population” (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 47). However, most importantly, power is always applied to achieve some desired end, one that benefits the ruled, the ruler, or both simultaneously. It is through an examination of Foucault’s concept of government rationality or “governmentality” that we can begin to compare how China and India have engaged in the religiosity of its people, and for what purpose. Foucault argued that government is defined as the “right manner of disposing things so as to lead not to the form of the common good […] but to an end which is ‘convenient’ for each of the things that are to be governed” (Foucault, 1991, p. 95). Moreover, for him, “governmentality” was a way to describe the “the conduct of conduct”, or how a government imposes its will to affect the actions of the governed. Gordon (1991) defines Foucault’s “conduct” theory as a government’s effort to “shape, guide, or affect the conduct of some person or persons”. Indeed, while Foucault applied his concept of “governmentality” to social institutions like schools, factories, and prisons, the theory can just as easily be applied to non-governmental groupings, such as Bourdieu’s “religious field”. In order to move from the approach of “governmentality” to that of execution, Foucault’s views on “power” offer a way forward. In his 1982 essay “The Subject and Power”, Foucault observed that “power” must be applied

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to individuals who are free to operate with a degree of individual will. A government’s “actions on others’ actions’”—as Foucault put it—are only meaningful and effective at achieving a desired or “convenient” end if the governed maintain a degree of autonomy in decision-making (Gordon, 1991, p. 5). Therefore, the “power” in “governmentality” is not synonymous with oppression or open nurturing; rather, it is subtle, and only effective when the people and institutions being governed are open, or at least perceived to be. This view of power also allows us to anticipate and gage the reactions of those on the receiving end of a state’s governmentality. The sources of Foucault’s “power” are not the same linear forces that draft government legislation, make laws, or police the streets. Here, “power” is diffuse, and more difficult to trace. As Powers note, “discourses of power are radiated through a given society. Their purposes and strategies can be ascertained, but there is no one person or group that is solely responsible for their creation, nor does anyone fully control them” (Powers, 2016, p. 158 f.). In other words, while state policy might call for the implementation of control in one direction, local application might move in the other (Pirie, 2013). As one final observation on Foucault’s approach to governmental rationality and its application to the religious field, it has already been tested in other arenas, including in China by Erie (2016), in his examination of accommodation with the Hui Muslim legal framework. As Erie (2016) notes, the party-state has sought “to shape the Hui social field through its elite, its institutions, and even Islamic law”. In this way, the Chinese government “attains legitimacy among Hui by presenting itself as the sovereign that provides justice, fairness, and prosperity, consonant with Islamic principles. As a consequence, the Hui social field can also constrain the state or, at least, the state’s legitimate rule in the eyes of Hui” (Erie, 2016, p. 25). A similar dynamic can be observed in Tibetan communities in China and India. I am not suggesting that Tibetan Buddhists have the same ability to influence the types of power applied by the Indian or Chinese state. However, like the Hui experience, at various times Tibetans have maintained a unique space within the contemporary political systems of both countries. With the Hui experience as a frame of reference, and Foucault’s theories of power and governmentality as theoretical guideposts, we now turn to how China and India have—in similar but divergent fashions—sought to engage with and shape their collective religious fields.

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Approach to Religion in India and China: A Comparative Overview

As Van Der Veer (2009) and Feuchtwang (2009) have argued, any comparative analysis of “religion” must begin with a discussion of where and how the comparators diverge in their definitions of the term. For India, the religious space has been a fundamental source of indigenous nationalism since prior to independence, and it played a role in the anti-colonialism that fueled the rise of Hindu nationalism (Duara, 1995). Mahatma Gandhi’s appeal to religion helped to ignite an anti-modernizing campaign that cleaved support away from secular British rule (Duara, 1995). However, the roots of India’s religiosity were already being formed during the end of the nineteenth century, well before Gandhi (Van Der Veer, 2009). Indian traditions such as yoga were being practiced as forms of “spirituality” and “spiritual exercise”, which Van Der Veer (2007) interprets as foundational elements of India’s religiosity. By the early-twentieth century, while the nationalist Congress Party pushed a narrative of Western modernity, a powerful counterforce had arisen, brandishing Hindu nationalism as a unifying force (Duara, 1995). British colonial rulers failed to grasp the role that this religious understanding played in societal organization and Indian identity formation (Duara, 1995). As Appadurai observed in his study of temple complexes in Madras, when the “triangular relationship” between kings, priests, and temple communities was severed, the legitimacy of the Indian political class began to fracture (Appadurai, 1981). Brahmin elites fought back, seeking to reassert political and religious authority. Indeed, although they failed, their struggle was later interpreted as demonstrating the inseparable nature of “politics and religious activities” in early modern India (Duara, 1995), Even today, India’s political classes are split along political, caste, and religious lines (Chatterjee, 2004). In the early-twentieth century, Gandhi took advantage of this sentiment to become “Indian secularism’s greatest martyr” (Sarkar, 2008, p. 431). Indians’ relationship with tradition and religion was therefore a key component of anti-colonial sentiment, and in the early sociology of modern India, religion encompassed the political (Dumont, 1980). According to Dumont (1980, p. 444), India’s “most successful political agitators […] had in actual fact most effectively injected religion into politics”. Dumont (1980, p. 444) concluded that for India’s leaders, religion’s importance “could not simply be ignored without damage”. China might best be understood as the inverse of India. For early modern China, religion—not secularism—was the impediment to modernization (Feuchtwang, 2002, p. 115). In this way, China’s imperial leaders have more in common with British colonialism than Indian nationalism. The removal of the “religious”

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obstacle was key to the revival of political life and national identity formation. As Van Der Veer (2009, p. 92) observed, “Chinese intellectuals in the past, and today, believe that religion is a backward phenomenon that has lost its importance in Chinese society”, although this is not to suggest that the relationship between religion and the Chinese state has been without purpose. Indeed, exactly the opposite is true; for example, during the late Ming and Qing periods, rites and rituals served as a legitimizing force for an emperor’s rule (Feuchtwang, 2002, p. 121). However, even during this early period of religious necessity, suspicion towards beliefs or groups of believers who were outside official doctrine was high, and there was fear of people who professed “a secret knowledge superseding all others” (Feuchtwang, 2002, p. 107). Such claims posed a challenge to the emperor’s monopoly on heavenly rule and threatened to undermine an emperor’s authority in performing li, or rites, which were conducted as a means to ensure the proper ordering of the universe under which the Son of Heaven ruled (Feuchtwang, 2002, p. 107). China’s eventual evolution from the practice of rites and rituals for imperial legitimization to religion for individual purification occurred slowly, but deliberately (Jensen, 1998). In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Italian Jesuits used visits to China to translate Confucian texts. According to Jensen (1998), the goal was to pave the way for the introduction of Christianity by suggesting that China—like Europe—had once borne witness to a god who “preached an ancient gospel of monotheism now forgotten” (Jensen, 1998, p. 33). The Jesuits were not looking to superimpose Western religion on top of Chinese rites, but rather to form an accommodation with what already existed. However, the linguistic alteration laid the groundwork for shifts in how the Chinese themselves viewed their “religious” practices. Along the way, the very meaning of “religion” began to take shape in China, moving from a system underpinning imperial authority to something more aligned with Western religious conceptions (Feuchtwang, 2002). China’s modern party-state has varied its approach to organized religion. As Billioud and Thoraval (2015) have noted, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) today sees its legitimacy as being—among other things—the defenders of Confucian tradition. However, vilification of certain religions has oscillated, reaching its zenith towards the end of the Maoist period. In the years after Mao’s death, organized faiths—especially Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism—flourished once more (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011). According to Feuchtwang (2002), this “compromise” was necessary to maintain a claim on “popular legitimacy”. Nonetheless, this leniency must also be viewed as a Weberian construct of necessity, rather than a gesture of good will (Weber, 1993). According to Goossaert and Palmer (2011), China’s leaders after Mao and before Xi Jinping came to terms with religion as a necessary evil,

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whereby it was no longer dismissed simply as dangerous, but rather as a tool to be nurtured carefully. In other words, if controlled, religion could offer the Communist Party “positive contributions […] for the execution of social plans” (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011, p. 2). I suggest that it is in this spirit that China and India agreed to move forward in their efforts to revive N¯aland¯a University.

2.1

Tibetans, Buddhism, and India

Buddhism was established in India sometime around the third century BC (Huber, 2008, p. 17), but it came to modern maturity inside Tibet. By the time that it had decayed in India—during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (Zhang, 2012)— a variant of Mahayana Buddhism had been the official state religion of Tibet for over 500 years. This religious patronage created strong ideological bonds between Tibetans and Indians, whereby these ties were further cemented following China’s occupation of Tibet in 1950 (Shakya, 2000). For Huber (2008), this is the key point of inflection in the Indo-Tibetan religious space today. India’s hosting of Tibetan exiles since their initial exodus in 1959 enables the Indian government to recapture an element of its “long-lost” religious heritage (Huber, 2008, p. 5). However, this hosting—with its political undertones—requires deft management (McConnell, 2011). Indeed, tracing Foucault’s approach to “governmentality”, this engagement is driven as much by cultural obligation as political opportunism (Singh, 2010). Although it would be an oversimplification to say that Buddhism simply faded from India in favor of Hindu rites, scholars generally agree that until the earlynineteenth century Indians were less interested in a lost faith than in the riches that its new keepers possessed (Huber, 2008). However, there is little question that the significance of India’s reconnection to the Tibetan religious and cultural space changed dramatically after 1950. The loss of Tibet as an independent buffer state between India and China refocused New Delhi’s calculations (Topgyal, 2012). Moreover, it put Buddhism back in play as a source of legitimacy for a nationalist-populist government looking to promote its religious credentials to a domestic audience (Singh, 2010). When the 14th Dalai Lama requested political asylum in India in March 1959, Nehru granted it, albeit with caveats. While the opening of India’s door was partly out of perceived religious obligation (Roemer, 2008, p. 64), politics also played a key role. At the time, the Indian public strongly supported putting out the welcome mat for Tibetans fleeing Chinese control (Shakya, 2000, p. 214; Roemer, 2008), and Nehru—isolated with his pro-China policy at home—took advantage. By offering the Dalai Lama a safe haven, Nehru

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found an opportunity to get tough on China, as many Indians were demanding at the time (Roemer, 2008, p. 64). Nonetheless, India’s Tibet policy had already begun to weaken by the time that the Dalai Lama arrived on Nehru’s doorstep. In the first few years after India’s independence in 1947, Nehru echoed the British policy of recognizing suzerainty for Tibet, de facto independence within the Chinese state. However, China protested, and by April 1954, with the signing of the Panchsheel trade agreements with China, Nehru signaled that New Delhi would no longer question China on its reading of the Tibet issue (McConnell, 2011). As Nehru himself conceded, India’s policy at the time was to walk a line between Chinese opposition and rising Indian nationalism. The result was containment of the Tibetan exiles’ political, physical, and—by extension—religious space (Nehru, 1962). Nehru’s caution in accepting the Tibetans set the stage for a lackluster welcome that has continued to this day (Bruno, 2018; McConnell, 2016; Shakya, 2000). While India remains committed to proving shelter to Tibetan refugees, it is also intent on controlling the shape, size, actions, and experiences of the Tibetan presence (Bruno, 2018; McConnell, 2016). By 1962, when India and China engaged in a brief border war, Tibetan asylum seekers were no longer classified as “refugees” upon entry to India (Roemer, 2008, p. 62 f.). Instead, they were registered under the Foreigners Act of 1946, which carries significantly fewer rights and opportunities than a refugee label. Today, these restrictions extend into Tibetans’ religious space (Tibet Justice Center (TJC), 2011; TJC, 2015). Due to their legal status, some of Buddhism’s most important religious leaders—including the 14th Dalai Lama and the 17th Karmapa—are unable to move freely without Indian approval (Brown, 2010; McConnell, 2016). Of the estimated 100,000 Tibetans who live in India (Tibetan Government in Exile, 2010), only a small percentage have obtained an Indian passport (Bruno, 2018), while the rest are technically stateless (TJC 2011; TJC 2015; McConnell, 2016). De facto statelessness has also influenced the legality of Tibetan monastic institutions. Because Tibetan exiles cannot own Indian land (TJC, 2011; TJC, 2015), many religious institutions—including temples and monasteries—are built on illegally-acquired property, arrangements that have drawn legal challenges (TJC, 2011; TJC, 2015). Much like Foucault’s theory of power-through-omission, India’s control over Tibetans’ religious association and political movement did not begin through the implementation of restrictive laws, but rather a lack of them. This approach carries political and geostrategic advantages for India. Indian scholars often describe a “Tibet card” in dealings with China (Stobdan, 2017). Ongoing border disputes along China’s southern border have been a particular cause of friction. However, like many aspects of these disputes, religious implications are never far from the

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surface. For example, the contested Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh happens to be home to the historic seat of the Karmapa, one of Tibetan Buddhism’s most important figures. When India permitted him to visit the region in December 2016, it was interpreted as an attempt by New Delhi to antagonize Beijing into border concessions (Press Trust of India, 2016). While geopolitical strategy is important to the argument of this paper, it is not the only reason why India has embraced Buddhism’s “return”. Tourism revenue has played a role, as has the regional soft-power value that Buddhism grants India in the pan-Asian community. However, most importantly—as Singh (2010) notes—Buddhism is part of India’s identity politics. Although less than 1 percent of Indians identify as Buddhist, the religion has become an important source of political association for India’s disadvantage castes. In the 1990s, Buddhist modernists were implicated in violent efforts to wrest control of holy sites that they believed had been commandeered by Hindu “infidels” (Esposito et al., 2002, p. 408 f.). New Delhi seeks to avoid a repeat of such tensions by managing the Buddhist field itself. In other words, while Tibetans may be victims of New Delhi’s restrictive policies—most clearly through the ongoing denial of civil liberties (TJC 2015)—India’s management of Tibetans’ “religious field” has implications far beyond Tibetan religiosity.

2.2

Tibetans, Buddhism, and China

China sees Tibetan Buddhism in a similar light, namely as an internal concern first (Goldstein, 1997). This is why Beijing’s post-imperial reconciliation with religion in general did not bring a radical shift for the Tibetan Buddhist experience in practice (Goldstein, 1997; Gyatso, 1998); rather, religion has remained the key point of friction between the Tibetans and the Chinese (Goldstein, 1997). According to Goldstein and Kapstein (1998, p. 6), Buddhism “is what [Tibetans] felt made their society unique and without equal”. This is why China continues to expend so much energy managing the confines of its autonomy, rather than forcing its eradication. Since at least the late-1980s, Tibetans have politicized their religion as a nationalist, anti-occupation project (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011, p. 367). According to Weber, this politicization has created an impossible challenge for China’s party-state (Parsons, 1963, p. L), as neither accommodation nor total control will guarantee the Foucauldian outcomes that China intends. As Kapstein (1998, p. 149) observes: “[B]y suppressing Tibetan Buddhism, Tibetan resentment and hence the longing for freedom are increased; but by adopting a liberal policy,

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the very cultural system that most encourages the Tibetans to identify themselves apart from China continues to flourish”. This is perhaps one reason why China’s current president, Xi Jinping, has been more restrictive of religious practice than his predecessors (Cook, 2017). Historically, China’s complex interaction with Tibetan faith has been most easily observed in Tibetan areas outside of the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), where a more pliable form of accommodation and consent—which Pirie (2013, p. 69) describes as control by “indirect rule”—has emerged. For example, in parts of Gansu Province, Chinese authorities have earned Tibetans’ allegiance through negotiations with religious leaders, rather than through domination. This is not unlike China’s stance toward the Hui legal-religious field identified by Erie (2016). Although the party-state still relies on complete “subjugation through the performance of paramount rule” inside the TAR, outside of it, local and regional officials have at times managed a more nuanced form of power (Pirie, 2013, p. 69). China’s control of Tibet’s religious space is often considered a contemporary development. However, religion has played a direct role in Sino-Tibetan relations for centuries. During the seventh century, when the Tibetan king Songtsen Gampo unified the mountainous plateau and pushed Tibet’s borders to areas controlled by China’s Tang dynasty, Tibet was viewed as a powerful border state (Perdue, 2010). Tibet’s king wielded significant political influence as well as religious authority, and he took tribute and foreign wives from beyond his empire (Goldstein, 1997). By the middle of the thirteenth century, a “priest-patron” relationship had been cemented between one of Tibetan Buddhism’s highest lamas, the Sakya Phagpa, and the Mongol ruler, Kublai Khan, linking Tibet’s star to China’s Yuan dynasty through religion (Goldstein, 1997). Although the patronage relationship did not continue after the end of the Yuan Dynasty in the mid-fourteenth century, Tibetans’ religious importance to the Mongols served as leverage against the Manchus Qing (Goldstein, 1997). For example, when Qing soldiers invaded Tibet in the early-eighteenth century, it was not to absorb territory, but rather to manage the religious aspect of the relationship (Perdue, 2010). As Goldstein (1997, p. 14) observed, the Qing army’s mission was “to control the actions of Tibet’s fractious leaders, and particularly to prevent its lamas from using their religious sway over the Mongols to harm Qing interests”. The period between the collapse of the Qing in 1911 and the rise of the CCP in 1949 gave way to a more autonomous Tibet, and even greater religious freedom (Goldstein, 1997). With the British out and the new republic under Sun Yat-sen fighting for stability, Tibet managed de facto independence with a deal signed in Shimla, India, in 1914 (Goldstein, 1997). Known as the Shimla Convention, the document did not grant Tibet full

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independence from China, although it secured Tibetan control over security, currency, religion, and political affairs (Goldstein, 1997). When Mao Zedong came to power after the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek, the Communist Party viewed Tibet in much the same way as its imperial predecessors: as a buffer and a source of resources (Topgyal, 2012). The first few years of Communist Party control were meant to ingratiate the elite while bringing Tibet’s poorest to socialism slowly, by waiting to introduce ideas of class struggle, for example (Goldstein, 1998; Smith, 2009; Gyatso, 1998). However, not even the deliberately slow pace of reforms ameliorated the Tibetans, and by the late-1950s Tibetans in eastern Tibet were resisting. In 1959, unrest erupted into a full-blown revolt (McGranahan, 2010), and in March, the Dalai Lama fled to India. The death of Mao in 1976 gave way to a new period of openness in the party-state’s Tibet policies (Grunfeld, 1996; Smith, 2009). Under Deng Xiaoping, Tibet’s political prisoners were freed, monasteries were rebuilt, and—according to the University of Birmingham’s Tsering Topgyal (2012, p. 230)—“the CCP abandoned the Cultural Revolution-era policy of violent assimilation and returned to the traditional Chinese belief that the frontierbarbarians would voluntarily adopt the ‘superior’ and ‘advanced’ culture of the Chinese”. Maoist-era restrictions on Tibetan Buddhism were once more rolled back in Tibetan areas across the plateau (Topgyal, 2012). However, after the pro-democracy protests of 1989, Tibet was again locked down, and the partystate turned to new forms of control to manage the Tibetan Buddhist space. In 1991, China’s Religious Affairs Bureau produced a directive that gave the partystate—and not Tibetans—final say over the selection and enthronement of tulkus, reincarnated lamas identified and trained to carry out the religious teachings of their deceased predecessors (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011, p. 365). A China State Council order concluded that while “reincarnation is allowed” in Tibetan Buddhism, numbers must be limited and only lamas approved by the Religious Affairs Bureau would be officially recognized (Goossaert & Palmer, 2011, p. 365). China first used its stamp of tulku approval in September 1992 when it recognized the enthronement of the 17th Karmapa, Ogyen Trinley Dorje, a senior figure of the Kagyu lineage (Xinhua, 2009).2 Three years later, in May 1995, the party-state intervened in the selection of the 11th Panchen Lama, a six-year-old boy from northwestern Tibet named Gedhun Choekyi Nyima. Following the Dalai Lama’s

2

In early 2000, the 17th Karmapa arrived in India, escaping from house arrest at his monastery inside Tibet (Brown, 2010). Like the Dalai Lama before him, he was granted political asylum by India, although his movements were restricted.

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announcement of the boy’s identification, China arrested the child and his family. Beijing then enthroned its own Panchen Lama candidate, Gyaincain Norbu. The arrests and re-enthronements had important political objectives for China (Fang, 2014). The Panchen Lama has historically been responsible for finding the Dalai Lama’s reincarnation, and vice versa. The party-state’s propensity for nurturing young, sympathetic religious leaders is aimed at creating legitimate alternatives to Tibetans’ religious figures in exile (Fang, 2014, p. 69). Since the program’s inception, close to 900 reincarnations have received official party-state approval (Free Tibet, 2016). China’s control of Tibetans’ religious “conduct” has intensified since 2008 (Bruno, 2018), and today it spans the globe. Efforts to shape the Tibetan political and religious field range from engaging in global propaganda and pressure campaigns (Brady, 2012) to deploying economic statecraft to delegitimize the authority of the Dalai Lama (Fuchs & Klann, 2010). Even Tibetans’ history is managed. As Powers (2016, p. 172) contends, Chinese scholars are employed to rewrite the historical roots of Tibetan Buddhism, including by misrepresenting the origins of the Tibetan faith. Powers (2016) sees these historical whitewashes as attempts to superimpose a Chinese lens over Tibet’s belief system, possibly to offer a narrative necessitating Chinese management. One of the more aggressive forms of management is the party-state’s promotion of a controversial spirit-deity called Dorjee Shugden. Ben Hillman (2005), a political scientist at Australian National University who studies monastic politics in China, has written that government officials have sought to capitalize on an intra-Tibetan rift surrounding the deity by offering “disproportionate amount of funds” to pro-Shugden-linked monasteries that oppose the Dalai Lama. In 2003, at one Tibetan monastery that Hillman visited, monks from Shugden-affiliated administrative units (called khangtsens) noted a surge in travel approvals for documents needed to study in India. “Similarly, in 2004, one of the monastery’s smallest and (previously) poorest khangtsens began to build an elaborate new prayer room and residence for its handful of members. Financial support had been obtained from Beijing through a network of pro-Shugden lamas with access to officials at the highest level” (Hillman, 2005). Official favoritism has only become more explicit in the subsequently years. In early 2014, Communist Party officials in the TAR published directives detailing how Tibetans should “correctly” view the issue, namely by supporting Shugden (China, 2014). Siding with the Dalai Lama—who has called for a de facto ban of the spirit—would result in criminal charges or imprisonment (Finney, 2014; Finney & Dorjee, 2014). A key objective for China’s approach to managing the Tibetan religious field is to eliminate threats to China’s one-party rule (Chau, 2005). Nonetheless, so far at least, the party-state has not disagreed with the

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Weberian view that it is better to shape religions that exist than to try and create new ones.

3

Reviving Naland ¯ a: ¯ A Blueprint for Control?

One the closest cultural-political partnerships to emerge between India and China in recent years was the planning phase of a new N¯aland¯a University in the north Indian state of Bihar (Pinkney, 2015; Zhang, 2012). Here, among a rocky expanse of open pits and standing water, Asia’s two superpowers worked together to plan the future home of a pan-Asian post-graduate research college. Indeed, it is N¯aland¯a’s historic ties to the theological foundations of Mahayana Buddhism— the predecessor of the Tibetan Buddhist doctrine (Gyatso, 2008, p. xxiv; Ghosh, 2008, p. 3)—that allow us to take a comparative look at how India and China interact with the Tibetan religious field (Shekhar, 2007). By omission and direct involvement, N¯aland¯a’s construction was a litmus test for how both sides have used Tibetan religion to further their own political objectives. N¯aland¯a Mah¯avih¯ara (“Great N¯aland¯a Monastery”) was built in the fifth century in modern-day Bihar, constructed at a location that had been important to Buddhists for at least eight centuries before that (Pinkney, 2015). Once the school opened around 427 AD, it operated for more than 800 consecutive years, and over that period it would become one of Asia’s most important centers for the study of Buddhist philosophy, mathematics, medicine, and astrology (N¯aland¯a, 2010). However, while the pan-Asian ties to N¯aland¯a are deep, and its historical linkages are important for Buddhists from China to Malaysia, we will now focus on the historical foundations that N¯aland¯a played in the establishment of Tibetan Buddhism. A key aspect of the school’s teaching style—which would later become a major component of Tibetan pedagogy—was that of live debating sessions on philosophical doctrine (Sen, 2015). In his journals, the Chinese monk Xuanzang recorded that these debating sessions were the principle means by which knowledge was shared and acquired (Rongxi, 1996). The main material used for study at N¯aland¯a was Mahayana Buddhist texts (Rongxi, 1996). Indeed, students lived by strict monastic codes of conduct (Tsing, 1896), evidence that N¯aland¯a was—in practice and intent—a monastic institution that Tibetans would later emulate (Gyatso, 2008). According to the 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, Tibetans owe the entirety of their religious roots to the ancient school (Gyatso, 2008). A common perception among Western scholars is that Tibetan Buddhism is endogenous to Tibet, a product of “lamaist” evolution, although this is not correct. Gyatso (2008,

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p. xxiv) argues that “the correct description of Tibetan Buddhism is the study of such texts which were written by N¯aland¯a masters”. Moreover, the core of Tibetan teachings—interdependence, non-violence, and compassion—were formulated at N¯aland¯a and transmitted to Tibet by Indian scholars (Gyatso, 2008, p. xxiv). Although the ancient school and monastic institution disappeared from the historic record in the thirteenth century, the doctrinal elements survived unbroken, nurtured by the Tibetan Buddhist religious space until their return to India in the twentieth century (Singh, 2010). However, Tibetans’ historic connection to N¯aland¯a has not been overly emphasized in the revival project. In 2006, when an Indian delegation to the East Asia Summit put forth the idea of N¯aland¯a’s revival, the Tibetan history was omitted. As the author of this article discovered during fieldwork in early 2017, these ties have been intentionally downplayed, out of deference to China (which views the Dalai Lama as a dangerous separatist). Understanding how this omission materialized can tell us much about the means by which both India and China have used the Tibetan religious field to further their own political aims. It must be stated here that the new N¯aland¯a project is not a perfect lens through which to compare Sino-Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan “governmentality” towards the religious field. For one, the new school is staffed by a secular, non-monastic administration. Moreover, as Pinkney (2015, p. 115) has observed, the revival effort has been “marked by degrees of inattention to the original institution’s fundamental nature”. Such oversights include—but are not limited to—the foundations of scholarship, tuition, and political support (Pinkney, 2015, p. 115). A closer source of comparison might be Pinkney’s (2015, p. 121) observation that N¯aland¯a was historically used to secure imperial patronage through the underwriting of monastic study. Legitimacy of association is a key factor for political involvement in the revival project. Officially, N¯aland¯a’s revival was presented as a pan-Asian education initiative (India, 2013; Yeo, 2011). In 2009, a statement adopted by ASEAN partners heralded the rebuilding of a “great ancient center of intellectual activity” as an important regional exercise in cultural diplomacy (East Asia Summit, 2009; Yeo, 2011). The statement added that N¯aland¯a’s revival “will bring together the brightest and the most dedicated students from all countries of Asia […] to enable them to acquire liberal and human education and to give them the means needed for pursuit of intellectual, philosophical, historical, and spiritual studies and thus achieve qualities of tolerance and accommodation” (East Asia Summit, 2009). Nonetheless, a fuller examination of the N¯aland¯a discourse reveals that for India and China in particular, there were additional if oft-unspoken pro-Tibetan interests. Shekhar (2007, p. 2) poses a key question: “Why are seemingly hostile

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countries of the Asia–Pacific working together to translate this program into reality […] Is it only about the revival of an ancient Buddhist university in India or a part of larger politico-strategic calculations based on culture-driven soft-power diplomacy?”. The Tibet connection is one way to answer. For India, the goal in leading N¯aland¯a’s revival is multifaceted, although its stated goal is to create an “international center of excellence” to educate the “future leaders of East Asia” (India, 2013). In 2010, an act of the Indian parliament established the university, and an estimated $484 million was allocated for its construction, although much less has been spent to date (Sen, 2015). As the school’s first Chancellor, the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (2015) wrote in the “New York Review of Books”: “The aim of the founders of the new N¯aland¯a was not only to have a first-rate university but to encourage cooperation and interchange of ideas across national borders (again, reflecting the traditions of the ancient N¯aland¯a). They endorsed a ‘vision’ of a new university that would be ‘open to currents of thought and practice from around the globe’”. Sen resigned his post in July 2015 and has since accused the Indian government of interfering in the academic independence of universities across India, including N¯aland¯a. India’s objective was to leverage N¯aland¯a’s past and present its historic ideology as an “attractive” form of modern educational soft power (Nye, 1990). Indeed, the project has most often been referred to as an extension of India’s “Look East” policy, which is meant to forge closer partnerships with East Asian states for economic and political gain (Mehrotra, 2012; Pinkney, 2015, p. 132). During the author’s fieldwork, administrators frequently positioned the N¯aland¯a revival as “an educational element” of its regional engagement strategy (Mehrotra, 2012, p. 81). However, the “N¯aland¯a” brand is also a geopolitical wedge that New Delhi has used to drive a point between Tibetans and the Chinese leadership (Zhang, 2012). While there is currently no Tibetan religious or political leader associated with the pan-Asian revival effort (administrators told this author that their presence would “antagonize” Beijing), an older, Indo-centric N¯aland¯a— established in 1951 to focus on a narrower interpretation of the ancient school’s curriculum—has partnered with the 14th Dalai Lama to promote the N¯aland¯a style of Buddhist philosophical tradition. In March 2017, the Indian Ministry of Culture hosted the Tibetan spiritual leader at that institution for a Buddhist conference and inauguration of a new teaching building (India, 2017). The last time he visited that school in 1956, he was living under Chinese occupation inside Tibet (Gyatso, 2017). The Chinese foreign ministry—which frequently accuses India of harboring an enemy of the Chinese state—denounced India’s hosting of the Tibetan leader, and registered its “strong opposition” with the Indian authorities (Aneja, 2017;

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China, 2017). However, given the sensitivity of the Indo-Tibetan relationship, it is reasonable to assume that India hosted the N¯aland¯a-related conference in part to demonstrate to China its cultural and historical importance to the Tibetan Buddhist foundation, or perhaps to exhibit the type of assertive geostrategic posturing that some Indian scholars have advocated (Stobdan, 2017). Either way, “N¯aland¯a” was deployed for political reasons. According to Singh (2010), India uses these connections for a variety of reasons, including to bolster domestic legitimacy as the defender of Buddhist heritage, and to further interests on foreign policy issues such as borders, trade, and tourism. Taken together, Singh’s (2010) summary defines the quintessential Foucauldian approach to power: by shaping the conduct of the governed, India is seeking to achieve its own, preferred outcomes. The revival of ancient N¯aland¯a, and the co-hosting of Buddhist conferences with Tibetan refugees in the name of N¯aland¯a demonstrates how New Delhi extends its authority over a key cultural and religious domain for undefined political purposes. China’s interests in the new N¯aland¯a University project appear to be motivated by similar ambitions, although they are executed differently, and target different actors. China—like India—has a historical motivation for restarting the ancient school (Sen, 2015). Indeed, the university’s most notorious student, a Chinese monk named Xuanzang, is lionized as a Chinese cultural icon. Motivated by these deep ties, China held a seat on the university’s governing board (although it reportedly resigned the seat in mid-2020 following a tense border standoff; Kumar, 2020), and was originally the participant country with the highest financial contributions, second only to India (India, 2016).3 In 2011, the Chinese Ambassador to India, Zhang Yan, pledged $1 million towards the construction of a “Chinesestyle library in the future university” (Zhang, 2011). The money and support were meant to forge closer ties between “Asian countries in general” and “China and India in particular” (Zhang, 2011). However, China’s initial interest in N¯aland¯a must also be viewed in the context of a broader, soft-power push into the field of “Buddhist diplomacy” (Zhang, 2012), an arena that includes the sponsoring of Buddhist temples, conferences, and tourism (Angelskår, 2013; Zhang, 2012). According to Angelskår (2013, p. 4), China’s Buddhist diplomacy began in earnest in 2006, when it sponsored the First World Buddhist Forum in Hangzhou. China later sought to position itself as a defender of Buddhist harmony, reclaim the historical narrative of its own Buddhist past, and—most importantly for this paper—promote “its version of

3

During January 2017 fieldwork, university administrators confirmed that Australia, Laos, and Thailand had pledged additional contributions.

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Buddhism and symbolic figures such as the Panchen Lama to counterbalance the world influence of the Dalai Lama” (Zhang, 2012, p. 27). Some have argued that China’s engagement with the Tibetan political and religious space has moved towards deeper accommodation in recent years (Erie, 2016; Pirie, 2013). This view was brought into question in July 2016, when party-state officials ordered the partial destruction of Larung Gar, once the largest Tibetan Buddhist institutes in the world (Free Tibet, 2017). Nonetheless, prior to starting this research, the author of this article hypothesized that China viewed the N¯aland¯a project as an opportunity to re-engage with a foundational element of Tibetan Buddhism as a path towards possible reconciliation. China’s $1 million commitment to the N¯aland¯a project came with “no strings attached”, administrators told this author, and as Pirie (2013), Potter (2003), and Hillman (2005) have all observed, authorities inside China have historically granted local Tibetan religious officials a degree of limited autonomy. However, after the conclusion of research on China’s engagement in N¯aland¯a, it is clear that under the country’s current leadership, accommodation is no longer on the table. China’s engagement on the N¯aland¯a project was once seen as inseparable from its political expectations, and China may have at one time felt no choice but to participate in the N¯aland¯a revival project, to maintain legitimacy at home, and within the greater pan-Asian community, for example. Meanwhile, for India, securing China’s engagement also meant the exclusion of Tibetan participation. During fieldwork, Indian university officials told this author that partnering with Tibetans “would upset China” and “antagonize” Beijing. Since then, China’s involvement in the project has all but vanished, along with the original funding pledge (Kumar, 2020), while Tibetans’ involvement remains unchanged. In the case of N¯aland¯a, China’s interests and motivations must be left to interpretation. As per Bogue’s (1989, p. 139) reading of Deleuze and Guattari, words and actions are required to effectively convey meaning. In the absence of one element, interpretation is required. In this regard, China’s actions—diplomatically, political, and militarily—are interpreted by India in this way: exclude Tibetans. Ongoing border disputes along the McMahon Line (Ranjan, 2016) or China’s condemnation of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Nava N¯aland¯a in 2017 (Aneja, 2017) are examples of these incomplete conveyances. Additional uncertainty surfaced in mid-2017 when Indian media reported the opening of a N¯aland¯a-like school in Hainan, China, to rival India’s pan-Asian version (Yadav, 2017). Although Chinese officials did not immediately comment on the school’s opening or confirm its relationship with the N¯aland¯a brand, the accusation from Indian observers was that Beijing wanted to usurp New Delhi’s claims to the region’s Buddhist past. Unlike the Indian version, the Chinese iteration is even reportedly considering

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degrees in Tibetan Buddhism (Yadav, 2017). Yin Shun, Vice President of the Buddhist Association of China, was named head of the Chinese school in 2017 (Bihar Times, 2017). The abbot has been a vocal proponent of China’s plans to redevelop other key Buddhist sites, including the birthplace of the Buddha in Lumbini, Nepal (Republica, 2016). Taken together, these actions are in line with Zhang’s reading of China’s desire to control the Buddhist narrative (Zhang, 2012, p. 27). As Pirie (2013) observed, China’s approach to managing relations with Tibetans in general—and the Tibetan religious field in particular—is a double-edged sword: insufficient leeway can turn the ruled against the ruler, while too much “can increase […] autonomy and assertiveness” (Pirie, 2013). Moreover, “to the extent that its enforcement of policies appears to contradict the accepted balance between autonomy and loyalty, the regime may undermine its own legitimacy” (Potter, 2003, p. 332). Indeed, fear of the de Tocqueville effect shapes partystate policy on many issues (Dickson, 2004, p. 141), including this one. Such concerns capture the essence of the Chinese engagement with N¯aland¯a: beyond China’s borders, where control is limited, disassociation with Tibetan refugees is the preferred action. Inside, a more accommodating stance has historically been permitted, albeit with an eye towards shaping the Buddhist narrative and foundational doctrines, and a Chinese-managed effort to delegitimize the Dalai Lama. In summary, Sino-Indo engagement on the revival of the new N¯aland¯a University may indeed carry pan-Asian cultural and educational objectives, but it is also a means to competitively shape a foundational element of Buddhism’s— including Tibetan Buddhism’s—past (Pinkney, 2015; Zhang, 2012). However, the competing “govermentality” in how that engagement has unfolded is one of the more enlightening aspects of the project. Ironically, the discourse surrounding the project’s objectives and implementations suggests that both China and India have valued the Tibetan association with the N¯aland¯a brand more as a tool to influence the geopolitical actions of their neighbor, rather than to shape a deeper accommodation with or manipulation of the Tibetan Buddhist religious space itself.

4

Conclusion

This paper set out to address a number of key questions surrounding Sino-Indian management of the “religious question” generally, and the Tibetan “religious field” in particular. By exploring the history of a joint effort to revive an ancient

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institution of Buddhist learning in northern India, it was endeavored to shed light on how state-sponsored “governmentality” could be applied to the margins of Tibetan Buddhism. The goal—as much as possible—was to use data collected during fieldwork and from within available literature to draw a line of comparison between how India and China operate in this space. The Indian government’s efforts to revive N¯aland¯a have been viewed most often through a lens of pan-Asian cultural and educational diplomacy (Pinkney, 2015; Sen, 2015). However, its rebirth has also served as a conduit for “Buddhist diplomacy” (Angelskår, 2013; Zhang, 2012) and a new field of transnational engagement (Angelskår, 2013; Zhang, 2012). Indeed, because the ancient university served as a historic foundation for the building blocks of Tibetan Buddhism, the revival project—when viewed as an exercise in transnational diplomacy—cannot successfully distance itself from the contemporary discourse surrounding the Tibetan religious field. Throughout their histories, India and China have maintained different approaches to religion’s place in state building. However, regardless of whether it was religion (for China) or secularism (for India) that served as the major impediment to modernization, both states have sought to manage the space in which religion functions, including its participants, institutions, doctrines, and sources of transmission. China and India have historically concurred with the Weberian view that religion is a key means of state legitimacy, but one that must be governed properly to achieve harmony between state control and individual autonomy. As demonstrated, Tibetan Buddhism—which carries a high degree of politicization in bilateral relations—is a clear target of Foucauldian power for each state. The new N¯aland¯a University project was a rare space in which Chinese and Indian interests intersected with the historic roots of Tibetan Buddhism, making it a unique observatory for comparing Foucauldian approaches to control (Pinkney, 2015; Zhang, 2012). Nonetheless, despite what might once have been a ripe playing field to push and test the doctrinal narratives of Tibetans’ religious field for state-specific gains, the revival effort—as far as the available evidence suggests— has instead become a means for China and India to use the roots to Tibetans’ faith to challenge each other on geopolitical grounds. In other words, if the goal was ever to use the establishment of a new N¯aland¯a educational curriculum and center to influence Tibetan Buddhism itself, this objective has either failed or been postponed. However, if the goal was to use the historic linkages between N¯aland¯a and Tibetan Buddhism as a source of state-to-state political leverage, then the new N¯aland¯a project has achieved its aim. The assessment of the discourse surrounding the N¯aland¯a revival effort during the 2016–17 period is that for both India and China, the project was a form of transnational “governmentality”—a tool of foreign policy—rather than a means to

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shape the Tibetan Buddhist religious space itself. This could change, especially if Tibetan religious leadership was ever permitted a seat at the table in planning the resurgence of a school considered key to their past. However, for now, it seems unlikely that the revival of N¯aland¯a University will serve as a conduit toward greater Sino-Indian-Tibetan religious accommodation.

References and Further Reading Arribas-Ayllon, M., & Walkerdine, V. (2008). Foucauldian discourse analysis. In C. Willig & W. Stainton-Rogers (Eds.), The SAGE handbook of qualitative research in psychology (pp. 91–108). Sage. Allen, C. (1999). Confucius and the scholars. The Atlantic. https://www.theatlantic.com/mag azine/archive/1999/04/confucius-and-the-scholars/377530/. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Anand, D. (2011). Hindu nationalism in India and the politics of fear. Palgrave Macmillan. Aneja, A. (2017). China ‘strongly dissatisfied’ with India for inviting Dalai Lama to Buddhist meet. The Hindu. http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/china-strongly-dissatisf ied-with-india-for-inviting-dalai-lama-to-buddhist-meet/article17542776.ece. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Angelskår, T. (2013). China’s Buddhist diplomacy. Norwegian Peace Building Resource Centre. Appadurai, A. (1981). Conflict and worship under colonial rule: A South Indian case. Cambridge University Press. Asad, T. (1993). Genealogies of religion. Johns Hopkins University Press. Bihar Times. (2017). China’s N¯aland¯a is finally ready to start first batch of students! Bihar Times. http://www.bihartimes.in/Newsbihar/2017/Jun/newsbihar03Jun18. html. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Billioud, S., & Thoraval, J. (2015). The sage and the people: The Confucian revival in China. Oxford University Press. Bogue, R. (1989). Deleuze and Guattari. Routledge. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice, trsl. R. Nice. Stanford University Press. Brady, A. M. (2012). We are all part of the same family: China’s ethnic propaganda. Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, 41(4), 159–181. Bruno, G. C. (2018). Blessings from Beijing: Inside China’s soft-power war on Tibet. University Press of New England. Brown, M. (2010). The dance of 17 lives: The incredible true story of Tibet’s 17th Karmapa. Bloomsbury. Chatterjee, P. (2004). The politics of the governed: Reflections on popular politics in most of the world. Columbia University Press. Chau, A. Y. (2005). The politics of legitimation and the revival of popular religion in Shaanbei. North-Central China. Modern China, 31(2), 236–278. China. (2014). Some opinions on dealing correctly with the ‘Gyalchen Shugden’ issue. Communist Party Committee of the Tibet autonomous region, trsl. International Campaign

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for Tibet. http://www.savetibet.org/the-official-line-on-shugden-translation/. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. China. (2017). Foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying’s regular press conference on March 20. Ministry of Foreign Affairs. http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/ s2510_665401/t1447146.shtml. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Cook, S. (2017). The battle for China’s spirit: Religious revival, repression, and resistance under Xi Jinping. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FH_Chinas Sprit2017_Abridged_FINAL_compressed.pdf. Accessed: 30 Dec. 2020. Dickson, B. J. (2004). Dilemmas of party adaptation: The CCP’s strategies for survival. In P. H. Gries & R. Stanley (Eds.), State and society in 21st century China: Crisis, contention and legitimation (pp. 141–158). Routledge. Duara, P. (1995). Rescuing history from the nation: Questioning narratives of modern China. University of Chicago Press. Dumont, L. (1980). Homo hierarchicus: The caste system and its implications. University Press of Chicago. East Asia Summit. (2009). Joint ress statement of the 4th East Asia summit on the revival of N¯aland¯a University. Cha-am Hua Hin, Thailand. http://asean.org/?static_post=jointpress-statement-of-the-4th-east-asia-summit-on-the-revival-of-N¯aland¯a-university-chaam-hua-hin-thailand-25-october-2009. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Ellwood, C. A. (1918). Religion and social control. The Scientific Monthly, 7(4), 335–348. Erie, M. S. (2016). China and Islam: The Prophet, the party, and law. Cambridge University Press. Esposito, J. L., Fasching, D. J., & Lewis, T. (2002). World religions today. Oxford University Press. Fang, T. (2014). Asymmetrical threat perceptions in India-China relations. Oxford University Press. Feuchtwang, S. (2002). Chinese religions. In L. Woodhead, C. Partridge, & H. Kawanami (Eds.), Religions in the modern world: Traditions and transformation (pp. 5–105). Routledge. Feuchtwang, S. (2009). India and China as spiritual nations: A comparative anthropology of histories. Social Anthropology, 17(1), 100–108. Finney, R. (2014). Elderly Tibetan is jailed for discouraging worship of controversial deity. Radio free Asia. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/worship-12122014152106.html. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Finney, R., & Dorjee, K. (2014). Another Tibetan is jailed for discouraging worship of controversial deity. Radio Free Asia. http://www.rfa.org/english/news/tibet/more-121720141 42131.html. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Foucault, M. (1991). Governmentality. In G. Burchell, C. Gordon, & P. Miller (Eds.), The Foucault effect: Studies in governmentality (pp. 87–104). Harvester Wheatsheaf. Free Tibet. (2017). Destroying heaven: China’s campaign of destruction at Larung Gar. https:// www.freetibet.org/files/Larung%20Gar%20report-web.pdf. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Free Tibet. (2016). China’s register of reincarnations. https://freetibet.org/news-media/na/ china-launches-list-authorised-living-buddhas. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Fuchs, A., & Klann, N. H. (2010). Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade. Center for European governance and economic development research; CEGE discussion papers 113, 1–47

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Lichterman, P. (2011). Thick description as a cosmopolitan practice: A pragmatic reading. In J. C. Alexander, P. Smith, & M. Norton (Eds.), Interpreting Clifford Geertz: Cultural investigation in the social sciences (pp. 77–91). Palgrave Macmillan. Mani, C. (Ed.). (2008). The heritage of N¯aland¯a. Aryan Books. McConnell, F. (2011). A state within a state? Exploring relations between the Indian state and the Tibetan community and government-in-exile. Contemporary South Asia, 19(3), 297–313. McConnell, F. (2016). Rehearsing the State: The political practices of the Tibetan governmentin-exile. Wiley. McGranahan, C. (2010). Arrested histories: Tibet, the CIA, and memories of a forgotten war. Duke University Press. Mehrotra, L. (2012). India’s look east policy: Its origins and development. Indian Foreign Affairs Journal, 7(1), 75–85. Miglani, S., & Wilkes, T. (2017). India to host Dalai Lama in disputed territory, defying China. Reuters. http://in.reuters.com/article/india-china-dalailama-idINKBN16B03F. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Najar, N. (2014). Indians plan rebirth for 5th -century university. The chronicle of higher education https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/world/asia/indians-plan-rebirth-for-5thcentury-university.html. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. N¯aland¯a University. (2010). N¯aland¯a University: History and revival. https://nalandauniv.edu. in/about-nalanda/history-and-revival/. Accessed: 14 Dec. 2020. Nehru, J. (1962). Prime Minister on Sino-Indian relations, vol. 2, Press Conferences. Government of India, External Publicity Division, Ministry of External Affairs: 16. Nye, J. (1990). Soft power. Foreign Policy, 80, 153–171. Parsons, T. (1963). Introduction. In the sociology of religion. Beacon Press. Perdue, P. (2010). China marches west: the Qing conquest of Central Eurasia. Harvard University Press. Pirie, F. (2013). The limits of the state: Coercion and consent in Chinese Tibet. The Journal of Asian Studies, 72(1), 69–89. Powers, J. (2016). The Buddha party: How the people’s republic of China works to define and control Tibetan Buddhism. Oxford University Press. Potter, P. B. (2003). Belief in control: Regulation of religion in China. The China Quarterly, 174, 317–337. Pinkney, A. M. (2015). Looking West to India: Asian education, intra-Asian renaissance, and the N¯aland¯a revival. Modern Asian Studies, 49(1), 111–149. Press Trust of India. (2016). Karmapa’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh: China hopes India would not complicate border issue. Times of India. http://indianexpress.com/article/india/kar mapas-arunachal-visit-china-hopes-india-would-not-complicate-border-issue-4411580/. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. Ranjan, A. (2016). India-China boundary disputes: An overview. Asian Affairs, 47(1), 101– 114. Ramstedt, M. (2015). Sociology at the intersection between law and religion. In S. Ferrari (Ed.), Routledge Handbook of Law and Religion. Routledge. Republica. (2016). Lumbini is the source of Buddhist philosophy: President Bhandari. The Himalayan Times. https://thehimalayantimes.com/nepal/lumbini-source-buddhist-philos ophy-prez-bhandari/. Accessed: 28 Dec. 2020.

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Foreign Policy Change and the Salience of Religion in Brazil Claudia Zilla

Argumentation based on faith has become more frequent in political speeches, debates and public policy justification in Brazil since Jair Bolsonaro took over the presidency on January 1, 2019. Already his campaign slogan—“Brazil above all, God above everyone”—contained a reference to God, which presaged the appreciation of the role of religion in politics under his government. In this context, Evangelical1 congregations have experienced a remarkable symbolic and political upgrading. To a large extent, Bolsonaro owes his electoral victory to the Evangelical religious leaders that openly backed him, and to their communities that mostly vote for him. Surveys show that Bolsonaro’s government still receives the

1

In Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking Latin America, the term evangélica/o has come to mean the religious communities discussed here. However, evangélicas not only includes the Pentecostal (pentecostales) and neo-Pentecostal (neopentecostales) communities, but also a number of other non-Catholic Christian denominations. It does not include the historically Protestant congregations of the Lutheran or Calvinist traditions, as these are usually referred to as Protestant congregations. On the other hand, Evangelical is used more frequently to refer to the first missionaries who came from the USA. The term Evangelista—sometimes erroneously used in Latin America for members of Evangelical churches—should be reserved for Jesus’ four disciples, after whom the four gospels are named.

Portions of this chapter on Brazil have been already published as Zilla (2017, 2020a, 2020b). C. Zilla (B) Berlin, Germany E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_9

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highest approval ratings from Evangelicals, compared with Catholics and agnostics (Datafolha, 2019, 2020).2 Moreover, never before had the Evangelicals had such privileged access to government as is nowadays the case, in terms of interactions, political concessions and offices. In concordance with this, no Brazilian President before has maintained such a close relationship with them as Bolsonaro. In absolute numbers, Brazil is the country with the second largest Christian population in the world (after the USA). Although it is still the largest Roman Catholic country, due to endogenous growth as well as religious switching Brazil is now also home to the Evangelical—predominantly Pentecostal and neoPentecostal—congregations with the most members worldwide. This development has led to an intensification of religiosity in society, since—compared with Catholics—faith is a question of conscious decision and it plays a much more significant role in the life of Evangelicals. Along with their growing social importance, Evangelicals have also strengthened their political commitment. The Evangelical universe is as heterogeneous as Brazilian society; however, the largest, economically strongest, most socially visible and politically active churches—which are also typically headed by charismatic leaders—can be ideologically classified as conservative and right-wing oriented. In addition to this structural transformation—i.e. the desecularization process of society and politics (Bettiza, 2019)—a critical juncture (Pierson, 2004) paved the way for the integration of faith-based beliefs and ideas into the political domain. After a period of four consecutive presidencies of the center-leftist Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, Workers Party) of Lula da Silva (2003–2011) and Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), which ended with a controversial impeachment in the midst of a political and economic crisis and criminal investigations in Operation Car Wash (Operação Lava Jato), the largest corruption scandal in Brazilian history (Wesche & Zilla, 2017),3 the political pendulum swung in the other direction. Thus, favorable conditions emerged for the strengthening of politics of morality, conservative positions and backwards-looking attitudes, an illiberal backlash (Hunter & Power, 2019) that can be partially seen as a reaction to the 2

See for instance the series 2019 and 2020 of Datafolha, Instituto de Pesquisas, https://dat afolha.folha.uol.com.br/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. “Avaliação de governo”. 3 Originating from a simple money laundering investigation at a car wash (lava jato) in the Brazilian state of Paraná, this corruption scandal initially shook the semi-state oil company Petrobras, from where it spread to the construction industry, especially the Odebrecht group, and the world’s largest meat producer, JBS. The (still ongoing) investigations have revealed that numerous Brazilian officials and politicians of different parties were involved in corrupt practices that took place not only in Brazil but in several countries of all five continents in the context of contracts with Brazilian companies.

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broad progressive agenda that the PT governments had advanced in terms of the expansion of rights and affirmative action towards minorities. Under these circumstances, positions of the politicized Evangelicals, the Christian Right and conservatives converge. This conglomerate of ideas contributed to the election victory of a right-wing populist presidential candidate well known for his highly emotional and aggressive speech (Maihold, 2019), his defense of the military dictatorship in Brazil (1964–1985), his misogynistic, homophobic and racist statements, and his pro-life and pro-family agenda, against the legalization of abortion and equal marriage. Today, many components of this ideational complex have the strongest presence within one of the three wings that compose Bolsonaro’s government: the so-called ideological wing, several members of which also belong to Evangelical congregations or maintain close personal relationships with religious actors. During his election campaign, Bolsonaro promised a rupture with the political culture of the past as well as profound changes in public policies, including foreign policy (Bolsonaro, 2018). In many respects, major political transformations have actually taken place, including regarding Brazilian international affairs, which have evolved away from not only the foreign policy of the last presidencies but also from traditional Brazilian foreign policy positions, as several foreign policy practitioners (Cardoso et al., 2020) and scholars (Saraiva & Costa Silva, 2019; Maihold, 2019) have highlighted.4 It is not the objective of this chapter to provide an exhaustive analysis of changes and continuities in Bolsonaro’s foreign policy and the factors that have led to the Evangelicals’ political engagement, nor do I aim to trace the developments that made Bolsonaro’s electoral success and Evangelicals’ support for him possible. Rather, my intention is to explore how a combination of structural, situational, ideational, and actor-related factors contributes to the growing relevance of religion in Brazilian foreign policy. My approach is not comprehensive but highly selective: I search for the salience of religion—i.e. a set of ideas, beliefs and practices that relate to the supernatural or transcendental (Berger, 1967; Weber, 4

The guiding principles of Brazil’s foreign policy are summarized in Article 4 of the Constitution of 1988: I. National independence; II. Prevalence of human rights; III. Self-determination of peoples; IV. Non-intervention; V. equality among States; VI. Defense of peace; VII. Peaceful solution of conflicts; VIII. Repudiation of terrorism and racism; IX. Cooperation among people for the progress of humanity; X. Concession of political asylum. Further constitutional objectives of international affairs are the economic, political, social and cultural integration of the people of Latin America, with a view toward forming a Latin American community of nations. Critics of Bolsonaro’s foreign policy see several of these principles as having been violated.

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1978)—in discourse and foreign affairs within a short space of time. I observe 17 months of government (January 2019–July 2020), of which at least the last five months have been marked by the Covid-19 pandemic. During the coronavirus crisis, the domestic agenda has prevailed and international activities have been significantly reduced, whereby both aspects affect the quality of the observation period, thus only allowing for limited conclusions. I focus on foreign policy discourse, debates and decisions that present two features: they exhibit reference to religious arguments and/or actors and represent a break with former/traditional Brazilian foreign policy positions. This book chapter comprises three main sections. In the first section, I outline the context in which faith has become politically relevant in Brazil, namely the religious transformation of society in a secular state. I describe the proliferation and growth of Evangelical denominations and their increasing engagement in politics. In the second section, I focus on the role of religion in Bolsonaro’s presidency. First, I examine political discourse by means of analyzing selected representative speeches and interventions that reveal the logic of religious argumentation in political contexts. Second, I trace foreign policy decisions that seem to be in contradiction with Brazilian tradition in foreign affairs and have religious foundations. In section three and against the backdrop of the empirical analysis, I discuss plausible interactions between religion and foreign policy-making and provide some provisional conclusions.

1

Social and Political Manifestations of the Religious Change

A silent transformation has been taking place over decades in Latin American societies, especially since the 1970s: the conversion of large parts of the population from Catholicism to different forms of Evangelicalism, in particular Pentecostal and neo-Pentecostal (which represent the majority within this broad Protestant spectrum). Meanwhile, the proliferation of Evangelical communities is also due to endogenous growth. This demographic change has significant social and political implications. At the subjective individual level, a stronger emphasis on faith-based identity and lifestyle can be observed in the region, since a nominal Catholicism has given way to a practiced and intensively-experienced Evangelicalism. At the societal level, there is greater religious pluralism (which also includes Afro-Brazilian faiths and the historical Protestant churches) as well as a more intense religiosity. Thus, religious belief is not retreating into the private sphere but becoming increasingly socially visible. Due to their demographic

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weight, their increased self-confidence and their intensified focus on the world, Evangelicals’ mega-events, mass media, and institutions play a role in the public sphere. At the political institutional level, where Evangelicals are still underrepresented—especially compared with Catholics—the desire of Evangelical churches to influence political developments in the country and assume responsibility in state institutions is becoming ever clearer. The plea for the separation of state and church—which rallied Protestants in the nineteenth century regarding their own protection as a minority against the Catholic Church—has today given way to a sacredly reformed political commitment that rather emphasizes the need for legal equality and equal political treatment between religions, especially vis-à-vis the Catholic Church. It is solely within the framework of a so-called conservative new ecumenism (Wynarczyk, 2019) striving for the implementation of a moral agenda pro-family and pro-life that the Catholic Church is changing from a rival to Evangelical churches to a cooperative partner. The 2010 Brazilian census (IBGE, 2011) identified over 42 million people of Evangelical faith, representing 22.2 percent of the total population of roughly 210 million (2020). Of these, 13.3 percent are members of Pentecostal churches, 4 percent of historical Protestant churches, and 4.8 percent Protestants without church affiliation. According to a representative national survey conducted in October 2017, seven years after the census, as many as 32 percent of Brazilians now describe themselves as Evangelical (Datafolha, 2017). The Evangelical universe in Brazil is highly diverse and fragmented. Countless communities exist and only some of them are loosely affiliated under umbrella organizations. They all understand themselves as Evangelical but show significant differences in terms of moral, social and political positions. Evangelical congregations also largely differ regarding their size, the intensity of their pastoral and community work (for instance in prisons and slams), political engagement, the grade of institutionalization, social inclusiveness and religious orthodoxy, and their economic strength. Three megachurches that own publishing houses, radio stations and TV channels, universities, various (service) companies and are politically active stand out in the heterogeneous Brazilian landscape of Evangelical faith communities: 1. The Assembly of God (Assembleia de Deus, AD) celebrated its centenary in 2011 and is thus Brazil’s second oldest as well as the largest Pentecostal Church with around 22.5 million members, according to its own figures.5 Since 5

Website Convenção Geral das Assembleias de Deus no Brasil: http://www.cgadb.org.br/ 2018a/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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the 1980s, the AD movement has experienced several secessions. Many individual churches and church groups have also become independent without giving up their original names. An important branch of the AD is the Assembly of God—Victory in Christ (Assembleia de Deus Vitória em Cristo, AD-VC) under the charismatic leadership of Pastor Silas Malafaia. 2. The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus, IURD), founded in 1977 by the former Catholic and self-proclaimed bishop Edir Macedo, is smaller (with 8 million members, according to its own figures) but particularly visible in Brazil’s public sphere and politics.6 In contrast to the AD churches, the IURD is organized hierarchically (Chesnut, 2003, p. 157). 3. The Church of the Foursquare Gospel (Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular, IEQ) is the third major Evangelical denomination in Brazil, and the smallest of the three, with fewer than 8 million members.7 Today, the church is headed by Reverend Mario de Oliveira. Although the preamble of Brazil’s constitution8 —which was passed in 1988 and revised in 1998—contains a reference to God, it does not confer any special status on Catholicism or the Catholic Church. In the dogmatic part, the constitution guarantees the freedom of conscience, religion and practice of religion, the protection of places of worship and religion as well as associated writings and liturgies. Its organic section prohibits the state from establishing religious cults or churches or subsidizing them or entering into a relationship of dependence with them. According to the Civil Code (2002), religious organizations of any denomination are legal entities under private law.9 Despite this principle of equality before the law (isonomy), the Catholic Church in Brazil has always enjoyed a privileged status, both de jure and de facto. However, nowadays the Catholic Church is under pressure, among other reasons due to the growing political involvement of Evangelical churches: they support informal and official candidates, engage in corporate parliamentary work and gain privileged access to government or even public offices. 6 Website Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus: https://www.universal.org/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 7 Website Igreja do Evangelho Quadrangular: http://www.portalbr4.com.br/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 8 Constituição da República Federativa do Brasil de 1988: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_ 03/constituicao/constituicao.htm. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 9 Código Civil Brasileiro: http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/LEIS/2002/L10406.htm. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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Evangelical congregations provide external candidates with informal support, or they promote their own candidates for parliamentary mandates and executive offices at all levels of state organization (Freston, 2001; Lacerda & Brasiliense, 2019). This occurs in the context of a highly fragmented party system: in the current legislative period (2019–2023), 30 parties are represented in the Chamber of Deputies, with the strongest political force—the PT—having just under 11 percent of the seats. In contrast to the informal backing of outside candidates, the church’s support for official candidates is an act of institutional representation, even though it takes place in line with electoral law, i.e. via a party list. The general public does not necessarily know that a candidate has this additional tie, beyond membership to a church; rather, such candidacies—mostly for legislative bodies—are launched and promoted within religious communities. The candidate’s religious affiliation is a necessary but not sufficient condition. Religious leaders must also be united behind the candidate and promote him or her among church members. In some cases, primary elections even take place within the faith community. In terms of denominational distribution, Evangelicals are underrepresented in the National Congress. However, one consequence of the informal and official support for mandate candidates is that Evangelical interests are more strongly articulated in Parliament than would be expected (Lacerda & Brasiliense, 2019). Brazil certainly has parties with a Christian orientation, but no Evangelical parties in the narrower sense. The Evangelical political landscape is as fragmented as the party system. Nevertheless, Evangelical candidates predominate in the right and center-right. The following parties have a disproportionately high number of Evangelicals: the Social-Liberal Party (Partido Social Liberal, PSL), whose presidential candidate 2018 was Bolsonaro; the Social-Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrático, PSD); the Republican Party of Brazil (Partido Republicano Brasileiro, PRB), which renamed itself Republicans (Republicanos) in May 2019; and the Social-Christian Party (Partido Social Cristão, PSC). Most of them work together in the cross-party Evangelical Parliamentary Front (Frente Parlamentar Evangélica, FPE), also known as the Evangelical Group (bancada evangélica). According to parliamentary rules of procedure, this cross-party parliamentary group or caucus is a statutory association of deputies from various parties with the aim of pushing through common agenda items. To be officially recognized, such a group must bring together at least one-third of the members of the legislature.10 In the current 2019–2023 legislative period, 195 deputies and 8 senators belonged

10

Câmara dos Deputados, Frentes e grupos parlamentares: http://www2.camara.leg.br/dep utados/liderancas-partidarias/frentes-e-grupos-parlamentares. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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to the FPE.11 Its coordinator is PSC deputy Silas Câmara, pastor and elder of the Evangelical church AD. Religious-conservative values can be asserted particularly effectively from key positions in parliamentary committees that deal with social issues. In the former legislative period, 14 of the 36 members of the Human Rights Committee were Evangelicals. Their equally strong presence in the Committee on Technology and Communication (14 out of 42) is because Evangelical churches are keen to have unrestricted access to radio and television licenses (Oualalou, 2015). In 2018, the FPE explicitly supported Bolsonaro for President. Since Bolsonaro’s presidency, they have been showing growing interest in committees and working groups related to foreign affairs.

2

The Political Salience of Religion in Bolsonaro’s Government

At the latest since the 2018 election campaign, the boundaries between the religious and the political domains in Brazil have become visibly permeable. The merging of religion and politics is not only a social fact but also a declared objective of many officials and parliamentarians. In December 2019, the FPE organized a national conference, whose kick-off event included a worship service and took place in Planalto, marking the first time in Brazilian history that a religious ceremony was held in the government palace. It was attended by several cabinet ministers and federal deputies as well as Bolsonaro, who on that occasion stated: “I thank God for the second life that He gave me, and I have the joy in this country that is 90% Christian to declare that I receive Jesus in this house as Head of the Executive, a house that has been many years away from His Word".12 Under the presidency of Bolsonaro, key actors of foreign policymaking manifest their religious identity publicly and apply faith-based reasoning in political context. This is especially observable in the ideological wing within Bolsonaro’s government.

11 Frente Parlamentar Evangélica do Congresso Nacional: https://www.camara.leg.br/int ernet/deputado/frenteDetalhe.asp?id=54010. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 12 Own translation. Câmara Municipal de Cruz Alta Poder Legislativo do Município de Cruz Alta. Conferência Nacional da Frente Parlamentar Evangélica do Congresso Nacional, 23.12.2019. https://www.camaracruzalta.rs.gov.br/noticia/conferencia-nacional-da-fre nte-parlamentar-evangelica-do-congresso-nacional-130218. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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189

The Ideological Wing in Bolsonaro’s Government

With respect to personal, professional and political profile, three wings or factions can be identify within Bolsonaro’s government (and supportive politicians) (Saraiva & Costa Silva, 2019). These three groups have different priorities, pursue partly conflicting ends and thus they sometimes limit each other’s scope of action, while the President’s integration performance in his cabinet is weak, i.e.: he is unable to generate cohesion between the wings. The military wing comprises active and passive members of the armed forces, who hold numerous (some 3,000) public offices at different levels of Bolsonaro’s administration. At present, 9 out of 22 ministries are headed by (partly retired) militaries. Besides them, the President and the Vice President—General Hamilton Mor¯ao—had military careers. The technocratic wing comprises professionals who possess the expertise and technical competence required for the areas for which they are responsible. A prominent exponent of this faction is Paulo Guedes, the Economics Minister. The ideological wing (also known as “olavist wing”) encompasses persons strongly influenced by the ideas as well as some scholars of Olavo de Carvalho, a polemic Brazilian publicist and self-promoted philosopher (former astrologer and journalist) who has been living in the US since 2005 and regularly comments on Brazilian and world politics. Over decades, Carvalho has been actively spreading his conservative, deeply anti-communist ideas and false information, criticizing “the establishment”, “mainstream media” and “cultural Marxism”, and contesting scientific knowledge and findings (such as climate change) over publications, journal articles, personal blogs, YouTube, and social media.13 Carvalho is seen as the intellectual father of the New Right in Brazil. A key actor of the ideological wing was Ernesto Araújo, Minister for Foreign Affairs from January 2019 to April 2021. In contrast to the military and technocratic factions—whose members can be roughly characterized as interest- and outcome-oriented pragmatists—those who make part of the ideological wing are strongly driven by beliefs, their wish to impose them, and a worldview based on the friend-foe dichotomy. Within Bolsonaro’s government, the ideological faction is the one whose political positions are very much in line with convictions of the New Right and founded on religious justifications. Its members also maintain close relations with Evangelical actors. Although President Bolsonaro himself is former military, his political discourse and positioning put him very close to the ideological wing.

13

See Olavo de Cavalho’s YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC6RQh zm93SterWntL7GzqYQ. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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President Bolsonaro publicly defines himself as a Christian14 ; however, it is a subject of debate in Brazil what specific kind of Christian he is. He was raised a Roman Catholic but Evangelically baptized in the Jordan River in 2016 by Everaldo Pereira, a pastor of the Pentecostal denomination AD and chairman of the conservative-religious PSC. Several pictures and videos of the religious ceremony in Israel have circulated on the internet. The President’s current wife— Michelle Bolsonaro—is Evangelical, and their wedding was performed by Silas Malafaia, the prominent AD-VC Pastor. Moreover, Bolsonaro’s sons Eduardo (national deputy for São Paulo, PSL), Flávio (national senator for Rio de Janeiro, Republicans) and Carlos (city councilor in Rio de Janeiro, Republicans) belong to an Evangelical faith community. On the evening of the run-off in October 2018, after the election results had been announced, Bolsonaro met a group of people and TV cameras outside his house: before the President-elect gave a short speech, the Baptist preacher and politician Magno Malta took his hand and said a prayer. Since then, Bolsonaro has actively participated in numerous Evangelical mega-events. Some observers ascribe Bolsonaro a certain “Christian ambiguity” and claim that he has never ceased to feel Catholic (Oualalou, 2019), whereas it is evident that he is determined to publicly cultivate religious symbolism, invoke religion’s alleged precepts as policy orientation and justification, and grant devout Christians—including Evangelical pastors—privileged access to government. President Bolsonaro frames his decision to make religion a public policy factor by applying two argumentative tools of assimilation and differentiation. Since his election campaign, he has been asserting—not only at Evangelical mass events— that although the Brazilian state might be secular, most Brazilians are Christians, including himself. By means of assimilation, Bolsonaro repeatedly emphasizes the religious identity between the (majority of Brazilian) people and their President, and he relativizes the secular character of the state as something deviant from dominant Brazilian self-understanding. Moreover, he signifies his election success as the outcome of Christians’ and God’s power. In a mystical manner, he interprets the fact that he recovered from a knife attack at a campaign rally in Minas Gerais in September 2018 and the following surgery as sign of God, representing “practically a miracle”.15 Thus, he states that it is on this road of faith that he wants to lead the country. 14

Own translation. UOL, 2020, Presidente em evento evangélico: “Estado é laico, mas Bolsonaro é cristão: https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimas-noticias/2020/02/08/presidenteem-evento-evangelico-estado-e-laico-mas-bolsonaro-e-cristao.htm. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 15 Coincidently, long before the assault Bolsonaro’s supports had been calling him o mito (the myth).

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The following quote from Bolsonaro’s speech at “The Send Brasil” Evangelical event that took place in February 2020 in a football stadium in Brasilia illustrates in a condensed way the framing described above: “I’m here because I believe in Brazil. And we are here because we believe in God. Brazil has changed. Words that were once forbidden began to become commonplace. God, family, country. We are one people, one race. We want peace, tranquility, harmony. You have decided, you have changed the fate of Brazil. I owe God my life, on the occasion of the elections. I owe it to you to give a north to the destiny of our Brazil” (UOL, 2020).16 By means of differentiation, Bolsonaro also sets himself and his policy— supposedly inspired by faith—apart from Brazil’s political past, as the citation also suggests. A decisive factor for Bolsonaro’s political self-positioning (and the courtship of his supporters) is hostility towards everything that he defines as “leftist”. He uses an extremely broad concept of “leftist” as a label for the political and moral atheist enemy, of which—in his view—the former PT governments are prime examples. According to him, in the last 30 years, the “cultural Marxism” along with the corrupt oligarchies has undermined the values of the Brazilian Nation and family (Bolsonaro, 2018, p. 8). Bolsonaro blames the so-called cultural Marxism—among other things—for being atheist, promoting political correctness, privileging minorities through special protection of their rights or affirmative action (e.g. LGBTQ, feminism, quotas for women and people of color), and pursuing an ideological foreign policy. For Bolsonaro, alongside the ideological faction within his cabinet, cultural Marxism embodies the national and international enemy against which his government pursues a political and moral crusade based on (not clearly-defined) Christian values. In this sense, the discursive strategies of assimilation and differentiation are interconnected and both attached to religious arguments. Together, they have a palpable impact on foreign policy. The most prominent exponent of the ideological wing with major political leverage in international affairs was Foreign Minister Ernesto Araújo, a Roman Catholic and career diplomat. He has most strongly elaborated on the idea that a cultural struggle is under way and that Christianity is at risk. In his internet blog “Metapolitica 17—Against Globalism”17 —which he was still running during 16

Own translation. UOL. (2020). Presidente em evento evangélico: “Estado é laico, mas Bolsonaro é cristão: https://noticias.uol.com.br/politica/ultimasnoticias/2020/02/08/presidenteem-evento-evangelico-estado-e-laico-mas-bolsonaroe-cristao.htm. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 17 Metapolítica17—Contra o Globalismo: https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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his time in office—Araújo makes clear his intention to contribute to the liberation of the world from globalist ideology. In his view, economic globalization is controlled by followers of a “cultural Marxism”, which embodies an anti-human and anti-Christian system. He claims that believing in God today means fighting against globalism, because its goal is to break the connection between God and man, so that man becomes enslaved and God becomes superfluous. According to Araújo, the “metapolitical project” is primarily a matter of visualizing the presence of God in political action and history (Araújo, 2019). As in the case of Bolsonaro, Araújo’s view is a blend of religious, anti-leftist, conservative, and conspiracy theory arguments that lead to an aggressive defense of Christianity and rightist political positions. In his view, a “left-wing project” is being pursued in Brazil and throughout the world, whose aim is to destroy the family, eradicate religion, and control language. In line with this, the former Foreign Minister opposes accepting non-traditional family constellations or gender-pluralistic lifestyles and secular-liberal values. According to Araújo, a language sensitive to minorities and gender pluralism must also be combated (see his blog). He finds all of these tendencies “dehumanizing” (Araújo, 2019). Moreover, the former Foreign Minister regards relations between religions as competition: “ecumenism à la we are the world”—which many sides aspire to—should be rejected because it places religions on an equal footing while also reducing them to mere moral systems. The search for the lowest common denominator within the framework of an interreligious dialogue usually ends with discrimination against or the exclusion of Christianity, Araújo wrote. He further claims that the “political correctness” enforced by atheists has led to a devaluation of language and religion. Against this background, he welcomes the fact that a debate on religious freedom has begun in the world, but especially in the West, because he concludes that all religions are tolerated and protected in America and Europe, except their own, the Christian religion (Araújo, 2019). These ideas are shared by two young politicians who have also been strongly influenced by Carvalho’s “philosophy” and are strongly involved in foreign policy debates and making. Filipe Martins, Carvalho’s scholar, member of a Pentecostal community and originally deputy advisor to the President, was promoted by Bolsonaro in June 2020 to his chief foreign policy advisor. Since then, he has been in Planalto—the Government House—Head of the Special Advisory for Foreign Affairs, a department that is also called “the office of hate” by members of the Parliament. Eduardo Bolsonaro—one of the President’s sons, who is extremely active on social media, commenting on foreign policy and world affairs—held the Presidency of the Committee for Foreign Affairs and Defense in the Chamber of Deputies from January 2019 to March 2021. In early 2019, Steve

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Bannon appointed him head of The Movement in South America, a united consortium of European representatives who support populist nationalism and reject the influence of progressive globalism. What was called the Ministry for Women, Racial Equality and Human Rights under the PT governments turned to the Ministry for Human Rights under the short Presidency of Michel Temer (2016–2019) and on behalf of Bolsonaro’s decision finally became the Ministry for Woman, Family and Human Rights. At the head of this policy area—which has an impact not only on domestic affairs but also Brazil’s positions in international forums—Bolsonaro appointed Damares Alves, a lawyer and IEQ Evangelical pastor, who upon taking office also clearly stated: “The state is secular, but this ministry is terribly Christian”.18 She sees herself as “one of those conservative Christian women who have been oppressed, ignored and forgotten in this nation”. Like Bolsonaro, Alves is an advocate of a traditional (heterosexual) family model, and conservative-Christian values that— in her view—have been strongly neglected under the “dictatorship of the leftwing minority in the media, universities and non-governmental organizations”.19 She is against feminism, the legalization of abortion, secular and pluralist sex education in schools, and has declared war on gender ideology, as it is called in conservative-Christian circles.

2.2

Religion and Foreign Policy Change

During the PT governments, especially under the Presidency of Lula das Silva, Itamaraty—as the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Brasilia is called—experienced an extraordinary organizational and thematic expansion in Brazil and abroad, which ended with the presidency of Temer. At the same time, foreign policymaking was partially opened to new actors’ influence, while maintaining the dominance of diplomats over political appointees. Based on the self-image as a rising power and the economic advantages of the commodity boom, Brazil

18

Vivas, F., (2019). TV Globo, “Estado é laico, mas esta ministra é terrivelmente cristã”, diz Damares ao assumir Direitos Humanos, 2 January 2019: https://g1.globo.com/politica/not icia/2019/01/02/estado-e-laico-mas-esta-ministra-e-terrivelmente-crista-diz-damares-ao-ass umir-direitos-humanos.ghtml. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 19 Käufer, T., (2019). Jair Bolsonaros Chefideologin ist die umstrittenste Politikerin Brasiliens, Frankfurter Rundschau, 19 August 2019, https://www.fr.de/politik/jair-bolsonaro-chefideol ogin-praesidenten-frauenministerin-12923162.html. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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developed an “assertive and active” foreign policy.20 Priority was given to nontraditional partners as emerging powers and developing countries. The Global South was privileged over the industrialized West. In this context, Brazil turned to Latin America (Spektor, 2010) and promoted building country groups and multilateral formats in its own region and beyond (UNASUR, BRICS, IBSA). While preserving the traditional Brazilian preference for peaceful conflict resolution and multilateral approaches, the PT governments engaged as a mediator and conflict manager (nuclear disagreement with Iran), and developed an incredible “insider activism” within international organizations (Hurrell, 2010) with the aim of pushing forward reforms and influencing agenda setting. In so doing, Brazil displayed not anti-systemic but rather anti-status quo behavior in foreign affairs. Former Foreign Minister Araújo used to refer, as well as President Bolsonaro still refers, to the described PT foreign policy as ideological and being in conflict with Brazilian national interests. They have been strongly critical of globalization and multilateralism, skeptical of international organizations and sought to narrow Brazil’s foreign policy scope of action. Therefore, Brazilian engagement in Latin America, Africa and within IBSA, BRICS and international organizations and regimes has been severely reduced (Stuenkel, 2019). Highest priority is being given to establishing special close relations with the US and (re)turning to the Christian West. In their view, US President Donald Trump had been spearheading the moral, religious and political crusade that would rescue the Christian-Western world (Araújo, 2016). The designation achieved by Brazil as major non-NATO ally of the US during the Trump Administration and Brazil’s bid for a membership in the OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) are important elements of this pro-Western approach that had already been initiated by President Temer. In accordance with this foreign policy ideas and beliefs, several organizational reforms have taken place. They were made possible by the President decree in January 2019,21 which—among other things—turned personnel policy within Itamaraty more flexible, authorizing appointments of non-diplomats for leading positions as well as diplomats in disregard of internal hierarchy. In addition, the

20

In the words of Celso Amorim, “política externa altiva e ativa”. He was Minister of External Relations from 2003 until 2011 and—during the Itamar Franco government—1993 until 1994. From June until September 1993, he acted as Secretary General of External Relations. In addition, he was a Professor of International Relations Theory at the Universidad de Brasilia. 21 Decree http://www.in.gov.br/materia/-/asset_publisher/Kujrw0TZC2Mb/content/id/585 49274/do1-2019-01-10-decreto-n-9-683-de-9-de-janeiro-de-2019-58549021. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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curriculum of the Rio Branco Institute—the training center for diplomats in Brazil—was modified. The discipline of History of Latin America was removed and chairs have been created for the study of classical works. Moreover, the program of the International Politics course was reformed, with the aim of—in the words of Araújo—keeping future diplomats away from “ideological ties eventually acquired in their previous training”. Another significant change was the dismissal of diplomat Paulo Roberto de Almeida—a critic of Olavo de Carvalho—from the board of the International Relations Research Institute. In this context, several foreign policy decisions and activities stand out for being connected to religious arguments, preferences and actors. The most remarkable ones affect the bilateral relations with Israel, policy towards Africa and Brazil’s positioning in international forums regarding social issues and the situation of Christian communities in the world. Alongside the objective of strengthening ties with the US and the West, Bolsonaro sees Israel and its Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as his closest allies. Bolsonaro’s sons also have great admiration for the country: a 2018 photo on Twitter shows one son in a Mossad T-shirt, another in a T-shirt with the inscription “Israel Defense Forces”.22 In contrast to the pro-Palestinian policy of the previous PT governments, Bolsonaro had already announced in his election campaign that he wanted to move the Brazilian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, following the US example. This not only aimed to pay tribute to the political right and advance the desired rapprochement with the US, but also to do justice to the importance of the Holy Land in the Evangelical faith. Regarding eschatology, i.e. the doctrine of the ultimate destiny of the individual human being and the world, Evangelicals are followers of millenarianism. They believe that the return of Jesus Christ (parousia) is imminent, and that he will establish a kingdom for a thousand years (a millennium) with Israel as the politically- and religiously-dominating world power, followed by the Last Judgment. While Pentecostal churches more strongly profess pre-millennialism (the belief that the present is pre-millennial), the neo-Pentecostal churches adhere to a post-Millennialism (the belief that the millennium has already begun). On the occasion of the “March for Jesus” in August 2019—an Evangelical mass event in which Bolsonaro participated in Brasilia—pointing to an Israeli flag 22

Moreover, in November 2020, Eduardo Bolsonaro was single guest in the first episode (in English) of “The Yair Netanyahu Show”, a new podcast-series of Benjamin Netanyahu’s son. In their conversation, both men agreed on the close friendship between Brazil and Israel and the commonalities between the ideas and policies of their fathers. The Yair Netanyahu Show: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=T_yIiPLv-fs&fbclid=IwAR0kep66ryUfW 1gZyN6NLWU-qvm4rT0UBqiAeXDwhIoIvwxECPvc0a3KEE8. Accessed: 18 Nov. 2020.

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waved by the demonstrators, Bolsonaro praised Judaism as the origin of Christianity, stating that Israel was a role model that he wanted to emulate in Brazil.23 At the end of March 2019, Bolsonaro paid a state visit to Israel shortly before the parliamentary elections there. Together with the Israeli head of government, he visited the Wailing Wall in East Jerusalem. According to the Israeli Foreign Ministry, this was a first for an acting head of state with an Israeli prime minister. However, the plan to relocate the Brazilian embassy is only supported by the ideological wing of the Bolsonaro government. The military wing and the technocratic wing are opposed, fearing that the decision could result in economic disadvantages for Brazil. Exports to Arab countries could suffer, especially Brazilian halal meat, which is currently exported to such countries in large amounts. Meanwhile, the project of the embassy relocation seems to have been reduced to establishing a trade mission in Jerusalem, which was inaugurated in December 2019 in the presence of Eduardo Bolsonaro and presented as “the first step” towards complete diplomatic relocation. Since the start of Bolsonaro’s presidency and in contrast to PT policy, Brazil has begun to vote in the framework of the UN in favor of Israel and against Palestine.24 In March 2019, Brazil voted against a UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution that “condemned Israel’s apparent intentional use of unlawful lethal and other excessive force against civilian protesters in Gaza, and called for perpetrators of violations in the enclave to face justice”. In June 2020, Brazil voted against a UNHRC resolution that demanded accountability for severe violations of international law in the occupied Palestinian territories and reached approval. Although Brazilian policy towards Africa has lost momentum, members of the Parliament associated with the FPE and large Evangelical churches have been engaging in foreign affairs related to this continent. Moreover, Evangelicals have become a driving actor behind Brazilian Africa policy, replacing in this role Brazilian companies that had sought to expand operations internationally under the PT presidency and now are involved in corruption investigations linked to Lava Jato case (Wesche & Zilla, 2017). Nowadays, Africa is seen as the place of the greatest expansion of Christianity in the world, and various Brazilian missionary organizations are active there. At the same time, it is a region where Evangelical interests do not clash with the foreign policy agenda of other groups as the military and technocratic wings. Evangelical federal deputies have become the presidents of 23

Marcha para Jesus em Brasília, DF—10 August 2019. https://www.facebook.com/watch/? v=2886241634782291. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 24 In December 2018, a couple of weeks before Bolsonaro’s inauguration, Brazil had already voted in favor of a draft UN Resolution sponsored by the US condemning the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, as a terrorist organization.

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seven of the eight parliamentary groups of friendship between Brazil and African nations.25 In a sign of alignment with the Evangelicals, former Foreign Minister Araújo traveled to five African countries in December 2019, accompanied by three congressmen, two of them pastors and members of the FPE, who participated in religious activities in Africa. Among them was Deputy Márcio Marinho, who is the main interlocutor of the Brazilian Congress with the Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries and bishop of the IURD, being responsible for the church’s African affairs. Beyond Africa policy, the Foreign Minister maintains close relations with the FPE: Araújo had already received a group of deputies at Itamaraty for a “Dialogue on Foreign Policy with Evangelical Parliamentarians” in June 2019 and participated in the national conference of the FPE in December 2019. The impact of religion upon foreign policy is also noticeable in Brazil’s positions in international bodies. At a UN conference in March 2019, the Brazilian government took a stand against citing the right to universal access to reproductive and sexual health services in a document claiming that such expressions could give rise to the “promotion of abortion”. In another conference, in Hungary in November 2019, the Secretary of National Sovereignty and Citizenship Affairs of Itamaraty—Fabio Mendes Marzano—defended that “religious freedom is not only the right to practice a religion, but the right to manifest, debate and defend the faith, and even to try to convert those who do not have a religion”.26 In accordance with the government’s new foreign policy priorities, at an international level he engages against the persecution of Christians and explains that religion is now a determining factor in the process of public policy formulation. In Itamaraty’s new view under former Foreign Minister Araújo, although the state is secular it is not atheist, and since Brazil is predominantly a Christian country, the defense of Christian minorities in the world should constitute an essential part of the national interest.

3

Conclusion

From an analytical perspective, references to God and religious beliefs in political contexts may have either an expressive character and reflect the faith of the

25

Grupos Parlamentares de Amizade: https://www.parlamento.pt/RelacoesInternacionais/ Paginas/GruposParlamentaresdeAmizade.aspx. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. 26 Own translation.

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public speakers or an instrumental character and respond to the speakers’ expectations regarding the resonance with the audience. However, at the empirical level, the two aspects—conviction and convenience—are intertwined: politicians cannot completely repress their own beliefs (or their concurrent role as pastors), and at the same time—and especially in democratic contexts—they generally seek to gain popular approval. Therefore, the religious beliefs of public actors and audiences are both relevant when it comes to religious references in political discourse. However, the religious identity of agents and target persons should not be naturalized in an essentialist view, given that it is neither imperative nor involuntary in those settings that religious reasoning finds its way into political argumentation and policy justification, even less in a secular state; rather, it is a matter of political decision. President Bolsonaro, several members of the ideological wing in his cabinet and parliamentarians are determined to incorporate the religious factor into politics by means of opening the policy-making process to religious arguments, beliefs, interest and actors. In so doing, they partly express their own faith, and partly take into account the religious identity of interest groups and constituencies. With the exception of the FPE, faith does not penetrate politics over institutional channels or programs that have been established or formulated with the deliberate purpose of addressing religion (Bettiza, 2019). Rather, religion achieves political salience through other mechanisms: • Ideological convergence: Christian and political conservatism, right-wing populist positions and regressive attitudes are compatible in many respects and mutually reinforcing. In today’s Brazil, they merge (not only) to a diffuse ideological cluster (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) in which religion becomes politically salient and loses its distinct character as an independent variable affecting the political arena from outside. • Personal union: In contrast to the policy of the Christian Church, the social and political engagement of the largest Evangelical congregations has led to an amalgamation of religious and political roles. Thus, many pastors enter politics and become members of the legislative and executive branches without giving up religious positions. They also show little interest in keeping the two fields of activity separated. • Actors’ cooperation: In the context of ideological convergence, personal networks emerge. This has been especially visible among those influenced by Carvalho’s ideas and attached to the ideological wing. They know each other and work together from different positions upon certain policies. Cooperation

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can also be observed between political and religious actors whose interests are complementary. In these three ways, religion gains salience in politics, and more specifically in foreign policy. President Bolsonaro and his former Foreign Minister Araújo have been the main drivers behind the introduction of faith-based considerations into foreign affairs, backed by further political actors in the Executive and Parliament. On the side of the politically-engaged Evangelicals, they have only recently started to develop foreign policy activism within congress and reaching out to the presidency. Christian conservatives and conservative Christians seeking to bring God into politics have stronger prospects of putting through their interests when they are not in conflict with the priorities and ends of the technocratic and military wings. The interactions described between politics and religion have developed in a fertile ground. On the one hand, the demographic transformation of the religious change has led to the intensification of religiosity in Brazil’s society, paving the way for the erosion of the boundaries between the fields of politics and faith and thus for a higher receptivity for political-religious argumentation in the population. On the other hand, the long period of progressive PT governments and its culmination in a political and economic crisis amid a corruption scandal created a critical juncture that enabled a political turn (to the right) and the search for the moralization of politics and a politics of morality. In Brazil, the political salience of religion has been growing over recent decades and was already visible under the PT governments. With Bolsonaro, the integration of faith-based considerations in policy-making has become a declared objective of officials.

References Araújo, E. (2017). Trump e o Occidente. Cadernos de política exterior, III, No. 6, 2 Semester, 323–357. Brasília, DF: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais (IPRI), Fundação Alexandre de Gusmão (FUNAG). http://funag.gov.br/biblioteca/download/CADERNOSDO-IPRI-N-6.pdf. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Araújo, E. (2019). Liberdade religiosa, religião libertadora. Metapolitica 17 – Contra o Globalismo (Blog), 20 July 2019. https://www.metapoliticabrasil.com/blog/liberdade-religi osa-religi%C3%A3o-libertadora. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Berger, P. (1967). The sacred canopy. Elements of a sociological theory of religion. Doubleday. Bettiza, G. (2019). Finding faith in foreign policy. Religion and American diplomacy in a postsecular world. Oxford University Press.

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Bolsonaro, J. (2018). O caminho da prosperidade. Proposta de Plano de Governo: constitucional, eficiente, fraterno. https://flaviobolsonaro.com/PLANO_DE_GOVERNO_JAIR_ BOLSONARO_2018.pdf. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Cardoso, F. H. et al. (2020). A reconstrução da política externa brasileira. Folha de São Paulo, 8 May 2020. https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/2020/05/a-reconstrucao-da-politicaexterna-brasileira.shtml. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Chesnut, R. A. (2003). Competitive spirits. Latin America’s new religious economy. Oxford University Press. Datafolha. (2017, 2019 and 2020). Opinião Pública. Several Series. São Paulo: Datafolha Instituto de Pesquisas. https://datafolha.folha.uol.com.br/opiniaopublica/index.shtml. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Freston, P. (2001). Evangelicals and politics in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Cambridge University Press. Hunter, W., & Power, T. (2019). Bolsonaro and Brazil’s illiberal backlash. Journal of Democracy, 30(1), 68–82. Hurrell, A. (2010). Brazil: What knd of rising state in what kind of institutional order? In Rising States, Rising Institutions. In A. S. Alexandroff & A. F. Cooper (Eds.), Challenges for global governance (pp. 128–150). Brookings Institution Press. IBGE. (2011). Censo Demográfico 2010. Características da população e dos domicílios. Rio de Janeiro: Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). https://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/93/ cd_2010_caracteristicas_populacao_domicilios.pdf. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Lacerda, F., & Brasiliense, J. M. (2019). Brasil: la Incursión de los Pentecostales en el Poder Legislativo Brasileño. In J. L. P. Guadalupe & S. Grundberger (Eds.), Evangélicos y Poder en América Latina (pp. 123–259). Instituto de Estudios Social Cristianos (IESC) and Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung (KAS). Maihold, G. (2019). Der Zorn des Jair Bolsonaros: Brasiliens Rückfall aus der Zukunft. Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (ZFAS), Published online: 22 November 2019. https://doi.org/10.1007/s12399-019-00775-8. Norris, P., & Inglehart, R. (2019). Cultural backlash. Trump, Brexit, and authoritarian populism.. Cambridge University Press. Oualalou, L. (2015). El poder evangélico en Brasil. Nueva Sociedad, 260 (November–December 2015), 122–133. Oualalou, L. (2019). Los evangélicos y el hermano Bolsonaro. Nueva Sociedad, 280 (March– April 2019), 68–77. Pierson, P. (2004). Politics in time: History, institutions, and social analysis Princeton. Princeton University Press. Saraiva, G. M., & Costa Silva, Á. V. (2019). Ideologia e pragmatismo na política externa de Jair Bolsonaro. Relações Internacionais, December 2019, 64, 117–137. https://doi.org/ 10.23906/ri2019.64a08. Spektor, M. (2010). Ideias de ativismo regional: A transformação das leituras brasileiras da região. Revista Brasileira De Política Internacional, 53(1), 25–44. Stuenkel, O. (2019). How Bolsonaro’s chaotic foreign policy worries the rest of South America. Americas quarterly. https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/bolsonaros-chaoticforeign-policy. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020.

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Weber, M. (1978). Economy and society, vol. 1. Eds. G. Roth & C. Wittich. University California Press. Wesche, P., & Zilla, C. (2017). Korruption in Brasilien – ein Fass ohne Boden. Der Lava-Jato-Fall, seine Aufklärung und die regionalen Implikationen. SWP-Aktuell 2017/A 39. https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/aktuell/2017A39_s ymbolzll.pdf. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Wynarczyk, H. (2019). Argentina: ¿Vino Nuevo en Odres Viejos? Evangélicos y Política. In J. L. P. Guadalupe & S. Grundberger (Eds.), Evangélicos y Poder en América Latina (pp. 193–122). Instituto de Estudios Social Cristianos (IESC) and Konrad-AdenauerStiftung (KAS). Zilla, C. (2017). Brazil’s foreign policy under Lula. SWP Research Paper 2017/RP 02. https:// www.swp-berlin.org/en/publication/brazils-foreign-policy-under-lula/. Accessed: 20 Jul. 2020. Zilla, C. (2020a). Evangelicals and politics in Brazil. The relevance of religion change in Latin America. SWP Research Paper 2020/RP 01. https://doi.org/10.18449/2020RP01. Zilla, C. (2020b). Corona-crisis and political confrontation in Brazil. The president, the people, and democracy under pressure. SWP Comment 2020/C 36. https://doi.org/10.18449/202 0C36.

The Role of Islam in the Egyptian Foreign Policy Decision-Making Process Alexey Khlebnikov and Natalia Berenkova

The Middle East is the birthplace for all Abrahamic religions and throughout history it was an example of both peaceful coexistence and heated sectarian conflicts, so religion has remained an important variable in the political realm. The use of religious references has increased and religious actors have proliferated in recent decades (Fuller, 2020; Gause, 2014; Hamid & Mandaville, 2018; Nasr, 2006; Salloukh, 2013). However, the mechanisms of religious influence on state foreign policy are still understudied, as well as specific relations between Islam and regional international scene. This article mainly focuses on two successive Egyptian governments that followed the Arab Uprising: first, the presidency of Mohammed Morsi (30th June 2012—3rd July 2013) representing the Islamist Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), and second, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who assumed the office in 2014 after the coup. The change of government and constitution has not affected the legal status of Islam in Egyptian society and the state. Both constitutions of the given period (2012 and 2014) have the same wording of Article 2: “Islam is the religion of the state and Arabic is its official language. The principles of Islamic Sharia are the principle source of legislation”. Accordingly, the formal framework for Islam’s relation to the state has remained. With this case study, we would like to address the question of religious influence on foreign policy in Egypt, as reflected at several levels of analysis: starting from ideas and then moving to power play, the role of religious parties and the logic of state institutions as well as particular agents who form opinions or lead A. Khlebnikov (B) · N. Berenkova Nizhny Novgorod, Russia E-Mail: [email protected] N. Berenkova E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_10

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interest groups. In fact, we take the model of Warner and Walker (2011) as a main guideline in our analysis. The authors build a “macroscopic map of religion and foreign policy” based on the use of main modern schools of international relations as a general theoretical framework (Warner & Walker, 2011). We explore the main elements of this map in relation to Egypt, namely power (realism), ideas and culture (constructivism), interests and institutions (liberalism and institutional liberalism). It should be noted that speculation on religion is always a contemplation of ideas, which is why the salience of ideas and culture will be considered in relation to all elements. They affect identities, interests and the configuration of institutions at play, as well as influencing decision-makers. The ideational factor of foreign policy also matters in terms of justifying some political moves and explaining it to domestic or/and external audiences. Below, we examine the practical application of Islam to foreign policy formulation and which elements of Warner and Walker’s map play a stronger role. First, we briefly review how the Islamic paradigm views international relations and outline the Egyptian context for the purpose of further analysis. Second, we look at religious ideas and secularism as well as their usage in framing foreign policy. After that we analyse Egyptian foreign policy towards state and non-state international actors—i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood—through the lens of rational interests as it is understood by the realist paradigm. Finally, we consider the role of domestic religious actors and institutions in shaping the foreign policy. Ultimately, we conclude that Islam has a marginal influence on Egyptian foreign policy, which is mainly driven by the country’s national interests (pragmatic economic and geopolitical interests), and institutional interests of the elites (the military).

1

Setting the Ground: Exploring the Islamic Factor in a Historical Context

Generally, the Islamic paradigm does not separate the religious and political spheres. At the same time, foreign policy of Middle East countries cannot be viewed outside of global trends since—despite their peculiarities—regional nation-states and their legal systems were formed by the example of colonial powers and secularism as one of the universal principles of the Westphalian international system, which found its own place in public life in these countries. In a certain way, the Westphalian system is a historical contingency and other understandings of international relations are possible, including non-Western ones (Acharya & Buzan, 2010). Attempts to interpret the world order in Islamic terms or provide Islamic normative guidelines for foreign policy have been undertaken by Islamic

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scholars, jurists and activists of past and present, including Ibn Khald¯un (1332– 1406), Jam¯al al-D¯ın al-Afgh¯an¯ı (1839–1897), Abul Al¯a Mawd¯ud¯ı (1903–1979), and Ruhollah Khomeini (1902–1989), to name a few. In the 1970s, the Middle East witnessed the wave of Islamism that presupposed that it should guide the political and public sphere as well as personal life. The Islamic epistemology of that time returned to the Islamic (not external, i.e. Western) ontology (Abdelkader et al., 2016, p. 3) in trying to comprehend the nature of international relations. The dominance of Western paradigms of international relations is a problem for Islamic scholars, not so much because they serve as a methodology but rather because they conceptualize the world order; for example, the notable Islamic concept that has been put into practice in Iran after the 1979 Islamic Revolution is Khomeini’s understanding of the world as opposition of the oppressed (mustad’afun) and oppressors (mustakbirun).1 It is important to note two things about Islamic and Islamist2 concepts of international relations. First is their normative character: in the Aristotelian sense of sciences, they are not only a reflection on what is, but also what should/must be done (Tadjbakhsh, 2010, p. 185). Second, they inevitably try to address the dichotomy between the Muslim/non-Muslim world, questioning the issues of Islamic unity and nation-states being the product of colonialism or historically-formed entities. This is why many Islamist movements including the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) have supra- and transnational characters, as discussed in this article. Nevertheless, it seems impossibleto create a comprehensive and universal “Islamic theory” of international relations (Tadjbakhsh, 2010; Sheikh, 2016; Abdelkader et al., 2016; Nuruzzaman, 2018), primarily due to multiple Islamic factions (at least Sunni and Shia), different madhabs3 and numerous doctrines. After all, the Middle Eastern countries adopted the Westphalian nation-state system and many of them exist in between local ideas and Western terms to explain them. Egypt is not an exception and this paper will attempt to address this ambiguity. Throughout the major part of the twentieth century, Egypt was a major regional power due to its geopolitical position, population size, the largest diplomatic network among the Arab states, close partnership with global powers, and its status as a leading and the most acknowledged Islamic educational center. The Egyptian

1

Read more on Iran in “Between Religious Identity and Pragmatic Strategy: The Iranian Attitude towards the “Shia Crescent” Countries” by Polina Vasilenko. 2 Under Islamist, we understand political Islam, Islamic political or social activist doctrines that intrinsically differ from Islam as a religion and belief system. 3 School of Islamic legal thought.

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Islamic milieu includes various threads of thought starting from Sufism (mystical belief and practice) to Salafism (puritan and fundamentalist direction), which demonstrates various political ambitions from quietism to activism. Modern Egypt experienced at least four waves of re-emergence of Islamic activist ideas: • Islamic modernism of Jam¯al al-D¯ın al-Afgh¯an¯ı and Muh.ammad ‘Abduh (the late XIXth century) who sought to reconcile Islam with signs of modernity, institutions and technology; • In 1928, the foundation of the Muslim Brotherhood by H.asan al-Bann¯a. It has subsequently become an influential movement in Egyptian politics with a grassroots approach and transnational outreach focusing on participation in political life through political means; • Islamic activism which started in the 1970s—both radical and moderate—that succeeded in the Islamization of societies across the Middle East; • Rise of the political Islamist forces and their active involvement into domestic politics of Arab countries in the 2010s startingwith the Arab Uprising (alNahd.a in Tunisia, Freedom and Justice Party in Egypt, al-Is.l¯ah. in Yemen). The period after the January 25, 2011 revolution witnessed the proliferation of Islamic parties emerging across the political scene. Even former opposition violent jihadi groups such as Al-Jam¯a‘ah al-Isl¯am¯ıyah or Al-Jihad al-Islam¯ı al-Misr¯ı formed political parties (Building and Development Party and Islamic Party correspondingly) and partially joined the non-violent political process. However, in relation to foreign policy in the given period, the Muslim Brotherhood movement is of substantial interest. This party was banned in 1954 and for decades it was divided into two major parts: one held up to revolutionary activities and the other concentrated on socio-religious work. In the 1970s due to the policy of president Anvar Saddat, the Brotherhood enjoyed a period of revival. Saddat leaned towards them over leftist and socialist forces. Until the 1990s, the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to their policy and in fact were the only party that opposed the government’s most controversial decisions, like the Camp David Agreement. In a way, they exploited foreign policy causes to gain popularity within Egyptian society. Party pluralism that was introduced in Egypt in 1977 has not become the basis for real political competition (Tsaregorodtseva, 2012). Early in the events that would be known as the “Arab Spring/Uprising”, the Muslim Brotherhood did not rush to be at the avant-garde of protests and rather it adopted a wait-andsee approach (Khlebnikov, 2016). They were not newcomers to Egypt’s political scene, but rather they were the most organized opposition movement with administrative experience and well-known slogans, which contributed to their success.

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This is why in the following the Muslim Brotherhood is considered as the most influential Islamic political actor.

2

Evaluating the Role of Islamism and Secularism in Egyptian Politics

According to the constructivist view on international relations, a country’s national identity derives from culture. The former inter alia embraces religion. This national identity defines how certain interests are rationalized and prioritized by governments. In such a way, common culture fosters a common understanding of rules in international relations, both cooperative and conflictual. Over and above at the level of realpolitik, religious differences may be used instrumentally as one justification for certain foreign policy decisions (Warner & Walker, 2011, p. 120). We assume that Egyptian foreign policy is affected by the historically-developed complex balance between secularism and religion. This balance is subject to longstanding public debate as well as a factor in the country’s self-positioning in relations with Muslim and non-Muslim counterparts. Despite the fact that the question of secularism is rooted in the European experience of religion in public life, it is usually seen as a sign of modernity. Taken with the globalization of liberal modernist project, the issue of religious-secular balance paves its way into the Islamic world. Egypt has been one of the pioneers of secularism in the Middle East and secularization history traces back to the colonial period. Since that time, public debate between advocates of Islamic government and secular society has been rather heated (Asad, 2015; Agrama, 2012). It even led to the change in the language replacing the term “secular” (‘alm¯an¯ı) with “civil” (madan¯ı) since the former was often equated with atheism (Najjar, 1996, p. 2). Egypt eventually developed a religious-secular balance model that El Sharakawy calls hybrid. He writes that this is a model “in which secular and Islamic tenets coexist in a unique formula, claiming to represent a moderation version of the two, and intending a full control of the society” (El Sharakawy, 2013, p. 37). Thus, the state in Egypt is the only actor that is entitled to politicize the religion (El Sharakawy, 2013) and subdue it for its own purposes. By the letter of the law, Islam and sharia are already embedded into the Egyptian Constitution and there is a certain balance between the sharia and the legal system largely based on European law. Ultimately, this legal formula is acceptable for all actors, including the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood. In practice, Islam and sharia are allowed to play a role in the social and family life of the Egyptians; however, when it comes to the

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political realm, their role is strictly regulated and limited (i.e. religion-based parties are prohibited,4 and the state enhances control over religious institutions). The existing separation of Islam and sharia in social life on the one hand and political life on the other indicates that the current leadership (Hosni Mubarak included) does not accept an Islamist agenda and sharia entering into the country’s political life. As for international relations, originally the Islamist paradigm viewed them as an order comprising ummah5 where foreign relations are limited to the interaction between the Islamic community (dar al-Islam) and the non-Islamic world (dar alharb). Essentially, it largely erased the difference between foreign and domestic policies, leaving to the former only relations with the non-Islamic world, while expanding the latter to the relations within the unified and borderless ummah. However, today this paradigm is rather obsolete. That said, ummah is losing its role as a major policy motivation, although its symbolic significance persists (AlKadi, 2019). Modern Islamist movements largely abandoned the ideal Islamist vision of an international order as successful engagement in domestic politics requires conducting a pragmatic approach to both domestic and foreign policies. As a result, Islamists had to adapt and engage in foreign policy conduct that did not differ much (if at all) from secular political parties/movements, giving up its universalist Islamist world vision. During various periods, the state had to play both secular and religion cards to gain necessary legitimacy domestically and internationally. Although Islam was kept as an important part of Egyptian identity, culture and social life, since the 1950s President Gamal Abdel Nasser attempted to significantly limit the role of religion in politics and the governing process. Nonetheless, in response to public request, succeeding secular Egyptian regimes (such as of Hosni Mubarak (1981– 2011) and the current government of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) used to approve a conservative social agenda that was close to Islamist values. The same goal is followed by maintaining state influence over key religious institutions such as Al-Azhar University, the Ministry of Al-Awq¯af6 and D¯ar al-Ift¯a’.7 The state also 4

Article 74 of 2014 Egyptian Constitution. Muslim community. A fundamental concept in Islam, expressing the essential unity and theoretical equality of Muslims from diverse cultural and geographical settings. In the Quran, designates people to whom God has sent a prophet or people who are objects of a divine plan of salvation. Oxford Islamic Studies Online. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/art icle/opr/t125/e2427. Accessed: 09 Sep. 2020. 6 Religious endowments. 7 Islamic advisory body established in 1895 that issues fatwas (Islamic legal opinion) and conducts research. 5

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prefers to embrace or contain alternative religious narratives. Such “nationalization” of religion led to the creation of “state Islam”, which is not favored by Islamic actors within the country. In this vein, Egyptian governments seek regional and international partners whose visions about appropriate Islamic narratives match their own. In the case of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, he has taken a harsh stance against the Muslim Brotherhood as a result of the 2013 coup and advanced relations with Saudi Arabia and UAE against Qatar, which supported an international Brotherhood network. Secularism in Egypt is occasionally exploited to stake international legitimacy and ensure Western countries’ support. In the post9/11 period, the question of extremism, levels of various Islamic and Islamist movements and the need to put them on terrorist lists (or not) is addressed by many governments worldwide. Anti-terrorist agenda has become one of the priorities of countries’ security policies. Middle Eastern regimes—authoritarian or democratic—are becoming advocates of moderate Islam and take part in international anti-terrorist projects; for instance, the participation of Arab countries (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and others) in the US-led global coalition against Daesh established in September 2014. During the time of Hosni Mubarak and now under the presidency of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, Egypt again uses secularism and the slogans of fighting Islamic fundamentalism as a reason to receive Western political and financial support.8 Egypt is one of the largest recipients of US foreign military assistance including the fight against extremism and the US State Department endorses Egypt’s ongoing CVE9 efforts, which include activities of government-controlled religious institutions.10 “Once Islam is inserted into public debates, how citizens interpret their religion, it becomes, in effect, a matter of national security” (Hamid & Mandaville, 2018). On a large scale, many Middle Eastern crises that are seen as religious or sectarian (e.g. intra-GCC rift, Sunni-Shiite confrontation) can be explained by domestic considerations and the existing regimes’ vision of how Islam should relate to governance, since they try to eliminate interpretations of religion that may undermine their domestic authority. More often than not, such authoritarian regimes equate their own survival with the survival of the entire state, its security, sovereignty and territorial integrity. This means that the possession of power and 8

Saferworld. 2017. “We need to talk about Egypt: how brutal ‘counter-terrorism’ is failing Egypt and its allies”. https://www.saferworld.org.uk/long-reads/we-need-to-talk-aboutegypt-how-brutal-acounter-terrorisma-is-failing-egypt-and-its-allies. Accessed: 12 Dec. 2020. 9 Countering Violent Extremism. 10 Country Reports on Terrorism 2019: Egypt. US Department of State. https://www.state. gov/reports/country-reports-on-terrorism-2019/egypt/. Accessed: 13 Oct. 2020.

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a lust to keep it define decision-makers’ behavior and rationale. Indeed, this is why not only domestic but also foreign policy decision-making is affected by the nature of a regime and its survival instinct, which dictates how to act. In Egypt, the existing secular-military regime is destined to develop its foreign policy based on ideological proximity11 with potential partners and economic support that they are ready to provide to remain sufficiently resilient in order to address any ideological, political and economic challenges domestically. In other words, Cairo has to build partnerships with those regional and global actors whose policies do not threaten the Egyptian regime or those that threaten it the least. For example, over the last seven years, Egypt has partnered and significantly developed its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which share Egyptian authorities’ attitude towards political Islam and in particular towards the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkish activity in the region. Based on their shared perception of security challenges (which among other things have an ideological character), they develop their partnerships and support each other (e.g. in Libya). Since Islam is seen as a part of Egyptian national identity, it is frequently used while formulating and explaining foreign policy objectives to the domestic audience. In this case, religious references and values are only used where material costs are few or when the material trade-offs are unknown to decisionmakers. Thus, the amount of information that decision-makers possess about the consequences of policy actions will influence the degree to which culture and religion influence foreign policy (Shaffer, 2006). If the material costs are bearable or acceptable, authorities allow religious sentiments to dominate in the domestic public domain and tolerate Islamic mobilisation caused by non-sensitive international issues, which cannot be ignored by ordinary Muslims who perceive them as very sensitive from religious/cultural perspective. Issues such as the Danish cartoons crisis12 or Israeli aggression vis-a-vis Palestinians (El Sharakawy, 2013, p. 42) resonate in the hearts and minds of religious public and cannot be ignored by authorities as they may cause domestic problems. A country’s religious heritage may influence its foreign policy orientation, although according to Warner and Walker the extent of this influence and mechanism remains poorly understood (Warner & Walker, 2011, p. 115). Common religious heritage does not prevent Islamic countries from entering into wars with each other and it does not define countries’ fundamental approaches towards their foreign partners. For example, the 11

By ideological proximity, here we mean similar or alike perceptions/attitudes of states towards certain issues that threaten their security. 12 Muhammad cartoons crisis in 2005 started when the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten published twelve editorial cartoons depicting prophet Muhammad, which led to protests around the world, including violent demonstrations and riots in some Muslim countries.

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participation of Egypt and other Muslim countries in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) does not prevent serious conflicts within this community of Muslim states (e.g. Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, the intra-GCC rift and blockade of Qatar, war in Yemen, Iran-KSA confrontation, etc.). Below we will take a look at foreign policy through the realist lens, trying to understand what calculations are behind decisions taken by the last two governments.

2.1

How do Pragmatism and National Interests in the Realist Paradigm Dominate over the Islamic Factor in Foreign Policy?

Throughout the past decade, Egypt has lost its leading position in the region due to the 2011 uprising and the turbulent years which have followed after. Egypt’s socio-economic situation significantly suffered (Bartenev, 2019; Khan & Miller, 2016), which was also reflected in the decrease of Cairo’s regional influence. Before 2011, Egypt used to be among the main power centers in the region, but that changed in the course of a year after the 2011 uprising, which damaged Egypt’s fragile economy and led to its increased dependency on financial support coming from GCC partners. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood that came to power in 2012 started to be a threat to the military regime, which toppled the Brotherhood in 2013. Since then, Egypt has been increasingly dependent on financial aid coming from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait and Bahrain, which have already provided well over $ 40 billion, helping Cairo to keep its economy afloat, preserve the existing military-secular regime and avoid destabilization (Khlebnikov, 2020). Although Sunni Islam and Muslim ummah presuppose a certain degree of solidarity among the Arab states, they have been increasingly fragmented over recent decades. The growing level of contradiction among Muslim states in the region is caused by various sectarian, ideological, economic and geopolitical factors that have been driving them apart, especially with increasing intensity after the Arab Uprising. As a result, they do not see eye to eye on different regional issues, which translates into different and sometimes conflicting foreign policies. Accordingly, being a part of the Islamic ummah does not necessarily guarantee conduct of nonconflicting foreign policies or translate into alliances. These are the state interests and/or security concerns that largely define their foreign policies. For example, despite the fact that Saudi Arabia belongs to the ultra-conservative Wahhabi creed of Salafi, Hanbali Islam (Hanbali madhab—one of four major schools of Sunni Islamic jurisprudence), Cairo built close partnership relations with Riyadh. At

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the same time, Qatar—which also practices Wahhabism as its state religion—is a current rival of Saudi Arabia, Egypt and the UAE (which has quite a large population that practices Hanbali Islam), that even introduced and sanctioned Qatar’s blockade. Today, the absolute majority of the regional Arab countries still have authoritarian political regimes, which are based on predictable and controlled power-transition mechanisms, with little space for political competition and opposition. The Muslim Brotherhood—which embraced politics as the main tool of struggle for power—has become an ideological rival and a political alternative that started to threaten the authoritarian governance model in the region, e.g. Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt13 (Khlebnikov, 2015). The legitimate rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood through political democratic means in Egypt and Tunisia in 2011 was a clear signal to the rest in the region (including Gulf monarchies) that there is a threat to their regimes. The Brotherhood in Egypt showcased successful political involvement, sending a strong signal to Islamists forces in the region to follow the case, which naturally challenged traditional authoritarian regimes and ruling elites in the region. When the Muslim Brotherhood came to power and Morsi was elected the president, Qatar and Turkey started to tunnel economic support to Egypt to showcase a success story of the Islamist party. Turkey provided Egypt with a $2 bn loan (Hamed, 2013), while Qatar has become Egypt’s key energy partner and granted it $8 bn in foreign aid (Hedges & Cafiero, 2017). As a result, Turkish AKP party has become the closest international ally of the Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) in Egypt. Eventually, in 2013 Egyptian military organized a coup against the Islamist president Morsi and got rid of the Brotherhood in politics, outlawing them and labeling a terrorist organization (the case was followed by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in 2014). Since the 1980s, the Brotherhood has been trying to enter Egyptian politics. Like any other political movement it strived to acquire and maintain power at a national level. In order to achieve this goal, any political actor is compelled by the practical pressures that it must take into account a country’s national interests, which might be not in line with ideological or religious orienteers of this political actor. As a result, those aspiring for power develop political strategies, including certain foreign policy stances with their main goal to legitimize and preserve themselves domestically (Al-Kadi, 2019). When the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom Justice Party won parliamentary elections in 2011 and its head Mohammed Morsi won the presidential elections in 2012, the movement reached 13

Since the 1960s, Qatar has co-opted the Muslim Brotherhood and provided them with a safe heaven and supporting its activities in the region; see Roberts (2014).

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its utmost success, having gained the power. It came as no surprise that the new president distanced himself from Hosni Mubarak and it was expected that he would advance Islamic vector in his policy. However, his foreign policy moves were characterized by two major trends: asserting Egypt’s regional leadership and opening Cairo’s foreign policy to new potential partners with the aim of compensating for the lack of progress in social and economic spheres within Egypt (Grimm & Roll, 2012), something that previous presidents had also followed. He confirmed the importance of the African Union to Egypt, made trips to Saudi Arabia, Iran (Egypt has not had full diplomatic relations with Iran since 1979), the US and Russia, received strong support from Qatar, and proposed a peace initiative to resolve the Syria conflict, involving Iran alongside Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Egypt. Such activity collided with Egypt’s limited capacity and dependence on foreign aid, including US military aid to armed forces and GCC financial assistance. Accordingly, Grimm and Roll (2012) note that Morsi’s foreign policy was largely symbolic and had not been considerably revisited since the Mubarak era. To sum up, we can see that despite Morsi’s motivation to make foreign policy look somewhat more “Islamic” during his short presidency, pragmatism and existing constraints of financial dependence prevailed. During the Egyptian uprising of 2010–11, protesters’ demands had nothing to do with religion or secularism. Despite the Brotherhood only being in power for around a year and a half, it was enough to see that the Islamist government could not simply disregard the country’s national interests (e.g. damaging the tourist industry by making wearing hijab obligatory, introducing accelerated Islamization of the country or breaking up with the US) or change the status of alreadyresolved but sensitive matters (e.g. withdrawing from the peace treaty with Israel, re-considering relations with the Saudis, etc.). This is why the religious factor plays a rather marginal role regarding power politics in regional affairs and cannot solely define Egyptian leadership decision-making. The Brotherhood did not act exclusively based on their religious preferences and their Islamist ideology did not change the pragmatic nature of the foreign policy during their time in power. By the same token, the current secular political regime of al-Sisi in Egypt— which deposed the Muslim Brotherhood in 2013—conducts its policies taking into account concerns of the religious part of the population. According to some polls in 2018, 33% of Egyptian Muslims voiced at least a “somewhat positive” opinion of the Muslim Brotherhood (Pollock, 2018), while those who agreed that it would be better if more religious people held public office increased in number from 25% in 2016 to 43% in 2019. The government simply cannot ignore the religious heritage of Egyptians, and at the same time it cannot build its policy

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exclusively on it. As a result, we can see that the religious factor is more strongly taken into account by the authorities when it comes to domestic policies and when its foreign moves are explained to the domestic audience.

2.2

Foreign Policy as an Extension of Domestic Politics: the Influence of Domestic Actors and Institutional Rules on Foreign Policy

Taking as a basis the liberal idea that foreign policy preferences derive from the domestic political considerations and are constrained by domestic and international institutions, Warner and Walker (2011, p. 122) propose adding to the ideational level a factor of organizations and state structures considering the role of religion in foreign policy. Accordingly, domestic religious and non-religious actors—as well as international and transnational ones—can influence foreign policy. Domestic institutions can be state-affiliated or non-state parties or interest groups. The latter can also be in opposition to the existing regime. Below we consider the factor of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egyptian foreign policy and political activities of the main Islamic religious institutions in Egypt, namely Al-Azhar University and D¯ar al-Ift¯a’. The Egyptian state permanently tries to increase control over the religious sphere and it does not allow powerful Islamist parties to emerge. As Nathan Brown (2012, p. 535) put it: “The message from the authorities seemed to be clear: if you organize, you should not participate; if you participate, you should not organize”. The main proponents of merging Islam with politics are Islamist movements in Egypt. They are not confined to the Muslim Brotherhood, although the latter is the most influential, as we earlier. In the absence of the monolithic international Brotherhood network (Rubin, 2010), its different offshoots operate throughout the Middle East and in the West. These organizations sharing common transnational ideas usually act according to their national agenda. Qatar and Turkey have cultivated ties with the Brotherhood and many exiled members of the Egyptian group have settled in those countries. Moreover, the Justice and Development Party in Turkey is considered a Muslim Brotherhood offspring to a certain extent. Turkey and Qatar welcomed the Egyptian revolution and promised to lend and invest. After Morsi’s deposition, Doha withdrew 2 billion of the 3 billion dollars that it had deposited with the Bank of Egypt in 2011, to be converted progressively into state bonds. Otherwise, in Saudi Arabia and UAE, Brotherhood-affiliated movements were suppressed and these countries watched the events after the 2011 revolution with suspicion. Since Egypt considers any

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material or moral support of the Brotherhood as an interference in its internal affairs, the attitude of other actors to this movement determines its regional and international orientations. The label “terrorist” that was placed on the Brotherhood movement by Abdel Fattah al-Sisi meant to be a marker of threat that should be contained at the regional and international levels. For example, we can see that Turkey-Egypt relations deteriorated significantly since the June 30, 2013 coup, while Turkey has become the regional hub for the Muslim Brotherhood’s international organization. The extent to which this factor is important for some Middle Eastern states can also be exemplified by the 2017 Qatar crisis. Saudi Arabia and its allies including Egypt issued a list of thirteen demands, among others “sever ties to all ‘terrorist, sectarian and ideological organizations,’ specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, ISIS, al-Qaeda, Fateh al-Sham (formerly known as the Nusra Front) and Lebanon’s Hezbollah”, “stop granting citizenship to wanted nationals from Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain”, and “cease contact with the political opposition in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and Bahrain”.14 It is worth noting that Qatar has been hospitable towards Brotherhood members since the 1950s and those migrant intellectuals played an important role in building the educational system of Qatar (Roberts, 2014). Considering that the Muslim Brotherhood does not posit any considerable threat for Qatar internally, it supported protests during the Arab Uprising and is now perceived as a main sponsor of the Brotherhood’s offspring around the region. In this vein, it should be contained by the regional coalition that includes Egypt. Unlike the Muslim Brotherhood movement—which by itself is an actor of international relations—Islamic religious institutions in Egypt are being deprived of their independence and serve as a tool used by the state to justify its foreign policy, with minor exceptions. One important religious institution in Egypt is the thousand-year-old Al-Azhar University, which is not only the center of Islamic education in Egypt but one of the leading centers in the Islamic world. Al-Azhar oversees a nationwide network of educational institutions starting from kindergarten, elementary and secondary schools and running through doctoral programmes and fatwa-giving bodies.15 Al-Azhar shapes how Islam is taught in Egypt (Brown & Ghanem, 2017). Article 4 of the Egyptian Constitution calls Al-Azhar “an 14

List of demands on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, other Arab nations. The Associated Press. June 23, 2017. https://apnews.com/article/3a58461737c44ad58047562e48f46e06. Accessed: 4 Dec. 2020. 15 Authoritative legal opinion given by a mufti (legal scholar) in response to a question posed by an individual or a court of law. Oxford Islamic Studies. http://www.oxfordislamicstudies. com/article/opr/t125/e646. Accessed: 9 Sep. 2020.

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encompassing independent Islamic institution, with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs, responsible for preaching Islam, theology and the Arabic language in Egypt and the world”. There are about 20,000 foreign students, which makes it the instrument of Egyptian soft power. The state control of Al-Azhar started way back in the monarchy period. In 1872, the state gained control under education programs and in 1936 the king gained the right to appoint the head of the university. After the Free Officers takeover, politicization of Al-Azhar and its institutional dependency on the state continued. It was a time of fatwas claiming the compatibility of Islam and Arab socialism, or the legitimization of Egypt’s participation in the First Gulf War against Iraq, siding with the US. Just as alAzhar conciliated religion and socialism during Nasser’s rule, later official ulema gave legitimacy to new orientations of Saddat’s regime and his foreign policy, thus enjoying some liberalization. On May 10, 1979, Gad al-Haqq Grand Sheikh of AlAzhar issued a notorious fatwa justifying Camp David peace with Israel. In 1991, Muhammad Sayyid Tantawi issued a 57-page “religious decree” with the title of “Islamic Verdict on the Gulf Crisis.” This “religious decree” of Egypt actually offered a defense and explanation of its foreign policies (Skovgaard-Petersen, 1997, p. 315). The recent news about normalisation between Israel and UAE and permissible fatwa from UAE sheikh Abdullah Bin Bayyah raise the question of function of fatwas in relation to foreign policy (Al-Khatib, 2020): is it consultative opinion that politicians may use to make a decision or in the current circumstances is it a way to legitimize decisions made? Regardless, Al-Azhar became the citadel of “state” religion in contrast to various proliferated radical Islamic groups and movements. During the 2011 upheaval, Al-Azhar supported peaceful protests while calling for the end of violence and condemning it (Lashkhia, 2019). The time of the Arab Uprising provided Al-Azhar with an opportunity to gain more autonomy. In one of the last legislative acts by the military in 2012 before the new parliament was seated, it gain a degree of internal autonomy. Now being a potential political playing field, it is still largely dependent on state policies. Another important religious institution is Egyptian D¯ar al-Ift¯a’, which is the government’s principal Islamic legal institution for issuing fatwas. By the same manner, it also does not seem to be autonomous regarding political matters. Most recently, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi started to exert more control over the powers of D¯ar al-Ift¯a’, putting it at his services. For instance, he made it issue quite a large number of fatwas supporting or legitimizing Sisi’s external policies (Al-Anani, 2020), e.g. they covered anti-terrorist campaigns, Islamists and Turkey, the war in Libya, etc. When discussing the place of religion, we should also pay attention to secular institutions that influence foreign policy formation and how Islamic it can be.

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In the context of Egypt, its military has significant influence on the country’s foreign policy decision-making and has its own institutional interests that must be considered (Meringolo, 2015, p. 4). The Egyptian military is not only powerful in the political scene (Chaiko, 2013). Indeed, its involvement in economic activities has also intensified under the presidency of al-Sisi (Marshall, 2015; Khlebnikov, 2016; Sayigh 2019). Even the elected Mohammed Morsi’s government had to look back to the needs of the army given its historically major role in society’s life and the country’s independence. A decade ago, the military’s economic stake in the Egyptian economy was estimated at 30 percent (Abul-Magd, 2012). Although leaders’ religious beliefs can have certain power and influence, they are mostly limited by existing state structures and institutions, domestic issues and a country’s geopolitical interests. Egypt is a good example of such leadership, which is mostly affected by the institutional culture of the military and its main interests, namely to preserve the existing political system and their positions in it and not to allow any alternative political force to come to power. Current president of Egypt Abdel Fattah al-Sisi represents the military, which forms the core of the existing secular regime in the country. The military as an institution is deeply entrenched into the country’s political and economic system (Khlebnikov, 2016; Sayigh, 2019). In a way, today Sisi continues the traditions of Nasser and Mubarak, who positioned themselves as the only guarantors of stability and security in the country and region, preserving and enhancing the role and positions of the army in the country. Marketing himself as an embodiment of a secular institution—the military, which is mainly driven by its institutional interests, survival and strife for power—Sisi is building and developing positive relations with leaders both in the region and internationally, who accept and praise his and army’s role in keeping the country stable. Despite not being successful, the previous president Mohammad Morsi—who was a Muslim Brotherhood party functionary—did not built Egyptian policies including foreign policy based on ideological/religious grounds, as he was also limited by the existing institutions (in the form of the military and their interests) and the country’s national interests. As a result, Morsi could not independently conduct his policies ignoring existing limitations. When he attempted to strip the military of their power and status, he was soon deposed and the Brotherhood was banned. In general, after Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, the military hegemony continued and even increased. When Morsi came to power in 2012, it sought to limit the army’s power and foothold in the economy by strengthening his positions in executive and judiciary (Jaraba, 2014) and initiating reforms and encouraging free-market competition, which directly threatened the military’s long-term interests. That said, over the past decade agents in charge of foreign

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policy decision-making processes have been constantly experiencing the power of the existing limitations and regulations in the form of institutions (the army), institutional culture, and the country’s national interests.

3

Conclusion

Even though religion can be an integral and very important part of the whole society (its identity or government policy or a particular political movement), its ability to influence foreign policy depends on many factors. Warner and Walker (2011, p. 128) suggest that “religion is structure-oriented, a systemic cause that limits, selects, reproduces, or mediates the range of foreign policy decisions by agents. This type of cause may be either material or ideational, respectively such as power in the realist school, interests in the liberal school, rules in the institutionalist school, or ideas in the constructivist school of IR theory”. Applying this approach to the Egyptian case, we conclude that nowadays religious heritage plays a rather marginal role in formulating the country’s foreign policy. At the ideational level, the role of Islam in Egypt is more visible in domestic affairs than in foreign policy. After the Arab Uprising, the number of political parties that appeal to Islam increased and the Muslim Brotherhood actually ran the country but failed to hold on to power. Although Middle Eastern governments and non-state international actors confirm that religion matters in foreign policy, religious reasoning and sectarian16 narratives used in various conflicts have a predominantly pragmatic, economic or geo-political nature. Since some Islamic and Islamist ideas have the potential to counterpose themselves to nationalist understandings, authoritarian states tend to monopolize religion, leaving it as a part of national identity. This is the case in Egypt, where the government subjugated major religious institutions to its needs and introduced tight control over religious activity in the country. Indeed, this is why over recent decades its religious affinity with other Muslim states in the region has not been strongly reflected in its foreign policy. Meanwhile, reference to Islam is frequently used to justify foreign policy moves for the domestic audience through existing religious institutions. However, one reservation should be made: the Egyptian government demonstrates secular–religious ambiguity, exploiting its moderate policies, state-proclaimed secularism and support of “moderate” Islam to promote foreign contacts with others, primarily Western countries (the US and EU) and those that can provide substantial economic assistance and political support. 16

Belonging to different Islamic sects.

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Secular ideas are consistently followed by the Egyptian military elite. The army is a very important and powerful institution in the political and economic life of Egypt, which puts it in the position to seriously affect countries’ policies, including foreign. Therefore, its institutional interests and the moves that it makes have an important influence on the decision-making process. Current president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi represents this key state institution, and religion is definitely not a central determinant of foreign policy. Over recent decades, especially since 2013, Egypt has been inherently opposing political Islam for a good reason. The Egyptian political and economic elite (the military) considers it as a major challenger to their power grip because it promotes and uses tools of liberal democratic paradigm—fair elections, public control, political responsibility and accountability, etc.—as the main instruments to gain power. When the Muslim Brotherhood took over the parliament and presidential chair through elections in 2011/12, it gradually started to pose a threat to the military, which was at the core of the existing state system since Nasser. Eventually, when Islamists attempted to limit the powers and influence of the military, the latter demonstrated a harsh response, deposing the Brotherhood from power and outlawing it in 2013. Sisi’s government first targeted the leadership of MB and subsequently tried to isolate it by linking to extremism and terrorism. As a result, the Islamist issue was securitized and the Brotherhood was portrayed as an enemy to both national and regional stability, which has also been reflected in policies of Egypt’s allies such as Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Despite the fact that in 2011–2013 Egyptian political life experienced a U-turn from an Islamist government back to military authoritarianism, foreign policy did not largely change. The Muslim Brotherhood government followed quite a realist approach as it well understood that Egypt has national interests (economic, geopolitical, security, etc.) that cannot be swiftly changed or ignored; otherwise, the movement risked losing its support. This is why they could not afford to simply push an Islamist agenda and ignore the pre-existing environment. Although the Muslim Brotherhood is a movement with broad international connections, its national agenda tops its priority list. This is why the Islamic vector was rather symbolic or instrumental, while economic and political pragmatism drove the Brothers’ policies. That said, although Islam certainly plays an important role in Egypt’s social life and is a crucial element of the national identity, it is neither a driving force of the country’s foreign policy nor a substantial variable that seriously affects it. Religion largely cannot override the economic and political pragmatism that currently dominate foreign policy rationale and it plays a rather auxiliary and instrumental role that complements dominant driving forces. This research question of Islam’s

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influence on foreign policy should definitely receive more scholarly attention, whereby it is especially important to observe and examine it in the countries where Islamists are in power, such as Turkey17 and Iran.18

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Read more on Turkey in “The Role of Religion in the Evolution of Turkey’s Foreign Policy ” by Jörg Baudner. 18 Read more on Iran in “Between Religious Identity and Pragmatic Strategy: The Iranian Attitude towards the “Shia Crescent” Countries” by Polina Vasilenko.

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Between Religious Identity and Pragmatic Strategy: The Iranian Attitude towards the “Shia Crescent” Countries Polina Vasilenko This article attempts to highlight one of the factors of Iranian foreign policy after 1979, i.e. after the country acquired a “modern shape” and became a theocratic republic. Moving on from general issues of the Islamic influence on the development and adoption of foreign policy decisions—which is most vividly illustrated by the example of the formal renunciation of chemical and nuclear weapons during the Iran-Iraq war—the author decided to focus this study on the Shiite agenda and particularly the “Shia crescent” concept and its impact on building ties with other Muslim countries. Since the limited format of the research did not allow considering all facets of this fundamental issue, the main condition for the choice of micro topics was their relevance for the current state of Iranian foreign policy. This approach is reflected in the last part of the article, which is devoted to analyzing several cases and forecasting their further development.

1

The Origins of the Ambiguity of Iranian Doctrines

The unique state formation of modern Iran—which is based on both theocratic and republican principles—appeared in the hearth of the Islamic Revolution of 1979 led by representatives of the Shiite clergy. According to the Iranian Constitution, adopted by referendum, Islamic law became an integral part of the government and the Leader of the Revolution Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (“Supreme Leader”) was appointed responsible for the delineation and supervision of the policies of the new state. The new state ideology—“Khomeinism”—became a kind of P. Vasilenko (B) Moscow, Russia E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_11

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modern eclectic political religion that flexibly responds to global and local changes (Abrahamian, 1993, p. 17). In contrast to the traditional pluralism of the Shiite sect of Islam, Khomeini developed a concept of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of Islamic jurist”), where the head of state is a deputy of the legitimate descendant of the Prophet (“Hidden Imam”). This worth man of knowledge will be elected by the ummah (“community”) to interpret the principles of Sharia and implement them in practical everyday matters. The constitution was based on the thesis that Ayatollah Khomeini wrote in his book, or rather in a collection of lectures given to students during exile in Iraq in the holy city of Najaf in 1970, entitled Hokumat-e Eslami (“Islamic Government”). However, it is important to emphasize that beyond the rationale for the rule of the faqih or fuqaha (pl.), there were no detailed descriptions of specific constitutional clauses, a structure explaining how the various elements of government would relate to each other, or a mechanism for expressing popular will. As British historian Michael Axworthy rightly pointed out, Khomeini probably deliberately left a “conceptual gap”, as it opened up room for flexible interpretation in the event of unforeseen changes. Alternatively—and most likely—as a theologian, Khomeini simply did not delve into the constitutional subtleties because he was absolutely sure that the law of Islam is comprehensive and covers all possible options, so there is no need to go into details (Axworthy, 2013, p. 139 f.). Without going deep into the details of the historical development of Khomeini’s concept or its particular points, we should first note two important theses that hold direct relevance to the topic of this study. First of all, Islamic law became the basis of the Constitution, but the Supreme Leader could act (and still does) as its main interpreter. In addition, it is important to note that Khomeini avoided detailed formulations in both the concept of the Islamic State and many subsequent doctrines, probably leaving room for a flexible response to new challenges. The first thesis explains the role that the Supreme Leader played in the decision-making process, including foreign policy. As for the second one, it seems that the inherent flexibility of the interpretation of Islamic law explains how Iranian politicians subsequently manage to combine religious dogmas with a pragmatic approach.

2

The Case of Ayatollahs’ Fatwas against the Development of Chemical and Nuclear Weapons

One of the earliest and most striking examples of a new foreign policy challenge after the Iranian revolution in 1979—which was answered within the framework of Islamic law, and at the same time created a remarkable precedent for double interpretation—was Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa prohibiting the creation and use

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of chemical weapons. It should be noted that although not directly related to Iran’s interaction with the “Shia’ crescent” countries, the appeal to this example in the framework of this study is nevertheless a role model that reflects the duality of the Iranian foreign policy, namely the ability to combine a religious form and a pragmatic approach. At the same time, this model also makes it possible to assess the role of the religious factor and project it on other cases. During the Iranian-Iraqi war (1980–1988), Iraq—trying to neutralize the numerical superiority of the enemy—began to use chemical weapons in 1982, including against civilians (Zanders, 2001). This forced the leadership of the newly-formed Islamic Republic to urgently raise the question of a response strategy. Iran did not have such technologies as well as means to protect against poisonous gases, so there were two options on the agenda: to either create a chemical weapons program at an accelerated pace, or draw the attention of the world community to the destructive actions of Iraq. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khomeini made it clear to his advisers that the creation of such weapons was contrary to Islamic norms, since they are a means of destruction and oppression (Karimi & Limba, 2008). In such cases where the question relates to the rules of waging a just war from the Islamic perspective, theologians refer to the famous Qur’anic principle: “Fight in the way of Allah against those who fight against you, but begin not hostilities. Lo! Allah loveth not aggressors” (2: 190). Khomeini’s decision was perceived as a fatwa—a religious ruling that was mandatory for implementation—since it came from the spiritual leader of the entire nation (for comparison: fatwas of qualified Muslim scholars are only mandatory for those who are their followers). The problem was that there was no formal text for the fatwa, which caused some to question its existence. Interestingly, in 2014, Mohsen Rafighdoost—who served as minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)1 throughout the eight-year war—confirmed in an interview with a journalist for Foreign Policy that he personally urged 1

Iran has a complex political architecture made up of changing and competing factions, led by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is arguably the most important decision-making body, which includes the president, parliament speaker, judiciary chief, military commanders, and key ministers, etc. SNSC makes important security decisions that primarily relate to national sovereignty. The Supreme Leader directly or indirectly appoints most SNSC members, and in practice he has veto power over its decisions. There is also a special unit of the Iranian armed forces, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is directly subordinate to the Supreme Leader. While the Iranian army defends Iranian borders and maintains internal order, the IRGC is designed to protect the Islamic Republic’s political system, as well as preventing foreign interference. The IRGC and the executive branch have the greatest influence on specific national security issues; however, the IRGC dominates regional portfolio decision-making, while the executive branch has more influence over the country’s approach to international powers.

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Ayatollah Khomeini to approve the creation of both chemical and nuclear weapons. However, the Ayatollah flatly refused, asking rhetorically: “If we produce chemical weapons, what is the difference between me and Saddam?” (Porter, 2014) A recent study shows that under pressure from officials and the military (which was also confirmed by Rafigdoost), Khomeini subsequently changed his mind, as the program was initiated and Iranian soldiers captured stocks of Iraqi chemicals and probably even used them to a limited extent (Eisenstadt, 2014; Simonen, 2017). However, in 2004, the Iranians provided a document confirming that the production of two chemicals had ceased, the building in which it was stored was sealed in 1988, the equipment was dismantled, and the weapons were never used (Porter, 2014). This case is important not only as an example of the deterrent, albeit limited influence of religion on foreign policy doctrine, but also as a precedent in the subsequent debate over Iran’s nuclear program. In the mid-1990s, Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor—former President Ali Khamenei—also issued a fatwa against the acquisition, development and use of nuclear weapons. It is believed that the fatwa was originally delivered orally by the Ayatollah, and then in August 2005 the fatwa was quoted in an official statement by the Iranian government at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna to reaffirm Iran’s commitment to the non-proliferation regime (Statement by the Islamic Republic of Iran, 2005, p. 121). Both the Ayatollah himself and President Obama (2013)—who sought to conclude a nuclear agreement with Iran—appealed this fatwa.2 However, critics question the consistency of the fatwa, and in this case its oral form is a powerful argument, since it can be easily changed in accordance with the current need (Eisenstadt & Khalaji, 2011). The search for hidden political motives is usually traced back to one of the guiding principles of Shiism, taqiyya (“prudence, fear”), according to which a believer can prudently hide his faith at a critical moment. An important point in the criticism was the fact that despite a fatwa against chemical weapons, Iran still launched a chemical program, although it allegedly did not use it. Similarly, Iranian officials simultaneously threaten the West with abandoning commitments made under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and begin the process of enriching uranium beyond the established measure (Smith, 2020), while at the same time regularly stressing that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to Islamic law (Tehran Times, 2020). 2

According to official Iranian statement made in Vienna in 2005, “The Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei has issued the Fatwa that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the Islamic Republic of Iran shall never acquire these weapons”.

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Based on this example, we can draw several intermediate conclusions. First, the appeal to Islamic law in the process of finding a foreign policy solution can be seen as part of a rhetoric based on pragmatic aspirations. Second, critics of Iranian politics tend to look for hidden meanings and implications in decisions based on Islamic norms, since the form of a foreign policy decision is abstract (in this case, we considered an example of an oral fatwa) and changeable. Third, Iranians demonstrate an ability to develop a flexible approach, which is perceived by supporters as an opportunity to find a compromise (the example of Barack Obama and Secretary of State John Kerry), while opponents see it as evidence of the Iranian side’s hypocrisy and a reason for expressing distrust towards them.

3

From “Shia crescent” to “Shiite full moon”

3.1

The Limited Scope of the Iran’s Islamic Revolution Export Doctrine

Since the proclamation of the Islamic Republic, Iran’s approach to establishing regional ties has undergone several stages from ideological and pan-Islamist, addressed to the entire Muslim community, to more pragmatic and based on Shiite identity. Khomeini intended to export the Islamic Revolution around the world, since in his view Islam should not only protect Muslims but also all of the oppressed who were interfered with by the West, as Iran saw itself (Khomeini, 1980, p. 22). It is noteworthy that Khomeini’s appeal went beyond the Islamic community. Thus, many secular states—passionate at that time in the construction of “Arab socialism” (Syria, Algeria, Libya, and South Yemen)—were among the fraternal ones due to shared anti-imperialism and anti-Zionism ground, but in the future it was assumed that they would also take the path of building an Islamic state. Thus, the Iranian Islamists had two goals. In the long term, they wanted to convert the whole world into Islam and create a single ummah of all humankind. However, in the short term, the main goal was to achieve the re-Islamization of regions with a historical Muslim population. Khomeini’s pan-Islamist hopes faced resistance from Arab states, which feared the overthrow of their governments following the example of Shah’s Iran and the spread of radicalism in their territories. Taking advantage of a long-standing dispute over the border areas along the Shatt-El-Arab River, which separates Iran and Iraq, Saddam Hussein invaded the Islamic Republic on September 22, 1980, seeking to overthrow the Khomeini regime and prevent the establishment of Shiite rule in Iraq along the Khomeinist model (Razoux, 2015, p. 45). Iraq became the hope of both

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the West (along with the USSR, which was the main supplier of weapons to Iraq), and the Arab countries, which viewed Iran as a threat (Rubin, 1989, p. 122). Thus, according to a study commissioned by the US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and carried out by the RAND think tank in 1991, “many Arab states agreed to finance Iraq’s war efforts through the sale of a portion of their oil production” (Schmidt, 1991). Besides, Jordan supplied Baghdad with equipment, including US artillery, and Saudi Arabia and Kuwait transferred tanks and artillery from their arsenals. The US did not directly transfer weapons to Iraq, but it provided Baghdad with commodity credits and financial assistance totaling US $2.5 billion. Among the European suppliers to Iraq were also France, Austria, Italy, etc. (Schmidt, 1991). Even though Khomeini appealed to the oppressed masses—declaring in 1980: “We are not fighting against Iraq. The people of Iraq support our Islamic Revolution; our quarrel is with America, and it is America whose hand can be seen emerging from the sleeves of the Iraqi government” (Khomeini, 1981, pp. 302–306)—neither side won the war. At the same time, Iran’s resources were severely depleted by almost eight years of military burden, which in turn influenced the revision of the revolution export doctrine by means of military force. In addition, one of the main opponents of the spread of Iranian influence in the Arab world was Saudi Arabia. After the revolution, Khomeini claimed that “the Hajj3 and the Holy places should be placed under international oversight as opposed to being managed by the Saudis alone”, which in the eyes of the Saudis undermined their status as the keeper of the most important Muslim shrines and primacy in the Muslim world. Therefore, the Hajj became a focal point of SaudiIranian tension since 1981 (Matthiesen, 2014, p. 128). The culmination of this confrontation was the incident in Mecca on July 31, 1987, when clashes between Shia pilgrim demonstrators and the Saudi Arabian security forces led to the deaths of over 400 people (Kifner, 1987). Faced with the devastating war between Iran and Iraq, in which Saudi Arabia sided with the latter, both Iran and Saudi Arabia subsequently made some efforts to maintain peace and order, although Khomeini’s radical followers continued to criticize the Saudi government (Hiro, 2018, p. 101). In a sense, here the Arab states drew a symbolic line that marked the limit of the Iranian revolution spread in the region among the predominantly Sunni states. Subsequently, the confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran has grown from being primarily ideological to geopolitical. Although the struggle for supremacy in the Muslim world remained at the heart of the conflict, the main factor of tension was the struggle for spheres of influence, and Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen became the battlefield. One of the striking symbols of this clash of interests was 3

Hajj is an annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca (Saudi Arabia), the holiest city for all Muslims.

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the rapprochement of Arab states—including Saudi Arabia—with their eternal enemy, Israel. Experts speculate whether Saudi Arabia can follow the example of Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates and conclude an agreement on the normalization of relations with Israel, de jure recognizing its existence and putting an end to the seventy-year conflict (Farouk, 2020). The answer depends on many factors, including the level of current tension with Iran, the strength of US pressure and the ability to convey to the domestic public the reasons for such a rapprochement and its potential benefits. However, against the background of a gradual change in the generational paradigm and the departure from the political scene of leaders who witnessed the Arab–Israeli wars, as well as Iran’s more active policy in the region, such an outcome cannot be ruled out. Despite the fact that the ideas that fueled the Islamic Revolution caused fears in the Muslim world rather than the desire to follow Iran’s example, several countries fell under its influence. Supporting the Palestinians in their war with Israel in Lebanon was part of an ambitious plan to create an Islamic Republic “in Miniature” with the support of the country’s Shiite population. Thus, with the guidance from Iran in the early-1980s, the Hezbollah movement arose in southern Lebanon to fight the military presence of Israel. It is unsurprising that one of the declaratory aims of Hezbollah was to establish an Islamic state in Lebanon governed by Sharia law (Ranstorp, 1997, p. 47). However, due to the complex balance between the many parties divided along confessional lines, as well as the interest of international actors in maintaining this balance (the US and France supported the Christian-dominated Lebanese government), this goal proved unrealizable. At the same time, it is important to note that the political wing of the movement has taken one of the leading positions in the domestic political arena in Lebanon. Hezbollah’s influence was particularly noticeable in 2018, when Hezbollah increased its representation in the Lebanese parliament in the first parliamentary elections since 2009. Together with allies, the party won at least 70 of the 128 seats in parliament (Hubbard & Saad, 2018). Thus, the decision-making process was impossible without taking into account the opinion of the Shiite party and its main ally in the region, Iran. On the contrary, the export of the Iranian revolution to Sunni Sudan—which became the world’s second Islamic state in 1989—was more successful. Together with the famous Islamist politician Sheikh Hassan al-Turabi, the leader of the National Islamic Front, President Omar al-Bashir launched the process of topdown Islamization of Sudan, transforming state institutions along ideological lines and imposing Sharia (Viorst, 1995). Influenced by the Iranian revolution, Sudan’s transformation into an Islamic Republic paved the way for closer ties with Iran

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(Cafiero, 2019). In 1991, the Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani paid an official visit to Sudan and proclaimed: “The Islamic revolution of Sudan, alongside Iran’s pioneer revolution, can doubtless be the source of movement and revolution throughout the Islamic world” (Schanzer, 2010). Iranians pledged $17 million in financial aid, arranged for weapons deliveries to the country and sent about 2,000 soldiers from the IRGC there to train the country’s military force (Schanzer, 2010). The Sudanese example is remarkable since the Iranian-Sudanese relations at the time of their establishment were not weakened by sectarian contradictions (unlike, for example, the Iranian-Saudi relations). According to experts, the partnership with Iran provided Khartoum with an opportunity to break out of its international status of a pariah. On the other hand, the two countries had common anti-American sentiments, which acted as a unifying factor (Verhoeven, 2014). Nevertheless, realizing the restrictions imposed by the pan-Islamist concept, Iran began to work closer with its neighbors, building relationships with local Shiite communities. Through this strategy, Iran sought to overcome the isolation imposed by the West after the revolution and the consequences of economic pressure,4 and restore its status as a significant regional player. Thus, Iran’s foreign policy aspirations acquired not only an ideological but also an obvious geopolitical dimension.

3.2

Strengthening Ties with Shia Communities Instead of Pan-Islamism

After the overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq in 2003, as well as due to the strengthening of Shiite radical organizations and the general rise in the civil consciousness of Shia Muslims in the Middle East, the “Shiite vector” began to be more clearly manifested in Iran’s foreign policy. One of the brightest theses of the revolution was the support of oppressed communities. As the largest Shiite country in the world, Iran took on the role of the protector of the Shiites and began to support 4

The first round of sanctions against Iran were imposed shortly after the victory of the Islamic Revolution and the seizure of the American embassy in Tehran in 1979. Then, by decree of the US President, the purchase of Iranian oil was stopped, Iranian deposits in American banks and their foreign branches were frozen, and the sale of spare parts for military equipment to Iran was prohibited. Since 2006, the UN has joined the tactics of economic pressure in the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1737 (and other subsequent resolutions) for Iran’s refusal to stop uranium enrichment, which were canceled in 2015 after the signing of the JCPOA. In 2018, President Donald Trump announced the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and the restoration of individual sanctions against Iran, as part of a “maximum pressure” campaign (Pompeo, 2018).

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groups of its fellow believers in the Gulf region, thus realizing its strategic interests and—above all—the security and survival of the state. However, a short-term goal hidden behind the traditional religious grounded rhetoric was to establish a strong presence in Iraq by fostering ties with both the Shia-led Iraqi government and the Iraqi Shia militia groups on the ground. Led by Sunni governments, the Gulf States feared the rise of oppressed and discriminated Shiite communities and the undermining of the state’s resilience from within, so they viewed Iran’s new strategy with distrust and hostility. Some of those suspicions were based on the previous events: in 1981, the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain attempted to overthrow the ruling regime in the country; in 1983, Shiite radical organizations carried out terrorist attacks on the barracks with foreign servicemen in Beirut, as well as on six embassies in Kuwait, etc. Furthermore, Iran provided support to radical Shiite groups in Iraq, which later became one of the main reasons for the Iran-Iraq war mentioned earlier (Byman, 2008, pp. 170–173). “If it was a Shia-led Iraq that had a special relationship with Iran, and you look at the relationship [among] Syria, Hezbollah [and] Lebanon, then we have this new crescent that appears that would be very destabilizing for the Gulf countries and actually for the whole region” (NBC News, 2004).

These words belong to the King of Jordan Abdullah, who during an interview with an American TV channel in 2004 coined a new anti-Iranian concept at a time when Iran was reportedly interfering in Iraq in the run-up to the January 2005 parliamentary elections. Subsequently, many leaders of the Arab world took up this idea, noting the “Shia axis” (Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon) as a threat to the balance of power between Sunnis and Shiites in the region, and in fact for the Sunni governments themselves, to please Iran’s interests. King Abdullah accused the Iranians of paying wages and providing welfare to unemployed Iraqis, while Iraqi President Ghazi Yawar stressed in an interview with the Washington Post that Iran regularly interferes in Iraqi business (Wright & Baker, 2004). Later, former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Saudi Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and others joined their assessments. For example, Mubarak stated that “most of the Shias are loyal to Iran, and not to the countries they are living in” (Al Jazeera, 2006). Thus, officials of the Sunni-led states preferred to assess any Iranian actions aimed at maintaining ties with Shiite communities as destructive, instead of providing sufficient support to Iraq and the Shiites in their own countries. For a balanced assessment, it is worth noting that any intentions of Iran towards local oppressed (primarily Shiite) communities in other countries were

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regarded as potentially subversive because—resorting to forceful methods—the Iranian government-sponsored proxy forces such as Hezbollah, Houthis in Yemen, Hashd al-Shaabi militias or Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, etc. served the interests of Iran. Constantly attacked by opponents in both the West and the Middle East, Iranian politicians have consistently turned to the language of diplomacy to maintain the image of an unjustly oppressed country that has been forced to bear the burden of economic pressure for more than 40 years. For the same purpose, the Iranians tried to turn the hostile concept of the “Shia crescent” in their favor, replacing it with a positive agenda. “We must remove Islam’s negative image from today’s cyber and real space”, President Hassan Rouhani told the 29th International Islamic Unity Conference in Tehran in 2015 and then continued: “There is neither a Shiite nor a Sunni crescent. We have an Islamic moon. We, Muslims, are in a world where we must be united” (Euronews, 2015). It is noteworthy that the announcement came amid a breakthrough in the nuclear deal (October 18, 2015 was an adoption day of JCPOA), but between two events that reflected rising tensions in the region itself. That year was marked by the Saudi Arabian military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen (a party to the conflict supported by Iran) and tragic death of Iranian pilgrims on September 24, caused by the stampede in Mina (neighborhood located in the Masha’er district of Mecca) during the Hajj. The Iranian government and religious leaders—which lost at least 464 citizens in the so-called “Mina disaster”—have been harshly critical of Saudi Arabia. Saudi leaders have in turn have claimed that Iran is attempting to take advantage of a tragedy for political purposes, linking the conflict to the war in Yemen (Deutsche Welle, 2015). Indeed, taking into account the fact that a couple of days after President Rouhani’s speech, the Saudi authorities executed the famous Shiite preacher Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr followed by the storming of the Saudi mission in Tehran and the breakdown of diplomatic relations (Hubbard, 2016), such a proposal from Iran looked more like a tribute to rhetoric than a constructive proposal.

3.3

“Shia crescent” as “hard power”

By mid-2017, Shiite and Sunni understandings of the “Shia crescent” concept converged on one point. In a video widely disseminated in the Arab media, the leader of one of the proxy forces of Iran expressed such an interpretation that proved to be the closest to what the king of Jordan spoke about in 2004. Qais al-Khazali—the leader of Iraqi Shiite militia Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH)—has said that his organization aims to establish a “Shiite full moon” not a “Shiite crescent”.

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He noted that the Shiite force would include the IRGC in Iran, the Lebanese Hezbollah, the Houthi movement in Yemen, the PMF and other Shiite militant groups operating in Syria and Iraq (Majidyar, 2017). Thus, the updated concept incorporates not only the military dimension but also ambitious plans to build a wider network of Shiite military formations throughout the region. The military aspect of Iran’s cooperation with regional Shiite groups and armed formations constantly attracts a flurry of criticism. Iran uses its proxy forces to weaken global (primarily the United States) and regional opponents (Israel, Saudi Arabia), but also to combat the terrorist threat (the war against IS in Iraq and Syria). However, the latter aspect is often neglected when US leaders start talking about Iran as the main sponsor of terrorism in the region (Trump, 2020). This has become especially frequent on the agenda during the presidency of Donald Trump, who has set himself the goal of severing Iran’s ties with regional groupings, exhausting it with economic pressure and ultimately changing the current regime there. When it comes to religion that operates in the field of ‘hard power’, Iran often faces misunderstanding and denial of its foreign policy interests, since for some this activity is associated with violence and terrorist methods of achieving goals, while for others the theocratic form of government itself causes distrust and a desire to undermine the regime of the “mad mullahs” (Leverett & Leverett, 2012). Religious identity in this case acts as a channel for establishing connections and forming a network of co-religionists with common goals and a formal way to separate ‘us’ from ‘strangers’. In this case, religion plays a pragmatic role for Iran, but in the West—which perceives Iran’s religious rhetoric not as part of tradition, but rather as a feature of fundamentalism—it leads to misunderstanding, rejection and hostility.

4

A Few Notes about the Perspective Instead of a Conclusion

In order to expand the provisions given in the text and outline the further prospect of building Iran’s ties with the countries of the “Shiite crescent” (with countries where the Shiite community is strongly oriented towards Iran), several specific political examples that are most relevant in the current Iranian foreign policy agenda will be given below. • In connection with the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in May 2018 and the restoration of sanctions pressure, Iran’s ability to finance Shiite proxy groups

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in the region was limited. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo estimates that Iran spent about $700 million annually on Hezbollah alone (Reuters, 2019). If we compare this information with the words of President Rouhani—who at the end of 2019 said that the sanctions cost the Iranian budget about $200 billion (Gulf News, 2019)—then it would be logical to assume that this was the reason for the reduced (or targeted) activity of the pro-Iranian forces in the region. US sanctions also caused a relative weakening of Hezbollah in Lebanon and forced the party secretary general to seek help from followers and initiate a “crowdfunding” campaign (Szakola, 2019). For American politicians, this became an argument in favor of the fact that the campaign of maximum pressure on Iran was effective and began to bear fruit. Internal instability in Lebanon due to the economic and political crisis also fuels hostility against Hezbollah. Although the party still appears to be the most stable force in Lebanon, protesters and outside forces are increasingly raising questions about disarming Hezbollah as a mandatory part of future reforms (Zahr, 2020). With the change of power in Iraq and the election of a new prime minister, Mustafa al-Kadhimi, who promised the people to deal with local Shiite groups, there was talk that Iran would soon lose its influence. Even though there are groups in Iraq, like Lebanon, who are calling for an end to Iranian influence in their country—which led to the burning of the Iranian consulate in the city of Najaf in November 2019 (Rubin & Hassan, 2019)—ties between the two countries remain strong. The soil for unity is primarily Shiite Islam and the preservation of Shiite shrines on the lands of both countries, as popular places for pilgrimages. In addition, from an economic perspective, Iraq strongly depends on energy imports from Iran including electricity and natural gas (The Arab Weekly, 2020). Thus, this thesis seems dubious in light of the fact that the new prime minister made his first foreign trip to Iran and stressed the importance of strengthening bilateral relations. However, Iran will have to deal with a new approach to diversifying policy, since al-Kadhimi has so far managed to successfully establish contact with all of the warring parties: the United States, Iran and Saudi Arabia. An interesting situation is developing around the establishment of diplomatic relations between Israel and the UAE and Bahrain. As one of the most consistent and implacable enemies of the “Zionist state”, Iran immediately condemned the betrayal of the brotherly Palestinian people by the two Arab states, and engaged its supporters in the region. Lebanese Hezbollah also condemned Arab–Israeli reconciliation. However, the ties of the Shiite community

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with Iran were most evident in Bahrain: Bahraini opposition groups have rejected a decision by the Gulf state to normalize relations with Israel with a leading Shia Muslim leader Ayatollah Sheikh Isa Qassim calling on the people of the region to resist (Al Jazeera, 2020). • A possible weakening or transformation of interaction between Iran and Shiite supporters may occur against the backdrop of the coronavirus pandemic, which not only threatened human lives but also challenged closed borders, educational institutions (traditional conductors of “soft power”) and places of pilgrimage. This is especially important for Iran, since there are several Shiite shrines on its territory. Moreover, part of Iran’s soft power is medical tourism, which has become impossible due to the restrictions imposed. On the one hand, the pandemic demonstrated that US efforts to isolate Iran in the region have failed (Singh, 2020). Despite political divisions, the authorities of the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar have provided assistance to Iran affected by the coronavirus. In addition, the common agenda allowed for constructive negotiations with regional neighbors, which could allow Iran to strengthen ties and reduce tensions. Moreover, in this sense, the UAE’s humanitarian aid has become a convenient pretext for de-escalation. As the UAE’s Minister of State for International Cooperation noted: “Providing life-saving assistance to those expressing distress is essential to the common good. The leadership and people stand shoulder to shoulder with nations in their time of need” (Fakhro, 2020). Thus, these words implied political intent to use the COVID-19 crisis to help ease regional tensions. Given the geopolitical ambitions of Iran—which have been discussed in detail in this study—the opportunities presented in the last part can help Iran to strengthen its position in the region and continue to pursue a policy of strengthening ties with the Shiite crescent countries. However, aggressive sentiments towards Iran both in the region (primarily Saudi Arabia) and beyond its borders (primarily the United States) remains one of the main obstacles on this path. The ability to build a pragmatic policy—one of the important elements of which is an appeal to the Muslim and moreover the Shiite community—turns out to be a conductor of Iranian foreign policy interests and a guarantee of maintaining its influence even in times of high tension in the Middle East region.

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Evolution of the Sunni Political Islam in Syria Dmitriy Frolovskiy and Kirill Semenov

Sunni political Islam in Syria has complicated legacies. Its development correlates with the Syrian state’s evolution and changes in the ruling regimes’ policies following the Ottoman state’s collapse and modern days. Although initially perceived as the group whose ideology might help to assert independence from the Ottoman Empire and later the Western colonial powers, political Islam was later treated as a threat by the authoritarian regime of Hafez al-Assad and as an obstacle to the state-driven secularism. Particular aspects of the Islamist ideology that appealed to the concepts of social justice and plurality also proved to threaten the ruling Ba’ath Party and its ideology. This pushed fractions of the Islamists to embrace more reactionary and radical postures, while the regime was eager to utilize the repressive apparatus to eliminate opposition. Despite Bashar al-Assad’s more moderate treatment of the Islamists compared with his father, as well as attempts to integrate them into the political spectrum, he was never keen on letting them operate separately from the state. Thus, their impacts on the policies were limited, leaving little space for moderation or actual integration into the political system. The authoritarian regime wanted to bring Islamists into the political fold and use them as imminent agents, including enlisting the most radical elements to its service when operating against Iraq’s allied forces. The policies worked for some time but ultimately failed as the widespread protests erupted in 2011. The Islamist groups joined the rebels, while growing support from foreign powers D. Frolovskiy (B) Toronto, Canada E-Mail: [email protected] K. Semenov Moscow, Russia E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_12

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such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar facilitated distinct cohorts of moderate and radical groups vehemently opposing Damascus’s regime. Bashar al-Assad’s attitudes towards Sunni Islamists also changed: he no longer sought using them as state actors but instead popularly portrayed them as radicals who hijacked the uprising brought havoc and destruction to the country.

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Historical Origins of Political Islam in Syria

The origins of political Islam in Syria can be traced to the events that happened before the Ottoman Empire’s collapse. In general, the Syria version of political Islam could be categorized as the very close reflection of the term given by the political scientist Guilain Denoeux (2002), who wrote about Islamism as “a form of instrumentalization of Islam by individuals and organizations that pursue political objectives. It provides political responses to today’s societal challenges by imagining a future, the foundations for which rest on reappropriated, reinvented concepts borrowed from the Islamic traditions” (p. 384). Thus, Syria Muslim religious scholars (ulama) advocated a return to scripture based on social and political order were pivotal and at conflict with the reformers (Commins, 1990, p. 22). The intellectual atmosphere of the Arab Renaissance (al-Nahda) gave further rise to such ideologues of Islamism in Syria as Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi and Muhammad Rashid Rida. They focused on the problem of Arab independence but also rejected the Pan-Islamist views. The most advanced early Islamist concept—an alternative to the existing Ottoman regime in the Middle East—was formulated by al-Kawakibi (Imarah, 1970). In his work “Umm al-Kura” (“The Mother of Towns”, i.e. Mecca) published in 1900, he criticized Ottoman despotism. He exposed the Sultan’s unfair policies towards the Arab provinces (vilayets) (Sheehi, 2017). He also revealed the reasons for the socio-political decline of the Muslim world. He argued that Islam recognized by the Ottoman regime had ceased to be a life-giving force and instead served as a tool at the hands of despotism. Simultaneously, al-Kawakibi singled out the Arabs and argued that the Muslim East’s unification and the Caliphate’s renewal are their mission since Islam originated in their midst. The desire to protect, revive and improve the Caliphate institution that arose and increased in the Middle Eastern intellectual environment after Muhammad Rashid Rida further reflected the First World War in his magazine Al-Manar (Wood, 2008). He reflected on the Caliphate’s future, refuted its Ottoman interpretation and—like al-Kawakibi— emphasized the advantages of the Arabs over the Turks in the matter of its revival (Kirillina et al., 2018). His views could ultimately highlight the moderate nature

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of the Islamists, which appealed to intellectual awakening and highlighted the pivotal role of Islam for promoting political moderation and rejecting most forms of radicalism and despotism. The collapse of the Ottoman state and the events of the 1920s could help to explain the current state of affairs in Syria, namely the relationship between the authorities and the Islamists. During the First World War, the Arabs joined the Entente. They started cooperating with the Western powers in their struggle against the Ottoman Empire, believing the promises that they would gain independence. On March 8, 1920, the Syrian Congress proclaimed independence in the territory of Greater Syria (modern-day Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and Israel) and declared an independent Arab Kingdom of Syria. Faisal—the son of the Sheriff of Mecca—the leader of the Arab uprising against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, was recognized as a king. Simultaneously, the Congress itself intended to deliver Arab views to the American King-Crane Commission of inquiry. Syrian Islamists who were not yet registered in any party and other representatives of society—whether traditionalists or secular nationalists—took part in the Congress, and together they began working on the Syrian constitution. Despite the widespread appeal to Islam, separation of religion and state was a significant provision, a stark contrast from the Ottoman rule. The proposed secularism guaranteed that Muslims and representatives of other confessions were equal, although it was assumed that the king should be Muslim. The final document appeared eight years before Kemal Atatürk put the Turkish Republic on the rails of secularism. The head of the Islamists of Syria and the Congress’s cochairman, Rashid Rida, then explained that equality is one of Islam’s key pillars. Therefore, making Islam the only state religion in the territory where representatives of other confessions live would be a violation (Thompson, 2020, p. 18). However, Western countries were not going to keep their promises. During the conference in San Remo (where the Arabs were not allowed in), they labeled the Syrian Congress’s decision as “extremist”. As a result, the territory of Greater Syria was divided between France (Syria, Lebanon) and Great Britain (Jordan, Palestine, Israel). Iraq was transferred to Great Britain because Iraqi oil would be divided between Britain and France (Thompson, 2020, p. 76). This marked the beginning of the new era of colonialism in the Middle East, which defines local political institutions and contributes to authoritarian rulers’ prevalence. The Western powers allowed Faisal to rule Iraq. The decision created a rift in the Congress that only deepened over time. Rashid Rida realized that Europeans would never allow Arabs to live independently (Haddad, 1997, p. 254). As a result, he broke with his liberal allies and returned to Cairo, where he reanimated the idea that justice can only be found

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within Islam. Thus, in his programmatic treatise titled “Supreme Imamate”, which was published in 1922, he announced the need to restore the “true” concept, including the abandonment of secularism and reliance on Islam as one aspect of the Arab unity. When the Caliphate’s abolition seemed inevitable in the post-war political situation, Rashid Rida proposed a non-standard solution that the Caliphate should be restored gradually, starting with recognizing the caliph’s spiritual power (Kirillina et al., 2018). This idea reflected his decision to support the nascent Arab nationalist movements that grew in response to Western colonialism (Willis, 2010, p. 712). One of his significant disciples in Egypt was Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. In Syria—now under French rule—secular liberal elites organized themselves into the National Bloc, which formed a government in 1936. It was opposed by the opposition in the face of the Islamists and Hassan al-Banna followers, who eventually emerged as the Islamist movement leader across the region. The Muslim Brotherhood is the force that popularly defines the emergence of political Islam. The cells across Syria were branches of the Egyptian Brotherhood. Their creation belonged to Al-Azhar University graduates who returned to Syria and founded many clubs and societies promoting the Brotherhood’s views. The French authorities insisted on discussing the problem of Islamic education in schools with a single national organization. Around this time, a young Syrian, Mustafa al-Siba’i—who was strongly influenced by the speeches of Hasan al-Banna—returned from Cairo. Leading the organization called the Youth of Muhammad, Sibai established contacts with the Egyptian branch and created a real political force, which enabled him to be elected to the Syrian parliament in 1949. In 1946, al-Banna himself came to Syria. He met with the leaders of local organizations, which was the impetus for creating the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria with Muhammad al-Mubarak al-Tayyib (Teitelbaum, 2011, p. 215). In parallel, the Arab Institute of Islam and a printing house were established. The Islamist newspaper Al-Manar began to appear, and Mustafa al-Sibai ultimately became the Syrian Islamist leader. Thus, during the first stage of political Islam formation in Syria, the followers united in various organizations, and primarily acted as a political force, devoid of any extremist coloring. Only further actions by the Syrian authorities—which tried to establish a rigid secular legal framework—led to a radicalization of the Syrian Islamists. Before forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, the Muslim Brotherhood continued to legally operate on Syria’s political scene. During the 1947 elections, three representatives of the Brotherhood were elected to parliament. In 1954, their number reached five. After the unification of Syria with Egypt, the organization was banned, which led to a significant limitation of their influence.

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However, after the withdrawal of Syria from the UAR, the Islamists came out of the underground, and their activities were restored. Among their followers were very influential politicians such as Maarouf al-Dawalibi, former Prime Minister of Syria (Manukyan, 2004, p. 111).

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Political Islam and the Ba’ath Party

The coming to power of the Ba’ath party in 1963 changed the calculus. The policy towards the Muslim Brotherhood became more stringent, and the pressure increased. During the first three decades of the rule, Syrian state institutions worked to forcefully secularize Syrian society and establish state control over religion and multiple civil society aspects. During this time, Islamism was perceived as a threat to the Ba’ath party’s rule as it offered an alternative ideological direction, facilitated decentralization of power and empowered nationalist sentiments. As a result, all the official Islamic organizations at that time were, and any sermons outside the mosques were banned. Only trusted religious scholars loyal to the regime were allowed to preach. Nevertheless, the Islamists continued their struggle by creating a chain of underground groups, such as the Islamic Freedom Movement. In 1976, after Hafez al-Assad supported Maronite Christians in a conflict against Muslim organizations and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Lebanon, the Syrian Muslim brothers stepped up their activities, including armed attacks on the regime’s officials (Blanga, 2017). In response, on July 7, 1980, the Syrian parliament passed Decree No. 49, which established the death penalty for belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood. Government policies also became tougher and embraced more repressive and brutal tactics against Islamists, which contributed to their radicalization. Journalists and politicians disliked by the regime were eliminated. At some point, the president’s brother Rifaat Assad perpetrated reprisals against more than 500 arrested representatives of the Brotherhood in prison in Palmyra (Manukyan, 2004, p. 114). In 1980, the Islamic Front was formed, which included—in addition to the Muslim Brotherhood—the Islamic Liberation Party and many Sufi groups. The leading role was taken by the most radical wing of the Brotherhood-led by Adnan Saad al-Din, and it united with a more conservative wing led by Said Havva and Sheikh Muhammad al-Bayanuni. Despite its Islamic doctrine, the Front advocated a multi-party system, thereby maintaining adherence to the Muslim Brotherhood’s early principles. However, in 1981, the Islamic Front split into a political faction with Adnan Saad al-Din and Said Havva and a fighting faction. The decisive

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clash between opponents of the Assad regime and the authorities took place in Hama, a stronghold of Puritan Sunni Islam and the Ba’athist regime’s most ardent opponent. According to various estimates, the death toll in the clashes ranged from 3,000 to 20,000 victims (Manukyan, 2004, p. 115). In addition to the regime’s brutality, the failure to rally sufficient foreign support and the contradictory narratives embraced within the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood are held responsible for the defeat (Brynjar, 2016, p. 542). This episode nearly wiped out the Brotherhood’s influence in Syria for the next three decades. Most of the high-ranking members went into exile, where they also split into rival factions. Meanwhile, the dramatic increase in the Assad regime’s regional influence in the 1980s forced rival Arab governments to abandon their support for Syria’s armed opposition. Under these conditions, from 1996 to 2000, there was a gradual moderation of the Brotherhood’s rhetoric and tactics under the leadership of al-Bayanuni from his exile in Jordan and later in Saudi Arabia. In 2001, the Brotherhood finally abandoned armed forms of struggle. In turn, the Islamic revival in the Arab world in the 1990s forced the Assad regime to start a new policy to liberalize religious life in Syria, which allowed some forms of religious freedom. Thus, in the beginning, the regime released many members of the Muslim Brotherhood, which helped Damascus to expand its ties with Sunni Islamists across the region. Nonetheless, the Ba’ath party continued to control all religious expression forms directly or indirectly, and changes could be classified as cosmetic rather than institutional. The new ruler Bashar al-Assad facilitated a certain degree of moderation in Islamist organizations’ relations (George, 2003, p. 64). He cancelled a 1983 decree that prohibited female students from wearing a hijab and allowed prayers in military camps (Akhmetov, 2008, p. 131). Many leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood living abroad turned to al-Assad with a proposal to initiate a dialogue with the authorities. Nonetheless, the authorities still feared the prospect of unification or close rapprochement of Islamist opposition with liberal democratic forces. However, attempts by the Brotherhood to establish contact with Damascus continued to intensify. In 2002, the Saudi branch of the Syrian Brotherhood and allied organizations of the Syrian foreign opposition signed the so-called Honorary Charter. They appealed to the Syrian authorities with a proposal for cooperation while also expressing their support of democracy and political pluralism (Akhmetov, 2008, p. 131). The rapprochement did not last for long (Khatib, 2018, p. 212). When the war in Iraq broke out in 2003, Damascus’s regime feared that it could share the fate of Baghdad’s regime. Against this backdrop, al-Assad started to use Islamists to hedge its resilience. While the late Hafez al-Assad kept the Palestinian and

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Lebanese Islamist clients of his regime at a distance, his son went much further during the war in Iraq, authorizing the recruitment of jihadists on their territory (Alabbasi, 2015; News Wires, 2009; Al-Jazeera, 2015). Most notable was Abu Kakaa (Mahmoud Aghasi), a preacher in Aleppo who was allowed to engage in religious appeal and directly recruit local youth for the Iraq war and even set up a training camp. As an integral part of the regime’s policy within the Islamic awakening framework, mass demonstrations under Islamic slogans were also allowed. Nonetheless, the Islamists were not becoming integrated into the institutions and were not capable of influencing them. Instead, they merely served as state agents by fulfilling the demands of the ruling regime.

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Political Islam and the Syrian Civil War

When demonstrations against the Syrian regime broke out for the first time in March 2011, most of the regime’s Sunni allies remained on the sidelines. As soon as it became clear that Assad could not suppress the uprising by force, they left the regime en masse (Karouny, 2012; Lefèvre, 2015; Mironova et al., 2014). This kind of revenge fighting also undercut the influence of moderate rebels, facilitated further radicalization of the conflict, and helped radicals to expand their recruitment (Walter, 2017, p. 9). Hamas leaders left their long-standing headquarters in Damascus and headed to Qatar in January 2012, while Salafis involved in the Iraqi war openly supported the uprising. The rationale was that the regime was not ready to accept Islamists and still viewed them as a threat. Simultaneously, improvements introduced by Bashar al-Assad were more cosmetic than conveying a change to the political structure. During the first four months of the uprising, when thousands of pro-democracy protesters turned against Assad, the regime released hundreds of Islamist Iraqi war veterans arrested after returning to Syria in 2008–09 (Cordall, 2014). Many of these newly freed were subsequently instrumental in the uprising, including Muhammad Zahran Alloush, the first Jaish al-Islam leader; Abdul Rahman Suweis from Liwa al-Haq; Hassan Abboud from Ahrar al-Sham; and Ahmad Issa Al-Sheikh, commander of Suqor al-Sham (Lister, 2014, p. 14). Some have interpreted the move as an effort to enlist support or at least neutrality, while others believed that their release should have led to a rapid and violent “radical Islamization” of the rebel movement. The international community then thought twice about helping the Syrian opposition, while the regime was supported by minorities and the Syrian Sunnis’ urban middle class. Furthermore, the Islamist opposition groups that arose in the conflict professed

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the same or very similar principles and ideological attitudes as the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, namely their difference was more organizational than ideological. The revolution surprised the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Few of the local leaders expected the nationwide uprising of such scale. Nevertheless, with extensive experience working in exile and underground, they were able to occupy a central position in forming opposition alliances by coordinating contacts among groups, participating in all opposition rallies abroad, and organizing the inaugural conference of the Syrian National Council (SNC). The Brotherhood’s tactical agility allowed them to claim seats for ideologically-close representatives and groups. Pierret (2013, p. 144) also argues about charitable foundations and educational programs that helped the Brotherhood boost their support through tribal and merchant networks while capitalizing on widespread disaffection with secular ideologies. Repeated restructuring and changing composition meant that even members of the organization could not fully appreciate the Muslim Brotherhood’s actual contribution to the SNC. Besides, most of the SNC Brotherhood members formally represented other groups. For example, in December 2011, 78 of the 320 SNC members were from the Brotherhood, but only 20 were formal organization members, while the rest were considered as independent or representatives of civil society groups and organizations. Later on, the Muslim Brotherhood secured a strong position in the National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCORS). Its establishment was announced on November 11, 2012, in Doha by the Group of Friends of the Syrian People (“the Friends’ Group”) (Carnegie MEC, 2012; MacFarquhar & Droubi, 2012). The first leader of the NCORS was more focused on Qatar and Turkey and allied with the Brotherhood’s ideological tenets (Khodynskaya-Golenishcheva, 2018). The Muslim Brotherhood was eventually able to break out at the first stage of the Syrian conflict to the leading roles. Qatar’s support is one of the main sponsors of the Syrian opposition in 2012–14 (Hinnebusch & Saouli, 2019, p. 11). Qatar’s involvement in the conflict aimed to project its influence across the region, supporting the force that—according to the Qatari leadership—was both the most prepared for the struggle for power and the most ideologically close to Doha. However, Qatar’s policy in Syria was neither ideological nor religious but rather pragmatic. Doha’s ties to Islamists evolved from the emirate’s tradition of providing political asylum for persecuted religious leaders in the Arab world and its attempts to hedge its foreign policy through diversification. Moreover, among Qatar’s ruling elite, it was widely believed that political Islam represents the only functional opposition to authoritarianism (Coates Ulrichsen, 2014; Lefèvre, 2015; Roberts, 2019). Thus, when the existing socio-political order of the Arab world disintegrated, Qatar perceived Islamist groups as the only

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available force that could fill the socio-political void (Krieg & Bowen, 2017). Hence, Doha’s goals in Syria were broadly aligned with those of the West. While the United States and Europe immediately dodged a decisive confrontation with Assad, Qatar tried to forcefully dismantle the authoritarian regime by relying on moderate Islamist groups (Krieg & Bowen, 2017). During the first stage of the civil war, the Brotherhood also tried to draw various armed Islamist groups into its orbit (Blanga, 2017). In 2012, Syrian Islamists were predominantly Qatar-oriented, and to some extent, they were affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood, which shortly held a leading position in the Syrian opposition movement. Most of the factions were not directly associated with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. They only played a prominent role in their creation and financing at the expense of Qatari funds. Therefore, when circumstances changed and Qatar’s positions weakened, many of the groups were able to reorient politically to other patrons, such as Turkey and Saudi Arabia, while often retaining Doha’s funding (Vasiliev et al., 2019). The transfer of the “Syrian dossier” from Qatar to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 2013 and the subsequent crisis in relations between Doha and Riyadh led to the Brotherhood losing a significant part of its support from Doha, and consequently a decrease in influence in the Syrian opposition camp (Hassan, 2013). Against the background of the weakening of Qatari-supported structures associated with the Brotherhood, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiyya—commonly referred to as Ahrar al-Sham— started to take the leading roles in the Syrian Islamist spectrum (Mironova, 2019, p. 101). Although the faction positioned itself as a completely separate ideological structure, its appearance marked the return of a part of the Syrian Islamists to the ideology of the military wing of the Brotherhood of the late-1970s-80s. The already quite strong Salafist basis complemented this. The faction itself was entirely independent of external aid and financed by various Islamic foundations. In many ways, Ahrar al-Sham combined a specifically Syrian revolutionary character with a Sunni sectarian Pan-Islamism (Doran et al., 2014). Throughout much of northern Syria, members of this group protected journalists, activists and civil society from predatory jihadists. Over the past few years, its members have made strenuous efforts to integrate into the revolutionary political mainstream, eventually becoming part of the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army (The Carter Center, 2017). The group expanded rather quickly, primarily due to its leaders’ popularity among the Islamist milieu, who had gone through training camps and the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. Members of Ahrar al-Sham stressed that their faction is not part of the Syrian Free Army, does not obey any structure outside of Syria and is staffed predominantly by Syrian Muslims. It also included those who had direct

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ties with al-Qaeda and personally with Osama bin Laden, such as Abu Khalid al-Suri (Lund, 2014a). His membership in Ahrar al-Sham was not advertised, and the faction itself never claimed the role of a transnational jihadist group (Lund, 2014a, 2014c). On the contrary, it tried to occupy a pragmatic intermediary niche between the entire conglomerate of rebel groups without imposing one or another ideology or religious dogma on anyone. In December 2012, under the auspices of Ahrar al-Sham, the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF) coalition was formed. By early 2013, Ahrar al-Sham had become one of the most influential rebel groups in the conflict (Pellerin, 2014). The group led the formation of the SIF and co-created the Islamic Front in 2013, which had 40,000–70,000 fighters and was Syria’s largest umbrella group. When these groups drifted apart, Ahrar al-Sham absorbed many fighters from smaller factions within the umbrella organizations (Stanford University, 2017a; The Economist, 2013). Despite the close interaction of the faction with Al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra—known as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, popularly described as al-Qaeda in Syria al-Qaeda in the Levant—in the 2015–16 period, Ahrar al-Sham never shared the principles of Salafi jihadism (Stanford University, 2017b; Lister, 2016, p. 3). After the terrorist attack of 2014 that claimed the lives of the leadership of Ahrar al-Sham, representatives of the spectrum—which is usually associated with the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood—once again began to dominate in the organization’s structure. Such flexibility of views in Ahrar al-Sham paved the way for a new, third and largest expansion of the faction in 2016–17. This primarily happened due to the drift of Ahrar al-Sham towards the Syrian Free Army and the participation of the group’s units in Turkey’s operation Shield of the Euphrates. Another primary reason is the departure of the rigid religious framework of Salafism, which previously limited participation. In May 2016, Deputy Amir Ali Al-Omar gave a lecture in which he tried to formulate the ideology of Ahrar al-Sham and a possible path for the group’s development (Heller, 2016). According to Al-Omar, the faction’s ideology is an entirely new school of Islamism, combining all existing trends. At the same time, it excludes only military methods and embraces different forms of religious and political moderation. Such rhetoric defended and justified the faction’s participation in the negotiations on a political settlement of the Syrian conflict, which also implied the group’s agreement that a secular state could be created in Syria that would respect the group’s interests other Islamist fractions. This radically distinguished Ahrar al-Sham from the Salafi-jihadist spectrum groupings, to which Ahrar al-Sham was sometimes mistakenly attributed. Ali Al-Omar also consistently opposed creating a joint Syrian Islamic Commission coalition with Jabhat al-Nusra and advocated for closer cooperation of his faction with Turkey and the

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Syrian Free Army. Such changes in the views of Ahrar al-Sham provoked an internal conflict, which was manifested during the voting of the Shura Council on a possible merger of the faction with Jabhat al-Nusra (which then adopted the new name Jabhat Fath-ash-Sham). As a result, most of the Shura Council elected Ali Al-Omar as the pragmatist-reformer group leader. However, eight out of 22 members suspended their participation in the governing body in protest. Simultaneously, the radical course supporters left the group and joined the formed radical coalition Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (Alami, 2016). Ahrar al-Sham eventually became part of the pro-Turkish Syrian National Army, whose ideological component is close to the Muslim Brotherhood’s positions in many respects. Pro-Saudi Salafi groups in Syria emerged as another spectrum of the moderate part of political Islam. Like Qataris, they also sought political Islamists to fill the voids of the authoritarian rule. At the same time, Saudi Arabia was forced to stake in Syria, not on the loyal Salafis-Madhalis, to Riyadh, but on the more independent Salafis-Sururites, advocating a political agenda that often diverged from the official course of Saudi Arabia. Indeed, it is unsurprising since the founder of this trend of Islamism was the Syrian Muhammad Surur, and one of his most famous followers is Salman al-Auda. They were imprisoned in Saudi Arabia for many years awaiting sentencing. Surur was the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria until the 1960s. He separated from the Brotherhood and moved to Saudi Arabia, where he fell under the influence of the classical Saudi interpretation of Salafism of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab and his contemporary followers. Ten years later, he left Saudi Arabia for Kuwait. In the 1970s, he was the inspiration for a religious movement that combined traditional and revolutionary ideas, dubbed the Islamic awakening (al-Sahwa). It led to the transmutation of Salafism from the conventional school of thought (Dawa) to the school of activists (haraki) thanks to the foreign influence of political revolutionaries (Hassan, 2016). Surur provided behind-the-scenes assistance to the Syrian uprising until he died in 2016. He helped to found the Syrian Islamic Council with the support of Qatar and Turkey. Five of the 21 board members were his imminent followers. The Syrian opposition political body—the National Coalition—praised Surur in a curious statement, highlighting his contribution to the revolution (Hassan, 2016). Thus, during the first stage, Surur and his followers actively worked with Qatar and Turkey until Saudi Arabia seized the initiative and tried to attract Surur’s followers to their side. In connection with the arrival of understanding about the lack of interaction exclusively with secular forces, Saudi Arabia decided not to limit itself to the Brotherhood. Riyadh began working with some Syrian Salafi factions that were under the influence of Surur’s followers. Thus, the Kingdom started assisting the Liwa al-Islam groupings (later deployed to Jaysh al-Islam)

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in Damascus, Nur ad-Din al-Zenki in Aleppo and others. In effect, some of the factions sponsored by Riyadh took leading positions in the Islamist spectrum of the Syrian opposition; for example, Jaysh al-Islam in the suburbs of Damascus and East Kalamoun (Vasiliev et al., 2019). The introduction of these groups into the larger opposition—such as the Islamic Front—failed to ensure Saudi Arabia’s ability to sway decision-making in its favor and cement its rule of the final word. Although they expected to attract Saudi assistance, such large coalitions had several sources of funding. They could rely on financial injections from both Qatar and Turkey and independent, primarily Kuwait-based Islamic funds. Thus, contrary to the Saudi line on countering structures associated with al-Qaeda, the Islamic Front interacted with the Syrian branch of this terrorist network—Jabhat al-Nusra—and carried out military actions against some secular groups. Since the beginning of 2016, Turkey has been playing a leading role in helping the Syrian opposition. In addition to the reduced role of Saudi Arabia due to its engagement in Yemen’s civil war, this was also because the main front of the struggle shifted to the Syrian north-west, bordering with Turkey. All decisive battles took place there, where the Syrian opposition’s main forces were concentrated. Therefore, any assistance that could be directed to them went through Turkey. Thus, they extended their influence to those rebel factions that were dependent on this help. In effect, many pro-Saudi Salafi groups have been gradually falling into the Turkish orbit and reorienting themselves to interact with Ankara, such as the Noureddine al-Zengi Battalions, which were part of the Asala wa al-Tanmiya Front, a parallel alliance of Islamist factions that receives support from conservative Salafi clerics who are hostile to al-Qaeda (Lund, 2014b). Between 2014 and 2015, the Battalions were affiliated with the Syrian Revolutionary Command Council and they were among the most influential factions in Aleppo. In turn, al-Assad’s victory in Eastern Ghouta in the spring of 2018 finally deprived Saudi Arabia of its reliance on local Salafi forces, in which Jaysh al-Islam was considered as the primary recipient of Saudi aid in Syria. After being redeployed from Damascus to North Aleppo, this powerful group—which enjoyed Riyadh’s patronage—has now also passed under the Turkish umbrella, becoming part of the Syrian National Army, while simultaneously losing its ideological isolation.

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Political Islam in Syria is still on the political agenda. Thus, most of the groups that have united in the Syrian National Army adhere to the ideology and attitudes of Islamism. Moreover, there are representatives of the Brotherhood and other non-party Islamists in the National Coalition and the Syrian interim government in Gaziantep. However, many of them do not affirm their participation in the Brotherhood. In general, the current structures of the Syrian opposition—including the armed opposition factions—are gradually coming to a common denominator in terms of their ideological markers, following in the mainstream, namely without directly advertising their adherence to the ideology of political Islam in the spirit of the Brotherhood, while still aiming to preserve the Islamic, Sunni identity of Syria. At the same time, groups that are part of the Syrian National Army—which is dominated by Islamists—secure a 20% quota in the negotiations’ Syrian opposition representation. Thus, the Syrian Islamists have not yet said their last word and—with the support of Turkey—they will probably not only stay afloat for a long time but also will rule some Syrian regions, possibly the whole of Idlib, if they eventually succeed with the help of Ankara, defeat the radicals from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and repel the offensive of the forces of the Assad regime. Simultaneously, the Islamist nature of the Syrian National Army does not suit many liberal and pro-Western opposition figures, who also distance themselves from pro-Turkish opposition structures. Such a relationship is characteristic of the Syrian political field and has never allowed the Syrian democratic opposition— both Islamist and secular—to throw off autocracies’ yoke. Elizabeth Thompson (2020) believes that it was in Syria of the 1920s—during the National Congress— that the political split began between East and West as well as between Islamists and liberals not only in Syria but also in each country in the region, a split that would only deepen after World War II. For decades, this split between Islamists and liberals has weakened opposition to dictatorial regimes. The overthrow of such regimes is only possible if the opposition is united (as it happened—albeit for a short time—in Egypt in 2011, resulting from Hosni Mubarak being overthrown). The future of democracy in the region depends on whether the Syrians and others in the Middle East can overcome this rift (Thompson, 2020).

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Synthesis: Common Trends and Perspectives Maria Toropova

Although there is no universal formula or scientific consensus of opinion for determining the influence of religious actors in shaping foreign policy (Warner & Walker, 2011; Sandal & Fox, 2013), the articles in this volume provide many striking insights so that certain patterns can be still traced and identified. In the twenty-first century, one can witness a popularization of conservative ideas and political forces. Furthermore, in this respect a general trend can be observed, namely that conservatives’ units—regardless of their core ideological orientation—actively involve religious institutions in the political agenda. For example, despite being on quite opposite poles ideologically, both the United States and the Russian Federation show broadly similar patterns of religious involvement in their public and foreign policies. Nevertheless, in conducting their foreign policies, both the United States and Russia emphasize the moral and ethical dimensions of their foreign actions and appeal to the ideals of Christian morality, more precisely to each country’s own understanding of this morality. Analyzing this phenomenon, the authors of the articles on the religious influence in foreign policy in the United States and Russia—Jeffrey Haynes and Maria Toropova, respectively—tend to believe that the Cold War ideological confrontation has been replaced with a confrontation of competing ethics. It is also worth noting that in her assessment of Brazil’s foreign policy under President Jair Bolsonaro, Claudia Zilla also concludes that Brazil has chosen the path of moralizing its foreign policy.

M. Toropova (B) Oslo, Norway E-Mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2021 M. Toropova (ed.), Rethinking the Religious Factor in Foreign Policy, Politik und Religion, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-33776-6_13

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Surprisingly, despite the existing foreign policy competition between America and Russia, Christian actors in both countries actively promote similar messages in the political agenda. For instance, the Christian actors in both countries actively articulate the need to protect Christians in the countries where they are persecuted. While the United States considers this issue a part of the “international religious freedom” agenda—which during the Trump presidency was focused primarily on the persecution of Christians in the Arab Middle East—the Russian Orthodox Church speaks out in defense of Christian values and freedom to practice Christianity without being persecuted. The strategy of translating the religious agenda into foreign policy shows some mechanisms’ differences. In the US, there are intermediate supportive platforms and institutions that help to integrate the Christian agenda into political discourse. According to Jeffrey Haynes, in America, a country with a strong institutional tradition, the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and the Office of International Religious Freedom (IRF)—which is independent and primarily reflects the involvement of the Christian Right in the context of international religious freedom issues—both publish reports that focus on the particularly sensitive aspects of religious freedom violations. The USCIRF’s reports also highlight the “countries of particular concern” that require attention by the Executive Branch. By contrast, in Russia the Russian Orthodox Church itself is the main proponent and ideological advancer of the idea of the necessity to defend Christians in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), as well as being its main promoter directly into Russia’s political discourse. Accordingly, in Russia the Russian Orthodox Church speaks directly to the state. In his article, Jeffrey Haynes calls the function of the USCIRF “a watchdog on the State Department’s vigor in pursuing this fundamental goal of US foreign policy”, while in Russia the Church itself both popularizes its agenda in society and communicates it to the political establishment, making it visible to Russian foreign policy decision-makers. Furthermore, the Russian Orthodox Church does not perceive international organizations or transnational institutions as the main defender of the Middle Eastern Christians from persecution, but Russia. For example, Metropolitan Hilarion— Head of the Department of External Church Relations—stated that Russia remains the only consistent defender of the Christian presence in the countries of the Middle East, where today “Christian communities are subjected to a genuine genocide”, while stressing that Western countries, that have been helping Christians in the region for centuries, have all but recommended officially to the persecuted Christians that they should leave the region and resettle elsewhere in the world, de facto denying their support (Lipich, 2014). This perception of the situation clearly indicates that the Russian Orthodox Church declares its position

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to be unique, emphasizing its own real activities to protect persecuted Christians in the Arab Middle East in comparison with other Christian initiatives in the Western cultures. Bearing in mind that the Christian actors in both the United States and Russia are dealing with the same issue, although the mechanics of its transfer to the political field differ, it is also important to note that in both cases the success of integrating a religious agenda into the political agenda largely depends on the support of specific persons within the political establishment with a serious level of foreign policy influence. For instance, Jeffrey Haynes stresses the importance of strong support from senior administration figures, especially from Trump’s Vice-President Michael Richard (Mike) Pence and the Secretary of State, Michael (Mike) Pompeo. The latter—as “America’s most senior diplomat”—said that “faith is not only powerful but required by the American tradition”, at the official events he also was announced as “first and foremost, […] a follower of the Lord Jesus Christ and a believer in our savior” (Pompeo & Graham, 2020). In Russia as well, the most senior foreign policy decision-makers do not hide their affiliation to Orthodoxy, and they are keen to conduct symbolic policy; for example, attending Christmas or Easter services of the Russian Orthodox Church. In turn, the Church also encourages Russian foreign policy-makers to publicly demonstrate that they belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. For example, in September 2020, Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia awarded Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov with the Russian Orthodox Church’s Order of Glory and Honor of the First Class for his contribution to establishing “peace and justice” in international relations and developing church-state cooperation. Minister Lavrov noted in return that this award is a sign of “recognition of the level of cooperation” that the Foreign Ministry and the Russian Orthodox Church have achieved “in the field of spiritual and moral recovery of international relations and protection of the Christianity” (RBC, 2020). Claudia Zilla states that the same symbolic policy is more than welcomed in Brazil, where President Bolsonaro regularly participates in religious events and services, and publicly calls himself a Christian (Premier Christian News, 2020). Another major area of comparison of religious actors’ strategies of influencing foreign policies is the domain of soft power, which is perhaps the most popular topic in the discussion about the role of religion in foreign policy. The idea of soft power was initially conceptualized by Joseph Nye in 1990 in his book “Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power”. Since then, the concept has been strongly popularized. A significant place in the conceptual understanding is given to the image of an actor, its brand, as well as the analysis of the mechanisms of influencing politics, which might create windows of opportunity for

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states, influencing their ability to successfully achieve their strategies (Nye, 1990, 2004a). Jeffrey Haynes appeals to a quote by Joseph Nye about the appropriateness of using soft power. The traditional tools of “carrots and sticks” in politics cost a lot of money: whether threatening with a stick or baiting with a carrot, both require enormous resources. At the same time, it is much more advantageous to persuade others to join you and support the fulfillment of a political scenario that is beneficial to you. In his article, Jeffrey Haynes refers to this logic, which Joseph Nye (2004b) succinctly summed up: “If you can get others to be attracted, to want what you want, it costs you much less in carrots and sticks”. This thesis has resonated in the implementation of foreign policy by various states. Over time, the notion of soft power has received increasing attention from both politicians and scholars. For example, Jeffrey Haynes implies in his article that soft power is widely used by the US administration and that government actions can be considered as soft power given that they promote their political goals while encouraging and persuading other parties to cooperate and rejecting the policy of coercing, threatening or buying allies. Other regional and global centers of power have begun to talk about the importance of soft power, consider it and—if possible—incorporate it into their political toolkit. For example, according to the Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation of 2013, soft power is an “indispensable component of modern international relations”. Although the acute conflict in Syria and Russia’s decision to participate in military operations clearly demonstrate that hard power remains the main trend of Russia’s foreign policy, nowadays it is increasingly supplemented with soft power. With the help of the Russian Orthodox Church, Russia has created a certain image in international politics. Nevertheless, despite the proclaimed shift to soft power in Russian foreign strategy, Joseph Nye (2013) doubts whether it is actually being implemented. Moreover, he claims that the Russian and Chinese governments have in fact misinterpreted his theory: “China and Russia make the mistake of thinking that government is the main instrument of soft power” (Nye, 2013). Nye’s thesis rests on the fact that according to his perception of Russian and Chinese foreign policies, both countries implement pressure on other parties and use force, which negates their desire to improve or strengthen their image in the international arena. Joseph Nye names the Beijing Olympics in 2008 as one of China’s successes in increasing its soft power. However, the Olympics were accompanied by protests against the policy of Sinicization of Tibet. These protests had a religious background, since the Dalai Lama—who is the spiritual leader of the Tibetan government-in-exile based in India—was accused by the Chinese authorities of instigating the protests (BBC News, 2008). Despite the major success of the

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Beijing Olympic Games, the protest had negative consequences for China, shadowing its international image and therefore reducing its soft power. In this regard, the chapter of Greg C. Bruno—who sets the focus of his analysis on the SinoIndian soft power competition related to the efforts to revive N¯aland¯a University in the tradition of pan-Asian cultural and educational diplomacy—holds particular interest. As N¯aland¯a’s revival was indeed the trigger for regional transnational cooperation, it was labeled by the practitioners and scholars involved as a critical piece of soft power in the region (Sen, 2012; Shekhar, 2007). Since this project was also seen by the participating parties as an opportunity to strengthen their positions in the competition over the management of Tibetan Buddhism, Greg C. Bruno concludes that despite the existence of a path towards greater SinoIndian-Tibetan religious accommodation and the precedence for an evolution of that kind, the Sino-Indian N¯aland¯a revival framework is currently being used more as a tool than an opportunity to engage with the Tibetan “religious field”. While discussing soft power and the variations of its implementation in different countries, Turkey seems to stand out in a remarkable way. Jörg Baudner looks at Turkey’s foreign policy strategies over the past twenty years, the role of religion in them, and the abrupt transition from the traditional model of “defensive nationalism” to “civilian power” (2002–2010), where religion was meant to be understood as the basis for a civilizational dialogue and the subsequent equally abrupt transition to a repositioning of Turkey as a “regional power” (after 2010). Framing religion as a basis for establishing a civilizational communication between the East and West, Turkey concentrated on economic growth, prioritized its trade interests and conducted a dialogue with the EU from the standing point that Turkey’s accession would provide the EU with a very strong asset, namely with Turkey as a facilitator creating the most constructive relations with the Muslim world. It seems that this position of maximum focus on mutually beneficial cooperation with the world laid the foundation for Turkish soft power. However, Turkey predominantly refers to this concept only after having changed its course towards positioning itself as a regional leader. Baudner links the emerging discourse of a “New Turkey” and its “soft power” with religious identity. With the beginning of the Arab Spring, Erdogan urged the Arab world to follow the so-called Turkish model, seeing secularism as a neutral platform that would not somehow compromise Islam, although this caused immediate protest and criticism from the Egyptian “Muslim Brotherhood”. This became the prerequisite for Turkey’s rapid shift in its foreign policy rhetoric towards the quest for the dominance of religious values as an important part of Turkey’s identity. Paradoxically, when Turkey started appealing to soft power, making a reference to a classical

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Nye’s (2004) “influence other than coercion”, it simultaneously started destroying its own reputational capital accumulated over the years of its “civilian power” strategy. Thus, Baudner suggests that the explicit Turkish claim to regional leadership very soon began to undermine its preconditions, citing studies from 2013 showing that support for Turkey’s foreign policy has declined in every state in the Middle East. While soft power continued to operate on an inertia basis in the early years after the transition to the “regional power” model, Turkey had the highest number of positive responses in 2011 and 2012 (78 and 69% of respondents, respectively), but already in 2013 a decline was evident (only 59%) and the number of respondents questioning the chosen foreign policy course increased from 28% in 2012 to 39% in 2013 (Akgün & Gündogar, 2014). The notion of soft power holds crucial importance for the analyses conducted in this volume, since in a 2008 publication Joseph Nye (2008, p. 96) formulated soft power’s focal points as follows: “The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority). Culture is the set of practices that create meaning for a society, and it has many manifestations”. First of all, this quote is interesting primarily because it revolves around the role of culture. One of the theses of Warner and Walker’s framework (2011) is that religion is often manifested through culture. Second, political values and foreign policies claiming to have a certain moral authority are explicitly mentioned, which seems to be the one of the most efficient strategies for religious institutions if they strive to incorporate their agenda into a state’s foreign policy. Officially, the Cold War was concluded many years ago. The Soviet Union lost this contest, and consequently it also lost in the ideological battle. However, the ideological confrontation was replaced by a cultural-civilizational one articulated by Huntington. Despite the fact that his thesis about the clash of civilizations was actively criticized by the academic community, his article “The Clash of Civilizations?” in Foreign Affairs (1993) became one of the most cited in international relations literature (Haynes, 2018), and his book on the same issue was also actively republished, supplemented and commented upon, which shows that Huntington touched a very sensitive nerve in world politics. A series of events that have occurred in international relations since the 1990s—such as the Operation Allied Force against Former Yugoslavia, the 9/11 terrorist attack, the invasion of Iraq, the declaration of Kosovo’s independence, the five-day war between Georgia and Russia and Russia’s subsequent recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent states, the Iranian nuclear program and the Arab Spring, terrorist attacks in Europe, the civil war in Syria and many more—have led to increased

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international controversy and the formation of competing ethics. The alienation of members of the international community has reached such a scale that at the Munich Security Conference in 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev spoke of all involved parties’ rapid return to the realities of the Cold War (BBC, 2016). The new and remarkable feature about this confrontation is the fact that ethics became the new political divide. To date, increasingly more countries have delineated their perimeter in the system of international relations through the designation and public proclamation of their values. In fact, one of the most serious dividing lines nowadays runs between liberal and traditionalist worldviews. For example, in Brazil, Claudia Zilla notes that President Bolsonaro’s ideological flank is conservative and biased to the right and therefore concludes that Christian and political conservatism multiplied with the right-wing populist positions are not only compatible but could mutually reinforce each other, merging into a diffuse ideological cluster (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). Cristian Vasile describes similar processes while analyzing the evolution of the relationship between the Romanian Orthodox Church and the Romanian political leadership. Zilla and Vasile are also similar in their conclusions regarding the importance of the networking system in strengthening the presence of the religious component in the formulation of a foreign policy agenda. In both present Brazil and post-communist Romania, religious and political roles merged at some points. In Bolsonaro’s Brazil—for example—many Evangelical pastors entered politics and became members of the legislative and executive branches of the government without giving up their religious positions. Cristian Vasile describes similar processes in post-communist Romania, where high-profile members of the clergy and representatives of the political establishment have known each other for years, which possibly led the former being nominated for serious political positions and generally created a constellation in which personal connections between highprofile representatives of both the state and Shurch could be traced into political reality. Returning to the debate about the values that states choose for themselves in the international arena and the tendency to moralize foreign policy, it is unavoidable to mention one of the main antagonisms of the predominantly Christian (but not only) world, namely the antagonism of liberal and traditionalist worldviews. The contradictions in respect of the human rights discussion and what should be considered as essential and non-essential human rights are particularly sharp. Liberal values—especially those relating to sexual minorities and reproductive issues—are seriously challenged and in some cases even revised by proponents of traditional values. For instance, in her article Maria Toropova analyzes the discourse on traditional values in post-Soviet Russia, whereby this

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narrative has become one of the reoccurring themes of Russian foreign policy life, successfully shifting from a religious agenda to a political one. The concept of traditional values initiated by the Russian Orthodox Church meets the classical canon not only of Orthodoxy, but also of other Russia’s traditional religions. Accordingly, for Russia this narrative as a whole is unifying rather than divisive. The Orthodox view of the concept of human rights was elaborated in 2008 with release of a document titled “The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights” (2008). In contrast to the previous Russian Orthodox conceptual documents addressing relevant social issues, this is a clearly conservative document questioning Western Christian ethics and its approach towards human rights. This document has become very resonant, partly because the Orthodox narrative has been incorporated into Russian foreign policy rhetoric. Based on its Orthodox civilizational identity, Russia has formulated a foreign policy mission for itself, opposing the allegedly decadent liberal West and claiming to be a true bastion of Christian values in today’s world (Fidler, 2013). It should be noted that not only Russia questions the liberal paradigm of values. Jeffrey Haynes notes that the United States has also undergone a substantial “departure from the strong antidiscrimination policy platform of the Obama administration” (Schmitt, 2019). During the presidency of Donald Trump, the influence of the Christian Right mirrored this shift, the understanding of the “essential” human rights was more and more derived from “natural law”, rooted in Christian understandings and Holy scripts (Ward & Coleman Flowers, 2019). This also resulted in the public’s awareness of the activities of the Commission on Unalienable Rights, established during George W. Bush presidency. The Commission—mainly composed of conservatives—was labeled as an entity that would likely try to use its influence to urge foreign policy-makers to act on the list of rights by their accord with the views of the Christian Right. President Trump himself has also publicly supported the conservative agenda; for example, by becoming the first US president to attend America’s largest annual anti-abortion rally (Prasad, 2020). Both Maria Toropova and Claudia Zilla respectively point to similar aspects of Russia’s and Brazil’s opposition to the dogmatization of liberal values. In both cases, one can observe the rejection of the imposition of a universal interpretation of the rights and values standard. In fact, both countries refuse the universality claim of the liberal worldview and object to its imposition on other civilizational centers. Both Russia and Brazil speak of the leveling of cultural identity and the destruction of the traditional family institution as one of the most dangerous side effects of globalism. However, looking more closely at the respective arguments,

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one might trace different accentuations in their reasonings. While Bolsonaro’s Brazil sees the root of the problem in the imposition of the modern “cultural Marxism”—which entrenches atheism, LGBTQ, feminism and therefore undermines Christian values—Putin’s Russia speaks out against a unipolar world, which implies the universalization of one value model for all of the actors in international relations—even against their will—and considers the principle of multipolarity in international relations as the most constructive one. It should be noted that Jörg Baudner also mentions that Turkey—in its transition from “civilian power” to “regional power” and related claims to regional leadership—has also shared a similar rhetoric. “New Turkey” spoke of its desire to “reject the universality of the modern Western civilization”, its unwillingness to submit to “global liberal tutelage” and enthusiastic aspiration for a “post-western global order” (Mis & Aslan, 2014). One of the most important further insights of this book—which is repeatedly articulated across chapters—may be that in countries where religion is firmly embedded in the state political realities, the religious dogmas actually hold less importance for the formulation and implementation of the foreign policy and are subordinated to the national interests. Perhaps the lower expansiveness of religious actors to extrapolate their agenda to the domain of foreign policy decisions is connected to the fact that religion and its status are already enshrined and anchored in the political life of the country. Accordingly, when religious actors find themselves directly in power—since the role of religion is fixed not only in the cultural but also in the political dimension of the country—the need for religious actors to push hard upon the foreign policy agenda and thereby maintain their relevance as a player and partner for the secular power is reduced. Therefore, Polina Vasilenko argues that despite the religious foundation laid by the leader of the revolution—Ayatollah Khomeini—Iranian politicians have successfully combined the dogmas of faith to build regional ties with a pragmatic and even rational approach to addressing new challenges. Vasilenko elaborates on the phenomenon of the duality of Iranian foreign policy, namely the ability to combine a religious form and a pragmatic approach. This duality gives room for flexibility in making specific foreign policy decisions without blurring the ideological narrative that is so important for preserving national identity and consolidation of power. A comparable situation can be observed in Egypt. According to Alexei Khlebnikov and Natalia Berenkova, despite the fact that Islam is an important component of the Egyptian identity and references to Islam are often used to justify foreign policy decisions for domestic audiences, the Egyptian government still tends to demonstrate a secular-religious duality in its foreign policy. Due to this duality, the state’s political elite are engaged in a balancing act, proclaiming secularism

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as well as support for a moderate version of Islam. This enables Egypt to maintain and promote foreign contacts with other states. This primarily concerns the interaction with Western countries (in the first instance with the United States of America and the European Union), as well as with other major regional and global players. In maintaining constructive relations with them, Egypt preserves its economic and political interests. A further important deterrent to the strengthening of the religious presence in Egypt’s foreign policy agenda is the military, whose role in Egyptian power has remained relatively stable since Nasser’s rule. This is reflected in the state’s foreign policy, which—despite the change in power— has not undergone radical changes of the whole political system. The Muslim Brotherhood—which tried to revise the existing balance of power in the country—received a strong response from the military and failed to retain the power that it had acquired. Accordingly, it turns out that in a country where religion has historically occupied a significant place in the way of living, its position and spheres of influence have remained relatively unchanged over time. Therefore, the attempts to revise them by religious institutions—without the tectonic structural changes of the entire political landscape—may not result in an increase but rather a decrease in their influence. Khlebnikov and Berenkova note that this is exactly what has happened in Egypt, where after the Muslim Brotherhood took over the parliament and the presidency as a result of the 2011/2012 elections, the organization gradually became a threat to the military, which led to a rapid loss of power. Sisi’s government first declared the Muslim Brotherhood de facto an organization non-grata, linking it to extremism and terrorism, and second it increased its control over religious life, effectively monopolizing it, placing the national economic and geopolitical interests of Egypt above religious sentiments. The Syrian government followed a similar strategy. Dmitriy Frolovskiy and Kirill Semenov highlight that political Islam was traditionally seen as a threat to the Hafez al-Assad regime, the ruling party, and the concept of managed secularism. Over time, tensions raised as the Islamist factions gradually radicalized, while the ruling regime sought to use the state’s repressive apparatus to eliminate such opposition. Despite Bashar Assad’s more moderate policy towards Islamists and his attempts to integrate them into the Syrian political spectrum, this issue was not de-escalated. A policy of state-controlled integration worked for some time, but with the start of large-scale public protests in 2011 in Syria, the political climate changed and marked the rapid disengagement between parties. As the Islamist groups joined the rebels and were increasingly supported by foreign countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar, any attempts at integration were ceased, and furthermore Bashar al-Assad moved into a phase of direct confrontation with Sunni Islamists. According to Frolovskiy and Semenov, he no longer sought

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to use them as part of state apparatus, but instead labeled them as radicals who had hijacked an uprising that brought chaos and destruction to the country. It is impossible to assess the influence of religious institutions solely in respect of Syrian foreign policy since the country is in a state of a civil war, the resolution of which involves a huge number of actors, including not only regional powers but also global ones. However, this influence on the Syrian opposition and the dynamics of the conflict as a whole is enormous, including mobilization potential, alliance building, recruiting, and fundraising. Frolovskiy and Semenov argue that it is important for states to understand and take seriously the mobilization potential of religious institutions, as well as building strategies for relations with them, rather than making cosmetic changes to the political landscape. They conclude that the experience of Syria—where religious institutions were forced to go underground for a long time and there develop and strengthen their structures and networks—shows that this resource can become barely controlled and therefore dangerous. It can detonate in a moment of instability, whereby the consequences for the country’s statehood and the Syrian nation proved to be simply disastrous. To briefly sum up, the examples and reports from different political contexts show remarkable trends of religious impact in the context of foreign policy, namely that ideological confrontation has been mostly replaced by a confrontation of ethics. In addition to the existing interfaith contradictions, one of the main axes of contemporary antagonism in the (predominantly) Christian world is the confrontation between liberal and traditionalist paradigms. Moreover, an increasing number of countries are choosing the course of moralizing foreign policy, whereby soft power is one of the most vivid and active forms of expression of religious influence on foreign policy, but there are a variety of forms of its interpretations and applications. The existence of a network system (in some cases even institutionalized ones) between religious and secular authorities that allows religious actors to access decision-makers or to be directly integrated in the political establishment depending on the political context holds strong importance for the successful incorporation of the religious agenda into foreign policy. In addition, in countries where religious relevance—including political one—is a part of social consensus, the foreign policy strategy is often driven by national interests first. Instead of having classic concluding remarks, it seems more appropriate to offer some thoughts on what it might mean for religious actors to become increasingly involved in political activity, including foreign policy. On that note, it is important to take into account the position of each particular religious actor in

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a given country, as well as the model of interaction between religious and secular authorities. Nevertheless, certain general trends can be traced to make some generalizations here: According to the view of the Orthodox Christian Churches, the ideal model of a relationship between church and state is a symphony, a unique type of cooperation model. The symphony model is guided by the assumption that the spheres of responsibility of the state and the church should form a unity, which therefore inevitably should lead to cooperation between them. This creates the need for the two sides to come closer together. Despite the fact that many Orthodox churches still appeal to the ideals of this model in their relations with the state, symphony also implicates certain paradoxes. In the symphony concept, the state holds the role of the protective power for the church, while the church supports and spiritually guides the secular power (Losehand, 2007, p. 23): indeed, these premises were prescribed in the original Byzantine symphony conception elaborated by Emperor Justinian in the sixth century. However, according to modern Orthodox theologians, the church and state should avoid merging into each other because the church has an ecclesiologically distinct nature different from that of the state (Nikolaou, 2011, p. 128 f.), and therefore political issues are not within the purview of the church. However, the prescribed dividing lines between close cooperation and non-merging are just not sharp. This ambivalence is exacerbated by the fact that the majority of Orthodox believers live in states where Orthodox churches are organized as national churches (or as in the case of Russia, where the Russian Orthodox Church is the church of the national majority). This leads to a leveling of the ecclesiologically-prescribed distance from the state (Bremer & Toropova, 2019, p. 161). Maria Toropova sums up that the increasing proximity to the state is dangerous for Orthodox churches because at the very least it serves as a resource for criticism and accusations of servility, which—for example—takes place very often in the case of the Russian Orthodox Church. At the most, proximity to the regime can be damming for the Church, in case the political regime has totally discredited itself. Therefore—for instance—Cristian Vasile concludes that this has happened in Romania with the Romanian Orthodox Church as it was found to be flirting and sharing the outlook with extreme nationalist and even fascist political forces. Claudia Zilla reaches a similar conclusion in her article, saying that in today’s Brazil the asymmetric symbiosis of Christian and political conservatism with right-wing populist rhetoric makes religion politically significant, but it also undermines its position as an independent variable that is able to influence the foreign policy agenda. Another controversial and potentially damaging strategy is the spearheading of a revival of a religious identity to consolidate political power when the population

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of the state is polarized and there is tension between the secular and religious populations. Jörg Baudner points to this risk in his article, discussing the case of Turkey as a “torn country” (Huntington, 1993) between Islamic and secular worldviews. The most neutral and reputationally beneficial strategy for religious actors appears to be reliable mediator, facilitator and consequent conductor of visible actions on the ground, which over time cumulatively strengthen their position and their visibility to political decision-makers and therefore enable them to more confidently influence foreign policy. Thus, Nicole Schramm concludes that the churches’ focus on the local level and their grassroot engagement played a significant role in resolving the uneasy situation in Northern Ireland. Her analysis also shows that the Catholic Church works with its ecumenical partners on a strategy to overcome political and economic issues caused by the uncertainties of Brexit. Furthermore, Peter Bender comes to comparable conclusions in his evaluation of the impact on the foreign policy made by the organization Religions for Peace (RfP). The consistent promotion of the organization’s vision and mission as well as the transnational infrastructure that enables its local presence and action on the ground have made RfP visible to the political establishment; for example, in Germany, where RfP was largely integrated into the work of the German Foreign Ministry’s Unit called “Religion and Foreign Policy” (Auswärtiges Amt, 2020). In addition to the success of grassroot engagement, another strategy (that is quite opposite in its level and nature of influence) can also be advantageous for religious actors in terms of their ability to influence foreign policy, namely the openness to the interpretation of their positions. In other words, the less specific that their religious positions are regarding the permissibility of certain actions, the more flexible and inclusive the discourses that they offer can be to political forces in making and legitimizing their foreign policy decisions. Surprisingly, this is true for both Christian and Muslim narratives. Examples include the Russian Orthodox Church’s position not to specify the provisions of its Social Doctrine as well as the Church’s conceptualization of the traditional values narrative, which contains no specific definitions to avoid creating any unnecessary contradictions for other traditional religions in Russia, and in which (in this respect) the unifying potential was largely responsible for the integration of this narrative into Russia’s foreign policy agenda. Iranian Khomeinism can be considered as another practical embodiment of the respective thesis. Polina Vasilenko claims in her article that Khomeini probably consciously left a “conceptual gap” because by doing so he opened up possibilities for flexible interpretation if needed. Moreover, since

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theologians generally tend to take the stance that their religious laws are universal and comprehensive, it liberates them from the obligation to enter into details and opens up possibilities for flexible and applicable interpretations. This edited volume once again demonstrates the ambiguity of religious influence, which can also be seen in respect of the foreign policy of specific countries and the international agenda as a whole. Although there are currently no universal criteria for analyzing and measuring this influence, the world recognizes that religious influence on foreign policy in particular and modernity in general cannot be denied. Nevertheless, despite the absence of a universal and acknowledged set of criteria, today we are already able to comprehend the different cases that have emerged in the world and identify some trends. The desire for a comprehensive view of this phenomenon was the basis for the idea of creating this compilation. The book is structured in a way that analyzes most different cases not by grouping religious actors according to their denominations, but rather by trying to compare different strategies of influence and identify common patterns despite the different political contexts in which religious actors operate. Some of the trends are frightening and some are hopeful, but the main conclusion is becoming crystal clear—religion increasingly matters—and therefore the analysis of the occurring processes is as relevant as ever, which might make this book interesting to the general public as well as professionals.

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